East Europe Report
NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.


Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.
NOTICE

Effective 1 May 1986, JPRS will issue a new serial entitled EUROPE: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. This serial, with the trigraph EST, will contain all material previously published in the WEST EUROPE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY as well as science and technology material previously included in the EAST EUROPE REPORT. Also as of 1 May, the WEST EUROPE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY will no longer be published.

Subscribers who receive the EAST EUROPE and the WEST EUROPE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY prior to 1 May 1986 will automatically receive the new EUROPE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

If any subscription changes are desired, U.S. Government subscribers should notify their distribution contact point. Non-government subscribers should contact the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161.
EAST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

ECONOMY

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Romanian-Bulgarian Machine-Building Cooperation
(E. Topolov, et al.; CONSTRUCTIA DE MASINI, No 11, Nov 85)........................................ 1

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Comprehensive CEMA R&D Program to Year 2000 Viewed
(Karel Matejka; HOSPODARSKE NOVINY, No 13, 1986).............. 4

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Statistics Published on 1985 Shipbuilding, Ship Deliveries
(SEEWIRTSCHAFT, No 2, Feb 86)........................................... 15

HUNGARY

State Secretary Hoos on 1986 Plan
(Janos Hoos; NEPSZABADSAG, 31 Dec 85)............................ 30

Laws on Private Work Partnerships Modified
(NEPSZABADSAG, 31 Dec 85)........................................... 36

Hungarian Deliveries Expedited To Honor Soviet Congress
(NEPSZABADSAG, 22 Feb 86)........................................... 38

ROMANIA

Features, Importance of Black Sea Canal Presented
(Virgil Matei; HIDROTEHNICA, No 11, 1986)....................... 40
MILITARY

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Youth Seen Reluctant To Join Military
(Hans Ulrich Kersten; DIE PRESSE, 17 Mar 86)......... 46

POLITICS

HUNGARY

Bibo's 'Third Way' Seen as Path for Political Science
(Andras Bozoki; TARSADALOMKUTATAS, No 3, 1985)......... 48

CC Secretary Berecz on Problems With Party's Leading Role
(Janos Berecz; TARSADALMI SZEMLE, No 2, 1986)......... 64

War Guilt, Hungarian Minority Seen Persisting Problem
(Gyula Juhasz Interview; NEPSZABADSAG, 23 Nov 85)........ 79

ROMANIA

Interdependence Between Domestic, Foreign Policy
(Mircea Nicolaescu; ERA SOCIALISTA, No 2, 30 Jan 86)...... 84

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

POLAND

Geological Research, Impact on Economy
(Waclaw Ryka; PRZEGŁAD GEOLOGICZNY, No 9, Sep 85)...... 94

ROMANIA

Artificial Vision System for Industrial Robots
(Ancuta Breaban, et al.; CONSTRUCTIA DE MASINI, Dec 85).... 102

- b -
ROMANIAN-BULGARIAN MACHINE-BUILDING COOPERATION

Bucharest CONSTRUCTIA DE MASINI in Romanian Vol 37, No 11, Nov 85 p 11


[Text] There is a spirit of cooperation between the Romanian Technology Research Institute for Machine-Building, ICTCM Bucharest, and NIIO Sofia that is exemplified by the close ties that exist in sharing technical information. Romanian-Bulgarian meetings, round-table discussions and symposia have become traditional, being held periodically at Bucharest, Sofia and Russe. Specifically, these meetings have discussed questions on the topic, "Organization, Mechanization and Automation in the Assembly Process," which is a matter of concern to both research institutes.

The most recent of these meetings between Romanian and Bulgarian specialists was held at Russe 15-18 May, 1985, where 20 technical papers were presented. Both sides agreed that the most representative of these papers would be published in the respective technical journals of Romania and Bulgaria.

This issue of CONSTRUCTIA DE MASINI publishes three summaries of materials presented by NIIO Sofia, which are of concern to specialists in our country. The first is as follows:

Given machine-building's intensive development, the design, testing and introduction of advanced technology has become more and more a fundamental state and economic policy. The 12th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party noted that the wide-scale introduction of advanced technology is a primary course to be followed in the general development of the national economy.

By introducing a system of management and control of advanced technology—a system created by NIIO in the machine-building industry—we have established a way to link together all the economic, procurement, and management factors upon which the use and introduction of new, advanced methods in machine-building depend.
The concept "advanced technology" includes: new or improved products; progressive, more efficient technologies and technological processes; modern methods of organizing and improving production and work; initiatives and accomplishments of the most advanced workteams and workers; inventions and innovations; and domestic and foreign technical and scientific design and research that can be introduced into the production process.

The basic characteristic of advanced technology that justifies its adoption and implementation is its recognized efficiency. This is exemplified by:

- achievement of higher economic indices;
- the ability to reproduce the method at any level;
- an impact on economic efficiency at the national level;
- practical application.

Introducing advanced technology requires that the following concerns be addressed:

- planning the introduction of the advanced process;
- funding to stimulate the introduction of advanced technology;
- determining the ways and means of research, testing, distribution and introduction of advanced processes;
- publicizing these activities;
- defining the role and tasks of the various functional sectors, of specialists and of public institutions.

The system that NIIOM devised clarifies all activities in the machine-building sector to research, test, distribute and introduce advanced technology into the production process. Basically this system consists of:

- researching and assembling data referring to existing advanced procedures in the state organizations and enterprises;
- researching and assembling data about advanced processes abroad in the machine-building sector;
- indexing and making available information about advanced processes that are of interest (both those from domestic and foreign sources) to assist in their integration into the national economy;
- developing a complex program regarding procedures and methods of advanced technology;
- analyzing the results of steps taken to introduce advanced technology.
A very important link in carrying out this cycle is the process of disseminating science and technology information through the indices. A central index was established at the interdisciplinary center for that purpose.

The collection of high technology information from both foreign and domestic sources is achieved by:

- executing complex programs on advanced technology procedures and methods;
- giving widespread publicity to appropriate investment and innovation proposals;
- publishing science and technology periodicals;
- working with institutes abroad similarly occupied with science and technology information;
- reading the technical documentation and materials regarding technical licenses;
- reports, conferences, seminars etc.

Special elements have been established in every enterprise to study advanced technology. These bodies look into all phases from research to implementation.

Every time a modern process or method is introduced, it is preceded by an estimate of the results expected and a calculation of the anticipated economic impact. Coordination and supervision of this entire process is carried out by the Central Council for the Introduction of Advanced Technology.

The Operational Bureau has been established within the council to take care of everyday concerns. The bureau has a formative mission, one of popularizing high technology, so that the process of introducing advanced technology can become common practice.

The Operational Bureau also develops a complex program of scientific and technical measures as well as economic, social and organizational steps, in keeping with the demands of the country's scientific and technical development over 1-year and 5-year periods.

12280/9190
CSO: 2700/108
COMPREHENSIVE CEMA R&D PROGRAM TO YEAR 2000 VIEWED

Prague HOSPODARSE NOVINY in Czech No 13, 1986 pp 8-9


[Text] Participation in the realization of the Comprehensive Program for Scientific-Technical Development Among CEMA Nations Through the Year 2000, which was adopted at the end of last year, is a great opportunity for Czechoslovakia to accelerate socioeconomic development. This fact is stressed in the Main Directions of Economic and Social Development for Czechoslovakia for the Years 1986-1990 and in the Prospects Through the Year 2000: Full participation in the program is the spine but also the essential prerequisite for the desired intensification of our economy. In addition to the state and its central organs, the Czechoslovak economic microsphere must share in fulfilling the tasks connected with effecting this intensification in a decisive way. Czechoslovakia will participate in the solution of the majority of 95 problems in 5 priority directions. With respect to a number of specific tasks, it will join in international cooperation or will fulfill the function of a so-called principal organization. This article, therefore, offers a glance not only into the "kitchen" of the first phase of effecting the Comprehensive Program for Scientific-Technical Development but, at the same time, is intended to serve as an instruction for the participating Czechoslovak entities on how to proceed with respect to the specification of the program goals.

Today, Czechoslovakia has a historic opportunity: through a well-thought-out and goal-oriented participation in effecting the comprehensive program of scientific-technical progress, it can secure the interconnection between the long-range outlook of development with respect to its national economy with the developmental line of the socialist community. This is, simultaneously, a unique opportunity for shaping the long-term structure of our research, development, and production base within the framework of the international division of labor, particularly with respect to specialization and coproduction in CEMA. The importance of such an intent, however, carries an obligation on the other hand: We are responsible for its fulfillment.

From this standpoint it is necessary, in compiling our own detailed "network" of implementing the program, for Czechoslovakia to take over to the maximum possible extent all work involved in solving those problems which are part and
parcel of the main directions of development of science and technology in Cze-
choslovakia in accordance with the resolution passed by the Eighth Session of
the Central Committee of the CPCZ and which were incorporated in the long-term
outlook of socioeconomic and scientific-technical development in Czechoslovak-
ia through the year 1995 and have been listed in the compendium of national
long-term goal-oriented and state scientific-technical programs. In addition
to these priorities, the solution of which will be participated in by Czecho-
slovakia to the maximum possible extent, we shall also join in the solution of
other problems with various intensities (corresponding to the possibilities
and levels available to the appropriate branches of our research, development,
and production base). This pertains primarily to areas which have express
multilateral effects on the economy and also areas where, objectively, there
will never be complete international specialization of production and where
Czechoslovak participation will assure the necessary connection with world
long-range scientific-technical developments, the results of which could not
be usefully merely imported, be it in the form of licenses or merchandise.

Apart from the central and industrial branch organizations of Czechoslovakia,
all participating Czechoslovak research, development, and production organiza-
tions must devote extraordinary attention to our participation in solving the
individual problems of the comprehensive program. Approximately 30 Czecho-
slovak organizations are vying for the function of principal organization with
respect to selected individual tasks within the framework of the 95 priority
problems (within the framework of the priority directions involving electroni-
fication of the national economy, these are, for example, the Research Insti-
tute of Mathematical Machines in Prague, the Computer Technology Research In-
stitute at Zilina, the Research Institute for Communications Technology in
Prague, Tesla Karlin, Tesla Strasnice, Chirana at Stara Tura, and Tesla Brno;
with respect to comprehensive automation, among others, this involves ZTS at
Martin, Tesla MLP and VUKOV at Presov; and with respect to the priority direc-
tion of nuclear energy, primarily the Institute for Nuclear Research at Rez
near Prague, etc.).

Tasks for This Half-Year

The following can be included among the most important tasks of the initial
period involved in effecting the comprehensive program which fall into the
first 6 months of this year:

a. the negotiating and concluding of interstate agreements covering multilat-
eral cooperation among interested CEMA countries in solving individual prob-
lems involved in the comprehensive program;

b. extending the validity of previously signed agreements on cooperation in
areas which have been included in the program and rendering them more precise;

c. working out and approving so-called detailed programs (working plans) for
cooperation in directions specified by the program for the level of the micro-
sphere;
d. concluding legal contracts between cooperating organizations regarding fulfillment of commitments taken on as a result of these working plans for cooperation;

e. passing through the tasks from the comprehensive program into agreed-upon plans for multilateral integration measures and into national plans for development of the national economy of the individual CEMA nations.

The decisive role in fulfilling these tasks will be primarily played by the so-called principal organizations for the 95 priority problems of the comprehensive program. These are responsible for the technical level and quality, for fulfillment of the tasks within the deadlines and for preparing proposals for agreements and contracts and, furthermore, for directing the cooperation of all participating organizations. All these principal organizations are based in the USSR.

To Act More Operationally in Negotiating Agreements

One of the primary tasks involved in the first phase of fulfilling the scientific-technical program is the timely preparation, negotiation, and conclusion of multilateral international agreements covering cooperation in solving the individual problems. In the first half of 1986, some 67 new agreements are to be concluded and the contents of 84 valid agreements are to be made more precise.

The principal organizations, in negotiating and extending these agreements must, together with the coordinating states, primarily assure their truly comprehensive concept. It is necessary for them to cover the entire reproduction cycle—"research--development--production--utilization." This is particularly true in extending the validity of existing agreements which, with a few exceptions (for example, the interstate agreement on cooperation in the development and production of robots and robotic complexes and regarding cooperation in research, development, production, and utilization of microprocessors) generally include only cooperation in the scientific-technical area.

The principle that negotiated agreements will be of an outline character applies: Only scientific-technical cooperation will be treated in more detail. Contractual determinations on the erection of test facilities, semioperational facilities, and production capacities (or agreements covering their expansion or modernization), volumes of production and necessary deliveries (in other words, actually on specialization and coproduction) will be merely orientational in character. They will be rendered more precise gradually according to progress and results achieved in research and development work, primarily in concluding contracts and agreements on a basic level—that is to say, among cooperating economic and foreign trade organizations. Successful negotiation of outline interstate agreements can be significantly aided by utilizing the text of the sample interstate agreement on scientific-technical and production cooperation, the proposal of which is to be approved by CEMA at the beginning of this year.
Schematic of Managing the Development of Nuclear Energy—The Priority Direction of the Comprehensive Program of Scientific-Technical Development in CEMA Countries

Key:
1. CEMA Executive Committee
2. CEMA Committee for Scientific-Technical Cooperation
3. CEMA Committee for Cooperation in the Area of Planning Activities
4. Intergovernmental Commission for Coordination of Cooperation in the Area of Production and Mutual Deliveries of Installations for Nuclear Power Plants
5. Permanent CEMA Commission for Standardization
6. CEMA Institute for Standardization
7. Principal Organization for the Problem "Development of Installations for Fast Reactors"
8. Principal Organization for the Problem "Increased Efficiency for Utilization of Nuclear Fuel"
9. Principal organization for a specific task
10. Cooperating research, development, and production organizations of CEMA countries
11. Principal (direct) line of management
12. Secondary (indirect) line of management
13. Cooperation
In view of the large number of interstate agreements which are to be concluded in the course of the first 6 months it would be useful to reexamine the possibility for simplifying the procedure in applying Czechoslovak Government Resolution No 31/1982 for negotiating agreements designed to effect the comprehensive program. The purpose of the amendment should be the adaptation of the thus far quite complicated Czechoslovak mechanism to a similar resolution passed by the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union which has established a simpler and more operational procedure for negotiating agreements on an economic nature between the USSR and other CEMA countries.

Because in the first phase of fulfilling the program it is difficult to assume that the appropriate cooperating organizations of all interested CEMA countries will already have the necessary extensive authority for the international compilation of financial means it is further necessary that interstate agreements at least specifically outline those research and development projects for which joint financial funds will be created by the interested CEMA member countries and also which activities are to be engaged in by the temporarily established international scientific-technical collectives and joint laboratories.

However, in order to make such decisions it is necessary to refer to detailed programs (working plans) involved in the solution of the individual scientific-technical problems.

Clear, Specific Duties

The compilation and approval of detailed programs for scientific-technical cooperation covering the agreed-upon problems is among the most important tasks to be performed by the principal and cooperating economic entities during the initial phase of effecting the program of scientific-technical progress.

Detailed working plans, which are compiled in accordance with directives contained in the amended document entitled "Organizational, Methodological, Economic, and Legal Principles for Scientific-Technical Cooperation Among CEMA Member Nations," must serve as a basis for fulfilling the tasks within established deadlines and within fundamental technical-economic parameters. Consequently, they will include all working phases, beginning with fundamental research and developmental work through the design of new products and the creation of new technologies, their testing in semioperational conditions, and their adoption on an industrial scale.

In compiling these plans, it is essential for the principal organization to precisely specify the specific duties of all participating organizations with respect to each research and development task and with respect to each working phase. This is the only way in which a realistic basis for the negotiation of legal contracts and agreements on scientific-technical cooperation can arise. At the microlevel it is also unacceptable for a single task to show several organizations—problem solvers from various CEMA nations who might not have specific obligations outlined for them with respect to specific tasks on the basis of a clear international division of labor and, thus, also would lack clear responsibility.
This phase of activity on the part of principal organizations will be extraordinarily complicated and demanding. It can be anticipated (and current practice already so proves) that several organizations from various member countries will attempt to share in the realization of individual tasks. The principal organization will then have to realistically weigh the possibilities and "quality" of the applicants from the standpoint of the most rapid, the most high quality, and the most effective fulfillment of the intentions and then propose and justify one of the following basic variants:

a) solve the task through contractual scientific-technical cooperation on the part of all or the majority of the interested organizations;

b) establish a temporary international scientific-technical collective or a joint laboratory for the realization of a specific task to which interested states would dispatch their best specialists;

c) establish a joint fund at the principal organization to be used, on the basis of agreements, to finance the appropriate research and development work, or

d) implement the task only in one or two countries where a high-quality research and development base exists and which is deemed capable of assuring the production which will meet the needs of the other CEMA countries.

It is clear that a decision on these questions implies a number of serious results, particularly with respect to conducting research and development work. For example, it will significantly influence the concentration of capacities, materials, and financial means and scientific and technical workers in selected organizations or will exert an influence on further intentions of the work and utilization of existing research and development potentials in organizations which will not be selected to solve these tasks. However, even at this stage, a decision will be made in the majority of cases covering organizations involved in related production, including their international specialization and coproduction, and decisions will be made on establishing new or possibly expanding or modernizing existing production capacities.

Sanctions Must Be Effective

It is possible to judge that, during the first phase of fulfilling the program, the conclusion of legal contracts between cooperating organizations will be extraordinarily demanding. These contracts are intended to legally firm up the agreed-upon detailed programs for cooperation and the commitments of economic units involved in conducting research and development work and in handing over and utilizing the obtained scientific-technical results which are contained in the agreements.

In negotiating such agreements, it is necessary to make maximum use of the recommended texts of such agreements. This is particularly true of the sample agreement on the conduct of research and development work on the basis of cooperation and the sample agreement on implementing research, developmental, and experimental work as ordered, which were worked out within the framework
of the CEMA Council for Legal Matters and the CEMA Committee for Scientific-
Technical Cooperation.

An important component of the legal agreements on scientific-technical cooper-
ation are the provisions on material responsibility and sanctions for failure
to fulfill or inappropriate fulfillment of obligations. Czechoslovak organi-
izations, in concluding agreements, have, for the present, referred to the ap-
propriate formulations in the General Delivery Conditions of CEMA in such
cases. However, this is not the most suitable solution. These conditions are
worked out primarily to cover responsibility in delivering merchandise. They
cannot and do not cover all situations which can arise in fulfilling agree-
ments on scientific-technical cooperation; an example is the attainment of a
so-called negative result.

For the above reasons, it would be useful if all Czechoslovak organizations,
as well as the Polytechna Foreign Trade Organization as a broker involved in a
considerable number of agreements on scientific-technical cooperation, would
utilize the Sample Regulations for Material Responsibility of Organizations
contained in the agreements on scientific-technical cooperation which were ap-
proved by CEMA in 1981 in their negotiations.

For Czechoslovak organizations engaged in contractual confirmations, of
agreed-upon scientific-technical cooperation it is significant to note that the
Comprehensive Program for Scientific-Technical Development Among CEMA Nations
Through the Year 2000 is an international agreement, according to Czechoslovak
Law No 42/1980 of SBRKA ZAKONU covering economic contacts with foreign na-
tions, by which Czechoslovakia is bound. As a result, Czechoslovak organiza-
tions engaged in concluding agreements on scientific-technical cooperation in-
volved in solving problems included in this program do not in any event re-
quire the permission of the substantively appropriate central organ.

Such a solution is undoubtedly a significant contribution to developing direct
contacts between cooperating organizations of the individual states. At the
same time, however, it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that Czecho-
slovak economic organizations must even in such cases, respect Resolution No
86/81 of SBRKA ZAKONU covering the conclusion and implementation of agree-
ments on scientific-technical cooperation with foreign countries, according to
which all agreements, the fulfillment of which is connected with foreign ex-
change and cashment or payments, as well as all agreements covering scientific-
technical cooperation whose object is the development of new technologies, ma-
chines, installations, tools, computer programs, materials, and other products
are to be concluded by Czechoslovak legal entities through the offices of the
Polytechna Foreign Trade Organization.

On the other hand, the appropriate central organ of the state administration
can make exceptions and permit the conclusion of some agreements directly be-
tween cooperating organizations. Exceptions can, among others, also be made
with respect to agreements having a compensation character, where the organi-
zations exchange scientific-technical results which have approximately the
same value.
The possibility of direct negotiation and conclusion of agreements covering scientific-technical cooperation without the assistance of the foreign trade enterprise, as outlined in the above resolution, is naturally applicable to all actions which do not involve direct outputs to production. In other words, these are primarily solutions of tasks involving fundamental and economic research and other research, developmental, and experimental work, the results of which are impossible to use directly in the national economy. However, such cases should not be typical in implementing the comprehensive program.

Plans Will Undergo Change

In the adopted Comprehensive Program for Scientific-Technical Development, the CEMA nations agreed, among others, that they would include the commitments necessary for its implementation for the period of the present 5-year plan in the national economic development plans for their countries for the years 1986-1990.

This means that the basic phase of implementing the comprehensive program will culminate in having the commitments adopted in compiling the detailed working plans of cooperation and in drawing up the necessary legal contracts included in the national plans for development of science and technology. In some cases (insofar as the comprehensive program includes some activities continuing from the period 1981 through 1985) the adopted commitments will already show up in plans for capital construction and production.

Naturally, the planning units must work up the tasks into all appropriate portions of their plans, including their personnel, material, and financial assurance. In view of the anticipated development involved in preparation and coordination of detailed working plans, it is possible that the adopted international commitments will be reflected in the national plans and will bring about a number of changes (some even significant changes) both in the 5-year plan and also particularly in the plan for the year 1986.

An overview of the assurance of the adopted international commitments in scientific-technical and economic cooperation can be obtained in Czechoslovakia from the average portion of the state plan for development of the national economy under the heading of "socialist economic integration."

The compilation of this segment of the plan is, for the time being, obligatory only for selected cooperation projects, included in the Agreed-Upon Plan of Multilateral Integration Measures. Effective 1986, however, compilation of this plan segment will be binding for all work resulting for Czechoslovakia from the comprehensive program. This portion of the state plan must then, logically, become a foundation for control and statistical monitoring of the realization of all commitments which Czechoslovakia has taken on within the framework of the Comprehensive Program of Scientific-Technical Development.
From Usti to Dresden Without Complications?

As has already been stated, the comprehensive program is to be fulfilled to the maximum extent possible through direct working contacts between cooperating economic entities of CEMA member countries. It is not without significance that, in the beginning, it will be necessary to create conditions particularly for direct contacts in the area of science and technology. Research and development work will form the decisive content of agreed-upon activity in the initial phase.

Czechoslovak organizations have relatively good opportunities for initiating and implementing direct contractual scientific-technical contacts, which are specifically outlined in Law No 42/1980 of SBIRKA ZAKONU on economic contacts with foreign countries, as well as by the previously mentioned Resolution No 86/1981 of SBIRKA ZAKONU. These standards make it possible for Czechoslovak organizations to negotiate and conclude agreements on research work with their partners in CEMA virtually in all cases without previously negotiating with and obtaining approval of the appropriate superior organs of the state administration. This is an authority which is only now being gained by appropriate units in the majority of the other CEMA nations, including the USSR.

The creation of optimum prerequisites for direct contacts, however, would undoubtedly be assisted by solution of the fundamental problem pertaining to their development which is common to all forms of scientific-technical co-operation: simplification of personal contacts among scientists and technicians, particularly on the occasion of official travel abroad. Current practice is such that if, for example, the director of an enterprise at Usti nad Labem wishes to send "his" technician to visit a cooperating enterprise in Dresden, he must first seek approval from his superior ministry (even where this contact would not involve any foreign exchange) and the dispatched technician must first travel to Prague to pick up an official passport and the necessary foreign exchange. Only then can he cross the frontier. And because he must negotiate a similar procedure in accounting for his trip, the handling of travel formalities sometimes takes longer than the actual trip. One cannot even speak of any kind of operational characteristics in this case.

On the basis of this status, certain exceptions or modifications were made by the centralized management of official foreign travel for various organizations. However, much is not resolved. Thus, for example, within the Federal Ministry of Metallurgy and Heavy Engineering, service passports of technicians of subordinate organizations were turned over to the appropriate general directorates but the foreign exchange limit for official foreign travel continues to be centralized. In practice this generally means still further complications. The traveling technician must go to Prague anyway (to get his foreign exchange quota) and in addition must visit the general directorate (for his passport) if he is not directly employed there. A more purposeful simplification was made, for example, by the Federal Ministry of Fuels and Energy, where the handing over of the passports was accompanied by a release of some 30 percent of the appropriate foreign exchange fund.
The introduction of a simple system of foreign official travel is of key significance to the mass development of direct contacts in implementing the Comprehensive Program for Scientific-Technical Development. That is why it is necessary to decide to deposit official passports directly in the organizations and, at the same time, release a portion of the ministry's foreign exchange limits to them. For selected entities, it would be necessary to permit (for example, through the form of an experiment) the free purchase of the necessary foreign exchange of the visited CEMA country from the appropriate branch of the Czechoslovak State Bank financing the trip.

Facilitate the Handing Over of Results

One of the goals of the comprehensive program is the extensive mutual exchange of information regarding results of research and development work and new technologies, which would facilitate their rapid utilization by all interested CEMA countries.

Despite the fact that Czechoslovakia exchanges approximately 8,000 sets of scientific-technical documentation with CEMA member countries each year (approximately one-half of these benefit Czechoslovakia), it cannot be said that the forms and methods of handing over scientific-technical results cannot be perfected and, primarily, simplified. First of all, it was possible to simplify the licensing regulations, carried out in accordance with Resolution No 64/1980 of SBIRKA ZAKONU covering the procedures involved in handling industrial rights and production-technical findings in contacts with foreign countries and according to Directive No 8/1980 of the FMTIR on the significance of documentation for licensing procedures.

The goal of adjustment efforts should be the replacement of the two-cycle licensing mechanism by a single-round licensing hearing in most cases and in direct connection with the economic significance of the purchased or sold license for the Czechoslovak national economy; simultaneously, license proceedings should be completely resconded up to a certain value of the license or its economic significance.

In support of the efficient implementation of the Comprehensive Program for Scientific-Technical Development and for successful scientific-technical cooperation with socialist states in general it would be a significant contribution for Czechoslovakia to obtain a precise definition of the concept "production-technical finding" [technical know-how?] (according to Section 33 of Law No 42/1980 of SBIRKA ZAKONU on economic contacts with foreign countries and its clear separation from the concept "scientific and technical finding" according to Section 29 of the same law. The existing lack of clarity in these definitions causes legal uncertainties and in its results leads either to appropriate complications or, on the other hand, even to inappropriate benevolence in handing over the results of Czechoslovak research and development to a foreign country.

It would also be necessary to examine and adjust the mutual relationship between Law No 42/1980 of SBIRKA ZAKONU on economic contacts with foreign nations (specifically Section 33) and the Agreement on Mutual Conclusion of
Copyright Provisions and other protective documents for inventions, dated 18 December 1976. The above law, together with the implementing regulations, on the one hand and the previously cited multilateral agreement between CEMA states on the other hand handle the possibilities of utilizing Czechoslovak inventions abroad in different ways.

