Near East/North Africa Report
No. 2678

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Effective 1 January 1983, this report series is being reorganized and retitled the NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT. In addition to material on the Near East and North Africa, it will contain material on the South Asian countries--Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka--that presently appears in the JPRS SOUTH AND EAST ASIA REPORT.
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2678

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UK TELEVISION TEAM REPORTS ON AFGHAN MUJAHIDIN

[Editorial Report] London ITV Television Network in English at 2100 GMT on 23 November carries a 60-minute documentary entitled: "Afghanistan: Behind Russian Lines" in which correspondent Sandy Gall reports on and provides television footage of the 3 months a British independent television crew spent with the Mujahidin in Afghanistan.

The television crew entered Afghanistan with a convoy of gunrunners crossing the border at night "to avoid the Pakistani police." Sandy Gall reports that during their 400-mile trek into the Panjshir Valley the convoy had to camp under trees to avoid being spotted by Soviet helicopter gunships. The gunrunning convoy comprises about 100 men who can be seen carrying Chinese mines and are reportedly also carrying Egyptian rockets, mortars and ammunition. Sandy Gall reports that the Mujahidin he is travelling with claim they buy their arms "on the work market with money they raise themselves, from taxes" and "from the sale of emeralds."

The Mujahidin carry AK-47 assault rifles captured from Russian soldiers. They rest and receive food at villages which they pass on their way and as the camera provides shots of them loading up after a stop at a village they can be seen loading several dozen RPG rocket-propelled grenades onto pack animals. Continuing their journey, the camera provides shots of destroyed Afghan villages and Sandy Gall cites reports from the Mujahidin of indiscriminate killings by the Russian troops. The shell of a Russian T-62 tank whose turret was blown off by a Chinese mine reinforced with TNT taken from an unexploded bomb can also be seen. As the crew reach (Shawwa) several more Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers ambushed by the Mujahidin with RPGs can be seen.

Gall reports that during the various Soviet-DRA offensives, "scores, possibly hundreds" of Afghan troops deserted to join the Mujahidin.

When the television crew arrive at the Panjshir Valley they meet with Ahmed Shah Mas'ud who, Gall claims, is the leader of the most powerful Mujahidin group in Afghanistan and whom the Russians have been seeking for 3 years. Mas'ud studied engineering in Kabul but fled to Pakistan in 1975 where he studied guerrilla warfare and read Che Guevara, Regis Debras and Mao Zedong. Following the Soviet invasion he returned to Afghanistan in 1979 and now controls 2,000 Mujahidin.
In an interview, Mas'ud says: "Islam has a central role in our revolution. It is vital. It is the foundation. We want Afghanistan to be free of Russian domination and we want the faith of Islam to be fully established here." Mas'ud admits that the split in the Mujahidin movement will delay victory against the Russians but efforts are being made to unite the Mujahidin.

The Mujahidin claim that Russian agents are sent to infiltrate the Mujahidin. One such "agent" who was caught, a 10-year-old Afghan boy, claims that he, together with 300 more boys from all over Afghanistan were taken to the Soviet Union to study espionage.

The television team then interviews a Russian soldier, a Muslim from Tashkent who defected to the Mujahidin. He says that there are many other Muslim believers in the Soviet Union but "they don't know what is happening. Our commander said the Americans were here and were helping. There are a few Muslims among the Russian military. There are many Muslims among the troops but not among the commanders. They are Russians."

Sandy Gall reports that he did not meet any Americans, mercenaries or other foreign troops with the Mujahidin. He was shown a letter written by a Russian soldier to his friends in the Soviet Union. The soldier was killed before he mailed the letter. Among other things, the letter says: "Here we are up to our necks in much and bullets." "Four of our lads have been killed and our commissar, Batuyev, was blown up by a mine. There was almost nothing left of him afterwards. As for your battalion, it is being slowly hammered into the ground." "We are counting the days until Demob." "By the way, the third company has been wiped out. They are all either lying in hospitals or in tin boxes."

The documentary then provides shots of a group of Mujahidin learning to use an AGS-70 grenade launcher captured from the Russians. Mas'ud says that 80 percent of the weapons used by the Mujahidin are captured from the Russians or bought, either for money or for hashish. He claims that most Russian soldiers in Afghanistan smoke hashish. Mas'ud maintains that he is not getting weapons from the West or from the Islamic countries although he urgently needs surface-to-air missiles.

Further on in his interview, Mas'ud says: "The West is wrong if it thinks that by helping the Afghans it will escalate the war. As I see it, the Russians have already used some of their most destructive weapons here." "If we can get arms from other sources, if we can increase our supplies of arms to the same extent that the Russians are reinforcing themselves the war would go in our favor. Secondly, we do not consider victory as the stopping of the fighting. Victory for us means being able to escalate the war against the Russians as much as possible. It is then that the Russians will be prepared to leave Afghanistan or at least come to the negotiating table."

The documentary then provides shots of a hit-and-run operation launched by the Mujahidin against a Soviet tank position holding the approaches to
Rokheh. The Mujahidin can be seen firing heavy machine guns at the Russian position while the Soviet troops respond with shells fired at the mountainside.

Asked what he would say if he had the opportunity of making a direct appeal to the leaders of the West, Mas'ud says: "For 3 years now the people of Afghanistan have blocked further Russian expansion with their bare hands. They have suffered thousands of deaths and overcome hundreds of difficulties and hardships with their faith alone. It is 3 years now that the Russians have been kept busy in Afghanistan without achieving the slightest degree of consent from the people. But the aims of the Russians are clear. The Russian goal is not merely Afghanistan. They want to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. They want to reach the Gulf countries and cut off the West's oil supply. The responsibility for this will lie on the shoulders of the present leaders of the West. Today they have the power but are sitting idly by and watching what the Russians are doing in Afghanistan. They content themselves with words but they have done nothing so far. The responsibility for what happens in the future rests with them, and one day they will have to answer to their own people."

Mas'ud goes on to say that next year he intends to widen the war against the Russians. He wants to form mobile groups of 150 men each and attack the Russians in their bases across the country. He hopes to be "knocking at the gates of Kabul in 2 years time, and maybe having a go at the Russian-built Salang tunnel on the way."

CSO: 4600/126
AIRLINE HEAD DISCUSSES FLIGHT BAN

LD030540 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0426 GMT 3 Dec 82

[Text] Kabul, 2 Dec, BAKHTAR—President of Arvana Afghan Airline Company in an interview with BIA correspondent concerning the boycotting of the flights of Aryana aeroplanes to the cities of London, Paris and Frankfurt and the position of international regulations in this regard said:

The state of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has always respected its international commitments and has endeavoured to fulfill them. This has been observed in connection with the hijacking of Pakistani aeroplane to Afghanistan too. The Afghan authorities have duly contacted the concerned authorities in this regard and have presented documentary materials to the responsible authorities of the interested countries and international organizations.

He added that the permanent representative of the DRA in the United Nations Organization has delivered a final official note to the Secretariat of the industrial conference of seven European countries in the face of the resolution adopted by the conference held in Ottawa, capital of Canada, last year. In this note, it had been explicitly mentioned that the DRA has respected its international commitments and has acted in accord with the international regulations concerning the incident of the hijacking of Pakistani aeroplane.

President of Aryana Airline added: The allegation that the Afghan responsible authorities have allegedly not discharged their duties regarding the hijacked Pakistani aeroplane are completely vain and unfounded. The boycotting of the flights of Aryana Afghan Airline by the three Western countries was completely unilateral and unjust decision which is employing an economic sanction over a landlocked less developing country such as Afghanistan.

Asked about his view on the claim of the Western news media that the boycotting of Aryana flights has a symbolic nature rather than economic, he said: If it was really so and it was not aimed at creating economic pressure on the economically less developed countries of the world, why then was this question discussed at the economic conference of Ottawa rather than at the International Civil Aviation Organization; it was feasible to have been studied and discussed in the latter organization.
As the imperialist news media gives it a symbolic nature rather than economic, then it can be inferred that the heads of the participating countries at Ottawa conference have decided on a series of fabrications made by the Western news media and have issued a unilateral resolution regarding the boycotting of the flights of Aryana Afghan aeroplanes to the three above mentioned cities.

He hoped that in case of misunderstanding on the Ottawa resolution, the participating countries should review their final decision because Afghanistan is a landlocked country and therefore no international regulations allow the closure of international civil airspaces and their airports to the flights of its aeroplanes.

Many incidents of aeroplanes hijackings have taken place in the world but boycotting decisions have not been applied over their concerned countries, he concluded.

CSO: 4600/126
AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

IRANIAN OFFICIAL VISITS REFUGEES--Commerce Minister 'Askar-Owladi, who is visiting Pakistan at the head of a delegation, 2 days ago visited a camp of Afghan refugees in Peshawar. According to a central news unit report, when the Iranian minister of commerce and his entourage arrived at the camp the Afghan refugees embraced members of the delegation and chanted slogans such as "God is great, Khomeyni is the leader" and "long live the Islamic Republic." According to the report, after taking part in the congregational prayers Mr 'Askar-Owladi made a short speech. Referring to the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in taking care of the Afghan refugees in Iran and praising the heroism and struggles of the Muslim people of Afghanistan, he expressed his hope that the crisis in Afghanistan will be solved by the powerful hands of the Muslim people of that country. [Text] [LD021358 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 2 Dec 82]

CSO: 4600/126
DOMESTIC POLICIES NOTED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English No 23, 17 Nov 82 p 6

[Text]

ALGERIA: COLONELS IN HAND. At the end of October President Chadli succeeded in removing Col. Hadjeres as commander of the important military region of Constantine in eastern Algeria. Hadjeres is considered one of the more brilliant of the new generation of Algerian officers. Apart from Col. Zine El Abidine's appointment in 1979 to the Bechar military region when Col. Saadi became minister of agriculture, he is the first regional commander for many years to have been moved. Chadli has given him command of the military school in Cherchell to the west of Algiers. (It will be recalled that until 1979 the school was run by Col. Salah Yiahiaoui, who tried to take the presidency after President Boumediene died in 1978).

Putting his stamp on the military is clearly a necessary part of Chadli's overall consolidation (AC Vol 22 No 23). At the end of last year he practically dismantled many parts of the security service and put his own appointee, Col. Lakehal Ayat, in charge. And having ousted the long-serving Col. Kaddi Merbah, now running the Société Nationale Sidérurgique, he has gained full control over the ministry of defence. He has, however, failed to place his own man as commander of the Blida military region, which included Algiers. Chadli circumnavigated the problem by creating a new military region to encompass the capital obviously the key to the Blida region — and put Col. Ali Bouhadja in command.

Of the seven military regions in Algeria, among the most important are those adjoining Morocco — the regions of Bechar and Oran, commanded respectively by Col. Zine El Abidine and Col. Karim Abderrahim, who replaced Chadli. Both are fairly close to the president. As insurance against the unexpected, Chadli anyhow appears to have installed adjoints to all seven of the regional commanders. During the last 18 months he has also pensioned off about 80 senior officers, many of whom are now in senior parasatal posts. (And doing very well judging by the size of the villas some of them are building around Algiers).

An overall feature is the origin from the east of the country of most of the senior officer corps. Since Boumediene's death and the disappearance from national life of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, western Algerians have also had little representation in top-level government.

CSO: 4500/31
WOMEN’S STATUS EXAMINED

London ARABIA in English No 14, Oct 82 pp 68-69

[Article by Jamil Shareef]

[Text]

During the celebrations of the 20th anniversary of Algeria's independence in July, a number of police women were on duty on the streets of the capital. Distinctive in their blue uniforms and caps, they take care of children going to and from school and help to run the police stations. What impact a women’s police corps will have is not yet known, but the question arises, can its establishment be seen as a further step towards female emancipation in Algeria?

The question of the role of women is one of the most controversial in Algeria and is best illustrated in the passionate debate which took place over the draft family code some months ago. Although the text, all 228 articles, had been subjected to careful study by a special parliamentary committee of coordination of 40 deputies (including nine women) before being submitted for parliamentary discussion, the debate that followed dragged on for several weeks before the issue was shelved due to "lack of consensus."

The fate of the draft was the same as previous ones submitted for "official" study in 1964, 1970 and briefly in 1980, before being put back into the parliamentary pending file.

During arguments over the code, two distinct factions appeared: those who supported a secular family law which they considered suited to the needs of post-independence Algerian society and in keeping with the "progressive option" of the regime; and the Islamists who believed that family law should be based solely on the sharia.

It is not clear, however, who opposed the adoption of the recent draft. According to some reports, it was the secularists who objected to its extensive references to Islam and the fact that it was not in line with modernist tendencies in the constitution and the National Charter.

The Islamists, on the other hand, un-officially admit to having lobbied to prevent the draft from being adopted, feeling that, like the constitution and more so the National Charter, it paid only lip service to Islam and was deliberately vague, leaving the way open for too loose an interpretation in the future.

As if in anticipation of Muslim opposition, before the bill appeared in parliament, specific assurances had been given in the state-run press that it was not against Islamic principles. At the same time, thanks to well-timed leaks about it, seen as a ploy by the regime to sound out popular opinion before making the issue official, the draft was being hotly debated in the streets and cafes of the capital. Neither strategy helped.

Among the main bones of contention when the draft was published were suggestions that polygamy be banned, and that the laws on inheritance, as outlined in the Quran, could on occasion be waived, neither of which is acceptable to a practising Muslim. All the same, there was no strong movement to present the conservative Islamic point of view on the matter.

Even without these verbal skirmishes, the question of the role of Algerian women is a pressing one, as their present status is nowhere near concomitant with their aspirations.

Though women represent almost 50 per cent of the country’s 20 million population, they comprise only 2.5 per cent of the workforce. The only area where they are extensively represented is in education where they comprise 38 per cent of teaching staff. Between 1976 and 1982 there were nine female deputies in the National Assembly but this number was
reduced to four in the latest elections — a decrease, some say, resulting from the controversy over the draft family code.

Reluctance to accept women into the workforce is still very strong. In a carefully structured interview published by the government weekly Algerie Actuelle, at the time of the independence day celebrations, women from 60 different sectors talked about the difficulties they encounter regarding work. All were in favour of the right to work for various reasons: for the educated woman it is seen as a means of social emancipation; for the socialist, as a tool to build up the country; for those with little or no education, it is the only way to make both ends meet.

