Near East/South Asia Report
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GREATER ARAB MAGHREB SCHEME ASSESSED

Paris ETUDES in French Mar 84 pp 345, 352-359

[Article by Pierre Rondot: "The Greater Arab Maghreb"]

[Excerpts] For the states of North Africa, the year 1983 will be known as the Year of the Greater Arab Maghreb. It began, in a way, on 26 February with the hope-filled meeting between King Hassan II of Morocco and Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid. One month later it was marked by the conclusion of the Treaty of Fraternity and Concord between Algeria and Tunisia, which was then joined by Mauritania and which Libya has asked to join.

However, in January 1984 riots were stirred up in two North African countries by the prospect of higher prices for basic food products or heavy taxes. In Tunisia the proximity to restless Libya, and in Morocco the financial burden of the war in the Sahara were called into question by various observers. These in fact were the chief obstacles to rapprochement in the Maghreb; to realize that rapprochement in the face of circumstances that are not entirely favorable, will require a great deal of political determination and flexible diplomacy.

Toward a Global Entente in the Maghreb?

Since early summer, 1980, the new Tunisian prime minister, Mohammed Mzali, has been bending every effort, in line with President Bourguiba's directives, to work toward reconciliation in the Maghreb. Before going to Rabat, he voiced his views: "Our Arab peoples of the Maghreb undoubtedly aspire to unity. But in the future we must spare them the disappointments brought on by improvisation and haste. It is up to us to weave the many ties of cooperation and rapprochement that definitely lead to unity, even if it takes a few generations. Unity is an end that we must treat carefully by making progress toward it in steps, with no hesitations or reversals...Our relations must follow a clear plan that must be solidly based, rejecting revolutionary solutions as we reject watered-down solutions and false solutions that are against our principles...Our interest ordains that we remain in the Maghreb of States, as one step toward obtaining first union and then unity."

On his return from a trip to Algiers in September 1980, Mohammed Mzali talked of a Tunisia disposed toward eventual good offices between "the concerned partners" ...It is through our approach to problems, and creative imagination, that we must find new modalities and formulas." On the other hand, he said he welcomed
Libya's advances and hoped to form, with its government, "relations marked by profound friendship and cooperation, forgetting misunderstandings..., thinking of the future and letting go of the past."^3

The major regional conflict, however, involved the Western Sahara. Algeria undoubtedly would not pass up any opportunity to affirm that, in this case, it was merely supporting the natural right of an African people to self-determination, as well as the principle of respect in Africa for the borders that emerged from colonization; there was no direct contention between Algeria and Morocco. Public opinion in Morocco was persuaded, nevertheless, that without Algeria's support the Polisario would not exist; it was increasingly clear that Morocco was desirous of ending a ruinous war. Both sides were thus disposed toward an entente, which was favored by certain good offices.

After several very discreet contacts between Ahmed Bensouda and Reda Guedira, advisers to the Moroccan sovereign, and Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, the Algerian foreign affairs minister, King Hassan II and President Chedli Bendjedid met for 5 hours on 26 February 1983 in Akid Loutfi.4 Details of the talk were kept secret. But there were hints in Rabat that it concerned, in particular, "the normalization of relations between Morocco and Algeria" and Morocco's constant dedication to the Nairobi resolution in the OAU relative to a referendum on the Sahara—an operation which, according to Rabat, could have value only as confirmation. In Algiers people were saying that there was no bilateral difference with Morocco, and that Algeria was always ready to work toward the rapprochement of "brothers in conflict," meaning Moroccans and Saharans, with the Western Sahara; this was simply a problem of decolonization. On the Saharan side they were saying that they were still awaiting direct negotiations with Rabat and the withdrawal of Moroccan forces from the Western Sahara.

As to the important matter, the Akid Loutfi meeting thus seems to have been reduced to a dialogue between deaf people. It was nonetheless a prelude to an Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement, made concrete first of all by the Moroccan minister of the interior, Driss Basri, going to Algeria at the end of March. Received by President Bendjedid with his Algerian counterpart, M'Hamed Yala, he examined "methods of surmounting the obstacles...(in order to) build an Arab Maghreb." Also studied were "different political, technical and legal measures...that were to be taken to facilitate circulation of persons and goods and promote the normalization of relations...and thus contribute to establishing a permanent climate of peace, serenity and mutual confidence."^5 The first accomplishment was the decision to immediately order free circulation between the two countries, of Algerian residents in Morocco and Moroccan residents in Algeria; this measure partially remedied the painful family break-ups that occurred after the massive expulsions of Moroccans from Oranie during the Algerian-Moroccan tension of 1963.

A final audit was awaited, then, on the Moroccan-Algerian border contention, in the form of a vote in the Moroccan Parliament for ratification of the Ifrane treaty. A confidant of the king, Moulay Ahmed Alouii, evoking "the spirit of Ifrane," was of the opinion that "the treaty's provisions are still valid, because the leaders of both countries are motivated by the same spirit and the same ideal."^6 However, the expected initiative did not occur. But Algerian-Moroccan contact continued at the ministerial level.
Between Algeria and Tunisia in the spring of 1983, nothing stood in the way of a solemn proclamation of complete entente: visits were stepped up at the level of prime ministers and ministers, a number of joint institutions were created and the number of cooperation projects increased. Mohammed Mzali, in an interview with an Algerian magazine, spoke of the Maghreb as "one of the most profound aspirations of the masses of the Maghreb, and the hope of future generations...The economic Maghreb is a vision that is vital in itself...building the Maghreb is the only valid response to all the threats...regional and subregional entities are a vital necessity in our time. We have always said that Arab unity and Islamic solidarity are the objective to be attained...the harmonious and viable Maghreb entity will be a milestone on the path to union."7

On 19 March 1983 in Tunis, Presidents Chedli Bendjedid and Habib Bourguiba signed "a Treaty of Fraternity and Concord, necessarily implying that any difference will be settled...by peaceful means." Mentioning "a common destiny within the framework of the Greater Arab Maghreb," to whose stability it would contribute by "consolidating relations of positive good-neighborliness and fraternal cooperation" then existing between the states of the Maghreb, to be valid for 20 years and with its membership open to the other states of the Greater Arab Maghreb, that document provided for maintaining peace and respecting national sovereignty (Art 1); ruling out recourse to force, maintaining territorial integrity and settling differences by dialogue or any other peaceful means (Art 2). Each party pledged itself not to belong to any alliance and not to tolerate any initiative directed against any other party (Art 3) and, more precisely, "not to tolerate on (its) territory the organization and activity of any group that would attack the security or territorial integrity of the other party, or attempt to change its regime by violence" (Art 4). A joint communiqué issued the following day stated that a solution must be found to the problem of the Western Sahara in conformity with the resolutions decreed by the OAU's Nairobi summit.

Joint Algerian-Tunisian projects grew in number, especially those concerned with developing border regions in common. A partial "Maghreb summit" in Algiers from 29 to 31 May brought together Presidents Habib Bourguiba, Chedli Bendjedid and Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidallah of Mauritania; but neither King Hassan nor Col Qadhafi, who had been informed, if not formally invited, was present. Finally, President Ould Haidallah became a member of the 19 March treaty on 13 December in Algiers.

Libyan Steps and the Saharan Problem

The immediate future of the Greater Arab Maghreb scheme, for which the Algerian-Tunisian developments provided a good initial platform, depended in large measure on the attitude of Libya and Morocco, which to the astonishment of observers were becoming closer.

While the bipartite "Large Committees," which were charged with the progress of the cooperation, were meeting or preparing to meet6, Col Qadhafi stepped up his state visits to the Maghreb. He seemed to have abandoned his prejudices against unity in the Maghreb, although he had formerly considered it an obstacle in the path of Arab unity. On the other hand, he believed Libya had really done its duty toward the Saharan people, whose cause was now in the hands of the OAU; since then, there had been no further dispute between Libya and Morocco on that
subject. He rejoiced that the Addis Ababa summit in early June had called upon Morocco and the Polisario Front to negotiate directly on preparations for the referendum; in fact, although he had always given aid to the Front, he remained cautious with respect to the SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic], because he felt creation of a new state would be unfortunate from a unitary point of view.

Putting aside his grievances and his former bad behavior against the Moroccan monarchy, Col Qadhdhafi visited Rabat from 30 June to 3 July 1983, talked with King Hassan II and received party leaders and trade union officials. The content of his talks with the sovereign was not published, but some ambiguity was noted in his public speeches: even while affirming that he would help settle the Saharan problem from the point of view of unity in the Maghreb, he underlined the influence of the Polisario Front, which had decided to keep fighting until independence was achieved, and said he believed it would be futile to organize a referendum; he asserted that Arabs must be concerned above all with fighting Israel. Morocco, which refused to negotiate directly with the Saharan and thus placed an obstacle in the path of the referendum, scheduled by the OAU for December 1983, was able to find a kind of approbation in these statements, but was also forced to detect in them the threat of increased Libyan military aid to the Polisario if political efforts should fail; also, hostilities, which had been interrupted for several months, were resumed on the Saharan front, now made tangible by the Moroccan defense "wall."

Pursuing his contacts in the Maghreb, Col Qadhdhafi went to Nouakchott on 22 July, to Algiers on 24 July, to Monastir on 16 August. In Tunisia he recommended hastening the completion of the Greater Arab Maghreb, "the first step on the path to total Arab unity," and seeking the solution to the Western Saharan problem within the framework of the Maghreb, in which the Polisario leaders were ready to assume their responsibilities; Libya, he added, had not supported the establishment of an independent Saharan state. He stated finally that, contrary to what he had formerly thought, Arab unity could be achieved gradually, through an understanding among regimes with differing ideological views, and in that regard he underlined the progress of the Tunisian-Libyan cooperation. In the Maghreb the joint communiqué recommended "strengthening the complementarity, as an important essential step toward realization of global unity"; the choice of words employed will be noted.

A Moroccan ambassador returned to Tripoli in August. There was a plan to exchange Libyan oil for Moroccan mining products, and Libya extended to Morocco its recruitment of manpower and continued that recruitment in Tunisia. Thus, these "concrete, pinpoint actions" were becoming widespread; by such means Tunisia and Algeria had long been bending every effort to bring about complementarity in the Maghreb.

Finally, on 18 December, Libya officially asked to join the Treaty of Fraternity and Concord of 19 March 1983, which already linked Tunisia, Algeria and Mauritania, and appeared to be a genuine Maghreb pact.

In Tunis this step gave rise to demonstrations of satisfaction; but 2 weeks later, serious troubles exploded in the southern part of the country, expanded to the capital and were clumsily put down: announcement of an imminent increase, sometimes a doubling, in the price of semolina, bread and other wheat derivatives, accompanied only by partial "accompaniment measures" that were belated and poorly publicized, was the immediate cause of the trouble. Some people, however, were to wonder if Libyan agitators had not contributed to setting off and
expanding the riots, with the authorities assuming no responsibility for the charges\textsuperscript{10}. In fact, the consequences of proximity to Libya undoubtedly played a role: Radio Tripoli, which gets better reception in the Tunisian South than Radio Tunis, praised Col Qadhafi's regime, and the many young people from the region who worked in Libya often expressed the same opinion, even though they misjudged the particularities of the Libyan case—that it had vast oil resources and sparse population, enabling it to house and employ everyone and even pay temporary foreign manpower. Moreover, at the end of January it was Libya, well known to be very hostile toward Yassir Arafat, which was complaining of the Palestinian presence in Tunis and protested "the use of Tunisia as a base for anti-Libyan activities"\textsuperscript{11}. Nevertheless, following a denial by the PLO, the Libyan secretary of foreign relations, Abdelati al Obeidi, was received on 2 February by the Tunisian premier and said he was pleased with the climate of the bilateral relations.

In Algiers, the Libyan candidacy met with discreet reservations: it would be proper, it was felt, for the border to delimited and marked off first. Libya, arguing that the border had resulted from the treaty concluded in 1955 between France and the Libyan monarchy\textsuperscript{12}, and that it had arbitrarily cut off the nomadization zone of the Ajjer Tuaregs, was loath to recognize the line.

On the other hand, Morocco, which was not a part of the treaty of 19 March 1983, was very clearly drawing closer to Libya, where King Hassan may have been planning to go soon. The troubles that occurred in the country, following upon tax increases and plans to raise prices and on the eve of the summit meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization, were attributed by the sovereign, in his 22 January speech, to a Khomeynist, Marxist and Zionist conspiracy to cause the meeting to fail; in any case, they were born in a climate of economic crisis and the distress of the underprivileged classes, which the underground opposition\textsuperscript{13}—without contradiction on this point by world opinion—attributes among other things to the ruinous expenses of the long war in the Sahara. But the recent change in Col Qadhafi's position with respect to the Saharan movement eliminated, in this case, any difference of opinion between Libya and Morocco, whose mutual understanding may also have been aimed at producing a counterweight to the Algerian-Mauritanian friendship, and led to the hope that Tripoli would benefit from a certain freedom of action in Chad. A cooperation agreement encompassing the most diverse areas was signed in Rabat on 26 January by the heads of the Moroccan and Libyan governments; it appeared to be "the outline of a new concept of unity in the Maghreb, founded on bases that are functional rather than organic, with respect to the specificities of each party."\textsuperscript{14}

Although the differences in political regimes and the ideological differences do not seem to be considered obstacles to the establishment of a complementarity in the Maghreb, which is likely also to favor general Arab unity, certain government interests and certain special views on the subject of the future Maghreb edifice are in danger of delaying, if not even compromising, its construction. On the other hand, one major difficulty remains: the problem of the Western Sahara.

In fact, the opening that was hoped for after the Algerian-Moroccan talks of 26 February 1983 has not come about. In Algiers, one gets the feeling that Morocco, by agreeing to the referendum on the Western Sahara but opposing the direct contacts required to set it up, is really seeking merely to prolong a status quo
that is favorable to the actual possessor; in Rabat there is argument as to whether there really was a problem, because the populations of the "new southern provinces" attest to their membership in the kingdom by the very fact of their participation in the various elections. The political solutions worked out by the OAU seem to be ineffectual, and undoubtedly no military decision could be obtained unless one of the antagonists had the benefit of decisive support from outside, in the form of a supply of powerful materiel. The battles are continuing nevertheless, and in the last few months they have even become more violent.

It is assuredly difficult to conceive of a "Greater Arab Maghreb" from which Morocco would be absent. Accomplishment of this project is in danger of being pursued from different poles, for the time being at least: the Morocco-Libya pair on the one hand and the group of signatories of the treaty of 19 March 1983 on the other. Tunisia, whose geographic situation and political orientation predispose it to mediation, has already tried very hard to alleviate this latent tension, in particular with the help of a step taken by its head of diplomacy, Beji Caid Essebsi, in Rabat in late 1983. In the coming months is will no doubt be possible to get a better glimpse of the prospects--still uncertain--for the Greater Arab Maghreb.

**FOOTNOTES**

1. Interview with AL ALAM, Rabat, 2 June 1980.


4. An Algerian locality near the Moroccan border.

5. Press communiqué.

6. LE MATIN DU SAHARA, Casablanca, 18 March 1983.

7. ALGERIE ACTUALITIES, 19 March 1983.


9. He had congratulated the authors of the attempted coup d'etat at Skhirat, which at that time he thought had been successful.

10. Mr Mzali said that "small groups of opponents from the extreme right, that is Khomeynists, to the extreme left..., Baasists, many young unemployed people returned from Libya or perhaps from Europe and, for Tunis, college and high-school students..." (interview with the QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, 14 January 1984).
11. A Libyan note sent to Tunis on 31 January.

12. Treaty duly ratified and registered by the UN; Libya, on the other hand, in order to occupy the "Aouzou strip," invokes the Laval-Mussolini accord of 1935, which was not ratified and was never put into operation by Italy and France.

13. Tracts disseminated by the organization Ila al Amam.

14. L'OPINION, the organ of 1'Istiqlal, Rabat, 28 January 1984.
DUTCH TV PROGRAM ON 'ARMENIAN GENOCIDE' ENRAGES TURKS

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 8 Mar 84 p 1

[Text] Two nights ago, the Dutch television broadcast a film named "The Tower of Babel" which provided another opportunity for the airing of Armenian allegations and anti-Turkish propaganda. The following questions were posed in magazines advertising the film: "What do Christian Armenians know about terrorist organizations? Why does this nation not have country of its own? Why have millions of Armenians been killed over the centuries? Why are Armenians still persecuted by the Turks? Is it because they are Christians?"

The television station that broadcast the film also arranged a panel discussion after the film. The participants invited to the discussion included a number of religious institutions, among them an organization named the "Foundation for Assisting Offenders of Christian Faith." The program was prepared by the Bible Society.

The Turkish embassy made no attempt this time to have the program cancelled, knowing full well that such an endeavor would be in vain. The embassy only proposed that a Turkish historian and an Armenian citizen of Turkey be invited to the panel discussion. The Bible Society responded by saying that it could only permit the participation of a Turkish embassy representative. The embassy, however, could not accept a bible society with no diplomatic credentials as a negotiating counterpart. The Bible Society and the television station agreed to the participation of a Turkish historian only at the last minute, only 24 hours before the film was scheduled to go on the air, and, as a result, a Turkish historian could not participate in the discussion.

The Amsterdam daily, DE TELEGRAAF, charged that the Turks would bomb the building housing the Bible Society, but no such incident materialized.

The film was 70 minutes long. Armenian historians from Geneva and Jerusalem and an Armenian spiritual leader from London were invited to the panel discussion. Also participating in the discussion was an Armenian director general who has established residence in Holland by marrying an American. Pictures depicting dead people, purportedly murdered on the instructions of Talat, Enver and Cemal Bey, were exhibited. Later a German-made film about Soviet Armenia was shown, featuring dancing Armenian young men and women. It was stated that Armenian young men and women living in Turkey are unhappy and that they cannot even talk about the Armenian problem. It was charged in connection with the Agri mountain
that the Ararat is of great symbolic significance to the Armenians, and that, however, no one can even go close to it. Also shown was a Turkish-Armenian whose face was concealed and who said he is one of 38 Turkish-Armenians who fled from a Turkish village. The name of the village was not disclosed.

An Armenian from Geneva said:

"Turkey does not acknowledge this genocide because it fears that it will be forced to pay reparations. It is naturally impossible to condone the acts of Armenian terrorists, but they are trying to draw attention to their cause. No inquiries can be made in Armenian-inhabited areas [of Turkey], even though they should be permitted under the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty. [French President] Mitterrand is the first statesman who paid attention to the Armenian question."

The said television program deeply enraged local Turks and was not even liked by the Dutch themselves.

Meanwhile, it was announced that Catholicos Karekin II of the Holy See of Cilicia will be received by the Queen of Denmark tomorrow. A group of Armenians in Denmark are preparing to launch an "Armenian genocide" campaign on 10 March.

9588
CSO: 4605/51
'DISREGARD' OF 3 COMMUNITIES IN GENEVA, LAUSANNE CONFERENCES CRITICIZED

Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 14 Mar 84 p 1

[Editorial: "Geneva and Lausanne"]

[Text] It was announced last year that "fighting Lebanese groups" would hold a reconciliation meeting in Geneva.

The Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic and Armenian communities were not invited to the conference because they were not parties involved in the fighting. Their absence at the conference, therefore, was not an oversight, but rather an honor for them since they had not participated in the destructive war in Lebanon; they were not "at odds" with anybody to need reconciliation.

Thus, these three communities, that is nearly half of Lebanon's Christian population did not take part in the Geneva conference—though, surprisingly, other personalities who also did not take part in the fighting were invited to Geneva.

And now, the Lausanne conference began on 12 March 1984. It is said that this conference is a meeting for a "national dialog", that it will determine the general principles on which the future Lebanon will be built and that the "details" and the implementation of the decisions taken at the conference will be left to a government of "national salvation."

The aforementioned three communities are absent from the Lausanne conference as well. Only one community has been invited to that conference to represent the Christian side.

While some more or less reasonable explanation or pretext could be found for the absence of the three communities from the Geneva conference, their absence in Lausanne is the result of an extremely unfair arrangement. We can even say that it is a historic mistake.

All international news agencies are at Lausanne. All the stage lights are focused on the conference. Thus, additional evidence is given to the world to emphasize the fact that there are indeed privileged parties and individuals in Lebanon.

The participants in the conference are also responsible and must also be blamed for this situation. They stated on several occasions that the disregard of the
three communities is wrong. Therefore, we ask: Why do they take part in a "national dialog" from which a major portion of the nation is absent? Could such an error have been committed if they had really insisted?

Possibly not.

We would not like to delve into the details of the hidden and dark motives behind this disregard.

However, as at other important turning points in the past, today, too, it remains true that the building of Lebanon is the duty and the right of all its children regardless of who they are.

It is essential that this mistake be rectified without delay.

9588
CSO: 4605/50
ISTANBUL PATRIARCH INTERVIEWED ON ARMENIANS IN TURKEY

Istanbul JAMANAK in Armenian 16, 17 Mar 84

[Interview with Shnork Kalustian, the Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul, by the Brussels LES EUROPEENS]

[16 Mar 84 pp 1,4]

[Text] [Editor's note] We have received a communique from the Press Secretariat of the Patriarchate informing us that the interview granted by His Holiness to the representatives of LES EUROPEENS, a political and economic journal published in Brussels, was printed in its entirety in the 100th edition of the magazine under the title "Armenians Today." LES EUROPEENS is an influential publication widely circulated in the European Parliament and NATO, and, consequently, this article, which we present verbatim below, is extremely important.

Today, there are Armenians in Turkey, but the size of their community has declined to approximately 60,000, 10,000 of whom live in rural areas. The remaining 50,000 live in Istanbul, the former capital. We sought them out and talked to them. Whenever an article is written about Turkey, even if it is only about economic issues, it is impossible not to refer to the Armenian problem. For that reason we established contact with leading Armenian religious, business and intellectual figures. The Armenian Patriarchate is situated in a low-income sector of Istanbul and it is one of the four patriarchates of the Armenian Church around the world. The other three are in Yerevan, Jerusalem and Beirut. The patriarchate in Istanbul has no authority over any of the others, since each patriarchate is independent.

We were first received in the patriarchate's secretariat office, where a robed clergymab sat a desk behind the statuette of a Turkish soldier. The building, a former wooden frame house which maintained its splendor, was undergoing restoration work at the time, and one could see that it had had better times. On the first floor, there is a large reception hall at one corner of which stands an ivory chair, the "Cathedra" if it is proper to use this Latin term here.

The Patriarch arrived a little later, accompanied by ten priests. With his white beard and venerable appearance, he looked exactly like what one would expect him to. Our questions concerned only communal and local issues such as religious life.
Question: How would you describe the life of the Armenian community today?

Answer: There is not much difference between the generations. The enthusiasm remains the same. Our church choirs, which we have kept alive, are modest but living examples of that.

Question: Western churches face a problem of survival in view of declining interest toward religion. What is the situation here?

Answer: We are fully aware of that problem. However, in our case the main problem is the economic one. Our schools, clergymen, and seminaries are inadequate. This is a secular country. As for the issue of survival, we must consider that we have two types of clergymen: priests and celibates. The difficulties are primarily with regard to the reformation of the latter class. Today we have nearly 35 clergymen. Most of our community is centered around Istanbul.

Question: Where do you stand in this secular but largely Muslim country?

Answer: During the time of the Empire, each community had its own laws, and religious leaders had moral as well as civic authority. But those times are now gone. Even if we are seen as a community, we are all Turks and we are all subject to the same laws. The Armenian and the Greek patriarchs can display the colors of their offices and they are part of state protocol. I am frequently consulted for my opinions, and my recommendations are always accepted. But I have no authority to adjudicate in community affairs.

Question: Does the adverse reaction resulting from terrorism come from only the Turkish government or the Muslims?

Answer: The government is naturally very sensitive about these movements and we fully share their sentiments. Christians in Turkey do not have any major problems. We are in constant contact with the government and minor problems are often solved through open-mindedness and good will.

Question: If you had to deliver us a message, what would you say?

Answer: I pray for world peace, the brotherhood of men of good will and better mutual understanding.

The Patriarch departed and we were left alone with a physician, a journalist and a businessman.

[17 Mar 84 p 1]

[Text] The physician appeared to be a fully accomplished man coming from a privileged social class. The businessman was more talkative: "The impact of terrorism on this country has been very strong. There are no public displays of resentment, but you know the situation is grave when your friends and colleagues come to assure you that they continue to trust and like you. The emigration trend is over. There are even those who are returning. We consider ourselves as Turks as well as Armenians, and in this country we do have the right to make
that distinction. Terrorism is an affront for all of us who live in this
country." According to the journalist, Armenian literary and intellectual life
continues in Istanbul and journalism is marked with "dynamism."

Conclusion

What conclusions can then be drawn from this situation? Firstly, the effects of
World War I have not worn off in this country, which did not enter World War II.
The Armenian community in Turkey has dwindled in size, but those who have
remained have assimilated in the new nation.

Is it likely that the others may return? The answer is more economic than
political. Most of the Armenians living in Istanbul are either artisans or
merchants. Some of them are part of the "upper-middle class." Can this
situation continue? Certainly. As for the issue of the return of emigree
Armenians, it is proper to recall that Turkey has been knocking on the door of
the European community for 20 years. If good will and respect for differences
is deemed proper, is it possible to avoid treating them the same way?

European problems can be solved in a Europe where everyone has an equal place.
This statement is valid for Turkey which has been wanting to become a European
country for the last 60 years.

Armenians living in Turkey consider themselves as both Turks and Europeans and
are not impressed with those enticing words that have often led them to
disappointment.

The article also contains the photograph of a 13th century Armenian sculptured
cross.

9588
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STRUCTURE, MISSION OF LIBYAN NAVY

Stuttgart MARINE RUNDSCHAU in German Feb 84. pp 55-62, 95

[Article by Gregor M. Manousakis: "The Libyan Navy--Its Structure and Mission"]

[Text] Like many navies in countries of the Third World, the Libyan navy does not look back over a long tradition. Although Libya has been independent since 1951, the navy was not established until 1962. Libya received assistance in this from the British Royal Navy, which trained the first recruits in the Libyan navy on Malta and the first cadets at the Britannia Royal Navy College in Dartmouth. The personnel of the Libyan navy was given practical training at the British training institutions HMS "Sultan" and HMS "Collingwood."

In spite of this auspicious beginning, the Libyan navy remained the stepchild of the Libyan armed forces in the years following. Like the other Arab countries, Libya gave preference to the army and the air force. When the FRG provided a minor amount of military training assistance to Libya in 1963, Tripoli was interested only in the training of flight personnel: 10 pilots and 10 air traffic controllers.

The "British Period" of the Libyan Navy

The Libyan navy placed its first order in the year that it was organized, 1962, to the Thornycroft yard in Singapore for a light coastal patrol boat. The boat measures 23.8 X 4.6 X 1.4 meters and is still in service.

It was not until 1964 that the Libyan navy placed a series of more important orders, which all went to different yards in Great Britain. This was the "British period" of the Libyan navy, the period in which the country, under King Mohammed Idris I al-Sanussi, was a pro-Western country with special ties to Great Britain.

In 1964 an order was placed for a corvette, which was given the name "Tobruq" (C 411) (Vosper Thornycroft, Portsmouth and Vickers). The ship, which is still in active service with the Libyan navy, measures 54 X 8.7 X 4 meters and has a displacement of 440/500 tons. The "Tobruq" is armed with a 102-mm cannon and two 40-mm antiaircraft guns and has a 63-man crew. It was launched on 29 June 1965 and arrived in Tripoli on 15 June 1966. Shortly after,
on 5 September 1966, the Libyan navy bought a repair ship from Great Britain, which was given the name "Zlitan" (ex-MRC 1013, ex-LCT). The ship was built in 1944/1945. Today only the hull is still in existence.

The next order comprised three fast patrol boats and was given to the Vosper yard in Portsmouth on 12 October 1966. The three boats represent a unique type, but are generally similar to the Sølaveen class of the Danish navy, but with modern electronic equipment. The class-ship "Susah" (No 512) was launched on 31 August 1968 and was delivered on 23 January 1969. It was followed by the "Sirte" (No 513) launched on 10 October 1968 and delivered 23 January 1969 and the "Suknah" (No 514), launched on 29 February 1968 and delivered 1 year later; the last ship was later renamed the "Sabella." The ships measure 30.5 X 7.8 X 2.1 meters and displace between 95 and 114 tons. The "Susah"-class boats are the first in the world to be equipped with the French Nord-Aviation SS-12. The crew is composed of 20 men. These ships were refitted in Italy in 1977, with the exception of their electronic equipment. Apart from their missile armament, these ships are equipped with two 40-mm antiaircraft guns.

