Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL
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ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

IZVESTIYA: U.S. MILITARY TAKING OVER CIVILIAN SPACE STATION

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Yu. Kosinskiy: "Notes on a Conflict Among Partners"]

[Text] In the United States, there is a lot of publicity about plans for the establishment of an orbital space station. A project being developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) still exists only on paper. Sharp arguments have already developed, however, between the United States and the other participants in this space enterprise.

At the personal initiative of U.S. President Reagan, the countries of Western Europe, Canada and Japan have been drawn into participating in the realization of the project. It has been proposed to them that they contribute their share amounting to $4 billion. In exchange, the partners of the United States in the space project were promised the right to take part in the joint management of the station as well as three laboratories and living modules on board (one of each for the West German, Canadian and Japanese researchers).

At the end of 1986, without any consultations with its partners in the project, NASA decided to make a number of changes in the design of the future space station as well as in the status of the participants in the project. According to information leaking to the Western press, the Pentagon is insisting that NASA speed up the realization of the space project that was planned for implementation by 1994. In counting on reducing the time for the assembly of the orbital station by about 5 years, NASA is striving to simplify its design. In particular, it is planned to limit the scope of the work by assembling the American modules only (laboratory and living modules). In addition, the magazine AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY reports that the Pentagon demanded that NASA terminate the negotiations that had begun with the European Space Agency (ESA) on the joint management of the space station.

The American military department, the magazine specifies, fears that, by binding itself contractually with foreign partners, the United States is risking limiting the use of the orbital space station for the realization of military programs. The impression arises that, in the light of these steps, Reagan's initiative on the joint realization of the space project is becoming quite illusory.
The negotiations between the United States and the ESA have been broken off. The meeting of representatives of these two organizations planned for January 1987 has been postponed indefinitely. Under the pressure of the American military, reports the French press, NASA is refusing to give to the West Europeans, Canada and Japan the right of access to American space research programs and is not giving its partners a guarantee of legal ownership of the results of research in space. In viewing the space station as "part of the territory of the United States," the Americans intend to be fully in charge of it.

According to the French weekly L'EXPRESS, the only thing that the partners of the United States can count on is agreement to carry out several of their programs by American specialists. At the same time, the journal recalls that the American side has already frustrated the realization of planned research by the ESA once. Thus, the module costing more than $1 billion for space experiments that the ESA turned over to the Americans in 1985 has not been in space.

The ambitious declarations of the principles of cooperation in a spirit of autonomy and unity of interests made by the Americans in Rome in 1985 do not pass the test, says L'EXPRESS. Even so, however, it is clear that the orbital space station being built by the United States will be used for the purposes of American military strategy and that its work program will be dictated by the Pentagon.
IZVESTIYA CLAIMS BRITISH HOTOL SPACECRAFT TIED TO SDI

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Dec 86 p 4

[Article by S. Mushkaterov, under rubric "Notes to the Point": "British Contribution to SDI"]

[Text] What is the purpose of the reusable HOTOL [Horizontal Takeoff and Landing] spacecraft that is presently being developed in Britain? Not so long ago British authorities were asserting that it was intended for placing satellites in orbit or overhauling them and for carrying cargo and passengers. In short, for the highly peaceful development of space.

Now silence reigns on this topic in Great Britain's official circles. It set in immediately after the TIMES newspaper reported that "military strategists in the countries of Western Europe are showing growing interest in the use of the HOTOL as a platform for the stationing of a new generation of superweapons."

Such great interest in the project on the part of NATO services did not come about by mere accident. It was preceded by a series of briefings, conducted in the strictest secrecy, for representatives of the defense ministries of Britain and the other NATO countries. At that time experts came to the conclusion that the space plane could become an effective means of placing strike weapons in space, since missiles with independently targeted warheads, laser and electromagnetic canons, and other weapons that are being worked on within the framework of SDI could be placed in the ship's cargo section, which is designed to carry seven tons of useful cargo.

It was M. Thatcher's cabinet that was the first to support SDI fully and sign a so-called "memorandum of understanding" with Washington, according to which, besides everything else, the American government is supposed to provide British military-industrial corporations with $1.5 billion in orders within the framework of SDI. However, the facts indicate that this proved too little for official London, and it intends to get into the placement of new weapons into space using its own device. Things didn't occur here, of course, without pressure from Washington, which wants to use the HOTOL project to help step up the implementation of SDI plans and expand the circle of its direct participants.
Whatever the case may be, the actions of the British Parliament in no way square with its words about its desire for peace. Not so long ago G. Younger wrote in a lengthy article published in the SUNDAY EXPRESS that talk about peace is not enough, that practical measures are needed! From every indication, official London understands these practical measures in an extremely unique fashion. Instead of intelligent, concrete proposals for reducing arms, it prefers to contribute to the militarization of space by means of the HOTOL project.

8756
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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET ACADEMICS COMMENT ON BIG BUSINESS ROLE IN SDI

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jan 87 p 5

[Article: "SDI: Superprofits for Military Magnates"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Washington's imperial ambitions in connection with the realization of SDI are being strongly supported by the military-industrial complex of the United States. In recent years, the bosses of the military-industrial complex have sought "new ideas" that could turn out to be sources of new profits. They have now taken a death hold on the "space version" of the arms race, considering it to be the most promising. During these days, the editor's office is receiving many letters in which readers are asking for information on the actions of military-industrial concerns in carrying out the "star wars" program. We asked researchers B.I Komzin and A.A. Nikolin from the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences to answer some questions stemming from the letters.

[Question] Why are American companies already such active supporters of SDI even though years of scientific research as well as of basic, advanced and other studies remain before a decision by the administration and Congress on deployment of a given system.

[Answer] The fact is that the research stage of preparations for "star wars" is a gold mine for military-industrial concerns. It is planned to appropriate from $60 billion to $90 billion for these purposes in the coming decades and, if the "research" continues another 10 years, this sum can rise to $225 billion, according to the Federation of American Scientists.

A ramified monopolistic state mechanism for financing American science "works" for military business. The resources of the taxpayers, officially earmarked for the stimulation of scientific-technical progress in the country's economy as a whole, actually are put at the disposal of a relatively limited group of monopolies. The share of the 100 largest recipients of federal funds for research work exceeds 90 percent. Under the conditions of state-monopolistic capitalism, research and experimental-design work has become the area of the greatest militarization. The share of military research in federal expenditures for science increased from 50 to 72 percent during the period of the presidency of R. Reagan.
For most American industrial companies, it is a risky business to carry on scientific research with their own resources. In any case, the initiator of such research can count on his investments being compensated only in the event that a new commodity is successfully marketed. The contractors of the Defense Department, NASA and the Department of Energy with its nuclear military programs are essentially participating in a "no-losers lottery." Under contracts with federal departments, the military-industrial corporations receive profits directly from the research itself, frequently many years before the production of new models of weapons or military equipment. For this reason, participation in Pentagon research programs is no less attractive for military concerns than is the direct production of military output. In recent years, the financial resources received by military-industrial corporations for research have amounted to about half of the funds that they have been drawing from the Federal Treasury in payment for the delivery of tanks, aircraft, and missile and other military technology.

[Question] Which U.S. industrial concerns have been actively involved in this new sphere of military business?

[Answer] The pioneers in the creation [sozdanie] of space arms were those military-industrial companies that for decades have been suppliers of the most varied types of offensive weapons, nuclear and conventional. The company TRW ("Thompson-Ramo-Woolridge") has been developing a high-energy combat laser since as early as 1970 and, in 1984, it delivered a powerful chemical laser to the military departments. In 1979, a group of American military-industrial corporations turned to Congress with a proposal for the creation of an ABM laser system. Martin-Marietta, an unfailing participant in U.S. missile programs, came out with a similar idea in 1981. Lockheed, one of the leading Pentagon contractors, has for many years been using federal funds to do research in the area of ABM defense.

An influential group of such corporations is playing an important role in "pushing" through Congress new appropriations for research and development of the SDI program. And they receive the lion's share of government orders under this program. The largest military-industrial concerns became pioneers in the receipt of research contracts under the SDI program. The 20 major U.S. military corporations received 75 percent of all funds appropriated for SDI in the last 3 years. General Motors received $613 million, Lockheed $580 million, Boeing $374 million, and TRW $373 million. Just as remarkable is the fact that during this period 47 percent of the SDI contracts went to California, the citadel of the American military-industrial complex. The American Council on Economic Priorities declared that "SDI is more an insurance policy to guarantee the prosperity of arms manufacturers than a system to defend America against nuclear attack."

[Question] What distinguishes the activities of the arms manufacturers in the framework of SDI from other rounds in the arms race?

[Answer] For the military-industrial corporations of the United States, the magnitude and structure of funds appropriated to the SDI program means the possibility of implementing their own highly profitable "initiatives"
practically through the entire broad spectrum of natural and other sciences, not only as applied to the conditions of "star" but also other wars. Even in its initial phase, the SDI program already includes as integral components the resolution of problems that are complex in their scientific and engineering aspects, permitting a sharp increase in the potential efficiency of all means of armed struggle.

Even before the official proclamation of the "star wars" program, the tendency toward the maximum expansion of the front of research work became apparent within American military business. The Western press notes that even in the 1970's military industrialists and generals connected with them had the thought that the demand for military aircraft, tanks and frigates will gradually decline and therefore their profits will be reduced. And the military-industrial corporations threw themselves into a real quest for new weapons, new military technology and new sources of profits. "In the course of 30 years," notes the West German magazine DER SPIEGEL, "military concerns lived through the technical equipping of nuclear land, naval and air forces. Whoever now raises strategy to the next higher level, that is, to space, will receive orders for the next 30 years, avoiding the necessity of changing the profile and structure of its production."

Military business is actively supporting the SDI program, taking into account the expected receipt of dividends not only from its participation in the current research phase of this program. In accordance with existing practice, the leading performers of the research projects will in the future be awarded contracts for the production and delivery of the corresponding arms and military equipment to the armed forces. And these are contracts measured not in tens but in hundreds of millions of dollars. According to some estimates, the cost of a large-scale deployment of SDI can be even higher--more than a trillion dollars. With long-term expenditures of this magnitude, orders to military-industrial corporations and their profits would be unprecedented. In the words of M. Torson, vice president of the Martin-Marietta Company, "this is one of the most important areas of technology in the country. We believe that this will yield much fruit of different kinds and we want to be in front."

[Question] What is Washington being guided by, in actively involving other capitalist countries in the SDI program?

[Answer] The American military-industrial complex is striving to establish a base of support for "star wars" abroad and to bring in the scientific-technical potential of Western Europe, Japan, Canada and other countries of the capitalist world. They are persistently suggesting to the industrialists of these countries that it is not in their interests to delay participating in programs for the militarization of space.

It is quite understandable that American business is far from disinterested when it proposes to foreign firms that they join in the SDI program. In striving for their support in carrying out the "star wars" program, the gigantic military-industrial corporations of the United States are thus counting on putting them in the position of being a kind of subcontractor forced to adapt to the American program for the creation of space arms. This
would naturally weaken the position of the competitors of American monopolies in world markets. In regard to the hopes of West European, Japanese and other companies of attaining access to the highest technology in the framework of SDI, there is reason to doubt that the American military-industrial complex will do everything it can to meet them.

Thus, the "Strategic Defense Initiative" was and is an obstacle on the path to transforming the earth into a nuclear-free zone. The truly historical Soviet-American agreement in this direction that was taking shape in Reykjavik was torpedoed by the "star wars" program. The ominous shadow of the U.S. military-industrial complex settled over the talks in Reykjavik. The union of the producers of death and militarism again revealed itself as being in support of the extreme reaction and as a constant and growing source of military danger.

9746
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FRG PAPERS SAY WEINBERGER CREATES CONCERN AMONG ALLIES

"Throwing a Promise Overboard"

DW251130 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Jan 87 p 12

[Commentary by "FK": "News From Weinberger"]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger has said that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has made unexpectedly great headway at least in research, and possibly certain components of the system can soon be installed in space. Thus the secretary is quite casually throwing a promise overboard that the European allies have always considered particularly important about SDI — the fact that research and deployment should be strictly separated, and the fact that the deployment issue should be discussed later by agreement with all partners. Weinberger’s statements on the miracles of research do not have to be taken at their face value, because they emerge in a similar form every spring when Congress must be persuaded to allocate funds for specific military projects; however, the announcement of deployment he made so easily is serious. If SDI were to be implemented — something that experts doubt regarding space-based defensive weapons at least — nothing much will come of the great consultations. Moreover, if it is under Weinberger’s jurisdiction, the allies must rather be worried that they will learn about the beginning of the venture from the press.

DIE WELT Comments

DW251245 Bonn DIE WELT in German 24 Jan 87 p 1

[Fritz Wirth editorial: "Dangerous Debate"]

[Text] In the United states the time has come once again to intensify the nation’s awareness of defense related to geography. Secretary of Defense Weinberger did so yesterday by stressing that “Western Europe is the forefront of freedom.” His warning is well-founded, because the strategists of a new isolationism are appearing again. In the new U.S. Congress, forces are rallying who not only demand trade barriers, but also want to set up a fortress of a new military nationalism. They are isolating themselves in the belief that they can resolve the country’s crises alone.
The debate is not new; it comes up periodically. However, that does not mean that it can be discarded as a routine event. In this case it has a new dimension because it must be viewed on the background of Gorbachev's effective disarmament propaganda offensive. A U.S. retirement from Europe, as sought by the isolationists, or a military-strategic gamble, as suggested by former security adviser Brzezinski who said that the United States should withdraw large contingents of troops from Europe, are dangerously undermining the West's negotiating positions in future disarmament talks.

In making such moves, the advocates of this new isolationism always use an effective means — many Americans' ignorance of the European and in particular German contribution to defense. In that respect an information campaign should be launched which U.S. Ambassador Burt has conducted for some time in his own country with gratifying clearness. It is about time to reinterpret the term "protective power America." The U.S. presence in Europe largely also serves its own protection. Or, putting it more precisely: that protection is indivisible, from the Pacific to Berlin.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BULGARIA: STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ANALYZED, CRITICIZED

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 12, 13, 14 Nov 86

[Article by Maj Gen Stoyan Andreev, Senior Science Associate, Candidate of Technical Sciences and Honored Technician: "Reykjavik and the Pentagon's Plans for Achieving Military Supremacy"]

[12 Nov 86 p 4]

[Text] The Reykjavik meeting between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and the U.S. President Ronald Reagan undoubtedly was a remarkable event in the contemporary history of mankind. At it they discussed the questions of the limitation and complete elimination of all nuclear weapons which are fatal for the survival of life on the earth. And while these problems were not actually solved, this was because the administration of President Reagan placed the interests of the U.S. military-industrial complex higher than those of all mankind, in not wishing to stop the realization of the Star Wars Program.

At present, the representatives of the White House and Pentagon and certain Western European political and military leaders are praising the possible problems which can be solved by this program. Here they make no mention either of the scientific truth or the standards of generally accepted morality and represent their so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as the salvation of all mankind. In actuality, the real and terrible truth is quite different. SDI is the next attempt by the U.S. military-industrial complex to gain military strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. Before the meeting in Reykjavik, a Pentagon representative stated: "There is no serious reason for the United States not to develop and further its superior potential in space. The United States must recover its sense of divine destiny."

What dangers are involved in carrying out the SDI, what strategic tasks does the United States intend to achieve by the SDI, what are the methods of the propaganda cover for implementing the SDI and can the United States gain unilateral strategic advantages by the SDI? Let us examine these questions one by one.

Western propaganda asserts that there is a contradiction in our assessment of the SDI. On the one hand, it is affirmed that the level of modern knowledge
and the existing and developing technologies are insufficient for creating a highly efficient and wide-scale antimissile defense system. On the other hand, it is asserted that the SDI is extremely dangerous and we must actively oppose its development. How can these assertions be reconciled without rejecting them.

In truth what does it mean to develop a wide-scale and highly efficient antimissile defense at present? This means to create a system of facilities to detect the launchings of all classes of missiles, to process the data concerning these, to assess the danger caused by them, to allocate the active means of resistance depending upon this assessment and to control them until the targets are destroyed. But calculations on the saturation of the space situation indicate that from 10,000 to 20,000 nuclear charges can be fired simultaneously and some of these can carry out their combat missions in 5-8 minutes. Studies by both Soviet and American scientists indicate that neither the capacity, the accuracy nor the number of planned active weapons (space weapons) can destroy such a multiplicity of space targets with a probability higher than 70 percent. Moreover, the intelligence and the computing power of the computers which must control them in a gigantic hypothetical space battle cannot meet the resolution, the technical and software reliability required by the SDI project. In a single second several hundred trillion operations must be carried out for controlling the programs which contain up to several-score million series of the program code with a reliability close to one.

The answer which science provides for the posed question is categorical. Neither now nor over the next several decades would it be possible to develop an antimissile system with a combat effectiveness proclaimed by President Reagan. This means in military language that even if the SDI were built as it were designed, it would not destroy more than 70 percent of the warheads of land-based ballistic missiles and could not respond to missile strikes launched by aviation, submarines or surface vessels armed with cruise missiles. Here the conclusions of science are inexorable. In launching a land nuclear strike with a power over 100 megatons the so-called threshold of the chain destruction of a state would occur. And this capacity can be delivered by just 1 percent of the presently existing carriers and warheads. For this reason Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stated to President Reagan at Reykjavik that "in military terms the SDI does not concern us." In other words, precisely as the conceived large-scale antimissile system the SDI does not bother the Soviet Union because its maximally achievable effectiveness is unsatisfactory and the possible countermeasures which could render it useless are much cheaper (hundreds of times cheaper) and have been proven effective.

Then what is the danger of carrying out the SDI and why do we oppose it so energetically?

The weapons which are to be developed under the SDI Program are weapons of the postnuclear age and in destructive might they are not the inferior but in many regards are superior to the present-day nuclear missiles. And while as antimissile weapons they are not sufficiently effective, as offensive strategic weapons they threaten mankind to a greater degree than weapons of mass destruction. Here are just a few examples. According to the SDI Program, the third generation of nuclear weapons is to be developed, or as
they are called the gamma laser. This in a single "shot" can hit up to 50 strategic targets which are hundreds of kilometers apart, including entire residential areas of important political significance or towns. These weapons will have an effective range of several thousand kilometers and will constantly "hang" over the head of entire groups of states, in maintaining millisecond readiness with a control system without human involvement. As a defensive weapon should this not cause concern?

Or another example. Lasers with the power on the order of 20-30 million watts create a concentration of energy on the earth's surface on the order of 15,000-20,000 joules per square centimeter and at which wooden and plastic structures ignite. Entire cities which are fixed targets can be burned up in a few seconds by using weapons located thousands of kilometers in space. What sort of defensive weapons are these lasers and should they not cause concern in people? These examples can be continued by the corpuscular-ray and microwave weapons which could destroy everything living on the earth!

The purely military dangers caused by the implementation of the SDI Program are not limited to what we have pointed out and in no way can be overlooked. I will mention just the most important ones.

a) A decisive increase in the level of the direct military danger. The most economic and at the same time one of the most efficient ways of countering the antinissile system is a sharp increase in the number of carriers and an improvement in the quality performance of the nuclear warheads. These have already been developed and their production is organized. In this manner any antinissile system can be reduced to a saturation state and turned into an uncontrollable one. However, this means new and severe consequences for mankind and the elimination of the very possibility that some people might avoid the nuclear threat.

b) A sharp increase in the danger that mankind may be drawn into a thermonuclear catastrophe without the involvement of politicians due to purely technical factors.

The disaster with the American Challenger spacecraft and the emergency at the Soviet nuclear plant in Chernobyl showed that almost improbable technical events in complicated systems do occur and we can no longer count just on the fact that they are almost improbable. And this is due to purely technological unreliability. In complicated controlling systems such as the electronically controlled equipment of space weapons, there is the very dangerous phenomenon of the "reflex captivating of one system by another." This means that if because of a mistake, for example, in one of the controlling programs (as happened with the American air defense computer facility of the NORAD system on 3 June 1980), a missile attack will be displayed and this will activate a portion of the active weapons, another system (the enemy's countersystem) will respond with more effective means and to which the first must also respond in a similar manner and so forth, until a complete catastrophe!

Many might say that a man in these systems would not allow this all-destroying avalanche!
However, man in the SDI plans is not to participate in critical situations due to the simple fact that the first attack from space is planned to occur in just 30 seconds! Just look how time has been tremendously reduced for assessing the situation and taking a decision over the last 40 years. In 1946-1947, this time was 12-14 hours. In 1957-1959, this had dropped to 30-40 minutes. In 1981-1984, this reached 5-8 minutes. The SDI Program will shorten it to seconds. What else could a person do in these few seconds to save himself except turn the fate of everyone over to the electronic brains (computers) of the attack space facilities. This in essence is the most misanthropic and dangerous in the SDI system regardless of the fact that those who proclaim themselves to be concerned with the fate of mankind convince us of the opposite.

But this program poisons international relations not only with its future dangers. The well-known American politician, Senator John Biden has pointed out that at present it is disrupting the political stability and economic might of the United States and the world in seven areas of which the disruption of the strategic military stability in the world, the elimination of the fundamental possibility of controlling strategic missiles and the reduction of American competitiveness in the strongly scientific-intensive sectors have already assumed dangerous amounts.

It is quite apparent that in accord with the Star Wars Program the American military-industrial complex intends to develop attack space weapons which in fractions of a second will hit targets in space and from space on earth. The United States, after attempting up to now by all ways to achieve military superiority by improving nuclear missile weapons and has not been able to gain any advantages, is presently attempting to achieve this by space. Western propaganda at present often repeats the following question: "How could the Russians for the sake of some SDI sacrifice the agreements on reducing strategic and medium-range nuclear missile weapons?"

The answer is quite simple. The Soviet Union has proposed the elimination of nuclear missile weapons in strict observance of the principle of strategic equality and equal security in order to free mankind once and for all from the danger of complete annihilation and not to create, or unilaterally by the United States, even more destructive weapons. On this question there can be no compromise since it is inadmissible to turn the life of people into an object of big business. This is new thinking, this is new morality, this is our political will based on the entire potential of the socialist commonwealth!

[Comments on SDI] Casper Weinberger, U.S. secretary of defense

"If we are able to obtain a system which will be effective and will make their (the Soviet—Editor) weapons ineffective, then we will return to the situation in which we were, that is, when we were the only country having nuclear weapons."
R. Marsh, U.S. Air Force general

"We are obliged to achieve the capacity to wage war from the earth's surface at targets in space, from space facilities against other space facilities and from space against earth." 

Graham Green, writer

"Along with the desire for military superiority, America with the aid of SDI intends to exhaust the Soviet Union in economic terms. To force it to spend money which could be employed for the development of the country. I feel that such a policy of economic pressure against the USSR is exceptionally stupid and will lead to nothing. As for SDI as a plan for creating an "impenetrable" antimissile shield, this is unfeasible. This is not only my viewpoint but also the opinion of many specialists with whom I have spoken."

John Cogut, physics professor at University of Illinois (United States)

"Particularly now, after the Reykjavik meeting, we must make every effort to see what can be done to prove that the SDI is founded on an incorrect idea. I expect that this will impel scientists who are against the SDI to act."

[13 Nov 86 p 4]

[Text] When a scientific and technical analysis is made of the antimissile system to be built under the Star War Program, it turns out that it cannot be employed to combat cruise missiles, particularly hypersonic, submarine-based missiles and nuclear-carrying aviation. These arguments are no longer disputed even by the closest advisers of President Reagan. But the supporters of SDI have asserted and do assert that this system will protect U.S. territory and even the territory of its NATO allies. However, in science there are objective proportions and patterns. Under the influence of the arguments of expert groups of such world-renowned scientists as H. Beatty, R. Harwin, H. Linn and C. Sagan, U.S. public opinion has begun to realize that behind the presidential ambitions linked with SDI stand more desires and publicity than strictly scientifically sound calculation. Comrade M.S. Gorbachev on this question has said: "In my view, in America no one no longer believes that such a system can be created."

This state of the Star Wars Project, however, raises the following very acute question: If the capabilities of the SDI are so limited (that is, it can destroy up to 70 percent of the warheads only on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles), why is the United States spending several trillion dollars for its development? Are there no specialists in the Pentagon who realistically view the capabilities of SDI?

It must be said that the estimates of the U.S. military-industrial complex given for the Star Wars Project have been well done. These estimates are complete and comprehensive and it is no accident that at present the U.S. administration is sacrificing, without hesitation, all existing agreements on the problems of weapons limitation as soon as the question is raised of halting SDI.
In the issue of 27 October 1986, the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT which is close to the U.S. military circles published extensive material on the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). It also included diagrams which we republish here. They show the various elements developed within the program at the corresponding stage of development with 1 — designating the research stage, 2 — laboratory research, 3 — testing under real conditions, 4 — deployment stage.

In the first row from left to right are shown power sources in the research stage (a developed nuclear reactor with uranium fuel and a power of 300 kilowatts is expected to be launched in space around 1993); laser weapons in the almost concluded stage of real testing (the lasers will be employed to hit ballistic missiles during the first 5 minutes of flight); ray weapons in the stage of laboratory testing; kinetic weapons in the stage of real testing.

In the second row from left to right are shown the systems for detection and tracking in the research stage (these are chiefly early warning satellites); carriers in the real testing stage; computers in the real testing stage; programming in the development and model testing stage.

Let us examine the main versions of the agreements between the United States and USSR offered by the White House with the obligatory condition of not banning the construction of the SDI.

First version. The United States accepts the Soviet proposals for a complete elimination of all nuclear weapons prior to 1996, but will develop the "backbone" of the SDI until then. What does this mean in military terms?

Even if the system can be built as an extensive and highly effective one, it will be capable of destroying just 50-60 percent of the warheads of the Soviet
intercontinental ballistic missiles. During the period of destroying the
warheads, according to the accepted schedule, its effectiveness will increase
rapidly, since it is substantially easier to combat individual ballistic
missiles than it is to fight against group (salvo) rocket attacks. Thus, the
United States gains decisive strategic advantages even in the cutback stage,
however these do not stop even then. If all the U.S. and Soviet nuclear
weapons are destroyed before 1996, after this time the United States will
remain the monopoly possessor of laser, nuclear (third generation) corpuscular
and microwave space-based weapons with a range of 4,000-5,000 km and an
activating time of 3-4 seconds. These are precisely the weapons of mass
destruction of the postnuclear age which only the United States is to possess.
But this is an attempt to return to the times of 1944-1945, when the Americans
blackmailed and terrorized the world with the monopoly possession of atomic
weapons.

It is perfectly obvious that such a development of events is not only
unacceptable by the USSR but also inconceivable!

