USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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**USSR REPORT**

**MILITARY AFFAIRS**

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LT GEN NECHAYEV ON PARTY'S LEADING ROLE

Moscow AGITATOR ARNII I FLOTA in Russian No 13, Jul 85 pp 1-6

[Article by Lt Gen V. Nechayev, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Combat Vanguard of the Soviet People"]

[Text] The Soviet people and the men of the Armed Forces are living and working under the indelible influence of the documents of the April (1985) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee which stirred all our people, caused great enthusiasm, and added new, creative strength.

The plenum determined the date for the convening of the next, 27th Party Congress --25 February 1986, and designated a range of questions which will be discussed at the party forum. The significance of the congress is determined by the paramount importance of the problems being brought up for discussion, the nature of the contemporary stage, and the novelty and scale of the tasks facing the Soviet people.

The report at the plenum by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, and the decisions adopted are the political and organizational basis for all the pre-congress activity of our Communist Party. Today the CPSU has been called upon to head the national movement for acceleration of the country's social and economic development.

In mapping out the expanded program of practical actions, the party is not avoid-difficulties which are arising but is boldly undertaking their overcoming. It discloses the strategic prospects for the progress of our society in all directions and directs the communists and all Soviet people toward a creative, innovative approach to the matter and toward a radical improvement in their activity.

The materials of the plenum and its work convincingly show again and again that the CPSU is successfully performing the role of political vanguard of the working class and of all workers and organizer of the masses in the struggle for the strengthening and development of a new social system. The Communist Party joins together the development of theory, policy, and organizational activity for their practical implementation. Armed with Marxist-Leninist theory and based on it, the party analyzes profoundly and comprehensively political, economic, and social processes, discloses pressing problems in the development of society, determines prospects, and finds the correct paths and means for accomplishment of tasks which arise.
At the contemporary stage, the party teaches, the development of Soviet society will be determined in decisive measure by qualitative shifts in the economy, its transfer to the rails of intensive growth, and a comprehensive increase in efficiency. Intensification of the national economy and its main strategic lever—the acceleration of scientific and technical progress, the reorganization of control and planning, an increase in discipline and organization everywhere, and a radical improvement in style of activity—the CPSU places these tasks at the center of all its work and the work of the party organizations.

The organizational-economic and social reserves of our society are truly inexhaustible. In order to disclose them completely and put them into operation, the party calls for moving forward more boldly along the path of expanding the rights of enterprises and their independence, introducing cost accounting and, on this basis, increasing the responsibility and interest of the labor collectives in the final results of the work.

Difficult work is to be done in attaining the highest world level of labor productivity, intensifying the struggle against mismanagement and wastefulness, and the complete use of all reserves to increase the production of food. There is an urgent task—to raise even higher the creative initiative and activity of people and see that each one works at his work site conscientiously and with the complete application of strength.

The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people. The party sees the highest meaning of the acceleration of social and economic development of our country in steadily raising the well-being of the people, improving all aspects of the life of the Soviet people, and ensuring the harmonic development of the personality. It is logically continuing the long-term line for a comprehensive and steady rise in the Soviet people's standard of living and equalizing the working and living conditions of all groups, strata, and classes of Soviet society. In the Soviet country the per capita real income is growing, the mean monthly wage of workers and employees is rising, and payments and privileges from public consumption funds are increasing.

Work on accomplishment of the Food Program is intensifying and an integrated program for the development of the production of consumer goods and service systems is being developed. Medical assistance is being improved and the provision of a dispensary system for all residents of the country has been begun. Much is being done to raise the quality of the education and indoctrination of the rising generation.

The party is seeing in every possible way that the potential of social justice which is contained in the very basis of the Soviet system is being used more completely. Specific, effective measures are being worked out on clearing from the distribution mechanism wage levelling, unearned income, and everything which contradicts the economic standards and moral ideals of Soviet society. These measures are called upon to ensure the direct dependence of the material position of each worker and collective on the results of their labor. In the future, too, the party will wage a decisive struggle against all negative phenomena which are foreign to the socialist way of life and our communist ethics.

The basis of working out the correct political course of the Leninist party is formed by the thorough consideration of the interests of each class and each
stratum of Soviet society and the ability correctly to combine them with the common interests of the entire people and with communist goals and ideals. In conducting a realistic consistent class policy, the CPSU always puts forth slogans which are capable of realization and vitally important, and it poses specific tasks. Resoluteness and boldness of revolutionary action, faith in the creative capabilities of the masses, their comprehensive ideological and organizational preparation for the accomplishment of the tasks which have been outlined, and a readiness not only to carry the workers along but also to learn from them ensure the firm unity of the party and the people.

There are the remarkable, wise words of V. I. Lenin: "...millions of people will never listen to the advice of the parties if this advice does not coincide with what the experience of their own lives teaches them." They express the deepest foundation for the leadership of the workers' revolutionary-transforming activity being accomplished by the party.

The party's leading role is based on its highest moral-political authority which was won among the masses by selfless struggle and the practically proven ability to find the correct solutions to the most difficult problems at difficult historical stages.

The party convinces with all its activity that it is the most conscientious, advanced, selfless part of the working class, of all workers, and of the entire Soviet people. It sees its mission in carrying the masses along behind it and always being in the vanguard of the people.

One of the characteristic features of the CPSU which permits it successfully to execute the role of leader of the people is that it is a party of internationalists. In its activity the party combines selfless serving of the interests of the working people with the same selfless serving the cause of the liberation of the entire world's workers.

In implementing its leadership role, the party does not substitute for the state and public organizations, does not command them, and does not permit administration in regard to them. The constitution of the USSR and the CPSU Regulation record the principle of a clear demarcation of the functions of party and state organizations.

A basic feature of the party's leadership of society is that this leadership is political. Operating with methods of conviction, the party widely explains its policy to the masses and organizes its implementation. It develops and deepens socialist democracy in every possible way and sees that all workers understand profoundly and grasp party policy.

At the present exceptionally important segment of history, when the fate of the country and the positions of socialism in the contemporary world depend to a great extent on how we conduct affairs further, the responsibility of the party and its leading and directing role in our society increase even more, which reflects the objective requirements for a further improvement in socialist construction.

Realization of socialism's tremendous possibilities and the change to the path of intensification of the national economy are feasible only on the basis of
the firm mastery of science and economic and social laws and with the most active participation of the working masses. And only the Marxist-Leninist party can work out a scientifically substantiated strategy and develop and direct the energy of the masses to the channel of organized, systematic work.

This is why the leading position of the CPSU in Soviet society and the steady strengthening of this position are a regularity and an objective necessity for the development of the party itself as well as for the progress of the entire socialist society. It is a single process which is developing along ascending lines and embracing all spheres of social life.

The party's serving the interests of the people is brilliantly displayed in the CPSU's struggle for the strengthening of our state's defensive capability. The CPSU considers the leadership of the Armed Forces as one of the most important sectors of its activity and accomplishes this task relying on the firm theoretical foundation of the Lenin teaching on the defense of the socialist society. V. I. Lenin taught that "any revolution is worth something only if it is able to defend itself." He bade the party and the Soviet people: "...be on the alert, cherish the defensive capability of our country and our Red Army as the apple of your eye...." Vladimir Ilich substantiated the leading role of the Communist Party in military organizational development and in the creation and strengthening of our state's Armed Forces.

The main and decisive source of the combat might and invincibility of the Soviet Armed Forces is in the party's leadership. At a ceremonial meeting devoted to the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, it was stated that in the time of most difficult tests the Leninist party became a fighting party which combined with the fighting people. It was equal to its tremendous responsibility for the fate of the motherland and led it to victory.

In our time, when determining the content and scales of Soviet military organizational development the party proceeds from the objective necessity for the defense of the socialist fatherland which is caused by imperialism's aggressive preparations. Here the CPSU and the Soviet state are steadily guided by the Lenin ideas and instructions that peace and peaceful coexistence are the basic principle of the policy of the socialist social system. The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist commonwealth have often come forth with specific proposals directed toward the strengthening of peace and the prevention and reduction of the arms race, declaring their readiness to do everything for the attainment of these goals.

The peaceful proposals do not find support in the American administration. The United States and its allies are striving to implement a qualitatively new round of the arms race and achieve military superiority over the USSR and the other socialist countries. The deployment of American medium range missiles in Europe is continuing, the development of new systems of highly effective conventional weapons is being accomplished on unprecedented scales, and the mastery of space for military purposes and the creation of weapons on new physical principles is being speeded up.

Under these conditions, the appropriate measures are being undertaken in our country to strengthen the country's defensive capability and increase the combat might
of the Armed Forces. In the interests of creating effective models of armaments a close alliance has been attained between science and production, in accordance with which combat equipment and weapons are being improved in accordance with the increasing requirements of contemporary war.

In the course of realizing the military-technical policy of the party, in recent years the reequipping of the Armed Forces with contemporary equipment and new types of airplanes, ships, tanks, artillery systems, small arms, and means for communication and control occurred. "We were forced to expend the necessary resources for the defense of the country. In the future, too, the Soviet Union will apply maximum efforts to halt the arms race, but faced by the aggressive policy and threat of imperialism, we cannot permit military superiority over us. Such is the will of the Soviet people," noted Comrade M. S. Gorbachev at a conference in the CPSU Central Committee on questions of accelerating scientific and technical progress.

Ever more improved combat equipment and weapons are reaching the troops with each passing year. It is the task and patriotic duty of each serviceman to master them tirelessly, learn to employ the equipment and weapons with the greatest effectiveness on the field of battle, operate them in a qualified manner, protect them skillfully, and become a true master of his military specialty.

The primary party organizations were called the main potential of the party at the April plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. For it is precisely in them that party policy is embodied in real deeds. Now there are more than 400,000 primary party organizations in the CPSU. They unite more than 18.5 million communists. The party appears as a mighty socio-political organization which embraces all aspects of the country's life with its influence.

The party organizations of the Armed Forces are the combat detachment of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The communists of the Armed Forces display concern for the comprehensive strengthening of party influence on all basic processes which occur in the Armed Forces. They are persistently working on implementing the party's instructions that the Soviet Armed Forces be a clear and coordinated organism and have a high level of organization and discipline.

Preparation for accounts and elections is being initiated ever more widely in the party organizations of the Armed Forces. The main slogans should be made the leit-motif of election and pre-congress meetings and of all preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress: creative soldierly labor, unity of word and deed, initiative and responsibility, demandingness toward oneself and comrades. The party points out the necessity to intensify the demand from each communist for his attitude toward his public duty, for the accomplishment of party decisions, and for the honest and neat appearance of a party member. The soldier-communist is a model for non-party personnel and an example for imitation in service and discipline.

The party organizations raise in the communists a sense of responsibility for the state of discipline and the combat capability of their units, ships, and subunits and instill in them a readiness to be genuine leaders and organizers of the masses of servicemen. In light of the party's requirements, it is also further necessary to maintain intra-party democracy at the proper level, discuss actively and in a businesslike manner at meetings urgent questions of political, organizational, and ideological work, and develop criticism and self-criticism. In
other words—to ensure a broad expanse for the display of the strengths and abilities of each communist.

Preparations for the congress and discussion of the draft conference documents will contribute to a further increase in the effectiveness of ideological and political-indoctrinal work. There is forward movement in this matter. However, far from everything has been done for ideological work to be linked with life in the closest manner.

The decisions of the April plenum of the party Central Committee orient commanders, political organs, party organizations, and all propaganda activists of the Armed Forces toward approaching the evaluation of what has been attained in indoctrinational work considerably more strictly and exactingly, seeing unresolved problems and shortcomings in it, improving all indoctrinational practice in every possible way, and directing mass political work toward the attainment of high final results in service and in strengthening military discipline.

Agitators of platoons, sections, crews, and compartments—the numerous category of Komsomol activists which is conducting work directly in the subunits, in the thick of the men—are called upon to make their contribution to the improvement of the ideological indoctrination of the men along with commanders, political officers, technical engineering personnel, and communists. They are the best prepared and most authoritative men, masters of combat proficiency and rated specialists, and experts of combat and political training. Their weapon is the living word and personal example in training and service. It is very important that the political agitation which they conduct be continuous, have an aggressive nature, and be constantly improved.

The confidence which the CPSU enjoys among the Soviet people is truly boundless. The victory of the Soviet Union which has world historic significance showed the correctness of the path along which our people are going under the leadership of the Leninist party. As a result of the selfless labor under the leadership of the CPSU, the Soviet people have built a developed socialist society for the first time in history. The experience of the revolutionary transformations amassed by the CPSU and the Soviet people is an example and beacon for all peoples who are struggling for social liberation and building socialism.

At the dawn of Soviet power Vladimir Ilich Lenin wrote that the party is the mind, honor, and conscience of our era. These words are engraved in the party cards of Soviet communists. In the days when the Soviet people and their Armed Forces are preparing to greet the 27th CPSU Congress in a worthy manner, these words are filled with the deep meaning of historic rightness and the majesty of the activity of the Leninist party of communists. They laconically and wisely express the ideological and moral essence of the CPSU and its role and significance in contemporary mankind's struggle for social progress.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

MILITARY-PATRIOTIC EDUCATION IN KUYBYSHEV OBLAST

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in Russian No 9, Sep 85 pp 44-53

[Article by I. N. Kitayev, manager of the Propaganda and Agitation Section of the Kuybyshev CPSU Obkom: "Military-Patriotic Education For Young People -- From The Experience Of The Kuybyshev Oblast Party ORganization]

[Text] The celebration of the 40th Anniversary of Victory convincingly showed how resolute our people are in the struggle for peace and against new military danger. The Soviet people, as no others, are fully resolved to steadfastly strengthen the country's defense through their own selfless labor. The military-patriotic education of workers and, most of all, of young people has an important place in resolving this task.

A significant number of publications in books and also in brochures and articles¹ have been dedicated to the problem of military-patriotic education. In this article the author's task is to disclose the positive experience of military-patriotic work that has been amassed by the Kuybyshev Oblast party organization in recent years and to dwell on the most urgent problems that at the present time are associated with educating the rising generation in the revolutionary, military and labor traditions of the Soviet people and their advanced guard, the CPSU.

The most important task in military-patriotic education is developing in young people a classic approach to social phenomena, high political vigilance and irreconciliability toward enemies of peace and socialism, to arm every young person with a clear understanding of the plans and tasks of communist construction, the awareness of the necessity to prepare himself to defend the socialist Fatherland and to work selflessly for the sake of increasing the economic and defensive might of the country.

Military-patriotic education is a critical part in developing in the younger generation a scientific, Marxist-Leninist attitude -- the foundation of the communist education of people, of patriotism and labor tempering.
Military-patriotic education is based on Leninist doctrine about defending the socialist Fatherland. The party will always remember Lenin's warning that in the face of world imperialism we must always be on the alert and must strengthen the country's defensive capabilities. The name of Lenin is associated with everything touching on the development of the spiritual make-up of man in the socialist epoch, of the defender of revolutionary conquests.

Life graphically shows that any work is very effective only when it is done systematically and purposefully and is not managed from event to event. Therefore the party obkom is focusing its primary attention on issues involved in planning military-patriotic educational measures at all levels, but especially in labor collectives.

Immediately after the June 1984 publication of the CPSU Central Committee resolution on "The 40th Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945", the CPSU obkom developed a special plan covering measures for the military-patriotic education of young people. Oblast ideological institutions, the obisovprof (oblast council of trade unions), Komsomol and DOSAAF obkom's, other social organizations and an extensive array of activists were involved in its development.

The extensive circle of interrelated issues which are being resolved in the process of working with young people includes improving the organization of military-patriotic work by taking into account the accumulated experience not only in Kuybyshev, but also in other oblasts, improving initial military training for young people, including those studying in school as was stipulated by the school reform, training specialists for the Army and Navy, increasing the general educational level of pre-military age youth and developing their physical culture and sports.

Education through the use of examples has a lot of significance in this work. V. I. Lenin's biography is a great educational example for everyone. He spent his childhood and youth on the banks of the Volga and Vladimir Illich developed as a revolutionary-Marxist in Samar. There he began to propagate revolutionary Marxism. Becoming acquainted with these Leninist locations, with the life and activities of the leader and his companions-in-arms in the struggle will teach young people to live, struggle and prevail for the sake of the great goal and for pure ideals.

Many pages of Volzhskiy Kray history serve the business of education, to include military-patriotic education. The Samar area was an arena for fierce battles during the civil war and the names of famous heroes of the young Soviet Republic such as M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukachevskiy, V. K. Blyukher and V. I. Chapayev were associated with this region, for it was here that their leadership talents were displayed in the struggle for victory in the socialist revolution.

The causes and fates of Kuybyshev during the Great Patriotic war are an inexhaustible source for the patriotic education of the rising generation. Kuybyshev Oblast sent hundreds of thousands of defenders into the struggle against the insidious enemy and this included 27,000 communists and 70,000 Komsomol members. The people of Kuybyshev fought valiantly for the
Fatherland. Nearly 40,000 received military decorations, 230 became Heroes of the Soviet Union and 26 became bearers of the Order of Glory. Examples of labor heroism in the rear area are used extensively for military-patriotic education. Dozens of huge enterprises that had a lot of defensive significance were constructed in a short time then.

The feats of the people of Kuybyshev, heroes of the war and labor fronts, have been engraved in numerous memorials and obelisks that were erected in the oblast's cities and towns. Solemn events take place here, including inductions into the Pioneers, and newly married couples come here. Thankful offspring bring flowers and their children to the Eternal Flame and to the memorials and monuments so that they can deeply feel the great life and the eternal feats of those who gave their all for the peace and happiness of their Motherland and its people.

The revolutionary, military and labor traditions, the importance of which for educational work was stressed in the CPSU Central Committee resolution on "The 40th Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945", provide abundant material for the development in young people of an active position in life, educating responsibility for carrying out their citizen's duty.

It is important to coordinate the joint efforts of party, soviet and social organizations that are involved in military-patriotic educational issues for young people and party gorkom and raykom ideological commissions have an enormous role in this matter. And this is understandable, for their membership includes partkom secretaries and directors of huge enterprises, leaders of ideological institutes and organizations that protect people's rights, mass media agencies, training institutions and also party, war and labor veterans, ie, those people who because of their service position and experience determine much of military-patriotic education. The CPSU gorkom (raykom) secretary for ideology heads the commission and each such commission has a section for various areas of ideological work, including military-patriotic education.

According to existing traditions, the members of the commission take part in the conduct of united political days on heroic spirit-patriotic themes, in practical scientific and readers' conferences, in preparations for celebrations and holidays dedicated to Great October, Victory Day, the May First holiday and other outstanding dates. They carry out specific work directly in collectives which in and of itself is very valuable: they do a lot to develop the material-technical base that is used in training young people for labor and service in the Army; by carefully studying the work in military-patriotic education in organizations, they not only expose errors but also determine ways to eliminate deficiencies.

For example, the Kirov CPSU raykom Ideological Commission in the city of Kuybyshev became acquainted with the work of the partkom from the 2nd Kuybyshev Aviation Enterprise of the Volga Civilian Aviation Directorate and the party bureau of an electrical repair factory, as well as the rayon DOSAAF Committee for military-political education in labor collectives. It turned out that the party organizations in these enterprises were doing a poor job of
using party influence in communist education. They remembered military-patriotic measures only when preparing for holidays. This practice was condemned.

Relying on material from inspections, the CPSU RK [Kirov Raykom] Commission outlined specific measures to eliminate the shortcomings that had been discovered. At their recommendation a group of experienced workers, including war veterans, were sent to the labor collectives in the aviation detachment and electrical repair factory to provide practical help. Now specific plans have been developed in the party organizations of these enterprises and new, energetic people are joining the leadership of the local DOSAAF organizations.

And many other raykom ideological commissions are approaching carrying out their functions in a specific manner, with well-developed practical recommendations.

The CPSU Obkom puts a lot of attention on carefully studying, summarizing and disseminating the experience of the party leadership through military-patriotic education. For example, they reviewed and approved the activities of the Kuybyshev Metallurgical Factory imeni V. I. Lenin partkom. This organization has often won the All-Union Socialist Competition and its experience in military-patriotic education merits being known by others and being adapted for their use. Their partkom has an eleven-man council for military-patriotic education and these eleven include war veterans, leaders of social organizations and economic leaders.

The council has four commission: one for military-patriotic education and mass defensive work; one for preparing and conducting mass propaganda measures; one for work among female war participants; and one for social-domestic issues. The council is headed by I. V. Tsvetkov who has been a party member since 1942, was an active participant in the Great Patriotic War and who in the past worked for many years as the deputy partkom secretary. The active supporters of the council include more than 500 of the 770 war veterans working at the factory.

The council is constantly monitoring the state of military-patriotic education in workshops and subunits. Meetings periodically include reports from section leaders and council representatives from different subelements. The factory museum and the sports and technical club regularly get practical help from the council. The council also cooperates in creating Corners of Military and Labor Glory and is a patron of six general educational schools, a factory technical and professional technical school and 11 youth clubs that were developed in residential locations. This in and of itself shows the extent that military-patriotic measures involve people. The council controls the allotment of privileges to people who took part in the war. It not only controls, but if necessary, actively defends the rights of veterans.

The system that is in effect in enterprises, under which work performance reports from representatives of the council and DOSAAF are heard every month at operational meetings of the secretaries from party bureau departments and the leaders of social organizations, allows the partkom to constantly be on top of
all council matters and concerns. The factory partkom uses the council on military-patriotic education to maintain control of the completion of the entire complex of measures stipulated by both the on-going and future plans and to coordinate the activities of shop party and social organizations. This increases shop and section leader responsibility for work and creates favorable conditions for a subsequent increase in its quality.

The business-like production of the collective's work in military-patriotic education is producing good results. Young people that are being called into the ranks of the Armed Forces are technically, ideologically and morally well prepared. They are carrying out their military duty to the Fatherland in an outstanding manner and the letters of thanks from military units where factory youth are serving proves this.

The center of military-patriotic education is being moved more and more into the labor collective. The party obkom is trying to reach the point where socialist competition and the movement for a communist attitude toward work is closely linked with military-patriotic educational measures. And as a consequence the shock-worker, Stakhanov movement and the movement for communist labor is being further developed in the competition among Komsomol-youth collectives to be awarded the names of heroes of war and labor and to win prizes named after veterans and famous people. Young machine operators and mechanized Komsomol youth detachments and teams fight for the Challenge Prize of Hero of the Soviet Union V. I. Surkov; young construction workers vie for the prize of Hero of Socialist Labor, Honored Construction Worker of the RSFSR and of honored citizen of Kuybyshev P. P. Machnev. Thirty Komsomol-youth harvesting teams in Borskiy Rayon annually compete for control of the prize imeni fellow countryman-cosmonaut twice Hero of the Soviet Union A. A. Gubarev.

The Komsomol-youth brigade of D. Labinskiy from Volgotsemmach Association shop No 7 and of A. Anisimov and V. Schastlivtsev from the metallurgical works of the Volga Automotive Factory enrolled countryman and Hero of the Soviet Union Yevgeniy Nikonov as an honored member of their collectives. Now, according to timeboard number 004 which was given to the new member of the brigade, 50 percent of his wages are transferred to the Soviet peace fund. The remaining money goes to a prize imeni Ye. Nikonov and this prize is awarded to the best workers on the Day of Victory for Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War.

Practice shows that the effectiveness of military-patriotic education in labor collectives is highest when the party organization draws on and uses the entire arsenal of means when conducting one measure or another. Ideological-educational work includes those measures which have a mass-political character, where young people take an active part in their organization and conduct, that have a practical trend and make integrated use of various forms and methods for influencing young people, and especially pre-military age personnel. In order to clearly and convincingly tell young people about a national labor feat and to give them the opportunity of touching the heroic emotions of our times, for example, a VAZ [Volga Motor Vehicle Factory] party committee is making extensive use of the factory's Museum of Labor Glory. They love to bring automobile builders there. Young museum visitors, school,
college and technical school students from the city of Tolyatti and from other cities and villages become acquainted here with the military and labor traditions of veterans and of their own fathers and mothers and make a solemn oath to be faithful to those traditions.

The factory partkom and administration are sparing no materials in creating and strengthening the material-technical base necessary for military-patriotic education. There are dozens of different type vehicles, modern boats, a sufficient amount of training weapons, firing ranges, radios and many other things at the disposal of factory DOSAAF members. There are sections of different types of military-technical sports and training locations for initial military training successfully operating at the factory. Hundreds of lectures, reports and discussions are held annually in shop and section collectives and they are attended by approximately 70,000 people in all. The council of war veterans, the professional union committee and the Komsomol and DOSAAF committees regularly hold meetings with veterans from the war and the Armed Forces.

It has become a tradition at the enterprise that shop collectives correspond with people who have left for the Army. Hundreds of soldiers, former workers at the motor vehicle factory, receive letters and congratulatory postcards from their comrades at work every month and in turn, letters come to the enterprise from military units. They are read and discussed in the brigades.

The increased amount of complicated military equipment in the Soviet Armed Forces and the reduction in active military service today demands a comprehensive and well-thought out approach to the problems of the ideological-political education and military training of pre-military age personnel. And in this vein we must stress that the military-patriotic education of young people who have been trained for service in the Armed Forces is not limited to their mastering military-technical skills. The first tasks to come forward are those of an ideological and moral-political nature -- increasing political and labor activity and the consciousness of the rising generation and indoctrinating them with intense patriotism and firm internationalist convictions. Kuybyshev Oblast has a multi-national population and therefore in working with pre-military age youth, special attention is focused on educating them in the spirit of the fraternal friendship of peoples in the USSR, of socialist internationalism, of the resolute and consistent struggle against such negative phenomena as prejudice and old ideas in peoples consciousness. As is known, it is impossible to develop the new man who is a stranger to nationalistic limitations without overcoming these problems.

An objective law of socialism is a conviction as to the unity of international and national origins and their skillful combination. The oblast's party committee directs a lot of the efforts of national educational agencies, DOSAAF, Komsomol, voyenkomat (military registration and enlistment office) and social organizations and coordinates their work.

There are many measures that are held on the eve of Army and Navy call-up for young people. These include such proven forms and methods of educating as
lectures and reports, practical exercises, meetings with soldiers from the older generation, thematic evenings and the solemn passage into the Army.

United political days are a effective form of work. The party committee skillfully uses this form of communicating with the masses for explaining CPSU domestic and foreign policies and important economic measures to the people. For example, a united political day was held on the theme "The Defense of the Motherland Is The Sacred Duty Of Every USSR Citizen". As a rule party, council and economic leaders, members of the Red Banner Volga Military District Military Council and officers from the voyenkomat and military units take part in united political days.

People's universities and faculties of military knowledge which have been created in schools and professional technical schools, clubs, cultural centers and in enterprises have gained a lot of popularity in the oblast and there are now more than 50 of them in the oblast. The students have lecture halls and high quality, well-equipped classrooms at their disposal. The plan of activities is set up in such a way that young workers and school students receive a clear picture of the structure of our Armed Forces and the service peculiarities of the different branches of service.

Initial political and military training which is held at training institutions and also at DOSAAF training locations plays an especially important role in educating pre-military age youth. All pre-military age young people take this training and they acquire practical skills and knowledge in the course of the exercises.

Issues involved in the extensive development of technical and military-related types of sports and in increasing their role in training young people for productive labor and for the defense of the Motherland have an important place in the activities of party committees for military-patriotic education. More than 30 technical and military-related types of sports are being developed in the oblast. Each of them holds oblast competition and combined teams participate in republic and all-union competition. In 1984 these teams won 33 prizes; eight Kuybyshev residents personally won the rand of champion of the USSR and 21 were RSFSR champions.

Patronage relations between civilian and army youth are constantly expanding and growing richer in content in our oblast and special attention is being focused on our kray providing extensively trained replacements for the Armed forces and also on the fact that those people who are serving in the Armed Forces feel the inseparable tie between the Army and the people. Such measures as acquainting young people, and especially selectees, with military equipment and weapons and with the life and routine of soldiers directly in Red Banner Volga Military District subunits and military units have become traditions.

The oblast military patronage commission which has been headed for many years by communist retired colonel Ye. G. Leschoev, a participant in the Great Patriotic War and an honored cultural worker of the RSFSR and now director of the Kuybyshev Sports Hall, is doing many interesting things. Thanks to the commissions initiative, it has become a tradition for patronage brigades to
take trips to the district's remote garrisons. The program of visits to military units calls for meetings with people who took part in the Great Patriotic War, lectures on the international situation and on the labor successes of the oblast's workers and also calls for them to provide practical assistance in creating Leninist Rooms, organizing artistic activities, etc.

Artists often make official creative trips into areas where there is tactical military training. This is seen as a continuation of the sacred traditions of the older generation's cultural experts who were desired guest of soldiers on the front during the war.

Agreements on cooperation between creative organizations and cultural institutions and soldiers are facilitating the enhancement of patronage ties. It is pleasant to note that for three years in a row the Kuybyshev Oblast has won the CPSU Central Committee Red Banner for fruitful military patronage work. Also in 1983 it was awarded the USSR Ministry of Defense Red Banner.

The heroic-spirit and patriotic education of students is an example of the great concern shown by the CPSU and Komsomol obkoms, local party and also the Komsomol organizations of general educational and professional-technical schools. Various forms of this type education are being used in the oblast and military-patriotic clubs and associations in particular have an important role in this. The children's clubs "Young Friends of the Soviet Army and Navy", "Red Pathfinders" and "Seekers" have been created in the oblast's cities and rayons. Schools for pilots and cosmonauts, tankers and sailors have been opened in Kuybyshev, Tolyatti and Syzran and an aviation-and-space production training combine is successfully operating in the city of Kuybyshev.

We have had good experience in working with young people in the area where they live. For example, the Mir teen-club and museum was created in one of the ZhEY [operational living areas] in the oblast center's Oktyabrskiy rayon. It has developed an large group of active supporters from among the students in nearby schools. Parents of the school children and also many war veterans take part in operating the museum. The initiator of this club-museum was retired colonel S. N. Zhiltkovskiy, a CPSU member since 1929, an active participant in the Great Patriotic War, the holder of military awards and a man who fought on many fronts as a member of an attack aviation regiment. People describe him as a man possessed with working with young people. He is an honored Komsomol member of the KATEK factory imeni Tarasov and for many years he headed the oblast headquarters of the Orel military sports games. For more than a quarter of a century Stepan Nikolayevich, assisted by young assistants from the Poisk detachment and students from schools and professional-technical schools, has been gathering material, little by little, on the history of attack aviation regiments whose military history began in the city of Kuybyshev.

The experience of military-patriotic schools, detachments and associations indicates that this form gives the party organization the ability to purposefully develop work in educating young people with respect for the military labor of the Motherland's defenders and to a large degree promotes
their selection of military professions after they finish school or VUZ [institution of higher education].

Several years ago the Kuybyshev Komsomol gorkom together with a section of the Committee of War Veterans decided to develop a school for young pilots and cosmonauts. A commission composed of CPSU gorkom workers and workers from the Council of People's Deputies and the Veterans of the Great Patriotic War ispolkoms, all former pilots, was created and this commission developed a program which the school had to follow. A list of specific issues that had to be resolved was developed. The school became operational in 1977 and two years later, on order of the USSR Ministry of Enlightenment, it became the foundation for the aviation-and-space training and production combine (UPK) in the city of Kuybyshev. This was the result of a lot of work by not only the Kuybyshev CPSU gorkom, but also the party obkom and obispolkom.

