USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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LEAD EDITORIAL URGES FULFILLMENT OF SOCIALIST COMPETITION

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 85 (signed to press 20 Dec 84) pp 3-8

[Lead editorial: "Let's Give Our Inspired Military Labor to Our Motherland"]

[Text] The Land of the Soviets has entered the final year of the 11th Five-Year Plan at the height of its great deeds and accomplishments. The party and our nation have been successfully resolving the increasingly extensive tasks of improving developed socialism. The economy has begun to develop more dynamically. Major sociopolitical measures are being carried out successively. The Baykal-Amur Mainline, which is rightfully called the mainline of the century, has been laid ahead of schedule through the impassable thickets of the taiga and across the swamps and mountain ranges. From areas of Siberia that used to be considered completely worthless and inaccessible to man, mighty gas pipelines now stretch to our country's western boundaries and even farther on, to foreign countries. Very large-scale thermal, hydroelectric, and nuclear electric-power stations have been activated. Despite the unfavorable weather conditions, the country's Food Program is being fulfilled. The longest piloted flight into outer space -- a flight lasting 237 days on the Salyut-7 orbiting station -- has been completed...

But it would be impossible to list all the stupendous achievements. Moreover, there are new, no less complicated, no less important tasks ahead of us. The year of 1985 that has begun is unusual in many regards. It is the year in which we celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet Nation in the Great Patriotic War, and the year of active preparation for the 27th CPSU Congress. All this, as Comrade K. U. Chernenko has remarked, gives special political meaning to the large job that is awaiting us in the new year. That job will require the mobilizing of all our efforts for the successful fulfillment of the current five-year plan and the creation of a good, solid base for the next one, the 12th Five-Year Plan, and for guaranteeing higher growth rates in the national economy.

Soviet people know that the party's policy is entirely directed toward the welfare of man, toward the further prosperity of our Motherland, and toward the reinforcement of its economic and defensive might. Soviet citizens are convinced that the better they work, the better they will live, the more
completely their material and spiritual needs will be satisfied, and the more opportunities our country will have for restraining the aggressive strivings of imperialism. Therefore the party's policy and decisions find among Soviet citizens a warm response and unanimous support.

The workers, kolkhoz members, and intellectuals have perceived as their heartfelt matter, as a combat program of actions, the decisions of the October 1984 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee; the instructions and conclusions set forth in the statements made by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade K. U. Chernenko at that Plenum and at the 15 November 1984 session of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee; and the USSR Law Concerning the State Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1985, which was approved by the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In all corners of our counters there has a broader increase in the nationwide struggle to intensify social production, to increase the effectiveness and quality of work, to intensify economy measures, and to reinforce discipline, organizational spirit, and order.

Soviet fighting men share the same thoughts and strivings as the rest of the nation. The successes and accomplishments of the workers in the city and the countryside evoke in them feelings of filial pride. In the current strained international situation, under the conditions of real military danger on the part of imperialism, they are firmly resolved to display unceasing vigilance and to maintain the combat readiness of the Armed Forces at a level that guarantees an immediate and crushing rebuff to any aggressor. Brilliant testimony to the political participation of the personnel and to their thorough understanding of their responsibility for the reliable defense of the peaceful labor of the Soviet nation is provided by the socialist competition that has become widespread in the army and navy under the motto "Let's give our selfless military labor to the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory and to the 27th CPSU Congress!"

The initiators are rightfully called forward-looking, boldly creative, daring people with a high sense of duty. The fighting men who have come forward as the leaders in the competition among the branches of the Armed Forces -- the fighting men of a missile unit (commander, Lieutenant Colonel T. Mayakov), of a guards motorized rifle regiment (commander, Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Zhuravlev), of the guards antiaircraft missile Putilov-Kirov Order of Lenin air defense regiment (commander, Guards Lieutenant Colonel A. Kurdenkov), a guards Red Banner bomber regiment (commander, Guards Colonel V. Tsar'kov), and the Slava missile cruiser (commander, Captain 2d Rank V. Krikunov) -- have served as an example that is worthy of imitation in their purposeful attitude toward the specific jobs to be done. Their patriotic undertaking has been approved by the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, and has been warmly supported by the personnel in all the military districts, groups of forces, and fleets.

The steady fulfillment of the party's requirements with regard to increasing the vigilance and combat readiness of the Armed Forces, the buildup of the qualitative indicators in combat and political training, the assimilation of weaponry and technology in shorter periods of time, the exemplary performance
of combat duty, the raising of the level of tactical—fire, field, air, and naval training, and the reinforcing of military discipline and order in accordance with the regulations -- that is a far from complete list of the specific goals to the attainment of which the military enthusiasm and creative initiative of the personnel have been directed.

In their individual and collective socialist pledges, the fighting men have also stipulated the expansion of their ideological—political and cultural horizon, the active use of frontline experience, the multiplying of the glorious combat traditions of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War, the improvement of their moral—psychological and physical training, and their participation in the struggle for the honor, dignity, and impeccable behavior of the defender of the Motherland, and for the consolidation of the military collectives. The carrying out of these and many other praiseworthy intentions will undoubtedly promote the resolution of the chief task -- the increase in the combat readiness of the subdivisions, units, and ships.

The concreteness of the socialist pledges, their well—substantiated nature, is one of the first and mandatory conditions for the mobilizing and indoctrinal force of the competition, and its effective influence upon increasing the intensity and effectiveness of the personnel's military labor. And it is, for example, the high goals in combat improvement that were set by the collective in the regiment that acted as the initiator of the competition in the Air Forces that orient the fighting men toward intensive training and strenuous labor. By having a clear idea of what each person has to do in order to achieve those goals, the guardsman—aviators work with the greatest training of their efforts and achieve the greatest return. From the very first days of the training year they strive for a situation in which tactical flight exercises in the squadrons and the regiment are conducted with grades of outstanding and good only, and in which 80 percent of the aircraft, technical groups, and crews become outstanding and an equal percentage of pilots, navigators, and other air specialists have proficiency level of 1 or 2. The flight crews work persistently to master their combat skills. They have given themselves the task of assuring that every missile, bomb, or shell hits the target accurately in the first attack. An atmosphere of businesslike efficiency, competency, and organizational spirit prevails in the unit, and it makes it possible to use every hour of training with the maximum benefit. The commanders, when summing up the results, evaluate in a demanding manner the results of the military labor and the competition among the personnel. The party organization broadly popularizes the experience of the advanced personnel, and is concerned about ensuring that that Communists play the vanguard role in combat training.

It was proven by troop practice long ago that a large goal also gives rise to a large amount of energy, consolidates the military collective, develops people's creative initiative, and increases the sense of responsibility that each person bears for the common success. Obviously, this occurs only in the event that the goal is a realistic one, if the fighting men are thoroughly aware of its sociopolitical significance and its vital necessity for increasing the combat readiness of the subdivision, unit, or ship. If, finally, the struggle for the attainment of the planned goal has been put on an efficient basis, there is a reinforcement of a daily basis of the
organizing and indoctrinational work of the commanders, political workers, staff officers, and the party and Komsomol activists, which work guarantees the precise rhythm and effectiveness of the instructional process, and the conscientious, initiatory labor of the personnel.

An unforgivable error is committed by those administrators who assume that it is sufficient to inspire their subordinates to take high socialist pledges and then to display them garishly on the competition screens, just as they assume that the zeal and persistence of the fighting men in fulfilling those pledges simply apply themselves. What this approach to the live, creative job leads to can be seen graphically in the example of the guards motorized rifle regiment which last year was the initiator of the competition in the Southern Group of Forces.

Yes, the motorized riflemen at that time took the optimal pledges and decided to win the honored title of outstanding regiment and to achieve high indicators in tactical-fire training and field training. And at first the fighting men were all on fire in their striving to reinforce their word by actual deed. Because all the opportunities for doing so existed in the unit. However, they were used in far from the best manner. For various reasons, interruptions in the instruction process began to occur frequently. There was a lack of practical directedness in the content of the officers' commander training. In the subdivisions headed by Guards Major V. Ivashohenko and Guards Captain S. Simonenko and in certain others, there were sometimes instances of easing up or oversimplification at classes and at exercises in the field. Factually speaking, the competition among the officers had been allowed to proceed without any guidance.

Unfortunately, neither the unit command element or party organization, or the officers from the formation staff and political department who made frequent visits had given a well-principled evaluation of those negative phenomena, or had taken any effective steps to correct them. As a consequence, the businesslike mood of the personnel was extinguished, and the zeal in the collective's struggle to achieve the set goals abated. At an inspection to sum up the results, the regiment received a grade of only "satisfactory." It is necessary both for the persons who had made these miscalculations and for the senior chiefs to learn lessons for the future from the miscalculations.

The CPSU Central Committee requires making the complete use of that mighty lever that the socialist competition is. And that depends upon how it is organized, what forms have been chosen, and how publicity, the comparability of the results, and the repetition of advanced experience are guaranteed. The commanders, political agencies, staffs, and party organizations must unswervingly follow the clear and precise principles enunciated by the party. And they require them, in particular, to channel the initiative and efforts of the competitors into practical affairs, chiefly the attainment of high qualitative indicators and final results. They require them to create in every collective an atmosphere of creative participation, demandingness, and adherence to discipline, and those conditions that would encourage the conscientious labor, initiative, and responsibility of people, and to develop the creative nature of the competition, to promptly notice, support, and
disseminate all the beneficial undertakings, and to eliminate that which has outlived its time.

People are directed at the unconditional implementation of these principles by the command and political complement, the party and Komsomol organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy. Concern for the high, efficient execution of every training task, for the exemplary performance of combat duty, for executing operations more rapidly than the time-performance norms and for the complete training of the troops and the naval forces for immediate, efficient, and decisive actions has been brought into the forefront in competition today. Competition is given a businesslike, creative nature also by such mass movements among the personnel as the struggle to acquire, or to raise, their level of proficiency; to assimilate related and second specialties; to hit the target, day or night, at the maximum range, with the first shot, launch, or burst; for the outstanding result of every field exercise, flight, sea voyage, every day of instruction... Everything beneficial that is engendered by the living creative of the masses constitutes an important reserve for increasing the effectiveness of military labor and requires the administrators to have an attentive, careful attitude.

The competition is all the more valuable in that, in the course of the competition, genuine military skills, innovatory methods and means of assimilating and using the weapons and technology, and of conducting modern warfare are revealed and are given public acknowledgement, becoming an instructive example for all. For example, the undertakings "Let's go from having experts in the crew to having a crew of expert" and "One expert trains another expert" -- which undertakings appeared first in the advanced units of the Strategic Rocket Forces and were then supported by all the other troops -- made it possible to increase considerably the number of specialists with the highest level of combat proficiency among the officers and warrant officers. And that had a beneficial effect both upon the quality of the performance of combat duty and upon the increase of combat readiness as a whole. The competition for the right to be called the followers of the best wartime specialists -- a competition that became widespread on the ships of the Navy -- played an important role in improving the military-technical and fire training of the personnel, in indoctrinating the sailors with the glorious traditions of the frontline heroes.

The experience of the advanced military collectives indicates that a tangible result in increasing the fruitfulness and quality of training and in developing people's combat skills is provided by a competition involving tasks and time-performance norms to find the best squad, weapon crew, vehicle crew, platoon, company, battalion, unit, or ship. Much here, of course, depends upon the commanders' ability to develop in their subordinates a spirit of competitiveness in every class and at every exercise, to compare the results achieved by the fighting me, and to make the proper evaluation of the zeal, initiative, and inquisitive mind of the advanced personnel. Subdivisions, as a rule, are commanded by young officers, and squads and crews are headed by army and navy warrant officers, sergeants, and master sergeants. Consequently, it is necessary to teach all of them the art of organizing the competition, of conducting live work with people.
In the light of the present-day requirements of the party, something that deserves the careful attention of the commanders, political agencies, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations is the movement for the careful, thrifty use of material assets. Our Motherland gives its protectors everything that they need to execute the responsible tasks that have been entrusted to them. Considerable amounts of the nation's money have been invested in the armament and technology, in the training centers and complexes, and in the military posts. And so it is necessary to take an attitude toward government property from government positions, to do everything to develop and encourage economy and thrift in every regard, large and small, including the struggle waged by the fighting men for the exemplary care and prolongation of the periods of time between repair operations for the weapons and technology, and the material-technical training base; the struggle to hit the targets with the minimum quantity of ammunition; and the struggle to achieve the efficient expenditure of the motor-vehicle expected life, fuel, and electrical energy.

It is important to reveal to the personnel in a convincing manner the combat and moral aspects of thrift, and the importance of invention and efficiency-improvement work and the economical running of the troop management. At the same time it is necessary to put up a solid road block against unthinking extravagance, and, with the use of real facts, to convince people that many things -- an unsuccessful firing, poorly organized classes or exercises, breakdowns of the technology, damage or loss of stock equipment or articles of uniform -- are included in the category of this kind of waste.

It is well known that success in training, service, and competition is largely predetermined by the extent of conscientiousness in the personnel's attitude toward the execution of their military duty, the extent of precision with which they understand the entire acuteness of the present-day military and political situation and the danger of the aggressive preparations that are being carried out feverishly in the United States and the NATO countries, and the degree of depth to which a sense of personal responsibility for our Motherland's security has been developed in the fighting men. And that means that the level of ideological, mass-political work being conducted in the subdivisions and units and on ships must correspond to the requirements of the 26th party congress and the June 1963 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Wherever every serviceman is completely surrounded by political influence, wherever the questions of the ideological training of people, of developing in them a clear-cut class position, and utter devotion to the cause of communism are resolved in a purposeful and efficient manner, and wherever the indoctrination is well organized on the revolutionary and combat traditions, one observes, as a rule, the successful resolution of the complicated tasks of improving the combat readiness and of reinforcing discipline and the fulfillment of the socialist pledges.

Competition as a powerful means of mobilizing the personnel for selfless labor contains within itself a large indoctrinational charge. It promotes the development of an active vital position and the social and political participation of the fighting men, the reinforcement of friendship and comradeship, and the consolidation of the military collectives, because nothing does more to bring people closer together and to unite them than having a common cause.
It is completely obvious that the indoctrinational opportunities of the competition are implemented not by themselves, but by the commanders, political workers, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations. Much in this regard depends upon how they reveal the political meaning of the fighting men's participation in the struggle for the worthy meeting of the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory and the 27th CPSU Congress, the high moral qualities of advanced personnel, and the social value of collectivism and of comradely mutual aid. An important role is also played by the extent of skill with which the commander sums up the results of the fulfillment of the pledges, guarantees the publicity and comparability of the achieved results, and employs material and psychological incentives for the purpose of encouraging zeal, creative initiative, and faithfulness to one's word. It is important in every way to elevate the valor of the military labor performed by those who are marching ahead, and to avoid the taking of a "low profile," or the use of red-tape methods to determine the winners, when points, percentages, and figures hide the living person, his moral outlook, and his motivations for his acts and deeds.

The regular and objective summing up of the results of the competition at the deadlines that have been established by the directive documents constitutes, first of all, the indoctrination of the personnel with the use of a positive example and experience and the indoctrination in them of the ability to make people accountable for idle talk, laziness, and irresponsibility. Objectively presupposed well-substantiated, conclusive analysis of who is leading in the competition and for what indicators, and who is lagging behind and why. And, of course, it is demandingness, especially when resolving the questions of who should be designated an outstanding serviceman, a certified specialist. One should not forget that there is nothing that cools people's enthusiasm, giving rise in them to complacency, or sometimes even to a know-it-all attitude, so much as excessive generosity and strained efforts in giving grades, or the glossing over of the true state of affairs.

The increase in the indoctrinational role of the competition and its effect upon all spheres of military life is one of the important tasks of the political agencies and party and Komsomol organizations. Communist Party and Komsomol members constitute the overwhelming majority of the personnel in the units and on ships. It is completely understandable that, by guaranteeing that they serve as a personal example in the fulfillment of the socialist pledges, the political agencies and the party and Komsomol committees and buros thus make an important contribution to the effectiveness of the patriotic movement. They make that contribution in many ways -- by the dissemination of advanced experience, by the rendering of assistance to those who are lagging behind, and by waging a well-principled struggle against inflating the results, and by carrying out meaningful individual work both with the organizers of the competition and with its participants.

However, last year's results attest to the fact there are still political agencies and party and Komsomol organizations that have not been acting combatively or in a well-principled manner in this regard. Among those who had not fulfilled their pledges there proved to be a few Communist Party and Komsomol members, and in individual military collectives a formalistic
approach that was the fault of the Communist administrators had established deep roots in the competition. That is what happened, in particular, on the small antisubmarine ship that is commanded by CPSU member Captain 3rd Rank V. Kulakov. The commander obviously underestimated the competition and failed to engage in its organization. The ship's party organization also remained aloof from this important matter. And what did the unit's party committee undertake? Twice it listened to an oral report given by Communist Kulakov and accepted for information his promises to correct the miscalculations, and it also recorded at the end of the training year that he had failed to keep his word. One scarcely has to convince anyone that this is not what party influence should be like.

The winter combat training has taken on high intensity and a precise rhythm. On firing and tank practice areas, in the air, on short and long ocean-going voyages the fighting men in the army and navy are working in an inspired manner to fulfill the party's requirements with regard to the reinforcement of the combat potential of the Armed Forces, and are persistently honing up their military skills. The patriotic striving to greet with worthy deeds the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory and the 27th CPSU Congress is multiplying their efforts, energy, and enthusiasm. The defenders of our socialist Homeland are always on guard, are keeping their powder dry, and are reliably protecting its state interests and security. They are ready at any moment to give a crushing rebuff to anyone who dares to encroach, by force of weapons, on the great gains of socialism.


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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

YEPISEV ON 'PARTIYNOSE', TECHNICAL COMPETENCE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 85 (signed to press 20 Dec 84) pp 9-17

[Article by General of the Army A. Yepelev, chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Communist's 'Partiynost'"

[Text] Like the rest of the Soviet citizens, the fighting men of the army and navy have entered the new year of 1985 with a large amount of political enthusiasm and a sense of pride in their Motherland. The patriotic movement for the worthy meeting of the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet nation in the Great Patriotic War and the 27th CPSU Congress is taking on broad scope.

The fighting men in the Armed Forces have been demonstrating monolithic solidarity around the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee, and have been unanimously approving and supporting the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet state. Under conditions of the sharp aggravation of the international situation and a real military danger on the part of imperialism, they are persistently executing the decisions of the 26th party congress and the instructions of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade K. U. Chernenko concerning the further reinforcement of our country's defense.

An analysis of the results of the past training year indicates that the military councils, commanders, political agencies, and party and Komsomol organizations have done a lot to increase the responsibility borne by all the servicemen for the performance of combat duty, to raise the qualitative level of the field, air, and naval training of the troops and naval forces, and to assimilate the weapons and combat technology. There has been an increase in the number of advanced units and ships, outstanding personnel in combat and political training, and certified specialists and military experts. High indicators were achieved by the initiators of the socialist competition in the Armed Forces.

The increase in the official and social participation of the personnel was promoted by the ideological, mass-political work carried out by the commanders, political agencies, and party and Komsomol organizations. The content of that work was enriched, there was an increase in the effect exerted
upon the fulfillment of the tasks of combat and political training and upon
the development in the fighting men of a sense of communist conviction and of
responsibility for defending the socialist Motherland.

The persons whom we can justifiably name as the right-flankers in the army
ranks and as the leaders in all that is new and advanced in training and in
the performance of official duties are the Communists. They are solidly
following the behest of V. I. Lenin, who emphasized that the preparation of
the country for defense requires not sudden spurts, but "prolonged, intensive,
very stubborn, and disciplined work on a mass scale." The vigilant
performance of combat duty, the complete mastery of the weapons and combat
technology, field, air, and naval training, the improvement of the moral-
political and psychological training of the fighting men, the reinforcement of
discipline -- each of the components of combat readiness is in the center of
their attention.

The present-day stage of the development of the Armed Forces is characterized
by the further increase in the level of technical equipment, the military
skills of the personnel, and their spirit of morale. All this presupposes the
constant improvement of the political approach to the resolution of the
specific questions of combat readiness, the assimilation of the new
technology, and the indoctrination of fighting men who are ideologically
trained, disciplined, and in complete mastery of their weapons.