Changes and Adjustments Also on an Experimental Basis

What can one say in conclusion? Much has to change or be adjusted in the system of management, planning, and financing the national economy of Czechoslovakia as well as the mechanism of scientific-technical and economic cooperation with socialist states. Only in this way will the actual optimum conditions and necessary prerequisites for implementing all intentions of the comprehensive program of scientific-technical progress among CEMA countries be created in Czechoslovakia. This finding is fully obvious without my even mentioning, for example, the directive of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Federal Finance Ministry on foreign exchange interests involved in exports and imports which, while stipulating a foreign exchange interest with respect to inventions, industrial samples, and innovation proposals in the area of solving scientific, technical, technico-economic, and natural science tasks, deliveries of technical, production, and design documentation, utilization or sales of programs involving the establishment of computer technology, etc., but does so essentially only in relationship with states having freely exchangeable currencies. In other words, it excludes the CEMA member countries. And one could continue in this vein....

In other words, the realization of the comprehensive program demands an elastic initiative approach in perfecting the economic mechanism in Czechoslovakia or its connection with the integration organism. In this direction it is necessary to support the efforts to solve some of the more complex questions and problems (particularly the verification of the possibilities of making the necessary adjustments involving direct contacts between Czechoslovak economic organizations and appropriate units in CEMA countries) by way of an experiment (Czechoslovak Government Resolution No 12/1986) which will involve the management of Czechoslovak organizations which will participate in the realization of the Comprehensive Program for Scientific-Technical Development throughout CEMA.

5911
CSO: 2400/236
STATISTICS PUBLISHED ON 1985 SHIPBUILDING, SHIP DELIVERIES

East Berlin SEEWIRTSCHAFT in German Vol 18, No 2, Feb 86 pp 60-68

[Text] In 1985 new construction output for the shipbuilding industry of the GDR was 69 seagoing ships, totalling 384,100 gross tons. The USSR purchased 62 of the 67 new ships destined for export, the socialist republic of Rumania took 1 ro-ro ship, and 4 multipurpose freighters sailed under the Liberian flag. The VEB Deutfchraft shipping company acquired new ships with special equipment for first-time use in container shipping with the two 118,155-tdw multipurpose freighters MS "Ruhland" and MS "Ruebeland." They are the new "Aequator" type, which has now gone into production.

The shipbuilding combine was an important pillar of the export strength of our republic in the 5-year plan period just ended. Out of 320 seagoing ships with an approximate total tonnage measurement of 1.9 million gross tons, the foreign trade company Schiffswerker sold 307 new ships to owners from 12 countries. Taking measurement tonnage as a reference, this comes to 96.4 percent. By comparison, in the 5-year plan period from 1976 to 1981, a total of 301 new ships was built, totalling 1.9 million gross tons, of which 253 ships—80 percent of the measurement tonnage—were exported.

The USSR was again the principal customer in the 5-year plan period just concluded, buying 254 new ships with a gross tonnage of 1.24 million. Of these the maritime fleet took 39 (among them 34 from the VEB Warnow Shipyard Warnemuende), the fishing fleet took 165 ships (147 of them catch and processing or refrigerated ships from the VEB Peoples Shipyard Stralsund), the inland fleet took 41 ships (including 14 large passenger vessels from the VEB Elbe Shipyards Boizenburg/Rossual) and the Technical Fleet took 9 bucket floating dredgers from the VEB Neptune Shipyard Rostock. These figures emphasize the basic importance of contracts from the USSR in keeping the GDR's shipbuilding industry working at full capacity. But they also bring out that the GDR is the biggest builder of ships for the USSR, that shipbuilding in the GDR has been able to hold its own successfully in this market against international competition and, not least, how the mutually beneficial division of labor and cooperation between the economies of the two countries has expanded and deepened within the framework of socialist economic integration.

Shipbuilding in the GDR was the sole manufacturer of large full-container ships for the USSR in the period studied (a total of 10 ships of the "Mercur
II" type, 16,030 tdw, 17,845 gross tons with about 940 container spaces, construction yard for this work: the VEB Warnow Shipyard Warnemunde).

Table 1. New Construction in 1985 by Shipyard

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shipyard</th>
<th>Number of ships</th>
<th>Gross Tonnage</th>
<th>Tons Dead Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VEB Warnow Warnemuende</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>156,252</td>
<td>174,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEB Mathias-Thesen Wismar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>93,363</td>
<td>92,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEB Peoples Yard Stralsund</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>68,292</td>
<td>24,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEB Neptune Rostock</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40,095</td>
<td>32,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEB Elbe Boizenburg/Rosslau</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26,098</td>
<td>13,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>384,100</td>
<td>337,403</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Something completely new in the world and reckoned by Lloyd's Register of London among the most interesting new ships of 1984, the Neptune Shipyard in Rostock developed and built 5 "Trailer" type ro-ro ships (4,670 tdw, 6,884 gross tons) with an angled stern ramp for inland navigation and areas close to the coast.

The GDR is the only country supplying large refrigerated transport ships for the Soviet flotilla fishing fleet. The VEB Mathias-Thesen Shipyard Wismar has delivered 41 of these vessels (13,306 m³ hold capacity with electronically controlled temperatures from -8°C to -30°C), of which 18 were the "Kristal I/II" version, supplied from 1981 to 1985.

Table 2. New Construction in 1985 by Ship Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship Type</th>
<th>Number of ships</th>
<th>Gross Tonnage</th>
<th>Tons Dead Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freighters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Full container ships</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>247,953</td>
<td>273,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Ro-ro and lo-ro ships</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35,690</td>
<td>32,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Multipurpose freighters</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>117,244</td>
<td>114,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Sea-inland freighters</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>85,163</td>
<td>114,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing Vessels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Catch and processing ships</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>117,824</td>
<td>62,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Refrigerated ships</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>68,292</td>
<td>24,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Inland passenger ships</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18,323</td>
<td>2,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Bucket floating dredgers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16,242</td>
<td>1,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>384,100</td>
<td>337,403</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the period from 1981 to 1985, shipowners from 11 more countries bought ships from GDR shipyards:

-- Rumania purchased the "Tutova" and the "Tuzla," which are DSR "Gleichenberg" type ro-ro ships, each of 6,700 tdw
-- the SFRY purchased two 17,400 tdw multipurpose freighters of the "Monsun" type and 4 13,865 tdw "Meridian" type ships
-- the FRG, Gabun, Liberia, Singapore, Panama, the Philippines, Indonesia, Libya and Cyprus purchased universal container-oriented multipurpose freighters.

In the light of the shipping crisis in capitalist countries, the sale of 45 multipurpose freighters, totalling a half million gross tons, is an expression of the good reputation that GDR shipyards and their products enjoy around the world, but at the same time it is also the result of the productive work of those in the combine's foreign trade company Schiffsscommerz.

Table 3. Share of Product Groups in New Construction in 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product Group</th>
<th>Number of ships</th>
<th>Tons Dead Weight</th>
<th>Tons Dead Weight in Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freighters</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>247,953</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing Vessels</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>117,824</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18,323</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>384,100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Build What Is Right for the Market, Conserve Material and Be Cost Beneficial—Operate Economically

As a result of the combine's proven strategy of renewal, shipowners and operators had a choice of increasingly more efficient ships and equipment. Important economic effects of this strategy are the increase in both net production and productivity compared with 1980, to more than 170 percent and 165 percent respectively, as well as an annual reduction in specific consumption of rolled steel of 5.6 percent. The fact that it was possible to put more than 20 types of ship into production in the 5-year plan period just ended and that the entire production program of the combine has been replaced is visible expression of the success that has been achieved in making intensification permanent. This strategy will pushed ahead until 1990, by annually replacing an average of 33 percent of industrial goods production and developing another generation of more than 20 ship types with improvements in consumption figures of 20 to 40 percent over the products that are to be replaced.

The pioneers in this area are primarily the ships engine and installation construction factories within the combine, which have contributed through the development and manufacture of:

-- 27 new generation cross-head engines,
-- 103 ships engines in 4 versions and with power outputs up to 5,000 kW, and 5 main-shaft mounted generators,
—higher capacity shipboard luffing cranes (25 tons, with a 40-ton crane in preparation),
—automation systems for the broad application of microelectronics based on the SES 6000 from VEB Ships Electronics Rostock,
—ramps, lifts and hatch covers for optimal cargo handling and winches for mechanized operation of fishing equipment and
—fish treatment and processing machinery for maximum refinement of the catch on board.

Table 4. Export Share in New Construction in 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of ships</th>
<th>Tons Dead Weight</th>
<th>Tons Dead Weight in Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total exports</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>356,650</td>
<td>92.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—USSR</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>288,694</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Other countries</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>67,866</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27,540</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>384,100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The investment power of the combine was concentrated and technological limitations were overcome for the manufacture of this generation of ships equipment and for the more effective full utilization of the available fixed assets.

The technological level in particular has been raised with complex designs for rationalization, for example, at the VEB Peoples Yard Stralsund for the launching of the 120.7-meter long and 19-meter wide factory trawlers and at the VEB Mathias-Thesen Shipyard Wismar for building hulls from section weighing up to 300 tons. Substantial investment funds were made available at these two shipyards as the result of building their own rationalization equipment, but also at other combine factories, for example at the VEB Diesel Engine Works Rostock and the VEB Klement-Gottwald Schwerin.

Table 5. New Construction and Exports in the 5-Year Plan 1981-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of ships</th>
<th>Tons Dead Weight</th>
<th>Ships Exported</th>
<th>Export Tonnage as a Percentage of TDW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>375,190</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>355,443</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>96.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>382,033</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>97.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>387,223</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>96.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>384,100</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>92.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>1,883,989</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The installations for mechanized cleaning, rust removal and protection of the ship's outer skin which are used in the shipyards' floating docks typify the performance level achieved in this sector today. Using the "Mekid" system, areas of 1,000 m² can be treated in 1 hour, allowing the painted surface to last longer and permitting shorter layovers in the dock.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shipyard</th>
<th>Number of ships</th>
<th>Gross Tonnage</th>
<th>Number of Ships</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>Percentage of GRT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VEB Warnow Warnemuende</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>753,211</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>712,144</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEB Mathias-Thesen</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>404,746</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>390,670</td>
<td>96.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wismar</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>258,229</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>258,229</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEB Neptune Rostock</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>358,429</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>348,760</td>
<td>97.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEB Peoples Yard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stralsund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEB Elbe Yards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boizenburg/Rossbau</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>108,654</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>107,246</td>
<td>98.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEB Yacht Yard Berlin</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>720</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>1,883,989</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>1,817,019</td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following testing in the Mathias-Thesen Shipyard, pipe conveyor lines using industrial robots are being readied in other shipyards for the automated and mechanized production of ships pipes.

The solutions already described in general terms also include cutting machines which were developed jointly with Soviet shipbuilders. All these methods of rationalization made a substantial contribution to achieving greater economic results and at the same time improving working and living conditions. For the 5-year plan from 1986-1990, the research concept "Perspectives on Technology" predicts an increase in construction of tools for rationalization by the shipbuilding combine to more than M 120 million, that is to say, double the present level.

Setting a Course for the Future

The treaty signed on 15 April 1985 on cooperation between the GDR and the USSR in the area of shipbuilding, which is to run from 1986 to 1990, and on the reciprocal delivery of ships and ships equipment provides for the GDR to supply fishing, marine and inland waterway ships to the USSR for M 12.5 billion, making it the most valuable government agreement ever signed between the two countries. It emphasizes once more the economic standing of our shipbuilding industry and the great responsibility of the shipbuilding combine in ensuring the success of the foodstuffs program of the USSR by supplying more than 100 ships of a new generation of fishing vessels, by improving the tonnage productivity of the Soviet maritime and inland waterway fleets and by providing floating capacity for vacationing and recuperation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dry Freighters</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Full container ships</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Ro-ro and lo-ro ships</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Multipurpose freighters</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Special bulk cargo freighters</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Sea-inland waterway freighters</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing Vessels</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Catch and processing ships</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Catch and refrigerated ships</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Deep freeze ships</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Large inland waterway passenger ships</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Seagoing bucket floating dredgers</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Fireboats</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Survey ships</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>320</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the year of the 11th Party Congress, the 58,000 members of the shipbuilding combine are setting a target of building 66 seagoing ships—51 of them for the USSR—and increasing net production to 107 percent.

**VEB Warnow Shipyard Warnemünde**

The Warnow Shipyard once again provided impressive proof of its productivity with 10 new ships (totalling 156,252 gross tons, 174,950 tdw). Although there were short-term changes requested by the customers concerning operating opportunities for the ships and the equipment in the new ships, and considerable changes had to be made, it was possible to meet the shipowners' wishes flexibly and quickly.

The principal client—the maritime fleet of the USSR—took delivery of the last two 10-series "Mercur II" full-container ships MS "Professor Tovstikh" (Baltic Shipping Company, Leningrad) and MS "Bolshevik M. Thomas" (Black Sea Shipping Company, Odessa), each with 940 container spaces, and 5 additional multipurpose 10-ro freighters (17,850 tdw). The periodical MORSKII FLOT 11/1985 carries a report on the type ship of this series, the MS "Astrakhan," which was delivered on 31 December 1983, saying: "The MS "Astrakhan" has been sailing for about 2 years in the Leningrad-based Baltic Shipping Company's fleet on the route to Cuba. In this short time her crew met the plan for 1984 with 108 percent, carried 640 tons of additional freight and saved 290 tons of standard fuels and 684 kg of lubricant. The sailors put 11 suggestions from innovators into practice, with an economic gain of R 60,000, increased the container capacity of the ship, participated with the workers at the maintenance base to convert the loading deck and stacked 26 more containers than the construction capacity (from 533 to 559 TEU)."
The production run of the "Monsun" type, which has been built since 1979 for export to the non-socialist economic area, ended on 18 March 1985 with the MS "Irini" for the Irini Maritime Corporation, Monrovia. These universal multipurpose freighters (17,300 tds, approximately 650 containers) are an example of the production of basic types which can be modified flexibly in many ways, without having to sacrifice the conditions of series production which are equally advantageous to both the shipowner and the yard building the ships.

With the MS "Ruhland" and the MS "Ruebeland" the DSR lines took delivery of its 64th and 65th new ships from the Warnow yard. These 18,155-tdw "Aequator" type multipurpose freighters, which recently went into production, were fitted with special equipment for first-time use in container transportation and, with 964 TEU, they even exceed slightly the number of container spaces of the "Mercur II" type full-container ships. The MS "Ruhland" started its maiden voyage on 23 September 1985, with Larnaca, Aqaba, Jeddah and Hodeida as its destinations. Loading was started in Rostock and completed in Aarhus, Rotterdam and Antwerp. Fig. 1 shows the MS "Ruhland" in the English Channel with four layers of containers on deck. Carrying primarily 40-foot containers (FEU), the "Aequator" type can take 162 FEU and 28 TEU in its hold and 247 FEU and 100 TEU on deck, a total of 409 FEU and 128 TEU. The building program for 1986 calls for five additional lo-ro type 18 multipurpose freighters and two more "Aequator" ships and the practical completion of the new "Saturn" full-container ship.

VEB Mathias-Thesen Shipyard Wismar

The Mathias-Thesen Shipyard delivered 7 new ships with a total of 93,363 gross tons and 92,104 tdw to clients from 3 countries. Series production of large refrigerated transport ships, which is unique in the world, was continued with another four of the "Kristall II" type (9,350 tdw, 13,306 m³ of refrigerated hold capacity) for flotilla fishing and increased to 46—41 of them for the USSR. More than 60,000 visitors to the International Fishing Exhibition "Inrybprom '85" in Leningrad were able to see for themselves the solidity and practicality of this ship type, one of which was on exhibition there.

With the second ro-ro ship "Tuzla" for Navrona in Constanza, the 5-series of the Ro 15 type was concluded on 28 March 1985. Two more universal OBC [ore bulk carrier] (24,000 tdw, 800 TEU) left the shipyard under the Liberian flag, raising the production total to 30 ships.

Last year the level of technology in the shipyard was raised significantly. For example, jib cranes with a capacity of 160 tons started operation, currently the most powerful in shipbuilding. The VEB Loading and Transport Plant Leizig developed two "Pelikan" type cranes to meet the special requirements of ship hull assembly. For the first time, prefabricated sections weighing up to 300 tons can now be brought directly to the slipway and welded together, saving even more time. With the construction of a special assembly area for deckhouses, which can be moved to the edge of the quay and mounted by means of floating cranes, another step was taken in creating the conditions for the more efficient construction of larger ships.
VEB Neptune Shipyard Rostock

Of the 6 new ships built (40,095 gross tons, 32,007 tdw), the USSR took 4 "Trailer" ro-ro ships (4,670 tdw, 6,884 gross tons) and 1 sea-going bucket floating dredger. The combination sea-inland navigation "Trailer", which is certified for voyages on the open sea up to 200 nautical miles from its home port, is a premier product of the GDR's shipbuilding industry. This ship type, described in detail on pp 69-79 of this issue, can tie up at normal quay installations and quay heights from 1.5 meters to 4 meters with its angled stern ramp and it possesses a remarkably high level of equipment for cargo handling and storage. This ship, which draws only 3.51 meters in river navigation and is only 14.4 meters above the waterline, is optimally designed for combined sea and inland waterway navigation and for passages of the Volga-Baltic and Volga-Don canals. The ships operate in and from the Caspian and Black Seas and between Soviet Baltic ports (Klaipeda) and western Europe.

On 31 July 1985 the launching of the first multipurpose "Aequator-Neptun" type container ship (construction no 201) for the new client country Nigeria took place. In the presence of leading representatives of the Nigerian shipping company African Ocean Lines (AOL) and of the chief executive ad interim of the Republic of Nigeria, the freighter was given the name "Binta Yar'Adua." It is the largest freighter built by the Neptune Shipyard, 158.9 meters overall and 17,300 tdw. The sister ship "Atinuke Abiola" was launched on 20 November. With these ships, African Ocean Lines -- the only shipping line in the exclusively in Nigerian hands -- takes ownerships of its first new vessels this year.

With the MS "Laplandia" (12,732 tdw, 10,478 gross tons) the yard delivered the 53rd and last ship of the "Neptun" series, which largely determined the product profile from 1970 to 1985. The largest freighter series from all the GDR yards, modified extensively and increased in capacity to 445 container spaces, these new ships sailing under the flag of more than 20 countries are an unmistakable visiting card for GDR shipbuilding.

Three more "Trailer" type ro-ro ships, 4 of the "Aequator" series and the 10th seagoing bucket dredger are due for delivery in 1986.

VEB Peoples Shipyard Stralsund

The building of 36 new fishing vessels, totalling 68,292 gross tons, and the advanced state of completion of the factory trawler "Atlantik 488" once again represent a record performance by world standards, which -- taking the customary international measurement tonnage as a basis for comparison -- is not reflected at all to this degree. After 84 GRS type fishing vessels which used a combination of trawl net and ring net equipment (construction nos 601 to 684), delivery began of a vessel designed exclusively as a trawl net vessel (GT) (description in SEEWIRTSCHAFT 7/1985, pp 330-333), starting with construction no 685 "Obolon."

On 10 December 1985, the Stralsund shipbuilders launched the 100th ship of this series, which will be continued in 1986 with an additional 36 ships. The
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery Date</th>
<th>Build No</th>
<th>Ship's Name</th>
<th>Ship Type</th>
<th>Flag State</th>
<th>Gross Tonnage (TDW)</th>
<th>LOA in ms</th>
<th>Beam in ms</th>
<th>Draft in ms</th>
<th>Engines</th>
<th>Power in kW</th>
<th>Speed in knots</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 March 1985</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>Irini</td>
<td>Monsun</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>13,360 (17,330)</td>
<td>163.57</td>
<td>23.05</td>
<td>10.05</td>
<td>K 7 Z</td>
<td>6,690</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>7/1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May 1985</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>Kremenchug</td>
<td>Lo-ro 18</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>15,893 (17,850)</td>
<td>161.0</td>
<td>23.05</td>
<td>10.02</td>
<td>K 5 SZ</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>10/1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 May 1985</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>Budapesht</td>
<td>Lo-ro 18</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>15,803 (17,850)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>see &quot;Kremenchug&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 June 1985</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>Kostroma</td>
<td>Lo-ro 18</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>15,803 (17,850)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>see &quot;Kremenchug&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 August 1985</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>Ruhland</td>
<td>Aequator</td>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>13,770 (18,155)</td>
<td></td>
<td>152.10</td>
<td>23.05</td>
<td>10.07</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>70/125BL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 September 1985</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>Brest</td>
<td>Lo-ro 18</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>15,893</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>see &quot;Kremenchug&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 October 1985</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>Bolshevik</td>
<td>Mercur II</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>17,845 (16,030)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>see &quot;Professor Tovstykh&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 December 1985</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>Ruebeland</td>
<td>Aequator</td>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>13,770 (18,155)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>see &quot;Ruhland&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December 1985</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>Rovno</td>
<td>Lo-ro 18</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>15,893 (17,850)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>see &quot;Kremenchug&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 10 new ships with altogether 156,252 measurement tons and 174,950 tdw
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery Date</th>
<th>Build No</th>
<th>Ship's Name</th>
<th>Ship Type</th>
<th>Flag State</th>
<th>Gross Tonnage</th>
<th>LOA in ms</th>
<th>Beam in ms</th>
<th>Draft in ms</th>
<th>Engines</th>
<th>Power in kW</th>
<th>Speed in knots</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 March 1985</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>Tuzla</td>
<td>Ro-ro</td>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>10,243 (6,704)</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>7.23</td>
<td>2x12VD 48/42AL-2</td>
<td>2x5295</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>2/1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 April 1985</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>Ulbanski Zaliv</td>
<td>Kristall II</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>12,383 (9,350)</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>8.02</td>
<td>K 5 SZ 70/125BL</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>7/1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 May 1985</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>Bereg Vetrov</td>
<td>Kristall II</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>12,383 (9,350)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>see &quot;Ulbanski Zaliv&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1985</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>Penzhinsky Zaliv</td>
<td>Kristall II</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>12,383 (9,350)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>see &quot;Ulbanski Zaliv&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 September 1985</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>Santa Rita</td>
<td>OBC</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>16,794 (24,000)</td>
<td>167.4</td>
<td>22.86</td>
<td>10.46</td>
<td>K 8 Z 70/120E</td>
<td>8,235</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 November 1985</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>Hermann Matern</td>
<td>Kristall II</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>12,383 (9,350)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>see &quot;Ulbanski Zaliv&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 November 1985</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>Santa Rosa</td>
<td>OBC</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>16,794 (24,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>see &quot;Santa Rita&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VEB Mathias-Thesen Shipyard Wismar
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery Date</th>
<th>Build No</th>
<th>Ship's Name</th>
<th>Ship Type</th>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Gross Tonnage</th>
<th>LOA in ms</th>
<th>Beam in ms</th>
<th>Draft in ms</th>
<th>Engines</th>
<th>Power in kW</th>
<th>Speed in knots</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 February 1985</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>Kompozitor Glinka</td>
<td>Ro-ro</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>6,884 (4,673)</td>
<td>117.5</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2xMH 6VDS 2x 48/42A1-2</td>
<td>2,650</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>2/1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May 1985</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>Kompozitor Dargomil-zhskii</td>
<td>Ro-ro</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>6,884 (4,673)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>see &quot;Kompozitor Glinka&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July 1985</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>Kompozitor Borodin</td>
<td>Ro-ro</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>6,884 (4,673)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 September 1985</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>Laplandia Neptun-421</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,478 (12,732)</td>
<td>140.67</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>9.05</td>
<td>MH K 9Z 6,620 60/105E</td>
<td>2/1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 November 1985</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>Kompozitor Mussorgsky</td>
<td>Ro-ro</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>6,884 (4,673)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>see Kompozitor Glinka&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 6 new ships with altogether 40,0095 measurement tons and 32,007 tdw

VEB Peoples Shipyard Stralsund

(All 1985)

2 January 661 Oparino
6 January 662 Orzhev
21 January 663 Osinki
27 January 664 Osinovka
31 January 665 Osipovichi
14 February 666 Alexander Lavrov
20 February 667 Orichi
28 February 668 Ossoara
15 March 669 Ostrovets
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery Date</th>
<th>Build No</th>
<th>Ship's Name</th>
<th>Ship Type</th>
<th>Flag State</th>
<th>Gross Tonnage (TDW)</th>
<th>LOA in ms</th>
<th>Beam in ms</th>
<th>Draft in ms</th>
<th>Engines</th>
<th>Power in</th>
<th>Speed in knots</th>
<th>Description in SEEWIRTSCHAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 March</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>Ostroye</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2x8VD</td>
<td>2x882</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>Ivan Vernigorenko</td>
<td>Trawler-Seiner</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2x8VD</td>
<td>2x882</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 April</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>Otar</td>
<td>Freezer trawler-Seiner</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>(672)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>Otynya</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2x8VD</td>
<td>2x882</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>Ocheretino</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 May</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>Vladimir Kalinin</td>
<td>Trawler-Seiner</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>Ochhamuri</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2x8VD</td>
<td>2x882</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>Oyra</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2x8VD</td>
<td>2x882</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 June</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>Orel</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>Ostropol</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>Olgino</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 July</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>Ostankino</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 July</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>Ochotino</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>Pyot Bulko</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 August</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>Obukhovo</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 August</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>Obolon</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sept</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>Olomnma</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Sept</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>Ordynskoye</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Sept</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>Ostryna</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Oct</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>Oymur</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Oct</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>Olemia</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>Martha</td>
<td>Freezer trawler</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td>(736)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Nov</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>Bernard Koenen</td>
<td>Trawler-Seiner</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Nov</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>Osreya</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Dec</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>Bestyzevo</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Dec</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>Kolomenskoe</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Dec</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>Karacharovo</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3/1982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 36 new ships with altogether 68,292 measurement tons and 24,960 tdw
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery Date</th>
<th>Build No</th>
<th>Ship's Name</th>
<th>Ship Type</th>
<th>Flag State</th>
<th>Gross Tonnage (IDW)</th>
<th>LOA in ms</th>
<th>Beam in ms</th>
<th>Draft in ms</th>
<th>Engines</th>
<th>Power in kW</th>
<th>Speed in kms/hr</th>
<th>Description in SEEWIRTSCHAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 March</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>CTK-1012 CTK-1012</td>
<td>CBK 1700</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,408 (1,706)</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>2x8VDS 36/24</td>
<td>2x441</td>
<td>21 km/hr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 March</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>Leonid Sobolev</td>
<td>Inland water passenger ship</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>5,414 (480)</td>
<td>122.43</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3xG70-5</td>
<td>3x736</td>
<td>25.5 km/hr</td>
<td>2/1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>CTK-1013 CTK-1013</td>
<td>CBK 1700</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,408 (1,706)</td>
<td>see &quot;CTK-1012&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>CTK-1014 CTK-1014</td>
<td>CBK 1700</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,408 (1,706)</td>
<td>see &quot;CTK-1012&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 June</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>CTK-1015 CTK-1015</td>
<td>CBK 1700</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,408 (1,706)</td>
<td>see &quot;CTK-1012&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 June</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>Mikhail Solochov</td>
<td>Inland water passenger ship</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>5,414 (480)</td>
<td>see &quot;Leonid Sobolev&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 August</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>CTK-1016 CTK-1016</td>
<td>CBK 1700</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,408 (1,706)</td>
<td>see &quot;CTK-1012&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>Alexei Vatchenko</td>
<td>Inland water passenger ship</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>5,414 (480)</td>
<td>see &quot;Lenoid Sobolev&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Dec</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>CTK-1018 CTK-1018</td>
<td>CBK 1700</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,408 (1,706)</td>
<td>see &quot;CTK-1012&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 10 new ships with altogether 26,098 measurement tons and 13,382 tdw
Peoples Shipyards has again proved its outstanding importance for exports to the USSR and the results which are organized as the result of socialist economic integration. The day of 30 April 1985 went down in the almost 40-year history of the yard as one on which technological limitations were convincingly overcome. When the factory trawler "Moonsund" was launched, the type ship of a series of more than 30 factory trawlers entered the water. The launching involved the use of a land transport system developed by the shipyard's facilities for building tools for rationalization and the combine's main factory, with pushing and pulling units to move the 3,200-ton hull, and a launching technique in which a floating dock was converted into a launching dock. These vessels (LOA 120.7 meters, moulded breadth 19 meters, equipment for about 96 days, hold capacity about 2,050 m³, trawl catch net equipment for 2,000 meters, fish preparation and processing about 120 tons, 26,000 tins daily), in contrast to the current designs for refrigerated trawlers intended for use inside the 200-mile economic zones, fish principally outside these waters. The low shoal concentration of fish in the open ocean requires substantially large fishing equipment and consequently higher engine performance. The distances to be covered can only be justified if the catch is highly refined when it is still on board. As a result, a high degree of processing (with canned production as the highest form) and factory-quality fish treatment and processing are special characteristics of this new type of fishing boat (see SEEWIRTSCHAFT 10/1984, pp 503-505).