With the help of party organizations the combine was able to develop a good pedagogical collective. It includes 32 communists and the majority of the instructors are veterans of the USSR Armed Forces, civil aviation and the aviation industry. Among them are 20 people who took part in the Great Patriotic War. The training production combine is headed by retired Major General F. G. Kisel who was a teacher before the war, but who became a participant in the war on its first day. The collective that he heads is successfully resolving the missions assigned to it, despite the fact that the combine is working along a very difficult plan. About 900 young boys who represent more than 100 city schools and who decided to prepare themselves for work in aviation and space are currently studying there.

Even now it is possible to talk about the excellent results of the combine's work. For example, 160 of the 281 graduates from the 1983 academic year became cadets at aviation military academies, 80 continued in civil aviation training institutes and 40 are students at the Kuybyshev Aviation Institute imeni S. P. Korolev.

The Ministry of Civil Aviation and the Aviation Worker Professional Union Central Committee have held oblast meetings and seminars based on the UPK and instructors from more than 140 cities have taken part in them. The combine's achievements have been exhibited in the USSR VDNKh [Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy].

The experience of developing and operating the Kuybyshev training and production combine is a testimony to the CPSU obkom and party organizations' business-like approach to resolving the problems of the military-patriotic education of young people. Combining this work with the professional orientation of young people is also extraordinarily important from the point of view of resolving social problems.

It is impossible to instill a readiness to actively take part in communist construction and to impart the possible trials of defending the Fatherland in a young contemporary without his thoroughly understanding the path trod by the older generation and without skillfully and actively using its rich experience. And research work by young people is very important in this area.
For example students at the 105th School in Kuybyshev are actively collecting material on the 40th aviation regiment.

Students decided at a Komsomol conference to celebrate a Labor and Victory Holiday with war veterans annually on 22 April, V. I. Lenin's birthday. The first such holiday took place in April 1966 and since then more than 40 Guards aviation regiment veterans, including eight Hero of the Soviet Union pilots from different corners of the country, have visited the school. These visits are very beneficial for the young people. They develop a love for the Armed Forces in the young men and women and have a beneficial effect on their studies and work. Many students enter military academies after finishing school.

Veterans conduct Lessons in Courage with young people and they lead groups of Pathfinders and take part in the organization, preparation and conduct of Orelensk and Zaritsa military-sports games and of visits to places of revolutionary, military and labor glory. They give a lot of effort and energy to the work of museums and rooms and corners of military and labor glory that are operating on social principles and they also present lectures and reports to young people. In the city of Kuybyshev alone, for example, 220,000 people, primarily young people, annually attend meetings with party, war and labor veterans. In discussing this work, it is impossible not to give the names of veterans who are giving their every effort to the business of the military-patriotic and labor education of young people. These are primarily representatives of the Kuybyshev section of the Soviet Committee of Great Patriotic War Veterans such as retired Major General of Aviation M. I. Burkin; retired Lieutenant General V. I. Ometov, who took part in the defense of Moscow; reserve Major General V. F. Stovba; a representative of the oblast headquarters for Komsomol members' and young people's visits to the Communist Party's and Soviet People's places of revolutionary, military and labor glory V. M. Korobko; and Hero of the Soviet Union retired Major General of Aviation I. I. GeYo.

We can say without exaggeration that the 40th Anniversary of Victory was extensively and solemnly celebrated in the oblast with the help of party, war and labor veterans and the entire oblast active that took part in measures for the military-patriotic education of young people. This was a holiday of triumphal spring and a labor holiday. Young people and all the workers in the oblast approached it under the slogan "The 40th Anniversary of Victory -- 40 Shock Weeks". More than 38,000 workers, 20 collectives from enterprises and organizations, 52 departments, 124 districts and shifts and about 4000 brigades completed the tasks of the 11th Five-Year Plan. More than 1,700,000 oblast workers took part in the All-Union Communist subbotnik [labor freely given on a day off] dedicated to the anniversary of Victory and a million rubles of various products were sold that day.

On the eve of the holiday, production collectives, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, institutes and organizations held meetings and gatherings, meetings with veterans of the Great Patriotic War and feasts in honor of those who took part in military battles. Many veterans were awarded medals and orders for their military labor.
On 9 May approximately one million townspeople witnessed a vivid and grand celebration dedicated to veterans of war and the rear. On that day workers bowed to the sacred places at the Eternal Flame and felt the feats of their heroic fellow countrymen. Theatrical artistic-sports holidays, meeting with veterans of war and labor and national mass walks were held everywhere in squares, parks, stadiums and residential areas. At a CPSU Central Committee meeting with veterans of the Great Patriotic War, after expressing his sincere gratitude and congratulating the veterans on the great holiday CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev said, "Victory is more than history, it is also today.

People could say that the war became the property of history long ago; is it worth returning again and again to the events of those years and remembering what is associated with them. Of course it is worth it. Moreover, it is vitally necessary both for us and for all mankind."

Yes, war is of the past. But not only the patriotic and international feat accomplished by the soldiers of our Army, the partisans and the workers of the rear area, but also the heavy lessons of the war will never be forgotten.

Many good things were accomplished in the Soviet people's military-patriotic education while preparing for the 40th Anniversary of Victory, and this work is not weakening now that the anniversary celebration is over.

The work of the oblast's CPSU obkom and party and social organizations in the area of military-patriotic education is guided by the integrated plan for the communist education of young people as defined for 1985-1990. This is a deployed military work program for oblast party organizations. Military-patriotic education has a place along with such areas as strengthening party control over the Komsomol, the development of a Marxist-Leninist attitude in young people and their labor, economic and legal education. The CPSU obkom will strive so that the military-patriotic educational experience that has been amassed during preparations for and the celebration of the 40th Anniversary of Victory and enriched with new finds and new initiatives and so that the measures being conducted are closely tied with the lives of labor collectives and with the resolution of social-economic, organizational and ideological-educational tasks. Planned measures include stirring up the activities of partkom ideological commissions for military-patriotic education and studying, summarizing and disseminating the most interesting work experience of the party commissions for educating the population in the revolutionary, war and labor traditions of the Communist Party and the Soviet people.

This is literally a relay race and the ideas of devotion to the native Communist Party, love for the Motherland, the ideas of internationalism, loyalty to the Leninist order to defend the socialist Fatherland and to be constantly ready to do this are transmitted from generation to generation of Soviet people. Developing these qualities in the workers of the Country of Soviets is the constant task of the ideological work conducted by party organizations. Military-patriotic educational work is one of its primary integral parts and its considers the presence of the constant danger of imperialism starting nuclear war and also the impact of the scientific-
technical revolution on the development of military affairs, the increased role of moral-political and psychological factors, educating the rising generation in the spirit of preparing to make every effort for the prosperity and defense of our socialist Motherland. And oblast party, soviet, Komsomol and administrative agencies are stirring up the activity of their work with young people in exactly this direction.

We are firmly convinced that all work in the ideological-political and military-patriotic education of young people must become yet more effective, as required by the decisions of the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and those of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo that increase the tempo of social-economic, scientific-technical and cultural development of Soviet society.

Time is placing an enormous responsibility on party, Soviet and administrative agencies and on every communist. Their duty is to do everything possible so as to be on top of these responsibilities, on top of new party demands and to meet the 27th CPSU Congress with honor and in a worthy manner.

FOOTNOTES:


4. VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS [Questions of CPSU History], No 9. [No footnote indicated on the appropriate page]
5. PRAVDA, 6 May 1985. [Also Numbered 4 in the text].


12511
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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

DEATH OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY A. A. YEPISHEV

Central Committee Announcement

Moscow KRAZNAIA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Sep 85 p 1

[Text] The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the USSR Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers with deep regret announce that on 15 September 1985, General of the Army Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev, a leading Soviet party worker, member of the CPSU Central Committee, deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Hero of the Soviet Union, passed away after a serious, lengthy illness.

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, USSR PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVET, USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Ministry of Defense Announcement

Moscow KRAZNAIA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Sep 85 p 1

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy with deep sorrow inform the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces that on 15 September 1985 at the age of 78 after a long, serious illness, General of the Army Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev, member of the CPSU Central Committee, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and Hero of the Soviet Union, passed away. In the person of General of the Army A. A. Yepishev, the Soviet Armed Forces have lost a leading political worker in the Soviet Army and Navy.

Obituary

Moscow KRAZNAIA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Sep 85 p 3

On 15 September 1985 after a long, serious illness, the leading political worker of the Soviet Armed Forces, member of the CPSU Central Committee, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev passed away.

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The Soviet people and their Armed Forces feel a great loss. A true son of the Communist Party who has given all his efforts, knowledge and varied experience in party and state work to the matter of strengthening the country's defense and its safety has left us.

A. A. Yepishev was born 19 May 1908 in the city of Astrakhan into a working family. At 15 he began his working life. He began Komsomol and party work in 1926. In 1930, A. A. Yepishev was called to active military service. After completing the Red Army Mechanization and Motorization Military Academy, he was assigned to responsible party work.

In 1938, A. A. Yepishev was confirmed by the Party Central Committee Party Organs Department to the Plant imeni Comintern in Kharkov, then selected to be the First Secretary of the Comintern Rayon Committee in the Ukrainian Communist Party and in March 1940 as First Secretary to the Kharkov Oblast and city party committee. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he directly participated in the mobilization of workers to repel the enemy. After completing the evacuation of the city and oblast industrial enterprises to the eastern parts of the country, he worked as secretary of the Nizhne-Tagil city party committee and Deputy People's Commissar for medium machine building. From 1943 he was in the active army. During the historical battle on the Volga, he was the Stalingrad Front Military Council representative.

As a member of the Army Military Council, he actively participated in battles against the Fascist German occupiers during the liberation of the Western Ukraine, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Under complicated combat conditions, he displayed organizational abilities, personal bravery and courage. He was wounded many times.

After the Great Patriotic War, A. A. Yepishev was secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, deputy minister of the USSR State Security and First Secretary of the Odessa Oblast Party Committee. In 1955 the Party assigned him to responsible diplomatic work as the USSR Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Romania and then to Yugoslavia.

In May 1962, A. A. Yepishev was appointed as chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and for more than 23 years in that responsible post he firmly and undeviatingly carried out the party policy in the Soviet Armed Forces and made a material contribution to the training and education of their personnel and to increasing the combat readiness of the army and navy.

Because of the principles, efficiency and high standards he set for himself and his subordinates and his close ties to the people, he won the profound respect of everyone who knew and worked with him. Recently, he had responsible work in the Ministry of Defense.

A. A. Yepishev took an active part in the social and political life of the country. He was a deputy to many congresses of the USSR Supreme Soviet and a member of the CPSU Central Committee.
For conspicuous service to our Homeland, General of the Army A. A. Yepishev was honored with the title Hero of the Soviet Union and awarded four Orders of Lenin; the Order of the October Revolution; four Red Banner Orders; the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitskiy, First Class; two Orders of the Patriotic War, First Class; the Order of Labor Red Banner; three Red Star Orders; the order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," Third Class and many medals. He was awarded many foreign orders and medals.

The soldiers of the USSR Armed Forces and the Soviet people will always cherish the memory of the bright example of the Communist, Patriot-Internationalist and distinguished political worker Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev.


From Funeral Commission

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Sep 85

[Text] The casket with General of the Army A. A. Yepishev's body will be on display in the Red Star Hall of the Soviet Army Central House imeni M. V. Frunze (Commune Square, No 2). One may pay his respects from 10-12 on 18 September.

The funeral will be at 1 o'clock, 18 September at the Novodevich Cemetery.

Army Gen Vasyagin: Memorial

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by Army Gen Vasyagin: "Memories of a Comrade in Arms"]

[Text] A prominent political worker in the Soviet Armed Forces and Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev has passed away. The heart of a man who traveled along a great and glorious path through life and faithfully served his Homeland in all the posts entrusted to him by the Party has stopped beating.

A. A. Yepishev linked his life with the army in 1930; the Party sent him, a VKP (b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] rayon committee instructor, to
the command course. Then he studied at the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Mechanization and Motorization Military Academy. In 1938, A. A. Yepishev was recalled to the command of the VKP (b) Central Committee. Remaining in the Armed Forces cadres, he worked as the Central Committee party organizer at the Plant imeni Comintern in Kharkhov and was simultaneously selected to be First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Comintern Rayon Committee. Starting in March 1940 Aleksey Alekseyevich held the post of First Secretary of the Kharkhov Oblast and Rayon Party Committee.

A. A. Yepishev's talent as a great party leader was clearly demonstrated in the complex initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Aleksey Alekseyevich played an important role in organizing the industrial enterprises to accomplish defensive orders and in the mobilization of human and material resources from the Kharkhov Oblast for the needs of the Front. He conducted important work in organizing the party underground and partisan movement in the oblast and in mobilizing workers on the construction of defensive lines in the Front zone. A. A. Yepishev acted with initiative and decisiveness and as the commissar of the Kharkhov Corps of People's Home Guard, actively participated in the defense of the city.

In 1942 and 1943, Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev worked as the responsible organizer from the Party Central Committee and accomplished the task of rapidly developing the defense industry in the Urals and had the post of Deputy USSR Medium Machine Building People's Commissar. During the Stalingrad Battle he was the Stalingrad Front military committee representative.

His skill in rallying men and firing them with an unshakable faith in victory over Fascism and his Bolshevik energy and selflessness with his special effort were demonstrated when he was appointed as a member of the Military Council of the 40th Army, Voronezh Front and soon after in October 1943 as a member of the Military Council of the 38th Army, First Ukrainian Front. Aleksey Alekseyevich skillfully supervised the party political work in units and formations, directed the efforts of propagandists, the political apparatus, and the party organization in strengthening the morale of the troops, ensuring that communists and Komsomols in battle set the example and inculcating soldiers with courage and bravery, determination and persistence and a burning hatred of the German Fascist occupier.

The great experience in party, state and economic activity helped A. A. Yepishev in solving many important tasks which arose in the dynamic front situation. He was almost constantly with the troops. The veterans of the 38th Army with which he traveled through difficult and glorious combat will always remember this. The army was distinguished during the liberation of Kiev and in the Zhitomir-Berdichev, Proskurov-Chernovtsi, L'vov-Sandomir, Karpat-Duklin, Moravska-Ostrava and Prague Operations. Comrades in arms noted the personal bravery and courage of General Yepishev.

In the postwar period Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev was the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee Secretary for Cadres and a member of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Organization Bureau First Secretary of the Odessa Party Oblast Committee and the deputy minister
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Romania and then in Yugoslavia.

A. A. Yepishev's great organizational talent and enormous experience in party activity was fully revealed in the post of the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy to which the Party appointed him in May of 1962.

Aleksey Alekseyevich devoted all of his effort and the richness of his spirit to the work for strengthening the political and moral condition in the Armed Forces, military discipline and mobilization of personnel in the army and navy to further improve combat and political training. He made a great contribution in the development of the theory and practice of communist education for the armed defenders of the Homeland. While supervising party political work, A. A. Yepishev directed it toward rallying the personnel around the CPSU and educating the soldier-patriots and internationalists who are selflessly devoted to their people, the socialist Homeland and the communist ideal.

At the 19th, 20th and 22nd Party Congresses, A. A. Yepishev was elected as a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and in November 1964 was elected member of the CPSU Central Committee. He completed great responsible work as a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

General of the Army A. A. Yepishev had great authority in the army and navy. He was a strict and demanding superior and a precise and attentive person. Everyone who came in direct contact with him received a high charge of spiritual energy and memorable lessons in principled actions, efficiency, and skill in penetrating deeply to the essence of problems and phenomena.

He will be remembered by us as a devoted warrior of the Party, a political worker of grand scale and a true patriot of our Homeland.

The bright example of General of the Army Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev will always live in the hearts of the warriors in the army and navy.

12747
CSO: 1801/23
WEATHER AS A POTENTIAL WEAPON

Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 28, 9 Jul 85 p 8

// Unsigned article appearing under the rubric "Questions and Answers"/

\[\text{Text} \] The terms "climatic weapon" and "weather war" have recently appeared in the press. To what do they refer? S. Sokolov, Omsk

Certain natural phenomena are associated with undesirable and serious consequences. The shock wave produced by a tornado (cyclone), for example, is equivalent to the explosion of a 50-kiloton atomic bomb, while a hurricane generates energy equal to that of a 1,000-megaton "superbomb."

It is already possible in principle to control these phenomena to some extent. Some progress has already been made in modifying certain natural processes for economic purposes and for countering natural calamities. Dispersion of clouds and fog is of great importance for uninterrupted operation of airports; hurricanes can be influenced to veer away from populated areas; clouds are seeded in times of drought; in mountains snow avalanches have been intentionally initiated for a long time, etc.

However, the above-mentioned processes can also be used for other purposes, particularly as principally new military weapons. Here are several examples. The energy of hurricanes or cyclones can be released directly on a battlefield to destroy airfields, ports and fighting ships at sea. Snow avalanches and slides are capable of blocking mountain passes and roads and halting river navigation. An increase in precipitation can modify the mechanical characteristics of soil to render it incapable of supporting the weight of heavy materiel; it can cause landslides and raise the level of rivers, which in turn could cause flooding of an area, destruction of bridges and reversal of coastal currents. Changes in weather elements (amount of precipitation, average temperature, number of sunny days) may cause catastrophic losses in agricultural production, soil erosion, destruction of forests, etc.

Military use of technical methods for influencing the environment may go even further. At one time there were reports on the possibility of exploding several nuclear charges on the edge of the continental shelf
for the purpose of removing an enormous piece in the depths of the ocean; the resulting wave—a tsunami—would devastate coastal areas of any nearby country. Scientists were alarmed by the concept of partial disruption of the natural ozone layer of the atmosphere, which protects all living things on the earth from harmful ultraviolet solar radiation. The National Academy of Sciences of the U.S. in a report on possible long-term effects of mass use of nuclear weapons arrived at the conclusion that explosion of charges totalling 10,000 megatons in the Northern Hemisphere would destroy more than half the ozone there, thus subjecting the population of the countries located there to the threat of serious burns and causing a drop in temperature over wide areas. Scientists have calculated that a one degree reduction in average annual temperature in Canada would result in a poor harvest of catastrophic proportions.

In this connection, the need arose to prevent dangerous trends in the use of scientific and technical advances to render geophysical influences of a harmful nature. The Soviet Union was a founder of a conference on prohibition of military or other harmful use of methods to influence the natural environment. The Soviet Union's proposal to this end was introduced into the UNO in 1974 and approved by the General Assembly. As a result of Soviet-American discussions and consideration of the issue in the Disarmament Committee, the convention was ratified in 1977.

The convention prohibited the use of methods associated with extensive, long-term or serious consequences with the intention of inflicting destruction, damage or harm to other countries—those participating in the convention.

In September 1984 a conference of countries that are participants of the convention was held in Geneva. The question of realizing the aims and position of the convention was discussed. The main conclusion of the conference was reached unanimously: due to the nature of problems involved, the significance of the convention is much broader than the interests of the participants, since the interests of all countries of the world are at stake.

It should be understood that the effectiveness of the convention would be greater if all countries would participate. At the present time there are 45 countries participating; nineteen others signed but have not ratified it. The Soviet Union is in favor of maximum possible expansion of the circle of participants.

13005/12276
CSO: 1801/18
COL DENISOV ARTICLE ON ECONOMY, THRIFT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 85 p1

[Article by Gds Col I. Denisov, commander of the Guards Kantemirovka Tank Division imeni Yu. V. Andropov: "Economy and Thrift Are Everyone's Concern"]

[Text] After completing the military academy in 1967, Ivan Lukich Denisov commanded a tank platoon, company, and battalion and was the deputy regimental commander in the Far East Military District. Then he completed the Armored Troops Military Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy with honors. He commanded a battalion and was a deputy regimental commander.

Gds Col I. Denisov was awarded the Red Star Order and the medal "For Combat Merit" for success in combat and political training.

In publishing his article on economy and thrift, the editorial staff is requesting that the readers express their opinion on these questions, present ideas on ways to increase savings and discuss positive experience as well as deficiencies.

Our party and people display true paternal concern that the army and navy have everything necessary to maintain the required level of combat readiness and organize effective combat and political training. As many resources as necessary are produced for these purposes. More urgent for us is the careful expenditure of the people's money.

In connection with this, I would like to touch upon an aspect of military training which does not always receive the attention it deserves—conservation. Unfortunately, we do not often reflect upon ways to achieve maximum training with minimum expenditures of time and material resources. Isn't this why training time, fuel and ammunition are sometimes expended without the desired effect?

Personnel in the battalion commanded by Gds Capt N. Samolyuk were well-prepared for platoon live fire: The tankers studied the control documents and
conducted training. But vehicle resource and ammunition expenditures during the first session indicated serious training deficiencies. The training had to be called off. The battalion commander was questioned: What else did he intend to do? The answer: Repeat platoon attacks over and over until the personnel had learned to operate skillfully. I did not agree with this decision. I gave orders to continue "dismounted tank training." At the same time, I advised him to consider how to avoid unplanned combat vehicle movement around the training area. Unfortunately, Gds Capt N. Samolyuk is not the only one who holds to the principle that "everything must be rushed in the interest of combat training." Recent actions and live fire training by tank companies commanded by Gds Capt A. Dobrotin and Gds Sr Lt V. Borodaty were irritating. Judging by fuel and motor resource expenditures, one would have thought that the subunits took several days to find the "enemy" in order to engage them. But the exercise controller, Gds Maj V. Fedorov, did not see any harm in this. He learned much at the military academy—analysis of the tactical situation and strict control of subordinates in combat and decisiveness. But is the ability to consider and save the people's kopeck unnecessary for a commander?

I notice that when the discussion moves to economy and thrift, most often everything comes down to conservation of expenditures of fuel, water and electrical energy. These are unquestionably important, but life requires that the problem be considered in a broader context.

In the past months, we evaluated unit training. We noted the successes of the battalion commanded by Gds Maj A. Grekhov and the artillery battalion commanded by Lt Col V. Sadovskiy. We determined that the excellent results here were a specific result of the highly effective, and I would say an economic, use of training time. Attendance at exercises was almost always 100 percent. In the subunits, there was no need to retrain on subjects or to make up anything omitted by using emergency methods without considering costs.

To conserve everything and be always thrifty is the patriotic duty of the defenders of the Homeland and a command of the military oath and regulations. The Party has put before the Soviet people and all of us a concrete task: Everyone is obligated to be a zealous steward in his own position, and each can do much in his situation.

On my desk I have the monthly report with conservation indicators and, of course, losses.

The military driver Private V. Shabunovskiy saved 244 liters of fuel. Private M. Arkhipov saved 316 liters. Private V. Muratov saved 412. How can one not be happy with such skillful specialists, people with a developed sense of duty towards the people.

The division savings over the past year have added up to a significant sum. But this does not mean that everything has gone well in all sectors and areas. There were losses in the past and they have not been overcome at the present time. The formation clothing service has suffered some very noticeable losses. In reporting them the service chief, Gds Maj V. Nikitin, finished his report in this manner: "On the whole, the service coped with the missions entrusted to it." It turns out that we lose and wear out State equipment and,
in this case, cheerfully report the good work! The food service and the fuel and lubricant material service did not avoid losses.

Is this a small matter—the spoonful, the bowlful and the grams of fuel spilled while fueling vehicles and thrown away in the past? But they come to great totals!

Recently, I had a meeting with Guards Majors S. Kozyrev and A. Gubanov. Because of them, it was necessary to pay a fine for idling railroad cars because their units' plans for scrap metal collection and meat production on the unit welfare farm were not fulfilled. Communists Kozyrev and Gubanov often exhibit sloth and disinterest in these affairs. No one could say that they feel the sharp pulse of time and are drawn to everything new and progressive. And in truth, they have little interest in becoming expert logistics specialists.

Officer A. Marchenko serves in one of the division units and is also an economic executive. His unit overfulfilled the plan for meat and vegetables for all customers by more than three-fold. Where is the best chief of food services? The unit with Lt. O. Dolotov. Where is the best administrative platoon commander and mess hall chief? In the same place. These are Senior Warrant Officer S. Ardeev and Warrant Officer Yu. Yemelyanov. And the cook instructor Jr. Sgt. O. Mitin is recognized as the best specialist in the whole formation. All of them are students of the Communist A. Marchenko. Aleksey Petrovich can convincingly demonstrate his many years of service in this position in working with people and zealously using material resources.

When speaking about economy and thrift, it is especially desirable to emphasize the role of the subunit first sergeant. In the division, the authority of Senior Warrant Officers I. Vasilyukh, I. Kolodko and many others is at its height. With these zealous stewards, everything in the barracks has a look of quality and is livable, and everything is maintained as required. With the battery first sergeant, Senior Warrant Officer A. Seleznov, each soldier and noncommissioned officer has several spare uniforms and pairs of boots. "The first sergeant's fund" has come about as a result of the fact that Seleznov does not throw away any uniforms or boots which are still capable of being serviceable but repairs them and reissues them.

There are conservation reserves in every unit. We have a great deal. The division has a good training base, but we do not seriously use everything. Classes, for instance, are rarely organized using movie trainers for mechanic-drivers. It was considered that training in the tank driving range was more effective, but recently it was necessary to repair the training tanks and the road to the tank park. A decision was made to use the trainers exclusively for the mechanic-drivers for a period of 3 weeks. And what were the results? The tests show that the specialist training quality did not drop at all. And the resources saved were significant.

In economy and thrift there are no small or private issues. It is this line that the division political section, staff, party and Komsomol organizations are striving to put forward. In the final result, everything is important. We were interested, for example, in the routine garrison service operations.
It turned out that it was not directed toward saving the duty time of officers and warrant officers. Purchases could only be made during duty hours, taking them away from matters for which they were responsible. It was decided to change; now the store is open 2 hours later allowing the men to accomplish the routine chores at a better time.

Experience convinces us that the greater the care in precisely organizing the training process and providing quality unit and subunit training, the more savings are achieved in combat training. Great responsibility of each in his sector, professional skill, progressive methodology and a feel for the new are the basis of thrift.

12747
CSO: 1801/299
UNITS WORKING AT THRIFT

Fuels, Lubricants Consumption Checked

Moscow KRASTAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by Maj M. Nikonov, Turkestan Military District: "On the Recommendation of the People's Controllers"]

[Text] The group of people's controllers headed by Lieutenant Colonel V. Padalka conducted several dozen raids in checking the maintenance and operation of armored and motor transport equipment.

Recently the controllers checked the procedure for the storage, care, issuing, and consumption of fuels and lubricants. They established the absence of lids on several pits for containers with diesel fuel, instances of late turn-in of depleted fuel and oils, the careless keeping of accounting documents, and shortcomings in indoctrinational work with the personnel. As a result of poor management a considerable quantity of fuels and lubricants proved to be over-consumed. The commander adopted specific measures in accordance with the results of the check.

A display, "The Voice of the People's Controller," was set up in the unit. Excerpts from the Law on People's Control of the USSR, posters calling for economy, and statements on the raids which have been conducted and information on measures adopted in accordance with them were placed in it.

The people's controllers, Lieutenant Colonels V. Padalka, V. Kuprin, N. Ossov, and M. Dryaganets, often give talks on economy and participate in the conduct of thematic morning sessions.

Fuel Economy Achieved

Moscow KRASTAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by Col A. Yurkin, Leningrad Military District: "Thrifty"]

[Text] A substantial savings in petroleum products was achieved in the summer training period in the Guards artillery unit where Captain F. Yefizov serves. The unit's subunits can operate for several days using the gasoline and diesel fuel which have been saved.
This was furthered by the clear organization of the training process. Each trip to the field is organized with the thoroughly thought out use of vehicles, and the delivery of materials is accomplished using a circular run which eliminates "idle" kilometers. The credit for this goes to Lieutenant Colonel M. Kulikov, Major A. Basisty, Warrant Officer [praporshchik] Ye. Yefimov, and others.

Unit Receives Economy Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by Lt Col S. Koshurnikov, Moscow Air Defense District: "Everyone In the Search"]

[Text] The results of the activity of the administrators in the care and efficient use of material and monetary resources were summed up recently in the unit where officer M. Sinitsyn serves. Fuels and lubricants, electric power, and motor transport resources worth more than 8,000 rubles were saved. Seventy-two tons of scrap metal were collected and turned in. Two tons of milk were obtained from the unit welfare farm for the additional feeding of the men. The personnel saved 31 tons of grain.

The deputy commander of the Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District for rear services and district chief of rear services, Major General A. Frolov, comments on this fact.

This example is gratifying. I note that it is not the only one in the district. Commanders, political officers, rear services specialists, and party and Komsomol organizations began to involve themselves in economy problems more objectively.

The rear services personnel of the named unit are distinguished by a high degree of organization. The administrators here do nothing in vain, to no purpose, or repeatedly--everything is in sequence, on time, and with high quality. And what is very important: they are able to foresee the results of their activity. Such an efficient grasp, I would say, which is noted by a glance is possessed by officers-communists M. Sinitsyn, N. Panfilov, S. Zverev, Yu. Chistov, G. Ivanov, and N. Bogachev.

Much attention here is devoted to instilling in the men a zealous attitude toward the people's property. This task, the communists believe, is not only administrative and economic, but also moral. Planned political training and agitation-propaganda and mass political work are subordinated to its accomplishment. Days of economics knowledge, meetings with rear services specialists, and thematic soirees devoted to various aspects of administrative activity are conducted regularly in the unit. In the course of them the men are taught the principles of the efficient and careful use of material resources.
Repair Ship Plans Economies

Moscow KRAASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by Maj A. Smetanin, Pacific Fleet: "Without Metal Waste"]

[Text] The repair ship commanded by Captain-Lieutenant O. Kovalev is considered to be one of the best in the Navy.

At the beginning of the current training year the seamen of the repair ship decided at their meeting: to work two days per quarter on raw materials, fuel, and electric power which had been saved. And this is what happened. High professional skill and creative keenness of wit helped the specialists to become zealous managers. The group of innovators developed a number of instruments and accessories which permit making the blanks of parts virtually without waste metal.

A factor such as interchangeability at battle stations and the mastery of several allied specialties also helps the seamen to save materials. And here the subordinates take as an example their commanders—Senior Lieutenant V. Primak and Warrant Officers [midshipman] A. Kalchenko and N. Pritulyak.

6367
CS0: 1801/14
DRUNKEN DRIVING BY MODEL SOLDIER CAUSES ACCIDENT

Moscow KRENSAYA ZVEZDA in Russia 6 Sep 85

[Article by Lt Col V. Zhitarevko, Moscow Military District: "The 'Innocent' Wine Glass: An Accident Occurred in the Nth Unit. What Was the Reason?"

