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DJP'S TRANSFORMATION UNDER NO TAE-U'S LEADERSHIP ANALYZED

Decoupling of Party From Administration

Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 11 Jul 87 p 2

[Editorial: "On the Occasion of the Launching of the DJP With No Tae-u at Its Helm: Pray Become a Party Healthy Enough To Face the Elections on Your Own Merit!"]

[Text] The 10 July move by President Chon Tu-hwan, removing himself from the position of the DJP's presidency which he had held concurrently with the presidency of the nation and entrusting Chairman No Tae-u with the authority to act as the party's president, has significantly altered the power structure of the ruling circle.

One can say that, as a result of this move, it will now be possible for President Chon to keep himself somewhat more detached from partisan politics in carrying on his administrative agenda geared to the preparations for the Olympics and peaceful transition of power, and that Chairman No has now been entrusted with most of the political responsibilities including that of taking the leading role in the management of the constitutional-reform phase of the political situation. Perhaps it may also be said that this marks the de facto beginning of the presidential election campaign by the DJP with Chairman No as its rallying point.

President Chon's decision to voluntarily relinquish the party's presidency even at the expense of some erosion to his prerogative as the supreme leader may be taken as a reflection of his willingness to settle for the role of "a caretaker in good faith" until the next government comes into being instead of being a direct party with a special interest in the incoming regime.

It is axiomatic that in any country the ruling political party enjoys a certain amount of premium that goes with the party in power. The less politically developed a country is, the higher the premium rises for the ruling party; hence, in such countries, a change of regime is a rare occurrence—even when it occurs, more often than not it takes the form of succession of power within the same ruling party.
Viewed in that context, President Chon's decision to relinquish the party's presidency and to concentrate on his duties as the nation's president is certain to bring about a major change in the relationship that has existed between the government and the ruling party. This means that the government will be in the position to be able to oversee the coming elections with a greater degree of neutrality and nonpartisan attitude than ever before.

The desire to ensure neutrality and nonpartisanship of the government is what led the opposition Reunification Democratic Party, while welcoming the decision by President Chon, to carry the issue a step further by demanding that the president also give up his DJP membership, that a new cabinet specifically geared to the handling of the coming elections be formed, and that there be no further consultations between the ruling party and the government from now through February of next year. The perennial concern of the political opposition in all elections has been the fear that the enormous influence of the government might be used in favor of the ruling party.

If an election is to be assured of a fair play with public servants adhering to political neutrality, it is essential for the government to adopt a nonpartisan, neutral posture. It is for this reason that we support the idea that at the next cabinet reshuffle the government consider freeing those portfolios now being held concurrently by other members of the cabinet and filling them with fresh personalities of neutral disposition.

At the same time it is our belief that, with the emergence of its No Tae-u-for-successor posture, the DJP now has an excellent opportunity on hand to regenerate itself and to put the party firmly on a democratic footing from within. To be frank, we believe that the DJP, despite so many talents from all walks of life it has under its wing, has not been able to fully realize its potentiality simply due to the "forced silence" imposed on them. That the party has finally arrived at a turning point for democratization is by no means a happenstance unrelated to its recent change of policy allowing its members of the National Assembly a broad range of discretionary power as well as open channels of communications.

The DJP must make a concerted effort to nurture its physical constitution to make it strong enough to survive even as an opposition party—should it become one in the days ahead. Metaphorically one can say that, with the removal of an "oversized umbrella" that has been shielding it thus far, the DJP has been taken out of a green house onto an open field.

Looking back the history of our constitutional government, everyone of the ruling parties of the past quickly disappeared from the scene with the demise of the regime of its backing. This can be attributed to the "sunflower" disposition prevalent among our politicians who, in their pursuit of power, had no compunction of changing their political allegiance from one party to another.

Be that as it may, for the DJP at this juncture to be able once again to sire a regime on its own merits, its only recourse, we believe, is to nurture for itself "the strength sufficient to ensure its survival even as an opposition party—if it should come to that." It is in this direction that we pray the DJP in the No Tae-u mode will proceed—with the resolve to, and with the conviction that it can, create a new chapter in our history.
Civilization of Leadership

Seoul CHOSUN ILBO in Korean 15 Jul 87 p 3

[Article by Yi Sang-chol]

[Text] Only Six Academy Graduates Remain

The 14 July reshuffle of the DJP's leadership, which may be termed as the first official move signaling the launching of the "No Tae-u structure," perhaps can best be characterized simply as "civilianization of the party framework."

The reason for this characterization is that those of military background, who had long played the role of "locomotive" in the party's operation, made a wholesale retreat to positions of secondary importance while others of civilian background, who had been relegated to the role of "passenger cars," emerged at the forefront of the leadership lineup.

The most symbolic of such changes is the appointment of men with civilian background to two of the most important leadership positions of the party—the position of secretary general which in effect is the hub of the party's power, and that of the floor leader which serves as the party's command post at the National Assembly; this move broke the 7-year-old practice, unfailingly adhered to by the party, of filling at least one of these two positions with an ex-military type, thereby giving the ex-military type a share of voice in charting the party's course.

As a result of the reshuffle, which included the removal of Yi Chun-ku, a 14th-class graduate of the Korean Military Academy, from the position of secretary general, all positions of the party's central leadership, with the exception of the acting president, are now filled by those of civilian background.

Additionally, there has been a broad shift from the military to the civilian in the composition of the Central Executive Committee, the party's highest executive organ: the military-civilian ratio in the committee's lineup is now 6 to 21 as compared with 11 to 18 before the reshuffle. Removed from the committee's lineup are such powerhouses as Yi Chun-ku and Chong Sun-tok, both of whom have served as secretary general; Yu Hak-song and Pak Chun-pyong, both of whom are retired four-star generals now holding seats in the National Assembly; and Kim Sik, an 11th-class graduate of the Korean Military Academy who is a member of the National Assembly. They have been replaced by persons of civilian background.

There are now only six Military Academy graduates remaining on the roster of the Central Executive Committee: they are Acting President No Tae-u, Advisor Kwon Ik-hyon, and National Assembly members Kwon Chong-tal, Yi Chong-chan, Yi Sang-ik, and Pae Myong-kuk.
According to one explanation offered, two considerations had led to Acting President No's decision to make "the civilianization of the party" the focus of the leadership reshuffle: one was his immediate desire to blunt the spearhead of the opposition's converging attack under the battle cry of "Bring an End to Military Dictatorship!"; the other was his longer-term desire to bring the party more closely in tune with the sense of the times—a longing for evolutionary progression of politics.

Meanwhile, observers generally agree that this reorganization, although it has to a degree strengthened the civilianization of the party's profile, is likely to create a new burden to bear for Acting President No—the burden of having to smooth out the dissensions which could develop between the military faction and the civilian faction, not just within the party but throughout the ruling circle as a whole.

It appears that the final decision on the scope and specifics of the reshuffle was still pending as late as 13 July, the day before the action.

A source close to Acting President No suggested that No, even when he was leaving the party headquarters to go home late on 13 July, apparently still had not been able to decide whether to limit the scope of the reshuffle to three key positions—namely the secretary general, the floor leader, and the party spokesman—or to expand it to five to include chairmen of the Central Committee and the Policy Committee.

His indecision seems to have been caused by two rather persuasive arguments: one, that replacing just the secretary general and the floor leader, although in itself a significant reshuffle in substance, might be perceived as a "narrow" move in terms of the number of changes and therefore could prove inadequate from the standpoint of building a new image for the No Tae-u structure; two, that this particular reshuffle ought not to be inhibited by consideration of such factors as the person's length of tenure in a given position (in the case of Chairman Im Chol-sun of the Policy Committee, he has been in that position only for 2 months)—rather, it ought to be handled in the manner of drawing a new picture on a blank piece of paper.

In the end, of the four key officials of the party leadership only two—the secretary general and the floor leader—were changed. Explaining this, a knowledgeable source within the party said, "The primary objective of this reshuffle was to change the party's image so that it can make a fresh start in responding to the changing political situation and the rising public expectations touched off by the No Tae-u declaration of 29 June. As such, changing the secretary general and the floor leader—the two officials who had played a leading role in running the party prior to the 29 June event—was considered sufficient. Conversely, it was not considered necessary to make a sweeping reshuffle going beyond that."

After he had made the 29 June declaration without a word of prior consultation with other members of the party leadership, Acting President No continued to keep things close to his chest, fanning a sense of perplexity among those
around him. But on the occasion of this reshuffle, No reportedly discussed personnel selection with outgoing Secretary General Yi Chun-ku and others in advance. Still, when the results were announced, there was a puzzled reaction by a leading official, who said, "As late as 13 July I was certain that Yi Tae-sun was going to be the new secretary general and Chong Sok-mu the new floor leader; obviously the two got switched around overnight!"

According to a late report, long before they were removed in the reshuffle, Secretary General Yi Chun-ku, Floor Leader Yi Han-tong, and Yu Hung-su, chief of the president's secretariat, had individually made known to Acting President No of their strong desire to resign.

In the case of Secretary General Yi, on 6 July, the day after the resignations submitted en masse by members of the Central Executive Committee had been rejected, he reportedly had a private meeting with No, during which he resubmitted his resignation and reiterated on his firm desire to leave the secretary general's position. It is also reported that about the same time Floor Leader Yi Han-tong, too, expressed his equally strong conviction to No Tae-ū by saying, "The floor leader is part of the same ticket with the secretary general and therefore must share the same responsibility with him."

Among those key officials who have been retained, Chairman Yin Pang-hyon of the Central Committee is said to have been retained mainly because he was just elected to that position only a month or so ago at the party's national convention held on 10 June. Likewise, Chairman Im Chol-sun of the Policy Committee reportedly was retained, despite his own wish to resign, partly because he had been on the job for only a couple of months, and partly because of the geographical consideration that it would be impolite to eliminate from the party's leadership lineup all the members of the National Assembly who hail from "Seoul."

Deputy Secretary General Kim Tae-ho was a case of automatic retention necessitated by the removal of his boss, the secretary general.

In the selection of the replacement for the outgoing party spokesman Kim Chong-nam, initially Yu Kyong-hyon and Cho Nam-cho, both National Assembly members from the Cholla region, were considered as primary candidates, but when National Assembly member Yi Tae-sun, a native of South Cholla Province, was picked to become the floor leader, the regional-balance consideration led to the decision to name Yi Min-sop, a National Assembly member from Kangwon Province, as the new spokesman. This appointment, coming on the heels of Sim Myong-po and Kim Chong-nam, makes it the third consecutive time a native of Kangwon Province has been chosen for the party spokesperson.

On the day of the reshuffle, all the outgoing officials looked rather cool and philosophical—as if they had fully anticipated their fate; they even looked so cheerful that one could almost sense their feeling of "relief."
Shortly before the reshuffle was announced, the outgoing Floor Leader Yi Han-tong came up to his office after a meeting with the outgoing Secretary General Yi Chun-ku. When asked what the long discussion between the two was all about, Yi Han-tong replied with a rhetorical question: "Shouldn't someone about to leave his job at least be allowed to settle his accounts to see how he comes out?" Asked how he came out, he replied, "To come out with what you started with is the rule of politics, is it not?" He laughed lightheartedly.

But when reporters asked him repeatedly about his replacement, the outgoing floor leader said half jokingly yet with sarcasm, "I am said to be a hardliner with a stiff neck, so I imagine my replacement will be someone who is rational, moderate, and fresh." Then he added, "my resignation was tendered long ago (through the Central Executive Committee on 29 June); only it took them a half month to accept it"—words that seemed to convey some of the uncomfortable feelings he had to endure during that period of limbo.

Shedding Hard-Line Image

Seoul SEOUL SINMUN in Korean 15 Jul 87 p 2

[Article by Yi Kyong-hyong]

[Text] The DJP's 14 July reshuffle of its leadership lineup, undertaken with an eye toward the day when the party will formally begin a fresh chapter under No Tae-u as its new president, may be assessed as a concrete step designed to improve the party's battle readiness in preparation for the implementation of "the No Tae-u declaration of 29 June."

The intrinsic aim of this reshuffle is to change the party's hard-line image to one of soft-line and to shift the party's posture into the election-ready mode.

From the standpoint of the softening of the party's image, the most symbolic feature of the reshuffle one can cite is the emergence of Chong Sok-mo as the new secretary general and Yi Tae-sun as the new floor leader, replacing Yi Chun-ku and Yi Han-tong, respectively.

The new lineup of Secretary General Chong Sok-mo and Floor Leader Yi Tae-sun is clearly presenting an image much softer than the one represented by the old team of Yi Chun-ku and Yi Han-tong.

One reason for this is that Chong, the new secretary general, is a three-term member of the National Assembly who, from the days of the old Democratic Republican Party, has been shuttling back and forth between the executive branch and the party, all the while maintaining harmonious personal relations with those around him; by contrast, former Secretary General Yi Chun-ku, a graduate of the 14th class of the Korean Military Academy and a leading member of the Fifth Republic's reformist group, has been regarded as the symbol of the toughness that has been the driving force of the party.
Decampment of the Parliamentary System Advocates

Beyond that, however, a closer look at the more substantive side of the picture reveals the following: The secretary general-floor leader team of Yi Chun-ku and Yi Han-tong, installed at the time of the leadership reshuffle of 23 August 1986, was the core of the party structure that was geared to the task of pushing through constitutional reform in favor of the parliamentary system of government and of ensuring the success of the political agenda subsequent to the 13 April suspension of the constitutional reform debate; as such, when the DJP embraced the principle of direct presidential elections with the "29 June declaration" as the turning point, it had no choice but to shift its basic political stance from the past emphasis on hardnosed driving to a new emphasis on a more soft, conciliatory approach. It was this basic shift that led to the introduction of a new team at the top--the team of Secretary General Chong Sok-mo and Floor Leader Yi Tae-sun.

The party's tilting toward a softer disposition is also evident in the wholesale removal of ex-military types from the roster of the Central Executive Committee.

Removed from the lineup of the Central Executive Committee, which plays a pivotal role in the party operation and functions as the highest deliberative organ on a day-to-day basis, are such men of military stock as Yi Hak-song, Pak Chun-pyong, Kim Sik, and Chong Sun-tok, all are members of the National Assembly. In their places, the following men of civilian background have been brought in: So Chong-hwa, a member of the National Assembly (former minister of home affairs); Ko Kwai-nam, director of the National Policy Institute; Yi Min-sop, the newly appointed spokesman of the party; and Kang Kyong-sik, director of the Policy Coordination Office.

Furthermore, shattered this time is the past practice, which appeared to be headed to becoming a permanent tradition, of automatically naming outgoing secretary general and floor leader to the Central Executive Committee as members at large: that both Yi Chun-ku and Yi Han-tong were excluded from the Central Executive Committee is another indication of Acting President No's intention to soften this committee.

Additionally, the replacement of party spokesman Kim Chong-nam, who was picked for the position at the time of the 11 May reshuffle and has been on that job only for 2 months or so, and the ouster of Assembly member Cho Ki-sang from the post of state minister for political affairs to which he was named just 50 days ago at the time of the 26 May cabinet reshuffle--these, too, should be viewed in the same broad context of the leadership reform the party has undertaken this time.

One plausible observation is that the removal of these two men--party spokesman Kim Chong-nam and State Minister Cho Ki-sang--was due, among other reasons, to their having been identified in the public eye as members of the pre-29 June hard-line faction of the party.
Bleaching of the Central Executive Committee

In short, the simultaneous actions of ridding the Central Executive Committee of ex-military types and elevating to the committee ranks the persons holding such positions as the director of the National Policy Institute, the party's spokesmanship, and the director of the Policy Coordination Office, taken together with the reshuffling of such key leadership positions as the secretary general and the floor leader, may be taken as a precursor of the things to come—the application of pragmatic approach to the operation of the party as well as its affiliated organizations.

Another discernible feature of this leadership reshuffle is that it is designed to shift the party into the election-ready mode. This is abundantly clear in the selection of Chong Sok-mo as the new secretary general, the retention of Kim Tae-ho as the deputy secretary general, and the appointment of Assembly member So Chong-hwa as a member of the Central Executive Committee.

