New Directions in Missile Defense Policy

Senator Sam Nunn

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Building a Greater Missile Defense Consensus
An IFPA Congressional Seminar Series on Missile Defense

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One of the most serious security challenges the US will face over the next 10-20 years is the proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them—ballistic missiles. To the extent that we have achieved consensus on meeting this threat, it was with the 1991 and 1992 Missile Defense Act.

The heart of the Missile Defense Act is to provide the United States with protection against limited missile attacks using space-based sensors, ground-based interceptors, and follow-on technologies to come. A very important part of this is theater defense. I believe that the Clinton Administration has correctly moved theater defense to the number one priority over the next five to seven years. There is a consensus on that priority in Congress.

A critical part of the Missile Defense Act is its call for the US to maintain strategic stability—that defenses would be deployed in a limited way so as not to cross the threshold where deterrence itself would be threatened. What must be avoided is a first-strike capability for either side. Finally, the Missile Defense Act moves forward to clarify the ABM Treaty and to seek modest changes and amendments to the treaty as required.

Before moving on to further discussion of missile defense issues, let me review what the Senate Armed Services Committee has concluded on the FY 1994 Defense Authorization Bill. We finished our mark mindful of the change in leadership at the White House and the Department of Defense. We did not view this year as an appropriate time to make revolutionary suggestions for change. We did make some important changes and suggestions, however.

In the strategic deterrent accounts, including defense, we consolidated funding of $1.2 billion for surveillance and warning programs, including Brilliant Eyes, Defense Support Programs, Follow-on Early Warning Systems, satellite programs, Cobra Ball, and certain kinds of surveillance and warning assets of a classified nature. All of these accounts were consolidated into one account under the control of the Secretary of Defense and reduced in funding by $350 million. The Secretary of Defense was directed to evaluate a low-cost, affordable alternative for surveillance and warning architecture.

Of very great importance was our direction to the Department of Defense to begin a comprehensive review of a number of missile defense systems and their compliance with
the ABM Treaty. The systems to be reviewed are the Patriot, Aegis, ERINT, GBRT, THAADs, BE, SPY RADAR, and the SM2 Interceptor. We fenced 50% of the funds for these programs until such review is completed as a means of expressing our strong sentiment that such a review should be undertaken quickly.

Finally, we directed the Secretary of Defense to evaluate the options for streamlining the missile defense acquisition process to reduce the cost and schedule of missile defense deployment, without increasing programmatic risks or concurrency.

A major concern of the committee was the projections of a missile defense being deployed some 11 years from now. After having spent $30 billion over the past decade, that is much too long. Deployment can and should be sooner.

The SASC believes that another key issue is this: Should the US deploy a ballistic missile defense only when we see an actual threat, a third world country that has actually acquired an intercontinental range for its ballistic missiles; or should we be prepared with missile defenses ahead of time? According to the CIA, 13 Countries will have the ability to acquire ballistic missiles in the near future.

There is also an important set of questions concerning the deployment of theater defenses: US. forces stationed in various parts of the world will be increasing vulnerable to ballistic missile attacks. But without question, the same ballistic missiles we would face would also threaten other countries in the regions. To what extent should the US be prepared to defend the entire region against ballistic missile attack? For which contingencies should we plan? Who would pay for such defense? If we are going to provide complete coverage, do we approach such defense deployments on an alliance basis, with appropriate cost sharing? Should we invite NATO to participate in this process? These are some of the very broad questions that have to be addressed. We also have to address in a very serious way how the ABM Treaty affects these deployments, what we think about the ABM Treaty, what it means in terms of theater missile defense. It is time for the Administration to get very serious about compliance reviews, and present a program on the overall ABM Treaty to the Congress and the Russians that would reflect our honest view as to what needs to be amended in the ABM Treaty.

We also have to be clear that ballistic missile defense cannot be separated from the rest of the defense budget, because there are inevitable trade-offs. None of us, especially this Chairman, wants to see the Defense budget wrecked to pay for this important program. The bottom line is that the procurement budget is down and we have to fit a great many needed programs into that. I have been informed by my number crunchers on that next year's outlay problem is $13 billion above where the President's budget has proposed we go with defense spending—and some of us, including myself, believe that the President's budget was already on too steep a slope coming down.
I am delighted to join this forum again. It has been a very important exchange of information. I find, frankly, that one of the things that benefits me the most is that my appearance requires me to read what every one has said. I did this very late last night, Peter, so I am up to date on what has been said. I must say there has been a very great amount of expertise represented by the speakers to date and that has been very useful to me.

