NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
OF THE
UNITED STATES

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The community of nations has entered into an exciting and promising era. Global war is now less likely and the US national security strategy reflects that fact. The *National Military Strategy* reflects this new world and guides US military planning.

The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 charges the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the responsibility of assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction for the Armed Forces. This document provides my advice in consultation with the commanders of the unified and specified commands and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It implements the Defense Agenda of the President's *National Security Strategy* and Secretary of Defense policies spelled out in the *Defense Planning Guidance* and in the *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*. This new strategy is built upon the four key foundations of the National Defense Strategy: Strategic Deterrence and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution.

For most of the past 45 years the primary focus of our national military strategy has been containment of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology -- we met that challenge successfully. Over the short span of the past 3 years, the Berlin Wall fell; the Warsaw Pact dissolved; Germany reunified; democracy took hold in Eastern Europe and grew stronger in Latin America; an international coalition successfully reversed Iraqi aggression; and the Soviet Union ceased to exist as communism collapsed as an ideology and as a way of life.

Certain realities remain -- the United States is looked to for world leadership; we have enduring cultural, political, and economic links across the Atlantic, the Pacific, and within the Western Hemisphere; and vast quantities of modern nuclear and conventional forces still exist in the Commonwealth of Independent States and its constituent republics.

Future threats to US interests are inherent in the uncertainty and instability of a rapidly changing world. We can meet the challenges of the foreseeable future with a much smaller force than we have had in recent years. Our force for the 1990s is a Base Force -- A Total Force - A Joint Force -- a carefully tailored combination of our active and reserve components. Ships, planes, tanks, and, most importantly, trained soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, and the leadership to make the force work in joint and combined operations cannot be created in a few days or months. This strategy provides the rationale for a reduced yet appropriate military capability -- a capability which will serve the Nation well throughout the remainder of the 1990s.

COLIN L. POWELL
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
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INTRODUCTION

This national military strategy contains a number of departures from principles that have shaped the American defense posture since the Second World War. Most significant is the shift from containing the spread of communism and deterring Soviet aggression to a more diverse, flexible strategy which is regionally oriented and capable of responding decisively to the challenges of this decade. Our military strategy implements the new, regionally focused defense strategy described in the President's National Security Strategy of the United States and builds upon the Annual Report to the President and Congress provided by the Secretary of Defense.

STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE

The Cold War is over and a host of powerful forces is shaping a new international order with major implications for US national security policy and military strategy. We are at the end of a period of history that began with World War I. The intervening seventy-five years witnessed the rise and fall of both fascism and communism. Fascism was defeated across the globe in 1945, and today, Communism has ended in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Communist ideology is in retreat in every corner of the globe.

However, the old international order was familiar, tangible, and it provided a focal point for Free World policies. Now that focus has been blurred by a whirlwind of historic change.

By far, the most consequential change is occurring within the former Soviet Union. The hammer and sickle no longer flies in Moscow, having been replaced by the Russian tricolor. While our relationship with Russia, the other republics, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), will continue to evolve over time, we are heartened, encouraged, and optimistic about the future.

Closely related is the revolution in Eastern Europe which led to German unification, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the rebirth of independence for over a half-dozen states.

Other significant forces impacting the security environment include:

- The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, combined with the means to deliver them.
- The continuing struggle to improve the human condition throughout the world, particularly in lesser developed countries.
- Drug trafficking and associated problems.
- The march toward democracy in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and many other parts of the world.
- The intensification of intractable conflicts between historic enemies now less constrained since the collapse of communist regimes.
- A momentum toward increased political, economic, and military cooperation in Europe, the Pacific, and other regions.
REALITIES

In the midst of the dramatic changes which have occurred and continue to occur, there are basic realities which guide our military planning.

Russia - Other Republics - Commonwealth of Independent States

The United States is greatly encouraged by its evolving relationship with the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), composed of most of the republics of the former Soviet Union. While we are optimistic about this relationship, there is concern with the potential volatility of these historic events.

Uncertainty surrounds the eventual disposition of the nuclear weapons and technicians of the former Soviet Union. Russia is certain to remain a nuclear power with modern, diverse and survivable forces. There is the additional possibility of some nuclear capability in other republics and of proliferation to countries outside the Commonwealth.

The inventory of conventional military equipment in Russia and the other nations which comprise the Commonwealth is both vast and modern. The military potential inherent in this equipment will continue to be a major factor on the Eurasian landmass. Offsetting this capability in the near term is the economic and political turmoil in the republics which severely inhibits the maintenance and effective employment of this equipment on a global scale.

US World Leadership

As a nation which seeks neither territory, hegemony, nor empire, the United States is in a unique position of trusted leadership on the world scene. Old friends view us as a stabilizing force in vitally important regions, new friends look to us for inspiration and security. We serve as a model for the democratic reform which continues to sweep the globe.

The United States has enduring cultural, political, and economic links across the Atlantic, the Pacific and within the Western Hemisphere. Though geography provides the United States a defensive shield not shared by many other nations, our national security is critically linked to events and access overseas. The United States must maintain the strength necessary to influence world events, deter would-be aggressors, guarantee free access to global markets, and encourage continued democratic and economic progress in an atmosphere of enhanced stability.

Across the Atlantic

Much of our heritage and economic well being are tied to Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Africa, and Southwest Asia.

Although the massive military threat to Western Europe has significantly diminished, continuing political and economic instabilities
in eastern Europe and within the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are causes for concern. Centuries-old fears and competing claims have emerged, rekindling historic antagonisms which again threaten European stability and integration.

