Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL
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WORLDWIDE REPORT
ARMS CONTROL

CONTENTS

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS on U.S. Discussion of SDI Deployment
(Vladimir Chernyshev; Moscow TASS, 4 Feb 87).............. 1

USSR on White House Conference on SDI Deployment
(S. Sidorov; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Jan 87; Vladimir
Dunayev; Moscow Television Service, 24 Jan 87).............. 3

Reagan Aiming ToDeploy
Support From Many Sources 4

USSR: U.S. Debates SDI Deployment, ABM Treaty Interpretations
(Various sources, various dates)......................... 5

U.S. Senators Cited 5
Reagan Addresses Religious Broadcasters 6
U.S. 'Outraged,' 'Protesting', by Igor Fesunenko 6
White House Conference 7
Mnatsakanov on 'Price Tag', by Eduard Mnatsakanov 7
IZVESTIYA Cites Shultz, Others 9
U.S. Allies Express Concern 10
Bogachev: ABM Demagoguery, by Vladimir Bogachev 11
Chernyshev: Undermines Relations, by Vladimir Chernyshev 12

USSR: U.S. Thule Radar Linked to SDI, Violates ABM Treaty
(Moscow IZVESTIYA, 5 Feb 87; Paris AFP, 6 Feb 87)......... 14

IZVESTIYA Commentary, by A. Sychev 13
Official Protest 14

- a -
TASS: U.S. Needs Nuclear Tests To Create 'Big Stick in Space'
(Vladimir Chernyshev; Moscow TASS, 5 Feb 87).............. 15

TASS: Reagan Requests Lifting of ASAT Limitations
(Moscow TASS, 11 Feb 87)........................................ 17

PRAVDA Weekly Review: Reagan Seeks To Make SDI 'Irreversible'
(Tomas Kolesnichenko; Moscow PRAVDA, 8 Feb 87)............. 18

Moscow: USSR Space Programs Contrasted With U.S. Tests
(Aleksandr Zholkver; Moscow Domestic Service, 6 Feb 87)... 22

MOSCOW NEWS Interviews, Rebuts Zbigniew Brzezinski on SDI
(Moscow MOSCOW NEWS, No 6, 8 Feb 87)....................... 23

Text of Interview, Zbigniew Brzezinski Interview
Brzezinski's 'Double Standards', by Andrey Grachev 26

Moscow: U.S. Allies' SDI Position Unchanged
(Nikolay Borin; Moscow to Great Britain and Ireland, 5 Feb 87)........... 28

Soviet Colonel on SDI: Maginot Line in Space
(V. Chernyshev; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 Feb 87).......... 30

Soviet Experts Deny USSR Has SDI Program
(Filipp Gontar Interview; Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT, 10 Feb 87)................................................. 33

USSR: SDI Programming Problems Could Cause Unintentional War
(B. V. Raushenbach; Moscow PRIRODA, No 11, Nov 86)....... 37

USSR Scientists' Study of SDI Program Reviewed
(V. Nazarenko; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 Jan 87)....... 50

PRAVDA on U.S. Allies' Opposition to SDI
(Vitaliy Korionov; Moscow PRAVDA, 11 Feb 87)............... 53

PRAVDA Commentary on Canadian Role in SDI
(Vladimir Shelkov; Moscow PRAVDA, 21 Dec 86)............... 55

XINHUA Cites WASHINGTON POST Warning on ABM Treaty
(Beijing XINHUA, 7 Feb 87).................................... 57

Briefs
Japanese SDI Participation To Follow FRG Formula 59

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG Paper Says Soviets Want Treaty With Reagan
(Jan Reifenberg; Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, 28 Jan 87)........................................ 60
XINHUA Reports U.S. Test Harms Disarmament Prospects
(Beijing XINHUA, 6 Feb 87)............................... 63

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Gorbachev Proposal on Medium-Range Missiles
(M. S. Gorbachev; Moscow PRAVDA, 1 Mar 87)............ 65

NATO Urges USSR To Negotiate Euromissile Agreement
(Paris AFP, 6 Feb 87).................................... 68

Canada: Defense Minister on Testing of New Cruise Missiles
(Toronto THE TORONTO STAR, 3 Feb 87).................. 69

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR Makes 'New Proposals' on Chemical Weapons at CD
(Moscow TASS, 17 Feb 87)................................. 70

Briefs
USSR-U.S. Consultations Resume 71

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: Booklet Urges End to Nuclear Testing
(Moscow IZVESTIYA, 23, 24 Nov 86)....................... 72

Nuclear Winter 72
Verification Question 74

Canadian Paper on Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
(Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 5 Feb 87)............... 78

Briefs
Gorbachev Sends Message to Hiroshima on Nuclear Freeze 79
Canadian Veterans Urge Caution 79
Hiroshima Sit-In Demands U.S. Halt Test 79

RELATED ISSUES

USSR's Shevardnadze Visits GDR, Discusses Missile Withdrawal
(Various sources, 2-5 Feb 87)............................ 80

Reviews Ties With Honecker 80
Gives Honecker Gorbachev Message 81
Talks With Honecker 81
Detailed Exchange With Fischer 82
Communiqué in PRAVDA 83
TASS Summary 85

- c -
USSR's Shevardnadze Visits CSSR, Discusses Missile Withdrawal
(Various sources, 4-6 Feb 87).......................... 86

Talks With Chnoupek 86
Meeting With Husak 86
Discussion With Strougal 87
Interview on NFZ, ABM 87
Joint Communiqué Issued 89

USSR's Petrovskiy 5 February Press Conference
(Moscow TASS, 5 Feb 87; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 6 Feb 87)....... 91

U.S. 'Blocking Progress' From Reykjavik 91
U.S. 'Anti-Sovietism' 91
Proposes Test Ban Talks 92
SDI 'Main Obstacle' 93
Disarmament, Development Linked, by A. Ivanko,
G. Charodeyev 93

USSR's Gerasimov News Conference 10 February
(Moscow TASS, 10 Feb 87).............................. 96

U.S. Stand on ABM Treaty 96
CSCE Progress 96

Moscow Talk Show: INF, SALT, SDI, MBFR, Nuclear Testing
(Boris Kalyagin, et al.; Moscow Television Service,
15 Jan 87)............................................. 98

Moscow Weekly Interviews Poland's Cardinal Glemp
(Józef Glemp Interview; Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA,
4 Feb 87)............................................... 114

USSR: Japanese Response to Soviet Asia-Pacific Initiative Hit
(A. Anichkin; Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 20 Jan 87)..... 119

/12223
TASS ON U.S. DISCUSSION OF SDI DEPLOYMENT

LD041640 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1537 GMT 4 Feb 87

["A Dubious and Dangerous Pentagon Commodity"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 4 Feb (TASS) -- Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS observer for military issues writes:

A session of the interdepartmental group at the level of cabinet members for planning policies in the realm of national security has been held in the White House under the chairmanship of R. Reagan. At the session the blatantly provocative question of beginning SDI deployment [razvertyvanie] was discussed. Although, as the U.S. media have reported, the President "has not yet made a decision" on this question, the supporters of deployment [razvertyvanie] in the very near future of the "Star Wars" system have expressed their satisfaction at the results of the conference, while Robert Dole, leader of the Republican minority in the Senate, has even announced that the head of the U.S. Administration is "inclined to agree" with the Pentagon's proposal for a very rapid SDI deployment [razvertyvanie].

In this way, the "star warriors" persistently strive to block any opportunity for reducing international tension and erect insurmountable obstacles to Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva, [blokirovat lyubye vozmozhnosti snizheniya mezdunarodnoy napryazhennosti, postavit nepredolimyye prepony na sovetsko-amerikanskih peregovorakh v zheneve], to ensure that Washington rejects the Reykjavik accord on nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty for a 10-year period, and to torpedo that treaty and open new channels for an unrestrained arms race.

In demanding a start to deployment [razvertyvanie] of space strike weapons, Caspar Weinberger has called for "this opportunity to be taken," since the United States will not be able to hang on indefinitely to the chance to surpass the USSR. A notable admission came from the Pentagon chief when he said that SDI supplements and gives fresh life to other U.S. "efforts," including the "rejuvenation" of strategic and conventional forces.

How can one fail to recall here the "passage" in R. Reagan's "Star" speech of 23 March 1983 when he said that if the defensive systems were to be combined with offensive systems then they could be viewed as a factor promoting an aggressive policy. We do not want this, the President then added. As can be clearly seen now, it is precisely this for which Washington is passionately thirsting.

In accordance with the true plans of the U.S. Administration, nuclear missile weapons and the weapons being created [sozdat] within the framework of the Star Wars program
are called upon to complement each other. SDI is an integral part of offensive strategy, the means with which Washington is trying to break out of the "straight-jacket" of military-strategic parity to create [sozdat] for itself an "absolute position," to give the opportunity to wage nuclear war and to be victorious in it.

Two years ago Weinberger "complained": If the Russians achieved clear progress in the sphere of antiballistic missile defense and our missiles "grew obsolete," the whole world would become vulnerable to nuclear blackmail. Now, demanding the adoption of a decision on the deployment of SDI, since the United States "has achieved clear progress in the sphere of antiballistic missile defense," the Pentagon chief is not at all embarrassed. This is understandable, for, in this case, "the whole world will become vulnerable," not to "somebody's," but to U.S. blackmail!

The distinguishing feature of the present U.S. administration is manifested in all clarity: the divergence of verbal rhetoric and actual deeds. Senator Albert Gore has just declared that SDI is detrimental to common sense and sensible judgements, a "trap with bait" for the American people, bearing absolutely no resemblance to that which was earlier advertised by the administration. C. Weinberger and other supporters of the "hard line" in the administration, Gore stresses, want to slam the "trap" shut as quickly as possible, while President R. Reagan is in power, to make this program irreversible and to close the path to arms control for his successors. It is absolutely possible to join the U.S. senator's appeal: SDI must not become yet another grandiose swindle of a project, sold to the American people in instalments.

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CSO: 5200/1280
USSR ON WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON SDI DEPLOYMENT
Reagan Aiming to Deploy

PM291427 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jan 87 First Edition p 3

[S. Sidorov "Military-Political Commentary": "'Star Wars'...by Installments"]

[Text] Only recently the champions of the "Star Wars" program, including the U.S. President himself, were declaring in their speeches that years of scientific research and basic development [poiskovyye razrabotki] would have to precede the decision to deploy a space ABM system.

Recently, however, the WASHINGTON POST reported that in the next few weeks "President Reagan will probably make the decision to begin deploying the first stage of the ABM system ahead of schedule, so as to be able to accelerate work on it during the remainder of his term in office and to create conditions for its deployment after his departure from the White House."

This involves, in particular, deploying a system to hit targets in space using kinetic energy. It is designed to destroy carrier missiles immediately after launch and also to hit warheads after separation using cylindrical projectiles. According to the newspaper, at a conference in the White House on 17 December last Weinberger and accompanying specialists, including General Abrahamson, director of the organization set up to implement SDI, and Admiral Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, convinced Reagan that deployment of the first stage of the ABM system was possible in 1993 or 1994.

The political purpose of this step is obvious--to preserve the "Star Wars" program, whatever happens, as the administration's most important legacy. But where has the technical potential been found? If you recall the recent past in ABM defense, under project "Bambi" in the sixties the Air Force rejected the idea of knocking out targets by kinetic means as inefficient and upromising, although comparatively simple and cheaper than other means. Perhaps everything has changed since then? Not at all. The Pentagon is trying to pass off its desires as reality. The members of the Senate Budget Committee reached this conclusion almost unanimously. It was stated in the first Senate hearings this year that implementing the previous option would mean just "dusting off the same old tattered program."
The administration has seized on this plan primarily for tactical reasons. Like cunning traveling salesmen, White House representatives are in a hurry to sell SDI by installments, piecemeal. Advocates of "Star Wars" have evidently begun to be really rather afraid that, as the absurdity of the entire program comes to light, people will give less and less for it. Finally, the time could come when people will refuse altogether to buy the dubious commodity called SDI.

Serious misgivings about the fate of "Star Wars" are prompting representatives of the Republican Party's extreme right wing to get from the White House an immediate and graphic demonstration of SDI's viability. Here are the words of Senator Dan Quayle, taken from his interview with an ABC-TV correspondent last week: "The patience of Congress is running out over SDI,... We must see the deployment of SDI," Clearly and frankly put.

To get the "Star Wars" program shifted from the research stage to the practical development [razrobotki] phase at all costs is what the Washington "hawks" are seeking.

Support From Many Sources

LD242259 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 24 Jan 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; Vladimir Dunayev Washington report--video shows Dunayev outside White House]

[Text] A conference has been held at the White House between the heads of the Pentagon and the U.S. President. I must tell you about this conference in detail, because it has—or could have—great and serious consequences. The boss of the Pentagon, Caspar Weinberger, his deputy, Richard Perle, and the head of the special "Star Wars"--SDI--department, Lieutenant-General James Abrahanson, were received by the president. They had a conversation, if the U.S. press is to be believed, about deploying space weapons as quickly as possible. The U.S. papers write that the aim of their discussion was to decide the question irreversibly in the next 2 years--Reagan's last 2 years in the White House--so that future governments and future presidents won't be able to change anything.

It has become known that it is not just the military-industrial complex in general that is behind this plan, but also particular monopolies, including Lockheed Corporation. It is also known—the chief "Star Wars" scientist, (Alan Manse), has already announced—that that program will cost $100 billion just to prepare. One hundred billion dollars will find their way into the coffers of the monopolies. A further $150-200 billion will be swallowed up by the deployment of the system.

In other words, there is clearly a plot to wreck the accords and pull back from the Reykjavik agreements to get, at all costs, huge allocations of many billions and perhaps trillions of dollars for the monopolies that want to enrich themselves and have now created a "Star Wars" lobby.
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: U.S. DEBATES SDI DEPLOYMENT, ABM TREATY INTERPRETATIONS
U.S. Senators Cited

PM101634 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Feb 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading "Working Toward Undermining the Treaty"]

[Text] New York, 9 Feb--The U.S. Administration is actively considering the question of the possible "early" phased deployment of space-based ABM systems. As ABC television notes, the United States is moving toward the adoption of a so-called "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty, which paves the way to intensive tests in space and possibly the early deployment of elements of "star wars." The first phase of SDI could be ready for deployment "somewhere in the region of 1993 or 1994," U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger stated in a BBC interview broadcast on Sunday.

This position on the administration's part is arousing alarm and growing opposition in the country. I believe that a new interpretation of the ABM Treaty by the U.S. President unilaterally will be a big mistake, Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, noted. Speaking in the same ABC program, Senator Carl Levin stressed: "If we renounce the ABM Treaty, this will not only lead to the acceleration of the arms race. By this means we will completely undermine the possibility of concluding an arms control agreement."

Democratic Senator D. Bumpers is of the same opinion. He writes in THE NEW YORK TIMES: "What do we gain from violating the restrictions imposed by the treaty? A miserly increase in our strategic forces and an additional 4 or 5 years keeping two missile-carrying submarines in the armory, after which they will be written off anyway on the expiry of their 30-year term of service. And what are the results? An unlimited nuclear arms race." It is not surprising, the article says, that former presidential National Security Adviser B. Scowcroft, six former defense secretaries, and the U.S. NATO allies are calling for compliance with the restrictions under the ABM Treaty.

A prominent American politician, former U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance, declared his categorical disagreement with official Washington's plans for the militarization of space. Answering a question, in an NBC television program, on the Reagan Administration's intention of speeding up the deployment of the first stage of SDI, Vance stressed: "I do not think we need to deploy such a system at all."
Reagan Addresses Religious Broadcasters

LD031638 Moscow TASS in English 1558 GMT 3 Feb 87

[Text] Washington, 3 Feb (TASS)--U.S. President Reagan has made a new publicity speech praising his "Star Wars" program. Addressing the annual convention of religious broadcasters, he alleged that the space arms systems being developed by the U.S. would open up new opportunities for preserving peace. Trying to justify his plans for spreading the arms race to space the President adduced a whole set of propaganda arguments beginning with the mythical "Soviet menace" and ending with references to the SDI's "moral superiority" over nuclear armaments.

According to the President the United States' dedication to the "Strategic Defense Initiative" makes the conclusion of agreements on nuclear arms limitation more probable.

U.S. 'Outraged,' 'Protesting'

LD062035 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2057 GMT 5 Feb 87

[From "The World Today" program presented by Igor Fesunenko]

[Text] From early morning today, peace supporters from various states in the United States have been gathering by the test site in Nevada. It is expected that no less than 2,000 people will participate in the protest action, which might have already begun by now. The United States is outraged, the United States is protesting.

But the White House and Pentagon are demonstratively ignoring the voice of their own people, and the protests of the world public. Defense Minister Caspar Weinberger addressed the Allocations Committee in the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. Once again, the minister spoke about the SDI program. He once again called it the keystone in the present administration's policy. Against logic and common sense, Weinberger claimed that the implementation of SDI is inseparable, as it were, from the process of arms control, and creates, as he put it, a favorable situation for reducing nuclear arsenals.

According to Weinberger, the Pentagon will do everything in its power in order to prevent a reduction in spending on this program. In connection with this, the U.S. press writes that this hysterical haste with which the Reagan Administration is attempting to start SDI implementation is conditioned by the wish to run as far ahead as possible in this path, to take such actions that the President and the administration that will replace Reagan, would no longer be able to renounce this program. This haste, causes bewilderment even among some of the United States' European allies. For example, the BBC has asserted that even in London official circles, doubts are being expressed as to the advisability of such haste.
White House Conference

LD111420 Moscow TASS in English 1352 GMT 11 Feb 87

[Text] Washington, 11 Feb (TASS)--A second conference on the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) in a few days took place in strict secrecy in the White House Tuesday.

According to press reports, the question it discussed was whether the United States should embark on large-scale testing of space-based missile defense systems and actually violate the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty banning it.

The Pentagon insists on the treaty's "broad interpretation" to bypass the document and orbit ABM systems.

Marlin Fitzwater, special assistant to the President and deputy press secretary, refused to disclose the specific decision taken at the conference and say whether the United States is going to begin testing "Star Wars" components in violation of the ABM Treaty.

The "broad interpretation" of the document has neither political nor legal grounds, said well-known American specialist John Pike, expert of the federation of American scientists.

Approving that interpretation, he said, effectively means renouncing the ABM Treaty.

Mnatsakanov on 'Price Tag'

OW101359 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1145 GMT 9 Feb 87

[From "The World Today" program presented by Eduard Mnatsakanov]

[Text] Hello, comrades. Allow me to start this broadcast with a brief quote: I have made a reassessment. I see the price tag, and I'm willing to pay.

One finds it hard to believe that this marketplace, bargain-style jargon relates to issues on which the future of mankind depends. I have quoted the words of U.S. President Reagan. He was the one that made the reassessment and decided to pay the price -- the price for the so-called early stage-by-stage deployment of the antimissile defense system -- space-based systems, the plans that preoccupy American imperialism today.

The matter, you see, is not simply limited to laboratory research in the framework of Star Wars and not even on developments [nasrabortka] in this direction. The matter now is in the deployment of first-strike weapons in space.

Is it really necessary to say this would be the most flagrant violation of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty, or that this is a dangerous, demonstrative, and provocative departure by the American side from the agreements reached by the leaders of the USSR and the United States in Geneva and Reykjavik?
President Reagan is in a hurry to expand as much as possible work on the Strategic Defense Initiative so his successor will not be able to reject the program. This is how the situation is being assessed by a commentator of the British ATV television company.

Weinberger is applying pressure, trying to get deployment to go ahead as soon as possible. He is striving to prevent the possibility of rejection of the Star Wars program, which may be what the next president will do, writes THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

Only recently American observers spoke about the last major problem facing the President, which lies in determining the direction Reagan should choose during the last 2 years of his Presidency — in the direction of arms limitations, or in the direction of Star Wars?

So, during the last meeting of senior members of the administration at the White House, with the President participating, a decision was taken to choose the latter direction. That is, to embark on the deployment of Star Wars components. The newly invented term in Washington — about the legitimacy of the so-called broad interpretation of the USSR-U.S. ABM Treaty — bears witness to the fact that the U.S. Government intends to discard the most important articles of this treaty standing in the way of the militarization of space.

This is the decision of the ultraconservative U.S. circles and President Reagan, judging by available facts.

Thus we are now speaking about the conscious undermining of one of the most fundamental bases of the contemporary world. It is precisely because of this that Washington, until the time is ripe, is attempting to keep the decision on the militarization of space a secret. The fact is these decisions are subject to the most serious criticism from both the majority of the U.S. Congress and from the U.S. NATO allies.

According to the report of the British newspaper THE SUNDAY TIMES West European countries and Japan have urgently called on the American President to refrain from taking a step that could prove to be fatal. THE SUNDAY TIMES says FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl addressed a special message to President Reagan regarding this question. The U.K. Cabinet and Lord Carrington, the general secretary of NATO, also called on the U.S. Government to abide by the ABM treaty.

Should the President disregard these calls, in the opinion of the newspaper, this would serve as a reason for one of the most serious flare-ups of discord within NATO since Reagan took over the Presidency.

This question could perhaps become the reason for serious differences and even clashes between the U.S. Congress and the White House. The fact is many American lawmakers are more realistic in their appraisal of the situation and do not, under any circumstances, wish to see the liquidation of the USSR-U.S. treaties.
Writing in THE NEW YORK TIMES, Democratic Senator Dale Bumpers says: Is it any surprise that former presidential national security adviser Scowcroft, six former defense secretaries, and out NATO allies demand compliance with SALT II treaty limits? Who can believe our world will become a better and more secure place if in future years the military arsenal increases by another 10,000 to 20,000 nuclear warheads? Comrades, these are very fair and undeniably convincing words. So why are the White House and the Pentagon stubbornly adhering to their insane course? Can it really be because of their pursuit of the illusory achievement of military superiority over the USSR?

Nevertheless we would very much like to hope the sensible forces of the American people will ultimately eliminate these plans.

IZVESTIYA Cites Shultz, Others

PM091615 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Feb 87 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA "Press Service" report: "About SDI"]

[Text] In an interview on an ABC television program U.S. Secretary of State Shultz raised the question of the so-called "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty with a view to proceeding on that basis to deployment of the SDI program.

According to the secretary of state, progress has been made. The efforts of the President and the defense secretary in the SDI sphere are producing results. We are forging ahead, and we will, perhaps, learn to defend ourselves against ballistic missiles. Such progress has been made on the program that it is now perfectly reasonable to consider that, if events and achievements develop as they are developing now, we should pay attention to the research program, namely: how to carry out deployment if the decision on it is adopted. This must be done in stages.

The SDI program was drawn up on the basis of a so-called "narrow" interpretation of the ABM Treaty, Shultz continued. However, it is quite clear now, taking into account the progress made, that it will be possible to continue the program still more successfully only if tests are permitted in a different form. That raises the question of a new interpretation of the treaty.

"There are some systems that need to be tested, but they cannot be tested given the 'narrow' interpretation of the treaty," Shultz added.

Senator Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who participated in the ABC program, declared:

"I believe that a one-sided revision of the treaty's interpretation by President Reagan without consultation with Congress and the U.S. allies would be an extremely serious mistake by the present administration. It would also call in question the constitutional role of the Senate, which approved the present interpretation of the treaty in 1972."

Nunn continued: I wish to particulary emphasize that not even a broad interpretation of the treaty permits the deployment of the system which Defense Secretary Weinberger has chosen for early deployment in space. We are now approaching a confrontation with the President over questions of funding SDI and constitutional questions.
Senator Levin, member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, declared: If we renounce the treaty, that will lead not only to an acceleration of the arms race. By that decision we will destroy the chances of concluding an arms control agreement.

Commenting on the secretary of state's statements, ABC points out: Shultz' statement is one more indication the United States is moving in the direction of adopting the so-called broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The interpretation proposed by the Reagan administration will open the way to intensive tests in space and will, perhaps, pave the way to implementing Defense Secretary Weinberger's recent call for early deployment of Strategic Defense Initiative systems.

Meanwhile, the Netherlands has issued a warning that accelerated U.S. deployment of the SDI system could wreck the U.S.-USSR talks in Geneva. Foreign Minister Van den Broek reported in a radio interview that he had asked the Reagan administration to explain the stand taken by the administration with regard to early deployment of SDI. Van den Broek declared that in any case he does not believe the decision to deploy SDI can be adopted this year.

The British PRESS ASSOCIATION agency has reported that "there are growing fears among the American allies in West Europe, including Britain, over the impact of any steps on the course of the arms control talks with the Soviet Union and on the future of the ABM Treaty concluded by the two great powers."

U.S. Allies Express Concern

LD901012 Moscow TASS in English 0937 GMT 9 Feb 87

[Text] Washington February 9 TASS — The U.S. closest allies notified the Reagan administration of their concern about the variant of the deployment of an ABM system with space-based elements now under consideration by the White House.

The reports about a possible official approval by the U.S. administration of a "new" interpretation of the 1972 Soviet-U.S. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) have also sparked protests by allies. This interpretation would allow the testing and deployment of a space system.

The newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST reported yesterday that Canada's Foreign Minister Joseph Clark told U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz that such actions would not be supported by his government.

A letter of similar content was received by Shultz also from West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, THE WASHINGTON POST reports. Last week, Britain and Japan expressed their anxiety in conjunction with this.
Bogachev: ABM Demagoguery

LD061808 Moscow TASS in English 1616 GMT 6 Feb 87

["Washington Wrecks ABM Treaty" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS -- TASS military writer Valdimir Bogachev:

The American press reports that the Reagan administration is bent on ultimately emasculating the 1972 treaty on the limitation of ABM systems by demagogical interpretations and eventually burying it altogether by intensifying work to deploy space strike systems.

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, a staunch opponent of any accords to lessen the threat of nuclear war, is now pushing in his public statement the idea that the 1972 treaty allows the development of ABM systems based on new physical principles. That is, laser, particle-beam and other weapons.

Having lost every sense of reality, Weinberger cites the agreed statement D, the purpose of which is precisely to ensure compliance with the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except those listed in Article III. Article III, meanwhile, stipulates limits on the number of ABM launchers and ABM interceptor missiles.

The Pentagon chief with his interpretations of quite unambiguous stipulations of the treaty resembles a subservient accountant from an old fable who, before answering his master's question. "How much is two times two?" always asked, "and how much do you want?"

The White House's fuss over the stipulations of the treaty and the intention of certain forces in Washington to begin "early phased" deployment of extensive space-based defenses at the start of the 1990s call in question the reputation of the incumbent U.S. Administration as a negotiating partner. It was not long ago that President Reagan promised in Reykjavik to refrain in the next 10 years from violating the 1972 treaty, which bans ABM defenses for the entire territory of the country.

In the past six years the U.S. Administration has never responded to the appeals of the world public to take at least one practical step to illustrate Washington's goodwill. Instead, the White House shows a zeal worthy of a better cause in subverting earlier agreements on the limitation of the arms race. To all appearances, President Reagan is still guiding himself by the threadbare philosophy of last century's militarists, according to whom the gun muzzle is the best referee in international relations.

Is not it time for Washington to show common sense? When problems of war and peace are in the balance, the stakes are equally high for all the peoples of the world without exception.
Chernyshev: Undermines Relations

LD091652 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1242 GMT 9 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow, 9 Feb (TASS) — Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS military affairs observer, writes:

If the existing treaties and accords prevent the R. Reagan administration from developing [sozdavat] new weapons, then the White House acts on the principle -- so much the worse for these treaties and accords. Official Washington has already demonstrated such an approach in practice in regard to the interim SALT I and SALT II treaties. Now, evidently, it is the turn of the ABM Treaty: The administration is intensively blowing up issues about the last unilateral review of the interpretation of this treaty, and about the possibility of deciding on the schedule for deploying [razvertyvanie] the first phase of the SDI. The White House's principal objective is to reject major provisions of the ABM Treaty which stand in the way of the intensive militarization of space envisaged in the "Star Wars" program.

It is only natural all this should cause serious concern both in the United States itself and among its allies. S. Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has stated that a unilateral review of the treaty's interpretation would be an "extremely serious error" and would call into question the constitutional role of the Senate, which approved the present interpretation of the treaty in 1972.

For my part, I would evaluate such a step not merely as an "error," but as deliberate destruction of the very basis of arms control. After all, the concluding of this treaty represented a recognition of the fact that only mutual restraint in the area of ABM systems allows progress towards diminishing the danger of a nuclear war and limiting and reducing arms. A unilateral review of the treaty's main restrictions at a time when its tremendous significance for the stabilization of the international situation is keenly felt throughout the world would amount to a blatant admission by Washington of the fact it is not in the least aiming at curbing the arms race and at beginning arms reduction.

Washington's "new reading" would cancel the ABM Treaty and would instill doubt as to the appropriateness of concluding any other agreements or treaties with the present administration. Moreover, the whole idea of arms control would be jeopardized and, for the remaining 2 years of this administration at least, it would be effectively dead.

The "new interpretation" of the ABM Treaty is needed by those strategists in R. Reagan's administration who are striving to annul all measures in the sphere of arms limitation and reduction, to preserve tension in the world, to maintain the deadlock at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons, and to undermine the fundamental bases on which USSR-U.S. relations are built.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1297
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: U.S. THULE RADAR LINKED TO SDI, VIOLATES ABM TREATY

IZVESTIYA Commentary

PM091235 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Feb 87 Morning Edition p 4

[A. Sychev dispatch under the rubric "Pertinent Remarks": "What Is the Real Reason for Modernizing the Radat?"]

[Text] Stockholm -- The radar station at the U.S. military base at Thule, northwest Greenland is the subject of a keen political debate that has flared up in Denmark in the last few days.

Parties in opposition to the center-right cabinet of Danish Prime Minister P. Schlueter have expressed concern that modernization of the radar is part of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) program and consequently undermines the Soviet-U.S. 1972 ABM Treaty.

The continuing arms race which, with Washington's "Star Wars" plans, threatens to extend to outer space, increases the danger of a nuclear conflict breaking out. This gloomy prospect has spurred the Folketing to pass a number of resolutions in recent years which state, in particular, Denmark's desire to contribute to strengthening peace and to help preserve the unlimited duration of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty and its refusal to become involved in the SDI program. Washington's plans in Greenland are, therefore, a clear blow to Denmark's foreign policy principles.

Danish newspapers write that there are plans to equip the radar station in Thule with the "Fave Paws" phased array system. This will make it possible to increase the station's range to approximately 5,000 kilometers. On the completion of this work, the potential of the radar complex will be enhanced, which, however Pentagon officials may try to justify the actions of their chiefs, will be at variance with the treaty conditions.

