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U.S. POLICY, STRATEGY IN THIRD WORLD VIEWED

Beijing XIANDAI GUOJI GUANXI [CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] in Chinese No 7, 20 Apr 86 pp 26-29, 15

[Article by Ha Zhang [0761 2627]: "The Third World's Situation as Appraised and Approached by the Reagan Administration"]

[Text]

I

The U.S. Government is extremely interested in the developing trends in the Third World's political and economic situation. In recent years, President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz, as well as other high-ranking government officials have issued many statements focused on the questions in this respect. From these people we see some of the basic appraisals and views of those in power in America on the current situation in the Third World. Summing them up, there are the following main points:

A. In economics, they think that the currently expanding Third World countries are exploring strategies for economic development, readjusting their economic policies, and bringing about a "revolution in economic thought and economic policy." From Asia and Africa to Latin America, everywhere there are trends encouraging the support of the private sector of the economy, the abolishment of nationalization, the decentralization of power, the "reduction of centralized planning to the greatest extent possible," the "reduction of rigid practices," and the expansion of the "scope of the consumer's freedom and cooperation through the market" (Shultz: statement on 3 January 1985 to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Senate; 23 September 1985 speech at the UN General Assembly). In brief, America thinks that a wind of change "toward a free market economy" is sweeping across the Third World.

B. In politics, it thinks that a tendency for "political democratization" is developing in the Third World countries, which is currently prominently reflected in the Latin American region. In the past, America's support of dictatorial regimes in Latin America was very unpopular, and during the Carter administration years "human rights diplomacy" was pursued, the results produced by it not being clear. After Reagan came to power, on the one hand he pursued a tough policy toward that region, and on the other hand he publicized "political democratization" and urged military governents to return political power to the people. In the past 6 years, the military
governments and dictatorial regimes in 11 countries of the Latin American region have been replaced by democratically elected governments. The fall from power of the Marcos regime in the Philippines not long ago also reflected the tendency in some Asian countries toward "democratization."

C. In some regions of the Third World, there has appeared a tendency for "stability, not revolution" and "strengthened cooperation." Scalapino (director of the East Asia Research Institute of the University of California at Berkeley) has said: "The theme in Asia is development, not adventure; dealing with concrete matters, not rigid ideology; and stability, not revolution." This is a representative view in America. After Reagan came to power, he strengthened the military deployment and diplomatic activity in the Asian-Pacific region, and there was a big growth in America's trade with Asian and Pacific countries and certain improvements in its position. America also thinks that this region is full of economic vigor, and there has appeared a new trend toward "enhanced cooperation with it. The idea of a Pacific Ocean community is being formed." The scope of regional consultations is expanding, and "the sense of common security interests is developing." Within the next 10 to 15 years, "it is very probable that the international relationships of the Pacific Ocean region will enter a new era." (Shultz: speeches on 31 January and 21 February 1985)

D. In some regions of the Third World there exist factors for instability and "potential flashpoints." For example, in South Korea and Chile, fierce political struggles have begun centered on effecting democratic systems and changing political power. In South Africa, the black people's struggle against racism is developing swiftly and violently, and their "hostility to America is extremely serious." In the Third World, nationalistic sentiments for defending national independence and getting rid of outside interference are daily rising, and their spearhead is being pointed more and more at America. America also plays up the increase in "low-intensity wars" in the Third World. For example, frequently the "regional conflicts and crises, the terrorist activities, as well as the subversive rebellions" imperil the interests of America and the West. They form a "moderate degree of challenge" to America, and are the "most immediate threat" that America now faces in the Third World.

E. The debt problem and the problem of America's trade protectionism have become a new focus of friction between America and the Third World. The debts of Latin American countries and other developing countries are heavy. After putting retrenchment policies into effect, some countries face enormous economic difficulties. The 11-country Contadora group of Latin America is gradually taking a harder line, stressing that they cannot by repaying debts sacrifice the economic development of the debtor countries and lower their people's living standards; in this struggle they are gradually coordinating their actions and speaking with one voice. America is realizing more and more that the debt problem not only involves the ability of the debtor countries to repay, but even relates to the entire international banking system and to America's economic, political, and strategic interests. If handled improperly it will cause social unrest and political instability in these countries,
which would not be to America's advantage. America's domestic trade protectionism also can at anytime touch off new conflicts between America and the Third World countries.

F. In its contention with the Soviet Union for influence, America has made progress but there also exist fundamental weak points. For example, there has been progress in the relations between the Soviet Union and the Gulf countries, and some "moderate friends of America are stealthily leaving America's side." In Asia, the Soviet Union has launched an "aggressive diplomatic offensive" in an attempt to expand its influence and improve its strategic position. All of this constitutes a "new challenge" for America.

In brief, in its overall appraisal of the current situation in the Third World, America thinks that there are some factors favorable to it, which provide America with opportunities, and that there also exist some unfavorable factors, which pose a severe challenge to it. In comparison, in America's contest of strength with the Soviet Union there are more favorable factors. This is mainly reflected in the fact that many countries in the Third World are breaking away from the Soviet model. In addition, the Soviet Union is busy with reorganizing its internal affairs, and has been forced to shorten its front in the Third World. Thus its offensive has been weakened, and in some regions it is in a "defensive" position.

II

Based on the abovementioned appraisal of the Third World situation, the Reagan administration is vigorously making use of all sorts of factors favorable to America and overcoming factors unfavorable to it. The general guiding idea and policy goals for the Third World are: Grasp the golden opportunity in which the Third World countries are now pursuing economic development strategies and the Soviet Union's influence in the Third World is in a relative decline. Based on long-term strategic considerations, make full use of America's economic and technological superiorities and its so-called "moral superiority" to guide and impel the developing countries to take the path of economic "opening to the outside world and liberalization" and of political "democratization and pluralization" so that they will become further estranged from the Soviet Union and thoroughly break away from the Soviet model, and will develop along a track favorable to America's policies. At the same time, in the contention with the Soviet Union, be sure to avoid a direct military confrontation. America's specific practices are:

A. In economics, use all economic measures to encourage the developing countries to develop in the direction of a free market economy. Reagan actively advocates that the developing countries adopt a "new viewpoint for development," namely, give full play to the "magic of the market," expand the free market economy, encourage private enterprise, reform the economic structure, and formulate an open-door economic policy for more participation in the world economic system, in order to promote America's private investment and to expand America's export of commodities and labor. This is the core of the Reagan administration's economic policy toward the Third World. To this end, through economic, technological, and development aid and food aid, and by using credit mechanisms, it exerts influence on the economic policies of the
developing countries. Besides providing a large amount of economic aid by the "Caribbean Basin Initiative" and the "Central American Peaceful Development Initiative" in the Latin American region, America, making use of the economic difficulties of African countries, it has set up a special fund for "promoting reform in Africa's economic policies" (appropriating for this purpose $500 million--$75 million in fiscal 1986) and the so-called "Food for Progress" initiative. Its purpose is to change the basic direction of the economic policies of these countries, and to encourage the development of open market companies and the "abandonment of centralized economic systems."

With regard to the current outstanding debt problem in the Third World, America's attitude has become flexible, and it has made an appropriate readjustment in its tactical methods; reflected in a concentrated manner by the "three-point proposal" set forth by U.S. Treasury Secretary Baker in October of last year. Departing from its past negative and perfunctory attitude, America has adopted a new policy of comparatively active involvement. From blindly demanding that debtor countries carry out economic retrenchment, it has switched to advocating that the economies of these countries be gradually restored and developed. It has called for the expansion within 3 years of new credits amounting to $29 billion to the main debtor countries, with the focus on helping the countries most heavily in debt (there are 15 of them, 10 of which are in Latin America), but on condition that these countries must carry out reforms to "head more in the direction of a liberalized market economy." Baker's proposal was made for the purpose of safeguarding America's own economic interests and also for the purpose of strengthening America's strategic rear.

B. In politics, America promotes so-called "democratization," actively props up pro-American forces, and especially focuses on the new generation of leaders in order to insure that the policies of the Third World countries continue to develop in a direction favorable to America. To this end, Reagan goes all out in the so-called "promotion of democratic movements" in the Third World, making this a component part of his foreign strategy. The specific measures are: 1. Through various forms visiting Third World leaders are inculcated with the West's "concept of value" and its "free and democratic system." 2. By the implementation of a "long-term, high-quality training plan" by American institutions, students from developing countries who are studying in America are provided with opportunities to pursue advanced studies. Americans call this plan a "strategic investment" in the future leaders at all levels in the Third World and an exerting of influence on the progress of development in these countries, which will have "far-reaching beneficial effects." 3. It helps "unofficial democratic organizations" in various countries, promotes "education in democracy," and enhances the exchange of ideas and culture. 4. At Reagan's proposal, the U.S. Congress has set up a "National Fund for Democracy," which specially engages in projects for "cooperation of democratic forces" in various places.

With regard to certain countries in the Third World in which there is currently an extremely turbulent political situation caused by the crisis in successors to the leadership, America has adopted a policy of working along both lines: on the one hand, it pressures the people in power to make political, economic, and military reforms while giving them aid in order to
maintain America's interests; on the other hand, it makes contacts with the opposition factions in these countries and exerts influence on them to provide for a rainy day and leave itself an option.

C. In regional contention, it pursues the so-called new strategy of "Reaganism" to check Soviet influence. Reagan has publicly declared that he wants to support forces resisting the Soviet Union "from Nicaragua to Angola, from Afghanistan to Kampuchea," and with more active forms to aid them; and to elevate this practice to the height of a basic principle of American foreign policy. Officials of America's Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, and Department of State have drafted a plan for setting up "freedom fighter coordination bureaus" in various places. Recently, the abovementioned departments jointly organized a secret organization—the "208 Committee"—to supervise the carrying out of secret activities of a paramilitary nature against the Third World. In November of last year, on the eve of the U.S.-Soviet summit talks, Reagan set forth a three-stage proposal for resolving the conflicts in Kampuchea, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and Angola. After the summit talks, Reagan said that from now on America would "follow with extremely close attention any changes in Soviet activities in the Third World," and he urged the Soviet Union to come up with a timetable for withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan.

D. Improve the capability for overseas intervention. To deal with the challenge to America posed by "low-intensity wars" in important regions of the Third World, the Reagan administration in recent years has greatly improved its capability for overseas intervention. Besides accelerating the buildup of the Rapid Deployment Force and setting up its central headquarters, it is preparing within the next 5 years to build five light divisions suited for operations in the Third World. At the same time, it is considering modeling itself on the Soviet Union by using "proxies" to intervene in trouble spots in the Third World.

E. It is taking comprehensive measures to deal more vigorously with terrorist activities. America is taking a series of comprehensive measures, such as "active defense," "preemptive strikes," exchange of intelligence, economic sanctions," and "retaliation" by military measures at necessary times, to deal with terrorist activities. Leaders of the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation have jointly formed an "antiterrorist activities special group." They are preparing to accredit abroad "forward groups" for antiterrorist activities to improve the capabilities for rapid reaction to deal with emergencies. America's Defense Department and Congress are studying a plan for concentrating the various antiterrorist forces into a "special defense organization," which would take over and merge the special units originally separately controlled by the service arms. This organization would deploy the special units and their aircraft and weapons at forward bases that are near trouble areas and from which it would be easy to mount a strike, in order to be able to swiftly exercise control once a crisis occurs. At the same time it calls on its allies to strengthen their coordination. In his budget message in February this year, Reagan asked for a special appropriation of $1.7 billion in fiscal 1987 to protect the security of American diplomatic missions abroad and to deal with terrorist activities.
III

By and large the following characteristics have appeared in the Reagan administration's policy toward the Third World:

A. It possesses a strong anticommunist ideological hue. Reagan's policy toward the Third World is proceeding even more from a strategy of a "competition between two ideologies." It stresses that one of the main goals of America's "second revolution" is to spread the West's "democracy and freedom" to the Third World. It advocates providing the developing countries with the "faith and aid" needed in the "competition with the Soviet Union," in an attempt to fundamentally influence the course of political and economic development in these countries.

B. Not permitting the Soviet Union to again expand by "one inch of land" in the Third World. During the course of Reagan's pursuit of his policy toward the Third World, he has stressed that the strategy of resisting the Soviet Union is on a higher level than human rights diplomacy; that security aid is more important than economic aid (in fiscal 1987 he has asked for $11.3 billion in military aid, $1 billion more than in the preceding year); and that the focus of aid be more concentrated on countries of important strategic significance to America.

C. Giving more prominence to the position of the Asian-Pacific Region in America's global strategy. It is stressed that the 21st century is the "Pacific Ocean century" and that "America's future is in the Pacific Ocean." The center of gravity of America's economic strength must be gradually shifted westward. The administration sees that the rapid rise of the Asian-Pacific region possess major significance for the future "economic, political, and military balance of the world." It also observes the Soviet Union's increasing interest in this region, and is taking a series of measures to strengthen America's economic, political, and strategic position in this region in an attempt to seize the initiative.

D. Avoiding direct military involvement in hot spots. Reagan received a lesson from his defeat in sending troops to Lebanon in his first term. No matter whether in Central America or the Middle East and other hot spots, he does not rashly directly employ American military forces, but stresses that America "must act with caution," and stresses a policy of the "art of diplomatic struggle," suitting measures to local conditions, or promoting change through pressure, or using "economic aid, security support, and diplomatic mediation" in order to contend more effectively with the Soviet Union, and at the same time "reduce the danger of a direct conflict between East and West.

E. Accurately spotting the Soviet Union's weak points, and applying even more of America's economic, scientific and technological superiorities to give full play to "economic diplomacy" in contending with the Soviet Union in the Third World. However, at the same time the administration maintains a cold attitude toward the questions of North-South dialogue and global talks.
Looking at the last 3 years of the Reagan administration's second term, we see that America's basic policy and practices for the Third World will not change. In the new situation after the U.S.-Soviet summit talks of a limited warming in the relations between the two countries, their contention in the Third World will not follow this trend of moderation. However, in pursuing its Third World policy, the Reagan administration still faces numerous difficulties. First, in some of its policies and practices in the Third World, America only considers its own interests, which are opposite to the legitimate rights and interests of the great number of developing countries. Thus, the struggle between control and anticontrol, between the maintaining of hegemony and the safeguarding of national interests, continues to develop. Currently, in the economic domain (for example, the debtor countries), the trend for a joint struggle against hegemonism is just unfolding. Next, on the question of the Third World, there are many contradictions and differences between America and its West European allies. In addition, the Soviet Union, grasping America's contradictions and weak points with the Third World countries, is waiting for a chance to forge ahead. All of these things are bound to contain and weaken America's influence, making it hard for America to carry out its policy successfully.
DISCUSSION OF U.S. POLICY CHOICES IN MIDDLE EAST

Beijing XIANDAI GUOJI GUANXI [CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] in Chinese No 2, 20 Apr 86 pp 30-34, 40

[Article by Wan Guang [8001 0342]: "U.S. Policies in the Middle East Are Inherently Self-Contradictory"]

[Text] The Middle East has consistently occupied an important place in U.S. global strategy since the end of World War II. In the first postwar years, the United States nudged out British and French influence and filled the void they left behind. Subsequently, the region became one of the focuses of contention in the worldwide struggle for hegemony between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States directly takes part in the Arab-Israeli conflict and time and again supports Israel in its wars of aggression. On two occasions it sent troops to the Middle East.

What policy choices Washington makes in the Middle East profoundly influences the unrest in the region, the way the regional situation evolves, and even events in the world as a whole.

Four Key Aspects

Four aspects of U.S. Middle Eastern policies have been of momentous significance.

1. U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Among the welter of conflicts that make up Middle Eastern politics, the confrontation between Arab nationalism and Israeli expansionism often takes center stage. U.S. policies toward the confrontation have special significance for the overall U.S. position and policies in the region.

Israel was founded after the war in 1948 with the wholehearted support of the Truman Administration. An Arab-Israeli war ensued in which the Arab nations were defeated.

In all subsequent Arab-Israeli struggles, the United States has basically supported Israel in its aggressive expansionism. In terms of specific actions, however, U.S. policies do change over time.
In 1956, Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt. To expel British and French influence and curry favor with the Arabs, the United States demanded that Britain and France agree to a cease-fire and evacuate their troops and urged Israel to withdraw from Sinai Peninsula, which belongs to Egypt. In 1957, it declared the "Eisenhower Doctrine" aimed at dominating the Middle East. In 1958, it sent troops to Lebanon and met fierce resistance from the Arab people. In the 1960's, the United States relied heavily on Israel to suppress the surging tide of Arab nationalism and check the growth of Soviet influence in the region. With U.S. backing, Israel invaded the Arab nations in 1967 and occupied extensive Arab territory. It was in the wake of these events that a number of Arab countries severed diplomatic relations with Washington. In the 1970's, the United States maintained its "special relations" with Israel, coming to the latter's aid unfailingy when it met Arab counterattacks during its war of aggression, and continued to preserve Israeli military superiority vis-a-vis its Arab neighbors. On the other hand, the United States also explored every avenue to improve relations with certain moderate Arab nations. In 1978 and 1979, under U.S. aegis, Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David accords and a bilateral peace treaty. These policy adjustments by the United States in the last decade were prompted by the demonstration of Arab strength in 1973 and in the oil crisis. They were also related to U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Middle East and Washington's desire to gain leverage with the Arab nations.

At the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the Palestinian issue. Time and again the United States strikes at the Palestinian resistance forces. For a while in the late 1970's, the Carter Administration softened its attitude toward the Palestinian issue only to stiffen its position again soon afterwards by adamantly refusing to recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization [PLO] and negotiate with it and opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state.

2. U.S. behavior in its struggle with the Soviet Union to dominate the region. U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Middle East has gone through several rounds. After World War II, the United States sought to make the Middle East its preserve and keep out Soviet influence. In the 1950's, with the "Eisenhower Doctrine" in a shambles and U.S. military intervention in Lebanon a failure, the Soviet Union began to penetrate into the Arab world. When Arab differences with the United States deepened following the 1967 war, the Soviet Union made every effort to strengthen its position in the region, sending the United States scrambling to stop its adversary from gaining superiority in the Middle East and seek to maintain a balance of power through negotiations and other maneuvers. In the 1970's, the Soviet Union suffered a string of serious setbacks, and the United States managed to reestablish itself at a number of bases and monopolize the peace process, excluding Soviet participation. Toward the end of the decade, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and intensified its southern push. Meanwhile the United States has beefed up its military deployments in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Middle East is interwoven with the Arab-Israeli conflict, which both superpowers exploit as they vie for regional supremacy. They alternate offensive positions with defensive ones as their policies change and their influence waxes and wanes. Their shifting positions are also
related to Arab resistance and the way they exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict. Basically, U.S. setbacks in the region in the 1950's and those suffered by the Soviet Union in the 1970's resulted from the resistance and struggle by the Arab nations.

Fierce as their competition in the Middle East, the superpowers many times compromised and struck deals with each other in order to avoid a head-on collision, suppress and undermine the strength of the Arab nations, and set up temporary spheres of influence, in the process sacrificing the interests of the Arab people. They compromise on a short-term basis only to intensify their struggle later.

3. U.S. policy toward Arab nations. It has always been the aim of the United States to undermine Arab nationalism, whether by organizing its own military alliance and intervening militarily, or by supporting Israel in its wars of aggression and provocation. Even as it works to improve relations with Arab nations and offers them military and economic aid, it invariably tries to infiltrate and control them with an eye toward steering them into its own sphere of influence. After the 1973 war and the oil crisis, the United States became even more committed to dividing and weakening the Arab nations.

4. The United States uses military and political means in turn to carry out its policies in the Middle East. In the early 1950's, it repeatedly sought to put together a military alliance in the region, but in vain. In the middle of the decade, it sponsored the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, which collapsed within a few years. In 1958, it invaded Lebanon under the "Eisenhower Doctrine" but was forced to withdraw its troops after a few months. Military alliances, direct military intervention, support for Israeli wars of aggression in the 1960's—all encountered violent resistance from the Arab people. U.S. military moves are often a two-edged weapon directed against the expansion of Soviet influence as well as the Arab countries.

At various points in time, the United States has also resorted to the ploy of peace talks. But in the talks after the 1967 war and those leading to the Camp David accord and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the United States was partial to Israel and had no sincere desire to work out a just solution to the Palestinian question. Its overriding concern is to expand its influence and power in the area through peace talks.

The Characteristics of Reagan's Policies

Since it came into power, the Reagan Administration has mounted a military buildup and adopted a hard-line attitude toward the Soviet Union. It has also exacerbated the conflict in the Middle East.

U.S. priorities in the event of a global war were set out by the Reagan Administration in a defense position paper for fiscal years 1984-88 prepared by the U.S. Defense Department. According to the document, "the top priority is to defend North America and territory covered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." "The second priority in overall planning is to safeguard passages to the oil-producing region in Southwest Asia."
The Reagan Administration outlined U.S. policies and goals in the Middle East in a report to Congress in October 1981. "Our regional goals (in the Middle East) can be enumerated as follows: ensure oil supplies, protect sea passages, contain growing Soviet influence, and improve our political, economic, and commercial relations in the region."

What policies has the Reagan Administration adopted to achieve these goals?

(1) Rely more heavily on Israel. Even before Reagan became president, the WASHINGTON POST pointed out in an article on 15 August 1979 that the downfall of the Shah of Iran has heightened Israel's value, that Israel may be the only strategic stronghold on which the United States could pin its hope, and that Israel has become Washington's "last major strategic asset in the region."

In a speech to reporters from Italy's TIME magazine in July 1980, Reagan said, "In the Middle East, we rely on Egypt. It is a fair weather friend." He also remarked that "the only country which is firmly on our side is Israel."

In September 1981, the Reagan Administration reached a strategic cooperative agreement with Israel, the first formal agreement on strategic cooperation between the two nations since Israel was founded in 1948. In November 1983 a joint U.S.-Israeli political and military commission was established. In 1984 the United States and Israel held two joint military exercises. Meanwhile, the U.S. has stepped up its military and economic assistance for Israel without interruption. Reagan claimed on 6 September 1984 that he had consolidated the U.S.-Israeli alliance with the result that bilateral relations were now closer and friendship stronger than at any time in history. It should be said that every U.S. president after World War II has supported Israel. But according to former President Nixon, "Israel probably has in President Reagan its strongest backer in the White House since Truman."

(2) Emphasizes U.S. military presence in the Middle East, and, in a replay of the 1950's, establishes an "anti-Soviet strategic cooperative system," and stands ready to intervene militarily. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late 1979, the Carter Administration declared a "Carter Doctrine" and set about augmenting U.S. military presence in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. The Reagan Administration has followed the same approach, only on a much larger scale.

As soon as he assumed office, President Reagan sent Secretary of State Haig to the Middle East to impress upon the nations in the region the need to fall in line with the anti-Soviet strategy of the United States and allow U.S. military presence. Yet by ignoring the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Palestinian question, the U.S. initiative was rebuffed by most Arab nations. The U.S. Central Command, established in early 1983 to cover the Middle East and the gulf, is authorized in an emergency to despatch to the region the rapid deployment force made up of more than 200,000 men from the army, navy, and air force and stationed mainly in the United States. The United States has been increasing its military strength in the Indian Ocean as well as the Middle East, expanding its naval and air bases on Diego Garcia and other islands off the coast of the Indian Ocean, and has been regularly holding joint military exercises and joint military commission meetings with some
Middle Eastern and north African nations. It has taken advantage of the
tension in the gulf arising from the war between Iran and Iraq to adopt a
higher military profile and asked a number of gulf states to offer it military
bases.

The military bias in the Middle East policy of the Reagan Administration
manifests itself most sharply not only in its support for Israel's wars of
aggression and provocation, but also in its armed intervention in the region
using U.S. troops.

In June 1982, Israel launched a war of aggression against Lebanon. The United
States supported Israel in the war, supplying it with weapons and economic
assistance throughout and coordinating its moves closely with those of Israel
militarily and diplomatically. U.S. marines were sent to Lebanon in the guise
of part of a multinational contingent. Along with U.S. warships and planes
amassed near Lebanon, the marines attacked Lebanese Muslem militias and Syrian
troops and bases in Lebanon. But the United States also played "mediator" and
helped arrange a cease-fire between Lebanon and Israel in May 1983 in an
attempt to bring Lebanon into the U.S.-Israeli sphere of influence, only to be
fiercely resisted by the Lebanese and Arab people. In February 1984 it was
forced to withdraw the marines and the Lebanese-Israeli agreement was also
renounced. The United States had suffered a serious defeat in the Middle
East.

In June 1981, the United States officially supported Israel's air raids on
Iraq's nuclear facilities. In October 1985, Israeli planes bombed the PLO
headquarters in Tunis. A White House spokesman declared the Israeli attack a
"legitimate response and an act of self-defense." Later an Italian cruise
ship was hijacked by Palestinians. After the incident was resolved, U.S.
military aircraft intercepted the Egyptian civilian plane carrying the
Palestinian hijackers in international air space over the Mediterranean Sea.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government declared its readiness to attack Palestinian
personnel. In addition, the United States attacked Libya militarily time and
again.

(3) Plays the card of peace talks. Faced with a wave of anti-U.S. sentiments
in the Arab world resulting from its behavior in the Lebanese war, the Reagan
Administration unveiled a Middle East peace plan in September 1982. The plan
offered self-government under Jordan to Palestinians on the West Bank of
Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip after a transitional period but opposed the
establishment of an independent Palestinian homeland. At the same time, the
United States continued to refuse to recognize the PLO and actually demanded
that Arab nations withdraw their recognition of the PLO as the legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people.

In the wake of U.S. defeat in Lebanon in 1984, the Soviet Union again got
active in the region. To resist the Soviet offensive and maintain and improve
its relations with the Arab nations, the United States launched another round
of peace talks in 1985, emphasizing direct negotiations between Jordan and
Israel, sidestepped the PLO and tried to work out a unilateral settlement.
The United States might put forth one peace formula after another and sing
different tunes at different times, but they are all variations on a theme.
Basically the United States has not changed its policy: It still denies the Palestinian people the right of self-determination and refuses to recognize the PLO. The Israeli authorities too have acted as if it were willing to negotiate with Jordan, while continuing to deny the rights of the Palestinian people. The series of peace talks made it all too plain the United States and Israeli designs to break up and annihilate the Palestinian people's resistance and struggle.

Compared to the peace talks of the 1970's, the United States has been more relentless in its pressure on the Arabs to make endless concessions. The United States has declared officially that it would not press Israel to change its position. Behind the U.S. policy is the assumption that the Arab world is still deeply divided and that the power of the PLO has been sapped by internal dissensions. As the world's oil supply outstrips demand and oil prices plunge, Arab nations are not in a position to wield the oil weapon. The United States is thus freed from any pressure to take urgent actions, while remaining free to put pressure on the Arab nations when an opportunity presents itself. Meanwhile, Israel has been gripped by a severe economic crisis and political unrest after the Lebanon war, and the United States believes that its most urgent task now is to prop up Israel.

