Near East/South Asia Report
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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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SYMPOSIUM HELD IN ANKARA ON 'INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM'

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 24 Apr 84 pp 1,4

[Text] Yesterday's edition of CUMHURIYET carried a very interesting article by Cengiz Candar. The article is reproduced below with some omissions.

It is evident that we will witness new Armenian activities these days on the occasion of 24 April [Armenian Martyrs' Day]. These expected activities have gained additional significance in view of the closed session to be held by the National Assembly.

The Symposium on International Terrorism held recently in Ankara also became a factor in focusing the public's attention on the issue. The symposium also led to a diplomatic row following a protest filed by the Soviet Embassy.

The symposium in Ankara was beneficial on at least one count: In view of the Soviet protest, we must begin taking a serious approach to the Armenian question. For the last two years, various institutions and individuals have been organizing meetings on Armenian terrorism—perhaps with the approval of higher authorities. The theme of such meetings and their participants have remained unchanged. The theme of the meetings is as follows:

1. It is the Soviet Union that stands behind Armenian terrorism. Since Turkey is a member of NATO, it is in the interests of the Soviet Union to see Turkey destabilized.

2. The Armenian fighters are trained in Palestinian camps. This charge has been modified recently, and it is now said that the Armenians are being trained in Syria. This is logical since Syria has the closest ties with the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

One of the permanent participants of these meetings on Armenian terrorism is Paul (Hentz), a former member of the U.S. National Security Council and a leading CIA official. Another frequent participant is Professor Wallsetter, a strategist for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force.

Given that Armenian terrorism is a Turkish problem, its resolution cannot be entrusted to individuals who have worked for the political interests of a superpower.
Meanwhile, the academicians who took part in the symposium in Ankara were generally psychiatrists and physicians who have spent most of their lives in the United States. In other words, they have no historical background. These individuals went further than their American colleagues in accusing the Soviets.

Consequently, it is hard to say that the symposium in Ankara was a serious and beneficial endeavor from a viewpoint of combating Armenian terrorism. Furthermore, it prompted the Soviet protest and thus got our country involved in the conflict between the two superpowers. Indeed, even former Ambassador to France Hasan Esat Isik—who left his post and returned to Turkey to protest the inauguration of an Armenian monument in Marseilles—criticized the symposium and said: "The campaign against Armenian terrorism must not become a board piece in the superpower conflict."

Therefore, the issue of Armenian terrorism must not be reduced to the level of anti-Soviet propaganda.

It should be noted that the charges leveled against the Soviets are not based on any evidence. The charges are fruits of deductive reasoning and imagination. However, those charges can be countered by the following argument:

1. The Soviet Union is a multinational state. Nationalism is a weapon against the Soviet Union. From that viewpoint, it is not in the interests of the Soviet Union to support Armenian terrorism which fuels Armenian nationalism. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the Dashnak party [Armenian Revolutionary Federation], which incorporates a major portion of Armenian terrorism, is a strongly anti-Soviet organization and would like to establish an independent Armenia and merge it with the territory of Soviet Armenia which will have to secede from the Soviet Union.

2. It is Israel which has been promoting the theory of dividing up Middle Eastern countries along ethnic or religious lines. Evidence is available on this issue. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir declared in connection with the operation of the Turkish armed forces inside Iraq that an ethnic group has been forced to live divided on the territories of several countries and that it too has the right to set up its own state. Shamir thus expressed his support for them and talked in favor of terrorism. It must also not be forgotten that the Armenian Church in Israel provides support for Armenian terrorism.

In addition, it is no secret that the United States maintains ties with the Dashnak party. The leader of the Christian forces in Lebanon, Fadi Hayek, once said that the Dashnak party is an organization affiliated with the CIA.

Therefore, we can argue that, in order to keep Turkey as an obedient and disciplined ally, the United States is employing means other than military aid which is used like a Damocles' sword. These methods may have been devised by mentors like Paul (Hentz).

In view of all these facts, it is hard to claim that the symposium in Ankara served any useful purpose. Now, we hope that the Assembly will take a serious approach to the issue.
ARMENIAN PRELATE IN TEHRAN INTERVIEWED BY TURKISH REPORTER

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 24 Apr 84 p 1

[Interview with Archbishop Ardak Manukian]

[Text] Today's edition of MILLIYET carries an interview with the Armenian Prelate of Tehran, Archbishop Ardak Manugian. Responding to reporter Murad Bardakci's questions, the Archbishop charges that Turkey must amend the injustice committed and that Turkey knows how it can be done. The Archbishop says:

"We have no ties with ASALA [Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia], but we know, of course, that the genocide and the historic Armenian lands lie at the root of the problem."

Asked why he has not yet responded to the attacks launched against Turks in Tehran although he has condemned acts of terrorism in France, the Archbishop replied:

"Terrorist acts are committed in every country, but the religious leaders of that country do not condemn the acts, because it is not their responsibility. That is an issue that must be resolved by governments."

[Question] What, in your opinion, should be done to solve this problem?

[Answer] The only solution lies in the implementation of justice.

[Question] What kind of justice?

[Answer] Turkey knows the way.

[Question] For example, should Turkey return the lands which ASALA demands and which allegedly belong to the Armenians? Do you think such a demand is realistic?

[Answer] There is nothing that cannot be realized in the world. At one time, millions of Armenians lived in Anatolia. Today, only a few remain. This means that something happened there. Where did the Armenians of Lebanon come from? That alone proves the veracity of the events of 1915. The first thing to do is to research how the animosity began 69 years ago.

[Question] Yes, but Turkey also has a viewpoint on this issue. Have you ever thought about that?
There is only one truth. Both sides cannot be right.

I understand that ceremonies have been planned for 24 April. How does Iran view your demands?

April 24 is Martyrs' Day. We will hold religious requiem and we will stage demonstrations. As Iranian citizens, we enjoy our minority rights.

But the use of Armenian language was recently banned in Armenian schools and Farsi became mandatory. Such a situation does not exist in Turkey.

This is an important problem for us. A tradition that goes back thousands of years has been altered and everything has been thrown into confusion. But I am hoping that this problem will be resolved.
DIMENSIONS OF REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE DESCRIBED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English No 9, 25 Apr 84 pp 1-4

[Article: "Libya: Terror Reigns"]

[Text] Britain's breaking of diplomatic relations with Libya is unlikely to curtain significantly Col Gadaffi's international terrorist network.

Libyan revolutionary violence abroad has both a domestic and a foreign dimension. It tends to erupt at times of tension within Libyan society. Gadaffi has skillfully managed to establish an extra-legal body of "shock troops of the Libyan revolution" in his 'revolutionary committees,' sometimes known as "revolutionary guards" or "brigades."

Various highly significant clashes between revolutionary committees and unhappy Libyan citizens took place in Libya during the few days before the London shooting. Particularly violent was the unrest at Zware, close to the Tunisian border, on 16 April, the day before the shooting. That day too, a Libyan military plane reportedly defected to Egypt. The previous day there had been the latest in a series of bomb explosions at military installations, this time at El Fwahat, close to Benghazi. Shortly before there was a well-documented explosion at the headquarters of the Libyan army's Seventh Division at Al Abyar, 40 miles east of Benghazi. The Seventh Division includes many professional soldiers who served in Chad. In the Al Abyar incident several people are reported to have died and scores were wounded. And on 15 April two Tripoli University students, Rasheed Kaabar and Salem al-Madaniz were hanged in front of an audience of shocked students in the main courtyard of the campus.

Gadaffi was also worried about the growing but in objective terms, still miniscule opposition movement. He was particularly concerned, it appears, about the effect of opposition literature and sentiments on the 8-10,000 students Libya sends abroad to study each year (4,000 in Britain alone). If these students were beginning to question his system, they could be corrupted and turned by the opposition. Therefore the opposition had to be eliminated.

5
Gadaffi already had the infrastructure for his hit-squads in place. During the past four years the regime has established an efficient arms purchasing system in Europe. Ironically much of the purchasing was coordinated from Tripoli by former London charge Musa Kusa, who from 1980 till recently worked in the ministry of religious works. Since February he has been one of the leading lights in the new ministry of external security. (Kusa was deported from London in 1980 after the murder of two Libyans in London).

As emerged in the trial of British arms dealer Barry Howson, London used to feature as a place where weapons were acquired by Libyans. In December 1982 he was convicted of smuggling 600 handguns, silencers and ammunition worth £80,000 to various Libyan embassies, including those in London, Brussels, Paris, Berne, Istanbul, Athens and Rabat.

Today arms purchasing is centred on Libyan People's Bureaux in Brussels and Berne. But buying missions from Libya tend to arrive anywhere at any time. Among the 20-30 individuals who were besieged inside the Libyan Peoples' Bureau in London was an eight-man 'military mission,' headed by a Col Hammali. The mission had come to London to visit various private armaments factories. (The ministry of defence was unaware of its presence in Britain).

Superimposed upon the semi-official Libyan defence procurement network is a more sinister terrorist link. Sometimes the two overlap. As suggested before in AC, Berne serves as an important spying and general communications headquarters for the Libyans. But recently Madrid has emerged as the focus for the coordination of terrorist activities in Europe. This is partly because of the extremely close relations between various strands of the ruling Spanish socialist party and the Libyans. Until recently a Libyan could have a visa for Spain on demand, though recently regulations have tightened up and one month is now the usual waiting time.

Despite official Libyan denials, the Peoples' Bureau in Madrid coordinated the despatch from Cyprus in late March or early April of two Syrian-trained Libyan hit-squads of six members each, not all of them Libyan nationals. One of these hit-squads allegedly came to London carrying UAE passports. Some members of this squad were possibly among the pro-Gadaffi demonstrators outside the Peoples' Bureau in London the morning of the shooting. They escaped to London airport where they were detained carrying UAE passports. But since there was nothing to charge them with, they were released.

On top of this structure are the 'revolutionary students' who have been sent to some countries, both to beef up the ideological fervour of the Libyan diplomats and to keep an eye on the activities of Libyan students there, using violence if need be to halt the spread of opposition activity. They act as the foreign arm of the revolutionary committees at home. Four revolutionary students, Abdul Ghadir Baghdadi, Saleh Ibrahim, Maatoq Maatoq and Ali Bugaziah took over the Peoples' Bureau in London with these ends (AC Vol 25 No 5). They themselves had already been in Britain as students for around two years. Apparently none of them was in the Peoples' Bureau at the time of the shooting. Bugaziah was in Libya on a trip.
Beghdadi and Ibrahim have since been deported. Maatooq was picked up by British police yesterday. Somewhat disconcerting for the authorities must be the knowledge that seemingly insignificant students (in Watford, Coventry and Bournemouth it appears) can act as 'sleeping' revolutionary committee members.

Before it was closed down four years ago, the Libyan People's Bureau in Washington was a centre for the coordination of spying on and, in one documented case, the assassination of Libyan students in the United States. (There were 4,000 there at the time). Italy, France and West Germany have been the other main operating centres. All these countries have conducted equally confused policies towards the revolutionary students. In April 1983 two Libyan terrorists charged in West Germany eventually had to be deported when Gaddafi held eight West Germans in Libya hostage (AC Vol 24 No 9).

Difficult to guage yet is the effect of the London shooting and its aftermath on Gaddafi's diplomacy. He has clearly revelled in the publicity, and sought to prolong the media circus associated with the siege to the very last minute. He may have frightened a few opposition figures with his show of force. But Libyans at home are unlikely to have been particularly impressed. Meanwhile the opposition has grown in stature, though it is difficult to assess how this advantage could be effectively realised.

The Political System, in Theory

Formally, political control in Libya is the prerogative of the Libyan people as a whole. Under the Jamahiri system, the "general will" of the Libyan people is expressed through a series of popular committees to which all Libyans belong. Their views, as expressed in the committees, are translated into decisions at the national level through the 189 basic popular congresses around the country, to which delegates are mandated from popular committees and through the General People's Congress, which meets once or twice a year to translate popular committee decisions into national policy. Under this system, Gaddafi and his old associates from the Nasserist Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) days have no formal role to play at all. Apart from Gaddafi only four original RCC members still survive. Their formal function is to "revolutionise the masses." Until 1980, these five effectively controlled Libya. Maj Jalloud advised Gaddafi, Abu Bakr Yunis was in charge of the armed forces, Mustafa al Kharoubi handled state security and Khawaldi al Hamaidi internal affairs.

However, in 1979, Gaddafi, realising that the revolutionary potential of the popular committee system was waning, decided to provide a new committee system to act as a guarantor of revolutionary vitality through the Jamahiriya—the name given to the new constitution granted to Libya by the assumption of "popular power" in March 1978. This was the revolutionary committee system in which revolutionary committee members were selected. Membership was kept secret. Revolutionary committees were created in all significant areas of society and the economy and committee members infiltrated the popular committees to galvanize their work. The personnel involved in the new system were
also new. Many were taken from the first generation that had grown up under the Libyan revolution and was thus free of the "dangerous contamination" of society under the previous regime. Leading figures in the system included Ahmed Ibrahim, who now runs the student revolutionary committees; Musa Kusa; Said Rashid, arrested last year in France on an Italian international warrant for involvement in the murder of a Libyan in Rome. (The French deported him to Libya after 37 French nationals were refused permission to leave Libya); Abdullah Senoussi Rashid who deals with security matters; and Abdullah Hijazi who also handles security and was responsible for planning revolutionary committee activity abroad, including the murder of dissidents in 1980 and more recently.

While the revolutionary committee system was being installed, the role of the old RCC members around Gadaffi was being reduced. Abu Bakr Ynis Jaber was left in charge of the Libyan armed forces because their political role had already been minimised and the controls over them—through the presidential guard and a special anti-military defence unit called the 'deterrent battalion' were considered to have neutralised any potential for independent action. Indeed, the disaffection of the armed forces from the regime has been made evident by repeated rumours of military-inspired coup attempts and by the regime's calls for the militarisation of Libyan society to render a professional army unnecessary. Maj Jalloud, effectively isolated by his role as Gadaffi's special adviser, has recently lost the control over the Libyan oil industry which had given him a certain degree of autonomy. Kharoubi and al Hamaidi still retain positions of importance, but are no longer the key figures they once were.

Partly because of the growing popular disaffection with his regime and partly because, in the end, the ideology he has foisted on Libya does not work, Gadaffi has fallen back on well-tried means of maintaining control of his political creation. Even the revolutionary committee movement has proved to be unreliable, mainly because many of its members lack the sophistication that would enable them to participate effectively in controlling Libya.

Gadaffi's Tribal Resort

As a result, there has been a growing tendency since the late 1970s for Gadaffi to rely on members of his own tribe. Hence the Gadhafia tribe from which he comes, located around the coast along the Gulf of Sirt, has been particularly favoured in the recent political and economic developments that have taken place in Libya. It is no accident, for instance, that the new water pipeline system (AC VOL 25 No 1) being built to pump water to the coast from the fossil reserves at Kufra and Sarir at an initial cost of $3.29 bn but at a total cost that may be as much as $18 bn, should terminate close to Sirt, nor that major petrochemical and industrial developments are taking place there. Nor is it by accident that the proposed new capital for Libya should be in Sirt region. Indeed, in addition to the happy accident of avoiding Cyrenaica as a birthplace, with all its associations with the Sanusi order and the old King Idris, Gadaffi has also been able to avoid relying on the old merchant classes of Tripoli who traditionally provided government in
the pre-colonial period. Thus, now that the well tried patterns of political power being articulated through kin solidarity have replaced formed political institutions, the Gadadhfa hold the crucial levers of power.

Many of the lower ranks of the revolutionary committee movement already betray a common tribal origin, a pattern that is even more strongly reflected at the height of the administration: the old RCC group has been supplanted by four new figures, all from the Gadadhfa. The critical Sirt military region is now controlled by Hassan Ishkal, who replaced Maj Jalloud as controller of the oil industry. Ishkal also controls the Cyrenaica military region. Khalifa Khanash now controls all aspects of security, including the presidential guard and the "deterrent batallion." Related to his activities, but at a slightly lower level, is Ahmed Gadafadam, Gaddafi's cousin who is in practical charge of revolutionary committee activities towards dissidents and security issues outside Libya. He works formally under Col Younis Bilgasim, the former head of intelligence who was appointed secretary of foreign security—a purely formal position. The real power lies with Ahmed Gadafadam. The final figure is Massaadul Abdelhafid, who is in charge of the Kufra and Fezzan military regions.

The Opposition

Organised opposition to the regime has existed almost from the moment the "Great September Revolution" took place in 1969. Though open disagreements were stifled for the first few years, there have been active opposition movements among the growing numbers of Libyans in permanent exile abroad—now numbering about 50,000—since 1973, when Gaddafi launched Libya on its own "cultural revolution." The original basis for dissent from Gaddafi's ideology stemmed from the same bases as his own political inspirations—Arab nationalism. However, while he was initially a convinced Nasserist—a position he has long abandoned in practice—his opponents came both from Nasserist and Baath traditions and saw themselves as progressive, modernist Arab nationalists, a tradition quite different, they believe, from his own political development.

Of the six groups that currently dominate the opposition, the oldest and most influential is the Libyan National Movement, effectively started in 1969. Its founding members, all progressive Arab nationalists, never compromised with the Nasserist Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) that took over in Libya that year. Instead they looked to Libya's youth for support. Among its founding members were Mohamed Hemi, Husain As-Shgir and Umar D'Cheis. D'Cheis, indeed, came from a unique tradition in the Middle East which as early as the 1820s had seen one of its members as a collaborator with Jeremy Bentham in formulating what must have been the first democratic constitution in the Arab world. Though the constitution was never put into practice, the D'Cheis family has always played a major role in Tripolite intellectual and commercial circles, and in government. In 1973, the movement began a far more active policy of opposition towards the regime from abroad, involving itself in open anti-regime propaganda and organisation of Libyan student opposition. Though it has been suggested in the British press recently that the movement is Iraqi-dominated, because
of the presence of activists there under Umran Burweis, the major centre for the movement is in Britain and the United States.

An important offshoot from the movement has been the Libyan General Student's Organisation, created after the public hanging of three students on April 7, 1976 following anti-regime demonstrations in Gareounis University. The student movement, which has been the most public expression of opposition to the regime, is centred in those countries where Libyans have been sent to study—particularly Britain, America and Italy. (There are smaller concentrations in France and Germany). Loosely associated with both these groups is the Libyan National Democratic Front, which draws on the socialist and marxist strain in current Arab nationalist ideologies. Many of its members, for instance, were educated in Egypt during the Nasser period; others had contacts with progressive regimes elsewhere in the Middle East.

The other opposition groups abroad were founded more recently. The Libyan Democratic Front, founded in 1979 by intellectuals and journalists who left Libya after the declaration of the cultural revolution in April 1973, is under the leadership of the journalist Fadhel Messaoudi and publishes a highly effective magazine on Libyan affairs—'Sawt al-Libya' (The Voice of Libya). Since 1982 the Front has been associated with the Libyan National Grouping which originally started in Tripoli in 1973 after the Arab-Israeli war in October of that year. It was implicated in an unsuccessful military coup in August 1975. After the coup, its leader, Capt Umar Meheishi, originally a member of the 1969 RCC in whose name the September revolution that brought the Gaddafi regime to power was carried out, fled Libya for Cairo. He then helped to reanimate the Libyan National Grouping in Cairo. However, its original backers are now dispersed—Meheishi has returned to Libya (AC Vol 24 No 24), for instance—and the group has been absorbed into the Libyan National Democratic Group, along with the Libyan Democratic Front. Its leading member in Britain now is Mahmoud Maghribi, onetime Libyan ambassador to Britain, who defected in 1977.

The group which has recently been a special target of pro-regime terrorism in Britain is the Libyan Constitutional Union, which was founded by Mohamed Ben Ghalboun at the end of 1981. It is particularly strong in Manchester and aims to overthrow the regime, restore the Libyan constitution that existed before the regime took over and hold elections as soon as possible thereafter. In Britain it stands apart from the Libyan National Democratic Grouping and the Libyan National Movement, both of which have been coordinating their activities for the past two years.

The only other significant anti-Gaddafi group is one that exists independently from those listed above and which, quite unlike them, does not take its cue from progressive Arab nationalism. This is the National Salvation Front for Libya founded in 1981 by Dr Mohamed el-Mughariaf in Khartoum. It is also supported by Saudi Arabia and, unlike other groups which accept the implications of operating in the West as well as the Middle East, is far more concerned with its Middle Eastern role. The Front is inspired by a specifically Muslim tradition, similar to that of modernist Islam and certain strands of the Muslim Brotherhood. As such, it is considered to be on the right of
the Libyan political spectrum and does not have close contacts with other groups, though it is the group which currently maintains the highest media profile. It has also been subject to special attacks by the Libyan authorities with threats of reprisals against its Omdurman-based radio station which broadcasts regularly to Libya.

All groups realise that activities inside Libya itself are extremely difficult given the intense security measures there and the widespread and growing militarisation of Libyan society. Nonetheless, they argue that popular discontent is growing because of the regime's demands for ever greater revolutionary fervour from a population that is basically unsympathetic to such demands. The sharp fall in oil revenue and the increasing economic problems the country faces has reduced Gadaffi's room for manouevre.

During the past three years oil revenues have fallen from $20 bn to about $10 bn, luxury imports have been cut, prestige development projects abandoned, even rationing of foodstuffs introduced. Together with foreign policy failures in Africa (the OAU and Chad being the biggest) and in the Middle East (Lebanon, the Gulf, the Mahgreb), the fall in revenue has punctured the 'never had it so good' air which used to be the norm in Libya. At the last General Peoples' Congress in Tripoli in February there were distinct criticisms of Gadaffi, particularly over his plans to restrict the education of women to the home and over his militarisation of the whole population. And the swaggering life-style of the revolutionary committees has come in for considerable if muted criticism. There was a certain element of 'tu quoque' in the revolutionary committees' criticism of the allegedly extravagant bourgeois lifestyles of Libyan diplomats abroad.

CSO: 4500/63
TREATY FOR FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION WITH BULGARIA

Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 6 Apr 84 pp 366-367


[Text] The Bulgarian People's Republic and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah, convinced that the further development and consolidation of the relationship for friendship and cooperation, created between them, respond to the interests of the peoples of both countries and serve the cause of international peace and security,

expressing their readiness to continue to work in the future for strengthening anti-imperialist solidarity, unity, and cohesion of the forces struggling for the consolidation of peace, liberty, and independence, democracy and social progress of all nations,

determined to oppose the aggressive policy of imperialism and to fight against colonialism, neocolonialism, Zionism, racism, and reaction in all their forms and manifestations,

affirming their adherence to the goals and principles set down in the Charter of the United Nations,

taking into consideration the Declaration for the Development of Friendship and Cooperation between the Bulgarian People's Republic and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah, signed on 25 December 1976, and guided by the aspiration to develop bilateral relations, have decided to conclude this treaty and have agreed upon the following:

Article 1

The contracting parties declare their determination to consolidate the staunch friendship between the two nations and to develop their political relations and universal cooperation on the basis of the principles of equality, respect of sovereignty, national independence, and territorial integrity, and of non-interference in internal affairs.
Article 2

The Bulgarian People's Republic respects the policies of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which are based on the principles and aims of the movement of the nonaligned countries, oriented toward the struggle against imperialism, for national liberation, and the consolidation of peace and cooperation among nations.

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya respects the foreign policy of the Bulgarian People's Republic, which is based on the principles and aims of the socialist community, which effectively contributes to guaranteeing peace and the consolidation of security and detente in international relations.

Article 3

The contracting parties, through mutual cooperation, will continue to make efforts in the future to create conditions for the consolidation and further expansion of the social and economic exchange between the two countries.

For this purpose, they will develop mutually beneficial cooperation in the various areas of national economy, scientific and technical cooperation, and cooperation in the expansion of commercial trade on the basis of respect for the principles of equality and mutual benefit.

The concrete areas and conditions of this cooperation will be regulated in supplementary documents.

Article 4

The contracting parties will contribute to the consolidation and development of contacts and cooperation in the fields of science, culture, education, health care, television, radio, the press, cinema, tourism, sports, etc., with the aim of mutual acquaintance with the life, labor, experience, and achievements of both nations.

Article 5

The contracting parties will continue to make efforts in the future to preserve peace and security in the world, for consolidation and development of the process of detente in the international situation, for stopping the arms race, and achieving a general and complex disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under efficient international control. They will make efforts to apply consistently the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations among nations with different social systems.

Article 6

The contracting parties will continue to cooperate together in the struggle against the aggressive policy of world imperialism, for opposing colonialism, neocolonialism, Zionism, and racism in all their forms and manifestations.
In the spirit of unity of the progressive anti-imperialist forces, they will support the righteous struggle for national liberation, independence, sovereignty, social progress, for the total reckoning of their right to use their own natural resources, as well as the efforts oriented toward reformation of international economic relations on a just and democratic basis.

Article 7

The contracting parties will exchange information and maintain consultation with the aim of exchanging opinion on important international problems, which concern the interests of both countries.

Article 8

Each of the contracting parties declares that it will not participate in armed alliances and will not participate in any groupings whatever, or in military actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 9

The contracting parties declare that this treaty does not affect their international obligations and it is not directed against a third party. They are obliged not to conclude any international agreements whatsoever, which are incompatible with this treaty.

Article 10

Questions which may arise in interpreting and applying this treaty will be settled by both contracting parties in the spirit of friendship, mutual respect, and understanding.

Article 11

This treaty is subject to ratification according to the procedure established by each of the contracting parties, and goes into effect on the date of the exchange of ratified documents, which will take place in Tripoli.

Article 12

This treaty is concluded for a period of 10 years from the date it goes into effect and will be automatically continued for each subsequent decade thereafter, unless one of the contracting parties declares, in written form, one year prior to the expiration of the corresponding period, that it wishes to abrogate the treaty.

Prepared in Sofia on 21 January 1983 (7. 4. 1392 [u.r.]) in two copies—in Bulgarian and Arabic, both texts being equally valid.

For the Bulgarian People's Republic
Todor Zhivkov

For the Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriyah
Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi
SPECIAL ADVISER TO SHAMIR DISCUSSES POLICIES

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Apr 84 p 5

[Article by Robert Rosenberg: "Shamir's Shadow"]

[Text] The corridors of power in Israel are represented by only one short, widdish hallway with seven doors. Behind a glass door guarded by a handful of security men is the inner sanctum, or, as more than one journalist has described it, the Holy of Holies of politics in Israel: the Prime Minister's Office.