[Text] This spring Private Raymondas Chiginskas was to be released to the reserve from the Armed Forces. He served for two yours in an exemplary manner; otherwise he would hardly have been entrusted to drive the unit commander's vehicle. He became one of the best specialists in the regiment. There were several commendations and not one punishment in his service card.... He prepared to travel to his native Baltic village, to his father and mother to say: and here I am, your assistant; now together we can give my 12 brothers and sisters a start in life.... And after a while, perhaps, he might even bring a bride to the house--this is how he and the daughter of a serviceman, Larisa, who was the pride of the school and an excellent student, sincerely felt about one another.

On that evening he took the regimental commander home but he did not put the vehicle in the motor pool. He knew that he would no longer sit behind the wheel—he will turn the automobile over to his successor. He drove past a store and bought alcohol. He decided to take his girl friend for a ride after all. Formerly, Chiginskas had never indulged in intoxicating potions. Now, what appeared to him to be the first innocent glass completely released the "brake." He exceeded the established speed and lost control of the automobile....

He was under examination when his mother and father arrived at the unit. They brought with them 745 rubles 30 kopecks to pay for the damage to the smashed vehicle. However, it proved to be insufficient: in such cases the loss is withheld from the culprit in an automobile accident based on the retail price of the vehicle. But if this was the only misfortune here! The elder Chiginskas' stopped at the home of their intended future relatives. But there will be no wedding, there cannot be. Larisa died from injuries received in that accident not having succeeded in receiving her school-leaving certificate. She was her parents' only child. It remains only to guess what kind of conversation took place between the Chiginskas' and the K. family when the details of the daughter's funeral were discussed instead of plans for the future....

On the day of the trial the soldiers' club was simply crammed. Everyone was agitated by the tragedy which had occurred and all were disturbed by the question of how could it happen that a soldier who was exemplary until recently could commit a crime.
It seemed that the answer lay on the surface: vodka is to blame for everything. That very first glass. Both the public and state prosecutors spoke of this, and the defender could not help but agree with them. In his last statement the accused did not state a request for mitigating the sentence but he gave advice to his fellow servicemen: "I want no one to repeat my stupidity!" That is, again about that very glass. It is precisely this which figured as the aggravating motive in the court's sentence....

And nevertheless, let us try to peer into the depth of the problem. In the course of the military tribunal's session no particular determination was pronounced which was directed at the unit. Because here all measures were being undertaken and especially are being undertaken and directed toward the struggle against drunkenness. Here, it has long been considered an unusual occurrence if any serviceman uses alcohol. And even if there is one who likes to drink, he is not the immediate chief of the same Private Chiginskas—is it really the business of the court to examine such distant ties?

But nevertheless, we will try to consider such remote ties, too....

...The training subunit of this unit which is commanded by Major A. Shestitko has been excellent for three years in a row. The trainees are distinguished by high self-collection and discipline in everything. And first of all, the successes of the subunit are connected with the personal example of the officers in training, service, and living.

"Bright heads!" they say about them. Do they have in mind the love of the officers for their military specialty and outstanding abilities in invention and innovation work? Unquestionably, this too. Suffice it to say that last year the personnel of the subunit led by the officers introduced eight suggestions directed toward intensification of the training process and the improvement of combat equipment. One of these suggestions caused interest even at the plant, and its representatives arrived at the unit where they are now studying the possibilities for introducing the "creation" of Shestitko's subordinates into series production. And really, how can they not become interested if the program for the preparation of intelligence data which they worked out permits accomplishing the assigned missions five times more rapidly than the usual method? Suffice it to say that Major Shestitko has been acknowledged as one of the best (and according to the comments of many of his commanders—the best) specialists of his field in the Armed Forces. As regards him himself, he believes that other officers of the subunit are extremely close to the attainment of such professional heights—Senior Lieutenants Yu. Kramarenko, L. Mastykin, and V. Shemyakinskiy.

These officers do not permit themselves to grow weak in anything. They prepare for each lesson and each drill with the personnel as for the first one in their officer biography—painstakingly and thoroughly, testing and introducing all new organizational forms and procedures. In indoctrination work with subordinates they undeviatingly follow the main principle "Do as I do!" This means, don't stop at what has been achieved, be handsome externally and internally with the beauty of a military person, and do not permit yourself the slightest indulgence.

"The officers of this subunit are teetotallers," the chief of the division's political division explained to me the initial cause of their successes. Thus
this determination acquired one more, literal meaning: bright heads. It means, not dulled by intoxication.

Later on they told: at one time there was one who liked to drink in this officer's collective, too. But thanks to the demandingness and exactingness of Shestitko and other officers of the subunit he gave up the pernicious habit. Now he holds the same views as his fellow servicemen in following the laws of sobriety.

Most likely it is the axiom: such commanders cannot have different subordinates. Once again it must be said: and all the same.... It was learned--and in this subunit one of the sergeants used alcohol. At the beginning of the year. So to say, he "shared the sorrow" with someone else who had received bad news from home. For Major Shestitko and for the other officers of the subunit this news was like a bolt out of the blue.

By the way, this story caused them no bewilderment. Bitterness, vexation--yes. Because they understood: everything depends not only on their personal example. Their subordinates also see others. And if even one officer in the regiment permits himself to stroll about the garrison with a staggering step, such a bad example does not go by without leaving a trace.

One. Only one--Junior Lieutenant A. Fomin. He should have been a captain already. And there were all inclinations and conditions for normal service. But somewhere, somehow, he also drank the first glass. And if a person suffers in the labyrinth of intoxication, don't stop him. Of course, they tried to stop him. They worked with him in one of the units of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany where Fomin served after completing military school. And in this large unit of the Moscow Military District. What chiefs didn't talk with him and how many times they talked with him! They explained, and admonished, and punished. They believed that in one regiment the commanders and political officers did not cope with the role of Fomin's teachers, so they transferred him to another, and then to a third. The comradely court of honor of junior officers sat five times, appealing to the higher command for the adoption of the strictest measures against the violator of military discipline and prescribed order. Several times the court suggested releasing the officer who had lost his honor and dignity from the ranks of the army. And each time the needed decision was not made.

I saw Fomin and Chiginskas for two years. I would not like to link the behavior of one and the other directly. But one can also conjecture without grounds as follows: In deciding to drink alcohol, Chiginskas took someone as an example. "Can they really condemn me for one glass one time since Fomin was permitted to do this systematically?" Perhaps this is how the soldier reasoned on the way to the store on that ill-fated day....

The sentence of the military tribunal which examined the Chiginskas case was severe but just--imprisonment for five years.

As formerly, Junior Lieutenant A. Fomin commands a platoon in an adjacent subunit. And as formerly, once in a while, he will appear slightly intoxicated before those who have not yet experienced the bitter aftertaste and tragic consequences of the first glass of alcohol in their lives. That "innocent" glass because of which the life of a young girl was suddenly ended and which destroyed the fate of a previously excellent soldier.

6367
CSO: 1801/14
PROBLEMS OF HOUSING SERVICEMEN'S FAMILIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Oct 85 p 4

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col Justice I. Vashkevich:
"Register at the Following Address...: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Made a Statement and a
Decision was Made: How is It Being Carried Out?"]

[Text] It seems he doesn't even suspect what kind of barrier he overcame. He
sits before me and talks about something as if it goes without saying: he
arrived in the unit and began work; his wife registered and also went to
work...

Well, it's true that there seemingly is nothing to be surprised at here. It
is a normal, natural course of events. The fact is that WO [Praporshchik]
Vladimir Golosov didn't arrive in this Belorussian city because of some whim,
but by order. It wasn't his fault that the unit can't assign him quarters
yet. He will live here all the same, either in a private apartment or in the
barracks, and his family with him. Such is the life of a military person.

And like all other people, his family needs work, medical services, a place
in the kindergarten for a child or, let's say, a motorcycle license plate.

But the problem is that it was not very long ago that the families of some
officers and warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany] couldn't take
advantage of such customary conditions at times, and specifically in the
period when they were awaiting the receipt of quarters at a new place of
residence. Without full-fledged housing, they were told, there was also no
registration, because the rules in existence at that time made no exception
for service families. It wasn't just hard for an officer's wife to get a
job; it wasn't that simple for his son to be registered with the military
commissariat because of the absence of a registration of place of residence.

This is why the question was raised twice in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (on 28 January
1982 and on 1 September 1983) about the need to change the procedure for
registering servicemen and their family members before they received their
housing. The newspaper wrote that if there was no opportunity to give quar-
ters immediately to those who needed them, then what was the hindrance in
issuing people the appropriate documents?
At the request of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Council of Ministers charged the governments of the union republics with considering this question.

As the editors were informed by Col Gen A. Fedorov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate, all union republics adopted positive resolutions in the form of decrees, instructions or directions providing for the registration of the members of servicemen's families before they received housing.

Yes, matters had moved off of dead center.

Before me is a directive of the chief of the Belorussian Military District KEU [billeting directorate]. It states that the republic Council of Ministers made it mandatory for the ispolkoms of oblast soviets of people's deputies and of the Minsk city soviet of people's deputies "to ensure the registration of officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen and members of their families arriving at a new duty station at the living space they were occupying by subletting (or renting) regardless of its size or at the address of the military unit in which the serviceman is serving, for the period of time until living space is obtained under established procedures."

"How many everyday 'knots' of all kinds this directive cut!" says Maj A. Penkin, acting chief of the post KECh [billeting unit]. "An officer's wife has to give birth, but people at the women's clinic didn't even want to talk to her without registration. A solution to the problem finally would be found, of course, but it cost so much trouble and nerves!"

By the way, a directive is a directive, but it was specific people who cut the "knots." It is common knowledge that someone can read any document and interpret it in his own way. And so it was that not everyone in this Belorussian city immediately understood what it means to register people at the military unit address. The police would ask: But where do the people live in fact?

"Nowhere!" says Maj Penkin hotly, recalling this. "First here, then there. Take that same WO Golosov. He rented an apartment in one place, but a planned marriage fell apart for the proprietor and she asked him to leave. He moved in with his grandmother, but a grandson suddenly decided to return to her. The only definite address for those such as Golosov is that of the military unit. A person always can be found here."

It was pleasing to learn that the gorispolkom chairman also took just as clear-cut a position in those days. Here is his answer to a question from the post commander: "For the registration of servicemen and members of their families at the military unit address, the billeting unit house management must be charged with keeping and accounting for registration material, or persons responsible for registering and signing out servicemen and members of their families must be appointed from the military units." Vladimir Petrovich explained his position to me as follows:
"Servicemen change their place of residence not at their 'desire.' This means we are simply obligated to grant them the legitimate rights of Soviet citizens."

The letter of the ispolkom chairman to the post commander was dated July of this year. WO Golosov arrived at the post somewhat later, and then a petition went from the unit where he now serves to the billeting unit. The acting chief of the billeting unit gave appropriate instructions to the house management. The house management's passport registration woman entered the arrivals on a special card and delivered their documents to the city police department. The people were registered at the military unit address on 21 August. Three days later Yelena Georgiyevna Golosova began work in one of the city construction organizations.

It is understandable that I am not telling all the prehistory of this event now for WO Golosov. One would like to arm everyone responsible for a rapid resolution of the matter in other places with a proper understanding of the law and the methodology of implementing it, because matters do not yet stand everywhere as in Belorussia. This is even after a special decree was adopted to supplement previous USSR Council of Ministers directions. Alas, it was not interpreted correctly everywhere.

Here is a letter from the Ukraine. Maj S. Panasenko arrived in one of the cities. Unfortunately, he will have to wait for an apartment. For several months now the officer's wife has not been able to get a job or receive medical help: there is no registration. Just what keeps from getting it? As gorispolkom worker Yu. Kuznetsov explains, it is the fact that servicemen and members of their families are permitted registration in the city "at the living space of other persons or of the military unit," but in this case the "military unit has no living space."

There you have it. But here it must not be a question of unit living space, but of its address. The task is extremely clear: to ease the situation of those who have arrived at a new place of residence in line of military duty. A military unit does not have its "own" living space. The barracks or other official space where the family of a serviceman has to live temporarily at times is not living space. It follows that the "interpretation" of the law made by Comrade Kuznetsov contradicts its spirit. No, it is not a desire to comply with the law, but ordinary formalism which was the reason for the gorispolkom's refusal to register the officer and his wife at the military unit address.

Warning signals about unjustified registration difficulties unfortunately continue to come to the editors not just from the Ukraine. This means it is not enough to make a good decision; it is necessary for it to be understood and applied correctly locally.
'DECEPTIONS' IN REPORTING OF DISCIPLINARY VIOLATIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col I. Varfolomeyev under the rubric "Discipline is the Basis of Combat Readiness": "Eyewash"]

[Text] "No, it is simply unfair to accuse us of embellishment and eyewash," said Maj Ya. Zagreba hotly. "We know the requirements on this score. We don't take away and we don't add. Objectively! Here are the reports..."

For several days I had been working with Lt Col I. Voronin, an officer of the large unit [soyedineniy] political department, in subunits of the radio technical unit commanded by Col Ye. Kachmarik, and that is the sort of justificatory monologue we often heard. But now and then we encountered facts forcing us to have strong doubts about these assertions. A detailed analysis of disciplinary practice showed that far from all the infractions were reported here through channels. Not all of them were included in accounting documents. Some, although they were included, were in a softened form, so to speak.

Here is one such report which went from the battalion to unit headquarters. It states that last month there were no gross infractions of military discipline in the subunit. A certain number of minor offenses were listed only in the column "Other Infractions." The latter were not expanded on, because it was all clear without that: "other" means minor and insignificant. On reading such a report any supervisor probably would draw the unambiguous conclusion that everything was in order with discipline in this battalion, at least in the past month.

We too would have thought exactly that, had we not learned by chance it was in that month that Lt G. Lapin committed a breach of discipline: the officer was absent from the unit for several days for an unknown reason. This violation, however, did not figure in the summary document, either among gross infractions or in the "others" column. Why?

"I am at a loss to explain how we didn't report him to headquarters," said Maj Zagreba, wrinkling his brow in a long-suffering manner.
Both he and other battalion officers also "were unable" to explain sensibly the meaning and purpose of the clumsy wordings which we often encountered in the radar operators' record of service cards.

We read that Pvt I. Makhkamov received punishment "for unconscientious performance of duties of the person in charge." What person in charge? Of a vehicle? Of a crew to clean up the grounds? Therein lay the rub! The fact is that had company commander Capt N. Titkov completed the phrase, any inspector would have understood that the private was in charge of a team and during operational training work he had removed himself from performing the duties assigned him.

Nevertheless, Makhkamov's name was not listed in the violations summary. It also didn't contain the name of Pvt A. Turayev, who was negligent in performing the duties of orderly. On the other hand, it is because of such "objectivity," in Maj Zagreba's words, that some monthly reports appear to be completely satisfactory.

We also encountered a similar method of accounting for violations and reporting them to headquarters and the political department in the neighboring battalion of this unit, the one where Maj V. Nikitin was acting commander. We learned, for example, that WO [Praporshchik] V. Galinas committed a gross violation on the basis of drunkenness. This was not reported to the unit headquarters or political department.

"We were late in learning about the offense," says political officer Maj N. Svinarenko.

Then we asked Svinarenko to help "interpret" an entry in the record of service card of Jr Sgt S. Yangibayev, who received a severe reprimand "for incorrect application of methods of indoctrinating soldiers." What specifically was the indoctrinational omission?

"Insofar as I remember," uttered Svinarenko uncertainly, "Yangibayev made an unjust criticism of a soldier."

Jr Sgt Yangibayev himself provided a more precise answer: he made a very rude, nonregulation attack on Pvt O. Guskov. In addition, Guskov also was insulted by Pvt S. Movchan. In the face of any logic, these nonregulation relationships were classified in the report as minor.

The purpose of embellishments is not to appear worse than others, but officers Nikitin and Svinarenko said over and over again that they only had made errors and inaccuracies in the entries. They declared for greater "persuasiveness" that an integrated inspection team had come to them from unit headquarters. It had uncovered some deficiencies but had not accused them of eyewash...

In short, like it or not, we were prompted to think that the fallacious practice was not being noticed by senior officers. And what would they themselves say about this?
"Do you really think that we staff officers know the state of affairs in our own subunit worse than you?" Lt Col I. Kondratov, deputy unit commander, responded to us with irritation, and he began to offer advice as to how a correspondent should work on TDY. Kondratov took as the standard the work of that same integrated inspection team he headed which had returned from the battalion two and a half weeks ago.

We familiarized ourselves with the results of this team's work. In addition to Kondratov, it also included four experienced officers who inspected the state of discipline, duty and training in the battalion for a week. It would appear that profound conclusions and objective, principled evaluations would follow such a thorough inspection, but let's turn to the final report prepared by the team.

"In the summer training period," we read, "the commanders and political workers did specific work to strengthen military discipline. There have been positive changes..." It seemed strange: On what basis did the inspectors make a conclusion about positive changes? There should have been mention here of the opposite. The fact is, as should have been expected, the natural result of the cover-up had been such an increase in violations that they already were difficult to conceal. Even according to the filtered summaries, the number of violations in July, for example, was noticeably higher than in the previous months. The nature of infractions also is not comforting. Perhaps, knowing the true value of these summaries, the inspectors didn't refer to them? But then it is generally unclear as to what data they were guided by, because had they delved deeper into the real state of affairs and evaluated everything exactly, the conclusions hardly would have been positive, as they had written. In addition to those we already identified and named, they would have found other deficiencies. For example, they surely would have noticed the connection between poor discipline and lack of execution with the servicing of equipment, performance of guard duty, and service of the daily detail...

We again recalled how, during our work in that same battalion, we had inquired about violations called "nonperformance of YeKF." "What kind of abbreviation is this?" we asked, dwelling on Sr Lt S. Kushnarev's record of service card.

"Daily check of equipment functioning," explained Maj Svinarenko.

"But this is a gross violation by any laws!"

"Any trifle can't be considered gross," said our companion, not agreeing with us.

We introduced ourselves to Kushnarev and elicited details.

"Training had begun," he said. "At the command I turned on the power supply unit. It didn't start, since I hadn't checked the storage batteries prior to that. They had run down."
There it was: the equipment had malfunctioned and this, it turns out, is the "trifle" which the inspectors didn't see. They registered only what was on the surface: no visual agitation, guidance documents on discipline are not signed out, and so on. There was not even a hint of a detailed, comprehensive analysis.

The inspectors treated the evaluation of troop duty with even greater carelessness, limiting themselves only to a few comments. "Why discuss this service in detail in the report each time?" unit commander Col Kachmarik would say later. This was strange to hear from the lips of a commander, the more so as matters concerning troop duty in the battalion were far from satisfactory. There was an instance where Pvt N. Dmitruk left the patrol route without authorization. Two days later a sensational unpleasant incident occurred here because of Pvt D. Aliyev's deviation from the route, and Pvt Yu. Melnikov deviated from the route a day later. Were conclusions drawn from this "bouquet" of flagrant violations? Obviously not, if the commander himself believes that it is not mandatory that he be given a guard duty report.

Meanwhile, eyewash as a "convenient" and generally uncensored "method" here already is being used in evaluating combat training results as well. Let's refer just to the following example. A tactical exercise was conducted during that same inspection. So many deficiencies were identified that just enumerating them would take up a great deal of space. In particular, the subordinates of Sr Lt S. Kolobukhov had unserviceable equipment, and the communicators were sending and receiving the signal such that Maj Nikitin could in no way understand it. Just what was the reaction of the inspectors to those and other deficiencies? "The personnel's actions in the tactical exercise are evaluated as good." That's how!

"The work was conducted normally according to control objectives," said Maj V. Mitkov, one of the commission members, "parrying" our arguments.

But the fact is that in its concept the exercise included many other missions which were accomplished with poor results. For example, the communicators' gross errors were a very major deficiency.

"Well, how is it you don't understand that we greatly complicated their task: instead of figures we gave letters," declared Mitkov, although his argument doesn't stand up to criticism. A communicator is obligated to work both with letter and figure texts.

Unit commander Col Kachmarik intervened in our conversation and said that we shouldn't argue as he had not yet approved the grade. He would study the report and give an answer tomorrow. He said this as if it was a matter of a very ordinary incident. But the incident was an uncommon one, as the saying goes: two and a half weeks had gone by since the day of what was considered in unit headquarters as an authoritative inspection, and the commander and his deputies had not yet taken an interest in its results!
Col I. Miftakhov studied the report at my request. His opinion was that the
grade was given under an incorrect methodology and didn't conform to the con-
tent of the report. It was inflated.

"In that case let's stipulate that a 'four' was given only for tracking tar-
gets," insisted Maj Mitkov.

Which means it is an ingrained habit!
CRITIQUE OF ARM-CHAIR OFFICERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Oct 85 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col V. Bogdanovskiy, Red Banner
Carpathian Military District: "When Efficiency is Lacking: Pledge Fulfillment
Under Strict Control"]

[Text] The company commanded by Maj N. Miklush lost its outstanding title in
the winter training period. That was when serious omissions were uncovered
in the organization of training and socialist competition and in the resolu-
tion of problems of strengthening military discipline in some other subunits
of the separate flightline maintenance battalion (OBATO). This was particu-
larly true in the subunits commanded by officers N. Leshchuk and I. Zakharov.

Just what did the battalion commander and his deputies do to keep the same
thing from happening in the summer training period? What was the battalion
staff officers' personal contribution toward fulfilling combat and political
training plans and the competition pledges? I expected to hear answers to
these questions at a report-election party meeting of the battalion headquar-
ters primary party organization, but there was no fundamental, objective
assessment of what had been done in the party members' statements. On the
other hand, there was much general discourse to the effect that they had to
"mobilize efforts" and "perform certain work" in order to return the batta-
lion's lost position. But there was not a word of reproach addressed to those
party members who contributed to the loss of position. "Objective" diffi-
culties which allegedly hamper thoughtful organization of the training and
indoctrination process in the companies and platoons were named as the basic
culprits.

Meanwhile, the facts convincingly indicate the opposite. All the trouble
here stems primarily from the fact that the battalion commander and certain
staff officers were performing the duties assigned them out of inertia, as it
were, without initiative, activeness, efficiency or imagination. They thus
set a negative example for subordinates, so that today battalion commander Lt
Col G. Gurtovyy, chief of staff Maj V. Kombarov, and battalion party bureau
secretary Capt M. Belanov complain in vain about "objective" difficulties and
about the fact that some company and platoon commanders allegedly did not
show proper execution or give their utmost in combat training and so the bat-
talion's results were below those promised. Here is where the officers in
charge above all should have placed strict demands on themselves and made a more principled assessment of the reasons for the existing situation.

One of the basic reasons for the battalion not fulfilling some points of socialist pledges was the armchair work style of many headquarters officers, a style permeated by formalism. Here is one example.

It was after the party meeting that I visited the company where Lt A. Khunin was acting commander. I inquired about fulfillment of the training plan and individual pledges in recent days, but unfortunately there was not even a class schedule here.

"We are preparing it and will post it soon," Lt Khunin hastened to say.

It was clear without a word being spoken that since there was no schedule, there also were no classes. It turns out that the staff officers didn't know about this; they simply were too busy to take an interest in the company personnel's life. But this company is not miles and miles away from the headquarters offices; it is one story higher in the very same building.

I had occasion to visit a classroom where a training course was being given for future hot air blower operators. The training process was not properly organized here. One of the privates was reading a manual on the hot air blower's design while the others were writing it down. In ten days of the course the future specialists had summarized 3-4 pages each and the battalion commander and other staff officers were viewing all this calmly.

In studying the accounting documents, I saw that staff officers visit the subunits very rarely, they don't know the true state of affairs and they don't give company officers specific assistance. Maj A. Chechurin, the battalion commander's political deputy, and Sr Lt S. Pavlov, the Komsoomol organization secretary, had several talks with the aviators during the year, but the other party members in charge just did not find time even for this.

That attitude toward the job on the part of the party members was no secret for battalion party bureau secretary Capt N. Belanov. I believe it was not excessive modesty and the fear of undermining the staff officers' authority, but lack of principle which kept him from placing proper demands on them for shirking the fulfillment of party assignments and official duty and for omissions in organizing combat training and socialist competition.

As mentioned earlier, the inert attitude by staff officers of the separate flightline maintenance battalion toward organizing socialist competition and their lack of strict exactingness reduced the personnel's activeness.

"We are taking necessary steps to change the situation for the better," said Maj Chechurin.

But the facts indicate for now that these are just words. There is no reason for optimism in the battalion. Scheduled classes in the company commanded by Maj N. Miklush continue to be held only occasionally,
indoctrinational work is not properly organized, and the aviators have a very vague impression about the fulfillment of their pledges. In talking with me, privates V. Mameko and A. Repatatskiy and many others honestly admitted that they didn't remember what pledges they had made and with whom they were competing, since there was practically no publicity of the socialist competition. There was not a single photograph of persons ahead in training in the company reading room, nor was there a display reflecting training results and progress in pledge fulfillment.

The training year is coming to a close. In the time remaining it is difficult to fundamentally change the state of affairs in the lagging battalion, but much can still be accomplished. Above all, the staff officers and battalion party organization must look into the mistakes made in a businesslike, self-critical manner, otherwise the "store" of deficiencies and incomplete work will obstruct the growth in combat training for aviators of the support subunit in the future training year as well.

6904
CSO: 1801/38
EARLY CAREERS, SHORTCOMINGS OF THREE LIUTENANTS REVIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by V. Zhitarenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Five Years Later"; passage enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

What has been the fate of the 1980 graduates of the Moscow Higher Command Academy for Road and Engineering Troops?

In the Nth Civil Defense Unit of the Moscow Military District, I recently heard about the "unfulfilled" service of three senior lieutenants: V. Makarov, A. Mel'nick and I. Skormin. All three are still platoon commanders although 5 years have passed since they graduated from the military academy—a time that is fully sufficient to master their responsibilities and sufficiently demonstrate their professional abilities and possibly reach a higher position.

What interfered with the officers in achieving this? The senior lieutenants' opinion is firm and unanimous: It is common bad luck.

"It is bad luck," emphasized Sr Lt Mel'nick during our visit. "The work in civil defense units is such that there is nothing in which you can prove yourself special, and therefore young officers in the service progress very slowly.

It turned out, however, that this unit had three other 1980 graduates of the Moscow Higher Command Academy for Road and Engineering Troops: Senior Lieutenants O. Berestov, S. Shirokov and V. Marmuzov. All three had long ago been promoted. Berestov had earned the medal "For Combat Merit." And the other two officers had achieved high indicators in training and service. Shirokov was elected secretary of the battalion party organization, Marmuzov has proven to be an inquisitive innovator whose endeavors have made possible longer periods of time between repairs for equipment being used.

Makarov, Mel'nick and Skormin cannot boast of anything similar. The opinion of not only their superiors but also the majority of their colleagues is this: the officers do not exhibit any special diligence in service. Makarov, for instance, is lacking in initiative; he has only a weak mastery of the
platoon's equipment. Mel'nick avoids individual work with the people and is passive in the collective's social life. Skormin allows rudeness in his relationships with subordinates and does not always show concern for them.

"And what else could you expect from the characteristics of platoon commanders who had been held 5 years in the 'black body'?' Mel'nick said when I passed on the opinion of the officers from their superiors. "All the graduates have this kind of bad luck. The majority are still sitting in the first officer's position. And in a platoon, how much can you demonstrate of your abilities? And this is not even considering the perspective of growth. There are only a few individuals who are lucky like Berestov, Shirokov and Marmuzov."

An unlucky class? Could this be true? We decided to find out the fate of the 1980 graduates of the Moscow Higher Command Academy for Road and Engineering Troops: How did it turn out; what was their fate, and what had they achieved in 5 years of officer service?

At first it was thought that getting interesting information at the academy itself would be a hopeless exercise: Fate could have taken an officer anywhere over 5 years; and it would be very difficult to pick up his track and find out how things had turned out with him; in what he had succeeded and in what he had shown weaknesses. It turned out we were wrong. At the academy they intently follow their alumni and scrupulously analyze their service.

"The class was strong," the academy political section chief, Col Yu. Davy dov, recalled about the 1980 graduates. "Among the officers from that class there are already a unit deputy commander, a battalion commander and 16 company commanders..."

So in 5 years a battalion commander and a unit deputy commander! We agree that such rapid advancement is possible only when the officer has outstanding characteristics which he is able to use in the best manner in the interest of his service. And the given case only confirmed this fact. Nonetheless, it is necessary to add this disclaimer: In the upward movement of these officers a coincidence—in the situation which was very advantageous to them played a major role. And for this reason we have not given their names.

But it is useful to name six academy graduates. Senior Lieutenants A. Bobotov, V. Grinevich, V. Kiselev, V. Kruglyak, A. Feoktistov and V. Serdyuk are deputy battalion commanders and chiefs of staff. These are officers who have also outdistanced their classmates in all categories: They have achieved outstanding results in combat training and competition, gained firm authority and have already achieved their second promotion in their service. And this was made possible not by luck but by steadfastness and daily work showing initiative and creativity.

There are three classmates in one pre-Baltic Military District unit—Senior Lieutenants V. Grinevich, A. Feoktistov and S. Prygayev. A battalion chief of staff, a battalion deputy commander for technical affairs and a platoon commander. You can imagine how the last feels about himself—since many know that all three were classmates. But on what can he blame this? On fate?
Hardly, and if he is resentful then shouldn't it be toward himself and his relationship to service.

Here is something very noteworthy. According to the recollection of the commanders and instructors who well remember Grinevich, Feoktistov and Prygayev as classmates, all three were approximately equal at the academy. Grinevich had success in many disciplines and clearly excelled in displaying the qualities of command. But he was capricious, touchy and even hot-tempered. In class, Feoktistov was significantly behind his comrade although he had a great love for equipment and had a rare capacity for work and purposefulness. Persistent work on oneself in combination with the influence of caring and precise commanders helped this officer to avoid deficiencies. And with Prygayev this did not happen. It is strange that at the academy he was the best of the three. Industrious, energetic, has qualities of command, loves to work with people—this is how he was characterized in his graduation evaluation. It only contained one negative feature: requires self-control. And this is how he is characterized: little initiative, knowledge gained has not been completed, does not have the necessary responsibility toward accomplishing duties.

It would seem that he achieved much at the academy, and in his time as a lieutenant only perfected the knowledge and the experience gained at the academy. No, his growth as an officer was halted. More than that, he started on the road to destroying discipline, what affected him? This sounds paradoxical but his previous independence hurt him. We remember the line of the graduation evaluation: Requires self-control. It was addressed to Prygayev himself. You are your own master. You are committed to subordinate your every action in the interest of your profession and the service. The one who does not realize this, for whom the idea of independence is akin to the capability to do as he likes to waste time, is the one who never achieves anything in service.

Prygayev did not heed this healthy advice. There was much work which had to be done in order to improve himself and to win authority.

Senior Lieutenant Ye. Nikolayev had a much more complex position. Nikolayev was also a platoon commander serving in the Central Asian Military District. It would be more accurate to say that he is still in the army. For, in the opinion of his unit commander, he has no special value to the army." He is indifferent to the accomplishment of his service responsibilities, rude to his subordinates and often violates discipline. Nikolayev has been excluded from Komsomol membership. An officer's Court of Honor has been called four times to examine gross violations committed by him.

