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DEMOCRACY AND THE MILITARY: ARE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DETERIORATING?

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Democracy and the Military: Are Civil-Military Relations Deteriorating?

by

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ABSTRACT

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Professors Gregory D. Foster and Richard H. Kohn suggest in their writings that there is a crisis in civil-military relations. Collectively, they believe that the military has become too politicized, there is a growing disparity between society and the military, and too much military power had been given to the military, particularly the Joint Staff and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The paper explores these notions by examining the civilian control of political decisions affecting the military. It also explores possible civilian involvement at the operational level and relations with society. Finally, it examines briefly what civil-military relations were like during the Vietnam War and Persian Gulf War. The conclusion is that civil-military relations are not in a crisis today nor were they in a crisis during the Gulf War. Civil-military relations during the Vietnam War were, however, in a crisis.
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PREFACE

Prior to my arrival at the U.S. Army War College, the majority of my assignments were with troops. I was amazed at the number of fellow classmates that were assigned to staffs above division level. Of course this was quite naive of me. I was being exposed to subjects, issues, concerns, and echelons above the reality I had experienced. Being surrounded by so many knowledgeable students stimulated my thinking. I attribute my colleagues' acquired expertise to months of professional experience, particularly for those previously assigned to inside the 'Belt-Way'.

During Course 2 of the War College Core Curriculum: "War, National Policy and Strategy," we conducted a lesson on civil-military relations. A requirement of the course was to present an oral presentation. The course instructor provided me a copy of a Strategic Research Project titled "Civil-Military Relations and General Maxwell Taylor: Getting it Right and Getting it Wrong!" from which to do the presentation. In addition to my report, our required readings for that lesson included two notables, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," by Professor Richard H. Kohn and "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations: Four Reactions to Richard H. Kohn." I became intrigued by this issue concerning civil-military
relations and decided to use it as the topic of my Strategic Research Project.

I contend that there is no crisis today in civil-military relations and a coup d’etat is not on the horizon. To support the thesis, the paper will focus on five specific areas that relate to civil-military relations. I subdivided the subject into the areas listed in the table of contents. More specifically: to what extent is control by civilians used in the political decision to use force, in the military budget process, and in military strategy; should the civil-military process be integrated at the operational level; how has society interpreted civil-military relations; what were civil-military relations like during the Vietnam War; and what were civil-military relations like during the Persian Gulf War?
CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

No decision or responsibility falls to the military unless expressly or implicitly delegated to it by civilian leaders. Even the decisions of command—the selection of strategy, of what operations to mount and when, what tactics to employ, the internal management of the military—derive from civilian authority. They are delegated to uniformed personnel only for reasons of convenience, tradition, effectiveness, or military experience and expertise. Civilians make all the rules, and they can change them at any time.

—Richard H. Kohn

Congress, as representatives of the people, is empowered to 'provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.' Furthermore, Congress 'shall have power to declare War.' As Commander in Chief, the President commands the Army, Navy, and Militia. The President 'may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.' The constitution has clearly established civilian control of the military and is not debatable, and Kohn has left little doubt regarding his position on civilian control of the military as emphasized in the above citation. However, some scholars, civic groups, and military leaders feel that there is civilian control of the military. To what extent, then, is control by civilians used in the political decision in the military budget process, to use force, and in military strategy?
The Department of Defense (DoD) defines the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) as the primary strategic management system used to allocate and manage resources. The PPBS provides for an orderly progression from national security objectives, policies, and strategies to the development of force requirements; establishment of force structure and programs within resource constraints; and the preparation, execution and review of the budget. It’s the official management system that ultimately produces DoD’s portion of the President’s budget.\footnote{4}

The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) provides the military departments, defense agencies, and the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOSCOM) guidance contained in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) to prepare Program Objectives Memoranda (POM). The POM is a request for resources to accomplish service missions. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)) is responsible reviewing and commenting on the POMs prior to submission of the budget estimates by the military departments and defense agencies to the SECDEF. In essence, the PPBS represent those programs that are approved by the SECDEF.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for the planning phase which provides the SECDEF's planning guidance and fiscal constraints to the Services for POM development. The CINC's contribute by providing their IPLs (Integrated Priority Lists) defining shortfalls in key programs that may affect their
mission. The Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation is responsible for the programming phase, and the USD (C) for the budgeting phase. All of which are highly competent civilians. This further illustrates that the check and balance of the military budget is civilian controlled and effectively operated by the executive and legislative branches. The executive branch proposes military policy and the budget for the military’s function and the legislative branch appropriates the funds. Civilian control of the budget beyond this would be unnecessary.