The second version. The Soviet Union agrees to cut back only the medium-range
nuclear missile weapons while the intercontinental ballistic missiles are to
be reduced drastically, while again not imposing any limitations on the
implementation of SDI. Since 70 percent of the Soviet nuclear might is
concentrated in the intercontinental ballistic missiles and since the SDI
cannot be employed against large salvo strikes of these missiles, to the
degree that the USSR reduces this component of its nuclear might, the
unilateral advantages increase for the United States. On the one hand, the
combat effectiveness of SDI is increased against a smaller number of warheads
and, on the other, their strategic attack might is increased due to the adding of
the "fire" of the offensive space facilities which can be used to hit
ground strategic targets. This version is also extremely unacceptable. In
essence, for the nonspecialist it is clear why the Soviet proposals made by
M.S. Gorbachev at Reykjavik for limiting and completely abolishing nuclear
weapons are inseparable from the demand to halt the implementation of the Star
Wars Program, or as the diplomats say, they are a package deal and not an a la
carte menu.

The third version. The United States will not accept any of the Soviet
proposals for limiting and abolishing nuclear weapons. An analysis of the
American military scientific research and design programs indicates that this
version is the main one for the present U.S. administration and in accord with
it American military organizational development is being carried out as well
as American foreign policy. According to this version the United States up to
the end of the century must build up its potential for launching the first
nuclear strike against the Soviet Union with impunity. As much as the
American administration denies this evil intention, the conclusions of the
designated analysis show precisely this. Moreover, they show very clearly a
first-strike scenario. Let us turn to the facts.

The first component in the first-strike potential is the highly accurate,
highly maneuverable and heavily protected nuclear missile weapons. The United
States has focused all its fundamental science on the development of these
weapons, in beginning with microelectronics, optoelectronics, geology and
geophysics and running to meteorology and oceanology. When we add to this the new technologies, they have created compact nuclear warheads with a power up to 600 kilotons, and control systems for them on the terminal leg of the flight providing an accuracy from 10 to 50 m and having the capability of maneuvering down to the last second.

Let us turn our attention to one other quality factor in the improvement of the offensive strategic weapons. In 1960, the targeting of a strategic missile required 24 hours, in 1975 this had been reduced to 35 minutes and with the commissioning of the MX missile, this will reach 5 seconds.

On the basis of these achievements, the MX, Trident-2 and B-1B bomber system are being built and commissioned. Naturally, one wonders: if the United States is not creating a strike potential for a countersilo attack (an attack against the strategic weapons), why do they need weapons for "surgical" (as they are termed) strikes? But this is only part of the truth.

The achieving of these high accuracies, this great maneuverability and survivability is done only by employing the capabilities of space-based information and navigation systems. This fact is the natural result of military-technical progress. It closely binds the development of weapons to the use of space. From precisely here arise the dual space ambitions of the Pentagon: to harness space in preparation to create a first-strike potential and to prevent the enemy during war from controlling its weapons and troops from space. For this reason at present the United States is intensely building up the next component in its first-strike potential. This is a system for countering enemy satellites.

The next element of the designated potential is a global control system for the U.S. armed forces and weapons during a nuclear war. Around 50 billion dollars have been planned for this program.

And where is the place of SDI in this scheme?

This system — and this is very important — must defend the U.S. launching pads for firing the intercontinental missiles of the Minuteman-3 and MX class and destroy up to a level of 70 percent of the warheads on the Soviet intercontinental missiles assigned to the retaliatory strike. But this is a first-strike scenario. Initially the Soviet reconnaissance satellites are knocked out, after which a counterforce "surgical" strike is launched against the Soviet strategic weapons systems, in destroying up to 70 percent of them. If the USSR endeavors to launch a retaliatory strike with the remaining 30 percent, the SDI will go into action against them. In this manner it is possible to reduce the U.S. losses in an eventual global nuclear conflict to acceptable levels. This would be an ideal platform for the American "hawks" to blackmail the Soviet Union and the entire world. As we can see, in this version the purely military role of SDI is primary. The reverse is even more noteworthy: there is not a single military scenario in which U.S. military doctrine is carried out and where SDI does not play a primary role.

At present, we can see the validity of the assessment of M.S. Gorbachev of the SDI: "After Reykjavik the notorious SDI for everyone is a symbol of the
obstructing of the cause of peace, a concentrated expression of militaristic ideas and a reticence to eliminate the nuclear threat hanging over mankind.

American imperialism obviously suffers from a great nostalgia for the time when it had a monopoly possession of nuclear weapons. In harnessing the scientific, economic and military potential of virtually the entire West, it is endeavoring to turn history back to this situation using primarily SDI. But at present both the times as well as the balance of forces on all decisive fronts are different.

The possibilities of real socialism to respond adequately but not symmetrically are enormous!

[14 Nov 86 p 4]

[Text] Even from the logical structure viewpoint, the Star Wars Project is a question of decrepit political and military-technical thought. An assessment of the combat effectiveness of SDI and the political conclusions stemming from this are based upon approaches employed during World War II. Then, if 50 percent of the attacking strategic bombers were repulsed, it was considered that the expected losses of the attacked enemy were reduced by approximately 50 percent. The employment of such an approach in assessing the capabilities of SDI is profoundly erroneous.

At present, we have reached a so-called saturation state of offensive strategic weapons whereby such quantities of them have been stockpiled that they are enough to destroy mankind ten times over. This is one aspect. The other is that the destructive capabilities even of solitary missiles are already of a strategic nature. Hence the task at present for a global antimissile defense is not to reduce the percentage of expected losses but rather to eliminate every possible loss, even an individual missile attack. But as scientists have shown, an antimissile system of such effectiveness in principle cannot be built over the next 50 years. Moreover, even now the maximum combat effectiveness of SDI of 80-90 percent, as conceived by the White House and Pentagon, in the opinion of both Soviet and American specialists is greatly overstated. If we use as the base the estimate of Academician B. Raushenbakh that at present simultaneously up to 1,000 missiles could be fired, we would see that at least 100 of them would reach enemy territory! Obviously, even this level of penetration of the SDI will be reached before the year 2000 and it becomes meaningless as a global antimissile system.

But precisely this vulnerability suggests the ways of reducing its effectiveness below an acceptable level. One has merely to fire in the missile salvo along with the 1,000 missiles with real warheads another several thousand dummy missiles with dummy warheads (which can be simply metalized balloons) and the entire electronic control facility of the SDI would be paralyzed. It requires neither time, nor new research, nor much money to develop these counterweapons.

Thus, an increase in the number of actual warheads with their greater accuracy and power, accompanied by the launching of many-fold more dummy missiles and
warheads can make SDI uncontrollable whereby its combat effectiveness is unacceptably low. Mikhail Gorbachev directly stated to the Americans: "...To restore equilibrium, the Soviet Union will be forced to increase the effectiveness, accuracy and might of its weapons in order to neutralize, if need be, the American-developed Star Wars electronic-space machine."

The possible, strongly-effective active countermeasures do not end with this. Let us examine the main ones which the Soviet scientists Academicians Velikhov, Sagdeyev and Raushenbakh and the American scientist H. Beatty have presented in the open press.

The upper part of the diagram which we republish from the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE shows the U.S. futuristic weapons for waging Star Wars. In the lower part of the diagram we show certain of the counterweapons.

As was already pointed out, SDI in terms of its structure and physical principles of operation cannot be employed effectively against cruise missiles, particularly hypersonic, strategic nuclear-carrying aviation and submarine-based ballistic missiles fired on oblique (low) trajectories. No space reconnaissance device can detect them on time, no precision tracking
systems can aim the space weapons at them, and the time for adequate response to them with the present and future technologies is not sufficient to destroy them.

Hence, the introduction of SDI obviously can lead to a certain restructuring of the nuclear-missile potential of the Superpowers but not to a substantial reduction in their offensive might. This is a military scientific argument strengthening the Soviet thesis that nuclear weapons can be eliminated not by developing the SDI but rather by constructive political talks and comprehensive international agreements.

The lofting into space of maneuvering mines which will constantly accompany the SDI space platforms. According to a command given from earth, these mines can be detonated and destroy the technical structure of the space-based SDI. Certainly, in principle it would be possible to loft space mines for destroying the space mines. Precisely this is one of the dangers of the new round of the arms race and of which the Soviet Union has warned the Americans. And if this path is followed, as an American scientist wisely pointed out, in this arms race the prime cause, SDI, will be forgotten.

The accelerated development and putting into space of antisatellite weapons for destroying the SDI reconnaissance satellites. This is an easily realized and much more effective program of the SDI, although it is not so effective as it. The introduction of these weapons would greatly disrupt strategic stability in the world and the United States would suffer from this first.

In addition, against the orbital SDI facilities one could very successfully employ the same ray weapons and homing missiles which are presently designed by the Americans to combat the Soviet ballistic missiles. The unsymmetricalness of the counteraction is that the SDI orbital facilities will be put into space orbit and the coordinates will be known down to a microsecond by the counteryesystems and destructive devices will be targeted at them ahead of time. Then they will be kept in an accurate and highly ready sight, while this cannot be done against missiles suddenly launched from the ground or under water.

In the Western special press, announcements have appeared that they have already begun to develop a new nuclear warhead for ballistic missiles which is virtually invisible and unrecognizable by the futuristic SDI weapons. In truth, modern technologies make it possible to develop housings for warheads which absorb up to 99 percent of the electromagnetic energy radiating them in virtually the entire electromagnetic spectrum. As is known, if a missile is not detected and cannot be tracked by the information equipment, there can be no counteraction however powerful the means activated to destroy it.

Moreover, if we add the new capabilities of modern technologies to develop highly maneuverable warheads, we can see what low efficiency there will be in the SDI command system, even without introducing special interference in its communications channels.

A group of passive countermeasures against SDI is represented by comparatively inexpensive and highly effective and fully tested measures.
Merely giving a rotary motion to the land-based launching missiles and the employing of the cold-launch method (without the brief activating of the launch engines), the effectiveness of the laser antimissile weapons, in the assessment of American specialists, drops by around 30 percent. If a special aerosol defense is created on the first hundred meters of the missile trajectory, the effectiveness of the lasers, including the gamma laser weapons, drops so much that the using of them as an antimissile weapon is absurd.

It is quite obvious that this complicated facility spread out in near space and consisting of weapons, identification and data transmission equipment and computer complexes is greatly vulnerable to electronic countermeasures. Starting from the weapons which are based upon an electromagnetic pulse and ending with the powerful space-based noise generators -- all of this can instantaneously paralyze tens of thousands of duplex SDI channels over which it must automatically control its strike facilities.

Without assessing the other possible ways for countering the SDI, it is possible to draw conclusions which are extremely disconcerting for the authors of the Star Wars Project:

a) All unsymmetrical countermeasures against the SDI have an extremely high effectiveness.

b) They are characterized by a comparatively low price which runs within the limits of 4-5 percent of that of the Star Wars Project.

c) These measures have already been developed and tested, including under range conditions and most under space conditions and in military terms nullify SDI as a large-scale antimissile system.

With good reason recently one can spot pessimistic notes even in the tone of President Reagan. After the meeting in Reykjavik, he stated: "I have never sought 100-percent effectiveness from SDI." What remains of his promises for a nuclear shield of the United States and which would nullify the Soviet nuclear missiles? One can also note delicate reassessments in the scientific SDI programs. After having spent several billion dollars and being unable to develop a sufficiently powerful chemical laser, at present the efforts of American scientists have shifted to other types of lasers. Even the functions of the nuclear laser (gamma laser) in SDI have been adjusted. Now they are planning to use it to detect dummy warheads and not to destroy the warheads.

Most of the scientific research on the SDI Project is now being shifted to humbler targets. Does all of this bespeak a certain sobering in Washington? Unfortunately, analyses of the military programs show quite the opposite. The American military-industrial complex blindly believes in the technological might of the United States and on this basis is planning and carrying out its class-egoistic policy, posing here the most irresponsible and adventuristic aims.

The Report of the CPSU Central Committee on the 69th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution stated: "The development of military equipment
confronts the world with a choice either of surviving and learning to live humanly or to perish. This requires a courageous and profound reassessment of the situation which has arisen and new thinking which has broken with the concepts and views of the prenuclear age."

The way out of the situation which has arisen largely due to the fault of the United States was pointed out by Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik. His proposals establish the necessity of a rapid solution to many major problems. There is an optimistic air to these proposals!

10272
CSO: 5200/3002
Canada might re-consider its financial and technical support for the U.S.-led space station project if the Pentagon goes ahead with plans to use the facility for weapons research, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said Wednesday.

Clark told a Commons committee he wrote to the U.S. administration Jan. 16 to express his concern over indications that the American military wanted to use the space station to research or test weapons in space.

News reports this month quoted Col. Gerald May, director of space for the U.S. National Security Council, saying the U.S. must keep its options open for military experiments aboard the space station.

Canada agreed last year to participate in the station, and some $800 million will be spent over 10 years developing a Canadian-built maintenance and servicing centre, a kind of “space garage” for the station.

Total cost of the project is estimated at $8 billion.

Canada agreed to participate in the project with the understanding it would be for civilian use only, and Clark told the committee Canada prefers it to stay that way.

His letter expressed “serious concern about any changes to the original purpose,” of the station.

However he said it was his understanding that there has been discussion since the beginning of the program of possible research into non-aggressive military uses of the station.

Non-aggressive uses might include verification of arms agreements or military intelligence-gathering, Clark said.

Clark stopped short of threatening Canada’s withdrawal from the project, which experts agree could yield important technological gains and provide access for Canadian companies to new fields of industrial and scientific research.
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

CANADIAN ARMS CONTROL CENTER ON POLICY REGARDING SDI

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 14 Jan 87 p A4

[Text]

Canada's top arms control think-tank says the federal government should steer clear of the U.S. Star Wars missile defence program when it looks at proposals on new defence policy later this year.

The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, in a statement on Tuesday, said the government should also press the United States to adhere strictly to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty with the Soviet Union.

That treaty, in which both superpowers agreed not to develop or deploy defensive shields to block missile attacks, is considered by many arms-control experts to be in danger because of research by both sides.

Washington's Strategic Defence Initiative, or Star Wars, envisions a space umbrella that would detect and destroy missiles aimed at the United States.

And U.S. arms-control negotiators have accused the Soviets of breaching the treaty by constructing a huge radar system at Krasnoyarsk, in the centre of the Soviet Union, that they say could be used for battle management to defend against an attack.

John Lamb, the centre's director, says in the statement that Canada should not endorse a shift in the current policy of nuclear deterrence to one of strategic defences.

But if both superpowers decide they want to develop the highly advanced and highly expensive missile shields, then the systems could be introduced — but only by mutual agreement, Lamb says.

The centre is not strictly against using space for defence. In fact, it urges the government to consider establishing a military space program using satellites to passively track and monitor military activities in space.

The government has already commissioned studies into a space-based surveillance system that could be linked to the new North Warning system currently under construction in the Arctic.

And private aerospace concerns have proposed that Canada construct a mobile satellite called Paxsat, which would identify satellites with military potential and relay the information to the ground.

In a related development, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty referred to the $600-million North Warning system Tuesday as a stop-gap until satellites can be developed to identify and track suspicious objects in space.

Some critics worry that North Warning will end up as a component of Star Wars. But U.S. Air Force Gen. Robert T. Herres, outgoing commander of the North American Aerospace Command (NORAD), says Star Wars is so far from actual development that such fears are unfounded.
GORBACHEV ANSWERS LAWYERS' APPEAL FOR FURTHER TALKS WITH U.S.

LD051239 Moscow TASS in English 1212 GMT 5 Feb 87

[Text] Brussels, February 5 TASS -- The secretariat of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers has announced today that it received from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, a reply to the association's address with the appeal to continue the dialogue started in Geneva and Reykjavik to put an end to the arms race.

It is noted in the communique of the association that its president Joe Norman received from Mikhail Gorbachev a reply, in which he said that he had read with much interest the address to him." The Soviet leader, the association says in the communique, which summarizes Mikhail Gorbachev's reply, pointed out that he shared the worry voiced in the association's address over the continuation of the arms race and the risks of the militarization of space.

The Soviet leadership, the association goes on to say in its summary of the reply from the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has a favourable view of the association's appeal for the continuation of the dialogue started in Geneva and Reykjavik to eliminate nuclear weapons in the world and to establish an all-embracing system of security for all the states and peoples. The Soviet Union is convinced that such an historical chance must not be missed. The radical reduction and eventual total abolition of nuclear weapons with strict respect for legal guarantees and renunciation of the militarization of space could pave the way to change and substantial improvements in the international situation and create an atmosphere of trust which would make it possible to resolve social and economic problems facing the world today.

Everything today depends on the U.S., the leaders of which should display a political will correctly to evaluate the current world situation and stop seeking what cannot be achieved, military superiority over the USSR. The Soviet Union has already taken steps and will take fresh ones to the best of its ability to safeguard peace and avert the threat of nuclear war looming over the world.

We think the association quotes Mikhail Gorbachev as saying, that the participation of ever broader sections of the world population in this struggle is bringing closer the point at which mankind will enter a non-nuclear age. Our country thinks highly of the efforts of democratic lawyers for peace and progress and their contribution towards the strengthening of the fundamental principles of international law and in defense of
social equality and democracy. The association's efforts in that direction will continue to enjoy the Soviet Union's support. The USSR reaffirms that it will keep honouring the U.N. Charter, international treaties and agreements and its own obligations. We stand for the further consolidation of the legal base of state-to-state relations. That is why we recently submitted for the consideration of the United Nations a draft memorandum on international law.

The association also says that it has not got any reply to an identical address sent to U.S. President Ronald Reagan simultaneously with the one to Mikhail Gorbachev.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1283
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: VORONTSOV SEES PROGRESS, CAUSES FOR ALARM AT GENEVA

LD031731 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1825 GMT 3 Feb 87

[Text] Geneva February 3 TASS -- The Soviet side has come for the current round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons with an open position of initiative, said Yuliy Vorontsov, member of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR first deputy foreign minister, who heads the USSR delegation at these talks.

He spoke about the results of the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that took place in Moscow 27-28 January. He stressed the plenum will occupy a special place in the implementation of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress on the acceleration of the socio-economic development of Soviet society. The plenum determined specific steps aimed at the revolutionary transformations of all areas of Soviet life and making socialist development more dynamic. The Soviet people link their vital interests, the fate of the country and its international prestige with the restructuring and democratization being carried out by the party.

Yu. Vorontsov noted it was clear to every unbiased person the achievement of the creative aims we have set is only possible in conditions of peace and security. The whole enormous activity of the Soviet state in the international arena, its specific proposals and very important initiatives are aimed at ensuring a peaceful future for people -- and at eliminating the threat of war. Replying to journalists' questions about the state of affairs at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons, Yu.M. Vorontsov, who heads the USSR delegation at these talks, said that at this round there are all the necessary prerequisites for consolidating Reykjavik's positive results. Wishing to end the deadlock at the talks, we proposed the Americans give up endless discussions in general terms and go to the specific coordination of the provisions of the framework understanding that would embrace all the directions at the talks -- a strengthening that would embrace all the directions at the talks -- a strengthening of the regime of the ABM Treaty, a cut in strategic offensive weapons down to their elimination by the end of 1996, elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, resolution of the question of the start of talks on the total prohibition of nuclear tests.

The measures in the said directions should be carried out, certainly, in a package, in their interconnection. Since the point at issue is to make a truly history-making step toward building a nuclear-freeworld free from the threats fraught in the appearance of strike weapons in outer space, Yuliy Vorontsov said.
Wishing to ensure progress at the talks, we expressed preparedness to carry out practical work for the coordination of the respective draft documents in each individual direction — at the group on outer space, at the group on strategic offensive weapons and at the group attending to medium-range missiles.

At our first meeting in January with Max Kampelman, the head of the U.S. delegation, we reached understanding on precisely such an organization of work at this round. It must be said the first weeks have produced their results.

As a result of numerous intensive meetings at various levels within the framework of the delegations, progress has been made on a number of aspects in coordinating the wording to seal the results of Reykjavik.

Alarming points have, however, appeared in all three directions of the talks. So far the U.S. delegation adheres, as a matter of fact, to its old positions which do not allow progress on a number of key issues. Moreover the U.S. side is introducing additional complicating elements into its approach.

There is an impression, and its has particularly increased in recent days that the hands of the U.S. delegation are clearly tied, that there are no powers from Washington for showing a constructive approach. This is apparently what is necessary to those in the United States who, trying to please the Pentagon, are stubbornly pursuing the policy of the deployment of SDI (and this is precisely what they in Washington are now talking about, having thrown aside the "intensive research" camouflage), of undermining the ABM Treaty, implementing large-scale programmes in the field of nuclear arms.

Such is, in a nutshell, the situation today. It cannot but be a source of concern, Yuliy Vorontsov said.

It may be asked how the Soviet side plans to act at the talks under these conditions? Our policy is clear — it is spelled out in the Soviet program for the elimination of nuclear weapons of January 15 last year, in our platform put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev at Reykjavik. All of this remains in force. We intend to do further everything necessary to implement the Reykjavik decisions. But, as you see, the ball is in the court of the U.S. side, the Soviet representatives stressed. Yuliy Vorontsov then replied to many questions posed by correspondents.

The majority of the delegations — and it is perhaps here that the main point of the present session lies — have realized the need to strive toward breaking out of the procedural quagmire as soon as possible and move on to a path of seeking constructive solutions to the whole complex of questions of disarmament.

Representatives of Mexico, the USSR, Britain, and other countries spoke today.

[Begin recording] [USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister Yu. M. Vorontsov] We make no secret of the fact that the implementation of our plans, which have been determined by the party and congress and the January plenum of the CPSU Central Committee — these are plans for the most important restructuring and the acceleration of the development of the whole of our country — would be facilitated by a reduction in international tension and an end to the wasting of forces and assets on an arms race which is senseless and deadly dangerous for the whole of mankind. [end recording]

So the winter session has begun its work. Success, it is stressed here, depends on good will and the contribution of all the states participating in the conference.
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S ARBATOV ASSESSES REYKJAVIK, RESULTS

AU161151 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 12 Jan 87 p 3

[Interview with Academician Georgiy Arbatov, head of the Soviet Union's United States of America and Canada Institute, by NOVOSTI: "Realistic Foreign Policy Initiatives" -- date and place not given; first two paragraphs are newspaper's introduction]

[Text] The year 1986, which the United Nations declared as the Year of Peace, is already history. This was the period of the large-scale realistic foreign policy initiatives made by the Soviet Union, initiatives aimed at eliminating the weapons of mass destruction, radically reducing conventional arms, and eliminating sources of international tension. From this point of view, the Soviet-initiated summit meeting in Reykjavik was a considerable event.

Academician Georgiy Arbatov answered some relevant questions asked by NOVOSTI.

[NOVOSTI] What is the importance of the Reykjavik summit and how can it affect the further development of East-West and Soviet-U.S. relations?

[Arbatov] In my opinion, the main achievement of the Reykjavik summit is that, for the first time in a very long period, we succeeded in ridding the issue of disarmament and nuclear arms reduction of the bureaucratic cobweb with which the enemies of detente surrounded it in the course of the negotiations prior to the summit meeting. According to Gorbachev, the negotiating table was covered by all kinds of "napthalene-smelling junk". The Vienna talks, which have been going on for 13 years, provide the most obvious example of this. It is enough for me to mention that a total of 0.5 percent of the armed forces stationed in central Europe has been the issue discussed in all the versions of the agreement negotiated for the last 13 years. The pace of the Vienna talks and of other talks proved that, on the one hand, the West could not reject dialogue with the Soviet Union while, on the other hand, the West did not want or was not ready to take determined steps for the creation of disarmament and of mutually acceptable conditions. More than that, the negotiations gradually became useless and even harmful; and they also became the factors of retreat in the thinking of the Western public opinion. With these negotiations, those in power in the West were proving their sham activity and thus reassuring people, while they were doing nothing concrete.

This "napthalene-smelling junk" was swept away from the table in Reykjavik. The issues immediately became clearer and more tangible. The issues were freed from the cobweb of words. It became clear that it was impossible to sweep the precisely outlined and concrete proposals made by the Soviet Union under the carpet and they were waiting for active solutions.
Therefore, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries are doing everything in their power to make sure we do not return to the "pre-Reykjavik" phase and the negotiations will continue at the point at which they concluded in Reykjavik. That is what we expect of the U.S. side too.

[NOVOSTI] In your opinion, why was there no agreement achieved in Reykjavik on the issue of the radical reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons?

[Arbatov] At the summit the Soviet Union initially proposed both sides reduce their strategic weapons by 50 percent in 5 years, eliminate the intermediate-range missiles stationed in Europe, and come to an agreement with the U.S. by which the Soviet Union would maintain 100 nuclear warheads on its intermediate-range missiles stationed in Asia and the United States would maintain a similar number of nuclear warheads on its similar-type missiles stationed on its territory. We proposed to strengthen our agreement on the missile defense system and begin negotiations on the complete ban to nuclear tests. In the course of the negotiations, however, the possibility of an even more radical solution emerged, namely, the complete elimination of nuclear arms by 1996. All these, however, came to nothing when we began talking about the strengthening of the agreements on the missile defense systems and the SDI. The main obstacle on the road leading to a world free of nuclear weapons was the stubborn U.S. desire to give itself a free hand on issues concerning SDI, something the elite of the U.S. military industry considers as some sort of panacea.

I was present at the Reykjavik summit and saw the U.S. President would have gladly come to an agreement. He seemed sad not to have succeeded in achieving results. This was because Reagan, particularly more recently, has been making great efforts to make sure that history will regard him as a President who brought peace. He has every reason to be worried: The U.S. media is criticizing the President with increasing frequency for being the only U.S. President for more than 50 years not to have signed an agreement with the Soviet Union. Was he prepared to give something for the Reykjavik agreement, something that is essential for agreement?

Was he prepared to pay by going half way to mutually acceptable decisions, rather than making some unilateral concessions? Hardly. Reagan failed this test. Perhaps he would have liked some nice agreement but, at the same time, he did not want to give up his plans, among others, SDI. I think Reagan is not particularly versed in arms limitations or military policy. Therefore, his effort to appear as a peace-fighter is perhaps nothing more than a naïve dream.

As for the President's entourage, many of them did not want any kind of agreement. One could feel this at the time of the Reykjavik summit. It was no accident that Gorbachev said at the press conference that Reagan was unable to rid himself of the military-industrial complex surrounding him and his administration.

The military-industrial complex is, of course, a great power but it is nevertheless not omnipotent. Therefore, I believe the fact no agreement was reached in Iceland does not mean such an agreement is inconceivable. Therefore, every peace-loving force on our planet should struggle for an agreement.

