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HUNGARY

Highlights of 13 June Parliamentary Committee Meetings

Mass Communications Media Debated
25000745N Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
14 Jun 90 pp 1, 4

[Report by Jozsef Bartha Szabo]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The National Assembly subcommittee on the radio, television, and the press heard expert testimony and [received] submissions (Ministry of Justice, Central Statistical Office, Ministry of Transportation and Communications) concerning the preparation of the law concerning the press, the media, and the protection of data, as well as about the distribution system for frequencies suitable for radio and television broadcasting. We asked Istvan Csurka, Miklos Haraszi, and Gabor Beneski about their perceptions related to the legislative proposals.

Istvan Csurka, Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]:
“The situation of the press must be settled by laws, guaranteeing the freedom of the press, and encouraging citizens and members of the press... The National Assembly does not create laws for the single term of government; party interests should not be permitted to filter into the creative process. But the present situation is extraordinary, it is unnatural, and it not only fails to serve the interests of the MDF, it does not serve the interests of the nation either. Forces which suffered defeat in the elections exercise an immeasurably greater influence through the press than those who received a mandate in the elections. A tremendous conflict is becoming increasingly tense here. It must be resolved by political means and in the course of the political struggle. [Frequency] distribution must be regulated by all means in the form of law, in such a way that national radio and national television receive the necessary number of frequencies for their functioning in the service of the nation. This must enjoy priority as compared to everything else, and only thereafter may we talk about the use of frequencies for commercial, business, etc. purposes. I regard the concern that the government may find itself in a monopolistic situation by owning the media to be an artificially fostered fear. This is an exaggeration, and one must not fear it. At the same time, it is a natural endeavor for the government to try to make its voice heard both in print and in the electronic media. It is equally clear that there are forces outside the government that wish to reduce this influence by all means, do not view the government favorably, and try to frustrate and reduce the influence which these forces are trying to acquire through the large national media and institutions. Unfortunately, there is no order in this very important field of public life, but the purpose of the laws being prepared is to establish this order.”

Miklos Haraszi, Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]:
“The number of frequencies that may be allocated should be clarified, and it is very important that the allocating authority be distinctly separate from the group which intends to profit from those frequencies. Concerning the law on information: It must serve the purpose of protecting personal data just as it is to protect the free flow of information. This legislative proposal is in the most advanced stage. Concerning the press law: We have serious debates, and there will be even greater debates. The basic draft submitted by the Ministry of Justice—because it cannot be regarded as more than a basic draft—intends to combine the press and the media laws. We find this to be unacceptable. The press law must be short and concise. As a result of its peculiar situation, the media law must be detailed, one could say it must cover everything. The most urgent issue is the separation of the national media from the commercial media. But most important is the assurance of the fundamental freedom of expressing opinions. But not in the way that most parties interpret this today. Control is necessary, I will not dispute that, but there is an even greater need to permit opinions that differ from those held by the parties, mainly by the government, to see the light of day. Avoiding monopolistic situations is a basic principle; its guarantee must be expressed by law.”
[passage omitted]

Media Privatization
25000745N Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
14 Jun 90 p 4

[Report by Lajos Pogany]

[Excerpts] Presidents of newspaper publishing enterprises who were asked to testify beginning early yesterday afternoon before the National Assembly committee that investigates the privatization proceedings of the print and electronic media were showered with questions. [Public] interest in this open meeting was so great that the originally planned location turned out to be too small.

As Committee Chairman Jozsef Debreczeni [MDF—Hungarian Democratic Forum] said, consistent with the agenda they had asked the presidents of the Pallas Newspaper and Book Publishing Enterprise and of the Newspaper Publishing Enterprise, as well as the business representative of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the person in authority at the editorial offices of
VAS NEPE, to report to the committee about the transfer of the newspapers published by these enterprises, about possible ongoing negotiations, and to state whether they might have discovered irregularities in the course of the privatization process.

Pallas President Jeno Nemeth was first to testify. [passage omitted] Nemeth said that the primary role of privatization was to "distribute losses." He confirmed the well known fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult to replace the losses suffered by cultural and weekly newspapers. At Pallas, privatization went on only within the legal framework, and the process did not "tear apart" the publisher.

In response to a question raised by Debreczeni as to whether there are ongoing negotiations regarding MAGYAR NEMZET, Nemeth replied that MAGYAR NEMZET is a limited liability corporation and that several foreign partners had sought out that newspaper. [passage omitted]

Newspaper Publishing Enterprise president, Ferenc Vagner, was second to testify. [passage omitted] Based on a series of negotiations between the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] and the Newspaper Publishing Enterprise which lasted three months, the two parties agreed on 9 April that the MSZP would surrender its ownership rights over the Newspaper Publishing Enterprise in favor of the Hungarian state. He also explained that the MSZP had transferred its ownership rights to NEPSZABADSAG to the Free Press Foundation, an organization registered by the Budapest Court last March. In reference to changing the ownership of the enterprise and the organizing of new ventures Vagner explained that they are negotiating with several domestic and foreign firms. Foreigners are expressing great interest, particularly in FIGYELÔ, MAGYAR NOK LAPJA, and PEST MEGYEI HIRLAP. [passage omitted]

Restoring Gendarmerie Discussed
25000745N Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 14 Jun 90 p 3

[Excerpt] At yesterday's session of the Parliamentary Defense Committee, Chairman Gyorgy Balogh (Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Citizen Party—FKgp) started out by saying that "order was restored instantly when they spotted the rooster feathers" [reference to rooster feathers worn in helmets of Royal Hungarian Gendarmes prior to 1945]. This took place in the course of discussing the pompous agenda item designated as "development of a concept for the establishment of an organization to perform the public security tasks of the former Gendarmerie." As a matter of persuasion, Balogh added that "One must deal differently with people in the farm country from those in Budapest's Rumbach street."

But members of the committee did not agree with the Smallholders' proposal. According to Tamas Wachsler (Association of Young Democrats [FIDESZ]) it would mean great trouble for an organization which is part of the Army to have to deal with domestic security. Bela Kiraly (independent) called upon the committee to immediately remove the issue from the agenda. After some debate the Defense Committee agreed with this proposal; only Miklos Borz (FKgp) who himself was a student in the Gendarmerie School, as he said, tried to persuade his colleagues to try to deal with the possibility of restoring the Gendarmerie.

Quite naturally, the committee also dealt with more important matters than the above. Major General and Defense State Secretary Antal Anrus reported on the state of Soviet troop removal. Anrus said that the troops will be moving out on 1.769 railroad trains altogether; thus far 261 of these trains have left the country, maintaining the pace that was scheduled in advance. They have not yet succeeded in resolving the issue of who owes whom. According to Hungarian experts, ownership rights to structures built on land owned by Hungary are not acquired by the person who builds. The Hungarian position: The Soviet Union would return all Hungarian-owned structures to the Honved Forces. The Soviet party demands 2.7 billion rubles—about 50 billion forints—for the structures it is leaving behind. Quite naturally, the Hungarian Government commissioner regards these figures as exaggerated.

According to present calculations the payment of at most 10 billion forints would be justified. This money may be accumulated as a result of utilizing the freed real property. In addition, Hungary would like to be compensated for environmental damages, and at the suggestion of representatives, the survivors of persons dragged away for "temporary labor" would also be entitled to compensation for their sufferings. Kalman Keri urged that in a manner similar to its condemnation of its 1968 invasion of the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federal Republic], the Soviet Union should condemn Hungary's occupation in 1956. In this way the moral and legal position of the Hungarian negotiating side would be strengthened. [passage omitted]

Constitutional Court Appointments, Case Load, Prospects Discussed
25000744C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
13 Jun 90 p 5

[Article by Gy. M.: "Five More Constitutional Court Judges To Be Elected; Increased Number of Nationalization Cases"]

[Text] By 2 July, within two months from the organizational meeting of the National Assembly, representatives must elect five new constitutional court judges. With that, the functioning of the five-member Constitutional Court will come to an end, and the almost five-year functioning of the ten-member body will begin.

Actually, three parliaments will elect the Constitutional Court, to be expanded later to have 15 members, unless Parliament decides in the meantime that this important
The institution of public law is capable of operating with fewer judges of great prestige. At yesterday's press conference Constitutional Court Executive Secretary Dr. András Hollo had this to add to the above: It would be appropriate for the five justices to be elected based on the principle of equality rather than on the proportions [in which parties are represented in Parliament], and for the nominating committee appointed by the National Assembly to delegate one representative from each party.

In conjunction with this, Constitutional Court Deputy President Dr. Laszlo Solyom noted that since elected justices cannot be removed from office for nine years, and therefore, from a practical standpoint will "survive" three Parliaments, it is the great responsibility of the House not to make its decisions on the basis of partisan considerations. Knowledge and maximum suitability should be the only criteria.

In examining the Court's six-month performance thus far, the scale suggests that citizens somewhat overburdened the prestigious forum. As of the end of May 655 cases had reached the Constitutional Court. There are still many misunderstandings; instances in which legal recourse is expected in regard to judicial decisions are not rare. In 522 of these submissions citizens claiming violations of the constitution requested a statement of principle; in other cases parties, cooperatives, and even attorneys' work cooperatives and courts turned to this forum. In two pending cases judges turned to the Constitutional Court to suspend legal proceedings, because in the judges' view their decisions would have to be based on rules that violate the constitution. During the past six months, after the fact examination of constitutionality was requested in 249 cases. Most of these represented critique of legal provisions. Most submissions pertained to the ominous tax on [mortgage] interest, but recently the number of nationalization cases has increased. The Constitutional Court does not entertain individual cases, so to speak, it adjudicates only in regard to principles.

It was said qqq(at the press conference) that in the present complicated situation, at a time when Parliament is continually amending the Constitution, it is the function of this high forum to establish an invisible constitution. This should be accomplished on the basis of request, but also in regard to other specific cases. The question of whether the Constitutional Court, which is independent from daily politics, could act if Parliament amended the basic law in a manner contrary to the Constitution was raised. This question continues to remain unanswered, and it will be up to the ten-member forum how it interprets its own constitutional authority. Just as the enlarged body will express its conceptual view concerning one or two older cases of importance, e.g., on the abortion issue and in regard to the death penalty. It is possible that the time will come when the Court will examine in advance compliance with [legal] standards, i.e. that it will examine legislative proposals prior to their submission to Parliament. Even at this time, [based on a petition by] 50 representatives, the Constitutional Court could be requested to render an opinion concerning individual legislative proposals. But as a result of the structure of Parliament, this possibility would become reality only if factions and minorities [in Parliament] are entitled to submit proposals to the Constitutional Court. For this and other reasons there may be a need to amend the law concerning the Constitutional Court. Similarly, there may be a need for an amendment so that this body does not perform its work based on a provisional operating rule.

Smallholders Respond to Critique of Land Program

25000744B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 13 Jun 90 p 5

[Article by Laszlo Kerekgyarto: “Smallholders’ Position: Only the Land Merchants Have Something To Fear...”]

[Text] The land program of the Independent Smallholders [Agricultural Workers and Citizens] Party [FKGP] is the most controversial part of the government program advanced by the coalition parties. Supporters of the FKGP expect that historic justice will be done to the peasantry as a result of implementing this program, and for many it means moral, legal, and financial rehabilitation for themselves and their families. The number of those who agree with the principle but do not envision the program as possible to implement is not small either. And finally, there is a stratum that is expressly interested in not realizing the Smallholders’ perception.

One source of concern is the fact that people are not well informed. One of the reasons for this is that the FKGP did not receive an appropriate propaganda opportunity on television, on the radio, and in the press; despite the fact that it is a government coalition party, it still does not have its own press medium. In addition, at the time of the elections an interest group wearing the FKGP cloak had good reason to misinform the public. And persons imposed on villagers by the earlier state party systematically endeavor to use the power they have preserved to this date to mislead the peasants.

We can only guess what motives Jozsef Mocsary has. He expressed his views first in the April issue of VALOSAG, and then in the 8 June issue of NEPSZABADSAG. On the other hand, we know that as a writer, agronomist Mocsary should not be uninformed to the extent as that is revealed in his above cited writings.

According to Mocsary the Smallholders’ land program is a “tragic idea, for which the entire nation will pay if it is implemented.” In contrast, with noble simplicity he calls the creation of agricultural cooperatives the “Hungarian agricultural miracle” recognized throughout “Europe and in the world.”

We believe that the miracle is that our agriculture [has managed to] stay on its feet as a result of the diligence and ingenuity of the peasantry, despite the cooperative movement; nevertheless, the voluntarist organization
based on the Soviet pattern caused immeasurable damage not only as a result of its establishment, but also in the course of its functioning, leaving behind machinery which by now has deteriorated, acidic soil, and a depleting livestock. In most places the membership of cooperatives supported their leaders as well as county and national organizations in the way that work animals support ticks. And now these same people, concerned about losing power, are filling people's heads with lies, while they try to buy up the best land at low prices, and seek an appropriate ideology to justify this action.

The most important link in the chain of this counter-campaign is the fact that they want villagers to believe that the Smallholders' Party is preparing to forcefully disintegrate the cooperatives, to use Mocsary's words: “to recreate the three million beggars,” and in a cavalier fashion the author presents all this not as a result of bad intentions, but as a result of “typical urban, lawyers' thinking.”

In contrast, let the statement of Jenő Gerbóvits stand. He is a minister without portfolio, the deputy executive secretary of the Independent Smallholders Party. He is no lawyer, instead he is an active landscape engineer. The statement appeared in the 5 June issue of SZABAD FOLD: “By no means do we want to see a decline in agricultural production or a shortage of food, and it has not even occurred to us to dismantle cooperatives. It is a shame to contrast these concepts with the peasantry’s legitimate sense of justice. Whoever worries about supply concerns is no real economist. Certainly, there will be overproduction, just as there is today; moreover, overproduction exists throughout the world. We do not want to mandate owners or tell the Hungarian peasantry what they should do. Agricultural professionals will help our work as soon as they understand that we urge the establishment of an agricultural system in which large plants may also transform and prosper based on the new law on cooperatives. There is no time or place now for the agricultural sector to fight for blood. In the end the market will render the decision anyway. But only realistic cooperatives will have room to survive.”

And contrary to Mocsary's statements, insecticide specialists, machinists, breeders of livestock, and other professionals will have ample work. Only the land merchants, the parasites, have something to fear.

Secret Grosz Speech Against Imre Nagy Revealed, Condemned

MSZMP Weekly Publishes Speech
25000745P Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
16 Jun 90 p 4

[Unattributed article: “Charges Against Imre Nagy Based on Soviet Writings; Grosz's Secret 1989 Speech Published in SZABADSAG”]

[Text] The Friday issue of SZABADSAG, the weekly newspaper of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP], published a speech by Karoly Grosz delivered at the MSZMP Central Committee [CC] meeting in September 1989, in his capacity as MSZMP executive secretary. The speech was printed on the occasion of the first anniversary of Nagy's funeral. The editors claim that no changes were made in Grosz's speech. The MSZMP newspaper gave the following title to its report: “The SZ-122 = Vologya Nagy. Report on OGPU [Special Government Political Administration] and NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] Agent Imre Nagy, Karoly Grosz's Secret Speech Reporting on Documents.”

It was in this secret speech that the then executive secretary mentioned that the MSZMP and the CPSU had begun negotiations concerning the release of documents concerning the Hungarian emigration in the Soviet Union, and said that “During June we received copies of several documents from the CPSU CC Politburo. Based on these documents we have acquired new knowledge. I feel that it is our obligation to share this knowledge with you.”

According to Grosz's report, Imre Nagy arrived in the Soviet Union toward the end of 1929, and on 4 September 1930 made a written commitment to cooperate with the state security organ OGPU. According to Grosz: “Between 1930 and 1941, until the beginning of the war, Imre Nagy served as the OGPU’s agent SZ-122, and then functioned as a secret associate at the internal commissariat. This is proven by the documents, and there can be no doubt as to their authenticity. The materials designated by the number 369993 in the Committee on State Security archives were inspected by one of our associates, and part of these were transferred by the Soviet side in the form of copies.”

According to Grosz's secret speech reported in SZABADSAG: “Imre Nagy also asserts himself in the documents. At first he prepares a list in his own handwriting about 38 persons with whom—and I quote—‘the source may establish friendly relations if necessary.’ A subsequent list prepared in April 1939 contains 150 names. In 1940, once again in a handwritten form, he prepared a list of 15 persons about—and I quote—‘persons arrested, about whom the source provided information.’”

Referring to documents which, according to SZABADSAG, were made available by Soviet authorities, the former executive secretary had this to say: Based on Imre Nagy's report, signed as “Vologya,” 25 members of the Hungarian emigration were arrested and convicted, according to our knowledge thus far. Fifteen persons of Imre Nagy's list of 150 persons, nine from the list of 15 persons, and 10 from the list of 38 persons were convicted. The speech mentions by name several known emigre personalities among those convicted. Other—Hungarian, Russian, German, Polish—persons were also convicted. Soviet judicial organs rehabilitated all of these.
In summarizing the data, Grosz recommended at the CC meeting that the documents not be published. "I will note, the CPSU leadership has left the matter of what we are going to do with the documents entirely up to our discretion."

NEPSZABADSAG Editorial Comment
25000745P Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
16 Jun 90 p 3

[Editorial by Ervin Tamas: "To a 'Funeral Speech'"]

[Text] "As we know, at its early September 1989 meeting the MSZMP CC dealt with the activities of Imre Nagy. Karoly Grosz made a presentation at the meeting, reporting on the contents of documents which deal with Imre Nagy's activities in the Soviet Union. This speech was not published based on the CC's decision. We feel, however, that in order to present Imre Nagy's life path, and in order to provide differences in detail and composite information to the public, it is indispensable for people to become familiar with the speech. We present in our newspaper Karoly Grosz's speech delivered at the CC meeting without change."

With this introduction the 15 June 1990 issue of the MSZMP political weekly SZABADSAG published the speech Karoly Grosz delivered at that time; this speech is based on documents placed at Grosz's disposal in a tense political situation by Soviet state security organs.

Quite naturally, it would be impermissible to interfere from the outside in the editorial work and the publishing policies of a newspaper. This is particularly true when a newspaper sets itself the objective of "rendering the truth more complete" when information is "indispensable in providing differences in detail and more composite information to the public."

And yet we may hold an opinion about this publishing policy and about this pharisee's argument. The newspaper publishes the speech one day before the first anniversary of the sad reburial of Imre Nagy, thus the irreverence suppresses all other evaluations, any endeavor to provide differences in detail. Quite naturally, the editors of SZABADSAG, the leaders of the MSZMP, are aware that the primary motivation for delivering the speech at the CC was not the search for truth, but the political endeavor to render the MSZMP reformers impossible, or at least to compromise them, as one of the last hopeless attempts [by the MSZMP].

Quite naturally there is a general and specific need for the presentation of differences in detail concerning the truth. This is necessary, partly because we feel liberated and enjoy being able to express things, and partly because as a result of a lack of knowledge or conscious distortions we are saturated with anachronisms—the placement of today's judgments in the past without consideration. And it is obviously important to specifically reveal the contradictory nature of Imre Nagy's person (again under appropriate circumstances!). But the SZABADSAG report falls outside of this. This report is an undignified, irreverent "funeral speech." Nevertheless, it makes no change with regard to Imre Nagy's death and martyrdom. And this should cause twice as much pain to the editors of SZABADSAG.

Nagy's Associate Comments
25000745P Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
20 Jun 90 p 5

[Interview with Miklos Vasarhelyi, co-defendant at Imre Nagy's trial, by Lajos Poganyi; place and date not given: "Unacceptable From Both a Scientific and a Political Standpoint"]

[Excerpts] I asked Miklos Vasarhelyi, an Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] representative, one of the founders of the Committee for Historical Justice, and co-defendant in the Imre Nagy trial, about his views on Karoly Grosz' secret speech published last Friday in the MSZMP weekly newspaper SZABADSAG. [passage omitted]

[Vasarhelyi] I learned from the NEPSZABADSAG editorial and from excerpts published by NEPSZABADSAG that the newspaper SZABADSAG had published the aforementioned writing. Quite naturally, I agree with the NEPSZABADSAG commentary which condemns the tasteless, transparent, and irreverent conduct manifested by SZABADSAG, notably the fact that they chose 15 June, the eve of the anniversary of Imre Nagy's execution and funeral to report Karoly Grosz' rather offensive speech delivered last September.