Iraq has been ejected from Kuwait, but the Middle East and Southwest Asia still face an uncertain future. Continued Iraqi belligerence, Iran's support for historically radical groups, nationalism, religious fanaticism, the Arab-Israeli issue, water rights, and the continuing rift between rich and poor contribute to instability. Dissolution of the Soviet Union raises the possibility of new regional coalitions, particularly among the former Soviet Islamic republics and other nations in Southwest Asia. Historic disputes, fueled by arsenals of modern weapons, will continue to challenge regional stability for the foreseeable future and keep us actively engaged in this region.

Across the Pacific

The East Asian economic miracle has made the Pacific Basin America's principal overseas trading area, a situation that shows every evidence of continuing. Throughout the Pacific, the surge of democracy and economic growth and an accompanying improvement in the military capabilities of our friends and allies have eased the US security burden. China, one of the world's largest countries, is also one of the last bastions of communism. The Korean peninsula remains divided in stark contrast with the end of the Cold War in Europe. Logic dictates that change is inevitable, but the transition period is likely to be fraught with great risk.

We must remain engaged across the Pacific, providing -- where necessary -- support, counsel, military reinforcement, and most important of all, stability.

Western Hemisphere

We share the Western Hemisphere with nations whose heritage is closely linked to our own. The advance of democracy within this region is the hard-won result of the combined efforts of the United States and its neighbors. The problems of drug trafficking, illegal immigration, the environment, lingering insurgency, and slow economic development are of concern to all. The United States must remain engaged in support of the developing democracies and in economic and social progress throughout the region. In the Western Hemisphere, Cuba remains as the last foothold of the failed communist experiment, a situation which will eventually succumb to the rising tide of democracy.

The Threat

The decline of the Soviet threat has fundamentally changed the concept of threat analysis as a basis for force structure planning. We can still point to a North Korea, a weakened Iraq, and perhaps even a hostile Iran as specific threats for which we must maintain forces. There may be one or two others that might be added to such a list without straining credulity.
But the real threat we now face is the threat of the unknown, the uncertain. The threat is instability and being unprepared to handle a crisis or war that no one predicted or expected.

Our recent wars were not fought by forces put in the structure because we saw the threat in time. For World War II, for Korea, and for Vietnam, we used our neglected pool of General Purpose Forces until we could rebuild a warfighting force. Even in Panama and Desert Storm, we used General Purpose Forces, and in the case of Desert Storm, we also used forces that were brought from Germany where they had been deterring the Red Army.

While the end of the Cold War has signalled a dramatic improvement in the prospects for peace, security, and economic progress, we still live in a very troubled world with danger, uncertainty, and instability in many regions. It is a world where crises, war, and challenges to US vital interests will continue to be very real possibilities.

Throughout our history, when our vital interests or those of our friends and allies have been threatened, often with very little warning, the US military has been called upon to both demonstrate US commitment and, when necessary, to fight.

It is certain that US military forces will be called upon again, but predicting the time, place, and circumstances will be difficult, as graphically demonstrated by recent political and military crises in Liberia, Kuwait, Somalia, Iraq and Ethiopia, as well as natural disasters in Bangladesh and in the Philippines.

Into the foreseeable future, the United States and its allies, often in concert with the United Nations, will be called upon to mediate economic and social strife and to deter regional aggressors. As the only nation with the military capability to influence events globally, we must remain capable of responding effectively if the United States is to successfully promote the stability required for global progress and prosperity.

**US Domestic Needs**

The momentous changes in the international environment are occurring during a period of US budget and trade deficits and urgent domestic needs. This military strategy, which places a premium on efficiency without compromising effectiveness, is designed to be implemented within a significantly reduced defense budget.
NATIONAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE 1990s

The broad, enduring national security interests and objectives, articulated by the President in his National Security Strategy of the United States, provide guidance for the development of our National Military Strategy. The national interests and selected objectives include:

☆ The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

- Deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies and -- should deterrence fail -- repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies.

- Effectively counter threats to the security of the United States and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism.

- Improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing systems capable of defending against limited ballistic-missile strikes, and enhancing appropriate conventional capabilities.

- Foster restraint in global military spending and discourage military adventurism.

- Prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies and resources to hostile countries or groups, especially the spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and associated high-technology means of delivery.

- Reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging reduction in foreign production, combatting international traffickers and reducing demand at home.

☆ A healthy and growing US economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.

- Ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space.

☆ Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

- Strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights.

- Strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, economic, and social progress.

☆ A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.

- Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance.

- Aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking.
FOUNDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES

The fundamental objective of America's armed forces will remain constant: to deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential foe. Deterrence remains the primary and central motivating purpose underlying our national military strategy.

The strategy is founded on the premise that the United States will provide the leadership needed to promote global peace and security. Improvements in East-West relations have shifted our focus away from the threat of global war to regional threats of consequence to US vital interests.

While we emphasize multinational operations under the auspices of international bodies such as the United Nations, we must retain the capability to act unilaterally when and where US interests dictate. This new strategy is, in many ways, more complex than the containment strategy of the Cold War era.

FOUNDATIONS

It is essential that the United States retain the capability to detect and respond decisively to tomorrow's challenges. To accomplish this, the President articulated a new, regionally oriented, national defense strategy in his Aspen, Colorado speech on August 2, 1990.

Codified in the National Security Strategy of the United States and further developed by the Secretary of Defense, this strategy is built upon the four foundations of Strategic Deterrence and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution.

Strategic Deterrence and Defense

Recent arms control agreements and unilateral initiatives provide for real reductions in the arsenals of nuclear powers. Even with the most optimistic outlook for nuclear reductions, the sheer number of remaining weapons is formidable. The former Soviet Union, which retains thousands of nuclear weapons, is confronted by significant political and security instabilities and faces an uncertain future. In light of this situation and the threat posed by the increasing number of potentially hostile states developing weapons of mass destruction, maintenance of a modern, fully capable, and reliable strategic deterrent remains the number one defense priority of the United States. A credible deterrent requires a reliable warning system, modern nuclear forces, the capability and flexibility to support a spectrum of response options and a defensive system for global protection against limited strikes.