(4) As part of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, the United States tries its best to maintain the advantage it has gained over the Soviet Union in the Middle East in the 1970's. Its intention has been to monopolize the peace process and exclude the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Soviet power in the region is not totally negligible. In the early 1980's, U.S.-Soviet relations were deadlocked. There was confrontation but no dialogue. Since 1985, because of both nations' individual needs, their relations have entered a new stage, characterized by dialogue as well as confrontation. While they compete ferociously in the Middle East, they are careful to avoid a direct conflict. In February 1985, the two nations held their first bilateral talks on the Middle East since 1977. Subsequently, many high-level discussions between the two nations also touched upon the Middle East. The Arab world is worried that the superpowers would again make a deal in the Middle East at their expense.

Conflicts Caused by U.S. Policies

In many ways the United States is well equipped to expand its power in the Middle East. It has its traditional bases and influence in the region. It is militarily, economically, and technologically powerful. Apart from supplying arms to nations there, it is also a source of capital, technology, and economic aid. With ties to both parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it has considerable room to maneuver diplomatically. As it is the only nation that can effectively influence the Israeli government, it can "mediate" and "sponsor peace talks."

On the other hand, the inconsistencies in the policy choices the United States has made also render them fatally flawed.

The United States has stood behind Israeli's expansionist aggressive policies throughout, provoking popular anti-U.S. anger in the Arab world. In identifying with Israeli expansionism, the United States has in effect made
itself the enemy of 150 million Arab people. By holding on to Israel as a "strategic asset," the United States has lost the friendship of the vast Arab world. In 1967 and 1982, the United States supported Israel in the latter's wars of aggression. The Israelis got their way, but the United States ended up losing its foothold in the Middle East and suffering a defeat.

Conflicts have also appeared between the United States and Israel from time to time, as in the Lebanon war and over the peace talks. Out of concern for its rivalry with the Soviet Union and for its own relations with the Arab nations, the United States now and then takes actions inconsistent with Israeli policies. But in their basic objectives to break up and annihilate Palestinian resistance and divide and weaken the Arabs, the United States and Israel are at one with each other.

The U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT said in its 6 February 1984 issue, "Thirty years of Arab antagonism toward the United States can be simply explained by U.S. official and public support for Israel. Arab hatred for and fear of the Jewish state will make them continue their confrontation with Israel, a source of endless trouble for the United States for the next several decades." During my stay in the Middle East from 1979 through 1983, I came across numerous U.S. scholars, journalists and diplomats, many of them long-time sojourners in Arab nations. They believed the U.S. policy of one-sided support for Israel was a sure "recipe for defeat." A U.S. expert on the Middle East said, "If the United States does not change its policies toward Israel, it will not be able to really improve its relations with the Arabs."

For years the Middle Eastern policy of the United States repeated this scenario: It would organize a military alliance, establish a military presence, and directly intervene by sending in troops, only to be defeated in the end. This happened again and again, in the early post-war years when the United States tried unsuccessfully to establish a military alliance in the region, when the Baghdad Pact collapsed, and when the "Eisenhower Doctrine" failed. The Reagan Administration, moreover, sets great store by "consistency with the anti-Soviet strategy" and established the Rapid Deployment Force. In an article in the WASHINGTON POST in late February 1981, Philip Geyelin wrote, "By rehearsing the same old ploys of the 1950's--nothing other than large-scale military aid, formal defense arrangements and base treaties--the United States is in danger of repeating history's mistakes."

I visited several Arab nations in April and May 1981, after the United States tried to sell the Arab world its "consistency with anti-Soviet strategy," and heard public denunciations of U.S. policies throughout the trip. The Arabs pointed out that "the history of opposition by Arab people to foreign rule since the Ottoman Empire shows that any foreign nation that establishes itself by force in an Arab country will inevitably court political and military disaster."

In Middle East peace talks, the United States always sides with Israel, instead of genuinely working to solve the Palestinian issue and Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, it exploits the peace process to expand its influence and
"balkanize" the region. For these reasons, the Arab nations many times look to the United States with hope and anticipation only to be disappointed, embittered and enraged in the end.

Not only do U.S. policies fail to "check Soviet expansion" effectively, as it hopes, but they actually give the Soviet Union many opportunities. Seth Tillman, a former staffer of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, wrote in his book, "The United States in the Middle East," "The kernel of U.S. policies in the Middle East is the refusal by successive administrations to recognize self-determination for the Palestinian people. And as long as the Palestinian issue remains unsolved, Arab-U.S. relations will continue to deteriorate, giving the Soviet Union a golden opportunity to maintain its foothold in the region."

Many a time the United States has expressed its hope to improve relations with the Arab world, particularly moderate Arab nations. Yet its very own policies continue to poison those relations and cannot but arouse the dissatisfaction and opposition of the Arab nations.

What the United States often does in the Middle East is to gain some ground only to lose it again. It is the Arab nations and people who suffer from U.S.-backed Israeli aggression and U.S.-Soviet rivalry and compromises. In recent years, more and more Arabs have come to see both superpowers as "neither trustworthy nor dependable." The tendency by the Arab nations toward going their own way is on the rise and with it a decline in either Soviet or U.S. ability to influence events in the Middle East.

The history of the Middle East in the postwar decades shows that if the U.S. government does not make fundamentally different policy choices there, it cannot extricate itself from the deep dilemma it faces in the region.

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INTERNATIONAL SITUATION VIEWED IN CONTEXT OF 3 WORLDS THEORY

Beijing XIANDAI GUOJI GUANXI [CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] in Chinese No 2, 20 Apr 86 pp 1-8

[Article by Chen Zhongjing [7115 1813 4842]: "Contemporary International Strategic Situation"]

[Text] Editor's note: This is part of the first chapter of the author's book "International Strategic Questions." The foreword of this book, "The Question of the Basis for China's Foreign Policy," was published in issue No 1 of this year.

The international situation is constantly changing and developing. Every day there is news of this. It is necessary to understand and observe the "special circumstances and even moment by moment changes" in the international situation. Of course, this produces two kinds of situations: One kind is that in which, within a certain period of time in a certain area a certain type of incident is constantly "repeated" or reenacted. For example, there is the frequent internal turmoil in Lebanon in which almost every day there is a shooting war between factions that intermingle internal and external elements. With regard to this kind of situation, speaking as an "outside" observer, I must either, out of consideration for the overall strategic situation, consider it unnecessary for the time being to give it excessive attention or temporarily put it aside; or I must pay attention to every small or subtle change in the constant "quantitative changes" in these "trivial matters," as well look to see whether they will ripen so that they could cause certain partial "qualititative changes." The other situation is that in which there appears every day in the news a fairly major intentional event, which of course one can even less afford to ignore. Observations and studies for the near term and the short term (1 or 2 months to 1 or 2 years) and even for the medium term (4 or 5 years to about 10 years) are likewise extremely necessary. For example, it is necessary for us to make a rough analysis and estimate of what the international environment will be like during the period of our Seventh Five-Year Plan beginning in 1986. In brief, observations on a medium-term, near-term, and even daily basis are indispensable. However, what I will stress here is long-term observation. That is to say, I will, from the thread of thought in past history, particularly looking back on the 40 years since the war, down to near-term observations, make a rough estimate and judgment of the basic trends in the development of international relations in the next 20
or 30 years, several decades, and even more than 100 years. At the end of 1985, when I visited the University of Texas in Austin, which is in the southern part of America, Professor Gordon Bennet of the Political Science Department, who is a leading member of the National Committee on U.S-China Relations, suggested that in its research on international questions, China should pay more attention to some long-term, far-reaching explorations. I think his suggestion showed sound judgment. Daily observations are, of course, a basis. Obviously, they are of practical significance for our near- and medium-term observations and research on the international situation. From a view of strategy, it is possible that 3 to 5 years could also become a strategic period and a strategic evolution, which would involve a readjustment of certain strategies of ours. However, if we neglect the more fundamental long-term analyses and estimates, do not look a little farther and deeper, our grasp of the overall strategic situation for a fairly long time will not be all that stable or accurate, and the limited nature, probable nature, and even blind nature of our near- and medium-term observations and research will increase. Under certain circumstances, this could affect our confidence and resolution in "never yielding to temporary emergencies," and make the "strategic basis" for our foreign policy (of course, it would also relate to all of our state's policy decisions) not all that deepgoing and penetrating. That is the significance of the title of this chapter being "contemporary," not "current," international situation.

The objectively existing contemporary international strategic situation is the direct strategic basis for China's foreign policy, and is the strategic basis for its long-term overall situation. Following are its main points:

First point: The "three worlds" have a long-term objective existence, and are a contemporary international long-term situation.

Not long ago a European statesman visiting China said: "Some people hope to divide the world into highly developed and undeveloped countries, and for many years this division has increased tension in the world. We think that a narrowing of this economic and technological gap would be beneficial to world stability and peace." The latter half of this statement was well said; the former half at the very least did not state the problem clearly. Highly developed and undeveloped countries exist objectively and they cannot be "divided" at will by people's subjective "hope." As for the increase in the tense situations in the world, one cannot in sweeping and vague terms say that it is caused by the "division" of this subjective hope. If it is said that some people are trying to maintain this objectively existing division forever in order that the tiny minority of "highly developed" countries for generations to come can bully and humiliate, oppress and exploit the great majority of "undeveloped countries," then the implication of the former half of this statement naturally is another matter. In a similar sense, the strategic idea of "the division into three worlds" is certainly not a subjective fabrication, but stems from the strategic situation of objective reality.

At the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century, after Christopher Columbus and Amerigo Vespucci had discovered new continents, people called the three continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa the "Old World"
and the American continents the "New World." This was first said in a geographical sense. As for what effects this has produced in politics, economy, religion, and culture on the "Old World," particularly Europe, and on the "New World" itself, that is, of course, another matter.

As far as nature goes, the earth is a celestial body in the universe, as well as one in which one or two million years or even longer all mortal beings began to multiply, and it can be said to be one world. As for human society, the primitive society of the primitive commune system can also be said to be one world. With the change from the primitive society to the slave society, from public ownership to private ownership, and from no classes and exploitation to classes and exploitation, particularly after the appearance of slave countries in different regions, human society in reality gradually became no longer one world. Afterward the emergence and development in various regions of the world of the feudal system was uneven. In Africa, the Americas, Australia, as well as some regions in Asia, whereas the feudal system in many countries had already developed and was even on the decline, the people there were just producing the feudal system, and some countries were still in the slave system and even the primitive commune system. The whole world in reality was not limited to the existence of one world. As far back as about 5 centuries B. C., China had become a feudal society, and not until the middle of the 19th century did its feudal economy gradually change and disintegrate, spanning a period of a thousand and several thousand years. However, speaking of the world as a whole, the feudal system was in the ruling position roughly from the latter part of the 5th century A.D., when the Roman Empire collapsed, to the middle of the 17th century, when the bourgeois revolution occurred in England, a span of 1,200 or 1,300 years. Then, from the 1750's to the 1860's, there was the first scientific and technological revolution represented by the steam engine, and England, Europe, America, and some other countries, one after another, gradually entered the capitalist system. In 1917, there appeared the first socialist country in the world. On the eve of the end of World War II, and mainly after this war, there appeared a number of socialist countries, and a large number of colonies and dependencies broke away from the rule of capitalist-imperialism and obtained political independence. Thus, besides another world formed by this large number of countries that had newly gained political independence, in human society there appeared two worlds: one was the capitalist world and the other was the socialist world, called by people at that time the "socialist camp." However, this situation did not last long—at most no more than 10 years. The development of history does not change according to people's will. The first socialist country, the Soviet Union, after the middle of the fifties further developed into a superpower that practiced hegemonism inside and outside the "socialist camp." Because of various historical conditions, another superpower that practiced hegemonism was formed—America—which it came to grips with, and together they rule the roost and contend with each other for hegemony over the whole world. There was no way that the "indestructible" would not be destroyed. The capitalist system could not avoid being divided, and the "socialist camp" also could not avoid splitting up. There has appeared a realignment of human society and of all countries in the world, and there has appeared a new strategic situation in contemporary international relations: the three worlds. The development of history and the actual situation is roughly like this. To simply draw a rough sketch, this is
nothing more than saying that the emergence and existence of the contemporary "three worlds" was not fortuitous. It was the necessary result of the uneven socioeconomic development of many countries in the world as well as the development of important contradictions. It was not something that was concocted by someone's subjective will when he had a brainwave.

Exactly what are the three worlds? On this question opinions vary.

We have affirmed and used the term "Third World" for many years, but the inventor's patent right does not belong to China. As a new term it began to be seen in books and newspapers roughly around the time of the Bandung Conference, and it has become very popular since the sixties. According to the book "The Third World," written by Dr (Franco Nokera), who was Portugal's foreign minister at the time, Alfred Sauvy, a French economist, in 1956 used this term for the first time. Sauvy explained that the term "Third World" (in French Tiers Monde) was deduced from the term "Third Estate" (Le Tiers Etat). In France's feudal era, the clergy was the "First Estate," the nobility was the "Second Estate," and the peasants, urban poor, and bourgeoisie were the "Third Estate." The former two were the privileged estates and the latter was the estate that was ruled. According to the entry in the "Abridged Larousse Dictionary" published in 1969, the "Third World" is all countries whose economies are not developed. They belong neither to the industrial countries with a free economy, nor to the bloc of socialist-type countries. The ninth volume of the "Encyclopedia Britannica" says: In the fifties and sixties the "Third World" referred to the colonial countries of Europe [as published] and Africa, or to nonindustrialized countries. The origin of the earliest use of this term was the "Third Bloc," which was differentiated from the communist and Western countries. America's "New Columbia Encyclopedia" says: the term "Third World" means the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America whose economies are undeveloped, thus differentiating them from the two categories of nation blocs whose economies and technologies are advanced. One category is the Western countries, mainly those countries under the influence of America; the other category is the Soviet bloc, mainly those countries under Soviet influence. China is usually assigned to the Third World countries, but perhaps it is a little more true to look upon it as a fourth force in the international balance. (Author's note: Not true.) (Owens Lewis Suarez), professor of sociology in the University of Washington, USA, in his book "World in Three Developing Stages," made the following exposition:

The "First World" means the world ruled by America, which includes its West European allies as well as its "satellite countries" in Latin America and various parts of the world.

The "Second World" means the world ruled by the Soviet Union, which historically is Russia's sphere of influence and includes its allies and "satellite countries" in parts of Eastern Europe and Asia.

The "Third World" means the nonaligned countries that are not "satellite countries" in regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and usually includes various types and kinds of countries in economy from Algeria to Yugoslavia and in systems of government from India to China.
In its geographical, economic, and social characteristics, China has points in common with the "Third World." If we select these factors as our standard, then China is not only a member of the "Third World" but also its leader. (Author's note: That it is a member is absolutely true; there is no sense in which China is its "leader," and also this does not conform to reality.) However, if we make the characteristics of the social system the main standard, China belongs to the Eastern Bloc. (Author's note: Not so.) Later, more and more countries that had no organizational connections with Nato or the Warsaw Treaty considered themselves to belong to the "Third World."

From a look at the abovementioned long exposition by Professor (Suarez), we see that he not only set forth a definition of the "Third World" but also dealt with the "First World" and the "Second World." Summing up what all the experts say, what they mean by the "Third World" is roughly the same or fairly close to being the same. As for the views of Professor (Suarez) and the abovementioned dictionaries and encyclopedias on the "First World" and the "Second World" our views are completely unlike. This could be partly for the reason that there have been some changes and developments in actual history. I don't know what their views are now.

In 1974, Chairman Mao Zedong clearly set forth the strategic idea or international strategic principle of differentiating three worlds. This, of course, was not something he did as he pleased, but was a scientific summation, through a long period of observation and careful consideration, of the objectively existing current and contemporary international strategic situation. Annotation No 30 (pp 378-379) in the "Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping" says: "On 22 February 1974, when receiving Zambian President Kaunda, Chairman Mao Zedong set forth the viewpoint differentiating the three worlds. According to this viewpoint, the First World refers to the two superpowers, America and the Soviet Union, who have the strongest military and economic forces and are pursuing hegemonism on a world scale; the Third World refers to the developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other regions; and the Second World refers to the developed countries in between these two worlds." (Author's note: To the reference at the end of this annotation "--pages 74, 122, and 46" should be added page 158). Although this annotation did not quote Chairman Mao's original words, after careful comparison and research I think that it faithfully and accurately sums up the spirit and content of the original conversation.

Here we must relate to some questions and situations

First, some Soviets complain to us: "How can you juxtapose us with America!" Similarly, some Americans complain to us: "How can you juxtapose us with the Soviet Union!" We have no alternative. This is not something we could subjectively stipulate as we pleased; it is an objectively existing reality acknowledged by the world. Only you two countries have "many atomic bombs and are comparatively rich." (Also, you "have the strongest military and economic forces.") Only you two countries pursue hegemonism on a world scale. If a world war were to begin, only you two countries have the qualifications to begin it. There is another point that might as well be first raised here: Some people say that we are pursuing a balanced policy "equidistant" between the two superpowers; we say that is incorrect and that that is not our
strategic principle. Our principle is: whichever of your countries in whatever region or by whatever incident pursues hegemonism, we oppose that country; whichever of your countries poses a direct threat of hegemonism to us, we, of course, oppose that country; and we oppose your pursuit of hegemonism on a world scale, no matter whether it is a fierce contention by you two for hegemony or a joint seeking of hegemony. We oppose hegemonism, oppose your policy of pursuing hegemonism, and we do not oppose the two countries of America and the Soviet Union; we affirmed long ago that, on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, we wanted to develop friendly relations between each of you or promote the normalization of relations between your two countries. As for the desire of the Chinese people for friendly relations with the great Soviet people and the great American people, it goes without saying. During our long contacts, we really understand that, no matter whether it is the Soviet Union or America, there is no lack of men of insight, no lack of farsighted and sagacious statesmen and specialist scholars. Even among the American capitalists, even though they are bent solely on profits, there are some of them with desirable strategic vision with regard to certain problems in world affairs. In talking with friends about these questions, which are worthy of serious considerations, we often have much language in common. At the same time, if these two superpowers do some good things in world affairs -- for example, the Geneva summit talks between the two countries in November 1985, as well as developments after them, and even the conclusion of certain provisional agreement--no matter whether they are genuine or false, whether they are propaganda or true actions, a little warmth is added to the international atmosphere. This, of course, should be praised and welcomed, even if it is a cautious, reserved, and doubting welcome.

This pattern of the "First World" composed of the two countries of America and the Soviet Union does not look to be a short-term affair. It is true that they will not easily let go and do nothing, and that there will be a slackening here and a tightening there. For a long time, the "boat will go up when the river rises"--particular things will improve with the improvement of the general situation--and they will strive to overtake each other, but nobody will be able to quickly complete a deployment that will lead to a showdown and the exclusive domination of the world. At the same time, for a long time, one cannot see any third country that will be able to jump up and ascend into the ranks of the "First World." For example, can Japan, which is known to be a great nation economically, become a great nation militarily? It is not that there are not people in Japan who think and would act for this end. However, this would not only not be permitted by America and the Soviet Union, not be permitted by the countries of Asia and the Pacific Ocean, but even more fundamentally, it would not be countenanced by the Japanese people.

Second, there are many countries in the Second World and also a small number of countries in the "Third World" that do not have relations of alliance with the "First World," either the Soviet Union or America. Are they "allies"? Does not there exist in the world of today the "Nato Bloc" and the "Warsaw Treaty Bloc," or what is called the "great family of socialism"? Isn't it correct that we cannot say yet whether the approximately more than 30 countries of the "Third World" will independently "divide" into a "Second World"? I say: Correct, because this conforms to reality, conforms to the
development of reality. This is because the Soviet Union and America practice hegemonism on their allies or quasi-allies to a considerably large degree or to different degrees. Adding to this, the uneven pattern of the development of the world economy--this fundamental factor--the contradictions in economic interests between the Soviet Union and America on the one hand and their allies on the other hand are becoming more and more prominent. There are many examples of this type. For example, a 3 May 1985 AP dispatch from Bonn reported on the situation of the summit conference of the seven Western countries: "Forming a sharp contrast with the happy frame of mind when deciding through consultation on a political declaration, on key economic questions there still exist serious differences." Therefore, we say that it is not hard to see from near- and medium-term observations: economics and politics seem to be "divorced"; in politics, some countries are allies with either the Soviet Union or America, but in economics, between the allies, and in particular between the allies and the "chiefs of the alliances," contradictions are becoming sharper and sharper. In the last part of April 1985, more than 20 former leaders of some countries held a meeting in Paris, at which former Australian Prime Minister Fraser even said that America's $200 billion deficit was a "downright crime" and the "biggest threat to the world since 1945." Former British Prime Minister Callaghan said that America's deficit was a "time bomb." Former Federal Germany Chancellor Schmidt said that it "must be destroyed." From this a pattern is evident! There are many similar situations in the so-called "Eastern Bloc." Many countries have crossed the dividing line between the Eastern and Western blocs to do business, and have established various business and loan relationships in agriculture, light and heavy industry, and even munitions industry. With regard to this "divorce" between economics and politics, the superpowers at times have had to make little temporary and partial concessions. More often, relying on their military and political power and influence, they have forced their allies to submit, causing a temporary readjustment and reuniting of this "divorce." Concerning the question of the so-called "divorce" between economics and politics (not only in Europe; in Japan, there also exist this phenomenon and relevant discussion of it), when I visited Rome in 1980 I specially consulted an Italian banker. In political attitude, he is firmly opposed to the Soviet Union. However, he personally, directly and indirectly, takes care of a large amount of business for the Soviet Union. He talked a long time without making the question clear. In 1985, I also consulted an American professor who had studied international questions. After pondering carefully he gave me an answer. Actually, this question is simple. In the long term, economics is, in the end, the decisive factor, and, in the end, it will be expressed in concentrated fashion in politics and cause politics and economics to "unite." The tendency for the "Third World," particularly Europe (including Western Europe and Eastern Europe) to try to break free from the control of the two superpowers, as well as to act independently with the initiative in its own hands in military and political deterrence and restraint, will become more and more marked and strong. The abovementioned visiting European statesman said it well: "For many years Europe lost its consciousness of self, but now it has completely changed. Europe has begun a self-awareness, and it is conscious of its identity and its important role in the world. What is interesting is that the growth of Europe's self-consciousness is not restricted because of national boundaries and blocs. The Warsaw Treaty countries, more strongly than before, are conscious that they
are Europeans." Really, it must be seen: "This trend and development toward an independent, united, and powerful Europe (including Western Europe and Eastern Europe except for the Soviet Union), although an extremely formidable process, is already proceeding step by step." In the long term, it will become an unavoidable great strategic trend.

Third, a key point in the contemporary international situation is, in the end, will there be "bipolar," "tripolar," "big triangular," "quintapolar," or "multipolar" systems? Or will there still be the "three worlds"?

Not longer after the Soviet-U.S. summit talks in Geneva in November 1985, in December of the same year a Soviet diplomatic official, seemingly seized by a sudden impulse, said: "The world at present is a bipolar world."

What is a "pole"? Originally it was a term of geography and physics and of electromagnetics. Borrowed for use in international politics, it roughly had the meaning of "control center," "influence center," or "power center." This of course relates to international relations, international relative strength, and international strategic structure or situation. There are many discussions of the so-called international "bipolar," "tripolar, "quintapolar," and multipolar" systems, and I will cite a few examples.

Several years ago, in 1981, Professor Robert Gilpin of Princeton University wrote a book entitled "War and Change in World Politics." His main thesis is: the unbalanced state of affairs in international systems at present has not yet touched off war between the two hegemonies, and one of the main reasons for this is that the existing U.S.-Soviet bipolar structure is relatively stable and that a relative balance is maintained. He thinks that the bipolar system is the most unstable structure. However, provided Western Europe lacks political unity, the Japanese military continues to be weak, and China remains backward, it is not very likely that a tripolar system will appear. Currently, the independence of the two sides' allies is not all that large. At the conclusion of this book, he sets forth the possible change toward multipolarization in the world.

The No 2 issue, 1985, of the Soviet THE WORKING CLASS AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (14 March) carried a conversation between A.E. (Baowen) and Professor B. P. (Lujin), a doctor of history, on the topic "'Power Centers'-Theory and Reality." They noted that some experts who study world politics think that the postwar world has already evolved or is evolving from a bipolar world into a multipolar world. To the original poles toward which the foreign policies of the entire world gravitated (the Soviet Union and America) have been added three poles: the European Economic Community, Japan, and China. To this list are often added the so-called regional power centers: basically they are the largest countries of Asia (India and Indonesia), Africa (Nigeria and Egypt), and Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina), as well as special countries like South Africa and Israel. The two conversationalists concluded: the more poles, the more difficult it is to maintain a balance of power in the system of international relations. The multipolarity in politics exists at the same time as the bipolarity in military strategy. The unrivalled military strength possessed by the Soviet Union and America exceeds the strength of the other "nuclear club" members by several times. Therefore, in the talks on
limiting offensive strategic weapons, when formulating a global strategic balance, the strength of a third country need not be considered. However, if trends are pointed out, their effect is opposite to that of the abovementioned bipolarity. Attention must be paid to the nuclear strength of France and Britain, and in the not too distant future extremely earnest considerations must be given to China's strength. In brief, "the bipolarity is being shattered."

On 19 November 1985, the day that the U.S.-Soviet summit talks in Geneva began, Japan's YOMIURI SHIMBUN carried an article written by reporter (Chikawa Akio) entitled "America, China, Soviet Union, Japan, Europe--the Quintapolar Structure of the World." He said: "President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, who have already arrived in Geneva, are representatives of the two superpowers which are in a state of utter exhaustion from their struggle against each other. To restrain Japan, China, and Europe, the other three poles in the quintapolar structure, the summit talks are trying to formulate new principles for competition that would prevent the two countries from expending their strength, so that their own positions in the world would not relatively drop. ...the handshake between the heads of America and the Soviet Union, of course, does not proclaim an end to the competition between the two superpowers. On the contrary, it may be said that, to reestablish a new order in the world after the Geneva meeting that is of a tripolar or quintapolar structure, the competition between the two countries for dominance is now beginning."

In addition, according to reports, the influential "American People's Forum" and the "Harriman Research Institute," one of America's important think tanks, soon after the U.S.-Soviet summit talks in Geneva, held, from 21 to 24 November 1985, a forum on foreign policy in which public figures from all quarters took part. Those at the forum held that the emergence of the two superpowers had changed the international political situation in this century and the world balance of power. At the beginning stage, the world was polarized, but with another factor for change, namely, the accelearted development of the process of anticolonialization, the Third World created a turbulent situation in the world: the establishment of these countries was an untranquill process; the countries they were close and loyal to changed frequently, and the composite of regional blocs and the breaking of "bipolar rule" produced a complex multipolar situation. Then those at the forum discussed at "great length" the general situation in the Third World and the situation in each of its regions (Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and Africa) as well as the contention between and equal shares of America and the Soviet Union in the Third World--"the two sides can share advantages"--and also the various questions and possibilities of not touching off violent conflicts with each other.