It is necessary, unfortunately, to note that commanders are expressing relatively serious claims against several other academy graduates: Senior Lieutenants S. Tkachenko, A. Sheykin, V. Sedov and Yu. Dan'kin. All of these are also from the Central Asian Military District. Several officers, with whom we met in the process of the work on these notes, discovered in a given situation a fundamental law: They say that life in isolated garrisons lack good conditions for cultural rest and relaxation. It is not surprising that individual officers seek diversions of a doubtful character.
What is the purpose of this? Senior Lieutenant S. Bogunov, also of the Central Asian Military District, having been assigned to an isolated garrison, did not wait for someone else to organize a good leisure-time program for the young officers. Many of the problems arising on this level were taken voluntarily upon his shoulders. And from his example the energy was spread to his colleagues.

In the Far East Military District Senior Lieutenant A. Voronin commands a company. They are not, as they say, spoiled by the theater. But his subunit has many times been included among the avant-garde and been awarded the medal "For Combat Merit." Senior Lieutenants K. Baklan and S. Fadeyev also successfully command companies here.

There is no reason to say much about the conditions of service in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan—the harsh and severe conditions, and tough service. But Senior Lieutenant K. Kozlov, holder of two state awards, is a model company commander. Company commanders; Senior Lieutenants S. Borisov, V. Bol’shoy, A. Kolbasin and A. Filatov; assistant unit chiefs of staff; Senior Lieutenants V. Zaichenko and A. Sokolov; unit motor chief Senior Lieutenant S. Lunin and others are fulfilling their internationalist duty in an exemplary manner in Afghanistan.

An unlucky class...as we have seen, this has been of no consequence to the 1980 graduates.

Thus, 5 years of officer service have passed. Ahead there is a time of maturity. And here, it seems very timely to attempt to look into the future and envision what the present senior lieutenants will be like after another 5 years. Will they be unit chiefs of staffs and commanders? Nothing is impossible. However, this is not in the realm of supposition. It is more important to answer the question: What kind of senior lieutenants will they be today? Are they prepared to march in time and successfully accomplish missions in the conditions of accelerated scientific and technical progress? Primarily the officers themselves must answer all these questions. The achievements which would be the most significant for them are those at the present stage. They are faced with doing much more. The questions of combat training intensification, the innovative use of duty hours and inculcating the most advanced experience into practice with each passing day become even more acute and require intense creative work, perfection in working style and precise organization from each. It is necessary to be constantly ready for this. High final results are achieved by those who know everything very well, who are directed toward the greatest and most complex tasks and are ready to give their effort, knowledge and capability to them.

By the way, I wish to add that many of those about whom we have spoken in these remarks have recently been promoted to the next military rank.
LEGAL BENEFITS OF OFFICERS CALLED UP FROM RESERVES

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 8 Sep 85 p 4

Article by Legal Service reserve Col D. Kashirin, legal consultant for Krasnaya Zvezda: "Answers to Readers' Questions--Legal Information"/

What housing benefits are available for officers called up from the reserves for two or three years? What living space are they entitled to while on active duty and after transfer back to the reserve? The questions are posed by officers P. Ufimtsev, N. Viktorov and others.

In accordance with prevailing statutes, officers called up from the reserves to active military duty for two or three years and their families retain their entitlement to the living space they occupied before the call up. They also cannot be excluded from waiting lists for a place to live.

These officers and their families are provided dormitory facilities or official living quarters by the military unit while on active military duty. After release from active duty they are provided living space on the same basis as civilians.

Officers V. Grishchenko and A. Yemalyanov, called up from the reserves, wish to inquire on their eligibility for scheduled leave in the year of call up and in the year of release from active military duty.

Officers called up from the reserves are entitled to scheduled leave in the year of call up with leave reckoned in relation to the time from the day of call up to the end of the year, at the rate of two and one-half days of leave for each full month of service. In addition, military travel documents issued for a round trip to the place of leave and travel time in excess of leave time are allowable only for officers entitled to leave of 10 days and longer. Leave of less than ten-day duration, if so requested by the officer, may be added to leave scheduled for the following year.
Similarly, leave in the year of release from active duty is granted concurrently with release from duty. In those cases where officers called up from the reserves to serve for two or three years complete their turn of service and are slated for release in December, scheduled leave of 30 days may be granted in any month of the year of release from duty.

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CRITIQUE OF FORMALISM IN STATISTICAL REPORTING ON INNOVATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 85 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank A. Alekseyev: "What Is Hidden Behind the Facade of Figures"]

[Text] When the results of technical creativity are summed up in one unit or another, as a rule there is no shortcoming in the figures. The accounting reports give the number of innovation suggestions submitted, the number of certificates issued, the percentage of increase.... But then the final results of the innovational labor at times do not cause pleasure. And you begin to ponder: what are these figures made up from, how do word and deed match one another? And aren't more losses than acquisitions concealed behind all this?

You talk with people, become interested in their concerns, and the true picture which is hidden behind the facade of "clear" figures surfaces. It often also happens, unfortunately, that the bold thought of the innovator runs up against the blank wall of formalism and callousness. They say, you thought it up yourself, introduce it yourself. And so it is necessary to "punch through" requisitions for materials, prove the necessity for the introduction, and expend time and nerves. While you introduce one innovation, according to the plan the next one should already be introduced. Times are adjusted. And, as a result, the quality of the innovation suggestions suffers and their number decreases as well. But the numerical indicator is important: one can be reproached for non-accomplishment of the plans for technical creativity. And then the easiest path is chosen—from year to year the very same paragraphs which are very similar to one another appear in the plans. It appears that everyone is satisfied: the plan is accomplished and innovational work "is in full swing." Individual leaders of commissions on invention do not miss the opportunity to "shine" with figures although there is no matter as such.

Or take the following fact. During a year, the commission on invention declined 28 applications, and 22 were returned for modification because they did not contain the proper novelty and usefulness. On the one hand, it is as if everything is normal and in the spirit of the times—the commission members became more competent, more devoted to principle, and more exacting in evaluating innovation suggestions which have been submitted. And on the other, the approach of the authors of these "innovations" to an understanding of their task is too simplified, too light. The question arises: "And where did those who provided the conclusion and prepared and presented these applications look?" It turns out that the
work was done to no purpose. But you see, time and materials were expended on it. And in addition, the moral aspect of the matter should be kept in mind and the losses which all this inflicts on those who are only becoming accustomed to technical creativity should be understood. I have in mind young officers and warrant officers [praporshchik and michman]. But you see, at a conference in the CPSU Central Committee on questions of accelerating scientific and technical progress it was stressed that "we expect especially much from the youth, from its energy and its inquisitive mind, and its interest in everything new and advanced."

And another aspect of this problem. The mobilizing role played by socialist competition in raising technical creativity is known. The final results depend on a serious approach to the adoption of obligations and on the monitoring of their accomplishment. Here is a specific example. Warrant Officers [michman] M. Vasilyev, O. Kulikov, and several other innovators, being masters of military affairs, assumed the obligations to submit and introduce altogether only one or two innovation suggestions each. On a check, it turned out that they did not accomplish this, either. As a result, the subunit where they serve and which formerly had occupied first place in the unit in technical creativity was moved back to last place. And here, this caused no serious alarm among the communists of the subunit.

At times one can hear: "There is no time to engage in innovation work, current details ate it up." Or: "We have no capabilities for this," and other justification. Unquestionably each officer and warrant officer has many direct service duties, and it happens that "they don't get to" technical creativity. Combat training is an interesting and varied process. But here is what for become thoughtful. When conducting lessons in specialties with the personnel and when teaching the fine points of work with combat equipment, one way or another the commander must work with graphic aids, working models, and simulators, and when servicing the equipment—with instruments, accessories, and tools. Are they good, convenient, and efficient in everything? So it is here that we should direct creative thought toward the improvement of various designs and accessories and the creation of the necessary simulators and work sites to improve the practical instruction of subordinates.

It would appear, and this is obvious, that there is nothing to prove here, either. But individual officers and warrant officers avoid the solution of these problems. Why think up something, introduce it, obtain materials, spend time? For it is more peaceful to live without this. If they "apply pressure from above," we'll give them the required number of suggestions. Well, do not judge us too severely for quality, they say, I cannot propose anything better; this is how individual comrades reason sometimes. And they are not made answerable but are left alone.

In the fleet there are many enthusiasts of technical creativity who are talented, energetic, and searching. The trouble is something else: at times some "pull two or three along behind them" while others hide behind their backs. This can pertain with full justification to the subunits commanded by Captains 3d Rank V. Studenovskiy and A. Kontarero. Here the commanders themselves accomplished and even overaccomplished obligations for the creation and introduction of technical innovations and submitting innovation suggestions. But their subordinates do not always follow their example.

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But when the reasons for the sluggishness of individual comrades were studied thoroughly, things started to move. Captain-Lieutenant B. Lopushnyan and Warrant Officer V. Trenikhin proposed a new system to monitor the entry of moisture into the fuel pipeline. Its introduction permitted preventing the breakdown of a diesel force pump and has a great technical impact.

And here is one more example. Captain-Lieutenant S. Gurin developed a simulator for working out the actions of personnel in damaged compartments of a submarine. It permits training seamen at several work sites simultaneously and frees the instructor from the need constantly to observe the actions of the personnel.

Practice shows: where commanders set the tone in technical creativity and involve all personnel in it, relying on the party and Komsomol organizations, the most rapid introduction of useful innovations is achieved and the quality of combat training is higher there. And conversely, in those places where there is no activity in technical creativity and where people do not worry about this sector of service activity, as a rule they do not shine in other indices in combat training.

6367
CSO: 1801/14
LETTERS TO KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITOR, RESPONSES

Complaints About Unnecessary Paperwork

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Sep 85 p 2

[Letter to editors from Sr Lt E. Chemerskiy, Red Banner Siberian Military District, under the rubric "The Newspaper Spoke Out and the Reader Continues the Discussion": "Against Paperpushing: Along the Path of Least Resistance"]

[Text] Responses to Maj S. Levitskiy's article entitled "Why is Formalism Tenacious?", KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 Jul 85.

Dear editors!

We discussed the article "Why is Formalism Tenacious?" with subunit commander Capt A. Ovspyannikov, with his deputies majors V. Gordin and N. Shcherban, and then with all the officers. We will note that the newspaper hit the bull's-eye. Here are the thoughts I would like to impart concerning the paperpushing and formalism castigated in the article.

I have been serving a relatively short time as an officer; this is the fifth year. I now am deputy subunit commander. I try to give my all to the service. That is how my father, a frontlinesman, taught me and that is what party duty commands, but I can't reconcile myself with the "burdens" of paperpushing. The article states it correctly: if an officer were to write everything required of him at times, then another two days have to be added. In all my career I have listened to hundreds of complaints by comrades about the great amount of paperwork of little use which takes them away from more important matters, and above all from lively work with people.

By common consent, some officers take the path of least resistance—they make formal entries about work they have done—in full view of everyone (isn't that what Gds Capt A. Omelyanchuk did?). If the papers are in place, that means for inspectors that we have everything in order. At times no one is interested in whether or not they were able to carry out measures and with what quality.

Paperpushing has been cut back of late, especially after the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, but it still continues to roll down the beaten path, albeit at lesser speed. There are moments when I would like to toss
the papers aside, go to the people and work with them, but I sit for a half-
day or even an entire, specially allocated "bureaucrat's" day, if it can be 
thus expressed.

There was also the following incident. Sr Lt M. Orlov would spend all duty 
time in working with people and proved to be an officer capable of maintain-
ing firm regulation order, and a thoughtful indoctrinator. A commission from 
higher headquarters arrived in the unit, however, and gave Orlov a firm 
skolding for the absence of certain accounting papers. The officer altered 
his work style: he sat down to the papers and engaged in a "search" for 
unusual decorative material for visual agitation. After the next inspection 
Orlov's experience soon was recommended to be generalized as foremost, but we 
saw for our part that the intensity of indoctrinational work in the subunit 
had fallen off.

What are the papers which hamper work? Well, they are those described in the 
article "Why is Formalism Tenacious?" I will add to this the plans for talks 
with the personnel and all kinds of detailed plans for conventional current 
activities which duplicate each other.

Just how can we fight paperpushing and formalism more effectively, and not 
just in socialist competition? Perhaps it would be useful to stop and look 
around, as they say, and study which of the routine documents are actually 
necessary and which ones we can do without.

Unanswered Questions about Paperwork

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Sep 85 p 2

[Letter to editors from Capt N. Petrenko, Order of Lenin Moscow Military Dis-
trict, under the rubric "The Newspaper Spoke Out and the Reader Continues the 
Discussion": "Against Paperpushing: Many Questions Remained"]

[Text] Responses to Maj S. Levitskiy's article entitled 
"Why is Formalism Tenacious?", KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 Jul 85.

I didn't like the article entitled "Why is Formalism Tenacious?" No, the 
question it touched on was of vital importance, but in my opinion the author 
didn't delve into it completely.

Why not have a look at the state of affairs in other squadrons involving that 
same accountability in documentation? Was it really only Gds Capt A. 
Omelyanchuk who entered nonexistent classes in the log? How did higher head-
quarters react to the aviators' desire to "fulfill the unfulfillable"? Where 
did the need arise to conduct such a number of classes? Who requires the 
cumbersome accounting? Perhaps it is necessary?

Or take the question of visual agitation. Why not clarify where and how the 
materials were obtained for it? It is no secret that the methods of "obtain-
ing" them sometimes are identically extravagant and immoral. How can we get 
rid of trumpery and sham? This is what I would like to read about.
Paperwork Redundancy Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Sep 85 p 2

[Letter to editors from Capt V. Gubin, unit assistant chief of staff, Red
Banner Kiev Military District, under the rubric "The Newspaper Spoke Out and
the Reader Continues the Discussion"; "Against Paperpushing: Unnecessary
Duplication"]

[Text] Responses to Maj S. Levitskiy's article entitled
"Why is Formalism Tenacious?", KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 31 Jul 85.

When people speak about paperpushing and formalism, they have to be more spe-
cific in showing their substance. Why in fact are many documents produced on
which much duty time is wasted making them out? Well, because some of them
duplicate each other. I believe it is very easy to demonstrate that they are
of little use. I will give specific examples.

We compile the Plan for Remediying Deficiencies in Inspections and Training
Sessions on the staff. Later all this material "migrates" to the commander's
report on remediying those same deficiencies. Is it possible to place every-
thing in a single document? I think so.

Or take the accountability for combat training and socialist competition. In
addition to the group classroom log where class results are recorded we have
another five similar report forms. We conscientiously make them up and for
some reason keep them.

Antidrinking Campaign Deficiencies Punished

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Sep 85 p 3

[Article under rubric "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage": "The Fruits of
Indifference"]

[Text] That was the title of a report published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on
18 August. It told of serious deficiencies in the work of a military con-
struction detachment's command element and party organization in intensifying
the campaign against drunkeness.

Maj Gen Yu. Shirinskiy, deputy chief of the Central Asian Military District
Political Directorate, informed the editors that the facts stated in the
article had been fully confirmed.

The report was discussed at a conference of the district construction direc-
torate's command and political personnel, as well as at a party meeting in
the military construction detachment and at a party committee session of the
UNR [work supervisor's office] where Col A. Smirnov is the chief.

Military construction detachment commander Maj V. Musiyenko and his political
deputy Capt Yu. Kovalchuk were given severe reprimands by the UNR party
committee for serious omissions in the work of maintaining regulation order and strengthening military discipline. Detachment party organization secretary Maj Yu. Rubanov was given strict instructions about poor organizational work by the party bureau in intensifying the campaign against drunkenness.

WO [Praporshchik] Yu. Lankov was expelled from the CPSU and is being recommended for release from the USSR Armed Forces for systematic abuse of liquor and gross violation of discipline.

The district construction directorate political department and the party committees of military construction organizations have been told to make a more thorough analysis of the status of military and labor discipline and to improve the effectiveness of political indoctrination work being done in the units.

September Mail Summarized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Oct 85 p 2

[Article: "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Mailbag"]

[Text] The editors received 8,012 letters in September, 549 of which were published. There were 389 responses to the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA coverage.

Letters continued to be received in September in which readers approve our party's strategic policy of accelerating national social-economic development, and they express their desire to strengthen the Motherland's might even more vigorously.

The first month of fall was filled with renowned military and labor affairs of Army and Navy personnel. The editors' mail reflected the highly dynamic nature of these strenuous days. It contains reports on tactical exercises, flight operations and naval cruises on the eve of the training year's finale, and news about servicemen's participation in the harvest. Each such letter invariably emphasizes that military collectives are dedicating their successes and achievements to the upcoming 27th CPSU Congress.

"Field firings are a very important point in precongress socialist competition for air defense personnel," writes Col A. Nekrashevich from the Far East Military District. "This year the personnel of the surface-to-air missile battalion in which Maj A. Anpilov serves had to function at the range under difficult, near-combat conditions. Nevertheless, the missilemen shot down a radio-controlled maneuvering target with the first attack, with one missile. This subunit's personnel are returning from the range with an outstanding grade for the fifth time in a row now."

Sr Lt A. Volkov from the Turkestan Military District, Capt 3d Rank A. Savitskiy from the Black Sea Fleet, Lt Col V. Baranov from the Moscow Air Defense District, Lt Col Yu. Muratov from the Northern Group of Forces and many others wrote to the editors about the successes in combat and political
training and the successful course of socialist competition in their military collectives. There is a special recognition of the vanguard role of party members and their personal responsibility for results of the subunits' combat training. In emphasizing this, for example, Maj. A. Lukashov from the Carpathian Military District writes about successful actions by a helicopter crew headed by Capt. N. Senotov in a recent tactical flying exercise.

Many letters arrived in September in which readers tell about the campaign for effective use of modern training equipment and weapons. "Cadets of the Leningrad Higher Military Topographic Command School imeni Army Gen. A. I. Antonov are actively learning the 'language' of intercourse with electronic computer technology this year," writes Maj. A. Blinov from Leningrad. "A new electronics complex has been set up here in the laboratory directed by Col. V. Derevyanko. It allowed an increase in training quality, an expansion in the engineering outlook of future topographic officers, and a substantial saving of training time and electrical energy."

The letters of many other readers of ours also are devoted to questions of thrift and economy. For example, Maj. V. Serikov reports from the Siberian Military District that this year their regiment engaged in three days of combat training on the diesel fuel saved. A barrier has been set up here against losses of fuels and lubricants, and strict accounting and control have been established over their expenditure. All BMP [infantry fighting vehicle] and transport vehicle driver-mechanics have personal thrift cards.

Our people are engaged in peaceful creative labor, the conclusion of the 11th Five-Year Plan. At the same time, Soviet citizens are keeping a close watch on the development of the international situation and on intrigues of the enemies of peace. All of them fervently support the peaceloving foreign policy of our party and Soviet government and call for a strengthening of our national defenses with shock labor and valorous service.

The September mailbag contained many letters in which readers complained of unsatisfactory preparation of official buildings and housing for winter. Building roofs and heating systems are still unserviceable and there is no hot water and sometimes even cold water on a number of military posts. The authors of the complaints believe that these deficiencies hardly will be remedied before the cold weather and they ask the editors for help. We sent the letters to appropriate echelons for steps to be taken and hope to receive detailed responses to the questions raised by readers.

In September the editors received 593 reports on steps taken in response to letters sent out to be looked into.
Abandoned Plant Recycling Urged

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Oct 85 p 2

[Letter to editors from Lt Col V. Ivanovskiy: "The Plant was Turned Over to the Scrap Heap"

[Text] Dear editors! I was prompted to turn to you by what are in my view rather strange things occurring not far from our home. A reinforced concrete articles plant headed by Lt Col V. Sidorov was located here for many years. It was closed in January 1985 since, as I was told, the production spaces and equipment of the enterprise had served their time. Well, perhaps that's so.

But there is something else I don't understand. Dismantling of the process lines is going extremely slowly, and at times people simply barbarously break up and destroy everything. How many still useful structures and parts remain in a plant, even though it is already closed and obsolete? For example, there are the electric motors from cranes and mixers from furnaces and boilers... All kinds of things that a good proprietor never wastes. The fact is that hundreds of tons of metal are senselessly lying around, with no one hastening to take it to the secondary raw materials receiving points.

There is practically no security of the premises and shifty people who love things just lying around are pilfering everything literally down to the last small stone or brick. To add to all this, there was a recent fire at the former plant in which many physical assets were irretrievably lost. I don't know whether or not it is true, but people say that no one bore responsibility for this negligence.

Now there is an active campaign extending everywhere to thriftyly save and sensibly use everything still fit to use, including secondary resources. But here an entire plant was written off "for scrap" and all of it was sent to the dump, as they say. Can we really treat the people's property this way?

Fire Safety Deficiencies Corrected

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Oct 85 p 2

[Article under the rubric "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage": "Fire"

[Text] That was the title under which a report by Maj N. Medvedev was published on 21 August concerning the irresponsible attitude toward fire safety rules by appointed persons in a number of units of the Ural Military District which led to a great loss.

As the editors were informed by Maj Gen P. Turla, deputy district commander for rear, chief of district rear, and by Col V. Bezmenov, deputy district commander for construction and troop billeting, the cited facts did occur. The newspaper's coverage was discussed with the district's leading command and political personnel. Maj Gen O. Vishnevskiy and Col Yu. Terletskiy were given strict instructions about the poor status of fire protection. Lt Col
I. Khalimon was reprimanded. One-third of a month's pay was withheld from Capt V. Pestryachev and Maj S. Kovalchuk. Classes were held with the persons responsible for fire safety in district units and establishments.

All posts took inventory, during which three bathhouse-saunas were found which had been built without planning estimates and which were not on the accounts of the rayon KED's [billeting units]. These bathhouses were picked up on the books. Persons were appointed to be responsible for their proper operation in order to improve personnel services.

Personnel Services Improved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Oct 85 p 2

[Article under the rubric "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage": "Improve Troop Everyday Life"]

[Text] That was the title of a lead article published on 1 August which noted in part deficiencies in the organization of troop everyday life in the Turkestan Military District. As the editors were told by Maj Gen M. Bevz, the questions of arranging the everyday life and leisure time of servicemen and members of their families became an object of consideration at a district military council session. Special attention was given to improving the organization of meals and bath and laundry services for servicemen, and to providing prompt medical assistance.

Corrective Action Falsely Reported

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Oct 85 p 2

[Letter to editors by Lt V. Statsenko, Komsomol committee secretary, and article responding to it by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Maj O. Faltieiev: "Conforming to Eyewash: Returning to a Previous Article"]

[Text] Dear editors! Combat and political training now is practically curtailed and the daily routine is regularly violated. The personnel cut grass and travel to the kolkhoz to earn money during training time. First sergeant Sr WO [Praporshchik] K. Kostenko sells hay and gets drunk on the money he makes...

We took this through channels, but no steps are being taken.

When Lt V. Statsenko wrote this letter the battalion [divizion] was in the process of haymaking. The personnel mowed and stacked from morning to night although the class schedule signed by the commander, Capt V. Strugov, continued to be posted in a prominent place. In a later inspection it would be learned that combat training logs and lesson plans were kept just as neatly. In short, if one were to believe the documents, strenuous combat training was in full swing in the subunit.
"The grass could wither... This time we had to shift certain classes to other days," explained Capt Strugov.

Perhaps the instance of such eyewash is really an isolated one, and the letter's author exaggerated? But let's hear what the soldiers say.

Radar chief Sr Sgt A. Levchenko: "Our classes were disrupted all summer. Not even physical training or political information sessions were held... Most important was to carry out the volume of economic work."

Driver Pvt V. Ovsyannikov: "We often traveled to the nearest kolkhoz to earn money. Recently we worked the farm of brigade leader R. Imamulov."

Yes, that also happened. At that time Lt Statsenko was placed in charge of the group of soldiers. Without giving explanations, Capt Strugov ordered them to grab forks and get in the vehicle. "Imanulov will explain everything," he tossed out. The brigade leader assigned the task: to clear out his ram manure and load hay... And the soldiers had to master new duties. Later, after receiving two bags of potatoes for Capt Strugov for their work, they took them to his apartment.

It is said that you can't fight the facts. By the way, Capt Strugov doesn't deny them. He says only that he was prompted to extricate himself by the circumstances. He alleged that first the electric motor went haywire and could be rewound at the kolkhoz, then there was not enough combined fodder for the animals and the neighbors would help out now and then... Subunit party members repeatedly directed his attention to the inadmissibility of such abnormal relationships with kolkhoz officials, but he didn't heed the sensible words. Even after learning that a kolkhoz tractor was being refueled at the subunit's combat position and subunit first sergeant Sr WO K. Kostenko was selling hay, he simply brushed it aside. Capt Strugov realized that the first sergeant, whom he trusted with a great deal in managing the kitchen farm, was exceeding his authority, to put it mildly, but he preferred "not to resort to petty coddling."

Taking advantage of the lack of supervision on the commander's part, Sr WO Kostenko felt himself to have more and more freedom. He would shout at subordinates, appoint them to fatigue duties himself, and would be free and easy in the presence of young officers. Other warrant officers began to take the example from him.

The personnel's separation from classes, trips for paid work on the kolkhoz, and the drunkenness of some warrant officers became a commonplace phenomenon, which of course reflected on the soldiers' indicators in combat training: the subunit slipped to last place in socialist competition.

Just what was the position taken by the unit [chast'] and large unit [soyedineniye] command element with respect to all this?

Of course, the principal reason for that state of affairs lies in Capt Strugov's lack of principle and a proper sense of responsibility. But it
would appear that the roots of connivance lie in the fallacious practice of covering up deficiencies and of taking a light attitude toward remedying them which took shape here. This is an old, neglected illness.

A report entitled "With Tacit Consent" was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 15 January 1984 under the rubric "On the Heels of a Letter," in which battalion [divizion] commander Lt Col A. Kolmykov was criticized. He was rude to subordinates, abused his official position and took people away for fatigue duties.

We had to wait almost a half-year for an answer from the large unit. It finally came, signed by Officer Obelov. It stated that Lt Col Kolmykov had been cited for negligence of duty for his abuse official position, rudeness toward subordinates, and taking people away from classes. The party commission of the unit political department gave him a severe reprimand with an entry in his record...

As we see, serious steps were taken with respect to Lt Col Kolmykov and it was expected that this would serve as a good lesson for the officer, as well as for the unit as a whole. Soon, however, we again had to return to this disgraceful matter.

In December 1984 the editors received a letter in which Jr Sgt K. Salin and Pvt P. Dyzhev wrote: "Lt Col Kolmykov became our subunit commander in August 1984. Our routine and our military life changed for the worse with the new commander's appearance. There began to be constant reproaches, insults, and the belittling of personal dignity not only of privates, but also of the officers and warrant officers.

"We worked an entire summer to harvest hay, but it turned out that our work was in vain. A portion of this hay was sold on the side and the money made simply went into the commander's pocket..."

At that time Officer B. Obelov worked with our correspondent in checking out the facts, which were confirmed. Another article by the newspaper naturally suggested itself, this time about the poor effectiveness of steps taken to remedy deficiencies and that the response to the editors was written for form only... The political department chief fervently assured the journalist that this time the most decisive steps would be taken.

The correspondent had not yet returned to the editorial offices when a written report came from the political department with the already familiar signature. It stated: "Subunit commander Lt Col A. G. Kolmykov has been relieved of his position and assigned to a lower position." Other steps were reported.

Well then, as steps had been taken to remedy the deficiencies and keep them from being repeated in the future, the editors deemed another critical article to be inadvisable, for criticism is not an end in itself; the important matter is for it to facilitate a constructive resolution of problems.
But then came the third letter from that same large unit, and we saw that the deficiencies essentially were the very same: the personnel's separation from classes, abuse of official position by appointed persons... How could that happen? Why the poor effectiveness of the steps taken despite assurances by the chief of the political body?

It was learned during an investigation of the facts that the incident with Kolmykov just had not been publicized widely enough. Although the officer had been criticized, it was in private, so to speak, within a narrow circle. That same Capt Strugov, whose story was like a copy of the previous one, says: "I think they mentioned this once at a summation of training results, and I heard something of the details behind the scenes."

Kolmykov's performance appraisal signed by the unit commander also confirms the formal nature of the measures taken: "Conforms to the position held. At his personal request, it is best to appoint him to a position with a lesser amount of work for the good of the service." This was stated even more loyally in a representation signed 30 January 1985, from which it is apparent that Lt Col Kolmykov sent a request through channels for his transfer for further duty to a position involving a lesser amount of work because of his state of health.

Well now, in the response to the editors Kolmykov "was relieved of his position and assigned with a demotion," but in the documents it turns out that he "conforms to the position held" and was transferred to another at his request because of health... What is this? Eyewash? Irresponsibility? Probably both.

...When we talked with officers V. Pakhno and I. Shepeta, the superiors of officers Kolmykov and Strugov, and others in the unit headquarters they partially admitted their mistakes. One sensed from everything, however, that the officials did not have a deep understanding that they involuntarily promoted the abuses which occurred by their lack of principle, their desire not to air dirty linen, and at times by their protection.

And so just what can the editors and newspaper readers now expect? Another report about "remedying deficiencies" or effective steps actually taken?

Commander Continues Immoral Behavior

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Maj N. Medvedev under the rubric "Party Life: On the Heels of a Letter": "Deafness"]

[Text] Lt Col G. Avdeyev's face reflected a poorly concealed lack of understanding.

"What would you like?" he finally uttered. "Life is life."

He said this in connection with the circumstances under which Maj G. Bedunkевич, commander of a separate flightline maintenance battalion, received his latest promotion in rank.
"We were sorry for him. He shifted back and forth for almost a year. We reasoned that once he was promoted he would come to his senses."

The recommendation was drawn up with the most enthusiastic words and Bedunkevich became a lieutenant colonel three months ago. Despite the hopes of the chief of staff for the rear of Central Asian Military District Aviation, however, he didn't come to his senses.

One has a strange feeling in trying to grasp the meaning of the lines describing the officer: "Proved to be disciplined..." In fact, he took liberties, which later were the subject of discussion on post for a long while. "Exacting..." Well, this quality can't be taken away from Bedunkevich, but his exactingness most often developed into rudeness. "Honest..." But here too there are doubts, and one can be convinced of their grounds by visiting the military procurator's office.

To understand why such a discrepancy became possible, we have to return to June 1984, when the report entitled "With His Every Word and Deed" was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

It is with every word and deed that the authority of a party member and leader is established; it is established through his work style and attitude toward the job and toward people. Bedunkevich figured as a negative example. Here is but one fact from that article. During one inspection parade it seemed to him that Sr Lt Med Serv V. Kasenchuk's cap visor was smaller than authorized. He ripped off the visor which was objectionable to him right there before formation...

The author of the article, Col S. Koropov, secretary of the party commission of the district aviation political department, expressed the hope that the party punishment already given Bedunkevich, as well as the article itself, would help the party member reform and draw the necessary conclusions.

He didn't reform and didn't draw conclusions. Sr Lt S. Zavarnitsyn recently wrote to the editors about this and he cited facts which were confirmed during an on-the-spot check. Many officers and warrant officers [praporschchiiki] expressed resentment, but they were complaining not just about Bedunkevich's rudeness and arrogance...

