Near East/South Asia Report
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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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HEAD OF ARAB BANKING UNION INTERVIEWED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 1-7 Apr 87 pp 34-35

[Interview with Anwar al-Khalil, chairman of the Arab Banking Union and vice president of the board of directors and general manager of the Beirut Riyadh Bank, by Rashid Hasan: "Chairman of Arab Banking Union Says, 'Arab Institute To Fill Gap Created by Shortage in Skills';" date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] When Anwar al-Khalil was elected chairman of the Arab Banking Union for the first time in 1983, many bankers considered his election a new stage in that institution's life. The Arab Banking Union did actually need a new beginning. Its relationship with member banks had been weakened as a result of the civil war in Lebanon--this was before the union was moved to Abu Dhabi. The union's relationship with member banks had been weakened because of its weak executive agency and because of Arab political conflicts, and it almost lost all its effectiveness in confronting mounting challenges in the industry. When al-Khalil was unanimously re-elected for a second term in May 1986, some of the principal features of that new stage, as well as some of the fruits, had actually started to emerge in several areas. Under al-Khalil's chairmanship the principal innovation introduced by the union into its methods of doing business involved a shift in attention and efforts away from general statements and ambitious projects, which for a while characterized many organizations involved in joint Arab action. Attention and efforts were devoted to urgent issues for the banking industry in particular. Thus, instead of being satisfied and content with decisions about Arab monetary integration, the Arab dinar and other matters, the union's principal focus was on having the union assume and carry out its normal responsibilities to the banks themselves. The union would prepare the banks and their personnel for catching up with "the revolution" which has been taking place in international money markets.

This radical shift in the union's strategy and understanding of its responsibilities was the subject of an interview which AL-MAJALLAH conducted with Mr al-Khalil who, in addition to being chairman of the Arab Banking Union, also serves as vice president of the board of directors and general manager of the Beirut Riyadh Bank. The interview follows.

[Question] It might seem to an observer that to a large extent many Arab banks are still lagging behind the radical developments which are taking place in
market operations. These developments are practically changing the nature and foundations of the banking industry. How do you see matters from your end?

[Answer] It must be acknowledged that Arab banks in general are still moving slowly in this area. By comparison, their customers have become more sophisticated and more demanding. Most of them no longer have that traditional loyalty which in the past they used to have for their bank. A customer who finds his bank unable to provide all the services he needs is willing quite simply to take his business to another bank. This has become common practice. But who is that customer who might do that? He is usually the good customer who has lots of cash. This means that a bank which will not develop as fast as necessary may lose that customer who has lots of cash and keep the customer who has less cash or who represents a burden to the bank. And that increases the deterioration in the quality of assets.

[Question] A large number of Arab banks opened branches abroad to provide these services, but it seems they did not succeed in doing that. From your experience, what are the problems that could curb movement in that direction?

[Answer] The answer to that is simple, and I have a ready example which has to do with my bank in particular. Before coming to this interview I was at our main office in the city, involved in solving a principal problem which we as well as others are facing. That problem involves the departure of a growing number of our employees to other foreign organizations because of the financial incentives that are offered to them. Because of the liberation of the money market in London, the demand for skilled people on all levels is huge. An American bank, for example, recently advertised that it had 64 vacant positions. Representatives of employment firms now stand at the entrances to train stations in the city distributing advertisements soliciting employees. This naturally creates a psychological condition which makes bank employees and stockbrokers feel that everyone is seeking their services. Thus, they tend to ask for higher salaries continuously. And bankers too have to raise the salaries they offer their employees so they can keep them or attract others to replace those who left and went to work for other organizations.

Movement towards Investment Services

[Question] This means that operating costs for any branch bank are growing even as profits from traditional lending operations are shrinking and trade in the region declining. Doesn't this show the need to find new and more varied sources of revenue?

[Answer] Traditional lending operations such as financing trade and so on will, of course, continue to be the banks' special function, and the banks have their own client bases in local or regional markets. Small and mid-size banks can offer these services in a manner better than that of the large international banks where a client is sometimes merely an account number. But it is also true to say that the contribution these services make to a bank's profits has diminished because the volume of Arab-international trade has shrunk and private investment activity in the region has slowed down. On the other hand, clients' needs are different since clients now have more experience in money management opportunities and increasing returns on investments. For these reasons we find
that there is a growing tendency among banks to provide portfolio management services, discount operations, trading in securities and other financial documents, and establishing special departments for these activities. For the same reasons we too as a bank started establishing an investment services department.

[Question] After about a decade in which emphasis was placed on "wholesale lending" to governments and large organizations, there is an opposite tendency now to pay attention to individual clients. How do you assess the significance of this change?

[Answer] In my opinion, banks have come around full circle and returned to the individual client or saver who 1 or 2 decades ago was the reason for being as well as the object of the banking industry. There was a period of time during the seventies when greater attention was given to international expansion and foreign loans—and that was led by American banks in particular. Some of these banks used to boast that profits from foreign operations exceeded their income from the local American market. That tendency was particularly strengthened by the oil countries' monetary surpluses which were managed by opening new credit markets in Third World countries. This process was relatively easy, and banks made millions in profits—these were paper profits, of course—through so-called wholesale operations. Now, however, the same American banks are leading the shift away from that trend by reducing their foreign presence, "trimming their importance" and making expenses more reasonable. The liberation of the American market which allowed major banks, in principle, to expand operations and services within the United States and carry out operations they were not allowed to become involved in in the past gave that tendency a boost.

Arab Banks

[Question] What about Arab banks? Did they too go through a stage of becoming more reasonable?

[Answer] Undoubtedly, there is an adjustment process going on, a process of trimming off extra fat. Frankly speaking, Arab banks probably have more employees than they need, and employee productivity among Arab banks is one of the lowest when compared with that of other banks. On the opposite side, we may have lagged behind in incorporating effectively the information revolution into the bank's daily operations. Compared with the total surplus there is also a relative shortage in quality, and that is the result of the major expansion which took place in establishing banks and financial institutions before a pool of skills became available to provide banks with the required level of expertise.

[Question] What did the Arab Banking Union do to strengthen cooperation among member banks and solve the problem of competent employees in the Arab banking industry?

[Answer] A shortage in competent employees is the first problem. Most of the union's projects and action programs have concentrated in past years on the attempt to treat that problem. I will explain that later, but let me also say that there is an equally important issue, which is that of cooperation among
Arab banks. Experience has shown us at the union that the two subjects are inseparable. If you want to set up training courses or institutes, money for that has to be made available, and the cooperation of all banks as well as their participation in the effort are essential. What we are trying to do now in the union is to organize and coordinate both operations. Regarding cooperation among Arab banks, for example, we started a tradition of annual meetings for Arab banking cooperation. These meetings are held for executive directors and directors of correspondent bank relations in the banks' general administration. The aim of these meetings is to encourage Arab banking institutions to rely on each other whenever it is possible not to turn to foreign banks.

At these meetings each participating bank tells the organizers before the meeting is held the names of other banks [whose representatives] that bank wishes to meet. On that basis a program of bilateral meetings between bank directors and their assistants is set up. These meetings proved to be highly beneficial and fruitful, particularly with regard to developing correspondence relations among Arab banks. What makes these meetings more important is that they are taking place in a situation in which foreign banks are tightening their hold on Arab banks and curtailing terms that are available to them. This is sometimes done arbitrarily. I would like to mention here that annual meetings for bank directors are scheduled on the basis of having two annual meetings for the same Arab banks. These are to be followed during the third year by a meeting for all Arab banks with international banks. The first such meeting will be held in Vienna before too long.

The Arab Institute for Training in Banking

[Question] Are you hoping that these meetings will help develop joint projects among Arab banks?

[Answer] This is happening in practice. Naturally, an agreement on a feasible project always goes through stages of studies and negotiations before it becomes reality. But basically, major accomplishments have been achieved in this regard, most importantly, the Arab Financial Services Company, which is issuing the Arab Traveler's check. The second accomplishment will be the Arab Institute for Training in Banking which will start operating this year in Amman.

[Question] How will this institute be funded?

[Answer] Initially, by the banks sending their employees to the institute's courses. Consequently, this will ensure the minimum number of trainees necessary to achieve a balance between the institute's expenses and revenues. But even if that balance is not realized in the first year or two, member banks are committed to cover the institute's deficit fully.

[Question] What are the objectives of training at the institute and what course of study will be followed?

[Answer] The Institute for Training in Banking is an institute of higher learning that is designed to develop qualified, competent banking personnel to assume leadership positions in banking institutions. The course of study will be 1 full year, and the institute will award students certificates that are equal
to a master's degree. But the program of study is different from that in a master's degree program with its heavy emphasis on banking technologies and on the applied aspects of the business. The course of study, the requirements and the applications were prepared by relying on the best programs that are in effect in the United States and in Britain. Arab facts and the needs of the Arab banking industry were taken into account.

[Question] Is the union involved in other activities in the area of training in banking?

[Answer] The union now has a training program which is being completed gradually. It provides a flexible range of training services for all levels of the profession. There are about 12 courses or workshops each of which lasts 7 days: these are training programs for mid-level management. Then there are two annual seminars for assistant managers and managers affiliated with the general administration; each one of these seminars lasts 3 days. Finally, there is an annual one and a half day symposium for executive directors or general managers only at which concentrated discussions of a banking issue with strategic implications or direct impact on the subject of banking policies are held.

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STRICTLY DEFINED POLITICAL ROLE OF ISLAM DISCUSSED

Grenoble GRAND MAGHREB in French 16 Mar 87 pp 103-105

[Article by El-Hadi Chalabi, doctor of law, Lyon: "Islam, Law and Politics in Algeria"]

[Text] Enjoying an eminent but strictly defined place in Algerian law, Islam plays a dual political role: It is both a source of legitimation for the government and a means by which to challenge that same government.

A Muslim country, Algeria is often regarded as a country in which Islam rules everything. This impression is heightened by fundamentalist factions that have increasingly emerged in the past several years and that go so far as to challenge political power.

The status of Islam as a state religion tends to lend credit to the idea that Islam is the prime source of all rules.

However, reality is far more complex. One can discern two movements in that reality: The first consists of determining Islam's precise place based on rules of law obeying specific procedures. In this sense, Islam is a rule of law only insofar as the legislator so decides. The second movement intends to place Islam out of range of any possible attack, as a divine norm that should inspire any other rule or cause that rule to bend.

A. Islam is a subsidiary source of law.

While Algeria is a Muslim country, it is nevertheless not a country of religious law. Compared with France, one could say that as a country with a Christian (or predominately Christian) religion, France is governed by rules of law whose source is somewhere other than the Holy See, even if certain facts lend themselves to confusion. At the time of the Pope's recent trip to France, the political authorities who insisted on welcoming and then accompanying him, with all the attendant publicity, could not better attest to the living place of religion in a country where the secular nature of the state is not a myth. Actually, as in the case of law, the place of religion is derived from public freedoms and the conditions under which they are exercised. It is the government that is responsible for ensuring enforcement of such conditions for exercising the freedom of religion in France. Likewise, the place granted to Islam in Algeria derives from the exercise of a public freedom that needs a certain number of means to be effective. As one element of the cultural
identity that long faced colonial aggression, Islam needs a certain number of
guarantees and protections. And yet, it would be a mistake to view those
guarantees and protections as an arsenal of provisions whose purpose it is to
 elevate Islam above rules of law which are by definition rules of government,
obeying precise notions and criteria.

Consequently, one can say that if Islam enjoys an eminent place, it is never-
theless confined to certain limits.

1---Islam enjoys an eminent place.

A certain number of easily discernable rules bear witness to this fact.

First of all, the constitution makes it the state religion (1).

Second, among the conditions of eligibility for the office of president of the
republic, the constitution lists the "Muslim religion" (2).

Third, in taking the oath of office, the president of the republic "swears to
respect and glorify the Islamic religion" (3).

Finally, Islam, as a state religion, enjoys adequate means making it possible
to practice it. There is also a whole religious administration, with a Min-
istry of Religious Affairs that ensures the recruiting and promotion of per-
sonnel at the mosques: imams, muftis and muezzins (4) whose training is
given at the Islamic lycees. On the level of every wilaya (5), an office of
inspector of religious affairs is entrusted with handling all administrative
and promotional matters "necessary for the proper conduct of religious activi-
ties" (6).

From all the foregoing, one could derive enough arguments to claim that Islam
 is the source of all rule of law, especially since Islam is not simply a reli-
gion. It is the total organization of society, at least if one refers to
Islam and the Islamic societies of the classical age. Actually, Islam has a
political organization and its own codification of public and private life
through the Koran, the hadiths (7) of the Prophet and the interpretation of
the wise men.

Viewed as a divine norm resulting in the organization of society, Islam be-
comes difficult to compare with or reduce to other standards. It is by defini-
tion above all temporal rule and whenever the possibility of any clash of
rules appears, the Islamic rule must win out.

Conceivable in theory, such an interpretation is contradicted by all the
texts governing the hierarchy of sources of law.

2---Islam's place remains limited.

In the Algerian legal system, as paradoxical as it may appear, Islam is not
considered to be the prime source of law.
Drafting laws is first of all linked to the organization of government and society, to choices made by the sovereign, meaning the people (8). It is through notions such as that of the people's sovereignty and the constitution that the hierarchy of sources of law is drafted. Submitted for the people's approval, the constitution is the source of all rule of law. Any difficulty of interpretation refers one back to the national charter, itself adopted by referendum. These principles of sovereignty and constitutionality are related to modern theories of the organization of power and the legitimacy of rules emerging therefrom.

The use of universal suffrage, the referendum and elections to establish the choices of society and designate the representatives in charge of it is in no way reminiscent of the practices characteristic of Islamic society.

By organizing the protection of Islam and by granting it such an eminent place, the constitution brings it under the jurisdiction of its own rules, the internal rules of the constitution. In that sense, the appeal to Islam and its practice must not run counter to the principles that have the same constitutional rank. In other words, if, as a state religion, Islam is protected constitutionally, the other rights and freedoms confirmed by the constitution legally enjoy the same protection and, quite simply, have the right to the same consideration.

Such is the case of the equality of all citizens before the law (9), equal access to all employment (10), the principle of the legality of crimes and penalties (11), the inviolability of the individual (12), freedom of conscience and opinion (13), and so on.

For all these freedoms, for all the duties and responsibilities exercised within the government and the party, there is no question of Islamic principles as criteria or conditions determining the exercise of a given freedom or assumption of a given responsibility.

The criteria chosen for respect of the principle of equal access to public employment do not refer to "good" or "bad" Muslims, but rather, have to do with merit, aptitude (14) or simply "competence, integrity and commitment" (15).

The rules to which the constitution refers make no allusion to the principles of Islam. For the implementation of its provisions, the constitution, in addition to the fact that it refers back to its own contents, as in the case of women's rights (16), also refers to the national charter (17), the law or regulations.

A single article of the constitution might be subject to ambiguity: Article 19, which gives to the cultural revolution, among its many objectives (18), that of "adopting a lifestyle in harmony with Islamic morals...." Actually, this reference to Islamic morals, which, moreover, goes along with the "principles of the socialist revolution," is an affirmation of its own differences from a society with an Islamic culture compared with other cultures. In itself, this provision lays no claim to subjecting society to the rules of
religious law. The constitution definitely retains the notion of morals rather than of Islamic law.

If one observes the terms in which the constitution deals with the state, one will find nowhere that the state derives its authority or bases its organization on Islamic principles. In order to transform society, "the Algerian socialist government relies on the principles of socialist organization" (19).

Likewise, insofar as the citizens are concerned, there is no reference to the precepts of Islam, but to respect for the law (20). Finally, regarding justice, Koranic laws are not at all given as basic principles. Justice is handed down in the name of the people (21). It "is expressed in respect for the law as well as by the search for fairness" (22), while the judge owes obedience only to the law (23).

In countries where Islam is the source of all legality, justice is handed down in the name of Allah. Such is the case of Saudi Arabia, "where Islam strongly permeates justice, education and legislation" (24). In Algerian programs to reform legislation, the question brought up by fundamental texts is that "of the adaptation of legislation to the objectives of the revolution" and "to the evolution of society" (25). The adaptation of legislation to Islam does not seem to be the object of any particular concern. It is rather the adaptation of Islam to modern rules that seems the question in Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, which reads as follows: "In the absence of any legal provision, the judge rules based on the principles of Muslim law and, in its absence, based on custom." In other words, appeal is made to the principles of Muslim law only in the absence of legislative or regulatory provisions. One must add that in the case of recourse to the principles of Muslim law, the latter must satisfy respect for the constitution.

In penal matters, one can say that Muslim law does not have the slightest sanction.

Consequently, one can situate the principles of Islamic law in a very modest place in the hierarchy of rules of law, as in areas which are the object of codification. Outside of the personal status, Islam is far from inspiring the lawmaking body or the administration.

And yet, there is a tendency to make Islam a legitimizing authority. In this sense, it has difficulty bending to the principle of accordance with the constitution.

B. Islam is a legitimizing authority.

It is easy to see to what extent Islamic values permeate Algerian society.
As a culture, Islam is accompanied by a system of education, morals, references to somewhat simplified principles that lead the political government to go through Islam in order to explain the nature of its choices, their legitimacy and their accordance with the precepts of Islam in order to gain better acceptance of them.
This dependency on Islam to justify the soundness of a specific legislative policy has resulted in an expansion of the space occupied by Islam, which also becomes the path through which political choices are challenged. Called upon to second the government, Islam has become the place to legitimize dissent, even opposition to the government.

1--Islam supports the government.

Since independence, Islam has been the stakes of contrary political forces trying to legitimize their respective positions based on Islamic rules.

Algeria's commitment to the socialist path has had the effect, since the early years of independence, of establishing the positions of the supporters and adversaries of such orientations. The latter have required the adoption of measures aimed at social justice and modernization of the country. Such is the case of nationalizations (in the agricultural and industrial domains), reforms of business, free medical care, reform of the system of education, and so on. All these reforms were to lead to qualitative transformations, to a modernization of many sectors. It is obvious that the implementation of such reforms, the intervention of such changes, could not take place amidst silence, especially since any proposal of in-depth transformation requires the support of the citizens. The indifference of the latter is a synonym of failure. Whence the need for debate, information campaigns and speeches by presidents, ministers or quite simply, party leaders.

Actually, the need to explain the urgency or alleged benefits of a reform in no way systematically justifies the recourse to Islam. While there are areas in which the involvement of Islam is completely normal, there are others where the utilization of Islam has only ideological goals. It is completely normal for Islam to influence a debate on family law, but its claim must be limited by other requirements, particularly rights which the constitution guarantees to the Algerian woman. With all the more reason, it may appear inappropriate to mingle Islamic precepts with nationalizations or the reform of education, to give but these two examples.

Any wide-ranging political proposal presumes actions broad in scope and defines a set of ways and means to achieve the goal, a schedule and, in short, a whole set of guidelines establishing the divergencies, even opposition within the leadership team or alliance of political forces. Since 1962, through the successive chiefs of state, the government has always deemed it necessary to explain and justify the political choices through an appeal to Islam, concerned at the same time for setting limitations upon the announced reforms. Regarding the factions supporting a greater radicalization of reforms, the chief of state relies on Islam for values and identity, thus suggesting that deeper reforms carried out at a different speed and with different means would tip Algerian society toward foreign values contrary to Arab-Islamism. This rhetoric, repeated endlessly by chiefs of state or ministers and party leaders, is addressed to any leftist opposition whatsoever its philosophical inspiration. Such a rhetoric intends, using Islam, to limit the political influence of factions tending to push the government toward radicalization.
Therefore, being careful to limit the influence of leftist factions, the government is consequently led to confront groups which rely on Islam to halt reforms planned or already undertaken or even to challenge them.

We are in the presence here of two branches:

1) first of all, that of the supporters of a liberal policy for which the appeal to religion serves solely to challenge a policy of economic interventionism and nationalizations and which on a number of questions easily gets along with an Islam solely confined to the mosques, provided it can come out to back demands for "laissez-faire"; and

2) second, the branch which intends to derive all choices, all orientations and the very organization of society from religious principles.

To these two currents wielding Islam in order to challenge a given orientation or policy, the government responds with the development of ideas that characterize reformist Islam, assuring that the latter can easily accommodate any undertaking of modernization and justice.

The debate on choices of society, confrontations on questions of an economic or cultural order, are always drawn toward a debate on Islam. Through the question "What type of socialism?", asked for some 20 years, another is heard: "What type of Islam?"

This leads to make Islam a gauge by which to measure any political orientation and consequently, any rule of law.

As an example illustrating this tendency, we shall look at the evolution marking the political practice consisting of separating government rhetoric from religious rhetoric. Since his election in 1979, President Chadi has always begun his speeches with the religious phrase "In the name of God, merciful and mild" (26). Such was not previously the case. Neither President Ben Bella nor President Boumedienne (who was perceived abroad as a practicing Muslim) used the famous formula to take up matters of state (27). Even Salah Yahiaoui, wrongly presented, it would appear, as a Muslim Brother (28), executive head of the FLN organization from 1977 to 1979, a potential presidential candidate upon the death of Houari Boumedienne, did not use the phrase preceding the reading of the Koran in his speeches (29).

This constant reference to Islam finally leads the latter to protect any dissidence or opposition, however remotely they may be affiliated with it.

2--Islam is the legitimate expression of dissent or opposition to the government.

The Algerian political system, based on the single party, the FLN, has difficulty tolerating dissent. The opposition quite simply has no legal existence. There is no other framework of possibility of expression outside the party. Within it, debate, closely controlled by the top-ranking officials, is rather rare. Keeping a close watch on the expression of opinions within it, the single party carefully prevents any disagreement, using various devices to make it
inoperative. This results in a situation in which only the dominant, not to say official, opinion is allowed to circulate. Along with other Muslim countries, Algeria remains confronted with the problem of democratic expression. It is first of all in that direction that one must try to seek an explanation for the development of fundamentalism. The latter cannot in fact be reduced to the mere influence of the Iranian phenomenon. Furthermore, while it is true that there is a new fascination with Islam in Algeria, it would be inaccurate to assimilate such a trend with Muslim fundamentalism. Let us first of all observe the fact that religion is becoming a vast rallying ground in which dissent stifled elsewhere is expressed. Neither the FLN nor the organs of the press, which by definition emerged from it, authorize any challenge or criticism of action by the political government. This lack or absence of freedom of expression within the political context normally provided for the purpose is accentuated by the imperfect operation of trade union structures and mass organizations. As a result, there is practically no framework defined by the institutions permitting the necessary expression of opinions seeking to be heard. The shift is quite naturally in the direction of Islam, which, viewed as a social, political, legal and religious unit, is able to accommodate incompetence within the operation of the institutions. All subjects then become the heart of the sermon at the Friday prayer service in the mosques. Nor is the phenomenon without complexity, for while it is true that it is the social classes hardest hit by the crisis in housing, unemployment and low wages that appeal to Islam for help, the ruling social classes did not reject the phenomenon in the beginning either, intending to use it as a means to camouflage the thorny questions that would not fail to arise in the political realm.

It is now clear that the fundamentalist movement is not easy to control. The development of the number of mosques, gaining public notoriety in recent years, was criticized by the chief of state only because the latter have become centers of dissent.

In the mosques, exchanges are often passionate between the supporters of fundamentalism marked by a dissident Islam and claiming original purity and the followers of an organized, state Islam that must serve the interests of the government.

The current strength of dissident Islam stems from the fact that it is based on real difficulties that place it in a situation of taking over the feeling of injustice evident in numerous domains. Two obstacles prevent the government from facing such a movement:

The first consists of the fact that this movement of dissent seeks shelter under the banner of Islam, the latter being difficult to monopolize by certain countercurrents. Thus it is that the government cannot make it its monopoly (31).

The second obstacle is represented by the means of communications open between one Islamic faction and another. The is no strict compartmentalization between reformist Islam and fundamentalist Islam when the result of the operation of the political, administrative and trade union institutions has turned Islam into a rallying point for various forms of dissent, one expressing disagreement
and reservations about official decisions and speeches. The ideological strength of Islam thus plays a full role. The result of such strength, such influence, can be expressed by the adoption of the Family Code in 1984 (32). Another indication should not be underestimated either: the increasingly noticeable presence of the theme of Islam in presidential speeches.

Sought out by the government or some of its elements, Islam also asserts itself as the center of dissent and opposition. This undoubtedly gives it a force of attraction that may lead one to evaluate and test the legitimacy of such and such a measure. But in addition to the fact that it cannot be the sole source of legitimacy, it cannot claim, as such, to be the source of law either. It can inspire a number of legal texts as a philosophical basis, but it remains subject to a specific procedure, that of adoption by the People's National Assembly. Consequently, national representation can draw upon other sources of legitimacy. Socialism is one, solemnly sanctioned by the national charter and the constitution. Thus it is that a text which at the outset is reputed to take up the rules of Islam can be amended in terms of the real needs of society. Even when Islamic rules are adopted without major changes, as in the case of the Family Code, the fact remains that the latter is a law and remains under the jurisdiction of the constitution. If one takes the example of the Family Code, once one has brought out the influence exercised by the Shari'ah [Islamic code], one is led to pick out cases of unconstitutionality. Within this context, the negation of the rights and freedoms of the woman by the 1984 code is a deliberate violation of the constitution. The fact of trying to legitimize such a text by appealing to Islam changes nothing, insofar as the constitution has not authorized any express waiver of the rights and freedoms it guarantees women.