My personal view is that, in observing and commenting on the contemporary international strategic situation, in a certain sense and to a certain degree, one cannot say that the idea of the so-called "bipolarity" and "multipolarity" is completely without a grain of truth. However, from a look at fundamentals, at the overall situation, and at the long-term trend, it may be said that this truth is very incomprehensive and does not conform to reality very much. For example, the two superpowers, America and the Soviet Union, are very powerful.
militarily and economically. They pursue hegemonism on a world scale, and only these two countries are qualified to start a world war. No matter whether they confront each other or engage in dialogue, to a considerably large degree they really hold the balance in international affairs and the situation really smacks of a little "bipolarity." However, thinking a little further, one realizes: Obviously, these two countries alone cannot decide humankind's destiny and the world's course. This "bipolar structure," in the final analysis, only constitutes the "First World"; on no account can one overlook the other two worlds that exist in the world.

"Tripolarity"? What tripolarity? I am in a little agreement with the above opinions of Professor Gilpin, at least to the extent that in the present state of affairs the appearance of a "tripolar system" is not very likely. Some people are now often talking about the "big triangle." What big triangle? The "big triangle" does not mean the "tripolar system." The cockpit of American and Soviet contention is Europe. When we observe the international strategic situation in this important aspect, we can make the directly connected three sides--America, the Soviet Union, and Europe--a "big triangle" to be handled. However, on a world scale, this "big triangle" does not constitute a "tripolarity." What people talk about more is the "big triangle" of America, the Soviet Union, and China. For example, commissioned by the relevant departments of the U.S. Government, the Rand Corporation once called together several dozen American officials and scholars who had an important influence on the formulation of policies toward the Soviet Union and China to discuss how to handle the big triangular relationship between America, China, and the Soviet Union. From a look at the summary of the minutes of this meeting that was printed and distributed in April 1984, these designers of American policies had considerably large differences of opinion on the question of the value of the concept of the "strategic triangular relationships." The majority of those at the meeting maintained that U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese relationships demand that people possess a certain "triangular" concept, because every action taken by a great nation has a strategic significance for the other great nations. The triangular relationships precisely reflect the international strategic environment, and the unavoidable essential factor when America is considering its policies toward the Soviet and China. However, there are also some people who think that this formulation is oversimplified and causes people to have misunderstandings, and that, as an instrument of American policy, it is of very little or even no use. My personal view is that, speaking of China, with regard to our present and future national strength, and even the role and effort that China plays and has played in the so-called "great triangle" relationships and even world affairs, this is a clear-headed appropriate estimate. Similarly, on a world scale, this "big triangle" also does not constitute a "tripolarity." At the same time, we cannot just discuss the "big triangle" in terms of itself, but must place it in the context of the world scale and consider and approach the "big triangle" relationship in relation to the Second World and the Third World. We belong to the Third World and stand on the side of the Third World. We place ourselves in the correct position and, proceeding from this fundamental standpoint, act independently and keep the initiative in our own hands. Thus we handle this big triangle as well as any other big triangle relationships, and handle the relationships of world affairs, with full initiative. It is said that, after the U.S.-Soviet summit
talks in Geneva in November 1985, some Americans once made this comment: Will China worry that, after the U.S.-Soviet summit talks, there will imperceptibly be formed an effect by the bipolar world on the big triangle of America, the Soviet Union, and China; there could be produced in Chinese leaders a morbid worry of being compressed, like the Molesms, in the space between America and the Soviet Union. We have only one impression of this view, namely, that these gentlemen have a fever in their heads. Our view is very simple: China—this great and proud socialist country—at this late hour has the capability and qualifications to carry out a foreign policy based on a long-range, overall strategy in which it acts independently with the initiative in its own hands. With regard to being able to handle world affairs we "pour water from a steep roof"—operate from a strategically advantageous position—and "handle a butcher's cleaver skilfully"—are more than equal to the task. The first phrase comes from "The Book of History" and refers to water tipped from a jar on top of a steep roof. It is a metaphor for the occupation of a commanding position and for an irresistible force. The latter phrase comes from the book "Zhuangzi." It describes a butcher of superb skill and proficiency who has found out the skeletal structure of an ox and has mastered its patterns. When he wields the cleaver to dissect it he does so very skillfully. Thus it is said: "How spacious. There must be room for wielding the cleaver."

Fourth, in the present-day world, there are 167 independent countries with an aggregate population of 4.8 billion and an aggregate land area of 149.5 million square kilometers (if Antarctica is excluded there are about 135 million square kilometers).

Among them, there are now 130 independent countries in the Third World, 78 percent of the total number in the world. Their population is 3.6 billion, 75 percent of the total world population. Their land area is about 80 million square kilometers, about 60 percent of the total land area of the world excluding Antarctica.

In the Second World there are roughly 35 independent countries, with a population of 700 million and a land area of about 23 million square kilometers.

The population of the First World—America and the Soviet Union—is about 500 million, and its land area is about 31 million square kilometers.

Thus it is not hard to see that for the Third World, which before World War II had 36 independent countries and now has 130, to have a land area and population respectively three-fifths and three-fourths of the world totals, is a major event of epochmaking significance in modern history. It obviously has changed the balance of power in world politics. Of course, we must also see that the Third World, although in it are a small number of developed countries, generally speaking, in comparison with the First World and the Second World, its countries are still developing countries that are economically backward, and in the old international economic order they are still in a fairly weak or very weak unequal position.

Inside each of the three worlds, as well as between the First, Second, and Third Worlds, there are many contradictions and connections. Worth paying
attention to among these intricate contradictions and connections are, first, the contradictions and connections of the First World itself, as well as the contradictions and connections between the First World and the Second World—with the relationships of the East and West primarily formed by the two; second, the contradictions and connections between the First World and the Second World (first of all between the First World) that constitute the relationships between North and South; and third is, with the Third World being primary, the connections with the Second World and even the masses of people in the First World, in a struggle and various forms of efforts to oppose the pursuit by the two superpowers of the First World of hegemonistic policies on a world scale and to oppose their arms race, particularly their nuclear arms race, and to safeguard world peace. The contradictions and connections between the three worlds, particularly these three main contradictions and connections, will determine the course of the entire international situation. From a fundamental and long-term view, the entire international situation will develop more and more in a direction favorable to the great majority of countries and the great majority of people. The above illustrates the first main point about the contemporary international strategic situation. At the beginning of November 1985 a friend of mine wrote an article in an American newspaper, in which he said: "Although China has never publicly abandoned the theory of the three worlds, for a long time it has not harped on this tune...." We say: Not so, we will always act in accordance with this concept; for a long time in the future this will be the case, because it stems from reality and also conforms to reality, conforms to the actual development of the contemporary world, and conforms to the contemporary international strategic situation.

(The writer of this article is a professor of Beijing University, a permanent director of the International Issues Research Center of the State Council, and a director-member of the Research Committee of the Modern International Relations Research Institute.)

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CSO: 4005/859
BRIEFS

U.S. CONSUL GENERAL RECEPTION---(Lu Zhi), the U.S. Consul General in Shanghai, held a reception this afternoon to celebrate United States Independence Day. At the reception, Consul General (Lu Zhi) and Vice Mayor Liu Zhenyuan exchanged toasts. Invited to the reception were Shu Wen, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the Municipal People's Congress, Li Guohao, chairman of the Municipal CPPCC Committee; (Zhan Xuezhong), secretary general of the Municipal People's Government; (Gao Sun), deputy director of the municipal Foreign Affairs Office; and others. [Text] [Shanghai City Service in Mandarin 1000 GMT 4 Jul 86 OW] /12624

CSO: 4005/830
OFFICIAL ON HONG KONG DRAFTING COMMITTEE WORK

HK120952 Hong Kong LIAOWANG Overseas Edition in Chinese No 23, 9 Jun 86 p 22

[Article by Tang Hua [3282 5478]: "Do a Good Job in Drafting the Basic Law With Collective Wisdom--an Interview with Shao Tianren, member of the Hong Kong Basic Law Drafting Committee"]

[Text] Since the framework of the basic law (draft) of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was made public in the last 10 days of April, the various special groups of the Basic Law Drafting Committee have engaged one after another in substantive drafting work. Most of the specific questions involved are central issues of great concern to people from all walks of life in Hong Kong.

From 31 May to 1 June, the Central-Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Relations Group of the Basic Law Drafting Committee held its second meeting in Shenzhen. The members fully exchanged views on three special issues, namely, the relationship between the central government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the external affairs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the legal status, explanation, and revision of the basic law. They intended to reach a consensus on most issues.

During the meeting, this reporter had a chance to interview Shao Tianren, one of the responsible persons of the group, who is a legal advisor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an advisor of the NPC Foreign Affairs Committee. Shao Tianren said: Of the five special groups of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, ours has been the first to discuss the specific contents of various chapters and sections of the basic law. All members of the group are glad that we have been able to discuss the three special topics once in just 2 days.

I

Shao Tianren held that it is quite appropriate to describe the way mainland and Hong Kong members worked together as "intimate cooperation."

According to the concept of "one country, two systems," drafting a basic law that can satisfy both the Hong Kong people and the 1 billion people on the mainland is a creative endeavor. Shao Tianren said: One can imagine the
difficulties we will encounter in actual drafting work in the absence of a precedent. The members must work together and fulfill this task with collective wisdom. It is necessary to extensively listen to opinions from various quarters, to thoroughly discuss every issue, to base ourselves on the need to reunify the motherland and to uphold Hong Kong's prosperity and stability, to adequately study Hong Kong's historical and current circumstances, to weigh various factors, and to analyze the advantages and disadvantages in order to produce the best draft. It is impossible for a single person or a few persons to successfully fulfill this task. Shao Tianren held that members from both the mainland and Hong Kong want to make a success of the drafting of the basic law. They had made earnest preparations before the meeting. Three Hong Kong members had even prepared written suggestions and distributed them to all participants the night before the meeting was held. At the meeting, all members could freely air their views and listen to others with open minds and there was a democratic atmosphere.

Shao Tianren continued: One can say that there is agreement between Hong Kong and mainland members on a fundamental problem, that is, they agreed to draft the basic law on the basis of the principle of "one country, two systems," the Sino-British Joint Declaration, and the recently promulgated Framework of the Basic Law (Draft). Of course, it is understandable that Hong Kong and mainland members, who live under different systems, should have different lines of reasoning and different viewpoints. It is also natural that people may hold different views in the course of the full exchange of views. There is not the problem of Hong Kong and mainland members representing two different sides. At the meeting, both Hong Kong and mainland members freely aired their views, which were not entirely identical, and there was equality between them because they participated in the discussion as individuals. There was initial agreement on most of the problems discussed. On some other problems, there was basically no disagreement. There was disagreement only on the way these problems should be presented and on the choice of the proper legal terms. Realizing that a satisfactory solution to this problem cannot be found overnight, the members agreed to continue to study this problem in the future. Shao Tianren held that this meeting of the special group had contributed to improving the mutual understanding between Hong Kong and mainland members and to facilitating the work of the Basic Law Drafting Committee.

II

The meeting discussed the contents of the various sections in Chapters 2, 7, and 9 of the Framework of the Basic Law (Draft). After the morning and afternoon sessions each day, Shao Tianren and Rayson Huang, met with Hong Kong reporters and reported the progress of the meeting and the initial agreement reached by the group. The contents of the discussion at the 2-day meeting were rich and varied and there were also many other activities on the schedule. But Shao Tianren, who is over 70, did not look tired and still accepted my interview.
Talking about the relative unanimity reached on some matters of great concern to people, Shao Tianren said this was because the meeting was held in a harmonious atmosphere and on the basis of adequately exchanging views. At the meeting, initial agreement was reached on numerous issues in Chapter 2 (relationship between the central government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region) of the Framework of the Basic Law (Draft). For example: after the basic law is promulgated, not only the Hong Kong people but also the whole country should observe it, with the exception of foreign affairs and national defense, which will be managed by the central people's government, all other ministries and commissions and all provinces and municipalities will not be allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the enterprises and institutions of various provinces and municipalities in Hong Kong will be similarly treated as private institutions; and another section will also be added to Chapter 2, that is, the entries of people from the mainland into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be subject to the original methods of management. When discussing the foreign affairs and national defense of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the members suggested that the central people's government set up an agency to handle these affairs. The name of the agency will be decided later.

Not long ago, some people in Hong Kong mentioned the issue of "residual power." This issue was also touched upon at the meeting. Many members suggested that since China is not a confederacy whose members (or states), as the sources of the confederacy's powers, delegate some of their powers to the confederacy, and since the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region's powers are to be granted by the central government, the problem of "residual power" is nonexistent. Shao Tianren said he personally thought that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region should be a highly autonomous region within a country and under a central government, that it should be more powerful than a member state of a confederacy, and that it is not a polity. Its powers will be granted by the central people's government, if there are such things as "residual powers."

Shao Tianren said that when the group discussed Chapter 7 of the basic law, that is, Hong Kong's foreign affairs, the members held that the annex of the Sino-British Joint Declaration has clearly defined this issue and that what is needed to be done is to codify these contents into a law.

Regarding the discussion of Chapter 9 of the Framework of the Basic Law (Draft), that is, the legal status of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and its explanation and revision, Shao Tianren said that due to the limited time for discussion, the members concentrated on airing their views at the meeting. The issue will be further discussed at the next meeting. For example, when touching upon the legal status of the basic law and its relationship with the Constitution, the members aired their views but were unable to immediately reach a consensus at the meeting.
III

Shao Tianren repeated, that the results of the meeting of the Central-Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Relations Group are only preliminary views, which cannot be regarded as final conclusions. Even after they have been written into a report or a tentative plan, they should also be submitted to the plenary session of the Basic Law Drafting Committee for deliberation. Shao Tianren also said that the consultative committee for the basic law of Hong Kong also has special groups to study these topics and that the mainland members will get in touch and exchange views with them. The mainland members will hold informal discussions with a delegation of the consultative committee which will come to the mainland in early June.

/9599
CSO: 4005/870
INTERVIEW WITH MA MAN-KI ON MACAO'S FUTURE

HK061111 Hong Kong ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE in Chinese 0707 GMT 5 Jun 86

[Text] Hong Kong, 5 Jun (ZHONGGUO XINWEI SHE)--The Sino-Portuguese talks on Macao's future will be held by the end of June. What do the people of Macao think about the issue? Do they have faith in the future? Recently, I went to a classically decorated room in Tai Hua [1120 5478] House, Nan Huan [0589 3883] Street, Macao, and interviewed Ma Man-ki, chairman of Macao's Chinese General Chamber of Commerce. He frankly told me about his view, analyzed Macao's present economic situation and its future, and revealed his investment plans for Macao.

Optimistic View on the Sino-Portuguese Talks

"The issue of Macao's future is rather obvious. Macao's sovereignty is in the hands of China, on which both China and Portugal share the same view," said Ma Man-ki without reserve. He recalled that when China and Portugal established diplomatic relations in 1979, both parties had reached an understanding on the sovereignty of Macao. Later, leaders of the two countries exchanged views on the issue when visiting each other's country. In principle, both of them shared the same view and sincerely wanted to solve the issue of Macao's future through negotiations. Therefore, he held an optimistic view on the Sino-Portuguese talks, and held that the "talks will be relatively more successful."

Optimistic View on Macao's Future

On Macao's future, Ma Man-ki takes an optimistic view. He said, "There is no question that the people of Macao have faith in Macao's future." This is because the citizens have accepted the future practice that there will be "one country two systems," Macao's capitalist system will remain unchanged, and so will the lifestyle. Therefore, there will be no social disturbance.

He praised the effect of solving the Hong Kong issue, which has helped set the minds of Macao people at ease. He said: For the past year and more following the signing of the Sino-British draft agreement, Hong Kong has scored economic successes. And the operation of society has been normal. This has made the people of Macao feel more relieved about their future.
But he was worried about the future of Portuguese born in Macao. There are about 8,000 to 9,000 of them. At present, both the Chinese and Portuguese governments are concerned about this issue. It is believed that both parties will take into consideration their interests and will find the appropriate and rational way for solving this. Ma Man-ki held: If China and Portugal succeed in the talks, Macao will have a long-term stable development.

Prospects for Macao's Economy

Over the past decade and more, the development of Macao's economy has been rather quick. The raise of export and manufacturing industries has changed the economic structure of Macao. Its industrial export value for the past 2 years exceeded 7 billion Macao dollars, an increase of over 400 million Macao dollars or 17 to 18 times over 1974. Its GNP per capita income was $3,800.

Ma Man-ki said: Macao is diversifying its economy, forming three major pillars, namely export trade, tourism, and construction industry. Its financial industry has also developed correspondingly. More and more foreign banks have opened branches in Macao. There has been a great improvement in telecommunications and communications between Macao and Hong Kong as well as China. He expects Macao's economy to make steady progress in the next decade.

He held that China's development of the "four modernizations" over the years had promoted the development of Macao's economy. He said: Macao's industrial raw materials, grain, and non-staple food come mainly from China. Macao also benefits from China's economic development.

Hong Kong-Macao Economic Relations Becomes Closer

On the economic relationship between Hong Kong and Macao, Ma Man-ki held: The recent rise of Macao's industry is closely related to the active investment of Hong Kong businessmen. Macao's wages are low and the land is cheap. Its living standard is also low. These are favorable factors for attracting foreign businessmen, particularly Hong Kong businessmen. Furthermore, the United States and some European countries have recently imposed restrictions on Hong Kong textiles, while providing preferential treatment to many Macao exporters. The number of Hong Kong businessmen investing in Macao has therefore increased, promoting the development of Macao's industry. In addition, Hong Kong is an important trading partner of Macao, and many of Macao's export goods go through Hong Kong. In future, both Hong Kong and Macao will implement the practice of "one country two systems" and will have the same mother. This will promote closer economic relationships between the two.

Zhuhai and Macao

Will the development of Zhuhai Special Economic Zone replace the economic status of Macao? Ma Man-ki expressed his view and said: Zhuhai is a socialist economic zone; whereas Macao will continue to maintain its
capitalist system while becoming a special administration region. Moreover, Macao is a free port. Its economic status is relatively independent. There is no foreign exchange control, and the political system and economic structure of the two places are different. Therefore, one cannot replace the other. The economic development of Zhuhai will help the development of Macao by providing raw materials, food, and by developing tourism.

"Let Me Set Broad-Minded and Lofty Ideals Without Any Obstruction"

On his investment plans in Macao, Ma Man-ki said that he has entered a joint venture with local real estate developers, Tai Fung Bank and China Building Development Co. on a 1-billion Macao dollar project of reclaiming 22 hectares of land from the sea in Hei Sha Wan for building 7,000 flats and 3 million square feet of industrial plants. They have just started exploratory work and will begin the reclamation soon. It is expected that the superstructure construction will be started early next year, and that the whole project will be completed in 8 years. He also plans to build a steel rolling mill on Colonane Island jointly with Hong Kong businessmen, Nan Yue [0589 4727] Co. and Zhongshan City.

Before the interview was concluded, I noticed that there were calligraphic works and paintings by famous artists on the walls. They were presented to Ma Man-ki by He Xiangning, Liu Hai-su, Huang Zhou, and Li Keran. I asked him about his favorite recreation activities. He recited a poem written on a scroll on the wall. The last part of the poem goes: "Being solemn, bold and generous I face the wind, and let me set broad-minded and lofty ideals without any obstruction. Though I am 60 now, I achieve nothing. But I hope my country will prosper." This poem was written on Mt. Taishan in 1979 when he was 60 years old. The impassioned verses have expressed his wishes. They are also his wishes for the country and Macao.

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CSO: 4005/870
BRIEFS

LAOS' FAIDANG LOBALIYAO--On the morning of 17 July a memorial service was held at the LPDR embassy in China for Faidang Lobaliyao, vice chairman of the SPC of the LPDR and of the Lao Front for National Construction, who passed away of illness on 12 July. Lie Shuqing, vice minister of foreign affairs, Xing Jun, vice chairman of the standing committee of the Beijing municipal People's Congress, and Wang Yingfan, deputy director of the Asian Affairs Department of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were present at the LPDR embassy to express profound grief for Vice Chairman Faidang Lobaliyao. A picture of Vice Chairman Faidang Lobaliyao was placed in the memorial room. Wreaths from the NPC standing committee, the CPPCC national committee, and the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs were placed in front of the room.

[Excerpt] [Beijing International Service in Lao 1230 GMT 17 Jul 86 BK]

CSO: 4206/131
JOURNAL ON JOINT INDIAN-BOUNDARY ISSUE

HK080725 Beijing GUOJI WENTI YANJIU in Chinese No 2, 13 Apr 86 pp 1-8

[Article by Jing Hui [2529 6540]: "Background of and Situations Concerning the Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute"—first paragraph is GUOJI WENTI YANJIU Introduction]

[Text] Although a Sino-Indian boundary has not been officially delineated, there exists between the two countries a traditional customary line based upon the extent of the jurisdiction of the governments of the two countries. The existing line of actual control between the two countries lies in Chinese territory away from the traditional customary line. A watershed is merely a geographical feature. It cannot be used as the only decisive criterion for delimiting a boundary. Of the three sectors of the Sino-Indian border, the most controversial is the eastern sector. China's jurisdiction over Men Yu [7024 7126], Luo Yu [3157 3254], and Xia Cha Yu [0007 1390 7126], which are situated in the eastern sector of the border, north of the traditional customary line, is an indisputable historical fact. The so-called Simla Treaty is null and void and the so-called "McMahon Line" illegal. They have been recognized by none of the Chinese governments. A slice of Chinese territory, with an area of about 2,000 square km, in the central sector of the border is at present not under Chinese control. Aksai Chin and other areas in the western sector have always been Chinese territory and under Chinese jurisdiction. Only through friendly negotiations, mutual understanding, and mutual accommodation can the Sino-Indian border dispute be openly, reasonably, and completely settled.

Along the full extent of the Sino-Indian border whose total length is about 2,500 km, there has never been an officially delineated boundary. Western colonial annexation of southwestern China and their aggression in this part of the country have led to a historical dispute, that is, the disagreement between China and India on the boundary between them. This dispute must be settled through negotiations between them. However, according to the Indian Government: the boundary claimed by India is "fully authoritative geographically, traditionally, and according to treaties"; there is no need to officially delineate a boundary because one has been dictated by nature, that is, by the watershed; and the gigantic arcs formed by the Himalayas and Kunlun Shan are the most impressive natural boundaries which have traditionally been recognized for several centuries, which limit the extent of the jurisdiction of the governments of the two countries, and which have been given recognition
in valid international agreements signed in various periods over the past 3 centuries. According to the Indians, the "McMahon Line" is legal, the Simla Treaty is valid, and the Aksai Chin area belongs to India. The Chinese Government suggests that: Although a Sino-Indian boundary has never been officially delineated, there exists between the two countries a traditional customary line based upon the extent of the jurisdiction of the governments of the two countries. The existing line of actual control, which does not coincide with the traditional customary line, is a result of India's succession to the land annexed by Britain in the past and of its attempt to extend its control to Chinese territory across the traditional customary line. The traditional customary line has been decided upon by the extent of the jurisdiction exercised by the two countries over a long period of time. A watershed is merely a geographical feature. It cannot be regarded as the only decisive criterion for delimiting a boundary. It would be unreasonable to suggest that with the existence of a boundary delineated by nature, there is no need to produce another one through negotiations. The Indian claim that the Sino-Indian boundary is recognized by international agreements is groundless. The so-called treaty concluded by the Tibetan local authorities with the Kashmir authorities is just a mutual nonaggression agreement saying nothing on the exact position of the boundary. As for the delimitation proposal raised by Britain in 1899 in an attempt to annex part of the Aksai Chin area, it was dismissed by the Chinese Government and was hence fruitless. The Indian Government admits that the central section is mentioned in none of the treaties. The Sino-Indian boundary issue was not discussed at the Simla Conference. Since the Chinese representative refused to sign it, the Simla Treaty has no legal binding force. The so-called "McMahon Line" was a product of the secret exchange between the British and Tibetan representatives without the knowledge of the Chinese representatives. Xizang has always been part of China and it has never been empowered to conclude treaties. The so-called McMahon Line is illegal. Recognized by none of the Chinese Governments, it has no binding force as far as China is concerned. The vast territory stretching from the so-called McMahon Line to the eastern sector of the traditional customary line between China and India has always belonged to China and has always been under the jurisdiction of China's Xizang. China does not recognize the illegal "McMahon Line." The correct way to settle the Sino-Indian border dispute would be to hold talks on the issue. Before the issue is settled, the two sides should seek to preserve the status quo on the border. The Sino-Indian boundary dispute can be fairly, reasonably, and thoroughly settled by taking into account the historical background, the current situation, and the national feelings of the peoples of the two countries, on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and through friendly negotiations based on the principle of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. In his "Unarmed Victory," which was published in 1963, the British philosopher Bertrand Russell said: "The dispute between China and India has not been on any ideological grounds, but solely on certain territorial questions in regions where the frontier was ill-defined." It is vehemently asserted by India that the Indian case along the whole length of the disputed frontier is legally indisputable. The Chinese, however, have prima facie evidence which needs to be examined by uncommitted experts." (Russell: "Unarmed Victory," pp 65-66) In order to
help the reader understand this issue, I will give an account of the Sino-
Indian border dispute by discussing the [word indistinct] central, and western
sectors of the border separately. The eastern sector refers to the sector
east of Bhutan; the central sector refers to that stretching from the south-
eastern end of the western sector to the juncture of China, India, and Nepal;
and the western sector refers to that between China's Xinjiang and Xizang
on the one hand and Ladakh on the other. The total area of the disputed
territory along the Sino-Indian border is about 125,000 square km. Of this,
about 90,000 square km are found along the eastern sector. This part includes
the vast territory between the so-called McMahon Line and the eastern sector
of the traditional customary line. The total area of the disputed territory
along the central sector of the border is about 2,000 square km. The total
area of the disputed territory along the western sector, which mainly comprises
the Aksai Chin area, is about 33,000 square km. The most disputed part is
found along the eastern sector of the border.

The Eastern Sector

Meandering between the southern slopes of the Himalayas and the plain fringing
the northern bank of the Brahmaputra, the traditional customary line, which
was formed on the basis of the extent of the jurisdiction of the governments
of the two countries, has always been respected by the Chinese and Indian
peoples. There has always been peace on the border. Men Yu, Luo Yu, Xia Cha
Yu, and other areas north of the traditional customary line have always been
Chinese territory. The inhabitants there are either Zang nationals or peoples
closely related to them ethnically. Local authorities in Xizang have
established administrative organs, assigned officials, collected taxes, and
exercised judicial powers in this part of the world without ever being
challenged. Chinese administrative jurisdiction over this part of the world
had continued despite the Simla Conference in 1914 and the first appearance
of the illegal McMahon Line on British and Indian maps in the thirties. The
traditional boundary had remained unchanged until the end of the Second World
War. In the early fifties, the Indians finally managed to completely annex
the Chinese territory north of the Traditional customary line and south of
the illegal McMahon Line.

