NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.


Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.
EAST EUROPE REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

BULGARIA

Bulgarian Daily Carries Articles on Turkey
(OTECHESTVEN FRONT, 30 Jan 85) ............................... 1

Libya's Jallud Views Differences in East, West Missiles
(BTA, 3 Feb 85) .................................................. 3

Briefs
Bulgaria's Filipov Visits Oil Refinery .......................... 4
Indian Ambassador's Reception ................................. 4

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Growth of Conservatism in United States Noted
(Oskar Krejci; RUDE PRAVO, 22 Dec 84) ...................... 5

Past, Present Solidarity With Poland Lauled
(Editorial; RUDE PRAVO, 15 Dec 84) ......................... 8

Misinterpretation of 1945 Prague Uprising Alleged
(Vitezslav Havlicek; RUDE PRAVO, 28 Dec 84) ........... 11

Slovak Autonomy, Federalism Described
(Viktor Meier; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 13 Dec 84) 14

Bilak Addresses East Slovak Aktiv
(RUDE PRAVO, 26 Jan 85) ...................................... 17

Vatican Cites Press Agency on Slovakia 'Denouncement' Service
(Vatican City International Service, 23 Jan 85) ........... 18

More Legal Responsibility, Education Urged
(Zdenek Ceska; NOVA MYSL, No 12, 1984) .................. 19

Socialist Way of Life Defined
(RUDE PRAVO, 12 Jan 85) ...................................... 25
Social Ills Discussed  
(PRAVDA, 22 Dec 84) ..................................... 28

Demography, Cultural Presence of Hungarian Minority in Slovakia  
(Viktor Meier; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 24 Dec 84) .... 30

Political Function of Art Affirmed  
(Editorial; RUDE PRAVO, 18 Dec 84) ......................... 33

Briefs  
Drunk Drivers .................................................. 36

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Recent Emigrant Speaks of Widespread Disillusionment  
(F. Fuchs; DIE WELT, 6 Dec 84) .............................. 37

People's Theater Closes Comedy for Political Reasons  
(DER TAGESSPIEGEL, 21 Dec 84) .............................. 40

HUNGARY

Employment Situation, Past, Future  
(MUNKAUCYI SZEMLE, No 10, 1984) ........................... 41

Employment Prognosis for 1984, by Sandor Berenyi  
Employment Situation, Work Force Composition, by  
Istvan Makay, Erzsebet Balint

POLAND

Kuron's Political Activities Excoriated  
(Jerzy A. Selecki; TRYBUNA LUDU, 10 Dec 84) .............. 67

Failure To Overcome Social Contradictions Analyzed  
(Karol B. Janowski; STUDIA SOCJOLOGICZNE, No 3, Sep-Dec 84) 71

Church Publication Criticized for Comments on Atheists  
(ARGUMENTY, No 49, 2 Dec 84) ............................. 97

Legal Intricacies Concerning Trade Unions Explained  
(Walery Masewicz; RZECZPOSPOLITA, 21 Dec 84) ........... 100

YUGOSLAVIA

Western Comment on Situation in Kosovo  
(Viktor Meier; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, various dates) .................................................. 104

Western Report on Differing Croatian Attitudes Toward Church  
(J. G. Reissmueller; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 8 Jan 85) 112
BULGARIAN DAILY CARRIES ARTICLES ON TURKEY

AU311611 [Editorial Report] Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT in Bulgarian on 30 January carries on pages 6 and 7 a special supplement called "Panorama" which is devoted to Bulgaria's neighboring countries in the Balkans, and to Turkey in particular.

The following article deals with subjects relating to Turkey:

A 1,300-word article by Delcho Balabanov on page 6, entitled: "They Are Dealing Espionage," is concerned with the "active interference of U.S. intelligence services in Turkey's political life." The article states that Paul Henze began his "brilliant career" in Turkey in the fifties, when the Democratic Party Government under Bayar and Menderes "closely linked itself with American imperialism, thus betraying the Kemalist principles of an independent foreign policy." Balabanov further describes the alleged activities of various CIA agents in Turkey during the sixties under the "cover of the Peace Corps." The author also mentions John Barron's book on the KGB, which "insinuates that at the beginning of the sixties the KGB organized terrorist groups on certain Arab countries' territories, which subsequently joined the left-radical youth movement, with the purpose of destabilizing the situation in Turkey. The book also propagates the idea that the KGB has periodically passed various documents to Turkish political leaders unmasking the activities of the United States."

Citing the Turkish daily MILLIYET, Delcho Balabanov makes this claim about Paul Henze's activities and identity: "He deals in espionage and is a specialist on the problems of Turkey, attached to the U.S. National Security Council."

The second, 600-word article about Turkey, by BTA correspondent Lyubomir Gabrovski, is on the same page and bears the title: "The 'Red Signal' Is On." It is devoted to problems of air pollution in the capital Ankara, and is based on materials from the daily MILLIYET. Gabrovski claims that the situation in the city is so alarming that "students are granted unexpected vacations, because the air outside is dangerous to their health." Gabrovski adds that "the municipal and state authorities are greatly concerned about the situation" and that "a group of experts from abroad" has come to examine the air pollution situation in Ankara. He further describes the measures adopted and those mapped out for the future by the government in order to improve the situation.
A third, 600-word article on page 7, by Stefka Purvanova, is entitled: "A New Agrarian Reform" and gives details on the Turkish Reform Law of 1984, which was adopted by the parliament. Stefka Purvanova bases her article on reports from Turkish dailies and on the parliamentary debates about the subject. Citing a "Study of Research Services Attached to the Parliament," Purvanova states that "Above all, the agrarian reform serves the development of capitalism in agriculture."

None of the three articles mentions Bulgarian-Turkish relations.

CSO: 2200/100
LIBYA'S JALLUD VIEWS DIFFERENCES IN EAST, WEST MISSILES

AU031821 Sofia BTA in English 1726 GMT 3 Feb 85

[Text] Tripoli, 3 Feb (BTA Special Correspondent)—Yesterday, after the final meeting with the Bulgarian prime minister, Mr Grisha Filipov, the member of the leadership of the Libyan Revolution, Major Jallud answered questions put to him by the special correspondent of the BULGARIAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY, travelling with the delegation.

Asked about the tasks the First-of-September Revolution should solve, he said that the most important aim at present is to build a prosperous, democratic society, a true Jamahiriya, which means people's power, to build socialism. He gave a very high assessment to the concluded talks with the Bulgarian delegation and added in this connection that Libya's relations with the other socialist countries, too, rested on trust, friendship, and mutual understanding.

Asked how Libya views the deployment of the American "Pershing" and winged missiles in Western Europe, Major Jallud said: "In principle we stand for the complete disarmament of the two great powers, but we think that the American missiles are missiles of war, while the Soviet missiles are missiles of peace, missiles which stand against war. We are particularly alarmed by the deployment of missiles in south Italy, which pose a direct threat for us. We are cooperating with the progressive forces in Italy and with the peace movement in Western Europe, because we believe that the public opinion can play a role in averting a nuclear war."

CSO: 2200/100
BULGARIA

BRIEFS

BULGARIA'S FILIPOV VISITS OIL REFINERY--Al Zawiya, Jumada Awal 10, 1 Feb (JAMAHIRIYAH News Agency)--Grisha Filipov, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and prime minister of Bulgaria visited early today Al Zawiya oil refinery. He toured with accompanying delegation [through] different departments of the refinery and was briefed about this petroleum achievement, realized thanks to the Great Al Fateh revolution. [Text] [Tripoli JANA in English 1745 GMT 1 Feb 85 LD]

INDIAN AMBASSADOR'S RECEPTION--The friendly people of India celebrated the 35th anniversary of their country's proclamation as a republic yesterday. On this occasion Baglodi Deva Rao, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of India, gave a reception at the Sofia VIP Hotel. Comrades Ongyan Doynov, Petur Tanchev, Stanko Todorov, and Chudimir Aleksandrov, leaders of public organizations, of various associatons, members of parliament, and high-ranking functionaries from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, scientists, cultural figures, and journalists attended the reception. Heads and members of diplomatic missions accredited to our country also attended the reception. The reception proceeded in a cordial, friendly atmosphere. [Text] [Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 27 Jan 85 p 2 AU]

CSO: $200/100
GROWTH OF CONSERVATISM IN UNITED STATES NOTED

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 22 Dec 84 p 4

[Article by Oskar Krejci: "Ideological Struggle and International Relations"]

[Excerpt] The exacerbation of the ideological struggle on an international scale has been produced by a series of laws of our epoch. The prior recognition of the existing power balance between the USSR and the United States led more than one bourgeois theoretician and politician to the conviction that socialism is impossible to destroy by force. That recognition, however, moved them to look for new ways to destroy socialism. This is the fundamental reason why, since the beginning of the 1960's, ideology is spoken of as the so-called fourth dimension of American foreign policy, or as the "public diplomacy" of the United States.

Certain new forms for the use of ideology in the foreign policy of imperialist states are made possible by the development of the media. As a result of the increase in economic, cultural, scientific and athletic exchanges, and particularly in connection with the development of communications technology, the worldwide ideological struggle has become more direct--it now touches more or less every person living in socialist countries. At the same time, all kinds of anticomunist theoretical centers are analyzing the social consciousness, social structure and political organization of socialist countries, looking for the most suitable topics of ideological manipulation and evaluating the effectiveness of their utilization in propaganda. Ideological activity growing into a semblance of a psychological war against real socialism has become more systematic in the foreign policy of imperialist states. Most of all, during the entire post-war period, bourgeois social science has been attempting to find a concept that would counterbalance the Marxist-Leninist notion of social progress. Thus the ideological struggle becomes ever more acute.

However, the most important changes of the contents of imperialist propaganda in the sphere of foreign policy are not connected with any shifts in bourgeois theoretical research. Those shifts are caused by the fact that in the most prominent imperialist states conservative doctrine has taken the place of liberal doctrine as the most important component of bourgeois ideology. Bourgeois social political doctrines, be they conservatism, liberalism, fascism, etc., are the most crystallized definitions of particular class interests. They always represent a specific arrangement of bourgeois theories, symbols, traditions and slogans.
Any changes in preference given to one doctrine or another greatly influence the changes in the behavior of imperialist states. "The bourgeoisie of all nations invariably works out two systems of rule, two methods of struggle for its interests and for the defense of its dominance, and those two methods either alternate or mix in various combinations," V. I. Lenin pointed out. "These are, first, the method of coercion; the method of refusing the workers' movement any concession, the method of supporting every old and antiquated institution... The second one is the method of 'liberalism,' i.e., a method which is directed at widening political rights, reforms, concessions, etc."

As components of bourgeois ideology, both doctrines encompass a whole series of social principles: maintaining and developing private property in the means of production, the idea of the immutability of the division of society into classes, anticommunism, etc. Those principles, to be sure, are differently motivated and diversely manifested. Each doctrine contains certain particular agenda, prevalent value orientations in resolutions and the behavior of bourgeois politicians. This is also valid for shifts in content and forms of propaganda aimed across the borders. One must not forget that according to the bourgeois conception the confrontation of opposite ideologies in international relations is nothing like an academic discussion or a simple exchange of information. According to these notions, ideological struggle is the deliberate participation of aggressive imperialist foreign policy in the national political battle with communism.

The difference between the two methods of the defense of the bourgeois state, described by V. I. Lenin, was vividly manifested when liberalism was replaced by conservativism in the United States at the end of the 1970's and beginning of the 1980's. According to the liberals, capitalism in contemporary bourgeois society has undergone a complex transformation. For the conservatives, capitalism has become the best possible social order, requiring no fundamental reforms. The liberals saw in socialism a historical phenomenon which could be "modified" by appropriate methods. The conservatives see in socialism the "empire of evil," a historical error. Whereas a liberal spoke of the great complexity of international relations and of the necessity to respect the balance of power, a conservative is speaking of the existential necessity of defeating socialism.

Those changes in outlook do not concern international relations alone. Whereas a liberal emphasized state interference in the domain of capitalist economy, a conservative calls for the liberation of market forces. Whereas a liberal, in the illusionary spirit of the bourgeois reformism, believed in the possibility of providing for a social policy and the universal welfare for all citizens of a capitalist state, a conservative, far from expressing such a belief, speaks even about the harmfulness of such a social policy. A liberal believed knowledge to be the way along which bourgeois society could develop without any class struggle. A conservative puts to doubt the idea of progress, does not believe in the ability of human reason to handle social affairs and wants to secure class stratification by propagating "western traditions" and religious faith. At the same time, religion, considered by the liberals to be a matter of individual conscience, has become in the hands of the conservatives a weapon in state combat.
We can be sure that the attempts of the conservatives to solve the economic, social and political problems of capitalism will turn out to be futile, since they act against historical progress. Presently, however, conservatism keeps strengthening its positions in bourgeois ideology and politics. Therefore, the scientific criticism of conservatism is today the general ground for the analysis of the newest manifestations of bourgeois ideology.

It is, therefore, a most important ideological and cultural task of Marxist–Leninist philosophy to contribute its analysis of the value structure of bourgeois conservatism to the political and ideological work of the party. Such an analysis would be a prerequisite for both an understanding of the nature of forces that have formed the new conservative bloc, and the familiarization with the real aims of the numerous devices of contemporary American politics. At the same time, it would also be a necessary condition for the understanding of the particular manifestations of the deepening of the crisis of capitalism.
PAST, PRESENT SOLIDARITY WITH POLAND LAUDED

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 15 Dec 84 p 1

[Editorial: "Hand in Hand With Fraternal Poland"]

[Excerpt] The traditions of Czechoslovak-Polish friendship were forged in the struggle against our common enemy. Fraternal solidarity which helped us mutually to overcome many obstacles on our road to a new social order was also born in the struggle against fascism and in the years of the postwar renewal. This solidarity does not depend on any vicissitudes of fortune. It is a new type of international relations in history, which was created as a result of the establishment of the socialist community; their character and principles also apply fully and invariably in relations between the CSSR and Poland.

In our country we are following the events in fraternal Poland with considerable interest and we are gratified by every success achieved in the process of economic and political consolidation by its progressive forces under the leadership of the Polish United Workers Party. One of the specific and effective expressions of our solidarity with the efforts of the Polish communists and other patriotic and progressive forces striving to overcome the consequences of the past period of crisis is our mutual cooperation in every area of political, economic and social life. It is developing on several levels and producing fruitful results. At their meeting on Thursday the representatives of the CSSR and Poland were able to note that the decisions adopted during the visit of our party and state delegation in the Polish People's Republic in November of 1983 are being successfully implemented. Our cooperation in production in metallurgy, machine and electrical engineering, chemical industry and other branches of the economy is progressing satisfactorily. Both parties also strongly emphasized further intensification of our cooperation in branches with promising outlooks for the future, such as electronics, microelectronics and robotization. Considerable growth has been achieved in the exchange of goods, particularly in the share of products delivered according to the agreement on cooperation in production and specialization.

The auspicious current situation in this area of mutual relations offers a realistic foundation for setting up additional programs of coordination of the upcoming 5-year plans for economic development and for preparations of a long-range plan for cooperation in economy and R&D.
The multilateral bonds reflected in our daily life are the specific contents of our ideological and programmatic unity. The highest representatives of our countries therefore highly lauded the preceding development of relations between the CPCZ and the Polish United Workers' Party, between our judicial councils, governments, the CSSR's National Front and the Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth of the Polish People's Republic, the trade union and other public organizations. They spoke in favor of further expansion and improvement of those relations also on the level of the krajs, towns, factories and other institutions.

The continuous growth of the authority and power of the socialist community is a guarantee that imperialism will not succeed in imposing its supremacy in international relations. For that reason socialist countries are a constant target of ideological, political and economic attacks and discriminations which have assumed an increasingly menacing form, particularly in the recent period. Our enemies are trying to take advantage of economic problems, national and religious feelings, and in the spirit of modern-day "crusades" against socialism, they are betting on the policy of escalating confrontation. Attempts by the United States and other NATO countries to gain strategic military supremacy have put the international situation into a very complex and dangerous position; they threaten to introduce a hectic arms race into outer space. It is therefore the most meaningful task of our days to eliminate the danger of nuclear confrontation by deescalating the arms race, particularly by abolishing nuclear weapons. Peace initiatives developed last year at the session of the Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Pact member countries in Prague and the decisions adopted at the summit meetings held in Moscow in 1983 and this year have pointed out the ways toward that goal.

Peace is our first and foremost wish. Therefore, together with the USSR and other socialist states we are supporting all initiatives for its consolidation and we are ready to devote all our forces to their implementation. The policy of detente is the only effective way to resolve these most burning problems of our days and we may return to it only by means of honest and constructive discussions based on the principle of equal rights.

In this conjunction the highest Czechoslovak and Polish representatives welcomed the agreement between the USSR and the United States on discussions of issues related to the reduction of nuclear weapons and armaments in space. Every positive step in this direction will place our planet farther from the danger and the unimaginable consequences of a worldwide nuclear conflict.

In Europe, which already twice in this country has been the central arena of the greatest war conflicts in the history of mankind thus far, consolidation of security and improvement of the general international atmosphere is of extraordinary importance, all the more so because our continent is again playing the leading role in the plans of the enemies.
of peace and understanding. In this respect particularly disturbing is the revival of the revanchist forces in the FRG and their crusade against the outcome of World War II, sealed not only by the Yalta and Potsdam agreements but above all by the lives and blood of tens of millions of those who had participated in defeating Hitler's fascism. Current activities of the revanchist forces not only trample in the crudest way the memory of those who made the highest sacrifice, but also introduce a new, dangerous element in the international atmosphere in Europe. Next year we shall celebrate the 40th anniversary of the USSR's victory over fascism; it is our duty to do everything in our power to prevent another tragedy such as the last war.

As the nations of the CSSR and Poland stood side by side in their joint struggle against fascism, today again they stand on the same side of the barricade in a class-divided world. We belong in the fraternal community of socialist countries, we proceed from the same principles, we share the same goals and the same ideals. We make no distinction between the attacks waged by the enemies of socialism against one of our countries or against our whole community. This unity is one of our first and foremost internationalist duties. It was the same in the times when the domestic and foreign reaction tried to uproot the socialist system of people's Poland, and so it is now when people's Poland is striving to come to grips with will be in the future years, one of the factors which undoubtedly will contribute to that process.

Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski's fraternal working visit to Prague is another source of many inspirations in expanding and intensifying our mutual relations.

9004
CSO: 2400/173
MISINTERPRETATION OF 1945 PRAGUE UPRISING ALLEGED

Prague RUDÉ PRAVO in Czech 28 Dec 84 p 6

[Article by Vitezslav Havlicek: "Are They Refusing To Learn From History?"]

[Text] The lesson to be learned from the defeat of Nazism obviously is not to some people's liking in the FRG. Particularly those who do not mean to reconcile themselves with the results of World War II are literally afraid to take a realistic look at the historic events of 40 years ago. The extensive psychological preparation of these circles for the May days next year is evident already today. Realizing that it will be impossible for him not to appear in public in this context, Premier Kohl announced that he would speak in the former Belsen concentration camp on 8 May 1985.

While almost the entire world will recall that day as the 40th anniversary of the defeat of Nazism and of liberation, for H. Kohl it is the day which "in the most effective way reminds us of the lowest point in our history." This definition of 8 May 1945 obviously is to set the tone for its entire official evaluation in the FRG which gave rise to sharp protests by the progressive FRG public. VVN, the Union of Antifascists, sees in such evaluation of the liberation day an insult to the victims of fascism, to all those who had fought against the criminal regime.

In particular, various "historical documentaries" on TV and in periodicals are part of the campaign in the FRG in connection with the approaching anniversary. They skillfully mix truth with half-truths and explicit lies especially where through omission or distortion of certain events it is possible to foment anticommunism and anti-Sovietism.

A typical example of such an attitude is the series of articles in the Hamburg weekly DER SPIEGEL which tries to interpret the events of the final weeks of World War II in accordance with official West German ideas. The manner in which the historical facts are manipulated is far remote from seriousness and objectivity, which this periodical otherwise claims as the fundamental principles by which its reporting is guided.
For us who spent the last days of the war in Prague the manner in which the
course of those events is distorted and used for anti-Soviet provocations
is grossly insulting. The beginning of the Prague Uprising is generally de-
picted realistically, although Nazi resistance, such as occupation of the
radio station, is passed over in silence. While the arduous struggle of the
Prague inhabitants and bestial crimes of fascists are not mentioned at all,
extraordinary attention is paid by DER SPIEGEL to a detailed description of
the participation of groups of the so-called Vlasov Army, whose members want-
ed to redeem their treachery in the last moments of the war.

"The Vlasov soldiers joined the insurgents and liberated them from the German
encirclement on 7 May," the weekly describes the situation in Prague, and
then continues: "The first Soviet tanks arrived in the city on the Vltava
on 9 May. According to the Soviet and Czechoslovak interpretation of his-
tory, ever since they have been described as the 'liberators' of the city,
which in fact had been saved by their mortal enemies, Vlasov's anticommu-
nist groups...."

Although almost 40 years have passed since those May days in 1945, I still
vividly remember all those events. Everybody who lived through those his-
toric days in Prague as I did—either fighting on the barricades or as a
"hostage" of the Nazis—knows that no liberation took place on 7 May. It
was on 8 May, and in fact even after the capitulation during the night of
9 May the Nazis raged most furiously and committed the most horrible crimes.
Hundreds of commemorative plaques throughout Prague offer sufficient evidence
of this. The worst recollection for me is the murder of victims from Zelena
Liska [Green Fox] and the exhumation of a mass grave near the present-day
bus terminal at Pankrac.

What the situation in Prague was prior to the arrival of the Soviet Army is
absolutely clear also to all those who had heard the appeals of the radio
Prague for help—in English and Russian. The Soviet Army reacted to it.
This fact cannot be covered up by any speculation and still less by in-
creased emphasis on the significance of local battles between Vlasov soldiers
and the Nazis destroying the insurgent Prague.

The distorted interpretation of historic events in DER SPIEGEL cannot be
excused by inadequate information, by accidental mistake. It is impossible
to pass over it in silence. There is no doubt that this series of articles
has a definite purpose. It represents an attempt to make use of the in-
famous and well-known slogan that a lie repeated a hundred times eventually
becomes the truth....

This was actually confirmed by the reaction to the letter which was sent to
the editor of DER SPIEGEL pointing out the discrepancies between the asser-
tions in the articles and historical reality. Instead of admitting mis-
takes—the editorial board had enough time to verify the facts—1 month
elapsed from the receipt of the letter to the publication of the reply. DER
SPIEGEL stuck to its "interpretation." The editorial board maintains that
neither "infamous assertions" nor fabrication of the "revanchist press" are
involved.
"It was exactly so," writes S. Kogelfranz on behalf of the editorial board, even if allegedly according to our understanding of history this "must not be so"...

According to DER SPIEGEL, Nazi crimes which we witnessed in Prague on 8 May 1945 simply never took place. Hundreds of Soviet soldiers killed and buried in Prague and its environs did not lay down their lives in the battle for the liberation of Prague and the final defeat of the Nazis, who were committing murders south of Prague as late as 12 May 1945.

The absurdity and untenability of such an assertion, however, may be obvious even to Mr Kogelfranz himself. And so he eventually tried to subdue the provocative, anti-Soviet and anticommunist tone of the DER SPIEGEL articles. At the conclusion of his letter concerning the articles he stated: "The decisive role of the Soviet Army in the defeat of Hitler's aggressive military machinery is thereby by no means affected or challenged."

Certainly. But this is precisely what the articles mentioned above attempted to do. And together with them also the authors of other articles who want to cover up not only the historical facts, but especially the warning lesson which must be drawn from them.

10501
CSO: 2400/186
SLOVAK AUTONOMY, FEDERALISM DESCRIBED

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 13 Dec 84 p 12

[Article by Viktor Meier: "Slovakia Is Self-Confident; Czechoslovak Federalism Today"]

[Text] Pressburg, December—Of the few acquisitions which the year 1968 left behind in Czechoslovakia, the most important is the "federalization" of the country, the creation of two entities with equal rights. Since the beginning of 1969, there have been a Czech republic and a Slovak republic as well as proportional representation of Slovaks in the federal government. The Slovaks began to transform their capital, Bratislava, the former Pressburg, into a metropolis. This was not totally beneficial to the city. For example, down in front of the old Grassalkovich palace, a broad, completely unstructured, formless space now lies. A highway was routed through the middle of the old city to the new Danube bridge, right past the door of one of the most beautiful churches in the city. "It's a wonder they didn't manage to run the road right through the church," an official guide actually says. In front of the Renaissance courtyard of the old national gallery, an aluminum frieze was erected; fortunately, according to the people, that will make it easier to tear down. But otherwise everyone will admit that autonomy agrees with the Slovaks. The interventions were not so severe here after 1968 as in the Czech regions; this could probably be attributed to the fact, among other things, that the year 1968 was for the Slovaks in general and also for many of their intellectuals primarily a struggle for autonomy and recognition of national independence. When that seemed to be won, both the functionaries and a large number of the representatives of cultural life were pleased. Of course, there were purges in Slovakia too, and of course, a political police force is also watching for "deviations" in Bratislava. Nevertheless, the climate is different: more self-confident, more open, more optimistic—in general freer. The people in Prague say that in Bratislava shopping is better, yet the people in Pressburg dispute this, claiming that Prague is better taken care of. Slovak television programming is generally more original and more objective. Also, certain people in Prague are not happy that, as a result of proportional representation in federal jobs, so many Slovaks, all of whom are guaranteed housing, are flooding into the capital.

The Slovaks call the federal system now in effect "symmetric" as opposed to that before 1969 which merely provided for certain autonomous rights for Slovakia under a council of "commissars." Today each of the two republics of the union
is under its own government with ministers. The two republics have exclusive control of certain jurisdictions. Thus there is no minister of culture in the federal government and none for education. Also some of the economic ministries are only on the level of the government of the republics. However, Czechoslovak federalism is not actually totally "symmetric." The Czech republic, which includes the historical countries of Bohemia and Moravia as well as the Czechoslovak region of Silesia, is not so embedded in the popular consciousness nor within the government as the Slovak republic. This is demonstrated also in the organizational statute of the Communist Party: there is a communist party in Slovakia, but only a party "buro" in the Czech republic. Thus, in practice, basically it all comes down to autonomy for the Slovaks, admittedly with a strong involvement of Slovaks in the federal government. President Husak is a Slovak.

Our questions about the strength of the independence of Slovakia are answered as follows by the editors of the Slovak party organ PRAVDA: Above all, it is said, the unity of the Czechoslovak economic arena is emphasized; an evolution of the Yugoslavian type would consequently be impossible. For certain economic sectors, such as energy supply or heavy industry, and also for foreign trade, jurisdiction lies exclusively with the federation. There is a special economic plan for Slovakia. It covers those enterprises and objects which first do not fall under the sovereignty of the federation and secondly are headquartered in Slovakia. It can happen, or so we hear, that enterprises headquartered in Slovakia may have affiliates in Czech territory; these also fall under the authority of the Slovak economic plan and the Slovak ministries. The converse holds for Slovak affiliates of Czech enterprises. Thus the areas of jurisdiction of the economic plans do not absolutely coincide with territorial boundaries. The same is true for the national budget of Slovakia, which, of course, covers the jurisdictions of the Slovak republic, but by no means all of the federal business activities which transpire in Slovakia.

Immediately after the introduction of the federal system, the budgets were much more strictly divided than they are now; and the influence of Slovak authorities on events in their republic was more comprehensively interpreted. This is readily admitted. It seems as if the increased influence of Slovakia and the greater Slovak participation in the exercise of federal power have reduced the over-sensitivity in Slovakia so that, especially in the economic sector, Czechoslovak unity is more pronounced than it was 10 years ago.