Algeria is certainly not an Islamic republic. Defense of Islam by the government on the same basis as public freedoms is indispensable to the fulfillment of a cultural expression that has nothing in common with obscurantism or religious fanaticism. Unlike other public freedoms, Islam can scarcely be challenged. The guarantees due it turn into a kind of allegiance and its legitimizing force increases as the conditions for exercising other freedoms disappear. The negation of the latter leads Islam to gradually absorb debate that has not found expression elsewhere.

In absorbing all the debate that should have taken place outside the mosque, Islam tends to recognize no other expression than that which comes under its authority. The use of Islam for ideological purposes, added to the negation of public freedoms and the basic rules of democracy, risks leading to a re-definition of the bases of the legality of the state and government.

FOOTNOTES

1. Article 2 of the constitution of 22 November 1976, to which we shall refer in the development of this article.

2. Article 107.
3. Article 110. The oath also concerns respect for and defense of the national charter, the constitution and all laws of the republic, the irreversible nature of the choice of socialism, and so on.

4. Imam: leads prayers. Muezzin: one who calls people to prayer. Mufti: legal expert in Muslim law affiliated with one or several mosques.

5. Department.

6. For more details, see the interministerial order of 1 October 1986, JORADP, No 61, 17/12/1986, p 1444.

7. Words, conversations of the Prophet which take on the significance of precepts.

8. Article 26: "The state derives its authority from the people's will. It is exclusively in the service of the people. It derives its effectiveness and raison d'être from the people's support."

9. Article 40.

10. Article 44.

11. Articles 45 and 51.


13. Article 53.

14. Article 44.

15. Article 38.

16. Article 42: "All political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Algerian woman are guaranteed by the constitution."

17. Article 6: "The National Charter is the fundamental source of the nation's policies and the laws of the state. It is the source of ideological and political reference... The National Charter is also a fundamental instrument of reference for any interpretation of the provisions of the constitution."

18. One might cite the improvement in the level of instruction and technical competence, cultural development, protection of the accomplishments of the socialist revolution and the new social awareness oriented toward transforming the archaic and unjust structures of society.

19. Article 28.

20. Article 74: "Every person is bound to respect the constitution and obey the laws and regulations of the republic."
22. Article 165.
23. Article 172.
26. See in particular the following speeches: "Message on the State of the Nation" before the People's National Assembly, 30 October 1980, EL MOUDJAHID, 1 November 1980; Speech on the state of the nation, reprinted by REVOLUTION AFRICAINE of 3-9 December 1982; Speech delivered on the occasion of the celebration of the 27th anniversary of the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA), REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, No 993, 4-10 March 1983.
27. See collections of speeches by President Boumediene, published by the Ministry of Information and Culture, Vols 1-4, 1965-1975. See also one of his last speeches delivered in Oran on 25 January 1978, EL MOUDJAHID, 26 January 1978. These speeches all begin by "Dear Brothers and Sisters."
28. "Activist aiming to overthrow the existing regime for the benefit of the Islamic order."
29. See also the speech delivered at the closing session of the Fourth Congress of the UNFA [National Union of Algerian Women], EL MOUDJAHID, 5 October 1978.
30. See the closing speech at the annual meeting of walis (prefects), EL MOUDJAHID, 12 November 1986: "Many mosques were built in an anarchic fashion with the backing of the wilayas and communes.... We cannot leave this mosque at the mercy of certain pernicious elements who use it for destructive purposes.... You must not be influenced by limited elements whose erroneous concepts do harm to Islam...."
31. The opposition movement headed by Ben Bella did not make a mistake in trying to use Islamic purity and enable the former president to try to regain lost power.
32. Law No 84-11 of 9 June 1984.

11,464
CSO: 4519/96
MOSLEM BROTHERS INSTRUCT PRESIDENT ON FOREIGN, DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA’ in Arabic 24 Mar 87 pp 18-23


[Text] Mr Muhammad Abu al-Nasr, the general guide of the Moslem Brothers, sent a letter to President Husni Mubarak which contained the Moslem Brothers' view concerning certain domestic and foreign issues. The general guide, in his letter, which the director of the president's office received last November, said "In these difficult circumstances the beloved nation is passing through, abroad and domestically, I would like to convey to your excellency what is going on in my mind and what is raging in my heart out of loyalty to what is due the trust God has assigned to us and performance of what is due our nation and homeland. Mr President, I hope that this letter will be met with satisfaction, acceptance and attention on your part. In God’s name, it is the fusion of a pure spirit and the upwelling of a sincere feeling toward religion and the nation. God knows that through it we seek only his almighty glorious satisfaction, then the interests of the venerable nation." Herewith is the text of the letter:

Mr President Muhammad Husni Mubarak, president of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

Good blessed greetings from God, and God's peace, mercy and blessings upon you. Following that:

A person following what is happening on the stage of the international community now can only register some important observations:

First, most countries, especially the two great powers, have repeatedly and deliberately violated the principles of international law, the United Nations charter and the principles of human rights and international treaties, and this portends a deterioration in the level of international relations and a denial by most countries of the principles of human justice.

There is no greater proof of that on the part of the United States of America than the following:
1. The commission by the United States of aggression against the Egyptian civilian aircraft flying in international airspace, compelling it to land in Italy.

2. The commission by the United States of direct armed aggression against Lebanon and Libya.

3. America's grant of permission to Israel to commit aggression against Tunisia and defense of this aggression in the international courts.

4. America's constant use of the right of the veto on Israel's behalf and its disruption thereby of the Security Council's international peacekeeping mission.

5. The blatant intervention by the United States of America in the internal affairs of a number of countries in the world, which does not require proof or confirmation following the admission of this by the American newspapers and broadcasting networks themselves.

As for the Soviet Union, nothing is greater proof of its violation of international laws, charters and treaties than the following:

1. The performance by the Soviet Union of armed aggression against the people of Afghanistan. The acquiescence of the government of Kabul is of no validity in that regard; it is a government which the Soviet Union itself knows to be illegitimate, and it does not represent the Afghan people in any respect, major or minor.

2. The performance by the Soviet Union and its satellite countries of oppression against the Moslems residing in them, forcing them to change their religion and names or be refused all the services the government offers. An example of that is what is happening in Bulgaria.

3. The intervention of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of other countries, especially the developing countries, and its provision of aid to Communist parties and communities in the form of information, money and arms, as has been the case in Afghanistan and South Yemen.

Second, the exacerbation of wars in a number of areas in Arab and and Islamic countries, of which Egypt is the heart. War is being exacerbated in Afghanistan, between Iraq and Iran and in Lebanon and is almost being ignited in the Sudan. A flareup is on the verge of resuming in the two halves of Yemen, not to speak of strife, wars and struggles on the part of al-Qadhafi, the Sahara front between Morocco and Algeria, and so forth.

Third, the upsurge of Israeli aggression against the Arab and Islamic countries. In this gloomy atmosphere, Israel has roamed at will about the region and engaged in armed aggression, and is doing so still, against Lebanon, from which it has not yet departed although the forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization, whose presence Israel adopted as a pretext to launch the war, have departed. Israel has engaged in armed aggression against Tunisia and killed hundreds of innocent civilians, as it had done
previously with armed aggression against Iraq, striking the nuclear reactor there. Israel also committed armed aggression against an Arab civil airplane flying in international space and compelled it to land in Israel. Finally, Israel has declared its refusal to sign the treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

Depletion of the Region's Resources

Fourth, the important observations, on the stage of the international community, also include the presence of economic pressure on the part of the major countries and the International Monetary Fund against Arab and Islamic countries. Nothing proves this more than the international conspiracy over the drop in the price of oil and deliberate laxity in putting an end to the Iraqi-Iranian war, which has gone on more than 6 years and has the objective of depleting the region's resources and calling a halt to its progress toward development and prosperity.

All these observations, Mr President, reaffirm that the Arab region is being subjected to a terrible political, military and economic colonialist scheme and they bespeak the big countries' intent and desire to intervene in the affairs of the region and pursue the policy of invasion and the use of force to devour it.

Therefore, every proud Moslem feels danger looming in general over the Islamic and Arab nation and in particular over our nation, which is its beating heart and whose security is its security and peace its peace, and vice versa.

Therefore, religious and national duty demands that we present some recommendations to your excellency in hopes that you will find that they include matters of benefit to the nation in its present and future:

First, the refusal to enter into any military alliance under any name and grant military facilities to any country, in view of the destructive threat that entails, which is no secret to your excellency.

Second, the refusal to become involved in any regional war, Arab or non-Arab. It is easy for a war to start, but it is difficult to end it, and the experience of Yemen in the past and Iraq at present is sufficient for us.

Third, the search to realize Arab and Islamic solidarity as soon as possible, eliminate all disputes among Arab and Islamic countries and end the wars that have been exacerbated in the region.

Fourth, the exploitation of the present period to raise the beloved armed forces' military competence in all areas and the completion and establishment of military industries out of the concern to spread the spirit of holy war and the spirit of manliness and seriousness among the people on all levels.

Fifth, the pursuit of a decisive policy toward Israel founded on extreme wariness and total alertness.
Israel Does Not Want Peace

This is in the general sense. Your excellency the president, permit me some detail at this point:

A. Mr President, I believe firmly that Israel does not want peace and all its behavior, some of which I have mentioned above, confirms this. It is still working seriously to realise its hope of having a nation for itself from the Nile to the Euphrates and it will most likely break the Arab and Islamic world up into countries as it did in Lebanon, then return to Egypt to devote itself to it exclusively and settle scores with it.

B. Therefore, we must be fully concerned that Israel leave Lebanon in defeat, so that that will be a lesson to it and it will not try to repeat this adventure again.

C. We must also freeze all dealings with Israel, especially in the area of tourist activity and trade, and, in order to protect the domestic front, abrogate the law bearing on non-Arab foreigners' right to own housing. The greatest beneficiaries of this law are the Israelis. If Israel is not sincere with the United States of America, whose offspring it is, and rises up against it, as the recent cases in the United States itself have revealed, will we expect sincerity or honor from dealings with it here?

D. Lastly, we must insist in a manner in which there is no negligence or compromise on the need for Israel to recognize the Palestinians' right to self determination so that they may establish an independent country on their national soil with Jerusalem as its capital, and we must be wholly concerned that no auctioneering or insistence cause this demand to be lost. It is a natural, legitimate right of every nation but at the same time it is important and essential for us for the following reasons:

The Al-Aqsa Mosque Must Be Returned

1. Because of their religious belief, the hearts of the Moslems in the nation, indeed in the Oriental and Occidental areas of the world, yearn for the al-Aqsa Mosque, the first of the two destinations of prayer, the third holy sanctuary and the point of departure for the midnight journey of the prophet of God, may God's prayers and peace be upon him: "The glory which released his servant at night from the great mosque to the al-Aqsa mosque." The Moslems will in no case be satisfied with any resolution to the Palestinian cause which does not lead to the return of the al-Aqsa mosque to the safekeeping of an Islamic country, whatever the reasons might be and whatever the results might be, especially since Israel has tried a number of times to destroy the mosque without the least consideration for the religious feelings of the Moslems in all areas of the world.

2. Egypt's security, Mr President, is totally linked to the security of Palestine. Egypt has been invaded, most times, from its eastern borders only, and it is in the interests of the nation that there be a fraternal country which cooperates with Egypt in good times and bad.

3. The Palestinian brothers huddled under Israeli occupation and tortured on the territories without committing sin or offense aspire to the day of
deliverance from all foreign rule and their eyes are turned toward Egypt, the protector of the Arab and Islamic countries over centuries and generations, to extend to them the life raft and lift the heat of suffering from their shoulders, especially since the Gaza Strip had been entrusted to us and some day the trust must be returned.

4. The insistence on the restoration of Egyptian supervision to all places holy to our brothers the Copts, especially Dayr al-Sultan.

These, Mr President, are some of the recommendations in the realm of foreign policy which we place before your eyes. In the area of domestic policy, I would like to present some facts here to your excellency.

The Islamic Awakening in Egypt

First, Egypt has been the leader of the Islamic world and its protector over the centuries, and over the generations its beacon by which the generations have been guided and from whom they have sought help. In its holy al-Azhar, they learn the loftiest forms of knowledge and most advanced sciences. The ancient Egyptians believed in religion and held its observances sacred. Their ancient civilization arose more than 7,000 years ago. Then in their modern history the Egyptians became the protectors of the Islamic nation and the Islamic succession and the place of residence of the family of the prophet of God, upon whom be God's peace and prayers. The Islamic awakening which Egypt is witnessing now is not a haphazard outgrowth in our history but is a truthful expression from the heart of its conscience and the depths of its feelings. I realized this, Mr President, more than 50 years ago. Although colonialism and its tools in the form of missionaries and orientalists spread about the opposite of this by means of publications, education, culture, learning and the other activities of life, the Egyptian people nonetheless ground their views underfoot and time has demonstrated the people's insistence on preserving their essence and genuineness and their loyalty to their religion and belief.

Second, I believe, Mr President, that if we put into effect the provisions of Article Two of the constitution, we will find the best and most judicious solutions to all modern problems in the protection of the lofty principles of Islamic law and in the light of the pure Islam. It is not just religious sentiment which dictates this statement, but a fact which pure logic stipulates and fairminded researchers in the East and the West support, at the highest levels. I will not continue to give details on this. Suffice it for me to review in brief the economic crisis Egypt is suffering from at present.

This crisis is not to be attributed, as some people imagine, to instability. Conditions, God be thanked, are stable. It is not to be attributed, either, as others maintain, to the increase in the rate of the population over the rate of increase in gross product, because the increase in manpower, which is one of the important factors of production, is supposed to lead to an increase in production if it is properly guided and used and not left merely as gaping mouths and empty intestines demanding food morning and night.
The Economic Crisis Is a Moral Crisis First of All

Rather, the crisis, in its essence, is a moral one. Most producers, with the severe decline in the level of virtues and deterioration in morals, have turned away from fruitful production, which they found it difficult to proceed with, and as a result of that honorable producers have been afflicted with a crisis of confidence regarding the feasibility of honorable labor and its returns for them. Thus production has been scant, while the wheel of consumption turns and the crisis becomes aggravated, not to speak about the disruption of economic policy and the frequency in changes of laws influencing economic conditions, above and beyond usury and its effect on foreign loans and the domestic economy.

This is the truth which there is no way to avoid reporting, and which all evidence and proof support. The investigations of the socialist prosecutor and the concomitant circumstances of the verdicts issued by the court of ethics, which we hope will be the object of attention and study, so that we may jointly arrive at this truth, which is the basis of the ailment and source of the plague, are sufficient in this regard.

No matter how much the government may seek to set out plans, draw up platforms and exert efforts, that will not lead to great progress as long as the element of morality is lacking throughout the nation, whether, unfortunately, in the agencies of the government or the people. There will be no resurgence without morality. Almighty God spoke the truth: "That is because God will not change a bounty which he has bestowed on a people until they change what is in themselves."

Mr President:

While we urge virtuous morality and higher examples so that we may build the resurgence of the country and the happiness of the nation upon them, religion is necessary. There is no morality without religion. Morals are the message of the prophets, on whom be peace, and the prophet of God, on whom be God's prayers and peace, spoke the truth: "I was sent to complete the virtues of morality." The prophet of God, on whom be God's prayers and peace, is the complete exemplar of virtuous morality and almighty God spoke the truth when he said, "You are of great morality." It is religion alone which establishes virtuous morality in the individual on the strongest foundations and the firmest buttresses, because the individual might violate the rules of the education on which he was raised, might violate the tradition of the society in which he grew up and might violate the rule of law which dominates this society, might do so as long as he can escape punishment from all of them, but if he believes in almighty glorious God and his rewards, punishment and sublime lofty power, and believes that he knows what betrays the eye and what people's hearts conceal, where can he flee from the echo of this belief in himself, which is within himself? Its echo might be more painful than any moral, social or legal punishment: almighty God spoke the truth when he said, "Indeed people are perspicacious with themselves, even though they offer their excuses." After that, where can one flee from God's punishment in the world and the hereafter?
The Provisions of Islamic Law

Third, these facts, Mr President, make us believe firmly that in response to the spirit of the Egyptian people, in expression of their will, as they are the basis and the government is the representative, in execution of the provisions of Article Two of the constitution which everyone has sworn to respect, and in rectification of the crushing crises which the venerable nation is passing through, especially the economic crisis, the government, with all its agencies and the officials in it, must orient themselves toward the principles of the pure Islam and its lofty law, in letter and spirit, statement and action, legislation and application. That requires much work. Suffice it for me to stipulate certain recommendations here:

A. In the area of the codification of the provisions of Islamic law:

1. Swift codification of the provisions of Islamic law in all areas, in execution of the stipulation of Article Two of the constitution, while making everything that violates the spirit of Islam and its lofty law a crime.

2. The effort to support all government agencies active in the field of the Islamic appeal and provide facilities for the media for that in the form of the radio, newspapers and television, so that the spirit and good intentions of Islamic law may be in effect in the nation and accompany its codification.

3. The grant of freedom to all individuals, bodies and societies active in the field of the Islamic appeal so that they may perform the duty of enjoining what is good and prohibiting what is evil and so that they may play their part in raising the members of the public in the principles of Islam and teachings of the Koran.

Restrictions on Public Freedoms

The numerous restrictions which have been imposed on public freedoms in order to add to the burden on individuals, deprive them of the feeling of confidence and security, severely detract from their legitimate rights to express opinions, form parties and groups and issue papers, magazines and publications and almost totally proscribe public meetings, and the other numerous restrictions that have been added to these through the declaration of the state of emergency over more than 5 years without justification or need for recourse to that -- all this has to a large extent obstructed the process of democratic development and has deprived the people of this nation of their genuine rights which lofty Islamic law has decreed and international charters, foremost among them the document on human rights and the constitution, have stipulated. Thus, the opportunities for the emergence of capable persons from these self-sacrificing people who, praise to God, are many, have become attenuated. If the gates of freedoms were opened they would become prominent and known and would have been of benefit through their learning, their work and the products of their thinking. Without a doubt, these restrictions and obstacles are casting a gloomy shadow over the image of our beloved Egypt, frightening away domestic and foreign investors alike and having a bad effect on the economic situation which we are in the
most extreme need of improving with full force and effort. In addition to the foregoing, these restrictions have given an opportunity to the people who have misused them and have resulted in succumbing to perverse, deviant acts which justice rejects and the conscience dismisses. It is sufficient to point to the arrest of a number of innocent persons without specific charges or proof in justification, indeed, without the issuance of verdicts of their innocence and their release. It is also necessary to refer to the condemnation by the judiciary of large numbers of policemen for committing crimes of torture on imprisoned and detained persons. I urge you, Mr President, to take the initiative, for which you will be thanked and rewarded by almighty God and all the honorable members of this nation, of eliminating the state of emergency and also those laws which everyone has agreed to refer to as laws of ill repute.

B. The government and all officials in it must be concerned to be a good example of adherence to the teachings of Islam with respect to all personal conduct so that a country with deep traditions which is governed by the lofty Islamic law will be afforded an honorable Islamic image. This requires:

The government must be a model:

1. The actions of the ministers and senior officials in the government must be compatible with the spirit of the law which governs them and the holy law which puts them in effect, which is Islamic law. They are, in the nation, tantamount to the head of the body and its members in terms of models, and people are subject to them. A crooked shadow and stick cannot be made straight.

2. The government should be concerned to provide the time necessary for performance of the Islamic obligations, especially prayer, in all its institutions. Nothing is harder for the spirit of a Moslem than to be kept from performing his prayers on time, and nothing is harder for him than to hear that a meeting is being held at the time of the Friday prayer, that an official meeting is being extended from just before dusk to after dinner, or that people are meeting in order to wreck one of God's duties without necessity or pressing need.

3. The law on employees in the government must not differentiate between personal forms of conduct and administrative considerations. Every official in the government must be rebuked for his personal conduct if that conflicts with the provisions of Islam.

4. The government must provide all employees with sufficient sums in terms of their wages and provide justice among them.

C. All the sources of culture in the nation must be derived from the spirit of the pure Islam. This requires:

1. The reform of education. Education in Egypt must be unified so that the cultures of the members of the united nation may draw close to one another. Education must be at an international level, preserving a quantity of
learning for Egyptian generations which is in no case less than that of
their peers in other countries. Education must be national, the country's
heritage and history of the nation must not be lost on the basis of it,
foreign cultures must not predominate in it and total concern must be given
to teach religious subjects at all levels of education, all in a manner
which is appropriate to these levels, with the degree of religious affairs
which every male and female Moslem must know. In addition, care, education,
conduct and action are necessary so that children may be nurtured on the
principles of virtuous, honorable morals.

2. Guidance of the media, the papers, magazines, publications, radio, televi-
    sion, stage and visual media (movies and videos). Nothing which violates
the spirit of Islam or leads to the destruction of morality, destruction of
values or rifts in higher examples must be published or broadcast.

3. The government must be concerned to provide young people with places and
facilities for physical education in the context of the governorate capi-
tals, district capitals and villages, with concern that the spirit of the
pure Islam dominate these clubs and camps, and the government must be con-
cerned to manage facilities and places for recreational tourist activity in
a manner which does not conflict with the morality of Islam, so that Moslem
families may find a clean space where they can provide relaxation for them-
selves and their families.

Women Also Have an Important Role

Mr President:

Following this, two things to which I would like to refer remain. The first
concerns rectification of the affairs of Egyptian women. I believe that wo-
men have an important role in the resurgence of our nation and the future of
our country. They are half of society and the whole society is reared
through their care and attention. Much of the future of this beloved country
depends on the degree of their success in raising their children.

Therefore, we want women to get special attention in their education, which
will make them capable of caring for their children from the cultural,
health and moral standpoints. A person who has grown up on something grows
old with it.

We want them to have participation in the progress of the society and work
in areas which are in keeping with their nature and their abilities in order
to serve other women.

Following that, we want women to have proper marriages based on the princi-
ples of Islamic law and the just laws of legislation which have preserved
for all the parties of the marriage contract their rights in full and are
not deficient. The codifying powers cannot violate the rules of this Islamic
law, so that we make what is forbidden permissible and make what is permis-
ible forbidden.

Following this, we want homes for women's care which will provide them with
strong protection in every crisis to which they are exposed, in preservation
of their dignity and honor in all public areas and means of transportation.
The Copts!

The second matter concerns the citizens who are Copts:

I do not believe, Mr President, that these abovementioned recommendations contain anything which will inflict harm on our brother Christian citizens. We are not addressing ourselves to any of the affairs of their belief or religion. The Copts have lived with the Moslems for many centuries and have met only with total justice and comprehensive fairness. The words of the second caliph to his commander in Egypt continue to resound in people's ears and be repeated on every tongue: "Amr, when did you remove the people, while their mothers gave birth to them as free persons? Isn't it strange for the Islamic regime and the Islamic nation that the former should teach the latter its lord's book, which says, 'God does not deprive you of those who have fought with you over religion and have not expelled you from your homes. You should be kindly toward them and deal justly with them. God loves those who are just.'"

Mr President: I am certain that the Egyptian people are not deficient or too weak to provide themselves with everything they need and I believe that if the government orients itself toward proper Islam and turns away the phenomena of laxity and corruption of morals and if the people regain their confidence in themselves and agree to work with a new Islamic spirit, they will work miracles and overcome all obstacles: "God prevails in his purpose, but most men know not."

In the name of God, I ask that he take us all by our hands toward the best that he loves and is content with and grant our nation success on his straight path.

Peace and God's mercy and blessings upon you.

[Signed] Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasir

The General Guide of the Moslem Brothers.
PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE

Khartoum HERITAGE in English 13 Apr 87 pp 8-12

[Interview with Prime Minister Mr. Sadia el Mahdi by Arop Madut, Editor-in-Chief of HERITAGE; date and place no given]

[Text]

Mr. Prime Minister, it is almost a year now since you took over power in the country. Evaluating the activities of your government during this period, would you say that you have succeeded? If the answer is yes, in what respects?

Sadig El Mahdi: There is no simple answer to your question because it covers a wide area of experience. But generally speaking, we are going to stock-take the experiences and achievements of my administration during the last ten months in office.

To begin with, I would like to say that we made certain commitments at the beginning of this administration.

Our first task was to liquidate the defunct May Regime institutions, laws and regulations, but in accordance to the rule of law.