[NOVOSTI] What is the contribution of the outstanding public personalities and scientists of the Soviet Union and other countries to the struggle for peace?
There has been a considerable increase in the activity of antiwar forces both in the Soviet Union and abroad recently. Scientists are playing a particular role in this struggle. Thus, for example, the appeal of the movement called "Internation Physicians for Preventing Nuclear War" to avoid the nuclear nightmare is of great importance. If a third world war broke out, there would be no doctors to attend to the injured. The model of "nuclear winter" worked out by scientists proves the extent of the fatal consequences of a worldwide nuclear conflict on every living creature on our planet.

Many scientists in various countries are exposing the lie connected with the SDI and are drawing attention to the destructive danger of uncontrolled nuclear energy. This is particularly important since the ignorance of the masses is the main weapon in the hands of the militarists. War against people can be prepared only in secret. Thus, scientists who reveal the reality are making a considerable contribution to the avoiding of a nuclear war. Public opinion still has a lot to do. I believe that we can avoid a nuclear catastrophe only by joint efforts.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET GENERAL MARKS GORBACHEV 15 JANUARY 1986 PROPOSAL

OW202114 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2305 GMT 17 Jan 87

[From the "I Serve the Soviet Union" program; Colonel General D.A. Volkogonov commentary]

[Text] A year ago our party and state announced a large scale program for the liquidation of nuclear weapons. This program was summarized in a speech, which is now known to the whole world, made by the general secretary of our party, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. One year—a mere moment in history. However, it can already be said today that this announcement expressed the despair for the future of millions of people on our planet.

For many centuries wars have rocked our civilization. A step is now needed that would put an end to this constant threat of wars, the genesis of which is found in exploitative societies. Let us take a retrospective look at history. For the past 5,500 years, according to the opinions of historians, mankind enjoyed only 200 odd years of peace. The rest of the time the flames of war were seen somewhere. There were wars of 7 years duration, 30 years, and there was even a hundred year war. Two world wars which took place in our century carried away 60 million lives. But all this fades in comparison to the unthinkable nuclear war being threatened by the imperialists—those who can be found across the ocean.

Under these conditions, the proposals made by Mikhail Sergeyevich are of exceptional significance. In substance they contain a detailed, realistic, and courageous program for the liquidation in stages of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, and the liquidation of nuclear weapons creates a precondition for liquidating the possibility of starting a nuclear war.

It should be said that this program was seen by many as improbable. The bourgeois press has on many occasions attempted to label our program as a utopian communist trap, but in October of last year, during the meeting of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev with the American President, people felt that the achievement—a radical, large-scale, and principled achievement—of an end to the arms race and of the destruction of nuclear weapons, was within reach.
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, supported by the statement made on 15 January 1986, announced a courageous program for further progress. This is a full package of proposals linking the liquidation in the near future of 50 percent of all strategic offensive arms; the liquidation of Soviet and American intermediate range missiles in Europe; and the strengthening of the ABM conditions—making it in essence impossible to deploy arms in space and finally ending nuclear tests, those tests which we have not been undertaking since August 1985. Unfortunately, those in Pentagon bunkers have not followed our example.

In practice, Reykjavik has shown that agreement is possible. The ray of hope has touched millions of people. The logic of the talks even led to talks on a specific timetable for the liquidation of nuclear weapons. In particular, preliminary agreement was reached that by 1996 it would be possible to destroy and liquidate the main offensive nuclear weapons. But at this moment another form of logic became active—the military logic. American imperialism, which put forward the star wars program the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, retreated at the most vital moment. The delegation in essence renounced the preliminary steps that were agreed to at Reykjavik. Because the star wars program is a stake in one-sided military superiority.

It should be said that for them the claim to star wars is an attempt to create a difficult situation, an attempt to create the opportunity for a possible decisive military victory in a nuclear war, and finally, it is a bottomless pit of profits—super profits. Suffice to say that the Manhattan Project for the creation of the American atomic bomb cost the state $14 billion. The Apollo Program—man's flight to the moon—cost $30 billion. Now specialists think that the star wars program—the American deployment of the full system in space—will cost 1 or even $2 trillion. In essence American imperialism and the military circles are not prepared to meet those broad, realistic proposals made by our party and state on 15 January and in the following proposals made in Reykjavik.

Today we are forced to support military strategic parity. Perhaps today this is one of the most important bases for the preservation, however fragile, of peace. The 27th party congress said that the military threat continues to exist. Moreover, it is expected to grow. Under these conditions, our political freedom, economic might, our ability to maintain military strategic parity, represent the bases and the possibilities of preserving and strengthening peace.

The announcement made by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 15 January is an example of new political thinking. For the Soviet soldiers this means that the higher our fighting readiness and the greater our vigilance, the less likely it is for a potential aggressor to embark on a nuclear adventure. These are the dialectics of the social role of the fighting men of our army and navy.

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USSR ARMY PAPER VIEWS REAGAN STATE OF UNION MESSAGE

PM021459 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 1 Feb 87 First Edition p 3

[Military-political Review" by observer Colonel M. Ponomarev: "White House Impasses"]

[Excerpts] The publicity ballyhoo was organized according to all the rules of American business. Long before President Reagan delivered the traditional annual report "On the State of the Union" at a joint session of both houses of Congress, the transatlantic mass media devoted many verbose commentaries to it. Apologists for the present Washington administration's policy breathlessly maintained that that message would be almost a manifesto of "faith in a better future" and would illumine the path of America and even the whole world over the coming years.

Then the President's speech was delivered this week. The public was able to familiarize itself with the text of his message. How did it turn out in fact? What prescriptions did the head of the White House write out for American policy, what positions does he champion, and what goals does he set the United States?

Their Credo Is Strength Above All Else

The report "On U.S. Strategy in the National Security Sphere," which has just been published on the other side of the ocean, provided a graphic illustration of the main directions of American foreign and direct military policy put before Congress by the President and made concrete Washington's intentions and actions. Commentators evaluate that document, prepared by the National Security Council and addressed to the U.S. Congress on the President's behalf, as the administration's program statement of its positions and aims in foreign and military policy for the next 2 years.

To be brief, the essence of the report may be expounded like this: It is a statement of Washington's intention to continue the previous "position of strength" policy and the "crusade" against the forces of socialism and progress and to pursue a policy of interfering in sovereign states' affairs. In fact, the Washington administration's chief foreign policy aims are proclaimed to be the further buildup of American military might, ensuring unimpeded U.S. access to the oceans and to space, strengthening military blocs and alliances with allies, and increasing pressure on the Soviet Union by using all means available to the United States.
The report describes the instruments with whose help the White House is implementing and intends to continue implementing its policy. It is a question of military force, blackmail of sovereign states, and generous dollar handouts to clients. The continuation of the program for the "rearmament of America," which the Reagan administration has begun and which is based on the further improvement of offensive strategic forces and also the implementation of the "Strategic Defense Initiative," is named as the U.S. "top priority" in the military sphere.

The entire contents of that report, as well as Reagan's message "On the State of the Union," irrefutably attest that Washington's credo is strength above all else. This conclusion cannot be shaken by both documents' references to a desire to establish "more constructive relations" with the Soviet Union and for arms control. They are set about with a number of conditions, particularly "a change in Soviet conduct around the world." The President's documents do not contain even a hint the United States is prepared to change its own obstructionist stance at the talks on limiting nuclear and space arms and to stop destroying the treaties signed earlier between the USSR and the United States. He further permitted himself to declare: "It would be extremely dangerous to expect success in the arms control process."

The claims to world hegemony and the gamble on the arms race find material embodiment in the steady growth of U.S. military spending. The President demanded in a really ultimatum-like form that the congressmen on no account cut back his request for appropriations for military purposes to the tune of $312 billion in fiscal 1988. In the future it is proposed to increase them by no less than $20 billion annually.

There is no need here to examine the Pentagon's specific military programs. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA regularly tells readers about them. I would, however, like to emphasize that not only a quantitative arms buildup but also their qualitative improvement are being implemented. Various systems of so-called high-precision weapons designed to inflict a first, disarming strike against an enemy are being created [sozdat] and adopted, and a new, third generation of nuclear arms is being developed [razrabatyvat]. All this leads to undermining the strategic equilibrium now existing in the world and creates a dangerous growth of tension.

In the light of these facts Reagan's warnings to Congress attract attention. He fears the legislators might curtail some of the military programs advanced by the administration, considering them excessive and too burdensome for the already overstretched budget. The President warns he will veto "any attempt to undermine our national security."

And What of Common Sense? [subhead]

An unprecedented incident occurred recently in the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. Two weeks after Democrat Congressman L. Aspin was removed from the post of chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, he was re-elected to that post. What had happened? The point is that previously Aspin had supported the "Star Wars" plans, the deployment of MX missiles, and aid for the Nicaraguan contras. His position had come into conflict with present sentiments in the Democratic Party. Aspin realized he could no longer adhere to his former, too conservative views. The congressman publicly renounced them, and he was given back his former post — one of the most important in the House of Representatives.
What happened to Aspin shows that support for the White House course is growing weaker even among congressmen. This is still more noticeable in broad public circles. Thus, public opinion polls attest to appreciable changes in the sentiments of Americans. In a recent poll conducted by ABC-TV and THE WASHINGTON POST, 56 percent of those questioned declared the country was on the wrong path, and only 36 percent approved of the administration's foreign policy. The press is increasingly frequently carrying articles by prominent figures who urge the White House to abandon the policy of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union. A recent article on this topic was written by such an authoritative U.S. figure as former Defense Secretary R. MacNamara.

Well, then, is the common sense so characteristic of Americans winning? No, it would be premature, to say the least, to draw such a conclusion. It would be more correct to say today this common sense still yields to crude pressure of force. Stereotypes which have become established over many decades are too firmly rooted in the Americans' consciousness. Anti-Soviet, anticommmunist propaganda plays its part. As those same polls show, the number of people who profess anticommmunism is not falling. This enables the ruling circles to continue having it their own way. It is not without reason the President's message to Congress plays considerable tribute to hardened anti-Sovietism and to attempts to hold our country responsible for the tense state of affairs in the world and, in particular, for the failure in Reykjavik and at the disarmament talks.

A discrepancy between rhetoric and reality — this is the general impression created by Reagan's "State of the Union" message to Congress. The President's rhetoric cannot obscure the essence of the policy he advocates — an offensive against the living standards of the people inside the country for the sake of enriching those who are already rich, and the desire for hegemony in the world arena and continued confrontation with the USSR in the foreign policy sphere. This is why that message, which contains no new ideas, has prompted such a critical attitude to it. Washington's old prescriptions can in no way help the modern, rapidly changing world.
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR ARMY PAPER ON NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD, SDI, ARMS RACE

Moscow KRA SNA YA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Dec 86 p 3

[Article by Col M. Ponomarev under the "Military Political Review" rubric: "Hopes Based on Strength Will Be Dashed: The Soviet Union Is Paving the Way to a Nuclear-Free World--The United States Is Increasing Tension--New Thinking Gains More and More Supporters"]

[Text] The 41st Session of the UN General Assembly had just finished its work. It showed the striving of most nations to put into the practice of international relations a new thinking oriented toward the resolution of security problems through political means. The idea put forward by the Soviet Union of improving the situation in the world and of giving a civilized character to relations between states and peoples, as befits the people of the enlightened 20th century, is more and more insistently making a way for itself.

Under the conditions where the arms race has not been stopped, where it continues to be in a tight spiral, where the threat of its being transferred to space, where dangerous sources of military conflict continue to exist, and, finally, where the United States of America, the most important power of the capitalist world, continues to pursue a course of confrontation and political permissiveness, the very raising of the question of the necessity of a new way of thinking and a new philosophy for international relations has become the outstanding merit of the Soviet Union before all of humanity. Even the bourgeois American newspaper PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER was forced to point out: "Nothing is as attractive as an idea that has appeared in time and the "new thinking" of the Russians is capable of gaining broad international support."

But the country of the soviets and the Leninist party of communists have not only developed a new philosophy of international relations and a new political way of thinking. When humanity was faced with the question of to be or not to be in all its acuteness and nakedness, the USSR showed the way to a nuclear-free world and outlined specific and quite realistic steps toward the achievement of this goal, steps capable of changing the existing world situation and of building a world free of nuclear arms and free of violence and hate, fear and suspicion.
The first such step was taken at the very beginning of this year. This was the proclamation of a large-scale program for freeing humanity from weapons of mass destruction by the end of the 20th century. The program itself and the clearly defined stages for its implementation were set forth in the 15 January declaration of M.S. Gorbachev. It gave cause for hope: a nuclear-free world is realistic and can be achieved during our generation.

This course of Soviet foreign policy for the destruction of weapons of mass destruction and the prevention of the nuclear risk was confirmed by the 27th CPSU Congress. The congress took an additional step on the way to the peaceful future of the nations of the entire earth, having worked out the bases for the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security.

The establishment of such a system is a matter for the future. Even though it did receive broad support, the joint draft of proposals of the socialist community setting forth the bases of such a system is still in the stage of discussion within the framework of the United Nations. Meanwhile, however, the Soviet Union has taken the next practical step with the goal of restraining and then reversing the nuclear arms race. Throughout the entire past year, it has strictly and rigorously observed its unilateral moratorium on any nuclear tests and 10 days ago it declared that it will continue it in the coming year as well until the first nuclear blast in the United States. It is difficult to find a similar example of the demonstration of good will in history.

The meeting of M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Reykjavik illuminated with unprecedented clarity who is who and what is what in world politics. In the Icelandic capital, the Soviet side presented a package of interrelated and balanced proposals. The world became convinced that it is possible to avert the threat of a nuclear disaster. If the American side had fully accepted the package of Soviet proposals—and agreement was reached on most of them—then this would have started a real process of eliminating nuclear weapons and averting the nuclear danger.

The Delhi Declaration made in the name of one-fifth of all humanity during the visit of M.S. Gorbachev to India proclaimed 10 principles for a nonviolent world free of nuclear arms. It showed that humanity has great forces for avoiding the danger hanging over it. The time has come for decisive and urgent actions.

The actions of the Soviet Union in the international arena and its policies that are encountering more and more support by those concerned about the fate of the world have greatly changed the situation on our planet. This is obviously the most characteristic and the most determining feature of the 1986 year-end and a start for the coming year. But those circles in the United States that essentially determine the policies of the administration in Washington do not want to accept the ideas and the apparent realities of a nuclear-free world, which are becoming more and more clear. They confess a political permissiveness and a cult of power and put their hopes on confrontation and the achievement of military superiority. The leaders across
the ocean are not at all striving to acquire contemporary political thinking. Speaking recently before the National Press Club, William Fulbright, one of the oldest and most experienced politicians in the United States, acknowledged that a new way of thinking is the only means of stopping the arms race. But he noted with sadness that "for the United States, where many prejudices and stereotypes have become deeply rooted, it will be a complex process to change its way of thinking."

The matter here is not only of "prejudices and stereotypes," which the transatlantic leaders should not have at all, and it is not so much a matter of them as it is of the unwillingness and inability to see today's world as it is.

The current American administration came to power 6 years ago under the drumbeat of demands for a restoration of the military superiority of the United States. Having pronounced strength, the emphasis and reliance on strength, and the application of strength as the core of its policy, it threw hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars into the arms race and other militaristic preparations. Did this make the security of the United States greater? Not at all. The danger of a general catastrophe has, however, become even more acute for all humanity.

The materials on this page of KRASNYA ZVEZDA bear rather elegant witness to the wantonness of militarism in the United States and to the unprecedented scope of the military preparations under way there. Relying on them and striving to activate them even more, the White House executives took a destructive position in relation to all peaceful initiatives, not only of the Soviet Union but also of other countries—the "Delhi Six", for example.

This was revealed especially clearly in Reykjavik and after Reykjavik. The American "star wars" plans, the so-called SDI program, became the main obstacle to an agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons. And now there is an obvious attempt to distort the agreements reached in the Icelandic capital, to emasculate them and, even better, simply to throw them overboard. And all of this is being accompanied by renewed calls for a "crusade" against communism.

And for what purpose? For the same—let us not hesitate to say it—illusory and unrealizable goal of achieving military superiority. A leading role in this policy is being assigned to that same SDI, in which its authors want to see a means of waging nuclear war with the intention winning it.

"Historical experience shows," stresses the Appeal of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World, "that the Soviet Union always found an adequate response to any threat to its security. That is how it will be in the future as well. For this purpose, the Soviet Union has a sufficient intellectual, scientific-technical and industrial potential."

The press has already presented information on possible specific means and methods of counteracting space strike arms developed in the framework of SDI. Soviet scientists think that they could include powerful ground-based lasers, missiles with more powerful engines than those now in existence to reduce
their boost time, an increase in the number of missiles and warheads on them and the use of decoy warheads, missiles and warheads protected against laser radiation, shielding clouds of tiny particles in space, means for suppressing the electronic systems of the other side, new tactics in the launch of missiles, etc. In this connection, C. Gottfried, an authoritative American specialist and physicist from Cornell University, wrote: "The measures proposed in Soviet publications and various interviews are realistic and effective and their number is large. Many scientists think that it will be easier to implement countermeasures than to develop an offensive system."

But it is not even a matter of how easy or, on the contrary, how difficult it is to carry out these countermeasures. The fact is that the realization of the "star wars" program and the basing of weapons in space will inevitably evoke an uncontrollable arms race, will diminish strategic stability, and will turn decisions affecting the fate of the world over to robotized and computerized electronic systems. And errors are inevitably intrinsic in these systems. In a period of just a year and a half in the United States, 3,703 alarm signals sounded advising of "the beginning of military actions by the enemy." And it turned out that they were false.

On the other side of the ocean, they love to boast—sometimes with justification but at other times without any special basis for it—about their industrial technology. But, possessing it, the leaders of the United States do not want to acquire the "technology" of contemporary political thinking. The prevailing system is based on confrontation and the primacy of strength.

During this past year, this system has been breaking down more and more frequently. The administration suffered a serious defeat in the recent so-called "interim elections" in the United States. The majority in both houses of Congress now belongs not to the Republicans but to their rivals, the Democrats. It became obvious at the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly that the United States is more and more often in opposition to the entire world community and is more and more frequently alone in votes on fundamental questions in world policy. An unprecedented decline in the prestige of the administration and the President himself was seen in the course of the loud political scandal relating to secret deliveries of American arms to Iran and the transfer of the profits to the Contras fighting against the people of Nicaragua. "Irangate" fouced the most negative features of American political intrigue and the striving of the United States to appropriate to itself prosecuting and—even better—dictatorial functions in the world.

In Washington, however, they are not taking into account the fact that the world is no longer as it was. A new political philosophy is taking over the consciousness of the nations of the planet to a greater and greater depth. And more and more statesmen in different countries are taking its positions to some degree or other.

The new political thinking must prevail. Humanity simply has no other way out.
MOSCOW RADIO PROGRAM ON SALT, SDI, TEST MORATORIUM

LD062311 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 6 Feb 87

["International Situation -- Questions and Answers" program presented by Konstantin Pastyuk, All-Union Radio commentator, with Professor Radmir Georgiyevich Bogdanov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute; Colonel V.I. Filatov, Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent; Aleksandr Kurilin, Bonn correspondent for All-Union Radio; Nikolay Agayants, All-Union Radio Foreign political commentator; and Sergey Pravdin, All-Union Radio Commentator]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] At the moment, the editorial office here is getting a lot of letters, the writers of which fully approve our country's foreign policy and its tireless efforts to normalize relations with the United States. At the same time, they condemn the Reagan administration's unrealistic foreign policy course, its reluctance to normalize these relations, and the United States' continuation of underground nuclear blasts. [passage omitted]

Comrade Mamedov from Ashkhabad expresses the hope that the U.S. Administration will yet heed the voice of reason and change its foreign policy. Judging from the last nuclear blast conducted recently at the Nevada test site, however, this has obviously not yet happened.

The state of Soviet-U.S. relations and how they are going to take shape -- and the world situation depends on that to a considerable extent -- all this greatly interests the whole world today. It also interests Soviet people, which is demonstrated by the letters which continue to come to the editorial office. Taking part in our program today is Professor and Doctor of Historical Sciences Radmir Georgiyevich Bogdanov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute. Please.

[Bogdanov] If we are to analyze in brief the conduct of the U.S. side after Reykjavik, on the one hand the Reagan administration has made massive efforts to distort the essence of the Soviet position at Reykjavik and to disown its own agreement to eliminate all kinds of nuclear weapons, to ascribe stubbornness and unconstructive behavior to the Soviet Union. The main argument of the administration has been devil-may-care statements indicating, they say, the main aim of the Russians is to bury President Reagan's SDI, which he defended, even at the cost of rejecting a nuclear-free world. On the other hand, having breached the limits of the SALT II treaty, having effectively demolished it by bringing into operation the 131st B-52 bomber, the U.S. side has clearly demonstrated it continues to be guided in Soviet-U.S. relations by the principle of hegemonism and by the position of strength.
Well, of course, one serious test of the U.S. administration's intentions was its attitude to the moratorium on nuclear blasts, introduced by the Soviet Union on 6 August 1985. For 18 months, a deathly silence has reigned over the test sites of the Soviet Union, but the U.S. side has in this time conducted 25 nuclear blasts of various capacity, including the latest on 3 February. With each blast, the U.S. administration seems to be repeating no and no to the possibility of stopping the arms race and to the possibility of creating a nuclear-free world. Indeed, the nuclear tests are needed by those who are building a new generation of mass destruction weapons and by those who intend to use atomic energy to equip combat lasers, which are the basis of SDI, and are designed to deprive the Soviet side of the possibility of making a retaliatory strike [udar vozmezdiya] in the event of a U.S. nuclear attack.

It is not so much a matter of the power of the explosive devices being tested in Nevada as the political aspect of the affair; Is the world to be without nuclear weapons or not?

Alongside this, the United States has not ceased its attempts to revise and, ultimately, to wreck the fundamental ABM Treaty of 1972. According to THE NEW YORK TIMES report of 4 February this year, the Reagan administration intends to continue to adhere to the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, which in fact means testing SDI components in space, which would be a most flagrant violation of the treaty, which permits research only under laboratory conditions. Essentially, it is a question of the Washington grave-diggers having embarked upon burying this most important Soviet-U.S. treaty too, which has for many years ensured strategic stability.

[Patysuk] Radomir Georgiyevich, how is our country reacting to the U.S. action?

[Bogdanov] Bearing in mind these realities, nevertheless, Soviet policy has been and remains to be consolidating the positive results of Reykjavik. Indeed, there were major ones: a 50 percent reduction over 5 years in all three elements of the strategic triad and the liquidation of intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe with, of course, the corresponding accords on the nondeployment in space of strike weapons.

From the moment Soviet-U.S. talks were resumed in Geneva, where the Reykjavik package was on the table, the Soviet side, wishing to bring the talks out of the deadlock in which they previously found themselves, proposed renouncing endless general discussions and moving on to reaching detailed agreement on the provisions of a framework accord encompassing all aspects of the talks: strengthening the status [rezhim] of the ABM Treaty, reducing strategic offensive weapons right up to their elimination by the end of 1996, eliminating U.S. and Soviet intermediate range missiles in Europe, and settling the matter of the start of talks on completely banning nuclear tests. Of course, these agreements must be implemented as a whole, in association with each other. The Soviet delegation's constructive line has led to progress on a number of aspects of reaching agreement on wording that consolidates the results of Reykjavik. However, cautionary aspects have also arisen in all areas of the talks. So, what is the Soviet side and how does it intend to act in these conditions? Our course is formulated in the Soviet program for eliminating nuclear weapons of 15 January last year, in our platform advanced by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in Reykjavik. All of this is still valid. Also valid are our firm intentions to continue to do everything necessary to realize the Reykjavik solutions. It is just up to the U.S. side.
[Patsyuk] The last question for you: Comrade Kurilko from Pavlograd in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast asks if there will be a meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan.

[Bogdanov] If, in this context, one examines the question of the possibility of a summit meeting between the Soviet leader and the U.S. President -- and in certain circumstances such a meeting would make a serious contribution to strengthening peace and security -- then it is obviously logical to proceed from the following: Given significant accords at the Geneva talks, worthy of being made fast by the top political leaders of the two countries, it could be a reality.

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MOSCOW TALK SHOW ON U.S. 'OPPOSITION' TO NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD

LD161021 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1120 GMT 15 Jan 87

["Into the 21st Century Without Nuclear Weapons" program presented by Vladimir Tsvetov, Central TV and All-Union Radio observer, with Valentine Sergeyevich Zorin, Central TV and All-Union Radio political observer; Vitaliy Invanovich Kobyshev, a publicist; and (Ashod Aleksandrovich Nasibov), All-Union Radio correspondent reporting from Mayakovskiy Square; all persons interviewed unidentified except where specified]

Today is 15 January. Precisely 1 year ago, Mikhail Sergeyvich Gorbachev set forth a program for stage-by-stage elimination of all nuclear and chemical weapons by the beginning of the 21st century. Today we are marking the anniversary of Comrade Gorbachev's statement not only to pay due tribute to a document which maps out a path from a peace based on an equilibrium of fear to a peace based on an equilibrium of reason. We also want to look back over the past year because the 15 January statement marked the emergence in world politics of fresh approaches to solution of the main problem: To be or not to be for mankind, that is, the emergence of the policy of a new thinking. What do Soviet people, Muscovites, think about the statement of its political significance? I asked correspondent (Ashod Alesandrovich Nasibov) to talk to them. Over to Mayakovskiy Square:

[Nasibov] What is your name?


[Nasibov] Aleksandr Dmitriyevich, the Soviet union has proposed a program for the total elimination of mass annihilation weapons by the 21st century, including chemical weapons. Do you think this is attainable? What is your attitude to this program?

[Kulikov] I think the proposal is well timed. It is precisely at this stage that every effort must be made, and if all of peace-loving mankind supports us, then it is quite possible to deal with the task.

[Nasibov] Introduce yourself, please.


[Nasibov] Galina Semenovna, the Soviet Union has proposed a program for the total elimination of mass annihilation weapons by the 21st century. What is your attitude to this?
[Kuetta] Well, of course it is very positive. I fully support it.


[Nasibov] Alseksandr Ivanovich, what is your attitude to it?

[Kryaus] The program is very realistic. It will make it possible to strengthen peace worldwide; it will allow people to have a sigh of relief. It is dangerous when we have mountains of weaponry overshadowing us, and weapons in space are doubly dangerous. Our program envisages the world being more safe from all this.

[Nasibov] What is your name?

[Sarapetyan] It is Khachik Sarapetyan. I am married with two children, a little girl and a little boy who attend school.

[Nasibov] The Soviet Union has adopted a program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the 21st century. What is your attitude?

[Sarapetyan] My opinion — and it is not just what I think now — I was a little boy during the war and then we really felt the war situation, we had great difficulties, we gave everything for the front, and we went without very much, and even then I was mindful, or cursed [as heard], what has to be done to save us from this. Forty years have passed, we have grown up, and it remains in your mind — God forbid — that this could return. Our own little children are 5 or 10 years old today.