The threat posed by global ballistic-missile proliferation and by an accidental or unauthorized launch resulting from political turmoil is on the rise. Because of these trends, the SDI program has been redirected to pursue a
system providing Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). GPALS offers many potential advantages: the United States would be protected against limited strikes by ballistic missiles; our forward deployed forces would be better defended against missile attacks; and our allies, many of whom are near troubled areas, could also be better protected. GPALS will be based on technologies pioneered by SDI, but would be both smaller and less expensive than the initial deployment originally projected for SDI.

**Forward Presence**

Over the past 45 years, the day-to-day presence of US forces in regions vital to US national interests has been key to averting crises and preventing war. Our forces deployed throughout the world show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis-response capability while promoting US influence and access. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence includes periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military contacts. Although the numbers of US forces stationed overseas will be reduced, the credibility of our capability and intent to respond to crises will continue to depend on judicious forward presence. Forward presence is also vital to the maintenance of the system of collective defense by which the United States works with its friends and allies to protect our security interests, while reducing the burdens of defense spending and unnecessary arms competition.

**Crisis Response**

The capability to respond to regional crises is one of the key demands of our strategy. Regional contingencies we might face are many and varied, and could arise on very short notice. US forces must therefore be able to respond rapidly to deter and, if necessary, to fight unilaterally or as part of a combined effort. This response might range from a single discriminate strike to the employment of overwhelming force to defeat a regional aggressor. Our strategy also recognizes that when the United States is responding to one substantial regional crisis, potential aggressors in other areas may be tempted to take advantage of our preoccupation. Thus, we can not reduce forces to a level which would leave us or our allies vulnerable elsewhere.

**Reconstitution**

As we reduce the size of our military forces in response to the demise of the global threat, we must preserve a credible capability to forestall any potential adversary from competing militarily with the United States. This "Reconstitution" capability is intended to deter such a power from militarizing and, if deterrence fails, to provide a global warfighting capability. Reconstitution involves forming, training, and fielding new fighting units. This includes initially drawing on cadre-type units.
and laid-up military assets; mobilizing previously trained or new manpower; and activating the industrial base on a large scale. Reconstitution also involves maintaining technology, doctrine, training, experienced military personnel, and innovation necessary to retain the competitive edge in decisive areas of potential military competition.

**STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES**

We employ a set of Strategic Principles — described in the following paragraphs — to build upon the National Defense Foundations. These principles capitalize on our enduring strengths, capture the key lessons learned from our victory in Desert Storm, and allow us to exploit the weaknesses of those who might challenge United States interests.

**Collective Security**

Increasingly, we expect to strengthen world response to crises through multilateral operations under the auspices of international security organizations. In the 1991 Gulf War, the United Nations played a role envisioned by its founders — orchestrating and sanctioning collective resistance to an aggressor. The new international order will be characterized by a growing consensus that force cannot be used to settle disputes and when the consensus is broken, the burdens and responsibilities are shared by many nations. While support of
formal alliances such as NATO will continue to be fundamental to American military strategy, the United States must be prepared to fight as part of an ad hoc coalition if we become involved in conflict where no formal security relationships exist. We must also retain the capability to operate independently, as our interests dictate.

Arms Control

We have engaged in arms control not as an end in itself but as a means to enhance our national security. As we enter the final decade of this century, it is apparent that arms control is beginning to bound uncertainty and reduce nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional arsenals in many meaningful and lasting ways.

In September 1991, the President directed a range of unilateral nuclear initiatives including elimination of the entire worldwide inventory of US ground-launched, short range, theater nuclear weapons. We will withdraw and destroy all of our nuclear artillery shells and short range nuclear ballistic missile warheads, while preserving an effective air-delivered nuclear capability. The US will also withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from aircraft carriers, surface ships, attack submarines, and those associated with land-based naval aircraft. We have taken all of our strategic bombers off of alert status for the first time since the 1950s. It is clear that we have entered an entirely new era in the arms control process -- for the first time nations with major arsenals are reducing, relocating, and restructuring stockpiles unilaterally, in realistic anticipation of corresponding measures from others. The era of prolonged and painstaking negotiations by mutually distrustful adversaries may be evolving into a much different arms control environment.

We will continue to seek to reduce military threats to our national interests, inject greater predictability into military relationships, and channel force postures in more stabilizing directions, while retaining vital military capabilities.

Maritime and Aerospace Superiority

Achieving and maintaining preeminence in the air, in space, and at sea is key to our continued success as a global leader. In peace, maritime and aerospace superiority enhance our deterrent capabilities. In war, they are critical to the conduct and successful termination of conflict. Extended supply lines demand the unimpeded flow of assets. The ability to quickly establish control of the air, sea, and space both en route and in the theater of operations provides for increased combat effectiveness, fewer losses, and efficient employment of combat power where it is needed most.

Strategic Agility

The force needed to win is assembled by the rapid movement of forces from wherever they are to wherever they are needed. US forces stationed in CONUS and overseas will be fully
Power Projection

Our ability to project power, both from the United States and from forward deployed locations, has strategic value beyond crisis response. It is a day in and day out contributor to deterrence, regional stability, and collective security. It becomes an even more critical part of our military strategy since overseas presence will be reduced and our regional focus has been enhanced.

Technological Superiority

The United States must continue to rely heavily on technological superiority to offset quantitative advantages, to minimize risk to US forces, and to enhance the potential for swift, decisive termination of conflict. In peace, technological superiority is a key element of deterrence. In war, it enhances combat effectiveness and reduces loss of personnel and equipment. Our collective defeat of Iraq clearly demonstrates the need for a superior intelligence capability and the world's best weapons and supporting systems. We must continue to maintain our qualitative edge. Therefore, advancement in and protection of technology is a national security obligation.