In politics, information—in fact, rumour or gossip—is the real source of power. To be inside that mundane-looking corridor is to be simultaneously the recipient and the source of information.

Since Yitzhak Shamir became prime minister, the man with his hand on the information faucet is Yosef Ben-Aharon.

Born in Israel and raised in Egypt, with a rich background in Arab affairs, Ben-Aharon, who wears a small knitted kippa on his balding head, has an office directly across the corridor from Shamir.

Ben-Aharon, who says he shares Shamir's pragmatism, holds to specific jobs and performs a host of other tasks for the prime minister. Officially, he is the prime minister's adviser on state affairs, and the deputy director-general for special tasks of the foreign ministry. But he writes speeches, makes appointments, screens cables, and measures out the information to his boss.

Ben-Aharon came out of relative anonymity in the Foreign Ministry. He had worked ("with my hawkish views") under Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin. He served with Rabin when the latter was ambassador in Washington and later at the Prime Minister's Office. Then he served as deputy counsel general in New York. On his return to Israel, he headed the Syria-Jordan-Palestinian-Lebanon desk in the Foreign Ministry's research centre.

When Shamir went into the Foreign Ministry, some Herut party politicians, racking their brains to find somebody hawkish rather than dovish in the ministry to head his bureau came up with Ben-Aharon's name.
He rapidly took control of Shamir's appointment book and in a short time
became adviser, speech-writer and general "special tasks" associate. So,
when the foreign minister became prime minister, it was natural that within
hours of Shamir's first day in the inner sanctum, he would bring Ben-Aharon
over from the low-slung and pastoral foreign ministry compound to the Prime
Minister's Office in Jerusalem's government kiry.

Ben-Aharon moved into the room occupied by then communications advisor Uri
Porat directly across the hall from the premier. Porat was, in any case,
on his way out. (Shamir's style was not Begin's, and Porat's sarcasm about
his former press colleagues, his highly partisan attitude to his duties as
spokesman, was not in line with Shamir's way of doing things).

Porat was sent to an office beyond the glass doors.

Ben-Aharon describes his working day with Shamir as a loose structure of
providing cables, working papers, "talking papers" for meetings with
visiting statesmen or when Shamir is travelling abroad, and screening the
information the premier receives.

The adviser sees Shamir's "colourlessness," as the press describes it, as
"a respect for the system, a style that requires listening to all the
facts, getting all the information necessary for a decision," and as
"pragmatism." Ben-Aharon implies that this was too often missing in recent
years in the corridors of power.

"He listens, and pulls out of the system the experts he needs to hear in
order to make his decision," says Ben-Aharon, who often during the day gets
a buzz from the premier and is asked to step across the hall in order to
confer on this or that problem.

Although Ben-Aharon insists that he is not Shamir's only source of informa-
tion ("He gets his advice on defence matters from [Defence Minister] Moshe
Arens; his advice on military matters from the chief of staff, and so forth"),
he does concede that he is the last step between Shamir and those who wish
to see him.

Ben-Aharon says that Shamir "much prefers to speak directly, rather than
over the telephone, with his sources."

So what is the advice Ben-Aharon is giving as adviser? I ask.

First of all, he reveals what he's not advising Shamir on: "Politics,
coalition problems, election matters."

Ben-Aharon wants to stay as far away from that sphere as possible, although
it is clear that in the coming months the election will be on everybody's
mind.

Keeping in mind that Israeli society and Arab society are irrevocably
different, the trick, says Ben-Aharon, to formulating policy is to know as
much as possible about the Arabs and conduct policy based on that information
in a manner that makes sense to the Arabs.
Thus, for example, he says that Israel, which will remain in the territories, should perhaps consider that it cannot apply the same democratic political procedure in the Arab society of the West Bank and Gaza as is available to Israeli citizens.

Isn't he afraid that a democratic society like Israel, applying the style of a very different society in its rule of the territories, will end up corrupt? Ben-Aharon answers simply: "We are a chosen people, and it is our challenge not to become corrupted."

But in almost the same breath, he expresses admiration for Shamir "who, while of course believing in the Bible, doesn't use all sorts of theological and historical explanations and formulations to determine his policy or explain it to the rest of the world."

For example, he describes a meeting with Rumanian President Nicolae Ceaucescu, in which the prime minister was essentially asked why Israel doesn't seek a dialogue with the PLO.

"Rather than start on the whole biblical history of our claims and on a historical analysis of anti-Semitism (here Ben-Aharon implies a comparison with a style well-remembered between May 1977 and August 1983), he analysed for Ceaucescu the PLO on the PLO's own terms.

"He explained that the problem lies in the very nature of the PLO, in the nature of Yasser Arafat's leadership, in the PLO covenant. Therefore, Ben-Aharon continues, even if Arafat offered to make peace, "we have nothing to talk about with him."

Shamir, says Ben-Aharon, is not a man for small talk or lecturing. He "has all the characteristics of an intellectual, without being one, preferring reality to theory."

While some describe Shamir as a slow decision-maker, procrastinating on Southern Lebanon, for example, Ben-Aharon says that it is a matter of the prime minister, (who is also the foreign minister) learning all he can before making a decision.

And he won't make any hasty decisions, in the coming months of election campaigning, especially not about Lebanon.

Indeed, says Shamir's adviser, the election campaign almost guarantees that there will be no hasty decision since, despite expected pressure from both inside the Likud (for electoral reasons) and from outside the Likud (for political reasons) for a withdrawal "two weeks before July 23," Shamir's style of decision-making makes those election needs "extraneous" to be the decision-making process.

Indeed, Shamir's style as the election campaign begins seems to be to keep the electioneering outside the corridors of power. The only genuinely partisan politician still in Shamir's office is Begin holdover Yehiel

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Kadishai, who served as Begin's bureau chief. But Kadishai is leaving and Shamir, who suffers neither fools nor sycophants, has given no indication that he plans to bring somebody into the office to serve as his eyes and ears to the party.

And after the Herut vote for Sharon, says another Shamir adviser, "we also won't be listening to the likes of MK Ronnie Milo," who predicted an easy victory for Shamir over Sharon.

Meanwhile, Ben-Aharon, whose views seem to range somewhere between Yuval Ne'eman's secular Tehiya to Hanan Porat's religious nationalism, with a very healthy knowledge of Arabic and what is euphemistically called "the Arab mentality" takes the phone calls.

This biblical scholar wants the prime minister to appear in Hebron on Lag B'Omer for a symposium on Tora and Eretz Yisrael; that Kiryat Shmona politician wants the PM in the northern town for a speech; this cable is coming in from the Foreign Ministry; that top-secret document lying face down on Ben-Aharon's desk needs the prime minister's signature.

The adviser on state affairs is above all an amiable man--both of them are, it seems. And at one point in the conversation Ben-Aharon recalls that in an earlier conversation he said of his boss: "He doesn't have the ambition inside him that says, 'I can do this job better than anybody else; I'm better qualified than anybody else to be prime minister.'"

"With Shamir it's more like, 'It has to be done; I was chosen to do it, and as long as I'm doing it I'll do it the best I can.'"
Knesset Candidate Selection Process Discussed

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 25 Apr 84 p 2

[Article by Sarah Honig]

[Text] Tel Aviv--The Labour Party's central committee convenes this afternoon to vote on the method whereby Knesset candidates will be chosen. There is considerable grass roots pressure for reform, but party sources doubt that any real changes will be made.

At present, 40 percent of the list is theoretically chosen by the party branches and 60 percent by the central committee. In practice, a party appointments committee does most of the choosing.

This has led some of the party groupings to demand that Labour at least in part take a leaf out of the Herut book and leave the choosing to a secret ballot in central committee, thereby freeing the appointments committee from pressure from lobbies and special interests groups.

Labour's Young Guard proposes that a third of the list be chosen by secret ballot. Party Secretary-General Haim Bar-Lev and campaign manager Mordechai Gur agree but they want the ranking of the candidates to still be done by the appointments committee, leaving the real power in the committee's hands.

The kibbutz and moshav movements which are the chief beneficiaries of the present system, oppose any change as does the camp of former premier Yitzhak Rabin.

The United Kibbutz Movement is now demanding 24 percent of the representation on the Labour list. The young guard wants 15 percent, or every seventh candidate, and the women want 20 percent or every fifth candidate.

One proposal is that the party leadership foursome—chairman Shimon Peres, Rabin, former president Yitzhak Navon and Bar-Lev constitute the appointments committee this year. But it is thought likely that others from various power groups will be co-opted.
Meanwhile, the foursome has chosen the platform committee, which will be headed by former justice minister Haim Zadok. The leadership foursome and Mapam leader Victor Shem-Tov will also take part. Gad Ya'acobi will be in charge of putting together the section on the economy, Shlomo Hillel on social and domestic affairs, Ya'acov Tzur on defence and foreign affairs and Ora Namir on education. The committee will hold its first meeting next week.

Former ambassador to the U.S. Simha Dinitz has been put in charge of Labour's TV and radio election advertising and former TV newsman Dan Shilon of TV production.

Author Amos Oz has meanwhile announced that he will not be running on the Labour list.

CSO: 4400/239
MASSIVE JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN HEBRON PLANNED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Apr 84 pp 1, 3

[Article by David Richardson]

[Text] A recently-completed master plan for Jewish settlement in Hebron drawn up by the settlers themselves envisages a Jewish community of some 3,000 people within seven years and extensive construction and renovation on over 70 dunams of partly Jewish-owned property in five separate areas of the predominantly Moslem city. Longer-term goals call for the purchase and requisitioning of Arab-owned property to link the Jewish quarters in Hebron in a "territorial continuum" to Kiryat Arba, the Israeli suburb on the eastern outskirts of the city several kilometres away.

The 18-page document drawn up by the "Committee for the Renewal of Jewish Settlement in the City of Patriarchs" has not yet been submitted for formal approval, although it assumes massive involvement by the Housing Ministry, the local military authorities and the currently Israeli-controlled Hebron Municipality. It does not include one budgetary estimate, devoting only its last 19 lines to the question of finance.

Only the final and so far unspecified stages of implementation are to be funded by private investors. All of the rest of the infrastructure, construction and redevelopment is to come from the public kitty--primarily the Housing Ministry which has to date provided the bulk of the funding for the 20-odd families and few score yeshiva students who currently live in Hebron.

Although the problem of livelihood for the 3,000 anticipated residents has not been directly addressed, it appears that most of them will derive their income from shops to be built for them (many along underground tunnels linking the various quarters of Jewish settlement), tourism services and from the various religious institutions which will serve as the nucleus of each quarter. The planners see the Jewish residents integrating fully and even partly replacing the commercial centre of Arab Hebron—the casba.

In addition, planning and implementation of the project itself is also seen as generating employment. The document stipulates that the committee itself, the Kiryat Arba Local Council and the Kiryat Arba-Hebron Development
Company should be charged with carrying out the detailed planning and implementation in cooperation with the Housing Ministry.

The document has been translated into English for presentation to potential American buyers and investors, since they are recognized as the main reservoir of possible interest in the project.

The planners have focused initially on the Hesed Le'Avraham Quarter around Beit Hadassah, the Hizkiyahu Quarter, a 10-dunam site surrounding Beit Romano owned by the Habad movement and now also the site of the Hebron bus terminal recently seized by the army and the Avraham Avinu quarter, a 25-dunam site surrounding the restored synagogue and including the municipal wholesale market of the city. Settlers already occupy buildings in each of these sites and the immediate aim is to establish a territorial link between all three sites.

In addition, they have set their sights on another plot of some 30 dunams, including the ancient Karaite, Sephardi and Ashkenazi cemetery at Tel Rumeidah.

Recognizing that the "integration of Jewish residents among the local population naturally entails a severe conflict of interests, especially when considering a highly Jewish-conscious population..." the planners stress the independent development of the Jewish neighbourhoods, integration into Hebron's main business district and "conformance with Hebron's overall architectural structure."

Security has been given considerable attention. Guard posts are to be included in the plans for each area, security lighting is to be provided with back-up by independent generators and the Avraham Avinu quarter is to have a "central security room including an armoury and communications centre." There is also a call for a "central provisions storeroom."

There are plans for more yeshivot, including one alongside the Tomb of the Patriarchs to be devoted to the Kabala, a special building for a rabbinical court and permanent headquarters for the Committee for the Renewal of Jewish Settlement in the City of the Patriarchs.

The committee claims to hold powers of attorney and leasing rights for 90 percent of the currently Jewish-owned property in Hebron, all of which is controlled by the military government's Custodian of Absentee and Government Property.

The plan recommends amalgamating and re-parcelling the Jewish-owned properties and the requisitioning of other sites against "appropriate compensation to the owners." Priorities for land purchasing and requisitioning are also provided, with the link between the Avraham Avinu quarter and the Tomb of the Patriarchs heading the list, followed by the eventual link to Kiryat Arba outside Hebron.
The lowest priority is the acquisition and development of the land around the cemetery at Tel Rumeidah, part of which is earmarked as a "national park and municipal garden...to serve the Jewish and Arab populations alike."

Officials in the Housing Ministry have not seen the plan and insist that no budget at all has been provided for it.

CSO: 4400/239
APPROVAL FOR TWO NEW SETTLEMENTS GIVEN

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Apr 84 p 3

The joint government-Zionist Federation Ministerial Committee for Settlement Affairs yesterday approved the establishment of two new community settlements in Judaea and Samaria. At the same time it became known that the start of construction of the new settlements was subject to the allocation of a special budget from the budgetary reserve, and as long as the Finance Ministry does not transfer the funding recently decided upon during the meeting between the chief of the settlement group, Mati Drobles, and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Finance Minister Yig' al Cohen-Orgad, establishment of the settlements will not begin.

The new settlements which the Ministerial Committee approved are Livna [as published] and 'Ali. Livna will be set up south of Mount Hebron, to the north of Yattir Forest, and during the first phase 30 dwelling units will be constructed in it. The settlement 'Ali will be built in southern Samaria, northwest of Shilo, on Levona Hill, and there too 30 dwelling units will be constructed during the first phase.

It was also decided during the meeting of the committee that the Ministry of Housing would hasten to locate a permanent site on which the settlement Adam, which will be made up of the residents of Jerusalem neighborhoods, is to be constructed. According to the plan of the Settlement Group, the community settlement would be built near Kfar Jana to the north of Anatot. Chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Settlement Affairs, Minister Yuval Ne'eman invited the committee to two additional meetings on the 10th and the 11th of the month in order to consider approval of the establishment of additional settlements in Judaea and Samaria and in the Gaza Strip as well as consolidation of 20 existing settlements. The purpose of this is to accelerate the settlement movement in Judaea and Samaria even before the elections to the Knesset on 23 July of this year.

8090
CS0: 4423/49
AMENDMENT TO VOTING LAW UNDER DISCUSSION

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 1 Apr 84 p 5

Article by Dr Rafal Barkan: "Amendment Essential to the Election Law"

This week the Knesset will meet in a vacation session to insert a number of amendments to the "Law on Election to the Knesset, 5729--1969." At least one amendment is essential, for if the inception of the Registration Year is not defined a significant segment of the citizenry of the State of Israel--among them virtually an entire age group of military personnel--will be ineligible to vote and to realize its highest degree of civic privilege.

But first, to whom is voting privilege granted?--"Basic Law: The Knesset" sets forth (in Section 5 thereof):

Every Israeli citizen 18 years of age or older is eligible to vote for the Knesset provided that a court of law has not stripped the citizen of this eligibility in accordance with the law; the election law will establish the period during which a person shall be deemed to have attained 18 years of age for the purpose of exercising voting privilege for the Knesset.

That is to say, since there is no restriction whatever by reason of religion, nationality, sex, race, property ownership and the like--every citizen is eligible to vote. Since Section 4 of this law establishes that the elections are to be "general, national, direct, equal, secret and proportional"--then except for the generality of the voting privilege, this privilege of the citizen is equal for every other citizen, and he expresses it directly (not by means of an electoral body), by a secret vote and with a list of candidates (by a proportional system), while the entire area of Israel is deemed to be a election district.

The limitation of voting privilege to citizens only directs us to "The Law of Citizenship, 5712-1952," which determines who is an Israeli citizen. This law determines that Israeli citizenship is acquired in five ways:

--by virtue of Return (Section 2)
--by virtue of residence in Israel (Sec 3)
--by virtue of birth (Sec 3)
--by virtue of birth and residence in Israel (Sec 4a)
--by virtue of naturalization (Secs 5-8)
--by virtue of grant (Sec 9)
The condition "if a court of law has not deprived the citizen of this right in accordance with law"—is almost nonexistent since in the State of Israel, in contrast to other countries, incarceration or lack of mental capacity, for example, do not deprive the citizen, theoretically, of civil rights. He is deprived of this privilege in a practical-physical manner—but about this in another article.

What is 18 Years of Age?

Except that the end of Section 5 of the "Basic Law: the Knesset" provides that the age of 18 years is not the biological age for purposes of the law. The law which does establish this age is "Law of Elections to the Knesset" which provides in its Section 2: The right to vote in elections for the Knesset is given only to whomever is registered in the voters ledger for the ledger year during which the elections are held.

What is the "voters ledger"?—The definitions for this law set forth:

The "Voters Ledger"—the term for the total of lists of voters;

"Voters' Register"—a register of everyone eligible for voting for the Knesset which was prepared in accordance with this law.

What is the "Ledger Year"?—The definitions for the law set forth: "The year of the Voters Ledger" or "The Ledger Year"—the period beginning on the 15th day of the month of Av of a given year and ending on the 14th day of the month of Av of the following year.

Who is registered and included in the Ledger?—Section 3 of the law provides:

a) In the matter of exercising a voting privilege for the Knesset anyone will be considered 18 years of age whose 18th birthday falls no later than on the starting day of Voters' Ledger Year in which the elections are to be held.

b) If a person's birthday is not known, the instructions in Section 12 of the Law of Judicial and Trusteeship qualification, 5722-1952, will apply.

In other words, since election day for the 11th Knesset has been established for 23 July 1984, 23 of Tammuz of 5744, anyone born after 15 Av 5725, 13 August 1965, cannot be included in the Voters' Ledger, or whoever has not attained 19 years less 21 days by the Hebrew Calendar, cannot vote for the 11th Knesset under present conditions of the law.

(There is somewhat of a difference in the status of one whose birthday is not known. Section 12 of the "Law of Judicial and Trusteeship Qualification" applies:

If the year of a person's birth is known and the day of his birth is not known, it shall be assumed that he was born on the first of Nissan of that year. If the month of his birth is known and the day of his birth is not known, it shall be assumed that he was born on the 15th day of that month.)
Not always is it required of the citizen to be almost 19 years old on election day. Section 9 of the "Basic Law: The Knesset" provides:

Elections for the Knesset shall be on the third Tuesday of the month of Kheshvan of the year in which the term of the outgoing Knesset expires. However, if the preceding year is a leap year, the elections shall take place on the first Tuesday of that month.

This applies to a Knesset which has completed all 4 years of its term. In this kind of instance the citizen is required to be 18 years and an additional 90-96 days old (or 18 years and an additional 76-82 days old, in the case of a year following a leap year). If, for example, the Knesset had determined that election day were to be Tuesday 17 Av 5744, 14 August 1984, the citizen would be required to be 18 years and 1 day old only, to be able to exercise his election privilege—since on the 15th of Av a new Voters' Ledger Year would already have commenced.

This abnormal situation has been considered and reconsidered a number of times. For example, in 5733-1973 the exigency of the time superseded the determining day and the conclusion of the ledger year by a full month. The elections in that year, for the Eighth Knesset, had been scheduled to take place on 30 October 1973. But the Yom Kippur War broke out and the voting population—by a significant portion—was mired on both banks of the Canal and in the Golan Heights. The elections were postponed for an additional 2 months, to 31 December 1973: The candidates' lists were not reopened (and thus the protest strike was postponed to the year 1977) but the voting privilege was broadened, to apply to everyone who was 18 years of age on the day of the elections.

In fact, in 1973 a significant portion of the nation was under mobilization and engaged in the heat of battle during the period of the first elections, and subsequently argued that it is not possible to deprive one who has given his life in defense of the state of the basic franchise. In point of fact there is no war today in this sense, yet here too a similar argument is justified: Military personnel of the IDF are immersed in the Lebanese quagmire, and it is not possible to deprive them, after an entire year of service, of the franchise. Therefore, this time as well the exigency of the hour makes it mandatory to change the time of the commencement of the Voters' Ledger Year, to include the majority of the 18-year-olds and above among those with voting privilege.

8090
CSO: 4423/49
INCREASE IN CIVILIAN IMPORTS DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 4 Apr 84 p 9

Article by Tzevi Timor: "What Causes an Increase in Imports"

The civilian deficit in the current balance of payments of the state increased in 1983 as compared with the previous year by $950 million. Added to this must be a $110 million increase in the export of services for without it the civilian deficit increased by $1.060 billion.

At the bank of Israel an examination of the causes which explain this increase was conducted. First, there was an increase of $215 million in the payments of interest to the export market. The decrease in the export of goods explains $82 million. After these adjustments there is an increase of $763 million in civilian imports.

The increase in the import of goods total led $432 million and the increase in the import of services was $331 million. Of the increase in the import of services, $126 million originated from the additional expense of citizens traveling abroad and the rest from an increase in the import of other services (exclusive of payments of interest abroad), such as transport services, insurance and the like.

The increase in the import of goods totalled $432 million and the prices of goods imported rose $491 million. To this should be added $300 million of reduction in the import of fuel. That is, the civilian market imported $790 million more and by a deduction of the drop in prices—$696 million. This total is composed of an increase of $120 million of direct import of consumer products, $300 million of an increase in equipment imported for investment purposes (excluding automobiles), $207 million increase in the import of gems, and another $58 million import of motor vehicles for investment, that is, for companies or other authorities.

The question raised on the rate of rise in import can be explained by the increase in private demand. This total is composed of the following:

Fifty-seven percent of the growth in indirect import of services for current production, during use, are designated for private use. This figure totals $117 million. Another 23.5 percent is added from the indirect import of goods
and raw materials (excluding fuel), which adds up to $14 million \text{(as published)}\].
To this should be added the entire increase in expenses for travel abroad, a
total of $126 million, and the rise in direct import of consumer goods, a total
of $120 million. With the indirect import detailed above, for a total of $131
million--the surplus of import for current civilian consumption totals $377
million. This within a rise of $1.060 billion requires clarification.

That is, the rise in private consumption explains only about 35 percent of the
deterioration in the civilian balance of payments of the state in the year 1983.
The remainder of the explanation is associated, apparently, with the rise in
defense spending by 12 percent and the rise in investments in the economy.

If we compare this $373 million with the year 1980, the year of Yigal Hurwitz,
it becomes clear that in the year 1980, too, the real import rose, after
adjusting for price rises, by $272 million.

Thus, when Yigal Cohen-Orgad directed most of his efforts to the improvement
of the balance of payments by way of controlling private consumption he affects
about one-third of the causes of deterioration. Limiting the investments tends
to "improve" the situation within the area of an additional one-third of the
deterioration factors, but in the last third, which includes the outlay for
the Lebanese war and the settlements, Cohen-Orgad not only fails to reduce the
anticipated outlay of foreign currency, but rather even assures in recent days
acceleration of the activity.

Acceleration of this activity points up the fact that the Likud government
senses that it has concluded its function and will pass on to the successor
government an empty coffer, monumental debts and economic problems that are not
amenable to solution.

8090
CSO: 4423/49
EXPORT OF ARMS, LOCAL ATTITUDES SURVEYED

Tel Aviv KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew No 70, 4 Apr 84 pp 20-21

[Article by Tom Shagav: "Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco: The Secret Clients"]

[Text] Moshe Zilbershatz of blessed memory who departed this earth several days ago has been described in giant obituaries made public after his demise as one of the pioneers of Israeli textile manufacture. The announcements demonstrated that those who honor his memory are scattered throughout many countries. But virtually all of them are not connected with the textile industry but rather with the affairs of his son, Avraham. Zilbershatz the son serves as chairman of the board of directors of the Ayit Co, Ltd, military equipment for export, Tel Aviv, Ashkelon, Qiryat Shemona. Expressions of participation in his grief reflected global connections. They extended from Singapore and from Thailand, from the Philippines and Korea, from France, from the United States and from Guatemala.

A study being published in Tel Aviv this week establishes that the arms dealings of Israel encompass dozens of additional countries, among them Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia and Morocco. The author of the study, Professor Aharon Kleiman of the University of Tel Aviv, estimates that the scope of Israel's defense exports at this time attains a billion dollars annually, more than 20 percent of the total industrial export of the country. Israeli enterprises for the manufacture of military arms and equipment employ some 60,000 workers and, in other words, 1 in every 5 Jewish production workers. In total, they support possibly a quarter of a million Israelis. Kleiman estimates that Israel's defense exports place it in 12th place on the list of countries manufacturing arms; the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Britain together dominate 75 percent of the arms export to the Third World. There is no country which sees Israel as a primary source for the supply of its needed arms; there is no tension point in the world which is burning through the influence of the arms that Israel is supplying to one of the involved sides. Kleiman thus tends to count Israel among the average arms exporters.

A Moral Dilemma--Yuk!

Kleiman is a professor of political science. His study is based upon open information that was published abroad. The Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Tel Aviv, which included it among its publications, prefaced
it with a disclaimer. The contents do not reflect the stand of the center but rather the position of the author only. But among the editors of this series of releases are listed Minister Yuval Ne'eman and former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the former chief of staff; Mordekhai Gur and three former heads of the Intelligence Branch: Yehoshafat Harkavi, Aharon Yariv and Shlomo Gazit. The study, which was published in English, was released for publication by the censor; it does not include criticism. It will thus be read everywhere as a semiofficial document.

