China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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# CHINA REPORT

## POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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GENERAL

PRC ELECTED TO POSTAL UNION CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL

OW280840 Beijing XINHUA in English 0818 GMT 28 Jul 84

[Text] Bonn, 27 Jul (XINHUA)--The 19th congress of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) ended in Hamburg today with the adoption of a new UPU convention, which will go into effect on 1 January 1986.

The congress, which opened on 18 June, also decided:

-- to raise the terminal fee of mails from 5.5 gold francs (about 6.7 marks) per kilogram to 8 gold francs. The decision is in the Third World countries' favor because they receive more mails than they send out.

-- to ease the weight limits on small postal parcels from 1 kilogram to 2 kilograms.

-- to increase the compensation for lost ordinary parcels by 50 percent.

-- to expel the South African regime from UPU in accordance with a proposal by African countries.

In a statement issued after a two-day debate, the congress called on member countries to expand their postal business to meet new demands and show more flexibility in handling the international postal business.

The congress, held once every 5 years, was attended by 1,000 delegates including those from China.

During the congress, China was elected member state of the Consultative Council for Postal Studies (CCPS) and chairman of the first committee responsible for postal development research.

State secretary of the Federal German Posts and Telecommunications Ministry Winfried Florian told a press conference yesterday that the UPU congress was successful. The decisions made by the congress on improvement of the postal service are new achievements in increasing and improving communications among the people of the world, he said.

The next UPU congress will be held in the United States in 1989.

CSO: 4000/424
PRC WITHHOLDS COMMENT ON ROK CHIEF'S JAPAN VISIT

OWL81231 Tokyo KYODO in English 1151 GMT 18 Jul 84

[Text] Beijing, 18 Jul (KYODO)--In its first official response to South Korean President Chon Tu-hwan's planned visit to Japan in September, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said Wednesday it will neither oppose or welcome the presidential trip.

"We have no comment (on Chon's state visit to Japan), since it is a matter between Japan and South Korea," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said in a reply to the Beijing bureau of Japan's KYODO news service.

Earlier this month, China's official XINHUA News Agency carried a report about Japanese Diet (Parliament) members campaigning against Chon's trip to Tokyo, indicating the Beijing Government may not tolerate the first ever official Japan visit by a South Korean head of state.

Already, North Korea has denounced the presidential visit, saying it will be the "first step by Japanese militarists in their renewed invasion policy toward Korea (Japan's colony from 1910 to 1945)."

When Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone visited Seoul early last year, the Chinese Foreign Ministry raised objection to the trip, saying it would not be helpful for stability in the Korean situation and peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

Western diplomatic sources have said China's assessment of the Korean situation has somewhat changed over the past 18 months.

China's "no comment" response to President Chon's Japan trip may be an indication of its hope that Prime Minister Nakasone will take a diplomatic initiative on behalf of the Beijing government in bringing the two Koreas and the United States together for tripartite peace negotiations proposed by North Korea, the sources said.

They said this Chinese hope obviously prompted the Chinese leadership to refrain from publicly objecting to President Chon's visit to Japan.

The sources speculated that the Chinese idea for Seoul-Pyongyang-Washington talks has been probably conveyed to Nakasone, both privately and through diplomatic channels.
Other diplomatic sources said China is expected to raise its objection to Chon's Tokyo visit if it sees the trip as not conducive to reduction of tension on the Korean Peninsula and three party negotiations, an idea backed by Beijing but so far rejected by Seoul, Washington and Tokyo.

The Seoul government favors direct talks between North and South Korea, without the United States at least initially, to discuss the future of the Korean Peninsula.
BRIEFS

IOC ON 1988 GAMES—Los Angeles, 21 Jul (XINHUA)—There is no question of moving the 1988 summer Olympic Games from Seoul to anywhere else, Madam Monique Berlioux, director of the International Olympic Committee, at the first IOC press briefing here today. She said that the executive board of the IOC met today to discuss the proposals and recommendations raised in the reports submitted by various IOC commissions, but no decisions have been made yet because all decisions have to be adopted at the full sessions. Speaking about the next Olympic winter games in Calgary, Canada, Berlioux said that a few new events would be added and there would be 16 days instead of 13 for the winter games. She said that a Libyan member proposed that boxing be omitted from the Olympic competition program. When asked about the possibility, the director said that there would not be much possibility since the sport was favoured by many member countries. Replying to a question of what measures to be taken by the IOC to prevent further boycotting in the future, Madam Berlioux said that these had still to be discussed in the next few days. [Text] [0W220740 Beijing XINHUA in English 0637 GMT 22 Jul 84]

ROMANIAN SUPPORT FOR DPRK—Bucharest, 16 Jul (XINHUA)—Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, today reaffirmed Romania's support for the just struggle launched by the people of Korea. While meeting a delegation of the League of Socialist Working Youth at the Neptun sanatorium of Constanta, southeast Romania, Ceausescu said that the Romanian people firmly support the proposal put forward by Korean President Kim Il-song for the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, the construction of an independent and peaceful Korea and the relaxation of the tense situation in the Korean Peninsula. Nicu Ceausescu, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Union of Communist Youth, met on last Friday the Korean delegation headed by Yi Yong-su, chairman of the Korean League of Socialist Working Youth. Both sides discussed the 1985 International Youth Year aimed at "participation-development-peace" and maintained that the youth organizations of the two countries should take an active part in the activities of the youth year. [Text] [0W170252 Beijing XINHUA in English 0240 GMT 17 Jul 84]
U.S. AGREES TO SPACE-WEAPONS TALKS IN VIENNA

OW291944 Beijing XINHUA in English 1910 GMT 29 Jul 84

[Text] Washington, 29 Jul (XINHUA)—The U.S. Government sent a diplomatic note to Moscow Saturday, explicitly agreeing to discuss space weapons in the Soviet-proposed talks in Vienna despite the Soviet accusation that the U.S. position made the talks "impossible."

United States State Department spokesman Anita Stockman said the note was delivered by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The text of the U.S. note was not disclosed.

But Stockman said that the United States is "serious" about substantive talks in Vienna. "We are prepared to go there and talk about outer space, including antisatellite weapons, and we have no preconditions," she said.

Earlier, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Komplektov accused the United States of "rejection of serious negotiations" and said the American draft document did not even mention "outer space" and completely ignored Moscow's proposals for complete mutual renunciation of antisatellite weapons and a moratorium on testing and deployment of space weapons.

The new U.S. diplomatic note and the State Department announcement seem to represent an effort by the Reagan administration to meet some objections raised by the Soviets in a private message Thursday and public attacks Friday in a continuing month-long exchange over the proposed talks.

The State Department statement said nothing about the U.S. desire to discuss intercontinental and intermediate nuclear missiles in the Vienna talks. But a White House official said the United States has not dropped its insistence that it will bring up this subject if the talks are held.

The State Department statement also said nothing regarding the Soviet demand for a moratorium on testing and deployment of outer space weapons from the beginning of the Vienna talks, but U.S. officials have made it clear that the United States is not ready to accept this.
United States Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who approved yesterday's State Department statement as he flew with President Reagan to the Olympic Games in Los Angeles, has been saying for some time that "the Soviets won't take yes for an answer" to their June 29 invitation to talk.

Nowadays, it appears that the Reagan administration "is not ready to take no for an answer from Moscow, especially in a presidential election year," the WASHINGTON POST said today.

CSO: 4000/430
SOUTH KOREAN GROUPS 'STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY'

[Text] Pyongyang, 8 Jul (XINHUA)--Several mass organizations have been set up recently in South Korea to promote the struggle for democracy.

Newspapers here quoted Japanese press reports as saying that an association of the people's democratic movement was formed in Seoul on June 29, mainly composed of bishops, priests and reporters.

Yi Boo-yong, chairman of the association and a former reporter of the daily TONGA ILBO in Seoul, has pledged to fight for social democratization in South Korea along with "the committee for the promotion of democratization" led by Kim Yong-sam.

Personages in the cultural circles have formed an association of the people's cultural movement to fight for democracy in the field of culture.

Seven mass organizations including the recently formed South Korean youth federation for democratic movement and the student Christian General Alliance in an appeal late last month called on the people of various circles to rise against the South Korean authorities' suppression and fight for democracy and civil rights in South Korea.

This new development in the political life in South Korea has alarmed the South Korean authorities. Special agents were sent on July 4 to smash the office of the committee for the promotion of democratization led by Kim Yong-sam. Kim has warned the authorities of fresh anti-government demonstrations if they fail to "apologize" for the incident.

Noted South Korean democrat Kim Dae-jung told reporters recently in the United States that he expected more intensified struggle against the dictatorship in South Korea.

CSO: 4000/425
BRIEFS

MOZAMBICAN PRESIDENT ENDS DPRK VISIT—Pyongyang, 24 Jul (XINHUA)—The Mozambican President and Chairman of the FRELIMO Party Samora Moises Machel and his party left here this morning for home after a two-day visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. During his visit, Samora and Kim Il-song, president of Korea, had talks but the subject of their conversation was not revealed. Samora and Kim Il-song presented each other with medals. The Mozambican party arrived here from Beijing on 22 July. [Text] [OW240940 Beijing XINHUA in English 0848 GMT 24 Jul 84]

POLISH OFFICIAL VISITS DPRK—Pyongyang, 14 Jul (XINHUA)—A Polish Government delegation led by vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers of Poland Janusz Obodowski concluded an 8-day visit to Korea here today. Korean President Kim Il-song met the delegation and gave a dinner in its honor. The Polish delegation arrived here on July 7 to attend the 8th meeting of the Korean-Polish Committee on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Obodowski and Korean Vice-Premier Kong Chin-tae expressed satisfaction at the results of the meeting and were convinced that the friendly cooperative ties between Korea and Poland would be further developed on the basis of the agreement recently reached by leaders of the two countries. [Text] [OWL41342 Beijing XINHUA in English 1328 GMT 14 Jul 84]

KIM YONG-SAM 4 JULY STATEMENT—According to reports in Korean newspapers which quoted the foreign press, Kim Yong-sam, president of the former New Democratic Party of South Korea, called for the South Korean authorities to assume the responsibility for the recently exposed scandal of illegally amassing wealth in a statement issued on 4 July and demanded that the South Korean cabinet resign en masse. According to a report, Chong Nae-hyok, the second man of the Democratic Justice Party, which is the ruling party in South Korea, has amassed huge amounts of wealth valued at as much as $20 million through speculation in real estate. With the exposure of this scandal, great resistance took place in South Korea. Because of this resistance, Chong Nae-hyok was compelled to announce his resignation. In his statement, Kim Yong-sam appealed to public opinion in South Korea to end subjugation under the South Korean authorities and to struggle against corruption and irregularities in South Korean society. [Text] [SKO80146 Beijing International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 7 Jul 84]
RESOLVING KOREAN ISSUE—Pyongyang, 17 Jul (XINHUA)—The Korean newspaper NODONG SINmun carried a commentary today which calls the need to solve the Korean issue through dialogue and consultations now more pressing than ever. The article said that because of the United States' "war policy," "South Korea today has become a dangerous hotbed for nuclear war." The article noted that the Korean people, who treasure national dignity and sovereignty, "will never agree to any outside aggressor turning their fatherland into the site of a nuclear war." The article stressed that the Korean issue should not be resolved by means of war but should be resolved in conformity with the national interests of the Korean people and in the interests of peace in Asia and throughout the world. The article reiterated that the United States should have responded to the call of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for tripartite talks, that it should have started to withdraw its troops and all military materials including nuclear weapons from South Korea and that it should stop interfering in the internal affairs of Korea. To prevent nuclear war, the article said, the nationwide antiwar movement and struggle against nuclear weapons in South Korea should be stepped up with the aim of turning the region into a nuclear-free zone where no U.S. troops are stationed. [Text] [OW171724 Beijing XINHUA in English 1649 GMT 17 Jul 84]

PERUVIAN APRA PARTY GROUP—Pyongyang, 16 Jul (XINHUA)—General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea Kim Il-song gave a dinner here this evening in honor of the Peruvian APRA party delegation led by its General Secretary Alan Garcia. Noting that the two parties of Korea and Peru take independent positions in their relations with other parties, Kim Il-song said in his speech at the dinner: "We cherish our close ties and friendly unity with the Peruvian APRA Party. We would like to go forward with you hand in hand in the days to come." In reply, Garcia praised the achievements scored by Korea in construction. He also expressed support to the Korean people in their struggle for consolidating socialism and reunifying their fatherland. Kim Il-song today also held talks with them in a comradely and friendly atmosphere. Garcia and his party arrived in Korea yesterday. [Text] [OW160638 Beijing XINHUA in English 0630 GMT 16 Jul 84]

JAPAN TO PURSUE 'CREATIVE DIPLOMACY'—Tokyo, 2 Aug (XINHUA)—Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe indicated in a speech here today that Japan would pursue creative diplomacy to have more consultations with the Soviet Union, Japan's JIJI News Agency reported. Speaking at a gathering here this afternoon, Abe reiterated that long-standing ties with the United States and solidarity with Western world and other countries in Asia remained the core of Japan's foreign policy. Japan would also have consultations and dialogue with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, and grant aid to the developing countries, he added. Abe also explained that his creative diplomacy was aimed at giving depth and credence to Japan's passive diplomacy in the past. Abe said that the thorniest issue was relations with the Soviet Union, which needed improving. [Text] [OW021638 Beijing XINHUA in English 1604 GMT 2 Aug 84]

CSO: 4000/425
SRV BEGINS KAMPUCHEAN RAINY-SEASON OFFENSIVE

OW300904 Beijing XINHUA in English 0838 GMT 30 Jul 84

[Text] Bangkok, 30 Jul (XINHUA)—Vietnamese occupation troops in Kampuchea yesterday morning shelled O-bok, a major civilian and military base controlled by the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by Son Sann, forcing about 2,000 civilians to flee into Thailand, according to today's local press reports.

Thai Army spokesman, Major General Narudon Detpradityut, was quoted by the local press as saying that the attack indicates the start of a Vietnamese rainy-season offensive against the resistance forces of the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea. More attacks are expected in near future, he said.

He said the bombardment started at 9:20 a.m. at least 63 artillery and mortar shells fell on the O-bok camp which is located in Ampil District of Oddor Meanchey Province bordering Thailand's northeastern province of Buriram.

Thai troops along the Thai-Kampuchean border are reported to have been placed on full alert right after the shelling.

KPNLF president, Son Sann, who is also the prime minister of the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea, told a group of foreign reporters in Bangkok not long ago that Hanoi, not reconciled to its defeat in the last dry season, is preparing for a new offensive in the rainy season. But the resistance forces are determined to beat them back, he added.

The KPNLF, a participant in the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea, now controls 9 encampments housing about 120,000 civilians. These encampments are spread out in the provinces of Pursat, Battambang, Oddor Meanchey and Preah Vihear. O-bok is a newly built civilian encampment.

CSO: 4000/429
KAMPUCHEA STRUGGLE AGAINST VIETNAM—Bangkok, 2 Aug (XINHUA)—Representatives of the three parties of the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea [GDK] held a meeting inside Kampuchea today. Vice-President of Democratic Kampuchea Khieu Samphan chaired the meeting, which discussed and agreed on measures to step up their struggle against Vietnamese aggression. A press release said that the three parties unanimously decided "to foil the manoeuvres of the Vietnamese aggressors and their accomplices aiming at breaking down the unity within the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea." "To carry on an armed struggle to liberate Kampuchea from the Vietnamese aggressors until the withdrawal of the Vietnamese occupation forces from Kampuchea, in accordance with the declaration of the international conference on Kampuchea and all relevant United Nations resolutions. [Text] [OW021343 Beijing XINHUA in English 1315 GMT 2 Aug 84]

SRV TROOPS IN KAMPUCHEA—Beijing, 28 Jul (XINHUA)—Vietnam has sent more than 4,000 troops as reinforcements to Kampuchea's Siem Reap province to deal with increased guerrilla activities and to protect Highway 6 since late June, Radio Democratic Kampuchea reported. The reinforcements include 2,900 men despatched from Vietnam in the first week of July. Four hundred of them are now stationed in Chireng District along Highway 6 and 2,500 in Phnom Krom between Siem Reap City and Tonle Sap. Earlier in late June and early July, 1,200 Vietnamese troops were brought into several districts of the province. The radio also reported that on 4 July, 400 Vietnamese recruits arrived at the provincial city of Kampuchea's Stung Treng and Thalbarivat of the province. The radio pointed out that this is another evidence that Vietnamese authorities are playing the game of false withdrawal from Kampuchea. [Text] [OW281020 Beijing XINHUA in English 0808 GMT 28 Jul 84]
NATIONAL AFFAIRS

LIAO MOSHA EULOGIZES 'REVOLUTIONARY' WU HAN

HK270807 Beijing REMIN RIBAO in Chinese 23 Jul 84 p 5

[Article by Liao Mosha [1675 3106 3097]: "The Path Taken by a Revolutionary--Preface to the 'Biography of Wu Han'"

I

Wu Han was my comrade and friend, and we came from the "same village," wrote for the same column, and were even criticized and denounced at the same public meetings. It was 2 decades ago when Deng Tuo, Wu Han and I started a special column in the fortnightly QIANXIAN as co-authors of the "Notes of the Three Family Village." Both Comrade Deng Tuo and Comrade Wu Han were great masters of the essay. Back in the time of the war of resistance against Japan, Wu Han wrote "New Talks on Old History." Most of his essays were written on historical subjects, and he was known at that time as a "wonderful fighter in the science of history." "Evening Chats at Yanshan," written by Comrade Deng Tuo alone in the early 1960's, was widely acclaimed. I myself love to write essays, too, which I first took up in the early 1930's. Therefore, the three of us got into the "Three Family Village" together quite by chance, reaching the same goal by different routes. Despite the fact that the "Three Family Village" was the coming together of three people without the precondition of a plan or organization, we did have a common wish at that time, namely, to sing in praise of the great cause of the party and socialism, while criticizing the remnants and stains left over by the old society. However, good wishes often led to unexpected misfortunes in extraordinary historical times. As soon as the 10 years of turmoil began, following the criticism of "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office," the "Three Family Village" was falsely branded an anti-party, anti-socialist clique. Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, and their gangs mobilized some people who were ignorant of the facts to take action in smashing up this small "Three Family Village"; Comrade Deng Tuo was persecuted to death at the very beginning, while Wu Han and I were criticized and repudiated all day; sometimes, we had to go through two or three public meetings of criticism and denunciation in a single day, this went on for as long as 18 months in succession. In March 1968, Comrade Wu Han and I were simultaneously imprisoned; a year later, Comrade Wu Han was persecuted to death, since when I have become the only one left of the "Three Family Village." The three of us, Comrade Deng Tuo, Comrade Wu Han and I had met and known each other after 1949, and we had ties in our work only, and it was not until we suffered from misfortune because we had been in the same "village" that we came to realize the peculiar relationship between us three; especially as Comrade Wu Han and I had been
criticized and denounced together for as long as 18 months, we could be said to have been in the same boat, and to have become friends in adversity. His voice, his face, and his smiles still flash across my mind now and then. Two years ago, a comrade working for a magazine showed me a photograph of Comrade Wu Han taken in 1964, on which I had written a poem when I first saw the photo; it reads:

"A disaster is impending resulting from devilish strategems,
So naive you are as to keep that broad smile on your face,
It's a pity that your office in the capital is but a dream,
But surely you will make a name in your lifetime and after."

The poem was poorly written, but it has faithfully recorded what I felt when I first looked at the photo.

II

Now, on the 15th anniversary of Wu Han's persecution and death, the "Biography of Wu Han" written by Comrades Su Shuangbi and Wang Hongzhi is on the point of publication by the Beijing Publishing House. This is inspiring. Wu Han was an intellectual who grew up in old China. He had been influenced by Hui Shi's theory of "saving the motherland with science," when he was studying at the Department of History of the National Qinghua University in the early 1930's. Hui Shi said that he would "train Wu Han into a scholar who will be able to sort our historical data of the Ming Dynasty," whereas Wu Han said that he would follow Hui Shi's instruction in "achieving this aim step by step." Throughout the 1930's, Wu Han's major works, such as "A Critical Study on the Case of Hu Weiyong and His Followers," "A Chronicle of Hy Yingling," "A Critical Study on Slave and Captive Households in the Yuan Dynasty," and so on, were all critical historical studies. However, even when he was bent on following the approach of scholarly research guided by Hui Shi, Wu Han gave strong expression to his patriotism. Shortly after the outbreak of the "18 September Incident," he wrote, in a letter to Hui Shi, an incisive criticism against the traitorous KMT government, saying: "Today, the leaders of the party and state are betraying the motherland, and the government and those high officials are doing the same"; "there was no parallel in the history of any dynasty in the past to match the base, shameless, and perverse authorities today." Wu Han often gave expression to his patriotism in the essays, poems, and other writings dating from that time. It was precisely because of his ardent patriotism that in the early 1940's, Wu Han rid himself of the ideological bondage of the theory of "saving the motherland with science," and began to take part in public activities. After the outbreak of the Pacific war, Wu Han openly denounced Kong Xiangxi in the classroom, comparing him to Jia Shida [a captain of the Southern Song Dynasty]. Calling him the "flying-dog president of the yuan" (referring to Kong Xiangxi airlifting his dog from Hong Kong to Chongqing.) Later, he was determined to join the "democratic political organizations league," and accept the leadership of the CPC. With essays of historical subjects as his weapon, he began to direct the spearhead against the KMT reactionary government, (see his collection of essays—"Javelins"); together with Wen Yiduo, he went about making speeches everywhere, and writing articles to expose the corrupt KMT rule. In the democratic movement in Kunming, Wu Han, Wen Yiduo,
and Li Gongpu and others gradually became staunch democratic fighters. Wen Yiduo was known as the "lion," whereas Wu Han was known as the "tiger." Wu Han at that time was a different person from what he had been in the 1930's. When his students asked him about the change in his ideology, he said: "It is the times and history" that pushed him onto the revolutionary road.

III

From being patriotic to taking part in the revolution, from participation in the old democratic revolution to taking part in the new democratic revolution; this has been the characteristic of China's intellectuals. In old China, the overwhelming majority of intellectuals were patriotic. They ardently loved the motherland and could not bear the invasion and oppression of foreign capitalism and imperialism, and eventually rose up to take part in the revolution with the aim of invigorating the Chinese nation. This was almost a universal law that governed the revolutionary intellectuals in the modern history of China. It was because they would not see China being "carved up" by the big powers that Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao initiated reform so as to change China's state of "being weak and poverty-stricken." And it was out of his wrath at the big powers going after China's rich natural resources that Sun Yat-sen loudly appealed to the public: "It is urgent to save the Chinese people who are in deep water." The revolution of 1911 initiated by Sun Yat-sen was motivated by patriotism. The patriotic "4 May" Movement of 1919 was initiated with the slogans of opposing the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty and opposing the betrayal of the northern warlords. At the time of the "4 May" Movement, some intellectuals who had some initial understanding of communism, such as Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Cai Hesen started from patriotism and eventually found the revolutionary truth of Marxism. In his article "Reform our Study," Comrade Mao Zedong described how they took up the Marxist road: "For a hundred years, the finest sons and daughters of the disaster-ridden Chinese nation fought and sacrificed their lives, one stepping into the breach as another fell, in quest of the truth that would save the country and the people. This moves us to song and tears. But it was only after World War I and the October Revolution in Russia that we found Marxism-Leninism, the best of truths, the best of weapons for liberating our nation. And the Communist Party of China has been the initiator, propagandist, and organizer in the wielding of this weapon. As soon as it was linked with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism gave an entirely new complexion to the Chinese revolution."

With his aim of saving the motherland and the people, Wu Han was one such patriotic intellectual, who had gone from the old democratic period to the new democratic revolutionary stage, and finally adopted the road of Marxist truth.

Wu Han was an upright scholar, unyielding in character. Once he had determined his target, he would advance bravely in big strides, so long as he believed his target to be correct. Before 1949, he had been an intellectual deeply affected by the theory of "saving motherland with science," before he took the road of the new democratic revolution. After the founding of new China, he once thought of "retiring because the target has been achieved." Later, with the help and education of Comrades Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, he came to understand that the
victory of the new democratic revolution was not the end of the revolution, but the new starting point of socialist revolution. After that, he was determined to continue the revolution. He recorded this ideological zigzag frankly in the articles "I Have Overcome the Supra-Class Viewpoint" and "Preface to the 'Biography of Zhu Yuanzhang.'" In these two articles, we can see not only that he had corrected his erroneous views, but also that he had made up his mind to continue participating in the revolution. With pleasure, he took up the office of vice mayor of Beijing Municipality, working with full vigor, untiringly, and conscientiously for the needs of the party and the revolution. Between 1949 and the early 1960's, he made outstanding contributions to the development of cultural and educational undertakings, academic activities, and the sorting out of ancient books in the capital city, and to the sorting out and protection of historical relics, and so on. During the same period, he published many articles, and rewrote and published the "Biography of Zhu Yuanzhang" and other works. He was also the chief editor of the "Book Series of Chinese History" and the "Book Series of Foreign Histories." However, he was not satisfied with all this; in order to train himself into a genuine communist, he had on several occasions sent in his application for CPC membership to the party organization. In a letter addressed to Comrade Peng Zhen, Wu Han wrote the following:

"I have never given up my hope of joining the CPC, I should like to achieve this through hard work. If I am not recruited this year, I will wait till next year. I will wait another 5 years, another decade or two; and so long as I am alive, I will join the party someday. There is no other purpose but to be educated by the CPC so as to do a good job in my work."

This was a voice from the bottom of his heart, expressing his utter faith in the party and his noble ideal for the communist cause. In March 1957, he was finally given approval to join the CPC.

The road which Wu Han went through was precisely the one sought after by the advanced elements among Chinese intellectuals. It is a correct road, and one for revolutionaries. The "Biography of Wu Han" gives truthful expression to Wu Han's experiences, and it is worth reference by the educated young people who are choosing their road. Therefore, it will be helpful for the young people to read it. At the same time, the "Biography" has systematically summed up Wu Han's approach of scholarly research and his academic ideas. It is also a book possessing some academic value.

CSO: 4005/761
HU QILI ADDRESSES ARMY-PeOPLE UNITY MODELS

OWO21425 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1428 GMT 1 Aug 84

[Text] Beijing, 1 August (XINHUA)--Speech by Hu Qili at the National Congress of Advanced Units and Individuals Supporting the Army and Giving Preferential Treatment to Families of Revolutionary Armymen and Martyrs, and Supporting the Government and Cherishing the People.

Comrades:

While the armymen and the people throughout the country are joyful celebrating the 57th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the National Congress of Advanced Units and Individuals Supporting the Army and Giving Preferential Treatment to Families of Revolutionary Armymen and Martyrs, and Supporting the Government and Cherishing the People has ceremoniously opened. On behalf of the party Central Committee and the State Council, I hereby extend my warm greetings to the congress, give my high respects to you representatives honorably attending this meeting, and send my cordial regards through you to all commanders and fighters of the People's Liberation Army and cadres, demobilized and discharged servicemen and servicemen transferred to civilian jobs, and to the activists supporting the army and giving preferential treatment to families of revolutionary armymen and martyrs on all fronts.