The constant striving for high goals, a striving that is closely combined with
a practical and businesslike attitude, acts currently as the indicator of a
Communist's maturity. What we have in mind is that every party member must
serve as an example of conscientious labor, initiative and creativity, high
organizational spirit and discipline. "But this alone is not enough," as
Comrade K. U. Chernenko emphasized in his speech at a session of the Politburo
of the CPSU Central Committee on 15 November 1984. "Today a very important
criterion of party spirit is not only how the Communist is working and
conducting himself, but also the degree of decisiveness and aggressiveness
with which he combat shortcomings and strives for the overall improvement of
the state of affairs."

Communist party spirit is an exceptionally broad concept. It is filled with
content of tremendous social and moral meaning.

Party spirit is characterized first of all by the degree of a person's
adherence to the party's political line. This is one of those very important
qualities of a Communist in which one finds the expression of his devotion to
the cause of communism, his selfless labor for the good of society, his
principled attitude, his ability to subordinate his personal interests to the
interests of society, his implacable attitude toward bourgeois ideology and
morality, and his honesty and truthfulness. The party spirit of a CPSU member
is judged primarily on the basis of the contribution that he has been making
to the struggle for the party's interests, for the implementation of its
intentions, to the resolution of a task of nationwide importance -- the
raising of the country's defense capability.

Just as the water from numerous rivulets combines to form a river, the efforts
of all the Communists combine to form the multifaceted activity of the CPSU. In order to justify the high title of party warrior, it is necessary to march constantly in the lead and to encourage others to follow, to serve as an example of high conscientiousness and creative participation in labor and public life, and to multiply one's contribution to the common cause.

Party spirit in the life and deeds of the army and navy Communists is varied in its manifestation. It encourages people to evaluate their military labor from the height of the tasks that have been set in the decisions of the 26th party congress and the subsequent Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and to apply a spirit of Leninist adherence to principles and intolerance of shortcomings. By the personal example of their exemplary actions, by the strength of their ideological conviction, they encourage their fellow servicemen to increase their combat readiness, to gain complete mastery of the weapons and combat technology, and to reinforce their military discipline, organizational spirit, and order. It is precisely the units and ships where the party members and candidate members possess high personal training and are skilled in brilliant propaganda and agitation that mobilize the servicemen for the efficient fulfillment of the plans for combat and political training, where the vital position of every Communist is active and has a profoundly party orientation, and his personal contribution to the overall success grows steadily, that take an honored place in the ranks of the outstanding ones.

What has been said also applies to the Communists in the Motorized Rifle Proskurov Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Regiment. From year to year that regiment achieves high indicators in combat and political training. And in everything that determines the steady success achieved by the Proskurovites, an important contribution is made by the Communists. Most of them are outstanding personnel in combat and political training, and all of them are certified specialists.

Leninist party spirit presupposes the highest demandingness toward the quality of any kind of work, to the level of special training. It encourages people to be implacable toward the slightest manifestations of carelessness or of easing up in training, or toward everything that lowers the level of combat readiness. At a number of party meetings that were held to hear reports and hold elections, justified criticism was directed at certain Communist officers for their poor work habits in mastering the assigned armament and for their lagging behind in technical and tactical-fire training. They were required to give a strict account of their actions to the party collective. It would seem that this criticism will prove to be advantageous, especially if it is followed by assistance for those who need it.

Party spirit today would be inconceivable without competency, without thorough professional knowledge, or the complete mastery of one's specialty. At the present time, when major changes are occurring in military affairs, it is more important than it has ever been to keep in step with the development of technology and weaponry, with the development of new methods of the armed struggle. It is only a thorough knowledge of the situation at hand that makes it possible to lead one's subordinates successfully. On the other hand, the weak professional training of the commander or political worker hampers his actions, makes his efforts less fruitful, and reduces their indoctrinal...
effect upon people. At best he could talk with them in general features, and ask, "How are things? What's new?" Or he can urge them, "Keep up the good efforts in training." But the most important thing -- how the fighting men are understanding their tasks, how they have been mastering the technology, how they are learning to use it effectively in modern combat -- cannot even be touched upon by him.

When we speak of competency as the manifestation of the administrator's party spirit, we have in mind also the competency of the entire collective of the staff or political agency. Wherever they have been staffed with officers who know their job, officers who have an analytical way of thinking that enables them to reveal the essence of the phenomena of life and to see the long-term prospects, one usually observes the more successful resolution of the tasks of combat readiness. The trips made by the representatives of those staffs and political agencies to visit the troops usually leave a good imprint and make it possible to improve the administration of the instruction and indoctrination of the personnel.

Unfortunately, there have been instances when all the work in the outlying areas is reduced to inspection trips which, although they are frequent, are of short duration, and to the superficial acquaintance with the course of combat and political training. And one of the reasons for the viability of this phenomenon is the insufficient competency of the apparatus to resolve the tasks that are linked with the increased requirements for combat readiness. One can scarcely expect the high effectiveness of the work among the troops if the officers who are checking it are incapable of penetrating deeply into the course of the combat training, of revealing the shortcomings and omissions, of determining their true causes, and of specifying the ways to improve the quality of the training process.

A very important gauge of the on-the-job and political qualities of a Communist and of his party spirit has always been, and continues to be, his achievements in the sector where he is working. The struggle for fulfillment of the plans of combat and political training, and for the effectiveness of the training process and high discipline, is equated by the Communists with the struggle for the implementation of the requirements stated in the CPSU Rules and the party's decisions.

A large amount of responsibility in this matter lies with the commanders. Those commanders, working in close unity with the political agencies and political workers, and relying upon the party organizations, are the chief organizers of the training and indoctrinational process, the effectiveness of which has an immediate and direct influence upon the combat readiness of the subdivisions, units, and ships. The commanders' high party spirit, their ability to work in an efficient, businesslike, fruitful manner, make them skillful organizers and indoctrinators of the fighting men. It is typical that approximately 90 percent of the unit and ship commanders have been currently elected as party committee members.

Communist party spirit is also the taking of a politically sophisticated, moral position. It is antithetical to the discrepancy between word and deed, decision and execution, conviction and action. In the ability not only to
elaborate a program or policy or to define the ways to resolve specific tasks, but also to carry them out in a practical ways lies a source of the effectiveness of party leadership, and the pledge of our successes. As is well known, Lenin specially isolated among the remarkable qualities of the CPSU member the unity of word and deed, of conviction and action. That quality evolves from the very nature of our party -- an organization of warriors who share the same thoughts and the same actions. "...We must use all our efforts to strive for a situation in which party spirit consists not only in word, but also in deed, and must also keep the most rigid watch over this," V. I. Lenin emphasized.

Faithfulness to one's word, to the promise that one has given, the keeping of one's pledge, constitutes one of the most valuable moral and on-the-job merits of the administrator or any other Communist. It acts not only as an ethical feature, but also as an absolutely immutable requirement for party discipline, which is identically mandatory in our party for all its members, regardless of what position they occupy.

Being true to the Leninist principle of the unity of word and deed means that, when one encounters difficulties -- and there are sometimes a rather large number of them -- one does not throw up one's hands, but, rather, mobilizes all his efforts, looks for reserves, and uses all the opportunities for fulfilling the tasks that have been assigned.

There is profound meaning in the folk saying, "Where there's a will, there's a way." At every step, life confirms that wisdom. We know a large number of examples of the exemplary fulfillment of tasks under complicated, at times extreme conditions. And, conversely, one also still encounters instances, albeit infrequent ones, when a particular job has proven to be left uncompleted, and people immediately begin to give you dozens of reasons, not a single one of which, upon being carefully analyzed, proves to be valid.

The best guarantee that a job that has been begun will be brought to its conclusion, and that a plan or decision will be implemented, is the regular checking of execution, from the top down. That checking is a good preventive measure in the struggle against irresponsibility, red tape, idle words, and the tendency to be lavish with promises and meager with execution. Of course, the ability to execute what has been promised does not come all by itself. The political agencies and party organizations have been called upon to develop that ability, to confirm in the process of daily work, and to make completely aware to every Communist, that the unity of word and deed is the combination of computation and willpower, of bold concepts and the most rigidly realistic approach, of careful thought processes and decisiveness, of enthusiasm and responsibility, of precise actions and creativity. It is precisely this work style that the CPSU Central Committee calls upon the Communists to master.

The multifaceted activity of the Communist administrator, all his deeds and actions, are evaluated from the position of party spirit, from the point of view of the partywide, countrywide interests, the interests of reinforcing the combat readiness. Important positive deeds in this regard typify the work performed by many administrators. At the same time, individual commanders and
political workers have been responsible for serious flaws in the organizing of the combat training and political work that is aimed at the resolution of the tasks of combat readiness. One continues to observe instances of unwillingness to execute orders, of lack of organizational spirit, and sometimes also the irresponsibility and lack of proper principles on the part of certain comrades, and this has a direct effect upon the quality of the resolution of the combat-training tasks and the fulfillment of the plans for combat training and of the socialist pledges.

Deviation from the standards that govern our life leads to a situation in which certain Communists take a conciliatory attitude toward shortcomings.

One of the units in the Urals Military District used to give a good accounting of itself. However, at an inspection to sum up results, certain of its subdivisions demonstrated low results. It turned out that the unit had been carrying out poor supervision of the rate of combat training and insufficient attention was being paid to questions of ideological-indoctrination work. The officers in the political department and the unit's party activists also had proved not to be on top of the situation, since they had failed to notice the slump that had occurred there. They had become reconciled to instances of deviations from the training plans and of the postponement of classes, and to instances of oversimplification and easing up in training, and had lessened their influence upon the struggle to reduce the amounts of time required to master the technique and weapons and to raise the level of the officers' professional training.

Instances such as this are infrequent, but they do exist. During the current training year it will be necessary to fight persistently to increase the responsibility borne by the cadres for the attainment of the guaranteed combat readiness, by using means of persuasion and by making higher demands upon those who have been using easier or oversimplified methods in combat training.

The aggressive position of the Communist authoritatively dictates the need to take all steps to promote the bringing of the combat training closer to the conditions for conducting combat actions in modern warfare, to strive for the intensification of party influence upon the organizing of the training and indoctrination process, upon the increasing of its effectiveness, and upon the buildup of the qualitative indicators in combat training. The combativeness and well-principledness of all the Communists is that lever that makes it possible to raise the quality of the combat training to a new level.

It is not only the lagging military collectives that deserve the more careful attention of the military councils, commanders, political agencies, and party and Komsomol organizations, but also the so-called "middle of the road" ones, because we still have units and ships which from year to year are completely satisfied with achieving low indicators in combat and political training. And this has an effect not only upon the overall state of affairs, but also leads to a situation in which the collectives that have not been devoting all their efforts to their combat improvement frequently augment the ranks of those who, as the expression goes, "are bringing up the rear." This is our reserve, and it is a rather large reserve, as was noted at many meetings to hear reports and hold elections.
Healthy dissatisfaction with what has been achieved, a search for ways to rise
to the level of the advanced personnel -- that is the best testimony to the
large internal forces that exist in every party collective. It is important
to use them to achieve higher goals in the combat improvement of all the units
and subdivisions. It cannot be considered to be a normal situation when, for
example, a formation has a unit which from year to year has been achieving
high goals in combat and political work, while other units remain among the
"middle of the roaders." The example of the leader in the competition, his
experience, are not being used by the Communists to pull the lagging
collectives up to the level of the best ones, or to achieve overall success.

Our highly principled party attitude will be at the height of the requirements
that are made only when we give a political evaluation to every error in the
approach to questions of combat readiness in the present-day acute
international situation, when only one thing becomes a party rule for all
Communists: the higher the position that a worker occupies, the greater his
degree of responsibility for the cause of combat readiness and the more
demanding the evaluation of his activity must be. One cannot tolerate any
complacency, much less any glossing over of the real state of affairs in the
units and on ships. It is necessary to preclude the possibility of a gap
between the cadres' understanding of the entire complexity of the
international situation and the buildup of a real danger of war, and the
 corresponding practical matters that have been directed toward increasing the
combat readiness of the troops and the naval forces.

There is no way, except as a lack of party principles on the part of certain
comrades, to explain instances in which the evaluation of the level of
training of units or ships that is given on the spot does not receive
confirmation at an inspection to sum up results that is conducted from above.
That situation was observed in certain units of the Belorussian and Trans-
Baykal military districts and the Northern Fleet. It would seem that the
matter here is not simply one of discrepancy between the evaluations, but in
the fact that a few people have lost a sense of reality, and sometimes also
the desire to represent the level of troop training higher than it actually
is.

The party requires the taking of a highly responsible attitude when analyzing
the course and results of combat and political training and requires the
objective evaluation of what has been achieved. When resolving tasks of
combat readiness that are linked with the country's security, the factors that
are of importance are not the high evaluations in and of themselves, but,
rather, the real level of people's training and their ability to fulfill the
combat tasks, and the actual state of military discipline.

The vanguard role of the Communists, his active vital position, manifest
themselves brilliantly in the socialist competition, in the concern for the
effectiveness of military labor. At the present time the competition for the
worthy meeting of the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory and the 27th CPSU
Congress is gaining broad scope. As is well known, USSR Ministry of Defense
and the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, having
considering the pledges and the messages sent by the personnel in the advanced
units and on the missile cruiser to the fighting men in the army and navy, approved them and called upon all the military personnel to engage actively in the socialist competition in the new training year under the motto "Let's give our selfless military labor to the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory and to the 27th CPSU Congress!"

As always, the Communists are marching ahead in the vanguard of the competition. And who, if not the Communists, ought to assign the tone in training, the performance of duties, and the struggle for strong discipline, to render honor to those who, by their deeds, have earned it, to point out the paths that led to success, to support valuable undertakings, to organize smoothly operating mutual aid, to contribute to the formation of high qualities of combat morale in people, and to be innovators and advanced personnel themselves.

Just as a hot dry wind dries out the crops while they are still standing, formalism, stereotype, and things done for show can completely nullify people's combat mood and their healthy rivalry. And so it is the duty of the party warrior to combat everything that hinders the broadening and deepening of the competition, to improve the forms of psychological incentives provided to the advanced personnel, and to work persistently to confirm the Leninist principles of the competition.

Communists will have to be concerned to assure that the flame of the competition burns especially brightly wherever people become aware of the nature of modern combat -- in the course of tactical exercises, on the firing ranges, test grounds, tank grounds, ocean voyages, complicated flights, and at missile launch positions. And they must assure that active participation, initiative, the sense of responsibility for the high effectiveness of combat training, the introduction of advanced experience, and concern to see that the competition helps to resolve as a totality the tasks of improving the combat training of the personnel and of indoctrinating the personnel, and of confirming in the collectives a healthy psychological atmosphere, are the standard for party action. The interests of improving the qualitative indicators and stability in combat training require a higher level of organization of the socialist competition, which is a very important form of developing the personnel's creativity and initiative and of improving their conscious attitude toward the gaining of complete military mastery.

Being located at the decisive sectors of the struggle for the combat readiness of the units and ships, the Communists act as the chief support for the commanders in the resolution of the training tasks, the instruction and indoctrination of the fighting men, and the reinforcement of discipline. The question of organizational spirit, about order, is for us an absolutely fundamental, key question.

The party approach to the reinforcement of military discipline is the only correct approach. The large and responsible tasks that the collectives in the units and on the ships have begun to resolve during the new training year make it necessary to apply stricter criteria when approaching the evaluation of the conduct of the military personnel, to work persistently to indoctrinate
them in the spirit of willingness to execute orders, and to pay constant
attention to the consolidation of the military collectives.

The struggle for the further reinforcement of discipline presupposes party
intolerance of any instances of unwillingness to execute orders, of any
deviations from the norms of communist morality. It is the direct duty of the
political agencies, party committees, and buros to increase the demandingness
with regard to how the Communists perform their duties and conduct themselves
in everyday life. Questions of morality and personal behavior are inseparable
from what we call party spirit in every regard, large and small. That is why
the instances of unworthy behavior, regardless of who the person is, deserve a
well-principled party evaluation.

Communists have been called upon to observe strictly the standards of party
life and the requirements of the CPSU Rules. Whoever forgets that, sooner or
later, loses his party qualities. It is precisely on that soil that undesirable attitudes can grow -- cockiness, bamboozling, and complacency. Those who conduct themselves in an unworthy manner, who violate the party
Rules and the standards of party morality should be given no indulgence, since
we are talking about honor, the authority of the party, and the purity of its
ranks.

The Communist's party position is strong in his ideological conviction, his
aggressive activity, which is directed at the successful implementation of the
party policy in the Armed Forces and at the indoctrination of the fighting
men. In the content of the ideological work, the chief factor is the thorough
study and implementation of the theoretical principles and specific tasks that
have been set forth in the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress, and the
implementation of the principles enunciated at the June 1983 Plenum of the
CPSU Central Committee. As was noted at the All-Union Conference on
Scientific Practice, which was held in Moscow in December 1984, the strategic
tasks of the party's ideological activity in the light of the decisions of the
party's 26th Congress were defined by the June Plenum. Influenced by the
vital needs at the stage of developed socialism and by the peculiarities of
the conflict between the two world systems, the Plenum's decisions have
enriched the theory and practice of ideological work.

Today we are, as it were, checking the pulse of the ideological activity
against the high social criteria for its effectiveness, against the overall
labor rhythm in the country, and against the processes that are occurring in
the Armed Forces. Guided by the principles enunciated at the June Plenum, the
political agencies and party organizations have increased their demandingness
toward Communists for the carrying out of the ideological work. That work is
becoming more meaningful, and is being linked more and more closely with the
tasks of improving the combat readiness and of reinforcing the military
discipline. Changes for the better have occurred in the training and
indoctrination of the cadres, in the forms and methods, and the style of
ideological work. In all this one can see the purposeful, well thought-out
efforts of the military councils, commanders, political agencies, party organizations, and all the Communists.

However, the opportunities for exerting an ideological influence upon the resolution of the tasks of combat readiness are not being used completely. We have not yet seen the complete elimination of the so-called "gross" approach to propaganda and agitation, an approach that lessens the attention devoted to the content of the ideological-indoctrinational measures and their effectiveness. Formalism in indoctrinational work leads to a situation in which that work sometimes does not seize the minds and hearts of people and does not yield the desired results in the struggle against undesirable situations occurring in certain military and naval collectives. Individual indoctrinational work is being obviously underevaluated by certain Communists. Frequently the Communists in the staffs and administrations remain completely aloof from participation in this kind of work. Some of them refrain from having any live personal contacts with people and they have been slow to transfer the indoctrinational efforts to the subdivisions, company party organizations, and party groups. In the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, entitled "The Participation of the Administrative Cadres of Estonian SSR in the Political-Indoctrinational Work Among the Workers," emphasis was made, with new strength, of the party's requirement that Leninist style and traditions of daily political work among the masses must become the inner need of the administrators at all levels.

Very large-scale and complicated matters lie ahead of us. The forthcoming 27th CPSU Congress will open up for our country new historic horizons. As is well known, that congress will accept a new edition of our party Program -- the program for the improvement of developed socialism -- and will define the tasks for the future.

The firm and consistent implementation of party policy in the Armed Forces, the indoctrination of the military personnel in the spirit of utter devotion to the ideals of communism, of high responsibility for guaranteeing the creative labor of the Soviet nation, and the reliable defense of the historic gains of socialism, represent the party duty of every Communist. The military councils, commanders, and political agencies must concentrate their efforts on the attainment of the high quality and effectiveness of the political training of the personnel and must increase its mobilizing role in the struggle for high indicators in combat training and discipline. It would seem to be necessary to intensify the moral and legal indoctrination of the personnel and to make better use of the indoctrinational opportunities of service in the army or in the navy for developing in the fighting men a conscious attitude toward the fulfillment of the requirements of the military oath and the military regulations, for consolidating the military collectives, and for creating in them a healthy moral climate and an atmosphere of friendship and comradeship, and of mutual aid.

The Communist's party spirit manifests itself in the taking the offensive in the struggle against the ideological diversions being carried out by our class enemies, and in the unmasking of the aggressive essence of imperialism. Ideological-indoctrinational work as a whole has been called upon to contribute in every way to increasing the revolutionary vigilance of the
Soviet fighting men, and their readiness to execute their patriotic and international duty.