It is obvious that the Simla Treaty has no legal binding force and that the
so-called McMahon Line is illegal. The Sino-Indian border issue was not on
the agenda for the Simla Conference and, hence, was not discussed. There is
no mention of the delineation of a Sino-Indian boundary in the full powers
of the representatives attending the conference. What McMahon (then the
Indian Government's foreign minister) did was beyond what was permitted by
the instructions issued by his government. On 23 July 1914, adding a few
lines to the final memorandum he was to present, for McMahon, to the British
Minister of State, Viceroy Hardinge of India wrote: "we are of the opinion
that it is not one of our tasks to consider the problem concerning the eastern
sector of our northeastern border and the contiguous areas there at the con-
ference. Thus, we request that the above views and proposals to be considered
McMahon's personal views and proposals, which have not yet been approved by
the Indian Government." According to Volume XIV of the 1929 edition of
"Aitchison's Collected Treaties," the conference "was an attempt to settle
the Sino-Tibetan boundary issue. A tripartite treaty was drafted at the
conference and initialed in 1914. However, the Chinese Government did not
allow its plenipotentiary to sign it officially." In fact, neither the Simla
Treaty, which is dated 27 April 1914, nor the Anglo-Tibetan document dated
3 July was officially signed. However, the forged 1929 edition of "Aitchison's
Collected Treaties," which was printed in 1938, contains the false statements
that the Simla Conference "was an attempt to reach an agreement on Xizang's
international status and, in particular, on the relations between the three
governments and the boundaries between Xizang and China and Xizang and India,
and that Britain and Xizang had "delineated the boundary between India and
Xizang near the border between Assam and Burma." In 1938, the Indian Survey
Bureau began updating its maps. However, the boundary was marked "unmarked
by boundary markers" on the maps. The chief of the Indian Survey Bureau
pointed out at the time many of the inaccuracies and anomalies concerning
the "Mahon Line." In 1938, in order to cover up the forgery, Britain
ordered the withdrawal and destruction of all authentic copies of Volume XIV
of the 1929 edition of "Aitchison's Collected Treaties." However, copies of
the authentic 1929 edition can still be found at Harvard University, Columbia
University, and the India Office in London.

Even the British themselves admit that the Simla Treaty is null. In the final
report he presented to London on 3 September 1915, McMahon said: "It is
regrettable that I left India before I could make China participate in a
tripartite agreement." "The fact is that the negotiations in Simla last year
broke down." In a letter written on the same day to Charles Bell, an Indian
administrative officer stationed in Sikkim, by the person replacing McMahon
as India's foreign minister, this person said: "The negotiations broke down
in Simla last year purely because the Indian Government attempted to secure
more interests than could be conceded by the Chinese Government." Commenting
on the benefits Bell suggested would be received by Britain as a result of
the Simla Treaty, this person said: "This is purely academic because, without
the signature of the Chinese Government and the acceptance of the Russian
Government (it) is null." Both British officials and scholars acknowledge
the illegal nature of the McMahon Line. In his memoirs "years of change in
Bengal and Assam," which was published in 1966, Robert Reid, an ex-governor
of Assam, said: "As late as in 1936, an official letter by the Assam Govern-
ment stated: the 1914 (Simla) Treaty has never been made known to the public
mainly because it was not approved by the Chinese Government. That means that
nothing has been done to implement Sir Henry McMahon's proposal for extending
administrative control to the Twang area. Another consequence is that on
many published maps, the Indian boundary follows Assam's administrative
border. The most recently published Chinese maps show that nearly the entire
tribal area between the McMahon Line and Assam's administrative border is
within Chinese territory. In spite of all this, the new India founded in
1947, inherited the McMahon Line with all its loopholes as part of the legacy
of our old Indian Empire. The communist Chinese found it easy to take
advantage of these loopholes. It is undeniable that they had presented
apparently convincing evidence. The present Indian Government must have
access to all the relevant documents. This makes one wonder whether or not
the McMahon Line is worth the material sacrifice and disgrace incurred by
India as a result of this dispute." (Robert Reid: "Years of Change in Bengal and Assam," p 103) in his book "The McMahon Line," which was published in 1966, the British scholar Professor Lamb said: "To make China sign the Simla Treaty, McMahon would have had to make concessions on the question of the boundary between inner Tibet and outer Tibet. The Dalai Lama certainly have refused to accept this. All this might have led to the signing of an Anglo-Chinese annex on the boundary of Assam. However, the history of the Simla Conference had made it impossible for the Chinese and British to seek such a solution. So long as Mr Nehru and his advisers insist on the course of action taken in Simla and Delhi between October 1913 and July 1914 as being still effective, such a solution between independent India and communist China will be impossible. It is quite ironic that the independent Indian Government should continue to cling to the imaginary benefits they could have received between 1913 and 1914. Obviously (they) do not realize that all this is the source of their present predicament. Why does Mr Nehru on the one hand profess to pursue the policy of friendship and peaceful co-existence with communist China and, on the other, cling to something which, at least in Chinese eyes, so resembles a symbol of British imperialism, that is, the Simla Treaty and the note on the McMahon Line? This is really a puzzle of the 20th century." (Lamb: "The McMahon Line," pp 558, 590) China did not sign the Simla Treaty and has never recognized the illegal "McMahon Line." In his letter to Prime Minister Nehru on 8 September 1959, Premier Zhou Enlai said: "How can China be forced to accept such an illegal boundary fringing such a vast territory and how can it be forced to humiliate itself, to forfeit its sovereignty, or to surrender its territory?"

The vast territory south of the "McMahon Line" has always been under Xizang jurisdiction. As for Men Yu (or Men Da Wang [7024 6671 2489], the British openly acknowledge that it belongs to Xizang. According to Volume XII of the 1931 edition of "Aitchison's Collected Treaties," "Men Yu (meaning lowland) is situated east of Bhutan... residents there are called Xizang Men Ba's [7024 1572] (meaning lowland dwellers). The Men Ba's living north of the Se La [5331 2139] range are under the jurisdiction of Xizang ("Aitchison's Collection of Treaties," p 100). In 1939, in his report to the Indian Government, Governor Reid of Assam said: "Tawang has always been under Tibetan control. None of the residents there is uncertain about their status as Xizang subjects. In 1939, H.J. Twynam, acting governor of Assam, suggested that the Se La range and the Di Qin [4574 3830] River be made a boundary and that the occupation of Tawang be avoided. Linlithgow, viceroy of India, agreed with him. On 1 August 1940, a conference was held in Shillong, Assam's as published capital city. The conference was attended by many, including the governor of Assam. It was suggested at the conference that the Se La range, or even Dirang Dzong in its south be made a boundary. In 1944, Britain began sending troops to intrude into those areas situated south of the Se La range in Men Yu, such as Dirang Dzong and Da Long [2092 7150] Dzong, and some areas in Luo Yu, such as Jia Gao [2059 7559] and Xu Mu [6079 2606]. British troops once even intruded into Wa Nong [3907 1702] in Xia Cha Yu. In 1946 and 1947, they intruded into the areas north of Luo Yu's Geng Ba La [2577 1572 2139] and Jia Gao and once again intruded into Wa Nong in Xia Cha Yu. Before the arrival of the PLA on the Sino-Indian border, the Indian Government, taking advantage of China's involvement in
the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea in 1951, sent troops to occupy
the areas north of Se La in Men Yu. In February, they took Tawang, occupied
Zha Na [2089 6719] and the areas drained by the Xi Luo Mu [6007 3157 2606]
river, and marched toward the McMahon Line. In 1953, the Indians forced the
Xizang local government to terminate its protracted administrative jurisdic-
tion, thus basically occupying all the areas south of the McMahon Line.
However, the illegal character of the "McMahon Line" remained unchanged. In
a letter written to THE TIMES on 2 September 1959, Twynam said: "The McMahon
Line, which follows a line linking the crests of the Himalayas, is, and has
always been, nonexistent. Xizang inhabitants and their religion and culture
have penetrated far into areas south of the Himalayas." On the "western
China and Tibet" map drawn in 1958 by (John Bartholomew), a member of Britain's
royal cartography society, both the eastern sector of the traditional boun-
dary and the "McMahon Line" are there and the areas between the two lines are
marked "disputed territory." On the "India in 1954" map in Nahu's "The
Discovery of India," which was published in 1946 and reprinted for the third
time in 1951, the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary is identical
with those on Chinese maps. On the maps in Robert Payne's "A Biography of
Gandhi," the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary is located south of
the Himalayas. On the basis of their so-called watershed principle, the
Indians stress that the line linking the crests of the Himalayas forms a
natural boundary in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border. However,
history tells us that since the mid-17th century, the local governments in
Xizang have been exercising jurisdiction over the vast territory consisting
of Men Yu, Luo Yu, Xiz Cha Yu, and other areas between the "McMahon Line"
and the eastern sector of the traditional customary line and that Britain
gradually nibbled at Chinese territory by asserting at different times
territorial claims not based on the watershed principle. Britain has never
exercised jurisdiction there, whereas the Chinese had been exercising
effective control there until it was undermined in the forties. Both British
and [word indistinct] can confirm this.

The Central Sector

The areas east and north of the central sector of the traditional customary
line have always belonged to China. The local authorities in Xizang still
have in their possession land contracts and scripts granting territories to
nobles which date back several centuries. The local authorities in Xizang
collected taxes in these areas. The present local authorities still have the
census and taxation records. Nearly all the residents there are Zang nationals
who consider themselves to be Chinese subjects. With the exception of Sang
and Tsungsha, which were invaded by the British in 1919 and which had become
an unsettled question following the Tibetan local authorities' futile
attempts between 1926 and 1935 to recover them through negotiations, these
areas have been successively occupied by the Indians since the signing of the
Sino-Indian agreement in 1954. Bo Lin San Duo [3134 2651 0005 1122], one of
the 10 trade ports China agreed to open to the outside world, was occupied by
the Indians shortly after the signing of the above agreement. The Indians
invaded Wu Re [3527 3583] in June 1954; invaded and annexed Xizang Zha
[7449 2089] and Lapthal in 1956; invaded and annexed the areas west of Shipki
Pass in 1957; and invaded and annexed Ju Wa [1565 0760] and Qu Re [92575 1931] in April 1958. According to the Indian Government, the 1954 Sino-Indian agreement recognizes the Indian claim to the boundary at the six mountain passes. However, since the boundary issue was not discussed at the negotiations, the Indian position is not tenable.

Official British and Indian maps and documents and works by the British and Indians sent to Tibet to conduct illegal surveys confirm that the areas are Chinese territory. For example, the maps of "India" published by the Indian Survey Bureau in 1880, 1881, 1889, and 1900 show that Sang, Tsungsha, and Bo Lin San Duo are within Chinese territory. The "Tibetan Handbook" compiled under the direction of the British Foreign Ministry in 1920 acknowledges that Sang and Tsungsha are located in Tibet. "Kai La Si [7030 2139 2448]—Ma Na Sa Luo Wa [3854 6719 5646 5012 3908]," a book written in 1949 by and Indian named Si Wa Mi [2448 2908 4717] Pu La Na Wa Nan [2528 2139 6719 3908 0589], confirms that Wu Re belongs to Xizang. In an article written in 1848, Lieutenant (Stretch) of Britain confirms that Xiang Zha and La Bu Di belong to Xizang. In the "Records of the Inian Survey Bureau" published in 1915, an Indian named Nan [0589] (Singh) confirms that Lapthal belongs to Xizang. In 1934, the British representative in Lhasa agreed that the land stretching from the Huo Bu Sang [3172 0008 2718] River to Shipki Pass Is Xizang territory. All the official maps published by the Indian Survey Bureau prior to 1954 do not show the central sector of the boundary but contain the words "boundary undefined." In his letter to Premier Zhou Enlai on 22 March 1959, Prime Minister Nehru did not say that the central sector is based on any treaties but simply stressed the watershed principle. However, a country cannot, by taking advantage of the watershed principle, annex land which has always been under the jurisdiction of another country.

The Western Sector

Ladakh had remained part of Xizang until the 10th century and had been a vassal state of the latter since. In 1834, Gu La Bo [0657 2139 0130], the Dogra ruler of Jammu, occupied Ladakh. In 1841, his troops fought Tibetan troops. Both sides claimed victory. In October 1842, they exchanged a mutual nonaggression document to express their respect for each other's territory, saying that "each party should administer its own territory without encroaching on that of the other party" and that "the two parties should get along well with each other without becoming enemies." Later, the Indian Government insisted that this was a boundary agreement and that the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary had been delineated. However, the exact position of the boundary is not stated in the document. In addition, 80 percent of the controversial territory along the western sector does not concern Xinjiang, which was one of the signatories. Thus, the Indian's evidence is not tenable. Akasi Chin and other controversial areas along the western sector have always been under China's effective control. Most of these areas are under the jurisdiction of Xinjiang's Hotan County and some are under the jurisdiction of Xizang's Rutong Tsong. Official Chinese documents and records can confirm this. This part of the country is a corridor between Xinjiang and western Xizang. During the Qing Dynasty, checkposts were set up there. In addition,
Chinese troops had always set up defences and patrolled in this area. In order to encroach on Chinese territory, the British established in 1846 and 1847 [as published] a boundary commission, with Alexander Cumminingham and Vans Agnew as its responsible persons. This commission unilaterally drew a boundary stretching from the areas north of Bangong Lake to the Si Pi Ti [0674 0012 2251] river on the maps it produced, thus placing Khurnak Fort, which should be within Xizang, on the boundary. In 1865, W.H. Johnson, a British official of the Indian Survey Bureau, privately drew a map on which Akasi Chin (an Uygur word meaning "China's white-stone beach") and a very large part of the territory north of the Karakorum are shown to be within Kashmir. However, according to the map produced by the British Foreign Ministry in 1873, Aksai Chin belongs to Xjiang. At that time, the British were divided on this sector of the boundary. George MacCartney, the British representative in Kashi, suggested that Aksai Chin be divided along the Lak Tsang range, which runs in an east-west direction, with the northern part going to China and the southern part to India. On the other hand, John Ardagh, director of the military intelligence service under the British chief of staff's office, suggested that the whole of Aksai Chin should go to India. The British Government accepted the first suggestion. On 14 March 1899, Claude MacDonald, the British envoy to China, presented a note to the Chinese Government. He proposed talks and the delineation of a boundary, saying that: "From the Karakorum Pass the crests of the range run east for about half a degree (100 li) and then turn south to a little below the 35th northern parallel. Rounding then what in our maps is shown as the source of the Karakash, the line of hills to be followed runs northeast to a point east of Kizil Jilga, and from there, in a southeasterly direction, follows the Lak Tsung range until that meets the spur running south from the Kun Lun Range, which has hitherto been shown on our maps as the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This is a little east of longitude 80 degrees east." This delineation proposal, which was in fact a British attempt to stealthily annex part of Aksai China, was ignored by the Chinese Government. This has been the only official proposal forwarded by Britain to China for delimiting the western sector of the boundary. It led to nothing because it was not accepted by China.

The western sector is drawn in basically the same way on the maps produced by China over the past 1 or 2 centuries. However, inconsistencies and confusions abound in the maps produced by Britain and India in the past century. This is a result of the British attempt to annex land by stealthily altering the maps. As mentioned above, in 1846, Britain began unilaterally altering the western sector of the boundary. However, the western sector drawn on the official maps produced by India prior to 1862 is drawn in the same way as it is drawn on Chinese maps. For example, the "Northern Frontier of British Hindoostan," a map produced by the Indian Survey Bureau, clearly shows that the Karakorum, which is marked "Cong [5523] Range of Karakorum," forms the boundary between Xinjiang and Kashmir. This boundary is missing on most of the official maps published by the Indian Survey Bureau between 1865 and 1945. Although the disputed territory and Kashmir are in the same color on the maps produced between 1945 and 1952, these maps do not show the boundary. Only the words "boundary undefined" are there. In July 1954, the Indian Government instructed its officials to draw the whole length of the Sino-Indian boundary according to its own views and tried to force others to accept this as the officially delimited boundary.
Concerning the western sector, according to Volume XII of "Aitchison's Collected Treaties" (a collection of the treaties, contracts, and certificates signed by India with its neighboring countries, which was compiled by the external affairs and political departments of the government of British India under the editorship of Aitchison, deputy secretary of the external affairs department), "the northern and eastern boundaries of Kashmir have not been delimited." On the official maps published by the Indian Survey Bureau in the thirties, the western sector roughly follows the Karakorum. It was only in 1945 that the western sector was pushed westward to Kunlun in accordance with the views of Olaf Caroe, then foreign minister of the Indian Government. The maps attached to the Indian Government reports prepared before or after 1945 show that the western sector of the boundary follows the Karakorum. For example, the map attached to Part I of the "Report of the Indian Statutory Commission," which was prepared in 1939, shows that the northern and northeastern sections of Kashmir's boundary follow the Karakorum. The map attached to the "Report of the Simon Commission," prepared in 1930, also shows that the western section follows the Karakorum. In "Asian Affairs," in June 1977, Sir H.A.F. Rumbold, who was in charge of Indian affairs in London before India's independence, wrote: "In 1929 the Simon Commission wished to include a map of India in Volume I of their report, and the question arose of how India's northern frontiers should be shown. In researching this point for them, I found nothing in the India Office records to justify the line on the Kun Lun range indicated on some maps; and the Commission's map... accordingly adopted a line roughly along the crest of the Karakorum range, excluding the Aksai China. But the post-independence government of India fought a war over this worthless area." (pp 210-212) On the "confidential" map the Indian Army's chief of staff presented to the British cabinet delegation, there is neither a well-defined western sector nor a well-defined central sector and Aksai Chin is not shown to be within Indian territory. In his (1951-53) report to the "northern and northeastern frontier agencies," K. Zachariah, the first director of the Indian Foreign Ministry's history office, said: The northern and eastern borders of Kashmir are not bound by well-defined boundaries. According to page 429 of Volume 20 of the 1949 edition of the Soviet encyclopedia and all its subsequent editions, the Karakorum is the western sector of the boundary. In his letter to the Indian House of the People on 29 August 1959, Prime Minister Nehru said: "this boundary between old Kashmir on the one hand and Chinese Turkistan and Tibet on the other has been delineated by nobody."

However, in his letter to Premier Zhou Enlai on 26 September the same year, Prime Minister Nehru asked for the entire Aksai Chin and, erroneously, confused the Macartney-Macdonald Line, which according to the note Britain presented to China in 1899, divides Aksai Chin into two parts, with India's territorial claims at that time, saying that the proposal then had been "that the northern boundary follows the Kunlun Shan until it reaches a point east of longitude 80 degrees east, where it meets the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This proves beyond doubt that the whole of Aksai Chin is within Indian borders." This view is inconsistent with what is said in the 1899 note. Actually, the delineation proposal in the 1899 note acknowledges that most of Aksai Chin belongs to China and it gives the entire Karakx Valley and all Aksai Chin'a
hinterlands to China, and the Lingzi Tang Plains, the Chang Chenmo River
Valley, and River Chip Chap to India. The boundary claimed by India is
basically identical with the Ardagh Line, and it claims the whole of Aksai
Chin. Even the British had not claimed so much from the Chinese Government.
In his letter, Prime Minister Nehru used "the Kun Lun Range" in place of
"a little below the 35 northern parallel... until that meets the spur running
south from the Kun Lun Range." By doing this, he had distorted what is said
in the 1899 note. He was claiming more territory and trying to turn India's
wishful claims into something similar to the "legal proposals" forwarded
to China by Britain in the past. In his book "The Sino-Indian Border—Causes
of the Border Dispute," the British scholar Lamb pointed out that: "This
note was mistakenly quoted as implying that the whole of Aksai Chin should
[words indistinct] and that the Macartney-Macdonald line divides the area
which is generally referred to as Aksai Chin into two halves." (p 147) In
an article entitled "A Historical Note on the Sino-Indian Dispute over Aksai
Chin" in CHINA QUARTERLY, April-June 1964, Robert A. Huttenback observed:
"In referring to the letter (that is, the note the British presented to the
Chinese Government in 1899) in detail, they (the Indians) altered its pro-
visions considerably. Instead of saying that it was the spur running south
from the Kunlun range which former British maps had shown as the eastern
boundary of Ladakh—a situation which the proposals in the letter did not
essentially change—they said it was the Kunlun range itself which the
British had described as being the northern frontier of Ladakh." (p 204)
However, in its notes and such documents as the reports prepared by its
officials in 1960, the Indian Government repeated the same mistake. The
Indian Government stressed that the watershed principle is a criterion
accepted by international law for delimiting national boundaries and that,
formed naturally along a watershed, India's northern boundary needed no
official delineation. The Chinese suggested that although watersheds and
other geographical features played a role in determining traditional boun-
daries, they were not the only decisive criterion for delimiting boundaries
and that traditional boundaries had been decided on the basis of the extent
of the protracted jurisdiction of two neighboring countries. In fact, the
boundary claimed by India, its western sector in particular, was not drawn
according to the watershed principle. The so-called watershed principle,
which was invented by the Indians, cannot be convincingly argued for. It is
said on page 84 of Volume 84 of the 1908 edition of the "Imperial Gazeteer
of India" that: "The Karakorum range is very complex. Generally speaking,
it is a continuation of the Hindu Kush, separating the river systems in
central Asia from those feeding the Indian Ocean." Apart from this, the
Encyclopedia," the Swedish adventurer Sven Hedin, and the American scholar
Owen Lattimore have all confirmed that the Karakorum is a watershed dividing
the water systems in this region.

Neither Britain nor India had exercised jurisdiction in Aksai Chin. Speaking
to the Indian Council of States on 10 September 1959, Prime Minister Nehru
said: "It has always been our view that Ladakh is an area with ill-defined
boundaries...the boundaries there are unclear. In 1958, when we discovered
that China had built a highway north of Yecheng [or Kargilik] more than a
year ago, we did not know the exact position of this highway...we are 100 miles away from that area. The area is uninhabitable and has never been under the control of any country." Speaking on the Akashi Chin area in the Indian House of the People on 12 September the same year, he said: "The problem of which part of Akashi Chin belongs to us and which part belongs to others is a controversial one...a boundary has never been delineated in that area." In the secret instruction he issued to Indian officials on 13 September, he said: "We can only more or less maintain the status quo in Akashi Chin. We do not even have a single post there. In fact, we cannot reach there." On 23 November, addressing the Indian Council of States, he said: "As far as I know, during British rule, nobody lived there and there was not even a single frontier post." All this shows that India has never exercised jurisdiction in Akashi Chin. However, the Indians also say that China has never exercised jurisdiction in Akashi Chin. In 1960, in their boundary report, Chinese officials presented a large amount of evidence that China had been exercising jurisdiction over Akashi Chin. The Indians cannot deny this. In 1949, after the liberation of Xinjiang, the PLA proceeded to take charge of the defense of this area. In the second half of 1950, PLA units entered Xizang via this area. Between March 1956 and October 1957, a 1,200-km highway was built between Xinjiang's Yecheng and Xizang's Gartok, with a 180-km section traversing this area. In his "Delhi-Chungking (London, 1947)," Meen a senior Indian diplomat, described how 2 of the Mir of Hunza's men were arrested and 300 of his sheep were impounded by the Xinjiang authorities when they were grazing their animals in Sarikal on the far slope of the Karakorum. ("Delhi-Chungking," 1974 edition, p 31) Supported by documents, the report prepared by Chinese officials in 1960 says that in September 1941, the Kashi commissioner's office arrested in Akashi Chin 11 intruders from Ladakh and lodged a serious protest with the British consul general in Kashi on this. According to the Indian scholar Karunakar Gupta, he and his associates found a document among the India Office records which is a letter written by Chen Fangbo [7115 2455 3134], foreign affairs director of the Kashi Commissioner's office, to E.E. Shipton, British consul general in Kashi, on 9 September 1941. Gupta said: This incident, which took place in an area traversed by a Chinese highway near Lake A Tuo Ge [7093 2093 0766] (that is, Akashi Hu), renders void and untenable the statement in the report prepared by Indian officials in 1960 that China cannot find a single document among Xinjiang's administrative records and its current records to substantiate its claim that it has been exercising jurisdiction in this area. The omnipresence of Chinese personnel in this area since 1950, when the PLA entered Xizang via Akashi Chin, was acknowledged by Prime Minister Nehru in his speech to the Indian House of the People on 14 August 1962. He said: "The Chinese took Xizang around that time. The more land they occupied, the more effective their control became. Shortly after that, provisioning across the Gobi desert became a serious problem from a logistical point of view...they built roads and so on. In the fifties, while building roads there, they contributed to improving the traffic along the trade route leading from Xinjiang via northern Aksai Chin to Xizang." (Karunakar Gupta: "Focusing on the Sino-Indian border," Calcutta, 1982, pp 156-158) Thus it can be seen that India is clearly aware of the fact that China has exercised jurisdiction over Aksai Chin.
The background to and the situation concerning the Sino-Indian border dispute are complicated. However, so long as both sides have sincerity, the boundary issue, which is a historical legacy, can be easily resolved. An encouraging fact is that thanks to the two countries' joint efforts, their relations have been gradually improving recently. Their officials have held many meetings to enhance mutual understanding. The author is hopeful that both China and India will be far-sighted, that they will bear in mind their peoples' fundamental interests, that they will try to settle the boundary issue fairly and reasonably on the basis of the principle of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, and that the boundary issue will not affect the relations between the countries or the friendship between their peoples, even if it remains unresolved for some time.

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DIRECTION, CHALLENGES FOR WESTERN EUROPE IN LATE 1980'S

Beijing XIANDAI GUOJI GUANXI [CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] in Chinese No 2, 20 Apr 86 pp 9-15

[Article by Qi Li [7871 0500]: "Western Europe To Take a More Independent Line"]

[Text] In the wake of worsening U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Europe and the onset of a global high-tech revolution since 1980, Western European security has come under severe threat and its position in the world economy has been steadily eroded. To reverse this trend, the Western Europeans are making a concerted effort to meet the challenges from every quarter. What is the state of Western Europe? What are the trends in the late 1980's? This article explores those and related questions.