[Poganyi] The timing last September cannot be regarded as a coincidence.

[Vasarhelyi] Under no circumstances, because in my view the purpose was to discredit reformers within the party. At that time all of this disturbed the peaceful transition, because these reform communists were the negotiating partners of the opposition. Discrediting the reformers had as its aim to return the Stalinists; the events that took place two years ago, at the Bathany memorial light, where those remembering Imre Nagy were brutally dispersed, well demonstrate what such discrediting would have resulted in.

[Poganyi] How do you regard the excerpts of details reported by SZABADSAG?

[Vasarhelyi] I would prefer to call these the "so-called" documents. The way Karoly Grosz approached this matter cannot be qualified from a moral and scientific point of view. It is well known that a huge volume of documents related to Hungary may be found in the Soviet Union, among them interstate and inter-party agreements, correspondence. Becoming familiar with these would be very important from a historical standpoint. Documents related to the period between 1945 and 1948 are of this kind, documents showing the Soviet background of conceptual trials, writings about 1956,
about the consolidation of the Kadar system. We could
gain a full picture of this era [only] if we obtained these
documents. Many aspects will remain in the twilight as
long as there is no way to obtain these documents. Well,
what took place is this: From this vast material suddenly
there surfaced so-called documents which deal with Imre
Nagy, and even from among these documents only those
surfaced which allegedly could be found in the archives
of the Soviet secret service. All of this amounts to
transparent and absurd manipulation, which speaks for
itself. In my eyes documents released by the Soviet secret
service archives have no credibility at all.

[Pogonyi] How come?

[Vasarhelyi] It is well known that the NKVD operated a
huge apparatus engaged in the manufacturing of forged
documents, disinformation, diversion, and similar mat-
ers. Well these “documents” are unacceptable from
both a scientific and a political standpoint. They prove
nothing, as far as I am concerned. The maneuvers
involving documents related to Imre Nagy qualify the
person who accedes to such means. Quite naturally, I am
not against anyone who fights a political battle. This also
applies to the MSZMP, as a legitimate party. But I do not
regard the SZABADSAG report as a political battle. In
this I recognize the methods of the political underworld.
Such methods can be used in dictatorships, because there
is no threat of anyone expressing criticism. In a democ-

[Qogonyi] Would you say the same if “documents” of
this nature concerning, let’s say, Rakosi or Gero were to
see the light of day?

[Vasarhelyi] By all means. Such writings are unaccept-
able to me, irrespective of who is involved. Within the
so-called Imre Nagy documents there appear the names
of a number of persons whom he allegedly observed, but
as it is known, to whom nothing happened, neither in the
Soviet Union nor in Hungary. Some persons who later
came into conflict with Imre Nagy also play a role. Had
there really been documents unfavorable to Imre Nagy,
they would have certainly brought them out at that time.
Not to mention the fact that Imre Nagy had openly
confronted Soviet policies since 1954. I find it impos-
sible that the Soviet leadership would not have tried to
exert pressure on Imre Nagy if they had such documents
available.

Editorial on First Anniversary of Imre Nagy’s
Reinternment
25000744H Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 16 Jun 90 p 1

[Lead editorial by Jozsef Marton: “Future Mirror”]

[Text] A year ago the nation said farewell to Imre Nagy
and those who shared his fate. It happened in the
framework of an uplifting ceremony, soothing to the
soul. The late successors were unable to repair what
could not be repaired, but to use Milan Fust’s words:
They obeyed the command given by the heart. On that
day of mourning the unburied dead received their final
honors; Antigone defeated Creon at last. Since that
symbolic 16 June—a shining day in history, by all
means—the former Central Europe has turned from its
axis.

A direct path lead from the farewell organized at Heroes
Square to the celebration of 23 October, the proclama-
tion of the republic, the collapse of the single-party
structure, and the call for free elections. Socialist dicta-
torships collapsed in Central Europe one by one, so that
now democratic governments sanctioned by elections
are trying to lay foundations for, and to develop, new
systems. Not quite one year after the reburial, part of the
former opposition became the ruling party and the
outlines of a parliamentary democracy evolved.

Those in power and the opposition were to face a
tremendous challenge: to perform the oft-missed tasks of
modernization. Because in and of itself a democratic
turnaround will not do away with a century of backward-
ness, with the misery of small nations, and with the
nationalistic feelings which set these peoples against
each other—the fundamentalist instincts. But let us
recall Laszlo Nemeth’s famous article in the former
IRODALMI UJSAG: If we want to be a nation that lifts
itself up, we must choose only a certain kind of method
to exercise power, one that fully respects the principles
of democracy, establishes the institutional system for con-

One should attempt to answer this question candidly,
and with true decency. I believe that 1956 was a trauma
the nation must deal with for a long time, a very long
time to come. Rehabilitation is far from complete. At
issue is not only whether there are always fresh flowers
on the martyrs’ graves, and whether research concerning
the revolution has begun already, or if it is proceeding in
a dignified manner. So that the souls may be put to rest,
we must give satisfaction to those heroes, named or
unnamed. Further, it would be appropriate to consist-
tently reveal, and not to cover up the crimes, the twilight
of latent secrets must be lit up, and the open issues must
be stubbornly questioned.

Moscow has already renounced the Katyn massacre and
the invasion of the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic]. In a historical sense, 1956 cannot be left out of this sequence, not even if this constitutes a new burden on the Gorbachev leadership, one that is creating epochal change, but at the same time also establishes its own alternative and is forced to face the threat of a disintegrating empire.

The past year has taught us that realities should not be "honored excessively." Just how many so-called realities were cast in concrete, yet collapsed? Although they existed and were "real," they were not genuine. Everyone is aware of the purpose the Warsaw Pact served, and it is one of the pivotal points of Imre Nagy's intellectual legacies that the structure which has been transcended, and which infringes upon national independence, must be liquidated in some way. But genuine realities include the fact that the progression of world events is not determined by Hungary now or in the future, and that our horizons cannot end either at our country's borders, or at the mountain ranges of the Carpathian basin. We may feel, and we do feel, a special responsibility for Hungarians residing beyond our borders, but only the citizens of Hungary can be masters of politics in Budapest.

Another genuine reality is the fact that in the course of the past several years a handful of courageous people in the minority raised their voices for the proper preservation of Imre Nagy's memory, while the great majority silently concealed their thoughts and reached their own compromises in the meantime. On the first anniversary of the reburial we may discover that a new abyss has emerged between today's words and yesterday's actions, as if the vocal ones believed that their truth would be greater if they spoke louder. Even though truth cannot be measured by the volume of sound. But there is yet another reason why anxiety is on the increase in the democracy and freedom that is "pouring" upon us. Many foster illusions in regard to quick results to be produced by a market economy, and to solidifying the order of moral values. This is true, even though there is no, and there will be no, Canaan here—nowhere is the political structure flawless—democracy does not mean the absence of scandals—but at the same time it does not mean the unobstructed enforcement of unlimited voluntarism either. We used to say that the past decades caused immeasurable devastation. This is true, but we must add that during the days of the "soft" dictatorship we lived better and more freely than under Rakosi's autocracy. We say that we endeavor to progress in the direction of Europe, but at every step we stumble into the Balkan, our Central European railroad stations, and monetary disturbances give rise to doubts—will we reach that highly desired Europe at all, or will we wander only from Mucsa to Mucsa [name of a village used to convey the sense of boorish conditions or conduct]

The first anniversary of the reburial suggests a quiet examination of the conscience, the preservation of human decency at all times, and morally well-founded ambition. Imre Nagy was able to claim the support of an entire country. It was easier to manifest unity in the insurrection: "Fire, blood, fever, news, happy changes"—who would not have shared poet Ady's revolutionary zeal. But democracy, the real one, contains division, fret, and the quality of being different from the outset. This is what we would have to get used to, because after all this is society on a human scale. 1956 was not the first time for Imre Nagy to try humanizing the system that was called communist or socialist. Previously tyranny expelled him only from politics; 32 years ago it extinguished his life. But they were unable to extinguish, and they will never be able to extinguish, his disgraceful death and the martyrdom of his associates of very different persuasions from the nation's memory, but without reconciliation it is impossible to build a country, and in particular not a new system on the old ruins. A new system which breaks down the small and large creons. Thanks to 1956, this has become an irrevocable part of the political agenda.

Grosz Surrenders Documents
25000745Q Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 15 Jun 90 p 5

[MTI [Hungarian Telegraph Agency] report]
[Text] Former prime minister Karoly Grosz, long-time executive secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP], handed over materials considered to have archival value to the Ministry of Culture and Public Education. The ministry had asked him to surrender the documents. About one-third of the 50 documents are originals, the rest are in the form of xeroxed copies. The documents include some which were released in the publication "Documents Which Were Not Incinerated," as well as documents related to the 1956 Revolution and the situation that evolved thereafter. The material also includes certain documents concerning Janos Kadar's discussions and correspondence with notable personalities (Edgar Balogh, Armand Hammer, Willy Brandt).

A decision concerning the permanent placement of the documents in archives will be made by the minister of culture and public education following the necessary expert examinations.

Justice Minister on Death Penalty, Military Justice
25000745I Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 15 Jun 90 p 5

[Interview with Justice Minister Istvan Balsai, by Peter Balla; place and date not given: "No Need To Protest the Legality of Action in the Future; Istvan Balsai on the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Military Justice, and Private Law Practice"—first three paragraphs are MAGYAR NEMZET introduction]

[Text] The Ministry of Justice appeared to be the "most smoothly running"—best sheltered from the wind—ministry in the new government that took office a few
weeks ago. But as the prison disturbances in the coun-
tryside showed, reality somewhat contradicted these
presumptions.

In the person of Dr. Istvan Balsai, a Budapest lawyer got
into the ministerial velvet chair. In the end, amid the
crises of the penal system, the 43-year-old Hungarian
Democratic Forum [MDF] politician could do only what
he did: Without delay, and simultaneously with the
disturbances, he submitted the legislative proposal on
amnesty, and declared that under no circumstances
would the justice ministry give in to extortion. The truth
also includes the fact that to a certain extent the Nemeth
government is responsible for the events, because during
the unwarranted delay of codification work certain
details of the legislative proposal were leaked, which in
part caused not only impatience, but disappointment
among the more than 12,000 prisoners.

Reviewing Life Sentences

Our reporter interviewed Justice Minister Dr. Istvan
Balsai about the issues confronting the ministry,
including his view of the death penalty and the future of
military justice.

[Balla] Despite all statements concerning this subject,
the death penalty exists de jure in our laws. Last year's
constitutional amendments provide only a single choice
to the provisional president of the republic: to commute
the death sentence. On 17 January 1990 the League
Against the Death Sentence submitted a constitutional
complaint concerning its cause. Has the Constitutional
Court reached a decision in this regard? When can we
expect the death penalty to be abolished in Hungary? If
that takes place, how should the Criminal Code provi-
sions of the sentence of life imprisonment be revised?

[Balsai] To my knowledge, the Constitutional Court will
decide this matter in September, at the earliest. Consid-
ering the great significance of the issue to be decided, the
Constitutional Court judges are conducting a broader
than usual investigation of this matter. After the deci-
sion—if the Constitutional Court decides in favor of the
League—the circumstances of serving life imprisonment
terms must be reviewed, of course. Professionals
involved in this matter must examine this method of
punishment from all aspects.

[Balla] One of the perhaps least successful undertakings
in the previous years' legislative “bumper crop” were the
amendments to provisions concerning the administra-
tion of military justice. The final text appears to include
certain elements reflecting moodiness, matters that seem
like spur-of-the-moment ideas, and improvised compro-
mises. It so happens that since the changes were made,
civilian courts have also been dealing with non-military
crimes (e.g. stealing from another soldier) committed by
soldiers at their places of duty. What further thoughts,
perhaps corrective ideas, are there in this field of law? In
general: Is there a need for separate military courts?

[Balsai] Our future perception of the military adminis-
tration of justice is to preferably discontinue the admin-
istration of military justice as a separate branch of
justice, and to integrate the functions of military tribu-
nals with the functions of ordinary courts. This is con-
sistent with our endeavors for the development of a
constitutional state. Since the number of cases subject to
military adjudication has decreased substantially, we
believe that at present it would suffice to operate so-
called military councils to adjudicate in the framework
of ordinary county courts. This, at the same time, would
provide an opportunity for military judges to participate
in the adjudication of non-military cases.

Autonomy Exists Already

[Balla] One of the possible consequences of the various
scandals surrounding the registration of firms is that
sooner or later foreign investors will think twice before
they invest in Hungary. How can the missing harmony
be established between the relatively modern Corporate
Law and Law on Transformation on the one hand, and
the Civil Code of Laws and outdated provisions of the
Land Law on the other?

[Balsai] I would begin by saying that the Law on Trans-
formation and the Corporate Law which you regard as
being relatively modern, are also in need of moderniza-
tion. The modernization of the Civil Code of Laws and
of the Land Law is of course a far greater task. This
pertains primarily to legal provisions concerning privat-
ization, and demands in-depth codification work from
the various specialized ministries.

[Balla] Recently we have heard less about perceptions
concerning the revamping of the judicial system. Where
does this work stand; will there be a multi-forum judicial
system in Hungary?

[Balsai] In the course of taking over the ministry I
reviewed the related work done by the division in charge
of this matter. I find that formulation of the concept
concerning the law governing the organization of courts
is in a rather advanced stage. I support the idea that the
present three-tiered judicial system should be replaced
by a system consisting of four tiers. The essence of this is
that above the county courts we would establish a new
system of intermediate forums which we would call the
high court or court of appeals, to operate on a regional
basis, each encompassing several counties. The Supreme
Court would remain in place, so that this system would
enable a two-stage appeals process. In this case, the
institution of protesting the legality of action as a special
means of legal recourse will not be needed in the future.

[Balla] The Association of Hungarian Judges was estab-
ilished in late March. At the same time, the Provisional
Council of Judges continues to function as a matter of
common law, still in the absence of legal provisions.
What do you intend to do to improve the existential
conditions for judges and to legalize judicial autonomy?
[Balsai] I would like to do a lot to improve existential conditions for judges. But quite naturally, as in all such matters, this endeavor demands financial means which would burden the budget. In any event, as a member of the government I will try to enforce the ministry's requirements in this regard. Insofar as judicial autonomy is concerned, it is "legitimate" at this time, because the Provisional Council of Judges has been operating for quite some time. To my knowledge, no decision affecting the courts has been reached without the concurrence of this body. As its name indicates, the Association of Hungarian Judges is a professional organization, it is similar to the Society of Jurists which takes the place of the Association of Jurists in terms of its functions and goals. I hope that I will be able to familiarize myself with their work and perceptions soon.

[Balla] Many are looking forward to seeing legal provisions concerning private law practice. When can this be expected, and which concerns related to [legal] representation will these provisions resolve in your view?

[Balsai] The present legal provisions governing attorneys are outdated, and do not respond at all to the perceptions of the bar. To my knowledge the National Council of Attorneys will submit a proposal in the near future for a thorough revision of the law. Thus, among other matters, attorneys will be able to practice as a matter of individual right. The form this will take will not be limited to the present system of lawyers' work cooperatives. Private lawyers will also be able to practice.

Secrecy and Legality

[Balla] In recent times, perceptions concerning the prosecutor's organization have stirred up great debate, and thus the discourse over whether there is a need for magistrates. How do you view these issues?

[Balsai] Insofar as debate concerning magistrates is concerned: This matter cannot be dealt with separate from all the issues surrounding the broadly based, comprehensive reform of criminal law, and within that the law on criminal procedure. For this reason we must revert to this issue after other issues have been decided.

[Balla] Pursuant to provisional law, you oversee the application of so-called secret means. Should the courts or the prosecutor's office oversee the legality of the application of secret means once the permanent legal provisions are in place (law concerning the police and national security)?

[Balsai] When final provisions are framed to govern activities related to national security, oversight of the secret means that may be applied in regard to the investigation of ordinary crimes must be dealt with separately from the use of secret means in regard to matters that are truly in the domain of national security. This is different from the current situation. It would be more appropriate to place the former under the authority of prosecutors, while the latter should be authorized (supervised) by all means by a responsible member of the government, i.e. preferably by a minister. Parliamentary oversight would be linked to this in a manner prescribed in the [present] provisional rules.

New National Police Commander Takes Office
25000745J Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 16 Jun 90 p 5

[MTI [Hungarian Telegraph Agency] report]

[Text] Self-confidence must be returned to the police, because many have become uncertain during the period of political changes. This statement was made by Gyozo Szabo, the new national police commander, to an MTI [Hungarian Telegraph Agency] reporter after Interior Minister Balazs Horvath installed him in his office on Friday afternoon. Szabo has had 28 years of experience in the administration of justice, 25 of which he served as a judge, most recently as president of the Vas County Court.

YUGOSLAVIA

Serbian Democratic Party Leader Interviewed
90BA0181B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jun 90 pp 22-23

[Interview with Dr. Vojislav Kostunica, a leader of the Democratic Party, by Branka Culic; place and date not given: "Democracy Is Not an Ornament"]

[Text] Dr. Vojislav Kostunica is one of the leaders of the Democratic Party from Belgrade and the only one of the instructors driven out of Belgrade University (School of Law) at one time who last fall refused to resume his professorial post. He did this by writing a letter to his former school in which he interpreted the discharge and then the reinstatement in terms of day-to-day politics. Even in his writings (he is the author of several important books, some of them published together with Dr. Kosta Cavoski), he has by and large been above such motives. He works in the Social Sciences Institute (Philosophy Center) in Belgrade.

[Culic] It is said of the Democratic Party, not without irony, that it is an elite Serbian club. It all but takes a doctor's degree to get into your party. Elitism in Serbia has always had negative connotations (and still does).

[Kostunica] Half a year since the first appeal to the public the Democratic Party has nearly 7,000 members and some 50 local committees and committees being formed, and the reports from the party's numerous events suggest the conclusion that the number of adherents this party can count on is large.

The ambitions of the Democratic Party, especially in the future, could not be further from being some kind of elite club. What is more, the founders of the party also include people who are not Serbs. As for intellectuals in the milieu in which our party was born, they are also present
in the other opposition parties, not to speak about the ruling party. There are quite a few people who do not directly support any party. In connection with this latter position, there have been attempts to give it a factual basis: It is said, that is, that in the past Serbian intellectuals avoided political participation in party politics and that an orientation of being above parties is something that has been inherent in the leading Serbian intellectuals. This simply is not true, and represents a rationalization of the speaker's attitude toward the present ruling party in Serbia. The leading Serbian intellectuals, there is no point in listing their names, have been seeking solutions in political and party life and in skirmishes in order to achieve the domestic or foreign freedom of their country—from Vladimir Jovanovic in the last century to his son Slobodan, who was unable to forego that in his later years.

A majority of the founders of our party have been taking part in democratic initiatives for more than 20 years, but especially in the early eighties (from within various professional associations, committees, and campaigns for protection of human rights). If there is anything to establish the credentials of the founders of this party with the public, then it is their past activity, not their academic titles. And finally, at this moment all the official bodies of the Democratic Party are provisional, and in the first assembly there will be a democratic election to choose by secret ballot among several candidates a leadership which will reflect far better the actual composition of society, that is, will represent the interests of the most diverse strata and social callings, a great many of which are represented by the party's members.

[Culic] These past days a question mark has been placed on your efforts for democracy with the public. Was the adverse impression of the party's activity on 4 May in Belgrade created exclusively by the press? And is it ever possible to tutor the people in how to demonstrate?

[Kostunica] In connection with the call for the usual form of paying respect to Josip Broz on 4 May of this year, the Democratic Party issued a statement in which it condemned this violence to the freedom of conscience as being no less anarchistic than a cynical appeal to the Yugoslav public to pay respect to a man whose name has become the synonym of the social and political wilderness and collapse of Yugoslav society, from which we are only now trying to recover. Equally at issue was the initiator of this hypocritical event, the Socialist Alliance. That is, an artificial organization whose only raison d'être up to now has been to disguise the monopolistic nature of communist rule. I will not even mention that in the desire for power that organization was not even able to do a decent job of performing this task; its leaders have almost to a man been members of that same ruling party. For all those reasons, one of the optima committees of the Democratic Party in Belgrade called out its supporters and friends for a protest walk in front of the Assembly in the name of elementary civil decency. This is by way of adding a new form, walking, to the well-known form of civil disobedience—sitting. Why has this particular act of refusing obedience been twisted into something else reminiscent perhaps of demolishing Stalin's monument in Budapest in 1956 or demolishing Lenin's monuments in the Soviet Union in 1990? The supporters of this unusual cult will have to provide the answers.