One of the biggest problems we have this year in the defense budget is how to squeeze all the budget authority we want given the outlay limits we are facing. This is one of the biggest problems we have. This forum has been very important over the years, and the past ten years of discussion fostered by this series has made a really valuable contribution to our security. I think a great deal has come out of these series of breakfast seminars that has helped shape the defense programs as we know them.

We have witnessed some very great changes over the past decade. I doubt very many people would have predicted that in the past 7-8 years we would see the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of the Soviet Union itself, and that Russian military power would be 1000 miles east of the Fulda Gap. That is a very great change.

I also doubt that very many in the past would have contemplated that Ukraine would not only be a sovereign nation, but one with nuclear weapons, and that Russia and the Ukraine would be at serious loggerheads over the future of these weapons, with increased tensions over not only the Ukraine's caretaking and protection of these missiles, but also, from the Russian perspective, whether the Ukraine is going to get operational control over these nuclear weapons.

When you talk to Russian military leaders today, the one threat uppermost in their minds is this question of whether Ukraine will gain operational control over the nuclear missiles on its territory — the 46 SS-24s and the SS-19s. The Russian military leaders insist that Ukraine is now seeking operational control over these missiles, and so that has to be taken into account as we move down the road toward arms control.

And certainly, 6-7 years ago, few predicted that the United States would be involved in a major war in the Middle East, involving well over half a million troops, and where a third world nation would be firing ballistic missiles at the US and its allies.

This brings me to the subject of today's remarks. One of the most serious security challenges we have for the next 10-20 years is the proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction — chemical, biological and nuclear weapons — as well as the means to deliver them — i.e., ballistic missiles. And to the extent that we have achieved consensus, it was with the 1991 and 1992 Missile Defense Act. This is the closest we have had to an agreement over the direction we should move on missile defense over the past 10 years.
The heart of the Missile Defense Act is to provide the United States with protection against limited missile attacks using space based sensors, ground based interceptors, and follow-on technologies to come. A very important part of this effort is theater defense. And I believe the Clinton Administration has correctly moved that to the number one priority over the next 5-7 years. That has assumed the number one priority and there is consensus in the Congress on that issue.

A critical part of the Missile Defense Act is its call for the US to maintain strategic stability—that defenses would be deployed in a limited way so as not to cross the threshold where deterrence itself would be threatened. The point to be avoided is where the combination of defenses plus a pre-emptive attack could place one of the two superpowers in a state of constant jeopardy. Finally, the Missile Defense Act moves forward to clarify the ABM Treaty and to seek modest changes and amendments to the treaty as required.

Before moving on to further discussion of missile defense issues, let me review what the Senate Armed Services Committee has just concluded on the FY 1994 Defense Authorization bill. We finished our mark-up mindful that we have a new Administration, a new Secretary of Defense, a Bottom-up Review going on, and a very significant change in the leadership of the White House and US Department of Defense. In that context, we did not view this year as the time to move forward with revolutionary suggestions for change. We did make some important changes and suggestions, however.

In the strategic deterrent accounts, including defense, we consolidated funding of $1.2 billion for surveillance and warning programs, including Brilliant Eyes [BE], defense support programs [DSP], Follow-on Early Warning Systems [FEWS], satellite programs, Cobra Ball, and certain kinds of surveillance and warning assets of a classified nature. All of these accounts were consolidated into one account under the control of the Secretary of Defense and reduced in funding by $350 million, and directed the Secretary of Defense to evaluate a low cost affordable alternative for surveillance and warning architecture, and to select the one that is affordable.

And let me say that the question of affordability is looming on the horizon as perhaps the most critical aspect of defense issues, both now and in the future — about which I will say more later.

We reduced the total funding for BMDO from $3.75 billion to $3.2 billion — but of that reduction, we transferred $251 million to the consolidated account I mentioned above which does not count against the overall BMD expenditures. The actual reduction was $350 million in the overall BMD accounts.