There was some question, however, as to whether the law should stipulate whether work was to be full time or part time. For the educated, who often see work as a means of escaping household duties, the idea of part-time work was dismissed as constituting a favour to the bourgeois women who get bored at home. The less educated ones found it difficult to work a full 44-hour week and still take care of the house and children.

In the same interview, women complained about impediments to promotion and about discrimination against them, even by senior women. Their resources to fight this, they claimed, were limited, and they blamed both their union representatives and the government-aligned women’s organisation, the Union des Femmes Algeriennes, for not being active enough on their behalf.

Obviously, a change in attitude on the part of the men would help to give support to women, but little has been done to encourage this. Even on a cultural level, there is scant official guidance in this area, as exemplified by the predominance on television of cheap foreign and Arab productions that often treat women as mere sex objects.

The debate over the family code should include such matters. What has happened is that it has developed into a much broader conflict between those who wish to return to traditional values based on shariah law and those who oppose this, which in turn becomes part of an even deeper debate between those who oppose the policies of the present regime and those who support them.

This goes back to 1964 and the imposition of the one-party system, which is seen by Muslims as having deprived them of the means of voicing their views on matters that most concern them. This created a good deal of distrust towards the regime, even though, overall, general opinion has been effective in modifying the regime’s policies.

The main exception has been the draft family code which still has not been submitted for open debate, probably for fear of exacerbating Muslim opposition. The imposition of secular family codes in Tunisia and Syria, for example, has led to a hardening of attitudes there, and thence to revolt, followed by repression of the Muslim opposition.

For the present, it appears that the Algerian government’s only move would be to resurrect the draft now and test the degree of opposition to it. It is already thought that when it shows up again, opposition to it will be stronger than ever.

The role of women is not a sticking point, the Islamists point out. As far back as 1943, the Muslim leader Malek Bennabi called upon the ulama to consider the role Algerian women should play in society. But this, the ulama says, was meant to happen within a specific Islamic ethical and ideological framework, not an imported one.

According to Algerian Islamic leaders, emancipation of both men and women must come through education, a process initiated by the ulama themselves in the 1940s with the creation of modern Arabic schools for both boys and girls. These schools, they add, were instrumental in preserving the Algerian personality and were responsible for producing the first modern Arabic teachers in the country, despite the limitations imposed by French colonialism. The phasing out of these madrasas in favour of secular, state-run schools constituted one of the first steps toward social antagonism between the Muslims and the secularists.

Now it is felt that some kind of balance is vital to allow both sides freely to express their opinion. Only then, it is thought, can the problems confronting Algeria’s social development be constructively tackled. Until that time, the draft family code seems set for constant revision and women’s freedom to choose their lifestyle will continue to be denied.

CSO: 4500/31
GOVERNMENT, OPPOSITION EXAMINE CONTROVERSIAL AL-SALIHIYAH PROJECT

Mubarak Reviews Project

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 27 Oct 82 p 3

Article by Sabri Suryanim, Sabir 'Abd-al-Wahhab, and 'Abd-al-Majid al-Shawadifi: The Al-Salihiyah Project To Invade the Desert is a Top-Notch National Project/

In the course of the full 5 hours which President Mubarak spent on the al-Salihiyah project, we stressed an important fact:

Egyptians have eternally been pioneers in agriculture throughout the whole world and they must continue to be so in the world today and in the era of advanced agricultural technology. The president praised the Egyptian people's efforts in invading the desert, bringing the production of desert lands up to record figures and also using up to date methods which have kept abreast of the most modern technology of the era in the field of agriculture and irrigation. The president asked the young people of Egypt who are carrying out the project, in the course of his conversation with them at the jobsites, to increase production, because that is the only way to uplift and advance Egypt.

33,000 Feddans in the Youth Department

President Mubarak came to the al-Salihiyah Project Youth Department, whose area comes to 33,000 feddans, at 0830 hours in the morning, accompanied by Dr Yusuf Naji, the minister of state for agriculture and self-sufficiency in food. Engs 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman and Husayn 'Uthman, to whom the al-Salihiyah project had been commissioned, Eng Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, the minister of redevelopment and housing, Eng Fu'ad Abu Zaghlal, minister of industry, and Mr 'Abd-al-Mun'im 'Imarah, the governor of al-Ismailiyah, where there to meet him.

The president began his visit to the project by touring the products exhibition. There he listened to a detailed description, backed up by project maps, by Eng Hasan al-Shafi'i, chairman of the board of Egyptian Engineers, which made the design for the infrastructure for civil work in the project.

The president also listened to a description by Eng 'Abd-al-Wahid Muhammad, the deputy director general of agricultural projects, on the agricultural work carried out in the project since its start in 1981. He said that the youth project
consisted of 33,000 feddans, 28,000 of which were planted with vegetables and green fodder. Preparations were also being made to plant 5,000 feddans with fruit.

The president asked Eng 'Abd-al-Wahid Muhammad about his expertise and foreign assignments, and he said that he had worked on a number of projects in Arab countries and had made a number of trips to certain European countries and the United States.

He also requested that the production set aside for the local market be distributed directly through distribution outlets in order to eliminate merchants' greed. The president also asked for a description of the rate of production in the youth lands, and Eng Midhat Bahr, the manager of agricultural projects, replied that the average feddan was providing high rates in light of the fact that the land had been recently reclaimed and that these rates were increasing annually.

The president was pleased with the department's output of honey, especially that prepared especially for children. He requested that the supply of this commodity in the market be made generally available and that a percentage of it be set aside for distribution among children in schools.

The president asked about soybean production in the project, whether cultivation of it had been a success, and whether it could be applied throughout Egypt in general. Eng Hussain 'Uthman replied that 14,000 feddans of soybeans had been successfully farmed, that the desert land had proved to have a high receptivity to the cultivation of this crop, and that production had been distributed among poultry companies' oil extraction plants.

The president also asked about the sales prices of vegetables to the public and was told that the prices are well below those on the market. A kilogram of zucchini, for instance, comes to 15 piasters.

The president inspected the pump station for the water supplied to the project. The president's visit to the youth project had taken an hour, but the president insisted on visiting every portion of the project and meeting the young people in their jobsites.

In the Heart of the Al-Salihiyah Project

After the conclusion of the president's visit to the Youth Department in Al-Salihiyah, he and the people accompanying him proceeded to visit the Al-Salihiyah project itself, on which work started in 1979 and in which 23,000 feddans have been reclaimed, livestock and poultry resource development stations, dairy plants and crop canning and packaging plants have been established, and an integrated residential community for workers has been established.

At the start of the visit, which took 2 hours, President Mubarak made a visit to the livestock resource stations and listened to a description of project goals by Eng Husayn 'Uthman. The project has the objective of producing new strains of cattle and stallions and offering large quantities of meat and large quantities of dairy products on the local market. To achieve this, a new experiment has been pursued in increasing livestock output, which is to conduct impregnation with the American (barakmiyasin) strain. Births through impregnation have started in cows
of improved strains, artificial insemination has been done through males with good genetic characteristics and the station now has 1,500 cattle with a productive capacity of about 20,000 head a year. The president also inspected the poultry production project, which has the objective of producing 180 million eggs a year, fattening 15 million chickens a year and establishing an automated slaughterhouse with a capacity of 4,000 birds per hour, a unit to process the slaughterhouse waste, and a fodder plant.

In his conversation with the engineer in charge of the plant installation, the president praised the excellent ability of Egyptians to perform what is demanded of them in record times.

The president inspected the community for the workers in the project, where work on the first stage has been completed, including 12,210 housing units with all facilities. These have been built by advanced methods with one goal of arriving at the lowest cost and highest quality and speed of performance.

At the end of his visit to the area, the president recorded the following statement:

"In the name of God the most merciful and all-compassionate: salutations of appreciation and affection from me in the name of Egypt to everyone who has taken part in the al-Salihiyah project, which is a strong, first class project. I wish you success in serving our beloved country, and give you my best wishes.

"Husni Mubarak."

The president left the al-Salihiyah area and returned to Cairo at 1330 hours in the afternoon, making a reconnaissance tour by airplane of the new agricultural projects and those that had recently been reclaimed in the al-Salihiyah plain area, the extension of the Governorates of al-Sharqiyah and al-Isma'iliyeh, the Bilbays desert and Tall al-Kabir.

Project Cost Overruns Flayed

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 26 Oct 82 p 4

⟨Article by 'Abd-al-Qadir Shuhayb⟩

⟨Text⟩ Eight months ago, President Husni Mubarak issued a decree forming a special committee to study the al-Salihiyah project from all angles, technical, financial and economic, after extensive debate had been raised about it and it had been subjected to criticism because of its high costs. We do not yet know the results of the activity of this technical committee, although it is not secret. Either that is because it has not yet completed the study of this project (as a consequence of statements being bruited about regarding the difficulties that some bodies have faced in obtaining the economic feasibility study on whose basis the project was established) or, because the committee has completed its study of the project but has not wanted to announce the conclusions of these studies for one reason or another--or again because this technical committee which the president ordered formed has not yet been formed and has not carried out its job, in essence! In any event, none of these reasons are acceptable.
Why the Delay?

This committee was supposed to have hastened the study of the project and to have announced the results of the study to the public. It is not proper that the criticisms that have been directed at this project, which has enjoyed the comprehensive attention of all the agencies of the government, should be left hanging, and of course that is not in the interests of the people who are carrying out the affairs of the project and are enthusiastic about it, or those who have made it one of their concerns, unless the project guardians are certain that the conclusions of the technical and economic study will not be fair to them or will record errors against them which they are trying to hide.

Of course the fact that Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman told the press 3 months ago that "Twenty-two committees have been formed to evaluate the al-Salihiyah project, there is not a single Arab Contractors Company employee among its members, and all the committees have stated that it is one of the best projects to have been carried out not in Egypt but in the Middle East," does not encourage one to dispense with the results of the study, now that the discussions have been going on for 9 months. Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman is not just one of the people who are enthusiastic about this project--he is, specifically, the person principally in charge of it. Therefore it is normal that he should defend the project, and do so zealously.

The purpose of the decree forming the special committee to resudy the project which the president issued was also, as he himself had declared at a National Party parliamentary board meeting, to ascertain its economic feasibility and determine that there were no cost overruns before it was repeated or expanded. The delay in the conclusion of the study means one of two things, and only two. Either there has been a delay in the reclamation projects which it is hoped will be a repetition of the al-Salihiyah model, or this type of project will be carried out with the same errors that have been spoken of in criticisms by a number of technicians and economists. The more palatable of either case is of course bitter! We are not prepared for the luxury of delays in our projects, specifically in the area of land reclamation, nor are we prepared to squander our limited funds repeating its mistakes!

Further Reasons

There are further reasons which make it necessary to hasten to study the al-Salihiyah project in the technical and economic senses, if this study which President Mubarak requested has not yet been completed, or the detailed results of this study have not been declared (if it has actually been completed) so that it can be accessible to all specialists and technicians who want to discuss this project, and, above them, of course, public opinion.

It has been declared that the Central Department in the Ministry of Planning has decided to allocate 700 million pounds for the reclamation and initial planting of 35,000 feddans of farmland in a period of 5 years, at an average cost of 2,000 pounds to reclaim and initially farm a single feddan (the newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH, 15 October 1982).

Eng Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, the minister of redevelopment and reclamation, has stated that about 1 million feddans (were reclaimed) in the 10 years between 1956
and 1966 at costs no greater than 500 pounds. That is, the costs of reclaiming a feddan did not exceed 500 pounds, whereas they now come to 3,200 pounds, including the costs of roads, energy, irrigation, housing, drinking water and utilities.

However, the total costs of reclaiming and initially planting a single feddan in al-Salihiyah came to 3.76 billion /sic/ pounds, including the costs of the infrastructure (roads, energy and facilities); this means that there is an excess of about 560 pounds in costs per feddan in al-Salihiyah over the estimates by the minister in charge of land reclamation, although it was stipulated that these estimates be measured in the future, not in the past, and they were supposed to have been lower in the past as a result of the constant increase in prices.

By a simple calculation, it is clear that total project cost overruns, measured against the estimates of the minister of land reclamation, came to 31.6 million pounds, which would have been enough to reclaim and initially plant about 10,000 additional feddans equivalent to 17 percent of the total land whose reclamation has been declared, which comes to 56,500 feddans in area. One should bear in mind that not all the land that has been reclaimed has been farmed, and this adds to the costs and consequently the overruns.

Outside the context of figures and calculations, Dr Yusuf Wali, after inspecting the project, stated that the central irrigation costs in the al-Salihiyah project were high and required the farming of high-cost crops, and that in the event this sort of project was repeated he would be careful to review the method by which the irrigation projects in al-Salihiyah were carried out and use an alternative irrigation method, drip irrigation, which is lower in cost. This statement was published in the latest issue of the magazine AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI.

These substantial project cost overruns occurred although the Ministry of Agriculture provided a large, distinctive group of experts and agreed that the project should be established in the most important of the areas that can be easily reclaimed, as the minister of agriculture has also stated.

For all these reasons, it is necessary to restudy the project or announce the results of the study, if it has actually been carried out.
PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY APPROVES EXTENSION OF STATE OF EMERGENCY

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 6 Oct 82 p 4

[Article by Karim Yahya: "After Heated Confrontation Between Government and Opposition at People's Assembly, 42d Year of Emergencies Has Started"]

[Text] After a heated confrontation between the government and the opposition in a hot session held 2 days ago, the People's Assembly approved extension of the emergency law for another year.

Because the law undermines the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution; because the state of emergency justifying enactment of the emergency law does not exist; because the emergency law affects foreign investments coming into the country and tourist revenues, as happened last year; and for the sake of 3,751 citizens who have, according to statistics supplied by the minister of interior, been proven not guilty so far, but who have spent from 1 month to 1 year in detention by authority of the emergency law--because of all of this, the opposition deputies refused to extend application of the emergency law.

On the other side, the government and its deputies supported the emergency to safeguard security and to insure the speedy movement of the security agencies. However, the government and its deputies have been eager to pledge that the law will be directed solely against terrorism.