The author tends to disregard and in any case to minimize the weight of the moral dilemma involved in the defense exports of Israel as if it never existed. He is of the opinion that the defense exports of Israel encompass the political, security and economic interests of the state. Most states that acquire arms of Israeli manufacture are situated in the Third World. In general they are dictatorships with a rightist orientation, according to Kleiman. Israeli arms are needed by them, among other things, to advance what Kleiman describes euphemistically as "internal threats" and in other words to persecute political opponents and to suppress them. There is of course room for the argument that Israel has no interest in the fact that arms of its manufacture would serve as damaging to human rights and for suppression of individual freedoms. Kleiman does not relate to that. He accepts the definition of the interests accepted, according to him, by most Israelis. He assumes apparently, and justifiably, that most Israelis do not want to know who buys Israeli munitions, whom they are slaughtering by its means, and why. According to Kleiman there is in fact a "Jewish element" in the export of Israeli munitions. Israel is sensitive to the security of Jewish communities situated in a number of the states that acquire arms and military equipment from it; there are countries which see in Israel a key to the prospects of recruiting investment of Jewish capital and to the improvement of their image in the United States. A few suffer from a negative image in the world and from diplomatic isolation, says Kleiman. So negative is the image and so deep is the isolation that there is no one who will sell them the arms they are seeking to buy—except Israel. Kleiman praises the success of Israel in making the connection by means of its arms dealings with countries whose influence has increased through the years, such as West Germany, and subsequently Iran, Argentina and Zaire. To a certain degree this applies to South Korea and Taiwan. Arms deals also help Israel to overcome the diplomatic isolation that the Arabs impose upon it, says Kleiman. He cites reports according to which Israel sells military equipment to the Republic of China and to Ethiopia and he is in favor of this. Kleiman: "If in fact the Marxist regime of Chairman Mengistu in Ethiopia decides to invite Israel to replace a number of its Soviet military advisors, not only is Israel apt to garner advantage thereby (such as in the opening of an air route between Addis Ababa and Tel Aviv) but the entire West as well, since the presence of Israel in the Horn of Africa will alter the strategic balance in favor of the West." Recently it was made known that Israel had succeeded in renewing its military ties with Ethiopia after Ethiopian military personnel trained by the Soviets were routed in battles conducted against the rebels in Eritrea.
Tanks For Morocco, Jet Engines For Iran

Kleiman cites the list of military equipment that Israel has sold, and it includes, among other things, tanks and armored personnel carriers to Morocco (no date), Skyhawk aircraft to Indonesia (1980) reconditioned jet engines to Iran (ordered in 1981), and Gabriel missiles to Malaysia (ordered in 1979). Israeli munitions manufacture was developed in the fifties to overcome the refusal of the great powers to sell to the IDF the equipment it required. In earlier years the IDF was practically its only client, but at the start of the eighties the IDF procured only 35 percent of the production of the aircraft manufacture and about 38 percent of the military industry production. All the rest was sold abroad. Kleiman says that a large part of the success of Israeli export in general is associated with the continuation of defense export. If a decision is made to discontinue or even to curtail it, "for example on the basis of moral considerations," says Kleiman, severe damage will accrue to the Israeli economy and to its society as a whole. It is no wonder then that most Israelis support defense exports although virtually all have no knowledge of what exactly is under discussion. Decisions on this issue are made in a special ministerial committee headed by the prime minister; implementation is in the hands of the Deputy Director General for defense exports in the Defense Ministry. There are apparently very few people who know all of the details. The secrecy surrounding the matter prevents public discussion. If more were known of the identity of the procurers of Israeli munitions and of the identity of those destroyed by it, it is possible that many more Israelis would disagree with the current export policy which tends to sell everything to all who are willing to pay. Kleiman argues that he is in favor of public discussion, but in his study he complains of the "leakage" of some of the details of the dealings between Israel and Iran and Argentina. He does not suggest how it is possible to discuss the subject without information.

Israel's arms industry is supported, according to him, by the interests of a powerful lobby, the components of which are heads of the military-industrial establishment, including the Federation industry. They know one another and help one another in influencing the government to broaden exports. Their influence is great. In addition to mutual interests they have a common world outlook and a similar mentality. They identify their special interest with the good of the state. The military past common to most of them reinforces their tendency to judge policy according to its immediate results; they are pragmatic, tend to relate with cynicism to what appears to them to be counterfeit moral norms.

Kleiman holds that the defense export of Israel has reached its peak. Various indicators point, in his opinion, to a lack of further expansion; there are data which indicate, in his opinion, a drop this year. This stems, among other factors, from the war in Lebanon, but also from the economic crisis in the country, which hinders expansion of production, and from the fact that a number of countries which customarily procured arms from Israel, among them Brazil, Singapore and Korea, have learned to fashion by themselves what they require. Kleiman is not distressed over that. He cites an opinion which establishes that defense exports need not exceed 25 percent of the total of all the export of the state, lest it find itself dependent for its existence on a branch which is inherently unstable and unpredictable.
TEL AVIV. — The IDF has geared itself to terrorist attacks in Israel and Southern Lebanon continuing at their present high level, Deputy Chief of Staff Aluf David Ivri told military correspondents here yesterday. Reviewing the army's plans for the fiscal year which began on April 1, Ivri said the IDF had therefore planned for increasing the number of security forces.

The army is short of troops, he maintained, but is aware of pressures in the civilian sector against long call-ups for the third consecutive year due to the war in Lebanon. The IDF therefore has decided to limit to 50 days a year the time commanders in fighting units may serve. The soldiers in those units may be called up for no more than 45 days, he added.

To meet manpower requirements the army expects to thin out its presence in unsensitive areas so as to maintain its full presence in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, he said.

Soldiers fulfilling jobs in high demand in service units — drivers for example — may also be called up for 50 days, he said.

Service units and rear echelon headquarters will be the ones most affected by the 11 to 13 per cent cut in the defence budget, which will total IS 463.5b, he said.

The cut will require the cancellation of 700 positions for career soldiers and some 430 in the number of army civilian employees. But since the units will have to provide the same level of service, Ivri said, the burden on regular soldiers there will increase.

He insisted that research and development projects will be affected minimally. Some projects will take longer, but few will be cancelled, he said.
VOTING RIGHTS FOR ISRAELIS ABROAD DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 27 Mar 84 p 9

[Article by Shemu'el Shemu'eli: "Voting Rights for Israelis Abroad"]

[Text] In the confusion to advance the election date, the issue of the Israelis who are living abroad at the time of the election, and who therefore cannot fulfill their duty as Israeli citizens to cast a vote, was forgotten. This issue concerns thousands of citizens--tourists, official representatives of the Embassy, the consulates and the Jewish Agency, students, professors on sabbatical leave, and other Israelis who hold a valid Israeli passport. This miscarriage of justice contradicts the basic principles of democracy in Israel, the laws established by the Knesset, and the practices accepted in the democratic world.

The basic law of the Knesset states: "Every Israeli citizen who is 18 years of age or older has the right to vote for the Knesset. Moreover, even the courts cannot justify taking away this right unless it is cited in the law.

The right to vote is a basic ingredient of democracy, and therefore the Knesset adopted it as an absolute principle in its formulation of the law.

While the law itself is enlightened and thus places Israel among the democratic nations, the law has not been implemented for more than 30 years with regard to the right of Israeli citizens to vote outside of Israel. The reason that the Knesset did not abridge the rights of Israeli citizens living abroad is simple: it was clear to the legislators that the legal system in Israel (as in other countries) is a combination of territorial and extraterritorial laws. The citizens who live in Israel have to comply with the territorial laws, while the extraterritorial laws are incumbent upon Israeli citizens even when they are outside Israel.

The principle that guided the legislators in establishing this fundamental law was the recognition that if an individual who carried an Israeli passport had duties, he had to be given the opportunity to exercise his rights. "Technical problems" was the official reason that was given on several occasions for not complying with the basic law. These "technical problems" could not withstand the pressure of the maritime organizations, and in 1955 a detailed proposal was submitted for the first time to insure the right of the Israelis to vote through special ballot boxes that were to be stationed on board

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Israeli ships and in diplomatic missions overseas. The Knesset adopted the proposal only for vessels, but, ironically, the law stated that this implementation would only be effected "after the Knesset amends the law by adopting the necessary voting procedures." Almost every election year, various members of the Knesset have tried to bring up this issue, and in the election year of 1969 the "technical issues" were resolved for the first time, but only for Israeli vessels. As a result of this arrangement, Israeli citizens who were passengers on ships at the time of the election were able to vote.

It is hard to understand the distinction between maritime workers and passengers on the one hand, and Israelis who are overseas for other reasons, on the other.

Is it more difficult to implement election procedures in diplomatic missions where official representatives are staying, than in vessels that are traveling at high sea?

The countries which recognize that right of citizens to vote is very important, knew how to find a solution to the "technical problems." In the U.S. there are specific instructions for citizens who are abroad on election day and wish to vote. In England, for example, the ballot of British subjects is accepted by authorized officials or by mail. France allows its citizens to vote in French diplomatic representations. Is it so difficult to find a similar solution for the elections in Israel?

A distorted system is being created by not allaying the law: hundreds of Israeli diplomats and their families--aren't they permanent citizens of the State of Israel?

Jewish Agency emissaries and their families, Israeli bank representatives, teachers who are sent abroad and other officials--aren't they part of Israel? EL Al staff staying abroad on the day of the election--what are their legal rights?

Hundreds of thousands of Israeli tourists travelling abroad for several weeks. Why should their right to vote be taken away from them?

Thousands of Israeli students who study abroad and professors on sabbatical leave who will be back in Israel when the elected government rules--why aren't they able to affect the outcome of the election?

The present voting law prevents a large number of citizens who are living permanently in Israel from exercising their right to vote, even though the outcome of the election will affect their lives directly.

In addition to these classes of Israelis, there are "temporary Israelis" who are not Yordim (Israelis who have emigrated from Israel) in the full sense of the word, but are not official representatives of the state, or students, or even tourists. These are business people who are dividing their time between Israel and the U.S., and are helping the Israeli economy; lawyers who represent
Israeli concerns and have to live abroad once in a while for a long period of time in order to complete their mission; even young people who completed their military service and left Israel for several years, often in order to save money to be able to purchase an apartment in Israel. These young people and sometimes whole families are leaving Israel temporarily in order to advance themselves and be able to live in Israel in the future more comfortably.

All those who are holding valid Israeli passports are entitled to the right to vote. Those who have left Israel and are not holding a valid passport, however, are not entitled to this right.
WORSENING RELIGIOUS-SECULAR STRIFE DEPICTED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 27 Mar 84 p 13

[Article by Bov Shin'ar: "National Unity--Yes, But Not at Any Cost"]

[Text] Like it or not, we can no longer ignore the fact that for several years we have had religious war in the State of Israel.

In this war the secular public is suffering one defeat after another, and the cumulative effect is disastrous. The other side hides intention of bringing about a total surrender of the opponent, and uses the salami method with great skill. The majority of the people in Israel are against the domination of religious law, but maintain that one should give in for the sake of national unity.

Indeed, for the sake of unity one should give in, but the concessions have to be mutual. But to the religious camp the only sacred thing is religious law, and according to that law the unity of the people is not sacred. If one could unite the people on the basis of religious law, all good and well. If not, one can make do without unity. According to this philosophy, only the secular can give in (the other side has nothing to give in, since its principles are more important than unity).

The way the problem is presented is also enlightening. Our faith, the religious people say, does not allow any concessions, and since you have no faith, why do you care if you have to make concessions? We are not allowed to violate the Sabbath, but you are not mandated to violate it, so unity is only possible by universal observance of the Sabbath. This argument is also used in regard to the dietary law, personal laws, the law of return, education, etc.

The mere fact of presenting the secular public as devoid of principles is a grave insult. Not all secular people have principles, just as among the religious there are also those who compromise. But the secular public does have faith. We believe that the world exists for the sake of man, and that man is allowed to live in this world according to his conscience and do whatever he wants as long as he does not harm others. The belief in the freedom of man and the rights of the individual is no less sacred to the secular person than the belief of the religious person in the sanctity of the Sabbath and
in the dignity of the dead. It is not possible that one side, especially the minority, continue to pressure its opponent incessantly and force him to give up his principles for sacred unity, while the other side does not demand anything else in return except for that unity. Mutual compromise means: I will not force you to violate the Sabbath and you will not force me to observe it. I will help you to keep all the religious laws you wish to keep, and you will enable me not to keep them if I so choose.

If the religious public is not willing to accept this coexistence, then it is preferable to stay separate while keeping the principles of each side rather than be united while the majority gives up its hallowed principles so as not to harm the minority which is not willing to make any compromises.

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CSO: 4423/48
DOLLARIZATION PLAN TO BE DISCUSSED AGAIN

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 28 Mar 84 pp 1, 11

[Article by Gabi Kessler: "Patt Suggests 'One-Time Dollarization'; 'Indexing of Wages Should be Cancelled' '"]

[Text] Industry and Trade Minister Gid'on Patt is about to submit to the government a proposal for canceling the indexing system, especially those provisions that link wages to the increase of the inflation index. In the minister's view, his proposal will cut drastically and immediately the inflation rate, which will decrease to single digit level per year.

Cancellation of the wage linkage will be implemented according to the plan after a one time increase in wages to bring it up to the dollar amount of 2 years ago.

Minister Patt emphasized that he did not intend to "dollarize" the economy to the same degree as former Finance Minister Yoram Aridor did. "The mistake that Aridor made," said Patt, "was that he tried to link the economy totally to the dollar. I am looking for a mechanism that will secure the real basis of market activities, and then we will not have to link the economy to the index or to the dollar."

In a conversation with a MA'ARIV reporter yesterday, Patt revealed that he had asked his staff to study the increase in the index and wages in the past 2 years in terms of dollars. The staff that studied the increases in the price of 100 products in the past 2 years (Jan 82 to Jan 84) revealed that in dollar terms this period showed a decline in prices by an average of 0.6 percent.

Minister Patt said it was clear that the inflation rate of several hundreds percent that was recorded in the past 2 years was "full of hot air" and in fact there was no real inflation.

Patt said that lately he had met with bankers and heard from big corporations overseas, and all recognized that there was a need to distinguish between artificial inflation in Israel and real inflation which translates into dollars.
In the minister's view, the high inflation rate in Israel is derived from the sophisticated index system. An increase in prices is followed by an increase in wages, which in turn leads to an increase in prices. This is a vicious circle, said Patt.

The second group, which has been studying the changes in wages in the past 2 years, had not yet completed its work. The minister said that if it is found out that wages lagged in dollar terms during the period, he would recommend a one-time wage increase to its dollar level of 2 years ago, and afterwards the linkage of the economy to the index would be canceled by a special law.

Patt added that upon completion of his staff investigation, he would submit his proposal to the government for discussion.

The minister said that if the Histadrut were strong enough, it would support his plan to cancel the linkage, as the "public wants to live with stability and to stand on firm ground."

According to the minister, the Histadrut has struggled all along to link the wages to the rise of the index and has neglected the real struggle for the basic wages of the worker.

"If we cancel the linkage," Patt clarified, "we no longer need to deal with handouts or with increases in the index. Inflation will be at a minimum and we will be able to build a new mechanism which will compensate for the increase in productivity and the real increase in prices."

The minister's plan agrees in principle with the position of the representatives of the International Monetary Fund, who visited Israel a month ago and recommended along with other proposals that Israel reduce its linkage system.

Finance Minister Yigal Cohen-Orgad in his response yesterday stated that he objected to the linkage of the wage system to the economic index, and, therefore, objected to the payment of a cost of living allowance every month. According to the finance minister, as long as the linkage mechanism in the economy continues, the struggle against inflation leads to an increase in unemployment.

Economics Minister Ya'akov Meridor stated last week in the Knesset that the steps taken by the Finance Ministry, including the budget cuts, will not bring down inflation rapidly, and that there was no way we could eliminate the need for drastic monetary reform.

Until now there has been no serious discussion of Patt's proposal in the Finance Ministry or in the Committee of Ministers of Economic Affairs.

Patt stated yesterday that he did not know if he would succeed in getting his proposal approved before the election.
Meanwhile, according to a senior official in the Ministry of Finance, the
government has pumped 30-40 billion shekels into the economy since the begin-
nning of March.

This assessment, combined with the data in the report of the entire fiscal
year ending this week, brings the annual amount to more than $2.2 billion.
HISTADRUT 1984 BUDGET APPROVED DESPITE CRITICISM

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 26 Mar 84 p 2

[Article by Histadrut correspondent: "Histadrut '84 Budget Approved"]

[Text] With a majority vote of the Labor Alignment, Shinuy and Independent Liberals, the executive committee of the Histadrut approved yesterday the '84 budget of 8.5 billion shekels.

The budget is based on an estimated inflation rate of 226 percent only, while the projections in the economy are much higher. Histadrut Treasurer Natan Almozlino, who presented the budget, said that 1983 ended without a deficit.

The Likud Will Monitor

The budget includes an increase of 192 percent in the total of all income and expenditures, and an increase of 212 percent in the expenditures of the workers' councils. It was also reported that the increase in the uniform tax in 1984 is planned according to quarter payments, in keeping with the payday and pay increase schedule for workers. The new budget report also shows that the share of the workers in the budget income dropped from 3.5 percent in 1981, to 2.6 percent in 1982, and to 1.5 percent in 1984.

Almozlino specified the criteria and coefficients used by the treasurer's group in preparing the budget. He said that all the money in the Histadrut funds, primarily the strike fund, were invested responsibly and wisely. All the changes caused by the collapse of the stock market and the decline in bank stocks did not affect those funds. He added that the goal was to end this year as well without a deficit, as was the case last year. Likud representative Daniel Nahamani attacked the budget and called it an election budget. Nahamai "threatened" that his faction would monitor the actions and the spending of the Histadrut in the course of the year.

Budget of Conflict

Aryeh Grossman, member of the coordinating committee, said that the budget is a budget of conflict: "We are, as can be seen in the budget, in constant conflict with the Government of Israel over the direction of the Israeli
Grossman strongly objected to the way the pioneering youth movements were treated in the budget.

HADASH representative Yosef Irga attacked the budget which, in his words, does not provide ammunition against the attacks on both Jewish and Arab workers.

SHELI faction chairman Ran Cohen, who attended for the first time after a long military tour of duty, attacked the Government policy. He also attacked the leaders of the Histadrut under whose leadership real salary goes down.
CRIME UP 15 PERCENT IN TEL AVIV; CHANGES NOTED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 29 Mar 84 p 16

[Article by Eli Danon: "Crime Rose 15 Percent in Tel Aviv; Ibtzan and Turgman Attacked Media in Hefetz Affair"]

[Text] Police Inspector-General Aryeh Ibtzan and Tel Aviv District Commander Avraham Turgman severely criticized yesterday the coverage in the media of the suspension of Deputy Commander Asaf Hefetz.

During the annual conference of the Tel Aviv district officers, the secretary-general argued that reports gave a "lunch treatment" to the affair.

Commander Turgman said: "The Hefetz affair was widely reviewed by the media, but the coverage was extremely one-sided."

Hefetz, the suspended commander of the central unit, did not attend the conference.

His substitute, Deputy Commander Moshe Friedman, attended the conference, and according to the district commander, this fact "speaks for itself at this stage." (It was reported in regard to Friedman that he had been investigated because of suspicion that he received a favor.)

The annual conference which took place at the Tel Aviv Museum, attended by hundreds of police officers, was conducted under great tension because of the storm in the police.

The inspector general painted a dark picture as he described the conditions under which the police have to operate: "We need considerable reinforcement in manpower. Conservatively, we need 1,000 more policemen. The salaries of the police have eroded, and it is sometimes harder to raise the salary than to catch the thieves."

He added that "the State of Israel is now suffering from a drug epidemic. We do not know what to do with the hashish we seize--3 tons of the stuff are stored in the North District." Superintendent Ibtzan pointed out that conditions in the jails are most severe. The courts are clogged with cases and the law enforcement system is inadequate.
District Commander Turgman said that in 1983 there was a rise of 15 percent in crime in comparison to the previous year.

Since the Lebanon war, many pounds of drugs are flowing through Tel Aviv. Lebanon has become a new source for smuggling heroin into Israel. Cocaine, which was considered a high class drug, has become more and more common.

In 1983, more than 82,000 criminal cases were filed in Tel Aviv, a rise of 15 percent compared to 1982. The highest rise is in robberies, some 47 percent. Immoral acts and drug dealing went down.

Turgman pointed out that there is a trend to shift from other crimes to drug dealing because of the high profit.
WORSENING RIFT IN TEHIA--The rift in the Tehiya movement between Knesset member Geulah Cohen and Minister Yuval Ne'eman is worsening. The movement is now split over the issue of its future political direction. In private conversations, Cohen spoke sharply against the trend of her movement to agree to the merger between the Tehiya and the Tzomet movement of former Chief of Staff Rafa'el Etan. "They are destroying my Tehiya," she said. Instead, she maintains, if Etan so wishes, he should join the Tehiya along with his movement and he will be given a senior position in the leadership. Cohen believes that the Tehiya along with other nationalist movements such as MTZD of MK Hayim Druckman and the NRP should appear as a "technical" partner bloc with the Likud. Minister Ne'eman, on the other hand, tends to agree to the merger between the Tehiya and the movement of the Chief of Staff Etan, and opposes going along with the Likud. MK Cohen does not rule out the possibility—if and when the differences of opinions intensify—of returning to Herut. The secretariat of the Tehiya movement will meet in Jerusalem today to discuss the issue. [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 28 Mar 84 p 1] 9565

FLIGHTS TO MOZAMBIQUE. Beginning in June there may be commercial flights between Israel and Mozambique. It will be the first time commercial flights take place between Israel and an African country. Following the de facto peace agreement signed 3 weeks ago between South Africa and Mozambique, the South African Government is trying to help its neighboring country with its weak economy by developing various businesses. This policy has prompted South African businessman Tony Factor to establish commercial flights. The flights will be made by the Mozambique airline. Menahem Lauffer, general manager of the Lauffer company, which provides ground services to airlines, reported yesterday that the airplanes will take off from the Maputo (formerly Lourenco Marques) airport. The company's DC-10 aircraft have 18 seats in first class and 250 seats in tourist class. In the first stage there will only be one flight. It is believed that most of the passengers from Mozambique to Israel will be Christian pilgrims. It appears that pilgrims from neighboring South Africa may also take advantage of the cheap flight. Israelis will be able to fly to Mozambique for $599 roundtrip. The price will include bus fare to Johannesburg for passengers going to that destination. Travel time by bus to Johannesburg is 6 hours. South Africa's Kruger Park nature preserve, one of the largest nature preserves in the world, is only 1.5 hours from Maputo. The Casino of Swaziland is at an
equal distance. According to Laufer, the Mozambique authorities have promised to grant Israelis entry permits into Mozambique upon arrival in Maputo. The director of civil aviation, Shai Shohami, confirmed yesterday that the Laufer Company applied for a permit to start the flights. He said that the matter will be studied carefully. [Text] [Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 29 Mar 84 p 3] 9565

CSO: 4423/48
LEBANESE FORCES SPOKESMAN SEES NO PERMANENT SOLUTION

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English No 614, 30 Apr-6 May 84 pp 38-46

[Naoum Farah, official spokesman of the Lebanese Forces, interviewed by Claude Khoury; date, place not given]

[Text]

A truce which may or may not last, but no solution — this is how "Lebanese Forces" official spokesman Naoum Farah describes the prospects for the current inter-Lebanese peace process.

"We run the risk," he warned in an interview with Monday Morning, that after a few years "we fall back into a new cycle of violence, perhaps more extensive and serious than the present cycle."

As Farah spoke to us last Tuesday the Christian "Lebanese Forces" (LF’s) final response to the Syrian-sponsored efforts to bring peace to Lebanon and form a new government of national unity under Rashid Karami was still unclear, and potentially a sticking-point in the process.

Farah, a member of the LF Command Council and head of the LF’s foreign relations department, told us: "We will not participate in any government the formation and policies of which are dictated, directly or indirectly, by Syria or by any other state.

"But we will be in favor of any government that may be formed without external intervention... at any rate we will try by every means to avoid the "Lebanese Forces" being accused of torpedoing the establishment of a government."

The LF spokesman described the political reforms being discussed at present as "like a doctor giving aspirin to a patient who’s had a heart attack" and sketched out the LF’s "very different... I would say revolutionary" plan to solve Lebanon’s crisis.

First of all, the Lebanese should "rid themselves of all foreign tutelage" and the foreign interference which, he said, is blocking national reconciliation. Foreign interference, "by which I mean Syrian interference," in the country’s internal affairs would determine how long the current truce lasted, he said.
Eliminating foreign intervention was up to the Lebanese themselves, Farah said, but they could be helped in this by changes in the regional balance of power.

He noted the possibility of a Syrian-Israeli war, Soviet penetration of the Middle East, the repercussions of the Gulf war, and the "precarious position of several Arab regimes."

"We do not consider the current situation in the region to be a definitive one," he said. "We may in the near, or not-so-near, future see this situation altering in some way that will enable Lebanon to extricate itself from its current predicament."

The core of the LF's plan for Lebanon, Farah, a lawyer, said, was "a very large measure of decentralization" which, contrary to charges that this would mean partitioning Lebanon, was in fact the only way to avoid partition.

"The reunification of Lebanon will be the result of decentralization. Partition could be the result of a new attempt at imposed centralization," he explained.

Decentralization would start with security matters. The Army, Farah noted, had already divided into sectarian-based units which should be allowed to take over regional security duties in partnership with local popular forces.

The vital ingredient in solving Lebanon's crisis, Farah stressed, is inter-Lebanese dialogue — "a direct, candid dialogue, without any foreign tutelage, because this is the only way Lebanon can emerge from its crisis."

Farah felt there were "sufficiently solid bases" for a dialogue to go ahead between the LF and the Progressive Socialist Party led by Druze chieftain Walid Junblatt.

Amal, the Shiite militia led by Nabih Berri, however, "has much less room for maneuver and much greater internal contradictions" and so there was less chance of a dialogue with it in the near future.

The LF also favors "a dialogue based on mutual respect with Syria because we consider Syria a permanent element, geopolitically speaking, in this part of the world," Farah said.

He urged an improvement not only in state-to-state relations between Beirut and Damascus, but also in Syria's relations with the various Lebanese parties.

The LF's demands from Syria were, he said, that the Syrians should officially recognize Lebanon as a state and establish diplomatic relations with it; accept that they must withdraw their troops from Lebanon; and demonstrate their good faith by pulling out of certain areas as soon as possible.