Chong Sok-mo, the new secretary general, is a veteran careerist in the home affairs field: having served as director of the Public Security Bureau and as a provincial governor, he is thoroughly familiar with regional and police administration. Not only that, he has also served as chairman of the DJP's Policy Committee and as minister of home affairs; being a three-term member of the National Assembly further adds to his air of gravity. All in all, he is rated as the first worthy figure to hold the secretary general's position in the DJP's history and a man well fit to handle the upcoming direct presidential election. As for the naming of Assembly member So Chong-hwa to the Central Executive Committee, given his own background of having served as minister of home affairs and secretary general of the Peaceful Reunification Council, it is expected that he will make a good working pair with Secretary General Chong Sok-mo. Incidentally, it is being said that So's elevation to the executive body is a move related to his having been informally designated to head an election readiness planning group soon to be formed within the party.

Should So actually become leader of the party's election planning group and take charge of all planning activities related to the upcoming presidential election—activities such as formulation of election strategy, development of an organizational model for vote acquisition, and conducting research on media and public relations techniques, it is expected that the fruit of his work will be used by Secretary General Chong Sok-mo, who has the control of the party organization, to produce as many votes as possible for the party.

Another noteworthy aspect of the 14 July leadership reshuffle is that it is not the end but only the first-phase basic work of the party's organizational restructuring under No Tae-u's leadership.

This assumption is based on the following factors: As was announced by Deputy Spokesman Choe Sang-chin, the party's Central Committee is scheduled to convene on 23 July to take up the question of revising the party constitution; this is likely to result in structural reform of the party, which in turn will inevitably lead to a second-phase personnel reshuffle.
It is reported that several new ideas are being considered in conjunction with the likely structural reform of the party—ideas such as creation of the system of multiple vice presidents, appointment of a special assistant to the president, and expansion of the president's secretariat; however, Acting President No reportedly has not made final decisions yet on these questions.

Aide Staff Likely To Be Strengthened

On the basis of the substance of the first-phase personnel reshuffle undertaken by Acting President No, the composition of the core leadership group, comprised of chairman of the Central Committee, the three ranking officials of the party, and the deputy secretary general—the structure based on the provisions of the existing constitution of the party, is likely to be retained; if so, the second phase of the personnel reshuffle is likely to be focused on the strengthening of the functions of the personal aide staff for the party president.

Not that the team of Secretary General Chong Sok-mo and Floor Leader Yi Tae-sun cannot handle political negotiations with the opposition but because of the realization that these two officials will have their handful just trying to oversee the party's organizational affairs and to keep things in order within the National Assembly on the eve of the crucial battle with the reins of government at stake, under consideration is the introduction of vice presidents who can handle negotiations with the opposition, supervise and stimulate vote-getting activities in regional sectors, and generally serve as the shield for the party president.

This idea is being treated with due caution for fear that introduction of the vice-presidential system could entail some complications or even duplication of authority vis-a-vis the president's personal staff and the party's existing affiliated organizations.

Assuming that the vice-presidential system will be instituted, for reasons of geographical consideration, Assembly members Yun Kil-chung from Seoul, Choe Yong-chol from the Cholla region, and Chae Mun-sik from the Kyongsang region are being cited as suitable candidates. Should persons from outside the party were to be brought in, the general understanding is that such persons would more likely be introduced as consultants or advisors for the president than as vice presidents.

For the positions of chief of the president's secretariat and special assistant to the president, the names of Assembly members Choe Pyong-yol, Hyon Hong-chu, Kim Chong-in, and Kang Yong-sik are being mentioned as likely candidates.

When the leadership lineup of the party structure under "President" No is completed through the second-phase personnel reshuffle, it is likely that the DPR's efforts to negotiate constitutional reform with the opposition and to implement its political agenda in general will accelerate measurably.
NO TAE-U ON 29 JUNE DECLARATION, ELECTION

OW110121 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 1200 GMT 10 Aug 87

["Exclusive" interview with No Tae-u, president of the ruling Democratic Justice Party of the ROK, by NHK's Special Chief Editor Hisanori Isomura and Seoul Correspondent Igarashi--recorded; date and place of interview not given; Isomura and Igarashi ask questions in Japanese and No Tae-u answers in Korea; No's answers are translated from the original Korean]

[Text] [Isomura] Recently, you, the DJP president, said in a speech before a women's group that what the ROK is experiencing this year is something like the beginning of great strides for 1988. In Japan, too, your declaration of 29 June, the so-called No Tae-u declaration, has been well received as representing a courageous choice and as a great stepping stone toward democratization. Was it your own decision?

[No Tae-u] My 29 June declaration sought to uphold the desire and will of our people exactly as they are, to eliminate all factors obstructing the cause of democratization, and to create the fairest possible conditions for pursuing democratization and holding elections in the future. I agonized a great deal before arriving at the decision. While making up my mind, I listened to the views of many people including young students, workers, journalists, religious workers, and experts in various walks of life. The fact is, though, that I made the decision alone, by myself.

[Igarashi] While you were in the process of making that decision, some within the ruling party reportedly called for emergency measures. Their demand reportedly led to a tentative decision to proclaim emergency measures. Is this true? Also, what kind of advice was there from the United States in that process? While it is believed that a variety of things, including the demonstrations, prompted your decision, what was the most important factor of them all? Would you also comment on any conversations you had with the president during that time, if you had any conversations with him?

[No Tae-u] I originally had no intention of proclaiming emergency measures, and the situation did not warrant such a proclamation, I believe.

Second, your question seems to be how the United States advised us on the series of developments in our country. Needless to say, the United States, as a good ally, is interested in our nation's stability, democratic developments,
and security, in particular, and can provide us with good advice. We welcome such advice. However, it is impossible for the United States to give any specific advice that might be considered intervention in our domestic affairs, or for us to accept such advice. To date there has been no such advice as could be considered intervention in our domestic affairs, I believe.

As I said, I met many people. At the same time, the president also met as many people. It is also a fact that the president and I discussed the results of our meetings—whom we met and what we discussed. It is also a fact that in making my decision, I was confident that the president would accommodate it.

[Isomura] In political negotiations with the opposition, you appear to be prepared to make fairly significant concessions—for example, over the candidacy of Mr Kim Tae-chung in connection with the legal requirement for residency in the country for a minimum of 5 consecutive years, and the proposed lowering of the voting age. Would you comment on this point? Also, amid the democratization climate since 29 June, 80 ROK firms are now experiencing workers' strikes, that is, in the labor-management relationship, unions are rapidly gaining strength, causing problems for management. Under these circumstances, are there any complaints that you are making excessive concessions? Are there any expressions of dissatisfaction by employers?

[No tae-u] It was I who arranged for the restoration of civil rights for Mr Kim Tae-chung and others. It is not my intention at all that Mr Kim Tae-chung could be targeted and prevented from running in the election on the grounds that he resided in the United States in the past. The concept of 5 years in the 5-year residency clause is merely a general concept. Mr Kim Tae-chung indeed resided in the United States, but it was for medical treatment, not for permanent residence. Considering these facts, I would like you to put to right now the misunderstanding that this issue was raised in order to impose restrictions on Mr Kim Tae-chung.

As regards the question of lowering the voting age to 18, although some West European nations have indeed set their voting age at 18, I feel that in our country 18 as the voting age is still premature, because the lowering, if adopted, would have to be accompanied by a similar lowering regarding various legal obligations too.

Today in our society, standards in various areas have improved to higher levels, as I have said. As a result, there is a rush of demands from workers, putting employers into a considerably difficult position. This is a fact, but I feel that workers will not behave unreasonably or emotionally as they did in the past; they will be reasonable to a certain extent. I also believe that employers will be capable of persuading workers, that they need to try to improve the treatment of workers at this time, and that, although we are experiencing a somewhat difficult time, we can overcome it.

[Igarashi] Would you comment on how confident you are about the election due later this year?
[No Tae-u] If we diligently pursue the cause of democratization, as I declared in my 29 June declaration, our people will know whom they should vote for. I am optimistic in this regard.

[Isomura] What do you think about Japan? Please give us your personal view.

[No Tae-u] We are quickly moving into a Pacific era in which Japan and the ROK are equally required to play leading roles. There are many things yet to be done to that end, I believe. With that in mind, cooperation between the two countries will have a great impact not only on the development of bilateral relations, but also on ushering in the Pacific era and leading it to success, and on achieving future prosperity as well. I highly appreciate Japan’s role, and at the same time have great expectations of it as a partner in this undertaking.

[Isomura] I once read an article saying that whenever you move, you always carry with you a map of the old, undivided Korea. My last question is about your view of the unification issue. Would you comment on this?

[No Tae-u] By the time we host the Olympics we are expected to have an overwhelming advantage over the North in all areas. At present the North has the upper hand in military strength, but this will be balanced in the 1990’s.

When this becomes like this, there will be a true first step toward reunification. The North will find it impossible to live alone and find it inevitable to open up. To this end our country will make efforts for peace and will hold dialogue with any country, including Japan, Communist China, and the Soviet Union, our neighbors.

I believe that our country will be unfailingly unified by peaceful means before the 21st Century, and we will exert all our efforts with that resolve.

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CSO: 4105/125
PAPER ON NO TAE-U'S ELECTION AS DJP PRESIDENT

SK052329 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 6 Aug 87 p 1

[Text] The majority Democratic Justice Party yesterday elected No Tae-u as the party president, readying itself for the election of the next president by direct popular vote late this year.

Upon being elected as the second head of the six-and-a-half-year-old ruling party in a meeting of the steering panel of the party Central Committee, No pledged "to make every effort to help make sure the upcoming presidential election is conducted in the freest and fairest manner in the Republic's history."

"As party of such efforts," No said, "our party will accept the opposition demands widely when revising the Presidential Election Law rather than just insisting on our party's position."

"I will do my best to have the on-going negotiation on constitutional amendment end in success and to complete the presidential election peacefully so that the peaceful transfer of government may not be hindered," said the head of the majority party in his acceptance speech.

No, who has been already nominated as the presidential candidate of the ruling party in its 10 June national convention, has been acting partt president since President Chon relinquished the top party post on 10 July.

President Chon was installed as an "honorary" party president by the 581 members of the steering panel of the Central Committee, which was delegated power by the national convention on 10 June.

The session of the steering committee held at the party's Central Political Training Institute in Karak-dong, south-eastern Seoul, lasted 2 hours.

No said that his eight-point democratization package announced on 29 June was designed to reform the accumulated "evil practices" in society in an impartial and fair manner.
He emphasized that the party members will have to deal with the people's expectations and demands in the transitional period through "a drastic change in their way of thinking and perception."

"I hope you will bear in mind that my 29 June declaration itself was a great conversion, a change in perception and way of thinking for the reform and genuine democratization of the nation," said No.

"Therefore," he went on, "the style of response to the sprouting demands and desire for democratization and reform will have to change."

No also pledged to make efforts for further release of political detainees and their political reinstatement.

Recalling that measures have been taken for the promotion of press freedom, No said, "I dare to say that our party is opening an era in which press freedom is not restricted both by systems and in practice."

Then the DJP presidential candidate said that the DJP was working out measures to ensure every sector of society enjoyed self-regulation and self-rule.

In what sounded like election pledges, No said that local autonomy will be expanded and accelerated so that the heads of local administrations may be elected by direct popular vote soon.

"Local self-rule on education will also be realized soon through the election of superintendents of boards of education by the board members themselves who will be elected by the local councils," said No.

As for the national economy, he said, the fruit of economic achievements of the nation will be shared evenly by all members of the society.

To that end, the DJP will reduce (economic) privileges and imbalance at the same time as it promotes small and medium industries and enlarges the economic basis for farmers, fishermen and city dwellers.

He also indicated that the foundation of new "ideological" political parties will be promoted for positive participation in national politics of workers, city dwellers, and farmers.

He was apparently referring to the emergence of progressive political parties to be founded by reformist political forces.

As for his party, No said that he will positively promote intra-party democracy through the election of its officers by competition instead of appointment.

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CSO: 4100/295
DAILY URGES DJP TO PRACTICE DEMOCRATIZATION

SK070715 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean 6 Aug 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Democratization Not in Word But in Deed: There Has Been Much Rhetoric by DJP President No Tae-u"]

[Text] As we have urged on many occasions, we want the DJP and its President No Tae-u to stop talking and carry out in bold practice what they have said. Of course, we do not deny that the 29 June declaration by No Tae-u was a start of practice; however, the DJP must now carry out democratization work with concrete action, instead of continuing to make pledge by saying "We would do this and that" for democratization.

Our solicitude over the remarks by DJP President No Tae-u must be fully understood. We say this because President No Tae-u's rhetorical remarks and speeches, which we have heard on many occasions, and his practice have been poles apart. About a year ago, he advocated "the true democratization of the country." But, only a few months after this, the sexual torture incident occurred at the Puchon police station, and student Pak Chong-chol was killed in torture. Thus, instead of true democratization, we saw an even more furious current of true anti-democratization. We want him to recall this.

Of course, we think we know the reason. What can be regarded as his moderate line has been overshadowed by the hard-liners of the ruling camp. President No Tae-u, however, has now seized the power over his party both in name and in reality. It is time for him to put into practice what he pledged in his 29 June declaration.

Above all, the DJP, now under President No Tae-u's leadership, should not try to adopt a conservative stand in any case. When the people cast their ballots, it is possible that the DJP will become an opposition party. Therefore, in establishing our new Constitution, the DJP should not think that it will remain a ruling party.

What is also extremely important is that the DJP under President No Tae-u now change its Constitution literally into one of civil liberalism. The DJP is still seen as a party that has reopened shop after refurbishing by the authoritarians of the authoritarian era who, all of sudden, say under the pressure of the people that "We, too, can achieve democratization."
We hope that the DJP will achieve a true self-innovation. Moderate and rational party officials, who have been the self-restraint in the party, are now, urged to courageously change the party's stiff Constitution into a democratic one.

We have advised the DJP to make preparations to become an opposition party. In our history, there have been, and are many personages in the former and present ruling circles who thought and think that becoming an opposition party means ruination. At the same time, there have been many personages thinking that the country will fall if the opposition party seizes power. This is indeed lamentable. We hope that the DJP will change its Constitution into one with which it can honorably turn itself into an opposition party.

The pending supreme task of the DJP is to guarantee fair elections. When the DJP has won as a result of elections, if the opposition party unreluctantly accepts this, this will be precisely fair elections. Accordingly, the DJP must fulfill its pledge that it will extensively accommodate the opposition party's demand in the negotiations over the election law.

Finally, over the pledge of the DJP and its President No Tae-u to accommodate the progressive desire of our young citizens—the plurality of our population—we would like to urge them to avoid undue defilement of their desire, prior to accommodating it. Very few of them are, of course too extreme; but the majority of them are only progressive. They are not radical leftists.

We will see whether President No Tae-u's pledge over democratization will be put into practice. If his word disagrees with his deed, there will be no second chance for him.

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CSO: 4107/234
RDP'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION DRAFT REVIEWED

Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean 14, 15 Jul 87

[Text of the RDP's tentative draft of the revised constitution with direct presidential elections]

[14 Jul 87 p 5]

[Text] PREAMBLE

We, the people of Korea, proud of our glorious history and traditions from time immemorial, established the provisional government of the Republic of Korea on the foundation of the 1 March Movement, established the First Republic on the legitimacy inherited thereof, and through the 19 April uprising and the 18 May Kwangju uprising established clearly the right of the people resolutely to oppose and resist illegitimate state power.

We now proclaim our determination:

To consolidate the system of liberal democracy and firmly establish democratic institutions by opposing military personnel's interference in politics and enunciating the idea of civilian government;

To afford equal opportunities to every person and provide the fullest development of the capabilities of each individual in all fields, including political, economic, social and cultural life;

To help each person discharge his responsibilities and duties;

To strive, internally, for the peaceful reunification of the country, the balanced improvement of the people's living standards, and the promotion of the welfare of the people, and, externally, to strive for a lasting international peace; and thereby to ensure security, liberty and happiness for ourselves and our descendants forever;

To forbid any political reprisal in order to achieve national unity with justice, humanity and brotherhood; and
We do hereby amend, upon passage by the National Assembly and through referendum, the Constitution ordained and established on the Twelfth Day of July in the year of Nineteen Hundred and Forty-eight A.D.

CHAPTER I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1. (1) The Republic of Korea [ROK] shall be a democratic Republic. (2) The sovereignty of the ROK shall reside in the people, and all state authority shall emanate from the people.

Article 2. (1) The citizenship of the Republic of Korea shall be determined by law. (2) Citizens residing abroad shall be protected by the State.

Article 3. The territory of the ROK shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands.