[Culic] So long as we are talking about 4 May, has the Democratic Party, and incidentally all the others in Serbia, discovered only now that Josip Broz is dead?

[Kostunica] The Democratic Party has never had any difficulty ascertaining the right date of Broz's death. At one time, several members of the party's founding committee, within the framework of the well-known Committee for Defense of the Freedom of Thought and Expression, called attention to that evident fact, appealing for a "free and critical reassessment of the historical role of Josip Broz Tito." The leadership of the today nonexistent League of Communists of Yugoslavia, defending at that time "what is strategic and still unsurpassed in Tito's career" asserted the opposite. The same was also done by a considerable portion of the press of the time. A year ago the party in power in Croatia today, the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], called in its Preliminary Draft of a Programmatic Basis for "relevant Titoist principles." The Democratic Party is not interested in Josip Broz, but in the consequences of his reign, which still constitutes a gloomy part of our everyday life. Broz will go on waiting for his biographers, perhaps someone like Zweig in his masterpiece about Fouche, but a true judgment of him will not come from court trials after the fact, nor from historians or writers, but from life itself. And it is doing that already in a big way.

[Culic] How effective has the anti-Tito and anticomunist platform, which have had a large response in pluralistic Serbia, been in attracting members?

[Kostunica] The Communists were in power in this country for nearly half a century. No party and no movement in the modern age has held power longer in this region, and the consequences of that regime as we make the transition to the new century are disastrous. Every opposition, in opposing the ruling party, tries to contest its policy, not to elevate it. There has never been an opposition which praised the regime in power. To be sure, the Communists in Eastern Europe tried after World War II to develop some kind of opposition, and, sterile and insignificant, in certain countries it even survived to see the most recent revolutionary transformations in this region.

Has there been exaggeration in the criticism of the communist past? Perhaps, although even in this case that exaggeration, this new kind of exclusiveness, is a product of the old exclusiveness. This, of course, explains the new forms of exclusiveness, but does not justify them. The Democratic Party is against every kind of exclusiveness, old and new, and in favor of creating a democratic
political regime in which there would be room for all those who do not question the basic principles of that system.

Finally, you ask whether the anti-Tito and anticommunist platform is an effective lure in attracting members. They certainly have not been for the Democratic Party. This party will gain its followers by striving for democratic procedures and values, which stand above any ideological and ethnic exclusiveness. This is its only platform. It is certain that a large part of political energy in our region is spent in an unproductive showdown with the ideas of communism, those of Titoism in particular. Perhaps the model of the Polish political transformation, in which even a General Jaruzelski has a certain role as the chief of state, would nevertheless be more fruitful? But there are differences in political traditions and culture of the two countries, aside from the fact of the question that can be put of whether Josip Broz was able to play the role of a constitutional ruler in the manner of General Jaruzelski? Would such a role not have been beyond his real capabilities and inclinations?

[Culjic] At this point, the question arises of the dialectics between nationalism and communism in Serbia. And then in Yugoslavia as well. What might its role be?

[Kostunica] Solving the nationality question has never been the first aim of any communist party, including the one in Serbia, and it certainly has never been an end in itself. It has served more to achieve the party’s basic strategic goal, the taking and preservation of power. The attempt of communist parties to replace their original totalitarian or authoritarian identity with a new ethnic or democratic mask in pluralistic elections such as have recently occurred in Slovenia and Croatia had to fail. The defeat of these parties is, of course, easy to explain: The roles on the political stage were assigned long ago, and only minor ones are left for the Communists. Their part in instigating the reawakening of national consciousness and nationalism has been unable to erase the awareness and memory of their totalitarian past, which among other things suspended even the most moderate forms of ethnic consciousness. The only point of support for Communists lies in their original identity, but that identity, at least in democratic Europe, has experienced its ultimate defeat. Serbian Communists, then, will meet a fate similar to the one experienced by the corresponding parties in Slovenia and Croatia: it is just that actual relations and activity of certain traditions will have an impact on the forms and proportions of their defeat.

[Culjic] Your party and the nationality question? You are reproached for not having a sufficiently Serbian slant. How much do those characteristics mean to you?

[Kostunica] Today’s Democratic Party, which follows the tradition of the prewar party by the same name, has no ethnic commitment. Democratic principles cannot be derived from ethnic premises and interests, although certain parties and public figures have done this in an almost delirious manner in Slovenia. The democratic issue is universal, not particular. Those are the guiding principles of this party, in which, both between the two wars and also today, the majority were Serbs. Milan Grol, president of the Democratic Party, wrote in his LONDONSKI DNEVNIK, which he published as an emigre toward the end of 1941: “I have never been a chauvinist, nor a Serbian expansionist, nor did I feel that someone who was a Serbian expansionist was a good Serb. It was my ambition to be an intelligent Serb. And that was also the ambition of my party.”

[Culjic] How do you interpret the fact that the Draft of the Law on Political Parties was written by the ruling party, as though this were some internal party document?

[Kostunica] The Democratic Party immediately called attention to the fact that the ruling party has once again assumed the right to speak in the name of others, and this at the moment when the opportunity is opening up for the first time for a pluralistic transformation of the present system. Alluding to the “legitimacy” of its power, gained in the one-party elections in Serbia in the fall, the Communists have said that the fact that they themselves are enacting this law only proves their breadth and tolerance. Then there have been various harangues against young members of the party at the university. After all, the principle of the autonomy of universities is supposedly off-bounds for the activity of parties, with the exception of the ruling party. Then came the bans on the meetings of various parties, such as the Democratic Party, and then an outright attempt at a pogrom in one such meeting in Titov Vrbas.

[Culjic] Will the experiences of Slovenia and Croatia with multiparty elections be of benefit to anyone in Serbia? To the party in power or those who will be coming along?

[Kostunica] The results of those elections could be a very instructive experience for Serbian Communists, although no one is less ready than they to draw some object lesson from that experience.

[Culjic] Since it has been said that “no one should import someone else’s democracy for us,” when do you think that multiparty elections will be scheduled in Serbia? And will that occasion, in your estimate, be used for a turn to the right?

[Kostunica] Slobodan Milosevic’s speech in Pancevo, which bristles with typical Titoist threats against an opposition referred to as hostile, illegal, mercenary, fifth-columnist, signifies the beginning of the election campaign of the Communists in which the role of all parties except theirs is supposed to be more decorative than real. To that extent, this campaign constitutes a hopeless attempt of the Serbian Communists to revive something reminiscent of the postwar party system: Formally, there would be several parties, but with the condition that the “leading” or “integrative” role of the ruling Communist Party would not be questioned.
Another passage in Milosevic's speech—about our not having anyone to copy, while others can only copy us if they are able—is again only a repetition of that well-known position of Kardelj's that this political system should be looked upon as something altogether exceptional even from the other side of every comparison. In terms of impact, both kinds of ideological speech largely belong to the past.

Sooner or later there will be free multiparty elections in Serbia. What with all I have said, there is no need for me to repeat that their postponement is harmful to the ruling party. But that will not be the first time that it has acted to its own detriment. I hope that the time which has passed and the time that lies ahead of us will demonstrate the utter emptiness and disastrousness of every kind of exclusiveness, communist and noncommunist, and that democracy will be triumphant in Serbia.

Vojvodina President Supports New Constitution
90BA0186A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
16 Jun 90 p 8

[Interview with Vojvodina president Yugoslav Kostic by
Toma Milic: “North Helps the South”]

[Text] Vojvodina’s economic power has been declining for years. In the next few days a multitude of initiatives will be launched from it and in it, in relieving the burden on the economy and reducing the “superstructure” by 30 percent, to seeking new development plans, a different approach in offering aid to Kosovo, the creation of a unified academy of sciences in Serbia, and the sale of villas and summer homes.

Jugoslav Kostic, always obliging where our newspaper is concerned, responded to an invitation to comment on some of these issues.

Instead of talking about Vojvodina at the beginning of the conversation, which would have been natural, Jugoslav Kostic, the president of the Presidency of this province, proposed that “we start with Kosovo, that wound that cannot be healed by any means.”

We will see his reasons for this at once.

Vojvodina joined in pooling resources on the basis of joint investments with Kosovo firms. Consequently, there will not be any cash payment either this year or in the following years, but it will be invested in specific programs. That means that the northern Serbian province will met all of its obligations to the Federation Fund for the Undeveloped Areas (on the basis of loans and the pooling of resources) through the construction of economic projects. That is the best way, according to our interlocutor, to prevent blunders and abuses; and it is also demanded by Vojvodina’s working class.

Prolonged Stagnation

Our interlocutor said that Vojvodina’s obligations toward Kosovo were considerable, especially today, when the northern province is faced with major difficulties of its own in development. This year alone, Vojvodina is supposed to invest more than 510 million dinars in Kosovo through the Federation Fund for the Undeveloped Areas.

“Because of its prolonged stagnation in development, poor economic structure, the backwardness of agriculture, and the blindness of the former provincial leadership, Vojvodina has fallen from third to fifth place in terms of social product among the federal units. That is why we are trying to increase efficiency in all areas of labor. Kosovo will help, but the residents of Vojvodina want to know where their money is being invested and how it will bear fruit. Many local communities in Vojvodina do not have their own cultural centers or health centers, but we are building such facilities in Kosovo. We will also do so in the future, but primarily in ethnically mixed and Serbian and Montenegrin villages.”

President Kostic has visited Kosovo about 10 times in the past five years, and has become familiar with conditions in many settlements. He believes that Kosovo must be “politically and economically defended” against violence and separatism—at any cost, but primarily through legal means. Vojvodina will make a full contribution in this respect to Serbia and Yugoslavia.

“A few days ago we initiated closer ties with Kosovo. We are providing additional economic assistance to that province, outside of the Yugoslav program. During this year and the next two years we will build 25 economic and other projects. All 44 opstinas in Vojvodina have established ties with corresponding opstinas in Kosovo, and are offering them economic and personnel assistance. In that way, close cooperation has been established between Indzija and Sombor and Titova Mitrovica. Kanjiza has ties with Kosovo Polje, Becej with Vucitrn, Staro Pazova with Pristina, etc. The results of that cooperation are already apparent.”

New Factories in Kosovo

Some forms of cooperation between the citizens of Vojvodina and Kosovo are tangible. We became convinced of that during the past few days, while traveling through Vojvodina. The Backa AIK [Industrial Farm] gave a tractor-trailer as a gift to an agricultural cooperative in Banjska, near Titova Mitrovica, and Vojvodina-Put [Vojvodina Road] and the Provincial Road Fund gave that same local community a new dredging machine. The Pecnici and Staro Pazova opstinas are providing assistance to poor families in Banjska, in the form of flour, sugar, coal, etc.

According to President Kostic, Vojvodina will build many facilities in Kosovo. Here are some of them: a factory for stackable crates, a liquid detergent factory, a plastic roof beam factory, an eight-grade school in Prizren, a cultural center in Zubin Potok and a chocolate factory in the same town, and also a spa and recreational center in Banjska, a pharmaceutical packaging factory, a
4,000-sheep farm in Srbica, a factory for semi-cellulose made from straw in Lipjan, etc.

The purchase of grain has been settled, and the anger of the peasants has currently subsided. That is the most important issue for farmers in the northern province. We asked our interlocutor what characterized political relations in Vojvodina.

One Academy of Sciences in Serbia

"The political situation is satisfactory. Interethnic relations are good, with the exception of an occasional sporadic incident. We welcome the new constitutional and economic concept for the development of Serbia. Our republic has to be a unified state, from Subotica to Dragas. We support a stable Serbian state, with both provinces, which will not have elements of statehood, as in the past, but we also support a stable, law-governed Yugoslav state. Multinational Vojvodina is extremely sensitive to interethnic quarrels, wherever they have occurred. That is why we will do everything possible to straighten out the situation in Kosovo, the source of almost all our problems. As far as the multiparty system in Vojvodina and elsewhere is concerned, we are against parties on a purely ethnic basis."

In response to a question about what he thought of the rationalization of the "superstructure" that had been announced in Vojvodina, Kostic said that all unnecessary institutions and organizations would be abolished or reduced, from opstinas up to schools and colleges. The number of people employed in the "superstructure" has to be reduced by about 30 percent in one year.

"The autonomist provincial leadership had adapted all the institutions and organizations to Vojvodina's role as a state. That is no longer necessary. Our state is Serbia. As far as the latest initiative (the unofficial one) for eliminating the academies of science in both provinces is concerned, we support the full flourishing of science, and its quality, while respecting all the unique features of national culture and the languages of peoples and nationalities. That issue needs to be thoroughly studied, and perhaps there should be a single academy of science in the republic, in which all creative and inventive forces could participate without regard to their ethnic identity," Yugoslav Kostic stated at the end of the interview.

[Box, p. 8]

All the Autonomists' Villas and Hunting Lodges for Sale

In response to a question about what happened with the luxury villas and hunting lodges of the former Vojvodina leadership, Yugoslav Kostic answered:

"Except for the villas in Belgrade and on Fruska Mountain, which will be used for public purposes, the villas in Cartanovici, Sremska Kamenica, Lovran, and Crikvenici, and the one on Bled, as well as all five hunting lodges, will be sold or leased to social enterprises and private persons. The facilities for citizens' vacations will retain the same purpose, although they will be reconstructed and expanded.

"As we have been informed, the sale will take place soon through public auction. As we have learned, however, there has been very great interest abroad, even before this sale. Some businessmen from Italy, West Germany, Austria, South Korea, and other countries have already visited Lovran and Bled, as well as individual hunting lodges, and have offered sizable amounts for purchase or lease."

Text of Decree on Amnesty Published

90BA0146B Belgrade SLUZBENI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 18 May 90 pp 933-934

[Official Gazette of the SFRJ]
[Text] 493.

DECREE

ABOUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE LAW ON AMNESTY

The Law on Amnesty, which the Assembly of the SFRJ passed at a meeting of the Executive Council on 16 May 1990, is announced.

Pg. no. 1197 Belgrade, 16 May 1990

President of the Presidency of the SFRJ
Dr. Borislav Jovic

President of the Assembly of the SFRJ
Dr. Slobodan Gligorijevic

LAW ON AMNESTY

Article 1

Those persons are exempt from prosecution and completely or partially exempt from carrying out their sentence ("amnesty" in the rest of the text) who, up to the day when this law goes into effect, have committed the criminal act of enemy propaganda under article 133, paragraphs 1 and 4 and the criminal act of defaming the reputation of the SFRJ under article 157 of the Criminal Law of the SFRJ.

Article 2

Persons are excluded from the amnesty who have committed a criminal act under article 1 of this law concurrently with some of the criminal acts against the foundation of the socialist, self-management social structure and security of the SFRJ under Chapter XV of the Criminal Law of the SFRJ.
Article 3
If criminal action has not been taken against a person under article 1 of this law, it will not be taken, while if criminal action is in progress, it will be suspended. If that person has been sentenced, he will be exempt from serving the sentence, while if the sentence has begun, he will be exempt from further serving the sentence.

Article 4
The amnesty does not affect the rights of third parties included in the sentence.

Article 5
The court will initiate proceedings according to this law as part of its official duties or at the request of the public prosecutor or the accused or a person who can register a complaint on behalf of the accused (article 360 of the Law on Criminal Procedure).

The decision on the declaration of amnesty or the decision confirming that there is no cause for the declaration of amnesty will be made by the court at the first level in a council composed of three judges. In deciding on the declaration of amnesty the court will determine one of the possibilities under article 3 of this law, depending on whether the criminal action is in progress or legally completed.

The court will make a decision under paragraph 2 of this article according to its official duties, within three days from the day this law goes into effect. Regarding a request of an authorized person under paragraph 1 of this article, the court is required to decide within three days from the day the request is received.

If the person affected by the decision on the declaration of amnesty is under temporary arrest or serving his sentence, the court will determine that he be freed immediately.

The public prosecutor and persons under paragraph 1 of this article can lodge a complaint against the decision under paragraph 2 of this article within three days from the day of the declaration of amnesty. The complaint against the decision on the declaration of amnesty will not delay the carrying out of the decision.

Article 6
If the criminal act under article 1 of this law has been committed concurrently with another criminal act, except for acts under article 2 of this law, for which a uniform sentence has been pronounced, the court will pronounce a new sentence under a judgment based on article 401, paragraph 4, of the Law on Criminal Procedure. The public prosecutor and persons under article 5, paragraph 1, of this law can lodge a complaint, within eight days from the day of the pronouncement of the judgment, against the judgment under which the new punishment is announced.

Article 7
The disposition of the complaint, figuring elapsed time, and the procedure regarding the complaint will conform with the regulations in the Law on Criminal Procedure.

Article 8
This law will go into effect on the day following the day of its announcement in SLUZBENI LIST SFRY [Official Gazette of the SFRY].

Law on Residence of Foreigners Amended
90BA0146C Belgrade SLUZBENI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 18 May 90 pp 934-935
[Official Gazette of the SFRY]
[Text] 494.
On the basis of article 315, point 3) of the Constitution of the SFRY, the Presidency of the SFRY issues a

DECREE
ABOUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE LAW ON AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW ON THE MOVEMENT AND SOJOURN OF FOREIGNERS
The Law on Amendments to the Law on the Movement and Sojourn of Foreigners, adopted by the Assembly of the SFRY at a meeting of the Federal Council on 16 May 1990, is announced.

Pg. no. 1198
Belgrade, 16 May 1990
President of the Presidency of the SFRY
Dr. Borislav Jovic
President of the Assembly of the SFRY
Dr. Slobodan Gligorijevic

LAW
ON AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW ON THE MOVEMENT AND THE SOJOURN OF FOREIGNERS

Article 1
To the Law on the Movement and the Sojourn of Foreigners (SLUZBENI LIST SFRY, no. 56/80, 53/85 and 30/89), after article 18, is added article 18a, which reads:

Article 18a
The foreigner who comes to the SFRY in order to carry out business and public activities covered by federal regulations governing foreign investments and the carrying out of international business, and the foreigner who, according to federal regulations, can establish a business relationship in the SFRY without a permit for establishing a business relationship, will be granted a business visa.
A business visa is issued for an unlimited number of trips and is valid for a period of time that is necessary for the carrying out of the business for which such a visa is issued, but no longer than the validity period for the foreign travel permit.

A business visa is issued by the diplomatic or consular mission of the SFRY abroad or the authorized organ in the republic or autonomous region at the request of the appropriate foreign physical or legal entity.

**Article 2**

In article 27, after paragraph 1, a new paragraph 2 is added which reads as follows:

“A business visa will also be cancelled if the foreigner, under article 18a of this law, within one year of the issuance of this visa, does not conclude an agreement on carrying out business and public activities, or within this period does not establish his own enterprise, if the enterprise that he founded or in which he invested ceases to exist, if the business is concluded by agreement in a period of time that is shorter than the validity period of the business visa and if within 30 days from the day of his arrival he does not establish a business relationship in the SFRY or if his business relationship is ended before the expiration of the validity period of the business visa.”

The present paragraphs 2 and 3 become paragraphs 3 and 4.

**Article 3**

In article 31 a new paragraph 2 is added which reads as follows:

“A foreigner who is issued a business visa may remain in the SFRY up to the expiration of the validity period of this visa.”

The present paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 become paragraphs 3, 4, and 5.

**Article 4**

In article 39, paragraph 1, point 3) the period at the end of the sentence is replaced by a semicolon and a point 4) is added which reads as follows:

“4) who invested funds in the SFRY in order to carry out business or public activities.”

**Article 5**

In article 41, paragraph 1, a new point 3), which reads as follows, is added after point 2):

“3) when he stops carrying out business or public activities or when he withdraws the funds invested.”

The present points 3) and 4) become points 4) and 5).

**Article 6**

In article 99, point 5) the period at the end of the sentence is replaced by a semicolon and a new point 6) is added which reads:

“6) prescribes the manner of issuing a business visa, the business visa form and the form for requesting issuance of that visa, as well as the manner of keeping files and information on business visas issued.”