Kohn asserts that in the last two centuries, war has become too complex—the preparations too elaborate, the weapons too sophisticated, command too arduous, operations too intricate—to leave the waging of combat to amateurs or part-time practitioners. Given this and the fact that more civilians in government lack military experience or have had little to no contact with the military, the professional military should be required to provide advice in the use of force and deciding military strategy. Kohn stated:

With war increasingly dangerous, civilians want more control to ensure congruence with political purpose; with weapons and operations becoming ever more technical and complex, military officers want more independence to achieve success with the least cost in blood and treasure. Where to divide authority and responsibility has become increasingly situational and uncertain.

The critical issue is where, and how, to distinguish between military and civilian responsibility rather than to what extent
is control by civilians used in the political decision to use force and in military strategy. The answer is still situational and uncertain. What Kohn offers in the following sentence is a likely response to the issue. Civilian control depends frequently on the individuals involved: how each side views its role and function; the public respect or popularity possessed by a particular politician or political institution or military officer or armed force; the bureaucratic or political skill of the various officials.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details. Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are the more influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle.

—Clausewitz

The Cold War brought with it an enemy that was definitive. For that reason, the Reagan and Bush administrations ensured deterrence with a build-up of military force. On the other hand, the post-Cold War brought with it a reduced force and a global environment that is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. Our military strategy encompasses one that defines future conflicts and battlefields as asymmetric. As mentioned in the previous section, fewer government civilians understand how the
military functions but civilians (depending on the audience) want more control in military matters. Since civilians desire more control, as Professor Kohn advocates, should the civil-military relation process be integrated at the operational level?

Healthy civilian control of the military requires a political leadership that understands how uncertain a business war is, and that recognizes that even the best trained and most dedicated military professionals can err. How can we trust then that the right decisions will be made by the least experienced after the best possible advice has been provided? Knowledgeable and experienced politicians can exert effective civilian control because they appreciate military virtues, and discern which military officers are the best, and can weigh the relative importance of political and military requirements. The operational level of war requires the expertise of professional military. FM 100-5 offers the following to highlight the military importance of this level of war:

The operational level is the vital link between national- and theater-strategic aims and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield. The focus at this level is on conducting joint operations—the employment of military forces to attain theater-strategic objectives in a theater of war and operational objectives in the theater of operations through design, organization, and execution of subordinate campaigns and major operations.

From the political leader's point of view, war serves at the altar of politics, so that he has not only a right but an obligation to intervene in military operations whenever he feels
such is necessary to ensure a military result consonant with the
government's political aims.\textsuperscript{11}

The strategic level of war requires the expertise of
politicians and professional military in applying the art and
science of employing armed forces with other instruments of
national power to achieve strategic goals. When the National
Command Authority and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
translate the national strategy into military policy and
requirements, theater commanders can formulate strategic campaign
plans to ensure theater strategic goals. The strategic campaign
plan is the basis for operational level planning. Intervention
by civilians at the operational level would be disruptive.
Matthews' view of this particular concern is valid and is noted
as follows:

From the soldier's point of view, the impulse of
civilian bureaucrats to intervene in military
operations violates three sacrosanct principles for the
successful conduct of war: (1) adherence to the
military chain of command, whereby a common order
reflecting the commander's intent flows downward to all
units, thus ensuring unity of command and effort; (2)
professional execution, whereby force is applied only
by those trained and qualified to do so; and (3)
decentralization, whereby latitude is extended to the
lower-echelon commander, who alone sees and can adjust
for conditions on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{12}

Joint and combined commanders are the subsequent levels of
expertise in applying the operational art of war for which no
corresponding political office exists. Articulating the vision
for war fighting and a statement of intent lies with the military commander.

The actual control or influence exercised by civilians is at the strategic level. Civilians at this level should be confident that the field commanders understand the strategic aims and goals, the strategic concept to accomplish such, and will not compromise the strategic intent. There are two ways civilian leaders can validate the confidence they have in the field commanders. First, by a series of backbriefs from theater commanders confirming or denying the commanders' understanding of the strategic concept, intent, and aims and goals. Second, when the strategic level civilians are satisfied with the theater commanders' understanding of the strategic plan, a visit to the operational area(s) may be conducted to enhance their confidence level.