That is why we had come up with a set of constitutional amendments to deal with the issue effectively, as well as repeal of the 1903, September laws.

In any case the new legislation that would replace the September laws has already been drafted and is ready for ratification.

I may say that the only area where we have not been very successful is the fulfilment of the principles embodied in the charter of the National Alliance and removal of the residues of the defunct May Regime.

The second point was our commitment to the rules of national conduct of policy. Although we are in a coalition government, Ministers are not allowed to play up the policies of their parties in contravention to the general political gui-
delines of the government.

Moreover, there have been regular contacts between the Government and all political forces in the country including those not represented in the government. These regular contacts are aimed at consolidating the national conduct of policy.

The third point was our commitment to issues of peace in general, the problem of the South and convention of the national constitutional conference. These issues will be handled at the national level.

In regard to the constitutional conference, an adhoc committee will be formed to prepare the ground for the conference. I am glad that the Ministry of Peace has already started holding meetings in this respect.

The fourth point of commitment was how to salvage the Sudanese economy. As a result of our initial efforts, we have managed to rehabilitate about 70% of Sudan economy, and this is a great achievement.

The fifth point of our plan of action is the alleviation of the economic pressures on the citizens. In this respect the Government has managed to stockpile within a short period of time certain basic commodities such as sugar, wheat, flour and other essential food items.

We hope that we shall soon be able to provide more essential commodities and their distribution as soon as possible.

The sixth point concerns restoration of peace and stability in the South. We feel that much ground has been covered between all the parties concerned.

Presently we are trying to reconcile points of difference over the Koka Dam Declaration. Although we were upset by the civil aircraft incident over Malakal of August 16th, I think that it is high time now for us to launch a new peace initiative for which we are prepared as we enter the third anniversary of the April 6th revolution.

Our peace initiative will involve a cease-fire and the timing for the convening of the national constitutional conference.

As regards to the peace in the South there have been positive developments to be proud of. I am glad to tell you that the Sudanese Armed Forces have denied the party conducting the war in the South any kind of military victory it wanted to achieve.

At present all routes to the South, rail, roads, rivers and air have been opened. In addition to this, all different agricultural production areas have been secured and protec-
ted. This was done in order to enable the citizens to cultivate and produce enough food for themselves.

Concerning the efforts exerted by the warring party in the South to transfer the war to the north, I am glad to tell you that this attempt has completely been checked.

All these points have been positive security achievements. However there have been of late a set-back in Pibor but I do not think that Pibor is an important military target.

In any case I do not take military option as the best solution to the problem of the South. In the meantime violent military exchanges will definitely continue between the warring parties to the conflict until a cease-fire is agreed upon and is put into effect.

It is also my strong belief that the Sudanese Armed Forces will continue to deny the warring party any victory.

It will also neutralise any kind of setback that might occur in this respect. This will continue until such a time that a cease-fire is arrived at.

The third area in which there has been some positive developments is in the recent realization of new administration in the South.

As you know this government inherited a situation whereby:-

a) the South was being governed by military administrators thus totally isolating all the political parties from participation in the government machinery;

b) the High Executive Council was imprisoned in Khartoum where it was unable to contribute to the problem of the South in a positive way.

What we did as a government was to invite the Southern Parties to come together and discuss the problem of the South with the aim of arriving at a consensus.

We told them from the beginning that the whole issue was not a question of solving the South North conflict nor solving the problem of the South in a national context.

We assured them that the administration we wanted to be established in the South would be governed by the 1972 Self Government Act. We told them that the 1972 Act would only be replaced by a new decree which would be arrived at in the national constitutional conference when it does convene.

We told them that the problem is not between the South and the North but between the Southern regions on the
one hand and the Southern public opinion on the other hand.

We asked them to agree on whatever the form of administration in the South and we will implement it.

After a long period of time they failed to reach a total agreement. They only agreed on some kind of agreement, which was the basis of the recent formation of the Southern administration.

It is my strong belief that this administration is a step forward.

We also appealed to the Southern parties which were divided over the issue in question to re-unite because the whole issue was a temporary arrangement which would come to an end after a permanent solution is arrived at by the national constitutional conference.

We told them that the interim administration should be formed so as to work for the normalization of the state of affairs in the south as well as the re-habilitation of social service relief and resettlement of the displaced people by the war. We have managed to move forward in this regard.

In the field of foreign affairs, we have committed ourselves to total change in Sudan's foreign policy. Sudan is now firmly established as a non-aligned state.

It has also reactivated its policy towards its neighbours. It is taking positive steps towards the neighbourin states.

In short Sudan has therefore abandoned both the alignment and axis policies Sudan is now gearing its policy of friendship and good neighbourliness to all states in the region and the world at large.

This policy we believe will bear last point we have committed ourselves to the rehabilitation of the public services.

Based on the recent reports of the Board of the International Labour Organization (ILO) about the structure of the civil service and its over-staffing, we shall examine these reports with the aim of finding alternative and workable policies.

In conclusion I am glad to say that we have made achievements in certain areas and not much in others. This is a brief account of a one year performance in offices. This appraisal will help us to prepare the ground for a better performance in the year ahead.

From what one has gathered from both the public, your friends and foes alike, it appears that most of them are against the Sharia Laws and any subsequent Isla-
mic Laws that would replace these laws. Mr. Prime Minister, can you tell us what has been the difficulty in scrapping the September laws?

The most difficult thing has been that the September laws were forced on the Sudanese people in a very high-handed and repulsive way. However despite the controversies over these laws, they have raised some additional issues for us in authority.

The issues have been do we implement the sharia or don't we? And if we do, what about the non-Muslims? Would the sharia guarantee one citizenship for all? Such are the issues the sharia has failed to address itself.

As far as this government is concerned it is committed to repeal these laws. But in case we repeal the sharia, it also raises the issue of who want to do with the Muslims who want to have sharia and what to do with non-Muslims who are opposed to sharia. This has been the problem that we have been trying to tackle.

We have now however a set of new laws which we believe will resolve this problem. We, as a government, are committed to the establishment of a common legal system that would guarantee plurality and one citizenship for all. This is going to be the key concept towards the resolution of the problem at issue.

Q: Some people have been led to believe that some of the policies of your government are not consistent to the ones you declared in your elections manifesto before you came to power. What does your Excellency say about this serious charge?

A: Well, I do not think that any declared policy can fully be implemented at face value. You take as an example: in an architect's blue print, often there is a discrepancy between what he has actually planned and what he is actually doing.

When we come to implement policies, there will always be some discrepancy between what you actually want to do and what you actually say. The discrepancy is always a result of conflicting interests that arise during the course of implementation.

New problems do crop up and so you have to find ways and means of resolving these discrepancies and to improve those policies in order to make them work.
Therefore it is natural that there can be discrepancies between the declared policies and actual policies being executed.

To come to your question, I think that the lack of consistency in my policies which people talk about is due to the discrepancy between idealism and realism.

Q: News reaching us from the Southern Sudan indicates that the activities of the SPLA/SPLM are increasing. On the other hand your government says that the army is in full control. What is the exact situation prevailing now in that part of our country?
A: You cannot really say what the war situation actually is 100 percent because the warring party has a presence in a neighbouring country where it can move freely.

In addition there is no possibility of policing the whole Sudanese borders. What you can do is to use some parameters.

For instance the warring party had succeeded to impede river navigation during Nimeri Regime and during the Transitional Military Council's period. Now all the rivers are navigable.

Secondly they had stopped rail transport from From Babanyessa to Aweil. They had also blown up bridges.

At present railroad transport is not rationing, especially roads linking Raga to Wau and Nimule to Juba. Moreover the three main airports are now serviceable.

The warring party had also intended to prevent any kind of cultivation in Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Niles. Yet, it has not been possible to stop agricultural production in those areas.

On the contrary cultivation has been very successful there. They have been defeated in the real military terms.

Thirdly, the warring party has been talking of war zone one and war zone two. The intention had been to transfer the war to the north. They have been defeated too. These are the parameters you can use without embarrassment.

However, we cannot definitely say that we have totally eliminated the warring party because whatever we do, it can withdraw across the borders and come back again.

The other reason why we think that we cannot completely wipe out the warring party is because some citizens within some tribes do sympathize or support them.
From the above facts you cannot talk about a total military solution to the present conflict.

From a military point of view the situation is far better than was under Nimeiri or the previous military government. Still I would say that there is a Guerilla war threat in the South because the warring party has established some military posts in Duma and Narus.

Apart from these guerilla threats, the situation has generally improved.

As a result of this general improvement of the security situation we are now planning for the reactivation of social services in the South. That is why we have invited the military commanders of the three Southern Sub-Regions to discuss ways and means of how to reactivate health and education services in addition to the stockpiling of food supplies there.

Generally speaking the situation in Equatoria is better than in Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile. Recently all plans concerning the reactivation of the social services in the South have now been handed over to new Southern administration which is charged with the normalization process in the whole area.

Summing up, I can say that in terms of the people's welfare and security the situation is better, and in terms of peace efforts the situation is clearer.

We do hope that all will contribute positively to the peace initiative that we have launched. And if it is positively responded to, it will open a new page in the life of the South.

Q: Many Sudanese do believe that the ongoing war in the South is very destructive, and that it should be brought to an end. What is your brief comment on this assertion?

A: We have been telling the people clearly that whoever is behind this war or is encouraging it should ponder over the following issues: Does this war aim at dividing the North? It does not. The North is being made more militant by this challenge. If it is not dividing the North does it unite the South? No it does not. The South in fact was better united behind Anya-nya one. It is not united behind the present warring party. So it is therefore obviously dividing the South.

Furthermore, is the war stopping the North from developing? Of course it is not.
On the contrary it has stopped the South from developing. Therefore, is it doing anything for the South? No it is not, because the Southern population is being exterminated by internal wars and by disease.

So, what is the sense of continuing with the war that is not achieving any military objective and whose possible end result is to make the north more militant to the point of exterminating the south?

Because of the gravity of the situation I have been saying again and again that we should all realize that there are grievances that had provoked this situation which should be redressed.

We should stop the war and sit down to plan and see how far we can rectify these grievances.

To my mind, the time has come to rectify these ailments especially that there are no more northerners today talking about the possibility of acculturizing the South.

In short, I would like to assure you that everybody in the north has accepted plurality and democracy as a cure to our chronic problems. So, if everybody in the north is accepting plurality and democracy, why don't we make use of this opportunity in order to stop the carnage?

Q: Some Northern Sudanese believe that the cost of keeping the south within a united Sudan is proving too great in terms of human lives and expenditure. They believe that the north would do better without the south. What is your comment?

A: There is a new phenomenon in our country. In the past all Southerners were taken as separatists and the northerners as unionists. Things have drastically changed.

There are now northern separatists as well as southern unionists. In my opinion the change indicates a general mood among northerners that they do not like to do away with southerners in order to keep the country united.

Indeed, many northerners today do feel that the south can go. They think that what I am trying to do in order to reach a peaceful solution with the southern parties is an impossible task.

I personally do not think so. But, do recognize the fact that for the first time there are many northerners who think that the south has nothing to do with the north. And, that it should have its
own way. This is not the result of indiffer-
ence but from a feeling that the cost of keep-
ing the south within Sudan is too great in terms of human lives.

Q: Have you violated the terms of the Addis Ababa agreement by se-
lecting the president and members of the Cou-
uncil for the south?

A: In my reply to this charge before the Constituent Assembly in Mar-
ch I made my position very clear. Article 16 (2) says simply that there will be a High Ex-
ecutive Council (HEC) which shall exercise the powers prescribed in the 1972 Self-Gover-
ment Act. Article 16 (2) says further that the regional government shall be established in the south in accordance with that act, or any ammendments to the same as passed by two-thirds of the Military council land the Coun-
cil of Ministers. And, that such ammendments will have to be confirm-
ed in accordance with the terms of the 1972 act.

Meanwhile, Article 7 says that the Southern Regional Assembly will be responsible for the legislation in the South. Article 16, however says that executive po-
ers in the south will be exercised on behalf of the president of the Republic and, furt-
her, that the head of the executive council will appointed by 

the president of the Republic after being re-
commended by the Regional Assembly.

As you can see from these facts, there are two new developments which must be looked into when one talks about violations of the 1972 Self-Government Act. First, the legal institutions referred to in the said act no longer exist. Secondly, there is a new politi-
cal reality which involves the rejection of the HEC by some segments of the south.

When the new presi-
dent and members of the (HEC) were appointed by the Transitional Mili-
tary Council (TMC), the 1972 Act was not consul-
ted. Moreover, the cou-
ncil could not move from Khartoum, due to the opposition from a great number of Equatorians and some from Upper Nile.

When we came to set up the present southern administration we invited all southern politi-
cal parties to meet and discuss the matter. We assured them that there was no difficulty concerning the powers ex-
pressed in the Self-
Government Act as re-
gards relations between the region and the centre or between the south and the north. We told them that the problem was no longer one between the north and the South, but between the south and south.

The absence of the legal institutions en-
visaged by the 1972 Self-Government Act and the presence of the new political realities mean that we cannot proceed to do anything about the south unless there is an agreement among the southerners themselves.

And, unless there was an agreement among the southern political parties we in the government thought that the whole affair would end up in a political stalemate.

As a result we would continue to have military governments in the south.

I made it clear to the southern political parties that the government was not interested in making things difficult. Rather it wanted to simplify matters.

The government could have allowed things to drag on but we thought that all the political parties in the south be involved instead of alienating them and allowing the military governors to rule the south indefinitely.

We also told the southern leaders that it was pointless to continue talking about the lack of security while neglecting things connected with the welfare of the southern people.

When we started to talk to them they were not on talking terms with one another. Those who wanted one region called those in favour of three regions stooges. And the divisionists called the unionists rebels.

At long last the polarisation was ended. Hence, the political parties began to talk to one another. In the end, all the southern parties began to consider the following facts: the absence of the legal institutions and the presence of new political realities meant that it was not possible to set up a NEC.

They finally agreed and signed a charter which confirmed that it was not possible to form the council as

They all accepted that the three southern regions are here to stay. They agreed that the southern parties would participate as a coalition government in the new council and in the three regional governments.

All this talk about the government imposing a solution on the south or doing something illegal is untrue. All what has been done was agreed upon by all southern parties.

However, another problem arose. On January 31 four southern parties the SSPA, SAC, Federal party and SANU reached an agreement on
the sharing of power in southern institutions. This agreement would have excluded the Equatorian parties SAPCO, and PPP which were opposed to the reunification of the three southern regions.

I thought that further talks might have led to a total agreement. But, unfortunately, I left for Holland. The matter was then handed to the Council of Ministers which decided that the recommendation presented to the Government by the mediatory committee be accepted in its totality.

I did not know that there was an agreement reached by the four parties on January 31. I only knew about the agreement made by another four southern parties which included the two Equatorian parties signed on January 19.

In any case, the new southern administration involves all the southern parties, except the Sudan African Congress (SAC) which was not affected by the divisions.

We had a situation where the Federal party and the SSPA were divided. SAC is the only party that does not approve of the present council but still accepted the political agreement.

Therefore, when I began to evaluate what we have done I am happy to say that there is a lot of southern participation in the present council.

It is true that there is a problem because some of the southern parties are divided. When I spoke before the Assembly last week I told them that the problem was not over. That something must be done to reunite southern parties.

Finally, I would like to reject the charge that anything has been imposed on the south. I also want to reject the charge that the central government or the north, for that matter, is taking away any powers that have been given to the south under the Self-Government Act. The powers embodied therein will be shared between the southern region and the centre.

As far as the sub-regional governments are concerned, they will be governed by political agreements that will be reached between the council for the south and sub-regions.

The real issue in my opinion is a south-south problem which preceded that formation of the Council for the South and the problems caused by the controversy over the re-establishment
of the HEC during the transitional period.

Q: You have been quoted as saying that your government will arrange the holding of the constitutional conference without the participation of the SPLA/SPLM. After you formed the Council for the South, SSPA and SAC accused you of violating the Addis Ababa Accord and are likely to boycott the constitutional conference. Is it wise to hold the conference when representatives for the majority of southerners will not be present?

A: There are two problems. First of all, the fact that SAC is out of government does not mean that it will not participate in the conference.

There is a possibility that there are some southerners inside or outside Sudan who may not join in. It is a very upsetting situation when people say they have grievances yet will not come and discuss these grievances. And at the same time, they declare that they cannot get what they want through military means so what is the point?

They said so themselves. Garang said so, and everybody in their movement said that they do not think they can achieve a military victory. And it is very obvious that they are not doing so. The alternative is by political means. Isn't it absurd for people who say that we cannot resolve the problem by military means to also say that we will boycott the political means?

They may say that we don't want any conditions imposed on us. This is acceptable. They may say that they want to be free to discuss whatever they want to discuss. This is also acceptable. They may say that we want certain guarantees. This is also acceptable. But they cannot say they want to resolve the matter militarily.

So what we are going to do is this: prepare the ground for the national constitutional conference, remove any obstacles and invite anyone interested to come and participate in the conference.

I think that if we prepare the ground properly, everyone who knows that there is no military solution will feel bound to participate. Particularly when everyone knows that there is no northern party or movement which would want to impose anything on the south.

I have seen that although we [the government] did not parti-
cipate in the Washington workshop convened by Dr. Francis Deng, on the question of the South, a kind of consensus has emerged.

I also know that some elements from Garang’s movement have also participated. There were also many individuals from my party and other parties who also participated but as individuals.

I think that the consensus they arrived at is acceptable to us; being democracy and plurality as a key to the resolution of our problems. Everyone now in the country is prepared to accept it. Again, this is another indication that the meeting of minds is possible.

We are going ahead to prepare the constitutional conference to invite everyone and accept democracy and plurality as a basis. If the others know that there is no military solution they will respond to this serious and genuine invitation.

Q: The SPLA/SPLA leaders say they want a Sudan which is not dominated by one ethnic group be it Islamic, Christian, Arab or African. What is your reaction to this?
A: You cannot really create a new Sudan by working from an outside base. A new Sudan is being created by the new forces within the country. You can’t import a new Sudan.

The point that there are problems in Sudan ethnic, religious and political is recognized by all of us. We have already renewed our party. For instance the Umma party is a new force which is able to serve the new Sudan.

The forces which overthrew Nimeiri are new social forces. There is a new Sudan being created not by importation but by indigenous forces.

What we can say to Garang and others is that, yes, there are many problems, many grievances and old wounds to be treated. But the way to do it is through the interaction of social forces within the country.

The forces of Garang are now doing two things they are playing into the hands of northern militants and they are further dividing and exterminating the southern civilian population.

For our part, yes, we say that there is a need for a new Sudanese package deal that will decide that in religion there is tolerance.

Muslims can be fully Muslims and Christians can be fully Christians. And other religions can be allowed to express themselves fully within
the framework of tolerance. This is an acceptable idea and we want the conference to confirm how this nation can be built.

We know that there are Sudanese who are ethnically Arab and others who are ethnically African. And, there are people of mixed race.

We think that we can devise a framework to guarantee co-existence within one nation. This is the vision we are striving to realize.

All these points are considered by us to be part of our realization of a new Sudan. If that is so, you don’t need to kill anyone to realize them.

We are already, in our party, (the Umma) taking appropriate steps. The party has a conference and a central committee which reflects the representation of social forces at regional and national levels.

Our political office is composed in such a way that ensures popular participation of all Sudanese, in much the same way as we have done with the Council of Ministers. The Council, as far as the government is concerned is a fair replica of the elements which comprise

Sudan—both the north and south—in accordance to our rule that the south must be represented in the council.

Q: Reports coming from Southern Kordofan suggest that the Dinka and the Messeirela are fighting each other to the finish. Is your Excellency aware of this appalling situation?

If so, what steps have your government taken to contain the situation?

A: I am aware of the Dinka-Messeiria acrimonious relations and the fact that they are killing themselves.

Again this is another by-product of the violence escalated by Garang.

Moreover some of the Dinka have attacked Arab tribes, especially the Messeiria, and that has resulted in the Messeiria counter attack.

We, and the Regional Government of Kordofan, are working on tribal reconciliation to contain the problem. I think that the problem will be contained as it had been done so before. But the problem will not end until aggression from abroad stops.

You see another by-product of Garang’s aggression is that many Dinka are suffering, although they are not necessarily against
the government or any other Arab tribes.

But the fact Garang's movement has got a tribal overtone has led to the deterioration of relations between the Dinka and non-Dinka tribes, both in the north and the South.

I also think that Garang's movement has greatly deprived the Dinka of their wealth and caused them great social upheaval in history.

Here again it is a very sad thing because I have seen Dinka uprooted all over the Sudan.

Whatever the case, I hope to do all I can because I feel that the Dinka tribe is an important Sudanese tribe whose stability and welfare, I believe, is paramount for the development of the Country.

Q: You have been reported as accusing Ethiopia for violating Sudanese airspace and borders. Could you substantiate your accusations?

A: When Garnag's movement started in 1983, it was provoked by certain internal grievances namely, economic neglect of the south, frequent interference by Nimri's Regime in the Affairs of the south, the mishandling of the armed forces and many others.

At the time the Southern problem began to take roots, the movement leaned towards the South Yemen - Libya - Ethiopia Axis. As a result it began to receive arms, money, training, diplomatic and media cover-age. This in turn brought about Sudanese - Egyptian Axis.

After the fall of Nimri the Sudanese - Egyptian alliance came to an end. Likewise the opposing axis came to an end.

But as a historic fact Ethiopia and the Soviet Union have continued to assist the movement. They provided it with training ground. They gave it the voice of the Gospel Radio Station and all the propaganda tools it needs.

Moreover, members of the movement do travel with Ethiopian Passports.

We can say that all these can be counter productive even to Ethiopia. There are Nuer and Anyuak tribesmen in Southern Ethiopia. In fact, Sudanese Southerners are better off than the Ethiopian Southerners in terms of political representation and many other social aspects.

Secondly, if it comes to the harming of each other, Sudan can harm Ethiopia much more.

But we have tried and suggested to Ethiop-
ia to stop all this and agree with us to reach some kind of peaceful settlement to our problems.

I personally think that although Ethiopia may not be listening now she may listen sooner or later.

And I think that as soon as Ethiopia begins to listen we will reciprocate by changing our position from that of hostility, confrontation and hurting each other, to that of cooperation and friendship. This is what I am expecting to happen.

Q: Mr. Prime Minister, what do you think can be done to remove the differences between the Sudan and Ethiopia so as to make relations between the two sister states become warmer than they are now?

A: Well, I do not know what more can be done to make the relations of the two countries more warmer.

But I am sure that in the near future the bitter sentiments that exist between us and Ethiopia may be removed and good relations established in terms of concrete agreements. I expect this to happen any time.

Q: Supposing that the Sudan Government and the SPLM/SPLA suddenly resolve their differences and reach a final agreement on their problems. Your Excellency would you tell the Eritreans to go home and do the same with their national government, or will you tell them to stay and continue with their struggle?

A: You see the problem is this. There are Eritreans and others who have come to the Sudan and we have dutifully accepted them as refugees. In fact Sudan does not use them against Ethiopia. But our suggestion is that these matters of political instability must be with an ultimate aim of signing a peace package with Ethiopia. Nothing is so far sacred. We can sit down and discuss our problems.

We do not intend to harm Ethiopia nor do we want to break it up because it is not in the ultimate interest of the Sudan. This is what I believe in candidly.

Q: Sudan is described as Afro-Arab. What do you think, Sudan, in this capacity – can play under your leadership?

A: Africa to the North is Muslim and Arab, while South of Sahara is non Muslim and non Arab. Sudan as a microcosm can play a positive role in bridging the gap between the two parts of Africa together. This could be achieved in terms of
cultural and economic cooperation as well as in terms of peaceful coexistence and cultural tolerance. For I believe that cultural values should not be imposed.

In this way we can extend the horizons of understanding and cooperation in Africa. This is what we want to achieve.

Q: What is your vision of Africa, the type of Africa you would like to see emerge?

A: Basically I think that the greatest challenge to Africa is in South Africa, because that regime is established on the basis of racial superiority. This practice shouldn't be allowed to continue on the African continent.

Secondly, Africa is strategically weak. As such African states are called upon to join in a collective security pact. Moreover, a more stronger and more dynamic OAU is needed.

Thirdly, Africa is economically underdeveloped. I think that there is a need for an inter-Africa cooperation to speed up development.

Fourthly, I do strongly believe also that there is a need for an intercultural exchange among all the African states.

Fifthly, there is the crucial question of human rights in Africa, and I think that the OAU can draw a charter on human rights that should be obligatory on all the member states.

For Africa free of colonialism and racism, Africa that cooperates culturally and economically, I think that Sudan can play a much positive role in realising this vision of Africa.