Today is "1 August," Army Day. Whenever we joyfully celebrate this glorious festival, we naturally think of the great contributions made by the People's Liberation Army, and renew our respect for the People's Liberation army for its revolutionary spirit of fighting bravely, shedding blood and sacrificing to defend and build the motherland. For more than half a century, during the revolutionary war years and the period of the great socialist revolution and construction, the heroic People's Liberation Army has always stood in the van of the struggle and has made immortal contributions for the party, the people and the motherland.

Since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, particularly since the 12th CPC National Congress, the People's Liberation Army has firmly kept a unity with the party Central Committee, and exemplarily implemented the party's line, principles and policies, in consideration of the characteristics of army work in the new period. The army has set things right in an all-round way, thoroughly eliminated within itself the influence of the extremely "left"
thinking of the Lin Biao-Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary clique, restored and carried forward the People's Army's glorious traditions, and improved its political quality. The army has successfully completed the readjustment of the leading bodies at all levels in accordance with the criteria aimed at making the cadre ranks become more revolutionary, younger in average age, better educated and more professionally competent. A large number of outstanding young and middle-aged cadres have assumed the heavy responsibilities of leadership. The army has greatly improved its military training, equipment and military quality. As the People's Liberation Army is heroically defending the motherland's border regions, the people throughout the country can work with peace of mind for the four modernizations. The great victories won by the commanders and fighters of our Guangxi and Yunnan Border Defense Units in the anti-Vietnamese self-defense counterattack and in recent border fighting to crush the Vietnamese incursions have upheld the dignity of the Chinese nation, defended the motherland's territorial integrity, dealt powerful blows at regional hegemonism, and fully shown the great might of the People's Liberation Army.

While engaging in building itself, the People's Liberation Army has taken an active part in and made outstanding contributions to the building of material and spiritual civilizations in the country. In the last few years, the army, after the completion of military tasks was assured, has supported the state and various localities in building more than 8,200 construction projects. Of those projects, the most commendable ones include the project for diverting water from the Luan He, the Tai Shan cableway and the project for diverting water from the Jilulong Jiang to Xiamen. In the course of building the project for diverting water from the Luan He, the broad masses of commanders and fighters, eager to meet the needs of the people, worked hard with tenacity and courage and overcame numerous difficulties. As a result, they completed the project ahead of schedule, and thus created a new miracle and set an example of achieving more, faster, better and economical results in building major construction projects. The army has fully displayed an exemplary leading role in the country's tree-planting and afforestation projects and public welfare projects. In actively training qualified personnel who are competent in doing both military and civilian work, the army has not only strengthened its own building, but also created favorable conditions for the fighters to develop the four modernization program after their retirement from the army. The army has vigorously strengthened its ideological and political work. Inspired by the slogan of upholding the "four haves, three stresses and two fearlessnesses," it has extensively developed various activities to promote socialist spiritual civilization with the joint efforts of the army men and the people, trained and brought up a large number of new exemplary persons and advanced collectives such as Zhang Hua, Zhu Boru, Ding Hongjun and "Heroes To Deal With Emergency" in the Hua Shan, and brought about a change for the better in the general mood of society and in the people's spiritual outlook. Just like their counterparts in the PLA, the commanders and fighters of the People's Armed Police Force have made positive contributions to promoting the material and spiritual civilization of the state, while strengthening itself, and doing a good job in standing security guard and maintaining social order. When Comrade Hu Yaobang inspected the border troops in Guangxi during the Spring Festival this year, he, on behalf of the party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, spoke highly of the tremendous achievements of the commanders and fighters of

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the whole army and gave all army commanders and fighters a tremendous inspiration. The People's Liberation Army has entered a brand new stage in revolutionizing, modernizing and regularizing itself. Many facts, past and present, have proven that our Chinese People's Liberation Army and the People's Armed Police Force are truly heroic troops armed with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. They are not only the iron-clad great wall in defending the motherland but also an important force in promoting the "two types of civilization."

The PLA is the people's own army. It comes from the people and serves the people. Its sole purpose is to serve the people wholeheartedly, enjoying the love and esteem and the full support of the people. The army cherishes the people while the people support the army. In order to help the PLA grow, the masses of people have mobilized the best young people to join the army and provided the PLA with their best supplies. This type of glorious tradition with the army and the people united as one constitutes an important guarantee in conquering the enemy and making our revolutionary cause a success. In despite of the fact that during the decade of internal turmoil, the relations between the army and the people were once seriously undermined by the Lin Biao-Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary clique, there have been significant improvements in the relations between the army and the government and between the army and the people, thanks to the firm implementation of the various principles and policies and the concerted efforts of the party, the government, the army and the people after the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee. Particularly in the current campaign of party rectification, a number of negative factors in the realm of ideology and in actual work that affect unity between the army and the government and between the army and the people have been unraveled and the problems left over from history rapidly solved by thoroughly negating the "Great Cultural Revolution." The moving sight which showed close unity between the army and the people during the war years in the past has once again presented itself before our eyes.

Comrades: Our nation has already entered a new period of historical development. Our new task in this new period has imposed a new requirement on us for the development of a new-type relation between the army and the government and between the army and the people. Our four modernization program is being developed in a complex and turbulent international environment, and class struggle still exists to a certain extent in our country. A powerful army, a consolidated national defense and a stable social order would affect the fundamental interests of the broad masses of people. The modernization of industry, agriculture and science and technology lays the foundation for the modernization of national defense, while the modernization of national defense ensures the modernization of industry, agriculture, science and technology. Therefore, we must regard the unity between the army and the people in the new period as a strategy of great current significance and far-reaching importance to help our nation flourish and enjoy a long period of order and stability. In strengthening the relations between the army and the government and between the army and the people in the new period, we must regard the glorious tradition and the close fish-and-water relation between the army and the people fostered by our party and army during the war years as our foundation, the great cause of promoting the four modernization program as our common goal and the development of socialism of Chinese characteristics as
the main content; closely unite as one; and join our efforts to build a highly-developed material and spiritual civilization.

To develop a new-type relation between the army and the government and between the army and the people, we must extensively develop mutual cooperation in the sphere of economic construction on the basis of the principle of benefiting both the army and the people. Comrade Deng Xiaoping recently pointed out: "The most fundamental task in the socialist stage is to develop the productive forces." In light of the characteristics in China where we have a vast territory, a large population, a poor foundation to start with and a weak technical force, we must bring into full play the enthusiasm of both the army and the people and vigorously tap their potentials in order to further develop the productive forces and quicken the tempo in promoting the modernization program. The new developments in recent years in turning out products for both military and civilian uses, running enterprises jointly by the army and the people and effecting cooperation between the army and the people in the fields of industry, agriculture, commerce, communications and capital construction have won vigorous support from the people and the army. We must earnestly sum up our experience in this regard and enthusiastically popularize such experience on the basis of the principle of benefiting both the army and the people. In the countryside, it is necessary to guide and help the disabled servicemen and family members of revolutionary martyrs to open up new avenues to develop commodity production and become well-to-do through arduous work. The army units and various localities must unite as one in struggle and achieve common progress in order to further promote economic development and quicken the pace in strengthening national defense.

To develop a new-type relation between the army and the government and between the army and the people, it is essential to further extensively develop the various activities to promote socialist spiritual civilization with the joint efforts of the army and the people. Efforts must be made to pay full attention to spiritual civilization, while promoting material civilization. This is an important aspect in building socialism with Chinese characteristics. To develop the various activities to promote socialist spiritual civilization at the basic level. From now on, we must extensively develop the various activities of mutual assistance between the army and the people in the realms of education, science, culture, physical education and public health. The various localities must select and send outstanding volunteers to the army, bring into full play the role of demobilized and retired servicemen and those armymen transferred to civilian jobs, do their best to train technical personnel badly needed in the army and do a good job in "providing the army with intellectual resources." The army must continue to train qualified personnel for both military and civilian employment and do a good job in "helping the people with intellectual resources." The army and the people must help and encourage each other in working hard to improve the cultural qualities of the whole nation and join their efforts to improve the style of the party the army and the people and to bring about a fundamental change for the better in the general mood of society as soon as possible.

The work of supporting the army and giving preferential treatment to families of revolutionary armymen and martyrs and of supporting the government and cherishing the people in the new period covers a wide range. Its task remains
arduous and its requirements are rigorous. It affects all fields of endeavor, all trades and professions and thousands of families. It constitutes the joint task of the whole society and the entire nation. The party committees and governments at all levels in various localities must strengthen their leadership over this work, give wide publicity to the important role of the people's army in defending and building the motherland, earnestly help the disabled servicemen lead a comfortable life, take good care of family members of revolutionary martyrs, give preferential treatment to military dependents and make proper arrangements for the retired servicemen to settle down. Efforts must be made to vigorously commend the exemplary individuals and advanced collectives in supporting the army and giving preferential treatment to families of revolutionary armymen and martyrs and raise the level of awareness in the whole army and among all the people in doing a good job to support the army and give preferential treatment to families of revolutionary armymen and martyrs and to support the government and cherish the people. The leadership at all levels must conduct investigation and study in a deepgoing manner; timely solve the problems that have cropped up between the army and the government and between the army and the people; strengthen unity between the army and the government and between the army and the people; and do more things that are conducive to the unity between the army and the people. The local party committees and governments must correctly handle the relations between economic construction and national defense, and concern themselves and support army building. The army must bring into full play its glorious tradition of cherishing the people and respecting the local government, do a good job in supporting the government and cherishing the people and support the state and local economic construction. The army and the people must unite as one, work hard shoulder to shoulder to strengthen army building, consolidate national defense and promote the four modernization program.

Comrades: The party Central Committee, the State Council and the Central Military Commission have attached great importance to this congress. It is hoped that all the people would definitely bring into full play the party's fine tradition of seeking truth from facts, affirm their achievements, sum up their experiences and push the work of supporting the army and giving preferential treatment to families of revolutionary armymen and martyrs and of supporting the government and cherishing the people to a new height. It is my belief that under the guidance of the principle laid down by the 12th CPC National Congress and with the joint efforts of those attending this congress, we will certainly achieve our goal as expected. I wish this congress very success and you comrades good health. [Sentence as received]

CSO: 4005/761
EAST REGION

RESULTS OF SHANGHAI'S SURVEY OF SPECIALIZED TALENTS

Shanghai WEN HUI BAO in Chinese 24 May 84 p 1

[Article: "Municipality Completes First Survey of Specialized Talents"]

[Text] The Shanghai Municipal Talent Forecast Office today issued a communiqué on the 1983 survey of specialized talents in Shanghai Municipality. This was the first regional specialized talents survey completed in the provinces and cities of China. The survey found from its investigation that Shanghai Municipality has a total of 485,773 persons with specialized talents, and it obtained the principal figures on their age, specialty and record of formal schooling, thereby providing a reliable basis for their rational utilization and for the formulation of plans for the development of the educational undertaking. The experts think that this survey of specialized talents, with regard to the development of economic, social and educational undertakings, in recent years in this municipality is second only to the census in being a fundamental work of major significance.

Based on the demands of the national work conference on planning for specialized talents, with the approval of the municipal government, the municipal talent forecast office, starting in October of last year, investigated the situation in the municipality with respect to specialized talents and the permanent cadres among them. The basic method in the investigation was to get survey forms that had been filled in by people from the basic-level personnel departments, and there were 14 main-column entries including graduation specialty, work specialty and administrative job level. A total of 7,252 units took part in the form filling, close to 20,000 personnel in the relevant units took part in the survey work and a total of more than 860,000 persons filled in the survey forms. The survey forms were collected and processed by electronic computers.

The principal figures for the 1983 specialized talents survey made public by the municipal talent forecast office are as follows:

As of 31 October 1983, there was a total of 485,773 persons with specialized talents in the municipality who possessed a record of formal schooling at the specialized or technical secondary school level or higher or who had a professional or technical title, accounting for 10.1 percent of the total number of staff members and workers in the municipality and for 56.4 percent of the 860,798 cadres in the municipality. With regard to the ages of specialized talents in
the municipality, there was a total of 249,919 middle-aged intellectuals between the ages of 36 and 50, or 51.5 percent of the specialized talents; there was a total of 168,448 persons 35 years old or younger, or 34.6 percent; and there was a total of 67,406 persons 51 years old and over, or 13.9 percent.

Looking at the formal schooling makeup of the specialized talents, it can be seen that there is a total of 389,036 specialized talents who are graduates of graduate schools, college graduates and training school graduates or specialized or technical secondary school graduates, making up 80 percent of the specialized talents. Among them, 4,538 have graduated from graduate schools, making up 0.9 percent of the specialized talents; 140,935 are college graduates, or 29 percent; 108,442 are graduates of colleges for professional training, or 22.3 percent; and 135,121 are graduates of specialized or technical secondary schools, or 27.8 percent. In addition, there are 96,737 persons, or 20 percent, who have a commensurate record of formal schooling and have obtained professional or technical titles. Among the specialized talents who have a record of formal schooling of specialized or technical secondary school and higher, most of them graduated in the periods 1961-1965 and 1981-1983.

Of the 389,036 specialized talents who possess a record of formal schooling at specialized or technical secondary schools and higher, scientific specialties account for 11.3 percent, engineering 42.8 percent, management 1.3 percent, medicine 14.4 percent, agriculture and forestry 1.7 percent, liberal arts 8.9 percent, education and secondary teacher training 9 percent, finance and economics 5.8 percent, politics and law 0.9 percent, art and physical education 3.1 percent and other specialties 0.8 percent.

Among the specialized talents there is a total of 427,549 specialized or technical cadres, of which 328,270 are scientists and technicians in the natural sciences, making up 6.8 percent of the total number of staff members and workers in the municipality (statistics for units under the ownership of the whole people show that they constitute 8.2 percent of the staff members and workers of these units); 99,279 are scientists in the social sciences, accounting for 2.1 percent of the total number of staff members and workers in the municipality.

There is a total of 303,417 specialized talents with professional or technical titles in the municipality, accounting for 62.5 percent of the total number of specialized talents, among whom are 7,474 senior engineers, full professors and associate professors, full researchers, director-physicians and deputy director-physicians, senior accountants and other persons with commensurate professional or technical titles; 91,664 engineers, lecturers, assistant researchers, physicians-in-charge, accountants and other persons with commensurate professional or technical titles; 101,237 assistant engineers, assistants of college faculties, trainee researchers, qualified doctors, assistant accountants and other persons with commensurate professional or technical titles; and 103,042 technicians, practitioners with secondary medical school education, nurses, bookkeepers and other persons with commensurate professional or technical titles.

According to personnel records, the distribution of specialized talents as percentages of the systems in the municipality is: economic committee system, 38.8 percent; communications system, 6.1 percent; construction committee system, 5.2 percent; finance and trade system, 3.3 percent; foreign economy and trade system, 0.8 percent; education and public health system, 12.2 percent; science and technology system, 2.8 percent; propaganda and culture system, 1.8 percent; agricultural committee system (including suburban counties), 11.3 percent; municipal districts, 16.3 percent; and organizations directly subordinate to the municipality and other systems, 1.5 percent.
EAST REGION

BO YIBO SPEAKS AT ZHEJIANG CPC STANDING COMMITTEE SESSION

Hangzhou ZHEJIANG RIBAO in Chinese 24 May 84 p 1

[Article: "Party Consolidation Must Promote Reform, Reform Must Promote Party Consolidation"]

[Text] On the morning of 22 May, Comrade Bo Yibo, vice chairman of the Central Advisory Commission and vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the Central Commission for Guiding Party Consolidation of the CPC Central Committee, met in Hangzhou with all the comrades attending the enlarged session of the Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial CPC Committee, and delivered an important speech to them on the questions of party consolidation and economic reform.

At 9:30 a.m. on 22 May, Comrade Bo Yibo, accompanied by Comrade Wang Pang [3769 5364], secretary of the provincial party committee, came to the meeting hall and everybody rose and clapped in welcome. Comrade Bo Yibo expounded his views on eight aspects of party consolidation and economic reform. He called on the comrades at the session truly to solve thoroughly the ideological and political problems of the "Great Cultural Revolution," to sum up conscientiously the experiences and lessons of history, to overcome the disruption of factionalism and to eliminate the influences of the "left." He said that they must maintain political and ideological unity with the party Central Committee; earnestly follow the spirit of Premier Zhao's report at the second session of the Sixth NPC and, through conscientious study, vigorously and steadily carry out reforms and resolutely and thoroughly implement further the policy of opening to the outside world; mount a big opposition to bureaucracy; conscientiously sort out the "three types of people" [those who are followers of the "gang of four," those who are seriously factionalist in their ideas and those who engaged in beating, smashing and looting during the Cultural Revolution] and build the third echelon in good fashion; become clear about the purpose of party consolidation; and make opposition to the tendency toward bourgeois liberalization and resistance to spiritual pollution a long-term fundamental task.

First of all, Comrade Bo Yibo said to everybody: My general impression on coming to Hangzhou is that the work you have done is not bad, that party consolidation is now entering the comparison and checkup stage and that a new atmosphere has appeared in economic reform. It is said that at this enlarged session of the Standing Committee, the comrades have brought up many problems. I think that it is a good thing for subordinates to be willing to dare to bring up problems and that it shows that the leadership of the provincial party committee is democratic. These problems must be solved well.
When discussing the fact that the problems of history must be correctly treated, he said that every party member, particularly the leaders and the leadership organizations, must distinguish right and wrong lines and must sum up in a deepgoing manner their experiences and lessons. The purpose of this is not to make everyone go through an ordeal but to let everyone raise their level of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, like the exposure and criticism of the Wang Ming line during the Yan'an rectification movement. Comrade Bo Yibo pointed out that the "Great Cultural Revolution" must be thoroughly negated and that if it is not, the correctness of the party's line since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee cannot be understood. We certainly must clear out the influences of the "left" and eliminate the disruption of factionalism. He affirmed the four phrases put forward by the provincial party committee: "clear away the 'left' in the system, constantly puncture complacency, bravely deal only with facts and boldly blaze new trails." When discussing the fact that we must maintain ideological and political unity with the party Central Committee, Comrade Bo Yibo said that this was not just a matter of speaking or writing or of repeating what the directives and decisions of the party Central Committee say and then thinking that everything is just fine; there must be an ideological straightening out, political solutions and organizational rules and methods.

When discussing the problem of reform, he said that our economic system must be reformed. At present, the popular feeling is for reform. Whether we are truly maintaining unity with the party Central Committee depends on whether we are now supporting reform and working hard to make reforms. Urban areas are more complex than rural areas, but they must also be determined to reform!

When discussing the policy of opening to the outside world, he said that this policy was proposed by Comrade Deng Xiaoping and unanimously passed by the party Central Committee. It is a major policy decision that follows the trend of world development and suits China's building of a socialism with its own distinctive features. Recently, the party Central Committee decided to open up 14 coastal cities and put into practice in them a policy similar to that of the special economic zones. Two of these cities are in Zhejiang, Ningbo and Wenzhou. The provincial party committee has also proposed that Hangzhou be made a zone open to tourism, so that together with the above-mentioned two cities there will be in Zhejiang three "windows" open to the outside world. This kind of arrangement is very good. However, the arrangement must certainly be made carefully and painstakingly and must start on the right foot; it certainly must be done well and cannot be done poorly. There certainly must be selected good managerial personnel, and there must be selected for the leadership work comrades who are knowledgeable, capable and dedicated and who have a strong party spirit and are comparatively young.

He emphatically pointed out that there must be sufficient understanding of the serious harm created by bureaucratism. He suggested that during party consolidation a period of time be set aside for conscientiously opposing bureaucratism. We must rectify well the party style and make the social atmosphere take on an entirely new aspect. He also said that we must get a good, tight grip on the work of sorting out the "three types of people" and building the third echelon. This is the crucial question in insuring that party consolidation is not done
perfunctorily. We must diligently guard against training the "three types of people" to be successors; to this day, there are still people who think that starting the "Great Cultural Revolution" was correct, and even if they are not among the "three types of people," they may be given some work but cannot become successors.

In concluding his speech, Comrade Bo Yibo said that party consolidation must be integrated with and promote reform. Without aroused and promising, determined and vital Chinese people, how can there be reform! Reforms certainly must be arranged well on the foundation of party consolidation. Through party consolidation we will make all party members and all people of the country truly feel that the party is honorable, great and correct and make every Chinese feel that he is exerting himself to advance the flourishing development of China. The party members and the masses must have this kind of sense of pride and must ultimately achieve the magnificent goal of quadrupling the gross annual value of industrial and agricultural output by the end of this century.
COMMENTARY ON INTELLECTUALS' DIFFICULTIES IN BECOMING CPC MEMBERS

Chengdu SICHUAN RIBAO in Chinese 8 Jun 84 p 1

[Article by staff commentator: "Conscientiously Settle the Problem of Intellectuals Encountering Difficulties in Becoming Party Members"]

[Text] To admit intellectuals into the party is an important task in implementing the policy on intellectuals. Where do the difficulties encountered by intellectuals in becoming party members lie?

Both positive and negative experiences prove that the difficulties lie in the fact that the effect of the "leftist" ideology in the minds of some leaders of party organizations at the grassroots level has not yet been eliminated. For this reason, they do not understand yet the reason for recruiting party members from among intellectuals, nor do they place the settlement of the problem of admitting intellectuals into the party on their work schedules. They did not pay close attention to it, nor did they do their best. It is exactly for this reason that they still have certain wrong ideas about admitting intellectuals into the party and are still on guard against the admission of intellectuals to the party. Some people even fear the possibility that intellectuals may transcend or replace them after being admitted into the party. They murmur that "at most, intellectuals can only be allowed to transcend us in professional work, but must not prevail over us in politics." These are the reasons why the party membership applications of some intellectuals have long been barred, even though they are basically qualified for party membership after they have applied many times, strived to qualify themselves and passed the tests for many years. Some of them were admitted as members of the party only posthumously. Thus it can be seen how serious have been the losses caused by the influence of the "leftist" ideology to the building and development of our party!

For this reason, the key to solving the problem of intellectuals encountering difficulties in becoming party members lies in the elimination of the influence of the "leftist" ideology. First, it is necessary to foster the Marxist scientific concept of intellectuals being a part of the working class and to understand correctly the status of and the role played by intellectuals in the construction of the four modernizations and in teaching and scientific research. This is a prerequisite to doing a good job in recruiting party members from among intellectuals. Intellectuals of our country, no matter whether they come from the old society or have been cultivated after the founding of the People's Republic,
have accumulated a fairly rich experience in their work after long practice and have shoudered important responsibilities in serving as links between the past and future and in tackling key problems in scientific matters with their professional skills. After having been cultivated and educated by the party over a long period of time, the political quality of these intellectuals is fairly good. They take the initiative in asking to join the party and actively create conditions to strive to qualify for party membership. This is a concentrated expression of the fact that they have a high level of political awareness, that they have faith in and a deep love for the party and that they are determined to struggle for the cause of the party. As party organizations, especially as party leaders, we ought to take a welcome attitude toward them. We should not bar them from entering the doors of party organizations because we have no reason to do so. Second, we must correctly handle issues regarding personal history, family background and the social relations of intellectuals. Some comrades among the intellectuals of our country come from families of the exploiting class while some of them have blemishes on their records and still others have more complicated social relations. All these have been the result of history. We must adhere to the principle of "family background based on oneself, social relations on the influence that one exercises and historical problems on one's practical performance." So long as one can make a clean breast of the facts, have a correct political understanding, do well in everyday life and be qualified for party membership, we must admit him into the party immediately. Third, we must make a concrete and realistic analysis of the shortcomings and weaknesses of intellectuals. The professions of intellectuals, especially of personnel engaged in scientific research and teaching, have some of the peculiarities of self-employed laborors. Many of them are accustomed to immersing themselves in order to gain professional efficiency. It is absolutely not advisable for us to regard their dedication to making contributions to teaching and to scientific research by devoting themselves to gaining of professional efficiency as following the "white professional road." We cannot regard the facts that intellectuals are fond of criticism, that they are bold in putting forward different opinions and that they are keen on making their views known to the public as being "arrogant and complacent," "seeking the limelight" or "trying to show off." It is not advisable for us to regard their merits and strong points as shortcomings so as to pick on them in minor and nonessential issues and thus cause a delay in granting party membership to them. Of course, it is a fact that intellectuals also have their shortcomings. We as party organizations and party leaders must point out to them their shortcomings with the best intentions and exercise patience in helping them to make continuous progress.

It is hoped that party organizations at all levels combine the examination of intellectuals which is being carried in our work with party consolidation in order to resolve conscientiously the problem of intellectuals encountering difficulties in becoming party members. We are glad to see more intellectuals becoming vanguard fighters of the proletarian class.
EFFORTS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS OF INTELLECTUALS BECOMING MEMBERS DISCUSSED

Actions in Sichuan

Chengdu SICHUAN RIBAO in Chinese 21 May 84 p 4

[Article by Organization Department and Report Section of Ziyang County Party Committee: "Clean up 'Leftist' Influence, Overcome Prejudice Against Intellectuals"]

[Text] The Ziyang County CPC Committee, while conscientiously eliminating the "leftist" influence and overcoming the old prejudice, is now actively and prudently making efforts to recruit party members from among the intellectuals. Since the 3d Plenum of the 11th CPC National Congress, a total of 322 intellectuals, making up approximately one-third of the total number of the newly recruited party members of the whole county, have been admitted to party organizations. The Ziyang party committee regards recruiting party members from among the intellectuals as an important task in implementing the policy on intellectuals and regards those who enthusiastically want to make progress or who are doing exceptionally well in their work as activists in party building. In addition to appointing personnel to take charge of the training work, measures such as setting up training classes for activists in party building and organizing them to attend party lectures have also been adopted in order to educate them in the basic knowledge of the party. Since 1979, the county party committee, the party school and the party committees of organizations directly under the county party committee have repeatedly run training classes in party building for activists. More than 200 intellectuals have attended these training classes one after another. At the same time, the county party committee has made conscientious efforts to eliminate the "leftist" influence and has demanded that party organizations at all levels adhere to the principle of "taking class status into consideration, but not only that, and laying the stress on political manifestations." This has been done so that family origin would be based on oneself, social relations on the relations on the influence that one exercises and historical problems on one's practical performance. Both Zhang Chixin [1728 3589 8590], a grade-1 history teacher, and Tan Yingshan [6223 2019 3790], a grade-1 chemistry teacher, of the Ziyang Middle School graduated from college before liberation. They are faithfully devoted to the party's educational task. For over 30 years in the past, they have many times been elected as advanced teachers of the province, the prefecture and the county. They have repeatedly asked to join the party, but their requests have never been approved because they
came from families of the exploiting class and their social relations have been relatively complicated. Since the 3d Plenum of the 11th CPC National Congress, on the basis of their consistent performance and in spite of the various reproaches and complaints, the school party branch has discussed and approved the party membership applications of the two teachers. The fact that these two teachers have been admitted to the party has caused strong repercussions both in the school and in society and thus has enabled intellectuals who are willing to contend for party membership but who have a "political and historical" load on their minds to relieve themselves of their longstanding "worries." Many people reported to party organizations on their ideological progress and problems and submitted their party membership applications. A physician in charge of the department of gynecology and obstetrics at the county hospital who has constantly been improving her skills over the past 20-plus years and has set an accident-free record in 10,000 family planning and gynecological-obstetric operations has repeatedly been elected as an advanced worker. She asked to be admitted to the party many times, but after holding three discussions the group under the party branch did not approve her request because she has always been relatively irritable and, when she speaks to others, she has sometimes failed to notice her manner of expression and the occasion to speak and has thereby hurt some comrades. After finding out about the situation, the county party committee sent a deputy director of the organization section in charge of the recruitment of party members to go to the hospital to look into the situation. In coordination with the party branch, it organized all party members to study party documents in order to guide all of them in dealing with the shortcomings of that physician in charge on the basis of the facts. Her application was finally approved. After joining the party, she has conscientiously corrected her shortcomings with the help of the party organizations. Recently, she was elected deputy to the county people's congress.