(The government rejected the proposal by Ibrahim Shukri, the Labor Party leader, to confine the emergency law to confronting solely armed terrorism), thus leaving the hall [session] with nothing but a constitutional debate between Dr Sufi Abu Talib and Mukhtar Hani, on the one hand, and Hafiz Badawi, on the other. Then there was silence followed by the hands of the majority raised to approve another year of emergencies in response to the request of Mukhtar Hani, the minister of state for the People's Assembly, who could not offer any justification for his refusal of Ibrahim Shukri's proposal.

Rejects for Sake of Innocent Citizen

Ilfat Kamal (Liberal Party) said that the special laws actually applied against numerous elements--laws on which a referendum was conducted prior to last October--were not the ideal means to realize stability. [She added:] I wonder, is our legislation flawed insofar as laws are concerned? Should we re-
sort to extending the emergency law every time we uncover a plot? Until when? Doesn't extending the emergency law harm tourism and the tourist revenues, as happened last year? Therefore, I and the Liberal Party reject extending application of the emergency law.

Counselor Muntaz Nassar [an independent] refuted the justifications cited by the People's Assembly General Committee in its request for extending application of the law. He said: The emergency law permits arrests. As has happened in numerous cases, the citizen remains under detention for months or even a year. Nassar asked: Who will compensate the citizen proven not guilty for the measures taken against him? It saddens the heart to see a single innocent person in jail. He added: We have an arsenal of special laws that are enough to correct any deviation. Law No 2 of 1977 penalizes sit-in strikes and demonstrations. These are activities connected with the expression of opinion and yet we punish them with enormous penalties that may reach the extent of life term at hard labor. The penal code and the amendments introduced into it are enough to deal with any deviation, regardless of its severity. Counselor Nassar also pointed out that the minister of interior's right to object to a court's decision for the release of a detainee, thus keeping the detainee in jail for another month, deprives this law of many of the guarantees which the committee wants to rely on.

Counselor Muntaz Nassar also talked about the impact of the state of emergency on the economic situation, saying: President Mubarak has spoken of increasing production. Is the citizen threatened by the arrest law and the innocent citizen who is arrested and put in jail capable of producing? Nassar then proceeded to ask the government: What has been the value of the monies coming into Egypt as foreign investments and what have been the tourist revenues during the past year of emergencies? What was the value of the investments and what were the tourist revenues that flowed into our country before the emergencies?

Honest Hands

Commenting on Muntaz Nassar's words, and justifying the request for extending the state of emergency, the minister of interior said: "The country was exposed this year to a danger to which it had never before in its history been exposed." He revealed the details of the Asyut events which claimed as their victims 100 officers and soldiers killed and 120 wounded. The minister then asked: Have these plots, which started with al-Sadat's assassination, ended? Answering, the minister said: There are foreign forces which have a major role in planning and financing the radical movement at home. Our information indicates that these forces have not stopped their activities and that plans have been made for operations no less serious than those of last October. The benefit of the emergency law is that it gives the security agencies the freedom of movement to confront these crimes. We are facing a phenomenon with special characteristics and methods new to the Egyptians. The emergency law within the narrow framework we are demanding will not harass the innocent citizen. As constitutional institutions, we must establish a balance between the country's supreme interests and the interest of the citizens themselves.
Dr Kamil Laylah (National Party) said: "The head of the state is entitled to impose a state of emergency to confront aggression against the liberties and to safeguard security and stability. If the homeland is lost, the citizen will also be lost. The minister of interior and the prime minister have photographs and documents which they do not wish to reveal so that complications will not develop—papers and photographs which, of course, Counselor Muntaz Nassar, does not have. This law will not be used to threaten the honorable citizens, the politicians or to censor the press, but to attack terrorism so that political stability, tourist growth and increased production may be realized. The government, which is the custodian of security, believes that it needs quick, decisive and firm measures to use in case of continuous necessity.

Hasan Hafiz (National Party) acknowledged that the emergency law actually does have broad powers but that a distinction must be made between the emergency law and the state of emergency under discussion.

Fikri Makram 'Ubayd (National Party) lauded the Democratic National Party which flies with two wings, nationalism and democracy, which have not been accidental or perfunctory. He said: In all we seek and do, our goal is to entrench the democratic thought. Therefore it is unacceptable and incomprehensible that anybody should engage in one-upmanship against us in this respect, because this is a part of our constitutional and national entity.

He added: Not only do the laws have to be strict but they must be implemented and applied. I say that application of the law is in the honest hands of the Democratic National Party's government and this government has promised that the law will be applied within the narrowest limits.

Before detonating his bomb, proposing that use of the emergency law be confined only against armed terrorism, Ibrahim Shukri, the Labor Party leader, rejected the emergency law, saying: We wish to declare to the entire world, by abolishing the emergency law that security in Egypt is stable, with numerous other laws which are the equivalent of these measures. It is true that they have adopted measures against terrorism in Germany and England. But they have not declared a state of emergency. The minister of interior says that the state of emergency makes it easier for us to move quickly. What price does the citizen pay for this quick movement? The world does not understand the law of shame and our nation's security courts and it is not necessary for it to know them. But the world knows perfectly well that a country with an emergency law "is not a stable country."

He added: Going back to October 1981 is incompatible with our present situation. The perpetrators of the event itself, the "Assassins," were tried and the sentences were carried out at the time. The same applies to the Asyut events. The 3,751 released detainees mentioned by the prime minister have never been charged in any cases and some of them spent 10 or more months in jail. It was then proven that they had nothing to do with cases for which they had been referred to the courts. This gives the proof that the issue is not that of releasing these people. The issue is that we arrested 3,751 citizens, each of them with a family and commitments, without any proven charge against them.
The People's Assembly session was ended in response to two requests made by the ruling party and despite the objection raised by Fikri al-Jazzar (an independent) who requested to take the floor but was denied the request—a denial which motivated him to abstain from voting in protest.

8494
CSO: 4504/26
EDUCATION COSTS DESCRIBED AS BURDENSOME TO FAMILY

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 6 Oct 82 p 4

[Article by 'A'ishah Shukr and Sawsan Muhammad: "How Much Does Family Shoulder in Expenses To Find Place for Its Child in Classroom; Minimum for One Child Ranges from Seven to 28 Pounds, Without Transportation, Additional Books or Private Lessons; Expenses Are No Longer Concern of Parents Only but of Children Also"]

[Text] The onset of winter is linked in the consciousness of Egyptians with growth and abundance. But also for many years, a new concern has been added to those of parents: The schools open their doors and the parents open their pocketbooks. The students go in and the pounds come out in an antagonistic relationship similar to that of angels and devils—a relationship where when one appears the other disappears immediately. The concerns of education in Egypt are numerous, both to the state and to the citizen. We are not about to discuss here the problems of education or the causes of the phenomenon of school "dropouts." We are only observing the annual October-September concern of every Egyptian family.

Education in Egypt is free. This is what the Constitution has said since the 1962 decree of free education. The state's education budget is ballooning year after year. Yet, educational costs to the family are still rising and casting doubts on the effectiveness of the Constitutional provision.

Hamdi al-Barri, an engineer, has said that the circumstances of his job required him to live in France for a year, adding: "I was concerned with the burden I would have to shoulder in a capitalistic country like France to educate two sons who had previously studied at the (Lycee) in Cairo. I was amazed by what happened. I went to the education section of the municipality with the jurisdiction over the quarter in which I lived. They asked me for my sons' photographs and papers and, at the same time, pointed out to me a school close to my residence where my sons were to go. I anticipated paying the schooling expenses and was surprised to find that they asked me for only the equivalent of 1.5 pounds for medical care throughout the academic year. They also gave me the option to pay either a monthly sum equal to 4 pounds for a daily lunch or to have the children eat their lunch at home between 1100 and 1300 daily, since the school day continued until 1700. As for books and notebooks, they were completely free. Moreover, I did not see any problem in-
sofar as keeping up with their studies was concerned, and I did not resort to any private lessons. It was a total surprise to me to find out that education at government schools was completely free in the true sense of the word. What is more, one of the two children was in kindergarten and they supplied the children with pencils, crayons and writing and drawing pads, putty and colored storybooks free of charge. Children's toys were available at school for all children, each child according to his age. The children couldn't take those toys home, of course."

How Much Does a Government School Student Cost Monthly?

There are in Egypt three types of schools: Government, or what we used to call public schools, private schools and language schools, or the so-called high-level schools. They are all subject to government supervision and receive a government subsidy. Most of them, especially in the elementary and preparatory [junior high] stage, require a special uniform.

In the government schools—the elementary stage—the family is faced on the average with the following demands per child: 350 piasters in fees; 550 piasters for a book bag; 650 piasters for a pair of shoes; 600 piasters for 2 shirts; 150 piasters for two pairs of socks; 300 piasters for a pair of sports shorts; 200 piasters for a pair of sneakers; 1,500 piasters for two pairs of pants; 1,000 piasters for two pullovers; 500 piasters for school supplies (for entire year).

Nearly all these items are in public sector prices. As we notice, these items are the minimum needed for use. But their total value is 56 pounds—with a family spending nearly 7 pounds monthly, and an academic year that is 8 months long—per child in elementary school, not to mention transportation costs, if needed, of costs of lunches, pocket money, additional [text] books, sketchbooks and notebooks (in addition to what the school supplies) and private lessons, "and God forbid that they should be needed."

The figure of 7 pounds monthly per elementary school child in government schools rises to reach 10 pounds per preparatory school student in the same type of school and to 13 pounds per secondary school student in government schools.

With a simple calculation, a family with 3 children in the various stages of education spends nearly 30 pounds monthly throughout the 8 months of the academic year, not to mention other details which no family escapes.

In Private Institutions and Language Schools

As for a family whose child is enrolled in a private school, the September—October bill rises by a large degree. Each of these schools has its distinguishing uniform. In most cases, these schools agree with a private sector shop to produce the uniform and ask the student's family to buy it from this shop. Even by calculating the minimal limit, this family finds itself required to pay the following sums per child: 75 pounds in fees; 15 pounds for two pairs of pants; 16 pounds for two pairs of shoes; 6 pounds for two shirts; 24 pounds for two pullovers (or jackets); 3 pounds for two pairs of socks; 1.5
pounds for a pair of sports shorts; 6 pounds for a pair of sneakers; 6.5 pounds for a book bag; 10 pounds for school supplies (for entire year).

The total is 163 pounds. Also by a simple calculation, it becomes evident that the sum which the family spends monthly throughout the 8 months of the academic year amounts to 20.5 pounds, not including of course the costs of school transportation (nearly 100 pounds) if the student uses it, the lunches, the pocket money, the outside books, notebooks or private lessons.

The figure of 20.5 pounds per month for the private elementary school student (not including transportation) rises to 25 pounds per preparatory student and 30 pounds per student in a private secondary school. Also by a simple calculation, a family with 3 students in the 3 stages of a private school shoulders an expense of 75 pounds monthly (without adding other expenses).

As for the language schools—high-level schools—the bill rises by 50-75 pounds constituting the difference in school fees which range from 120-150 pounds. This means that a single child costs during the 8 months of the academic year nearly 225 pounds, not including the costs of transportation (nearly 120 pounds), should the student opt for them, or other well-known detailed accounts. Thus the figure rises to 32 pounds for the preparatory stage and 35 for the secondary stage. Should a family have children in all three stages of education in these schools, then it is catastrophic.

Not Only "Concern" of Parents

This is why the Egyptian family makes a thousand and one calculations every year before the September-October school opening. Many participate in what is known as the "associations" system whereby a number of individuals contribute a monthly payment, with the collected payments going to one of the "association" members each month. The members compete for the September turn. Others depend on loans from the institution they work for and yet others manage their affairs in different ways. However, the finances of the majority get shaken up every time the start of school approaches.

Umm Muhsin is a housewife and the wife of a cab driver. [She has said:] "I have four children, all of whom go to school, two to elementary school, one to preparatory school and one to secondary school. I prepared to start this year with 300 pounds, of which 100 pounds are for Muhsin's school fees—National Private School—4.10 pounds for the preparatory government school and 3.60 pounds for another elementary government school. I have bought shoes for 35 pounds and school bags for 3 children for 20 pounds. I have not bought Muhsin a school bag. Muhsin's clothes have cost me 60 pounds, Samiyah's 25 pounds and the clothes for Muhammad and Jihan, who are in an elementary school, 20 pounds. I have not bought the school supplies yet."

Accountant Ahmad Hasan: He has 3 children in al-Salam College: Thab is in the 2d preparatory class and his father will pay his fees in three installments: 60 pounds and then 50 pounds and 50 pounds. The school uniform costs 50 pounds. Hatim is in the 5th elementary class and his father will pay his fees in three installments also, 50 pounds each. The uniform also costs 50 pounds. Dina is
in kindergarten and he has paid 150 pounds in school expenses and 150 more in contributions because this is her 1st year. He bought the school uniform from Rimondos Shop in al-Zamalik, paying 35 pounds for it. The fee for school transportation has risen to 100 pounds each and so the father has not participated in it and he drives his children to school.

Mahmud al-Sayyid Muhammad (Upholsterer): He has three children in school. Mustafa is in the second elementary class in a government school. [Muhammad said:] "He has cost me 25 pounds so far and I am still struggling to meet his demands." Samah is in the 5th elementary class in a government school "and she has cost me 25 pounds, and still more to come." 'Abd al-Nasir is in the preparatory stage and "he has cost me 35 pounds so far."

In summer, the number of children and youths working at various jobs for wages attracts attention. They work in cafeterias, refrigerator repair shops, electricity shops, construction work and many other kinds of jobs. I thought at the start that this was a sort of entering the field of work early with the aim of maturing, getting used to shouldering responsibility and experiencing life. But after the short tour I made to familiarize myself with the Egyptian family's expenses with the onset of the new school year, I now understood the issue differently.