Towards this end I have been thinking of an African Workshop comprised of African Statesmen, prominent thinkers and writers to come together to discuss an Africa of the future. This is what I am very much interested now in respect to Africa.
COUNCIL OF CHURCHES GENERAL SECRETARY INTERVIEWED

Khartoum HERITAGE in English 13 Apr 87 p 13

[Interview with the General Secretary of the Sudan Council of Churches — Janda by Kenneth de Kongs Adam; date and place not given]

[Text] How would you assess the last two years of democratic rule?

Janda: As a matter of fact I wouldn't like to assess or evaluate the last two years since April 1985. I don't believe that this was entirely a period of democracy, although the definitions of democracy could mean many things to different people.

The period of the transitional period could be described as a time of guided democracy. Between the TMC and the civilian cabinet, there was some kind of an uneasy truce. If you are speaking, things were not normal. Even the steps taken leading up to the elections were in favour of certain groups. This was clear in the way the constituencies were being formulated, and the groups that were allowed to be represented were chosen.

As to the period of Premier Sadig El Mahdi, I believe we have wasted one whole year doing virtually nothing.

What happened at the celebrations of April uprising in 1987 should have been the beginning of things in April 1986.

Q: HOW CAN THIS NEWLY ACQUIRED DEMOCRACY BE CONSOLIDATED?

A: Democracy is not acquired like a disease. It has always been there. Given the correct atmosphere People can practice it to the best of their interest. Anybody or Party that believes in democracy should be
prepared to play using the same rules.

Democracy should not be degraded to mean one thing to someone and another to somebody else.

But for the rules to be the same there is a need for a universally acclaimed constitution and laws. They should be applicable to one as well as a hundred. That is the way forward with democracy.

Q. KAIEREGA, IN HIS BOOK "ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY" SAYS THAT WHEN MUSLIMS LIVE IN LANDS WHICH ARE PREDOMINANTLY CHRISTIAN, THE CHURCH NEEDS TO ENCOURAGE FREEDOM FOR MUSLIMS TO WITNESS AND FOR CHRISTIANS TO CONVERT TO ISLAM IF THEY DECIDE TO DO SO. TAKING SHARIA LAWS INTO CONSIDERATION IN SUDAN, WHAT DO YOU THINK OF KATAEREGA'S STATEMENT?

A. Incidentally Dr. Kataerega is my colleague. We studied Islam together at Makerere University. Kataerega is reflecting on the situation as it exists in East Africa where Muslims are not told that they are a minority, but where Islam just like Christianity, is protected equally in the constitutions of those countries. In the Sudan we are yet to get a constitution that recognises people for what they are irrespective of religion or race.

I believe what Nyeri's sharia did was to put the wish of many segregationists into very high gear.

By segregations I mean Sudanese who have tried since 1956 to codify a constitution for the Sudan which defines people in terms of race and religion.

However people in the Sudan belong to many races or nations and they belong to several religions. Irrespective of what number constitutes a majority, peace for Sudan is possible where all these people recognize their worth in equality. Laws which protect all these citizens do not threaten the so called majority or minority.

Q. I SEE YOU ARE TRAVELLING A LOT, ONE DAY IN AND TWO DAYS OUT. ARE YOU MOSTLY OUT IN SEARCH OF PEACE?

A. Peace is only one of many of the council's programmes. So I don't always move in search of peace as it is narrowly understood. But if we can call food a peace issue, or a drug, a peace issue, then I guess my movements are related to peace.
PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL FOR SOUTH INTERVIEWED

Khartoum HERITAGE in English 13 Apr 87 p 3

[Interview with Sayed Mathew Obur Ayang, President for the Council for the South by NEW AFRICAN correspondent and HERITAGE contributor Moyiga Korokoto Ndur; date and place not given]

[Text] Heritage: Several Southern parties have rejected the formation of the new Council for the South Sudan, on the ground that it violated the letter of Self Rule Act of 1972, which provided for unitary South on the basis of local autonomy within the United Sudan. As a result, the Southern Sudan Political Association (SSPA) says it is now taking the government to a Constitutional Court. What is your reaction to all these claims?

Ndur: Well, I don't know how several is several. Because, as I know, SSPA is participating in the Council. The Leader of the SSPA Assembly Body Sayed Angelico Beda is a member of the Council. So when you say SSPA you should qualify what you are saying. The SSPA is participating in the provinces and in the Council here. So the idea of several parties sounds to me like more politics than real.

Q: But the President of SSPA Sayed Samuel Aruol is not with the Council.

A: Well. Perhaps he is not. But I also know that the Leader of the SSPA Assembly Body is with us.

Q: What about the allegation that the formation of the Council violates the letter of Self Rule of 1972.

A: That again is a statement without focus. Because you just don't say it violates the letter or the spirit. You have to quote, tell us what law exactly has been violated and how?
When you go to court
you go on specifics.
What exactly has been
violated?

A: I think the Council
is just a recognition
of the fact that the
south is no longer one.
It is three. And that
there are forces work-
ing to keep it three.
Political forces, which
are as powerful as any-
body can imagine there
are. In fact already in
the National constitue-
nt Assembly today the
parliamentary group
that come from the south,
the majority say
the south should be kept
three. And if you think
that democracy is any-
thing to go by, I don't
see how you can over-
rule this.

Q: If we can change
the topic a little bit.
What are the priorities
of your government?

A: I think I mention-
ed this sometime ago.
But, as yet, we are to
come out with what I
call policy highlights.
All the same, the urgent
thing is relief. People
are starving. They are
dying daily of diseases.
We want to take food to
as many people as we
can reach, and save
them at least from hun-
ger. And we have alrea-
dy taken step to that
effect.

Q: What about security?
Don't you think it
should be top on the
agenda of any government
of the day in the south?

Q: But are you working
within this Act?

A: No. Certainly not.
The law of 1972 speaks
of one south. The south
is not one now. There
are three sub-regions
and three mini-govern-
ments. These things are
not in that Act.

Q: Then, are you happy
with this arrangement?

A: My opinion doesn't
come in. This is de fa-
cto situation.

We have to grapple with
it. And even these par-
ties who are talking of
taking the government
to the court signed a
document (charter) con-
ceding to the three re-
ions in the south.
That in itself constitu-
tes a violation, too.
In fact the three re-
ions came about as a
result of Republican
decree No 1 (June 1983)
that divided the south
into three regions and
locked some of us into
the prison. Now these
political parties are
saying this is alright
and they signed a char-
ter to this effect. I
call this a serious con-
tradiction.

Q: Can we say the Cou-
ncil is a middle line
between the proponents
and opponents of one
southern region?
Q: The security is an overall affair of the whole Sudan. And it is not exclusively ours. We will join hands together and try to see some measure of protection is given to the people. But this is difficult to come by because you need the cooperation of the SPLA, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (which is fighting government forces in the south). If they don't cooperate, and if they say the war should continue then there is going to be insecurity. But we will try on our own to see to it that people are protected and food is provided.

Q: So you feel that there is really no fundamental differences among them.

A: That's right. Nothing fundamental. Somebody thinks he doesn't like that tribe. Some other fellow thinks he doesn't like the face of that guy. Ask me what political principle is there that divides them. Hardly any. You look into their (election) manifestos, they all read alike. And you wonder why are they not one? It comes to this prejudices. fears, suspicions, all that small things. I think all these can be resolved if we establish a way of communicating with one another. This is, of course, a matter of public relations and we will do it.

Q: What about the location of the Council? Since under the 1972 Act the legal seat of the southern government is in Juba. Are you going to move the government there?

A: I told you before that the Act is no longer the version it was in 1972. Its sanctity has been violated eight times. And, as I mentioned before, there is no one south anymore. There are three. And the forces of division are still in plain. We will not force anything on anybody. This is a democratic system. But we will persuade the people to come to know that it is in their interest to live together. If that is in Juba, fine. If they choose Malakal, fine. If they choose another place altogether, that is also fine.

Q: Is that an admission that the Council will sit in Khartoum? A: Our offices are in Khartoum. We are talking in Khartoum now. And what you know, of course, is that the Governors are members of this Council. So we can choose any day to go and hold our meetings in Juba. We can choose tomorrow to go to Malakal or go to Wau, depending on the problems that arise. If there are urgent problems...
that require our collective action in Juba, we will go to Juba, and hold the meetings and take decisions there. Because we are so divided now that it is physically impossible to run the affairs of the south from one sector.

Q: Let's now move to the burning issue of the north/south conflict. What do you think can be done to bring the two together?

A: You are aware there is a constitutional conference underway. It is intended to resolve the constitutional differences, the political differences, the prejudices, the bitterness and so forth. These things are to be corrected, and set in a law that should perhaps come after the constitutional conference. It is, however, difficult to speculate. But I think there is goodwill everywhere. Many people in the north here, including the Prime Minister (Saddiq El Mahdi) have come to know and to admit in public and in private that southerners have got grievances which must be corrected. If you take this, as a take-off point, to the resolution of the problems, I think we can go very far. What's important is perhaps we should start off first by trusting one another, then we can go far. If you start off by mistrust the road is likely to be bumpy, dusty and zigzag, full of dangers.

Let's say, take the Prime Minister from what he says, and give him the chance to prove this point. Give the Sudanese also a chance to prove to themselves and to the rest of the world that they can live together.

Q: What is your vision of southern Sudan? In other words, what sort of southern Sudan would you like to see emerge?

A: My role is caretaking, to a point where southerners would sit among themselves and determine the style of government they would like to see in one southern, two southern regions, three or even more. What I can do is to see that the people at least get together. Let them agree and let them quarrel. My ultimate hope is that they will agree on something. I will play the role of a catalyst.

As to my vision of southern Sudan, I want it peaceful. I want it prosperous, united, at least in spirit. I want the people to love one another, to like one another and to exchange visits. I want any southerner to live where he wants, to live in the south and in the Sudan as a whole, for that matter. This is, of course, a teamwork, and a collective responsibility. It includes you, it includes me and it includes everybody. That is all I can tell you now.
INTERVIEW WITH LEADING POLITICIAN ON INDEPENDANCE

Khartoum HERITAGE in English 13 Apr 87 pp 4, 6

[Interview with Sayed Hilary Paul Logali by HERITAGE Editor-in-Chief, Mr. Arop Madut Arop; date and place not given]

[Text] Q: As a leading Sudanese Politician and statesman looking from a broad angle, how could you assess the 21 years of Independence? And what lessons can we draw from those experiences as we move towards the building of a united democratic Republic?

A: Thirty one years is quite a long time in the life of a man. We can say the same for a Nation. Those who ushered in Independence are no longer in the political scene and most of them have died. Those now at the helm are a younger generation. One should reasonably expect that with the passage of Thirty one years in the life of a nation some sort of maturity ought to have been achieved both in the civil and political life.

The Sudan however emerged into nationhood with no impediment. It had never been ruled as one country, it had never been brought up to feel as one nation, and two distinct parts of it were kept rigidly apart. The South and the North were treated as two separate countries, with two official different languages: Arabic in the North and English in the South. Whereas in the North, Islam predominated, in the South Christianity was given way. There were even two different days of rest in the week: Friday in the North and Sunday in the South. There were different sets of holidays and others. The mentalities of the two were therefore different.

Unfortunately for the Sudan, the "BIG BANG" of independence...
triggered a civil war which took much of the first seventeen years of independence. In short independence started with suspicions between the two parts of the country. At worst it was bitterness between the two. The South felt betrayed by the British and hoodwinked by the Northerners. One can therefore say the growing together of the two parts of the country to mould into one was slowed down and brought with built-in time-bombs. Normally with the differences described above, one would not expect such a homogeneous country to draw together and become homogeneous.

To guide such a country to unity of purpose and goals needed much more insight and imagination from our founding fathers. This is where I think we failed miserably. Instead of introducing a slow purposeful process of integration our founding fathers behaved as if they had inherited a homogeneous country which was wrongfully and purposefully kept apart by a malicious ruler. Many hurried measures of integration into homogeneity were rushed i.e. Sudanization, mixing of the Army by attempting to transfer Southern units to the North, a part of the country totally alien to these soldiers mainly recruited from village warriors. A friction triggering an explosion was therefore created.

The solution offered by our founding fathers led to more resentment from the aggrieved especially when these solutions hankered after the slogan that the Sudan was one country and anyone wanting any differentiation was a separatist. It was therefore tantamount to treason. Things went from bad to worse and instead of achieving a national consensus, the gap began to widen more and more and more the country was dragged into a devastating civil war in the attempt of the leaders to enforce a military solution. The Army was brought in for the purpose and parliamentary democracy was suspended. With the Army making more blunders in the prosecution of the war, the October revolution took place and there was a brief experiment with parliamentary democracy again. Yet no lessons were learnt and political parties began political bickering. The politicians that held the rein of power still refused to accept facts and tried to continue ruling the country in the same manner.
as they had done immediately after independence. The aim had been homogeneity — one country — one language — one religion. A permanent constitution was not made because of the insistence of adopting an Islamic constitution. This was resented and vigorously opposed by the Southerners. The situation again made the Army to come in to take the reins of power in May 1969.

With the recognition of the futility of centralism, the May leaders achieved a measure of success crowned by bringing the civil war to an end in 1972. The rest of the story is known to your readers as it had taken place in their lifetime. Again after abrogation of the agreement that brought the first civil war to an end, and with the introduction of Islamic Sharia, the clandestine movement in the South was galvanized into a full blown rebellion very highly organized and led by more sophisticated and well educated younger men. It has plunged the country into a worse bloodshed than hitherto because most international arms are now used by the SPLA and the government. This is tantamount to mutual destruction.

To summarise, the points are as follows:

(1) The Sudan is not a homogeneous country. Therefore a suitable form of government should be aimed at.

(2) War cannot solve the problem.

(3) Insistence on a Religious Constitution particularly an Islamic one will not permit national integration and consensus.

(4) The South should not be taken for granted as a misled group of people who should be re-oriented if need be by force.

(5) National Economic Development programs should be evenly distributed.

(6) The South means to be a part of the Sudan and not an appendage and would like the power of state to be broadened at the Centre, and not merely to be given a portion in the form of autonomy.

To my mind the present leaders who have now inherited the reins of power from their predecessors still think the same. "Power is theirs" the South can be given the crumbs that fall from the table. They are not full participants. In fact the power in the North has revolved around two fami-
lies; the Mahdi's and
the Mirghani's. They
have now come out in
full colours to lead the
political parties inste-
dad of manipulating
things in the back-
ground as their fathers did.
They do not even think
this power should pass
out to their followers
in the North, how can
they then expect to
dream one day to share
it with the peripheral
Southerners? This is the
reality of the mentality
of those in power now.

The years of indepen-
dence therefore have be-
en characterized by bro-
ken promises and suspi-
cion between the two parts
of the country. The South
has graduated from separat-
tion to taking their role
of jointly owning the
Sudan with the Northern-
ers seriously. They re-
fuse a pariah position.
This has surprised the
Northerners who thought
they could keep the Sou-
th at bay by promises and
guile. They are surprised
to the extent that they
are now toying with the
dream of the possibility
and the distant necessity
of letting the South go
its way i.e. separation.

The Southerners are
surprised that when they
demand their lot and when
they point out the
other existing majority
in the country i.e. maj-
ority of the black non-
Arab people they are
now accused of racism!!

If we can therefore
draw proper lessons from
the problems I have em-
erated above, I believe
we can build a strong,
beautiful, rich United Sud-
ian entity.

Q. 2 Some people in au-
thority think that the
problem facing the Sudan
is no longer North-South,
but South-South problems.
How valid is this claim?

A. 2: It is a gimmick.
They want to transfer
responsibility for the-
ir failures and to incite
the South against itself.
They have created poverty
by unequal development
and to cover-up they in-
cite the Southerners that
they are cheating one
another. In fact anything
stand now in the political
spectrum the trouble is
taking the shape of those
who had been continuously
locked out of power, i.e.
the Rural Sudanese people
and those who had and
would like to perpetually
enjoy the power, i.e. the
Urban dwellers and the
people of the Central
Sudan who had benefited
from the British rule and
social services. They now
possess the wealth and
power. They would conjure
up tricks to divide their
opponents and cling to
power.

Q. 3: Is the Sudan sus-
ceptible to the Lebanese
type of Sectarian dichot-
omy and how can we avert
it?
A. 3: The ingredients of the Lebanese situation are there, but I do not anticipate in the near future a Lebanese situation. The more we delay in the solutions to our problems the more we will slide into the Lebanese scenario. Partition may look simpler to the frustrated politician, but where do you draw the line now? The Rural people of the Sudan all feel together now. They feel they are cheated whether they are in the South, in Darfur, in the Nuba Mountains, in the Red Sea Hills, in Southern Blue Nile, in the far North just to mention a few. They feel the same burden. Why partition and not change course instead?

I still believe however that at the end some modus vivendi will be worked out. The first eight years of the May Regime indicates that something can always be thrashed out and harmony can be achieved.

Q. 4: As a veteran politician, do you think that chances for national reconciliation are stronger today than they had ever been?

A. 4: I actually believe that National reconciliation is there staring us at our faces but we do not want to seize the opportunity. We are still in love with the past and are romantic rather than realistic. We still are lured by the idea of homogeneity and if that is unachievable than a kind of majority should impose itself. In the minds of the present rulers the Islamic majority should impose itself. They are frightened by the fact that there is another majority in the Sudan and that is the non-Arab majority. Why can't this impose itself?

For me I do not believe in the imposition of this majority or that but in an accommodation of all to live together peacefully. When we talk of majorities in the sense above then we shall lose sight of solutions. We can still find solution instead of insiting on inherited entrenched positions left to us at independence. It is time to readjust. Reconciliation was already made in Addis Ababa in 1972.
Q: The public thinks that April 6th uprising has not achieved the anticipated peace process. What is your comment?

A: First of all it is an honour and privilege to talk to Heritage. Heritage is one of the true children of the uprising. Heritage is also among the few newspapers that we have in this country which is addressing itself to the real consensus and immediate dangers that we perceive. I am glad that I can meet with you.

But I must share with you the frustrations of the failure of peace initiative. When we fought against the dictatorship of Nimeri, and defeated him on April 6th, we had high hopes and we thought that the will of our people will find its way to realise the objectives of unity, democracy, peace and development.

Unfortunately the very fact that people are still being killed everyday is an indication of our failure.

But I don't attribute this failure to lack of determination from the part of our people. I believe that there are forces in our society which are benefiting from the present situation. The fact that, today, we can buy the USA dollars in Khartoum for a certain number of pounds and sell them in Juba with huge profits means that there are people who are benefitting from the war. The same people also smuggle liquor, which has
been banned in the Sudan, from the neighbouring countries.

I will not be cynical to say that Sudanese politicians don't want peace. I believe that every Sudanese want peace. The problem is what kind of peace and how?

The dominant thinking since April 6th calls for peace based on certain terms. Whether this is Gizouli government or the present regime. The thing is there are a lot of conditions and hurdles that have been created. I believe that the government wants peace, but it doesn't seem that the decision makers are willing to pay the price for peace.

There is a price for everything. There is a price for war and we are paying it everyday, in terms of human resources, development and the unity of the country. This is the price of war.

And the price of peace means that we have to sit and truely, sincerely and seriously decide that the balance of economic and political powers in this country since independence has to do with the structure of power be it economical, social or political in this country.

We now know that this structure will always perpetuate war. Therefore the only way is to restructure the system. This is what the problem is about.

But the difficulty is that some groups know that by restructuring the system they are not going to be in the position of power. Until this leadership feels that we have paid enough, I don't think peace will come.

The mentality that has had had the upper hand since the April 6th was a mentality which thought that the problem of war can be solved by just having a peace conference - in the sense that you bring few people from this or that place, give them ministerial and ambassadorial positions, and all will be well. This, of course, doesn't mean restructuring the system.

Genuine peace in this country will not take place unless there is genuine equality, justice and development for all.

The otherside of the equation, of course, is that those in power seem to be interested
in peace at their own terms. I hope we know by now that there is no military solution to this situation. People talk about military solution as if it is an option. It is a real option because it is not a solution. This war will continue.

The only way out is to try and sit down as Sudanese and reach an accommodation. This will depend on whether people are ready to pay the price of peace.

Having said that, I must underline the fact that we have failed in getting peace as quickly as we had anticipated.

Fortunately, there are other indications. The typical example in the Koka Dam Declaration, which is the product of the Sudanese initiative. Koka Dam is not just the child of the National Alliance for the Salvation of the country (NASC) and the SPLA. It belongs to all of us. But we were able to sit together and address ourselves with open hearts and open minds to the new Sudan that we want to establish.

The fact that some of us were able to agree gives me hope, inspirations and strength in my commitment that if we work hard enough we will achieve peace.

But the peace will not be given by someone outside the Sudan. We have to fight for it and work for it. I say this because I feel that Heritage has been instrumental in this fight - by articulating the grieveness of our people, by expressing the point of view that doesn't find an opportunity to express itself in other media. But by working collectively, hammering on the need for peace, I think eventually we will have it.

Q: What is your comment about the Prime Minister's new peace initiative offered on April 6th?

A: An assessment of the Prime Minister's Sadiq el Mahdi's initiative is not an easy thing to do. Because it is too soon to start passing judgment. This is not the first time such an initiative was made. I believe that all Sudanese patriots, those who are concerned with peace must welcome the reconciliation that was expressed by the Prime Minister. I must say that the Prime Minister's speech carried no condemnations, no accusations and no calling names. Instead the Prime Minister was talking in a very reconciliatory terms.
This is something that all of us must welcome. But in real political terms and in down to earth political terms, the initiative really falls short of a move that could realise peace immediately.

We know since the beginning of the dialogue with the SPLA in 1985, that we have now in the situation where if two steps are taken there would be an immediate ceasefire.

These two steps are, one, the conciliation of the September Sharia laws or their substitutions by the laws that were proposed by the Bar Association.

The second step is that the controversy Article 4 of the 1985 Transitional Constitution referring to the source of legislation should at least be frozen, until the convening of the proposed Constitutional Conference.

If implemented, the two steps would lead to an immediate cease-fire and the lifting of the state of emergency. But the initiative does not do that.

Frankly speaking, it does not do that.

The initiative promises us that the laws would be cancelled and that substitute laws would be found. Laws that would satisfy the aspirations of Muslims and non-Muslims.

But you know, this is a very difficult balance, and we have been trying to do it for the last two years. Why talk about it now again. Why don't we just say we will have laws that would satisfy the aspirations of all the Sudanese. But having chosen to do that we will have to wait and see. Also the same applies to Article 4. The Prime Minister in his initiative say there will be an endeavour to amend article 4 in such a way that it will reflect the cultural, religious and social diversity of the Sudan.

Well you know, it is good that the statement contained a partial acknowledgement of the diversity of this country. And there is a promise to fulfil the aspirations of all the diverse groups.

But my problem with the declaration is that it doesn't specify how. I say this because such promises were made several times in the past. But given the complexity of the problem, what is needed now is more than the promise. What is needed is concrete, clear policy statement.

But, anyway, still I think one should not be pessimistic, we should all welcome this initiative that there
is going to be a back-up to this statement. Provided there is going to be a follow-up to this statement. The thing is, we have heard so many statements made today, and the next day contradicted. This is the problem. One hopes that there will be consistency and continuous clarifications of this initiative.

One hopes also that there will be concrete action to indicate that this is not just a whimsical or a political statement that was made on such a dear and grand occasion when we were celebrating April 6th Uprising.

We have now reached a new level of understanding of the conflict, its roots and how to stop it. I hope that will be reflected by a series of endeavours to create a conducive atmosphere for the convening of the constitution conference.

To sum up, the initiative offered some hope for the renewal of effort for peace but it falls from reaching that peace immediately. But, as I said, one hopes that it would be the beginning to create a conducive atmosphere for that purpose.

Moreover, one hopes that there will be a national dialogue, that the media will engage itself in addressing the immediate reasons for the continuation of the war.

Let's all talk about why this war is continuing and let us all try to put an end to it.

The debate should not be focused on September laws or on article 4 of the Constitution alone. The important thing is the war and the effort for peace.

If we engage in such a national dialogue, we will make giant strides and move faster towards what we all hope to see in the Sudan -- and that is Peace, Prosperity and Development.

/13104
CSO: 4500/90
Nineteen sixty-four. It's three o'clock in the morning. Outside the Sudanese parliament sits a group of women; they are demanding equality in employment, education and other walks of life. A tall young woman constantly reminds them of their rights and assures them that their determination will force the government to give in. At four o'clock the government concedes.

Nineteen sixty-seven. It's the same square outside the Sudanese parliament, and it's evening. A group of women has assembled to ask the government to ban the communist party, whose members had insulted the Prophet Muhammad the previous day. The same tall woman, now 35 years old, tells the officials that the women are in no mood to leave until their request is granted. The government gives in. The communist party is banned.