In order to be relatively independent of both tankers for refueling and of provision and refrigerated transport ships for transferring the catch, the "Atlantik 488" has particularly large holds and fuel bunkers; its ability to sustain itself for more than 100 days is supported by the appropriate living and working conditions. The use-value of the factory trawler in comparison with the "Atlantik-Supertrawler," which was built until 1983, was increased by 52 percent—more than 50 applications for patents are a sign of this creative effort.

VEB Elbe Shipyards Boizenburg/Rosslau

In 1985 the Elbe Shipyards delivered 10 new ships totalling 26,098 gross tons to the inland waterway fleet of the USSR. With the passenger ships (332 cabin berths according to project 302, for a description see SEEWIRTSCHAFT 2/1984, pp 81-93) "Lenoid Sobolev" (home port Gorki), "Mikhail Sholochov" (home port Rostov on the Don) and "Alexei Vachenko" (home port Cherson), the production run was raised to 30 units, including the 22 ships built under project 301. The boats trips on the Dnieper and the Volga, which are offered from May to October, are also very popular with tourists from the GDR. On 19 April 1985, the 32nd ship of the series was named after the former Minister for Inland Shipping of the USSR "Zosima Shaskov."

The delivery on 30 December 1985 of CTK-1018 as the 50th ship in the series of container inland waterway-coastal motor ships, which was started in 1977 (CBK 1600/KBK CBK 1700) was another production anniversary for the shipyard. Twenty ships of this series are in the Siberian part of the USSR, 6 of them in service in the Yakut SSR on the 4,700-km-long Lena. On the Irtysh, the Ob and its numerous tributaries, the ships of the Irtysh Shipping Line transport
millions of tons of goods of all kinds throughout the year for geologists, oil
workers, construction workers, fishermen and for kolchozes and sovchozes in
the Omsk and Tjumen regions. In the years of the 10th 5-year plan alone, the
economy of these areas was supplied in this way with 122 million tons of con-
struction material, fuels, pipes, fittings, industrial goods and food. For
the construction of the crude oil and natural gas pipelines 34.8 million tons
of various goods were delivered directly, 9.9 million tons to areas north of
the Arctic Circle, that is, twice as much as in the previous 5-year plan
period.

The growing need for transport in areas north of the Arctic Circle requires a
constant expansion of the fleet with ships that are capable of sailing in
areas close off the coast. The 11 special container ships of the Irtysh
Shipping Line (project no 326 CBK 1000), which were built in the GDR, have
proven their worth. Each of these ships can carry 1,000 tons of mixed cargo
in containers or 1,600 tons of reinforced concrete sections on board. They
can operate both on the river and at sea.

During the previous sailing period the container ships rendered an inestimable
service to the construction workers and technical experts at the Nadym natural
gas fields by delivering modular dwellings built in Finland. The houses were
transported by rail to the harbor in Omsk, then transferred to the CBK 1600
motor vessels, which proved to be extremely suitable for this type of trans-
portation. Containers were loaded in the first level in their holds, and
the dwellings were loaded in the second level and on deck. The ships were
loaded to their maximum possible draft, which made direct delivery to Nadym
possible without transshipment. This ensured delivery of the freight in a
perfectly undamaged condition, quicker delivery to the consignees and
efficient use of the means of transportation.

The ships' holds are universal in the truest sense of the word. In addition
to containers, they can be loaded with cement and other industrial goods,
with food on pallets and in boxes, with reinforced concrete, equipment in
crates, etc.

At the present time, the 11 container ships which make up the fleet of the
Irtysh Shipping Line from the VEB Elbe Shipyards are carrying more than
250,000 tons of cargo annually, of which about 40,000 tons is in containers
(total cargo handling is more than 400 million ton/km). The planned operat-
ing time of the ships is being exceeded by about 10 percent).

9581  
CSO: 2300/267
STATE SECRETARY HOOS ON 1986 PLAN

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 31 Dec 85 p 3

[Article by Janos Hoos, Secretary of State: "The First Year of the Seventh Five Year Plan"]

[Text] The main goal of the 1986 national economic plan is to start implementing the economic and political direction of the Seventh Five-Year Plan. The plan does not call for sudden changes in our economic policies, its main efforts fit into the economic policies followed since 1979, directed at achieving consolidation and re-establishing and stabilizing economic equilibrium. At the same time, the plan is not characterized by continuity alone; it also meets the demands for gradual, yet substantive transformations. In the present stage of the consolidating process, the improvement of equilibrium does not call for as radical an increase in the volume of exports as was the case between 1979 and 1984, and thus the demands are not as likely to create tension in the areas of economic development and social policies as they had done earlier. The main characteristic of this stage of economic development is that the gradual improvement and stabilization of equilibrium will be brought about by increasing efficiency and enlarging the choice of resources, rather than compulsory reduction in domestic consumption.

The Lessons of 1985

Based upon the numerical projections of the 1986 plan, it could be determined that it fits well into the above process. The plan projects an approximately 2.5 percent increase in national income, and in order to achieve this, it proposes a production increase of 2-2.5 percent in the manufacturing industries, 3-3.5 percent in agriculture, and 1-1.5 percent in construction-installation activities. The resources thus created will provide possibilities for both aspects of our foreign trade to moderate our indebtedness abroad, while at the same time we should be able to maintain the present level of domestic consumption in the most important areas. Accordingly, next year's plan calls for a positive trade balance of 350-400 million dollars and 100-200 million rubles. Depending on the actual realization of resources and the utilization of the country's reserves, the plan allows for a 0.2-1 percent increase in domestic consumption; within this figure consumption by the citizenry may increase by 1 percent, and per capita real incomes by 1-1.5 percent, which permits us to maintain the present level
of average real wages. One of the important goals of the plan is the slowing of retail price increases, compared to the past few years. The projected retail price increase for the next year is 5 percent. In order to support families with children, we extend the duration of child-rearing subsidy to 18 months. For people over 70 years of age, we increase pensions by 5 percent, or a minimum of 150 forints. Pensions below 3,000 forints per month must also be increased by 5 percent. In the case of other pensions, the present system will remain in effect. In addition to measures affecting the standards of living, the plan is based upon the projection that resources for further economic development will not be decreased. Thus, the investments of the socialist sector are limited to 201-204 billion forints (in current prices), which is essentially the same as the 1985 amount.

At the same time, the 1986 plan takes into consideration the relatively more difficult circumstances of economic development. These become particularly evident if we compare the plan to the economic processes of 1985. Many of the difficulties are connected with the fact that in several important areas the 1985 economic developments did not proceed according to our wishes. The change in economic policy mentioned above was already contained in the 1985 plan. However, our goals have been realized only in an unbalanced manner, substantially affecting only domestic consumption and the decrease in ruble-based debts. The volume of investments by and large equalled the projected amount; the real income and consumption of the population increased at the projected rate, and the average per capita real wages increased somewhat. At the same time, the rate of production increased at a slower rate than planned. National income did not reach the amount planned, and the earnings-producing capacity and the creation of resources have remained well below the projected level. The equilibrium of national economy did not improve, and the balance of trade produced a smaller surplus of convertible currency than projected.

Even if we examine short-range progress, we can determine the necessity for significant economic and political changes toward more rapid creation of resources, and not only in theory but in practice as well. In order to realize these in 1986, we need consistent and determined attitudes in economic leadership, well-organized enterprising activities that take maximum advantage of all opportunities, and the disciplined, quality work of every worker. As demonstrated by the concrete lessons of 1985, accomplishing the goals of this plan will be a demanding task. The same lessons can be useful in the practical work of 1986.

We may begin with a factor over which we have no control, and one which we hope will not be repeated: the unusually cold winter, which had a significant negative role in the creation of national income and in the unfavorable foreign trade balance. It resulted in an increased specific and total use of energy, and the only way to meet these demands was to increase our imports significantly. The cold winter has also caused sizeable production delays, especially in the construction industry, for which we could compensate only in part during the rest of the year. Although the effects of the winter cannot be precisely measured, our estimates show that about half of the losses in earnings and the deterioration in foreign trade balance can be attributed to that phenomenon. Of course, we immediately have to add that these losses could have been moderated by better preparation and the more consistent
implementation of energy-saving measures. This provides us with a lesson: similar situations could arise again, and we must prepare for them. The 1986 plan was prepared with this in mind, and suitable measures have been introduced.

The other half of the production lag was not caused by the winter and can be attributed to a low production rate and insufficient improvement in efficiency. This is especially closely connected to the high production cost and poor competitiveness of certain items, which were made even more visible by the unfavorable conditions on the world market. Although there have been steps taken to change the structure and improve efficiency during 1985, the results are far from satisfactory. We expect statistics for the year to show that, instead of the planned 5-6 percent, the volume of exports to non-socialist countries has barely increased. Much of the below-plan performance occurred in the production of industrial commodities. (It is especially noteworthy, for example, that our 1985 exports of industrial consumer products to Western countries is likely to be about 7 percent less than it was in 1982.) Since the plan prescribes that only a small percentage of the items produced for Western export would be sold on the domestic or CMEA market, the above lag had a negative effect on the increase of production and reduced our hard currency foreign trade surplus. Additionally, there has been a worldwide decrease in the prices of some items, and this cut further into our national income and our balance of foreign trade. Another indication of the unsatisfactory development in our ability to produce income is the fact that in 1985—contrary to our principles—the amount of subsidies and preferential treatment offered to certain inefficient branches of our economy continued to grow and exceeded the planned level. Classified under various categories, the total of these subsidies exceeded the 1984 level by 16-17 billion forints, or nearly 30 percent, and amounted to approximately 12 billion forints more than we had planned.

Equilibrium and Efficiency

The modifications of the economic regulatory system that were introduced at the beginning of 1985 were aimed at stimulating more efficient work by the enterprises, assisting those that evidenced progress, and eliminating un-economic production. However, the more recent subsidies, extended since that time, have served to weaken the effectiveness of the new regulations and limited our efforts to classify activities in accordance with their efficiency. This resulted in relatively frequent situations in which even enterprises that under-utilize their capacities and fail to demonstrate significant efforts can obtain satisfactory profits. (This is illustrated by the figures according to which during 1985 the profits of enterprises have been dynamically growing, while the increase of production remained well below the planned level.)

The lessons of 1985 and disclosure of the circumstances of development make it even more evident that the key points for achieving the main economic goals of the 1986 plan remain basically unchanged. These are, at the same time, the key points for realizing the goals of the Seventh Five-Year Plan itself, and, by their very nature, they are also those points of the plan that are the most demanding.
An especially important issue is the continuing improvement of our hard currency foreign trade balance. In order to achieve this, we must reverse the negative process of 1985, and we must significantly increase our export surplus. Accordingly, the 1986 plan projects a 2-2.5 percent increase in the volume of our export to non-socialist countries. In view of the shortage of commodities and the changes in market conditions, the share of agricultural goods in this area will probably decrease, while that of industrial commodities, especially that of processed goods, will significantly increase. This is a significant change from the trends of previous years, and it will mean growing demands on the structure and competitiveness of the processing industries. In the event our dollar surplus and our export activities develop along the planned lines, a small increase in the import of industrial materials may be feasible. This will be sufficient to support the planned increase in production level, if our efforts in replacing expensive imported materials with economical domestic ones and the thrifty utilization of imported goods succeeds.

It will continue to be an important responsibility for enterprises to fulfill their export obligations toward the CMEA countries. Connected with this is the important requirement that our central leadership (but also, as much as possible, the lesser economic units) obtain the imports that are necessary for the nation's economy.

Another critical point of the 1986 plan is a moderation in the amount of specific expenditures, especially in the area of energy use. The plan calls for the optimal eventualty of no increase over the relatively high level of energy use that took place in 1985. In order to accomplish this, the program of saving energy resources must be implemented in a determined manner, and a saving equivalent to 400,000 tons of oil must be achieved. Simultaneously, the plan emphasizes that any reasonable energy-demands created as a result of these savings must be satisfied without delay.

Continuity and Progress

Another point stressed by the 1986 plan is expediting changes in the production and distribution structures, thus putting new vitality in the process of creating incomes. As one aspect of this effort, the central leadership will devote special attention to increasing the effectiveness of those areas of production that are experiencing difficulties. For example, in the metallurgy of ferrous metals, high-rise construction, coal mining and meat processing we will introduce rationalizing measures aimed at reducing losses. These are unavoidable if, at the very least, we wish to slow down the increase in the already heavy burden on the state's subsidizing machinery. I must point out also that making the production structure more economical and moderating the level of expenditure is, at the same time, an effective step to prevent inflation. By consistently executing these policies, we can create the lasting foundation for moderating the rise in the level of consumer prices. The organs of the state, the local mass organizations, and the representative bodies perform their best work on behalf of the national economy and the individual citizens by supporting the above measures.
The 1986 plan places great emphasis on substantively aiding the achievement of projected goals. The activities of the leadership consistently keep in mind the conditions for improving our balance of payments. We are making every effort to discover and profitably utilize new market possibilities. In addition to the general regulations, export-oriented developments and the growth of sales abroad are further encouraged by other preferential measures such as reductions in taxes on accumulated goods and improved conditions for credit and other supports, to be implemented in the framework of a multi-year bidding system. With the consistent application of pricing principles and regulations, and the reduction in subsidies, the demands on domestic distribution are increasing. At the same time, however, the relationship between commercial conditions on the hard currency, ruble-based, and domestic markets is becoming more favorable. Structural changes are also aided by further development in certain elements of regulation. New channels for the circulation of social capital continue to be introduced, and the legal frameworks connected to associations, bankruptcies and business closures are given new life.

The strict supervision of domestic demand continues to be an important task of economic regulatory agencies. In 1986 this will be increasingly difficult, because it has to be accomplished in the context of a price increase which is about 2 percent lower than previous levels. At the same time, the strict investment restriction of the past few years resulted in a backlog of investment demands, and the leadership was forced to accept certain risks in connection with the accumulating resources: it did not withhold some of the surplus income, counting on the populace to place it into saving accounts. In order to assure the realization of this hope, a degree of strictness has to be exercised in our credit policies.

More Consistently

In the course of determining the methods for changing regulations, however, we had to synchronize requirements that were, in part, conflicting: we had to support the developmental measures called for by our mid-range plans, as well as the goals for establishing equilibrium, while at the same time we had to meet the challenges of the difficult economic situation. Compelling circumstances made the increase in profit taxes unavoidable, even though this conflicted with our long range aspirations. The system of regulations is generally becoming more strict, but in a selective manner; in order to assist undertakings that are preferred by our economic policies, even subsidies have been granted. In the branches that are involved in export to hard currency areas, these subsidies largely countered the negative effects of increased profit taxes: the leadership re-distributes much of the incomes from the taxes to these areas of production. Consequently—in our opinion—enterprises will have stronger incentives for improving their achievement level, while at the same time the requirements enforcing such improvements also become stronger.

The organs directing our economic activities must be increasingly aware of the delayed nature of desirable effects derived from the above measures and must realize that it is not advisable to interfere with economic processes without good reason. Subsidies and preferential measures must be kept within the projected guidelines, thereby avoiding the negative phenomenon of 1985,
wherein some enterprises tried to achieve equilibrium at a sinking level of activities. As early as 1986, there will be more predictable and accountable conditions available for those enterprises that appear able and willing to develop their own enterprisal plans and long-range strategies, and ready to act in accordance with them. At the same time, our economic leadership must be increasingly firm in its dealings with enterprises that strive to present the expansion of their activities—be it in the area of Western or ruble-based exports, or in domestic distribution—as being in the national interest, occasionally making it appear as a sacrifice on their part, and only ready to proceed with said expansion in exchange for receiving special preferences. The realization of economic goals must be primarily served by the entire system of economic regulation, including in this category the suitable stimulation of exporting activities. True, the system of regulation may utilize auxiliary measures, as exemplified by the bidding used in 1986, but it could prove to be counterproductive if these measures became too widely accepted: the total effect of regulation could become devalued, and artificial withholding of performance and negotiating regulations could appear on the scene. This kind of handling of auxiliary measures is not likely to bring about increased production; on the contrary, it would result in the creation of excess purchasing power.

In order to achieve the goals of the 1986 plan, we must interpret and execute our tasks in a unified manner, even if we do not agree on everything. Especially important is the creation of a suitable accord between the national leadership and the management of enterprises. Naturally, the views of these functionaries are frequently in contrast; after all, the leaders of national economy and the managers who represent the interests of their firms may, to a certain degree, objectively differ in their opinions. This results from their positions. It is not advisable to either enlarge or belittle these conflicts. Under the present, increasingly difficult, economic circumstances, it is natural that those involved will differ more sharply than usual on questions of economic development and regulation, or—frequently due to representing well-defined local interests—they will debate the issues. In my opinion, we can and must develop commonly held views on the central questions, because this is in everyone's interest. In order to achieve this, the cooperation of political and mass organizations, urging increased economic activities and improving efficiency, is an absolute requirement.
LAWS ON PRIVATE WORK PARTNERSHIPS MODIFIED

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 31 Dec 85 p 4

[Unsigned news item from the Hungarian Telegraph Agency [MTI]: "Changing Regulations Concerning Economic Work Associations"]

[Text] Based on the December 30 decision of the Presidential Council, beginning with January 1 certain regulations contained in the Civil Code concerning the work associations will be modified. The new regulations will give increased consideration to the initiatives of the small enterprises, will aid the economic and civil legal associations as well as work cooperatives in their activities, and will provide additional opportunities for the above to obtain properties.

In the future it will be possible for economic cooperatives, or other associations operating under a communal designation, to obtain real estate and other properties. However, as long as the associations remain in existence, the members cannot individually exercise their rights of ownership; the communal property can only be broken up after the association ceases to exist. In order to more effectively assert their legal rights, the associations can initiate law suits under their communal name, and they can be sued by others. With this modification, administering the legal affairs of the associations will become significantly simpler. Another innovation is that, based on majority decision and subsequent to written warning, members who endanger the aims of the association or those who break their contracts can be expelled from the associations. What this means is that in the future it will not be necessary to disband the entire association because of personal problems.
The person in charge of an enterprise or institution will still be allowed to forbid employees to continue their membership in economic work associations, if such membership is in conflict with the interests of the place of employment. According to the new regulations, in such a case the worker must immediately discontinue his membership in the economic work association. If he fails to do this, the association can expell him, thus avoiding the disbanding of the entire association on account of one person.

In connection with the activities of enterprisal economic work associations, the new regulations state that workers who are on vacation without pay, or those cooperative members who are temporarily not working, cannot perform work for the enterprisal economic work associations.

12588
CSO:2500/146
HUNGARIAN DELIVERIES EXPEDITED TO HONOR SOVIET CONGRESS

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 22 Feb 86 p 3

[Article, "Pledges in Honor of the XXVII Soviet Congress: Many New Projects Will Be Completed Before the Deadline, and Costs Are Being Reduced"]

[Text] In recent weeks, at hundreds of workers' meetings, the employees of our factories and institutions have saluted the approaching XXVIIth Congress of the CPSU. Valuable pledges were born and the participants in the meetings sent telegrams and letters of warm greetings to the workers and residents of their Soviet sister factory or region.

The workers at the Industrial Cooperative for Refrigeration Technology in Tata contracted to fill a significant Soviet supplementary order, and therefore this year they will already be delivering to the Soviet Union heavy-duty refrigeration equipment valued at almost half a billion forints. It has also been announced that measures have been taken for strengthening technological discipline and for improving quality. In order to successfully complete the undertaking, the firm will develop closer ties with their Soviet partners. The goal is for all refrigeration equipment to reach its purchaser on time.

A pledge which is especially important and of significance to the nation's economy was announced at the Tisza Chemical Combine. For years this northern Hungarian large-scale industrial works has manufactured polyethylene, and up to this time it has exported this product on a direct pipeline to the Soviet Union. The shop that will supply linear polyethylene for domestic consumption is now being built. According to original plans, this six-billion-forint investment should be completed by the end of the year. The workers for the building contractors announced that in honor of the XXVIIth Congress of the CPSU they will shorten by two months the deadline for dedication of the factory; therefore, the testing of the new factory can already begin in the third quarter of the year. With this, the function of the ethylene pipeline connecting the Hungarian factory and its Soviet sister facility will change. Up to this time it carried polyethylene to the Soviet Union--to the Combine located at Kallus; in the future, however, the same kind of material will arrive through it in Leninvartos from the Soviet Union, from the large-scale factory which has now been completed there. With the processing of polyethylene imported from the Soviet Union and prepared domestically, they will be able to prepare in Leninvartos a modern plastic with outstanding
characteristics. The manufacturing of this material is only now being developed worldwide, and therefore the potential for its export is excellent.

At the Danube Iron Works they also made a pledge to significantly shorten a deadline. Similarly to the workers at the Tisza Chemical Combine, the builders and technicians at the combine's new coking plant, which is being built at a cost of ten billion forints, accepted the responsibility of shortening by two months the deadline for the dedication of the new facility. According to their promise, they will dedicate the new factory by November 7, the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Pledges were also made by the collectives of the Steel Works to continue improving quality, those of the rolling mills to increase the yield, the sheet-metal shop to increase the proportion of more valuable products, the energy suppliers to economize, and the transporters to better organize their work.

At the workers' meeting held at the Hungarian Ball-Bearings Works, the socialist brigades announced that with better utilization of production equipment and with continued improvement of technological discipline they would undertake to fill orders in excess of the plan. (MTI)
FEATURES, IMPORTANCE OF BLACK SEA CANAL PRESENTED

Bucharest HIDROTEHNICA in Romanian Vol 30, No 11, 1986 pp. 332-333


[Text] The formal opening of the Danube-Black-Sea Canal took place on 26 May 1984, with Nicolae Ceausescu, secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party and president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, in attendance. The ceremony was held shortly before the 13th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party, at a time when the entire people was celebrating the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Romania, to pay homage to the creative work of the Romanian people.

Historical Background in Brief

The idea of reducing the distance between the Danube and the Black Sea was first advanced in 1851 by Romanian governor Ion Ionescu of Brad. Plans for a canal between Cernavoda and Constanta were drawn up in 1878 by G. Laho-vari, in collaboration with the Belgian I. Van Drunen. In 1897, a Romanian engineer named Assan proposed his version of the canal, which was to promote the development of international trade. A number of proposals were subsequently advanced by various specialists who presented original designs accompanied by technical and economic calculations.

Scientific articles appearing in various journals stressed the importance of the canal to the economy of Dobruja and the country as a whole and its importance in expanding Romania's international economic relations. However, the economic capabilities of the country at the time forbade the commencement of these projects.

Not until the country struck out on the path of socialist development did it become possible to carry out such construction.
Building of the Danube-Black Sea Canal began in the young republic of Romania in 1949. The work was interrupted in 1953 because of the absence of the necessary conditions in the country for carrying on such work.

A decision to resume construction was made at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party in June 1973, and construction work was resumed toward the end of 1975 on the basis of new plans.

Construction of the canal, which extended over a period of 8 years, was accomplished with the country's own resources. Construction workers from all areas of the country took part in project, including hundreds of volunteer youth brigades. More than 13,000 young people were trained in various skills.

Romanian Army troops also participated in construction, especially in the area of deep excavation.

Engineering Characteristics of the Canal

The route of the Danube-Black Sea Canal begins at the Danube in the area of the old port of Cernavoda and extends through the Carasu Valley, running through the localities of Medgidia and Basarabi. It then traverses the Dobrujan Plateau and ends at the port of Constanta (South) (see Figure 1).

In addition to the canal proper, the hydraulic engineering complex comprises two symmetrical locks at Cernavoda and Agigea, a pumping station at Cernavoda, and 3 commercial harbors at Cernavoda, Medgidia, and Basarabi.

The complex of civil engineering projects also includes 6 large bridges over the canal, rerouting of electric power transmission lines and water supply mains, rebuilding of irrigation systems, reclamation of swamps for agricultural use, drainage operations, building of dikes, creation of reservoirs along streams, etc.

Earth was moved in the amount of 300 million cubic meters, and 3.6 million cubic meters of concrete were poured, this including 2.12 million cubic meters in locks and harbor structures. For 46 kilometers of its length, the canal is walled. More than 20 tons of hydraulic engineering equipment are installed in it.

The Danube-Black Sea Canal is a Class IV inland canal under the United Nations EEC classification.

In the accompanying table, its characteristics are compared with those of other canals around the world.

With a length of 64.2 kilometers, the Danube-Black Sea Canal has a width at the bottom of 70, 90, and 120 meters, and the water depth at normal operating level ranges from 7 to 7.5 meters.

The longitudinal profile of the canal and typical cross-sections are shown in Figure 2.
The 2 largest hydraulic engineering structures of the canal, the Cernavoda and Agigea locks, have chambers 310 meters long, 25 meters wide, and 7.5 meters deep at the sill. The locks are equipped with outports. The Agigea lock is outfitted with special structures preventing penetration of sea water into the canal when the lock is opened. It delivers a stream of fresh water into the sea through a compressed air curtain.