[Tsveryov] Thank you, Mayakovskiy Square, we will be in touch again. So that is The opinion of the Muscovites: The Soviet program for elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons by the 21st century is timely and a nuclear-free world is quite realistic.

[Kobysh] It must be said that what our people say is all the more weighty because for the year that has passed since Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev’s statement, Western propaganda and Western politicians have been making every effort to sow doubt about the program being realistic. I would say there is a whole group of so-called arguments with which Western propaganda is trying to diminish the impression made by the proposals set forth on 15 January last year by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. The first thing they started doing right after the statement was made public, was to argue that this is all very well, but it is all unattainable, it is all a fine dream. Only a few months passed, and what the Western propaganda had been declaring a fantasy became a real agenda in Reykjavik; it was on the negotiating table, and was discussed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and President Reagan. It was not only discussed, but on many issues the points of view were brought closer together. So there is your fantasy, there is your utopia.

[Zorin] Remember, Reagan even said, why wait 15 years, it would be possible to attain a nuclear-free world even sooner.

[Kobysh] Quite so. It is important to bear in mind now that, yes, because of the United States' opposition over SDI, agreement was not reached in Reykjavik, but the fact that the Soviet proposals are realistic was demonstrated by Reykjavik. These proposals are on the negotiating table today, they are the foundation of Soviet-U.S. talks, and hence the first argument of Western propaganda about the utopian character of the proposals contained in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorachev's statement of 15 January 1986, has been smashed to smithereens by life.
There are other grounds for considering the program for elimination of nuclear weapons by the 21st century realistic.

The world is becoming more and more acutely aware of the fact it is threatened with destruction of mankind's habitat, with a scarcity of energy sources, and finally with hunger. We can get rid of these dangers when we eliminate nuclear weapons. How? This is what the statement has to say about this: Instead of the principle imposed by militarism, or armament instead of development, the opposite order of things must come: disarmament for development.

The Muscovites we heard were caught unaware, as they say, by the correspondent's questions, and did not expand on their replies. But when Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Kulikov called the Soviet proposals well-timed and realistic, then we must oppose that he was thinking about the timeliness of redistributing funds from the nuclear arms race to eliminating destruction or the environment, to creating new energy sources, to eliminating hunger, and about the realism of such redistribution, because without it, mankind might come face to face with tragedy even before a nuclear conflict breaks out.

Developing what has been said, I would like to recall what happened in Reykjavik. There are those who are inclined to approach the results of Reykjavik in a purely arithmetical manner: this was signed, that was not signed, this was agreed, that was not agreed. But you see, Valentin Sergeyevich is right; what was taken as a foundation for talks in Reykjavik was a formula set forth on 15 January 1986, and the President of the United States of America -- probably not because he welcomed these proposals so much, but rather because he could not do otherwise -- was virtually on the point of recognizing this formula. He came close to the possibility of eliminating nuclear weapons from the life of mankind even before the end of the century. It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of Reykjavik.

It must be said that when we speak of the West's negative stand, we have in mind not countries and not peoples, we have in mind quite a small handful of politicians.

Valentin Sergeyevich, excuse me for interrupting. Judging from the words of the Muscovites we have heard, they understand clearly what we are talking about here, even though there is not one among them who is professionally involved in politics. It turns out that there are professional politicians -- in the United States first and foremost -- who thus far do not want to understand things that are obvious. Perhaps we could go over to Mayakovskiy Square again, and ask our correspondent to continue his interviews with Muscovites. Mayakovskiy Square, you are on the air:

What do you think, why is the United States against elimination of mass annihilation weapons and chemical weapons?

Well, I think it is inherent in the nature of their system; their government acts as a placeman for the military-industrial complex.

What do you think, who is opposing the elimination of mass annihilation weapons?

Well, I think it is just those who develop them, just those who get some profit, some capital from them, who else?
Second woman] I think there are some loonies in charge there, I do not know what they are expecting there. They can only expect the same as what they start against us.

[Third woman] It is quite clear that human principles must play a lesser role when it is a matter of profits.

[Man] I do not think that it is the United States that has come out against it.

[Nasibov] Who is it then?

[Man] It is the government, those at the top, and all those for whom military production is profitable, makes money, and so on.

[Tsytov] Thank you, (Ashod Aleksandrovich). Wait until we next link up with you.

Indeed, the people we have heard from just now are completely correct. In accordance with the budget for the coming year, the United States intends to spend $312 billion on military preparations. These huge sums will be paid out to military-industrial corporations. If we take the Star Wars program, it is proposed to spend more than $1 trillion on that. However, it is not just considerations of material gain which are the causes of the United States reluctance to join in the Soviet program for eliminating nuclear and chemical arms by the 21st century. There are political causes, too. One of these is the desire for world domination.

[Kobysh] Of course, the military-industrial complex of the United States does not act solely out of the expectation of receiving a profit, although this is important for military corporations. This complex is a complicated, interwoven mixture of political, economic, and intellectual forces which serve this military-industrial complex. Their fundamental idea is, of course, world domination. They want the United States to consume, as formerly, 5 of 10 times more energy than people in the world do on the average, although it is energy which does not belong to them, and to receive raw materials which do not belong to it; they want the United States to dispatch its fleets and settle problems which cannot be resolved by other than political means, by firing salvoes, as it was in Lebanon when the 16-inch guns of the battleship "New Jersey" bombarded the districts of Beirut.

[Zorin] I think political motives -- the desire to occupy a dominant position in the world, a policy which has found its expression in the term neoglobalism -- play a very large part in the general direction of the activity of the present administration. You spoke correctly about that, Vitaliy Ivanovich. Now, in progress is this, one of the biggest domestic political scandals in the history of the United States -- I might even say the biggest one -- because so-called Irangate, is a more serious affair than Watergate, although this time, the United States ruling class will obviously not take on such an excessively costly operation as the expulsion of the President from the White House.

You see, both external and internal causes are interwoven in this scandal.
On the one hand, it is clear the military-industrial complex is dissatisfied with the president's position at Reykjavik, is trying to insure itself against recurrences of such a position and is now teaching the President a serious lesson. On the other hand, there are some interesting figures. I would like to quote them to the listeners: Out of the 500 largest corporations in the United States, 50 to 52 are Pentagon contractors, but about 450 -- 448, more precisely -- either are not contractors to the Pentagon or have very small military orders. Consequently, there are influential circles in the United States which do not gain from the arms race at all, which view the world somewhat differently than the representatives of the military-industrial complex. The other side of Irangate is the fact that, in this case, the dissatisfaction of these circles with the policy of the present administration -- which, in their view, is too much in the pocket of the Californian military-industrial companies -- is telling.

[Tsvetov] I would like to remind the listeners of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's letter to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, which, according to the calendar, almost coincided with the year which has passed since the publication of the statement of 15 January and which was called International Peace Year -- was completely without results with regard to movement toward nuclear disarmament. In other words, this year provided an impetus, all the same, to the subsequent forward development of this movement. Let us return once more to Mayakovskiy Square and listen to people of Moscow (Ashod Aleksandrovich), you are on the air:

[Nasibov] What do you think it is necessary to do to achieve the complete elimination of mass destruction weapons?

[Woman] I think, to unite all peace-loving forces and from all strata of society, because that seems to me the only thing that can force the United States to act correctly.

[Nasibov] What practical actions by the Soviet Union aid the attainment of this goal?

[Man] I think the Reykjavik meeting aids it; the declaration adopted in India also aids it.

[Man] The proposals of 15 January 1986, the proposals that were presented by Gorbachev in Vladivostok, those that were made during the meeting in India, in Delhi, and a number of other proposals in response to various questions, from the RUDE PRAVO correspondent, for example. They all amounted to trying in the first place, to rid the world of nuclear arms and, second, to reduce the level of military confrontation and achieve detente on this basis.

[Man] Much has been done by the Soviet Union, and it is still doing much. It has stopped all sorts of nuclear tests, but the United States is stubbornly reluctant. It is clear to us that they want war. But they will not win anything, for nothing will remain either for us or for them. Wasteland will remain, who wants that? Perhaps the earth and the sun (will be covered). Let both sides think reasonably, so people may live and prosper. Let the two sides reach agreement. Noone has ever wanted to wage war, neither now nor at any other time.
It is only a matter of need. You fight to defend your motherland, but no one needs to fight to conquer. Only bandits and capitalists go out to conquer.

[Tsvetov] Thank you. Please wait until we link up next. You know, listening to these interviews, it seems to me that the accusations of insincerity aimed at us by some U.S. and Western European politicians when we propose eliminating nuclear arms look not only deceitful, but blasphemous.

[Zorin] I would say there have been malicious statements the Soviet Union will not renounce nuclear arms, because the Soviet Union has only to renounce the status of a nuclear power and it will be transformed into a second-rate power. The only thing that makes it a great superpower is its nuclear arsenal. Margaret Thatcher, in particular, has said this. Well, we can only wonder at such historical illiteracy and such logic, if such it may be called so. If I were not afraid of offending our lady listeners, I would say feminine logic, because it is enough to recall the role of the Soviet Union before WW II; it is enough to recall the role of the Soviet Union, which broke the back of Hitlerite Germany, the most powerful state of the capitalist world at that time, in order for it to become clear that the Soviet Union was a mighty power in the prenuclear age, and one with which the whole capitalist world reckoned. Everything happening now — the Soviet Union's economic potential, and its political weight — absolutely demolishes any idea that the nuclear arsenal is what makes the Soviet Union a great power. This is a malicious fabrication, of course.

[Tsvetov] Cited in the text of the statement itself is perhaps the most weighty argument in favor of our sincerity. It says in the statement, I want to quote: All efforts by the CPSU are aimed to ensure the further improvement of the life of the Soviet People. The resolution of this task is incompatible with the desire for an arms race, especially a nuclear arms race.

[Kobysh] The proposals, which are only a year old, are projected into the future, and their significance is understood throughout the world, for the United States is not the whole world. So let us go through the main events in various parts of the globe which have resounded in direct connection with our proposals. We shall see how all of this is closely interconnected. Well, first of all there was the Vladivostok speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, where issues of the security of the Pacific and of the Far East were raised; let us recall Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to India and the results of the visit, which are of importance by no means only for India and for the Soviet Union. What they managed to agree on could perhaps act as a model for the whole world, for other countries, although we are not trying to impose that upon anyone, of course.

[Tsvetov] This should probably be a model for relations between different countries.

[Kobysh] A very important event was the conference in Harare, where the African leaders formulated their stand concerning problems of peace and security, and this intersects with our proposals. I would like to say that last year, in 1986, mankind won a very serious victory here in Europe, in Stockholm, where they managed to adopt agreements that have a direct bearing on peace and security for European people.
[Tsvetov] As it happens I would like to speak about a feature of the 15 January 1986 statement, which was then developed in other speeches by Comrade Gorbachev and in other Soviet documents. What I have in mind is the involvement of both nuclear and nonaligned countries, in the process of eliminating nuclear weapons. Comrade Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok called upon the Asian and Pacific countries to take part in this process. The Delhi declaration will, I think, draw the nonaligned and neutral countries into this process. In fact, many of them have already engaged in it; for example, the Delhi Six, comprising Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden, are already doing a great deal to get the process of elimination of nuclear weapons moving.

You remember, one of the Muscovites that we heard from Mayakovskiy Square called out unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions a practical step on the path to eliminating nuclear weapons. Let us go over to Mayakovskiy Square again. Mayakovskiy Square, you are on the air:

[Nasibov] The Soviet Union has extended its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions for the fifth time, this time until the first nuclear test at U.S. test ranges. What is your attitude to the Soviet moratorium?

[Man] Naturally, I am glad that we are trying to do all we can to eliminate atomic weapons, but somehow one's hopes that this will be of help keep fading.

[Nasibov] You said there is less and less hope. Why?

[Man] Because there is no positive response on their part.

[Nasibov] But why is there no positive response?

[Man] It is probably simply that over there they are gaining massive profits from the developments of nuclear weapons; that is what Dostoyevskiy says: human nature and its vices. It is difficult to suppose that suddenly they will become virtues.

[Nasibov] Why does the United States oppose ending nuclear tests?

[Man] Well, they are crazy. Obviously they have nowhere to put their funds, although they have terrible poverty and unemployment.

[Man] The moratorium compels the ignorant and the unbelievers to believe what we say about peace, not war.

[Second man] Well, certain forces are taken in by statements that Star Wars will allegedly give the United States some kind of advantage. It is for carrying out tasks in developing nuclear weapons and putting them into space that these underground nuclear tests are carried out.

[Tsvetov] Thank you. We will leave you for a while, so we will say good-bye until we link up again. So, comrades you have heard how one of the Muscovites made a somewhat emotional assessment of the U.S. politicians who do not want to join in with our moratorium on all nuclear explosions.
In fact, from a normal, practical point of view, the actions by the U.S. side do give the impression of some kind of anomaly. Politicians however, are moved not by emotion, but by interests.

[Zorin] The moratorium was due to expire on 1 January; now more than 2 weeks of the new year have passed, and silence reigns at the Soviet test sites. Now, I think, discussions are in progress in the United States about what to do next. There are quarters which vigorously insist on continuing tests, and I think that in the nearest future it is these quarters which will determine the policy; but, there are also other forces and they are active. The Soviet moratorium was not a waste of time; the Soviet moratorium has in practice buried the myth about a Soviet military threat.

[Tsvetov] We have just heard something from Mayakovskiy Square, I remember it clearly: The moratorium compels the ignorant and the unbelievers to believe in what we think about peace, not war.

[Zorin] Our people are able to express their thoughts very precisely, but one must bear in mind that at a certain stage bourgeois propaganda managed to convince a certain part of those who were called unbelievers on Mayakovskiy Square that there is such a threat. The Soviet Union has shown, not by words, not by a propaganda campaign, but by making a difficult decision on suspending nuclear tests, its true aims, its true interests, and its genuine goodwill. You see, this is of political significance not only in Europe, not only in Asia, but also within the United States. The political climate in the United States is today different from what it was even 1 or 2 years ago. I would not want to make far-reaching predictions, but I can imagine, for instance, that even if the United States continues its tests in the near future, then what will become a political reality is such pressure on the White House that the leaders of the administration will have to agree to talks; not, perhaps, about banning nuclear tests right away, but about restricting them. That is also a real influence of the moratorium which the Soviet Union implemented, and which has brought about serious changes in the political thinking in the United States of America.

[Kobysh] I think what you have said has a most direct bearing on other parts of the world. One can imagine how they regard the moratorium in Western Europe. Western Europe is chock-a-block with nuclear weapons, but the West Europeans are always living under the yoke of fear of the nuclear threat. Of course for them, the moratorium is simply a moment of salvation, which they cannot fail to assess at its full worth. For the developing states, it is the best demonstrations of the fact that the state is indeed striving for the elimination of nuclear weapons. They understand that the moratorium is the first real step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, and this step was made by the Soviet Union.

[Tsvetov] It is the first real step not only toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, but also toward the nonmilitarization of space. I think that we have now approached the problem which might be put something like this: Should space be an arena for Star Wars, or a field for space peace? Let us hear what the Muscovites think about this. Mayakovskiy Square, you are on the air again:

[Man] Because the means of controlling the systems, the automatic systems which are behind the sending of nuclear weapons into space, one may say that they are uncontrolled, and it is possible for a so-called fateful event to be created, which would lead to nuclear conflict.

[Second man] Space should be peaceful because if we presently are unable to reach agreement in the affairs of our earth -- Iran and Iraq, Israel and the Arabs -- then we just have no concept of what kind of dangers there may be in going into space.

[Nasibov] Do you think that this peace in space can be achieved?

[Second man] Of course it can be achieved, just as in any family, if peace is possible...then in the regions of space it is always possible to create a peaceful situation.

[Nasibov] What do you think: Does the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions and the banning of the launching into space of Soviet space weapons up until the time that such weapons are launched into space by the United States, which was adopted some time ago, facilitate the nonmilitarization of space? What is your opinion?

[Second man] Of course it does, and in my view there cannot be another opinion. It is clear to anyone; even a schoolboy would say the same thing if you asked him.

[Nasibov] Which practical steps by the Soviet Union facilitate the nonmilitarization of space?

[Second man] Well, there are many such steps. The first thing is that presently we are conducting a policy of community with all countries. We are making available to any country, large or small, the use of our technology, which is quite highly developed, to get data from space, which weakly developed countries -- or even developed countries which do not, however, have certain opportunities, say -- do not have.

Second, we are, in my view, implementing an enormous program, for peaceful ends and which in practical terms is already yielding positive results.

Thank you, I shall call on you once again. So, on the one hand a program for peaceful cooperation in space and on the other, a program for its militarization. One excludes the other.

[Kobysh] I think that these are two programs that are laying the road toward the future of humanity in directly opposite directions. We want a peaceful earth and a peaceful space. The other side is now imposing not only nuclear weapons on earth, but nuclear weapons in space for the coming century and perhaps even beyond.

[Tsvetov] Perhaps it would be proper to note here that these two programs are distinguished by the fact that one of them is really laying the road toward the future, while the other is laying a road toward oblivion.

[Zorin] I want to cite for our radio listeners comments that belong to one of the darkest figures of present-day Washington, a person who is the right-hand man of Defense Secretary Weinberger, the not unknown Perle.
Recently, he decided to demonstrate his wit at a press conference in Washington in the following manner. I quote his comments: If the SDI program is so unpromising, as they say in the Soviet Union, then I fail to understand how it is that the Soviet Union is seeking so desperately to stop its implementation!

These are cheap statistics, and I think that Perle understands this full well. He is counting on the fact that those who listen to him will not grasp the details. I have to say there are some grounds for this. I frequently have had to meet with Americans and I will permit myself to say that I cannot imagine interviews with the majority of Americans on the streets of Washington or New York such as we are hearing today with ordinary Soviet people, who were chance conversational partners with our correspondent. The U.S. public has been spoiled by bourgeois propaganda, and such cheap sophisms are able to exert an influence on them.

Yes, we and serious scientists — ours and not only ours, but leading scientists in the United States — assert that in all, Reagan's whole idea of creating such a system which will make the United States invulnerable to a nuclear missile strike is not even science fiction! It is impossible to do this on the basis of what is at the disposal of present-day, and not only present-day, but perhaps tomorrow's science.

But Perle's question as to why it is that we are so desperately, as he says, against this is not so difficult. It is very easy to reply to it, because at issue is not the final effect, but the arms race, a new arms race, a space weapons race which is being imposed by the United States under the auspices of this SDI program.

[Tsvetov] You see, this idea of the nonmilitarization of space has actually been expressed in the 15 January statement. It seems to me that the statement itself also attracted the attention of the world public, above all, because there the task of not permitting the arms race to be taken into space is set in a completely clear manner.

Well, our time is coming to a close and for the last time, I want to offer the air to Mayakovskiy Square. (Ashod Aleksandrovich), we are listening:

[Nasibov] Tell us your name please.

[Rodyanovskaya] Rodyanovskaya, Nina Serafimovna.

[Nasibov] Nina Serafimovna, the Soviet Union has adopted a program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the 21st century. How do you regard this?

[Rodyanovskaya] I think that that would be wonderful.

[Nasibov] Which practical actions by the Soviet Union do you think facilitate this goal?

[Rodyanovskaya] The active struggle for peace, and the active promulgation of peace.

[Nasibov] What do you think it is necessary to do?
American people should know more about the Soviet Union and Soviet people should know more about the American people. Let us send our children to America and American children come to us, get to know each other more, somehow. That all affects young people, and the growing generations, their generation and our generation are of the same age, but all the same, they are not the same in the way they think and the way they look at life, at public and political life. They have different views. In general it is a very difficult political moment now, even more difficult than it was before probably. You have got Reagan's policy, and not only Reagan's personal policy, but the policy of his administration, of the whole military complex, which aims to build up weapons.

Tsvetsov] Thank you. On that, the Ostankino studio takes its leave of Mayakovskiy Square. All the best.

It remains for us to sum up. The last comments by the Muscovites lead to this thought: It is difficult to reach agreement on ending the arms race, because the sides do not trust each other. Yet, in its turn, the arms race intensifies the distrust.

Zorin] Yet another argument, if one may call it thus, is being set in motion to sow doubt about the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union, the argument that it is precisely nuclear weapons -- the so-called balance of nuclear fear -- which guarantee peace on earth, and that were it not for the horror of the consequences of nuclear war, it would have been impossible to have maintained peace for more than 40 years, and that war would long since have started. Well, it is perfectly clear that this is a limited view of the political process. But if one thinks in terms of centuries, is it really possible to imagine security on mountains of nuclear weapons? Is it not clear that an increase in nuclear arsenals is an increase in the possibility of the very annihilation of humanity? It is perfectly clear that all these so-called arguments do not bear serious criticism. What is required is action by both sides.

Tsvetsov] Alone, one can achieve nothing, but one can start to do things. So, our side has started the cause of nuclear disarmament.

We have been speaking with you about the moratorium. We have been speaking with you about the meeting in Reykjavik, about our contribution to the success of this meeting in Reykjavik, about our contribution to the success of this meeting. Perhaps you recall our proposals on monitoring [kontrol] up to and including monitoring on nuclear test sites. All this is a good start which is being proposed by the Soviet Union. Has the United States responded?

Zorin] If one speaks of the official United States, then, for the time being, one cannot speak of a requisite response. Objective factors exist which are at work in the present-day world, and which are at work in the United States itself, which render this program viable and promising, and which determine the political process which is under way in the present day world-political arena.

Tsvetsov] It is just that life itself is gradually pressing U.S. society to realize that one cannot live in a situation of distrust, that by its actions, the Soviet Union is proving that it is possible to trust it. On that, I want to take my leave of you comrades. All the best.

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MOSCOW: UNTENABILITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE DOCTRINE ARGUED

PM261559 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 23 Jan 87 p 3

[G. Kuznetsov article: "Dead Ends of the 'Balance of Terror'"]

[Text] "From the U.S. standpoint the Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons is the strategic equivalent of the apple that Eve offered Adam. It is a tempting offer but one fraught with catastrophic consequences"—that was the truth recently stated in THE NEW YORK TIMES by S. Solarz, member of the House of Representatives.

He is not a "hawk," he advocates that Washington reaffirm its adherence to a limited interpretation of the ABM Treaty for 10 years and conclude an agreement on SDI with the Soviet Union. However, even he adheres to the concept of "nuclear deterrence" or "nuclear intimidation," which is often also called the "balance of terror."

It is no secret that the prospect of eliminating all Soviet and U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe in accordance with the understanding reached at the Reykjavik summit produced a state close to panic in NATO circles. U.S. General B. Rogers, supreme commander in chief NATO Joint Armed Forces Europe, stated in this regard that the threat of using nuclear weapons must "remain the most important factor in our deterrence system." Roughly the same idea was reflected in the communiqué issued after the NATO council's December session.

If we leave aside the lie about the USSR's "aggressiveness," which is probably not even believed by those who fabricated and spread it, and if we also leave aside the myth about Soviet military "superiority" in conventional arms, there is only one thing left to the "deterrence" concept—the panegyric to nuclear weapons. Hypocritically praising them as a factor of peace (not for nothing did the president demagogically give the name "Peacekeeper" to the new first-strike MX ICBM), the governments of the United States and other Western powers reinforced the use of nuclear weapons as their official policy with the phrase "legitimate means of self-defense." This means admitting the legitimacy of unleashing nuclear war as a deliberate and conscious act.

Striving to camouflage the adventurist aspect of their imperialist policy, the ruling circles of the West's nuclear powers and their close NATO allies issued the legend that it is thanks to "nuclear deterrence" that it has been
possible to maintain peace for more than 40 years and therefore—as (G.) Wegener, head of the FRG delegation at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and Professor R. Osgood of John Hopkins University, claim in their research for the United Nations—it is the "most acceptable policy for preventing war in the nuclear age." They contend that the "deterrence" concept espoused by the NATO bloc is "defensive in nature since it is aimed at preventing aggression and really saving the world from the disasters of a war in the nuclear age."

The artificiality of these propaganda claims is obvious, since the essence of the concept, which has been formulated and detailed by the United States and its allies throughout the postwar years, lies in using the threat of U.S. military might to scare the other side and thereby attain its political ends. By taking its real content into account the concept is doubly unacceptable at the present stage of the nuclear-space age with its more sophisticated mass destruction weapons. "The 'balance of terror' is ceasing to be a factor in deterrence," M.S. Gorbachev stressed. "And not only because terror cannot counsel reason at all and can only prod us into actions that may have unpredictable consequences. This terror is a direct participant in the arms race: In intensifying distrust and suspicion, it forms a vicious circle for whipping up tension."

The "deterrence" concept was founded on the desire to strive for military superiority over the Soviet Union. It has been accompanied by an unhealthy refusal to accept the prevailing approximate military-strategic parity between the United States and the USSR, which leads to attempts at all costs to tilt the current military balance in favor of the United States. But, as is well known, parity is a determining factor in stable East-West relations—that is, one of the foundations of peace on our planet.

It would not be out of place to recall that in Washington the U.S. Armed Forces are called "deterrence forces," no less. But the shameful list of their often aggressive and by no means deterrent actions since World War II—one need only remember Vietnam, Lebanon, Libya, Grenada, and Nicaragua—is well known. Incidentally, since the NATO bloc was set up its member states have taken part in almost 100 wars and military operations which were not defensive and were conducted not on their territories but primarily in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, at a time when there was not a single instance of a NATO state being attacked. The profoundly aggressive nature of the military doctrine of the United States and the other NATO powers is attested by the data cited by R. McNamara, former U.S. defense secretary, in his recent book "Mistakes That Led to Catastrophe". "The United States has repeatedly forged ahead in developing new types of nuclear weapons. In the military technology race the United States has also repeatedly forged ahead, but always temporarily. The Soviet Union has quickly caught the United States up, resulting in another spiral being added to the arms race," he wrote, admitting that it is the United States that has always been the trailblazer in this sphere. Thus, if we take the years of testing or deployment, the United States obtained the atom bomb in 1945, the USSR in 1949; the hydrogen bomb was obtained in 1952 and 1953 respectively; intercontinental bombers in 1948 and 1955; jet-engined bombers
in 1951 and 1954; nuclear missile submarines in 1960 and 1964; solid-fuel ICBM's in 1962 and 1966; MIRVEO warheads were obtained by the United States in 1970 and by the USSR in 1975, and so on.

"The Soviets were forced to catch us up in the sphere of latest technology. The United States must exploit this advantage by launching an offensive on the frontiers of science. Thus, being several steps ahead, we will be able to doom to failure the enemy's most persistent attempts to match us." These words belong to George Keyworth, formerly President Reagan's scientific adviser, who substantiated and pushed the "strategic defense initiative" idea, which is also trumpeted by Washington as an element of "deterrence."