Dr Suad al-Fatih is not a feminist. Yet her work and the contribution she has made to women's causes might make the hardest and staunchest of feminists wonder if religion could be the real liberating force. She is a member of the Sudanese parliament and also a champion of those who are downtrodden in Sudan. Although she is so deeply involved in politics and social work there is no-one better at caring for her family or running the house, as her husband and children will vouch.

Hectic and tiring

Dr Suad wakes at 4 o'clock in the morning, performs prayers, recites the Quran, prepares breakfast, reads the papers, attends to administrative jobs and then goes to work after dropping her children off at university and school. In the evening she returns home to devote herself again to family chores. The life is hectic and very tiring. But she has the full support of her husband, whom she met while at university and who is an activist like herself.

Life has always been very busy for Dr Suad and her family. Her father was a governor and her grandfather was head of the ulama. Together with her two sisters she received the best education available to any Sudanese during the 1940s. She joined the Islamic movement in 1952 at the age of 20, while studying at the University of Khartoum. She was an activist and also a journalist for the magazine published by the Islamic movement.

Expelled

She came to England to complete her PhD at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. Before that she had spent considerable time in Saudi Arabia organising the first girls' college in Riyadh. She was also a consultant for girls' education with Unesco. In the 1970s she joined the Omdurman Islamic University in Sudan, from where she and her husband were later expelled for their political views.

Dr Suad feels that true knowledge of Islam would enable men and women to respect each other and to share social and political responsibilities. She believes that woman is the head of the state; on her shoulders rests the responsibility of raising good leaders for the nation. Motherhood, in her view, is the most serious and complex duty. "It is more serious than statesmanship" she says.

Her closest friends

She has tried to practise her ideas in her own family life. She regards love, when it is related to husband or children, as the basis for a healthy family life. A positive, loving attitude can mean that a woman is the friend of her children. She has two sons and one daughter and believes them to be her closest friends. "They discuss with everything they consider significant in their lives" she says.

Dr Suad also maintains that even a happy marriage is not without problems. "Problems add spice to married life" she admits. Her husband, Ahmad Hassan, is himself an Islamist and fully understands the pressures of her work. They consult together (a cardinal point of Islam) to sort out their problems.

Dr Suad is widely travelled. This is something she doesn't like as it has deprived her of a lot of reading time and she wants to pursue an academic career. But when she finds time she returns to her reading room and reads about the life of the Prophet, who has been the most dominating influence on her attitudes.

It was for the honour of the Prophet that she spent several months in gaud. And it was in the Sudanese gaad that she taught to other inmates those aspects of the Prophet's life which have made her such a dedicated Islamist.
OWNER OF AL-SAHAFAH DISCUSSES ROLE OF PRESS

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 15-21 Apr 87 pp 59-60

[Interview with 'Abd-al-Rahman Mukhtar, owner and founder of AL-SAHAFAH, on the occasion of the newspaper's resumption of publication, by Muhammad Ahmad Hisham: "We Followed al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's Advice To Turn the Newspapers into Corporations"; Khartoum, date not given]

[Text] The new Sudanese information system bill that the cabinet has discussed establishes broad areas for participation, not limited to the transmission of information and ideas to the media, but embodied also in the forms of media ownership and management. Thus, opening the way for individuals, groups, and parties to publish political and nonpolitical newspapers and removing the government's hand from the newspapers it used to own—all this falls under the heading of healthy democracy that distances the hand of the government from the area of press control.

In keeping with this line, the government decided to return the [newspaper] names AL-AYYAM and AL-SAHAFAH to their founders, Bashir Muhammad Sa'id and 'Abd-al-Rahman Mukhtar. After a government-decreed suspension lasting more than 6 months, and after more than a year of debate, during which the Sudanese journalists' unions and the workers at the two publishing houses took an opposing position strongly rejecting any movement to restore them to private ownership, the countdown to resume publication of the two newspapers has indeed begun.

Regarding the circumstances that accompanied the making of the decision such a long time after the uprising, 'Abd-al-Rahman Mukhtar, owner and founder of AL-SAHAFAH Publishing House, said to AL-MAJALLAH:

"The 'May' press, represented by AL-SAHAFAH and AL-AYYAM, was alone in the field after the April 1985 popular uprising. For certain reasons, among them the influence of these two newspapers, the transitional government took a shortcut and used them to propagandize for the transitional government and introduce the new ministers who came from the ranks of the political forces. The transitional government thought it best not to interfere directly with the operation of these two newspapers, so as not to lose them, and secondly, so as not to come into collision with the two unions, especially since at that moment in the Sudan the unions as a whole controlled and dominated the entire
situation. The transitional government therefore decided on an easy shortcut, which was to refer to AL-SAHAFAH and AL-AYYAM as the national press, without making any attempt to return the two newspapers to their legitimate owners. I am certain that the phrase "nationalistic press" is an innovation that the world of the press never knew, even in the Egyptian experiment during the time of 'Abd-al-Nasir."

He went on to say: "In spite of the fact that the local press suppressed and did not allow the appearance of the many opinions demanding the return of the newspapers to their owners on the grounds that these newspapers had been confiscated by the overthrown regime and that the democratic administration and revolution had taken place only to restore rights to those to whom they were due and to restore the sons to their fathers, the legitimate government that came to power after the elections and which represents the will of the Sudanese people could find no way to avoid restoring the right to the person to whom it was due."

During the initial measures and arrangements for resuming publication of AL-AYYAM and AL-SAHAFAH, certain independent daily newspapers, i.e. AL-SIYASAH, published and edited by Khalid Farah, and AL-USBU', edited by Muhyl-al-Din Titawi, expressed strong reservations to the dealings accompanying the return of AL-AYYAM and AL-SAHAFAH. This was especially the assessment of AL-SIYASAH and AL-USBU', both of which pointed out that, "One of the confiscated newspapers now being returned to its owners and resuming publication obtained the approval of a government agency to rent government real estate to be used as offices for the newspaper. There are also reports that the same returning newspapers intend to benefit from government presses so that they can be published at the expense of other newspapers. Information has also leaked out that the government has decided to become a partner in the nationalized newspapers now being returned to their owners."

AL-USBU' and AL-SIYASAH held that this should be considered an attempt at interference by the government and constituted an attack on the freedom and traditions of the press through the government's offering financial facilities and support. AL-SIYASAH demanded "giving just and equal opportunity to everyone, in the light of day, not in the dark."

Regarding these accusations, the owner of AL-SAHAFAH said to AL-MAJALLAH:

"I can categorically deny that the government offered us any conditions for resuming publication. It imposed no opinion on us. Rather, Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi gave us the advice that these newspapers should be corporations. Personally, I say without reservation that no individual can publish a newspaper by himself at a time when the costs of a newspaper publishing and printing business have reached 12 million [Sudanese] pounds. We agree with the prime minister's assessment that no individual can publish a successful newspaper with his own funds."

'Abd-al-Rahman Mukhtar went on, saying: "Despite the precautions of the owners of the newspapers, the Numayri regime took away not just our names, but our names, presses, and buildings. The legitimate government cannot agree to return only our names to us, making us have recourse to the courts to demand
equivalent treatment, according to the presidential decree issued by Numayri during his administration and mandating the return of all confiscated and nationalized commercial firms to their owners. A law to that effect was issued; under its terms, settlement committees were formed, and the aggrieved parties received their buildings and property after they had carried out their obligations. Why aren't AL-AYYAM and AL-SAHAFAH being given equal treatment, in accordance with the decision of the settlement committees and the presidential decree?"

Regarding the arrangements that have been made for resuming publication of AL-SAHAFAH, 'Abd-al-Rahman Mukhtar explained: "The legitimate government suspended AL-AYYAM and AL-SAHAFAH because the performance was not good and because the material losses were great on account of the huge 'May' armies absorbed by these two newspapers. For example, AL-SAHAFAH, which had no more than 100 employees at the time it was nationalized, now had more than 500 of them. We have welcomed and thanked the government for the decision to return the names, and we have begun preparing to publish the newspapers as corporations not subject to any authority, government, or party, as the prime minister and minister of information stressed. Preparations are expected to be completed within 3 months. AL-SAHAFAH will begin from the point where its hopes were broken and its dreams ended in August 1970, with the decree of nationalization. The daily AL-SAHAFAH will be published, followed by the publication of THE AFRICAN STAR, the magazine 'AZIZI AL-QARI', based on [the Egyptian magazine] AKHIR SA'AH, the magazine SAYYIDATI, and KITAB AL-SHAHR [the book of the month], which will be published based on the [Egyptian] serial IQRA'. An AL-SAHAFAH Publishing and Printing House will be established to print all these publications, in addition to its other commercial activities. It will open its doors to young talents and see to their training domestically and abroad. Together with the other Arabic newspapers, we will try to contribute to raising the level of the Sudanese citizen and strengthening Sudanese relations with our Arab brothers."

The law established during the transition period made it possible for any person to pay the insurance easily and publish a newspaper, something that created many distortions in journalistic practice. These things worried some people, and they began to talk about fears of what they called foreign extensions and the dedication of pages to suspicious purposes and to serve personal ends lacking in journalistic feeling. 'Abd-al-Rahman Mukhtar commented on this question, saying:

"The transitional period was shaky and stood on slippery ground because of the shock of success. Therefore, the government that took over the burdens at that time was not able to look into the details of the injustices committed during the May regime. Yet despite the fact that many people have held its weakness in details against it, no one can deny that the transitional government accomplished the fundamental things for which it came. It held clean elections and turned over the legitimate government to elected agencies. My assessment of journalistic performance during the transitional period is that it, too, was weak, because the workers in these publishing houses were an inseparable part of the May administration, and because a feeling of guilt led them to extremism in nationalism. This made their practice move in one direction, without allowing the other opinion to appear."
Thus, the Sudanese press during the transitional period carried on with the same heads and pens that served the Socialist Union and its concepts and slogans. From one day to the next, it turned into a spokesman for democracy and freedom, something that the mind cannot understand or comprehend. It was therefore unable to carry out its basic obligation, which, at that period, should have been to preach democracy and teach people its concepts and benefits and the meaning of freedom of the press and of the pen."

'Abd-al-Rahman Mukhtar ended by saying, "One of democracy's merits is that it has approved the publication of many newspapers, so that the Sudanese stage has been established. Unfortunately, however, journalistic performance has in general not satisfied the aspirations of the Sudanese people who experienced the revolution. Performance is weak, the style is tawdry, confidence is shaky, and wrangling fills half of the space in the newspapers. In general, this journalism has been unable to keep up with the march of events and carry out its duty to preach democracy, hold to its goals, and shine light on its merits. It has had recourse to the most dangerous style known to today's press: publishing reports, commenting on them, and charging others with crimes, only for it to turn out subsequently that the reports themselves were untrue. Thus, the attacks in the newspapers rest on uncertain foundations and flow from personal points of departure having no relation to the sanctity of the profession. This has made the people worry about the consequences of this faulty behavior that threatens democracy at its foundation."

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MINISTER OF ECONOMY DISCUSSES ARAB INVESTMENT, ECONOMIC CRISIS

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 1-7 Apr 87 pp 32-33

[Interview with Ismail Khelil, Tunisian economy minister, by Nura Fakhuri: "Support of Some Consumer Commodities Must Be Repealed, Someone Must Pay the Price"; Tunis, date not given]

[Text] Many observers of the Tunisian economic budget have agreed that the economic reform program adopted by the government of Prime Minister Rachid Sfar and watched over by Economy Minister Ismail Khelil has begun to yield a positive return and that it may indeed over the long term be a program that will restore its efficiency to the Tunisian economy. On the other hand, some think that this program, whose implementation in Tunisia began 7 months ago, has dealt harshly with the ordinary Tunisian, who has found himself in a closed circle, bearing the burden of increased prices for consumer goods, transportation, and services without a increase in his income.

How does the Tunisian economy minister evaluate his reform program? What is the role of the Arab states in supporting the Tunisian economy? How have the program's negative aspects affected the ordinary Tunisian? How can he be protected from them?

AL-MAJALLAH met with Minister Ismail Khelil for a frank conversation and listened to his defense of the economic reform program he oversees.

[Question] You have undertaken a number of moves, including a visit to Saudi Arabia and a number of European countries, in order to gather the largest possible amount of support for the Tunisian economy in the form of long-term loans or investments. One notes that most of the loans obtained by Tunisia from 1985 to the present are foreign loans from France, Canada, or the World Bank. What place do the Arab world and Arab funds have in aiding Tunisia?

[Answer] The place of the Arab world is significant for Tunisia. Saudi assistance has been up to the level of our hopes, since all the projects we agreed on have been implemented. Our cooperation with the Saudi Development Fund has been and still is positive, as is our cooperation with the government of Kuwait. There has previously been cooperation between us and the Kuwaiti Development Fund. We can say that Tunisia derives the highest proportion of benefit from this fund in comparison to other countries.

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Contacts Continue

[Question] Do you think Foreign Minister Hedi Mabrouk's recent visit to the Arab states was positive, particularly since there are rumors that consider it to have been a failure? If Arab cooperation with Tunisia has been considerable, why does the visitor to Tunisia come away with the impression that the man in the street blames some of the Arab world for not holding out a helping hand to him during his distress?

[Answer] We are in continuing contact with our [Arab] brothers, particularly with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. I believe there is a response on the part of these countries. I think Hedi Mabrouk’s visit concentrated on political, not economic aspects. I think this impression about support for Tunisia is incorrect, because the Arab states participated in the recent Paris meeting held late in February to support the Tunisian economy. The meeting included no less that 16 countries and 13 financial organizations. The Arab states, like other countries, contributed to supporting the economic reform program approved last year for implementation in Tunisia.

[Question] What about the suspended Arab investments in Tunisia, such as the project to clean up Lake Tunis and turn it into a tourist area?

[Answer] This is a joint private investment undertaken by a Saudi investor in partnership with the Tunisian government. I think the project will continue. I had a conversation last month with the investor, Shaykh Salih Kamil, and he has no intention to stop the project; rather, the opposite. There was merely a misunderstanding, and it has recently been removed—especially since about $15 million have already been invested in the project.

[Question] Some economic observers believe the economic reform project you are adopting has begun to bear positive fruit. Let us, however, consider the program from the point of view of the Tunisian citizen who imagined that the prices of his basic needs would go down. Now, suddenly, all the prices are rising, including recently the price of transportation; and the price of bread is said to be rising at the end of this month, while the purchasing power of the dinar is falling. From these two points of view, how do you evaluate the program, taking into consideration what happened 3 years ago when the price of bread increased?

[Answer] The program is an integrated one. In it there are a number of measures aimed at giving the Tunisian economy greater efficiency, so that it will be able to confront the challenges. As everyone knows, Tunisia was able to fund part of its development program from oil revenues estimated at 300 million dinars a year. However, these revenues have begun to shrink. It is expected that by the end of 1990, Tunisia will find itself with an oil deficit and will become an importer, after having been an exporter. It was therefore necessary for us to prepare the Tunisian economy for such developments and adjust the Tunisian economic structure so that it will become able to fund the development effort and absorb the largest possible number of Tunisian workers, whose unemployment would constitute a social and political danger to the
country. It is necessary for us to continue development, modernization of work methods, and preparation of the Tunisian economy for the coming phase and for the provision of the hard currency we need. For all these reason an agreement was reached on a number of measures, which aim at controlling public and private consumption, rationalizing investment, and increasing exports until they become part of our economic strategy, for exports are what will provide the alternative to shrinking oil resources. We have therefore concentrated on human resources in our reform project. We think that these resources must be exploited in production and export operations. Until now, the motivating force for development in Tunisia has been domestic demand and the domestic market. The motivating force must now become foreign demand and the exporting of services and goods. The exports battle is not easy. Our products must be able to compete with other products, including the products of the European market. While talking about exports, I would like to talk about tourism, which has become the largest source of hard currency, and about agricultural and industrial goods. As for agricultural products, we export dates, olive oil, and citrus; and we will increase their export. There are agricultural products we import from abroad, and we will try to decrease our need for them. Grain, meat, and dairy products contribute to an annual balance of trade deficit of 160 million dinars in hard currency. If we produce these foodstuffs locally and content ourselves with [what we produce], this deficit can be cut in half by the end of the reform program. On the other hand, there is a good industrial base in Tunisia, and we want to direct part of the edifice of industrial production abroad. Tunisia has great advantages. It lies at the crossroads between the European, African, and Arab countries. This location must be exploited to support the Tunisian economy, especially since Tunisia has important and good economic agreements with the countries of the European market and other countries. All [our] agricultural and industrial products enter the [Common] Market countries without restriction or condition. Within this economic strategy, one must control public and private consumption. This can take place only by controlling revenue policy. Thus, the budget that used to support many consumer commodities has to be decreased or abolished, and someone has to pay the price.

Who Pays?

[Question] Unfortunately, the man in the street is the one who pays, although this plan was established to help him. Also, if the goal of the plan is to increase production, I should think the easiest way to increase production would be to insure a comfortable atmosphere for the worker so that he can give more. This is what the new plan has not taken into account.

[Answer] Wage-earners, workers, and employees will have an opportunity to increase their incomes, but by improving productivity. If productivity increases, we see nothing to prevent an increase in their salaries and purchasing power. If we increase wages without an increase in productivity, a financial deficit will result, and the worker will be the first loser.

[Question] But as a matter of fact, without raising wages, you are continually raising prices!
An increase in wages means an increase in prices. At the present time, we are saying that the Tunisian people as a whole are asked to accept some sort of sacrifice for 3 or 4 years, because without sacrifice no program can succeed. This is the price we are asking from the Tunisian people. They must bear some scarcity until the Tunisian economy regains its effectiveness, which will happen because of the support we are getting from a number of countries and organizations and because of the government’s effort, which we hope will invigorate the economy. Only when the plan succeeds and the Tunisian economy regains its vitality can we raise wages. We are not unaware of the difficulty of this equation. People feel squeezed. We know it and perceive it. But what is the alternative? If we do not increase the price of transportation and some consumer goods, who will assume these increases? The state, without the least doubt. With the budget of the state already in deficit, these increases must be obtained either by levying taxes—and we in Tunisia have reached the maximum level of taxation—or the deficit must be taken away by foreign loans—and we have also reached the maximum borrowing level. We cannot go beyond it, or else the Tunisian economy will be in danger. I ask the Tunisian people to understand that all we are undertaking is for their good. Let the people give us 2 or 3 years to restore the health and soundness of the economy, and the yield in the end will be to the benefit of this people. In general, before we began to implement the reform plan, we took certain measures. We increased the minimum wage and increased family allowances. We gave more than 80,000 needy families special support to protect them from the negative effects of the program. As for the middle classes and those above middle class, we ask them to be steadfast and to sacrifice until we succeed in the task of saving the economy. I agree with you that there are some difficulties in the program, but we have no alternative. Any program will necessarily have negative effects, but the positive ones remain greater.

Crisis of Confidence

Part of the economic crisis Tunisia is experiencing today is a crisis of confidence between the people and the government, a crisis with roots stretching back to misbehavior in the previous government. How can you ask people to sacrifice when they have no guarantees and their confidence has been shaken?

The crisis through which Tunisia is passing is not peculiar to Tunisia. The whole world is passing through an economic crisis. Dozens of developing countries are passing through crises more severe than ours. Because of the respect it enjoys and the friendships it cultivates, Tunisia always finds support and assistance. In a month and a half, we have been able to gather $530 million. This is not easy. We have a clarity of vision that has helped us gain the support of other countries. Regarding the mistakes that have been made, I would like to correct a certain belief. Since the beginning of the sixth plan in 1982, most of the pressures brought to bear on the Tunisian economy have been external ones. The pressures began with the fluctuation of exchange rates. The value of the dollar went up, and 60 percent of our debt is in dollars. Is it Tunisia’s fault that the value of the dollar went up and that all these Tunisian debts were in that particular hard currency? Secondly, a decline in the conditions of trade took place.
When we export a ton of [olive] oil, it remains at the same price for a long time. When we import a bus or agricultural machinery, it must be imported in dollars. Then a sudden decline in the price of petroleum took place. At the end of 1985, we used to sell a barrel of petroleum for $30; in July 1986, we were selling it for less than $10. And these were the resources we were employing to finance our deficit. In addition, the tourist season last year was weak because of the events that took place.

[Question] Tunisia's reliance for a large part of its income on tourism, which can be subject to various influences--don't you consider this a mistake in the structure of the Tunisian economy?

[Answer] Tunisia does not have natural resources. We have to exploit all our resources. Tourism is part of these resources and brings in no less than 400 million dinars in hard currency. However, tourism, like agriculture, can be affected by the weather.

[Question] Will the value of the dinar decrease again this year?

[Answer] The value of the dinar will remain as it is.

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BAGHDAD GOVERNOR DISCUSSES PUBLIC SERVICE PROJECTS

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 22 Feb 87 p 5

[Text] The appropriate agencies in the districts of the governorate of Baghdad are continuing to work in order to complete the process of development and advancement through which our proud country is advancing under the leadership of the nation's hero, the commander-in-chief, Saddam Husayn.

This was stated to AL-THAWRAH by the governor of Baghdad, 'Abd-al-Qadir Muhammad Amin. He said that the governorate built 120 primary, middle, and secondary schools in the entire area of Baghdad. The schools contain 6 to 12 classrooms, are equipped with laboratories and athletic arenas, and were built by the General Corporation for School Construction of the Ministry of Housing and Construction.

He pointed out that 55 of the 120 schools have been handed over and made completely operational. It is hoped that the remaining schools will be completed by the end of 1987 in addition to the construction of wings for 38 primary, middle, and secondary schools within the framework of the plan to develop Saddam City in Baghdad.

The governor added that renovation and maintenance has been completed on 584 primary schools and kindergartens, and 538 local administration buildings and middle and secondary schools. Also, there are other schools which were completed during the previous year, including 3 18-classroom primary schools in al-Karkh, a primary school in al-Sha'b City, another in Raghibah Khatun, and 5 primary schools in al-Mahmudiyah. Kindergarten facilities were completed, including two in al-Mahmudiyah and one in the al-Tarmiyah district while others were completed in the al-'Amil and al-'Azmiah quarters, each of which contains 6 classrooms. Six youth centers were also completed. Two of them are in al-Dawrah, and the rest are distributed in the al-'Amil and al-Rashidiyah quarters and the townships. Six secondary schools were also completed; two of them are in al-Mahmudiyah, two more are in the al-Jasr district, one is in al-Tarmiyah, and one is in al-Latifah. Also, wings and laboratories were added to the schools, including a four-classroom wing at the Secondary College of Baghdad, and a science laboratory at the al-'Aqidah Secondary School.

The governor confirmed that there are a number of training courses pertaining to all of the primary levels and kindergarten to prepare trainees and
specialists who work in administration, personnel, and accounting in the districts of al-Karkh and al-Rasafah, and in Saddam City. He confirmed that there are courses to improve the teaching of English, math, science, kindergarten administration, vocational training education, and operational scientific research. Other courses include Arabic and English, teaching the alphabet, Islamic education, the administration of kindergartens, library science, special education, and Arabic calligraphy which the Institute of Training and Educational Development and the Institute for the Development of English Teaching will be responsible for implementing. There are also special academic activities for teachers being implemented by the office of training and preparation within the education department of al-Rasafah, including academic and study sessions, training sessions, seminars, lectures, and an educational film presentation.

The governor indicated that there is a new plan to establish courses which will be implemented during the current year. These will include: refresher courses for female teachers currently in education in the specialties of math, science, handicrafts, and kindergarten; courses in the administration of primary schools; a course in technical education; and a course in operational research.

He confirmed that there are workshops for smithcraft and carpentry which are preparing to develop their production by manufacturing home furnishings with modern specifications in order to market them locally. This is in addition to their basic function of producing furniture for the primary schools. So far they have been able to cover the furniture needs of the Baghdad governorate's primary schools and also repair the furniture belonging to the school administrations and the kindergartens as well as the furniture of the newly opened schools and the furniture in all government offices of the Baghdad governorate according to the administrative specifications in effect.

He added that there is a printing press which belongs to the local administration which fulfills the need of many government agencies for forms and paper. It also produces seals for government offices, prints the publications of the Ministry of Local Justice, and issues notices which pertain to this ministry.

He stated that the production of smithcraft and carpentry workshops during the previous year totaled 35,000 desks, 1,572 school chalkboards, 1,674 children's chairs, 558 children's tables, 58 sofas, and 11,000 metal desks, whereas the 1987 plan includes a 5 percent production increase.

As for the municipalities, 'Abd-al-Qadir Muhammad Amin, the governor of Baghdad, pointed out that committees have been formed in the majority of the governorate's municipalities to undertake the leveling and paving of roads within the boundaries of the municipalities with the support of the leaders of the party and the revolution, headed by the commander-in-chief, Saddam Husayn, the architect of the Iraqi renaissance. The al-Mahmudiyah asphalt factory is operational and its high capacity suffices for the paving of al-Mahmudiyah's thoroughfares and sidestreets; another asphalt plant under construction will go into operation at Abu Gharib with a good production level estimated at 20 tons per hour in order to fulfill the needs of the
areas of Abu Gharib, al-Taji, al-Tarmiyah, and al-Rashidiyah in terms of paving and surfacing new streets and maintaining old streets.