**Article 7**

The official in charge of the federal organ of administration responsible for internal affairs will prepare regulations under article 6 of this law within 30 days of the day when this law goes into effect.

**Article 8**

This law goes into effect on the eighth day after the day of its announcement in SLUZBENI LIST SFRY [Official Gazette of the SFRY].

**Law on Federation Budget Amended**

90BA0146D Belgrade SLUZBENI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 18 May 90 p 935

[Official Gazette of the SFRY]

[Text] 495.

On the basis of article 315, point 3) of the Constitution of the SFRY, the Presidency of the SFRY issues a

**DECREE**

**ABOUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHANGES IN AND AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERATION BUDGET FOR 1990**

Changes in and Amendments to the Federation Budget for 1990, which were passed by the Assembly of the SFRY at a meeting of the Federal Council on 17 May 1990, are announced.

Pg. no. 1191
Belgrade, 17 May 1990

President of the Presidency of the SFRY
Dr. Borisav Jovic

President of the Assembly of the SFRY
Dr. Slobodan Gligorijevic

**CHANGES IN AND AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERATION BUDGET FOR 1990**

**Article 1**

In the Federation Budget for 1990 (SLUZBENI LIST SFRY, no. 88/89), in article 2, the sum "3,917,700,000" is replaced by the sum "2,285,500,000."
Article 2

In article 3, in the Subtotal of Revenues and Expenditures of Funds for Financing Other Functions and Obligations of the Federation and for Reserves of the Federation for 1990, in Section II, Disposition of Revenues, the following is changed:

1) In Basic Application 01. Funds for the Work of Administrative Organs, in the disposition group 01-3 Funds for Special Applications, the sum “2,273,495,400” is replaced by the sum “1,873,495,400,” in the disposition subgroup 01-3-2 Other Special Applications, the sum “2,139,323,900” is replaced by the sum “1,739,323,900,” and in the item Total Basic Application 01, the sum “6,143,875,900” is replaced by “5,743,875,900.”

2) In Basic Application 07. Reserve Funds of the Federation, in disposition subgroup 07-1 Outlays for the Permanent Budget Reserve, the sum “3,917,700,000” is replaced by the sum “2,285,500,000,” and in the item Total Basic Application 07, the sum “3,947,268,600” is replaced by the sum “2,315,068,600.”

3) In Basic Application 09. Funds for Intervention in the Economy and Stimulus of Development, in the disposition subgroup 09-5 Funds for Intervention in the Economy and Stimulus of Development, the sum “19,793,100,000” is replaced by the sum “21,825,300,000,” and in the item Total Basic Application 09, the sum “19,793,100,000” is replaced by the sum “21,825,300,000.”

Export of Equipment and Ships and Carrying Out Investment Work Abroad On Credit 942,000,000.” In the item Total Basic Application 09, the sum “12,441,200,000” is replaced by the sum “13,773,400,000.” In the item Total Chapter 1, the sum “24,851,868,200” is replaced by the sum “24,151,868,200,” and in the item Total Section 13 (positions 138 to 183), the sum “24,889,268,600” is replaced by the sum “24,189,286,600.”

2) In Section 13, Federal Secretariat for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, Basic Application 09. Funds for Intervention in the Economy and Stimulus of Development, in position 189,9-5-1 Return of Customs Duties and Other Import Fees, the sum “3,392,500,000” is replaced by the sum “4,092,500,000,” in the item Total Basic Application 09, the sum “3,606,000,000” is replaced by the sum “4,306,000,000,” and in the item Total Section 14 (positions 184 to 190), the sum “3,654,321,000” is replaced by the sum “4,354,321,000.”

These changes and amendments go into effect on the day of the announcement in SLUZBENI LIST SFRY [Official Gazette of the SFYR].

Article 4

Closing of Albanian-Dominated Pristina University Urged
90BA0188A Belgrade STUDENT in Serbo-Croatian
No 8-9, May 90 pp 28-30

[Article and interview with Tomislav Stojkovic, lecturer in international public law at Pristina University, by Slavisa Sosic; place and date not given: “Do Away With Pristina University”]

[Text] It is likely that there is no greater dilemma felt by any thinking person in Serbia: Pristina University is a bastion of Yugoslav Albanian nationalism, separatism, and secessionism. It is more than obvious that many professors from that institution are not simply ideologues who use “academic” lectures to corrupt the youth, but also “eminences grises” for all the anti-Serbian hysteria that has become part of Albanian and Kosovo everyday life. More than 35,000 students study at this mammoth university, primarily Yugoslav Albanians, who have made a key contribution to the political turmoil in Kosovo and Metohija over the past 10 years. Because of the overproduction of university diplomas whose holders do not have the knowledge of the average Yugoslav high-school student, the insatiable swallowing up of financial resources, the impossibility of following curricula and teaching plans, (because the Albanian “academics” are continually demonstrating and protesting), permanent involvement in attempts to violently dismember the country, the fact that no other national minority in the world has a university of its own, and other more than adequate reasons, there are
increasing numbers of people who are demanding the closing of this Tirana-Vatican-jihad branch office. We spoke about these problems with Tomislav Stojkovic, lecturer in international public law at the Pristina School of Law.

[Sosic] Give us a brief overview of the origins of Pristina University and its “distinguished” professors.

[Stojkovic] Pristina University is one of the youngest universities in Yugoslavia. It was founded in 1971, under the full name University of Kosovo at Pristina. The name was officially changed last year. There is a large number of Albanian immigrants present in the cultural and educational life of the province, who received their education in the schools of the occupying regime of fascist Italy. Thus, the professors and educators include citizens who were members of fascist units or who even worked in their institutions. So it is anything but a coincidence that there is talk in provincial educational circles about the following. During the fascist occupation of the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, under orders from the government of greater Albania, teachers were transferred at the government's whim. Thus, in 1943 Ismail Sacir were sent to Pec to teach, while Dzevdet Doda and Xhavid Nimani were transferred to teach in Djakovica. Their students and followers have continued their program and in many ways have outstripped their program. For example, Dr. Jusuf Redzepi was a lieutenant in the fascist unit “Ljuboten,” which was under the tutelage of OVRA [Voluntary Work for the Repression of Anti-Fascism], the Italian intelligence service. He came to Pristina in 1971 from Tetovo and first became a doctor, then a professor of internal medicine.

Fascist as Lecturer

Professor Sokol Dobroshi was a member of the fascist organization “Agimi” (Daybreak). Together with Qazim Blac, he organized “Besia” as a student in Belgrade before the war, which was financed by the Italian consulate. After the Italian occupation in 1941, Dobroshi became an envoy of the assembly of greater Albania. He was also a member of the Central Ballistic Committee, and within the framework of the second Prizren League in 1943, he worked on mobilizing Albanians to create the notorious “Skenderbeg” SS division, which committed numerous atrocities in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Despite this past, Dobroshi was chosen as senior lecturer for the School of Law in Pristina, and retired as a high-ranking provincial official.

[Sosic] Have lectures been held at Pristina University by professors from Tirana as well?

[Stojkovic] A large number of instructors from Tirana have come to Pristina and worked closely with professors there. There have been exchanges of experiences, scientific expeditions, and post-graduate study. One of the true gems of this cooperation was Bujar Hodzha, a professor of Marxism at the Department of Philosophy in Pristina up to 1981. Before that job in educating young Yugoslav Albanians, he was a captain in the Albanian intelligence service “Sigurimi.” We have seen what type of education this was, as well as the nature of academic cooperation between Albania and Kosovo and Metohija, on the streets of many Kosovo cities over the past few years.

Albanians—Forerunners of Civilization?

[Sosic] Since a great deal of money is spent on Pristina University, have the academics of that institution in turn justified, even in part, the resources invested there through any discoveries and scientific achievements?

[Stojkovic] As far as scientific discoveries by specialists and professors from the university are concerned, I would mention one striking fact that could be of “interest” to world public opinion. This is the “epochal” finding by specialists at the School of Medicine in Pristina through which nationality in Kosovo and Metohija can be determined according to blood group. These findings were published in the professional journal of the Kosovo Society of Physicians, PRASKIS MEDIKA, in the dual issue 3-4 from 1977. It should be noted that Dr. Daut Mustafa and Dr. Sefedet Mekuli were members of the journal's editorial board.

Where historical sciences are concerned, their historical truths teem with falsifications. I would mention the “scientific finding” by university professor Dr. Skender Rizaj. He “established,” specifically, that Egyptians, Arabs, Palestinians, Jews, Greeks, and even Muhammad and Moses originated from the Albanians. As far as the Serbs are concerned, he similarly “established positively” that they are not a Slavic people, but rather Turkish.

We should not forget Dr. Muhamed Mufllaku, who is incidentally originally from Albania, and who did his undergraduate studies in Damascus, Syria, but completed his Master's and doctorate in Pristina. The review for full university professor was signed by two professors from Tirana, Stefan Nadj and Prof. Jorgaj.

We can continue our list with the academic Dr. Ali Hadri, a citizen of Albania, who forged the documents that he needed to receive a pension. Certain documents were also supplied to him by officials at the embassy in Belgrade.

Dr. Idriz Ajeti arrived in Kosovo and Metohija from Albania in 1943, and became a professor at Pristina University without any problem whatsoever.

The results of the selection of this type of teaching staff and their academic achievements are exemplified best by the image of a hundred thousand young people in Kosovo and Metohija indoctrinated to fanaticism. Everything that was done in this direction at the university was done gradually and deliberately, and whether or not we want to admit it, from the point of view of separatist positions it has been very successful.
Is there an ideological link between Pristina University and other educational and cultural institutions in the province, and what is their contribution to the overall indoctrination of young Serbs?

The discerning creators of Kosovo's post-war politics were educated at Pristina University and other classical national institutions, such as the Academy of Sciences of Kosovo and Metohija and the Albanology Institute. All institutions that are involved in culture and education are based on the national element, which had to be wakened among young people at any price. And instead of a broad education that would have integrated young Albanians into Yugoslav and European developments, they offered these young people animosity towards other peoples, towards Serbia, towards Yugoslavia. This is why today they regard the Yugoslav state and its territory as foreign, and are trying to acquire part of the territory of Serbia for themselves, meaning that their goal is to join Albania. The leading figures in these institutions are attempting, by falsifying historical facts, to glorify Albanian history. They stubbornly cling to the theory of the link between Albanians and Illyrians and their continuity in the Balkans, in so doing forgetting the very important historical fact that in the early Middle Ages there was only a Serbian state in this area. During that period it had all the elements of medieval European states of that time. Albanian separatists and chauvinists ignore this fact. In Kosovo and Metohija you will rarely find a mosque more than 50 years old, but at the same time there are countless Serbian monasteries more than six, seven, or more centuries old, which prove a much earlier presence of Slavs than Albanians in this part of the Balkans.

As far as the Albanology Institute is concerned in concrete terms, I will mention only a few facts. For example, Dzeliadin Tobičji is an immigrant from Albania, but with no problems whatsoever he became secretary of the provincial FEC [Federal Executive Council] for education during the famous counterrevolutionary events in Kosovo, and later even the director of the provincial Institute for the Improvement of Schools. We have seen how he improved the schools.

The director of the Albanology Institute is Fazis Sulja, also an immigrant from Albania.

[Stojkovic] Has the link between Tirana and Pristina been broken off, or is this only apparently the case?

That link functioned extremely well and openly up to the moment that Albanians took to the streets. Formally, it has been broken off, but in my opinion it is still dazzlingly in force. Otherwise, this organizing of rebellions in Kosovo and Metohija over the past couple of years could have encountered weak foundations. Serbia will have to make a great effort to destroy those foundations.

As far as university-level cooperation between Tirana and Pristina is concerned, it does not exist formally, but one need only go to the library of any department in Pristina to see the multitude of books that have arrived over the years from Albania, from which young people in Kosovo and Metohija are learning even today. For years, there was an exchange of textbooks and professional groups between those two centers. The fundamental goal and task of that type of cooperation was to overthrow the sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia and to separate the territory of Kosovo and Metohija from Yugoslavia and join it to Albania.

Is it necessary, in order to more easily integrate Yugoslav Albanians into European integrationist trends, to abolish the province of Kosovo de facto and de jure, and is it necessary for the same reason to abolish Pristina University as an Albanian-language institution?

It is well-known that Serbia won the territory of Kosovo and Metohija from Turkey after the Balkan Wars, which is recognized in international documents. Albania then emerged in 1913 as the result of political games by the major European powers at the London conference of ambassadors. But the province of Kosovo and Metohija, although an integral part of the Republic of Serbia was unfortunately the subject of ill-fated wording, once again due to political games, and magically became a constituent element of a federation, which meant that Serbia became a federal state.

In this way, the province of Kosovo gained independent legislative, executive, and judicial power. This situation is absolutely insupportable, unacceptable, and unknown to international public opinion. Thus, the provinces in Serbia should be stripped of their nation-building—i.e., governmental and political—autonomy, while the only thing that they can keep is their cultural autonomy. Any other form of autonomy means the complete split-up and disintegration of the Republic of Serbia. Serbia itself and the Serbian people cannot allow this. It is in the national interest of Serbia that it be unified in all segments, that its fundamental governmental attributes not be decided on by the provinces, which have seized all actual power and thus excluded the possibility of republican influence on provincial organs and institutions.

The Republic of Serbia as a state has permitted itself the luxury of court rulings being handed down in a foreign language in its own territory. I would like for someone to show me any other state in the world where a similar practice exists.

For the sake of comparison, I will mention another example. Consider a state like California, which is part of the United States. In its territory, 10 percent of the population is of Asian origin. Would the United States of America allow a special university to be founded in California for Japanese or Chinese? And would they also be allowed to have separate governmental bodies? Americans would not even consider such a possibility.
For the reasons that I have noted, I think that Pristina University as an Albanian-language institution must be abolished as soon as possible. The justification for my position is as follows: 85 percent of the funding with which the university is financed comes from the outside. Thus, Kosovo and Metohija is not capable of sustaining such an army of students, and we can scarcely conceive of the influx of students from the next generation, taking into account that more than half of the total population in this province is under age. We can only imagine what sort of expenditures they will require then and what sort of financial pressure this will constitute.

Amidst enormous financial problems, the university has effected the overproduction of lawyers, economists, doctors, and others who cannot find work in the province.

Moreover, Pristina University thus far has proven itself to be a bastion and hotbed of Albanian chauvinism, separatism, and secessionism. It is inconceivable that a state, in this case Serbia, will act to its own disadvantage.

Even today, provincial leaders such as Muhammed Bicaj, the provincial secretary for education, ex-vice chancellor of Pristina University, and president of the action conference of the League of Communists of the university, feel that the abolition of that university would be an attack on the integrity of the Albanian people. If they can show that there is anywhere in the world where a national minority has its own university, then I will grant them the right to think that Yugoslav Albanians will be threatened as a national minority by the closing of the national university. Otherwise their theories about would-be national threats are just hot air.

Honorary Doctorate to Josip Broz

[Sosic] Is one of the difficulties surrounding the abolition of an Albanian-language Pristina University the fact that Josip Broz received an honorary doctorate of sciences from that university?

[Stojkovic] Four years after the founding of Pristina University, in 1975, Josip Broz was awarded an honorary doctorate of sciences. Upon receiving that degree, he said, among other things, that that university will be of use in the emancipation of the Albanian nationality, in its further cultural prosperity, and in ties with all the peoples of Yugoslavia. The type of relations between Albanians and other peoples in question here is something that we have seen numerous times. The majority of these young people who were educated at and graduated from Pristina University have a hostile attitude towards Serbia and Yugoslavia. If we want to survive, we in Serbia must, in full deliberation, effect a turnover as far as Kosovo is concerned. One of the ways to help ourselves is to do our very best to see to it that an Albanian-language Pristina University be abolished. If we do nothing, we will be forced to retreat from the entire territory, and that will be the greatest tragedy in the history of the Serbian people. I think that such a move would be equivalent to national suicide.

[Sosic] Lecturers in the Serbian language at Pristina University have lately been supporting a separation of linguistic groups. What exactly is this all about?

[Stojkovic] With regard to the fact that there is an obvious numerical superiority of Albanian instructors and workers at the university, it is normal that decisions made within the framework of the academic-educational council are voted on. Albanians are predominantly opposed to decisions by Serbian educators, and vice versa. In such a situation, the only real and possible resolution that remains is to split up the academic-educational council, and this means that there should be separate instruction in Serbian and separate instruction in Albanian. Such a resolution is inevitable only if the complete abolition of the Albanian-language university is not achieved.

Artificial Nationality

[Sosic] In your opinion, what are the prospects for an Albanian nationality within the context of Serbia and potentially Yugoslavia.

[Stojkovic] This unfortunately or intentionally chosen term “nationality” is a formula from 1974 that is not in any sense appropriate, neither linguistically nor legally. There exists an adequate term in the international community, and that term is “national minority.” The word “nationality” by necessity served as the cover for the future events that we have now witnessed. Thus, the chairman of the constitutional commission of the Assembly of Kosovo, Fatmir Fehmiu, feels that the Albanian nationality should be accorded the status of nation. It is obvious that the strategy of separatists and secessionists is to gain the status of nation and take advantage of the confusion in the country that could occur and then demand separation from Serbia, and thus from Yugoslavia. However, the respectable people who support the rule-of-law state and respect for international laws forget several elementary facts. For example, Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter guarantees the territorial integrity and political independence of its member-states. This is the sense of Resolution 1514/15, which suggests that the principle of self-determination cannot be invoked by those who through that principle would destroy, in whole or in part, the territorial integrity and completeness of any state.

Unfortunately, through the solid support for and coordination of the movement that apparently exists, the staff that is so ready and organized, an attempt is being made to take every advantage of the term “nationality” and in this way to deal the final blow to the sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia. All that remains is the hope that the Republic of Serbia and its governmental organs will not permit this. But then one might raise the question of whether this is possible, and if it is feasible. My opinion is that the Albanians living in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija can be divided into three categories. The first category is indigenous Albanians. The second category is political immigrants, and the third
category, which incidentally elicits the most doubt, comprises migrants. The members of this category came to Kosovo and Metohija during two periods. First, during the period between 1941 and 1945, i.e., during the occupation. They took advantage of a factual situation in the territory of Yugoslavia, which at the time was under occupation, and thus not a legal situation. At that time, around 120,000 Albanians settled in this area from Albania. During the second period, from 1945 to 1948, they moved from Albania to the territory of Kosmet, occupying the area that was supposed to belong to the Albanian federal entity within the framework of the plan for a future, imaginary Balkan confederation.

Dislocation of Albanians from Serbia

When we talk about the dislocation of Albanians from Serbia, we can find as a model a similar resolution that already exists in international law. Such resolutions are possible and completely realistic. As an example, I would mention the case in international practice between Nigeria and Uganda, when a million and a half inhabitants were sent from one territory to another for similar reasons.

And when we are talking about the prospects for further revolts by the Albanian national minority in Kosovo and Metohija, I think that their self-styled intellectuals have fed the flames. Instead of leading their people into Serbian and Yugoslav, and thus European, integrationist developments, they have led them into regressive processes, offering them utopian ideals, infecting them with animosity and chauvinism, which is unthinkable in modern Europe.

I feel that the decision on the way out of the Kosovo labyrinth can be found only within the context of democratic options and democratic formulas. We are witnesses to how the provincial assembly has become de facto mononational. It has become the assembly of a national minority in Yugoslavia. Such a thing exists nowhere else in the world. How to resolve this? There is a resolution, and it is a democratic one. First of all, we must dissolve the provincial assembly and then hold free democratic elections, in which all the inhabitants of Kosovo and Metohija would have their own legitimate, democratic representatives, who would hold seats in a joint assembly of the Republic of Serbia where on the basis of classical democratic principles and parity—one man, one vote—they would enjoy proportionate representation in a common republican assembly, and not in a provincial assembly. This could not be to the detriment of their human rights and liberties, which are guaranteed by international agreements, the right to use their own language, to develop their own culture, the right to publish, and to certain schools in their mother tongue.

All of those who live in the territory of the Republic of Serbia must view themselves as an integral part of that state. Those who are not responsive to these natural processes should look for somewhere else to live.