Commentary

Chengdu SICHUAN RIBAO in Chinese 21 May 84 p 4

[Commentary: "Conscientiously Solve the Problem of 'Difficulties in Becoming Party Members' Encountered by Intellectuals"]

[Text] The Ziyang County party committee and the party committee of the primary steel-rolling mill of the Pan-Zhi-Hua Iron and Steel Company, in their efforts to overcome the prejudice against intellectuals and to eliminate the "leftist" influence, have drawn a large number of qualified intellectuals into the party. The ratio of intellectuals in the party has thus shown a significant increase. It indicates that they have achieved better results in carrying out the policy on intellectuals and in implementing the principle of reforming while consolidating.

However, even today the problem of intellectuals encountering difficulties in becoming party members still exists in many places. The difficulties which intellectuals have encountered in becoming party members lie in the fact that the influence of the "leftist" ideology of some comrades within our party has not yet been eradicated. They still regard intellectuals as "outsiders" or an "alienated force." They look upon others with a distorted view and are prone
to regard the merits of intellectuals, such as independent thinking, adeptness in contention and the courage to criticize, as the shortcomings of "standing aloof from politics and material pursuits," "pride," "individualism" and so forth. They are overcritical toward intellectuals who contend for party membership in that they apply impractical standards and adopt a marathon-type "test" in handling intellectuals' applications for party membership. This is absolutely wrong.

The strong points of intellectuals lie in the fact that they have a good command of more scientific and cultural knowledge in a period where the crux of the four modernizations is the modernization of science and technology. The purpose of recruiting party members from among intellectuals is to enable them to play a more important role and thereby further strengthen the party's leadership in the construction of the modernizations and promote the progress of the socialist and communist causes. Any erroneous ideology or course of action which tends to play down the role of intellectuals or to prevent them from joining the party runs counter to the basic interests of the party and the people.

Party organizations at all levels must follow the examples of the Ziyang County party committee and the party committee of the primary steel-rolling mill in setting up concrete plans and measures to cultivate, educate and test intellectuals and to admit them into the party in order to absorb the outstanding intellectuals who are willing to dedicate themselves to the cause of communism into our party on the basis of the principle of recruiting one as soon as one's conditions for becoming a party member have matured.

9560
CSO: 4005/720
SELECTING THIRD-ECHELON CADRES FROM REVOLUTIONARIES URGED

Chengdu SICHUAN RIBAO in Chinese 3 Jun 84 p 1

[Article by staff reporter Fu Yuguí [0265 7183 6311]: "Comrade Yang Rudai Urges To Test Party Consolidation Results by Practice"]

[Text] On 1 and 2 June, leading cadres of some departments and bureaus at the provincial level in charge of economic affairs one after another reported back to the provincial party committee on the situation of party consolidation work. While listening to the reports, provincial party committee secretary Yang Rudai [2799 3067 1486] put forward concrete demands on the party consolidation work of organizations at the provincial level. He specifically emphasized that we must pinpoint the main problems which exist in the leading groups, further eliminate the "leftist" influence and adopt practical and realistic measures in consolidation and reform in order to promote the progress of the various reforms and test party consolidation results through the practice of reform.

The party consolidation work of organizations at the provincial level has been successively carried out since last winter. After studying the documents relevant to party consolidation, some units have already entered the stage of comparison and examination. At the report-back meeting on both 1 and 2 June, Comrade Yang Rudai reiterated that, in comparison and examination, we must fully carry forward the democratic style of work and solicit opinions from party members and the general public in order correctly to find out problems which exist in the leading groups. The collective examination of the leading groups must not be done in generalities, nor should each and every aspect be considered. It is necessary to hold on to the main problems which have an impact on the opening of new prospects so as to deepen our ideological understanding to resolve them earnestly and conscientiously by practice.

Comrade Yang Rudai said that after carrying out party consolidation, all units and departments must have a new look in their work. Whether there is such a new look or not can be examined mainly from the following three aspects: the first is to carry out a variety of reforms. All units and departments, no matter what they are, have the responsibility to carry out reform, and economic departments, in particular, must do the reform work well. The second is to implement the policies conscientiously. It is necessary to bring the role of intellectuals into play. Practical problems with regard to their work and daily life must be reasonably resolved. Other policies which have not yet been implemented must also be settled during party consolidation. The third is to foster a new work style.
The bureaucratic style such as delays in handling things and arguing back and forth must be resolutely rectified. "Time is money; efficiency is life." We must have a strong time concept and not delay for a long time the settlement of problems which should have been resolved.

In the course of listening to reports, Comrade Yang Rudai repeatedly stressed that it is necessary to regard reform as a very important question for us to answer. He said that all departments and units must conscientiously eliminate the influence of the "leftist" ideology and adopt a correct attitude toward reform and the revolutionaries. To open new prospects and realize the goal of "making people rich and promoting people to a higher level" cannot be made possible without reform and the revolutionaries. In Sichuan, people who dare to reform are not too many, but too few. Some people think of reform but are hampered by the old ideas and old restrictions. We must untie these people and encourage them to be bold in reform. In dealing with revolutionaries, we must pay attention to the intrinsic quality and the main trend. We must support and help them. In some places and units, revolutionaries are not too popular, while those who try never to offend anybody or who do not intend to reform are well-liked. This is very unusual. Such a situation must be resolutely altered in party consolidation. In selecting cadres to build a "third echelon," it is not advisable to select those who try never to offend anybody. We must select persons who dare to destroy the old and create the new and select them from among the revolutionaries. After party consolidation, if everybody in a unit is still not interested in reform, it will mean that party consolidation has merely been a superficial gesture.

9560
CS0: 4005/720
PUNISHMENT OF SHIJIAZHUANG CPPCC CHAIRMAN DISCUSSED
Case of Misusing Authority

Shijiazhuang HEBEI RIBAO in Chinese 2 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by Ji Yan "In Response, the Provincial Disciplinary Committee Issues Directives Demanding That Party Committees and Disciplinary Committees of the Various Levels Examine Earnestly and Deal Seriously with Those Who, in the Campaign To Correct Erroneous Practices, Do Not Correct Their Own Mistakes and Those Who Commit New Mistakes While They Correct Old Ones. [4764 0917]: "Liu Lifu Subjected To Party Disciplinary Action"]

[Text] This paper has learned that the Provincial Disciplinary Committee has issued a bulletin in response to the warning and punishment given to the Shijiazhuang CPPCC Chairman Liu Lifu [0491 0500 1133]. Liu Lifu was warned and punished for having used government funds to pay for auxiliary facilities in his state-allocated house. This misuse of government funds could initiate a new trend of erroneous practices.

The bulletin states that in August 1983, as the city of Shijiazhuang was trying to obey the directives in the Central Disciplinary Committee's "open letter" by redressing the erroneous practices in housing construction and allocations for leading cadres, Comrade Liu Lifu moved into a luxurious mansion with seven rooms that took up 114 square meters—49 square meters more than the allowed space. The Municipal Party Committee, seeing that Liu Lifu had been redressing past errors even though he committed new ones, decided to allow him to move out and issued him another house with four rooms that took up 65.85 square meters (still slightly more than the allowed space). Liu Lifu, using maintenance and repair as excuses, again abused his power and had the Housing Department construct a second indoor bathtub (there was one in the house already), a kitchen that took up 9 square meters and a room that took up 8 square meters. In addition, he used more than 1,200 yuan and 54 workers to add 3 walls outside his yard.

The bulletin points out that Liu Lifu, as one who has been a party member for several decades and who has been a leading cadre on the municipal level, should have exercised self-discipline and should have been a model
for others in party rectification work. But he failed to do this. While the directives in the Central Disciplinary Committee's "open letter" on correcting erroneous practices in housing construction and allocation were being followed, Liu Lifu committed the same mistakes again and again. This indicates that his sense of party loyalty and his determination to obey party directives were weak. This also indicates that he rejected the party's campaign to correct erroneous practices both in theory and in practice. His conduct has jeopardized the reputation of the party and has affected negatively the confidence that many members of the party and the general public have in the party's campaign to correct erroneous practices.

The Shijiazhuang Municipal Party Committee's effort to redress the errors committed by Comrade Liu Lifu has been positive. It examined the case and took measures right after Liu Lifu's crimes had been discovered. But we should ask ourselves seriously why is there such great resistance to the campaign to correct erroneous practices in housing construction and allocations and the use of one's authority for private gain? And why is it that some leading municipal cadres keep on committing new mistakes while they correct old ones? We would like to ask that the Municipal Party Committee, as it fulfills the directives in the Central Disciplinary Committee's "open letter," summarize its experiences, draw a lesson from these experiences and further strengthen its leadership in the party rectification work.

The bulletin ends by stating that in 1983 considerable results were achieved in the campaign to correct such erroneous practices as using one's authority for private gain. These results were achieved because the party committees and disciplinary committees of various levels as well as the majority of party members and cadres worked hard for it. But we can see clearly that the rectification of erroneous practices has not been conducted thoroughly. Some mistakes have been corrected only on the surface and not completely. What cannot be tolerated is some party members and leading cadres choosing to ignore the directives of the Party Central Committee and committing new mistakes while they correct old ones. The areas and agencies these cadres affiliate with choose either to turn a blind eye to these practices or to go through the motions of interfering but never dealing with them seriously. Some of these cadres have even received the blessing of the party organization. We ought to ask ourselves how party practices can take a turn for the better if this trend continues? And how can we be expected to act in unison with Party Central Committee? We hope the party committees and organizations of the various levels can integrate these concrete examples with one another, examine earnestly the issue of correcting unhealthy practices and deal seriously with those who refuse to correct their mistakes or those who commit new mistakes while they correct old ones.
Abuses Explained

Shijiazhuang HEBEI RIBAO in Chinese 2 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by staff commentator: "What is the Reason for Committing New Mistakes While Correcting Old Ones"]

[Text] Just as the entire province was following the Party Central Committee's decision to rectify vigorously the various erroneous practices of using authority for private gain, two leading municipal cadres in the city of Shijiazhuang (CPPCC chairman Liu Lifu as reported today and the assistant director of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress as reported on January 29) took control over public housing, used public funds to set up auxiliary facilities in their private quarters and constructed luxurious housing. The party cannot tolerate this kind of behavior, which ignores the Party Central Committee's directives, flagrantly violates party discipline and persists in erroneous practices. The behavior of these officials has corrupted party morality and jeopardized the party's reputation. The Municipal Disciplinary Committee has instructed the entire province on the necessity of using these examples to educate the mass of cadres and party members in the party spirit, party morality and party discipline.

Party rectification work has already begun, but why is it that in some places unhealthy tendencies and evil practices are still prevalent and people are still committing new mistakes while correcting old ones? There are two major reasons:

First, there are a number of party members and cadres whose acceptance of party discipline is too weak, who stress too prominently their personal considerations, who ignore the Central Committee's directives on party rectification and who flagrantly violate discipline and act in defiance of the law or public opinion. On the surface they agree that they should be role models in improving party morality, but deep inside they are making plans for their private "worlds" of leisure and comfort. Some of them use their authority for private gain and engage in erroneous practices. But they have the kind of mentality that assumes that they will not be subjected to discipline. They feel that since they have been party members for years, since they have been involved with the revolution for decades and since they have seniority, no one will dare to touch them when they engage in erroneous practices -- what's done cannot be undone. We ask these comrades to examine themselves and their sense of loyalty to the party. Where is their sense of political consciousness as party members and cadres? The rectification of the party has begun; under these circumstances, those who are still engaged in erroneous practices should examine themselves ideologically and stop sticking obstinately to the wrong course!

Second, the party organization and leadership in some areas are indeed too weak to correct erroneous practices effectively. It is fearful of the powerful, and those responsible do not act according to principles.
On the surface they talk about acting in unison with the Party Central Committee and the importance of the party, but once real problems arise -- especially problems related to erroneous practices among leading cadres -- they are plagued with all kinds of worries. They worry about offending people, about losing face, about straining relations and so on and so forth. Often they find it hard to do something about it and can only adopt the policy of noninterference. We should ask ourselves when party morality can take a turn for the better if this kind of non-interference continues.

Those areas and departments that fail to correct erroneous practices and that fail to combat unhealthy trends and evil styles and those areas and departments that continuously violate discipline and make new mistakes while they correct old ones must have their party organizations examined. We hope that those party organizations and leading cadres that have not vigorously corrected erroneous practices and unhealthy and evil trends will overcome their soft stance and adopt effective measures as soon as possible in order to better party morality within their organizations and agencies. By doing so they can contribute to the rectification of party morality.

As we rectify incorrect practices within the party and offer the assurance that we will not neglect any aspects in party rectification work, we should insist on halting the phenomenon of committing new mistakes while correcting old ones. Party committees and disciplinary committees of the various levels must deal with this problem as soon as it arises. One who commits new mistakes while correcting old ones must be treated in a serious manner irrespective of his rank. Otherwise, it will be difficult to see justice done, to appease public anger and to rectify party morality. We must treat this problem as an urgent issue.

12680
CSO: 4005/678
RESOLVING INTELLECTUALS' 'DIFFICULTIES IN JOINING PARTY' URGED

Minister's Proposals

Shijiazhuang HEBEI RIBAO in Chinese 18 May 84 p 1

[Article by staff reporter Wu Yonghua [0702 3057 5478]: "Minister of Shijiazhuang Municipal Party Committee's Organizational Department Proposes Five Ways To Solve the Problem Concerning the 35-year-old Application of Zhao Muping [6392 2606 1627] -- An Outstanding Class Director Nationally -- To Join the Party"]

[Text] This paper has learned that on 14 May, Fu Yuncheng [0265 0061 4453] standing member and minister of the Shijiazhuang municipal party committee's organizational department, met at a seminar with leaders of 12 agencies affiliated with the municipal bureau of education and the second municipal squadron. Also participating were activists who had been requesting party membership for a long time and intellectuals who had joined the party only recently. Fu Yuncheng offered five ways to overcome the intellectuals' "difficulties in acquiring party membership."

Fu Yuncheng stated that the case of Zhao Muping, who is an outstanding class director nationally and who should have been admitted into the party after 35 years of applying, was a representative incident reflecting the party organization in our city. Presently, the party organizations of some agencies are rejecting people who are qualified to become party members. The reason is that some of the people responsible for leading the party groups fail to regard intellectuals as part of the working class; instead, they still treat intellectuals as target for consolidation, education and reform. Some tend to disregard the overall performance of those applicants who are activists and stress only their family and historical backgrounds. Some ignore the main body of intellectuals and criticize all intellectuals by the same standard or even regard their strengths as weaknesses.

Fu Yuncheng stated that in order to overcome the intellectuals' "difficulties in acquiring party membership" we must be well-schooled in those documents related to party rectification and liquidate the pernicious remnants of the "leftist" ideology in the same spirit with which we rectify the party. Various agencies should correct realistically
and thoroughly their mistake of ignoring the political progress intellectuals have made and also their mistake of judging intellectuals by their families, backgrounds and personal experiences. We should welcome intellectuals to join the party as long as they have a clear understanding of circumstances and are able to perform satisfactorily. Second, we should publicize intensely the role and function of intellectuals in the four modernizations movement. Party members should undergo ideological education on how to build the party in a new age so that they will be aware of the political progress intellectuals are making. Third, we should reform before we consolidate. We should find out exactly how many intellectuals have applied for party membership in each agency and how many intellectuals are qualified but still have not been granted membership. We should understand and analyze each application and arrange them in order of importance and urgency. We should deal with them one by one. This task should be included in the agenda of leading party groups and should be studied on a regular basis in order to carry out successfully foundational work. Fourth, we should pay attention to both positive and negative examples as we try to overcome the intellectuals' "difficulties in acquiring party membership." Those in the leading party groups who refuse to recruit intellectuals into the party must be punished by party discipline. Fifth, presently the percentage of party members among elementary and high-school teachers and college students is small. This is the weakness in the leading party groups' work to recruit party members. The main target for recruitment into the party should be middle-aged intellectuals. Their role in the four modernizations movement is that of continuing whatever has not been accomplished. It is important to assist them politically so that they can keep on making political progress.

Elimination of 'Long-term Testing' Proposed

Shijiazhuang HEBEI RIBAO in Chinese 18 May 84 p 1

[Commentator's article: "We Can Do Without the Theory of "Long-term Testing"]

[Text] On the subject of recruiting intellectuals into the party, because of the negative influence of "leftists," for a long time the prevalent excuse has been "it is difficult to change the world view of intellectuals, so they have to undergo a lengthy testing period before they can be allowed to join the party." The number of people who voice such an opinion has decreased due to the thorough execution of the party line, goals and policies proposed during the 3d Plenum of the 11th Party Central Committee. But if we look hard enough we can still detect this kind of mentality:

First, "those intellectuals who have applied for party membership do not enjoy a close relationship with the masses." When we talk about the relationship between intellectuals and the masses, we should mean only the relationship between intellectuals and those of the masses they work with. Physicians who treat the diseased with devotion and technicians
who serve the masses and the state with great enthusiasm should be looked
upon as intellectuals who enjoy a close relationship with the masses.
It would be erroneous to demand that they establish a different kind of
close relationship with the masses.

Second, "those intellectuals who have applied for party membership have
weaknesses and the public has voiced concern that it would be improper
to recruit them into the party." It is true that any intellectual will
have weaknesses. But the issue should be how these weaknesses are to
be treated when we review an intellectual's application to join the party.
We should consider both the applicant's strengths and weaknesses. This
will enable us to recognize those weaknesses that are inevitable, those
that can be overcome through work and those that are completely irrelevant
to becoming a party member. Leaders of leading party groups should guide
and correct the incorrect views of some people. If leaders of the leading
party groups refuse to admit qualified intellectuals into the party simply
on the basis that the public has "voiced complaints," then they are mis-
handling their responsibility.

Third, some of those in charge of the basic-level work of leading party
groups have rejected applications by some intellectuals for party
membership on the basis that those intellectuals have made too few
ideological self-examinations and therefore "lack an understanding of
their proper role in the organization." In examining the application
of an activist intellectual, we should see if the applicant has acted
in accordance with the Party Central Committee ideologically and
politically. We should see if the applicant has the determination and
willingness to serve the people, and we should see if the applicant
abides by the party's principle of democratic collectivism. It is
improper to make the number of times the applicant has engaged in
ideological self-examination the criterion in granting party member-
ship.

It is our hope that the intellectuals' "difficulties in acquiring party
membership" can be overcome in the same spirit with which we rectify
the party, for this will further our policy toward the intellectuals.
Those cadres who are prejudiced against intellectuals should be educated
before they commit more errors, and those who refuse to correct their
mistakes should be punished by party discipline or even fired.

12680
CSO: 4005/681
STRONG IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY ON INTELLECTUALS URGED

Shijiazhuang HEBEI RIBAO in Chinese 15 May 84 p 1

[Article by staff commentator: "Strengthen Leadership, Resolutely Promote Implementation"]

[Text] The last provincial examination of the implementation of the policy toward intellectuals indicates that those areas and agencies that have been performing well share one common sentiment -- their leadership has a high level of understanding, is determined to do a good job, adopts effective measures and deals with issues in the most pragmatic way. As for those areas and agencies that have not been performing well, even though each area and agency experiences circumstances unique to itself, inefficiency can always be attributed to ineffective leadership, erroneous ideological lines within the leading circles, failure to integrate the implementation of the policy toward intellectuals with the directives from the Party Central Committee and failure to utilize the policy toward intellectuals as the key to the four modernizations movement.

The implementation of the policy toward intellectuals is the most realistic and concrete test for leaders of the various levels. Those leaders who insist on adhering politically to the Party Central Committee, who wish earnestly to accomplish the four modernizations movement and who are determined to reform and to bring forth new ideas will surely implement firmly the Party Central Committee's policy toward intellectuals initiated since the 3d Plenum of the 11th Party Central Committee. They will surely respect people with knowledge and talent. They, like Comrade Chen Xiuyun [7115 4423 0061], worship talent, recognize talent when they see it, are courageous in employing talent and know how to attract talent. They implement the policy toward intellectuals with the utmost effort and in the most pragmatic spirit. They will surely deal, in a decisive manner, with those people who attack, reject and discriminate against intellectuals. Otherwise, the policy toward intellectuals will not be carried out and will not be able to be carried out no matter how hard we try. Moreover, talent will be suppressed and rejected. Therefore, supervisory circles should follow the policy toward intellectuals closely. Those who do not implement thoroughly the party's policy toward intellectuals and who discriminate against or harass, attack and
persecute intellectuals must undergo serious educational criticism; those who refuse to reform or be educated must have their work re-adjusted and serious offenders must be disciplined. We must enhance our leadership in a concrete, not abstract, manner. Enhancing leadership means that leading cadres must be actively involved; it means that they cannot be "called leaders and refrain from participating in battles." The responsibility system should be implemented to deal with this issue. The top one or two figures of the level which fails to carry out the policy toward intellectuals should be held responsible. Enhancing leadership also means that concrete and clear-cut measures must be taken; we cannot simply copy and convey the directives and documents handed down to us without seeing to it that they are carried out. The third thing to do in order to enhance leadership is to beef up supervisory work and to pay attention to both positive and negative examples. Issues raised by intellectuals should be examined individually; those that can be dealt with should be dealt with immediately. They should not remain topics for conferences and documents. Officials should never act like irresponsible bureaucrats. The fourth thing to do in order to enhance leadership is to strengthen the work on political ideology. After a lengthy period of exposure to the influence of "leftists," it is only natural that there be ideological confusion and errors among cadres and the public. The most important factor is the attitude of the leaders of the various levels. The correct things to do are to liquidate the influence of the "leftists" and to raise the awareness of the masses by propagating the party's policy toward intellectuals. Leaders would be ignoring their responsibilities as leaders if they adopted the attitude of negligence and appeasement.

Presently our province faces serious and difficult tasks in implementing the policy toward intellectuals. We should not think that our job is "almost done"; there is no such thing as "implementing something too thoroughly." Leaders of the various levels must have a clear understanding and enhance their leadership solidly in order to implement the policy toward intellectuals firmly, successfully and effectively.

12680
CSO: 4005/681
NORTH REGION

CASE OF MISTREATED INTELLECTUAL IN TANGSHAN DISCUSSED

Shijiazhuang HEBEI RIBAO in Chinese 6 May 84 p 1

[Article by staff reporter Han Shuting [7281 2885 0080]: "Wang Huafeng [3769 5478 6912] Relieved of His Position for Being Jealous of the Talented and the Capable. Li Guoguang [6786 0948 0342] Given an Important Position Because of His Expertise"

[Text] This paper has learned that after the inquiries by responsible comrades from provincial party committee and Tangshan city's municipal party committee, Tangshan City's Second Light Industry Company has recently made the following decisions: Nang Huafeng, assistant chief of the preparatory section of the Industrial Art Company, should be relieved of his position because he demonstrated jealousy toward the talented and the capable; Li Guoguang, who had been discriminated against and persecuted, should be appointed as chief of the preparatory section of the Industrial Art Company; and Liu Zhenguo [2692 2182 0948], the incumbent chief of the preparatory section of the Industrial Art Company, should be transferred elsewhere.

Li Guoguang graduated from the East China Academy of Arts (now called the Nanjing Academy of Arts) in September 1956. His specialties are painting and photography. He was a top student at the academy and exhibitions of his influential oil paintings and cartoons have been held. After his graduation, Li Guoguang was assigned to the Culture Bureau of Gansu Province. In 1958 he was wrongly classified as a rightist. He has been rehabilitated since the 3d Plenum of the 11th Party Central Committee. In March of last year, as Hubei Province was recruiting talent to work here, Li Guoguang was assigned to the preparatory section of Tangshan City's Industrial Art Company. Li Guoguang was determined to accomplish something for the company, but he was discriminated against politically and harassed professionally because the leaders of the company, Liu Zhenguo and Wang Huafeng, were prejudiced against and jealous of intellectuals. In late March of last year, Li Guoguang reported to the company from the provincial capital of Shijiazhuang. But for a long time, Liu Zhenguo and Wang Huafeng refused to assign him work. Li Guoguang was assigned to the technical section in the end of July only after having pleaded for work repeatedly. In order to be able to begin his work as soon as possible, Li Guoguang on three occasions asked the
company leadership to purchase painting equipment such as brushes, paper and paints. Liu Zhenguo and Wang Huafeng refused to do so on the grounds that they "did not have the money." In order to improve the company's operation in the field of industrial art, Li Guoguang submitted verbal and written suggestions and ideas to the company leadership on many occasions. But his suggestions and ideas were never appreciated or studied. In mid-May of last year, the company, while answering the provincial department of culture's call, held a design contest. Li Guoguang and others gave the award for outstanding design to the Industrial Art Factory's wall hanging entitled "Flying to the Sky." They also decided that the winning design should enter a provincial contest. But Liu and Wang, out of ignorance and prejudice, criticized it for being "pornographic" and "spiritually polluting." However, it was this very artistic design that was later chosen by the Chinese ambassador to Japan as Comrade Hu Yaobang's gift to that nation during his visit there. It was subsequently given the provincial award for outstanding design.

The leadership of the company should have cared for Li Guoguang, who had traveled a long way to work in Tangshan. But instead he received cold treatment from Liu and Wang. He had not been assigned a living unit in the company's housing complex and had not eaten in the company's cafeteria for more than a year since he came to Tangshan.

On numerous occasions Li Guoguang voiced to the supervisory agency -- the Second Municipal Light Industry Company -- his concern over the conduct of Wang Huafeng and others, but to no avail. He had no choice but to voice his complaints to the municipal and provincial party committees and finally was able to arouse the concern of the organizational departments of the provincial and municipal party committees. An investigation into the issue was conducted by a joint investigative team that consisted of people from the Tangshan municipal party committee's organizational department, industrial department and the office in charge of implementing the policy toward intellectuals. Lin Xianyun [2651 3759 0061], advisor to the provincial organizational department, and Wang Dachuan [3769 1129 1557], standing member of the municipal Party committee and director of the organizational department, met with Li Guoguang personally and listened to his suggestions and requests. Discrimination and persecution against Li Guoguang were finally dealt with properly.

12680
CS0: 4005/680
DIRECTOR DISMISSED FOR DISCRIMINATING AGAINST INTELLECTUALS

Shijiazhuang HEBEI RIBAO in Chinese 28 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by staff reporter: "Provincial Party Committee Makes Decisions To Eliminate Obstacles in Implementing Policy Toward Intellectuals. Sun Xibin [1327 0823 2430] Stripped of His Position as Director of Tractor Factory. Engineers Liu Ricang [0491 2480 0221] and Yang Baoqin [2799 1405 3830] Once Forced to Leave Now Treated Properly"]

[Text] This paper has learned that the provincial party committee has made the following decisions on 24 April: Sun Xibin will be stripped of his position as the director of Shijiazhuang's tractor factory; the provincial joint inspection team will continue to examine and regulate the leading circles of the factory so that the party's policy toward intellectuals can be fully implemented.