The following is a translation of our interview in French with Naoum Farah.
The “Lebanese Forces” have rejected any government under Syrian tutelage. Given the current circumstances, doesn’t this mean that the “Lebanese Forces” will, of necessity, be against any government that replaces the current Wazzan caretaker cabinet?

First of all, you have to look at the problem as a whole. At present Lebanon is under a dual occupation: a Syrian occupation and an Israeli occupation. As far as your question is concerned, we’re essentially talking about the Syrian occupation of Lebanon and Syria’s intervention in Lebanon’s internal affairs.

Our position of principle is very clear. We will not participate in any government the formation and policies of which are dictated, directly or indirectly, by Syria or by any other state.

But we will be in favor of any government that may be formed without any external intervention. The elimination of external intervention must be effected by the Lebanese themselves, and whether the policies followed by the government-to-be will or will not be dictated from outside will depend on the attitudes the members of this government adopt.

Therefore it is not absolutely true to say we are going be against any future government, because we do not consider the current situation in the region to be a definitive one, and we may in the near, or not-so-near, future see this situation altering in some way that will enable Lebanon to extricate itself from its current predicament and regain, if not its full independence and sovereignty, at least a larger measure of its independence and sovereignty.

Let’s be realistic. I don’t think any of those who participate in the government are going to be very happy about doing so, precisely because of the multiple forms of interference going on in the process of forming this government.

We, the “Lebanese Forces”, will vigorously applaud any government that takes only Lebanon’s historic and permanent interests into consideration.

Can we say, then, that it is possible that the “Lebanese Forces” will participate in this government of national unity?

The “Lebanese Forces” have not yet been sounded out on participating in the next government. Given the present circumstances, of course, we aren’t enthusiastic about participating in this government. At any rate, we will try by every means to avoid the “Lebanese Forces” being accused of torpedoing the establishment of a government.

There’s something I would like to add. As a matter of terminology, how can people talk about a government of national unity when this government may be being imposed by external forces? When one speaks of a government of national unity one assumes the parties and groups participating in it are exercising their own free will, a purely Lebanese will, without constraint, and that the consensus
thus established in forming this government gives birth to what we call national unity.

We are in favor of a genuine government of national unity, a government in which all parties would be free to express their points of view, and when such a thing comes about we will discuss it and it won’t be too difficult for us to participate in such a government.

What effect would it have, on the ground and on the political scene, if you decided not to participate in the government?

We must distinguish here between the security problem and the political problems.

Since September 25, 1983, in other words since the first cease-fire, announced at the time, ironically, in Damascus in the course of (Saudi) Prince Bandar’s mediation, all this time we have said we favor the strict and serious application of a permanent cease-fire.

Our position has not varied in the least. Since September 25 we have been on the defensive; in other words we have been defending ourselves and responding only when attacked and bombarded.

After (the first national reconciliation conference in) Geneva, and after (the second round in) Lausanne, we stated clearly that we would be selective about the Geneva and Lausanne results, but that at any rate we would respect the cease-fire agreement.

So on the security level, in my view, if we do not participate in the forthcoming so-called government of national unity this will not have any negative repercussions on events or on developments in the security situation. With or without a government of national unity we are going to respect the cease-fire agreement.

From a political point of view, we consider that we will not be concerned by the decisions taken at the political level by the future government, because, as I have already said, it will be a Syrian-inspired government, a government turning in the Syrian orbit, and hence our plans are very different.

This is a government that will be trying to patch up the 1943 (National Pact) formula with certain timid, partial reforms whereas our plan is much more, shall we say, on a revolutionary scale, because it goes beyond the 1943 formula and calls for a very large measure of decentralization in Lebanon: a decentralization of security, which will open the way for decentralization of a political order.

Do the “Lebanese Forces” support the reforms being proposed at present?

First of all, these reforms are still nebulous. They aren’t very clear. There are just ideas that have been put forward and questions or proposals published in the press.

As far as we are concerned, and according to our information on these reforms, there are many comments and criticisms we could make on each point of them, but we reject them as a whole because we want to move on from the 1943 framework.
These reforms fall within the 1943 framework, and we're very surprised to see this or that person say the 1943 formula is dead and buried and then come along and propose reforms of "1943" inspiration!

We, on the other hand, are proposing to move on from, go beyond, 1943 and apply a modern formula capable of uniting the people and state institutions within the framework of the country's international borders, within the framework of its 10,452 square kilometers.

So you are in favor of abolishing confessionalism?

One has to be consistent. If you continue with the 1943 system — and the proposed reforms are still within the 1943 system — you can't then go and ask for political confessionalism to be abolished. It's a contradiction in terms, an internal logical error.

Either we say let's introduce decentralization in its broadest sense, and then, at a federal level, through federal institutions, we can think about abolishing political confessionalism; or else we continue with the 1943 system, in which case we can't call for the abolition of political confessionalism because the basic philosophy underlying 1943 is a confessional philosophy.

We are more in favor of abolishing all confessionalism: political, in matters of personal status, and at the social level. In this sense we favor a modern, and I would say evolutionary, formula.

We favor either the abolition of all confessionalism, not just political confessionalism, in other words the secularization of the State; otherwise we have to remain in the domain of confessionalism.

You have to be logical: don't ask for something and its opposite at the same time. These are our basic principles regarding those who are calling for the abolition of political confessionalism.

You mentioned regional developments that could change the situation. What did you have in mind — a Syrian-Israeli war, for example?

Regional developments may take several forms. There is, firstly, the permanent risk of a Syrian-Israeli war. I'm not saying it's going to happen tomorrow, but it fits logically into the scheme of things because, on the one hand, Syria is building itself up again militarily in such a fashion as to become an increasing threat for Israel.

On the other hand, meanwhile, there is the whole problem of Soviet penetration of the Middle East via Syria, a danger threatening both Israel and the United States.

Thirdly, there are the repercussions of the Iran-Iraq war, which risks spilling over from the Gulf to have consequences for the whole of the Near East.

And then of course there is the precarious and volatile position of several Arab regimes within their own countries.

So all these factors, taken together, should in future lead to changes in the situation, as well as structural changes, in the Middle East.
And how will this affect Lebanon?

I think that, with the help of any change in the regional balance, the Lebanese should be sufficiently mature and adult to try to rid themselves of all foreign tutelage; to try to call a halt to the foreign interference which is impeding genuine national reconciliation, and hence take advantage of this adjustment at the regional level to sit down at one table and hold an inter-Lebanese discussion; and to bring about radical reforms capable of saving Lebanon, ending the Lebanese crisis and ensuring political, social, confessional, economic and cultural stability in Lebanon for years to come.

It is with the help of regional changes like these that the Lebanese would be able to get rid of foreign tutelage.

So at the moment you see only a truce, not a solution?

At present I don’t see that there is a solution. There is a truce which may or may not last for some time. This depends basically on foreign interference, by which I mean Syrian interference, in the country’s internal affairs. So it’s a truce which may last for some time, but there is no solution there.

After ten years of war, the reforms now being proposed cannot resolve the Lebanese crisis. The crisis goes beyond specific problems such as the prerogatives of the prime minister or the creation of a senate, which in the end won’t make any difference to the Lebanese political scene.

So we have to go beyond this and look at the roots of the problem, the roots of the Lebanese crisis, and try to solve them. So far it’s been like a doctor giving aspirin to a patient who’s had a heart attack. We have to go further than these superficial reforms, which can’t solve the Lebanese crisis.

The danger is that these reforms give the Lebanese and world opinion the false impression that everything has been sorted out; and we run the risk that a few years after these proposed reforms have been introduced we fall back into a new cycle of violence, perhaps more extensive and serious than the present cycle.

Do you think Israel will try to make the “Syrian solution” fail?

I believe that Syria’s interests and Israel’s interests contradict one another. So long as there is no agreement, tacit or explicit, between Israel and Syria on certain “red lines” in Lebanon, Syrian interests will get in the way of any “Israeli solution” in Lebanon and the Israelis have an interest in making any “Syrian solution” fail.

As far as we, the “Lebanese Forces”, are concerned, we don’t have either an Israeli or a Syrian option. What we are proposing is a purely Lebanese option.

Coming back to the truce you talked about which may or may not last; if it ever does last, what is your position on the matter of crossing-points between East and West Beirut, since the Museum crossing-point alone is not enough; and what is your position regarding the Lebanese buffer force?
Our attitude is extremely clear and definite. We oppose the division of Beirut into two sections. We oppose the existence of demarcation lines. We oppose the closure of crossing-points.

I think the main security problem the government-to-be will have to settle is opening the crossing-points between the two sectors of the capital and allowing the Lebanese to see and meet each other once again so as to wipe out this psychological split that exists between the inhabitants of these two sectors.

As for us, we will do everything possible to facilitate the serious and permanent restoration of security in Beirut and elsewhere.

For us the priority is to pacify the front lines, open the crossings, and also facilitate an even larger-scale disengagement of forces than that which is now taking place.

Will you then in this respect fall in line with the future government’s decisions?

On security matters we will facilitate to the full extent of our ability any qualitative improvement in the security situation. For us there are no problems on security, as I explained just now by distinguishing between security problems and problems of a political order on which we may not be in agreement.

As far as security goes, the attitude of the “Lebanese Forces” is very clear. The cease-fire must be adhered to. Beirut must also be pacified, to the extent that ordinary citizens can resume their daily lives, schools reopen normally, especially those near the demarcation lines, and factories and businesses get back to work...

One has the impression that the “Lebanese Forces” are ready for a frank and honest dialogue with the Syrians and are keeping the door between them and Damascusajar. Is this correct?

We are in favor of any dialogue based on mutual respect, including with the Progressive Socialist Party. We called two months ago for a direct dialogue with the PSP and (the Shiite militia) Amal after the failure of Lausanne.

We are in favor of a dialogue based on mutual respect with Syria because we consider Syria a permanent element, geopolitically speaking, in this part of the world, and think we should try to improve relations, starting with state-to-state relations between Lebanon and Syria, but at the same time improving the relationships that exist between Syria and the various Lebanese parties.

One example would be moving away from the state of dependence, of subordination, of certain political groups and parties which I don’t wish to name. These parties should free themselves of Syrian tutelage.

For our part, we advocate moving away from the state of hostility that exists between us and Syria towards a state of non-belligerence, at least, that would enable us to discuss the country’s future on a basis that is very clear to us: respect for Lebanon’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty.
This means the Syrians must agree:
1. to recognize Lebanon as such, and to establish
diplomatic relations between Beirut and Damascus;
2. to accept and recognize that they must withdraw
from Lebanon and start to demonstrate their good faith by
withdrawing from certain areas as soon as possible.

As you have just said, the “Lebanese Forces” have
often spoken in favor of a dialogue — without foreign
interference — with Amal and the PSP. The PSP chief
Waldi Junblatt says he favors this dialogue, and Amal
leader Nabih Berri told Monday Morning last week that
he is ready to talk provided the dialogue takes South
Lebanon as its starting-point. Do you think this
dialogue will take place, and if so on what basis?
I think the dialogue will take place, at least with one of
the two parties you mention, if not both. At least with one
of these two there is more chance of a dialogue or serious
contacts.

I am referring to the PSP rather than Amal, which has
much less room for maneuver and much greater internal
contradictions than the PSP.

For us the problem is to keep it an inter-Lebanese
affair, to draw up an agenda, and then to negotiate with
Amal and with the PSP.

With the PSP, will the dialogue mostly be about the
Shouf mountain area, or will it cover all points?
It will cover all points, but it will have to start with
problems of common concern to both the PSP and the
“Lebanese Forces”, such as the establishment of a proper
cease-fire in areas where only the PSP and “Lebanese
Forces” are present.

Then we can go on to discuss normalization in the
Shouf and the Aley district. The original Christian
inhabitants of these areas will have to be able to go home to
their village and homes and live a normal life.

Are you optimistic about Christians returning to the
Shouf, following the talks between National Liberal
Party leader Camille Chamoun and Walid Junblatt in
Lausanne and the recent NLP-PSP meeting on board
the aircraft-carrier Clemenceau (last Monday)?

For the time being, yes, I am optimistic, but it’s an
extremely delicate process that will take a long time and
not be easy. It won’t happen immediately, because there is
a great deal of mutual distrust, an accumulation of hatred,
and a great deal of blood that has been shed. All this calls
for extremely delicate and yet thorough handling.

I think there are sufficiently solid bases for us to enter
into dialogue with the PSP and I am not pessimistic.

You say a dialogue with Amal would be harder. Would
you be prepared to make some gesture to facilitate
such a dialogue, like opening the road to the South
between the Awali River and Damour?
We solemnly declare that we favor the opening of all roads. This is based on our overall view of things, our general attitude, and it applies particularly in the case of the coastal highway to the South.

We favor the opening of this road, but at the same time one must be realistic. Opening this road is not up to the “Lebanese Forces”, and the Amal people know that.

I tell you, we are in favor of opening this road but at the same time, when we say this, we also ask that Amal adopt a similar attitude of openness towards us, with regard to the town of Zahle, for example. Let Amal declare, for example, that it opposes the blockade of Zahle and take down its barricades all along the road between Zahle and the mountains.

Some opposition leaders have called for Syrian troops to return to Beirut. Do you think this is a tactical ploy to put pressure on the “Lebanese Forces”?

Listen, if it really is a tactical ploy it won’t have any effect on us because even when the Syrians were present in and around Beirut they were incapable of putting any real pressure on the “Lebanese Forces”, so I don’t think it’s really very realistic to start talking about the return of the Syrian army to Beirut. There are many, many Lebanese, Syrian, regional and international factors militating against the return of the Syrian army to Beirut. I think it’s just a test balloon which hasn’t so far produced any real results.

I would advise those who want to put pressure on us not to choose such means, because they won’t produce any result. The best way to put pressure on the “Lebanese Forces” is to open up a dialogue with them and apply friendly pressure, candid pressure, responsible pressure, in the course of this intercommunal dialogue.

So you don’t see Syrian forces returning to Beirut, or do you see them coming just to West Beirut, perhaps?

No, no. I was talking about West Beirut. Is it in Mr. Nabih Berri’s interest, for example, or that of Mr. Walid Jumblatt, for the Syrian army to come back to West Beirut?

If it did, then these two, who at present rule the roost and are regarded as great Beiruti, if not Lebanese, leaders, would be under the orders of some lieutenant in the Syrian intelligence service.

Even at this level it’s not in their interests for the Syrian army to return to West Beirut because this would reduce the political role and standing of all the West Beirut leaders.

How would you describe relations between Israel and the “Lebanese Forces”, especially since Israel more or less abandoned you in the Shouf?

Listen, the Shouf story is an extremely complicated business and I don’t want to go into the details. It would probably take a political science thesis to explain the whole affair.

It’s a very bald statement just to say Israel did or didn’t abandon us, and doesn’t necessarily fit the detailed reality of the Shouf during the summer of 1983.
Our relations with Israel are candid and based on mutual respect. We each know the limitations of the other and each is aware of the other’s room for maneuver. We have cordial relations, friendly relations which we are trying to make use of in the higher interests of the country.

Aren’t these relations an obstacle to inter-Lebanese dialogue?

Listen, I think this war, which has gone on for ten years, has enabled all the Lebanese to grow up and become politically adult. We don’t accept preconditions, and we don’t accept that we should be judged by our relations with such-and-such a country or people.

Just as we don’t ask Amal why they have relations with the city of Qom in Iran, neither will we allow Amal to pass judgement on our relations with Israel.

As for Mr. Walid Junblatt, I think he’s in a very poor position to criticize us — he rarely does so, anyway — for our relations with Israel, because everyone knows the state of Druze-Israeli relations.

So we won’t allow ourselves to be judged, and we don’t accept a return to these taboos they’ve been raising since Nasser’s time, and even before that, and the days of the PLO, which had behind-the-scenes contacts with certain Israeli parties and yet would not allow anyone at all to have contacts with Israel.

We have got past the stage of political childishness and are mature and responsible, and accept responsibility for all our actions.

At the beginning you referred to Syrian interference in internal Lebanese affairs, but you never mention Israeli interference in Lebanon’s affairs. Why not?

Listen, Israel is present in Lebanon, in the South and in part of the Bekaa, and it intervenes there in the affairs of these areas it is occupying. This is obvious.

But when we speak of Syrian interference and not of Israeli interference, we must, I think, be quite clear and call things by their proper names.

Who’s going to Damascus? Did Mr. Rashid Karami, who is apparently tipped to form the next government, go to Jerusalem or Damascus? These meetings of most of Lebanon’s leaders, have they taken place in Israel or in Syria? Who is currently engaged in handling the “Lebanese file”?

In Lausanne and in Geneva, was there an Israeli observer, or a Syrian observer butting in at every turn in the negotiations and trying to impose his point of view?

Let’s be realistic. When we talk about Syrian interference and intervention, we’re basing this on facts, on a policy that has remained constant for ten years.
Why have the "Lebanese Forces" asked their members to join the "South Lebanon Army", especially since this militia is a long way off being able to play a major role in the South without Israeli help?

Our decision was taken some months ago. We have dismantled our barracks in South Lebanon. We have eliminated the appearance of arms and uniforms in public, and we have dismissed our troops.

The inhabitants of the South can join the "South Lebanon Army" or not as it suits them best. As far as we are concerned there are no longer any "Lebanese Forces" south of the Awali.

You have often proposed cantonization. Wouldn't that involve further demographic changes on the ground?

No, not necessarily. With the introduction of a federal formula or cantonal formula, or broad decentralization — we don't want to argue over the terminology; call it what you like, though I prefer to use the term "regionalization"
AMAL LEADER BARRI INTERVIEWED ON MOVEMENT'S DEMANDS

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[Amal Leader Nabih Barri interviewed by Mona Es-Said; date, place not given]

[Text]

Amal Movement Leader Nabih Berri is adamant that three essential issues must be settled before there can be a solution to Lebanon's national crisis: the South, the Army, and political reform.

Speaking to Monday Morning on the eve of last week's summit meeting between President Amin Gemayel and Syria's President Hafez Assad, Berri said: "I think it is this package of three points that the two presidents will be discussing. If they manage to reach a solution I think it will be the beginning of the end for the Lebanese crisis."

"I can't say I would be wildly optimistic, because there is always the fear of problems cropping up, but at least the mood of pessimism would begin to dissipate and one would start to see a glimmer of hope."

Elaborating on Amal's three demands, he said that

- without efforts to liberate Israeli-occupied South Lebanon "we cannot envisage peace in the (southern Beirut) suburbs, West Beirut, the mountains or the Bekaa";
- the Army has to be restructured on a national basis because without securing this instrument of power any government formed "will just be a kind of window-dressing without any practical meaning in reality"; and
- Amal thinks "the framework within which all so-called political reforms should be packaged is the abolition of political sectarianism."

This last demand refers to ending the Lebanese system of apportioning political posts, parliamentary seats and civil service jobs on a sectarian basis.

The Shi'ite leader revealed a divergence of opinion on this point between his Amal Movement and the Lebanese opposition's supporters in Damascus, and recognized that he would have to accept a compromise.

Amal, he said, "wants the abolition of political sectarianism, and it wants it now," all in one go.

But the Syrian leadership, recognizing the reservations of other parties, he said, was trying to find a compromise solution, and "as I see it, this will have to be that deconfessionalization comes about slowly and gradually."
Berri urged President Gemayel, however, to “be a second Ataturk, instead of just another president of Lebanon,” and take “a real, bold leap forward.”

Ataturk was the leader who in the 1920s turned Ottoman Turkey into a modern, secular state.

Berri insisted that these three key issues would have to be settled before a government could be set up, because otherwise the government “would not be able to discuss anything, because each member would be working from a different set of principles, and we would suffer a serious disappointment.”

The idea of a dialogue between the Shiite Amal Movement and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), and the Christian “Lebanese Forces” militia has been floated recently.

Amal’s boss told us: “I’m prepared to enter into dialogue on all the issues, starting tomorrow” — but only after the question of the South has been dealt with.

Berri, himself a southerner, referred in particular to the coastal highway to the South being closed north of the Awali River by the “Lebanese Forces,” and to the Israeli-sponsored “South Lebanon Army” militia, which LF elements in the South have been ordered to join.

He said that if the Lebanese were united on the southern issues, they could have Israeli troops out of the area within three months.

On the security situation in Beirut, he said there had been progress on the disengagement of forces, though “this may not be very apparent on the ground... sometimes the withdrawals have been by as little as ten meters, which from the purely military angle is just a joke.”

But he was not sorry about this, because it meant there was no risk of the demarcation lines developing into permanent borders, he said.

In West Beirut, said Berri, the Army and Internal Security Forces are entirely responsible for security and preventing men in uniform or carrying weapons from appearing on the streets. Amal and the PSP have no role to play in this, he said, because to do so they would need to deploy armed elements of their own and so there would be men carrying weapons on the streets.

The following is the text of our interview with Nabih Berri, translated from the Arabic.

What results do you expect the Lebanese-Syrian summit meeting to produce on security and political issues?

In my view, the summit has to succeed. Put it another way, it is not permissible for the summit to fail. It is perhaps the last hope for the Lebanese and for Lebanese accord, so it must produce good, or at any rate satisfactory, results, whether from the political or the security angle.

Experience has shown that the security issue is bound up with the political issue, in the sense that the political situation is always reflected in the security situation. Ceasefires have to have a political basis if they are to endure.
The summit faces several challenges. The challenge, in general outline, is for Lebanon to survive: the one, unified Lebanon. Translating this general outline into details must, in our view, cover three issues.

The first, essential and principal issue is the issue of South Lebanon. My attention was drawn today (Wednesday) to an article in al-Amal (the Phalangist Party organ) which was on the whole good on this subject. It said the South is the essential element and we cannot envisage any calming of the security situation, nor any definitive political solutions in Lebanon, without it. The issue of liberating the South holds the key to total liberation of the whole, starting from the part. So we cannot envisage peace in the (southern Beirut) suburbs, West Beirut, the mountains, the Bekaa etc. without this reflecting the situation in the South.

This southern issue is the first of the essential details to be dealt with within this general framework. The second is the issue of the Army.

There are two instruments of government, of course: one, to deal with security and military matters, is the Army and the other is the cabinet. So, if you form a government, or if a government is formed, as people are proposing, without your having secured the (other) instrument which a regime rules, then this government will just be a kind of window-dressing without any practical meaning in reality, like we have under the present regime. As for whether it should be a government of faction leaders, or a government of first instance or second instance, all this amounts to nothing more than wordplay if the government does not hold this instrument, the Army.

So the second issue to be dealt with is the issue of the Army, and of how to reconstruct it on a national basis instead of the sort of farmyard mess that has prevailed in Lebanon.

The whole Lebanese system has been mirrored in this Army. In peacetime it had the appearance of an army, but when the crunch came and warfare broke out, it could not do anything, because it was itself a product of discrimination on a sectarian, not a national, basis.

It's like having a revolver in your home. In peacetime it's very reassuring to have it tucked away in a drawer, but when you need it, when a thief comes along, or something, it jams, and doesn't work properly.

This is what has happened to the Lebanese Army since 1943. It's not the Army's fault, or the soldiers' fault. It has always been the fault of the political system that has politicized and sectarianized this Army and made it like a fez -- purely ornamental, with no practical value.

This problem has to be tackled on a national basis so that we can use this Army as a bulwark for Lebanon, in the South and in every internal and external upset. This is another essential issue to be tackled before we move on to the other side of the coin, the matter of the government.
The third thing, as many people have already agreed, is so-called reform measures. On this issue everyone including the administration, unfortunately, sees things from a sectarian point of view, on the basis of the principle that has been in force since 1943. We have tried this principle and it has led to our ruination. 1975 was not the first time; it had sometimes happened before that.

In our view, the issue of reforms is the third and last of the detailed issues to be tackled within this framework, or general outline, for the summit talks.

It could be discussed under the heading of “methods of power-sharing,” but we, the Amal Movement, reject this and think the framework within which all so-called political reforms should be packaged is the abolition of political sectarianism.

Now some may say that it would be difficult to abolish political sectarianism once and for all, all in one go. I, on the other hand, think the difficult thing is for us to remain as we are.

Nevertheless, there is no question of Amal imposing its views on others, or of others imposing their views on Amal, so there will have to be some give-and-take.

What we insist on is that the key theme in these reforms should be the abolition of political sectarianism. Something could be done immediately to be going on with, and further steps could be taken after six months, a year, two years, three years, if necessary, as a result of such an accord.

If such a framework is established, setting Lebanon on the road to civilization, progress and development, then I think after a while no one will pay attention any more to what each sect gets. Each citizen will only look at what he himself gets. When that happens, each citizen will be just like any other citizen in a society governed by the principles of justice, equality and merit, and there will no longer be these distinctions between Lebanese.

We will then have established Lebanon as a national, civilized structure in which our children and grandchildren can live as we approach the year 2000.

These three things, I think, will make up the whole package. Once agreement has been reached on them, we will then discuss a cabinet, the other, political, instrument of government.

This government will have to be given extraordinary powers by parliament in various fields which it will determine, so that it can both legislate on these principles comprised by the framework I have been talking about (how to liberate the South, matters concerning the Army and matters of reform) and implement them on the ground.

You say, or rather some people say, why not form a government and let the government discuss this? But then the government would not be able to discuss anything, because each member would be working from a different set of principles and we would suffer a serious disappointment, very serious.
Therefore I think it is this package of three points, at least, that the two presidents will be discussing at the summit meeting, and if they manage to reach a solution there I think it will be the beginning of the end for the Lebanese crisis.

I can’t say I would be wildly optimistic, because there is always the fear of problems cropping up, but at least the mood of pessimism would begin to dissipate, and one would start to see a glimmer of hope; and when you have a glimmer of hope you always try to build on it.

Apart from the fact that the partition of Lebanon would be a great pity for the country as a whole, don’t you think the Shiites have most to lose if partition actually took place, given that they are mainly present in the South, which is occupied by Israel, while the other major sects have “cantons” ready mapped out for them on the ground?

I don’t share this view. It won’t be the Shiites’ loss; it will be the loss of all Lebanese without exception.