Fascist Alternative

[Sosic] To what extent do you believe in the authenticity of the support by alternativists in Kosovo and Metohija for democracy?

[Stojkovic] Albanian alternativists are clothing themselves in democratic attire, but their leaders prove that a wolf can change his coat but not his temperament. The first violin of alternativist Dr. Ibrahim Rugova has an enviable pedigree behind him, because his grandfather, father, and three uncles were shot as war criminals for crimes committed against Serbs and Montenegrins in the east. As a writer, Rugova has written children’s stories, several essays and poems, and with this literary opus he became an academic.

Zekeria Cana played his role in the arrest and conviction of the greatest Albanian dissident, Adem Demaci, and with the newly constituted democracy is attempting to redeem himself for previous sins.

The third leader of the alternativists, Veton Surroi, who is incidentally the son of Ambassador Redzaj Surroi, the brother-in-law of Farid Hajdza, who died under mysterious circumstances in Spain, is proof of Kosovo nepotism.

All these facts show clearly that the “democratic” alternative in Kosovo and Metohija in the proper sense of the word constitutes a separatist-fascist organization. The fundamental characteristic of their party strategy is openly anti-Serbian and opposed to everything with Slavic markings in the territory of Kosmet.

[Sosic] Young Albanians took to the streets in the past decade with various slogans. How do you explain that?

[Stojkovic] Proof of the fact that what we have here is a well-organized and even better-led movement is the ideological transformation with which the demonstrators took to the streets. First of all, they were anti-Titoist, throwing out pictures of Tito. Then, Marxist-Leninist, and when necessary, in the demonstrations of February 1989, they carried pictures of Tito at the head of the procession, like shields. European developments were exploited by the alternativists to expose anti-Bolshevism and anticommunism. The purpose of this latter event is for the alternativists to present their movement to worldwide public opinion as a democratic one, in the sense of true political marketing.
HUNGARY

Defense Minister on Warsaw Pact Position
25000745W Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
16 Jun 90 p 1

[Interview with Defense Minister Lajos Fur by Peter Vajda; place and date not given: “We Will Not Participate in Warsaw Pact Military Exercises—According to Defense Minister Lajos Fur”]

[Text] [Vajda] Mr. Minister, you returned from the Warsaw Pact Defense Committee meeting on Friday dawn: How would you summarize the position you represented? And what are the chances of enforcing that position?

[Fur] Consistent with the declared intent of the government, I travelled to Berlin with the same position that was represented by the delegation lead by the head of government in Moscow. Notably: The Warsaw Pact has lost its earlier role, and we will leave its military organization at the time specified: by the end of 1991. But we want to accomplish this not in the form of a unilateral step but by way of negotiations. I learned from chief officers in my company that this was the first time in this forum that a participant had raised the idea of quitting.

[Vajda] Was this the main topic of your statement?

[Fur] My statement covered four important issues. First was the quitting of the military organization of the Warsaw Pact, the one I already mentioned. Second, paralleling our negotiations on this subject, we should prepare the establishment of a new, all-European security system, so that the Warsaw Pact integrates with that organization. In other words: to integrate with that organization, not with NATO. Third, as long as we work on all of this, we must cease and liquidate everything that violates national sovereignty, and the national command of the army. Fourth, we must react with an appropriate gesture to the NATO statement made in May, according to which it does not regard the Warsaw Pact as its enemy. As you can see, the spirit of this last recommendation of mine has prevailed in the closing communiqué.

[Vajda] Insofar as our departure from the military organization is concerned, the recognition that the Hungarian position is so radical that in the end we will remain all by ourselves has already arisen in Moscow, in the course of the Political Consultative Body session....

[Fur] This is true in my view, insofar as the quitting of the military organization itself is concerned. But along with this, this time we did not have political leaders negotiating, and the way of thinking manifested by the participants was somewhat different. They understood, however, that we intend to achieve our goal by way of negotiations. And even if we are left by ourselves in this regard, I do not regard this goal as unrealistic. Incidentally, a certain period of time will pass before the Hungarian membership ceases to exist, and much similarity may be found between our views and the views of a few other countries. This applies to the CSFR, Poland, and in particular to the position held by the GDR.

[Vajda] What [argument] do the countries which do not adopt the Hungarian position invoke?

[Fur] They claim that Europe is still divided into two parts. There is NATO, and as long as one bloc exists there is a need for the other. The other argument: At the Vienna negotiations we participate as the Warsaw Pact, and this warrants our waiting for the time being with liquidation of the Pact.

[Vajda] Could we leave the military organization of the Warsaw Pact at this time?

[Fur] Considering the Vienna negotiations we could not accomplish that at the moment, but we could after the negotiations.

[Vajda] Could it be that this was the last defense ministers’ committee meeting in which the Hungarian minister of defense will take part?

[Fur] I don’t believe so. We are talking about the end of 1991; at that time there certainly will be another meeting. Moreover, one cannot rule out an extraordinary meeting, if they decide on one at the PTT (expansion unknown) to be held in November in Budapest.

[Vajda] The resolution of the National Assembly foreign affairs committee does not indicate the 1991 date, but has this to say: “In the course of its initial negotiations the government shall set as its goal the suspension of Hungary’s participation in the military organization of the Warsaw Pact. The Honved Forces shall not take part in joint military exercises, and Warsaw Pact troops shall not conduct military exercises within Hungarian territory.” What is your view?

[Fur] Essentially, in our case the suspension of specific military activities within the Warsaw Pact organization has begun already. Accordingly, we do not participate in joint military exercises, and there will be no Warsaw Pact exercises in Hungary.

[Vajda] Finally, to change the subject: I hear that the other day you also met with military attaches now on foreign assignments. Will there be personnel changes in this field, and if so, will they be similar to the scope of changes that took place in the leading posts at the Foreign Ministry?

[Fur] I am not exactly familiar with the scope of changes at the Foreign Ministry. We have 28 military attaches, and seven or eight will be recalled at present; we will publicize this shortly. On occasion decisions like this are forced by circumstances. For example, we will not need a military attaché in the GDR; that country is becoming unified.
Conflicting Statements on Soviet Troop Removal From Szolnok

Soviets on Withdrawal Dates
25000745U Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 13 Jun 90 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Is Withdrawal Delayed?"]

[Text] The Hungarian delegation was allowed to enter the Soviet barracks in Szolnok yesterday. Two weeks ago they were turned away from the gate due to misunderstandings. Moreover, the local commander apologized for what happened. The purpose of the visit is related to the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Representatives of the city government and of the Honved Forces inspected the "inheritance" to be left to the city after the withdrawal.

In all three Soviet compounds in Szolnok the guests found neglected, devastated buildings. The only exception to this is the new, three-story enlisted men's quarters on Varosmajor Street. This building, together with the cafeteria that goes with it, was viewed by council members as a future college. At this time the committee did not inspect the Soviet military hospital, because, according to information received thus far, that ensemble of buildings appears to be in good condition from the outside, and will be the last one in the city to be vacated by the Soviets.

The Hungarian inspectors—both civilians and soldiers—were surprised to listen to the scheduling of Soviet troop removal, as read out loud from a notebook by the commercial supply representative of the Southern Command. According to what he read, the initial units returning home have left the city already, but further withdrawal will be delayed until the middle of next year.

Members of the Hungarian inspection committee insisted that the intergovernmental agreement concerning withdrawal specifies 8 August and September of this year as the actual deadline in Szolnok. This deadline is also specified in a circular received by the county recruiting command. Compared to that, the hosts reported dates this fall and winter, and next spring and summer. Moreover, a September 1991 date was also mentioned. The committee could not accept that date at all, because it is beyond the final deadline for the full troop withdrawal!

Asked for the reason of the changed time frame, the local commander smiled politely and spread his arms: He would leave for home tomorrow if he received an order to that effect, but at present this is the order, and this is what they must implement. Also, the representative of the commercial supply group revealed only that the changed dates are justified for organizational reasons.

Boldizsar Lengyel, the deputy chairman of the city council, promised the Soviet party that they would provide notice within two weeks as to which Soviet-built objects the city wants to have, or, alternatively, does not want to have. The purchase price of the former must be negotiated, but the latter may be wrecked and taken out with the withdrawn troops.

Original Date Confirmed
25000745U Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 16 Jun 90 p 4

[Interview with representative Miklos Vasarhelyi by Lajos Poganyi; place and date not given: "Representatives With General Burlakov"]

[Text] Yesterday afternoon Colonel General Burlakov, commander of the Southern Army, and several generals from his staff received an ad hoc committee of the Hungarian Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee headed by Miklos Vasarhelyi.

The meeting was initiated by the Hungarian side, and the topics involved political, material, technical, and transportation issues relative to Soviet troop removal. Vasarhelyi told NEPSZABADSAG. He added: The three-hour meeting took place in a friendly, open, and candid atmosphere.

[Poganyi] This statement sounds a bit official. Could we hear more?

[Vasarhelyi] Colonel General Burlakov confirmed that, consistent with the Soviet-Hungarian agreement reached at the government level, the Soviet side will do everything in the interest of removing its forces fully and accurately by 30 June 1991.

[Poganyi] Was there any discussion concerning the financial problems related to troop withdrawal?

[Vasarhelyi] Yes, but we told them that this issue must be dealt with by experts. We agreed that the common goal of both the Soviet and the Hungarian sides is to continue maintaining the good relationship between the two countries. We also agreed that problems like the accident that occurred at the Kunszentmiklos heliport must be clarified with mutual good intentions. The Soviet party also told us that we may inspect the various Soviet military objects, if we wish.

Defense Ministry Protests
25000745U Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 16 Jun 90 p 4

[Article by V. P.: "The Defense Ministry Registered Its Protest: Soviet Troops Will Be Removed From Szolnok on Time"]

[Text] The Friday issue of this newspaper carried a report entitled "Is Withdrawal Delayed?" concerning a visit paid to the Soviet barracks in Szolnok. Soviet officers there made statements to the effect that due to organizational reasons the withdrawal of Soviet troops, their transportation to the Soviet Union from Szolnok, may be delayed even until September 1991.
Defense Ministry spokesman colonel Gyorgy Keleti called the command headquarters of the Southern Army and protested the peculiar statement. He stated that withdrawal is fixed pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement, and that observing the dates contained in the attachment to the agreement is mandatory for everyone. The Defense spokesman told this newspaper that according to the schedule countersigned by Colonel General Burlakov, commander of the Southern Army Group, the Soviet troops will be removed altogether in five intervals from Szolnok. Four of these dates occur this year, and only one date is scheduled for next year. That date is 19 June 1991. The Southern Command headquarters stated that the withdrawal plan remains in force unchanged, and also that they could not understand the statement.

Last Trainload of Soviet Troops Leaves Town of Tab

25000745V Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 15 Jun 90 p 5

[MTI [Hungarian Telegraph Agency] report]

[Text] Rosettes in the national colors, inscribed with the word "Tab," were given as souvenirs to 400 Soviet soldiers who permanently left this outer-Somogy small town Wednesday afternoon. With them the last—the eighth—train carrying vehicles, materiel, and the personal property of military families also left the town.

YUGOSLAVIA

Law on Military Leave, Retirement Amended

90BA0146A Belgrade SLUZBENI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 18 May 90 p 933

[Official Gazette of the SFRY]

[Text] 492.

On the basis of Article 316. Point 3) of the Constitution of the SFRY, the Presidency of the SFRY issues a

DECREE

ABOUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE LAW ON CHANGES IN AND AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW ON SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES

The Law on Changes in and Amendments to the Law on Service in the Armed Forces, which was passed by the Parliament of the SFRY in a meeting of the Executive Council on 16 May 1990, is announced.

Pg. no. 1196
Belgrade, 16 May 1990

President of the Presidency of the SFRY
Dr. Borisav Jovic
President of the Assembly of the SFRY
Dr. Slobodan Gligorijevic

LAW

ON CHANGES IN AND AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW ON SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES

Article 1

In the Law on Service in the Armed Forces (SLUZBENI LIST SFRY, No. 7/85, 20/89 and 40/89) in article 314, paragraph 1, the words "in the previous month" are changed to the words "for the previous month."

Article 2

In article 372, paragraph 1, is changed to read:

"The soldier is entitled to regular leave in the amount of 15 days for 12 months of military service or one day of leave for each month of military service beyond 12 months, not counting travel time."

Article 3

In article 471, paragraphs 2 to 4 are added and read:

"With the exception of the regulation in paragraph 1 of this article, a civilian can leave the service, depending on the needs of the service, if he has fulfilled the conditions for an age pension or if he is entitled to one of the following rights:

1) the right to buy off time of service if he lacks up to five years retirement time for qualifying for the right to an age pension;

2) the right to one-time compensation in the form of severance pay in the amount of at least 24 average personal salaries that he earned in the last three months before leaving the service, if he indicates in writing that he wishes to leave the service and that these funds will permanently resolve his employment status, under the conditions and in the manner prescribed by law.

The federal secretary or the superior in charge of the civilian will make the decision on the departure of the civilian from the service according to the regulations of paragraph 2 of this article.

The civilian who leaves the service according to the regulations in paragraph 2, point 2) of this article is not entitled to severance pay under article 483, paragraph 3, of this law."

Article 4

This law will go into effect on the day following its announcement in SLUZBENI LIST SFRY [Official Gazette of the SFRY].
Precise Specifications and Conducting of Tasks

Concerning individual cases and construction specifics of past and known statements on the circle of problems in the renewal process, they no longer only exist in the use of construction capacity in response to demand, but also in an active advertising strategy which demands market knowledge. Advertising will also actively influence construction demand.

Associated with this continuing task is a long-term outlook for expansion of a computer-supported information system. Its demand for information is to be organized in conjunction with the processing of renewal projects on proposal-oriented contracts which supply information.

A proposal- and reorganization-oriented management will become the catalyst pushing the process of reorganization towards a goal, securing its just demands for the present, and preparing for it in the future.

Today, proposal orientation is a component part of work in market-oriented contracting firms, when they provide constant forward-looking work, when they estimate the value their own potential at the present and in the near future, and when they want to use it effectively.

In the basic trends of contractor development, three primary sections of deliberate performance come to light:

- analysis of internal capability;
- strategic variety of proposals;
- achievement in a chosen direction of development.

From the strategic (concept) phase to demanding economic and scientific-technical goals (the implementation phase), the proposal-oriented transition demands the insurance of material-technical prerequisites (supplies) for planned renewals, whereby the consideration of social aspects must be preceded by the direction of renewal processes.

The Inclusion of Social Aspects as a Constant Goal

Among the uninterrupted goals to be considered as a minimum prerequisites for managerial control of the renewal process are:

- a performance-oriented work atmosphere;
- appropriate relationships between work sections (within a construction company);
- direction of the work force movement;
- employee recruitment and preparation for renewal processes and certain renewal plans.

In managing the reorganization processes, the circumstances of social aspects contain the specifics of the construction company work groups, and are determined by accomplishments at the construction site, which is constantly changing. This is a necessary aspect which has effects on other specifics, and has effects on setting goals and orienting objectives.
Tailoring the Management System, as Determined by Reorganization

Moving from command reaction through matching capacity to reorganization-oriented proposals with the help of modern management methods and tools, the transition raises the question of how far proven organizational solutions can assist flexible reaction, without first requiring changes in contractor organizational solutions.

There are repetitive elements of every construction site, but each is fundamentally unique, due to the always differing site and the associated specifics of working area and time constraints. These affect job preparation through to construction and quite long job times in comparison to industrial products. Given these unique conditions, construction sites always possess the character of a custom management and reorganization process.

The changing demands on reorganization with respect to time and work space, which depend on the site and duration of project construction, demand answers to two questions:

1. To what limit can a stable management system quickly react flexibly, and when must it go through a major reorganization due to construction project demands?

2. What are the most appropriate forms of construction project management to be used in implementing reorganization processes?

The necessary answers are closely related to one another, since the construction contractors create the foundation and prerequisites of their own fortunes themselves with the aid of active proposal strategies.

The step-by-step analysis of construction conditions in this process, which are becoming more and more complicated, lead to methods of solution and practical results for the management of reorganization processes:

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<th>Stage</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Expected form of results</th>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Reorganization plans effecting internal management procedures</td>
<td>Solution with existing management system without change</td>
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<td>II</td>
<td>Change in capacity in direction of performance and structure</td>
<td>Capacity adjustment and increase in work output</td>
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<td>III</td>
<td>Renewal processes from the construction site, which have unique characteristics at each site</td>
<td>Flexible management elements with internal construction site management</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Affecting management tasks in a project management sense</td>
<td>New solutions with effects on the existing management system</td>
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The staged program to be implemented here, for organizational reworking contains in its results the steps towards building up towards a more efficient application of renewal potential.

The untangling of the reorganization processes in diverse renewal plans for products, procedures, materials, organizational and information systems, with further embedded subdivisions does not always lead to the desired stated goal from management.

A concentration of reorganization on the enterprise-level statements is necessary, because in the center of the staged program is Stage II with effects on Stage III.

This means it concerns timely and appropriate changes, as well as enduring ones, in output and structure of capacities. (1) It influences internal company management procedures after this sets the process in motion from Phase I to Phase II on the management side. (2) To what extent the project management demands inferences of generally changed construction site management (3) is a question of possible information collection and processing. This task is thoroughly enduring, and it must be accomplished in the future if the construction contracting enterprise will change to a project management method.

Staged Program Management Tasks

The construction company's director exercises his leadership function in the reorganization process under various aspects.

First of all, continuous work must be primarily insured, because it forces the concept of staged development of reorganization processes upon the manager who is looking ahead. This will insure continuity and economy by responding to market demands in the future, too. It is clear in this that one step precedes the other, and skipping steps does not gain much useful.

The director must decide how far the reorganization process should reach. Little is gained when the entire material reorganization process is permanent reorganization. The true target in sight is something else, down to the department to a reorganization-oriented attitude and actions.

After preliminary findings, a potential group from management, those under the responsibility of the Technical Director, for example, will be required which is available and prepared to meet these demands. It will need to be capable of directing long-range work. This insures continuous strategic long-range planning without the creation of new departmental units or department expansion. Just the opposite, it becomes available through consistent organization of planning activities and preliminary work over long periods of time. These are clear
statements on behalf of the necessary reductions in expenditures for management and administration, in conjunction with necessary notification and incentives for construction company employees.

The aspect of continuity, beginning with strategic long-range planning activities, is contrasted with other aspects such as that of temporary construction crew employment, which is particularly dependent on each construction project. The uniqueness of construction procedures requires, for example, construction crews which work on numerous construction projects within a specified territory, working on schedules dependent on individual construction project deadlines.

The organization of temporary crew assignments in the context of a stable management structure is a basic component of managing reorganization, particularly in the working construction industry. This comes from the specifics of construction procedures.

Guidelines on Construction Management Practice

In the past, the structure of the management system appeared to be a command structure called “a stable framework” which was the goal and outcome of the construction organization. In contrast to that, the procedural organization remains the dynamic element with which the accelerated reorganization cycle can be effective.

For the transition from structure to procedure, task management is typical for construction firms, which makes comprehensive renewal processes manageable. Contract management is a form of procedural responsibility which varies from the line-staff organization. In general, the process-oriented training of management groups can be scientifically founded and practically tested to be a contribution to the application of project management. This is because practical means of managerial implementation are created which were not previously available.

A further construction-related contribution is the embodied improvement in fundamental management activities.

Fundamental activities associated with initiating work processes (reorganization processes here), affect the position of the director in the procedure organization.

Apparently, the results of inter-dependent fundamental activities are an indicator of the director's management style. Fundamental activities, as a basic component of a comprehensively exercised and so comprehensively effective management process, are enriched and improved into a system of decisionmaking support for the implementation of reorganization processes.

The subjective demands which fundamental activities postulate on the director are ultimately made objective when management models are successfully used as an information tool.

With the current far-reaching possibilities to collect information, to store it and to usefully process it, the director does not have to just depend on his own knowledge and experience for his decisions. The director, with information tools gives far-reaching support for the dynamics of the reorganization process precisely in the construction industry and the necessary reorganization-related procedures in order to guide and accelerate this process.