This paper's 29 March front-page story entitled "Two Middle-aged Engineers Forced To Leave Shijiazhuang Tractor Factory" aroused the attention of the provincial party committee, provincial government and other related departments. Several leading cadres in the provincial party committee and government have issued verbal or written directives demanding that the incident be dealt with quickly and seriously in order to expedite the implementation of the policy toward intellectuals in the entire province. The investigative team appointed by the provincial party committee carried out a second investigation and found the paper's accusation to be valid. The person who discriminated against the persecuted Mr and Mrs Liu Ricang the most was the director of Shijiazhuang tractor factory, Sun Xibin. The investigative team found Sun Xibin's level of political consciousness low and his policies ineffective. Sun Xibin was upset by the paper's criticism and even made statements such as the following on 13 April: "The Liu Ricang case does not really involve discrimination against the harassment of intellectuals"; "personally, I do not think this case deserves the attention of the press"; "my reputation is at stake, how am I supposed to do my job in the future?" and so on and so forth. The investigative team also learned that serious problems existed not only within the leading circles of the Shijiazhuang tractor factory but also in the factory's implementation of the policy toward intellectuals.

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Based on the findings stated above, the provincial party committee decided that Sun Xibin be relieved of his position as the director of the factory. The provincial party committee also asked related departments to form a joint inspection team whose mission would be to examine and regulate continuously the leading circles of the Shijiazhuang tractor factory. The inspection team has been stationed in the factory since 25 April.

Liu Ricang and his wife Yang Baoqin, under the care of the concerned provincial and municipal departments, have started working at Shijiazhuang's auto manufacturing factory. The supervisor of the factory personally had paintec and cleaned their room. Cadres in charge of the organizational department of the provincial party committee as well as those in charge of the Shijiazhuang Economic Council even visited with Mr and Mrs Liu Ricang at their new home.

12680
CSO: 4005/680
HEILONGJIANG RIBAO CELEBRATES ANNIVERSARY--The HEILONGJIANG RIBAO office held a meeting today to mark the 30th anniversary of the change of title. Li Lian, secretary of the provincial CPC Committee, gave a written speech to extend congratulations. Attending the meeting were provincial and Harbin City leaders, including Chen Junsheng, Hou Jie, Wang Yilun, Li Jianbai, Chen Yuanzhi, Zhang Xiangling and Wang Zhao, and responsible comrades [of] various press and publication units in Harbin. (Qi Guiyuan), chief editor of HEILONGJIANG RIBAO, spoke, introducing its development and progress over the past 30 years. On August 1954 when Songjiang Province and Heilongjiang Province merged into one, the former SONGJIANG RIBAO and the former HEILONGJIANG RIBAO also merged and took HEILONGJIANG RIBAO as its title. Over the past 30 years, HEILONGJIANG RIBAO has actively publicized the CPC Central Committee's line, principles, and policies and earnestly implemented the provincial CPC Committee's work plans and purposes, thus winning the trust of the party members, cadres, and the people throughout the province. Chen Junsheng, deputy secretary of the provincial CPC Committee, spoke at the meeting. He offered seven opinions on ways to run HEILONGJIANG RIBAO successfully. [Excerpts] [SK310200 Harbin Heilongjiang Provincial Service in Mandarin 1000 GMT 30 Jul 84]
CHENGDU PLA UNITS REPORT ALL-ROUND PROGRESS

HK300605 Chengdu Sichuan Provincial Service in Mandarin 0030 GMT 30 Jul 84

[Excerpts] The Chengdu PLA Units have advanced in big strides along the road of building a modern, regular, and revolutionary army with Chinese characteristics. They have made new and major progress in all work since the Third Plenary Session.

In military training, the CPC committees at all levels have raised education and training to a strategic position; they have organized it carefully and carried it out strictly, setting strict demands. The number of companies carrying out all-round training this year shows a big increase over last year. By the end of May these companies had fulfilled over 60 percent of their training schedules for the year. There has been a big increase in training successes. A number of units have also organized realistic maneuvers to practice coordinated tactics.

In reforming training, many units have kept the whole world in view and focused on the requirements of future war. They have adopted confrontation methods to steel the units' adaptability.

In political work, since the Third Plenary Session the commanders and fighters of the Chengdu PLA Units have got their brains working, emancipated their minds, and boldly carried out reforms in political work.

In the past 2 years the progress of making the cadre force of the units revolutionized, younger, better educated, and more professionally competent has been continually stepped up. This is shown by the fact that the cadres' ideological and political awareness has been raised to a new level and they have been more conscious in maintaining a high degree of unity with the CPC Central Committee in thinking and action. Over one-third of the cadres in the military region have undergone training in regular academies and schools. At present over 20,000 cadres are taking part in secondary technical and tertiary educational studies, and 33,000 fighters are taking part in specialized courses for training dual-purpose talented people.

The units of the military region have regarded joint building of spiritual civilization by army and people as specific action in implementing the spirit of the 12th Party Congress, and as an important way of building and developing new-style army-people and army-government relations.
In putting the logistics services on a combat basis, the logistics and transport departments of the military region and their subordinate vehicle units have instituted contract responsibility systems in transport tasks, thus fully mobilizing the enthusiasm of the cadres and fighters. Transport work into Xizang assigned by the upper levels last year showed a 28.4 percent rise over 1982. The transport units still managed to overfulfill this task by 4 percent.

The units' farms have perfected the production responsibility system, and actively popularized advanced agricultural science and technology. They have reaped bumper harvest year after year. In the past 2 and more years, they have harvested a total of 30 million jin of grain and oil. The units stationed in Sichuan are now 60 percent self-sufficient in meat and vegetables. Many companies are completely self-sufficient in both these items.

CSO: 4005/750
IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW MILITARY SERVICE LAW DISCUSSED

Chengdu

Chengdu SICHUAN RIBAO in Chinese 6 Jun 84 p 1

[Article by Cheng Dongbing [2052 0520 0365]: "Chengdu Military Region Convenes Forum on New Military Service Law"]

[Text] Yesterday afternoon, the leadership organ of the Chengdu Military Region invited some veteran comrades who had been in military service work for years to a forum to learn from and discuss informally with them the new military service law and to study measures for strengthening the leadership in order to do a good job in the military service work in the new situations.

At the forum, they studied the military service law item by item and word by word and carried out enthusiastic discussions. Yan Shouqing [7051 1343 1987], the former deputy commander of the military region, and Zhu Yuting [2612 3768 1656], the former deputy chief of staff and the first person to serve as director of the Military Service Bureau of Sichuan Province, spoke excitedly with the other participants: The new military service law, which sums up the valuable experience since the founding of the People's Republic, is formulated in light of the characteristics of modern warfare and of the needs of our nation's defense. It proceeds from the actual situations of our country and our army. It is a military service law with Chinese characteristics. It puts forward policies and measures to carry out the military service work in the new situations, which is of great significance in further perfecting the military service system of our country, in strengthening the building of the armed forces and in safeguarding the security of our socialist motherland and the smooth progress of the great cause of the four modernizations.

Bearing in mind the establishment of the reserve service system throughout our region in recent years, comrades participating in the forum said that since the 3d Plenum of the 11th CPC National Congress, the military service work in our region has made gratifying achievements. Military units and militia throughout the region have centered on the main task of the construction of the four modernizations and have taken the needs in future wars against aggression into consideration in their efforts to modernize, regularize and revolutionize the military units and to build up the reserve forces.

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During discussions at the forum, some measures for doing a good job in learning, publicizing and implementing the new military law were put forward by all of them. First, various forms of activities must be carried out extensively and thoroughly to do a good job in publicity while cadres and soldiers of military units, armed cadres and militia cadres are being organized to study. In carrying out publicity, stress must be placed on doing a good job in the rural areas, especially in the outlying mountain areas. We must bring this publicity to every family as quickly as possible. Second, we must go down to the grassroots units to put into effective practice the provisions of the new military service law. Third, the leadership organ must study ways to improve its method of work, proceed realistically to give more effective leadership adapted to different needs and pay attention to giving more room for maneuver to the departments of the people's armed forces in order to enable them to concentrate on doing a good job in the military service so that they can perform still better in their militia and reserve service work.

Lanzhou

Lanzhou LANZHOU BAO in Chinese 8 Jun 84 p 2

[Article by Li Zengrong [2621 1073 2837], director of the provincial staff office of the Leading Group for Wartime Mobilization and Army Expansion and concurrently deputy chief of staff of the provincial military region: "Resolutely Implement the Military Service Law"]

[Text] The new military service law has formally established the reserve force system of national defense in our country, which combines the militia with the reserve service. This system is of great significance in accelerating the modernization of our national defense and in safeguarding the long-term peace and security of our country.

To implement this system is to promote a correct law which is fully suited to the situations in our country and which was made after summing up both the positive and negative historical experiences of our country, especially the fresh experiences gained in the reform of the military service work carried out since the 3d Plenum of the 11th CPC National Congress. In the past, we never succeeded in settling the question of combining the militia with the reserve service. Judging by the needs in future wars against aggression, it would not work without a sound reserve service system, because the regular troops required in wartime mobilization of course can be supplied by the militiamen, but the militia organization alone is still unable to resolve the problem of providing soldiers and officers with professional skills because they are relatively difficult to train. Therefore, to combine the militia with the reserve service so that they can supplement and take care of each other is a wise measure which is advantageous to perfecting the system of the wartime mobilization of soldiers.

To implement this system is also an important policy decision which draws extensively on the exemplary practices and successful experiences of foreign countries. Nowadays, all countries in the world pay a lot of attention to building the reserve forces of their armies. They not only have established relatively sound reserve service systems but have also maintained a certain
number of soldiers and officers in their reserve services. These soldiers and officers in the reserves can be quickly mustered into military units with certain fighting strength during wartime. If we can learn the merits of all the countries in the world in building up their military forces and integrate these lessons with the traditional militia system of our country so as to build up a reserve force system with Chinese characteristics, it can be assured that we shall be in an impregnable position in future wars against aggression.

To implement this system is also a strategic plan suited to the needs in the construction of the four modernizations and in consideration of the condition of our country. At present, the economy in our country has not yet been well developed. In a period of considerable length from now on, the whole party will center its efforts on the acceleration of economic construction. For this reason, it is impossible for the state to allocate large funds to be used in the construction of national defense. As a result, it is absolutely necessary that we reduce the size of our military forces and carry out reorganization. A reduction of the size of the armed forces on active duty will call for a stronger reserve force. As it is now, we can maintain fewer yet better troops during peacetime and also mobilize a large number of soldiers during war. This is advantageous to both economic construction and the modernization of the armed forces.

Implementing this system is necessary as well as absolutely feasible. At present, the organization of the reserve forces now underway is a concrete way to realize the combination of the militia with the reserve service. The formal promulgation of the new military service law has provided us with an ideological weapon and a legal basis, both of which serve as basic guarantees to ensure that we do this job well. We must study conscientiously, implement the military service law resolutely and combine the militia with the reserve service earnestly so as to promote and strengthen the building of the reserve forces in our province.

Xi'an

Xi'an SHAANXI RIBAO in Chinese 13 Jun 84 p 3

[Article by Wang Lanjiang [3769 5695 3058], deputy to the Sixth National People's Congress and Shaanxi Military District political commissar: "Experience Gained in Studying the Military Service Law"]

[Text] The "Military Service Law of the People's Republic of China" adopted at the Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress is an important reform of the military system of our country. To combine the militia system with that of the reserve service is an important task in the reform and the most significant feature of the new military service law.

Since the promulgation of the first military service law in 1955, the reserve service system has once been established in our country, but the building of the militia was neglected for a time. Since the enthusiastic movement to organize a militia was started in 1958, the reserve service system was then discarded. For this reason, over the past 30 years we have not been able to resolve the
question of combining the militia with the reserve service and the reserve service system is still far from perfect. The large number of ordinary soldiers needed during a wartime mobilization can be supplied by militiamen; however, we cannot rely on the militia organization alone to resolve the problem of the supply of reserve service cadres and skilled soldiers who need more intensive training. The existence of these problems is inconsistent with the current international and domestic situation. The new military service law stipulates that in the military service system the militia must be combined with the reserve service. It also provides specific provisions for those with a reserve service obligation and deals with the question of how to combine the militia with the reserve service. This is a remedy for the weaknesses of the former military service law and further perfects the military service system of the state.

To combine the militia system with that of the reserve service is advantageous in overcoming the two deviations of either establishing only the militia system but not that of the reserve service or vice versa. It has provided us with a legal guarantee for adhering to the traditional militia and reserve service systems of our country. Judging by the nature and tasks of the militia and the reserve service, there are some things in common and also some differences between them. The purpose of implementing the reserve service system is to accumulate reserve strength. Members of the reserve service must participate in certain military training programs according to regulations and be ready to respond to the calls of the state to serve on active duty in the army. The militia organization as the reserve strength of our army is similar to the reserve service, which is the basis of wartime mobilization. From this point of view, the two services are the same. However, the militia as a component part of the armed forces of our country has to take up the tasks of land and sea frontier defense, safeguarding social security, coordinating with the army in military operations and conducting independent warfare. From this point of view, the militia is different from the reserve service. For this reason, the two can only be combined closely but cannot become totally identical, nor can they take each other's place. The new military service law not only stipulates that the militia is the armed organization of the masses which does not withdraw from production but also makes it a rule that the militia is the reserve strength of the PLA and the basic form of organization of the reserve service. We can thus use the organizational form of the militia to put most of those who serve in the reserve service under control and combine the work pertaining to the militia with the preparatory work of wartime mobilization. In so doing, we not only have adhered to the traditional militia system of our country but also have accumulated a strong reserve force for wartime use.

At present, along with the progress of science and technology and the continuing renewal of the weapons and equipment of the army, we must increase our military expenditures. In a situation like this, the total number of the standing army of the state must be kept within the limits the national treasury can afford; therefore, it is impossible to maintain a huge army in peacetime. However, once a war breaks out, a large number of troops will be required and the number of troops on active duty will be insufficient to meet the needs. In such a situation, the only correct way is to strengthen the building of reserve forces including
the adherence of the militia system and the establishment of the reserve service system as soon as possible in order to lay a solid foundation for wartime mobilization. The new military service law stipulates that the militia system must be combined with the reserve service system; that servicemen transferred to civilian work, retired servicemen and local people with professional skills must register themselves to serve on reserve duty; and that necessary military training must be conducted for students in institutions of higher learning and in senior middle schools. This proves that we have imported some of the better ways that are practiced in foreign countries and have fully considered the actual financial capability of our country as well as our needs in future wars against aggression.

It is necessary to do a great amount of painstaking work to implement the new regulation regarding the acceleration of the building of reserve forces as provided for in the new military service law, and this requires combining the militia system with the reserve service system so that it can be implemented in practice step by step. However, the most important point is to enhance the national defense concept among our citizens all over the country. We must hold firm to the favorable opportunity of the promulgation of the new military service law in order to conduct propaganda and education extensively and thoroughly among the masses by making it clear that the safety and danger of our country and the life and death of our nation are closely bound up with each and every citizen and to enhance further the concept of combat preparedness, heighten the spirit of patriotism and heroism, deepen the sense of honor and responsibility in serving both the militia and reserves, consciously fulfill the duties provided for in the military service law and make contributions to the augmentation of national defense.

9560
CSO: 4005/721
PRE-OLYMPIC WARM-UP—Los Angeles, 27 July (XINHUA)—Athletes from both mainland China and Taibei participated in a pre-Olympic warm-up at Mount San Antonio College on the evening of 25 July. Athletes from the two sides had met before in 1983 Asian Track and Field Championships. Track and field teams from both China and China's Taibei sent several athletes to the last-pre-Olympic warm-up, which was attended by nearly 500 athletes from over 40 countries and areas. The first to compete in the same event were high jumpers of the two teams. In the event participated by 10 athletes, Zheng Dazhen of the Chinese team trial jumped before Taibei Team's Cai Lijiao and Liu Yanzhen. Whenever she cleared a height, she signaled greetings to the Taibei athletes, encouraging them to do well. In the end, both Japan's Hisae Fukuhiro and Zheng Dazhen cleared 1.85 meters. Fukuhiro finished first because she succeeded on her first attempt. Zheng Dazhen finished second. In the men's high jumping event, Chinese team's Zhu Jianhua and Liu Yunpeng competed with Chinese Taibei team's Liu Jinqiang. Liu Jinqiang missed the bar at 2.03 meters and Liu Yunpeng failed in his try at 2.13 meters. Zhu Jianhua, who finished first at 2.33 meters, held the spotlight in the meet and won warm applause from the audience. [By reporter He Zhou] [Excerpts] [0622/059 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0931 GMT 27 Jul 84]
BRIEFS

U.S. PURCHASE OF PRC FIGHTER—It is reported that the U.S. purchase of 24 Jian-7 fighters from our country has caused great concern and dissatisfaction in some Third World countries. The United States will use these Jian-7 fighters to train its pilots as well as those from its allies in dealing with some enemy aircraft. The Jian-7 fighter is modeled on the MiG fighter, and the armed forces of many countries, especially Arab countries, are using such MiG fighters. The United States and its allies will use the Jian-7 fighters as mock enemy aircraft, which will pose a direct threat to those countries whose pilots fly MiG fighters. [Text] [OW230241 (Clandestine) Ba Yi Radio in Mandarin to China 1215 GMT 20 Jul 84]

CSO: 4005/749
BRIEFS

ASSEMBLYMEN VISIT FRANCE--Paris, 28 Jul (CNA)--A group of national assemblymen from the Republic of China [ROC] is visiting France to study telecommunications and transportation systems. The 18-member mission led by Wong Sheng-nong had called at the Association for the Promotion of Economy, Commerce and Tourism in Paris for a meeting with the representatives of various organizations from the ROC. Wong and his members were briefed on the political developments in France and the substantive ties of cooperation between Paris and Taipei. Mission leader Wong told the meeting that after the presidential election by the National Assembly earlier this year, the ROC has further consolidated its unity under the leadership of President Chiang Ching-kuo and Vice President Lee Teng-hui. He also reported on the ROC's progress in the fields of telecommunications and transportation to the participants at the meeting. The mission is currently visiting West Europe to do study and collect data for references by the ROC Government. [Text] [OW291435 Taipei CNA in English 1342 GMT 29 Jul 84]

LEGISLATORS MISSION TO EUROPE--Taipei, 30 Jul (CNA)--Vice President Lee Teng-hui Monday received legislators Huang Ho-ching, Hung Wen-tung and Luo Chuan-chin, who will head a 13-member legislators mission to visit Europe, at the Presidential Office. He encouraged the lawmakers to promote people-to-people diplomacy and to encourage overseas Chinese there. Vice President Lee also exchanged views with the legislators on introducing more technology into agricultural garbage treatment, establishment of traffic [word indistinct], public medical service system and the opening of transworld air and sea routes. He urged them to bring back other nations' experiences in these fields for the government's reference. The mission will take off August 2 and will visit Italy, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, France, England, Greece, Egypt and the Holy See in Rome. They are scheduled to return on August 29. The 13 members of the mission are Huang Ho-ching (chief), Hung Wen-tung (deputy), Chang Kuang-jen (deputy), Luo Chuan-chin (secretary general), Liao Fu-ken, Yu Heng, Chen Chin-hsing, Fu Yen, Kuo Lin-yung, Wu Chun-hsiung, Hsieh Mei-hui, Chang Chien-hua and Huang Jung-chiu. [Text] [OW301441 Taipei CNA in English 1414 GMT 30 Jul 84]

GUATEMALAN AMBASSADOR LEAVES--Taipei, 29 Jul (CNA)--Ambassador of the Republic of Guatemala Edgar Arturo Lopez Calvo left here Sunday for home after completing his tenure of seven years in the Republic of China. Chiu Chin-yih and Ou Hung-ou Hung-lien, directors of the Departments of Protocol and Central and South American Affairs of the Foreign Ministry respectively, and members of the diplomatic corps of Taipei were on hand to see him off at the Chiang Kai-shek International Airport. [Excerpts] [OW301431 Taipei CNA in English 0301 GMT 30 Jul 84 OW]

CSO: 4000/428
CHINA, BRITAIN TO SET UP LIAISON OFFICE

HK010446 Hong Kong Commercial Radio in English 0430 GMT 1 Aug 84

[Text] An informed source has revealed that China and Britain have reached agreement on the joint liaison office to be set up to monitor the implementation of the 1997 agreement. (Mark Cagino) has the details:

[begin recording] [Cagino] The source told Commercial Radio that this was one of the major decisions reached during Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe's just-completed Beijing visit. It is also known that both governments have settled the issue of the function of the office, which will not be set up here for several years, but it will continue to operate for a short time after 1997, when Britain hands back the territory to China.

It is expected that Sir Geoffrey will release details on this liaison office during his press conference this afternoon, which will be broadcast live on Commercial Radio in its entirety from the Legislative Council chamber, starting at 1630.

Meanwhile the foreign secretary has spent the morning meeting members of the Executive Council [EXCO] to give them a 3-hour briefing on his China visit and a full explanation of what he described as substantial progress being made. After the meeting he spoke briefly to reporters waiting outside the Government Secretariat.

[Howe] Good morning. I've just had another very valuable meeting with EXCO. Their advice has been candid and helpful and I very much value these opportunities I have of discussing matters with them. From there I'd like to say a word to the press and media as well: You have been very patient with me throughout my two visits to Hong Kong, and in Peking, those of who have come there with me, as well. I fully understand how important it is for the people of Hong Kong to have as much information as I can give them about the negotiations, and I am very appreciative of the help that you have given in that process. [end recording]

CSO: 4000/426
HONG KONG MEDIA ON CHINA

MAO ZEDONG'S 27-YEAR RULE, CHAPTER 6

Hong Kong CHENG MING [CONTENDING] in Chinese No 75, Jan 84 & No 76, Feb 84

[Article by Kong Zhongwen [1313 0112 2429]: "The Ultimate Goal of the 'Cultural Revolution': The Overthrow of Zhou Enlai"]

[No 75, Jan 84 pp 74-78]

[Text] Editor's Note: In Chapter 6 of "Mao Zedong's 27-Year Rule," Mr Kong Zhongwen argues that Mao Zedong's ultimate goal in starting the "cultural revolution" was to liquidate Zhou Enlai. This is a view, up to the present, very different from that of others. The author provides a great deal of persuasive data to prove his viewpoint. Because of the rich data, the number of characters is rather large. Hence this chapter is published in two installments.

Today's observers mostly maintain that the reason Mao Zedong started the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" was to overthrow Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of the People's Republic; ordinary party members and the masses of people in particular have unquestioningly followed this view.

Yet, this is by no means the case, or we may say that it is rather inaccurate. Liu Shaoqi was undoubtedly one of the principal figures whom Mao Zedong wanted to eliminate in the first place; but Mao's ultimate target in starting the "cultural revolution" was Zhou Enlai, one who stood erect like Mount Tai within the party and amidst the people of the country! That is to say, insofar as Mao's original idea was concerned, he was determined to thoroughly uproot this big tree within the party, Zhou Enlai.

Why Did Mao Zedong Take Zhou Enlai as His Opponent?

This matter involves many subtle and complicated factors—including political views, personal talents, and prestige as well as "cumulated grievances" from history, etc. Below, we might as well proceed to illustrate concretely a few aspects:
First of all, the reasons that Mao took Zhou as his opponent was neither because there had been any errors or defects on Zhou's part which Mao found hard to accommodate, nor because Zhou had any ambition, but because Zhou enjoyed a very lofty prestige both within the party and among the people; this served to make Mao look relatively less appealing almost anytime and anywhere. Mao was the one so keenly bent on building an imperial hegemony for ten thousand generations; yet now there was an able man actually overtaking him; this naturally made him very jealous, unbearable, sleepless, and perhaps even grudging after death. He was older than Zhou and thus very much afraid that Zhou would outlive him and that therefore the whole party and the whole nation acknowledge Zhou as their paramount leader. Power would then be distributed by Zhou, all sovereign authority would belong to him, and, after Mao's death Mao would look very much tarnished! Therefore, Mao was determined that Zhou should collapse or die before himself.

As everyone know, on the question of authority and prestige among the CPC's leading figures, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were radically different. Mao's authority was built through long, sustained inflation and flattery; that is, it became established on account of the "defication" and cult of personality that he fostered. But Zhou Enlai's authority and prestige genuinely, objectively, and naturally took shape in history. Zhou never allowed others to resort to the cult of his personality but depended entirely on his particularly noble disposition as a statesman and his outstanding leadership capability in winning the trust and love of the whole party and the whole nation. This radical difference between the two was something Mao Zedong would not but see, and this was precisely a great lump that Mao Zedong harbored deep in his heart. Zhou Enlai also clearly discerned this lump on Mao's part; therefore, he had always disallowed any situation to appear in the party's propaganda in which his own brilliance would diminish or exceed that of Mao. Even so, however, he was unable to satisfy Mao or make him relax.

Second, Zhou's political outlook was also entirely different from Mao's. Zhou Enlai was the central figure of the CPC's pragmatic faction. Together with a large contingent of pragmatic people within the party like Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and others, he hoped to do a good job in furthering the cause of China's development in a down-to-earth manner so as to help the country to embark upon the path of prosperity and strength—yet, their plans were always subjected to sabotage by Mao Zedong's Leftist mischief-making. Viewing the 27-year history as a whole since the founding of the state by the CPC, we have discovered the following strange phenomenon: whenever a major administrative plan on the part of Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi and others of the pragmatic faction was about to steer the cause of China's development onto a normal course, Mao Zedong would as usual come out to do an exercise of sabotage; and whenever Mao Zedong succeeded in messing up things to a terrible extent, Zhou, Liu and others would as usual come forward to salvage what they could and before long there would be a turn for the better again—this was what made Mao Zedong extremely jealous. Mao naturally would not admit his own shortcomings; what made him jealous was that Zhou's and Liu's pragmatic line undermined his adventurous and preposterous "revolutionary" experiments. This naturally was something which Mao could not tolerate.
We may also see that, even on many concrete matters, Zhou Enlai never followed Mao Zedong blindly; there was a real struggle between Zhou and Mao on certain questions of principle. A most conspicuous example was when, at the 1959 Lushan conference, Zhou openly expressed his own view, indicating that he was to reserve his own opinions. Both he and Liu Shaoqi refrained from casting either an affirmative or a negative vote. This incident has already been discussed in detail in the chapter entitled "Pathological Sensitiveness Toward Power" and hence is not repeated here (Editor's note: published in No 72 of this journal). As for other facts concerning the struggle between Zhou and Mao, some details will follow below.

This manner of adhering to principles was also something the dictatorial, tyrannical Mao Zedong could not tolerate.

Third, on the question of an unscrupulous personal life, Mao was also often subject to criticism and resistance by a principled Zhou Enlai; this, too, constituted part of their long-standing personal "accumulated grievances." Here, it is necessary to mention "the problem of Jiang Qing."

A Long-Standing Historical Grievance During the "Mao-Jiang Marriage"

During the period of the anti-Japanese war, a second- or third-rate movie actress by the name of Lang Ping decided to try her opportunist hand at revolution when she could no longer fare well in Shanghai. She was once arrested and put in jail; then she changed her mind and told the truth, so she was released. After living together with several officials of the Guomindang, she took a zigzag route to find her way to the revolutionary sacred place of Yan'an. At this juncture, she changed her name into Jiang Qing. This witch, who was quite ambitious both in her expected lifestyle and politically, discovered that Yan'an was a place which lacked intellectuals, and especially lacked women; she decided to try her own antics by beginning to attack leaders of the CPC with her charm. On various points she looked for opportunities to flirt with Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, Xu Haidong, and others, but was sternly deterred by all of them; then, she doggedly fixed her eyes on Xu Yixin [1776 0110 2450], a fresh returned student from the Soviet Union in Yan'an (after liberation, Xu served as a bureau chief in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and began to live with him.