It is noteworthy that American congressmen officially admitted this fact by turning down plans for reconstruction in Thule in 1980. They presented their views at the time of a law on the state budget. However, in July 1983, U.S. President R. Reagan amended this decision and gave the go-ahead for the modernization.

So what changed in the period between these events? A great deal, it seems. As we well known, several months earlier, in March to be precise, President R. Reagan made a speech in which he presented his so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative." Washington adopted a course aimed at beginning a new stage in the arms race, one of the elements of which is the modernization of the entire U.S. radar network, in Thule in particular,
as well as in the small town of Fylingdales in Britain. The purpose of this is obvious -- to ensure that the ground-based ABM systems now being created [sozdat] in the United States at a rapid rate will home in on their target. They are links in the same chain.

To this must be added, of course, the fact that, by openly violating the ABM Treaty and also the SALT II treaty, those across the ocean are trying to involve their North Atlantic allies in White House policy.

Official Protest

AU061708 Paris AFP in English 1705 GMT 6 Feb 87

[Text] Copenhagen, Feb 6 (AFP) -- The Soviet Union has officially protested to the Danish charge d'affaires in Moscow over the installation of a new U.S. radar system at Thule in northern Greenland, officials said here Friday.

The Soviet protest claimed the new Phased Array Radar, set to begin operating next summer at a cost of about 125 million dollars, would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, the officials said.

According to a clause in the treaty, the superpowers can only set up anti-ballistic-missile radar stations on their own territory or in bordering areas.

Greenland is a self-governing territory of Denmark.

Moscow also rejected Washington's assertions that the new system would merely modernize the existing radar station at Thule. "It is not a modernization, but the construction of a new radar," the protest note said.

Denmark's left-wing opposition has also criticized the new radar station as being a violation of the ABM treaty. The issue has recently led to heated debates in the Danish parliament.

/9274
CSO: 5200/1280
TASS: U.S. NEEDS NUCLEAR TESTS TO CREATE 'BIG STICK IN SPACE'

LD060731 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1515 GMT 5 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow, 5 Feb (TASS) -- TASS Observer on military matters Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

Speaking at hearings in the allocations committee of the U.S. Congress's House of Representatives, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger called the SDI program the keystone of the administration's policy. The "keystone" is one of the main reasons for Washington's reluctance to join the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions. The nuclear explosion conducted on the Nevada test site the other day has provided yet another vivid proof of the haste with which the present U.S. Administration is putting the SDI program onto a practical footing.

SDI, with its nuclear test program is aimed at achieving military-strategic superiority for the United States and satisfying its ambitious designs for holding it over the world like the threat of a nuclear 'big stick' in space. It was not without reason that the U.S. Assistant Energy Secretary S. Foley said on one occasion that the testing and production of nuclear weapons will continue into the 21st century.

All the world knows that, as part of the SDI program, a nuclear-triggered x-ray laser is being developed. This the adherents of "Star WArS" call 'the longest stick', capable of controlling [kontrolirovat] space and ensuring domination on earth. But x-ray lasers are by no means all there is to the nuclear content of "Star WArS". Under that program, a whole spectrum of third-generation nuclear devices is being developed for use as strike weapons in space.

In February 1985 the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the U.S. Energy Secretary signed a special document stating their departments must conduct vigorous work on the development of such devices for "Star WArS".

The nuclear explosions in Nevada are necessary not for monitoring [kontrol] the combat efficiency of existing nuclear arsenals, as they are trying to make out in Washington, but for trying out [otrabotka] increasingly new, and ever more lethal, nuclear armaments. In so doing, as the U.S. specialists themselves admit, with the nuclear devices becoming more complicated, more and more tests are required.

One can also not rule out that, in their striving to acquire "a big stick in space" as quickly as possible, the U.S. "space warriors" may also use "classic" nuclear weapons as space armaments. Let us recall, how in June 1985 the not unknown E. Teller, speaking in Paris in the role of commercial traveller for "Star WArS", stated that upon their entry into the atmosphere missile warheads can best be destroyed with a nuclear explosion. All this is being said and done for SDI, which is being advertised by the U.S. President as a "denuclearized" [bezyadernyy] program!
It would be useful to remind the SDI champions of the statement made by George
Kistiakovsky, the well-known U.S. scientist who was in Alamogordo when for the first
time in the history of mankind a lethal mushroom cloud burst into the sky. Many years
have elapsed since then, he said, but until now we are wandering in this desert, and it
is precisely the United States which is continually taking the first step along the
mortal dangerous road of a spiralling arms race going further upward.

It is taking this step now as well, by rearming America and creating "space weapons".

Is it not time to abandon the striving to continue keeping mankind on this mortal
dangerous path, for in the nuclear space age the whole of our planet can be turned into
a lifeless desert. Today's underground explosions in Nevada state carry a threat to
earth from the heights of space!

/9274
CSO: 5200/1280
TASS: REAGAN REQUESTS LIFTING OF ASAT LIMITATIONS

LD110834 Moscow TASS in English 0806 GMT 11 Feb 87

[Text] Washington February 11 TASS -- The Reagan Administration has now demanded that U.S. Congress lift all limitations on the testing of the anti-satellite (ASAT) system involving a real target in outer space and on the batch production of big-eye binary airbombs filled with deadly nerve gas which begins this year.

The demand came in proposals submitted by the administration to Congress for change to the wording of some laws now in force.

A White House spokesman told TASS that the aim of the move was to remove what he called unnecessary limitations on the President's powers related to strategic programs.

According to the DEFENSE AND TECHNOLOGY magazine, the Pentagon plans to put into service 56 F-16 fighter planes fitted out to carry anti-satellite weapons by 1992.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1297
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA WEEKLY REVIEW: REAGAN SEEKS TO MAKE SDI 'IRREVERSIBLE'

PM081830 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 87 First Edition p 4

[Tomas Kolesnichenko "International Review"]

[Excerpts] Policy or Politicking

When assessing any particular event of the present time, we frequently start thinking about future historians. From their enigmatic distance, how will they judge our actions when the passions of the present have long died down; how will they impartially note the truth and the lies of the present time, and its ups and downs?

Thus it was that at M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with prominent U.S. public figures and politicians, he was asked what future historians would say about Soviet-U.S. relations. This was not a fortuitous question. It was not posed by just any people. The U.S. delegation which arrived in Moscow last week contained H. Kissinger, C. Vance, former U.S. secretaries of state; H. Brown, who held the post of defense secretary; J. Kirkpatrick, a former cabinet member and spiritual "father" or rather "mother" of modern conservatism in America -- in a word they are people who so to speak were quite recently shaping history "with their own hands" and even today are not standing aside. Books have, already been written about them. They have given their own assessments in their memoirs. Now the question worrying them is: What next?

To a large extent the fate of mankind depends on the state of Soviet-American relations. Is there, or is there not, to be life on earth -- that is how the age-old question sounds today. Both countries have accumulated a lethal nuclear weapons potential sufficient to annihilate each other and every living thing on our planet many times over. In such case future historians will not be saying anything. There simply will be none. On the other hand, sensible cooperation by the two great powers would be an important motive force for progress and would be marked by great achievements of civilization and would help to solve acute and vital problems of the present time.

Unfortunately, Soviet-American relations for the moment remain at a crossroads and it is necessary to find within oneself the will and strength to turn the corner. The Soviet Union is doing the utmost for this. Its foreign policy proposals do not lay any claim to ultimate truth and are always open to constructive ideas. In our proposals we never forcibly separate our own security from the security of others and we seek to take their opinion into account. If proof of that is required then the Soviet stance at Reykjavik, which became a new stage in the approach to problems of disarmament, can serve as such proof.
What of the United States? What will future historians learn from leafing through the yellowed pages of last week's newspapers? They must direct their attention first and foremost to 3 February. Perhaps this number will be enclosed in a black box on their calendars. In any case many newspapers are already calling it a "sad day" for 1987. On that day the United States conducted at its testing ground in Nevada a nuclear explosion which erased a real opportunity to begin right now the process of eliminating nuclear weapons [kotoryy perecherknul realnuyu vozmozhnost uzhe seychas nachat protsess likvidatsii yadernogo oruzhiya]. After all, this explosion was the response by the Reagan administration to the Soviet unilateral moratorium which has been extended five times (yes, five!) until the first U.S. nuclear explosion in 1987.

The indignation which has just lately been manifested around the world is understandable. "R. Reagan is playing with fire," the French newspaper L'HUMANITE wrote recently. "The American leaders have embarked on a path leading to a precipice." K. McNamara, a member of the British Labor Party's "Shadow Cabinet" called Washington's provocative step "a shameful political step in the cold war spirit." There are many such assessments and a characteristic feature is that no one rejects them, and even among Washington's closest allies there are no overt defenders of such a course to be found. Is this not evidence of the unpopularity of the United States' present policy?

If one considers the Soviet-American aspect of the problem of nuclear tests, it can be bluntly asserted that having refused to join our moratorium, the United States has selected the path of creating hostility and not cooperation. By taking this path it wants to secure military superiority over the Soviet Union which certain U.S. circles consider to be the "focus of evil" merely because our people are building their society not according to U.S. recipes, but according to their own judgment.

We are talking about the "Star Wars" plans, the notorious SDI. Primarily for the sake of this chimera the United States is refusing to end nuclear tests during which it tries out elements of space first-strike weapons. In America itself there is open talk about this, as if about something that is self-evident. But just recently a new element has appeared to which one cannot fail to draw attention.

Thus, when announcing the new explosion in Nevada, the presenter of ABC television news reported imperturbably: "At the present time this is the clearest indication that President Reagan, before leaving the White House in 2 years' time, is trying to secure the deployment [razvertyvaniye] in space of components of his 'Star Wars' program."

Maybe the commentator was mixing something up. After all, even the testing in space of SDI components, not to mention their deployment [razvertyvaniye], is a very crude violation of the ABM Treaty. Moreover this constitutes the torpedoing of the whole process of negotiations on the reduction of strategic rms, a wholesale retreat from Geneva and Reykjavik. Alas, there had been no slip of the tongue here. The Nevada explosion indeed "coincided" with the new fuss surrounding the "Star Wars" plans which Senator Gore in his article in THE NEW YORK TIMES called "yet another ambitious and scoundrelly project for selling SDI to the American people by installments."

So what is its essence and meaning? Everything began with the Pentagon chief "suddenly" discovering that work in the sphere of SDI had "progressed so far" that the opportunity had arisen not to wait long years for the implementation of the SDI program as a whole but to deploy [razvernut] in space and to test components of the program individually in the very near future.

R. Reagan immediately took up this idea with enthusiasm. Snow fell in the U.S. capital (which is a very rare occurrence) and, as an NBC correspondent reported on 3 February,
"the President threw snowballs on the street although another weapon was on his mind -- whether he should embark on the speediest deployment [razvetyvanie] of the 'star wars' antimissile defense." Then followed secret and "semisecret" (with leaks) conferences behind closed doors between the President and his closest advisers and ministers. A maelstrom of rumor began circulating. Weinberger is "insisting," Shultz is "vacillating," Reagan is "inclined," and so forth according to the familiar scenario of Washington "trial balloons" for sounding out the Congress and public opinion.

As happens in such situations, "everything was mixed together" in the White House: patent political calculation and the shameless bluff of politicians. The calculations include imparting irreversibility to the SDI program and binding the denizens of Capitol Hill with a single cord and extorting from them as much money as possible for SDI (what Weinberger is proposing will cost at least 100 billion dollars). This is for domestic consumption.

For foreign consumption there is the attempt to "destabilize" the Reykjavik stance of the Soviet Union, to show "inflexibility" with regard to SDI, even gambling with the fate of the nuclear disarmament talks. The premise for this is the delirious idea that it is allegedly precisely SDI which is coaxing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. When G. Shultz was asked how a decision to deploy [razvernut] SDI would affect the talks on arms control, he replied without a second's hesitation: "It is perfectly clear to me that the SDI system can in any case already be deemed to be deployed [razvernutaya] in the sense that it has produced a tremendous impression on the Soviet Union and has become an important consideration in their approach to these talks."

So, judge for yourselves: Is there common sense in this statement or does it reflect the frivolousness of gamblers who have overreached themselves and who, in hope of a win, are raising the stakes in their thoughtless excitement? After all, as Reykjavik showed, it is SDI which is the chief obstacle on the path of the disarmament negotiations. We shall never agree to a radical reduction of strategic arms, not to mention their elimination, if the United States refuses to observe the ABM Treaty. Washington is well aware of this. They also know in Washington that all this fuss surrounding the "phased deployment [razvetyvanie] of SDI is a complete bluff because according to assessments by experts, even the first phase of SDI (incidentally, it is extremely vulnerable and unreliable) cannot be ready earlier than in 7-10 years' time. So they are simply trying to frighten us. They are trying to frighten us but we are not daunted, for the Soviet Union has strong nerves.

There is one more underlying cause behind this "psychological attack" (there is no other word for it), a purely short-term consideration. It concerns the President himself and his entourage who of late have found themselves in a state of profound crisis. Scandal follows scandal and "Iran gate" has not only undermined the President's popularity but is continuing like a maggot to eat away the political stability of Republican rule. Matters have reached the point where Reagan has, for the first time, suffered defeat in the Congress when both the Senate and the House overturned his veto.

All this has turned not so much into a personal, as into a national problem. "Let Reagan be Reagan," his assistants used to repeat when public opinion polls used to show that the smiling President, the "Great Communicator" enjoyed the support of the majority of the population. Under this, crude errors and miscalculations of policy of the entire administration were "written off." So even quite recently journalists would write about this phenomenon thus: "People forgive Reagan anything, and will forget everything — lies great and small, blunders, and cruelest mistakes. When he argues about disarmament and asserts that missiles, once launched from submarines can

20
perfectly well be 'brought back,' Americans laugh and forget. They laugh when they learn that during a trip to Latin America he mistook Brazil for Bolivia and even 5 years later he continues to mistake one of the members of his cabinet for the ambassador of a certain European power."

Since "Irangate" people are laughing less and showing indignation more. Although this scandal has not caused the fall of the President, he can no longer halt the avalanche of criticism directed at the administration and the White House.
Rapid changes have begun in the President's closest entourage. One after another Reagan is having to sacrifice loyal men who were once his buttress. Poindexter, Speakes, Casey are just the "first swallows." His assistant Buchanan, one of pillars of conservatism, is leaving. There is a scandal surrounding the odious Perle. When in Europe he declared that the idea of a nuclear-free world is "nonsense" and that the European allies of the United States are "chatterboxes and cowards." It is said that he too will retire to write...a novel. Hollywood will, most likely, shoot its latest "horror movie" based on that book.

So the more attention is paid to the White House and to its "kitchen" the more feverishly the people there seek something to which to switch the focus of the public's attention as if to look "tougher" and to display that "inflexibility." "SDI Right Now!" is nothing if not a sensational slogan: So, they say, talk about it, make much of it, and don't go rooting around in "Irangate." All this is lamentable because it is taking place in a great country inhabited by talented people who are worthy of being led by politicians rather than by politicians.

/9274
CSO: 5200/1280
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW: USSR SPACE PROGRAMS CONTRASTED WITH U.S. TESTS

LD062252 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 6 Feb 87

[Political Observer Aleksandr Zholkver commentary]

[Text] In the stormy protests from many countries at the latest nuclear blast in Nevada, this thought is often expressed: Is there really any alternative to the mad arms race? Are we not bearing witness to a certain fatality in the use of the greatest achievements of science and technology for military purposes?

Well, an event has happened which, in my view, graphically demonstrates the huge possibilities of how science can serve the interests of the whole of mankind. The launching of a new space craft has been carried out in our country. This is one more step in the peaceful research of space, its exploration for the good of the people. It is also a new phase in arranging international cooperation in space. Future cosmonauts from Syria who also have the prospect of working on the Mir orbital complex have visited Baykonur.

Let me remind you that your country is sponsoring the creation of a worldwide space organization which would be engaged in implementing large-scale international projects. During his recent visit to India Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev proposed the setting up of an international space center for joint research and the development of space equipment prototypes. I not that such peaceful alternatives to military programs are important not only from the point of view of resolving global problems, truly common to all mankind, but also in an ethical and political context. Peaceful cooperation in space would make it possible to expand knowledge about one another, and about plans and projects, and would thus strengthen mutual trust and help to overcome the mentality that believes in the inevitability of military confrontation.

However, the unceasing nuclear blasts in Nevada demonstrate the Washington Administration's attachment to the old political thinking, counting on force, and striving to smash the military balance that exists in the world. But surely the new space launch from Baykonur is new confirmation of the hopelessness of the U.S. policy of strength. Surely it is clear that a country that can carry out accomplishments in space will be able to take care of its security too. However, we are striving for international cooperation and disarmament to supplant military programs as soon as possible. The world has come to the juncture where a new political thinking is doubly essential, in the interests of the survival of mankind and its progress.

/9274
CSO: 5200/1280

22
MOSCOW NEWS INTERVIEWS, REBUTS ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ON SDI

Text of Interview

MF131111 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 6, 8 Feb 87 p 7

["Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski" -- first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Our New York correspondent Edgar Cheporov met with the prominent US political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski. The unwritten journalists' law does not allow the interviewer to argue with the interviewee. The reporter's function is to ask questions and the report the answers with maximum accuracy. [paragraph continues]

Mr Brzezinski's answers allow one to form quite a definite idea of the position held by the right wing of American society on the issue of America's relations with the USSR. The Soviet position is made clear in a commentary by the political analyst Andrey Grachev.

Q: Is trust possible between superpowers in the nuclear age?

A: I think that a relationship between two superpowers such as the USA and the Soviet Union has to be based on arrangements that these arrangements are stable, enduring and not subject to unilateral change. In other words, I do not believe that the word "trust" suffices in the nuclear age, because in the nuclear age a miscalculation can produce total devastation, national destruction, in fact, national suicide. This makes it important that all arrangements between superpowers be based on realistic and enduring commitments which by themselves have stability.

Q: But what do you mean by "realistic"?

A: Realistic means respectful of the national interests of the countries concerned and in keeping with the emerging international norms which require respect for national independence and for human rights.

Q: What do you think of the contemporary situation concerning the trust between the USA and USSR, at what level is it?

A: I think both sides are quite suspicious of the other. The Soviet Union often talks about the encirclement of the Soviet Union and of American aggressive intentions, and it is making a major issue out of Strategic Defense Initiative which it sees as a threat. On the American side there is concern over the Soviet aggression against the
people of Afghanistan and the continuing destructive war that is being waged by the Soviet armed forces against the people of Afghanistan for over 6 years. There is concern in America about the heavy reliance that the Soviet Union is placing particularly on first-strike strategic forces, such as SS-18. There is concern in America over Soviet policy regarding human rights, and so forth. The point I am making is that each side has strong reasons to be suspicious and concerned about the conduct of the other.

Q: So you admit that the Soviet Union has reasons to be concerned?

A: I was not making a judgement as to what extent these concerns are justified. I was making note of the fact that these concerns exist. Needless to say, and you'd expect this from my public record, I am rather inclined to share the American concern, and I'd be more inclined to argue that at least some of the Soviet concerns are less than justified.

Q: You said, Mr Brzezinski, that the Soviet Union is making a major issue out of SDI. Don't you think the SDI represents a threat to the Soviet Union?

A: If the USA were to try to deploy a comprehensive population-wide strategic defence and at the same time were to deploy a great many offensive first-strike-capable strategic systems, such as SS-18, then indeed there would be such a threat to the Soviet Union. [paragraph continues]

Similarly, if the Soviet Union were to deploy surreptitiously a nationwide strategic defence while deploying more first-strike systems such as SS-18, this would represent a threat to the United States. My own judgement is that in the long run we would both be best off if we had a prudent mix of some offensive strategic systems, but deployed in numbers always below the number of first-strike targets that would have to be hit in a first-strike attack, with a limited strategic defence confined only to the protection of the capital, the command and the control centers, and only some of one's own strategic forces. Such a prudent mix of limited strategic forces that are offensive and limited strategic forces that are defensive would give security and stability to both sides.

Q: We think in the USSR that the American programme of strategic armaments from the beginning of 80s has been serving the purpose of achieving military superiority over the USSR. The SDI is included in this programme, and we can't help seeing the logic of its development to achieve military superiority.

A: It seems to me that one has to make a judgement regarding such matter on the basis of systematic and serious analysis of what is actually being done. If one looks at American strategic deployments, one finds that between now and 1995 the US is not going to deploy sufficient forces to achieve that alleged purpose which you have described. In other words, the sum total of all of the strategic systems that the US is planning to deploy would be insufficient numerically and strategically to achieve the objective which you ascribed to the American side. We are simply not planning to deploy enough of MXS or air-launched cruise missiles or the new Trident missiles to achieve what might be called strategic superiority. I ought to note in this connection, and I think that the Soviet readers should be aware of this fact, that all American strategic programmes are publicly discussed and debated at least ten years before they are even implemented, and Soviet analysts of American strategic planning can know at least ten years before what exactly will be the scale and character of the strategic systems that the US will be deploying. That gives the Soviet side plenty of time to analyze what America is doing, and also to take any reactions that the Soviet side deems necessary.
In contrast, all Soviet strategic planning and all Soviet strategic deployments are made in total secrecy, without any advance notice, and hence they pose a greater concern and threat to the American side because there is no time to react to them. We become only aware of Soviet deployments of new systems when they actually occur. The Soviet side has the advantage of at least 10 years notice before any American deployments occur.

Q.: How can we believe that the American strategic programme is openly discussed, that the society knows everything, knows the main things if even such a case as "Irangate", the sale of the American arms to Iran and so forth was made in secrecy, and US leaders didn't know about it. Some of them knew nothing, others knew a little. One can feel always a kind of tendency to hide from society and Congress some military actions. How can one believe that the society is aware of what is going on?

A.: First of all, when something like that occurs, it ends up by being exposed in the American press and by the American Congress with full investigation in process, with public officials being called to account. I have never heard of anything like that happening in the Soviet Union. Criticism of the political leaders in the Soviet Union usually occurs after they have been dead, never when they are actually in the office.

Currently, for example, the Soviet Union is providing arms both to Iran and Iraq, but it is doing it secretly. The Soviet citizens have not been told what is the size of the Soviet military deliveries to Iran and what is the size of the Soviet military delivery to Iraq. If the Soviet citizens want to find out, there is no way they could do so.

Q.: But how do you know that the Soviet Union is secretly delivering arms to Iran and Iraq?

A.: Because we monitor very closely what kind of arms the Iraqis and the Iranians are using in the war, and it is striking that increasingly in many sectors of that warfare it is Soviet military equipment that is being used by both sides.

Q.: You are sure about the Soviet Union and couldn't find out about United States' military deliveries to Iran?

A.: We knew that the American arms were there, but the point I am making is that a lot of Soviet arms are used in that war.

Q.: It would be interesting to our readers to learn how you interpret the term "new mode of thinking" which is often being used by politicians during past years, and how it could show in the USSR-USA relationship?

A.: In the long run, both the US and the Soviet Union have to learn to live in an increasingly interdependent world. And that requires more openness, freedom to move without restrictions, freedom to read what one wishes, the freedom to choose one's rules. I wish the Soviet people that they may become part of such an open world.
Brzezinski's 'Double Standards'

PM131129 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 6, 8 Feb 87 p 7

[Andrey Grachev commentary: "Games and Politics"]

[Text] "Zbigniew Brzezinski: Exclusive to MN [MOSCOW NEWS]" could well be the headline for the interview published here. Such a combination probably seems quite unusual, both for the newspaper and Mr. Brzezinski.

True, the same of the US political scientist, once a Professor of Harvard and Columbia Universities and the head of the famous Trilateral Commission, later Assistant to President Carter for National Security Affairs, has been regularly appearing in the Soviet press. His statements and works are often quoted and referred to. But I think that the professional Sovietologist has never had a chance to present to the Soviet readers his views on Soviet-American relations so fully and directly.

Well, new times bring new customs. One of the more salient features of the new times is that we are getting used to read in the press about facts and events which may be not quite to our liking, both on domestic or international affairs.

Let us take a close look at Mr. Brzezinski's pronouncements and views, for he is to this day an influential spokesman in American political thought, even though he has withdrawn, or perhaps has been withdrawn, from the process of political decision-making. Incidentally, practice has shown that in the United States, retired politicians often prove more thoughtful, broad minded and more capable of well-balanced judgement than they cared to when they were in key political positions.

Without commenting on particular points or trying to refute them on the basis of the well-known Soviet position on the issues involved (strangely, the celebrated Kremilnologist appears to be ignorant of the latter), I would like to outline my general impression of the interview, bearing in mind that as an ideologist and politician, Brzezinski has been invariably classified (at least in the pre-Reagan era) as a "hawk".

I read the interview with mixed feelings. On the one hand, it was evident that Mr. Brzezinski tried to confine himself to an outwardly correct and impartial "professorial" analysis of the factors affecting foreign policy-making in the USA and the USSR, as well as relations between each other. On the other hand, I was amazed at his inability, or perhaps unwillingness, to apply a single standard to his assessment of our two countries' interests and mutual claims.

Consistent in his use of double standards, and following in the steps of the present administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski lists some of the factors causing "concern" in the United States: the Soviet strategic missiles, the presence of Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan, and even Soviet policy regarding human rights. Yet the Soviet Union is denied the right to feel similar concern and is advised to take the present administration's assurances of its peaceful intentions and sincerity on trust (which, incidentally, even Americans find extremely difficult to do after the Iranagate affair). Mr Brzezinski tells us not to mind the large-scale programmes for America's rearmament, nor the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the US war bases, nor SDI.
Yet the "partial" deployment of the "first echelons" of strategic defence systems, persistently advocated by the US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in defiance of the ABM Treaty, is nothing short of the very combination of a "comprehensive population-wide strategic defence... and a great many offensive first-strike-capable strategic systems" which, Mr Brzezinski admits, can pose a threat to the Soviet Union.

As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union has many more reasons for feeling concerned about US policies, among them America's behaviour in conflict situations in various regions, including those adjacent to Soviet borders, specifically Afghanistan. With the aid of the late Anwar al-Sadat, the United States had been smuggling arms to the counterrevolutionary gangs in Afghanistan. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had once gamely aimed his gun at Afghans from the territory of Pakistan, must know all about those arms deliveries, including the fact that Egypt had supplied samples of Soviet arms to Afghanistan to be produced as "captured" weapons from Afghan and Soviet troops.

Incidentally, the "Soviet" arms found in the recently shot-down CIA cargo plane bound for the Nicaraguan contras were of the same origin. Does not this, and the deplorable situation regarding human rights in the United States, give us reason enough to feel concerned and alarmed?

However, reasons like this are left well out of the former National Security Assistant's field of vision. [paragraph continues]

At this point, I feel it would be fit to note one more aspect of his interview, i.e., his wonderful and almost disarming conviction of America's being God's gift to the world. Apparently, God created America after his liking and ordered her to do the same to the rest of the world. With unreasoning faith and self-confidence of a missionary bringing the Gospel to savages, Zbigniew Brzezinski explains how and when our leaders should be elected and criticized, what our press should be like, and obligingly shows us the shortest way to the "open world", at the gate of which a St. Peter in a cowboy hat has been waiting for us for the last 70 years.

It is well known that the United States has often applied all sorts of methods, including body checks, to adjust the world into its own pattern. The pitiful results of such endeavours are equally well known.

Nevertheless, Washington has remained a reckless player confident of getting the trump card sooner or later than would snatch the final victory, and so the old pack of political cards based on the position of strength is being shuffled and reshuffled again and again.

In his latest book, Mr. Brzezinski formulates his "game plan" (this is also the book's title - ed.) to score the "final victory" in the historic rivalry with the Soviet Union. According to Brzezinski, the United States ought to maintain an integrated war capability for fighting combat action on land, sea and in space, as a starting point for its determined and tough political competition for global control.

Reading such statements, one can't help asking oneself if American time is behind the UTC [universal time clock], or rather, if the clock of American politics is running at all, and if so, in what direction? If nuclear gambits are played according to such rules, they are sure to turn lethal.

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CSO: 5200/1297
MOSCOW: U.S. ALLIES' SDI POSITION UNCHANGED

LD060052 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 5 Feb 87

[Nikolay Borin commentary]

[Text] [Announcer] Speaking to the Budget Appropriation Subcommittee of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said, and I quote: We could see a space deployment of SDI far earlier than the 2000.

And he also said: We believe we are close to being able to recommend deployment decisions. Reacting to this report from Washington, the British defense secretary, George Younger, has declared that as far as SDI is concerned the British Government's position has not changed. We are very clear, he went on to say, that under the ABM Treaty, which we adhere to, research of the SDI is perfectly OK and perfectly acceptable within the treaty. But either development or deployment is not. And we believe that if that comes to that, further negotiations would be needed with the Soviet Union in a normal way. Research is all right, development of that kind is not. Our commentary is by Nikolay Borin, and this is what he writes.

[Borin] This reaction of the British defense secretary is quite legitimate. One can understand his categorical tone, for when London signed its agreement with Washington regarding Britain's participation in the SDI project, it stipulated that any phase of its deployment would necessitate serious talks with the Soviet Union and with NATO member countries. In Reykjavik the American delegation in essence rejected any serious discussion of the SDI issue. The American Star Wars program actually torpedoed the agreements reached on reducing nuclear armaments. Moreover, Washington is paying little heed to the many signals coming from London and other West European capitals, spelling out the need for the United States to strictly adhere to the ABM Treaty.

[Announcer] Do you think it realistic that President Reagan will decide on a hurried deployment of SDI [word indistinct]?

[Borin] Uncertainty about whether Mr Reagan will deploy SDI and switch to an active phase of this program stems from what the secretary of state has said. George Shultz stated on Wednesday that Mr Reagan was unlikely to decide this year whether to deploy the SDI system. But the short time period specified and the hesitant tone of his statement naturally arouses concern regarding the striving of the United States to put the weapon in space. I am more inclined to subscribe to the view expressed by Senator Dole, who thinks that the President supports an early phase of SDI deployment. This is confirmed by what Mr Reagan himself told THE LOS ANGELES TIMES last year in an interview.