**SOCIETY AND THE MILITARY**

Since 1940, military service has shaped the early careers of millions of American young men, particularly, those who have gone on to become business and political leaders. The end of the draft in the early 1970s created a noticeable gap between civilian and military elite. That gap widened with the dramatic shrinkage of the military in the wake of the cold war, a shrinkage likely to continue.

—Eliot A. Cohen
Cheating, rape, and hazing at the academies; sexual misconduct charges; abusing the privilege of rank; and extremist activities are all too familiar within and without the military service. Is American society distorted with the seemingly rising number of embarrassing incidents that plaque our military or is it complacency that typifies the attitude toward the military?

In the fall of 1991, soon after U.S. and allied forces defeated Iraq, the propensity of males to enlist was strong, with 26.2% responding positively. The figure fell dramatically the following year and has continued to slide ever since. The implication is that males are finding less opportunity in the military compared to the 1960s, 70s, and 80s and are going to college as a means to prepare them for better employment.

According to Defense Manpower Data Center analysts Anita R. Lancaster and Jerry Lehnus in a paper summarizing a focus group comments (based on a Youth Attitude Tracking Survey of 1996), "Over and over, parents and youth referred to recruiters and advertising as 'painting a rosy picture' that was not believable." This suggests that recruiting efforts will be more difficult in the years to come.

With the Cold War over, young men see the military as less relevant. The fall of the Wall meant the fall of the associated threat. Now that we’ve broadened our missions to encompass peace operations, peace enforcement, and humanitarian
assistance, there is more reliance on military specialties that exist in the National Guard and Reserves. These types of missions and operations will keep our forces deployed in places like, Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia. "They objected," the paper says, "to being put in jeopardy to fight someone else's battles."¹⁷ This may translate to mean that serving in the armed forces is perceived as much too dangerous. Trying to convince single parents otherwise would certainly be monumental. Single parents are less likely to send their sons and daughters off to fight someone else's battles when their children could lose their lives and they could lose a means of financial support.

The population of interviewers for the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey was 10,200 youth ages 16 to 24. A nation-wide survey would unsurprisingly discover that there exist a number of Americans who would have difficulty-identifying Bosnia on a world map. Ignorance of geography will most certainly contribute to a desire to not get involved in distant areas.

The glamour associated with the return of victorious armed forces has dissipated. What the American public expects from the military is a force capable of providing for the common defense and protecting U.S. interests abroad in a non-political yet highly moral and ethical manner. Gregory Foster summarized the American public's expectation of the military this way:

Thus given the blind trust in these, who profess to serve them, the people ask that their military maintain strict political neutrality—distancing itself from partisan politics, staying out of domestic affairs.
The public also expects military personnel to conform to the highest standards of ethical and legal conduct, even if the international environment in which they operate is the dog-eat-dog, killed-or-be-killed Hobbesian jungle realists tell us it is.18

The Harris Poll, which has been tracking the confidence that Americans have in institutions, says 37% of adults had a great deal of confidence in the military for 1997. This is, however, a ten-percent decrease from the 1996 poll that was 47%. The ten-point difference (representing a one-year variance and hardly significant) can be viewed as troubling and that a great disparity may exist between society and the military. A speculation could be that the military is not as attractive as it was immediately following the Gulf War. The real fact of the matter is that of fourteen leading institutions used in the poll, the military has been the leader at least since 1990. The Harris Poll offered no expert analysis to indicate otherwise.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING THE VIETNAM WAR

A president must be confident, first, that the military field commander is fully attuned to the political aims of any contemplated military action. He must be confident, second, that the commander will exert the degree of control over his forces necessary to ensure that attainment of the political objectives is never compromised.

—Colonel Lloyd J. Matthews, U.S. Army (Retired)

During the 1960 presidential campaign, John F. Kennedy narrowly defeated Eisenhower's Vice President, Richard Nixon.
Along with the presidency, Kennedy brought reforms that included the national defense strategy and Department of Defense. Former Defense Secretary Robert Lovett advised Kennedy that reform in the Pentagon would be "painful" but was "long overdue." He told him that his defense secretary should be "an analytical statistician who can...tear out the overlap, the empire building." Lovett advised Kennedy to consider Robert Strange McNamara, the 44-year-old president of the Ford Motor Company.