When Jiang Qing was just relishing her romance, a storm suddenly swooped down from heaven as a talented and charming Communist by the name of Sun Weishi [1327 4850 0013] returned to Yan'an. Jiang Qing was no match to her from any point of view. Xu Yixin immediately dropped Jiang Qing and fervently began to pursue Sun Weishi; Jiang Qing was very angry and hated Sun to the bone.

Jiang Qing came from a theatrical background; as she found nothing to do after reaching Yan'an, she chose, apart from participating in plays, to audit courses at the Lu Xun Institute of Art. Mao had been giving lectures at the Institute; seeing such an opportunity, Jiang Qing was not going to let it pass her by. She sat in the first row and put up a front of concentration while listening to his lectures; after class, she also asked Mao many questions and wanted his
answers. This left a deep impression on him. Once, when Mao and several CPC leaders finished watching a performance, they went backstage to receive the players; when he saw that Jiang Qing's costume was rather thin, he took off his quilt cloak and put it on her. A thoroughly experienced old hand in the battlefield of love, she had long before prepared her move on Mao; this was the fine chance for her to demonstrate her art. Seeing that Mao's feelings for her were urgent as fire, she went to Mao's cave and stayed there overnight, at first under the pretext of returning his cloak to him. After losing a small donkey, she now somehow had won a big elephant; who could tell that misfortune would not lead to bigger fortune!

Seeking pleasure in the flesh was, after all, not in accord with organizational discipline; thus, Mao made a formal request to the Politburo for permission to marry Jiang Qing. After carefully studying the request, senior members of the Politburo Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, Zhu De and others declined Mao's request, the reason being that: 1) Mao's wife He Zizhen is a spouse who has been living and fighting together with Mao for many years; because she got wounded during the war and is undergoing treatment, Mao has no reason to abandon her; 2) Jiang Qing's background is not very clear, and her personal story is very complicated; it is temporarily impossible to know all about her. For the sake of political security, not only may he not marry her, but he must not even get close to her.

The Politburo conveyed his conclusion to Mao; Mao could do nothing on the one hand, but he continued to seek pleasure with Jiang Qing on the other. In a situation in which the Politburo issued repeated admonitions, Jiang Qing sought to demonstrate her wherewithal as shrew by making big trouble for it; when the Politburo met, she crashed into the meeting hall to declare that she had been living with Mao and had become pregnant. Upon hearing this announce- ment, the members of the Politburo were all stunned and did not know what to do. At this moment, the old go-between, head of special services section of the bureau of political defense Kang Sheng stepped forward to say: "Congratulations!" A farce thus came to an end.

Mao forced the Politburo to give its consent to this fait accompli. But they considered the matter to be of great consequence and deemed it necessary to take disciplinary action against Mao! Members of the Politburo headed by Zhou Enlai therefore "issued three rules" as the condition for effecting a compromise with Mao concerning his mistake: 1) Jiang Qing must not become Mao's formal spouse; she could only keep him company in his house under the label of "living-in secretary"; 2) Jiang Qing must not be allowed to participate in any political activity; and 3) Jiang Qing must not appear on any public occasion. Thus Mao faced a crucial choice; he must either abandon Jiang Qing or accept the resolution. But he ultimately accepted the Politburo's resolution. However, this resolution made him very uncomfortable; it also made Jiang Qing extremely resentful, as she succeeded in grabbing Mao but only to occupy the position of a concubine. She swore to overthrow Zhou Enlai and others who despised her.

Like a curse, the resolution of the 1939 Politburo kept Jiang Qing from moving about freely; from the cave in Yan'an to the compound of Zhongnanhai, she was confined for over 20 years. Longingly she saw others showing themselves
off at diplomatic feasts while she herself had to suffer the exclusion in silence with her teeth grinding, her envy and jealousy becoming woven into anger and hatred. She wanted to break this political chain which shackled her, but Mao forbade her from making any nonsensical moves. Actually, Mao in his heart also wanted urgently to crush this chain, although that would risk breaking a party resolution and violating party discipline; thus it was better, still, to keep calm temporarily and watch forthcoming changes.

By the end of the 1950's, after Mao had carried out several triumphant struggles, he was uncontrollably inclined to test the relative weight of the political chips between the Politburo and himself; thus he issued his challenge to it by openly allowing Jiang Qing to attend the dinner reception for Indonesian President Sukarno and his wife. The Politburo members were altogether aware of this behavior in violation of its resolution: it was a serious step toward oligarchic dictatorial politics; it was a political trial balloon which Mao set off for the sake of testing environmental reaction. The upshot was that no one came forward to criticize Mao's conduct in violation of party discipline. Mao had won.

This historical injustice and grievance later led Mao to allow this witch Jiang Qing freely to spring forth and bite to death one by one all of her erstwhile enemies—but Mao remained Jiang Qing's greatest backer.

From the above three aspects alone we can already see that Mao would not have felt satisfied until and unless he succeeded in getting rid of Zhou Enlai.

The Reason the "Cultural Revolution" Was "Unprecedented"

But, it was only idle talk to speak of getting rid of Zhou Enlai in those days! Zhou Enlai was the CPC's most powerful political personality and the representative of the real power faction in the party; his actual prestige was far higher than that of Mao. Hence, before touching Zhou Enlai, Mao had to isolate him—that is, he had to overthrow the large contingent of elders united around Zhou Enlai—before it would be possible for him to do so.

This was why the "Cultural Revolution" had to thoroughly eliminate a large contingent of the elders!

This at the same time answers the question, why during the "cultural revolution" was a large contingent of so-called "rebel faction" personalities put into position. Those figures of the CPC Central Committee who later became favorites of the day, such as the "gang of four" and the Lin Biao clique, never really had any historical relationship with party elders like Zhou Enlai and others, nor did they enter the realm of the real power faction within the party headed by Zhou Enlai. Only by relying on these careerists could Mao seek to touch Zhou Enlai "with his head in his hand"! Therefore, to speak more accurately, the "cultural revolution" was really a movement by which Mao Zedong sought, as if borrowing a knife to kill a person, to liquidate Zhou Enlai. As for how Mao borrowed the knife to kill the person, mention will be specifically made below; it is skipped here.
What effectively illustrates the fact that the purpose of Mao Zedong in starting the "cultural Revolution" was to liquidate Zhou Enlai is that, after 10 years of activities, the "cultural revolution" has not yet wound up even today. When the "cultural revolution" first got started, no one in the country, Mao included, could have foreseen that it was going to continue for as long as 10 years. That during these 10 years the chaotic situation in China had developed to a point beyond redemption is something Mao himself also witnessed, yet he simply ignored it. He knew that this was the last chance in his lifetime for him to match his strength, with Zhou Enlai; he had already made up his mind to take a last stand, and even if "the state should disintegrate," it still would not do if he could not "pull him down from the house" in dealing with Zhou Enlai! But, viewed in another light, this serves effectively to indicate how difficult it was to shake up Zhou Enlai; like "an ant trying to shake a big tree," how could this be easily attempted! In tugging with Mao for 10 years, Zhou allowed Mao only one wish, and that was to topple Zhou physically and let Zhou "visit Marx" ahead of himself! But Mao eventually paid the sad price of becoming utterly discredited!

Therefore, were it not for the purpose of doing away with a Zhou Enlai whose strength was greater than that of Mao himself, there should have been no need for any "revolutionary movement" activated in a time of peace to toss back and forth for as long as 10 years.

What needs to be pointed out there is that the "cultural revolution" was but the ultimate battle of decision; but before that, Mao had already tested the liquidation of Zhou Enlai, and that was none other than the "four clean-ups campaign" prior to the "cultural revolution."

"Four Clean-up"—An Experiment in Liquidating Zhou Enlai Prior to the "Cultural Revolution"

The "great leap forward" initiated by Mao Zedong led China toward the abyss of disaster; in addition, he put down Peng Dehuai inside the party by autocratic means. Thereafter, Mao's prestige inside the CPC plummeted precipitously.

The situation in which Mao found himself was rather awkward, indeed. The situation of defeat surrounding the "great leap forward" was something he had no way of salvaging; that remnant situation could only be cleared up by Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and others of the real power faction while Mao could only retreat temporarily behind the scene.

Zhou Enlai was the head family manager of the 600 million people; he was very distressed in the face of the great calamities resulting from the great leap forward. He worked tirelessly to save the people from these calamities. On the one hand, for the sake of protecting Mao's face, he had to patch up things everywhere. For example, he sought to explain to the whole party: "Although the big steel refining campaign resulted in some waste, it also turned people's hearts red and heightened the political consciousness of the masses; the wasted part may perhaps be regarded as tuition for our study of construction. We must not just keep economic accounting, but also a political accounting." The people did not really agree with such a way of putting things, but they understood Zhou Enlai's difficulties and expressed themselves
further. On the other hand, Zhou Enlai faced the formidable task of returning the ruined national economy speedily to the road to recovery. As early as the winter of 1960, he had already put forward the principles of "readjustment, consolidation, strengthening and improvement"; after passage by the Politburo these later became a resolution of the CPC Central Committee which was issued to the whole party for implementation. But because the "three-year period of difficulties" had just begun and the national economy was still following a downward trend, the tasks of readjustment and salvaging the situation of decline were not yet effective. Not until 1962 did this policy orientation become earnestly implemented, and its results proved to be very conspicuous indeed. After 3 years of readjustment, the national economy had by 1965 returned to a course of normal development. The Chinese have often recalled with unlimited admiration and gratitude the situation in which Zhou Enlai worked day in and day out in those years at the risk of his own health.

But "good times" seldom last; precisely at a time when the national economy was showing promise, i.e., in 1963, Mao suddenly started in the countryside a so-called "socialist education movement". In 1964, he launched a political campaign in the cities under a similar name but with different content, which later was generally referred to as "the four clean-ups" campaign.

Several Incidents Targeting Zhou Enlai in the "Four Clean-ups Campaign"

The so-called "four clean-ups" denoted the cleaning-up of accounts, of work points, of warehouses, and of properties. How could these have anything to do with an attack on Zhou Enlai? A review of the following will clarify matters.

1. The "four clean-ups" campaign in the cities was really never fully deployed; it merely laid stress on carrying out a serious rectification operation against the cultural and educational departments. Little did people know, however, that these departments have most of the country's intellectuals and also not a few of the objects of the party's united front work—and these happened to be subject to management by Zhou Enlai, and they were also among the most influential departments. Among those departments which Mao made a point to tackle, a most persuasive struggle took place at Beijing University.

At the time, Mao dispatched a contingent of imperial commissions to Beida [Beijing University] to launch the socialist education movement and designated Beida a rotten unit, meaning that capitalism had achieved an overall restoration there. But after a few rounds of struggle, the step was taken, with Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and others supporting from behind the scene, to remove that fearsome label from Beida and to declare it a socialist university; its party committee secretary Lu Ping [7120 1627] was a good comrade. This naturally did not suit with Mao's original plan; he originally wanted to pull down Beida so as to pick on the behind-the-scene supporter of the school's mistaken line—Zhou Enlai. This behind-the-scene supporter had quite some strength, and Mao temporarily still had no power to bring down this fortress. The result of the fight between the two factions within the CPC this time was that each held its own ground, allowing no decision to be the decision, temporarily postponing their conflict.
2. In 1963, with Jiang Qing stepping forward in his behalf, Mao instigated Qi Benyu to write an article to criticize the well-known general Li Xiucheng in the later period of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, blaming him for lacking resolve before the enemy just before his death and for suspected revolt, even though he had repeatedly established merits in the interest of the revolutionary regime and was well-known for his achievements. After the article was published, Jiang Qing turned it over to Mao for his review. Mao penned the following: "As black characters are written on white paper, the proofs are iron-clad: the general was disloyal in his late years and hence could not serve as an example for others." We all know that, when Mao studied history or appraised the ancients, he meant never just to study knowledge, but as he had acknowledged himself, to have history serve current political struggles. Criticizing the historical figure Li Xiucheng was intended precisely to reflect on current figures; thus the expression "disloyal in his late years" was a stealthy arrow he was shooting at revolutionary idlers Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and others. During the "cultural revolution" period, Zhou Enlai repeatedly indicated that he would strive to "retain his integrity in his late years"; this was the very answer to Mao's insinuation.

3. As early as 1962, i.e., after the national economy had survived the setbacks of "the three-year period of difficulties" and was beginning to show promise for a turn for the better, Mao suddenly issued his call "Never forget class struggle" in order to imply that the stuff trotted out by Liu and Zhou was nothing but a capitalist line. By 1963, Mao coined the expression "putting emphasis on rectifying the power-holders inside the party who were taking the capitalist road." This "capitalist roader" designation was originally intended especially for those spokesmen of the rich peasants within the party. Later, Mao expanded this concept to include their behind-the-scene supporters found in leading organs at all levels; still later, he again expanded it to include their behind-the-scene supporters also found in the party Central Committee. Mao was now saying that the "socialist education movement" was meant not only to weed out capitalist roaders below but also to grab their behind-the-scene supporters at the party center. Mao's thinking appeared in the internal party document, the 17 articles governing work in the countryside issued by Mao in the name of the CPC Central Committee. This document was orally presented by Mao and recorded by Chen Boda. After reviewing this document, Zhou Enlai felt that it had already turned its spearhead at the party Central Committee without having been discussed by the Politburo and that it really showed too much of a murderous attitude. He therefore suggested that the term "Central Committee" be replaced with "various central departments" which all had guilty representatives. This revision contravened Mao's intention; but, for the sake of avoiding an immediate showdown, he reluctantly agreed to it.

The eventual course of events has fully illustrated that Mao's political stick was at first wielded against those below. However, a drunkard aiming at something other than wine in this instance, his ultimate goal was to strike down a batch of central leaders represented by Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai. Between 1964 and 1965, the CPC Central Committee appeared calm on the surface but internally swords were drawn and bows were pulled full under a very tense atmosphere. At the same time, this superficial calm accurately foreshadowed Mao Zedong's preparations for an even bigger struggle to liquidate Zhou Enlai.
Why the "Cultural Revolution" Selected "Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office" as Its Initial Point of Attack

Expectedly, a "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" aiming ultimately at liquidating Zhou Enlai got started in a hurry even without the "four clean-ups" campaign being wound up (Mao knew that this "four clean-ups" campaign did not suffice to shake up Zhou Enlai).

Today, the unfolding of history has supplied numerous facts to enable posterity to expose this campaign as one with the liquidation of Zhou Enlai as its point of departure as well as destination.

How did Mao Zedong seek to overthrow Zhou through the "cultural revolution"?

Below, we can only cast a historical retrospective summarizing the major aspects.

The "cultural revolution" launched its initial attack by way of Yao Wenyuan's article "A Critique of the Newly-Compiled Historical Play "Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office." At the time, no one suspected that this had anything to do with Zhou Enlai. But this could not be clearer now.

Jiang Qing has professed without being subject to torture that she went to Shanghai to cook up this article "secretly" at the suggestion of Mao. That is to say, Mao went ahead to do something not presentable behind the backs of the majority of the Central Committee Politburo. For a person who had bragged about his being "above-board and forthright" to engage in a secret activity behind the back of the party Central Committee indicated that he had some scheme in mind. If he did not intend to do something antagonistic to Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and others in the Politburo, there would have been no need for him to send his wife to engage in the secret extra-organizational activity!

Jiang Qing also self-assuredly stated that in Beijing where the party Central Committee was located she naturally could not carry out the task suggested by Mao, so she had to go to Shanghai. Why should this have been the case? To carry out the task in Beijing would have been tantamount to doing it right under the noses of Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi; that naturally would not do. But Shanghai at that time happened to be the realm of Ko Qingshi, who was aggressively banking on replacing Zhou Enlai; the place was of course the safest possible.

The target of the article which Jiang Qing cooked up with Yao Wenyuan and others was really beyond people's guess—they were using the pretext of criticizing historian Wu Han's historical play and, at a first glance, it had nothing to do with current reality whatsoever.

Indeed, Mao Zedong knew very well that it was not so easy for people to understand his intention; thus, after Yao Wenyuan's article aroused great waves, Mao came forward to "spotlight the theme." He said:
"The crux of 'Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office' is dismissal from office. Emperor Jiaqing dismissed Hai Rui from his office, we dismissed Peng Dehuai from his office; Peng Dehuai is no other than Hai Rui" (Mao's words to Yao Wenyuan in 1965).

But that is not necessarily the case in terms of historical and present truth. Peng Dehuai was dismissed from his office at the Lushan meeting in 1959, whereas Wu Han finished writing his new historical play "Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office" before 1959—how could Wu Han have foreseen that, after some years, Mao would dismiss Peng Dehuai from his office, and thereby have written in advance this historical play in order later to "call for justice" on behalf of Peng Dehuai? It was impossible for Mao not to know such a simple mistake; but, "When Xiang Zhuang performed his sword dance, he really aimed at Duke Pei"—what did it matter if he turned facts upside down a little!

It turned out that, in Mao's mind, the real honest official Hai Rui then was not Peng Dehuai but Zhou Enlai! And the one really "calling for justice" for "Hai Rui" was also not Wu Han but Zhou Enlai! We have already pointed out that at Lushan Zhou Enlai by no means agreed with Mao's disposal of Peng Dehuai and when the Peng Dehuai incident was voted on, he abstained—in reality in support of Peng Dehuai. Facts are thus telling us: among those many "poisonous weeds," "Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office" was somehow selected for the initial attack; what it aimed at was precisely Zhou Enlai!

Mao Zedong already knew that, in seeking a showdown with Zhou Enlai within the party his plot would simply not have its way; hence he had to adopt a "secret", devious approach to gradually get rid of Zhou Enlai. Thus, at that time Mao's inner world was very complicated and contradictory—fearing both that people would fail to discern his intent to overthrow Zhou and that his plot to defeat Zhou would become prematurely exposed; and still less would Mao wish to see that he would be discovered before "the water arrived just in time to fill up the channel" and "the opportunity was just ripe." Therefore, at the very beginning of the "cultural revolution" there already occurred incidents whereby keenly observant intellectuals were first subjected to prosecution. Once the intellectuals were given a head-on blow upon the first encounter, even if there were people as observant as can be, they would naturally become silenced.

The large batch of "instructions" trotted out by Mao at the time were also aimed at Zhou Enlai. For instance, he scolded the Ministry of Public Health as "the ministry of public health of the urban overlords," he scolded the Ministry of Culture as "the ministry of talented writers and beauties," the "Beethoven club," as "being ruled by dead persons"—all of these were departments directly under the jurisdiction of the State Council led by Zhou Enlai. By scolding them in this way, Mao in effect was scolding Zhou by pointing at his nose!

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Why Did Mao Zedong Irrationally Discredit Himself

At the beginning of the "cultural revolution", almost everyone became puzzled by the following strange happening:
Mao Zedong had always permitted people only praise the CPC under his control and the PRC founded by the CPC but never to smear them. The 1957 "anti-rightist campaign" ended ultimately in cruel suppression precisely because the "rightists" failed to sing their praise of the CPC and socialism but instead uttered a bunch of unappealing, disturbing words. The "Anti-Rightist Battle Song" of those days was called "Socialism Is Fine," and the whole country was expected to sing it out loud every day. In 1959, Peng Dehuai painfully denounced with a solicitous attitude toward the country and the people the mischief of the "great leap forward" instigated by Mao for placing the nation in the midst of disaster. It was because he was thus "smearing" it that Peng was ultimately ruthlessly designated as an "anti-party element." Even during the "cultural revolution", when things could not have been worse, Mao Zedong still did not forget to shout "our situation is exceedingly fine, not just slightly fine." All the above serves to demonstrate that Mao Zedong could only permit the people to sing their praise of him, his party, and the state under his thumb; listening to genuine but disturbing words (though they might be "loyal admonitions"), smearing words, and even criticism was definitely not in keeping with Mao's character.

Yet, something totally against the regular rule somehow happened: At the beginning of the "cultural revolution" Mao had trotted out one batch after another of "instructions" by which he personally painted his party and the state led by his party pitch black. Now there was the "ministry of public health of the Overlords," now the "ministry of talented writers and beauties," and now some place was "ruled by dead persons"—in a word, all from the center to the local level had "turned revisionist"! Please note that this was painted by Mao Zedong himself. If his "anti-rightist" criteria were followed, then these utterances at the beginning of the "cultural revolution" period could really be rated as pertaining to the biggest rightist in the CPC! But he somehow plausibly stated: This is "anti-revisionism," suggesting that only an expose of the dark side within the party from below would be regarded as genuinely "revolutionary."

This was not a case, of course, of "only the prefectural magistrate is allowed to set a fire, but the common people cannot even light a lamp"; nor was it a case of "all in the world are contaminated but I alone am clean; all in the world are drunk but I alone am wide awake." The only purpose of this aberrant approach that puzzled everyone was to deliberately smear the pragmatists represented by Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi in order to fabricate the "factual basis" for liquidating Zhou Enlai. Everyone knew that Zhou Enlai actually held great party, government and military power and also was the general family manager of the 600 million Chinese people; if the party, government and the military had really "turned revisionist," then, as one groped for the melon along its vine, its root must lie in Zhou Enlai.

The "cultural revolution" took as its principal pretext to "oppose revisionism and guard against revisionism." At the beginning of the 1960's, the CPC became quite reputable for awhile as it sought to pride itself on being "the fortress of anti-revisionism"; yet, overnight, "revisionism had emerged." This was of course a myth intentionally fabricated by Mao Zedong. Its goal was to trump up the criminal label of "revisionism" in order to attack it to a Zhou Enlai who was in direct charge of the concrete affairs of the party, government and the military, and thereby attack him accordingly.
In a word, things were very clear: At the beginning when Mao Zedong launched the "cultural revolution," he first used the "Shanghai clique" to make a big issue of the historical play "Hai Rui’s Dismissal from Office." He then proceeded to smear the party, government and the military to some extent by trotting out a big batch of his "anti-revisionist instructions"; all this was paving the way in public opinion for liquidating Zhou Enlai.

Forging a Military and Political Alliance with Lin Biao, Who Had No Deep Relationship with Zhou Enlai

This was the "civilian" side. The function of the "civilian" approach was to "aggravate the wind and aggravate the rain" by disturbing the mind of the party and the hearts of the people. But there was still another crucial side which was the "martial" approach. The political status of practical power depends on the degree of military control. For this reason Mao Zedong had to strike up a new "military and political alliance" with the big careerist Lin Biao.

As for how Mao borrowed the knife of Lin Biao to kill others, there will be a special discussion below. Here let us still analyze the matter of liquidating Zhou Enlai from the "martial" aspect.

The simplest issue was that, if the "cultural revolution" started by Mao Zedong was limited only to liquidating Liu Shaoqi and not aimed at the Zhou Enlai, it would not have been necessary for him to strike up a military and political alliance with Lin Biao.

Liu Shaoqi had never really led the CPC's troops in armed struggle; for long periods of time he was engaged in leading the CPC's struggle in the "white areas." He could only be the representative of the faction of the "Kuomintang-ruled area" inside the CPC, and his relationship with the faction of military strength was rather thin. After liberation, while Lin succeeded in serving as Chairman of the Republic, his position in the CPC system was still more symbolic than real. State power was still located inside the CPC and in the State Council under Zhou Enlai's jurisdiction.

Mao Zedong had resorted to many clean-up campaigns within the CPC and each time it was enough to have effected a little "coup" within the circle behind the doors of the CPC Politburo. There had definitely been no need to mobilize the country's party, government and military ranks and people as a whole to help them carry out the clean-up. Even in 1971 in the middle period of the "cultural revolution," because of Mao's laxity in "raising a tiger to make trouble," Lin Biao staged a revolt and it became imperative to liquidate him. But even in the case of such a serious state of affairs, the problem was solved in the plenary session of the party Central Committee and no appeal was issued for assistance by the whole party and the whole nation. And before the "cultural revolution" Liu Shaoqi's power was not yet so inflated as that of Lin Biao, as he showed no intention and took no action to seize power from Mao. Therefore, if Liu Shaoqi was in any way intolerable to Mao and must be liquidated, that would actually have been an intra-party struggle which could be solved behind doors.
But, if this approach was adopted to deal with Zhou Enlai, it simply would not do. This was because not only did Zhou Enlai enjoy great prestige among the ranks of the party, government, the military and the people, but he also had many more supporters than Mao did in the party Central Committee and Politburo. If Mao had chosen to publicly speak of liquidating him even just once, he would have been picking up a rock only to drop it on his own feet.

It was only thus that Mao Zedong was forced to abandon his traditional last-resort method of liquidating "opponents" and to adopt a historically unprecedented approach "from above." That is to say, he was forced to bypass the party Central Committee and Politburo, willingly risk violating party discipline and laws of the state, and get rid of Zhou Enlai by means of plots and tricks.

At the same time, Mao knew very well the logic of "once Zhou is criticized the people are bound to rebel." Since he had made up his iron-clad mind to liquidate Zhou Enlai and yet had to guard against the situation of "the people are bound to rebel," he therefore had to seek to control the overall situation by relying on military strength.

But the trouble was that no one could underestimate Zhou Enlai's strength in the military. From the historical perspective, Zhou Enlai's relationship with the military was even deeper than that of Mao Zedong; viewed from the realistic angle, Zhou Enlai's relationship with the generals was very close and influential. Zhou Enlai enjoyed authority of control among all military factions of the CPC.

Precisely because of this, Mao Zedong was forced to strike up a military and political alliance with Lin Biao. But why did he rely on Lin Biao?

First of all, Lin Biao had political ambitions; on this Mao Zedong should be clearer than anyone else.

Second, since Lin Biao succeeded Peng Dehuai as defense minister in 1959, his authority expanded from control over the "4th Field Army" to control of the entire army.

Third, most important was the fact that among the CPC's large contingent of high-rank generals, Lin Biao had sprung forth the latest. When Zhou Enlai and a batch of old generals started their uprising together, Lin Biao was still an unknown soldier; during the Jinggangshan period, he was but a platoon leader. That is to say, among all the high-ranking generals, Lin Biao was the only one who had no profound relationship with Zhou Enlai; only he could be the one in whom Mao could place his trust and with whom he could feel at ease.

Only by Overthrowing a Large Group Could "Zhou Be Overthrown"

After the outbreak of the "cultural revolution", the changes in the situation wholly proved that Mao's intention was entirely to get rid of Zhou Enlai--the subordinates in Lin Biao's "4th Field Army" each enjoyed straight-up
promotions and occupation of strategic posts, yet his teachers and other ranking generals became impacted or overthrown one after another. At the time, there occurred the incident in which the teachers all descended on Huairen Hall to make a fuss while in the end they were designated by Mao Zedong as the "adverse current of February"; that was a struggle the teachers and the generals put up in the interest of self-salvation and protection of Zhou Enlai. On the other hand, when the situation became extremely chaotic, Zhou Enlai also proceeded under highly difficult circumstances to make full use of his prestige and advantageous conditions to protect as far as possible a large contingent of ranking cadres and generals—this was really a sensational duel between Mao and Zhou!