28
Additional evidence of Washington's intention of ignoring the thinking of its European partners on this question is borne out by the extremely sharp displeasure voiced recently by Richard Perle, deputy defense secretary, over the wish of America's NATO partners for Washington to observe the terms of the SALT II treaty. This took place at the Munich annual conference of the Wehrkunde military scientific conference. Thus Britain's defense secretary, George Younger, and the British ambassador to NATO, Michael Alexander, sharply rebuked this imperative tone in talking to allies. But it seems to me that if Washington does finally endorse the Star Wars program, then it will ignore the opinion of its European partners regarding the ABM Treaty in the same way as it died with their opinion regarding the SALT II treaty. In this event, the most important treaty curbing the arms race, not only in space but also on the ground, would be breached.

[Announcer] And how do you regard Mr George Younger's statement welcoming research into SDI, while condemning its deployment?

[Boris] This falls into line with the Soviet stand advanced at Reykjavik. Moscow has repeatedly declared that it does not want to kill SDI. The Kremlin welcomes its research stage. This similarity of views in London and Moscow is encouraging. Should Washington endorse this stand, then the path will be cleared for reaching agreement on reducing nuclear armaments which at present is blocked by the American SDI.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1297
SOVIET COLONEL ON SDI: MAGINOT LINE IN SPACE

PM061405 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Feb 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report with commentary by Colonel of the Reserve V. Chernyshev, candidate of technical sciences, under the "Specialist's Opinion" rubric: "In a Hurry To Cross the Rubicon: Space Warriors From the White House" -- first three paragraphs are TASS report]

[Text] Washington, 5 Feb -- As already reported, a session of the national security planning group was held under President Reagan's chairmanship behind closed doors at the White House Tuesday. It discussed the present state of the "Star Wars" program and the plans for the phased deployment of components of the "Strategic Defense Initiative."

At the meeting the hawks, above all Pentagon chief C. Weinberger, made a new attempt to secure a decision on bringing forward the beginning of the phased deployment of SDI. Judging from statements made by official White House and Pentagon representatives, the advocates of this dangerous step used as their "trump card" the claims that the "Star Wars" program work is "going better than expected." As NBC-TV notes, C. Weinberger states "The United States may deploy certain arms systems of this kind, including space battle stations, as early as 1994."

However, no unanimous opinion has yet been reached on this score in the administration. According to NBC, "some officials are specifically pointing out the early deployment of SDI will "wreck the chances" of concluding a Soviet-U.S. arms limitation agreement. Reagan himself, according to ABC, campaigned for the phased deployment of components of the "Star Wars" system within the tightest deadline. In the dispute on these questions, NBC notes, the scales are by all accounts tipping in Weinberger's favor.

In December last year a special seminar was organized for the President at the White House at which Pentagon representatives tried to show that a "preliminary" SDI system can be deployed by 1993-1994. The Pentagon chief and his assistants outlined the successes purportedly achieved in the process of implementing the "Star Wars" programs which would enable them to begin deploying the "first phase" armaments in the next few years.

Attempting at one time to pacify the world public alarmed at the dangers posed by the "Star Wars" program, the U.S. Administration circulated the thesis that its implementation was not planned for many decades to come. Its development would take a great many years and only when "everything was cleared up" would the decision be taken on the program's practical implementation. However, the U.S. hawks are demanding that an immediate decision be taken on the phased deployment of SDI.

30
The Pentagon chief pointed out that "at least five different solutions of this problem" are being worked on "with the aim of determining the best way to achieve the goal." "I believe it quite probable," he told correspondents accredited to the U.S. Defense Department, "that we shall want to deploy two or three of those systems." One option envisages the stationing in orbit between 1992 and 1994 of 250 space platforms each armed with 10 small homing missiles as well as the deployment on earth of a certain number of ABM missiles.

On the basis of these and similar projects, the hawks are urging the U.S. President "not to concede" anything on any account to the Soviet Union concerning the "Star Wars" program. The whole world knows about C. Weinberger's personal letter to the head of the White House on the eve of the Soviet-U.S. summit in Geneva in which he demanded that no concessions be made and on no account should fidelity to the ABM Treaty be confirmed.

The Reykjavik meeting, which raised the nuclear disarmament cause to an unprecedently high level and also exposed the whole unseemliness of the U.S. SDI program, gave an extreme fright to the "Star Wars" supporters. That is why they are now in such a hurry and have become so active in demanding that the "space Rubicon" be crossed as quickly as possible.

In the first place, the SDI supporters are trying to guarantee the continuation of the "Star Wars" program regardless of the results of subsequent scientific research. They are not at all worried by the fact that the statements on the Pentagon's intention to accelerate the implementation of the "first phase" of the program to deploy strike space arms exposes the White House's false assurances about the "purely research" nature of the work under way.

Second, the "star warriors" will do anything to "stake out" the space Klondike so that, as U.S. Attorney General E. Meese frankly admits, the "Star Wars" program cannot be "wrecked" by a future administration. Conservatives, the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT writes, are trying to convince the President that the best way to ensure unfailing support for the program even after he has left the post is to demonstrate right now that some progress has been achieved on the path to the creation of an actual system.

Third, the U.S. military-industrial complex is rushing to attain a position of strategic superiority somewhat earlier by creating, in addition to the first-strike potential, some kind of "shield," albeit a quite primitive one with gaping holes, behind which the lovers of military adventures could feel "more confident" or, rather, more impudent. "If we can produce a system which will be effective and will make the Soviet Union's armaments ineffective," C. Weinberger said, "then we will be back to the situation when we were the only country with nuclear weapons." Even though the "first phase" will not guarantee the Pentagon the desired "effectiveness," some people still view it as the first step toward that coveted situation.

Fourth, one goal of the current campaign is to break the resistance of at least a section of those congressmen and senators opposed to SDI and to secure in the near future approval of the appropriations requested. The "Star Wars" advocates have clearly begun to seriously fear that as the absurdity and danger of the "Star Wars" programs for the United States itself are revealed, it will become increasingly difficult to secure large funds for it from Congress. The very prospect of the early deployment of SDI may make it difficult for some members of congress to oppose appropriations for this or to reduce them, commentator T. Wicker has written in THE NEW YORK TIMES.
Fifth, the campaign for the earliest deployment of SDI is aimed at placing a major obstacle in the way of any nuclear arms limitation and reduction agreements. The Pentagon is trying to "block the attainment of those compromises which may be needed for the conclusion of agreements in the arms control sphere with Moscow," and also to force the "withdrawal" of R. Reagan's agreement in Reykjavik to abide by the ABM Treaty for 10 years, the U.S. press writes.

Sixth, official Washington is trying to dig into the U.S. and world public the idea that the implementation of the "Star Wars" program is "inevitable" and that it is "too late" and "futile" to protest against it.

Despite those arguments, this is roughly how sensible Americans are arguing today. In 2 years a new President will come to power in the United States. Agreement to abide by the ABM Treaty for 10 years would ensure Reagan's successor an opportunity to show flexibility and he would have freedom of action. However, the deployment of SDI in the early nineties would limit his scope. Those Americans are asking the reasonable question: Why should a Democrat-controlled Congress allow the President to impose his "Star Wars dream" with all its unpredictable consequences on his successor or on America's future? "For Reagan, 'Star Wars','" THE WASHINGTON POST has written, "is the same as the pyramids were for the pharaohs or the Coliseum for the Roman emperors. It is a document which is supposed to perpetuate the President's greatness."

The "Star Wars" apologists either cannot or do not want to grasp the real consequences of the militarization of space. France once created the "Maginot Line" which, despite its initiators' plans, weakened rather than strengthened the country's security. In that sense the "Star Wars" program is increasingly frequently being called a "Maginot Line in space." However, it weakens security throughout the world and threatens it with thermonuclear catastrophe.

After a nuclear war — whether sanctioned or unsanctioned, deliberate or accidental — the probability of which is increased most gravely by the deployment of SDI, there would be no "pyramids in space" left or indeed anyone at all to "judge the U.S. president's greatness." There would just be ruins left — the ruins of treaties and agreements, the ruins of unused opportunities to create a safe world, and the ruins of human civilization.

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CSO: 5200/1297
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET EXPERTS DENY USSR HAS SDI PROGRAM

AU112011 Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT in Bulgarian 10 Feb 87 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Major General Filipp Gontar, candidate of military sciences and expert of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, and Colonel Vasiliy Morozov, candidate of military sciences and NOVOSTI military affairs observer, by correspondent Vasil Asparukhov "in the OTECHESTVEN FRONT correspondent's office in Moscow": "Who Is Shifting the Blame Onto Someone Else's Shoulders" — date of interview not given; first two paragraphs are newspaper's introduction]

[Text] A claim is being spread in the Western mass media that the Soviet Union has already developed "its own Strategic Defense Initiative" [SDI], and therefore does not have "to react" to the deployment of U.S. offensive weapons in space under the "Star Wars" program worked out by Washington.

This was the motive for our Moscow correspondent Vasil Asparukhov inviting Major General Filipp Gontar, candidate of military sciences and expert of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, and Colonel Vasiliy Morozov, candidate of military sciences and NOVOSTI military affairs observer, to a round table discussion.

[Asparukhov] In connection with the assertions being spread about in the West that the USSR possesses "its own SDI," the OTECHESTVEN FRONT readers are interested in knowing on what this view is based.

[Vasilii Morozov] I would like first of all to emphasize at the present moment neither the USSR nor the United States have weapons deployed in outer space. However, to justify their assertion that the USSR has "its own SDI," the mass media in the West are claiming that the militarization of outer space began a long time ago, most probably with the appearance of satellites with the most varied military purposes, and that since that moment the USSR and the United States have been competing in mastering outer space for military goals.

The satellites used by both sides at present for communications, navigation, early warning of a possible missile attack, and so on are not weapons; they do not create a risk of a direct attack in space or of [passage illegible] being "fired" from space.
What is more, the above-mentioned satellite systems contribute to maintaining strategic stability, by depriving the opposing side of the opportunity to launch a sudden disarming nuclear strike. This is why the existence of military satellites in the hands of the USSR (as well as of the United States) gives no grounds for asserting that outer space is militarized and that the USSR has... (its own SDI). [punctuation as published] These claims are being circulated with the sole aim of "justifying" to the public the development and forthcoming deployment of the American broad-scale antimissile defense system containing space-based component elements, the most important of which will be the offensive space weapons.

[Filipp Contar] We are witnesses to an attempts to shift the blame onto someone else's shoulders. Behind the American SDI is concealed the "Star Wars" program, dangerous in its aggressive nature. The United States does not want to give up the illusory dream of attaining military supremacy over the USSR. That is the real reason the United States is aiming at a new spiral in the arms race and at transferring it into outer space. This is borne out by the U.S. repudiation of the SALT II treaty and its undermining of the Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems.

I would like to say a few words about the military-technical aims of the nuclear tests being conducted in Nevada. They are essential to the United States for the final development of the new warheads for the MX, Midgetman, and Trident 2 strategic missiles, and the nuclear weapons for the future ACM long-range cruise missiles intended for equipping the new B-1b and Atbyrategir bombers. Also a number of explosions (up to 10 out of the 24 explosions conducted during the unilateral Soviet moratorium) have been used for the final development of the nuclear warheads for the offensive space weapons being developed under the "Star Wars" program.

[Asparukhov] How would you briefly describe the offensive space armaments? Where does the particular danger lie?

[Vasily Morozov] Offensive space armaments are a fundamentally new type of offensive weapon. Here one is primarily thinking of the laser weapon, as well as kinetic weapons (electromagnetic guns, self-homing missiles, and projectiles [snaryad], which possess great destructive power and are capable, within short spans of time and on a mass scale, of selectively destroying objectives thousands of kilometers away, both in space and on earth. The range of these weapons is global; deployed in a near-earth orbit and capable of maneuvering, they can at practically any single moment create a real danger to the security of any single state.

I would like to stress that space strike armaments are offensive weapons intended to carry out a first strike against the USSR and its allies. [paragraph continues]

They are distinguished by their military-technical specifications and capabilities. The offensive space weapons can be effectively applied to destroy space targets belonging to another country. They can also be used to strike important targets in the atmosphere and on the earth's surface. Finally, offensive space weapons, when used in the capacity of an "integrated" potential, are capable of sharply increasing the offensive power of the nuclear weapons and of giving them an exceptionally dangerous quality — a capacity to deal a first strike and a hope that the already weakened counterstrike of the other side can be repulsed with the aid of the antimissile defense installations.
A particular danger of the offensive space armaments is they are designed for automatic application, excluding human participation. In this context I would like to point out that, whereas with the existing armament systems a certain amount of time is still left for assessing the situation, in order not to reach the point of no return, war with offensive space weapons can break out with lightning speed.

[Asparukhov] What lies at the basis of the offensive space weapons for the design of which the United States "needs" the nuclear tests?

[Filipp Gontar] The nuclear tests are necessary solely for creating the new types of weapons, including the "Star Wars" program. Washington's nuclear ambitions in space are not limited to creating the X-ray laser which is at the basis of the offensive space weapons. The design of a number of other nuclear devices of the so-called "third generation" is being envisaged. The reference here is to devices which generate directional high-energy particle beams which form a directed electromagnetic pulse and create a directed stream of strike bodies [udarni elementi] with high kinetic energy, as well as to devices in which the energy of a nuclear explosion is used to boost gamma lasers and high-energy lasers operating in the optical wavelength range.

[Vasiliy Morozov] If the United States abandons the nuclear testing in Nevada, this means it will have no X-ray laser or other "third generation" nuclear devices, that is, that the "Star Wars" program will not be accomplished. This is why Washington does not want to hold constructive negotiations on this issue.

[Asparukhov] A number of facts indicate that contrary to common sense the United States has started to implement the "Star Wars" program. If the United States starts the deployment of space strike weapons in near-earth orbit, what will be the Soviet response to these risky actions?

[Vasiliy Morozov] The political response to "Star Wars" is unequivocal: The Soviet Union is opposing the "Star Wars" program with the program of "Star Peace," a program for broad international cooperation which is of interest not only to the Soviet people, but also to the other peace-loving forces and to the whole of progressive mankind, because it is in the interest of all states.

I wish to reiterate once more that from the very beginning of the conquering of space the USSR has consistently appealed to the United States not to permit the arms race to be transferred into this area. The Soviet Union's declaration that it will never station weapons in space is well known. It is also well known that our country has on more than one occasion proposed to the United States a ban on space weapons, including antisatellite weapons. As early as 1983 the USSR displayed its goodwill by taking upon itself the obligation not to be the first to launch any antisatellite weapons into space, and called upon the United States to follow its example. Up to this moment Washington has failed to respond to this peace initiative.
In this regard I wish to stress the USSR has never concealed and does not conceal the fact it is conducting relevant scientific research studies in the space field, including the military aspect. However, it must be pointed out this activity is not directed at creating space strike weapons, but is connected solely with perfecting the space systems for early warning, reconnaissance, communications, and navigation. This is why I wish to declare the USSR does not have space strike weapons and an antimissile defense with space-based components at its disposal and, in contrast to the United States, has no intention of working in this direction. The Soviet Union is firmly adhering to the 1972 treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems and supports not its revision, as Washington is insisting, but the strict execution of its requirements. This was once again declared to the United States during the Reykjavik talks. If the United States, in contravention of this treaty, still creates offensive space weapons and a broad-scale antimissile defense system under the "Star Wars" program, if it builds its notorious "space shield" to guarantee a first strike with impunity against the USSR and its allies, then the Soviet Union's response will be adequate to the danger which Washington's development of SDI is creating.

Here one should bear in mind the material and intellectual potential of the USSR today is such that it can guarantee the creation for the Soviet Union of any counterweapon.

In essence the United States definitely considers that the USSR, to preserve the existing balance, will begin to create its own SDI, similar to the U.S. one, and in this way will be drawn into an arms race in space that will be ruinous for itself and will undermine its economy for many decades, so it will not succeed in carrying out its programs for the country's socio-economic development. It must candidly be pointed out these assertions are without foundation. The military side of SDI is no secret for the USSR, and does not scare it. The Soviet Union has other effective measures available to counteract the "Star Wars" program. These measures will be implemented at the appropriate time.

Here one should bear in mind the Soviet counteraction program will be such that it will be able to substantially incapacitate the U.S. antimissile defense system with space-based components, and its intercontinental missiles will become unusable. On the other hand, these weapons will possess the capability of penetrating the U.S. "space shield" and of striking a retaliatory blow unacceptable to the aggressor.

[Filipp Contar] Those forces in the West who are counting on the USSR's "technological weakness" and consider that it cannot withstand the competition in near-earth orbit are deeply deluded. The experience of our history undeniably demonstrates the Soviet Union has inevitably found a response to all the provocations of the United States. However, our country has always declared, and continues to declare, it does not lay claim to greater security for itself than for others, but will not accept lesser security. Our ideal is a world without war and weapons.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1297
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: SDI PROGRAMMING PROBLEMS COULD CAUSE UNINTENTIONAL WAR

Moscow PRIODA in Russian No 11, Nov 86 pp 3-11

[Article by B. V. Raushenbach: "'Star Wars' and the Possibility of an Uninten-
tional Nuclear Conflict"]

It is no longer possible to win the arms race as well as nuclear
war itself. Continuation of such a race on Earth and, what is
more, its spread into space as it is will accelerate the criti-
cally high rate of accumulation and improvement of nuclear weap-
on. The situation in the world may acquire a character where
it will no longer depend on the reason or will of the politi-
cians. It will find itself a prisoner of technology and mili-
tary-technocratic logic.

From the Political Report of the CPSU Cent-
tral Committee to the 27th Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Boris Viktorovich Raushenbach is an academician and department
head of the Moscow Physical-Technical Institute. He is a spe-
cialist in the field of mechanics and control processes. He is
the author of the books "Vibratsiionnaye goreniiye" [Vibrational
Combustion], Moscow, 1961; "Upravleniya orientatsii kosmiches-
kykh apparatov" [Control of Attitude Controls of Spacecraft] in
coauthorship with Ye. N. Tokar), Moscow, 1974; "Prostranstven-
nyye postrojeniya v zhivopisi" [Three-Dimensional Constructions
in Painting], Moscow, 1980, and others. Member of the Interna-
tional Academy of Astronautics. Member of the Committee of
Soviet Scientists in the Defense of Peace and Against the Nu-
clear Threat. Winner of the Lenin Prize. Author of a number
of articles in PRIODA including: "The Problem of Militariza-
tion of Outer Space: Technical Prerequisites and Consequences"
(No 2, 1986).

The program which the President of the United States, R. Reagan, called the
"Strategic Defense Initiative" caused many objections on the part of scientists
of the most diverse specialties. Basically, they are reduced to a critical anal-
ysis of the physical processes which form the basis of the proposed new weapons,
their technical feasibility, astronomical cost, insufficient effectiveness, and
destabilizing influence on the military-political situation.

37
Considerably less attention is devoted to an analysis of the consequences of the brevity of the proposed "star battles." And, you see, it requires virtually the complete automation of all control of the opposing forces deployed in space and on the ground. Actually, intercontinental ballistic missiles should be destroyed on the powered flight phase during the 100-300 seconds after their appearance above the atmosphere. The duration of the attack of artificial Earth satellites by anti-satellite weapons for order of magnitude is the same, and so forth. It is obvious that under such conditions the decision concerning a response to the start of combat operations will be assigned to automated complexes which rely on computers in their work. As regards the response to such a response, under conditions of a shortage of time it also will be made by computers of the other side. A "computer war" breaks out where, in the best case, the computers will inform the political leaders of the interested sides concerning the course of the combat operations.

As outer space is militarized, not only will combat stations intended for the destruction of ballistic missiles and their warheads appear in it, but also an entire complex of spacecraft accomplishing the functions of command, control, and communication which are necessary for the successful use of the combat stations which have been orbited. And if we consider that the militarization of space will lead to the appearance of the corresponding means from both sides, means for countering the operation of the combat stations inevitably will be placed in near-earth orbits. As a result, intricate multifunctional complexes will appear in space which are intended not only for the destruction of ballistic missiles and their warheads, but also for combating one another.

The complete automation of combat operations requires the exceptionally high reliability of the entire system so that the probability of the start of combat operations by error in peacetime is excluded. What can trigger the computers of one of the opposing sides to begin combat operations without sufficient grounds and what circumstances can lead to the start of an unintentional nuclear conflict?

The basic reasons capable of causing combat operations unprovoked by the other side can be grouped in the following manner:

--failures of elements of the control system;

--software errors;

--mismatch of the software of the opposing systems.

Failures of Elements of the Control System

The system of space stations which comprise the material basis of the "Star Wars" program will contain many millions of elements, and it is unrealistic to expect that they will all work faultlessly. The requirements imposed on the elements which are part of the combat equipment ensure their serviceability for a guaranteed period only in the statistical sense: only a certain portion of the elements of the entire system are permitted to fail. This fraction of elements "having the right to failure" depends on the type of elements and can have different values in different countries but nowhere can it be equal to zero.
It is obvious that with the tremendous number of elements which are part of involved automated complexes, a rather large number of elements which fail is inevitable. An entire set of procedures which may help avoiding difficulties of this type has been developed. They are, first of all, duplication—ensuring the necessary reliability by installing a second, duplicating set of instruments. The system for identifying failures (which is required in an automated complex) should turn off the unit which has failed and turn on the spare.

A somewhat different method for increasing reliability is usually used in computers and electronic instruments. The logical processing of information proceeds in instruments of this type. It is conducted, for example, over three independent circuits, and three independently obtained results are compared at the end of each logic processing step. If they coincide, processing continues. If not, two coinciding results are processed and the third is rejected. Thus the failed element is excluded (it is presumed that the probability of two absolutely identical failures in two independent circuits is negligibly small). When two coinciding results are subjected to the next processing step, they are first "reported" to the third circuit which contains the failed element. Since the third circuit receives this information "below" the failed element, its malfunction can no longer affect the serviceability of this circuit, and further processing of information again goes over three independent circuits (in case of necessity the number of circuits operating in parallel may be even greater). By these and similar methods it is possible to obtain a system which is more reliable than its component elements. And nevertheless, it is not possible to exclude completely the possibility of serious malfunctions in the circuits of such a complex system as is required for the conduct of "Star Wars" (it is not possible, for example, to completely drop from calculations the possibility of the identical failure of two elements in parallel processing circuits, after which information processing will proceed along an erroneous path).

Software Errors

The process of creating "Star Wars" software can be arbitrarily divided into four stages: planning, development, realization, and test to check and eliminate errors.

Planning is the composition of the most detailed operating logic of a system with the mandatory consideration of all possible variants of combat operations, also including those enemy actions which can be taken as combat actions only from formal signs but are not such and, consequently, it is not necessary to respond to them. This includes planning the repelling of an attack of ballistic missiles which can be attacked by space weapons but do not act on them themselves (for this reason it is the "simplest" part of the entire mission) and also consideration of the inevitability of combat operations directed against space objects which comprise the technical means of antimissile defense. In contrast with monotypically

1 The problem of the correct development of software to repel an attack of intercontinental ballistic missiles by space combat stations was examined in detail in the article: Lin, G., "Razrabotka programmnoego obespecheniya diya sistemy protivoraketnoy oborony" [The Development of Software for an Antimissile Defense System]. V MIRE NAUKI [In the World of Science], No 2, 1986, pp 4-13.
flying missiles, the most diverse variants of destroying antimissile defense satellites and satellites for other actions against the space objects of both sides are possible here, in which regard, variants which both sides will carefully conceal from one another. Under these conditions, the planning of softwear acquires a probability nature; it will be necessary to indicate possible enemy actions depending on various versions of the start of combat operations and on the various natures of their subsequent development.

The failure (destruction) of each space object which is part of the system will change the structure of the corresponding space system and, therefore, will require a new variation of combat operations. As a result of the weakness of the planned versions of combat operations, there will be not only the precariousness of their foundation which is based on conjectures concerning the probable actions of the other side, but also a tremendous number of such variations which grow like an avalanche with any change in the structure of the space combat system.

Assume, for example, that a space combat system consists of 40 satellites and it is surmised that the opposing side will succeed in destroying up to 10 of them. Then, when preparing the softwear it is necessary to envisage different variations of combat operations depending on how many and just which satellites of one's space system have been put out of action. It is easy to be convinced that in this case more than 350 million versions will arise. And if we increase the number of satellites which may be put out of action from 10 to 11 (that is, by only one satellite!), the number of variations which must be considered exceeds a billion. Such a dizzying growth in the variations which must be envisioned unquestionably will force the softwear authors to reduce these versions to certain groups and to consider them from generalized positions less concretely than would be necessary from the essence of the matter and not to trace remote consequences in each specific case (all the more since the variations should be modified not only depending on friendly losses, but also on possible losses of the opposing side). And you see, in a version which has not been completely considered those remote consequences may be omitted which may be equivalent to a most dangerous error. This happens in chess matches--a move which seems natural and good at a given moment may in fact be the undoing of the match, but this will become clear only after several dozen moves.

Thus, from the very beginning the planning of combat operations of space and missile systems which are opposing one another will not assume a clear aspect; in particular it will depend to a great extent on how precisely the operations of the other side will be guessed (and this, perhaps, many years prior to an actual conflict situation). In which regard, the word "guess" here should be understood actually literally: for the opposing side will not simply try conceal its strategy but will also try to deceive the enemy. Under such conditions, the appearance of many programming errors as early as the planning stage becomes simply inevitable, in which regard errors in no way connected with the low qualifications or inattention of the executors.

Development in accordance with detailed logic formulated at the softwear planning stage is the next stage in its creation. And here errors of a different nature will be added to the basic errors of the preceding stage.
According to a preliminary estimate, software of the necessary class should contain tens of millions of instructions in the development of which thousands of programmers will take part over many years. Under these conditions, complete infallibility is simply excluded. In which regard, in addition to random errors there will surely appear here errors in the matching of individual parts of the program which have been prepared in different places, at different times, and by different executives and are difficult to detect, and errors connected with the programmers' imprecise understanding of individual fine points of the planned logic of the combat system's operation.

Realization is the third stage in software creation. It is reduced to the fact that the algorithms which have been developed during accomplishment of the second stage are input into the corresponding automatic systems and computers. Errors are also possible here, but they are detectable and can be eliminated comparatively easily.

Tests and the elimination of errors are the extremely important fourth stage of software. First of all, it is almost obvious that the basic errors committed on the first stage cannot be detected by simple tests of the system. For you see, they are connected basically with incorrect notions of enemy operations, but the rub is precisely that the software authors do not know that these notions are incorrect! They will compare the operation of the system with their own (erroneous!) notions and will begin to achieve the precise following of them. Errors will be detected only in the course of combat operations when, most likely, it will already be too late.

As regards errors committed on the second stage—software development—it would appear that they should be disclosed rather simply during tests of the system. In many cases this is actually so; however, the situation may prove to be so simple far from always.

As the experience of many years shows, when debugging software of complex systems a tremendous number of errors are discovered in it. Their elimination is a rather difficult and prolonged process. It usually occupies more than 30 percent of the total time from the start of planning to turning over to the customer of the systems which have been developed and debugged.

By just what methods is the detection of programming errors accomplished? Here, for example, we can have recourse to the assistance of other computers which, sending various signals to the "input" of the apparatus being tested, will follow the signals on the "output." If the "response" of the system or a part of it coincides with the planned reaction, it means that the circuit being tested contains no errors. Otherwise, the error must be found and eliminated. However, this method is fraught with great difficulties.

First, in its volume the program of checks is no smaller than the software being checked since it is required to contain all the planned operating logic of a combat-missile-space system. But this means that the program of checks will also contain a mass of errors. Therefore, in the course of the check switchings of the combat system and its individual elements, the mutual check of two programs occurs—errors are detected in the combat system as well as in the check programs. This greatly complicates the entire process of software debugging and protracts it in time. In addition, here the possibility is opened up for the
appearance of errors which basically cannot be eliminated. It may happen, for example, that an error in the software of a combat system is compensated by a corresponding error in the check program.

Second, and this is more important, the debugging of combat programs using computers is unable to discover an entire series of errors connected with the operation under real conditions. The disclosure of these errors is possible only by the conduct of full-scale tests. It should be noted, however, that tests of this type require not only the turning-on of one's system, but also simulation of the operation of the other side's system, in which regard not a mathematical simulation but an actual one connected with the launching of missiles, orbiting analogs of the other side's space means, simulation of their combat activity, and so forth. It is completely obvious that all this greatly narrows the possibility for full-scale tests for their number as well as for scales.

For the present, let us lay aside a discussion of the difficulties which arise with the conduct of sufficiently complete full-scale tests and concentrate our attention on difficulties of a technical order.

Work in real time has its own specific nature. With the turnings-on of actual equipment (and its composition also includes mechanical devices which operate at a slow rate by comparison with electronic equipment) the sequence of signals which arrive from this equipment in the course of its functioning should be contained in a specific logic chain. For example, the switching on of some unit for operation should occur only after receipt of a signal concerning the conclusion of necessary preparatory operations. Since a large number of various units and computers connected into complex systems participate in the work, the logical sequences of signals which describe their functioning become very complicated. As is known, the rate of triggering devices and units of various types (especially those which switch on mechanical elements) has a natural spread and, in addition, may vary depending on external conditions (temperature, pressure, and so forth). As a result of such changes which are difficult to forecast as well as of the difficulty in synchronizing the operation of the various parts of a combat system, disruptions may arise in the planned sequence of signals received by the control computer. Therefore, an apparently insignificant delay (or lead) of some intermediate signal can lead to where the system, having evaluated this weak shift of the expected signal in time as a substantial change in the situation, will select an incorrect path for further functioning. In the end, an error is detected in the operation of the system, but its elimination may prove to be an extremely difficult matter. The fact is that with the repeated switching-on the goal of which is the disclosure of a defect, the entire chain of the time sequence for triggering the system's elements may arrive at the standard since due to the same natural spread the times for triggering the elements each time they are switched on turn out to be different.

Most common is the case where the system usually operates normally, and comparatively rarely, with an especially unfavorable combination of actual times of the triggering of its component elements, fails. Everyone who worked on the debugging of automatic systems knows that the most difficult are the so-called "self-correcting defects" which arise once in every 20-30 or more switch-ons. Their disclosure in the systems which we are considering is complicated to the highest degree by strong restrictions on the number and volume of full-scale tests.
One more reason for the appearance of errors of this type is the inevitable replacement of individual units of the combat system which should function for many years and, perhaps, decades. The new units (whether because of some improvement or change in manufacturing technology) may differ somewhat from those being replaced, in particular in those characteristics which determine the rate of triggering of their elements. This may lead to serious failures in the operation of the system.