In January 1967 the Libyan navy gave an order to the Vosper Thornycroft yard in Woolston for an escort and workshop ship, which was launched on 28 February 1968 and was delivered on 23 January 1969. The ship was named "Zlitan" (711). It measures 98.7 X 14.6 X 3.1 meters and displaces between 2,200 and 2,470 tons.

The "Zlitan" has only two 40-mm antiaircraft guns and is operated by a crew of 100. The floodable dock aft can accept ships up to 35 meters in length.

In the same year, 1967, the same yard (Vosper Thornycroft) received orders for six coastal patrol boats. The class-ship "Baninah" (ex-"al-Rakib") was delivered on 29 August 1968. The entire order was completed during 1969. The names of the other ships of this type are: "Akrawa" (ex-Khums), "al-Khums," "Misratah," "al-Rakib" and "Farwhah."

The newest editions of the various fleet manuals provided different data about the existing units of this class. JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1983/84 still includes the "Baninah," the "Akrawa" and the "Misratah," while the three others are said to have been passed on to Malta. FLOTTE DE COMBAT 1984 names the "Farwhah," the "Baninah," and the "al-Khums," while the "al-Rakib" and the "Akrava" went to Malta in 1978. The Swedish MARINEKALENDER 1984 mentions the "Banina," the "Misratah" and the "al-Khums." The new WEYER 1984/85 mentions the same names as the FDC, while the ALMANACCO NAVALE 1983/84 lists the "Baninah," the "Farwhah" and "Misratah" and also the "Akrawa" (ex-"al-Khums) as a fishery guard boat.3

The dimensions of the ships of this class are 30.5 X 6.4 X 1.7 meters and they have a displacement of 100 tons. They carry only a single 20-mm antiaircraft gun and carry a crew of 15 men.

The Vosper Thornycroft yard in Woolston was also given the order for the construction of a frigate on 6 February 1969. This was the largest fighting ship that the Libyan navy had ever ordered. The keel was laid on 27 September.
1968, it was launched at the end of September 1969 and was not delivered to the Libyans until 1 February 1973. The Mk 7 frigate, which was christened the "Dhat-al-Sawari," is similar to the Iranian Mk 5, but is larger and differently armed. The "Dhat-al-Sawari" measures 101.5 X 11.7 X 3.4 meters and displaces between 1360 and 1780 tons.

Because of errors in her generators, the "Dhat-al-Sawari" was supposed to sail to Great Britain in 1978 for repairs. In view of the long voyage it was decided to transfer the ship to Genoa, to the Cantieri Navali Rimini. On 29 October 1980 an explosion occurred in the interior of the ship which caused substantial damage. At the end of 1983, following a 3-year conversion period, the "Dhat-al-Sawari" began her trial runs. Now the ship is equipped with four Otomat Mk 2 SSM missiles and four Aspide sea-to-air Albatross system missiles. The ship also carries a single 114-mm cannon, two 40-mm and two 350-mm Oerlikon antiaircraft guns and two triple-tube torpedo tubes for A-244 torpedoes. The "Dhat-al-Sawari" carries a crew of 130.

Even before the fall of the Libyan monarchy (1 September 1969), an order was placed with the Brooke naval yard in Lowestoft, Great Britain, for four additional coastal boats. The class-ship is the "Garian" (612), measuring 32.3 X 6.5 X 1.7 meters and displacing between 120 and 159 tons. This boat was launched on 21 April 1969 and was delivered, with the "Khaluan" (613) which was launched on 29 May 1969, on 30 August 1969. The "Sabratha" (611) and the "Marawah" were launched on 30 September and 25 October 1969 respectively and delivered in the spring of 1970. The armament of the two ships consists of a 40-mm antiaircraft gun and an additional 20-mm antiaircraft gun, their crew consists of 20 men.

The Rapid Buildup of the Libyan Navy

As a result of the overthrow of 1 September 1969 and the seizure of power by a junta of young officers under Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi the "British period" of the Libyan navy came to an end and a new era of rapid buildup was insti-
tuted. The Libyans demonstrated their independence immediately: their orders for the constructions of new units were no longer given to one country, Great Britain, as hitherto, but to several countries. The same held true for officer training in the Libyan navy; since 1970 it has been carried out in Greece and later in the Soviet Union.

At the beginning of May 1975, the then premier of the Soviet Union, Alexei Kosygin, visited Tripoli. A little less than 3 years earlier, on 18 July 1972, the Soviet Union had suffered a severe setback in Egypt when President Anwar al-Sadat delivered an ultimatum to the Russian "military advisors" to leave the country immediately; this involved about 18,000 men. Overnight the Soviet Union had lost everything that it had built up in Egypt since the mid-1950's. Its position in the eastern Mediterranean area had been severely shaken; it did not escape Qadhafi's attention that Kosygin came to Tripoli ready to make concessions. He made his calculation accordingly . . . .

On 23 May the semi-official Cairo newspaper AL-AHRAM, basing its statement on information from Beirut, that Kosygin had signed a military assistance treaty
in Tripoli which, among other items, provided for the delivery of armaments worth $4 billion. The report was initially met with disbelief; what did Libya, with its small population, want with so many weapons? In the time ahead the doubters were taught a lesson: in fact these were not arms shipments worth $4 billion, but $12 billion. At the time there was some talk that the price of six submarines was included in the amount. As it turned out, they were Soviet "Foxtrot" class submarines.

Submarines

The order for the buildup of a Libyan submarine arm, including training of the crews, in fact was given in its entirety in the spring of 1975 to the Soviet Union. In all probability six "Foxtrot" class submarines were purchased at the same time. At this time, only four or five (?) of them have been identified and registered. The submarines of this class were built for the Soviet navy in the years from 1958 to 1968, after which construction for export was resumed. They are an improved version of the "Zulu" class submarines, which had been built from 1952 to 1954. No less than 59 units of the "Foxtrot" class were built, to which can be added the vessels exported to India (8 delivered between 1968 and 1975), Libya and Cuba (2 in 1979/1980).

The submarines of this class are 91.5 X 8 X 6.1 meters and displace 1,950 tons on the surface, 2,400 tons submerged. They have six 533-mm torpedo tubes, four additional 406-mm tubes and carry 22 torpedoes. The "Foxtrot" boats can dive to a depth of 300 meters. The "Foxtrot" submarines registered so far with the Libyan navy are: the "al-Badr" (No 311), which docked in Tripoli on 27 December 1976, the "al-Fatih" (No 312), which docked in the final months of 1977, the "al-Ahad" (No 313), which docked in the spring of 1978 and the "al-Mitraqah" (No 314), which docked on 17 March 1981. As was already stated, the two other submarines have not been positively identified by Western agencies. The first (fifth), according to FDC and WEVER, is the "al-Mitraqah" (?), of them was delivered on 27 February 1982, the second (sixth) in February 1983.

The "Foxtrot" class requires a crew of 75. Until now 12 Russian "military advisors" have been attached to each Libyan submarine. In 1978 Libya also acquired two Yugoslavian "Mala" type miniature submarines. These boats have a two-man crew, are 7.5 meters long, weigh 25 tons and are electrically propelled. These mini-submarines are meant for commando raids and can be transported into the target area either on a submarine or on the deck of a ship equipped with a 25-ton crane. Remarkably, no warship in the Libyan navy has such an installation.

In 1979 Libya again purchased two miniature submarines, type Cosmos-SX404, and supposedly gave them to the PLO. There has been no report of these submarines having been used in action. More precise information about these vessels is also not available. Probably some confusion exists in the existing literature, and the Yugoslavian "Mala" type submarines are identical with the Cosmos-SX404 type.

Libya has also applied for the purchase of four German "209" class submarines. It is highly questionable whether the government of the FRG will grant approval for the delivery of these vessels.
Guided Missile Corvettes

In October 1981 and on 2 February 1983 a Soviet guided missile corvette, type "Nanuchka II," arrived in Libya. It is generally assumed that Libya has placed orders for two additional corvettes of this type.

The "Nanuchka II" missile corvettes have been built since 1977/78 in Leningrad, so they number among the more recent constructions from the Soviet navy. They measure 60.3 X 12.2 X 3.1 meters and have a displacement of 780/900 tons. According to JANE'S, their main armament consists of four SS-N-2 SS missiles and a single SA-N-4 sea-to-air missile twin launcher. They also have a twin 57-mm antiaircraft gun. The crew on these ships numbers 60.

The ships already delivered to Libya were given the names: "Ayn Marrah" (No 416), handed over in October 1981; "Ayn al-Ghazalah" (No 417), delivered on 2 February 1983.

True to the Libyan policy of not tying itself down politically in the matter of equipping its armed forces, the Italian shipyard of Cantieri del Muggiano in La Spezia was given the contract to build four missile corvettes in 1974. However, the first keel was not laid until 25 May 1976. The four boats represent a special type: Wadi/Asad. The names of this ship type are: "Asad Tadjier" (ex "Wadi M'Raich", No 412), Asad-al-Thughur" (ex "Wadi Majir," No 413); the keels for these two boats were laid on 25 May 1976 and they were delivered on 14 September 1979 and 12 February 1980 to the Libyan navy. The "Asad-al-Khalij" (ex "Wadi Mercit", No 4141), had its keel laid on 26 October 1977 and was launched on 15 December 1978; it was handed over on 28 March 1981. The comparable data for the fourth boat, the "Asad-al-Hudud," are: keel laid on 25 May 1978, launched on 21 June 1969 and handed over on 28 March 1982.

The "Wadi/Asad" type boats measure 61.7 X 9.3 X 2.2 meters and their displacement is 670 tons. They are longer than the "Nanuchka II" type boats, but considerably narrower. The maximum speed of both types is the same, 34 knots. Cruising speed for long voyages is 15 knots for the "Nanuchka II," 14 knots for the "Asad." (Data taken from JANE'S 1983, which differ in part substantially from the data for this type [18 knots] in WEYER and other fleet yearbooks.)

The armament of the "Asad" type boats, which have a crew of 54, consists of 4 Otomat missiles, 1 76-mm OTO Melara, a single Oerlikon twin 35-mm anti-aircraft gun and 6 324-mm antisubmarine torpedoes in two groups of three (Ilas torpedo tubes) for A-244 torpedoes. Each boat can also lay 16 mines.

Small Missile Boats

In May 1977 Libya ordered 10 FK-S [high-speed missile] "La Combattante II G" boats from Constructions Mechaniques in Cherbourg, France. The boats were all completed. Their names—following their last renaming at the end of 1983—and dates of construction are:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Date Keel Laid</th>
<th>Date of Launch</th>
<th>Delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shararah (ex Bi'r Qarrasah)</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>13 March 1978</td>
<td>28 June 1979</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shihab (ex Bi'r Gzir)</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>10 June 1978</td>
<td>22 January 1980</td>
<td>3 April 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahg (ex Bi'r al-Qutayafah)</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>30 January 1979</td>
<td>20 May 1980</td>
<td>29 May 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahid [ex Bi'r Jallud]</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>20 October 1979</td>
<td>30 September 1980</td>
<td>8 September 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shouaiai (ex Bi'r Qandula)</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>12 September 1979</td>
<td>14 January 1981</td>
<td>1981(?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shu'lah (ex Bi'r Ktitat)</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>17 December 1979</td>
<td>22 April 1981</td>
<td>20 October 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barq (ex Bi'r al-Kardamin)</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>9 June 1980</td>
<td>23 June 1981</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra'd (ex Bi'r Kur)</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>20 October 1980</td>
<td>30 November 81</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The "Combattante II G" boats measure 49 X 7.1 X 2 meters and have a displacement of 285/311 tons. Their armament consists of four Otomat missiles, a single 76-mm OTO Melara cannon and a Breda twin 40-mm antiaircraft gun. The crew is made up of 30 men. Their maximum speed is 39 knots; cruising speed is 15 knots.

The Soviet navy has so far built no less than 110 units of the OSA-type small missile boats in two versions. Some of them are in use with the Soviet navy in coastal waters off the USSR. But the Soviet Union also supplies its friends and allies in the entire world with these high-speed missile boats. In addition to the Libyan navy, the Egyptian, Algerian, Yugoslavian and Syrian navies have OSA I and OSA II-type boats in the Mediterranean.

The OSA II boats measure 39 X 8.1 X 1.8 meters, with a displacement of 165/210 tons. They carry a crew of 30 and they are armed with four SS-N-2 Styx missiles and a twin 30-mm antiaircraft gun. The maximum speed of these boats is 40 knots. In November 1975 it was announced officially in Tripoli
that Libya would purchase 24 OSA II-class units from the USSR. Later unofficial reports claimed that the number of boats to be purchased was reduced to 12. In fact, 12 OSA boats have been delivered to date to Libya. These are the names of the OSA II boats belonging to the Libyan navy:

al-Katum (No 205)  
al-Owakh (No 206) [al-O'Wark]  
al-Rwae (No 207)  
al-Bayda (No 208)  
al-Nabha (No 209)  
al-Fikar (No 210)  
al-Safha (No 952)  
al-Zakab (No 954)  
al-Zuwarah (No 956)  
al-Mwash (No ---)  
al-Btar (No ---)  
al-Sud (No ---)  

The boats were delivered as follows: the first one in October 1976, two in the spring of 1977, two more at the end of 1977, the sixth one in 1978, the seventh and eighth in September 1979, the "al-Zuwarah" (No 956) in October 1979, one (the 10th) in April 1980 in Tobruk, the "al-Safha" (No 952) in May 1980 and the 12th, the "al-Zakab" (No 954) in July 1980.

According to unofficial reports, Libya is supposed to have placed orders for four "Rade Koncar" class high-speed missile boats in Yugoslavia in the spring of 1980. This report has not yet been confirmed.

The SAR 33-class boats were designed by the Abeking and Rasmussen yard in Lemwerder, Germany, and built by the Turkish Taskizak yard. At the beginning of 1980, Libya already had 14 boats of this type on order (FDC), according to other sources 12 (JANE'S) and had received some of them. They are assigned to the Libyan coastguard.

The SAR 33-class boats measure 33.5 X 8.16 X 1.9 meters, with a displacement of 155/170 tons. (This is according to FDC and WEYER'S FLOTENKALENDER, JANE'S quotes some dimensions differently.)

The armaments of these boats consists of a twin 40-mm antiaircraft gun and two machine guns. But the boats can also be armed with ship-to-ship missiles, a 76-mm cannon and a twin 35-mm antiaircraft gun. They can reach a speed of 42 knots and carry a crew of 24.

Minesweepers

At the end of 1979 Libya purchased four "Natya" class minesweepers from the Soviet Union. This class has been built at the Izhora yard in Leningrad since 1970, to date 38 units. The ships of this class measure 61 X 10 X 3.5 meters, with a displacement of 650/950 tons. They are armed with four 30-mm antiaircraft guns (in pairs) and four additional 25-mm guns and two RBU 1200 5
depth charge launchers. They carry a crew of 70 and can lay 10 mines. The first two units delivered to the Libyan navy arrived on 17 March 1981 in Tripoli, the other two on 2 February 1983. Their Libyan navy names are: "Ra's al-Gelais" (No 111), "Ra's Haddad" (No 113), "Ra's al-Hammam" (No 115) and "Ra's al-Falluga" (No 117).

Landing Ships

Probably at the beginning of 1979, Libya ordered two landing ships from the CNI de la Mediterranee yard in La Seyne, France. These ships represent a unique class: "PS 700." Their measurements are 99.5 X 15.6 X 2.4 meters and fully loaded they displace 2,800 tons. Their armament consists of six 40-mm Breda antiaircraft guns, in twin turrets, and an 81-mm mortar. They are also equipped with a helicopter platform and are able to transport either 240 fully equipped men or 11 tanks; the appropriate ramp is built into the ship. They carry a crew of 34.

The Libyan navy's PS 700 class ships are: the "Ibn-'Auwf" (No 132); the keel was laid on 1 April 1976, it was launched on 22 October and was delivered on 11 March 1977; the "Ibn-Harisah" (No 134), keel laying took place on 18 April 1977, the launching was on 18 October 1977 and it was handed over to the Libyan navy on 10 March 1978.

In 1977 the Libyan acquired 4 Polnocny C landing ships from the Soviet Union. All the ships of this class have been built in Danzig yards for the Soviet and other navies.

Construction of the Polnocny C class was started in 1975, and an unknown number of units has been built since then. The Polnocny C class ships measure 82 X 10 X 1.8 meters, with a displacement of 1,150 tons (fully laden). They carry four 30-mm antiaircraft guns and two rocket launchers. They can carry up to eight tanks and have a crew of 40.

The first ships of the Polnocny C class belonging to the Libyan navy arrived in Tripoli at the end of 1977. They were: the "Ibn-Qays" (No ----) and the "Ibn-al-Hadrami" (No 112); on 14 September the "Ibn-Qays" was completely destroyed by fire during maneuvers. The "Ibn-Umayyah" (No 116) and the "Ibn-al-Furat" (No 118) were handed over to the Libyans in June 1979. (WETERS'S FLOTTENKALENDER 1982/83 gives different names for some of the ships.)

In 1979 Libya placed orders for 20, perhaps 30, short-range landing craft in Turkey for the Turkish C-107 class, which is built using the French Edic type as a model. By 1982 Turkey had built 31 units of this class of landing craft: Nos 107-137. Starting with No 119, the original design was slightly modified in its dimensions, becoming somewhat smaller. The Libyan units are derived from this modified type. The boats built to this design measure 56 X 11.6 X 1.3 meters and have a displacement of 280/600 tons. They are armed only with a twin 20-mm antiaircraft gun and carry a crew of 16. The first two boats of this type (ex Turkish C 132 and C 133) were handed over on 7 December 1979. In the Libyan navy they were named "Ra's al-Hilal" and "al-Kobayat."
Tugboats

In 1979 the Libyan navy placed orders with the Jonker and Stans BV yard in the Netherlands for three small tugs of 150 tons. The keel was laid for the first one on 16 October 1979. In the Libyan navy they carry the identification numbers A 33, A 34 and A 35.

The Libyan navy placed orders for four additional tugs at the end of 1975 with the Portugese Montego yard. Dimensions for these boats are 34.8 X 9 X 4 meters, with a displacement of 200 tons. The class ship "Ra's al-Hilal" (No A 31) had its keel laid on 5 February 1976 and was delivered on 22 October 1976. The names and the matching data for the remaining three boats are: "al-Ahuverif" [al-Shuwayrif] (No A 32), 23 March 1976/12 February 1977, "al-Qaryat" No ---) 23 March 1976/1 July 1977, "al-Tabkah" (No ---), ---/29 July 1978.

Transport Ships

In 1979 Libya ordered a ro-ro [roll-on roll-off] freighter of 3,100 gross tons in Italy. The ship measures 117.5 X 17.5 X 4.9 meters, has a displacement of 3,100 tons and is named the "al-Timsah." It is equipped with stabilizers and can also be deployed as a minelayer.

In 1977 the Libyan navy acquired a Soviet "Yelva" class tender from the USSR, measuring 40.5 X 8 X 2 meters, with a displacement of 295 tons. The ship was built in 1979 and in the Libyan navy is called the "al-Manoud." It carries a 1.5-ton crane. Finally, the Libyan navy has its own dock, with a lifting capacity of 5,000 tons, which is stationed in Tripoli.

Bases

The Libyan navy maintains bases in Tripoli, in Derna (Darnah) and in Benghazi, with an auxiliary base under construction in Tobruk; a repair base is maintained in Homs (al-Khums), east of Tripoli; reconnaissance planes, which work with the navy, but do not belong to it, are stationed in Misrata (Misratah), farther to the east of Homs; a marine battalion is stationed in Sidi Bilal, and a submarine base is under construction in Ras Hilal, which is supposed to be completed in 1985.

The Mission of the Libyan Navy

After Col al-Qadhafi seized power on 1 September 1969, it immediately became clear that Libya would change its previous direction in foreign policy.

Al-Qadhafi is an admirer of Nasser and is one of the most radical opponents of Israel. He himself once said that in his youth he had felt special humiliation at the fact that British airplanes were flying against the Egyptians from Libyan airfields during the Suez war. Logically, the United States and Great Britain had to leave their military bases in Libya soon after the coup. Libya has been changing its orientation slowly ever since.
The reasons that led al-Qadhafi to build such a large and expensive instrument are many and varied. First, this man's personal inclination to acquire arsenals of weapons must be mentioned. If just the arms available to the armed forces on land and in the air are compared with those of the navy, the conclusion is that, with 90 units, the Libyan navy still came out on the short end, so it remains the stepchild of the Libyan armed forces.

But other, objective reasons also led to the rapid buildup of the Libyan navy in the 1970's. The most important of them is the discussion that flared up during that decade about the extension of territorial waters and the creation of economic zones on the world's seas. All the Third World coastal nations followed this discussion with special attentiveness, all of them supported the extension of territorial waters, all of them are determined to preserve their rights—however they are understood by each individual nation—if necessary by using force; as, for example, with Argentina and the Falkland Islands.

However, only the oil-producing nations among all the Third World countries had a realistic possibility of underlining their claims to territorial waters and economic zones by means of suitable maritime equipment. Whoever was able to, did it; among them was Libya.

Another reason that has brought about the oversizing of the Libyan navy is the quarrel with Egypt. Behind it is a cold calculation on al-Qadhafi's part: on land he can accomplish little against the Egyptian army, even if he should win the upper hand in the air. This weakness cannot be corrected with money, Libya's population is numerically too small. But with money, al-Qadhafi is much more in a position to purchase a service which Egypt cannot match because of a shortage of funds. Today, the Egyptian navy does not represent a serious opponent for the Libyan navy, applying just the standards of number and combat readiness of the units. If, in fact, the Libyan navy should acquire 30 C-107 class landing boats, no neighboring country of Libya should overlook this fact, least of all Egypt. Because of the quarrel with Libya, the Egyptian army maintains strong units along its western border with Libya. If Libya acquires an equally strong land force, the Libyan army will be in a position to risk a landing somewhere between Matruh and the Libyan border, even with weak forces, and to cut the only road between Alexandria and the Libyan border. The situation of the Egyptian forces which could be located west of this possible Libyan bridgehead would immediately become extremely precarious.

These minor jealousies between neighboring coastal states have also played a part in the buildup of relatively significant fleets in other Third World countries.

A third reason for the buildup of navies in the Third World and also in Libya can be found in the advantages offered by modern weapons technology. Missiles and weapons electronic systems make it possible to build small ships today which, compared with the equivalent warships from WW II, have enormous firepower and require a numerically smaller but well trained crew. Everyone believes he is in a position to provide this personnel; so ships are purchased as long as the financial means are available. Libya is doing the same.5
There is a further reason, in addition to the general ones which hold true for other Third World countries, and which have led Libya to build up a relatively large fleet: the problem of the Great Surt.

Libyan Territorial Waters

If one looks at the map of Libya from the north, one can see that the Khalij Surt (Gulf of Sidra) divides the country into two parts. Older maps show two gulfs here, the Great and the Little Syrtis (this spelling is also the more correct). The Great Surt is the bay that starts in the west from Cape Misratah and ends in the east in the area north of Benghazi. The Little Surt runs into the Great Surt in the north, starts near the city of Marsa in the west and ends in the east near Az-Zuwatinah, far to the south of Benghazi.

To the west of the Great Surt lies Tripolitania, to the east of it Cyrenaica. The country of Libya has more problems than enjoyment from these two regions. They are deserts, steppes at best, with Tripolitania being more mountainous than Cyrenaica. Only in a few places in these enormous regions can a few sheep and goats eke out a precarious existence. The economic usefulness of these regions is out of the question. They are a burden from an economic point of view. This burden is borne by the area south of the two Surts, because Libya's bountiful oil lies here. This is one of the reasons why the Libyans are so particularly sensitive in this area that is right in front of their oil wells. Added to this is the peculiar nature of the seabed of the two Surts; they are not very deep, the seabed is smooth and drops off gradually to the north as if scraped level. (Syrtis is from the Greek verb "syrein", meaning to pull; the ancient Greeks could "pull" their nets on the seabed of the two Surts and, even in those times, bring back all kinds of treasures from the sea and sponges to the surface.) Both Surts are therefore extremely suitable as a route for an attack on Libya and as a gateway to its oilwells.

It is also true that Greek sponge divers and Italian fishermen have regarded the two Surts since time immemorial as their "personal" territory, much to the distress of their Libyan colleagues, who have hardly any chance against them. The minor diplomatic incidents between Italy and Greece on the one side and Libya on the other are innumerable, since the Libyans are constantly stopping Italian and Greek fishing boats in the Surts, taking them into custody and throwing the fishermen into jail; in spite of protestations to the contrary by those affected, mostly justifiably.

In addition, oil fields are suspected to exist in the Little Surt and beyond. In order to solve all these problems at once, al-Qadhdhafi came up with the idea of declaring the Little and the Great Surt to be Libya's territorial waters. A suitable law, dated 9 October 1973, declared accordingly that "the Gulf of Sidra, which is a part of Libyan territory, borders the Libyan mainland to the east, the south and the west and the 32nd degree of latitude to the north."

None of the bordering countries is willing to accept this Libyan claim (even less the non-law abiding Greek and Italian fishermen). The United States has
repeatedly lodged energetic protests against this claim and rejected the aforementioned law. The Soviet Union would like to do the same, if it had a different relationship with Libya, because the area of the two Surts is, on account of the constitution of the seabed, extremely suitable as an anchorage for the third Soviet naval squadron, which is "homeless" in the Mediterranean.

The Libyan navy's mission is, basically, to protect the sea area of the two Surts. It is mainly the United States that is not prepared to accept the extension of territorial waters to more than 200 nautical miles anywhere, much less in the narrow Mediterranean. This is what the Libyan claim in the Great Surt amounts to. The incident of 19 August 1981 must be seen against this background, in the course of which two F-14 Tomcat fighters from the "Nimitz," which was exercising there illegally in the view of the Libyans, shot down two Libyan Su-22's.

Just the current size of the Libyan fleet justifies the question whether it is intended solely to enforce Libyan claims in the two Surts. The Israelis are asking themselves this question. The head of the Israeli navy, Admiral Zeev Akmog, expressed his concern in August 1981 about the growth of the Libyan naval forces" and stated that "Libya had become a real naval power." Libyan fast patrol boats could appear off the coast of Israel without any difficulty to operate jointly with the armed forces of Syria.6

The Combat Effectiveness of the Libyan Navy

The Arab-Israeli wars have had a lasting psychological effect on many people. The way in which the Israelis have won their brilliant victories has led to a widespread view that the Arabs are still "camel jockeys," "bunglers," at least "inferior." (The fact that the Israelis would contribute to "confirming" racist theories of this kind is one of the twists of history.) It speaks for the Israelis that they set no store by such simplistic judgments of the Arabs, because they are in the best position to know that the combat capability of the Arabs has increased with each war, and that the last victory (1973) was not won with bravura but by sheer determination. In this context the author shares the opinion of the Israelis and he is far from believing that the combat effectiveness of the Libyan navy has to be set about with questions marks, just because an Arabian navy is under discussion.

However, these question marks have to be inserted. In general: al-Qadhfi's evident inclination towards imposing arsenals is confronted by a natural, almost insurmountable limit: Libya's population. If one deducts the "foreign workers" from Egypt, Turkey and other Islamic, but also European, countries, it numbers less than 2.5 million. Libya maintains a total of 73,000 men under arms, 6,500 of them in the navy. The weapons that Libya has at its disposal would be sufficient for an army at least twice as strong, this is not the place where this point can be augmented. Libya has available a system of mobilization that includes the drafting of women. But this system exists only on paper, it has never been tested in an emergency, the question of its utility must remain unanswered, it depends on the state of training of all those who participate in this system in any way.
For the Libyan navy specially, this aspect appears to be as follows: according to my own, very careful calculation the number of officers and crew members serving in the approximately 90 units of the Libyan navy is 2,200; it is probably even higher. But since, as was just stated, there are only 6,500 men serving in the Libyan navy altogether, it is clear that at best only one crew is available per unit. Possible losses in the event of a conflict cannot be replaced at all.

This weakness becomes even more evident when one observes the speed of the buildup of the Libyan navy in the last few years. I doubt whether any armed forces in the world are capable of managing such a speed. With respect to the Libyan navy, it is an almost insoluble problem because even military training has its limits in the physical fatigue threshold of the personnel. There is an additional aspect: the ships of the Libyan navy are of British, French, Italian, Yugoslavian, Polish, Portuguese, Soviet and Turkish construction. This accumulation of different technologies places corresponding logistic demands on the Libyans. Even if the financial aspect is set aside here, the question remains whether the Libyan navy has any ability at all to meet the remaining demands on it, particularly in a conflict.