Despite This

On top of all this cost and hardship, the Egyptian family is then surprised with another hardship or burden that is not any less oppressive. All three types of schools do not bear the main burden of education. The family does, and woe be to the child whose family does not help him keep up with his studies. To put it briefly, such a child does not learn. The school assigns the homework, and in most cases without adequate explanation of the lesson, and the family supervises what is not done at school, which is a lot. This is where the need for private lessons arises. Such lessons become necessary either because nobody in the family can help, because of the lack of time or lack of knowledge. Private lessons have become an independent tragedy. The reasons are numerous and diverse, rather entwined, and this is not the place to discuss them. But ultimately, the family pays. [Private] lessons are no longer by the month, the week or the day. They are by the hour, with the rates ranging from one pound [per hour] for the simple subjects in the elementary school to 6 pounds for the preparatory and secondary school in the subjects of mathematics (especially modern mathematics) and languages. The family has to reserve a place with the teacher it chooses [for private lessons] from the start of the year. Should it think of doing this in the second half or near the end of the academic year, then often it will not be able to find a teacher who has enough time. As a last resort, the parents enroll their children in the student-improvement groups organized by all kinds of schools. These groups are less expensive, with their rates ranging from 2-5 pounds monthly per subject, depending on the stage and type of school.

Despite all this, the drop in the student's educational standard is a complaint heard in every home.
BRIEFS

DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES COMMITTEE--The Egyptian Committee for the Defense of Liberties will hold its first meeting at 1900 next Monday at the Grouping Party headquarters. The committee will discuss its method of work in the coming period. The meeting will be attended by representatives of the Grouping, Labor and Liberal Parties and of the press, engineers and teachers unions, the Alexandria Society for the Support of Human Rights and of the elected Lawyers Union Council and by independent national figures. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 6 Oct 82 p 1] 8494

CSO: 4504/26
**WE CANNOT 'OUT-ISLAM' KHOMEINI, FORMER MINISTER WARNS**

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 4 Nov 82 pp 6, 7

[Text] Prominent Iranian journalist and one time minister of information Dariush Homayoun has advised opposition activists not to use religion as a weapon against the Khomeini regime. He has argued that religious belief and practices should be allowed to remain personal concerns.

Writing in IRAN-VA-JAHAN, a Persian-language weekly published in Paris, Homayoun warns that those who wish to replace the present Khomeini-style theocracy by what they hope will be a more moderate and possibly compassionate Islamic theocracy, are making a serious mistake because such a replacement cannot present a viable alternative to the present regime.

"You cannot out-Islam Khomeini," he argues. "We have seen how Khomeini can cynically make political capital out of Islam and yet escape criticism by the mainstream of the established Shia hierarchy."

Homayoun believes that politicisation of Islam was bound to play into the hands of extremists and the reactionaries. Any theocracy, he says, can only survive by adopting repressive totalitarianism.

This was clearly demonstrated in Iran as the so-called moderate advocates of Islamic rule steadily lost ground to the extremists, whether those with crude reactionary ideas or those obsessed by other forms of totalitarianism.

The present Islamic regime has committed the most horrible acts under the guise of Islam and yet has got away with them. It has even turned against one of the most prominent religious leaders (a reference to Ayatollah Shariat-Madari) with relative ease.

Homayoun [as published] argues that Islamic theocratic rule and indeed any kind of theocracy has been discredited in Iran. The politically-motivated mullahs are scorned and rejected by Iranians. It would be self-defeating for the intelligentsia to try to use religion once again as a political weapon.

He says that the experiences gained during the past four years have proved the necessity of relegating religion to the domain of private and personal
choice. The intelligentsia must have the courage of their convictions to say so and publicly campaign for separation of religion from politics.

"Today we cannot use the weapons of four years ago to ride to victory," he says. "Not only are those weapons no longer effective but we cannot fight mullahs at their own game.

"And for Iran, this one experiment in rule by preachers and the illiterate is enough."

CSO: 4600/109
BAKHTIAR GROUP SAYS TUDEH IS REAL THREAT

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 4 Nov 82 p 7

[Text] Nehzat, the official organ of the National Movement of Iranian Resistance (NAMIR) warns Iranians and western governments that the infiltration of the Moscow-backed Tudeh party into the Khomeini administration is far deeper than has been appreciated.

In an unsigned article which reflects policy outlines of NAMIR, the paper argues that continued purges of civil service, army and other ranks of the middle class professionals were encouraged and actually administered by covert agents of the Tudeh. Through them known anti-communist elements were branded as "American" or Western-oriented liberals, and thus eliminated. Their places were then taken by Tudeh sympathisers.

Nehzat says that because of the general animosity towards the Tudeh in Iran, this party and its Moscow-based overlords knew they could not and must not openly make a bid for power. "So they have adopted furtive tactics to consolidate their hold over the administration," it says.

The incessant anti-American propaganda of the regime was engineered by communist elements in an effort to build up a solid anti-Western feeling among the mass of the ordinary people. Such sentiments would come in useful when Iranians found themselves compelled to turn to the outside world for necessary technical assistance.

"This we already see in the regime's foreign policy," it says. "By creating a phoney anti-American and anti-Western feeling the regime, of necessity, has to turn to such countries as North Korea and other communists for its foreign relations.

Nehzat says the present, unobjective and emotional spate of anti-American propaganda is an indirect way of promoting the interests of the Soviet Union. "If you cannot sell the Soviet Union because it has no buyers, you might as well make it impossible for the client to see any attractions which the competitors may have. Then you force the competitor out and leave the room for the bad buy unhindered."

Nehzat criticises western governments for their short-sighted, mercenary policy towards Iran. It says the Western regimes believe that they can deal
with Khomeini only if they turn a blind eye to his inhuman rule in Iran. Western regimes simply wanted to perpetuate their commercial interests and be assured that Iran under Khomeini would not be devoured by Russia.

On both counts they were mistaken, Nehzat said. They could not maintain beneficial ties with Khomeini because the nature of his regime was anti-human, and they could not be sure that Iran would not fall to the Russians because Khomeini was removing obstacles against communist advances.

CSO: 4600/109
WORLD SAID TO BE GETTING FALSE PICTURE OF KHOMEINI'S IRAN

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 4 Nov 82 pp 7-9

[Text] A writer in the London-based monthly VOICE OF IRAN, an organ of the National Movement of the Iranian Resistance, claims that the discrepancy between what is portrayed in the world's press and the reality of Khomeini's Iran is at times so wide that it appears almost wilful.

Referring to the comments by Martin Walker in his book "Powers of the Press" that the press had largely ignored or misinformed the world about the instability of the late Shah's regime and the power of Islam, the writer said not all Iranians would agree with Walker on the nature of this misinformation.

But few would discount Walker's other contention that a failure in information and analysis is serious since it can mislead the public as well as decision-makers such as politicians, diplomats and government officials, he added.

In the case of Khomeini's regime such a failure was now evident.

"The reality is that since Khomeini's return in February 1979, people's hopes for political liberalization and social justice have been shattered," the article said. "Instead they live under an arbitrary and fanatical tyranny. Against this background, the remarks of some leading newspapers make curious reading. The GUARDIAN in an editorial (21/1/81) wrote "Iran today is a freer (and curiously more democratic) country than it was...". The DAILY TELEGRAPH (10/6/81) compared Khomeini to Gandhi, praised him for being a harsh critic of excesses and expressed the belief that "Iran has moved towards greater political stability". The TIMES (July 1981) gave prominence to several extracts from Mohammed Heikal's book in which Khomeini is described as a 'reluctant saint'."

The writer went on: "In the past year things have changed. The Islamic Republic has been criticized for mass executions and its treatment of the Bahais. Too often, however, when the barbarities of the mullah's regime are mentioned, it is in a misleading and inadequate manner. The TIMES (23/9/82), for example, announced that the Iranian Parliament has outlawed the drinking of alcohol and homosexuality. In fact, these 'offences', legally or not, have been punished since the beginning of the revolution.
On March 6, 1979 Reuters reported that a large number of people had been flogged for drinking. In 1981 alone, more than 100 people were executed for adultery and homosexuality. But, whereas these dramatic events are sometimes reported, the appalling economic, social and political condition of the country is bypassed. How many people are aware, for instance, that the places of higher education in Iran have been closed since June 1980? By contrast the temporary closure of Birzeit University in the West Bank not only receives press coverage but elicits indignant letters from respected academics such as Dorothy Hodgkin, Helen Gardner and others.

"One explanation for this indifference is the lack of reporters in Iran. But, another is that proffered by Ferdinand Mount. Mr Mount suggests (THE NEW STANDARD 20/1/81) "There are more long-term dividends to be gained from conciliating a regime like the Ayatollah's, ghastly though it may be, which does at least enjoy deep-rooted support". The lingering belief that Khomeini's [as published] regime is popular is based, among other things, on the notion that the revolution has benefited 'the masses'.

"There is little doubt that the lower classes ('the dispossessed' in Islamic terminology) were initially behind Khomeini. In return, the regime made much propaganda out of its pro-'disinherited' stance. The reality is that the predicament of the lower classes is now worse than ever. As a result of neglect, loss of skilled labour and proper management, Iran's oil production is down by 29%. Industry, both the public and private sector, is operating at around 45% of its production capacity. The outcome is massive unemployment. According to the regime's officials, falling incomes in rural areas are rapidly swelling the ranks of the unemployed in the towns. The government's land allocation of 5 to 6 hectares per family (when implemented), will only lead to further fragmentation of the land. This will allow living at a subsistence level, with little left for sale on the market. What is more, 30% of the peasants remain landless. Before the revolution, the landless peasant could seek seasonal work in towns or work on the larger farms. Now many large farms have ceased to function because of a shortage of spare parts for farm machinery, disrepair of deep wells and official harassment. The overall result has increased unemployment and decreased food production. Given that from 1974 the consumption of food rose sharply, consumer expectation is high. The regime's answer to this problem is higher importation of foodstuffs, plus lectures on the morality of hardship.

"The poor are also worse off as far as housing is concerned. The leader of Friday prayer in Tabriz, Ayatollah Malakuti, has remarked (Kayhan 11/9/82) that those who were homeless during the Shah's regime are still homeless. He adds that housing co-operatives have only benefited the rich and that while some families are homeless, others own up to 700 pieces of building land. From the same source we learn that, after the revolution, rampant dishonesty resulted in the best lands going to the influential with nothing left for the slum dwellers. What, one wonders, has happened to those thousands of requisitioned homes? And under what conditions are the nearly 2 million rural poor, who have flooded Tehran since the revolution, now living?"

CSO: 4600/109

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YOUNG SHAH ADVISED ON FUTURE ROLE

London IRANIAN PRESS SERVICE in English 4 Nov 82 pp 9-12

[Article by Teezbin]

[Text] The pro-monarchists in London held a short but enthusiastic gathering to mark the second anniversary of the acceptance of the Iranian crown by the young king Reza on Sunday—but only after a bomb scare, a change of venue and a by-now typical attempt by one small group to try to discredit another which had usurped its functions as the standard-bearers of the monarchist cause in Britain.

A Persian language newspaper published in London had printed a picture of a purported meeting in Tehran in which a character with a vague similarity to Piruz Mojtahedzadeh, a bright and perspicacious advocate of the royal cause, was sitting with a group of mullahs; they placed a small photograph of the real Mojtahedzadeh above it in a bid to back up their contention that it was Mojtahedzadeh consorting with the hated clergy. A group of activists from the crowd who ran the royalist platform in Hyde Park before Mojtahedzadeh and his clique took it over waved the newspaper aloft and Mojtahedzadeh was loudly denounced as an embassy spy.

The row which broke out in front of a crowd of two or three hundred people who had already been shunted from one meeting place to another was only ended when the denouncers left the building with a bit of gentle encouragement from the crowd of policemen who turned up to watch the altercation. The incredible egoism of so many Iranians and the relish they have for altercations of this kind has to be seen to be believed; but on this occasion most people there were thoroughly distressed by the row.

The man sitting with the mullahs in the newspaper photograph, it was obvious to the most shortsighted reader, was not Mojtahedzadeh and how the British law of libel applies to the attempt to suggest it was, we are not qualified to say. Nor can it be proved who rang up the first establishment where the meeting was to be held and told them it would be bombed and thus had the management bar the Iranians. But the organisers of the gathering suspected it was not the young Shah's enemies but supposed allies who were responsible.
Whoever was to blame, the effect of the row was to arouse passions and turn the meeting once it did get under way into a passionate demonstration in support of the monarchy. The shouts of "Javid Shah" (Long live the Shah) and the national songs echoed round Kensington. It seemed a pity to many of us that the young king himself doesn't seem to share the same passion for his cause and for his task as these ordinary Iranians so obviously do.

For the reason these rows break out is the lack of real leadership he gives to the Iranian communities everywhere, his failure to show that he has really made up his mind to be a symbolic leader or not. Similarly the indiscipline and the rivalries that ravage many other sections of the exile communities are attributable to the cowardice and the disdain which the intelligentsia, and other people from which leadership should come, have shown in avoiding playing their role in holding their compatriots together.

The young king seems to be completely confused as to the role his people demand of him. He is obviously listening to the advice of those who have lost touch with the real nature of Iranians, intellectuals or officials who have spent too long in the west and are leading him into the same mistake his father made when he tried to play the liberal as the frenzied mobs flooded the streets of Tehran.

Nobody wants him to set himself up as a wild despot, determined to avenge the fate of his father in a river of blood. Nor, however, do they want him to remain an anaemic figure, failing to rally his supporters, failing to create any image on the international stage at all, being a pale pretender and not a leader in any real sense of the word. Nor do truly nationalistic Iranians see as very pretty his refusal to defend his late father's record, to do everything in his power to try to put the record straight and to encourage the world to see the late Shah as a man who, in spite of his mistakes, devoted himself tirelessly in his last years to achieving what he believed was right for his country.

Perhaps the young shah believes his countrymen don't deserve what his father tried to give them—and in many ways succeeded in doing? He could be forgiven that if he were making a judgment solely on the basis of the behaviour of so many of his father's former close confidants, and the young intelligentsia and businessmen who were in many ways the main beneficiaries in terms of prestige and status of what the late shah achieved. For they have turned out to be an ineffectual, irresponsible and utterly pathetic bunch. Four years after the revolution most of them have done nothing to help their country or Iranians, wasting 24 hours of their day in a void which suggests to the rest of us that they would have done better to stay home and have taken up all those places in Evin prison so the schoolkids could not be placed in them and dragged off for execution. Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani has been inviting back the "professionals" to return to Iran to work for their country; these professional "moft-khors" should respond to it.