The Communist's active position presupposes unceasing concern for the indoctrination of young people, for arming them with a deep understanding of the laws of social development, for developing in them a communist conviction and social responsibility for the fates of socialism. Guided by the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee and by the principles and conclusions stated in the speech made by Comrade K. U. Chernenko at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations, the commanders, political workers, and party activists have been doing a lot to assure that the active participation of the Komsomol organizations in the army and navy becomes more and more effective. At the same time the party members can have no complacency with regard to the matters in this important sector of organizational and indoctrinal work. They do not have the right to lessen their efforts in the fulfillment of the party-wide task -- the task of guiding the Komsomol organizations on a daily basis, in a thoughtful, painstaking manner, the task of relying upon them, guiding their initiative and efforts along the necessary channels, and striving for a situation in which they actually are the combat assistants of the commanders and party organizations in the resolution of the tasks of combat readiness.

The party spirit of any Communist, and especially a leader, is also judged by what he is like in his relations with people. Having an interest in them and showing sensitivity require the leader to be sincere, to have a warm heart, to want to have close contact, and to be understanding of the other person. That is why it is impossible to reconcile oneself to the situation in which individual Communist leaders forget the road to the enlisted men's barracks, to the sailors' mess deck, and allow themselves to be tactless, callous, arrogant, and sometimes even crude, and this contradicts our very way of life.

Constant demandingness toward the fighting men must be combined with a sensitivity toward people, with a profound respect for their human dignity, with support in a matter that is right and necessary, and with the ability to give free rein to their initiative and good ideas. Let us say, for example, that a person has spoken out against oversimplification in combat training, has refused to reconcile himself to instances of lack of discipline or of glossing over of shortcomings, has censured an ideologically fallacious view that is alien to us, or applied his own efforts in putting an end to abnormal situations. He has completed an important and necessary job. And a word of approval will do even more to convince everyone that the party collective will stand up for anyone who speaks out against abnormal situations or combats them. There will be an increase in the authority of the people who are direct and well-principled, and their ranks will multiply.

Party spirit is formed in everyday situations, in the moral-political climate that has been created in the party organization. Wherever an atmosphere of firm adherence in principles, of trust and demandingness toward one another, of intolerance toward shortcomings, and of broad criticism and self-criticism has been established, Communists are quicker to graduate from the school of political and moral training.
Communist party spirit elevates the CPSU member and makes his outward appearance whole and attractive for others. Possessing that quality means fulfilling with distinction the responsible duties of a fighter in the Leninist party, means giving all one's efforts, knowledge, and energy to the steady implementation of its policy and to the improvement of the combat readiness of the army and navy.


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MSU KURKOTKIN ON IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMY IN 'GREAT VICTORY'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 85 (signed to press 20 Dec 84) pp 30-36

[Article by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Kurkotkin, USSR deputy minister of defense, chief of rear services, USSR Armed Forces, under rubric "40th Anniversary of the Great Victory": "The Outstanding Exploit of the Rear-Services Workers"]

[Text] The years of the Great Patriotic War are receding farther and farther into the past. But time cannot diminish the grandeur of the unprecedented exploit of the Soviet nation that was carried out under the guidance of the Communist Party. As is noted in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, entitled "The 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet Nation in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," the Victory achieved by the Soviet Union completely revealed the advantages of socialism and its tremendous economic, sociopolitical, and spiritual capabilities.

The course and outcome of the fiercest and bloodiest of wars that mankind had even known reconfirmed the correctness of the Leninist instruction to the effect that without an economic upsurge "one cannot even discuss any serious increase in the defense capability" ([Lenin, V. I.], "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 168).

The material basis of the enemy's defeat during the years of the Great Patriotic War was laid in the course of the prewar Soviet five-year plans. In an unprecedentedly short period of time our country had overcome the technical and economic backwardness that had been inherited from tsarist Russia.

The factor that became a very important link in the resolution of the tasks of the most rapid increase in the country's economic might was its industrialization. At the 14th party congress it was noted that industrialization was the basis not only for the overall upsurge of the entire national economy, but also the basis of the reinforcement of the country's defense capacity. And it is not by accident that it was emphasized in the directives for the 1st Five-Year Plan, "Taking into consideration the possibility of a military attack on the part of the capitalist countries on the world's first proletarian country, it is necessary, when elaborating the five-year plan, to pay the maximum amount of attention to the most rapid
development of those branches of the national economy in general and industry in particular which will play the leading role in the job of guaranteeing the country's defense and economic stability during wartime.

The Leninist party did everything necessary to assure that socialist construction, under conditions of the hostile capitalist encirclement, was reliably defended. Therefore the proper attention during the prewar years was directed primarily at those branches of industry which had the most direct influence upon the production of military output and upon the reinforcement of the country's military-economic potential. In the overall volume of industrial production, the percentage of machine-building and metal processing rose at the most rapid rates. Branches that received further development were machine-tool-building, power and transport machine building, and the electrical industry. Something that was especially important for defense needs was the production of special and high-grade types of steel, which were required for the tank, aviation, motor-vehicle, and other branches of industry. Another circumstance that was of tremendous importance was the fact that the Soviet Union had provided ferrous metallurgy with its own base for the smelting of the ferroalloys that were needed for the production of especially strong grades of steel.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government, in their economic policy, proceeded for the need for the correct combination of the interests of developing the national economy and the tasks of creating and improving the country's military-economic potential. The aggravation of the international situation and the buildup of the threat of attack upon our country during the 1930's forced the USSR to accelerate the development of the war industry. For example, during the years of the 2nd Five-Year Plan, with an increase in the total industrial output by a factor of 2.2, in the defense branches it increased by a factor of 3.9. The average annual production of aircraft and tanks in 1935–1937 quadrupled as compared with 1930–1931; artillery pieces increased by a factor of 2.6; and rifles, by a factor of almost 2.3. The party's course that was aimed at the accelerated development of the defense industry was also typical of the 3rd Five-Year Plan. In the course of that five-year plan the increase in the production of civilian output during the three-year period was an average of 13.2 percent a year, and military output, 39 percent a year.

The 18th party congress devoted the most serious attention to questions of reinforcing the country's defense capability. At all levels of party and state leadership, a considerable amount of work was carried out, which was aimed at reinforcing the country's military-economic potential. According to a decision of the party's Central Committee, the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry was subdivided into four independent people's commissariats, which were headed by candidate members of the Central Committee. In 1939–1941 the VKP(b) Central Committee and the Soviet government enacted several decrees dealing with questions of the development of the war industry. They included "The Remodeling of Existing Aircraft Plants and the Construction of New Ones" (September 1939), "The Production of T-34 Tanks in 1940," etc.

It was also at that time that our country created the T-34 and KV-1 tanks, the YaK-1, MIG-1, LAGG-3, IL-2, and PE-2 aircraft, and the volley-fire rocket
launcher that was given the frontline name of the "Katyusha." All these things withstood their test well during the course of the war. Unfortunately, by the beginning of the 1940's their production was only being to grow and the share of these models of armament in the overall quantity was insignificant.

Together with the development of the defense industry, measures were taken to increase the viability of the economy and to prepare the national economy for reorganization on a military basis. In this regard a factor that was of truly strategic importance was the party's course that was aimed at the creation of a large-scale industrial base in the eastern part of the country. New industrial regions sprang up there. The country's second coal and metallurgical base was activated -- the Urals-Kuznetsk complex with such industrial giants as the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk combines.

The Karaganda Coal Basin grew rapidly. A major petroleum-drilling and petroleum-refining industry -- the "second Baku" -- was being created between the Volga and the Urals. And by the summer of 1941 the eastern parts of the country accounted for almost one-fifth of all the war plants.

Heavy industry became the basis of the material-technical base for the collectivization of agriculture -- one of the most important sources of the country's economic might. By the beginning of 1941 the kolkhozes and sovkhozes had in operation as many as 684,000 tractors (in 15-horsepower terms), 182,000 grain combines, and 228,000 trucks. Thanks to the kolkhoz system it was possible to organize during the difficult wartime period the providing of the army and the population with food supplies and the providing of industry with raw materials.

At the 18th Party Conference that was held in February 1941 the questions of the further development of industrial production were in the center of attention. Decisions enacted by that conference provided for the more complete development of the branches of the national economy that were decisive for the country's defense, and the creation of the necessary state reserves and mobilization reserves.

Considerable success during the prewar years was achieved in the national economy, occupational instruction, and the indoctrination of the Soviet citizens in the spirit of utter devotion to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, love for our socialist Motherland, and the spirit of the inviolable friendship of the peoples of our country. The Communist Party showed constant concern for the reinforcement of the moral-political unity of Soviet society.

The German fascist aggression disrupted the fulfillment of the creative plans of the Land of the Soviets. It proved to be impossible to carry out everything that had been planned. We were also given too little time by history to prepare our country to repel the aggression. But that which we succeeded in doing was an important contribution to increasing the industrial and defensive might of the Soviet state and to the buildup of the production of weapons and combat technology in the course of the war.

The treacherous attack by fascist Germany upon the Soviet Union immediately necessitated the reorganization of the party ranks, the operation of the state
agencies and public organizations on a military basis, and the mobilization of the country's resources for the production of military technology. Therefore the total power was concentrated in a single agency that united the efforts of the front and the rear. That agency was the State Defense Committee (GKO), which was formed on 30 June 1941 on the basis of a joint decision by the VKP(b) Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Council of People's Commissars.

Based upon Leninist theory concerning the defense of the socialist Motherland, the Communist Party developed a clear-cut program for combating the aggressor. The basic documents that set forth the specific paths for defeating the fascist usurpers were the 22 June Declaration of the Soviet Government, and the 29 June 1941 directive of the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] and the VPK(b) Central Committee to the party and Soviet organizations in the oblasts along the front. The party and the Soviet nation, in the extraordinary circumstances of that time, applied tremendous efforts that were aimed at reinforcing our army, putting the economy onto a military basis as rapidly as possible, and converting the country into a single military camp.

As early as the first day of the war, a Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet stipulated such economic measures as the introduction of labor conscription and the regulation of the operating time of industrial enterprises and of institutions. A ration-card system was introduced for the purpose of regulating personal consumption.

The mortal danger that hung over the country did not shake by even one iota the party's conviction of victory. The party consolidated its ranks even more closely for the purpose of executing a truly historic task. The Soviet Union was opposed not only by an aggressor army that was armed to the teeth, but also by the economy of the fascist Reich, an economy that had been mobilized to the maximum extent. Hitlerite Germany surpassed the USSR with regard to the size of the machine-tool pool by a factor of 2.5; number of specialists in machine-building, by a factor of almost 1.5; and for coal production, by a factor of 2.5. Germany produced much more coal, magnesium, electric power, locomotives, and motor vehicles. In addition, Hitler's Reich was making the maximum use of the industrial potential and natural resources of its allies and the countries that it had occupied.

The first months of the armed struggle against the Hitlerite usurpers were extremely complicated ones for us. As a consequence of the fact that the enemy had occupied a number of rayons, the national economy of the USSR suffered tremendous losses. Prior to the war, the Soviet territory that was temporarily seized by the end of 1941 had had approximately 40 percent of the population, had produced 63 percent of the coal, 68 percent of the cast iron, and 58 percent of the steel, had more than 40 percent of the total length of the railroads, and produced 38 percent of the grain.

From the very first days of the war the Communist Party and the Soviet government were confronted by a task of unusual complexity -- the task of converting the country's national economy to a military basis within the shortest possible periods of time. That necessitated the immediate and
fundamental change in the branch structure of the national economy, the organization of military production, the assimilation of new technological processes, etc. The things that the front needed first of all were aircraft, tanks, ammunition, and other materiel without which it would have been impossible to conduct military actions.

The complicated situation in the first months of the year and the need to make time-responsive decisions were among the factors influencing the increase in the role of current planning. For example, by 23 June a mobilization plan for the production of ammunition was put into effect, and a week later an overall national-economic mobilization plan for the third quarter of 1941 was approved.

However, because of the extremely unfavorable conditions it was necessary to shut down the principal military-industrial base urgently and to evacuate it from the rayons that were threatened with seizure by the enemy, moving it deep into the country. Therefore, for purposes of the prompt providing of the needs of the front, on 4 July 1941 the State Defense Committee gave a commission headed by USSR Gosplan Chairman N. A. Voznesenskiy the assignment of developing a military-economic plan for guaranteeing the country's defense, having in mind the use of the resources and enterprises on the Volga, in West Siberia, and in the Urals, as well the resources and enterprises to be transferred to those areas on an evacuation basis.

On 16 August the VKP(b) Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars approved a military-economic plan that was a program for the creation of a well-coordinated military economy that was capable of guaranteeing the attainment of victory. The plan provided for a comprehensive program of measures, which program included the evacuation of enterprises in the military people's commissariats to the eastern parts of the country; the expansion of the production of arms, ammunition, aircraft, tanks, and ships; and the development of heavy industry and rail transportation.

It was only a planned socialist economy that could have been able to use in a purposeful manner all the resources in the interests of the war. Entire branches of the national economy were changed over and put on a military basis. The plants in heavy, transport, and agricultural machine-building began producing artillery pieces and mortars. The production of arms and ammunition was organized at the repair and overhaul shops of plants, and at enterprises of local industry and cooperative trades. The work that was carried out was complicated and responsible. But the fulfillment of the plan required time. Meanwhile a considerable number of industrial enterprise proved to be dismantled or were preparing to move to the east. The evacuation occupies a special place among the stupendous tasks that were resolved by the nation under the guidance of the party. It was an operation that could probably be compared with the largest battles in the Great Patriotic War.

The execution of that completely unprecedented task was made the responsibility of a specially created Evacuation Council, to which N. M. Shvernik was assigned as chairman, and A. N. Kosygin and M. G. Pervukhin as deputies. Carrying out the overall guidance of the evacuation, the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR Council of People's Commissars
adopted on 27 June 1941 the decree entitled "The Procedure for Removing and Transferring Contingents of People and Valuable Property." That decree mentioned the need to give the preference to the military enterprises when transferring the plants. From July through November 1941 alone, 1523 plants and factories were transferred to the east. The total number of industrial enterprises, according to incomplete data, which were transferred from the threatened rayons was 2593.

The tremendous amount of organizational work carried out by the party committees and the trade-union and Komsomol organizations, and the truly heroic labor of the workers, kolkhoz members, and intellectuals yielded their fruit. By the middle of 1942 it was possible to activate 1200 of the evacuated plants and factories.

Thanks to the selflessness of the working class, many of the evacuated enterprises began producing military technology within a month or a month and a half after arrival at the new location. There was a shortage of working hands. It was at that time, in answer to a summons issued by the Communist Party, that housewives, teenagers, and retirees took up positions at the machine tools. Many of them were able, within very brief periods of time, to master related specialties and to become experts in their field.

And so, by only one year after the beginning of the war, the reorganization of the economy on a military basis was successfully carried out, and by the end of 1942 the process of creating a well-organized military economy was completed.

A special role in the development of military production belonged to the Urals. With regard to the production of steel, rolled metal, and aluminum, the Urals occupied first place in the country during the war years. The Urals produced 60 percent of the medium tanks and 100 percent of the heavy ones. Every other artillery shell that was shot at the enemy was made out of Urals steel.

By the joint efforts of scientists, production specialists, and all those who worked untiringly for the sake of achieving victory over the enemy, by the second half of 1942 and the beginning of 1943 the necessary military-economic conditions were created for achieving a major breaking point in the war. Those conditions became possible thanks to the quantitative and qualitative growth of the Soviet rear area. The front and the rear squeezed together into a single crushing fist and there was no force that could oppose that indissoluble unity. That is why the more perspicacious Hitlerite generals and economists concluded after Stalingrad and Kursk that the German economy had already won the fight.

But the war continued. And during the year of the major breakthrough, our country's economy was facing new tasks. That was linked with the fact that by that time the possibility of increasing production by means of the redistribution of the math the fact that by that time the possibility of increasing production by means of the redistribution of the material and labor resources was basically exhausted. The qualitative factors began to take on
greater and greater importance: the increase in labor productivity as a result of improving the technological processes and the organization of production.

By May 1942, in response to an appeal issued by the party, a completely unprecedented All-Union Socialist Competition under the motto "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" was broadly extended throughout all the branches of the national economy. The movement of the 200-percenters, 300-percenters, and even thousand-percenters -- that is, those who had overfulfilled their norms by a factor of 2, 3, or 10 -- was broadening. The competition encompassed thousands of industrial enterprises and played a tremendous role in increasing the labor productivity.

An important condition for the successful resolution of the military-economic tasks was the intensification of the party leadership of the economy. The basic branches of the military economy were headed by members or candidate members of the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee. Experienced party and economic workers headed the people's commissariats of industry: D. F. Ustinov, armament; A. I. Shakhurin, aviation industry; P. I. Parshin, mortar industry; and B. A. Vannikov, ammunition. Thousands of Communists were sent to very important enterprises in heavy industry. Whereas by the beginning of 1943 there were 920,400 Communists working in the leading branches of the USSR national economy, by the end of the year there were 1,114,200. The reinforcement of the party organizations and the concentration of the party forces in the decisive sectors of the military economy tremendously contributed to improving the work of Soviet industry.

At the beginning of 1943 the party's Central Committee began concentrating the Communists' efforts at the elimination of the bottlenecks in the economy and at the fulfillment of an extensive program for the development of heavy industry. Decisive steps were taken to eliminate the lag in the fuel, metallurgical, and power industry. During a one-year period the capital investments in those branches doubled as compared with the previous period.

But what was the effect that the success in the creation and improvement of a well-organized military economy had upon equipping the Red Army and upon the course of combat actions? First, the increase in military production made it possible to restore the considerable losses of combat technology that had been incurred at the beginning of the war and served as a solid basis for carrying out a major turning point in the war. Secondly, that success made it possible also to achieve a qualitative superiority over the enemy with regard to very important types of armament. The troops received the latest tanks, which got the upper hand over the Panthers and Tigers that had been advertised in every way by fascist propaganda; aircraft that enabled our pilots to win supremacy in the air; as well as excellent small arms and different kinds of ammunition. Whereas Soviet industry in 1942-1944 had a monthly production of more than 2000 tanks, it was not until May 1944 that Germany's industry reached its maximum -- 1450 units.

In the work of providing all kinds of support to the front there were no secondary sectors. All the links in the economy were important. It would have been impossible, for example, to overestimate the contribution that was made to the attainment of victory by the workers in agriculture. The
conditions under which they worked were the most complicated ones. Agriculture transferred to the front its tractors and trucks and a considerable number of horses. As a result of the temporary occupation of part of our territory by the enemy, there was a sharp reduction in the areas that were planted to crops. The entire brunt of the rural labor fell onto the shoulders of the women, the old men, and children. Having replaced the men who had gone to the front, they worked unceasingly in the name of bringing the victory closer. Summing up the results of 1943, the party's Central Committee remarked that under the difficult wartime conditions the kolkhozes and sovkhozes had coped during the year that had elapsed with the agricultural operations and had guaranteed without any serious interruptions the supplying of the Red Army with food supplies and industry with raw materials.

The initiative shown by the workers in collecting funds for the Soviet Army deserves the most profound gratitude. The funds that were received just from the workers, kolkhoz members, and intellectuals were used to build 2500 aircraft, 30,000 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery pieces], 20 submarines and gunboats, and a large amount of other armament.

Or take, for example, the activity of the transportation specialists. The successful resolution of the tasks confronting them became possible thanks to the maximum concentration of their efforts and means in the decisive sectors of the transportation management, the centralization of the administration of the branch, and the strenuous, and frequently risky, labor performed by the railroad workers, motor-road workers, and river-transportation workers. When carrying out all the operations, transportation uninterruptedly carried out operational and operational-supply shipments, and carried the wounded back to the rear. Rail transportation alone carried more than 19 million cars with military freight.

Something that was exceptionally important in the political, economic, and social sense was the restoration of the destroyed economy during the course of the war. Thanks to the titanic work performed by the party, the government, and the entire nation, the restoration proceeded at rapid rates. For example, whereas in 1943 the liberated rayons produced industrial output valued at 2.7 billion rubles, in 1944 they already produced 3.1 times more industrial output. By 1945, 7500 industrial enterprises were restored in the liberated rayons.

An important role in guaranteeing the Victory was also played by the Rear of the USSR Armed Forces. That was influenced by the fact that, as the military production expanded, there was also an increased complexity in the tasks of delivering promptly everything that was needed to the formations, units, and ships.