For all these reasons, the Libyan navy is, if I can be excused for saying so, immeasurably overextended, and this alone puts an additional question mark that cannot be erased on its combat effectiveness, a question mark, however, which would be justified for any navy in the world under comparable circumstances.

What the Libyan navy currently needs is a period of consolidation, which gives the officers and crews the chance to become knowledgeable in operating the existing equipment. Col Muammar al-Qadhafi is, however, apparently not prepared to grant his navy a "pause to catch its breath." According to the "Military Balance 1983/84" from the IISS [International Institute for Strategic Studies] in London, besides the units previously mentioned, he has ordered 4 additional "Assad" class corvettes, 4 "Boxina" and 3 coastal patrol boats as well as 12 (!) C-107 landing craft. The Libyan navy needs 518 men just for crews. Where are they to come from? The Soviet "advisors" who are attached to Libyan warships should not be overestimated. For one thing, al-Qadhafi will not hand over his ships to the Russians, for another, there can be no question that the Russians will not let themselves be turned into al-Qadhafi's tools.

FOOTNOTES


2. Ulrich Albrecht and Birgit A. Sommer, "Deutsche Waffen fuer die Dritte Welt. Militaerhilfe und Entwicklungssetik" [German Weapons for the Third World. Military Aid and the Politics of Aid to Developing Countries], Reinbeck, Hamburg, 1972 (roro aktuell), p 118.
3. According to JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1983/84; WEYER'S FLOTTENTASCHENBUCH 1982/83 gives the "Homs" as still in service (1982?).


PROBLEM OF DESERTIFICATION OUTLINED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 40, 14 Jan 34 pp 45-43

[Article: "Hungry Sands Eat Up Vegetation, Leave Dessication and Extend Their Long Tongue to Yan"]

[Text] The problem of desertification in Sudan is not a marginal one which is mentioned in passing in obscure places in the press, as though it were a forgotten subject. There has been a great deal of repeated discussion about it, to no avail.

The problem of desertification has begun to threaten one of the most valuable possessions of 17 countries in Africa, including Sudan. We mean land suitable for cultivation and grazing and grazing and agricultural land. Just as on the other hand, we know what distinguishes Sudan from most Third World countries.

Therefore, it is not true that the problem of desertification in Sudan is merely a topic everyone has been constantly discussing without conveying anything new worth embracing or pursuing in profound and continuous study. A great number of scientists and specialists are concerned with this increasingly complicated and grave problem today, and not just on a local or international level.

When it confirmed the danger of desertification, particularly in Africa, the UN assigned a body to become involved in it, study it and help implement programs to combat it. It is called the UNSO [as published].

The problem of desertification known in Egypt as "the advance of the desert," has begun to emerge through its impact on the environment, economy, society and recently even on literature, especially with respect to short stories and novels. Through these processes, we see that the concept of desertification and its manifestation in Egypt differ little from its appearance and actual presence in Sudan. This becomes clear for example in the story Hungry Sands."

"The words of its Egyptian protagonist suffice here:

"When I was a boy, my grandfather used to stop with me by the tamarisk trees which stretched out across from our field. Pointing with his index finger, he would say, 'These yellow sands have eaten up the village of my fathers and forefathers.' Then Grandfather would describe that: 'Tamarisk trees used
to surround my village on all sides. Beyond them was the desert. One morning we awoke and saw the yellow sands encircling the tamarisk trees like rings. We didn't realize that this ring of sand was stronger than a ring of iron. However, the desert began with the village guardians and shackled them before starting its infernal work. The people of the village weren't concerned about these yellow circles surrounding the tree trunks and infiltrating among them like vipers. The flowers in the field were still in bloom, with their red, yellow and white colors on a lush green background. But we awoke one morning and saw that sand had filled in the canals and closed up the wells. We were worried. We kept working until sunset striking with hoes and carrying sand until we had returned to the desert most of the sand it had loaned us. We slept the sleep of the dead, from weariness. Then we awoke to a tumult such as we had never heard before. It was the strong hot winds which blow two or three times per year. But we had never seen nor heard such a wind as this, whistling, deafening to the ears, a resounding cracking like thunder. We didn't know if it was night or day. We looked out from the small windows and saw only yellow, like the yellow of death. The winds nearly blinded us. We shut all the windows and locked every door, but the sand continued to come through to us inside our houses, as though it were boring right through the walls themselves. We couldn't breathe. We were drowned in a sea of sand. We were in the midst of a howling wind listening to houses crashing down and trees snapping. I don't know how long we remained in this state. However, I saw all my family die, their eyes bulging like those of people who have suffocated, wild terror gleaming in their eyes as they die. Suddenly I felt silence, a silence I can't describe, as if life on earth had come to an end, silence like a well in which you are afraid to breath so you won't hear the echo of your own breathing. I felt I was on the brink of insanity. I rushed to the door and tried to open it, but the sand which had penetrated through its cracks had made a barrier under it like a gate. I ran to the roof terrace of the house. I didn't see the ladder, but I did see a hill of sand heaped up on the bodies of my family. I looked and didn't find any roof to my house. However, for the first time since the period I don't remember, I saw the color of the sky. The roof had collapsed with the accumulation of sand on it. I felt as though I were emerging from the darkness of a tomb. What was I to do, with this sea of sand surrounding me? The desert with its armies had marched on our village."

As we may see, it is a splendid literary interpretation of the advance of the desert with its sands which is one cause, if not the most important one, leading to the imminent destruction of the world, as anticipated by the experts. However, the picture in real life isn't this hopeless gloom. Desertification in actuality is not entirely or even mostly an advance of sand. Desertification as it exists in Sudan and other African and non-African countries too means the destruction of agricultural cultivation and suffering from drought. It is good land being made barren, being condemned to death and ruin. This phenomenon of desertification, according to the expert Dr Muhammad Fathi 'Avadallah, has several manifestations:

First, scarcity of water or the poor use of it.
Second, man's calumny against the land, his depletion of the soil.

Third, overgrazing.

Finally, the advance of the sand.

All these warnings lead most certainly to the radical destruction of the plant environment in the ground and adversely affect man and his way of life. Here arises the frightening menace of desertification. It is a constant danger if these conditions are present, and it continues to become increasingly grave as the days go by. We now ask what the nature of desertification in Sudan is. How does one confront the problem while it is threatening good, usable lands? What area has actually been turned into desert? What hope is there of stopping this menace which threatens to lay waste to vast areas?

We find the answers to these and other questions of AL-TADAMUN in conversation with the national coordinator of the program to combat desertification in Khartoum, Faruq Hasan Ahmad.

He said, "The office of national coordination was set up in 1972 to confront the danger of desertification. Certain Sudanese ministries and organs participate in it, including the Ministry of Agriculture with its two agencies for natural resources and animal resources. The departments of forests and grazing land are included in the agency for natural resources. The Ministry of Energy and Mining also participates and is represented by the departments of energy and rural water. The agricultural research agency participates through its research departments on forests, grazing land and soil retention. Added to all of these is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

Faruq Hasan Ahmad explained to AL-TADAMUN that all these institutions drafted their own projects and proposals to combat desertification in Sudan, and subsequently to reclaim land which has been laid to waste and ruined. These projects included other concepts and programs drafted by the regional ministries. From all these programs came the plan named "the national program to combat desertification in Sudan." That is what Sudan is striving to implement.

Faruq Hasan Ahmad had figures on land transformed into desert in Sudan, an area of 100,000 square kilometers, located between 10° N and the Egyptian border. It includes areas in the center and north of the two provinces of North Darfur and North Kordofan. Not long ago these areas which have turned into desert were grazing lands and savanna forests rich with "Acacia Senegal" trees which produce the famous gum arabic. Also located in these areas were plantations producing oil seeds.

According to Faruq Hasan Ahmad, desertification in these vast areas resulted from the poor use of natural resources, not from natural factors alone, as some believe. Desertification occurred in Sudan in the first instance as a result of overgrazing, the cutting down of trees, poor exploitation of both ground and surface water and intensive cultivation in marginal areas bordering on the desert. Added to this, naturally, were the effects of the drought which became more acute during the 1970's.
The provision of drinking water, for which a great deal of money and effort has been expended, has caused an increase in the number of inhabitants and their livestock in specific places. This is in contrast to the inhabitant's former way of life which was entirely nomadic. This concentration around new water sites and the overexploitation of natural resources ruined the land. It became completely denuded. Then it was exposed to wind and water erosion. This in practical terms is what is called "desertification." Desertification in Sudan does not mean the advance of the desert alone. The desert was formed originally millions of years ago under established climatic conditions. Desertification means the creation of desert conditions which do not produce anything. This does not mean, naturally, that there is no advance of desert sands. Sudan has experienced that in its northern borders located originally on the edge of the great desert.

The result of desertification in Sudan are not limited to the loss of valuable natural resources, the most important of which is agricultural land. There is in addition a decline in animal resources due to the scarcity of grazing land. Then there is the migration of people from their traditional areas of other remote parts to settle down, and this creates problems of a new kind requiring in turn various exorbitantly expensive solutions.

The national project to combat the phenomenon of desertification in Sudan, as Farouq Hassan Ahmad remarked to AL-TADAMUN, has not remained frozen, with no additions possible. Rather, it has remained open to the incorporation of the greatest number of projects, especially those which are planned according to natural, climatic, economic and social conditions on a local scale and which might be omitted in the draft national model project. For example, when UN delegations made numerous visits to the different regions of Sudan, officials presented them with certain local projects established in accordance with the conditions of these regions. These projects were added to the national program.

In the last 2 years certain projects to combat desertification in Sudan have been financed with foreign technical assistance through the UN which is represented by its office, UNSO [as published]: The UN has given it the task of helping 17 African nations south of the Sahara in their programs to combat desertification worldwide by obtaining international financing and technical help from nations and international bodies participating in programs to combat desertification throughout the world. Each year these nations and bodies are invited to meetings called the "Advisory Group to Combat Desertification." All the projects submitted by nations concerned are reviewed. One of the nations or international bodies chooses the project it wants to finance, according to its desires and willingness to participate.

It is noteworthy that there are more than 50 nations affected by desertification throughout the world. Seventeen of these are in Africa. All these nations have submitted many projects at these meetings. In the last 2 years Sudan has submitted more than 13. Clearly, implementation of projects to combat desertification in Sudan will be extremely slow-paced in view of limited financing and the threat of desertification itself which consumes grazing and crop land. Also, only a limited number of projects receives aid each year. If the present situation continues, with one or two projects being chosen for
each nation annually, then it will take Sudan another 80 years at least to be
able to finance the projects already incorporated in its national program,
not to mention those being planned now or those planned in the future. The
latter are the most important, because they are long-term projects. In this
situation, which cries out to the world for a helping hand, social problems
arise which are contained mercilessly inside the country, perhaps more
effectively than desertification itself is contained. Changes in living
conditions affecting natural resources have caused desertification and have
then been branded by it. We see these changes in attempts to settle nomadic
owners of livestock since the beginning of the 20th century, even though one
of the advantages of itinerant grazing is the balances use of grazing areas.
The proliferation of animals in such a confined area as this, bordering on
the Sahil, has caused and continues to cause a great decline in natural re-
sources, through the concentrated use of lands with low yield (land lying in
the African Sahil). The "African Sahil" is a term meaning the climatic
and vegetal belt lying directly south of the Great Sahara.

If we follow the size of population and animal resources (factors affecting the
soil) in Sudan since 1917, we find that over a period of 60 years, the popu-
lation increased sixfold. Animal resources increased at an ever faster rate.
The number of cows increased 21 times over the 1917 figure; camels, 16 times;
lambs, 12; and goats, 8. During the same period grazing land dwindled, and
its yield of grass and trees decreased due to overexploitation. As a result
of the population increase in the Sahil region of Sudan and a fluctuation of
between 100 and 600 millimeters there in average annual rainfall, the number
of villages is increasing, and they are becoming more densely populated. Ac-
cording to 1977 statistics in Darfur (western Sudan), 40 percent of all vil-
lages have sprung up since the beginning of this century. Most of these vil-
lages have been built around surface and ground water wells. New villages
have been built near the old ones. Each one is surrounded by a ring of culti-
vated land. A satellite photograph clearly shows, especially in the region of
al-'Ubayyid and Bara, the proliferation of agricultural villages with their
encircling rings which have turned into desert, appearing as white halos
completely devoid of plant life. In the period between 1970 and 1973 inhabi-
tants of the sahil abandoned a number of their villages, fleeing the deserti-
fication which encircled them. They fled south where they erected new villages
replacing the old.

From a study of this phenomenon in the region of a Sudanese tribe known as
"al-Zaghawah" in Darfur, it is clear that the people of this tribe abandoned
475 of their villages out of a total 804 during this period.

Certain projects proposed to combat desertification are currently being finan-
ced through foreign technical assistance. One of these on-going projects con-
cerns the development and exploitation of ground water reservoirs in northern
Sudan. It is being carried out at a cost of $5 million through the UN program
on environment and financed by Italy and Kuwait. Nearly $3 million has been
proved so far to finance the project.

The goal of this project is to study and exploit ground water reservoirs in
the northern region in order to increase acreage in regions far from the Nile
and to stabilize sand dunes. Implementation of the first agricultural phase of the project began during the 1981-82 season.

There is also a project to develop a gum arabic belt. Its goal is to plant "Acacia senegal" trees in regions of central Sudan which are exposed to desertification. Implementation began in July 1971. A grant of $1.5 million has been provided for this project by the government of the Netherlands. A survey of the region of western Kordofan is being conducted, as the second stage of the project. It will be financed by the European Common Market and Belgium.

Among projects currently being implemented to combat desertification in Sudan is one known by the name, the "project for grassland belts around water sources, cities and villages." Sweden is providing financing of $900,000 for it. The implementation phase began in August, 1982, and it will take 3 years to complete. The World Council of Churches has allocated $3 million to another project to plant trees in irrigated agricultural projects in the northern region to prevent desertification. One of the projects included in the plan of 1982-83 and mid-1984 to combat desertification in Sudan is the stabilization of sand dunes. Planning for it has been completed, and sources of its financing have been determined (the first stage). It includes the region of central North Darfur Province. Its cost of $1 million is covered by a grant, also from Sweden.

One project under study will exploit surplus ground water to increase the size of agricultural land in the region of Saq al-Na'amah in North Darfur. The project now depends on a detailed study by a special UN commission and is similar to the project to reclaim "al-Qardud" lands (in other words, lands which have hardened through soil erosion) which is also awaiting a detailed study.

These projects cannot have a real impact on the problem of desertification in Sudan because of the vastness of the region affected and the living conditions associated with desertification. Approximately 48 percent of Sudanese territory located north of 14°N is either the desert or semi-desert, and 29 percent of the territory located between 10°N and 14°N is savanna. In other words, 77 percent of the territory of Sudan is covered by savanna, semi-desert or desert. With its plant and climatic make-up, this portion of the country is of extreme importance to the nation's economy.

Nevertheless, the situation in Sudan is preferable by far when compared to that in neighboring African countries. We can see this from the extent to which nations of the African Sahel (in other words, nations of the climatic and vegetal belt lying south of the Great Sahara) have been affected by desertification. Average annual rainfall there fluctuates between 100 millimeters in the north and 600 millimeters in the south. This belt makes up a great portion of many African nations. From west to east, they are Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia.

These countries have been affected in recent years, between 1969 and 1973 in particular, by severe drought, causing thirst, want, famine, the exodus of tribes and tremendous economic, social and political problems.
A UN report has revealed that approximately 630 million inhabitants of countries suffering from drought are threatened by the danger of desertification. Research has also indicated that the desert is expanding throughout the world by thousands of [square] kilometers. The rate of expansion of this dangerous phenomenon is most evident in the southern portion of the Great African Sahara which has witnessed over the past 50 years the transformation of nearly 650,000 square kilometers of productive land into bleak desert. That area is three times larger than Great Britain.

The problem of desertification in Sudan which has subjected vast areas of usable land to ruin was recognized by the agencies concerned nearly 30 years before the drought crisis existed. Attempts began in 1944 to combat desertification in Sudan through measures of a special committee known as the "Land Use Committee."

These measures provided for a belt of trees around al-'Ubayyid, the capital of Kordofan, to protect it from sand storms in the dry season and to lay out grazing land around the city. The committee recommended that similar belts be created in certain large cities such as al-Ruhud, al-FAQhir, Umm Ravabah and Bara.

Between 1944 and 1956 there existed an agency for soil protection. Aside from finding more water sources in agricultural areas, its most important function was to draft programs to protect the country's natural resources and continue to create belts of threes as part of soil protection and as a means of combating wind erosion around principal cities. However, this effort failed, due to many intervening factors. Between 1956 and 1965 another agency became prominent, the Agency for Rural Land and Water Use. One of its functions was to draft programs to protect soil and combat the advance of the desert in northern Sudan. In its time this agency began promoting implementation of the first of its soil protection programs. It composed a team of experts and technicians in the fields of agriculture, grazing and forests to undertake a general survey covering what was then known as "the problem area," the area lying between 10°N and 16°N, stretching from the Nile in the east to the western borders of Sudan with Chad.

The problems of concern in this rectangle are the decline in agricultural productivity due to the reduction of soil through wind and water erosion and the destruction of the plant cover (in other words, desertification). One of the tasks given these specialists was to find solutions to the problem of water in order to alleviate pressure at the permanent water sites. The first signs of desertification and even the advance of the desert were beginning to appear around them, especially in Naleit, Umm Kaddadah, Umm Badir and Bara.

Then the scope of study was enlarged with the participation of foreign expertise. All of this led to a recommendation to create farms, research stations and experiments in various environmental sectors of the "problem area" in order to protect and develop natural resources and combat agents of wind erosion, or desertification to be more exact.
These recommendations have not been applied in their entirety, because this agency was turned into a body to provide for water and rural development in 1976. All its efforts were focused on creating sources of water, without concern for the protection of soil and natural resources themselves. These vast efforts dealt successfully with the problem of water, but on the other hand, contributed toward desertification in an unexpected manner.

Clearly, the burden of desertification is one Sudan has borne over many years. However, it is a burden which has of necessity required participation in a broad, worldwide campaign. It is a heavy and harsh burden, and it will grow steadily worse if left to local efforts.

7811
CSO: 4504/181
SECRETARY GENERAL ABDELAZIZ BOURAOUI ON ROLE OF UNTT

Tunis REALITES in French No 17, 24 Feb 84 pp 10-13

[Interview with Abdelaziz Bouraoui, secretary general of the UNTT [Tunisian National Labor Federation] by Samir Abdellah; place and date of interview not given]

[Text] A 2-hour interview with Mr Abdelaziz Bouraoui, co-founder, with Farhat Hached and Habib Achour, of the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor]. Today, he is the founder and secretary general of a rival federation: the UNTT.

What is behind this development, the scope of the new federation, its sources of funds, and its relationships with the government, employers, the UGTT and the political parties were the pivotal questions dominating this interview.

[Question] Your federation has come into being surrounded by controversies. Many doubt your independence and the credibility of your federation plan. What do you say to this?

[Answer] Those who judge us a priori are merely expressing a value judgement and that is their own affair. We cannot keep people from thinking what they want to think. But the reality is entirely another thing. The creation of the new union organization was not based on a decision by the "seven," but rather on the will of the the union rank-and-filers, a large number of whom compelled the creation of this federation. This federation is independent. It belongs to no one.

[Question] Some say that employer circles and even some members of the government are backing you...

[Answer] Employers backing us! A figment of the imagination. I don't think employers would have to form a federation simply to try to plant a few stooges at company levels.
They can always find one or two stooges. As for the government authorities, we have the proof that certain government bodies did not adhere to the appropriate neutrality in these cases. I will give you an example: The press conference we held to announce the coming into being of a legally constituted federation was not given impartial coverage by certain newspapers. They are also the radio and television networks, which are public domain, and which are presumed to be at the service of all the citizens. Not a word was said by them concerning this event, although they were there with their microphones and cameras. On the other hand, during their newscasts, they broadcast an item concerning a meeting Mr Achour held with some PTT workers to tell them their strike was unwarranted. Do you think this item was more important news than the forming of a new federation in accordance with the multiparty and multi-union policy announced by the government several months ago?

I find that rather the opposite is happening. Attempts are being made to obstruct the orderly emergence of our organization. And we are going to use our right to organize in accordance with the law.

[Question] It is being said that a minister who is a former union leader attends your meetings...

[Answer] We have no ministers attending our meetings, but I have the right to receive any citizen in my home, whether he be a minister or not. Certainly, there is a minister who comes to my home, because he is a friend and a comrade, since he is a former union leader. He comes to my home not as a minister but as a friend... I am free to receive anyone.

[Question] Your federation represents a splintering of the UGTT. Some persons are happy about this... "Divide and conquer!" Eh?

[Answer] A second organization within the country is not a new invention... It is something that has already existed in our country: In 1956-1957, with the UTT [Tunisian Workers Union]. I was a member of it together with Habib Achour.

Then, multi-unionism exists almost everywhere in the world. I will not cite France, but close to us, in Morocco, it appears to be working quite well. In Senegal as well, several unions coexist. In the present state of things, and considering the maturity of the working class, I don't believe the situation can be viewed in those terms... The union leaders could some day form a coalition, join in a common action against against this or that employer, to press their demands to a successful conclusion. I don't believe, therefore, that the dictum "Divide and conquer" is a necessarily valid one in all cases.

[Question] We note that in quite a short lapse of time you have formed some 800 local unions. Is this not rather surprising?

[Answer] It is not at all surprising! We do not have exact figures at present. Some unions have been legally constituted, others have just
finished filing their by-laws, and others are in the process of drawing up their constitution and by-laws. If we lump these all together, we might arrive at the figure you have mentioned. This figure is indicative of the extent of the malcontentedness that exists within the UGTT and points to the existence of a flaw at the local union level. It should also be noted that the meeting held recently which ended in our expulsion was but the straw that broke the camel's back. The union leaders rose in protest against this anti-democratic action. That is in fact the reason that explains the rapidity with which our federation was formed.

[Question] But this undertaking needs funds funding... Do you have sufficient?

[Answer] To date, we have not spent much money. Some of our premises have been leased for a 3-months period only, through the efforts of each region. If we had had the means, we could have done many more things as well. If you have visited our headquarters, you will certainly have noted that there is very little furniture. There are, at most, a few chairs and one or two desks. Other premises are still unfurnished. And if we hold out our hand to anybody, we at that point cease to be independent. Any claims that we receive money from anybody at all are products of the imagination and of intoxication. We are relying on no one but ourselves.

[Question] ... And as for cards?

[Answer] What cards?


[Answer] They are not yet printed! We have no embosser, no telephone, no rubber stamps, no letterheads. We have no newspaper. As of now, we have absolutely nothing! We are hoping for loans, for example, to cover some of these things... This shows that our means are very limited and that our hands are clean.

[Question] Is it possible to know the total of your membership?

[Answer] Even less, since we have not as yet set up records.

[Question] How about an approximate figure?

[Answer] I can give you some examples. Bizerte's Regional Transportation Company union has 620 members out of 632 workers employed by that company. In other unions we have the majority membership among the workers. There are other unions in which our membership equals that of the UGTT, and still others in which we have a minority.

[Question] With regard to the unions in which you hold a majority, can you cite a few more?
In addition to the preceding example, I can cite the entire region of Beja, and of Kasserine, where we have an overwhelming majority. Something like 90 to 95 percent of the total workers in these two regions.

Some observers consider that your federation is not the outcome of a historic process, as was the case of the UGTT, but rather perceive it as the response to a disagreement between you and your comrades of the UGTT. Some even consider that the UTTT is to be your way of settling some scores. What do you say to this?

Those who have read or will read our manifesto will perceive that this is in no way an affair of the "seven," that it is not a response but rather a historic fact. It is the union rank-and-file who have demanded the formation of a new union organization. The future will bear this out.

You are being compared to the French organization "Workers Force." What do you say to that?

A workers force, yes! But why compare us to foreign union organizations? We are actually a working force in our own right. We are neither phantoms nor empty shells!

... With this point in mind, namely, that FO [(French) Workers Force] is a union close to the French Right.

Everyone is free to make the value judgement he or she wishes to make. The future will prove that such judgements are without basis.

What is your position with respect to the UGTT?

We have nothing further to do with the UGTT!

You seem to imply that you intend to maintain a conflictual relationship with the UGTT...

We have no further relationship and that is all!

What exactly do you find wrong with the UGTT?

That is a difficult question to answer within the bounds of this interview, but I can refer you to the manifesto of 11 November 1983, which you will find covers the entirety of our criticisms.

You mean the manifesto that was published in one of the current news weeklies...

Yes. But it is not we who gave that text to that paper. The manifesto is an internal union one. You know very well that reporters go all out after exclusive stories... If we had wanted to render it public, we would have had to distribute it to all the papers to reach an extensive readership.
[Question] You accuse the UGTT leadership of mismanagement. Have you any proof of that?

[Answer] In that regard, we have requested that an investigative committee be formed to clarify all the issues we have raised in that manifesto. The Administrative Committee of the UGTT has refused to take this urgent request into consideration.

[Question] The UGTT considers that these matters should be debated within the organization and accuses you of having made a public issue of them. Why did you not await the meeting of the National Council to thrash out all of these issues?

[Answer] I owe the UGTT no explanation. All of that is gratuitous on their part. And, excuse the term, it is a load of rubbish! Why should one have to think of resorting to such procedural umbrellas, when the Administrative Committee is actually not empowered to make such decisions? The question should be put in the opposite sense: Why did the Administrative Committee, which expelled us, not await the holding of the National Council? What can we expect of that National Council after having been expelled from the UGTT?

[Question] You criticize Mr Habib Achour's personal power. However, you have been one of his closest collaborators...

[Answer] That is water over the dam!

[Question] Initially, you denied intending to form a new union organization. Is that not correct?

[Answer] That entails no contradiction!

At that time, we were sincere in our declarations. We had no intention of forming this federation. But today, it is the rank-and-filers who want it. And it is the policy and orientation being followed by the UGTT and the transgressions committed by its leadership that have encouraged us in our undertaking.

[Question] Does the existence of a second federation not risk generating a process of competitive bidding on demands between you and the UGTT?

[Answer] I don't think so.

[Question] Don't you think that multi-unionism is still not advantageous to the working class and to a country that is still underdeveloped?

[Answer] I don't think the new unions have been formed of their own free will. Our rank-and-filers were driven to it as their only alternative. And the underlying cause of it has been the UGTT's antidemocratic orientation. Union-minded people don't want to be in an organization in which democracy is not adhered to.
We are most happy to welcome multiparty-ism now that our rank-and-filers have imposed multi-unionism on us.

[Question] Some see a link between your initiative and the government's decision instituting political and union pluralism. What is your view of this?

[Answer] We have nothing to do with what the government thinks! That is its own affair!

[Question] What is your relationship to the political parties?

[Answer] None whatever! Our main concern is our independence, and we place all the parties on an equal footing. We are neither against any one of them nor under the control of any one of them.

[Question] And to the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party]?

[Answer] I have said "all the parties"! Why do you single out the PSD? It forms part of the plural!

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UGTT SECRETARY GENERAL TAIEB BACCOUCHE ON CURRENT EVENTS

Tunis REALITES in French No 17, 24 Feb 84 pp 14-17

[Interview with Taieb Baccouche, secretary general of the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor], by Samir Abdellah and Hassen Marouqi; place and date of interview not given]

[Text] What does the UGTT think of the emergence of the UNTT [Tunisian National Labor Federation]? The secretary general of the UGTT responds to this question. Mr. Taieb Baccouche also addresses, in this interview, several burning issues of the day, of interest to labor but also to the nation as a whole.

[Question] Strikes are advancing, by sectors. There is talk of "shows of force" against those who are supporting the "seven." Is this true?

[Answer] No, it is not true. The current strikes have nothing to do with the union split-up. A major problem confronts us at present in several sectors: The non-implementation of the statutes that were signed several months ago, and the failure to publish those statutes in the JORT [Official Gazette of the Tunisian Republic]. The reason being given by the Government authorities is as follows: The statutes cannot be published prior to the general law and Law 68/13, which have yet to be subjected to the process of negotiation and amendment. As we see it, the institutions involved, which negotiated hard and long over a period of several months, are not to blame for the situation. The Government, though, should have commenced its negotiating process on the wording of the general laws involved, concurrently with or before the start of ours, so that there would be no bottleneck.

The Government claims that we cannot undertake a revision of Law 68/13 before publication of the more general one, Law 68/12, which concerns the civil service.