But if young Reza would take the time to come and really see the mood of the thousands of ordinary Iranians, those who are not too disdainful to
show their grief and their anger before foreigners, who are passionate and not concerned to give a false image of western phlegm and cynicism to the world which has anyway contemptuously ignored their plight, then he would perhaps feel a little more strongly about the treatment meted out to his father.

Both here and in the West and back home in Iran the liberals, the intellectuals, the leftists and those who feel they are the natural leaders have tried and failed to combat the mullahs and their pragmatic ruthlessness. It is clear already that the mullahs have understood their only chance of survival is to physically obliterate every vestige of resistance to them on sight. No idealism, no pious sentiments will combat that, only brute force, a fearsome backlash that will obliterate the present leadership with the same violence it has obliterated its predecessors (other than those who ran away at the first sight of a cloud of dust on the horizon).

The hope for the future of Iran does not lie amongst the so-called intellectuals, those who listen to their British or American friends and who want to share the western idea that humanity and its future are merely a game like chess in which solutions only come from certain set moves on the board. The rulers of Iran, once the mullahs have left the scene, will not be the intellectuals, the liberals, those who spout inexplicable drivel about democracy and other concepts which can only survive in balmy atmospheres like those of the slowly degenerating societies of western Europe, where the people no longer care for more than an ever-growing portion of daily bread. They will be people with red blood in their veins, with passion and with strength.

They could be people on the extreme left who have the conviction to carry out what they believe; they could be the "jahels" and the "amalehs" of the revolutionary guards corps, under firm leadership and the sponsorship of a section of the clergy backed by foreign friends; they could be just ordinary, passionate nationalists who feel they've had enough of the misery imposed on them and find the courage and the right moment to take things into their own hands. Whoever it is, they will have no time for those who have spent the last four years hiding in the woodwork or those who couldn't live up to their roles.

The monarchy, as we have said before, does not belong to the Pahlavis. It is an integral part of Iran's history and the fabric of the nation and it is to the credit of Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza that they used it to bring a benighted country into the 20th century. It is no use their enemies talking about those who tried before them, in 1906 and even earlier, to induce change in the degraded country which Iran was: it was Reza Shah, the non-intellectual, the soldier, who succeeded where so many others had failed. It was his son, also uneducated in the strictly academic sense of the word, who made some meaning out of the changes his father instigated. And that's the qualification which gives the new Reza his significance to Iranians, his right to claim he is the protagonist of the monarchy.

Two years ago one could be forgiven for thinking that the monarchy was finished for good in Iran. It seemed that the mullahs' power, allied to
a new revolutionary realism among sections of the population that could give only some kind of social democrats any other possible role, had taken Iran into a new chapter of its history that would dispense with much of the past. But the brutality of the mullahs, the folly and mindless egoism of people like Bani-Sadr and Rajavi, with their belief in their divine calling, together with the feebleness of other aspirants for power, has changed the scene dramatically.

There is now a void which can only be filled by determined, and probably ruthless men who are ultra-nationalists and who for a long time ahead, will ignore the western and other selfish influences which led to the collapse of an increasingly progressive society into the present chaos.

If the young king does believe passionately enough in his country and in the beneficial, tempering role that a traditional symbol like the monarchy can play, history may have given him a part to play. But he must begin now to show that he can play it. His father, while still young, learned to speak up to Churchill and Roosevelt, to find some sense of his role. The people of Iran have always supported their monarchs when they were forthright in their defence of the interests of their country. They showed again in 1978 that they do not support them when they show weakness, when they are influenced by alien ideas. They do not want the monarch to be strong and selfish towards them, but strong and nationalistic towards the rest of the world.

If he comes among the exile community and mixes with the ordinary Iranians Reza will find the true nature of the monarchy's support. The idle, rich Iranians see the monarchy simply as an instrument to secure their own positions, but most of the Iranian exiles (and now an ever-growing number inside Iran) see it as a symbol of nationalism, of national pride, and of an older order which, whatever its disadvantages, was a thousand times preferable to the present horror. Their feeling about the monarch is a strictly Iranian thing, something which westerners cannot identify with.

The westernised "wets" who are seemingly misleading Reza Pahlavi about the nature of his role are doing only the mullahs and the self-centred opportunists cluttering the political scene a favour. The way he is playing the part at the moment will inevitably lead to the monarchy fading finally into irrelevancy. In its present agony Iran can do without Reza Pahlavi; but it would be a tragedy if the monarchy disappeared with him. Only some other, probably alien ideology like marxism could replace it. That, Reza Pahlavi, is the responsibility which rests upon you.

CSO: 4600/109
YOUNG SHAH APPEALS TO OPPOSITION GROUPS TO WORK TOGETHER

London IRANIAN PRESS SERVICE in English 4 Nov 82 p 9

[Text] The young Shah Reza appealed to all Iranian opposition movements "striving to serve the country within the framework of the constitution" to forget their differences and work together to free Iran in a message to mark the second anniversary of his acceptance of the crown.

He said the clique in Tehran saw their inevitable end approaching and nothing nor no-one in the world could save them. The rapid rise in repression and cruelty, the increasing number of executions, the plunging into mourning of thousands of Iranian households during the past four years, the recourse to wars, bombings and assassinations, could no longer defer the sentence of history.

He continued: "You sons and daughters of Iran! Patriots, soldiers, members of tribes, farmers, workers, students! All of you working in the country's various economic, social and cultural sectors! Hear the verdict of history: the reign of evil draws to an end. Eternal Iran will arise once again and live and build again. Have faith in our future. Let us be aware that at present our primary duty is to combat the regime of evil with all our strength and all means available. Destiny is on the march and the day is near at hand when, on our sacred soil, with me at your side, we shall all bear aloft the glorious flag of our reborn Iran.

"On that day, a new Iran will arise from the ashes, and a new era will begin, allowing us to reconstruct, on the ruins of the past and profiting from the bitter experiences of these four years, the edifice of the future. A future based this time on the true values of our national heritage: love, creativity, honour."

The message was primarily designed for reception inside Iran.
IRAQI OPPOSITION GROUP SPOKESMAN ON PLANS

LD242100 Tehran IRNA in English 1958 GMT 24 Nov 82

[Text] Tehran, 24 Nov (IRNA)--The spokesman for the Iraqi Revolutionary Council said in an interview published here today that he had no doubts about the Iraqi people's desire for the establishment of an Islamic government. But nevertheless he said that the issues should be put to a national referendum.

Hojjat Oleslam Seyyed Mohammed Baqir Hakim said in an interview with the daily Persian ETTELA'AT published today that the Iraqi Revolutionary Council (IRC) was not a government in exile but a gathering of committed Iraqi religious personalities which would lead the struggle for the overthrow of the ruling Iraqi regime.

He said the IRC was not a coalition of different political groups, rather it was a collection of Muslim personalities who followed a specific aim, ideology and policy. However, he added that the members of the IRC could be from a political group but they were only considered as an individual in the council and not as a representative of that group.

The IRC had actually been formed a number of months ago, Hakim said: The first official announcement of its formation came on 17 November.

He told the paper that the IRC was willing to cooperate within a serious way with non-Islamic groups who were honest and genuine in their struggle against the Iraqi regime. "We are prepared to cooperate with all forces who are making an effort to achieve the objective, i.e. overthrowing the Baghdad regime," Hakim said.

Concerning its plans to be followed after Saddam's fall, Hakim said the IRC was making efforts towards the establishment of an Islamic government in Iraq which would follow a "neither East nor West" policy in its relations with other countries of the world and revive Iraq's agriculture, which had been destroyed despite its suitableness and potentials. He said that the over production of oil would only serve the interests of foreign powers and is of no benefit to the Iraqi people.
On relations with regional Arab countries, the Iraqi spokesman said the people of the region had common interests since all had been victims of military, cultural and economic aggression by imperialism. "The countries which defended the interests of the people of the region and which had a policy of confronting world arrogance would be in a single front with us... but those countries which had a hostile position against the interests of the people and which worked to increase the influence of world arrogance in the region would naturally compel us to have a different policy towards them," he said.

Commenting on Majlis speaker Rafsanjani's recent call for the granting of military bases to the Iraqi exiles near the border with Iraq, Hakim said that Saddam could not be overthrown by mere political means but he added that, "the red line of martyrdom and an armed struggle for the sake of the Iraqi regime's destruction should also be paved and therefore the existence of military bases can be viewed as a necessary demand." He said, "From the point of view of this council the realization of these determined aims is not possible but through armed struggle."

He also said that the Iraqi people should pay attention to Imam Khomeyini's guidances because he was an example of a true Muslim leader.

CSO: 4600/125
AYATOLLAHS URGED TO WITHHOLD SUPPORT OF DECEMBER ELECTIONS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 4 Nov 82 pp 4, 5

[Text] Pressure is mounting on two grand ayatollahs--Mussavi-Golpayegani and Marashi-Najafi--to withhold their support for the December elections to the constituent assembly designed to choose Khomeini's successor or successors.

"We have been mobilising imitators (supporters) of Marashi in Iran and abroad to bring pressure on him to denounce the elections, or at least not to support the project and not to vote," one of the supporters of Marashi told IPS.

"I have also been in contact with the imitators of Golpayegani asking them to organise a similar campaign," he said. "The son of a prominent Tehran merchant who finances part of Golpayegani's expenses has promised to help us."

As part of the campaign a letter has been sent from Hamburg to Marashi in Qom in which the ayatollah has been informed of atrocities and other un-Islamic acts committed by Khomeini and his followers. The letter in part says:

"Your Holiness, we have documents which prove Khomeini is a liar, a liar who knowingly lies to achieve his unholy objectives. We have documents, Khomeini's own taped voice, in which he has said blatant lies. We also have Khomeini's own seal on documents in which he has sanctioned murder and confiscation of private property. We have documents to prove that Khamenei, who is Khomeini's chosen man, was a corrupt element in Mashad as a theological student. We have documents that prove that other trusted men of Khomeini such as Montazeri are sinners and corrupt. For instance, in the Justice Office of Qom there were records of complaints against Montazeri as a corrupt man. The documents may have been destroyed by now but we have copies of them. We have records to prove Khalkhali is an insane killer. We have proof that Mussavi-Ardabili, the so-called Chief Justice of Khomeini, was a small-time lawyer in Ardebil who was in the service of corrupt elements.

"Your Holiness, we also have documents to prove that the Islamic republican regime which is headed by Khomeini uses terror and torture as part of official policy. We have documents signed by the ministry of foreign affairs' top officials in which cadres attached to the regime's embassies in foreign countries are given explicit instructions to engage in acts of murder,
terror, espionage and robbery. We can prove to you that the Islamic republic regime is one of the most corrupt regimes on earth. We will send all these documents for your inspection.

"Your Holiness, we implore you not to support this inhuman and corrupt regime. Your support would be a devastating blow to our faith. Already Khomeini has done immense harm to our faith. Do not allow him to abuse your holy office."

The letter has been sent to Marashi by mail. "We know that it is possible that the Khomeini authorities will intercept the letter and now allow it to reach the ayatollah's hands," his Hamburg-based follower said.

However, copies of the same letter have been mailed from Frankfurt and Rome and efforts were made to get another copy of the letter through to him by what the follower described as a "courier service."

Followers of Golpayegani have also been collecting similar documents against the regime to send a similar letter.

However, it is claimed that both Marashi and Golpayegani are under the strict control of Khomeini's turbanned aides. Both grand theologians are in their 80's and are reportedly ill. Marashi's eyesight is very poor.

"According to our information, young revolutionary guards in the pay of Mussavi-Khoyniha and Nateq-Nouri have been dressed in clerical garments and sent to the houses and schools of the two ayatollahs as their disciples. These Khomeini spies control all their affairs, especially any kind of outside communication with them," the Hamburg-based informant said.

It is also said that because of economic depression and chaos many merchants who used to contribute to the expenses of these two ayatollahs have no longer then income to do so. [as published] Moreover, contributions to religious leaders have been brought under the control of Montazeri's office in Qom.

Having denied the independent mullahs access to cash the regime has then moved in to donate money to them from the national budget. As a result the two grand ayatollahs depend on cash from Khomeini's regime to pay the expenses of their schools and dependents.

"We know that the Khomeini thugs have brought everything under their control," Marashi's follower said. "But we hope to convince the Ayatollah Marashi that it is better to refuse cash from the regime and to allow the theological school and their dependents to suffer rather than sanction Khomeini's anti-Islamic deeds."

It is interesting to note that during the Moharram ceremonies the two grand ayatollahs did not allow their close aides to engage in government-sponsored processions and religious ceremonies.
Golpayegani's followers in Tehran have told his critics that the grand ayatollah's support for Khomeini's move to legalise the Retribution Law came because of a serious misrepresentation. He said the Ayatollah was not told the whole truth about the law; he sanctioned it as an academic subject and not as a legal code for implementation by worldly governments.

CSO: 4600/109
ASHURA DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST KHOMEINI REPORTED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 4 Nov 82 p 2

[Text] There was widespread unrest in East and West Azerbaijan during the 10 days between October 18 and October 28, coinciding with the first days of the mourning period of Moharram. Travellers from the areas said that in Tabriz a procession for Ashura turned into an anti-Khomeini demonstration in which his pictures were set on fire.

Khomeini's representative and Tabriz Friday prayer leader Mohsen Malakuti, a much-hated mullah, was conspicuously absent from the municipality balcony on Ashura day, when the government-sponsored procession was held.

In the small town of Marand, some 40 kilometres west of Tabriz, mourners on Thursday (Ashura) pulled down the official mullah from an improvised pulpit and declared that they would not allow "dirty" politics to spoil their religious ceremony. Revolutionary guards, mainly non-residents, speedily whisked the official mullah away.

In Khoy the official mullahs, sensing that the people were angry, did not indulge in politicising their sermons. Even then trouble started when a procession of mourners, brandishing their daggers, arrived at the city's main square. Guards rushed to take away the daggers, arguing that Khomeini, as the Imam, had forbidden use of daggers in mourning processions. But there was resistance, and at least two guards were reported to have been seriously injured.