Of very great importance was our direction to the Department of Defense to begin a comprehensive review of a number of missile defense systems and their compliance with the ABM Treaty, including Patriot, Aegis, ERINT, GBRT, THAAD, BE, SPY RADAR, and the SM2 Interceptor. All of these systems need to have a compliance review. And we fenced 50% of the funds for these programs until such review is completed as a means of expressing our strong sentiment that such a review should be undertaken quickly. We want the compliance review now, and we should not continue to move down a road toward the deployment of defense systems that at some later date are discovered or alleged not to be in compliance with the ABM Treaty.

And finally, we asked the Secretary of Defense to evaluate the options for streamlining the missile defense acquisition process to reduce the cost and schedule of missile defense deployment, without increasing programmatic risks or concurrency. There are many who believe that we can save significant amounts of money in the acquisition process.
On strategic deterrent issues, the Committee, without prejudice to the program, but as the result of a long term disappointment with the program's performance, we cut the B1B bomber modernization program by $50 million in R&D and $36 million in procurement.

We approved the budget request for 24 Trident submarine D-5 missiles of $953 million, and we increased the advanced procurement funds by $24.7 million. There is strong sentiment in our Committee to increase that production rate and those extra funds keep open the option of increasing that production rate to 48 a year starting in 1995 which would be a much more economical and efficient production rate for those missiles.

On the B2 bomber program, we fully funded the budget request, although we did fence some of the funds pending a number of certifications and clarifications required of the Secretary of Defense. I believe that stopping at 20 B2 bombers was mistake, but we did not do anything in this bill to increase the number of B2 bombers. And finally, we fully supported the funding request for the maintenance and modernization of our Minuteman ICBM leg of our Triad.

Let us put this in a larger context or broader framework now that I have reviewed the ballistic missile defense accounts and the strategic deterrent accounts. The key question I come away with, and a question which Congress and the Administration are going to have to struggle with, is the projection that a ballistic missile defense will be deployed at least 11 years from now.

Let me just say that projections of a missile defense being deployed some 11 years from now, after having spent $30 billion over the past decade, is much too long. That's a long way down the road for having put that much money into the program. The majority of our Committee believes that is a long range projection that is too far into the future.

A majority of our Committee also believes that another central issue we should debate is this: should the US deploy a ballistic missile defense only when we see an actual threat, a third world country that has actually acquired an intercontinental range for its ballistic missiles, or should we try and get out in front of that threat and deploy missile defenses in this country in order to deter, prevent or dissuade or have some significant impeding effect on some third world country that may be intending to develop that [intercontinental] kind of range on their ballistic missiles? That is a conceptual debate that is only just beginning in a serious way, but in my mind it is central to the ballistic missile debate now before us.

Another area of deep concern is our view that some 13 countries today have or will have ballistic missiles in the not too distant future. That is the projection of the CIA, even though they do not see such a capability in a strategic sense in the near term, but certainly the CIA believes it can be done if these countries set it as a goal and pursue that path.

Another key issue and big philosophical question that has just begun being thought about is theater defenses: it appears that everybody agrees that should be our top national priority, that we have the technical capability to move in that direction, but we have not begun to discuss in depth the very important philosophical question of how extensive these theater defenses should be.

In other words, should we protect both our forces — which we should, of course, because as our forces are stationed in various parts of the world, they are going to increasingly be subject to ballistic missile attacks — and our allies, to the extent that we are going to be fighting in a host country? I think the answer to that question is clearly "Yes". You can't simply protect American forces in a host country and not also provide defense for the whole country.

But without question, the types of ballistic missiles we are going to face are going to have a range beyond that of the immediate area of the fighting and are going to be able to threaten the
entire theater of operations, which is going to often extend or most likely extend beyond the geographic boundaries of any one nation.

Do we then provide ballistic missile defense capability for the entire theater? If we protect the entire theater, if we do, do we pay for that expense or bill ourselves, alone? Do we take on the task of defending every area of a host country where we have deployed forces that might come under ballistic missile attack, and to plan for that and every other contingency as we proceed toward deployment of ballistic missile defense systems?

If we are going to provide complete coverage, do we approach such defense deployments on an alliance basis, with appropriate cost sharing? Are we going to have NATO invited to participate in this process in a very significant way beyond participation in competing for defense contracts, which, of course, they would be glad to do. But I am speaking of something much beyond that.