As for Liu Shaoqi, who bore the brunt of the "cultural revolution" and was thoroughly overthrown under the criminal label of "China's Khrushchev," he was but a breach Mao Zedong had to open up in the overall strategy to overthrow Zhou Enlai. Just think, if he wished merely to get rid of Liu Shaoqi, why did he have to overthrow a big batch of ranking generals and cadres who had hardly any profound relationship with Liu? The fact that Liu Shaoqi bore the brunt of the attack was a direct result of his failure to perceive that the calculating Mao Zedong's criticism of "Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office" was but to fan the fire so as to get at Zhou Enlai. Thus he even instigated Peng Zhen and others to trot out a "February Outline" in order to guide "Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office" onto academic discussion. At the same time, when Mao was absent from Beijing, he also took upon himself to dispatch some work teams to the institutions of higher learning to exercise control over the situation—all this could not but provoke and anger Mao Zedong! From Mao's point of view, before he was to really touch Zhou Enlai he must start with Liu Shaoqi so as to thoroughly shake Zhou's foundation, thoroughly isolate him, and thereby get rid of him in one stroke.

Before Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai headed toward a direct showdown, Mao did some exploratory work and began dropping hints. For instance, at the very beginning of the "cultural revolution," some ignorant Red Guards were utilized to post some big-character posters concerning Zhou Enlai's overthrow, as a means of testing the waters. And when Mao purposely elevated Lin Biao but cold-shouldered and put down Zhou Enlai on various public forums and conferred upon Lin Biao the label of "closet comrade-in-arms," this was dropping a hint.

In the beginning of the "cultural revolution," Zhou Enlai's position was really very difficult; after all the vice premiers and ministers in the cabinet were overthrown and pushed aside, he actually shouldered the heavy burden of government for a country of 900 million people. From internal affairs to diplomacy, not a single matter failed to require his personal attention. He often had no time to eat or to sleep while working several days in a row. He wanted to step forward to protect those revolutionary elders being subjected to persecution. He wanted to continue to prevent Jiang Qing and her ilk from interfering with and sabotaging government work. The matter of Jiang Qing dispatching Wang Li to instigate workers to burn down the British embassy incensed Zhou, who was forced to apologize to the British government. Zhou also had to guard against Mao's sniper-shooting at him from all corners. Just as Lu Xun had said, when he fought the enemy, he had to stand horizontally in order to guard against daggers thrust at him from within his own camp.
But Mao Zedong underestimated Zhou Enlai's strength. Before Lin Biao bolted him, Mao did not even get as far as to touch Zhou Enlai, but he had already messed up his own affairs. The aftermath as Lin Biao's failed coup ultimately had to be cleaned up by Zhou Enlai. At this time, there was a brief detente in the struggle between Mao and Zhou. But Mao's intention to overthrow Zhou did not necessarily relent, as soon as his camp became slightly stabilized he immediately and impatiently resumed his anti-Zhou activities. We might even say that the more unabashed anti-Zhou work was undertaken only after the Lin Biao incident.

Mao Zedong Glaring "Overthrow Zhou" Activities During the Campaign to "Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius"

Below are some facts about Mao Zedong's more blatant attempts to overthrow Zhou after the Lin Biao incident.

Beginning in 1973, Mao plotted a nationwide "Criticize Lin Biao and Criticize Confucius" campaign. On the surface this campaign aimed at criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius; but in reality it aimed it fire at Zhou Enlai. In early 1973, Mao issued the documents of the CPC Central Committee on Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius, which was equivalent to issuing a declaration of war on Zhou Enlai. Zhou was forced to meet the challenge and at once convened a "mobilization conference of the State Council for Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius."

At the conference, Zhou issued a very tactful statement. He said: Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius is a very important political campaign, because it was personally initiated by Chairman Mao himself. Compared to other units, the State Council has fallen far behind, because I did not know about starting this campaign. Zhou also said that this conference invited all members of the Politburo and the Central Committee who were in Beijing to let them know the significance of this campaign. Then, he read aloud seven letters written by Jiang Qing and conveyed them to the lower levels to fan the wind and light up the fire—these letters glaringly encouraged people to rebel, to overthrow Confucius; but they actually encouraged them to overthrow Zhou.

Zhou's talk undoubtedly was meant as a direct response to expose how Mao once again violated party discipline by taking upon himself to start a political campaign without going through discussion by the Politburo. In saying that he invited all members of the Politburo and Central Committee to attend the conference so as to let them know that such a movement was to get started, he meant to reveal how Mao strangled intra-party democracy. In reading Jiang Qing's letters out loud, he intended to show how she was sabotaging state laws and the order of society and creating confusion.

Then, Jiang Qing instigated two confidants, Xie Jingyi [6200 7234 1355] and Chi Qun [6688 5028], to mount the platform to unscrupulously attack Zhou and other revolutionary elders. After the conference, Zhang Chunqiao stepped in front of Zhou to reproach him for having not adopted a serious attitude in criticizing Confucius and thereby heaped abuse upon Zhou right there.
Since he suffered cancer of the bladder in 1972, Zhou Enlai's physique had become very weak; in addition, having been overworked over the decades in handling the country's internal and foreign affairs and now encountering the relentless attacks of this bunch of political scoundrels, he immediately experienced a recurrence of his heart disease that night and lost consciousness; only after emergency treatment did he recover. The physician concluded that in view of Zhou Enlai's weakened condition, he should no longer be working and must rest. But Zhou insisted on working and insisted on struggling even more stubbornly.

In the past, when Zhou went to Mao's house he merely talked about his work and never touched on other matters, including how Mao instigated one political struggle after another, which he refrained from mentioning because to Zhou, Mao's conduct was as clear as the palm of his hand; he knew it all and did not need to ask many questions. Now Zhou felt that there was no more need to play hide-and-seek. He therefore went straight to Mao's house and asked him: Who is the great scholar in the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius and criticize the great scholar? Mao replied: "I am the scholar No 1, you are the scholar No 2." This was equivalent to saying: I mean to overthrow you now! Zhou indicated that he knew what he meant and then took his leave. That was a showdown. Expectedly, the gang of four later began publicly to replace "Confucius" with "Kong the Second--"Kong the Second" means "scholar No 2", Zhou Enlai!

When the CPC criticized "Kong the Second," it aroused serious concern on the part of certain communists in the international arena. Chairman Hill of the Australian Communist Party asked Zhang Chunqiao: Who was the "great scholar" the CPC was criticizing? Zhang replied: "The great scholar is Zhou Enlai." Upon hearing this, Hill became very concerned; he therefore went to see Mao and to seek proof from Mao about what Zhang Chunqiao said. Mao told him he did not know who the great scholar was. This fully exposed Mao's double-dealing and pretentious behavior.

The "Cabinet-Organizing" Struggle Was a Big Showdown

Another showdown during Mao's attempt to overthrow Zhou had to do with the organization of the cabinet.

According to CPC tradition, after a Party Congress is convened the People's Congress should be convened closely thereafter in order to hear and approve the government work report, to approve the national economic plan, and appoint the government. After the convening of the CPC's 9th National Congress in April 1969, the People's Congress was repeatedly delayed and could not be convened. Even as it dragged on till the convening of the CPC's 10th National Congress in August 1973, the People's Congress still could not be convened. The only reason was that the new administration could not be organized. Mao wanted to remove Zhou and not allow him to organize a cabinet again; but no one else was qualified to do so. Mao tried to let Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao organize the cabinet several times, but neither succeeded. In the first place, elders within the party were all opposed; in the second place heads of local regimes also mostly refused to agree. These two persons'
reputations stank too much and their prestige was too low; if the cabinet list they organized had been forcibly presented to the People's Congress for rubber stamping, it would incur boisterous public opinion and become a laughingstock and leave something to be reproached forever. Mao sensed this and ultimately was forced to abandon this extremely unpopular horse-trading plan and to invite Zhou Enlai to organize the cabinet. Several times Zhou declined to do so, alleging that he was old and gravely ill and could no longer do things as he would like; furthermore, he should also give the able-bodied a chance to serve a premier in the interest of the country and the people. His sentiments and words were both earnest.

That in a period of 4 years between two Party Congresses the People's Congress still could not be convened was because Mao had many worries and dared not publicly allow his wife and a crony to come forward to organize the cabinet. By the time the 10th Party Congress was convened in 1973, if the People's Congress could still not be convened there would be no more excuse to cope with domestic and international public opinion. The situation forced Mao to make that attempt by allowing Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao to try. But the activities of Jiang and Zhang incurred the wrath of the masses, who profusely questioned: Why was Zhou Enlai unable to continue to serve as premier? Thus compelled by an unpromising situation, Mao quickly withdrew his existing order to let Jiang and Zhang organize the cabinet and again invited Zhou to step forward to do it; he also made a great show of being in earnest about how the party's resolution and discipline required compliance; Zhou was forced to fall in line.

In asking Zhou to organize the cabinet, Mao was by no means showing him his affection; he did so because he was forced to and because he wanted to protect himself. Letting Zhou continue to serve as premier was a political necessity on Mao's part; to maintain rivalry with him in the ideological realm and make further efforts to overthrow him was another of his political necessities. These two were by no means contradictory, for Mao had to use Zhou in the short run and attack him in the long run, until he collapsed.

Zhou Enlai Refused To Serve as Puppet Premier

On this profit, Zhou Enlai was very clear in his own mind. With the broad-mindedness of a "prime minister whose stomach is fit for navigation," he despised all plots and tricks and proceeded to make even more contributions to the motherland and the people with his limited remaining time to live. At the same time, his acceptance of the order to organize the cabinet also was predicated on the general situation without calculating personal favors or grievances. He knew that his continued service as premier was indispensable to the maintenance of the CPC's internal stability and unity. Such a lofty spiritual plane on Zhou Enlai's part earned him the people's highest appraisal and acclaim.

Of course, Zhou's acceptance was by no means unconditional. He insisted that he have the actual power to organize the cabinet; the cabinet must not become stuffed with a bunch of Jiang Qing's cronies, lest he became a puppet premier. After repeated discussion and bargaining, an agreement was ultimately reached whereby the ministries of public security, culture,
public health and sports might be allocated to Mrs Mao, while the rest, such as the ministries of national defense, finance and economic affairs, should be appointed by Zhou himself.

In January 1975, the 4th National People's Congress was held in utter secrecy; in front of the conference mansion, apart from the reinforcing guards, no vehicle traffic was evident. According to all kinds of indications, people guessed that a conference was taking place. But reporters, Chinese or foreign, could gather no news. The delegates failed to ask the voters for any opinion. Hence, it was a 100 percent rubber-stamp conference affirming Mao's cabinet list. Afterwards, the newspapers published the news about Zhou Enlai's remaining premier and the cabinet list; the Chinese felt satisfied and comforted because this was an important victory for the force representing the people's interests over the clique of power and dominance of Mao and his wife!

Zhou Enlai appointed more than two-thirds of the cabinet ministers; among them the most contested was the Ministry of Education. The "cultural revolution" first instigated struggles in the universities; how to run the schools was always one of the major areas of disagreement between Mao and Zhou. Zhou was of the opinion that, in order to enable China's industry and agriculture to develop rapidly, it is necessary to do a good job in managing the country's education. He took the school as an important battleground for cultivating personnel for construction and advocated putting emphasis and reinforcement on basic theoretical research, whereas Mao took government power as his private property and wanted to keep it in the hands of the Mao family and its cronies. This required keeping the people stupid and ignorant; the raising of the country's educational and scientific and technological level would destroy this necessary social condition. Therefore, Mao substituted class education for, and cancelled, scientific and cultural education. It became a matter of course that these two different educational lines representing two different political lines should struggle for control over education.

Zhou Enlai Deleted Chi Qun's Name From the Cabinet List Three Times

On the cabinet list Zhou Enlai put down the appointment of Zhou Rongxin [0719 3827 9515] as the Minister of Education. When it was turned over to Mao for examination, he changed the appointment to Chi Qun [6688 5028] as Minister of Education. Chi Qun was originally a deputy chief of the propaganda section of the corps of guards at Zhongnanhai; his rise and success in becoming Mao's confidant was due to his endeavor to propagate Mao's inclination to take class struggle as a school's main course and to substitute it for teaching science and culture. From his second draft of the cabinet list, Zhou eliminated Chi Qun's name as a matter of course and again put down Zhou Rongxin; when it was again sent to Mao for examination, Mao once more changed it. In this manner the struggle over the cabinet list went on three times. This was the first time in the half-century that Mao had worked together with Zhou that Mao encountered Zhou insisting on his own view without retreat! Mao was forced to compromise with Zhou; otherwise, he would risk Zhou's refusal to organize the cabinet. Mao finally realized this fact--Zhou was a choice for the premiership which all factions of political forces could accept, whereas anyone else coming forward to organize the cabinet would have faced resolute opposition by other groups of forces. Therefore, at the meeting where the
Politburo decided on the cabbient choices, Mao was forced to say: "No one else wants to organize the cabinet; the State Council premiership still awaits Zhou Enlai, and the cabinet list must be supplied by Zhou Enlai."

But, Mao was very disappointed by Zhou's firm refusal to allow Chi Qun to serve as the Minister of Education. On the final list, Mao penned these words: "Chi Qun is a hegemon in Beijing, a hegemon in education; he is not qualified to serve as a minister, a bureau chief, a division chief, or a section chief!" After Jiang Qing's downfall, the CPC propagated the idea that Mao did not give his consent to Chi Qun serving as the Minister of Education and gave the above words as proof. This does not tally with the facts at all. Mao's notations in this regard were words of anger, a venting of his resentment against Zhou. While this incident was merely a minor episode, the true historical interpretation must still be restored.

Because Zhou Enlai's illness was becoming increasingly grave, after the new government was organized Deng Xiaoping began to act in his behalf on daily routines of considerable proportions. Zhou established an office in his room at the Beijing Hospital in order to handle major domestic and foreign affairs.

Although Mao's attempt to let Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao organize the cabinet fell through, they were unreconciled to this failure and unwilling to take it lying down. They maintained that while for the time being their prestige could not be compared to that of the revolutionary elders, they had the advantage of age. The elders were all 70 to 80 years old, but they were only 50 or 60. Said Chi Qun: I am only 40 years old; even just competing or wasting time would get me eventually ahead of them!" They placed their hopes on the passing away of the elders one by one, and they also began to make preparations in public opinion for their own ambitions. Hence they still exhibited a great deal of zeal.

After the failure he sustained on the matter of organizing the cabinet, Mao Zedong began to realize that if he came forward to have an open showdown with Zhou, his plot would not get anywhere. Thus, after Zhou succeeded in initializing the cabinet, Mao turned around to retreat behind the scene and become the backstage proprietor, letting Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and others to deal with Zhou. Naturally, Mao continued to take advantage of his special conditions to carry out anti-Zhou public opinion work by way of insinuation from time to time.

Here, it is necessary to relate the injury secretly done to Zhou during the period of his illness, which led to his early death.

After the physicians discovered Zhou's bladder cancer, they reported it to Mao. After Mrs Mao and Zhang Chunqiao learned about this they immediately went to the hospital and warned the physicians that Zhou's illness is the greatest state secret, so they were not allowed to divulge it to anyone. Hearing such a warning, the physicians all kept silent thereafter. They were also told not to reveal this condition to Zhou himself, for his own good in taking care of his emotions and keeping him from suffering any blow spiritually. But Zhou ultimately learned of his condition and asked for the best treatment. But the physicians were warned that any treatment must be approved by the Party Central Committee; they themselves could only provide a program for
treatment but would have no right to make a decision. Thus, Zhou's illness was allowed to drag on and on until it was beyond the period fit for operation. By the time the cancer began to dissipate, Jiang Qing somehow urged the physicians to operate on Zhou. Experts earnestly advised against this, saying that to operate now was already too late; without surgery, his life might on the other hand be prolonged somewhat. And Zhou himself also declined the operation. Then, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao said to Zhou: The CPC Central Committee is responsible for your health and has decided to carry out surgery; this is an organization resolution. Zhou had to say: "I am a Communist; I shall obey the organization's resolution." He ascended the operation table with tears in his eyes. The result of the operation was of course not very good. After foreign governements and friends learned about Zhou's illness, they all sent fine medicines, which were intercepted by Jiang Qing. Please see, when there should have been surgery in the earlier stage, it was not permitted, whereas when it became no longer advisable, it was somehow forced upon him. Such a vicious approach caused Zhou Enlai to depart several years too early!

Likening Zhou Enlai to Song Jiang with Convoluted Language

During the very period of Zhou Enlai's grave illness, Mao Zedong's health also deteriorated; he contracted "Parkinson's disease" with a loss of control over his nervous system; he knew that he, too, no longer had much more time to live. But he never wanted to abandon the matter of overthrowing Zhou. In the fall of 1975, he once again resorted to a campaign to criticize the classic novel "All Men Are Brothers" by attacking Zhou through the device of allegory based on stories of the past. Said he: "What is good about this book 'All Men Are Brothers' is that it brings out surrender. It may be used as negative teaching material to enable the people to recognize those who surrender." Again, "'All Men Are Brothers' allows dissension to corrupt only officials but not the Emperor; this leaves Yao Gai out of the 108 heroes of the book. Song Jiang surrendered and resorted to revisionism, thus changing Yao's Righteousness Hall into Loyalty Hall and allowing himself to be pacified with amnesty." These convoluted, incoherent, and logically confused words were hard to decipher. But, when poked through, they bare themselves as an insinuation intended to equate Zhou Enlai with the capitulationist Song Jiang: Zhou has capitulated to capitalism and resorted to revisionism; as a suggestion that Zhou failed to oppose Liu Shaoqi and excluded Mao from the ranks of revolutionary elders under the pretext of paying him respect but actually upstaging him; and also as a hint that Zhou had changed Mao's revolutionary line into a capitalist line and became bought by others.

These criminal labels were heavy but their impact was minimal; because Mao dared not to reproach Zhou openly, they aroused no attention in society. On the matter of "All Men Are Brothers" at that time the gang of four controlled all mass media from above and therefore chose to trumpet it with some fanfare. But it could hardly penetrate the basic-level ranks below, for the people really felt that they could make head nor tail of it and thus could only respond in a perfunctory way by resorting to "copying the newspaper when asked to speak, small newspapers copying big ones and big ones copying Liang Xiao [2733 2400] ("Liang Xiao" is the penname of Jiang Qing's privy theoretical group)". In loading scholarship onto his anti-Zhou chariot, Mao ended up suffering his defeat.
Zhou Enlai Laughing at Mao's Two Devious Poems at the Last Hour

In the winter of 1975, Zhou's illness became grave. Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao and their ilk let it be known that on New Year's Day 1976 heavy anti-Zhou Enlai cannon shots were to be fired. They did not intend to relent when Zhou Enlai was in his last hour but continued instead to apply their psychological pressure on him to accelerate his death.

Zhou Enlai had already experienced many shocks; he asked the physicians to do their best to help him live beyond New Year's Day 1976 because he anticipated that Jiang Qing and others would take some action on that day. He had the nurse turn on the radio that day and listened attentively to new broadcasts. The station broadcast the two poems Mao had written in 1965 and an editorial jointly published by PEOPLE'S DAILY, LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, and RED FLAG.

The title of Mao's first poem was "Jinggangshan Revisited." Its message was that so long as people make efforts to struggle, the revolution will inevitably succeed; published at this juncture, its intent was to have people adhere to the direction of the "cultural revolution". The second poem, "Conversation Between the Birds," satirized Khrushchev's revisionist line. The editorial of the "two newspapers and one journal" once again affirmed that "cultural revolution," pointing out that whoever should oppose it would be regarded as restorationists and reactionaries; it also called upon people to participate in the criticism of "All Men Are Brothers."

It can be seen that the realistic political meaning of the first poem was to ask people to follow Mao; the second poem attempted to satirize Khrushchev in name but attack Zhou Enlai in substance, reproaching Zhou for making efforts to raise the people's living standards. The editorial attacked Zhou as a restorationist and capitulationist.

When Zhou Enlai listened to the broadcast, he laughed out loud. Later the PEOPLE'S DAILY explained that Zhou's laughter indicated his appreciation of Mao's poems. Whether purposely or not, this was a distortion. Zhou was originally prepared to hear the roar of the heavy cannon shots aiming at overthrowing him but what he heard instead were but listless cries. He felt that his opponents were rather pathetic and laughable, and he laughed. He laughed at the pathetically few and laughably worn out weapons they held in their hands.

Zhou Enlai felt relaxed; he felt that, after doing all they could to persecute him over the years, his opponents found themselves now at the end of their wits. Now he could say goodbye to the world calmly. He called the physicians and told them to stop treating him immediately and no longer waste their efforts; he directed them to turn to other rooms to look after patients who still had hope. On 8 January 1976, Zhou Enlai departed the world!
Why His Will Asked That His Ashes Be Spread Over the Motherland's Rivers and Soil

Zhou Enlai left a will that contained five points: 1) Do not hold any large-scale memorial service for him. 2) Do not ask people to send wreaths but only let his wife send a small one and let her pay for it too. 3) Put no new clothes on him and let him only wear the old clothes he ordinarily wore at work. 4) Do not let his relatives to go to Beijing for the funeral but let them adhere to their work. 5) After his body is cremated, have his ashes spread over the motherland's rivers and soil.

After the CPC achieved power, Zhou Enlai saw many ranking official struggle for power and gains in their lifetime and, even after death, also struggle for spots on the Babao Mountain; he did not think much of them. Said he: "Funeral is also a revolution. In the years of revolution and war, many of our comrades died without a place for burial; where are their bones now? We simply do not know. Yet, some people are now struggling for their spots after death. When I die I am definitely not going to occupy any spot on the Babao Mountain." His ashes were spread over China's rivers and soil; a promise was thus kept.

Willing that his ashes be spread over the motherland's rivers and soil was at the same time a very witty approach. Because he understood best that Mao's ultimate goal was to get rid of him, whereas Mao had been unable to bring down Zhou in his lifetime, he still might not let him pass by after his death. Even if his ashes were saved or interned on Babao Mountain, there was no guarantee that thereafter some people would not move them out and heap abuse upon them. But since his ashes have been properly disposed of, the matter becomes much more easily solved and no gap is left for Mao to pry into! What a witty step! This will on his ashes undoubtedly suggest to the countrymen that Mao was really determined to get rid of Zhou Enlai.

Zhou Enlai set an example on death for the Chinese, just as his lifetime work and style had been commonly recognized as their examples by the Chinese.

The Chinese people earnestly remember him and their tears have formed rivers. He does not have a memorial hall, nor a monument; but he lives in the hearts of millions of the people! On the other hand, while Mao enjoys alone an extravagant "Memorial Hall," he lies there also alone--and really dead!

During the period of Zhou Enlai's illness, Mao had never gone to the hospital to visit him; after Zhou's death, Mao refrained from saying goodbye to his body or attending his funeral, thus purposely cold-shouldering and belittling Zhou's status. Yet, the effect achieved proved to be exactly the opposite: Zhou's status in people minds became greatly exalted; Mao's became greatly lowered.

Finally, there is need to provide some remedial narration about past events which suggest that Zhou Enlai was able to survive great adversities. One ranking CPC personality has revealed that in his lifetime Zhou Enlai encountered six or seven life-threatening dangers but was able to come through unscratched. Here are three of them:
Three Adversities Which Failed To Destroy Zhou Enlai

During the Yan'an period, Zhou one day rushed on horseback to a meeting; upon hearing this Jiang Qing, also followed with a horse. On the narrow steep mountain road, she purposely rushed ahead of Zhou's horse with the intent to bump him into the ditch below. Thus frightened, Zhou's horse raised its front legs and thereby threw Zhou off onto the ground; he broke his right elbow. Because medical equipment was too inadequate, his wound became a deformity; this is why people later saw that he could not straighten his right elbow.

During the Hungarian incident in 1956, Mao sent Zhou to Budapest. But because all transportation was in disorder it was impossible for Zhou to enter the Hungarian capital. Ultimately he rode in a tank and proceeded under fire and was hence able to accomplish his task. Historians have observed: Zhou was already 58 years old at the time and also the premier of the government; for such a dangerous job the dispatch of a general of medium rank would have sufficed; why was Zhou sent to risk his life? Was there an attempt to put him to death?

After Nixon visited China in 1972, Sino-American relations achieved an important breakthrough. But this event aroused great resentment on the part of the Vietnamese Government. Mao sent Zhou as his secret envoy to explain Chinese policy to Hanoi and to readjust Sino-Vietnamese relations. The talks this time were not successful. Zhou telegraphed information on the talks and also the hour of his return. Tan Furen [6223 6534 0882] garrison commander for the Kunming Military District, suddenly received a telegram from the CPC Central Committee informing him that an airplane crossing into China's air space from the Vietnamese border and ordering him to shoot it down immediately. Tan considered shooting down an airplane a matter of grave consequence that should not be undertaken rashly; he therefore dispatched four fighter planes to investigate the situation. According to reports, the so-called plane of unknown nationality turned out to be clearly marked CAAC: Tan thereby ordered the plane to make a forced landing. After the CAAC plane landed, Zhou Enlai walked out of the cockpit to ask Tan what was the matter. Tan was frightened stiff and could not utter a word; he then took out the telegram to show to Zhou. Zhou immediately knew what had happened upon seeing the signature, and he said to Tan; "You had better leave this place immediately!" Thereupon, he re-entered the plane and went back to the capital. This fright stupified Tan and he did not know exactly what Zhou meant, nor dared he leave his post. As it turned out, Tan was shot by an assassin with a machine gun that very day. Till his death Zhou never mentioned this incident on any occasion. But there were at least two persons who were aware of it but kept a tacit mutual understanding without saying anything.

For the sake of liquidating Zhou Enlai, Mao thus spent a full 10-year period and yet ultimately ended up in failure.

Mao's aberrant behavior toward Zhou eventually aroused the people's wrath expressed in The world-shaking "Tiananmen Incident." Rather than a political movement by which the awakened masses of the people opposed the gang of four, the "Tiananmen Incident" might as well be regarded as the first mammoth
Mao-denunciation campaign in modern Chinese history. During this campaign Mao ignored all organizational principles and procedures and fired Deng Xiaoping, accusing him of being "China's Nagy." Deng Xiaoping had nothing to do with the "Tiananmen Incident"; why then did Mao choose to take offense against him? This was because after the death of Zhou Enlai, the representative personality who continued to protect and implement Zhou Enlai's pragmatic line was none other than Deng Xiaoping. To attack Deng meant undoubtedly to continue the attack on Zhou Enlai. But in doing this Mao Zedong thoroughly lost all popularity!
MAO ZEDONG'S 27-YEAR RULE, CHAPTER 7

Hong Kong CHENG MING [CONTENDING] in Chinese No 77, Mar 84 and No 78, Apr 84

[Article by Kong Zhongwen [1313 0112 2429]: "The Awkward, Isolated and Depressed Last 10 Years"]

[No 77, Mar 84 pp 73-76]

[Text] Mao Zedong Is a Tragic Figure

"Lifting a rock only to drop it on one's own feet"—this is a famous statement Mao used to draw an analogy between reactionaries and blockheads.

It is a pity that this statement has somehow become substantiated in Mao Zedong himself!

Undoubtedly, Mao Zedong has been a political strongman in China's modern history. After he established the new state, in order to practice a personal dictatorship he terrorized all the subjects under his rule and liquidated one political "opponent" after another. He did whatever he saw fit and counted on achieving whatever he set out for. Little did he expect that when he dealt with another political strongman--Zhou Enlai--he somehow "lifted a rock only to drop it on his own feet!" Ultimately, the "cultural revolution" which he started for the purpose of overthrowing Zhou Enlai developed as a whole in such a way that in his late years he became bogged down in an extremely awkward, isolated and depressed state. Mao Zedong was indeed an authentically tragic figure!