Decisive Force

Once a decision for military action has been made, half-measures and confused objectives extract a severe price in the form of a protracted conflict which can cause needless waste of human lives and material resources, a divided nation at home, and defeat. Therefore, one of the essential elements of our national military strategy is the ability to rapidly assemble the forces needed to win -- the concept of applying decisive force to overwhelm our adversaries and thereby terminate conflicts swiftly with a minimum loss of life.
PLANNING AND EMPLOYMENT

The President and the Secretary of Defense crafted a national defense strategy firmly based on the four foundations of Strategic Deterrence, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution. The National Military Strategy implements the defense strategy using the strategic principles outlined in the previous section. The nature of the forces required and how they are to be employed are described below.

REGIONAL FOCUS

Because of the changes in the strategic environment, the threats we expect to face are regional rather than global. We will, of course, deter and defend against strategic nuclear attacks as we have for the past forty years. We will also retain the potential to defeat a global threat, should one emerge. However, our plans and resources are primarily focused on deterring and fighting regional rather than global wars.

The growing complexity of the international security environment makes it increasingly difficult to predict the circumstances under which US military power might be employed. Hence, forward presence and crisis response are fundamental to our regionally oriented strategy.

In peacetime our forward presence is the "glue" that helps hold alliances together, builds cooperative institutions, and helps regional countries work together, including some with historical antagonisms. Forward presence helps to reduce regional tensions, to deter potential aggressors, and to dampen regional arms competitions.

During peacetime our forces train with allies and friends, building relationships, developing standard operating procedures, and demonstrating US commitment to both friends and potential aggressors. Such operations contribute to readiness and the quality of our forces, thus further enhancing deterrence. Our forward presence is also the leading edge of our crisis response capability.

Crisis response gives us the ability to project power and decisively use military force when and where the national leadership determines it is needed. There remain potential threats - countries with substantial or growing military capability - that, coupled with a trigger such as an age old antagonism, could erupt into crisis as happened in the summer of 1990 when in a very short period Iraq invaded Kuwait. We don't know whether one of today's potential threats will become the next crisis or if some new threat will evolve to create a crisis in the coming years. Thus, we are focusing our planning efforts on regions of potential conflict. We must be able to project power to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia rapidly and in sufficient strength to defeat any aggressor who has not been deterred by our forward presence. Plans for contingencies in these regions are developed such that they can be readily adapted to a range of crises that could occur.
By examining and anticipating the potential for instability or crisis, the regional CINCs develop plans for the employment of military assets (as well as examining the complementary economic, diplomatic, and political options). These options, used singly or in various combinations, can be carried out with the intent of deterring or averting crisis. They vary widely from large joint and combined operations and the deployment of task forces to small mobile training teams and low level military to military contacts. Forward presence forces in Europe, Asia, Central and South America, and at sea, though reduced in size, are fundamental to this concept.

ADAPTIVE PLANNING

To meet our unilateral and alliance responsibilities, the United States needs a diverse spectrum of military options. A smaller total force requires flexibility in planning, training, and employment, placing an even greater premium on maintaining and enhancing technological superiority and the high quality of our total-force.

The end of the Cold War and profound changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union call into question many of the traditional warning assumptions used for planning. Warning time, or available response time, is far more likely to be exploited by key decisionmakers if they have a menu of options from which to choose. These options need to be pre-planned and gauged to a wide range of crises. This fundamental change to our military strategy is reflected in an adaptive planning process, through which planners develop multiple options keyed to specific crises.

Adaptive planning provides a range of preplanned options, encompassing all the instruments of national power (diplomatic, political, economic and military) to clearly demonstrate US resolve, deter potential adversaries, and, if necessary, to deploy and employ force to fight and win, quickly and decisively.

The spectrum of available options confronts any opponent's leadership with uncertainty and risk should it contemplate aggression of any kind to include the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

The military strategy provides a framework within which the combatant commanders -- the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands (CINCs) -- plan the use of military forces in their areas of responsibility and communicate their recommended military options for decision by the National Command Authorities in times of crisis. There are four general categories of operations combatant CINCs must plan for and be prepared to execute. These operations are broadly explained below and expanded in the subsequent sections.
☆ Employ strategic nuclear forces and strategic defenses to deter and respond to a nuclear attack.

☆ Actively employ resources on a day-to-day basis to build military and alliance readiness; foster stability; promote peace, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; protect lives and property; help our friends, allies, and those in need of humanitarian aid. This includes evacuation of non-combatants, such as the 1990 operations SHARP EDGE in Liberia and EASTERN EXIT in Somalia.

☆ Deploy and employ forces to deter and if necessary, to rapidly and decisively resolve a regional military conflict. The 1989 Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and the 1990-1991 Operation DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM in Southwest Asia are recent examples. Also in this category are more limited combat operations in support of national policy objectives. The 1986 raid on Libya, Operation EL DORADO CANYON, and Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada are examples.

☆ Deploy and employ reconstituted forces to counter the emergence of a global threat and to defeat any that should arise.

Planning is decentralized to the CINCs to the maximum possible extent. Broad policy and strategy guidance, mission assignment, and final plan review are provided by the Secretary of Defense. The assumptions, the concepts of operations, and specific forces to be employed are determined by the CINCs and approved by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in close coordination with the Services and defense agencies.