He referred to the coordination between the governorate and the General Establishment for Roads and Bridges as well as the Baghdad Road Administration in the implementation of rural roads according to priority.

Drinking water projects for the current year include the implementation of the water project of al-Rashidiyah and al-Yusufiyah, the improvement of water system projects in Baghdad governorate, the water system in the new quarters of al-Rashidiyah, the water system in the villages of al-Mahmudiyah and al-Latifah, and the water project in the villages of al-Mada'in, the systems and water project in the village of al-Dawrah, the water system in al-Taji and al-Tarmiyah, supplying the villages with water and extending the networks to the new quarters in al-Mada'in.

With regard to the distribution of residential land to the citizens, the governor of Baghdad announced that this year 25,000 lots will be distributed throughout the governorate of Baghdad of which 7,000 lots will be distributed in the first batch in accordance with the regulations and principles adopted in this regard.

The governor of Baghdad concluded his remarks by pointing to the preparations being undertaken for the celebration of Governorate Day, which will coincide with the 21st day of this April.

13286/9365
CSOP 4404/265
BRIEFS

RESIDENTIAL LAND DISTRIBUTION IN NINAWA—Five hundred residential lots were distributed yesterday to the citizens of the first governorate of Ninawa. This occurred during a reception at the Ibn-al-'Athir Hall in Mosul, which began with the recitation of the opening verse of the Quran for the souls of the pious martyrs of the battle of Qadisiyyat Saddam. The authorized representative of the first governorate of Ninawa, 'Abd-al-'Kazim 'Ulaywi, delivered a speech in which he saluted the victories of the blessed army of truth in the field of honor in defense of the great Iraq, and its cultural achievements under the leadership of the commander-in-chief, Saddam Husayn, and the defeat of the Iranian enemy. It is worth mentioning that this is the fourth batch to be distributed during 1 year. The municipality of Mosul is currently preparing the fifth batch for distribution at a later time. One lot is 200 square meters and is located in the Ijdidah area of Mosul. [Text] [Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 4 Mar 87 p 4] 13286/9365

CSO: 4404/265
NATIONAL PARTY LEADERS DISCUSS PARTY DISPUTE

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 3 Apr 87 pp 20, 21


[Text] Where is the Syrian National Socialist Party headed, with the disputes which for a number of weeks have raged over it within the leadership? What are the results of the steps the leaders have ventured on to confine the ramifications of the dispute and correct the trends in the debate, which, at some stages of tension, led to a party confrontation that imparted aftereffects which still exist to this day?

AL-HAWADITH went to the Syrian National Socialist Party leadership and submitted to them the questions circulated concerning the dispute which flared up when the party's higher committee decided to dismiss the party chairman, Mr 'Isam al-Mahayiri, stating, as the reason for its decision, that the party chairman had violated the law and the constitution, and al-Mahayiri took the counter-initiative of replying to the higher council by declaring a legal state of emergency within the party and applying the provisions of the constitution, which meant freezing the powers of the higher council while awaiting settlement of the existing disputes.

The chairman of the party, 'Isam al-Mahayiri, talked to AL-HAWADITH at his headquarters in Shatura and said, "What happened in the party is one of the manifestations of the party's inability to overcome fragmentation. In spite of the party unity which was realized in 1978, the mentality of fragmentation or what we in the party call the 'factional mentality' was active in the framework of unity with the mentality of its factional spirit and, of course, the party's bylaws and constitution, which say that the voting body in the party consists of the group of secretaries. The factional mentality gave earnest thought over the course of the past years to enabling its factional spirit to control the council of secretaries and the party voting body. This action created conditions within the party which the successive leaders tried to overcome, weakening the factional spirit and implanting the notions of party unity. However, the factional mentality always tried to implant its factional fanaticism in such a way that prominent fighting men in the party, such as Asad al-'Ashqar, 'Abdallah Sa'adah, Munir Khuri,
'Abdallah Muhsin, Ilyas Jirji and other people who succeeded one another in the chairmanship of the party and its leadership in difficult, critical circumstances became incapable of obtaining membership in the higher council of the party. Meanwhile, we were seeing the likes of Joseph al-Sab'ali, Tawfiq Muhanna and other persons who had no cultural or combative effect in the history of the party gaining the ascendant over the historical leaders—all this because factionalism caused them to triumph at the expense of the basic values in the party. This factionalism strengthened their power through their concern to tighten their grip over the branches and administrative regions by planting certain people who served their clique in our party regions. Therefore, they grew and created an accumulated capital which helped them be the people with the power to take over the leadership.

**AL-HAWADITH:** However, after the party unity in 1978, this "factionalism" managed to preserve its gains. Doesn't this mean that it is stronger?

'Isam al-Mahayiri: Following the circumstances of the unity in the party, because the chairman of the party at that time, Dr 'Abdallah Sab'adah, had refused to yield to the factional mentality and tried as hard as he could to make the party absorb everything, he was considered, in the view of the factionalists, to have committed an unpardonable crime. Therefore, a year of unity did not elapse before the date for the new elections for chairman fell due. Dr Sab'adah ought to have renominated himself for another term as chairman, but he was fought and brought down by the factionalists, and In'am Ra'd, who represented this factional orientation and was the inspector of its school for 30 years, took his place. However, In'am Ra'd struck at the factional coalition during the invasion, and when the pressure was intensified provoked general vindictiveness in the ranks of the national socialists thanks to the laxity of the leadership at that time and his laxity at the head of the command, since the factional spirit in the party felt that it was no longer able to seek shelter under In'am Ra'd's banner because he had lost the ability to represent the leadership force in the party.

**AL-HAWADITH:** Did your election as chairman of the party in opposition to In'am Ra'd come about in effect as a blow against factionalism and revenge against laxity in the face of the invasion or did it come about in effect as a settlement?

'Isam al-Mahayiri: The factional spirit began trying to protect its survival in the party by finding people who would enable it to endure. Therefore, 'Isam al-Mahayiri came in as chairman of the party, since al-Mahayiri does not have a competing factional allegiance and consequently this factional spirit would be able, by means of him, to preserve its positions and increase its strength while waiting for more propitious circumstances for the nomination of one of its personnel to the leadership of the party, especially since this factional spirit, due to the laxity of its leadership, had also started declining in the body of the party, and even among the voters in it.

**AL-HAWADITH:** Didn't the uprising which occurred in 1985 have any role in the change of chairmen?

'Isam al-Mahayiri: The military uprising which occurred in the party in June 1985 was one manifestation of the blockage occurring in the party, because
the factional spirit, through its factional platform, provoked much agitation and tension, which led to the outbreak of this uprising and whose proponents, as they said, sought to send the higher council a letter expressing the party rank and file's refusal to accept the factional dominance which was taking place. This movement was aimed at the higher council specifically, in order to inform it of the rejection of its factional platform. Of course this movement crossed over the red line of protest which is customary in the party, and the national socialists condemned it in terms of method, especially since, most unfortunately, that had occurred in conjunction with the martyrdom of the defense chief in the party, Muhammad Salim, a prominent commander in the party and a respected, appreciated fighting man in the ranks of the party men.

AL-HAWADITH: How was this military uprising dealt with?

'Isam al-Mahayiri: The higher council had the right to issue harsh decrees regarding the comrades who had acted in this manner, in the sense that all the military, legal and moral facts entitled it to make a decision expelling this group from the party. Since this movement had its reasons and its personnel, and since the people who carried it out were fighting comrades in this party and also had their acts of self-sacrifice and their history, the higher council, against which the movement had made a protest, adopted a decree unanimously requesting that this phenomenon be absorbed and that its factors and causes be investigated in order that they could be dealt with — provided that these comrades be submitted to investigation and the punishment they deserved be imposed — while realizing that the party's branches and regions informed the center of the party and the higher council that in spite of their rejection of the style the people conducting the uprising had relied on they were on their side in terms of substance, even if they had not participated with them in their uprising.

Proceeding from the pressure of this party rank and file and from the existing atmosphere, the higher council made its decision and demanded that the executive authorities carry it out. However, the problem that occurred was that the authorities responsible for the execution of this decree faced an attempt to block their ability to carry it out by the exertion of pressure against this decree in the ranks of party members, in particular by the people who had adopted it specifically and portrayed it as a specific platform on the part of the party chairman, who was consequently opposed to the higher council's platform. This meant evasion of responsibility for the decree the higher council itself had taken and portrayal of the party chairman as responsible for the failure to expel the people conducting the uprising and consequently for the failure to carry out the decision taken against them. One should bear in mind that the chairman of the party had clearly expressed his view at the higher council session and demanded that a specific plan for preserving the party be applied. However, this view did not find a sympathetic hearing because the decision ultimately was not his but that of the higher council. The latter's attempt to evade the decision it had made and wash its hands of it impinged repercussions in the ranks of the party, since some people considered that it was the higher council which was restricted by principles and that it was the executive powers which were overriding them. This situation continued over the past year and a half.
AL-HAWADITH: However, during this period your party entered into military conflicts with other military organizations present on the Lebanese stage. Was this to conceal the internal struggle or implicate the party further?

'Isam al-Mahayiri: In reality, these battles the party got into were by party decree and by the higher party authorities, be they the battles of Tripoli, North al-Ma'tn or Mushaghgharah. In addition, the schizophrenia in treatment put the people adopting these decisions up against the party ranks because of the attempt to wash their hands of it.

During these battles, the rebels assumed the burdens of these battles, as committed troops within this party, and some of them were killed during them. Thus, a sort of contradiction arose. These comrades were committed to the party's bylaws and decrees, performed their duties and sacrificed their blood. Should we hold to this schizophrenic attitude in dealing with them, or should we end this state by a decree putting a limit to the executive authorities' incompetence in dealing with this matter?

Proceeding from this, the chairman of the party distributed an internal statement to the party ranks in March 1986 in which he diagnosed the party diseases and the ailments which had caused the party to depart from its proper emphasis. In this diagnosis, which one could label "the struggle for power" within the party and the phenomena and negative features it was bringing to the fore, the chairman of the party presented a program for clearing and enhancing the party's atmosphere. This program was accepted with great enthusiasm and support by the national socialists. One should bear in mind that the diagnosis of these diseases did not involve the disparagement of anyone and did not take a factional position but rather dealt with the phenomenon as a phenomenon and propounded means for liberating the party from it. The factionalists tried to stifle this statement-program by various means, to the point where they tried to block off its distribution, causing the party head to adhere adamantly to it and the need to unify the sources of reference in the party. Because the party chairman adhered to his platform, adamantly insisted on its being his instrument, and refused to stand with his hands tied in the face of a situation which was getting out of hand, the higher council meetings were suspended and turned into meetings to which just a group within it was invited, at specific places which not all members of the council could get to, so that the conviction was reached on the part of the majority there that a decision should be made to dismiss the party chairman in an unconstitutional manner. However, the party chairman benefited from a legal loophole which existed in the party emergency law which gave him the right to declare a state of "legal emergency" when the higher council refrained from holding constitutional sessions in the party center, on grounds that the decisions which had been made outside the main center were to be considered unlawful.

AL-HAWADITH: It is said that the blockage within the party started with the Khaldah incident, in which the victims were two socialists from the Dhubyan family. What is the truth about this incident?

'Isam al-Mahayiri: This incident which occurred in Khaldah revealed the extent to which the factional attitudes that had become accumulated within the
party were lying in wait for one another and considered it legitimate to resort to arms to settle their scores.

We were surprised when it came to our knowledge that a nationalist group working in the context of the Beirut executive office was the one that had ventured upon this incident and murdered fighting men from the Socialist Party. One should bear in mind that no causes for hostility exist between our party and that one. We understood the following day, from Mr. Akram Shabih, that the incident had been unintentional and that the two fighting men had been killed by chance, because the target was a member of the National Socialist Party, Butrus Alhak, who had killed one of his nationalist comrades, Samir Jaber, in al-Jiyeh. Butrus Alhak greatly resembled the hapless Yasin Dhbyan, and therefore the confusion which this latter was the victim of occurred. This incident basically is to be renounced in military, moral and legal terms.

This incident in effect constituted the point of departure for the party rift. A statement was issued by a body which does not have the right to issue statements in the name of the party, and in it this front considered that the Khalid incident had been a conspiracy to strike at national security before any investigation was made to put this crime in its proper context. The chairman of the party issued a detailed statement on this incident, and the factionalists considered this a coverup of the crime. In this statement they found an opportunity to mobilize and seek support from the National Socialist Party in this regard, and this search for support was what was behind what happened in the party.

AL-HAWADITH: That is, you accuse the Socialist Party of participating in what took place?

イスム・アル・マハイリ: I do not accuse the National Socialist Party, because I do not have proof for that. I do say that they sought support from it in order to carry out their act.

AL-HAWADITH: Constitutionally, though, and in accordance with the party by-laws, who today is considered chairman of the party, 'イスム・アル・マハイリ or ジュブラン・ジュレイ?

イスム・アル・マハイリ: Since the chairman of the party declared the legal state of emergency, the higher council no longer has power or authority. Rather, that is now frozen and as a consequence has been transferred to the chairman of the party. Therefore they were deliberately fraudulent regarding this issue when they said that they had dismissed the chairman of the party on 22 January 1987 before he issued his decree on 24 January 1987. However, there are documents to the effect that when I issued my decree I was exercising my tasks as chairman of the party and received letters and cables before the issuance of my decree, from the members of the higher council specifically, inviting me to the joint session the council would hold the following day to make my decision. Thus the decree of the party chairman froze the higher council's authorities and all that derived from it subsequently should be considered unconstitutional.

The next chairman of the National Socialist Party, Mr. Jubran Jurayj, refused to answer AL-HAWADITH's questions and said that he was not concerned with
the stage preceding his election and that that stage remained the business of the party alone.

Mr Juresj asserted that everything Mr al-Mahayiri said was totally lacking in truth and that he did not have the right to speak for the party, because he was no longer the legitimate chairman. Rather, he himself, that is, Jursesj, had become the chairman of the National Socialist Party, after the higher council had summoned him and asked him to assume the responsibilities of the chairmanship. Juresj said, "The chairman of the higher council does not have the right to talk in the name of the party; rather, it is the chairman of the party himself who speaks in its name, and when the opportunity presents itself we will allocate to AL-HAWADITH a comprehensive press interview."

Dr Marwan Faris, the vice chairman of the party, spoke to AL-HAWADITH about the viewpoint of the party's new leadership. The conversation with the doctor began with a question on the West Beirut skirmishes which preceded the arrival of the Syrian forces in Beirut.

This is the text of the conversation:

AL-HAWADITH: What are the causes of the uprising which took place in the party?

Marwan Faris: First, an uprising did not take place. The higher council exercised its constitutional powers and carried out an internal change, which is one of its legitimate rights. However, a rejection of this decree occurred. That rejection on the part of the former chairman of the party resulted in making it seem as if a rift had occurred. We assert that the Syrian National Socialist Party is a single party and the days to come will give the most truthful expression of this.

AL-HAWADITH: Could you explain to us the reason for the rejection or the legal nature of the rejection by the former chairman?

Marwan Faris: There is no legal backing for his rejection. Of course, we avoid getting involved, because of our concern for the party regarding this internal matter, because it is internal.

AL-HAWADITH: Have you resolved the internal situation, especially since observers note that there are two leaderships acting in the name of the party? Who is the real representative of the party, by law?

Marwan Faris: The party's constitutional and legitimate powers speak for it, and its constitutional and legitimate powers are represented by the higher council and its decisions. In the coming stage, such things will not happen.

AL-HAWADITH: It is said that the war of the camps has its effect in the outbreak of the uprising, or this internal change in the party has been the result of your alliances with Palestinian parties. What is your response?

Marwan Faris: What happened in the party had no connection with external affairs or political relations. The party conference which was held in 1984
determined the alliances of the party and determined its political platform regarding national relations and Palestinian, Arab and international relations. Therefore, everything that has been rumored regarding this matter has only assumed the form of rumors which we do not want to get into.

AL-HAWADITH: Could you explain this struggle over legitimacy between the higher council and Mr. al-Mahayiri for us?

Marwan Faris: There is no struggle over legitimacy in the party. The higher council which elects the chairman has the right to accept him with two thirds of the votes, and this is what actually happened. Declaration of the state of legal emergency is illegitimate, because it was declared in the absence of all the members of the higher council, or their failure to meet after a month had elapsed since their invitation by the party chairman. None of these things were provided for the declaration of the state of legal emergency. The members of the higher council are all living and they hold their periodic meetings regularly. They have the right even in the context of the legal emergency to put an end to this state, dismiss the chairman of the party and reorganize the secretaries. I know this law very well because I signed it when I was chairman of the higher council, and he knows very well that the legal emergency which he declared is an illegitimate matter.

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PRO-SYRIAN JOURNAL LAUDS DETERRENT FORCES’ ROLE

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 4 Apr 87 pp 24-25


[Text] Between one round in which, it was said, the talks between the Lebanese and Syrian working teams took place in a positive, encouraging atmosphere and constituted a step forward, and another round, in which the opposite was said, that they were unsuccessful and constituted a step back, the Lebanese-Syrian talks on coming up with a unified plan to reform the Lebanese political system will continue to revolve in a vicious circle. That is, they have advanced one step and taken two steps back, and whenever they have taken a step back they have taken two steps forward. That is the case with the negotiations on the political solution that have been going on for some 2 months so that a political settlement to the Lebanese crisis can be reached.

Since the negotiations entered the stage of delay, procrastination, argumentation and exchange of observations and recommendations, questions on the reasons for this delay have arisen. What entity has an interest in the downplaying and the delay? Is it really a dispute over the powers and authorities of the president, or is it a dispute over the conditions and timing of the elimination of political factionalism? Or is it a dispute over the issue of the Lebanese army, or over the issue of the distinctive relations which are supposed to be stipulated between Lebanon and Syria?

In the midst of this flood of questions, no one is imagining that Syria could be the party with an interest in this, because it goes without saying that Syria is the party that has the greatest interest in realizing this historic achievement to save Lebanon so that it may resume playing its part.

In the midst of this flood of questions, no one has been imagining, either, that the Lebanese president, Amin al-Jumayyil, could be the party with an interest in wasting this opportunity or trying to sabotage the negotiations, especially since he is the prime interested party in reaching a solution to the country’s crisis on the eve of the end of his constitutional term, of which only a year and a half remain. President al-Jumayyil is also anxious
to have his term attain the honor of setting out an agreement which will preserve the unity of Lebanon in terms of land and people on the bases of a new political plan the future will live and coexist with and he, that is, President al-Jumayyil, is the person who took the initiative to open the road to Damascus and adopt the initiative of discussing and negotiating this solution -- although no one doubts for a moment that President al-Jumayyil is also from the political angle a figure with an interest in realizing this achievement to guarantee his political future and his Christian leadership, of whom he is supposed to be one of the most prominent symbols in Lebanon following the departure of the historic symbols who lived and intimately experienced the period of the 1943 charter.

Notwithstanding the admission by Lebanese and non-Lebanese parties that a difference in views must exist regarding some of the basic sections in the political reform plan which is the subject of negotiation in Damascus between the Lebanese and Syrian working teams, admitting that a unified agreement has been reached is something which might take more time than anticipated, although the desire of the Lebanese and Syrian presidents is that it continue and not be halted, no matter what the circumstances might be. This means that there are other reasons more numerous than any dispute over sections in the political reform plan and that what appears on the political screen in some of these sections, especially those which were previously referred to, is no more than a cloak concealing foreign causes that lie behind the obstacles to the birth of a desired settlement or the halt in the ability to effect this difficult "passage" toward a new birth of a new Lebanese regime which will bring about continued coexistence among Lebanese factions and participation in a government founded on balance and justice.

If we go beyond the truth to the statement that a difference in views does exist concerning some of the sections of the draft political agreement, two important questions stand out:

First, why did the positive atmosphere change? Why was the working paper presented by President al-Jumayyil recognized to be of importance and considered a valid vision of a political resolution at the beginning, and why did it then begin to be subjected to criticism?

Second, what international bodies have started moving in a direction opposed to Syria's role in the realization of political conciliation or a political resolution to the Lebanese crisis in its domestic sphere and therefore have started to dictate their terms concerning the Syrian role and set out restrictions on it?

A Lebanese figure who is knowledgeable about these developments and has watched the course of the new winds which have stared to blow over the Lebanese-Syrian process states that the two questions in reality complement one another and it is therefore necessary to condense the two questions into one. This figure goes on to offer an explanation by stating: Why did the United States, in previous periods, consistently consider that the entry of Syrian military forces into West Beirut was an aggression, opposing this entry even though its purpose was to end the state of disruption and security chaos and put a limit to the deterioration in security, political and
economic conditions in the Western portion of the Lebanese capital? Why has Washington agreed to the Syrian military entry into West Beirut, considered it a positive act and joined those who praise it?

The answer, as this prominent, well-known figure says, is that the American administration, or a number of officials in it at least, had its own reasons which prompted it not to oppose this Syrian entry. It found that there was a brief point of agreement with the Syrian plan to control the collapsing situation in West Beirut. However, this brief point of agreement then came to an end and Washington once again resumed acting in service of its goals in Lebanon and the region. This figure went on to cite the information at his disposal by saying that this brief point of agreement occurred when the United States of America started to fear the possibility that Iran would manage to occupy Basra and establish an Islamic republic there which would be an extension of the Iranian regime, and that this Islamic republic in Basrah might at least be of the magnitude of its presence in the politics and among the people on the Lebanese stage, where the Islamic and fundamentalist currents constitute a large force in actual conditions which would be able to respond to and interact with this shift that was likely to occur in Iraq.

The Lebanese figure continued his statement by pointing out that Washington moved its fleet near the Lebanese coastline and Israeli ports as a show of force whose goal was to terrify Iran, in the event that such an Iranian invasion occurred. The Soviet Union on the one hand was not against this American show of force in the waters of the Mediterranean and was not harmed by it, and on the other it viewed the occurrence of such a development in the Iraqi-Iranian war with anxiety.

While the United States of America tried to sell its show of force in the Mediterranean, in the Arab context, as an act placating the Arab countries which the transaction of American arms to Iran had angered, appear as the party defending the security of the Gulf and the moderate regimes in the Arab region, and make these countries feel that the transaction of arms to Iran was not an expression of America's strategy and policy in the region so much as an expression of a special situation which ended with the end of the transaction:

The same figure, quoting a Western diplomatic report which contained extremely important information, stressed that Israel played the prime role in putting pressure for the performance by American Sixth Fleet units of a show of force in the waters of the Mediterranean close to the Gulf region so that they would be ready to keep the Iraqi-Iranian war from departing from its traditional framework, because of Israel's fears of the establishment of an extremist Islamic regime in Iraq which would give the fundamentalist movements in the region an impetus to act all along the Arab stage, in view of the repercussions that would constitute on the nature of the struggle in the region, which could turn into a religious war against Israel.

Once the possibility that Basrah might fall faded, the American attitude toward the Syrian role in Lebanon and the creation of a political settlement changed, since this accomplishment was linked to the security role the
Syrian forces in West Beirut would be playing and the anticipated evolution of that security role in the context of a security plan that would embrace all Lebanese territory. At that point, that figure stated, the United States, through its emissaries and diplomatic correspondence, decided to give warning and proceeded to set out limits to action on matters related to the Lebanese army, rejection of any change in its structure and policy, the subject of the rejection of the elimination of political factionalism and other Lebanese matters.

New evidence has emerged on the terms Washington is setting out to bring the negotiations out of their vicious circle and give Syria a free hand in reaching an understanding with the Lebanese president on a final formula for a political settlement. These American conditions include the need to solve the problem of the Palestinian camps in Lebanon on the basis of putting an end to the armed Palestinian presence in them and consequently the effort to reduce the significance of the fundamentalist Islamic currents, and, ahead of either of these, an end to the problem of the hostages and the creation of suitable means for that.