Firstly, from the purely Shiite angle, while the majority in the South is Shiite, yes, so too is the majority in the Bekaa; and in the center, in Beirut (Greater Beirut, that is, incorporating the southern suburbs and both East and West Beirut), there is again a Shiite majority. There is also a substantial Shiite minority in Jbail and Keserwan.

I don’t believe the Lebanese mentality has reached the point where there are plans... despite the fact that something of this sort has taken place in Nabaa, Bourj Hammoud and elsewhere, I don’t think it can reach the stage where the rest of the Lebanese are displaced and there is an end to coexistence among the Lebanese and the life we share together at present.

So much for the Shiites. As regards the Sunnites, there are plenty of them in the South — just take Sidon, for a start. And there are a very great number of them in the North — just look at Tripoli. There are also a lot of them in Beirut, in the middle.

As for the Christians, they aren’t a majority in the South, but they are a sizeable minority there. They are in Beirut, even in West Beirut, and in the North and everywhere in Lebanon, let alone the Bekaa, particularly Zahle.

I’m speaking from the demographic point of view, of course.

Secondly, a lot of people are terribly concerned about the economic aspects. We Lebanese have a great reputation; it is often noted how much credit we do our homeland. We emigrate a lot, for economic reasons, in search of a better lifestyle. All Lebanese share in this emigration process, and the Lebanese community abroad is bigger than the one in Lebanon itself.

The economic aspect is important. If Lebanon is partitioned, what will each canton’s economic strength be? No region of Lebanon is self-sufficient. No region has oil reserves; and from the commercial point of view no region is industrially self-sufficient in terms of either exports or imports.
Lebanon itself, within its international borders, can barely be considered an economic unit. It is hardly enough as it is, so how would it manage if it was broken up into pieces, mini-Lebanons?

The harm done to the South will be harm done to a third of Lebanon. Israel is now occupying the South, the Western Bekaa, Rashaya, etc., which in fact means it has seized roughly a third, or two fifths, of Lebanon.

I see Lebanon as like a person, a whole person, with a head, a chest, two legs and two arms. Cutting any part of it off will turn the Lebanon that remains into a great cripple, always needing someone to act as a crutch for it and help it to get along.

Some cantons will want to lean on Israel, and will therefore isolate themselves from their Arab milieu. This is from the economic point of view, regardless of its national and ethical aspects. It is in nobody’s interest at all.

So the people of the South, in all their various sects and factions, are at present paying the price on behalf of the whole of Lebanon.

At present the Shiites there are bearing the greatest burden, because they represent the majority of the population, as you said. This is the reason for the Shiites’ pride, not any consideration of the issue as being of purely Shiite interest. The issue is one of general Lebanese interest, but unfortunately the atmosphere in which we find ourselves...

Look, we have now entered our tenth year of civil strife. The war in Lebanon has made each one of us view the issue exactly like a herd of cows, or should I say a flock of sheep. It shames me to use such a metaphor, but it’s a good way of describing people who, as it were, are all grazing together in a field when the butcher comes along and takes a sheep and slaughters it, and the sheep next to it just carries on eating as if nothing had happened, and as if the matter is none of its concern.

I mean, this is a policy of picking us off like sheep, one by one, region by region. This has been the prevailing policy in Lebanon since 1975.

There’s shelling on the demarcation lines, and the edge of Ras el-Nabeh gets hit — but what does that matter in Basta or to someone sitting in Ashrafiyeh, aware that he, at least, is safe, thank God? After a while you start thinking only of yourself. If there’s shelling in Hazmiyeh, there are people just 20 meters away who say “there wasn’t any shelling near us” — as if nothing had happened.

We have become selfish and concerned only with our own area. A lot of people think “it’s OK in Jouieh, you can go out at night in Jouieh,” and don’t care about what has happened in the southern suburbs. They don’t care about the destruction, and the buildings falling down.

You hear people over here speaking up to condemn what has happened to the southern suburbs, but you don’t hear any condemnations coming from Jouieh, or anyone asking “why should this happen to the southern suburbs?”
It would be very, very significant if someone from Jounieh did speak out — and vice versa; I don't want to give a one-sided example.

This illustrates my answer to your first question, when I said that certain principles have to be laid down before the formation of a government.

A lot of people think this approach is strictly that of Amal, but this isn't true. I've seen statements made by prominent Phalangist members, such as Louis Abu Sharaf, for example, saying that the government must be preceded by agreed principles. So not everything that Amal says, for example, should be regarded by the Phalangists as being against them, and vice versa.

All this is part of the general background against which each of us has come to see things from a completely different perspective. It's as if each of us is thinking that so long as his side of the room is illuminated, so that he can see clearly, so what if the person on the other side of the same room is sitting in darkness. But what is really called for is a broader vision of the whole of Lebanon and the region.

There's a common proverb expressing this idea in everyday terms: "If your neighbor's all right, you're all right." So how much more true is this of people who are actually in the same house?

Are there any new security or political moves in the offing, such as the disengagement of forces, reopening of public facilities or setting up of the constituent body or a government of national unity?

On security matters, the Lausanne resolutions laid down a cease-fire, though I don't regard the cease-fire as an independent resolution; it has to be complemented by the three clauses that followed, even if they only come in the form of clauses: the disengagement of forces, the collection of heavy weapons as a preliminary step, and returning the Army to barracks and restructuring it.

There has been progress on the disengagement of forces. This may not be very apparent on the ground, because in fact there has been more consolidation of forces in their positions than disengagement by means of withdrawals.

Sometimes the withdrawals have been by (as little as) ten meters, which in fact, looked at from the purely military angle, is just ridiculous, a joke, rather than a serious situation.

One very important aspect is the positioning of observers to check cease-fire violations, should they occur. This is very important, especially as it goes hand in hand with political plans to break the deadlock.

Therefore we have absolutely never got bogged down — that is, Amal's representative Dr. Ayoub Hmayed doesn't get bogged down — in considerations that have always prevailed in everything in Lebanon.
For example, they decided they wanted to call up observers from among reservist officers. A list of those who had put their names forward offered us 40 or 45, of whom we found 30 or 35 to be of one sect and only 6 or 7 of other sects. Let me put it more clearly: there were more Christian than Moslem volunteers.

Nevertheless, for the sake of getting the job done, we said this should not hold us up, especially since we are calling for the abolition of political sectarianism. In other words, if at every turn we are going to say we want one Christian for every Moslem, or vice versa, we won't be able to get anywhere.

Yesterday (Tuesday) the positioning of French observers on the Rizk and Murr towers began, and there will be a meeting this afternoon (Wednesday) to follow this up.

We mustn't stop at this, however, and say, "that's all right then, let's go and put our feet up," oh, no. Because this might pose the risk of partition, of specific geographical boundaries which might develop into permanent borders. This just isn't on.

So I wasn't at all sorry that the (opposing) forces weren't moved a large distance apart so that semi-permanent boundaries came into force. No, what is needed, as we have said, is for this to be an observer operation, and a temporary one, accompanied later on by the gathering in of heavy weapons, and by political solutions and the restructuring of the Army, until all these things disappear and there is no longer any distinction between different groups. We're talking about an imaginary line rather than a real line on the ground.

So much for the disengagement of forces. Turning to the issue of public facilities, I'd like to go on to the offensive just a little here. The authorities, and specifically the president of the Republic, have entirely failed to carry out their full obligations in connection with the matter of these installations. Before going to Lausanne there were questions which could have been resolved without Lausanne. Why should the airport and the port remain closed and out of action? Why does this issue need summit meetings to be held; why does it require talks in Lausanne, Geneva or Damascus?

There are armed forces in both East and West Beirut. This is now obviously a fact. However, this does not mean that we have to accept this reality as a permanent situation. Why are we all exerting every effort to keep the Museum crossing open? Is it not in order that this main artery can continue to maintain the flow of blood between the heart and the head, figuratively speaking?

The same goes for the airport, the airport road and the port. Before going to Lausanne I had a televised press conference at which I invited the authorities to open the port and airport, noting that in both cases the security situation was no longer an issue, since there was now an army in East Beirut and an army in West Beirut as well.
I pointed out that we were the ones who were entitled to have reservations about the Army units in the East, because they were shelling and killing us, and because they had destroyed the (southern) suburbs, leaving its people homeless. I don't know if people are aware of the fact, but according to the figures of the International Red Cross, 42,000 families were left homeless in the suburbs. At an average of six persons per family, this means around a quarter of a million people were left homeless and forced to flee to West Beirut.

Meanwhile, there has been no shelling of civilian areas in East Beirut until just recently, and Amal did not mean this to happen.

The Lebanese Army units on this side refused to participate in this massacre and have not asked them, nor have they asked, to take up positions on the demarcation line to carry out the same role that is being carried out by the Army units in the East. We have left them in their barracks and let them maintain law and order. They are here to serve all people of all religious sects in West Beirut, and have not been involved in any fighting.

So we have the right to be critical of the Army in the East. Nevertheless, I said, for the sake of these public installations and of restoring unity among the Lebanese, we would suspend our criticisms right there and then until further notice. Let the Army in the East take over the port, including the fifth basin and everything, I said, so that workers can go back to work from this side and elsewhere, so that port operations could be resumed. In other words, the Army units in the East, which go by the name of "the Lebanese Army," should assume responsibility for the port.

On this side, meanwhile, what were the Army's duties before the February 6 uprising? Things remain the same. We haven't changed anything. Who was the commander of the airport security unit? Brigadier Swaid, and he's still there. Who was responsible for public security inside the airport? Major Matar, and he's still there. On the road from Tayyouneh (the edge of the eastern sector) up to the airport and the limits of Brigadier Swaid's authority, there was the Sixth Brigade—and it is still there.

So come on, please, I said. Everything remains as it was in the past and we, the Amal Movement and the national forces, are willing to make a public commitment in exchange for a similar public commitment from the other side that no one will attack these two installations or harass them in any way.

They asked for the Internal Security Forces (ISF) to be in charge. We said OK. Then a bit later they came up with the bright idea that they wanted Amal to ensure the safety of Christian travellers coming from East Beirut to pick them up at Tayyouneh and deliver them to the airport, claiming that they did not trust the Army. Isn't that the weirdest thing you can think of? If there is anything to fear on the way between Tayyouneh and the airport, it is Amal, because it is the only force in this area. Obviously there was a political objective behind this.
They're telling us that everyone, including those who were shelled and those who died, should recognize those who obeyed the Army command and the political leadership and shelled the suburbs, wreaking destruction and leaving its people homeless.

And yet they reject those Army units which simply said "no", adopting a position similar to that of Fouad Chehab in 1958 when he refused to participate in the civil war, and say they can't be trusted to secure a road!

And yet they know, and I know, that the unity of the Army can only be restored if all these units are included, meaning the Lebanese Army and nationalist Lebanese Army, whether they accept it or not.

On the other hand, I cannot say that I do not accept all the Army units over there. This is something that neither I nor anybody else can say.

This is what has held up the opening of these installations. This is what has kept Beirut under siege. The roads to the South are closed. The fruits and agricultural products of the South are not reaching us. This is even holding up delivery of the tobacco crop, and as you know, the South depends for its livelihood on tobacco.

I'm sorry to have to talk in terms of Christians and Moslems, but it is worth noting that the people suffering most from the failure to settle the tobacco crop issue are our Christian brothers in the South. The villages of Rmeish, Shahr, Ain Ibel, Debel, Yaroun, parts of Tibnin, Safad el-Bateekh, and Brashet, which are the major tobacco-producers, are all or mostly Christian or mixed villages, and they are the main losers. I believe that the second-largest producer of tobacco, after the city of Nabatiyeh, is Rmeish, which is 100 percent Christian. Why should the people of the South, whether Christian or Moslem, suffer this punishment?

This siege has been imposed on the South and on Beirut while certain other installations have been strengthened. We know they have been working at night sometimes at the fifth basin (of Beirut Port) and we have not shelled it. Work goes on day and night at Jounieh Port, and we have not shelled it, because we believe that harm should not be countered with harm, but rather benefit should be countered with benefit.

There have been calls for the opening of a fully legal port while this siege continues to be imposed on nationalist Beirut and on the southern suburbs, that is, on more than one million people, representing more than a third of the Lebanese population.

They are under a full siege, with only the mountain road as the sole outlet, which they are closing from the other side daily, not to mention its poor condition. Some people are spending 5-6 hours on these roads just to reach the Bater roadblock or some other destination. And then there is the difficulty of using our main artery, the Museum crossing between East and West Beirut. This is why we have now started operating a sea route between Larnaca and the Bain Militaire for passengers, but not for goods.
Reports have been circulated about the opening of a sea route to connect Beirut with Tyre and Sidon, but this is out of the question. Acceptance of this would mean that we have intentionally or unintentionally given up our claim to the coastal highway, and not everybody can afford to travel by sea. One way or another, we would be cutting off the South. The only sea route will be the passenger line operated between the Bain Militaire to Larnaca, i.e. to a non-Lebanese destination.

Have Amal and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) actually started to operate this port facility in West Beirut, then?

No. Allow me to explain. A decision on this question was reached yesterday. Once the decision had been taken, this is what happened. I personally contacted the chairman of the Higher Customs Council and asked him to delegate some customs officers to go to the Bain Militaire, so that when someone brings goods in with him he can go through the proper customs formalities, because he is coming from outside Lebanon.

Secondly, we asked the Public Security force at the airport for Public Security to contact the interior ministry’s directorate-general to check people, because maybe there will be undesirable people ("personae non gratae") arriving.

We asked the Lebanese Army, since it is responsible for the security of West Beirut, to be present to supervise the whole Bain Militaire, and it is indeed keen to ensure security (there).

And we asked Squad 16 and the ISF to provide support and vice versa, because the ISF is supposed to help the Army.

There is no involvement of Amal or the PSP or any other group whatsoever, absolutely no involvement.

A boat arrived today as an experiment, carrying eight passengers, no more. The customs authorities, the Army and those others I have named were all present.

So party organizations are not involved?

No, not at all; we aren’t allowing either ourselves or other parties to involve themselves in this matter, because we don’t want to do it as a sort of reflex action, as if establishing our own legality in the face of legality. No, we have left legality intact. But at the same time we are entitled to a bit of breathing space, and to be able to come and go. We’re going to have Public Security there with its official stamp, as at the airport.

And of course, this is just an interim measure until the port and airport open. If that happens tomorrow, this operation will cease tomorrow, not the day after. So much for public facilities.

What exactly are your conditions for participating in a government of national unity to replace the Wazzan government?
If you mean Amal's conditions for either participating in or supporting the government, then our conditions are those I emphasized earlier in my answer to your first question, in other words the general framework I outlined, with special reference to the South.

As I said at my press conference last Saturday, we want national accord, with and in and through the South, not passing over it. This is why I told you the editorial in al-Amal was good in this context, because in our view, any administration or government or national accord needs to be based on a concerted view of how to save the South and restore it to Lebanon, otherwise its approach will be crippled and unable to succeed.

The "Lebanese Forces" heard a "sincere Lebanese voice" speaking when you called recently for a dialogue, after the "Lebanese Forces" had earlier made a similar invitation to Amal and the PSP. Walid Jumblatt has also expressed his willingness to join in such a dialogue. Is there, then, any dialogue in the offing?

I did in fact read these words — and all the other sentences that came with it. I wish there hadn't been these other phrases, but anyway, in accordance with the principles I mentioned in answering your first question, we are fully prepared for a dialogue, starting with the South, as we have specified. The dialogue can cover other matters too, but the basic starting-point has to be this issue of the South.

Let me be clear about this. I simply can't understand the "Lebanese Forces' attitude towards the closure of the coast road. Israel, in the face of public opinion worldwide, has withdrawn to the Awali. The road from the Awali as far as Damour is now closed by the "Lebanese Forces." In no way can I accept that a Lebanese should be in the position of having to say "I'm condemned to this; Israel is pressuring me to be here and close the road."

This road is a Lebanese road, under Lebanese sovereignty. What happened to all the constant revelling in Lebanon's glory, and our eternal cedars, our national pride, and so on?

This matter doesn't call for dialogue, it calls for a stand, so that the road is opened. It calls for a stand on all of Israel's by-products, especially the so-called South Lebanon Army. This is their latest production, this South Lebanon Army and (its commander Antoine) Lahd.

According to my information, this has more to do with the National Liberal Party than the "Lebanese Forces." The "Lebanese Forces" are partly responsible, because they issued a notice telling LF elements in the South to amalgamate with the South Lebanon Army.

It's funny how one minute we support the Army here, and the next minute we've joined the South Lebanon Army... unless there's some scheme behind all this.

This issue is beyond discussion. It has to precede the dialogue, and even the other issues of finding ways to reconstruct the Army, of reforms, urgent reforms, of the government, everything — the airport, the port...
These things can all be dealt with through dialogue. We’re not saying they have to adopt satisfactory attitudes on everything before there can be a dialogue, otherwise the dialogue would then be superfluous. There would be no need for a dialogue if we had settled and agreed on everything.

But the issue of the South is the gateway by which we must enter so that we can all sit down on our chairs or sofas and start talking.

To put it more clearly, a stand must be adopted, action must be taken on the South, and after that I’m prepared to enter into dialogue on all the issues, starting tomorrow.

According to Syrian President Hafez Assad’s close aides, he sees the “no victor, no vanquished” formula as the only one that fits Lebanon. How does Syria’s role as mediator affect relations between Damascus and the Lebanese opposition, including Amal?

Syria views things realistically. It can see the state of segregation Lebanon has reached with its eastern and western sectors of Beirut, for example. The Syrians can see that there is a Lebanese Front and there are nationalist forces.

According to my information, the Syrians believe that there are certain principles to which everyone must subscribe: the unity of Lebanon, the issue of the South, the matter of power-sharing, justice, and a general balance. These are the things Syrian policy takes into account. The whole thing, of course, comes under the heading of Lebanese national accord, and we share the Syrian leadership’s views on these matters.

This doesn’t mean in practice that there are no differences of opinion. I can say on Amal’s behalf, for example, that Amal wants the abolition of political sectarianism, and it wants it now.

But from what you have been saying, it seems you aren’t expecting the question of political sectarianism to be solved quickly.

That’s what I’m getting at. I’d like it all to happen now, and I think (the president) Sheik Amin Gemayel has the chance to be a second Ataturk, instead of just another president of Lebanon. Over the past one and a half years he has been a destructive president, so now let’s see the other side of the coin.

He has the chance to build a real “House of the Future” out of Lebanon and to take action.

Because he is a son of the Phalangists, and the son of the Phalangists’ party president, he more than anyone else can say “I want to set Lebanon on the path of progress, thus...” that is, to adopt a position that makes a leap forward, a real, bold leap ahead.

If he does adopt such a position, the Syrians are naturally not going to say no to him. The Syrians will welcome it.
repeated bombings of Druze interests in the capital, and lately in Tripoli. Why has the opposition allowed things to come to such a pass, so that we now talk of Shiite, Druze and Sunni, instead of united Moslem ranks?

The disagreement between the PSP and the Murabitoun was a political, not sectarian, dispute. It was a natural consequence of the general atmosphere at present. And if we go on like this you'll hear other voices raised. The people of one area, the people of one street, will lash out at the people of the next street, because what we are seeing at present is a wave of fragmentation.

I think when someone gets malaria he keeps looking at his hand to see if his thumb and index finger look different. Each one hurts in a different place and a sort of fragmentation or breakdown sets in, right down to the cells that set the different organs apart.

Lebanon is going through this process. That is why we have these sensitivities between Druze, Shiite, Sunni and Christian. There's a certain amount on the other side (of Beirut) as well, although they're better than us at hiding it, given the greater democracy we have here.

But couldn't you stop this conflict?

Well, it did stop. The deployment of the Army and Internal Security Forces (ISF) and the parties' renunciation and handover of security duties in Beirut, I think, rang down the final curtain on all that. So since this measure was taken about 12 days ago, you can see that this sort of thing has been on the decline in West Beirut and the southern suburbs.

It had started to affect everything. Sometimes a Shiite may be a saboteur and have to be locked up, but the very fact of his detention gives rise to sensitivities, maybe in his Sunni friend or his Druze friend, and so on.

How can we settle this problem? Really what we don't need is for people to be subject to party security measures. What we need is for Beirut to adopt a nationalist stand, and this has happened.

There are no disagreements on this nationalist approach among the residents of nationalist Beirut, be they Christians, Sunni or Shiite Moslems, or Druze.

The dispute is over matters of conduct on the ground—conduct which caused a lot of casualties in West Beirut, even before the "events" themselves.

Hence the move to ring down the curtain on all this—bringing in the Army and ISF so that they could take over security duties and the parties could relinquish this security role in Beirut.

Having said this, however, I must add that this issue (of sensitivities) will remain one of our concerns.

Recently, for example, there was a meeting at the (Maronite) Patriarchate, and somehow or other the Orthodox community turned out not to have been invited as they should have been, and this created problems.

So let no one believe that he is immune to this sort of thing—neither the Greek Orthodox, nor the Catholics, nor
But the Syrians are well aware that so far the administration and the Lebanese Front still aren’t saying this. Faced with the stand of Amal and the nationalist forces, divided between these forces’ call for the immediate abolition of political sectarianism in all fields, in matters of representation and otherwise, and the reservations of the others, they are trying to find a compromise solution.

As I see it, this compromise solution will have to be that deconfessionalization comes about slowly and gradually, not all in one go.

We and the Syrian leadership have different views on this point, and different ways of looking at things. But right now there is no point in disagreeing, because basically we want to try and find some way out of the problem in which nobody comes off too badly. This is exactly what the Syrians mean when they say “no victor and no vanquished.”

Do you expect Syrian forces to return to Beirut as some leaders have requested, especially since it appears that Syria is not keen to take such a step, given the risks involved?

I don’t expect this will happen. My information is that the Syrian leadership does not intend this to happen.

Bear in mind that when the idea was put to us to see what we thought, both from a national point of view and that of Lebanon’s interests, we said fine, by all means.

But I don’t think our Syrian brothers are considering this, and so even though there have been positive and negative reactions to the idea, it wasn’t really necessary to react because basically the idea just hasn’t seriously been suggested, in my opinion.

Of course when I reacted to the idea at first, I noted that the first person to hint at the matter was Sheikh Pierre (Gemayel, the president’s father and Phalangist Party chief, at the national reconciliation conference last month) in Lausanne.

In fact he said three or four times “come on now, before you discuss a cease-fire or anything else you need to talk about a force capable of separating the two sides.”

I remember (former Prime Minister) Saeb Salam asking him “and what force is that?” and Sheikh Pierre telling him “the deterrent force” (originally the Arab Deterrent Force, latterly entirely Syrian in composition); and the president of the Republic intervening to say “no, he means a Lebanese force.”

Three or four times, he said it. Of course the other day he answered me and said he had meant a deterrent force, not the deterrent force.

I was amazed his Arabic was good enough to play on words in this way.

Despite attempts at reconciliation between Walid Junblatt (the Druze PSP leader) and Ibrahim Klailat (leader of the Sunniite Murabitoun, or Independent Nasserite Movement), it seems there has been an inter-denominational split in West Beirut, apparent in the
the Shiites in Jbail, nor the Christians or Maronites present in any area. These things happen. Everything is so precariously balanced, like some kind of acrobatics.

Take the Kfarsala incident for example. Were it not for the mature leadership in some Christian circles, and the mature leadership on this side, it could have led to a disaster. Shiites were harassed in the Jbail area, and even women were kidnaped and insulted. Exaggerated reports reached Beirut, and this could have led to very violent reactions.

The abduction of people from Kmatiyeh is another example. Residents of the village reacted by kidnaping two journalists (and a sales manager) to draw attention to their plight. Of course, you know how we dealt with this problem.

These incidents are not confined to one area to the exclusion of others. They are the result of the disintegration of the Lebanese structure. Let no one believe that events which occur in one area will not affect other areas. The shock waves of any blow in one region will be felt in all other regions of Lebanon.

Consequently, what we need is a patriotic stand. We don't need a sectarian, let alone denominational stand, because it is fraught with dangers and would have (negative) repercussions on all factions without exception.

What is your message to the Christians of West Beirut, who cannot but fear that they might become the victims of the sectarian segregation which is gradually taking place in Lebanon, especially in the aftermath of the Haddad family murder on April 8?

There are no words to express our condemnation of this tragedy—the massacre of the Haddad family. I do not say that simply because it occurred in West Beirut. Had it occurred in any other part of Lebanon, be it the extreme South or the far end of the Bekaa, we would have denounced it in so many words.

It is unfortunately true that a number of offenses—including attacks on embassies—were committed in West Beirut, especially before the Army took over security responsibilities. This incident has a particularly bitter impact because it involved a Christian family, and also because it occurred on the same day that a practical step was taken to introduce law and order in West Beirut. Its timing gives the impression that it was aimed at the security step taken that day (the deployment of the Lebanese Army's Sixth Brigade and the ISF in West Beirut).

I remember driving around the city in my car that day to check on measures taken and ensure that nobody in (militia) uniform or carrying arms was to be seen anywhere. I returned home around 6 p.m., with a great sense of satisfaction.
At around 9-10 p.m., I was informed of the Haddad family murder—as if it was meant to abort all that had been accomplished that day.

It was a test for us. We were afraid that if the Amal Movement or the PSP handled the investigation, the whole matter would get lost. Therefore, from the outset we insisted that the judicial authorities, the ISF and the Army handle the case. I think there is very slight evidence that could lead to the culprit or culprits. Once the perpetrators are identified, there will be no leniency whatsoever. I repeat that the motive behind the crime was to distort the step taken that day.

And what is your message to the Christians of West Beirut?

The Christians of (West) Beirut are not inferior to me. They are not second-class citizens. This is exactly what I was telling one of our Christian brethren yesterday. The Christians of (West) Beirut undeniably share in the decision-making, just like the Shiites and the Sunnites and the Druze. Their loss is ours, and our gain is theirs. Nobody should feel like he is a second-class citizen, not at all. Our problem in Lebanon is that some people feel they are deprived and second-class citizens. This is totally unacceptable.

The Christians of (West) Beirut have the same right of decision-making that others have. On Palm Sunday, one of our brothers from among local priests called us saying that the churches wanted to celebrate and asking for protection. Our response was: "Protection for who? Protection from whom? Feel totally free." In fact, I also said that I would send a reporter from our newspaper, Amal, or a crew from the television station to cover the ceremonies. But protection? Why?