Article 4. The State shall aspire to national reunification and endeavor to establish and execute a peaceful reunification policy.

Article 5. (1) (same as current provision) [The Republic of Korea shall endeavor to maintain international peace and shall renounce all aggressive wars.] (2) The Armed Forces of the ROK shall be charged with the sacred mission of national security and the defense of the land and shall not interfere with politics for whatever reason.

Article 6. (1) Treaties duly concluded and promulgated in accordance with the Constitution and the generally recognized rules of international law shall have the same effect as that of the domestic laws of the ROK. (2) The status of aliens shall be guaranteed in accordance with international law and treaties.

Article 7. (1) All public officials shall be servants of the whole people and shall be responsible to the people. (2) The status and political impartiality of public officials shall be guaranteed in accordance with the provisions of law. (3) Public officials shall publicly disclose their property in accordance with the provisions of law.

Article 8. (1) The establishment of political parties shall be free and the plural party system shall be guaranteed. (2) Political parties shall be democratic in their goals, organization and activities, and shall have the necessary organizational arrangements for the people to participate in the formation of political will. (3) Political parties shall enjoy the protection of the State and may be provided with operational funds by the State in accordance with the provisions of law. (4) If the purposes or activities of a political party are contrary to the basic democratic order, the Government may bring action against it in the
Constitution Committee for its dissolution, and the political party shall be dissolved in accordance with the decision of the constitution Committee.

Article 9. The State shall strive to sustain and develop the cultural heritage and to enhance national culture.

CHAPTER II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS

Article 10. All citizens shall be assured the dignity and value of human beings and have the right to pursue happiness. It shall be the duty of the State to confirm and guarantee the fundamental and inviolable human rights of individuals.

Article 11. (1) All citizens shall be equal before the law, and there shall be no discrimination in all fields of political, economic, social or cultural life on account of sex, religion or social status.
(2) No privileged caste shall ever be recognized or established in any form.
(3) The awarding of decorations or distinctions of honor in any form shall be effective only for the recipients, and no privileged status shall be created thereby.

Article 12. (1) All citizens shall enjoy personal liberty. No person shall be subject to arrest, detention, seizure, search or interrogation except as provided by law, nor to punishment, probationary supervision or involuntary labor except by a criminal sentence.
(2) No citizen shall be tortured or be compelled to testify against himself in criminal cases.
(3) Warrants issued by a judge upon the request of a prosecutor shall be presented in case of arrest, detention, seizure or search. However, in case a criminal suspect is apprehended flagrante delicto, or where there is danger that a person suspected of committing a crime punishable by imprisonment of 3 years or more may escape or destroy evidence, investigating authorities may request an ex post facto warrant.
(4) Warrants issued by a judge shall specify the offense with which the person is charged, on the basis of reliable evidence, and no warrant shall be issued or executed except by lawful procedure and method.
(5) No person shall be escorted away, arrested or detained in any form without being informed of the charges against him or without being assured of the privilege of consulting his attorney, receiving transportation, and other assistance from counsel.
(6) All persons who are arrested or detained shall have the right to prompt assistance of counsel. When the criminal defendant is unable to secure counsel by his own efforts, the state shall assign counsel for the defendant as provided by law.
(7) All persons who are arrested or detained shall have the right to request the court to review the legality of the arrest or detention.
(8) In case a confession is determined at a formal trial to have been made against the defendant's will by torture, violence, intimidation, unduly prolonged arrest, deceit or by other improper means, or in case a confession is the only evidence against the accused or where evidence has been collected
by illegal means, such confession or evidence shall not be admitted in evidence toward a conviction nor shall punishment be meted out on the basis of such confession or evidence.

Article 13. (1) No citizen shall be prosecuted for an act which did not constitute a crime under the law effective at the time it was committed, nor shall he be subject for the same crime to be twice put in jeopardy of punishment.
(2) No restrictions shall be imposed upon the political rights of any citizen, nor shall any person be deprived of property rights by means of retroactive legislation.
(3) No citizen shall suffer unfavorable treatment on account of an act not of his own but committed by a relative.

Article 14. All citizens shall enjoy freedom of residence and moving movement.

Article 15. All citizens shall enjoy freedom of choice of occupation.

Article 16. No citizen shall be subject to violation of freedom of residence. In case of search or seizure in a residence, a warrant issued by a judge upon request of a prosecutor shall be presented.

Article 17. No citizen shall be subject to violation of the privacy and freedom of private life.

Article 18. (1) No citizen shall be subject to violation of the secrecy of any means of communication.
(2) There shall be no postal censorship, no wire tapping of telephone or telegraph communication, no opening of private correspondents except upon a writ issued by a judge at the request of a prosecutor as provided for by law, except where in their judgment, there is clear present danger that the security of the State and public order may be jeopardized.

Article 19. All citizens shall enjoy freedom of conscience.

Article 20. (1) All citizens shall enjoy freedom of religion.
(2) No state religion shall be recognized, and religion and politics shall be separated.

Article 21. (1) All citizens enjoy freedom of speech and press and freedom of assembly and association.
(2) No permit shall be required for any censorship allowed of speech, press, movies, and public entertainment, nor shall any permit be required for assembly and association.
(3) No speech, press, movie or public entertainment shall violate the honor or rights of other persons, or undermine public morals or social ethics.

Article 22. (1) All citizens shall enjoy freedom of learning and the arts.
(2) The rights of authors, inventors, and artists shall be protected by law.
Article 23. (1) The right of property of all citizens shall be guaranteed. The contents and limitations thereof shall be determined by law. (2) The exercise of property rights shall conform to the public welfare. (3) Expropriation, use or restriction of private property for public necessity may be made by law, but just compensation thereof shall be paid.

Article 24. All citizens who have attained to the age of 18 years or older shall have the right to vote in accordance with the provisions of law.

Article 25. All citizens shall have the right to hold public office in accordance with the provisions of law.

Article 26. (1) All citizens shall have the right to petition in writing any State agency in accordance with the provisions of law. (2) The State shall be obligated to examine all such petitions.

Article 27. (1) All citizens shall have the right to be tried in conformity with the law by judges qualified under the Constitution and the law. (2) Citizens who are not on active military service or employees of the military forces shall not be tried by a military tribunal except when the court is unable to exercise its normal authority while extraordinary martial law is in force. (3) All citizens shall have the right to a speedy trial. A criminal defendant shall have the right to a public trial without delay in the absence of justifiable reasons to the contrary. (4) The criminal defendant shall be presumed innocent until a determination of guilt has been confirmed.

Article 28. In case a criminal defendant or suspect under detention has been acquitted, or in case a disposition not to prosecute him has been made as provided for by law, he shall be entitled to a claim against the State for just compensation in accordance with the provisions of law.

Article 29. In case a person has sustained damage by unlawful acts of public officials done in the course of their official duties, he may make a claim against the state or public agency for just compensation in accordance with the provisions of law. However, the public officials concerned shall not be immune from liabilities.

Article 30. (1) All citizens shall have the right to receive an equal education corresponding to their abilities. (2) All citizens who have children to support shall be responsible at least for their elementary education and other education as provided for by law. (3) Compulsory education shall be free. (4) Independence and political impartiality of education shall be guaranteed. (5) The State shall guarantee the autonomy of colleges and universities. (6) Fundamental matters pertaining to the educational system and its administration shall be determined by law. (7) Fundamental matters pertaining to the education system, including in-school and lifelong education, administration, finance, and the status of teachers, shall be determined by law.
Article 31. (1) All citizens shall have the right and obligation to work. (2) The State shall endeavor to promote the employment of workers and to guarantee optimum wages and shall enforce a minimum wage system as provided for by law. (3) The contents of work and standards of working conditions shall be determined by law in such a way as to guarantee human dignity. (4) Special protection shall be accorded to working women and children, and there shall be no discrimination against them in terms of employment, wage and working conditions. (5) The opportunity to work shall by law be accorded preferentially to the bereaved families of those who have given distinguished service to the state, wounded veterans and policemen, military servicemen and policemen killed in action, and those killed in industrial accidents.

Article 32. To enhance working conditions and improve their economic and social status, workers shall have the right to independent association, collective bargaining and collective action. The state shall guarantee this right.

Article 33. To improve their economic and social status and to meet the requirements of production, workers shall have the right to participate in business management as provided for by law.

Article 34. Workers employed by profit-making enterprises shall have the right to share in the distribution of profits in accordance with law.

Article 35. (1) (current provision) [All citizens shall have the right to a life worthy of human beings.] (2) The state shall have the duty to endeavor at promotion of social security and social welfare and to protect the people from disasters, diseases, loss of the ability to work, and from the living condition requiring aid, such as aging, physical incapacity, and unemployment.

Article 36. (1) All citizens shall have the right to enjoy a healthy and comfortable environment and shall endeavor to protect the environment. (2) The State shall strive for the proper utilization, management, and protection of the environment. (3) The contents and exercise of the right of environment shall be prescribed by law.

Article 37. (1) Marriage and family life shall be entered into and sustained on the basis of individual dignity and equality of the sexes. (2) The health of of all citizens shall be protected by the State.

Article 38. (1) Freedoms and rights of citizens shall not be neglected on the grounds that they are not enumerated in the Constitution. (2) Freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by law only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of public order or public welfare. Even when such restriction is imposed, no essentials of the freedom or right shall be violated.
Article 39. All citizens shall have the duty to pay taxes in accordance with the provisions of law.

Article 40. (1) All citizens shall have the duty of national defense in accordance with law.
(2) No person shall be discriminated against on account of the fulfillment of his obligation of military service.

CHAPTER III THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Article 41. Legislative power shall be vested in the National Assembly.

Article 42. (1) The National Assembly shall be composed of members elected by universal, equal, direct ballot by the citizens.
(2) The number of members of the National Assembly shall be determined by law, but the number shall be more than 200.
(3) The electoral districts of members of the National Assembly, proportional representation and other matters pertaining to National Assembly elections shall be determined by law.
(4) Under the proportional representation system, seats shall be distributed in proportion to the number of votes polled by each party.

Article 43. The term of office of members of the National Assembly shall be 4 years.

Article 44. Members of the National Assembly shall not concurrently hold any other office prescribed by law.

Article 45. (1) During the sessions of the National Assembly, no member of the National Assembly shall be arrested or detained without the consent of the National Assembly except in case of flagrante delicto.
(2) In case of apprehension or detention of a member of the National Assembly prior to the opening of a session, such member shall be released during the session upon the request of the National Assembly, except in case of flagrante delicto.

Article 46. No member of the National Assembly shall be held responsible outside the National Assembly for opinions officially expressed, or votes cast, or any other acts related thereto conducted inside the Assembly.

Article 47. (1) Members of the National Assembly shall maintain high standards of integrity.
(2) Members of the National Assembly shall give preference to national interests and shall perform their duties in accordance with conscience.
(3) Members of the National Assembly shall not, through abuse of their position, acquire rights and interests in property or position, or cause other persons to acquire the same by means of contracts with or dispositions by the state, public agencies or industries.

Article 48. (1) A regular session of the National Assembly shall be convened once every year in accordance with the provisions of law.
(2) Extraordinary sessions of the National Assembly shall be convened upon the
request of the president or one-third or more of the members on the register.
(3) The period of regular sessions shall not exceed 120 days and of
extraordinary sessions 30 days.
(4) If the President requests the convening of an extraordinary session, the
period of the session and the reasons for the request shall be clearly
specified.

Article 49. The National Assembly shall elect one Speaker and two Vice
Speakers.

Article 50. Unless otherwise provided for in the Constitution or in law, the
attendance of a majority of the members on the register, and the concurrence
of a majority of the members present, shall be necessary for decisions of the
National Assembly. In case of a tie vote, the matter shall be regarded as
rejected by the National Assembly.

Article 51. (1) Sessions of the National Assembly shall be open to the
public. However, they may be closed to the public when so decided by a
majority of the members present.
(2) Contents of sessions which are not open to the public shall not be
publicized.

Article 52. Bills and other matters submitted to the National Assembly for
deliberation shall not be abandoned on the ground that they were not acted
upon during the session in which they were introduced. However, it shall be
otherwise in case the term of the members of the National Assembly has
expired.

Article 53. Bills may be introduced by members of the National Assembly or by
the Executive.

Article 54. (1) Each bill passed by the National Assembly shall be sent to
the Executive and the President shall promulgate it within 15 days.
(2) In case of objection to the bill, the President may, within the period
referred to in Paragraph 1, return it to the National Assembly with written
explanation of his objection, and request it be reconsidered. The President
may do the same during the session [as published] of the National Assembly.
(3) The President shall not request the National Assembly to reconsider the
bill in part, or with proposed amendments.
(4) In case there is a request for reconsideration of a bill, the National
Assembly shall reconsider it, and if the National Assembly repasses the bill
in the original form with the attendance of more than one-half of the members
on the register, and with concurrence of two-thirds or more of the members
present, the bill shall become a law.
(5) If the President does not promulgate the bill, or does not request the
National Assembly to reconsider the bill within the period referred to in
Paragraph 4 [as published], the bill shall become a law.
(6) The President shall without delay promulgate the law as determined in
accordance with the foregoing Paragraph 4 and 5. If the President does not
promulgate the law within 5 days after it has been determined under Paragraph
5, or after law determined under Paragraph 4 has been returned to the
Executive, the Speaker shall promulgate it.

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(7) A law shall take effect 20 days after the date of promulgation unless otherwise provided.

Article 55. (1) The National Assembly shall deliberate and decide upon the national budget bill.
(2) The Executive shall formulate the budget bill for each fiscal year and submit it to the National Assembly within 120 days before the beginning of a fiscal year. The National Assembly shall decide upon it within 30 days before the beginning of the fiscal year.
(3) The Executive shall not trim without the consent of the Chief Justice the annual expenditure budget compiled by the Judiciary.
(4) If the budget bill is not passed by the beginning of the new fiscal year, the Executive may, in conformity with the budget of the previous fiscal year, disburse funds for the following purposes until the budget bill is passed by the National Assembly:

1. The maintenance and operation of agencies and institutions established by the Constitution or law.
2. Execution of the obligatory expenditures provided by law.
3. Continuation of projects previously approved in the budget.

Article 56. (1) In case it shall be necessary to make continuing disbursements for a period longer than 1 fiscal year, the Executive shall determine the length of the period for such continuing disbursements and obtain the approval of the National Assembly for the continuing disbursements.
(2) A reserve fund shall be approved by the National Assembly in total. The disbursement of the reserve fund shall be approved during the subsequent session of the National Assembly.

Article 57. When it is necessary to amend the budget, the Executive may formulate a supplementary revised budget bill and submit it to the National Assembly.

Article 58. The National Assembly shall, without the consent of the Executive, neither increase the sum of any item of expenditure nor create any new items in the budget submitted by the Executive.

Article 59. When the Executive plans to issue national bonds or to conclude contracts which may incur financial obligations on the State outside the budget, it shall have the prior concurrence of the National Assembly.

Article 60. Items and rates of taxes shall be determined by law.

Article 61. (1) The National Assembly shall have power to consent to the conclusion and ratification of treaties pertaining to mutual assistance or mutual security; treaties concerning important international organizations; treaties of friendship, trade and navigation; treaties pertaining to any restriction in sovereignty; peace treaties; treaties which will burden the State or people with an important financial obligation; or treaties related to legislative affairs.
(2) The National Assembly shall also have power to consent to the declaration of war, the dispatch of armed forces to foreign states, or stationing of alien forces in the territory of the ROK.

Article 62. The National Assembly may inspect or investigate State affairs, and may demand the production of necessary documents, the appearance of witnesses in person and the furnishing of testimony or opinions.

Article 63. The Prime Minister, members of the State Council and their representatives may attend meetings of the National Assembly or its committees and report on the state of administration or deliver opinions and answer questions. When requested by one-third or more of the members of the National Assembly on the register or its committees, the Prime Minister, members of the State Council or their representatives shall be obliged to attend any meeting of the National Assembly and answer questions.

Article 64. (1) The National Assembly may recommend to the President the removal of the Prime Minister or a State Council member from office.
(2) The recommendation prescribed in the foregoing paragraph shall require the consent of a majority of the members.
(3) When a recommendation prescribed in Paragraph 1 and 2 has been made, the President shall follow the recommendation unless he has specific reasons for not doing so.