A bulldozer somehow disappeared from the motor pool back in April. People ran their legs off in search of it, but they just didn't find it. Maj N. Dakhin, who was in charge of the equipment, hastened to report to the commander, who grinned after listening:

"You took alarm for nothing. I am informed about it."

But he didn't consider it necessary to give explanations. It turns out that the bulldozer had been assigned to the military exchange for construction work, and it got stuck there for an entire half-year.

Here is another incident. One company was missing four privates at the same time. Company commander Capt S. Romanov sounded the alarm and another awkward situation arose. Bedunkevich again was knowledgeable:
"The privates won't disappear. They'll return in about two weeks."

It turned out he had assigned the people to shear sheep at the request of a kolkhoz chairman he knew.

Where didn't the aviators work who were sent by the battalion commander for "hire"? There were instances where they repaired private homes at local enterprises and in trade organizations, and all this for the sake of "mutually advantageous contacts." For this Gennadiy Antonovich committed a serious infraction by using state gasoline in exchange for necessary services. The military procurator's office intervened and the battalion commander had to pay a substantial amount to compensate for the loss incurred, but even this lesson didn't hit home. Quite recently a suspicious, involved incident surfaced involving bricks which had been acquired with funds allocated the battalion, but the bricks disappeared somewhere...

The reader doesn't have to be wearied by an enumeration of such facts. It's time to ask the question: Was there really no one to call officer and party member Bedunkevich to order and give him a timely warning? People generally did call him to order and warn him, and the vague "generally" probably is fully apropos here. Judge for yourselves. The party commission discussed his personal file twice and both times hot on the heels of the event, as the saying goes. First he was punished for using young replacements to work at civilian enterprises, and later he went through the high-sounding "watermelon affair." By the way, let's quote an excerpt from the party commission's resolution: "A severe reprimand with entry in the record is to be announced for abuse of official position and for the dishonesty and negligence displayed in selling the harvest of watermelons grown on the kitchen farm..."

But then just why didn't the punishments given him play their indoctrinational role? Is it because they were lifted at Bedunkevich's very first request, with his statement that "I realize my guilt and feel it keenly" taken at face value? He was relieved of the last severe reprimand because he had to be promoted. But when his application was being discussed, things already were smelling palpably of the "gasoline affair."

"We were sorry for him in a worldly way," admitted Maj. V. Kolotovichev, one of the party commission members.

Again a reference to life and to the fact that they allegedly had to understand the situation, the person, and so on in a worldly way.

Let's have a look: Doesn't the root of many miscalculations in working with personnel lie in such a mental attitude? This attitude pushes us to condescension, to a lack of principle, and to an unintentional encouragement of a person who has thrown aside all restraint. But life requires something else—a more rigid demand for each person to be independent professionally and spiritually in his position, for the party member and leader to perform an assigned job with the highest sense of responsibility, and not indulge those who do not wish to act or are incapable of acting in the spirit of our policy and our morality.
It seems that some are not hearing this call of life very well. They also
didn't hear those signals of trouble which battalion life was giving off.
Inspectors and reputable commissions often arrive here. Not a month would go
by where someone didn't visit the post. They would come on scheduled and
surprise inspections. But much of what I later would tell about in the dis-
trict aviation headquarters and political department sounded like a reve-
lation to my audience. For example, they were surprised that Bedunkevich was
arranging collective drinking bouts, while he was obligated to stop them
decisively and to head up the campaign for normalizing everyday life. To be
an example! By the way, it was the "arrangement of anti-alcohol work" that
the members of one of the commissions was studying. It included district
aviation political department officers Lt Col B. Kirilyuk and Maj Yu.
Malenko. I inquired as to the conclusions at which they had arrived.

"Anti-alcohol propaganda in the subunits generally has strengthened,"
responded Kirilyuk.

But Bedunkevich arranged a noisy banquet literally a week before the commis-
sion's arrival, and battalion party bureau secretary Capt U. Akhmetov took part
in it. All this was no secret for the officers, warrant officers and
enlisted men. Capt Romanov arranged the very same kind of drinking bout
sometime later, and who would reproach him? There were other similar facts
contradicting the commission members' optimistic conclusions.

Other inspectors such as Col A. Kabanov, Lt Col G. Avdeyev and Maj V. Aksenov
from the district aviation rear, and post political workers also worked in
the battalion at different times. They were seemingly interested in every-
thing: the condition of the airfield, performance of guard duty, internal
order in the barracks, the supply of gear, preparation for winter, progress
of political classes and how party documents were kept up... But the work
style in the battalion and the collective's moral atmosphere remained outside
their field of view. The fact is, however, that this always must be in the
foreground: how people live, what methods are being used to achieve the
result, and what specifically is being achieved.

Yes, outwardly everything was done as it should have been done and at the
same time the situation was becoming more and more nervous and unhealthy. The
joy of work faded for many, and criticism at party meetings slowly died away.

"Once I tried to air dirty linen for the sake of the work," said Capt B.
Nizhnik, imparting a sore subject. "But later the commander said so many
contemptuous things to me..."

Knowing Bedunkevich's vengeful nature, people feared him. Even in speaking
with me and telling about deficiencies, many asked that their names not be
mentioned:

"You will leave, but we have to serve here."

It is indeed difficult to serve. Capt N. Kalnik submitted a request through
channels to be transferred to another unit. He was sick of the endless
faultfinding and insults from Bedunkevich, and after this he lost heart...
The inspectors didn't hear anything of this. Such alarming signals didn't reach their ears. They were deaf to them. Such deafness often leads to a situation where a fallacious style seems to justify itself. In the distorted light one no longer sees that people such as Bedunkevich are not improving work, but disorganizing it; they are not strengthening order, but are worsening and spoiling matters.

When this article was being prepared for printing a telephone call was received in the editorial office from the political department of Central Asian Military District Aviation. We were told that Lt Col Gennady Antonovich Bedunkevich had been expelled from the party and relieved of his position for gross violation of the CPSU Bylaws and abuse of official position.

"As you see, conclusions were drawn," said the voice over the phone.

Yes, with respect to Bedunkevich, but were conclusions drawn regarding the work style of some workers in the district aviation headquarters and political department and some post political workers? This is still guesswork, although some facts place us on guard. On departing from the post I asked political worker Maj V. Yakhov to take steps to see that Bedunkevich did not settle accounts with those who were open with the correspondent. Yakhov promised that everything "would be in order." Then it was learned that Bedunkevich immediately arranged to identify those who had complained and to bring pressure on them. The first to surrender was Sr Lt Zavarnitsyn, the author of the letter to the editors. We received one other letter from him in which he completely rejected the fact that he had turned to the editors at one time, refusing himself. For some reason the letter was certified by battalion chief of staff Maj Zh. Kuznechenko.

And something else about the results of such pressure. A serious incident occurred in the battalion. One more representative commission departed urgently for there...

Performance Appraisal Warning Ignored

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Oct 85 p 2

[Letter to editors from Capt V. Cherepkovskiy, unit party bureau secretary, Red Banner Baltic Military District: "A Little Late for Principle: Sobriety is the Standard of Life"]

[Text] It isn't easy for me to write about a person with whom I was in the same combat formation until recently. But today he isn't with me; Capt A. Shapran has been released from the Army. Now he is already a former military pilot for everyone, and also for himself. For my part, I am tormented by my conscience about whether or not what happened with Aleksandr Shapran isn't my fault as well.

He completed the Stavropol Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots and Navigators imeni Mar Avn V. A. Sudets in 1976. The lieutenant was met
cordially in the combat regiment. He had his share of flying, as air training is not only a personal matter, it is a common concern.

Shapran confidently mastered what was for him a new type of fighter. He flew in adverse weather conditions and made day and night intercepts. Broad prospects were opening before the officer, when suddenly everything began to crumble.

No! Not suddenly. I now think that all of us around him, commanders and comrades, might have contributed to the officer's fall. Was it really a secret to us that Shapran began to drink? At first he didn't drink alone: a friend would have a birthday, someone was promoted, there was a successful target intercept, or it would be simply a hundred grams "for the appetite." In short, a reason always was found.

The military physicians were first to be alarmed. Abrupt changes occurred in the fighter pilot's health. Shapran was forced to be recertified as a helicopter pilot, but he also didn't stay there long. Sobriety came for a certain instant when the officer was finally "grounded." The question of his release from the Army arose.

"I'm giving up drinking!" swore Shapran. "Just permit me to remain in the Army.

They believed him and assigned him to a staff position. Shapran took up the new job with enthusiasm.

"I have an excellent assistant," said chief of staff Maj G. Krush.

None of us had any complaints about Shapran. Soon he was promoted to the rank of captain. It seemed the officer had put an end to the past once and for all.

But one morning Shapran didn't report for duty. He showed up in headquarters only toward noon and the smell of liquor filled the room.

"A guest arrived," explained Shapran, "and we stayed up very late. I couldn't come to headquarters in such a state. I assure you it won't be repeated again."

The officer gave excuses like a schoolboy. Some of us said at that time: "See how conscientious he is. He got drunk, overslept, and then only came to work because he's afraid of letting down the collective."

Shapran rather quickly began to display this "conscientiousness" daily. When we shamed him, Shapran would give vows and promises. "Let's believe in him once more," suggested one of his most compassionate colleagues. And Shapran got off with a slight scare, as the saying goes.

But the time came when we had to take urgent steps: the captain's drinking bouts became known outside the unit. At that time we commanders and
political workers generated violent activity. Shapran was given disciplinary
punishment and held liable by the party, then expelled from CPSU membership.
Then recently the officer was released to the reserve because of drunkenness.

His wife had left him still earlier, taking with her their young son who at
one time was proud of his father and dreamed of becoming a pilot like his
father.

It's easy now to say that it is a natural finale, but I wonder whether or not
it is natural. For how did we, Shapran's comrades in the party and in serv-
ice, bring him up? We tried closing the barn door after the horse was gone,
because from the very beginning of the officer's career we took a superficial
approach to studying him as an individual and didn't show the proper demands
or principle. We didn't even get around to reading the officer's personal
file. The fact is, it contains the following lines: "Inclined to abuse
liquor..."

This entry was made in the first performance appraisal of school graduate Lt
Shapran. It was made as a warning to his future commanders. I personally
read it for the first time when the officer was being released from the Armed
Forces.

Officer's Complaints Unfounded

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Oct 85 p 2

[Letter to editors from Capt 3d Rank V. Sorokin and response by KRASNAYA
ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 2d Rank Yu. Timoshchuk, Red Banner Pacific Fleet,
under the rubric "On the Heels of a Letter": "He Was Once Successful"]

[Text] Dear comrades, I was forced to turn to you on the following matter.
The position in which I previously served has been cut. According to guid-
ance documents, personnel organs were obligated to give me a new position for
serving in my specialty, but I have been outside the table of organization
for a long time now.

I turned to various echelons with a request to resolve my difficulties, but
everything remains as it was. I finally wrote a request to be released to
the reserve because of a reduction in force just to put an end to my misery.
The request was allowed to go forward, but for some reason the documents now
indicate a discrediting of the officer's rank as the reason for satisfying my
request. The justification given was that I wouldn't be released otherwise.
I even agreed to this, but the question of release to the reserve also is
stalled at the present time.

Please help me if possible, although I have little faith in this. The fact
is, I wish to serve, but they don't let me.

The editors assigned Capt 2d Rank Yu. Timoshchuk, their corre-
respondent for the Pacific Fleet, to meet with Officer Sorokin
and take an on-the-spot look at his complaint.
"But didn't you really receive the second letter in which I requested that the first letter be disregarded because they already found me a position?" asked Capt 3d Rank Sorokin with surprise when I met him.

The question appeared to be exhausted. Disregard means disregard, but Sorokin's letter seemed very unusual to me. I know submariners well, since I myself put in much service aboard submarines. That is why I couldn't imagine such indifference shown to a person who desired shipboard duty or that obstacles to the officer's conscientious performance of military duties would be raised.

Then what was the matter? The letter's author declined comment, just as he had omitted very essential points of his service biography in turning to the editors for help.

Capt 3d Rank Sorokin didn't end up as excess all at once. The reason was his liking for liquor, which was an old one. The fact is that the officer was assigned to his last position, that of submarine department head, with a demotion, having parted with the position of unit flag navigator for abuse of intoxicating drinks.

Viktor Alekseyevich Sorokin didn't want to remember this, and he wasn't carried away with memories at all because his past career had not been distinguished by brightness of tone. When he was a first lieutenant aboard a submarine back in 1978 he was expelled from the CPSU for neglect of duty, drunkenness and unauthorized absences. Performance appraisals of various years further continued to establish the officer's fatal passion.

Capt 3d Rank Sorokin now accuses his superiors of callousness. That was the result of their liberalism. Even after Sorokin was expelled from the party he continued to be "advanced" along the career ladder: he was recommended for the position of submarine executive officer. Despite the officer's numerous adventures in an inebriated state, he was promoted in rank.

"We believed the person would have second thoughts and come to his senses," now says Capt 1st Rank O. Fedorov with a sense of disappointment. Sorokin identifies Fedorov's exactingness with indifference and callousness.

And here is the opinion of Officer A. Ovechkin, who has known Sorokin since school:

"A competent specialist, but an unreliable person."

One won't envy the ship's commanding officer with such an officer under him who is known to be a weak link in the crew.

Here is just one incident from Capt 3d Rank Sorokin's shipboard "practice" as told by the political officer of the submarine from which the officer was made excess:
"We decided not to issue industrial alcohol for servicing navigational equipment to the head of the BCH-1 [navigation department]. Sorokin was greatly offended at the distrust shown, so we trusted him and issued it, and some time later Sorokin was in his cups. What authority of Sorokin can we speak about after this? It is natural that service didn’t go well and his family broke up."

The expression "service didn't go well" in itself usually means that a person himself did little for it. The Navy always has a need for officers who have zeal for the job and who are disciplined and vigorous. Here is eloquent confirmation in this case: several of Sorokin's classmates from school already have been in command of submarines for more than one year, and there is a captain first rank among them. One can speak of their attainment of high naval maturity. But Viktor Alekseyevich recently was assigned as head of a fire crew, to the position of a senior lieutenant. At one time, however, he had been successful in training, he began his officer career well and a brilliant future had been predicted for him...

Of course the ruin of hopes does not go by painlessly for the ego even if it is a delayed ruin. But at whom should he take offense here?

"I am to blame for everything," Sorokin finally agreed.

But in a minute or two he was again contritely taking offense at his superiors. This is how he has become accustomed and trained to take a tolerant view of his deficiencies. Sensing his own insolvency, he is ready to be released, but only "from a reduction in force." The fact is, there are no excess people in the Navy, and if the Navy does get rid of anyone, it is those who are unworthy.

He decided very late and with a far from faultless method to get back his good name. As the unit commander informed me, I was already the fifth person who had to look into Sorokin's letters.

Well then, lack of discipline, lack of self-criticism and self-interest also have initiative, they take the offense, and they don't wait for conditions, but try to create them for their own success, scorning the means.

Sorokin learned to interpret to his benefit not only the indulging actions of superiors, but also the military laws. "In accordance with guidance documents . . . were obligated to give me..." we read in the letter. Take note that they "were obligated." But nowhere did the author say a word about his obligations.

A "desperate" signal: "I wish to serve, but they don't let me" is only an unsubstantiated phrase, an acting technique. But naval duty is not a theatrical stage where people play insulted but proud roles. It is not a role to be performed aboard a combatant or in combat formation, but military and civic duty, and it must be performed honestly.
Training Assembly Deficiencies Corrected

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Oct 85 p 2

[Article under the rubric "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage": "For the Sake of a Checkmark"]

[Text] Three letters about deficiencies in conducting training assemblies were published under that title on 6 August.

Lt Gen N. Ter-Grigoryants, deputy chief of the ground forces main staff, announced a check of the facts cited in the letter from Lt (Res) V. Puzynyia. They were fully confirmed. Disciplinary punishment was imposed on lieutenant colonels A. Bryantsev and V. Netrebin, Maj A. Monakhov and Lt V. Yashin for poor organization of classes and a lack of proper supervision over them. The staff of the Moscow Military District took additional steps to strengthen supervision over the preparation and conduct of training assemblies with registered personnel.

Maj Gen Yu. Shumilikhin, commander of missile troops and artillery of the Moscow Military District, also informed the editors of the nature of these steps. A detailed response to the criticism also was received from the large unit [soyedineniye] in which the training assembly was held. It was signed by the large unit commander and political department chief.

Maj Gen I. Gamov, commander of missile troops and artillery of the Ural Military District, and Maj Gen A. Shibayev, chief of that district's personnel department, informed the editors about a check of the letter from MSGt (Res) Yu. Lalikhov. There too the deficiencies mentioned in the letter were confirmed, although the training assembly program had been fulfilled. The unit commander was given strict instructions about poor supervision of classes with reserve officers. Specific steps were outlined to improve the organization of a training assembly which is to be conducted during October and November.

In connection with the fact that the heads of the Poltava Higher Military Command School of Communications did not properly assess the facts cited in Maj V. Kovalenko's letter, the military procurator of the Poltava Post sent the school chief a representation suggesting that he institute disciplinary proceedings against guilty parties. The editors were informed of this by Col Justice Ye. Levchenko, first deputy military procurator of the Kiev Military District.

6904
CSO:  1801/43
DATA ON KA-32 'HELIX' HELICOPTER

Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian No 8, Aug 85 pp 26-2

[Article by design engineer V. Kasyanikov: "The KA-32 Helicopter"]

[Text] At the 36th Paris Air Show, we members of the Soviet delegation had occasion to witness the increased attention of many thousands of visitors, including aviation experts, on the Soviet exhibit and, in particular, on the Ka-32 helicopter. In my opinion, this is explained not only by the fundamental design that is unusual for the majority of viewers, including aviation experts, but is explained primarily by its high tactical-flight and economic characteristics. In 1983 and 1985 Soviet sports pilots Tatyana Zueva and Nadezhda Yeremina set seven world records, including records with commercial loads of one and two tons, in this type helicopter.

What is the Ka-32?

We should note that this is a cargo helicopter. The records that were set are only indicators of the capabilities incorporated into its design. During the development of the Ka-32 the OKB [Bureau of Experimental Design], headed by Chief Designer S. V. Mikhayev, tried to create a vehicle which would do the best job possible in answering the needs of as wide a sector of the economy as possible and that possessed high technical flight characteristics while maximizing economy. The designers understood that they could resolve this complex problem only by making extensive use of the latest achievements of modern science and as well as the latest techniques and also by creatively applying their accumulated experience in developing helicopters with a coaxial design. The father of such helicopters in our country was N. I. Kamov.

The comprehensive tests that were conducted under various geographical and climatic conditions showed that the collective had successfully managed this difficult task. Crews reliably flew Ka-32's in medium and high latitudes and carried extremely diverse loads with weights up to five tons both in the fuselage and on an external sling. For example, the crew of pilot G. Isayev made 25 sorties before dinner to transport hundreds of cubic meters of "switches" (i.e., entire trunks) and packets of valuable wood from a mountainous wood-cutting area of the Northern Caucasus to the valley. Pilot G. Provalov's crew, which had worked in the opposite side of the country, took only 30
sorties to remove almost 200 tons of assorted cargo from the deck of a ship that had approached Bear Island and to transfer the cargo directly to the homes of people wintering there.

We should especially note that it was in a Ka-32 that the crew of honored test pilot N. Bezedtnov successfully reconnoitered the ice under polar night conditions for the first time in the history of Arctic conquest and allowed a convoy of ships to sail the North Sea route. A pilot from the State Civil Aviation Scientific and Experimental Institute, G. Provalov, who had continued the operational testing, carried out courageous flights from the deck of the nuclear powered ice-breaker Sibir that was operating with a ship convoy in the Kara Sea.

Two variations, a transport and an ocean-going version, of the Ka-32 helicopter have been developed. Both are equipped with 2225 horsepower TVZ-117 engines. These were developed by the collective headed by S. P, Izotov. The transport version was designed to carry passengers and freight stowed inside the cabin or, if necessary, on an external sling. The ocean-going version was developed for ice reconnaissance while escorting ship convoys, for unloading them without their having to stop by flying directly from the hold to the shore, for search and rescue operations at sea and for supplying floating platforms on the shelf.

Technical and Flight Characteristics

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<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tr>
<td>Normal flight weight</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maximum load on the external sling</td>
<td>5000 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum flight speed</td>
<td>250 km/h</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cruising speed</td>
<td>230 km/h</td>
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<td>Service ceiling</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cabin dimensions</td>
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<tr>
<td>- length</td>
<td>4.52 meters</td>
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<tr>
<td>- width</td>
<td>1.3 meters</td>
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<tr>
<td>- height</td>
<td>1.32 meters</td>
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The pilot's cabin was designed with work positions for the pilot, navigator and external sling operator.

Modern piloting, navigational and radio equipment, including an on-board computer, allow the helicopter to reach an assigned area, ship or point whose coordinates have been transmitted to the helicopter by land-based (ship-based) radio equipment or assigned at any point in the flight. The crew can also fly to an object which they have selected from the radar screen. The on-board equipment allows the crew to fly along an assigned route under normal and difficult meteorological conditions, by depending on intermediate points or totally without them. An automated landing approach is also possible under normal and difficult meteorological conditions, day or night. The helicopter has all the communications equipment it needs. In addition to this, the
The ocean-going version has equipment for instrument ice reconnaissance and has additional illumination equipment.

The two turboshaft engines are started by using an air turbo-starter, the compressed air for which comes from the on-board auxiliary power plant or from an external source. A gear box is used to transfer the torque from the engine to the two rotors and to the helicopter linkage assemblies. The gear box has two free motion couplings that automatically disconnect it from the engines. This allows the helicopter to fly with only one operational engine and the gear box also operates during auto-rotation.

The rotor system is composed of two propellers that rotate in opposite directions. As viewed from above their blades are rectangular and are made entirely of composite materials, are equipped with an electrical deicing/heating system and have practically an unlimited operating life. The leading edge of the blade spar is protected by abrasion-resistant rubber with a metallic fitting. To facilitate basing the helicopter on ships, the blades can be folded toward the tail. When this is done, they are stored without disconnecting the control elements.
The fuselage is primarily made of aluminum alloys. It has three doors: one on either side of the forward section (the left is for the pilot, the right for the navigator and operator); the third is on the left side of the cargo cabin.

During a flight to maximum range, the cargo cabin, which is partially separated from the crew cabin by a heat-insulating bulkhead, can hold 16 passengers or four tons of cargo. Mooring assemblies are used to strengthen the floor. The helicopter carries large loads up to five tons on an external sling which is equipped with a scale mechanism and an emergency release mechanism.

The Ka-32 transport version can also be used for carrying medical patients. Four patients are put on stretchers and four are seated. There is also room for a doctor and an attendant.

The helicopter can be piloted by one man, but controls are also provided for a second.

The helicopter's hydraulic system is composed of three independent hydraulic systems -- a primary, a backup and an auxiliary. The primary services the control linkage in the helicopter control circuits, the wheel brake linings and the hydraulic cylinder for controlling the LPG-300 hoist boom. The backup hydraulic system automatically goes into operation when the primary quits, but services only the control linkages that guide the helicopter.

The Ka-32 has a four-prop, non-retractable undercarriage. The helicopter has a system of ballonets that fill up with air so that it can land in water in an emergency situation. These are deployed on cowlings along the sides of the fuselage.

The fuel tanks are combined into a left and a right group. Each group provides fuel to "its" engine, but the fuel system provides for the possibility of supplying fuel from either group of tanks as well as supplying both engines from one group.

As a rule, icing problems are associated with flights under difficult meteorological conditions, especially in high latitudes and over the seas of the Northern Arctic Ocean. The Ka-32 designers focused a lot of attention on measures to prevent this dangerous phenomena. The helicopter has very effective deicing systems that include the engine air-intakes, crew cabin windows, rotor blades and air pressure detectors. The air-intakes are heated with warm air that is taken from the engine compressors, while the rotor blades and air pressure detectors are heated by the on-board electrical system. Condensation and icing on the cabin window is prevented by blowing hot air from the main heating and ventilation system on them and by washing the window with an alcohol compound.

The helicopter has a system of attachments for raising and lowering personnel and also has a 300-kilogram capacity freight boom with an electric hoist so that the crew can carry out search and rescue work at sea and on dry land.
The helicopter's range of uses can be extended by using a system of detachable equipment. This system includes ballonets for landing in water, skis for landing on ice and soft ground and cable up to 40 meters long for transporting massive loads up to 5000 kilograms and for carrying out construction and assembly work. Additional fuel tanks can be mounted when it is necessary to increase flight range and duration.

The helicopter's design, equipment configuration and independent power supply allow technical servicing to be accomplished by a small number of specialists without special equipment.

The demonstration flights of Soviet airplanes and helicopters invariably aroused increased interest at the World-wide Aviation and Space Exhibition. Pilot D. Avtukhov who made the demonstration flights in the Ka-32 showed the excellent performance and high flight characteristics of the new Soviet helicopter.

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12511
CSO: 1801/27
CHANGE IN ARTICLE 26 OF CRIMINAL CODE

Moscow VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SOYUZA SOVETSKIH SOTSIALISTICHESKIH RESPUBLIK in Russian No 41 (2323) 9 Oct 85 p 657

[Ukase 780 of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on Amending Article 29 of the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics, signed by USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman A. Gromyko and by USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretary T. Menteshashvili, Moscow, the Kremlin, 5 Oct 85, No 3354-XI]

[Text] The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To amend Article 29 of the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics, approved by USSR law of 25 December 1958 (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, No 1, 1959, Article 6) to read as follows:

"Article 29. Sending servicemen who have committed crimes to the disciplinary battalion and substituting detention in the guardhouse for correctional labor

"First-term servicemen who have committed crimes may be sent to the disciplinary battalion in instances provided by law for a period of from three months to two years, and in instances where, considering the circumstances of the case and the person of the convict, a court shall deem it advisable to enforce his being sent to a disciplinary battalion for a period up to three years instead of imprisonment for the very same period. Persons who previously served punishment in the form of imprisonment cannot be sent to a disciplinary battalion in place of imprisonment.

"Correctional labor without imprisonment is replaced by confinement in the guardhouse for a period of up to two months for servicemen."

2. To charge the presidiums of supreme soviets of union republics to make the legislation of the union republics conform to this Ukaese.

6904
GSO: 1801/38
MILITARY SCIENCE

CHANGE IN LAW ON WARRANT OFFICERS

Moscow VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK in Russian No 41 (2323) 9 Oct 85 pp 656-657

[Ukase No 779 of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on amending Article 2 of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase on Warrant Officers [Praporshchiki and Michmany] of the USSR Armed Forces, signed by USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman A. Gromyko and by USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretary T. Menteshashvili, Moscow, the Kremlin, 2 Oct 85, No 3333-XI]

[Text] The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

Paragraph b, Article 2 of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase dated 18 November 1971 "On Warrant Officers of the USSR Armed Forces" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, No 47, 1971, Article 453; No 52, 1980, Article 1133) is to be worded as follows:

"b. Aboard ships and vessels, in naval combat support shore units, in naval units of the Border Guard Troops and in divisions [divizion] of patrol ships (motor patrol boats) of the Internal Security Forces: warrant officer [michman], senior warrant officer [michman]."

6904
CSO: 1801/38
MONETARY AWARDS TO DEFENSE ENTERPRISES

[Article: "For Shock Work"]

The results of the All-Union socialist competition for construction organizations and enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Defense Construction Industry have come in for the second quarter of 1985. Competing to properly meet the 27th CPSU Congress, the majority of collectives successfully fulfilled their plans and socialist obligations for productivity growth, increased effectiveness and the quality of work.

USSR Ministry of Defense and Construction and Construction Material Industry Trade Union Central Committee Challenge Red Banners were awarded to construction control collectives in the Moscow and Belorussian Military Districts and to construction organization collectives led by Comrades A. Gorovatskiy, M. Gromenko, G. Dorokhovich, A. Dushkevich, F. Zheberlyayev, V. Kopylov, A. Kornelyuk, M. Makerov, M. Margolis, A. Navasardov, A. Ragatskin, F. Renich, Yu. Rossomakhov, and V. Svirskiy and to the enterprise collectives with the chiefs Comrades V. Kutsyuruba, I. Mikhailov, S. Puzyrav, S. Sergeyev and R. Khlebnikov.


Many organization and enterprise collectives were awarded third place and monetary prizes.
NOTEWORTHY GRADUATES INCLUDE AKHROMEYEV, MIKHAYLOV

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Oct 85 p 2

[Items by Capt 1st Rank (Ret) V. Grigoryev and by Maj (Ret) E. Traube: "Fighting Men Remember"]

[Text] Special artillery, air forces and naval schools were established in our country in the prewar years. Juveniles studied in these schools after completing the seven-year school, and they then were sent to military schools.

[Item by Grigoryev] Veterans of the Moscow 1st Special Naval School who assembled in the Central Soviet Army Club имени M. V. Frunze had something to remember. They fought the enemy bravely aboard warships of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets and at Stalingrad. Among the special school's graduates are HSU's Mar SU S. Akhromeyev, Adm A. Mikhaylovskiy and Rear Adm L. Zhiltsov.

[Item by Traube] Over 1,500 students of the Moscow 2d Special Artillery School became officers and generals. Six graduates--Lt T. Frunze, Capt N. Prokhorenko, Sr Lt S. Novichkov, Maj M. Libman, Lt Gen Avn S. Mikoyan, and Army Gen V. Govorov--received the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Many of this school's graduates are in formation even today. The veterans who assembled in Secondary School No 348 of the city of Moscow reminisced for a long while that evening about their youth and comrades in arms.

6904
CSO: 1801/38
SHORTCOMINGS IN BMP TRAINING EXERCISE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Oct 85 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Lukashov and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col V. Shevchenko, Red Banner Odessa Military District: "They Set Hopes on Binoculars: Is That What a Control Problem is Supposed to be Like?"]

[Text] There were two inspectors at once present at the infantry fighting vehicle driving problem in the motorized rifle company commanded by Capt A. Bozhok: Lt Col A. Zhmur, a division staff officer, and Maj V. Kalchenko, the battalion technical supply officer. The inspectors were at the tank training area for several hours. Just how did their presence affect the quality of the training problem?

It should be said above all that many requirements of the guidance documents were not fulfilled in the training problem. In particular, communications was not functioning with the persons attending obstacles. Moreover, when we and Maj Kalchenko drove up to the antitank ditch in a vehicle, there was no controller at the obstacle.

Soon an infantry fighting vehicle appeared from behind a hillock and approached the antitank ditch at high speed.

"Why is he operating the vehicle that way?" said Maj Kalchenko, outraged over the actions of the driver-mechanic. "He'll destroy the obstacle..."

That's what happened. The BMP [infantry fighting vehicle] dove into the deep antitank ditch. The driver-mechanic began to slow down late and lost control. Catching the brick facing of the obstacle, the armored vehicle demolished it.

But had we not been at the antitank ditch at this moment, the problem director probably wouldn't have learned about the mistakes made by the driver-mechanic. By the way, the very same thing also happened at the other obstacles. True, Lt Col Zhmur tried to persuade us, for example, that the treadway bridge was easily visible from the tank training area command post through binoculars, especially if the BMP fell off the obstacle.
Nevertheless, even the strongest optics didn't help the inspectors notice that other specialists were in the infantry fighting vehicles in addition to the driver-mechanics either as passengers or as assistants during performance of the exercise and that vehicles temporarily out of order were repaired right on the course, although all this is prohibited for safety reasons.