Challenges Facing Western Europe

Since the latter half of the 1970's, Western Europe has been confronted with formidable challenges in every quarter, the two most basic of which are as follows:

First, the United States and the Soviet Union have stepped up their struggle for hegemony in Europe, escalated their arms race, and now compete on land, at sea, and even in space, constituting a severe threat to Western European security. Behind the smoke screen of detente, the Soviet Union mounted a massive military buildup in the 1970's, overtook the United States in strategic nuclear weapons, and quietly deployed SS-20 medium-range guided missiles in Europe, thereby gaining a nuclear edge in that continent. To change this unfavorable situation, and urged on by its Western European allies, the United States decided to deploy 108 Pershing 2 guided missiles and 464 land-based cruise missiles in Europe only toward the end of the decade. At the same time, it proposed to the Soviet Union that they open talks on reducing medium-range guided missiles in Europe. In the early 1980's, the bone of contention between the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe was medium-range guided missiles. As a result of the dispute, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] phased in the deployment of U.S. medium-range guided missiles in Europe beginning in late 1983. Western Europe agreed to deployment as a way of pressing the Kremlin to accept arms reductions, preventing "a strategic break with the United States," and checking the
momentum of arms expansion by the two superpowers. But things did not turn out the way it expected. Retaliating in kind, the Soviet Union soon deployed their own SS-21 and SS-22 guided missiles in Europe, leading to an escalation in the arms race and worsening military confrontation with the United States. Hardly had the medium-range guided missile dispute died down before the Soviet Union and the United States began a round of fierce competition in space. In 1983, President Reagan proposed his "Star Wars" program in an attempt to beat the Soviet Union to "global domination" by marshalling its economic and technological superiority. The "Star Wars" program is also a ploy to strengthen U.S. control over its allies and achieve its ultimate aim of controlling the world. The Soviet Union reacted to the program sharply, declaring repeatedly that "it would never allow the United States to disrupt the existing military equilibrium between the two nations" and that it would go all out to try to stop the "Star Wars" program. If it cannot have its way, the Soviet Union says, it is prepared to research and manufacture a corresponding weapons system to rise to the U.S. challenge. Apparently the United States and Soviet Union are hell bent on continuing their arms race centered on space weapons on a larger scale and in a widening area. Caught between their rivalry, Western Europe is worried that once the superpowers establish an anti-guided missile defense system, British and French nuclear forces and NATO's "flexible response strategy" would become ineffectual. Also, with a "space shield," the United States may drift away from Western Europe in defense matters. All this may mean reduced security for Western Europe at a time when the Soviet Union has the upper hand in nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, and chemical weapons. Under these circumstances, Western Europe will either become more and more an appendage of the United States or knuckle under to Soviet pressure. These are the only possible scenarios and both are disastrous. More than at any point in their past, therefore, Western Europe sees the grimness of their situation, and more desperately than ever, they try to seek strength in unity and strive to protect their own interests.

Second, the formidable challenge posed by the United States and Japan in high technology. The United States has consistently set the pace in research on state-of-the-art science and technology in the high-tech revolution sweeping the world today. Japan, meanwhile, has made big strides in the development and application of microelectronic technology. Europe, where the first Industrial Revolution was born and the second flowered, pales in comparison as it trails both nations in the two key areas of information technology and biotechnology. U.S. and Japanese corporations have dominated the world's information technology market. In 1975, Western Europe had a trade surplus in information technological products and labor services. In subsequent years the surplus dwindled until it was replaced by a deficit that swelled to $20 billion in 1984. Western Europe's share of the world's total high-tech exports, such as computers, numerical controlled machine tools, and robots, has dropped below the average of the 24-nation Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD]. In 1980, combined sales of Western European-made computers were less than half those of just one U.S. company, IBM. In 1983, all mainframe computers, most microprocessors, and two thirds of the integrated circuits used in Europe came from the United States or Japan. Even more ominous is the fact that the United States is currently pouring colossal sums of money and a vast pool of scientific talent into
aerospace technology research, the inevitable result of which is to push scientific research to new heights and potentially widen the U.S.-Western Europe scientific gap. What is more, the United States is presently in touch with scores of industrial corporations and banks in Europe in the hope of recruiting the best scientific experts from Western Europe for its own space program. Once its program materializes, the United States may tighten its grip on its allies by virtue of its technological lead. The above scenario has the Western Europeans both anxious and indignant. President Mitterand warned, "The 21st century is a century for aerospace powers. Europe must unite in the field of science and technology without delay. If nations like us each go it alone, we run the risk of being reduced to 'subsidiary processing plants' of the U.S." Scientific backwardness has directly affected economic growth in Western Europe. After World War II, Europe experienced a "golden age" of uninterrupted economic growth for 20 years. From 1954 through 1973, industrial output in the nine-nation European Economic Community [EEC] grew by an average 5.6 percent annually, compared with 4.2 percent in the United States. Western European researchers, who invented radar, the jet plane, nuclear power generation, etc., were in the forefront of science and technology. After the mid-1970's, however, Western Europe lost its scientific edge and was gradually overtaken by United States and Japan. An additional blow was the first oil crisis of 1973 and the economic crisis of 1974-75, slowing down the economy considerably. Take industrial output, for instance. While it rose 26 and 16 percent in Japan and the United States, respectively, between 1973 and 1981, it edged up just 8 percent in the EEC. In 1984, industrial output increased 6.8 percent and 5.8 percent in the United States and Japan, respectively. The corresponding EEC figure was a meager 2.4 percent.

Trends of Development in Western Europe

Faced with the grim situation above and a barrage of challenges, Western European nations have not flinched but have taken positive measures to accelerate the pace of unification, made every effort to develop high tech, and turned the economy around to increase their strength and narrow their gaps with the United States and Japan. They have also made a mighty push for a "multipolar" world where they can be a vital anti-war and pro-peace force. The following trends may emerge in Western Europe in the next 5 years:

1. The new momentum toward economic, scientific, political, and defense unification will continue. The economic crisis a few years ago and the lack of progress toward integration have led to a decline in the position of Western Europe. Learning from history and realities, Western European nations are now more and more aware that given the world situation today, no single nation working alone can meet the current challenges and that Western Europe's only hope lies in strength through unity. If they hang together, they will constitute a formidable force capable of holding its own against the superpowers in political, economic, scientific, and technological matters. If they remain divided, they will be a sheet of loose sand, impotent in the political arena and even in danger of slipping into subordination and vassalage. A united Europe will prosper while a divided Europe will decline. This new appreciation of the situation has not only expedited the solution of a number of hitherto intractable problems in the EEC, but also added fresh
momentum to the drive for Western European integration. After meeting in Stuttgart in June 1983, EEC leaders decided to put the great cause of unification first and committed themselves to working out internal problems. Under active prodding by France and the Federal Republic of Germany [FRG], and after endless deliberations and compromises, the member nations finally reached an agreement to reform the EEC's agricultural policy and financial system at a meeting in Brussels in March 1984. In June the same year, they resolved the disagreement brewing for years over Britain's demand for refund on its budget contribution, thereby removing a major impediment to Western European unity. In March 1985, the members arrived at a final agreement, on the admission of Spain and Portugal, at which point the EEC had basically put its problems behind it.

Now that a consensus has been achieved and internal divisions healed, Western Europeans can devote themselves to furthering unification. The EEC summit in Luxembourg last December took a number of major far-reaching actions in this regard. It reached a package of agreements on amending the Rome Convention, including the reaffirmation of the decision to establish an integrated borderless internal market by 1992, the accelerated expansion of the scope for "majority decision" and "political cooperation," stepped-up monetary cooperation and a strengthened European monetary system. This trend also manifests itself in the following ways:

1) making political integration a top priority. Western European leaders, especially those of France and the FRG, realize that Western European integration has developed to a stage where a major push at the political level is urgently needed. Without such a move, integration will not only be stalled, but will also falter and regress. President Mitterand of France says, "To survive and prosper in the world, we must have political determination and common organizational machinery. That's why I stress that we must not be content with solving disputes and putting forward new policies. What Europe needs is a political program." West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl also emphasizes that EEC's political future lies in political integration. He says, "President Mitterand and I share the hope that Europe will move one step forward on the road of political construction." The long-term objective of political integration is the establishment of a European political community. At the present stage, their main concern is to solve the following issues: 1) replace "unanimous vote" with "majority vote" to strengthen the EEC's decision-making and executive powers; 2) establish a special agency to coordinate diplomatic and security matters and speak with one voice to the world; 3) the various nations must give up part of their sovereignty to the European Parliament to expand the latter's power and role; 4) take further actions to bring about European integration, toward which end France and the FRG are making concerted efforts. Together with Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and Ireland, they voted at the EEC summit in Milan in June 1985 in favor of holding another meeting to discuss the establishment of a European political union. Three nations cast negative votes.

2. Make high-tech cooperation the future focus of European integration. To meet the scientific and technological challenge from Japan and the United States, the eastern European nations are determined to accelerate integration in high tech which will also serve as a driving force for civilian and
military industries and the locomotive of sustained economic growth to gradually solve unemployment and other social problems, enhance Europe's international competitiveness, and narrow its gap with United States and Japan. In information technology, biotechnology, space technology, new energy resources, and thermonuclear fusion, etc., the EEC nations have begun to take joint actions. Last year they approved a "strategic plan for research and development in information technology," the aim being to increase Europe's share of the global information technology market to 30 percent, up from the current 10 percent. As a counterweight to the "Strategic Defense Initiative" program of the United States, France proposed in April 1985 the idea for a "European technological community," also known as the Eureka Plan. At the Milan meeting in late June 1985, the various government leaders endorsed the "Eureka program" and resolved to convene a special meeting to discuss the establishment of a European technological community in the future. In mid-July, the birth of the Eureka program was formally declared, which enlists the joint research efforts of 17 nations in six fields, including optical electronics, high-speed microelectronics, mainframe computer technology, high-power laser, bunch of particles, new materials, and artificial intelligence. In November 1985, 18 nations met in Hanover to select the first batch of pilot projects and reached a basic agreement on a number of issues relating to the "Eureka" plan, such as its development direction, methods of cooperation, organizational machinery and sources of funding. This marked a new high in scientific and technological cooperation among Western European nations.

3. Adopt flexible, diversified forms of cooperation. After the EEC expanded its membership from 10 to 12, it became even more difficult to reach a consensus on major issues. Accordingly, French President Mitterand and West German Chancellor Kohl decided to step up French-German cooperation and vigorously push for "a two-tier Europe," that is, nations which share a basic consensus and are eager for unification can integrate ahead of others, while nations with a wait-and-see attitude who cannot make up their minds as yet may slowly catch up at their own pace. This formula avoids some conflicts and disputes, prevents Western European integration from stagnating, and keeps alive the momentum toward ultimate integration. There is also new flexibility when it comes to the actual manner in which member states cooperate. Within a framework of basic principles, they can voluntarily form partnerships in economic, scientific and technological, defense, and political areas, for bilateral or multilateral cooperation, depending on the circumstances. Cooperation can take place between member states or between member states and non-member states.

The current environment is propitious for Western European integration. For one thing, there has been a clear heightened consciousness of integration on the part of all Western European nations in recent years. The EEC's six founding members, led by France and the FRG, in particular, are committed to pushing integration further and have a clear sense of direction. In economic, scientific, and defense matters, integration has made new headway. Second, following the solution of the above-mentioned problems which had proved intractable for years, the EEC leaders can now afford to concentrate their energies on mulling over Europe's future and concern themselves with meeting the challenges of the new era. Third, the European economy is expected to turn around in the next 5 years. Projections call for a period of slow steady
growth when the economy will gradually pick up, the GNP will be maintained at between 2.5 and 3 percent, and inflation will slow down even further. As the economic situation improves, integration will quicken correspondingly. Fourth, all Western European leaders realize that European integration has matured to a stage where any further progress requires the members to make concessions in the interest of common objectives. The idea of "nationalism first" must be checked.

But the road to Western European integration is still strewn with obstacles, such as the uneven levels of political and economic development in different member states; conflicting national interests; insufficient capital; the revenue issue, which has defied solution; the lack of coordination between Britain and the continental states; and superpower obstruction and sabotage. Basic to all of them is how to reconcile national interests with the general interests of Western Europe.

To sum up, a positive situation has emerged in Western Europe where nations are banding together to strengthen themselves. Both objective and subjective conditions exist for integration, but all kinds of obstacles and difficulties remain. Clearly Western European integration is the trend of the times and the desire of the people. The potential is there for integration to various extents in all areas, yet the road ahead is inevitably long and tortuous.

2. The growing tendency in Western Europe tendency toward independence and self-determination. After the war, as its power relative to the U.S. changes, Western Europe's tendency toward independence and self-determination has become stronger and stronger. In the first 5 years of the 1980's, European nations did their best to defy U.S. policies and defend their own interests. This is true whether we are talking about economic sanctions against Poland, the monetary war between Europe and the United States caused by high U.S. interest rates, the dispute over medium-range guided missiles in Europe, or the present debate over the "Star Wars" program. The result is a sharp decline in United States ability to control its allies. Essentially Western Europe is demanding an elevated status in NATO, more say on foreign policies and East-West relations, and more initiative and independence in foreign policies and economic matters so as to determine their own destiny. It also seeks to enhance its influence on U.S. actions and decisions and steer the world in the direction of "multi-polarity." In a word, even as it aligns itself with the United States and preserves the Atlantic alliance, Western Europe wants an independent role and equality with the United States. This can be described as Western Europe's basic policy toward that nation. In 1982, the LONDON TIMES specially invited such prominent figures as Willy Brandt of the FRG, DuMaurier of France, and Callaghan of Britain to discuss relations within the Atlantic alliance. They all concluded that while the alliance must be maintained, relations among the allies need to be adjusted and the key adjustment is that the United States must treat its allies as equals. Western Europe's independent tendency will strengthen in the next 5 years primarily in the following ways:

1. Instead of completely toeing the U.S. line in foreign relations, it will try to shape its foreign policies independent of Washington. First, let's look at their policies toward the Soviet Union. In their dealings with the
Soviets, the United States stresses confrontation, while Western Europe emphasizes detente. The United States seeks to gain a military edge over the Soviet Union, but Western Europe is more concerned to maintain a "low-level parity" between East and West. The United States sets great store by military power, but the Western Europeans think that although a strong defense is important, the preservation of peace and security requires "economic cooperation," "negotiation," and "disarmament" as well as a balance of power. It is for these reasons that Western Europe is firmly opposed to the U.S.-Soviet arms race and insists on detente with the Kremlin. As Western Europe sees it, "detente" yields economic benefits in addition to peace and stability and is in its basic interests. Accordingly, it deployed new U.S. missiles in 1984, on the one hand, and promptly modified its policy toward the Soviet Union by taking the initiative to establish high-level contacts with it, on the other. Thus European-Soviet relations became more than a function of U.S.-Soviet relations. In its policies toward the Third World, too, Western Europe marches under its own banner and differs from the United States. Many Western European leaders believe that its inability to defend itself militarily and heavy economic dependence on the world are Western Europe's two "fatal weaknesses." And "the strength and wealth of the Third World" offer Western Europe a crucial way of offsetting those weaknesses. Hence a key strategy is to aggressively cultivate its relations with the Third World. The United States and Western Europe look for the sources of Third World unrest in different places. The former often blames Soviet expansion and infiltration for the turbulence in developing nations, whereas the latter believes that while superpower expansion is one reason for such unrest, the root cause is poverty, backwardness, and internal dissensions. That's why Western Europe looks askance at the power politics and hegemonism pursued by the Reagan Administration in the Third World. And that's why it relies more on economic aid and political influence to appeal to Third World nations, actively advocates the "North-South dialogue" and "Arab-European dialogue," pays more attention than the United States to strengthening economic and political relations with the Middle East and regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], and seeks extensive common ground with the Third World. Since the late 1970's, Western Europe has signed three successive "Lome Conventions" with 66 countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, constituting a "third force" distinct from the United States and Soviet Union. In the next 5 years, prompted by economic needs and strategic considerations, Western Europe will make cooperation with the Third World an even higher priority. In practical terms, this will translate into a redoubling of efforts in Central America and Asia as well as the maintenance and expansion of traditional influence and channels of cooperation in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Africa.

2. Western Europe will set about strengthening itself economically and militarily to reduce its dependence on the U.S. Western European nations are acutely aware that a politically divided, militarily enfeebled, economically stagnant, and technologically backward Europe cannot act independently from the United States. On the basis of that awareness, the EEC is striving to become a single entity in all respects. In military matters, it has called for the "Europeanization" of defense. In 1984 it revived the "Western European Union," dormant for 30 long years, and turned it into a forum for the discussion of security issues and the coordination of defense policies. In
monetary matters, the EEC has set up a European monetary system and proposes to gradually make the Eurodollar the currency of foreign trade to lessen the adverse impact of a fluctuating U.S. dollar on its economy. Turning to science and technology, Western Europe on the one hand demands an equal share of the most sophisticated aerospace technology with the United States, and, on the other, speeds up its own research in order to maintain its independence from the United States.

Western Europe's tendency toward independence will intensify in the days ahead, but since it will continue to rely on U.S. "nuclear protection" for a long time to come and need the backing of the Atlantic alliance even as it pursues "detente," there are limits to its independence.

3. The tendency toward more dialogue and cooperation between Western and Eastern Europe will gain momentum.

A notable development in Europe in the past 2 years is that amid rising East-West tension, the relations between Western and Eastern Europe have eased, contacts have become frequent, and a "pan-European" viewpoint transcending so-called "blocs" has appeared.

According to incomplete data, from 1983 through the end of 1985, prime ministers, chancellors, and ministers from Eastern and Western Europe paid one another almost 50 visits. In an unprecedented move, former West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt; Josef Strauss, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union; Krueger, chairman of the parliamentary delegation of the Liberal Democratic Party, and Mayor Eberhard Diepgen of West Berlin successively visited Erich Honecker in East Germany in May 1984. The warming trend in the relations between Eastern and Western Europe can be accounted for by these reasons. First, both sides are deeply troubled by the intensification of U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Europe and the deterioration in the arms race. It was their common fear of war and desire for peace that finally made them turn to each other for support in a way that transcended social systems and political blocs. Together they look for avenues to blunt the momentum toward arms buildup by the two superpowers and, in the process, have reduced the tension in Europe and diminished the threat of a nuclear war to a certain extent. They also hope to use the thaw between Eastern and Western Europe to bring about detente between East and West. Second, neither Western nor Eastern Europe is resigned to superpower subjugation. Even more reluctant are they to let the superpowers dominate the continent. Arguing that small and medium-sized nations should not have to go along with superpowers every step of the way, they intend to keep both the United States and the Soviet Union at arm's length, seek to play an independent role in the relaxation of East-West relations, and demand more say for small and medium-sized countries in European affairs. Third, Eastern and Western Europe depend on each other economically. A former Czechoslovakian minister said, "The technology and capital we need are in the West." Western Europe, for its part, needs Eastern Europe as a market. Increased trade with Eastern Europe, it hopes, will help cut down on unemployment at home and facilitate its ideological infiltration.

Certainly, the rapprochement between Eastern and Western Europe cannot be smooth sailing all the way. The East German leader, Erich Honecker, and his
Bulgarian counterpart, Todor Zhivkov, were originally scheduled to visit the FRG in separate trips in late 1984, which, however, were later cancelled due to Soviet obstruction. This shows that when superpower relations are strained, they definitely constrain the freedom of action of small nations. Hence the rapprochement between Eastern and Western Europe will be a long slow process. But the rapprochement itself has tremendous far-reaching significance: It reflects the Europeans' popular aspirations for independence and self-determination, accords with their basic interests, and is historically inevitable. Future intercourse and dialogue between the two will continue. Practically speaking, the European approach will be characterized by the following: (1) an incremental, low-key strategy, the goal being "long-term relaxation and gradual improvements;" (2) a long-term view. Western Europe will try to induce an internal "change" in Eastern Europe through economic, scientific and technical, and cultural cooperation; (3) Western Europe will continue to reshape its policies toward Eastern Europe, emphasizing relations between states, and discard the view of Eastern Europe as "a Soviet satellite."

4. Because of strategic, security, and economic needs, Western Europe will consolidate its relations with China in the late 1980's. There are three major reasons.

1. Western Europe hopes to improve its position in the global strategic game by developing relations with China. As it bears the brunt of the burden of the U.S.-Soviet contest, Western Europe wants nothing better than an end to the bipolar pattern and the establishment of a multipolar world where a multitude of forces balance each other. Since it cannot bring about this on its own, it looks toward China as a counterweight to the United States and Soviet Union. They believe that China may become a power in the Third World, but that it will not seek hegemony but is sincere in its support for Western Europe's drive for self-revitalization through integration. Western Europe, therefore, should take China's role seriously, holds political consultations with it, and develops a dialogue concerning the most pressing international issues today. It should coordinate its moves with China, which will help it gain more clout in international affairs.

2. Western Europe relies on China politically and strategically to reduce Soviet pressure on itself. It sees both China and itself threatened by the Soviet Union. By pinning down one quarter of Soviet armed forces and one third of its guided missiles in Asia, China has considerably reduced Soviet pressure on Western Europe. In formulating its defense policies, Western Europe should consider the China factor.

3. Economic cooperation with China will not only solve Western Europe's present economic difficulties but will also benefit future economic growth and better prepare it to meet challenges from the Asian and Pacific region. In recent years, Western Europe's advanced technological products have been driven out of the market by Japan and U.S. merchandise, while developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and oil-exporting nations have been slashing imports. This double squeeze has confined European exports to their traditional markets. China's open door policy is a godsend to Europe that may help its economic growth. Western Europe regards China as a market
for its exports and a supplier of raw materials and energy. In this sense, China will contribute to job creation in various Western European nations and help reduce unemployment. Western Europe expects the Asian and Pacific region to be "the world's economic and political center in the next 2 or 3 decades." It will be both economically and strategically significant for Western Europe to capture a "fair and reasonable" share of the China market. Already Japan and the United States have had a head start over Europe and won a sizable chunk of the market. Should Western Europe hesitate any longer, it may "lose out in the competition." Accordingly Western Europe has studied the needs of China's four modernizations and market competition in that nation and decided to take a long-term view, concentrate on the short-term, advance steadily, and adopt a variety of methods. In practical terms, this means it will participate in the exploitation of China's resources and the technical modernization of its enterprises by extending loans, providing equipment, transferring technology and easing curbs on the export of advanced technology.

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CSO: 4005/858
BRIEFS

HEFEI, BURUNDI SISTER CITIES--Bujumbura, Burundi, 3 Jul (XINHUA)--Hefei, the capital of China's Anhui Province and Bujumbura, capital of the central African state of Burundi have signed an agreement making the two sister cities. After the signing ceremonies today between Bujumbura's Mayor Lucien Sakubu and the head of the Chinese delegation Yang Yongliang, the delegation met with Burundi's National Assembly President Emile Mworoha. "I am very happy to see that cooperation between China and Burundi has been extended from a governmental to a municipal level," Mworoha said. "It was our intention to come here to strengthen our friendly relations with the people of Burundi and to officially sign an accord that now makes Bujumbura and Hefei sister cities," said Yang who is also an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and secretary of the municipal committee of the CPC in Hefei. The meeting was also attended by the Chinese Ambassador to Burundi Shen Lianrui. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 0013 GMT 4 Jul 86 OW] /9738

ANNIVERSARY WITH SIERRA LEONE--Beijing, 25 Jul (XINHUA)--The fifteenth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Sierra Leone was marked at a reception here this evening. Chu Tunan, vice-chairman of China's National People's Congress Standing Committee, as well as Sierra Leonean embassy officials and students in Beijing, attended. Lin Qing, vice-president of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, and C.B. Aube, Sierra Leonean ambassador to China, toasted the continued development of friendly relations between the two countries. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1214 GMT 25 Jul 86 OW] /9738

CSO: 4000/325
BRIEFS

SUN YAT-SEN SYMPOSIUM—Guangzhou, July 25 (XINHUA)—One hundred young researchers from across China gathered here today for a symposium on Dr Sun Yat-sen and his ideology. This is part of the activities to mark the 120th anniversary of the birth of Dr Sun November 12. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) was the forerunner of the Chinese Democratic Revolution. He led the 1911 revolution which overthrew the Qing Dynasty, thus putting an end to China's feudal autocracy. He was also the founder of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party). Scheduled to close on Monday, the symposium has received 115 papers and is sponsored by the Chinese Sun Yat-sen society, Zhongshan University and the Guangdong Province Sun Yat-sen society. "Sun Yat-sen and His Time" is the theme. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1518 GMT 25 Jul 86 OW] /12624

FANG YI CONDOLENCES FOR ASTRONOMER—Nanjing, July 31 (XINHUA)—A memorial meeting was held here today for Professor Zhang Yuzhe, China's leading astronomer who died 21 July at the age of 84. Zhang and his assistants discovered three comets and nearly 1,000 minor planets since 1949. He was a leading advocate of Chinese participation in activities of the international astronomical union. Present at today's memorial meeting were 500 provincial officials and people. The meeting received messages of condolence from Fang Yi, Pen Chong and other Chinese leaders. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1454 GMT 31 Jul 86 OW] /12624

COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMS FIGURES—Beijing, 9 Jul (XINHUA)—A total of 1.91 million young people, mostly graduates fresh from senior middle schools, took part in this year's entrance examination which began Monday through Wednesday. According to the State Education Commission, 543,000 new students will be enrolled by fulltime universities and colleges. The Television and Broadcasting University will enroll another 42,000. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1114 GMT 9 Jul 86 OW] / 12228

LAWYERS' CASES INCREASE—Beijing 3 Jul (XINHUA)—Almost two-thirds of China's civil law cases were handled by lawyers in the past 2 years, today's PEOPLE'S DAILY reports. Lawyers resumed activities in 1979, after a 20-year suspension. China now has over 13,670 fulltime and 7,060 parttime lawyers. The first congress of Chinese lawyers will be held this weekend in Beijing. Lawyers promoted reconciliation in 45,000 cases last year, according to the paper. Through providing legal services in over 60,000 cases in 1985, they helped to avoid economic losses or recovered several billion yuan. Zou Yu, minister of justice, said that in 1981 lawyers dealt with fewer than 100 cases of economic disputes with foreign firms and only in coastal provinces and cities. They
handled more than 14,700 cases involving foreign trade and economic relations in 1985, the paper said. Lawyers also attended trade negotiations as legal advisers to Chinese companies, in addition to offering regular legal consultations to domestic enterprises. Zou Yu expects a "law of lawyers" to be drafted soon. "The legitimate rights of lawyers must be fully guaranteed," he said. The minister also said that the number of lawyers was too small to serve the needs of such a big country as China. While employing more graduates from the institutes of political science and law, legal authorities would conduct more training courses for inservice lawyers to improve their professional knowledge and skills, the minister said. /Text/ /Beijing XINHUA in English 0936 GMT 3 Jul 86 40/ 12228

CSO: 4000/313
FUJIAN SECRETARY AT MEETING ON PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

0W110613 Fuzhou FUJIAN RIBAO in Chinese 31 May 86 p 1

[Excerpts] The 5-day provincial exchange-experience meeting on the work of the provincial People's Congress ended on 28 May. Over 200 responsible comrades of the standing committees of the provincial, city, county, and district people's congresses and the liaison teams of prefectural people's congresses attended the meeting. The central topic of this meeting was: Sum up experience, increase understanding, and perform the people's congress work even better to meet the needs of the 7th 5-Year Plan and of the new situation of reform and opening to the outside world.

The provincial CPC Committee attached considerable importance to this meeting. Chen Guangyi, secretary of the provincial CPC Committee, spoke to the meeting on strengthening the party committee's leadership over the work of the people's congresses and giving fuller play to the important role of the people's congresses in the new situation. Comrades Xiang Nan and Hu Hong visited the comrades attending the meeting. Cheng Xu, chairman of the Standing Committee of the provincial People's Congress, spoke to the meeting at its inception.