The end of the Cold War marks the beginning of a new era, an era that demands responses and plans which can be readily adapted to the unforeseen and unexpected. We are now in the process of developing adaptive operational plans. This framework provides continuity of planning from peace through the use of nuclear forces.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The purpose of nuclear forces is to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction and to serve as a hedge against the emergence of an overwhelming conventional threat. The need for nuclear deterrence is a continuing one whether the nation is at peace or our troops are responding to a contingency in some region of the world. Detailed target planning is done to enhance responsiveness and to provide options. Specific target selection and the alert status of the force are functions of the world situation at any particular point in time. The President's September 1991 nuclear force initiative was intended to enhance our security through arms reductions while preserving the capability to regenerate selected forces if required.
FORWARD PRESENCE OPERATIONS

Forward presence operations of US forces demonstrate our commitment, foster regional stability, lend credibility to our alliances, and enhance our crisis response capability. In addition to traditional activities such as exercises, deployments, port visits, military-to-military contacts, security assistance, countering terrorism and protecting American citizens in crisis areas, in the new security environment, our military forces may be called upon to execute less traditional operations. These include newly defined roles for the military in the war on drugs and in providing humanitarian assistance.

Operational Training and Deployments

As our forces conduct regular overseas deployments, port visits, and participate in joint and combined training exercises overseas, they continue to show our commitment to alliances and contribute to regional stability throughout the world. These operations reinforce our capability to participate in coalition and combined warfare with the military units of other nations, as well as strengthen relations with allied military personnel and civilians alike. As we draw down our permanently stationed forces overseas, it becomes even more important to preserve access agreements and basing rights which prove so vital to responding to crises overseas. Forward presence forces conducting operational and training deployments are often the most responsive in cases of natural disaster or regional crisis.

Security Assistance

The bonds of collective security can be strengthened greatly, particularly with lesser developed nations, through programs designed to aid friends and allies to meet the needs of their countries. Through security assistance, the United States can demonstrate commitment, reinforce alliance cohesion, build upon bilateral relations, and provide a moderating influence vital to regional stability and cooperation. The use of US equipment, training, and professional military education can increase US influence, foster interoperability, and build relationships which help create the sympathetic global infrastructure crucial to effective crisis response.

Protecting US Citizens Abroad

US military forces have traditionally been called upon when US lives and property are threatened abroad. Our uniformed military have frequently conducted short-notice evacuation missions, of Americans and non-Americans alike. Not only must our forces provide responsive and capable evacuation lift, they must be prepared to conduct those operations in the midst of armed conflict.

In recent decades, these traditional protection responsibilities have included deterring and countering the threat of
international terrorism to American citizens and property abroad. This requires international cooperation and coordination, and a military force prepared to monitor terrorist activities, anticipate terrorist acts, protect vulnerable targets, and other measures to counter terrorist threats.

**Combatting Drugs**

The detection and significant reduction of the production and trafficking of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of our armed forces. The President and the Secretary of Defense have directed that we deal with this threat as a danger to our security. Under the President's National Drug Strategy, we are charged to help lead the attack on the supply of illegal drugs from abroad.

A comprehensive program for attacking the flow of drugs -- at the source and in transit -- has been established. In the United States proper, the military will support local, state, and federal agencies as permitted by law. The US military is fully committed to this effort. We have established an effective communications network for federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. The military will continue to enhance its detection and monitoring capabilities, and will encourage and assist other nations to develop aggressive efforts and capabilities necessary to stem the flow of drugs. This mission will require the sustained employment of properly trained and equipped forces for the foreseeable future.

**Humanitarian Assistance**

Increasingly, US forces will be called upon to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief both at home and abroad. As one of the few nations in the world with the means to rapidly and effectively respond to disaster, many nations depend on us for assistance. Not only must our forces be prepared to provide humanitarian aid, but as seen recently in Northern Iraq, in some cases they must also be prepared to engage in conflict in order to assist and protect those in need.

**CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

The precise nature of a US response to a crisis will be predicated on the criticality of US interests at stake, our commitments to the nations involved, the level and sophistication of the threat, and the capabilities of US and allied forces. Prior to committing US forces to combat it must be determined that US vital interests are at risk and that political, diplomatic, and economic measures have failed to correct the situation or have been ruled out for some other reason. Our strategy is to resolve any conflict in which we become involved swiftly and decisively, in concert with our allies and friends. While striving to contain conflict to the region of origin and to limit conflict to conventional means, we must plan measures to deter or defend US interests and take other actions as necessary outside the region.
There are cases where the swift and effective application of force such as a preemptory or retaliatory measure can defuse a crisis before it develops into a situation requiring the deployment of large formations. Key to the success of these and all other combat operations are clearly stated, measurable, and attainable military objectives. The military force is then tailored to the particular circumstances and to accomplish the specific tasks assigned.

**PLANNING FOR A GLOBAL CONFLICT**

While there is no longer a proximate threat of a global war, our superpower status carries with it the responsibility for leadership in the free world should the potential for global conflict emerge as it has three times in this century. We will not retain the forces required for a global conflict. However, we must know what it takes to build up to the necessary levels and to effectively employ the forces. Reconstitution can take on different forms depending upon the assessed time available to prepare the forces and equipment. CINC's must plan for this eventuality but as a last priority.

Classic military strategy matches the ends to be achieved with the means to achieve the ends - an ends, ways, and means approach. The uncertain world we face requires us to deal effectively with the unknown and unexpected, and we have done so with flexible options and adaptive plans. The forces then are derived from the strategy -- the forces needed to execute the strategy -- a base force.
As we reduce and restructure our armed forces in recognition of the realities of the 1990s, it is important to preserve a core capability to deter aggression, provide meaningful presence abroad, respond to regional crises, and rebuild a global warfighting capability. As portrayed in the diagram below, this force must be prepared to meet these demands throughout a spectrum of environments, from peace through the occurrence of multiple regional crises. In each case, the force must be flexible enough to adapt to the changing circumstances while preserving those core capabilities so necessary to deter and defend. This force is the Base Force.