After Kennedy's first meeting with McNamara, McNamara was hired as SECDEF. Eventually, McNamara would surround himself with a group of civilians who shared his "pensant for quantitative analysis" and suspicion of proposals based solely on "military experience" and who would ultimately be referred to as the "Whiz Kids."

Kennedy also brought in General (retired) Maxwell Taylor because he was so impressed with Taylor's The Uncertain Trumpet, a strong critique of President Eisenhower's national defense strategy of "massive retaliation" and the basis from which Kennedy would outline his defense program. Kennedy also had another motive for bringing in Taylor. He wanted to fill the civil-military void that resulted from his strained relations with the Pentagon over the Cuban Bay of Pigs fiasco. Taylor was recalled to active duty and appointed as Special Military Representative to the President. Taylor would soon become a very
close friend with Kennedy and the Kennedy family. Taylor’s loyalty as a friend would also overshadow his military responsibility to provide military advice into his job later as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Taylor would be inclined to tell the President what he wanted to hear and not what he needed to know.

Other events occurred: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, a build-up of military assistance to South Vietnam, the assassination of Kennedy 22 November 1963, Lyndon B. Johnson’s assumption of the presidency, and escalation of the Vietnam War.

The withdrawal of the Soviet missiles and bombers from Cuba was considered a political success. McNamara contributed the success to diplomatic savvy and the political strategy planned by him, the whiz kids, and President Kennedy and the orchestration of specific activities by U.S. ships by himself and the President. The planned invasion by 180,000 American troops assembled in southeast U.S. ports or the Navy’s ability to conduct a naval blockade did not appear to be contributing factors to the success. In any case, McNamara would use this success as a basis for planning the graduated response to Vietnam.

When Johnson assumed office as President, not only did he assume the question of what to do about Vietnam but he also inherited Kennedy’s closest advisors and the relationships that had developed among them. The civil-military relationship of
the Johnson administration was destined to mirror that of the Kennedy administration. McMaster described the already developed relationship between Johnson, his advisors, and the military as follows:

The relationship between the JCS and those to whom they provided military advice had become one of deep mistrust. The chairman, selected for his personal loyalty to the president, had forged a closer relationship with the secretary of defense than the one he enjoyed with his military colleagues. McNamara, emboldened in the realm of strategic planning, was poised to become the president's dominant advisor on military affairs. Convinced that military advice based on the objective of achieving victory was outmoded, even dangerous, he would use his talent for analysis and the experience of the Cuban missile crisis to develop a new concept for the use of American military power. John Kennedy bequeathed to Lydon Johnson an advisory system that limited real influence to his inner circle and treated others, particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff, more like a source of potential opposition than of useful advice.24

This is how civil-military relations existed during the entire presidency of Johnson. McNamara only fueled the fire by not allowing the Joint Chiefs an opportunity to see Johnson and offer their insights on how to conduct and win the war.

To appease the Joint Chiefs, McNamara supported their request to see the Johnson in early November 1965 but not before he had talked to Johnson and virtually told him not to accept what the Chiefs had to brief. Charles G. Cooper, as Marine aide-de-camp to Chief of Naval Operations in attendance at the meeting with Johnson and the Chiefs, recalled some details of the meeting as follows:
Seemingly deep in thought, President Johnson turned his back on them for a minute or so, then suddenly, losing the calm, patient demeanor he had maintained throughout the meeting, he whirled to face them and exploded...He screamed obscenities, he cursed them personally, he ridiculed them for coming to his office with their "military advice." Noting that it was he who was carrying the weight of the free world on his shoulders, he called them filthy names—sh_heads, dumbsh_s, pompous assh_s—and used "the F-word" as an adjective more freely than a Marine at boot camp. He then accused them of trying to pass the buck for World War III to him. It was unnerving. It was degrading.25

Had the recommendations of the Joints Chiefs been given serious study, it is possible that 55,000 or so of America's sons and daughters would not have died in a war that its major architect, Robert S. McNamara, thirty years later considers to have been a tragic mistake.26 We will never know. We might conclude, however, from this synopsis and a more detailed study that negative civil-military relations contributed to the turmoil of the Vietnam War.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

Clausewitz insisted that an effective political-military nexus in a nation's "cabinet" government require not only the military members to understand the political imperatives but also civilian members to understand the military imperatives. More than civilian clothes are needed for the latter duty.