The 10-year "cultural revolution" functioned from beginning to end to make Mao Zedong feel awkward, isolated and endlessly depressed.

The "cultural revolution," which was started in 1966 and lasted up to 1976 when Mao "went to see Marx" upon the formal declaration of its conclusion, lasted altogether 10 years. To spend such a long period of time on carrying out what he himself knew to be an extremely destructive political movement was by no means Mao's original motive. He originally wanted to spend just about 2 years or so solving the problem--liquidating the "opponents." But because the start of this movement was from the very beginning illegal and unpopular, he therefore met unexpectedly powerful obstacles. Also because he
wanted to borrow the hands of the masses and did not wish to do things himself in overthrowing the rather numerous "opponents" headed by Zhou Enlai, he was forced to give the masses a great deal of power to make trouble. By the time things developed beyond control, when he wanted to restrain the anarchist inclination on the part of the masses, there was already nothing he could do.

Man's spirit is a mixture of mutually contradictory things. Because of the constraints of beliefs, education, morality and the law, the majority of any society tend to follow what is good and stay away from what is bad; this way, the balance between the individual's internal world and his social life can be maintained. Be it a Christian prayer or confession or a Communist criticism or brainwashing, it all aims at maintaining the balance and stability of the individual spirit and of society. But the "cultural revolution" thoroughly destroyed the Communists' own beliefs, education, morality and laws as well as all norms of conduct; it caused Mao to lose the ideology for exercising his rule over people and hence also the means for exercising his rule over the state.

The 10 years in which the "cultural revolution" took place were also the peak years during which Mao Zedong resorted to personal superstitions. But, as historical dialectics relentlessly reveals, just as personal worship developed to a fanatical peak, the idol being so worshiped also lost its brilliance and became the object of people's silent satire.

The "cultural revolution" thus destroyed the balance between good and evil in people's inner minds; it helped evil overcome good; it called forth the basest and most vicious emotions in people's hearts; it drove good-natured people to commit vices; it made people see through this-worldly life, see through political plots and see through everything and thereby render it no longer possible for Mao and his successors to restore the people's belief in it. All this was a consequence that fire-player Mao Zedong failed to expect.

And all this constitutes precisely one of the great tragedies in Mao Zedong's last years.

Because the problems of the "cultural revolution" are quite numerous, this chapter merely takes a look, on the basis of a few major events, at how Mao Zedong got himself bogged down in that awkward, isolated and depressed predicament. These problems are, respectively: instigation of the "cultural revolution" which encountered "unprecedented" obstacles; the Red Guards campaigns which negated Mao's authority; Lin Biao's revolt which caused Mao to face an awkward and passive situation never before experienced; and his inability to put Jiang Qing in the saddle, thus turning to naught his beautiful dream for succession within the family.

Personally Starting the "Cultural Revolution" Bespeaks Mao's Illegality and Isolation

When Mao Zedong instigated the "cultural revolution" he carried his plans out by resorting to extra-organizational activities and by launching sudden attacks behind the backs of the majority of members of the Political Bureau
of the Party Central Committee. Therefore, from the very beginning, when the "cultural revolution" got started, Mao was already situated in a state of isolation and also encountered very great obstacles.

In the summer of 1965, after Mao went to Shanghai and planned secretly with his hack writers, an article written by Yao Wenyuan entitled "A Critique of the Newly Compiled Historical Play 'Hai Rui's Dismissal From Office'" was sent to the editorial department of the newspapers and journals in Beijing, but it was rejected. For this, Mao later reproached the Beijing municipal CPC committee as "an independent kingdom which neither a needle nor water can penetrate." Mao felt deeply that in Beijing he was alone and isolated, that that place was not his battleground; he thus decided to launch the event with Shanghai as his base. Yao Wenyuan's article was ultimately published in Shanghai.

Before he went to Shanghai, Mao repeatedly made the request before the organs of the highest authority in the CPC Central Committee to start a "cultural revolution," but it was repeatedly voted down. Mao originally thought of starting the "cultural revolution" through the method of intraparty democratic consultation, that is, through legitimate procedures; since this approach did not work, he decided to take the illegal approach, that is, the approach of openly violating and trampling party discipline, to carry out the last venture in his political life.

In 1967, namely, 1 year after the start of the "cultural revolution," Mao said while recalling how the Political Bureau discussed his suggestion in 1965: "At that time, most of them did not agree with my idea and I was temporarily left alone; they said that my view was obsolescent. I was forced to take my view to the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Party Central Committee for discussion. After debate, I obtained the consent of only slightly more than half of them." These words indicate that Mao was isolated on the matter of starting the "cultural revolution"; even though discussion was held again at the Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee in May 1966, after the newspapers and journals had debated for half a year over Wu Han's "Hai Rui's Dismissal From Office," Mao was still in the minority. According to revelations by ranking personalities familiar with the inside situation, if there were no "lobbying activities" staged by Lin Biao, Kang Sheng, Chen Boda and others at the time in using both soft and hard approaches, making promises and presenting pleas, Mao's policy would never have been passed by more than half of the votes.

In 1966 the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Party Central Committee passed the well-known "16 May Circular," which was the formal, legitimate document authorizing the start of the "cultural revolution"; its content was full of gunpower suggesting the overthrow of everyone. Since at the beginning of the discussion an overwhelming majority did not agree with Mao's suggestion, then how was it that by the time it came to a vote it was passed by more than half of the votes? Here were three causes: First, Mao's record of cracking down on his opponents and putting them to death had left a profound impression in the minds of members of the Central Committee, and few of them dared to offend him; second, in order to preserve their own offices and plentiful
renumerations, not a few people would rather give up their own correct views as the credo that a Communist must be brave enough to stick to the truth became in their cases but an empty expression and to them honor and status had become more important than the truth, and when the two were found to be in conflict they would rather abandon the truth; and, third, with the prolonged impartation of religious ideas, their thinking had mostly become petrified and in their conduct they had become used to following their leaders blindly.

Unfortunately, those who cast negative votes naturally were destined to suffer the disaster of submersion during the "cultural revolution," but even those who cast supporting votes could not be spared either, as they were subjected to persecution similar to that sustained by the former and not a few of them paid with their lives. This lesson of history tells people that those who fail to treasure and use their own democratic power are destined not only to become accomplices of autocracy but ultimately also its sacrifices!

Lin Biao and his close friends propagated repeatedly at the beginning of the "cultural revolution" that "the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was personally started and led by Chairman Mao." For many years the Chinese understood this to be a praise for Mao's wisdom, greatness and exalted status and failed to appreciate its true meaning. Actually, by "personally" it was meant that Mao was isolated on the question of starting the "cultural revolution"; it was something that he decided on by himself and did not secure the support of the party. Since this revolution was then already successfully launched, the achievement and honor reaped therefrom had to be attributed to Mao alone. Lin Biao and his ilk gathered that this revolution was sufficient to push Mao into the hall of gods and at the same time cast the big personalities among the "opponents" to the hell of ghosts. But they failed to see that its being "started personally" by him served fully to expose Mao's isolation and tyranny.

Relying on the Red Guards as Political Auxiliaries

Since in starting the "cultural revolution" Mao failed to obtain the genuine consent and support of those within the party, the only thing he could do was to make use of Lin Biao, the defense minister who was full of political ambition, strike up a military and political alliance with him and thereby strengthen his own power with Lin Biao and also take advantage of Lin's ingenious god-making campaign which appealed to Mao's tastes and needs so as to put on a layer of "godly" power that could not be thicker in order to bewilder the young and ignorant children and youths. On this basis, Mao unprecedentedly drove the children and youths to charge ahead in his behalf--this was no other than the singular and strange Red Guards movement in world history.

At the beginning of the "cultural revolution," the PEOPLE'S DAILY published an open letter to the Red Guards from Mao; in that letter, he expressed "warm support" for the Red Guards' "rebelling" conduct.
Overnight, the Red Guards became masters of the country. On the basis of Mao's instruction that "to rebel is right," they did whatever they wished and all they could. They wore their grass-green military uniforms, their caps and their red arm bands and raised a hullabaloo wherever they went while swashbuckling across the country. No one seeing them would fail to feel like Germans seeing the Brown Shirts and hence to get out of their way in a hurry. They hovered above all government organs; their will became the law, and they would resort at random to searching, arresting, detaining, trying, punishing and killing people and depriving them of their property and money....

Because they were free of legal and disciplinary constraints, the Red Guards were able unscrupulously to do what the police and the military could not. They became a contingent of auxiliaries carrying out Mao's special political tasks and hence also his darlings who were time and again "received" and "inspected" by him. By way of the Red Guards' hands, Mao was able to overthrow and eliminate most of his political enemies and successful intellectuals and all those whom he did not like.

We should never underestimate the role the Red Guards performed for Mao. Although Mao lifted the curtain for the "cultural revolution" through Yao Wenyuan's "A Critique of the Newly Compiled Historical Play 'Hai Rui's Dismissal From Office'" and later also instigated Kang Sheng's wife Cao Yi'ou [2580 6522 2962] to go to Beijing University secretly to plot how to let Nie Yuanzi [5119 0955 2737] trot out a copy of what Mao praised as "the first Marxist-Leninist big-character poster of the whole country" and thereby blow the clarion call to charge forward for the "cultural revolution," those two measures served as his instrumentalities merely to muddy up the water in the river but were not enough to arouse waves there nor to overthrow Mao's powerful political enemies. It was only the youthful Red Guards' "rebelling" spirit and action which really accomplished the great mission for Mao. They ransacked the homes of those ranging from vice premiers and cabinet ministers to small grocery store managers, and they exercised "proletarian dictatorship" over professors, scientists, middle and primary school principals and teachers, writers, players and all cultural workers.

Red Guards Playing Big Tricks on Mao Zedong

However, we should also not fail to see that the Red Guards also played big tricks on Mao Zedong.

After the Red Guards carried out a round of stormy commando raids for Mao and brought party and government organs all to ruins and after they overthrew Mao's political enemies one after another, they no longer had any "revolutionary action" to take. Since they called themselves "successors to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat" and established especially great merits during the "cultural revolution," they thus also fell into the vortex of the "power struggle." They began to get heated up for seizing leadership power at various universities and governments at various levels.

All major Red Guards organizations regarded themselves as being "meritorious in having staged a revolution against the capitalist-roads," and they all
attempted to enjoy the "fruits of revolution" alone with no intention of sharing them with anyone else. Contradictions thus could not be reconciled and gradually became even more aggravated; thus armed struggles ultimately exploded on the campuses of the two institutions of higher learning, Beijing University and Qinghua University. A spark can lead to a conflagration. Closely thereafter, armed struggles also exploded in the country's various provinces, municipalities and counties. Mao acknowledged to foreign correspondents that in China a civil war with real bayonettes and guns actually took place.

At the beginning of the rise of the Red Guards, Mao set his eyes especially on five Red Guard leaders of various universities in Beijing; they were Nie Yuanzi of Beijing University, Kuai Dafu [5566 1129 1381] of Qinghua University, Tan Houlan [6223 0624 5695] of Beijing Normal University, Wang Dabin [3769 1129 6333] of Beijing College of Geology and Han Aijing [7281 1947 2533]. After a year's observation, Mao earnestly acknowledged that their merits and contributions were great in the struggle to liquidate his "opponents." As he was calculating on how to confer important appointments upon them, it turned out that each and every one of them had already become unsatisfactory careerists who, for the sake of seizing power, would not at all hesitate to resort to arms and to get rid of their own opponents; this created great chaos in Chinese society and also messed up Mao's overall plan and schedule. At this time, Mao noticed that in overthrowing his political enemies and destroying the party organizations of the CPC at all levels as well as government organs at all levels, the Red Guards had already accomplished their tasks, whereas their excessive conduct in cases like beating up people, killing them, robbing people of their property and money and other actions had increasingly aroused indignation and hatred on the part of the people; it was necessary to adopt measures to stop them. Thus, Mao began to organize workers' inspection teams to maintain social order and also mobilized a part of the troops to take over crucial departments of government. This was the beginning of military control.

On 20 July 1968, Mao dispatched nearly 10,000 workers to be stationed at Qinghua University and thereby determined Kuai Dafu's rule over that institution. This junior student, having served as commander of the Red Guards and as "president" of Qinghua University for 2 years, achieved a great understanding in serving as an official. He did not wish to retreat from the stage of history and therefore put up a resistance by force against the stationing of the workers, which resulted in the workers suffering bloodshed and casualties.

From 3:30 am to 8:30 am on 28 July 1968, Mao, accompanied by Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and other colleagues of the "cultural revolution," received the five Red Guard leaders of Beijing and talked with them for 5 hours. The central content of this conversation was to inform them that they could no longer rule these institutions and must hand over their leadership power to the working class.

Yet, they could hardly take in half of Mao Zedong's "one statement that could take the place of 10,000 statements"; after the conversation, they still
indulged in armed struggles and power struggles. This forced Mao ultimately
to kick them aside in one swing. After about 2 years, the Red Guards movement
started to decline.

But the nationwide armed struggles initiated by the Red Guards became even
more unmanageable and did not stop or wind up just because of the decline of
the Red Guards movement.

This unmanageable situation, once started, thus came to make Mao feel very
awkward and cause him great discomfiture. What did this illustrate?

Mao aroused the masses to struggle against the masses; he set a fire, but
could not extinguish the resultant conflagration. He had successfully mobi-
lized the masses to defeat the Japanese aggressors and the Chiang Kai-shek
dynasty, but because there was a scourge in his heart in starting the "cul-
tural revolution," he found it impossible to control this unpopular mass
movement; the masses no longer listened to him. While overthrowing his
political enemies by making use of the masses, he at the same time overthrew
his own prestige. The "cultural revolution" messed up the boundaries between
right and wrong and between good and evil; people did whatever they wished,
and they did what each of them deemed practicable. When people shouted the
slogan "May you live 10,000 years" to Mao the loudest, and when they cited
quotations from Mao most frequently, it was also the time when they were
determined to cast off Mao's instructions; they were taking the idol of Mao
and his little red book as a magic wand to defeat their own rivals. In
China, such ignorant, backward and ridiculous modern superstition itself
produces the very factors for its own negation.

Military Control Was a Mirror of Mao's Big Failure

Mao discovered that no one would listen to the words uttered by him as the
highest priest and highest authority any longer, nor would anyone implement
his orders either; he could do nothing and ultimately was forced to adopt an
approach which was most unpopular and which he delayed time and again in
implementing—the carrying out of military control nationwide in order to
restore order and the functions of the regime.

At the end of the 1960's, there emerged this strange phenomenon: transferring
workers from the factories to take over schools and scientific and cultural
organs and also transferring lower-rank officers from the troops to take over
the factories. This illustrates that the great chaos in the country also led
to confusion in Mao's policy. To the universities, Mao dispatched both
workers and troops to take them over; then which of the two was regarded as
the dominant force? On the surface, the workers were so regarded, because
when orders were issued, the name of the workers' propagation team was always
arranged ahead of that of the soldiers' propagation team; but, actually, the
power of making important decisions and issuing orders was all held in the
hands of the troops. This also demonstrated the essence of military control.
Small wonder that some workers complained that dispatching them to the univer-
sities was but an ornamental display that served as a decoration of Mao's
slogan "The Working Class Must Lead Everything," while de facto power was
held in the hands of the troops.
Military control implied that the use of political means to deal with crises had already become ineffective; this was an approach which anyone who could no longer control a situation yet at the same time found himself unwilling to retreat from the political stage is bound to adopt. From the end of the 1960's, when he first carried out military control, until his death, Mao had never abandoned the approach. This illustrates that in his late years he could only rely on troops to maintain his already toppling rule.

Political Connivance Between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao

In carrying out his long-sustained military control, Mao mainly relied on Lin Biao's strength in the military and on the military and political alliance he forged with Lin Biao.

Some say that at the beginning Mao really hoped to foster Lin Biao as his "successor," but this is wrong. Between Mao and Lin Biao, there was nothing but a relationship of mutual political utilization—Mao gave a politically very ambitious Lin Biao the inducement of being designated "deputy commander-in-chief" and "successor" and then made use of Lin Biao in doing the god-making job for him and in serving as his powerful backer in the venture of "overthrowing a big contingent." This was a dirty political connivance.

In 1960, Mao appointed Lin Biao as the Chinese Communists' defense minister to replace the dismissed Gen Peng Dehuai and also to preside over the work of the CPC Central Military Commission. This was the beginning of the Mao-Lin military and political alliance.

Lin really did not disappoint Mao's trust in him; apart from seriously implementing Mao's directives, he also "creatively" propagated Maoism. He first advocated the study of Maoism among the troops and also presided over the compiling of a 270-page "little red book"—"Quotations From Chairman Mao." Lin Biao said that Maoism is the peak of the development of Marxism, the Marxism of the highest level today; that Mao is far greater than Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin; and that, therefore, in order to study Marxism, people must first of all study Maoism, because that is the short cut to studying proletarian theories.

The merits Lin Biao established in propagating Maoism and raising Mao's political status and historical status are far greater than his contributions in war. In the fabrication of modern superstition and creating Maoist-style religion for the purpose of hoodwinking the masses and fooling the people, Lin played an even more indispensable role. Hence, Mao returned this favor by openly calling for "the whole country to learn from the Liberation Army."

In newspapers and journals, Lin Biao was called Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms and best student"; this was the highest praise that could be bestowed on anyone in those days, and it implied that since the beginning of the "cultural revolution" Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De were no longer Mao's "close comrades-in-arms."
Because Lin Biao's prestige was not high either within the party or among the masses of the people and because among the older generation of meritorious contributors to the revolution in particular, his reputation was not so great, his qualifications were shallow and he was held in contempt by others, Mao's intention to establish him as successor to the throne was bound to encounter obstacles. At the beginning of the "cultural revolution" already, Mao recommended Lin Biao to the CPC Central Committee for him to become the number two leader, but he faced unanimous opposition by the elders of the party. This contingent of ranking personalities, with elders Chen Yi, Tan Zhenlin, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzen as their core, discussed together repeatedly from the end of 1966 to February 1967 the approach to resist the "cultural revolution" and Lin Biao; this matter was conveyed to Mao's ears and it provoked him. Thus, he appointed Jiang Qing, Chen Boda and others to fight back and also publicly criticized the "February adverse current" in the newspapers and journals, saying that it was a reactionary political undercurrent running counter to the tide of the "cultural revolution."

Mao's Greatest Stake in Lin Biao

Mao's greatest stake in Lin Biao was to confer upon him the titles of "deputy commander-in-chief" and "successor." But as "an oral commitment would lack proof," it was still necessary to have the "legal procedure" completed—that is, to have them determined through the Party Congress.

According to provisions of the Party Constitution, the Party Congress was supposed to be convened once every 4 years. But since the Eighth Party Congress (1956), it had not been convened for over 10 years; this was a rather abnormal phenomenon. Mao's political accomplice Kang Sheng had said in a talk in the spring of 1967 while receiving the masses: "Two years ago, there was a Yunnan provincial party committee secretary by the name of Zhao Jianmin who was on an assignment to Beijing and who asked to see me; at that time my work was very heavy, but I still took time out to receive him. He said to me that according to the provisions of our Party Constitution, a Party Congress should have been held a long time ago; he therefore asked to have it convened early so as to facilitate democratic life within the party. At that time we could not convene a Party Congress because the party was under the control of Liu Shaoqi and others; were a Party Congress held, that would cause Chairman Mao to lose the election." Kang Sheng frankly admitted the reason why Mao refrained from convening the Party Congress in violation of the Party Constitution. In 1969, conditions for convening the Party Congress were already present, because the party under the control of Liu Shaoqi and others were already destroyed, most of the original members of the Central Committee were already overthrown or dismissed and the election of party delegates had already fallen under the control of Mao and his allies Jiang Qing, Lin Biao and Kang Sheng. Simply put, there was already a guarantee that those people whom Mao wanted could be elected and those not wanted could be excluded.

In April 1969, the Ninth CPC Congress passed its new constitution in which Lin Biao was explicitly provided as Mao's successor. Such an approach was historically unprecedented in the international Communist movement.
In man's history, only the medieval feudal monarchs practiced the system of appointing successors to the throne; in modern society, only a few underdeveloped countries practice such a backward method of having royal power privately passed on. Yet, in a China reputedly led by the Communist Party and in the person of a Mao who was praised to be a great leader of the proletariat, people somehow saw such typically feudal, monarchical thinking and style; this is really very surprising, indeed!

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[Text] Lin Biao Staged a Big Showdown for the Sake of Sharing the Highest Power With Mao

In personally designating Lin Biao as his "successor" and having it written into the Party Constitution, Mao's approach broke all precedents in the international Communist movement; but Mao's estimate of Lin Biao was a mistake, and the stake Mao put up for forging a military and political alliance with Lin Biao was really too big--this again paved the way for his tragic loss later.

Lin Biao was never so loyal and obedient as Mao Zedong had appraised him at first. Before Lin secured the status of deputy commander-in-chief and legal successor, he really demonstrated such qualities, but once he achieved that status, he immediately exhibited on occasion a compulsive inclination toward securing the highest leadership position as soon as possible. What aroused Mao's suspicion and vigilance most was the fact that during the period in which the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Party Committee was convened at Lushan in August 1970, Lin Biao instigated his partners Chen Boda, Political Bureau member Ye Chun (Lin's wife), Wu Faxian (Air Force commander), Li Zuopeng (Navy commander), Qiu Huizuo (General Rear Services Department head) and others to do their best to request the establishment in the new administration of the post of chairman of the republic. The aim of this approach was to help Lin secure the status of chief of state before Mao's death and thereby share the highest power of party and government together with Mao.

At this time, it was naturally not something for a Mao Zedong who had hardly found it easy to concentrate all party and government power in himself to agree to in a rush. Actually, on the question as to why the post of chairman of the republic could not be restored, Mao Zedong never really put forward any reasons convincing enough to members of the Central Committee. Yet Lin Biao energetically advocated restoring the chairmanship of the republic, because, in the case of his ambition, it was like "Sima Yi's desire--even a man in the street knows"; therefore he too failed to give any plausible reasons. Thus, Mao and Lin as opponents could only relish their struggle around the data on "the appraisal of geniuses" trotted out by Chen Boda.

On 31 August Mao wrote "Some of My Views" to the Central Committee in which he sternly refuted Chen Boda and thereby liquidated him at one stroke. Mao called this incident a "smashed counterrevolutionary coup."
The so-called data on "the appraisal of geniuses" came about as a result of Lin Biao secretly instigating Chen Boda to gather and compile all passages from the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao that involve "genius" and then distribute them to all Central Committee members at the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Party Central Committee. This measure was executed in a rather topsy-turvy manner because, at a plenary session of the Central Committee, there was plenty of data to be distributed; yet such a batch which had nothing to do with issues of the plenary session somehow popped up. That was really clumsy. The purpose of Lin Biao and Chen Boda was to use "quotations on genius" from Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao as their backing, which seems infallible, to flatter Mao as a thorough "genius" of the day and then to have this genius leader step forward to serve as chairman of the republic. But they knew clearly in advance that Mao had long ago said that he would not serve as chairman of the republic; thus, so long as the issue on the establishment of the chairman of the republic became recognized among the Central Committee members, such a post could not but belong to Lin Biao himself.

This clever calculation, as it turned out, somehow misfired. In his "Some of My Views," Mao Zedong ruthlessly criticized Lin Biao and Chen Boda. But on this very question, Mao also makes it hard for one to keep from laughing. In the past, Mao, for the sake of exercising dictatorship, did not mind resorting to god-making activities in an unrestricted way in order to have himself unprecedentedly deified. During such god-making activities, things there that were even more ridiculous than this case of "appraising geniuses" were quite numerous, and the one who exerted his utmost was none other than Lin Biao, who repeatedly placed the dragon robe of a "genius" on Mao himself. Yet at that time Mao failed to feel offended but, instead, relished it like honey and wanted to have as much as possible. But now, Mao actually refused to show appreciation and even scolded it with severity. This incident fully illustrates that Mao's pleasure, anger, grief and happiness and what he does all take "personal power" as their point of departure and destination. For the sake of personal power, he could be perfectly fickle on the same questions and matters.

The real showdown between Mao and his personally designated successor took place precisely at this Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Party Central Committee. The liquidation of Chen Boda was but an overture for the liquidation of Lin Biao--on this point, they both knew very well in their minds; Lin Biao, in particular, was deeply aware as to how tragic a man's future would be after he loses favor with Mao Zedong.

Both Mao and Lin Made Diligent Preparations for the Duel

This was a duel which was far more sensational than those anticipating the liquidation of Peng Dehuai and of Liu Shaoqi. Both Mao and Lin became extremely tense.

First of all, it was Mao himself. After the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Party Central Committee, Mao discovered Lin Biao's political ambition;
he immediately took the initiative to rectify and eliminate Lin Biao's cronies and thereby preempted Lin Biao politically. He started a "Criticize Chen Boda Rectification Campaign" but, in reality, it was to criticize Lin Biao.

As for Lin Biao himself, he knew that once he lost favor with Mao, he would not have any good future and was forced to take the risky road in the hope of finding salvation in the face of despair. During this period, Lin made his appearance scarce and even seldom showed his face rarely in the political arena. But, through his son Lin Liguo and his ordinary cronies, he secretly intensified his arrangement of measures to adapt to contingencies.

Mao discerned Lin's abnormal behavior; hence, step by step he tightened his encirclement around Lin. In the middle of August 1971, Mao mysteriously set out on an inspection tour to go to the various provinces of the south in order to work on the party, government and military chiefs there; he also asked these party, government and military chiefs of the provinces to express themselves as to which side they were standing in this unfolding struggle.

Both sides were making diligent preparations. Because Lin had cronies in all provinces, Mao's talks during his southern tour were quickly conveyed to Lin. In addition, Mao's whereabouts this time were kept secret and made mysterious; this made Lin Biao sense profoundly that matters did not look good and hence also prompted him to move ahead his armed coup plot to assassinate Mao. But because his actions were rendered innocuous, he, under such circumstances, could only flee the country if he wished to live.

In describing Lin Biao's outlook of discomfiture, the CPC used the expression "fled in a hurry." In reality, he hurried very much indeed. This was because, after Lin's attempt to assassinate Mao failed, his whole plot became exposed. It was on 12 September that Mao secretly returned to Beijing; after Lin Biao learned about this, he knew that there was no time to lose and no more room for hesitation; hence he took a plane in the early morning of 13 September to seek refuge in the Soviet Union.

Mao Arranged a Perfect End for Lin Biao

As for the cause of Lin Biao's plane's fall in Wenturhkan, Mongolia, it remains a mystery today. Official authorities said that its fuel was burned out, so that it was forced to land and thereby encounter the accident. But there is also another view that it was shot down by the Chinese Communists' missiles. However the situation might have been, the following description coming from the higher stratum of the CPC still merits recording here:

It is said that Mao obtained the information about Lin Biao's fleeing toward the Soviet side in time and thereby invited Zhou Enlai to discuss the matter of response. Zhou immediately kept Chief of Staff Huang Yongsheng under control by sitting together with him in front of the radar screen. Mao asked Huang Yongsheng what should be done. Huang replied that the direction in which Lin was flying obviously indicated an escapade toward the Soviet Union by way of Outer Mongolia, and he also suggested shooting it down with missiles.
Mao waved his hand and said, smiling: "No. He is the vice chairman; if we shoot him down, how are we going to tell the people? If the people should ask why did we shoot down the vice chairman's plane, it would not be easy for us to answer. As for fleeing, it is something we cannot prevent; the sky must rain, and a woman must get married; this is something that does not depend on man's will." When the plane flew to the Sino-Mongolian border, its image suddenly disappeared from the screen. Mao exclaimed with a sense of ease: "Good." Then he immediately left the screen and also asked Zhou Enlai to drink some Maotai wine with him, saying to Zhou: "We haven't slept for 53 hours. Now let us not bother with anything any more; let us go back and go to bed right away."