Article 65. (1) The National Assembly may establish the rules of its proceedings and internal regulations, provided that they are not in conflict with law.
(2) The National Assembly may review the qualifications of its members and may take disciplinary actions against its members.
(3) The concurrence of two-thirds or more of the members on the register of the National Assembly shall be required for the expulsion of any member.

Article 66. (1) In case the President, Vice President, the Prime Minister, members of the State Council, Heads of Executive Ministries, members of the Constitution Committee, judges, members of the Central Election Management Committee, commissioners of the Board of Audit and Inspection, and other public officials designated by law have violated the Constitution or other laws in the performance of their duties, the National Assembly may pass motions for their impeachment.
(2) A motion for impeachment prescribed in Paragraph 1 shall be proposed by one-third or more of the members on the register of the National Assembly and shall require concurrence of a majority of the members on the register of the National Assembly for passage. However, a motion for the impeachment of the President shall be proposed by a majority of the members on the register of the National Assembly, and shall require two-thirds of the members on the register of the National Assembly for passage.
(3) Any person against whom a motion for impeachment has been passed shall be suspended from exercising his power until the impeachment has been decided.

Article 67. (1) An Impeachment Court shall be established for the purpose of hearing impeachment cases.
(2) The Impeachment Court shall be presided over by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and shall consist of four Supreme Court justices and four members of the National Assembly. However, when the President or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is tried, the Speaker of the National Assembly shall preside.

(3) The concurrence of six or more of the members of the Impeachment Court shall be required for a decision on impeachment.  
(4) A decision on impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office. However, it shall not exempt the person impeached from civil or criminal liability.  
(5) Matters pertaining to trial of impeachments shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER IV. THE EXECUTIVE

SECTION 1. The President

Article 68. (1) The executive power shall be vested in the Executive branch of government headed by the President.  
(2) The President shall represent the State in relations with foreign states.  
(3) The President shall have the responsibility and duty to safeguard the independence, territorial integrity, continuity of the State and the Constitution.  
(4) The President shall have the duty to pursue sincerely the peaceful reunification of the homeland.  
(5) The Vice President shall assist the President, and in case the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office for any reason, the Vice President shall act for him, and when the office of President becomes vacated, the Vice President shall succeed to said office.

Article 69. (1) The President and Vice President shall be elected by the people by universal, equal, direct, and secret ballot.  
(2) Citizens who are eligible for election to the National Assembly and who, as of the day of the presidential and vice presidential election, shall have attained to the age of 40 years, shall be eligible to be elected to the office of President or Vice President.  
(3) Persons seeking candidacy on a joint ticket for President and Vice President shall be nominated by the same party to which both belong.  
(4) In the election of the President and Vice President, the voter shall cast only one ballot for the joint candidates nominated by the same party.  
(5) If in the election of the President and Vice President, there be two or more candidates who have the greatest equal number of votes, then the National Assembly at an open session attended by one-half or more of the members on the register shall choose by ballot one of them who shall have a majority vote as the elected.  
(6) In case there be only one candidate each for the President and Vice President, no candidate shall be elected as President or Vice President unless the number of votes he has received is one-third or more of the total number of the votes cast.  
(7) Matters pertaining to presidential and vice presidential elections shall be determined by law.
Article 70. (1) Election for successors to the office of the President and Vice president shall be held at least 60 days before the term of office of the incumbents expires.
(2) In case of vacancy in the office of both the President and Vice President, the Prime Minister acting as President shall hold an election for President and Vice President within 60 days.
(3) In case of the death of the President-elect, or loss of his qualifications caused by a judgment or for any other reason, the Vice President-elect shall become the President-elect.
(4) In case of vacancy in the office of the Vice President, or of the Vice President-elect's death or loss of qualifications as a result of a judgment or for any other reason, the President shall designate a vice presidential candidate at the recommendation of the political party to which the President belongs, and the National Assembly shall elect the said candidate as Vice President by a majority of the members on the register of the National Assembly.

Article 71. (1) The President, at the time of his inauguration, shall take the following oath: "I do solemnly swear before the people that, by observing the Constitution, defending the State, striving for the peaceful reunification of the homeland, and endeavoring to promote the freedom and welfare of the people and to develop national culture, I will faithfully execute the duties of the President."
(2) The oath prescribed in the foregoing paragraph shall be administered in the National Assembly.

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[Text] Article 72. (1) The President and Vice President shall hold office for 4 years.
(2) Consecutive re-election shall be permissible for one time only.

Article 73. In case of a vacancy in the office of both the President and Vice President or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the Prime Minister and members of the State Council in the order of priority as determined by law shall act as President.

Article 74. The President may submit important policies relating to diplomacy, national defense, national reunification, and other matters to a national referendum if he deems it necessary.

Article 75. The President shall have power to conclude and ratify treaties; to accredit, receive or dispatch diplomatic envoys, and to declare war and conclude peace.

Article 76. (1) The President shall be Commander-in-chief of the National Armed Forces in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and law.
(2) The organization and formation of the National Armed Forces shall be provided by law.
Article 77. The President may issue presidential decrees within the framework of powers specifically delegated to him and decrees necessary for the enforcement of laws.

Article 78. (1) In time of civil war, or in a dangerous situation arising from foreign relations, or in case of a natural calamity, or on account of a grave financial or economic crisis, if it is necessary to take urgent measures for the maintenance of public order and security, the President shall have power to make minimum necessary financial dispositions or to issue orders having the effect of law, provided that time is lacking for the convocation of the National Assembly.
(2) When the nation is in a grave state of war in which national security is at stake and it is necessary to take emergency measures, the President has power to issue orders having the effect of law, provided that time is lacking for the convocation of the National Assembly.
(3) The President shall without delay notify the National Assembly of such orders and dispositions as referred to in Paragraph 1 and 2 for approval.
(4) If approval of the National Assembly is not obtained, such orders and dispositions shall lose their effect. In such case, moreover, the laws which have been amended or repealed under such orders shall as a matter of course restore their original force.
(5) The President shall without delay announce the fact of approval or disapproval as prescribed in Paragraph 3 and 4.

Article 79. (1) When there is a military necessity or a necessity to maintain the public safety and order by military forces in time of war, armed conflict or similar national emergency, the President may proclaim martial law in accordance with the provisions of law.
(2) Martial law shall have two types, extraordinary and martial law and precautionary martial law.
(3) Under extraordinary martial law, special measures may be taken, as provided for by law, with respect to freedom of speech, press, broadcast, telecast, assembly and association, and with respect to the powers of the Executive; only in areas where the court is unable to discharge its powers and duties, special measures may be taken with respect to the warrant system and the authority of the court.
(4) When martial law is proclaimed, the President shall convene the National Assembly within 7 days to obtain its concurrence. In case the President fails to obtain the concurrence of the National Assembly, or in case the National Assembly has resolved to lift martial law, martial law shall thereupon become null and void.
(5) (deleted)

Article 80. The President shall appoint public officials in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and law.

Article 81. (1) The President may grant amnesty, commutation of punishment, and restoration of rights in accordance with the provisions of law.
(2) The President shall receive the consent of the National Assembly in granting a general amnesty.
(3) Matters pertaining to amnesty, commutation of punishment, and restoration of rights shall be determined by law.
Article 82. The President shall award decorations and other honors in accordance with the provisions of law.

Article 83. The President may attend and address the National Assembly or express his views by written messages.

Article 84. The acts of the President pertaining to state affairs shall be executed in written documents and all such documents shall be countersigned by the vice president, the Prime Minister, and members of the State Council concerned. The same requirement applies in the execution of military affairs.

Article 85. The President and Vice President shall not concurrently hold the office of the Prime Minister, a member of the State Council, the head of any Executive Ministry, or other public or private posts prescribed by law.

Article 86. The President shall not be charged with a criminal offense during his tenure of office for insurrection or treason.

Article 87. Matters pertaining to the status and privileges of former Presidents shall be determined by law.

2. The Executive Branch

Sub-Section 1. The Prime Minister and Members of the State Council

Article 88. (1) the Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the National Assembly.
(2) The members of the State Council shall be appointed by the President at the recommendation of the Prime Minister.
(3) The Prime Minister shall assist the President and shall, under the order of the President, supervise the Executive Ministries in their administration.
(4) The members of the State Council shall assist the President in the conduct of State affairs and, as constituents of the State Council, shall deliberate on State affairs.
(5) No member of the military forces shall be appointed a Prime Minister or a member of the State Council unless he shall be retired from active service.
(6) The Prime Minister may recommend to the President the removal of a member of the State Council from office.

Sub-Section 2. The State Council

Article 89. (1) The State Council shall deliberate on important policies that fall within the power of the Executive.
(2) The State Council shall be composed of the President, the Vice President, the Prime Minister, and the members of the State Council, whose number shall be no more than 30 and no less than 15.
(3) The President shall be the chairman of the State Council, and the Vice President shall be the vice chairman.
Article 90. The following matters shall be referred to the State Council for deliberation:

1. Basic plans for State affairs, and general government policies;
2. Declaration of war, conclusion of peace and other important matters pertaining to foreign policy;
3. Draft amendments to the Constitution, proposals for national referendum, proposed treaties, legislative bills, and proposed Presidential Decrees;
4. Proposed budgets, closing of accounts, basic plans for disposal of State properties, contracts incurring financial obligation on the State, and other important financial matters;
5. Emergency measures by the President, and proclamation and termination of martial law;
6. Important military affairs;
7. Requests for convening an extraordinary session of the National Assembly;
8. Awarding of honors;
9. Granting amnesty, commutation and restoration of rights;
10. Matters pertaining to the determination of jurisdiction between Executive Ministries;
11. Basic plans concerning delegation or allocation of powers within the Executive;
12. Evaluation and analysis of the administration of State affairs;
13. Formulation and coordination of important policies of each Executive Ministry;
[ No 14 is missing]
15. (deleted)
16. Examination of petitions pertaining to executive policies submitted or referred to the Executive;
17. Appointment of the Prosecutor General, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff of each armed service, the presidents of national universities, ambassadors, and such other public officials and managers of important state-run enterprises as designated by law; and
18. Other matters presented by the President, the Prime Minister or a member of the State Council.

Article 91. (1) A National Security Council shall be established to advise the President on the formulation of foreign, military, and domestic policies related to national security prior to deliberation by the State Council.
(2) The meetings of the National Security Council shall be presided over by the President.
(3) The organization, scope of function and other necessary matters pertaining to the National Security Council shall be determined by law.

Sub-Section 3. The Executive Ministries.

Article 92. Heads of Executive Ministries shall be appointed by the President from among members of the State Council on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.
Article 93. The Prime Minister or the head of each Executive Ministry may, under the powers delegated by law or Presidential Decree, or ex officio, issue ordinances of the Prime Minister or the Executive Ministry concerning matters that are within their jurisdiction.

Article 94. The establishment, organization, and the scope of function of each Executive Ministry shall be determined by law.

Article 95. (1) A special prosecutor may be appointed to investigate and institute charges against offenses and misdemeanors in impeachment cases or in other cases where it would be inappropriate for ordinary investigative authorities to investigate and institute charges. 
(2) The special prosecutor shall be independent in performing his functions. 
(3) The selection and scope of functions of the special prosecutor, and other necessary matters shall be determined by law.

Sub-Section 4. The Board of Audit and Inspection

Article 96. The Board of Audit and Inspection shall be established under the President to audit the closing of accounts of revenues and expenditures, the accounts of the State and such organizations as prescribed by law, and to inspect the administrative functions of the executive agencies and public officials.

Article 97. (1) The Board of Audit and Inspection shall be composed of no less than 5 and no more than 11 commissioners, including the Chairman.
(2) The Chairman of the Board shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the National Assembly. The term of the office of Chairman shall be 4 years, and he may be reappointed only once.
(3) (deleted)
(4) The commissioners of the Board shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Chairman. The term of office of the commissioners shall be 4 years, and they may be reappointed only once.

Article 98. The Board of Audit and Inspection shall audit the closing of accounts of revenues and expenditures every year, and report the results to the President and the National Assembly in the following fiscal year.

Article 99. The organization and scope of functions of the board, the qualifications of the commissioners of the Board, the range of of the public officials subject to inspection and other necessary matters shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER V. THE COURTS

Article 100. (1) The judicial power shall be vested in courts composed of judges.
(2) The courts shall consists of the Supreme Court, which is the highest court of the State, and other courts at specified levels.
(3) Qualifications for judges shall be determined by law.

Article 101. (1) Departments may be established in the Supreme Court.
(2) (deleted)
(3) There shall be Supreme Court Justices at the Supreme Court. However, judges other than Supreme Court Justices may be assigned to the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of law.
(4) The number of the Supreme Court Justices shall be 18.
(5) The organization of the Supreme Court and lower courts shall be determined by law.

Article 102. Judges shall judge independently according to their conscience and in conformity with the Constitution and law.

Article 103. (1) The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Council for the Nomination of Judges and with the consent of the National Assembly. The President, when there be such recommendation by the Council for the Nomination of Judges, shall request for the consent of the National Assembly, and when consent has been given, shall make such appointment.
(2) The Supreme Court justices other than the Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Chief Justice made with the consent of the Council for the Nomination of Judges. When such recommendation is made, the President shall be obligated to make the appointment.
(3) Judges other than the Chief Justice and Supreme Court justices shall be appointed by the Chief Justice on the resolution passed by the College of Supreme Court Justices.
(4) The Council for the Nomination of Judges shall be composed of six members selected by the College of Supreme Court Justices, three members selected by the Korean Bar Association, two members nominated by the Present from among those who have qualifications as judges, and two members selected by the National Assembly.
(5) Necessary matters pertaining to the Council for the Nomination of Judges shall be determined by law.

Article 104. (1) The term of office of the Chief Justice shall be 6 years and he shall not be reapppointed.
(2) The term of office of the Justices of the Supreme Court shall be 6 years and they may be reappointed in accordance with the provisions of law.
(3) The term of office of judges other than the Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court shall be 10 years and they may be reappointed in accordance with the provisions of law.
(4) The Supreme Court shall be retired at the age of 70 and all other judges at the age of 65.

Article 105. (1) No judge shall be removed from office except by impeachment or criminal punishment, nor shall he be suspended from office, have his salary reduced or receive any other unfavorable treatment except by disciplinary action.
(2) In the event a judge is unable to discharge his official duties because of mental or physical impairment, he may be removed from office in accordance with the provisions of law.
Article 106. (1) When the constitutionality of a law is prerequisite to a trial, the Supreme Court shall have power to make a final review of the constitutionality.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to make a final review of constitutionality or legality of administrative decrees, regulations or dispositions, when their constitutionality or legality is a prerequisite to a trial.
(3) Administrative adjudication may be established as a procedure prior to a trial. The procedure of administrate adjudication shall be determined by law and shall be in conformity with the the principles of judicial procedures.

Article 107. The Supreme Court may establish, within the scope of law, regulations pertaining to judicial proceedings and internal rules and regulations on administrative matters of the court.

Article 108. Trials and decisions of the courts shall be open to the public. However, trials may be closed to the public by court decision when there is a danger that open trials may undermine the national security or disturb public safety and order, or be harmful to public morals.

Article 109. (1) Courts-martial may be established as special courts to exercise jurisdiction over military trials.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have the final appellate jurisdiction over courts-martial.
(3) The organization, authority of courts-martial, and the qualifications of the judges shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER VI. ELECTION MANAGEMENT

Article 110. (1) Election Management Committees shall be established for the purpose of fair management of elections and national referendums, and dealing with affairs concerning political parties.
(2) The Central Election Management Committee shall be composed of three members appointed by the President, three members selected by the National Assembly, and three members selected by the College of the Justices of the Supreme Court, and three members selected by each political party. The Chairman of the Committee shall be elected from among members.
(3) The term of office of the members of the Central Election Management Committee shall be 5 years.
(4) The members of the Central Election Management Committee, excepting the members recommended by the parties, shall not join political parties, nor shall they participate in political activities.
(5) No member of the Central Election Management Committee shall be expelled from office except by impeachment or criminal punishment.
(6) The Central Election Management Committee may, within the limit of laws and decrees, establish regulations pertaining to the management of elections, national referendums, and matters concerning political parties.
(7) The organization and scope of function, and other necessary matters pertaining to the Election Management Committees at each level shall be determined by law.
Article 111. (1) Election Management Committees at each level may issue necessary instructions to administrative agencies concerned with matters pertaining to elections and referendums such as the preparation of the rosters of voters.  
(2) Administrative agencies concerned, upon receipt of such instructions, shall comply.