—Lieutenant General William Odom, U.S. Army (Retired)

Again, Professor Kohn attacks General Powell's position as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff by asserting innuendoes regarding
misuse of his powers and authority during the Gulf War. Kohn stated:

If Bob Woodward's 1991 book The Commanders can be believed, and no one has disputed its facts, Powell together with General Schwarzkopf consistently maneuvered to delay the war, to mount overwhelming force, to demand the clearest guidance and direction, and to limit the political objectives. Much research remains to be done on this point, but the literature indicates that the Chairman was a reluctant interventionist who made extraordinary efforts to control civilian superiors' inclinations to make strategy and to move into combat.²⁷

There are some historical observations that conflict with Kohn's assertion.

During August 1989, SECDEF Richard B. Cheney was seriously contemplating a Chairman to succeed Admiral Crowe. Powell was on that short list of nominees. Cheney had met with President Bush to discuss this appointment and mentioned Powell as the most likely candidate. In short, Bush agreed. Subsequently, Cheney met with Powell to discuss the Chairman position. Cheney pointed out that "one hallmark of his Pentagon would be increased civilian control."²⁸ Powell had no argument or comment opposing the SECDEF's view on civilian control.

Cheney made the preceding remark to Powell because he was not oblivious to the fact that one-day as SECDEF he may have to make tough decisions on using force, employing military personnel to die. He had witnessed during early years the 1975 evacuation of Southeast Asia and the Mayaguez incident of 1975 and read classified after action reports on major uses of the military.
since the Vietnam War. He had seen first-hand the tendency of the people at the top—the President, the national security advisor, the Secretary of Defense—to meddle needlessly and counter productively in military operations.\textsuperscript{29}

Retrospectively, during a meeting in Powell’s office with the Chiefs for a final once-over of the Panama invasion, Cheney joined them. Cheney viewed this as a symbolic moment demonstrating that he kept the Chiefs involved. He felt that the chain of command was just right, running as it did from him to Powell, rather than to the Chiefs as a committee.\textsuperscript{30} The same relationship existed throughout the Gulf War.

When Cheney discussed the firing of Air Force Chief General Michael Dugan (for discussing the Gulf situation with the Washington Post about operational plans, a priority listing of targets, the potential revelation of classified information about the size and disposition of our forces, of obtaining targeting information from Israel, and the possible violation of an executive order banning participation in assassinations by targeting Saddam’s family members, mistress, and body guards) with Bush and Powell, neither had objections and would support any decision the SECDEF made.

Powell’s reluctance to hurry into war was due to two reasons. Firstly, Powell made attempts to convince Cheney of his “containment” option. Powell felt that until they were sure that sanctions and strangulation had failed it would be very difficult
to justify going to war. Cheney countered by indicating that the President would be tough to sell on this and the possibility of leaving Kuwait in Saddam’s control could constitute policy failure. Secondly, Powell and Schwarzkopf were firmly aware of the President’s inclination to force Saddam out of Kuwait. This meant offensive operations. As Vietnam veterans, they knew all too well that a build-up of combat power far beyond the present status would be required for a decisive victory.

Cheney himself had come to realize the impact the Vietnam War had on the President. The President had internalized the lessons—send enough force to do the job and don’t tie the hands of the commanders. In a 12 September 1990 speech in California, Cheney had said, “The President belongs to what I call the ‘Don’t screw around’ school of military strategy.”

Kohn notes that Schwarzkopf communicated with Washington only through Powell (which Schwarzkopf says had advantages but was “unnerving at times, because it kept me in the dark”), and apparently never discussed his activity or plans with Cheney or Bush unless the former was visiting the theater. This clearly was a choice made by General Schwarzkopf.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 establishes the Chairman as the communications and oversight link between the CINCs and the SECDEF and President and a direct chain-of-command from the CINCs to the SECDEF and President. The Act would have fully supported
Schwarzkopf’s actions had he elected direct communications with the SECDEF and President.

Despite the certain victory attained during the Gulf War, the war did have some military and political blunders. For instance, Powell reported to President Bush and Cheney that “the Iraqis had been so thoroughly dismembered that allied intelligence “can’t find divisions, can’t find brigades, can’t find battalions,”...it’s all just shattered.” Powell would go on to advise Bush that the war campaign should cease. In actuality, half of the Republican Guard tanks and other heavy equipment escaped and approximately one-third of all Iraqi forces escaped.