A convincing illustration of what has been said may be provided by the failure of the system for controlling the orientation of the "Voskhod-2" spaceship during the flight of which in 1965 Soviet cosmonaut A. A. Leonov took a space walk. At the end of the flight the ship's automatic equipment interrupted the landing maneuver immediately after its start and a landing proved to be impossible. This failure did not have tragic consequences only because manual control was included on the ship and it was landed manually on the next turn.

Postflight analysis showed the following. Some improvements were introduced into the valves which bring compressed nitrogen to the attitude control engines of the "Voskhod-2," which increased their reliability. It goes without saying that the valves underwent the complete cycle of tests. Moreover, they had already been employed successfully in other spacecraft. There were no doubts of their serviceability and, really, on this flight they functioned perfectly—for in the end these same valves were used in manual control.

The improved design of the valve was characterized by somewhat different rates of movement of its component elements. Although this difference appeared to be negligibly small (the triggering times differed by small fractions of a second), in actual flight these milliseconds added up in such a way that the automatic equipment perceived such a change as a dangerous malfunction and interrupted the process of attitude control. The control instructions which were generated in accordance with the logic placed in the attitude control system ceased to pass farther toward the valves.²

Elimination of this annoying malfunction was reduced to a very simple change in the adjustment of one of the automatic units; however, for the question being discussed here something else is important: the inevitability of the most dangerous failure was not discovered in numerous ground tests but was manifested only in flight.

What has been said shows the extreme necessity for numerous full-scale tests. But the paradox consists exactly of the fact that absolutely precise full-scale tests are simply impossible. Assume, for example, that the missile-space combat system of side A is calculated to repel the launching of 1,000 missiles of side B. But then, for the complete check of its system side A should organize the launching of 1,000 missiles from the territory of side B in the direction of

² In some descriptions of the landing of the "Voskhod-2" ship which claim to have documentation the words "the instruction did not pass" were naively interpreted as the disruption of radio communication between the control center and the spaceship. This does not correspond to the facts—radio communication functioned irreproachably.
its own territory. The absurdity of such a requirement is obvious but then, something else is also obvious: both sides are capable of accomplishing full-scale tests which only approximate reality.

The effectiveness of a combat missile-space system must be ensured by mathematical modeling and small-scale full-scale tests against hypothetical targets. It is obvious that under such conditions the system will not be brought to the state where its software will prove to be faultless. But nevertheless, in order to demonstrate the entire completeness of the danger with which "Star Wars" threatens mankind, we will make the improbable assumption that the software of both opposing systems contains no errors in development and that no failures of the systems' elements occur. The only things which we will subsequently consider are errors connected with the unreliability of information concerning the opposing side.

Mismatch of the Sides' Software

The multifunctional systems, discussed above, which are injected into outer space comprise some combat complex. In order to obtain the needed effectiveness, such a multifunctional complex should not be taken by surprise, and considerable resources will be expended not only on detecting the launch of ballistic missiles, but also on the preparations for such a launch and for the combat use of space weapons and also on the detection of any type of other preparatory operations.

We will further proceed from the fact that the detection of operations which directly precede the combat use of space weapons is possible and that both sides are not striving to unleash a nuclear conflict with the very first detection of indicators which can be interpreted as preparations for the start of combat operations or as the start of combat operations itself.

If space system A detected that system B began preparatory operations, it should also begin them but not unleash a nuclear war since it is not excluded that the actions of system B were simply interpreted erroneously. Only with the detection of a sufficiently large aggregate of alarming indicators can system A consider itself forced to begin combat operations, in which regard it is not mandatory that it put nuclear weapons into action at once. Thus, a certain gradualness of reaction to the actions of the other side is created which has the goal of excluding the possibility of a chance outbreak of a nuclear conflict.

In order to give these rather general reasonings a certain clarity, let us define somewhat concretely the scheme for the reaction of system A to the actions of system B. Assume that the developers of system A placed in it a program for a sequence of actions which proceeds from the fact that the simultaneous appearance of six alarming signals is critical for some aggregate of indicators. Then the actions of the system may appear as follows:

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3 Concerning the reliability of computer systems, see also in this issue: "Computers and the SDI" (p 103).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First appearance of 1 indicator</th>
<th>→ intensification of observation (possibly the switching-on of additional observation means)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneous appearance of 2 indicators</td>
<td>→ preparatory operations which require a relatively long time for transition to a state of combat readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneous appearance of 3 indicators</td>
<td>→ average degree of combat readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneous appearance of 4 indicators</td>
<td>→ highest degree of combat readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneous appearance of 5 indicators</td>
<td>→ combat operations without the use of nuclear weapons (for example, the destruction of some satellite of system B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneous appearance of 6 indicators</td>
<td>→ nuclear war</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The scheme which has been presented is only one of the possible versions, that shows results for rather elementary reaction to the actions of side B. However, whatever the actual programs may be, they should always proceed from the requirements for a gradual increase in responsive actions so that the latter prove to be adequate for the potential threat. It is also obvious that the disappearance of the alarming signals (reduction in their number) leads to a corresponding cancellation of responsive measures, too. In the end, if the actions of system B were simply incorrectly interpreted, then as the alarming signals disappear or their interpretation is refined (for they could also be caused by rare natural phenomena) system A will return to the initial state.

The described sequence of actions— their gradualness and reversibility— makes system A "stable" in relation to weak perturbations (small number of alarming signals): it reacts in a "proportional" manner building up or relaxing responsive preparatory operations. No reasons are seen here for the avalanche-like development of a process which leads to a nuclear conflict without sufficient grounds. This simple "proportionality" would seem to exclude the chance outbreak of a nuclear conflict.

It is obvious that system B is structured with the consideration of similar requirements and will also become stable, and the "proportionality" which was discussed above will also be realized in it. However, the stability of systems A and B, taken separately, does not at all mean that the large system A + B will also prove to be stable. Here the usual methods of calculation, modeling, developing, and testing the large systems necessary to ensure the stability of their joint operation will not be able to be realized with necessary completeness. And here is why. Systems A and B are opposing; therefore, the development and debugging of each of them will proceed independently and, moreover, in complete...
secrecy from one another. Their first "combination" in a large system will occur when they go on alert status, their first joint operation will begin with the very first actual conflict situation, and the first test may prove to be combat operations.

Contemporary control theory tells us that the combination of two separately stable systems into a common large system often will lead to the instability of the latter. We will explain what has been said by turning to the following diagram:

Rectangles A and B depict the corresponding systems, and lines x and y, which end in arrows—the flows of information which are exchanged by systems A and B after they were combined into the large system A + B. These flows of information are alarming indicators which one system detects in the other (apart from its desire). Let us begin an examination of the problem, turning to the "open" system and assuming that at point C communication between A and B has been interrupted and information y does not reach system B, that is, system B is unable to discover the processes taking place in system A.

Assume that under conditions of the actual functioning of system B (we are not speaking of combat operations, but of the usual duty mode) some processes occur in it which are recorded by system A (on the figure, this is shown as the receipt of information x). Let us assume that these processes are not at all connected with preparation for combat actions but have as their cause a minor malfunction or some other verifying switch–on which is accomplished on instruction from the ground or something else similar. Let us assume that system A perceives them as signals which indicate the preparation of system B for combat operations (for system A does not possess exhaustive information on reliable indicators of the preparation of system B for combat operations; under these conditions, a certain mutual suspicion is not only easily explainable, but also necessary). Having received this information x, system A shifts from the mode of pure observation to the state of combat readiness of that degree which is adequate for the received information x. If, on the expiration of some time, the malfunction in system B is eliminated or its verifying switch–on is ended on instructions from the ground, in other words, the flow of information x ceases to contain alarming indicators, system A will return to the pure observation mode. No tragic consequences occurred. System A manifested stability because information y, which tells about the actions of system A, did not reach system B.
Let us now examine the behavior of both systems with the completion of feedback at point C, when they will become the single system A + B. Let us assume that both systems are stable in the meaning described above and both are working ideally. Assume further that arriving in system A is signal g which is in no way connected with the operation of system B and having as a cause some rare atmospheric phenomenon or random event in space or something else which may be interpreted by system A as an alarming signal. Let us assume that this signal is not too important and system A will begin to take only the first steps toward the transition to a state of combat readiness. As soon as information y about these first steps reaches system B, the latter will also begin similar steps and two simultaneous signals g and x will appear at the input to system A, in which regard the latter will be connected with the actions of system B. The appearance of two alarming signals instead of one forces system A to take the next step toward complete combat readiness, and this will immediately change the information y at the input to system B—-it will also become more alarming. The retuning of the functioning of system B connected with this will change the content of information x, which will acquire an even more alarming nature. System A will immediately react to this, as a result of which an avalanche-like process of approaching combat actions of the systems will develop which may develop into a nuclear conflict.

The discussions which have been presented are instructive in the sense that they illustrate the real possibility of an absolutely "groundless" start of combat operations as a result of the interaction of two absolutely serviceable automated systems, each of which is stable itself, that is, incapable of developing an avalanche-like process which leads to combat actions if it records a weak single signal g. This is a typical example of the start of a war by automated systems without any "consultation" with military or political leaders.

Control theory easily explains the instability of system A + B which arose by the presence of positive feedback between stations A and B: A responds to the actions of B in such a way that B does not quiet down but is stimulated even more strongly. A way out of the situation may be the introduction of a control scheme which simply does not react to weak signals. In the limiting case, in striving to eliminate the instability of system A + B in the sense which was examined, we can presume a scheme for the functioning of the systems which, in general, do not react to the indicators of the preparation of the other system for combat operations but react, in which regard very sharply, possibly with the use of nuclear weapons, only to the start of combat actions of the other side. From the point of view of control theory, this means the transition from control systems, the basis of which is formed by proportional reaction, to systems of the relay type.

The problem which arises when developing a space system with reaction to the actions of the other side in accordance with a relay type can be formulated as a problem of determining that threshold value of the aggregate of indicators which indicate the start of combat operations and which are sufficient for the start of one's own (responsive) combat actions. As analysis shows, this problem is not as simple as may appear at first glance.

If systems A and B had not been opposing but had collaborated in the implementation of some peaceful program, it is always possible to accomplish the full-scale turning on of system B so that system A can study and record the aggregate of observable indicators which are necessary and sufficient for its turn-on (and
vice versa). But since the systems being examined are opposing, system B is in no way interested in switching on system A (for this signifies the start of responsive combat operations) and therefore will adopt all possible measures capable of hampering the operation of system A.

Let us assume that system B is preparing for combat operations. Understanding that the timely counteraction of system A may lower their effectiveness, the creators of system B are trying to envision a complex of measures which prevent the normal operation of system A. This complex of measures is reduced to "camouflage," that is, the distortion of the nature of alarming indicators which system A can observe, right up to the accomplishment of launchings of decoys and the organization of other diversionary maneuvers. Consequently, the softwear of side A should be able to distinguish genuine alarming signals from their simulations which have the goal of "confusing" combat system A. This leads to the additional destabilization of all softwear.

Let us assume that the creators of system A know that a specific variant of the start of combat operations by the other side can be correctly determined with the appearance of five known alarming indicators. Considering the potential possibility of camouflage, they will find themselves facing a difficult task: and what if the instruments record only three or four alarming indicators of the five? Should combat operations be begun. They should begin if the absence of a number of indicators is simply the result of a "strategum" of the attacking side. In no case should combat operations begin if the absence of a number of indicators suggests that it no way is an attack occurring but something else is being observed since the responsive actions of side A in this case would become the start of combat operations through error. All this is aggravated by the fact that such an important decision should be placed in the softwear of system A long (possibly many years) before it will in fact be received by the computers of this system. Thus, the uncertainty of the indicators of the start of combat actions which has arisen may lead either to an erroneous refusal to repel an attack or to the start of combat operations through error. The creation of absolutely reliable softwear for system A under these conditions is simply impossible. Of course, all this also pertains to system B.

Thus, the independently created systems A and B are combined by life itself into a single system $A + B$ which then functions in accordance with its internal laws which are unknown either to the authors of system A or the authors of system B. For both sides developed their parts of the program without using the data of the other side and relying only on conjectures concerning the probable nature of his actions. Very many inaccuracies and direct errors will appear in these conjectures due to the striving of the opposing sides to deceive one another.

Two limiting cases were examined here—proportional and relay reactions to the actions of the other side. The actual softwear systems of "Star Wars" will probably contain elements of both but this will not change the final conclusions to the slightest degree. And the inevitability of errors in the development of the softwear, which was written about above, is capable of making the situation even more dangerous."

4 [See footnote 3 above]
One of the possible objections to the picture of the almost inevitable unleashing of a military conflict even with the absence of errors in the development of softwear or the failure of elements of the opposing systems which was drawn here is the low probability of such a fatal concurrence of circumstances. However, it should not be forgotten that probability theory is inapplicable to a single event. If the reader of these lines tries to calculate the probability that it was precisely he who was born into the world and not his potential brothers and sisters, he will consider the probability of the birth and the meeting of his parents, then their parents, and so forth and he will immediately be convinced of the fact that the probability of his appearance in the world is virtually equal to zero. But nevertheless, he is reading these lines.

The tragedy with the "Challenger" spaceship also shows the unexpectedly large probability of the failure of an "absolutely reliable" (as it was called) space system. Here, it should be kept in mind that the softwear and design complexity of this space shuttle cannot in any way be compared with the most complex providing of the "Star Wars" space system and the most complex designs of combat space stations with laser and other weapons. Consequently, accidents, failures, and the explosions of objects which comprise the material basis of the "Star Wars" system are completely possible and it is far from clear how these accidents and explosions will be interpreted by sides A and B which are opposing one another.

The suicidal outcome of the mutual observation of two opposing systems can set in soon after they are turned on or it may happen after several years, but if it occurs, most likely it will not be necessary to wait for a second such case. Life on Earth will end.

If it does not abandon the arms race, an apocalyptic future awaits mankind. For this not to happen, people must unite on the basis of disarmament. Otherwise the "clever" automatons which they have created will unite and will destroy the unwise people.

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CSP: 5200/1210
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR SCIENTISTS' STUDY OF SDI PROGRAM REVIEWED

PM011803 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 29 Jan 87 Sole Edition p 3

[Article by candidate of military sciences Colonel V. Nazarenko: "Space Spiral of the Arms Race"]

[Text] "Star wars"... This is the subject of the book "Space Weapons: Security Dilemma" (Kosmicheskoye Oruzhiye: Dilemma Bezopasnosti) prepared by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat (Footnote) (Under the editorship of Ye.p. Velikhov, R.Z. Sagdeyev, and A.A. Kokoshin."Mir" Publishing House, Moscow, 1986, 182 pages, illustrated). To explain intelligibly to the public the fatal danger of plans for the militarization of space, to use scientific arguments to show the true essence of the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" program—this was how the purpose of the collective monograph's publication was formulated by one of its authors, Ye.P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The book traces in detail the evolution of the American projects to create [sozdaniye] a space arms system and the idea of an "impenetrable" space shield supposedly capable of defending the United States and its allies against the threat of nuclear destruction. The scientific-technical, military-strategic, and international political consequences associated with the prospect of creating [sozdaniye] a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements are comprehensively examined in detail on the basis of extensive factual material for the first time. An in-depth and multifaceted analysis of SDI has enabled the monograph's authors to draw an unambiguous conclusion: Such a system cannot be regarded as purely defensive but represents a new, complex kind of weapon whose emergence gives a powerful boost to the arms race and sharply increases the risk of nuclear war breaking out.

Both the supporters and the opponents of SDI believe that the most efficient ABM system must include means of hitting attacking missiles during the powered flight phase above all. The point is that the number of targets susceptible to destruction during that part of the flight is minimal (the separation of warheads has not yet taken place, and false targets have not been launched), and attacking missiles are most easily detectable because of the powerful flame created by burning fuel. The flight time of modern missiles during the powered flight phase of the trajectory is approximately

50
200 seconds, and the corresponding altitude is within the range of 200-350 km. According to American research data, these parameters can, in principle, be reduced: the time to 50 seconds, and the altitude to 80-90 km.

The monograph's authors classify the means of destruction that are being developed [razrabatyvat] within the SDI framework as follows: directed-energy weapons, including all kinds of laser and beam weapons; kinetic weapons—interceptor shells with a guidance (homing) system or ballistic shells that accelerate to supersonic speeds and annihilate space targets by mechanical destruction; weapons analogous in operation to an electromagnetic impulse from a nuclear explosion (emi-weapons).

Directed-energy weapon means, whose creation [sozdaniye] is becoming possible in principle thanks to major successes in the spheres of physics and technology, possess a number of special features which single them out in terms of efficiency from existing types of arms, namely: almost instant destruction of the target, because energy is transmitted practically at the speed of light, and long-range destruction (4,000-5,000 km). Best use of these features of the "exotic" weapons could be made in space.

The task of destroying enemy ballistic missiles throughout their flight trajectory, and primarily during the powered flight phase, the authors point out, presupposes launching into near-earth orbits a whole number of key elements of an ABM system, that is, creating [sozdaniye] an echeloned (multitier) ABM system with combat space stations and platforms with various means of detection, tracking, guidance, combat control, and power supply.

According to a statement by Lieutenant General J. Abrahamson, director of the SDI program, the United States plans to start the phased deployment of space-based ABM arms as early as the beginning of the nineties, without waiting for the whole system to be created [sozdaniye]. At the first stage it is planned to put into space and deploy in various orbits more than 250 combat space stations with small homing missiles, as well as platforms equipped with various kinds of target detection sensors, information processing facilities, and power plants. As of the year 2000, space complexes of weapons based on new physical principles—laser, beam, emi-weapons and others—will start to be put into orbit.

Confirming the conclusions drawn by American colleagues and accompanying them with their own theoretical calculations, the Soviet scientists reach the conclusion that the SDI program is of a clearly expressed aggressive nature, because the latest kinds of space arms being created [sozdavat] have a dual purpose. A nuclear-pumped laser, for example, being an accurate, powerful, and fast-acting strike weapon, can also be used to hit targets on the ground and in the air. In short, an essentially new kind of offensive arms, a new component for the existing strategic triad, is being created [sozdavat] in accordance with SDI, and a first-strike potential is being built up. This does not mean "substituting defense for offense" but combining them in a unified offensive-defensive strategic complex of forces. It is characteristic that "this aspect of the problem is in practice not mentioned in any official American document devoted to the SDI program," because it totally refutes the "defensive logic" of that project's authors.
One of the book's chapters is entirely devoted to answering this important question—with what can we counter SDI? As is known, the Soviet leadership has repeatedly declared that, if necessary, an answer to SDI will quickly be found, and it will not be what the United States expects. M.S. Gorbachev emphasized at the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik that SDI does not worry the USSR militarily. If the United States ventures to deploy it, the Soviet answer will be asymmetrical. It will be effective and less costly and will make the "star wars" program worthless.

Specialists in the sphere of space weapons believe that countermeasures must fulfill two chief functions: parry the danger of a unilateral violation of the military-strategic equilibrium as a consequence of deploying SDI; ensure that the ability to inflict on the aggressor a retaliatory counterstrike unacceptable to him is preserved in any version of a nuclear attack. The book examines in detail possible countermeasures and specific ways and means of countering the space strike weapons being developed [razrabatyvat] within the SDI framework.

The USSR has the ability to create [sozdaniye] a reliable counter to SDI. The problem, however, is something different. With the help of the "star wars" program the United States wants to extend the spiral of the arms race into space, turning space into a military citadel and a bridgehead for establishing American hegemony. SDI is a massive attempt to ensure U.S. military-strategic superiority, it is the continuation of an international policy from a position of strength, and, finally, it is total disregard for the United States' obligations under international law and for international security interests.

It undermines trust in international relations. It does not strengthen but reduces security, including for America itself.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1297
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA ON U.S. ALLIES' OPPOSITION TO SDI

PM121557 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Feb 87 First Edition p 5

[Vitaliy Korionov "Commentator's Column": "The Peoples Will Not Be Deceived"]

[Text] The world's press is full of reports on the new battles ranging around SDI in the NATO countries. Washington is holding conference after conference of ranking U.S. Government spokesmen at which the Pentagon "hawks" are demanding that an "accelerated timetable" be adopted which would pave the way for the speedy deployment and testing in space of the first SDI elements.

Striving to "justify" this course, the administration is trying to find holes in the 1972 Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty. In particular, it is trying to give a so-called "broad interpretation" to the provisions of the treaty, which would give a free hand to those who hate the restrictions imposed by this document. Official White House spokesman M. Fitzwater recently announced that back in October 1985 R. Reagan concluded that such a "broad interpretation" would be "permissible from the legal viewpoint" and now he is personally deciding whether he should switch to the practical use of this "broad" interpretation with a view to expediting the creation [sozdaniye] of space strike weapons. As Fitzwater was forced to admit, this approach is not even supported by a number of leading figures in Congress.

The administration's course, THE WASHINGTON POST notes, "can only be justified if we are convinced about the option of not giving a damn about anything for the sake of SDI." "If this proposal goes through," THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR adds, "we can forget about any agreement or about arms control during the Reagan presidency."

Naturally, the administration's adventurist actions are generating mounting opposition not only in the United States itself but also in the circles of the U.S. NATO allies. The countries making up the "big seven" have just recently rejected the attempts to involve them in the gendarme action which the Pentagon "top brass" are planning to carry out against Lebanon. Now they are faced with Washington's efforts to trample the ABM Treaty underfoot.
Realistically minded West European circles cannot fail to understand that Washington is striving to open the floodgates for an even more dangerous spiral in the arms race.

"Washington's open disregard for the allies' interests," Britain's THE OBSERVER writes, "now forces us to discuss the danger of the intensification of anti-American sentiments, which have roots in a number of West European countries." West European government circles cannot fail to take account of this or of the fact that Washington's actions undermine their states' security. London, Bonn, and other allied capitals have already voiced their concern to the United States.

Life attests that SDI has already become a factor in the exacerbation of tension in the world. It is natural that rejection of the nuclear maniacs' militarist action is growing everywhere.

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CSO: 5200/1297
PRAVDA COMMENTARY ON CANADIAN ROLE IN SDI

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Dec 86 p 5

[Article by Vladimir Shelkov, Ottawa: "The First 'Signs!'"]

[Text] The Canadian Magnus Aerospace Corporation has received from the Pentagon an order for the conduct of studies for the "Star Wars" program. As the newspapers here note, six million dollars will be allocated for the first two stages of the work. For the present, the company's task is a study of the possibilities of creating a new flight vehicle capable of lifting up to 100 tons of cargo to an altitude exceeding 21 kilometers and remaining there for a year.

These characteristics also attracted the attention of developers of the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] of General J. Abrahamson's department to the future creation of the Canadian company—a superdirigible. The American creators of "Star Wars" are aiming at using the lift capacity, altitude, and flight duration of the apparatus which soars in the skies to emplace observation posts and missile launch sites on it.

As the president of the Canadian Association of the Aerospace Industry, (K.) Lewis, stated, Magnus is the first of the private companies of the country which received a Pentagon order within the framework of the "strategic defense initiative program." So to say, the first "signs." In this case, will it not be the predecessor of a much more active involvement of Canadian capital and the scientific potential connected with it in the implementation of plans for the militarization of space? For it is no secret that some Canadian concerns get no peace from the profits which are extracted by the U.S. military-industrial complex from the arms race.

On the other hand, considerable thirst for Canadian laboratories and ranges is also found in the pentahedron on the Potomac. To link its ally with actions which undermine the spirit of Reykjavik as quickly as possible—this is what they are striving for in the Pentagon. There they would like to use the interest of the Canadian firms in the feeding trough of SDI to attract Canadian military science and industry to the arms race "at high orbits." In Washington they also are obviously counting on the fact that having faced its northern neighbor with the accomplished fact of its involvement in the space arms race through private capital, they will succeed de facto in cancelling Ottawa's refusal of last year to participate in the SDI program at the governmental level.
Thus, they are beginning to get rid of the fears of those political and public figures of Canada and of representatives of opposition parties who criticized the decision of the conservative government which left the door halfway open for the military-space experiments of private companies. Such a decision in fact may bring Canada to actual full-scale participation in the realization of the "Star Wars" plans.

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CSO: 5200/1202
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

XINHUA CITES WASHINGTON POST WARNING ON ABM TREATY

OW070436 Beijing XINHUA in English 0239 GMT 7 Feb 87

[Text] Washington, February 6 (XINHUA) -- THE WASHINGTON POST in an editorial today cautioned the Reagan administration against reinterpreting the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty in a bid to pave the way for early development of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The editorial came amid numerous reports here that President Ronald Reagan, pushed by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and other SDI enthusiasts, was about to make a decision to formally adopt a new interpretation of the ABM treaty.

The treaty, negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, declares that both parties will not "develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."

But the new interpretation, put forward by the Reagan administration in October 1985 but not formally invoked so far, argues that extensive testing and even deployment of the SDI space-based missile defense system are allowed under the treaty.

THE WASHINGTON POST editorial said that interpretation "contradicts the very name and purpose of the treaty." "It contradicts 15 years of precedent by Moscow and Washington and testimony given by (former) American negotiators to Congress."

The editorial noted the ABM treaty is almost the only remaining one among U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements that "has helped prevent nuclear war, sharply curtailing the development of a dangerous mix of defensive and offensive forces."

Should President Reagan decide to put the new interpretation into effect, the editorial said, "he could do no greater harm to his own stated goals for arms control or to American national security."
The editorial also questioned the wisdom of development and deployment of the so-called "mini-Star Wars system" which was advocated by Weinberger and other supporters both inside and outside the administration.

If the system is designed to defend American cities, rather than missiles, the editorial said, "that would ominously lead to what strategists call war planning: A first strike against the other side's nuclear forces and a defense to blunt his weakened retaliatory blow."

The editorial urged the Reagan administration to demonstrate sincerity in arms control by "making some constructive new proposals." Otherwise, it said: "The administration stands exposed as indifferent in its pursuit of arms control and confused in its pursuit of strength."

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CSO: 5200/4056
BRIEFS

JAPANESE SDI PARTICIPATION TO FOLLOW FRG FORMULA--Tokyo, 31 Jan (KYODO)--The government will participate in the research and development phases of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative under formulas similar to those concluded by West Germany, Italy, Israel and Britain, officials said Saturday. It has also decided that agreements on participation in the project will be concluded individually between Japanese enterprises and the U.S. Government. In these agreements, the decision will be left to the U.S. Administration on the ownership and transfer of technology developed by Japanese companies, they said. The government will try, however, to help Japanese firms retain the copyright and right to use technology they have developed. This would make it possible for Japanese companies to use their technology for civilian purposes, the officials said. The agreement signed by the United States and West Germany excluded such a possibility, they said. In this connection, the officials said, the government has no plan to formulate new domestic laws regulating the participation of Japanese companies in the SDI project. The Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) urged the government to reserve the right for Japanese enterprises to use new technology they develop. The government plans to conclude a formal agreement with the United States toward April. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 1031 GMT 31 Jan 87 OW] /9738

CSO: 5260/065
FRG PAPER SAYS SOVIETS WANT TREATY WITH REAGAN

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 28 Jan 87 p 12

[Article by Jan Reifenberg: "Time Is Running Short in Geneva--The Seventh Round in Arms Control Negotiations Must Show Political Feasibility"]

[Text] Geneva, January--The seventh round in U.S.-Soviet arms-control negotiations, currently under way in Geneva, is dominated by a new style and a new pace. The new Soviet chief negotiator, Voronzov, who is also one of the Kremlin's top U.S. experts, has requested that the kind of stiff, formal plenary sessions where all three negotiation teams attend be done away with for the present. Instead, Voronzov and his American counterpart Kampelman privately discussed over lunch key questions, topic formulations, and "specific" tasks for all three negotiators. Since then, each group has met daily. Something that was an impossibility at Reykjavik, at the hapless meeting between Secretary of State Schultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Vienna, and at the beginning of the Geneva negotiations in December, has finally become a reality: Both sides have agreed to exchange new "working papers" plus comparisons between existing positions and suggestions for amendments and improvements.

Voronzov, a first deputy minister of foreign affairs with direct access to Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, has stirred up the Soviet team, which, under his predecessor Karpov, had fallen into a comfortable routine. Voronzov now expects the team to work at more detailed versions of the far-reaching proposals made at Reykjavik. The Americans, too, are working at full blast and without interruptions. Direct lines to the White House, the Department of Defense, the Pentagon, and to the news services are in constant use.

Both sides are pressed for time. Should the Americans decide to present the Senate with a ratifiable treaty before the lame duck presidency of the national election year 1988 rolls around, they must have a treaty formulation by late fall. For a serious debate over ratification by the Senate, it is necessary that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--now under Democratic opposition leadership--make a recommendation by the end of January 1988. The Soviets, for their part, seem to have reached the tentative conclusion that it is best to nail down a treaty while Reagan is still in office instead of waiting for an unknown successor to take at least two years before being ready to conduct foreign and security policy in earnest. Such a wait would not

60
only mean an hiatus in negotiations until 1991, but also four more years in which the U.S. could continue to develop first "components" for a space-based missile defense system.

Until now, Soviet negotiators in Geneva have given no concrete indications that Gorbachev is ready to untie the strings of the "Reykjavik" package, meaning a loosening of the linkage between strategic arms reduction talks (START), negotiations about long-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF), and the development of SDI. It actually rather looks as if—with regard to key issues—both sides have chosen to retreat behind the advances made since 1983, when NATO's dual-track decision was implemented. This impression is misleading, however, especially when one considers the political and technology related realities that tie both Washington and Moscow's hands. In the end, all the wrangling comes down to the interpretation of treaty terms supposed to limit the number of anti-ballistic missiles. What, for example, is meant by so-called "laboratories?" How far can each side go in the research and development of space-based defensive weapons? What kind of experiments with "components" are permissible outside "laboratories?" (From the Soviets' viewpoint, all of space, measured from its scientifically defined lower periphery, is off-limits.)

In this respect, there was some rapprochement in Geneva because it seemed that the technology developed by 1991 would only allow for a land-based particle and laser beam missile defense system. Now, however, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger sees the possibility that by the beginning of the 1990's, first "elements" for a comprehensive defense system for the American continent can be deployed in space. Such a decision would of course constitute a violation of the existing ABM Treaty. Is Reagan ready for such a step? This question is on everybody's mind during this round of negotiations in Geneva. Thus, one of the main tasks of the negotiators is to define the term "components" for the future SDI system. It should be possible to find a compromise somewhere between the present Soviet definition of research "laboratories" and the claim by Reagan's staff that everything goes—even under a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. A compromise of this kind could untie the Reykjavik package.