A considerable influence upon the construction of the Rear of the Armed Forces was exerted by the increasingly complicated military-strategic tasks. For example, the seizure of the strategic initiative, the increase in the depth
and rates of the operations, and their duration dictated the need to increase the number of railroad, motor-transport, and road-management troops.

The basis of supporting the operations and other combat actions was material supply. With regard to its overall volume of production and expenditure, during the war years it constituted more than 10 million tons of ammunition, 16.4 million tons of fuel, 40 million tons of food supplies and fodder, and a large quantity of uniform articles.

During each period of the war, the operation of the rear had its peculiarities. But one thing is indisputable. Not a single operation, not a single combat engagement, would have been successful without the prompt providing of the troops with armament, ammunition, rations, and fuel.

Take, for example, the supplying of the troops with fuel. The fuel reserves during the period of the defensive Moscow engagement on the Western Front provided for 35-40 days of operation of the armored-tank and motor-transport technology and the 10-12 day needs of aviation. With the changeover of the troops to the counteroffensive, the fuel expenditure increased by 40-50 percent.

In the Battle of Stalingrad 149,000 tons of fuel were expended; and in the Kursk engagement, 204,000 tons. And this entire tremendous quantity had to be received from the enterprises, promptly brought to the fuel depots, stored, and then delivered to the field of combat.

A tremendous contribution to the attainment of Victory was made by the military medics. They returned to active duty more than 72 percent of the wounded and 90.6 percent of the sick.

During the wartime years the Rear of the Armed Forces also executed other important tasks. To meet the needs of aviation, more than 6000 airfields were equipped, and hundreds of thousands of individual pieces of various kinds of armament, combat technology, etc. were repaired.

In the course of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet rear received the richest experience in providing economic support to an armed struggle that was completely unprecedented with regard to its scope or ferocity, and experience in mobilizing all the material and spiritual forces of the nation for the defeat of the usurper. That experience continues to this day to be of tremendous theoretical and practical importance for reinforcing the military-economic might of our country and of all the countries in the socialist community.

As was emphasized in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, entitled "The 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet Nation in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," a great exploit was performed during the war years by the workers in the rear services. The workers, kolkhoz members, scientists, engineers, and designers, by their selfless labor, won an unprecedented battle for metal and grain and for the creation of powerful Soviet weapons.
The economic victory of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War was in complete accord with natural law. It was influenced by the most advanced socialist state and social system, by the advantages that were brilliantly used during the war years by the Communist Party. It was precisely the party, armed with advanced Marxist-Leninist theory, that mobilized the Soviet nation for the attainment of Victory.

The advantages of our economy are based on the fact that the enterprises, transportation, communication, natural resources, and material means are owned by the nation. Unprecedented opportunities, as compared with the capitalist countries, were opened up by the planned socialist economy. That was precisely the factor that helped our country to use more effectively every ton of metal and coal, and every piece of machine-tool equipment. The Communist Party was able to guarantee a higher concentration of industry than that of the enemy, and was able in a planned and flexible manner to concentrate the country's forces and means on the resolution of the chief tasks.

Falsifiers of history in the West are striving with all their might to exaggerate the role that was played by the shipments of arms and ammunition to the Soviet Union from the United States and England. Actuality refutes the conjectures of the imperialistic historians and politicians. The Allies shipped to us only 2 percent of the antiaircraft pieces, 13 percent of the aircraft, and 7 percent of the tanks. It is completely obvious that the Soviet Union destroyed the fascists by using Soviet-produced weapons.

Almost 40 years have passed since the victorious May 1945. During the decades that have elapsed, the USSR has achieved tremendous success in all spheres of social life. An important stage in the further reinforcement of our Motherland's might is the final year of the 11th Five-Year Plan. The State Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1985, which was approved by the 2nd Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, has set down new prospects for improving mature socialism. That plan stipulates the resolution of the key questions in the development of the economy, the raising of the national standard of living, and the guaranteeing of our country's defense capability.

The economic and scientific-technical potential of the USSR represents a very reliable factor in deterring the imperialistic aggression. "The party's Central Committee and the Soviet government," K. U. Chernenko has stated, "understand their very great responsibility to the nation. June 1941 will not be repeated! Any aggressor will receive immediate retribution. Let everyone know that -- both our friends, and those who are not our friends."

The Land of the Soviets has never striven for, and is not striving now for, the attainment of military superiority over anyone. But the Soviet Union will not allow the disturbance of the military balance that has developed. The present-day level of production, science, and technology in the USSR makes it possible to create -- if this should be required in response to a military challenge issued by imperialism -- any types of arms and to supply them in the necessary quantity to the army and navy, and to maintain our Armed Forces constantly in a high state of combat readiness.


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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

POLITICAL WORK DIRECTED TOWARD YOUNG OFFICERS' WIVES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 85 (signed to press 20 Dec 84) pp 46-51

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Nekrylov under rubric "Party Life": "Without an Icicle in the Heart"]

[Excerpts] The passengers, exhausted from the crowding in the station, were bustling around as they took their seats in the express-train cars. After everything had quieted down, I went out into the corridor. A young woman was standing by the window. We started chatting with one another.

Olg'a -- for that was the woman's name -- was married to Lieutenant Sergey Averin. They had been married about six months earlier, when the young officer had been on leave. Now, after graduation from the institute, she was traveling to the place where her husband was assigned, at a remote garrison.

"It will probably be very interesting, living on a military post, don't you think?" Olg'a asked, with her face beaming. "Serezha told me that there is a wonderful forest there, with beautiful pine trees and birches. And there are so many mushrooms..."

Her imagination created many other comforting scenes for herself. But if it was as though she wanted her conversational partner to create additional scenes.

"Do you think that they will give us an apartment, or at least a room?"

I said, jokingly, "The palaces there are, of course, already occupied, but certainly they will be able to find a corner somewhere for you."

"We'll see, we'll see," she said, and the smile and slightly elated mood did not leave her.

On the platform a tall officer carrying a bouquet of red roses walked up to Olg'a, took her carefully by the arm, and they started walking toward the exit..."
Almost a half-year has passed since then. As things turned out, I happened to be in that part of the country again on official business. I was returning just before New Year's. The compartment that the conductor assigned me to already had a passenger in it. It was a woman. She was sitting by the window, with her head lowered onto her hands. She was wearing a sheepskin jacket and had blond hair. Two suitcases were standing in the passageway. I said hello. She lifted up her head. I recognized her as the person I had casually met before.

"Olya?"

A tortured smile barely touched her lips.

"Well, it's really a small world!"

Then she turned back to the window. The wheels beat out their monotonous song, and I could just barely hear the spoon tinkling in the glass. It was nice just to think one's thoughts as the train sped along. Then Ol'ga shook her head, as though trying to chase away some thoughts. Looking directly at me, she asked, "Well, are you surprised? You've got something to be surprised about. I ran away. That's right, I ran away." She smiled bitterly, and then became silent. Then, as though giving meaning to her words, she said, "I didn't prove to be an exemplary officer's wife. Why I didn't, I myself don't know. I had a husband and a television set -- that was my entire life. No, no, it wasn't a matter of having theaters to go to. Even when I was at home, I wouldn't go more often than once a month, if that."

Then, deep in thought, she continued, "For the first and second months everything was all right. I used to like to stroll through the woods, collecting mushrooms and berries -- there were plenty of them there. But then," and a shadow fell on her face, "the winter came and everything suddenly was covered up. I would frequently sit by the window, leafing through my teacher's course outlines, or simply looking at the white snow, waiting for my husband to get off duty. And there really was nowhere to go. I really felt as though I had been completely cut off from life."

She fell silent and made no further attempt to resume the conversation.

"Will you be staying a long time with your mother?"

"I don't know..."

In the reflection in the window I could see a tear running down her pale face.

Later on, on my next official trip, I mentioned this to the political worker at an antiaircraft missile regiment, Major S. Sudorgin.

"To tell you the honest truth, we do have that problem," he admitted. "One woman will look at the situation there: no work to do, nothing to keep her busy, boredom from having nothing to do, and she just cannot stand it. It's true that there are just not enough jobs for everyone to do at the garrison, and so there are those who don't even look. That is why some of our wives -- who are teachers, doctors, and engineers -- become 'certified housewives.'"
lot of people don't like that, of course. But if it were possible to find a useful social occupation for each of them, the remoteness would not affect them so much, there would be fewer family problems, and the officers' performance of their duties would proceed better."

He told me about an officer who had violated military discipline, as a result of which he had been severely punished. But when it came around to a discussion of the reasons for his misdeed, he shrugged his shoulders and said, "People say that things were not going so well in his family. He was having trouble with his wife. True, you never know what's going on in another person's family."

But what kind of "other person's family" is the family of an officer living in a garrison? The family members do not have any worldly-wise parents near at hand, who could give some needed advice (at least with regard to family life), make a few suggestions, or provide a bit of help. All that there is is the combat collective, which becomes the "family" for the officer and his wife. And it is probably for that reason that it has become a remarkable tradition in our army that the collective, for everyone who becomes a part of it, is at the same time their own family.

A young family has arrived at the garrison. Everything is unfamiliar and strange. A room in communal living accommodations for two persons, or for three persons. Quiet woods. Snowbanks coming right up against the windows. No theaters, no dressmaking shop, no laundry. No work in one's favorite specialty. At times like this, people lose heart, or even become ill from boredom. But how important it is if the young couple are given a good welcome, if they are helped to set up housekeeping in the new location, and if the attempt is made to find an interesting job to keep the officer's wife busy. Then, even though they may not be too frequent, there will always be meetings at the holiday table, in front of the television screen, at an interesting lecture, at the library. That is very necessary, in order to assure that a person does not feel that she is forgotten or completely cut off from people.

In this regard I recall the following situation. A lieutenant's family was living in a certain garrison. Nikolay and Tat'yana Volkov. From the very first days of their arrival there, there had been no peace in that family. Tat'yana grumbled endlessly about the "wells and supposed-to's." "Well, is this really the way it's supposed to be?" she objected. "I don't want to just live off of my husband. I want to be his assistant in everything that pertains in one way or another to the garrison. Give me some kind of work, something to do, even if it is public, unpaid work. I want to feel that I'm doing something worthwhile for someone." The commander did not ignore these complaints, and invited the Volkovs in for a chat. The chat was extremely brief, but it was extremely to the point.

"Well, what do you think about conducting a literary discussion group at our library?" the commander suggested. "After all, you graduated from the department of languages and literature."
"Do you think that it's necessary?"
"Definitely," he answered. "There are a lot of new books coming out. So you can acquaint us with all of them."

Tat'yana eagerly undertook the job. She began conducting the literary discussion group. That's what they called it. She gave lectures to the enlisted men and officers, conducted discussions about new books, and acquainted people with the problems that modern literature deals with. She also took part in organizing literary quizzes and young people's debates.

In this story, something else attracted the commander's attention. The social work load was for Volkova just a drop that could scarcely quench everyone's thirst. Because there were a lot of thirsty people on the military post. It would take her a whole year just to deal with family problems.

"Look, Ivan Timofeyevich," he told his deputy for political affairs once, "Could you find out for us how many doctors and teachers we have, what kind of specialists we have, and then take your plans to the rayon executive committee?"

They walked around and asked questions, and as a result they found jobs in the city for the teachers and doctors, and also found two engineer positions at a local radio plant. They also resolved the problem with transportation to take the women to the city to their jobs. Sponsors helped. And when they found out that a nearby millionaire-kolkhoz spent a bundle on a modern school with a swimming pool, they suggested to the chairman that they also open up a music classroom there: "We have four music teachers. It would be a good idea for the tots to learn music." And back in the garrison they started up courses in dressmaking and in typing. The women's council also increased its work. It began conducting housekeeping and cooking contests and meetings between the families of young officers and the families of army veterans.

The benefit from all of this was considerable. Primarily for combat readiness. The families became stronger and the officers performed their duty in a good mood, with a desire to carry out their jobs conscientiously.

Of course, people might object to me that this is possible when the garrison is situated close to a city, but if the city is located 40-50 kilometers away, people just cannot get there. You can't lay down a narrow-gauge railroad. There is, of course, a lot of sense to this objection. Every garrison has its own specifics and you just can't write out a single recipe. Moreover, there is no need to do so. The crux of the matter lies elsewhere — in the attitude to that problem, in the very desire to resolve it. One commander does this through the local authorities, another one attempts to build his own school and personal-services center... The most important thing is not to turn your back to the "family problem." Because that is what sometimes happens. Some commanders, without even listening to everything a woman has to say, will rush to escort her to the door, and give her the invariable parting words, "It
would be better for your husband to come and see me, honey. It's easier for me if he tells me what the problem is."

But I would like to make an immediate stipulation. It would scarcely be correct to reduce the work with the wives of military personnel simply to finding jobs for them. After all, that is only one aspect of it. There is another, no less important aspect -- the ideological-indoctrinational. An officer's duties are such that he has to be able to withstand the temporary inconveniences in everyday life, and he definitely has to learn how to wait, because it is precisely because the officer's fate is unusual and his profession is such a difficult one, that the wife of a military man is called his combat girl friend. And that is what she must be.

The life situation in itself is usual. But from it the commander, political worker, and the party committee made the appropriate conclusions for themselves. Among the Communists, at the party committee, there has frequently started up an acute, well-principled discussion about everyday life, about how to render assistance to young families in setting them up in housekeeping, and about the best ways to organize the political-indoctrinational work with the wives of officers and warrant officers. Everyone remembers the party meeting on the topic "The Communist and His Family." The unit's political worker gave a report. It was an acute, self-critical one, and it set the tone for the entire meeting. Those who spoke gave heated statements about how it is not enough to know a person "halfway," or to exert an influence upon him only on the job. The party organization must invariably keep within its field of vision the person in his entire "growth." Because the performance of a person's official duty, his everyday life, and his social activity are inseparable, and influence one another. The Communists at the meeting also mentioned that the members of the party committee should visit the families of the officers and warrant officers more frequently, should organize trips and recreational evenings, and be concerned to have the women's council constantly bubbling with activity.

And all that had to be done was to break with tradition -- of not looking beyond the line that sets off the way a person spends his time while off duty -- and the commander and the political worker immediately noticed that the persons ceased to keep tightly sealed everything that is concealed by the term "personal." Whenever it was necessary they began to go to the chiefs, to the party committee, to share their griefs genuinely, and to verify their innermost thoughts, and they asked for help and for support in various ways. And that advice and that support were given to the officers and their wives.

Once the following conversation took place between a commander and a political worker.

"Doesn't it seem to you," the commander asked, "that our wives know very little about our work, and about the conditions that we fly under?"
"It doesn't just seem that way. It's actually so," the political worker confirmed.

And he reminded the commander that husbands sometimes hear their wives saying, "You don't help me around the house, and you don't help with the children. Are you really so overworked on the job?"

And so, on one of the flight day, the pilots' wives were invited to the airfield. They were met by the regimental commander, the political worker, and the party committee secretary. At first the wives were given the opportunity to observe the flights. Then there was a discussion about the complexities of flight work under the local climatic conditions, and about the pilot's need to prepare himself carefully for every assignment in order not to make an error in the sky. A discussion also ensued about the way in which the officer's attitude toward executing effective work is also created at home, in the family situation. The discussion was beneficial. It caused the combat girl friends to gain new insight. And certain administrators even began thinking seriously that maybe our women had now gone to the other extreme. Who knows, if the husbands were freed from all their household worries, our subordinates would be spoiled. But the requirements toward the officers themselves were not lowered. An interest was shown not only in the performance of their official duties, but also in how they behaved at home.

Whatever the garrison, there are certain new and life-tested forms of working with officer wives. For example, forms that are invariably of interest among them are the lectures and discussions about our country's domestic life and the international situation that are given by the commanders, political workers, party committee members, and visiting lecturers. A good impression is left by the meetings with senior chiefs of visit the garrison, army veterans and their combat girl friends who have lived a long and difficult life on military posts. And the various cultural and indoctrinal measures that are organized by the women's councils are very beneficial. The young women listen interestedly to statements given by the workers of the local party and state agencies, and exchange their opinions about the affairs in their hometowns.

At one of the units I was told about the large amount of interest with which the wives of the young pilots listened to a statement made by Lieutenant Colonel B. Shishakov and his wife. Boris Nikolayevich began serving here when he was still a lieutenant. He got to love this part of the country, and his heart became more strongly attached to it. He was transferred to other places that had been well-populated long ago. But after a few years the pilot again requested to be assigned here -- he was drawn back to this remote part of the country that had become near and dear to him. Here the officer became an outstanding pilot. And it was to no small extent because of the fact that he always had beside him a true companion in life -- his combat girl friend.

I happened to be a participant at a session of the women's club that dealt with interesting activities that were their favorites. This time the club had a demonstration of the women's cooking skills. On the tables were loaves of bread, pies, and cakes. The person in charge -- the wife of officer I.
Abramov -- told about the way in which people used to bake bread in blockaded Leningrad, where there was almost no bread at all. Spontaneously a discussion began about what people had experienced during the years of the Great Patriotic War. The women began talking about duty to our past, present, and future, and about the responsibility for their participation in the fate of the Homeland and for its defense out here, on the forward edge of the Soviet land.

Kind of a life they have, and whether their home will be warm and comfortable, largely depends not only upon themselves, but also upon those who surround them, and who give them guidance. Warming these people with their penetrating heat means treating them not with indifference, not with an icicle in one's heart, but with heartfelt warmth.


5075
CSO: 1801/155
REVIEW; ON MILITARY FRATERNITY OF THE NATIONALITIES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 85 (signed to press 20 Dec 84) pp 87-89

[Review by N. Gorokhov, candidate of historical sciences, of book by N. A. Kirsanov, "V boevom stroyu narodov-brat'yev" [In the Combat Formation of Fraternal Peoples], Moscow, Mysl', 1984, 263 pp, 1.30 rubles]

[Text] The inviolable friendship of the peoples of the USSR is one of the most significant achievements of the national policy of the CPSU. That friendship became tempered and stronger in the joint struggle waged by the workers against the landlords and the bourgeoisie, the struggle for the revolutionary transformation of society on the principles of scientific communism. And that friendship played a tremendous role in reinforcing the defense capability of the Soviet state and in defending the socialist Homeland.

For the first time in history the multinational composition of a country ceased to be a source of its weakness, and instead was turned into a source of its strength and prosperity. In the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, entitled "The 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet Nation in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," it is noted that in the struggle against German fascism the inviolability of the friendship and fraternity of the peoples of the USSR was convincingly demonstrated. The struggle against the Hitlerite usurpers consolidated even more closely the Soviet people, all the nations and nationalities of our country.

Much has been written about the fraternal combat community of the peoples of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War. However, that multilevel problem needs even more thorough research, especially today, when the bourgeois falsifiers of the national relations in the USSR, carrying out the social orders of the aggressive imperialistic circles that are actively preparing for a third world war, are making frenzied attempts to belittle the principle of proletarian, socialist internationalism, which constitutes the basis of the national policy of the Marxist-Leninist parties, and the pledge of the monolithic strength and inviolability of the countries in the socialist
community and the combat fraternity of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

They are showing a particular predilection for falsifying the combat exploit of the multinational Soviet nation, and are giving a distorted interpretation of the national relations and the Leninist national policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government during the years of the Great Patriotic War. The slanderous intentions of these efforts become especially obvious when they are compared with the concrete historical facts that are cited in a new book by Doctor of Historical Sciences N. A. Kirsanov, which is devoted to the history of the creation of, and the combat path of, the national military formations of the Red Army during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

The book being reviewed is the most complete, most extensive study of the problem. It was prepared by including extensive documentary materials, chiefly from the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, attached to CPSU Central Committee, the Central Archives of USSR Ministry of Defense, and the party archives of a number of union republics.

Analyzing in the first chapter the primary sources of the combat fraternity of the peoples of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War and their overall patriotic contribution to the victory over the enemy, the author convincingly shows that the unity of the fundamental interests of the working class in the Soviet republics and of all people of labor was influenced by the successful implementation of the party's Leninist national policy. As a result, socialist internationalism became the chief feature of the state self-awareness of all the nations and nationalities of our country.

The Great Patriotic War was a severe test of the strength and viability of that socialist internationalism. When preparing the treacherous attack upon the Soviet Union, the leadership of fascist Germany counted on the rapid collapse of the multinational socialist state, which collapse would allegedly occur when the first failures of the Red Army would cause feuds and conflicts among the nations of the USSR. The book reveals in detail the barbaric plans of the enemy. Carrying out a policy of genocide that was absolutely monstrous in its inhumanity, the Hitlerites on the Soviet territory that had been subjected to occupation killed or tortured approximately 10 million Soviet citizens — men, women, and children. They attempted to sow seeds of hatred among nationalities, and to destroy the solidarity of the workers of various nationalities in the Soviet Union.