So these are some very broad questions that have to be addressed. And we also have to address in a very serious way how the ABM Treaty affects these deployments, what we think about the ABM Treaty, what it means in terms of theater missile defense, and to address a number of the problems we have had with the treaty for some time.

It is time for the Administration to get very serious about compliance reviews, and presenting a program on the overall ABM Treaty to the Congress and the Russians that would reflect our honest view as to what needs to be amended in the ABM Treaty. I think most people who are serious about ballistic missile defense believe that there have to be at least modest amendments to the ABM Treaty, so I think it is time we all understand that and what is required.

We also have to be clear that ballistic missile defense cannot be separated from the rest of the defense budget because there are inevitable trade-offs. Just to give you one example, in this mark-up, the SASC made cuts that were necessary to fit our bill within the Administration budget spending proposals and those adopted by Congress. We are not required in the authorization bill to actually meet the budget outlay targets provided by the Administration and Congress.

But we have thought within the SASC that if we did not meet those outlay targets, our bill would not have the credibility needed to carry weight with the Appropriations Committee, or the rest of the Senate. So each year we have always tried to meet the outlay targets provided us. This year was no exception. We tried to meet the targets; we did meet the outlays as we and OMB understood them; but the CBO has ruled against procedures used in our bill which we thought would have resolved the dispute between CBO and OMB about how to score the budget. OMB has one set of outlay figures and CBO has a higher set of numbers. Without getting into the technicalities of the issue, CBO says the Administration is going to spend $2.6 billion in outlays more than the Administration believes. That $2.6 billion was dealt with by the SASC, but CBO ruled our methods to be invalid.

That means that our bill, despite all the cuts we have made, still has a $2.6 billion outlay problem that we have either to deal with on the floor or leave to the appropriators to deal with. Now those of you who recognize the relationship between outlays and spending authority realize that a $2.6 billion cut in outlays is equivalent to a $6-10 billion cut in budget authority.

Even to meet those targets in our bill, we have had to cut the President's budget request by $1 billion [in BA] already to meet the outlay numbers in the President's budget request. Primarily this was due to our Committee approving a 2.2% military pay raise which was not included in the President's budget. This was a very important effort, to maintain the quality of our forces and to maintain morale. In addition, base closing savings were overestimated by some $700 million; there is also an additional $900 million coming out, in outlays, to pay for the Russian aid
package. And no one has shown me where those funds are going to come from, despite a general
consensus in the Senate that we would like to help the President fulfill his pledge to Yeltsin on
that issue.

None of us, especially this Chairman, wants to see the defense budget wrecked to pay for this
important program. My bottom line is that one has to look at the $350 million cut in the
SDI/BMD line in the context of these problems I have just mentioned. We had to make some
unpleasant cuts.

I find the coverage of our efforts somewhat amusing. I examined the Washington Post the day
after our mark-up was concluded. There was not one word on the sweeping changes we made on
tactical air policy. But the media, including the New York Times, focused exclusively on the issue
of gays in the military.

We terminated three major aircraft programs. We terminated the AFX; we terminated the multi-
role fighter; and we terminated the F-16, not because we don't think its a great airplane, but
because we believe we have too many already. Now these are the major changes we made. We
do not know whether the Bottom-up Review (BUR) will agree with these changes but there is
some indication that is the direction they are moving in. We are not locked in on these decisions
to the extent that we will not take a really careful look at what Secretary Aspin and the President
put together in the BUR. But we had to make decisions, and it is apparent to anyone looking at
the defense budget, there is no way you can build four new aircraft as planned. We are
recommending that the F-18E/F be one of the common planes we move to, and that the F-22 be a
variant of the current planned F-22 and hopefully there will be a lot of commonality so that it
will be adopted by the Navy as well.

We also made some major changes in airlift. We basically have gotten very frustrated with the C-
17, not that we do not think its important, and it is not that we do not think we need some — we
do. We are basically saying that it is time to take a look at the whole airlift and sealift trade-off.

We put all the C-17 procurement money in one account. We said to the Secretary of Defense,
you can decide how many of these planes to build — you can build all that have been requested
or you can look at the trade-offs and put some of the funds into sealift. We also said that you can
put some of these funds into commercial air freighters if you choose to.