Since the other bill has taken time, much time has been lost.

I am not charging intentionality, but I do say that, in my opinion, an error has been made. Thus, the problem of the union split-up does not enter at all
into the picture. The proof is that, as soon as contacts were made, the sectors threatening to strike began negotiating. If these negotiations are productive the strikes will not take place.

[Question] How do you explain the rather violent reaction, which surprised union circles? Is it aimed at destabilizing the Mzali Government?

[Answer] Speaking for the UGTT, what occurs inside the Government, what occurs among the different cliques in the Government, is of no concern to us.

We have never sought to become involved in the internal affairs of the Government, except, obviously, from the standpoint of their impact on the nation, on the economic and social life of the nation as a whole. But the UGTT has no interest whatever in backing such and such a clique against any other one, or this person against that.

The UGTT considers the Government as an entity without personal distinctions, and, as such, a partner with whom it can negotiate, with whom it can agree on certain points, and disagree on others. No more, no less.

[Question] Why do you defend political pluralism as a democratic thing, but oppose union pluralism? Is not union pluralism, as a principle, a corollary of democracy?

[Answer] The question is in fact a very delicate one, evoking, as it does, a dichotomy: Democratic or anti-democratic. In reality, it is far more complex. Obviously, political pluralism is a necessary prior condition, though not always a sufficient one in itself, to any democratic process, since political parties can have widely divergent aims, platforms and options, from the standpoint of policies to be followed. Policies can differ widely depending on the party in power, depending on the alliance among parties in power, and can run the gamut between extreme Right and extreme Left. Thus, when the population participates in a democratic voting process, it chooses on the basis of the platforms and options that have been presented to it.

In general, then, we might say that the choice is made on the basis of the situational needs and on that of the extent to which a given political platform meets these needs. Unions cannot differ as much as political parties, because the fundamental purpose of a union is to defend the interests of a class—in our case, the workers and wage earners. This defense can take different forms. Unions can resort to different means, but as to the basic option there can be no wide divergences.

This why multi-unionism must not be linked to multiparty-ism.

Those who do so are being influenced by a given model, the European model. The fact is that, in most European countries, the split-up of a labor federation has been accompanied by a political split-up, and that the creation of a labor federation has been accompanied by the creation of a political party. Sometimes, political parties have been created by labor federations. Thus,
in Europe there is a link, a de facto correlation between multi-unionism and multiparty-ism.

[Question] Tunisian unionism itself had its inception in a pluralistic context. There was a certain union pluralism during the time of the protectorate.

[Answer] The multi-unionism that prevailed in Tunisia during the period of the protectorate was not specific to Tunisia. It was in fact an extension of the French situation. All the unions that existed in Tunisia were indeed branches of the French unions. Thus, it cannot be said that what existed then constitutes a tradition specific to Tunisia. The tradition that is truly specific to Tunisia is that of a national unionism—the nationalism that began with Mohamed Ali in 1920. And that must be our point of departure, the basis for defining a Tunisian unionism and the true Tunisian union tradition. It has, thus, a national and a nationalistic dimension. The UGTT, then, is the true perpetuation of the movement of 1920. And it is that movement which has continued to this day, with all the corrections and adaptations that became necessary following the country's independence and its adoption, in our political situation, of the principle of a one-party system of government. All the links between the UGTT and the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] have been perpetuated. Therein lies, therefore, the specificity of Tunisian unionism.

Now more than ever, the UGTT and the workers need labor unity, because not until recently has the UGTT been able to get out from under the guardianship of the governing party. Its relationships have always been more or less conflictual because of that. These ties with the governing party have always been ambiguous, because the latter has always sought to impose its dikta on the UGTT. Real independence was not gained until after the great sacrifices of the January 1978 crisis.

We even stated that the Gafsa congress was not 100 percent free and democratic, because there were shortcomings owing to the transitional phase of the reconstruction. But we can now state that the UGTT is now entirely independent, entirely self-governing, with respect as much to the party in power as to the opposition parties. Thus, to introduce multi-unionism as the order of the day, at the very moment when the UGTT, after its sacrifices, has finally succeeded in gaining its autonomy, is to disrupt or to counteract that autonomy so dearly won.

[Question] Don't you think multi-unionism already exists within the UGTT? For example, Taieb Baccouche is perceived by some as pitted against Achour or against certain members of the BE [Executive Bureau] in defense of a union policy that is, let us not call it opposed but rather totally different from theirs.

[Answer] That cannot be labeled multi-unionism, but the existence of different views within the organization is a very positive thing; it is enriching. Having said this, I draw a distinction, however. The existence of different
perceptions, of different ideas, is something positive and enriching, but only insofar as these different views can be expressed freely within the organization. There is a danger, however, when one of the possible views cannot find expression, when the democratic process is blocked, when a single view imposes its law on all the others, in an anti-democratic manner. That is precisely the point at which the risk of a split-up becomes real.

I believe that as long as the organization permits a dialogue and consideration of multiple views, there is no such risk. The democratic game must be played out.

[Question] Do you believe there is democracy within the UGTT?

[Answer] I believe the UGTT is the country's most democratic mass organization. Democracy, however, is a relative thing. One cannot demand a model democracy.

[Question] The dissident "seven" also talk of mismanagement.

[Answer] I stand on facts. All those having something to criticize should have the courage and sense of responsibility to state it solemnly within the frame of reference of the UGTT, before everyone.

[Question] Is there regionalism in the UGTT?

[Answer] Personally, I believe regionalism does not come into the picture except where appointments are involved. Where there is an election there is no regionalism. If the electorate engages in regionalism, it does so by way of the vote; if they did, it would be regrettable, but it would nevertheless be by way of the vote.

[Question] Rumor has it that you are sympathetic toward the group of "seven." What is your view of this?

[Answer] I am a union leader; I am secretary general. I consider myself a representative of union leaders as a whole, including those who voted for me as well as those who voted against me.

[Question] In that regard, do you really feel you are assuming the position of secretary general in actual fact?

[Answer] I don't understand the question.

[Question] The position of secretary general carries with it a "power." Are you assuming that power?

[Answer] I do not consider a "union leader's power" to be a personal power. I see myself as a collegial power, and it is in that respect that I fulfill my role as secretary general, the second-ranking official of the Federation.
Getting back to the "seven." Do you think the "seven" have the backing of the Government?

From the moment the Government introduced multi-unionism together with multiparty-ism, that implied a de facto recognition of multi-unionism, hence a more or less explicit encouragement of union splintering. But I am not worried about the attitude of the Government. To me, it is clear. All I would ask of it is that it remain neutral. For, if the Government or a faction of the Government promotes union splintering, it can only be perceived as a hostile attitude toward the workers and their interests.

Do you think they are actually being encouraged by certain circles of the PSD or within the Government?

Personally, I have no proof.

There is talk within the UGTT of connivance, of complicity, with certain governmental circles.

I think we must work to bring about three conditions that, in my opinion, would inherently hinder and stave off all splintering action:

1) A fully informed union rank-and-file membership;

2) Increased democracy and an enhancement of democratic operating methods within the UGTT;

3) Proper defense of the interests of the workers as a whole and sector by sector.

But in these respects there are flaws, and the risks of union splintering can become serious.

Is the problem of succession going to arise at the topmost level of the UGTT?

There is no Dauphin in the UGTT. In a congress, the one chosen by those of the congress will be the head of the UGTT regardless of individuals as such.

From a union standpoint, do the "seven" actually qualify as representative?

The importance of certain parallel unions cannot be judged without knowing the real number of its members. But who really knows the actual number of members of "independent unions?"

Several members of the Executive Bureau have referred to the problem of the Workers Party. What is your view?
Those who have brought up that problem have retracted their comments.

And as for your personal viewpoint?

I am against the creation of a workers party.

But what if some high-level union leaders were to decide to form a workers party?

If some leaders, as citizens, were to form a party, and call it a workers party or by any other name, that would be their affair. They are free to do so.

The problem that would concern me would be the creation of a political party by the Federation. No one person can decide this. A frame of reference is needed for arriving at this decision. A congress, for example.

Are you a sympathizer of any of the political parties?

If I were to say that I am partial to no political party whatever, that would be negative on my part. I encourage multiparty-ism and I would judge a party on the basis of its positions, of its platforms.

Are you a candidate at the forthcoming UGTT congress?

I see no reason to state to you at this time whether or not I am a candidate. When the time comes, I will decide.

Do you think the UGTT has carried out its role in full on the issue of the Wage Compensation Fund?

Frankly, I say to you that the UGTT's attitude on the matter of the Wage Compensation Fund was clear, in that, well before the start of negotiations with the Government on the issue, we drew attention on several occasions to the dangers and risks involved in a very substantial increase, and in this case, a doubling of the prices of staple items. The Government went out of its way to prevent the public from knowing the position of the UGTT. I refer to the speech of 5 December 1983, which was censored in its entirety.
DROUGHT CONDITIONS IN NEGEV DESCRIBED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Feb 84 p 11

Article by Mordekhay Artzi'eli: "A Land Without Water"

Drought is not an unusual phenomenon in the Negev, and farmers are aware of the possibility that it will occur. Statistics show that over the last 60 years there have been more years of drought than years of rain. But, there are different levels of drought. There is partial drought which results in sparse, poor crops; and then there is the cruel, devastating drought like that of this year, the likes of which has not been experienced in the Negev since 1963.

From the beginning of the season to mid-February, only 76 millimeters of rain have fallen in the Be'er Sheva area, whereas the annual average is 200 millimeters. South of Be'er Sheva, the amount is even smaller. On many farms, the sprinklers are running as if it were mid-summer. In the Bedouin camps, the death rate among young sheep is high. The ewes have no milk to nurse their young.

Even if rain were to fall soon -- and no one in the Negev believes in miracles -- the crops would not be saved. The tragedy is already a "fait accompli." Even if a miracle were to take place, as happened in 1953 when suddenly in March 100 millimeters of rain fell in the Be'er Sheva area, the wheat would not be saved. Soon, the Ministry of Agriculture will formally declare an emergency drought situation and compensation for the farmers will be determined.

Compensatory payments, which will probably amount to hundreds of millions of shekels, will only cover part of the loss. The damage caused by the drought is far greater. Auxiliary (artificial) watering systems this winter used 35 million cubic meters of water, of which 20 million went to field crops and 15 million to orchard crops and irrigation. In monetary terms, this amounts to more than 300 million shekels. The firm of "Mekorot" is now supplying 80 percent of the amount of water it normally supplies in the summer, from the North to the Negev. The remaining 20 percent is being pumped from wells and other water sources in the Negev. The impact this will have on Israel's water supply has not yet been calculated. The lack of rain and the parched earth will mean that summer crops cannot be planted and grains will have to be imported from the United States. It is estimated that grain imports may cost as much as $30 million.
From the beginning of November until mid-December 1983, farmers in Jewish sectors of the Negev planted more than 600,000 dunams, mostly with wheat. The Bedouins planted more than 250,000 dunams. The tragedy that is about to occur was predicted back at the beginning of December when farmers had measured only 9 millimeters of water fall in the Be'er Sheva area. Of the 600,000 dunams planted in Jewish areas, 150,000 are being watered with auxiliary systems. The remaining 450,000 dunams, where thousands of tons of wheat were planted, are lost. The fields are still green, but the stalks are straggly and even if the grain does grow, it will not be suitable for harvesting. Instead of a yield of 250 kilograms or more to the dunam, the yield is expected to be 50-60 kilograms to the dunam in Jewish sectors, around 20 kilograms to the dunam in Bedouin sectors. These figures represent severe drought conditions.

Compensation will be paid only to those farmers who planted north of the "drought line." That line was determined by the Ministry of Agriculture 23 years ago. It starts in the area of Kibbutz Nirim, crosses Kibbutz Orim and Kibbutz Mishmar Hanegev, and ends at Kibbutz Lahav. Anyone below that line who plants crops -- the Ministry proclaimed at the time -- does so at his own risk and is not eligible for drought compensation. Around one third of the crops planted in the Jewish sector this winter was below that line. But of the 250,000 dunams planted by Bedouins, less than 60,000 were north of the line.

The Bedouins have about 150,000 head of sheep; 80,000 registered and 70,000 unregistered -- "partisan" sheep as they are called. For these latter, the Ministry of Agriculture is not obligated to provide pasture during a drought year. The wells in the Bedouin sector are dry, without even a drop of water. Now it is birthing season. The ewes need food to produce milk to nurse their young. But there is no pasture. The average weight of newborn lambs is dropping -- less than 2 kilograms instead of more than 3.5. The result: a high mortality rate, almost 70 percent.

As part of their supplications for the skies to open, the more traditional Bedouins last week began a fast. The women did not fast. They went out to the fields with tin pots and enamel pans and sprayed drops of water on the tent walls, singing: "Umm el-rit irtina" (mother of blessing, wet our tents). After they marched a line of young virgins, shouting: "With this blessing, give us grain from our fields." But the blessings did not work and the skies did not respond to the elders' fast.

Just this week, around 150 shaykhs and tribal dignitaries arrived at the Ministry of Agriculture in Be'er Sheva asking for permission to move their flocks to pasture in the north. The Ministry was only willing -- they were told -- to help out with the 80,000 head of sheep officially registered, to provide pasture on kibbutzim in the northern Negev. But Bedouins who had traveled through the area said that the land in question was arid and that there was no pasture.

In the next few days, farmers throughout the Negev will meet to discuss the situation. Even before the drought, they were not well off, and they do not know how they will be able to support the additional financial burden. Many will undoubtedly go under.
TENSIONS WITHIN LABOR, HISTADRUT FOLLOWING LEVINSON DEATH

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 26 Feb 84 pp 1, 7

Article by Bina Barzel, Ari'e Avneri, Eli Tabur, Avraham Dison and Avi Shahar: "A Stormy Atmosphere of 'Settling Accounts' in the Labor Party"

Tension and a stormy atmosphere of 'settling accounts' have prevailed within the Labor Party since Levinson's funeral. Among the party leadership and senior members of the kibbutz movement, the pressure is increasing to remove Histadrut secretary general Yeruham Mashal from his post and also to replace the managing director of Bank HaPoalim, Giora Gazit.

MK Avraham Katz-Oz told a YEDI'OT reporter: "We are demanding the replacement of Mashal and an examination of certain personal claims against Bank HaPoalim director Giora Gazit, claims integrally related to the complex affair surrounding Ya'akov Levinson before his death." As a replacement for Gazit, the names of Arnon Gafni, Amos Oren and Moshe Zambar have been mentioned.

Meanwhile, rumors are rampant within the party following the suicide and due to various incidents related to it. High level sources within the party expressed shock over the fact that Levinson's casket was not placed in the committee's chambers or Bank HaPoalim's headquarters. Levinson's widow, Nurit, explained to YEDI'OT reporter Ari'e Avneri that she rejected the Labor Party delegation suggestion that they decide jointly on who would deliver a eulogy on the party's behalf, including the suggestion that the eulogy be delivered by Isra'el Kaiser. "I had enough with what they did to him in his lifetime. I did not want anyone from the party or the Histadrut to eulogize Ya'akov," she said.

Labor Party officials are confident that by the end of the 7-day mourning period, the initiatives to replace Mashal and Gazit will have died out. However, the internal disputes will only become more bitter after that week is up. Today, Labor Party chairman Shimon Peres will return to Israel from the United States, Yeruham Mashal is still in Romania, presiding over labor union meetings there. He decided not to cut his trip short and will return on schedule — tomorrow. Meanwhile, there has been no communication with him regarding Levinson's suicide. Mashal's son, Me'ir, reported that he had not been in contact with his father, nor did he know how to reach him. Histadrut secretary general Isra'el Kaiser also said that he had not spoken with Mashal since Levinson's suicide, and Levinson's personal secretary claimed yesterday that she had not spoken with him either, nor did she know how to contact him.
Notwithstanding, Histadrut spokesman Shemu'el Soler, who accompanied Mashal on his visit to Romania, did call Israel and dictated a release concerning Mashal's meeting with Romanian President Nicolae Ceaucescu.

Today, Kaiser will hold a special memorial session of the Histadrut central committee, which, it appears, will be conducted on a heavy note, with Kaiser delivering a eulogy for Ya'akov Levinson. The central committee is scheduled to meet again in 2 days, with Yeruham Mashal who, as mentioned above, will return tomorrow from Romania. In effect, the problems faced by the committee -- such as power struggles within the Labor Party -- were present even before Levinson's suicide. But his tragic death has accelerated the processes set in motion during the past. In the committee, the formation of a "new generation" as a power bloc looms as a potential force threatening to change the face of the party leadership. This bloc includes MKs Eliyahu Speizer, Arik Nehamkin, Avraham Katz-Oz, Dov Ben-Me'ir, Rafi Edri, Yehezki'el Zakai, Ya'akov Tzur, Na'ava Arad, Naftali Blumenthal, Miki Bar-Zohar and Aharon Nahmias, as well as NA'AMAT secretary Masha Lubalski, head of the cultural center Nahum Pesah, and Amiram Sivan.

The move to replace Mashal had already been initiated a few months ago, and during discussions on the subject, an understanding had been reached whereby Kaiser would be declared secretary general of Histadrut thus spring and Mashal would become head of Bank Hapoalim's administrative council. However, the new generation bloc raised considerable resistance to this solution, before Levinson's death, laying the ground work for the decision reached at the end of the week by the Labor Party's working committee, to freeze appointments within the Histadrut and its sub-committees. This decision, in effect, reversed the previous intent of the committee.

However, it now appears that the struggle of the new generation against Mashal may create animosity between them and the camps of Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin. There have recently been complaints about the management of party affairs being "headed off at the pass," to which Rabin replied: "When we argued, they complained -- now that we're working together, they're still complaining?"

Relations between the two camps may suffer now nonetheless, in light of demands to replace Mashal. Shinom Peres may find himself caught in the middle on this issue:
- If he responds to demands to replace Mashal and to investigate Bank Hapoalim, he is likely to meet resistance from the Rabin camp which, it is felt, will object to replacing Mashal at this point because it would be like an admission of Mashal's guilt.
- If he does not respond to the demands, but goes along with Rabin's position, there is likely to be resistance to them both from within broad sectors of the party.

MK Uzi Bar'am told a YEDI'OT reporter that he would under no circumstances allow the issue to be swept under the carpet and buried. Bar'am has created a storm in Labor Party circles by publishing an article last Friday in DAVAR, following Levinson's suicide. The article by Bar'am, bearing the headline "Allegory from the Jungle," included wording such as: "A lion left the jungle,
appointing a mouse to rule after his departure. The mouse who took the place of the lion saw apathy at first in the eyes of the other animals. After a few days, two of the mouse's best friends -- the snake and the fox -- came to him and said: 'King Mouse, there is great danger. The real king, the lion, will want to come back to the jungle some day. Then all the animals will know that this big, fancy palace belongs to him, not to you.'"

In the continuation of the article, Bar'am wrote: "Following the advice of the snake, information was collected from the other animals regarding complaints they had against animals in the lion's court... Then the snake said: 'Now it is time to establish an investigative committee.'"

DAVAR's editorial board claimed that the article was printed to "prevent further incitement within the Labor Party." The publication of the article, however, which pointed an accusing finger at Histadrut secretary general Yeruham Mashal, bank director Giora Gazit and joint staff administrator Moshe Ulnik, did nonetheless create a storm within the party at the end of the week, when the three men mentioned were identified as the mouse, the fox and the snake.

Meanwhile, it was reported that union leader Dani Rozlev was not prepared at this time to respond to accusations made by now deceased Ya'akov Levinson.
NEW ANTI-MISSILE UNDER DEVELOPMENT

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 22 Feb 84 pp 1,11

Article by Dan Arkin: "Israel is Developing a New Anti-Missile Missile"

A new marine anti-missile missile, to be installed on missile carriers, is now in advanced stages of development in two aircraft industry facilities and with the cooperation of REFAEL (Network for Weaponry Development).

The development of this type of anti-missile missile, which will be the most sophisticated and advanced of its kind, will take a few more years to complete. Intelligence sources report that two aircraft industry facilities are involved -- Alta and Mabat -- in cooperation with REFAEL. The anti-missile is being developed after extensive research into future trends in naval warfare. Experts explain that the greatest threat to small, fast ships such as those used in Israel's navy, is the missile.

The most dangerous missiles are those called "sea skimmers" -- i.e. missiles that move toward their target -- ships -- just above the surface of the water, skimming the surface and traveling at very high speeds.

The answer to these missiles is now being developed: an anti-missile missile armed with an attack head capable of tremendous destruction. This anti-missile missile will approach enemy missiles after they have been launched, attack and destroy them.

Intelligence sources point out that this anti-missile missile system, now at an advanced stage of development, has an extremely high degree of proven accuracy. The missile and the system are designed to solve the problems of identifying enemy ships, tracking missiles after they have been launched, and launching anti-missile missiles to destroy the enemy missiles.

Intelligence sources added that in the future, there will be great demand for such systems among world fleets and under certain conditions, Israel will be able to export these missiles, because the system will offer solutions to problems developing in theaters of war throughout the world.
JORDAN VALLEY WATER CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLANS DISCUSSED

JNO81223 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 8 Mar 84 p 10

[Second installment of "Press Investigation" by Muhammad Abu-Chawsh and Jamil Al-Sa'ayidah: "AL-DUSTUR Sounds the Alarm; Water Crisis in the Jordan Valley"]

[Text] In a previous report AL-DUSTUR reviewed the real crisis being experienced by agriculture and farmers in the Jordan Valley, which is the most fertile agricultural area in Jordan, an area which is considered to be "the breadbasket" of our homeland, and the backbone of our national agricultural and economic production.

In short, the crisis is "a crisis of water." Therefore, it is a serious crisis because irrigation in the Jordan Valley is the lifeline of agricultural life.

As we stated in our previous report, this crisis is represented by a 20 percent drop in water supplies. This drop might rise to 50 percent during the next few months if God does not bestow His mercy and send us rain. The water crisis is also manifested in the considerable drop in the reservoirs of dams, a matter which will affect the cultivated areas and both the summer and fall crops.

Another manifestation and result of the water crisis we saw during our field tour was that some agricultural areas have turned into grazing ground for livestock.

This crisis is clearly evident in the fact that the Jordan Valley Authority has started to ration the amount of water supplied to farmers in order to tackle the scarcity of water. The irrigation periods have been reduced. The specialists decided to remove the irrigation pipes that supply the agricultural areas directly from the canal. They also decided to stop the operation of water pumps at the eastern part of the King Talal Dam. These measures are directly connected with the agricultural areas adjacent to the canal and affect scores of farmers in the area extending from the northern Jordan Valley to Al-Karamah.

The authority issued these instructions due to the low rainfall and the drop in water reserves for the sake of rationing water and guiding farmers on the ways to cope with the crisis.
Since the farmer is the means and end for development and since he is the first to be harmed by this crisis, some farmers summed up the situation to us by saying: The drop in the allocated water supplies has an adverse effect on produce and results in financial loss, bearing in mind that some crops have already dried up. Some farmers told us that their losses amounted to 70 percent of the crops; others said their farms have not been irrigated for 10 days. Some feared that if the situation became worse it might lead farmers to leave the Jordan Valley and give up agriculture. One farmer said that due to the crisis and because he was in debt to a landlord, he was forced to hand the farm over to its owner and take another job for 3 dinars daily in order to support his family.

In view of their poor crops and prices, the farmers affected summed up their demands by appealing to the responsible quarters to allow them to postpone paying off the debts they owe to the Agricultural Credit Corporation, the Cooperative Society, the Farmers Union, and other finance and credit bodies. They also hoped to find a financial source for the next agricultural season due to their financial commitments and in view of the current crisis.

Since the Agricultural Engineers Union is a direct and important part of the agricultural process, Samir Habashinah, member of the Agricultural Engineers Union's council, summed up his view on this crisis by saying: First of all I must thank AL-DUSTUR for tackling this important subject to which officials should have paid attention during the last 2 months. It must be pointed out that next season we will face a real problem where agriculture in the Jordan Valley is concerned. The scarcity of rain this year means that water in the reservoirs will be consumed this year without being replenished, and this means that there will be no water for agriculture in the Jordan Valley next year, and water is the most important element.

He added: The quarters responsible for agriculture in the Jordan Valley should adopt measures to be implemented jointly by the farmer and the various state departments. Among these measures are the following:

Defining the various types of crops to be cultivated and determining the areas allocated for each crop so that these areas can satisfy the needs of the local market for each type, because the situation requires us first and foremost to think only of satisfying our local needs.

This rationing should give each crop only the necessary amount of water as determined on scientific bases well known to the agricultural engineers. Each crop's water requirement should be fixed according to the type of soil and the age of the plantation, taking into consideration the quantities of rainfall next season.

This requires the drawing up of a comprehensive program for the cultivated areas, their type, and the necessary quantities of water. All quarters should take part in this program and guarantee its implementation.

Finally, a disadvantage may turn to an advantage, and the current bad situation vis-à-vis the scarcity of water may prompt us to implement the agricultural program which we have been talking about for a long time without seeing any sign of practical application.
Jamal Salim, agricultural engineer and member of the Agricultural Engineers Union, said: All logical and scientific expectations say that a shortage in irrigation water in the Jordan Valley will emerge next year. Since water is one of the most important production elements in agriculture, this means that this matter will affect production. Consequently, this situation calls on us to seriously think about rationing water in order to guarantee a large amount of production with the amount of water available by using the following methods:

1. We must think of growing vegetables that will fulfill the needs of the local market. We must concentrate on the intensive agriculture, protected agriculture. Thus, we would consume the least amount of water, in comparison with high production.

2. We must avoid flood irrigation, and use drop irrigation since this method will save a great deal of irrigation water. By using this method, we will ration water in accordance with plant needs. An increase in water will lead to root disease and will weaken the roots. This situation will effect the need for water in the last stage and will make us benefit from the superficial moisture only.

3. Scarcity of water will affect the amount of water the Jordan Valley Authority distributes to the agricultural units. Every farmer must accurately study the amount given to him, and plant part of his land to avoid irrigation problems in the future.

4. We must avoid growing fruit trees in the valley, and postpone their planting until the next season, hoping that the amount of water will be better. By doing so, we can save the water that would be given to the trees, and use it to grow and produce the vegetables which are very important to our local market.

5. We must be aware that projects that are run and supervised by specialists can overcome the shortages of water because these specialists are fully aware of the plants' need for water, and the problems that result from excessive water use. Thus, they can save amounts of water in order to use it in a larger area—this should give us more and better production.

AL-DUSTUR went to the Agricultural Credit Corporation to become acquainted with the official viewpoint on the crisis which the farmers in the Jordan Valley and other areas are passing through because of the scarcity of rain, and the drought season.

In a statement to AL-DUSTUR, Agricultural Engineer Burhan Alh-Sharabi, deputy general director of the Agricultural Credit Corporation, said: I would like to assert to AL-DUSTUR, which raised this issue, that the corporation is fully aware of the situation of the farmers because we follow the status of the farmers who receive loans. In light of the farmers' situation caused by the drought season, and its affect on their paying their loans, we are ready to study the status of each farmer separately, and study any satisfactory settlement. We agree to make any settlement within a framework of understanding with every farmer.
We can say that the corporation will agree to postpone the payment of any loan, or to extend the period of payment in light of the damages and losses inflicted on the farmer as well as his ability to pay the loan.

He added: Our brother farmers must realize that the objective of the corporation is to help farmers, provide them with the means of development, improve their resources and incomes, and develop their situation. We know the situation of farmers because of our methods in controlling the loans. Alh-Sharabi said: We do not look at the problem in a general way. We will study every request by farmers to postpone loans, or rearrange payments after checking into the projects. The damages in such a crisis will not be the same for all farmers. Consequently, we cannot deal with all farmers alike without an objective study that will take into consideration the situation of the farmers, and the size of their damages in order to achieve the suitable settlement for each case separately.

Alh-Sharabi said: This trend of cooperation with the farmer, the response to his demands, and providing him with the necessary loans falls within the framework of the corporation's general policy.

He added: As a result of the drought season this year, the corporation is ready to study any request to buy fodder, and to consider the possibility to grant loans for buying fodder. He noted that the corporation has instructed the branch directors to study the situation of livestock owners and farmers separately, and to provide them with loans for buying fodder in order to face the drought problem.

Engineer, Alh-Sharabi explained that during the 1982-1984 period, and as part of its efforts to help farmers, the Agricultural Credit Corporation granted loans to the Farmers Union amounting to 1.5 million dinars. These loans were granted under a government guarantee that the Farmers Union would, in turn, grant loans in kind to individual farmers. This process simplified the procedure of granting loans to farmers, including members of the Farmers Union. It also simplified the procedure for granting seasonal loans and generally ensuring all the requirements of agricultural production.