According to incomplete statistics made by cities and counties, of the 953 resolutions and decisions made by the Standing Committees of the people's congresses of all places in 1985 alone, 919 were implemented with good results.

The meeting pointed out: The recently concluded Fifth Session of the Sixth Provincial People's Congress passed the 7th 5-Year Plan for Fujian, presenting to the people of the whole province the magnificent goal to work for and the tasks to perform in the next 5 years. To attain this goal, we must, according to the principle of "endeavor in construction on the one hand and enforce the legal system on the other," make further efforts to increase the work of the people's congresses at all levels and pay attention to the problem of imbalance in the work of the people's congresses.

The meeting held: To give fuller play to the important role of the people's congresses, it is necessary to strengthen constantly the party's leadership over the work of the people's congresses. All participants had high appraisal of the experience Ye Wenjian, secretary of the Nanping City Party Committee,
introduced to the meeting. The Nanping City Party Committee genuinely placed the work of the People's Congress on its agenda; supported the People's Congress in exercising all its functions and powers; demanded that the city government, the city procuratorate, and the city People's Court voluntarily accept supervision by the Standing Committee of the city People's Congress; and asked all party members of the city to abide exemplarily by the state's laws and decrees. The city party committee and departments concerned also helped the city People's Congress solve a number of problems concerning its working conditions. The Standing Committee of the city People's Congress, on its part, voluntarily placed its work under the leadership and supervision of the party committee while exercising its functions and powers and playing its role well.

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CSO: 4005/871
JIANGSU CPC URGES LEARNING FROM NANJING PLANT

OW100939 Nanjing Jiangsu Provincial Service in Mandarin 2200 GMT 6 Jun 86

[Excerpts] The Jiangsu Provincial CPC Committee adopted a decision on 24 May calling on the province to learn from the Nanjing Chenguang Machinery Plant and from Comrade Tao Keming. The full text of this decision follows:

The Nanjing Chenguang Machinery Plant is an advanced enterprise that has excelled in efforts to build socialist material and spiritual civilizations. Comrade Tao Keming, party committee secretary and director of the plant, is an outstanding leading cadre with lofty ideals and an enterprising spirit who is strict with himself.

In recent years, the Nanjing Chenguang Machinery Plant has made outstanding achievements in all fields of work by persisting in reform and promoting both material and spiritual civilizations. In particular, it has done remarkably well in rectifying party style, doing ideological and political work in the new period, carrying out reforms within the enterprise, and increasing economic results.

In learning from the Nanjing Chenguang Machinery Plant, efforts should be made to emulate it in striving to build a leading body with strong party spirit, correct workstyle, and good unity; to persist in promoting both socialist material and spiritual civilizations, to effectively carry out ideological and political work in all aspects of reform, production, and daily life so as to fully mobilize the socialist initiative and eagerness to work of cadres and workers; and to always adhere to the socialist orientation in running enterprises to ensure that the greater the decisionmaking power of an enterprise the stronger is its sense of responsibility to be masters of the country in contributing as much as it can to the state.

In learning from Comrade Tao Keming, we should follow his example of maintaining and carrying forward the party's fine workstyle; maintaining close ties with the masses, uniting with one's comrades, and working selflessly for the interests of the people with ardor and sincerity. We should follow his example of acting in a down-to-earth, exemplary, and honest way when performing actual work. We should follow his example of upholding principles; keeping in mind the interests of the whole, being courageous in and good at
managerial work; and implementing all policies of the party and state in an exemplary manner.

The provincial party committee hopes that the Nanjing Chenguang Machinery Plant and Comrade Tao Keming will guard against arrogance and rashness; be modest and prudent; carry forward their achievements by continuing to exert themselves and displaying the spirit of constant progress; and strive for still higher criteria in an effort to win new successes and make new contributions.

/9599
CSO: 4005/871
SHANDONG PEOPLE'S CONGRESS STANDING COMMITTEE MEETING

Work Report Given

SK130227 Jinan DAZHONG RIBAO in Chinese 23 May 86 pp 1, 3

[Work report given by Li Zhen, chairman of the Shandong Provincial People's Congress Standing Committee, at the fourth session of the sixth provincial People's Congress on 16 May]

[Excerpts] Fellow deputies:

Entrusted by the provincial People's Congress Standing Committee, I now submit a report to the session on the work done by the Standing Committee in the period since the third session of the sixth provincial People's Congress.

Since the third session of the sixth provincial People's Congress in 1985, the Standing Committee has earnestly implemented the spirit of the National Conference of Party Delegates and the third session of the sixth NPC in line with the resolutions adopted at the third session of the sixth provincial People's Congress, the duty and power imposed by the Constitution and the organic law for local congresses and governments, and the general task and target set forth by the party for the new historic period. It has enhanced supervision over the implementation of the Constitution and the law and over the work of administration, administration of justice, and procuratorial affairs; strengthened local legislative work and the leadership over the popularization of legal knowledge; earnestly dealt with the motions and proposals offered by the deputies; made close contact with the People's Congress Standing Committees at city and county (district) levels; and has enhanced self improvement. We have achieved new progress in various fields and made positive contributions to promoting the province's program of conducting reforms, building the two civilizations, developing socialist democracy, and improving social legal systems.

1. Efforts have been made to hear or discuss the work reports given by the provincial People's Government, the provincial Higher People's Court, and the provincial People's Procuratorate, and to enhance supervisions over various work.

Hearing, discussing, and making decisions on the major and big events in various fields for their own administrative regions constitute an important
duty of the local People's Congress Standing Committee and also represent a basic style of the local state apparatus in conducting work supervisions. Over the past year, the Standing Committee has heard and discussed in succession the work reports on 14 items submitted to the provincial People's Government, the provincial Higher People's Court, and the provincial People's Procuratorate.

The year 1985 was the last year in implementing the 6th 5-Year Plan, which has a vital bearing on fulfilling various targets set forth by the plan in the year, realizing the 6th 5-Year Plan in an overall way, and laying a solid foundation for fulfilling the 7th 5-Year Plan. In order to inspect and supervise the implementation of the plan this year, the Standing Committee heard and discussed the report given by the provincial People's Government with regard to the implementation of the 1985 plan for the national economy and social development and the final accounts of the 1985 financial budget.

In order to earnestly implement 1985 Document No 1 of the central authorities and the spirit of the national conference on rural work, the Standing Committee, the basis of carrying out investigation and study, heard and discussed the report given by the provincial People's Government with regard to the implementation and the No 1 Document and the situation in readjusting rural production structure.

Farmland is a big issue related to the national economy and the people's livelihood. In view of our province being endowed with less farmland and dense population and the serious problem of daily decreasing farmland, the Standing Committee heard and discussed the report given by the provincial People's Government with regard to the work on land control.

The provisions set forth by the Constitution with regard to establishing audit organs and conducting audit supervision represent an important policy decision on running the country in line with the law. The Standing Committee heard and discussed the work report given by the provincial audit bureau and also adopted a "resolution" on enhancing audit work.

In order to accelerate the pace of achieving a fundamental turn for the better in public security, the Standing Committee heard and discussed the report given by the provincial Public Security Department with regard to dealing strict blows to serious criminal activities.

Dealing strict blows to serious economic crimes has a vital bearing on ensuring the smooth progress in conducting reforms in economic systems and building the four modernizations. The Standing Committee heard and discussed the reports given by the provincial Higher People's Court and the provincial People's Procuratorate with regard to dealing strict blows to serious economic crimes in the province.

Public health work is closely related to the people's health and the prosperity of the Chinese nation and constitutes an important content in the program of building socialist spiritual civilization. The Standing Committee
heard and discussed the report given by the provincial Public Health Department with regard to the work done in the past and the opinions on future work.

Compiling local history is a fine cultural tradition of ours and plays an important role in carrying out "education, political support, and historical files." The Standing Committee heard and discussed the report with regard to the work done in compiling local history and also adopted a "resolution" on enhancing its work.

2. Efforts have been made to popularize legal knowledge and to enhance supervision over legal implementation.

Making legal knowledge universal among the people as a whole constitutes a big event in the political life of the people throughout the country, and an important component part in building socialist spiritual civilization. Making a success in this regard has a vital bearing on further carrying forward socialist democracy, strengthening socialist legal systems, accelerating the pace of building the two civilizations, and fulfilling the general target and task set forth by the party for the new historical period.

Over the past year, the Standing Committee has earnestly grasped the propaganda and educational work with the central content of the Constitution and the law in line with the directives issued by the central authorities and the arrangement made by the provincial CPC Committee.

Since the third session of the sixth provincial People's Congress, the Standing Committee has adopted the following measures in conducting legal supervisions: First, some acts which were in violation of the Constitution and the law have been corrected in a timely manner. Second, efforts have been made to conduct necessary supervisions after hearing the reports concerning the implementation of the law. Third, efforts have been made to carry out legal supervisions after answering the people's letters and receiving people's visits. In 1985, the Standing Committee received 4,418 letters and visits sent or paid by the people and examined or dealt with 28 major or serious cases.

3. Efforts have been made to formulate local regulations and rules in order to meet the need of reforms and construction.

Since the third session of the sixth provincial People's Congress, the Standing Committee has further enhanced the legislative work on local economic laws in line with the spirit of the decision made at the Third Plenary Session of the 12th CPC Central Committee with regard to the fact that "the drive to conduct reforms and the national economic development have enabled the guiding principles of economic relations and activities to be legalized; and that the state legislative organs should accelerate their pace in conducting legislative work in the economy." It has also formulated four local economic regulations and rules.
The 17th Standing Committee meeting discussed and approved the "temporary provisions" on land control among the provincial economic and technical development zones, the "temporary provisions" on enterprise registration among the provincial economic and technical development zones, and the "temporary provisions" on labor management among the provincial economic and technical development zones. All of these provisions were put into effect by the provincial People's Government.

Over the past few years, the problems of water, gas, and waste pollution have become increasingly serious along with the development of industrial and mining enterprises and the increase of urban public facilities, against which the masses have lodged stronger complaints. In order to control water pollution and to improve the environment, the 18th Standing Committee meeting discussed and approved the provincial "provisions (trial)" on levying water pollution charges, and the provincial "measures" on levying pollution charges, which were adopted by the provincial People's Congress Standing Committee in 1980 and 1982.

Over the past year, the Standing Committee, while formulating local regulations and rules, has also organized relevant units and invited a number of experts and scholars to hold discussions on some state draft laws in line with the demand set forth by the Legislative Affairs Commission under the NPC Standing Committee.

4. Efforts have been made to organize inspection activities and to carry out in-depth investigation and study.

Organizing inspection activities constitutes an important method of bringing into full play the role of deputies and the People's Congress Standing Committee. Over the past year, in order to ensure the implementation of the state law and to better discuss and make decisions on the province's big events, the Standing Committee has not only organized inspections over the implementation of the Constitution and the work of popularizing legal knowledge among the four cities including Jinan and Qingdao, but also has organized inspection activities in the following aspects: 1) Inspection activities have been carried out over historical relics. 2) Inspection activities have been carried out over educational work. 3) Inspection activities have been carried out over food sanitation work.

We have further enhanced investigation and studies. Over the past year, chairman, vice chairmen, members, and comrades from the general office under the provincial People's Congress Standing Committee have carried out investigation and studies in many aspects in line with the issue of how to further create a new work situation in the provincial People's Congress.

5. Efforts have been made to make close contact with deputies and the People's Congress Standing Committees at city and county levels.

Making close contact with deputies and bringing into full play the role of deputies constitute a foundation for making a success in the People's Congress
work. In line with temporary provisions adopted by the Standing Committee with regard to making contact with deputies, we have organized and conducted the following work over the past year: 1) Efforts have been made to deal with the motions offered by the deputies. 2) Efforts have been made to relay in a timely manner the 531 proposals raised by the deputies in the period since the third session of the sixth provincial People's Congress to the relevant departments of the provincial People's Government for disposal. 3) Efforts have been made to pay a visit to deputies and to invite deputies to hold discussions.

While enhancing contact with deputies, the Standing Committee also strengthened the contact with the People's Congress Standing Committees at city and county levels. Over the past year, we have not only continuously invited the responsible persons from the People's Congress Standing Committee at city and county levels and from the prefectural liaison offices in charge of congress work to attend as observers the Standing Committee meetings, but also has held discussions with such responsible persons at the 15th Standing Committee meeting to exchange work information and experience.

6. Efforts have been made to enhance the building of Standing Committees and to establish and improve regulations and rules.

Not only being the local organ of state power, but also being a working organ, the provincial People's Congress Standing Committee must enhance self improvement and strive to upgrade ideological and working standards in order to successfully perform its duty under the law and to fulfill its undertaken tasks. Over the past year, the Standing Committee has grasped the following work in enhancing self improvement: 1) Efforts have been made to earnestly study legal knowledge and to continuously upgrade the professional quality of working personnel. 2) Since last summer, we have held 2-year higher-learning legal classes at the provincial college in charge of training cadres of judicial management. 3) Efforts have been made to enhance the building of organizations and systems on the basis of carrying out party rectification.

All in all, under the leadership of the provincial CPC Committee and the support of the people throughout the province, the provincial People's Congress Standing Committee, over the past year, has earnestly implemented the function and duty of local organs of state power and made new progress in various fields. When comparing the function and power invested by the Constitution and the Organic Law for Local Congresses and Governments to the expectation harbored by the people, a larger gap that mainly surfaces in the work of formulating local regulations and rules, which is not in conformity with the need of conducting reforms in economic systems, still exists. The issue of how to conduct better supervision over the implementation of the Constitution and the law remains to be continuously studied and improved. The organizational establishment of the Standing Committee and the quality and quantity of its cadres still do not meet the needs of its work and all of them need to be further reinforced or enhanced. We should make efforts to study, to earnestly sum up our experience, and to pay attention to studying new
questions and new situations in order to steadily improve the Standing Committee work.

Fellow deputies:

The year 1986 is the first year in implementing the 7th 5-Year Plan. The tasks we face are very heavy. The heavy duty cropping up in the new historic period and the people's trust in us require us to double our efforts, to work with a will to make the country strong, and to pioneer a road of advance. Under the guidance of the spirit of the National Conference of Party Delegates and the Fourth Session of the Sixth NPC and under the support of deputies, we are determined to better implement the function and power of the Standing Committee, to bring into full play the role of the local organ of state power, to develop socialist democracy, improve socialist legal systems, and to unite with the people throughout the province to vigorously wage struggle for a splendid future and to strive to win new and still greater victories.

Meeting Concludes

SK290236 Jinan Shandong Provincial Service in Mandarin 2200 GMT 28 Jun 86

[Excerpts] The 20th Standing Committee meeting of the sixth provincial People's Congress ended on 28 June. During the meeting, the committee members conscientiously examined and discussed a report on the province's current agricultural production and held that the report was given in a timely manner and was very necessary. They held that the report not only comprehensively reflected our province's current agricultural production situation but also put forward a few tasks which we must grasp well during the second half of this year. The committee members were satisfied with the report.

The participants also offered some constructive suggestions on strengthening farmland and water conservancy capital construction, economizing on arable lands, popularizing scientific farming technology, improving the agricultural contract responsibility system, invigorating the rural commodity circulation, and developing the rural commodity economy. At the plenary meeting held on the afternoon of 28 June, the committee members heard an explanation on electing additional members of three commissions of the provincial People's Congress Standing Committee, including the legal system work commission, the financial and economic work commission, and the education, science, culture and public health commission. They adopted a report on the appointments and removals of personnel.

The meeting was presided over by Xu Leijian, vice chairman of the provincial People's Congress Standing Committee. Attending were Li Zhen, chairman of the provincial People's Congress Standing Committee, Gao Fengwu, Zhang Zhusheng, Xu Jianchun, Lin Ping, Feng Lizu, Lu Hong, Xu Shen, and Yan Qingqing, vice chairmen of the provincial People's Congress Standing Committee. Vice Governor Ma Zongchen attended the meeting as observer.

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CSO: 4005/871
SHANDONG FORUM OF PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT DIRECTORS CONCLUDES

SK070511 Jinan Shandong Provincial Service in Mandarin 2200 GMT 5 Jul 86

[Excerpt] The provincial forum of Propaganda Department directors concluded in Jinan on 4 July. The forum pointed out that propaganda work should be geared to the needs of reform, opening to the outside world, and the four modernizations. It urged: Propaganda departments of CPC committees at all levels should fully understand the tasks of propaganda work in the new situation, change their outdated ideas and concepts, enhance their sense of the economy, improve the competence of cadres, and make positive contributions to revitalizing Shandong's economy, fulfilling our province's 7th 5-Year Plan, and promoting the two civilizations.

Li Changan, deputy secretary of the provincial CPC Committee and provincial governor; Lu Maozeng, deputy secretary of the provincial CPC Committee; and Miao Fenglin, Standing Committee member and Propaganda Department director of the provincial CPC Committee, attended and addressed the forum.

The forum noted: Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, Shandong's ideological and economic fronts have scored significant achievements in building both spiritual and material civilization. The enlivened economy cannot be achieved without work on the ideological front. At present, the major problem in propaganda work is its failure in adapting to the needs of the new situation in reform and opening to the outside world, and its need for further strengthening and improvement.

The forum pointed out: To make propaganda work correspond to the needs of reform and opening to the outside world, we should, above all, change our ideas and concepts, and renew our concepts on propaganda. First, we should change our methods to foster advanced typical cases and give wide publicity to the good examples in reform. Second, we should change our methods to make comparisons. We should not only compare the present with the past but also compare ourselves with the advanced and draw lessons from all quarters. Third, we should change our ideas on treating public opinions and should not regard invigoration as disorder. Extensive discussion is a good thing, which reflects the people's sense of responsibility as masters of the state and our country's democratic atmosphere. The key is that we should learn to give correct guidance, and choose and follow what is good. Fourth, we should change the idea of making momentum. Such a way of propaganda will easily lead
to a unitary scale of propaganda work and a unitary propaganda method. In carrying out propaganda work, we should stress actual results, quality, and persistence. Fifth, we should rethink the idea that educators are a cut above others. Propaganda work means service, and personnel in charge of propaganda work should spread principles, information, and knowledge among the people. They are by no means superior to those who are educated, and should not regard the idea of being a cut above others as their authority in ideological and political work and try to safeguard it. Sixth, we should change our ideas concerning the actual results of propaganda work. We should stress time, efficiency, policy bounds, and purposes.

The forum urged: Propaganda departments at all levels should make meticulous organization in order to make both the vertical and lateral ties of propaganda work successful. In terms of lateral ties, they should give full play to the role of all functional departments, strengthen guidance, transmit CPC committees' relevant instructions and opinions in a timely manner, help these departments in implementing them, submit special reports to CPC committees at regular intervals, and subject the work of ideological and cultural departments to the unified leadership of CPC committees. They should gear ideological and political work to the needs of the masses and strengthen their contacts with noted personages, professors, experts, and scholars. In terms of vertical ties, propaganda departments at higher levels should provide more favorable conditions for those at lower levels, hold meetings and issue material in a timely manner, frequently to lower levels, less economically developed areas in particular, to ascertain the situation and help solve problems on the spot.

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CSO: 4005/871
SHANGHAI LEGAL ADVICE CENTER--Shanghai, 28 Jun (XINHUA)--A legal advice center in downtown Shanghai has attracted people from all walks of life. Workers, teachers, students, and factory managers come here to attend lectures on laws concerning contracts, economic conflicts, the principles of the civil code and the marriage law. Ou Yuntao, a young manager who has been in his position for only 2 months, found the answers to two contract problems at the advice center. The center was set up in March this year by a local newspaper--the "SHANGHAI LEGAL SYSTEM"--and four young legal workers. Judges, college teachers, and law students also give lectures and answer questions. Books on law are on sale. Tao Qianjian, a part-time lawyer and a sponsor of the center, told XINHUA, "We are attempting to make the center a shortcut for Shanghai residents to acquire legal knowledge. And people interested in legislation can also make new friends here." [Excerpt] [Beijing XINHUA in English 2813 GMT 28 Jun 86] /9599

ZHIFU BAO RURAL EDITION OF XINHUA RIBAO--With the approval of the Jiangsu Provincial CPC Committee, ZHIFU BAO [DEVOTING EFFORTS TO ACHIEVING PROSPERITY] officially becomes the rural edition of XINHUA RIBAO, as of today. This fact further affirms ZHIFU BAO's status as the party paper. Since its establishment, ZHIFU BAO has served peasants wholeheartedly, in accordance with the directive of the provincial CPC committee, and has played a notable role in disseminating and implementing party policies, in promoting readjustment of the structure of agricultural production and development of the rural commodity economy, and in helping peasants achieve prosperity by working hard, applying science, and observing the law, thereby winning their trust and approval. [Text] [Nanjing Jiangsu Provincial Service in Mandarin 2200 GMT 2 Jul 86] /9599

CSO: 4005/871
XINHUA ADVOCATES PREVENTION OF CRIME BY MEDIATION

OW261013 Beijing XINHUA in English 0537 GMT 26 Jul 86

[News feature: Mediation--Preventive Means Against Crime--XINHUA Headline]

[Excerpts] Changsha, July 26 (by XINHUA correspondents Wang Pingxing and Wang Yanlei)--Two men fell into a furious quarrel outside a factory dormitory and one of them turned back to the house and rushed out with a sharp cleaver in his hand.

He was suddenly clasped by the waist by somebody from behind. The two were instantly separated by their neighbors.

Tian Jidong, the man with the cleaver, was criticized for his rudeness. The two workers apologized to each other and have been on friendly terms ever since.

The incident occurred in Changde City, Hunan Province, and the man who was the first to hold Tian and stop the incident was a mediator of the factory.

According to statistics of the provincial Department of Justice, mediators in the province have resolved nearly 800,000 civil disputes over the past 2 years. Among them, 40,000 cases were potential murders or suicides, said an official of the department.

The Chinese Constitution stipulates that people's mediation groups are set up at villages and neighborhood committees to solve civil disputes. Now 97 percent of Chinese villages and 91 neighborhoods have mediators totalling more than 5.3 million.

Local officials told XINHUA that disputes involved were mostly love affairs, the care of the elderly, compensation and inheritance of property, and the division or sharing of fields and houses, as well as quarrels between husband and wife.

Mediators in grassroot units are all volunteers. Many are retired teachers, workers, and cadres.

The main task of the mediators is to prevent disputes from becoming sharper to maintain social order. Local courts offer them regular training in legal knowledge and mediation methods.
BRIEFS

SOCIAL SITUATION IN TANGSHAN--Shijiazhuang July 11 (by XINHUA correspondents Li Xinrui and Zhao Wei) -- a worker in a Tangshan machine-building factory, who watched as his wife and two children were killed by a falling roof during a 7.8-magnitude earthquake ten years ago, often woke in the following months with a bottle of liquor clutched in his hand. The earthquake on July 28, 1976 claimed 242,000 lives, wiped out 7,000 families and destroyed all housing buildings in this major industrial and mining center in North China. In contrast to the one-child family policy for the nation, the local government during the 1977-78 period allowed each remarried couple to have one more child, provided that the couple had had no more than two children born with their previous spouse. Jobs were provided to those from the rural areas under the jurisdiction of Tangshan City who married with widowed people in the city center. In China, rural people are discouraged from migrating into cities, which are overcrowded and have difficulty providing sufficient jobs and housing even to their own residents. [Excerpts] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1358 GMT 11 Jul 86 OW] /12624

BEIJING COLLEGE DEPARTMENTS--Beijing, July 14 (XINHUA)--Almost all of Beijing's 61 colleges and universities here will open new departments or offer new majors for students this fall as part of China's modernization drive. Over the past few years, students have enrolled in more than 300 new majors, including textiles, foods, applied electronics technology and applied computer technology. New schools are offering majors in economic management, law, tourism, Chinese medicine, and electronics and chemistry in daily life. In line with China's economic reform and opening to the outside world, students are flocking to such majors as finance and economics, planning and statistics, and insurance and taxation, which were not popular in the past. More interdisciplin ary majors have been created, including biochemical engineering. Beijing University has also established research centers for management science, information science and environmental science. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 0953 GMT 14 Jul 86 OW] /12624

CSO: 4000/315
BRIEFS

XINJIANG MOSLEMS TO MECCA--Urumqi, 18 Jul (XINHUA)--Some 1,000 Moslems from Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region have left the Khunjerab pass on China's western border so far this year for Mecca--the holy city of Islamism--via Pakistan. Another 1,000 are about to start the journey to the Saudi city, when every healthy Moslem is required to visit once in his life, provided he is financially able to do so and it is safe on the way. At least 1,000 Xinjiang Moslems have made the journey at their own expense each year since 1981, when China resumed the policy of allowing individual pilgrims to Mecca. The regional government has set up reception centers for the convenience of the pilgrims. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1421 GMT 18 Jul 86] /9599

C50: 4000/323
MILITIA'S MILITARY TRAINING REFORMS ANALYZED

Taipei CHUNG-KUNG YEN-CHIU [STUDIES ON CHINESE COMMUNISM] in Chinese
15 May 86 pp 111-118

[Article by Ch'ang T'ai [1603 3141]: "Chinese Communists' Reform of Militia Training"]

I. Foreword

[Text] The Chinese communists have always stressed that in militia work, besides "implementation in organization and politics," there must be implementation in the militia's military training. Under the principle of what is called "engage in productive labor and perform militia duties" and "support the performance of militia duties with productive labor," they demand an elevation of the militia's military quality. However, over the years, because of the effect of the internal power struggle within the CPC, coupled with the fact that cadres responsible for militia work in various areas regard the militia's military training as a burden, and they either do it perfunctorily as a mere matter of form or make it an emergency measure, it has been impossible for any part of militia training work to be done effectively.

Since 1979, the Chinese communists have been carrying out a comprehensive reform of the economic system, reforming part of the production management system. Especially after various forms of the production responsibility system were put into practice, militia training activities faced new difficulties. To coordinate with the work of carrying out reforms and streamlining and reorganizing the communist army, the Chinese communists must implement reforms in militia training.