The figure ended his statement by saying that Syria was not about to take instructions from the American administration or others, first, because Damascus was not in a weak position internationally or in the Arab context, and secondly, because it had its Arab and Middle East policy, a policy which could not be separated from the strategy of the struggle with Israel. Finally, Damascus had its theory on ways for dealing with the Lebanese situation and the political-security attempts at obstruction which started in the course of some explosions that had been set in the areas of West Beirut on a night's notice. These explosions did not diminish or detract from the ability to effect security which the Syrian deterrent forces have realized in West Beirut. Indeed, today they are provoking the resentment and anger of the people of Beirut against any entity which would mobilize itself as an instrument for such an operation, whether connected to well known Arab bodies or to Lebanese groups that are harmed by the restoration of security to Beirut.
BRIEFS

IRAN APPROVES ANTI-SYRIAN FORCE—Ayatollah Janti, President of the Iranian Informations Center and Member of the Constitution Trusteeship Council, currently on a visit to Lebanon has advised Hizballah leaders of Khomeini’s approval of their initiative to establish an anti-Syrian guerilla force in Beirut. Reports reaching AL-DUSTUR from Iranian sources indicate that the cost establishing this force will be covered by the "Martyr's Association" (Mu'assasat al-Shahid) in Beirut, Ba'labakk's "Revolutionary Guard" assuming responsibility for training the force. [Text] [London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 16 Mar 87 p 3]

LICENCE TO KILL 'COMMUNISTS'—The latest doctrine to be formulated by Lebanon's disciples of signs and wonders permits the killing of Palestinian and Lebanese nationals who have been educated in communist countries. Dully covered by this doctrine, Amal militiamen in the south are assassinating nationals who oppose their view or attempt to resist the Israeli occupation. This information has been confirmed by Assistant Secretary General of the Lebanese Communist Party, Karim Muruwwah. In an interview with a French paper, he stated that "there is a fundamental contradiction between what Amal leaders say and what they do. On the one hand they claim to be anti-Israeli, but at the same time they act as a stumbling block to any movement against it." [Text] [London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 30 Mar 87 p 3]
ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION SPOKESMAN INTERVIEWED

Tripoli AL-JAMAHIRIYAH in Arabic 3 Apr 87 p 17

[Interview with Mr 'Atif Abu Bakr, official spokesman for Fatah's Revolutionary Council, by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam: "Several Years of Conflict Were Ended Abruptly in a Few Days; Spokesman for Fatah's Revolutionary Council Says, 'One Practical Step Is Better Than a Dozen Programs';" date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] AL-JAMAHIRIYAH interviewed Mr 'Atif Abu Bakr, the official spokesman for the Palestine National Liberation Movement, Fatah's Revolutionary Council. The text of the interview follows:

[Question] What is your assessment of the meetings which were held in Tripoli between the six Palestinian factions, and how would you rate the outcome of these meetings, particularly the Dialogue Paper or the Tripoli Document?

[Answer] First, I wish to say for the record that on behalf of our movement's organization, its leaders and its secretary, fellow citizen Abu Nidal, we want to express profound thanks to Libya and its leader, Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi whose sincere national initiative came at the right time. To us that initiative was comparable to a few drops of water to a thirsty and parched person. That is why we responded to that historical initiative without any hesitation. We realized that if Algeria's sincere efforts were added to Libya's efforts and prestige, the effort to overcome the fragmentation in the Palestinian Revolution would have been given a real push. As I said at the press conference following the meetings in Tripoli, if an actual friend is one who extends his hand at the time of need and annihilation, then Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi has done everything he could so that the Palestinian Resistance could overcome its current crisis.

The agreed upon Dialogue Paper is an important national document which creates a sturdy bridge on the road. It is most certainly one of the subjects to be discussed in the comprehensive talks that will be held to achieve a common denominator for everybody, and that includes the other party or the organizations which failed to participate in the dialogue. We believe that we have experienced enough bitterness and enough fragmentation and well-known conflicts. That is why we believe that with this document, which may be called the key to a locked door, we must all put the supreme national interests above
every consideration and above all disputes and conflicts as well. Some of these disputes and conflicts will essentially linger, but we must articulate them in the proper framework, and we must put them in the proper context. This document is also tantamount to a judge who examines and separates those with meager resources from the fat cats; it will test everybody. Those who abandon and disregard its fixed principles will be labeling themselves just as those who assume a proper position on this document do. This document comes at the heels of the siege that was placed around our camps in Lebanon. Sharon was not able to conquer these camps in the past, and these camps never waved a white flag to the new criminals. Our fighters have affirmed their unity; and our people in the occupied land have affirmed that they are one body. That is why their political leaders are being called upon to translate our people's unity, as it manifests itself on the field, in the context of the PLO, which today represents the national Palestinian ship of state, home, and place of worship.

Toward that end we talked as six factions. The four meetings we had with Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi staved off and overcame some difficulties, and we managed to achieve the political and organizational agreement which we announced together. This represents a major achievement that we were not able to get during the past years of fragmentation. It represents a common denominator and a solid cement unifying points of view on principal issues. This means that many, many obstacles have been removed. We knew that Col al-Qadhdhafi had made another effort with the other party which is concerned with the same subject and that he had achieved with that party results which constituted one step on the road. Thus, the doors were somewhat open for completing the effort to restore the PLO's unity on a foundation of fixed political and organizational principles which are incorporated into the declared document. We would have thus cut off several years of conflict in only 4 days. Most certainly the land which sponsored this dialogue played a principal role in that achievement, and that will have major repercussions amidst our people who have always known that Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi is one of the Palestinian Arab people's fighters and sons.

[Question] With regard to the steps that are being taken for Palestinian unity, what role will you play in Fatah's Revolutionary Council during the coming stage?

[Answer] We were among the first to draw our swords against the disorder and against mistakes and departures from programs and pacts. We did that for Fatah, as we understand it, and we did it for the armed revolution to achieve total liberation as we understand it. That is why our differences with others were neither emotional nor personal; instead, they were organizational and political. This is still our understanding of the matter. The gap which separates us narrows inasmuch as each party returns to the constant principles we agreed upon. If the parties do not return to those agreed upon constant principles, the gap between us will widen. We are convinced that what we learned from the pain our people have at this stage involves putting the nation's interests above everything else without letting that affect our understanding and our conviction about organizational matters. To our people the nation's interests are much more important than other conflicts, which although legitimate, must take second place and must [not] destroy the central issue. Thus, we in Fatah's
Revolutionary Council are placing all our resources at the disposal of the
unification operation. We are willing to offer everything that is essential for
that purpose without dealing a blow to constant national principles.

History gives us lessons and examples which we can learn from. When the Japanese
invaded China, Chinese revolutionaries proclaimed the slogan, "Unity despite all
differences to crush the occupiers." None of the differences and gaps which
separated them were removed. When the Nazis invaded Moscow, history awakening
slogans were heard all over that city urging Muscovites to "Unite, ye sons of
Peter the Great." And we are calling upon Palestinians of different schools of
thought and persuasions to unite and defend the revolution, their existence,
their weapons and their role in Lebanon. We are asking them to unite so they
can dismantle the royal Jordanian conspiracy and the normalization procedures in
occupied Palestine. We are asking them to unite so they can cut off the hand of
the client regime in Cairo, which is bound by the chains of Camp David. We are
asking them to unite so they can restore their cause to the forefront. We are
asking them to unite for their national place of worship. We are fighting to
make this place of worship a place in which all Palestinian forces involved in
this struggle can come to an agreement. We do not want this to be a wailing wall
or a bridge to nowhere. It is for that reason that we took the lead in fighting
disorders, mistakes and sins, and we will take the lead in fighting for the
cause of unity. We are willing to become loyal soldiers in our people's army of
unity; we are neither looking for gain nor dwelling on formalities. Some people
may find that unusual, but it all becomes clear when we tell them about the
bitterness, the ways in which people are being eliminated, and the guns that are
pointed to our heads in the camps.

The National Command Is the Framework through Which We Are Fighting

[Question] Given the dangerous stage which the Arab nation is going through
now, is a comprehensive national awakening achievable in the face of the factors
of defeat? What is your role in the Arab Revolutionary Forces' national
command?

[Answer] We think that there is always much room for hope, and no matter how
severe the predicaments become, dark clouds bring a heavy rainfall. In Egypt
al-Sadat considered himself destiny, but the Arab masses in Egypt mustered all
the bitterness they felt and expressed it with one shot which killed al-Sadat.
These national and progressive forces in Egypt, and Nasirists are at the
forefront of these forces, are getting stronger and their convictions are
becoming harder. The bullets which were fired by Sulayman Khatir had a major
impact that struck at the heart of the normalization effort. We all realized
that this revolutionary wave in Egypt was growing every day and that very soon
it will overthrow the gloomy regime once and for all.

In Sudan the strongholds of injustice and slavery collapsed, and the Sudanese
masses are entering into a new stage. In Lebanon, despite difficulties,
nationalists are still bravely resisting the isolation plan and the Zionist
occupation. They are affirming that these two plans will fare no better than
the marines and the battleships which sail the Atlantic. The fight against the
Zionist enemy is still going on, despite difficulties, and a forest of national

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weapons is still terrifying Lebanon's enemies: the Phalangists, imperialists and Zionists. The camps in Lebanon have affirmed that they are stronger than death and that they can reach beyond the walls of the siege. Although under siege, the camps have continued to resist, and the countdown for those who set the siege has started. They are beset by breakups and breakdowns as a result of the crimes they committed.

In occupied Palestine all forms of rejection are growing, and the armed revolution is also growing. Knives and rocks are now playing a distinguished role in the battle. All Arab masses have stood by Libya, and today they are standing by it as a creative model for resistance. The subject of engaging our enemies wherever they are, even outside Arab borders, is clear to everyone. Ever since Camp David our enemies have been trying to force us to surrender, but we think that the countdown is in our favor as revolutionary forces. That countdown too has started, and its continued progress requires the solidarity of Arab regimes, so that a model of steadfastness can be rebuilt, and it also requires the applied and concrete cooperation of national revolutionary forces. After a framework which comprises all these forces from A to Z—the forces which are represented in the Arab Revolutionary Forces' national command and are led by Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi—becomes available, putting the forces' programs for engaging the enemies in combat into action will have become urgent. Toward that end we are placing all our efforts, our energies and our experiences as well at the disposal of these forces. We did not hesitate to affirm this in the past. In practice we still have much to talk about with these forces within the national command, on its behalf and in accordance with its programs which constitute a proper approach to engaging enemies in combat and unifying revolutionary and national forces. One practical step is always better than a dozen programs.

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LONDON TALKS FOCUS ON PALESTINIANS, GULF WAR, LEBANON

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 30 Mar 87 p 15

[Article] For a decade at least, no King or head of state has ever received such a warm official and popular welcome from the United Kingdom as that extended to the Servitor of the two Shrines, Fahd Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the King of Saudi Arabia, during his four-day epoch-making visit which he spent, with his entourage, at Buckingham Palace.

More a than a week before the date scheduled for the visit, main square, stores government buildings, roads leading to the House of Lords and the House of the Royal Palace and the routes from Victoria station to Buckingham, were bedecked with Saudi flags fluttering alongside the Union Jack. On his arrival at Gatwick airport, the King was received by Prince Charles and Princess Diana who welcomed his Majesty, as he disembarked on behalf of Queen Elizabeth II.

From Gatwick King Fahd took a train to Victoria Station where Queen Elizabeth II, her Consort Prince Philip and British Prime Minister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher headed the welcoming party. An artillery salute greeted the monarch and the Royal procession proceeded to Buckingham Palace along a route lined with thousands of Britons and members of the Arab and Muslim communities in Britain, waving Saudi flags and the Union Jack.

With the official and popular welcome having already been accorded to King Fahd's history-making official visit to Britain, the nature of the discussions that took place [further] confirmed the historic value and importance of the visit, not only insofar as concerns bilateral relations which go back to well before 1914, but also in terms of Anglo-Arab relations in general and Britain's attitude towards Arab issues in particular.

As anticipated by AL-DUSTUR in its last issue, Anglo-Saudi talks dealt with the Palestine issue, the Iraq-Iran conflict, conditions in Lebanon and bilateral relations between the two countries.

As far as Arab issues are concerned King Fahd made it clear that the main cause of tension and instability in the region is the injustice done to the Palestinians. It is up to Britain to play a positive role in finding a just and comprehensive solution ensuring restoration of Palestinian rights and "Israel's" withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967. In this context the King emphasized
that the Arabs, for their part, had confirmed under the Fez plan their sincere desire for a just and comprehensive peace.

Turning to Lebanon, the Saudi monarch pointed out that the ultimate solution to that country's tragedy lies in reestablishing the rule of law, bringing about national reconciliation and preserving Lebanon's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

Concerning the Iraq-Iran war, King Fahd stressed that events in the Gulf region pose a threat to international stability and security, and emphasized the need for terminating hostilities.

In the light of the decisive Arab positions which underscored the more enduring aspects of Saudi policy, Mrs Thatcher hailed the importance of the Fez unified Arab peace plan and stated that the recent Brussels communique had emphasized the adherence of European Common Market countries to the principles enunciated in the 1980 Venice Communique. These countries would maintain close contacts with all parties in the Middle East to help boost their efforts to achieve peace.

Britain's position stressing the need for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict differs very little from its position pertaining to the Gulf war. Although Mrs. Thatcher pointed out in her interview with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, published in London, that there are no indications of the possibility of ending the war "very soon," the indisputable fact is that Britain's position is identical to Saudi Arabia's in stressing the war's threat to international peace and security.

Dominating the agenda for discussions within the framework of bilateral relations, in addition to the many facets of those relations, were the oil issues and the "Tornado" aircraft deal. This was more particularly stressed by Mrs. Thatcher when she referred in her statement to the fact that the "al-Yamamah project regarding sale of Tornado and other aircraft to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has served to focus Saudi interest on Britain and British interest on Saudi Arabia."

13291/12951
CSO: 4404/291
BRIEFS

SA'UDIZING POSITIONS IN GIRLS SCHOOLS--The chairmanship of women's education has affirmed the importance of staffing educational and administrative positions with Saudi citizens, and the importance of not contracting out any position which can be filled by a Saudi cadre. This was contained in a government edict issued by the deputy chairman of women's education, Dr 'Abdallah al-Rashid, in which he emphasized the necessity of not contracting out any job which can be filled by a citizen as well as the need to provide employment opportunities to Saudis, and to substitute Saudis for contract employees. In the above-mentioned edict, His Excellency pointed to the determination of His Excellency, the minister of labor and social affairs, in regard to the observation that there are not a few non-Saudis working in official government offices, as well as public and affiliated institutions, who were contracted on the basis of the wage, operation, and maintenance clauses, and who are subject to work regulations which also guarantee the rights of Saudi citizens which take priority over the rights of others with regard to work. His Excellency accordingly called on personnel managers not to contract for any position which can be filled by a citizen. [Text] [Riyadh AL-Riyad in Arabic 14 Jan 87 p 9] 13286/9365

CSO: 4404/265
AFGHAN ISLAMIC PARTY LEADER ON SOVIET OCCUPATION OF DRA

LD221627 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1310 GMT 22 Apr 87

[Text] Riyadh, 22 April (SPA)—Amir Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Afghan Islamic Party [Hizb-i Islami], has praised the support provided by the kingdom, led by His Majesty King Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud, custodian of the two holy mosques, to the Afghan mujahidin. He said at a press conference, held at the conferences palace in Riyadh today, that this support has enabled the mujahidin to continue the jihad for the sake of God and the elevation of His word, and the liberation of Afghanistan from Russian occupation. He confirmed the determination of the Afghan mujahidin to continue their hold jihad, to liberate their land, and to establish an Islamic government in it.

He pointed to the Russian declaration on the withdrawal of their invading troops from Afghanistan and said this is merely an attempt to deceive world public opinion, and is a new means of aggression against the Muslim Afghan people. Having realized that their military attempts and cheap plots have failed in the face of the steadfastness of the mujahidin, the Russian occupation forces continue to shell villages and commit mass murder of women, children, and the old, leaving destruction in their wake.

He declared at the start of the press conference that 90 percent of Afghan territory has been liberated during the last 9 years from Soviet occupation, and that it is in the hands of the mujahidin, who have established local governments to run judicial, administrative, security, and educational affairs. He added that the invading forces control the remaining 10 percent of the territory, where they have established military bases which are continuously attacked by the Mujahidin, and he said that the Russian forces cannot move toward their targets freely and safely because of these attacks.

He said that the war is now in the cities around the military bases, and the main roads. The leader of the Afghan Islamic Party spoke about the results of the Afghan struggle as it is about to enter its 10th year, and explained that by the admission of the Soviets themselves, the numbers of those wounded or killed totals 91,000, of whom 29,000 have died. The Afghan mujahidin have also shot down 284 jet aircraft and helicopters, have destroyed some 2,100 tanks, and some 3870 vehicles. Three ammunition dumps in Kabul have been destroyed, and he said that during the last 3 months the mujahidin have destroyed some 187 aircraft, averaging 2 a day.
He explained that 1,100,000 Afghans have been martyred as a result of the bestial Russian raids, and hundreds of thousands wounded. Some 5 million have been forced into exile after the Russians destroyed their homes. Also tens of thousands live as refugees inside Afghanistan itself, living in valleys and in the mountains. He added that as a result of the Soviet occupation and the destructive war waged against the Afghan people, an Afghan citizen is martyred every 4 minutes, and one is wounded every 52 seconds. Every 12 minutes, one person is forced to live in exile, and even more to become refugees at home, and one person is arrested.

/12232
CSO: 4600/213
AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

MUJAHIDIN DESTROY, KILL—According to a report, the mujahidin in Afghanistan attacked the Soviet-Kabul forces in (Kesham) subdivision of Badakhshan Province and destroyed one tank and killed its personnel. According to another report, 120 soldiers out of the 136 Soviet-Kabul forces captured by the mujahidin after attacking on (Zawar Khan) last year have joined the resistance movement after their release in Paktia Province. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0600 GMT 29 Apr 87 BK] /12232

CSO: 4600/213
DETAILS ON POLITICAL ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIA ANNOUNCED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 27 Mar 87 pp 1,18

[Text] Economic Service—In an exclusive interview with KEYHAN, the Ministry of Industry's general manager of international affairs and supervisor of the industrial committee of Iran's economic delegation gave details on the economic and political talks and understandings reached in the fourth annual meeting between Iran and India.

KEYHAN's economic correspondent reports that the Ministry of Industry's general manager of international affairs Mas'ud Qamsari also discussed industrial and technical cooperation between Iran and the eastern bloc countries. The text of the interview is as follows:

Formation of Three Committees

KEYHAN: Last week the fourth annual Iran-India economic and political cooperation conference was held in New Delhi. What understandings were reached during these meetings?

The Ministry of Industry's general manager of international affairs: The Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation with India meets alternately in Tehran and New Delhi. This year's meeting was held from 26 Bahman to 2 Esfand [15–21 February] in New Delhi, supervised by our country's foreign minister.

The session's work began with the formation of the industrial, commercial, and cultural cooperation committees.

In general, the policy of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the view of our nation's officials is that bilateral cooperation with India, an active non-aligned country, should expand. In this regard in the above commission we have tried to make good preparations for industrial and commercial cooperation. Unfortunately, last year's cooperation has not continued as expected, perhaps because of the drop in the price of oil, along with India's failure to buy it.

In the industrial committee, issues of interest and areas of cooperation within the various ministries were discussed with the Indian side. Concerning cooperation with the Ministry of Industries, agreements were reached in such areas as the textile and cement industries and educational cooperation in connection with the great Aklil Benzin Project.
Production of Automobile Parts

With regard to the Ministry of Heavy Industries, the statement of mutual cooperation signed by the Minister of Heavy Industries of Iran and the Indian Minister of Industry was affirmed. Its most important areas are cooperation in automated manufacturing projects, the production of parts for various vehicles, and future industrial cooperation between the two countries.

Concerning the Ministry of Mines and Metals, a problem which remains unsolved since prior to the revolution is the Kudrmukh Iron Ore Project. Heavy investments have been made on these mines in India, but the problems have not been solved.

During these meetings we succeeded in getting the Indian side to accept a timetable for resolving this issue. The first meeting in this regard will be held in May 1987 (early in the year 1366) in New Delhi. The meetings will alternate afterwards between Tehran and New Delhi in order to solve the Kudrmukh problem. It has been agreed that this problem will be solved by December 1987 at the latest, and we will be able to make use of the great project to obtain the raw materials needed by Iran's steel factories.

Discussions and exchanges of views have also been held with regard to other matters, such as educational and technical cooperation in the steel mills as well as the purchase of parts for Iran's steel industry.

Likewise, in view of previous talks with the Ministry of the Reconstruction Crusade with regard to small rural industrial projects in India, it has been stressed that these projects will be studied again.

With regard to fighting agricultural pestilence, especially corn, cotton, sugar cane, as well as the manufacture of paper from sugar cane waste and the implementation of a ceramic kilns project, it was agreed that experts on both sides would study the issue.

India also expressed an interest in cooperating with Iran on projects for power stations.

Indian officials also declared their readiness to cooperate with Iran in a large project to build a railway from Baq to Bandar 'Abbass, and they expressed the desire to set up the alarm and communications systems, and to carry out the training associated with this project.

Numerous talks were held in the commerce committee. It was agreed that we would buy one-half the volume of goods from India that it buys from Iran. Of course India's primary purchases from Iran will be oil.

Plans have therefore been made for the petroleum councils of both countries to sign the associated protocol in Tehran within a month.

In the cultural committee talks were held concerning educational, cultural, and athletic relations, as well as the creation of the necessary facilities to issue visas for both sides.

India's Industrial Growth

KEYHAN: Is the industrial growth and level of technology in India at a level where it can meet the technical and training needs of Iran's industrial sector?
[Answer]: In view of the fact that our country's industry is actually dependent on the West for technology and machinery, a precise answer cannot be given to the question of what extent India can help us, but clearly we are not yet fully informed concerning India's technological and industrial resources in order to be able to express an opinion on it. However, we have declared our own readiness in these meetings with the Indian side; particularly with regard to the cement industry, we have stressed that in view of Iran's program for self-sufficiency in the production of equipment and machinery for industrial products in Iran, which must reach 85 percent within a few years, we are prepared to cooperate with India, on the condition, of course, that they buy the products produced by these projects.

KEYHAN: Were talks held concerning improving the quality of Indian products, particularly vehicle parts?

[Answer]: Clearly, if the understandings reached are carried out, among the chief issues to be raised by the Iranian side, meaning the Ministry of Heavy Industries, is the matter of the quality of products, and if it is not agreeable, then there will be no cooperation.

KEYHAN: What decisions were made during these meetings concerning the textile industries projects and Akil Benzin?

[Answer]: Concerning the textile industries, a study will be made of the manner of India's cooperation with Iran, obtained last year, in the modernization and reconstruction of some textile factories.

Even now one of our country's textile factories is being rebuilt and modernized by India, and if the desired results are achieved by this project, we are ready to rely on the Indians for future reconstruction.

The Akil Benzin Production Line Project is especially important, and it will produce various laundry detergents. The Indian side has accepted Iran's proposal to create a technical training program for this project, and this training will be carried out soon in India. At the same time, institutions for standards and industrial research in the two countries will jointly create various laboratories.

Small Rural Industries

KEYHAN: To what degree do you regard the overall cooperation between the two countries to be successful, in view of India's industrial position?

[Answer]: In my view India has good resources in the two industrial sectors, the small rural industries and the heavy industries. Investments have recently been made in India by foreign countries and we are seeing striking growth in this nation's industry. A great many Western companies have not done "joint production" with India and are now carrying out special projects.

The above matters have made India one of the most advanced countries in the non-aligned movement.

9310
CSO: 4640/0113
IRAQI GOVERNMENT REPORTEDLY REWARDS KILLING OF DESERTERS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 2 Mar 87 p 18

[Text] Secret and Personal

To: Brigade headquarters company and communications
Subject: Reward
Headquarters
T-55 Armor
Date: 1 November 1982 [21/10/1361]


Any soldier who can kill a deserter fleeing to the enemy and produce the body, by authorization of the commander of the army, will be promoted, receive a month’s leave, and receive substantial material compensation.

Lieutenant Colonel ‘Abd al-Wahid Mizher al-Sa’dun
From: T-55 Armor Commander

Likewise in another document Ragheb Fakhri, adjutant general and director of the legal council of the Iraqi regime calls upon the commander of the Third Army to send bloodthirsty Saddam all documents pertaining to executions. A translation of the document follows:

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate

Ministry of Defense
Directorate of the Legal Administration
Secret and Personal
Date: 11 August 1981 [5 Mordad 1360]
To: Third Army Commander
Subject: The Performance of Executions
Secret immediate telegram number 559, dated 5/24/1360 [15 August 1982]

After an individual is executed for cowardice, the following steps must be taken:

1) All papers pertaining to the execution must be sent to the president.
2) We suggest that you prepare a detailed report (summarized) so that the president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces may read it. This report must contain the following items:

A) The name of the person who issued the order that was violated.
B) The time and place of the mission assigned to the cowardly person.
J) The type of mission and the conditions under which the fear occurred.
D) The legal steps taken after the manifestation of cowardice.

3) The papers to be sent include all the principal issues from the initial investigation to comments by the appropriate officials, the site of the event, the place of the execution, and whatever pertains to the subject and its circumstances and events.

To be posted

Adjutant General Ragheb Fakhri, Director of the Legal Council

9310
CSO: 4640/113
KEYHAN SPEAKS WITH IRAQI PRISONERS IN JASIM FRONT

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 4 Mar 87 p 3

[Text] KEYHAN’s correspondent in the Karbala Five operational area interviewed several Iraqi prisoners from the 78th Brigade of the 16th Army of Iraq.