Need we say much about the fact that this space "shield" in conjunction with a nuclear sword is in fact an offensive first-strike weapon. Furthermore, the United States is continuing the race in purely offensive types of arms such as the MX missile, the Trident 2 system on submarines, B-52 bombers armed with cruise missiles, the B-1, "Stealth", and others. Another two nuclear aircraft carriers have been laid down. Development [razrabotka] of the Midgetman missile is under way. The nuclear arms buildup program, which envisages production of 2,000 warheads a year, is the largest program in the last 20 years. Yet even now the U.S. nuclear triad is capable of delivering over 12,000 nuclear munitions, each yielding between 50 kilotons and 10 megatons, against Soviet territory. Nonetheless, by the end of this century the Pentagon plans to increase its missile forces by 50-150 percent. And all this is sanctimoniously called "nuclear deterrence"!

Improvements in the tactical and technical characteristics of the latest weapons lead to reduced flight times, and this in turn leads to computerization and the automation of guidance systems and decisionmaking. Consequently, there is an increased risk of a nuclear war—with its unpredictable consequences—breaking out as the result of the rejection of even the tiniest detail. The placing of the latest types of weapons in space, which is what the Reagan Administration is striving for, will make verification [kontrol]—and, consequently, arms limitation agreements—impossible.

Under these circumstances the conclusion to be drawn is clear: Neither "nuclear deterrence" nor the notorious "balance of terror" can guarantee stable and reliable peace and security for the peoples. These are attainable only through reducing nuclear arms on the basis of complete equality and identical security for all states and through the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union's proposals contained in M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 statement are aimed at resolving this historically important task.

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CSO: 5200/1283
IZVESTIYA EXAMINES UK GOVERNMENT STANCE ON SDI, REYKJAVIK

PM031449 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jan 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent A. Krivopalov "Letter from London": "Runup to Election Year"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted assessing the Conservative Government's record since 1979 and the opposition parties' likely election programs]

Many people in Britain are disappointed at the Conservative government's attitude to the problem of nuclear disarmament in the year of great hope engendered by M.S. Gorbachev's Statement of 15 January 1986. At the very time that the Soviet test ranges were falling silent British and U.S. nuclear munitions were being detonated in far-off Nevada and M. Thatcher was openly saying that she did not imagine a world without nuclear weapons.

That was not simply an expression of the prime minister's personal opinion, it was also a gamble that some voters believe that Britain's own "deterrent forces" (costly and ultimately useless, in the opinion of others) do nevertheless ensure the country's position as a great world power, a matter which by tradition is particularly sensitive to quite a few British people.

Tory Britain was the first of the NATO states to agree to take part in work on the SDI program, which presumably reflected not just the desire for large profits from General Abrahamsen's orders but also certain political and military-strategic concepts.

They include crude attacks on the Soviet Union, various maneuvers to perfect "defenses against a Soviet invasion," and outright attempts at interference in our country's internal affairs. This is also part of the Conservatives' election campaign. However, such political measures can hardly help strengthen international confidence. Possibly quite the reverse.

Nevertheless, it seems to me that M. Thatcher cannot fail to realize that London's one-sided orientation toward the Reagan administration has shown signs of strain. Like it or not, she will have to prove during the election campaign that the Conservative government knows how to defend its own interests, take account of its Western European partners' collective interests, and offer something in the disarmament sphere. It is common knowledge that Britain has already put forward some practical measures here, notably with regard to chemical weapons. Other measures are surely possible, too.
However, the position taken by some Western European leaders, including in Britain, since Reykjavik can only cause bewilderment. It only took the appearance of a move toward nuclear disarmament to frighten London to death. It tries to replace radical moves in this sphere with certain "priorities," based on measures taken from our package of proposals and linked to the artificial problems of verification and confidence, and almost with the changing of the political system in the USSR. Clearly, the Reykjavik "package" — that balance of concessions and interdependent interests — is not to everyone's liking in the British Isles.

...It is hard to predict whether this will be election year for the United Kingdom and, if so, who will win. But what is certain is that Britain, which is expected to play a more responsible and constructive role in the world arena, faces a global choice: either to promote or to hinder nuclear disarmament, without which there can be no peaceful or confident future for any of the world's peoples.

/9738
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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BONN ON U.S. TESTS, SDI, INF

DW091421 Bonn GENERAL-ANZEIGER in German 7 Feb 87 p 3

[Interview with Soviet Ambassador Yuliy Kvitsinskiy by Friedhelm Kemna and Hans-Werner Loose; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] GENERAL-ANZEIGER: The disarmament discussion between the superpowers is burdened by the controversy over the U.S. nuclear weapons tests and the announced resumption of Soviet testing. Does that constitute a foreign policy defeat for Gorbachev, whose moratorium on nuclear tests has been ignored by the United States?

Kvitsinskiy: I would rather see that as another moral defeat for the Reagan administration. Despite the fact that no nuclear test was conducted anywhere in the Soviet Union for 547 days, and despite many requests to the United States, it nevertheless carried out the test in Nevada. The world was about to make the simplest and most effective step toward nuclear disarmament. In 1983, Reagan eloquently announced the elimination of all nuclear weapons as the highest goal of U.S. policy. After the new test, the curtain is torn away. The temple to American's love of peace is empty.

GENERAL-ANZEIGER: Do military experts in the Soviet Union also exert pressure on the political leadership because certain weapons have not been tested?

Kvitsinskiy: The point is not the pressure by the military. The point is to abolish nuclear weapons and not to allow any more of the arms race. At some point the time will come when you will have to ask yourself whether your own restraint is worthwhile, or whether it affects your own security. We stick to our policy of nuclear disarmament, and we will not yield on it. If the Americans stop testing, we will also stop testing. So our door continues to be wide open.

GENERAL-ANZEIGER: Is agreement on ABM systems a prerequisite for agreement in other fields?

Kvitsinskiy: In some areas solutions are possible that have nothing to do with space, for instance, the chemical weapons ban, radical cuts in conventional armed forces, the nuclear test ban, and so forth.
GENERAL-ANZEIGER: Agreement on intermediate-range weapons also?

Kvitsinskii: Intermediate-range weapons, to the extent that they were discussed in Reykjavik, are part of a package. That is no artificial linkage. After World War II, we made considerable efforts to achieve strategic parity with the United States. That parity absorbed part of our national income and by no means a small part. The nuclear weapons race has led to a dead end. Everybody realizes now that it is no longer worthwhile. We are ready to scrap what we achieved at so much cost. We are ready to destroy all nuclear weapons. However, that only makes sense if the other side does the same and if both sides agree simultaneously not to continue the weapons race in a qualitatively new area. That is why we urge preventing an arms race in space under any circumstances.

GENERAL-ANZEIGER: So the Soviet Union links a solution on the intermediate-range area to that demand?

Kvitsinskii: Yes, the European zero solution for intermediate-range missiles is a component part of the package. Experts in Geneva are now working on texts about space-based weapons, strategic weapons, and intermediate-range missiles. But the United States is complicating work in particular on the intermediate-range missiles.

GENERAL-ANZEIGER: Does the package also have to contain accords on the reduction of short-range missiles?

Kvitsinskii: Once a European zero solution for intermediate-range missiles has been reached, we will be ready to enter into negotiations on short-range weapons. However, we reject a linkage. With linkage hardly anything moves. Basically, it is being used in an attempt to put together another package and prevent a quick solution for intermediate-range missiles. However, the USSR advocates the total destruction of all tactical nuclear weapons within a short time. That is the second stage of Gorbachev's program of 15 January 1986. Those weapons are particularly dangerous, because they might lead to the idea of limited use. If it starts, it would be very hard to stop. The destructive power of those weapons would be terrible, particularly in European circumstances.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: FRG PARTIES' VIEWS ON INF, SDI

LD091906 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 8 Feb 87

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by Georgiy Zubkov; Vladimir Kondratyev video report]

[Excerpts] [Video shows Kondratyev in studio facing camera] After the battles of the pre-election campaign, the breakdown of political forces in the coming 4 years is well-known, but tranquility has not descended upon the West German capital.

The outcome of the election, in which the conservative parties, despite their expectations, suffered palpable losses, has weakened their position within the ruling coalition. Coalition negotiations have begun and promise to be very stubborn. The Christian Democratic Union [CDU], Christian Social Union, [CSU], and the Free Democratic Party [FDP] make up an alliance which is far from a smooth-running operation. At the same time, there is a manifest discord between the CSU and a group of extreme right wingers from the CDU on the one hand, and the FDP on the other, as far as the so-called Ostpolitik, disarmament, and arms control are concerned.

The West German voters made it known that they do not want a return to the Cold War era. They perceive a counterbalance to the dangerous trends in the preservation and further development of the course that is defended by Free Democrat Genscher. [Video shows brief shots of officials; a black and white photo of a B-52 bomber; Genscher addressing a conference]

Speaking the other day at a forum on the world economy in Davos, Switzerland, the minister of foreign affairs called for an unprejudiced look at the processes under way in the Soviet Union and its proposals regarding international affairs. It is a dangerous illusion to think that the Soviet Union's proposals are dictated by considerations of its weakness. A policy derived from a position of strength, a striving toward superiority, attempts to drive it into a corner through an arms buildup -- these categories of thought must be consigned to the past, Genscher thinks.

Woerner, Christian Democrat and Minister of defense, has a different idea: In Munich, at the annual conference of the Wehrkunde [military studies] Society, he stressed that there can be no talk of the nuclear denudation of Europe. [Video shows brief shots of conference in progress, showing Woerner captioned in German as "Woerner, CDU, defense minister" in close-up; then showing Strauss, speaking -- no caption]
Woerner's reasoning is developed by Strauss; he makes assertions about the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet Union in short-range missiles and demands that this problem be linked with the achievement of any solution on medium-range missiles. Strauss expresses the interests of the military-industrial complex, and welcomes SDI.

The Social Democrats [video shows man captioned as "Egon Bahr, Spd", speaking], who also took part in the Wehrkunde conference, draw the conclusion from what the representatives of the ruling camp say that in the coming years the government for the most part will continue to take a negative stand in response to concrete moves for disarmament.

A process of rethinking of a number of strategic aims is in progress in the SPD following the election. [video shows Brandt and Kohl with three others, unidentified, speaking on what appears to be a television discussion program]
FRG PAPER CALLS GORBACHEV SERIOUS ABOUT ARMS CONTROL

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 1 Dec 86 p 1

[Editorial by jr: "Gorbachev Urges Haste"]

[Text] At year's end, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that he himself would work with all energy for an arms control accord with the United States in 1987. To give his words credibility, the Soviet party chief has hitherto avoided doing something that he might well have been expected to do, and that his military advisers are certainly urging on him: The resumption of the nuclear weapons tests suspended for the past 18 months. Indeed, by stating that the United States was indifferent to whatever the Soviets chose to do in this matter, Washington virtually invited Moscow to end its self-imposed test moratorium.

Gorbachev is not just waiting passively. He is actually doing something to restart the engine that got stuck in the final phase of Reykjavik. The release of Nobel Peace laureate Andrei Sakharov from his 7-year banishment was also aimed at preparing the ground for a new meeting with Ronald Reagan--regardless of the fact that the U.S. President has twice met with Gorbachev without consideration for the man confined to Gorki. Less measurable than the act of mercy in its effect on the Reagan Administration is the appointment of Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov as the new head of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva arms control negotiations before their resumption on Thursday.

It is certainly indisputable that Gorbachev's political upgrading of the Geneva delegation head is intended to speed up the course of the negotiations--in particular because Moscow called on Washington to follow its example. This urgency is not a matter of chance but of external circumstances. On the one hand we have a President who is damaged politically and healthwise and is unlikely to be succeeded by someone more accommodating; on the other we have Gorbachev who has initiated a great deal but so far not recorded many successes. He fully intends to at least achieve the breakthrough this year.

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FRG'S TELTSCHIK SAYS SERIES OF ARMS AGREEMENTS POSSIBLE

Hamburg DEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT in German 30 Nov 86 p 8

[Article by Horst Teltschik, foreign policy adviser to FRG Chancellor Kohl: "There Is No Logical Reason for the All-or-Nothing Doctrine"]

[Text] Worldwide reactions varied greatly when President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev parted without any result arising from their 11 hours' discussions in Reykjavik. U.S. Secretary of State Shultz, his face showing signs of fatigue after negotiations that lasted the night from Saturday to Sunday, spoke of his profound disappointment and thus provided next morning's headlines in the international press. According to Horst Ehmke speaking the same night, this represented a wasted historical opportunity and a "black day for mankind." The most sober reaction came from General Secretary Gorbachev. In his press conference the same Saturday night he announced that further progress had been achieved. More reflection was needed now, prior to another meeting.

Indeed: Never before in the history of disarmament had the standpoints of the two superpowers approached each other so closely as in Reykjavik, and never before had such comprehensive and far-reaching proposals been tabled for negotiation. Agreement in principle had been achieved on the reduction of all long-range intermediate-range nuclear weapons (LRINF) in Europe and on the future of shorter-range systems (STINF). Also agreed upon was the 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons within 5 years. Rapprochement had been recorded with regard to a nuclear test stop and, surprisingly, the sensitive issue of human rights.

The discussions on the abolition of all strategic nuclear systems--the Soviet proposal--or all ballistic systems--the U.S. proposal--bore an almost sensational character. The vision of a nuclear free world suddenly appeared to be realizable.

The superpowers were unable to agree how in these 10 years to limit research on strategic defense systems within the framework of the ABM Treaty, and how to proceed with the results of this research at the end of the 10 years.

The attempt to conclude the talks with concrete results broke down at this point. General Secretary Gorbachev had bundled all topics of negotiation into
a single package and made it subject to agreement on the U.S. President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

General Secretary Gorbachev's watchword was "all or nothing." The American President refused to entertain this proposition. Did he thereby squander the opportunity for the first time in postwar history to come to an agreement on concrete steps toward disarmament?

In the first 2 days following Reykjavik, Soviet spokesmen in London and Bonn still asserted that separate agreements, possibly relating to intermediate-range missiles, might still be possible, and that there was no question of linkage with SDI. However, the Moscow Politburo came to a different decision. Though the Moscow leaders initially did not tie either the 1983 Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear missiles or the Reykjavik summit to the SDI program, they now did just that. If they maintain this uncompromising attitude, negotiations would seem for the moment to be blocked.

President Reagan will not accept any step jeopardizing the SDI research program, especially because the Soviet Union itself is carrying on comparable research. Moreover, the SDI program serves both Republicans and Democrats as an insurance policy against any Soviet tricks in the course of agreed steps toward disarmament. Washington is all too well aware of the fact that negotiations with General Secretary Gorbachev would never have gotten so far without SDI.

If, therefore, the two superpowers were to keep strictly to their positions, no progress could be made. The result would necessarily be a reciprocal blockade, just as once before in 1983, when negotiations in Geneva on the reduction of intermediate-range missiles broke down due to the Soviet refusal to accept a zero solution in Europe without regard for the French and British systems.

There is no logical reason for an all-or-nothing attitude. On the contrary: A series of individual agreements such as on zero intermediate-range missiles in Europe, a 50 percent reduction in strategic systems, a worldwide ban on chemical weapons and the limitation of nuclear tests would represent a major victory for reason, welcomed by all mankind. The prerequisites are already present.

Such a step might well strengthen trust between West and East and contribute to bringing closer the disentanglement and, consequently, the settlement of the complex issues of the interaction between strategic nuclear weapons and strategic defense systems. As reported by attendants at the summit of both sides, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have arrived at a good personal relationship. They do not deny each other's seriousness of purpose with regard to the efforts for disarmament. Progress would be achievable within a brief delay if the protagonists were to begin with the steps now in the realm of possibility.

11698
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FRG PAPER COMMENTS ON OPENING OF NST SEVENTH ROUND

Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 15 Jan 87 p 4

[Editorial by Josef Joffe: "New Round in the Missile Chess Game"]

[Text] The seventh round of the Geneva disarmament talks is beginning today, though actually it started a week ago—with a "public diplomacy" maneuver not entirely untypical for the profession. The Soviet Union has already proclaimed the replacement of its head of delegation Victor Karpov by Yuliy Vorontsov to be a small victory. Though the new man in Geneva has not been in the business as long as the experienced Karpov, he holds a more impressive title: "First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR." This formal upgrading is designed to make for "greater dynamism" in the talks; Moscow suggested at the same time that the Americans should demonstrate the seriousness of their intentions by a similar gesture. As a result Max Kampelman, the long-standing U.S. delegation chief, came to enjoy a new title. He has become a Counselor, putting him on something like secretary of state level in the hierarchy of the State Department.

Independent of this exercise in nomenclature (decisions will, of course, continue to be made in Washington and Moscow), we may expect at least an attempt at a "new impetus" in Geneva. Confronting one another in that city now are two superpowers, both of them in a stage of decline as regards their international influence. Reagan's presidency has lost some of its lustre in the Iran affair. And Gorbachev has not scored his hoped-for success anywhere—in particular in internal affairs, where the outcome of the duel between the new management and the ancien regime is far from decided. We may therefore conclude that both would welcome a visible success on the chessboard of missile diplomacy, because it would demonstrate that the men at the top continue to keep a firm grasp on power.

Unfortunately we have learned since 1969 (when the SALT talks started under Nixon and Brezhnev) that arms control represents the greatest possible difficulty for statesmen. Another Counselor in the State Department, Kissinger's aide Helmut Sonnenfeldt, described the problem by an illuminating aphorism: "Whatever is significant is not negotiable; whatever is negotiable is not significant." What he meant to say is that negotiations are easiest for the superpowers on matters that do not affect the fullness of their powers nor their status. In 1972 Moscow and Washington were able to agree on the ABM
Treaty for the limitation of antiballistic missiles because these systems did not at that time promise any gain in security. They were able to sign SALT I and SALT II, because neither the one nor the other treaty upset the status quo. Moreover: under cover of the fixed upper limits, both could energetically flex their muscles, so that the 1970's carry the imprint of rearmament rather than disarmament.

Now, however, in the sign of Reykjavik, are the nuclear armories really to be emptied, the world liberated from the curse of the bomb promptly at the turn of the millenium? To begin with, sobriety has gained ground. Just 2 years ago, Reagan could still legitimately dream of abolition under the shield of SDI: "We want to break up the balance of terror and replace it with a system that prevents an attack by anybody." These ambitions have shrunk in the meantime. "An effective strategic defense," Defense Secretary Weinberger proclaimed, "is not meant to replace but to support deterrence. As long as our enemies have nuclear arms, we need to keep modern and effective nuclear forces available." The Soviets may say otherwise, but they are equally unable to disclaim the 40-year logic of deterrence. The abolition of all strategic missiles in the coming decade? For Moscow this would surely involve a poor because only apparently balanced bargain. After all, a missile free world would mean that the Soviets would have to scrap their best weapons—their intercontinental ballistic missiles—, while the Americans would be allowed to keep the systems that guarantee their technical advantage: Cruise missiles and "stealth" bombers.

A "zero solution" in Europe? In fact nobody among the allies wants it—from the Socialist Mitterand to the Christian Democrat Kohl—, as long as the Soviets maintain a short range arsenal easily capable of taking over much of the SS-20 target planning. A 50 percent cut for all weapons, as now proposed in Geneva? Anyone seriously reflecting about the curse of nuclear peace knows very well that "numbers counting" alone does not spell salvation. Stability means that nobody is likely to fall prey to the first strike temptation, that nobody believes the other to already have this capability. Realistic arms control would confine itself to the most threatening weapons, the Soviet monster missiles with their umpteen warheads and the American precision projectiles that appear to offer an advantage to the one who shoots first. A unilateral SDI shield is in the same category, because it might betaken to promise immunity from retaliation. Messianic visions are merely a substitute for practical arms control; the real work of Messrs Kampelman and Vorontsov involves the satanic detail.

11698
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SALT/START ISSUES

MOSCOW DOCUMENTS U.S. 'UNDERMINING' OF SALT

PM221255 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jan 87 First Edition p 3

[V. Dodonov article: "Pinning the Blame on Others...; How Washington Undermined the SALT II Treaty"]

[Text] In January, now that the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms and multilateral talks on other problems highly important to the fate of peace are starting, the world public is again turning its attention to the historic importance of M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 statement. And it is being noted that for the first time a new philosophy of security for all was organically combined with a precisely scheduled program of specific nuclear disarmament measures subject to the strictest verification [kontrol]. It is for this that the Soviet Union, which strictly adheres to international agreements and accords, has been tirelessly striving and continues to strive.

A different, directly opposite stance is taken by U.S. ruling circles. Nurturing unrealistic plans to acquire military superiority, they are undermining existing agreements limiting nuclear arsenals and moving toward transferring the arms race to space. The U.S. Administration is striving at all costs to wreck the entire structure of strategic arms limitation agreements that has existed for the last 15 years. The results of its 6-year tenure confirm that, having accomplished nothing, it has destroyed and continues to destroy a great deal in the arms limitation sphere.

Concrete evidence of that is the provocative blow which the United States dealt in 1986 to the 1973 Interim Agreement and the 1979 SALT II Treaty, which had been observed by both sides on a reciprocal basis. The abandonment of these agreements is a result of a scheme long nurtured by the Reagan Administration. It had been undermining them for more than a year and had repeatedly permitted serious violations of the accords.

By wrecking the ratification of the SALT II Treaty within days of coming to power, the present administration rejected the agreement appended to it by way of a protocol on the nondeployment of long-range ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles. This blocked further resolution of the cruise missile question. On this basis the United States started deploying this dangerous weapon in massive numbers.
Starting deployment of Pershing 2 ballistic missiles and long-range GLCM's in West Europe in late 1983, the United States to all intents and purposes violated the provision not to sidestep the SALT II Treaty. The siting of these first-strike nuclear means capable of striking targets on Soviet territory is a considerable addition to the U.S. strategic nuclear potential and is aimed at upsetting the USSR-U.S. strategic equilibrium. Mass deployment of long-range cruise missiles has also been under way on U.S. surface ships and submarines since mid-1984.

The U.S. use of deliberate cloaking measures to complicate the implementation of verification [kontrol] is a U.S. violation of commitments made. During work in the United States on ICBM and SLBM launchers concealment was used to make it harder for the other side to carry out verification [kontrol] using its national means. The Soviet Union has repeatedly pointed out the illegal nature of such actions to the U.S. side, but the practice of using concealment has continued. This has prevented reliable verification [kontrolirovat] of Washington's observance of one of the main accords—the agreement to limit numbers of ballistic missiles with MIRVED warheads.

On 27 May 1986 President R. Reagan announced his "final and irrevocable" refusal to observe Soviet-U.S. treaties and legal documents on strategic offensive arms limitation in the future. And in late November the 131st B-52 heavy bomber equipped to carry long-range cruise missiles was commissioned. The United States thereby exceeded the "ceiling" of 1,320 units stipulated by the SALT II Treaty for the number of ballistic missile launchers with MIRVED warheads and for heavy bombers equipped to carry cruise missiles. These actions were a sign of the complete U.S. break with the SALT II Treaty.

Other militarist "gifts" poured forth as if from Santa's sack. Just 1 month later yet another B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles—the 132d—landed at Sawyer Air Base, Michigan, and the 133d will arrive soon. The deployment of another batch of MX ICBM's, the start of full-scale development [razrabotka] of Midgetman mobile ICBM's, the launch in Croton, Connecticut of the submarine "Tennessee," which will be equipped with Trident 2 (D-5) missiles, the preparation of a new series of nuclear tests, and the administration's request for an "additional" 2.8 billion dollars in the Pentagon's budget for the current fiscal year have all been announced.

In view of the fact that the abandonment of the SALT II Treaty has been condemned by many governments and the world public and is the subject of protest in the United States itself, the White House is trying to distort the true purport and aim of this act by pinning the blame for it, as the saying goes, on someone else. It is again resorting to the well-versed, unscrupulous method of leveling clearly fabricated accusations against the other side of allegedly violating the treaty.

Hiding behind sanctimonious arguments about alleged U.S. "restraint," U.S. Government officials are bending over backward in their vain attempts to demonstrate the "colossal growth" in the power of the USSR's strategic nuclear forces and to accuse the USSR of exceeding the level for strategic delivery
means laid down during the signing of the SALT II Treaty (2,504 units). The value of these false accusations can be seen, for instance, from the letter sent to President Reagan by 57 U.S. senators. The senators state that the limitations have "hitherto been observed by them" (that is, the Soviet Union).

Evidence can also be cited from a competent specialist--P. Warnke, former head of the U.S. delegation at the SALT talks: "The President has stated that the USSR must end its 'massive violation of agreements.' But such violations simply do not exist. The President demands that the Soviet Union 'reverse' its massive buildup in the strategic sphere, but its forces come within the agreed treaty framework." P. Warnke reasonably asks: Is not President Reagan asking the Soviet Union to unilaterally disarm?

The efforts of U.S. propaganda in ascribing to the Soviet Union some kind of violations of strategic arms agreements are merely a desperate and dishonest attempt to divert attention from the U.S. desire to violate strategic stability and find even a semblance of justification for its abandonment of highly important international treaties.

The Soviet Union has always strictly and honestly observed all the articles and provisions of both the SALT II Treaty and other international agreements. Our country resolutely counters the militarist line of the present U.S. Administration with a course of peace and international security.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1282
SOVIET ARMY PAPER DENIES SUBMARINES BREACH SALT

PMO11411 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jan 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer M. Ponomarev under the rubric "International Observer Replies to Reader": 'On Submarines, SALT II, and Western Radio Voices'; first three paragraphs are editorial introduction and reader's letter]

[Text] Retired Captain D. Kharebava from Lvov has written to the editorial bureau. He says in particular:

"I have heard the Soviet Union has launched new nuclear submarines, including Typhoon-class SSBN's. Western radio voices are claiming that USSR has thereby violated the SALT II treaty by going beyond the limits it laid down. How true are these reports, how should one approach them?"

M. Ponomarev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer, answers reader D. Kharebava.

Your letter, Comrade Kharebava, essentially asks three different questions: Has the Soviet Union produced new nuclear submarines, did this violate the SALT II treaty, and how accurate are Western radio broadcasts aimed at Soviet listeners. We will examine them in order.

Your first question can be answered in the affirmative. Yes, our country recently launched two nuclear submarines.

True, they have not been commissioned. They are still under construction and their sea trials have not yet been held. The naval ensign has not yet been hoisted over them.

As for the ruckus whipped up in the West over the appearance of Typhoon-class nuclear submarines in the Soviet Union and the accusations about an "impermissible increase in Soviet military potential," it will be apposite to recall the United States has already commissioned eight modern submarines of a similar class (the Ohio class for the Trident system) and a month ago launched the ninth — the Tennessee. It is armed with highly accurate Trident 2 (D-5) missiles, each of which can carry up to 14 nuclear warheads. Yet these systems might not have been in the sides' arsenals of nuclear arms if Washington had adopted the Soviet proposal put forward several years ago to abandon a reciprocal basis construction of Typhoon-class submarines in the USSR and Ohio-class submarines in the United States.