In short, there were many deficiencies. But, strange as it may seem, inspectors who are called upon in the line of duty to react acutely to omissions preferred not to intervene. One of the reasons for their passiveness was quickly determined—the officers themselves had a shaky knowledge of requirements of the documents by which they must be guided. "It seems possible to conduct training activities if there is no communications with the obstacles," Lt Col Zhmur reflected out loud. Maj Kalchenko turned directly to the documents so as not to be unsubstantiated and to confirm the words of the senior officer. He leafed through the "Kurs vozhdleniya" [Driving Course] for a long while, but just was not able to find the necessary article.

The representatives of two staffs differing in echelon also did not know the duties assigned them as inspectors. Lt Col Zhmur merely entered data on results of the runs in a notebook. Maj Kalchenko entirely assumed the role of assistant company commander: he clocked the time it took the driver-mechanics to perform the exercise.

Yes, the inspectors' range of actions was not very broad. Fuel and engine operating time were spent in vain, but this seemingly didn't concern them. The inspectors naturally just did not succeed in determining the real level of the specialists' training.

When it came time to grade the motorized riflemen's modest indicators, Lt Col Zhmur and Maj Kalchenko concluded that the weather was to blame, that the rain didn't allow more to be achieved. As a matter of fact, what more could inspectors say who had conducted an inspection only by the method of observing from the command post? Prior to the training problem they had not familiarized themselves even with the accounting documents which reflected the progress of training and competition and fulfillment of the combat training program in the company.

The time has come when commanders and their subordinates give an account of what has been achieved in the training year. It is hardly necessary to mention how important the strictness and objectivity of the grade and depth of conclusions are here. It is understandable that proper conclusions won't be drawn from the position of an outside observer.

6904
CSO: 1801/40
TANK FIRING EXERCISE CRITICIZED AS OVERSIMPLIFIED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Oct 85 p 1

[Article by Maj O. Bedula, Red Banner Turkestan Military District, under the rubric "Troop Field Training": "The Degree of Approximation"]

[Text] This episode was the culmination of the exercise—the company commanded by Sr Lt L. Borisenko was to fire the standard round.

Even the strict inspector from higher headquarters could not refrain from comment when the tankers negotiated the restricted minefield passages quickly and cohesively and reformed into combat formation precisely.

"Not bad," he remarked, addressing the battalion commander.

The company soon moved to the open-fire line. Targets were hoisted far down-range and the battle broke out!

But the further the tankers moved into the depth of "enemy" defenses, the gloomier the inspector became.

Soon it was learned that an oversimplified target situation had been established for the tankers in the exercise. Not all targets were camouflaged to resemble the background of terrain and the "enemy" tanks and weapons were located primarily on elevations which could easily be viewed. In short, the defenders seemingly placed themselves under fire.

That attitude which some commanders take toward denoting the "enemy" in exercises unfortunately can be encountered even now, in the final phase of the training year.

Of course, the most modern training facility cannot fully preclude all conditionalities in working lessons involving troop actions in combat, but bringing the training process as close as possible to actual combat conditions is a task fully within our capabilities. Experience shows that accomplishment of this task depends largely on how the "enemy" is denoted. In short, the problem is to attempt to create that situation in exercises, especially field fire exercises, which would prompt the people to act creatively and to remember against what enemy they are entering battle.
...A tactical drill problem is being held on the tactical field. Personnel of the battalion commanded by Capt V. Ivochkin are practicing lessons involving motorized riflemen's actions in the offensive. Standard trenches and connecting passages have been dug in the "enemy" strongpoint, firing areas have been organized, and pop-up targets which reveal themselves by the flashes of rounds at night have been installed.

Here too are camouflaged weapon and combat equipment mock-ups. There are minefields and other obstacles ahead of the strongpoint. It is noteworthy that the battalion commander took an active part in creating a difficult situation for subordinates.

In short, the problem was organized so that trainees could obtain a rather complete picture about the nature of real combat actions. According to the scenarios, the "enemy" employed toxic agents, squad commanders were put out of action, and a fragment damaged a radio antenna... The scenarios were accompanied by appropriate sound and light simulation. Targets would periodically shift laterally and into the depth of the defensive line, and smoke pots, battle noise simulators and blank cartridges were used actively. All this gave the people an opportunity to genuinely sense the intensity of battle. The problem director helped the trainees comprehend the most advisable method of actions in each situation, then reinforce the skills by multiple repetitions.

It is fully understandable that this approach to training the personnel has a positive influence on their schooling and on the level of the subunits' combat readiness.

I recall that at the beginning of the summer training period many soldiers of the battalion commanded by Capt Ivochkin demonstrated poor results in weapon training in such a difficult situation. This didn't trouble Capt Ivochkin. He adhered firmly to the methodology which had been developed, and now the battalion is showing stable, high results in weapon and tactical training.

I would like to highlight the following point as well. It is common knowledge that subunits practice elements in fire engagement of the "enemy" during tactical field fire exercises. The attacking subunit acts regardless of how many and what kind of targets have been hit. The subunit commander often learns the extent of the "enemy's" destruction only in the exercise critique. And so it turns out that the attackers always are assured of success and their efforts reduce only to moving promptly to the designated line and opening fire on command.

The unit where Capt Ivochkin serves does this differently. It makes extensive use of feedback equipment in setting up target fields for exercises. This makes it possible for the exercise director to immediately see the extent of target destruction. It is fully understandable that the attackers are not given success and don't advance until destruction reaches its calculated value. In such a situation the subunit commanders have to seek the most optimum variants of actions, call in artillery and helicopter fire, and so on. Strictly speaking, that is how it should be.
A conditional enemy... It isn't easy for commanders and staffs who are organizing exercises to fight against conditionalities, including in denoting the opposing side. Nevertheless, many difficulties are surmountable. We only have to take an imaginative approach to matters and not allow indulgences and oversimplifications. Then the results in final problems also will reflect the subunits' real readiness for combat.
AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

COL GEN KHYUPENEN DISCUSSES TRAINING OF PVO TROOPS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Col Gen A. Khyupenen, commander of PVO Air Defense Missile Troops: "Value Every Minute: Rational Use of Training Time Is the Guarantee for Increasing Combat Skill and Saving Resources"]

[Text] Not too long ago there was an exercise in one of the PVO units. Complex multiple missions were accomplished by the subunits there. The tactical situation was notable for its dynamism and the inclusion of situations which required the personnel to have deep and broad knowledge, great skill and psychological and physical tempering. These subunits achieved varying results, but there was a notable feature: The best were those which had been noted for good training organization before the exercise. Frankly, in this exceptionally complex situation the air defense missile battalion with Capt N. Fidorenko as the launch control officer accomplished their missions outstandingly. But, it should be understood, that it was not just Capt Fidorenko's skill which made possible this success. It was an indication of the high level of training and coordination of all the battalion combat crews. In achieving this success the missilemen focused on daily combat training, and it is manifested here by their rhythm and organization. In the battalion there were no cases of scheduled training being interrupted or changed. They were conducted on a high methodological level considering control documentation requirements. The officers developed and internalized the methodology for using the capabilities of assigned training aids, simulators and other technical equipment rationally making it possible to create complex tactical and nonstandard situations during training and provide effective use of training time. Also very important was conserving material and equipment resources.

Combat training is also precisely and thoughtfully organized in this unit's other subunits. And naturally, it received an outstanding evaluation for this tactical exercise.

Often there are times while you are observing tactical exercises and missile live fires, especially if they are in complex tactical situations, that you think with pride: What terrific equipment and weapons we have... They allow us to accomplish missions which not long ago we could not even imagine. You involuntarily think about other things. In order to skillfully use all the
combat capabilities of this weapon, it must be learned to perfection and used with skill. This is not an easy task. It requires great mental and physical intensity and corresponding efforts; the first of which is highly organized combat training. Every hour and every minute of this training must serve our main purpose--increasing combat readiness.

Many of our officers know this well. They strive to organize the training process so that each class will yield the greatest effect. An example of this is the air defense missile regiment which until recently was commanded by A. Vyrvich. High combat training intensity was achieved primarily due to the well-thought-out plans and continuing planning. The period of time required for training every category of personnel was precisely determined. The culmination of that plan was constantly monitored by the commander, his deputies and the staff officers.

There is a great deal instructive in the combat training organization of other units. Along with them, we also encounter the results of disorganization, failure on the part of certain commanders who simply squander training time on nothing instructive. If you ask such a commander: Why do you allow this? As answers, you hear incomprehensible explanations. They are forced to interrupt training for urgent fatigue details and other incidental matters. And such statements as: We will make up the omissions in record tactical exercises and catch up. It's as if it had not occurred to the officer that the final account is not the high evaluation in an exercise or the final inspection for which the subunit must learn these things, but so that they will be ready to accomplish missions entrusted to it at any minute.

We encountered such an example in the Nth Air Defense Missile Unit recently. Although neither the commander nor other officers openly expressed these opinions, they acted in full consonance with them as shown by the weak organization of the training process. In particular, personnel in the subunit commanded by Officer A. Zinin were taken from training. We were interested: Why was training so poorly organized? As an answer there were references to urgent and extremely urgent matters. In actuality, the reason was that the commander and the officers subordinate to him acted without a plan and in an unconsidered manner resulting in leaving a number of "current matters" to accumulate and cause lost training time. And where is the responsibility for the main object in service--combat training of subordinates?

It was necessary to demand that the commander, as they say, render what is due. In contemplating these facts another question occurs: Is Officer Zinin the only person responsible? Unit staff members visited his subunit many times. Each time they reported to their commander: All training in the subunit is normal; in training the personnel operate well; the specialists consistently accomplish their functional responsibilities... But then comes record training conducted by main staff officers and the subunit received a low evaluation. How do the unit commander and staff, who as already indicated visited this subunit many times, feel in this case? They feel as though nothing special has happened. They only suggest: Zinin, they say, let them down by not justifying their hopes. However, they clearly do not see their own fault.
A commander or chief is fully responsible for the state of affairs in the sector entrusted to him. In referring to staff officers, I did not say that it was necessary to transfer the responsibility from the subunit commander to themselves; however, to the extent that they did not note deficiencies in training in subordinate subunits they are responsible. A staff officer is not a sideline observer of the subunit but a responsible official required to make his effect and actions felt on the state of affairs.

Much can be said, first of all, about the need to increase the responsibility of officers. But often, these are only words which do not entail requirements which are strongly put so that everyone will accomplish the functional responsibilities at his post to the fullest extent. As a result of this, a category of officials who "talk about everything, but take responsibility for nothing" has appeared. And in the army there are truly no positions without responsibility. Crew-served weapons increased the role and responsibility of each crew member immeasurably. There is no denying that officers are called to have the greatest active impact on unit and subunit combat readiness. However, they are not always held to the demands required.

Recently, the air defense missile subunit commanded by Capt V. Ivanov demonstrated poor training. As it was explained, this occurred as a result of subunit combat training conducted under weak, simplified conditions. The unit staff officers present—A. Molovskiy, I. Dariy and A. Fedotov—did not understand the training process organization well and were not as demanding as required, and this was the result. However, no one was held responsible for this failure in combat training until the instructions came from above.

Monitoring training—is first of all research, analysis and development of effective measures for improving the training process which, unfortunately, is not always done. Life urgently requires a fundamental movement toward improving the training process, its all round intensification and the rational expenditure of material resources.

The struggle for further intensification in the training process must include, as they say, things both great and small. Whether routine classes or tactical exercises with live fire—they must be a forward step in the mastery of things military. It is necessary to decisively prevent monotonous and mechanical development of these tasks and other types of simplification in subunit and crew classes and training. The outcome of this, as one may call it, is that methodology is poor and maximum material resources are expended.

There is a well-known truism: the best classes not only teach but also indoctrinate. Its indoctrination role plays an especially great part in our day. For successful completion of the missions before us, it is necessary to increase activity, organization and discipline and to advance so that each individual will put all his effort into his work. However, in certain subunits and units there is still formalism and lack of consciousness in organizing training which dampens the ardor of the people and sometimes leads to severe violations of military discipline. Officer V. Zaval'nyy entrusted a class which he was supposed to conduct himself to another officer. This one in turn then entrusted it to a sergeant who even then did not take attendance for the soldiers in the class. Taking advantage of this lack of control, one
undisciplined soldier went AWOL from the class, and his absence resulted in an extraordinary incident. When studying the causes of the incident, it became clear that it was not at all an accident as subunit, unit and formation staffs tried to represent it. This was a natural result of disorganization in training and service. That many officials were responsible is an involuntary thought.

It is specifically in the subunits that our achievements in combat readiness, service and education are achieved. Here, there is the immediate struggle for a further increase in combat readiness. Consequently, we must agitate the state of affairs especially at this level. Isn't it true that if literally every official in every position at the subunit, unit and formation levels does not display genuine efficiency in handling those things he is directed to do in training organization, its effectiveness and quality would be higher everywhere. But this is not completely and in every case well understood. In researching the incidence above, again, just as before in similar situations we heard excuses and promises to correct the problems, but today words are not enough—decisive and urgent measures are necessary to suppress negligence, disorganization and the desire to escape personal responsibility.

We have not always strictly dealt with those who fail to take responsibility toward combat readiness organization. At this time of increased supervision requirements (and in the military service this role is especially high), our approach to them has become more strict. Officer Zaval'nyy was relieved of his position and discharged from the armed forces.

Commanders and staffs are called upon to teach officers to search for innovative training forms and training methods and to value every minute of training time. These represent our daily concern about future increases in combat readiness and the successful completion of the socialist responsibility in honor of the 27th CPSU Congress.
USE OF PVO 'SPECIAL SIMULATOR' DISCUSSED

Moscow KRAshNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Sep 85 p 3

Article by Col V. Subbotin, District Headquarters Officer, Red Banner Far East Military District: "The Commander and Modern Combat--Lessons of the Training Ground"/

When the anti-aircraft missile battalion set out for the training ground, no one in the unit doubted the missilemen's ability to carry out field firing. This confidence rested on a solid foundation: Most of the subunit /podrazdelenie/ members are highly qualified specialists who have earned excellent ratings in military and political training.

At first everything went as expected. A check of the special training of the missilemen confirmed their advanced knowledge and skills required to adjust the equipment properly. The men started the combat aspect of the exercise confidently. The operators detected the "enemy" aircraft at the operating range and commenced to track it.

All of a sudden new targets appeared in the air and their number increased continuously. The screens of the display units became cluttered with strong interference. It was difficult to decide which targets were real and which were dummy targets. The situation required immediate and critical resolution. However, the performance of interception controller Senior Lt A. Sokolov and operators Private First Class A. Voloshin and Private P. Kappelya was impaired by haste, nervousness and then errors. As a result, the fire effect was unsatisfactory.

I have a purpose for discussing this tactical exercise in detail. The fact is that in the battalion it was concluded that the missilemen's poor performance was simply a vexatious anomaly. It was felt that this sort of thing can happen to anybody. And they did not draw the proper conclusions for themselves.

After the exercise was completed officers from higher headquarters conducted a thorough analysis not only of the combat performance of the battalion members but also of the instruction administered before the battalion set out for the training ground. It indicated that at times the drills practiced in the subunit were oversimplified, lacking the complex instructive component. Simulators were rarely used.
Tactical training which includes field firing is an important test for missilemen. I often participated in the organization and conduct of fires and comparison of results. I can state without reservation that I do not remember a single occasion on the training ground when the subunit personnel attained an excellent rating by accident. Success comes to those that possess solid theoretical knowledge, firm skills and good political, moral and psychological training.

In the PVO Air Defense troops of our district there are many subunits which for many years have been conducting field firings at the training ground with consistently excellent ratings. Take the anti-aircraft missile battalion commanded by Major V. Kiryukhin, for example. This subunit possesses a great many positive characteristics, including high professional mastery of specialists, tactical competence of officers and effectiveness in the training process. Most of the credit is due the commander. Major Kiryukhin is a well-trained officer and master of combat qualification. He approaches his own training with high standards. He demands the same of his subordinates. What does this mean? In all classroom sessions and drills the combat situation is approximated as closely as possible. As a rule, a training package is devised, consisting of special problems combined with tasks of a tactical, physical and psychological nature. In the operator drills, for example, use is made of a special simulator which creates the illusion of a high density of "enemy" attacking aircraft. On the display screen the aerial targets approach from various directions, maneuvering in altitude and speed. At the same time a tape recorder reproduces sounds of combat: missiles are launched, aircraft turbines roar, projectiles explode. In addition, the time and sequence of working on the exercise setting, actions of personnel in a critical situation and errors committed by each man are entered into a special log.

It must be admitted that these demands were not to everyone's liking. Nevertheless, Major Kiryukhin pressed on with his program steadfastly. The subunit continually eliminated oversimplification in personnel training. Thus, in the heat of a drill Major Kiryukhin "knocked out of action" team leader Lt V. Provorov and interception operator Private First Class V. Shava. Their positions were immediately taken up by Lt A. Kontsybovskiy and Private First Class S. Shats. The men worked earnestly but did not meet the requirements of the norm, since their training in related specialties was inadequate. This was discussed in the training critique.

This kind of thorough and thoughtful approach to personnel training influences the combat readiness of the subunit and makes it possible for the men to resolve problems at the training ground confidently and with a high degree of stability.

Unfortunately, this is not the case in all subunits. In some collectives field firings are considered to be more or less the finish of a long and difficult run. It is felt that the run is over, the marks are credited, and now it is time to relax. The experience acquired, the same as shortcomings uncovered, does not become the subject of thorough analysis and
commander's reflections on ways to improve the training process. Time passes and the impressions gained at the training ground fade, the new thoughts generated by firing exercises wear off and effective equipment operating procedures are forgotten.

For example, why do the subordinates of Major V. Nuzhdov and Captain S. Zheinov perform so poorly in carrying out their field firing duties at the training ground? Because to a great extent lessons often were not learned in previous fires, although there was a need to do so. On a previous occasion at the training ground personnel of subunits exhibited shallow knowledge of materiel and acted in an unskilful manner in handling equipment for protection against mass destruction weapons. However, the officers did not draw conclusions for their own benefit.

Field firings at the training ground provide good practice in organizing coordinated actions of all missile complex elements and bring enrichment by virtue of experience gained in field operations. In daily classroom sessions and drills it is important to retain and enrich this experience, developing in the missilemen the qualities and skills required for combat. I will use as an example the experience gained by the subunit commanded by Major V. Zakharov. There was a time when it was content with merely satisfactory results, being considered an "average performer." This year, however, the missilemen accomplished their missile launchings in an excellent manner. This was due to the fact that the combat training was organized as prescribed, without simplification and short cuts. I would say that the beneficial effect of training ground exercises is felt in everything. On repeated visits during drills in this subunit I saw that Major Zakharov organized the missilemen such that they often "got caught" in difficult situations which required of them maximum concentration of efforts.

What can be seen in other cases in the sessions? Operators carry out the same well-known operations in the same old exercise settings, attaining in this manner high ratings. The launch control officer in turn is not required to puzzle over which targets should be fired at first or when to open fire—everything will be as before: The target course, flight pattern, target priority... In random conversations with officers before the start of tactical exercises it becomes evident that they know many details beforehand: The concept of the exercise, exercise setting, attack plan. How do they become so well informed? "We found out from neighbors," "Senior comrades at headquarters told us"—these replies are often given. It is not difficult to obtain a high rating after this, of course.

Everyone knows that no good comes of oversimplification and short cuts in combat instruction. But not everyone finds the strength within himself to stop, have a look around and evaluate his work objectively.

Consider another aspect. In another subunit there is a large number of highly qualified specialists, but its combat training performance is less than brilliant. What is the reason? We know that class rating is
an index of mastery. On this basis the explanation is simple: The pursuit of inflated figures and percentages brings about short cuts in training.

The conduct of exercises and skills under conditions approximating those of the battlefield is a requirement that is set by reality itself. In modern combat the most unexpected situations arise. The victor can be only he who possesses combat mastery, high physical and psychological strength—all those qualities which taken together comprise the fund of solidity and reliability of the combat subunit and which cannot be forged without the toughening process of the training ground.

13005/12276
CSO: 1801/12
ECONOMIZING ON FUEL: AVIATION IN TURKESTAN MD

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col G. Ivanov, Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "Economics of the Flight Section"]

[Box insert] How "excess" fuel is consumed - Cost of an early start-up - "Hook" of extravagance.

[Text] "We needed half the usual amount of fuel for these flights to carry out the mission," said squadron commander Maj V. Shlomin.

He explained that the fuel was saved during a flight in which the flight he led practiced group teamwork and later launched missiles at the range. A special feature of the flight operation was that on the way to the range the flight did not repeat the simplest figures which had been practiced many times previously and which provided nothing for first-class pilots who had made more than a hundred flights together. The duration of the flight was cut almost in half by excluding these figures. During this section many other squadron pilots also performed only those elements in the air which promoted an improvement in their professional training. No one burned up fuel to no purpose.

The reduction in fuel consumption in that shift unfortunately had nothing to do with competition for thrifty expenditure of material and technical resources. It was achieved thanks to the thoughtful, substantiated directions of Col V. Kopylov, a representative of higher headquarters who was present during the flight operations. After carefully studying the flight timetable he identified many elements in it which gave many hours in flying time but added nothing to the pilots' professional expertise. He ordered the duration of each flight to be cut and only what was actually necessary for improving the pilots' combat training to be practiced in the air.

With respect to competition for thrift and economy, not one subunit commander even tried to organize it in the flight operations. By the way, this was not just for this flight section: alas, even the pilots' individual and collective socialist pledges for the year had no paragraph on a campaign for supply economy. This was no accident.
"Economy of fuels and lubricants doesn't concern the pilots," said Maj S. Gorshkov, deputy squadron commander for political affairs. Strange as it may seem, other pilots also shared his point of view.

Such an opinion didn't form here overnight. The fact is that the pilots have not become accustomed to using fuel and aviation equipment operating time economically. For example, a pilot is given an integrated assignment where he practices flying techniques in the zone and tactical applications at the range. The pilots don't know specifically how much fuel is needed for a given flight. A little more is added to the aircraft tanks just in case. It is not surprising that considerable fuel excesses remain in the tanks on returning to the airfield.

"And so you circle the airfield, using up fuel until the aircraft weight drops to that authorized for the landing approach," said Sr Lt S. Gaponov.

The commander is obligated to indicate the fueling variant depending on flight duration in the flight timetable but, in the words of Maj Ye. Prasolov, deputy squadron commander for aviation engineering service, this often is not done. In such cases the technicians completely fuel the aircraft, and there is no time to pump out the fuel just before take-off when it becomes clear how much fuel will be necessary. And so it turns out that according to plan it is enough for the aircraft to be in the air a half-hour, but it lands an hour later: the pilot again idly circles near the airfield using up excess fuel.

The length of time the engine operates on the ground is of no small importance from the standpoint of thrifty expenditure of fuel and engine operating time. In the foremost subunits this is a matter of minutes, only a few percent of the flight duration, but here its proportion is considerably higher. For example, the engines of the aircraft operated by lieutenants V. Anosov and S. Dmitriyev and by Capt V. Tsurikov operated almost a half-hour each on the ground. By the way, Maj V. Shlomin himself allowed the engine of his aircraft to operate for 25 minutes on the ground, although the flight itself was planned to last 39 minutes.

"I should have waited a little with the start-up, for I knew that one flight had landed and another had taxied to the take-off strip. Consequently the flight which I led had to wait its turn at the starting line," said the squadron commander, honestly admitting his mistake.

The major calculated then and there that his haste in starting up the engines of the flight's aircraft had cost several hundred liters of fuel. The fact is that he could have performed this simple calculation prior to start-up.

The unit constantly keeps a record of the time of ground operation of the engine of each aircraft in a flight section. It is strange, however, that there is no analysis of the record from the standpoint of coming up with effective recommendations for the pilots to save on fuel and engine operating time on the ground and in the air. This is entirely within the capability of the unit methods council headed by Lt Col A. Postnov. It is a pity that the methods council is sidestepping an important avenue for now.
The deputy regimental commander for aviation engineering service also is not doing a complete job in this matter. He was obligated to organize a strict accounting of aircraft fueling depending on the flight assignment and, having the objective monitoring data on the duration of aircraft engine ground operation, to comprehensively increase the demands on pilots and technicians. Unfortunately this was not done.

In conversing with the pilots one becomes convinced that they are not accustomed to looking on the combat training process from an economic standpoint. For example, Lt V. Ovcharuk made a flight with lowered landing gear through his negligence. It stands to reason that he used considerably more fuel than the norm, but in looking into what happened, the squadron commander pointed out to the lieutenant only the deficiencies on a professional plane and said not a word about overexpenditure of fuel.

Or take Lt V. Anosov, who has accounted for several tens of additional flights which cost the state a pretty penny. Once he damaged the aircraft by not maintaining a given speed of descent in a landing. The officer heard many justified reproaches addressed to him, but no accounting was demanded of him for the fact that considerable supplies were expended through his fault.

Here is a noteworthy feature. Some 20 slogans are posted in the room at the airfield where pilots and technicians rest between sorties, but there is not one among them calling for a thrifty consumption of the people's property. With a thoughtful attitude taken toward economic propaganda here, one could have made the pilots aware of the cost of a bomb, a missile, a sortie, and so on.

"The question of thrift and economy doesn't concern us pilots," said Maj V. Kudinov, an officer in the regimental political department, repeating Maj Gorschkov's words. "And what specifically can we do here?"

Meanwhile, the practical work of the regiment's pilots is oriented considerably on the extravagant, sometimes ill-conceived expenditure of fuels and lubricants and aviation equipment operating time. For example, the number of flying hours is one of the principal indicators in the work of a pilot, a subunit and the unit. Each pilot's yearly flying hours are set by guidance documents. The individual norm was multiplied by the number of pilots and the resulting figure was approved in higher headquarters before the beginning of the training year. Now it is the regiment's planning goal, and the regiment has to issue the planned "wave" of flying hours even though several pilots departed the regiment long ago. In their place, colleagues must make up for the flying time which is lacking.

The regiment has to work at least three additional weeks because of this "wave." This is why pilots have their flight planned for twice the duration necessary for practicing particular exercises. This is why pilots and technicians do not pump out excess fuel and the flight controller authorizes pilots to remain in the air considerably longer than prescribed by the flight timetable. A flight often is predetermined in advance for the sake of flying hours. It is included in the timetable as a "hook" lasting 25 minutes along the route to the range. The pilots unanimously confirm that the "hook" gives them
nothing from the standpoint of improving flying techniques. The conclusion suggests itself: it is best to exclude the "wave" in flying hours from the indicators by which subunit and unit activity is evaluated.

"The fact that it was necessary to make adjustments to the timetable and reduce the duration of 'empty' flights was an extreme measure," says Col V. Kopylov with conviction. "A set of measures for economizing on material and technical resources must be developed and adopted. The experience of foremost squadrons and regiments must be made its basis."

It stands to reason that district aviation has such experience. Has it been studied and generalized? I asked this question of some officials of district aviation. Maj Gen Avn V. Ilyushkin, the chief engineer of district aviation, responded very vaguely: "It is an important matter and something has to be done." In the opinion of Col N. Seliverstov, deputy commander of district aviation for combat training, rear specialists must engage in a campaign for economy and in generalizing the experience here. But rear specialist Lt Col Tarasenko is certain: "We have the data about where matters are better and worse with economy, but foremost experience hasn't been generalized. It is Col Seliverstov's subordinates who must do this." Col P. Sablin, deputy chief of the district aviation political department, admitted: "People's controllers work in a number of units on our assignments, studying questions of economy, but we have not yet generalized the foremost experience."

In short, an important matter remains open although the beginning of planning for the aviators' combat training for the new training year is approaching. During this planning it is important to take account of everything valuable and foremost accumulated in the subunits in the campaign for economy in the training year which is coming to a close. This is why we must unite the efforts of all services to draw up specific recommendations for pilots in the thrifty use of people's property in increasing the intensity of combat training.
AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

UNREALISTIC TRAINING YIELDS HIGH MARKS, LOWER READINESS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Sep 85 p 2

Article by Lt Gen Avn I. Sviridov, honored military pilot of the USSR: "Unannounced Evaluation: Discloses Stereotyping in the Nth Regiment Aviator Training"

One after the other, the aircraft took off and soon the airwaves sounded that the next target was successfully destroyed. The victory count over the "enemy" grew in their eyes and the pilots and the evaluation exercise controller did not hide their joy but more and more a feeling of bitterness grew in my heart. The reason for this was the ease with which the air victories were achieved.

Having become acutely aware of the regiment training plan for the exercise, it was impossible not to notice that it was completely penetrated by the assignment; the enemy actions were planned and accomplished by the same people who were given the task to organize the response. Each step of the opposing sides was carefully traced on diagrams and charts, scheduled to the minute and second and assiduously memorized by the pilots. When I asked one of the regimental staff officers how he hoped to obtain such detailed information about the enemy concept of operation in real combat, he looked at me with bewilderment and did not answer. "What is the purpose then of this whole exhibition?" I asked him asked him a second question. The answer was obvious without words: To achieve a high rating.

Unfortunately, one often meets similar approaches to organizing evaluations. Recently, there have been many changes for the better and although evaluation results ratings have noticeably dropped in comparison with the previous period, unit combat readiness has undoubtedly grown. And just the same, it is impossible to talk about complete satisfaction of given combat training which provides the required tactical fund in all aviation units. Commanders and staffs have still not yet been able to, in every case, overcome the inclination to simplification, stereotyping and creating greenhouse conditions on the training ranges in the name of achieving high ratings.

Recently, I had the opportunity to take part in the unscheduled combat readiness evaluation for the fighter aviation regiment commanded by Col Yu. Trubchaninov. Everything was organized in such manner that the evaluation
conditions were as close as possible to those which might be found in actual combat operation situations.

The commander confidently and precisely reported the level of training of the pilots and the unit capabilities, but when he was given a packet with situation additions, he clearly slumped and was even confused. His deputies were unable to help him. It turned out that there is a significant difference between the commander's preliminary report and the true facts of the matter.

It turned out, for example, that the low altitude air combat training of many pilots did not correspond to tactical requirements. The commander was asked, "Why was the low altitude limit increased during routine combat training?" "For safety," was his answer. I looked at the commander and thought: Such "concern" for safety would cost the whole regiment dearly in actual combat.

I could say a great deal about how important it is to master the aircraft, not for the beauty of flying but to meet the requirements of air combat tactics with an actual enemy, but I will present only one combat episode.

At the time we were near Orel. A fresh regiment was transferred to our airfield from the rear reserve. All of them were high altitude master pilots. They were showing off their art for us and we noted that the aces looked down upon us sergeants. There were even those among them, who as if in jest, but not without some bragging, said that they would teach those Fascists a lesson. But in the first battle, the master pilots did not even manage to break into the victory column, and moreover, not all of them returned to their airfield.