For a long time, even before the war, Slovakia was considered reactionary and therefore in need of a certain sponsorship. In Slovakia under communist rule and also since 1968 many large and modern factories have been built; today Slovak industry is on the whole much more modern than its Czech counterpart. This also contributes to the greater self-esteem of the Slovaks. Today the levels of economic development are essentially even. Of about 15 million inhabitants of Czechoslovakia, scarcely 5 million live in Slovakia which is involved in the acquisition of about 30 percent of Czechoslovak national income. Also about one-third of all today's investments go to Slovakia. According to many people, the problem of Slovak backwardness has finally been remedied.

Of course, we also hear critical voices in Bratislava. In fact, a large share of the newly developed industry, for example the oil and petrochemical industries, is under federal jurisdiction; but these economic sectors have great
significance for Slovakia. Some people are therefore wondering whether, indirectly through the theory of the unified Czechoslovak economy, Slovak autonomy might again be whittled away; in a new centralization the Czechs would again be the stronger partners. It is said that Slovakia would then end up, like the republics in the Soviet Union, with essentially only "cultural autonomy"; this, however, would not suffice. In conversation one learns that one way to counteract such developments would be to strengthen individual enterprises and to free them from the central apron strings. From this, we were told, could result a sort of indirect support for Slovak autonomy.

It seems in Bratislava that those are, for now, mostly problems for the future. Right now, as far as we can tell, there is no "Slovak problem" in Czechoslovakia. The more relaxed internal climate, compared with that in the Czech regions, is a fundamental factor. In Slovakia, individuals who already held significant offices in 1968 are still governing in influential positions: Jozef Lenart is first party secretary; Peter Colotka is head of the government; Vilian Salgovic who, during the course of the "Normalization," returned from the Stalinistic past, is currently only a member of the Slovak Communist Party presidium, and, for a long time, has not held such a strong position as has often been assumed abroad.

12666
CSO: 2300/183
BILAK ADDRESSES EAST SLOVAK AKTIV

AU281205 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 26 Jan 85 p 1

["(EDK)"-signed report: "We Will Fight For Peace"]

[Excerpts] Kosice—Vasil Bilak, Presidium member and secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, spoke this Friday [25 January] in Kosice to the aktiv of party and state functionaries of the [East Slovak] Region on the topical issues of the current domestic and foreign policy. He particularly emphasized the need to intensify the struggle for peace. "We will spare no effort or means to ensure the conditions of a peaceful development; because socialism can be built only in peace," Comrade Bilak stressed.

In a further part of his statement he dealt with the current international situation, which is most complicated. If the Reagan government has to date been using the argument that, following the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, the security of the world would be increased and the USSR would become "more acquiescent" in negotiations, then developments have shown that these hopes have not materialized.

Comrade V. Bilak then dealt with the conditions under which the U.S.-USSR negotiations took place. He stressed that the struggle for peace has not ended. Neither has imperialism's fight against socialism, which continues in new forms. The imperialists are increasingly showing their effort to escalate psychowar, to revive nationalism and chauvinism, and to support all that is reactionary and that could corrode the unity of the socialist countries and destabilize the states which are in favor of progress in general. However, the imperialists' wish is one thing, Comrade Bilak said, and reality is another. And the reality is that Comrade Gromyko's meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State has strengthened the prospects of preserving peace. But one should not succumb to illusions that everything will be a simple procedure. We, too, must contribute to this by our conscientious and devoted work and by fulfilling all the tasks set for us by the CPCZ. At the same time Comrade Bilak expressed the conviction that we will all concentrate on this work and on preparing the 17th CPCZ Congress.

In conclusion Comrade Bilak replied to a number of questions put to him by the participants in the aktiv meeting.
VATICAN CITES PRESS AGENCY ON SLOVAKIA 'DENOUNCEMENT' SERVICE

LD232227 Vatican City International Service in Slovak 1845 GMT 23 Jan 85

[Text] Bratislava: According to the KIPA press agency, a secret denouncement service is being organized in Slovakia so that police can follow the religious activity of priests and common people more easily. Because the reviving religious movement is spreading especially among students, the police is particularly attempting to recruit denouncers from student circles. According to a letter from central Slovakia, a certain Jan Kracky is particularly ruthless. Complaints about him are arriving from all sides, as well as pleas for help.

According to KIPA, Kracky invites young students to attend pious acts and offers them better and more favorable positions, and asks them in repayment to engage in the denouncement service for state security [police]. When unsuccessful, he has the students concerned watched and calls them for interrogation after which they return exhausted and shocked. He does not spare threats, asserting that he can run them over and so on. He even drags girls into the denouncement service. According to KIPA, the center of Kracky's activity is Liptovsky Mikulas. KIPA ends its report by posing the question whether this is authorized by the Ministry of the Interior or whether he [Kacky] does this himself for career reasons.

CSO: 2400/241
MORE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY, EDUCATION URGED

Prague NOVA MYSL in Czech No 12, 1984 pp 3-13

[Article by Zdenek Ceska: "To Strengthen the Socialist Legal Conscience of the Citizens"]

[Excerpts] One of the objectives of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in planning to build a developed socialist society is the education of people to think and act in a socialist way. The formation, strengthening and intensifying of the socialist legal conscience of the citizens is an important task in such an endeavor.

The socialist legal conscience is an integral part of the socialist social conscience which, besides political, philosophical, moral, esthetic and other ideas and concepts, includes notions on the state and the law and related opinions.

Just as the socialist social conscience, the socialist legal conscience has a class substance. In its entity, the socialist legal conscience represents the legal conscience of the working class, the vanguard of a socialist society. This does not necessarily mean that all our citizens are instilled with a socialist legal conscience. Although the majority of our working people identify with the legal conscience of the working class, there are individual citizens, even groups of citizens whose legal conscience is not socialist but indeed is in direct contradiction to it. These people living among us used to belong to the bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie and are still not reconciled with the socialist system of our country; their thinking and feelings remain influenced by the obsolete notions of times gone by. The influence of bourgeois propaganda from abroad should not be underestimated, either; it tries to keep alive such outdated ideas. As a result, there exists in our society -- besides the common socialist legal conscience -- an individual or group legal conscience which may either approximate the socialist legal conscience or be in direct contradiction to it. Our task therefore should be a gradual restriction of such an individual or group legal conscience and its ever increasing identification with the socialist legal conscience.

What then should be understood by the term "legal conscience?" This question has been answered in many ways, even in socialist legal literature. From all the relevant points of view, it may be deduced that legal conscience represents
a synthesis of ideas, concepts, notions and feelings related to state and law. It is a subjective relationship of the citizens to state and law, their conviction of what is just or unjust, legal or illegal. Legal conscience also includes evaluation of the existing law and its application by the state authorities, as well as concepts about what should be legally regulated in the future and how (this is then a matter concerning considerations both de lege lata and de lege ferenda). Legal conscience also contains the relation of the citizens to their rights and duties. If we talk about socialist legal conscience, then all that forms such legal conscience has to have a socialist content resulting from the Marxist-Leninist world outlook.

It is questionable that legal conscience comprises legal knowledge as well. I believe that this question should definitely be answered in the affirmative. Legal knowledge undoubtedly influences legal conscience, regardless of whether it concerns people with full legal education or those who, while not educated in law, are nevertheless in contact with certain legal matters (either professionally, like officials of national committees, or for some other reason, like special interest work in the case of motor vehicle drivers or hunters). Similarly, the same would apply to persons simply interested in the legal regulation of a specific field, e.g., penal, labor or family law. It may be said that every citizen has legal conscience, be it a man without any formal knowledge of law, or a judge, public prosecutor, or attorney—so that the question is only how much the legal conscience of each individual is influenced by a concrete knowledge of law. We are sometimes talking about the professional legal conscience of jurists. But even here it is a legal conscience playing a role in the interpretation and application of concrete legal provisions. A special mission belongs to legal conscience in instances where a certain case cannot be fully ruled by existing legal stipulations, so that it is necessary to complement it, or where the existing legal provision offers to the deciding authority a possibility of option.

It is necessary to differentiate between legal conscience and legal ideology. Contrary to legal ideology, representing a deliberately created and systematized synthesis of ideas and opinions on the state and law created by legal scientists specialized in this particular field, legal conscience evolves empirically. It is not and practically cannot be systematically arranged. While legal ideology is uniform, legal conscience is, as already stated above, diversified and exists in a differentiated form in various groups of citizens and individuals. Legal ideology is purposely introduced into the society and influences considerably the legal conscience of the citizens.

Because legal conscience fulfills an important role in orienting the behavior of the citizens, the socialist society is especially interested that the legal conscience of its citizens be a socialist legal conscience; this is, after all, in full accordance with the socialist legal ideology. Thus, the legal conscience of individuals and groups, not as yet entirely socialist, should gradually be overcome and made to disappear.

The legal education of citizens plays an important role in the formation, strengthening and increased depth of the socialist legal conscience. It should be helpful in making the citizens accept socialist legality and in thus creating "an appropriate psychological climate for the successful fulfillment of the role of socialist law in society."
Legal instruction is by no means a simple affair, but its role is facilitated by the interest of our citizens in questions concerning the state and the law. It is not unusual that authors choose certain legal situations as themes of their artistic works, be they novels, short stories, films, stage, radio or television plays, etc. The questions of the state and law are dealt with in numerous articles in the daily press and certain newspapers and magazines carry regular legal columns which are rather popular with the readers.

Such educational activities through artistic work and mass media, though not to be underestimated, are nevertheless of an incidental nature, while legal instruction, to be really effective, definitely has to be systematic.

In family life, legal instruction has always been closely linked with moral education. One expects from the family that it will above all cultivate in children respect for law and that, aside from being alerted to what contradicts the rules of socialist morality, children will also be told what behavior is even contrary to the law.

An important role in legal education is, of course, played by the school at all its levels. In the elementary classes of the geography and history of our country, as well as later in civics, it is necessary to acquaint students with the mission of our state and with the role of law in socialist society, to provide them with basic information on the community and state system of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and on the fundamental rights and duties of citizens, and also on the principles of certain legal disciplines. The contents and the scope of legal instruction on various school levels must of course differ, particularly with respect to the age of pupils and students. However, it should be kept in mind that well-rounded basic knowledge of the state and law should also be acquired in school by those whose formal education terminates at the age of 16 and who will not continue their schooling any further.

It is equally of the essence that legal instruction be intensified at all universities, i.e., where state and law are not a direct part of the curriculum as they are in law schools and economic institutes. Here an important role must be assigned primarily to the teaching of Marxism–Leninism. In its framework, the class substance of the socialist state and socialist law should be properly explained, while reacting critically to the bourgeois theories of state and law, especially to their absolutist and liberal concepts.

Legal instruction cannot, of course, end with school education. One has to think also of the legal training of adults, and this is a special task for legal propaganda. Its realization must combine the activities of state authorities with those of national and special interest organizations.

If we intend to have most of our citizens become standard-bearers of socialist legal conscience, it is necessary to ponder what concrete orientation should be given to legal education. State and law are elements of the political and legal superstructure; consequently, their character is determined by the economic base of society. They can, however, retroactively exert a meaningful influence on the evolution of the economic base, by either accelerating or slowing it down.
From that perspective it is desirable to explain properly to the citizens the active role of state and law in the building of socialism in our country, to refer to the correlation between legal norms and the rules of socialist morality, and to win over the citizens for the strengthening of the socialist state and for the enforcement of socialist legality.

The socialist state is not merely a state apparatus; it is also a political organization of the entire working population and serves to secure all its achievements. The socialist state represents a tool for the realization of the revolutionary objectives of the working class, of the cooperative peasantry and all other workers. It is a guarantee of the inviolability of the socialist national establishment of our country and of the continued socialist evolution of our society. It also serves, of course, the securing of public order, and in that sense contributes to the strengthening of the personal security of citizens, the protection of their property acquired by honest work and the intensification of their social and legal assurance.

Once the citizens have thus understood the mission of the socialist state and adopted it fully for themselves, they will be ready to help in the struggle against domestic and foreign enemies, will cooperate with the state agencies and take an active part in the administration of their state. That is an elementary postulate of socialist democracy. (Bourgeois political scientists try in vain to prove that the socialist state is not interested in genuine activity on the part of its citizens. The very opposite is true. If we have any reason to be dissatisfied, then it is by the fact that we have not yet fully succeeded in winning over all our citizens for an efficient interest in the administration of public affairs, which may of course be expressed not only by holding an office, but also by working in the citizen action groups or simply by active participation in the life of the nation and in the solution of its tasks.)

Socialist legality is based on the requirement that community relations be regulated by relevant legal rules as well as on the requirement that individual laws and the executory legal provisions issued to implement them be consistently upheld. That is why our society cares in equal measure on one hand for the quality of legislation and for the correct application of the law by the decisionmaking authorities and, on the other hand, for the voluntary observance of laws and other legal rules by citizens and socialist organizations.

Once the citizens are convinced that in our country laws are passed in concordance with the interests of the entire nation and with its active participation, then they will quite logically become their defenders and enforcers of socialist legality. If our citizens respect laws, then they will voluntarily abide by such laws and not violate them, and there will ensue a decline in the scope of state coercion, which is a characteristic of law and one of its defining terms.

Similarly to the Constitution of the USSR and those of other countries of the socialist community, the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic includes among the basic rights of the citizens not only the traditional political rights, but also social rights, in particular the right to work, which the bourgeois states simply cannot venture to proclaim let alone to guarantee in face of permanent and often growing unemployment. It is of course necessary that the citizens also respect their constitutional duties, including that of
working honestly in the interest of the whole population. For a correct understanding of the relationship between the whole and the individual in the socialist system must indeed be a part not only of the socialist legal conscience, but of the entire socialist community conscience. The evolution of the individual is directly dependent on the evolution of the entire class, and it is consequently in his personal interest to act in unison with the overall national interest. For only a socialist community can guarantee the full physical and intellectual evolution of each of its members, a task it assumes not only in the Constitution but also in other parts of its legal system, e.g., in the family code.

It is not the objective of legal education to dispense a detailed knowledge of individual legal sectors. There exist, however, elements of the legal system which enjoy the special interest of the citizens and with regard to which an explanation of the foundations of the legal provisions may have a positive influence on the creation and deepening of the socialist legal conscience. These are particularly those legal disciplines that are encountered by the citizens in their daily life.

Viewed from that angle, in the first place should be listed the civil code, which regulates property matters and certain personal relations among citizens. The civil code accompanies every citizen literally from birth to death. It regulates his capacity for rights and duties, his competence in legal acts; it deals with personal property, the personal use of apartments and real property, sales in socialist commerce and other services where the citizen deals with socialist organizations; it stipulates legal rules for awarding damages and for the restitution of material advantages improperly obtained; it also provides for the settlement of estates and the protection of privacy. Obviously, the citizens encounter such questions often in their lifetimes and have to have them answered. In providing the answers, one should make the citizens aware that if they wish to avail themselves fully of their civil rights they must respect the rights of others and also perform duties resulting from the above-mentioned civil rights. No less relevant is the requirement that citizens, while creating their civil rights relations, keep equally in mind the interest of the community with which they must not enter into conflict any more than with the law. Even in this sector of the legal system, there must be evident the correct notion of relations between the community and the individual. A private owner must, for instance, realize that the scope and evolution of private ownership are, in a socialist society, directly dependent on the scope and the evolution of socialist ownership, which is also rightly entitled to increased protection. The stipulations of the civil code and of other provisions of civil law are in the overwhelming majority of cases respected and voluntarily applied. Yet, litigations do sometimes occur over a specific right (e.g., from relations between neighbors, from liability for defects, etc.). Citizens must be guided toward solving the arising conflicts, wherever possible, out of court and to turn to tribunals with a plea for the protection of their threatened or violated right only when no agreement could have been reached. Should such an event occur, citizens should of course be aware that the court will provide for a just deliberation of the case and for the effective protection of their subjective right. In contrast to bourgeois legislation, our codes of procedure are concerned with making the protection of rights accessible to citizens, preventing it from becoming overly costly, by handling it
expeditiously, so that the trial is free from useless formalities and the citizens are not harmed by lack of legal knowledge. Procedural provisions also take into account the requirement of the trial not only to assure a just protection of the citizen's rights, but also to perform an educational function by passing just decisions and motivating them carefully.

Closely related to civil law is family law, regulating mainly the relations between married couples or parents and children. The special role played by exactly this particular specialty, very popular with the public, in the formation of socialist legal conscience does not need any emphasis. Its educational role should be, above all, focused on the question of fulfillment of family duties, important not only to family members but to the whole society; the family, as the nucleus of the entire society, influences greatly the preparation of healthy and morally mature young generation.

The legal instruction of the citizens cannot, most certainly, neglect the domain of penal law. The citizen should be, at least in general, informed what action is considered by the penal law as dangerous enough for society that it should be classified as a penal case. Because the penal law stipulates that every penal case should be punished, it is necessary that every criminal action be detected, prosecuted according to the law, and punished. To detect criminal actions is, of course, the task of competent state authorities, such as the State Security, courts, and prosecutors. But because criminal actions endanger the entire society and in many instances also the individuals, even common citizens should not remain indifferent to it. We are well aware of many instances where the perpetrator of a rather important criminal action was caught thanks to the tip of citizens or their collaboration with security agencies. On the other hand, there are, unfortunately, quite a few cases where a crime was committed practically before the very eyes of the public without any interference, though it was possible. Public indifference is never commendable, and even less so where important public interests are concerned, such as life, health, dignity, or the property of fellow citizens. The socialist legal conscience, therefore, has to include an inherent condemnation of any action that infringes upon the penal code, a decision to participate in the prevention of criminality, and the willingness to detect such activity and its perpetrators. At the same time, every citizen should be aware that our substantive and procedural law are not only geared to punish the guilty, but to re-educate him as well where such re-education is still feasible. Society has to defend itself against those who do not respect its laws and who aim to live to its detriment. But it wants to provide even to those who have transgressed it the possibility of reforming, especially where young people are concerned.
SOCIALIST WAY OF LIFE DEFINED

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 12 Jan 85 p 1

[Article: "The Battle for Our Contemporary Man"]

[Excerpt] The types of concrete activity which forms a component of the socialist way of life cannot be defined across the board with binding and definitive validity for all types of members of society or for all situations and conditions. Nevertheless, one of the standard characteristics of the socialist way of life is the new positive creative relationship between man and work which is formed and cultivated only during the process of socialist work itself. That is to say during work which is not only deprived of its exploitative nature but also work which is well organized, well conducted and justly remunerated, work which brings utility to society—utility of which the worker is aware and with respect to which he is able to apply his initiative.

In this regard we still encounter substantial shortcomings: a negative attitude with respect to work, low discipline, a lackadaisical approach to tasks, the demoralization of the collective and other undesirable phenomena. We continue to encounter serious problems, for example, with respect to the organization of work at certain workplaces, with regard to poor utilization of high-capacity machinery and installations; elsewhere, inadequate maintenance and direction leads to unnecessary downtime; serious shortcomings persist with respect to the organization of supplier-consumer relations. This is not a matter of the lack of organizational guidelines with regard to the realization of party directives or perhaps that the areas of competence and responsibility of institutions and management are not clearly outlined. The fault lies in the fact that much formalism, alibis, craftiness and rationalizing shortcomings survive within the work per se by virtue of so-called objective reasons.

And so, even the effort to manage better in all sectors in conjunction with the growing requirements of scientific-technical progress today represents one of the key directions as well as further intellectual and worldly improvement in the development of these factors which actually form the socialist personality.

Naturally, nobody claims that the interests of socialist society and the interests of each of its members are always the same under all conditions. Petit bourgeois deformation of the relationships between the interests of the
individual and the whole does not disappear with the installation of socialist social relationships any more than it causes the disappearance of unhealthy individualism, egotism and other psychological and mental remnants in the attitudes of thinking people. Some of them imagine socialism to be a kind of providing society whose accomplishments are there to serve them not toward some kind of universal spiritual development but toward the acquisition and maintenance of that which they call a sweet life—and not by way of an honest path through conscientious work but through numerous underhanded and private pathways.

Such people only know of their rights, demand more and more from society but decline to fulfill their obligations with regard to it, they ignore the overall societal interest. They strive for maximum personal success and existential comfort through the path of least resistance, without regard to the interests of others or socialist moral standards.

It is precisely these types of people that are usually living foci and spreaders of the infection of careerism, protectionism, bootlicking, corruption, petit bourgeois consumer psychology and the worship of material things, of conspicuous consumption, the carriers of unsocialist moral norms and representatives of social irresponsibility. This is why the thorough and consistent overcoming of these negative phenomena and surviving remnants in our life remains even today a serious social imperative—the principal task of ideological educational activity.

A significant direction of the continued active formation of the socialist way of life is the more intensive orientation of people with respect to public interests. The care in the realization of the common interest becomes the affair of a constantly larger number of people and raises their personal life and their individual interests to an incomparably higher degree than was the case under capitalism. Still further deepening of socialist democracy brings man out of the narrow alley of immediate cares regarding his livelihood into the circle of commonly shared experiences connected with carrying out those things necessary for life, it arouses and cultivates in man new strengths and capabilities, develops his talents. The mass of the people thus constantly and more actively participates in the most widely varied activities of social life, its horizons are expanded, their life-style becomes internally more rich and meaningful. This, too, then, constitutes the substance and goals of forming the new socialist man.

During the current period, characterized by an unprecedented sharpening of the relationships between states of a class-divided world, other characteristically qualitative factors in the socialist way of life take on added significance: these include primarily the peaceful way of life which is characterized by an active battle on the part of the people of socialist countries for a lasting world peace, for averting the nuclear threat and the prohibition of additional weapons of mass destruction, for instilling confidence and understanding between states and nations.

The way of life in the contemporary world is the subject of sharp political and ideological contention. Our class enemies are attempting to force upon
the people of the socialist countries their bourgeois and limited concepts, their stereotype petit bourgeois way of life, their purely consumerist relationship with life and its beauties, their "cult of things," their spiritless nature, their contempt for actual culture and its heritage, their immorality, their nationality conflicts, their cult of force, pornography, as well as other manifestations of morals which are foreign to us, their social pessimism and distrust of the future. A large majority of our people reject these bourgeois value criteria. They see in socialism, from the standpoint of world progress as well as their own development, the sole possible variation, they agree with socialism and support their political party with actions.

Nevertheless, we remain realists and are aware of the fact that the level and depth of understanding socialism, of internal identification with it and its principles and ideals, can vary. We encounter not only petit bourgeois consumerist ideas regarding socialism but also an ideological mix of surviving traditions and stereotypes with anachronistic views regarding the relationship between men and women, we encounter remnants of political clericalism, etc. That is why such emphasis is placed today and will be placed in the future on improving the quality of world view education, on explaining the substance, the lawfulness and the advantages of socialism, the relationship between social and individual interests and the prospects for the development of society and the individual, as well as his personality.

5911
CSO: 2400/219
SOCIAL ILLS DISCUSSED

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Dec 84 p 2

[Text] Prague (CSTK)--An aktiv meeting of functionaries and workers of trade union organizations at all levels from the entire country held in Prague yesterday dealt with the question of a further increase in the role of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement in protecting the socialist economy. The meeting was attended by Dalibor Hanes, deputy chairman of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly; Jan Fejes, Czechoslovak prosecutor general; Josef Ondrej, chairman of the Czechoslovak Supreme Court; and Antonin Jakubik, Czech minister of trade.

Jiri Neubert, secretary of the Central Trade Union Council, emphasized in his opening speech that on the basis of a resolution adopted by the secretariat of the Central Trade Union Council in April 1983, the trade union agencies and organizations prepared their own plans of action to fight the violations of the principles of socialist legality, morale, and discipline.

The experience from the operation of social control over the observance of labor regulations shows a more favorable attitude on the part of citizens in the struggle against unlawful enrichment and other forms of antisocial activities and has become a basis for intensifying efforts to suppress these negative phenomena. There are still mistakes made in the administration, inventorying, and protection of socialist property, in recovering claims for damage, in observing labor discipline, and in the use of worktime.

In uncovering criminal activity the control groups of organizations, social organizations, and individuals have an important role. When speaking about shortcomings in our national economy, Jiri Neubert emphasized the significance of the systematic use of worktime because even the use of only 50 percent of the existing reserves, namely 42 minutes in each shift, represents an increase in labor productivity of 4 percent and an additional almost Kcs 20 million in goods produced. Similarly, poor-quality production represents losses of approximately Kcs 900 million annually.

Jan Fejes, the Czechoslovak prosecutor general, illustrated through several concrete cases the extent of damage caused to the socialist economy by the failure to observe labor and technological discipline. He also spoke about the damage caused by misplaced loyalty, the failure to report criminal acts
and their cover-up. Antonin Jakubik, the Czech minister of trade, informed the meeting of the solution of the tasks in protecting socialist property and consumers and the courage of merchandisers. Comrade Dalibor Hanes emphasized among other things that socialist legality is one of the basic values of socialist policy, a method for achieving a socialist political system and strengthening social relations. He also spoke about questions of developing socialist legality and the legal awareness of the people. Josef Ondrej, the chairman of the Czechoslovak Supreme Court, spoke about the role that the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement plays in defending the rights and legal claims of the working people, the outcome of labor and sociolegal disputes, and the protection of socialist property.
DEMography, Cultural Presence of HunGarian Minority in slovakia

Frankfurt Frankfurter Allgemeine in German 24 Dec 84 p 10

[Article by Viktor Meier: "The Hungarians in Slovakia: Their Own Schools, Newspapers and a Cultural Club"]

[Text] Bratislava, December—The first Czechoslovak republic was conceived as a state of Czechs and Slovaks, but in reality it was a state of many peoples. According to the census of 1930, it numbered 7.4 million Czechs, 3.2 million Germans, 2.2 million Slovaks and 690,000 Hungarians within its borders at that time. Back during the war, the newly founded Czechoslovak state gave up the Carpatho-Ukraine, then drove out the overwhelming majority of the Germans, solved the question of the Slovaks at the beginning of 1969 and finally had as its sole problem the Hungarians, whose number now was officially given to us as 560,000. The Magyars dwell in the plains of southern Slovakia and reach from hills country into the region of Kaschau (Kosice); this city, once overwhelmingly Hungarian, has had—ever since the construction of a large steel works and the influx of people that came with it—only a Hungarian minority that is barely 30 percent of the population. The actual Hungarian center in Slovakia is Komarno on the Danube, which is also the home of the Hungarian theater. After the war, as we were officially told in Bratislava, around 90,000 Hungarians were forced, some more or less willingly, to emigrate to Hungary, in exchange for an admittedly much smaller number of Slovaks from Hungary. At that time, Hungarians were also deported to the region of Bohemia, which had been stripped away by the Germans, but they were later allowed to return.

On the Hungarian side, it is occasionally asserted, in private, that the Magyars' situation in Slovakia—aside from the somewhat better standard of living—is essentially almost as bad as in Rumania. This is definitely an exaggeration. The appropriate office of the Slovak regional government gave us remarkably open information; one cannot, of course, check it in detail, but, lacking evidence to the contrary, we have little cause to distrust it, especially since the problematic points of the minority's situation were not left unmentioned. They said that there have been Hungarian schools again since 1948; the parents have the right to demand a Hungarian school for their children in villages inhabited by Hungarians; 15 requests will lead to the formation of a class. If, however, there is not a sufficient number for a class, the Hungarian children will not be transported to the next village at
the state's cost, in contrast to the opposite case for Slovak children. There are, we were told, 340 Hungarian kindergartens, 27 elementary schools, 10 independent Hungarian high schools and 8 high schools with Hungarian classes, as well as 5 Hungarian technical schools and 18 with Hungarian classes. The 11.6 percent of schoolchildren in Hungarian elementary schools is said to correspond pretty exactly to the proportion of the Hungarian population, and the number of Hungarian high school students is likewise roughly proportional to the Hungarian portion of the population. Slovak is taught for four hours a week in the Hungarian elementary schools and high schools. German still seems to have the strongest position among the foreign languages.