But the enemy's plans were not to be realized. The more difficult the situation became on the front, the stronger the friendship among the Soviet nations became. Its vital force was multiplied by the close solidarity of the Soviet citizens around the Communist Party. That idea forms the basis of the book and determines its content. The party inspired, organized, and ideologically armed the multinational Soviet nation for the struggle against the enemy. The patriotic activity of the workers that was guided by the party made it possible to make more complete, broader use of the tremendous military-mobilizational opportunities and advantages of the socialist system for the strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Something that was a great patriotic achievement was the formation of Red Army national units and formations. The readers have the opportunity in the second chapter of the book to become acquainted with the manner in which they were created and what constituted their differentiating features. The following national units and formations were formed from the workers of 11 union republics and 4 autonomous republics: 2 rifle corps; 20 rifle and 20 cavalry divisions; 15 rifle brigades; 2 rifle and one air regiment; 2 separate rifle battalions; and one air squadron. The decisions with regard to this question were made directly by the State Defense Committee (SDC) and the VKP(b) Central Committee.

The formation that became the first national formation in the Red Army was the 201st Latvian Rifle Division, that was created on the initial of the Communist Party of Latvia and the LaSSR Council of People's Commissars. In the 3 August 1941 decree of the SDC it was stated that that formation was being formed "from fighting men in the former workers' guard, militia, party and Soviet workers, and other citizens of LaSSR who had been evacuated to the territory of the RSFSR." Approximately 70 percent of the fighting men in that formation were volunteers; as many as 90 percent, citizens of LaSSR; and 62 percent, workers. The division had more than 1100 Communist Party members and candidate members, and 940 members of the Komsomol.

On 18 December 1941 the official requests of the Central Committees of the Communist parties and governments of LiSSR and ESSR concerning the formation of the 7th Estonian Rifle Division and the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division were satisfied, and two months later, the formation of the 249th Estonian Rifle Division. They were also manned chiefly from the evacuated citizens of the corresponding Soviet Baltic republics.

The book points out that the creation of the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian military formations was an important political event that attested to the unshakable, firm resolve of the laboring masses to defend the socialist future of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and, together with all the rest of the peoples in the USSR, to defend the Soviet Motherland. In response to a challenge issued by the political department of the 201st Latvian Rifle Division, "a division for many thousands of people who only recently had been liberated from their capitalistic shackles became an important school of life and politics."

National units and formations were also created in a number of other republics. On 13 November the SDC adopted a decree concerning the formation of 15 separate rifle brigades and 20 cavalry divisions in Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek union republics and Bashkir, Kalmyk, Kabardino-Balkar, and Chechen-Ingush autonomous republics.

The materials in the book make it possible to trace the basic trends in the military-mobilizational activity of the party and Soviet organizations in the union and autonomous republics in connection with the creation of the Red Army national units and formations. In a decision that was made in regard to this question, for example, the party's Kalmyk Oblast Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Kalmyk ASSR obliged the republic's party and Soviet agencies "to broadly popularize among the population the organization of
Kalmyk national cavalry units and to provide this very important state measures with all kinds of support by all the workers of Kalmyk ASSR... To conduct in all nomad camps and in the city (of Elista) party and Komsomol meetings, and meetings of kolkhoz members and of sovkhoz workers and employees, to discuss and accept the specific pledges from each kolkhoz, each sovkhoz, and each enterprise in providing the fighting men with articles of uniform and rations, and also in providing horses and equipment for them."

In the course of the establishment of these units and formations, special importance was attached to the reinforcement of the party and Komsomol segment. As becomes obvious from the book, in the national military formations of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, that segment reached 35-50 percent, and in certain of them was even higher; in the 108th Cavalry Division, 50.2 percent; in the 101st Cavalry Division, 53.2 percent; in the 106th Cavalry Division, 59.2 percent; and in the 91st Separate Rifle Brigade, 66.6 percent.

The personnel in the national formations, who had been selected chiefly among that part of the indigenous population that was not fluent in Russian or had absolutely no knowledge of Russian, underwent military training in their native language, and that made it possible to accelerate considerably the process of military training. The same method, the book notes, was used to form and train national formations in the trans-Caucasian republics. The party and Soviet agencies of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia helped the command element of the Trans-Caucasus Military District (Front) to carry out successfully the measures that were necessary for the resolution of that task. From December 1941 through July 1943, 14 national rifle divisions were formed there.

In order to characterize the personnel in the military formations, the author makes wide use of statistical materials. On their basis he repeatedly points out that every formation that had been established "according to the national attribute" (as was stated in the order to the troops of the Trans-Caucasus Front) was actually a multinational one, but with the numerical predominance of personnel corresponding to the indigenous population. For example, fighting men of 36 nationalities served in the 276th Georgian Rifle Division; and more than 20 nationalities in the 223rd Azerbaijani Rifle Division; that completely naturally reflected the national makeup of the republic where the formation was created.

In five chapters of the book the reader can thoroughly trace the combat path of the Red Army national units and formations, and see revealed their contribution to the defeat of the fascist usurpers. The author concentrates his attention on examples of the mass heroism of the Soviet fighting men of various nationalities, and individual specific questions of party-political work (as a whole that work can be the object of special research), changes in the national makeup in the course of combat actions, the increase in the party and Komsomol ranks, and the vanguard role of the Communist Party and Komsomol members in the combat engagements against the enemy.

The Red Army national units and formations traveled a long combat path. Our Motherland greatly appreciated their military exploits. Formations that
became guards formations were the 201st Latvian Rifle Division, the 112th Bashkir Cavalry Division, and the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps. A large number of fighting men were awarded the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Although the books does contain certain repetitious material and excessive details, as a whole it throws light thoroughly on the combat community of the peoples of the USSR during the years of the Great Patriotic War and contributes to expanding our ideas concerning the multifaceted nature of the Leninist national policy of the CPSU in reinforcing the friendship and brotherhood of the peoples of the USSR, and its role in the defense of the socialist Homeland.

As is pointed out in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, entitled "The 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet Nation in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," as a result of the especially dangerous nature of the present-day situation, a factor that is taking on greater and greater importance is the indoctrination of the workers and the fighting men in the army and navy in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian, socialist internationalism, and the friendship of the peoples of the USSR. It would appear that the book being reviewed will become a good support in this work for the commanders and political workers and the ideological activists in the units and subdivisions of the army and navy.


5075
CSO: 1801/155
ADMIRAL SOROKIN SPELLS OUT MODERN LESSONS OF WW II

PM201738 Moscow KRASNAYA AVEZDA in Russian 19 Apr 85 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Admiral A. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate: "A Harsh Lesson for the Aggressors"]

[Excerpts] The 40th anniversary of the Soviet People's victory in the Great Patriotic War offers new confirmation that the war's course and history and its abidingly significant lessons are the subject of a most acute ideological struggle launched and conducted by imperialist reaction against our country and the entire socialist community. Apart from diligently and maliciously falsifying the causes and course of the World War II and rejecting the Soviet Union's decisive contribution to the attainment of victory over fascism, the Western politicians and ideologists are also deliberately distorting the political lessons of the war.

One of the main objectives of this unseemly—to put it mildly—campaign is to slander socialism as a social system and deny its objective advantages and potential which predetermined our victory, and also its present ability to defend its revolutionary gains. Today's organizers of a "crusade" against socialism, calculating on attaining military superiority, would very much like to impart a semblance of attainable reality to their insane ideas, plans, and doctrines. This is why today they raise doubts about the most important lesson of the last war. This lesson consists of the fact that no forces capable of crushing socialism exist in the world.

Illusions and Reality

Having launched an unprecedented arms race, the modern politicians and strategists in imperialist states, and primarily in the United States, console themselves with the illusory hope that the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole will not sustain the struggle to maintain the military-strategic equilibrium, and calculate on their economic exhaustion. After all, the opponents of socialism deluded themselves with similar expectations also in the past, but their forecasts proved to be nothing but illusions.

Parity is Inviolable

V.I. Lenin warned the aggressors: "Any attempt to wage war against us will mean—as far as the states which would get involved in such a war are concerned—
that the conditions which will emerge as a result of and after the war will be worse than the conditions that would have existed without war or before the war." The fascist aggressors disregarded this, and had to pay a heavy price. German fascism and Japanese militarism were crushed as a result of the war.

This had a most profound effect on the entire course of world development. The positions of progressive, democratic, and peace-loving forces were strengthened. The influence of communist and workers parties increased. The world socialist system emerged, and is developing successfully. The process of the disintegration of imperialism's colonial system was accelerated beneath the blows by the national liberation movement, and culminated in its collapse.

Since imperialism failed to destroy the first socialist state in the world at a time when we stood alone and were in many respects inferior to the invading forces, how much more hopeless are all attempts to put an end to socialism today, when the socialist community countries stand together with the Soviet Union and military-strategic equilibrium has been established between the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other.

Nonetheless, the reactionary imperialist forces headed by the U.S. and NATO ruling circles refuse to take realities into account and are trying to change the correlation of forces to their own advantage. Unprecedented arms race programs are being elaborated and implemented for this purpose. Increasingly sophisticated and increasingly powerful means for delivering nuclear weapons on target are being created. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles—first strike weapons—are being deployed in Europe. International tension is being whipped up more and more. Theaters for military operations are being prepared and public opinion is being processed. Diplomacy is being subordinated to missiles and bombers. As Comrade M.S. Gorbachev stressed in his conversation with the editor of PRAVDA, they speak of defense but are preparing for attack, they advertise a space shield but are forging a space sword, they promise to liquidate nuclear weapons, but in practice are building them up and improving them, they promise the world stability but are leading matters toward the disruption of military equilibrium.

Such hypocrisy comes as no surprise for anyone in the world today. It only goes to confirm the need for lofty vigilance toward those who ignore the harsh lessons of history, the need for constant combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Our party has repeatedly declared that no one will be allowed to disrupt the military-strategic parity. This warning is based on a profound and sober analysis of the material and spiritual potential of the competing sides and of their ability to utilize them. When the defense of the gains of October is at issue, our people are capable of overcoming any hardships. This was convincingly demonstrated by the Great Patriotic War. It proved that socialism is invincible! Any attempt to put an end to it will turn into a harsh defeat and inevitable collapse of the aggressor.

Socialism, like everything else that is new and progressive, grows, develops, and strengthens. There is no force capable of halting its mighty advance.
The hordes of White Guards and numerous interventionists were smashed to pieces against the fortress of the young Republic of Soviets. Hitlerite Fascism, which dreamed of the destruction of the USSR and the conquest of world domination, collapsed beneath the blows of the Red Army. And today anyone who infringes on the security of the land of the Soviets and its allies or the peaceful life of Soviet people will be met with a crushing retaliatory strike. Our glorious armed forces, the CPSU Central Committee March (1985) Extraordinary Plenum noted, will continue to have at their disposal everything necessary for this purpose.

CSO: 1801/206
POLISH DEFENSE MINISTER SPEAKS IN KOLOBRZEG

PM201455 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 20 Mar 85 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Celebrations in Kolobrzeg"]

[Text] Warsaw, 19 March--Celebrations marking the 40th anniversary of the city's liberation from the fascist invaders have been held in Kolobrzeg—a port center on Poland's Baltic coast. Polish party and state leaders, representatives of the public, war veterans, and servicemen of the Polish Army participated in them.

Speaking at the celebrations, Army General F. Siwicki, candidate member of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo and Polish Minister of National Defense, emphasized the heroism of the Soviet and Polish servicemen who fought side by side to liberate Kolobrzeg. We consistently and resolutely oppose all who question the inviolability of Poland's western borders. Their inviolability is guaranteed by the combat readiness of the Polish People's Army and by the might of the socialist states' defensive alliance—the Warsaw Pact Organization.

F. Siwicki gave an assurance that the Polish people will continue to strengthen friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and make a contribution to strengthening the socialist community's defense capability.

CSO: 1801/199
MSU SOKOLOV LEAVES FOR WARSAW 9 APR

PM100921 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 10 Apr 85 Second Edition p 1

[Own correspond, TASS reports: "On An Official Friendly Visit"]

[Text] [Own Correspondent Report] On 9 April Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR defense minister, left on an official friendly visit to Poland at the invitation of Army General F. Siwicki, candidate member of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo and Polish minister of national defense.

He is accompanied on his trip by USSR Deputy Defense Ministers Army General Y.F. Ivanovskiy, Marshal of Aviation A.N. Yefimov, and Army General V.M. Shabanov; Admiral A.I. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, and other officials.

Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov and his companions were seen off at the airport by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister; Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, USSR first deputy defense minister and commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces; and also Army General P.G. Lushev, commander of the Moscow Military District and other generals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The sendoff party included S. Kociolek, Polish ambassador to the Soviet Union, and H. Koczara, army, navy, and air force attaché to the Polish Embassy in the USSR.

[TASS report] At the airport in Warsaw, the USSR defense minister was met by F. Siwicki; H. Jaroszek, Polish deputy foreign minister; and other officials. A.N. Aksenov, USSR ambassador to Poland, was among the welcoming party.

On the same day a meeting took place between S.L. Sokolov and F. Siwicki, in a warm, friendly atmosphere.

The USSR defense minister laid wreaths at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and the cemetery-mausoleum to Soviet servicemen who fell in the liberation of Warsaw from the fascist Germany aggressors, and visited the Polish Army Museum.

CSO: 1801/199
LT GEN ARAPOV ON SOVIET ARMY, NAVY DAY

Kiev PRAVA UKRAINY in Russian 22 Feb 85 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant General Arapov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Administration for the Red Banner Kiev Military District: "Always On Guard. Always On The Alert"]

[Text] Soviet Army and Navy Day has indeed become a national holiday in our country. This is in recognition of the very great services and the enormous social role of the Soviet Armed Forces which have been reliably guaranteeing the security of the Socialist Fatherland and our friends and allies for 67 years now and are a powerful factor in restraining the aggressive aspirations of imperialism.

The Soviet Army and Navy had convincingly proven their ability to complete the great historical mission assigned them with dignity and honor as long ago as the civil war and also during the foreign military intervention. As a new socialist type of military organization, they clearly demonstrated their indisputable advantages and inexhaustible capabilities to the whole world, having utterly defeated the combined forces of the international and domestic counterrevolution. This especially clearly showed the genius of V. I. Lenin and the organizational role of the party which became a wise strategist and leader of the workers.

Yes, the young Country of Soviets withstood the fierce fight with the enemy! But the Communist Party understood that imperialists would not reconcile themselves to the existence of the state of workers and peasants and so took the most energetic steps to strengthen the political, economic and military power of the Motherland.

The Motherland of Great October reached manhood and strengthened its own authority in the international arena. And her Armed Forces improve. The party and the Soviet people, occupied with peaceful, constructive labor, constantly kept the Army and Navy preparing for new ordeals and these ordeals did draw near. The most severe test was the Great Patriotic War.

We moved toward Victory for 1418 days and nights. The almost four years of war demanded more than the utmost effort from all the country's material and
spiritual forces as it engaged in what was really single combat with the well-trained and well-armed fascist hoards. The Communist Party, which became a real fighting party as it had been during the civil war, provided political, economic and military unity of leadership. The best sons of the party found themselves on the forward edge of battles with fascism.

There are no examples of mass heroism in history that match that displayed by our soldiers, commanders and political workers on the battlefields against the German-fascist invaders and the Japanese Samurai. Therefore we held out. And therefore the much praised fascist warriors smashed their foreheads against the stronghold of the invincible spirit of the Soviet soldier, a soldier who is a patriot and an internationalist and who convincingly proved that subjugating our people is as impossible as extinguishing the sun.

People in the West are trying to belittle the Soviet Army's role in the past war, but all these slanderous fabrications by these anti-Soviet people and falsifiers are powerless before historical truth. And the truth is that our heroic Armed Forces not only held out before the onslaught of the fascist military machine but also freed the peoples of many European countries from Nazi enslavement and raised the scarlet banner over the toppled Reichstadt. Such a feat is not subject to time and is remembered. Both the Soviet peoples and progressive mankind of the planet who are ready to mark the 40th anniversary of Great Victory again and again refer to this feat.

Our people have been living under peaceful conditions for almost 40 years, but the lessons of the past war during which the country lost approximately 30 percent of its national riches and more than 20 million human lives have demanded and still demand vigilance. The final volleys of the war had hardly died down when imperialists adopted a course toward undermining world socialism, unfurled the "cold war" and the arms race, started nuclear blackmail and created aggressive military blocs.

To strengthen its own security the Soviet Union had to increase the military power of its Army and Navy. Increasing party leadership as much as possible over the Armed Forces was a characteristic of Soviet military builders. There wasn't a single area of military affairs in which the mobilization and directed activity of the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee were not displayed. Comrade K. U. Chernenko noted, "Let no one have the slightest doubt that in the future we will take care to strengthen our country's defensive might so that we will have sufficient means with which to dampen the burning heads of military adventurers". Thanks to such concern, our Armed Forces have significantly exceeded the levels of technical equipment, organizational structure and systems of command, control and supply that they had by the end of the Great Patriotic War.

However the military might of the USSR Armed Forces is more than their technical equipment level. Outstanding people serve in the Army and the Navy, people who have mastered modern military equipment and weapons to perfection and who have been morally and politically hardened. At the present time almost 100 percent of our servicemen have higher, secondary and incomplete secondary educations. More than 70 percent of the officers have advanced military and special military training. The officer corps is the foundation
and the skeleton of the Army and Navy and really the most valuable possession of our Armed Forces.

Our military service is not only a school for military skills. It is also a school for ideological and physical tempering, discipline and organization. Today's generation of the Motherland's defenders are young patriots and internationalists. They are sure of the correctness of our affairs, closely united around the Leninist Party and totally dedicated to their own people and the ideals of Communism. The rightful successors to the military glory of the older generation, they are true to the heroic military traditions and are proud of their chance to serve under the banners of the legendary regiments and divisions, banners that have been scorched in the fire of battles.

As with all Soviet peoples, the soldiers of the Army and Navy passionately approve and wholeheartedly support the fundamental, class foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, a policy that is aimed at relaxing international tension, further strengthening the unity of socialist countries, helping in every possible way those people fighting for their own social freedom and cooperating with all states in guaranteeing the peace and security of peoples.

However, there are forces that exist and are active in the world, forces that are trying in every possible way to disrupt the process of detente, to create new types of death-dealing weapons. The lessons of history did not benefit them. American imperialism is nurturing plans of a nuclear war against the USSR and is planning to win it. This is a dangerous policy, for Soviet Armed Forces are always on the alert. If required, the defenders of socialism's conquests will bring down a totally overwhelming blow on the enemy, without wavering and with all the selfless bravery and courage inherent in Soviet people. They are tirelessly, stubbornly and persistently learning this, as bequeathed by the great Lenin.

Initiative and creation, a conscientious attitude toward the assigned business and the desire to totally and completely give themselves to training and service are characteristics of the soldiers of the Red Banner Kiev Military District. Among them are many officers who have fulfilled their international duty on the land of fraternal Afghanistan with honor and dignity. Many were awarded orders and medals of the USSR and are now serving the Motherland in an exemplary manner. Following their example, soldiers and sergeants, warrant and commissioned officers are persistently working to increase the combat readiness of units and subunits, conscientiously mastering modern military equipment and weapons and seeking effective means to employ them.

In resolving these tasks, commanders, political agencies, headquarters and party and Komsomol organizations are constantly aware of the help and support from local party and soviet agencies, the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, the republic's government and also the personal help and support from Comrade V. V. Shcherbitskiy, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The Guards tank regiment where Guards Major V. Kruglik is secretary of the party committee is making the Motherland happy by its excellent results in
military and political training. Soldiers totally met their socialist commitments for the current training year, have elevated their collective to the level of outstanding and were awarded the Penant of the USSR Ministry of Defense for Courage and Soldierly Prowess for this. The tank regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Sokolov which is the present initiator of socialist competition under the slogan "The 40th Anniversary of Great Victory and the 27th CPSU Congress -- Our Selfless Military Labor!" in the district is confidently retaining the rank of leader. Subunits and units where officers V. Khokhlyuk, V. Tkachenko, G. Legkobyty, N. Dmitruk and many others serve are successfully putting the planned levels into operation.