HUNGARY

Finance Minister Envisons 1991 Economic Turnaround

250007455K Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 16 Jun 90 p 9

[Interview with Finance Minister Ferenc Rabar by Nandor Bognar; place and date not given: “The Great Turnaround Can Be Expected To Take Place in January”—first two paragraphs are MAGYAR NEMZET introduction]

[Text] The largest part of the avalanche of attacks aimed at the new government when it announced the names of its members undoubtedly fell on Finance Minister Ferenc Rabar. They questioned his practical and theoretical knowledge, his suitability for the job, and his education.

After all this the first question presented itself naturally:

[Bognar] How did Ferenc Rabar live through this unusual start: Did you count on such a reception, or were you surprised?

[Rabar] I was surprised, because I did not think that the lack of confidence in our society could be exploited to that extent, that it could be so directed. In the end, however, I had to understand that the entire matter is a result of the injured state of mind of the public and its actors. I register this as an unpleasant experience which I have to bear together with my office.

[Bognar] I also feel that you have gotten over this without significant conflicts and without an exchange of punches with the press. So now the everyday constructive work may begin. On this occasion “constructive work” must be understood literally, because you must reconstruct the entire organization of the ministry. How far have you gotten?

[Rabar] I have been here only a bit more than two weeks, and even during this time I have had to fight brush fires
most of the time. Meanwhile, I have also travelled abroad, to France and to Austria. Outside negotiations and the achievement of internal operative tasks have not left much time to do long-range organizing. During this brief period of time the group charged with transforming the three organizations has been established. Its main function is to perform the tasks related to the merger of the Planning Office and the Ministry of Finance. The third organization, the Pricing Office, actually constitutes a closed unit. It will be changed into a cartel office, i.e. it will adapt to the circumstances of a market economy with fundamentally new tasks, as an organization independent of the Finance Ministry.

Credible Promises

[Bognar] The profession has also spoken, more accurately a few leaders from the specialized area of finance have spoken. We have come to understand from their statements that under the given circumstances they applied the best possible solutions, and consequently if someone else were to do this differently, it would only produce worse results. They predicted in advance that the measurable indexes: the volume of indebtedness, the budgetary deficit, and inflation, could only be larger than they would have been had the Nemeth government stayed in office. Under no circumstances would I want to prompt you to forecast the future, but I must ask: Is it conceivable that by the end of the year we will be able to record better financial results than the former ministry of finance predicted in January of 1990?

[Rabar] In discussing anticipated results we must distinguish between the anticipated results of this year, and long-term results. Generally speaking, it is characteristic of financial decisions that the consequences appear only after a certain period of time. At present we are experiencing the consequences of last year's decisions; the results of our present decisions will show only next year. Accordingly, our opportunities this year are highly limited. Our agreement with the IMF represents an additional restriction, and there is not much we can change in that regard. I am aware, that in this way all the observer sees is that the government does nothing else, no more than the previous government. It introduces restrictive measures to increase revenues: It takes steps which have evoked dissatisfaction and outrage on the part of the populace and businesses thus far. But as I said: Our actions this year are fundamentally determined by our international agreements and our budget.

[Bognar] According to what you just said, the populace, society, may look forward only to having faith in the government and tightening its belt?

[Rabar] Yes, but this faith may be supported by two important factors. One is a consideration that this government has not yet discredited itself, it has not made promises which cannot be fulfilled. From this standpoint the members of this government are still clean, thus it is warranted to give credence to its promises. The other matter: Our promises are not being made at a time when long-term politics remain unchanged, and while we experiment with raising some kind of hope in the short term. We intend to support our measures with a long-range plan which makes our promises credible at least in the eyes of professionals.

[Bognar] That sounds nice, but meanwhile leaders of the opposition continually mention the approaching end of the 100 days; the populace is becoming increasingly impatient: People would like to sense something from the favorable changes in terms of taxes, prices, anything, and they want to do so as soon as possible, not next year. When can we expect to directly experience something as a result of the fact that there is something new in financial policies?

[Rabar] I feel that the stressing of those 100 days has the character of a fetish. The fact is that actions will also be taken during those 100 days, but they will still be of the same character as the previous ones, i.e. brush fire fighting types, measures that help resolve the concerns in individual fields. These are not yet parts of the transformation plan; in introducing these measures we will observe only that they do not contradict our longer term intentions. These three months are needed to prepare the plans, because if we want to introduce fundamental changes beginning early next year, we must present those to Parliament this fall. On the other hand: We have reached an agreement with the IMF concerning a plan to be implemented jointly in the course of three years; this provides the indispensable international support for our perceptions which aim for the fundamental transformation of the Hungarian economy. Accordingly, the 100 days pertain to the development of our plans.

[Bognar] And the populace...?

[Rabar] Unfortunately, the populace will not notice significant changes this year either: If faced with any sector of financial policy it will seemingly respond the same way as it did last year. I expect to see changes in two areas from the standpoint of citizens. Once we discontinue regulations which hinder the market economy, prices, wages, taxes, subsidies will change all at once, i.e. a fundamentally new situation will present itself. Thereafter the economy may fall into place and market forces may begin to function. This turnaround will be felt strongly by citizens, and also by institutions. This will be followed by a period of adaptation during which we hope the market system of prices and wages will evolve, supply and demand, and prices already freed will define each other.

[Bognar] By when do you think all of this will be realized?

[Rabar] During the first half of next year. By the middle of next year, in the autumn at the latest, a market balance will have evolved which at the same time establishes conditions for convertibility. This also shows: We do not regard convertibility as a means, but as a consequence which flows naturally from an open market economy,
and which may be introduced without particularly large shocks in a situation like this.

**Price Increases Under the Table**

[Bognar] The first half of the year has passed. I do not want to ask you to make predictions, but still, what do you expect to see in regard to those of-mentioned key parameters: inflation, the volume of indebtedness, and the budgetary deficit?

[Rabar] This year’s inflation has many years of history, beginning with the 1973 oil price explosion, which we did not permit to have its ripple effects in those days.... This is an accelerating process that is impossible to stop all of a sudden; one can slow it down at best. I believe that by the end of this year the inflation rate may run up as high as 25 percent, perhaps even higher by one or two percentage points. Our results are much more promising regarding indebtedness. Based on our agreement with the IMF, by the end of this year the current balance of payments deficit must be no higher than $500 million. We have a chance to reduce this [deficit] significantly, to build up foreign exchange reserves in support of next year’s turnaround.

[Bognar] The budget is an even more complicated task I would think, because in addition to the fact that there is a deficit, the entire structure needs to be changed....

[Rabar] In this regard one must really separate matters. One thing is the extent of the budgetary deficit, in regard to which we also have commitments to the IMF. Under no circumstances can we exceed the projected 10 billion [forint] budgetary deficit by the end of the year, because if we do, that may mean the loss of our creditworthiness in the eyes of the international financial world. Accordingly, in this regard we must confront the inherited deficit in the framework of the old structure with the old methods.

[Bognar] Price increases once again, that is...?

[Rabar] Yes, but we intend to accomplish price increases to an extent and in areas so as to avoid accelerating the growth of inflation. I must add, however, that in this regard we are dealing exclusively with price increases planned and announced by the previous government, the implementation of which was delayed. Energy price increases, for example, were decided upon by the previous government, yet we are hesitating to touch them. The ripple effects of such price increases can be felt throughout the economy, and this is by all means contrary to our anti-inflationary endeavors. Accordingly, beyond these we are not planning to have any other price increases. We will use these means only in an ultimate emergency; we find the reduction of subsidies, in the area of agricultural product exports for example, to be far more important.

[Bognar] It is difficult to separate an actor in public life and his role, particularly in times of political systems change, I believe. As a person you appear to be a calm, balanced individual, of whom we also know that he is 60 years old, has five children, is cultured, and has not been involved with the earlier financial leadership, not even tangentially. This placid image is somewhat contradicted by your statement at the nomination hearing in Parliament. This is what you said: As finance minister you will not be deterred from playing the role of even a murderer, and you will force party politicians demanding subsidies to the grounds of reality. Is there no contradiction here?

[Rabar] Yes there is, I think. Even within himself a person should separate his social inclinations, aspirations, and the milieu, the opportunities offered by the situation. We are in a situation in which our permissiveness in regard to fulfilling our cultural, social, or otherwise warranted desires without establishing the needed funds, will result in our dragging on with us the diseases which have lead thus far to the destruction and the plundering of the country. The term “murderer” is supposedly a journalistic exaggeration, but stringency is required by all means, if for no other reason, in order to be able to provide as much as possible for culture, sports, everything.

**What’s the Cost of Transformation?**

[Bognar] In the end, then, we have once again returned to a situation in which the government is able to promise only “blood and tears,” a further struggle that is...?

[Rabar] No, I feel that we can promise something fundamentally different from what the governments have promised thus far. Notably: the shortening of the time frame. This government does not distribute small amounts here and there, while it idly observes that the country is continuing to fall apart and that the general situation is further deteriorating for decades. This government says: This year I will not be able to help, but I will help next year! As we mentioned earlier: At the beginning of the year we will implement fundamental changes whose results can be felt by all means in six or eight months. There will be no small changes in one or two areas, the economy as a whole will begin to breathe and to come alive, a growth will start instead of continued contraction. This provides security for our ability to satisfy our debt service payments without domestic restrictions.

[Bognar] At present, however, the situation is that from among the members of the government the finance minister inherited the most burdensome legacy. His situation is somewhat like having to perform the act of contrition without having “enjoyed” the commission of sins. How do you regard the acceptance of these burdens, the acceptance of performing the acts of contrition professionally and as a human being?

[Rabar] As an individual concerned with the welfare of society I am able to fully understand the misery of people, the struggle of pensioners and families with many children; at the same time, however, as a professional I must also recognize that the fate of these people can be helped only if at this time we establish primarily
the opportunity for a turnaround. And this has its price. Living with this contradiction has meant a spiritual burden of unimaginable proportions thus far. Even before [I became minister] I performed my job conscientiously I believe, but I was always able to separate my own personality, I was able to set aside the appropriate time and attention for my favorite chores and hobbies. This has come to an end now. I have to surrender myself; my entire personality is involved in this task.

[Bognar] Are you a religious person?

[Rabar] Yes, and that helps a lot. It's much easier this way.

**Interior Ministry Involvement in Equipment, Arms Deal Alleged**

25000745T Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 14 Jun 90 p 5

[Article by M.P.—V.P.: “Armsdealer Limited Liability Corporation? The Court of Registry Refused To Record Arzenal”]

[Text] Smallholders Party [FKGP] representative Miklos Omolnar has submitted an inquiry addressed to the interior state secretary. In his view an arms-dealing limited liability corporation has been established within the Interior Ministry, brought under roof out of funds appropriated to the Interior Ministry, and with enterprise capital and funds from high-ranking Interior Ministry officials. Omolnar was hinting at the Hungarian Steel Arzenal Limited Liability Corporation, whose registration was refused by the Court of Registry on 13 June.

The background of the case is this: The Hungarian Steel Products Factory and the Ministry of the Interior, as well as six private individuals (Steel Products Factory employees and—allegedly—an active Interior Ministry official) wanted to establish a limited liability corporation, for the sale of hunting weapons received from the Yugoslavian Zastava factory, among other items. They reached an agreement in this regard with the former Interior Ministry leadership. According to Arzenal Managing Director Tamas Rucz, between 4,000 and 5,000 hunters would like to buy guns, and Zastava was unable to pay with any other sellable goods for the products of the Hungarian Steel Products Factory than with guns. The first shipment of hunting weapons will soon arrive in Hungary from Yugoslavia. The Steel Factory's shop is already selling goods within the profile of the company that is intended to be established: Workers Guard equipment, camouflage clothing, shoes, boots, compasses. There is minimum interest in these products. Business plans regarding weapons for self-defense purposes hinge on regulations, but in this regard they envision far smaller prospects than with hunting weapons, we learned from Hungarian Steel Products Factory President Ferenc Sors.

Sors provided NEPSZABADSAG with a copy of a telefax message sent at that time to the interior minister. "It is the company's purpose, among other matters, to contribute to the reduction of the Interior Ministry's budgeted expenses with the sale of stored Workers Guard inventories." The president regards the Court of Registry's action as illegal. In its determination rejecting the registration, the Court of Registry also requested that the present Interior Ministry declare whether it will take part in the limited liability corporation. Ferenc Sors is repeating the same request, awaiting a response from Interior Minister Dr. [Balazs] Horvath as to whether the Interior Ministry will remain in the company or if it quits.

Interior Ministry cabinet chief Dr. Lajos Bosanszky told NEPSZABADSAG that an investigation is in progress with regard to the entire matter, including the possible personal participation of Interior Ministry workers in the limited liability corporation. The public will be informed of the investigative results without delay.

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We are looking forward with interest to the information. Considering the fact that the issue pertains to an organ that is funded by the budget joining in on a business venture, the clarification may have the significance of clarifying a principle. We believe that anyone willing to sell Workers Guard equipment other than items having the character of weapons should only be encouraged, because doing so certainly does not represent a promising business deal. At the same time, however, we regard any Interior Ministry participation in the sale of weapons as cause for grave concern, because the licensing process and regulation related to the ownership of weapons is within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. A conflict of interest between precise regulation and sales is unavoidable. This country cannot be so poor that the salaries of soldiers and policemen must be paid from the sale of weapons by companies established with the participation of ministries.

**Plans To Switch to Western Electrical Grid Discuss**

25000745L Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 16 Jun 90 p 9

[Interview with Gyorgy Hatvani, president of MVMT [Hungarian Electrical Works Trust], by Lorinc Szendrei; place and date not given: “From Ontario to the Danube: Energy System X-Rayed”—first paragraph is MAGYAR NEMZET introduction]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted on visit to power plant at Niagara Falls, comparison with Bos-Nagymaros, description of the Canadian example of “influencing consumer behavior”] Having seen and heard all this, it occurred to me that a Hungarian housewife would not believe that an electrical utility would half the electrical bill if she turned on her iron, her washing machine, her vacuum cleaner at a certain time of the day. In other
words: Confidence is an extremely important element in this program. We talked with [MVMT—Hungarian Electrical Works Trust] President Gyorgy Hatvani about whether a Hungarian utility could obtain such confidence.

**Conduit About To Break**

[Hatvani] We have no other choice. We will have to introduce the Canadian program, or a program similar to the Canadian program, because the specter that the Soviets will reduce, or God forbid, halt the electrical energy supply is hovering over our heads. In other words: In the changing Hungarian consumption patterns the fundamental element is a certain uncertainty in expectations concerning electrical power supply in the coming decades. There is a potential threat that we will partly or fully lose our imports.

[Szendrei] Is the Peace Transmission Line breaking apart?

[Hatvani] Even if not literally, it is breaking up figuratively, which is far more dangerous than a possible disturbance in operations. One should add to this that at present no power plant is being constructed in Hungary. On the other hand, we have developed a concept for the electrical energy supply of the country. This includes the fact that we must construct a basic power plant. But we cannot just sit until we have money for this purpose.

[Szendrei] What can you do if Soviet imports are reduced or discontinued?

[Hatvani] The most important task is to strengthen our linkage with the unified West European electrical energy system. This does not mean that we would permanently surrender the business we have fostered with our Soviet partners.

[Szendrei] Is the Hungarian system adaptable to the Western system?

[Hatvani] Not yet. Moreover, we will have to rearrange our lines even within our borders. This is not an impossible task, because the Hungarian electrical energy supply system complies with relatively high standards. We must link up with West Europe while being able to continue to receive Soviet imports, because irrespective of how large the uncertainty, we cannot give up Soviet imports, even if we must pay large sums of money for it.

[Szendrei] Thus far, energy supplies have been dealt with at the governmental level. We do not read much about that in the new government program. How is the MVMT’s situation changing?

[Hatvani] Certainly we will be able to discuss this matter at the earliest possible date with the member of the government having jurisdiction. Our program is complete. We have assessed the risks that may be anticipated, and have developed our defensive tactics. On one side the establishment and development of inter-enterprise relations is important. This is the only possible way in terms of our procurement. On the other hand, we have defined our tactics with respect to our consumers; this is where we will integrate our Canadian and French experiences, in other words, we intend to incorporate the DSM [consumer awareness, behavior modification] program.

[Szendrei] Are they going to buy this?

[Hatvani] It is not certain that it can be applied in Hungary in its present form. But several specific elements of the program may be incorporated. The principle is important, it can be proved that the principle is correct, because the issue is that everything must be done in order to optimize consumption as long as new investments can be avoided. [passage omitted]

**Polluted Environment, Long-Term Health Risks Described**

90CHO174A Vienna PROFIL in German 30 Apr 90 pp 76-80

[Article by Robert Buchacher: “Health Care Expenditures Rival Military Budget”]

[Text] At the bottom of the Dorog Basin, 38 km northwest of Budapest, there lies a brown veil of haze; when there is atmospheric inversion, it’s enough to make a person believe he will choke.

In Dorog, (13,000 inhabitants), inferior lignite coal is broken down and used as fuel in two heating plants right in the middle of town. Each year, the stacks belch 13,000 tons of unfiltered sulphur dioxide into the air, one ton for each inhabitant.

On the grounds of a briquette factory, 10,000 tons of coal dust are stored, and not 25 meters away, children play in the soot-blackened concrete courtyard of an elementary school. The ground level dust concentration at that spot is seven times the maximum allowable concentration. The pediatrician Anna David of Budapest’s Institute of the Peoples’ Health knows: “These are carcinogenic substances.”

David, who practiced in Dorog for 17 years, reports of cases of suffocation involving small children, of pseudocroup, chronic asthma, incipient pulmonary emphysema, diminished developmental opportunities, and a high rate of congenital heart defects: “The situation is dramatic; it will have its effects on the next generations.”

Nearly one Hungarian out of two lives in an area of heavy air pollution. In the last 10 years, the number of cases of acute bronchitis has nearly trebled. Deaths attributable to acute respiratory diseases increase constantly, even among children and adolescents.

Hungary’s lung cancer rate heads the list throughout the world. In Austria in 1988, 417 persons per 100,000 in the population died of lung cancer; in Hungary, the figure
grams, super has 0.15), the levels found in nearly 90 percent of the children studied in the inner city were above the internationally-permitted limit.

Not until a year ago did data begin leaking to the public. Agnes Nagy, a free-lance doll-painter at Martirok utja 73 set up urine tests for lead for her two and a half-year-old son Aron and for an additional 40 neighborhood children.

Some 82 percent of the children surpassed the limit set for adults. In Aron Nagy's case, the reading measured was twice as high, and in another child's case, the reading measured was even three times that of the adult limit.

International studies show that such concentrations of lead can adversely affect a child's nervous system, his ability to concentrate, the ability to learn and modes of behavior in a detectable way. A study conducted at Budapest's Institute of the People's Health uncovered a significant drop in the intelligence quotients of children in Budapest and Romhany due to lead.

The carbon monoxide content of the air is increasing steadily, chiefly as a result of the growing number of motor vehicles. The Hungarian Ministry of Traffic estimates there will be a 50 percent increase in the number of motor vehicles by the year 2000. A leaning toward a catalyzing car is nowhere in sight, quite the contrary: anyone who imports a Western-made catalyzing car has to pay the same duty and value added tax rate (17 plus 25 percent) as he would for an old air polluter, and anyone who replaces his two-stroke engine with a Fiat 127 engine has to pay a re-equipping fee of 2,100 florins. Lead-free gasoline also costs more than leaded gasoline.

In addition to the airborne noxae, high levels of formaldehyde exposure from adhesives and glues pose an additional problem in newly constructed apartments. In many cases, rooms are heated by gas stoves; the exhaust fumes escape to the outside underneath the windows, only to reenter through the windows or through insufficient insulation of the flue, into the walls.

In a questionnaire conducted in 1988, the vast majority of those polled indicated that they would be willing to accept a decline in the standard of living in exchange for a decline of health risks.

They already have the lower standard of living, but the health risks have increased again. In the urban centers and in those areas near industry, not only air pollution, but also soil pollution has assumed alarming proportions. Along the roadsides, soil concentrations of lead are as much as 100 times higher than in slightly polluted areas. Other concentrations of heavy metals exceed the allowable limits several fold.

Hungary produces 6.1 million tons of hazardous waste annually. According to a government report, one-third of the toxic waste is not detoxified; the detoxification system, like the one in Austria, is just now being built.
Experts estimate that there are thousands of illegal dumping sites in Hungary—a ticking time bomb. Approximately 60 percent of the known 2,600 dump sites are not in compliance with environmental regulations.