You provide people with security just as they provide you with security. Security is a social issue. This is exactly how it happened on Palm Sunday.

Despite the handover of security responsibilities in West Beirut to the Sixth Brigade and the ISF, armed manifestations have not totally disappeared from the city, and there are so many incidents that people do not dare leave their homes after dark. When will true security return to West Beirut, and who is responsible for these violations of law and order?

The decision was that there should be nobody wearing a uniform or carrying a weapon, heavy, light or medium, in West Beirut. Now, if there are any irregularities, they are supposed to be stamped out by the ISF and the Army. It's their responsibility alone.

I've said this to the various leaders concerned, and told them that Amal for one is not going to condone any party strolling down the road—the Army can arrest him. The same goes for the PSP and also the other national forces.
This is the responsibility of the Army and ISF. If there is any infringement of this decision, let them suppress it. This is their responsibility, not that of Amal and others, because if I wanted, say, to know whether there was an armed man in a certain place, I would have to send armed men to find out, and that would mean that there were armed men coming and going.

Is there any news on the identity of the kidnappers of American University professor Frank Regier and French engineer Christian Joubert, both of whom were freed by Amal?

So far, no, we have not managed to find out who did this, because the operation in which the house (where they were held) was stormed came about by chance in fact. We didn't know who was inside or anything.

Some small boys playing near the house saw through the window some men tied up and with chains on their legs. They tipped off Amal's office, which decided to break into the house, not knowing in fact who was inside. They brought the men to me and I at once asked them who they were. To be perfectly frank, the operation came about purely by chance.

Amal's security network had been working on the case for more than one and a half or two months, trying to find the professor especially. We didn't know about the Frenchman as well.

This professor is a quasi-Lebanese because he has been living in Lebanon, married to a Lebanese, for 17 years, and he has a heart ailment. We were doing all we could to release him, and God gave us success.

What about the other kidnapped Americans? Does Amal have any information on them?

There's an American journalist still being held, and another American official. So far there's nothing, but investigations are continuing.

Doesn't the semi-isolated South now look more remote from the rest of the country than ever before? Do you see any way that Israel is going to pull out of the South, with its fertile land and abundant water, which it is turning into a "North Bank" with alarming rapidity?

Israel has to leave the South. I steadfastly believe that a Lebanon united on this matter wouldn't allow Israel to remain in the South for longer than three months. I said this in Geneva and Lausanne, and I say it again now. The people of the South refuse to live under occupation. What is needed is support for their stand, but it must be the united support of the whole of Lebanon. If the Lebanese position is united we need not fear for the South. There is more to fear internally than from Israel's remaining.
SHI'ITE RESISTANCE TO ISRAELIS REPORTED IN SOUTH

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English No 613, 23-29 Apr 84 pp 46-55

[Article by Sue Bolton: "Israel, Islam and the Resistance"]

[Text] "It's what we call the Allah-o Akbar early warning system," says a United Nations official in Nakoura, explaining how Shiite villagers in South Lebanon mobilize to confront Israeli search-and-arrest raids in what he said was becoming a "daily cat-and-mouse game."

As soon as there is word of Israeli troops arriving in force, or making any hostile move, he said, the loudspeakers normally used to call the Moslem faithful to prayer at the mosque will call them instead with the same words, "Allah-o Akbar (God is Great)," into defensive positions.

Those who want to hide go into hiding; tires are set on fire in the streets; and men, women and children arm themselves with sticks and stones to resist their heavily armed enemy.

Beirut, with its endless political meetings and pronouncements, seems a very long way away.

Cut off from the rest of Lebanon and the outside world by the Israeli armed forces, the South has little communication with the Lebanese capital. There are no telephone or telex lines working between the South and other areas, and some days no newspapers arrive.

The only road link north is the long, circuitous and pot-holed route through Jezzin and the Shouf mountains, when the Israelis open the road at Bater and let the long queues of traffic trickle through.

At Bater lines of cars and trucks are strung out for several kilometers along the road, which clings to the steep hillside, thick with wild flowers, overlooking the Awali River valley.

Taxis and coffee-sellers ply their trade as pedestrians make their way through the mud among the Israeli tanks, choosing to walk rather than spend further hours getting their cars cleared too.
In the port city of Sidon, the southern capital, TV programs from Syria, Cyprus and Egypt can be picked up much more clearly than Lebanese broadcasts from Beirut.

And instead of the Beirut vocabulary of random shelling, "armed manifestations," security committees and collapsing cease-fires, you hear the Sidonese talking constantly of "operations"—attacks on the Israeli forces by local resistance groups; of roads opened and closed at will by the Israelis for security reasons or, as it often seems to the weary southerner, just to make life under occupation more difficult; and of "the boat" that plies between Sidon and Jounieh, the only link with the rest of Lebanon apart from the trying route through Bater.

Ruinous

Much of the traffic passing through the Israeli checkpoint there consists of trucks carrying citrus fruits and bananas, major income-earners for the South, to markets in Beirut and the Gulf.

The difficulty of getting their produce to market is proving ruinous for many fruit-growers, and businessmen and contractors are having similar problems bringing merchandise, construction materials and other supplies into the sealed-off South.

The isolation of the South affects social relations too. At the brand-new Hariri Medical Center built by Rafik Hariri, the Sidon businessman-turned-Saudi mediator, at Kfar Falous, between Sidon and Jezzin, a young hospital administrator says he can see his hometown of Shehim in the Shouf, just ten kilometers to the north, but hasn't visited his family for three months because of the problems of making the journey there and back through Bater.

"The people of the South are besieged," says Sheikh Sayyed Ali Mehdi Ibrahim, the imam of Adloun, half-way between Sidon and Tyre.

"Economically, it's a catastrophe. Were it not for their faith, patience and steadfastness in resisting the occupation, there would be despair in their hearts."

But faith works miracles, he said. Islam encourages resistance to aggressors, and so, he added, "we will continue to resist; our strength and depth is divine."

Another imam, Sheikh Abedilharim Obeid of Jibsheet, scene of a renowned clash between civilians and the Israeli armed forces on March 28, described the situation in the South as deteriorating. He said this was inflaming resistance to the occupation, even though "we have no weapons except sticks and stones and our cries of 'Allah-o Akbar'"
Running parallel with the resistance of civilians armed only with religious faith, however, are the activities of the armed resistance, the "operations" which have become so much a part of the southern scene.

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has recently noticed an increase in both the number and the sophistication of these operations, mostly roadside bomb attacks on passing Israeli patrols.

A French UNIFIL officer also noted the deterioration in relations between the occupying Israeli army and the increasingly hostile population. He said relations between the two sides seemed to have reached the point of no return. "It's finished, it's irreversible," he said, shaking his head.

A liberal-minded Sidon resident thought the first Israelis in the area after the 1982 invasion had at least tried to make themselves to some extent acceptable, by mingling with the townspeople, shopping in Sidon market and even socializing a little.

**Targets**

But subsequent units had distanced themselves from the local population, he said, and Israeli troops were now forbidden to shop in town, for the very good reason that they had become targets for hostile and dedicated resistance groups.

The invading Israelis relieved the South of what Sheikh Ibrahim called "the bitter taste of the Palestinian presence," and, Sheikh Obeid said, they could have won the people's hearts and minds by adopting a peaceful approach.

But they could not do so with their warlike style, Obeid said. Israel cannot safeguard its interests in Lebanon by force, and to do so now it must withdraw; staying here is only increasing the people's hostility and hatred towards it, he concluded.

Both Obeid and Ibrahim regarded resisting the occupation as a duty and obligation, and saw a role for themselves as clerics in consciousness-raising, alerting people to Israel's true nature and increasing their awareness of the need to resist.

Obeid, talking in the whitewashed sitting-room of his Jibsheit home, said Islam distinguished between aggressors and the victims of aggression, oppressor and oppressed.

Ibrahim put it succinctly: As we see it, he said, Israel has committed an aggression, and we are resisting it. They are the terrorists, not us!

Ibrahim, who wears the black turban of a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, feels strongly that the people of South Lebanon, and in particular the Shiite Moslems of the South, are on their own, ignored and unassisted by the rest of the Lebanese and other Arab countries.
While the southerners, who had nothing, were resisting, he said, others who had everything were doing nothing. What interest and support for the resistance was shown, he commented bitterly, was "just words—nothing concrete" and tended to be self-serving.

In Beirut even Amal, the Shiite organization led by Nabih Berri, was principally concerned with events going on in the capital, he said, though it expressed a lot of sympathy for the South.

Ibrahim also criticized the current administration in Beirut, likening it to the harsh regime of Yazid, a 7th-century (A.D.) Arab ruler remembered by Shiites with hatred for killing the Prophet Mohammed's grandson Hussein, a much-revered Shiite hero.

Both imams spoke with disdain of the South Lebanon Army, the militia Israel is building up in the hope that it will be able to take over the policing of South Lebanon if and when the Jewish state pulls its own troops out. Ibrahim described the SLA as part of an Israeli plan to divide the people of South Lebanon who, he said, would resist any armed organization intending to act as guardians or policeman for Israel just as they resisted the Israelis themselves.

Hypocrites

Shiites who cooperated with Israel were worse than the Israelis, he said, because they were being hypocrites as well.

Obeid said the SLA had very few men. Early on in the occupation there had been people ready to collaborate with Israel, even though they had heard of Israel's oppressive ways, he said, but with time the Israelis had appeared in their true colors and there was now very little collaboration with them.

Ibrahim also remarked on how few Lebanese Shiites in the South would now cooperate with Israel. He said the Israelis would have preferred a Shiite to command the SLA rather than the Christian Major-General Antoine Lahd, but they had been unable to find a candidate.

(U.N. sources note that several prominent collaborators have been killed. Prominent anti-Israeli figures have also been assassinated, including Obeid's predecessor as imam of Jibsheet, the fiery Sheikh Ragheb Harb).

The two imams spoke warmly of the general Islamic revival in South Lebanon which, they said, although definitely given a boost by the inspiring example of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeiny's Islamic revolution in Iran, predated that event and had firm local roots.

Obeid traced the "return to religion" to 1976, when he said, young Moslems, disillusioned by the Lebanese civil war and all the various "isms" on offer (nationalism, socialism, communism) turned back to Islam in search of something of more lasting value.
He said girls were now commonly wearing "hijab," a modest headscarf, and attendance at the mosque for Friday prayer was high, especially among the young.

Regarding contacts with Iran—setting aside the physical difficulties of communicating with anywhere outside the South—Obeid explained that Islam knows no frontiers. A Moslem, he said, can turn to any respected religious authority anywhere for guidance in matters of faith and worship, regardless of political boundaries.

And today Khomeiny was the main point of reference for Moslems not only in Iran, but virtually throughout the world, he said.

Ibrahim was careful to point out, however, that contacts between Lebanese Shiites and Iran brought moral support and sympathy for their cause, but not practical assistance. "We work from our own resources," he added.

Fundamentalism

Ibrahim dismissed, too, the notion of a rising tide of Shiite fundamentalism posing a threat to Lebanese Christians.

He said Shiites and Christians had lived together for centuries and the idea of the Christians being afraid of Islam was like the mighty Israel claiming to fear the Arabs: a confusion of the roles of wolf and rabbit.

In other words, the Moslems had more to fear from the Christians, he said, adding that "this (Christian Phalangist) Party" had distorted Christianity and Christ's message of love into a policy of oppression.

Ibrahim and Obeid had less to say about the bomb attacks carried out by the armed resistance in South Lebanon than about the civilian resistance they were strongly advocating.

But Obeid affirmed that each method had its role to play, and their combined effectiveness was demonstrated by Israel's reaction in tightening up its security measures.

U.N. sources talked of an upsurge in resistance operations over the past few months, and pointed out that this was happening despite extreme (and expensive) Israeli security measures throughout South Lebanon. A U.N. official described the Israelis as "like an occupation army under siege, shall we say...they don't rule the country at night, certainly."

UNIFIL statistics show that there were roughly 50 attacks on the Israeli forces in December 1983, 70 in January this year, 50 in February and 60-70 in March.

These figures show a marked increase on last year's operations which the U.N. official tentatively suggested might be linked with last November's release of detainees from Israel's South Lebanon prison camp at Ansar.
Around 2,500 of these former detainees are in Sidon, and some of them are "pretty expert" in guerilla activities, he said.

In addition to attacks that actually take place, many more are foiled when Israeli or UNIFIL troops find unexploded devices and detonate them safely, or local people find such things and report them to either UNIFIL or the Israelis.

Over the past two months UNIFIL has noted an increasing level of sophistication in the bombs it is finding. Some are radio-controlled; some use sensitive plastic explosives that require expert handling; some are skillfully-set booby-trap devices, again requiring some expertise.

UNIFIL believes the materials and expertise are all locally available, and a U.N. official described the organization behind the bombings as a "very professionally arranged cell structure" consisting of tightly knit 10-12 member units, often grouped round a Shiite cleric and very difficult to infiltrate.

Viet Cong

Another sign of sophistication is a new tactic being used, which the U.N. official said was reminiscent of Viet Cong methods in Vietnam. This was to draw the Israelis on the minefields by detonating a small bomb on the roadside and relying on automatic Israeli reaction of plunging into the surrounding orchards to search the area immediately.

This happened in late March near Rihan, northeast of Nabatiyeh, when the Israelis stumbled on five booby-trapped devices, and again more recently in another area south of the Zahrani River, the U.N. official said.

After the Rihan incident the Israelis closed the Bater road, giving as their reason that they were clearing mines in the area.

A drive along the coast road south of Sidon, lined with thick blossom-scented orange groves, gives a clear idea of the ideal territory the area provides for guerilla attacks. But in some places whole swathes of land have been cleared of trees recently.

The resistance has also been encouraged to become more daring, the U.N. official said, by the greater media attention and political pronouncements that have recently been devoted to the South. This has come about since the takeover of West Beirut by Moslem militia groups and subsequent attempts at national reconciliation.

The official said Moslem fundamentalism also played a part in the resistance, especially as "local firebrands" among the village imams have stepped in to fill the leadership vacuum left by the departing Palestinians after the Israeli invasion.
In the UNIFIL area south of the Litani where there was no Palestinian presence, the traditional leadership of major families and village mukhtars or headmen had remained intact and retained its credibility, the U.N. official said.

But, as he pointed out, the Litani can't stop the spread of fundamentalism and militant Shiism is on the march within the UNIFIL area as well—his contacts book is "full of imams" these days!

He described the southern Shiites' relations with the Amal organization in Beirut as tenuous, and said that in the South the term "Amal" refers less to an organized body than to a general ethos of militant Shiism. Sheikh Obeid later appeared to share this assessment.

It was widely assumed for some time that the bombers in the South were mainly militant Shiites.

But three who were killed by the Israelis and identified last December in Sidon, proved to be Sunnites, and Sidon, a predominantly Sunni town, regularly accounts for around one third of the monthly total number of attacks, the U.N. official said.

He described the Israelis' tough response to the increase in resistance activities. They have been stepping up armored patrols; shooting randomly in Sidon streets when attacked; making full use of their extensive intelligence resources, including a local informer network; trying to minimize their exposure by using helicopters to move most of the supplies about; closing roads; searching villages; and arresting and interrogating large numbers of people.

Computer

Following the April 2 "Jerusalem operation" by Palestinian guerillas in which 48 people were injured, the Israelis said they were tightening security on the Lebanese border and they also tightened their control over entry to South Lebanon via Bater.

At the checkpoint there they introduced a thick computer printout in Hebrew listing thousands of names, and made Lebanese stand in lines for hours while they checked up on them.

U.N. sources say the computer list is probably intended to be a deterrent to the Lebanese as much as a serious security measure, however.

Israel now regularly seals off unruly villages to search for weapons and resistance sympathizers. When this happens in UNIFIL's area of operations the international peacekeepers try to keep tempers cool and minimize clashes between the villagers and the Israeli army.
But if Israel plans to move into a village in force all UNIFIL can do is try to be present and witness what happens.

French officers said openly that their battalion, operating in an area that covers several fundamentalist villages, was not neutral. You have to choose between the two camps, one said, "and we are with the local population against the occupation."

He added hastily that UNIFIL was not, of course, going to fight the Israelis, nor was it mandated to do so, though relations between them were poor.

Israeli Pullout

So, as southerners tend to ask each other—and visiting journalists—given the all-round hostility to its presence in the South, is Israel going to withdraw?

The answer, of course, depends entirely on the politicians in Israel and cannot therefore be found in South Lebanon.

There are indications, however, that the Israeli government may decide on at least a partial pullout before long.

The regularity of attacks on Israeli forces, especially in Sidon, despite strenuous security efforts, is one good reason for a pullout, at least from Sidon, but maybe not a sufficient reason, even with Israeli general elections coming up on July 23.

As a French officer with UNIFIL put it: "I feel Israel will leave part of Lebanon soon, probably Sidon. But I have had this feeling since we arrived!"

A U.N. source in Nakoura described the line currently held by the Israelis, said to have cost 30 million dollars to establish along the Awali River, as a political or psychological line rather than a militarily useful one, because all the explosives and resistance fighters are behind it.

He said that a few months ago Israel had been planning to pull out of Sidon to roughly the Litani line, but that Israeli thinking on the matter was now more divided.

He didn't think the Israelis had in fact made up their minds about withdrawing, but he considered it likely nevertheless that they would pull out of Sidon at least, before the July elections.

Another UNIFIL source thought the Israelis would pull right back to the Litani, a distance of some 30 kilometers, because of the casualties they were suffering at the hands of the resistance.
In support of his theory, he said UNIFIL units had recently noticed Israel's crack Golani Brigade being moved into Tyre and replacing reserve troops in Jwayya, both areas a long way south of the present Israeli line.

He said this had also happened just before the Israelis withdrew from the Shouf last September, and was a sign that they were again planning to withdraw southward, possibly all the way to the Litani.

It was militarily logical to send in your best troops for such a move, he said.

There has been talk of an Israeli withdrawal for several months, and as a result many people in the South, like Sheikh Ibrahim, now dismiss the whole idea as no more than that— "just talk."

Security Council

But a proposal put to the U.N. Security Council two weeks ago by Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to expand the role of UNIFIL seemed to suggest that an Israeli withdrawal was being seriously discussed.

His report to the Security Council, in which he said the Lebanese government had requested a further six-month renewal when UNIFIL's current term ended on April 19, suggested measures to "make more effective the mandate of UNIFIL, specifically in South Lebanon, in the context of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from that area."

These measures included "the temporary deployment of UNIFIL, with elements of the Lebanese Army and Internal Security Forces, in areas vacated by Israeli forces" and "the immediate deployment of UNIFIL in the Sidon area on Israeli withdrawal from that area, with a view to assuring the safety and security of the population, including Palestinian refugees in the camps in that area."

The proposals were thought unlikely to have been made without prior consultation with the parties concerned, and gave rise to speculation that Undersecretary-General Brian Urquhart's recent tour of Israel, Syria and Lebanon had produced some form of agreement.

But when objections raised in the Security Council's private discussions on the report clouded the picture and postponed a vote on the issue until last week, it began to look likely that the six-month extension would simply go ahead routinely without any change for now in UNIFIL's mandate.

From the technical point of view, UNIFIL officers said, it would be feasible for the U.N. force to protect the Ain Sidon, or even the whole town, as long as its role and mission were clearly defined.

It couldn't cope with a larger area, however, if the Israelis withdrew further, they said.
The force, currently 5,700 strong, could be boosted to 7,000 men without difficulty, a U.N. source said, though further expansion would require another vote in the Security Council.

One element that would need to be considered carefully would be the extent of Lebanese Army and ISF involvement, he said.

But the main factor that will determine whether the idea works or not is what Israel decides to do.

As the U.N. source said, in 1978 the understanding was that Israel would withdraw to the international border and UNIFIL would deploy throughout the area vacated.

But in the event Israel decided to set up the Saad Haddad militia and the enclave that became known as "Haddad-land" between the border and UNIFIL's zone of operations.

South Lebanon Army

Once again, Israel is trying to build up a local force to secure its interests in South Lebanon once its own troops withdraw. U.N. sources say Israel's withdrawal plans will hinge to a great extent on its assessment of the effectiveness of this militia, the South Lebanon Army.

The prospects of the SLA policing the South do not, so far, look promising. The militia numbers around 1,500 men, made up of the old Haddad militia, about 600 former "Lebanese Forces" militiamen, mostly from Jezzin, elements of the extreme rightist "Guardians of the Cedars," and a handful of Druze from the Hasbaya area, according to the U.N. sources.

Israel plans to expand the force to 6,000 men.

The sources said the SLA is 85 percent Christian and wholly obedient to Israel, which makes it doubly unacceptable in an area where the population is 80 percent Shiite.

They said Israel has been trying to recruit more Shiites and reactivate Shiite militias such as the "National Guard" and "Ansar al-Jeish (Supporters of the Army)."

But they have had little success, they said, partly because local imams appear to be dissuading Shiite youths from working with the Israeli occupation forces.

A U.N. official said Israel had involved SLA militiamen in its raid on Jibsheen at the end of March and had been dismayed by their undisciplined conduct.
Jibsheet's imam, Sheikh Obeid, said a few elements of the SLA had been present, but it was not possible to say whether they or Israelis had fired the shots that killed the three people who died in the incident. In any case, he said, Israel's presence as the occupying power made it responsible for all that happened.

Since Jibhseet, the U.N. official said, Israel has had more serious doubts about the effectiveness of its client militias.

U.N. sources said Israel was considering the idea of leaving behind as many as 400 Israeli volunteer "advisers" to lead the SLA, so as to avoid bloody clashes with the local population after an Israeli withdrawal.

But one UNIFIL officer wondered whether the SLA could ever manage to police the whole of South Lebanon. With Israeli officers it might be more disciplined and efficient, he said, though the local population would have no confidence in it.

However, without the Israeli officers, he said, "the situation could be very bad."

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LEBANON

ISRAEL'S PLANS TO PUMP LITANI WATER SOUTH DETAILED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 54, 21 Apr 84 pp 67-69

[Article by Ibrahim 'Awwadah: "The Old Israeli Plan Has Begun to Be Realized in Lebanon: They Have Stolen the al-Litani"]

[Text] Day after day, the true goals behind the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 under cover of what was called "Peace for Galilee" are becoming clearer.

Reports coming from occupied southern Lebanon for more than a year and a half confirm the true character of Israel's goals in Lebanon. These goals have been the object of organized study and planning by the Jewish state since the seizure of Palestine. Perhaps one of the most prominent goals and plans that have been worked out for Lebanon is the taking over of its water supplies, which are of vital importance to the plans for Israeli expansion in the Arab region. Aggressive wars were waged against the Arab states in 1967 and 1973. Then came the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It was an act of aggression that took place within the context of Israel's policy of hegemony and expansion at the expense of the Arab states, with the aim of plundering their wealth in order to assure the continuity of the state of Israel. At the head of the list of these resources stands water, which the Zionist state lacks and needs in order to attract Jewish immigrants to occupied Palestine and irrigate its agricultural land.

Reports coming from southern Lebanon indicate that Israel has made great progress toward plundering Lebanon's water supplies and pumping them toward the occupied territories in order to use the water in irrigation and drinking water projects. This will allow Israel to attract thousands of new Jewish immigrants and carry out agricultural projects that will ultimately serve the interests of the Israeli economy.

Information acquired by AL-TADAMUN from those arriving in Beirut from the south affirms that Israel, as part of the process of stealing Lebanon's water supplies, has begun to build pumping stations near the al-Khardalah bridge. These stations will pump the water of the al-Litani to Israel's natural reservoir: Lake Tabariya. Israel has completed most of the installations needed for this project. A tunnel has been dug connecting Tall al-Nahhas with al-Khardalah and Lake Tabariya, in order to assure that 150
million cubic meters of water are pumped annually from the al-Litani River in the direction of Israel's territory. Nothing remains but to open the tunnel's mouth, which is close to al-Khardalah. In addition, submerged pumping stations must be installed. The project will be completed by the construction of a collection dam (the al-Khardalah dam), for purposes of water storage, especially in the winter season (the dam's capacity will be about 120 million cubic meters).

Why the al-Litani?

Israel needs pure water for irrigation and drinking purposes. This need recently peaked. Since 1975, maximal exploitation of the various surface and underground sources of water in Israel has been achieved (the total is about 150 million cubic meters). In this period, two major problems have emerged.

The first problem is to provide additional quantities of water, in order to expand the irrigated, agricultural area and meet the needs of the new Jewish immigrants for fresh water.

The second problem is to reduce the salinity of the irrigation water transported in the main irrigation canals currently existing in Israel (the Negev–Tabariya project is of special importance in this regard).

Israel is now completely exploiting the Arab water sources in occupied Palestine and some occupied Arab territories. (These sources are the Jordan River and the al-Yarmuk River in the Syrian Golan region. The tributaries of the al-Yarmuk and some other small rivers flow into the Hula plain, and finally into the al-Wazzani River.)

1. It has used technological methods of exploiting irrigation water by employing modern methods of irrigation (drip irrigation and spot irrigation). It has also limited evaporation and waste as much as possible.

2. It has selected well-bred and improved seeds and seedlings that require little water. In addition, the leaves of trees and plants have been covered and protected from the heat of the sun.