In peacetime, those forces not dedicated to strategic deterrence will primarily be charged with responsibilities of forward presence and preparing for crisis response. The portions dedicated to presence are largely driven by interests in various regions of the world, as well as commitments to allies and formal collective security agreements. Those forces earmarked for crisis response train for regional contingencies and often serve in the forward presence role as they participate in deployments and joint and combined exercises in various regions of the world. This carefully managed blend of highly ready forces engaged in peacetime activities at diverse locations provides the nation with the global strength to deter would-be aggressors, influence world events, and to encourage continued democratic and
economic progress and respect for human rights in an atmosphere of enhanced stability.

As the nation is called upon to respond to crises, regional CINCs will form appropriately tailored joint task forces, the "crisis response" portion of the diagram. These joint task forces will include an increasing number of both forward presence and crisis response forces as the intensity of regional crises grows. Such task forces may require maritime prepositioned supplies and equipment in regions where land-based prepositioning is not feasible. In each situation, however, it is crucial that a portion of the force continues to deter would-be aggressors in other regions, and to support alliance commitments elsewhere. In other words, we do not plan to commit 100% of the force to any one crisis.

While the nation downsizes and restructures its military forces in response to the changing environment, those elements and assets necessary to rebuild our global warfighting capability must be preserved. During the period of expanded warning time, these resources would be used to create new units, expand defense production, and begin the long-term mobilization necessary to respond to a global challenge.

In brief, the National Military Strategy provides for our enduring defense needs. The Base Force is the force needed to execute the National Military Strategy and to maintain an acceptable level of risk.

Substantially smaller than the forces of the 1980s, the Base Force is a future force which anticipates continued progress and improvement in the security environment. Designed to provide us with the capabilities needed to deal with an uncertain future, the Base Force is dynamic and can be reshaped in response to further changes in the strategic environment. The plan for downsizing and reconfiguring our forces to the Base Force level is both prudent and fiscally attainable. Faster reductions risk the danger of destroying the cohesion, morale, and military effectiveness of today's forces.
The Base Force acknowledges the changing world order, domestic fiscal constraints, and the needs of our new military strategy. It maximizes the capabilities of each component and integrates active and reserve forces from each of the services into an effective military force capable of responding across the spectrum of conflict. Founded upon the capabilities of historical, current, and potential adversaries, the Base Force also acknowledges the support of friends and allies.

Forward presence forces are predominantly drawn from the active component of all services. For regional crises, our forces will also be drawn in large part from the active components, with essential support from the reserve components. If these crises become larger or more protracted, we will increasingly rely upon the reserve components.

While some forces are oriented on specific geographic areas to include forward stationing, all forces are available for worldwide employment. The Base Force is not today's force. It is the much smaller force we intend to have in 1995.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCE COMPOSITION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRATEGIC</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers B-52 + B-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBNs 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active 16 Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve 10 Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAVY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships 530 (15 CVBGs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active 13 Air Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve 2 Air Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USMC</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active 3 MEFs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve 1 Division / Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active 22 FWE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve 12 FWE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CVBG: Carrier Battle Group  MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force  FWE: Fighter Wing Equivalent

The Base Force is subdivided into four conceptual force packages and four supporting capabilities. This is a force sizing tool and not a blueprint for a new command structure.
FOUR MILITARY FORCE PACKAGES

Strategic Forces

To deter the threat of nuclear aggression -- as we have for the past 40 years -- we must continue to maintain a credible triad of modern, flexible, and survivable systems. The 18 ballistic missile submarines in the force are all Tridents. The bomber leg, consisting of the B-1, B-52, and B-2, will provide us with both nuclear and conventional capability. 500 Minuteman III and 50 Peacekeeper land-based ICBMs round out the strategic triad. The reserve components accomplish the majority of air defense interceptor missions and will comprise a significant portion of the air refueling fleet.

Our strategic force structure complies with START and the President's unilateral nuclear initiative and could get even smaller depending on the results of discussions with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. However, the sheer size of the old Soviet arsenal means the requirement for nuclear deterrence will be with us for years to come. Also, the number of nations possessing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long range delivery systems will likely increase. SDI efforts have been refocused to develop and field a global protection against limited strikes (GPALS) on our deployed forces, friends and allies, and the United States.

Atlantic Forces

US interests in the Atlantic Regions -- including Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Africa, and Southwest Asia -- require a continuing commitment. The United States will maintain forward stationed and rotational forces, a capability for rapid reinforcement from within the Atlantic region and from the United States, and the means to support deployment of larger forces when needed.

- Forward Presence -

The end of the Cold War has significantly reduced the requirement to station US forces in Europe. Yet, the security of the United States remains linked to that of Europe, and our continued support of the Atlantic Alliance is crucial. Our stake in long-term European security and stability, as well as enduring economic, cultural, and geo-political interests require a continued commitment of US military strength.

Our forward presence forces in Europe must be sized, designed, and postured to preserve an active and influential role in the Atlantic Alliance and in the future security framework on the continent. We are committing an Army corps, Air Force wings, and naval forces to support the new NATO strategy. The Army corps is the foundation of a US-led multinational corps and provides the US division committed to a German-led multinational corps as well as forward based
elements of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Forces.

The corps is the fundamental Army unit capable of credible theater warfighting, possessing organic logistics, communications, and intelligence infrastructure. It can conduct combat operations in Europe, project viable power elsewhere, and support the arrival of reinforcing units from the CONUS should the continental situation change. A corps, with two divisions, is the minimum Army force suitable to serve this purpose.