The initiatives "A Guards Unit Is The Best, A Guardsman Is An Outstanding Soldier", "Know Your Military Equipment And Your Weapon At The Outstanding Level, Operate At A Skillful Level, Maintain At The Excellent Level", "Destroy Targets With The First Shot" and "Everything I Know And Am Able To Do I Pass On To You, Junior Soldier" with which the foremost military collectives advanced have received wide support in units and subunits.

The mission "Be Vigilant, Always On The Alert And Combat Ready" remains the most important in the life of the district's troops whose force and stronghold is their unseverable unity with the people. Our troops are maintaining the closest ties with soviet, party, Komsomol and other social organizations of the Ukraine and with the workers of the industrial enterprises and jobs, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, with those young people who are studying and with war veterans and are actively taking part in the economic and social-political life of the republic and the country. On 24 February they will take part in the election for the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and local soviets of peoples deputies and will raise their voice as one for the candidates of the inviolable bloc of communist and non-party members. As with all personnel of the Armed Forces, they are again demonstrating an loyalty to the party and the Soviet people and are also demonstrating their resolve to celebrate the 40th Anniversary of Great Victory and the 27th CPSU Congress with worthy military deeds.

12511
CSO: 1801/174
LEADING EDUCATOR PROFILED

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian of 19 February 1985 carries on page 1 a 150-word article by Colonel I. Pantak entitled "Leading Personnel of the Army and Navy. The Right to Trust," which offers a brief profile of Lt Col Yuzef Alekseyevich Slavinskiy, an educator and former political officer. The Colonel was also at one time assigned to a construction detachment. That unit overfulfilled its norms by 13 percent. Slavinskiy is known for his ability to work with people, his strict discipline, and "daily concern" for subordinates. He has been elected once again as a deputy to the city Soviet of People's Deputies.

LEADING PERSONNEL: MILITARY COMMISSAR PROFILED

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian on 26 February 1985 carries on page 1 a 200-word article by Captain 1st Rank A. Zlydnev entitled "Leading Personnel of the Army and Navy. Concerns of a Military Commissar." The article briefly profiles the achievements of Captain 1st Rank Mikhail Grigor'evich Khvostov, military commissar of the Vasil'yevskiy rayon of the city of Leningrad. Captain Khvostov is said to have logged thousands of miles at sea, on the cruiser "Maxim Gor'kiy", a trawler base ship, a small anti-submarine vessel and in torpedo boats. It is noted that he is the sort who loves to work with people, which has resulted in his election several times as secretary of the party organization. He is said to have served as the unit political worker for a year.

As a military commissar he is said to have demonstrated much concern for personnel returning from Afghanistan, as well as for the material-technical basis for military-sport and pre-draft training. During this year a specialized military-sport complex for Vasilevskiy Rayon was equipped.

He was recently awarded the order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces," third class.

CS0: 1801/209
ARMED FORCES

BRIEF

GORBACHEV SIGNS BATOV OBITUARY—A prominent Soviet military commander, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Army Gen Pavel Batov, has died following a long and serious illness. He was 87. An obituary signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders stresses the outstanding services rendered by Pavel Batov in strengthening the defenses of the Soviet Union and the combat community of the Warsaw Treaty countries. [Text] [Moscow World Service in English 0900 GMT 24 Apr 85 LD]

BATOV FUNERAL ATTENDEES NOTED—Today the fighting men of the Soviet Armed Forces and the working people of the capital accompanied the prominent Soviet military leader, active participant in the Civil and Great Fatherland wars, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Pavel Ivanovich Batov, on his last journey. The Red Banner Hall of the Frunze Central House of the Soviet Army, where the coffin with the body of the deceased was placed, is in funeral garb. In the honor guard were: Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade Sokolov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Defense; Comrade Savinkin, chief of a CPSU Central Committee department; deputy defense ministers of the USSR, and military leaders. At the Novodevichye Cemetery, where Pavel Ivanovich Batov was buried, there was a funeral meeting. [Text] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 25 Apr 85]

COS: 1801/206
TANK COMMANDER PROFILED

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian of 26 March 1985 carries on page 1 a 200-word article by Colonel V. Kir'yayev entitled "Leading Personnel of the Army and Navy. Regimental Commander," which briefly describes the achievements of Guards Lieutenant-Colonel V. Nikulin. He is described as the commander of a Guards tank regiment imeni Orshanskiy and a member of the CPSU. The article notes that when he took command of the regiment, while a major, it was 'not among the best.' The regiment did not fulfill its obligations in the socialist competition. Nikulin is said to have instituted a new regime which turned the regiments performance around, earning the unit high marks.

CSO: 1801/209
LEADING PVO COMMANDER PROFILED

[Editorial Report] Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian on 5 March 1985 carries on page 1 a 100-word article by Captain A. Dokuchayev entitled "Leading Personnel of the Army and Navy. Master of Accurate Launches." The article offers a brief profile of Major G. Bichurov, commander of an anti-aircraft missile unit. This is an officer who is said to strive continually to improve the quality of combat training. The article notes: "He demands that commanders operate on the basis of the leading methods of training and upbringing. On the firing range his precision launches have earned the rating of 'excellent.'"

LEADING PERSONNEL: PILOT PROFILED

[Editorial Report] Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian on 2 April 1985 carries on page 1 a 175-word article by Major A. Lukashov entitled "Leading Personnel of the Army and Navy. Sniper-Pilot." The article presents a brief profile of Lt-Col Nikolay Ivanovich Oleynikov, a 'Sniper-Pilot' and deputy squadron commander. Oleynikov is said to have logged around 4,000 hours of flight time in all-weather, day/night fighter-bomber aircraft. "His experience and knowledge of aviation equipment and the tactics of its combat application" earned him the Order of the Red Star and medal for "Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third class, the article notes. He is said to devote attention to assisting the newer officers, and to display great concern for the successes of his subordinates.
GORSHKOV ON NAVAL ART, EXPERIENCE OF WORLD WAR II

Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 4, Apr 85 (signed to press 9 Apr 85)
pp 13-22

[Article by Flt Adm SU S. Gorshkov, twice Hero of the Soviet Union and
commander-in-chief of the Navy: "The Experience of the Great Patriotic War and
the Present Stage in the Development of Naval Art"]

[Text] Some four decades separate us, the Soviet people, the peoples of the
fraternal socialist commonwealth countries and all progressive mankind, from
one of the major world-historical events of the modern age, the victory over
Nazi Germany. The Soviet people and their valorous Armed Forces, under the
leadership of the Communist Party, dealt crushing defeats to the Nazi invaders,
they defended the independence of the homeland of October and carried out their
international duty in expelling the occupiers from the Eastern European
countries, a significant portion of Austria and also freed the German workers from
Nazi suppression.

The path to victory was long--1,418 days and nights--and difficult. This war
was the fiercest and severest of all the wars which have ever been experienced
in the history of our motherland. Some 20 million sons and daughters of the
Soviet Union did not live to see the bright spring day of 9 May.

From the very first day of the treacherous attack by the Nazi hordes on the
Soviet Union until the victorious conclusion of World War II in Europe, the
Soviet-German Front was the main theater of military operations. Here due to
the intentional delay by the United States and England in opening a second
front, the Soviet Armed Forces for 3 years fought alone against the crack Nazi
troops. It was precisely here that the fate of human civilization was deter-
mined. And here the legend of the insurpassability of the military art of the
German Army was dissipated like smoke and the myth of the Wehrmacht's invinci-
bility was dispelled.

The defeat of the aggressor was preceded by enormous organizational work of the
Communist Party and the Soviet government during the prewar years to strengthen
the nation's defense capability, including to increase its sea power. On the
eve of the Great Patriotic War, the Navy represented an impressive force. It
included the Northern, Red Banner Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific Fleets as well as
the Caspian, Danube, Pinsk and Amur Naval Flotillas. The Navy had 276 fighting
ships of the main classes. In terms of the main tactical and technical specifications, many of them were the equal of analogous foreign ships and even surpassed them in certain areas.

Along with the organizing of the forces and means for armed combat at sea, young Soviet naval theory developed on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology and the recent achievements of military science. Inadequately reflecting the potential combat capabilities of the then modern material base, this theory elaborated concepts of strategic and operational-tactical employment of the naval forces. For the first time in the world an ordered theory of operational art was created and its provisions were the basis for the guiding documents of that period, the Provisional Regulation on the Conduct of Sea Operations (NMO-40) and the Field Manual of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Naval Forces (BUNSM-37). Running as a constant theme through these were the demand to constantly seek out and in any situation decisively attack the enemy.

A clear system was worked out and put into effect for shifting the naval forces to higher states of alert and these met the actually developing military-political conditions in the theaters. This system was put to a severe test at the very outset of the war and confirmed its realism. During the threatening period, due to the precise work of the headquarters bodies, all the naval forces in a short period of time were shifted to a state of alert No 1 and the surprise attack by Nazi aviation during the first hours of the war did not achieve its aim as the ships and naval bases fully maintained their battleworthiness.

Over the entire Great Patriotic War, the basic burden of fighting the Nazi invaders rested on the ground forces. The other Armed Services, including the Navy, directed its efforts at the greatest possible support for the success of their combat operations. In this context the forces of the operational fleets and naval flotillas had to simultaneously carry out two main tasks: assist the troops on the defensive and offensive and fight against the enemy at sea.

In the defensive and offensive operations, the naval forces securely supported the strategic flanks of the Soviet Army and by fire attacks from sea and by landing amphibious forces they effectively assisted the fronts and armies in defeating the enemy maritime groupings.

The intense struggle for the strategic initiative was a major feature in the armed clash during the war. The surprise attack gave the aggressor a significant advantage in the conduct of military operations during the war's first period. The Soviet Supreme High Command took every measure to alter the unfavorable course of armed combat, to achieve a turning point and establish prerequisites for a decisive crushing of the interventionists.

The unprecedented steadfastness and stubbornness of the Soviet Armed Forces during the active strategic defensive undercut the strategic plans of the Wehrmacht Supreme Command and even the initial period of the war showed that the Nazi military adventure was doomed to defeat. During the most difficult times for the Soviet state, the strong assault groupings of our fleets released all their fire power against the enemy and ensured the stability of the maritime troop flanks. During the first period of the war, the Navy sent over 400,000
officers, petty officers and sailors to the land fronts. Naval infantry brigades, naval rifle brigades, individual regiments and battalions organized from the sailors were used in the most crucial areas of combat.

In defending the naval bases, the operational situation brought about the organizing of a new form of joint operations among the units and formations of the fleet, the ground forces and the aviation under unified leadership; these were the defensive areas (Odessa, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk and others). This ensured centralized control and command over the diverse forces and closer cooperation between them. Later (from 1943) naval defensive areas (MOR) were organized and these included several naval bases. In 1945, the Navy included 13 such forces.

In the course of operations on the maritime sectors, the Navy provided the most effective aid to the troops in defeating the enemy groupings by landing amphibious forces. As a total during the war years, over 100 amphibious forces were landed numbering more than 250,000 men with combat equipment and weapons; this was the equivalent of approximately 30 rifle divisions. The river flotillas alone operating in direct operational-tactical cooperation with the field forces, formations and units of the Red Army landed 55 forces in the enemy flank and rear. Participating in the landing operations was a total of up to 2,000 ships and launches, around several thousand vessels and about 10,000 aircraft. At the same time, the Navy by active operations did not allow the Nazi troops to carry out one major landing, although they already had experience in landing significant groupings of forces in the Western European theater of war.

Combat at sea included disrupting and thwarting enemy sea movements, the attacking of enemy ports and naval bases, the laying of active minefields and supporting our own troop and national economic shipments. In conducting combat operations at sea, great attention was given to winning air supremacy and to organizing a secure air defense for the ships at sea and at base.

In the struggle on the enemy lines of communications aviation and submarines were the main attack force. This assumed a more planned nature from the second half of 1943, when naval aviation which during the first period of the war operated basically against the ground enemy, again began to carry out its immediate missions and the fleets received a significant number of new torpedo and ground attack planes. By this time, the methods of employing the submarines had become more effective. While in 1941-1943, they operated, as a rule, singly, subsequently for attacking convoys they were employed in operational cooperation with the aviation and torpedo boats.

The methods of employing naval aviation were also improved: from attacks in small groups it shifted to massed attacks by mixed groups of torpedo planes, bombers and ground attack planes. The depth of its operations reached 350-400 km.

The combined use of the diverse naval forces significantly increased the effectiveness of combat operations on the enemy sea lines of communications. Having destroyed a total of around 1,400 ships with troops, ammunition, fuel, combat equipment and other cargo, our Navy provided much aid to the troops fighting on the Soviet-German Front.
The fleet gained great experience in organizing the defense of its sea lines of communications. For our navigation the basic danger was the operations of enemy aviation and submarines, and on the Baltic, the use of mines. For this reason great attention was given to the questions of air, antisubmarine and antiship defense of the convoys and shipping areas. The defense of the sealanes was organized chiefly within the daily combat activity of the fleet. The movement of convoys was supported, as a rule, by the men and weapons of special air defense areas deployed along the most important routes of the sealanes. Fighters employed the direct cover method for the convoys (air patrolling) and with the development of radar, airfield alert. The direct ships security for the transports was organized in such a manner as to protect them against diverse enemy forces and piloting behind trawls.

The effective activities of the naval forces to protect our shipments are eloquently seen from the following facts: as a total 17 million tons of diverse cargo was transported over the external [overseas] lines of communications and over 100 million tons over the inland waterways.

The combat operations of the naval forces against the ships of the Nazi coalition comprised a significant portion of the content of armed struggle at sea in the course of the Great Patriotic War. As a total over 1,300 enemy ships of different classes were sunk. The naval pilots Downed in air combat and destroyed at airfields some 5,500 aircraft. On the Barents, Baltic and Black Seas, the Navy ensured the stability of the ground troops' flanks and their successful operations on the maritime sectors.

The increased scale in the use of naval forces in joint operations with the troops brought about a change in the system of planning and organizing their actions. While in 1941-1942, they were employed in front and army operations, from 1944, as a rule, they were employed in strategic operations. For example, in the Crimean Operation, in addition to assisting the troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front and the Separate Maritime Army, the Black Sea Fleet carried out the independent mission of stopping enemy communications between the Crimea and Romania and blockading the enemy troops in Sevastopol. In the Iasi-Kishinev Operation, simultaneously with direct assistance to the troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, the fleet made massed attacks against enemy ships and transports in Constanta and Sulina.

Leadership of the Navy was provided by the People's Commissariat of the Navy through the Main Navy Staff as well as the main and central directorates. Operational and strategic activities of the People's Commissariat of the Navy were determined by the nature of the missions confronting the fleets and naval flotillas which, up to 1984, in operational terms were under the commanders of the fronts (armies) for more effectively utilizing the forces in joint operations on the maritime sectors. The People's Commissariat of the Navy and the Main Naval Staff provided direct leadership (upon instructions from Headquarters) over the independent combat operations of the naval forces in the sea theaters and carried out the missions of developing the fleets and naval flotillas and their logistical support. After the fleets were put fully under the command of the People's Commissar of the Navy who at the same time became the commander-in-chief of the Navy, in the spring of 1944, a large portion of the questions concerning the planning and fleet operations began to be taken up by the People's Commissariat of the Navy and the Main Naval Staff.
Close, uninterrupted and dependable command of the forces was one of the main factors in achieving victory. Where this was organized on scientifically sound operational and tactical calculations, as a rule, it was possible to anticipate the course of events, it was possible to set specific missions and there was always success.

A matter of constant concern for the commanders and staffs of all levels was the careful monitoring of the situation, the prompt and quick response to a change in it, the adjustment and setting of new missions for conducting combat operations and supervising the fulfillment of the issued orders and instructions. Field visits by representatives of the People's Commissariat of the Navy, the Main Naval Staff, the staffs of the fleets and flotillas made it possible to promptly take measures to eliminate arising difficulties, to ascertain the nature and scope of the help needed, to know in detail the actual state of battleworthiness of the forces and the course of carrying out the issued orders and instructions and to effectively resolve the questions of cooperation between the diverse naval forces and the units, formations and field forces of the other Armed Services.

"The victory in the Great Patriotic War," pointed out the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," "has shown the superiority of Soviet military science and military art, the high level of strategic leadership and combat skill of our military personnel." 1

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the talent of such major naval figures as N. Kuznetsov, I. Isakov, A. Golovko, F. Oktyabr'skiy, I. Yumashev, V. Tributs, L. Vladimirs'kiy, Yu. Panteleyev, Yu. Rall', N. Basisty, S. Zhavoronkov, M. Samokhin, N. Ostryakov, V. Yermachenkov, Ye. Preobrazhenskiy and many others became fully apparent. They made a great personal contribution to the defeat of the enemy and to the development of Soviet naval art.

The force of the Soviet sailors was multiplied by the constant concern for the navy and its leadership by the Communist Party. The political indoctrination of all the commanders and political workers, the political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations was directed at increasing the moral-combat qualities of the Navy personnel. At the head of this work stood such experienced political workers as I. Rogov, N. Smirnov, A. Nikolayev, N. Kulakov, I. Azarov and S. Zakharov. By their personal example of courage and valor, wholehearted service to the motherland and the impassioned word of the propagandist, the communists and Komsomol members brought the will of the party to all the soldiers and sailors, they strengthened their certainty in overcoming all difficulties on the path to victory and inspired them to feats.

In examining events of 40 years ago and in comparing the combat capabilities of the naval forces of those times and today, the question naturally arises: has the previous experience of the combat employment of the fleets lost its importance for the present stage in the development of the Navy and its theory? The

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1 PRAVDA, 17 June 1984.
question is a legitimate one as the physical plant or material base which determines the forms and methods of armed combat over this period has undergone fundamental qualitative changes. Nevertheless, there can only be one answer: no, it has not.

The combat experience was diverse and acquired in operations and battles that were grandiose in scope and unprecedented in fierceness and tenacity extending into all spheres of armed combat: on land, at sea, under water and in the air space. It so touched all aspects of naval activities that its influence on the organizational development of the fleet, the development of naval theory, military training and indoctrination of the personnel and operational and combat training will be felt for a long time to come. However, this does not mean that in now solving new problems related to the development of the fleets and their employment, in the event the imperialist aggressors start a war, we must follow the same paths which led previously to the necessary result or seek out and choose those analogies which could be employed with modern weapons systems and combat equipment. Such an approach to the use of the experience of the previous was is completely wrong and dangerous for things, as the existing material base of armed combat at sea differs fundamentally from that used in the fight against the Nazi invaders.

"...I have looked to the past," said V. I. Lenin, "only from the viewpoint of what is needed tomorrow and the day after for our policy." These words of his should be the guiding principle in studying various aspects of naval history.

The Great Patriotic War showed that the leading patterns in the development of military affairs are the growing organic relationship of policy and strategy, the obliterating of the distinction between the theater of military operations and the rear, the joint conduct of armed conflict by nations of coalitions, the increased dependence of the combat might of the armed forces upon the economy and scientific-technical progress, the high morale and ideological-psychological qualities of the Army and Navy personnel.

These patterns should be taken into account fully by us in developing the naval forces and in the navy's daily activities, for the threat of the unleashing of a new world war by the imperialists is now greater than ever before. In ignoring the lessons of history, the reactionary circles of the West, and primarily the United States, have declared a new "crusade" against socialism, and are endeavoring to achieve military supremacy over the socialist commonwealth nations. The deployment of first-strike missiles on the territory of a number of Western European countries, the increased military preparations of the United States in the Far East and the growing militarization of Japan are fraught with great danger.

"We cannot help but see the growing aggressiveness of imperialism and its attempts to achieve military supremacy over the socialist commonwealth," as was pointed out at a session of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in October 1984. "Our nation does not intend to attack anyone. This is clear to

2 V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], vol 38, p 136.
any clear-thinking person. But we will strengthen our defense capability, protecting the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and defending the cause of peace throughout the world."³

In solving the fundamental problems of military organizational development considering the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party and the Soviet government have designated the main tasks in the military-technical area to be: achieving a close alliance of science with production in the interests of developing the most effective weapons models; a rational improvement in the diverse combat equipment and weapons in accord with the growing demands of modern warfare; a transition to full automation of command and control of troops and weapons systems.