The problem, they openly admit, is with the universities and colleges. Only 5.6 percent of all college students in Slovakia belong to the Hungarian minority, many fewer than their portion of the population; moreover, there are generally no Hungarian colleges. So, members of the Hungarian minority have to study in Slovak; there are only 10 to 15 places available per year in Bratislava for "Magyar studies." The person we were speaking with believes that an aversion towards learning Slovak certainly plays a role in the low proportion of Hungarian students in the colleges, even though much is done to accommodate the Hungarian students at the exams, especially in the technical fields, and often they are allowed to write the entrance exams in Hungarian. The Hungarians come, of course, primarily from agricultural areas, and since one can currently earn more in agriculture than in industry, the Hungarians' drive to the city and to the universities and colleges is not great at the moment, we were told.

In contrast to Rumania, one can freely subscribe to Hungarian newspapers and magazines in Slovakia, and even buy them at kiosks. The selection does seem to be limited, since lines form in front of the kiosks, especially for fashion magazines. There are Hungarian radio and television programs, but we were told that these are really superfluous, since the Hungarians in Slovakia almost exclusively watch the—as was admitted to us—"somewhat more interesting" Hungarian television or listen to Radio Budapest. It has come to pass, we were told, that on the day after wage increases were announced in Hungary, Hungarian workers in Slovakia came to their jobs and asked about it: "the television" had surely said that there was more pay.

In the local administrations, we were told, the Hungarians are represented roughly in proportion to their 11 percent share of the population; in the Slovak government, as well. They have their daily newspaper with a circulation of over 90 thousand, as well as magazines and the "Madach" publishing house, which puts out 50 or 60 titles per year. On the order of roughly 10,000-15,000 popular magazines from Hungary are sold. Books are imported from Hungary. Moreover, there is a cultural club called Csemadok with individual membership, which maintains sections for cultivating traditions and folklore and the like all over. An organization of this sort would be unthinkable for the Hungarians in Rumania. The person we spoke with did concede, however, that not all Hungarians were satisfied; in particular, many of them view college education as biased towards a literary education: "Many of them see themselves only as little Petofi or little Adi."
Recently, dissident groups in Hungary have strongly criticized the position of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia as well. Not everything that they said seems to hold water on all counts. For example, we were told in Bratislava, it is not true that three Hungarian villages were flooded during the construction of the Danube power plant at Gabčíkovo on the artificial island, but only three farmsteads, admittedly with much land and also much pasturage. Three Hungarian villages will, however, wind up lying south of the new bed of the Danube, and so will be disadvantaged as far as traffic is concerned. We obtained the following official information concerning the trial of the dissident Miklos Duray, a member of the Hungarian minority: This man, a geologist, was under detention until June or July, because he had committed "nationalistic agitation." In the meanwhile, his trial was called off and he was released. Then, however, they say he started publicly abusing the socialist system in Czechoslovakia in general, whereupon he was arrested again. Now he is being tried for general activities hostile to the regime. The course of the Duray affair seems to indicate that one can truly and openly successfully intervene from Hungary, as long as it is an issue of specifically Hungarian interest. Now, according to the Slovak account, this is no longer the case.
POLITICAL FUNCTION OF ART AFFIRMED

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 18 Dec 84 p 1

[Editorial]

[Excerpts] Art is the most human of activities; it belongs to man and to man alone, as inseparably as any conscious work. Maksim Gor'kly's statement that all that is good in him he owes to books expresses the sentiment of millions of people in their relationship to culture and to art generally. Without exaggerating, it is possible to apply this thought to art as a whole, particularly to art in a socialist society. It is precisely socialism that provides art with the greatest opportunity to function in society, because the democratization of culture, as it has been and still is being realized by socialist society, has no parallel in history. Art was and is being created by people and only for people.

In a socialist society art attains its highest calling; to enrich the world of literally the broadest strata of working people, to strengthen the active relationship of citizens to the ideals of socialism, to promote, by reflecting life's truths, the growth of the cultural and social activity of citizens in a socialist society. In this respect we understand art to be an integral part of the total socialist life style.

The socialist artist of today indeed has a great civic responsibility and a right to change, through his artistic creativity, the consciousness of our society and by means of such substantial achievement to contribute toward its development. It is precisely socialism which gives him this supreme right and, at the same time, pledges him to a no less supreme responsibility. An artist never exists just for himself alone. All the traditions, history and experiences of literature and art confirm this. Supported by the traditions of what is best in the legacy of world culture and the qualities bequeathed by our national culture, art masters have influenced and are influencing in a particularly strong manner the minds and emotions, the total consciousness of their readers, spectators or listeners. They do so not only by virtue of their civic commitments, but also by the manner in which such attitudes are reflected in their work.

Art has a direct bearing on our contemporary life. If today the characteristic feature of the times is the constantly growing complexity of the
collective production process, then hand in hand with this also grow the
challengers of intellectual work. We know that as we work today, so shall
we live. And as we think, so shall we succeed in our work. To this new
understanding a significant contribution of its own is made by art, which
leads us toward deeper reflection and helps us to comprehend better all that
is involved. That is why creative artistic work, most of all literature,
is of such significance in increasing the creative aspect of all work.

Thus to create, and therefore to be of help, is understandably in the power
only of an artist, a creative person who can identify with his time and its
needs. No nonpolitical art exists, because no art exists apart from man and
society. To reflect in his work the problems of contemporary society, to un-
derstand the progressive trends of its development and help to strive for new
ones, requires total civic and political commitment of the part of the artist
and a capacity for precise understanding. Gottwald's wise maxim also reminds
us at all times—do not let success go to your head, do not despair over
failures.

From such an understanding evolves a fundamental law—to safeguard with utmost
care the verifiable harmony between words and deeds. All this applies in full
measure to art, the creation of which springs from adherence to life's truths
and socialist ideals. In this is rooted the essential condition of communist
partisanship and popularity of art.

In its simultaneous impact on people's minds and emotions, art and its influ-
ence are truly irreplaceable. The attention given to the ideological and
moral development of maturing generations and to the cultivation of noble
sentiments is as important today as is the attention given to teaching the
basic sciences.

Let us give due credit, for example, to the importance of teaching history in
the nurturing of civic consciousness, socialist patriotism and internation-
ism. It is particularly the present moment, when we are more strongly then
ever mindful of history both recent and past, that gives it emphasis. The
present especially, because we remind ourselves that it comes from the past,
because we are more strongly than ever mindful of the continuity of our
social development and maturation.

Artists also have an immense task in the international effort to educate honest
people to distinguish lies from truth and thereby make correct decisions. Art
is also of considerable importance to the understanding of social experiences
and can make solid contributions to it. The point is that, with the help of
even artistic works, everybody should realize who aims for what goals, who
proclaims and practices what policies. Even in this instance the unity of
words and deeds is directly verifiable and at its most persuasive.

To be able to perform all these important tasks, an artist cannot but attain,
together with attesting to profound idealism and civic consciousness, also a
high and demanding level of artistic mastery. Without that there can be no
talk of real art; without that, his social function cannot have positive re-
sults. Poor work can discredit even a lofty idea. In this respect, art
criticism has a responsible duty. Understandably, even criticism can be effective only by virtue of its high standards, uncompromising professionalism and civic responsibility.

A key role is played by the circumstance of how the climate of high standards, as expected by the artists themselves from each other, is manifested and intensified.

The present era gives artists every opportunity to fulfill the demands that society and they themselves place before them. To be sure, the realization of these demanding and momentous tasks in future development and life will, conversely, depend on all of us, all of socialist society, as well as on the unique, shared responsibility and solid creative contribution of the creators of art.

12605
CSO: 2400/182
BRIEFS

DRUNK DRIVERS--Neither the issuance of a driver's license nor the purchase of a car mean that the driver must become a teetotaler. The reason is simple: there is no absolute prohibition against alcohol use. The laws try in the first place to discourage excessive drinking, i.e., the abuse of alcohol. They prohibit the use of alcohol, even in small amounts, on account of age (adolescents), sex (pregnant women), health (the sick and convalescent) and vocation (among others, truck drivers on duty belong to this category). Regardless of what individuals think of the problem, a truck driver who drinks becomes a potential hazard on the road. Statistics show that 6 to 8 percent of traffic accidents are caused by drunk drivers. As far as traffic accidents caused by drunk drivers are concerned, we occupy fourth place in Europe after Poland, Denmark and Hungary. [Excerpt] [Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 21 Dec 84 p 4] 1277

CSO: 2400/206
RECENT EMIGRANT SPEAKS OF WIDESPREAD DISILLUSIONMENT

Bonn DIE WELT in German 6 Dec 84 p 19

[Interview by F. Fuchs with H. Noll: "No Illusions Left at the Age of Twelve"]

[Text] More and more sons and daughters of senior party and literary functionaries are applying for emigration from the GDR. Recently graphic artist Hans Noll (31), son of SED writer Dieter Noll, arrived in the West with his family. DIE WELT talked with Noll about the motivation of his flight and the generation gap in the GDR.

WELT: Herr Noll, many of the "deserters" from the GDR are young people from privileged families. What is your explanation of this phenomenon?

Noll: In the recent past conspicuously many younger and materially privileged GDR citizens have indeed left, people who were really intended "to take the baton for the next stage of the relay." Actually, though, rejection is widespread in the entire young generation. This does not usually signify resistance (I believe only a few afford themselves that luxury), it simply amounts to not going along. Parents react in various ways. Some are furious and adopt "countermeasures" up to and including disinheriting their offspring, others secretly sympathize with the young. I was told of a People's Chamber representative who threatened his children with suicide. Still, by now many parents also have deserted communism and try to ease the situation for their children. Their train of thought runs something like this: "If I have to stick it out here and will never get out, you at least should follow your preferences and try to make your way somewhere else."

WELT: When do the "comrades" tell the truth about what they really think?

Noll: That depends not least on the volume of alcohol just consumed. When sober, all are more or less closed books. I repeatedly noticed the same thing in Moscow, among more senior officials. They have all attended the school so impressively described by Wolfgang Leonhard, the school of coded speech in stereotyped phrases. People are often wondering why Russian officials tend to speak so very slowly. Actually they just want to think before speaking.
Once, however, they have swallowed an appropriate amount of vodka, something like regular abysses open up, they pop off.

WELT: You have put down your experiences in a book. Who will publish it?

Noll: The book has the title "Der Abschied" [The Leave Taking] and will be published by Hoffmann and Campe. The publishers thought a short title would be the best. The subtitle runs "Diary of my Emigration from the GDR," because it is written in diary form. When I wrote my first letter to the Politburo, I decided to note everything down because I already suspected the kind of circus performance to come. Accordingly I kept a diary until the day I left. The manuscript was smuggled to the West. I had little confidence in the safety of our rooms. Since we spent the day in the studio, it could not remain in the apartment, and when we came home to the apartment for the night, it could not remain in the studio. I carried it in my briefcase at all times, and when it got too thick, it was taken across.

WELT: Is family life easier for the nonprivileged?

Noll: Nonprivileged persons need to perform their idolatrous services for the sake of appearances in public only, while family relations at home may stay relatively normal. But the higher the status of the family, the more intolerable the internal family conditions, due to the growing schizophrenia. Basically, a senior party official can no longer have a sensible conversation with his children. He is constantly obligated to justify the most idiotic things which are totally incomprehensible for anyone with common sense.

No 14-year old daughter is disciplined and "party-like" enough to refrain from asking inconvenient questions. Usually an acute breach occurs at that age, and that breach is never healed. After all, these children now their parents from the obverse aspect. They are perfectly aware of the hypocrisy. As for myself, I definitely claim no longer to be a communist—neither an "alternative" nor a "nonalternative." For me communism has ceased to be a topic.

We, my wife and I, made an effort in the past 2 years to reread Lenin, and I must tell you that this entire societal model appears to me neither feasible nor operationally efficient.

WELT: Are you alone in this, or is that a general phenomenon?

Noll: In recent years I hardly ever met anyone who still truly considered communism relevant in whatever form or shape, whether as real socialism in the GDR or idealistic Eurocommunism. With the exception of some officials, you will certainly not find anyone at all in Poland, who even talks about communism. The trend to serious disillusionment affects the GDR, too, and that applies to theory also. Bahro left a few years ago, when an alternative still existed. My wife and I have been noticed here in the West that those emigrants of the 1970's, who left with Biermann, are still clinging to leftist conceptions. In the GDR nothing of that remains.
Conditions there have progressed in such a way that the (in party parlance) reformist theories are no longer of any interest. At age 18, young people are simply and totally "against." They oppose the system as such. The age of this discovery is constantly dropping. One of the reasons may well be the fact that the system used to be able to offer something to some people. By being granted university admission, it took people longer to indulge in fundamental reflections about the system. Young people now have fewer and fewer prospects. They tend to notice that at the tender age of 12 or 13, when it is suddenly revealed that two children from party member families per grade decided to become professional officers, because nobody else is still admitted to the expanded secondary school. Anyone experiencing this kind of thing has virtually written off the system at age 14.

Until he is 18 years old, he is forced to suffer constant exposure to this bothersome and boring litany of the "new man," with the sole result that his inner rejection stiffens even more. When our children were 12, they told us that they found it hard to attend civics classes, because they knew perfectly well that not one word said there was true.

At the time I told them: "There were times when people were publicly burned at the stake for saying they did not follow the only saving Church. And then there are times when you may spoil your entire life by contradicting the civics teacher, for example. That makes no sense at all. Just mechanically pronounce the right words as long as we are still here."

11698
CSO: 2300/227
PEOPLE'S THEATER CLOSES COMEDY FOR POLITICAL REASONS

West Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 21 Dec 84 p 4

[Article: "Rudi Strahl's New Drama Canceled"]

[Text] According to reports by well informed circles, the new play "Taking the Blue out of the Sky" by Rudi Strahl, an author widely popular for his comedies, and included in the schedule of the East Berlin Volksbuehne Theater, has been withdrawn from the repertory for political reasons. The first night was supposed to take place this month, but after the first rehearsals the authorities decided not to have the play staged.

The text of the play (subtitled "A Play with Death and the Devil in Three Acts had been printed early this year in the periodical THEATER DER ZEIT. Strahl is not known for any dissident inclinations. In an interview in connection with this particular play he said that it was designed to illustrate the "threat" to peace and human protest against that danger. One of the author's stage directions runs as follows: "At the beginning of the play, the staging calls for the public to be totally ignorant about the location of the play and the people in it."

The rather sketch-like text does not properly distinguish between good and evil military men as otherwise customary in the GDR; in fact that practice is somewhat parodied. One earlier Strahl play, "The Whisper Party," was stopped during preparations for its staging in the early 1970's, because the topic dealt with, "Intershops" (foreign exchange shops) was considered unsuitable for the stage.

This is the second time this year that the authorities have interfered with the repertory of an East Berlin theater for political reasons. The play "George's Mountain" by playwright Rainer Kerdnl, premiered in late January at the Maxim Gorki Theater, was taken off after only three performances. In that play Kerdnl had dealt with the sensitive topic of "greed for foreign exchange.”
EMPLOYMENT SITUATION, PAST, FUTURE

Employment Prognosis for 1984

Budapest MUNKAUGYI SZEMLE in Hungarian No 10, 1984 pp 1-5

[Article by Mrs Sandor Berenyi: "Expected Developments in the Employment Situation for 1984"]

[Text] Most 1984 employment processes are developing like the trends of the preceding year. A change is evident in several instances.

Full employment continues to be consistently realized but without significant progress in the improvement of manpower efficiency. Demand for manpower is still greater than the available number of workers. The greatest problem in manpower management continues to be that manpower trade and area structure is at variance with requirements deriving from the production and service tasks of a given district.

The direction and intensity of manpower mobility has changed in the sub-branches for material production. The 40-hour work week has been inaugurated in industry and the construction industry as scheduled, a fact which strengthens the positions of the two economic branches. The means which were introduced in order to effect changes appropriate to the economic goals of our manpower structure have brought few results thus far. The effects of measures which were instituted this year are now unfolding.

The increase in midyear earnings exceeds the planned annual levels. In the remaining part of the year the rate of increase in earnings will moderate for the nonsocialist sector of cooperative farming but will exceed the goal planned for the year as a whole. The extent of the increase in earnings is differentiated by economic branches. In those branches where the possibility existed for greater than average wage increases and the management exploited the opportunities, the incentive effect of the wage system has improved, and differentiation by achievements has been extended.

I shall deal below in greater detail with the development of manpower processes in 1984.
Work Force and Productivity Development

The 1984 annual plan estimates a 0.4 percent (21,000 persons) reduction of workers in the socialist sector as a whole—including a reduction of 0.7 percent in the material branches (26,000 persons)—based on a further decline in the working-age population and the number of gainfully employed. According to compiled information received from the economic units, the manpower demand corresponds to last year's actual work force. That is, the enterprises want to employ almost 20,000 more workers than called for in the economic plan. In general, they do not adequately estimate the limits on the amount of manpower available in their operational districts.

In the first half of 1984 the number of employees in the material branches, as compared to the same period for the previous year, declined by 1.4 percent, or to a greater extent than planned for the whole year. This greater than planned decline in the work force appears mostly in cooperative farming. The number of workers in the material branches of noncooperative farming declined to a lesser extent than planned, because the extent of the decline in manpower both in industry and the construction industry fell behind the goal and the previous year's achievement.

As opposed to the small increase that had been counted on, the work force in state farming and forestry declined, while the number of workers in transportation-communications and in the economic branches of trade declined as against the planned maintenance of level.

The number of full-time workers and outworkers declined in most subbranches, while the number of part-time workers and employed pensioners increased (dynamically, particularly in the case of the latter).

Work force developments in the first half of the year will also be characteristic for the second half of the year. At an annual level, the number of workers in the socialist sector of the economy will be reduced nearly as planned. But this will include a change in the work force for the construction industry and agriculture that is expected to vary significantly from the goal. That is:

-- as expected, to a lesser extent than planned in industry and the construction industry, or about a 1 or 2 to 2.5 percent decline in manpower;

-- in cooperative farming a decline is expected of about 2 to 3 percent below the planned increase.

A number of factors are involved in the reduction of the work force in industry and the construction industry, namely:

-- an increasingly broader scope to establish VGMKS [enterprise work associations] (the additional work and income possibilities provided on the site help the enterprises retain their manpower);
--the circle of economic units using experimental income regulation has expanded significantly. In this area the substantially more favorable wage-development possibilities have a stabilizing effect on the work force;

--central wage-policy measures (the introduction of additional pay for high temperature workshop conditions, the raising of the shift allowance) also tend to ease work force losses;

--conversion to the 40-hour work week also strengthens the ability to maintain the work force;

--in addition to the foregoing, the quitting of jobs in industry and the construction industry is moderated by a reduction in the power of attraction by other areas--primarily agriculture. In cooperative farming the rate of expansion in auxiliary activities has been significantly moderated as compared to previous years, this in connection with the vigorous increase in the number of VCMKs and the reduction thereby of the volume of jobs performed and the narrowing of development sources.

Considering the foregoing, it is expected that the number of workers will decline by 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points below the plan in the nonsocialist sector of the economy's cooperative farming (including workers and employees) and within this in the material branches.

Manpower Situation

The manpower situation is characterized this year also by an overall excess in the demand for manpower. The plans of the enterprises and cooperatives include a manpower demand that is greater than manpower resources.

The additional demand comes as a combined effect of various factors:

--as a consequence of the extensive increase in the previous years the number of work places is greater in relation to the available manpower;

--the low level of organization, the amount of lost time is great and as a consequence the number of workers is too large as compared to the technical and technological level. To view it from another aspect, the level for determining achievement requirements is low, and the internal manpower reserves which have not as yet been discovered--and therefore are not used--are great. Operation and work organization activity is directed to a lesser extent than desirable at increased productivity and at reduced per unit outlays for live work; when making decisions on developments that are being implemented from limited available means, the requirement for manpower savings is not adequately realized;

--the economic units do not willingly give up manpower because it is not easy to hire manpower when needed. This attitude is the result, on one hand, of faith in an upswing and, on the other hand, of the manpower demand that arises at peak periods. In recent times, the role of the work peaks has increased because of problems in material supply and cooperative activity.
the economic organizations are reluctant to give up even obviously superfluous manpower for subjective reasons (people are "close" to the enterprise, protected);

--enterprise economic incentive is not sufficiently intensive; the economic regulatory system does not adequately compel more rational manpower management and effective employment.

This year, too, the manpower situation is differentiated by area according to jobs and skills. The work force shortages and surpluses are present at the same time and place but in different degrees by area and skill, and thus they cannot balance each other. The shortage areas are polarized primarily on the basis of job characteristics, skills, working conditions and work organization.

--In general, there are relatively few skilled workers who have outstanding expert knowledge and practical knowledge and are capable of fulfilling high-quality requirements. While in certain more recently industrialized areas there is a shortage even of skilled workers with average ability, the skilled workers in other areas (for example, the capital city) are performing semi-skilled work in many cases. There are various reasons for this. On the one hand, there may not be enough semiskilled workers in a given district; certain classes with a skilled worker certification are not capable of performing qualified tasks because of inadequate preparation. On the other hand, it does not help if there are in the provinces semiskilled workers who could perform tasks now being done in the capital city by skilled workers because area exchanges are prevented by social and economic reasons (lifestyle, housing situation, transportation, and so forth);

--In addition to the general characteristics, area differences are also to be found in the income structure. In certain counties—for example, Hajdu-Bihar and Veszprem—they are looking for unskilled manpower; in Borsod, Szolnok counties on the other hand, demand is mostly for workers with the heavy industry, construction industry and chemical industry skills that constitute the main profile of their activities.

In certain counties the problems are caused by simultaneous surpluses and shortages. In Borsod county there is a surplus demand in heavy, multi-shift job areas, while few jobs can be offered to women. The level of economic activity for women is the lowest here next to Szabolcs-Szatmar county. In a number of counties it is difficult to find nonmanual jobs for manpower, chiefly female, with a high school diploma but no trade skill.

A continuing decline in the manpower supply is causing broad-scale shortages particularly in the capital city, and in several counties modest shortages. For demographic reasons (the unfavorable development of the age structure) and the strengthening of the population retention power of the villages, the number of those gainfully employed is declining in Budapest to a greater extent than the national average.
Almost everywhere there are too few applicants for heavy, multi-shift manual jobs and in many skills. In certain skills and jobs the manpower supply depends on the intensity of the work. For example, shortages exist only in areas where wages are based on achievement.

Demand is characteristically great chiefly for male workers, but the placement of women in some areas of the country causes problems in some instances.

As a result of the increased manpower demand, those seeking employment may choose among various possibilities. They are unwilling to accept work that is performed under unfavorable working circumstances and conditions (for example, more than one shift) or work that requires hard manual labor. For this reason, those enterprises face the greatest difficulties which have most of their jobs in the areas mentioned. As a partial counter to this, central assistance has been given since 1 April to grant additional pay for high temperature workshop conditions and for the raising of the shift allowance. This increases the material rewards for work performed under unfavorable working circumstances and conditions. A certain favorable effect from these measures is evident (for example, the decline in metallurgical personnel moderated in the second quarter).

In certain areas of work, however, the manpower shortage has consolidated and is now increasingly difficult to resolve by means of wage measures. For these work places modernization is the only long term solution, and also perhaps area manpower exchanges. Enterprises must deal especially with these points of view when investment decisions are made, or else their problems will continue to be intensified in the field of area manpower supply.

The possibilities of making up work force shortages are varied. Finding new reserves, reducing lost time, exploring possibilities latent in plant and work organization continue to have a negligible role in making up shortages.

Although they know that the preconditions do not exist for assuring the work force called for in their plans (this has become obvious to them in recent years), the economic units rarely initiate such organizational measures as would be accompanied by concrete results over the long term. By eliminating some of the work place sites, by detecting the causes for lost time stemming from lack of organization, and by taking concrete steps for their elimination, the work bottlenecks could be avoided and the work processes made more even. All these things as well as the circumspect and appropriately prepared for regrouping (primarily internal, but if necessary also external) of personnel would significantly contribute to a discovery of the internal manpower reserves and to a more rational termination of the shortages.

But in order to attend to these tasks it is necessary to have an adequate number of well-trained experts and managers who want to do something in the field of organization. Frequently the organizational knowledge and demands of the managers are inadequate. The regression that has occurred in recent years in organizational activity and the formal fulfillment of tasks has contributed to all this, which is also shown by the fact that some experts
with organizational capabilities have left their careers and are working in other areas.

The role of the VGMKs in making up for manpower shortages was considerable last year and has continued to increase this year. The creation of VGMKs is advantageous both to the workers and the enterprises. It is worthwhile for the latter, despite the fact that workers are paid more for a unit of work than they are in regular working time, because wage charges are not imposed for VGMK income. The fixed costs exist no matter what, not to mention the fact that the enterprises need not worry about the cover of progressive charges for wage development.

In general the work of the VGMKs is well organized, achievements are greater than during regular working hours. Since most of the VGMKs perform the same tasks as in their basic activity (which conflicts, however, with the original goals), their operation has made the lack of organization more obvious in the work performed during regular working hours. But because of the above-mentioned advantages, the enterprises also use VGMKs for making up such manpower shortages, in some instances, as were previously solved within the enterprise by other methods (for example, overtime and organizational measures).

The operation of the VGMKs expands the work-time base in an extensive way. The possibility of using their activities does not encounter limits, and in fact because of the favorable pay the pressure from the workers expanding this form is increasing. But this carries with it the danger that there will be fewer constraints to find the reserves in regular-time work performance, to even out the work process and improve organization, because by virtue of the activities of the VGMKs they can more easily deal with problems and tensions, while assuring the workers more favorable income possibilities.

Under such circumstances the results of the otherwise well organized and more efficient work of the VGMKs "may be lost" in the enterprise's lack of organization. Such an attitude and practice works against the rational employment of manpower and the improvement of the productivity level in that it creates the opportunity for escaping the compulsion for more efficient employment. It may preserve the extensive expansion of the work-time base. To avoid the foregoing, it is necessary to make regular-time activity more organized and by discovering internal manpower reserves reduce the manpower intensiveness of production. Moreover, the enterprise management must license the operation of only those VGMKs that are intended to carry out additional tasks—in harmony with original goals—and contribute to an improvement in the population's supply.

Enterprise manpower shortages—where such exist—are generally limited to one or several skills and jobs. According to our experiences, the economic units are able, in general, to make up for most of the shortages by various measures—most frequently by overtime, the organization of VGMKs, internal redeployment, and the internal use of workers in the framework of auxiliary employment.
But manpower shortages cannot be completely compensated for in every area by the foregoing measures. In most cases, quantitative compensation has an unfavorable effect on services, on the level at which tasks are executed, and not in every instance can the enterprises assure the quality requirements.

Manpower Movement

In the second half of last year there were already certain signs—which have become firmly characteristic only this year—that the direction and intensity of manpower mobility is changing in the subbranches of material production.