At closer range, the considerable progress achieved even before Reykjavik, shows a substantial concurrence of opinion with regard to an agreement on long-range intermediate nuclear weapons as well as on a mutually agreed upon way to reduce strategic ballistic missiles. There was not only an agreement to try—over the next five years—to reduce such missile systems by half and to limit the number of intercontinental ballistic missile launchers to a maximum of 1,600; there also seemed to be an understanding with regard to sub-limits for nuclear warheads, stationary and mobile land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles—the chief Soviet weapon—and submarine based nuclear missiles as well as to the method for counting manned bombers carrying cruise missiles (ALCMS). Since Reykjavik, though, the Soviet Union has once again been "stonewalling." The Soviets also have changed their minds on having
sea-based cruise missiles included. What matters now, is whether Gorbachev will give up his goal of seeing all nuclear weapons eliminated by the turn of the century—an infeasible goal for both superpowers because of possible blackmail threats by third parties—and will instead declare himself ready to take the first step in reducing nuclear weapons by half. Now, as then, the most attainable goal would be an agreement on long-range intermediate nuclear missiles through the implementation of the zero-option for Europe and by the retention of 100 launchers each, stationed in Soviet central Asia and the U.S. Americans, without doubt, would take up such a Soviet offer, and to please NATO allies, they would agree to stick to the terms that demand the dismantling of Soviet short-range nuclear missiles in central Europe within six months after the conclusion of an "INF Agreement." This should not be seen as "linkage," but rather as a consideration for justified worries by European allies.

The current seventh round of negotiations in Geneva is filled with a sense of drama. Time is short and negotiators might be tempted to succumb to a quick, yet unsatisfactory interim solution that would surely fail to find the approval of the U.S. Senate, especially when controlled by Democrats. Nine years ago, even before the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, it was such a Senate that refused ratification of SALT II.

13196/12851
CSO: 5200/2488
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

XINHUA REPORTS U.S. TEST HARMs DISARMAMENT PROSPECTS

0W061028 Beijing XINHUA in English 0928 GMT 6 Feb 87

["U.S. Nuclear Test Casts Shadow Over Arms Talks" — XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, February 5 (XINHUA) — Now that the United States has conducted its first nuclear test of the year, the dispute between the superpowers over the test issue is expected to intensify, further shadowing the already dim prospects of the Geneva arms control talks.

Immediately after the U.S. underground blast at the Nevada test site on Tuesday, the Soviet news agency TASS said the move had confirmed the Reagan administration's "intention to follow a dangerous course for the escalation of the nuclear arms race," and called it a challenge to "world opinion."

Responding to the American move, Soviet Vice Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy declared in Moscow today a formal end to the 18-month-old unilateral Soviet nuclear test moratorium.

The response conformed with Moscow's warning late last year that if the United States continued to refuse to join the test moratorium, Moscow would resume nuclear testing once Washington conducted its first test in 1987.

The Soviet Union started its self-imposed nuclear test ban on August 6, 1985, the 40th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, and has since repeatedly urged the United States to follow suit.

The Reagan administration, however, argued that the Soviet move was a "propaganda scheme" designed to deceive world opinion.

It rejected Soviet calls to join the moratorium and to conduct bilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, arguing that continued testing is essential to its strategic deterrence and the invention of new nuclear weapons.

After the Reykjavik summit last October, Moscow added a comprehensive nuclear test ban to strict restraints on "Star Wars" testing as the major preconditions for any superpower agreement on reducing strategic weapons.

Washington has charged that the linkage represented a Soviet backtracking from its previous positions and posed new obstacles to the long-dragged-out arms control talks.
Although the two countries have held three rounds of discussions in Geneva in an attempt to narrow their differences on the issue, no progress has been made.

The fourth round of talks is now under way in Geneva, but last week, the two sides were reportedly unable even to agree on the title of the talks.

The Soviets wanted a reference in the title to the "cessation of nuclear testing," but the United States refused and sought a more ambiguous title, according to a WASHINGTON POST report.

The new U.S. atomic test was criticized by some delegates to the 40-nation conference on disarmament now in session in Geneva.

Swedish ambassador to the conference, Britt Theorin, said: "It (the U.S. test) would amount to nothing less than an affront to international efforts" to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

The blast was also criticized by several members of the U.S. Congress who feared that it would trigger strong reactions from the Soviets and further complicate the deadlocked Geneva arms control negotiations.

Democratic members of U.S. Congress yesterday passed a resolution condemning the explosion and called for enactment of legislation to halt further U.S. nuclear testing as long as the Soviet Union continues its test moratorium.

The resolution also urged the Reagan administration to "begin immediate negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve a reciprocal, simultaneous and verifiable ban on nuclear weapons test."

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CSO: 5200/4055

64
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

GORBACHEV PROPOSAL ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES

LD281756 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 87 First Edition

["Statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev"]

[Text] Moscow 1 Mar -- On 15 January 1986, the Soviet Union put forward an historic program, that of stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons. When suggesting it we proceeded from the firm conviction that future security would be a nuclear-free one.

The Soviet leadership, and the country's Defense Council, which I am instructed to head, constantly keeps the problems of the security of the country, that of our allies, and of universal security at the center of attention. We do not have the slightest doubt the security of the world and the survival of humanity should be ensured by joint efforts and political means, and not by weapons.

The common sense of the peoples, an overwhelming majority of parties and movements, and the natural instinct of self-preservation decline to accept the logic of humanity's suicide.

Guided by the awareness of high responsibility to the world, the Soviet Union comes out in favor of finding mutually acceptable solutions in the interests of a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world.

At the recent forum in Moscow we once again felt the expectations, concerns and intense searchings of outstanding representatives of science and culture, politics and religions and again became keenly aware of the crucial nature of our times.

The Reykjavik meeting showed nuclear disarmament is a completely realistic policy. In the capital of Iceland we were one step away from an accord on a whole range of such decisions which in their aggregate would have signified a deep breakthrough in the front of nuclear danger.

Herein is the greatness and tragedy of the Reykjavik meeting. Its greatness was in the fact that an attainable prospect of a nuclear-free world opened. Its tragedy lay in the fact that powerful forces, being held captive by nuclear-strength mentality, opposed accords.

It is a matter of common knowledge what was happened after the Reykjavik meeting. The U.S. Administration backed away from what was achieved.
The Soviet-U.S. talks, notwithstanding our efforts to give dynamism and specific character to them, are again being deliberately blocked.

The same officials who regarded it as logical in Reykjavik to consider the entire package of proposals covering strategic offensive arms, medium-range missiles, space weaponry, and nuclear tests, are now preoccupied with sabotaging accords on each of the areas by pleading that the Soviet Union insists on solving them as a package.

In actual fact the talks are being blocked by narrow selfish interests and by unwillingness to give up counting on military and technological superiority, and by illusory expectations to get ahead, and primarily via outer space.

To us, this approach is alien, and more than that — it is unacceptable. Our principled course is to look tirelessly for solutions which would open up a way to mutually acceptable accords and to equal security.

The Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, upon having recently considered the package of issues connected with the implementation of the program for a nuclear-free world, decided to make yet another big step in this direction.

Today, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, I am announcing our decision which is as follows.

The Soviet Union suggests the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe be singled out from the package of issues, and that a separate agreement on it be concluded on it without delay.

There is actually a ready accord, and not just a basis, for such a step. It was agreed in Reykjavik that the Soviet Union and the United States would eliminate all their medium-range missiles (MRM) in Europe within the next five years. Within the same period the number of Soviet MRM's in the Asian part of our territory would be reduced to a hundred warheads on the understanding that the United States could leave the same number of MRM warheads in its national territory.

As soon as an agreement on eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe is signed, the USSR will withdraw from the GDR and the USSR, by agreement with the governments of those countries, the enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles [operativno-takticheskiye rakety povyshennoy dalnosti] which were sited there as retaliatory measures to the deployment in Western Europe.

As far as other theater missiles are concerned, we are prepared to begin talks immediately with a view to reducing and fully eliminating them.

So, there is a real opportunity to free our common European home from a considerable portion of nuclear burden within the shortest possible time. That would be a real and big step toward full deliverance of Europe from nuclear arms. We are putting our proposals on the table of negotiations with the United States in Geneva.

We were assured more than once that if the USSR singles out the issue of medium-range missiles from the Reykjavik package, there would be no difficulty to agree to their elimination in Europe. A good opportunity is now being offered to prove that in practice. This is being awaited by the Europeans and by the peoples of other continents. This is required by the interests of the present and the future.
While singling out the issue of medium-rangé missiles in Europe now, the Soviet Government still considers it highly important to reach agreement on substantial limitation and then elimination of strategic arms.

Of course, the conclusion of such an agreement, as has been repeatedly emphasized, should be conditioned by a decision on the prevention of deployment of weapons in outer space, in view of the organic interconnection of these issues.

Despite all the difficulties and artificial obstructions, the Soviet Union is again showing its will to resolve the nuclear disarmament issue.

The new way of thinking means an ability to listen to the voice of the public, the European and world one, to understand the concerns and interests of other peoples, and not to separate one's own security from the security of neighbors in our interconnected world.

The historic chance should not be missed! We are awaiting a speedy and positive reply.

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CSO: 5200/1311
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

NATO URGES USSR TO NEGOTIATE EUROMISSILE AGREEMENT

AU061538 Paris AFP in English 1529 GMT 6 Feb 87

[Text] Brussels, Feb 6 (AFP) — NATO countries called Friday on the Soviet Union to negotiate "vigorously to narrow the remaining areas of difference" that are hindering an agreement on reduction of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) "reaffirmed its support for eliminating U.S. and Soviet" long-range intermediate nuclear forces from Europe, said a statement from the Special Consultative Group (SCG) after a two-hour meeting Friday.

The United States presides the SCG and convenes the group to inform and consult with its allies on the progress of its arms control talks in Geneva with the Soviet Union.

NATO considers that the negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces (INF) are "vital" and "should therefore lead to a separate agreement on its own merits and not be held hostage to progress in any other negotiations," the statement said.

This was a reference to a formal link established by the Soviet Union after the Reykjavik summit last October between an agreement on INF and a compromise on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative plan for a space-based missile defense system.

European members of the alliance have strongly criticized reestablishing such a link, which they say is contrary to previous assurances by the Soviet Union.

The group supported the agreement reached in principle by President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev to match global ceilings for U.S. and Soviet long-range INF missiles [LRINF], limiting each side to a total of 100 warheads deployed only in Soviet Asia and on U.S. territory, the statement said.

This agreement, according to NATO, is tied to "constraints on shorter-range INF missile systems and follow-up negotiations on further limitations and reductions of LRINF missiles and shorter range missiles."

According to NATO, the Soviet Union has a 9 to 1 advantage for the number of missile with a range under or equal to 1,000 kilometers — shorter range missiles — directed against European military targets.

Before a "balanced, equitable and effectively verifiable arms control agreement" can be reached, NATO confirmed its "determination to continue the deployment" in Europe of 572 U.S. missiles, scheduled to be completed before the end of 1988.

According to NATO, the Soviet Union has deployed a total of 441 SS-20 missiles, each equipped with three warheads and having a potential range of 5,000 kilometers.

NATO has acknowledged deploying 316 Pershing II and cruise missiles, with a single warhead on each, as of January 1, in West Germany, Britain, Italy and Belgium.

France has an independent nuclear deterrent force and does not attend SCG meetings.
OTTAWA (CP) — Defence Minister Perrin Beatty has denied that the Pentagon has asked for tests in Canada of a new generation of cruise missiles.

Beatty told the House of Commons yesterday that no such request has been made, despite documents obtained by Project Ploughshares indicating that notes on a U.S. proposal for new cruise tests had been submitted to his office.

Headings for a series of briefing notes were obtained by the anti-war group through the Access to Information Act.

One listing, dated April 21, 1986, refers to a proposal for tests of the “AGM 129” advanced cruise missile.

Ploughshares researcher Bill Robinson said in an interview that the AGM 129 is believed to be a super-secret cruise missile that will employ so-called Stealth radar-evading technology.

News reports from Washington last month quoted Pentagon spokesmen as saying the U.S. defense department wants to have the weapon ready for deployment by 1989 — a deadline that would require testing to begin almost immediately.

**Arms race**

Beatty, replying to questions from New Democrat MP Pauline Jewett, said little beyond flatly denying that a request for testing has been made.

If a request is made, he said, “we will consider it in due course.”

Outside the Commons, Jewett said the government should not entertain any requests for new cruise tests because the weapon will accelerate the arms race and destabilize superpower relations.

The Liberal government under Pierre Trudeau agreed in 1983 to test the cruise missile over terrain in the North that closely resembles the Soviet and eastern European landscape it would traverse in war.

Ottawa has allowed the tests until now on grounds that they constitute a part of Canada’s commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The tests so far over the Northwest Territories and Alberta have been of unarmed missiles released from U.S. B-52 bombers.

According to U.S. news reports, limited production of the Stealth-model missile began last year. Ultimately, some 40 per cent of the U.S. fleet of 3,000 cruise missiles are to employ the Stealth technology.
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR MAKES 'NEW PROPOSALS' ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AT CD

LD171426 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1335 GMT 17 Feb 87

[Excerpts] Geneva, 17 Feb -- The disarmament conference session being held here is devoting a great deal of attention to the issue of banning chemical weapons. Prospects for working out an appropriate agreement have recently been clearly noted. [passage omitted]

At today's plenary session, the USSR delegation put forward a series of new proposals and ideas aimed at promoting further progress of the negotiations. As Yu.K. Nazarkin, head of the delegation, stated, each state which is a member of the convention should, within 30 days of it coming into force, make a declaration containing detailed information concerning the storage places for chemical weapons, both on national territory as well as outside it, under that state's jurisdiction or control, including the precise whereabouts of each depot.

In addition, the member-state should, within that same 30-day period, take measures to shut chemical weapons depots and prevent transfer of stockpiles except for transfer to liquidate them.

Citing the words of M.S. Gorbachev at his meeting with participants at the Moscow forum on the USSR seeking to obtain "the most stringent system of monitoring [kontrol] and verification [proverka], including at an international level," and also there must be "complete confidence that the obligations are being fulfilled by everyone" the head of the USSR delegation also put forward a number of new ideas concerning verifications on request, and methods of implementing both constant and systematic international on-site monitoring. The Soviet delegation is prepared to continue its active search for mutually acceptable outcomes [pazvyazka] and is awaiting counter steps from other participants in the talks, the Soviet representative said.

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CSO: 5200/1296
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BRIEFS

USSR-U.S. CONSULTATIONS RESUME--Geneva, 18 Feb (TASS)--Soviet-American consultations covering all aspects of the problem of concluding an effective and verifiable convention on universal and complete ban on chemical weapons have resumed here. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0835 GMT 18 Feb 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1296
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: BOOKLET URGES END TO NUCLEAR TESTING

Nuclear Winter

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Nov 86 p 5

[Report based on Novosti Press Agency booklet: "The Last Nuclear Explosion"]

[Excerpts] The question of prohibiting nuclear tests was one of those key questions which were discussed at the Reykjavik meeting between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev, and the President of the United States, R. Reagan. The Soviet side also had specific proposals on this question, too: it was proposed that responsible representatives of the USSR and the United States be instructed to begin full-scale talks on the cessation of nuclear explosions so as, in the end, to work out an agreement on their total prohibition. However, final agreement on this account, unfortunately, was not achieved: the obstacle was the "strategic defense initiative."

Meanwhile, nuclear explosions are continuing in the United States. Twenty-three explosions have already been conducted there since the introduction of the unilateral Soviet moratorium.

..."The Last Nuclear Explosion"--this is the title of a book which was published by the APN [Novosti Press Agency] for the present in English. Today, we publish the first of two materials based on excerpts from this book.

For a long time it was believed that nuclear explosions affect the atmosphere approximately the same as volcanoes at the moment that they eject tremendous clouds of dust. According to the estimates of several American scientists, a burst with a yield of one megaton which has been accomplished on the surface ejects 300,000-400,000 tons of dust to an altitude of up to 10 kilometers. Consequently, bursts with a total yield on the order of 10,000 megatons will raise about 3-4 billion tons of dust and will substantially influence the processes of heat exchange. Of course, the dust will gradually begin to precipitate due to gravitation and to fall out with the rain. Especially small particles can be in the atmosphere for many months. And nevertheless, it was considered that a change in climate as a result of nuclear war should not be profound.
Professor (P. Krudtsen) of the Planck Institute in the FRG and, later, other specialists showed, however, that nuclear bursts raise into the atmosphere not only dust, but also a tremendous quantity of soot. It was established that, along with everything else, a nuclear bomb can play the role of igniter in a fire of unprecedented force. Having confirmed this, the scientists calculated that nuclear charges with a yield of 1, 3, and 10 megatons are capable of igniting respectively 500, 1,000, and 2,100 square kilometers of forest. Thirteen percent of the nuclear potential which the five nuclear powers have would be sufficient to transform one million square kilometers of forest into a bonfire. Such a fire would eject upward about four billion tons of soot. The soot from the forest fires alone will decrease at least by half the amount of light reaching the Earth's surface.

But nevertheless, the basic quantity of soot will be ejected into the atmosphere by city fires rather than forest fires: for example, in European cities the density of fuel per square centimeter is 12-15 times greater than in a forest. The cloud of soot above cities will be a minimum of 100 times denser than clouds formed as a result of forest fires.

A professor of astronomy of Cornell University in the United States, Carl Sagan, and his associates examined what in their opinion is the most probable scenario for a nuclear war in which the opponents exchange strikes with a total yield of 5,000 megatons. It was assumed that these megatons would come down on cities of the northern hemisphere.

Calculations showed: the mentioned number of nuclear weapons is sufficient to burn 1,000 large cities. As a result, during the very first hours of the war vast expanses of the northern hemisphere will find themselves beneath a carpet of soot clouds virtually impenetrable to light. In this regard, even a year after the catastrophe the Earth's atmosphere will not return to its initial state. Together with the "nuclear night" which will set in due to contamination of the air, cold will come to the Earth which does not receive its portion of sunlight.

Specialists of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Computer Center extrapolated Sagan's scenario to the entire biosphere in 1983. They conducted a mathematical experiment on estimating the global climatic consequences of nuclear war in the case of the exchange of strikes with a total yield of 5,000 megatons. The results proved to be stunning.

In a month and a half or two months hundreds of millions of tons of dust lifted into the atmosphere and ash and soot from the cities and forests which were burnt will mix together into a continuous blanket which is virtually impenetrable to light and which will envelop the entire Earth. In the first weeks, the mean temperatures of the northern hemisphere will drop by 15-20 degrees, and in northern Europe—by 30. On the eastern coast of the United States it will cool by 40-50 degrees and in Saudi Arabia by the end of the first month the temperature will drop by 30 degrees. As the soot clouds merge into a continuous carpet the cooling will also spread to the southern hemisphere. By the beginning of the third month the finely dispersed soot layer will envelop the entire Earth. On the 99th day after the nuclear catastrophe temperatures will be negative even in the tropical forests of Africa and in the Amazon.
Due to the tremendous heat capacity the temperature of the water on the surface of the ocean will drop by only one and a half to two degrees. The tremendous temperature difference between the land and the ocean and between the air and water, obviously, will cause heaviest storms and typhoons in the coastal regions.

In 1984 the center conducted additional calculations on a model based on the fact that weapons with a total yield of 100-150 megatons, that is, 30-50 times less than in Sagan's version, will be used in the war. The computer showed that if the strikes were launched against the main cities of Europe, Asia, and America then even in this case soot clouds would be formed which cause the "nuclear winter" effect. The winter, it is true, would come to an end in several months and not years, but it would hardly be easier because of this: civilization on Earth would be ended.

But what are 100 megatons? They are the aggregate explosive power of the weapons of one or two submarines of the Trident-2 type.

The center's scientists changed the combinations and force of the hypothetical nuclear bursts dozens of times. The result remained constant: the "nuclear night" and "nuclear winter" will set in after a nuclear war. No one, wherever he may live, will be able to survive this nightmare: in America or Europe, at the North or South Poles.

It has been established that as a result of the cooling off all sources of fresh water will freeze and the harvest will perish on the entire Earth's sphere. The radiation intensity will exceed the lethally dangerous level on tremendous territories. Perhaps separate groups of people who hid in special bunkers or beneath the water as well as residents of some remote islands and atolls in the equatorial zone of the World Ocean will survive. But for long? The disastrous radiation background will be supplemented by strong X-ray radiation of the Sun for the absorbing ozone layer will be almost destroyed.

Tropical forests and their inhabitants will perish from the low temperatures. The fate of the biota, the aggregate of the flora and the fauna, and the ocean will be just as tragic. It is not excluded that the biota will revert to the period of primeval algae which lived on the planet three and a half billion years ago. On the whole, in the view of the scientists, the biosphere which may arise after a nuclear war will not be very suitable for human life. In any case, for the first...million years!

(Conclusion follows)

Verification Question

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Nov 86 p 3

[Report based on APN booklet: "The Last Nuclear Explosion"]

[Text] Nuclear tests are a method and external indicator of the improvement of nuclear weapons and a method for working out the techniques and tactics for their employment. After the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, according to unofficial estimates, the United States produced 60,000 nuclear warheads of 71 types for 116 weapons systems. Seven hundred and fifty billion dollars were
expended for these purposes. Now Washington's nuclear arsenal contains 30 types
of such warheads and their total reserve exceeds 26,000 units.

The widespread assertion that allegedly the United States needs the tests to main-
tain confidence in the combat readiness of its available potential does not with-
stand criticism. Approximately 70 percent of the American nuclear arsenal con-
ists of weapons with a yield of 150 kilotons, from the tests of which the parties
pledged to refrain 12 years ago.

Just as far-fetched are arguments that allegedly the United States "lagged behind
the USSR" and was forced to "restore the balance." During the period from 16
July 1945 through 1 January 1986 the United States conducted 801 nuclear explo-
sions while the USSR conducted 563, France--135, Great Britain--38, and China--
29. In this regard the United States conducted more nuclear explosions than any-
one else in each separate medium—in the atmosphere, underground, and underwater.

Thus, if we look at the facts in a valid manner the conclusion will be unambig-
ous: there can be no talk of the United States "lagging" in the field of nuclear
tests. The argument is also far-fetched that allegedly, on the eve of the an-
nouncement of a moratorium, the USSR conducted an "intensive series" of nu-
clear explosions and can, they say, permit themselves a "respite." During the
administration of R. Reagan the United States tested 40 percent more nuclear
weapons for various purposes than did the USSR.

Of other arguments in justification of its unconstructive approach the United
States regularly repeats references to the alleged fact that previously, in the
60's, the USSR violated such a moratorium and it cannot be trusted. It also talks
of the "impossibility" of absolutely reliable monitoring.

The falseness of the thesis of Moscow's "violation" of the previous moratorium is
exposed in the article by Rear Admiral E. Carroll, U.S. Navy (retired), which was
published in the NEW YORK TIMES. First, the author of the article noted, back in
December 1959 President Eisenhower halted the effect of the moratorium of 1958,
officially declaring that America considers itself right in renewing tests. For
Moscow, Carroll stresses, no legal or ethical limitations existed which would
stimulate her to refrain from tests in 1961, especially in light of the French
tests of nuclear weapons which had begun in 1959.

Also false, the admiral writes, is the assertion of the Washington administration
that allegedly by the renewing of tests beginning in September 1961 the Soviet
Union achieved a big advantage over the United States. In fact, from 1 September
1961 to the completion of atmospheric tests on 5 August 1963 the United States
outstripped the USSR in a ratio of 2:1.

The question of monitoring is Washington's "hobby horse." The United States has
been saddling it regularly since 1946 when it wants to evade businesslike discus-
sions. As a result of the endless incantations of the American representatives,
the opinion may be formed that allegedly the United States is for and the USSR—
against monitoring. But for some time the "horse" began to limp on all four feet.

The essence of the Soviet approach consists of the following: disarmament without
monitoring is impossible, but monitoring without disarmament makes no sense. The
Soviet Union is open for monitoring, which has been declared publicly many times.
As regards practical verification measures, when political will is present they can always be agreed upon.

"Our country which, in its bitter experience, has felt what a treacherous attack is, is interested in the reliability and strictness of control no less than anyone else," said M. S. Gorbachev on 27 December 1985 when meeting with the heads of diplomatic delegations accredited to the USSR. "Under present international conditions, with a shortage of mutual confidence, monitoring measures are simply necessary. Let it be monitoring with the use of national technical means or international monitoring, provided it is monitoring the observance of specific understandings."

Actually, monitoring the observance of the prohibition of the conduct of tests is not a technical problem. Today the actual state of affairs in this field is as follows. First, the seismic stations which the USSR and the United States have permit the reliable implementation of monitoring, in which regard the resolution of the instruments is continuously improving. Prominent American specialists confirm that the contemporary level of development of seismology and the existing technical means for observing seismic waves permit the rapid detection of any secret test, even if the yield of the explosion does not exceed one kiloton.

Second, there is the possibility of using international seismic data as proposed, in particular, by Argentina, India, Tanzania, Sweden, Mexico, and Greece. The leaders of the "six" were informed that the Soviet Union is ready to take advantage of their proposal if it will be accepted by the American side.

And here is the opinion of the director of the Institute of Earth Physics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Academician M. A. Sadovskyi: The entire territory of the Soviet Union is surrounded by nuclear test tracking stations installed either by the United States or under its direction. They number approximately 200 as against 20 Soviet. Nevertheless, the USSR agrees to mutual monitoring since, as Academician M. A. Sadovskyi stressed, 20 Soviet stations are sufficient to follow nuclear tests which are conducted outside the USSR. Do 200 American stations equipped with first-class equipment really work worse than 20 Soviet?! Back in 1958, recalled the scientist, American, British, French, and Soviet representatives agreed in the opinion that the detection of any nuclear explosions can be guaranteed. After this, a long drawn-out affair was begun through the fault of the West lasting for 28 years already....

As a sign of proof of its readiness for the placement of American monitoring equipment on its territory, the USSR permitted American specialists to install and put into operation such equipment in the area of Semipalatinsk.

Thus, it is not at all the problem of monitoring which prevents Washington from joining in the Soviet moratorium. The American position is predetermined by orientation on scrapping parity and achieving military superiority. All of Washington's false arguments hit at one goal—to prove the necessity to improve nuclear weapons for the sake of...rendering nuclear weapons harmless, which is proclaimed as the official goal of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI). "Forget propagandist fabrications," the NEW YORK TIMES wrote in this regard, "that allegedly the United States needs to conduct tests in order to be convinced of the effectiveness of nuclear weapons. The actual reason for the continuation of tests covered by a smokescreen of propaganda is that nuclear tests in the future may
help to create new, more improved types of weapons, such as lasers for nuclear pumping for the "Star Wars" program.

The year 1986, declared as the International Year of Peace by the United Nations, is ending. The heat of the international situation is not weakening. Questions of war and peace continue to worry mankind. The problem of nuclear tests and, more precisely, the question of stopping and prohibiting nuclear explosions, found itself among them at the forward edge of the struggle for nuclear disarmament.

The majority of governments and political and public figures and all organizations of the antiwar and antinuclear movements as well as simple people in all states of the East and West are coming forth for the cessation of nuclear explosions without delay and everywhere.

The attitude toward the prohibition of tests of nuclear weapons is simultaneously the attitude toward the idea of a nuclear-free world. When nuclear explosions thunder, it is first of all policy and intentions which are tested rather than weapons.

Washington is trying to present the problem of prohibiting tests as a strong nut which is impossible to crack. In fact, the United States is not ready to abandon the arms race—and that is why it is bluffing. It needs nuclear explosions not to restrain (there is no one to "restrain": no one intends to attack the United States), but for the creation of weapons intended for the conduct of nuclear war.

Forty years of nuclear explosions, combat and test, provided many grounds for pessimism. However, having entered the fifth decade of the struggle against nuclear weapons, people have not lost courage and faith. This is also shown by common sense which is full of faith and the new thinking of the Soviet program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

The alloying of courage and faith became the second and most important half of the truth of the nuclear missile and space age which is inspiring the hope that the last nuclear explosion will not be a combat explosion but will go down in history as the last barrier captured by mankind on the path to a nuclear-free world. Otherwise, History will not be able to record this last explosion because it, however strange it may sound, will come to an end, as a minimum, with degradation of mankind, and in the most real variant—its death.
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

CANADIAN PAPER ON COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 5 Feb 87 p A6

[Text]

While the seventh round of the superpower arms talks churns on at Geneva, the United States has made its own loud statement on nuclear disarmament beneath the Nevada desert.

The first U.S. nuclear weapons test of 1987 was conducted on Tuesday — a day earlier than previously announced — in an apparent bid to pre-empt anti-nuclear protesters who hoped to obstruct the test. The diplomatic fallout from the blast was soon perceptible in Moscow, where state-run Soviet media hinted that the Kremlin is likely to end its 18-month-old unilateral test moratorium.

The Russians warned last December that a further explosion at Yucca Flat in Nevada would provoke the renewal of detonations at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. The U.S. has carried out 20 announced nuclear tests and, according to the Soviets, five unannounced ones — since Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev first declared his one-sided total test ban.

The Soviet initiative offered one of two potential benefits to its sponsors. If accepted by the U.S., the test ban would hamper America’s development of ballistic missile defence, since an X-ray laser powered by a nuclear explosion is a key technology in the “Star Wars” program. If spurned by the U.S., the test ban would show the Soviet Union to be the superpower dedicated to disarmament.

Given President Ronald Reagan’s commitment to the untrammelled development of “Star Wars,” Mr. Gorbachev has thus far had to settle for the propaganda benefit rather than the military one. That is not only the Soviet Union’s loss but the world’s. For a comprehensive nuclear test ban, particularly in the context of a space weapons accord and cuts in offensive nuclear weapons, would be a laudable and readily verifiable arms control measure.

The Democratic caucus of the U.S. House of Representatives made more than a partisan point when, in a resolution passed yesterday, it urged Mr. Reagan to stop further tests and “begin immediate negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve a reciprocal, simultaneous and verifiable ban.”

While the resolution called on House committees to withhold funds for further U.S. nuclear tests of more than one kiloton, it is unlikely that Congress will tether the Reagan Administration in this manner. But it could ratify two treaties, signed in the 1970s, that would limit the yield of underground nuclear tests to 150 kilotons.