Figure 1. The Danube-Black Sea Canal:

Length: 64.4 kilometers
Width of navigable channel on straightway: 90 meters
Water depth in canal: 7.0 meters
Current draft: 5.5 meters
Bridge clearance: 17.0 meters
Minimum curve radius: 3,000 meters

Key:
1. Legend
2. Drainage basin
3. Harbor area
4. Industrial area
5. Danube
6. Black Sea

Table 1. Characteristics of Major World Canals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canal</th>
<th>Length (kilometers)</th>
<th>Construction work volume (millions of cubic meters)</th>
<th>Construction period (years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow-Volga</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North German</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danube-Black Sea</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42
The height of the 6 major bridges crossing the canal (from the bottom beam) above high water level is 17 meters. In all, 36 highway and railroad bridges of a total length of 4 kilometers have been built across the canal.

At Cernavoda, a two-tier bridge crosses the canal. The Bucharest-Constanta railroad runs across the lower tier, and a highway across the upper one.

The Constanta-Mangalia highway bridge is distinguished by an original design involving a central pylon bearing cables and having a height of 90 meters. It is the largest bridge of this type in Romania.

Figure 2. Cross-sections and longitudinal profile.

Key:
1. Cross-sections.
2. 0-40-kilometer section
3. Crest section, kilometers 40-64
4. Longitudinal profile
5. Danube hydraulic engineering assembly
6. Black Sea hydraulic engineering assembly

The parallel highways run to 150 kilometers in length, service roads 800 kilometers, and railroads 80 kilometers. The Bucharest-Constanta will be built along the canal in the near future.

The minimum radius of curves along the canal is 3000 meters.

Navigation on the Canal

The dimensions of the canal permit seagoing and river navigation with a displacement of 5000 tons deadweight, with a maximum draft of 6 meters, and at a speed of travel of 8 to 9 kilometers per hour. Trains made up of 6 double barges each weighing 3000 tons can navigate the canal. The length of a train, including the tugboat, may reach 296 meters, its width 23 meters, and the draft 3.8 meters.

The annual traffic at the new port of Cernavoda is currently 1 million tons; it is expected to rise to 7 million tons in the future. The 3 ports in question have a total of 61 ship's berths, a water area of 43 hectares, and a storage platform area of 36 hectares.
Legal Aspects

From the legal viewpoint, the Danube-Black Sea Canal has the status of an inland waterway. The Socialist Republic of Romania has full and sovereign rights to and exclusive jurisdiction over the canal.

The operational status of the Danube-Black Sea Canal does not infringe on the obligations assumed by Romania under the convention on navigation on the Danube signed in Belgrade in 1948, since the provisions of this convention apply only to the river itself from Ulm to the Black Sea, including the outlet through the Sulina Canal.

The Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications bears responsibility for operating the canal. The administrative authority of the canal has its offices in the city of Agigea. The obligations of this administration include making provisions for passenger and freight transportation including pilots, tugboats, loading and unloading services, rendering technical assistance, supply of fuel and electric energy, and other services.

The canal is open to navigation by Romanian vessels and those of other countries carrying passengers and freight which meet the legal requirements of Romania. A fee is charged for navigation on the canal and for services.

The Economic Importance of the Danube-Black Sea Canal

Maritime and river shipping has come to be especially profitable under the conditions of the current energy crisis. The hauling of 1 ton by railroad requires a unit power of 1 horsepower, while the same unit power can transport 5 to 6 tons by water.

Another advantage of the Danube-Black Sea canal is that it reduces the distance between the ports of Cernavoda and Constanta by 400 kilometers, so that a substantial amount of fuel is conserved and the hauling time is shortened.

The creation of the canal will have a favorable impact on the regions through which it runs. Urban localities will be developed in these regions, important industrial installations will come into being, land will be reclaimed for agricultural use, and tourism will develop. In addition to navigation, the canal is of particular importance in water resource management. The water in the canal will be used in part to supply the public, industry, and agriculture in Dobruja, which is a region with low precipitation.

Building of the canal has also led to development of industries in the area and to significant population growth. An intensive process of urban development has begun in the canal zone, in which towns such as Cernavoda, Medgidia, and Basarabi have grown as urban centers.
Figure 3. Diagrams of ports of Cernavoda (a) and Medgidia (b)

Key:

1. Wharves
2. SHTM slip
3. Passengers
4. Danube
5. Legend
6. Harbor facilities
7. Passenger docks
8. Commercial docks
9. Industrial product docks

The Danube-Black Sea Canal may thus be regarded as making a particular contribution to development of the national economy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and at the same time to be an exceptional hydraulic engineering project.
YOUTH SEEN RELUCTANT TO JOIN MILITARY

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 17 Mar 86 p 3

[Article by Hans Ulrich Kersten: "A People's Army Without Enthusiasm/ The GDR Battles Military Apathy]

[Text] Even 30 years after the founding of the National People's Army, the GDR leadership has great difficulty in justifying the existence of its armed forces. All the jubilant articles published in GDR newspapers in recent days cannot obscure that fact. The GDR leadership is caught in the dilemma of propagating Gorbachev's disarmament proposals on the one hand, and recruiting for military service on the other hand, and nothing is more indicative than the fact that the East Berlin radio broadcast a panel discussion on the subject, "do soldiers and peace even go together?"

No day passes without the GDR press finding an occasion to praise Gorbachev's disarmament proposals to high heaven, and to warn of the nuclear inferno threatening mankind because of Reagan's "star wars." Not even the reporting on the 27th Party Congress of the CPSU permitted treating the subject of disarmament with greater reserve, in view of the National People's Army anniversary. Dialecticians were called upon—and they performed with socialist bravura. Even Friedrich Engel's Elberfelder letters were brought in, citing that "the soldier of socialism will have a true fatherland and a true hearth to defend."

Yet many remarks in radio and television broadcasts make it apparent that GDR youth is reluctant to join the military. In the broadcast on the subject whether soldiers and peace go together, it was two high school students, a boy and a girl—of late, girls can also join the National People's Army, but only in the medical and communications services—who reported their classmates' reaction to their decision to join the National People's Army. The girl: "Some made the 'cuckoo sign,' you must be crazy!" The boy: "I had a similar experience. There were some in my class who also said, 'you are mad, or something, I would never do that;' others said 'that's OK, I think it's right, but I myself would never do that.'"

The fact that this was said (and broadcast) openly in an East Berlin radio broadcast indicates that a large sector of GDR youth is not particularly eager to perform the "service of honor" in the People's Army. And this, although there is compulsory military service in the GDR. Military re-
Recruiters in the GDR are having a hard time, especially since there are gaps for the years of lower birth rates. To make a military officer career attractive, the lure is the promise of admission to a university, or preferential treatment in entering various professions otherwise difficult to attain. Or, quite in general, one uses the attraction of the great technologies which the heavily armed National People's Army has to offer.

Or else, it is tried the other way around: by pointing to the threat posed by NATO or "imperialism." For example, GDR television put a radar observer on the air: "Day and night, I see the sometimes provocative flights of the NATO air forces. And the intentions of these people are clear to me. They are searching for gaps in our defense system and want to test our 'on-duty system.' It is striking, for instance, that in recent times the reconnaissance planes carry out their flights at varying times, and more frequently, and that demands highest concentration of me and my comrades in our everyday duty."

But this soldier, also, will not provide greater motivation to a GDR youngster to rush to arms with enthusiasm.

9917
CSO: 2300/288
BIBO'S 'THIRD WAY' SEEN AS PATH FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE

Budapest TARSADALOMKUTATAS in Hungarian No 3 1985 pp 107-117

[Article by Andras Bozoki: "Political Science Is Born"]

[Text] "There are sciences that have eternal youth as their share; for them, the process of culture constantly brings new problems to the surface." (Footnote 1) (In Mannheim, "The Tasks of Contemporary Sociology" ["A jelenkori szociologia feladatai"], Budapest, 1945, p 43.) In addition to sociology, economics, law, etc., it is perhaps not unjustified to use this Weberian statement in connection with the youngest science of our region, political science.

Young science? In a country where political thinking has its traditions reaching back to the [19th century] Reform Period? Where, from Wesselenyi to Botvos, from Kemeny to Agost Pulszky, from Jastzi to Bibo, from Dezso Szabo to Gyula Szekfu, so many people, in so many different manners, cultivated the art of political writing, scientific analysis and political rhetorics? Where, in searching for solutions to the problems caused by a delayed and half-successful social development, in trying to meet the urgent demands of modernization and attempting to eliminate backwardness, again and again the dominance of politics appeared to be the adequate answer? Where the now prevailing social theories of Marxism, historical materialism and scientific socialism offer scientific matter and a theoretical framework that can and should be utilized by political thinking? In view of the above social and scientific conditions, is there a call for the domestic recognition of a new discipline, distinct in its themes and methods, such as the formerly "bourgeois"-designated political science?

It was in the crossfire of the above questions, around the end of the 1970s, that the struggle began to achieve legality for the new science, after psychology, genetics, and sociology had been accepted. In this study, far from claiming completeness, we try to follow this process by emphasizing certain major points. (Footnote 2) (Methodologically we would like the review as well as contemporary historiography to follow the course that was exemplified by Matyas Janos Kovacs in his study "In the Thick of Negotiated
Reforms" ["A reformmalku surujeben"], VALOSAG, 1984, No 3. We are not going to
survey the political science writings of the 1960s and 1970s, because we feel
that they belong to the pre-history of the discipline. (See, for example, the
Papp, et al.)

The acceptance of a science, beyond its feasibility, is measured by the degree
which it has been institutionalized. If we survey the domestic history of
the way political science has achieved independence, it becomes immediately
evident that progress has been connected to the various stages of
institutionalization. Thus we are talking about an emancipation struggle that
took place on two levels: that of scientific policies and that of scientific
activities.

1.

The support of scientific policies became evident from about the end of the
1980s, the time when the reform process gained new life. In 1980 the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences established its Political Science Committee,
which meant the first step toward institutionalization. This decision was
certainly made easier by the proposal accepted at the November 30, 1979
meeting of the Soviet Political Science Association, which supported "the
acceptance of Marxist political science as an independent scientific
discipline." (Footnote 3) (Cited in Tivadar Molnar, "Concerning Some
Theoretical Problems of Marxist Political Science" ["A marxista
politikatudomany nehany tudomanyelmeleti kerdeselor"], TARSADALOMTUDOMANYI
KOZLEMENYEK, 1981, 1-2.)

However, the relationship of politics and political science was far from clear
at that time. The fact that adapting the results of political science into
the decisionmaking mechanism of politics "does not require a specific
transformation" (Footnote 4) (Laszlo Boros, "The Relationship Between
Political Science and Sociology" ["A politologia es a szociologia viszonya"],
TARSADALOMKUTATAS, 1983, 4.) created the illusion in many people that the
existence of political science is justified by its direct applicability to
politics. (Footnote 5) (For example, Tivadar Molnar writes in his cited
article: "To this day we have not seen the birth of a Marxist branch of
science which a priori makes it its goal to directly satisfy the theoretical
demands of rational political decisions." /emphasis by author/)

The rationality of politicians and that of scientists, however, differs even
in this case, because scientific acquaintance and political practice are, per
definitionem, distinct qualities. Most of the participants in the debate took
the position that the "fetishism of political science," i.e. the false faith
placed in the "miraculous" powers of political science, must be avoided,
because "it is in vain to expect science to 'rationalize' politics." (Footnote
6) (Gyorgy Szoboszlai, "Political Science and Scientific Policies"
["Politikatudomany es tudomanypolitika"], TARSADALOMTUDOMANYI KOZLEMENYEK,
1982, 1. This was the closing article and summation of a year-long debate
concerning political science.) In fact, "political science could be the
'autognosis of political practice,' but only in an indirect form, through
ideology. After all, the self-knowledge of practical politics is never

49
[achieved through] science but [through] ideology." (Footnote 7) (Istvan Huvely, "The Social Necessity of Politics and the Discipline of Political Science" ["A politika tarsadalmi szukseglete es a politikatudomany"], TARSADALMTUDOMANYI KOZLEMENYEK, 1982, 1. This thought was continued by Istvan Schlett in this manner: "The issue of political science's existence cannot be limited to obtaining the good will of the political leadership." See Istvan Schlett, "Political Science, Politics, and Scientific Policies" ["Politikatudomany, politika, tudomanypolitika"], TARSADALMTUDOMANYI KOZLEMENYEK, 1981, 3.) And the primary task of ideology is "not gaining knowledge, but justification"; (Footnote 8) (Miklos Szabo, "Program-Ideologies and Status-Ideologies" ["Programideologiak es allapotideologiak"], VILAGOSSAG, 1978, 2.) this is what gives ideology its specific functions, distinct from those of science. (Footnote 9) (In his article cited above, Miklos Szabo discusses the "affirmative" and "agitative" functions of ideologies. He also distinguishes several other functions [orientational, integrational, legitimizing, acquaintance, et al.]. Istvan Schlett, "Concerning the Nature of Political Ideologies" ["A politikai ideologiak termeszeterol"], TARSADALMI SZEMLE, 1982, 3.) The conscious recognition of the above distinctions creates the theoretical possibility for the sub-systems of society to become functionally distinct from each other—even in countries that have traditionally been dominated by politics, where the mechanism of political authority operates as a sort of "melting-pot"—because it acknowledges that, in addition to politics, not only the sciences but also the entities of culture, economics, etc. have their own autonomous laws of mobility.

The next step in institutionalization came in 1982, with the formation of the Hungarian Political Science Association. The associational form offers good possibilities for creating and making more direct a scientific public life, provided that the form becomes filled with activity. The first political science association was created in the United States as early as 1903, and it found followers, especially after the Second World War, in Europe. (Footnote 10) (Tivadar Molnar, op. cit.) There are five sections operating within the Hungarian Political Science Association:

1. theory and history of politics;
2. political sociology;
3. economic politics;
4. political systems, state and political institutions;
5. international politics.

Since 1983 the Association has been publishing yearbooks that—through describing the yearly activities of the Association—generally present a good overview of developments within the discipline. (Footnote 11) (1983: "Politics and Society" ["Politika es tarsadalom"]; 1984: "Ideology and Democracy" ["Ideologia es demokracia"], ed. Gyorgy Szoboszlai.) However, the development in the domestic and external scientific communication of Hungarian political science has remained far below what is possible or desirable. In addition to the Yearbook, there is a need for more lively periodical publications (such as a trade journal of the Association's own), a series of books, an encyclopedia of political science, and the broadening of research opportunities. (Footnote 12) (Laszlo Keri, "On the Information System of Political Science" ["A politikatudomany informacios rendszererol"],
TARSDALOMTUDOMANYI KOZLEMENYEK, 1981, 4.) Primarily due to the efforts of the Kossuth and Gondolat publishing houses, there have been thematic volumes: e.g.: "Essays in Political Science" ["Politikatudomanyi Tanulmanyok"] Budapest, 1981; "Pluralism" ["Pluralizmus"], eds. Bayer and Hardy, Budapest, 1985, et al.; and the first volumes of promising series ("Four Decades" ["Négy evetized"] and "Political Thinkers" ["Politikai gondolkodok"] (Footnote 13) (Sandor Balogh, "Elections in Hungary, 1945" ["Valasztasok Magyarorszagon 1945"]; Balint Szabo, "A New Phase in the Policies of the Hungarian Workers' Party /MDP/ 1953-1954" ["Uj szakasz az MDP politikajaban 1953-1954"]; Peter Simon, "The Turning Point in the Fate of Hungarian Peasantry, 1946-1949" ["A magyar parasztsag sorsfordulova 1946-1949"], all in "Four Decades," Budapest, 1984; R. Luxemburg, "Marxism, Socialism, Democracy" ["Marxizmus, szocializmus, demokracia"], in "Political Thinkers," Budapest, 1983; de Tocqueville, "Democracy in America" ["A demokracia Amerikaban"], Budapest, 1983; Aristotle, "Politics" ["Politika"], Budapest, 1984; Bakunin, "Statehood and Anarchy" ["Allamisag es anarchia"], Budapest, 1984,) have appeared in print. In publishing the research results of political thinking, a pioneering role is played by the Department of Scientific Socialism in the School of State and Legal Studies at the University of Budapest (ELTE), which publishes the "Political Science Pamphlets" ["Politikatudomanyi Fuzetek"] and the "Essays in Development" ["Fejlődés tanulmanyok"]. (Footnote 14) (In "Political Science Pamphlets," Budapest, 1980; Csaba Gombar, "Politics in Entry-Words" ["Politika--cimszavakban"]; Csaba Gombar [7], "Rosa Luxemburg and the Russian Revolution" ["Rosa Luxemburg es az orosz forradalom"], Budapest, 1982; M. F. Rakowski, "The Republic at the Threshold of the 1980s" ["A koztarsasag a nyolcvanas evek kuzsoben"], Budapest, 1984.) It is to be expected that our country's political science will escape its relative isolation soon and develop closer ties with the international organization of the discipline, the International Political Science Association (IPSA).

The next, and most important, conditions for becoming an accepted science were guaranteeing research opportunities and making political science a subject in the curricula of schools, and these were the most difficult to establish. It is expected that during the second half of the 1980s an effort will be made to research the history of political modernization, Hungarian political thinking and political publicity. As for the area of teaching, much of the problem was in how to fit political science into the system of Marxist curricular subjects. Long debates were required in order to assure the status of an independent classroom subject for political science, next to philosophy, scientific socialism, sociology, and state and legal studies. The relationship of political philosophy, political sociology, state theory, international law, constitutional law and scientific socialism to political science had to be clarified. Especially strong doubts arose from the area of scientific socialism: [it was proposed that] the existence of one discipline makes the other superfluous. Finally, however, the participants of the debate accepted the view according to which "The research areas and applied research methods of political science and those of scientific socialism cannot be considered identical."

(Footnote 15) (Ferenc Nagy, "On Political Science, From the Point of View of Scientific Socialism" ["A politikatudomanyrol a tudomanyos szocializmus oldalara neve"], TARSADALOMTUDOMANYI KOZLEMENYEK, 1982, 1.) Scientific socialism is the theory behind the process of creating a socialist-communist society, the class struggle, strategy and tactics of the
working classes, while political science focuses, among other things, on the
general theory, history, systems, culture, institutions, ideologies of
politics. The distinction of political science is "derived from the specific
nature of its subject matter," (Footnote 16) (Csaba Gombar, "Concerning the
Issue of Political Science," ["A politikai tudomány kerdeseehez"], VÁLOSAG,
1967, 10.) which is the same reason why it should not be confused with other
scientific disciplines that are also referred to as "political" (such as
military science, history, statecraft, economics, political philosophy, law,
etc.).

As an early sign of independent political science education, a separate
Political Science Group was formed in the autumn of 1984 within the School of
State and Law Studies at the University of Budapest (ELTE). The Group begins
its teaching activities in September 1985, offering elective classes. It
would be desirable to see the introduction of the discipline in the other
schools of social studies—in the countryside, too—as well as at the Higher
School of Politics.

The sensitive and close relationship between the existence and activities of
political science and the contemporary political conditions is scarcely a
matter of debate. This realization should ideally be followed by scientific
achievements in revealing reality, instead of administrative-restrictive
measures.

2.

After having outlined developments at the level of scientific policies, we are
now focusing on the imminent chances for the discipline's acceptance, that is,
the cultivation of [political] science itself. It took what may appear an
unnecessarily long time to clarify the problems inherent in the system of the
science, and to define the internal and external parameters, and—in spite of
the various approaches employed—efforts in these areas have been less than
effective. (Footnote 17) (Concerning this, see "Essays in Political Theory"
["Politikaelmeleti tanulmanyok"], Budapest, 1981; "Essays in Political
Science" ["Politikatudományi tanulmanyok"], Budapest, 1981.) The various
systems of political science—the works of Burlatskii, (Footnote 18)
(Burlatskii, "1. The Marxist Theory of Politics; 2. The Sociological Problems
of Political Systems; 3. The Science of Administration; 4. International
Relations and the Sociology of Global Politics; 5. Political Ideology," cited
in Mihaly Samu, "Marxist Political Science and the Social Sciences," ["A
marxista politologia és a tarsadalomtudományok"], in "Essays in Political
Sociology of Political Relations" ["A politikai viszonyok szociologiaja"],
section: Political Movements and Parties; The State; Political Consciousness;
Political Behavior; The Sociology of International Political Relations.)
Tivadar Molnar, (Footnote 20) (Tivadar Molnar, op. cit. I. 1. The Theoretical
Questions of Marxist Political Science; 2. An Examination of Bourgeois
Political Science. II. 1. The History of Political Tenets. 2. The Universal/
Marxist/ Theory of Politics. 3. The System of Politics (Relationships,
Institutions, Consciousness, Behavior) III. 1. The Political Systems of Our
The Complex Theory of a Given Country's (e.g. Hungary's/ Political System.) et al.--have not become the bases for the discipline, not even in a heuristic sense. Two definitions of political science became widely accepted: the narrower one, referring to the theory of politics as one of the well-defined sub-systems of society, and the broader one, the theory of society as a political system. (Footnote 21) (Attila Agh, "Political Science: Illusions and Demands" ["Politikutudomany: illuziok es igyenek"], TARSADALOMTUDOMANYI KOZLEMENYTEK, 1981, 4.) The first one reflects the traditional philosophical, legal and administrative approach, while the second one became the starting point for modern political science. To use the expression of Giovanni Sartori, we are talking about the distinction between "the system of politics" and the "political system."

Even when considering the research methodology of the science, we can detect the dualistic nature of its definition and basis. One of its bases is political philosophy--as in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Mill, Tocqueville, Marx, Lenin, Luxemburg, Gramsci, Lukacs, et al.--while the other is social sociology--Weber, Michels, Mannheim, Mills, Parsons, Habermas, Duverger, Wiatr, Deutsch, et al. Although it was not easy to artificially separate the sociological and philosophical traits of politics in the works of the above authors, Marxist political science is still relying more strongly on the normativity approach having its origins in philosophical traditions than on a "desire to reveal the real processes taking place in political life." (Footnote 22) (Mihaly Bihari, "Political Science--Political Sociology?" ["Politikutudomany--politikai szociologia?"] TARSADALOMKUTATAS, 1983, 3.) In its early stages of development, domestic political science is characterized by its efforts to make up for this shortcoming; its best representatives never tire of emphasizing the importance of the sociological approach. This methodology is going through a worldwide revival, in part attributable to the general decline in popularity enjoyed by "The Great Theory": Lukacs' "Ontology" is collecting dust without having attracted any substantial philosophical reflection, and with the exception of Althusser and Habermas there has hardly been anyone working on the re-interpretation of Marxist social theory or the development of a new general theory. (Footnote 23) (Miklos Almasi, "Is the Great Theory Going to Rise Again?" ["Feltemad-e a Nagy Elmlet?"] VILAGOSSAG, 1984, 1; Zsolt Papp, "Before We Solidify" ["Mielott megalvadunk"], ELET ES IRODALOM, October 5, 1984.) Yet, as of now, the greatest debt of Hungarian political science is attributable to the absence of concrete sociological research activity, surveying the various areas of political life. A clarification of philosophical bases has been attempted by producing essays that concentrated on Marxist political theory, on the atomization of the bourgeois socio-political state and on the emancipation of politics, (Footnote 24) (Attila Agh, "The World of Politics" ["A politika vilaga"], Budapest, 1984; Zsolt Papp, "Bourgeois Society and the Political State," ["Polgari tarsadalom es politikai állam"]; Ferenc Tokei, "Community and Political Forms in Social Science Research," ["Kozosseg es politikai formak a tarsadalomkutatasban"]; Mihaly Bihari, "The Relationship Between the Economic Foundation and the Political Superstructure" ["A gazdasagi alap es a politikai felepitmeny kaposolata"], all three in "Politics and Political Science" ["Politika es politikutudomany"], ed. Mihaly Bihari, Budapest, 1982.) while sociologically oriented political science has a basic handbook in Csaba Gombar's work,
"Politics In Entry-Words" ["Politika--cimszavakban"], which solves the problem of defining and distinguishing terms more effectively and in a manner that is more stimulating for future contemplation than the methodological debates. It may be claimed that the publication of this book marked the birth of Hungarian political science. Even though it appears to be nothing more than a "dictionary," it is more than that: Conceived in the spirit of Bibo's spiritual inheritance and written with the full responsibility and decency of a citizen and scientist, the book examines those segments of a phenomena we call politics, which are still awaiting precise definition. Terms such as alternatives, system of political transmission, divided authority, publicity, political anonymity, paternalism, and legitimacy—to mention only a few characteristic titles—came to life after a long sleep and entered the stream of scientific thinking. Not surprisingly, during the earlier years these terms had been missing from the "vocabulary" of people thinking about politics; after all, if "the legitimacy-base of any authority is defined as absolutely self-evident, as it is characteristic of the East Central European power establishments, then any direct or indirect questioning or the problematization of said self-evident factors is considered 'illegitimate' and 'inimical' activity, regardless of its subjective good intentions." (Footnote 25) (Lajos Cs. Kiss, "Notes on the Nature of Ideological 'Perception' and Sign-Transmission" ["Adalekok az ideologai 'esszleles' es jelentesatadás termeszetehenzhen"], Manuscript, 1984. In this work, the author makes Miklos Szabo's ideology definition operational and traces the changes in the meaning of Bolsheivik program ideology between 1945 and 1956, based on an analysis of texts from TARSADALMI SZEMLE.) This explains the relatively potent effect of Gombar's cool, cautious, but "pointed questions," in spite of the fact that they are free of ideological overtones.

This book is well supplemented by a survey of the history of political theories, published in 1984 by Peter Paczolay and Mate Szabo: in spite of, or perhaps because of, its brevity, it could be a useful orientation handbook for anyone interested in the discipline. (Footnote 25a) (Peter Paczolay and Mate Szabo, "The Short History of Political Theory" ["A politikaelmelet rovid tortenete"], Budapest, 1984.)

Looking around in the domestic political science literature, we can find two more similar works: "Politics and Political Science" ["Politika es politikatudomany"], ed. Mihaly Bihari, 1982, and Csaba Gombar's new volume that appeared under the title "The Thoughts of a Citizen" ["Egy allampolgar gondolatai"], 1984. Because of space limitations, we only wish to say a few words about the latter book, which contains the articles and essays of the author written between 1967 and 1983. It is more likely to meander and is looser in its structure than "Politics In Entry-Words," lacking the former's contextual and formal solidity and coherence; the essays are held together "only" by their identity of view, whether the subject is geopolitics, national interests, local autonomy, political culture, or even the idea of democracy. We would like to focus on two topics (social structure and political culture) that have recently attracted the attention of informed domestic public opinion.
Instead of fashionable "empirical pseudo-research," the author follows the early writings of Ferenc Erdei when he describes the method of examining social structure that he deems desirable. He feels that the structure of society cannot be described by status indices alone, using only one dimension, the relationship of inequality, as a guide: we must not ignore the dynamism of society, its degree of being determined by history, and the simultaneous accounting of confused and co-existent structures. In fact—asks Gombar—does our society have a structure, if the distinct existence-consciences of varying layers cannot be articulated publicly?