A scientifically sound and planned solution to the problems of military organizational development have made it possible for the Soviet Union during the post-war years to establish a balanced Navy consisting of nuclear submarines, surface vessels, missile-carrying and ASW naval aviation, naval infantry and shore missile-artillery troops. That is, we now can do what we could not do by 1941, that is, establish an ocean-going fleet capable of making powerful attacks against ground installations and groupings of the aggressor's naval forces operating in any regions of the world's ocean.

With the development of the Navy, inevitably there will be changes in its missions, the forms and methods of the strategic and operational employment of the forces, the tactical procedures of their actions and the employment of weapons. The building up of the fleet and the development of naval art in essence comprise a single process. In line with the fundamental change in the material base during the postwar years, such categories of military and naval art as cooperation, surprise, the massing of forces, attack, combat, maneuver, the pace of combat, combat readiness and so forth have assumed a qualitatively new content.

The cooperation of the Armed Services, the branches of forces and naval forces has been and remains a major principle of Soviet military and naval art. Its skillful realization is one of the main conditions for carrying out combat missions in modern armed combat at sea. The most advantageous combination of the combat capabilities of the diverse naval forces is presently the main demand in organizing combat operations of varying scale.

Surprise attacks by the Soviet Army played an important role in the defeat of the Nazi invaders. An unexpected powerful attack against the Nazi troops made it possible to disrupt the plans of their command, to catch the enemy by surprise, to cause him the greatest losses, to seize initiative and establish the necessary prerequisites for the further development of success.

Surprise, as a category of military art, has maintained its importance at present. The United States and its NATO allies, in strengthening the arsenal of weapons, have focused their attention primarily on first-strike weapons which

³ COMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 23, 1984, p 7.
are based upon ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. As the experience of local wars has shown, all the aggressors have planned on a surprise attack against their victims. This was achieved by the integrated use of diverse forces, a diverse arsenal of means and methods of reconnaissance, camouflage, ECM, and in certain instances the use of high-precision conventional weapons with great destructive force.

In the course of the local wars there has been a tendency to bring together reconnaissance, attack and support resources into automated and rigidly correlated reconnaissance-attack complexes which make it possible to fight according to a new principle: "detect--blind--destroy." The United States has worked out several such mission-specialized complexes. In the near future they will be commissioned. The aim of developing such complexes has been to increase the arsenal of first-strike weapons.

The perfidy of the aggressors is well known. For this reason, it is essential to carefully study the methods by which they achieve surprise in order to be able to promptly detect the plans of the probable enemy and immediately localize all its attempts to make a surprise attack.

In the postwar years, the fact has become more and more apparent that ships with more advanced weapons and combat equipment are assuming a universal nature and are capable of carrying out diverse missions. This has led to a situation where now the forces of the Navy can carry out missions which previously belonged only to other Armed Services. The spatial scope of armed combat at sea is assuming a global and worldwide nature. The criterion of its scope characterized by the number of combat units or carriers of weapons is being replaced by the criterion of the total power of the potential combat capabilities of the men and weapons. The increased spatial scope has, in turn, predetermined the ever-increasing involvement of the other Armed Services in combat operations.

The increased might of naval weapons during the war years gave a completely new content to such a category of naval art as attack. While previously an attack was an element of combat, during the Great Patriotic War in a number of instances this assumed an operational scale. At present, in line with the equipping of the navies of foreign sea powers with long-range, high-precision weapons, the attack has become the dominant form of employing the forces. It can achieve not only tactical but also operational and strategic goals.

The content of the main form of carrying out tactical missions, sea battle, has also changed substantially. Its evolution during the war years was brought about by an increase in the distances of the clashes and their spatial scope, with the change of these, in turn, being caused by the increased range of naval weapons, maneuverability, the cruising (flight) range of the carriers, and by the involvement in combat of other branches of forces, primarily aviation. As a result of the increased range of naval weapons a new variety of combat has appeared "contactless," that is, outside the visible range of the fighting groups.

The "contactlessness" and speed of combat will, obviously, be among the basic features of modern naval combat. There are very substantial prerequisites for this. Western specialists have pointed out that the American air and space
systems are now capable in a short period of time and with high reliability to
detect the situation over enormous expanses of the world's ocean and adjacent
territory and immediately relay data about it to the users, that is, create all
prerequisites for employing the weapons immediately upon detecting the targets
which are still hundreds of kilometers away from the attack groupings.

This has become possible due to the extensive use of radio electronics which
even during the war years had become a factor which largely determined military
superiority over the enemy. Its penetration into all spheres of fleet opera-
tions, particularly into the control systems of the forces, weapons and combat
equipment, has made it possible to rapidly collect various data on the situa-
tion, to analyze them, to give target designations, the current coordinates of
targets and take optimum decisions for the conduct of combat.

All the profound qualitative changes in the forms, methods and procedures of
armed combat at sea as well as in its material base have become possible due to
the fact that Soviet military science, on the basis of analyzing the war's ex-
perience, has correctly established the new patterns and insipient trends in
the employment of naval forces as brought about by the realization of recent
scientific and technical accomplishments in combat practices. Only a scientific
approach to an examination of the past helps in assessing its importance for the
future reliably and objectively.

The ongoing improvement in the weapons systems and combat equipment at a certain
stage will inevitably lead to a reassessment of the role of one or another
branch of forces or class of ships. For this reason an important mission for
the command and scientific personnel is to promptly determine the occurrence of
a qualitative shift in the development of the material base, to bring the con-
cepts of naval art into conformity with it and find new forms, methods and means
of employing the naval forces.

The unrestrained increase in the weapons arsenal of the NATO countries headed by
the United States, the ignoring by their governments of the demands of the world
community to check the arms race and direct the foreign policy of the Western
powers toward a lessening of international tension are reminiscent of the aggres-
sive aspirations of the Nazi leadership of Germany for world domination prior to
World War II. This necessitates high vigilance and combat readiness on the part
of all the naval forces. The older generation of Soviet people knows well to
what their reduction can lead. The combat readiness of the naval forces should
always be such that under any conditions they can quickly shift to a war footing,
enter the war in an organized manner and successfully carry out the set missions.

As long as military and political tension exists, as long as a nuclear missile
danger from the aggressive imperialist forces hangs over our nation, as the CPSU
Central Committee and Soviet government have pointed out, it is essential to
keep out powder dry and to always be on guard to prevent a repetition of June
1941.

Even a cursory analysis of combat experience convinces one of its enormous im-
portance for our fleet which is undergoing fundamental and complete transfor-
mations brought about by the scientific and technical revolution. A study and
utilization of this experience in the activities of fleet construction and in the forecasting of its development protect us against the errors of a narrow practical approach, subjectivism and rash schemes and they make it possible to draw correct conclusions from an analysis of our own military experience and the military practice of the imperialist navies. All of this is of exceptionally important significance for strengthening the defense capability of our nation and its sea power.

At present, the Soviet Navy possesses complex weapons systems and modern facilities of varying combat purpose, each of which individually and together introduces changes in the conditions of armed combat at sea. It is essential to disclose the new patterns and their specific influence on the use of all the branches of forces in independent and joint operations with the other Armed Services, since the full realization of all the combat capabilities of the various forces in the best combination remains a most important demand in organizing any combat operations of any scale.

The results obtained from studying the combat experience of the Navy in the last war must be more widely employed in actual operational and combat training, for this experience serves as an inexhaustible source of knowledge essential for developing military-theoretical thinking, for the organizational development of our Navy and its strategic and operational use in a modern war, if the imperialist aggressors start it.

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10272
CSO: 1801/213
LEADING SRF OFFICER PROFILED

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian of 19 March 1985 carries on page 1 a 150-word article by Colonel V. Polezhayev entitled "Leading Personnel of the Army and Navy. 'Rocketist,'" which briefly discusses Major L. Zhadan, the commander of an "excellent" sub-unit. He is said to have been an officer for the last 9 years and is cited as having become particularly well-known for promoting a healthy moral climate in his unit. He is said to put considerable effort into properly orienting young engineers toward their military service and promoting educational work on the part of young officers.

CSO: 1801/209
MISTAKEN STALIN ORDER TO MARSHAL MALINOVS KIY RECALLED


A brief general introduction and summary of Malinovskiy's early life and career are followed by an extensive description of his wartime service and, coming to the fall of 1944, Gorbunov says: "R. Ya. Malinovskiy was summoned to Moscow 13 September for the preparation of the ceasefire treaty between Romania and the allied states. The same day Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin presented him with the marshal's star in the Kremlin. At that time Rodion Yakovlevich was 46 years old."

Describing the early stages of the Hungarian campaign in September 1944, Gorbunov speaks of Malinovskiy's wish to consolidate his forces and await the arrival of reinforcements before taking Budapest, as ordered by the general staff, and goes on: "The front commander had asked for 5 days' delay, just 5 days. A transcript of his conversation with the supreme commander has been preserved.

"Stalin: 'You are insisting in vain. You do not understand the political need for an immediate strike against Budapest.'

"(The liberation of Budapest would have speeded up the process of forming Hungary's democratic government, which was taking place at the time.--M.G.)

"Malinovskiy: 'I understand the entire political importance of taking Budapest, and this is why I ask for 5 days....'

"Stalin: 'I am ordering you categorically to launch an offensive against Budapest straight away tomorrow!'

"This haste resulted in the general staff being later forced to cease attacks against the Hungarian capital to avoid unjustified losses and launch an offensive on a broad front.... Malinovskiy recalled that for a long time Stalin avoided telephone conversations on the subject of Budapest."

CSO: 1801/201
FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

31 May 1985

JPRS-UMA-85-036

ACHIEVEMENTS OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S ARMY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 85 (signed to press 20 Dec 84) pp 82-86

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Nikul'chenkov, candidate of historical sciences, under rubric "In Fraternal Armies": "The Army of a Heroic People"]

[Excerpts] The Vietnamese People's Army [VPA] was born in the fire of engagements against the French colonizers and Japanese occupying forces. Together with its nation, under the leadership of the party of Communists, it has traveled a glorious and difficult combat path. It has always been typified by utter devotion to its nation, its part, and to the cause of the revolution, and by high combat spirit. In the combat engagements against the aggressors, the VPA withstood its test of strength and currently is an experienced, organizationally stronger, well-trained army that has been equipped with modern weapons.

Only such a political force as the Marxist-Leninist party could have armed the Vietnamese nation with a clear understanding of the tasks and goals confronting it, or could have inspired it to carry out the mass exploit that led to the crushing defeat of the foreign usurpers and their henchmen. Fighting Vietnam will remain in our memory a symbol of unprecedented bravery and true heroism, selflessness, and unbending resistance.

The inception and growth of the VPA are inseparably linked with the most significant period in the history of the Vietnamese nation. That period begins in 1930, when the Communist Party of Indochina (today the Communist Party of Vietnam) was formed. That party took on Marxism-Leninism as armament in carrying out the Vietnamese national-democratic revolution, which developed into the socialist revolution.

At all stages of the national-liberation struggle, the Vietnamese Communists remembered well the Leninist principle: "Every revolution is worth anything only if it knows how to defend itself..." ([Lenin, V. I.], "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 37, p 122). Therefore in its first documents the party of the Communists of Vietnam pointed out the need to create a workers and peasants army in order to seize the power in the country and to defend the revolutionary gains, and the need to arm the workers and peasants and to organize workers and peasants self-defense detachments. Those questions were resolved on the basis of the creative application of Marxist-
Leninist theory concerning warfare and the army, with a consideration of the specific conditions in Vietnam and the experience of the struggle waged by the Vietnamese nation against the foreign usurpers.

But the peaceful development of Vietnam in conformity with the Geneva Agreements contradicted the plans of the imperialistic circles of the Western powers, and primarily the United States of America, which were attempting at any cost to preserve their positions in Vietnam, and to achieve the perpetuation of the split in the country, and the conversion of South Vietnam into a beachhead of aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the suppression of the national-liberation movement in all of Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese nation, which had withstood the very difficult tests in the warfare against the French colonizers, proved to be threatened with a new war against a very large-scale imperialistic power, which had the most powerful military-economic potential in the capitalist world and the most developed, most up-to-date military machinery.

In 1965 the American imperialists changed over to open aggressive actions against the DRV. Attempting to save its puppets from disaster, the United States sent to South Vietnam an army of half a million men, delivered to the Saigon regime a large quantity of modern military technology, and began to carry out regular bombings of North Vietnam. Thus the overseas imperialists hoped to suppress the national-liberation movement of the South Vietnamese population, to prevent North Vietnam from rendering assistance to the patriots in the South, and to hinder the further growth of the influence of the ideas of socialism in Southeast Asia.

However, the Vietnamese nation did not flinch. Relying upon the unselfish assistance and support of the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries, and all the progressive forces on the planet, it achieved a historic victory in the spring of 1975. The complete liberation of the South crowned the 30-year heroic struggle of the Vietnamese nation against the imperialistic aggressors. That victory went down in history as a golden page in the chronicle of the heroic history of the struggle of the Vietnamese nation and army. That victory became a triumph of the effective, combat solidarity of the fraternal socialist countries that had rendered a tremendous amount of aid to the fighting country, and a testimony to that sympathy and powerful support that Vietnam enjoyed on the part of the progressive forces of the world.

During the years of the American aggression, the Vietnamese Workers Party (as the Communist Party was then called) and the government showed constant concern for the reinforcement of the country's defense capability, for increasing the combat might of the VPA, especially the air-defense and air forces, for carrying out the ideological and political toughening of the fighting men, and improving the structure and organization of the troops. The air-defense system, within short periods of time, was equipped with antiaircraft guns of various caliber, missiles, jet aircraft, and other modern technology that was received from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Testimony to the increased might of the VPA and the skills acquired by the defenders of the skies over socialist Vietnam is the fact that during the war times almost 4200 American aircraft were shot down over the DRV.
Something that became a qualitative leap forward in the improvement of the VPA was the formation, starting in 1973, of large operational-tactical formations [ob'yedineniye] — army corps having within their makeup formations [soyedineniye] and units of various fighting branches. To a large extent this was promoted by shipments by the Soviet Union to Vietnam of combat aircraft that were the latest ones for that time, as well as modern military technology, including tanks, heavy artillery, and air-defense means. Simultaneously there was an expansion of the shipments to the DRV of transportation means, petroleum products, food supplies, and medicines. Soviet specialists were sent to Vietnam. The military schools in the USSR trained many Vietnamese military personnel who, within short periods of time, gained complete mastery of the combat technology and weapons.

The years of the struggle against the American usurpers and their puppets, the struggle for independence, unity, and socialism, became for the VPA a period of its further development and improvement, a period of successes and victories in combat engagements against a strongly and well-armed opponent.

After the victorious completion of the war of Resistance against the aggression of the United States, the Vietnamese nation began to heal its wartime wounds, and began to carry out peaceful creative labor. In July 1976 the National Assembly of the Single Vietnam unanimously adopted a decision concerning the creation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam [SRV]. In December 1976, at its 4th Congress, the Communist Party of Vietnam [VCP] adopted a program for constructing socialism on a countrywide scale. The party advanced the task of creating powerful people's armed forces, and a modern regular army that was equipped with the latest weapons and combat technology. At the same time the VCP called upon the fighting men to participate in economic construction, and to make an active contribution to the creation of the material-technical base of socialism.

Implementing the instructions of the party and government, the Vietnamese enlisted men and officers are boldly combining their combat training with production activity. By their vigilant service and their unceasing selfless work, they are multiplying the glorious traditions of the older generation. Faithful sons of their nation, the fighting men in the VPA are maintaining high combat readiness and showing themselves to be examples of socialist labor. They are participating in the construction of a trans-Vietnam railroad that is linking Hanoi to Ho Chi Minh City; in the construction, with the aid of the USSR, of the largest hydroelectric-power plant in Southeast Asia, on the Black River; and in the creation of new economic regions and the assimilation of virgin lands and neglected land.

The VPA is taking good care of and is multiplying its combat and revolutionary traditions. Veterans of the war and the revolution, heroes of the People's Army of whom the entire nation is proud, are a living example of proper service to the homeland. They are transferring their rich experience to the young enlisted men and officers. The personnel are being trained and indoctrinated in the glorious combat traditions of the units and subdivisions that distinguished themselves in the combat engagements against the aggressors and their henchmen.
In the face of the increasingly aggressive intrigues and subversive actions of the forces of imperialism and expansionism, the VCP devotes constant attention to increasing the country's defense capability and to guaranteeing the reliable defense of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Thanks to the fraternal aid of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and to broad use of the rich experience of military construction in the USSR, the VPA, under the guidance of the CPV, has been changed into a socialist-type regular army that is equipped with modern weapons and military technology. In that army the Vietnamese nation has a reliable defender of its socialist gains. At the present time the VPA has at its disposal ground troops, air forces, a navy, and air-defense forces, and has as standard equipment antiaircraft missile complexes, artillery systems and tanks, modern supersonic fighters and bombers, combat vessels, and other military technology.

Of great importance for the building of the VPA are the laws that were adopted in 1981 concerning universal military duty and the performance of duty by the officer complement, which laws have been called upon to raise to a new level the training of the fighting men in the army and navy, and to increase the role of the military cadres in improving the combat and political training of the personnel.

Proceeding from the tasks that were advanced by the party at its regular 5th Congress, which was held in March 1982, the fighting men of the VPA have been improving their combat skills and working consistently to implement its military-political program. Exercises and maneuvers are regularly conducted among the troops, and the troops study the experience of combat actions, on the basis of which experience the combat training of the troops and the staffs is carried out. The socialist competition is broadly extended. It received broad scope in the course of the preparation for the 5th party congress. The fighting men of the army and navy, fighting for the fulfillment of the socialist pledges, achieved higher results in combat training and political training, and in the reinforcement of discipline and order in accordance with the regulations. There was an increase in the number of outstanding personnel and outstanding subdivisions. The first stage of the competition ended with the summing up of the results on the eve of the congress. The results of the all-army socialist competition in honor of the 40th anniversary of the VPA, which was solemnly celebrated in December 1984, are being generally disseminated.

There has been a broad development of the socialist competition for the worthy meeting of the noteworthy dates in the history of our countries: the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, the 67th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the 39th anniversary of the proclamation of the independence of Vietnam, and the 6th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the SRV.

Close ties of fraternal friendship, complete cooperation, and mutual aid link Vietnam with Laos and Cambodia. From the very first days of the party's existence, Vietnamese Communists fought for the bright future of their homeland alongside of the Lao and Cambodian brothers. In turn, the
workers of Laos and Cambodia have entered into a close alliance and fraternal solidarity with the Vietnamese nation.

The victory of Vietnam and Laos in the prolonged struggle for independence, and the overthrow of the antipopulist regime in Cambodia, created the new nature of relations among the peoples of the three countries. There has been a constant strengthening of their solidarity, friendship, and their firm resolve to defend their gains. Today, as it was during the years of struggle against the Japanese occupying forces, the French colonizers, and the American imperialists, socialist Vietnam is rendering international assistance to the peoples of Laos and Cambodia. In conformity with bilateral treaties between the SRV and LNDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic], and the SRV and NRK [People's Republic of Cambodia], the fighting men of the VPA are executing with distinction their international duty of defending the revolutionary gains of the Lao and Cambodian nations, and disrupting all the attempts of imperialism and the forces of reaction to interfere in the domestic affairs of the fraternal countries of Indochina. In recognition of outstanding successes in executing their international duty, two corps of Vietnamese volunteers -- the Tay Nguyen and Huong Giang corps -- as well as the Cuu Long Corps, which was withdrawn in May 1983 from the territory of a fraternal country in conformity with decisions that were made at a meeting of the leaders of the three countries of Indochina, were awarded the highest order of the People's Republic of Cambodia -- the Order of Angkor.

From year to year there has been a constant strengthening of the relations of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and Vietnam, and between our armed forces, which relations are based on a solid foundation of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and the SRV, which was concluded in November 1978, raised Soviet-Vietnamese relations to a qualitatively new level. The Soviet Union highly treasures the friendship and cooperation with socialist Vietnam and, faithful to its international duty, renders the SRV not only effective aid in the restoration and development of the economy, but also in the defense of the country's independence and in the protection of its revolutionary gains against encroachments from without.