Neither too early nor too late, neither too much on this side nor too much on the other side, Lin Biao's plane somehow fell just after it had crossed not too far beyond the Sino-Mongolian border; whether this illustrates that "nature's calculation is not as good as man's calculation" or "man's calculation is not as good as nature's calculation" is something which we should perhaps not comment on any longer here. But this conclusion, insofar as Mao was concerned, simply could not have been more perfect.

First, the Soviet Union was deprived of an unexpected gain.

Second, Lin Biao was not only eliminated but even "incurred his own destruction."

This conclusion gave Mao sufficient reason to fix the crime of revolt against the party and state. He could demonstrate to the world public that no one wanted to harm Lin Biao and that it was he who separated himself from the party and the people.

But even so, Mao refrained from openly telling the party and people right away of this "13 September incident"; instead, he kept it a secret for a long, long time. This was because Mao was facing a very troublesome issue, i.e., how to tell the people why a man long propagated as "the closest comrade-in-arms" and "the most ideal successor" could overnight become the worst possible person.

The "Lin Biao Incident" Slapped the "Deity" in the Face Very Hard

Lin Biao's revolt and escapade poked through the legend that Mao was immortal. For many years, Mao was turned into a living icon who could see perfectly clearly and discern everything, and no bad person could escape his penetrating eyes. Now, his most trusted person had gone against him; this was equivalent to having this deity image slapped very hard in the political face. This incident also illustrates that since Mao could erroneously appraise Lin Biao, he could have likewise erroneously appraised Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, and others. This incident also put Mao in the greatest of discomfitures because he had established Lin Biao as his successor and had even written that in the Party Constitution, which made him look very foolish and unable to justify it.
Thus Mao decided to launch a "Criticize Lin Biao" movement for a long time in order to offset the impact of his heaping praise on him for so many years. Such a trick in politics of turning one's palm one way to make it cloud and the other way to make it rain, of making a 180-degree turnabout, is really not something that anyone can handle easily. To criticize Lin Biao according to normal rules would be very hard to achieve any propaganda result; heavy cannon shots must be fired in order to convince the people that he was really a scoundrel. Thus, a special case team to sort out the data about Lin Biao began to work day and night.

Following the careful selection of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and others, two batches of data on criminal evidence related to Lin Biao were internally published at various government organs, military units, factories, enterprises and schools in China; but the third batch of data originally scheduled for publication was never compiled. Before the data were published, there had been debate within the special case team centered mainly on whether or not to publish the words with which Lin appraised Mao himself. Mao insisted on including the data under the subheading of Lin attacking Mao. Lin Biao had written in his diary that Mao was a man deprived of any sense of fidelity and justice, that he always incessantly played political tricks, that he would rope in a faction of people and attack another faction in different periods of time and that he liquidated one political enemy after another in order to climb to the peak of power. Jiang Qing's running dog Chi Qun cried his heart out in opposing the publication of such data, saying that this would "damage the brilliant image of Chairman Mao," but he was refuted. With the mind of a gambler, Mao decided to have the data published for the implied suggestion that since he dared to publish them, they are therefore not facts but attacks. After the data were published, the data aroused some widespread responses amidst the vast ranks of party members and masses. At meetings, people all said that these were vicious attacks, but beyond the meetings and inside the homes and between friends, people all said that these words of Lin Biao were correct, that he accurately described Mao's conduct. Chi Qun's worries were by no means superfluous.

The Lin Biao incident put Mao on the defensive and in a state of confusion; it left his strategic deployment and timetable in disarray, and it greatly tarnished his reputation within the CPC and among the people. He became depressed, worried and sleepless and, in such a soul-searching process, he attempted to find a way to restore his prestige but got nowhere. One year after, trouble was discovered in his nervous system, and his speech was impaired, his limbs became numb and he started to take on a listless and senile outlook. The appearance of such symptoms was hardly beneficial to Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and others in their power struggle; hence it was treated as the party's greatest secret not to be divulged. Consequently, a great many false news stories were reported in the press as to how fine Mao's health was, whereas in photos and on the television screen people saw facts to the contrary and thus made their own conclusions. Mao came forward even more frequently than before to receive foreign civic and governmental delegations in order to demonstrate that he was still able to carry out his work. Such antics of pretending to be a healthy man were staged until several months before his death (the last foreign guest Mao received was Pakistani premier Ali Bhutto, and the time was 27 May 1976).
Clumsy Reputation—salvaging Work—"A Letter to Jiang Qing"

During the "Criticize Lin Biao" campaign, another task which Mao felt deeply that he must carry out was that he had to convince party members and the people that having been honored as an "all-perceiving" leader, he did not necessarily lack an understanding about Lin Biao but had actually acquired some discernment about his problem much earlier. Hence, a very difficult, face-saving task began to be carried out at all cost.

During the 2 years of 1972 and 1973, a great deal of time was spent on carrying out this task. After countless revisions until he and Jiang Qing felt that it had become flawless, a piece of work on which he spent the longest time in his life and which was most important to him was made public to his subjects in March 1974, and that was namely Mao's letter to Jiang Qing. The date on which this letter was written was said to be 8 July 1966. Along with this, he also handed down two other documents; these were "Some of My Views (31 August 1970) and "Recordings of Talks During the Southern Inspection Tour" (August—September 1971). In terms of their political significance, however, these two documents were far less important than that letter Mao wrote to Jiang Qing.

The letter Mao wrote to Jiang Qing totals 1,500 characters; it contains no separate paragraphs and was written in one breath. In that letter he addressed Lin Biao as a "friend" and not as "comrade"; he wrote about a round of 7 or 8 years of class struggle as a law; he wrote about the reason why he did not agree with "my friend" Lin Biao concerning the coup and leadership but had to go along with him; he described his contradictory mind on "having a great reputation but actually finding it very hard to match with substance"; he lovingly admonished Jiang Qing to be careful and humble; he advised Jiang Qing to prepare to carry a bloody struggle through to the end with his opponents after his death; he predicted that "the future is bright, the path will be zigzag...."

When Jiang Qing made public this letter Mao sent to her on "8 July 1966" at the enlarged session of the CPC Central Political Bureau, she delivered an impromptu speech. Its content was as follows:

1. Lin Biao was never a Marxist, which Mao sensed long ago; 2. There was a process through which Lin Biao's plot became exposed, and there was also a process through which we recognized him; it was impossible to see him through all at once; 3. When she received this letter, Zhou Enlai and Wang Renzhong were present; 4. Then, Jiang Qing gave an extremely high appraisal to this letter. Said she: "This letter is succinct in its structure, written in one breath; it exhibits a great sense of humor and high order and adheres to reasoning from beginning to end, showing no belligerence whatsoever. The more one reads this letter, the more savory it becomes and the deeper one appreciates its meaning; it touches on China, foreign countries, politics, history and philosophy; it summarizes the inevitable laws of class struggle at home and abroad and it sums up the precious experience of our continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat; it links dialectical materialism and historical materialism and is a brilliant document in the treasury of
Marxism-Leninism. It has great realistic significance and profound historical significance toward the direction of the entire socialist revolution until the realization of communism."

All above and below across the country spent more than a month's time in the study of Mao's letter and of Jiang Qing's speech on that letter. Mao and Jiang Qing paid a great deal of attention to the propaganda effects this time; each evening they would listen to reports on discussions held by the masses submitted by various provincial and municipal party committees. Party committees in various provinces and municipalities all said in their reports, of course, that the reaction of the masses was very good, that they all recognized Mao to be very great, that Mao was still a wise leader who could discover problems and take preventive actions and that Mao's humility greatly moved others, etc.

However, the actual situation was entirely to the contrary; during their discussions people put forward many questions. The one most frequently posed was, why, since Mao had long perceived Lin Biao as never a genuine Marxist, did he still make him his successor?

As for people discussing in private, the questions they posed were even more numerous. For example, when Jiang Qing mentioned in her speech that at the time she received the letter Zhou Enlai and Wang Renzhong were present, some said that she was trying to take advantage of the fact that Zhou always has the breadth of mind to protect the overall situation and would probably come forward to testify in order to help gloss over her falsification of history. But Zhou maintained his composure, neither testifying nor giving any speech of his own, which was equivalent to exposing her lies right there.

As for the applause and praise in the extreme that Jiang Qing heaped on this letter, they aroused no attention or fuss on the part of the people. Ordinarily, in this case of Mao's letter, if there had been no explanation such as Jiang Qing tried to provide, it would have been able to hoodwink part of the people; but once she did so, contrary to her wishes it played the role of exposing its falsity.

"Attentive People's" Verification of the Authenticity of Mao's Letter to Jiang Qing

About this letter, not a few "attentive people" have gone through a process of verification and it is their opinion that it actually bears Mao's personal handwriting and was not written by anyone else. But the time at which it was written cannot possibly be 1966, but 1972 or 1973, after Lin Biao's death. Mao's suggestion in the letter that a round of class struggle takes 7 or 8 years is but another way of indicating that he planned to liquidate people holding different political views every 7 or 8 years. In indicating that he did not agree with Lin Biao's view on a coup d'état, it means that he did not agree with his own view, because it was he who first told the stories of a coup d'état in Chinese history at the Political Bureau. Lin Biao merely picked up where he had left off by taking the recorded text of his talk to the military commission to show off his being privy to the inner proceedings. Lin Biao really did not have the kind of learning that could have equipped
him to read off a classic on coups d'état. Indicating that he did not agree with Lin Biao on leadership, Mao meant the applause and flattery Lin heaped upon him and his books; he thought Lin's purpose in heaping applause and flattery upon him was to make use of his status to elevate Lin himself. This tells merely half of the story; in reality, Mao and Lin made use of each other. When they wanted to overthrow a large contingent of revolutionary elders, they needed to forge a fast political alliance; that can hardly be said to be a case in which one alone is made use of. In his letter Mao said that he did not like the way Lin applauded and praised him. This hardly tallies with the facts. In 1971, when he talked with Edgar Snow, he acknowledged that at the time he needed people to worship him.

In a word, while this letter provides quotations and sources of authenticity and pays a great deal of attention to literary skill and can be said to have been dexterously wrought, where it aims is still not so difficult for "attentive people" to see through at one glance. He lightly cast off from him a Lin Biao who was once as close to him as if he were one with him and rendered himself as having nothing to do with the applause and flattery that Lin heaped upon him with his approval and encouragement. His admonition to Jiang Qing, while looking like criticism on surface, actually implies protection and was also designed to calm down some of the dissatisfactions on the part of the masses. He was very much afraid that the opponents overthrown by him would come forward to reverse the verdict after his death; he therefore predicted that they would come to no good end. This constitutes both an encouragement to Jiang Qing and also a testament for her, allowing her to use it to suppress the opponents.

Mao and Jiang Qing thought that this dexterously wrought letter was a seamless heavenly robe, a masterpiece which could cover up the ears and eyes of all people of the world, but, from the viewpoint of the Chinese people, it was but a clumsy apology full of holes.

Two Ludicrous Incidents During the "Criticize Lin Biao" Campaign

The "Lin Biao incident" undoubtedly brought Mao unprecedented discomfiture and defensiveness and caused his reputation to fall precipitously. But in making use of this incident to launch a nationwide "Criticize Lin Biao" campaign later, Mao also obtained political benefits from it.

First of all, it temporarily diverted the attention of people within and without the party and mollified the contradictions within the party and the country resulting from the "cultural revolution" Mao had started. Just as Mao passed all past mistakes and faults on to Liu Shaoqi as soon as the latter was overthrown, upon Lin Biao's death the responsibility of all destruction and chaos since the "cultural revolution" was also shifted to Lin.

But here also appeared some ludicrous antics. Everyone knows that the "cultural revolution" represented the nonsensical functioning of Mao's ultra-left line, and Lin Biao's various ultra-left inventions and creations all played up to Mao's ultra-left line. Because the people hated in the extreme the unprecedented disaster leftist opportunism brought them, therefore once
it became known that Lin was going to be criticized, the people immediately came forth in droves to criticize him fiercely and expose him as the representative of the ultra-left. This situation aroused the attention and worries of old plotter Kang Sheng. He immediately reminded Mao that it was necessary at once to reverse the direction of criticism on the part of the masses; he admonished that should matters develop forward in this manner, the criticism would be sooner or later turned on Mao himself. Hence, overnight, the tone of criticism against Lin Biao made a 180-degree turn from that of Lin Biao's ultra-left line suddenly to that of his "ultra-right line." The people failed to understand such political magic, nor could they accept it. Thus, Mao assigned his friends Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and others to write articles and publish editorials; they repeatedly sought to discourse that ultra-left and ultra-right were the same thing, the essence of the ultra-left being the ultra-right, which aims at the restoration of capitalism. In a word, left was right. Such a "theory" got people muddled.

Second, Mao also took advantage of the "Criticize Lin Biao" campaign and guided it toward a "Criticize Zhou" counterpart. This was really a political masterpiece! It turned out that when Lin Biao's official residence was searched, his secretary was discovered to have copied a big batch of cards with some quotations from Confucius on them. This made Jiang Qing very happy, as if she had obtained some rare treasure. They determined that Lin's mistaken ideas originated from Confucius. Thus, the "Criticize Lin Biao" campaign was renamed the "Criticize Lin Biao and Criticize Confucius Campaign." Confucius definitely never thought that 2,000-plus years later he was to keep Lin Biao company in facing criticism.

Confucius and Lin Biao, an ancient man and a dead man; they have already retreated from the stage of history and no longer constituted any threat to Mao; yet Mao still wanted to criticize them with fanfare. Wherein did the intention lie? We must know that Mao was a politician and not a scholar; in criticizing an ancient man and a dead man, he inevitably predicated himself on his need in current struggles. It was said that the essence of Confucius' thought was no other than "restraining oneself and returning to propriety," i.e., the restoration of old institutions. Hence, they forcibly developed the "Criticize Lin Biao" campaign into a "Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius and Criticize Duke of Zhou" campaign. The ludicrousness of politicians sometimes hardly makes any sense!

"Empress of the Red Capital" Causes Mao Zedong To Lose All Face

Another personality who made Mao's late years very awkward, who put him in a dilemma between love and hatred, was his wife Jiang Qing.

People around the world have already acquired a thorough understanding of what kind of person Jiang Qing is and there is no longer any need here to describe her. But worthy of mention is that a Mao Zedong who was reputed to be "foresightful" as well as "insightful" but actually not only lacked self-knowledge but also was short of "knowledge about his own wife." Mao had always dreamed of passing his highest authority on to Jiang Qing directly;
the fact that he did not hesitate to let her come to the front stage to resort
to nonsensical operations while completely oblivious of the people's resent-
ment is clear proof in this regard.

But when Jiang Qing's nonsensical operations developed to a point of causing
Mao to show his seamy side, that was really something which made Mao himself
lament his own helplessness. A typical example is that she regarded herself
as "Empress of the Red Capital" and failed to take Mao into account. The
matter developed this way:

In the beginning of 1972, a fame-hunting historical writer from America
named Roxanne Witke visited China for the first time as a reporter accompanying
Nixon. After she returned to her own country she wrote an article entitled
"Jiang Qing, Standard Bearer of China's Cultural Revolution" which heaped
some praise on Jiang Qing and earned her some favor. At the end of 1972,
Witke again visited China and indicated that she wanted to write an ode to
the "cultural revolution" to eliminate antagonistic feelings in the West
about it. After Jiang Qing learned of this, she immediately indicated her
willingness to provide the necessary information. Jiang Qing indicated to
Witke that she hoped Witke would write about her just as Edgar Snow wrote
about Mao in his biography; this was evidently in preparation for her ascen-
sion to the throne in terms of international public opinion. She received
Witke alone 10-odd times, speaking to her for over 60 hours and providing
her a large quantity of "raw material." Witke returned fully loaded and also
did not disappoint Jiang by writing the book "Empress of the Red Capital"
whose first edition was published in early 1974.

In the book "Empress of the Red Capital," Jiang Qing divulged a great deal
of party and state secrets; even the private life between her and Mao which
could hardly have been a matter of public concern was revealed with relish.
When the book was first published and came to the attention of ethnic
Chinese author Han Suyin, the latter was greatly surprised; it occurred to her
that the book would damage Mao's prestige, and she quickly submitted it to
Huang Hua, China's ambassador to the United Nations. Ultimately, vice min-
ister of foreign affairs Wang Hairong (granddaughter of Mao's cousin) took it
to Mao himself. Mao saw its Chinese version and discovered that Jiang Qing
had inflated her own influence as being above that of Mao himself; this became
intolerable to him. Besides, Jiang Qing shamelessly divulged to a foreigner
her loose life in the 1930's and her private life with Mao; this was like
smearing Mao. But what made him feel most regretful was that this book
surely was going to cause Jiang Qing to lose her right to organize a cabinet.

Mao felt that since this matter was reported to him by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, it would be impossible to keep it secret; he therefore invited Zhou
Enlai, Zhu De and Kang Sheng over and showed them the book, telling them that
"a treaty signed many years ago (author's note: meaning the resolution passed
by the Political Bureau in 1939 on restraining Jiang Qing) is here not
observed by her." He thus shirked his own responsibility; also, he penned
some words in the book; "ignorant and stupid; have her driven out of the
Political Bureau immediately, and let us part company." Zhou Enlai knew very
well that these were but words of temporary anger, and they also weighed very
little; they were indicative of merely an attitude that he had to express in
the face of the evidence of Jiang Qing's offense. Therefore, in order to
save Mao's face, Zhou penned his own suggestion: "Not to be implemented for
the time being." Thus no punishment was meted out to Jiang Qing. Mao also
penned on the inside cover of the book: "Jiang Qing has the desire of Wu
Zetian but not the latter's talent; she has Empress Lu's power, but the
latter's virtue." This fully revealed his sentiments of regret about how
Jiang Qing could not earn the people's support.

In 1975 the wife of Philippine President Marcos came to China for a visit;
Mao copied a few passages from Li Xiao's article "On Fate" in the Zhaoming
anthology to give to her as a souvenir. The poem reads:

"When a tree is taller than the rest of the forest, wind is bound to destroy
it;

"When a beach protrudes from the shore, the current is bound to rush against
it;

"When one's conduct is superior to others, the populace is bound to detract
him."

On the surface, these few passages seem to have been meant to praise Mrs
Marcos; in reality, they were meant to praise his own wife Jiang Qing and
lament the unfavorable situation in which she found herself because she had
incurred too many grievances among the people against her.

Witke's book caused Mao to lose points as well as face in front of his
rivals; it also caused Jiang to suffer a very grave setback. She was forced
to keep herself from the public for nearly half a year. While this news did
not show up in the press, it somehow went around unaided and became soon
spread across the country. In the 3 months of July, August and September of
1975, every family and every household was secretly or semi-publicly dis-
cussing this book and attributed the root of the matter to Mao's senility
and his trust of crafty sycophants.

The Chinese version of this book was internally printed and circulated to
some extent after Mao's death. The Chinese who have seen this book all sug-
gest that Witke's book has no value whatsoever because the data on which it
is based have all been altered and distorted by Jiang Qing; what her book has
done is but an incongruous elevation of a political prostitute, which is
equivalent to having written a campaign advertisement for this political
deceiver.

After this setback, Mao's health situation deteriorated; his inner self
hardly found satisfaction. But even while in such discomfiture, he still did
not forget to launch his attack against Zhou and even tried through such an
attack to let her ultimately accede to power.

The fact that Jiang Qing could not be put in the saddle with his help was one
of the things for which Mao Zedong felt the greatest of regrets.
"Self-examination" Undertaken While in Grave Illness, Isolation and Emptiness

In the last year of his life, especially in the several months after the successive deaths of Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, Mao became a sick, lonely and depressed old man. His illness had become grave, being unable to speak clearly or walk around and staying only in bed. Yet Jiang Qing neither looked after him nor worried about his predicament—she was too busy preparing to take over power.

Mao felt lonely; he lacked people who genuinely supported him. He was very much afraid of death; he was afraid of assassins, and he suspected all persons. He rarely moved about and was surrounded by guards. He always doubted the loyalty of his court guards, dismissing and replacing them often. Even his close friend Kang Sheng ultimately pretended to be sick and declined to come out and stayed away from him.

On 13 January 1976, Mao called forth Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, Hua Guofeng, Wu De, Wang Hairong and Mao Yuanxin and told them:

"It is rare that a man can live to 70 years of age; now I am more than 80 years old and when a man becomes old he always thinks about matters after his death. China has a saying which states: 'Final judgment can be passed on a person only when the lid is laid to his coffin.' Although the lid of my coffin is not yet laid, that'll be done soon, and final judgment can perhaps be passed already now. In my life I have done two things: one is to fight Chiang Kai-shek for several decades and drive him to a bunch of islands, and also to fight the war of resistance for 8 years and send the Japanese home. As we entered Beijing, we ultimately entered the Forbidden City. On this matter, few hold any different opinion; only a few have been murmuring around me and their desire is but to have that island (Taiwan) recovered early. Another, as you all know, is to start the cultural revolution; on this matter those who support me have been few but those who oppose me, quite numerous. Both of these matters are not yet completed; this bequest will have to be passed on to the next generation. Peaceful transition will be impossible; it looks as though it has to be made in instability. If we fail to handle it properly, there will be bloodshed. What are you going to do? What is the next generation going to do? Only heaven knows."

Mao did not write any will, because he understood that his will could not be put down in black and white. He had spent a period of several decades looking for foolhardy, loyal people in order to "entrust the orphan" to them, but such people are not very numerous, nor necessarily dependable. The above words were but a "self-examination" uttered by a lonely old man who felt that his perverse acts of a lifetime had been so unpopular that he had better set the tone of his will ahead of time.

It looks as though Mao was most afraid of his perverse acts becoming the subject of negation by posterity. About the "cultural revolution," for instance, Mao knew that it caused heaven as well as the people to feel angry. Yet he still stuck to his ground alone and insisted that it was correct. On the "cultural revolution" Mao also exercised "self-examination" on another
occasion. He said: "I would be satisfied if on the matter of the cultural revolution my merits and demerits could be appraised at 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively." He meant that people do not have to affirm 100 percent insofar as the "cultural revolution" is concerned; it would be enough for them to affirm 70 percent and disapprove of 30 percent. This illustrates that Mao refused to let go of this "creative measure" even at the time of his death. And one can hardly blame him, because the negation of the "cultural revolution" would be tantamount to negating Mao. How could he help feeling the lump in his mind?

This piece on "Mao Zedong's 27-year Rule" can now come to a close. Here there is no need to write any lengthy conclusion; the author only wishes to conclude this article with the following words:

Mao Zedong was never a Marxist; he was but a monarch in modern China. Looking at Mao Zedong's behavior in his lifetime as a whole, he was never one who could carry out any conscientious self-criticism, such as he had always asked others to do, nor was he one who could shoulder solemn responsibility in behalf of his party, the people and the state. He was one who put personal power and reputation above everything else. (End of entire article)
HOWE-ZHAO TALKS, MEETING WITH DENG XIAOPING DISCUSSED

HK310310 Hong Kong SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST in English 31 Jul 84 pp 1, 10

[Report from Terry Cheng in Beijing]

[Text] The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, is to meet China's leader, Mr Deng Xiaoping, tomorrow morning amid signs that the stumbling blocks in the negotiations over Hong Kong's future have been cleared.

And Sir Geoffrey may make a further visit to Peking in September, according to a British source—but only if it is "absolutely necessary."

Tomorrow's meeting is seen as confirmation at the highest level of what has been achieved during Sir Geoffrey's visit.

Britain's demand for a binding and detailed agreement on Hong Kong's future and China's demand for the establishment of a joint liaison office are thought to have been the main issues discussed over the past few days.

A British source said that terms used to describe meetings Sir Geoffrey and his party have had with their Chinese counterparts during his stay—"friendly," "cooperative" and "successful"—and those used to describe progress made—"substantial" and "significant"—had been carefully chosen by both sides.

He said they gave a pretty good impression of what has been going on in the past few days.

But while the indications are that the main obstacles have been overcome, official sources say a great deal of work remains to be done.

The British source that it was still too early to say when the negotiations would be completed.

He added that the regular meetings of the two negotiating teams and the joint working group would continue.

Today, Sir Geoffrey had talks with the Chinese prime minister, Mr Zhao Ziyang.

Both the Chinese and British sides described their meeting as "friendly and productive."
The British source said the meeting had "taken the talks a little bit forward."

During their 1 1/2-hour meeting in the Zhong Nan Hai, Mr Zhao said Sir Geoffrey's present trip, like his previous visit in April, had given a new impetus to the negotiations.

"The discussions demonstrated a spirit of setting great store by the overall situation, far-sightedness, friendship, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation between the two sides," he said.

"I hope that both sides will continue to display this spirit so that they will constitute lasting factor between the two countries."

The Chinese Government attached great importance to its relations with Britain, and the British Government attached great importance to its relations with China, he said.

"A successful settlement of the Hong Kong question, a question left over by history, will usher in a new high tide of comprehensive cooperation in Sino-British relations," Mr Zhao said.

Sir Geoffrey replied: "Discussions conducted between our two sides during my visit here have deepened our mutual understanding.

"I believe that this has provided us with a basis for future cooperation."

British officials present at the meeting included the Deputy Undersecretary at the foreign office, Sir Percy Craddock, the British ambassador to China, Sir Richard Evans, the governor, Sir Edward Youde, Hong Kong's political adviser, Mr Robin McLaren, and the leader of the British team in the joint working group on Hong Kong's future, Dr David Wilson.

Chinese officials attending included the assistant foreign minister, Mr Zhou Nan, and the Chinese ambassador to Britain, Mr Chen Shoayuan.

There were no further contacts at ministerial level today and no further meetings of the ad hoc groups established yesterday.

However, there were contacts between individual officials from the two sides.

Sir Geoffrey toured the Summer Palace in the afternoon, accompanied by Mr Zhou Nan.

He told reporters there: "Taking together the work that we have been doing over the past few years, we have achieved significant progress.

"But there are substantial matters still to be dealt with."

He added that his meeting with Mr Zhao had made a important contribution to that progress.

The fact that Sir Geoffrey had time to visit the Summer Palace was seen as another sign that differences needing to be dealt with had been largely resolved.
The tour was announced only this morning and appeared to have been hastily arranged.

This evening, Sir Geoffrey had a dinner of Peking duck with the director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, Mr Ji Pengfei. The two men were said to have had a formal 40-minute discussion about Hong Kong.

Tomorrow, Sr Geoffrey will meet Mr Deng at the Great Hall of the People.

A British source said Sir Geoffrey regarded this meeting as a symbol of the very serious and hard-working talks that had taken place in the past few days.

It would not be just a courtesy call.

The British side hoped the meeting will help give the right impetus to the remaining negotiations, he added.

The Chinese foreign minister, Mr Wu Xueqian, is unlikely to attend the meeting. He will leave Peking for a visit to Latin American tomorrow morning.

Mr Wu postponed his trip for one day to attend the meeting this morning between Sir Geoffrey and Mr Zhao.