The change in the manpower structure in 1984 is being realized mostly by natural manpower movement. Manpower transfers among any considerable number of enterprises will not occur this year.

According to our representative study about one-third of the enterprises we questioned had carried out manpower redeployment, which was done exclusively within the enterprise itself, in certain areas for dealing with manpower shortages and solving tensions stemming from the uneven rate of production. However, included among the causes are also the starting of a new plant, a change in the structure of stock on order and flexible adjustment to export requirements. The ratio of personnel redeployment in the enterprises concerned ranged from 0.3 percent to 0.6 percent.

Only rarely do the enterprises choose inter-enterprise redeployment, even if capacities are not being adequately used. It is more characteristic—although on a broad scale—that when nonprofitable production is eliminated they seek to find new work possibilities for the released manpower within the enterprise itself, which in most instances requires retraining, however. As of this year, retraining support may be used even in case of a redeployment accompanied by retraining, something which has raised the interest of the economic units. In the first half of the year four enterprises permitted such support to nearly 1,000 of their workers. A number of enterprise requests are in process, that is, awaiting a decision.

It would help the more rational use of the manpower available to the enterprises and would reduce their costs if for a definite period of time they would loan workers who are temporarily superfluous to other economic units which could employ them effectively. The legal conditions have been created this year to intensify the interest of enterprises in making such loans. Nevertheless, loans are characteristic only in very limited scope.

Wage Management

According to the econo-political goals of the 1984 economic plan, the average wage in the socialist sector and average earnings may increase by 4.8 to 5* percent, and the sum of paid-out wages and earnings by 4.3* percent.

*Together with wage preferences and central wage policy measures.
In the first half of 1984 the wage and earnings bill in material branches as a whole increased by about 5 percent, or about 0.8 percentage points more than planned at the annual level. This included in the cooperative nonagricultural material branches a rise in the wage bill and earnings bill (about 5.8 percent) that should exceed the goal by about 2 percentage points, and in cooperative agriculture it remained at the previous year's level as a function of a rather significant decline in personnel.

Average wage and average earnings in the material branches as a whole increased by 6.4 and 6.3 percent respectively, including a 6.8 percent increase in the cooperative nonagricultural material branches.

In the wage increase for the first half of the year the effect of last year's wage increases are still significant, since in 1983 the economic units delayed wage development in line with central expectations. For this reason the base is low, that is, the prolonged effect is considerable.

One of the danger zones in the 1984 earnings outlay is in the increase of profit not supported by achievements (for example, an increase realized by passing on cost increases in prices). Moreover, there may be a danger in the transfer of the R-fund of capital (or a part of it) that is being released with the elimination of the compulsory formation of reserve funds.

The disposable surplus income deriving from the above-mentioned factors may make a significant rise in earnings possible in every earnings regulation form, but particularly in the areas belonging under flexible income regulation it will create high wage-development possibilities because from a per unit enterprise income increase, the earnings increase may be several times greater than in areas under general regulation.

Because of a broader-scale relaxing of the regulatory system the attitude of the enterprises will play a greater role this year in the development of the wage outlay. Last year, too, there was evidence of efforts by the economic units belonging to this area to raise earnings to a greater extent than economically justified and often without an increase in achievement. With an attitude like this an unfounded earnings outflow may develop which exceeds the plan and could have an unfavorable effect on the development of the economy's equilibrium situation.

It is the enterprise leadership that may, above all, prevent the loosening of the relation between achievements and wages. Every manager is morally and materially responsible for assuring this. The supervisory organizations have called this to the attention of enterprises operating under the flexible regulation form. Moreover, the subbranch ministries and the ARMH [State Office for Wages and Labor] have conducted on-site investigations at every enterprise concerned to evaluate their activity and better understand their intentions and possibilities. At those enterprises where on the basis of the investigative results the ratio between achievement and wage was not appropriate, the supervisory organs must withhold premium advances from the managers until a harmony is established. Moreover, on the basis of the
balance data for the first three quarters of the year and the expected annual results the supervisory organizations must again investigate the activities of the enterprises participating in the flexible earnings regulation form. Managers will be called to account in case of management that varies from expectations, or the enterprises may be precluded from making such attempts.

Base corrections or the establishment of the starting base data permitted under various entitlements may have an influence on increasing the wage outlay. The number of such cases has increased, on one hand, because the number of reestablished units continues to grow with the new organizational forms (for example, affiliate enterprises), and on the other hand, because of the strengthening of the effort at independence, the separation of reorganizations and departments and their operation under a different form, correction is a requirement. In this area a great deal of laxness was in evidence, which made it necessary to review activity related to base correction. In analyzing the experiences of the investigation, the practice of the activity under discussion was made centrally more stringent. For proper implementation they fixed in guide books the compulsory order for this activity.

It is expected that this will tend to counter the wage increases stemming from the base correction. For this it is necessary, however, that the enterprises should request the base correction only when and to the extent this is justified. The licensing organs (ministries and councils) should act circumspectly in making their decisions. According to the analyses on wage outlay, the earnings increase will exceed the goal on an annual level, it is expected, by about 1 percentage point. In any event, a cover must be created for the excess earnings or otherwise these will exercise an unfavorable effect on the balance of purchasing power and the commodity base. Therefore, in the remaining portion of this year further efforts are necessary to increase achievements. It is important that a greater increase than planned for gross production value and national income should establish the base of the surplus outlay at an annual level, and the possibility should not arise for enterprise income formation (inflationary profit) not supported by actual achievement.

In the framework of the representative investigations, one-fifth of the enterprises that were questioned are planning to carry out this annual wage development in a number of stages (two or three). In respect to point of time, about 90 percent of salary raises planned by the enterprises in the first half of the year have been realized (about one-half in the first quarter and almost 40 percent in the second and only 10 percent remains to be done in the second half of the year.

In order to improve the incentive-interest system and by this means make management more successful, most enterprises have modified the internal incentive system. They are giving greater independence to the units (or are increasing their responsibilities), establishing for this purpose independent accounting conditions. They are making broad-scale use of wage payment by achievement and are linking the wage outlay more closely to profit development. There are obvious efforts to improve quality and the production rate,
to reduce costs and increase profits, and to develop and broaden stimulating incentive systems for the fulfillment of export tasks. But negative trends are also in evidence. The problems arise primarily because in many instances the incentive intensity is not strong enough. The level of achievement requirements—work norms, personnel norms—are not adequate.

A technically well-founded supervision of work norms is not up to the desired standard. A larger ratio of the norms than justified for a manufacturing character is statistical or estimated. Norms are sometimes tightened not to the extent actually justified but mechanically (for example, tightened with over 10-percent fulfillment, or with one-half of the achieved overfulfillment). This is the practice although it prompts achievement restraint and distorts the structure of the norms (a significant part of the technical norms that were originally worked out in a mechanical way loses its technical character and becomes statistical) and in addition a clarity of vision and knowledge about the reserves within the norms becomes less and less certain.

Employment Situation, Work Force Composition

Budapest MUNKAUGYI SZEMLE in Hungarian No 10, 1984 pp 6-14

[Article by Mrs Istvan Makay and Dr Erzsebet Balint: "Characteristics of Changes in the Employment Situation and the Work Force"]

[Text] A turn occurred in the economy in the field of employment during the Fifth 5-Year Plan period. The reason is that after several decades of expansion in manpower resources a decline has begun in the number of gainfully employed. Thus, the possibility for extensive development has come to an end and in its place an intensive phase has appeared. This trend is continuing in the Sixth 5-Year Plan period. The slowing down of economic growth has also represented an altered condition from the employment point of view. It has affected the development of industrial and construction production and reduced the work force requirements in these areas. Thus a new feature has appeared in the development of the subbranch structure of manpower. Formerly, it was characteristic to have a decline in the work force for agriculture, from which the job seekers moved, primarily to industry and the tertiary sector. In the new phase of development the industrial and construction work force began to decline, or its ratio declined, while the number and ratio of workers increased in agriculture (or in its auxiliary subbranches). Throughout all of this, the ratio of the work force in the tertiary sector was characterized by growth, but this increase was weaker than desired. The rate began to accelerate only in the first half of the 1970s and then again moderated. The year 1983 brought stagnation, in the field of services a decline of about 10,000 workers (see Table 1).

More than one-fourth of the workers in the tertiary sector (26 to 27 percent) are employed in trade.1 As a function of increased living standards and the trade and network development the number of those gainfully employed in trade is growing.
Table 1. The Number of Gainfully Employed and Changes in Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (1 January)</th>
<th>Total gainfully employed (in 1,000 persons)</th>
<th>Primary sector* Number (in 1,000 persons)</th>
<th>Ratio (percentage)</th>
<th>Secondary sector** Number (in 1,000 persons)</th>
<th>Ratio (percentage)</th>
<th>Tertiary sector Number (in 1,000 persons)</th>
<th>Ratio (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4,735.0</td>
<td>1,629.8</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>1,647.9</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>1,457.3</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4,980.2</td>
<td>1,225.8</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>2,160.5</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>1,593.9</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>5,093.2</td>
<td>1,059.1</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>2,209.2</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>1,824.9</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>5,014.5</td>
<td>1,032.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>2,046.7</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>1,935.1</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>5,001.9</td>
<td>1,052.8</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>2,002.9</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>1,946.2</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>4,970.1</td>
<td>1,082.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>1,950.5</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>1,936.8</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Agriculture and forestry

**Industry, construction industry
This trend is characteristic both of the Fifth and Sixth 5-Year Plan period. Although the total number of gainfully employed declined between 1976 and 1980, this same index increased by 4.3 percent in trade. A decline of approximately 2 percent is expected in the number of gainfully employed by the end of the Sixth 5-Year Plan, but a rise of about 3.5 percent is expected in trade.

A rising trend for workers employed in trade is a worldwide phenomenon. This is also characteristic of Hungary where given the increase in the number of those gainfully employed in trade the ratio, as compared to total gainfully employed workers, rose from 9 percent in 1975 to 10 percent in 1983. Despite the significant development in the recent period, the number of those gainfully employed in trade is still low as compared to the population. (In 1983 there were 465 workers gainfully employed in trade per 10,000 inhabitants.)

Characteristics of Work Force Development in Domestic Trade

The corrected statutes-of-labor work force shows a declining trend contrary to that of those gainfully employed in trade. One reason is that private businessmen and contract business managers, the number of whom has increased significantly in recent times, are not included in the statutes-of-labor work force. The average work force figures in domestic trade also show a similar trend, from which it is evident that not even the increased employment of pensioners could counter the significant work force decline for those of working age.

Table 2. Development in the Corrected Statutes-of-Labor or Average Work Force in Socialist Domestic and Consumer Goods Trade, 1975 to 1983 (in 1,000 persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Corrected Statutes-of-Labor Work Force at end of year</th>
<th>Average work force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total domestic trade</td>
<td>Including consumer goods trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>431.4</td>
<td>357.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>439.0</td>
<td>365.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>442.9</td>
<td>368.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>447.5</td>
<td>373.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>449.3</td>
<td>376.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>444.2</td>
<td>372.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980*</td>
<td>456.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>445.8</td>
<td>375.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>440.4</td>
<td>371.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Belkereskedelmi Statisztikai Evkonyv (Statistical Yearbook for Domestic Trade), 1982, KSH and the corrected data of the Labor Department of the Ministry of Domestic Trade.

*Corrected with organizational changes
Factors influencing work force development merit special attention. Without attempting to be complete, we shall mention a few. Beginning in 1980 the altered enterprise wage regulation (introduction of wage-bill regulation, or the use of special elements stimulating work force reduction) significantly moderated the ideas of enterprises on work force growth. An important role was also played by significant differences in wage payments for industrial and commercial workers, which made it increasingly difficult for trade to obtain manpower, particularly in jobs where the demand is great and there is a manpower shortage. The introduction of the 5-day work week also increased manpower problems in the trade area, for the granting of a work-free day less favorable than for other subbranches and the longer daily working hours meant problems particularly for women with family and growing children. The work force development in trade was also affected by the significantly altered economic conditions, reduced trade and network development and the extension of new operational forms.

As a function of the available manpower resources, the commercial work force developed differently by area. As compared to the 1975 base period the number of workers in domestic trade increased nationally up to 1982 by almost 5 percent. In the same period the reduction in the capital city work force amounted on the average to more than 4 percent (see Table 3). This manifested itself differently in the various sectors; in state trade the decline came to more than 7 percent, while in cooperative trade--primarily because of the strong network development--the work force, starting from a low level, increased by more than 20 percent (which it attracted for the most part from state trade).

Table 3. Changes in the Number of Workers Employed in Capital City Trade, by sector, 1975 to 1982 (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Cooperative</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>107.4</td>
<td>100.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>112.8</td>
<td>101.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>115.4</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>112.6</td>
<td>98.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>115.5</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>116.6</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>121.8</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Area differences in work force changes show undesirable trends. Despite regulatory changes and incentives for work force reduction, it is not primarily the areas (enterprises) with work force reserves that have reduced their work force use, but rather where because of the difficulties in manpower recruitment there was no way to replace those who quit with new help, that is, there was no way to moderate the manpower shortage. This caused tensions primarily in the capital city and the Budapest agglomeration. The
plants of a given provincial enterprise operate in settlements and cities that differ in their manpower situation. For an enterprise to afford manpower that is more difficult to obtain in certain cities, given the restraints on the wage levels that are being implemented in wage regulation, it has to employ a significant number of lower paid workers in other localities. Therefore, enterprises were in a fortunate situation if the manpower situation varied in their operational area (for example, large national enterprises operating in a number of counties), because there was relatively small opportunity for them to redirect the manpower to another area, but they were able to use the possibilities stemming from differing wage levels for the higher wage development of places with a more difficult manpower situation.

It should be emphasized that already in the mid-1970's there was in certain skills, areas and jobs of the subbranch a significant manpower shortage, which in the state sector was estimated in 1975 at 10,000 persons. In the years that have passed since then, little has been done to eliminate the causes of these shortages. With the various wage policy measures the subbranch possibilities improved somewhat, but did not overcome the lag. Thus it is again worthwhile to survey the extent of the work force shortage in the framework of present regulation.

Day in and day out, the fact of the work force shortage is expressed in the most varied ways (for example, businesses are kept closed because of illnesses, two-shift businesses have been transformed into a one-shift operation, queuing up is on the increase, and although there are enough goods in the warehouses, the store shelves are not filled up—all this without mentioning other quality factors like cleanliness, courtesy and so forth. The work force shortage is, of course, relative and related to the prevailing incentive system as is shown by the higher productivity indexes of businesses operating under differing incentives in the new operational form. Still it is worth comparing the extent of the work force shortages, latent in the various areas, under given conditions and on basis of the differences that show up in productivity.

We assayed the work force shortage in two variant forms. First we took the average level of the provincial productivity indexes as the basis of the comparison (the data for Gyor-Sopron county agreed essentially with this index). In this way we were able to arrive at a figure of 13,000 for the work force shortage (11,000 in the capital city and Pest county, 1,000 to 2,000 in the industrial areas, for example, Borsod, Komarom and Nograd counties) and certain seasonally active counties (Somogy and Veszprem).

In the second version we took for a basis of comparison a county (Csongrad) with a comparatively better work force supply and we related the production data to this particular county. In this manner an appreciably higher number of 20,000 employee requirement can be demonstrated, approximately 15,000 in the capital city and in Pest county.

Our calculations called attention to the fact that because of the limited manpower resources in the subbranch, the shortage had increased and the
enterprises had not countered this with deliberate measures for force reduction, better work organization and technological and technical modernization. In addition to the work force shortage of 13,000 to 20,000 persons that we estimated for the store network, there are shortages in certain skills and jobs. The data of the contract businesses show spectacular work force savings (productivity improvement). But attention must be called to the fact that a significant number does not represent real savings, because a considerable amount of overtime is involved.

Work Force Composition According to Sex and Age

The rate of increase in the hiring of female workers has slowed somewhat as compared to earlier years. The female employment ratio declined temporarily in the mid-1970's and then slowly rose again (See Table 4). This was contributed to, on one hand, by the exhaustion of reserves stemming from the attainment of the social maximum in female employment, by the high ratio of those taking advantage of child-care leave, and by the fact that even at the present males are employed only in jobs where the nature of the work and its degree of difficulty makes this unconditionally necessary, and where the replacement must also be male.

Table 4. Changes in the Ratio of Female Workers in Domestic Trade, 1975 to 1982* (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average for domestic trade</th>
<th>Workers under 30 years of age</th>
<th>Average in consumer goods trade</th>
<th>Workers under 30 years of age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Year-end data

As a result of the increase in the female work force in recent years, the ratio of women employed in domestic trade was 65 percent in 1982, which is higher than in any other economic branch. The high ratio of women in the subbranch is a problem primarily because of age composition. In 1975 almost 40 percent were under 30 years of age, and therefore the ratio of those on child-care assistance was very high: as compared to other subbranches of the economy it was outstandingly high, or almost 10 percent of the employees. This index is higher only in certain subbranches of the light industry (for example, the textile industry, and in the leather, fur and shoe industry. In respect to absolute numbers, however, commerce was in first place with more than 45,000 workers. At present there are 40,000 women on GYES (three-fourths of whom are manual workers).
There are significant subbranch differences in distribution according to sex. In subbranches which deal basically with retail trade and in the area of commercial services, the ratio of women is especially high. For example, almost 90 percent of the work force in the pharmaceutical trade is female. In the wholesale trade subbranches—in jobs that require heavy physical labor and are harmful to health—proportionately more males are employed. For example, more than 60 percent of the employees at MEH [Trash and Garbage Collection Trust] enterprises are males.

In the retail trade area the ratio of women (86 percent) is particularly high in the clothing enterprises, but in the fuel and construction material trade the work force is more than one-half male. While in the tourist business the ratio of women is relatively low, it is high in plant eating (almost one-half of the work force) and in food and chemical goods wholesale trade.

The age composition of the work force in domestic trade as compared to other subbranches can be judged as favorable. The ratio of young people is relatively high. While in the socialist sector of the economy (on 31 December 1981) 31.7 percent of the employees were below the age of 30 years, this age group formed 36 percent of the work force in trade. In the past 10 years their ratio has shown a declining trend.

According to the most recent and representative survey available, almost 12 percent of the employees in domestic trade will reach retirement age within 5 years. (This ratio is higher than in industry, or the average for the material subbranches of the economy.)

Table 5. Composition by Age and Sex in Domestic Trade, 31 December 1982* (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 30 years of age</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-60 respectively</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60, respectively</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 55 years of age</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Corrected labor law figures

In the case of men in manual work and in managerial positions and of skilled women in manual work, those expecting to retire within the subbranch significantly exceed the average (above 20 percent). All these matters must be considered in developing ideas for recruitment and training.

From the point of view of age composition it is worthwhile to pay particular attention to those members, or that ratio, of the work force close to retirement age (50 years for women and above 55 years for men) and for whom the subbranch will have to find replacements.
It is a matter of concern that at present more than 6,500 workers within the work force have reached retirement age. Their numbers are particularly high in the hotel and catering industry (about 2,000 workers) and in the general consumer and marketing cooperatives (AFESZ) (about 1,300 workers). The biggest majority of those who are entitled to a pension but are still on the job consists of manual workers, mostly semiskilled or unskilled. The Seventh 5-Year Plan must unconditionally deal with their retirement and adequate replacement.

Changes in Worker Composition According to the Nature of Employment

The seasonal and service nature of the work and the manpower problems in the trade area made it necessary to provide at the same time more intensive work for employes of working age but working less than full time and for pensioned workers. As a result of this, between 1975 and 1982 (with temporary periods of regression) the ratio of full-time workers declined somewhat. In 1982, 91.5 percent of the force worked full time. As compared to international data, this ratio may be judged high.

Between 1975 and 1982 the employment of pensioners increased strongly, or by more than 40 percent, and there are about 27,000 pensioners at work in the subbranch. (Almost 6 percent of the force consists of pensioners.) On the other hand, there was a significant decline in the ratio of full-time workers of working age. In fact even in absolute terms the development cannot be judged favorable in any subbranches. By putting part-time workers into jobs that are adjusted on a broader scale to trade and are more flexible, the efficiency in the work of the commercial subbranches would be considerably improved. Work force expansion has been hindered by the limited availability of manpower resources and the attitude of the enterprises. Lack of incentive for the enterprises played a role in this, or the fact that given the low wages paid on the basis of working time (regardless of achievements) there were hardly any applicants for running the business in the peak trade periods that are unusually active. Following an earlier decline in the number of less than full-time workers, a change occurred in 1982 when the enterprises were forced to hire part-time workers because of the introduction of the 5-day work week. On the other hand, among women job seekers with small children there was an increase in the number of those who because of the longer workday could no longer accept jobs.

Excluding pensioners, 2.6 percent of the work force in 1982 worked less than full time. Because of contract workers, their number and ratio was higher in businesses with mixed activities. The surplus tasks in hotel and catering and in commercial services during the 1975 tourist season were solved by the large-scale hiring of less than full-time workers (part-time and students). By the beginning of the 1980's, however, only the ratio of pensioners was high in these subbranches. Otherwise the ratio and number of those working less than full time was well below what would be justified by the fluctuation in trade.
Composition Changes According to Work Categories

Between 1975 and 1982 the ratio of manual workers increased in respect to the corrected statutes-of-labor work force in the subbranch as a whole. In the Fifth 5-Year Plan period stagnation was characteristic, but since then—particularly in the consumer product trade—the ratio of manual workers started to climb once more (see Table 6).

Table 6. Composition Changes According to Work Categories in Domestic Trade, 1975 to 1982 (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average in domestic trade</th>
<th>Average in consumer product trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>Sedentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are a number of reasons for the increase. First of all, a significant part of the work force which has left because of contract operations came originally from sedentary categories. In several sedentary work areas—primarily in office management—the work force shortage has stabilized, and thus it is not possible to hire replacements for those leaving. In addition, the administrative office management "work force freeze" also has restrained the efforts of enterprises to reduce the work force. (To counter this where possible the enterprises are trying mechanization.)

The increase in the ratio of manual workers has meant in fact only a small degree of work force growth, but within the total declining subbranch work force it was essential that the number of manual workers who are directly participating in trade should have less than average decline. The subbranch management and the enterprises made significant efforts to this end—for example, well-designed wage-policy measures.

The ratio of the sedentary category, and even more its composition, was significantly influenced by the number of enterprises, organizational concentration, structure and so forth. In recent years there has been a decline in the number of enterprises (cooperatives). Given many other factors this also had a favorable effect on the decrease in the sedentary category.

Comparing the sedentary work force ratio by organization, there are great variations. In retail store trade, for example, there were 27 sedentary workers at the end of 1982 per 100 manual workers in department stores, while in enterprises selling miscellaneous industrial items there were 51 sedentary workers per 100 manual workers. In commercial hotel and catering the ratio is higher than in plant catering (34 and 28 respectively). Many trades, enterprises and manpower management factors come into play here. For example, the wholesale trade enterprises (involving consumer goods and production)
operate with a large sedentary category. Statistical classification of the warehouse managers, trade characteristics, the increase in management tasks stemming from modern delivery organization, and many other factors are all important here. On the other hand, the existing manpower shortage in certain administrative job areas and the mechanization of office management have resulted in a decrease in these areas. (Moreover, the data recorders (adatrogzitok), in the meantime, were placed in the manual work category.) Finally, by 1982 the number of sedentary workers per 100 manual workers in wholesale trade enterprises declined significantly to 62. In the mid-1970's this index was still above 90.

One other characteristic affects the ratio of the sedentary work force: the size of the enterprise. The larger the enterprise the better the possibilities are for work specialization, and it is possible to perform tasks with smaller size sedentary personnel. At the same time, in the case of small enterprises (for example, county clothing retail) they are obligated to hire one worker each for jobs so prescribed by statutory provision, regardless of how they fulfill their working hours (for example, fireman, policeman). Moreover, it is also a problem for small enterprises if they have only one employee in a given work area (for example, wage accounting, SZTK [Trade Union Social Insurance Center] management, for in case of illness or quitting insoluble problems arise. These conditions make a rational development of manpower composition for small enterprises very difficult.

As compared to 1975 the sedentary category work force declined in all job areas and its composition changed significantly. In the Fifth 5-Year Plan period the ratio of actual sedentary workers—primarily economic-administrative jobs—increased, but at the same time the absolute numbers and ratios declined for office management and administrative workers. In many job areas—as we have said—the decline of the office management work force in the subbranch as a whole was caused primarily by the work force shortage and by the administrative and office management freeze which became effective in 1976. The introduction of the wage-bill regulation and work force norms which were continuously developed in retail trade also contributed to the decline in the administrative work force.

In the Fifth 5-Year Plan period the work force increase in economic-administrative job areas was also stronger than the increase of the manual work force in the domestic trade subbranch. The intellectual and practical leaders in domestic trade and the actual managers belong to this group. The increase in their ratio reflects a favorable development.

A clear trend in the Fifth 5-Year Plan period changed beginning in 1980, and in fact the ratio of economic-administrative workers declined and the ratio of management-administrative workers stayed the same. We regard this change as temporary. The advances made by new operational forms (because of the number of contractual business managers) will reduce for a time the number of those working in economic-administrative positions, and at the same time the preparation for a new type of incentive and the creation of the conditions related to it will periodically increase administrative tasks. After the
establishment of the elementary conditions, there will be, over the long run, the most possibilities for mechanization and the release of manpower in this area.

Table 7. Composition Changes for the Sedentary Work Force in Domestic Trade, 1975 to 1982* (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Technical</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Management administrative</th>
<th>Other sedentary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>27.82</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Corrected labor law figures, 31 December

The increased ratio of technical workers shows an even development through the whole period under study. The modernization of goods in trade, the improvement of the technical level and the furnished equipment of the network conducting the trade work, and the expanding industrial and service activity made this necessary. The number of technical workers per enterprise varies greatly among the subbranches. While it comes to around 20 workers in the hotel and catering industry, it is about 5 workers in cooperatives despite the industrial activity. This index is outstandingly high (37 workers) in purchasing. Several characteristics become evident when one examines by county the composition of the sedentary category. Somogy, Tolna, Pest and Nógrád counties are in an inferior situation in respect to the ratio of technicians. We think that in these areas the lag is due to the lack of skilled personnel and not to the work done; this needs to be changed in coming years. We need to call attention to a characteristic in Somogy county, where the ratio of workers in the financial management area is very high (about one-half of the sedentary category). Although the seasonal nature of operations increases the administrative tasks of the enterprises to a significant extent, the more moderate administrative work force ratio in Veszprem, which also operates in seasonal areas, shows that there are ample reserves to be found here (it is another question whether this should be done by mechanization, better work organization, or different simultaneous methods). The ratio is also high in Tolna county (38 percent); the administrative-management ratio is similar to the ratio in the capital city. This must be regarded as high, for many county and national enterprise centers operate in the capital city, and these perform important administrative tasks which do not occur in Tolna county.

Composition Changes According to Employment and Skills in the Manual Category

In 1982, 56 percent of the manual category workers in domestic trade consisted of commercial and hotel-catering industry employees, 14 percent of industrial and construction employees, and nearly 10 percent of delivery-communication, material movement and goods attendant employees. The remaining occupational groups had only a minor share in the work force. The
composition of the work force according to main occupational groups adjusts
to characteristic tasks in the various subbranches. Commercial and hotel-
catering employees predominate in the retail subbranches (in a ratio of 80
percent for store retail and 60 percent for hotel-catering). The ratio of
workers in goods delivery and movement is high in the wholesale subbranches.
Sixty-five percent of the employees in the pharmaceutical trade are in the
industrial category. The number of industrial workers is also high in coop-
eratives and other subbranches.