One of the lessons that came out of the Persian Gulf conflict was that it was apparent that the
number of outsize missions was significantly lower than had been projected. There is a sense that
we can do some of that, but not all of it, some of the missions that only outsized aircraft could
have done in previous projections, and do that with commercial freighters. So given the difficulty
we are having with the C-17, budget problems, and other factors, it is time to make some hard
decisions and trade-offs.

The bottom line is that the procurement budget is down and we have to fit a great many needed
programs into that. And I have been informed by my usually reliable number crunchers on the
Committee staff that next year's outlay problem is $13 billion above where the President's budget
has proposed we go with defense spending — and some of us, including myself, believe that the
President's proposed budget was on too steep a slope coming down.
Q. Are there areas in which you feel we should be investing, increasing funding, even though the general budget direction is downward?

A. I believe that the feeling in our Committee, and I cannot speak beyond that, we will know on the floor probably in September, but in our Committee there is very strong support for theater missile defense, that has very high priority. I think there is an open debate right now as to how quickly we can deploy limited defenses for this country. Whether we need to get out front of the threat and move forward and deter it, if that is essential, or whether we ought to do everything we can do to be prepared for such an eventual deployment of a limited defense, but without deploying anything until the threat to the United States actually emerges, that debate is still unresolved.

Q. What is your view of the possibility of the Navy providing an upper tier defense capability for limited defense. What are your views?

A. I am enthusiastic about using the Aegis system and to see how far we can move in that respect. I think we need to go slow in the upper tier aspects of it, but the lower tier is an exciting concept.

Q. What are the prospects for consolidating bases, laboratories, depots and other facilities, and using the saved funds for new investment such as in missile defense?

A. Unfortunately, many of these savings are long term in nature. In fact, it usually costs you more in the first couple of years to consolidate and close bases than if you did nothing. Many of the savings associated with base closings have to do with personnel reductions, which are happening anyway. So there is some double counting going on. If you look at the overall force structure over the past 4-5 years, and look ahead 2-3 years, we will have cut force stucture by one-third, personnel very significantly, but bases and depots only about 15%. So force structure has come down much steeper than infrastructure. So we are going to have to undertake more consolidation, realignments and base closings. We do not have to have a match between the two reductions, but it should be closer than the gap between 15% and 35%. Personnel is where the major savings are.

Q. What is your view of the planned force structure of aircraft carrier battle groups, army divisions and air wings?

A. I do not have a vision of reducing to the numbers that have been talked about. When I hear people talking about a one war or a two war capability, I have to ask myself what the third trouble spot in the world is going to do once we have engaged ourselves in two small, regional conflicts. If we explicitly say that we cannot deal with more than two conflicts, if you are ever going to start a war, and you see the United States involved in, let us say, Yugoslavia, and we are involved in Korea at the same time, just think what the invitation looks like for someone to get involved in a conflict in the Middle East.
Reverse that: Let us say we were involved in a UN peacekeeping force in a large way in Yugoslavia, and a conflict also begins with Iraq or Iran and we are heavily involved. What do the North Koreans do at that point? I think we have to be much more flexible than talking in terms of a one or two conflict capability.

For one thing, I have done a very detailed and careful analysis of our force structure when we talked about fighting two and one-half major wars. But we never had that capability, we were not even close. We talked about that capability. And some people perceived that we had such a capability. I think that if you narrow your vision down too much, you may be inviting conflict. I would rather have the flexibility to move in a number of directions simultaneously. I am dubious about cutting the force structure at the same rate we are cutting it now. We have to level off at some point and I believe that point is not too far off.

Q. What are the prospects for amending the ABM Treaty and should we multilateralize the ABM Treaty, bringing the other nuclear republics in the FSU under its umbrella?

A. I would not be ready to discuss that right now. A lot would depend on whether the proposed changes were procedural or substantive. I think it would be dependent also on whether we were dealing with a transitional step toward non-nuclear status, or whether these new parties would be permanent parties to the treaty and thus also permanent nuclear powers. There would have to be some very serious thought in such an event as you suggest and I am not ready to outline where I would go at this time.

Q. To what extent does the deployment of a missile defense also have the effect of deterring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?