Both superpowers should recall the ephemeral accord they achieved on the test ban issue at the Reykjavik summit, where Messrs. Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to seek a gradual reduction rather than an instant ban. Step-by-step progress remains desirable and, despite the overall deadlock at Reykjavik, possible. Way-stations en route to a comprehensive test ban could include a quota testing agreement — which would reduce the number of tests — and a lower threshold treaty — which would reduce the yield of underground tests to less than 150 kilotons.

Such advances should be facilitated by Moscow’s more receptive attitude toward test ban verification. The traditional Soviet resistance to on-site inspection of arms control compliance has been modified. A team of U.S. and Soviet scientists last year was allowed to set up monitoring devices around the Semipalatinsk test site.

But for a comprehensive test ban treaty, or perhaps any other major arms control treaty, to be a realistic prospect, the U.S. Administration will have to curb its “Star Wars” ambitions. That’s why Pentagon proposals this week to accelerate the program were a worrisome counterpoint to the blast in Nevada.
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

GORBACHEV SENDS MESSAGE TO HIROSHIMA ON NUCLEAR FREEZE—Hiroshima, 16 Jan (KYODO)—Soviet Communist Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev said in a letter delivered here Friday that Moscow is prepared to freeze nuclear arms tests again if the United States agrees. Gorbachev's letter was delivered to Hiroshima Mayor Takeshi Araki by Soviet Ambassador to Japan Nikolay N. Solovyev. The letter was a reply to Araki’s written appeal sent to the Soviet leader last year urging him to extend the Soviet Union's self-imposed ban on nuclear arms tests. The Soviet Union recently announced it would lift the moratorium if the U.S. continues to conduct nuclear arms experiment. The U.S. said it would carry out the first such in 1987 on 5 February. Gorbachev said the Soviet Union fully understands Hiroshima citizens' desire for a ban on nuclear weapons tests, adding that even in the event the Kremlin is forced to resume the experiments it is prepared to resume the freeze on testing if the U.S. agrees to a moratorium. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0323 GMT 16 Jan 87 OW] /9738

CANADIAN VETERANS URGE CAUTION—Ottawa—Canada should drop commitments to NATO and the North American Aerospace Defence Command to the bottom of its priorities, says a group of retired military officers. Veterans Against Nuclear Arms told reporters that Canada, by participating in the NATO and NORAD alliances, is supporting a confrontation between the superpowers that becomes more dangerous every day. Ray Creery, a retired naval captain, said Canada should put more emphasis on peacekeeping through the United Nations, declare itself a nuclear-free zone and press NATO to guarantee that the alliance will not be the first to use atomic weapons. [Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 3 Feb 87 p A4] /9738

HIROSHIMA SIT-IN DEMANDS U.S. HALT TEST—Hiroshima, 2 Feb (KYODO)—Some 60 people, including survivors of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, began a sit-in in drizzling rain at the Peace Park here Monday in protest at a planned nuclear test by the U.S. They said they feared the test, scheduled for Thursday, would cause the Soviet Union to resume its own nuclear tests. Akira Ishida, one of the demonstration's organizers, said, "If the Soviets breach their ban on nuclear test, the world will again be plunged into a nuclear arms race." [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0936 GMT 2 Feb 87 OW] /9738

CSO: 5260/066
USSR'S SHEVARDNADZE VISITS GDR, DISCUSSES MISSILE WITHDRAWAL

Reviews Ties With Honecker

LD021847 Moscow TASS in English 1811 GMT 2 Feb 87

[Excerpts] Berlin, 2 Feb (TASS)--A meeting was held today between General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Chairman of the GDR Council of State Erich Honecker and member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, on an official friendly visit in the GDR at the invitation of the GDR Government.

The participants in the conversation confirmed the striving for the stepping up of joint effort toward the elimination of nuclear weapons and reduction of conventional armaments, toward the consolidation of peace and international security, the striving expressed at a working meeting of the leaders of fraternal parties of socialist countries, CEMA members, in Moscow. The sides expressed the resolve to press vigorously, in close implementation of foreign policy initiatives advanced at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states in Budapest.

It was noted that the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik signified a qualitatively new stage in the struggle for a world without nuclear arms. The Soviet Union's principled stand at that summit was striking manifestation of new political thinking in international affairs, was an important milestone on the road toward the implementation of the program for a nuclear weapons free world advanced in Mikhail Gorbachev's statement on January 15, 1986.

Eduard Shevardnadze proclaimed the Soviet Union's complete support for the initiatives of the GDR and Czechoslovakia to create in central Europe a nuclear weapons free corridor and a zone free from chemical weapons.

Having discussed the situation in the European Continent, the sides emphasized the fundamental importance that the treaties registering the inviolability of the post-war frontiers have for peace and constructive cooperation. It was noted that European peoples have a right to expect from the FRC Government a constructive contribution toward the efforts to curb the arms race and achieve disarmament, to consolidate security and cooperation in Europe.
Gives Honecker Gorbachev Message

LD031446 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 3 Feb 87

[Excerpts] Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State, received in Berlin Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, who is in the GDR on an official friendly visit. During the friendly conversation, Shevardnadze handed Honecker cordial greetings from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and from Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

During an exchange of opinions on issues relating to consolidating peace, the parties noted that the participant states of the Warsaw Pact had submitted an all-embracing program which makes it possible to reduce any type of weapons, based on the principles of equality, identical security, and under strict international verification [kontrol].

Comrade Honecker highly commended the constructive and bold approach of the USSR to the discussion of issues important for mankind. This policy stimulates the support of all peoples', because it meets with their vital interests. The submitting in Reykjavik of far-reaching initiatives, he noted, and also the proclamation of a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests, which the USSR has now been adhering to for 1 and 1/2 years, is an example to everyone of the Soviet Union's good will. Comrade Honecker and Shevardnadze spoke in favor of continuing the policy of dialogue with all forces of reason, realism and good will.

Talks With Honecker

PM040937 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Feb 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Friendly Meeting in Berlin"]

[Text] Berlin, 3 Feb -- E. Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State, has received here E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, who is in the GDR on an official friendly visit.

During the exchange of opinions on questions of strengthening peace, the sides pointed out that the Warsaw Pact states have advanced an all-embracing program which makes it possible to reduce any kind of weapon on the basis of the principle of equality and identical security and with strict international verification [kontrol]. Its implementation would make it possible to free mankind from mass destruction weapons by the end of this century and thereby finally deliver it from the threat of nuclear destruction. This historic opportunity must be realized. As distinct from this, the intention of U.S. imperialism's aggressive circles to extend the arms race to space means an increasing threat to peace. Therefore, there is a pressing need for all forces of peace, reason, and realism to exert active efforts aimed at making a turn for the better in international relations.
The participants in the talks stated unanimously that the Reykjavik meeting of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan and also the mutual understanding reached there on the basis of the Soviet proposals are of fundamental significance for the further holding of arms limitation talks. It is clearer than ever that practical agreements on disarmament are not only necessary but also possible. However, the opportunity that presented itself in Reykjavik has not been able to be used because the United States continues to adhere to its "Star Wars" program.

Both sides emphasized that the U.S. refusal to subscribe to the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests and its violation of the SALT II treaty are continuing to complicate the international situation.

E. Honecker evaluated highly the USSR's constructive and bold approach to discussing questions of vital importance to mankind. That policy elicits the support of all peoples because it meets their vital interests. The advancing of far-reaching initiatives in Reykjavik and also the proclamation of the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests, by which the USSR has now abided for 18 months, are an example obvious to everyone of the good will on the Soviet Union's part. The GDR evaluates this approach highly and will continue to entirely promote the achievement of success in implementing a concerted peace-loving policy. The U.S. Administration and its NATO allies must finally display the necessary political will and readiness to compromise and act so that a world without mass destruction weapons and wars becomes a reality.

E. Honecker and E.A. Shevardnadze advocated continuing the policy of dialogue with all forces of reason, realism, and goodwill. The results of the Stockholm conference show that, despite all the differences of opinion that exist, accords on strengthening security and mutual trust are possible. At the same time, they are a reassuring basis for continuing the process begun at the Helsinki CSCE. Concerning the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states which participated in that conference, the sides voiced the hope that it will serve arms limitation, disarmament, and the start of a new phase of the policy of detente and dialogue among all states.

GDR Foreign Minister O. Fischer and V.I. Kochemasov, USSR ambassador to the GDR, and G. Koenig, GDR ambassador to the USSR, participated in the talks.

Detailed Exchange With Fischer

LD041607 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 4 Feb 87

[Excerpts] As has already been reported, Comrade Shevardnadze paid an official friendly visit to the GDR at the invitation of the GDR Government, from 2-4 February 1987.

Eduard Amvrosievich Shevardnadze was received by Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee, chairman of the GDR State Council, and held a friendly conversation with him. Questions of bilateral cooperation and the international situation were discussed. A meeting also was held with Willi Stoph, member of the SED Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers.
Comrade Shevardnadze and Oskar Fischer, GDR minister of foreign affairs, held a detailed exchange of opinions on questions of the continued development of bilateral relations and topical international problems. They noted with satisfaction the beneficial effect of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 11th SED Congress on all spheres of cooperation between the USSR and the GDR. Stress was laid on the great importance of the meetings between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Erich Honecker for the ongoing development of the whole complex of relations between the two countries. Taking as a basis their full coincidence of views on all matters of principle concerning the theory and practice of socialist construction, the USSR and the GDR intend to deepen their close cooperation, which is based on trust, and to conduct a systematic exchange of experience in this sphere. They stressed the profound effect of the broad-scale program for the reduction and elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, and for a substantial reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons, on the basis of the principle of equality, identical security and effective verification [kontrol] as set out in the statement of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev of 15 January 1986, in the Soviet proposals at Reykjavik, and in the appeal from the Budapest Conference of the Warsaw Pact Member-States' Political Consultative Committee. The participants in the talks expressed the hope that the U.S. Administration would, in its approach to concrete accords on the reduction of nuclear weapons and the banning of the militarization of space, be guided by the joint responsibility for the maintenance of peace and also by the prospects opened up in Reykjavik. In this regard, the need was stressed for a strict observance and a strengthening of the treaty on antiballistic missile defense.

Total support also was voiced for the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nonnuclear and nonviolent world and on the need for a new political mentality in the nuclear space age.

During the discussion of the situation in Europe, attention was drawn to the joint initiatives of the Warsaw Pact states that have created the prerequisites for major steps to reduce military confrontation on the continent. The Soviet side decisively supports the initiatives advanced by the GDR and the CSSR for the creation in Central Europe of nonnuclear corridor and a zone free from chemical weapons. Their implementation would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of peace and security. The ministers spoke in favor of the advancement of the all-European process in all directions, both in the field of disarmament and on the issues of cooperation in the economic, humanitarian, and other spheres.

On behalf of the Soviet Government, Eduard Amvrosievich Shevardnadze relayed to Oskar Fischer an invitation to visit the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit. The invitation was accepted with gratitude.

Communique in PRAVDA

PM051042 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Feb 87 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed report under the general heading "On E.A. Shevardnadze's Visit to the GDR"]

[Excerpts] E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, was in the GDR on an official friendly visit 2-4 February 1987 at the invitation of the GDR Government.
E.A. Shevardnadze and GDR Foreign Minister O. Fischer had a detailed exchange of opinions on questions of the further development of bilateral relations and topical international problems. The beneficial influence of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 11th SED Congress on all spheres of USSR-GDR cooperation was noted with satisfaction. The great significance of meetings between M.S. Gorbachev and E. Honecker for the progressive development of the entire range of relations between the two countries was stressed. On the basis of the total identity of views on all fundamental questions of the theory and practice of socialist building, the USSR and the GDR intend to deepen their close cooperation based on trust and systematically to exchange experience in this sphere. The joint celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution will be a convincing confirmation of the unity, cohesion, and indissoluble fraternal friendship of our peoples.

In the course of the exchange of opinions on questions of the international situation, emphasis was placed on the profound influence of the large-scale program for the reduction and elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction and the substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional arms on the basis of the principle of equality and identical security and under effective verification, set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 Statement, the Soviet proposals in Reykjavik, and the appeal of the Budapest conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee.

The participants in the talks expressed the hope that the U.S. Administration, in its approach to concrete accords on nuclear arms reduction and on preventing the militarization of space, will be guided by joint responsibility for preserving peace and also by the prospects which opened up in Reykjavik.

In this connection the need for strict compliance with and strengthening of the ABM Treaty was stressed.

It was the unanimous opinion that the implementation of the 41st UN General Assembly session resolution, adopted on the socialist countries' initiative and concerning the creation of an all-embracing system of peace and international security, is an urgent task.

The GDR side expressed full support for the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world and on the need for new political thinking in the nuclear and space age.

During the discussion of the situation in Europe, attention was drawn to the joint initiatives of the Warsaw Pact states, which created the preconditions for major steps to lessen military confrontation on the continent. The package of proposals on nuclear and space arms put forward by the Soviet Union opens up real opportunities for the elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles on the European continent. In the event of the elimination of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, the grounds for the continued presence of Soviet increased-range operational-tactical missiles in the GDR and the CSSR will disappear.

The Soviet side resolutely supports the initiatives put forward by the GDR and the CSSR on creating a nuclear-free corridor and a zone free from chemical weapons in Central Europe. Their implementation would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of peace and security.
The ministers came out in favor of proceeding with the all-European process in all avenues, of adopting at the Vienna meeting of CSCE states a decision on adding disarmament questions to the mandate of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, and of widening cooperation in the economic, humanitarian, and other spheres.

TASS Summary

LD042055 Moscow TASS in English 1628 GMT 4 Feb 87

[Text] Berlin February 4 TASS -- The USSR and the GDR have expressed hope that in its approach to specific agreements on a cut in nuclear weapons and prevention of militarisation of outer space, the U.S. Administration will be guided by joint responsibility for the preservation of peace and the perspectives, which opened at Reykjavik.

This is pointed out in an announcement issued here today on the visit of Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR foreign minister, to the GDR. The announcement stresses the need for a strict observance and strengthening of the ABM Treaty.

In the course of a discussion of the situation in Europe, attention was drawn to the joint initiatives of the Warsaw Treaty member states, which have created prerequisites for major steps to lessen military confrontation on the continent. The package of proposals on nuclear and space weapons put forward by the Soviet Union opens real opportunities for the elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles on the European continent. If the U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe are eliminated, there will be no need for a further stay of Soviet tactical missiles of increased range in the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet side supports the initiatives put forward by the GDR and Czechoslovakia on the creation in Central Europe of a nuclear free corridor and a zone free from chemical weapons.

The ministers declared for the advancement of the all-European process in all directions, for the adoption at the Vienna meeting of the states -- participants in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation of a decision on complementing the mandate of the Conference on Confidence- [and] Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe with other disarmament issues, questions pertaining to broadening cooperation in the economic, humanitarian and other fields.

The significance has again been stressed of the treaties of the socialist countries with the FRG and also of the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin sealing the inviolability of contemporary Europe's territorial-political realities and making a basis for starting and developing constructive cooperation. The sides expressed the hope that the federal government will be consistently guided by the spirit and letter of these treaties, show political wisdom and refrain from actions that are detrimental to the development of relations with the socialist countries, the interests of peace and security in Europe.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1301
RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S SHEVARDNADZE VISITS CSSR, DISCUSSES MISSILE WITHDRAWAL

Talks with Chnoupek

LD041825 Moscow International Service in Russian 1715 GMT 4 Feb 87

[Excerpts] Prague, 4 Feb (TASS)--Talks took place today in Prague between Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, and Bohuslav Chnoupek, member of the CPCZ Central Committee and CSSR foreign minister.

During an exchange of views on a broad range of international problems, the two sides confirmed their determination to do everything possible to solve the main contemporary task: the liberation of the world from nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction before the end of the century. In this regard, they noted the particular topicality of M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986 and the importance of increasing efforts to implement the proposals contained in it. They stressed the urgent need to activate the struggle for the establishment of an all-embracing system of international security.

In the discussion of questions of security and cooperation on the European continent, support was expressed from the Soviet side for the initiative proposed by the CSSR and the GDR for creating in Central Europe a nuclear-free corridor and a zone free of chemical weapons and for the CSSR proposal for conducting an economic forum by the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The talks passed in a warm, comradely atmosphere, and once again affirmed the complete unity of views on all the questions discussed.

Meeting With Husak

LD051727 Moscow International Service in Russian 1412 GMT 5 Feb 87

[Excerpts] Prague, 5 Feb (TASS)--Profound satisfaction over the fruitful development of relations between the USSR and the CSSR, which is based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, was expressed today at a meeting in Prague between Gustav Husak, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, president of the CSSR, and Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, who is in the CSSR on an official friendly visit.
During the exchange of views on international questions, they expressed the necessity -- under conditions of the complex and tense international situation -- for the further strengthening of the unity and cohesion of countries of the socialist community and the stepping up of their joint efforts in the struggle against the nuclear threat to mankind. In this regard, it was stressed that the complex of Soviet foreign policy initiatives, contained in the statement of Mikhail Gorbachev from 15 January 1986, and other proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries, are a constructive platform for the effective struggle for strengthening international peace and security.

The sides condemned the U.S. Administration's destructive course toward the worsening of international tension and toward diluting the mutual understanding on major disarmament questions reached in Reykjavik. It was noted that the new nuclear blast carried out a few days ago by the United States is a challenge to all mankind; seriously complicating the international situation.

During the meeting, the importance of giving material form, in the practice of international relations, to the new thinking that is taking hold in the minds of men was expressed.

Discussion With Strougal

LD051718 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1445 GMT 5 Feb 87

[Excerpts] Prague, 5 Feb (TASS)—Lubomir Strougal, member of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium and chairman of the CSSR Government, met in Prague today with Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs.

During the exchange of views on key problems of the contemporary international situation, it was stressed that a realistic alternative to the arms race policy is the peace initiatives of the USSR and other socialist countries directed at freeing mankind of the nuclear threat and creating a universal system of international security. They pointed to the importance of an all-round stepping up of the activity of the all-European process and improving the political climate in Europe.

Interview on NFZ, ABM

LD060942 Prague CTK in English 0844 GMT 6 Feb 87

[Text] Prague Feb 6 (CTK) -- Innovative proposals and the bold actions of the fraternal socialist countries in all directions, including questions of control, settlement of regional conflicts and social humanitarian cooperation, widen the roads leading to the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security, Eduard Shevardnadze said in an interview for RUDE PRAVO published today.

The Soviet foreign minister said at the conclusion of his two-day visit to Czechoslovakia that the Soviet Union wants the Soviet-American dialogue to be constructive and wishes that every effort is made so that the historic "window" of possibilities half-opened in Reykjavik may not be slammed.
It has so far been hardly possible to point to some hopeful aspects in the stand of the U.S. Administration. Rather on the contrary. Concepts of policy from the position of strength, confirmed by the President in his State of the Union message, new financial sources for the program of nuclear rearmament and space militarization of the USA as well as the continuing U.S. withdrawal from fundamental Soviet-American agreements -- all this gives no reason for optimism. Hopes are naturally undermined by the latest nuclear explosion carried out by the USA these days. It constitutes another overt challenge to mankind; it is an act of disregard for its fundamental interests, the Soviet foreign minister stressed.

Eduard Shevardnadze went on to say that the Soviet Union does not cease to seek a road towards agreement. "We would not like to believe that the present U.S. Administration has taken the final choice and that it is ready to allow the failure of the whole perspective of an agreement with the Soviet Union and to permit that the remaining two years be wasted on the same dangerous rush for the vision of military superiority. In principle we have not lost hope for the successful culmination of the Reykjavik talks with the present leading U.S. representatives. I believe that it is also in their interest to get to the end of the term of office of the present President with a good score," he said.

He further highly appreciated and supported the initiative of three political parties -- the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the SPD and the Czechoslovak Communist Party -- to create a nuclear-free zone in central Europe and a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe.

He said that the Soviet Union considers the very fact that political parties of three European states standing on different sides of the military dividing line cooperate a new positive feature, a new aspect in the practice of international relations. The implementation of this proposal would undoubtedly improve political climate in Europe, he added.

The Soviet foreign minister further stressed that Europe needs the largest possible area free of dangerous weapons. Attention and support should therefore be given to the proposals that zones free of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction be established in Europe, especially in its central and northern part and in the Balkans.

Speaking of measures aimed at disarmament in Europe, the Soviet foreign minister said that the Soviet Union is of the opinion that the most suitable forum for talks on all questions concerning conventional weapons in Europe and also the mandate of these talks is the Vienna meeting of representatives of states taking part in the all-European process.

He also expressed the Soviet view that it would be effective to hold consultations with the NATO countries. Bilateral and multilateral contacts not only between the states of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO but also with neutral and nonaligned countries could contribute to mutual understanding.

He also said that the stands which are often expressed in the West that the question of medium-range missiles should be taken out from the Reykjavik "package" are irresponsible. "The problem of the Reykjavik package contains response to the question whether to agree with space militarization. To liquidate the only obstacle to space weapons -- the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty? Our answer is explicitly no. It is a matter of principle, honour and conscience," the Soviet Foreign Minister said.
Joint Communiqué Issued

LD051858 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 5 Feb 87

["Joint Soviet-Czechoslovak Communiqué," issued on 5 February--read by announcer]

[Excerpts] Comrade Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, was on an official friendly visit to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on 4 and 5 February 1987 as the guest of the CSSR Government.

The talks confirmed the total unanimity of views in assessing the current international situation and the reasons for the dangerous tension in the world. The nuclear threat hanging over mankind is a direct result of the imperialist policy of the United States and of the NATO military bloc. Concern was expressed at the actions of the United States, which is eroding earlier-reached agreements limiting the nuclear armaments race [words indistinct] strategic stability, leading toward taking weapons into space. This is clearly shown by the U.S. renunciation of the SALT II treaty.

The sides stated that the past year has clearly shown the vitality and realism of the program for the elimination by the end of this century of nuclear and other types of weapons as set out in the statement of 15 January 1986 by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which received broad international support. The constructive proposals based on a careful balance of interests and mutual concessions that were put forward by the USSR in Reykjavik raised the struggle for a nuclear weapon-free world to a qualitatively new level.

The U.S. plans for Star Wars continue to remain the main obstacle to achieving an accord leading mankind to eliminating the threat of a universal nuclear catastrophe. The real possibility of creating effective barriers in the way of the nuclear arms race was shown by the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions that the USSR has implemented for 1 and 1/2 years. Whether this is to be turned into a bilateral one depends entirely on the United States.

The sides are fully resolved to step up efforts in the struggle for the reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear arsenals for the sake of the survival of mankind. With this aim, they will develop dialogue and expand cooperation with other states and with all peace-loving forces.

It was stressed that the complex of Soviet proposals on nuclear and space weapons opens up a realistic path for eliminating U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. If the U.S. missiles of this type in Europe are eliminated, there will be no grounds for the further stay [prebyvaniye] of Soviet enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles in the CSSR and GDR.

The ministers discussed further steps with regard to the implementation of the joint initiative of the socialist countries for the creation of a universal system of international peace and security approved by the 41st session of the UN General Assembly. They paid particular attention to the situation in Europe and to efforts to improve the atmosphere on the continent. Stress was laid on the fact that the proposals put forward in Budapest by the Warsaw Pact member-states open up prospects
for an integrated and in-depth reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Readiness was expressed for immediate discussion, within the framework of the European process, of practical measures to implement this proposal.

Standing for the deepening of cooperation between European states in all fields, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia will make every effort to ensure that the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is conducted in a constructive spirit and ends with positive results.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1301
RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S PETROVSKIY 5 FEBRUARY PRESS CONFERENCE

U.S. 'Blocking Progress' From Reykjavik

LD051257 Moscow TASS in English 1238 GMT 5 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow February 5 TASS -- Speaking today at a press conference, Vladimir Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, said that at the current round of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space weapons some progress had been registered in agreeing wording which reflects the results of the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik.

At a proposal of the Soviet delegation the sides started agreeing provisions on such issues as consolidation of the regime of the ABM Treaty, reducing and eventual liquidation of strategic offensive weapons, liquidation of medium-range missiles of the USSR and USA in Europe, a decision on the start of negotiations on complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

At the same time, the deputy minister said, one cannot help seeing that in the position of the U.S. delegation there are, regrettably, the same elements blocking progress on the main issues of negotiations. The position is supplemented in some aspects with new elements which make reaching understandings more difficult. One gets an impression that the U.S. delegation is not authorized to press resolutely for agreeing appropriate draft documents. To all appearances, this is not on the mind of those in Washington who advocate the earliest deployment of the SDI (in defiance of the ABM Treaty) and a further buildup of nuclear weapons.

U.S. 'Anti-Sovietism'

LD051250 Moscow TASS in English 1234 GMT 5 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow February 5 TASS -- If we are to give a concise definition of the essence of the current U.S. foreign policy course, it is the same adventuristic banking on strength, the maniacal desire to tip the existing military equilibrium in the world, to secure positions of dominance and to dictate American will and orders to other countries, Vladimir Petrovskiy, a deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, today said at a press conference in the Press Centre of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
Characterising the report of the U.S. President on the national security strategy of the United States, the Soviet deputy foreign minister noted that the contents of that document could not help giving cause for serious worry. What strikes the eye is the fervor with which the White House chief asserts the arms race and intensive war preparations as the cornerstone of U.S. international strategy and hostility as a norm of Soviet-American relations.

The entire spirit and structuring of Washington's policy are proof positive that the hawkish anti-Sovietism of the United States is feeding not only on blind anti-communist instincts but also on the entrenched conviction that the Soviet Union is the main obstacle to the neoglobalist imperial ambitions of the more reactionary forces of American imperialism.

Hence the poorly disguised desire of the American Administration to "creep out" of the jointly formulated limits on strategic weapons, the misrepresentation of the letter and the spirit of the historic understandings reached at the Reykjavík meeting and other piece of lavish praise for the "Star Wars" programme.

Displaying arrogance of strength, Petrovskiy continued, Washington is dividing the rest of the world, independent states into "good" and "bad" and arrogates to itself the right to pardon some and punish others, to substitute aircraft carriers for diplomacy and jungle law for elementary morality. This policy has always led up a dangerous blind alley, and especially so in our complex, crucial time.

Realism and responsibility today is not a good wish but a categorical imperative for any statesman. One must disabuse oneself of stereotypes and old modes of thinking and take a sober view of the world from the only correct positions of respect for the interests of all countries and peoples and care for the future. What is needed is energetic and bold actions to check the mad pace of the arms race and to rid mankind of the burden of nuclear fetters. Forward to cooperation and universal security rather than backward to confrontation — this is the key slogan of our time, the Soviet deputy foreign minister stressed.

Proposes Test Ban Talks

LD051313 Moscow TASS in English 1255 GMT 5 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow February 5 TASS — The Soviet Union actively stands for beginning full-scale talks on a total nuclear test ban, naturally, with the participation of the United States, Soviet Deputy Foreign minister Vladimir Petrovskiy said at a press conference here today. The Soviet side is ready to agree at such talks to a stage-by-stage solution of this problem, such as interim limits on the number and yield of nuclear explosions. Naturally, such measures should, first, be substantial and provide for considerable reductions in the allowed yield and number of test explosions a year and, second, be truly interim, temporary, complete with a timeframe for transition to the total prohibition of nuclear testing.

The talks we are suggesting, the Soviet deputy foreign minister continued, should also produce methods and forms of verification to create the basis of the verification mechanism of the future treaty. The main thing is that the talks should be oriented towards the clear goal of a total test ban. We proceed from the belief that a ban on all testing will become a dependable obstacle to improvements in nuclear weapons and a first substantial step towards real disarmament.
The American side is still avoiding practical discussions on a nuclear test ban. Conversely, it insists on discussing ways of conducting and controlling testing. We cannot be satisfied with this, just as no one with a real interest in a total nuclear test ban can be satisfied, Petrovskiy stressed.

Along with carrying on bilateral efforts at the Soviet-American talks, the Soviet deputy foreign minister continued, we think it important to use the multilateral mechanism of the Geneva Disarmament Conference to put the problem of a total nuclear test ban at long last onto the road leading towards a concrete accord. Examples of fruitful multilateral cooperation in Stockholm and Vienna last year are forceful proof of its great political potential, which should be used, too, to terminate nuclear testing.

SDI 'Main Obstacle'

LD051521 Moscow TASS in English 1445 GMT 5 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow February 5 TASS -- The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) is now the main obstacle to translating into life the package of proposals advanced in Reykjavik, Vladimir Petrovskiy, a deputy foreign minister of the USSR, told a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists today.

"The 'Star Wars' plans, if implemented, would impede the verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. This is why we suggest concentrating all efforts on keeping nuclear weapons away from outer space and stopping the arms race on earth", Petrovskiy said. "Reykjavik has shown that these goals are no utopia, but a practicable possibility which can be realised in a historically short period of time". "Practical implementation of the SDI plan would cancel the ARM Treaty banning the deployment of limited and large-scale space-based anti-missile defences", the deputy minister said.

Petrovskiy noted that those plans would be in conflict with the goals and tasks set before the current Geneva arms talks.

Yevgeniy Velikhov, vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, explained at the news conference why it was erroneous to think that the SDI could advance modern technology.

Disarmament, Development Linked

PM051645 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Feb 87 Morning Edition p 4

[A. Ivanko and G. Charodeyev report: "Through Disarmament to Development. Press Conference in Moscow"]

[Text] International cooperation in various spheres, disarmament and development, the creation of a World Space Organization and a world laboratory -- these and many other questions were at the focus of attention at the news conference on 'Peaceful Alternatives to the Arms Race and Military Programs' held in Moscow 5 February.
The journalists were addressed by Academician Ye. M. Primakov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economic and International Relations; Ye. P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Academician N.K. Kochetkov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Zelinskiy Institute of Organic Chemistry; V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister; and G.I. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, disarmament is not a goal in itself, it is not just a means for eliminating the military threat but also a method for channeling additional resources to facilitate the solution of increasingly acute global problems, V.F. Petrovskiy said in opening the news conference. This is precisely why the program for security through disarmament put forward by us on 15 January last year perceives the allocation of funds for the purpose of social and economic development as a measure to accompany agreements on curbing the arms race.

The Soviet Union welcomes the conference on the interconnection of disarmament and development scheduled for next August in New York. Our country submitted a proposal to the United Nations to set up an international fund for assistance to developing countries which would receive part of the funds saved through reductions of military expenditure.

In our view there are no spheres in the utilization of science and technology without real peaceful options.