That, in short, is the position with regard to your first question, Comrade Kharebava. Let us look at the second question. [paragraph continues]
First and foremost it is necessary to recall that the SALT II treaty places a summary limit of 1,320 on MIRVed strategic ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles. Until recently both the United States and the USSR had adhered to this limit. Thus, the figures on the number of Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive arms that M.S. Gorbachev gave R. Reagan during the Reykjavik summit indicated that on 11 October 1986 the Soviet Union had 1,225 MIRVed ICBM and SSBN launchers and heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles, while the United States had 1,317 such launchers, including 127 heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles. President Reagan had no objections.

However, since then the United States has commissioned another five heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles and exceeded the summary limit laid down by the SALT II treaty. This treaty, which is based on recognition by both sides of the principle of equality and identical security and provides for strategic stability, was thereby trampled by the U.S. side. In taking this step, the United States opened the floodgates for an unrestricted race in strategic nuclear arms, which cannot fail to lead to the exacerbation of rivalry in the military sphere.

How did the Soviet Union act in these complex conditions? Carefully weighing the political, military, and moral aspects of the situation, the Soviet leadership concluded that it was necessary to make additional efforts to save mankind from the threat of slipping down the road to strategic chaos. This position was set forth in the Soviet Government’s 5 January 1987 statement. It stresses U.S. actions give the Soviet Union "every justification for considering itself released from its commitments under the 1972 Interim Agreement and the SALT II treaty." At the same time, the statement pointed out, the USSR believes there is still a possibility of stopping the dangerous development of events which the current U.S. Administration is provoking through its irresponsible actions. Taking into account the immense human importance of the question and the need to retain the main factor inhibiting a strategic arms race, the USSR is still refraining from exceeding the restrictions imposed by the SALT I agreement and the SALT II treaty.

The Soviet Union's decision has been approved and supported by the world public. The decision, the West German newspaper KIELER NACHRICHTEN wrote, "dovetails with the peaceful, positive concept of disarmament put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee... The Soviet Union’s decision to adhere to the SALT II treaty for the time being is further proof that Moscow is really interested in arms reduction." And THE WASHINGTON POST pointed out: "The Reagan administration’s decision to violate an important limit with regard to SALT has produced an insignificant military gain which will cost us dear... Washington, not Moscow, has been the first to violate existing agreements in the arms control sphere."

Alright, but how do things stand over the launch of the new Soviet nuclear submarines? As I have already said, they have yet to undergo sea trials. It is only then, according to the SALT II treaty, that their launchers are counted and included in the limits defined by that document. So there can be no question of any violations of SALT II by the Soviet Union. The USSR intends to continue carrying out its commitments with regard to the limits set by the treaty.

I think it is important, Comrade Kharebava, to stress once again an oft-repeated idea: The Soviet Union stakes no claim to greater security, but nor will it accept reduced security.
It will take every measure necessary to maintain military-strategic equilibrium with the United States and strengthen strategic stability.

In conclusion, a word about Western radio voices. Clearly, there is no special need to talk about the broadcasts of radio stations such as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. Through the traitors and renegades encamped in their apparatus these CIA offshoots produce a daily stream of slander against our country and the other socialist states and do not balk at any provocations. There is no need to discuss the accuracy of their broadcasts.

As for the Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, or, say, the BBC, which pride themselves on their objectivity, their broadcasts as a rule are a veritable cocktail of truth, half-truth, and deliberate disinformation. A good example is their assessment of the USSR's attitude to the SALT II treaty in connection with the launch of the new Soviet submarines. It is a fact these submarines were launched. But the claim that the SALT II treaty was violated can be left to the conscience of those who authored it; to their unclean conscience, to be blunt. *[This article is accompanied by a strategic offensive arms table which was previously published on page AA 2 in the Arms Control & Disarmament section of the 21 January 1987 DAILY REPORT]*

/9738
CSO: 5200/1282
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRC: CSU'S STRAUSS ON ZERO SOLUTION, MISSILES

LD160926 Hamburg DPA in German 1854 GMT 15 Jan 87

[Text] Munich, 15 Jan (DPA) — The Bavarian minister president and CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss has spoken in favor of a linkage between the zero solution on intermediate-range missiles and the scrapping or reduction of Soviet short-range missiles in Europe. Should disarmament on short-range missiles not be possible, then in Strauss' opinion NATO for its part must have the right to counter-arm in short-range missiles, the party leader said in an interview with the Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Friday's edition).

Strauss described the zero solution as questionable from the start. It had been part of the NATO two-track decision, which had not been very helpful in the matter and had given the Soviet Union the opportunity "to hammer away psychologically with a heavy barrage at public opinion in the West." The introduction of the short-range systems on the Soviet side had in the meantime largely destroyed the original zero-solution philosophy. For the Federal Republic the danger was no longer the intermediate-range missiles but the new SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 short-range systems.

Strauss accused Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) of misrepresenting the position of the CSU on detente policy. The CSU had not put in doubt the validity of the treaties with the East, but opposed the "highly illusionary elements" of Genscher's policy.

Strauss also rejected the assertion made by Chancellor Kohl that there were no differences with Genscher in the coalition. Genscher was dodging the issue on the question whether Europe could pursue a detente policy with the Soviet Union which the USSR pursued its bloody policy of force in other parts of the world. Were Moscow to stop this, then detente policy would be much easier. "What I hate is waffling on detente and detente dreaminess."

Relations with the GDR need no suffer from a realistic detente policy, because the communist rulers acted primarily in their interests, Strauss said. However, he called for "relations with the GDR not to be made more difficult as a result of controversial remarks."

On domestic policy, Strauss said that the CSU was not a "reservoir of right-wing radicals." He did not want to draw a line under German history. The "historical truth" could not, however, be limited to the atrocities of the Germans. No one need give their second votes to the FDP at the Bundestag election for fear of a red-Green left-wing alliance.

/9274
CSO 5200/2487
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

MOSCOW: U.S., NOT USSR, UNDERMINING CBW CONVENTION

PM290915 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 3, 26 Jan 87 p 13

[Text] Geneva-Moscow—Another forgery has recently been made public in Washington. This time, to give it a semblance of authenticity, it was presented as a military intelligence report. The subject is the observance by the USSR of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction.

The U.S. has tried on previous occasions to accuse the USSR of violating this important international convention. Moscow refuted inventions about outbreaks of epidemics in Soviet territory and the alleged use of toxin weapons by the USSR. They were given the lie by highly qualified experts from various countries, the U.S. included.

Why is the U.S. trying to galvanize these fabricated accusations?

This is an obvious attempt to undermine existing international agreements in the field of disarmament, complicated relations between states, the USSR and the U.S., in particular, sow seeds of doubt with regard to the honesty of the Soviet Union as a partner in curbing the arms race; and, last but not least, call the very convention into question.

Another point merits attention in this context. We know from experience that accusations of all sorts of "breaches" of international agreements on disarmament are advanced against the USSR by the U.S. each time the latter gives the "green light" to new military programmes, and it becomes clear that these programmes are not compatible with the limitations imposed by the agreements. It looks as if the same trick is being used now.

New evidence of the Pentagon's intention to get down to the development of bacteriological weapons has recently become public knowledge.

Officially, military biological research in the United States is restricted to the "defence studies" stipulated by the appropriate clauses of the convention. This research is being carried on in Fort Detrick, Maryland. The
centre employs up to 4,000 military and civilian experts and has a budget of about 20 million dollars.

At the same time, the construction of a special laboratory for the study of bacteriological aerosols has started on the Dugway proving site, Utah. The Pentagon intends to spend 1.4 million dollars on its construction in this fiscal year alone. Reportedly, the new centre's main task is to study especially dangerous aerosolized biological agents like the pathogens causing grave haemorrhagic fevers—the Lassa, Ebol and Marburg viruses. James Sasser, the American Democratic Senator, has said that the Dugway laboratory has the specific purpose of experimenting with biological and toxin weapons banned by the 1972 convention.

There is now open talk in the U.S. about the increasing military importance of bacteriological (biological) weapons. According to the WASHINGTON POST, a high-ranking U.S. Defence Department official said in August 1986 that bacteriological weapons using the latest in technology could assume immense military importance. We have changed our opinion of these weapons' military usefulness, he intimated, and now says that bacteriological weapons made on the basis of modern technology can be truly great.

Last autumn the American papers carried information on the subject. The WALL STREET JOURNAL stressed, in particular, that the funds allocated for biological weapon research had been increased tenfold over the past five years.

The Pentagon claims that research in this field is of a purely defensive character, but experts say it is preparing to take a practical step towards the development of "an offensive biological potential." Private U.S. (and Israeli) companies, as well as a number of U.S. universities, are being drawn into this effort on a wide scale. Such is the truth about Washington's campaign.

The U.S. tactics at the second conference on the observance of the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons, held in Geneva last autumn, pursued the same objectives.

In view of the participants being at one on the need to improve the control mechanism, our delegation suggested that an additional protocol be worked out and adopted for the purpose by a special conference of the convention's signatories, after the appropriate preparations have been made.

In compliance with the wishes of many states the Soviet side supported a number of confidence-building measures, such as the exchange of information about biological research centres (specifically, on their locations, and the amount of character of the work they do), the obligatory notification of every outbreak of an epidemic, and the formation of a group of experts to discuss new achievements in the field of biology pertaining to the observance of the convention.

Unfortunately, the proposals of the USSR and other states were not embodied in appropriate decisions because of the American delegation's unconstructive and, in a number of cases, frankly obstructionist stand.
By opposing a special conference on control, the U.S. showed its unwillingness to undertake additional legal commitments in this field, or to let anything interfere with the implementation of its biological weapon development programmes.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction is the first measure towards genuine disarmament and an important part of the complex of treaties and agreements on arms race limitation now in force. Safeguarding and improving this international legal mechanism, which has proved its viability and effectiveness, is an immediate obligation of all states—especially those on which the maintenance of peace and international security chiefly depends.

It is from such positions that Moscow approaches everything achieved in this field, including the convention prohibiting bacteriological weapons.

/6662
GSO: 5200/1284
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BULGARIAN COMMENTS ON PLANS FOR BALKAN CW-FREE ZONE

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Jan 87 p 5

[Article by Lyubomir Koralov, observer of the newspaper OTECHESTVEN FRONT, under the "Foreign Publicists in IZVESTIYA" rubric: "Balkans Without Chemical Weapons"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Sofia--The first meeting recently in Bucharest of the representatives of the Balkan countries--Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia--that discussed questions in the conversion of the Balkans into a zone free from chemical weapons was a notable and encouraging event.

The very fact of this meeting is evidence that the idea presented in 1985 by the leaders of Bulgaria and Romania and formulated in their appeal to the neighboring states to safeguard the Balkans against the spread of chemical weapons has been put to work. This is especially so because the circumstances are favorable for this. According to the official statements of the governments of the Balkan countries, such weapons are not now located in their territories and are not being produced or developed.

Having received broad public support in the region, the Bulgarian-Romanian initiative is in essence a part of the great efforts of the states of the socialist community to improve international relations and to maintain peace on earth. It is an organic part of the truly historical program for freeing humanity of the fear of a nuclear catastrophe put forward in the 15 January 1986 declaration of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. As everyone knows, the Soviet proposals on the elimination--in addition to nuclear weapons--of chemical weapons, the highly barbaric weapons of mass destruction, are the most important section of this program.

The past year showed with what persistence and flexibility, considering the different points of view of the partners, the Soviet Union is pursuing negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons in the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. It has performed a great service in that it was possible to make appreciable progress in this direction. Precisely the proposals of the Soviet Union paved a realistic way to the signing of a corresponding international convention as early as this year, 1987. While
cherishing hopes for a positive outcome to the negotiations, one must not, however, fail to take into account that the words of the NATO participants on the desirability of such a convention are still far from their deeds.

Judging from the reports in the Western press, these deeds are generating considerable concern. Plans have been drawn up and are starting to go into effect for the improvement and renewal of NATO chemical arsenals. They are producing new means of "yellow death" capable of provoking a chemical war, as the NEW YORK TIMES wrote recently. The press informs of the manufacture of "cruise missiles" with module chemical weapons and of missiles of the "ground-to-air" type with binary charges. At the U.S. Air Force base at Wellford in England, according to London's TODAY, they are preparing to receive binary chemical weapons. There are reports that it is planned to station 460,000 binary weapons in the FRG.

The flashing and thunderous nuclear death, the slightly slower "yellow" chemical death, and the noiseless binary death—a threat of universal destruction hung over the earth, above all over Europe. In this situation, when the problem of the survivability of humanity arose, no one can be indifferent and there can be on bystanders. As the Soviet leader emphasized in the mentioned declaration, "of importance here is the contribution of each nation, large or small, socialist or capitalist."

Large and small steps are essential but only on one road, the road to peace. The realization of the joint proposal of the GDR and CSSR on the establishment of a zone in central Europe free of chemical weapons could also be a step forward. One would like to believe that such a step will also be taken in the Balkans, for which a good sign was the Bucharest meeting of experts from five neighboring states.

Each delegation at this meeting presented the positions of its own country on the questions under discussion. The Romanian delegation presented a draft declaration proclaiming the Balkans to be a zone free of chemical weapons. The representatives of the participating countries obligated themselves to submit this document to their governments for study and the subsequent informing of the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

There must be neither nuclear nor chemical weapons in the Balkans. Today the Balkan governments can no longer fail to listen to this authoritative demand of the peoples there.

9746
CS0: 5200/1240

81
EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

CANADA: NDP CRITIC ON PULLING TROOPS OUT OF EUROPE

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 17 Jan 87 p A 4

[Article by Dan Turner]

[Text] Defence Minister Perrin Beatty says he wants to pump "billions of dollars" into upgrading Canada's military reserves, but at least one critic says Beatty is avoiding the issue of restructuring Canada's defence priorities.

Beatty told the Conference of Defence Associations Friday that Canada should double the size of its reserves and give them enough training to make them a legitimate back-up force in case of war.

One of his central proposals was the establishment of a new chain of modern militia training and support centres to serve all regions of the country.

NATO thinking has moved away from the certainty that any war in Europe would be nuclear and over immediately, he said. In the case of a conventional European war, well-trained reserves would be needed both to defend Canada when regulars were dispatched to Europe, and to replace dead and wounded soldiers in Europe.

But while Beatty said his proposals were designed to advance Canada from the "60s thinking" which assumed the only European threat was a quick nuclear war, New Democratic defence critic Derek Blackburn said that Beatty appeared to be locked in the 40s.

By refusing to recognize that Canada should pull its "billion-dollar-a-year, second-line reserve" out of Europe in order to concentrate on more specialized areas of North American defence, Blackburn maintained Beatty was saying "we're going to stick with World War II strategy."

"I'm all in favor of upgrading the reserves," said Blackburn. "but he's saying we've got too many commitments, we're under-equipped, but we're going to keep all these commitments and plug the holes with reserves."

Canada, he said, should be concentrating on upgrading its northern and maritime defences to counter the threat of Soviet-launched cruise and ballistic missiles.
"We should be slowly, gradually withdrawing from NATO's central flank, which is a political commitment, not strategic."

Beatty said such major decisions are currently under consideration.

Beatty acknowledged that he couldn't be sure how much money will be available to upgrade Canada's contingent of 24,000 primary and 26,000 supplementary military reserves, composed of civilians ranging from those who train regularly to those whose commitment is limited to having their names on a list.

But he said to create a back-up military force of between 30,000 and 40,000.

/9274
CSO: 5220/26
BRIEFS

FRG ON LACK OF MBFR ACCORD—Bonn [no date as received] (DPA)—The Federal Government expressed regret today that agreement with the Soviets on supervision again seems "more distant" at the MBFR Vienna negotiations. A Foreign Ministry statement at the start of the 41st MBFR round of talks placed emphasis on the importance that a successful conclusion to this 13-year-old series of disarmament talks would have as a basis for ongoing negotiations concerning conventional stability for all Europe. It is disappointing that the Soviets have not yet responded constructively to the West's compromise proposals dated 5 December 1985. In view of future tasks in conventional disarmament the Federal Government "attaches great importance, now as in the past, to the task facing the MBFR negotiations." [Text] [Hamburg DPA in German 1015 GMT 29 Jan 87 LD] /9274

CSO: 5200/2487
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: U.S.-SOVIET TESTING TALKS TO TAKE BREAK, RESUME
Petrosyants Deplores U.S. Line
LD101950 Moscow TASS in Russian 1753 GMT 10 Feb 87

[Text] Geneva February 10 TASS -- The USSR and U.S. delegations participating in the bilateral talks on questions of ending nuclear tests have decided to make a working break and resume the current, fourth round, on March 16.

Addressing a news conference today, the head of the Soviet delegation Andranik Petrosyants, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, said the round started in conditions when the Soviet moratorium on nuclear blasts was extended a fifth time. The Soviet Union hoped, in common with peace-loving mankind, the U.S. Administration would, at last, revise its negative attitude to the moratorium. Yet the nuclear blast in the Nevada test range on February 3 shattered these hopes.

Even under these conditions, the preparedness of the USSR, expressed in the Soviet Government's statement of December 18, 1986, stays: If the U.S. ends nuclear tests, the USSR will be ready any day and month to halt, on the basis of reciprocity, the implementation of its program for such tests.

The Soviet Union's principled stand on the question of ending nuclear tests is clearly set out in the statement referred to, where it is again proposed to "begin full-scale talks on a total ban on nuclear tests without delay."

At such talks, the Soviet side is ready for a stage-by-stage resolution of that task, the introduction of intermediate restrictions on the number and yield of nuclear blasts, Andranik Petrosyants said. These measures should certainly be, in the first place, substantial, provide for a considerable lowering of the permitted yield of blasts and the number of tests a year, and, second, be of a truly intermediate, temporary character with guidelines set for the terms of transition to a total ban on nuclear tests.
Deplorably, this constructive approach does not meet with a response from the current U.S. Administration pursuing a tough line against curbing the nuclear weapon race. As a matter of fact, the U.S. delegation proposes that only one question be tabled at the talks — ratification of the "threshold" treaties on condition of a change in their protocols regarding treaties on condition of a change in their protocols regarding control. The resolution of that question, from the positions announced in advance by the United States, is put forward as a preliminary condition for discussions on all other issues proposed by the Soviet delegation. Thus, the examination of the whole package of problems for a further limitation and, certainly, an end to nuclear tests is put off for an indefinite future.

What is more, progress toward further restrictions on nuclear tests and ending them completely is being hindered by a large number of preconditions linked with progress at the talks on nuclear and space weapons.

In conclusion, the head of the USSR delegation repeated that, despite the complexities, the Soviet side bases itself on the fundamental need to end nuclear weapons tests, and that it is ready for this reason to continue the joint quest for mutually acceptable resolution.

U.S. 'Absurd' Logic

LD101542 Moscow TASS in English 1523 GMT 10 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow February 10 TASS — TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev comments:

A break till March 16 was announced at Soviet-U.S. talks on the issue of ending nuclear testing. The talks have failed to produce any positive results due to the United States' categorical refusal even to discuss the issue of a ban on nuclear explosions, press reports say.

In Geneva the United States adheres to the stand that calls in question the sense of holding any discussions with it on nuclear tests.

The U.S. side was reproached, and rightly so, also in the past that sometimes at the talks it put the cart before the horse, displaying readiness to discuss secondary, technical matters while refusing to solve the crucial items on the agenda. Currently, however, U.S. Chief Negotiator Robert Barker went much farther than shifting accents and priorities in discussion. Following his announcement of the break at the talks, he stated that nuclear weapon tests could be halted only after these weapons were destroyed.

Going one better than medieval scholastics, Robert Barker actually contends that it is much more expedient to conduct discussions on ending tests of the already abolished weapons than to hold talks on banning the perfection of the current huge arsenals of weapons of mass destruction.

Certainly, nobody takes Robert Barker seriously. The trouble is not in the absurd logic of the head of the U.S. delegation.
The point is that this logic reflects the U.S. Administration's unwillingness to take if only one step towards arresting the arms race, towards delivering mankind of the threat of nuclear war.

The conclusion that the U.S. delegation arrived at the talks on ending nuclear weapon tests unprepared would be too mild an assessment of the U.S. stand. It is perfectly obvious that at the fourth round of the talks in Geneva Washington sabotages the solution of the issue of banning nuclear explosions.

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CSO: 5200/1286
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW RADIO ON SDI, U.S. TESTING

LD081913 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 8 Feb 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, commentator of All-Union Radio; Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, Corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute; and Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, political observer]

[Excerpts] [Levin] Hello, esteemed comrades. We want to begin today's program with an analysis of the conversation between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and the delegation from the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, with an account of the significance of this meeting. You, after all, have obviously taken note of the fact that taking part in this meeting on the U.S. side were two former secretaries of state—Kissinger and Vance—and there was former permanent representative of the United States at the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick. It seems to me that sheer fact of this meeting very clearly and convincingly confirms our sincere striving for dialogue with the opposite side, for a search for mutual understanding, that is, for a search of that same trust, to generate the trust without which one simply can't imagine the world today. After all, people very frequently say the arms race is being escalated by the absence of trust, and there is no trust because there is an arms race.

[Shishlin] This series of meetings with U.S. state figures and public figures—irrespective of whether the word former is applied to them or not, these are notable people in U.S. political life—but, this series of meetings must, of course, be put—and here I agree with you—as a whole, in the overall context of Soviet-U.S. relations, which, of course, leave much to be desired.

Well, what have we seen in past weeks in the U.S. line of action? First of all, of course, I would say that the Americans, despite the Soviet Union's clear warning and the Soviet Union's statements in December, conducted another nuclear blast in the State of Nevada. This is, of course, a quite provocative act which says as clear as day what the system of priorities is in the foreign policy of the United States in the present administration and on what it places emphasis. This is intertwined with the strong-arm policy which the United States is trying to implement in connection with the United States'
actions such as the erosion and wrecking of existing treaties and agreements limiting the arms race to one degree or another, with those fairly tiresome statements about the fact that in the United States the administration is currently examining the issue of the early and staged positioning in space of SDI components, the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative.

To a certain extent, of course, the policy of the current administration looks chaotic at present, because the President's statements, in particular his address on the State of the Union, and his other latest major statements, remain, as in the past, extremely contradictory. There is the presence there of declarations about readiness to build relations with the Soviet Union constructively; there is the presence of the repeated declarations about the unacceptability of nuclear war; but there is the complete absence of any practical, mundane, and tangible approaches to resolving these problems. In this respect, it seems to me that a wide discussion such as the one held by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev with the U.S. delegation, and the conversations which the Americans had with our party and state figures at the United States of America and Canada Institute—this has, of course, been noted and heard. It has also become, by and large, an event of international significance. What seems to me to be particularly vital is the assessment of the world situation given by Mikhail Sergeyevich in his conversation with the Americans. What I have in mind is the fundamental thesis on the unacceptability of nuclear war, which, of course, would be a calamity for the whole of humanity; I have in mind the thesis which speaks of the importance of putting serious efforts into a just political settlement of the existing regional conflicts; I have in mind that broad view which requires a correct evaluation of the fruits of social progress and the establishment of new political thinking in this new world, which requires new answers, not only to the new problems but also to the old problems.

[Levin] At this point, I would like to mention the nuclear device which exploded in Nevada. First, one's attention is drawn to the fact that the explosion was scheduled for 5 February, but conducted on 3 February—2 days early. This was clearly connected with attempts to create what I would call a preemptive situation.

[Zhurkin] One could say preventive...preventing measures.

[Levin] Yes, preventive actions to make it impossible for the peace supporters, whose ranks are swelling—it is very indicative that there were eight Congressmen taking part in the demonstration which was nevertheless held on 5 February at the nuclear testing ground in Nevada, a very interesting point... and....

[Zhurkin interrupts] Viktor Nikolayevich, quite a lot of people were arrested there too, including—and I want to emphasize this in particular—the eminent scientist and astronomer Carl Sagan, who is widely known in the scientific world. It is hardly adequate to say he is simply an outstanding natural scientists, a prominent man of encyclopaedic learning, a humanist, a fighter for human rights and the rights of all mankind. He was seized by the police at that testing ground—a disgrace, in my view, a disgrace for society.
The U.S. Administration's justification is that he was taking part in the demonstration, but Carl Sagan was taking part in that demonstration for the additional reason that he was—if I am not mistaken—one of the first to develop the theory of nuclear winter, one of the first to show what the use of nuclear weapons might lead to. In this connection the statement by White House spokesman Dan Howard—a statement made at a regular briefing for foreign journalists on 5 February... He was asked whether the nuclear test on 3 February was sanctioned beforehand by the White House. Dan Howard's reply to this was—and I quote: I don't know at what level it was sanctioned, but that explosion was a component part of our normal continuing test program; we did not attach great importance to it. The issue could not have been more poignant. The Soviet Union, on extending its moratorium for the fifth time—and incidentally 6 February marked the 18th month since our moratorium came into force—extending our moratorium for the fifth time we said that our moratorium would continue for as long as there were no nuclear explosions in the United States this year; until that time. The first U.S. explosion blows up our moratorium as well. In these circumstances the White House spokesman says: That explosion wasn't of much importance. Is this cynicism?

It is both cynicism and a very frivolous attitude. Here's a resolution by Democratic Congressmen: It plainly urges the President to postpone further underground tests of nuclear weapons. A question often arises here—one we have heard in letters from our radio listeners and when we meet an audience. Fine, they say, we have extended the moratorium, we have appealed to the United States, there has been international pressure, but the United States continues its explosions, stubbornly going its own way. But they're not getting it all their own way: The fact that a demonstration took place, that they were forced to resort to arrests, even including people like Carl Sagan, testifies to the fact that both the Soviet actions for peace and the broad worldwide support for these actions, are making their mark. THE WASHINGTON POST published an article on banning nuclear tests under the title: "We Could Verify if We Wanted To."

The article is very interesting, but I shall quote just a few passages from it. The Natural Resources Defense Council wants to prove that a private organization of American citizens with a budget of $2 million could do what, in the view of the Pentagon with its budget of $300 billion, we are incapable of doing—verifying [proizvodit proverku] nuclear tests.

You know that we have an agreement with this council...

Our Academy of Sciences has...

Absolutely right, our Academy of Sciences has an agreement with this council according to which, in the region of Semipalatinsk, in the region of the Soviet testing ground, seismic devices have been installed...

Which have been registering the absence of blasts because there have been no blasts for 18 months.
[Levin] Absolutely right.

[Zhurkin] They have been registering American blasts.