First class flying is a necessary quality for a good air warrior. But it can never be forgotten in mastering it, that it is necessary to conform to those tactical conditions which one might face in combat with an actual enemy. After this first unsuccessful operation, the commanders organized a conference to exchange experience, and the replacement pilots questioned us about our experiences in engagements with the Hitlerites.

In the regiment being evaluated, few of the pilots knew the tactical and technical data and combat capabilities of aircraft used by the probable enemy. The command post officers were also accustomed to "fighting" both sides using our tactics. When organizing air combat exercises, they planned fighter maneuvers without considering possible "enemy" counter-actions. I think that it is unnecessary to explain to anyone how pilots trained in this manner would turn out in their first actual combat action.

One of the evaluation elements was the requirement to repel a mass "enemy" air raid on a target covered by the fighters. Unfortunately, the regimental commander and his staff could not organize the precise cooperation of groups with different tactical assignments and the "enemy" aircraft broke through the fighter covering detachment. It was disappointing to realize that the large, deployed defending forces could not accomplish their mission due to poor combat control by the commander and staff.

When it was necessary to make a decision on the regiment's repeat sortie, it turned out that the commander did not study the intelligence summary given by
the evaluators the evening before to the chief of staff, Maj G. Zhidenev. It contained the latest data on the "enemy" and without this knowledge it was simply impossible to skillfully control the battle. The chief of staff also did not give it any significance, even failing to inform the commander about the receipt of such an important document. This fact was the convincing factor that in the organization of routine combat training for the personnel, the officers and supervisors forgot and lost sight of its main, I would say, political purpose: Prepare for battle and not simply complete flight plans and fill in the sequential squares in the innumerable charts. The habit of acting in a stereotypical manner and moving along well-trodden paths and trying to simplify as much as possible will always appear, where they have forgotten the highest goal of combat aviation and the necessity to constantly keep in view during every exercise and flight the capabilities of the probable enemy and to foresee his active countermeasures. I repeat: it is active responses and not those prepared in advance by the same ones who are organizing the combat training for the "score."

Permit me again to direct our attention to the experience of the Great Patriotic War. We often escorted groups of ground attack bombers and covered them from Fascist fighters. In essence, the "Ilushin" pilots entrusted their lives to us. Once the fighter detail for escorting the "Ilushins" was entrusted to three different regiments. No one coordinated the actions of the group, simply detaching the prescribed number of fighters for cover. There were plenty to completely satisfy the successful accomplishment of the mission; however, out of 12 ground attack bombers escorted by us, only one returned to its airfield... And this was literally on the day after the fighters of our regiment managed to escort under significantly more complex conditions the same group of ground attack bombers without losing even one aircraft.

The reason for the lack of success was the poor organization of coordination, the lack of coordination between the fighter groups and the absence of a single and clear leader. We were disappointed and hurt and ashamed before the ground attack bomber pilots. It is more disappointing, that now, in conditions of peacetime combat training, when no one and nothing can interfere with the day-to-day, careful and scrupulous mastering of experience already in hand to develop old tactical examples for air combat and on this basis create new tactics, individual commanders are sacrificing the holy of holies, combat readiness, to insignificant and false success, to the achievement of high ratings at any price, even by simplifications.

During the regiment's evaluation, we closely followed the actions of the commander, staff and the pilots in the air minutely analyzing mistakes made by them and then repeating certain added situations. The results were a little higher.

The evaluations conducted by the generals and officers of the Air Force Combat Readiness Directorate showed that there was a significant shift for the better and that a serious step on the path to more complete mastery of modern aircraft systems by the pilots was made and that combat readiness was increased. And, moreover, there is impatience to the general increase in the separate instances of combat training simplification and attempts to achieve a
high rating at any cost. A safeguard to the growth of such an attitude may be the unannounced evaluation and the actual evaluation of achieved final results.

Conducting unannounced evaluations lately has shown that more and more unit and formation commanders and staffs are creatively approaching the organization of training. The ability of officers and leaders to quickly and skillfully make decisions in complex constantly changing situations and to immediately implement them is a cause for joy. In my view, it is necessary to conduct meeting engagement training as often as possible and to give the opposing controllers as much independence as possible to display initiative, inventiveness and keenness of wit and to practice wide maneuvering by aviation units during exercises.

Today, the Party requires us to activate the human factor, to work in a new manner, to achieve the maximum output from equipment, to increase organization and discipline, to decisively overcome stagnation, and to broadly use the achievements of science and technology. For us, airmen, this is primarily the requirement to increase combat training quality and to raise Air Force units and formations to a new level of combat readiness. Much in this direction has already been done, but there is still more to do.

12747
CSO: 1801/23
BALTIC FLEET SHIP CRITICIZED FOR WASTING FUEL

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 7 Aug 85 p1

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent, Twice Awarded Red Star Baltic Fleet under the rubric, "For Economy and Thrift": "Why Useless Miles"]

[Text] Recently the escort ship commanded by Capt 3rd Rank V. Tikhomirov put to sea for gunnery practice. Many miles passed expending a great deal of fuel, but due to the weak professional training of certain radio service specialists and primarily its chief, Sr Lt M. Ivakhnenko, the firing was postponed. The ship had to return to base and only after this was it able to accomplish its assigned mission.

What lessons could be drawn from this incident? When I asked this question, the ship's deputy commander for political affairs did not understand for a long time. Finally, he noted with surprise:

"Since we accomplished the firing anyway, what should have been prevented?" The officer clearly had no concern for the economic aspect. As it turned out, this was not accidental. No work for conserving fuel and motor resources had been done onboard ship for a long time. It is true that this was a point in the crew's socialist obligations, but no concrete efforts had been made to fulfill it. Since the beginning of the training year, this question had been given no attention in any of the specialist classes, in socialist competition nor in the party-political measures. Even members of the peoples control post established on the ship let it slip. The engineering department had done no fuel and motor resource expenditure analysis which is a prerequisite in determining the conservation obligation. And also, as we found out, there were many instances of ship motor resource, fuel and technical oil overexpenditures.

In the unit headquarters there were also very similar views on the struggle for economy and thrift onboard ships. The engineering department deputy commander, Capt 2nd Rank Ye. Kaplin, revealed the thick plan for ship conservation, dozens of references and every possible table. All of these documents looked impressive; however, they only reflected one aspect: what was to be done to improve the POL conservation. But the staff did not know the current situation, its bottlenecks or what reserves were on hand. This
was not surprising; in actuality, during the 8 months of the training year the staff had not checked even one ship for conservation. The political section relinquished control as well. The current need to seriously study this question and take effective steps is clear. Chronic technical oil and fuel overexpenditure is seen on many ships; there are cases of putting to sea for "no reason" similar to the example described above. For example, once an escort ship "raced" for dozens of miles just to see what kind of weather was in a given ocean quadrant.

It is alarming that not one of these facts was ascertained by ethical and strict evaluations by the staff and political department. It is clear they are accustomed to this state of affairs and do not see anything negative.

No monitoring, complacency and a weak organizational conservation program led to the current relatively difficult position onboard several ships. The military training plan cannot be fully completed. The motor resources have almost been expended. Who is responsible for this? How can this be prevented in the future? The unit command must find the answers to these questions as soon as possible and take questions of economy and thrift with all seriousness.

12747
CSO: 1801/299
ORGANIZING ORLENOK COMPETITION FOR COMING YEAR

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Sep 85 p 4

 Unsigned article appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA

In connection with the start of the school year, the commander of the Orlenok All-Union Komsomol Military Sports Game has issued an order. It addresses in part the need by 1 October of this year to organize preinduction youth platoons and battalions in secondary schools, vocational schools and tekhnikums. Subunit /podrazdelenye/ commanders are to recommend young people who exhibit particular interest in studying military subjects and technical and military types of sports. Veterans of the USSR Armed Forces, servicemen on active duty and reservists are to be invited to serve as instructors and consultants.

In the new school year the Orlenok participants will take active part in the All-Union activity "Keep Up That Revolutionary Cadence!" Efforts must be made to include in the individual Lennist tasks realistic missions designed to develop in youth ideological, political and moral strengths; also courage, discipline, assiduousness, collectivism and other qualities so necessary for the future armed defender of the Fatherland.

Every preinduction youth is asked to study diligently the heroic history of the Soviet Armed Forces and make his own entry into the "Annals of the Great War of the Fatherland."

Throughout the school year there will be a broad and full program of activities. They will include Preinduction Youth Days, various group tests, competitions, short forced marches and studies. As in the past, maximum support will be given to initiative displayed in setting up technical military circles, sections, clubs of young sailors, pilots, parachutists, cosmonauts, border patrolmen and tankers, and in carrying out work that is interesting and steeped in military and patriotic material during holidays and in pupils' labor associations.

It is planned to use the game as a framework for devising a complex of activities designed to involve every pupil in active mass defense work and prepare preinduction youth for military service.

13005/12276
CSO: 1801/12
COL GEN ODINTSOV ON NEED TO IMPROVE MILITARY-APPLIED SPORTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Col Gen A. Odintsov, first deputy chairman of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee: "Quantitative Reserves"]

[Text] Everywhere now, when the entire country is preparing a worthy greeting for the 27th party congress, an exacting, thoughtful analysis is under way both of our unquestionable achievements and of the still unresolved problems and unused reserves in order to sharply increase the rates of forward progress in all walks of life and activities of Soviet citizens. This is why the conclusions and assessments of the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum also serve as a priority reference point in the work of our Defense Society, which is called upon to actively promote the workers' preparation for defense of the Motherland, an increase in their labor and social activeness, a strengthening of health, and the development in Soviet citizens of high moral traits and the habits of a healthy way of life.

The technical and applied military sports have an important role to play here as a component part of the overall system of the people's physical education. This role unquestionably will increase with a further acceleration of scientific-technical progress. Even today there are over 15 million persons who regularly take part in parachute, automotive, motorcycle, shooting and other sports for which DOSAAF has been assigned to ensure their development.

The boys and girls who devote their leisure time to sports do not just receive comprehensive physical training, temper their will and character, and develop purposefulness and industriousness. The friendship with equipment helps them learn it in more detail and master the working trade faster and better, while participation in competition teaches comradeship, staunchness, resolve, and the ability to instantaneously estimate the situation and choose the very best of a multitude of decisions. All this of course comes in handy for the youth during service in the Armed Forces, and in life in general.

We representatives of the generation which covered the war roads know well how necessary these skills and traits are for the future soldier.
I remember the difficult year of 1941. The Western Front Military Council special-purpose detachment in which I was the commissar was accomplishing an unusual mission. Our detachment's raid through the deep rear areas of fascist German troops pushing toward Moscow had lasted two months in a row. The detachment's fighting men were attacking columns of enemy combat equipment and cargo vehicles. We had covered more than just a single hundred kilometers through forests and marshes, usually at night. More than 300 fascists had been killed in the two months. We had to cross rivers afloat during a cold October when the first frosts already were gripping the earth. The detachment also was able to perform the combat mission successfully because there were none among us who could not have withstood the exhausting marches and those very difficult conditions under which we had to fight. By the way, at that time many lacked the ability to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle or use a radio.

Modern warfare also places rigid demands on a soldier. This is why it is so important to include as many young people as possible in technical and applied military sports activities and increase their mass nature even more. The reserves here are truly enormous. This is why I would like to specifically discuss these yet unused capabilities.

Take rifle shooting, for example. Lately many Defense Society committees have ceased to work properly on developing this important sport, referring basically to a lack of small-caliber weapons and ammunition in the primary organizations. As a matter of fact there are no weapons in some of them because of the absence of appropriate conditions for storing the weapons. That situation even suits some heads of DOSAAF rayon and city committees: no weapons means fewer concerns and troubles in the work, according to them. Such leaders don't ponder the fact that such an attitude toward teaching the populace to shoot does harm to people's training to defend the Motherland. With the assistance of local organs, DOSAAF committees must get the heads of economic enterprises which have primary organizations of the Society to establish necessary conditions to store training weapons and ammunition.

Air-operated weapons are not being used enough at the present to increase the mass nature of rifle shooting. This relates particularly to schools of general education, tekhnikums, and vocational-technical schools. Here we have the right to count on more effective help on the part of the Trudovyye Rezervy and the Burevestnik volunteer sports societies. Shooting air guns doesn't require the establishment of a costly facility; it is accessible to all boys and girls and, as shown by the experience of foremost DOSAAF committees, it produces a considerable effect. Pupils and students must be included more actively in the practices in the air gun ranges with a subsequent transition to shooting small-caliber weapons.

All-Union Shooting Week has been held for several years now within the scope of monthlong campaigns of mass defense work. This is one of the new forms of competition aimed at mass testing in norms of the CTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] complex and the fulfillment of sports categories. Unfortunately, not all DOSAAF committees organize these competitions properly, and often everything comes down to competition of teams with a very limited number of persons.
Together with the trade union, Komsomol and other organizations and economic leaders, the DOSAAF committees must carry out active work in building open and indoor ranges.

We also have many examples of purposeful work in developing technical and applied military sports. DOSAAF organizations of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Belorussia and Latvia do a great deal along this line. They constantly seek and find new forms and methods for improving the training and indoctrination processes, and they make skilled use of the reserves.

For a long while now there has been no problem of how to keep the young people in the village in the Nakotne Kolkhoz of Latvia where Hero of Socialist Labor A. Chikste is the chairman. The kolkhoz has its own air club with its own airfield, aircraft, gliders and hanggliders. There are sections of automotive and motorcycle sport. Boys and girls from other places are drawn here.

Here are other examples. A cinder track for motorcycle racing was built in Kustanay with local resources. There were 120 technical sports clubs for teenagers established in Penza. A club for young pilots in which hundreds of teenagers participate has been in operation for 20 years now in Lipetsk at the initiative of the city Komsomol committee and the DOSAAF aviation sports club. Interesting experience in technical sports work at the place of residence has been accumulated in Alma-Ata Oblast. For example, a technical sports club was established for the first time in the republic in the school of general education of the settlement of Fabrichnyy. It has nine sections operating, including automotive, parachute, cart-racing, autocross, motorcycle sports, hang-gliding and shooting. Other settlement residents participate here in addition to the school's pupils. The entire school collective including teachers took part in building a shooting range and bays and preparing classrooms. They were given much assistance by sponsors—the collective of the local cloth combine.

In short, there are great opportunities everywhere to develop and increase the mass nature of technical and applied military sports successfully and promisingly. DOSAAF also has a substantial sports facility for this. There are 53 stadiums and complexes for technical and applied military sports, some 900 courses for autocross and motocross, 285 water stations, 188 firing ranges, and thousands of shooting ranges and other sports facilities in operation in the country. We will continue to be concerned with building new projects. But no matter how many of them are built, a genuine mass effort will be achieved only if people everywhere learn to make rational use of everything they have.

Unfortunately even that which now exists often operates ineffectively. A fair number of sports facilities are being kept in an unsatisfactory condition. There are sometimes instances such as in Alma-Ata, where a recently built modern sports shooting club is used only to a fourth of its capacity. Or take the excellent Chayka sports complex in Kiev, where competitions are held extremely rarely. The republic sports shooting club in Dushanbe and the oblast club in Elista are in a sorry state. The question arises how such blunders and omissions can be allowed and how one can be reconciled with them. Proper order must be imposed in this matter and the demands must be raised for
having the large amount of funds allocated for expanding the sports facility provide an appropriate return. We are also oriented on this by the recent CPSU Central Committee Decree "Measures for Improving the Use of Club Establishments and Sports Facilities."

I also can't help but mention that in my view the development of technical and applied military sports is being held up to a certain extent by the insufficient attention shown them on the part of voluntary sports societies of the trade unions. Isn't it really strange, for example, that the Vodnik DSO [voluntary sports society], which unites workers of the river and maritime fleet, has not one section of underwater swimming, naval combined games, or motorboat sport? Is it normal that civil aviation workers are deprived of an opportunity to engage in aviation sports in their Spartak voluntary sports society?

There also are reserves for a further development of technical and applied military sports in the USSR Armed Forces, where some automotive sports--rallies, cart-racing, combined games--have not yet become properly widespread. It is also time to revive the past glory of the Army motorcycle speedway.

Alas, such examples could be continued. This situation took shape to a certain extent because the indicators which characterize the development of technical and applied military sports still are not taken into account in evaluating the work of sports organizations of trade unions and departments. The fact is that this contradicts the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "A Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport."

Technical and applied military sports have great opportunities for forming a harmoniously developed Soviet citizen, organizing healthy leisure time and a healthy way of life, performing the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth, and making the youth ready for defense of the Motherland and for effective labor. It is a task of state importance to realize these capabilities.

6904
CSO: 1801/40
LUKIN COMMENTARY ON U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, PLANS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Aug 85 p 3

[Article by Col V. Lukin: "A Policy of Peace versus a Policy of War--A Courageous and Important Decision"]

[Text] The Soviet Union, in conditions where the nuclear danger has begun to threaten all of humanity, has taken a most important and, at the same time, courageous decision—to discontinue unilaterally any nuclear detonations beginning August 6 of this year. "Our moratorium," stated CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev in his declaration, "is declared until January 1, 1986. It will, however, continue in effect if the United States, for its part, will refrain from conducting nuclear detonations." A mutual moratorium by the USSR and the United States on any nuclear detonations would also undoubtedly serve as a fine example for other states that possess nuclear weapons.

Why is the Soviet Union again focusing its attention on the cessation of nuclear testing? In the first place, such a moratorium can be accomplished without inflicting damage on any of the nuclear states, as well as not granting any one of them unilateral advantages. Secondly, the states already today have fully adequate means for effectively monitoring the observance of such a moratorium.

The fundamental reason, however, is undoubtedly the fact that in many cases, testing is the key, and in some cases simply the only, method of searching out ways and directions for the further development of nuclear weapons. We are talking about research into their destructive effects. The results of testing lay the foundation of an ever more destructive and dangerous variety of them.

The neutron bomb, accepted into the Pentagon's armament, can serve as an example of that. This is an enhanced-radiation nuclear weapon whose projected casualties are the civilian populace. The creation of a space attack weapon is also presently conceived of in the United States. Specifically, it is an X-ray laser with an energy surge from a nuclear explosion. A great role in the realization of this dangerous enterprise, signifying a transition to an uncontrollable nuclear arms race in space, again belongs to nuclear testing.

What is more, testing is being conducted on nuclear weapons that have been
stored in the U.S. arsenals for a long period. According to the official declaration of the appropriate Pentagon representative, it is carried out with the aim of "maintaining the capability for nuclear deterrence at a trustworthy level." Naturally, across the ocean they do not conceive of getting by without nuclear testing. The regular underground test of a nuclear device in Nevada on August 17, just a few days after the Soviet Union adopted a unilateral moratorium on any nuclear detonations, serves as proof of that.

The U.S. nuclear conveyor itself, comprising seven gigantic plants, operates using the test results of experimental models of nuclear weapons. Series production begins only after such tests. How extensive in scope the U.S. nuclear armaments production industry is can be judged by the following facts. Full testing has been completed and full-scale production has begun on 10 new models of nuclear weapons, including warheads for the MX intercontinental ballistic missile and the Pershing-2 missile, warheads for naval-, air- and ground-launched strategic cruise missiles, a nuclear bomb for the B1-B strategic bomber, a neutron warhead for the 203.2mm-caliber artillery shell and others. Approximately 10 more new types of nuclear weapons are undergoing active refinement and test-range trial stages. Among them are the monoblock warhead for the Midgetman small ICBM, the warhead of the Standard-2-class surface-to-air missile, the nuclear charge for depth charges, the warhead of the ASROC anti-submarine missile and others. A number of types of nuclear weapons are in the development stage. According to the estimates of Western specialists, the United States will need to conduct approximately 20 test detonations in 1986 alone.

The level of expenditures shows the growing nuclear appetite of the Pentagon in this area. According to the data of a group of experts headed by former U.S. Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs Clark, expenses for the creation of nuclear weapons from 1979 to 1985 in the United States grew from two to seven billion dollars. In the next fiscal year they will total eight billion dollars and will cover 22 different programs connected with the production and development of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear flywheel of the United States, as we see, spins ever more strongly and strongly. It was announced in Washington that, over the course of the next few years, the production of at least 17,000 new nuclear charges is envisaged, and in the period up to 1990—up to 23,000. Such a significant addition to the already existing arsenal of nuclear weaponry leads to the destabilization of the situation, the senseless expenditure of material resources and a strengthening of the threat of nuclear self-destruction.

Being in the captivity of its own nuclear plans, the American administration did not even try to investigate seriously the Soviet proposal. There followed the routine propaganda references to the supposed impossibility of effectively monitoring nuclear testing. It even progressed to the point where the American administration, by way of a "counterproposal," spoke out for the exchange of observers at the test ranges during nuclear test detonations (!). The discussion is really taking place in different languages. The Soviet Union is for the full cessation of any nuclear detonations, but the representatives of the U.S. administration are for their legalization and legitimization. Such an
approach proves that Washington does not intend to halt nuclear testing. U.S. Secretary of State Schultz declared bluntly in an interview for the press that "we do not regard it as being in our interest to halt our testing program..." He further agreed that "it would be harmful to conclude an agreement" for the United States altogether. Moreover, Schultz did not deny that a rough parity of nuclear armaments exists between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Try and discern what logic guides the American administration. It is clear to everyone that the moratorium can in no way violate the existing rough parity and destabilize the equilibrium. On the contrary, it will create more favorable conditions for the prevention of an arms race in space and its cessation on Earth, and for lowering the levels of nuclear confrontation. From the utterances of the Secretary of State and other representatives of the administration, only one thing can be concluded: everything is being done in Washington so as to further increase and perfect the offensive nuclear capability on a large scale and to transfer the arms race to space. Such a conclusion arises from the White House's stubborn unwillingness to join with other initiatives proposed by the Soviet Union: to pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; not to introduce antisatellite weapons into space; to halt the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Western Europe in response to our halted growth in reciprocal measures on the continent.

Why does Washington stubbornly retain for itself the right to pump up its nuclear muscle even further? Can it be that they really do lag in something? For example, in nuclear weapons testing? Here it is appropriate to include data presented at the Geneva Disarmament Conference in February of this year by the Swedish representative Theolin.

The statistics scrupulously collected by the Swedes impartially demonstrate that since 1945 to January 1, 1985, the United States conducted 772 nuclear detonations, and the USSR--only 556. Thus, the gap between the United States and the USSR is quite significant. In spite of this, the USSR enters into the implementation of a unilateral moratorium on nuclear detonations and continues to strive for the immediate and all-round cessation of all nuclear testing. This is one more confirmation that the course of achieving military superiority is alien to the peaceloving policies of the USSR. In his declaration of July 29, M. S. Gorbachev noted: "The Soviet Union does not strive for military superiority--it is for the maintenance of equilibrium in military forces at the lowest level possible."

The Soviet peace initiative is a most important step in strengthening stability and peace on Earth and in the struggle to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Its broad support on the whole planet is visible proof of that. But in order that such a moratorium can in reality turn the arms race around, an analogous responsible approach is necessary on the part of the U.S. administration.

A mutual moratorium would make possible not only a halt to the further growth of nuclear arsenals, but would allow the proper undertaking of the solution of the problems of their reduction and, in the final reckoning, their liquidation.

12821
CS0: 1801/16
DETAILS ON U.S. RECONNAISSANCE-STRIKE COMPLEX

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 85 pp 44-45

"Reconnaissance-Strike Complexes"

In the last few years in the U.S. new models of guided weapons have been designed, based on the concept "Reconnaissance-Launched Destroy," which has as its objective a direct hit on the target with the first missile launch (shot) at a probability of at least 0.5. These weapons have generally come to be referred to in the U.S. as precision guided weapons. As pointed out in the foreign press, it has become possible to produce them as a result of advances made in microelectronics and production technology and availability of new materials.

After analyzing the prospects for employing these weapons, American military specialists arrived at the conclusion that combat effectiveness would be enhanced substantially if the reconnaissance and target designation equipment, meaning the weapons and control devices, were combined into a single complex. This is how the idea to develop reconnaissance-strike complexes originated.

One of them, the PLSS, is designed to carry out continuous electronic reconnaissance against operating enemy ground equipment (radar, radio units), determining their type and location, and launch against them missile and bomb strikes by tactical aircraft. The complex can also be used to destroy non-radiating ground targets (bridges, supply depots, etc) detected by aerial photo reconnaissance. The PLSS unit consists of a network of ground support electronic navigation points and a ground data processing and control center.

Support radio-navigation points (RNP's) are fixed by precision survey and used to determine the location of targets and guide fighter-bombers to them. Their receiving devices continually intercept signals emitted by electronic equipment. The data processing and control center determines the time difference between signals received simultaneously by three RNP's and computes the target coordinates and present position of strike aircraft, which are then directed to the point of attack.
However, RNP's are limited in determining the coordinates of radiating targets to 10-15 km. It is proposed to extend the target detection range by employing special high-altitude reconnaissance and relay aircraft which would comprise an aerial range difference network. Within this context it is planned to employ TR-1 aircraft developed on the basis of the fairly well-known U-2 spy planes. They are provided with equipment capable of carrying out reconnaissance at altitudes about 20,000 m against radio-frequency targets at ranges to 500 km. TR-1 cruising speed is 700 km/hr. Range is 4,800 km. The fuel supply is adequate for up to 12 hours of flight.

Target coordinates are determined and fighter-bombers guided by means of three aircraft. Each aircraft when located 250 km from the forward edge of battle area intercepts within its designated zone the enemy radio signals and relays them to the ground processing and control center. On the basis of the time difference of signals received from the three TR-1's, a determination is made here of the coordinates of emissions from electronic equipment and guidance commands are computed and transmitted to the same reconnaissance vehicles, the strike aircraft, which are armed with bombs and air-to-surface missiles, in addition fitted with special radio-command guidance units.

American specialists state that targets can be located by means of the PLSS complex with a circular probable error of about 20 m.

Also under development in the U.S., for the benefit of the Air Force and ground troops, is the Assault Breaker reconnaissance-strike complex designed to detect and destroy concentrated and moving armored targets (tanks, infantry combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, etc) located 150-200 km from the forward edge of battle area. This complex consists of an aircraft (reconnaissance and relay vehicle) equipped with onboard Pave Mover side-looking radar and data transfer equipment, a ground data processing and guidance center, and pilotless delivery vehicles based on surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles carrying precision guided munitions.

The foreign press gives a description of the proposed method of employing the Assault Breaker reconnaissance-strike complex. The aircraft (reconnaissance and relay craft) flies over friendly territory at an altitude of 15-18 km and detects targets exhibiting radar contrast (tanks, infantry combat vehicles, etc). The resulting data are transmitted to the ground processing and control center, which computes the target coordinates and forms the commands to launch the missiles carrying homing munitions.

According to the foreign press, the Assault Breaker reconnaissance-strike complex is to employ T-16 and T-22 missiles.

The T-16 (length 6.2 m, diameter 0.4 m, weight 1,150 kg) is a modified Patriot surface-to-air missile under development in two versions, one with two sections, the other with three, for carrying the clustered munitions. In the two-section version it carries TGSM sub-missiles or 56 small-caliber
Skeet bombs. In the three-section variant the T-16 is designed to carry 22 sub-missiles or 88 Skeet munitions. The T-22 (diameter 559 mm) is a modified Lance operational and tactical missile (range to 140 km) fitted with 24 sub-missiles or 96 Skeet munitions.

The TGSM sub-missile, weighing 11 kg, is 63.5 cm long and 10.1 cm in diameter. The design features (in addition to components common to missiles of this type) a special device which extends the control surfaces and deploys a parachute. The sub-missile is fitted with an infrared homing system for terminal guidance and a shaped-charge warhead.

Plans provide for four methods of dispensing the sub-missiles, depending upon the size and shape of zones in which search and destruction of ground targets will be carried out. It is reported that these zones are to be circular (diameter 250 and 350 m) for strikes against multiple targets in a concentration area or elliptical (major axis length 400 and 800 m) for destruction of armor moving in column formation.

The Skeet munitions (weight 2.7 kg) are fitted with infrared sensors which are sensitive to a heat-emitting ground target. The munitions are packaged in special clusters delivered to the attack area by T-16 or T-22 missiles. In each cluster there can be four Skeet munitions.

An important element of the Assault Breaker is the equipment, which operates in a wide frequency range to transmit data on targets exhibiting radar contrast from the flying aircraft to the ground data processing and control center, after which the data is sent to the weapons proper.

The Assault Breaker complex is controlled by means of a display unit. Target data and the resulting guidance commands are displayed on color screens of the unit along with the corresponding alpha-numeric data.

In the foreign press it is pointed out that in addition to missiles the complex can deliver strikes against targets by means of piloted aircraft armed with the same guided antitank munitions as the T-16 and T-22. The strike aircraft in this concept would be tactical fighters provided with an advanced system of navigation and guidance measurements and equipment required to interface with the Pave Mover radar. In this combat mode the fighters would be fitted with WASP missiles.

The range of the millimeter range radar homing head of the WASP missile exceeds 5 km in clear weather, while in poor visibility it is 3 km. The missile is provided with folding fins and a curciform wing located in front of the rectangular steering rudders. The booster, a modification of the TOW antitank missile booster, operates for 1.2 seconds. A shaped-charge warhead is fitted. The primary advantage of the WASP guidance system is the possibility of target intercept on the trajectory without the participation of the equipment aboard the carrier aircraft.

Missiles are launched from pods carried under the wings. After launch the missile accomplishes programmed maneuvers for automatic search, intercept and attack. In each launch device, which is also used to carry
and store the missiles, there are 12 WASP missiles. Total weight of the launch device and missiles is 907 kg. The F-16 aircraft can carry two launch devices, and the A-10 and F-111, four.

The aircraft crew can fire one, several or all 12 missiles in salvo, after which the launch device is jettisoned. In the latter there are six tubular rails 228.5 mm in diameter arranged in a circle each having in tandem two WASP missiles.

Some foreign writers feel that development of reconnaissance-strike complexes will continue. In particular, plans are being made to design and introduce robotic devices, combine to a greater extent weapon systems and reconnaissance equipment, including space systems, and employ jointly complexes of weapons and advanced automated troop control systems.

In general, efforts being made by the U.S. and other NATO countries to improve high-accuracy weapons are clearly aggressive in nature, intended to attain military superiority over the USSR and Warsaw Pact nations and gain one-sided advantages in delivering surprise assaults.

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CSO: 1801/5
COMMENTARY ON ROGERS' PLAN, U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONRY IN EUROPE

Moscow GOLOS RODINY in Russian No 39, Sep 85 pp 12-13

[Article by V. Bogdanov: "From the Pentagon--Via Europe"]

[Text] The American press today loves to quote a certain dialogue in which a teenager answers the question of what he wants to be when he grows up by saying "Alive!" There is a bitter truth in this answer. It consists of the fact that the people who sometimes occupy the chair in the Oval Office don't give two cents for one of the chief rights of man—the right to life.

Practical plans for the destruction of this right are being developed, as is well known, in the Pentagon and the NATO staff quarters; it is precisely there that directives are born that reflect the general purposes of the military and political leadership of the United States and the North Atlantic bloc on the character of a future war and means of waging it. One of the latest creations of this type is the Rogers Doctrine. American Gen B. Rogers, its author and the supreme commander of the Joint Armed Forces (JAF) of NATO in Europe, took it upon himself to explain it.