In 1981, many inhabitants of Vac, an industrial city north of Budapest complained of bouts of vomiting and diarrhea. The drinking water had become contaminated with pharmaceutical waste, and a waterworks was shut down. In Gyál near Budapest, the drinking water was poisoned by a galvanization plant.

Toxic waste from Graz found its way to the dump site for household garbage at Mosonmagyaróvar, 15 km from the border crossing at Nickelsdorf. The city fathers want to use the revenues to construct an incinerator; now they are constructing a communal well, 10 km away from the city.

Some 90 percent of the population of Hungary receives its water from a public water supply system, but only 50 percent are connected to a sewer system. Only 358 of the approximately 3,500 communities have a sewer system.

For decades, untreated household and industrial waste water has been flowing into Lake Balaton. The largest steppe lake in Europe was biologically dead 10 years ago, and the source of drinking water for many lakeshore communities was threatened.

Concern for the tourist trade has, in the meantime, provided the impetus for the construction of an encircling canal, complete with purification plants. Many such environmental projects are surrounded by stories of penury, bungling, and corruption at the ministerial level.

The purification plant at Boglarfelle, which was finished 4 years ago, is still not working, and the Zala, replete with household and industrial waste, continues to flow into the western part of the lake.

Cities like Szeged, Szolnok, Debrecen, Pecs, or Győr allow untreated household and industrial waste to flow into the rivers to this day. In Budapest thus far, only 20 percent of the waste water is purified, 80 percent flows untreated into the Danube.

In some cities, like Győr, Komárno, and Esztergom, purification plants are being built at the present time, but the available purification technology cannot keep pace with the noxae. Budapest could use two large purification facilities right now, but funds are lacking.

In Budapest, the Danube’s water contains a series of toxins, including heavy metals, chlorinated halogens, and chlorinated hydrocarbons. Some 90 percent of Budapest’s drinking water comes from riverbank filtrate, and 10 percent is taken directly from the Danube.

The Apena Health and Mineral Water Factory in Budapest-Oermeczoc, a plant operated by the Ministry of Health, fills 600,000 half-liter bottles annually for babies. The bottles are available at certain grocery stores free of charge, upon presentation of ration coupon. In those areas where the water is undrinkable, and in 1987, there were still 636 villages and towns where that was the case, and today that number includes 570 villages and towns, every child has a right to two liters of baby water per day until he or she has reached the age of three.

To give the water a longer shelf life, it is enriched with carbonic acid, and each bottle’s label bears the instructions: “Boil five minutes before using.”

The plant’s director, Maria Gyarmathy, responds after being questioned at length: “The water is piped in from the municipal waterworks on the island of Csepel.”

The island of Csepel in the Danube is Budapest’s industrial center. There, as in South Buda on the opposite bank, stand many chemical plants that dump their waste water into the Danube in an unpurified state. Water from the riverbank filtrate is prepared physically and chemically. “Our water,” says Gyarmathy, who is in charge of filling the baby bottles, “is constantly monitored by the health authorities, we’re far below the acceptable limits.”

But for eight years now the plant has not been allowed to send any mineral water to Austria because of limits that have been exceeded. New purification methods should bring the seltzer up to Austrian standards.

Water that has been purified to Hungarian standards is delivered to the industrial city of Vac, among other things. The tap water there contains nitrate concentrations that exceed the concentration of 40 milligrams per liter by as much as twofold—dangerous doses for babies and small children.

Between 1976 and 1988 approximately 1,600 Hungarian babies suffered from drinking water poisoning; 25 of them died.

Dead babies are a real indictment of the drinking water; it is then delivered in tank trucks, in bottles, or in plastic bags. In many places, as in Nagymaros or in Veszprém, the children go to school with water bags under their arms. Throughout the country, only one-quarter of the water can be drunk without some form of preparation.

In the Southeast, as a result of nitrate poisoning of the ground water, many deep wells have been drilled. In 1983 it proved that, due to prevailing geological conditions, the new water findings are contaminated with arsenic concentrations of as much as fourfold the allowable limit. Sixty-eight communities with a total combined population of 450,000 inhabitants were affected, but the data were kept secret for years. In addition to the arsenic, methane gas also came up from the depths, and there were many accidents involving explosions.

In the meantime, new wells at depths of up to 200 meters in depth were drilled, and highly contaminated water is mixed with water that is contaminated to a lesser degree, so that now those villages are drinking water that exceeds the maximum allowable concentration of arsenic by
twofold. Children up to the age of 14 are getting bottled water from the mountains near Pécs.

According to ministerial water management authorities, by the year 2005, all Hungarians will be supplied with pure water. "Then," the Budapest film director, Jozsef Magyar mocks, "a liter of water will cost as much as a liter of Tokay."

The official story has it that the future is rosy, the young democracy will get environmental protection on track. The will is there, but the funds are lacking in all quarters. At the same time, the race is on against the deadly heritage from the Communists.

The six-year-old boy, Peter More from Százhalombatta, 30 km southwest of Budapest, experienced his first asthma attack when he was nine months old. Today, he is a chronic asthmatic. His two sisters, 12 and 14, suffered for years from allergic skin rashes, diarrhea, and febrile diseases of the respiratory passages. The children are pale and physically underdeveloped.

The laundry that is hung up outside soon becomes yellow from the sulphur, the garden fence, newly-painted just two years ago, is all rusted and covered with black spots. Black nubs, from the sulphur, form on the cars.

Százhalombatta (18,000 inhabitants) is one of the dirtiest towns in Hungary. The largest refinery (3,000 workers) and the largest caloric power plant (1,300 workers, a 2,000-megawatt facility) in the country are located here. The high voltage-heat generating plant, in addition to oil and natural gas, burns gudron [as published], a petroleum distillate, not unlike bitumen. The unfiltered exhaust gases are released into the atmosphere, and the unpurified waste water is released into the Danube. The workers have already threatened to give up their jobs due to the pollution—"We are poisoning our children."

Peter Takacs, Director of the Municipal Cultural Center and editor in chief of a local newspaper, wanted to report on the environmental impact as long as several years ago, "but no one wanted to open his mouth." Finally, physicians who felt a high degree of social commitment sounded the alarm due to the extremely high rate of stillbirths. High concentrations of heavy metals were found in the dead fetuses and in the placentas.

Peter Takacs computed that per inhabitant "including infants," 5,000 kg of toxic dust descended on Százhalombatta per annum. The concentrations of benzene, toluene, xylool, sulphur, vanadium, nickel, were 20 to 100 times the level of the less polluted comparison city Budaoers, a suburb of Budapest. Vanadium compounds are carcinogenic.

According to estimates by experts, 20 billion florins would be needed for the environmental clean-up of Százhalombatta. Instead of doing anything of that kind, the refinery and the power plant, which generate billions, continue merrily paying their fines of a few million for exceeding environmental limits on a regular basis, and send the children who are suffering from severe cases of asthma to the GDR for a salt cure. That helps for a maximum of six months.

In Ercsi, a few kilometers downstream on the Danube, the plants are damaged, and the children are losing their hair.

The pediatrician and Municipal Health Commissioner of Százhalombatta, Laszlo Benedek, worked in Karcag, in Central Hungary in the 1970's without developing any interest in environmental matters. "Seven to eight children per annum suffocated there," he reported. "Now I know why." Peter Takacs: "My wife died of lung cancer at the age of 40, and she never smoked."

[Box, p. 79]

"The Crippling of Half a Century"

Apajpuszta, known for its riding festival, is now a synonym for the moral collapse of "Socialist" society.

In Apaj, a village of 1,000 inhabitants a good 50 km south of Budapest, the UNESCO protection for a 140-km Biosphere Reservation, Hungary's largest Puszta national park, begins. That is where the romance of the puszta stopped.

Abutting the national park and a meat-processing plant, the State-run Kiskunsag agriculture collective established a 4,500-square-kilometer depot for hazardous chemical waste in 1983. "We had authorizations by the carload," says the former Director of the collective, Dezsoe Halsz.

When 17,000 barrels of poison from the Budapest paint factory "Budalakk" and from other chemical plants throughout the entire country were stored at the site, Halasz "invented" a "distillation facility." From a technical standpoint, this was nothing more than a still of the type used to produce alcoholic spirits. As a recycling facility, it was a complete failure. Halasz and others banked hundreds of thousands of florins from the State collective in "patent royalties."

In the next step, the toxic waste was simply burned. Because the neighbors complained of the acrid stench, the health authorities banned the incineration of the waste, and levied a fine of 3.5 million florins against the plant. Then 500 drums of toxins were buried as furtively as could be in the national park. The figure could even be as high as 2,000. Istvan Toth, the Director of the preserve calls this "unique in the annals of national parks throughout the world."

The scandal did not come to light until the political situation had eased up. In 1988, the post of Director of the collective was no longer simply issued to a Party favorite by the Central Committee. Rather, there was an open competition for it. One of the applicants, chief
agronomist in the State-run plant, reported in his application concerning the events that had hitherto been hushed up.

The stench that rose from that mess had to do with far more than just some buried drums of toxins; it had to do with the disappearance of 16 million florins, concealment, corruption, fear, and terror. One of the leaders of the collective put his aged grandmother on the payroll as the driver of a tractor at a fantastic salary. Although the people in the town knew precisely what had happened, no one dared open his mouth. They all depended on the State collective, the only employer in the area. The health authorities reported that 80 percent of those living in the place were alcoholics.

When the various machinations at the collective exploded in everyone’s faces, an obscure tractor driver hanged himself. Szusza Dorko, an employee of the environmental protection authorities for the Mid-Danube Region said: “The people were living in fear. To this day, they still cannot understand that it is allowed to talk about the facts. Believe us when we say it was a regular mafia.”

In the case of the annual riding festivals, the Communist Party bosses were kept quiet by bribes and orgies. One of the bosses, who regularly had the trunk of his car filled with wine, threatened to have an employee of the collective fired because one of the bottles toppled over.

“Riders’ festival” (“Lovasuennep”) is also the title of a documentary film about the happenings in Apajpuszta. The film, which had its premiere in early February at the Budapest Film Festival, tracks down the social environment in which economic and environmental criminality could flourish, the world of “moral pollution” (Jozsef Magyar, the Director).

Magyar, 61, stumbled onto the topic quite by accident. In February, 1989, the Budapest film studio, Argos, which is, in a roundabout way, a department of the Ministry of the Environment, received a commission to take aerial photographs above Apajpuszta National Park.

By comparing photographs that were 10 years old, it was hoped they could encounter “traces of injury” in the landscape, that is, those areas where the toxic drums were buried.

In point of fact, by comparing the aerial photos, it was possible to limit the 140 square kilometers to relatively small zones. In these zones, damage to vegetation was looked for, and, with the aid of geo-radar, it was found. The drums that were dug up were severely rusted, and, for the most part, empty. The chemical broth had poisoned the groundwater. The water table in the Pusztasz National Park lies no more than 260 cm beneath the surface.

Investigations of environmental damage that had been done brought additional facts to the light of day: drums of poison had also been buried under wheat fields and sunflower fields, and mercury concentrations of up to eight times the allowable limit were found in the plants. It is said the tainted wheat found its way to a Budapest bakery, and the sunflowers that were laced with heavy metals were fed to the collective’s animals. The meat was processed for human consumption in the processing plant just a few meters away from the toxic dump site, or rather, the garbage incineration site.

Until that time, it had been impossible to forge a connection between environmental pollution and several children who died in Apajpuszta of leukemia.

In the early 1980’s, the Agricultural Collective at Kisunksag (10,000 hectares, 800 workers) had encountered economic troubles. The socialist managers found the ideal way out of the problem: the “detoxification” of chemical waste seemed to be a sure-fire success, because there was no suitable dumping site for hazardous waste.

As strange as it sounds, Apajpuszta could happen because legal land was in sight for Hungary’s toxic waste. In Aszd, near Budapest, Hungary’s first state-inspected hazardous waste dumping site was being built, and in Dorog 38 km from the capital, the Austrians and Swiss were building an incinerator for hazardous waste.

Until both sites were operational, interim dump-sites had to be found, and, in all the country, Apajpuszta fit the bill perfectly. Even the environmental authorities sent the chemical plants to Apajpuszta; there they would solve all their waste problems.

In the meantime, the “unsecured final dump-site Aszd” (Pal Rosza, ex-director of the subterranean construction firm Foldgop) and the hazardous waste incinerator at Dorog have long been in operation, and yet, 1,900 tons of toxic waste are standing in Apaj on a giant concrete slab. Some of the drums are severely rusted, and at the present time, their content is being transferred to intake drums. An earthen trench has been dug all around the concrete slab in which, sealed off with a plastic film in a makeshift way, a reddish-brown chemical broth is floating. The authorities suspect that drums lie hidden under the concrete slab.

Toxic drums that were dug up out of the national park are supposed to have been reburied immediately at another location and “sealed” in concrete.

Although the revenue police have also uncovered damning evidence, as have the environmental authorities, a trial never got under way. One of those responsible received a nominal fine of 16,000 florins.

For the ridiculous sum of 5,000 florins, two lowly workers assumed full responsibility for the buried drums of toxin, the wife of the wood technician Istvan Kaposztas.

Kaposztas, who bore primary responsibility for the business with the toxic drums, defends his actions in the documentary film “Riders’ Festival” in the following
way: “I have children, I was given an apartment and a secure job. What was I supposed to do?—Otherwise, they would have fired me.” He speaks out several times in the film. Over the months, as the film was being made, he was absent from time to time, at the end, the film crew went to his funeral. He died of lung cancer.

“It’s all blown up way out of proportion,” Csizsar Matyas, who has been Director of the chemical plant since last August assures everyone. The dump is being dismantled, and the plant has converting to filling putty.

In the documentary film, which was financed for the most part by the Ministry of the Environment, Janos Varadi, Chief of Police for the collective, who got the job of protecting representatives of the authorities as their excavation work progressed, appears. He pulls out a pistol and says: “Given the present situation around here, you’ve got to be ready for anything.”

Janos Soos, former Communist Party Secretary from Apaj and former Director of the agricultural collective thought the film was “excellent.” The producer, Aristid Ditzendy said: “These people don’t even notice their crippling condition; it’s a crippling condition that has lasted for half a century.”

[Box, p. 80]

Hungary in Figures

Area: 93,032 km², 18 percent of which is forest, one-quarter of which is damaged.

Inhabitants: 10.7 million, 2.1 million in Budapest.

Urban population: 58 percent.


Sulphur exports to Austria: 22,000 tons per annum.


Dust emissions per capita (1988): 75.5 kg/annum.

Life expectancy at birth (1987): 65.3 years (males), 73.2 years (females).

Mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 inhabitants, 1987): 13.4 (Austria: 11.2).

Infant mortality (of 1,000 live births, 1987) 17.4 (Austria: 9.8).
INTRABLOC

EC Ministers ‘Shocked’ About East European Environmental Conditions

25000744E Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 18 Jun 90 p 3

[MTI [Hungarian Telegraph Agency] report: “All European Environmental Protection Meeting: Shocking Ecological Damage in East Europe; Hungarian Invitation to Countries Along the Danube”]

[Text] “An ecological catastrophe may be prevented only with joint effort,” according to a statement adopted Saturday by ministers of the European Communities and of seven Central and East European countries at an environmental protection conference held in the Irish capital. Sandor K. Keresztes represented Hungary at the conference.

According to reports, West European ministers at the Dublin conference were shocked to hear reports revealing the true magnitude of damage suffered by the environment of East European countries.

According to depressing data presented by Czechoslovak minister Josef Vavrousek, the anticipated life expectancy in his country is between five and seven years lower than in the countries of the European Community [EC]. In Prague and in certain parts of the CSFR, sulfur dioxide concentration is twenty times higher than the permissible level in EC countries. As Polish minister Bronislaw Kaminski reported, in his country 11 percent of the population is exposed to sulfur dioxide concentration, primarily in Krakow and in Upper Silesia.

The East European ministers unanimously declared their intent to render environmental protection rules more stringent. The EC Committee’s environmental protection delegate Ripa di Meana intends to initiate action as a result of which one-third of the 200 million ECU [European currency unit] support to be provided by the EC to the GDR, the CSFR, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia would be used for environmental protection purposes. (Forty-seven million ECU were already earmarked for such purposes in regard to Poland and Hungary.)

As the most important result of the first all-European environmental protection conference the ministers agreed to develop an information and data network. In addition, the EC will encourage enterprises in member countries to observe at this stage the more stringent West European environmental protection standards in regard to their investments in East Europe.

Hungary invited all states along the Danube to take part in an environmental protection conference, the French news agency AFP reported. According to Environmental Protection Minister Sandor K. Keresztes, at the meeting scheduled for the second part of October it would be possible to take account of the environmental protection problems of the region, and to determine specific tasks and schedule their implementation.

At the [Dublin] conference, Hungary and the CSFR requested that the EC Committee prepare an expert report about the feasibility of implementing the conflict-laden Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros barrage, authoritative persons announced on behalf of the committee.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Various Health Risks Surveyed; Seriousness Ranked

90GE0153B Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 31 May 90 p 12

[Article by Rosemarie Stein: “Nutrition Is the ‘Number One Health Risk’”]

[Text] Berlin, 30 May — The president of the Federal Health Agency, Professor Dieter Grossklaus, calls nutrition our “number one health risk at this time.” It is common knowledge that we eat too much, and that what we eat is too fat and too sweet. This probably applies to an even greater degree to the residents of the GDR, where the “eating binge” began later and—to compensate for the lack of other possibilities to enjoy life—lasted longer. The average life expectancy in the GDR is two and one-half years less than in the FRG. Overeating and eating the wrong things are no doubt a contributing factor, but that is only conjecture. Environmental pollution is apparently not a primary factor, since in the southern part of the country, where most of the antiquated industry is located, people live longer than in the northern part, with its forests, fields, and lakes.

But what about the psychosocial stresses during the decades of “tangibly existent socialism”? Have they had a life-shortening effect? One does not know, but health researchers in East Berlin collected epidemiological indications that this was the case already before the political turning point, whose publication at that time was prohibited in the same way that suicide statistics were, for example. Scientists of the Federal Health Office, the highest health research agency of the FRG, working together with colleagues from the GDR, hope to find out more about the causes of avoidable diseases and premature deaths, so as to be able to take concerted action to prevent diseases and to be able to protect and improve the health of the population with better prospects of success than in the past.

In the FRG, as in other countries as well, little is known about the frequency and distribution of most diseases, according to Prof. Hans Hofmeister, the director of the Institute for Social Medicine and Epidemiology of the Federal Health Office, at the annual press conference of the research agency, which has now submitted its activity report for 1989. This means that statements that one can read almost daily about an increase in the incidence of certain diseases (one in three persons is allergic to
something nowadays, one in 12 will contract diabetes in the foreseeable future, there are 6 million people afflicted with rheumatism in the FRG, etc.) have no scientific basis. Hoffmeister intimated that such assertions could many times be attributed to medical overzealousness or even—unwittingly, most likely—to selfish interests. ("More doctors also need more patients. Availing oneself of a doctor's services is something that can be nurtured.")

In his judgment, only reliable statistics could help answer the much-discussed questions about the influence, for example, of environmental pollutants, stresses at the workplace, or consumer habits. At least a representative sampling of the population of the FRG has been regularly examined physically and systematically questioned since 1985, following the example set in the United States. In this way, comparable and scientifically grounded data on health behavior, risk factors, diseases, and handicaps is gained for the first time. The proposal that this investigation be expanded to also include the GDR has already been made.

Various contacts with GDR scientists have already been made by the Federal Health Office. The research agency, which has been in existence for 100 years and was founded as the Imperial Research Office, was never divided. By coincidence, all its institutes (the oldest are the Robert-Koch-Institute and the Institute for Water, Soil and Air Hygiene) are located in the western part of Berlin. The fact that the Federal Health Office stayed in the old German capital and further expanded its operations there now turns out to be an advantage; suddenly it no longer finds itself at the edge but in the middle of Germany, a good prerequisite for contacts "over there." It does not have a counterpart office in the GDR, but it does have small affiliated institutes there.