It is quite clear by now that science cannot accept the politicized social structure image offered by the model of "two classes making up one layer," because it is not descriptive but rather prescriptive in character. It is opposed by research activities that describe social layers based on the hierarchy of inequality; since these are revelatory in nature, they serve to provide scientific knowledge. (Footnote 26) (The research in question was undertaken by Tamas Kolosi and his group. For the debate connected with their work, see Tamas Kolosi, "Structure, Layer-forming, Methodology," ["Struktura, retegezodes, metodologia"]; Csaba Gombar, "The Structure of Our Society, History, and the Difficulties of Understanding" ["Tarsadalmunk szerkezete, a tortenelem, valamint a megertes nehezaegei"], Zsolt Papp, "Structure and Identity: About the Types of Social Integration"), in "Theories and Hypotheses" ["Elmeletek es hipoteziksek"], Budapest, 1982. Gombar's study also appears in "The Thoughts of a Citizen" ["Egy allampolgár gondolatai"], Budapest, 1984.) They brought to the surface Durkheimian "social facts," such as that one's position on the ladder of social inequality is most closely correlated to "cultural capital," and not—as many used to claim—to the conditions of work distribution. Still, scholars of political science may rightfully raise the question: How relevant can an image of structure be, if it defines social layers on the basis of averages indicating consumption of salami, theater attendance, earnings, reading of newspapers or the size of dwellings, while at the same time these layers, existing in the reality of a centrally controlled "quasi-ideological unity," are never given the opportunity to organize themselves on the basis of "selfish" considerations? Naturally we are not saying that political fragmentation is a faithful representation of the social structure. History offers numerous examples of people living under identical circumstances, yet becoming the proponents of diametrically opposing views. However, as long as political fragmentation remains below the surface and the ideologies of alternatives are expressed in allegories, the social scientist is forced to "create" a social structure based on un-examinable data.

In his essays, Gombar also takes the first steps toward revealing political culture. How can one grasp such an elusive and subtle category? Should we approach them from the direction of national character, political anthropology, or should we perhaps take historical situations as the bases of our examination? The author scrutinizes the terms of ideology, history of ideas, public opinion and communal morality, but ends up saying that each of these separately, or all of them together, are insufficient to describe political culture, that one also needs "to make use, in some manner, of our psychological knowledge." (Footnote 27) (Cited in Gyorgy Szretyko, "Political Culture As a Category of Marxist Political Science" ["A politikai
kultura, mint a marxista politikatudomany kategoriaja"], TARSADALOMTUDOMANYI KOZLEMENYEK, 1982, 1. According to Szretyko, Gombar's analysis is "very similar to those bourgeois concepts which have as their main characteristics the psychologization of social phenomena." In his definition, "political culture is such an emotional and attitudinal environment, in which the political system operates, and which cognitively, affectively and evaluatively characterizes the political system." (Footnote 28) (Csaba Gombar, "For the Possibility of Getting to Know Hungarian Political Culture" ["A magyar politikai kultura megismeresenek lehetosegeit"], in "Politics and Political Science," Budapest, 1982, p 612.)

Once more we must depart along the path that was broken in 1948: Outside of Istvan Bibo's study written in that year, (Footnote 29) (Istvan Bibo, "Distorted Hungarian Character, A Hungarian History Strewn With Blind Alleys," ["Eltorzult magyar alkat, zsakutcas magyar torte mellem"], in "The Collected Works of Istvan Bibo" ["Bibo Istvan osszegyujtott munkai"], Volume I, Bern, Switzerland, 1981.) there has not been another work written in the past 40 years which the author could have utilized in his examination. In addition to contemporary American researchers (Almond, Verba, Greenstein, Goffman, Pye, et al.), he was compelled to refer to earlier Hungarian writings (Illyes, Szekfu, Kornis, Sandor Karacsony, Laszlo Nemeth, et al.), which, although "impressionistic" in nature, are also unique and without followers. On this point, the issues of political culture are connected with political-social fragmentation, because "the nature, health and regeneration of a community's makeup is primarily evidenced in politics. That is, of course, if by politics we do not mean the activities of politicians but the entire process of solving the community's problems." (Footnote 30) (Bibo, op. cit., p 286.) While research into political culture has gained new momentum all over the world, in our country "the characterological approach was completely and exclusively replaced by an institutional attitude, which was manifested primarily in ideologization; thus, at this time, our political system has not been discovered even on the institutional level, and the issue of political culture has not even been mentioned in the form of questions." (Footnote 31) (Csaba Gombar, "For the Possibility of Gaining Acquaintance of Hungarian Political Culture" ["A magyar politikai kultura megismeresenek lehetosegeit"], in "Politics and Political Science" ["Politika es politikatudomany"], Budapest, 1982, p 612.)

Of course, even Gombar does not claim that the problem lies in the false choice between "institution or character"; on the contrary, we need to have simultaneous, valid research carried on in both areas. Happily, both approaches have their distinguished representatives in the political science of our country. [Their] views are basically rooted in the two great trends of twentieth century sociology. The political sphere, as the easily distinguishable sub-unit of the social system, is being dealt with in the system-oriented, "system-integrative" approaches, which follow the school of structural functionalism (Merton, Parsons and Luhmann, as well as the political scientists Deutsch, Wiseman, et al.). These approaches are eminently suitable to describe certain objectivizations of the political system (organizations, institutions, symbols, etc.). They examine political life within the framework of totality-as-a-system, within which one can distinguish movements of content (power relationships, interests, political
ideology, and political culture), as well as movements of form (political organizations, communities, norms and a system of information). Society operates as a system, with the system of politics as its most dynamic subsystem, while modernization is connected to the process of differentiation, the functional separation of society's sub-systems. (As for the Hungarian authors, see the writings of M. Bihari, K. Kulcsar, I. Forgacs, and B. Pokol.)


The other approach—frequently not in opposition to, but supplementing the previous one—devotes more attention to the depiction of the "world of living," the context present in communicative actions. More precisely, to the questions: How does politics appear in, and how does it affect, everyday life, and how does the system controlling behavior influence those people who are members of the system, while in part they are also outside it? In Habermas' synthesis, the world of living is always reproduced in interaction and at three levels: these are the areas of (1) cultural reproduction (according to Schutz), (2) social integration (according to Durkheim), and (3) socialization (according to Mead). The system is objective and normative, while the world of living consists of subjective and inter-subjective phenomena. (Footnote 33) (J. Habermas, "Theorie des kommunikative Handels," Frankfurt, 1981; R. Weiner, "Cultural Marxism and Political Sociology," Beverly Hills, London, 1981.) In the course of institutionalization, the system and the world of living are separated even more (this line of thought can be referred back to the dichotomy of Tonnies concerning community and society), and the world of living is rationalized. In opposition with the "colonizing" efforts of the system, we should preserve the values of communicative rationality hidden in the world of living, either by maintaining the autonomy of the world of living (as in the Western societies) or by assuring the survival of the world of living within the elements of the system (as in the Eastern European societies). The problems and opportunities of the world of living are equally derived from the fact that the integration of the system does not necessarily coincide with social integration. The theoretical basis of the "social-integrative" approach contains the interactionist trends (Cooley, Mead, Ward, Goffman, and in political science, Almond, Verba, Greenstein, et al.), which derive the existence of society from the interaction that is practiced through signal-bearing symbols and gestures understandable by everyone. The influence of this school is recognizable in
Hungarian research efforts aimed at examining political culture, political socialization, national attitude or social anomalies. (Concerning these, see the writings of Cs. Gombar, L. Keri, Gy. Csepeli, E. Hankiss, et al.) (Footnote 34) (Csaba Gombar, "For the Possibility of Getting to Know Hungarian Political Culture" ["A magyar politikai kultura megismeresenek lehetosegeit"]; Csaba Gombar, "Is There a Political Particularism in Our Country, and if So, What Kind?" ["Van-e, s ha van, milyen, a politikai tagoltsag nalunk?"], both in "Politics and Political Science," Budapest, 1982; Csaba Gombar, "The Thoughts of a Citizen" ["Egy allampolgar gondolatai"], Budapest, 1984; Laszlo Keri, "An Outline of Political Socialization" ["A politikai szocializacio vzialata"], MUHELY, 1984, 4; Gyorgy Csepeli, "The National Identity and Attitudes of White-Collar Workers" ["Ertelmisegiek nemzeti identitasa es attitudjei"], Research completed in 1983-1984; Elemer Hankiss, "Diagnoses" ["Diagnozisok"], Budapest, 1982; Elemer Hankiss, "A Second Society." ["Masodik tarsadalom"], VALOSAG, 1984, 11; etc.) Also assignable to the second trend is phenomenological sociology that also has its roots in certain elements of everyday life, which at times appear to be particular in nature (Schutz, Berger, Luckmann, Garfinkel, et al.), (Footnote 35) (In Miklos Hernadi, ed., "Phenomenology In The Social Sciences" ["A fenomenologia a tarsadalomtudomanyban"], Budapest, 1984.) in looking for an answer to the question: How is society possible as an objectivated, habit-based system of relationships serving human co-existence? The theme of this approach is the inter-subjective world of meanings contained in everyday life, the integrative role of natural dispositions and social idealizations. As a consequence, it considers common sense equal to scientific or "official" knowledge; what is more, it claims that social action cannot be comprehended from the outside, in a Weberian manner, but only by assuming the way of thinking practiced by the participants. From the experience of a "retreating political system" (Footnote 36) (In Laszlo Boros and Laszlo Keri, "The Political Socialization of Youth," ["Az ifjusag politikai szocializacioja"], in "Hungarian Youth in the 1980s" ["A magyar ifjusag a nyolcvanas evekben"], Budapest, 1984, p 187.) it follows that for the vast majority of people politics does not mean the marketplace and authentic social actions, but rather the "supra"-societal organizations and institutions (the state, the party, the centralized mass communication network, etc.) as an isolated "political corpus."

In societies where the interests and values of everyday life can make their appearance in the channels of open political discourse only selectively and through various transformations (because, for example, the network of political transmission system is narrow, and its move is one-directional), some of these efforts will be smothered, while others will find their own functional substitutes (in the Mertonian sense), which will make it possible for them to be manifested. One such functional alternative for politics could be the sphere of culture: This is one of the reasons for the traditional role-acceptance of literature throughout the development of Central and East European social development (Footnote 36a) (According to the malicious remark of the novelist Peter Esterhazy, our writers have been primarily thinking in terms of "people vs. nation," instead of "subject vs. predicate.") and for the "heroic" role of the intelligentsia in general.
The aberrations of social development that appear in the field of politics (Footnote 37) (According to Mihaly Bihari, on the level of politics these are manifested in: (1) a party-centered political system; (2) a monopolistic block of power; (3) a strong centralization; (4) a swollen bureaucracy; (5) organizational concentration; (6) the confusion in spheres of competence; (7) authority and hierarchical dependencies are based upon personal dependencies; (8) spheres of competence are distributed in accord with a peculiar principle of "plunder." For more details, see Mihaly Bihari, "The Theoretical and Practical Issues of Political Systems (With Special Attention to Socialist Democracy and the Social Reforms)" ["A politikai rendszer elméleti és gyakorlati kerdesei (kulonos tekintettel a szocialista demokraciara és a tarsadalmi reformokra)", MUHELY, 1984, 5.) force the not-yet-fully formed discipline of political science to become evaluative and critical as well as descriptive. Of course, this derives from its very nature as a social science: albeit a freedom from values could be the ideal of honest scientists who try to avoid becoming "ideologized," in the background of scholarly explications one can in fact detect commitments to values. The Marxist political science that is coming into being in this country has committed itself to the principle of democracy and the broadening of social publicity. "Socialism and democracy, humanism and democracy: these are the inseparable pre-conditions for the creation of a new society. Community cooperation capable of effectively completing great achievements and humane conditions can be developed only under democratic leadership." (Footnote 38) (Imre Pozsgay, "Our Fate Is Democracy" ["Sorsunk a demokraciában"], MAGyar NEZET, December 24, 1984.) In order to govern democratically, a democratic system of institutions must be constructed within society. In fact, there is one common factor behind the re-occurring crises of the East Central European region, the shared wish of the peoples: "The state should not control society; rather, society should control the state." (Footnote 39) (Imre Pozsgay, op. cit.--Marx expressed the thought this way: "Freedom is achieved when the state is no longer an organ dominating every aspect of society, becoming instead an organ whose every aspect is dominated by society, and today's political forms are as free or unfree as the degree to which they limit the freedom of the state." Marx, "The Critique of the Gotha Program" ["A gothai program kritikájában"], Budapest, 1975, p 33.)

From its beginnings, political science recognized that in democratic societies liberty and equality are not primarily alternative, but rather connecting conditions. The road for us to follow could be the seemingly narrow path created by Bibo's thought, in which the socialist striving for a society free of exploitation is not in conflict with obtaining the "Western technique" of political freedom. Political science is not called upon to compose concrete political programs, nor is it suited to that task; however, in the possession of its specific familiarity, it is able to generally describe for us the socialist conditions for setting up a democratic social and political system. This is most coherently presented in the works of Mihaly Bihari, [who proposes] the following: (1) "The political security and liberty of individuals and communities /citizenship rights/ must be guaranteed; (2) "The guaranteeing of political equality between individuals and communities. In other words, everyone should be able to adhere to his own political opinions and should be free to strive to implement his political will in accordance with his own interests;" (3) "An appropriately organized
system of means should be established for representing interests and exercising authority." (An organized system to assure the articulation of interests, system of controls, and a system of mass communications that is held openly accountable to the public.) (Footnote 40) (Mihaly Bihari, "The Theoretical and Practical Issues of Political Systems (With Special Attention to Socialist Democracy and the Social Reforms)" ["A politikai rendszer elmeleti es gyakorlati kerdesei (kulonos tekintettel a szocialista demokraciara es a tarsadalmi reformokra)"], MUHELY, 1984, 5. See also Miklos Szabo, "Historical Form-Changes of Legitimacy in the Socialist Countries" ["A legitimacio torteneti alakvaltozasi a szocialista orszagokban"], Manuscript; Miklos Szabo, "The Majority's Authority, The Minority's Rights" ["A tobbseg hatalma, a kisebbseg joga"], VILAGOSSAG, 1982, 12.)

It was almost self evident that a close relationship was developed between the pioneers of [Hungarian] political science and the reform-idea that gained new life around the end of the 1970s. It may appear peculiar that we have to emphasize this relationship. After all, the term reform, even in its meaning according to Eotvos, (Footnote 41) (Jozsef Eotvos, "Reform," first published in 1846.) designates a change that is intrinsically political in nature. (For examples in our history, see for example: the emancipation of serfs, the reform of franchise rights, the plans concerning the reform of the county system, etc.) After 1949, however, since everything in the political sphere was declared to be evident and "immutable," reform took on an almost entirely economic meaning and could only touch political life through the transmission of economic activities. This could explain the regularly re-occurring unevenness of East European reform attempts. Even those who earlier used to think in terms of political reform were now compelled to express their thoughts in economic terms and in accordance with the logic of economic changes. This may have contributed to the spectacular rise in prestige accorded to economic experts during the past decades. In 1968 "the reformers wanted to implement political reforms in such a way that the word 'political' should not even be mentioned. This not only conflicted with their own logic, in the real world of politics it also signified capitulation. After all, if the reformers did not organize a movement of their own and failed to enlist support by the decisive segment of political decision-makers, this only meant that the anti-reform forces would organize a movement of their own. This of course brought defeat for the reformers. The lesson is that proponents of an open and democratic program should have unconditional faith in the demos and in publicity, and should not attempt to distinguish themselves in 'clique-politics,' because those call for entirely different skills." (Footnote 42) (Csaba Gombar, "Failure or Defeat? /Comments on the Politics of Hungarian Reforms/" ["Bukas vagy vereseg? Megjegyzesek a magyar reform politikumahoz"], UJ FORRAS, 1983, 4.)

There are many ways in which we can compare the reform waves of 1966-72 and 1979-85. In this study, we wish to focus only on the political-ideological collective terms of pro-reform and anti-reform behavior. Decisive in the defeat of previous reform attempts was the "technocrat" classification; the anti-reform "neo-plebeian movement" was able to counter the principle of liberty with that of equality, the expertise of technocratic and logocratic intellect with "democracy." Liberalism was accorded its "cosmopolitan" label, in opposition to which it was easy to invoke national interests.
The post-1978 reform period attempts to connect technocratic rationality to democratic interests (self-government, social control, etc.), but (paradoxically!) this is again done before the "watching eyes" of a limited public. Certain reform measures (dual nomination lists in elections, the Council of Constitutional Law, etc.) indicate a move in the direction that would go beyond strict economic changes. It appears that [the slogan of] democracy cannot be used successfully against reform: even the anti-reform faction stopped alluding to it and instead referred to state and security interests. (Footnote 43) (Andrea Szego, "Economics and Politics--Interests and Structure" ["Gazdasag es politika--Erdek es struktura"], MEDVETANC, 1983, 2-3; Gyorgy Wiener, "Economic Leadership and Political System," ["Gazdasagiranyitas es politikai rendszer"], in "Ideology and Democracy" ["Ideologia es demokracia"], Budapest, 1984; although in the latter study there arise some doubts even in the name of democracy.)

During the last two decades the process of redistribution, and even the entire social reproduction, became more rational, a change which was experienced as liberalization on the level of everyday life. However, the recession that appeared during the second half of the 1970s made it obvious that this type of social leadership gradually exhausted its opportunities; instead of a change in style, a change in structure, instead of liberalization, democratization is called for. Beyond a certain point, the reform of various social sub-systems, isolated from each other, is no longer sufficient: "Every decisive issue in the politics of moderation, political and social self-government, legality, public honesty, the gradual elimination of bureaucracy, and improving the quality of life—all are mutually inter-related; it is impossible to deal only with the most convenient issues and shelve the others." (Footnote 44) (Istvan Bibo, "The Third Way" ["Harmadik ut"], Hungarian Writers' Association Abroad, London, 1960, p 375.)

idoszerusege"], in "Politics and Society," op. cit.; Miklos Szabo, "Dezso Szabo, the Political Thinker," ["Szabo Dezso a politikai gondolkodo"], MEDVETANC, 1982, 4 and 1983, 1; Tibor Huszar, "Conversations" ["Beszelgetesek"], Budapest, 1984; Tibor Huszar, "National Existence, National Consciousness, Intelligentsia" ["Nemzetlet, nemzettudat, er telmiseg"], Budapest, 1984; etc.) As a matter of fact, in this discipline we find the study that exercised the greatest influence on thinking among [Hungarian] social scientists: Jenő Szucs' "An Outline Concerning the Three Historical Regions of Europe" ["Vazlat Europa harom történeti regiójáról"]. (Reviewed in detail elsewhere in this issue. The Editor.) The work traces the series of "bad compromises" in the region of East Central Europe, from the Carolingian Empire to the Enlightenment. The author alludes to the "mixed absolutism" (feudal dualism within the framework of imperial rule) that developed halfway between Western popular sovereignty and Eastern autocracy, in order to point out the factors contributing to the creation of "cul de sacs" as far back as the middle ages, and later in 1867, 1918, 1944 and 1949. To follow to their logical conclusion and utilize the Hajnal-Bibo-Szucs historical views could contribute significantly to our understanding of Hungarian society's development.

Every fledgling scientific discipline has a natural need to seek out its "ancestors;" this not only serves self-legitimization but also determines which traditions merit keeping alive.

Hungarian political science reached back to leftist and liberal traditions, as these were the primary representatives of progress in our history. In contrast, "conservative tradition in political thinking did not strive to safeguard values and equilibrium but attempted instead to compel society to remain in, or sink back into, a status of dependence." (Footnote 46) (Ivan Zoltan Denes, "The Conservative Tradition in Modern Hungarian Political Thinking" ["A konzervatív hagyomány az ujkori magyar politikai gondolkodásban"], VALOSAG, 1984, 12. Of course there are exceptions here, too, such as Concha, I. Weis, Gy. Ottlik, et al.) Every epoch is characterized by the examples it attempts to follow and by its intellectual fads. Nowadays the once fashionable revolutionary types of intellectual behavior patterns are being replaced by those of reformer orientation, and this necessitates that the latter be "re-discovered" and re-established in our memories. Martinovics, Gábor Bethlen, Szechenyi and Kemeny—as both traps and opportunities—are intellectual types that have been reconsidered and are to be reconsidered again. This century offers us an especially rich selection from which to choose our examples: Jaszi or Dezso Szabo, Landler or Kun, Lukacs or Revai, Fejto or Veres, Erdei or Nemeth—and we could continue with the mostly unnecessary opposition of alternatives (because they are not exclusive of each other), from the anarchists to the social democrats, from the Oktoberists through the adherents of the Sarlo Movement to the populists. (Footnote 47) (In this respect, our book-publishing—in spite of the changes in the past few years—still owes us numerous works. Only as examples, we can cite the following: Jaszi, Dezso Szabo, Laszlo Nemeth, Bibo, Imre Kovacs, Gyula Szekfu, Zoltan Szabo, Istvan Hajnal, and many others, who all have hitherto un-published writings. In the aftermath of the Szarszo-volume, it would be particularly interesting to read about an event that took place 40 years earlier: the debate-series of the Society for Social Sciences
/Tarsadalomtudományi Tarsaság/ started appearing in 1904 under the title "Concerning the Direction of Society's Development." These would be exciting and still-relevant reading, as they gathered the various intellectual trends of the fin de siècle. Still, if we were to designate the value-orientation of contemporary political thinking, we would have to choose the circle represented by the names of Eotvos, Jaszi and Bibo. (Footnote 47a) (Concerning this analogy, see Miklos Sukosd, "Eotvos, Jaszi, Bibo," Manuscript, 1985.) (Needless to say, this choice does not imply the discrediting of other theories; we merely wish to emphasize the dominant values that "saturate the atmosphere" of contemporary scientific discourse.) Most authors choose the above model as potentially providing footholds in attempting to solve today's social problems. However, even the names cited above cannot give us prescriptions: "The analysis of the past can only be truly informative and liberating if it does not replace but complement the appreciation of perspective." (Footnote 48) (Ivan Zoltan Denes, op. cit.)

The decade of the 1960s was characterized by a renaissance of philosophy, while the 1970s belonged to sociology. If circumstances of society and scientific policy remain favorable for the immediate future, the development of the scientific discipline devoted to politics could become even more rapid. Could it be that, in addition to economics, political science will dominate the decade of the 1980s?

12588
CSO 2500/178

63
CC SECRETARY BEREZCZ ON PROBLEMS WITH PARTY'S LEADING ROLE

Budapest TARSADALMI SZÉMLE in Hungarian No 2, 1986 pp 13-24

[Article by Janos Berecz, secretary of the MSZMP Central Committee: "Consensus and the Party's Leading Role"]

[Text] The Communist Party has been playing the leading role in Hungarian society's life for the past four decades. Historical experience proves that the Marxist party's society-leading activity is a factor indispensable to building socialism. Since the socialist system's very existence, its enemies have been directing the main fire of their propaganda attacks at the party and are attempting continually to weaken the party's leading position. For they have recognized what we have known all along and are professing with conviction: that the party's deliberate and successful influence on society's processes is the most important guaranty of socialist progress.

On the questions of the party's leading role--on its necessity, form, and the ways and means of its realization--there are debates within society that flare up from time to time, and theoretically supported standpoints as well as simplistic views are advanced in them. Naturally, debate is proceeding in many areas and in different approaches, and we could also say that several debates are in progress simultaneously. The most important of these debates is the exchange of views within the party itself. In the course of this, we seek the ways of asserting the party's leading role, the ones that best suit the present situation, the current phase of building socialism. But we cannot disregard even the debates that our domestic and foreign critics initiate, and we have no intention of avoiding them, either. However, our attitude is different toward views formulated in the spirit of constructive criticism, and again different toward provocative views bent on destruction.

The opinions bring to the surface many kinds of views, occasionally extremely conflicting ones and uncertain assessments. Is not the party's leading role being jeopardized? Has not the party relinquished some of its leading role voluntarily and "culpably"? Has not the party lost by now its influence and control over the social and economic processes and phenomena, which are assuming a more and more spontaneous form? We encounter these questions explicitly or implicitly, in the form of concerns or accusations. Interpreting the same social and economic facts, however, those who criticize and oppose our social and political conditions from liberal principles feel that the assertion of the party's leading role is "still too much." In their opinion, the party's
leading role has weakened considerably but is still an obstacle to further economic and social development. They regard it as a factor hampering the "development" of the economy free of the "restrictions of socialist economic planning," and the evolution of a kind of idealized, Western-style democracy that presupposes political pluralism.

Another group of views that have polarized in the debates believes to have discovered in social consensus the relinquishing of the party's leading role and sees principled Marxist-Leninist policy being lost in the efforts to maintain and strengthen social consensus. According to the proponents of these views, the party's leading role becomes dissolved in too broadly interpreted socialist national unity. Others question whether consensus actually exists. They deny that an overwhelming majority within society agrees with the party's objectives and supports them through active cooperation. They assume that passivity, indifference and emervation are behind the indisputable social tranquility and solid political stability. They believe (fear or, conversely, hope!) that the confidence of the masses, of the people, in the party has weakened, and that the only thing which today guarantees social tranquility is public opinion which holds, correctly as it happens, that the economic situation in our country is better, the living standard's development is more favorable, and the living conditions are more amenable than in many other countries.

By way of introduction, we have glanced at, and intentionally intensified, several types of views that have crystallized regarding the relationship between consensus and the party's leading role. We have done so without any selection and have presented, respectively, views originating on the right and the pseudoleft, dissident and even inimically charged views, and worried cautioning views from within the party as well.

Our party is continually analyzing and examining its own leading role, the state and changes of consensus and socialist national unity, and it perceives the periodically rekindled extreme behavior as well. The state in question is not a static one; rather, it is shaping and developing constantly. The party maintains a principled and modern Marxist-Leninist standpoint regarding the close relationship that exists between the party's leading role on the one hand, and consensus on the other. At the 13th MSZMP Congress, the Central Committee's report formulated this as follows: "On the main questions of building socialism, we remain in mutual agreement with the overwhelming majority of our people. But the views are far more divided than earlier on the assessment of our situation and regarding the ways and means of our further development. Under these conditions, our efforts to strengthen unity are even more important."

The document continues these thoughts also in its further analysis, in the section on the party's situation and development: "The party's leading role asserts itself in every area of society's life . . . . Persuasion, ideological influence, reasoning, policy guidance, political organizing activity, and mobilization of the masses unalterably remain the principal methods of exercising the party's leading role and implementing policy. The party requires the support of the masses in shaping and carrying out its policy." In the resolution it adopted, the congress confirmed this assessment and standpoint.
The creation of a socialist society—socialist revolution in its broadest sense, the replacement of a capitalist social system by a socialist one, and every single stage of this process that encompasses a long historical period—can take place only under the leadership of the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party of the working class. For us this is not a dogma, but it is indeed the unassailable cornerstone of our revolutionary theory and of our practice proven by history. But, regardless of how true this aspiration, it is likewise indisputable that the Communists alone are unable to do this work and complete the construction of socialism. They are able to do so only in agreement and active cooperation with the masses, the working class, the classes and strata that support themselves by their labor, the overwhelming majority of the people. To use a current, nuanced and modern expression, socialism can be built only through consensus.