Briefly, the gist of it is this: insofar as there exists nowadays nuclear parity (in this case it was to the general's advantage to acknowledge the obvious, although the White House is continually repeating that the United States lags), Rogers suggests that attention be directed toward the possibility of waging a non-nuclear war. This war, in his words, "would not necessarily escalate into a nuclear conflict," but on the other hand it fully subscribes to Washington's current strategic conception—"catastrophe—now." The May (1985) session of NATO confirmed that the Rogers Doctrine received full support in Western militarist circles: it was decided to increase appropriations for the acquisition and deployment of conventional weapons types. But that is not all. With his plan, Rogers gave an example of truly "flexible response," having placed, in the words of Senate Armed Forces Committee member S. Nunn "the conventional horse before the nuclear cart." The general in this accentuates the approach of military might in conventional weapons to the possibilities of nuclear weapons, and the placing of tasks on them whose solution was up until now associated only with the nuclear arsenal.

Developing his plan, Rogers elucidates that it is only a matter of saturating the armed forces of the North Atlantic pact in the near term with the most modern conventional weapons systems with electronic and laser aiming (so-called "one round--one hit"--class systems) and the broad-scale production of chemical
means of waging war. As the magazine SPECIAL writes, the latter should be incorporated as a "fourth leg" of the NATO "triad," along with conventional, tactical-nuclear and strategic-nuclear weapons.

There is yet another not unimportant "innovation" of the generals if nuclear weapons can only be used with the consent of the chief of the White House, then the chemical weapons, he says, should be given over to the full disposal of the NATO supreme commander in Europe (that is, Gen Rogers himself).

To justify its actions in preparing for chemical warfare, official Washington again advanced the bankrupt thesis of the "hopeless lagging of the United States" behind the USSR. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Wade first announced the necessity of a chemical weapons "buildup" at the beginning of 1982. His speech was the first trial balloon. The American magazine ARMED FORCES JOURNAL characterized him as "the leading Pentagon specialist" on chemical weapons. Thanks to the efforts of "specialists" like Wade, the United States spent approximately 445 million dollars in 1982, and almost twice as much in 1983, on preparing for chemical warfare. The White House plans to expend 1.2 billion dollars in fiscal 1986 on the chemical rearmament program. Specifically, more than 130 million dollars are requested for the production of binary artillery shells and aerial neuroparalytic bombs. In all, the Pentagon plans to spend up to 10 billion dollars by the end of 1987 on the modernization of "chemical death."

The undertakers of the Pentagon consider Western Europe the most suitable place for waging the future chemical warfare. These insidious calculations were confirmed by the recent declaration of Democratic Senator G. Hart, who considers that "in the event of war" the newest chemical weapons, developed in the United States, "will most likely be used on the territory of the FRG." Gen Glenn Otis, U.S. Ground Forces Commander in Europe and Lt Gen Charles Donnelly, U.S. Air Force Commander in Europe, appearing in March of this year at Senate Armed Forces Committee hearings, reported that the new binary weapons are intended for deployment on the European continent.

Approximately four million liters of poisonous substances are already stored for this purpose in American warehouses in Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz and Baden-Württemberg. A total of more than 170,000 chemical shells were already warehoused in Western Europe by the beginning of 1982 for the U.S. V and VII Army Corps. Even this quantity, however, is clearly insufficient for the Rogers Doctrine in the opinion of the NATO generals. They scrupulously calculated that for the "success" of chemical Armageddon, it is necessary to increase the stocks of chemical arms in Western Europe to 300,000 tons of chemical weapons, that is, a calculated average of 500 grams for every man, woman and child (a kilogram of zorin is sufficient to annihilate a million human lives).

Few people know yet another fact. The waters of the oceans washing the Western European coastline have been turned into cemeteries where thousands of tons of "obsolete" poisonous substances have been buried. This is a sort of colossal delayed-action ecological timebomb. After all, the containers in which the chemicals are contained are gradually eroding. The following instance shows what this can lead to and what grave consequences it promises not only for the
environment, but for man. A mysterious accident occurred on Okinawa in the summer of 1968: after swimming in the ocean, 267 Japanese schoolchildren came down with a temperature and a rash appeared on their skin without any apparent causes. It turned out that right next to the beach was located a special U.S. subunit that had thrown containers with "obsolete" lethal chemical contents into the sea.

The very nature of chemical weapons makes them first-strike weapons, and that is why their warehousing and use are basically intended, along with medium-range missiles, for the European theater of military operations. After all, in the plans of the White House, Europe is the "first line of defense," behind which America hopes to sit in the event of the beginning of a third world war. This plan becomes all the more practicable and sinister if one takes into account the fact that the United States, alone among 159 member countries of the United Nations, voted against a resolution calling for restraint in the production and deployment of new types of chemical death. The allies of "chemical arms buildup," like their colleagues for "nuclear arms buildup," are trying to instill in the uneasy world community the nonsensical notion that the new lethal arsenal will, they say, strengthen the position of the United States in negotiations with the Soviet Union and will, supposedly, make it possible to work out agreements, including one banning nuclear weapons. Such an approach by Washington to the negotiations, a position of first "buildup" and then disarmament, is wholly without promise and neither brought nor will bring to Washington any kind of new "trump card."

As regards the position of the Soviet Union, our country unswervingly observes the obligations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (by the way, only ratified by the U.S. government in 1975) and comes forward in favor of the total banning and destruction of chemical means of waging war. At the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament, the USSR introduced for review a draft of "Fundamental Positions of the Convention on Banning the Development, Production and Accumulation of Chemical Weapons Stockpiles and on Their Destruction." The distinctive response of the Reagan administration to this step was the refusal to renew the negotiations on banning chemical weapons that were earlier conducted between the USSR and the United States, and were broken off in 1980 at the fault of the White House administration.

Chemical weapons are abominable and amoral in their essence. The placing of new American chemical means of waging war on the European continent according to the Rogers Doctrine is a monstrous and insane plan to create mass murder for the current and future generations of the peoples of Western Europe.

12821

CSO: 1801/16
YELLOW RAIN SENSATION, PENTAGON PLANS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Kiselev: "What is Concealed Behind the Curtain of 'Yellow Rain,' or the Story of One Propaganda Bluff"]

[Text] The term "yellow rain" recently appeared in the lexicon of the American press, which splashes out streams of lies about the Soviet Union. Using the screen of this same rain of unusual color, which is called deadly and mysterious, the United States wishes to conceal the president's decision to begin mass production of binary weapons (a new generation of chemical weapons), a decision which is antihuman and anithuman to the highest degree.

The plot of the sensational "discovery" of the so-called "yellow rain" is primitive to the utmost, but it is necessary to return to its story. At one time figureheads "testified" that a new "Soviet-made" chemical weapon, "yellow rain," allegedly had been used in Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan. According to the "authoritative" assertion of Pentagon and CIA specialists, this new weapon caused general poisoning of the body to an enormously greater extent than all combat mixtures known to date. It was said with all certainty that the weapon had been employed "with the help of artillery systems, which covered certain terrain sectors with chemical weapons." "Victims" also were found who testified that they had gotten into the effective zone of this "rain" and "experienced its effects on themselves."

The sensation worked. Intended for "pressing many buttons of the mind," it generated a certain reaction and a new bluff about the "Soviet military threat."

But sober voices also were found in the chorus of malicious and false distortions. They demanded proof, but naturally there was none. None at all! Scientists expressed their opinion. The newspaper DAILY WORLD also refuted the conjecture about the "yellow rain." Doubt was cast on much that had been written about the "new Russian chemical weapon." In particular, in exposing the statement that this weapon had been employed using artillery, the newspaper noted the following fact: for some reason not one shell fragment was found on the territory against which the chemical-filled shells allegedly had been fired, although according to the description of "witnesses," the stricken area itself was so great that thousands of the aforementioned munitions would have been required for its contamination.
Other denunciations followed after the first one. It turned out that none of the "eyewitnesses" remembered such a powerful assault. But the propaganda spiral continued to unwind. A specially established committee of UN experts took up this matter at the direct request of the United States.

Let's leave the "yellow rain" for a time and follow what happened in the United States itself. What happened was that, as the journal NEW SCIENTIST notes, preliminary American-British bilateral talks about the possibility of joint production of binary weapons began in Washington back in June 1980. For a number of reasons, however, an official continuation of these talks, planned for March 1981, did not take place. All further contacts on this subject between representatives of the Pentagon and the UK Ministry of Defence now bore an "unofficial" character. But it was then that the parties agreed that Great Britain would engage in basic research on new toxic agents and the United States would support their testing and production.

In this same period the U.S. administration began to actively cultivate its European allies for the purpose of inclining them toward stationing binary weapons on their territories. This pressure continues to this day, and it becomes more and more powerful as the day nears for a final resolution of this matter.

On 19 June of this year the House of Representatives voted 229 to 196 in support of legislation earmarking appropriations for a chemical weapon production program, although the House had been against it during the preceding three years. The myth of the "yellow rain" probably played a certain role here.

With regard to results of work by the UN special commission, it is known that they turned out to be far from in favor of the overseas adventurers and Pentagon "authorities," to the obvious regret of the accusers. This did not, however, embarrass the lovers of false sensations.

Well, what are the real facts? Let's turn to studies by a group of prominent American and British scientists from leading universities of the two countries. They familiarized themselves in detail with analyses of over 300 samples taken by specialists of the U.S. Army Chemical Laboratory; performed their own analyses of the samples obtained from areas of Southeast Asia; and, taking into account their own personal observations in these countries, they arrived at the unanimous conclusion that the "yellow rain" observed at one time in some states of the region had nothing in common with manmade toxic agents.

According to their statement, the reason for the "yellow rain" is a behavior, still unknown to science, of gigantic Asiatic bees—Apis dorsata—which at a certain time and under the effect of certain factors assemble at a height of several hundreds of meters in an enormous swarm of many thousands. Flying at relatively high speed, this swarm creates an avalanche of its excrement, perceived by "eyewitnesses" as "yellow rain."

The scientists called on Washington officials to publish the conclusions of their work and take practical steps for a further study of this natural phenomenon.
And now a few specific figures. The Pentagon plans to spend some $10 billion up to 1987 on the development and production of new chemical weapons. This despite the fact that the U.S. arsenal already has some 150,000 tons of toxic agents and over three million chemical shells, missiles, bombs and mines capable of destroying all living things on Earth many times over.

The Soviet Union always has favored and continues to favor a total ban on chemical weapons and the elimination of their stockpiles. This is the substance of our policy. Herein lies its fundamental difference from the U.S. imperialist course, the danger of which for mankind is obvious.

Now the true meaning of the false fabrications about "yellow rain" becomes clear. They are one more ill-meaning attempt to slander the USSR and to conceal one's militaristic plans for stockpiling chemical weapons.

6904
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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

LAO DEFENSE MINISTER'S MOSCOW ARRIVAL, TALKS REPORTED

PMO21343 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 1 Nov 85 2nd Ed p 1

Unattributed report: "Official Friendly Visit"

Text /LPRF/ Army Gen K. Siphandon, member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Politburo and Lao defense minister, arrived in the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit 31 October at the invitation of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister.

At the capital's Sheremetyevo Airport the Lao guest was met by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister; Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeyev, armed forces chief of General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister; Col Gen A. D. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; USSR deputy defense ministers Army Gen Ye F. Ivanovskiy, Marshal of Aviation A. N. Yefimov, and Army Gen A. T. Altunin; and generals, admirals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Among the welcoming party were Thongsavat Khalkhamphithoun, Lao ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Col B. (Senchongkhak), military, naval, and air attache at the Lao Embassy in the Soviet Union.

The state flags of Laos and the USSR were hoisted at the airport, an honor guard was formed, and the two countries' national anthems were played.

Army Gen K. Siphandon, Lao defense minister, accepted the report of the chief of the honor guard and reviewed the line of Soviet servicemen.

The same day a meeting was held between Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, and Army Gen K. Siphandon, member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Politburo and Lao defense minister. During a warm and friendly talk questions of mutual interest were discussed.

Taking part in the talk were, on the Soviet side: Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeyev, Col Gen A. D. Lizichev, Army Gen Ye F. Ivanovskiy, Marshal of Aviation A. N. Yefimov, Army Gen A. T. Altunin, Adm Yu. P. Grishin, and

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other officials; and on the Lao side: T. Khaikhamphithoun, Lao ambassador to the USSR, Maj Gen O. Thammatheva and C. Sai-Gnakon, Lao deputy defense ministers, and other officials accompany the Lao defense minister.

Army Gen K. Siphandon, member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Politburo and Lao defense minister, laid a wreath at the V. I. Lenin Mausoleum and at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin Wall. The wreath-laying ceremony was attended by Col Gen V. M. Arkhipov, commander of Moscow Military District.

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CSO: 1801/56
IZVESTIYA ON ANTI-DRA PROPAGANDA

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Oct 85 p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent G. Ustinov, Kabul: "The Black Lie of the Enemies"]

[Text] This enormous mountain in the frontier district of Khost was given a strange name at one time. The translation of its Pushtu name, (Zhavar), sounds like "depth." But it immediately became clear to soldiers of the Afghan Army who took this strategically important objective after a difficult assault what the secret was here. It turned out that the entire "foundation" of the mountain is perforated by deep natural caves. They were what the enemies were defending so stubbornly. There they stored supplies for several years of war: hundreds of surface-to-surface missiles, antiaircraft shells, many thousands of antitank and antipersonnel mines, a huge number of small arms and over a million cartridges for them, shelves of boxes of grenades, and storehouses with food, clothing, footwear, medicines and bandages.

A special commission from Kabul, including comrades from the Main Political Directorate of the DRA People's Army, flew in to receive this arsenal. The political comrades had their own subject of interest: bags of subversive literature, counterrevolutionary journals and newspapers, leaflets, a mimeograph and the latest radio for conducting hostile broadcasts were found in the (Zhavar) caves. As Col Abdul Wahez, one of the army's prominent political workers, told me later, he immediately filled in the collection of enemy publications and technical propaganda resources which he keeps with a dozen new "models" not previously encountered.

The portrait of the basic enemy is rather well known: a cutthroat armed to the teeth, a paid murderer, a specialist in secret passages across state borders and in hiding places and camouflage, a robber who is not beyond stuffing his pocket if the occasion presents itself, whether it be at the expense of victims or by cleaning out the purse of a fallen fellow bandit. Then one other character in the Afghan counterrevolution looms next to him more and more noticeably. He has a West German movie camera in his hands instead of an Egyptian submachinegun, and a Japanese video tape recorder instead of an Italian mine. His camels in the bandit caravan don't carry boxes of cartridges, but mountains of books and texts and bundles of recent newspapers. His "work place" is not in ambush around a turn of the mountain road, but in
the "studio" of a field radio station. He fights the revolution primarily with the word or, more precisely, with malignant gossip and poisonous slander, and he is no less dangerous than his brother robber, the bloody enemy murderer.

In the first stage of the undeclared war against the DRA the foreign guardians of the counterrevolution assumed all propaganda concerns, which stands to reason, with such experience in conducting campaigns to brainwash one's own and foreign peoples. Some illiterate head of a band could hardly be compared with them! While before the April Revolution many western radio stations, including Voice of America, weren't operating in Afghanistan's state languages of Pashto and Dari, the situation changed radically following the revolution. Presently more than 50 western radio stations are carrying on propaganda against the DRA. The amount of radio broadcasting to this country has increased 30 times over the last five years and comprises 110 hours per day. There are plans to open up branches of the subversive radio stations Liberty and Free Europe, which are on the CIA's payroll, in the Pakistani city of Peshawar.

Yet all this seems little to the inspirers and organizers of the undeclared war. They are making ever wider use of the Afghan counterrevolution itself for ideological subversion; it is more fluent with 'local material' and has a better knowledge of the social and national psychology. And so the radio stations "Voice of the Islam Revolution of Afghanistan," "True Voice of Muslims of Afghanistan," and "United Muslims and Mujahideens of Afghanistan" were set up in Pakistan. These stations' radio broadcasts, conducted in the best time for the airwaves in the morning and evening, have an especially unbridled, instigatory nature. By appealing to religious and nationalist feelings and taking advantage of the population's illiteracy and backwardness and the tenacity of feudal and clan prejudices, their authors carry on a continuous slanderous bombardment against the DRA people's power and against the revolution's plans and achievements. They pass off black as white, heap one fable on another and spread the most incredible rumors. They are the ones who supply propaganda material to the mobile radio stations with which many bandit formations operating on DRA territory are outfitted.

In recent years the largest counterrevolutionary groupings—the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA) and the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (IOS)—have acquired a rather substantial propaganda base designed for waging protracted psychological warfare against the DRA. Initially these groupings and then other "parties" of the reactionary emigration set up "culture and dissemination" departments in their headquarters. An "Afghan Information Center" began to operate in Peshawar.

Great efforts are being applied to strengthen the printed base of this ideological offensive. Various Afghan counterrevolutionary groupings now publish over 70 newspapers, journals and weeklies, which come out not only in Pakistan and Iran, but also in the FRG, Italy, England and the United States. A large portion of them are printed in the Dari and Pashto languages, but some publications are in English and Arabic, for a broader audience, so to speak.
The counterrevolution is attempting to build up the scale of verbal propaganda in every way. Lately propagandist cadres are being trained for this purpose from among the active and literate band members. Special training centers have been established in Pakistan and Iran.

The Afghan comrades acquainted me with an arrested graduate of such a center operating on Pakistani territory just 40 km from the DRA. The village of Pishin, located halfway between the city of Kvettoy and the Afghan border, had a bad reputation even before. Courses for training commando-type fighters and a school of general military training have operated here for five years now. A center for training enemy propagandists was set up here some time ago. Two hundred persons train here simultaneously, with classes designed for two months.

Ahmed (Dzhan), known by the nickname "Teacher," told me that the leader himself is directly responsible for ideological work in the enemy groups and detachments. Each major band has several propagandists who carry on subversive work in the mosques, at bazaars and in other crowded places; they arrange rallies, "heart-to-heart talks" and tea-drinking; and they conduct jirgi, the traditional meetings of the elders and residents.

In addition to verbal propaganda, the enemy agitators disseminate posters, caricatures, and inflammatory slogans and appeals often written on trade containers, matchboxes and pocket calendars. In both his first and last trip along the Afghan frontier, the "Teacher" "dropped off" about ten cassette tapes in Afghan refugee camps with promises of generous help to the "jihad"—the "sacred war against the infidels." On the tapes, following innocent eastern songs and dances, were violent anti-Afghan sermons of the counterrevolutionary leaders, threats and incantations of figures in the reaction, and quotes from statements by western politicians.

The career of Ahmed (Dzhan) was unsuccessful. He reported to us, however, that in case of great personal success he later would have been favored with a promotion. He could be sent to Peshawar where there are courses for training cameramen. Their first graduation took place in December 1984. Course graduates are issued movie cameras and video tape recorders with a goodly supply of film and cassettes. They are also given personal means of transportation. Their task is to film staged "solemn" meetings between the bandits and the local populace, and the distribution for show of food and other vital necessities from the "assistance funds."

We didn't pass up a chance to spend a day with Col Abdul Wahez in his "archives." Hundreds of posters, leaflets, newspapers, journals, texts, books, and programs of subversive radio stations passed through our hands. With all the outward diversity of these products, their content and spirit are rather uniform: unmasking of the "crimes" of the people's power, antisoviet slander, and propaganda of the "jihad" and "heroism" of the enemies.

Having realized the absolute impossibility of winning victory in the undeclared war, the counterrevolution and its foreign guardians are snatching at lies and, to save their own black deeds, they are attempting to confuse the
republic's citizens with the propaganda hullabaloo and slander and to undermine the revolution from within.

The western and eastern protectors of the enemy rabble take on a very unseemly appearance in this situation. For example, the U.S. Congress recently passed a legislative amendment sanctioning the allocation of $500,000 in fiscal year 1986 for training Afghan counterrevolutionaries in methods of subversive propaganda and ideological subversion.

But the initiators of psychological warfare are striving in vain. The Afghan people chose their path, and no propagandistic wailing and howling will make them swerve from it.

6904
CSO: 1801/40
ROCKET ATTACK ON KABUL SUBURB REPORTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Sep 85 p 3

Article by Col V. Shrizhalin, correspondent for KRASNAYA AVEZDA: "New Crime Committed by the Dushmani"

Text/ The counterrevolution has committed another crime against the Afghan people. Insurgents fired on (Chekhel-Sultan), a suburb of Kabul. Seven rockets struck the thickly-populated area, with each missile causing loss of human lives.

Laborer Muradzhan and his family were left without a roof over their head. Only sheer luck kept injuries limited to light wounds. However, the wife and two children of Murza Mukhammeda were rushed to the hospital in hopeless condition. Two rockets which exploded in the yard of Gausuddin wounded five people seriously.

Western propaganda is working feverishly to create an aura of "defenders of the people" around the "Mujahedeen," as the dushmani are called in the West. This is necessary for the inspirers of the undeclared war against democratic Afghanistan to justify in some manner before the eyes of world opinion the daily increase in supplies of weapons, ammunition and military equipment delivered to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries.

It is not love of the Afghan people which guides the rulers of the West, who are allotting many additional millions of dollars to escalate the aggression.

With its demagogy on "defending the Afghan people," bourgeois propaganda is attempting to camouflage the expansionist purposes of imperialism, which is striving to restore its lost position in the region. The aggressors are not concerned with the fact that the main victims of the undeclared war are peaceful women, children and old people.

13005/12276
CSO: 1801/18
MOSCOW TV REPORTS ON ROAD CONSTRUCTION

LD180456 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 16 Nov 85

Report by Mikhail Leshchinskiy: "The Road of Friendship"; from the "Vremya" newscast

Text The roads of Afghanistan are its history, its present, and its future. For a mountainous country all its land routes have been of primary importance for centuries, but this is a special one. The Afghans honor it by giving it a name familiar to every Soviet person--the Road of Life. This is no exaggeration. It is precisely along this road that the main bulk of the cargo which is most vital to Afghanistan's national economy comes from the Soviet Union. Each kilometer is unique in its own way, but life has been given to this road by a tunnel nearly 3-km long which traverses the Hindu Kush range to the Salang passes. The tunnels; galleries, bridges and the road itself were built over two decades ago by Soviet specialists. All these years the road has been living and working like a well-oiled machine, thanks to the efforts and care of the Soviet and Afghan road builders. They have built asphalt-and-concrete plants, and there is a large road-repair depot.

At the most difficult section, where the pass is, a group of our specialists is led by engineer Aflatun Rastunovich Nasirov. Working conditions in the mountains are, of course, familiar to him, a native of the Caucasus. However, every day he and his comrades have to come across things which one should not have to be used to. Dushmani mines and shells rip up the highway. Bandit groups, hiding on the mountain slopes along the road, constantly threaten the lives of the Soviet and Afghan road workers.

Fulfilling one's civil international duty requires here the same courage as the fulfillment of military duty.

Video shows aerial shot and then roadside view of convoy trucks winding its way along highway up a mountain pass; zoom shot of plaque with legend "Salang 1964" on wall; rear view of armored vehicle following convoy with trucks passing on opposite side of road; roadbuilders raking asphalt as it is emptied on to highway from a truck.

The task is to daily increase the freight turnover along this main artery of Afghanistan. At the present moment reconstruction work is going on in a high-altitude tunnel. It could be said that this is the pride of Salang. Specialists are devoting all their efforts to fulfilling the tasks entrusted to them.

/12228
CS0: 1801/56
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AFGHANISTAN

EDITORIAL: RELATIONSHIP OF NATIONALITIES IN ARMY

PM191100 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 17 Nov 85 2nd Ed p 1

Editorial: "According to the Laws of Friendship"

They serve on Afghan soil as part of the limited contingent of Soviet troops. That alone sharpens their sense of the motherland and sense of international duty and rallies still further the servicemen of the company commanded by Sr Lt A. Pliukov. They include representatives of 12 ethnic groups, but the unit's combat formation is monolithic, as has repeatedly been verified by complex and dangerous tasks when international brotherhood, friendship, and troop comradeship have been among the decisive factors in success.

Each day of the activity of the Soviet Armed Forces, raised and educated by the Leninist Party, is rich in vivid manifestations of remarkable traits and very high qualities that the presocialist era did not know and that no army in no capitalist state has ever known or now knows. The sources of these distinguishing features and qualities lie in the very nature and ideals of the socialist system, which entered the historical arena of revolutionary struggle and constructive creativity under the banner of the political and social equality of working people, proletarian internationalism, and friendship and brotherhood of the peoples. These very lofty ideals have also been profoundly embodied in our state's military organization.

The internationalism of the Soviet Armed Forces is predetermined by the very essence and the very historic mission of the socialist army, which is called upon to defend the revolutionary gains, freedom, and sovereignty of its state's peoples, irrespective of their nationality.

The defense of socialism is profoundly international in its sociopolitical nature and essence. This natural law was vividly seen in the civil war years, during the concluding stage of which the sons and daughters of 50 ethnic groups fought shoulder to shoulder under the red army's combat banners. Representatives of over 100 of our country's nations and ethnic groups fought on the fronts of the great patriotic war. The friendship and brotherhood among the peoples of the land of the Soviets became part of the combat arsenal and were one of the decisive factors in our world historic victory.
The Soviet Armed Forces have honorably fulfilled both their patriotic duty and their international liberating mission. True to their militant class solidarity, along with the Warsaw Pact countries' armies they are now vigilantly standing guard over the fraternal peoples' revolutionary gains.

Soviet people's unbreakable friendship and great sense of commonality of interests and of indissoluble destinies cementing the military formation even more reliably now that the nationalities question has been resolved in our country not only juridically but in practice. Now that social and national relations have reached unprecedented maturity. Now that the mutual influences of peoples and the internationalization of the entire tenor of life in our country have intensified and continue to intensify. Now that a new historic community of people—the Soviet people—has emerged.

Today a great mustering of forces and a mobilization of all the reserves of each Soviet republic in order to accelerate the country's socioeconomic development are under way in our multinational society. The party, the draft new edition of the CPSU program notes, proceeds on the basis that the consistent implementation of the Leninist nationalities policy and the strengthening in every possible way of friendship among the peoples are part and parcel of the improvement of socialism. The draft points out that in our socialist multinational state new tasks in improving national relations naturally arise in the process of the joint labor and lives of more than 100 nations and ethnic groups.

This natural law is appropriately manifested in our armed forces too. Each Soviet republic makes and will continue to make its contribution to strengthening their combat potential. Now almost all military collectives are composed of representatives of 10 or more of the country's nations and ethnic groups.

All this imposes great obligations on commanders, political workers, military cadres as a whole, and party and komsomol organizations and to a considerable extent predetermines the nature, content, and intensity of work on personnel's patriotic and international education. In many of our units and on many ships this work is conducted in a well-conceived way and with mounting intensity. Its content is being enriched and plan principles are being strengthened.

General trends are displayed only in the particular, in the specific. Following this logic, let us take the regiment commanded by Lt Col N. Smirnov. Servicemen from 12 ethnic groups serve in it. That is why officers at the regimental and subunit level and party organizations study people and their relationships so attentively and are so concerned for the moral health of the military collective. This health is maintained by educational measures—among which "by the map of the motherland" soirees are particularly popular—by an identically equable and respectful attitude to servicemen of any nationality, and by disciplinary practice in which demandingness and justice are of supreme importance. So the soldiers live according to the laws of international brotherhood and troop comradeship and the military collectives do not experience the slightest manifestations of national egoism or alienation.
The sanctity and inviolability of the laws of friendship and brotherhood among the peoples determine the moral atmosphere of most of our multinational military collectives. However, this cannot be grounds for slackening educational work. It must not be forgotten that nationalist prejudices are an exceptionally tenacious phenomenon and that they have a firm grip on the consciousness of people who are not sufficiently politically mature. It must also be remembered that the nationalities question has been and remains an active section of the ideological front on which the struggle between socialism and capitalism has sharply exacerbated. That means that it is necessary to study and appropriately influence people and to know and take account of the foreign policy situation.

The nationalities question is a political one. Consequently, it requires an appropriate approach. This applies to the educational and to the organizational work of commanders, political organs, and party and komsomol organizations.

The draft new edition of the party program orients us toward this approach too. However, certain officers unfortunately cannot see all aspects of the problem. Some of them argue approximately as follows: since the nationalities question in the country has been resolved, is it necessary to attach great importance to certain quirks in subordinates' behavior? Yes it is! Even those taking place at the level of individual relationships.

In a multinational military collective it is important to organize the service, training, and leisure of servicemen in such a way as to ensure that each of them feels himself to be a full member of a united combat family. That the national dignity of each person is highly respected in the collective. That the sense of all-national pride that has been asserted in our society becomes a determining factor in the moral climate of the collective. That each person is profoundly aware of his personal responsibility for the defense of the socialist fatherland and is an active participant in the struggle to further raise the combat readiness of his subunit, unit, and ship and to strengthen military discipline.

There is no room in the Soviet Armed Forces for national discrimination. This is now reflected by the makeup of our political command and engineering and technical cadres, which comprise representatives of the most varied nations and ethnic groups. In assessing their activity and services and in nominating any of them the political, moral, and professional qualities of officers are taken into account, not their nationality. This principle is also strictly observed with regard to draftees.

The USSR Armed Forces have been and remain a remarkable school of patriotism and internationalism. Guided by the party, they are selflessly true to this high ideals and are rallying their ranks still more closely under its Leninist banner.
AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

SUCCESSES CLAIMED NEAR KABUL--Kabul, October 10 TASS--According to a BAKHTAR agency report, successful combat operations to neutralize bandits have been carried out in Paghman District (Kabul Province). In the course of fierce fighting, a considerable number of counter-revolutionary bandits has been destroyed, foreign-made weapons and ammunitions have been captured. The subversive literature and documents seized from the bandits convincing evidence of the ties of the bandits with the counter-revolutionary chiefs, who entrenched themselves on the territory of neighbouring states. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1825 GMT 10 Oct 85 LD] /6662

TURKISH VISITOR NOTES ROCKET ATTACK IN HERAT--Moscow, October 30 TASS--"I was deeply shocked by the report from the Afghan city of Herat where 14 people were killed and 78 wounded by rocket fire at a square near the mosque", Tayar Alty Kulac, chairman of the Chief Board for the Affairs of Religions at the prime minister of Turkey, [as received] told a TASS correspondent. He was staying in the USSR at the head of the delegation of Turkish Moslems. Tayar Alty Kulac said Turkish Moslems denounced this deeply inhuman act the way they would denounce any such act of vandalism against representatives of any other religion. Tayar Alty Kulac met with Soviet journalists before departure from the USSR where he stayed on October 18-30. He positively assessed the visit of the delegation of Turkish Moslems to the USSR and declared for fostering contacts between the two countries' Moslem organisations. The delegation visited the Soviet Central Asian republic of Uzbekistan, the Transcaucasian republic of Azerbaijan and the north-Caucasian Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Republic. The guests met with representatives of central and local government bodies, Moslem clergy and believers, had joint Friday prayers and studies historic and Moslem monuments. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1025 GMT 30 Oct 85 LD] /6662

CSO: 1812/26

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