The interview, which was held in the Jasim River operational area, indicates that the 78th Brigade of Iraq was completely destroyed three days ago in action against the combatants of Islam.

KEYHAN’s correspondent reports that operations to penetrate and destroy conducted by the combatants of Islam in the Shalamcheh area under the code name “Ya Zahra,” which began in the early hours of dawn on Sunday, totally destroyed the 78th Brigade of the 16th Army of Iraq’s defeated army. The same report states that the commander of this brigade fled from the battlefield during operations by the combatants of Islam, that a number of field grade officers were killed and wounded by fire from the forces of Islam, and that a number of soldiers and non-commissioned officers were taken prisoner.

One prisoner, who identified himself as Ziya Tariq Tawfiq of the First Battalion, 78th Brigade, discussed his capture. He said: Part of our brigade was routed by misdirected Iraqi artillery fire and we quickly surrendered to the forces of Islam. He added: I was taken prisoner in the Jasim River. Our brigade commander had told us that we must remain in the Jasim River for three days. We were not given food and water during this period.

Concerning losses and damages, he said: Our brigade was 100 percent destroyed. He then discussed the Iraqi regime’s propaganda. He said: Films are shown in Iraq where Iraqi prisoners are savagely killed by Iranians, but in the first moments of my captivity I realized that all of these films are lies.

Another prisoner, a draftee named Ghalib Balal Qati‘, told KEYHAN’s correspondent: I am 17 years old. By mandatory raising of my age, the Iraqi regime brought me to the fronts. Discussing how he was captured, he said: I was captured right here (the Jasim River). Our brigade and battalion commanders fled the hardships of the fighting and in the first moments after the operation began, we saw the forces of Islam overrun our fortifications.

He discussed the Ba‘thist regime’s propaganda. He said: In Iraq they told us that prisoners are killed in the Islamic Republic of Iran and by saying these things they kept us at the fronts.

First Warrant Officer ‘Abid Maktuf Khalaf discussed his capture. He said:
There were ten of us. All of us had been wounded by artillery fire from the forces of Islam, and we were captured by mobilization forces when our fortifications were taken.

He said: In the first moments of the operation the brigade commander was so surprised that he fled from the battlefield.

Another prisoner, named Zubayr ‘Ali Ibrahim, described his capture for KEYHAN’s correspondent as follows: We were asleep in our fortifications when we were suddenly awakened and captured by the combatants of Islam. A colonel and a captain in our brigade were wounded, and the colonel was probably killed later. Our former brigade commander was also killed in the previous operation. Concerning the extent of his brigade’s losses, he said: This brigade was completely destroyed. He added: The Iraqi regime’s media and propaganda centers do not publish any kind of news about the triumph of the combatants of Islam and the defeat of the Iraqi regime’s troops. The only films seen there show Iraqi prisoners being killed by the forces of Islam.

9310
CSO: 4640/0119
MONTAZERI URGES REFORM INSTEAD OF RECIPROCAL DISGRACE

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Mar p 18

[Text] Qom—A group of families of martyrs of seminaries under the supervision of Ayatollah al-'Ozma Montazeri, other martyrs of the Qom seminary, a group of crusaders from the battle fronts, and some officials and other people from Qom met Saturday with the great theologian Ayatollah al-'Ozma Montazeri.

During this meeting he offered congratulations to all the families of martyrs, the heroic and martyr-nurturing nation of Iran, and all Muslims on the auspicious birthday of the the master of the pious, His Holiness ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (Peace Be Upon Him), along with condolences and congratulations to the families of martyrs. Citing several Traditions of the Prophet, he said: If the child of a mother and father is martyred during their lifetime, it is worth more to them than it would be if seventy children fought in the path of God after they passed away. When Almighty God loves someone, he takes their dearest child from them, and the reward for this mother and father is Heaven, especially if they are patient and submissive to Almighty God. As the Koran says, their reward is incalculable, and this is good news for all the fathers and mothers of martyrs who are themselves happy, in addition to the martyrdom of their children.

Continuing his remarks, he said: There is a Tradition explaining the meaning of guidance on the straight path that says we have two paths, one in the world, the other in the next life. The path in the world is the imam who must be obeyed. In another Tradition the straight path has been equated with His Holiness the Commander of the Faithful and that holy man’s way, and it says that if we fully obey the chaste imam in the world and follow the straight path, we will easily pass along the next world’s straight path, which is the hidden part of the straight path in the world.

He added: Being a Shi’ite does not consist of adopting the name and saying slogans; one must actually follow the path of that holy man. His commands must be learned by reading the traditions and sermons in the The Highway of Eloquence, and they must be put into practice in personal and social life, in encounters with officials and the country’s leaders, in encounters with various classes of people, and in using the methods that were used by that holy man, if one is to walk the straight path.

Ayatollah al-'Ozma Montazeri cited a tradition from Tohof ol-'Oqul. He said: In his will to Imam Hoseyn (Peace Be Upon Him) His Holiness ‘Ali says 'My son, whoever does not correct his own faults will not see the faults of others. Unfortunately, we play with one another’s dignity every day. Instead of making efforts in the universities, the seminaries, and other places for the purpose of scientific advancement, reform, and service, we slander each other. We exonerate ourselves by finding fault, gossiping, making accusations, telling lies and attacking others. I wish
we would take account of ourselves one day and see how much we have sinned, and that we would realize how much of it takes place in a year. We should be warned and concentrate our efforts to elevate Islam, promote friendship among people, respect for others, and reform individuals and society in the proper way.‘

Continuing his will, the Master of the pious says: ‘My son, whoever does not wear the robe of piety and does not control himself cannot hide his faults with material clothing. Whoever is satisfied with whatever God has appointed as his lot will not be unhappy if he loses something, whether property or children. His soul will be so strong that events will have no effect on it. Whoever draws the sword of rebellion against others will be killed by it himself. If a person keeps files and makes trouble for other people, others will do so for him. Whoever digs a well for his brother to fall into will fall into it himself. So many people have borne false witness, kept files, spread scandalous information, started rumors, stirred up public opinion, and then been caught in the same trap themselves and received their punishment in this world.’

His Holiness the Commander of the Faithful says: ‘My son, whoever exposes the secrets of others will have his inner secrets revealed and his honor will be blown away by the wind. Whoever is thrilled with his own opinions will be lost; whoever is proud of his intellect and does not make use of other minds will slip; whoever is arrogant and proud with the people will be debased. A human being must always value other people, consult with others in all affairs in order to succeed always. On the other hand, if we are proud and fail to value others, in the end failure and degradation await us. It is therefore good if we always submit to the commands and guidance of the imams (Peace Be upon Them), take their comments into consideration and avoid the impulses of passion so that we will succeed in this world and in the next’.

In conclusion, Ayatollah al-‘Ozma Montazeri prayed for victory for the combatants of Islam in Iran, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Palestine and other places, as well as for a long life for the leader of the revolution, for the destruction of Saddam and his henchmen and for defense from the evil of the superpowers and Israel.

9310
CSO: 4640/0116
DATE FOR DISPATCH OF MEDICAL TEAM ANNOUNCED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 2 Feb 87 p 18

[Text] KEYHAN Political Service—Colonel Khalil Razmju, Chief of the Selective Service Office, told our correspondent this morning: Eligible persons in the medical group will be sent for military service on Wednesday 29 Bahman [18 February] and eligible persons with bachelors degrees and higher will be sent on 30 Bahman [19 February].

It is necessary to explain that further details and the procedures for reporting for the medical group (physicians, dentists, veterinarians and pharmacists) and for those with bachelors degrees and higher will be given in an announcement by the Selective Service Office.


Based on this announcement, the eligible persons mentioned must report in the municipalities with dispatch papers between 11/18/65 and 11/23/65 [7 - 12 February] to the appropriate regiments, battalions, companies, and precincts. In Tehran, they must report to the designated centers, as listed below, to be sent for service:

1 - All eligible persons with high school diplomas who have obtained their assignment orders from precincts one, two, and three in Tehran must report at 6:30 a.m. on 11/18/65 [7 February] to the Imam of the Age Base in Tehran on Sepah Street.

2 - All ordinary eligible persons who have obtained their assignment orders from Precinct One in Tehran must report at 6:30 a.m. on 11/19/65 [8 February] to the Imam of the Age Base in Tehran.

3 - All ordinary eligible persons who have obtained their assignment orders from Precinct Two in Tehran must report at 6:30 a.m. on 11/20/65 [9 February] to the Shohada Gendarmerie base located on Molavi Street.
4 – All ordinary eligible persons who have obtained their assignment orders from Precinct Three in Tehran must report at 6:30 a.m. on 11/21/65 [10 February] to the Imam of the Age Base.

5 – All ordinary eligible persons who have obtained their assignment orders from precincts one, two and three in Tehran must report at 6:30 a.m. on 11/23/65 [12 February] to the Imam of the Age Base in Tehran.

In this announcement the names of 24 districts and cities where ordinary eligible persons born there in 1346 [21 March 1967 – 20 March 1968] are being called to service are given as follows:

Majaveh, Khash Dust Mohammad, Zahak, Khark, Abadan, Masjed-e Soleyman, Bostan, 'Ayn-e Khosh, Rudan, Iranshahr, Sanuj, Sarbaz, Pishin, Ferdowsi, Nurabad, Shiraz, Qa'em Shahr, Mashhad, Pezhman, Qa'inat, Chanf, Tasuy and Sefidabi.

9310
CSO: 4640/0119
CONDITIONS FOR CHANGES IN EXEMPTION STATUS ANNOUNCED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 26 Feb 87 p 3

[Text] Mashhad—KEYHAN correspondent—With the implementation of the new national military service law for temporary exemption, if the individual is still qualified for exemption after the end of two years the exemption becomes permanent. Students who have entered universities with a one-year exemption will be covered under this law subject to the same conditions.

Colonel Sohrabi, national gendarmerie commander, announced the above at a press conference in Mashhad.

He added: The families of most martyrs, whose who have previously had a member exempted, may now make use of the new conditions for exemption to the effect that if a family has four children and the third child has been martyred, the fourth child may obtain a permanent exemption.

He noted that since the implementation of the new military service law, more than 85 percent of those eligible for military service have turned themselves in or been arrested. He said: Measures have been taken to fight those who forge military service papers. Several gangs of these people have been arrested and turned over to judicial officials.

He called upon the martyr-nurturing nation to report violations in this area to responsible organizations in the country so that the violators will be be punished.

Continuing his remarks, the commander of the gendarmerie discussed the strike plan to fight narcotics and control the borders. He said: The brothers of the gendarmerie, along with the revolutionary guards and the Islamic revolutionary komitehs, are responsible for controlling the borders and fighting narcotics smuggling gangs. This year more than 14 tons of opium, hashish, and burnt opium residue and 708 kilograms of heroin have been confiscated from profiteers, and a great many smuggling rings have been destroyed.

He added: For this purpose, by implementing timed strike plans and creating groups to combat narcotics throughout the country, the gendarmerie continues the destruction of smugglers with full vigor.
He discussed the construction of roads and outposts on the country's borders. He said: The gendarmerie has constructed and rebuilt 155,690 square meters of outposts and more than 559 kilometers of border roads in cooperation with the ideological and political crusades on the borders of the Province of Khorasan. In conclusion he discussed expansion of highway patrol outposts throughout the country. He said:

Since the beginning of the current year seven highway patrol outposts have been built in remote parts of the country. Within several days a highway patrol outpost will go into operation in the Birjand-Zahedan precinct, and by the end of the year another outpost will go into operation in the western part of the country in Saqz.

He added: In view of the approaching New Year's holidays in the third ten days of the month of Esfand [11 – 20 March], a special highway patrol plan to control the nation's roads, especially between Tehran and Mashhad, will be put into effect.

9310
CSO: 4640/0119
PNP HEAD SAYS U.S. DOES NOT WANT AFGHAN SETTLEMENT

BK261330 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 14 Apr 87 p 8

[Text] Peshawar, 13 April—The PNP [Pakistan National Party] President Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo has opined that Geneva peace talks are unlikely to succeed as the United States did not want a political settlement of the Afghan dispute.

Addressing the members of the Peshawar District Bar Association on Monday, he said the Americans wanted to bleed the Soviets in Afghanistan to avenge their disgrace in Vietnam. He warned the Pakistan government not to put the country's integrity at stake by toeing the American imperialist line because the failure at Geneva could trigger instability and uncertainty in the region. He emphasised that the rulers must be overthrown if the people wanted Pakistan to survive.

The PNP chief accused the United States of using Pakistan as a base to interfere in Iran's affairs and to sponsor the undeclared war against Afghanistan with the connivance of Islamabad. He said the Americans would not allow the restoration of a truly democratic order in Pakistan until they have achieved their goals of finding a foothold in Soviet Central Asia, subverting the Islamic revolution in Iran, humiliating Arabs at the hands of Israel and forcing India to follow its dictates.

Mir Bizenjo lamented that the Pakistan's affairs have come to such a sorry pass that nobody cared about the country's future. He warned that the old generation of politicians was fading out and it had become all the more difficult to restore [word indistinct] the new generation in Pakistan's solidarity. He defended politicians and maintained that the country had come to grief mostly at the hands of army generals. He stressed that nationalities ought to be given their rights in line with the Pakistan resolution if the country was to prosper and survive.

Earlier the Bar Association Vice President Tahir Khan Mastkhel introduced Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo to the lawyers. The PNP leader later answered questions posed from amongst the audience.

Mir Bizenjo later addressed at a reception hosted by the PNP activists at Bari Bank in north Hashtnagar, and in Kuladher and Umarzai nearCharsadda. These meetings were also addressed by PNP Provincial President Colonel (Retd) Ali Gohar Khan and General Secretary Roz Gul. Mir Bizenjo highlighted his party's programme in his speeches and explained national democracy as expounded in its manifesto.

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CSO: 4600/214

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OPPOSITION COMMENTS ON U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

BK291459 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 21 Apr 87 p 1

[Text] Islamabad, 20 April--Pakistan People's Party [PPP] has advised the U.S. State Department to avoid misrepresenting the basic facts about Pakistan "even if the aim is the pragmatic one of treading softly on the tarnished record of a regime, in a state of strategic importance."

Commenting on the latest State Department report on the human rights situation in Pakistan, the Pakistan People's Party in a detailed statement issued today has observed that it contains assertions which "are observed that it contains assertions which are at best half truths." [sentence as published]

Challenging the report's assertion about "democracy and respect for human rights advanced significantly in Pakistan in 1986, [no closing quotation mark as published] the PPP has observed that martial courts were abolished but their legacy still remained intact. Sentences passed by the Martial Law Courts enjoy absolute constitutional protection and the report is wholly wrong when it asserts that "the government agreed to consider legislation that would allow persons alleging abuse of their rights during the martial law era to seek redress," it pointed out.

The PPP statement has drawn attention towards the fact that even after 1 and 1/2 years period of this "democratic era" about 200 political prisoners most of whom are serving life sentences and hard labour have not been able to obtain judicial redress.

The PPP statement issued by the Information Secretary of Sind has also challenged the reports' claim that 1973 Constitution has been restored and refers to the amendments made in March 1985 by General Ziaul Haq aimed at "concentrating all powers in his hands."

The statement has also pointed out many other inaccuracies in the report and made it clear that "the present civilian regime is a constitution, admittedly under a more favourable guise, of the old order."

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NOORANI: SOVIET UNION 'DELAYING' AFGHAN WITHDRAWAL

BK270043 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 27 Apr 87 p 3

[Text] The Soviet Union is delaying the withdrawal of its estimated 120,000 troops from Afghanistan, according to visiting Pakistani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Zain Noorani.

Mr Noorani, who is attending the 43rd ESCAP conference in Bangkok, said the Kabul regime lacked popular support and would crumble without Soviet troops and firepower.

At the Geneva proximity talks held under the UN auspices to end fighting in Afghanistan between the ruling regime and resistance fighters, Soviet negotiators agreed to pull out their troops in 4 years.

Following outright rejection by Pakistan, the Soviets put forward timetables with shorter withdrawal periods and finally cut them to 18 months.

Moscow sent its forces into Afghanistan in 1979 "within a matter of days." A pullout should take an equal period of time, he said. Pakistan has given the Soviets 7 months to pull out. "It should be much less than a year to be realistic," he said.

"The Soviets had no right to send troops into another country to dominate the people's way of life," he said. "The people were not passive spectators. So, they resisted."

Six million Afghans have reportedly fled the war-torn country since fighting began 7 years ago. Half of them scrambled for safety into neighbouring Pakistan and the rest fled to Iran and other countries.

Pakistan has provided shelter to "our Islamic brothers" purely for humanitarian reasons, hoping the conflict could be resolved through negotiations, he said. "The key to peace lies in Moscow, not in Kabul," Mr Noorani said.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev recently hinted the Kremlin was having second thoughts about its presence in Afghanistan. Talks were eventually held between Soviet and Pakistani officials on the issue.
Mr Noorani described the Soviet proposal to set up a national reconciliation government in Afghanistan as one similar to the present regime, a proposition he said was unacceptable to "the refugees, the resistance fighters and other freedom-loving countries."

"The future government of Afghanistan must be decided by the Afghan people, not by the Soviet Union or Pakistan," he said.

Afghan planes have been bombarding Pakistani border refugee camps to pressure Pakistan to accept an "unfair solution of the Afghan problem," he said. "They are making a mistake, Pakistan will never let down the Afghan people."

Without a complete withdrawal of the Soviet forces, the refugees and those who oppose the Afghan regime will never return to Afghanistan for fear of being "liquidated," he said.

Though 6 regiments of Soviet troops were pulled out last year, 122 nations still condemned the presence of remaining troops at the last UN General Assembly, he said.

Mr Noorani dismissed reports his country possessed nuclear weapons, saying it has no technological or economic capabilities to build them. "Our scientists possess only theoretical knowledge," he said.

Nuclear programmes in Pakistan are "entirely for peaceful purposes" to provide much-needed energy for the country, he said.

He attributed the Pakistani nuclear scare which allegedly caught world attention every year to India "crying wolf." "We certainly could not enter into a nuclear weapons race with India. Resources should be put to other development uses," he said.

Describing his country's relations with India as a "see-saw," Mr Noorani said the latter "is behaving like a mini-superpower."

He said India repeatedly refused to enter into an agreement with Pakistan that would permit either country to inspect the other's nuclear installations.

He expressed support for Prince Norodom Sihanouk, president of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, and the Khmer people for their independence struggles and called on all foreign forces to leave Kampuchea.

Mr Noorani also sympathised with the Thai government for having to shoulder the Khmer refugee problem.

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PAPER ANALYZES PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT

BK291611 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 21 Apr 87 p 4

[Editorial: "President's Address"]

[Text] In his address to the Joint Session of Parliament, President Ziaul Haq has dealt with a number of domestic and foreign policy issues. He has praised Parliament for its good work, and expressed faith in the viability of the civilian order. He has reiterated that he did not want a constitutional role for the armed forces and wished democratic traditions to flourish in the country. Talking about foreign relations he denied that Pakistan had produced an atom bomb, but made it clear that it would not accept unilateral curbs on its nuclear programme. Pakistan, he said, would continue its peace offensive to improve ties with India, but settlement of the Kashmir issue was the biggest hurdle in the achievement of this objective.

In an otherwise uneventful speech President Ziaul Haq has spoken at length about the Afghan issue, which he listed as the most important problem of Pakistan's foreign policy. Though he reaffirmed his faith in the political settlement of the issue and expressed his appreciation of the Soviet commitment to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, he did not deem it fit to mention the Geneva peace process. On the contrary he was keen to emphasise that Pakistan was being pressurised to give up its principled position on the issue. He also expressed his solidarity with the Mujahidin and decried their war as Pakistan's war and a war of the 'free world.'

The president's pronouncements on the Afghan issue suggest that he has reservations about the prospects of an early peace. Instead of de-linking the issue from the area of superpower contention, he has identified himself with the so-called free world, thus inhibiting the chances of a bilateral agreement. Hitherto we were led to believe Pakistan was a part of the Third World and a non-aligned nation, and that its support for the Afghan cause was motivated by fraternal Islamic ties. The "free world" factor, however, brings in a new and horrifying dimension, which may represent American perceptions but is certainly not in consonance with Pakistan's professed foreign policy. It is pertinent to inquire as to what are our priorities and in which direction we are heading. It is not enough to reiterate our faith in a political settlement unless positive measures are taken to break the stalemate.
The president's assurance to the Afghan refugees that they are welcome guests is laudable, but their early return to their homeland can be made possible only if a peaceful settlement of the Afghan conflict is soon arrived at. Hopefully the president does not want the Afghan crisis to become an issue of cold war between the two power blocs which would mean an unending contention between the superpowers at the expense of Pakistan.

The president's re-affirmation that the civil authorities are now supreme in the country and nobody, including the armed forces, desired the return of martial law is re-assuring. However, his assertion that the armed forces have no constitutional role to play would be more credible if he would shed his office of chief of army staff while functioning as the country's president. We hope that concrete steps will be taken to ensure Parliament functions as a sovereign body to whom the government is accountable for all its policies. To begin with it would be in the fitness of things to hold a full-fledged debate on the President's address during the current session of Parliament and not put it off to some unspecified future date when the issues raised in the address may have lost their urgency.

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PAKISTAN

PAPER VIEWS APPARENT TENSION BETWEEN ZIA, JUNEJO

BK291601 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 24 Apr 87 p 4

[Editorial: "Real or Apparent Tension"]

[Text] The hiatus between President Ziaul Haq and Prime Minister Junejo appears to be assuming obvious overtones and the situation looks like developing from inhouse quibbling to public tension. The contrast between the president's speech to the joint session of Parliament and the prime minister's address are perhaps only the top if the iceberg. Is all this real or make-believe? After Haji Saifullah's volte face, perhaps political pundits would be prone to dismiss the president-prime-minister hiatus as shadow boxing intended to give credence to the notion of democratic dissent and consolidation to political forces outside the ring. But to the more serious analysts neither the infighting nor its reverse gives rise to any satisfaction.

The whole system comprising the president, Parliament and prime minister lacks legitimacy in the eyes of many people, which is why the sooner free and fair elections are announced the better. The lack of legitimacy derives from the fact that the whole civilian edifice and structure ensued originally from one exercise: The 1984 Referendum. This was hardly a roaring success, to put it mildly. And it is because of this realisation that the president insists on continuing as chief of army staff and still refers to the armed forces as his real constituency, while his contemporaries next door like General Kenan Evren dispensed with their uniform some time ago.

The burgeoning president-PM tension, whatever its other causes, could reflect a difference in approach to a whole host of issues, political or otherwise, which springs from the fundamental difference in their backgrounds and probably in their set of commitments. Nonetheless where they seem to agree is in working the system to its full tenure: 1990. Here there appears a convergence of interest.

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BRIEFS

GRANTS FROM JAPAN--Islamabad, 18 April--Under four separate agreements signed here today, Japan has agreed to extend financial assistance to Pakistan, in the form of grant-in-aid, totalling 3,980 million yen (US$28.06 million) for projects in the communications, education and health sectors. Notes to this effect were exchanged between Mr Kenichi Yanagi, ambassador to Japan, and A. Ghafoor Mirza, joint secretary to the government of Pakistan Economic Affairs Division. [Excerpts] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 19 Apr 87 p 1 BK] /12232

OIL IMPORTS--The National Assembly was told this evening that Pakistan imported about 38 lakh [metric] tons of 56 lakh [metric] tons of oil which were needed in the last fiscal year. Minister of State for Petroleum and Natural Resources Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan told the house during question hour that the country spent 10.642 billion rupees on oil imports last year. Replying to a question, he said Pakistan has been importing 20,000 barrels of Iranian crude oil per day since February at a concessional rate which is lower than the official rate for Iranian crude set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. In exchange, Pakistan supplies leather goods, cotton thread, wheat, and rice to Iran, the minister added. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 1500 GMT 26 Apr 87 BK] /12232

NATIONALS IN INDIAN JAILS--The National Assembly was informed during question hour this morning that there are 122 Pakistanis in various Indian jails. The foreign minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, told the house that both countries have agreed on reciprocal repatriation of prisoners who have completed the terms of their sentence. [Text] [Karachi Overseas Service in English 0800 GMT 27 Apr 87 BK] /12232

SHIFTING PEOPLE FROM KARACHI--A press note issued by the Karachi administration this evening says that shifting of (?Kabolis) of Surjani Town has been completed today and representatives of relevant construction companies have been given occupancy of the houses. The press note said that rehabilitation of families and individuals transferred from the Surjani town is going on fast and more than 1,000 families and individuals have already been rehabilitated. According to the press note, situation in the city remained normal today. [Text] [Karachi domestic Service in Urdu 1700 GMT 27 Apr 87 BK] /12232

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