Table 8. Composition of Manual Category Workers, 1975 to 1982* (distribution
percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Skilled workers</th>
<th>Semiskilled workers</th>
<th>Unskilled workers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Corrected labor law figures, 31 December

Between 1975 and 1980 the number of skilled workers increased most rapidly in
the manual workers' category, with a somewhat more moderate work force devel-
opment in the semiskilled worker category—in response to this, their ratio
decreased. A significant decline has occurred in the number and ratio of un-
skilled workers. The year 1981 represented a turn, following which—as com-
pared to the level achieved—the ratio of skilled workers began to decline
and the ratio of semiskilled workers increased.

Within consumer product trade there were various changes. The pharmaceutical
trade and the AFESZ's increased the number and ratio of skilled workers. The
decline of the skilled work force in hotel-catering was more moderate than in
the case of others, and thus the ratio of skilled workers improved within the
changing total work force. The skilled worker situation worsened in the other
retail and wholesale subbranches as well as in the medium-sized businesses
both in absolute numbers and proportionately.

Local decline in the number or proportion of skilled workers was related to
the unfavorable manpower situation or the expansion of new operational forms.
The altered skilled worker situation in wholesale trade occurred under this
kind of impact.

With the exception of the mixed activity businesses (AFESZ), there was a
significant decline in the ratio of unskilled workers in all subbranches.
This was made possible in part by the mechanization of material movement and
technical development, and in part by the fact that the hiring of personnel
was hindered to a large extent by the manpower shortage. It became increas-
ingly difficult to find manpower for hard, dirty manual labor in the economy
as a whole, and because of unfavorable wage-payment conditions, the trade
area must be prepared for even more difficult recruitment. A development
which differed from that of the cooperative average was caused primarily by
expanding industrial activity. The cover for this was provided by free manpower resources to be found mostly in villages. This is also reflected by county data on the composition of the manpower category.

In the Alfold counties with a better manpower supply, the ratio of unskilled workers is somewhat higher. The ratio of skilled workers in Komarom and Nógrád counties is outstanding (above 60 percent), which is related to the capacity of the trade training institutions, and to [with] the kind of methods that the commercial enterprises use in the attempt to keep those with trade training in their line of work. An essentially more unfavorable picture is shown by data for Tolna, Fejér and Szolnok counties, not to mention Budapest, where the skilled worker ratio is substantially lower than in the counties, and the ratio of semiskilled workers is higher. The differing network composition and the large modern units naturally reduce the need for skilled workers. Considering, however, that in the capital city the modernization of the network was slower than in the provinces and that with adjustment to purchasing power there will be a need here also, over the long run, for a variety of businesses offering specialized, high-level services and counsel, it would also be necessary to improve this situation. Particularly at a time when in the capital city the students have shown an inclination for studying commercial and hotel-catering lines of work. Because of the limited training capacities, there is no way to increase commercial registration although this is the way the shortage of skilled manpower can be solved. Young people leaving trade schools to start a career form the largest share of skilled worker recruitment for domestic trade.

Composition by Schooling

It is evident from the foregoing that the level of trade training is relatively favorable in the subbranch. The same cannot be said of schooling. The composition by schooling of the gainfully employed in commerce (foreign and domestic trade) indicates, however, a more favorable situation than is actually the case. The reason for this is that the schooling of foreign trade workers is higher than average, and also that in the nonsocialist sector (private business, contractual business) schooling level is higher than in the state enterprises or the cooperatives.

On basis of available data regarding the schooling of sedentary workers (nonmanual category) (see Table 9), we can state that there is a low ratio (particularly in pharmaceutical trade) of those with higher education, while the ratio of those who have finished general school, or less, is relatively high. All this causes many problems in the sedentary worker category. In the staff jobs—and in fact even in managerial positions in some places—for the time being there is a substantial share of workers with only coursework training, although their number—as a consequence of retirements and quality exchanges—is gradually declining. To find experts with higher education is a particularly difficult problem in the accounting-financial work area and in managerial work areas of large units in the network. (These problems are especially serious in counties located at a distance from institutions of higher learning and primarily at small enterprises which offer poor material conditions.) Young people are reluctant to take these jobs. Network
Table 9. Composition of Sedentary Workers According to Schooling by Subbranch, 30 September 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subbranch</th>
<th>In number of workers</th>
<th>Distribution in percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>higher</td>
<td>with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store retail trade</td>
<td>1,874</td>
<td>19,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel-catering</td>
<td>2,162</td>
<td>12,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer product</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wholesale trade</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>7,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-sized trade</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>3,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed activity trade</td>
<td>1,928</td>
<td>24,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmaceutical trade</td>
<td>3,949</td>
<td>1,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing Enterprise</td>
<td>1,924</td>
<td>8,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchasing</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>5,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial services</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>4,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total domestic trade</td>
<td>16,221</td>
<td>87,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>12,272</td>
<td>85,896</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
jobs are unattractive primarily because of the unfavorable work-time arrange-
ments and great material responsibility. But the management of large, modern,
newly established units with a big work force and greater economic indepen-
dence makes it essential to have a management of higher level than at the
present (for example, at purchasing centers, department stores, and large
warehouses).

Young graduates from higher institutions of education desire, above all, to
find a position at the centers of commercial enterprises in commodity trade,
and in organization, economic and advertising-market research jobs. However,
aside from a few exceptions, as a result of the work force development in
recent years, these jobs have been largely filled and only in case of vacan-
cies arising from retirement or job transfer can young applicants be assured
permanent work that is appropriate to their interests and education. Positional
development possibilities are increasingly slower in arriving, and
many graduates do not have the patience for this. It is particularly true
at career beginning that appropriate work cannot be assured to graduates.

The incongruence between jobs and expertise (schooling) is still marked pri-
marily by "undertraining" rather than by "overtraining." A strong quality
change is necessary therefore to improve the congruence in job areas that re-
quire higher education.

Tasks of the Seventh 5-Year Plan Period

The analysis of the employment situation in the Fifth and Sixth 5-Year Plan
periods brought attention to the fact that the condition for successful com-
mmercial work performance is a rational and more evenly balanced work burden
on the employees in this area. To this end, there is much to be done under
the Sixth 5-Year Plan. We must stop the trend toward work force reduction
in socialist trade, and following this it will be practical to increase the
work force in harmony with the quantitative and qualitative development of
commercial work.

As is well known, the number of gainfully employed in the economy will con-
tinue to decline in the middle of the plan period, and only in the second
half of the period can a small-scale improvement be expected. Thus for the
time being—despite the significant increase in the burdens of live work—we
cannot expect any significant improvement in the manpower situation of
commerce or movement of released work force from other subbranches (indus-
try, construction industry) into the trade area. Expansion of the work force
in the first half of the plan period could be solved (particularly if regula-
tion giving preference to this were adopted) by increasingly employing part-
time female workers and mothers with young children. Given appropriate in-
come relations, the manpower cover will be available for increasing the full-
time work force in the second half of the plan period.

In harmony with changing requirements, it will also be necessary to modify
work force composition in the Seventh 5-Year Plan period. Because of the
work being done and the characteristic working conditions, there is justifi-
cation to increase the presently small number of male workers and raise their
ratio among full-time workers.
An increase can be expected in the ratio of the age group under 40 years of age partly because of the continuous and natural turnover of manpower, partly because of a strengthening in the entrepreneurial nature of trade, and increased demand among the young for certain commercial hotel and catering lines of work, and also the intensified "wage sensitivity" of the enterprises. The ratio of the manual work category will continue to increase. Here only skilled workers can continue to be in direct association with the buyers, but in other work areas—chiefly in large modern businesses—an increase is justified in the ratio of unskilled workers. At the same time, the ratio of unskilled workers—primarily because of the limited manpower resources—will decline, and a part (the easier share) of their work will be done by semi-skilled workers.

To assure the necessary work force for certain sedentary (economic-administrative, technical, health) job areas, it will be necessary to make changes in the composition of the sedentary category itself in order to eliminate local shortages. Work force reductions must be achieved in certain office management-administrative jobs by way of mechanization, better office and job organization, elimination of superfluous data processing and better use of work time.

In all work areas we are counting on a change and transformation in job requirements, and an emphasis on quality requirements important from the service point of view. To do this, we regard it as necessary to raise the schooling level (an increase in the number of workers with higher and secondary level education) in certain areas and to moderate the differences among enterprises.

The condition for a justifiable increase in the work force, for composition improvement, and for strengthening the ability of the subbranch to retain its manpower is to eliminate the lag in earnings as compared to other subbranches. This will be promoted by the planned modernization of income regulation and improvement in the incentive system within enterprises.

It is also a requirement to raise efficiency in commerce and therefore we must improve by all means the use of the work-time base. These include flexible work-time arrangements, maximum use of network capacities with a business-hours schedule suitable to demands, broadening of part-time employment and so forth. We must expand training possibilities in commerce, primarily in Budapest, where the skills of the manual category are unnecessarily poor, worse than in the provinces. In the provinces we must try to increase the number of experts with higher education by assuring young graduates better material conditions and worthwhile jobs. At the macrolevel we must improve the compatibility between skills and jobs through a well-surveyed training structure taking into account the requirements, and at the enterprise level by deliberate manpower management or apprentice training. In the preparation of future managers and in the further training of present managers we must give appropriate emphasis to the human factors. An understanding of the methods for improving human relations will be one of the key tasks of managerial training and continuation training in the future.
It will be practical to introduce such methods, still rarely used, as inter-enterprise loaning of manpower by which the work-load differences can be evened out with the varying seasonal needs. We need to develop the activities of the manpower service offices in order that the extent and direction of manpower movement will be rational both from the point of view of realizing individual and social interests.

In commerce too we must improve employment policy and manpower management so as to rationalize the acquisition and retention of manpower and changes in the work place. This is the only way to increase the prestige of commercial work and develop a manpower category of the desired size and composition.

FOOTNOTES

1. Foreign and domestic trade combined.

2. This is reflected by the fact that in 1981 the number of network workers (in socialist and private trade and hotel-catering combined) in Hungary was 267 per 10,000 inhabitants, while in the CSSR the same index was 420, in the GDR 360, in the Soviet Union 280, and in Bulgaria 276.

3. Not included are those on GYES [child care benefits], students, and pensioners.


5. In our calculations we started from county-by-county store productivity data in 1982 and from the varying trade composition (work season food-trade ratio). The combined data for the state and cooperative network played a role in our investigations.

6. The ABMH representative survey of ratios for basic wage-earnings in the work force according to age and work category.

7. Although most pensioners work part time, they are dealt with separately in statistics, independently of hours worked.

6691
CSO: 2500/115
KURON'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES EXCORIATED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 10 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Jerzy A. Salecki: "Denial and Irresponsibility"]

[Text] The different views of the 37 million people in Poland are something obvious, a real fact that has definite implications in everyday life and political life.

Despite the different attitudes, world views and models, patterns that are not always akin to those of socialism or do not even approach socialist ideas, the vast majority of the formal and informal groups and circles of PRL [Polish People's Republic] citizens order their concepts and actions consciously under the following common denominators: the interests of the homeland, the benefits to the nation and its needs, Polish reasons of state, the historical determinants defining reality and, consequently, the present and future of Poland and the Poles.

A sense of responsibility for the whole of Polish affairs that emanates in turn from beliefs and ideological views, from patriotism and the civic understanding of one's duty to the state, from common sense or from simple pragmatism determines the broad but common foundation built not without hindrances and resistance to national understanding.

Among the real partners of understanding, among the communities alluding to the ideas of dialogue and cooperation, if only causatively or contributively, one seeks in vain for groups that, despite nuances in programs and the makeup of groups, create the so-called political opposition (this is not a precise term). There is no understanding with this group.

This fact emanates from the oppositionist programmatic rejection of every opportunity for dialogue, every possibility linking Poles together to articulate the most important issues, every joint proposal of patriot Poles to shape the life of the society that has a socialist system and a state on the road to socialism. Anticommunism and anti-Sovietism characterize the programs of these people, they underlie the theories, actions and manipulations, they determine the choice of friends and the interpretation of socioeconomic, historical and political phenomena both domestically and internationally.
Objectively speaking, since Poland is a socialist state, the opposition, which is thus consistently antisocialist, is and must be anti-Polish as well, despite the patriotic phraseology. In other words, it is antistate, anti-government and, most importantly, antinational. It is this even though the battle with socialism is detrimental to the homeland, the struggle with authority reflects upon the social situation and the struggle for recognizing the rights of the opposition based on total negation directly endangers the existence of the nation.

What do antisocialist groups oppose? What are their program concepts? What are their methods?

These three basic questions have been answered convincingly in recent years, and not only in written form.

What kind of antisocialist opposition has existed since December 1981? All doubts on this question are dispelled if we read the two programs and the "tactical" considerations written by Jacek Kuron, the KOR [Social Self-Defense Committee KOR] idol and one of KSS-KOR's chief ideologs and leaders. The presentation of his ideas and proposals for Poland and the Poles reveals not only the myth of the opposition, but also an irresponsibility that is very dangerous for all Poles. As of old...

Both in "Theses on Exiting From a No-exit Situation" (February 1982) and in "Moderating Radicals and the Radicalism of Moderates" (July 1982), the old axioms are for Kuron the point of departure for making considerations on the Polish reality. The most important one that has pervaded the entire "strategy" of the opposition for years is the idea of absolute "Soviet domination in Poland." The choice of words used for this question is equally obsolete and cold-war (without quotation marks).

The author is consistent. In examining the possibilities for overcoming the socioeconomic and political crisis he is direct: "...we are on a sinking ship and this being the case, we cannot change the incompetent and cruel captain. Therefore, we must force him to direct the ship's rescue instead of fighting with the sailors (when I speak of the captain, I do not mean any specific person, I mean the USSR in Poland)."

While we may dispense with a polemic over onomastics and formulas, we must note a characteristic feature of Kuron's reasoning: in his opinion, Poland and the future of the Poles do not belong to society or to the authorities of our country: "totalitarian intervention" from the outside determines everything.

In his desire to be "constructive" Kuron ceases being logical: although the Soviet Union is the "captain" deciding the fate of Poland in his opinion, he discusses the issue of national understanding (oh yes!) and it is an understanding between: "the resistance movement, universal, well organized and the only chance for Poles" and the "government camp" to which he refuses to give any allegiance whatsoever.
Kuron retains his old distinction between "us" (or society) and "them" (or the party and state authorities). In his discussion there is no possibility for all citizens to cooperate honestly for the good of the country. There is only the problem of how to outsmart the authorities, of how to force them to recognize the opposition as a partner. Let us add that opposition groups continue to be treated as the representatives of the entire society with the exception of the "apparatus"...

"...And if it turns out," Kuron writes, "that a war that is thrust upon us must last a long time...we would have to revise many of today's incontestable principles. We would have to change our attitude toward economic sanctions, we would have to eliminate the institution of 'illegal' (covert) activists, which would mean changing the way the movement works and, in particular, we would have to develop forms of the participation of Poles in official public life (self-governments, associations, radio and television, commissions and committees...)."

Although in February 1982 the author of these words wrote: "I am aware of my duty to speak out to declare that I believe the current preparations to overthrow the occupation in a collective uprising to be the much lesser evil," when attempts to provoke society to rise up failed, with fatal consequences, several months later, in July 1982, he appears as a "dove" counseling not counterrevolutionary uprisings, but the slow, equally counterrevolutionary gnawing away at all existing social structures from within.

It is worth noting here that the strategic goals of the antisocialist opposition remain unchanged. "I was and I am an advocate of social movements and independent structures," Kuron confirms. "We aim for independence and we should express our aim..."

Understanding independence to mean taking Poland out of the socialist camp and breaking with our allies, as well as Poland's entry into the sphere of Western influence aimed at the "evolution" of the state socioeconomic and political system, Kuron advises a change of tactics in the new situation.

And let us observe: the statements of the former leaders of the former Solidarity, all sorts of announcements of the "underground structures" demonstrate that the ideas of the KOR leaders were accepted in full. There were attempts to mount a "universal resistance movement"; street demonstrations were organized as per instruction. Writing of an understanding that had to be "forced" ("the communist authorities make no concessions of their own free will..."), Kuron advised: "...an effective, i.e., coercive and flexible activity worked out by society already during the martial law period is the street demonstration that should be treated as a spontaneous element and as a component of a broader activity in preparation for a general work boycott..."

When it turned out that people became aware of the price of anarchy and that not enough people were willing to demonstrate or ready to strike, the tactics were changed. Reagan was "asked" to consider lifting the sanctions that formerly had received such high praise; taking advantage of the amnesty act, some activists of the "underground structures" came out in the open.
These included those that had decided to join the labor current honestly and wholeheartedly and those that wish to implement in union organizations, associations and self-governments the compromise strategy of "evolutionary liberation."

This was not only something Kuron wrote: the opposition uses his ideas in its actions. Given this, it is clear why there can be no understanding with these groups.

Kuron advises "publishing activity," "from handbills and wall painting through various forms of group uprisings to shorter and longer strikes." He is concerned over an "efficient information system." His primary concern, however, is that the "resistance movement [be] universal, well organized," that it focus "around a central point," demonstrating full discipline. Let us observe: this is written by an advocate of anarchosyndicalism, a theoretician of the "self-governing society" and the multiplicity of "independent" structures. It is clear that when the situation suggests a change in tactics in the name of the major goal--the overthrow of the socialist system--all theoretical standards fall by the wayside.

Kuron writes with a sense of disillusionment: "We are in a situation that has no good exit, we must choose the least of evils." Were someone to wonder what he considers to be a good exit (for the opposition, certainly not for Polish society), he explains this with another "revelation": "The leadership of the resistance movement must prepare Polish society to liquidate the occupation in an organized group uprising, while at the same time making even the most farreaching concessions in compromise with the authorities."

"This being the case!"

Kuron incites the Poles once again to cause a disturbance. He has no concern for the future of the homeland. He does not care how the Poles will work, how the program for extricating the country [from the crisis] is to be implemented, how we are to surmount obstacles in a group creative effort. He does not fret over what determines the existence of every Pole, ordinary, everyday life that can improve only in an atmosphere of work, order and responsibility. Kuron urges "repeat performances," denials of reality, scheming against the Polish state by all Poles.

This is the meaning of Kuron's discussion and this is the sense of the actions of the group that is not only anticommunist and anti-Soviet, but also anti-Polish and antinational. In the name of its own goals, this group wishes to incite citizens to destruction and not to work, to activities that destroy instead of creating.

8536
CSO: 2600/353
FAILURE TO OVERCOME SOCIAL CONTRADICTIONS ANALYZED

Warsaw STUDIA SOCJOLOGICZNE in Polish No 3, Sep-Dec 84 pp 21-46

[Article by Karol B. Janowski, Academy of Social Sciences: "Interpretations of Social Contradictions in the Political Thought of the PZPR"]

[Text] Reflections on the political thought of the PZPR raise many questions: has the category of social contradictions and conflicts, which is an irreplaceable element of the Marxist concept of reality analysis, been stressed or glossed over in the party? Have the concepts worked out by the party reflected adequately the complexity of the development of socialism in Poland so as to provide a tool for the correct analysis and shaping of socioeconomic and political relations? These questions are not unfounded. The party has unremittingly been declaring its loyalty to the Marxist-Leninist tradition and orienting itself toward materializing the postulate of surmounting the alienations inherent in the capitalism system. Above all, property relations have changed fundamentally, while the social structure has been essentially flattened and the property classes--except the peasant and artisan strata--were eliminated. Lastly, new institutions and forms of articulating socioeconomic and political aspirations have emerged. At the same time, there arose trends reflecting a multiplicity of diverse contradictions which, on being glossed over and concealed, cumulated and resulted in social conflicts. The accumulation of these contradictions and the failure to resolve them resulted in social and political crises that were usually accompanied by violent outbursts of discontent, discontinuities in development or, at least, major perturbances in the mechanisms for the regulation and control of political, social and economic life.1/

A different situation is conceivable, namely, one in which the contradictions are perceived in time and turned into the motive force of transformations. This may be exemplified by the initial stage of the socialist revolution, when the surmounting of elements of the capitalist system was accompanied by their concurrent replacement with elements proper to socialism. This contradiction was defined in the political language of those times as the opposition of the new to the old.
Throughout the period of existence of the PZPR between the merger congress [merger of the Polish Worker Party and the Polish Socialist Party into the PZPR in the 1948] and the 9th Extraordinary Congress [in 1981] the structure of contradictions in the public life of People's Poland was formed chiefly by: the subject of the collective life of the society, namely, the Polish working class, the entire nation, and the social and political organisms which emerged from within that subject and acquired an alienated form by virtue of their autonomous or even colliding functioning vis a vis that subject. 2/ In this sense the analytical-applicational proposition of Karl Marx stressing the contradiction between the substrate, the subject (e.g., the civic society) and what which becomes alienated in relation to it retained its validity also under socialism; this was a symptom of alienation. In the actual historically Polish dimension, Marx's analysis of the bourgeois class society can be applied to the cyclic alienation and opposition to the subject, namely, to the working class, of the creations of social life, i.e., the party, the state and social organizations. This was reflected in not only the social conflicts but also the political doctrine of the PZPR, in which the analysis of the working class was onesided and susceptible to current socioeconomic and political options. 3/

The presence and intensity of manifestation of the contradictions were not uniformly perceived in the activities of the PZPR. This influenced, among other things, the party's position on the scope and domains of the functioning of socialist democracy. Generally, however, the thesis can be formulated that the contradictions were treated as a dysfunctional element in relation to integrative processes. There were periods when the vision of the class struggle dominated the perception of the reality, as reflected in the thesis of the exacerbation of that struggle in the course of socialism-building. There also were periods when elements of social contradictions and conflicts disappeared from the analysis of the social and political reality and instead the thesis of the moral-political unity of the nation was championed—a thesis according to which social contradictions were relics or mere marginal aspects of social life. But in both cases socioeconomic and political contradictions were regarded as obstacles on the road toward the integration of the socialism-building society. In between these two extreme interpretations there apparently lies an approach that reflected a mediating tendency that acknowledged both the need to wage the class struggle and the need to undertake efforts to promote the political unity of the nation.

The Thesis of the Exacerbating Class Struggle

In the initial years of existence of the PZPR the analysis of reality was dominated by the thesis that the transition from capitalism to socialism would occur in the presence of a growing resistance of the capitalist strata, undertaking attempts to restore the status quo prior to the socialist revolution. The capitalist strata linked to the private ownership of means of production are not inclined to relinquish their rule voluntarily. It was claimed that the pressure of the class enemy that has not been conclusively eliminated by revolutionary means results in that the road to socialism is filled by the class struggle. The intensity of this struggle would thus not
weaken but on the contrary grow, resulting in the "curtailment, dislodgment and finally abolition of the exploiting strata."/4/

In this connection, ideological mystification was resorted to by claiming that Marxism-Leninism is the theoretical foundation of the thesis of the exacerbating class struggle. In practice this was to be confirmed and verified by the experience of the other socialist countries, chiefly though of the Soviet Union. In this way this thesis acquired a universal dimension, appearing to be an immanent attribute of the era of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Essentially, the political thought of the PZPR in the first half of the 1950's was dominated by the thesis of the steadily exacerbating class struggle. Representing an inconsistent mode of interpreting reality, in view of the concept of the nonantagonistic nature of social and political relations under socialism, the thesis of the exacerbating class struggle essentially provided clear if mystified knowledge of the social and political reality and the contest between the forces of the revolution and the forces of the reaction, between socialism and capitalism; it clearly defined the front of the struggle between the adherents and opponents of socialism. It also served to justify the special atmosphere of the times and the special means employed to break the resistance of the class enemy. The exacerbation of the class struggle and the intensification of revolutionary vigilance were regarded as a basic condition for the successful building of socialism in Poland. The means available to and employed by the class enemy were unlimited and undefined; they were characterized by deviousness and slyness.

The enemy directed his actions not only against socialism; he equally menaced the world peace, as well as Poland's sovereignty and independence. All this prescribed resorting to even the most drastic means. Without defining explicitly the conditions or time limits of the class struggle, it was suggested that it should cover the entire period of transition from capitalism to socialism. Employing a distinctive historiosophic construct, it was emphasized that the abolition of classes is possible only by means of a continuing intensification of the class struggle. This schematic mode of thinking was next applied to the question of the state, whose liquidation is to be a consequence of its maximum strengthening. As for the duty of displaying particular vigilance and determination, it rested on party members./5/

It appears that the party leadership soon perceived the limitations of this thesis. After all, the extent of nationalization of the economy markedly restricted the possibilities for applying it to the urban milieu (owing to ideological reasons as well), which was dominated by the proletariat and employees of the state sector. Hence this thesis was applied chiefly to the countryside, which would also indicate its socioeconomic genesis of the food supply problems, and to the general agricultural policies. In relation to the countryside this thesis was presumably intended to play an unmasking role. Overt and covert enemies of socialism were thought to operate in the countryside; they were thought to include also persons displaying a critical attitude toward the collectivization of agriculture. In this connection,
emphasis was placed on the fact of the existence there of private ownership of means of production, constituting a basic reservoir of capitalist elements. The countryside was thought at that time to be the principal focus of hostile and counterrevolutionary resistance to socialist transformations. Hence, any expression of doubt as to the validity of the employment of drastic measures in the countryside met with disapproval. Although a primitive interpretation of the class struggle in the countryside was rejected, the stressing of that struggle there and, above all, the policy of executing it and the distortions injurious to legality as well as to the freedom and dignity of peasants undermined their trust in the socialist transformations in Poland./6/

From the moment of its acceptance, the thesis of the constantly exacerbating class struggle was of a definitely antidemocratic nature. The arbitrary interpretation of the principles of Marxism-Leninism prompted, in the process of materializing socialism, preference for administrative measures and underestimation of [noncoercive] means of persuasion. This engendered an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion. The menace represented by the opponents of the new system of society was stressed to justify the exacerbation of the political course. Thus, assumption became proof. At the same time, attempts were made to preserve the appearances of legality, on exploiting the political trials conducted in those times. Their purpose was also to intensify vigilance and eliminate indulgence and liberalism as well as doubts regarding the principles of the existence and expansion of the security apparatus and the means it resorted to./7/ The thesis propagated will now have to be considered in relation to the personality cult. For that cult was a manifestation of the distorted perception of the role of the individual in socialist transformations, while the thesis of the constantly exacerbating class struggle was, in accordance with class terminology, to justify in theory a particular style of the exercise of power. The personality cult and the concept of the exacerbating class struggle were also simultaneously surmounted./8/

The gradual abandonment of the thesis of the exacerbating class struggle was linked to the unfolding of the political situation in the countries of people's democracies, particularly in the Soviet Union. In Poland this was reflected in the critical analysis of the activities of the state security apparatus, undertaken at the end of 1954 and beginning of 1955. On the basis of that analysis it was found that the problem of class struggle had previously been interpreted vulgarly, which caused the security agencies to become a major force operating in isolation from the laboring masses and the party. This criticism of the previous interpretation of the thesis of the exacerbating class struggle resulted in indicating socialist transformations in Poland in a manner undermining the validity of references to that thesis.