Article 112. (1) Election campaigns and campaigns related to referendums shall be conducted under the management of the Election Management Committees at each level within the limit set by law. Equal opportunity shall be guaranteed.  
(2) Expenditures for elections shall not be borne by political parties or candidates or candidates, except as otherwise provided for by law.

CHAPTER 7. LOCAL AUTONOMY

Article 113. (1) Local governments shall deal with matters pertaining to the rights of local residents, manage properties, and may establish, within the limit of laws and decrees, rules and regulations regarding local autonomy.  
(2) The kinds of local government shall be determined by law.

Article 114. (1) The chief executive officers of local governments shall be elected locally by universal, equal, direct, secret vote, and the same rule shall apply to the election of the assemblies of local government bodies.  
(2) The organization, operation, election and other matters of local governments shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER 8. THE ECONOMY

Article 115. (1) The economic order of the ROK shall be based on the principle of respect for freedom and creative ideas of the individual and business enterprise in economic affairs and shall be aimed at the balanced development of the national economy.  
(2) The state shall regulate and coordinate economic affairs within the limit necessary for the realization of social justice and for the balanced development of the national economy to fulfill the basic living requirements of all citizens.  
(3) Imbalances in income resulting from the evil practices of monopoly and oligopoly and from the abuse of economic powers, and biases in the distribution system shall be strictly regulated and adjusted.  
(4) The State shall take positive measures to stabilize the livelihood, increase the income, and promote the welfare of the people in the low income bracket.

Article 116. Licenses to exploit, develop or utilize minerals and all other important underground resources, marine resources, water and other natural power sources available for economic use may be granted for limited periods of time in accordance with the provisions of law.  
(2) The land and natural resources shall be protected by the State, and the State shall establish plans to necessary for their balanced development and utilization.
Article 117. Tenant farming shall be prohibited in accordance with the provisions of law. However, appropriate measures shall be taken with respect to the leasing of farmland under unavoidable circumstances. The State may impose restrictions or obligations in the utilization and development of land for its maximum effective use and for the realization of economic and social justice in accordance with the provisions of law.

Article 119. (1) The State shall establish a plan for the overall development of farming and fishing communities necessary to protect and foster agriculture as a basic industry for national survival and to promote the welfare of farmers and fishermen, and shall support the plan and strive for the balanced development of urban and rural communities.
(2) The State shall guarantee farm prices and protect the interests of the farmers through adjustment of farm production to supply and demand and improvement in the distribution system.
(3) The State shall foster self-help organizations of farmers, fishermen and businessmen engaged in small and medium enterprises and shall guarantee their initiatives and development.

Article 120. The State shall, in accordance with the provisions of law, guarantee the consumer protection movement intended to encourage sound consumption activities and to urge improvement in the quality of products.

Article 121. The State shall foster foreign trade, and may regulate and coordinate it.

Article 122. Private enterprises shall not be nationalized or transferred to public ownership, nor shall their management be controlled or administered by the State, except in cases determined by law to meet urgent necessities of national defense or the national economy.

Article 123. (1) The State shall strive to develop the national economy through the renovation of science and technology and the development of information and manpower.
(2) The State shall protect and foster the business activities of small and medium enterprises.
(3) The State shall guarantee the neutrality of the Central Bank so that it may formulate and execute currency and credit policies and business independently and on its own initiative.
(4) The State shall establish a system of national standards.
(5) The President may establish an advisory body for the purpose referred to in Paragraph 1.

CHAPTER 9. AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION

Article 124. (1) A proposal to amend the Constitution shall be proposed either by the President or by a majority of the members on the register of the National Assembly.
(2) (same as current provision) [Amendments to the Constitution for the extension of the term of office of the President or for a change allowing for the reelection of the President shall not be effective for the President in office at the time of the proposal for such amendments to the Constitution.]
Article 125. Proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be put before the public by the President for 25 days or more.

Article 126. (1) The National Assembly shall decide upon the proposed amendments within 60 days of the public announcement, and passage by the National Assembly shall require the concurrence of two-thirds or more of the members on the register of the National Assembly.
(2) The proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be submitted to a national referendum not later than 30 days after passage by the National Assembly, and shall be determined by more than one-half of all votes cast by more than one-half of voters eligible to vote in elections for members of the National Assembly.
(3) When the proposed amendments to the Constitution receive the concurrence prescribed in Paragraph 2, the amendments to the Constitution shall be finalized, and the President shall promulgate it without delay.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS

Article 1. (1) This Constitution shall enter into force as of the date of its promulgation. However, the enactment or amendment of laws, and other preparations necessary for the enforcement of this Constitution may be executed before this Constitution shall take effect.
(2) Such provisions of this Constitution as shall be inoperative without the enactment or amendment of law shall enter into force when there has been such enactment or amendment.

Article 2. (1) The first presidential election under this Constitution shall be held no less than 30 days before the expiration of the term of office of the President incumbent at the time of amendment of the Constitution.
(2) The term of office of the first President under this Constitution shall begin on the day following the expiration of the term of office of the President incumbent at the time this Constitution enters into force.

Article 3. (1) The first National Assembly election under this Constitution shall be held no less than ( ) days following the first day of the term of office of the first President elected under this Constitution, and the term of the members of the National Assembly so elected shall begin the first day the National Assembly convenes.
(2) The term of office of the members of the National Assembly incumbent at the time this Constitution enters into force shall expire on the day preceding the first day the National Assembly convenes under this Constitution.

Article 4. Laws, decrees, ordinances and treaties in force at the time this Constitution enters into force shall remain valid unless they conflict with this Constitution.

Article 5. Public officials and government-appointed executive officers of public corporations who are holding positions at the effective date of this Constitution shall be regarded as having been appointed under this Constitution.
However, in case the method of appointment has changed or in case the officials having appointive authority have changed in consequence of this Constitution, such officials and officers shall continue to execute their functions until such time as their successors shall be appointed under this Constitution. In such cases, the term of office of the outgoing officials shall expire when their successors are appointed.

Article 6. (1) Agencies which at the effective date of this Constitution, are executing such functions as shall fall within the powers of the organs which shall be newly established under this Constitution, shall continue to exist until such time as new agencies shall be established under this Constitution. (2) The agencies which shall be established under this Constitution shall be formed within 6 months after the effective date of this Constitution. (3) Elections for the chief executive officers of local governments and local assemblies under this Constitution shall be held no less than ( ) days after the effective date of this Constitution.

Article 7. The amendment or abolition of the laws which shall otherwise become null and void due to its conflict with the provisions of this Constitution or the enactment of new laws to replace them shall be completed no later than 1 year after the effective date of this Constitution.

Article 8. The Constitution Committee, the Advisory Council on State Affairs, the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy existing at the effective date of this Constitution shall be abolished.

13311
CSO: 41070234
TONG-A ILBO ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION TALKS

SK021035 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 31 Jul 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Magnanimity Worthy of a Great Party--Negotiations for Constitutional Revision Should Not Be Stranded]

[Text] The eight-man political talks of the DJP and the Reunification Democratic Party [RDP] ran aground shortly before they began because of an unexpected ambush. The talks were about to be inaugurated with the exhilarant dream of preparing an agreed draft of a revised Constitution on which the people have pinned their expectations. The eight-man talks, which had been scheduled to hold their first session in the National Assembly on 30 July to exchange greetings among the participants, became abortive because of fierce opposition by the New Korea Democratic Party and the Korea National Party, which occupied the meeting site.

Expectantly watching the start of negotiations for constitutional revision, the people were very disappointed by this incident. Their path is long, and they have much work to do. On top of that, they lost much time because of the flood damage. They worry whether the political schedule is put into effect as scheduled when negotiations for constitutional revision is delayed because of the incident which occurred at the start of the talks.

Although we understand the position of the NKDP and the KNP and their opposition, we do not regard their occupation of the meeting side to hinder the talks as commendable behavior, taking the wide view of the act. Just as some people termed the eight-man talks as not one-man dictatorship but two-man dictatorship, the act will likely be termed as despotism by the minority.

Of course, the party that has seats in the National Assembly should have as much right to speak as the number of the seats. Accordingly, even if the National Assembly is operated based on the principle majority rule, bills are dealt with with the proviso that the opinion of the minority has been taken into consideration. Needless to say, the principle of democracy is to value the opinion of the minority according to the share it takes, although majority rule is important.

Just as the RDP has noted, the eight-man talks are not National Assembly-level talks but party-to-party political negotiations, which differ from the special
committee for constitutional revision formed in the National Assembly last year. Therefore, the minority represented by the NKDP and KNP, which holds 56 seats in the National Assembly, will be given an opportunity to speak in the National Assembly in the course of the review of the draft of the revised Constitution.

We understand why the RDP much more strongly insists on the eight-man talks than the DJP and why the former rejects the NKDP more than the KNP. It is certain that the RDP believes that the NKDP, which was the RDP's political colleague before the split of the party, did not consistently keep pace with it in leading the situation in favor of a direct presidential election system.

However, we believe that at this crucial moment, the RDP, sticking to the past incident, should not prevent the work of adopting a democratic Constitution based on the national consensus. As a matter of fact, the distribution of seats in the National Assembly is the result of the multiparty system and the legacy of the old politics. It will be sorry if the RDP, the first opposition party which is trying to become a ruling party, fails to display the spirit of magnanimity.

We believe that if participation by the NKDP and the KNP changes the 8-man talks to 10-man talks, there will be no change in the trend of the times. Accordingly, the RDP should view the issue, taking the wide view of the situation and display the spirit of magnanimity worthy of a great party.

If every party concerned asserts that it alone struggled to achieve democracy and that its merits are the greatest in this regard, many off-stage forces will emerge to the fore to speak.

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ANALYST ASSESSES CONSTRUCTION REVISION TALKS

SK010658 Seoul YONHAP in English 0622 GMT 1 Aug 87

[Article by Kim Tae-sik]

[Text] Seoul, 1 Aug (YONHAP)--Amid keen interest at home and abroad, South Korea's two major political parties launched their first negotiations Friday to revise the constitution l month after the dramatic 29 June declaration of democratic reforms by ruling party Chairman No Tae-u.

Described by foreign news media as "dramatic concessions" to opposition demands, No's surprising eight-point proposal, most noticeably called for a direct presidential election and amnesty and restoration of dissident leader Kim Tae-chung's civil rights--two items persistently demanded by the opposition and adamantly rejected by the ruling group.

The bipartisan meeting was a product of No's proposal.

In the inaugural meeting Friday evening, representatives of the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) and the opposition Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) agreed to draft a new constitution by 20 August.

The committee consists of four senior officials from the ruling DJP and four from the opposition parties.

Although there are some minor problems between the two parties due to their differing views, optimism prevails because the chief stumbling blocks--the power structure and the method of electing the president--have been resolved by No's proposal.

The amnesty and restoration of Kim Tae-chung's civil rights on 9 July provides further cause for optimism. The issue of Kim Tae-chung's amnesty had served as a major obstacle preventing the smooth operation of the National Assembly's constitutional revision committee, they said.

The two sides also agreed on such knotty issues as the restoration of the National Assembly's right to investigate state affairs; the repeal of the president's emergency powers; and the full guarantee of workers' rights, including the right of collective action.
Another advantage of the eight-member panel is that it consists of a small number of experienced delegates who have influence in their respective parties. One of the reasons behind the failure of the earlier constitutional revision committee was that it consisted of 50 people representing all political factions in the National Assembly.

Bipartisan delegates to the eight-member committee are Kwon Ik-hyun, Yun Kil Chung, Choe Yong-chol, and Yi Han-tong from the DJP; and Yi Chung-chae, Pak Yong-man, Yi Yong-hui, and Kim Tong-yong from the RDP.

Rep Kwon had served as chairman of the ruling party while Yun and Choe are veteran politicians having served as vice speakers in the National Assembly. Yi was a former floor leader of the ruling party. All four RDP delegates are vice presidents of the opposition party. Kim and Pak are from the faction led by party President Kim Yong-sam while the other two vice presidents are from the faction led by Kim Tae-chung.

Despite the optimism for an early settlement of the constitutional revision, the prospects for a compromise at an early date still remain uncertain because the rival parties differ in their views on some points such as the tenure of the president, the voting age, and the question of a vice president.

The ruling party suggested a single 6-year term for the next president, while the opposition is insisting on a 4-year term and allowing the president to be re-elected to one more term.

The opposition RDP favors the installation of a vice president while the DJP opposes it.

The RDP's suggestion for a vice president may have resulted from the consideration that Kim Yong-sam and Kim Tae-chung may adopt a "running mate" system in case they cannot compromise on a single presidential candidate.

The outcome of the presidential election will be influenced by the course of action taken by the two Kims. If both Kims run in the election, the prospects for a ruling party victory will be greatly enhanced.

As for the voting age, the DJP seeks to maintain it as it stands now—at 20, while the opposition RDP insists on lowering it by 2 years. There are some 1.7 million people aged 18 and 19 in the country and the opposition thinks lowering the voting age to 18 would greatly boost their presidential election prospects.

Another problem concerns rewriting the constitution's preamble, which observers say is a rather symbolic matter but still sensitive.

The opposition party insists that the description of the 18 May 1980 Kwangju uprising should be included in the preamble, while the DJP opposes it saying "it is premature."
Political observers expect the delegates of both parties are expected to undertake substantial bargaining on these issues through both official and behind-the-scenes contacts.

They have reserved room for concessions or modification of their positions on these issues, the observers said.

As for the suffrage age, the rival parties may compromise settling on 19 years old or lowering the age to 18 as the opposition insists but make the lowered age effective not from the upcoming 13th presidential election, but from the 14th presidential election, they said.

There is a possibility that the rival parties would agree to the RDP's proposal on the president's term of office—a 4-year term and one additional term by re-election—while agreeing with the DJP and not creating the post of vice president.

Besides the differing views of the rival parties, the competition between Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam over who will run in the presidential election may face an unexpected obstacle, observers worry.

Kim Yong-sam, the opposition party president, hopes to reach a bipartisan agreement as soon as possible in order to retain his political advantage over Kim Tae-chung who has yet to formally join the RDP.

Kim Tae-chung, allowed to engage in politics effective 9 July, does not hope for speedy progress in the negotiations, they noted.

If the competition between the two Kims intensifies, it would adversely affect the constitutional negotiations, they said.

At any rate, the two parties presented a tentative schedule for the new constitution to be drafted by the end of this month with deliberations on other laws such as the presidential election law beginning in September.

In order to settle problems concerning the differences in the constitutional revision politically, there is a good possibility for a meeting between RDP President Kim Yong-sam and DJP acting President No Tae-u.

/9599
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TWO KIMS RELATIONSHIP, UPCOMING ELECTION EXAMINED

Future of Relationship

Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 6 Jul 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Two Kims Future Relationship]

[Text] On the road to democracy, the relationship between the two Kims is emerging as a matter of great interest to the people. The focus of the attention is on whether the two Kims will indeed continue to maintain a cooperative relationship as they have recently, or whether they will go their separate ways to gain power as they did in 1980.

For this reason, the two Kims' meeting held last weekend was enough to attract the attention of the people. Especially, as their somewhat different views on how to deal with the various issues of interest, such as the question of forming a national neutral cabinet, have surfaced, the outcome of their meeting was the focus of attention.

But the six points on which they reached an agreement show that they have found areas in which they can compromise. Their differences on the question of forming a national neutral cabinet were settled by "making a recommendation to the ruling party," and reportedly, they have agreed to put off talks on the constitutional revision until after amnesty has been granted to Kim Tae-chung and his civil rights reinstated.

Solutions have been put off to the questions that are more complex and difficult such as the single candidacy in the forthcoming presidential election and the power sharing between the Sangdo-dong faction and the Tongkyo-dong faction within the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP). The only thing that they have agreed upon is that Kim Tae-chung may join the RDP and become its permanent advisor after amnesty has been granted to him and his civil rights reinstated; however, this may possibly turn into a factor which complicates the two Kims' relationship.

The fact is that the relationship of the two Kims holds political significance beyond a simple human relationship; it has a direct bearing on the realization of democracy in the days ahead. The foreign press' speculation about the future, and the speculations of the capital are necessarily based on judgments at the elementary level.
Of course, it may be burdensome for the two Kims that their relationship is viewed as holding the most important key to the realization of democracy. They might feel particularly dismayed by the fact that they find themselves in a position of having to come up with solutions to all of the issues and having to make decisions without leaving them to either the people or the party members.