Therefore consensus and the party’s leading role are inseparable. They mutually presuppose each other, and neither can be imagined without the other. The mostly implied, one-sided standpoint which sees only the infallible directing functions in the party’s leading role, but attributes at best only secondary importance to consensus, to the requirement that the people not only accept the party’s program but also support it with their cooperation, is doomed to failure from the very outset. This type of sectarian isolation—even if it has fought (or is still fighting) for real popular interests, but is full of mistrust of the people, and wants to achieve its goals without the workers’ cooperation, "excluding" them and going "over their heads"—does not serve the interests of the working masses and merely reflects petit-bourgeois intolerance. We need to look also beyond the socialist working-class movement, and back into the distant past as well, to see that—as a design or experiment—this type of "utopianism" has been and is doomed to fail from the very outset.

Any concept or practice that does not regard the people as the vehicle of its political objective, and simultaneously also as the subject of political action, is foreign to socialism and to the Marxist-Leninist party. This is true even though sectarian isolation has occurred in the course of our history, causing no small harm both to the people and the party. Socialist policy becomes living reality for the people and with the people, with their agreement and active cooperation; it cannot dispense with consensus.

Naturally, these two requirements can be the real basis of action only if it is recognized that consensus cannot emerge or last without the party’s leading role. No consensus or will of the whole population can emerge and sustain itself spontaneously. To assume otherwise would be mystification of the people, a naive and romantic notion. The ordering of interests in one direction, a common objective, and methodologically proper action cannot emerge spontaneously from millions of individual interests and directions, from different aspirations, amorphous ideas, desires and passions.

Historical evidence shows that spontaneous popular movements have never yet achieved their goals. It is the historical experience of the revolutionary working-class movement and a lasting perception of our theory that the struggle of the working class can be successful only under the leadership of its revolutionary vanguard, a force organized on the principle of democratic centralism.
October of 1917 and the nearly seven decades since then have confirmed in many ways this realization within our movement. At times, regrettably, there has also been negative confirmation. When the working-class movement, a popular movement, lacks the party's leading role, it can and has become from its very inception a tool of counterrevolutionary forces. The emergence of a crisis situation also indicates a weakening or tragic cessation of the party's leading role. An example of this is the Hungarian counterrevolution of 1956 or the 1980-1981 crisis in Poland.

Socialist conditions and consensus cannot arise in the absence of the Marxist-Leninist party's leading role and cannot be maintained without incessant ideological and political work. But it is equally true that the party's leading role can assert itself only, and increasingly, by forming and continuously maintaining and strengthening consensus and winning it anew; in other words, by convincing and mobilizing the masses, the people.

Consensus is a new word in our political dictionary, a concept that has been in use only a few years. But what it expresses, and its relationship to the party's leading role are by no means new. It has always been one of the pillars on which the communist movement rests. It has been a part of Marxism already when the latter distanced itself from the sectarian, anarchist trends; when the movement formed a new, revolutionary party that broke with the revisionistic and opportunistic trends which renounce revolutionary action and the party's leading role. The communist and working-class movements have achieved all their historically significant successes on the basis of this relationship.

The appearance of consensus in political usage indicates specifically the need to clearly state that the party's leading role, and the closest possible cooperation of the active popular masses lined up behind the party are essential even in the last decade of this century, under circumstances and conditions that have changed significantly and in many respects. But it must be conveyed that, even in themselves, the consensus and active political support of the working class, the working masses, the people, have changed much over the years. The concept itself has necessarily undergone differentiation, and therefore also the exercise of the party's leading role, including its methods, has had to change and be streamlined to meet the requirements of a modern age.

The brief, 133-day history of the Hungarian Soviet Republic provides a good example of resourceful revolutionary leadership and of the popular masses' willingness to actively cooperate. Tens and even hundreds of thousands took up arms to defend the dictatorship of the proletariat, the revolutionary social changes and social achievements. In exemplary fashion, even though not fully. For we know the lessons: that we were unable to truly win over a significant proportion of the peasant masses who wanted land.

After the bloody suppression of the Hungarian soviet regime, during the long counterrevolutionary period, or at least during its first half, the party—hard pressed by its heavy losses, persecution and the ruthless terror, and in part because it misjudged the situation and clung rigidly to the slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat—was unsuccessful in gaining the support of the popular
masses, or its ties with the popular masses were only tenuous. The Seventh
Congress of the Communist International changed all that a half century ago.
To avert the threat of a world war, it announced the collaboration of the com-
munists with all the progressive, democratic and antifascist forces against
the right-wing or fascist dictatorships that had emerged in several countries
of Europe—thus in Hungary and Italy, for example—and against the most extreme
fascism that had come to power in Germany in 1933.

The congress called for the establishment of a popular front movement. Despite
the collaboration and the innumerable heroic efforts, the congress was unable
to prevent the great world conflagration, and our country's tragedy on the side
of Hitler's Germany. Nevertheless, this has been an indisputably valuable con-
tribution toward victory of the antifascist movement, of the resistance strug-
gles and, in the final outcome, of the antifascist coalition, primarily the
Soviet Union. Although it demanded a huge sacrifice of blood, it was a victory
of world significance that eventually led to our country's liberation. A new
people's Hungary emerged on the ruins of semifeudal Hungary, and a new histori-
cal development could begin.

Projection of a typically modern concept back to decades earlier might seem
far-fetched. And yet, without any arbitrary interpretation, we are able to
recognize the combined effect of the party's leading role, and of consensus in
the current sense of the word, on all the real, epochal results of our history
since the liberation.

A very large majority of the working masses, of the people, has heeded the par-
ty's initiative—providing, guiding, organizing, convincing and mobilizing word,
and has supported the party with political standpoints and work. We may at-
tribute to this alone such achievements as the land reform or—measured on a
historical scale—the agricultural revolution, the country's reconstruction,
the class enemy's defeat in the coalitional struggles, the nationalization of
the most important means of production, and the creation of a socialist balance
of power. The country's industrialization, not free of contradictions but by
no means negligible, has been achieved in the revolutionary momentum of colla-
boration between the party and the masses. The rapid social restratification
affecting wide popular masses, the intellectual and cultural advancement of the
working masses, and humane living conditions for millions of people who earlier
lived at the poverty level have been the results of collaboration.

However, the epochal transformations were burdened by political distortions.
The committed mistakes and crimes also meant a breakdown of the party's leading
role, and of relationships that by the end of the 1940's could be regarded as
consensus but were not yet called that! Without dissecting once again all the
political problems of that period, it will be worthwhile to call attention to
two important lessons. First, that the weakening and erosion of consensus
occurred only gradually and with a phase delay. The popular masses continued
to trust the party leadership long after this trust had become one-sided, and
even the party members learned of the committed crimes only much later, in
some instances years later.

Thus the explosion that dramatically marked the erosion of consensus came only
later, at a time when there was a firm determination within the party's leader-
ship to confront the committed mistakes and crimes. But by then there was not
enough time and strenght left to oppose the revisionist, right-wing trend that had gained ground, and to win back the people's trust. This is an important lesson. The party must work incessantly to maintain and strengthen the people's trust and consensus, because even small fissures could be indications of serious problems. We must not wait until the social stresses appear, even if occasionally they do arrive with a phase delay.

The second lesson: many people feel that the party strongly asserted its leading role in the early 1950's, regardless of the political distortions and the committed mistakes. Despite the rapid, gradual erosion of consensus. In other words, that the party's "strong" leading role does not require or presuppose the consensus and active support of the masses. It can be asserted also by other means: through administrative methods; by direct control and intervention in all areas of life, reserving all authority and decisions; through commands and orders. In fact, they believe that consensus can be achieved the most effectively this way. Quite a few people think that the party's leading role truly asserts itself when it finds expression in such methods. It never comes to their minds that this is direction by commands from a position of power, rather than the party's leading role.

There are those who are concerned. They criticize the absence of sound decisions, or of decisions which they regard as sound, and demand decisive action. Considering as inadequate the present practice, strength and effectiveness of the party's leading role, they look back with nostalgia on the mentioned direct methods. In a nervous response to just hearing the expression "the party's leading role," others immediately identify it with the methods that characterize a painful but brief deviation in our 40-year history.

Without the trust, consensus and active support of the people, the party's leading role has no roots, although superficially it might seem "strong." This is a sad and even tragic lesson. Where did the "strong" leading role that lacked consensus lead to? It fell completely apart when the need for it was the greatest, when the unfolding counterrevolution posed a deadly threat to people's power, and the party's sound forces needed ideologically clear and politically consistent leadership. All this happened because an internal struggle developed between a sectarian leadership unable to consistently confront its mistakes and crimes on the one hand, and the gaining revisionist right wing on the other.

Let us go on. After the counterrevolution, is not the "secret" of the historically rapid consolidation the fact that—in struggle on both fronts and with political sensitivity—the new revolutionary center, the leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, has successfully combined decisive and forceful action with winning over the masses and gaining their trust? In other words, the party's leading role has been based on the need to achieve a consensus regarding the objectives. An original and always valid theoretical and practical requirement, a basic principle of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory has thereby been restored.

It is now nearly 30 years that the party has been observing and consistently applying this principle. This has been, and will remain, the source of all our
results and is helping us to overcome our difficulties. In our efforts to build a socialist society, this is the key to solving every new task, qualitatively different from our tasks in the past, and to resolving all the newly arising contradictions.

Barely a few years after the counterrevolution, when the party adopted the resolution to collectivize the mostly backward, small-scale peasant farms and began to implement this resolution vigorously, it relied on the understanding and active support of a majority of the peasantry and entire society; or, we might say, on a consensus that gradually evolved through frank political work. What had never been a widespread and resounding success in the past under a so-called "strong-handed" party leadership, despite its resorting in some places to high-handed methods and pressures that had violated legality, now succeeded through persuasion and by ideological and political methods, while observing the principle of joining agricultural cooperatives voluntarily.

And all this was not accompanied by a temporary decline of the farm output, either. Unlike the faint of heart, the peasantry trusted the word of the party that leads by ideological and political means. A brief decade later, by the end of the 1960's, the view gained general acceptance—and was voiced frequently at that time—that private farming could not be restored, not even by force. And another decade later, Hungary's once backward agriculture had climbed to the world lead in many respects. The peasantry's work, thinking and way of life, and the appearance of the Hungarian village have been radically transformed, in a truly revolutionary manner. All this, together with the consensus and active support of the people, certified the assertion of the party's leading role and the successful implementation of its policy, with the creative collaboration of the people and on their behalf.

Another example of historical significance is the 1968 reform of managing the economy. Well, the consensus regarding this issue did not emerge at all automatically. We may recall the debates before and after the reform's introduction. The party's leading role manifested itself in that the party proposed the reform and directed its elaboration and launching. Persistent everyday party propaganda won understanding and acceptance of the reform and broadened our perception of economic issues; or, as expressed at that time, it reformed our economic thinking. This provided the foundation for the consensus regarding the economic reform, for there can hardly be any doubt that this, too, has been a prerequisite for the reform's realization. Just as today it is a prerequisite for the reform's continuation and perfection now on the agenda.

Every advance in the course of our history has been successful whenever a majority of our people accepted and identified with the policy of the Marxist-Leninist party playing the leading role in our society, and effectively contributed their work and political action toward the implementation of this policy. This is how a consensus is formed, and this close relationship is indispensable even today. Naturally, the methods of exercising the party's leading role have changed and will continue to change over time. The changing circumstances and conditions under which socialism is being built modify the content, scope and depth of consensus, and its forms of manifestation.
The factors are common knowledge which at present, give and take a few years, (in other words, in the 1980's) make more difficult and more complex than before the conditions under which socialism is being built. Increased attention has focused on the lively interrelations between the party's leading role on the one hand, and consensus on the other. There is talk both of internal and external causes, in their mutual relationship and interaction.

The external causes manifest themselves in the international political and economic changes. The favorable period of detente in relations between the two world systems, which characterized the first half of the 1970's, changed by the end of that decade to a sustained tension reminiscent of the one-time cold war's climate. In recent months, since the Geneva summit meeting between the CPSU General Secretary and the United States President, there have been some signs of a relaxation in the deteriorated relations, but not enough. America's space weapons program is continuing, and the expansion and modernization of the nuclear arsenal are assuming dangerous proportions. Imperialist politics is preventing the elimination of international trouble spots that have developed at many points in the world, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. All this places a greater and growing burden on the socialist world, militarily, politically, economically and ideologically as well. No country within the socialist community, which includes also Hungary, is able to avoid these unfavorable effects.

No less familiar is also the other group of factors. Likewise at the middle of the past decade, or slightly earlier if we wish to be more exact, a series of new international economic processes unfolded in the world. All the effects have to be taken into account of the recession in the capitalist world economy in 1973-1974, and also of the other, somewhat milder, recession that appeared at the end of that decade. The strongest and economically most advanced capitalist countries have emerged from a decade of recession, although at the cost of violent shocks, a high rate of inflation, the demise of traditional industries, and mass unemployment. But in many countries the recession's unfavorable social consequences for the wide popular masses have proven durable. It must be admitted that the way has become freer for a kind of economic renewal, for the industries and sectors that are using the most modern technology. This fact indicates that, in this respect and within certain limits, the capitalist system still has internal reserves, and its viability and growth potential have not been exhausted as yet.

The real losers in the economic rearrangement following the recessions are the underdeveloped countries. Besides inflation and unemployment, catastrophic indebtedness and the pauperization of the popular masses indicate that in the rearrangement of economic relations, as a result of the worsening terms of trade, truly "the poorest of the poor" have become and are becoming even poorer.

Naturally, the economic rearrangement has also affected the socialist countries. Especially the ones which, like Hungary, are necessarily linked to the world market, due to their size and conditions; they are exporting a large part of their output, because they are able to supply a substantial proportion of their demand only from import.

The unfavorable development and worsening (from our point of view) of our terms of trade exhausted the national economy's financial reserves by the end of the
past decade. We have accumulated a huge total foreign debt that will burden the economy for many years to come. To avoid a more serious economic catastrophe, our party has been forced to decide on a radical change of direction in the practice of economic policy, and to introduce restrictions. All the painful consequences of a restrictive economic policy could and had to be considered well in advance. The growth of national income would grind to a halt; instead of its earlier dynamic rise, the living standard would stagnate and, for significant population groups, even decline. But at that time there was no other way of responding to the external economic changes.

We mentioned external economic causes, but could have said internal causes just as well. For it became apparent, specifically under the pressure of external influences, that our economy—all its commendable results notwithstanding which have been achieved along the road of socialist development—is not sufficiently developed as yet when measured by the high requirements and standards of the ruthless competition in the world market and of the international division of labor. Its production and product structures, its technical and technological level, and the quality of a large proportion of its products are unsatisfactory. Labor productivity, the economic efficiency of production, the quality of organization and management, and the domestic interest relations that serve as a driving force are lower than they need be.

From all this it follows that, to avoid economic collapse under such conditions, we had to aim simultaneously for restoration of economic equilibrium, maintenance of international solvency, and preservation of the living standard if possible, or at least the avoidance of its sharp decline. In addition to all this, we were faced with the imperative of modernizing our economy; moreover, of renewing it, perfecting its management, and definitely proceeding further with its reform. Taken together, these are enormous tasks that can be solved only with maximum effort, because often the individual parts are in objective contradiction even with one another, and these contradictions are difficult to resolve. No matter how modest, the objectives in conjunction with the living standard and social policy require financial resources if they are to be achieved, and this is also true of solving acute problems, and of technical modernization and economic innovation. Only a more developed economy is able to produce the necessary resources. Consequently, we can expect only a slow and painful accumulation of resources, which in its turn will slow down and delay economic recovery.

Certain contradictions of our economy have become more conspicuous. An increase of our economy's ability to generate income demands the perfection of our system of managing the economy. We are determined to proceed further with the reform. But at the same time we are being forced at every step to resort to direct measures that are foreign to the economic reform's system (withdrawal of resources into the state budget, import-license revocations that are disrupting production, etc.) in order to cover the budget's deficit, meet our financial obligations, etc. Full employment is a fundamental requirement of our policy on the living standard. However, an increase of the economy's ability to generate income requires the curtailment of uneconomical production, which means a loss of jobs, the planned transfer and retraining of the work force and, as a result, more efficient employment.
The perfection of interest relations, which provide the driving force, is indispensable to the economy's development, but it does not always occur where it is needed the most and could boost the socialist economy. It is essential to encourage entrepreneurship. But we do not always witness this at those points of key importance where the entrepreneur could serve the interests of entire society, together with his own interests.

The differentiation of incomes, in accordance with the work performed and its usefulness to society, is likewise an indispensable driving force. Together with such differentiation we encounter, often inseparably intertwined, the functioning of high personal incomes as "capital." Within unearned income we find its legal forms together with the illegal ones that are violations and often cannot be verified. Average real income has increased somewhat in recent years, but this includes a slight drop of average real wages. Within the average, the financial situation of significant population strata has worsened perceptibly. But at the other end of the scale we find a small stratum that is rapidly becoming more prosperous. This process includes income recipients who are getting richer deservedly, through work and outstanding performances, and also income recipients who are getting richer underservedly, through unearned income.

Without any claim to complete coverage, we have just illustrated the extreme complexity and contradictory nature of the economic and social situation, and the degree of the difficulty of the problems and tasks that have to be solved. But this review has been essential to provide some idea of how important and complex are the issues on which the party must exercise its leading role. Of the conditions under which the party has to pursue its policy, and of the loads and internal stresses to which society's consensus, the people's approval of party policy, is subjected.

Under these conditions, assertion of the party's leading role presupposes a delicate yet definite, firm balance. The socialist objectives are clear, and the tasks that realistically can be fulfilled within the foreseeable future have been formulated; they are summarized in the resolution of our 13th party congress, in the government's program, and in the 7th Five-Year Plan that the National Assembly has enacted into law. At every level of the party's leading role—from the highest positions, through the party's intermediate organs, down to the frontline of party work in the party locals and to the everyday activity of Communists actively engaged in politics— influence must be exerted to encourage that the sound processes which have sprung up in the economy and within society unfold as vigorously as possible also in economic innovation and the spreading of the new forms of socialist democracy.

So far as the internal stresses, mistakes or errors that accompany development are concerned, they need the party's initiative—providing policy. It is a requirement of the party's political work that the resolution, respectively the curbing and elimination, of the stresses and mistakes or errors must be well-founded and permanent; and, no less importantly, this must not impede the unfolding of the favorable processes. A consensus must emerge as to which aspirations and strata of society are to be supported, at whose expense in the given case, who should bear the burden of solving the tasks, and whom should
policy protect. We cannot eradicate weeds in a way that kills also the germinating crop which must be protected. But this requirement is valid conversely as well: we cannot expect fruit or a harvest if we let weeds choke the germinating crop. To assert the party's leading role today we need a large measure of political acumen, struggle on both fronts, comprehensive sensitivity, coolness that is devoid of nervous confusion and impatience, revolutionary determination that rejects loss of perspective and enervation, and courage that recognizes and embraces everything new that is good and dares to abandon the obsolete methods.

An overwhelming majority of our people supports the action that unfolds in the wake of the party's policy. A consensus and active support can be won and formed through modern political work, even for the most difficult decisions made in emergencies, for the most unpopular measures, and measures whose results will be long in coming, rather than immediately evident.

Even though it may cite also the complicated situation, any aspiration directed against socialism and attempting to dissuade the party from decision-making positions of key importance, or to dispute the party's historically confirmed and constitutional right to lead society, would make questionable our society's path to socialism. It would reverse the socialist direction of our development, something which should least expect to win the approval and support of the Hungarian people. But any advocate of intolerance who would prefer "firmer (i.e., more direct) measures"—instead of the methods and style of exercising the party's leading role that this day and age, and the complexity of the present conditions require—does not trust the effectiveness of political persuasion and implicitly regards consensus, the agreement of wide popular masses, as something we could very well dispense with.

As an even greater danger, however, such an aspiration would certainly liquidate—under the label of struggle to overcome the mistakes and difficulties that unquestionably exist—also the new, unfolding, progress-foreshadowing processes within our society that are taking us in socialism's direction. Has it happened in the National Assembly and local elections last year that a third or fourth candidate was elected, and not one of the Popular Front's official nominees? Yes, it has. But has this made the party's leading role questionable? Is there any danger that the new enterprise councils or enterprise collectives might elect as enterprise director a person who is not the best qualified for the job, or that they might adopt short-sighted decisions which will serve only short-term goals or perhaps narrow group interests? There unquestionably are such enterprise councils and collectives, and decisions of this kind have indeed been adopted. Has it happened that the residents in some cities voted against a contribution for the development of settlements? It has happened, and not merely in one or two cities. But does all this justify the conclusion that, as they say, "it is a pity the party has permitted and even initiated" the continuation of economic reform, the "excessive" expansion of democracy?

Every Marxist knows that no development ever proceeds "smoothly," in a straight line, or can be free of contradictions. Every step ahead carries its own risk. But should we renounce progress itself because of this? It is likewise obvious
that the progress-foreshadowing way of resolving the contradictions is to overcome and eliminate them. The abuses due to shortages of goods (and services) can and should be handled, kept in line, through administrative measures and draconian penalties, but only temporarily and never completely. Such abuses will really cease only when the shortages themselves will have been liquidated. Our socialist development, our historical path, has always been lined by problems, often by problems more serious than our present ones. The turn of the millenium will undoubtedly produce its own problems, not foreseeable as yet and of an entirely different type than our present problems. But should this deter us from proceeding ahead? Because of this, should we step back and resort to the old, incorrectly interpreted methods of asserting the party's leading role? It is proof of the party's growing strength, rather than a sign of weakness, that the party can assert more and more fully its leading role only by forging a consensus, by winning the approval and active support of our people, and is able to achieve in this manner its objective, to realize its policy that the people, too, help to formulate.

After all, how live, broad, strong and deep may we rate consensus, the people's approval of party policy and their active collaboration in implementing it, the relationship between the party and the people? In the introduction we have already quoted the realistic and succinct situation assessment at the party congress: there is a consensus regarding the main questions, but opinions are more divided than before concerning the details. We might add that specifically the complex conditions and task at present have necessitated the elaboration of the concept of consensus and its application.

Consensus is fairly flexible and therefore suitable to express the real situation in all its nuances and differentiation. Consensus performs its unique function in the acceptance of conflicts, in the debates unfolding within society, and in the joint action agreed on in their wake. For consensus, if correctly interpreted, does not mean complete agreement, but the agreement of an overwhelming majority of the people. It does not presuppose agreement on every detail, only on the main, decisive issues. It expresses not a static state, but a relationship that changes, fluctuates with time and in its intensity, weakening or gaining in strength. It is not something that is given once and for all, but must be won anew from time to time. For consensus also means the existence within society of live interests that exert a vigorous influence, their reconciliation and classification, and the possibility of their assertion. And these interests are in constant motion, undergoing change. What today is a socially accepted group aspiration, might—and often does—violate in the process of its realization the interests of other groups, their opportunities for advancement. Acceptance of the manifested interests, and of the disputes and conflicts stemming from them, is also a condition of development. The reconciliation of socially valid aspirations is a part of the party's leading role and is included in the process of forming a consensus.

But a no less important element in this process is guaranteeing the mutual understanding, respect and tolerance of the citizens within our society who subscribe to different ideologies. This, too, is a prerequisite for an overwhelming majority of the people to accept, and to identify with, socialist Hungary's historical past, its present that is coping with complicated tasks, and its renewing future, regardless of their religion, nationality or social status.
This is why consensus includes not only agreement and identification in principle, but also their conversion into a material force, action, work, standpoint, behavior and lifestyle.

If we examine our society while bearing all this in mind, we are able to establish truly that a consensus does exist and is functioning, but our party must work ceaselessly to maintain and strengthen it.

The two allied principal classes in our society, the working class and the peasantry, are the solid foundation on which consensus is based. There has been and still is an extensive re stratification, and internal transformation, in both these classes; their work, attitudes and way of life are becoming increasingly similar. Naturally, each of these principal classes also in itself is strongly differentiated and stratified. We find in them highly qualified, skilled and unskilled strata, masses politically committed to socialism, and lumpenproletarian elements as well. On the whole, however, agreement with the party's policy, positive identification with it, and active collaboration in its implementation are the most widespread, deep-rooted and trouble-free here.

The point in question is not that these two classes are not affected by the outlined socioeconomic contradictions and stresses. They are affected, and they often vent their dissatisfaction openly. But this, if we stop to consider, does not detract from their trust, from their agreement with party policy. We could not live with, or become reconciled to, the adverse aspirations and harmful retrograde phenomena which the party, too, rejects and for whose suppression primarily the party itself is fighting. The task in this respect is to replace the sometimes justifiably arising anger over the stresses, with meaningful and purposeful action that will lead to overcoming and eliminating the contradictions.

Intellectuals, most of whom support the policy of our party even in more trying times, have been largely instrumental in forming a consensus. Under the present difficult conditions, however, groups of intellectuals, not small by any means, are turning away from the party's policy and the socialist ideals, with growing indifference and apathy. A certain loss of perspective characterizes them, or they come under the influence of bourgeois ideologies foreign to socialism; some of their representatives adopt clearly opposing standpoints. Our party turns to the individual strata within the intelligentsia, respectively to the various politically-minded groups of intellectuals, with a differentiated policy appropriate to this situation. We are not engaging the "dissidents" in personal debate. Incidentally, their standpoints are very heterogeneous, and we find among them advocates of extreme-right as well as of ultra-left views. In full awareness of our strength, we are showing due tolerance toward them, so long as they do not actively turn against our social system.

Winning over the intellectual strata that have become indifferent or have lost their perspective will require extremely persistent, patient and incessant ideological and political work of a higher level than at present. There are also acute problems of an economic nature that must be solved. Today a major proportion of the intellectuals is underpaid. In accordance with our economic possibilities, it will be necessary to establish more favorable income ratios: in the interest of entire society, including also the working class and the
peasantry, we must increase the value of intellectual work and provide more incentive for it. On the other hand, we must also recognize that the intellectuals working in the areas of technology, the economy and science must produce by their own activity the resources necessary for this purpose; not to mention the development of modes of distribution that will elicit more valuable work, the remuneration for which will be commensurate with its social utility. We must accept also the conflicts that will accompany this within the enterprises or institutions. This, too, is a specific problem associated with consensus.

Most artisans and retailers support the socialist system and see their future ensured under it. They are not doing badly under the present circumstances. Most of them are respected members of society, equal in rank to other workers. But some of them see a kind of business opportunity in the shortages and shortcomings that exist at present. Even though they do not reject openly the party's leading role, particularly certain elements of the party's policy, they quietly disregard them.

In conjunction with the preceding, furthermore, we must emphasize that consensus also means acceptance of the conflicts of interest between social strata. Because the necessary compromises, priorities and common denominators that emerge from these conflicts are the basis of joint action and real progress.