Asked about the amount of loans which the Agricultural Credit Corporation granted to farmers in the Jordan Valley who were directly affected by the water crisis, engineer Alh-Sharabi said that in 1982 and 1983, the corporation granted 3.5 million dinars in medium-term loans and 1.3 million dinars in seasonal loans. These loans were used in drip irrigation networks, greenhouses, and protected agriculture in the Jordan Valley.

Regarding the corporation's credit policy and the importance it attaches to the agricultural sector in Jordan, engineer Alh-Sharabi said:

Since agriculture is an important production sector that guarantees work and the livelihood of a high percentage of the population, it has become essential to pay special and continuous attention to this sector and those working in it. Thus, the corporation is contributing toward pushing the wheel of agricultural development, improving the incomes of farmers, and increasing production in the
agricultural sector by granting loans under easy terms to farmers who reclaim their lands, or seek better means of exploiting these lands, or carrying out any feasible projects in agricultural production, animal husbandry, and agricultural industrialization.

And, in order to ensure the success of the projects which it finances, the corporation subjects these projects to technical and economic feasibility studies by expert agricultural engineers. These engineers also guide farmers on the best means of utilizing the loans for his own benefit. They also provide counseling and administrative support for projects which require such services.

Alh-Sharabi said that projects that are backed by the corporation include:

Collective and individual irrigation projects and building modern irrigation canals and networks.

Digging and equipping artesian wells.

Reclamation of agricultural lands, including dredging and deep plowing operations, and building support and surrounding walls such as barbed wire fences.

Digging wells for storing rain water and building water pools and reservoirs for irrigation purposes.

Planting fruit trees in the valley and on highlands.

Establishing nurseries for tree, fruit, and garden plants.

Purchasing and setting up greenhouses and other means of protected farming.

Purchasing tractors, harvesters, and other agricultural tools, and repairing and maintaining these tools.

Establishing poultry farms.

Establishing dairy farms and other farms for grazing, fattening, and improving livestock.

Establishing bee farms and fisheries.

Supporting collective farms set up by small farmers.

Establishing agricultural buildings that are needed for servicing agricultural investments and the abovementioned projects.

Establishing projects for industrializing agricultural products such as olive mills, food conservation plants, and so forth.

Purchasing agricultural production requirements such as fertilizers, seeds, fodder, medicines, and so forth through seasonal loans.
Regarding the factors which determine the amount of the loan, engineer Alh-Shirabi said:

The loan granted by the corporation for financing any agricultural project must be proportionate to the total cost of the project, the financial condition of the debtor, the value of the collateral given, the profitability of the project, and the amount of installments which can be paid from the time the project begins production.

On the nature of loans and the interest rates, Alh-Sharabi said: The corporation gives loans as follows:

1. Seasonal loans whose duration does not exceed 12 months with 8 percent interest that is paid in advance. In case the loan is repaid on schedule, 1 percent of the interest will be returned to the debtor. The duration of the loan is estimated in terms of the duration of the agricultural project, its expected volume of production, and the date on which the production will start.

2. Loans of medium terms that do not exceed 10 years with an annual interest that ranges between 6 and 7 percent, calculated from the date it is granted to the date on which it becomes due.

3. Long-term loans ranging between 11 and 20 years with a 6 to 7 percent interest rate depending on the nature of the project.

On how the loans are disbursed, Alh-Sharabi said:

The corporation applies the law of supervised loans. The medium-term loan is disbursed in three installments: The first when the loan documents are completed; the second when the debtor completes an amount of work in the project equivalent to the first installment; and the third when the debtor completes a portion of the project equivalent to the first and second installments. No installment will be disbursed unless the implemented portion of the project is inspected.

As for the loans to buy agricultural machinery, equipment, and greenhouses, and the installation of drip irrigation networks, these loans are disbursed to the companies from which the debtor is buying such things. This will be done after a written agreement from him is submitted, in three installments according to the progress of the work. In case the debtor wishes to import such machinery and equipment from abroad, the corporation will open a credit account in one of the banks. In this case, the corporation pays to the debtor's account 25 percent of the value of the prices of the imported machinery and equipment the moment it receives an attested copy of the letter of credit in the name of the debtor in accordance with the specifications agreed on. Another 50 percent of the loan will be paid when the bills of lading arrive and when the bank in question receives an attested copy of these bills. The rest of the loan will be disbursed after the imported equipment is installed on the project site and after an official report on the installation is received from the relevant branch of the corporation. The farmer may be given
the loan directly if the corporation is convinced of the soundness of the implementation. As for the seasonal loans, they are paid in accordance with the needs of the project and the recommendations of the directors of the corporation's branches.

On the stand taken by the cooperative societies organization vis-a-vis the crisis of water scarcity and the need for alleviating their suffering and allowing them time to settle their debts, Eng Musa 'Arafah, deputy director general of the organization said:

"In such a situation, the organization considers each case separately in light of the farmers' personal circumstances and his production, in accordance with the bylaws of the organization, and in cooperation with the cooperative societies bank and the supervisors of loans."

'Arafah added: "We received weekly reports from the presidents of the cooperative societies and the organization's chiefs of branches on the situation of the farmers and the members of the societies and the circumstances that affect their conditions"

'Arafah also said that 1982, the Jordan Valley farmers were given 1.5 million dinars in loans. Loans for that year amounted to 5.5 million dinars. This includes all types of long-term and short-term loans and other kinds of loans. He asserted that the organization alerted all its cadres and departments when the drought crisis began to alleviate the suffering of the farmers and livestock breeders and to help them overcome this crisis.

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FURTHER INFORMATION ON BOMBING SUSPECTS

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 211, 25 Feb-2 Mar 84 pp 36-37

Article by Amin Muhammad Amin: "Kuwait: Secret Information Concerning the Trial of the Bombing Suspects"

The Supreme Court of State Security in Kuwait is continuing to hold its secret sessions to try the accused in the middle of a fortified citadel and strict security precautions. At the same time, both public and secret reactions to the trial are escalating. They range from demonstrations in front of Kuwait's embassies abroad to a direct threat by the Islamic Call Party, to which most of the accused belong, according to their own declarations. They joined the party in order to achieve their goal of setting up Islamic republics by force in the states of the region. They have affirmed that they are working underground to achieve their goal in more than one Gulf and Arab country. Despite the increase in the security measures and precautions being taken by local security authorities in the Gulf countries, a wave of acts of domestic and foreign violence has begun to escalate in the region in a noticeable fashion. It has even extended to the diplomatic missions of these countries abroad. The most recent incident was the kidnapping of the two sons of the Kuwaiti press counselor in Beirut. The Amal movement was able to foil the operation and return the twin brothers safely. Indeed, it arrested the eight kidnappers, who came from the Husayn Musawi Group. The group split off from the Amal movement and is loyal to Iran.

On a level other than that of the trials, a new stage in the Gulf War between Iraq and Iran began with the bombing of selected vital and civilian targets in the two countries in an attempt to reach a military decision in the war. Observers expect the Gulf region to witness a hot spring, with both the scope and the operations of the war escalating day after day.

The question one must ask is this: can the effects of the war extend and expand to take in the neighboring states in the region and threaten their security, or will they stay limited to the two combatant states? Moreover, what is the magnitude of terrorism among the states of the region, and to what extent has unrest been aroused? Will the Gulf witness a hot spring and a hot summer in terms of its domestic and foreign security, thereby being distracted from its basic, domestic problems, such as the oil war, oil prices, and the "Suq al-Manakh" crisis, all of which are affecting banks, companies, and the course of development? What effective role can the Gulf Cooperation
Council countries play with regard to Arab, Islamic, and international issues? There are many questions looking for answers.

Confessions of the Accused

The confessions of the accused are being heard in daily, secret sessions at the Supreme Court of State Security, with Counselor Ghazi 'Abid al-Sahhar presiding. In the opinion of the officials, they will remove many obstacles and uncover much secret information that will play an important and serious role in confronting probable terrorist actions in the near future. This is especially true now that the initial questioning has uncovered the idea behind the acts of sabotage and the bombings that the Islamic Call Party began to carry out a year and a half ago both inside and outside Kuwait. The party conducts its sabotage activities in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Kuwait, and other countries whose names have not yet been uncovered. Its goal is to establish comprehensive Islamic republics by force of arms.

Defendant Baqir Ibrahim 'Abd al-Radi, whose surname is Abu Muhammad al-'Aql, planned and carried out the bombings. It was not Defendant Ra'd Muftin 'Ajil, as had been announced before. He said in his confessions that his activities with the Islamic Call Party went back 4 years. He said that he had agreed with the third defendant, Fugitive Ahmad 'Ali Husayn, more than a year and 2 months before the date on which the explosions occurred, to undertake broad-ranging sabotage activities inside Kuwait, in order to destroy the interests of the Western states. He confessed that he had received for this purpose the sum of 3000 Kuwaiti dinars in order to finance the bombings. He was also provided with a varied supply of explosives to be used as a first shipment. He smuggled it in via the sea. The second infusion of funds was worth 10,000 Kuwaiti dinars. It came with two shipments of weapons that were brought into Kuwait via the sea by the fourth defendant, Fugitive Mustafa Ibrahim Ahmad. The tenth defendant, Nasrallah Siwan, and the 18th defendant, Yusuf Muhammad Wahib, cooperated with the 26th defendant, Ra'd Muftin 'Ajil, in transporting the materials to land and hiding them in a car. The criminal charge against the latter has lapsed, since he is dead. Baqir Ibrahim 'Abd al-Radi also admitted that four defendants left Kuwait more than a year ago for Iran via Syria in order to be trained in the use of the weapons and explosives that were employed abroad. Among the four were the defendants Husayn Falih and Sa'd Yasin.

Baqir admitted that the money turned over to him for arranging the bombings amounted to 25,000 Kuwaiti dinars. He received it in three installments.

As for the Lebanese defendant and explosives expert, Ilyas Fu'ad Sa'b, he said that he came to Kuwait with a visitor's visa obtained by Defendant Ya'rub Fa'iq via a Kuwaiti company. In an attempt to turn some of the accusations aside, he said that the events in Lebanon had caused him to think about taking revenge on the Americans and destroying their interests abroad. He added that he was a handicapped person, since his right leg was paralyzed, his eye was afflicted with a retinal split, and suffered from heart and stomach ailments. Ilyas Sa'b confirmed that he regretted what he had done. Therefore, he has cooperated intelligently with the security personnel and led them to everything in an attempt to gain forgiveness for the acts he committed against Kuwait.
Ilyas Sa'b cooperated with Ra'd Muftin 'Ajil in the selection of the locations to be bombed. It was he who determined the zero hour, while Ra'd set the day of the operation. Ilyas also sought the aid of his friend Husayn al-Musawi and promised him 40,000 Kuwaiti dinars if he would bomb the homes and offices of the American experts. Moreover, Ilyas and Ra'd bought nine automobiles, including the vehicle that was detonated in the American embassy. They also bought 260 gas cylinders, 35 gallons of highly flammable materials, and the timers and wires needed for the bombing from the markets in Kuwait. Experts have estimated that the quantity of explosives used in the "torpedo" automobile that was blown up in the American embassy was more than 300 kilograms. In addition, the vehicle contained a load of 100 gas cylinders. As for the other operations, the quantities of explosives used in them were smaller. It has been learned that the defendants decided that Sunday, 11 December would be the day on which their crimes would be carried out. However, they changed the date to Monday, 12 December, so that the largest number of employees would be present at the targets. It has been learned that weapons were hidden in a shop for repairing auto frames and in a number of the homes of the accused. These weapons consisted of machine guns, pistols, rockets, bombs, RPG shells, and various explosives.

The fifth defendant, Husayn 'Aziz, confessed that he had joined the Islamic Call Party 11 months ago. He is convinced of his goal of setting up a comprehensive Islamic republic in Iraq, as well as in other states. The method to be used consists of recruiting young men and encouraging them to struggle and confront the public authorities in these countries, with support from abroad in the form of money and equipment. He said that most of the accused were members of the Islamic Call Party. They themselves confessed this during the investigation. Their names are Baqir Ibrahim, Ra'd Muftin, Hasan Falih, Yusuf Wahib, Husayn Yusuf al-Musawi, Nasrallah Ma'tuq, 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abbas, Jamal Ja'far Muhammad, Nasir Murad Mudhish, and 'Amir 'Abd al-Zahra' Sulayman.

Defendant Husayn Qasim Hasan confessed that he drove the Mercedes truck in the industrial area of al-Shu'aybah. He said he withdrew only one of the two firing pins that were supposed to be withdrawn. He did so because he feared for his life.

Defendant Husayn al-Sayyid Yusuf al-Musawi, who is a Lebanese citizen, said that he agreed to take part because he wanted to express his hatred of the Americans for what they had done in Lebanon. Sa'd Yass 'Abdullah said he was a member of the Islamic Call Party and belonged to a group headed by Nasrallah Ma'tuk. Nasrallah Ma'tuk said that the top official was Baqir Ibrahim, and that he and Baqir 'Abd al-Husayn were two of the leaders of the party. He confessed that it was Baqir who planned and thought out all the incidents. Nasir Murad confessed that Defendant 'Abd al-Husayn asked him to supply him with information on the military facilities in which he worked. Defendant 'Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Da'ud Muruwah, a former mayor in the Kuwaiti police, confirmed that Defendant Falih al-Hamid lived with him in his home and kept a case containing information on military facilities. He said he knew about the latter's plan, but did not tell the security authorities.
BRIEFS

EXPORT FIGURES--The statistics of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Commerce and Industry show that the value of Kuwait's exports to Arab markets in 1983 fell by 40.5 percent in comparison with the level of the previous year. The figure was about 58.3 million Kuwaiti dinars, after having reached about 98 million Kuwaiti dinars in 1982. The second figure was the highest ever reached by exports of Kuwaiti products to the Arab countries. Despite the decline, the principal markets for Kuwait's exports continued to be those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, since 71.8 percent of Kuwait's exports to the Arab countries, in terms of value, went to the GCC countries last year. On this level, the value of the exports of Kuwait's products to the GCC countries rose by 11.2 percent in 1983 in comparison with the value of these exports in 1982. Among the GCC nations, Saudi Arabia monopolizes the largest share of Kuwaiti exports whose value reached approximately 36.1 million dinars in 1983. This represents an increase of 11.5 percent over the value of exports from 1982. The largest portion of these exports included pre-fabricated building materials, automobile bodies and some industrial commodities such as dyes and ready-made clothing. Conversely, the value of Kuwaiti exports to Iraq fell by 73.2 percent in 1983, reaching only 15.8 million dinars, after having reached 59.3 million dinars in 1982. The Kuwaiti commodity that declined the most from among export commodities to Iraq was cement. In contrast to 1982, Iraq did not import any Kuwaiti cement during 1983, which reflects the decline in construction activity during the aforementioned year. [Text] [London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 210, 18-24 Feb 84 p 387] 12224

CSO: 4404/344
RECENT POLITICAL, MILITARY EVENTS REVIEWED

London Al-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 210, 18-24 Feb 84 pp 10-12

[Text] The civil war that broke out recently in Lebanon has raised a number of questions on the local, regional, and international levels. What are the causes of the renewal of the war? Why has the army split? Are there available alternatives that could bring peace to Lebanon? What are the positions of the regional actors on the recent events? What is the American position, now that the Marines have been withdrawn to the ships of the Sixth Fleet off the Lebanese coase? Does Washington intend to offer a replacement for President Amin al-Jamayyl? What is the true Soviet position, in light of the visit by Haydar Aliev, the strong man in Moscow, to Damascus. Where does France stand, now that London, Washington, and Rome have pulled out of the multinational force? Who will will the gap left by these forces in Lebanon? What lessons and warnings are offered by what recently happened in Lebanon? Here, these pictures show one aspect of the situation in the Lebanese arena.

AL-MAJALLAH answers these questions in the following pages.

Lebanon was the cause of the state of complete disarray that last week took in all the agencies concerned with foreign policy. They are the National Security Council, the State Department, the Defense Department, and, of course, the White House. Perhaps one thing worthy of interest in this regard was that President Reagan left Washington to take a vacation in California, where he has so far spent 172 days since being elected to the office of the presidency a little more than 3 years ago.

Given the clear failure of American policy in Lebanon, a great deal of confusion exists regarding some key matters that are currently the subject of discussion. For example, one of these issues is the question
of whether it shall be necessary for the United States to continue to support the collapsing President Amin al-Jumayyil if he cancels the 17 May 1983 agreement with Israel. Questions were raised in this regard after al-Jumayyil called for a resumption of the "reconciliation" talks in Geneva on 27 February and announced that "everything can be discussed." Washington began to think about this subject at length, just as the Vatican investigates an obscure religious matter. In the end, it refused to give the "green light" for the cancellation of the accord. However, it did give a discontinuous yellow light, which in the language of traffic means "advance cautiously." In a statement to AL-MAJALLAH, a high official in the American State Department said: "The agreement has not been applied at all, anyway. The Israeli forces are still in Lebanon.

The main news item that occupied the headlines in the newspapers last week was President Reagan's decision to withdraw the American Marines from the airport area in Beirut to ships off the Lebanese coast. The Marines were doing nothing in Lebanon except defending themselves as best they could. For political and military reasons, Reagan was forced to announce that the naval artillery would now be used in a much broader fashion to "defend Beirut." This announcement was intended to create the impression that the United States would not take its hands off Lebanon. It was also made to help the realization of American goals there. But what are these "American goals"? Journalists asked this question at several Press conferences held last week. The answer was never clear.

One day before the announcement of the withdrawal of the Marines, which opened the door to a simultaneous and quick withdrawal of the Italian and British units, Alan Romberg, a spokesman for the American State Department, said: "We want to arrive at the best method of using the multinational force." In a private interview, another official from the American State Department said, "We are now studying how to form a larger multinational force. Some say in jest that we will call this force 'the campaign of the conquerors'."

All last week, official speakers confirmed that the United States was still "supportive" of Amin al-Jumayyil. To a large extent, the statements were similar to the American position during the last days of the Shah's rule. Behind the smoke screen, the clear meaning of America's actions was this: If al-Jumayyil is able to work a miracle and stay in power, that will be good. However, we must let someone else come to power if he fails to do so. The name being often mentioned as the American's favorite candidate was General Ibrahim Tannus, the Maronite commander of the Lebanese army.

The official American spokesmen were constantly repeating: "We want a government of national unity." The expression, "We truly want national reconciliation and a cease-fire," was also repeated. However, American officials conceded in their private statements that achieving any of these goals would not be easy. Romberg went so far as to admit that the resignation of the al-Jumayyil government "might become a useful factor."
Despite Washington's attempt to grasp any straw, it has been clear since the beginning that al-Jumayyil's plan, which contains eight clauses, as well as his call for the resumption of the national dialogue conference in Geneva, will not bear any fruit. The Amal organization has gained control of West Beirut, and it has been made clear that the Shi'ah, Sunnis, and Druze are not interested in moving slowly to execute their goals. Thus, the United States can do nothing but abandon Amin al-Jumayyil with as much adroitness as it can muster, while simultaneously affirming that he still represents America's first choice.

The policy of the United States toward Lebanon resembles its policy toward the Lebanese army, to which President Reagan a few weeks ago addressed the deepest expressions of praise and commendation. When Romberg was recently asked about news reports to the effect that some Lebanese officers trained by the United States had turned their new American weapons over to the Amal movement, his only response was, "No comment."

The American State Department itself was full of critics of Amin al-Jumayyil, especially because it was easier to cast blame on him than on American policy. Moreover, there was nothing to be gained by praising a "lame racehorse."

One American official said frankly: "Amin al-Jumayyil fears his Phalangist militia just as much as the United States fears its Israeli mercenaries."

America's Friends

In Beirut, Donald Rumsfeld, the special American envoy, and Richard Murphy, the assistant American secretary of state, were engaged in feverish activity. In Washington, Reagan called Vice President George Bush and asked him to cancel the tour he had been supposed to make of the European countries. Just as Secretary of Defense Weinberger was making a statement about the defense budget in the Congress, he was ordered to stop and head for the White House immediately. However, all this disturbance did not prevent President Reagan, who does not devote all of his time to the duties of the presidency, from taking a vacation on the following day. Perhaps one of the reasons for this was that the American government did not want to give the impression that it was not in control of the situation. Therefore, Secretary of State George Schultz did not cut short the visit he was making to Latin America. Rather, he lengthened it by a few hours in order to visit Grenada, which has been affected by war.

The United States needs friends in Lebanon urgently. One American official said: "If anyone can save the situation in Lebanon, it is Rafiq al-Hariri, the special Saudi envoy, and the French, because both parties enjoy some credibility in Damascus."

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During the numerous press conferences witnessed by the American capital last week, questions were asked about America's intentions to use its power. By way of reply, Romberg limited himself to saying: "There is nothing new for me to add."

As the days passed, the state of confusion increased. "Non-essential" and temporary personnel were transferred from the American embassy in Beirut to Cyprus, as were wives and children, with the exception of Richard Murphy's wife. There remained only 34 diplomats and some secretaries and code clerks. These persons noted that the building they live in, which consists of several apartments, was exposed to shelling. However, none of them were lost. The dormitories of the students at the American University of Beirut were also fired upon, but the limited number of American students there refused to be evacuated from the Lebanese capital. Two Lebanese employees of the American embassy were detained at a checkpoint belonging to the Amal movement, but were later released.

These details were announced at crowded press conferences in Washington, since it was hoped that the correspondents would be satisfied with them. Perhaps it is lucky for the United States that Romberg has a sense of humor and can confront difficult situations better than his boss, John Hughes, the official spokesman for the American State Department, who was away with Schultz in Latin America. When the situation at a press conference became tense, Romberg said, "We cannot describe the current situation as being 'magnificent'."

However, this humor did not keep the questions from continuing. Was the United States thinking about withdrawing completely? "No comment." At the present time, was a review of American policy being conducted? "No comment." Was the United States thinking of referring the matter to the Security Council and confronting Syria with the charge of preventing a peaceful resolution? Although the clear answer to this question was that only Lebanon could present the problem to the United States, and that any decision issued by the Security Council would have to meet with the approval of the Soviet Union, lest it use its veto power, Romberg responded once again by saying: "I am not able to comment on that."

It was clear that the official spokespersons had difficulty in following the changes in American policy. Romberg stated at one press conference that the American ships would fire only if the multinational force were attacked. When the journalists mentioned the bombardment of Suq al-Charib, he was forced to change his statement and say that the ships would fire if "there is a possibility of an attack on the multinational force." Thereafter President Reagan annulled all that and said that the American ships would fire on any party bombarding Beirut, at least in theory.
No Coordination

It is clear that there has not been a lot of coordination with America's European allies. The allies only learned of the decision to withdraw the Marines 4 hours before it was announced. Cooperation with France, America's principal ally in Beirut, collapsed after Samuel Lewis, the American ambassador in Tel Aviv, was delegated to discuss the possibilities of military cooperation with Israel, with the goal of keeping Amin al-Jumayyil in power. France considered this move to be another lethal blow to al Jumayyil. In addition, France believed it would produce disastrous results in the region of the Middle East for the United States, as well as for the countries cooperating with the U.S. in the multinational force. The disagreement about this measure became even clearer when it was revealed that the United States was asking the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to send its envoy, Rafiq al-Hariri, to Lebanon once again, while Lewis was holding talks with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. One official at the American State Department commented on this situation by saying, "At any rate, the French prefer to go their own way."

One thing that became very clear in this situation was the Reagan administration's tendency to use military force to compensate for its diplomatic deficiency, especially now that the era of the "Vietnam complex" is over. After all, most Americans feel comfortable watching their country make its presence felt as a great power. However, the best method for using military power has still not become clear. For example, it is not likely that American forces will be used to support Fadi Ifram, Amin al-Jumayyil's brother-in-law, who heads the reckless Phalangist militia in East Beirut. However, the fact that the Amal movement has taken control of West Beirut means that Ifram's militia is currently the only party that can fire on this area, which formerly lay under the protection of the multinational force, at least in theory. This force was originally dispatched to Lebanon to help the Lebanese army defend West Beirut, but the Lebanese army no longer has a presence there. Now the American ships can only protect West Beirut by firing their artillery at the Phalangist militia. One American official said half-seriously, "Perhaps we ought to do that."

Perhaps the best indicator of how bogged down the United States is in Lebanon is its attempt to work together with Israel in order to keep Amin al-Jumayyil in power. One of the most experienced persons working in the Near East division of the American State Department said, "We must reach an agreement with Syria. With respect to Lebanon, Syria plays the same role as the United States does with respect to Grenada." The only person whose star has risen in this crisis is Secretary of Defense Weinberger, whom many have opposed because he has said since the beginning what the American generals have been saying: a small unit of Marines cannot play any role in Beirut. Nevertheless, Weinberger supports the use of naval and aerial bombardment, if it will produce a result.
It seems that the Arab affairs experts in the American State Department agree that the reconstruction of the Lebanese state with a Maronite president and a Maronite commander of the army can only be achieved if the Maronites themselves unite and if the other Lebanese Christian sects support them. Given the fact that the degree of enmity between the Christian sects is no less than that between the Christians and the Muslims, these experts say that the United States must cooperate with anyone who comes to power.

One group of Americans has viewed the collapse of Reagan's policy in Lebanon with pleasure. This group is the organizing body for the electoral campaign of the Democratic Party. The Democrats consider the decision to transfer the Marines to the ships proof of the soundness of their view, which says that these soldiers should have been pulled out from the beginning. Some Democrats go so far as to claim that Reagan listened to their advice in the end, even though there was no relationship between this advice and the reasons that led Reagan to take this decision. At any rate, the Democratic Party will be the only beneficiary if the American president continues to fail in the Middle East. It is difficult for one to imagine how Walter Mondale, the candidate of the Democratic Party, could have handled the Lebanese crisis better, because his preference for Israel makes one despair.
POLITICAL FUTURE OF PRESIDENT AL-JUMAYYIL CONSIDERED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 210, 18-28 Feb 84 pp 12-13

[Article by Ilyas Harfush: "Lebanon: Al-Jumayyil or the Alternative? 'The War of the Alternatives is Receding'"

[Text] Although more than a week has passed since the battles in Beirut and the mountain, the political positions recently announced by Lebanese President Amin al-Jumayyil do not indicate that the orientation of the government in Lebanon has undergone a basic change that would let one say that reconciliation with the opposition factions has become more likely. President Amin al-Jumayyil is still convinced that American political and military air for the Lebanese government is essential to the realization of "balance" with the Israeli and Syrian forces in Lebanon. He is also convinced, as he was both during and after the Geneva conference, that the withdrawals must be the beginning of the domestic political solution, and not vice versa. In addition to all that, his position on the Lebanese-Israeli agreement is still obscure. That is, he has announced his willingness to review the agreement, but on the other hand, under American pressure, he seems convinced that this agreement is the only way to get the Israeli forces out of Lebanon.

The opposition political factions in Lebanon (especially Mr Nabih Birri and Mr Walid Junblatt) charge that during the last 3 months, President Amin al-Jumayyil's zealous positions have obstructed the reconvening of the Geneva conference. This, in turn, has caused the opposition to be similarly inflexible. The strange thing is that despite the contradiction currently existing between the government and its opponents on political and security questions, President Amin al-Jumayyil is still calling for a return to Geneva, although all observers believe that a political solution has become practically impossible under the current circumstances, since no dramatic change has taken place in the positions of the conflicting factions. Nothing indicates that such change will come from the government. President Amin al-Jumayyil's concept of the solution has not changed. The fact that America's commitment to support the Lebanese regime militarily and politically is stronger than it was previously, despite the "redeployment" of the Marines off the Lebanese coast, makes it more difficult, if not impossible, for such change to occur in the government's positions.

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Recent statements by American Vice President George Bush confirm this commitment. While passing through London on his way to attend the last rites for the late Soviet Leader Yuri Andropov, Bush said, "America is committed to offering advice and aid to President Amin al-Jumayyl as he deals with the terrorists." He noted that America was supplying Lebanon with quantities of "effective and advanced" military equipment capable of hitting, destroying, and silencing the sources of "enemy fire." When Bush was asked if the current American administration considered the redeployment of the Marines in Beirut a setback for American policy, he responded by saying, "The game in Leganon is not yet over." Information from Washington indicates that a tendency exists in Congress to increase military aid for Lebanon by $300 million, in addition to increasing the number of "technical experts" working alongside the Lebanese army. Last year, the American government sold the Lebanese army weapons and military equipment worth $600 million. Of that, $150 million worth was in the form of loans, while the rest was paid in cash.