A reflection of the obvious reassessments was the view that it was precisely the growth of people's rule that curtailed the base of the reactionary forces, which together with the growth of the potential of the people's state nullified the expectations for the restoration of the capitalist system. In view of this, the forces of reaction were to go underground. Their nucleus remained the intrasengent political emigres. The party began to perceive the
changes occurring in the country: the broadening of the social base of people's rule and the growing support for the party's policy, which prompted a differentiated interpretation of the class struggle. At the same time, the static interpretation of development processes began to be abandoned, on finding that the views held among the Polish society did not always signify a complete acceptance of socialism, and on also admitting the possibility of the appearance of doubts as to the methods of materializing socialism. Expressions of criticism, reservations and doubts became not only accepted but also encouraged. In this connection, the conviction was expressed that this would assure their genuine rather than apparent surmounting. At the same time, the excessively hasty qualification of the criticism of negative phenomena as hostile activity was warned against. /9/

The ultimate abandonment of the thesis of the constantly exacerbating class struggle occurred following the 20th CPSU Congress. This fact also influenced the analysis of the conditions, scope and consequences of that struggle. By focusing the main causes and conditions of the thesis of the exacerbating class struggle in the person of Stalin and attributing all distortions to his psychological traits, attempts were made to find a key accounting for the reasons why this thesis was employed and why antidemocratic practices were tolerated. This approach was justified by the desire to disburden the party of the Stalinist tradition and relieve it of responsibility for illegal practices; it was also justified by the desire to democratize social and political relations in Poland. No allowance was made for the fact that, to be sure, the personality cult was indeed conceived in the Soviet Union, but it thrived in a favorable soil of dogmatic-sectarian tendencies and, secondly, it mobilized and strengthened forces interested in the style of resolving the class struggle proper to the personality cult. /10/

For in reality the thesis of the exacerbating class struggle became the theoretical platform for resorting to repressions and provocations and creating an atmosphere of suspicion and pressure. It undermined the principles of socialism and the rules of socialist democracy. In this sense it can be regarded as a manifestation of a mythicized treatment of reality, an attempt to manipulate reality and disregard the need for its differentiated analysis. By making reality two-dimensional, this thesis reflected a minimalist approach abandoning a many-sided view of reality that would allow for the degree of materialization of the goals of socialism and the extent of its acceptance by the working class and the society. The polarized perception of reality, its definition in terms of the simplified category of contradictions between the forces of socialism and capitalism, markedly impoverished the picture of both capitalism and the actual forces and aspirations manifested in the course of socialist transformations. The cultivation of the thesis of the exacerbating class struggle produced various effects, not only ideological and political but also social, and at the same time it caused a regression of the party's political thought.

A theory constructed in behalf and in the interest of the working class had in reality resulted in the limitation or even denial of its aspirations and possibilities for expression of views. This requires answering the question of
to what extent was this theory accepted by the working class, and whether that
class had the opportunity to influence its implementation.

Also open is the question of whether, given the particular conditions of the
1950's, which included the collision between opposed ideas and forces on the
international arena, a different unfolding of the situation in the Soviet
Union and the other countries electing the road of socialist transformations
may not have been possible. While the thesis of the constantly exacerbating
class struggle had been conceived in the Soviet Union toward the end of the
1920's, its strengthening in the political doctrine of the communist parties
took place during the immediate postwar period and was influenced by the
difficulties experienced during the stage of accelerated industrialization as
well as by the unfolding of the international situation. It was characterized
by the collapse of the anti-Hitlerite coalition and the rise of two opposed
political and military blocs. The maneuver transferring the concept of the
class struggle from the international arena to the soil of the socialism-
building societies was a mechanical and undialectical undertaking, quite aside
from the consideration that in international relations a frontal collision
between capitalism and socialism was not inevitable. This last conviction was
reflected in the position of the 20th CPSU Congress, which formulated the idea
of the peaceful coexistence of countries with differing systems of society. As
for applying the vision of the international class conflict to the analysis of
domestic relations in the countries following the road of socialist
transformations, this did not consider the process of the progressing
acceptance of socialism by the working class. Also disregarded was the fact
that, as early as in the 1940s, an overwhelming majority of the Polish
proletariat had, by supporting the democratic camp and participating in the
implementation of revolutionary reforms, approved the socialist direction of
development. By contrast, the thesis of the exacerbating class struggle
disrupted the historical continuity of political practice, because it
underestimated the accomplishments so far, and it certainly underestimated the
often elemental acceptance of the goals of socialism-building.

It can be presumed that this thesis did not contribute to broadening the
social base of socialism. To be sure, it served to eliminate the real class
enemy, but by justifying the use and even abuse of coercion it engendered and
strengthened in social and political life unnatural mechanisms of selection.
This resulted in, on the one hand, camouflaging actual views and attitudes
owing to the fear of discovery and of the attendant consequences. On the other
hand, this dislodged into the underground not only the explicitly
antisocialist forces. The suppression of criticism, of free exchange of
thoughts, and the inclination toward the regimentation of all domains of
social life led to self-withdrawal, which could cause the phenomenon of double
loyalty. The question arises whether the potential consequences of this
situation had been realized. When one considers the response to the Poznan
events [worker protests in 1956] and the course of the 7th PZPR Central
Committee Plenum, the answer is obvious.

Focusing attention chiefly on eliminating the relics of capitalism and
combating them sharply resulted in failure to perceive the contradictions
inherent in the development of the socialist society. Thus, it was believed
that, by abolishing antagonistic conflicts, the socialist revolution would eliminate all contradictions and conflicts in the society and state; that it would eliminate the divergences in interests manifesting themselves not only among discrete classes but also among strata and within social groups. The dominance of the interests of the working class was used to curtail in behalf of that class the area of manifestation of possible differences in views and attitudes as well. The theory of the constant exacerbation of the class struggle led to perpetuating the conditions of constant militancy. The relations of struggle dividing two opposed classes were thus to be a permanent and even strengthened element of the process of socialist transformations. This was thus an expression of a kind of reductionism, dominated by ideological and political voluntarism.

The thesis of the exacerbating class struggle resulted from a subjective perception of the process of socialist construction through the prism of menaces that were to justify the curtailment of democracy. It ignored the inevitable narrowing of the social base of operations of the forces hostile to socialism in measure with the progress of socialism and the extension of its benefits to growing masses of the society. This thesis will have to be regarded as secondary in relation to the methods of governing and the operating mechanisms of the political system. In stressing the repressive aspect of this thesis and underestimating other ways of resolving the class struggle, in reality the motivational considerations in favor of the socialist direction of transformations had been ignored. At the same time, in reducing the category of dictatorship of the proletariat—as exercised in behalf and in lieu of the working class—to just one of its aspects, the democratic values of that category were underestimated.11/

The Topicality of the Class Struggle

The rejection of the thesis of the exacerbating class struggle did not, however, mean that its requirements and conditions were underestimated. Still, a feature of the policies of the subsequent years was the conviction that the conflicts and contradictions of the first 15 or so years of people's rule were now a thing of the past. The class struggle underwent a change. Thus, it was pointed out that the elimination of the material base of capitalism neither eliminates completely the class struggle nor liquidates the influence of bourgeois ideology on the awareness of the society. On taking note of the ideological consolidation of the socialist society, the party at the same time espoused the view of the unflagging ideological struggle reflecting the "fundamental conflict between the forces of socialism and those of capitalism on the world scale."/12/ The party inferred hence the directive of eliminating all the attitudes and actions undermining the socialist systemic principles, the system of international alliances and the operating mechanisms of the political system in Poland. In this perspective, which had been dominant until the end of the 1960's, the line of struggle did not run between social classes or strata because, it was argued, in their overwhelming majority the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia accepted the program for socialist construction and actively participated in its implementation. Political divisions do not coincide with social divisions. For on the one hand there is the majority of the society that actively supports socialism, while on the
other there are individuals or groups of individuals who constantly express their discontent and are critically disposed toward or undertake actions directed against the party and the government, which embody the idea of socialism.

Evaluations of the influence of the political enemy in the Polish society showed that the possibilities of the groups deriving from the rightist elements of the society for influencing the situation in Poland were limited, and that they were incapable of endangering socialism in Poland. All the traditional political tendencies expressing the interests of the bourgeoisie or the petit bourgeoisie lacked the social base and political opportunities for becoming a significant nucleus for the crystallization of the rightist opposition. As a result of all this, it was thought that the opponents of socialism, being aware of the impossibility of gaining any major social support, since socialist ideas and practices have taken root in the society, would avoid overt demonstrations, conceal their actual intentions and operate under the guise of the slogans of "repair of socialism" or "democratic socialism."

Thus the main division runs along the ideological rather than the social plane. The collision occurs in the sphere of awareness. In this connection, it was pointed out that many nonsocialist if not reactionary views still survived in the awareness of certain strata. These views are nourished by foreign forces expressing the desire and efforts of imperialism to exert an influence on the unfolding of events in the socialist countries. Being unable to wage a frontal clash with socialism, owing to the danger of the outbreak of war, imperialism explores "peaceful" ways of disintegrating the societies implementing the tasks of socialist reconstruction. This situation was to be facilitated by the intensification of direct interpersonal contacts, the progressing detente between capitalist and socialist countries, and the expansion of economic, scientific, cultural and tourist exchanges. Since that is so, there can be no peaceful coexistence in the sphere of ideology, contrary to the slogans of the decline of ideology or the disappearance of ideological struggle being proclaimed in the West. On the contrary, the struggle between bourgeois and socialist ideologies is subject to being intensified. This was to be evidenced by the growth in the activism of the centers for ideological and political diversionary activities engaging in psychological warfare.

The class struggle was thus shifted onto the plane of the ideological concept, of a contest for hearts and minds, for the awareness of the working class and the entire society. Attitudes favoring orientations alien to socialism were perceived in the existing strata as well as in petit-bourgeois mentality. As for the substrate of the hesitations and doubts voiced about socialism, it was represented by both the difficulties attending its materialization and the unremitting pressure of domestic and foreign antisocialist forces. Their activism hinged mainly on the support received from the political and propaganda centers of the international bourgeoisie that were hostile to socialism. /13/
In the light of the ideological-political perspective outlined above, the class struggle changed its nature to the extent that it acquired the form of a great contest between a progressive-socialist-idea and a reactionary-bourgeois-idea rather than the form of a direct collision among large social groups entangled in conflicting interests and aspirations. Thus, this was a struggle for awareness and against the tendencies considered hostile to socialism. In this struggle, with its international dimension, there could be no room for coexistence. In the ideological battles waged particularly during the second half of the 1950's and in the 1960's, the motive of contest with the bourgeois ideology and for the victory of the socialist revolution was an ever-present factor.

Revisionism gained the status of being the most serious danger menacing the party and the basic principles of socialist construction in Poland. Initially, it meant deviations from Marxism-Leninism but later it was interpreted to mean the main theoretical and political formation attacking the superstructure of the socialist state and objectively desiring to restore bourgeois-liberal principles in social and political life and open the road to antisocialist forces. The ultimate goals and intentions followed by revisionism were thought to be decided by the fact that its theoretical basis and political practice rested on bourgeois ideology and the support it received from the "imperialist apparatus of ideological diversionary activities and psychological warfare."/14/

But while revisionism became regarded as a constant element menacing to socialism, Zionism, interpreted as a component part of the "anticommunist front" gained a different dimension. Although in its capacity as the ideology of Jewish nationalists it represented no threat to the sociopolitical system in Poland, it was pointed out that its danger "may ensue from various reactionary domestic sources aided by foreign centers of international anticomunist reaction." The issue of exacerbating relations between the state and the Church was also considered in the plane of ideological—and political as well—collision after, in the second half of the 1960's, part of the ecclesiastical hierarchy came to be regarded as a pillar of forces hostile to socialism./15/

Analysis of the interpretation of the contradictions perceived in the second half of the 1950's and during the 1960's indicates that the thesis of the exacerbating class struggle had then definitely been rejected. However, the contradictions between socialism and capitalism continued to be regarded as fundamental. This raises many questions requiring additional research. For example, were the fronts of struggle defined properly? Were they so explicitly defined as to cause the danger of spreading them too thin? Were the menaces indicated in a manner that did not raise doubts as to the actual purposes of the measures taken? Was the method of antagonizing various social groups workable, and did it indeed—that having been the objective—serve to rally the society around the longrange goals of socialism-building? In asking these questions It is not possible to gloss over the gradual curtailment of intraparty and general-social democracy /16/ following October 1956 and the growth of contradictions that had not been perceived and that led to the December [1970, worker protests] outbreak.
But the complexity of the international situation in those times (the Vietnam War, Israel's aggression in Egypt, the unfolding of events in Czechoslovakia), prompting special anxieties about the policy of the Western countries, cannot be disregarded. It remains an open question whether, in view of the gradual retreat of imperialism from a frontal clash in the contest between socialism and capitalism, the need for a more differentiated manner of defining the political opponent had been considered adequately. This was certainly not helped by the constriction of the domains of social life open to discussion and criticism, which resulted in viewing the world of contradictions through the prism of adherents versus opponents of socialism and disregarding other aspects of the differences within the society. As for the problem of the Church and Zionism, it may have been treated as a substitute for differentiation by world outlook or nationality. However, neither these factors nor revisionism became the causative agents of the crises, so that contradictions in this domain arose and accumulated until finally they led to the social conflict in December 1970.

Did the habit of viewing the world solely through the prism of the contradictions dividing the countries of socialism and capitalism disappear in the subsequent years? There are perceptible differences compared with the preceding period, but they do not detract from the validity of an affirmative answer to the question thus formulated. They serve to identify acknowledged priorities. At the same time, they demonstrate that in the political thought of the PZPR the problem of the class struggle interpreted on a global scale did not disappear, although the approach to this problem underwent a tangible reassessment. On the other hand, however, in the 1970's the contest between socialism and capitalism was not emphasized too much.

The conflict between socialism and capitalism was in those times presented as something nearly marginal, chiefly when considering international events in the context of the struggle with imperialism for peace, the support provided to national-liberation movements, etc., but it was not particularly emphasized in this context. This happened because, apparently, at the time Poland had the ambition to play a significant role in shaping the international situation./17/ The resulting concept of the "opening to the world" restricted as it were the domains of class struggle.

But it would be a great oversimplification to believe that the category of the class struggle had been eliminated from the political thought of the PZPR in those times. To be sure, the new post-December [1970] leadership team [Gierek] did not stress the class struggle, being desirous to emphasize its differences from the previous administration. This of a certainty resulted in underestimating the scope of influence of the opposition and the possibilities of the political enemy for action, although just then it was claimed that his activities were becoming more energetic whenever mistakes were being committed in the course of socialism-building./18/

In general, in the 1970's contradictions were interpreted in an inconsistent manner. For on the one hand, attention was drawn to the progressing rapprochement of the classes and strata of laboring people, as reflected in
increasingly frequent interclass and interstratal family ties, equalization of material conditions, concurrent growth in cultural interests and the process of the standardization of customs. This was to provide the foundations for strengthening the moral-political unity of the Polish nation and promote the evolution of a socialist national state in which the leading role would be played by the working class. On the other hand, the theory of the disappearance of class contradictions and conflicts in the Polish society was thought to be premature, although their scope and forms were thought to have changed markedly.

At the same time also the approach worked out in the 1960's, according to which ideology was the principal field of the class struggle, was clearly continued. Thus the struggle was now being waged for social and political awareness and attitudes. The aim of the ideological struggle was to eliminate the bourgeois mentality and the system of values, myths and customs that were relics of the past, revived and encouraged from abroad. Moreover, this concerned eliminating from the social awareness conservative political and ideological views and the prejudices and distortions introduced by the opponents of socialism./19/

But the greatest stress was placed on advocating the idea of the moral-political unity of the nation, something that is different from the thesis of the constantly exacerbating class struggle. It is worth noting that the idea of moral-political unity shaping a socialist Polish nation had already been proclaimed in the early 1950's. Together with criticism and self-criticism, socialist patriotism and friendship of the nations of the USSR, this idea provided the motive power for socialism. This also reflected an inconsistency, in the sense that the idea of the moral-political unity of the nation had existed in, so to speak, the shadow of the thesis of the exacerbating class struggle, although it had a distinct political shape. The unity achieved by materializing the worker-peasant alliance with the participation of the intelligentsia was to signify consent to the basic and decisive principles of the system of society. Groups displaying their linkage to capitalism were to lie outside the bounds of that unity. To be sure, unity on "essential and decisive issues" did not preclude criticism and the clash of opinions and views, but the domination of the political thought by the thesis of the exacerbating class struggle /20/ had markedly constricted the natural road to the attainment of that unity.

The idea of the moral-political unity of the nation revealed its limitations when coupled to the thesis of the exacerbating class struggle in the first half of the 1950's. In practice, reducing the contradictions to the fundamental conflict between socialism and capitalism had prevented a realistic evaluation of the actual support gained by the party. On the other hand, however, there was the tangible social and cultural advancement of the working class and the peasantry, as well as the changes occurring within the intelligentsia owing to the socialist industrialization, which was accompanied by a kind of support that often became enthusiastic. How then is the effect of the unity formulated in the first half of the 1950's to be evaluated? Is it to be regarded as an artificial creation, an idea welcomed solely by that part of the working class and the society which was fascinated by the implementation
of the farreaching goals of socialism-building and proud of the accomplishments so far, blind to the distortions or willing to eliminate the factors disturbing the propagated unity? Or should—despite the attendant mistakes and distortions—emphasis be placed on the incontrovertible accomplishments of socialism-building that would have been impossible without the active support of the party's policy by the working class and large segments of the society?/21/

The basic weakness of the interpretation of moral-political unity in the first half of the 1950's apparently lay in reducing the existing differences to the fundamental contradiction between socialism and capitalism and failing to perceive the other contradictions, engendered by the process of socialism-building. That had surely accounted for the practical limitations of that interpretation. For the basic problem was expressed in the question, "Who will win over whom? How to eliminate the class enemy?" As for the question of how to broaden the base of social support for socialism, it had seemed to be less important.

At the same time, another orientation can be distinguished. Its representatives were the delegates of the communist and worker parties gathered in Moscow in November 1960. They acknowledged moral-political unity to be an attribute of socialism-building that was conceived and consolidated in the Soviet Union and was being developed in the other socialist countries. According to this interpretation, moral-political unity serves to "utilize the creative energy of free working people in an optimal manner, in the interest of the development of productive forces and the burgeoning of the socialist society."/22/ Such an understanding of unity rejected the employment of administrative measures. On the contrary, it presupposed imbuing the society with the conviction in the validity of the program for building socialism and prompting it to participate actively and consciously in materializing that program.

That was the direction presumably followed by the political thought of the PZPR in the 1960's, although the concept of moral-political unity of the nation did not occupy the foremost place. A feature of this approach was the perception of various foreign and domestic factors influencing the acuteness of the political struggle and, on the other hand, the desire to create a national unity substructured on an explicitly class-oriented foundation representing the process of gaining a growing consensus on and acceptance of the values constituting socialism. Close to this perspective may have been the concept envisaging a gradual obliteration of differences among social classes and strata along with a simultaneous natural rallying of "growing social masses round the common economic, social and cultural problems."/23/

In this place it is worth mentioning the position of Władysław Gomułka, who at the 3rd PZPR Congress had demanded an analysis of the social and political circumstances of the socialist transformations. In his opinion, "the process of surmounting class contradictions in the political sphere is not unidirectional; reverses occur at various stages and under various circumstances,"/24/ complicating this process greatly.
Unity was thus regarded as not an automatic process and one not free of "perturbations and halts." That position reflected a certain detachment which may be understood in the context of the political battles waged during that period. On the other hand, at that time too the moral-political unity of the nation was an important political value to the PZPR./25/

The thesis of the moral-political unity of the nation gained particularly great importance in the 1970's. The causes of this reorientation will have to be traced to not only the tendency to oppose the pre-December period to the new era in which violent polemics, attacks and accusations were to be dispensed with and, instead, emphasis was to be placed on a new positive program, new socioeconomic prospects characterized by a considerable developmental vigor. This change was also to be reflected in assuaging the differences manifesting themselves in the society, which were to be overcome by unity-promoting processes. At the same time, the rejection of subjectivism in interpreting the social and political reality was proclaimed. The symbol of the new policy was to be the meeting of material and cultural needs, emphasis on the sphere of consumption, modernization of the management and guidance of the economy, the society and the state, and the development and broadening of socialist democracy. The goals thus proclaimed required combining the efforts of workers, peasants and the intelligentsia and eliminating the differences that may have arisen among them.

The vision of the changes connected with the new stage was to be a bold one, exceeding the previous caution and rigidity. A prerequisite for this vision, and at the same time its complement, was the policy of opening to the world, exploiting the international situation and benefiting from the blessings of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different systems of society. The conclusions drawn from the unfolding of the international situation were thus different than those in the 1960's. The contradictions between socialism and capitalism were not a major aspect of the new vision./26/ In this sense, the thesis of moral-political unity corresponded to the general political concepts in the 1970's.

Initially, moral-political unity was regarded as a process accompanying the building of a mature socialist society. It was pointed out that this unity counteracts divisions within the society and becomes the foundation for common action to promote the materialization of the tasks of the current stage of development. In addition, it was stressed that shaping moral-political unity resembles the mechanism of "attaining truth on the basis of science." In this perspective, in which the dominant vision was that of a "socialist nation of working people" within which the working class plays the leading role,/27/ analysis of the conflicts and contradictions existing in the society was considered less important. Such an interpretation of the society resulted in that the actual causes of the conflict of June 1976 were not analyzed and, in addition, the revival of political tendencies directed against the systemic order in Poland and the position of the PZPR and its guiding role in the state was not perceived.

Throughout that decade, however, a varying degree of certainty was expressed as regards the extent of the advancement of the moral-political unity of the nation,
perhaps owing to the awareness that the theses proclaimed did not fully correspond to the reality. In particular, the events of June 1976 became a dramatic test of the previously proclaimed thesis. Of a certainty owing to the growing socioeconomic and political difficulties toward the end of the 1970's, the fact that class contradictions and conflicts were not disappearing in the Polish society was recalled, and this was to be considered when "shaping the theory and practice of strengthening the nation's unity." The basis for that unity was to be the acceptance of the socialist system of society, the socialist policy of the state and socialist international alliances. Within the thus defined framework was tolerated the plurality of views and positions serving to develop optimal programs and solutions for their implementation./28/

The nature of the thesis of the moral-political unity of the nation as propagated in the 1970's and its class implications were analyzed at the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress, which admitted the fallaciousness of this thesis. For, on the one hand, this thesis caused the party leadership to isolate itself from the realities of social and political life and fail to perceive the contradictions and conflicts present in the Polish society and, on the other, it led to the disregard and underestimation of "the role of forces hostile to socialism."/29/

It appears that the thesis of the moral-political unity of the nation, together with the entire concept of building a mature socialist society, a reflected a subjective interpretation of the processes of societal development. It disregarded the role of the social reality and was not conducive to perceiving the contradictions present in the Polish society as well as to a comprehensive analysis and identification of the contradictions appearing in the course of socialism-building.

On the other hand, an outright rejection of the idea of the moral-political unity of the nation does not appear justified. This unity is conceivably a process of rallying the nation around the socioeconomic, political and moral goals expressed in the program for the communist transformation of ideology, society and politics—an program requiring that a consensus be reached on the values constituting socialism, but also a program that does not preclude differences in ways and means of materializing [socialism]. This would presuppose a certain naturalness of the manifestation of differences and their resolution and harmonization with the object of developing optimal solutions. A major place here is occupied by the broad development of the individual, his dignity and aspirations and his benefiting from the opportunities afforded by the materialization of the communist idea. In this context, the moral-political unity of the nation appears to be a longrange goal whose attainment transcends the life of a single generation.

On analyzing both concepts, that is, the thesis of the exacerbating class struggle and the concept of moral-political unity, it appears that they represent two extreme views of essentially the same problem, namely, that of the methods of socialism-building and the priorities to be acknowledged. Their political effects were similar. The first concept, which reduces contradictions to the fundamental conflict and magnifies its scope, does not serve to perceive other and not necessarily antagonistic contradictions
accompanying the socialist transformations. Thus, the limiting of contradictions pertained to just one domain, that of the contest between the socialist and the capitalist systems. The second concept, which reflects the desire to attain harmony and concord within the society, also removes from the field of view the differences in interests and divergences in opinions that have appeared in social and political practice.

It has to be admitted that both concepts were injurious to socialist democracy. The first, by antagonizing the society and justifying the employment of more drastic measures in social and political life, impoverished and narrowed democratic procedures and mechanisms. As for the second, by artificially eliminating the differentiation of interests and aspirations, views and attitudes, it undermined the meaning of the employment of democratic procedure, for such a procedure was unnecessary in a situation of complete accord symbolized by the moral-political unity of the nation.

Restoring Value to the Meaning of Contradictions

It can be concluded from the reflections on the political thought of the PZPR that its dominant element was the viewing of contradictions through the prism of the contest between two sociopolitical systems: socialism and capitalism. Not infrequently, the term "antisocialist forces" was employed. But neither the universal nor the particular attributes of these forces were defined. The term was accusatory in nature instead of explaining a fragment or the whole of the reality. This threatened devaluing this term—a threat that was compounded by the imprecise and broad use of such terms as "class enemy" and "enemy of socialism" as well. At moments of great tensions and conflicts it was always a problem to define, in a manner adequate to the corresponding stage of socialism-building, the base, scope and strength of the antisocialist tendencies, which were exaggerated in the initial stages of the conflicts in 1956, 1970 and 1976. A certain pattern prevails here, as reflected in attributing the causes of the successive conflicts to the operation of forces hostile to socialism. This also, presumably, reflected a kind of reductionism prompting the disregard of other causes of social and political conflicts in Poland and probably also ensuing from the desire to derive comfort from the attendant disclaimer of responsibility for these conflicts. If the other causes of the conflicts were perceived at all, that was usually only after their climax, following the replacement of the ruling group, during the stage of considering the prospects for surmounting the crisis. Here an exception was the events of August 1980, in the course of which the then ruling group itself provided the reappraisals and formulated the main directions of the rebirth of socioeconomic and political life.

Against this background, the statement adopted in July 1956 at the 7th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee was certainly of ideological and political value. It admitted the possibility of the existence of contradictions between the activities of the state and the interests of the working class when the expectations and aspirations of that class might be inadequately considered or, in extreme cases, ignored. The premise for the occurrence of other than antagonistic contradictions was to be the fact that, though to be sure the socialist revolution does eliminate the contradictions and conflicts between
the world of capital and the world of work, it does not eliminate conflicts of other kinds. Yet it is these other conflicts that influence the status of the working class and its role in the sphere of political relations, methods and forms of governing, ideology and culture. The socialist revolution does not automatically resolve the relations between the party, the state and the popular masses, and neither does it eliminate nonclass, nonantagonistic contradictions that might arise in the sphere of the economy, on the soil of politics and ideological and cultural values. The existence of such contradictions was also noted subsequently, when attempts were made to investigate the sources of the successive conflicts, broadening the analysis by adding to it new elements./30/

In February 1971, during the 8th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, the multifaceted crisis of confidence of the society in the party as well as of the party membership was said to be a manifestation of "a deep contradiction between the modern productive forces and the civilizational level of People's Poland, attained owing to socialism-building but not corresponding to the level and needs of the present stage of development of the methods of directing the party and the state."

A similar concatenation of circumstances was placed in the forefront by the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress in its stated position on the causes of the August protest of the working class, whose aspirations for co-governing enterprises and the country, as ensuing from socialist ideology, were not being satisfied and, what is more even, whose material and ideological potential was being wasted. Thus, on the one side were ranged the needs to participate in the making of decisions important to the state and society—needs engendered and perpetuated by socialism—and on the other, the centralized and antidemocratic system for ruling the party and the state./31/

In this interpretation, contradictions exist between the actions of the state authorities, which are identified with the party, and the working class or the society. This interpretation is a cumulative result of contradictions of varying nature, extent and intensity which, having been previously suppressed and deprived of the possibility of their natural articulation, combined and heaped up until they acquired the form of an outbreak—a frontal collision of a political nature. On the one side stood the state authorities, whose rationale was defended by the party owing to, among other things, its incorrectly construed leading role, while on the other side stood a considerable part of the working class and the society, so substantial that usually the policy of making far-reaching concessions was usually viewed as the way out of the crisis. At the same time, it was realized that the alternative would be another confrontation.