Looking at our society in a different cross section, the formation of a consensus within the ranks of our youth would merit detailed exposition. A large proportion of youths are committed to socialism. They accept and implement party policy, which is the basis of the continuity of consensus. But the same cannot be said of certain strata within our youth, which are by no means small. This applies particularly to youths who have been affected more painfully than in the past by the problems of setting up housekeeping or finding employment. They are the most vulnerable, because they are inexperienced when exposed to views and fashions foreign to socialism, and to antisocial forms of deviant behavior.

The unfavorable economic and living-standard changes affect the elderly the most severely. Large groups of the elderly are coping with serious problems in making both ends meet. Yet we find most of them loyal to the social system they actively helped to establish in their time. In accordance with the existing financial possibilities, the party that is fulfilling its leading role with a sense of responsibility is urging measures—although only more modest ones for the time being—to improve the financial situation of the elderly, just as it is devoting increased attention also to the multiply disadvantaged strata, regardless of age. This, too, is a part of the political work for maintaining and strengthening consensus. Because we must decide, whenever we work out the resolution of some tension, from where we will provide the conditions necessary for this purpose. And we must make it clearly understood that the planned decision, even though there is agreement regarding it, will improve the situation of retired persons living on pensions, for example, at the cost of lower increases of income for certain strata, for the gainfully employed in the given case. The agreement undertaken in this manner helps to strengthen consensus.

The nationalities living in our country receive extensive subsidies to foster their cultures and are firm supporters of our social system. An atmosphere in
which the religious masses are able to participate, without any conflicts of conscience, in building a socialist society unquestionably helps to strengthen consensus.

Finally, there is a junction where assertion of the party's leading role and social consensus meet. This junction is the party itself, and the party membership. Within the party, namely, the party's unity and activity are the only guaranty of what we call consensus with reference to entire society. The ideological, political and action unity of the Hungarian Communists is the most important prerequisite for asserting the party's leading role, for popular approval of the party's policy, and for our people's active participation in its realization, in promoting our common prosperity and in creating our socialist future.

1014
CSO: 2500/224
WAR GUILT, HUNGARIAN MINORITY SEEN PERSISTING PROBLEM

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 23 Nov 85 p 9

[Denes Kovacs's interview with Gyula Juhasz, Academician, Head of the recently formed Research Group for Hungarian Identity: "Our Role in the World War and the Public Consciousness."

[Text] When it comes to Hungary's role in the world war and its consequences, a great deal of misunderstanding, fallacy, and inaccurate and one-sided thinking continues to survive in the thinking of both the constantly shrinking generation that lived through the war and of the younger generations born after the liberation. All of this is obviously related to the fact that the science of history still owes us a presentation and explanation of the events, and that even our schools, our information and propaganda system has been unable to disperse the periodically re-appearing false views, and to "put in its place" one of the most tragic chapters in the thousand-year history of our country, along with the forces behind the events and their effects. This is what we came to talk about with one of the noted experts on the subject, Gyula Juhasz, academician and director of the recently formed Research Group for Hungarian Identity, whose many valuable books and studies (which frequently elicited lively debates) are well known by readers interested in history.

The Consequences of Collapse

[Gy. Juhasz] "No matter what our point of departure is in our search for the effect of the Second World War in the thinking of our public, the only stable point from which we can study the details is the concluding phase of the war. In other words, the last six months, a period which unequivocally demonstrates the often-stated thesis that the liberation of Hungary came about in the form of a total military defeat. This did not happen to any of the other small countries that were allied with Germany. Let us consider the fact that even in the neighboring nations that long remained within the German alliance, the old ruling classes (at least at the last minute) were able to turn against fascist authority and create a common front with the popular resistance led by the working classes.

In our country, by contrast, the takeover of authority by the Arrow Cross in October 1944 was accomplished more smoothly than even the Germans or the
Szalasi group (not exactly at the peak of their influence at the time) had hoped for. A large segment of public administrators saw the Arrow Cross government as the holders of legal continuity, the last representatives of the thousand-year-old statehood, even if they held members of the Arrow Cross party in rather low esteem. As a consequence, the machinery of state—the administrative apparatus, the army, the gendarmerie, and the police, and even the so-called rump parliament—continued to function, albeit with a decreasing number of participants and a shrinking area of authority, not just until the liberation of the entire country by the Soviet Army, but even a few weeks past that time, after having been re-settled to German territory. Naturally, there should be that much more recognition granted to those individuals (and there were quite a few of them) who opposed fascism and the German occupation from the beginning and who never gave their loyalty to the Szalasi government, but instead fought against Arrow Cross power. In the final analysis, the German occupation, the Arrow Cross rule, and the six-month-long fighting that swept the entire area of the country brought about by the spring of 1945 not only the collapse of old Hungary’s system of authority, but also a thorough change in its social makeup and traditional structure."

[Question] How was the new leadership, and especially the country’s public opinion, able to react to such a total defeat?

[Answer] Not even the political forces of the left were prepared for such a complete collapse of old Hungary. They did not, and probably could not, have a program suitable for finding a way out of such a schism; after all, even as late as the autumn of 1944 they could not imagine that the reconstruction of the country would have to start from the state of total fragmentation. In view of this, the individuals who took on, and accomplished, the task [of rebuilding] deserve even more of our respect.

The majority of the populace, not necessarily or not at all of leftist persuasion, could hardly face this tremendous shock in any other manner than by refusing to accept responsibility for what happened: Not only did the country fail to liberate itself, achieving freedom instead as a consequence of armed struggle by the Soviet Army, but, without precedent in Hungarian, or even European, history, nearly the entire governing class of a country departed from the scene. A significant segment of landholders escaped, as did the "new guard" of the bourgeoisie created as a result of the anti-Jewish laws and the business boom of the war years. And here we must mention the effect the anti-Jewish laws, followed by the deportations and mass butcherings, had on the property conditions (along with the legalized looting), because these are phenomena that have been overlooked by some of the people who condemn—with full justification—the post-war deportations, lawless measures and extreme actions. These wartime damages and the accompanying symptoms and consequences created severe trauma and shock in the thinking of the public, traces of which can be detected and felt to this day.

[Question] How could public opinion and the consciousness of people bear such a heavy trauma? How did all this influence national identity?

[Answer] For many people the need to compensate was an almost natural consequence, not only for those who lived through the war, but also for the
younger generations. New life was gained by the view, always present in our consciousness, according to which the real or purported turning points of our history should be presented in such a manner that, even if historical truth suffers somewhat, at least the result should benefit rather than harm our nation. From time to time and with varying intensity the domestic science of history has been confronted by such demands, and similar expectations are still present in our public consciousness.

A War Experienced In Different Ways

[Question] Is there a need for such compensation and—let us call it what it is—for the falsification of facts and events?

[Answer] My answer is an unequivocal no. I consider it better, more practical and correct if we accurately reveal and present the events of the war, because only that approach can dispell the designation of "fascistic people," by demonstrating that the majority of Hungarians were not fascists, not even committed to the Horthy regime—they were simply afraid. Of course, it is also true that the gravely culpable politics of those years compelled many people to become accomplices in condemnable activities. And the majority of people were not heroes or brave resistance fighters; they simply lived as best as they could.

In fact, in spite of troubles and difficulties, until the spring of 1944 the majority of Hungarians had a different view of the war than the peoples of enslaved, occupied, or war-ravaged countries. At the same time, most Hungarians, the masses of workers and peasants, had a concept of the war that conflicted with the one held by the soldiers of the Second Hungarian Army fighting on the [eastern] front. The war experiences of the tortured conscript in a labor battalion, or the person persecuted for his political views, was no more shared by the population at large than the anxiety and terror felt by the country's Jews.

This was also influenced by the fact that the institutional framework of the counterrevolutionary regime, for the most part, survived throughout the war. For example, until the German occupation, Hungary was the only country in Central and Eastern Europe where a social democratic party, with hundreds of thousands of members, was legally allowed to exist and be represented in Parliament, and—albeit with restrictions—the government had a legal, left-wing democratic opposition. The anti-Jewish laws notwithstanding, the Kallai government did not fulfill German demands for mass deportations. In other words, compared to the neighboring occupied or Nazi-dominated countries, relatively favorable political and social conditions survived in Hungary. All of these factors nourished the illusion that the country could survive the war without serious consequences.

The majority of the populace first encountered the substance of the war, the bombing raids, the street fights, the horrors of mass deportations, the legalized lootings, inhumanity and indifference, during the fifth year of the hostilities, in 1944. Not surprisingly, in the consciousness of many people the war became identified, willy-nilly, with the liberation struggles of the
final six months or so, "the siege." Their war experience is derived from this period, and this is what they pass on to their descendants.

The Responsibility of Governments and People

[Question] If all of this is true and, difficult as it is, we can break with the stigma of "fascist people," a domestic clarification of the picture has still been hindered by the global view of Hungary's wartime role. What is your opinion concerning this?

[Answer] The Second World War and the barbaric conduct of Nazi warfare caused great suffering for nearly every European nation. This led to the situation in which—even though the leaders of Allied Powers did not identify peoples with the militaristic policies of their governments and made it clear that peoples cannot be held responsible for the war—gradually, as the war went on and the suffering of occupied areas was prolonged, popular thinking made less and less distinction between the peoples and the governments of the German alliance.

In this situation, the fact that Hungary achieved a revision of its territorial demands with the participation of Germany proved to be greatly detrimental to the country's image. It meant that when we were judged by the international community, the decisive factor was our participation in the war, and ethnic principles did not carry much weight in the course of post-war border readjustments, which were influenced instead by the cold facts of wartime history. This is difficult to understand, especially for those generations that have grown up since the war. It is understandable, therefore, that the territorial revisions obtained during the war still hold a certain attraction for many people, especially in view of the fact that—combining the Hungarians living in the neighboring countries and those who ended up in the West as a result of the three great emigration waves—one-third of all Hungarians live outside the borders of this country. This also caused a severe trauma in public consciousness. With the passing of time, as the nation's thinking is shaped increasingly more by generations that were born since the liberation, it is less and less understood why the new democratic Hungary had to accept responsibility for the wartime sins of the Horthy regime. It is even more difficult to understand by the new generations, why we have remained the only nation in Europe with millions of our ethnic brethren living as minorities in the neighboring countries.

[Question] What can we do in order to erase the effects of the shock caused by the war which is still influencing the conscience of our society?

[Answer] Nobody can offer an exclusive, all-powerful and simple prescription to heal the wounds; after all, the thinking of people continues to harbor the memories of many ancient, deep-seated, real or imagined injuries. And let us not forget that there are many varieties of wartime trauma: some touch the entire nation and bring dislocation to the traditional layers of society; some have their roots in racial discrimination and mass butcheries, and are not ever likely to heal; others result from the bitterness of individuals who have been persecuted for their political views, or from vulnerability, terror and suffering. However, we cannot and must not "combine" all of these in order to
create from them a national sense of injury. All we can do is open each of the wounds and cleanse them; and the science of history can only accomplish this difficult task on the basis of the 2,000-year-old evangelical text: "For we are not allowed to do anything against truth, only on behalf of truth." In this activity, there can be and must be an alliance between historians of Marxist conviction, writers, teachers, propagandists, and all those who have a decisive influence in shaping public consciousness.

12588
CSO 2500/147

83
INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN DOMESTIC, FOREIGN POLICY

Bucharest ERA SOCIALISTA in Romanian No 2, 30 Jan 86 pp 20-23

[Article by Professor Mircea Nicolaescu: "The Dialectical Interdependence Between the Domestic and Foreign Policy of Our Party and State"]

[Text] The years following the Ninth RCP Congress were marked by exceptional and unprecedented achievements in building a new system in our country and at the same time, by the increasingly more prestigious assertion of socialist Romania in international life. During these years, our country's foreign policy and its international activities acquired a new scope and rose to a qualitatively higher level; Romania's relations with the socialist countries and with all the countries of the world were expanded and strengthened, its contribution to debating and solving the major contemporary issues markedly increased, and its prestige among the nations rose continuously.

All these exceptionally important achievements are indissolubly linked to the innovative, creative and profoundly original thinking and to the prodigious and untiring activities carried out in a high sense of communist and revolutionary responsibility and high principles by the party secretary general and president of the republic, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, a brilliant promotor of the ideals of peace, freedom, and progress and of cooperation among all the peoples of the world, and an eminent figure of world politics. Our party-state leader plays the decisive role in mapping out and implementing socialist Romania's domestic and foreign policies and in ensuring their complete unity and the organic links between the vital interests of the Romanian people and the fundamental aspirations of all the world peoples and nations.

The defining characteristics of Comrade Nicole Ceausescu's theoretical work and all his practical activities are profound and balanced analysis of international trends and phenomena; scientific examination of the cardinal issues of contemporary social development; realistic and profoundly constructive solutions suggested to solve these problems permanently and democratically; consistent and resolute promotion of a policy of independence, peace, and extensive international cooperation; and consistent efforts to ensure the unity and solidarity of all revolutionary, progressive, and democratic forces and of all the nations of the world. Romania's and President Nicolae Ceausescu's proposals, initiatives, and actions devoted to the cause
of international peace and disarmament, understanding and cooperation have elicited broad international response and enjoy a justified positive appreciation among the public opinion of many countries.

Fully in accordance with the domestic policy of building a new system, Romania's foreign policy embodies in its essence the lofty values of the socialist system and of revolutionary humanism and our people's ideals of freedom and prosperity, and expresses the consistency with which the RCP is fulfilling the its national and international obligations, viewed in an organic correlations and in their dialectical interdependence. While giving the top priority to building the new social system and raising the fatherland to higher peaks of progress and civilization, our party and state simultaneously act to broadly develop Romania's relations with the socialist countries and with all the states of the world, regardless of social system, and are actively contributing to the nations' struggle to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament, defend and consolidate peace, establish a new world economic order, democratize the international relations, and ensure the triumph of the general cause of national independence and social progress, and of international understanding and cooperation.

In all its activities, our party proceeds from the consideration that the domestic policy and the foreign policy constitute two inseparable facets of the single general line of building the comprehensively developed socialist society and of Romania's advance toward communism. As the party secretary, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, stated in his report to the 13th RCP Congress, "The successful implementation of the plans and programs of socioeconomic development of our country is feasible only in conditions of international peace and security and of cooperation with all the states of the world, regardless of social system. Consequently, there is a close dialectical unity between domestic and international policies."

International Interdependence and Global Problems

The contemporary world is developing under the mark of deepening and expanding interdependence; this is one of the objective and unavoidable phenomena of our era. As a telling expression of the assertion of the new scientific-technical revolution, this process necessarily determines intensified exchanges of commodities, technology, intellectual values, etc., and an extensive cooperation among all the peoples and nations. More than ever in the past, no state and no nation can today develop successfully outside the international economic, scientific-technical, and cultural flow or without actively participating in the international division of labor, because the world exchanges of commodities and values constitutes an essential condition for the socioeconomic development and the progress of each country. This is why our party and its secretary general believe that in the contemporary world, developing economic and technical cooperation and expanding exchanges of material and cultural assets, information, and experience constitute an objective requirement for the development of each country in accordance with the achievements of universal progress and at the same time, a contribution to the progress of all mankind. As Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu stressed, "We must recognize the interdependence existing within the international division of labor among countries with different economic and social systems; we must
recognize the fact that an active and extensive cooperation among all the states, in a spirit of equality and mutual advantage, is of a fundamental importance for the general progress of the peoples, and for security and peace."

Under the impact of the process of growing interdependence an increasing number of contemporary problems, whose solution is of a vital interest to all the nations and all humanity, are becoming "globalized." In order to resolve these problems justly, democratically, and permanently efforts must be made to continuously expand and deepen international cooperation among the states, regardless of their social system, size, and strength, and to promote the active and equal participation of all the countries, without any distinction, in international politics.

Currently, the system of international relations and the world economic and political order have an increasing impact on the development of each country, just as domestic developments and national changes and transformations increasingly acquire an international significance and general implications. In these conditions, as Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu emphasized, each country and each nation must always take into consideration external conditions, the growing complexity of international life, changes, and the major trends in the international balance of forces. The progress of each nation is currently objectively and closely linked to the global, general development of humanity and in turn has an increasing influence on the world balance and on the evolution of international relations.

Naturally, the socioeconomic development of any country and the progress of any nation are predicated primarily by ensuring a climate of peace and security, understanding and cooperation among nations. This truth is all the more evident today, when the arms race—primarily the nuclear arms race—is being escalated; there are growing tendencies to militarize the outer space; the policy of force and forceful threats, maintaining and redividing the world into zones of influence, and interference in the affairs of other states is at work; old hotbeds of tension and conflict are perpetuated and new ones are emerging, and the deepening contradictions among various states and groups of states have created a high international tension, thus enhancing the danger of a new world war, which would inevitably deteriorate into a nuclear catastrophe leading to the disappearance of the conditions that make life possible on our planet. In view of these circumstances, the fundamental issue of our times is to halt the arms race and begin general, primarily nuclear, disarmament, preclude war, and ensure a lasting peace in the world, thus saving mankind from nuclear calamity and holocaust, and safeguarding the supreme right of people and nations to a free and dignified life. "The issue of peace," Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu stressed in his speech to the December 1985 plenum of the National Council of Working People, "is the fundamental issue, without which we cannot be certain of implementing our programs. No people can concentrate on development unless there is peace! Therefore, disarmament and peace are currently the basic issue which requires our undivided attention in international activities."

Solving this vital problem is of the greatest interest to all the peoples and countries of the world without exception, because it is the sine qua non
condition for fulfilling each nation's aspirations for freedom, progress, and prosperity, and for resolving mankind's global problems, building a better and more just world, and ensuring peace and cooperation on earth. That is why our party and its secretary general believe that the European and all other states and nations of the world must assume a greater direct responsibility for negotiating a solution to the problems concerning halting the nuclear arms race and the militarization of space, and must resolutely and closely work to achieve specific and real disarmament measures, and to reduce armaments and military spending.

In our times, the development of the states is also increasingly affected by world economic phenomena and processes. The protracted international economic crisis, deepening underdevelopment, exacerbation of the economic gaps between rich and poor countries, the structures and mechanisms of the current world economic order, and the protectionist and other measures that preclude a normal development of international economic and scientific-technical exchanges have a greater or lesser negative impact on all the states and peoples, beginning with the developing countries, and on the implementation of their developing programs. This requires increased efforts by each state and by the international community as a whole to devise global solutions to the problems of underdevelopment, including the problem of the developing countries' huge foreign debt, and the establishment of a new world economic order based on equality, equity, and mutual advantage—that being the primary condition for overcoming the economic crisis, ensuring the socioeconomic progress of all the nations, securing the stable development of the world economy, and asserting the policy of detente, cooperation, and peace.

Our party secretary general has highlighted and scientifically demonstrated the organic and dialectical correlation currently existing between disarmament and peace, and international development and economics. "We proceed from the fact," Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu said, "that there is a growing mutual dependence between the problems of disarmament and those of world economics, between underdevelopment and the new world economic order, and that only by solving these problems—through disarmament, cuts in military spending, and a new world economic order—will international relations generally improve and the way open up for resuming detente and promoting a policy of cooperation among all the nations."

The successful implementation of each country's socioeconomic development programs thus require, in our party's concept, a profound and multilateral analysis of the international processes and trends in their entirety, transcending any simplistic and limited representation of the mutual dependence between national and international factors, and resolutely promoting a policy designed to resolve the cardinal problems of all the nations. "In order to thoroughly understand the complex problems of the new stage of development of the Romanian society," Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out in his report to the June 1982 expanded plenum of the RCP Central Committee, "we must take into account the great revolutionary changes that have occurred in the world and the character of the current international situation, proceeding from the close dialectical unity and mutual conditioning existing between the domestic and foreign policies of our country."
Respect for National Sovereignty and Independence—A Primary Condition for International Peace and Cooperation

The impact of international factors on national processes and the adjustment of domestic efforts to the requirements and realities of the contemporary world do not, of course, constitute an automatic projection of foreign relations at the domestic level, nor a unilateral fashioning of the ways and means of domestic development exclusively and predominantly in accordance with foreign factors. The present conditions fully verify the truth, highlighted by Marx, that the reciprocal position of the various nations and the relations among them "depend on the extent to which each country develops its production forces and participation in the international division of labor." Thus, we are dealing not only with the adjustment of some national domain—material production, for example—to international requirements, but with an increasingly extensive incorporation of the social, economic, political, legal, and cultural relations and of the entire system of phenomena that make up the essence of national existence into the process of international interdependence.

The dialectical unity between national and international as two interdependent facets of social development is thus realized by necessarily taking into account all the conditions of national existence and domestic realities: sociopolitical system, degree of development of the forces of production, territorial dimensions, resources, populations, and so forth in both their individual manifestation and in their mutual, dialectical relationship. It may be said that at present none of the areas of social life can remain outside this process. Consequently, the implications of the dialectical unity between national and international are increasingly numerous and diverse, and the harmonization of the domestic and international policies can acquire a genuinely rejuvenating force only when and where the vital interests of independent and sovereign development of the nation and of the national state are taken into consideration in a close and permanent relationship with all the international conditions that influence domestic socioeconomic life and the process of national development in each country within the context of increasing international interdependence.

Naturally, the process of expanding relations among nations—as a materialization of the objective need to increase peoples' participation in the international circuit of material and cultural assets, in resolving problems of common interest, and in the entire international life—does not take place anarchically, arbitrarily, or at random. The dynamics of international life has its own objective laws generated by the particular traits of the international systems and primarily by the fact that international relations are relations between independent and sovereign states, between entities that independently establish both their domestic and foreign policies. Consequently, the mechanism of world interdependence is established and acts amid the growing role of the nations, particularly the role and functions of the state, and amid the increasing assertion of national factors of political decision.
These realities verify the lack of scientific foundation of the globalist theories which, distorting the true meaning of growing interdependence and negating or minimalizing the important role of the nation, attempt to accredit the idea of the "necessity" of supranational institutions and bodies that strip the states of their vital attributes: national sovereignty and independence. The recognition of the growing interdependence among nations as an objective phenomenon of the contemporary world in no way presupposes the annihilation of the national life of each country; it does not in the least imply a fatalistic or passive acceptance of events, nor an evolution toward supranational structures; it does not exclude, but on the contrary, it necessarily requires the existence and consolidation of the nations as basic entities and as building cells of the system of international relations, and imposes respect for the national sovereignty and independence of each state as a fundamental requirement for the development of relations of fruitful and broad cooperation in the international arena. That is why at the center of our party's and Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's concept on developing international relations and the contemporary world as a whole stands the thesis according to which "Currently, one of the essential aspects of the entire international life is support of national independence and of the independent economic development of all the nations."

Unqualified observance of the right of each nation to sovereignly decide its fate and path of social, economic, and political development, without any foreign interference, is a sine qua non condition for achieving a beneficial correlation between domestic and foreign factors. At the same time, as a result of the increasing assertion of the nations and peoples, and thus of the growth of the subjective factor in its diverse manifestations in historical development, real opportunities emerge for shaping international interdependence according to the interests of the independent and peaceful development of each people and nation. That is so because the vital interest of the world peoples and nations is not to conserve and deepen an interdependence that preserves and perpetuates new inequities and disparities in the international system and in the world economic and political order, but on the contrary, to build international structures, mechanisms, and relations and a world order that favor, without any discrimination, the development and prosperity of all the nations, the constructive efforts of all the peoples, the extensive development of international cooperation and collaboration, and the safeguarding and consolidation of peace.

The dialectical correlation between national and international factors, in the conditions of growing world interdependence, is thus called upon to ensure for all the states, without any distinction, optimal conditions for the sovereign and unrestricted promotion of domestic efforts as a decisive factor of implementing the strategy of socioeconomic development in keeping with the freely chosen options of each nation. Moreover, the international community must actively support the peoples' efforts to eliminate underdevelopment, reduce the economic and social gaps between nations, ensure the rapid progress of the developing countries in particular, and forge a new world economic order.

All these require fundamental changes in international relations in accordance with the vital interests of all the peoples. One of the major objectives of
such changes is to establish new interstate relations, based on strict observance of the principles of full equality of rights, national sovereignty and independence, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, and nonuse of force and forceful threats.

Romania and its president believe that the generalization of the new principles of interstate relations can guarantee the extensive development of international cooperation and the freedom and progress of all the nations.

Constructive Proposals and Initiatives, and Resolve and Consistent Actions to Ensure the Triumph of the Policy of Independence, Cooperation, and Peace

In the past 20 years, the uniform implementation of the objectives of the domestic and international policies of our party and state has continuously increased socialist Romania's contribution to resolving the major international problems and has enhanced the prestige and appreciation currently enjoyed by our country and by President Nicolae Ceausescu in the world.

Socialist Romania's international prestige is primarily based on the great progress achieved by our people in their socioeconomic development, in asserting and perfecting new, socialist relations, developing workers revolutionary democracy, and raising the people's living standard. Thanks to their own efforts, our people, led by the communist party, traveled several historical stages, from the bourgeois land-owners' society to a comprehensively developed socialist society, within a relatively short period of time. Today Romania is a socialist country in full upswing which, even at a time when mankind is shaken by economic, political, and military earthquakes, hurricanes, and storms, can successfully pursue its efforts to join the group of highly civilized countries with a high degree of development, and can resolutely advance along the path of building a free, independent, and prosperous life. Romania has proven that a socialist developing country belonging to the group of small and medium-sized countries, is fully capable of mobilizing its entire material and human potential in order to gradually overcome difficulties generated by the negative impact of the international economic crisis and by certain internal contradictions; moreover, socialist Romania has been and is one of the active promoters of new and democratic international relations capable of meeting the interests of all the peoples.

Naturally, the achievement of the great objectives established by the 13th party congress and joining the group of countries with an average level of development in the course of the present 5-year plan, and the group of developed countries by the end of the century, require new and consistent efforts designed to attain a new quality in all the areas and a higher productivity and efficiency.

At the same time, these efforts are closely linked to the further promotion of an active foreign policy of broad international cooperation, independence, peace, and progress. Along this line, it is particularly important to extensively develop our country's relations of cooperation with all the states of the world; this is a direction resolutely implemented by our party and state, particularly since the ninth party congress.
Naturally, the efforts made to achieve a complete coordination between Romania's domestic and foreign policies are marked primarily by the development of its relations of friendship and manysided cooperation with all the socialist countries, beginning with its neighbors, and by our party's constant endeavors to ensure that the relations among these states increasingly assert their superiority as a new type of interstate relations, based on basic common aspirations for social and national freedom, progress and peace, and on the principles of full equality of rights, respect for national independence and sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, mutual advantage, and mutual comradely assistance. The concept of the party secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, is that the development of the relations among the socialist states on the basis of those principles can contribute to speeding up the process of building a socialist and communist society in each country, fully utilizing the creative potential of the new social system, strengthening the general force of socialism, and enhancing its prestige and influence in the world.