In the face of this support, the opposition is still demanding that President Amin al-Jumayyl resign. Last week, both Mr. Nabil Birri and Mr. Walid Junblatt made statements that differed in form but were alike in content. Both men said that there was no longer any way to reach a solution with President Amin al-Jumayyl. Junblatt said, "Al-Jumayyl is conducting consultations with a view toward forming a new government. We are conducting consultations in order to come up with an alternative." Before a number of American journalists, Birri commented on the bombardment of the quarters of the southern suburb by units of the Lebanese army: "Could a president stay in the White House if he ordered the bombing of New York?" Although Walid Junblatt seemed to think a compromise solution was ruled out, Birri suggested what he called "a constitutional way out." Under this solution, the constitution would be amended so as to allow early presidential elections to be held next summer. President Amin al-Jumayyl's term of office would be reduced to 2 years and would end in September 1984. Observers in the Lebanese capital note the importance of the change in Birri's position. All last year, he was eager to avoid joining the National Salvation Front, which is made up of former President Sulayman Franjiya, former Prime Minister Rashid Karami, and Mr. Walid Junblatt and has enjoyed Syrian support. Birri kept his lines of communication with the Lebanese government open via a number of ministers and persons close to President Amin al-Jumayyl.

The Army's Crisis

In addition to the political crisis facing President Amin al-Jumayyl, there is the army crisis, which appeared clearly during the 48 hours following the beginning of the clashes in Beirut. At least two Lebanese army divisions withdrew from the fighting (Walid Junblatt said that three and a half divisions withdrew). This amounted to about 2000 soldiers. The Amal movement gained effective control over most of
the barracks lying in Beirut, as well as other barracks in the Biqa' region. Furthermore, other barracks in the north announced their "neutrality." Former Prime Minister Rashid Karami called on them to follow his orders. Observers estimate that 8000 men withdrew, out of a total of 35,000. The Amal movement is currently overseeing the security situation in Beirut, in cooperation with units of the Lebanese police. This development is considered a serious and prominent indicator of the collapse of President Amin al-Jumayyl's authority. Last year, the reunification of Beirut within the framework of "Greater Beirut" seemed like a victory for the Lebanese regime and the beginning of the extension of its authority over the other regions of Lebanon.

Can President Amin al-Jumayyl reach a formula of mutual understanding that will permit him to stay in power and obtain the political solution he has been promising? Observers here note that the American position of supporting the Lebanese regime, despite all the flaws and opposition, could be an impetus for him to hold fast instead of taking a moderate stance and working out a solution. Contracts conducted last week in Damascus between Syrian officials, American Envoy Donald Rumsfeld, and American Ambassador in Damascus Robert Paganelli, indicate that the American position on the Lebanese crisis is unchanged. Consequently, it is the same as it was when al-Jumayyl visited Washington in December and was informed by President Reagan That America absolutely rejected any review of the Lebanese-Israeli agreement. Mr Walid Junblatt took part in some of the contacts with the Americans in Damascus, and he has confirmed America's commitment to the same position on both the agreement and the Lebanese regime.

However, observers in the Syrian capital note that the Syrian position has not reached the point of demanding the resignation of President Amin al-Jumayyl, as the leaders of the Lebanese opposition have done. Unlike the zealous commentaries that have appeared in Syria's official media and newspapers, the positions taken by President al-Asad and Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam at meetings with the leaders of the Lebanese opposition have tended toward the view that, "Mutual understanding with Amin al-Jumayyl is easier than mutual understanding with someone else." Nevertheless, it seemed clear from these meetings that the Lebanese-Israeli agreement was the main problem, in the opinion of Syrian officials. In this context, mutual understanding must be achieved on the Syrian-American level, not on the level of the local Lebanese leaders.

Political and diplomatic contacts resumed at the end of last week, especially those carried out by Mr Rafiq al-Hariri in both Beirut and Damascus, indicate that a search is once again being conducted for a way out of the dilemma posed by the agreement. This is to be achieved with an understanding with President Amin al-Jumayyl, and not in isolation from him. This means that the "war of alternatives" launched by the opposition against the Lebanese president has receded. Observers
think that two basic elements must be provided in order for the current contacts to succeed. The first is a positive response by the American administration to the prominent elements of flexibility in the Syrian position. President Amin al-Jumayyil and the intransigent elements in the Phalangist Party and the Lebanese Forces must truly want to benefit from the lessons of the recent past. In this regard, observers note that President Amin al-Jumayyil has hesitated to consecrate the positive results that emerged at the end of the first round of the Geneva conference. Moreover, he delayed his visit to Washington at that time, following the emergence of America's desire (as expressed in the positions of American Envoy Richard Fairbanks) to carry out changes in the Lebanese-Israeli agreement. The counterpart of this desire was Syria's wish to reach a mutual understanding on security guarantees for Israel in southern Lebanon. All this changed the equations. After the United States signed its strategic agreement with Israel, President Amin al-Jumayyil encountered in Washington a decisive position against amending the agreement.

Politicians close to the decision-making process in Syria report from Damascus that the discussion of alternatives has reached the stage where names are being circulated. The Syrian view has been that the obstacle presented by the accord would confront its allies as well as President Amin al-Jumayyil. The Syrians think that confronting the Phalange and President Amin al-Jumayyil with an extreme position will politically isolate the extremist Christian faction and cause it to take stands that could end, for all practical intents and purposes, in partition. This would not be in the interest of any of the Lebanese parties. Aside from the problem of the agreement, the Syrians think that the constitutional document agreed on during the term of former President Sulayman Franjiyyah with Syrian mediation could form the basis for political reform, on the basis of two principles: an equal division of seats in the Chamber of Deputies between the Christian and Muslim deputies, and changing the constitution in the direction of electing the prime minister in the Chamber of Deputies.
ISLAMIC LEADER MAKES BROAD APPEAL FOR RECONCILIATION

Beirut AL-SAIFIR in Arabic 27 Feb 84 p 3

[Interview with Mufti Khalid: "The Sunnites Will Not Operate on a Factionalist Basis Lest They Fall into a Trap"; date and place not specified]

[Text] It appears that the meeting of the Sunnite faction in the House of Judicial Rulings was delayed, due to the developments the Druzes have caused in the mountains and those the Shites have caused in Beirut.

[Answer] You know that this is not a valid statement, because the Moslems in Beirut, in particular the Sunnite faction, were subjected to Israeli occupation before others, gave every form of consideration to the legitimate authorities after that, more than others, but on the regime more than others did, and gave officials every opportunity to deal with the Lebanese crisis in the manner in which it ought to be dealt with.

However, that was all on one level of negativism which caused the Sunnite Moslems, especially in Beirut, many tragedies, social problems, security breakdowns, curfews and a deliberate struggle for a livelihood, all together, as if the blockade had continued from the Israeli occupation up to this hour. These were all in effect factors which actually delayed the organization of our ranks, but they did not deter us for a moment from the separate side meetings we held with the Islamic and nationalist parties. Dissension was being prepared to strike out at Islamic unity and create a rift in the ranks of all the Moslems, but, through the grace and help of God, we have managed, through bilateral meetings with His Eminence Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din, may God preserve him, our brother the lawyer Nabih Barri, may God bless his efforts, and some honorable Druze leaders, to have unified positions which made the conspirators miss the opportunity to fragment the ranks of the Moslems.

That is the role we played in the context of these conspiracies we referred to, and, when Beirut was liberated from the blockade which was set up around it until a few days ago, its Sunnite Moslem leaders rose up as one, with a single voice, to express their real position in an unparalleled unanimity which was embodied in this statement issued by the House of Judicial Rulings.
There are people who ask where the Sunnites stand relative to the alliance between the AMAL movement and the Progressive Socialist Party.

We have never been a party, a group, or a faction, because if that sort of designation is applied to us it will not be in keeping with the true nature of our being.

We are a nation, consistently representing a position of unity and comprehensiveness. Our strength and our power arise from this position and we have always been acting, working and struggling in this frame-work.

The Sunni Role

Frankly, your eminence the mufti, it has been suggested that your periodic meetings to which you have invited Sunnite political personalities and activists at the House of Judiciary Rulings indicates that you intend to establish an undeclared organization on the lines of what exists in some other Lebanese factions.

It is well known to all Lebanese that the Sunnite Moslems in Lebanon have a historic, constant role in the present and the future in establishing the unity of Moslems of all creeds, on the one hand. The concern is the identity of Arab Lebanon, its Arab affiliation, and the defense of Lebanon as an independent country with united territory, people and institutions.

Therefore the first duty of the Moslems is that they be at the forefront of the leadership of unificationist national action in various times, at various levels, proceeding from the premise of unification and rejecting partition or fragmentation. Our national unity will guarantee that we will achieve what the Islamic-national ranks need through these meetings.

It might be strange, the way it appears to some people, that we should meet at the House of Judiciary Rulings as Sunnites, but our platform is that we talk only from the Islamic premise, not the factional or sectarian one. We might find that a cause for astonishment among some people at these Sunnite meetings, and we have not met out in the open like Moslems in general, but I would like, from this national Islamic podium in the House of Judiciary Rulings, to assert to Lebanese public opinion that we have not lost the notion of comprehensiveness for one moment.

We are Moslems, we meet and set forth as a unit from the premise of Islam, and we cannot work on a sectarian or factional base. Our meetings have not violated this rule, and if a faction, as I have mentioned, chooses not to take part with some other factions, or a sect chooses not to take part with some other sects, that does not justify casting aspersions on their meeting. In addition, our meetings are not an innovation for Sunnites. As I have said, and I repeat, they are to preserve the Islamic unificationist notion which we are all concerned about.
No Sectarian Characteristic

/Question/ More frankly, your eminence the mufti, your latest meeting at the House of Judiciary Rulings seemed like an attempt to justify or assert the Sunnite sectarian character in political and military action following the latest developments.

/Answer/ That was not the intention, as you interpret it or they interpret it. It was in fact to inform the people who had met in a fuller fashion than you have been informed, and this method is clear to us, so that we can remember it and try to deal with it in the appropriate fashion. Therefore, the attention of the people who had met at the House of Judiciary Rulings was drawn to the following:

First, the battle of the mountain took place and went on at length, and we took part in it in the real sense, politically and in principle. The politicians took positions that would support this struggle, each for his own part. As I said, we are not a parliament or a party.

Second, there then arose the problem of the southern suburbs, then West Beirut. Our position was the same as that relative to the mountain, where the official situation was confused and the administrative, social and military situations were also confused. It was not in our power to hold a meeting as quickly as this one so that we could adopt a comprehensive Sunnite position which would eliminate all obscurity and draw up a plan for confronting the current stage on the basis of a unified national Islamic position.

As regards the House of Judiciary Rulings, we had followed up on the situation in the mountain, in the suburb and in West Beirut from the start of the events there to the present, in a detailed manner, with full coordination and cooperation with our brothers the leaders of the Shiites and Druzes who consider this house a base for any Islamic position which might assert our unified positions, as it has always been.

We have also warned, at the House of Judiciary Rulings, of the policy of continuing to strike at our people in the southern suburbs in a manner which will reflect negatively on the position of the authorities. We have often appealed for the situation in the mountain to be dealt with in a manner that would preserve the dignity of our brothers the Druzes and would free them from armed party hegemony. We have often advocated a balance of security in Greater Beirut. Here the unfortunate results have taken form before our eyes, because the regime has ignored these urgent appeals.

/Question/ Your recent meeting was distinguished by the fact that it seemed to reveal to the Sunnite faction the extent of the need for organizing its activities, in the desire that it not be out of touch with developments and that it record its positions when circumstances call for that.

/Answer/ From the standpoint of principle, none of the persons at the meeting was against the notion of this meeting at the House of Judiciary Rulings,
and consequently the call to continue it in the form of periodic meetings so that there would be emphasis on the Sunnite faction's position regarding national Islamic issues.

However, I would like to point out that the views of Islamic leaders and activities at these two meetings called for extreme caution in dealing with the current circumstances from the Sunnite factional angle, because that would lead us into the trap that has been set, which goes beyond our work in the Sunni, Shiite and Druze Islamic unificationist context.

The opinion of the peoples at the meeting was that we should face the political future as Moslems, not as sects, or ours would become a stage of struggle over quotas, and we counselled mutual understanding with everyone. From the position of comprehensive responsibility, it is not permissible to allow specific events to be fabricated, be they military or security events, or simple excesses which might affect the position and orientations of the Islamic-national destiny. What is needed is participation with all our forces, provided that we be strengthening the major cause, advancing our rights and working to maintain our national Islamic interests and preserve our destiny in this country.

Therefore, some of our brothers among those in attendance who were leaders were of the opinion that the military or security stage would be of short duration and therefore it would be necessary to emphasize again the unity of the Moslems and their interests. In this national stage, the Moslems' comprehensive view is the true position, and our task is to unify Islamic ranks. We have previously unified ranks and we consider that to respond to the urgency of these political leaders in calling for a unified Islamic meeting including all Moslems is the Sunnites' true position.

We took the initiative of uttering the Moslems' first statement when we presented the political program which has the goal of trying to correct the course of the government, which has become disrupted, eliminating dominance and the policy of the dominant and the dominated, and so forth, at the last Lesser Bayram holiday at the municipal playground in Beirut.

This position, in the view of all Moslems, was in effect a focal point for them to rally about the House of Judiciary Rulings as Sunnites, Shiites and Druzes. The complaints now are tentative and transitory, and it is not permissible that they hinder any unified Islamic position, because there is nothing stronger than this: "Cling to the rope of God, all of you, and do not separate." That is a saying of great God.

Fighting Beirut

[Question] What about Beirut and the gambles, positions, fears and so forth that have been raised?
/Answer/ Beirut is the bulwark of true national action and the beacon of Arab nationalism. It is the refuge of the Moslems in this country and Beirut must preserve its character, which has distinguished it through the ages.

There is no doubt that Beirut's status and its fighting role in defending the causes of the Moslems and the Arabs was behind the viciousness of the Israeli strike against Beirut in the 1982 invasion. How ferocious was the faith with which the hearts of the heroic people of Beirut overflowed as they stood up to their enemy, the enemy of Lebanon and their Arab and Islamic nation, for the Lebanese capital, when they gave what was dear and precious to preserve its honor and the honor of the Arabs and Moslems, and as they stood up to the Israeli enemy and aided their Palestinian brothers in defending the Palestinian cause.

I would like to refer here to the statement a political personality made at this Islamic meeting in the House of Judicial Rulings, which is that Beirut did not stint sacrifice and support for every nationalist. If it did not bear arms that was because of the times it had been almost totally deprived of them. What that means is that Beirut was no longer the Beirut of nationalism. The Sunnites of Beirut, when they say that they are Moslems, always mean, and are well known for this, that they mean all the Moslems in Lebanon by that.

The Sunnites have borne all the Moslems on one shoulder, as they have borne all the Lebanese on the other. The Sunnite Moslems aspire to Beirut because Beirut is the heart, and it participates with the citizen everywhere. Therefore, there is no time for narrow-sighted and short-sighted comparisons or accountability. Suffice it for me to say that it is now the time for us to adopt the national position, and be in a race to assert our rights as Moslems.

Therefore I state as my brothers at this Islamic meeting stated, because we are in fact involved in a cause which goes beyond the borders of the Sunnites of Beirut to the Moslems of Lebanon, and all of Lebanon, and to all of Arab-hood, as I have said, if we turn to discuss Sunnites and non-Sunnite Moslems, we will have fallen into the trap, because the heart of the national stage, as I have said, is in the hand of the Moslems, and the southern suburbs and its cause are only like the cause of Islamic Beirut within this context.

We must always remember that the people of the south are fighting the Israeli enemy, and Shiite and Sunnite heroes are being martyred together, 50 kilometers from Beirut as Shaykh Râghib Harb and other heroic men of Sidon have martyred themselves, not in the defense of sectarian or factional rights but in defense of all Lebanon, to relieve all the Lebanese of the ignominy of Israeli occupation.

We must also remember that at the summit of 'Armin, for the past 3 years, we have made a similar search, and we have not faltered or fallen behind on that same nationalist Islamic road. In addition, we are people in whose hearts the glory of the Moslems and the dignity of all Lebanese have become

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rooted. This Islamic policy must not bring us in the end to a search for factional distinctions or loathsome sectarian touchiness, because our effort, like our work, is dedicated to supporting the appeal for a comprehensive united Islamic meeting which will include all Moslems, so that we will not enter into sectarian mazes and labyrinths.

/Question/ However, some people hold the top Sunnite, that is, the prime minister, responsible for the Moslems' failure to participate with the president, according to constitutional principles, in a manner where, it is conjectured, there has been a Sunni Maronite alliance at the expense of the other factions, especially the Islamic ones.

/Answer/ Our brothers' discussions at this meeting were frank on our weak points and our strong points together, and the discussion concentrated on these points specifically.

They did not let this point go by without contemplating it at length. I am in agreement with the political leaders and the Islamic activists who have urged that the state of the Moslems in power must be studied, in a comprehensive Islamic meeting, because the issue of government in its entirety is now being presented in Islamic and national discussions, so that the final positions on the subject may become defined, in a manner where the foundations of legitimacy may be erected on the bases of true participation and not usurpation, control, or hegemony, because when the ruling Moslem is assured a strong base, he will then have no excuses.

The 17 May Agreement

/Question/ What about the 17 May agreement? Wasn't the Islamic position, especially the Sunnite position, on the demand that this agreement be abrogated, late in coming?

/Answer/ Our position was clear from the beginning, that this Lebanese-Israeli agreement would inflict harm on Lebanon and would inflict the most blatant damage on Lebanon's Arab relations, especially with our fraternal Syria, and that it is necessary to preserve this fact, which is one of the basic facts of the Lebanese situation, that Lebanon must not be a headquarters or passageway for an enemy or foreigner toward what is harmful to our Arab brothers, especially Syria.

Therefore we consider that one of the gravest stages that Moslems in particular, and Lebanon in general are going through is a result of the absence of responsible persons in the regime, as a result of the Lebanese complications that have occurred; for that reason it is necessary to hasten to form a national government in which one can have confidence.

The 17 May agreement concluded with the Israeli enemy must be abrogated and the issue of this abrogation must be presented on the national, Arab and international levels so that they can bear their responsibilities, because the causes of this agreement concern all parties.
This situation which has been disrupted must also be rectified and the party dominance which the Phalange party exercises over the government, security and all organizations of the government must be eliminated. That will also require that all the issuance of exceptional legislative decrees, the approval of factional appointments, the causation of migration in most areas and the concealment of the tragedy of the last and kidnapped persons that that dominance has led to be eliminated.

The Islamic position still insistently holds that the people responsible for striking the mountain, the suburbs and West Beirut be brought to trial, whether they are men in the government or military persons, because the slaughters and grievous losses that have been inflicted on all Islamic areas without exception must be compensated for. That is a matter that now requires the formation of a collective military leadership that will restore trust to the army.

These demands put the Sunnite Moslems, political leaders or young activists, as the people who met at the House of Judiciary Rulings, in a single rank of opposition, alongside the Shiite Moslems and Druzes and all Arab-oriented Lebanese Christians who are concerned over the unity of the opposition in Lebanon and its integration with the National Salvation Front and the AMAL movement for the sake of legitimate opposition and the effort to prepare a single common conception of the desired political reform, which will be built on full justice, equality and nationalism.

We are recording our total contentment with the success of the efforts which have been made in the context of remedying the security situation in Beirut, by virtue of the unity and vigilance of the positions of the responsible leaders, and consequently the success of all of us in assuring the deployment of the forces of domestic security through West Beirut and the support of the army that is present in its barracks, bearing in mind that we do not in any way separate this security situation from the comprehensive political solution.

The role of the city of Beirut remains that of the heart in the body, and provides this fighting capital with arteries which extend to all areas, supplying it with blood and the wherewithal for life. Therefore it is for all Lebanese without exception and all the Lebanese, Moslem and Christian, of all factions and sects, are joined in it, so that it may represent a living example of real coexistence for all of Lebanon. Therefore it is necessary to be concerned over the formation of an information center in Beirut which will be concerned with the regions and will be in organic solidarity with them.

It is necessary to draw attention to the fact that the Israeli scheme, which the aggressor state set out with the secessionists and domestic agents, has the goal of fragmenting the Lebanese and crushing the national ranks. This imposes a high level of awareness on everyone, so that they may strengthen the national resistance to the Israeli enemy and its agents and turn it into a resistance which includes all political, military, economic and social
aspects. Israel is Lebanon's unique enemy. It is working to fragment it, to stir up sectarian rancor in it, and eliminate all its economic assets, organizations and infrastructure. Therefore those who met at the House of Judiciary Rulings gave high appreciation to the rigid, growing opposition which the people of Sidon and the whole south are exercising, with the utmost sacrifice, under the leadership of the eminent religious scholars, not in defense of a faction or creed but to liberate land and to defend a nation.

We consider that the continued entry of the Phalangist forces into the mountain and the bombardment of its people by the army, and its extension to the suburbs and West Beirut, constitutes a serious situation from whose trials it will be impossible to emerge, especially since the participation of the American battleships in the bombardment of the Islamic areas in the mountain and all other places makes it inevitable that the civilized world will condemn this sort of thoughtless barbarism. Therefore, an immediate cease fire on all fronts and its substitution by an intelligent, constructive dialogue will alone be able to get Lebanon out of this difficult dilemma, on the basis of a political solution which guarantees the rights of all the Lebanese.

We can only assert the principles which are included in the fixed Islamic ideals, especially as regards the establishment of a just democratic state from which political factionalism and the manifestations of party hegemony will be eliminated, assert the contents of the resolutions of the Geneva conference, to show concern for the independence, sovereignty and unity of Lebanon, assert the Arabhood of its identity and its affiliation, and consider Syria the natural supporter of this identity and affiliation.

Eliminating Privileges

/Question/ How do you explain the sectarian phenomenon which has become severely manifested in a large number of Lebanese factions, and how in your opinion can it be remedied in such crucial circumstances?

/Answer/ I believe that false beginnings will lead to endings that are as false as they are. The false beginning in Lebanon occurred when the noble Maronite faction was given a monopoly and its policy was allocated privileges in governance. This factional sectarian distinction produced natural reactions in the context of all the Lebanese factions, whether Christian or Islamic.

Some factions started to form political entities for their own groups, out of a natural reaction to the problem of the Maronite privileges which some political figures in that noble faction had monopolized. I can still point out that we in the House of Judiciary Rulings were meeting as Sunnite, Shiites and Druzes on Islamic occasions. The holiday lists were issued by us all, for example, on many occasions. This was the least form of devotion, but our political position was constantly united, starting with the coastal conference in the early twenties. These were held on most occasions under the chairmanship of the mufti of the Lebanese Republic, Shaykh Tawfiq Khalid,
and it contained Sunnites, Shiites and Druzes, in order to spell out a single unified Islamic position. The Sunnites in this area did not meet alone at all, and the same with the Shiites and the Druzes. Islam is one, and the Moslems were and remain a coherent unit expressing its identity and feeling anxious for the unity and independence of the nation and respect for the principle of cooperation and coexistence with all other Lebanese factions.

That is our form of Islam and these are our principles, in whose framework we are functioning. The solution, therefore, to me, is to eliminate the false beginnings which have led to false results. The privileges the Maronites enjoy, to the exclusion of other Christians and Moslems, must be totally eliminated. The privileges must be for all Lebanon, not for one Lebanese faction to the exclusion of the others. That is the remedy, that is the road to salvation, and there is no salvation beside that.

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C50: 4404/366
SIDQI AL-DAJJANI DISCUSSES PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 13 Feb 84 p 5

[Interview with Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajjani, member of PLO Executive Committee, by Sayyid 'Ali; "Mubarak's Arab Policy Has Bolstered Steadfastness in Lebanon and Occupied Territories"; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] Dr Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajjani is a Palestinian intellectual and one of the Palestinian political decisionmakers by virtue of his position in the PLO Executive Committee and as one of the founders of the PLO. He is a history professor who has taught at Tripoli University in Libya, Cairo University and Beirut University for 15 years, since he obtained his Ph.D. degree in history and Islamic culture. He has written 20 books on Arab and Islamic history and political thought. He has with Egypt firm relations that have never weakened or cooled. MAYU has had the following interview with al-Dajjani on the strength of the Palestinian-Egyptian relations and on the Arab policy followed by Egypt and charted by President Husni Mubarak—a policy, Arab and foreign observers agree, which has bolstered steadfastness in Lebanon and the occupied homeland. Al-Dajjani also discussed the question of how to put the Arab house in order and how to solve the Lebanese problem, as well as the question of the minimum Palestinian consensus required for the comprehensive settlement.

[Question] Where does the Palestinian intellectual stand vis-a-vis the cause?

[Answer] The Palestinian intellectual is an Arab human being whose position vis-a-vis his cause is determined by his belonging and his identity and who performs his role in light of his specialization. It is natural for him to unite with his cause. Considering that he deals with thought, then his position is the position of the intellectual toward all that happens. Thought's place in the body is usually the head. Therefore, the Palestinian intellectual must provide knowledge and must analyze events skillfully so as to chart the course. He thus integrates with the rest of his brothers in the revolution's body.

[Question] How do you deal with the future and what are your instruments in your capacity as a history professor?

[Answer] This is an important question because my study of history is what has led me to engage in futuristic studies. In my writings on this issue, I have
tried to crystalize my method, which I will describe briefly. Through knowledge of the current reality and analyzing this reality scientifically and linking it to the course taken by past events, we can discern the future, taking into consideration that what happens in the future is an extension of this course in interaction with man's will to act and his ability to act. We always say that discerning the future is a trip in future time as studying history is a trip in past time. The difference between the two trips is that the trip in future time involves man's dream world and man's will and ability to act.

Arab Awakening

[Question] So where does the Palestinian issue stand now?

[Answer] If we examine the graph of the Arab-Israeli conflict which entered its second century 2 years ago, we find that the Palestinian issue stands now at a rising line with the emergence in the Arab land of the signs of an awakening which began to appear clearly with the invasion at the beginning of the second century. This awakening became evident militarily in 1968, in the war of attrition and in the Palestinian resistance developing in the wake of the 1967 setback. The awakening became even more obvious in the 1973 Ramadan war which was followed for the first time by an Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories and by a decline of the Israeli presence whereas this presence had entered its ugliest form of expansion in 1967. Even though the invasion of Lebanon in 1978 and then in 1982 has affected this rising graph, the resistance facing this invasion--resistance which I expect will impose withdrawal on Israel--confirms that this graph is still rising.

Politically, this escalation has been embodied in the special place which our Palestinian issue has occupied in our world, especially in the past 10 years. The continued future escalation of this graph depends on the efforts we will exert this year and in future years. This is what makes us tackle our tasks with confidence.

Palestinian Resistance

[Question] But there have been indicators in the past 10 years, ending with the Palestine National Council held in Algiers in 1983. What are the lessons that must be learned?

[Answer] If we focus our attention on what happened last year at the Palestinian level, then there are two things: The first is the continued popular resistance to the occupation inside the occupied homeland--resistance which has taken numerous forms. Whoever studies this resistance carefully will find out that our people never stop sacrificing, despite the ferocious occupation and the violent tyranny aimed against this people. This resistance has developed in form. There has been the resistance with stones in which children engage and the negative resistance to the occupation. There has also been this determination to cling to the right.

The second thing is the crisis that afflicted the Palestinian action and the PLO shortly after convocation of the Palestine National Council in Algiers.

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The crisis began, as we know, within the Fatah organization, the biggest of the Palestinian organizations, and spread to the PLO and the front of organizations operating jointly in the PLO arena. This crisis was then reflected clearly in relations with Syria. This crisis is one of the most serious crises undergone by the Palestinian action. It is enough to note that it has witnessed intra-Palestinian fighting in the Tripoli events and has exposed maladies in the Palestinian body and in Palestinian–Arab relations. This crisis will be dealt with fully in the Palestine National Council session. To be dealt with soundly, we must make preparations for this session so that we may attain a sound form of national unity that brings cohesion to a clear political program which enables us to carry on with the political struggle to the end and to formulate the plans we need to continue our resistance against the occupation. This resistance is a right guaranteed by the international charters and by the divine laws to those whose land is occupied.

We Seek to Stop Gulf War

At the Arab level, there have been important events, such as the Gulf war which grieves us and which we are seeking to stop with all our might so that we may employ our capabilities in confronting bigger and severer dangers posed by our external enemy. There are the Lebanese events also, and here we must note the great resistance against the Israeli occupation and the development of these events to the extent whereby they have assumed an international dimension.