At the threshold of democratization, it is unreasonable to speculate how the two men's relationship will develop. Their relationship will be redefined often by the turn of events and the change of circumstances.

The only thing that can be said at this point is that—it should be stressed—the two Kims' relationship should not turn into something that chills the hope for democracy, which is just budding. It should not have a negative influence on it. The much-needed opportunity for political reform ahead and the fruit of the long struggle for democracy with blood and sweat should not be allowed to go down the drain through a rift between these two men.

For this reason, it is not desirable for the press to exaggerate to the people the minor differences of opinion between the two men. Unlike the party in power, which is shrouded behind a veil, the moves of the opposition parties or the opposition circle are completely open. This is not an overstatement. Therefore, their relationship could be poisoned by disseminating and exaggerating very trivial matters.

The news media should, of course, exercise restraint, but what is most essential in this regard is that the two men exercise self-control in expressing their views. It appears wise for them to observe the turn of events calmly and act prudently.

Further, close associates and members of the factions of the two Kims must also do their utmost to exercise self-control in words and deeds so as not to create discord between the two men.

Possibility of Compromise

Seoul KYONGHYANG SINMUN in Korean 11 Jul 87 p 3

[Article by reporter Song Chung-sik]

[Text] With the amnesty and reinstatement of civil rights of Kim Tae-chung, the opposition forces, as has been anticipated, are gearing up for a race for presidential nomination between the two Kims.

The greatest interest in politics since the declaration of a constitutional revision for the direct popular presidential election is undoubtedly the question of singularizing the presidential candidates in the opposition camp, and the question of which of the two Kims, who are fated to be rivals, will be chosen as presidential candidate.
If we recall the all-out competition for power between the two Kims in the spring of 1980, we will see it will be extremely difficult for the two men to avoid the pressure of public opinion, which demands the singularization of presidential candidates.

Void "Noncandidacy"

If the political styles of the two Kims, their attachment to power, and the territorial bases and interests of the Sangdo faction and the Tongkyo faction are taken into consideration, realistically, it is difficult to believe that the process of choosing a presidential candidate will be easy, even if it is assumed that the singularization of candidacy is possible.

It is true that president Kim Young-sam has maintained a relative advantage in running for the presidential nomination on the strength of his being the president of the number one opposition party, and with the belief that he has the "vested right" since Kim Tae-chung declared that he would not be a candidate.

But, immediately following his pardon and recovery of rights, Kim Tae-chung voided for all practical purposes his "declaration that he would not run," by using the "people's wishes" as his reason. He strongly hinted that he is prepared to compete with a clean slate with party President Kim for the candidacy.

The reactions of the two Kims to the question of the presidential candidacy since the "No Tae-u Declaration" contrast with the attitudes they took at the end of last year, when Kim Tae-chung declared his noncandidacy. They then competed with each other to "give up the presidential candidacy."

In the case of Kim Tae-chung, he voided his earlier noncandidacy declaration by using multistage reasoning and phraseology. Right after the 29 June declaration for a constitutional revision for the direct popular election of the president, on the validity of his noncandidacy declaration, he commented that "he was not interested in the presidency," and went on to say that "it is not the right time to bring up the question of candidacy." When his pardon and restoration of rights became imminent, he argued that the situation had changed. He said, "At this time, when a constitutional revision for the direct popular election of the president is possible because of the efforts of the people, the situation is different from the time when I declared that I would not run."

He hinted at his interest in running right after he had gained pardon and had his rights restored with this remark: "Whether I should run or not will be decided after listening directly to the public opinion." At the same time, he stressed the singularization of presidential candidacy from the opposition camp. He thus released himself from the restraint under the noncandidacy declaration, and talked about the rationale for a race to singularize the candidacy.

Party President Kim also revealed his interest in power by leaking his interest in running to foreign reporters. He told them, "I never said that I would not
run, departing from his earlier position that "the presidential disease has been cured."

Three Difficult Problems

Accordingly, as of now, the question of singularization of candidacy for the two Kims has boiled down to two alternatives: "compromise" or "competition"; because neither is likely to unconditionally give up the candidacy nor support the other's candidacy.

There are three difficult problems to be settled before the two Kims can produce a single candidate through compromise. First of all, they must remove themselves from the obsession that "the present challenge for power might be the last chance in their political careers."

On the one hand, party President Kim's side seems to conclude from the standpoint of the general turn of events, as it did in the spring of 1980, that "since Kim Tae-chung had a chance before, it is now President Kim's turn to run." On the other hand, Kim Tae-chung's side maintains that Kim Tae-chung was not only the man who gave the toughest challenge to both the late President Pak Chong-hui in the 1970's and the present regime, but also that he is a politician who should be entitled to compensation for his long ordeal.

Secondly, a problem lies in their different regional political bases, Young-nam and Honam. The Sangdo-dong faction maintains that if indeed Kim Tae-chung becomes a presidential candidate, there will not be a confrontation between the ruling forces and the opposition forces, but there will instead be a regional confrontation between Young-nam and Honam; and as a result, the governing forces might possibly encroach upon Young-nam. In contrast, the Tongkyo-dong faction's logic is that in order to avenge "the bitterness of Honam," reflected in incidents such as the Kwangju incident, Kim Tae-chung's candidacy is inevitable.

Thirdly, the Sangdo-dong faction's logic is that if Kim Tae-chung, who has long been shunned by the ruling circles and the middle class, again plays to "the politics of the wind," by joining the radical opposition and student forces, the military and the hard-liners will emerge and a vicious cycle of retaliatory politics will be a possibility. As a consequence, political stability could be damaged. But, the Tongkyo-dong faction maintains that the radical image of Kim Tae-chung was merely concocted by past regimes to damage him, and that this very aspect of his image can help calm down the radical forces and prevent the politics of retaliation.

Campaign Tactics

In view of such tight logic on both sides, the only way to produce a single candidate by compromise will be to define their relationship passively and artificially through the assurance of a single term, by one running as a running mate, or by role-sharing between the presidency and the party presidency.
But if in case such a compromise is not reached, the question of the singularization of candidacy will very likely end up in competition. Kim Tae-chung's statement hinting—choice by competition—that "it is not necessary to tastelessly produce a candidate early"—is based on the logic that choice by competition is a tradition of the democratic opposition party and it is "competition with good intentions." Displaying unity by producing a single candidate following competition is also a way to gain the support of the people.

In other words, the view is that attracting the people's concentrated attention in an open game channels attention to the main game. Choosing the winner is a kind of election tactic which dilutes the image of the other party's candidate.

In connection with choice by competition, in the spring of 1980 when Kim Tae-chung refused to join the party, his faction was relatively a minority faction, but, now, in the case of the RDP, their power is completely 50:50. For Kim Tae-chung, who views that many votes of the Sangdo-dong faction are fluid, there is no good reason for him to stay away from the choice by competition within the party.

But party President Kim's side stresses more strongly than Kim Tae-chung's the unity of the two Kims by saying that "under no circumstances am I interested in confrontation by votes." The logic of President Kim's side is that if in case the decision on a presidential candidate is delayed to the extent that it must be left to a vote, much energy would be wasted in the fight and, therefore, a confrontation between the two factions would be inevitable.

Time Limit for Cooperation

Their differences on choice by competition are reflected in their words. President Kim states, "I will cooperate with Kim Tae-chung even after democratic reform is achieved." Kim Tae-chung drew the line: "I will cooperate with President Kim until democratic reform is achieved." But in the case that the two Kims are unable to reach an agreement, even in choice by competition, it cannot be ruled out that Kim Tae-chung, by bringing up the question of inviting the opposition circles, may use the possibility of the opposition forming a new party as a means to apply pressure.

The Kim Tae-chung side is very likely to singularize the candidacy through a 2:1 power struggle by using the representatives of the opposition movement circles in addition to the 50 percent share of the party that he has already built up. Words about staging a "demonstration of support" are already circulating.

At any rate, unlike in 1980, the question of a single candidacy between the two Kims is growing inevitably and increasingly intense. It is a painful process because of the pressure of the time; the single candidacy question should be decided within 3 or 4 months at the most.
Candidate Selection

Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 18 Jul 87 p 3

[Text] Since the granting of amnesty and reinstatement of civil rights of Kim Tae-chung, co-chairman of the Council for the Promotion of Democracy, the attention of the political world is being focused on the question of having one presidential candidate from the opposition circles. Chairman Kim himself and his close associates have been making statements which nullify the "declaration of condition noncandidacy for presidency" that he made last year. Therefore, it will be interesting to watch the race.

Whether such a change in attitude on the part of the Tongkyo-dong faction should be regarded logically as a repeat of the noncandidacy declaration or merely as a declaration of "void" is not yet clear. So far, both dimensions still seem to be there.

Especially, the regular gathering of the People's Rights Society, held on the 17th, where Chairman Kim's declaration of noncandidacy was formally voided, also maintained that since the acceptance of the direct presidential election system as the condition for the noncandidacy declaration was rejected the minute the 13 April decision to keep the existing constitution was announced, the declaration of noncandidacy itself was accordingly voided. Also, since the presidential candidate is chosen in accordance with the will of the people, the past declaration is not a particular problem.

According to analysis, the first of the two points is the result of a "logical study" conducted mainly by the close associates of Chairman Kim; the second point is based on the wishes of Chairman Kim's supporters, who are scattered all over the country.

According to a source who is familiar with the proceedings at the key faction leader's meeting, held on the 24th of last month, right after Chairman Kim's house arrest was lifted, when the present question was discussed, Secretary General Kim Yong-pae alone argued that "so long as there is no voluntary acceptance of the direct presidential election system, the noncandidacy declaration is not binding." Vice presidents of the party, Yi Chung-che, and Yi Yong-hi took the attitude that the pledge given by a public figure must be kept.

While the pro and con talks were going on even within the faction, Chairman Kim remarked in an interview on the 8th, on the occasion of the granting of amnesty and reinstatement of his civil rights, that "the acceptance of the direct election system by the government and the ruling party is not done voluntarily by President Chon, but is a result of the struggles of the people." He thus hinted for the first time at a changed attitude.

Until this time, the faction had not taken the position that Chairman Kim's noncandidacy declaration had become void because of the 13 April decision; however, since the Tongkyo-dong breakfast meeting of political affairs council members belonging to his faction, the idea that "the noncandidacy
declaration was voided with the 13 April decision to keep the present constitution" has come to prevail. The story goes that from this time on, the atmosphere has been changed to encourage Chairman Kim to "make up his mind in favor of running."

If so, the efforts of the National Assembly members belonging to the People's Rights Society to avoid the noncandidacy declaration on the 17th mean that the argument within the Tongkyo-dong faction of supporting Chairman Kim as a presidential candidate has completed its initial process of consolidating its factional opinions. Thus, it will advance to the next stage, which is to turn the public opinion in favor of this. This is the view of the people both in and out of the party.

Along with the process of forming such a logic of conversion, another noticeable feature, growing in the outer-periphery of politics, is the phenomenon of pressure for Chairman Kim to reverse his declaration.

According to the secretaries of Chairman Kim, since right after the lifting of his house arrest at the end of last month, "there have been many telephone calls every day urging him to run for the presidency this time, expressing the will of the people. Also, especially, since the beginning of this week, his supporters, mainly from the central Young-nam regions such as Pusan, Kwangju, Masan, Taejon, Kimchon and Wulsan, have been coming up to Seoul in groups of 100 or 200 to urge him in person to reverse the noncandidacy declaration."

Because of such collective moves, Chairman Kim's Tongkyo-dong residence and the office of the People's Rights Society at Kongdok-dong are daily bustling with people. Most of these people from the provinces are guided by those who wish to become the organization leaders in their respective regions. This may be viewed as a special feature.

Along with such developments, Chairman Kim, since he gained freedom, has been making his existence known by giving speeches before large crowds, including a visit to headquarters of the National Movement, attendance at the memorial service for Yi Han-yol, and a visit with the people holding a sit-in at the RDP headquarters.

Further, since Chairman Kim wants to make a decision on the question of his candidacy after listening to public opinion, during his forthcoming tour of the country, including Kwangju, Taechon, and Pusan, the move to "support Kim Tae-chung to be the party's candidate," which may rise spontaneously or systematically, is already attracting the attention of the people.

It appears that Chairman Kim's own decision on the question of candidacy and his compromise with party President Kim will become clear only after the completion of his tour of the country. The question of Chairman Kim's joining the RDP will be settled only then.

The members of the Tongkyo-dong faction speculate that the time will be after the end of August, sometime in September.
President Kim Young-sam's Sangdo-dong faction is very sensitive about the move of the Tongkyo-dong faction, and is laboring to come up with a countermeasure.

Although the Sangdo-dong faction is showing a generous reaction by viewing "the Kim Tae-chung draft," that is rising in the Tongkyo-dong circle, as an expected move, in reality, the atmosphere is rather confusing, as it is unable to come up with a counterstrategy which will make "the draft strategy" die.

Especially, as the question of candidacy is a delicate problem for these two factions, it is clearly seen that along with President Kim, even the assembly members of his faction either are refusing to comment on or are restraining their reactions to the resolution of the People's Rights Society to void the noncandidacy declaration on the 17th, and to the movement urging Kim Tae-chung to run.

According to the analysis of the Sangdo-dong faction, the sympathy for his long political persecutions, the elaborate strategy to forestall the opponent in capturing the presidential candidacy, the expectations of the young people who have never met Chairman Kim, and the freedom of activities he enjoys not as a party member but as an individual are reasons to expect a "draft" movement for Chairman Kim.

Accordingly, the Sangdo-dong faction sees that the "Tongkyo-dong draft" will probably not calm down for a while, and it says that it will "exercise self-restraint since countermeasures in the same form are not desirable." But it is suffering internal agony because it is unable to come with a clear countermeasure.

The Sangdo-dong faction foresees that the Tongkyo-dong faction will negotiate on the choosing of a presidential candidate from the position that Chairman Kim is riding the tide of public opinion by making personal tours of the country, and by mobilizing all the factional organization forces, instead of negotiating on a person-to-person basis.

Accordingly, some Assembly members of the Sangdo-dong faction are complaining that Chairman Kim "should either clarify his decision or come up with a measure." The close key associates of President Kim hint that "from next week a counterstrategy will be studied."

But the Sangdo-dong faction views the "choosing of a presidential candidate by competition" as the last resort, and at present, it is maintaining the view that President Kim has already clarified his position: promote political negotiations as soon as possible, and bring Chairman Kim into the party as soon as possible. But the Tongkyo-dong faction, including the chairman himself, maintains that both of these do not require haste. This baffles the Sangdo-dong side.

What the Sangdo-dong faction has in mind is to continue to hold the hegemony in the party by pushing political negotiations, which are the major currents of politics: to limit the activities of Chairman Kim as much as possible by bringing him into the party as a member; and smoothly to steer the problem of the presidential candidacy in the direction of President Kim.
The reaction of the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) to the voiding of the declaration of noncandidacy by Kim Tae-chung, co-chairman of the Council for Promotion of Democracy, is reflected in the remark made by spokesman Yi Min-sop: "It is contrary to politician ethics, but it is not surprising."

According to a report of the DJP study of the effects of the two Kims' relationship following the granting of amnesty and reinstatement of civil rights of Chairman Kim on the forthcoming presidential election, if Chairman Kim runs, it has a better chance to win.

In connection with this, a party official said that "they party continues to analyze the situation where both Kims are running as candidates, and where only one runs." He explained that "taking regional aspects and personal image into consideration, at this time, the general opinion is that Chairman Kim is easier to handle."

The DJP's attitude is that it observes developments with the belief that the longer the two Kims fight like "dogs in a muddy field," the less the DJP has to lose.

12474/13046
CSO: 4107/228
KIM TAE-CHUNG JOINS RDP AS ADVISOR 7 AUGUST

SK070005 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 7 Aug 87 p 1

[Text] Kim Tae-chung will join the major opposition Unification Democratic Party [RDP] as a permanent advisor today.

The decision was made in a meeting between RDP President Kim Yong-sam and Kim Tae-chung at the Council for the Promotion of Democracy yesterday.

Kim Tae-chung will submit a formal entry application to the party today and an official entrance ceremony will be held at the headquarters of the main opposition party Saturday.