The authorities had foreseen the danger of using daggers in the procession. It is an old practice in Azerbaijan for mourners on Ashura to stab their heads with daggers. This practice was forbidden by Reza Shah some 50 years ago, and the ban remained until recently. Since the revolution the practice has been revived in some places. However, this year Khomeini decreed that the use of daggers would give a pretext to the enemies to ridicule Islam, and so it was better not to use them.

But enemies of the regime contend that Khomeini was afraid the angry mourners would use the daggers to kill his revolutionary guards, and that was why he banned their use. These incidents happened despite the fact that the authorities have purged Azerbaijan revolutionary guards units of local recruits and replaced them by Sunni militia, including Afghan refugees.
In Rezaieh, a hotbed of royalist sentiment, the people did not participate in any kind of processions during the Moharram period. Mullah Hussein Imani, Mullah Hassani and two other Persian-speaking mullah held a brief ceremony at a mosque.
CLANDESTINE CIVIL SERVANTS ASSOCIATION URGES NONPAYMENT OF TAXES

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 4 Nov 82 pp 5, 6

[Text] An open letter from the clandestine Civil Servants Association circulated in Tehran recently calls upon people not to pay taxes to "an essentially alien regime" and to avoid helping the regime's efforts to plunder the wealth of the nation.

The letter asks Iranians to look at what Khomeini and his "gang" were now saying about the revolution not being intended to bring material benefits. "His prime minister says that people are happy with supplies of goods and that the only problem is an inefficient distribution system," it said. "Can you believe them?"

The letter continued, "Do you remember the greatest forgery of the time (1978), the list published in the name of the Central Bank employees on transfer of foreign exchange?

"We now know that the list was a forgery, that it was a clever piece of trickery conceived by communists and mullahs to create hatred and jealousy. There were other such dirty tricks. Do you remember how the then spiritual sons of Khomeini—Qotbzadeh and Bank-Sadr—were trying to fabricate documents to show that the Shah had transferred billions of money out? What has happened to these two opportunists? Where are their documents?"

The letter says that at the time of revolution, when Bazargan took over, the country's foreign exchange reserves were at an all-time high of $14 billion. In addition, the Government had assets in the form of gold, securities and shares in the equity of multinational corporations to the tune of $4 billion. At that time, with Hassan Nazih at the helm of the National Iranian Oil Company, the country used to export over two million barrels of oil a day, with a daily income of more than 60 million dollars.

"What happened to all that money?" the letter asks. "Now we know that the amount of national wealth squandered under the mullahs during the past four years far outstrips any squandering which went on during the past 75 years since the constitutional rule. Yet, these mullahs and their communist allies do not tire of constantly referring to wastage of resources during our time in office."

The letter said that under the mullahs there is no system of public finance and accountability.

CSO: 4600/109
IMPLEMENTATION OF KORDESTAN PROJECTS URGED

TA270618 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1730 GMT 26 Nov 82

[Unattributed commentary: "Disarm the Counterrevolution in Kordestan by Implementing Development Programs"]

[Excerpts] Dear compatriots: The honorable jurisconsult, great eminence Ayatollah Montazeri, in his meeting with the imam's representative in the west of the country, referring to the situation in Kordestan, said: It is incumbent upon the government and all officials to further attend to the needs of the Kordestan region and to endeavor to eradicate the roots of its cultural and economic poverty.

This is not the first time that the country's high-ranking authorities have reminded government officials and individuals in charge of affairs of the message of the Iranian nation's glorious revolution about Kordestan as one of the duties that cannot be delayed.

During scores of years as a result of the policy of discrimination and national oppression that the sinister royal regime had practiced with regard to the people of various provinces, Kordestan has carried the heavy burden of economic, cultural and medical backwardness. The self-centered Phalavi regime had deprived the brave and patriotic Kurdish people of their most basic rights, and during long years it launched fierce onslaughts on Kordestan.

The overthrow of the sinister royal regime and the victory of the Iranian nation's popular and anti-imperialist revolution was a hopeful and promising turning point in the political and social life of the Kurdish people as well. Unfortunately, the world-devouring imperialists, and first and foremost U.S. imperialism, who harbor a vicious hatred toward the Iranian revolution, transformed Kordestan into the arena of fratricidal wars, implementing their evil plots. Their aim of incessant conspiracies and seditions in this region was no more than undermining the Iranian revolution and creating barriers and problems to the implementation of the revolution's goals.
In the very first months of the revolution's victory the foes of the Iranian revolution staged uprisings in Kordestan, and this at a time when the Iranian revolution had still not developed and was facing difficulties and problems that were being created by U.S. imperialism and the counter-revolution. Fortunately, as a result of the realistic measures adopted by Imam Khomeyni, founder of the Islamic Republic and leader of the Iranian revolution, in the first stage the foes of the Iranian revolution failed and agreement was reached between the government and the representatives of the Kurdish people. The late Ayatollah Taleqani who headed the government's mission to Kordestan reached certain agreements with the Kurds. This agreement, as was rightly pointed out also in the country's press at that time, had historical importance and could have formed a strong foundation for resolving the issue of self-government not only in Kordestan but also in the other regions of the country. We again bring to your attention this seven-point agreement in the same order that was broadcast by the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran in April 1979.

This was the content of the agreement reached between the then government's mission headed by the late Ayatollah Taleqani and the representatives of the Kurds. The Kurdish people too did not expect otherwise from the Islamic government, but future developments and the sabotage of the liberals' provisional government hand in hand with the plots and seditions of imperialist elements and other enemies of freedom prevented the achievement of the goals of the abovementioned agreement.

The emphasis and recommendation by the honorable jurisconsult Ayatollah Montazeri with regard to eradicating the Kurdish people's economic and cultural poverty and attending to the needs of this region once again confirms the fact that the realistic leaders of the Islamic leadership do not maintain any sort of discrimination regarding the people of various provinces, as stipulated in the constitution also, and that they have not forgotten Kordestan's pitiful situation.

CSO: 4600/125
PILOT DEFECTS TO AUSTRIA

GF231738 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT
23 Nov 82

[Text] Another pilot of Iran National Airlines, HOMA, has escaped from Khomeyni's hell-seeking refuge to the free world. According to our reporter in Vienna, Mahmud Namdar, an Iranian pilot, has asked the Austrian Government for political asylum. The National Resistance Council has reported that the pilot, in a letter, has announced his support for the council. The letter states: I, Mahmud Namdar, a pilot for the National Iranian Airlines and one of the founders of the Iranian Pilots and Flight Engineers' Society and a representative of this society, announce my disgust for the antihuman regime of Khomeyni, which destroyed my homeland and barbarically executed over 20,000 people, as well as imprisoning over 50,000 others.

Mahmud Namdar, in his letter, calls the National Resistance Council the only alternative and replacement for the Khomeyni regime and adds: With 20 years of flying experience I was once arrested and jailed for 2 months by the regime of Khomeyni for objecting to the lack of flight safety, but was released due to a threat of strikes by the pilots. The regime was forced to reinstate me. My life became endangered again in November of this year for supporting the Mojahedin-e Khalq. Armed guards attacked my house to arrest me but I was able to escape.

The pilot, who called Mas'ud Rajavi, the leader of Mojahedin-e Khalq "my Mojahed brother," adds: Following this incident, which occurred about the same time as the statement by Rajavi concerning a cut off of all cooperation with the regime of Khomeyni, I left my home and job and together with my wife and two children left Iran under dangerous circumstances and came to Vienna.

At the end he invites all news agencies, radios, televisions and newspapers of Austria and the world to interview him in a press conference. He announced his contact telephone numbers as follows: 432-2274, 432-2242, 432-2246.

CSO: 4600/125
ISLAMIC SCHOLAR COMMENTS ON KHOMENEI REGIME

GF261700 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT
25 Nov 82

[Text] Sheykh 'Isman Naqshbandi, leader of the Naqshbandi School of
Sufistic Thought in Islamic countries issued a decree vehemently condemning
the actions of the so-called Islamic regime of Khomenei.

In the decree, he said that the repulsive mask covering the face of Iran
is not the true Islam. The mentor of the Naqshbandis requested the erudite
figures of the world of Islam to make genuine efforts to eradicate the
sedition and hardship in Iran. The following is the text of the statement
of Sheykh Mohammad 'Osman Serajeddin Naqshbandi:

This faithful servant of the prophet Mohammad's brilliant Shari'a and a
religious individual who has spent many years in the propagation of the
orders and important Islamic disciplines requests Muslim scholars all over
the world to take note of the anti-Shari'a actions of Khomenei and his
so-called Islamic regime which has no idea of what Islam really is and has
stained its chaste cloak and its rightful limits by committing innumerable
different sins such as murder, pillage, plunder, tyranny, mass executions,
injustices and the brutal massacre of children, women and older persons
and thousands of other crimes which the people have witnessed become
regular phenomena.

In light of all the evidence which is being projected by the collective
international media, the information received, communiques and in particular,
the documents, and statistics released by the Amnesty International and
other human rights organizations which lift the veil from such crimes
committed by them [Khomeini's criminals], I think the time has come that
the learned Islamic community, the noble scholars, the prominent clergymen
of the world should break this Islam-destroying deadly silence because it
is possible that a group with political aspirations or merely due to
ignorance or lack of cultural sense or sheer deceit may consider your
silence justified. However, in the court of divine justice, the silence
of scholars, religious figures, jurisprudents is an unforgivable crime and
its repercussions are more destructive than this black plague which is
gripping the Muslim Iranian nation and by the same token, Islamic society.
This flouting of the Shari'a should be condemned so that the people in the world realize that this repulsive and filthy distortion of Islam is not the true Islam.

I appeal to all Islamic nations to take some steps to terminate this disaster and hardship in Iran in order to prevent any further annihilation of Iran and the murder of the young Muslims, whether in Iran or in Iraq, whether Sunnis or Shi'ites and all those Islamic offspring being killed to satisfy Khomeyni's desires.

The time has come when the elders and religious scholars of Islamic nations should take effective measures to end this futile religious war.

CSO: 4600/125
'SYMBOLIC' PROTESTS BY DOCTORS, NURSES REPORTED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 4 Nov 82 pp 2, 3

[Text] Doctors and nurses at several Tehran hospitals are reported to have staged symbolic protests against the theocratic regime's increasingly totalitarian policy and practices, reports from Tehran indicated this week.

In several hospitals doctors were reported to have told turbanned inspectors to leave the premises and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the hospitals.

In another hospital on Saadi Avenue two nurses were reported to have resigned in disgust against bullying by young mullahs.

The young mullahs ostensibly call at the hospitals to ensure that the female staff wear Islamic garments and do not indulge in "un-Islamic" contacts with the male staff, even forcing them into "temporary" marriage with them or with revolutionary guards. The same informants say that invariably the young mullahs engage in abusing their powers to try to gain sexual favours from the female workers, who resist their efforts. But tension among hospital staff is high.

The situation has been so bad that on several occasions the Minister of Health, Dr. Manafi, has had to intervene on behalf of the doctors and nurses who have been badgered by the mullahs. Even then many doctors are known to have resigned their positions at hospitals and to have opened private clinics. To prevent this exodus of doctors from hospitals the authorities have now introduced regulations to ban the opening of new private clinics in Tehran.

Another bone of contention is the shortage of medical supplies. Some of the most common items of medicine are hard to come by. Antibiotics, plasma and similar items are almost non-existent. Most of these items were manufactured by several major industrial concerns in Iran before the revolution but because of nationalisation and control of the plants by Islamic associations production has dropped considerably. And what little supplies are available are snatched up by the authorities for the war fronts.

Medical staff are, meanwhile, critical of the way the authorities treat the injured in bomb blasts. Bearded interrogators often do not allow the doctors and nurses to attend to the injured until they have been questioned by them, it is alleged.

CSO: 4600/109
BRIEFS

TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENTS WITH HUNGARY--Belgrade [as received], 17 Nov (IRNA)--Iran and Hungary reached new agreements for mutual cooperation in the field of transportation, said Undersecretary of the Ministry of Road and Transportation Mehdi Karbasian [spelling of name as received] at the end of his visit here. Iranian delegation, left Budapest for Tehran Tuesday, held talks concerning the bilateral interests during their stay here. At a reception at the Iranian Embassy in Budapest Karbasian hoped for expansion of Iran's political relations with Hungary. Another Iranian delegate Shafa'at [spelling of name as received] talked about Saddam's crimes which resulted in destruction of the Iranian border cities and villages and criticized the governments who kept silence on the issue adding that their nations would question the governments for such negative attitude. He also criticized silence of certain countries over the crimes of imperialism particularly those of U.S. and their non participation in voting against the Zionist regime in the General Assembly of the UN. The Hungarian Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Tibor Malega in his speech hoped that the two countries relations will expand in the years to come. The Iranian delegation left Tehran for Hungary on 7 November. [Text] [LD171402 Tehran IRNA in English 0926 GMT 17 Nov 82]

JOINT PROJECTS DISCUSSED WITH SPAIN--Tehran, 23 Nov (IRNA)--The expansion of mutual economic relations between the Islamic Republic and Spain were reviewed in a meeting here today between the Spanish ambassador to Iran, Javier Oyarzun and his minister of state and head of the Plan and Budget Organisation, Dr Mohammad Taqi Banki. The two sides also discussed issues relating to joint construction entersprises currently underway in Iran and the grounds for further economic relations between the two countries in the future. During the meeting, Dr Banki said that the Western world and its allies, expected the Islamic Republic to humbly ask for assistance from superpowers after imposition of economic sanctions. Nevertheless, he added, the outcome of this unequal war proved the impotence of the United States. Because, he said, Iran proved its power of action and resolute decision for preserving its independence and territorial integrity against the imposed economic sanction and Iraqi war. The Spanish ambassador said in reply that his country had not participated in the economic sanctions, adding that Spain was the only country (in Western Europe) which did not have political relations with the Zionist regime. He also expressed the willingness of his country for cooperating with Iran in construction and development projects. [Text] [GF231708 Tehran IRNA in English 1700 GMT 23 Nov 82]
EMBASSY OFFICIAL DEFEATS IN ROME—Rome, 26 Nov (AFP)—Commercial Counsellor Hoseyn Pashang today became the fourth member of the Iranian Embassy here to dissociate himself from the present Iranian Islamic Republic in just over a year. Mr Pashang announced in a letter carried by Italian newspapers that he had left his embassy post to join the National Resistance Council led by former Iranian President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr. Mr Pashang did not say where he was now based. Earlier defections from the embassy were by Ambassador Naser Sadat Salami and successive Charge d'Affaires Ehsan Rastegar and Hoseyn Naqdi. [Text] [NC261134 Paris AFP in English 1125 GMT 26 Nov 82]

NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION INCREASES—Ahvaz, 26 Nov (IRNA)—The daily production of gas and liquid gas of the southern oil industries has increased from 500 million cubic feet to 600 million. Further expansion of the factories, which were formerly administered by American and European experts, was carried out and put into operation by the workers of the southern oil industries within 6 months. The expansion of the factories included cooling systems and condenser pumps installations for the piping of gas to Mahshahr and Esfahan. [Text] [GP261600 Tehran IRNA in English 1550 GMT 26 Nov 82]

TUDEH OFFICERS' ARREST—Following the rumors on the arrest of Ehsan Tabari, Tudeh Party theoretician, and the flight of Nureddin Kianuri abroad, informed sources have reported that 237 Tudeh officers of various ranks in the Iranian Armed Forces were arrested recently. Khomeyni's regime has not published any report on the arrest of these Tudeh Party members so far. [Excerpt] [NC021538 Paris IRAN-E AZAD in Persian 27 Nov 82 p 8]

IRAQI POWS DEMAND ISLAMIC RULE—Tehran, 27 Nov (IRNA)—In the wake of the formation of the Iraqi Revolutionary Council, 1,100 Iraqi POWs from Mashhad POW camp signed a scroll addressed to Imam Khomeyni, the leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, demanding the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iraq inspired by the leadership of the imam. Also another group of Iraqi POWs at the Heshmatiyeh [spelling of name as received] camp here called on the officials of the Islamic Republic to permit them to take part in the war against the aggressor Iraqis, fighting side by side with the Iranian combatants. In another development Iraqi POWs from Heshmatiyeh and South Mehrabad camp in Tehran, donated 23,9000 [number as received] rials from their savings to be utilised for the combatants and war immigrants. [Text] [LD272038 Tehran IRNA in English 1929 GMT 27 Nov 82]

TRADE DELEGATION DEPARTS FOR PAKISTAN—Tehran, 29 Nov (IRNA)—A 20-man Iranian delegation led by Minister of Commerce Habibollah 'Asgar-Owladi-Mosalmal left Tehran for Islamabad this morning. Prior to his departure, 'Asgar-Owladi-Mosalmal told IRNA that the tour to Pakistan was in response to an invitation extended by his Pakistani counterpart Ghulam Ishaq Khan. He said that during the 4-day visit efforts will be made to find out the ways and means for the expansion of trade ties of the two countries. [Text] [LD291034 Tehran IRNA in English 0933 GMT 29 Nov 82]
FIRST 5-YEAR PLAN DISCUSSED--Shahr'e Kord (Chaharmahal Va Bakhtiari Province), 30 Nov (IRNA)--Dr Mohammad Taqi Banki, state minister and head of the Plan and Budget Organisation said today that the first 5-year plan of the Islamic Republic is a step towards further attaining the nation's goals in conformity with Islam. Dr Banki is currently in Chaharmahal Va Bakhtiari Province inspecting development programmes and becoming more acquainted with the region's problems and needs. In an interview with IRNA here he said that up till now 70 percent of the budget for development has been expended. He also added that the government has allocated 8 billion rials to various provinces, to be spent under the supervision of high council of programming of each province. Some 500 million rials, he said, has been allocated to Chaharmahal Va Bakhtiari Province, adding that the government has given priority to these deprived provinces, in order to better their plight and help them attain self-sufficiency. In this respect the government considers it of the utmost importance to build roads, schools and hospitals in these provinces. Therefore, he said in the first 5 year programme more credits have been allocated for these matters. Concluding, the plan and budget minister said that the greatest problem affecting the deprived areas was a shortage of technical staff, but he added necessary steps have been taken in this regard. [Text] [GF301750 Tehran IRNA in English 1640 GMT 30 Nov 82]

RECORDING CLAIMED OF KHOMEYNI ORDERING KILLINGS--Riyadh, 30 Nov (SPA)-- Al-Madinah today published excerpts from a voice recording obtained by the paper. In Khomeyni's voice, which makes it clear that Khomeyni's regime is executing the wounded who oppose his regime and who are receiving treatment in Iranian hospitals. The paper said the voice recording was taken from a transmission between the so-called revolutionary guards and the revolutionary committees, conveying Khomeyni's instructions to these committees. Khomeyni's instructions confirmed the need to get rid of opposition to the ruling regime in Iran and said that if any of the wounded in the hospitals were from the opposition, his presence should be turned into a funeral; he should be gotten rid of by killing him. [Text] [LD301110 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 0942 GMT 30 Nov 82]

ENVOY TO UAE PRESENTS CREDENTIALS--Tehran, 29 Nov (IRNA)--The new ambassador of the Islamic Republic to the United Arab Emirates, Mahmud Sadat Madar-Shahi today presented copies of his credentials to the UAE state minister in charge of foreign affairs, Rashid 'Abdallah in Abu Dhabi. [Text] [LD301100 Tehran IRNA in English 0931 GMT 30 Nov 82]

OIL MINISTER ARRIVES IN KHUZESTAN--IRNA has reported that Mr Ghazi, the minister of petroleum, together with several high-ranking officials of that ministry who had travelled for a few days visit to Khuzestan and the battlefields of the war visited the oil fields and oil installation which was liberated from the Iraqis by the powerful hands of the Islamic warriors. Last night the oil minister also attended a meeting at which the governor general and officials of the province were present and studied the oil problems in the region. He praised the work of the personnel in the oil industry whose love of the revolution and Islam have kept this industry running smoothly. [Text] [GF010622 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 1 Dec 82]
BUSHEHR DECLARES RED ALERT—Dear listeners. We have just been informed that a red alert has been declared for Bushehr region. Please comply with all the regulations for the red alert. [Sound of siren] [Text] [GF021002 Bushehr Domestic Service in Persian 0948 GMT 2 Dec 82]

SHIRAVAN GOVERNOR APPOINTED—Mr Shi'at ol-A'emeh has been appointed Shiravan governor by the governor general of Khorasan Province, Mr Habibian. [GF021831 Mashhad Domestic Service in Persian 1400 GMT 2 Nov 82]

KHUZEStan ADMINISTRATIVE APPOINTMENTS—In various appointments made by Khuzestan Governor General Fruzendeh, Messrs Amin Bayanak, Rahmatollah (Ostadsharif), Mohammad Baqer (?Dowraqisadeh), Seyyed Mohhamad Reza Musavi-Gharabaghi and Mohammad Reza 'Abbasi were appointed Andimeshk mayor, district governor of Ramhormoz, district governor of Minu Island, governor of Andimeshk and governor of Khorranshar respectively. [GF100930 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1330 GMT 8 Nov 82]

SONAR DEVICE INVENTED—An Esfahani youngster has invented a sonar distance finder for military use which is less than 1/1,000 of the price of its American equivalent. The distance finder is comparable to the similar devices using laser or radar for this purpose. The error is only 0.9 meters compared to a 35-meter error of the American equivalent [distance not specified for evaluation of margin of error]. The effective range is 6 km but current research indicates possibility of extending this to 12 km. [GF011506 Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 17 Nov 82 p 2]

CIVIL, DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENTS—The Public Relations Office of the Health Ministry announced that the health minister, Dr Manafi, has approved the appointments of Dr Mohammad Reza Kalantari-M'Otamadi as under secretary for medicinal affairs and Dr Seyyed Jamaeddin Sajjadi as under secretary for the coordination of research and training in the Health Ministry. The Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran has announced the appointment of Mr Hushang Rahimian as the acting charge d'affaires of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Bangkok. [GF231742 Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 8 Nov 82 p 2]

NEW IRANIAN ENVOY—The first Iranian ambassador to Bangladesh presented his credentials to the Bangladesh president yesterday. [GF192048 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 18 Nov 82]

CENTRAL BANK ASSETS—Due to the suggestion of the governor of the Central Bank of Iran and approval of the General Assembly of the bank, the assets of the Central Bank of Iran has increased from $300 million to $1.5 billion. [Text] [LD240430 Tehran in English to Europe 1930 GMT 23 Nov 82]
MINISTER OF HOUSING, COOPERATIVES INTERVIEWED

London, AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1352, 1 Oct 82 pp 64-65

[Interview with Salim al-Jahil by AL-HAWADITH on 14 Sep 82 in Beirut]

This interview with Housing Minister Salim al-Hajil took place on Tuesday 14 September a few hours before the death of President Bashir al-Jumayyil. Since the electricity was cut off, the minister met me in the office of Shawqi al-Hajj, chief of the joint administrative department in the ministry and the person in charge of the tasks of the General Housing Directorate. We met on the third floor instead of al-Jahil's office on the seventh floor.

Before the interview began, the minister told me he had an appointment with a German delegation that had come to "inquire" into the facts about Lebanon's future housing needs and to obtain information on Lebanon's requirements in this regard after the devastation and ruin caused by the war in the residential sector. This delegation was one of dozens that preceded it and had meetings and talks with Salim al-Jahil on the same subject. The minister said he was almost "exhausted" from repeating the facts about housing needs in Lebanon.

The back of the office of the deputy director was filled with files, papers, and transactions. From them protruded a file that caught my eye, and I asked about it. I know from the minister and his director that it is a file of new housing projects that were prepared and arranged to be presented to the new administration for study and final decision. The minister proceeded to answer my questions, sometimes at length and sometimes very concisely which was useful.

I naturally started with a reference to the past, saying:

[AL-HAWADITH] Let's begin with a general inventory of what the Ministry of Housing has accomplished while you have been in charge.

[Al-Jahil] We undertook to apply the regulations written by Mishel al-Murr and other former ministers. These regulations deal with loans to citizens who want to own a home, either by building or buying one. There are two institutions that provide the loans: the housing bank and independent housing fund. Each one deals with a specific level of the income of citizens

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requesting a loan. The bank is for incomes above 40,000 while the independent fund is for persons with incomes of less than 40,000. The loans naturally also vary according to the income. Some have a low interest, others are long-term. These foundations were laid (some time ago) and we have abided by them.

What innovations did we introduce? What we introduced is very important, e.g., reliance on cooperatives in building homes. We were able to create many formal cooperatives to handle the purchase, ownership of land and construction for a group of people who are members of a cooperative. We continued to use and encourage this approach since we assumed responsibility for the affairs of the ministry. And we achieved results that I consider excellent. We used this approach, in particular, to restore the buildings that were wrecked by the war. The first experiment was in Zahlah and it was successful. The town had been bombed and totally destroyed in 1981 (3300 homes damaged or demolished). We found no other city that suffered such bombing and destruction. When we compare it with Sidon or Tyre the difference is great. Since it was impossible to use the traditional methods, we resorted to cooperatives to do the building, and they were so successful that in a few months Zahlah was completely rebuilt.

We are using this procedure as much as possible. We encourage our critics to follow it in the consultation and guidance center. The advantages of cooperatives are well known. It costs less to build and to purchase. They are independent of public agencies. They benefit from tax exemptions and create among their members a spirit of cooperation and mutual help. This is important for building the country. There are some other positive features too.

There is a second aspect we want to stress. It is based on the notion that a person cannot build a house for himself by relying on someone else, even if the someone else is the government, because it is a kind of robbery. We rob the government and the taxpayers. Therefore, he himself must participate in building his house in order that he not become a parasite. He should rely on himself, on what he managed to save. We therefore encourage savings, for money saved up can be quickly employed in building and upon repayment of the loans to the banks that provided them, they will be in a position to employ them. Consequently, the money will remain in circulation to assure sufficient funds for housing. We have fine-tuned this aspect and it has begun to produce excellent results.

Naturally, there was a psychological aspect that induce people to save. What happened as a result of the Palestinians' departure and Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil's election as president of the country made the people confident and secure. These two basic factors motivate people to save. But when they do not believe in their future, they are not interested in saving. We made a proposal in this connection too, namely, to create cooperatives for students. The plan is used in a number of advanced countries. These cooperatives are created by the teacher who brings together all the students in his school and forms among them a cooperative and they place in a public fund some money from their allowance to improve the school system, for example, or to save money for the future so that when they graduate, they will have money to help them start out in life. These funds are managed by the cooperative which employs
them in areas which it believes are suitable for providing return on investment thus increasing the share of each member in the cooperative. Among the advantages of this approach is that it instills a spirit of saving and cooperation and destroys the spirit of individualism in the Lebanese.