[Levin] Yes. The verification [proverka] is absolutely accurate there. THE WASHINGTON POST goes on: The verification [proverka] was a clever—in inverted commas—word which specialists in arms control have been using from the very moment nuclear arsenals appeared. Norris, one of the representatives of the Natural Resources Defense Council—and he was one of the authors of this initiative—says that even under Reagan you cannot tell decent people that you are against arms control. All you can do is to nod with the look of a wise man and to mention that you would like very much to conclude a treaty banning nuclear tests, but only if you could be sure that the Soviets would fulfill their pledges. It has turned out now that by using new technology one can measure the power of tests to an accuracy of several tons. We are saying that it is not at all necessary to trust the Soviets, Norris points out. Verification [proverka] is possible, and this is exactly what we are proving. We have eliminated this obstacle.

[Zhurkin] It seems to me, Viktor Nikolayevich, that both this and everything we have said before emphasizes even more the importance of the major international event that is to take place a week from now, here, in our capital, Moscow. I am speaking about the international forum for a nuclear-free world, for the survival of mankind, that will be attended by prominent public figures, scientists, religious figures, important businessmen....

[Levin interrupts] Art figures.

[Zhurkin] Art figures, from over 80 countries. A dialogue about destinies of mankind, a dialogue on the subject of how we are going to live, and how we are to develop in future will indeed take place at this forum. Different points of view will be compared, and a wide range of various opinions will most certainly be presented, and an interesting discussion will take place.

[Shishlin] On the whole, this is an event of a kind which takes to a new level the phenomenon we have been witnessing for recent years when movements of scientists against the nuclear threat started, when the movement of physicians for preventing nuclear catastrophe began, when a host of all kinds of associations joined efforts, stances, and points of view of people who often stick to different notions on issues of human existence but who really show true concern and who are prepared to seek ways to avert the threat of nuclear death from mankind. I think what is so precious about the forthcoming forum is the fact that it will include not just one rostrum but a number of rostrums from which people will be able to express various points of views on ways to harmonize international relations, to make international relations more democratic, and, of course, first of all, on the issue of war and peace.

[Levin] The Soviet Union has been conducting an active foreign policy in all directions, yet, naturally—and this has been stated in party decisions—the
development of relations with socialist countries is our priority. I think it would be fairly expedient, in connection with this, to spend the short time remaining at our disposal on analyzing the visits of USSR Foreign Minister Comrade Shevardnadze to the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

[Shishlin] I think it is important in principle that in the course of the visits a most broad agreement along all the main directions of foreign activity by our countries has been revealed. What the Soviet Union undertakes in the international arena is not only our national policy, it is socialist policy and as such it has been met with understanding and support, with active support, from our friends.

[Levin] The final documents on the talks by Comrade Shevardnadze in Berlin and Prague, and also the joint Soviet-Mongolian statement on the results of the talks in Moscow with Comrade Dugersuren, foreign minister of the Mongolian People's Republic, note the parties have given a high appraisal to the 15 January 1986 statement by Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev in which the task of freeing the world of nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of this year [as heard] was set out. The affirmation of the fact this statement has played a great part in the development of international relations and has opened new prospects for the whole of mankind has been reflected in all the documents. In particular, the joint Soviet-Czechoslovakian communiqué says the following: The parties have established that last year has forcefully shown the viability and feasibility of the program for the liquidation of nuclear and other kinds of weapons by the end of this century, the program that was expounded in the 15 January 1986 statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and which met with broad international support. I would like also to note that while our friends have been supporting our initiative policy, the Soviet Union has been actively supporting those initiatives aimed at the consolidation of peace that have been put forward by fraternal socialist countries. In particular, a report on the visit by Comrade Shevardnadze to the GDR says the following: The Soviet side is decisively in favor of the initiatives put forward by the GDR and the CSSR for creating a nuclear-free corridor and a chemical weapons-free zone in Central Europe. Their implementation could become an essential contribution to the strengthening of peace and security. This joint policy of ours directed toward the solution of the problems the world is facing today, these coordinated actions by socialist countries are bringing a growing influence to bear upon the whole course of international events and are providing mankind with an opportunity to look--with a certain degree of confidence, though the world is complex and difficult enough, yet, nevertheless, with a certain degree of confidence--to look ahead.

[Shishlin] I think it is very important--although, of course, the main point of those talks was in the area of foreign policy--the broad mutual understanding that has been revealed concerning ways of consolidating relations between the Soviet Union and the GDR, between the Soviet Union and socialist Czechoslovakia, is nevertheless, very important. I think the interest shown by German and Czechoslovak interlocutors to issues of Soviet internal policies, and first of all of course, to the decisions of the January Plenum of the
CPSU Central Committee, could be fully expected. This event not only reveals the firm line of the CPSU toward the implementation of restructuring which is really gaining in force and depth, although, as is known, we are far from having walked the whole road of this restructuring, we are only in the beginning; yet it is also essential that in this event, in the plenum's decisions, our friends and the whole world should see the unswerving resolve of the Soviet Union to stay, in international affairs, with the strategy that was chosen at the CPSU 27th congress. The very commitment itself of the Soviet Union to internal affairs, to solving such problems as deepening socialist democracy, establishing socialist self-governing by the people, implementing a fundamental economic reform—all this shows as clearly as day the Soviet Union has chosen its future path. This is a path of overcoming the threat of war, a path of socialist construction, of revealing the enormous creative potential contained in the socialist structure of society.

[Levin] Here I would like to recall the words of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in the conversation with the U.S. delegation: Restructuring in the USSR does not contradict the interests of other peoples. What is going on in our country is the most forceful and objective argument showing it needs a peaceful and conservative policy and will be implementing it sincerely and consistently.

Esteemed comrades, our time is up. Thank you and all the best.

/6662
CSO: 5200/1286
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

COMMENTARY ON U.S. TEST RESUMPTION

U.S. Nuclear Tests Pondered

PM161455 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jan 87 First Edition p 3

[Observer M. Ponomarev's reply to a reader's letter under the rubric "International Observer Replies to Readers": "A Difficult but a Necessary Decision"--first three grafs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Excerpts] Among the mail received by the editorial office there was a letter from Warrant Officer V. Bakhmetyev. This is what he writes in part:

"Almost 18 months have passed since the Soviet Union declared its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. Over this time I have read many articles which cited various--and in my opinion convincing--arguments in favor of the need for and importance of this step. We are also perfectly aware of the fact that the U.S. leading circles have refused to comply with our appeal to join the moratorium and continued the nuclear weapon tests. Recently our country was forced to announce that we will resume our tests after the next U.S. nuclear explosion.

Now reports are coming in from across the ocean about a new series of tests in preparation there. This means that the Soviet moratorium is coming to an end. How then is one to interpret the arguments which have been cited in favor of the moratorium. Does this mean that we now reject them?"

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer M. Ponomarev replies to the newspaper's reader, Warrant Officer V. Bakhmetyev.

The whole world acknowledges that the Soviet moratorium has brought the issue of ending nuclear tests within practical reach. However, in conditions where the United States continues its tests, the USSR cannot extend its unilateral moratorium indefinitely. By not carrying out any nuclear explosions for some 18 months now, the Soviet Union has already incurred certain losses in military and national economic respects. Meanwhile the United States proceeded to modernize its nuclear missile arsenal and implement a number of major military programs, including SDI."
In this respect it is necessary to clearly bear in mind that nuclear tests are also connected with the military equilibrium in the world. There can be no genuine security unless it is identical and comprehensive. And as a result of the fact that the United States has carried out 30 percent more nuclear tests than the USSR and is continuing them, a real threat has arisen that it may gain a lead in the development of strategic arms. A situation has developed whose continuation is fraught with the inflicting of serious damage upon the security of the USSR and its allies.

Comrade Bakhmetyev, you know what action the Soviet Union has taken in these, frankly speaking, difficult circumstances. It has declared that it is prepared to abide by its moratorium in the future. However, it will resume nuclear tests after the first U.S. explosion in 1987. This was a difficult decision which was foisted on us, but it had to be taken.

People are now sometimes asking: If the Soviet Union resumes nuclear explosions, what will its attitude be to all the arguments in favor of the moratorium and to criticism of the U.S. stance and U.S. attempts to justify nuclear tests. This question is far-fetched. We remain convinced and principled supporters of a total nuclear test ban and we stick to every work as to where they may lead. We make no secret of the fact that Soviet nuclear tests, if they are resumed, will concentrate mainly on improving our strategic potential. Because this is the only way to reliably ensure the security of the Soviet Union and its allies and friends.

In conclusion, Comrade Bakhmetyev, I would like to recall the words of a prominent Soviet scientist, Academician Ye. P. Velikhov. At one of the press conferences he said: The push button for triggering tests at Soviet test sites is, figuratively speaking, located on the U.S. President's desk. If he presses it, he will improve Soviet warheads targeted on the United States.

As they used to say in the old days: He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.

U.S. Uses Verification as 'Barrier'

LD171740 Moscow TASS in English 1412 GMT 17 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow, 17 Jan TASS--TASS news analyst Lev Chernenko writes:

Silence has been reigning at Soviet nuclear test ranges for almost one year and a half now, and there will be silence until the first U.S. explosion this year.

The silence is being monitored by sensitive U.S. equipment installed in the area of Semipalatinsk. Over there, U.S. scientists and specialists have been engaging in seismic monitoring for more than half a year now.

It would seem that at a time when U.S. seismic stations are functioning in the environs of the Soviet test range, it is ridiculous to speak of the Russians' inclination to secrecy or of the complexity of the verification
problem. But the White House again reiterates the favourite old arguments as to "insufficiency" and "unreliability" of the existing monitoring measures. The arguments have been resorted to make it difficult to ratify the ten-year-old treaties.

President Reagan has sent a message to the Senate, expressing the administration's readiness to agree at last to a ratification of the Soviet-U.S. 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

However, this belated consent is being accompanied with endeavours to put forward new conditions. It is being asserted that the treaties are not effectively verifiable, and that verification measures should be improved.

The President speaks of the so-called Corrtelex measurement as an effective measure which could be used to monitor compliance with the provisions of the treaties. It is being attempted again to make the verification problem a barrier to accord.

Why does the U.S. side insist on the use of the Corrtelex procedure? What does it consist of? Near the well into which a nuclear device is put, another well is bored for a special installation to record the parameters of explosion.

"Such a method is very costly and, besides, there are no materials which would indicate its accuracy and effectiveness", maintains Igor Nersesov, scientific director of the Soviet-U.S. experiment to monitor non-conduct of nuclear tests, the head of a department of the Institute of the Physics of the Earth of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

"Meanwhile, there are other well-tried solutions. For example, American Professor Nootley from St. Louis University has shown in his research that a proper use of seismological methods produces results which are up to those yielded by the Corrtelex procedure. In the USSR, seismologists have long been engaging in the utilization of the entire recording of an earthquake to determine the magnitude of slight vibrations. The application of this procedure yields results which are by far better than the classical ways to determine the power of a source".

"Our measurements with the use of seismological methods show that their accuracy is close to those yield estimates which are made by the Americans themselves on the strength of U.S. nuclear explosions."

It means that the Corrtelex procedure can be successfully replaced by a seismological one which is much cheaper, simpler, and in a whole number of cases more reliable".

Soviet scientists suggested a seismological procedure to the American specialists when concluding an agreement on joint work in Kazakhstan and in Nevada. If the American side still insists on the Corrtelex measurement and considers it the only one, it could be compared with seismological methods. But the Americans do not for some reason agree to that.
"If we received permission to conduct work in Nevada (so far this kind of work is being conducted only in Kazakhstan)", Nersesov maintains, "such a comparison could be made jointly with American specialists, and it would be possible to show that accuracy in both procedures is equivalent."

Reagan's gravitation to the Corrtext procedure is accounted for by yet another important circumstance. This measurement is used only to record high-yield nuclear detonations--over 50 kilotons. It is not applicable to detonations of a lesser yield. Thus, the Americans, by linking verification with the Corrtext measurement, virtually move on to testing higher-yield nuclear detonations, i.e., those which they need to implement SDI components. Instead of lowering the threshold of tests, Reagan, by advocating the Corrtext measurement, virtually raises it to the upper limit permissible under the treaty.

In short, the belated readiness to ratify the ten-year-old treaties is not a gesture of goodwill which the international community vainly expects from the U.S. Administration but yet another skillful maneuver, yet another barrier to a nuclear-test ban.

Reagan's new message to the Senate still declares a comprehensive test ban to be a matter of distant future, "a long-term objective".

General Denounces Tests

AU221054 East Berlin NATIONAL-ZEITUNG in German 17-18 Jan 87 p 4

[Article by Major General F. Gontar, "Expert of the USSR Defense Ministry": "What Does Washington Want To Be Tested Under the Nevada Desert?"]

[Text] For more than 500 days now all has been calm on the Soviet nuclear testing ground in the Semipalatinsk region in Kazakhstan. But tests are being conducted demonstratively on the American testing ground in the Nevada desert; as a rule these follow Soviet peace initiatives that are aimed at clearing the way for a world free from nuclear weapons as soon as possible.

The United States carried out 24 underground tests between 6 August 1985 and 21 December 1986. In the 1 and a half years since the validation of the Soviet moratorium a nuclear blast has shaken the earth in Nevada every 20 days. By doing so the White House in Washington disregards not only world public opinion but also that of the citizens of its own country where 80 percent of the population is today in favor of a complete halt to nuclear weapons tests. One need only point to the relevant appeal which 130 members of the House of Representatives addressed to President Reagan.

Everybody knows today what political and military objectives are being pursued with the stepped-up American nuclear tests: At no cost will Washington abandon the illusion that it is possible to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union. For the same reason the United States is time and again starting new rounds in the arms race and is trying to extend them to outer space. It wants to eliminate in its own favor the military strategical
parity that has existed between the USSR and the United States for some 15 years. Proof of this also is the fact that Washington is renouncing the SALT II treaty and wrecking the unlimited treaty with the Soviet Union on limiting antimissile defense systems.

It must be said with respect to the purely military-technical objectives of the continuous nuclear tests in Nevada that they serve the development of new warheads—for strategic missiles with a high degree of accuracy that is, for the MX, Midgetman, and Trident II types and for future long-range cruise missiles which have been put into action [eingesetzt wurden] from new strategic bombers. Up to 10 tests were specifically conducted for work on nuclear charges for space attack weapons which have been developed under the "Strategic Defense Initiative" program.

What all arguments the United States will fabricate to at least somehow justify its negative attitude to the Soviet moratorium and conceal the aggressive nature of the "SDI" program! The United States does not need the nuclear weapons tests for "deterrence" or in order to verify the reliability of the stockpiled weapons but only and alone for the creation of new, even more developed nuclear space weapons, among other things precisely for space armament. Nor should one fail to mention that Washington's nuclear space ambitions are by no means restricted to erecting a nuclear X ray-laser which is to constitute the basis for the space theater weapon to be built under the "SDI" program. The program also envisages the creation of a whole series of other nuclear devices of, as they are called, the "third generation," which are intended for space combat weapons.

It is directly pointed out in official statements of the U.S. Department of Energy that more and more nuclear tests will constantly be conducted in the coming few years because intensive tests are necessary for both "SDI" and other nuclear programs. As a leading staff worker of the Department of Energy stated in this context: "It may be expected that the testing and manufacture of nuclear weapons will be continued in the 21st century." And Pentagon Chief Caspar Weinberger stated explicitly: "As long as the United States depends on nuclear weapons, the need to test them remains."

All this gives us reason to believe that Washington's option of continuing the nuclear arms race, achieving military superiority over the USSR, and being capable of a nuclear first strike is the keynote of U.S. long-term policy.

USSR Efforts for Test Cessation

LD221051 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0350 GMT 22 Jan 87

[Viktor Levin commentary]

[Text] The scheduled fourth round of the Soviet-American talks on stopping nuclear tests starts in Geneva today. Our commentator Viktor Levin is at the microphone:
[Levin] When the briefing was held in Moscow in connection with the start of the new round of these talks, Gerasimov, chief of the information department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, recalled that the Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing was in its 533d day of functioning. That was 2 days ago, and so today is already the 535th day of the moratorium. Why is it that this question is being raised? Because it illustrates the principled attitude of the Soviet Union, an attitude typified by a sincere and--this must have special attention paid to it--effective striving of the Soviet Union for a full cessation of nuclear testing.

This attitude is also illustrated in the platform with which our delegation is starting—as has already been noted—the fourth round of the Geneva talks. We want, and will make efforts to ensure it, this round to be a preparatory round to the opening of full-scale talks with the final aim of a total cessation of nuclear testing.

The sincerity of our stance is clearly confirmed also by the reply from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to the leaders of the states of the Delhi Six in connection with the declaration they adopted on the ending of 1986. Remember, this reply not only again expresses the readiness of our country to make use of the proposal of the states of the Six on giving help in monitoring the cessation of explosions. This proposal was raised by the Six previously, and we took it up immediately. So now this stance is not just being confirmed, but it also says that the Soviet Union, even if the United States does not reexamine its negative attitude to the proposal raised, is ready to send Soviet representatives to a meeting with experts of the Six countries. After all, in this way already now it would be possible to initiate a joint specific search for mutually acceptable decisions which later could form the basis of a reliable monitoring mechanism of a treaty on a full and general nuclear weapons test ban.

Incidentally, the positive attitude of the Soviet Union to the proposal of the Six countries on the one hand, and the negative stance taken by the United States on the other, show once again who is really in favor of monitoring [kontrol] a cessation of nuclear testing, and who is covering an unwillingness to put an end to these tests with blather about monitoring [kontrol].

The Soviet Union still hopes the United States will also adopt a realistic view, for a cessation of nuclear testing is the simplest and at the same time an extremely effective first step on the way to stopping the nuclear arms race, and that is precisely our starting-point.

U.S. Plan for Nuclear Test

LD232250 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 23 Jan 87

[Text] Here is a latest news commentary. At the microphone is Viktor Levin:

[Levin] Reports coming from different countries are showing that actions for stopping nuclear tests have been spreading everywhere lately. These actions
are becoming more and more active and are involving more and more people. Why has the question of the need to stop nuclear tests become so acute just now? The United States is about to carry out a regular nuclear blast.

According to information published by THE WASHINGTON POST, the test is planned for 29 January, while according to THE NEW YORK TIMES, it is due to take place on 5 February. In the end, the point is not exactly why the thunder of the explosion in Nevada will be heard, a week earlier or later. The essence of the problem lies in the stubborn unwillingness of the United States to join the Soviet moratorium on nuclear blasts that has been maintained for 18 months and in the striving of the U.S. militarist circles to whip up the nuclear arms race.

Adopting its bold decision to extend the unilateral moratorium for the fifth time, the Soviet Union announced that the moratorium will be valid until the United States resumes explosions. Consequently, the tests in Nevada will also blow up the Soviet moratorium. As is clearly said in the statement of the Soviet Government, we will be prepared even after that to stop nuclear tests on a reciprocal basis, yet it is immeasurably simpler and--what is immeasurably more important for the consolidation of peace--to put an end to nuclear tests now, immediately. This step would have not only military significance--or anti-military significance, to be more precise, since the process of improving nuclear arms would be brought to a halt--but also political significance because it would undoubtedly contribute to a thaw in the international situation and to an improvement in East-West relations.

In a letter addressed to President Reagan, British peace supporters sensibly pointed out that the Soviet moratorium is a unique opportunity to stop and then to reverse the arms race. To miss such a chance in the name of the modernization of nuclear weapons and moving the arms race into space, the letter stresses, would mean to commit a grave mistake.

The question stands now in its full acute form. If the United States heeds common sense, the demands by many world states and international public opinions, heeds and gives up nuclear tests, mankind can breathe freely. What if the answer is no? The struggle against the threat of nuclear annihilation will not stop; the seeds that people of good will, the Soviet Union and its friends, are sowing now will yield the expected crop in the future. Mankind cannot and will not permit anyone to destroy it.

/6662
CSO: 5200/1286
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS CORRESPONDENTS ON NUCLEAR TEST VERIFICATION

Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 43, Oct 86 pp 6-7

[Special report for OGONEK by TASS correspondents Vladimir Itkin and Lev Chernichenko, untitled. First paragraph is introduction.]

[Text] "For 14 months silence has reigned on our testing grounds; isn't this evidence of our adherence to the understandings reached in Geneva and our responsibility for the fate of the world. These are all difficult decisions, if you consider that the explosions in Nevada have continued and are continuing even now."--from a statement by M. S. Gorbachev at his press conference in Reykjavik.

The splash of a wave in the lake and the breath of the wind rocking the treetops, someone's step on the forest path and the echo of remote earthquakes—-that's all that is recorded by the sensitive seismometers with the inscription "Made in USA" that have been installed near the Soviet nuclear test site. Empty hotels for specialists; "mothballed" galleries and Pamir argali at the tops of granite rocks that used to tremble from explosions; herds that graze tranquilly in a special zone; military construction workers building a children's campus, instead of a tunnel for the next explosion—all this was seen directly by foreign correspondents to whom the doors of the "holy of holies," the Soviet nuclear testing site, were opened. Its quiet and the fidelity to the moratorium have now been documented not just on the seismograms obtained by the American scientists in the region of Semipalatinsk, but also in reports that journalists have transmitted directly from the testing grounds.

On the other hand, from their high space orbits satellites have probably noted the recent step-up in activity at the test site, when correspondents from REUTERS, FRANCE-PRESSE KYODO TSUSHIN and American television networks arrived there. After all, this territory is under close observation from space: every 24 hours, 16 to 18 American satellites pass over it. But on this day the photographic eyes from orbit recorded their own compatriots, who were openly taking photographs there, at the Soviet test site.

It has been more than a year now that no one has disturbed the symphony of the earth's interior there in the Degelen mountain tract. Powerful forces have not shaken the granite rocks. Since the day when the last nuclear test

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explosion was conducted there, our test site has remained silent. The Soviet unilateral moratorium is one of the most palpable manifestations of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. It is a practical, concrete action. To stop testing means not to permit the appearance of new classes of nuclear weapons and to close the path to the creation of nuclear space weapons.

The Soviet Union is prepared at any time to sign a treaty completely banning nuclear testing. In 1963 in Moscow a treaty was signed banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere and space and under water. Underground tests were excluded at that time not because the sides wanted to continue them but because they could not agree on the verification of a ban on them.

Since that time 23 years have passed. Does the problem of verification continue to be a problem?

The Soviet-American experiment on monitoring the conduct of nuclear tests has helped destroy these arguments, as well as to debunk the myth concerning the secrecy that is allegedly characteristic of our country. In accordance with an agreement between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the US Committee for the Protection of Natural Resources on the conditions of a joint experiment in monitoring the absence of nuclear testing in the region of Semipalitinsk, American seismic equipment has been put in place. Scientists from the United States have come to Kazakhstan.

The place where the experiment is being conducted is like a marvelous oasis in the midst of the endless Kazakh steppe. Suddenly the scorched grass gives way, a pine forest rises, and a chain of relatively low mountains stretches out.

A mountain slope, covered with pines, reaches upward. The orange cylinders of the seismometers have been placed on a stony terrace. Tangles of wires run from them. Metal cases filled with instruments lie open on the grass. Nearby, there are the bright cubes of batteries.

The technician [David Carrell] and his Soviet colleague understand one another without words—specialists have their own language of formulas and charts. The recording drum revolves, and a magnetic tape turns in the cassette recorder.

A clearing spread out with bright boxes, people on the grass—all this resembled an unusual picnic. And indeed, such work is like a holiday, a real celebration for the scientists. A celebration of trust and mutual understanding. The sensitive instruments are recording the "music" of the moratorium.

The Soviet test site is quiet. But from many thousands of kilometers away the uneasy echo of explosions in Nevada reaches there, leaving a characteristic flourish on the seismograms and causing the Americans to feel awkward in front of their Soviet colleagues.

"In ancient times people developed the ritual of hand-shaking in order to show that there was no stone in their hand," said Maj Gen Yuriy Viktorovich
Lebedev, spokesman for the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. "And the Americans now are asking us to exchange handshakes while holding clubs in their hands."

The American administration talks about verification. Please, come and verify. But the question is not about the verification of tests but about the verification of the absence of testing.

The test site greeted the foreign correspondents with heat, the smell of wormwood, and silence. Alleys of birches and poplars, standardized five-story buildings, swings, sandboxes in the yards. An ordinary campus—clean, cared-for and green. Except that it takes greater effort to produce its greenness. Without irrigation, nothing will grow there. At first a person was assigned to each tree to care for it and water it. And now there are more people and more trees, and a whole green oasis has sprung up in the middle of the steppe. One of the campus's streets bears the name of Kurchatov. He was the one who, taking numerous factors into consideration, chose the place for the testing grounds. He worked here, worked to create our "atomic shield." On the building where he lived there is a memorial plaque, and a distinctive museum now occupies his office.

"When science makes a leap forward and creates the opportunity for actions affecting millions of people," believed Igor Vasilievich Kurchatov, "the need arises to reinterpret the norms of life in order to put these actions under control."

"No one conceives, to the extent that we people who engage in testing do, what a terrible force lies in this weaponry," says Lt Gen Arkady Danilovich Ilyenko, director of the testing grounds. "And therefore there is no paradox in the fact that we testers favor the ending of nuclear testing. It's too costly and dangerous a 'pleasure.'"

And the general gets carried away telling about experiments in the study of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. With the use of explosions it is possible to create huge underground storage facilities for oil and gas. At one time the Well experiment was conducted at the Soviet testing grounds—an artificial lake was created with the help of a peaceful explosion. Now it is full of fish and, according to the conclusion of specialists from the USSR Ministry of Public Health, they can be used for food.

And in general, it is not just quiet but clean at the Soviet testing grounds. The radiation there is on the level of the natural background. At the present time, the moratorium is in effect, and herds graze on the territory, land is tilled, grain is grown, and hay is harvested there. And the farms neighboring the testing grounds have another interest of their own—if the moratorium becomes bilateral, vast areas of presently vacant land will go to them.

From a helicopter now, in the autumn, these lands look lifeless. Grass burned out by the sun, granite rocks, dried-up lakes. And then there we were at the spot where the tests were conducted. A gloomy place. Bare granite stones. The peak of the rock was lost in fog. Rails led to its base, and there were cables and pipes running up to it. Iron gates leading to the gallery were
concealed there. An officer threw open the massive gates. Everyone photographed this symbolic moment. Numerous still and television camera lenses were aimed at the gates. People asked the officer several times to open the gates again so that they could record that moment.

And then they were opened, and a chain of lights flared up in the tunnel. The journalists, trying to overtake one another, rushed there. They walked along the tiss under the stone arches. Trolleys that carry out the stone used to move along the rails there. But now the trolley fleet was standing idle on the tracks leading into the tunnel. The diesel engines of the drilling units were not humming. The only noise was from the ventilation system. Heavy stone arches hung over our heads.

"This is very labor-intensive work," said the testing grounds' director. "The rock here is hard, granite. It takes many months to build a gallery. The work here was almost finished. Two months were left until it was completely ready. Tremendous labor and a huge amount of money had been expended. Nonetheless, the state took the step of halting this work. And it was halted. And since 6 August 1985 the gallery has been mothballed."