After the hour-long meeting yesterday, the two Kims said that their cooperation and unity will continue in the future.

The two Kims also agreed that representatives of their two factions in the party will work jointly to hammer out bi-partisan agreement on the revision of the constitution in the ongoing negotiations with the ruling Democratic Justice Party.

They also shared the identical view yesterday that the neutrality of the military in politics is key to the full blossoming of democracy in Korea.

They urged the government to implement the eight-point democratization pledges made by DJP President No Tae-u without fail.

The opposition leaders vowed that the RDP will seek to abolish the controversial Basic Press Law in the upcoming extra House session to ensure the freedom of the press.

They expressed "serious concern" about those held in jail for political reasons, urging the government to make an additional release of political prisoners.

As to the problem of the neutrality of the military in politics, they said "political military leaders should return to their sole duty of the defense of the nation."
"We render our full support and encouragement to the majority of soldiers who are engrossed in the defesne and security of the fatherland," the two Kims said in a prepared statement.

"If the military intervenes in politics again, the whole democratization movement as well as the formulation of a new constitution will come to naught," the statement said.

"We do not exclude the possibility that the military will intervene in the politics, nullify the bi-partisan constitution and seize power again as they did in 1980," they warned.

Although Kim Tae-chung decided to enter the party as permanent advisor, the two Kims did not agree on who should become the next opposition presidential candidate and when the decision would be made on the candidacy.

However, a senior RDP post-holder said that Kim Tae-chung had accepted the invitation to join the party on condition that the presidential candidacy issue will not be raised until after the ruling and opposition parties finalize a bi-partisan constitution.

There was also no discussion of whether the RDP should accept non-RDP lawmakers or other dissident figures and when.

They also did not make any announcement about whether presidential and parliamentarian elections should be held simultaneously or separately. They said these matters will be discussed later.

In conversations with reporters, Kim Yong-sam and Kim Tae-chung said that the RDP will surely succeed in putting up one single presidential candidate.

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CSO: 4100/295
IMPACT OF KIM TAE-CHUNG'S POLITICAL FREEDOM ANALYZED

Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean 9 Jul 87 p 3

[Article by reporter Ho Nam-chin]

[Text] The most difficult topic in ruling and opposition parties' negotiations concerning constitutional revision—that of "amnesty and reinstatement of civil rights"—was finally resolved by the government's measures on 9 July.

In the short run, the recent "amnesty and reinstatement of civil rights" may be termed a kind of guarantee "card" underwriting the 29 June announcement; in longer-range terms it may more broadly be analyzed as a course correction in the principles established when the current regime began.

Among other things, the political emancipation of the particular individual Mr Kim Tae-chung and the lifting of the political oppression symbolized during that time by "Kim Tae-chung" may be cited as the fundamental political significance of the recent measures.

Of course, Mr Kim has had the title of co-chairman of the Council for Promotion of Democracy [CPD] since the 12 February general elections, together with the Reunification Democratic Party (RPD) president Kim Yong-sam, he has exercised unequalled influence on actual politics, in reality conducting political activities all along.

However, Kim Tae-chung has been thoroughly rejected and ignored by the present regime, as seen in the fact that he has been under extraordinary restrictions; under house arrest 55 times, and confined to his house for 183 days.

Now, Chairman Kim is legally free to conduct political activities, and as far as the current government is concerned has been allowed to escape from the political burdens and suffering that accompanied the restrictions on his civil rights.

Thus Chairman Kim has been allowed to return to the public political stage after an absence of 7 years. What political changes will result from this public return to politics is a question attracting attention at this important and decisive juncture.
First, with his full-fledged political emergence, the possibility of a reorganization within the opposition is being predicted. And as a result, unavoidably, the relation between ruling and opposition sides comes into question, and there is a great possibility of change in the basic structure of the political situation.

So far, with respect to every issue he (Kim Tae-chung) is saying "there is time, so we don't want to be hasty," but, he is conscious of the scrutiny of groups that reject him. Although if he really exercises the unique influence he has and his "politics of the masses", the political situation may well heat up and it will not be easy to forecast the direction and velocity of the whirlwind he will cause in the days to come.

From now on, the matter of greatest concern is the problem of coordinating the presidential candidacy between Kim Yong-sam and Kim Tae-chung.

Both say (1) they will not repeat the mistakes of 1980; (2) they will not cause concern for the people; and (3) they will not stage a vote-getting confrontation. Both are making assurances that there will be a single, unified opposition candidacy. However, there so far is no indication at all that either intends to yield to the other.

Party President Kim Yong-sam has never said he will not run, and Chairman Kim Tae-chung, although he says "there is still no change of my mind" concerning his no-run announcement of this past 4 November, still states that he "will be directed by the opinions of the people," and strongly hints that he may reconsider his decision, depending on the circumstances.

The camp of party President Kim Yong-sam, while emphasizing its rich respect for Kim Tae-chung, states that "In order fully to achieve democracy, the candidate should be a person acceptable to any political force; at the major crossroads of transfer of power, this is the only path that will benefit the country and the people."

On the other hand, the Kim Tae-chung side takes the opposing view that "The only person who can persuade the strong voices of the democratization movement in the days to come is, after all, Kim Tae-chung, who has suffered the most oppression. As for the most difficult problem—that of Kwangju—how, after all, can someone who was not the instigator be able to resolve it?"

As for ways of solving the problem of a unified candidacy for the two Kim's, there are (1) a competitive election; (2) negotiations between the two; and (3) mediation by a third party. However, since they say they will not have a competitive election, there is no choice but for the two to negotiate or for third-party mediation. The two sides, in order to be the first to occupy the advantageous high ground, are beginning to compete to widen their base among off-stage groups, such as the people's movement headquarters, and meanwhile they appear to be showing off their popular support to each other.

Party President Kim Yong-sam's strategy is to carry out constitutional revision negotiations quickly, while at the same time enhancing his image among the
people by taking the leadership in the political situation, exercising his
vested powers as party president to the utmost.

Chairman Kim Tae-chung, it seems certain, will adopt the method of direct
dialogue with the people. Saying that "unlike 1980, I will have some leeway to
act," and "visiting Kwangju and participating in the Mangwol Dong worship serv-
ice are just to console the people; I have no intention of giving a speech."
Nonetheless, several of those in his entourage are already hinting that the
central city will close up shop for the occasion. It is known that some forces
supporting Kim Tae-chung are planning a rally to congratulate him on his pardon
and recovery of rights, and invitations to speak at universities, etc., are also
anticipated.

The two Kim's have agreed that Chairman Kim Tae-chung will join the Reunifica-
tion Democratic Party through an induction ceremony as standing advisor, and
the head of the party is in agreement with the postponement of the question of
the admission of off-stage personages until after the presidential election.

Accordingly, for the time being, it is believed certain that the RDP will carry
on with a structure that has Kim Yong-sam as party president and Kim Tae-chung
as standing advisor.

However, an unseen collision is fully anticipated between party President Kim
Yong-sam, who seeks to firm up his command of the party, and Chairman Kim
Tae-chung, who continues to seek to expand his base of support among the off-
stage constituency.

Chairman Kim Tae-chung's return to politics may also bring changes to negotia-
tions between the ruling and opposition sides. It is beginning to appear that
he will insist upon being seated at future three- or four-party talks between
the ruling and opposition sides. On this subject, it has become known that the
Democratic Justice Party (DJP) side has been keenly observing activities within
the opposition camp—in particular the establishment of relations between the
two Kim's—and also is seriously studying opening a channel for dialogue with
Chairman Kim Tae-chung.

Moreover, although there are some dissenting voices, the question of producing
a single candidate among the two Kim's is expected to arise, and two distinct
election strategies also are rumored to be under preparation.

The recent amnesty and reinstatement of Kim Tae-chung's civil rights brings
both qualitative and quantitative reinforcement to the opposition party by
bringing numerous behind the scenes and off-stage political persons into insti-
tutional politics. Accordingly, it has the significance of increasing the
importance of institutional politics as well.

However, this is apt to be expressed in a variety of voices, and it cannot
completely be ruled out that disharmony, rather than reinforcement, may be the
result.
It is difficult to say that the recent amnesty and reinstatement of civil rights affect solely the personage whose civil rights were stripped away. It also signifies a change where the era of the unfair political game, in which one side had its hands tied, is past; now a fair political game must be played. It says that the background to the recent amnesty and reinstatement of civil rights and the direct, public promise made in the 29 June declaration for a fair and democratic political game were made at popular demand.

Moreover, it may also be thought of as a change in the method of social control exercised over nearly the past 20 years. One cannot help but feel that unfair politics and authoritarian controls are no longer acceptable.

However, if there are those who say that such changes cannot be adopted and are not being adopted institutionally, then there are also concerns that there are no political groups who will adopt these changes.

Therefore, the recent amnesty and reinstatement of civil rights are a first step toward democratization, while at the same time having great significance as a social revolution; and so there is interest in the directions in which it will spread and be diffused.

12837/12859
CSO: 4107/221
DAILY DISAPPOINTED WITH FINDINGS ON STUDENT'S DEATH

SK021015 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 30 Jul 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Points of Doubt in the Investigation Into the Cause of Mr Yi's Death"]

[Text] In connection with the recent release of the result of the investigation into the cause of Mr Yi Han-yol's death, we would not like to flatly criticize it, saying, "the investigation was insufficient," or "it was an investigation designed not to ferret out the criminal but to leave him at large by blurring the procedures of the relevant crime." We would like to believe that the result was a conclusion that was reached after examining various past practices and carefully analyzing and pondering evidence for an extended period of time.

Frankly speaking, in view of the scale of this investigation, in which as many as 65 relevant figures were questioned during the long period of 51 days after the incident took place and during the long period of 25 days after Mr Yi died, the result of the investigation was disappointing. This type of result, which says, "We could not identify which combat policeman fired the very tear gas canister whose scraps consequently killed Mr Yi," can be released the day after the incident or in 2 or 3 days after the incident if the relevant investigation was expeditied. Of course, we do not ask [the prosecution] to identify the very combat policeman who fired the tear gas canister in question. This is because it is impossible to specify each instance of the firing of tear gas canisters that took place during a collective confrontation. This characterizes a collective confrontation or a collective action.

However, this is not a matter in question. [The prosecution] has a different viewpoint on the characteristics of the act of dispersing and quelling so-called demonstrators—a collective action. We believe that an investigation that was conducted from this viewpoint cannot bring about any more than the result contained in the recent announcement.

Of course, criminal responsibility means responsibility for an individual act. Collective responsibility cannot exist in criminal responsibility. One cannot be responsible for another's act under any circumstances. It is clear that from this theoretical background they tried to identify the very person who
fired the very SY-44 tear gas canister whose scraps were found in Mr Yi's head.

However, this classic theory on individual responsibility has long been revised. This is because, as collective actions are on the increase in the modern times, [there are cases in which] criminal responsibility can be fairly imposed only when crimes are viewed as collective actions. If the ringleader of a group of larcenists personally told his subordinates when and how to locate and steal valuables and personally asked them to steal those valuables, he is also responsible for the larceny even though he was taking a nap at the very hour. This so-called collective responsibility theory has already been recognized in Korea and Japan. Suppose five hired assassins fired guns, one of which was not loaded in order to alleviate their guilty conscience, and suppose an assassin who used the unloaded gun was identified. We want to ask the prosecution whether he is exempted; and if the very person who used the unloaded gun could not be identified, then, we want to ask the prosecution whether all five assassins can be exempted.

A problem also arises in how to view the act of firing tear gas canisters at an angle of less than 35 degrees in violation of the "method of firing tear gas canisters." Of course, firing tear gas canisters at "an angle of less than 35 degrees" does not necessarily mean committing willful murder. However, can it be considered a simple mistake? The recent announcement on the result of the investigation said that there was no dereliction of duty on the part of the chief of the Sodae mun Police Station, the relevant company commander, and the relevant platoon leader in teaching the combat policemen under them how to fire tear gas canisters and commanding and supervising those combat policemen under them to prevent accidents involving firing tear gas canisters. If this is the case, firing tear gas canisters at an angle of less than 35 degrees cannot be a mistake. It must be probed whether this incident was a murder out of willful negligence with which they thought that "even if we fire tear gas canisters at an angle of less than 35 degrees, chances are that no one will be killed," or that "we do not care if someone is killed." If the combat policemen who were at the scene that day to quell the demonstrations were conscious or half-conscious of this, that is a matter of real significance. We want to ask the prosecution whether it deeply considered and investigated this matter. It is doubtful whether a certain degree of violence was overlooked at that time to "boost the morale" of the combat policemen and whether this was escalated to willful negligence. This is a matter that the prosecution's investigation into the responsibility for supervision must have pointed out.

Of course, we do not assert that imposing criminal responsibility is everything. Imposing criminal responsibility alone will not heal the aftermath of the past confrontation between forces in the name of public authority and the hot-blooded youths who struggled for democracy. Nevertheless, we think that the recent prosecution investigation is also problematic in view of the democratic administration of justice.

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PROFILE OF NEW HOME MINISTER CHONG HO-YONG

Seoul SINDONGA in Korean Mar 87 pp 146-159

[Article by Yi Chong-ok]

[Text] "An Extraordinary Personnel Move"

When Chong Ho-yong, a former Army chief of staff (55), was named the minister of home affairs last 20 January in the aftermath of the torture death of Pak Chong-chol, the head of the ruling Democratic Justice Party No Tae-u had the following official comment: "In order to be faithful to the peaceful transition of power, we have mobilized the full resources of the ruling party." Another official of the ruling party noted, "It is the last personnel move available to the highest echelon." One source close to the ruling party commented that "he is a man capable of great accomplishments." These are some of the puzzling, mystifying comments made at the time of his appointment.

If one were to accept these comments at their face value, it is reasonable to infer that he is a "man of high caliber" among the inner circle of the Fifth Republic. But since he has spent 35 long years in the military, however, Chong Ho-yong is hardly known outside of it. What is known to the public is the fact that he is a member of the 11th Class of the Military Academy along with President Chon Tu-hwan and Party Representative No Tae-u (he was also a classmate of No's at Kyongbuk High School), he is the first Army chief of staff graduate of the regular Military Academy and has exerted considerable influence on founding and maintaining the current military regime.

"A Typical Warrior Type"

Sharp eyes, firmly closed lips, expressionless face, and short hair all create an impression of a typical warrior. Combined with his key military position during the turbulent years since 1980, he has not given the public an impression of being a gentle or warm person.

According to Pak Chun-Pyong, chairman of the DJP national policy committee, who graduated from the Military Academy 1 year behind Chong and was a key member of the military inner power circle (reserve army general, former commander of the security forces), he is a "man of moderation and common sense who avoids excess." A former national assemblyman who had some dealings
with him through National Assembly defense committee business describes him as a man "who is fearless and direct, and quite liberal for a military person."

While his appointment as home minister is welcomed in general by the ruling party, the opposition New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) and those out of office tend to view it as a prelude to a confrontation with the opposition party. Some take exception to this view, thinking that the appointment does not necessarily reflect a rigid confrontational posture on the part of the government. National Assemblyman L., one of those "known to be close to Minister Chong," noted that "as he himself commented at the time of his appointment, it may in part mean fully sharing responsibility to the end since he was actively involved in founding the Fifth Republic. However, I tend to speculate that his role may be to serve as a moderating force in easing the current political tension." Mr. L. went on to say that "since he is a man capable of talking to a wide range of persons, I hope that he will play a role as a moderating force to ease the transition from 1987 to 1988."

The above comment has something in common with the following episode reported by one of the influential members of the NKDP:

"Unexpectedly I had an occasion to be with him, discussing a variety of current events at the time of the loudly debated controversy about the law on college campus stabilization (August 1985). He was concerned that when a son grows up, there was little that either parents or government can do, regardless of the amount of love or care. Mr. Chong further went on to say 'what will we do--it will be a grave situation--if the legislation of the campus stabilization measures does not bring about stability on college campuses? What will we do if the situation deteriorates further and police force alone is unable to contain the situation? I think I should talk to Representative No and advise him against such legislation and convey the same concern to higher authorities."

It remains unknown whether Minister Chong actually provided such advice and whether the campus stabilization legislation was not enacted because of such advice. At the same time, it has been frequently mentioned in political circles that he has often provided "frank advice" on delicate, sensitive, or complicated issues more than anyone else in power.

As has been mentioned in the foreign news media, some observers see a connection between his appointment and the transfer and succession of power of the ruling party.