"We have already been eagerly looking for partners in the GDR," Grossklaus said. He sees a close cooperation as offering great possibilities for both sides to better fulfill the expectations of the populace with respect to the protection of health, consumers, and the environment. As partners of the Institute for Social Medicine of the Federal Health Office, for example, the Institute for Social Hygiene and Organization of the Public Health System as well as the Institute for Medical Statistics and Data Processing, which are assigned to the GDR health ministry, could be given consideration. Like the Academy for Supplementary Training of Physicians, they are located in the Berlin district of Lichtenberg. Here Grossklaus also sees an additional crystallization point for the founding of the first German "Institute of Health" (School of Public Health).

Much has been said, and justifiably so, about the benefits of cooperation and a subsequent fusion of the research agencies in both parts of Berlin and Germany, but very little about the obstacles that have to be overcome. In the GDR, for example, all cancer cases must be reported and a cancer registry is thus maintained, of whose completeness researchers in the FRG, with its strict data protection laws, can only dream. If the state security-illuminated GDR wanted to take over these data protection laws sight unseen, it would be psychologically plausible, but it would be just as understandable if the researchers were to fight for regulations that permitted exceptions to these laws. Population-oriented health research (now referred to internationally as public health research) was without a doubt more strongly cultivated in the GDR than here in the FRG, but not all findings will be useable. The public health researchers will only be able to rely on the "hard" data, which is not subject to reinterpretation, since a lot of data, in line with the notion of a "perfect world socialism," had to be prettied up or suppressed, such as suicides or drug addiction, for example.

Medications will become a difficult subject in reaching agreement on a common public health system, since the GDR laws dealing with this subject are not only much older but also much stricter than those of the FRG. Similar to the situation here in the FRG, before a medication is approved, its effectiveness and relative safety must be assured. In addition, however, there must also be a "justified social need" for it. Medications which "no longer conform to scientific findings" are removed from the register. As a result, this register has for decades never consisted of more than approximately 2,000 medications, similar to the situation in several other countries, such as Norway, for example.

The completely different situation in the FRG was recently described by Prof. Alfred Hildebrandt, director of the medicament institute of the Federal Health Office, approximately as follows: Pursuant to the law on medications, which did not go into effect until 1978, only 8,000 preparations were systematically checked for quality, effectiveness, and safety, and approved. All the products that were already in existence before 1978—no less than 140,000—were allowed to continue to be sold during a transition period. Today, 122,000 of these still remain, 81 percent of them composite preparations. (Included in this figure are the many products having identical composition as well as various administering forms.)

These frequently insufficiently tested "old preparations," pursuant to EC guidelines of the year 1975, were to have been tested on the basis of uniform principles by mid-1990. In the FRG, however, this checking process is beginning only now. The manufacturers had until 30 April to ask the Federal Health Office to examine their preparations and decide on their future approval status. Approximately 38,000 such requests were received by the Medicament Institute of the Federal Health Office, the approving agency. This figure does not include the 25,000 additional requests received for homeopathic products, which in accordance with a waiver provision only need to be registered. Of the 140,000 preparations of the days when there were no laws governing medications, slightly less than half will thus be left. But those
still number more than 60,000. During the time that their approval is pending, they can in any case continue to be prescribed and sold. And the bulk of those medications which are no longer being manufactured do not even need to be removed from the shelves right away, but only by the end of 1992.

This is confusing for doctors and patients in the GDR. Even doctors in the FRG are complaining about the number of inadequately tested products and the rules resulting therefrom that have to be observed when prescribing them. At the Federal Health Office, one likes to cite the figures provided by the pharmaceutical industry, according to which only 2,000 medicaments make up 93 percent of the sales of the pharmacies anyway.

In the GDR, experts such as pharmacologist Professor Alfred Scherber of Greifswald, even of the short list of medicaments approved there (most of them "EC-conforming"), consider 20-25 percent superfluous.

HUNGARY

Police Deputy Interior State Secretary Appointed
25000745G Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 14 Jun 90 p 7

[Interview with Laszlo Korinek, newly appointed deputy interior state secretary for police affairs, by U. T. in Pecs; date not given: "From Pecs to the Interior Ministry: Dissertation on Concealed Crime"]

[Text] The interior minister has appointed Laszlo Korinek as deputy state secretary for police affairs. This docent at the Janus Pannonius University of Sciences is, and always has been, a party outsider, and in his own judgment he was granted confidence based on the research he has done thus far. Korinek is a criminologist; he wrote his dissertation on concealed crime. In recent years he has dealt with the subject of crime prevention. This was the topic of our questions at his home in Pecs.

[Korinek] I consider it to be my important duty to succeed in mobilizing social forces for the prosecution of crime. In this regard we are familiar with West European experience which may be utilized. Self-inspired crime prevention groups which have proven themselves abroad significantly strengthen the ability of the populace to defend itself. In a majority of the cases, situations in which people fall victim to criminals can be avoided. But the way to do that must be taught to people. It would be impossible to assign a policeman to every person, and that would not even be desirable.

[U.T.] Isn't it dangerous for the police to get involved in organizing these self-inspired groups?

[Korinek] Yes, it is. These groups must by all means preserve their character of being social organizations. The police may give them advice only in regard to professional issues; the police should by no means get involved in organizing such groups or in their internal workings. Many are deterred from joining such groups if the group's color is overly "blue."

[U.T.] Will the level at which the police are equipped improve in the near future?

[Korinek] By all means. We need new cars, we must modernize our computerized network, and I could go on listing all the things needed to render the level of our technical equipment appropriate. We are counting on help from West Europe in this regard.

Hankiss on Anticipated Plight of Lower Social Strata
25000745F Budapest VILAG in Hungarian 3 May 90 pp 36-38

[Article by Elemer Hankiss: "Not Yet Canaan"]

[Excerpts] Yes, there is no doubt that after 8 April an incomparably better social order will take the place of the communist Rakosi-Kadar system of the past 40 years. Better, because it will be the society of a free country, in both meanings of that term. One the one hand, its colonial dependence on the Soviet Union will cease, while there is a chance for maintaining the increased economic and financial dependence on the Western world within tolerable limits. On the other hand, it will be better because it will constitutionally guarantee the rights and the liberty of its citizens. It will also be better because the country will be democratic, and democracy is better than any kind of autocratic or authoritarian political system, even if we are aware that democracy is no miracle cure for all social and economic problems, and that it is not always capable of protecting minority rights vis-a-vis the will and the interests of the majority, for example. Again, it will be better, because the country will be more efficient; a market economy mobilizes and produces more return on social and economic resources than the so-called socialist planned economy. Once again, it will be better, because society will be better off, or at least it will have an opportunity and a chance to extricate itself from the present crisis, and to embark on the path of social and economic prosperity.

But will it also be better in the sense that this society will be more just than its predecessor? How could it not be when the past 40 years were the era of injustices; a majority of the people were victimized daily by arbitrary tyranny and injustice. But we must ponder this issue more thoroughly. We must do so, because the word "justice" is diverse, it has many meanings, it covers many concepts of justice. On the other hand, the meaning of the term changes both in time and in a historical context, it meant different things in different times. Even during the past four decades its meaning changes continually.

The concept of fairness is always related to a distribution system, and within that, to abiding or not abiding by the
rules of distribution. Depending on the subject of distribution, one usually distinguishes between “legal justice” and “social justice,” (although this distinction operates only within certain limits).

Legal justice is related to the distribution system of human and citizen rights and duties. In every society a distribution system for rights and duties evolves that is accepted by a majority of society because they feel that the system is just, or because those in power judge their own and everyone else’s actions according to that system. [passage omitted]

From this standpoint the new Hungarian society will be more just than its predecessor and its ancestors, because, as intended by legislators and by the new political elite, every Hungarian citizen will be given identical rights, will establish the actual means by which these rights can be enforced, and will punish those who violate these rights.

Social justice, so-called, presents a more complicated situation. Based on Aristotle, professional literature calls this distributive justice, [passage omitted] which suggests that this form of justice is also linked to some kind of distribution, except here not only are rights at issue, but also the distribution of wealth, and material and non-material goods in general. Depending on what is being distributed, this concept of justice is tied to three different principles of equality [passage omitted].

This gradual shift from substantive equality through equity, to the principle of equal opportunity clearly suggests that in Hungary the emphasis on value, and the emphasis on outlook and ideology, has increasingly shifted from the poor strata toward the middle, and later to the middle and upper strata in the course of the past 40 years. Enforcement of substantive equality, i.e. the narrowing of differences in the standard of living and in living conditions, favored the poorer working strata, the unskilled workers; the strengthening of performance-based distribution appreciated the knowledge of skills, the skilled workers stratum, and the performance of the evolving middle class. The enforcement of the equal opportunity principle will favor primarily (although not exclusively) the middle and upper strata, and those relatively few who will be able to take advantage of this opportunity and break out of the lower strata and classes. [passage omitted]

The bankruptcy of ownership by the bureaucratic state also points in this direction. It does so because it compromised social ownership, and—as the only solution—greatly appreciated private ownership in both social consciousness and practice. This also favors primarily the upper middle and upper strata, classes. Although, if they succeed in protecting and further increasing the existing small owner stratum, the lower middle class will also profit as a result, and only the worker and employee stratum which has no property will be truly detached. (For them only a strong and real trade union movement and the spread of various forms of employee ownership may mean certain protection.)

At the moment it seems that this trend is also being strengthened by the political transformation. At least temporarily. There can be no doubt that the new system will be better, more free, more democratic, more European, and more efficient than its predecessor was. And given time it is likely that its financial growth will also start and accelerate. Similarly, there can be no doubt that the basis of political power has broadened to an extraordinary extent. At the national level the exercise of power has already been removed from the hands of the Kadarist oligarchy (at the local level one must wait until the local elections), and it has been transferred, is being transferred, in the hands of the new political elite which were placed in Parliament by a majority of society as a result of the elections. But the evolving social-economic system will favor more the middle and upper classes than the middle and lower social strata.

—This is not only because a disproportionately large part of the burden presented by the transition will have to be borne by the lower and lower-middle strata which live off of wages and salaries—at least in the short term, within the next two or three years. These strata will also be hit hardest by unemployment and inflation, and this stratum will profit least from the reduced progression of entrepreneurial and personal income taxes, and will suffer most as a result of the partial conversion of social policy institutions into business ventures, etc. The cold thatcherism of some of the parties, and the sympathizing uncertainty of others could have been an ominous warning to the more poor and more defenseless strata of society. Perhaps this threat is still shielded from them by the parties’ radical anticommunism or by the magic of their national liberalism, and therefore they voted for them in great masses, but the hour of bitter measurement may soon come. In my view they really did not know what they were doing when they voted. They voted against the past and for the future, but probably could not, or did not want to, believe—even though enough hints were made by the parties—that to a significant extent transformation will be accomplished by placing a significant burden on them. The unexpected shift of voting ratios between the first and the second turn of elections was probably the first sign of this evolving recognition: Voters turned toward the more moderate, the more deliberately proceeding party which was more sensitive to the societal costs of transition.

—Another bad omen was that the sole party which could have accepted representation of the working class and of the employee stratum in a credible and honorable manner—the Social Democratic Party [MSZDP]—suffered an ugly defeat and could not send even a single representative to Parliament.

—From among the large parties only the Independent Smallholders Party [FKgp] is primarily the party of a
stratum, the rest are broadly based program parties, people's parties. But despite their people's party character, the voter base of the two strongest parties which got into Parliament was biased upwards, toward the middle and upper strata of society. The following few tables indicate this phenomenon well. These tables are based on a survey conducted by Gallup-Budapest on 22 March 1990.

Table 1 shows the middle and upper strata of the occupational hierarchy conglomerate as potential voters for the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]; this includes 49.1 percent of skilled workers, 41.3 percent of the leadership stratum, 62.1 percent of the intelligentsia, but only 30.2 percent of unskilled workers and only 12.5 percent of agricultural unskilled workers. Table 2 reflects the internal composition of the parties: Here too we find that the middle strata dominate in the MDF, while the middle and upper strata dominate within the SZDSZ, in contrast to, e.g., the FKGP and the MSZDP in which there is a preponderance of the lower strata. Table 3 shows that potential voters for the SZDSZ and the MDF are biased in the direction of the well-to-do and rich strata as compared to the social average, in contrast to the FKGP and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] where the lower strata constitute a relative majority. Table 4 indicates the same on the basis of educational levels: Among potential voters for the SZDSZ and the MDF there was a preponderance of people with mid-level and high level education a few days before the elections. (After the elections, of course one must examine the actual voter base of the parties, although I do not believe that there will be a substantial change in the results.)

All of this may mean that, irrespective of the intentions of the present leaders of these parties, their voter base will prompt them, motivate them to represent and to enforce the interests of middle and upper social strata. And this can be offset only partially by the voter base of the much weaker FKGP and the KDNP which tilt toward the lower social strata; and by the Association of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] in which present the middle strata dominate. And to an even lesser extent the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] will be able to offset this phenomenon: its voter base is also strongly orienting itself upwards, toward the upper social strata. A real counterbalance will exist only in the form of a social democratic type platform presented by representatives, or as a result of a social democratic type movement outside of Parliament. Both of these may evolve in the coming years. (At present our Parliament and party structure are still lopsided: As compared to civil, or more civil, parties there is still a vacuum in the place of a labor party, a social democratic party, a left of center party. This presents a particularly large responsibility to the parties that will govern now, and will confront them with difficult problems.

Accordingly, it is appropriate to assume that despite all its good intentions, the new political system, and the new Parliament, while they supposedly will want to secure legal equality and judiciousness at a high level, will be less sensitive to social justice and injustices, without even recognizing this lack of sensitivity. They will not do so, because they cannot strive for the establishment of actual equality in living conditions; willing or unwilling, they will place higher values on the performance types of middle and upper strata than on the performance of lower and low middle strata; in the case of the lower strata, they will replace real equality in terms of opportunity with today's oft-mentioned social safety net; despite their presumable good intentions and democratism they will be less sensitive to the problems of the poor than to those of people who are better off. (We have seen countless examples of this phenomenon already; for example, when restrictions on the importation of Western automobiles caused a larger outcry, and called greater attention than the impoverishment of millions, and so on.)

The new government will have convincing, and in most cases correct, arguments and reasons for all of this in a majority of the cases. This, however, does not change the fact that, willing or unwilling, knowing or unknowing, reluctantly the new political elite will make the lower third of society pay for the bill incurred by the mistakes of the other political elite. Or at least they will assign a greater burden to these than what would follow based on their numerical ratio in society. And this does not change the fact that, as its 19th Century predecessors, this new political elite will have to motivate the lower third or half of society to voluntarily and peacefully accept want in hopes for an abundance five or ten years hence—the burdens of the development of a market economy and of an evolving civil society. There may be no other solution. If indeed there is no other solution, then this will mean in different terms that it is not the presently evolving social order that is unjust, but in general the present day history of East Europe. If there is another solution, our (European) sense of justice should prompt all of us to seek that other possibility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>FKGP</th>
<th>MSZDP</th>
<th>FIDESZ</th>
<th>MDF</th>
<th>SZDSZ</th>
<th>MSZP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural unskilled workers</td>
<td>30.0</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<td>Unskilled workers</td>
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<td>7.4</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
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<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
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### Table 1. Society and the Parties: Distribution of Occupational Groups Among Voters for Various Parties (in percent) (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intelligentsia</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
<th>Social average</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<td>(Gallup-Budapest) 22 March</td>
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### Table 2. Up and Down: Internal Distribution of Occupational Groups Among Voters of Various Parties (in percent)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agricultural</th>
<th>Unskilled Workers</th>
<th>Skilled Workers</th>
<th>Administrators</th>
<th>Intelligentsia</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
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<tr>
<td>FKgP</td>
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<td>40.7</td>
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<td>4.9</td>
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<td>MSZDP</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIDESZ</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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<td>MDF</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>19.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
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<td>Average</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
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Numbers in **bold**: above average
Numbers in *italics*: below average
(Gallup-Budapest) 22 March 1990

### Table 3. Rich and Poor: Income Groups Among Voters for Various Parties (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>4,000</th>
<th>4,001-6,000</th>
<th>6,000-</th>
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<tr>
<td>FKgP</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDNP</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIDESZ</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td><strong>34.8</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social average</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Numbers in **bold**: above average
Numbers in *italics*: below average
(Gallup-Budapest) 22 March 1990

### Table 4. Educated and Uneducated: Groups by Educational Accomplishment Among Voters for Various Parties (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grade School</th>
<th>High School Plus Skilled Worker Training</th>
<th>Higher Education</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FKgP</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDNP</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIDESZ</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td><strong>19.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td><strong>19.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social average</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers in **bold**: above average
Numbers in *italics*: below average
(Gallup-Budapest) 22 March 1990
Jewish Petition, Signature Drive Against Separate Representation

25000745A Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 16 Jun 90 p 3

["Open Letter to the President of the National Assembly"]

[Text] The following statement was drafted by a group of the Jewish intelligentsia and is being circulated throughout Budapest. It has already been signed by artists, writers, and historians like Gyorgy G. Kardos, Mihaly Kornis, Tibor Szanto, Janos Kobanyai, Laszlo Varga, and Laszlo Karsai, but people belonging to the synagogues in the vicinity of Teleki Square [the old second hand market] are also collecting signatures to protest. They have no real practice in organizing protests, but hope that the result of their action will prompt the National Assembly committee having jurisdiction to make a more circumspect decision based on a number of viewpoints.

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We, Hungarian Jews—not more Jews than Hungarians, not more Hungarians than Jews—protest the fact that a handful of people [claiming] to act on behalf of the Jewry are trying to squeeze us and our dead, as well as our entire history in Hungary, into a nationality ghetto. Hungarians and Jews built modern Hungary beginning at the dawn of the reform era, and in the framework of this coexistence Hungarians and Jews did not play a minority role.

We would be denying our ancestors and our hosts, and the Hungarian-Jewish coexistence, if we were to surrender our Hungarian character.

This coexistence did not start at Orgovany; the tragedy of 1944 is alive in us as a severe trauma. [But] those who after all this insist upon their Hungarian national identity are certain that the wounds caused by the murder of half a million Hungarian Jews can heal only in Hungary, in the midst of Hungarian culture.

We are convinced that belonging to any nationality is based on objective criteria; the Jewry in Hungary do not satisfy these criteria. On the other hand, we do not dispute the right of individuals to regard themselves as whatever they want to be. Being Jewish is a more deep-seated, more solemn, and more time tested [existence] than to be given representation of a political nature, one that denies the past and the future.

Religious Holidays Possibly To Become Work Holidays

Catholic Bishops

25000745B Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 7 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by S. Gy. F.]

[Text] Ascension Day and the Monday of Pentecost have just passed. Still to come are the Feast of the Assumption, Our Lady's Day, and All Saints Day. But we will not go on listing these.

We inquired at circles close to the Hungarian Roman Catholic Episcopate:

"When are you going to reclaim the holidays that were taken away? Is the delay justified? These were the beautiful, uplifting, traditional holidays of the Hungarian people. And most of them are still work holidays in Austria, for example."

The response was as follows. It may be regarded as quasi-official:

"The Episcopate has received requests from fellow priests and from parishioners to negotiate with the government the matter of holidays abolished during the past period. It is the duty of the Hungarian Roman Catholic Episcopate to maintain and to nurture this tradition. Therefore, this matter will be placed on the agenda of the next Conference of Bishops to be held on 11, 12, and 13 June; we will discuss it, and a request to the government will most certainly be drafted," according to our high priest informer.

Reformed Church Action

25000745B Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 16 Jun 90 p 4


[Text] The Council of the Reformed Church in Hungary intends to file an initiative with the National Assembly that several church holidays be declared work holidays. In this relation Lajos Pal, head of the employment law division of the Ministry of Labor, had this to say:

"No official information has been received yet by the ministry, but you may announce this in advance: They consider it to be desirable that in regard to this matter Parliament should make a decision that is contrary to the present practice. That is, work holidays are still regulated by a Council of Ministers decree in the form of an implementing provision to the Law on Labor, but, based on the Law on Legislation, it is deemed necessary that in the future the National Assembly should make decisions regarding such matters, not the government.

"There is no legal barrier to having more paid holidays than there are at present, because last year they suspended a Council of Ministers decree which prescribed the number of mandatory work days per year. But increasing the number of work holidays may be limited on the basis of economic rationale. Incidentally, a majority of the holidays presently initiated by the Reformed Church Council are also holidays in Hungary from the standpoint of other denominations."
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