If I wanted to examine the outcome of these events, then I would find that it is a positive outcome, despite the hardship being experienced by our people in Lebanon and in the Arab homeland. What is positive here lies in making the external foreign forces that have intervened in Lebanon realize that their policy is wrong. This realization was created among these powers as of last September and reached its ultimate point with the U.S. administration's recent decision to withdraw the U.S. forces to the aircraft carriers at sea.

We must also note that the Israeli presence in South Lebanon has been coupled with an exorbitant cost which Israeli military commanders acknowledge they cannot pay. In these events, the silent Syrian position vis-a-vis the Israeli position and vis-a-vis the foreign forces has been a surprising position.

Effective Role by Egyptian Policy

The other thing that has surfaced in the Arab arena this year and that has drawn strong attention is the Arab policy adopted by Arab Egypt and charted and followed forcefully by President Mubarak. No observer, be he Arab or foreign, can but see the major positive effects of this policy in Egypt and in the Arab homeland. This policy has contributed to bolster the elements of steadfastness in Lebanon and inside the occupied homeland. In addition to these three prominent Arab events, there are other factors which fall within the framework of Arab relations and of the endeavors to put the Arab house in order, which indicate the presence of troubles in these relations and the presence of sincere endeavors to reach reconciliation in putting this house in order and in enhancing these relations.

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Putting Arab House in Order

**Question** Where do we start in putting the Arab house in order? Do we start with the resolutions of the next Palestine National Council or with the resolutions of the forthcoming Arab summit?

**Answer** The fact is that the effect in this case must be made at more than one level simultaneously. It requires steps at the level of each country separately and at the pan-Arab level. As for Palestinian action, convocation of the Palestine National Council comes under the title of "putting the Palestinian house in order." There are other Arab countries and arenas that need to take other steps to put their houses in order.

As for the pan-Arab level, we have to mobilize all Arab capabilities, and Palestinian capabilities are a part of them, within the framework of the bilateral and multilateral relations between the Arab countries in order to meet the requirements of the coming phase.

**Question** We always need a shock to confront our crises. Therefore, who has affected whom: the Lebanese events or the Palestinian issue?

**Answer** The impact is mutual, with a difference. The Palestinian issue has been and continues to be the issue of the external danger to the people and the nation. As for the Lebanese issue, it started as an internal social issue which quickly reflected the external dimension that then intensified and turned into an issue of Israeli occupation and of the presence of foreign forces. The impact is mutual, as in the case of the various issues of the Arab homeland. If the Lebanese issue has occupied a large space, then this is compatible with the transfer of the center of the battle to the Lebanese arena. But the Palestinian issue remains the essence, reflecting the external aggression against the Arab area.

**Question** Where are Egyptian-Palestinian relations heading?

**Answer** The words mean more than one thing to me. There are, first, the relations between the two fraternal peoples inside Egypt and there are the external groupings. Inside Egypt, in my capacity as one of those who live in the vast bosom of Arab Egypt, I express my full satisfaction with these strong relations, the spirit that dominates them and the values that govern them. It is not surprising to say that Palestine's sons live here among their brothers and cousins. Let me remind you that they all descend from Egyptian ancestors who migrated to Palestine. As for the Palestinian people in their other places of gathering, they have always felt a special bond with and a special role played by the bigger sister, Egypt. This feeling has intensified by a large degree in the past 2 years since President Mubarak assumed power and took a number of steps that have had their obvious impact. Regarding the relations between the PLO and Egypt, they have always existed, though not officially in the wake of the 1978 Baghdad summit. We look forward to their assuming an official form shortly. Our National Council has planted some landmarks on this path and we expect the coming days to witness a further cementing of this relationship in a manner that will serve Arab rapprochement in its entirety.
After all that has been said about Abu 'Ammar's visit to Cairo, what is your objective evaluation of this visit?

We must view the visit from more than one angle. If we view it from the angle of Arab Egypt and of the meaning it has reflected at the level of Egypt, then we appreciate the step taken by President Mubarak, whether by providing freedom to the departing fighters on the high seas or by expressing Egypt's solidarity with the Palestinian people and Egypt's eagerness to perform its role toward the Palestinian issue. This meaning has also been reflected at the Egyptian domestic level. If we view the visit from the angle of the PLO, then I say as a member of its Executive Committee that I, like my brothers in the Executive Committee, did not learn of the visit until it took place because brother Abu 'Ammar did not, because of circumstances of which we are all aware, familiarize his brothers in the command with the decision he had made. The committee heard a report on the visit from Abu 'Ammar when it held its meeting and it was decided to discuss the issue in its entirety at the National Council session. The criticism against the visit in the Palestinian arena has focused on the way in which the decision was taken and on the fact that brother Abu 'Ammar made the decision independently. This approach has evoked in the Palestinian arena reactions that still persist. At their meeting in Tunis, the Central Committee members were able to reach a united position which they reflected in their communique. What remains is for the entire arena to reach a single position through the National Council meeting. It is very obvious that this position will underline the need for solidarity with Arab Egypt so that we may grow stronger with it and it may grow stronger with us. At the same time, we will be eager to strengthen the relationship.

But has this visit and Palestinian-Egyptian rapprochement had an effect in the form of political practice on Palestinian opposition forces.

First, I must stop at the term 'opposition' because we need to explain to our brothers in the Arab homeland the chart of forces inside the PLO, which is led by an executive committee. This committee is controlled by a front which is composed of independents and organizations. This front had agreed on a program of action which had been set by its national council. It then happened that, due to the recent crisis, the dispute inside the front over a group of orders became more apparent, and we are exerting efforts to ameliorate this dispute. It is natural that the occurrence of the visit would be an object of controversy and would be included in a sharp debate which would express these relationships. But we must say that this sharp debate took place before the visit occurred. As for the mechanics of the course, I do not believe that there has been any change.

Fes Resolutions Are Minimum

What is the minimum Palestinian consensus required for a settle-

One of the characteristics of Palestinian action is that it has always defined the minimum limit. It is very important that we pause before these limits that have been noted in our Palestine National Council's resolutions, the latest being the resolution issued in Algiers which has considered
the Fes summit resolutions the minimum. These resolutions are clear and are very close to the previous resolutions of our Council which speak of liberation of the territories occupied in 1967 and of the Palestinian people's exercise of their rights to repatriation, self-determination and establishment of the independent Palestinian state.

Question So what is the fundamental agreement and disagreement between the Fes summit, the Egyptian-French initiative and the Reagan initiative?

Answer The first part of the Egyptian-French plan contains resolutions concerning Lebanon which have become invalid. The second part of the plan calls for renewed acknowledgement of the rights of all the area's states to live in security in accordance with Security Council resolution 242, for recognition of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights to participate in the negotiations and of the PLO to be a partner in these negotiations. It also calls on all the parties concerned to recognize each other comprehensively.

This means that the plan has introduced a clear provision concerning the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people and another provision concerning the PLO's participation in the negotiations. But the plan does not detail the other provisions in accordance with which the settlement is to be achieved because they are spelled out in resolution 242.

Eight Clear Points

If we come to the Fes Arab plan, we find that it contains eight clear points, namely Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, elimination of the settlements, guaranteeing the freedom of worship and of the exercise of religious rites, reaffirmation of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to the exercise of their firm rights, putting the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the supervision of the United Nations for an interim period not exceeding several months and establishing the Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital. The plan also calls on the UN Security Council to establish peace guarantees for all of the area's states, including the Palestinian state and, finally, it calls on the UN Security Council to implement these principles.

I believe truly and objectively that these are very clear principles which could provide the mechanism of implementation with ease and facility.

Vague Initiative

As for the Reagan initiative, a lot can be said about it. However, if I were to sum it up briefly, I would say that this initiative has gotten things confused and that it contains so much ambiguity and so many contradictions that make it incapable of forging ahead. This is not the only reason for its non-implementation. Rather, the more important reason is that when the U.S. administration presented the initiative, it did not embark on steps reflecting a sincere intention to implement it. The most important of these steps are the steps of imposing demanding Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon and freezing the building of settlements. The other reason for the obstruction of this initiative is its quick rejection by the Israelis. The U.S. administration
has the opportunity to clarify the ambiguity and to eliminate the contradic-
tions in some parts of the initiative. I believe that the Arab efforts being
exerted in this regard deserve to be continued until they fully convince the
U.S. administration of a just peace in the area.

Persuading United States

\textbf{Question} In light of this and of the Palestinian diplomatic movement, do we
see chances of developing and enhancing Palestinian-U.S. relations?

\textbf{Answer} We have always directed our attention at succeeding in persuading
the United States to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people and to deal with the PLO officially as long as it wants to
deal with the parties involved in the conflict in the area. But these efforts
have always been confronted with the restriction imposed in 1975 in a secret
agreement concluded by Kissinger with Israel—a restriction dictating that the
United States refrain from recognizing the PLO unless the organization recog-
nizes Israel and its right to existence. This restriction puts the issue
in the wrong place. We will continue our efforts to attain U.S. recognition
of the PLO. I see no imminent changes in this respect because we are in a year
of U.S. elections when the tunes of radicalism rise among the presidential can-
didates in an endeavor to please the Jewish vote. But I am confident that the
coming period will make the United States reconsider this issue and acknowledge
that it is necessary to deal with the organization.

\textbf{Question} What are the indicators we derive from the Palestinian people's
position and from their support for Palestinian legitimacy and for Abu 'Ammar's
leadership of the organization?

\textbf{Answer} The fact is that the situation generally is dominated by the
phenomenon you have pointed out as one of the most prominent phenomena at the
Palestinian level in 1983. This is the phenomenon of the ability of our people
at home to stand fast and unite. But I must note a number of things, the
first of which is the escalating suppression practiced by Israel and the intro-
duction of Israel's policy to evict our people, especially from Jerusalem
which is the holiest of our sanctities and where al-Aqsa Mosque and the Church
of the Holy Sepulchre are found. In the face of all this, you find our
people resisting, feeling their roots extending deep into their soil, acting
to destroy the barrier of fear of the enemy and clinging to their land. But
all this requires us to strengthen our people. As for the people's unity with
their leadership, this unity reflects the people's awareness of the true
character of their leadership.

I am not one of those who fear the occurrence of sudden developments in this
issue. Every now and then, psychological pressure is put on us through the
talk about the element of time, as if Israel will end everything in a matter
of days. Unscientific movement also take place when it is said that new
leaderships will emerge inside the occupied homeland to replace the organiza-
tion or that unacceptable solutions will be offered, and so forth. I do not
agree with the opinion that accepts such talk because I am confident that our
people are united with their leadership and that they rely on the policy of
the long-drawn struggle as a part of the awakening of which I have spoken.
What is the minimum required for the Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue?

The minimum is a strong and a fully clear relationship that embodies the concept of cohesion and unity and that binds both sides within a firm Arab framework.

I would like some more detail.

Our National Council has raised the slogan of confederalism and we keep our attention directed at this slogan. I must also note that we must embark on a detailed discussion to crystalize this slogan.
BRIEFS

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK--Abu Dhabi, 2 March (WAKH)--It was reported here that the UAE has surplus funds of foreign currency that are adequate to cover any insufficiency in its revenues for many years to come. It was also reported that the UAE's reserves of oil and its derivatives can meet its needs for at least half a century if the current production average is adhered to. This was reported by 'abd al-Malik al-Hamar, the governor of the UAE Central Bank, in a statement he made to the magazine of AKHBAR ALBITRUL WA AS-SINA'AH, which is issued by the UAE Petroleum and Natural Resources Ministry. He added that the statistics available for the Central Bank indicate that the UAE economy has been flourishing since that last 3 months of 1983. [Text] [GF021747 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1435 GMT 2 Mar 84]

COMPANIES BOYCOTTED--Dubayy, 3 March (QNA)--The Israel Boycott Office in the Emirate of Dubai announced a list of 32 boycotted companies from various countries and their branches in a retroactive action effective 1 February 1984. These companies are being boycotted for violating the rules and principles of Arab boycott of Israel. The list included 8 Belgian companies; 2 Swiss; and 10 companies from France, Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, United States, Spain, and Canada. It also included 12 branch companies of an American company in a number of foreign countries. These branches are of the American company of Motorlance which is now boycotted. [Excerpts] [GF031924 Doha QNA in Arabic 1915 GMT 3 Mar 84]

OIL DISCOVERIES--Ra's al-Khaymah, 11 March (QNA)--In a statement published in today's edition of AL-ITTIHAD, Ra's al-Khaymah ruler Shaykh Saqr ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi said that new oil discoveries have been made, that drilling operations will begin during this month in the regions of Chalilah and al-Halilah Island, and that a third offshore oil field will be announced. He added that there is a plan to increase production to 500,000 barrels a day in Salih field during the next year. [Summary] [GF121347 Doha QNA in Arabic 0805 GMT 11 Mar 84]

DUBAYY ALUMINIUM PRODUCTION--Dubayy, 12 March (WAKH)--Dubayy's aluminium imports during last year totalled 65 million dirhams, which is an increase of 8 percent compared with the imports in 1982, which totalled 59 million dirhams. According to a study prepared by the Department of Studies and research at the Dubayy Chamber of Commerce and Industry, aluminium exports during 1982 totalled 609 million dirhams, registering an increase of 25 percent in comparison with the 1982 exports, which totalled 449 million dirhams. Copper exports in Dubayy last year totalled 31 million dirhams, while copper imports during 1982 totalled

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37 million dirhams—a reduction of 16 percent in the value. A total of 2 million dirhams of copper have also been exported this year. The study noted that Dubayy's steel, cement, and wood imports during last year totalled 451 million dirhams against the 527 million dirhams in 1982—a reduction of 14 percent. [Text] [GF121347 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1200 GMT 12 Mar 84]

IDB LOAN—Jidda, 12 March (WAKH)—The Islamic Development Bank signed four agreements here today whereby it will finance the purchase of four ships for the (Prince Offshore) Company in the UAE in the amount of $16 million to help the company's fleet in the services of offshore oil platforms. [Excerpt] [GF121942 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1815 GMT 12 Feb 84]

CSO: 4400/208
DEPUTY PLANNING MINISTER DISCUSSES 5-YEAR PLAN INVESTMENTS

Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 15 Feb 84 p 3

[Interview with 'Abdallah Sa'id 'Abdan, deputy planning minister, by 'Umar Ba-Wazir: "Volume of Investments for 1983 Includes a Higher Level Than the Past 2 Years"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The most important issues that were put to Deputy Minister of Planning 'Abdallah Said 'Abdan for his response included evaluation of the 1983 investment program, the results of the use of the investments, the plan's most important projects, the growth indicators--for the previous year, the third year of the second 5-year plan--as well as the size of the investments for the 4th year of the plan, and the most important projects and growth indicators. This is the result of a 3-hour interview.

[Question] What is your evaluation of the 1983 investment plan, what are the results of the use of investments in the projects for which they were earmarked, were they implemented and what are these projects?

[Answer] Discussing the evaluation of the 1983 plan at this stage will have to be based on preliminary accounts, which require close scrutiny in light of the information, data and reports that the ministries submit. In accordance with the cabinet decision concerning preparing reports of the annual plan's accomplishments, the deadline for submission of this data to the Ministry of Planning is the end of February of each year.

However, the Ministry of Planning relies on separate reports that it receives concerning the level of the plan's implementation. With regard to these reports, we can say that it is expected that the actual investment funds for 1983 will reach 155 million dinars. This is about 17.5 million dinars more than the actual figure for 1982, since the investment funds for that year totaled 137.5 million dinars.

If we compare the investment funds anticipated for 1983 with the funds for 1981, which was the first year of the second 5-year plan, we find that the increase between the 2 years amounts to 50 million dinars,
i.e., a 47.6 percent increase (actual funds for 1981 totaled 105 million dinars). If we look at the size of the actual investments for 1983, we find that they amounted to 83 percent of the planned investment volume for that year. This is a higher percentage than that attained during the first 2 years of the second 5-year plan, since that was 77.9 percent in 1981 and 75 percent in 1982. This is an indicator that reflects improvement in the use of investments, and perhaps also demonstrates the close examination in investment planning, in light of the developments that occurred in the planning process and in the planning cadres on the level of the Ministry of Planning and its planning units in the ministries and the provinces.

[Question] What is the total size of investments for the past 3 years of the 5-year plan and, in that connection, the total investments for the entire 5-year plan?

[Answer] By the end of 1983, 3 years of the second 5-year plan for economic and social development will have been completed. The actual investments for the 3 years total 397.5 million dinars. This is 78.2 percent of the plan's total investments for the 5 years, amounting to 508 million dinars.

[Question] Does this mean that by the end of the 5-year plan, we will have exceeded the investment planning?

[Answer] Yes, we will exceed the amounts planned for investment when the 5-year plan began for several reasons, of which perhaps the most important is the flexibility in preparing the annual plans and putting in the required projects after ensuring their feasibility. There is also another basic factor, the rise in world prices, especially since the Democratic Republic of Yemen depends on foreign markets for the importing of equipment, machinery and certain building materials.

On the other hand, we find that the total expenditures in investments during the first 3 years of the plan, in addition to the appropriations earmarked in the 1984 plan, amounting to 175.2 million dinars, will exceed what was appropriated in the beginning of the plan, since the investment volume during those 4 years totaled 572.7 million dinars.

Results of Investment Use and Projects Completed

Regarding the results of the use of investments in projects during 1983, we can say that the industrial sector enjoyed the priority, since the value of what it accomplished amounted to 42.2 million dinars, followed by the transportation and communications sector with 34.5 million, the Ministry of Housing with 18.5 million and the Ministry of Agriculture with 18.3 million dinars.

A number of projects were completed last year and have entered the production and operation stage in the industrial sector. These include:
development of the sponge industry, the addition of new lines for certain factories, such as the sailing and athletic shoe industry and the production of electrical appliances, as well as the opening of several plants to produce aluminum doors and windows in the governorates of Aden and Hadramawt.

With regard to the fishing industry, the Institute of Ocean Sciences has been completed, which is expected to share in the study of fishing resources and ways to use them.

In the agricultural sector, a number of projects have been completed to combat flood damage, such as subsidies for the leasing stations and maintenance workshops, and the repair of several dams, such as the Hannad Dam in the Ahwar/Abyan area and the al-Hadaram/Lahij Dam.

Additionally, in the agricultural sector, the central workshop in Dar Sa'd, owned by the Yemeni-Soviet Projects has been completed, four warehouses to store grain have been built, and a number of coops to produce eggs and poultry meat have been prepared.

Regarding the transportation and communications sector, al-Riyan Airport in al-Mukalla has been completed, approximately 100 kms of new roads have been asphalted and about 45 kms of paved roads renewed, as well as more than 3,000 new telephone lines put into operation and 11 postal offices and agencies opened.

In the social services area, a number of health centers have been completed, the most important being the health center in Ahwar/Abyan and in al-Mudarabah in Lahij, as well as in Huraydah in Hadramawt. Moreover, television broadcasting has been extended to include the Governorate of Shabwah, a new hotel in Aden and a group of villas have been opened and 2,682 apartments constructed (this is approximately 15 percent more than was planned for 1983 and 303 percent more than was built in 1982).

With respect to municipalities, Aden and some of the municipalities of the governorates were supplied with machinery and equipment connected with environmental health. The sewer system was also improved in Lawdar and Ja'ar in Abyan Governorate and al-Mukalla in Hadramawt.

[Question] Excuse me, were there projects in the plan that were not completed?

[Answer] In the process of implementing growth projects, there are a number of factors that play their role in delaying some jobs and programs past their set date. Some of them are local and some others are connected with outside factors.

In 1983, outside factors played a role with regard to importing materials and their availability at the right time, or in the completion of contracts
with foreign authorities. In general, the percentage of projects that were not completed as programmed in 1983 was very small.

[Question] What are the growth indicators for the 1983 plan, and were these indicators achieved in all sectors?

[Answer] Relying on the figures and data currently available to the ministry, we can say that growth did occur in 1983, compared with what was achieved in 1982. Total production rose from 376.4 million dinars in 1982 to 395.4 million dinars in 1983, using fixed prices. This is a 5.1 percent growth rate. Moreover, net output increased in 1983 to 203.5 million dinars compared with 197.9 million in 1982. This is a 3 percent growth rate.

If we take the branches of the national economy into account, we find that growth in the production branches (industry/fishing/agriculture/building and construction) totaled 8.3 percent more than in 1982 in gross product and 8.5 percent in net product.

As for production services (transportation and communications/commerce/restaurants and hotels) we find that the growth rate in gross product was 6.5 percent and in net product 6.3 percent over 1982.

As regards application, one can say that all the sectors achieved growth during 1983, with the differences between one sector and another according to the circumstances of each sector and the financial and human resources available.

Distribution of Investments of 1983

[Question] How were investments distributed to the sectors of the national economy, what are the most important projects for the 4th year of the plan, and what are the growth indicators in light of the desired goals?

[Answer] Investment funds for 1983 totaled 175.2 million dinars, i.e., an increase of 13 percent over what was estimated for use in 1983. It is important that we point out here that the 1983 plan's projects basically concentrated on carrying out existing projects, aimed at completing them, along with a small number of new projects which have priority and which have been provided with sources of financing and implementation resources. We find that the total investment funds have been distributed, according to the branches of the national economy, for the growth depicted in table No 2, in millions of dinars.

Most Important Projects for 1983

Regarding the most important projects in the 1984 plan, the industrial sector is concentrating on developing some of the existing plants and
introducing certain new lines, such as the al-Jundi plastics factory, the al-Thawrah spare parts plant, and the agricultural and mining tool factory. A production line for automobile tires has been opened in the rubber sandals factory, as well as an automated bakery in al-Mansurah, another one in al-Mukalla and a brick and tile plant.

As for electrical projects, the most important ones incorporated in the 1984 plan is the continuation of construction of the thermoelectric station in al-Hiswah, as well as the electrification of five towns east of al-Mukalla, the increase of power generated in al-Mukalla and Ja'ar and repair of the Hajif station.

Water projects include the greater Aden water project, and the al-Mukalla, Shagrah and Saywun water projects, in addition to nearly 30 small water projects in other parts of the republic.

With respect to oil and mineral explorations, the seismic and geographic surveys in the Shabwah area have priority. In addition to that, there are some survey projects in other areas of the republic, as well as the preparation of geological and mineral maps of the country.

During 1984, the Aden refinery will get four projects, at a cost of more than 8 million dinars, to improve storage and production, to purchase tugboats and to build housing for workers.

With regard to the fishing sector, there is the completion of a project to build a fishing harbor in Nashtun in al-Mahrah Governorate, which is expected to be completed next April. We are also continuing to construct the fishing harbor in Aden, as well as to build a fisheries institute and to develop fishing cooperatives along the western coast of the republic.

As for the agricultural sector, the most important projects that will be underway in 1984 are the project to dig main and feeder canals, survey and level land, and rebuild the dams, as well as digging wells, exploiting arable land, and developing the Bayhan agricultural valley and the Hadramawt agricultural valley (second stage).

There is a project to deal with the flood damage in the area of al-Dal' and to rebuild the Batays Dam, and a project to develop and improve the storage of fruits and vegetables, so that they will be regularly available to the citizens.

The following road projects are included in the plan: the al-Shahr-Sayhut road, the al-Nagbah-Nassab in Shabwah governorate, rebuilding the roads damaged by floods, the Nawbah-Dakim-al-Habilayn road, rebuilding the Zinjibar Bridge and repairing bridges in the Aden Governorate.
In the communications sector, the most important projects are the completion of the Khalaf Harbor, the national network for wire and wireless communications and constructing the earth satellite station to communicate with the Arab nations and another one to communicate with the Socialist countries. There is also the construction of a passenger terminal for Aden International Airport and enlarging the aircraft parking area, as well as the project to bolster the Al-Yamda fleet by buying two Boeing 737 aircraft. There are other projects to support land transport companies in the governorates and the Yemen Land Transport Company.

In the area of education and training, the medical college of Aden University will be completed and political centers will be built, as well as several vocational and industrial schools in various governorates.

As for health, construction of maternity, pediatrics, and mental and psychological illness hospitals will be completed in Aden Governorate as well as the Fuh hospital in al-Mukalla, while repair and refurbishment of the al-Jumhuriyah Teaching Hospital will be completed, as well as construction of the health institute in Khawr Maksir.

With respect to commerce, there are several projects including the construction of consumer complexes in Kraytar, Shaykh 'Uthman and al-Mukalla, as well as the building of a number of warehouses to store foodstuffs and other materials in various parts of the republic.

In 1984, it is expected that the construction of 2,049 new residential units will be completed.

As for the expected growth indicators of the plan during 1984, it is expected that total production will increase from 443.6 million dinars in 1983 to 481.3 million dinars, i.e., a growth of 8.5 percent.

With regard to the gross national product, it is expected to reach 245.2 million dinars in 1984, an increase of 8 percent over 1983 (227 million dinars).

This will increase average individual income from 110.5 dinars in 1983 to 116.3 dinars in 1984, i.e., a growth rate of 5.3 percent.

It is worth pointing out that in 1984, it is expected that the state sector's share of the value of social production will grow by 10.3 percent, while the cooperative share will be 16.3 percent, the mixed sector 11 percent, and the private sector 5.9 percent.

How Projects Are Decided

[Question] What ways are followed in your ministry to decide on projects?

[Answer] Development priorities were determined at the beginning of the planning process. This was easy in the Democratic Republic of
Yemen, since the country lacked all the features and signs of development. Therefore, development projects were included in the 3-year plan 71/72 to 73/74 and the first 5-year plan, 74/75 to 75/78, without much in the way of profound study. As for now, the Ministry of Planning does not accept projects for the development plan, until after economic and technical feasibility studies have been made and the certainty of economic profit from these projects determined.

These studies by themselves are not enough to get the projects incorporated into the development plan, but the factors of financing and implementation also play a decisive role in getting the projects into the annual plan.

There are some small projects that fulfill the needs of the citizens by providing certain necessary services, such as water, electricity, health, education and the like, whose insertion into the annual plan affects the factors of the masses' participation and enthusiasm.
Table 1. Size of Investments According to Branches of the National Economy for 1981-84 (in Millions of Dinars).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Production Branches</th>
<th>Actual/81</th>
<th>Actual/82</th>
<th>Estimated/83</th>
<th>Planned/84</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building and construction</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| B. Branches of Production Services         |           |           |              |            |
| Transportation and communications          | 23.1      | 27.6      | 34.5         | 43.4       |
| Commerce, restaurants and hotels           | 7.2       | 10.2      | 5.7          | 7.5        |
| Totals                                     | 30.3      | 37.8      | 40.2         | 50.9       |

| C. Branches of Social Services             |           |           |              |            |
| Educational services                       | 3.4       | 5.4       | 5.9          | 8.8        |
| Health services                            | 1.0       | 3.8       | 6.0          | 9.5        |
| Housing services                           | 13.9      | 18.9      | 18.5         | 15.3       |
| Culture and media                          | 1.8       | 1.1       | 1.0          | 1.2        |
| Other governmental services                | 1.8       | 2.1       | 8.3          | 9.2        |
| Totals                                     | 21.8      | 32.3      | 39.7         | 43.9       |
Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production Branches</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>7.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Building and Construction</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production Services Branches</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and Communications</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce, Restaurants and Hotels</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>43.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Educational Services</td>
<td>8.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health Services</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing Services</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and Media</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Governmental Services</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7005
CSO: 4404/356
ABYAN GOVERNORATE ANNUAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN DISCUSSED

Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 21 Feb 84 p 2

[Article by Hashim Rabi': "Discussion of Annual Production Plan and Agricultural Conditions in Abyan Governorate"]

[Text] There was a seasonal meeting Saturday, 18 February 1984, in Abyan Governorate, with the agricultural cadres and the directors of the state farms, cooperatives and leasing stations, attended by Comrades Salih Muslih Qasim, member of the Central Committee and minister of defense; Ahmad Haydarah Sa'id, member of the Central Committee and secretary of the party organization in Abyan Governorate; Muhammad 'Ali Ahmad, member of the Central Committee and chief of the Executive Office for Abyan Governorate; Sa'id Salih, member of the Central Committee and secretary of the Farmers Union; and Muhammad Sulayman Nasir, candidate member of the Central Committee and minister of agriculture and agrarian reform.

The purpose was to discuss the annual agricultural production plan and ways to ensure the growth of agricultural conditions in the governorate.

During the meeting, the comrade officials stressed the importance of this meeting, through which many questions pertaining to agriculture might be cleared up, with the goal of making it prosper and develop so as to ensure the constant supply of the masses' needs.