A. I think that is definitely something we have to put into the equation. I am not one of those who believes that some third world nations have now made an irrevocable commitment to move to acquire a strategic capability to launch weapons of mass destruction against the United States. We have to realize that such a capability could also threaten other nations besides the United States. So even should the United States deploy a limited ballistic missile defense system, this doesn't mean that every third world nation suddenly drops their plans for acquiring such a ballistic missile capability. But I do believe that our acquisition of ballistic missile capability could very well delay the time at which a third world country pursues such a capability.

I also have to agree with Dave McCurdy's comments to this seminar series. And that is that I have never subscribed to the notion that you could basically eliminate offensive weapons and that you could rely on defense alone. I believe we still have to have a strong retaliatory capability. And our retaliatory capability is, in the final analysis, the biggest deterrent, rather than the defenses themselves.

I cannot conceive of a country not launching an attack on the United States solely because we had defenses, but did not have a capability to retaliate. I think clearly in the Persian Gulf War, we told Iraq that we equated a chemical weapons attack with a nuclear attack, and said so fairly explicitly and clearly. We said that if you attack us with chemicals, we will consider that a nuclear attack. So we were using nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the use against our allies and ourselves of chemical weapons, for example. And that will continue to be the pattern into the foreseeable future, with or without defenses.

Q. Russian officials appear to differ as to the effect the SDI program had on the end of the Cold War. Your comments.

A. The threat of the deployment of missile defenses was not the driving force behind Gorbachev's actions. I have known the former Soviet President for a long time. Gorbachev was a
different kind of Soviet leader. What was critical, and this is often misunderstood, was the impact of the program on the Soviet military. I think the Russian military was very concerned with the technological capability of the United States and how technology was revolutionizing warfare. They knew they had to make some serious and fundamental changes or they would be in danger of falling very far behind the US militarily. This was a major factor in their willingness to tolerate a Gorbachev and make the fundamental changes he did. Would a Russian military, fully confident of its technological capability, have tolerated the changes in Europe and Russia. I seriously doubt it. SDI was thus a factor, but it was part of the overall technological assessment that the Soviet military made, including US naval power and US stealth air power capabilities, both of which may have outweighed missile defense. The Russians, for years, were paranoid about US naval capability. That was intensified in the 1980s with the revolutionary changes in US naval capability. So was SDI a factor? Yes. But it was part of an overall technological factor. And we have to keep in mind that the Russian economy was rotten and going to hell. And that was going to not only have a profound political effect but undermine the capability of the Russian military to maintain its power. It wasn't SDI that caused the Russian economy to go belly-up. It was their rotten system. But the changes that were tolerated by the Russian military were tolerated because the military felt they could not compete technologically with the United States unless the Russian economy was changed dramatically.

Q. How would one streamline the acquisition process of the ballistic missile shop?

A. Anyone looking at the BMD operation over the past several years would not want a system where you had three services all feeding into it. It was a political set-up that, for better or worse, was too separate to be efficient. Now the Reagan Administration wanted to give it high visibility, hype it, in effect, but I think it has cost a lot of money. The question is, do we need to hype it anymore? The hype was probably counterproductive the last few years; to begin with, it probably helped move the program forward and fund the program at a higher level than would otherwise have been the case. But it is time to look at this and say how can we manage these resources in the best way possible? Today's arrangement just doesn't bear a relationship to what needs to be done.

Q. What about follow-on technology?

A. What we thought was leading edge technology, to be deployed in the 1996-1997 time frame has now assumed the unwelcome status of follow-on technology, and the follow-on technology is following things that are 11 years down the road. So our whole context for follow-on technology has changed. The question that concerns me is how can you still be 11 years away from deployment after having spent $30 billion over the past 10 years? Now certainly the technology we have is more capable than what we had in the 1950s, but it goes to the question of what have we been doing? We need to have a programmatic decision made for deployment, for a mission. On this I agree with Senator Malcolm Wallop. We have spent so much on R&D and so little toward operational deployment. Given that context, there is not going to be a burst of enthusiasm for follow-on technology here in Congress. Now we are not going to eliminate such technology. What it means is that they are going to be put on the back burner. The real question is whether we can work out a consensus to put something on the front burner. That is what we need.
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