3. Israel has turned to purifying sea water. This has been done in cooperation with the United States of America.

However, these solutions have not permitted Israel to provide additional quantities of water, since the country's annual need for fresh water will reach about 200 million cubic meters during the next 10 years. With this amount, it will be possible to irrigate about 25,000 hectares of land, in addition to providing the water needed to receive an additional million Jewish immigrants. It is clear that Israel is currently looking to the al-Litani to provide this quantity of water. It can excuse itself by saying that excess, unused water exists that goes to waste by flowing into the sea. Moreover, as we have already pointed out, Israel no longer has any Arab source of water left to exploit, except for the al-Litani.
Israel has actually exploited the operation it called "Peace for Galilee" when it invaded Lebanon in order to realize its new-old dream of taking control of the waters of the al-Litani. It has begun to execute this project in plain view and within earshot of the entire world in order to assure itself a copious supply of additional fresh water amounting to no less than 150 million cubic meters a year. In this way, it will be able to carry out the 10-year plan it has drawn up to irrigate 25,000 additional hectares and absorb about a million new immigrants. In Israel's mind, all this can be assured by the waters of the al-Litani, which provide an abundant flow of water amounting to 700 million cubic meters annually. Of this, Lebanon currently uses 400 million cubic meters to produce electricity and irrigate some of the plains lying in the Biqa' and southern coastal regions. Thus, the remaining 300 million cubic meters flow into the sea to the south of Sayda' and are wasted. All Israel has to do is exploit the waters of the al-Litani in the al-Khardalah region between Marj 'Uyun and Arnun, where the river heads westward to the sea, in order to provide itself with 150 million cubic meters of fresh water a year, which can be pumped to Israel. It will then be able to irrigate an additional 25,000 hectares of unirrigated agricultural land and absorb about 1 million new immigrants. This means that Israel, with 150 million cubic meters of water from the al-Litani annually, will increase its population by 25 percent. Thus, it will also be able to increase the percentage of mobilization in its army by 25 percent. This is an increase of about 1.4 million draftees. This will all serve to increase Israel's military and economic capabilities and provide important support for Israel's security vis-a-vis the surrounding Arab countries. If Israel exploits all of the al-Litani's wasted water, it will be able to absorb about 2 million new immigrants and increase the mobilization capacity of its army by 50 percent.

Add to that the fact that Israel will be forced, when it begins to pump the waters of the al-Litani inside occupied Palestine, to remain in a broad swath of Lebanese territory in order to protect its pumps and installations. This means Israel will stay in the south, at least in the border region lying between al-Nabatiyah and the towns of Marj 'Uyun and al-Khayyam, where the pumping installations it has begun to construct will be located.

On the basis of the above, the true economic and military dimensions and character of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon become clear, and not just for Lebanon alone, but for the Arab world as a whole. This is a matter calling for rapid Arab-Lebanese action in order to confront the new Israeli attack. This must be done before Israel succeeds in imposing a fait accompli, especially since the execution of the operation of pumping the waters of the al-Litani to occupied Palestine is supposed to begin very soon. Israel is waiting for demographic changes in the south and for certain factors to mature. These things are essential for its plan to execute its aggressive project.

First of all, Lebanon must use the international organizations to affect public opinion, so that it can explain the true character of the goals of the Israeli occupation of the south. Moreover, there must be similar Arab activity designed to thwart the realization of the Israeli dream. If this
dream is realized, it will have awful consequences and bring terrible danger to all the Arab states.

Lebanon's Responsibility

Finally, we must point out the dangers Lebanon shall face as a result of the process of drawing the water of the al-Litani to Israel. They can be summarized as follows:

First of all, the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon will be entrenched, at least in the border regions.

Secondly, Israel will be able to strike against the al-Qasimiyah agricultural project, which was established in order to irrigate about 50,000 dunams of banana and citrus groves between Sayda and the south. That is, Israel will be able to sabotage this project and cause large problems for thousands of Lebanese farmers.

Thirdly, about 50 southern Lebanese villages will be deprived of their drinking water, since Israel will cut the Jabl 'Amil water network between the al-Litani, al-Tayyibah, and Arnun. This network provides drinking water for 50 Lebanese villages. It has recently been rumored that Israel has actually linked this network with an Israeli water network serving the Upper Galilee, via large storage facilities set up in the Lebanese border townships of 'Ayn Awbal and Rumaysh.

Fourthly, southern Lebanon will be deprived of the benefits of the implementation of the southern irrigation project for 30 years. The project is supposed to irrigate land at the 500 to 800 meter level, and its goal is to revive the region and the unirrigated agricultural land that could give the south the ability to be steadfast.

Finally, we must point out that successive Lebanese governments have been responsible for failing to use all of the abundant waters of the al-Litani for many years. Had the water been used, 40 percent of this river's water (300 million cubic meters) would not have flowed into the sea to be wasted. Consequently, this water would not have given Israel an excuse and a reason for invading southern Lebanon.

One must point out the obstacles that were placed in the way of the execution of the second half of the al-Litani project. The project was carried out in the 1950's, and it had to do with the construction of a dam in the al-Khardalah region to collect water from rain and creeks between al-Qir'awn and the area of the dam. The water was to be used to irrigate land at altitudes below 800 meters, especially in the al-Nabatiyah region (25,000 hectares). It was also to be used for the operation of the al-Zorariyah power plant.

Had these obstacles not been placed in the project's way, the water of the al-Litani would not be wasted as it is today and Israel would have no excuse for exploiting it. The south and its people would not be suffering today under the Israeli occupation, after having suffered for long years from
political, social, economic, and feudal exploitation. This exploitation was the direct cause for the deprivation of the south from the benefits of the al-Litani project. This deprivation was excused by the dispute over the question of whether irrigation should occur up to the 600 meter level or the 800 meter level. Other excuses were used as well, and their aim was never the interest of the people of the south. Rather, they were intended to keep these people in the grip of political, cultural, economic, and social backwardness, and to serve the interests of political feudalism.

The al-Litani in a Few Lines

Lebanon's most important and longest river (170 kilometers) irrigates broad stretches of the Bīqa's plain and the plain of Sayda' and Sur. A dam was constructed on it at the township of al-Qir'aun in order to store water for power generation and irrigation.

The al-Litani rises from the spring of al-'Ullayyiq to the southwest of the city of Ba'llabakk. It then heads southward to the citadel of al-Shaqif, where it turns westward to flow toward the sea. It reaches the sea north of Sur, where it is known as the al-Qasimiyah River.

In its course from its source to its mouth, the al-Litani is met by several tributaries. Here are the most important ones: the al-Barduni, the Shtawrah, the Qabb Ilyas, the al-Khurayzat, the Mashgharah, and the Zurayqun, from the right bank, and the al-Ghuzayyil River, which has as its tributaries the springs of 'Anjar, from the left bank.

The area of the basin that feeds the al-Litani its water is about 2168 square kilometers. This amounts to a fifth of Lebanon's area.

In 1954, the Lebanese government set up the al-Litani Authority and charged it with the execution of a project calling for the construction of three dams for storing 340 million cubic meters of water. In addition, it was supposed to set up six hydropower plants with a total capacity of 172,000 kilowatts. An area of about 50,000 hectares was also to be irrigated.

At the end of 1958, the authority began to execute the project. It completed the first phase in 1965. This included the construction of the dam at al-Qir'aun and the power plants at Markabah and Jun. The other sections of the project were not executed. Thus, no use was made of the al-Litani water that flows into the sea (300 million cubic meters) in the al-Qasimiyah project in southern Lebanon (38,000 hectares) at the 800 meter level.
Al-Litani Project, Not Yet Fully Implemented

Source of map of Al–Litani Project is the National Authority for the al–Litani River 1962

KEY:  
(1) Beirut  
(2) B'hamdun  
(3) Dahr al-Baydar  
(4) Qabb Ilyas  
(5) Shrawrah  
(6) Zahlah  
(7) Toward Ba'labakk  
(8) Qa'ur dam  
(9) Shamsin canal  
(10) Shamsin dam  
(11) Al-'Anjar dam  
(12) Sayda--Beirut irrigation area  
(13) Al-Kharub province irrigation  
(14) 'Ammiq  
(15) Kafariya
(16) Majd al-'Anjar
(17) Al-Biqa' irrigation
(18) Toward Damascus
(19) Sayda
(20) Jun station
(21) Al-Awwali station
(22) Al-Qir'awn
(23) Al-Qir'awn dam
(24) Markaba tunnel
(25) Markaba station
(26) Markaba dam
(27) tunnel
(28) Al-'Awwali tunnel
(29) Al-Nabatiyah al-Tahta irrigation
(30) Al-Nabatiyah al-Fawqa irrigation
(31) Al-Zrariyah
(32) Al-Zrariyah station
(33) Al-Zrariyah tunnel
(34) Marj 'Uyun
(35) Al-Khayyam
(36) Al-Khardalah dam
(37) Palestine
(38) Syrian Arab Republic
TREASURY REVENUES TUMBLE AFTER PORT, AIRPORT CLOSED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 9 Apr 84 p 7

[Article; "Following the Closing of the Port and the Airport, Customs Fees Totaled 104 Million Pounds During the First Quarter of the Year"]

[Text] Treasury income in the form of customs fees fell during the first half of the year. Revenues did not reach expected levels, following a year in which they had achieved record figures.

During last January, the value of customs fees amounted to 61,760,009.29 Lebanese pounds. During February, it was possible to collect fees worth 4,909,921.30 pounds from the port of Tripoli. In addition, fees worth 5,828,741.82 pounds were collected from the port of Juniyah, while the sum of 247,172.44 pounds was collected from the port of Sayda'. The total was equal to 10,975,836.56 Lebanese pounds. Customs fees from the port of Beirut for the first week of February were estimated to be 10 million pounds. The fees from the airport were estimated to be 1.5 million pounds, while those from al-Masna' amounted to 2.5 million pounds. Total income for the month of February was thus 25.7 million pounds.

During March, the value of the customs fees collected from the port of Tripoli was 5,428,264.96 pounds. For the port of Juniyah, the figure was 9,374,905.58 pounds. The sum of 1.280 million pounds was collected from al-Masna' while 318,244.61 pounds were collected from the airport. It should be noted that the employees went to the airport twice a week in order to remove the goods that were in the storehouses. The customs fees collected from the port of Sayda' were estimated to be less than 200,000 pounds. That is, total customs fees collected last March were no more than 17.2 million pounds.

Thus, the sum of customs fees collected during the first quarter of the year was about 104 million pounds.

It should be noted that the closing of the port of Beirut and the airport had the greatest effect on customs fees, because more than 80 percent of total customs fees come from these two institutions. The port of Tripoli was not able to compensate for the revenues of the port of Beirut as it had in the 2-Year War and afterwards, when the monthly average for
customs fees used to reach 16 million pounds when the port of Beirut was closed. The reason for this failure is the existence of seven illegal ports in the vicinity of the port of Tripoli, which has lowered the volume of customs fees collected there.

As for the customs fees collected from the port of Juniyah, they just about doubled, despite the port's limited facilities. It has been noted that the closing of the port of Beirut this time has created no pressure for the opening of illegal ports, as happened in the past. However, it has also been noted that small boats have been transporting goods from ships anchored offshore, especially at night.

12224
CSO: 4404/439
STATISTICS DETAIL 1983 BANKING ACTIVITY

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 14 Apr 84 p 7

[Article: "Banking Activity As of the End of 1983"]

[Text] The events that took place at the beginning of last February delayed the issuing of the Bank of Lebanon's statistics on bank activity as of the end of 1983.

Last year, especially the second half, witnessed security developments that had an effect on the economic situation in general and on the banking and monetary situations in particular. This will be shown in the statistics that are about to be issued.

However, some general features of the banking situation have been delineated via the initial statistics made available at the Central Bank.

Deposits:

By the end of 1983, total bank deposits were worth about 57.969 billion Lebanese pounds, as compared with 45.439 billion at the end of 1982. That is, an increase of 12.530 billion occurred. This is a 27.57 percent increase.

These figures include private sector deposits, in both Lebanese pounds and foreign currencies, belonging to residents and non-residents alike. Part of the increase was due to the increase in the Lebanese valuation of foreign deposits, which resulted from the 44 percent increase in the price of the dollar last year.

Deposits in Lebanese pounds owned by residents increased from 32.152 billion at the end of 1982 to 41.129 billion at the end of 1983. That is, there was an increase of 8.977 billion pounds. This meant a 27.92 percent increase.

Total deposits in Lebanese pounds held by both residents and non-residents have developed in the following manner since 1977.

It is to be noted that the percentage increase last year was the smallest since 1981. It was much smaller than the increase achieved in 1982, despite the Israeli invasion.

97
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Deposits (in millions)</th>
<th>Annual Increase (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>9316</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>11504</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>12971</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>16129</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>21321</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>32152</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>41129</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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On the other hand, it should be noted that deposits in foreign currencies, which increased by 26.7 percent last year as a result of the increase in the dollar exchange rate, fell in 1982 by 31.1 percent in view of the improving price of the pound at the end of that year following the election of the late President Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil.

Credit:

Total private sector credit at the end of 1983 amounted to about 33.604 billion pounds, in comparison with 25.729 billion pounds at the end of 1982. That is, an increase of 7.875 billion pounds occurred. This amounted to a 30.6 percent increase.

However, this increase seems limited, because it averages 2.5 percent a month. It almost parallels the aggregate interest rate and the differential in the exchange rate of the dollar. This expresses the state of immobility that predominated all of last year.


Special Funds:

The sum of special funds in the banking system (both capital and reserves) at the end of 1983 was about 2.978 billion pounds, as compared with 2.162 billion at the end of 1982. That is, there was an increase of 816 million pounds. This amounted to a 37.74 percent increase.

This increase, which reflects the solvency of the banking system, is considered to be very satisfying in comparison with the increase in the volume of deposits and credits.


The Unified Balance:

The sum of the unified balance of the commercial banks at the end of 1983 was about 78.496 billion pounds, as compared with 61.718 billion pounds at the end of 1982. That is, an increase of 16.778 billion pounds occurred. This amounted to an increase of 27.18 percent.
CHIEF OF STAFF LAUDS ARMY AS 'LOYAL TO KORAN, ISLAM'

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 18 Apr 84 p 2

[Text] Brigadier Zahir-Nezhad, Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Army of the Islamic Republic, gave an exclusive interview to the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY in the occasion of Army day (29 Farvardin [18 April]). He explained the state of the army during the years of the flowering of the revolution, and referred to the great internal changes and fundamental alterations which were brought about in the army system and among the zealous and brave personnel of this organization because of the appearance of today's Islamic Revolution. He said: The relentless battle waged against domestic and foreign mercenary elements throughout the imposed war by the brothers of the army, who even competed against one another to sacrifice their lives, are all part of this great change.

Referring to the Imam's command after the triumph of the Islamic revolution that the army must remain, and the designation of 29 Farvardin [18 April] in 1358 [21 Mar 1979-20 Mar 1980] as the Islamic Republic's Army Day, and a day of solidarity between the army and the Muslim nation, he noted the great responsibility of each of the nation's officials before this great day.

The Chief of Staff recalled the plot of the counterrevolutionary mini-groups, who wanted to deprive the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran of its armed forces by chanting slogans to dissolve the army, so that in time they could implement their evil plans in the interest of the superpowers of East and West, and he described various aspects of the organization of the army. While enumerating the factors that maintain a strong, committed, combative army for the defense of all of a country's territory, he said: The reformation and rebuilding of an organization with this capability and these special characteristics which can preserve a durable independence is not easily done, and here we perceive the value of the Imam's command, and the perception and foresight that only the great leader of the Islamic revolution had concerning the preservation of the army.
Continuing his talk, Brigadier General Zahir-Nezhad stressed that during the revolution the army regained its foothold and proved its loyalty to the Koran and Islam. He referred to the rigid, oppressive laws that prevailed over the army of the idolaters, and said: The first responsibility of the army was to preserve the sinister monarchical regime; failure in this responsibility was answered with execution, and weakness in it meant prolonged imprisonment.

He emphasized: The army is proud that in the Lavizan incident it made the first armed attack on the life of the idolaters and made the heart of the shah its target. This incident caused the shah to give up on his supporters, and aside from the resistance of a few mercenary commanders during the Islamic revolution, the army stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the Moslem nation and made efforts to overthrow the evil regime. During the revolution the army did not obey even five percent of its orders, because the army was intact, and most important of all, it was Moslem.

The Chief of Staff then explained the army's accomplishments since the triumph of the Islamic revolution, and recalled the sacrifices and the relentless battle of the brothers of the army against foreign and domestic mercenaries of world imperialism in order to defend the government of the Islamic republic.

Continuing, he said: The activities of army personnel, who are charged with guarding the Islamic Republic of Iran, must be appreciated and praised.

In conclusion, the Chief of Staff conveyed Army Day greetings to the Imam of the nation, the Moslem nation, the zealous soldiers, and the combatants of the Islamic revolutionary guards. He said: God willing, Army Day will be an auspicious day for the combative brothers of the revolutionary guards, the revolutionary organizations, and other fearless combative people's forces, whose sacrifice, loyalty, and bravery would need a book to describe.

9310
CSO: 4640/214
BOOK BY RAJAVI'S BROTHER SURVEYS KHOMEYNI REGIME

Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Apr 84 p 5

[Article by Roland Delcour]

[Text] Ever since the plane carrying Imam Khomeyni to Iran landed at Tehran airport on 1 February 1979, the course of events has quickened. With mad enthusiasm and boundless hope, millions of Iranians and, additionally, countless witnesses of one of the largest revolutions of the Near East, have in four years gone from hope to doubt, confusion and, finally, to disgust. How could a reign of terror have emerged from the hands of the turban-clad man who, at Neauophile-le-chateau, answered each question with the same words: "Our regime will be Islamic, our republic will be Islamic, our laws will be Islamic." Who could have predicted such an about face?

It is that question which Kazem Rajavi's book, entitled THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE MOJAHEDINS,* attempts to answer. Kazem Rajavi is the younger brother of Massoud Rajavi, president of the CNR (National Resistance Council), and head of the Mojahedins' Khalq (that is, "of the people"), who escaped from Iran in 1981 along with M Bani Sadr. Kazem Rajavi is professor at the University of Geneva, where he has been living for 15 years. Shortly after the revolution, he was appointed ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva. He was later sent to Africa. He was to resign during the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran.

The author is not content with offering a defense and description of the Mojahedins. He tries to explain how the rejection of the imperial regime could have been guided and then monopolized by Imam Khomeyni and his Islamic Revolutionary Party (PRI), and how that formidable revolution could become a regime whose excesses and cruelties are in many ways worse than those of the shah.

Kazem Rajavi seeks to explain that deviation of the February 1979 Iranian revolution by the coup of Mossadegh in 1953 and also by the shah's unsuccessful agrarian reform. The author also denounces the "abduction" of Islam by the mullahs. The undertaking is the main thing. It consists in trying to

* Anthropos Editions, 257, p 85 F.
unite the fighting on the land itself and among the diaspora with the struggle to reestablish the truth about an Islam whose message Kazem Rajavi considers to be truly democratic.

A Double Miracle

Since 20 June 1981, the response of Iran's Mojahedins to the oppression which it has suffered from the authorities has been violence itself. It is held responsible for the well-known atrocity of June 1981, in which dozens of deputies and some of the most prominent pro-Khomeini leaders perished. The Iranian regime and its representatives are also trying to discredit the movement by calling it "terrorist," not fearing the parable of the straw and the beam. In his book, Kazem Rajavi states: "From 20 June 1981 up to now, there have been 4,000 officially reported executions (not counting those of Kurdistan) and almost 30,000 political prisoners are languishing in the prisons. The dreaded tortures of the former regime are being used once again. The present one, moreover, has invented some new ones." The infamous Evin prison is receiving prisoners again under conditions as inhumane as before, with thirty to eighty people in one small cell, living in such a way, the author states, that they are able to sleep only two hours a day, taking turns. The massive repression has spread to the whole country," he concludes.... "having as its only objective to safeguard the power at any price." Kazem Rajavi also shows how, in his opinion, the Khomeyni regime, which already in 1981 was breathing its last, was saved by the double miracle of the occupation of the American embassy (4 November 1979) and then by the war unleashed by Iran on 22 September 1980, which were naturally able to provoke an upsurge of patriotism and close the ranks around the mullahs' regime.

Faced with that situation, what do the Iranian Mojahedins propose? Kazem Rajavi is formal, of course, as might be expected. "Aside from the National Resistance Council, the only democratic alternative, there is no other solution that could possibly replace the present regime," he states in his conclusion. In a postscript, the author recalls the unfortunate road taken by the (communist) Tudeh, from its cooperation with the regime to its inglorious end in 1983. He mentions the existence of two "extreme parties," the monarchist movement on one hand, and the now overthrown and outlawed Tudeh, on the other. Of those two extremes, only the monarchist still remains. "They have at their disposal," the author says, "foreign aid, essential material needs, some officers at the border and a small number of others in the army." On the other hand, the Mojahedin movement remains, in his words, "the only opposing force within the country." The author concludes by affirming his faith in the movement. In this regard, it is appropriate to note that the importance of the Mojahedins' role in the National Resistance Council further increased after breaking with former president Bani Sadr and M Massoud Rajavi, reported on 31 March 1983, for which one of the main reasons was the attitude toward the Gulf conflict and conditions for a possible peace. M Kazem Rajavi recalls in a postscript that, in January 1983, the CNR, with Bani Sadr's approval, signed a border agreement with Iraq, based on the 1975 peace treaty between the two countries.

9475
CSO: 4619/38
OVER 235,000 EDUCATORS REQUIRED IN NEXT FIVE YEARS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 2 May 84 p 8

[Interview with Minister of Education; date and place not specified]

[Text] In an exclusive interview in conjunction with the upcoming teachers' day, Seyyed Akbar Parvaresh responded to the questions of our KEYHAN correspondent concerning the various problems of teachers and the welfare and educational programs for them. We congratulate all the hard working teachers throughout the country on this day and wish them all success in educating the children of this country for the stabilization and perpetuation of the Islamic revolution of Iran. The text of our interview with the minister of education is as follows:

Seyyed Akbar Parvaresh first spoke in regards to the status of teachers in the society and their mission in the area of education: "Since the spiritual status of the teacher is very high, he is also responsible for a very important mission. If the teacher conforms his views with those of the Islamic leaders and looks at the student as a world, he has, in fact, placed a great deal of value on being a teacher and on the student. On the other hand, the society and the leaders must realize the value of the teacher more than ever before and help more than ever before in the attainment of the goals of education which will be followed by improvement with regard to the situation of the students."

Then, on the dawn of teachers' week, Mr Parvaresh praised the status and high service
of teachers and said that the teachers and instructors of the country at the present time are under financial pressure and that the authorities are aware of this. For this reason, certain decisions have been made to secure the welfare of teachers.

[Question] What steps have been taken thus far to encourage the teachers to be more effective and do you essentially have a plan in this regard?

[Answer] In order to encourage the teachers to be more effective, a plan for the continued education of tenured teachers with high school diplomas up to those with associate degrees, a proposal has been prepared and presented to the supreme council of education. The ratification of this proposal would be an important step in this regard. Also, to increase the knowledge of teachers, some classes have been established to:

1. Improve the level of the Islamic and political knowledge and views of the faculties.
2. Improve the quality of teaching methodology of the teaching profession and the faculties.
3. Increase the knowledge of the faculties in the various specialized fields.
4. Acquainting the faculties with newly published books.
5. Familiarizing administrative employees with and training them in administrative sciences.
6. Devising long-term, permanent educational plans.

Also, the central offices of education throughout the country have been asked to introduce outstanding teachers to be admitted to teacher training centers without an entrance examination to continue their education.

[Question] How many of the teachers have taken courses thus far to increase their knowledge while still teaching?

[Answer] In regards to efforts in the area of administrative training for administrators at various educational and administrative levels to achieve the above-mentioned goals, during the period 21 March 1981-20 March 1980, some 70,844 persons throughout the country participated in the educational programs of this office.
During the period 21 March 1982-20 March 1983, we also had at the elementary and exceptional levels, 18 projects at the high school level; 15 projects in the agricultural, technical and trade fields; 10 projects for administrative employees; and 9 teacher training projects, which involve the training of 363,132 persons throughout the country.

[Question] Since the cultural revolution, have steps been taken at the pre-collegiate levels to coordinate with those at the higher educational levels?

[Answer] At the beginning of the establishment of the headquarters of the cultural revolution, a committee called the pre-collegiate committee was established under the supervision of the honorable teacher, martyr Bahonar, which began pre-collegiate planning in coordination with the university programs. Another committee, called the coordinating committee for educational and manpower planning, was established in the presence of the representatives of the headquarters of the cultural revolution and the Ministries of Higher Education and Education. It prepared certain proposals which, after ratification by the honorable headquarters of the cultural revolution, were implemented. Among them we can point to the use of university students in schools; and to date, about 8,000 students of previous years have been selected to teach.

[Question] What considerations have taken in sending high school teachers to deprived areas from this Ministry?

[Answer] Many considerations have been taken, including the following:

1. Special pay which is generally allocated to deprived areas.

2. Recently, the honorable Cabinet ratified a bill allowing the payment of up to 20,000 rials for housing costs over and above salaries and benefits to about 1,000 high school teachers who volunteer to serve in deprived areas.

3. In the near future, a number of Peykan and Renault passenger cars will be distributed at government cost among elementary and high school teachers of the deprived areas of the country and also to those high school teachers who have volunteered to serve in the deprived areas.

4. High school teachers who volunteer to serve in the deprived areas of the country may return to their own provinces after one year of service.

5. High school teachers with bachelor's degrees who have been newly hired will be sent to the deprived areas of the country for
a period of two years and after two years, if they wish, they may transfer to the province of their choice.

6. Recently, it was decided that a number of teachers with high school diplomas would be selected from the deprived areas of the country to be admitted to the teacher training centers without having to take the entrance examination.

[Question] Explain the general programs of the Ministry of Education for the deprived areas.

[Answer] Given that at the present time, about 25,000 villages or rural units lack schools as well as the fact that the establishment of schools requires many resources—including a proper educational atmosphere, elementary and high school teachers, a sufficient number of students, and so on—while in a large number of villages, due to the small population, there are not sufficient numbers of students, a plan has been prepared on the basis of which those beloved children of the less populated villages may participate in the education process in a central village, which will be selected according to regulations, in an educational complex. The central village will be selected to enable students from other villages to reach the central village without spending an excessive amount of time. This plan was implemented last year in several areas of Central Province on a trial basis and it is hoped that in the future, it will be implemented throughout the country, whereby all the rural children will be included in the educational program. Also, in order to ensure that a larger number of the students in the rural areas continue their education, steps have been taken to expand night and day Rahnama'i schools.

[Question] Considering the increased number of students and the capacity of the teacher training and high school teacher training centers, how much educational manpower will you need throughout the country over the next five years?

[Answer] Considering the increased number of students, which will automatically result in the creation or expansion of educational units, it has been projected that in the course of the next five years, the Ministry of Education will need a minimum of 220,000 persons in various educational and employment capacities, including education, training and administrative areas. Some of these forces will naturally replace a portion of the existing manpower which in the course of the above-mentioned period will leave their service for various reasons (death, retirement, transfer to other ministries and government or other organizations).