International cooperation could be developed in literally all spheres of modern science. The only thing missing is to demonstrate in practice the advantages of dialogue and publicity over confrontation and exclusivity.

Replying to journalists' questions, Academician N.K. Kochetkov noted the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons is a direct ecological purification of our planet. Moreover, chemical disarmament offers very broad opportunities for the development of chemistry, especially in the spheres of medicine and agriculture, and would also release certain industrial capacities.

Another problem involves disarmament and development. As Academician Ye. M. Primakov noted, if the Soviet proposals outlined in the 15 January 1986 statement were to be adopted, savings by the end of the century would amount to 1 trillion dollars for the United States and 300 billion for West Europe. The USSR is prepared to hand over 10 percent of funds saved from military expenditures for assistance to developing countries. Developing countries are getting involved on an increasingly large scale in the arms race. They account for 18 percent of the world's military expenditures. Their reduction would substantially assist these countries' development.

Much attention was devoted at the news conference to the Soviet Union's reaction to the latest nuclear explosion conducted by the United States at the underground test site in Nevada 3 February. This is already the 25th explosion, V.F. Petrovskiy said. The Soviet Union perceived this action by Washington as a challenge to world public opinion. Despite this, however, we continue to believe in the potential of common sense and good will existing in the world, to believe in the affirmation of sensible principles in the political behavior of states.
Ye. P. Velikhov said at the news conference that current opinion in the West holds that SDI is the only way to advance the latest technological methods. We are prepared to dispute this. The USSR proposes that cooperation begins in the sphere of creating the "Tokamak" installation for thermonuclear fusion. A number of countries actively support us. This is just one of several projects offering so many opportunities for cooperation. Furthermore, many scientists are now worried by the question of destroying the unity of science, which is linked both with the deterioration of the international situation and with commercial and military secrets. Scientific cooperation is beginning to deteriorate. Consequently, a number of scientists have drawn the conclusion that it is possible to take a certain sector of science and make it completely open, thus creating an international laboratory as a scheme uniting various projects. For example, the creation of new types of irradiation, electromagnetic probes, and many others.

Other questions by Soviet and foreign journalists were also answered.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1288
RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S GERASIMOV NEWS CONFERENCE 10 FEBRUARY

U.S. Stand on ABM Treaty

LD101524 Moscow TASS in English 1511 GMT 10 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow February 10 TASS -- A "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty is linked with the plans of the Reagan administration to embark, as soon as they are ready, on an early phasing-in of ABM defences components, Chief of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry Gennadiy Gerasimov said at a briefing here today.

He said the essence of a "broad" interpretation is that the treaty, allegedly, permits not only research, but also development, including testing, of anti-missile defense systems or their components of any type of basing, if they are based on new physical principles. Thus this manoeuvre of the U.S. Administration has the aim of justifying stepping up developments in the SDI framework.

Having abandoned the SALT-I and SALT-II treaties, the United States now actually starts undermining the ABM treaty, Gerasimov said.

CSCE Progress

LD101522 Moscow TASS in English 1459 GMT 10 Feb 87

[Text] Moscow February 10 TASS -- "An important stage of work has begun at the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) participating states," Gennadiy Gerasimov, a spokesman for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at briefing here today.

"The participants in the meeting began to consider proposals aimed at strengthening security and cooperation in Europe."

"The Soviet Union regards the strengthening of security and real disarmament as one of the central directions of the CSCE process."

"We hold that the problem of reducing armed forces and conventional arms on a European scale should be considered on an all-European basis with the participation of all the 35 CSCE participating states."

"At any rate it would be unreasonable to fail to use the resources of neutral and non-aligned countries, bearing in mind the positive role which they played at the first stage of the Stockholm conference."

96
"Disconnecting this group of countries from the consideration of disarmament issues in Europe would undermine the very foundation of the CSCE process and would take out its kernel."

"We believe that the second stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and on Disarmament in Europe would be the most appropriate forum to consider the issue of reducing the armed forces and conventional arms. This is why we support the well-known Polish proposal on supplementing the mandate of the conference."

"The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are still prepared to consider other countries' disarmament proposals aimed at resolving the urgent task of lowering the level of military confrontation and building security in Europe. It is now of importance to act dynamically and flexibly, and not to drown the issue in protracted debates."

"Our stand does not rule it out that with a view to expediting a transition to practical consideration of the disarmament issue in Europe we are ready for any forms of work, including unofficial contacts, both bilateral ones and those within a broader circle," the spokesman for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasised.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1288
RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW TALK SHOW: INF, SALT, SDI, MBFR, NUCLEAR TESTING

LD152210 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1600 GMT 15 Jan 87

[Phone-in program "Repercussions: The Way To A Nuclear-Free World," presented by Boris Kalyagin, with Viktor Karpov, member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and chief of the Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament Directorate; Georgiy Korniienko, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department; Valentin Falin, chairman of the Board of the Novosti Press Agency; and Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, chief of a directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; video shows Karpov, Korniienko, Kalyagin, Falin and Chervov seated at tables, with telephoneists seated at typewriters placed around the sides of the studio; telephone numbers to be called are displayed on the screen -- live]

[Excerpts] [Kalyagin] Hello, esteemed viewers. Once again we are here with you in the television studio of the "Repercussions" program at Ostankino to answer questions that are of concern to you. The discussion today will deal with the Soviet program for the creation of a nuclear-free world and the elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction before the end of the present century, as proposed in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement exactly a year ago.

Comrades, I suggest you immediately write down the studio telephone numbers. [telephone numbers displayed on screen] You may call in on any of these numbers. Your question will be received by the stenographers and immediately handed to us. It is desirable that you give your surname, place of residence, and also your profession or workplace.

Now permit me to introduce to you the participants in our program. They are: Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and chief of the Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament Directorate; Georgiy Markovich Korniienko, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department; Valentin Mikhailovich Falin, chairman of the Board of the Novosti Press Agency; and Colonel General Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov, chief of a directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. [medium shots of Karpov, Korniienko, Falin and Chervov]

The title of our program is "Repercussions" -- that is, response and reaction. Perhaps of late no single international document has produced such a broad response throughout the world as has the 15 January statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and this is certainly understandable. After all, the statement deals with the fate of mankind and ridding it of the threat of nuclear destruction. This matter concerns everyone.
For the first time ever the statement puts forward a specific and realistic program, which is precisely calculated from the viewpoint of time, for the total elimination everywhere of all types of nuclear weapons before the beginning of the next century. It set the tone, as it were, for International Peace Year, which was declared in 1986. During the ensuing 12 months we gave specific form to the program and reinforced it by practical deeds. That is to say, we did everything possible to see that Peace Year corresponded in fact with its title. So at the present time the significance of this initiative has not only lessened, but has, perhaps, increased even more.

By a symbolic coincidence, precisely today -- the 1st anniversary of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement -- the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms resumed in Geneva. As was pointed out by our senior representatives, the Soviet side will do everything possible to ensure the present round of talks becomes a turning-point and brings closer the possibility of the conclusion of specific accords which would make it possible to terminate the arms race on earth and avert it in space.

I hear that our stenographers are already receiving the first questions. While they are typing the questions and distributing them according to themes, I would like to ask the participants in our program to sum up some of the results of the appraisals made of the statement during the past year. After all, over the past 12 months there appeared a great deal of material, abundant material, which makes it possible to see more clearly the prospects for carrying out our program and the difficulties standing in the way of its implementation.

What in your view was most important in the discussion of the Soviet initiative? You have the floor, Valentin Mikhaylovich.

[Falin] Many things may occur in the future, of course, but whatever the turn of events might be, one thing is certain, namely, that the 15 January statement has become the starting point for a fresh stage in the struggle for a truly democratic and human world in which the peoples would be rid of alarms over their future and security, and able to concentrate on pressing economic and other issues.

The Soviet program for reorganizing the world and for eliminating nuclear and other forms of weapons of mass destruction embodies experience from the only objectively correct standpoint, which is not from the standpoint of just one or other state, and not from the standpoint of just one social system or a single class. The statement embodies the experience of the entire world community. This obviously is one of the main reasons why the 15 January statement met with such a broad response -- and by the standards of real politics, such an unusual response -- and why this statement is still being discussed. This is shown by the statements, pronouncements and commentaries we are witnessing at the present time on the news agency services.

The 15 January statement is a vivid example of new political thinking, and at the same time new political action. In the statement, word and deed, and this is very important, constitute a unified and inseparable whole. Correspondingly the text of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement fully reflects the assessments and conclusions made in 1985 at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Geneva. At the meeting, I would remind you, both sides acknowledged that war cannot be a means of settling contentious problems; there can be no winner in a nuclear war and there ought not to be nuclear war or any war at all between our countries. Both sides undertook the commitment not to
strive to achieve military superiority and to act to halt the arms race on earth and to avert an arms race in space. This is highly important, and it greatly heartened not only the USSR and the United States and not only the Soviet and American peoples, but also provided some prospects for other peoples of the world and other governments.

Previously it used to be said that if one had the force, one did not need intelligence. This is quite inappropriate now. Now, the more force one has, the more need there is of both intelligence and circumspection. The shortcomings and defects of the obsolete policy of force cannot be compensated for or made good by any of the most up-to-date military technology.

The one to live and for civilization to continue and to develop the possibility of the outbreak of an accidental unpaided or premeditated war needs to be ruled out totally and forever, as a war today would be a total and irreversible catastrophe.

Our party defines the current state of development as a turning point in the life of mankind. Security problems are turning from a military problem, more and more into a political problem. The logic of power confrontation, which steps up the arms race, should be replaced by the logic of honest, conscientious cooperation — a logic in which weapons are not needed at all. Only then will mankind be saved from, insured against, all unexpected events. Only in this way can we ensure that war will forever be a thing of the past. The USSR, in its program proposed on 15 January, which set its sights into the 21st century, demonstrated its readiness not only to turn 1985 into a year of peace, as was proclaimed by the United Nations: The USSR proposed making last year, 1986, the prologue to a bright future undarkened by military conflicts. Mankind has had enough of warring, and that is said clearly in the statement: It has had enough for ever. The sooner this is understood and recognized, the better it will be for everyone.

[Chervov] Boris Aleksandrovich, would you permit me to stress, from the military point of view, the realistic nature of the Soviet program? Our program is not propaganda. It is not an appeal, nor is it just fine words. It is in fact our practical action. I will give some specific examples. The Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions has been in operation for 18 months. Is that propaganda? No. It is actually an integral part of our program. It is the practical embodiment of the Soviet program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. If the Americans were to join the Soviet moratorium, a major step forward would be taken on the path toward a nuclear-free world. Take another example. The USSR pledged no first use of nuclear weapons. From the military point of view that was no straightforward step to take, but we took it. If the United States joined us and took the same pledge, we could say boldly that the current world situation would be a great deal better.

Take other practical, unilateral steps that we have taken. We removed, dismantled, all the medium-range missile launchers on the Kola Peninsula. We removed from alert status some of the SS-20 medium-range missiles in the European zone. We froze such missiles in Europe. For almost 3 years now the Soviet moratorium on antisatellite systems has been in operation. All of these practical, unilateral steps of ours are an integral part of our program. If the United States and NATO were to respond reciprocally, people would breathe a sign of relief and the world situation would become significantly better. One other consideration: Our program is a realistic one for the additional reason that it is specific. You are all familiar with the program. It designates specific stages, volumes of reduction, and the time of the reduction. It
proposed the drawing up of a specific procedure for eliminating nuclear weapons -- both delivery vehicles and warheads. It proposes specific monitoring [kontrol] of all kinds, by national means and also international monitoring in all its forms including on site inspection [inspekteiya na mestakh]. In other words, we realize -- and the Soviet leadership is fully aware of this -- that the task of eliminating nuclear weapons is no easy one, but it is a soluble task and can realistically be solved.

[Kalyagin] We have several questions relating to the behaviour of the U.S. delegation in Geneva. Viktor Pavlovich, since you headed the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks, it would probably be best for you to say what the Americans' line was and what can be expected of them now.

[Karpov] The line taken by the U.S. delegation at the talks was, and still, is a combination of support, in words, for the aims and targets formulated on 8 January 1985, and practical proposals diverging from those aims and that program. Let's take specific examples. With regard to space, the task was clearly formulated to prevent an arms race in space. What was proposed by the United States from the very start of the talks? That the implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative be considered a guarantee that there would be no arms race in space. Paradoxical as it may be, it's a fact. The U.S. delegation has been trying, under one dressing or another, to drag the Star Wars program through the talks as a means of achieving the aim of preventing an arms race in space. All our proposals -- for a complete ban on space strike arms, a ban on antisatellite systems, a ban on space-to-earth weapons, the strengthening of the ABM Treaty regime -- have in practice received no positive response from the U.S. side. The stakes are being put, as before, on the implementation of Star Wars.

Take the problem of strategic offensive weapons. It's the same thing: The United States says it is also in favor of achieving a reduction in strategic offensive weapons, officially advocating a 50 percent reduction in them over a period of 5 years. If you analyze the U.S. proposals that have been put forward at the talks, you find that in them the recognition of the need to reduce strategic arms is combined with hidden elements which in fact permit the build-up of such weapons. It's not difficult to find an example. There is a proposal by the Soviet side to reduce the number of strategic offensive weapons in the first stage to 6,000 warheads. The United States agrees with this, but in point of fact the position provides for the possibility of deploying -- as the weaponry of strategic bombers and sea-based cruise missiles -- many more thousands of nuclear weapons on strategic delivery vehicles to an overall total of roughly 15,000. So there you have it: One one hand what is said, and on the other what is done.

On medium-range missiles, the United States agreed with our proposal to eliminate these missiles of the United States and the USSR in Europe. In this respect we made some concessions to the United States and agreed also to reduce our medium-range missiles in Asia to 100 warheads. We agreed also that the United States could also have 100 warheads on medium-range missiles on its territory. What does the United States put forward as a condition for solving the problem? The right to have on its territory medium-range missiles in such a way that they can reach the territory of the USSR. In other words, creating an additional threat to the territory of the USSR during the process of the reduction and elimination of medium-range missiles.
So, you have statements on the one hand, and actions on the other. This is very
typical of the U.S. position, particularly now, after Reykjavik, when, setting ajar the
doors to a nuclear-free world, Reykjavik has shown the possibility, the real
possibility, of major solutions to the problem of nuclear armaments, the reduction of
nuclear armaments, going as far as the elimination of U.S. and Soviet strategic
offensive weapons. What do we see from the U.S. side? A retreat from Reykjavik in all
directions. On space, President Reagan gave his agreement at Reykjavik to
nonabandonment of the ABM Treaty for 10 years. At the talks — 10 days had not elapsed
when the U.S. representative at Geneva said that the United States could not make an
unconditional pledge to this effect, and that all they could do was talk to the USSR
and seek agreement on the rules and conditions for abandoning the ABM Treaty during
this 10-year period. Instead of the full elimination of strategic offensive weapons,
on which an accord was, to all practical purposes, achieved at Reykjavik, the United
States is now talking just about the elimination of ballistic missiles, so it continues.

So what we see is an unvarying line. It could be regarded as enviable constancy if it
were not for the fact it is directed against the performance of tasks which are
essential and which must be performed to achieve the goals facing the talks.

[Kalyagin] Georgiy Markovich, I can see you already have several questions there.
Perhaps you could make a start on replying to them.

[Korniyenko] Yes, I have a whole set of questions. (Yuriy Vladimirovich Nishchenko)
from Moscow, a builder by profession, asks: How will our government act if the United
States tests a nuclear weapon in Nevada on 5 February?

The Soviet Government, as one knows, gave advance warning last December that
considerations of the security of the USSR and its allies would not permit us to
continue unilaterally adhering to the moratorium if the United States does not join it,
and that after the first U.S. nuclear blast in 1987 we will be forced to resume
testing. The reply that follows from this is as follows: If — as Comrade
(Nishchenko) says in his question — on 5 February or some other date the U.S.
Government carries out the latest blast, nuclear tests will also be resumed in the
USSR. I should like to add that the same Soviet Government statement said in clear and
precise terms that the USSR will be prepared at any moment to break off its nuclear
test program if the United States at long last decides to halt its nuclear blasts.

(Chekanov), a student, also from Moscow, has sent in the following question: Of late
the USSR seems to have been counting on the mood of the U.S. Congress in its statements
on disarmament matters. For instance, our extension of the moratorium on nuclear tests
is evidently linked to the possibility of the U.S. Congress halting finance for these
tests. What is the mood in the Congress at the present time?

To assess the mood in Congress I think it would be enough to cite the fact that on 6
January the 1st day of proceedings in the U.S. Congress of the new session, three draft
resolutions were presented in the House of Representatives. One resolution, if
adopted, will prohibit the government from testing nuclear weapons with a yield
exceeding 1 kilotonne. The second resolution prohibits breaches of the ABM Treaty:
Specifically, it prohibits the testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems. The
third resolution calls for observance of the SALT-II treaty. This unquestionably
characterizes the mood in Congress. Whether the backers of these resolutions manage to
put these resolutions through and when this is going to happen is another matter. But
to assess the mood, I repeat, these are telling facts.
There is the following question from Comrade (Nazarov): Will there be a summit this year, and why should our leader travel to the United States? It would be better for Reagan to come to our country. Perhaps he would then change his attitude to our country.

Will a meeting take place? As before, we reply to this question unambiguously. Such a meeting — that is, Mikhail Sergeevich's visit to the United States — can take place if the necessary conditions exist for it, and above all if there is a guarantee that the meeting will end with concrete and substantial results, first and foremost in the sphere agreed at the Geneva meeting: The sphere of halting the arms race on earth and preventing an arms race in space. Why should Mikhail Sergeevich travel to the United States and not the other way round? It was arranged at Geneva that the first visit would be paid to the United States and subsequently the U.S. President would travel to the USSR. We always adhere to the accords we have made.

[Kalyagin] Comrade (Yuriy Sergeevich Sagakov) from Kuybyshev expresses surprise as to why programs like "Repercussions" devote so little attention to the financial problem, in particular the links between SDI and the financial-industrial [as heard] complex. Well, I would say that in our programs we do pay attention to this problem, stressing that attempts to implement SDI can be put down in part to pressure form the military-industrial complex, which, I think, will have guaranteed profits — if the plan goes ahead — for the next 30 years. As far as our own program, "Repercussions," is concerned, our job is to reply to your questions, space comrades, your specific questions, and we have pleasure in replying specifically on the link between SDI and the financial-industrial complex.

I should like Valentin Mikhaylovich to reply to these questions from (Sergey Valentinovich Shevtsov), a junior scientific worker from Moscow, who asks: What is the link between nuclear disarmament questions and humanitarian questions? What proposals on humanitarian questions did we take to Reykjavik?

[Falin] Like everything in life, these things are interlinked. There is no formal link, but there is a de facto one. As regards Reykjavik and the ideas on humanitarian issues which we took with us and the question of what could be settled there along with other matters, one could put it briefly as follows: An improvement in contacts between the population and people of the USSR and the population and people of the United States, between specific groups, professional groups, and an improvement in exchanges of information. In this context the Soviet side proposed certain ideas which would make it possible to provide the American public with more specific and concrete information of this sort. In essence, the majority of Americans are cut off from all objective information about the USSR. For a number of reasons, Americans — if one takes the majority, the mass of Americans — are unable to receive our radio broadcasts or watch our television programs. There are at best episodes, at best exceptions. I shall say nothing of the fact that very few Americans, as a percentage of the population, know the Russian language, they cannot read literature in Russian, listen to our Russian broadcasts or watch our movies. If one compares the number of American movies shown in the USSR with the number of Soviet movies shown in the United States, there are 20 times more of the former, or an even higher ratio. The same thing, incidentally, goes for the number of books by American authors published in our country or of Soviet and Russian authors there, respectively.
A review was also made of a number of issues concerning resumption of scientific cooperation and cultural exchanges, and our positions were drawn closer together on these. The question of reuniting families was examined on a working basis, and so forth. In short, if the Reykjavik meeting had ended productively on the main topics, it would undoubtedly have been accompanied by no less, or the same, or a similar success on all the other problems, which comprise part of the relations between the countries, part of the relations between the peoples of our countries.

[Kalyagin] We are not on an equal footing with our television viewers: They can see us, we cannot see them. Soon, probably, we shall be using videotelephones, and then we shall be able to both hear and see our interlocutor. For the time being, however, we nevertheless have the possibility of meeting some of our viewers on the screen. True, we recorded their questions in advance. Are our producers ready to run the video film? [video shows crowd scene, close-up of three people in outdoor winter clothing]

[Begin video recording] [Aleksyev] Aleksyev, Leonid Aleksyevich, from the town of Brest, agricultural worker. I would like to know whether one can, in the year ahead, hope for a reduction of the two military political groups, the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

[Aleksyeva] Alekseyeva, Olga Zakharovna, German language teacher. I am interested in whether one can hope for an improvement in relations with the FRG regardless of the United States?

[Girl] My name is Tatyana. I would like to ask the following question: What is it that hampers the young people of the United States from understanding our young people? [end recording]

[Kalyagin] Over to you.

[Chervov] The first question — can one hope for an agreement on reducing the groupings of armed forces in Europe? First, it should be said that reaching an agreement on reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe is possible and essential to curtail, to lessen, the level of dangerous military confrontation. But time waits for no man. Unfortunately, the United States and the NATO countries are in no hurry to resolve this problem. They even refuse direct contacts on coordinating disarmament issues. In particular, they have refused direct contacts between groups of experts of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, between Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgiyevich Kulikov, commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, and General Rogers, Commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of NATO. They have refused a meeting between the general secretaries of the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO.

At present the NATO leaders are putting forward preliminary conditions: The elimination of the alleged imbalance in conventional weapons which, they say, exists in the Warsaw Pact's favor. Only after this, they say, will it be possible to reach an agreement on reducing troops and weapons. In fact, there is no imbalance. The leaders of the West, of the appropriate ranks, are well aware of this.

The obstacles being raised by the United States and the NATO countries on this issue create a sort of vicious circle. They are now declaring that nuclear weapons cannot be cut, because, they say, conventional weapons must be cut; but it is not possible to reduce conventional weapons at present, either, since insurmountable artificial obstructions are being created on their part.

104
Can one, all the same, hope an agreement may be reached? One can, if the United States and the NATO countries take up realistic positions and make countersteps in response to the Warsaw Pact countries Budapest appeal.

[Kalyagin] The second question was probably for you, Valentin Mikhailovich.

[Falin] Can one count on an improvement in relations with the FRG regardless of our relations with the United States?

I should like to draw attention to the following: Mikhail Sergeyevich's statement of 15 January last year is addressed to no specific country, to no specific group of countries. The statement stresses that it is addressed to all states of the world, to all responsible parties, to all public organizations, to all people of good will.

Of course, we would welcome an improvement in relations with every country, large and small, whether a European state or not. We would also welcome an improvement in relations with European countries, and the FRG is no exception to this, of course. If the FRG considered it possible, useful and expedient for itself actively to support the constructive proposals of the USSR aimed toward ridding Europe, too, of nuclear weapons, and for a profound reduction in conventional weapons on that continent, this would undoubtedly have the most positive effect on the state of and prospects for our relations with that state.

[Karpov] Engineer (Aleksandr Viktorovich Semayev) from Moscow, poses a very serious question. Does it not seem to you that in the event of an agreement being reached at Reykjavik, we would in 10 years' time have ended up weaponless in the face of such countries as unwittingly failed to join in the nuclear disarmament process?

The fact is that our program of 15 January cannot be separated from the nuclear disarmament program, from what was discussed in Reykjavik. Reykjavik is a part of our nuclear disarmament program, and is to a certain degree a means of realizing that program. Our program envisages as the first stage of nuclear disarmament a 50 percent cut in the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the United States; while in subsequent stages, all the nuclear powers are to join the USSR and United States in this matter, that of eliminating nuclear weapons. So that at the third stage, a system of a nuclear-free world is already being established, with the appropriate guarantees against the revival of nuclear weapons. Reykjavik compressed this program into shorter periods, but the program remains a guide for action; and precisely within this framework, within the framework of this program, there can be guaranteed a nuclear-free world, with no detriment to the security of all those participating in it.

Here's another question relating to nuclear tests. It is asked by biologist (Eduard Alekseyevich Meshcherikov) from Moscow. It is known that Reagan has just submitted to the U.S. Congress two treaties, on underground nuclear tests and on peaceful nuclear explosions on the condition that the USSR permits the United States to carry out inspections at the nuclear test sites. The point is, the Soviet Government has already given agreement to monitoring [kontrol] Soviet nuclear testing grounds, so what further agreement is Reagan demanding?

It should be pointed out that submission to the U.S. Congress of these two agreements — of 1974 and 1976, signed at that time, but still not ratified through the fault of the United States — is a political ruse, an attempt to show that the U.S. Government is trying to undertake something to proceed toward if not a total cessation of nuclear tests, at least to some sort of limitation of those tests.
But a condition is stipulated here: The working out of a completely different type of system of monitoring [kontrol] from that provided for in those treaties; and this condition is a tough one, which requires the establishment of a monitoring system on the basis of the Cortex system proposed by the Americans, in effect, on-site monitoring, at the site of the explosions.

It should be said that we are in favor of the system for monitoring the cessation of nuclear tests being as effective as possible. We are ready to negotiate this. We are also ready to conduct negotiations with the U.S. side aimed at the cessation of nuclear tests. We could proceed to this by stages. For instance, by means of reducing the number of explosions carried out, by means of a sharp reduction in the power threshold of the tests carried out. We are at the same time ready to talk about further perfecting the monitoring system [usovershensnostvoaniye sistemy kontrolya]. But what the President is proposing now as a condition for ratification of the treaties is, in essence, the legalization of nuclear tests, and a large-scale nuclear tests at that, because the Cortex system is incapable of monitoring explosions below a certain power -- shall we say a few tens of kilotonnes.

[Kalyagin] Nikolay Fedorovich, there are a lot of questions dealing with military topics.

[Chervov] Yes, indeed, there are many such questions. I will start with questions relating to nuclear tests. Comrade (Nikolay Platonovich Magar), a war veteran, from No 19, Ulitsa Gogolya, in the town of Glukhov in Sumy Oblast, poses the following question. Starting from December last month, representatives of the White House administration, of various ranks, including the President himself, have been openly stating that they will continue test explosions. Why then are we, knowing this, waiting for their first explosion? We have got so behind them in this respect, to the extent of over 500 days. Are not such steps dangerous for our state? Comrade (Alla Ivanovna Gerasimenko) from Moscow, asks: Are we, in the past 1 and 1/2 years, greatly behind in the testing of nuclear weapons?

Firstly it should be said that our Soviet moratorium, which we have now been observing for over 1 and 1/2 years, has two aspects -- the political aspect and the military aspect. Regarding the political aspect, by continuing to test nuclear weapons the United States is revealing itself to the whole world as an instigator of the arms race. It is pursuing a course aimed at achieving military superiority and at attempting to upset the military parity that now exists. The whole world can now see the source of the military threat to the world. Therefore, at the political level, we have certainly gained substantially. As for the military aspect, the objective situation is this. When one side has been testing nuclear weapons for 1 and 1/2 years, and the other side has not been testing them and its test sites have been silent, there is naturally a falling behind. However, to date this lagging behind has been permissible. To date, the USSR's security has not been put under threat. We are attentively watching the Pentagon's behavior and we know with whom we are dealing. The Soviet leadership is all the time carefully assessing the situation and analyzing it. As a result there is the Soviet Government statement regarding the decision to further extend the Soviet moratorium in 1987 until the first U.S. nuclear explosion.

In this connection there is also a question from Comrade (Smirnov), an economist living in Moscow. Why was it reported in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, and moreover, only in that newspaper, that the Americans had put their 133d bomber into service -- that is, their third over the limit? Since we are all the time some 5-10 years behind the Americans in all types of armament, as has been reported in all the Soviet press publications, even in ICBMs with multiple warheads, and we are all the time trying to persuade the Americans to halt nuclear weapons testing, while they are continuing testing, will it not be 1941 yet again?
This anxiety is natural. I have already spoken of the Soviet Government decision regarding the moratorium. As for the USSR being some 5-10 years behind, the situation is as follows. The U.S. has been conducting an arms race. Beginning from 1945 it has been continuously creating new kinds and classes of strategic and other kinds of armaments. The USSR has only been taking countermeasures in the interests of safeguarding its security. We are not conducting an arms race. For this reason we are objectively forced into taking countermeasures to get to some extent behind the United States in the development of our armaments and this or that kind of weapon. It needs to be said that a military-strategic parity now exists between the United States and the USSR, and we will not permit the United States to upset this parity, including in the sphere of testing nuclear weapons. It must be said that those measures the United States is planning and carrying out in the arms race oblige us servicemen of the Soviet armed forces to be on the alert and to display high vigilance. Our country's security is, for us, a sacred cause, and the men of the Soviet Armed Forces see it as their duty to the people to reliably defend their socialist homeland and to be in a constant readiness guaranteeing the immediate rebuff of any aggressor. It may be boldly asserted in a most responsible way that there will be no repetition of 1941.

(Mariya Fedorovna Kulikova), a teacher, who is now a pensioner, from Moscow, asks this: Is there a realistic possibility of U.S. military superiority over the USSR? No, such a possibility does not exist and this will not happen, In present-day conditions this is impossible. The USSR and the United States are both states that will not permit any military superiority over each other -- neither U.S. military superiority over the USSR, nor Soviet military superiority over the United States. The state of the economies and the military-technological potential of the sides are such that it is now impossible to achieve military superiority. I will give you a simple example. Beginning in 1941, the United States has been conducting an arms race and has spent billions of dollars on its military programs. But what has it achieved? Has its security been strengthened and has it achieved military superiority? No, military superiority has not been achieved, and its security has not only failed to be increased, but has indeed been lessened. This is how it will continue.

[Kalyagin] Thank you, Nikolay Fedorovich. (Savinova), an engineer from Moscow, asks the following: She says that for the past few years there have been meetings between the Soviet and American public via various telebridges. Is such a meeting possible between the leaders of the United States and the USSR on questions of nuclear arms? Well, there is an agreement for a meeting of representatives of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Congress, and I think that if relations develop, then probably meetings at a higher level are in principle possible. I can see that a lot of questions have come in concerning the policy of the U.S. Administration. Georgiy Markovich, that's your subject.