Although Powell could conceivably be partially responsible for the political blunder of allowing the escape of the Republican Guards and other Iraqi forces, it was more of a military blunder and Cheney and Schwarzkopf should be held accountable as well. Cheney and Powell believed that the Republican Guards were encircled because of a CENTCOM daily intelligence summary dated 27 February reporting that “the Republican Guards are encircled...they have few options other than surrender or destruction.” Schwarzkopf was the CENTCOM commander responsible for the daily summary. No allied forces had occupied the corridor leading into Basrah from the south or the roads leading north from the city. Later, Saddam would use his military ground forces to crush the rebellion by the Kurds in
northern Iraq. We would respond with allied forces by blocking
Iraqi forces north of the 36th Parallel.

Another blunder that took place after the cease-fire occurred
when the Iraqi leaders were allowed to use their armed
helicopters. Schwarzkopf, alone, is responsible for this
misfortune. A description of the incident follows:

During his armistice talks at Safwan, Schwarzkopf, in
an unfortunate act of largesse, had consented to enemy
helicopter flights by Iraqi officials who needed an
expeditious means of transportation because of bomb
damage to roads and bridges. Instead, helicopter
gunships and loyalist ground troops slaughtered
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Shi'ites, including
women and children.34

Again, we would respond with allied forces by not allowing Iraqi
forces south of the 32nd Parallel.

The political aims to liberate Kuwait, continued access of
cheap oil, maintain friendly monarchies, and deterring the
emergence of a hegemonic power inimical to American interests in
the Middle East35 were achieved. The political aim to smash
Saddam's war-making capability was not.

As Woodward noted in his book regarding Bush's feelings on
managing the war:

President Bush has said he does not want another
Vietnam, Cheney reminded Schwarzkopf. The
administration was committed. The military commanders
would not have their hands tied. The President,
Cheney, and Powell had to sign off on the plan, but
once it was approved, it would for the most part be in
Schwarzkopf's hands. The President would make the
final decisions, such as when to launch the Phase Four
ground campaign.36
Does this insinuate that Powell and Schwarzkopf had the authority to make political decisions? No. Should Powell and Schwarzkopf have consulted with Bush and Cheney concerning political matters or actions that were contrary to the plan affecting political outcomes? Yes. On the other hand, Bush and Cheney could have intervened in matters concerning the war at any time. Bush also had the option to relieve Powell and/or Schwarzkopf at any time if he disliked decisions being made by them or developed mistrust in them. Instead, Bush limply suggested (in the case of the armed enemy helicopters) that helicopters “should not be used for combat purposes inside Iraq.” Otherwise, in a feckless abdication of a victor’s power and responsibility, the administration turned a blind eye.37

There was some political fallout toward the close of the war and following the cease-fire; however, evidence that civil-military relations during the Gulf War were in a state of consequential deterioration is lacking. Quite the reverse may be concluded. A contributing factor to the success of the Persian Gulf War is due in some part to the excellent civil-military relation that existed throughout the campaign.

CONCLUSION

The legitimacy of the nation state and its decision and ability to use military force to promote and secure its interests
always has its antagonists. For the U.S., it’s the "baby boomer
generation" that questions the fundamental assumptions of the
military approach. More and more governmental appointees with
little or no military experience find themselves interacting with
the military and inevitably pressing military decisions with the
lack of military advice or, military scrutiny. There will always
be differing opinions on how to achieve political aims with the
use of force. The Commander in Chief will make the final
decision and the civil-military process will work to try to
achieve success as intended.

The Vietnam and Persian Gulf wars are valuable case studies
for examining how bad civil-military relations and good civil-
military relations can be major factors in the outcome of war.
When expectations in the civil-military relationship go unmet,
the result is alienation, distrust, disunity, and, ultimately,
debilitation. We were at that point during the Vietnam War.
We were not at that point during the Persian Gulf War and we’re
not at that point today.

Word Count: 5,811.
ENDNOTES

1 The Constitution of the United States of America, As Amended, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 (1992).

2 Ibid., Clause 11.

3 Ibid., Article II, Section 2, Clause 1.


6 Ibid., 143.

7 Ibid.


9 Ibid.


12 Ibid.


14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.


20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 19.


23 McMaster, 41.

24 Ibid.


26 Ibid.


29 Ibid., 175.

30 Ibid., 179.

31 Ibid., 307.


33 Ibid., 470.

34 Ibid., 489.

35 Ibid., 492.

36 Woodward, 347.

37 Atkinson, 490.

39 Foster, 62.
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