The PZPR perceived the contradictions between the socialist ideology and its implementation, between the Leninist model of the communist party and its operating practice. Irrespective of the belief in the elimination of the conflict between the rulers and the ruled, the problem of the dichotomic division of the society into "we" and "they" kept returning. Here a different approach could be adopted to the question of the pace of socialism-building, the extent to which the ensuing burden should be borne, the operating
mechanisms of power and the methods of the exercise of power, the ways of legitimizing power, etc. It is true that every time the party carried out an analysis of yet another conflict, this pattern was reestablished. On the other hand, reflections on the contradictions and social and political conflicts could be made, and briefly at that [as published], when considering the causes of the tensions and violent collisions. It appears a distinctive paradox that the category of class and social interest, so fundamental to Marxist thought, was not perceived and, above all, was not applied to analysis of the social reality.

For under normal conditions the political thought of the PZPR reflected the bourgeois theory stressing elements of social accord and embodying the already classical functional-structural concept which essentially is of a not only static but also conservative nature. It is worth noting that this theory was opposed by advocates of social conflict on the grounds of bourgeois sciences, although they did not identify themselves with Marxism./32/

Analysis of the political thought of the PZPR led to formulating the conclusion that the theory of social tranquility and reconciliation prevailed in the party declaring fidelity to the Marxist tradition. This resulted in a failure to perceive contradictions as an immanent and universal attribute of all social processes. Above all, however, contradictions were not regarded as a factor in the dynamic development of social processes. In reality, the view of contradictions as a dysfunctional element and the favoring of equilibrium and stability implied the admission of the value of contradictions as a dynamic and invigorating factor. As for the category of contradictions and conflicts itself, apparently it was regarded as secondary, although the social reality offered proof justifying the topicality of the law of the unity and struggle of opposites./33/ Essentially, the thesis of the exacerbating class struggle may be regarded as a variant of this tendency. For the reduction of contradictions to the collision between socialism and capitalism alone resulted in the failure to perceive the possibility of the occurrence of the contradictions proper to the stage of building socialism, which was envisaged by Lenin. He drew attention to, for example, the need to liquidate the differences between town and country and between physical and mental labor, as well as to the possibility of existence of a proletarian state with bureaucratic distortions./34/

In addition, other contradictions can be distinguished here, such as: between the development of the productive forces and the rapid growth of the material and intellectual needs of the society; or between the excessively centralized and bureaucratic forms and methods of the organization and management of the economy and the diversity of the forms of social and political life. Contradictions may also arise among various social and professional and occupational groups depending on material status or place occupied in the social structure. The nature of the contradictions manifesting themselves in the course of socialism-building is unstable, both as regards the fields in which they manifest themselves and the intensity of their occurrence. Some may decline and others intensify. Certain domains of social life may, owing to the operation of various factors, be exposed to a particularly rapid onset of contradictions, while others may be bypassed.
Against this background, it is worthwhile to draw attention to a fact that has been until recently overlooked, namely, that the very principle of democratic centralism, which constitutes the intraorganizational life of the communist party, operates as a dialectical unity of contradictions. Within the framework of that principle, alienation of one wing from another is possible, and so is juxtaposition of resulting opposites which should promote strengthening the unity and cohesiveness of the party. Unity may be disrupted by an excessive centralism that degenerates into bureaucratism and suppresses the free exchange of thought, results in curtailing the democratic procedure and introduces inequality among party members or, finally, poor relations among them. On the other hand, dialectical unity may also be disrupted by an excessively expanded democracy or its abuses such as lack of discipline and the transformation of the party into a federation of debating clubs. The sense of the explorations thus reduces to identifying the indispensable equilibrium between centralism and discipline, on the one hand, and democracy and free exchange of thought, on the other, demonstrating that the two sides of the coin of democratic centralism should support one another.

It appears that the principle of democratic centralism as a unity of opposites clearly emerged in the political thought of the PZPR during the post-August [1980] period. For the first time in the party's history, it publicly expressed its awareness that this principle is a dialectical synthesis of centralism and democracy, and that under this principle the contradictions of opposite tendencies come into open and can be surmounted only through their interpenetration and mutual conditioning. This dialectic is created not only by the opposition but also by the unity ensuing from the fact that centralism without democracy results in ideological, political and organizational regression and leads to a schism within the party, its paralysis and loss of identity and ability to lead in the process of socialism-building, while democracy without concerted action, without an efficient leadership enjoying the trust of the party membership and competent to lead that membership, produces exactly the same effects. Against this background, the party increased its awareness of the difficulties that may arise in the practice of implementing the principle of democratic centralism. This awareness was the starting point for the declaration that "finding the proper relationship between centralism and democracy is one of the most complex problems of the political practice of our movement."/35/

On the basis of reflections on the interpretations of the development of socialism in Poland it can be judged that these interpretations displayed a kind of voluntarism consisting in failure to perceive the contradictions existing in the individual and collective life of the Polish society; this voluntarism was inconsonant with the spirit of Marxism, which rests on the assumption that the road to mastering the elementary nature of socioeconomic development leads through the cognition of the laws governing that development. F. Engels wrote: "The operative social forces operate just like the forces of nature: blindly, violently, destructively, so long as we do not explore and consider them. But once we explore them and comprehend their operation, orientation and consequences, it is up to us to subordinate them increasingly to our will and exploit them to accomplish our purposes."/36/
Contradictions are of just as elemental a nature. Knowledge of their nature, genesis and manifestations is a prerequisite for their correct resolution and surmounting. Thus, the treatment of contradictions as an objective fact is the essence of scientific socialism which, as construed by O. Lange, represents "an undertaking made with the object of a deliberate and purposive resolution of these contradictions and conscious direction of the life of the human society through a skillful exploitation of the sociological and economic laws explored by science."/37/

The previous interpretations of contradictions were criticized at the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress, whose resolution drew attention to the absence of a coherent and accurate concept of the resolution of contradictions in socioeconomic and political relations. On the basis of an analysis of the causes of the contradictions arising between the level of productive forces and the development of social awareness, on the one hand, and the economic and sociopolitical structures and the manner of the exercise of power, on the other, it was established that, in the past history of People's Poland, erroneous diagnoses caused economic crises and social conflicts. It was then that the category of social contradictions and conflicts gained its proper place in the political thought of the PZPR. This was also confirmed by the decision to appoint a commission for elucidating the causes and course of social conflicts in the history of People's Poland./38/

The socialist revolution and the attendant liquidation of antagonistic classes eliminated contradictions of an antagonistic nature. There appeared, on the other hand, new social differentiations and strata, as well as differences in interests and aspirations among discrete social classes, strata and groups, and even individuals. New social and political forces and tendencies unrelated to the antagonistic system manifested themselves. Ignoring this diversity meant assent to social, economic and political improvisation, disregard of economic laws and principles of rational management and also underestimation of the consequences produced by this way of interpreting reality./39/

The category of social contradictions and conflicts appears to be exceedingly important to reflections on socialist democracy. Disregard of this category and blocking the natural articulation of interests and aspirations result in ignoring the causes of the actual contradictions and differences in views and attitudes. Moreover, this leads to reducing the tasks of democracy. For the presumption of the consonance and uncontradictory nature of aspirations deprives democracy of the role that it can play as a major factor in regulating socioeconomic and political relations.

Recognizing the differentiation of the Polish society, the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress changed its position compared with the past. However, it did not confine itself to stating the situation. It also postulated that every social constituency should, on utilizing the institutions of socialist democracy, be enabled to "voice its interests, aspirations and opinions." This would serve not only to create a climate of social trust and support for the activities of the authorities and the administration but also to eliminate promptly mistakes and negative phenomena as well as their causes and consequences./40/
It does not seem though that on this basis it can be concluded that contradictions other than those of a social nature are not perceived. The congress, on identifying the causes of the successive crises in Poland, stressed that the restrictions on democracy broadened the opportunities for action by the opponents of socialism. The situation of rising discontent was also exploited by the centers for imperialist diversionary activities. This means, it was pointed out at the congress, that the class struggle, which reflects the contradictions between two different class orientations, has not declined. An expression of this struggle has been, as stated at the congress, the tendencies "toward the destabilization of discrete elements of the political system" of socialism.

FOOTNOTES


4. "Ideological Declaration of the PZPR," NOWE DROGI, No 1, 1949, p 13. The thesis of the exacerbation of the class struggle during socialism-building appeared as a directive at the plenary session of 31 August-3 September 1948 of the PZPR Central Committee, which resolved that the implementation of socialism in Poland requires the further deepening and sharpening of the class struggle ("Resolution on the Rightist and Nationalist Deviation in the Party Leadership, Its Causes, and the Ways of Overcoming It," NOWE DROGI, No 11, 1948, p 153).

5. According to R. Zambrowski, the growth of the class struggle is independent of the form of the power exercised by "the laboring people headed by the working class": this applies equally to both people's democracy and the Soviet system ("Actual Tasks in the Countryside. Report to the 2nd Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee," NOWE DROGI, No 2, 1949, P 81). In his address to the 2nd Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, B. Bierut recommended more refined and sharper forms and methods of class struggle in order to "effectively unmask and neutralize agents of foreign centers." Complementing the arguments in favor of the thesis of the steadily exacerbating class struggle, he pointed out that the enemy was threatening world peace and Poland's sovereignty and independence ("The Party in the Struggle for Peace. Report to the 2nd Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee," NOWE DROGI, No 2, 1949, pp 43-44). In view of the danger of capitalist recidivism, B. Bierut commented that "We should not for a moment relax our alertness toward the class enemy and his sly, criminal machinations" toward which a "revolutionary vigilance" should be constantly displayed, so long as "the class enemy exists and acts"

7. The political trial of the well-known Hungarian activist Laszlo Rajek in 1949, which had inaugurated similar trials in other countries of people's democracies, provided an occasion for condemning indulgence and liberalism, which, by relaxing vigilance, were thought to undermine the party's general line ("Lessons of the Rajek Trial," NOWE DROGI, No 5, 1949, p 23).


9. According to J. Morawski, in the early 1950's a vulgar interpretation of the problem of the class struggle was displayed and the role of the security agencies was exaggerated, with these agencies expressing the "megalomaniac view that they are the principal force in this struggle" (J. Morawski, "Third Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee," NOWE DROGI, No 2, 1955, pp 11, 17).

10. The thesis of the exacerbating class struggle was borrowed from Stalin (J. Morawski, "Lessons of the 20th CPSU Congress," NOWE DROGI, No 3, 1956). This view was supported by E. Ochab at the 7th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee ("On the Political and Economic Situation. Report to the 7th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, CA [expansion unknown, probably Central Archives] of the PZPR Central Committee, Vol No 237/II-14, file 51).

W. Gomulka shared the view that the personality cult was borrowed from the Soviet Union but believed that it would be a great oversimplification and misconception to blame Stalin for all the evils in Poland: "We also have had our own native Berias" ("Address to the 8th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee," NOWE DROGI, No 10, 1956, pp 39-41).
11. One will have to agree with E. Erazmus, who points to the changed situation in which, in the course of socialism-building, "...the former historically evolved inequalities among the principal social classes become obliterated..., while at the same time new inequalities arise" ("Sporosztań partii" [The Dispute on the Form of the Party], Warsaw: KiW, 1983, pp 82-83).


13. In the Polish society the social frictions and conflicts proper to the immediate postwar years were to disappear. Hence, the line of struggle does not run between social classes or strata, since the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia display attitudes of "builders and fellow owners of People's Poland" ("The Front of National Unity," prefatory article, NOWE DROGI, No 6, 1965, p 5). On the other hand, the forces hostile to socialism are "fairly limited." Their activity is conditioned by the unsurmounted relics of traditional antisocialist and reactionary mentality and old customs and habits gaining the support of domestic forces and imperialism (Z. Kliszko, "On the Current Tasks of the Party's Political Work. Report of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee to the 8th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee," NOWE DROGI, No 6, 1967, pp 20, 27). See also "Resolution of the 4th PZPR Congress" and "Resolution of the 5th PZPR Congress," NOWE DROGI, No 7, 1964, p 197, and No 12, 1968, pp 135, 139.

14. The 9th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee declared revisionism to be an ideological-political orientation undermining the "validity and pertinence of socialism-building" ("On the Situation and Principal Tasks of the Party. Resolution of the 9th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee," NOWE DROGI, No 6, 1957, p 147). See "Resolution of the 5th Congress of the PZPR," NOWE DROGI, No 12, 1968, pp 125-126. The treatment of revisionism as the principal danger menacing socialism was to find confirmation in that it played the main role in "opening the field for an offensive by explicitly rightist and counterrevolutionary forces" which aimed at plucking Czechoslovakia from the socialist camp (Ibid., p 139).

16. In J. Morawski's opinion, the slogan of struggle against revisionism was used in the late 1950's to get rid of individuals or groups desiring reforms and demanding safeguards for and implementation of the principles of a democracy "that would assure a genuine responsibility of the authorities toward the society as well as genuine social control." According to Morawski, the party leadership, being unable to cope with "the so-called revisionists by means of discussion," employed administrative measures, suppressing criticism and manifestations of discontent ("You Were There, Healthy Instinct," interview with J. Morawski in POLITYKA, No 48, 1981). The party leadership paid special attention to the intelligentsia community, whose representatives repeatedly voiced resistance to the policy pursued by the party and state. Not all the dissident initiatives were accommodated within the socialist mainstream (cf. J. Kuron and K. Modzelewski, "An Open Letter to the Party," Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1966). However, a definite growth in the mistrust felt by the party leadership toward the intelligentsia as an ideologically uncertain element that might bear the torch of unrest was observable. The Resolution of the 5th PZPR Congress declared that the intelligentsia's mentality "still is not free from its traditional feeling of detachment from the laboring masses" (NOWE DROGI, No 12, 1968, p 126). The opposite of the intelligentsia was to be the working class, which was to safeguard peace and order and symbolized fidelity to the ideas of socialism (W. Gomulka, "Address to the 12th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee," in: W. Gomulka, "O naszej partii...," Ibid., p 684).

17. E. Girek in his speech at the Helsinki meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe stressed Poland's activities on the international arena ("Wielka Karta Pokoju. Materialy Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Wspolpracy w Europie" [The Great Card of Peace. Materials of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], Warsaw: KsW, 1975, p 6). The 7th PZPR Congress, on assessing the unfolding of the international situation and raising Poland's role against this background, declared: "A radical turnabout from the policy of tension and confrontation to the policy of detente and peaceful coexistence has taken place" ("For the Further Development of the Forces of Socialism, Perpetuation of Peace and Further Strengthening of the International Standing of the Polish People's Republic. Resolution of the 7th PZPR Congress," NOWE DROGI, No 1, 1976, p 150). And indeed, the international detente achieved during the first half of the 1970's and preceded by, among other things, the signing in December 1970 of a treaty between the Polish People's Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on the principles for the normalization of their mutual relations, and crowned by the signing in Helsinki of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, may have produced the impression that a new page was opened in the annals of international relations.


20. A. Zawadzki, "Nature and Role of People's Councils as Standard Power-Exercising Bodies in Our People's Democratic State," NOWE DROGI, No 2, 1950, p 103. B. Bierut, when stressing at the 2nd PZPR Congress the need to promote the moral-political unity of the nation, declared that this would happen contrary to the forces interested in restoring capitalism. In this connection, he recommended displaying vigilance toward "covert and masked enemies of the laboring people" ("Report of the PZPR Central Committee to the 2nd PZPR Congress," NOWE DROGI, No 3, 1954, pp 55-56).

21. The seeming nature, illusoriness and onesidedness of the idea of the moral-political unity of the nation as pursued during the first half of the 1950's were pointed out by R. Werfel, "Thoughts About the Aktiv," NOWE DROGI, No 8, 1957, p 56.


23. "Front of National Unity" (prefatory article), op. cit., p 4.


25. "Front of National Unity" (prefatory article), op. cit., p 4. J. Cynrankiewicz in his televised speech of 17 December 1970 declared that the demonstrators on the Coast submitted to anarchistic and hostile forces and were injuring the moral-political unity of the nation ("We Appeal for Civic Responsibility and Reason," TRYBUNA LUDU, No 351, 18 December 1970).


28. Gierêk, "For the Further Socialist Development of Poland....," op. cit., p 75. At a session of the 3rd Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee (on 20 February 1976) E. Gierêk declared that "the unity of the nation is a fact" ("For Deepening the Patriotic Unity of the Nation, Strengthening the State and Developing Socialist Democracy. Report of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee to the 3rd Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee," NOWE DROGI, No 3, 19876, p 10).
29. Report on the activities of the commission appointed at the 10th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee for evaluating the course so far of the work on the question of the personal responsibility of the PZPR members exercising leadership functions, for expediting this work and for submitting appropriate recommendations on this matter to the Central Committee. NOWE DROGI, No 8, 1981, p 108.

30. E. Ochab admitted at the 7th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee that the socialist revolution does not automatically streamline the "relations among the party, the state and the popular masses." While it eliminates antagonistic contradictions, it does not eliminate contradictions of a different nature. ("Speech at the 7th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee," CA of the PZPR Central Committee, Vol No 237/II-14, f. 49-50 and 55). In his turn, W. Gomułka stressed at the 8th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee that the working class of Poznań demonstrated against the distortions of the basic principles of socialism (NOWE DROGI, No 10, 1956). This side of the conflict was also illuminated at the 8th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee in February 1971 (see "Assessment of December Events.... Material at the 8th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee," op. cit., p 48) and at the 4th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee in August 1980 ("Report of S. Kania to the 4th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee," NOWE DROGI, No 9, 1980, pp 18-19).


33. It is worth noting that R. Werfel in 1957 had drawn attention to contradictions unrelated to the antagonistic system, but this did not influence greatly the political thought of the PZPR ("On Certain Contradictions of Our Era," NOWE DROGI, No 3, 1957, p 76). In the social sciences, too, the category of contradictions was represented, as evidenced by M. Cholaj's view that "it is incorrect to regard the socialist society as a conflict-free society, or to regard contradictions as a secondary, marginal and purely extraneous issue. Contradictions are engendered by the desire of individuals and groups to attain the most advantageous economic status, the most favorable working conditions, to maximally satisfy their needs and to participate in the life of the society" ("Mature Socialism and Refining the Economic Mechanism," EKONOMISTA, No 1, 1978, p 23). Of special interest seems to be the interview granted by W. Markiewicz, "The Importance of Conflicts Should Be Restored," LITERATURA, No 11, 1983.


41. Ibid., p 123.

1386

CS0: 2600/400
CHURCH PUBLICATION CRITICIZED FOR COMMENTS ON ATHISTS

Warsaw ARGUMENTY in Polish No 49, 2 Dec 84 p 15

[Article by (j.n.): "On the 'Worldview Market'"

[Text] I have availed myself here of the same title as that used by Father Janusz Marianski, who writes in an article about rural religion in the process of change that "...alongside Christianity there are appearing in society competing worldviews and similarly functioning value systems by means of which the church is being situated in a 'worldview market.'"

Can the church cope with this situation in such a way as to make its own position understandable and acceptable (in light of the applied methods) to other people? In this same issue of WIADOMOSCI DIECEZJALNYCH PODLASKICH (7-8, 1984), from which the above view of Father Janusz Marianski is quoted, Father Ryszard Kaminski gave notice of another study in a piece entitled "Function of the Parish." Among the contemporary functions of the parish he mentions the sociohumanistic function. He writes that "this function is linked with current social changes and especially with sociocultural pluralism, as well as with the parish's need for openness in the world and in the community. This function rests on undertaking and supporting those activities which unite all parishioners, regardless of how they see the world. Such activities are also to serve in more general matters as well as, on the other hand, to open the parish to the needs and problems of the community and to dialogue."

That sounds, let us admit, benign. Dialogue, an opening to people of differing outlooks.... So what if the path from theory to practice leads through such curves? And if the last one turns out to be a contradiction of lofty theoretical thought? It is easy to convince oneself of this, having reached the first pages in that issue of WIADOMOSCI DIECEZJALNYCH PODLASKICH in the middle of which issue was printed the article by Father R. Kaminski.

Here issue 7-8 of the monthly discloses two documents by the bishop of the diocese, Jan Mazur. The first is "Communique on the Christian Use of Vacation Time by Children and School-age Youths." His audience is mainly parents and teachers. The second article is "The Word of Bishop Siedlecki," on the matter of declaring August as National Sobriety Month. In both articles there are many valid observations about the threats stemming from the plagues
of alcoholism, drug abuse, smoking and licentiousness. They would be articles written from the standpoint of the general and common good of people with genuinely different outlooks if they were not attempts at discredited meddling in pathological phenomena, and in a manner removed from the postulates of Father R. Kaminski. If they were not, putting it plainly, the seed of a harvest of contempt toward people of a nonreligious worldview. "It has befallen us to live in times of alienation from God and from His teaching not just as individuals, but as entire nations. But God still, even amid a deluge of Godlessness and demoralization, treasures those who trust in Him," writes Bishop J. Mazur. "In times when evil and atheism have usurped the right of citizenship, and virtue and belief in God have become a thing of shame for many, there is a need for vigilance and courage" adds the bishop.

How characteristic is this tactic of setting alongside each other and mentioning, in one breath, evil and atheism, demoralization and godlessness. How classic an example of obscurantist propaganda in its contempt for one's fellow creatures and how much those labels depend on worldview. How numerous the clerics pattern themselves after their own prelates....

Bishop J. Mazur quite openly assumes that if someone is an atheist, then the scoundrel is godless, and if someone is a communist then he is morally defective, which is the same as being a brute, a drug abuser, a drunkard and everything else at the very nadir.

Indeed, this is a splendid illustration of the sociohumanistic function which the parish, in Father R. Kaminski's opinion, has to realize. He simply asks the reader to recall Pope Paul VI's encyclical "Ecclesiam suam," in which, however, the then-pope did not formulate such an approach to nonbelievers.

Bishop J. Mazur, in his call for the maintenance of sobriety in August, appealed not only to faith, but to patriotism as well. But here, too, in particular "...I would like...to write...addressing once again all those who speak Polish. I ask most sincerely for a firm posture of personal sobriety and of education concerning the sobriety of others so that the Polish nation might not perish and so that the enemy might not mock us; so that we might be spiritually and religiously, socially and economically strong.... Let the Christian and the Pole this month refrain from buying alcohol, from drinking it, and from offering it to anyone, and let each drunkard this month recall for us the yoke of slavery and let him be a symbol of those who ever oppressed us, exploited us, or persecuted us."

This is a very useful, organized initiative in support of at least temporary sobriety. But just why does Bishop Mazur relate this initiative to such a weird national scenario? After all, judging from a multitude of various clerics' observations, we have not had any enemies for a long time. Thus there is no one to mock us, regardless of whether it is a drunk Pole or a sober one. The bishop probably has in mind those pseudo-jokes originating in the United States in which the Pole is always portrayed either as an idiot or as a moral zero. But as far as we know, the United States plays the role of good old Uncle Sam, so it is probably not a question of such enemies. It is to be regretted that the bishop leaves his listeners such a large area
in which to speculate. He is, after all, as the prelate, supposed to show the way clearly, without any insinuations.

Nor is it easy to comprehend why each tippler should be a symbol of the "yoke of slavery" as well as a symbol of those who have at any time (!) "...oppressed us, exploited us, or persecuted us." Maybe this is an appropriate metaphor, to say that a person in the clutches of addiction is as if in slavery. Still, it is worthwhile to remember that to the average reader coming across the drunkard of Bishop Mazur's imagination, that drunkard may call to mind not only the capitalist exploiter, the Hitlerite occupier, and the feudal torturer of the peasants, but also the sauced bourgeois, the drunk feudal lord, and the besotten fascist. Meanwhile, those who ever oppressed us Poles did so, as a rule, quite soberly and with full awareness, with complete calculation and cynicism. Perhaps it would be simpler not to sound these high tones, occasioned by the battle against alcoholism, on the keyboard of historical metaphor, but rather would be better to introduce to people's awareness that which today constitutes the standing repertoire of church agitation, a repertoire also brought to bear on other, political, occasions. It would be better simply to document that a person giving himself up to an addiction loses his human dignity, his humanity. But the propagandists, behaving in a manner similar to that suggested here, reserve the right to link the loss of one's humanity to materialism, atheism, "godlessness," laicism, secularism, materialism; in a word, all that which finds itself at the other end of the worldview spectrum.

In the arena where worldviews are compared and confronted, it is still slow going as concerns a suitable level of culture. That is unfortunate.

12512
CSO. 2600/416
LEGAL INTRICACIES CONCERNING TRADE UNIONS EXPLAINED

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 21 Dec 84 p 6

[Article by Walery Masewicz: "The Trade Union's Bargaining Competence"]

[Text] The problem of collective labor contracts is becoming more and more pressing. There are growing demands to terminate the currently valid ones and to conclude new ones. In the meantime, the question most often on the agenda is the so-called agreement competence, which in the most general terms means the authority to conclude them. Until this time it has not been decided which body or institution should represent the employers or the employees. The following article contains the first part of the thoughts on that subject by Doc Dr Hab Walery Masewicz. This is a review of his ideas expressed in a lecture delivered at the Conference on Collective Bargaining, organized by the Institute for Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

The ability to negotiate and sign a collective labor agreement is one of the basic rights of a union. This prerogative is a consistent result of the social position which the unions have secured for themselves.

The fulfillment of certain definite conditions is a prerequisite for the eligibility to negotiate. The first of these is authorization to represent the union interests, which should be treated as their main statutory purpose. (For that reason the right to negotiate is denied to organizations or associations with various purposes and statutory goals, such as the protection of rights as well as charitable, sport, or cultural activities.) Further conditions are as follows: socially homogeneous membership of the organization comprising exclusively employed workers (excluding, for instance, craftsmen, people in free professions); permanence of the trade organization, not of temporary character; its independence from the negotiating partner (organizational, functional, economic, personal, etc.); and finally, a voluntary character.

With this approach the eligibility to negotiate is nothing but a recognition of the competence of the trade union, confirmation of its position and reliability by the partner, the state authorities.
Different Variants

The power to negotiate, if we apply to it not only a normative but also a sociological meaning, does not necessarily result from legal authorization. Its real source always lies in social forces represented in the trade union and influencing the pattern of negotiations between employees and employers.

This power comprises many particular rights which may be realized simply as a consequence of the general authorization to act in the name and on behalf of the represented group, or it may require an additional authorization. In any case, a body which has the negotiating authority has the right to start activities preceding negotiations, especially to demand that the employer make available materials and information indispensable to maintaining the negotiations. It can also usually suggest the time of the beginning of talks, decide on the methods of consultations (confirmation, approbation, etc.) between the negotiating labor representation and the collective on whose behalf it is acting and also, which is most important, it can sign a collective agreement, acting either on the basis of the authorization resulting from the representative mandate or acting only after following the acceptance of its text by the directly interested people (by means of a poll, referendum, or public opinion). Further prerogatives are to cancel a collective agreement in full or in part, and to participate in mixed commissions made up of an equal number of representatives of both sides, for the purpose of interpretation and control of the application of the contract.