Air Force fighter wings have the flexibility to meet the wide range of theater commander tasks. They can gain air superiority, suppress enemy defenses, and strike tactical and strategic targets with precision. In addition, the Air Force in Europe provides the core basing, command and control, and mobility infrastructure to facilitate the receipt of reinforcing units. Three to four wings are required to meet these forward presence demands.

Carrier battle groups and Marine amphibious forces provide meaningful forward presence and crisis response capabilities from the North Atlantic throughout the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Gulf. Providing stability and security in these densely travelled and potentially volatile seas, naval forces can establish and maintain control of open ocean and littoral areas, deliver forces by sea, land Marine amphibious forces, and support a land engagement with carrier air and cruise missiles. Two carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups (from both Atlantic and Pacific Forces) are required to support US interests throughout this region, providing the full range of naval subsurface, surface, and air power.

The 1990-1991 Gulf crisis tested our capability to respond rapidly to a severe threat in Southwest Asia. Today, almost a year after the defeat of Iraq, about 25,000 US servicemen and women remain in the Persian Gulf, many times our presence before Desert Shield. This heightened level of presence in the Gulf is not permanent -- it's there to reassure our friends, to chill our adversaries, and to discourage other adversaries from emerging. Presence can be reduced as the potential for crisis decreases. The long term strategy includes a mix of maritime deployments, a capability to rotate selected air forces, pre-positioned materiel, and combined exercises involving each of our military components.

- Crisis Response -

In times of crisis, we must have the capability to reinforce our forward presence forces while still maintaining our commitments in other regions. These requirements underscore the need to preserve the strength of US-based heavy Army forces capable of prevailing against a similarly armed opponent; naval forces capable of establishing and maintaining sea control and projecting power ashore; amphibious forces capable of conducting forcible entry operations; and air forces that can strike an enemy's vital centers of gravity,
achieve air superiority and conduct other missions to achieve theater commander objectives.

Active forces based in the US, tailored principally to respond to crises in the Atlantic region, include: a reinforcing heavy Army corps with three divisions, each with a reserve roundout brigade; two Air Force fighter wings; one Marine Expeditionary Force; and four carrier battle groups. In addition, US elements of the Belgian Tri-national Corps will come from the CONUS.

Across the Atlantic, potential adversaries still have large, modern, and capable armies and air forces. Although available for world-wide employment, six Army reserve divisions and eleven Air Force fighter wings are, therefore, focused on this area.

**Pacific Forces**

US interests in the Pacific, including Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, require a continuing commitment. Because the forces of potential adversaries in the Pacific are different than in the Atlantic, and due to the maritime character of the area, US military forces in this vast region of major importance differ from those in the Atlantic arena.

**- Forward Presence -**

The presence of US forces serves as a stabilizing influence in this economically important area. The geography, US interests, and the nature of potential threats dictate the need for joint forces similar to but smaller than those present today. Forward presence forces will be principally maritime, with half of our projected carrier and amphibious force oriented toward this area including one forward deployed carrier battle group along with a Marine Expeditionary Force. We plan to keep one aircraft carrier battle group and an amphibious ready group homeported in Japan and have developed new forward options not dependent upon our former bases in the Philippines. The improving military capability of South Korea has enabled our Army forces to be trimmed to less than a division. Air Forces can be reduced to 2 to 3 fighter wing equivalents in Korea and Japan. The pace of the reductions is gauged to shifting to a supporting role in Korea and modulated by North Korea’s actions and nuclear cooperation. In addition, we retain forward presence forces in both Alaska and Hawaii.

**- Crisis Response -**

Forces oriented toward the Pacific must be sufficient to demonstrate the United States will continue to be a military power and remain vitally interested in the region. The North Korean threat remains and still requires reinforcing US forces for the Korean peninsula. As South Korea continues to improve its military capabilities, we expect to be able to reduce our ground and air presence. Crisis response forces focused on the Pacific region include forces in Hawaii, Alaska, and CONUS. These include 1+ division, 1 fighter wing, and 5 carrier battle groups.
Contingency Forces

Our strategy for the "come-as-you-are" arena of spontaneous, often unpredictable crises, requires fully-trained, highly-ready forces that are rapidly deliverable, and initially self-sufficient. Therefore, such forces must be drawn primarily from the active force structure and tailored into highly effective joint task forces that capitalize on the unique capabilities of each service and the special operations forces. In this regard, the CINC must have the opportunity to select from a broad spectrum of capabilities such as: airborne, air assault, light infantry, and rapidly deliverable heavy forces from the Army; the entire range of fighter, fighter-bomber, and long range conventional bomber forces provided by the Air Force; carrier-based naval air power, the striking capability of surface combatants, and the covert capabilities of attack submarines from the Navy; the amphibious combat power of the Marine Corps, particularly when access ashore is contested; and the unique capabilities of our special operations forces. Additionally, certain reserve units must be maintained at high readiness to assist and augment responding active units. Reserve forces perform much of the lift and other vital missions from the outset of any contingency operation. Contingency forces include forward stationed and deployed Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Forces; special operations forces; and US-based units.

US-Based Contingency Forces

Each CINC can choose what is needed for crisis response either from assigned forces, or from US-based contingency forces, and special operations forces. US-based contingency forces include an Airborne Corps headquarters, 5 Army divisions, 7 Air Force fighter wings, and 1 Marine Expeditionary Force. These forces are carefully balanced to provide both light and heavy ground forces with a forced entry capability by air or sea, and a fighter and attack capability from Air Force wings or Navy carriers. Also, the locations of the bases for air, sea, and land contingency forces facilitate joint training and enable early, rapid movement to rail terminals, airports, and seaport facilities.