Our people's aspirations for independence, peace, and social progress encourage joint ventures with both the nations that are building the new system and with the peoples freed of the colonial yoke, in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism, for independent development, and for establishing a new world economic order. In this spirit, Romania is developing relations of friendship and solidarity with the developing, nonaligned, small, and medium-sized countries; it is also expanding its ties with the developing capitalist countries and with all the states of the world, regardless of social system, in the struggle for disarmament and peace. "We are determined," Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu stressed in his speech last year to the chiefs of diplomatic missions, "to further act and do everything possible to cooperate with all the countries and peoples, and with all those who want mankind to live in peace, so that each nation can be free and independent."

In order to enter the third stage of implementation of the party's program, Romania must further actively participate in the international flow of material and cultural assets. Along this line, our party and its secretary general continuously emphasize the need to promote extensive exchanges and an increasingly broad economic cooperation with the CEMA member-states, with all the socialist countries, and with all the other states, regardless of social system. Foreign economic relations are expected to continuously increase their contribution to efficiently marketing Romanian products in international markets, steadily improving our country's standing in the international economy, and to the general socioeconomic development of the fatherland.

At the same time, the pursuit of a policy of large opening, cooperation, and peace with all the states, also provides our country with extensive opportunities for a constructive dialogue, unhampered by narrow and restrictive outlooks. The long-term concept of Romania and of President Nicolae Ceausescu on the importance of such a dialogue, devoted to peace, understanding, and cooperation among nations, is tellingly reflected in our country's consistent efforts to democratize the international relations and to
increase the role and contribution of international organizations, primarily the United Nations, to solving the major contemporary problems. Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's innovative concept on international cooperation and solidarity in the present conditions is also reflected in the continuous strengthening of the relations between our party and communist and workers parties, on the basis of the principles of equality and noninterference in internal affairs, and respect for each party's right to independently map out its political line and its revolutionary strategy and tactics in keeping with the specific conditions amid which its is working. At the same time, our party develops its relations with socialist and social-democratic parties, national liberation movements and progressive ruling parties in developing countries, with other democratic parties and organizations, and with all the progressive and anti-imperialist forces of the contemporary world.

In the spirit of the guidelines established by the 13th congress, Romania is resolutely endeavoring to resolve the major contemporary problems and to establish an international climate of peace, cooperation, and security favorable to asserting the creative energies of our people and of all the peoples. Scientifically analyzing international developments, our country and Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu have, at bilateral level or in international bodies, advanced many constructive proposals and realistic solutions designed to halt the arms race and begin disarmament, in the interests of the nations and of life itself. It may be said that currently there exists an extensive and comprehensive Romanian program for disarmament, peace, and security and for halting the dangerous course of events toward nuclear confrontation.

After the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva, in view of the fact that the basic problems have remained unsolved and that, in fact, the manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons continues, Romania believes that it is now more necessary than ever to intensify the political-diplomatic efforts of the states, peoples, and realistic forces everywhere to bring about the beginning of nuclear and general disarmament. "The commitments assumed by the two big powers in Geneva are important," Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu stated, "but we and all the nations expect concrete measures to halt the arms race, stop the deployment of new missiles and nuclear weapons in Europe, and begin to destroy the existing ones. This meeting will demonstrate its historic importance only if concrete and real measures are taken along this line."

The bold reconsideration by our party of the issues of war and peace in the conditions of the nuclear era, coupled with persevering efforts to implement the historic imperative of eliminating wars from the world, dismantling the military blocs, and abolishing the use or threat of force, and with the stressing of the truth that the defense capability of the states can be bolstered not by more weapons but by a policy of peace and disarmament and by reducing military spending, and primarily by a domestic policy of socioeconomic development, open up new prospects for the radical reconsideration of the correlation between domestic and foreign factors in national policy.

In the concept of our party and its secretary general, asserting a new policy of independence, peace, and cooperation equally requires uninterrupted efforts to promote dialogue for the political settlement of any conflicts that may
appear in interstate relations and solving international problems in keeping with the interests of all the nations. As life has shown, there is no problem that cannot be solved through negotiations, if the sides proceed from the right of each people to develop freely and independently, without any foreign interference, and from the peace aspirations of all mankind.

In view of the continuously increasing complexity of the relationship between national and international factors, adopting peaceful means as the only rational means of solving the complex contemporary problems can no longer be viewed as an option exclusively subordinated to the wishes of the factors responsible or to the decision prerogatives of power; the recourse to negotiations becomes primarily a fundamental obligation of the governments toward both their own people and all humanity, an obligation that must materialize daily in their practical activities. Naturally, the states are increasingly feeling the need to use dialogue and negotiations in order to identify and capitalize on the elements of rapprochement and unity among peoples and to patiently resolve the elements of hostility and opposition, with a view to expanding multilateral cooperation and strengthening mutual cooperation in promoting basic common interests.

Based, in the spirit of dialectical materialism, on a profound analysis of the tendencies of the dynamics of the contemporary society and of their reciprocal influences, the concept of our party and of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu on the interdependence between national and international factors in determining the foreign policy of the states, and on the complete unity between the domestic and foreign policy of our party and state constitutes a valuable contribution to enriching the theoretical and practical experience of the international revolutionary and progressive movement and to elaborating ways and means of developing peaceful cooperation among all the nations. The positive response elicited by these concepts is due not to considerations of size or military might, but to our people's constructive efforts and to the untiring activities carried out by Romania and by its president in order to solve the cardinal problems of the contemporary world in accordance with the interests of the peoples, life, and civilization. "In the future, too, we are firmly determined," Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu stressed in his speech to the July 1985 plenum of the RCP Central Committee and the central party aktiv, "to pursue the same principled policy geared on both the interests of our country and on the general interests of independent development for all the nations and of peace. We are firmly convinced that only such a policy, only close cooperation among and strengthening the independence of all the nations and of world peace can ensure the fulfillment of our people's and all peoples' aspirations for a better life, for a free life, for prosperity and happiness!"

12782
CSo:2700/118
GEOLOGICAL RESEARCH, IMPACT ON ECONOMY

Warsaw PRZEGlad GEOLOGICZNY in Polish No 9, Sep 85 pp 481-484

[Article by Waclaw Ryka: "Prospective Geological Research In Poland By the Institute of Geology"]

[Text] Many scientific institutes in Poland conduct geological research. One of them, the Institute of Geology, has initiated and carried out systematic and comprehensive geological studies of our country. Geological research is also conducted by the Polish Academy of Sciences [PAN] Institute of Geological Sciences, industrial institutes and establishments of higher learning. Specialized establishments of the Central Bureau of Geology and certain ministries also participate in these studies. The growth of geological research in Poland has been coordinated by the Central Bureau of Geology which is the government's central organ for geological administration.

Geological activity is one of the primary links in the national economic system because its results affect many different branches of the economy. The resources allocated to the realization of geological research are dependent upon the current economic situation of the country and they therefore make it necessary to analyze the plan of geological research in order to eliminate the problems (among already-prepared geological and prospecting plans) whose realization can in the coming years produce substantial benefits.

The Institute of Geology is operated according to a charter which defines its basic tasks as "the study of the nation's geological structure for development of our mineral resources and the establishment of hydrogeological relations". The general directions and range of these activities are outlined by prospective and long-term plans which are then supplemented and modified by annual plans established on the basis of existing and newly-defined comprehensive research programs.

The resources allocated for research should make it possible to realize this work to the degree that it help guarantee the growth of our stock of mineral resources most important to the nation's economy. The economic crisis of recent years has created many difficulties for geological research. However, we cannot allow these limitations to hinder our basic geological research, disrupt the existing proportions or lower the economic results of research.
Underfinancing of geological research is not a new problem. This is a problem that has worsened over the years as we have exhausted our possibilities for uncovering new surface or subsurface deposits. This situation has made it necessary to take our geological explorations to ever greater depths and this in turn has made it necessary to use more expensive drilling and geophysical apparatus. At the same time, there have been changes in the methods of mineral research and especially research on rarer minerals. At the present time, these activities require the use of precise analytical methods and expensive and complicated apparatus and this too has led to a noticeable rise in the cost of geological research. Underinvestment lowers the quality of research and retards the course of analytical work. Many mineral substances are left out of analytical laboratories because of a lack of the proper facilities and instruments for comprehensive research. Therefore, the value of our analysis of the usefulness of tested material is lessened.

If therefore the level of resources allotted to geological research remains the same, then in spite of the higher amount of funding, the actual support geology receives will remain the same. An example of this is the continuous drop in the metric volume of deep test drilling conducted for the Institute of Geology. About 185,000 running meters were drilled in 1971-75, 82,000 in 1976-80 and just 45,000 in the first four years of this decade. If the drop continues at the present rate, then by the end of the present 5-year period we will achieve little more than 70,000 running meters and therefore 40 percent less metric volume than in 1971-75. This drop has also made itself felt in seismic testing. The downward trend in other areas of geological research is almost as bad. Regardless of the rate at which research is retarded, this is an alarming phenomenon because it has a very detrimental effect on the national economy.

The restrictions on resources for geological research have caused them to be very specifically broken down for various goals. This means that they have been arranged in a manner allowing the continuation of all essential areas of study and this in turn prevents any one area or several areas from gaining preference over the others regardless of whether they may be of crucial interest at a given moment. In consequence, this has delayed the geological exploration of many areas of Poland including such important ones as the Sudeten region or the northwestern border of the Upper Silesian Coal Basin as well as the best regions in terms of favorable natural conditions and most promising geological discoveries. At the same time, geological exploration of the Suwałki massif to find deposits of vanadium-bearing titanium magnetite ore has been going on for 20 years for the very reasons mentioned above. The present state of this work does not offer any hope that this problem will be resolved. Still many other such examples can be cited. They are not, however, the result of improper action but of bad tendencies caused by very limited resources.

Another important problem is that of determining what is to be gained by geological exploration and what can be achieved. In other words, what can we do with the resources we have at hand? Practical action will depend on choosing one or several tasks from among a set of others no less important. In relation to basic geological research, this means that it can be
concentrated in one or a few different geological regions and just like prospecting work, it can be carried out in different geological regions or it can also concentrate on the search for one or more selected mineral resources. This is a problem for the strategy for geological research and should be resolved before any analysis of geological studies is conducted.

The Institute of Geology is of the opinion that basic geological research must, if it is properly financed, take precedence over geological prospecting. We feel that greater concern must be given to geological cartography which has already achieved the publication of a complete set of geological maps on a scale of 1:200,000 and very advanced work on a 1:50,000 detailed geological map of Poland. Aside from these serial geological maps, the Institute of Geology is preparing other editions starting with the Sudeten region on a scale of 1:25,000 on through thematic and synthetic maps on scales of 1:500,000 and 1:1,000,000. The Institute of Geology has also prepared and published a series of geophysical and hydrogeological maps on a scale of 1:200,000 and other such series. Furthermore, it is preparing and printing nonserial maps and atlases covering the entire country as well as particular geological regions. Cartographic activity is not only the germ for all geological activities but also affects many economic activities.

At the Institute of Geology, basic research has become very broadly developed and has concentrated on stratigraphy, paleography, tectonics, mineralogy, petrography, geochemistry, photogeology, geophysics and others. These are growing disciplines in the different departments of the Institute and have become very much a strong part of all geological and prospecting activities while often taking a leading role. These disciplines supply materials without which it would be very difficult if not impossible to plan and carry out geological and prospecting work. To underline the importance of this work, we can use the example of the lithological and paleofacial exploration of the Cechszyn basin which made it possible to locate and evaluate of collector rock strata as well as probable hydrocarbon zones. Without broadly developed basic research, we cannot carry out the study of rare earth elements and radioactive substances, their compounds or methods for their enrichment. We can cite other such examples but this does not seem to be necessary because their scientific and economic values are quite obvious.

We see an urgent need to intensify geological testing in the Sudeten region, the northwest border of the Upper Silesian Coal Basin, the Paleozoic and Precambrian platform of the Polish depression and the Carpathian Mountains. These regions are important because of the need to broaden the scope of basic research that throws light on many crucial geological problems and in many cases alone makes it possible to learn about the geological structure (of the northwest part of the Upper Silesian Coal Basin) and sets the proper directions for subsequent geological prospecting work.

One of the main tasks of the state geological service is to carry out comprehensive regional studies. There is also a strong need to further encourage research applied to the problems of particular regions in Poland.
In the last 15 years, considerable progress has been made in our knowledge of the country's geological structure and in determining perspectives for finding new deposits of hydrocarbons. The greatest amount of progress has been achieved in the Polish depression where the nature of the sediment covering these formations is now known, especially in the southeast part of the country. Very serious progress has also been made in studies of the Flysch Carpathians and their substrata.

On the western seacoast region where intensive research is being conducted, the principal problem is to determine the nature of the bedrock of the Permian basin and especially the appearance and formation of lithological facial carbon formations. Within this zone, these formations give the most promise of holding bitumens.

To a considerable degree, we are now familiar with the region of the Precarpathian depression where aside from Miocene sediments, we have studied its Mesozoic and Paleozoic bedrock. In the western part of the Flysch Carpathians, an advanced stage has been reached by studies aimed at learning about the Flysch bedrock and the subterranean structures. We now know more about the substrata of the Western Carpathians.

In spite of the progress in the growth of regional studies in the Sudeten, the Presudeten block, the Holy Cross Mountains and the Upper Silesian Coal Basin, the subterranean structure of these regions is still not well enough known to more accurately make any prognosis for prospecting.

In looking at the basic directions taken in research and exploration, it is necessary to consider the varying importance of research problems in defining regional regularities in the development of certain structural complexes and formations as well as local phenomena of importance to certain regions. The solving of these problems is not only important for geological science in general but above all serves to guide prospecting for mineral deposits.

The tasks posed by geophysics and drilling to regional study and prospecting work are becoming increasingly difficult because of the need to modernize technical equipment which has for many years now been underinvested. Geophysical instruments must be able to more precisely determine leading seismic horizons while drilling apparatus should guarantee safe drilling at great depths of more than 5000-6000 meters. It is also necessary to provide equipment for geophysical drilling and that will produce reliable measurements under conditions of high pressure and temperature.

Broadly-based regional and prospecting research should be accompanied by improvement and expansion of basic research methods used in stratigraphy, paleography, tectonics, mineralogy, petrography, geochemistry and geophysics because these will in turn make it easier to carry out basic and regional research and therefore also geological prospecting work.

The geological problems requiring a high level of investment are associated with research on the geological structures of the Polish depression and the
Carpathians that may be of great importance to increasing our supply of hydrocarbon resources.

Geological research aimed at the discovery of petroleum oil and natural gas deposits will be carried out in the Polish depression and the Carpathians. These have now become acknowledged to be the main problems that must be resolved before all others. Close geological analysis of materials has made it possible to distinguish 7 zones:

1. Formations of the Permian basin and its substrata. Work is aimed at learning about the facial formation of red sandstone and preliminary recognition of its Devonian and Carboniferous bedrock. The latter in particular are felt to be highly-promising formations for gas deposits.

2. Formations of the border zone between the [waryscyjski] formation and the Paleozoic platform. In this region, the Permian bedrock probably just consists of carboniferous rocks. Geological exploration is aimed only at evaluating the prospects for carbon but also for Permian rocks which in the western part of this region supply the most petroleum and natural gas.

3. Cambrian and Ordovician rocks on the Precambrian platform and the zone of contact with the Paleozoic platform.

4. Formations of the earlier Mesozoic in zones of saliferous tectonics. The goal is to study zones associated with changes in thickness and facial formation of rocky series and saliferous diapirs in connection with the possibility that hydrocarbons may be accumulated there.

5. Platform substrata of the Carpathians and the autochthonous cover of the Miocene. Studies are aimed at recognizing characteristic features of the structure and evaluating the prospects for petroleum- and gas-containing formations of the platform foundation and its Neogenic cover.

6. The problem of subterranean flexures of the Borysław-Pokuck unit. Studies should explain the existence of subterranean flexures in Poland, their position and prospects for petroleum and natural gas as well as the geological structure of part of the profile of the central synclinorium in the duality zone of the Flysch mass at depths of less than 4000 meters in the Leska-Zachoczewia region.

7. The Flysch structure of the Carpathians. The goal is to learn about the deep part of the Flysch in the central synclinorium of the Carpathians and in the southern flexures of the Silesian unit. We must resolve important structural questions of several areas of the Silesian unit.

Geological studies are also oriented at increasing our resources in pit coal. This research is being conducted in the area of three basins. The directions and goals of this work call for:

I. Continuation of geological research of deep layers in the Upper Silesian Coal Basin in order to learn about the nature of the deposits in weakly-
explored areas especially in relation to prospecting for coking and sapropelic coal.

II. Continuation of geological research in the region of the Lublin Coal Basin in order to define the borders of this basin and to determine which areas contain high-energy coal deposits.

Brown-coal prospecting will be based on:

A. A broad scope of studies using geophysical and drilling methods to find coal deposits in regions adjacent to already-exploited deposits in order to increase coal supplies to industry and find deposits in new regions.

B. The detection and analysis of shallow deposits of brown coal in order to determine how they can be used locally at low cost to improve the energy balance in various regions of Poland.

With regard to prospecting for metal-ore deposits, geological studies will be concentrated on areas with promising geological conditions, in places in which there have been found considerable signs of ore mineralization at shallower depths. At the same time, more attention is being paid to the possibility of uncovering small deposits of valuable minerals. For this purpose, metalometric geochemical photographs are being taken in the Sudeten and Carpathians.

To better concentrate our resources, we must conduct the bulk of our geological work in the Upper Silesian Coal Basin, the Sudeten and its foothills and the crystalline bedrock of the Precambrian platform. We find it necessary above all to carry out work in the northeast portion of the Upper Silesian Coal Basin to account for the mineralization of Mo, Cu and W in the Paleozoic bedrock. We feel that the present drilling potential intended for the prospecting of zinc and lead ores should be maintained. However, this drilling should be carried out in areas important not only for the prospecting of zinc and lead but chiefly for the ores occurring in the Paleozoic bedrock in order to map out and establish some connection between mineralization and magmatism and metamorphosism. It would also be advisable to carry out deep drilling operations in the immediate vicinity of discovered ore deposits in order to more exactly determine their size and nature.

In comparison with past years, a somewhat greater amount of resources should be alloted to basic geological work and prospecting for metal-ore deposits in the Sudetens and their foothills. As part of this work, geological testing for copper ores will be continued in order to determine the prospects for finding cupferiferous slate on the Zar periclinal fold, the Presudeten monoclinal fold and the north Sudeten trough. Out of the remaining metal-ore prospecting work, the most important is:

1. Prospecting for zinc, wolfram and molybdenum ores of the Karkonosze block within the Izera slate band as well as within the eastern contact zone and the Rudawy Janowickie.
2. Work to determine the occurrence of shallow uranium deposits in wallchowite slates and Karkonosze granites.

3. Continuation of geological study of mafic and ultramafic rocks in order account for the occurrence of copper and nickel ores.

4. Geochemical prospecting of secondary surface aureoli of metal dispersion and study of the primary aureoli in the central and western Carpathians in order to account for the appearance of polymetallic and rare metallic ores.

Within the crystalline bedrock of the Precambrian platform, geological studies will be conducted within the Suwalki massif in order to find iron, titanium and vanadium ore. We also feel that we must concentrate efforts on exploring other objects within the Suwalki massif and to penetrate other areas in which shallow crystalline bedrock is found.

Most of all, geological studies should be directed at syenites of the Elk massif as well as the pyroxenites and syenites of the Tarnowo massif in order to explain the mineralization of rare-earth elements and niobium in the former and lanthanum and cerium in the latter, concentrated in carbonate veins.

The work program at the Institute of Geology also includes problems of chemical and mineral resources. One of its especially urgent tasks is to solve the problem of potassium salts in the Baltic region, find rock salt and deposits of sulfur and its accompanying minerals (such as strontium, barium, gypsum and anhydrite).

The Institute of Geology takes part in the formulation of comprehensive programs for the use of mineral resources, especially in established areas of mineral exploitation. These studies will concentrate on preparing plans for prospecting for new deposits of minerals such as natural aggregate throughout Poland, clayey minerals for fine and industrial ceramics and the fire-resistant materials industry as well as carbonate minerals and construction stone.

A considerable amount of financing is also required by hydrological research. The purpose of such research by the Institute of Geology is to learn about the conditions for the occurrence of subterranean water in Poland, assess our subterranean water supply, its quality and degree of pollution. In the coming years, hydrogeological research will be concentrated on:

1. Organization of a network for observation of stationary underground waters. This would involve 1000 different points and stations. The changes in hydrogeological conditions caused by human activity require the quick completion of such a network. It is also accumulate, change and work out methodologies for using this observation network to forecast changes in hydrogeological conditions.

2. Study of the quality and level of pollution of underground waters throughout Poland and on the borders of selected regions.
3. Study of mineral and thermal waters. To a greater extent, activities will be carried out to exploit mineral waters as a resource for the production of certain elements like iodine and bromine.

In the area of geological engineering research, it is necessary to improve our geological-engineering mapping methods used in regional planning. From an economic point of view, it is very important to continue the preparation of geological engineering maps for regions in which construction or growth are planned that involves change in the management of extensive areas and regions with newly-found deposits.

In order to assure the correct progress of geological research and work, it is also necessary to increase geological data and data-processing. In the past, these areas have been largely neglected and they must now be properly developed and financed.

We have presented the briefest possible survey of the main research and prospecting problems caused by the country's geological structure shows how necessary it is to not reduce the activity of the state geological service even under the present economic crisis. Some hope of improving the situation would be offered by a geological research fund making it possible to continue geological research on at least its present level.

12261
CSO: 2602/23
ARTIFICIAL VISION SYSTEM FOR INDUSTRIAL ROBOTS

Bucharest CONSTRUCTIA DE MASINI in Romanian Vol 37 Dec 85 pp 671-673

[Article by Ancuta Breaban, Magda Radu, and Ofelia Vasilescu: "An Artificial Vision System for Industrial Robots"]

[Text] General

The term "automation intelligence" applies to the area of research concerned with the intelligence of industrial equipment, and industrial robots in particular, and relates chiefly to the ability of robots to adapt their behavior to changes in their environment. This ability involves outfitting the robots with specific sensors to detect changes in the environment and development of software able to interpret information received. Among the existing sensor systems, the greatest amount of research effort has of late been applied to artificial vision systems, both because of the difficulty of the problems which such systems involve and in view of the great number of potential applications.

The chief artificial vision functions required for robotized applications are recognition of a manipulated article, determination of an article's position and orientation, and establishment of the quality of an article during a general or partial quality inspection.

The performance of these functions necessitates the existence of a set of equipment and programs that are combined to make up an "artificial vision system for industrial robots." Such a system must meet the following requirements: lowest possible cost; ruggedness and reliability in operation (lifting); structural and functional simplicity; short response time; greatest possible independence from local lighting conditions; and minimal change in the manufacturing process in which the system is used.

Artificial vision systems for industrial robots have now emerged from the laboratory testing stage throughout the world, and all things considered it is felt that dedicated mechanisms yield performance superior to that of existing systems from the viewpoint of the accuracy and speed necessary in assembly operations.
This article is devoted to discussion of the first artificial vision system for industrial robots developed in Romania and in the process of laboratory testing at ICSIT-TCE since 1983.

The Image Recognition System for RIR Industrial Robots

The authors set themselves the task of developing an artificial vision system capable of memorizing and recognizing two-dimensional images.

This system performs the following functions:

(a) receiving and digitizing (numerically coding) an image;

(b) primary processing of an image---binarization of an image, that is, conversion to black-and-white and erasure of pixels (a pixel is an elementary zone on the screen of a cathode ray tube, a picture element) that are not in harmony with the environment represented by 3 x 3 windows. The "gray threshold" level for binarization is established by experiment, as a function of the lighting conditions. Initially a global threshold is established, with binarization subsequently carried out on the basis of local thresholds;

(c) extraction of the outline of an object (article) from the picture. During this first stage, only the case of a single object having no holes was dealt with. However, transition to pictures with several objects, including some with holes, presents no particular difficulty, since the principles of primary image processing and outline extraction are the same. The image outline extraction algorithm used is that of Dudani [5].

(d) calculation of global parameters. The global parameters calculated are the area of the object, the perimeter, the maximum radius, the average radius, the second-order moments of inertia (mxx, mxy, myy), the slope of the main axis, and the center of gravity coordinates (XG, YG).

The structure of the hardware support system for the artificial vision system is made up of a FELIX M-18 microcomputer with 64 kilobytes of internal memory, floppy disk drive, and console, and of a video information acquisition system. The latter is designed as a subordinate module on the FELIX M-18 (FELIX M-118 OR FELIX M-216) microcomputer and permits connection to a TV monitor and TV camera (Tehnoton) for image acquisition and processing.

The software system was designed to be modular and was implemented in ASM-80 language on the FELIX M-18 computer system.

Table 1 gives a list of all the program modules, along with their principal characteristics.

The following findings were obtained after laboratory testing of the system described in the foregoing with prismatic objects.

1. The achievement of results that can be applied in practice imposes special restrictions on the hardware system described in the foregoing (computer, special interface, and camera) from the viewpoint of fidelity and dependability.
2. The lighting system is of particular importance in obtaining correct images, and especially in ensuring image reproducibility in successive acquisitions.

Table 1. List of Modules

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Program Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>RIR 000</td>
<td>Monitor program</td>
<td>Calls other programs according to control characters</td>
<td>Console</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>RIR 010</td>
<td>Primary processing program</td>
<td>Selection of binarization &quot;gray threshold&quot; level</td>
<td>Interface with image acquisition system</td>
<td>Video memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>RIR 020</td>
<td>Outline extraction</td>
<td>Binary image acquisition/packaging module</td>
<td>Outline extraction</td>
<td>Video memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control display</td>
<td></td>
<td>Monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>RIR 030</td>
<td>Calculation module</td>
<td>Calculates global parameters of an object</td>
<td>Video memory</td>
<td>Monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>RIR 040</td>
<td>Recognition module</td>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td></td>
<td>Console</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The calculating capacity of the FELIX M-18 microcomputer (and of the INTEL 8080 microprocessor in general) was found to be adequate for performance of the functions of the system. Particular emphasis must be placed on the fact that a response time shorter than 1 second (400 to 600 milliseconds) was achieved for calculation of outline points. The total recognition time for the first version of the system is of the order of seconds (10 to 15 seconds), depending on the dimensions of the object to be recognized. This time will be greatly reduced in the next version, however, by use of a more efficient mathematical library for calculation of the global parameters.

4. Analysis of the results obtained in repeated recognition of the same object under different lighting conditions (different light intensity) has shown that the global parameters calculated on each occasion are affected differently by noise (disturbing elements):

The center of gravity coordinates may be considered to be virtually unchanged by lighting.

The area and perimeter undergo a maximum variation of 50 percent relative to the mean.

The minimum radius, mean radius, and maximum radius vary by 15 to 30 percent relative to the mean.
It follows that in applications involving only identification of the position of an object (without recognition) the RIR system can be used without precautionary measures relative to the lighting system. An improved version of the RIR system will now be developed on the basis of the foregoing findings. The system will also be tested in a specific application, along with a Romanian-made industrial robot.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