"So if it weren't for the moratorium, we wouldn't be standing here?" asked one of the journalists.

"Of course, the gallery would be caved in," replied the general. The explosion plugs up itself, as it were. In order to create a complete seal, extensive work is done, which makes it possible to rule out the emission of radioactive products."

The journalists were persuaded of the reliability of such measures when they examined a gallery in which a test had been conducted. At its lattice gates an officer with a dosage meter turned on his instrument, and the arrow, after showing the level of natural background radiation on the scale, didn't move from that spot. But the rock under which an explosion had been conducted 10 years ago differed sharply from its neighbors. It was like a pile of gravel alongside the sharp granite peaks—as though it had been smashed by a giant hammer.

And suddenly at its peak appeared the argali, graceful mountain goats. The rare animals had once again returned to the place where the underground jolts had previously disturbed them. The jolting had stopped, and the number of argali had increased. That's another mark of the moratorium.

The word for testing ground [poligon] in Greek means polygon. So far, we look at the problem of verification from different angles of vision. There are some sharp angles in this matter. But there is also goodwill aimed at removing them, and there is the force of world public opinion, which will invariably be stirred by the reports that the Americans A. [O'Conner] and R. [Turner], the Englishman R. [Evans], the Japanese K. [Edzawa], the Frenchman P. [Lesour] and others have filed from the testing grounds. Our openness and candor give us the right to hope for their honesty and objectivity. That is also a kind of test. The testing grounds, which are not conducting testing, are nonetheless testing people for their readiness for actions to remove the nuclear threat.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA'S KORIONOV ON TEST VERIFICATION ISSUE

PM21627 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 87 First Edition p 4

[PRAIIVDAl Political Observer Vitaliy Korionov article: 'Who Is Objecting to Verification']

[Text] As is known, the present Washington administration has failed to respond constructively to any of the large-scale peace initiatives advanced by the Soviet Union. In the year which has just begun it is again concentrating its efforts on devising new "arguments" to enable it to block even the slightest progress in the sphere of disarmament.

It has become a kind of rule that as soon as any Soviet-American talks are in the offing, a noisy campaign is launched in Washington which is designed to disorient public opinion and present the Soviet Union's position in a distorted light, while depicting Washington in the role of champion of peace and disarmament. This is also the case right now, with the opening in Geneva of the seventh round of talks on nuclear and space weapons. The situation is presented approximately as follows: The United States is seeking agreements in the disarmament sphere, but alas, the Soviet Union is thwarting this through its opposition to effective verification [control] of arms reductions.

Politicians who sing the White House's tune are making speeches and men of science are being mobilized. Considerable efforts are made to discredit the very idea of disarmament in the eyes of the public. Certain Harvard University "specialists" are seriously claiming that it is futile to believe that curbing the arms race "will secure major reductions in existing or planned arsenals or prevent the emergence of new and more sophisticated military hardware."

However, probably the most cynical statement has come from K. Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He tried somehow to "theoretically substantiate" the present administration's policy of wrecking all international agreements aimed at curbing the arms race.

"In people's consciousness," Adelman stated, "arms limitation is identified with certain agreements such as, for instance, the 1979 (SALT II) Treaty. Stability is identified with the existence of such agreements." In an effort to disprove this view he declared: "...Basically deterrence can only be ensured with the help of arms." People like Adelman are placed at the head of establishments in Washington whose alleged purpose is "arms control"!
It is abundantly clear that at the moment the Reagan administration has no intention to engage in arms control, not to mention disarmament. All its thoughts are focused in the opposite direction—on opening the floodgates of a totally unrestrained arms race. This is why it has pronounced the SALT I and SALT II treaties "dead" and lined up the ABM Treaty in its sights. Just like the military-industrial complex, it only has one thing in mind, namely MX missiles, Midgetman, Trident-2, and space strike weapons—in short, everything designed to annihilate people and provide arms manufacturers with fantastic profits.

On the other hand, understandably, they cannot openly show their innermost militarist aspirations, so they masquerade as peacemakers. So, interminably, they block the practical solution of disarmament problems, and especially nuclear disarmament problems, by resorting time and again specifically to the verification [kontrol] issue. All this is no more than empty talk.

This was clearly confirmed recently by former U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesinger. Speaking at hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee, knowledgeable of the topic, he said: The demands for on-site verification [kontrol na mestakh] put forward by the United States as an essential precondition for an agreement with the Soviet Union on banning nuclear tests are not of crucial importance. According to him, the United States possesses excellent national means of inspection [proverka] which are quite adequate to verify [proverka] the observance of such an agreement with a high degree of accuracy.

Schlesinger noted that over the past 20 years U.S. representatives at disarmament talks, including himself, have used the verification [proverka] issue for the purpose of "manipulation." "Since 1963, when a partial ban on nuclear tests came into force, the problem of verification [proverka] has been extensively used by the United States to justify its unwillingness to proceed further in this sphere," he admitted. This tactic, according to Schlesinger, was employed because the United States has in effect always been opposed to the introduction of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The efforts of the gentlemen in Washington to camouflage their true position on the verification [kontrol] issue and to present the USSR's position in a false light are futile. This position is clear and comprehensible. There are no weapons which the Soviet Union is not prepared to limit or ban on a reciprocal basis, provided there is effective verification [control]. Anyone with any common sense can see that the USSR—against whom the sword of war based on nuclear and space weapons is being forged across the ocean—is interested in effective verification [kontrol] no less than the United States.

After all, the postnuclear situation will demand [as published] a special level of responsibility. A great deal depends on verification [kontrol], it could even be said the fate of the world, the fate of peoples and states depend on it. Therefore comprehensive, effective, and efficient verification [kontrol] of the observance of the achieved agreements must be established. States must have full confidence in the reliable observance of agreements. At the meeting in Reykjavik the Soviet side told the U.S. President with the
utmost emphasis that if the two countries embarked on the path of nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union would toughen its position on verification [kontrol]. There must be no false interpretations here.

"We are prepared," M.S. Gorbachev's message to UN Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar says, "to advance in all areas which lead to the implementation of real measures to curb and end the arms race. We regard rigorous verification [kontrol] of the observance of the achieved agreements, including on-site inspection [inspeksiï na mestakh], as essential at all stages and in every sphere. However, measures of the most thorough and reliable verification [kontrol], just like disarmament measures, must be reciprocal and, regrettably, we have not received a corresponding answer from the other side. Lately, we have put forward proposals for the establishment of adequate verification [kontrol] of the cessation of nuclear tests, a chemical weapons ban, conventional arms reduction, and prevention of the spread of weapons into space. We are prepared to open our laboratories, but all this must be based on reciprocity. Meanwhile we have not received a positive response from those who until quite recently were militating for most rigorous verification [kontrol]."

No, the Washington political machinators will not succeed in misleading the peoples!

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW: JAPANESE REACTION TO GORBACHEV REPLY ON U.S. TESTING

OW211305 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 19 Jan 87

[By Tokyo correspondent Pavel Potapov]

[Text] Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, sent a reply to Takeashi Araki, mayor of Hiroshima. The contents of this reply have attracted the attention of the Japanese people and the mass media. All papers point out that the Soviet leader has reiterated the USSR's intention to agree to any compromise that is mutually acceptable which will lead to the major objective of eliminating nuclear arms by the end of this century. What has particularly attracted attention is that in this reply Gorbachev stated that if the United States should stop nuclear testing, the USSR would continue the moratorium on its nuclear tests. The unilateral moratorium that the USSR has continued for over 530 days has gained general approval in various Japanese circles.

Representatives of various political parties and social organizations, as well as noted scholars and intellectuals, support the Soviet proposal and call on the United States to go along with the USSR in its moratorium. This wish has also been expressed in touching reports and letters published in various Japanese papers, as well as in the letters received by the Tokyo Bureau of Radio Moscow. The prevalent view among the letter-writers is that the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests is an effective measure to prevent the development of new-type mass destruction weapons. In other words, it will lead to opening up the way for nuclear disarmament.

In a telephone interview with this correspondent, Minoru Toma, member of the editorial board of the journal LEARNING, commented on the attitude of the United States. He stated: Taking the Soviet moratorium merely as propaganda, the United States has continued its nuclear tests in Nevada. This action by the United States has naturally aroused negative reactions. In terms of propaganda, the Soviet moratorium can be regarded as a very effective propaganda for peace, as it is not merely stated in words but endorsed by actions and concrete proposals.

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LONDON — There have been 24 American nuclear tests since the Soviet Union announced its moratorium in August 1985, on the 40th anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb. The Russians have unilaterally extended the moratorium twice, last March and again last August, while the Reagan administration ploughed grimly ahead with its own nuclear testing program.

Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, has to deal with a military-industrial complex very nearly as powerful as the American one. That is why, after 16 months of restraint, Gorbachev has had to declare that after the next U.S. nuclear test — now scheduled for Jan. 29 — Moscow will resume testing too.

But even now, he would probably be able to shout his generals down if the U.S. said that it just wanted another five (or 10 or 20) tests to "catch up" with the last Soviet test series, and then it would stop. The reason the U.S. has said nothing of the sort is that it is not really trying to catch up; it is trying to draw ahead.

It cannot actually do it, of course: there is no such thing as "ahead" at the level of nuclear overkill both superpowers have now achieved. The fantasy of impenetrable Star Wars defences that would allow the U.S. to destroy the Soviet Union without suffering the same fate in return is just that: a fantasy.

An extraordinary opportunity is going to waste here. In Moscow we have a new man, of a new generation, who genuinely seems to want to walk away from all the nuclear nonsense, and to be willing to take large risks with his own people to do it. And in Washington we have a Holy Fool who was willing to meet him halfway.
White House “spokesmen” can paper over the cracks with as many lies as they like, but Reagan did agree to Gorbachev's goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons by 1996 at the Reykjavik summit. It was only after they had the president back in Washington under control that they got him to put out the line that he had really only agreed to eliminate ballistic missiles by 1996.

This is a pretty standard management tactic around the Reagan White House, and there were lots of practical political reasons to back away from the president's bold commitment. The Western Europeans didn't like it one bit, since they are still addicted to the U.S. nuclear guarantee as a cheap substitute for a serious defense policy of their own. And the various nuclear principalities in the Pentagon were so outraged that they were having kittens.

And so a little damage limitation was practised. Instead of having agreed to get rid of nuclear weapons, the president would say that he had agreed with Gorbachev to work for the abolition of ballistic missiles. (This redefinition also had the attractive aspect, much admired in arms-controlling circles, of seeming to be fair and reasonable while actually favoring “our side.” The Soviet Union depends much more heavily on ballistic missiles than the U.S., which retains a large bomber force and is far ahead in cruise missile technology and deployment.)

Everybody in Washington took this adjustment of the truth in their stride; political fine-tuning is a fine art on the Potomac. But although the truth usually has a fairly flexible quality in Moscow too, the Russians do have a rather old-fashioned attitude about unilateral “adjustments” to what was said by national leaders at summit meetings.

The Soviet Union protested Reagan's revised version of what was said at Reykjavik, and proposed that it and the State Department both publish their translators’ notes from the meeting. (State had a sudden coughing fit, blushed beet-red, and demurred.) And although the Russians have been quite gentlemanly about it in public, in private they are seething at Washington's bad faith.

It is perfectly true that Reagan and Gorbachev didn't get much further in Reykjavik than an agreement in principle to abolish all nuclear weapons within 10 years; all progress was then blocked by Reagan's quite illogical insistence that Star Wars was still necessary. But they did make that vital, historic commitment to the actual abolition of nuclear weapons — and in Gorbachev’s eyes, Reagan has welshed.
It has made Gorbachev's position virtually untenable with his own military-industrial lobby, who opposed his unilateral moratorium in the first place, and were horrified to see it stretch out over 16 unrequited months. The irony and the pity of it all is that Reagan really did mean it; it wasn't just a slip of the tongue or the mind.

Reagan quite desperately wants to use his presidency to find a way of averting the nuclear war that he realizes will otherwise eventually destroy the country he loves. (That is how he got seduced into the Star Wars boondoggle.) At Reykjavik, just for a moment, he found the courage and the vision to commit himself to do what is really necessary.

But back in Washington, it didn't take them long to get him back on the tracks, and in any case the Iran-Nicaragua imbroglio has now destroyed Reagan's power to initiate major change. So Gorbachev is crawling back in from the limb he had climbed out on, and on Jan. 29 the test of some perfectly useless piece of nuclear hardware in the Nevada desert will end all this weak-kneed palaver about nuclear disarmament.

The Soviets will go back to testing new and better weapons too, and we will all resume our slow march towards oblivion.
RELATED ISSUES

IZVESTIYA PRAISES 1986 UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION'S WORK

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Dec 86 p 5

[Article by Ye. Amelin and E. Mamedov: "Key to a Non-Nuclear World: Results of the Discussion of Disarmament Issues at the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly"]

[Text] The realities of the nuclear age require new political thinking. Proceeding on this premise, the Soviet Union has taken concrete steps to establish new approaches to the solution of the urgent problems of humanity, especially the problems of war and peace.

And this was fully reflected in the discussion of the issues of arms limitation and disarmament at the 41st session of the UN General Assembly.

The session took place under the sign of the results of Reykjavik, which revealed the shortest paths to a non-nuclear future. Practically every delegation noted in its statement the historical importance of the closeness of positions that was achieved at Reykjavik and spoke out in favor of the continuation and expansion of efforts on the basis of the frontiers reached in Iceland's capital. The impetuses of the new thinking stemming from the program for a non-nuclear world advanced by the Soviet Union have prompted other states, as well, to take a new look at the possibilities of the international community and its most representative forum, the United Nations.

The international community has seemingly recognized that the key to solving the dilemma of "to be or not to be" is found in its own hands, and that all that is needed is a genuine pooling of efforts and unity around the idea of excluding violence from the political-philosophy world view of the present day.

For all intents and purposes, for the first time the discussion of disarmament problems in the United Nations proved practically free of confrontation, which made it possible to focus attention on concrete problems, as well as to channel in a practical direction ideas that had previously been advanced concerning the urgency of measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. For the first time a resolution was passed with general consent emphasizing that the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons, and that all the nuclear powers bear responsibility for the implementation of this process.

In this connection, the speeches of most delegations clearly expressed the idea that nuclear disarmament should not be the domain only of a narrow circle of members of the "nuclear club." Expressing general attitudes, India's representative in the General Assembly's First Committee stated: "The fate of our civilization cannot remain in the hands of two or five states. The states that do not possess nuclear arms also have rights to decide their own fate." The resolution on the prevention of nuclear war that was adopted at the initiative of a number of socialist and nonaligned countries is evidence of the international community's increased resolve not to permit a nuclear catastrophe.

Almost all the delegations noted that nuclear disarmament is a set of real measures in specific areas, and the cessation of nuclear tests was practically unanimously cited as the first possible and implementable measure. The attractive force of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing unquestionably contributed to invigoration of the discussion of the problem of nuclear testing at the current session. The Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions was supported in two resolutions that were approved. Altogether five resolutions were adopted on the testing issue. These documents, whose coauthors included not just influential nonaligned and neutral countries but certain Western states, as well, emphasize that the comprehensive banning of nuclear explosions is a litmus test of genuine readiness to achieve nuclear disarmament. Two of the resolutions adopted urgently call on the Conference on Disarmament to begin multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Only the United States, together with Britain and France, refused to support this appeal.

This year the problem of preventing an arms race in space proved to be at the center of the General Assembly's close attention. The majority of nonaligned countries and a number of Western countries came out directly for the preservation and strengthening of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Even the closest US allies such as Britain, the FRG, Japan and Italy voted among 154 countries for a resolution on preventing an arms race in space, which contains an appeal to begin multilateral negotiations for the purpose of reaching an agreement on this issue. Only the United States abstained.

An increase in the priority accorded to problems of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons was also characteristic of the 41st session. In many respects, there was evidence of the influence of such factors as the successful completion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security and Disarmament in Europe, as well as the new situation that has existed since Reykjavik. The Soviet Union demonstrated the utmost constructiveness and supported all the current session’s resolutions on these issues, including those that were proposed by Western countries.

An atmosphere of mutual understanding and sincere desire to solve existing problems also reigned in the discussion of the questions of eliminating chemical weapons, limiting naval arms, creating nuclear-free zones, etc. The
US delegation's position, which to all intents and purposes came down to blocking every intelligent idea, no matter where it came from, looked like an anachronism. Washington's obstructionist policy showed up with emphatic distinctness this year. The United States opposed a whole series of proposals on measures in the area of curbing and turning back the arms race.

The Soviet Union did not once vote "no" in the adoption of resolutions on the issues of arms limitation and disarmament. Moreover, in several cases the Soviet Union, together with the other socialist countries, withdrew its own draft resolutions in order to side with proposals advanced by other countries and support their desire to play a more active and significant role in solving the cardinal problems of the present day.

The spirit of constructiveness and mutual understanding that arose in the beginning of the session's work was solicitously supported by the overwhelming majority of states, which made it possible to adopt by consensus resolutions on such issues that only recently were considered controversial and even the source of conflicts, such as the issues of the monitoring and verification of the treaty observance. It is noteworthy that for a number of resolutions the USSR and the other socialist countries acted as coauthors with Canada, the FRG and other Western countries.

The results of the discussion of disarmament issues at the 41st session of the General Assembly make it possible to draw several serious conclusions. In the first place, the international community is entering an historic phase of the formation of a political world view, the moral content of which should fully correspond to the imperatives of the nuclear and space age.

In the second place, the clear-cut practical orientation of the resolutions that were adopted indicates that disarmament is ceasing to be a Utopian dream and starting to take on the outlines of a reality that is achievable in the foreseeable future. In the third place, the session showed that attempts to stop the course of history can in no case produce results.

The stubborn refusal of the United States to reckon with the interests of the entire international community is making Washington a source of increased danger for the whole world.

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RELATED ISSUES

REVIEW OF SOVIET BOOK 'CAPITALIST INTEGRATION AND MILITARISM'

Moscow KRASNAIA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Dec 86 p 3


[Text] In October of this year, the entire world was witness to the fact that the American "star wars" program prevented the leaders of the USSR and United States from reaching an agreement in Reykjavik on the elimination of the nuclear threat hanging over humanity. The stubborn adherence to the "Strategic Defense Initiative" shows as well as anything else the dependence of the U.S. administration on the military-industrial complex and on monopolistic groups that have transformed the arms race into a source of multiple millions in profits.

But it is not just American imperialists who are putting their hopes on SDI but also the bosses of the military-industrial complex of other Western nations. For the first time more than 3 years ago, the President of the United States proposed to the West European NATO partners that they participate in joint measures for the implementation of the SDI program. Great Britain, the FRG and several other nations responded to this appeal. The inclusion of the allies of the United States in the adventuristic "star wars" program is one of the graphic and very convincing manifestations of the most dangerous and threatening side of capitalistic integration for the cause of peace—the integration of militarism. This phenomenon inherent in contemporary capitalism has been subjected to a detailed analysis in a new book issued by Voyenizdat.

The book touches not only on the technical military, economic and strategic aspects of the SDI program leading to a new and more dangerous round in the arms race. Through rich factual material, it shows convincingly how the strategic integration of imperialism under the conditions of the scientific-technical revolution and the activation of the work of the transnational monopolies is influencing the action of NATO, the development of the aggressive military political doctrines of the bloc, and the intensification of the process of the physical preparation for a new world war.
The reactionary strategic integration of imperialism has a clearly antisocialist orientation. The bosses of the military-industrial complexes of the imperialist states continue to dream of achieving military superiority over socialism. Idle hopes. As has been the case more than once in the past, the book stesses, the adventuristic plans of imperialism to turn back the course of history belong to the realm of chimeras and unachievable dreams. The USSR and its allies have repeatedly declared that they will not permit the West to achieve superiority and to dictate its will to other states and peoples.

The peoples of the planet do not need the integration of militarism but a true economic, political and cultural convergence of the nations of Europe and the entire world. An outstanding example of this convergence is the economic union of fraternal nations—the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance. Occupied in peaceful creative labor, the peoples of the socialist states are not forgetting about the military danger emanating from world militarism headed by the United States. The USSR and its allies are tirelessly taking care to maintain their defense capability at the necessary level and are taking decisive actions to stop any attempts by imperialism to disrupt the existing balance of power. This, states the book in conclusion, is why it is essential to do everything possible in the future as well to raise the defense readiness, efficiency and quality of the combat and political training of the personnel of the fraternal armies and to train the soldiers to be prepared at any moment to defend their socialist homeland and the achievements of world socialism.
RELATED ISSUES

FRG FOREIGN MINISTER MAKES 'DISARMAMENT REVIEW'

LD201216 Hamburg DPA in German 1024 GMT 20 Jan 87

[Text] Bonn, 20 Jan (DPA) — Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher believes that the abolition of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, new contacts with the East about conventional arms control, and a breakthrough in the verification problem for a ban of chemical warfare will be possible this year. In a disarmament review signed by him and published by the Foreign Ministry today, Genscher writes that "prospects of concrete results in arms control negotiations" have improved "as never before."

Addressing the two great superpowers, the foreign minister notes that no one can ignore the bases for disarmament created in Reykjavik "without shattering the hopes of the peoples everywhere for far-reaching disarmament." European interest is largely concentrated on the removal of intermediate-range missiles (INF) [Intermediate-range nuclear forces]. The aimed-at zero option would certainly correspond to the alliance partners' objectives following "the two-track decision".

A linkage would damage the security interests of Europe "and thus of the Federal Republic", Genscher rejected any linkage of conditions to a zero option. He also rejected the call for simultaneous negotiations on shorter-range medium-range missiles as much as the Soviet condition to agree to a zero option only after the Americans have given up SDI.

In his official disarmament review he thus rejects efforts by the right-wing conservative circles of the [CDU/CSU] Union, and underlined the standpoint that it is sufficient for followup negotiations on short-range missiles to start after the zero option has been agreed.

Without actually mentioning SDI, the federal foreign minister called in his disarmament review for strict adherence to the ABM Treaty on missile defense systems. "We are of the opinion," Genscher wrote "that developments in the weapons sector must not develop their own uncontrolled dynamism, but must remain subject to political control and lead to cooperative solutions."

Furthermore, the Federal Government continues to be in favor of a gradual approach to a complete ban of all nuclear tests "at the earliest possible time." The overall drift of Genscher's remarks was directed at the two superpowers, without mentioning France which also carries out nuclear tests and which has so far shown no willingness to stop them.

In the area of conventional disarmament Genscher explained the West's double strategy. The Western alliance will take up the initiative "in the near future" to launch talks with the East on a new mandate for conventional arms control. First contacts with the East gave given rise to justified hope.

In addition, "separate from these negotiations", the Federal Government, as a member of the CSCE conference, is striving for continuation of the Stockholm disarmament conference on confidence-building measures. Genscher emphasized that, as a confidence-building foundation, it is especially important to translate the Stockholm agreement into action this year. The foreign minister obviously wants to remind the superpowers in this way of obligations they have entered into.

Early conclusion of the negotiations on a worldwide and verifiable ban of all chemical weapons is also possible, the foreign minister said. Solutions have already been offered, both as regards the investigation of suspected breaches of any agreement as well as control of the halt in production.
RELATED ISSUES

FRG PAPER SAYS HAWKS CONTROL WESTERN DISARMAMENT STRATEGY

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 3 Dec 86 p 12

[Editorial by Ulrich Mackensen: "Moving on Two Different Tracks"]

[Text] Aside from the painstaking negotiations in Geneva and Vienna, arms control is developing at present on two different tracks. For once, the West is faced with ever new proposals, advances, and initiatives by the Soviet Union. One day, for example, either Sergei Achromeeiev or Moscow's arms control negotiator Victor Karpov announces the resumption of negotiations between the superpowers and offers discussions on the dismantling of intermediate nuclear missiles, or—with respect to the Strategic Defense Initiative program (SDI)—asks that the U.S. define its understanding of SDI-related research. The next day, General Secretary Gorbachev proposes a plan for complete nuclear disarmament and even a reduction in conventional weapons.

After U.S. President Reagan's far-reaching proposals in Reykjavik, the West doesn't quite know how to react and leaves its response to the hawks. This, to put it mildly, has led to a peculiar confusion of ideas. There is also the suspicion that either U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, his colleague in Bonn Manfred Woerner, or NATO's Supreme Commander in Europe U.S. General Bernard Rogers is more interested in an arms build-up than in arms reduction, and that there is actually a desire to reach military superiority, especially in the conventional field, over the Warsaw Pact countries.

This observation can be illustrated with two concepts which recently have resurfaced: The "zero-option" with regard to intermediate range nuclear missiles and the notion of "parity" in the field of conventional weapons. The actual objective of NATO's dual-track decision of 1979 was to do away with all intermediate range nuclear missiles—the Soviet SS-20, NATO's Pershing II, and cruise missiles. At that time, Moscow had already deployed its first SS-20 missiles and ignored Western offers to negotiated. Only then did the West begin its arms build-up.

If the Soviet Union is now ready to negotiate the complete withdrawal of these weapons, NATO's dual-track decision has fulfilled its purpose after all. Such an argument, though, draws the immediate and not entirely unjustified objection that Moscow, meanwhile, has deployed longer range intermediate
nuclear weapons, such as the SS-23 with an action radius of 900 kilometers. Yet, according to Soviet leadership, these new nuclear missiles are also negotiable. Would it then not be reasonable to test the current by taking up some of their proposals?

But, instead, Weinberger and Woerner have come up with an additional condition. Should the zero-option become reality, then, so they say, conventional parity—meaning parity in the non-nuclear field—must first be assured. Such a condition is not only plain nonsense from a security policy point of view, it is also extremely dangerous from an arms control point of view.

The ABC of strategy still holds that a successful attack is only possible with an aggressor three to five times stronger than the defender. Thus, even if Warsaw Pact forces are twice those of NATO's, and sizable differences do exist along the "peripheries" from Norway to Turkey, they are not strong enough to launch a successful attack.

Why then doesn't the West simply turn the tables, just as it did at the MBFR conference (Mutual and Balanced Reduction of Forces) in Vienna and prepare to ask for a reduction in conventional forces? NATO propositions stand a good chance for success in Vienna. Already, the proposal to acknowledge mutual troop ceilings has triggered an offer from Moscow for the withdrawal of one Soviet and one American division from Central Europe. Since the Soviets, however, refused verification of such a troop reduction, the offer lost its credibility.

It would make sense now to test the Soviets' actual commitment to disarmament by calling for immediate negotiations concerning the scrapping of short range and intermediate range nuclear missiles and by pressing on with MBFR negotiations in Vienna. But, instead, the hawks in the West are clamoring for "conventional parity" and that means an arms build-up race.