On 14 December 1985, the Chinese communists held an "all-army conference on militia and reserve duty work" in Peiping. At the conference it was stressed that militia work in the new period should "be subordinated to economic construction, reduce quantity, compress training, give prominence to key points, and improve quality." Responsible persons in all areas were called on to make comprehensive reforms of militia training work, readjust the scattered training in various areas of the past to concentrated training, reduce the scope of militia training, and cut down on training time. Separately related below for reference will be the relevant situations in the Chinese communists' reform of militia training and the problems derived therefrom.
II. The Reasons for the Chinese Communists' Reform of Militia Training

A. Militia Training Work Could Not Be Done

In the Chinese communists' militia training work, over the years, because of restrictions in manpower, material resources, time, and region, from first to last training work could not be done. The majority of militiamen concluded that they could only engage in production work and that militia training work was not essential. If a war breaks out the militia will only do some logistics support work, they thought, and they were not too keen on military training work, often regarding it as not their duty. They thought there was no rush about military training work, and feared that militia training and agricultural production vied for labor power and that the former adversely affected production. Therefore, to cope with the inspections of the higher level, they copy some old training outlines and training progress charts in order to prepare for the higher level's checks, causing there to appear in militia training work the erroneous tendency of "training for show" and not "training for combat." Some units only "consider whether militia will assemble as called," and give little consideration to how the unit should strengthen the work of militia military training." Therefore, the militia training work is not vigorous, and it is even discovered when starting militia training that there are the problems that "personnel are hard to concentrate, time is hard to arrange, and sites are hard to find." The militia political education system in some units is not sound. Attendance rate at classes is low. The education is slack at the beginning and has to speed up toward the end, and there is a single form in the education. The educational methods are boring, oversimplified, and dull. The content of the education lacks erudition, interest, and appeal. All this makes it impossible to integrate the education with actual situations. In some areas, no consideration is given to the objective conditions of sites, equipment, instruction, and the militia's production level. Unified training topics and unified assessments of achievements are sought, thereby causing the appearance of the phenomena of making up natural numbers and making up the numbers of personnel, and of exaggerating training results. (1)

B. The Necessity for Reform of the Economic System

The principal nature of the Chinese communists' militia is that it is a mass armed organization that is not separated from production. In peacetime, besides the militia's participation in production activities, it is stipulated that the militia should make use of the slack season in farming, the intervals in production, and sparetime to engage in military training. Formerly, because the organization of production in the rural and urban areas on the mainland was fairly simple, it was easy to control the militia's training activities. However, after 1979, when the Chinese communists carried out a comprehensive reform of the economic system and the production responsibility system was put into effect in the rural areas, in every area on the mainland, no matter whether in rural areas or cities. There occurred extremely big changes in militia training work. The usefulness of militia in a future war—the so-called "strategic position of militia"—was also greatly affected. Therefore, to solve the problems, after the reform of the economic system, of how the militia organizations are to adapt to the changed production
management system and of how military training time for the militia is to be arranged and the wages and allowances for the activities the militia takes part in, the Chinese communists had to make a comprehensive reform of militia training.

C. Coordination With the Streamlining and Reorganization of the Armed Forces

For a long time, because the Chinese communists' military conscription system had been wrecked, the armed forces organizations have been overstaffed and full of redundant personnel. For this reason, in 1982 the Chinese communists began the work of comprehensively "streamlining and reorganizing" the armed forces. From 23 May to 6 June 1985, the Chinese communists held an "enlarged session of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee," which formally announced that within 2 years the number of personnel in the communist army would be cut by 1 million. To coordinate militia work with the communist army's streamlining and reorganization so that it meets the requirements of wartime troop mobilization, support of unit operations, defense of localities, and basic-level unit self-defense, the Chinese communists called for the work of militia building to be integrated with the work of wartime troop mobilization, so as to establish a perfected mobilization system. Therefore, besides starting to readjust the militia organizations and tasks, the Chinese communists are now carrying out a comprehensive reform of the militia's training work. In reforming militia training, the reform of the military training of core members of the militia is made a key point. Because in the militia's military training in the past, some of it consisted of a set of training methods that copied indiscriminately those of a field army and did not suit the requirements of militia, and some of it was a case of "practicing arbitrary uniformity" and simply pursuing quantity, and even "only drawing graphs, going through the motions, and making flower stands," which did not meet the requirements of actual combat, therefore it was stressed that in the militia's military training, faced with the new situation, there be readjustment and reform. It was necessary, proceeding from reality, to change the past situation in which, because there were many militia spread over a wide area, the burden on basic-level units and militia was too heavy, and training could not be realistic, so as to make it adapt to the communist army's work of "streamlining and reorganization," and thus improve the quality of militia training and its combat readiness in the so-called new period.

III. The Chinese communist's Stipulations Concerning the Reform of Militia Training

A. Stipulations for Militia and Reserve Duty Training

Based on the Chinese communists' new "military service law" of May 1984, the relevant provisions for militia and reserve duty training are as follows:

1. Every year militia and reserve duty personnel must participate in military training as stipulated.
2. Arrangements for the military education and training of militia and reserve duty soldiers are to be made in the militia organizations or independently.

3. Core members of the militia and first-category reserve duty personnel who have not yet been on active service, and who are between the ages of 18 to 20, should participate in military training 30 to 40 days a year. The training time for militia with special skills is to be suitably extended according to practical needs.

4. Core members of the militia and first-category reserve duty personnel who have been on active service and have undergone military training should still receive 1 to 2 weeks of refresher training.

5. The military training of ordinary militia and reserve duty soldiers who have not yet been put into militia organizations is to be carried out as stipulated.

6. During their reserve duty period, reserve duty officers should participate in 3 to 6 months of military training. (2)

B. Provision for the General Training of Militia

So that the militia will meet the needs of the reform of the economic system and coordinate with the communist army's "streamlining and reorganization," the Chinese communists have set forth the following specific provisions for reforming the training of ordinary members and core members of the militia:

1. The militia's military training should be a training that combines concentrated training, dispersed set-point training, and dispersed makeup training. The principal objects of the training are core members of the militia and militia with specialized skills.

2. Except in border defense areas, the time devoted to militia training in all areas must not be too long, the number of persons taking part in the training must be cut down, and the training of militia cadres must be enhanced.

3. All parts of the militia's military training are to be changed from seasonal training to annual training.

4. The training of core members of the militia will be rotational training according to principles of training one person or a batch of persons in the use of every weapon. After completing the topics in the training plan, those who really qualify by examination will no longer participate in training that year, and every year afterward they will take 3 to 5 days of refresher training.

5. The cadres with specialized skills should complete their training tasks every year, and their training period may be extended as appropriate.
6. The training of militia cadres must not be less than 15 days every year. In remote and special areas and units, circumstances can be taken into consideration and 2 years' training time can be concentrated into 1 year.

7. The "military subdistrict" is responsible for organizing the training of full-time people's armed forces department cadres, and every year they are to receive 1 month of concentrated training in the training unit. When there are special circumstances, 2 years' training time may be concentrated in one session.

8. Cadres who have been through many sessions of concentrated training, and who are able to organize training and lead militia in the performance of operational tasks, need not take part in concentrated training, but they must undertake the task of being "little instructors" who train militia cadres and backbone elements.

9. The training of militia with special skills must really be done in accordance with the stipulated tasks of the relevant branch or arm of the service. The "military region" and "provincial military district" must incorporate the training of militia with specialized skills in the entire militia training plan and make unified dispositions; the "military subdistrict" and the "people's armed forces department" are to coordinate with the relevant branches and arms of the service in jointly organizing the implementation of the training.

10. The "military subdistrict" is responsible for the rotational training of people's armed forces department cadres; the county or city "people's armed forces department" is responsible for the concentrated training of company commanders and platoon leaders who are militia core members and for running classes to train "little instructors"; and the factory or mine "people's armed forces department" is responsible for training core members of the militia.

C. Provisions in the Content of Militia Training

The current reform of militia training by the Chinese communists should, putting emphasis on the need to carry out the main tasks of militia in the new period, streamline all training courses. The militia cadres must enhance their teaching methods and command of training, so that they will be able to organize and command at all levels the militia's training and operations. The relevant parts of training are as follows:

1. In general, the militia will be trained in accordance with the different environments of a regional nature. The training content lays stress on firing, hand grenade throwing, demolition, earthwork, close combat, night combat, reconnaissance, techniques, and tactics. In particular, the stress is on training in the "three attacks and three defenses" and in traditional militia tactics.

2. In all parts of the training of ordinary militia, besides the general military basic training, there should be an increase of training in scientific and technical knowledge and a strengthening of the appeal of
militia training in order to help the militia to "create wealth through labor."

3. The training content for core members of the militia should concentrate on basic combat movements and on basic training in techniques and tactics.

4. In the training content for militia who possess specialized skills, emphasis must be placed on their studying the knowledge of specialized skills and on priority being given to training in mastering the specialized skills in their own work.

5. Cadres who have had many sessions of concentrated training are to train cadres who have not met the training requirements in line with the principle of makeup training for whatever they are deficient in.

D. Provisions for the Political Education of Militia

While strengthening the reform of the militia's military training, the Chinese communists also attach extreme importance to the militiam's political education. They think that the political and ideological education of the militia is an important link in militia building, and demand that militia cadres at all levels be clear about the guiding ideology for the political and ideological education of the militia in the new period, eliminate the pernicious influence and effects of the "leftist" ideology, improve the militia's socialist consciousness, strengthen combat readiness, improve production, and, during the building of the "two civilizations," enhance the militia's own building. (3) The key points of the reform of the militia's political and ideological education are as follows:

1. In the time every year that militia devote to military training, the time of political subjects must not be less than 10 percent.

2. For core members of the militia, the past system of 1 session of political education every month is changed to 4 sessions every year.

3. For ordinary militia, the past system of 4 or 5 sessions of political education every year is now changed to 1 or 2 sessions every year, either combined with reorganization or at year end.

4. Militia in border areas should, in combination with their combat-readiness guard duties, be given combat-readiness ideological education; the political and ideological education of militia in disaster areas and poor areas should be flexible.

5. When county or city "people's armed forces departments" give concentrated training to full-time people's armed forces cadres and to militia cadres, they must arrange suitable times for political education and the study of experiences in political work, adopting the forms of holding education preparation meetings and meetings to exchange experiences of educational experimental points and of leading cadres' passing on experience, giving help,
and setting an example. Every year the concentrated training is to be given to separate batches of cadres in turn, so that full-time people's armed forces department cadres get military training and political education.

6. The political and ideological education of all levels of militia is to be integrated with reality, striving for actual results and grasping the characteristics of militia and their ideological state. The focused nature of the education is to be enhanced, and all educational channels are to be opened. Effective methods are to be used, such as wall newspapers, blackboard newspapers, wired broadcasting, slide shows, pictures, and picture books, in order to make the education varied and vivid. Also, the necessary checks and assessments are to be made.

7. In the content of the militia's ideological and political education, education on basic knowledge and education on current affairs and policies are to be made primary. Education on basic knowledge includes combat-preparedness ideology, "revolutionary" warfare, the glorious traditions of the militia, and the importance of militia building. Education on current affairs and policies includes education on situations and tasks and on various laws and decrees.

IV. Specific Measures in the Chinese Communists' Reform of Militia Training.

A. Reduction in the Quantity of Militia Training

To reform the serious defects in past militia training of too many people, poor training quality, and too heavy a burden on basic-level units, the Chinese communists stress that from now on militia training work must be guided by the principle of "reducing quantity and improving quality," and they demand that there not be too many people taking militia training; militia units at all levels must determine the number of people in advance, and every year one militiamen or one set of personnel must be trained in every weapon and piece of equipment. (4) On 19 October 1985, after Yang Shangkun [2799 1424 2492], permanent vice chairman of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, went to the Chinese communists' "Henan Provincial Military District" and made an inspection there, he set forth the key points of military training in the new period, and called for "reducing the number of people taking militia training, improving the quality of militia training, lightening the burden on the mass economy, and giving play to the positive role of the militia in economic construction." (5)

To implement this call, the Chinese communists' militia responsible persons in all areas cut down the work of training ordinary militia. For example, the Chinese communists' "Henan Provincial Military District," upholding the principle of "supporting the military with labor," reduced the number of personnel taking militia training, cut down on the training of ordinary militia, and put emphasis on the training of core members of the militia and militia with specialized skills. (6) Chinese communists' "Hubei Provincial Military District" also vigorously cut back on the training of ordinary militia, and made militia cadres and militia with specialized skills the primary objects of training. (7)
B. Reduction of Militia Training Time

In the past, because in some areas the militia training time was too long, the militia's production work was seriously affected. In striving for results, in some units for a long time there existed a partiality for giving a lot of time to militia training without considering whether the militia training quality was good or bad. Thus, the work of militia training could not be done solidly. In some areas, militia training work could not adapt to various production developments, neglected the requirements of militia tasks, and often made the militia engage in various training activities, adding to the militia's burdens. To strengthen the work of reforming militia training, the Chinese communists are now changing the time for training to one period every one or two years, and, in accordance with the training time completing the training topics, and giving refresher training every other year or every other two years. (8) For example, the Chinese communists' "Shandong Provincial Military District" has cut the militia's training time by a third, and has combined militia military training with training the militia in the skills for "creating wealth." (9) The Chinese communists' "Hubei Provincial Military District" devotes 30 days each year to militia training, and it makes militia and cadres with specialized skills the primary object of training; the one political class each month for core members of the militia has been changed to one class each quarter-year. (10) The Chinese communists' "Hunan Provincial Military District" has changed the militia's periodic training to annual training, and has correspondingly reduced the training time for core members of the militia in areas that already have reserve duty units. Political education during the militia's military training is mainly carried out in combination with the reserve units' commemorative activities and with the "building of the two civilizations." It no longer makes the number of persons attending class the sole criterion for judging the results of political education, and it has reduced the time devoted to the militia's political education. (11) The Chinese communists' "Jiangsu Provincial Military District" has adopted the principle of "more training in key areas and less training in ordinary areas," making full-time people's armed forces department cadres the primary focus of training, so that, compared with the past, militia training activities have been reduced by half. (12)

C. Cancellation of Scattered Militia "Training Points"

Because in the past the area over which the Chinese communists' militia were trained was wide, militia training sites were set up in various areas, and there were too many training personnel and funds. With regard to the excessive number of training sites, some areas called for them to be "standardized and made into organic wholes." At one site too much land was occupied and a lot of equipment was expended, but less than 100 persons were trained each year. Now, in their reform of the work of militia training, the Chinese communists have demanded the cancellation of all militia "training points" in township and towns, and the changing of the past scattered mode of training by townships and towns into concentrated training by counties and cities. (13) For example, the "people's armed forces department" of Huairong County in Hunan formerly made townships and towns the units for giving concentrated training to militia. Each one separately organized training, and there was a serious waste of manpower and financial resources. Now, in
reforming militia training, 26 militia "training points" in the county's townships and towns have been deactivated. The county has been made the unit for militia training, and a small special skill militia training base has been set up, which trains in rotation eight special skill militia including those of artillery, reconnaissance, and signal communications. The instructors at the base are cadres who had been transferred to civilian work and demobilized servicemen. Thus, the quantity and costs of training have been reduced. (14) Besides cutting down the number of people taking militia training and reducing militia training activities in poor townships, the Chinese communists' "Nanjing Military Region" has deactivated 7,760 militia "training points." The objects of training have been changed from people engaged in agricultural production to young militia in township and town enterprises, with priority given to new worker militia who have just gone into factories and are awaiting assignment. (15) The Chinese communists' "Shandong Military District" is now making many reforms in militia training. More than 2,000 militia training sites have been cut out, and scattered training has been readjusted into concentrated training. (16)

D. Exempting Poor Areas From Militia Activities or Reducing Such Activities in Them

To coordinate with their policy of assisting poor and backward areas, the Chinese communists, in certain areas where circumstances are special, like disaster areas and poor and backward areas, have temporarily exempted them from or reduced militia training. For example, on 22 February 1986, the Chinese communists' "Lanzhou Military Region" held a "militia and reserve duty meeting." The meeting decided to completely exempt more than 3,000 poor townships and towns in Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang from militia and reserve duty training activities. The original plan that within 5 years these places should set up militia training bases was also cancelled. (17) The Chinese communists' "Gansu Provincial Military District" has exempted or reduced militia training activities in the poor prefectures of Dingxi, Pingliang, and Qingyang, the proportion of exemption or reduction now accounts for 34 percent of the originally planned training activities. (18) Besides reducing militia training by 45 percent in the poor areas of Anhui and Jiangxi, the Chinese communists' "Nanjing Military Region" has exempted 150 poor townships and towns in Fujian Province from militia training activities. (19) The Chinese communists' "Jiangsu Provincial Military District" has adopted the practice of "less training in ordinary areas, more training in key areas, and less or no training in poor areas." It plans to exempt militia in 66 townships and 450 villages of poor areas from all training activities. (20)

E. Setting Up Militia Concentrated Training Centers

To reduce the scope of militia training the Chinese communists have deactivated training sites of all sizes in various places and set up new militia concentrated training centers with the county and the city as the units for training, the principles for setting up training centers are:

1. The scale and equipment of training bases are to be set up on the basis of different training tasks and contents.
2. Special skill militia training bases are to be set up to meet the need for special skills.

3. Each training base should set up a small tactical training ground, an infantry weapon live-ammunition firing range, and a handgrenade throwing range; and it should provide teaching section equipment and living quarters facilities. (21)

On the mainland there are now more than 1,200 militia concentrated training centers of various types based on the circumstances in different places, which provide concentrated training for the militia and reduce the repetitious training at bases. (22) For example, the Chinese communists' "Hebei Provincial Military District" has changed the past practice of dispersed militia training. It makes the county and city the unit for training, and, as much as possible, builds training bases on barren, sandy, and poor land and on hill slopes. In the 39 militia concentrated training centers now built, each training base has a teaching and research section, a weapon and ammunition warehouse, a training ground, as well as living and production facilities. In it the militia can eat, stay, train, and produce. In it coaches, weapon storekeepers, and training support personnel are gathered together. (23) The Chinese communists' "Henan Provincial Military District" has set up more than 80 militia or reserve duty specialized skill soldiers training center. Each training center has training bases for the ground artillery, antiaircraft gun, signal communications, antichemical warfare, and engineer specialities. Installed in each base is a teaching section and an equipment and ordnance repair section. (24) With the county as the unit, the Chinese communists' "Shijiazhuang Military Subdistrict" in Hebei Province has set up concentrated training centers. Besides regularly giving military training, each training base gives militia training in specialized skills and cultivates the militia to be dual-purpose talents in labor and military affairs. There are over 40 training topics, including crop growing, aquatic breeding, processing, repairing, and cooking. (25)

F. Strengthening the Training of Full-Time Armed Forces Department Cadres

To streamline the number of people in militia training, and to improve militia training quality, the Chinese communists have called on all areas to strengthen the training of full-time people's armed forces department cadres. It has stipulated that the "military subdistricts" and "provincial military districts" should run concentrated training classes to train full-time cadres and backbone elements of people's armed forces departments. For example, putting the focus of military training primarily on full-time people's armed forces department cadres, the Chinese communists' "Jiangxi Provincial Military District, since the beginning of this year, besides holding an all-district meeting on exchanging experiences in the education and training of full-time people's armed forces departments, has begun concentrated training of these cadres throughout the district. At present, 27 concentrated training classes are training 3,540 of these cadres, 85.9 percent of the number that should be trained. In the training content, military training is made primary, and courses in specialized skills such as scientific and technological knowledge and economic management methods are given to raise the militia's educational level. (26) To strengthen the training of full-time people's armed forces
cadres, the Chinese communists' "Jiangsu Provincial Military District" has adopted the escalated educational system for full-time people's armed forces department cadres, and gives rotational training in stages and groups to them in tactical topics at its own level and in guerrilla tactics. (27)

G. Strengthening the Training of Militia with Specialized Skills.

It is stipulated that the "military subdistricts may use the training units to train "little instructors" of special skills fendui, and the "provincial military districts" may use concentrated training units to train the backbone elements of the special skills fendui. For example, a certain army of the "Wuhan Military Region" and the "people's armed forces departments" where it is stationed are training militia in 29 special skills, and plan to develop more than 4,200 technical militiamen, and among the militia develop a batch of soldiers with special skills matched to the needs of wartime mobilization. (28) The Chinese communists' "Henan Provincial Military District," making use of militia training sites in various places, is training militia with special skills. (29) To strengthen the training of militia with special skills, the Gu'an County "People's Armed Forces Department" in Hebei Province has run five kinds of special skills training classes--aquatic breeding, orchard management, woods management, motor vehicle driving, and tractor driving--and the relevant units have organized technicians to give the training, planning to train about 300 people every year. (30)

V. Problems Derived From the Chinese Communists' Reform of Militia Training

Although the Chinese communists have stressed that the purpose of militia training reform is to adapt to the reform of the economic system and coordinate with the needs of the communist army's streamlining and reorganization, because in understanding there is still a relatively long distance between the militia and militia cadres at all levels on the one hand and the Chinese communists' basic demands on the other, many problems have derived from the training reform. Here they are separately stated as follows:

A. An Indistinct Understanding of Training Reform

When the Chinese communists reform militia training, the majority of the militia have an indistinct understanding of the reduction in the number of the militia. They think militia training has become something that is not essential. In wartime the militia will not go to the battlefield and in peacetime every militiaman can engage in production, and if one does not engage in militia activities one can, just the same, become prosperous, so that there is no necessity for the existence of the militia. (31) In some areas, during the reform of training, the militiamen think that "money is made by engaging in production, and money is spent by engaging in training activities," so that in training "the less the better, and not to do it is best of all." Among them there exists widely the psychology of "being in the mood to want money and not being in the mood to fulfill their obligations" and "only wanting wealth, not military duties." In the work of "developing the militia to engage in the four modernizations and run the militia centered on the four modernizations," they hesitate to advance and cannot open up the situation. When some units are reforming militia training, the ordinary
militiaman's "indistinct understanding of socialism" means that he only knows the "neck" of militia building and his enthusiasm for training activities is low. He thinks that under conditions of modern warfare "weapons and equipment have changed and operational forms have changed," so there is no use for militia. Militia cadres in some areas fear that if militia take part in a lot of training activities production will be adversely affected. Therefore, they are unable to carry out militia training according to regulations. (32)

B. Training Becomes a Mere Formality

The Chinese communists are now demanding that militia training "be reduced in quantity, cut down in time, and narrowed in scope." Militia training activities in all areas has been changed from seasonal training to annual training. Each year there are only 15 days of training, or the training time for 2 years is merged into 1 year. Therefore the majority of areas handle military training activities in a perfunctory manner. Although training provisions are listed in plans, because the higher authorities do not give sufficient attention to them or delay them too long, militia training can no longer be done according to plan, a fact that seriously affects militia training. (33) Some areas excessively emphasize that militia should "become prosperous through labor," and they devote training activities time to developing special skills, causing training to become a mere formality. Some units give a lot of consideration to putting the militia into production work, but give very little thought to how to organize the militia to carry out training activities. Some units only make a list of the important points in the higher authorities' directives on militia training reform, but do not make specific plans with regard to the training policy, causing training results to be exaggerated and without substance. To cope with the stipulations of the higher authorities, some units, in the militia concentrated training centers, occupy a lot of land, construct many buildings, consume a lot of time and money, and increase the burden on the common people, but when it is time for militia training activities the number of militia coming for training often falls short of the scheduled number. (34)

C. Contradiction Between Production Work and Militia Training Activities

Because when militia take part in military training their productive labor is correspondingly reduced, the militia in various areas are not enthusiastic about taking part in training, and thus the promotion of training activities is adversely affected. The Chinese communists have admitted that some units, on the excuse that they are busy in production, are unwilling to release militia to take part in the annual military training. Some militia and reserve duty personnel have been away on business for a long time, and there is no way to give them timely notification. In some factories and mines, when production personnel leave their work units, complex procedures must be followed. The people's armed forces department must first get the responsible person of the factory or mine to agree, after which it must consult with the workshop and then handle the procedures for transferring people. As a result, every time there is militia training, 20 percent of the people cannot take part. (35) Because in some areas peasants have contracted out land, the number of personnel coming from outside the area has increased extremely fast, as high as more than half the people, and of them a considerable number are
militia. Some of them have concentrated in the labor force of township and town enterprises, accounting for a third of the total labor force, and they are mainly core members of the militia and demobilized servicemen. Some specialized households and key households have gradually increased, and the proportion of the militia in the "two households" is about 10 percent. Therefore, with arrangements for time for training being difficult, all militia training is greatly affected. (36)

D. The Problem of Loss of Work Remuneration When Taking Part in Training is Hard To Solve

Because some enterprise units have now put into practice many forms of awards for exceeding production quotas, when militia perform service activities their bonuses for exceeding production quotas shrinks. Some factories and mines have instituted graduated-level contracts and separate-level accounting in transferring militia to service activities, thus affecting the production of militia in workshops, teams and groups, and contract groups. However, because they are not given appropriate remuneration to make up for the shortfall in bonuses, the majority of militia refuse to take part in the activities. In some areas when militia take part in activities, the standards for remuneration of loss of working time tend to be low, and a situation is created in which the militia "are unwilling to come when summoned, and when they come they are discontented." When some people's armed forces departments engage in annual training activities they plan to transfer key members of the militia to take part in the training. Because the remuneration given for loss of working time to each militiaman per day is too low, half of the militia who take part in training activities slip away midway through the training. As a result of an investigation by leading cadres of the militia, it was discovered that the core members of the militia attach importance to making money by engaging in production, scorn the low remuneration, and are uninterested in taking part in training activities. (37)

E. Serious Cases of Cadres Practicing Fraud

Because they have been influenced by the reform of the economic system, under the circumstances that it is difficult for militia cadres to obtain an effective solution to the problem of making arrangements for militia to take part in training activities, there are serious cases of fraud in militia training work. In some areas, militia cadres do not attach sufficient importance to the reform of militia training. They only put emphasis on "work at one point" and belittle "work over the whole area," thinking that "since it is hard to do work over the whole area, it is better to do work at one point well." Therefore, training work is not practical or realistic but is only a matter of form. (38) Attaching excessive importance to the militia's production work, some units think that in the present stage the chief task of militia work is to vigorously engage in production work and support the economy, and that training activities are work of secondary importance. Therefore, they no longer talk about training work. However, to cope with inspections by the higher authorities, they make a pretense of studying the training system and fabricate insubstantial training plans. They
painstakingly arrange several militia cadres who have been "trained" to deal with the examination questions, and thus by means of fraud and deception pass the test.

VI. Opinions from Research and Analysis

A. Currently, with regard to militia training reform, the Chinese communists stress the principle that they must persist in "reducing quantity and narrowing the scope." They call on militia cadres in all areas to lighten as much as possible the military duties of militia, shorten the militia training time, and reform militia training well. Their main intent is: on the one hand, to meet the needs of their practice of the production responsibility system in the rural areas and of the production organizational forms of industrial and mining enterprises, that is, meeting the needs of the economic readjustment and the reform of the production management system, in order to solve the economic predicament that they face; on the other hand, in coordination with the communist army's streamlining and reorganization, to effect a mobilization system that "combines militia with reserve duty," changing the original reserve forces in which the militia were primary to reserve forces in which reserve duty units are primary, with the expectation of gradually "transforming quantity and raising quality." Therefore, in a future war, the militia who have not been incorporated into reserve duty units will only undertake the mission of public security and joint defense of a regional nature and of supporting civilian industry.