US-based Army contingency forces provide an airborne division that can be air-dropped or air-landed on short notice; an air assault division providing the unique helicopter capabilities exploited with great success in Desert Storm; two full-up, all-active, heavy divisions ready to be the first heavy units to arrive from the US; and a light infantry division capable of being transported rapidly to a crisis. Air Force wings provide a full spectrum of air combat capability to include air superiority, strategic attack, mobility, air refueling, and support of surface forces. Selected forces are organized into composite wings -- Air Force multi-aircraft organizations specifically tailored for rapid power projection abroad and support of air-land operations. A Marine expeditionary force provides an amphibious forcible entry capability and the ability to employ Maritime
Prepositioning Squadrons positioned in strategic areas around the world.

The contingency forces must be maintained at the highest possible readiness levels to respond in a moment’s notice to crisis around the world. They complement our forward deployed assets; can provide an initial response capability where we have no forward deployed forces; facilitate joint training and the development of joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; and enhance joint force employment since these forces will routinely train together.

**FOUR SUPPORTING CAPABILITIES**

**Transportation**

Regional focus, flexible/adaptive planning, and reduced forward presence have all combined to significantly increase our reliance on strategic mobility. The United States requires sufficient strategic mobility to rapidly deploy and sustain overwhelming combat power in any region where US national interests are threatened. Prepositioned materiel, either ashore or afloat, can contribute to strategic mobility by reducing the requirements for early heavy lift at the time of crisis. Any weak link along this complex chain can disrupt or even halt a deployment.

**Space**

Effective employment of Strategic, Atlantic, Pacific, and Contingency forces requires an extensive space capability. Early warning, intelligence, weather, surveillance, navigation, and C3 requirements dictate the need for a wide variety of space systems, including the means to provide information to field commanders in a timely manner. Increasing demands for strategic defense and treaty monitoring, as well as emerging tactical needs, require effective spacecraft and infrastructure. Space forces must be able to accomplish four tasks: space control (combat against enemy forces in space and their infrastructure); force application (combat against enemy land, sea, air, and missile forces); force enhancement (support for land, sea, and air forces); and space support (satellite control and launch capability). More than ever before, space is the "High Ground" that we must occupy.

**Reconstitution**

Preserving the potential for expansion of air, ground, and maritime forces will require extraordinary foresight and political courage to lay away infrastructure, stockpile critical materials, protect the defense industrial base, sustain a cadre of quality leaders, and invest in basic science and high-payoff technologies. Reconstitution also requires important decisions based on early strategic warning.
A key element in responding to this challenge is Graduated Mobilization Response. This national process integrates actions to increase our emergency preparedness posture in response to warning of crisis. These actions are designed to mitigate the impact of a crisis and to reduce significantly the lead time associated with responding to a full scale national security emergency.

**Research and Development (R&D)**

Beyond the requirement for a reconstitution capability, is the compelling need for continued and significant R&D in a wide spectrum of technologies, applications, and systems. As with the training and overall readiness of our military forces, there can be no false economies in this critical area. Product improvement, modernization, and technological innovation all flow from research and development, and, if properly protected, have dramatic impacts on battlefield effectiveness and on our ability to reconstitute fighting forces in the future. Since we currently have the most technologically advanced systems in the world, our future investment choices may require a different acquisition strategy than we have followed in the past. For example, full scale production may not always follow prototyping. We need to protect the capability to produce the world's most technologically advanced weapons systems, but only if required.
CONCLUSION

The world has changed in dramatic ways. This national military strategy reflects those changes with a shift in focus to adaptive regional planning providing more options for decisionmakers. Forces, ready to move either from CONUS or forward deployed locations to the scene of a crisis, have the strategic agility to mass overwhelming force and terminate conflict swiftly and decisively. The strategy recognizes the very positive developments in the former Soviet Union and acknowledges the changes brought about through the arms control process.

The strategy has evolved as profound changes continued throughout the world and reflects a vision of the coming decade. The distinguishing feature of this new strategy is that it focuses more on regional threats and less on global confrontation. The recent conflict in the Gulf followed the new directions charted by this strategy. Examples include:

☆ Effective coalitions are possible and desirable in countering regional conflicts;

☆ High-technology weapons, combined with innovative joint doctrine, gave our forces the edge;

☆ The high quality of our military men and women made an extraordinary victory possible;

☆ In a highly uncertain world, sound planning, forces in forward areas, and strategic air and sea lift are critical for developing the confidence, capabilities, international cooperation, and reach needed in times of trouble; and

☆ It takes a long time to build the high-quality forces, systems, leadership, and doctrine that make success possible.

While we learned valuable lessons from Desert Shield and Desert Storm, it would be unwise to assume that future regional conflict will be similar in either circumstance or response.

This strategy provides our national leadership with the ways and means to achieve national security objectives and facilitates United States global leadership in a rapidly changing world -- an unprecedented opportunity to influence peaceful change.

WHAT HAS REALLY CHANGED IN US MILITARY STRATEGY?

Regional Orientation

Threat of the Uncertain and Unknown

A Smaller Total Force -- The Base Force

CINCs Drive the Planning Process

Adaptive Plans

Strategic Agility

Decisive Force
The United States has been the world's leading power twice before in our history, in 1918 and 1945, and many saw no dangers then. In the 1950s and in the 1970s, some said we would never again become involved in any new regional conflicts. If we choose to do nothing -- to merely hope fledgling international cooperation and democratic ideals will take root - to stagnate and weaken in our isolation -- we assuredly sow seeds for future conflicts.

Winston Churchill is quoted as having said just before World War I...

"War is too foolish, too fantastic to be thought of in the Twentieth Century.... Civilization has climbed above such perils. The interdependence of nations..., the sense of public law...have rendered such nightmares impossible."

After stating this popular position, Churchill added, "Are you quite sure? It would be a pity to be wrong."

We have paid the price of being wrong before. It is far cheaper in the long run, and far safer, to pay the price that readiness requires -- even in this safer world that our past efforts have made possible.