At the beginning of the meeting, Comrade Ahmad Haydarah Sa'id, member of the Central Committee and secretary of the party organization in Abyan Governorate, emphasized the role that all state farms and cooperatives must play in bringing prosperity to the agricultural sector and to increase productivity, pointing out that "we in the party organization in the governorate will not spare any effort to offer all our available resources for the development of agriculture in the governorate. We are working hard, in coordination with the comrades in the Ministry of Agriculture, to deal with the agricultural situation in the governorate."
Comrade Muhammad Sulayman Nasir, candidate member of the Central Committee and minister of agriculture and agrarian reform, referred to the fact that this meeting is one of a series of seasonal meetings that have been held in Shabwah Governorate at the instructions of the Central Committee during its recent session, which put forth several decisions and recommendations for the development of our economic situation. "This meeting of ours with the directors of the state farms, cooperatives and leasing stations, and the agricultural cadres and officials in the governorate, is for the purpose of finding out at first hand the features of the annual production plan and the specific obligations on the governorate in light of the plan's features and to learn the governorate's requirements in order to implement this plan. The Ministry of Agriculture will take the responsibility for providing the necessary allocations for the plan, whether that pertains to fertilizer or seeds or pesticides, in order, fundamentally, to ensure receipt and to maintain and expand production."

I. Those participating in the meeting were advised of the features pertaining to the development plan for Abyan Governorate, which comprised the following:

1. A project to dig main canals, total appropriating 1.7 million, estimated appropriation 1 million.

2. Construction of the new Batays Dam, total appropriation 965,000, estimated appropriation 685,000.

3. Rebuilding Ahwar Dam, total appropriation 1.3 million, estimated appropriation 591,000.

4. Maintenance of irrigation works, total appropriation 415,000, estimated appropriation 225,000.

5. Building and organizing traditional ways of irrigation, total appropriation 1.416 million, estimated appropriation 1 million.

6. Anti-desertification measures in the Mudiyyah area, total allocation 266,000, estimated appropriations 45,000.

7. Development of potato cultivation in Mukairis, total allocation 231,000, estimated appropriation 231,000.

The directors of the projects discussed the ways in which the projects would be implemented in the governorate.

II. The General Budget:

The sum of 206,871 dinars has been allocated for the Bureau of Agriculture, Abyan Governorate, as administrative and individual expenditures. The Agricultural Bureau in Abyan Governorate is required to draw up the
required bases to determine expenditures within the limits of the sum allocated in the general budget.

III. Production organizations and their needs in Abyan.

Those participating in the meeting underscored the need to expedite the provision of electricity to the branch of the State Poultry Organization, especially for the poultry meat project, which will undertake to provide approximately 500,000 tons of chicken annually.

IV. Features of the production plan for state farms and cooperatives in Abyan Governorate.

With regard to this, the participants evaluated the conditions of the state farms and cooperatives. Comrade Salih Muslih Qasim touched on the need to benefit from model farms' experiences, which have been able to achieve excellent results in carrying out their plans, so that the difficulties that are still present in some farms can be overcome.

Comrade Muhammad Sulayman Nasir also stressed that next year, 1985, will see that state farms have made significant growth, by incorporating a special project, through which these farms will be provided with the required equipment.

The discussion of the features of the agricultural production plan continued, and participants in the meeting stressed the need for earnest efforts to implement this plan, based on the slogan which was produced from the meetings of the secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party, chairman of the Supreme People's Council and chairman of the Council of Ministers, in both Aden and Saywun, in order to deal with the agricultural situation and to make it flourish this year, "the Year of Agricultural Prosperity."

The leasing stations for agricultural machinery were also the center of the participants' attention in this meeting. The need was stressed for them to carry out the plans determined for them and to offer machinery services to the state cooperatives and farms.

The participants in the meeting were shown a memorandum of the Abyan Governorate's Bureau of Agriculture about the agricultural plan, the difficulties that its implementation will face, and the requirements of Abyan Governorate to implement it. It referred in detail to the agricultural situation in Abyan and the actions which must be taken to implement the agricultural plans. It is worth noting that Abyan's agricultural plan for the 83/84 season includes 51,245 feddans of field and garden crops, of which 90 percent of this area is dependent on irrigation.

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Regarding this aspect, flood waters control implementation of these crops, and they overflowed according to expectations during the second half of 1983.

The memorandum included a number of actions, the most important being:

I. The projects incorporated in the governorate's annual plan are:

1. Irrigation canals, estimated at 6,500 meters in the Lenin Farm and the Fourth Conference Farm.

2. Leveling the lands of the production teams in the Zjinjbar and al-Makhzan cooperatives, estimated at 1,350 feddans.

3. Completion of the electrification of wells in the Martyr Ahmad Salih Farm.

4. Digging six artesian wells in the 5 October and Fourth Conference Farms.

There are also other actions which will have a share in bringing prosperity to the agricultural sector.

At the conclusion of the annual meeting, the participants issued several appropriate resolutions, assigning their follow-up and implementation by the Bureau of Agriculture in the governorate, the Bureau of State Farms and Cooperatives in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Executive Office in the governorate.

7005
CSO: 4404/356
NORTH YEMEN PRESIDENT INTERVIEWED ON COOPERATION WITH SOUTH YEMEN

Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 20 Feb 84 p 6

[Interview with 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the president of North Yemen, by 'Adallah 'Abd-al-'llah; "The Second Session of the Yemeni Council Took Place under Many Positive National Circumstances"; in Aden, date not specified]

[Text] During the last 3 days of last week, Aden embraced with all optimism, love, welcome, and hope the meetings of the second session of the Yemeni Council, which was held in an atmosphere jampacked with brotherly feelings and a sense of historic responsibility vis-a-vis the hope of our people and their legitimate aspirations for the reunification of their homeland on sound and democratic foundations.

Since the meeting was important, journalists were looking anxiously for something new to offer to the readers. They were putting forward questions looking for answers.

One can say that the brotherly, unionist atmosphere by which the session was characterized, as a result of the sincere efforts on the part of the leaders of the two regions of the country, helped to bring about this meeting with Brother Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the president of the republic, the general commander of the armed forces, and the general secretary of the General People's Congress in the northern region of the homeland, despite the shortness of time and the intensity of the program. Without such an atmosphere, this interview could not have taken place.

Greetings from the heart to the creators of this atmosphere! With their nationalism and their accurate vision, they transcend the limits of the cities, the province, and the region, to reach an issue that is more sublime, broader, more important, and of greater note.

We apologize to the readers if we have gone beyond some questions of importance to them. The coming days will clarify every effort and decision in reality.
We thank Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, who responded to our questions publicly. Thus, we contribute to progress along this road, though it may be long. A journalist has only his concern, his pen, and the position he takes.

[Question] The holding of the second session of the Yemeni Council, though its duration was limited, is considered an important and historic event in the course of the efforts being exerted to unify the two parts of the country. Your Excellency, Mr President, what is your evaluation of the accomplishments made in the area of unity in recent years? What is your view of the effect they have had on the future of unionist activity and the life of our Yemeni people? How do you evaluate the holding of this session under the current Yemeni, Arab, and international circumstances?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the way to realize unity requires much effort and persistent, diligent work on the part of our people in the country's two regions, because the legacy and heritage of partition are heavy. It is not easy to do away with them with mere emotions or wishes. Since we realize what we must do in order to achieve the goals imposed by our legitimate national ambition, we in the country's two regions have been able to begin to take steps that introduce Yemeni unity into the stage of laying down material supports and foundations in the form of the joint institutions that have been established as a first step. We have created an atmosphere conducive to allowing every Yemeni citizen in both parts of the country to live as a Yemeni and move beyond the imaginary barriers. This was achieved in the form of the fruit of the meetings of the first session of the Yemeni Council, which was held 6 months ago. It produced agreement on the right of the citizens to move between the two parts of the country, while the joint unity committees are continuing their deliberations. Perhaps the achievement made by the joint constitutional committee in the form of the proposed unified constitution, which has made clear the continuous steps being taken on the road to achieving Yemeni unity, is of importance, since the meetings of the second session of the Yemeni Council are being held under many positive national circumstances, which will assist us to move forward and achieve more unionist steps. At the same time, we always recall how difficult the road of building is. However, it must be trod in order to translate the aspirations of the masses of our people into reality. As I have explained, it requires more coordination, cooperation, and persistent, diligent work, so that we can rectify the course of history and preserve the Yemeni homeland, with its single Arab-Muslim personality, which the Imamate and colonialism tried to exterminate by dividing it, attacking it, and exposing it to partition. The realization of these aspects helps greatly in the process of making a correct diagnosis that will lead to laying the foundation and base needed to build the edifice of unity. Perhaps the current Arab situation can teach us many lessons, given the numerous, regrettable events that Lebanon and the Palestinian people are experiencing. This makes our road to the reestablishment of unity clearer, so that we can overcome the difficulties we face.
Building the Economic Foundations of Unity

[Question] One constantly hears affirmations of the importance and necessity of working to create economic integration between the two sections of the country. Are more serious steps being taken in this area? What are they?

[Answer] Laying the economic foundations of unity is considered one of the most important areas of building. It requires one to look for possibilities whereby the basic measure of economic integration between the two regions can be achieved. In view of what the national needs of the two regions require, the results of the studies on which the officials of both regions are working very hard must lead to further steps being taken. At the same time, we must evaluate the activities of the joint institutions that have been established. We must provide suitable circumstances for protecting them and expanding the scope of their activities, since their success will play a positive role with respect to any other steps taken in this area.

The Area of Agriculture Has Priority in Terms of Integration

[Question] Your Excellency, Mr President, do you agree with us when we say that the area of agriculture has priority and is more important with respect to integration? What is your opinion?

[Answer] There is no doubt that integration in the area of agriculture is important. However, the heavy legacy left by the Imamate and colonialism in the two regions has caused the entire Yemeni countryside to be underdeveloped. The citizens of Yemen have suffered for long years from fear, isolation and darkness. The revolutions of 26 September and 14 October had to work seriously to eliminate isolation, build roads, set up schools, and provide the requirements of a humane and dignified life to every citizen. May God be praised, the 26 September revolution has been able to realize great progress in the area of bringing roads, schools, clinics, and clean water to each village during the last two decades. This has caused us to focus our interest and concentrate our potential on reviving the agricultural sector, developing the means of production, and limiting the importing of commodities that compete with Yemeni agricultural products. All of these steps go in the direction of building the future, especially since agricultural products in the two regions of the homeland are the vehicle whereby our steps toward integration in the area of agriculture are now beginning.

A Unified Spinning Corporation

[Question] Your Excellency, Mr President, why, for example, is nothing being done to set up a unified spinning and weaving corporation with all the requirements of success?
[Answer] Setting up a unified spinning and weaving corporation is one of the many ideas in the various areas and horizons that require study, so that more steps toward unity can be taken.

Encouraging Results in Oil Exploration

[Question] Exploration for oil and minerals is going on in the two regions. How are they coordinating this process? Has exploration in our northern region yielded positive results?

[Answer] Coordination in the area of the search for Yemen's mineral wealth is a matter of vital importance for our people in the two regions, especially since Yemen's two regions, given the confrontation with the various challenges of backwardness, urgently need to exploit any materials found in the earth, whether they have to do with oil or not. Extant coordination lets us undertake joint activities. They include geological surveys, diverse studies of the aspects from which benefit can be derived, and other forms of cooperation required by the interest of Yemen's two regions in well-known circumstances under which raw materials are a prominent issue in current international economic relations and circumstances.

University Education in the Homeland Has Priority

[Question] Your brother president, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, has announced more than once that education at the University of Aden would not be limited to students from the southern region. Rather, the university is open to students from both regions. What would your opinion be if a joint plan were drawn up for education in the two regions in the specializations found at the universities of Sanaa and Aden. These extant colleges would be supported with all resources. Does not education in the homeland have priority?

[Answer] The University of Aden, like the University of Sanaa, and indeed, like all the other areas of higher education in the two regions of the homeland, cannot remain aloof from coordination, cooperation, and joint efforts intended to achieve Yemeni unity. Of course, the doors of the University of Sanaa and its colleges are open to all the sons of the Yemeni homeland. I believe that the preparation of joint plans for education on the basis of the extant specializations will be a vital step responding to the aspirations of development based on integrationist foundations for the two regions of the homeland, thereby achieving the goals of any joint plan for education in the area of the specializations offered by the existing colleges at the two universities.

The Causes of Emigration Must Be Studied

[Answer] With respect to Yemeni society, the problem of emigration has existed all through Yemeni history, since the collapse of the dam at
Ma'rib. The Yemenis have experienced successive stages that led to greater emigration. This has cost Yemen many skilled workers and minds. They have left their mark, sweated, and worked hard in the many cities in which one finds Yemeni emigres.

After the glorious 26 September revolution, hundreds of emigres returned to the homeland and contributed to the process of starting from scratch that began after the revolution. They contributed to the establishment of numerous national institutions. However, the problem of emigration has remained, due to the environment and the desire to learn a skill. Nevertheless, we have been eager to strengthen and deepen the bond between the homeland and its emigre sons, by supporting the General Federation of Emigres and facilitating its tasks, so that it can be like a bridge and a connecting link between the homeland and its sons abroad. I believe that numerous causes are behind the matter of emigration. We must study all the aspects of these causes. The environment plays a role and contains incentives that lead people to emigrate. Emigration has become a characteristic of the societies of the developing countries.

Are We Cooperating To End Illiteracy?

[Question] You announced 2 years ago that the 21st year of the revolution would be the start of a comprehensive plan to wipe out illiteracy. This year is the year for liquidating illiteracy in the southern region. Are we cooperating to wipe out illiteracy among our people? How?

[Answer] The campaign against illiteracy was begun in the northern region of the homeland a few years ago with efforts on the part of the Ministries of Education and Instruction, Information and Culture, the armed forces, and the security forces. All the agencies and institutions are contributing to this campaign. The concerned agencies are also playing their role in accordance with prepared programs. There is no doubt that cooperation to wipe out illiteracy in the two regions of the country requires joint efforts. It also requires the participation of the intellectuals and those who oversee the unions and federations, so that they can play their role in this area, which is considered to be the true starting point and basic support for entering the road of progress and development. We will not hesitate to support any effort that will bring success to the campaign to eliminate illiteracy in both regions, especially since ignorance is one side of the terrible trinity from which our people in the northern region of the country have suffered, due to the ages preceding the revolution.

Measures to Limit Imports

[Question] Your Excellency, Mr President, we are following with interest the measures recently taken in the area of economics. What steps have been taken to reduce imports, increase the GNP, and protect these important decisions?
[Answer] In my answer to another question, I have already explained why we are interested in and focusing on the area of agriculture, which contains horizons and vital fields we cannot do without. There is no doubt that the measures we have taken to limit the importing of some luxuries have been accompanied by real steps designed to increase agricultural production and develop all the aspects connected with it, from irrigation projects to land reclamation, poultry projects, and the development of animal and fish wealth. In addition, steps will be taken to increase forestation and protect the forests. With God's help, the positive returns from this orientation as a whole will be the fruits we desire. They will protect the measures that have been taken, without a disturbance occurring in the balance of consumption and production.

Arab Circumstances Are a Focus of Interest

[Question] During the siege of Beirut, you acted in concert with your brother president, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad. The Zionist occupation is still going on, while American intervention in Lebanon has become direct. Dangerous threats face our Arab peoples, especially Syria. Can you once again adopt a unified Yemeni position on the Arab level, or is Yemen's voice still a prisoner of poverty? What means can be used to confront the dangers and developments witnessed on the Arab scene?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the circumstances that made it necessary to undertake a joint Yemeni initiative in mid-1983 differed from the current circumstances. At that time, the Israeli invasion seemed able to envelop West Beirut, where the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance was located. This sort of siege posed a direct danger that required us to exert every effort in order to support the steadfastness of the Palestinians and Lebanese in the face of the Israeli encirclement. That initiative opened the way for joint Arab activity to save the Palestinian revolution. The current Arab circumstances were the center of interest and the focus of the discussion between myself and my brother president, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, at the meetings of the second session of the Yemeni Council. We will not hesitate to exert any joint effort in order to confront the dangers currently witnessed by the Arab scene.

What is the Position on America?

[Question] Although the United States of America is supporting the Zionist enemy with money and weapons and strengthening its strategic alliance with him, some in our Arab homeland are still betting on neutralizing America, even as it bombards Lebanon's land and people with its weapons. How do you interpret these positions?

[Answer] It is my belief that any basic wager intended as a way of confronting the various dangers and challenges must essentially focus on Arab capabilities and potentialities, in terms of both the people and the land. Events in the past, including the events in Lebanon, have demonstrated that most of the keys to the solutions of these
difficult problems lie in the hands of those directly concerned with
the issues. It does not pay to depend or bet on foreign powers, because
they will not perceive our issues any better than we do.

There is no doubt that the participation of the Marines in the events
in Lebanon proves that the view the United States has of the Lebanese
problem differs from that which the Lebanese have of their own problem.
Unless each people depends on its own capabilities and potential, it
will end up wagering on someone else. Such dependence leads to fatal
consequences.

In Support of Palestinian National Unity

[Question] After the regrettable events the Palestinian revolution
has seen, what, in your view, are the dimensions of the dangers that
threaten it, let alone the maintenance of Palestinian national unity?

[Answer] The national unity of the Palestinian revolution is the primary
basis for the protection of this revolution, lest it be further divided
and weakened. Therefore, the leaders of the revolution must draw all
the lessons provided by the past stages, in preparation for confronting
the greatest Zionist danger, which is expressed by the continuing Judai-
zation and settlement operations, not to mention the alteration of
the features of the Arab towns located on the West Bank and in the
Gaza Strip, which have been occupied since 1967.

Relations With Moscow Are Developing

[Question] Our northern region was the first Arab state to sign a
treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. How do you evaluate your
relations with the Soviet Union?

[Answer] Our relations with the Soviet Union are developing in a positive
fashion and in a manner consistent with their deep-rootedness and the
fact that they are relations first established more than half a century
ago. These relations have been based on clearly recognizable foundations.
As a result of this fact, they have been able to develop and grow continu-
ously.

Will We Unify the Day of the Martyrs?

[Question] 'Ali 'Abd-al-Mughanni was martyred for the sake of the
freedom, independence, progress, and unity of the homeland, as were
Labuzah and 'Abud. What if we were to suggest having one day for the
Yemeni martyrs all through the homeland. On it we could celebrate
the greatness of their martyrdom and renew our oath to them to continue
along this path. Would you agree, Your Excellency, Mr President?

[Answer] We celebrate the anniversary of the 26 September revolution.
This festival has become linked in the life and sentiment of our entire
Yemeni people with many meanings. First and foremost are the meanings of the great national sacrifices made in defense of the revolution and the republic. Therefore, our yearly celebrations of the anniversary of the revolution always begin with the honoring of the martyrs who made with their blood the glorious victory of 26 September.

The 26th of September is the day of the martyrs who affirmed the national will, which insisted on being victorious and waving the banners of the revolution and the republic in the sky of the homeland.

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BRIEFS

AGREEMENTS WITH NETHERLANDS, JAPAN—San'a', 29 February (WAKH)—The Netherlands will provide the YAR with 46 million riyals within the framework of cooperation between the two countries. The agreement was signed by YAR Development Minister and Chairman of the Central Planning Organization Muhammad Ahmad al-Junayd and the Dutch charge d'affaires in San'a'. The YAR also signed an agreement with Japan stipulating that four Japanese companies will import fertilizer, pesticide and agricultural equipment worth 5 million yen to increase agricultural produce in Yemen. The agreement was signed by Agricultural and Fisheries Minister Ahmad al-Hamadani and the Japanese charge d'affaires in San'a'. [Text] [GF011812 Manama WAKH in English 1630 GMT 29 Feb 84]

AMF LOAN—Abu Dhabi, 4 March (WAKH)—The Arab Monetary Fund [AMF] signed an agreement here today with the YAR by which it will receive a loan of 4.9 million arithmetic Arab dinars or about $15.6 million. The loan will be used to encourage and facilitate trade exchange among Arab countries and to help alleviate the deficit in its trade balance. The period of the loan will be 4 years, with a 2-year grace period at a rate ranging between 4.95 and 5.85 percent. [Excerpt] [GF050632 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1215 GMT 4 Mar 84]

IDB LOAN—Judda, 4 March (WAKH)—The Islamic Development Bank [IDB] and the YAR signed four agreements today by which the IDB will grant the YAR 5.6 million Islamic arithmetic dinars [about $16 million] to finance health, glass works, and agricultural projects. [Summary] [GF050632 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1750 GMT 4 Mar 84]

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U.S.-SOVIET 'STRATEGIC ACCORD' CITED IN IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 28 Feb 84 pp 1, 2

As the Iran-Iraq war intensifies and the Islamic Republic of Iran begins broad attacks on Iraqi soil, the viewpoints and evaluations existing at the two international poles are quickly drawing closer together. It can be clearly observed that the western camp led by the United States, and the eastern camp led by the USSR, are evaluating the Iran-Iraq war from the same point of view. The reasons for this excessive similarity must be sought amidst the probable consequences of a decisive regional victory by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Of course it must be said that viewpoints and understandings jointly held by the West and East on world affairs cannot be considered a new phenomenon. Instead, in the history of the last half-century and at the important junctures of history, there have been numerous instances where the views and evaluations of world events by the West and East joined together.

The war imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Iraqi regime is the most prominent example proving the thesis of strategic understandings and accords.

In Iranian history one can observe several cases of this type of accord, the description of which can show an historical motivation for the understanding existing between West and East on the imposed war. During the Jangal Movement led by Mirza Kuchek Khan, the Soviet Union took the side of Reza Shah, tarring the Jangal Movement a reactionary phenomenon compared to Reza Khan's national bourgeoisie. The West's satisfaction with the Soviet Union's position was so great that Kremlin authorities were astounded. The fall of the Jangal Movement stabilized the basis of Reza Khan's coup d'état regime to the point sought by the Soviet Union.

During the shah's White Revolution and the great 15 Khordad Movement, the doctor once again prescribed the same medicine for the Soviet Union and the West. The 15 Khordad Movement was considered a reactionary, antiprogressive phenomenon. The Soviet Union interpreted the White Revolution as a reform development, and the United States considered it a real revolution. The basis of the shah's regime and U.S. imperialism in the region was strengthened when the flames of the 15 Khordad Movement were extinguished, and Iran was turned into a gendarme protecting world imperialism's interests. All these developments occurred since the Soviet Union was not seeking to negate them.
Historical precedent can also be found for this type of strategic accord on regional and world issues. During the formation of the Zionist state in Palestine, the Soviet Union considered Israel a phenomenon spreading progress through Western technology in the backward region of the Middle East, and deemed its stabilization essential to the growth and strengthening of the workers ranks in the capitalist camp. The Soviet Union was one of the first countries to officially recognize Israel, and it set the Zionist regime's flag fluttering in Moscow. A new chapter in the West's penetration of the Middle East opened with the stabilization of the Zionist regime's position in the region. The Arab-Israeli conflict took hundreds of thousands of victims. Stage by stage the Zionist regime's borders expanded. The Soviet Union considered Israel a true turning point in Marxian analysis. Consequently the Soviet Union was never and is not inclined to reject Israel's existence and in so doing proclaim its Marxist conception as a dead letter. So far there has been no change in the U.S.-Soviet agreement based on the necessity of preserving the Zionist regime's existence, and the Soviet Union's ethical bluffs on the Palestinian issue are acceptable as long as they do not agress against the Marxist conception.

As far as the Algerian revolution was concerned, the Soviet Union considered the thesis of peaceful coexistence with the West an unalterable principle. The Algerian revolution was one of those that sacrificed many lives to the preservation of Krushchev's doctrine of peaceful coexistence. Krushchev did not give the popular Algerian revolution his complete support so as to void shattering his doctrine and to preserve his relations with General DeGaulle. Replying to the protests made by the leaders of the Algerian Liberation Front he said: Keep your self-control!

Now the issue of Iraq's imposed war on Iran provides a clear look at the strategic accords between the United States and the Soviet Union. The West makes a gift of Super-Etendard fighters to the Iraqi regime, and the Soviet Union gives the long-range Frog and Scud missiles. The United States and the West in general believe that the victory of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Iraq's aggressive war will shatter the stability of the Persian Gulf region to the advantage of Iran's Islamic revolution and in Kissinger's words, will bring radicalism in the region to its climax. From its ideological viewpoint, the Soviet Union believes that if an event occurs in the region which will cut off the flow of oil, the industries in the West and Japan will come to a halt. As a result the ever-increasing contradiction between the proletarian and exploiting classes will decline and the friendly relations between the worker and capitalist classes will increase. This does not square with the Soviet Union's judgment that the West is in its death throes. From another angle the Soviet Union believes that as revolutionary Islam grows in the vital Middle Eastern region, the phenomenon of religion will once again gain favor, and instead of being opium, will inspire the region's masses into movement and struggle. Consequently the necessity of bringing socialism to the region will pale before that of resisting the spread of revolutionary Islam. Therefore the Soviet Union is striving to preserve the region's stability, the very same stability that the West is seeking. The Soviet Union sees no way to preserve the region's stability except by guarding Baghdad's regime. For this reason it shares in every Western action to preserve Baghdad's regime and struggle against the Iranian Islamic
revolution. The Soviet Union provides Iraq with its own modern weapons which mainly are for its Warsaw Pact allies. However, it shares the West's view on boycotting military supplies to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The reason is not clear. Perhaps, to turn a phrase, the Soviet Union knows that the Islamic Republic of Iran is armed with the slogan of God is Great, and because the Soviet Union lacks the spare parts for this slogan, it sides with the West!

Politically, the Soviet Union basically pursues its hostility to the West as long as there is no other powerful factor involved. The Soviet Union knows that hostility to the West is controllable, but the hostility of a powerful third party is not controllable. Here, in the Soviet Union's view, the Islamic Republic of Iran is an uncontrollable factor. The spread of this factor in the region necessarily causes a short pause in U.S.-Soviet enmity. All viewpoints must be brought closer together to confront this new factor, and all approaches must be unified to victimize this factor. This is what now can be observed in the Iran-Iraq war. The Soviet Union views the Islamic revolution in the region as a greater danger than its present situation with the West. For this reason the Soviet Union is now exactly following in the West's footsteps regarding the imposed war. But the path it is following sooner or later will come to the same end awaiting Saddam's regime.
KHAMENE'I LAUDS BAZAAR PEOPLE AS 'VANGUARDS OF REVOLUTION'

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 29 Feb 84 p 10

Representatives of guild Islamic Societies and bazaar and guild trustees from all over the country who had come to Tehran for a seminar on guild affairs met yesterday with Hojjat ol-Eslam va ol-Moslemin Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, the president.

In the meeting the president gave a speech in which he pointed to society's responsibilities and the holding of the seminar, and said: In organizing this seminar you have taken an effective step to create coordination among those involved.

The president, pointing out that society held two views towards guildsmen and craftsmen, one Islamic and Koranic, and the other non-Islamic, emphasized: Islam sanctions commerce, trade and exchange. Therefore, the guilds and craftsmen, which are a prominent crystallization of these things in the bazaars, existing in our traditional way, are an Islamic phenomenon. Anyone who rejects it has no correct knowledge of Islamic culture and does not recognize Islam's attention to business and trade. The president, also pointing out that in the revolution the guilds and bazaar people gained preference to others, said: The bazaar trustees were the first persons to kindle the struggle, and this time they gained trustworthiness and pulled the rest of the bazaar in that direction. Thus this stratum on the whole was more active in providing aid and assistance to the movement than others.

Hojjat ol-Eslam va ol-Moslemin Khamene'i, pointing out that not every tradesman was beloved by God, but rather those satisfied with a small profit who serve the people, addressed those present, and added: At your work in your place of trade you must propagate the quality of divine belovedness so that you can create an Islamic model for tradesmen for others to look at.

In another portion of his speech the president pointed out: Today the slogan of the guilds nationwide must be that of good supply at a low price. He considered drawing the trades into society's production sector as a fundamental task, and added: This is the general policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the constitution stresses this issue as well.
The president then pointed to the issue of the elections, and said: The elections are a fundamental issue, and the nation's imam has also clarified your duty in this area.

It would be good for you to define some standards in this seminar. In conclusion, the president of the Supreme Defense Council pointed to the recent operations of Islam's warriors, and stated: Praise God, the revolution is advancing in the war just as in other areas. Despite the words of all the world's great powers who have been worried and apprehensive over Saddam's defeat, we have inflicted a mighty blow on Saddam, and we will go on doing so. God willing, with God's succor, our zealous combatants will bring down the fragile, rotten trappings of that system with one decisive blow.