Each educational level, considering the need for related education and expertise, will require a particular educational
degree. For instance, the manpower needed for the elementary level, which has the largest numbers, that is, about 130,000, will have high school diplomas and associate degrees; the Rahnama'i level will require about 70,000 persons with associate degrees, who will be trained by the Ministry of Education in the teacher training centers, as will most of the needed manpower at these levels. However, in order to fill the employment needs at the high school level, including general, technical and trade schools, the needed manpower must be trained at the universities and colleges. According to projections, about 25,000 of the above-mentioned number must have a bachelor's or higher degree.

[Question] What is the procedure for contact between the teachers and the executive and planning authorities for education?

[Answer] Since the 1982-1983 academic year, educational groups made up of elementary and high school teachers, have been formed throughout the country and have begun their activities. In the course of the academic year, these educational groups have continuously engaged in researching and studying textbooks, educational programs, planning, testing, and other educational programs. They have sent their views in letters to the headquarters and planning offices. The headquarters and offices are devising the educational programs taking into consideration these views. In addition to the correspondence which has taken place in this manner, there are also seminars with the elementary and high school teachers from across the country and the necessary coordination is created between high school and elementary school teachers and the planning offices.

[Question] If possible, tell us the statistics on the quantitative and qualitative growth of teachers since the revolution.

[Answer] Since the victory of the Islamic revolution, the number of employees of the Ministry of Education has increased by about 140,000, which, compared to the number of employees before the victory of the revolution, is an increase of about 40 percent. It should be pointed out that this number should be viewed in the light of the precision imposed on the selection and hiring process of individuals since the revolution.

Since the expansion of education after the victory of the revolution has occurred mostly in the rural areas and sending the sisters to those areas has encountered some difficulties, the Ministry of Education needs to take measures to attract forces from among the brothers in order to resolve the problems of the villages. For this reason, the ratio of women employees to all employees of the Ministry of Education has decreased from 49.5 to 44.5 percent. The total number of employees of the Ministry of
Education in the current academic year is about 560,000, of which 500,000 hold education related jobs and the remainder are in service jobs.

Of the total number of employees, about 280,000 are brothers and 220,000 are sisters.

From the viewpoint of the exalted culture of Islam, being a teacher is not a specialty or a trade and being a student is not a "class or type," for according to the imams, teaching is the vocation of the prophets and is a mission involving commitment and trust for becoming a human being, being a human being, and remaining a human being. One is not a student only in school but from the cradle to the grave and from the mosque of worship to the altar of holy war.

It is with such an ideology that martyr Mottahari shines like the sun over the scene of the Islamic education of our time and becomes a guide to the ideological and committed teacher. It was he who, throughout his blessed life, like the unschooled prophets, taught wherever he went. His perpetual fight against falsehood knew no bounds: In the alley and the market, in the room and the school, in street demonstrations and university podiums, in newspapers and interviews, in small local committees and large international conferences, in the underground houses of the Islamic freedom fighters and in the direct line of the machine gun fire of the tyrant, at the altar of war and the altar of worship, everywhere he rose up like a soldier in the trenches of education. He had an ear everywhere with which to listen to the word of truth. You see the lofty height of the master of the pious who follows the righteous path steadfastly.

He was a steadfast guard and guide; he suppressed and exposed every darkness and deviation.

That is why our imam of the nation said in mourning his martyrdom:

Condolences and congratulations for the martyrdom of a personality who spent his noble and worthy life on the path of the sacred goals
of Islam, fighting strongly all aberrations and deviations. Condolences for the martyrdom of a man who was unmatched in the study of Islam and the various fields of Islam and the Koran. I have lost a very dear son and mourn him whom I considered the fruit of my life.

10,000
CSO: 4640/221
INAUGURATION OF NORTH KOREAN 'FILM WEEK' IN TEHRAN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 16 Apr 84 p 15

[Text] Islamic Guidance Ministry's director-general for research and film-making affairs: "Iran's Film Week will be held in the capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea during the second half of the current year."

The Film Week of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which is being held on the occasion of the national day of that country, began yesterday (Sunday) afternoon at the Tehran Film Institute. On the first day of the Film Week of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea a film was shown entitled "On the Rail" and dubbed in Persian, after which the ambassador of North Korea expressed appreciation for the help and cooperation of the Islamic Republic of Iran for holding the Film Week. He said: Relations between the two countries of Iran and Korea are getting stronger day by day and the holding of this Film Week is a clear indication of friendship between the governments and the peoples of Iran and Korea. The ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea then referred to the anti-imperialist struggle of the two countries, saying: The sincere friendship existing between the two countries engaged in a joint struggle against imperialism is unshakeable. He added: The heroic nation of Iran has achieved significant successes in building a new society under the guidance of Imam Khomeyni, leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the government and the people of Korea consider these as their own successes. In conclusion, the Korean ambassador expressed hope that the expansion of cultural relations between the two countries would be the means for furthering friendly bilateral ties. According to the report, following the speech of the Korean ambassador in Tehran, brother Shoja'nuri the director-general for research and film-making affairs in the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, congratulated the government and the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on their national day and while expressing his gratitude over the holding of such events stated: Following the splendid Islamic revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran expanded its relations with many countries in which new standards are in effect—including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with whom we have strengthened ties. The director-general for research and film-making affairs of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance said in another part of his speech: We believe that the geographic distance between nations can be disregarded by such nations becoming familiar with each others culture and traditions. Therefore, we welcome the holding of such Film Weeks
and for our part give other nations the opportunity to become familiar with the revolutionary culture of our people.

In conclusion he thanked the organizers of the Film Week, saying: We hope to be able to hold the Iran Film Week in Pyongyang, capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in the second half of the current year. According to IRNA, following the speech of the director-general for research and film-making affairs of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, a Persian language film entitled "Island of the Brave" was shown. A reminder that the Korean Film Week will continue until 21 April and that every day films from Korea will be shown in two sessions, at 3:00 pm and 5:00 pm.

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CSO: 4640/198
ASSYRIANS, ARMENIANS OBSERVE EASTER IN AZARBAYJAN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 23 Apr 84 p 3

[Text] Christians in Urumiyeh from yesterday morning began worship ceremonies and paid their respects on the occasion of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ in churches and other religious centers. According to the Central News Unit during the Easter Sunday high mass conducted at the Assyrian-Chaldean Church in Urumiyeh, Bishop Thuma, the religious leader of Assyrians in Azarbajjan, during the Easter prayers and homage, asked that the year should bring plenty as well as success and victory for the Iranian nation and be a year of understanding and peace for other nations.

He said: Jesus Christ fought for the well-being of mankind and for that reason was subjected to the harshest tortures by the agents of injustice and oppression.

In conclusion, Bishop Thuma prayed for the success of all responsible officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran in carrying forward the humane goals of the Islamic Republic system and asked the Almighty to guide to the righteous path violators of the rights of human beings and those Christians who act contrary to the teachings of Jesus Christ.

During these ceremonies, the religious leader of Assyrians in Azarbajjan also asked all other Christians of the country to bear in mind the special conditions of the imposed war and the confrontation with the people of Iran who have risen against world arrogance, to observe Easter in simple fashion and during the Easter season to visit wounded fighters in hospitals, to express their appreciation to them and to concentrate their efforts toward helping the afflicted and the needy.

Similar ceremonies were conducted in the Armenian Church in Urumiyeh and in Christian villages of the city regions (shahrestan), as well as the city region of Salmas, including Khosrowabad, Tatehvar and Haftvan, with sermons about the life of Christ, may God's blessing be upon Him.

Also yesterday, Christians who had fasted for 50 days and abstained from eating meats and animal products, ended their fast after receiving communion.

According to the same report, in the course of all Easter observances held in Christian churches and religious centers in West Azarbajjan, prayers were offered for the health and long life of the people's Imam, Khomeyni the Great, and for the early victory of the extremely capable fighters of Islam.
RAWALPINDI, April 28: The Defence Minister, Mr Ali Ahmed Khan Talpur, said that the People's Republic of China has always stood by Pakistan in its hour of trial, and the unflinching support it rendered to us so far is unique and unprecedented.

He was talking to the Director-General CAAC, Mr Shen Tu, the leader of the Chinese Airline goodwill mission, currently on a six-day visit to Pakistan, who called on him in his office here this morning.

Welcoming the distinguished guest, the Defence Minister said that Pakistan and China are marching forward shoulder-to-shoulder, and the existence of the airlink between them have contributed significantly in bringing the peoples of the two countries close together.

He hoped that the present visit of the Chinese goodwill mission will further cement the friendly ties between the two countries. Paying glowing tributes to the farsightedness of the late Chinese Premier Mr Zhao-En-lai, the Minister said that during his premiership the nefarious designs of the enemies were successfully foiled. Reciprocating the feelings, Mr Shen Tu said that 20 years ago the Sino-Pak airlink protocol was signed in the teeth of opposition from some quarters.

He said that during the last three decades Pakistan has progressed remarkably in all walks of life, and is happy to note that Pakistan was flourishing day by day. During the meeting, Secretary-General Defence, Maj. Gen. (retd) M. Rahim Khan, Secretary Defence, Mr Aftab Ahmed Khan, M.D. PIAC, Air Marshal Waqar Azim and Pakistan Ambassador to China were also present.
TRADE WITH JAPAN DISCUSSED

Karachi DAWN in English 29 Apr 84 Supplement pp I, II

[Article by Tufail Ahmad Khan: "Biggest Trade Partner of Pakistan"]

JAPAN has emerged as the biggest trade partner of Pakistan, and the second biggest buyer of Pakistan's exports during the current fiscal year 1983-84.

This is amply proved by the figures relating to the eight months, July 1983 to February 1984 for which data are available from the Federal Bureau of Statistics. Her purchases during the period amounted to Rs 2.2 billion which were next to exports only to Iran valuing at Rs 4.06 billion.

Japan's main purchases were shrimps, raw cotton, cotton yarn, cotton cloth (bleached and sheetings), Desi cotton, cotton waste, bags and sacks of cotton, towels, carpets, pig iron, leather made of goatskins and sheepskins, bone meal, animal casings, guar gum, raw wool, marble and onyx, platinum ores, platinum concentrates and alloys, scraps of (i) iron and steel, (ii) copper and (iii) nickel, castor seed oil, poppy seed, waste of regenerated fibre, rubber, and such chemical products as ethyl alcohol and alcohol peroxide.

Of course, the list of her purchases are fairly long but the items named above are comparatively larger in value.

Comparison

It will be of interest to compare Pakistan's trade with Japan to our trade with other principal countries during the first 8 months of 1983-84. The figures in the table below are in thousand rupees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports to</th>
<th>Imports from</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>4,066,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2,201,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Arabia</td>
<td>1,889,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mainly oil)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>1,835,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>1,080,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1,040,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>686,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>442,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>364,868</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures also reveal some other important facts. Japan is the largest supplier of goods to Pakistan and has left behind even Saudi Arabia, the principal supplier of crude oil and petroleum to this country, and the USA which supplies edible oil, tallow and now raw cotton to Pakistan in large quantities among other commodities. During the eight months of the current financial year Japan has imported from Pakistan more than what she had imported in the first nine months of fiscal 1982-83 (Rs 2.02 billion). It is likely that by the end of 1983-84 (July-June) her imports from Pakistan would exceed the imports during the corresponding 1982-83, period although the hope has been dimmed due to the failure of our cotton crop. However, the trend is towards increase from the very beginning of the eighties.

What is disturbing in Pakistan-Japan trade in that since our imports from Japan have been rising at a higher rate the imbalance in our trade with Japan has also been increasing by leaps and bounds.
The imbalance in the first eight months during the current year alone exceeded the imbalance in the whole of the year 1980-81. Effective steps will have to be taken to reduce the deficit in our trade with Japan. Such measures seem to be indispensable with the deficit in our trade with Japan. Such measures seem to be indispensable with Japan adding new items to her purchase list, e.g., petroleum products and other value added goods; increasing industrial investment in Pakistan and exporting products of those investments to Japan. Japan may also place subtracting orders with Pakistan's engineering firms and companies such as shipyard, machine tool, electrical firms for supplies to the oil-producing countries which are in close-proximity with Pakistan.

So far most of the Japanese investment in Pakistan have been technical in nature in our industrial development. To reduce, if not wipe out, the imbalance Japan must change her policy and increase her equity investment on an effective scale. This is indispensable also for the much-desired transfer of technology from Japan to Pakistan.

Concerted efforts are also needed on the part of Pakistan exporters. A brilliant Swiss study of Japan's import market holds the opinion that it is not possible to export to Japan unless the exporter caters to the peculiarities of Japan's culture which is easier for an Asian country like Pakistan than, for instance, an EEC country. Our exports of hand-knotted carpets to Japan have increased in recent times. These exports can be further increased if the weavers in Pakistan study the size of rooms and the styles in Japanese homes, and make carpets accordingly. For instance, Japanese homes have smaller room floors but our carpets are usually of much larger sizes. While weaving carpets, especially for Japan, our manufacturers and exporters of carpets must keep this important fact in view. Similarly, the woven pictures on carpets meant for hanging on walls can depict Fuji Yama, Big Bronze Buddha of Nara and the golden palaces of Kyoto and Nara. Likewise, exporters of leather and leather manufacturers must also keep in view the Japanese taste and requirements arising from her climatic and social conditions.

It will not be an exaggeration to say that Japan has played a pioneering role in such vital fields of Pakistan's industrialisation as cotton textile, art silk weaving. She is now playing a similar role in the development of electronics, tanning and automobile industries. Her large-scale sales of renovated textile machinery in the early years of Pakistan's industrialisation was of mutual benefit as it helped Pakistan establish at low costs an industry that was based on the processing of one of her principal raw materials and sell the semi-processed goods (cotton yarn and coarse cloth) to Japan and even to Europe, and simultaneously helped Japan and Europe in rehabilitating their war-torn economies with speed.

In this process of mutually beneficial economic cooperation Japan had a major share. In the sector of art silk industry Japan supplied not only machinery to Pakistan but also art silk yarn and, gradually, almost replaced Italy in the supply of man-made yarn. Later, Pakistan was able to establish certain of her own varieties of man-made fibre and yarn-making industries.

Automobiles

Similarly, in the case of two-wheelers Japan has been of positive assistance to Pakistan. It started with imports of fully assembled motorcycles, and then progressively local assembly of CKD imports and local manufacture of parts and components up to about 54 per cent, developed. Honda, Yamaha, Kawasaki, Suzuki, are the established names in Pakistan's automobile trade and industry, having joint ventures with some leading private sector companies in our country, such as Atlas Autos, Dawood Corporation and Saif Nadeem. It is hoped that gradually all parts and components (including engine components of Japanese motor trucks) will come to be made within Pakistan. Messrs Allwin Engineering are playing a leading role in this field.

Two additional truck-making projects based on joint ventures with Japanese companies are coming up. Hino project is a Pakistan-UAE-Japan joint venture. Pakistan Automobile Corporation, Al-Futtaim of UAE and Hino and Tyodo Tsusho Kaisha of Japan are
partners. The Nissan project is a direct joint venture of Nissan, Japan, and Gandhara of Pakistan. Both will assemble and manufacture trucks and buses in Pakistan, each having an annual capacity of 6,000 trucks and buses of 190 horse power. Their buses will have 62 seats each. Nissan is estimated to Rs 316 million including foreign exchange cost of Rs 129 million while the Hino project is calculated to cost Rs 453 million.

Japan provided machinery and technician trainer (Mr. C. Ogiwara) for the establishment of a leather-making research centre in cooperation with the PCSIR (Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research) in Karachi which has greatly helped Pakistan in the manufacture of finished leather of international standards. It has an engineering cell, research wing, library and advisory services. It has done very valuable work in the transfer of advanced leather-making technology to Pakistan.

Japan has also lent industrial technical assistance in Ceramics. The other important fields in which Japanese industrial technical and financial assistance is of significant value are diesel electric locomotive, making of cargo vessels and CITRAL (Central Telecommunication Research Laboratories).

Japan is a leading member of the World Bank's Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium. Next to the USA, her pledge at the April 1983 meeting of the Consortium in Paris for 1983-84 was the highest at $149 million (including project aid of $73.1 million). The country-wise details of this year's meeting (April 12, 1984) are not yet available except that the total pledge at 1.822 billion is higher compared both to last year and to what Pakistan had requested for 84-85.

However, this is certain that next to USA, our highest indebtedness relates to Japan, $846 million as on June 30, 1982, out of which $700 million were disbursed and outstanding $145 million as undisbursed. Out of the above-mentioned total of $846 million capital debt stood at $830 million and suppliers' credit at $16 million. This heavy indebtedness is undoubtedly of help to Japan in its export trade with Pakistan.

Additionally, Japan has provided Pakistan with grants totaling last June to $4,499 million yen. The grant amounts are devoted to health, social, educational and telecommunication plans and projects.
IMPLICATIONS OF BIG FARMS, COMMERCIAL FARMING DISCUSSED

Karachi DAWN in English 28 Apr 84 Business Supplement p III

[Article by Sajjad Akhtar: "Commercial Farming—How Will It Affect Structure of Our Agriculture"]

[Text]

IT IS widely acknowledged that sustained increases in marketable surplus of agriculture output denote a turning point in this sector. Pakistan's agriculture, hopefully will be soon approaching this milestone in its economic history.

However, this transition sets in motion, though gradually, forces of commercialisation or some may call it capitalistic farming that have an impact on tenurial relationships, employment opportunities, income distribution, availability and price structure of inputs and outputs.

Admittedly, the scale, speed and characteristics of this phenomenon in our agriculture sector would ultimately determine the degree of impact on the aforementioned variables. The most one can do, at the risk of being premature, is to present some tentative propositions about the nature of the impact, thereby providing few useful insights for the policy makers.

Farm size

The impact of commercial farming on existing agriculture structure would largely depend on the perceived minimum size of farms viable for commercial farming.

Though it is difficult to argue that small and medium size farms cannot favourably compare with large farms in terms of marketable surplus of output per acre, potential entrants into commercialised farming in Pakistan may be inclined to operate on farm of size greater than 25 acres. Eligibility to institutional credit, and economies of scale may justify their outlook.

Given this assumption about the size of commercial farms, existing skewed distribution of land may be further accentuated by three kinds of pressures:

a) Government's willingness to give huge parcels of hereto unsold cultivable land to private entrepreneurs interested in capitalistic farming

b) Increased incomes due to favourable price structure of agriculture outputs, prevailing since last few years, may positively influence the capacity of medium size farmers to buy adjoining lands from the subsistence farmers

c) Industrialists and urban traders pushed by increased competition, government regulations and labour laws in the industrial sector and attracted by liberal tax exemptions and low wages in the agriculture sector, may decide to buy existing cultivable land from the small and subsistence farmers.

Employment policy

The employment policy of the commercial farmers or agricultural entrepreneurs would largely specify the cost to the society of this new emerging trend in land ownership. The degree of stress
and strain on the existing tenurial relationship between landlord, tenant, share cropper and landless peasant would be more visible from the changes in asset ownership emanating from the latter two forces just mentioned.

Employing wage labour may be a profitable proposition in the presence of greater capital intensity, high productivity requisite and owner-cum-manager supervision of the commercial farms. However, the benefits in terms of assured labour supply from retaining traditional tenurial arrangements cannot be overlooked.

Wages opportunities

Will labour be better placed in terms of real wages and job opportunities than at present, under the former type of hiring policy in the commercial farming sector? Unfortunately at this juncture, the answer is not as simple and one may resort to a hypothetical superstructure of likely effects.

- This approach is partly unavoidable due to the complex nature of the labour market. The decision by the commercial farmer to retain and hire which members and how many of the inherited surplus pool of labour from previous owners or arrangements would depend on: a) skill and educational level of the pool; b) local labour market conditions; c) potential for adaptability to new capital intensive technology.

The unemployment cost of commercialisation, that is, risk of eviction will be the highest for those who fail to fit in any of the above three requirements. Whether those possessing characteristics (a) and (c) and retained as wage or salaried labour are better off than under the present arrangements would depend on the wage package offered by the new agriculture entrepreneur.

In this regard, one can safely deduce that the wage, salary and non-pecuniary benefit structure would have to be comparable to those offered by the management of industrial plants set up in the rural areas. This would partly compensate for the loss of control over the land and withdrawal of previous benefits such as free housing and food.

With the advent of commercial farming the demand pattern of various types of agriculture labour would also alter. The shift would be towards skilled and specialised agriculture manpower indispensable for extracting higher output per acre.

Inputs

Theoretically, agriculture run on commercial lines can lower input prices to the extent that significant increase in their demand lead to lowering of their production costs, i.e. positive externalities of commercial farms then are also enjoyed by the rest of the agriculture sector.

Given the situation in Pakistan where prices of major inputs, like fertiliser and pesticides are subsidised, these may continue to be set by the government sector or large multinationals. Consequently, externalities of this type would be negligible and may, in fact, contribute to increasing profits or reducing subsidy bill of the manufacturing sector.

A more likely possibility would be an increase in the frequency of localised short-run shortages of these inputs. The entry of commercial farms, alongside existing large farms, as potential buyers of inputs in bulk quantities would mean that small farmer is now less assured of continuous supply of inputs throughout the season.

Here, government role in building an efficient distribution network combined with effective monitoring system would minimise these adverse effects of commercial farming on the availability of inputs.

Agricultural machinery industry which is subject to economies of scale can gain by passing the benefits of increased demand in the form of lower prices to the farmers. The number, size and other characteristics of the firms within this industry would be the determining factors in generating such benefits for the entire agriculture sector.

Impact on output

Projecting the impact of commercial farming on the availability and prices of output is more intricate than for inputs. Multiplicity of prices such as support, ration and world prices together with interprovincial movement bans, reserve maintenance, and govern-
ment versus private export agencies would combine to form a challenge for the policy makers under the changing agrarian structure.

Assuming that entire agriculture output of commercial farmer is available for export, a major decision facing the government would be whether to regulate the private export of these commodities through a system of export licences or to buy the surplus at the existing support prices and enter into the export trade itself.

Under the latter policy decision, if the domestic support prices are higher than the world prices, the benefits to the commercial farmer and the middlemen, have to be weighed by the cost to the economy of subsidising agriculture export, and thereby questioning the whole rationale of promoting commercial agriculture.

Apparently, a suitable policy would be to encourage the export of commercial farmers output through their privately owned export houses at the world prices. The world prices will then serve as a check in ensuring efficiency of the commercial farmer.

For equity considerations in favour of the small and medium farmers, some form of institutional check will be needed to maintain this two-tier pricing structure.

If the government restricts itself only to the procurement programme for building reserve stocks and issuing export licences, the small farmer may not withstand the pressure on output prices due to lower production cost of the commercial farmer.
SIND POLICE CHIEF ANALYZES FACTORS BEHIND VIOLENCE IN PROVINCE

Karachi DAWN in English 29 Apr 84 p 2

[Text]

KARACHI, April 28: The changing pattern of living standards, unemployment of educated youth, ever-rising foreign remittances (about Rs 1200 million yearly) and availability of sophisticated weapons from 'Darra factories' are, according to IG Police, Mr Bashir Ahmad Siddiqui, the main factors responsible for violence in Sind province.

Addressing the members of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Karachi, on Saturday, he claimed that the crime rate was less last year as compared to the previous year. There were 14,786 cases in 1983 as compared to 15,022 in 1982. The year 1976 was the worst for crimes.

He said there was a recovery of stolen goods/looted property worth over Rs 37 million out of the total stolen property of the value of over Rs 82 million indicating 40 per cent recovery employing the out-dated methods of investigation by the Police in the province.

He admitted that there were 'black sheep' in the 30,000 police force and that nearly 3000 of them had been punished departmentally for dereliction of their duties. Yet, there were policemen who have started showing valour in combating crimes/criminals and even laid down their lives which was a good sign, he said.

Mr Bashir Ahmad pleaded for an independent judiciary in the country. The success in crime control depended on securing convictions from courts and added that this was possible only if the people cooperated with the police in exposing criminals by giving evidence. The majority of the people avoided giving evidence, he said.

This, indirectly helped the criminals.

He disclosed that currently there were at least 30,000 (20,000 under Penal Code) cases pending in different courts of the province out of which nearly 15,000 accused were on bail. The figure included offences under local as well as special laws.

The deterioration in the force and the rise in crimes was mainly due to the personalised and one-man-oriented nature of the police force. A public-service oriented system could help in boosting the efficiency of the police force to make it a model institution.

He said he had placed a ban on the recruitment of illiterates while filling up 3000 vacant posts, adding that the unemployment scene was so grave that B.A. and M.A. pass candidates had applied for the jobs of constables.

He stressed the need for reforming society and recognising merit particularly while providing jobs to the jobless. Unemployment, he said, leads to stagnation which breeds anti-socials.

He said that there were 900 policemen in the Traffic Police who can cover just a third of the city area. He said he had submitted a scheme to the government for increasing manpower for streamlining the traffic system where 90 per cent of the traffic signals were surely out of order. He hoped to add 500 new policemen to the force next month. He disclosed that 23 new Police Stations had been opened in Sind including seven in Karachi.

Regarding smuggling, he said, it was a secondary job for them as
under the new law, they were supposed to refer all smuggling cases to the customs.

Replying to a question, Mr Bashir said that he had planned to have police fork-lifts to remove the general complaints of the public pertaining to extortion by the police and fork-lift men in the city.

Answering a question, the IGP disclosed that an amendment in Section 51 of the Police Act had been sought to remove the complaints about the existence of "patharewalas", particularly in the city's congested areas like Jodia Bazar and Marriot Road, etc., and added that the KMC staff was not cooperating with the police in this regard.

He favoured the idea of a member that there should be nomination of respectable citizens including a representative of the Chamber of the Committee for Reform of Prisoners in Jail and that such a member should be allowed free access to jails at all times.

He also favoured the enforcement of Shariff system, like in the USA, on community basis for the welfare and well-being of the people and to involve them in tackling local problems including anti-crime measures.

Answering another question, he said that the government had taken a serious view of the unwarranted holding up of vehicles laden with manufactured goods in SITE and promised such acts would not be repeated.