[Korniyenko] Comrade (Busin), a journalist asks: What has changed in the views of President Reagan in the year that has passed since the statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was published? Have any positive moves appeared regarding that statement? I would say that in the year that has passed since last 15 January, certain changes have taken place. That was shown by Reykjavik. Yes, Mr Reagan did come to Reykjavik with the old baggage, as Mikhail Sergeyevich said there, in Reykjavik. During the Reykjavik meeting he did, in the final analysis, go out to achieve accords. What happened, as we all know, was that questions relating to strategic offensive weapons and medium-range missiles were agreed in principle. That was a move forward. That was a change, and a positive one. Yet that agreement was wrecked due to the President's adherence to his SDI space program. In addition, the President was called to order, and after Reykjavik the U.S. side also went back on the question of strategic arms and medium-range missiles. Nonetheless, the January statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich did have an effect, and not everything is the same as it was a year ago.
Linked with this is, I would say, another question from Comrade (Rekeza), a war veteran from Moscow, who asks: Why not suggest to Gorbachev that he and Reagan sign the two points in the accord on arms reduction on which mutual understanding was achieved at Reykjavik, and then reach an accord on SDI afterward to eliminate it altogether? Well, the answer to this question must be that if it was not possible in Reykjavik to agree on a comprehensive solution to the issues, including the issue of SDI, without which it was impossible to come to an agreement, then what hope could there be that afterward the President would agree separately on SDI? It would be naive to think that.

[Karpov] Excuse me, but I've got a question here from Saratov, from (Yuriy Vladimirovich Gavrilchev), also on roughly the same subject. He asks: The fact that the United States will implement the SDI program, or will at least try to take it to the end, we have understood. Isn't it a mistake to refuse to sign a treaty eliminating earth-based nuclear weapons? Why have two big sticks in the future instead of one? We know the official viewpoints of our government, but I would like to hear your personal opinion. My personal opinion is that if we follow the same path the United States intends to follow, and engage in the arms race in space, this will in no way lead to the strengthening of our security. For many years now, 25 years, our security and the strategic mutual relationship existing between the USSR and the United States have been preserved because we, primarily through the deployment of our ICBMs, have made the United States vulnerable to a counterstrike by us. If we scrap that possibility, and if at the same time the United States is engaged in deploying weapons in space, that will in no way mean the strengthening of our security. That is why we cannot agree to ignore the U.S. Star Wars program and engage in the reduction of Soviet strategic arms. My point of view on this is that we don't need any second big stick. We should not blindly copy the U.S. Star Wars program. We will take measures -- Nikolay Fedorovich Gherov can probably explain better than I how we can do it -- measures that will make the U.S. SDI program ineffective in achieving superiority over the USSR. That we will do, but we will not be copying the Americans by creating a big stick in space like the United States is. We don't need it. We have no intention of dealing a first strike against the United States, and an arms race in space will mean increasing the danger of war.

[Kalyagin] Here's another question: Isn't the program for eliminating nuclear weapons utopian? What would happen in a nuclear-free world if an aggressive nuclear power, for example Israel, came forward? Valentin Mikhaylovich?

[Falin] Of course, any promising idea can be declared utopian, but that doesn't mean that we can thereby deny objective facts which exist unbeknown to us, or which will exist regardless of whether we reach an agreement or not. The question is: Is it possible to create, to build, a nuclear-free world? I would like to remind you this question was around back in 1945, and the initiative to prevent a nuclear arms race came from the USSR. It was rejected by the United States, which then had the monopoly, and which counted on keeping that monopoly for the next 15-20 years. Of course, it cannot be ruled out, and there is certain information to indicate, that a number of countries are secretly preparing to produce nuclear weapons, or are already producing these weapons, or at least the components for these weapons. Among these countries is Israel. It is clear that the Soviet-U.S. accord on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons presupposes cooperation in this process among other countries -- both those which already possess nuclear weapons and the potential possessors of nuclear weapons. It is quite clear that the United States would be the first not to accept the principle of a nuclear-free world if, for example, Israel had nuclear weapons. But the force of public opinion, the force of the United Nations and the force of the world community are sufficient to prevent the processes that are presupposed in this question. Finally, when we speak of eliminating the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, what is meant of course is not a limited number of nuclear weapons -- a few tens or even hundreds.
There are now such colossal destructive capabilities: They are concentrated primarily in the hands of the USSR and the United States — or rather the other way around, in the hands of the United States and the USSR — and if the USSR and the United States come to an agreement, are able to come to an agreement, this will undoubtedly have the most far-reaching effect on the position of other countries.

[Kalyagin] I see you’ve still got a lot of questions there.

[Falin] I’ve still got a lot of questions, yes, and there are a number of questions which continue or echo the questions on SDI that have already been asked. Comrade (Dmitry Aleksandrovich Melovitskiy) from Voronezh, a war veteran; to some extent the same question from an engineer who has just given his first name, Aleksey, from Moscow; and others. They also talk about SDI, saying that perhaps we shouldn’t insist on reaching an accord on SDI, but should agree on what we can agree on. This is what I would like to say on this point. SDI, in the form announced by the U.S. President in March 1983, has a history of its own. As far as it is known today, the first discussion in the U.S. Administration of the plan for an arms race in space took place not in 1983, but in February 1981. That discussion took place not with a view to countering some sort of Soviet threats, but with a view to restoring U.S. military superiority.

I also want to draw attention to the first public statements on this subject — Weinberger was, of course, among the first: In June 1981 he declared that if the work being carried out in the United States to create [sozdaniye] ABM weapons gives the Americans more of a guarantee than the currently valid ABM Treaty, the United States would, without hesitation, withdraw from the treaty. At the time, by the way, the United States and the administration were not talking about any imaginary violations on the part of the Soviet Union. At the time, there was not talk at all about whether the treaty permitted or did not permit the Americans to conduct the work they were conducting. This was all unnecessary. At the time, the administration was altogether of the view that there would be not talks with the Soviet Union on any matters related to arms control and disarmament. This came later as a concession both to U.S. public opinion and to the United States’s own NATO allies. That is why if one is to be precise, from start to finish, and to the present day, SDI is no defense system, but it is the American way of performing strategic tasks connected with the illusion of the reinstatement of U.S. military superiority. Thus, when the propose we agree about everything else but leave SDI to one side, this is equivalent to our sanctioning the United States’ unilateral efforts to achieve this goal which is quite unacceptable to us, a goal which demands an appropriate response. There is another side to the coin. You may recall that in March 1983 Reagan declared SDI necessary to render nuclear weapons harmless, to make them pointless. Our program — and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev drew President Reagan’s attention to this aspect at Reykjavik — would mean that there will be no nuclear weapons, so why is SDI necessary? Thus, again the Americans have not been saying what they really think. That is an extra reason to take a serious attitude toward this intention of theirs.

Within the framework of SDI, as it is called, the Americans are now working on — they are testing — devices which are to provide them with third-generation nuclear weapons, with weapons based on physical principles which are unknown and as yet untested — offensive weapons destroying targets thousands of kilometers away. This very fact shows that the weapons we are talking about cannot be defensive. These weapons will create fresh, certainly not smaller and perhaps even greater, dangers than the nuclear weapons which currently exist. So what is the sense in replacing the present threat of nuclear weapons with an even greater threat? There is no logic here. When there is no logic it means there is some sort of concealed interests behind a person’s stance, behind his actions.
Now that you've given me the microphone, here are brief replies to a number of other questions. Do all the NATO countries support SDI, which the United States is pursuing under Reagan's leadership? This question is from (Kirill Alekseyevich Ivanov), from Kursk. The answer is that no, not all countries support SDI, although admittedly these are in the main the small NATO countries — Norway, Denmark, Greece, Spain, and some others. They have expressed their disagreement with this program and have spoken out against participation in the implementation of a program of this sort. I would say that many large countries finally joined in this program only with major reservations and under very strong pressure from Washington, because they are well aware of the fact that if the 1972 ABM Treaty ceases to function, this will cancel out the existing — and I stress, the currently existing — possibility of resolving the problem of the reduction and subsequent destruction of strategic nuclear weapons. There is an understanding of this, but as a result of the customs prevailing in the context of NATO, countries are afraid of saying this. That is why the governments of certain Western European countries, in particular, are maneuvering; they cannot tell their people how things really are.

Now another question which seems to me to be quite interesting. It is asked by Muscovite (Spassovskiy, Konstantin Vladimirovich), a pensioner. Are the current deteriorations in Soviet-U.S. relations not linked with the improvement in the economic situation in the Soviet Union? Is it not this the Reagan Administration is afraid of?

I would formulate the question somewhat differently, and the reply to it likewise somewhat differently. If we turn to U.S. Government documents, we can read in them — in particular documents of 1982 — that the point of the arms race unleashed by the Americans consists in placing the Soviet Union in an extremely difficult economic situation, to exhaust and ruin the Soviet Union, as they put it. Former President Carter once said: 500 grams less meat — no, 50 grams less meat on the table of the Soviet working man is the victory of U.S. policy. Many officials in the current administration are guided to an even greater degree by roughly these ideas, which define the meaning and content of the success of U.S. policy. They seek their gain in our loss. They want to impose upon us such a rate and scale in the arms race, and a race in such spheres, that they calculate we will have difficulty in catching up to the Americans; and due to the weight of these burdensome expenditures — and we must admit it is burdensome — we shall find it harder to realize the socioeconomic programs adopted by our communist party.

[Kalyagin] I would like to offer you two more questions which we recorded in advance. Our policy is full of concern for young people. At the same time, the problems of war and people worry not only adults but also young people, working people, students. Therefore we shall offer them the opportunity of putting a number of questions to you. We shall ask our producer to run the videotape.

[Begin recording; video shows crowd of young people; first a young man in uniform and then a young school boy address camera]

[Shepovalov] Suvorov cadet Shepovalov, Spartak. The question I am interested in is this: What is the technology for destroying nuclear munitions, and can they be used for peaceful purposes?

[Ladoshin] I am from Kazan. My name is (Tolya), surname (Ladoshin). What interests me is this: Everyone is talking about disarmament, and in the United States they are fighting for disarmament too. So can Reagan himself do it, or is some one pushing him into not disarm, frightening him with something. He's the boss of the United States; after all. [end recording] [laughter]

[Kalyagin] Well, I think Comrade General will answer the Suvorov cadet.
The second question, too. Good man, I shall tell Comrade Suvorov Cadet outright that this is an interesting question, and not a very simple one. However, the Soviet program provides for the solution of this question. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement says that to solve this task, special procedures will be developed [razrabotanny] for the destruction of nuclear weapons, including nuclear munitions, and also for dismantling and re-equipping or destroying launchers. Applied to nuclear munitions, these procedures would relate separately both to nuclear and nonnuclear components of the nuclear weapon. Of course, there should be reliable verification [kontrol] of the destruction of nuclear weapons, and here, of course, on-site inspection is needed.

Technology for the destruction of nuclear weapons, including nuclear munitions, has been developed at the talks of the interested parties. In this connection I am answering the second part of your question also. One must not rule out the transfer of a certain part of the released nuclear materials for civilian sectors of the economy. But after appropriate treatment, of course. This answers the first question. As for the second question, perhaps you will link it, Georgiy Markovich, with the military-industrial complex?

Well, I think that what is being done by the Soviet Union, the program that lies at the root of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement of 15 January, is an appeal to common sense, human reason. This is the real way to find a solution to the disarmament problem. If one embarks on the path of frightening each other, as it were, we will do this, whereas the other side will say that they will do something else -- this is the path of the arms race. It has not produced anything good, and in the future it is liable to lead to a still worse situation.

Have you any more questions?

There are many questions here.

I would only like to warn that we have only 8 minutes left. Therefore, let us give not longer than 3 minutes to each participant.

There are masses of questions.

Nothing can be done about it.

Comrade Leonid Petrovich Gerasimov, an engineer from Moscow, asks why U.S. workers have an interest in the production of weapons as in having a job to avoid becoming one of the millions, many millions of unemployed in the United States. Comrade (Besedin), a scientific worker, asks whether one can count on the ability of the Democratic Congress to restrain the militarist ambitions of the Reagan Administration. I would like to give a positive answer to this question based on the mere fact the previous composition of the Congress in which Republicans had the majority in the Senate curbed the appetites of the administration by reducing the administration's requests for military spending by $28 billion. Now that the Democrats have the majority in both houses of the Congress — although one must state the reservation that Democrats vary; they cannot all be tarred with the same brush, but nor can the Republicans — but I think that there will be a great deal of fighting over the $300 billion military budget which has been introduced by the administration.
I also think this budget will be cut. Can it happen that the Reagan administration will opt for some considerable compromises in the areas of nuclear disarmament in 1988 for pre-election purposes. This question is asked by the same viewer. I would give this brief reply: Let us hope that it will. It will if there is a real aspiration to find considerable compromises, that is, to reach substantial accords. For the present, unfortunately, there are no such signs. Everything that is being done by the administration today does not yet indicate this.

Comrade (Konkov) asks why our Soviet Government continues to make large concessions in such important questions as international detente and national security, whereas the U.S. Government does not make any concessions to us. Yes, we are making great concessions. But these concessions are to common sense and to enabling mankind to continue living, not to somebody in the United States, be it the U.S. President or someone else. There is a limit to these concessions, beyond which we really cannot go without damaging our security. SDI represents such a limit. Without an accord on SDI, that is, without an accord on the prevention of the arms race in space, we cannot and will not embark on those accords which could be reached on other parts of the problem. There are no grounds, therefore, to fear that we will so to speak, step over this limit. All these questions are being weighed up by the Soviet leadership very, very scrupulously.

[Kalyagin] Well, Viktor Pavlovich, could you choose the most interesting questions.

[Karpov] (Mikhail Mikhailovich Tretiakov), an engineer from Moscow is asking this question: Why cant we introduce space borders in the same way as we have airspace boundaries, to prevent enemy space stations from being situated in space above us. We believe space should be the common property of mankind and should be used for peaceful purposes. This is what we are fighting for, and we have proposals on the subject, which have been formulated by our chairman of the Council of Ministers in his letter to Perez de Cuellar. We advocate peace in space. This is a better solution than dividing space into pieces.

If I may put them briefly, there are some more questions. Can one hope for success in the Geneva talks? I personally do not believe in them. Comrade (Yershov), from the city of Vladimir, says. Comrade (Merkulov), from Moscow, also asks whether the members of the Soviet delegation had a feeling of devastation when all our positive proposals on disarmament were in practice adamantly opposed, and whether all the members of the U.S. delegation have a negative attitude towards our proposals.

[Kalyagin] Well, this is subtle.

[Karpov] Yes, I think we should not approach the questions of the talks from the point of view of whether or not we have patience. We have a noble purpose. The Soviet participants in the talks have this purpose in front of them: They are prepared to do all that is incumbent upon them for this purpose to achieve success in the talks. But ultimately we are banking on common sense taking the upper hand in the U.S. administration and making it possible to hold a practical conversation about concrete agreements.

[Kalyagin] We have 2 minutes left, and I want to say our program is being received by Czechoslovak television.
(Vlastimil Neersta), international affairs commentator of Czechoslovak television, asks the following question: It is still necessary to do a great deal for the implementation of the Soviet proposals put forward in the statement of Comrade Gorbachev. How can other countries help to implement the colossal program for a nuclear-free world. Valentin Mikhaylovich, please.

[Falin] One can answer by quoting the words of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev from the statement of 15 January. The contribution of every state and every person is invaluable for a nuclear-free planet to become reality and for a nuclear-free world to take a concrete shape. In this connection, the close and active cooperation of our socialist countries is a very, very important factor on the path toward the attainment of this goal, the attainment of this goal in a very difficult — as it is now understood by everyone — struggle, considering the position of the United States and some of their imperialist allies.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1288
RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW WEEKLY INTERVIEWS POLAND'S CARDINAL GLEMP

PM041012 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Feb 87 p 14

[Report by special correspondent Leonid Pochivalov on visit to Warsaw, and interview with Cardinal Jozef Glemp, primate of Poland: "The Concept of Peace Is the Same for Everyone"—date of interview not given]

[Excerpts] [Pochivalov report]

Our philosophy is incompatible with that of the church. But it does not reject by any means collaboration in matters aimed at truly benefiting mankind. During my stay in Poland, a conference of secretaries of the Central Committee of the socialist countries' fraternal parties was taking place in the capital. The conference discussed today's most urgent problems, including the struggle for peace. The conference communique stressed: "Ideological, political, and philosophical differences should be no obstacle to cooperation in the struggle for these goals. What unites individual forces is of paramount significance, not what divides them."

It was on the basis of this premise that I requested an audience with one of the most important religious leaders of today, Jozef Cardinal Glemp, head of the Polish Catholic Church and primate of Poland. To be honest, I did not have much hope of success in my intention. I knew the cardinal avoids contact with journalists, whatever viewpoints they represent. I was told that the head of the Polish church has already received representatives of the Soviet press more than once, as well as representatives of the socialist countries' mass media in general. And the fact that, all the same, he did agree to meet with LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's correspondent was assessed as a remarkable event both in Poland and abroad. Certain Western radio stations even hurried to report it.

[Interview begins] J. Glemp: I am glad to meet a journalist from the Soviet Union. I have been to the USSR as a tourist in my time. During my visit I saw a high level of culture in your country. And not once did I detect any unfriendliness toward Poles. I believe that friendship, an understanding of every people's interests, and respect for their culture and their historical traditions form the basis for normal coexistence between peoples. And that is the guarantee of peace.

L. Pochivalov: Could you please give your assessment of the situation in the world today, Your Eminence. Is the danger of universal catastrophe a real one, in your opinion?
J. Glemp: Today every person on earth is aware of the great forces that are participating in the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction. And that cannot but lead to an awareness of danger. Fear of the possible use of these weapons is gripping more and more people. I have been to the United States and many other countries and I know that the fear of war has become ubiquitous. But I do not think that in this situation, when great nuclear forces exist, people can permit war to occur. The guarantee that we nevertheless can count on peace is the existence of approximate equilibrium in arms — that is on the one hand; on the other hand, there is people's universal desire for peace. These two elements do not, however, provide an absolute guarantee of security, because a universal catastrophe could occur due to some madman.

L. Pochivalov: It need not happen only because of a madman. We are living in the computer age, and a computer can go wrong. There is much in our lives that is entrusted to machines. The problem of an unexpected fatal mistake by a machine is dealt with today more and more frequently by writers and artists in their work. Shortcomings of some kind in machinery could lead to major catastrophes. This was confirmed by the loss of the American spaceship Challenger and the events at Chernobyl. This means that machinery must not be relied on too much.

J. Glemp: That is true. People who handle machinery must be trained to be fully responsible for it, because there is always human error behind a catastrophe. This is extremely important when people are dealing with machinery capable of causing disaster. In this case, people must be especially responsible.

L. Pochivalov: Do you believe, Your Eminence, in mankind's ability to save itself from self-destruction? If so, what is the basis for your conviction that people can conquer evil in themselves? What is the relationship between the basic dogmas of Christianity and the task of delivering mankind from military madness?

J. Glemp: The Catholic Church shares the universal conviction that the world can be protected from catastrophe. Indeed, we must seek peace by all available methods. One method is the political method. This is up to the authorities in individual countries. Another is the moral striving to educate man to respect ethical principles. That is a very important task for all churches. We believers talk above all about human consciousness and attention to other people. An argument of the utmost importance in our teaching is love, which is expressed even toward an enemy. That is a very difficult matter. It requires that people be educated from the very first with a view to curbing their negative tendencies to evil and anger. I think the church has already done something in this sphere. Let me remind you of Pope John XXIII's encyclical on peace; this is a very important doctrine. And now every 1 January the pope delivers a speech in favor of peace, because 1 January has been declared Peace Day; there have already been 20 such speeches. Our principles with regard to peace are not so much political as moral.

L. Pochivalov: But I know your actions include not only preaching but concrete actions, like the well-known Assisi meeting. Representatives of various faiths met in that Italian city to speak with one voice of their concern for the fate of peace and their willingness to help defend it. Is not that a political action?

J. Glemp: These actions are above all conversations with others — dialogues. Meetings like Assisi are of great significance in consolidating the forces of peace. Much significance is also attached to other antiwar actions, such as demonstrations in defense of peace, especially in capitalist countries.
L. Pochivalov: The outstanding Soviet physicist and Nobel Prize winner, academician P.L. Kapitsa, in a conversation with me as a representative of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA not long before his death, said that morality in the world lags behind the development of science and technology. Morally, people have not yet caught up with many of their achievements, and in nuclear power, in particular. Man long since has gone into space and creates machines that think, but has not yet managed to improve himself to meet the demands of the age. Crime, drug addiction, terrorism, and irresponsibility on the part of certain politicians and statesmen are growing in the world. Do you agree that only man can stop war?

J. Glemp: Certainly.

L. Pochivalov: Last year, here in Warsaw, at an exhibition in defense of peace, I saw a small picture which made a powerful impression; I do not remember the artist's name; the picture showed a desert. In the foreground was a stone sculpture of a man, several meters high, fashioned according to the ancient models. At its foot was the tiny figure of the sculptor. He had flung aside his chisel and was sitting on a stone, exhausted. He is clearly in despair. The sculptor's creation, which he had carved out over endless days, was cracked from its head to its base. So man was unable to create man. I saw this picture as the embodiment of the sentiments which exist in the world today. What does Your Eminence think about such feelings?

J. Glemp: I can confirm with conviction the concern of your physicist. Man has indeed come a long way in technology. Even a child can drive a car, a tractor, a tank. However, he cannot find his way in dealing with other people. The rapid development of technology does not, unfortunately, make people any better. That is why we say that ethics must prevail over technology. I have frequent contact with many people. When I meet with humanitarians, I can sense that pessimism prevails among them. But when I talk with people involved with technology, for instance professors at polytechnical institutes, I can sense more optimism. [paragraph continues]

And not because these people believe in the power of their technology, but rather because a return to ethical problems can be observed among them. And that is very reassuring because technology is only a good thing for man himself has his dignity. So it is my deep conviction that the church's activity in the ethical sphere is complementary to political efforts.

L. Pochivalov: Including efforts to defend peace?

J. Glemp: Of course, that is what I am talking about.

L. Pochivalov: Is the Catholic Church ready to cooperate with other political and nonpolitical movements in the cause of the defense of peace? What potential might exist for such cooperation?

J. Glemp: I believe the concept of peace is the same for everyone. What is peace? It is a universal good. If many people seek that good, then neutrally they must show good will toward each other. Here in Poland we do not form any specially organized groups of believers in defense of peace, but our people's desire for peace is very strong. My generation remembers what war is. At the beginning of our meeting I mentioned Poland's liberation by the Soviet Army, but I also remember 1939, when the Hitlerite occupation began. I remember how our people were taken away to concentration camps, how they were shipped off to Germany to do forced labor, how we were thrown out of our homes. And we do not want a repetition of that. I believe our priests think the same way. After all, during the war, one-half of the priests in the eparchy where I was born were killed.
L. Pochivalov: I have read that not one Polish Catholic priest cooperated with the Hitlerites.

J. Glemp: I have not heard of any such case.

L. Pochivalov: What do you think about the prospects for humanitarian cooperation? What form could contacts take with different ideologies, which also come out in defense of peace? I would like to give an example. A movie called "Ascent" ["Voskhodchenyi"] devoted to the tragedy of war, was once released in the USSR. Its creator was the young director Larisa Shepitko, who unfortunately, died in a car accident. She told me that she was awarded a Vatican prize for this movie. So can points of contact be found in what is most important for mankind — the attitude to war and peace?

J. Glemp: I seem to remember this move was shown here in Poland.

L. Pochivalov: It was based on a story by the Belorussian writer Vasil Bykov.

J. Glemp: Yes, the movie was shown here, but under a different title — "Ascension" ["Vozneseniye"].

L. Pochivalov: Perhaps. I mentioned this movie as an example of how we can seek more and more new opportunities for such contacts in the humanist sphere.

J. Glemp: Of course we should seek such opportunities, we have opportunities like dialogue. This can be extended to other forms of contact like symposiums, exhibitions, and the development of tourism.

L. Pochivalov: The arms race has taken away the potential for combating drought. It is the arms race that is responsible for children dying of hunger...

J. Glemp: Yes, that is true.

L. Pochivalov: The USSR has put forward a proposal to totally eliminate nuclear weapons by the end of this century, to make the new century a century without weapons or wars, and to resolve all international conflicts exclusively by nonviolent means. Do these proposals meet with support in the Catholic church?

J. Glemp: I do not fully understand this problem. I only know that the question is very complex. One may, of course, wish for there to be no weapons on the planet by the year 2000, but there are the realities of our time, which show that this is a difficult question. It must evidently be done in stages. First, stop the further growth of arms. For me, it is always a mystery: Why is this not done? I think the arms race has spread so many spheres that all kinds of opportunities to arm oneself have arisen. If one side sees that the other side has overtaken it in a certain sphere of arms, it seeks to make up the lost ground. This means that first of all we must declare resolutely: An end to all arms! And then reduce the arms stockpiles which exist. This means dialogue, constant dialogue — at the highest political level.

L. Pochivalov: Your Eminence, how do you assess the Reykjavik meeting? Do you see positive aspects to it?
J. Glemp: I think it was a beginning.

L. Pochivalov: How do you regard the call for a total end to nuclear weapon tests?

J. Glemp: I suppose that is the same thing as stopping further armament. I am astonished that people can test weapons that are designed for the mass destruction of people.

L. Pochivalov: What is your view of the appeal made by M.S. Gorbachev for the creation of a world without weapons, a nonviolent world?

J. Glemp: I do not think anyone would not share that opinion. But the point is that trust between people has not yet been created. People do not believe what is said. To this end, a process of education is needed, and we wish to work on that.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1288
RELATED ISSUES

USSR: JAPANESE RESPONSE TO SOVIET ASIA-PACIFIC INITIATIVE HIT

PM231229 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Jan 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by A. Anichkin: "Japan's New Pacific Policy, or Tokyo's 'Marshall Plan'"]

[Text] Japanese Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari made a speech the other day in the capital of Fiji -- Suva -- setting out Tokyo's "Pacific doctrine." It sets forth the basic guidelines of Japanese foreign policy in the South Pacific. Long before the "doctrine" was announced the Japanese papers had dubbed it "Tokyo's Marshall Plan."

What did Kuranari promise for the Pacific Ocean, and why has neither Tokyo nor Washington needed such "doctrines" before? His vision of the "Pacific community of the future" -- this is what the foreign minister called his plan -- is based on joint prosperity. Tokyo is promising to provide abundant economic assistance to "strengthen political stability" and "promote the independence and self-sufficiency of the island states of the Pacific Ocean." Kuranari solemnly proclaimed that "Japan is using every opportunity to develop bilateral relations, and it will not encroach on independence or hinder any independent initiatives, no matter how small the partner might be." [paragraph continues]

Tokyo "supports and will promote all existing regional initiatives in the development of multilateral cooperation in the Pacific Ocean," and on no account will it "support the injection of tension into this region." Japan is sparing no effort to promote the development of friendly relations, links, and cooperation among the countries of the region, in particular between neighbors. Stressing that Japan's Pacific policy is a policy of peace, the minister, who comes from Nagasaki, Japan's second "atom city," solemnly stated: "The Pacific Ocean must remain an ocean of peace, as its very name suggests."

But why was his "doctrine" greeted in Australia and New Zealand with barely disguised apprehension? And why, when talking about promoting regional initiatives, did the Japanese minister not support the major joint act by the countries of the South Pacific region -- the conclusion and ratification of the Rarotonga treaty proclaiming the region a nuclear-free zone? Why did the Japanese journalists accompanying Kuranari on his tour of five Pacific countries constantly interpret their boss' pronouncements as a warning against "Soviet penetration"? And why did Walter Lini, prime minister of Vanuatu, have to make a special statement after his meeting with the Japanese minister to the effect that he did not share his concern about this mythical penetration?
The real purpose of the Kuranari "doctrine" is to consolidate the Pacific islands' status as the West's domain. The Japanese Government gave a hostile reception to the extensive program for peaceful, mutually advantageous cooperation and the creation of a lasting system of comprehensive security in the Asia-Pacific region which was set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech last July. What Tokyo saw primarily was a threat to its own interests, not the prospect of the Pacific becoming a zone of peace and prosperity. But the Soviet proposals made such a wide impact among the Pacific Ocean states that Japan felt it was necessary to come up with something to counter them. "Basically we found ourselves without our own strategy in the face of a vigorous Soviet peace offensive," the paper SANKEI SHIMBUN admitted. And Kuranari's trip was an attempt to counter the USSR's Pacific program with his own "doctrine."

Hence the patent attempts to discredit Soviet policy in the Pacific in the Japanese press, with anonymous "military experts" continuing to use the local press as a medium for frightening Japanese by talking about Soviet plans to "patrol the southern part of the Pacific Ocean with nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles" and even to set up a "permanent base" for them somewhere in Fiji or Vanuatu.

The USSR's steps to establish mutually advantageous trade and economic relations with the region's island states provoke in Tokyo almost hysterical calls for efforts to block the "Soviet advance." The focus of Tokyo's current "anxiety" is Vanuatu -- a republic with a total area of around 12,000 square km and a population of 120,000. The Japanese minister plugged the Tokyo-style "concern" during his talks in Australia and New Zealand, but he did not encounter particular enthusiasm. Australia and New Zealand advocate the idea of "Pacific Ocean economic detente," and they treated the Soviet Union's Vladivostok proposals seriously.

Tokyo's efforts to prevent the Soviet Union from participating in the process of developing and strengthening Pacific cooperation are distrusted in Japan itself.

"Military-political aspects must not be allowed to come to the fore, because this would ultimately undermine Japan's relations with the developing countries, and we must ensure that the U.S. line is not imposed on the Pacific Ocean states," N. Goto, president of the Japanese Chamber of Trade and Industry, said in a recent interview.

The concern about the "U.S. line" is no accident. According to the press, the United States made a confidential request to Japan last summer to step up economic influence on the Pacific countries. Washington's plan is that credit and loans from Tokyo will put a damper on the growth of the antinuclear and antinuclear mood in the region, which is strewn with major U.S. strategic bases. New Zealand's policy of prohibiting calls by nuclear-powered ships or ships carrying nuclear weapons, the similar stance adopted by a number of other countries in the South Pacific and, finally, the entry into force of the Rarotonga treaty -- these are the causes of the concern felt by Washington and its loyal ally, Tokyo, which turns a blind eye to the ever-increasing use of the Japanese islands in U.S. nuclear strategy.

Isn't it the Pacific Ocean states' desire for peace and cooperation for future generations that Kuranari's "Pacific doctrine" is trying to prevent?