Relations between the negotiating group and the general membership which it represents may be shaped according to one of many variations. After all, they depend primarily on the legal status of that group. Relatively the fewest doubts of a legal nature are brought about in a situation where the negotiations are conducted by legal officials of a trade union, and particularly in cases when the union is the statutory representative of the interests of all the workers employed in a particular line or branch of work. The status of a legal representative at least eliminates doubts about the limits of his legal authorization to act. The question that still remains open concerns the channels of communication between the organs of the union and the general membership, which becomes of vital importance in case of a general labor conflict.

The situation becomes more complicated when the group leading the negotiations gets to represent the workers on the spur of the moment.

The status of a trade union is not always a sufficient condition for gaining the negotiating prerogative. The necessity of being a representative union is in this area only one of the initial conditions. This condition most often means registration of the union, which means undergoing a special procedure connected with its "legalization."

The negotiating competence of a trade union may also be voluntarily acknowledged by the partner, who by starting negotiations indirectly confirms
that he considers that union an authorized and competent representative of the workers' side. However, the results of such "recognition" are of no further consequence in the relationship between the union and the agencies of administration, and they do not endow it with a legal status. The only practical result is the opportunity to reach a collective agreement, treated as a "gentleman's agreement" between the two parties.

Looking at the generally applied legal solutions and practices formed in the world today, it may be said that the authority to negotiate on the side of labor is given most often to some of the trade unions (for instance, so-called "registered" unions), which fulfill the conditions prescribed in the rules regulating the problems of negotiating collective labor agreements. There also exist some other solutions, for instance, granting such power to all legally acting trade unions or mixed representations (in the way of personnel), namely consisting of representatives of the work force (for instance, shop stewards in England) and the local branch of trade union, or finally, representations chosen by workers themselves if they are considered reliable and competent to represent the interest of a definite collective body of employees.

Labor Code

The labor code granted the right to negotiate to the management of those branch trade unions whose members are employees of enterprises included in a collective agreement. The executive directives regulated the legal consequences of either a merger or breakup of trade unions of which one was a party to a collective contract. This regulation was characteristic of the idea of that time in building the socialist economy and especially of the centralized tendencies in regulating wages and other labor benefits. The legal decision of acknowledging only one link of the union's structure as authorized to draw up a contract was a departure from the principle of allowing the trade unions themselves to appoint the agencies authorized for these functions independently.

At least the law on trade unions of 8 October 1982 does not contain the legal error of seeming to point out only indirectly that negotiating qualifications belong to statewide union organizations; and still, even this conclusion may be considered doubtful if it is recognized that article 23 of this law pertains rather to the scope of the agreement and not the ability to negotiate by those single links of the trade union movement. The code does not contain any detailed rules regulating these problems.

Statutes of Federación:

At present, even before the reform of the regulations on collective labor agreements, the trade union federations in their statutes reserved for themselves the power to negotiate. One of the main purposes of the federation--forgetting the differences in verbal expressions in particular statutes--is to represent a united stand, a common front vis-a-vis the
agencies of government and state administration. Within the framework of this general formula the majority of statutes leave the decision about the collective agreement (that is, the start of negotiations, completion, changes, canceling, etc.) to the highest authority of the federation (Union Assembly, National Conference, Federation Council), requiring for a decision in this instance only a qualified majority of votes, for instance, three-fourths of the present members of that authority.

Since the federation may sometimes comprise unions of various lines of work, and sometimes those of one kind, various specialized advisory councils or evaluating bodies are foreseen in its structure. Their duty, among others, will be to evaluate the drafts of collective labor contracts. However, these statutes do not contain a decision about the membership and competence of the representative body of the federation for the bargaining sessions or the system of consultations about the draft of agreement with the work force of interested workplaces, etc. So far, the present suprafactory structures of trade unions do not have any practice pertaining to collective bargaining, so many problems will have to be solved on the spot.

There is no decision about that problem in the premises of the new legal ruling about collective agreements issued by the minister of labor, wages and social affairs (of October last year).

12470
CSO: 2600/429
WESTERN COMMENT ON SITUATION IN KOSOVO

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 28, 29, 31 Dec 84

[Articles by Viktor Meier]

[28 Dec 84, p 10]

[Text] Pristina, in December—When we first visited Kosovo in 1950, we encountered the kind of poverty which was commensurate with its state of development at that time. Today, almost 35 years later, the predominant impression—aside from the not quite genuine luster of the metropolis of Pristina (called Prishtine in Albanian)—once again is one of poverty and misery; where the misery now in many instances is of the kind brought on by civilization. It is a throwback to a time that seemed full of promise, 100,000 people are registered as unemployed. Now these are people who already thought they were part of a developed economy but have now been thrown back into extended families which take care of their own or who are suffering deprivation or even hunger. Many things which were achieved under the aspect of what seemed like surprisingly fast progress in the early seventies are now falling apart once again.

This is not to say that the authorities fail to see it or try to hide it. In the aftermath of the unrest in Kosovo in 1981, the Yugoslav federation approved a stepped-up development aid program for the region. The so-called federal fund to aid the underdeveloped regions of the country to which all Yugoslav businesses contribute is being used almost exclusively for the Kosovo region. In addition, half the funds are being granted in the form of direct investments and the other half is given to the Kosovo authorities to distribute as they see fit. Since 1981, it is said, 79 projects have been approved which are to provide work for 20,000 people. 11 of the projects have already been completed. The Kosovo region turned down all offers to have the funds used to finance energy projects. Originally, the idea was to use the plentiful brown coal deposits of the region to run thermal energy plants and to distribute the electric power throughout Yugoslavia. But the Kosovo authorities say they want to build such power plants only for their own use and to sell their brown coal to the other constituent republics. Energy projects, they say, do not contribute to a solution of their most serious problem—which is unemployment. For another thing, it must be taken into account that the use of brown coal leads to environmental pollution.
But given the present situation—is the Yugoslav federation even in a position to do very much for the development of the Kosovo region? The region has something like an $600 million debt to the hard currency area and exports about $100 million worth of goods to that area each year—primarily nonferrous metals from the "Trepa" lead and zinc combine in addition to wood products, wine and textiles. And then there is about $100 million worth of exports to the non-convertible currency area plus the monies transferred by some 30,000 citizens of Kosovo who are working in foreign countries. The region is far removed from being able to amortize the debt on its own. To do so, it needs help from the central government. How did this huge debt actually pile up?

The World Bank recently extended a loan of some $70 million to the Kosovo region for financing small and mostly private agricultural projects. It is hard to fathom the reasoning behind such hard currency credits. To develop private agricultural production, it would be necessary to set the proper pricing policy, to establish markets and a viable sales organization and to make it possible for the farmers to create independent cooperatives under their own leadership. This could be done without the benefit of hard currency loans. It is doubtful whether the region will be able to earn enough hard currency from this World Bank project to pay for the interest and amortization of the loan.

Even Pristina realizes by now that more freedom for private initiative might help to overcome the serious economic stagnation at least in part. But it now appears that the 40 years of dogmatic socialist economic policy have made a good many of the traditionally suspicious Albanians turn their backs on such considerations. 70 percent of the few people who were interested wanted to open up a coffee house, so the complaint runs, although it is craftsmen who are needed. Just the same, the suspicions of the Albanians do not seem to be entirely unjustified because everywhere in Yugoslavia one can hear stories of local functionaries making life difficult for private entrepreneurs no matter what promises were originally made. Thus, there is a depressing air of passiveness throughout the Kosovo region while just a few hours by car from here, in Greece, one has the feeling that just about everyone is trying to get something constructive and profitable going. The Albanians in the Kosovo region take refuge in mostly non-productive assets such as land or gold—or they build residential dwellings.

But as compared to the Albanians living under Enver Hoxha the Albanians in Yugoslav Kosovo still enjoy some decided advantages; but the bad economic conditions tend to make these advantages shrink. Both this and the heavy political burdens of the past continue to provide the soil on which Albanian nationalism and even irredentism can grow. People here are scarcely aware of conditions in Albania proper but they can see that their own standard of living is constantly declining. At this time, the situation may be more or less calm on the surface but the calm is deceptive. For that matter, while we were there there was an assassination attempt.
on an officer in Peo. More and more Albanians in the region are asking them-
selves whether they have any kind of future in Yugoslavia at all. Only a
handful would want the region to become a part of Enver Hoxha's Albania
but all of them are keeping a watchful eye on developments there.

For another thing, there is a more and more noticeable, overt anti-Albanian
atmosphere spreading both among the population and the government through-
out Yugoslavia and particularly in Serbia. The impetus for it is among other
things that the exodus of Serbians and Montenegrins from the Kosovo region
is continuing—even if at a slower pace. In many cases it is due to pressure
but in many others it is simply unthinkable for a good many Serbians to live
in an entirely Albanian environment all by themselves, frequently in total
isolation. Individual incidents are played up by the Belgrade newspapers
which has in effect resulted in crimes such as rape carrying sentences twice
as long in Kosovo as in Serbia. The authorities frequently make an attempt
to put the brakes on such anti-Albanian campaigns but such attempts are not
always appreciated by the Serbians and Montenegrins. In Montenegro, where
the authorities react with less severity to these so-called subversive ac-
tivities of the Albanians than in Macedonia, we were told that this "leni-
ent attitude" was responsible for all the discord. The Albanians who did
not like living in Yugoslavia should take "their hand baggage and be
brought to the border in a matter of 2 hours." The only problem is that
the Albanians were living in places like Ulcinj, Plav or Gusinje long be-
fore these areas became part of Montenegro. In fact, it took the support
of the big powers to help the Montenegrins to capture the coastal city of
Ulcinj. The Serbs, for their part, maintain that the Kosovo region belongs
to them because the center of a Serbian empire was located there in the
Middle Ages. To be sure, starting in the late 17th century, many Serbians
did migrate from there to Vojvodina north of the Danube. But these same
Serbians also maintain that the Vojvodina also belongs to them because
the Serbians are now living there.

[29 Dec 84 p 10]

[Text] Pristina, in December—In the Djakovica area along the Albanian
border Albanian television programs can be picked up. The Kosovo Albanians
living there are said to enjoy watching the programs hugely. It is not
that the programs are particularly interesting or better than the local
programs coming from Pristina; but it is forbidden to watch—not by law
but in actual practice just as any person caught listening to Radio Tirana
or, worse still, telling others what he heard there can be arrested and
put on trial. At the moment, there is no cultural contact of any kind be-
tween the Kosovo Albanians and Albania proper. When Ramiz Alia, the No 2
man of the Tirane regime, called for a resumption of cultural exchanges
which were broken off in 1981, the Yugoslav news agency termed his state-
ment "odd" and "one-sided." Dragoslav Markovic, an influential Serbian
political leader, said some time ago that it was unthinkable for the
Kosovo region to engage in cultural exchange activities with Albania on its own. This was a matter to be handled on an all-Yugoslav basis only. Even foreign travelers passing through Yugoslavia on their way from Albania are relieved of any printed material they might be carrying on the border.

Albanian intellectuals in the Kosovo region regard this situation as discriminatory as compared to the treatment accorded to the other nations and nationalities in Yugoslavia. They are asking what would happen, if the republic of Slovenia were prohibited from carrying on cultural exchanges with its Western neighbors. The problem is even more serious down here. The Albanians on both sides of the border think of themselves as one nation—at least in the cultural sense. In the Kosovo region people openly refer to Albania as their cultural "motherland." In the early seventies, a joint decision by the appropriate cultural authorities made Albanian the common written language of communication. Since that time, Tosk—instead of the local Gheg dialect—which became the "officialized" language in Albania after the war has been used as the written language. The authorities in Pristina admit that such a decision could scarcely be reached any more at this juncture. Albanian intellectuals are therefore asking themselves with some concern whether Yugoslavia will return to the "Rankovic era" when an attempt was made to label the Albanians living in Yugoslavia as "Shqiptars" and segregate them from those living in Albania; to make them write in the Gheg dialect and to vilify them for buying the Kosovo Albanian-language newspaper RILINDJA. To be sure, people say, things have not progressed this far but one can feel the pressure exerted against all manifestations of Albanian identity both in the Kosovo region itself and in other parts of Yugoslavia.

A typical example of this is the fate suffered by the Albanian-language film "A Man from the Country" shot in Kosovo and directed by Agim Sopi, a young Albanian film maker. The film tells the story of a deeply patriotic man whose life is made difficult by unknown persons and who ultimately decides to emigrate to Turkey while his son goes to West Germany. The film was taken out of circulation in Kosovo after just a few showings—the reason given being that it contained "some ideologically unacceptable points of view." It is hard to tell why this step was taken. Serbian representatives believe the authorities thought that the film was alluding to the Serbian exodus from the Kosovo region—which was not to the liking of the Albanian politicians. But others feel that the film constituted a kind of nationalist Albanian counter-propaganda against the constant Serbian charge that Serbians and Montenegrians were being forced to leave the Kosovo region.
In fact, no one denies that there was a time when Albanians were supposed to be forced to leave Kosovo. Prof Hajredin Hoxha, the present dean of the University of Pristina, an avowed supporter of Yugoslavia, recently wrote an essay on the "affirmation of Albanian nationality in Yugoslavia" in which he openly points out for the first time ever that the Yugoslav police forced many Albanians in the years after 1951 to declare that they were Turks. Of course Hoxha does not dare say that this not only happened in Kosovo but also in Macedonia. Between 1953 and 1961, he writes, the number of "Turks" in Yugoslavia climbed from 98,000 to 260,000. In 1953, the authorities began to pressure the Turks—using force in some instances—to emigrate to Turkey which was what the old Yugoslav government had already wanted to do in 1938. By 1966, a total of 231,000 "Turks" had left Yugoslavia. Some 80,000 of these were Albanians, most of whom had been forced to leave the country. Although Prof Hoxha tries to put a good face on such practices by calling them exceptions and "deviations" he has been attacked by the Belgrade press nonetheless.

No actual charges were lodged against the young Albanian film director from Pristina. He himself assumes that higher authorities are using him as a pretext for fighting their own battles. One is left with the impression that the Kosovo authorities would be best advised to shun all conflicts with the central government in Belgrade. They are confronted with grave economic problems and their autonomy is gradually being curtailed by the Serbian republic so that they no longer appear to be able to give free rein to the feelings of Albanian national identity in their cultural life. And the Belgrade magazine NIN promptly wrote that the ban on the film was perfectly justified because people had played in it who were known to be "irredentists."

There are similar problems in the writing of history. Albanian patriots who played a leading role in Kosovo's past—such as Isa Boletino, Hasan Frishtina and Hajram Curri—are barely mentioned in official publications and schoolbooks or at least not in keeping with their importance. In many instances, their activities are referred to only insofar as they took place outside Yugoslavia's borders. The reason for this is that the Albanians of the Kosovo region—whether one likes to admit it or not—never wanted to become a part of Serbia (or Yugoslavia in later times) but in fact offered armed resistance against it on several occasions and were quite resolute about it. The "affirmation" of the Albanians in Yugoslavia of which Prof Hajredin Hoxha speaks thus comes out as a rather controversial process and one has the impression that at present nothing even faintly resembling progress is being made in that direction.

Kosovo officials try as best they can to hide controversial matters from foreign visitors. They are probably right because otherwise they themselves might wind up being accused of engaging in "hostile propaganda."
Only someone like Hajredin Hoxha can probably take a chance in relating the salient features of communist-Yugoslav rule in Kosovo prior to 1966 in a comparatively open fashion. As early as 1944, he writes, a Macedonian partisan brigade was guilty of outrages against innocent civilians in the Gnjilane area; but the worst acts were committed between 1951 and 1957. In addition to the attempts (often coupled with acts of physical violence) to remove the Albanians to Turkey a major police action was started in the winter of 1955-1956 to "collect arms." Numerous people were roughed up, tortured and killed. Even communist functionaries and public officials were targets—among other things at a show trial in Prizren. About 100 Albanians lost their lives while many became invalids as a result of the mistreatment.

These days, such things no longer happen as frequently although it is known that political prisoners are mistreated and that applies to prisons outside the region—particularly in Serbia—as well. Several Albanians, it is said, have come back from prison sick or as invalids. The number of those sentenced since 1981 has long since topped 2,000. Since many of them are intellectuals, this has resulted in a mood of vengefulness and bitterness among the Albanian intelligentsia. Only a precious few know what things are really like in neighboring Albania—and most people do not really want to know. But they cling to Albanian television and have their children take down the pictures of Tito that hang in their schoolrooms—because they regard them as an affront—and they dream vague dreams of a faroff Albanian future.

[31 Dec 84 p 10]

[Text] Pristina, in December—The final session of the Serbian central committee which dealt with "changes in the political system" ultimately focused only on the demand that Kosovo and Vojvodina, the two autonomous regions of the Serbian republic, should "at long last" fall into line with the rest of the republic and bow to its authority. The Serbian politicians were unhappy about the fact that the funds being raised in other parts of Serbia are initially paid into the federal fund for the underdeveloped areas and are then turned over to the Kosovo region. "Inside Serbia," it was said, there was no need for "the federal government to play the role of a middleman." By the same token, Kosovo would have to become part of the development plans of the republic of Serbia. Furthermore, the territorial defense law would have to be applied uniformly throughout Serbia and the Kosovo Communist Party would have to comply with the rules and regulations of the Serbian party.

The Pristina authorities are surprised and critical, saying that they see no need for changing the modus operandi of the federal fund for the underdeveloped areas. The Kosovo region's status is regulated not only by the Serbian constitution but also (in the first instance) by the federal constitution. Every attempt to curtail the constitutional status
of the region would have to be rejected. Azem Vlasi, the party secretary for Pristina and one of the more influential Albanian politicians of the Kosovo region, used the subsequent meeting of the central committee at the federal level to take aim at the attempt by the Serbian party to force the Kosovo region to adopt its procedures and regulations. This did not sit too well with the Serbian representatives but it was clear to see that some of the other republics of the Yugoslav federation were watching the Serbian attempts to exert pressure on the Kosovo authorities with some concern. There is overt support from Bosnia and particularly from Slovenia for Kosovo's efforts to defend the constitutional prerogatives of the region.

It is quite apparent that nationalist and even Greater Serbian points of view are coming to the fore in Serbia. In part they are coupled with a relatively broad-minded policy toward the intelligentsia. The primary target at this time quite obviously is Kosovo. Since the 1981 riots the Albanian authorities in the region have never been under more pressure than they are now. It is difficult to find a plausible reason for this—except perhaps the constantly growing affirmation of Albanian identity. In spite of the relative outward calm, this seems to point to an aggravation of the problem. It is apparent that Belgrade is becoming increasingly nervous about everything taking place in the Kosovo region. Most observers think that the reason for the pressure on the Kosovo authorities is the exodus of Serbians and Montenegrins from the region, who today make up only 12 percent of the population. In Pristina people are saying that it is really impossible to tie every instance of people leaving the region to nationalistic pressure. Albanians are also leaving the region and then again Albanians are leaving Macedonia because they are badly treated there and coming to Kosovo. In addition, sources in Pristina say, even the Serbian newspapers are carrying stories to the effect that in other parts of Serbia outside the Kosovo region—such as in the Presovo area south of Vranje along the Nis-Skopje highway—Serbians are also moving away and leaving "ethnically pure" Albanian villages behind.

The pressure exerted on the region has resulted in the Albanian functionaries in the Kosovo region feeling under attack and under the compunction to react whether they want to or not. This has created the impression of greater solidarity on the political plane on the part of all Albanians which, in turn, raises the level of nervousness in Belgrade. More recently, the Albanians may no longer use the Albanian flag, it seems, which was a privilege they obtained in 1968 as a result of a personal intervention by Tito. The Yugoslav supreme court found in response to an appeal by Montenegro and Macedonia that it was not permissible to fly a foreign flag for official purposes in Yugoslavia. The Albanian authorities in Pristina say that they will not comply with this ban on their flag in view of the fact that its use was expressly approved earlier. There is no way back in such matters without the risk of serious political consequences. One source
said that one conceivable solution for the problem might be to move the star which the communists in Albania and in Kosovo placed into the traditional Albanian flag a little to one side when the flag is flown in Kosovo.

Why is it, we asked, that in spite of the alleged "consolidation process" the sentences meted out to alleged Albanian nationalists have been getting progressively harsher---up to 18 years in prison. The answer we got was that "there is a lot at stake." On occasion, the sentences were reduced by the Kosovo supreme court which is also the subject of criticism in the Belgrade newspapers. One gets the impression that those young Albanians in the Kosovo region who organize themselves nowadays in illegal groups are for the most part direct supporters of Enver Hoxha and his Albanian regime. Their position is in direct contrast to the predominant attitude according to which Enver Hoxha, as the national leader of Albania, is deserving of respect but that his regime could not serve as a model. In this way, the police are able to infiltrate into these groups again and again.

But what would the situation be like, if conditions in neighboring Albania changed and if that would lead to more of a political consensus among the Albanians on both sides of the border? Word from Albania is that Ramiz Alia, Hoxha's likely successor, is popular among the population and that the Albanians are happy about the fact that doctrinaire Mehmed Shehu has been "removed" from succession. Ramiz Alia is expected to follow a more pragmatic course. But even Hoxha is said to be moving in new directions. He is reported to have said recently that the time will come when "the believers" will no longer force their views "on the non-believers and vice versa." Is this a harbinger of the reintroduction of religious freedom? There is no way of telling. Stane Dolanc, a member of the Yugoslav federal presidium, visited the Kosovo region a few days ago and voiced his displeasure over the present situation where the Albanian population is not allowed to have any contact with Albania at all. This might indeed lead to serious consequences. More than ever the future of the Kosovo problem appears to depend on developments taking place outside Yugoslavia's borders and over which the Belgrade government has no control. One cannot make a case for the fact that this is proof of the success of Belgrade's policies.
WESTERN REPORT ON DIFFERING CROATIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD CHURCH

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 8 Jan 85 p 3

[Article by J.G. Reissmueller, datelined Frankfurt, 7 Jan 84: "A More Liberal or More Severe Church Policy in Croatia?"

[Text] Croatia at the beginning of the year is ruled by uncertainty about the future church policy of the communist authorities. In early September last, at the "National Eucharistic Congress" in the Croatian pilgrimage center Marija Bistrica, attended by 300,000-400,000 Catholics (mainly from Croatia but also from other regions of Yugoslavia), some indications were noted of the intention of the party leadership in the Croatian federal republic to halt the argument with the Catholic Church, indeed possibly aim for a modus vivendi to be maintained for some considerable time.

The reasons were obvious: Economic difficulties are no less in Croatia than in the other federal Yugoslav republics, and in Croatia they more quickly than elsewhere result in political dissatisfaction. Added to this are the centralist efforts in Belgrade, originating mainly with the Serbian party organization though supported also by officials in other federal republics, and rejected only by the majority of party leaders in Croatia and Slovenia. In view of all this, the Croatian leadership evidently considered it inopportune to persist in a policy of constant clashes with the Church. The Eucharistic Congress convincingly demonstrate the vitality of this Church.

The state authorities refrained from obstructing this religious gathering; the representatives of the state, invited to the receptions, maintained a reserved but generally friendly attitude. Subsequently, Professor Lalic, chairman of the Croatian Government Committee on Religious Issues (a kind of state secretary for ecclesiastical affairs), carried out a cautiously appreciative appraisal of the congress in Marija Bistrica. His most striking remarks were those devoted to his assessment of the eulogy of former Zagreb Archbishop Stepinac, (sentenced to banishment in 1946 at a show trial in Zagreb and who died in a Croatian village in 1960), pronounced in Marija Bistrica by Cardinal Kuharic, archbishop of Zagreb, and Cardinal Koenig, archbishop of Vienna. Professor Lalic said that theirs had been ecclesiastical-religious, not political remarks, and this should be considered something positive.
The text of Lalic's speech was published in the party controlled Croatian press, and the various news commentators continued in the same vein. The Church had not heard such words from the authorities in a long time. For many years Archbishop Kuharic had been violently attacked, at times even threatened for paying undue respect to his pre-predecessor Stepinac.

However, in the fall the beginnings of a reverse appeared on the horizon. There are various indications that the representatives of a hardline Church and general policy reproached state secretary Lalic and the party leaders backing him with having wrongly assessed the situation. One such hardliner coming forward was public prosecutor Blazevic who had led the team prosecuting Archbishop Stepinac and in the following decades continued his personal vendetta against the defendant and subsequent convict in all the high party and government offices he occupied--and even in his retirement. Still, not only retiree Blazevic, senior party leader Dragosavac also joined the attack: The authorities, he said, should have promptly expelled Cardinal Koenig from Yugoslavia for his praise of Archbishop Stepinac.

This represented not only an attack on the Church but also, indirectly, on some of the Croat leaders. It is reported that another senior Croatian official, Baltic, was backing Dragosavac. These two members of the Serbian minority in Croatia have always been considered champions of a more dogmatic and centralist policy and, consequently, of greater vigilance toward "Croatian nationalism." It seems safe to conclude that the more or less anticentralist majority of the Croatian leadership--led by Vrhevec, Bilic, Spiljak and Suvar--fears a merger of the centralist forces in the Croatian Republic with those in Serbia and would prefer to avoid an open clash.

It is too early to forecast the possible outlook for church policy in such a complex situation. We do have some indications that state secretary Lalic will not keep his office much longer. For public consumption his recall could be justified by the Yugoslav principle of rotating offices. Up to now Lalic had been conspicuously exempted from this rule--he has held his office for the past 10 years. In fact, the name of his successor has already been mentioned: Diplomat Svete, former Yugoslav Ambassador to the Vatican. Some people have predicted that the noncentralist party in the Croatian leadership is willing, at least for the time being, to sacrifice its barely emerged new Church policy so as to ease its own situation. The real victim will be the Church.

This interpretation is lent some strength by the recent criminal proceedings instituted against Father Kustic, editor-in-chief of the Croatian Church newspaper GLAS KONCILA [Voice of the Council]. At the request of the public prosecutor's office, the Zagreb police summoned him to appear on 11 January to be interrogated with regard to the criminal accusation of "having spread serious disinformation" (Article 197 Paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code). This offense is punishable by a prison term ranging from 1 year to 5 years. Kustic will have to wait until his interrogation by the police to find out what exactly in GLAS KONCILA was considered a felonious publication. In 1973 this same priest had been sentenced to 5 months in prison and 2 years' ban on publication for an alleged appeal to civil disobedience. A lower court had
acquitted him at the time but the Croatian Supreme Court found him guilty on appeal, though suspending the sentence in favor of probation. Kustic did not go to prison.

It is not certain yet whether there will actually be an indictment this time and, possibly, a trial. Maybe some of the Croatian leaders simply want to do something to cut the ground from under the reproaches of the others. This may be coupled with the intention to once again remind Kustic of the limits of the freedom of publication by GLAS KONCILA.

The new criminal proceedings against Kustic come at a time when his newspaper is celebrating a new success. Since the beginning of this year, GLAS KONCILA with a circulation of more than 100,000 has been appearing weekly instead of biweekly as before. It thus joined the Slovenia Church newspaper DRUZINA ("The Family"), published in Ljubljana. Also since the turn of the year, GLAS KONCILA is no longer published by the Zagreb archbishopric alone but jointly by the archbishoprics of Zagreb, Split, Rijeka, Zadar and Sarajevo. GLAS KONCILA has thereby officially turned into the voice of all Croatian Catholics, including those residing in the federal republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

GLAS KONCILA is informative and interesting, popular in all strata of the Catholic public; the communist authorities take the paper very seriously. All this is likely to be even more pronounced following the transition to weekly publication.

11698
CSO: 2300/226
END