B. Ever since the Chinese communists reformed the economic system, the militia in all areas have attached considerable importance to production work, and they have felt dissatisfaction about the fact that the problem of renumeration for loss of working time when taking part in education and training work has been unable to be rationally solved. The majority of militia are unwilling to take part in military training activities and thus reduce their opportunities for production and cause losses to their individual interests. Some production units are also unwilling to share the burden of the too many work points that the militia get for taking part in training, which adversely affect the collective income, causing the appearance in militia training work of the phenomenon of it being in name but not in reality. In some areas, the number of militia taking part in training activities has been greatly reduced. The training content is sketchy. The period of training core members of the militia cannot be carried out according to regulations, and the training of ordinary militia seems to have stopped. For the Chinese communists' upholding of the principle that in the militia "labor and military affairs must be combined," this is perplexing problem that is hard to solve.

B. At present, because the Chinese communists are overemphasizing the slogan that the militia "combines labor and military affairs," causing the units in all areas which are responsible for militia work to encourage the militia to get into production work, and to make the militia training bases in all areas into centers for training militia to be special skill talents and for developing commodity production, they are going all out to set up militia economic entities. All of this creates the serious ideological problems among the militia of "being in the mood to want money and not being in the mood to
fulfill their duties," "only wanting wealth, not military duties," as well as "money is made by engaging in production, and money is spent by engaging in training activities." It is even thought that in the new period, with regard to militia work, "the less the better, and none is best of all." They think that in a future war "weapons and equipment will have changed, and operational forms will have changed," so there will be no use for militia. Therefore, they only strive to grasp the "neck" of militia building, and enthusiasm for taking part in militia training activities is low. All of this will seriously affect militia military training work.

FOOTNOTES

(1) October 1984, report in the Chinese communists' magazine ZHONGGUO MINBING [CHINESE MILITIA].

(2) 4 June 1984, Beijing dispatch by the Chinese communists' XINHUA News Agency.

(3) January 1984, report in ZHONGGUO MINBING.

(4) April 1981, report in the Chinese communists' magazine JUNSHI XUESHU [MILITARY SCIENCE].

(5) 26 October 1985, report in the Chinese communists JIEFANGJUN BAO [LIBERATION ARMY DAILY--LAD]

(6) Ibid (5).

(7) 21 February 1985, broadcast by the Chinese communists' Hubei Radio Station.

(8) April 1981, report in JUNSHI XUESHU.

(9) 18 January 1986, report in LAD.

(10) 2 February 1986, broadcast by Hubei Radio Station.

(11) 10 January 1985, report in LAD.

(12) 15 December 1985, Beijing dispatch by XINHUA News Agency.

(13) 16 December 1985, Beijing dispatch by XINHUA News Agency.

(14) 4 November 1985, report in LAD.

(15) 8 January 1986, report in LAD.

(16) Ibid (15).

(17) 22 February 1986, broadcast by the Chinese communists' Central Radio Staton.
(18) 4 May 1986, broadcast by the Chinese communists' Gansu Radio Station.
(19) 8 January 1985, report in the Chinese communists' RENMIN QIANXIAN BAO.
(20) 9 March 1986, broadcast by the Chinese communists' Henan Radio Station.
(21) April 1981, report in JUNSHI XUESHU.
(22) 16 November 1985, Beijing dispatch by XINHUA News Agency.
(23) 6 July 1984, Beijing dispatch by XINHUA News Agency.
(24) 15 March 1986, broadcast by Central Radio Station.
(25) 30 December 1985, report in LAD.
(26) 7 February 1985, broadcast in the Chinese communists' Jiangxi Radio Station.
(27) 15 December 1985, report in the Chinese communists' XINHUA RIBAO.
(28) 20 March 1985, report in LAD.
(29) 26 October 1985, report in LAD.
(30) 9 December 1984, report in LAD.
(31) March 1986, report in ZHONGGUO MINBING.
(32) January 1985, report in ZHONGGUO MINBING.
(33) April 1981, report in JUNSHI XUESHU.
(34) 26 October 1985, report in LAD.
(35) May 1985, report in ZHONGGUO MINBING.
(36) December 1984, report in ZHONGGUO MINBING.
(37) April 1985, report in ZHONGGUO MINBING.
(38) 9 June 1984, report in LAD.

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UNIT 84870 TRAINS UNDER NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL 'ATTACK'

Beijing JIEFANGJUN SHENHOU [PLA LIFE] in Chinese No 6, 13 Jun 86 pp 23-24

[Article by Kong Shuxian [1313 2579 6343]: "When the Time for 'Attack' Comes...On-the-Spot Report on a 'Three Defenses' Drill by an Infantry Squad of A Certain Company"]

[Text] A comprehensive drill in a "coordinated sequence" of movements in the "three defenses" by an infantry squad of a certain company in Unit 84870 presented before the eyes an authentic picture of a war that could occur in the future, and explored methods of dealing with this kind of war. The recording and narration here of the real situation and actual scene of their drill will perhaps provide some enlightenment to young comrades-in-arms.

Siren Sounds for Three Seconds

At noon on this day, at the foot of a hill on the Weihe Plateau in Shaanxi, a comprehensive drill in the "three defenses" under conditions approximating actual combat was about to begin.

The nine fighters of the company's 4th Squad were lying low in a forest waiting for the order to launch an attack. Du Fengyang [2629 7364 7122], leader of this "Dagger Squad," was sunk in brief but deep thought. He knew from the mission given to him by his platoon leader that this was an exercise that was "a play to be taken seriously." The "hypothetical enemy" that the higher level had intentionally deployed was extremely fierce and merciless, and he was equipped with various kinds of modernized, highly effective antipersonnel weapons. If the "Dagger Squad" were to plant the red banner on Height 1, it first had to effectively preserve itself. To do this would by no means be easy!

Indeed, several months ago his squad was "wiped out" in a "nuclear attack." That was in an exercise organized by its regiment. While the squad was moving out, the higher level issued a warning that the "enemy" had made a "nuclear attack," and transmitted a report on the enormous power of this highly effective weapon: The ray radiation in almost no time at all can blind people. The shock wave, spreading out all around from the nuclear burst center at a speed of several thousand meters per second, within a certain distance can turn tanks into "iron lumps." However, because the squad members in peacetime had not studied assiduously the "three defenses," not only were their protective movements either stiff or disordered but also they made many exhibitions of themselves: some of them were at a loss what to do,
and others, their eyes wide with curiosity, raised their heads and looked at
the bustle around them. The judgment of science and war is merciless. The
conclusion of the higher level's assessment was: there was no "honor" for him
and his comrades-in-arms while they were moving out. After the drill, all
members of the squad felt ashamed. Indeed, all day long they had shouted
slogans about training well in skills and defending the motherland, but the
result was that in peacetime training they had failed the test. Once a real
war broke out, how could they not fail even more? A sense of shame engenders
courage. He and his comrades-in-arms made a determined effort. In the past
several months, they repeatedly studied and explored questions centered on the
"three defenses." Today, on this unfamiliar, complex terrain, would this
squad, under conditions of a "nuclear attack," be able to hand in a qualified
examination paper? Although Du Fengyang was worried, he even more was eager
to have a try. In a low voice he gave the order: "Check protective gear!"
In an instant, there was a "rustling" sound after which the fighters were
ready and waiting.

Three red signal flares soared into the sky. This was the order issued by the
exercise command post for the whole line to launch an attack! Du Fengyang
suddenly jumped up and waved his hand: "Forward!" Like a flying dragon, the
4th Squad rushed forward. "Ring--," the command post sounded the warning
signal that the "enemy" had made a "nuclear attack."

"Nuclear attack at the right front!" Following Du Fengyang's shout, the squad
swiftly spread out. Some of them dropped to a prone position in pits and
ditches; others crawled into shell craters and under embankments; those who
had no terrain features to use turned their backs to the burst center, covered
their heads with their hands, and hugged the ground.... Immediately the grass
green of the 4th Squad's fighters' uniforms blended into the emerald green of
the earth. All their protective movements met the demands of actual combat.
Du Fengyang glanced at his watch—they had only taken 3 seconds! A faint
smile flickered across his face. Indeed, in a modernized war of the future,
the speed of the enemy's nuclear attack will be astonishing, and often the
question of whether one can preserve oneself will be decided in a flash. To
finish taking cover in 3 seconds indicated that the squad's protective
capability had switched from the passive to the active. After the "nuclear
attack" had passed, the squad, following Du Fengyang, swiftly charged forward.

Bound To Be a "Comet"

"Approaching contaminated zone!" In a broken brick kiln, the platoon leader
relayed the "emergency report" from the exercise command post: 100 meters in
front is the nuclear blast contaminated zone. Its depth is about 8
kilometers, and the highest dosage rate is 15 roentgens per hour. There is no
path to take to avoid it. The "Dagger Squad" had to directly cross the
contaminated zone to occupy its attack start position.

This was really a crucial problem in the exercise, because the contaminated
zone was what Western nuclear experts call a "gate of hell" danger zone. The
radiation cloud produced by the nuclear explosion would seriously pollute the
environment and injure the human body, with relatively long-term effects.
Therefore, some authoritative sources in the nuclear field in China and abroad
call radiation contamination a "comet" that will bring enormous disaster and misfortune to humanity.

However, after a period of anxiety, the fighters became extremely cool-headed, because they had long ago trained in the skills of crossing through the "gate of hell." How could they forget that the more than 100 days and nights before this exercise, during which they expended so much painstaking effort and sweat to train in rapid reaction and squad protection under various weather and terrain conditions, was for the purpose of subduing this "comet"?

Du Fengyang began to give orders: "Act in accordance with the original plan!" The sound of his voice had just fallen when all comrades of the squad immediately took crucial protective measures. They drank boiled water, took antiradiation doses, put on protective masks, and tightly fastened their collars, sleeves, and trouser legs.... Even Du Fengyang was amazed at the rapidity and precision of their movements. "Cross the contaminated zone!" At the sound of his command, the squad formed into a single-line formation, spaced out, and in a low posture ran forward.

"Buzz--" came the sound in the sky of aircraft motors. Du Fengyang resolutely ordered: "Air raid, drop down and take cover!" He directed all members of the squad to make use of ditches and pits as they kept forward, and he had them fire their weapons into the sky in counterattack against the "enemy aircraft." After half an hour the fighters had expended a great deal of their physical strength and they were taking deep breaths. At this juncture, without the least hesitation Du Fengyang gave the order: "Cross the contaminated zone as fast as you can!" Without a doubt this was a wise and decisive command, because during a modernized war in the future if one stays one second more in the contaminated zone than one has to, one will run more risk of becoming a casualty. Especially if one encounters a harassing attack by enemy aircraft while one is in a contaminated zone, risk is added to risk that one will be injured. Contaminated particles will take advantage of the longer stay in the zone, and the comrades-in-arms will lose their lives on the spot. Time is the principle of life, and herein its full significance is shown. The fighters of the "Dagger Squad," regarding the exercise as a true practice, raced against time as they rushed forward....

Storming Heavily Fortified Positions Amid the "Poisonous Mist"

"Boom!" "Boom!" The "hypothetical enemy" deployed by the exercise command post began a sporadic artillery attack. The 4th Squad was advancing in a concealed manner when suddenly Du Fengyang heard, intermingled among the sounds of artillery, a dull explosion and he raised his eyes to have a look. After an artillery shell hit the ground, a new brownish yellow cloud had risen. He quickly decided that the "enemy" had used a chemical weapon. Just at that time he received a notice from the exercise command post: "It has been ascertained that the enemy has used mustard and lewisite toxicants, and that the depth of the contaminated area is 200 meters. Your squad is ordered to cross it directly." Du Fengyang immediately made a movement that had been arranged beforehand, and the squad with a "rustling" sound put on their gas masks, indicating that they were about to encounter a rigorous test on the exercise. Indeed, a chemical weapon is a toxicant that kills by subtle means.
In an instant a poisonous mist had sealed off the path of advance. Du Fengyang organized all the squad members to take further strict protective measures, after which he led them across the contaminated zone at 100-meter dash speed. Then they did simple decontamination work and began precharge preparations and reconnaissance. At this time, the face of "Height 1" was completely revealed in Du Fengyang's field of vision. "Boom, boom, boom!" "Boom, boom, boom!" came the sound of artillery in the general attack. Du Fengyang directed the fire team to take cover while ordering the demolition team to open a route through the composite minefield. Suddenly there was a "boom" as an enemy chemical mine was touched off. He made a prompt decision: "Put on your masks!" He then ordered three teams to cover each other in turn and run straight at Hill 1. After more than 70 minutes of hiding, fighting, defending, and running, the red banner finally fluttered over Hill 1.

A "Battle" Approximating Actual Combat

The 4th Squad was drinking a little water and eating some dry rations when the "enemy" assigned by the exercise command post began a frenzied counterattack.

This was a "battle" approximating actual combat. The intermingling of nuclear warfare, chemical warfare, and conventional warfare gave the 4th Squad very hard problems. After an intensive bombardment, yellow smoke from toxic shells swept all over the position. Du Fengyang decisively ordered that one observer with a squad weapon would remain behind while he had the other comrades went into artillery shelters to give themselves full-body protection. He inclined his head and listened attentively. From far off came the rumbling sound of tanks, indicating that the "enemy" was coming. "Get set!" At his command, all comrades of the squad, like arrows shot from bows, rushed to the battle position and held their weapons in combat readiness. The observer, hit by gas, fell unconscious. Veteran fighter Zhang Shuang [1728 7175] did some simple decontamination work and gave him emergency treatment. Du Fengyang directed the squad members to rake the "enemy" infantry with rifle and machinegun fire. Rockets destroyed enemy armored targets as the squad firmly held its position.

"Ring--" "ring--" came a warning from the exercise command post that the "enemy" was making a "nuclear attack." Du Fengyang ordered the entire squad to take protection in shelters. After a flash of light, there was a tremendous "boom," indicating that our defense position had suffered a low-altitude nuclear attack. Radiation contamination spread all over the position. Donning all-body protective suits, the fighters of the 4th Squad rush-repaired the defense work, helped themselves and each other, and removed from the surface of the defense works, the weapons and equipment, and their bodies the contamination from toxicants and radiation. Shortly afterward they threw themselves into a battle of attack against the counterattacking enemy.

"Whizz!" "Whizz!" Two green signal flares flashed across the curtain of night, indicating that the exercise had come to a successful end.

9727
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BACKGROUND OF AIR FORCE COMMANDER WANG HAI

Beijing XIN GUANCHA [NEW OBSERVATIONS] in Chinese No 9, 10 May 86 pp 6-7

[Article by Sun Maoqing [1327 5399 1987]: "Biographical Sketch of Air Force Commander Wang Hai"]

[Text] In China's military circles a batch of budding young high-ranking military officers are replacing the teachers of former days. Newly appointed Air Force Commander Wang Hai [3769 3189] is one of this earthshaking new crop.

"Air Hero" of Those Years

Although Wang Hai did not take part in the Long March, he long ago gained a reputation in the Air Force and even world military circles: at the beginning of the fifties, he worked wonders on the Korean battlefield by shooting down or damaging nine enemy aircraft, becoming an "air hero."

On the afternoon of 3 December 1952, Wang Hai, as commander of an Air Force dadui, led 12 aircraft, which encountered 44 American aircraft over (Chongchon) in Korea.

With more mobility and greater numbers, the American aircraft fiercely went on the attack. Wang Hai faced the danger fearlessly and commanded calmly. He first led the aircraft of the dadui to fly directly upward. He led the aircraft to fight left and right, ripping to shreds the "black net" spread by enemy aircraft, after which each of them routed. In a flash one badly shaken American aircraft was hit. A bright flame immediately lit up the sky. The aluminum sections of its fuselage and wings cracked. Trailing thick smoke, the enemy aircraft plunged into the sea. Seeing the way things were going, the rest of the American aircraft fled in panic. Wang Hai's aircraft turned up and then down. Like a slanting dagger it plunged into the group of American aircraft, in succession damaging and shooting down two of them.

When two strong forces meet the bravest wins. Taking a cue from Wang Hai's courageous spirit of fiercely charging, attacking, and pursuing, the unit he led scored the brilliant battle success of shooting down or damaging six enemy aircraft within 15 minutes without a single injury or death to itself.
General Gabriel, the current chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, took part in this "miraculous" aerial battle. When Wang Hai accompanied a Chinese military delegation on its visit to America, Gabriel saw him and said: I knew you long ago. The famous Wang Hai Dadui! It shot down or damaged 29 U.S. Air Force aircraft. I was shot down by you in those years. Wang Hai said jocularly: If you attack us again, I will have to shoot you down again. His remark set everybody laughing. Embracing Wang Hai, General Gabriel said: "We are friends, friends!"

Not long ago General Gabriel led a delegation on a visit to China. He saw in an exhibition room of the Military Museum in Beijing the fighter plane that Wang Hai had flown in those years. Really it was such a backward low-speed aircraft. It made him stop and gaze for a long time, a long time....

Indeed, there is still a gap between the equipment of the Chinese Air Force and that of technologically advanced countries, but the quality of Chinese flyers is first rate.

On 1 October, accompanied by Wang Hai, General Gabriel went to the demonstration unit of a certain air unit to watch a flying demonstration.

The deep blue vault of heaven was like a still sea. Two green signal flares streaked across the blue sky, following which engines roared into life as the demonstration for guests by the demonstration dadui began. Aircraft took off and rose into the sky.

Nine red and white fighter planes in vee formation and trailing colored smoke flew past the visitors' stand to salute the visitors. Then, pointing their noses up, they ascended at high speed. Piercing the deep blue sky, they vanished in the depths of white clouds. When people were craning their necks and looking for traces of them, the nine aircraft, in double-wedge formation, swept over their heads. In an instant, like magic they changed from a wedge formation to a diamond formation and a swallow formation. The entire formation did one stunt after another. While people were exclaiming with admiration, the nine aircraft split into two halves of a "flower blossom." The "fighting eagles" emitted brilliant purple and red smoke. It was like the flutter dance of the Guangxi opera, like a long rainbow resting on the waves. Now the nine aircraft wedge formation became three groups that passed over the field at minimum altitude. In an instant, the dark blue, clean and bright canopy of the heavens was inlaid with three silver flowers. How enchanting it was....

Looking on with zest, General Gabriel, U.S. Air Force chief of staff, frequently applauded. At the conclusion of the demonstration, this veteran flyer, who has 4,000 hours of flight time, held up his thumb and said to Wang Hai: "I have visited many countries and seen many flying demonstrations. I can say that your demonstration was the best. A truly astonishing feat!"

A "Reformer's" Good Name

A few years ago the Air Force held a large-scale military exercise at a certain place in the south.
In an instant, engines roared and wings glittered brightly....

New-type fighter planes equipped with air-to-air missiles patrolled at an altitude of 10,000 meters. The dense mass of a group of bombers, in three-aircraft follow-up formation, bombed targets. An assault plane group, called the "aerial dynamiter," whizzed by like lighting in one formation after another, as one cluster after another of cannon shells and one bunch after another of rockets exploded on targets again and again. At the same time, a group of electronic jamming aircraft emitted powerful electromagnetic waves in support of the operational flight. Suddenly an "enemy" tank unit was discovered. It was assembling in cover, waiting for an opportunity to cross open terrain and attack us. A group of helicopters, which had received an order to attack, immediately lined up in a tight two-helicopter follow-up formation and swiftly went on the attack. Filling the sky they dropped countless white parachutes. Tied by a rope to each parachute was an antitank mine. The parachutes accurately landed in that stretch of open terrain and formed a tight antitank network....

This was the magnificent scene of the Air Force's first combined arms exercise. The one who organized and commanded this mighty and magnificent exercise was combat hero Wang Hai, known far and wide for his military prowess in former years.

In the Air Force, Wang Hai possesses the good name of "reformer." He has vowed to blaze new trails, has the courage to keep forging ahead, and has been promoted again and again. In 1969 he was promoted from deputy commander of a certain army to director of the Military Training Department in Air Force Headquarters. In 1975, after pursuing advanced studies at the PLA Military Academy, he was appointed commander of the Air Force in the Guangzhou MR.

The Guangzhou Air Force was a disaster area that had been heavily sabotaged by Lin Biao and the "gang of four." The combat effectiveness of its units had sharply declined, and in the entire air force one could not find a Class A flight regiment able to fly under complex weather conditions.

When Wang Hai took over, besides drastically chopping off the "false, big, and empty" practices of Lin Biao and the "gang of four," he quickly restored military discipline and ran the air force with strictness.

In the south the thunder and rain season is fairly long. Wang Hai personally went to airfields and directed training. He made each flight division commander pick up his bedroll and move to the flight dadui. He made them take the lead in new flight topics. He made them be the first to train in complex flight skills. With the leaders charging ahead of their men, their subordinates naturally did not dare to fall behind. In a short period of time, big successes were seen in flight training. In only a little over a year, the Air Force of the Guangzhou Military Region had set the best records in history in various aspects of military training and air force management. The number of flyers who had finished night flight training was 2.7 times that of the number in the "great tournament" of 1964. The number of newly added all-weather flyers was 4.5 times that of 1964. In addition, Wang Hai trained the first all-weather flight regiment in the Chinese Air Force.
Wang Hai's outstanding achievements and his courage and insight drew the attention of the leaders of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee. In 1983 Wang Hai was promoted to Air Force deputy commander, and last year he was appointed commander.

The Chinese Air Force has been developing for a little over 30 years and is now a combined arms branch of considerable combat effectiveness, with the air arm being primary, that includes antiaircraft gun, ground-to-air missile, and airborne operational units and radar and signal support units. In the number of combat aircraft, the Chinese Air Force is now third in the world (only behind the Soviet Union and America). However the Air Force's level of modernization to deal with a future war still is waiting to be raised. According to what Wang Hai disclosed, he is arranging the Air Force's strategic deployment in three main aspects.

The first is stressing the improvement of its main weapons and equipment.

The second is enhancing the quality of flyers.

The third is improving the command level of commanders.

His Joys of Life

Wang Hai's natural disposition is open-minded and magnanimous, and his sparetime interests are broad. He is keen on Beijing opera, which he often hums and sings to himself. When the occasion arises, he cannot refrain from singing opera arias before a crowd of people. He is extremely fond of searching for rocks of grotesque shapes. When discussing the countless small rocks he has in his house, he told why he values them. He said: These rocks cannot be belittled. Look at this rock, with the passage of years, signs of great changes have cut its network of veins. Archeologists, in their study of humankind's past, and paleontologists, in their search for the evolution of life, want rocks. In the soul of rocks are deep thoughts. Their convexities and concavities and their countless shapes were not carved according to people's will but are purely the work of nature. The charm and integrity of rocks not only give people aesthetic enjoyment, but also produce in people's minds many connections. Their myriad shapes, their riotous profusion of colors exceed all expectations; they are not stiff and artificial. However, speaking of their intrinsic quality, rocks are plain, gloomy, thick, firm, and selfless--isn't this the character of rocks! What I love in rocks is their character!

Wang Hai is keen on swimming. He is quite expert in table tennis, basketball, and volleyball. He likes to watch football matches and never misses an important one. He said: Whenever I see athletes kick a goal or retrieve an impossible shot I am touched by their unconquerable spirit. In life one should forge ahead and go all out!

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PREMIER YU INTERVIEWED BY SAUDI JOURNALISTS

OW300424 Taipei CHUNG YANG JIH PAO in Chinese 24 Jul 86 p 2

[Excerpts] Premier Yu Kuo-Hua on 15 July granted an interview to (Hasin), Chief editor of 'UKAZ; (Nahare), chief editor of (NATIONAL DAILY NEWS); and (Alawe), chief editor of (FEIZ) monthly. The full text of the interview follows:

Question: Will you describe the relations between the Republic of China and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?

Answer: The Republic of China has always attached great importance to the friendly relations and cooperation with Saudi Arabia. For many years China and Saudi Arabia have made positive efforts to promote all kinds of cooperation, whose broadly-based scope covers economic, technical, agricultural, electrical, scientific, technological, communications, industrial, printing, medical, cultural and financial fields. The friendship between the two countries is growing every day.

Question: What is your view on the restoration of peace in the Middle East?

Answer: The government of the Republic of China always upholds the principles for respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent states, and it opposes any country seizing the territory of another country by force. As far as the issue of restoring peace in the Middle East is concerned, we hold that Israel should withdraw from the Arab land that it has occupied since the "Six Day War" in 1967. The Chinese Government has issued a statement openly supporting the eight-point peace plan put forward by Prince Fahd in 1981, as well as the "Fez Declaration" adopted by the summit conference of the 12th Arab League in 1982. In short, we think the settlement of the Middle East issue should be based on universally acknowledged principles and justice, and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people should be preserved.

Question: Do you think that reunification of China will soon be realized?

Answer: Reunification of China is the common aspiration of all the Chinese people. Reunification, however, is not just a slogan. The type of reunification we are after is a reunification in ideological, social and
living systems. The obstacle of China's reunification today is the Chinese communists' communist system, which is the source of political dictatorship and economic failures on the Chinese mainland. Struggling to survive, the Chinese communists have carried out partial economic reform in recent years, but they still adhere to communist ideology and system. We firmly believe that the reunification of China can be achieved very soon if the Chinese communist regime foresakes communism and carries out a democratic and free political system under the Three Principles of the People.

Question: What are the prospects for our two countries' cooperation?

Answer: Based on traditional friendship, our bilateral cooperation in the cultural, economic, scientific and technical fields has been very close for many years. Since the signing of the Treaty of Economic and Technical Cooperation and the Treaty of Cultural Cooperation between our two countries, very fruitful results have been achieved in the cultural, educational, agricultural, industrial, trade, communications, medical, scientific and technological areas through the permanent joint committees of our two countries.

With respect to scientific and technical cooperation, China and Saudi Arabia have established good relations in carrying out cooperation in fish breeding, in producing unicellular protein, stabilization of sand dunes, and in setting up earthquake monitoring stations. In addition to this, the two countries have formulated plans to cooperate in developing Arab-language computers, in studying the utilization of solar energy, and in preventing B-type hepatitis. With respect to cultural cooperation, not only have the youth groups of our two countries continued their exchange of visits, the scope of cultural, educational and academic cooperation has also been broadening. We firmly believe that by pursuing these areas of cooperation, we will help promote both countries' development and mutual understanding.

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BRIEFS

PILOT VISITS NATIVE SICHUAN—Chengdu, 11 Jul (XINHUA)—Wang Xijue, a pilot who landed a cargo plane of Taiwan's China Airlines at Guangzhou 3 May, recently visited Sichuan Province, which he had left 37 years ago. Wang was appointed deputy director and deputy chief pilot of the Beijing Regional Administration of the Civil Aviation Administration of China last month.
[Excerpt] [Beijing XINHUA in English 0746 GMT 11 Jul 86 OW] /9738

SOFTBALL TEAM BEATS PRC—Ottawa, 16 Jul (XINHUA)—The Chinese national team lost to the Chinese Taipei [as received] squad 3-5 at the 1986 Pacific-region women's softball championship Tuesday in New Westminster, Canada. [Excerpt] [Beijing XINHUA in English 0013 GMT 17 Jul 86 OW] /9738

CSO: 4000/322

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