As for the workers, we devised a plan for workers' savings, but recent events prevented us from implementing it. However, the plan has been carefully studied and is ready. We will submit it to the government at the earliest possible opportunity. This is in addition to other practical studies on how to deal with the housing problem.

\[\text{AL-HAWADITH}\] Is there any coordination between the housing bank and the independent housing fund?

\[\text{al-Jahi}\] Of course. The Ministry of Housing is the link between them. It supervised both institutions. However, this supervision is comparatively less strict for the bank because it is an institution with two affiliations. It belongs partly to the public sector, which owns the majority of shares, and partly to the private sector, which owns a smaller number of the shares. Supervision of the national housing fund is total because it belongs entirely to the state.

\[\text{AL-HAWADITH}\] There is a ceiling for a housing loan. Don't you think the rise in costs has exceeded it so that it needs to be lifted?

\[\text{al-Jahi}\] Of course. There is actually a proposal to do so, but recent events and the general situation in the country have prevented us from having adjustments in the direction of raising the ceiling because of the rise in the prices of materials and land and the drop in the purchasing power of the Lebanese lira. The matter has been presented to the cabinet and it will then have to go to Parliament for approval.

\[\text{AL-HAWADITH}\] Many houses and housing developments were completely destroyed in the Lebanese war. Does the Ministry of Housing have any thought of encouraging housing associations to join the campaign to rebuild Lebanon?

\[\text{al-Jahi}\] The problem can be solved by means of cooperatives. A new approach could be used if money were in ample supply, i.e., restoration of the construction administration, an experiment that produced good results. But problems with this administration arose that have not been resolved to now. Personally, however, I prefer the cooperatives because the people rely on themselves, share responsibility, and cooperate with and help one another.

\[\text{AL-HAWADITH}\] The last war resulted in a housing crisis for the Palestinians. You personally announced before that it is absolutely impossible for them to resume living in camps. What do you think about the question of rehousing the Palestinians if a number of them remain in Lebanon?

\[\text{al-Jahi}\] The Palestinians must be treated like all foreigners. The mistake made in the past was to regard them as visitors who had come to spend a "weekend" in Lebanon. This notion proved to be wrong. The Palestinians now
have neither an army nor a country. We cannot tolerate them all—this from
the political standpoint. As for the housing aspect, the experience with the
camps was a very futile experience because it harmed the Palestinians as
human beings, psychologically, and as a nation. It also harmed the Lebanese
because it created among the Palestinians a spirit of hostility and rancor
and rebellion against the ordinary citizen because a camp, whether a refugee
camp or a military internment camp, is all the same. This naturally must not
recur. As for homes, the Palestinians must get used to living like other
foreigners. I don't know why we grant them a special prerogative to which
they are not entitled. If they had a right, they lost it by their behavior.
Therefore, each of them has to look for a home either by himself or through
the institution in which he is working. I believe the UNRWA assistance they
received was harmful.

\[ Al-Hawadith \] What is the role of the Ministry of Housing in the future recon-
struction of Lebanon?

\[ Al-Jahil \] From its name we understand that the Ministry of Housing is inter-
ested in and deals solely with housing. It is a mistake to think that the
Ministry is going to do everything related to reconstruction in Lebanon.
We have no connection with business, not even with the infrastructure except inso-
far as it is related to housing. For example, when a housing cooperative is
formed, it has to deal with this infrastructure. At that time we deal with it
but do so only through the cooperative.

\[ Al-Hawadith \] You met with officials from the Agency for International
Development and other institutions who came to learn about Lebanon's needs.
Was the research related to the role of the housing ministry in the coming
reconstruction period?

\[ Al-Jahil \] Housing undoubtedly must receive its share of the aid that is
coming for reconstruction. I invited representatives of advanced countries
and sent a memorandum describing the best ways in which the aid can be
provided. We (also) sent them some statistics.

\[ Al-Hawadith \] Regarding the housing sector, does the ministry have any con-
crete estimates of the scale of the losses that occurred?

\[ Al-Jahil \] We do not have complete estimates of the scale of housing losses,
but we do have partial estimates for some of the cities and villages. The
fact is this kind of calculation (has not been done) even in Beirut proper and
its suburbs, first because of the vastness of the damage and second because
there are regions where we haven't been able even to see the damage.

\[ Al-Hawadith \] Let's talk about the attitude of the Ministry of Housing
toward the new rental law that has just been passed. Should it be permanent?

\[ Al-Jahil \] At the present time and in view of the prevailing situation, it
was impossible to enact a better law than the one we have. Naturally, it is
not perfect. And I don't believe it will solve the rental problem. The
rental problem will not be finally solved until we broaden the range of home ownership so that the time will come when 90 percent of the citizens are home owners and 10 percent are renters. Homes were rented out originally for humanitarian reasons. It is man's nature to live in what he owns. He depends on renting when he moves from his town or when he loses his dwelling. When a high percentage of our fellow countrymen own their homes, we will solve the rental problem, as was the case in other countries before us.

\[\text{Al-Hawadith}\] It has become customary to pay compensation for the homes damaged as a result of the Israeli invasion. Is there any cooperation in this matter between you and the Council of the South. Does the compensation this time also include the losses suffered by Beirut?

\[\text{Al-Jahi}\] We and the Council of the South are working together. It makes grants and we give loans, but we first decide the value of the grant that it makes and we administer it in accordance with the existing legislation on the subject. I personally find no justification for distinguishing between the losses resulting from the Israeli bombings and the other losses resulting from the abnormal practices of the Palestinians and the Syrian bombings. To adapt existing legislation on damage repairs I urge the creation of cooperatives, as was the case in Zahlah. As for the future, Beirut's in particular, we need new legislation. I ask myself what steps should be taken so that no one is cheated. Will we wind up, for example, with the creation of a construction administration which encompasses all of Lebanon? I do not know. To decide this or something else is the task of the new administration which I am convinced is aware of the magnitude of what has befallen Lebanon and will act accordingly.

5214
CSO: 4404/16
INFLUX OF ISRAELI GOODS, BUSINESS VIEWED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 296, 23 Oct 82 pp 43-47

[Article: "Israel in Lebanon: Economic Invasion in Wake of Military Invasion: Will Dealing With Invasion Begin in Washington or in Beirut: Lebanese Do not Expect Economic Climate To Restore Its Lebanese Character as Long as Government Has not Gained Control of Ports and Free Markets"]

[Text] Before embarking on his visit to the United States, France, Italy and the Vatican at the beginning of this week, Lebanese President Amin al-Jumayyil received at B'abda Palace a memorandum from the Lebanese economic organizations containing a detailed explanation of the Israeli economic invasion to which Lebanon is being subjected, and which poses a threat to the structure of the national economy with its commerce, industry and agriculture, not to mention its banks.

These organizations were eager to present the memorandum to President al-Jumayyil before his departure in the hope that its content will be one of the most prominent topics raised by the new president with U.S. President Ronald Reagan and with his administration, and perhaps with the president of the World Bank with whom the Lebanese president will meet during his scheduled itinerary.

These organizations believe, and they are right to a large degree, that dealing with the Israeli economic invasion under the canopy of the military occupation begin in Washington because it requires a U.S. decision and stance to pressure Israel. As long as Washington is the one capable of ending the occupation, especially at the economic level. The organizations also believe that the concern expressed repeatedly and on numerous occasions by the United States for the establishment of a strong central state in Lebanon and for the termination of all forms of non-Lebanese military presence—they believe that this strong state requires, among other things, a strong, sound and healthy economy which cannot be established under the shadow of the Israeli plundering and spoliation through the "good wall" between Israel and Lebanon.

The organizations further believe that the Israeli inundating invasion of Lebanon's market will not only hit Lebanon's industry and agriculture but will also isolated Lebanon from its Arab market and will, consequently, lead
to demolishing a fundamental, and sole, mainstay of Lebanon's exports. Perhaps this scheme includes political and economic objectives at the same time, and this is something that justifies Washington's intervention.

The organizations' memorandum to President al-Jumayyl inaugurated their movement, which began on the day after the formation of the new government, with the publication of information bulletins issued by the Lebanese chambers of commerce] and by some of the other professional associations. The fact is that the observers have criticized the organizations for their delay in bringing up this topic, considering that the invasion had proliferated, expanded and intensified both quantitatively and qualitatively. But the organizations' reply to this criticism is that they gave priority to the more important over the important. Under the nightmare of the shelling, killing, destruction and the storming of homes, it was impossible to raise this issue because people's lives are dearer than their property. Under the canopy of the preoccupation of al-Wazzan's cabinet before and after its resignation, the concern of the economic dealing with Israel was a small concern in comparison to the other fateful concerns.

Regardless of whether or not the organizations have delay, the movement began and has generated interaction at the economic, political and popular levels. The Israeli invasion has taken two fundamental and dangerous forms embodied in the following:

First is the opening of the "good wall" to the Israeli agricultural and industrial products which enter the local markets at dumping prices that compete with the local products on their own ground. This invasion includes all the Israeli agricultural products, such as citrus and other fruits and vegetables, in addition to some light industry products, such as canned foods, candy and pastries, as well as textiles, clothing, glass and some construction materials.

This invasion has caused a considerable recession as to similar agricultural and industrial products because it competes with the local production at prices below the value of this production. This poses a real danger to the farmer and the industrialist.

Second there is the importation by Lebanese merchants of various kinds of goods through Haifa and bringing them into Lebanon free of any customs fees. This threatens the structure of the Lebanese commerce, wipes out the role of Beirut Port and deprives the Lebanese treasury of its most important revenue source, namely customs revenues. Moreover, if this phenomenon persists, it will destroy Lebanon's industry and commerce sectors and whatever is exported from Lebanon to the Arab countries. These countries show a reservation toward any goods entering them via Lebanon, not to mention goods imported via Haifa port.

In the face of these two economically and nationally serious phenomena, the economic organizations stand perplexed, watching the imminent danger and not knowing how to confront it, perhaps because the profit and loss element is not clear and decisive in this respect. The danger from these two phenomena is intensifying under the shadow of the ongoing psychological "normalization"
in Lebanon where some people are expressing new opinions, including an opinion that opening the borders between Lebanon and Israel will provide Lebanon with the opportunity to invade the African markets without losing the Arab markets. If we tell the advocates of this opinion that the political situation will inevitably lead to losing the Arab markets, they will say that the African markets will constitute an alternative. If we add to the two alternative phenomena what is being reported about Israel's endeavors to invade Africa by way of Lebanese merchants (most of the leaders of the Lebanese communities in Africa are from south Lebanon), then we would realize the dimensions of the Israeli scheme to normalize the south militarily and economically. The south could then form a launching base for an Israeli economic invasion that would not be confined to the Arab countries but would go beyond to Africa where the Israeli influence has been growing after its setback and the Arab influence has been receding gradually for reasons which cannot be noted at present.

In view of this economic danger that needs no proof and is not at all exaggerated, how can the issue be dealt with? What is the role of the economic leadership in confronting it, are they capable and serious and what are the means they possess?

These questions are currently raised in the economic arena and there is no satisfactory answer because every opinion has a counter opinion. But in their entirety, these questions must raise a Lebanese concern that should not remain within the framework of the organizations but must go beyond them to the state and its agencies so that all the measures possible may be taken while awaiting the "cure," that may or may not come from Washington.

The first constructive solution that comes to the mind is for the organizations to scratch out and to denounce, through their chambers, the name of every merchant proven to be dealing with Haifa port. Perhaps the state should take punitive measures against such a merchant denying him many of the other gains which he is eager not to lose. But the organizations counter with the reply that those dealing [with Haifa port] may not be merchants belonging to the chamber because commerce is not regulated. Consequently, the resolutions of the chambers do not apply to such persons as long as they are not members.

But this reply evokes a counter reply saying that it is difficult to imagine the presence of "transient" merchants because dealing with the foreign markets requires long experience and it is unthinkable that more than a few experienced merchants are engaged in this activity. What reinforces this belief is that the smuggling done through the illegal Lebanese ports was carried out, according to the organizations, by prominent Lebanese merchants. But who are these merchants?

Nobody, not the organizations themselves, nor the state which knows them one by one, has dared mention the name of any of these merchants for 7 long years.

If we admit that the scratching out and denunciation measures are possible, the questions is raised of how to prove that any of them has dealt with Haifa port or with Israeli exporters. How can this be proven as long as there is no Lebanese authority present in the south?
There is no doubt that the task is difficult. But it is not impossible, because it is possible to set up Lebanese customs checkpoints to isolate the south from the other provinces. Those who import goods cannot be content with the southern consumer market but want to get to Beirut, where the market is bigger, not to mention the north. This is what has actually happened with imported olives that have reached al-Kurah Province (north Lebanon) which is the main Lebanese olive production area. Moreover, it is possible to check the presence of the goods in shops and to examine the bill of sale for every type of commodity to find out its source, and to penalize every merchant or shop owner dealing in goods not imported via the Lebanese ports. All these measures and others are possible if there is serious resolution on the part of the state and its agencies. The measures can be reinforced by a concerted propaganda campaign launched by the various media, and they are numerous and varied in Lebanon. The fact is that this resolution is mixed with evident doubts that emanate primarily from the failure up to now of the state to close the illegal Lebanese ports. This is something that the late President Bashir al-Jumayyll had intended to do as of the day he assumed his constitutional authority. Moreover, the government has not been able so far to remove the customs checkpoint in al-Barbarah which separates the Mount Lebanon area from the north, because it is acknowledged that the "security barrier" may have its justifications. Moreover, the government has not yet been able to resume operation of the various departments, even if only in terms of employee attendance. Though this matter is premature, its early signs are not at all encouraging. If the Lebanese shores remain in Israeli hands, if the "good wall" remains open and if the Syrian-Lebanese borders remain beyond the state control, how can we imagine the presence of an economic climate that is supposed to be the cornerstone in rebuilding? Moreover, how can we experience political stability under the shadow of rising unemployment, poverty, and social and financial problems, not to mention the constant deficit in the treasury revenues? Furthermore, how can we imagine, under the canopy of all this chaos, the presence of an active local investment by the banks and the influx of investments from abroad, be they from Lebanese or non-Lebanese investors?

Perhaps these questions project certain basic facts which can be noted, namely:

First, the Israeli economic invasion cannot be compared with local economic measures because the Israeli economy is based on export aid and grants under the canopy of a guided economic system. Consequently, this invasion cannot be challenged by a Lebanese economy based on free and undisciplined initiative, that is excessive in its individualism, and that is remote from any collective action.

Second, it is possible for Beirut to challenge the Israeli economic invasion through a campaign of strict measures which the state is not afraid to take and which the citizen dares not violate.

Third, the issue of the Israeli economic invasion may not find attentive ears in Washington, at least in this phase, because Washington has its Middle East policy priorities and because it has other concerns that may overshadow this issue. On the other hand, the Lebanese president may also have his concerns which may make him postpone bringing up this issue because he needs other more important and critical things.
Fourth, Lebanon is called upon in this phase to be alert to the Israeli economic danger and to mobilize all its capabilities in this respect and for this task. The task may not be impossible if the people concerned realize the extent of its seriousness, regardless of whether the people concerned wish or do not wish to establish peace with Israel because this does not make a difference to Lebanon [insofar as the Israeli economic threat is concerned].

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BRIEFS

FRG FINANCES DAM PROJECTS--Nouakchott, 3 Dec (AFP)--The Mauritanian minister of rural development and the FRG ambassador to Mauritania have signed an agreement under which the FRG will give financial assistance to Mauritania for the constructions of dams in the center-east part of Mauritania. The first phase of the project will cost 206 million ouguiya. [AB032103 Paris AFP in French 1844 GMT 3 Dec 82]