The regular meetings of the party, governmental, and military leaders of our countries have been of very great importance for the further expansion and reinforcement of Soviet-Vietnamese relations. A new impetus for their further development was provided by the meeting that took place on 11 July 1984 between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade K. U. Chernenko, and General Secretary of the VCP Central Committee, Le Duan and member of the Politburo of the VCP Central Committee, Chairman of the SRV Council of Ministers Pham Van Dong. In the course of the meeting it was emphasized that the complete support of fraternal Vietnam and the international solidarity with the Vietnamese nation that is building socialism represent the invariable course of the CPSU and the Soviet government. That solidarity manifests itself currently in the most diverse
forms -- from cooperation in the area of the assimilation of the natural resources to the conquest of outer space.

One of the important areas in the completely developing Soviet-Vietnamese relations is military cooperation between our countries. With every passing year that cooperation has been enriched with new content and has been becoming more and more varied. Visits of friendship by military vessels, reciprocal trips by commanders, political workers, and various specialists for the purpose of exchanging experience in the training and indoctrination of the personnel and in the assimilation of combat technology, and cultural and sports ties between our armies have been contributing to the consolidation of friendship and combat comradeship, to the international indoctrination of the fighting men, and to their ideological training. "The Vietnamese People's Army is proud to have a good friend, the USSR Armed Forces," General of the Army Chu Huy Man, chief of the Main Political Administration of the VPA, remarks. "We have studied and are continuing to study the advanced experience of Soviet military art, creatively applying it under the specific conditions of Vietnam."

During the years of its existence the Vietnamese People's Army has grown and has become stronger in all respects. The experience that was accumulated during the wars against the colonizers and aggressors is being augmented by the achievements of modern military science. That makes the VPA a reliable defender of the revolutionary gains of the Vietnamese nation, and an important factor for peace and security in Southeast Asia.


5075
CS: 1801/155
U.S. PLAN TO UPDATE SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUBS CRITICIZED

PM221059 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 85 Second Edition p 3

[Captain First Class V. Cherenkov article under the rubric "Pertinent notes": "Missile Carriers for Saboteurs"]

[Text] So Vice Admiral N. Thunman, U.S. Navy deputy chief of staff for submarine warfare, has stated, two missile submarines of the "Ethan Allen" class—the "S. Houston" and the "J. Marshall"—have been tasked with carrying out so-called special operations to secretly transfer terrorist commando subunits. These cutthroats are intended for carrying out antipartisan operations, subversive actions, and other operations to interfere in the internal affairs of countries with regimes and governments which do not suit the United States.

It is well known that hitherto the tasks of transporting special detachments have been carried out by the "Grayback" diesel submarine. Not being nuclear-powered, it is considerably inferior to missile-carrying submarines in terms of speed and autonomy. With a displacement of 3,900 metric tons, which is less than half that of the missile carriers, the "Grayback" could only carry around 70 saboteurs with landing equipment. The Pentagon now thinks this insufficient. With the expansion of the U.S. Navy's gendarme functions the need to transfer subversive detachments to the world's hot spots has increased.

Britain's JANE'S defence weekly notes, quoting official sources, that with a view to preparing to resolve supplementary, that is, subversive tasks, since October 1983 both missile-carrying submarines have undergone a routine refit involving the recharging of their nuclear reactors, resulting in a 10-year increase in their usable life. The journal deliberately fails to mention details of the work done on the submarines, stressing that it is not in the interests of future operations to assess the new capacities acquired by the missile carriers in the course of the refit. However, no secret is made of the fact that as a whole the U.S. Navy's potential for carrying out secret troop movements is expanding.

The Pentagon's latest venture is particularly dangerous and provocative because, as the Western press is noting, the commandos are armed with nuclear weapons. Thus, the MAIL and SUNDAY newspaper writes, for instance, the "saboteurs intended for operations in northern waters and off the Norwegian coast have been given a similar submarine, and they themselves will receive nuclear charges."
Judging by foreign press reports, both missile-carrying submarines will be able to put to sea this year with saboteurs aboard. The aggressive thrust of this step is self-evident. It is simply a question of where they are being sent and who will be the first victim of these cutthroats.

CSO: 1801/206
FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

INDIA'S RAO VISITS LENINGRAD--Indian Defense Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, who is on an official friendly visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Government, has visited Leningrad Military District, and generals and officers of the district. The Indian guest called at the Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko Naval Academy, laid flowers at the monument to the heroic defenders of Leningrad, and toured the city sights. P.V. Narasimha Rao was accompanied on the trip by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.I. Petrov, USSR first deputy defense minister. Brigadier (S.D. Pillai), military attaché at the Indian Embassy in the Soviet Union, was also among the persons accompanying him. [Lt Col A. Yurkin report under general heading "The Visit Continues"] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 85 First Edition p 1 PM]

PAKISTAN TO BUY E-2C--New Delhi 20 March TASS--Pakistan intends to purchase in the United States E-2C spy planes equipped with the airborne warning and control system. This was confirmed by John Lehman, U.S. secretary of the navy, in an interview published in Washington, the Indian news agency PTI reports. It points out that the statement by the secretary should be viewed as evidence of the United States' readiness to supply these aircraft to Islamabad. PTI stresses that the use of the aircraft will substantially enhance the strike power of the Pakistani Airforce. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1245 GMT 20 Mar 85 LD]
MOSCOW ON FUTILITY OF U.S. ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS DRA REVOLUTION

LD151647 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 15 Apr 85

[Commentary by Yevgeniy Kachanov]

[Text] According to reports from Kabul, Pakistani Army subunits have carried out a fresh series of armed provocations against settlements on the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's territory. Repeated Pakistani Artillery and Mortar Attacks have resulted in deaths and injuries among Afghan civilians, including women and children. Serious damage has been caused to dwellings. Over to our commentator, Yevgeniy Kachanov:

The events on the Afghan-Pakistani border have once again drawn a number of world press organs attention to what they usually term the undeclared war, the secret war against democratic Afghanistan. They wisely ask, however, what kind of secret war it is, if even the Pakistani press, in particular the URDU DIGEST journal, writes of the virtually open participation of Pakistani Army detachments in military actions on the territory of the Afghan Province of Paktia. And, indeed, it is also difficult to describe it as undeclared following the repeated statements by high-ranking U.S. administration representatives to the effect that they will exert all efforts to alter the political situation inside Afghanistan; specifically, to overthrow that country's legitimate government. The United States, of course, is not doing this with its own hands but through its Pakistani allies and Afghan counterrevolutionaries, in full accordance with the notorious Guam doctrine, the essence of which, if I may remind you, the Americans themselves formulated: To compel Asians to wage war against Asians.

This policy, it must be noted, was conducted by Washington in Indochina. No one called that an undeclared war. But let us return to Afghanistan. The results of the Dushman Bands' actions speak for themselves. According to official data published in Kabul, 1,814 school buildings, 31 hospitals, 906 peasant cooperatives, 14,000 km of telephone lines, many bridges and so forth have been destroyed. The direct damage exceeds 35 billion Afghans, approximately 800 million dollars. And it is no secret that the bandits are being trained and armed using American money, and that their main bases are on Pakistani territory. A considerable portion of the generous American military aid to the Ziaul Haq regime is being spent on subversive action against Afghanistan. Pakistan is essentially being turned into an obedient executor of another's will; it yields its national sovereignty in exchange for American weapons.
It was not coincidental that I mentioned the Guam doctrine and Indochina, because the story of the shameful flop of the U.S. Vietnam adventure shows all of the hopelessness of Washington's attempts to suppress revolutionary movements among the Asian peoples. Just as in Indochina, so it will be in Afghanistan. The guarantee of this is the incessant and irreversible process of the strengthening of the government of Democratic Afghanistan's positions within both the country itself and beyond its borders.

CSO: 1801/199
MOSCOW RELATES PANJsher VALLEY FIGHTING

LD261051 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1315 GMT 23 Apr 85

[Text] A sudden explosion shattered the monolith of the sheer cliff. Breaking into pieces in the air, a large section of the cliff tumbled down into the indistinct landslide, and immediately to the rolling echo of the explosion there beat the hollow rattle of heavy machine guns. The slanting clusters of fiery streams cut through the convoy and pressed the paratroopers to the rocks. Guards Captain Nikolay Kravchenko, deafened by the explosion, fell a few hundred steps from the now non-existent pass. His head throbbed and swam; his helmet, knocked backward on his head by the wave of the explosion, seemed like a 30-pound weight. He loosened its strap, got up slightly, trying to pull himself together. A pebble immediately flew into his face; a bullet whistled on the rebound. The duskmans had set a trap. The officer cast an alarmed glance over the steep walls of the canyon. It wouldn't be easy to dig your way out of this stone net. Kravchenko anxiously looked back. Scattered like a fan along the canyon, hidden behind rocks, in crevices, the paratroopers returned fire. No losses, the officer noted with relief. Fumbling for the head of his throat microphone which had been knocked off, he switched on the short-wave radio and gave the group commander's callsign. The radio waves responded with a dry crackle barely discernible in the firing. Guard Cpt Vladimir Fedorov answered with heavy breathing: "Take over my command." After a pause there was the sound of the agitated voice of a radio operator: "The commander is wounded," he reported, "he's lost consciousness: the doctor is rendering him aid. We are trying to call the helicopters."

"They couldn't reach us by helicopter," Kravchenko noted with concern, looking at the swirling, heavy clouds which had been accumulating over the mountains for several days now. That meant that help would not come shortly. They had gone too far into the depths of the kingdom of rocks.

[Change of announcer] The area where the paratroopers were located was one of the furthest-flung in the infamous valley of the Five Lions. [translation of Panjsher] On the map, the valley, which is drawn in an arc, reminds one of the scar of a sabre blow, cutting across the main highway of the country which links Kabul with the northern provinces. Ahmad Shah Masud, the duskmans' chief, at one time turned these places into a bandits' hideout, terrorized
the population, and mercilessly marauded on the only mountain road. In the
summer of last year during the Panjsher operation, Afghan Army detachments
routed his bandit formations. Having dislodged the dushmans from the valley,
they began cleansing Panjsher of its lethal contents, the latest brands of
mines with foreign trademarks. In retreat, the dushmans left mines everywhere;
on pack roads, in abandoned villages, near wells; the guiding hand of pro-
fessional foreign instructors could be perceived. The Afghan authorities
turned to the Soviet forces for help. One of the groups reinforced with
sappers headed by guards Cpt Fedorov, day after day examined the high mountain
ravines. Military equipment and other hardware had to be left down below.
For several days now the paratroopers had been getting deeper and deeper into
the labyrinth of ravines, and more and more often the undeclared war gave re-
minders of itself in deserted villages, wrecked vehicles, cliffs scorched
by fire at the sites of fierce skirmishes.

[Change of announcer] From his cover Kravchenko examined the opposite slopes
with his binoculars. The green peaks began to lose their clarity of out-
line; it was as if the ground was being covered with a yashmak of starless
night. The paratroopers had won the first round of the duel. They could
regroup forces, think through their plan for further action. Escape from
the trap would have to be made under cover of darkness, otherwise they would
be met at dawn by a hail of lead from the dushmans' machine guns. The para-
troopers knew well the bandits' wolfish practices. All the group's radios
were now set to take incoming signals: the paratroopers were waiting to
see what the commander would decide to do. "Saturn over here to me," Krav-
chenko's voice sounded on the airwaves. Saturn is the callsign of his friend
Aleksandr Lepeshkin; Kravchenko began his service in Afghanistan with him,
and had travelled more than a few hundred kilometers with him along the
distant mountain paths. And just now Kravchenko decided to entrust him with
the fulfillment of a bold and very risky plan—to penetrate the dushmans'
covering detachment with a group of paratroopers to the rear of the firing
position they had located, so as to attack them suddenly at dawn. "We are
arming our positions. There are no losses," stated Lepeshkin, silently
emerging from the darkness. After a short consultation they chose a route
for the group, the most difficult one, up the sheer cliff. It would be hard
to climb up onto the top; however, they would have less chance of encountering
the dushmans' covering detachments. Everything agreed, they embraced
silently. The dangerous nature of the situation they both understood; if
the group were discovered there could be no source of help; "In which case we
will have quite a good last conversation," murmured Lepeshkin, as the barrel
of his submachine gun shined dully.

A few hours had gone by since the group had dissolved in the darkness. Sud-
dently from out of the distance somewhere the sound reached them, a barely
discernible but very familiar rumbling of...a helicopter. The sound of the
rotors first fell away then came up again. The aircraft went on following
the sharp turns of the ravine. In a few minutes Kravchenko had already worked
out with the leader of the pair of MI-8's on the radio the signals for recog-
nizing the landing point. The wounded commander had to be evacuated and the
ammunition restocked. They stayed silent in the cave. The bandits evidently
supposed that landing a helicopter was unthinkable now. Moreover, fire from on board the second helicopter which was circling the canyon would immediately attack any firing position which had been discovered. A crimson color just barely blazed on the horizon when Lepeshkin's long-awaited words sounded into the earphones: "I've found the target." And immediately on the ridge of the nearby mountain with black gaps indicating caves, scarlet flashes began to dance. A volley struck from the grenade launchers. "Forward!" Kravchenko gave the brief command. Nuzzling his chin to his bulletproof vest, he dashed toward the cliff face. Up behind him went all the paratroopers. Kravchenko did not then know that he and the group would escape from this trap in a few hours with hands soaked in blood, with an empty magazine in the automatic rifle. And a single cartridge in the pistol; he didn't know that the paratroopers would be recommended for awards for their courage and heroism, and that he himself would be honored with the Gold Star of a hero.

Meanwhile, however, the paratroopers sped upwards in short spurts to the rocky caves, attacking in silent fury, burning themselves with the barrels of their automatic guns and cartridges cases. And the mountain's [word indistinct] of alarm rolled in a wave over the wounded-covered slopes of the nameless canyon.

CSO: 1801/215
HEROISM OF AFGHAN-SOVET TRANSPORTATION COMPANY

LD222202 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1421 GMT 22 Apr 85

[From the Vremya newscast]

[Text] With the assistance of the Soviet Union, important national economic tasks are being fulfilled successfully in Afghanistan. A great contribution to developing the Republic's economic and trade links is made by AFSSOTR—the Afghan-Soviet Transport and Forwarding Company.

[Begin recording] [Reporter V. Fadeyev identified by screen caption] The emblem of the globe on the top of the office building of the motor transport enterprise means that AFSSOTR drivers have to deliver freight to Afghanistan from many states of the world. Supplies of food and fuel, industrial and building equipment, and consumer goods to the country go through AFSSOTR. In the 9 years of its existence AFSSOTR has grown into a powerful and modern enterprise. There was a time when the owners of private transport, having fallen for the counterrevolutionary propaganda, sabotaged the transportation of freight and then the drivers of AFSSOTR took upon themselves the large part of this work. Many did not return from their trips them. Every working day starts for all who work here with a meeting at this monument to the heroism and courage of the drivers. And today every trip along the 450-km route is accompanied by danger and risk. The [word indistinct] bullet holes in the cabin of this lorry are the result of an ambush by the Dushman [line missing]. However, neither the intrigues of the enemies of the April Revolution nor the difficult weather conditions interrupt the rhythmic work of this transport enterprise.

[Video shows building with globe on top and sign with AFSSOTR on it; lorry park with articulated lorries, trailers, and cabins; container being towed, drivers talking, monument, and lorry cabin with bullet-holes]

[I.F. Prokofyev, member of AFSSOTR management identified by screen caption] AFSSOTR is an international organization with Soviet and Afghan specialists working together. The drivers are quite simply heroes. The Soviet specialists are fulfilling their international duty with honor. All the work done is only what is necessary. I would like to single out the Afghan comrades—drivers who in the very complex conditions of Afghanistan carry out their duty. The freight gets there and will continue to get there. [Video shows Prokofyev speaking to correspondent while a caravan of lorries moves along road] [End recording]
AFGHANISTAN

TASS CITES BAKHTAR CHARGES OF PAKISTANI INTERFERENCE IN DRA

LD240156 Moscow TASS in English 2234 GMT 23 Apr 85

[Text] Kabul 23 April TASS—The Pakistani military regime is seeking to use Pashtun tribes and their lands to escalate an undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. This was pointed out at a press conference in Kabul at which Pakistan's intervention in Pashtun affairs was exposed.

Spokesmen for the tribes, including the Vazirs, the Afridis and the Momands, who addressed the press conference, announced the decisions of the councils of their tribes not to allow their lands to be used as staging areas for bandit attacks on the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Tribal Chief Momand Habibulla said that the Pakistani authorities, realising that the Pashtuns were resolved to counter the actions of the counterrevolutionary Afghan rabble, were now seeking to make the tribal lands a scene of combat operations. They launched a number of operations with the use of heavy weaponry against the more "disobedient" tribes opposed to the attempts of the Islamabad administration to restrict traditional tribal rights and to intervene in tribal affairs.

It was stressed at the press conference that the Pakistani military regime, following the "divide and rule" principle, was trying to instigate divisions and enmity between the tribes and to bring them under its control. The authorities were trying to provoke in the tribes hostility towards the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and to prevent the spread of the truth about the April revolution. Habibulla said that the USSR was a true friend of Afghanistan and was giving its support in repulsing imperialist aggression.

A statement of the BAKHTAR news agency read at the press conference strongly denounced Pakistan's intervention in the affairs of Pashtun tribes.

CSO: 1812/220
BRIEFS

PAKISTANI CHARGES DENIED--Kabul 19 April TASS--As is reported by the BAKHTAR news agency, charge d'affaires of Pakistan in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has been summoned to the Foreign Ministry of Afghanistan, and the following statement was made to him: Pakistan's military authorities have distributed a slanderous statement that allegedly on 14 April this year an Afghan warplane intruded into the Pakistani airspace in the area of Chatral and bombed the area of Arandu. The Pakistani authorities also distributed slanderous fabrications that on 15 April two Afghan warplanes allegedly intruded into Pakistan's airspace and having gone as deep as 14 kilometers also dropped two bombs on Pakistani territory. According to the assertion of the Pakistani authorities, on the same day an Afghan warplane, which intruded into the Pakistani airspace, fired 20 missile salvos on the area of Arandu and another two Afghan warplanes dropped a bomb in that area of Pakistan. After a thorough and comprehensive study of the question the Afghan authorities considered those assertions as groundless, being not in accordance with reality, and categorically turn down those assertions. They demand that the Pakistani side should put an end to spreading such groundless statements.
[Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1308 GMT 19 Apr 85 LD]

AFGHANS PROTEST PAKISTANI 'VIOLATIONS'--New York 19 April TASS--The Afghan Government has protested against continued violations of Afghan air space by Pakistani planes. Afghanistan's permanent representative to the United Nations, Mohammad Farid Zarif, characterises these actions in a letter to the United Nations secretary general as aggressive and provocative acts of the Pakistani armed forces which are fraught with dangerous and grave consequences. The letter has been released as an official document of the UN General Assembly and security council. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 2026 GMT 19 Apr 85 LD]

'SIMMERING'DISCONTENT IN PAKISTAN--London 21 April TASS--Discontent is simmering among the Pakistani people over an undeclared war waged by terrorist gangs against Afghanistan from Pakistani territory, the British newspaper SUNDAY TIMES writes. The newspaper quotes Nur Khan, the former head of the Pakistani Air Force, as saying that all political parties are convinced that Pakistan has been converted into an instrument of Washington's global policy. In exchange for U.S. aid, Pakistan gives sanctuary to anti-Afghan groupings, with whose hands the West is waging an open subversive war against Afghanistan. Serious doubt is expressed even in the ranks of the Pakistani Army, with the help of which the current president clings to power, about the correctness of the course steered by Pakistan which has subordinated its entire policy to Washington. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0851 GMT 21 Apr 85 LD]
PAKISTANI 'AGGRESSION' PROTESTED—New York 17 April TASS—The government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan drew the attention of the international community to continuing acts of armed aggression staged by Pakistan. A letter addressed to the United Nations secretary general by Farid Zarif, permanent representative of the DRA to the United Nations, says that on 15 March–9 April residential districts in the area of Barikowt, Kunarha Province, came under heavy fire including from mortars and recoiless rifles. The fire caused civilian casualties, including women and children. Residential buildings were destroyed and serious damage was caused to crops. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan demanded that Pakistani authorities put an end to these acts of armed aggression and stop supplying weapons and dispatching counterrevolutionary bands to Afghanistan's territory. The letter was circulated as an official document of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1926 GMT 17 Apr 85 LD]

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