In contrast to these views which attach considerable weight to his appointment, some consider it another appointment without special significance. Without attaching particular meaning to the prestige and influence of Chong Ho-yong, this view considers the appointment as a normal cabinet shuffle.

Apart from the question of which view is more plausible, it can be said that the judgment and acts of Minister Chong will be of considerable significance in the future political situation. This is simply because the timing of his appointment coincides with a most critical turning point toward 1988. When
spring comes, the campus situation will take on added sensitivity. There will be a general election this year. As the minister in charge of handling these developments (although it is not clear how much leeway he will have in discharging his duties), his judgment will undeniably be a significant variable in charting our future course.

"The Kwangju Incident As a Yoke"

The Kwangju incident has remained a burdensome yoke for the revolutionary leadership, in particular by the central members of the Fifth Republic. Minister Chong is no exception in this respect.

On 23 January, the 3d day after his appointment, he paid a courtesy visit to the leader of the opposition NKDP, Yi Min-u, at his headquarters office. On this occasion, he suffered unexpected bitter insults from the opposition party members regarding the Kwangju incident. As the minister entered the opposition party building, senior party officials hurled insults in connection with his military position at the time of the Kwangju incident, such as "What kind of face do you to come here?" and "How can you dare to come to the NKDP building?"

Ignoring such insults and criticisms, Minister Chong entered Mr Yi's office and commented "The NKDP has many enthusiasts and I received quite a welcome," displaying great presence of mind. While he was waiting for an elevator after his visit, Minister Chong was showered with more insults from some 10 staff members of the business office. Without any change on his face, he maintained silence.

Yu Che-yon, general secretary of the NKDP, who was standing beside the minister's car, very politely apologized to the minister, saying "I am extremely sorry," and the chief of police for the Dongdaemun District who accompanied the minister had the palest face for a while. Staff members of the DJP and the home ministry were upset over the rude behavior of NKDP officials and suggested disciplinary action. Minister Chong, however, was tolerant of the incident, saying "it wasn't anything special."

At the special session of the National Assembly convened 3 days after the incident at the NKDP headquarters building to hear about the death of a young man, Pak Chong-chol, Minister Chong faced severe questioning concerning the Kwangju incident. This line of questioning was totally unrelated to the purpose of the session. The following is an exchange between Minister Chong and Assemblyman Chang Ki-uk (NKDP) that took place on the 1st day of the special session (16 January)....

Assemblyman Chang Ki-uk: Mr Minister, have you emerged to take charge of the torture case? Is it true that at the time of the Kwangju incident you were an upper-level commander in charge of the troops implicated with the incident? I demand an explanation of your duties at the time. Can you swear to the people of this country that you have reformed after the Kwangju incident and thus you will handle the current crisis appropriately? I wish to inform you that upon learning of your appointment a large number of the general public felt that it is an endless game, obstacle after obstacle, and peak after peak.
Minister Chong: Assemblyman Chang Ki-uk at the beginning asked what my duties were at the time of the Kwangju incident. Although the question strikes me as totally unrelated to today's agenda, I wish to answer the question out of respect for the integrity of the assemblyman.

As the commander of the special combat forces, following orders from above, I assigned three of the seven divisions under my command to the Chonnam Province martial law headquarters for the purpose of containing the Kwangju situation. I should explain at this point the meaning of "assigning." Although under the command of the special combat forces, the troops once assigned are placed completely under the control, command, and order of the martial law headquarters.

My feelings regarding the Kwangju incident are painful as I am sure yours are. I pray peace for the citizens of Kwangju and the police and soldiers, who were all victims of the incident.

After 3 days of grueling sessions concerning the torture death case, Minister Chong is said to have commented that although he did not have to answer the Kwangju question because of its irrelevance, he thought it better to, and accordingly decided to face the question squarely rather than to be evasive.

"A Deep and Lasting Impression"

During the special session concerning the torture case, he used such phrases as "apology," "feeling guilty," and "will not allow it to recur," in his answers. In addition to these forthright, decisive phrases, he made the following statement which was an object of considerable interest:

"In my 50 years of life, this is my first time on the main floor of the National Assembly. Based on my experience over the past several days, I am deeply impressed and overwhelmed by your patriotic loyalty and the sincerity with which you debate national issues and represent the people."

From this statement, one might infer that he felt in his heart something different from what he, as the deputy chief and then chief of the Army General Staff, felt in previous dealings with the national defense committee of the National Assembly.

Although the questions asked by assemblymen may have been more immediate and touching because of the nature of the agenda, it is conceivable that he may have realized for the first time the merits of a parliamentary system, which he may have been unaware of during his military service. At a social gathering sometime ago with members of the National Assembly defense committee, he is supposed to have said after a few drinks that "if I were a politician, I think I would want to be a stylish opposition party member."

The foregoing impression stands in sharp contrast to the militaristic manner he exhibited in his first meeting with staff members of the Home Affairs Ministry department: He is said to have received military salutes from his staff and to have given the "at ease" order. Those who had earlier developed
apprehension and fear of the minister are now said to have softened their views considerably.

Several factors have contributed to this development. When his subordinates prepare draft "Questions and Answers" for National Assembly hearings using evasive ploys or ambiguous phrases such as "I will study and consider the problem," his admonition is "I do not approve of these tactics. We should be frank and candidly say what we can or cannot do." Sometimes he edits and corrects drafts. He listens to and respects the opinions of the frontline professionals. He advocates to his bureau chiefs that they should not be overly sensitive to the minister, and should relegate their duties as they see fit and assume responsibility for their actions.

Upon his appointment as minister, he did not bring even one of "his own people." He retained the previous staff including the chief of staff, the confidential secretary, and the chauffeur. In an unprecedented fashion, he had dinner with the entire staff of his secretariat. These small events are objects of favorable comments and may have contributed to a positive assessment.

"Smart and Gutsy"

Minister Chong was born on 10 September 1932 in Kosu Dong, Chongdo Eup, Chongdo Gun, Kyongbuk Province when Japanese imperialists were at the height of their continental invasion with the incitement of the Manchurian Incident (1931). He was the sixth child of Chong Tae-won, who owned and operated a fabrics store and a printing shop, and his mother Park Chon-soon. He has two older brothers and three older sisters.

His family lived in the Goon-wi area for generations, but his father had to move to the Chongdo area for business reasons. The printing shop was a small operation with only a few hired hands, but family farming was on a considerably bigger scale. His family enjoyed an above-average standard of living, and feeding and educating the children were of no concern.

When he was a second grader, Chong Ho-yong the young man moved from Chongdo to Taegu and attended Naman elementary school. Because his parents were committed to their children's education, they bought a house in Kesan Dong for his second brother Myong-yong, who was attending Kesong Middle School, and his younger brother Eul-yong, who was about to enter elementary school. His father traveled between Taegu and Chongdo taking care of both farming and business.

His father lived to be 94 and passed away in June 1985 when Minister Chong was the chief of the General Staff. His mother passed away in 1969 at the age of 75.

The minister's eldest brother Sang-yong (69) has managed for the past several decades a yarn and textile factory named the Sangshin Industrial Co. Ltd. He graduated from the Keumchon High School and withdrew from Waseda University in Japan. Until recently, he was chairman of the Korean Textile Federation.
His second eldest brother Myong-yong (66) is a wireless communication specialist who graduated from the Kesong Middle School and the Maruda Wireless Institute in Japan. Recently he retired from oceangoing duties and now lives in Seoul.

His three older sisters live in Seoul and Taegu, and his younger brother Eul-yong (53) is 2 years younger which makes him a 34th class graduate of Kwongbuk High School. During the Korean war, his brother enrolled in the Naval Academy but withdrew in his junior year, and subsequently graduated from the Taegu College (predecessor of the Kyong-nam University). After serving as managing director of the Agricultural Bank and chairman of the board of directors of the Korea Raw Silk Export Union, he is now the chief representative of the Kyong-san Mutual Savings and Finance Company. Eul-yong, who resembles his older brother, had the following to say about him:

"I remember him to be on the stubborn side, and from an early age he was gutsy. He used to prefer playing with his friends to studying, and our big house with 10 rooms was always filled with his visiting friends. He liked sports and was very athletic. When he was in elementary school, he belonged to a horseback riding club and used to ride in the racetrack behind the Taegu city hall. Once he broke his arm during a wrestling match and suffered quite a bit. At the same time, however, he was fond of reading books. He was particularly fond of reading Samurai (Japanese warrior) novels.

"Although he was not the type who studied diligently, he passed the entrance examination of the Kwongbuk High School, which had a reputation of being difficult—perhaps it was due to his intelligence. If I remember correctly, he always maintained fair grades during both the middle school and military academy years. He did not have much to do with those students who were exclusively preoccupied with academics. In my view, his fondness for people and leadership may have helped him to be where he is today."

According to Suh Chang-kyo (director of the Chong-u Development Co.), who lived next door to the minister and who was a classmate during both elementary and middle schools, he was described as "having an amicable personality and rarely had fights with friends. He was quiet and never petty. He was smart and had good grades, but more important he was athletic, excelling in sports and physical prowess." Mr Suh, with the minister, represented their elementary school in Japanese-style wrestling (Sumo), and participated in the Taegu elementary school competition. He also recalls playing frequently at the minister's house, which had a huge yard.

"Aspiring To Be An Engineer"

It was 1 April 1945 when young Chong Ho-yong had the honor of passing the highly competitive entrance examination of the Kwongbuk Middle School (one of the most prestigious schools in those days) (a 6-year system which was later divided in 1951 into middle and high schools, 3 years each). After 1 semester, the country was liberated. Although the confrontation between the left and right wing was extremely tense and disorderly, causing for example the 1 October Taegu riot (1946), his education was unaffected. As he continued
his education, he developed a keen interest in mathematics and chemistry and began to want to go to engineering college.

A consensus among the graduates of the Kwongbuk 32d class regarding their "classmate Chong Ho-yong" is as follows:

"He did not particularly care to be in the forefront; he was quiet with many friends, but stubborn. He was active in sports, playing rugby, but managed to have good grades, belonging at the top of the class. He did well in mathematics and aspired to go to an engineering college and become an engineer; his family was fairly well off." There were no memorable events in his school life.

On 10 January, the day when he was appointed the minister of home affairs, his Kwongbuk High School classmates were having a New Year's gathering at the Keumho Hotel in Taegu. At the height of this party, which was attended by over 40 couples, his classmate Yi Sang-yon (Executive Director of the Bank of Taegu) announced that, "Here is a news break I would like to share with you all. A minute ago, there was a news announcement that our classmate Chong Ho-yong has been appointed the minister of home affairs."

Among his classmates gathered at this meeting, the feeling was more of concern than congratulations in assuming the important post of home minister. Some commented that "it might have been better if the appointment was to the ministry of national defense, since he is a man of military background, than to the home affairs ministry which is fraught with complex headaches."

According to Lee Kil-woo, who since 1987 has been the president of the 32d class graduates in the Taegu area (principal of the Yong-nam Middle School in Taegu), Minister Chong is "a humble man. Usually as one moves ahead in governmental positions, it is common that one's behavior becomes affected and distant. However, he is an exception to the norm." Another classmate Youn Kon-ho (president of the Taegu Physicians Association and director of the Tong-in Hospital for External Medicine) comments that "in spite of his warrior-type appearance, one soon discovers that he is unlike the stereotypical soldier." He also recalls that when one of their classmates passed away, Minister Chong was commander of the Special Forces. In spite of an extremely busy schedule, he made an effort to stop by in Taegu by helicopter on his return trip from Kwangju. He participated in the funeral service and played an active role in fundraising for the surviving family. He is "a man of affection who is also loyal."

Attorney Yoo Soo-ho (chairman of the Taegu middle and western districts of the DJP), who is said to have stopped by frequently at Minister Chong's provides the following glimpse. "When our classmates visit Seoul from Taegu, he always invites them to his home. Many of us have stayed with him and had breakfast at his home. An ordinary man would shun such time-consuming courtesies, particularly when one is becoming socially prominent. Yet he remains plain and unaffected.... In short, he is the same country boy we have always known. He makes you feel at home, and for this reason he is frequently surrounded by friends and subordinates at his home."
His classmates are all proud that their friend has survived so many close calls with death throughout his military career, completed his tour of duty as a four-star general and Army chief of staff, and finally is now given the heavy responsibility of home affairs minister. At the same time, they are sorry that "his name was prominently mentioned by student demonstrators at the time of occupation of the U.S. Cultural Center in connection with the Kwangju incident."

The Korean War Breaks Out in 12th Grade

He was a member of the graduating class of 1950, and he entertained a dream of becoming an engineer by registering in the department of mechanical engineering at the Seoul National University's College of Engineering since he was quite fond of mathematics in his high school years. Since his family's financial situation was good, he did not have to worry about financing his college education.

The unexpected commencement of the Korean war destroyed his dream of going to college, and he had to join the war effort. On 18 July 1950, less than 1 month after the war broke out, "a relatively naive high school student responded to the call of his country by joining the army, and thus began a 35-year and 5-month-long career which started as a private and ended as a general," (quoted from the history of army chiefs of staff, 16 December 1985).

The young man, who was not even 18 years of age, received brief basic military training including the operation of a rifle, and was thrust into the Yong-chon battle. There were many soldiers who did not have to participate in battles, but his career included a relatively large number of active combat duties. The 7th Division to which he belonged marched north all the way to the Yalu River. With the intervention of the Chinese Communist army, the 7th Division had to withdraw southward during the confusion. As a result, he was captured and made a prisoner of war. He managed to save his life because of a desperate escape from the POW camp. His brother Eul-yong recalls that the minister's military career included more than a usual share of hardships and risks.

While he was stationed at army headquarters in Taegu in September 1951, after suffering through numerous battles, he submitted an application in response to the announcement for "student recruitment for a 4-year military academy." The war had been going on for 1 year and 3 months, and our army was waging an intense battle against the North Koreans as well as the Chinese Communist army. Since there was no telling how long the war would last, people must have thought that it was advantageous to enter a 4-year academy. From across the nation, over 5,000 young men applied for 200 some slots with a competitive ratio of 27:1. Applicants included soldiers in active service, student soldier candidates, officers of the defense corps, and earlier graduates of his high school.

He successfully passed the written examinations held in Taegu on 21 and 22 October, and finally registered in the military academy on 1 January 1952, thus becoming a member of the 11th class of the Military Academy.
Although circumstances were not favorable, the then President Syngman Rhee had a fervent wish to establish a 4-year military academy and he was finally able to realize his dream with the assistance of the U.S. Armed Forces. After 2 month's preparation, it was finally possible to admit the students who had already been selected. The newly admitted students received 20 some days basic training in the severe winter of 1952.

The first principal of the military academy was Brigadier General An Choon-sang (a retired lieutenant general, a member of the 9th Yu-Chong Congress, currently director of the Independence Memorial Hall), who was a nephew of patriot An Chung-kun.

The opening ceremony was held on 20 January at the Jin-hae campus and was attended by President Rhee, military luminaries such as the commander of the U.N. Armed Forces General Ridgeway and the Commander of the U.S. 8th Army in Korea General Van Fleet, the diplomatic corps stationed in Korea, and parents. After the opening ceremony, President Rhee had all the students gather in a small classroom and in a voice raised with emotion said, "Now I feel better," (quoted from "Oh, Hwa-rang-dae" by Yi Tong-hui).

"Adventuresome"

Yi Tong-hui, a member of the 11th class of the Military Academy and also the author of the book "Oh, Hwa-rang-dae" (now a retired lieutenant general; graduate of the Seoul National University with a PhD in political science from Seoul National University; head of the Academy faculty; former dean of the Chongju Teachers College) offers the following description of classmate Chong Ho-yong during the academy years.

"When we entered the academy, he was close to us in the internal affairs club. Ordinarily he was a man of few words, but once he started talking he always made himself clear and avoided idle talks. Even though he was a graduate of a renowned school and survived numerous hardships during the war, including his capture by the communists, he was never prone to boasting. Had he been inclined to talk, his experiences would have made him a narrator of great adventures.

"In those days, most of the military cadets were eager to serve as a student commander of a regiment or battalion, but Cadet Chong Ho-yong made an effort to be noncompetitive and remain ordinary and humble. He moved rather slowly and even when a meeting was called, he would walk leisurely. He read widely and I remember him as a person of depth.

"He did not belong to any one sports club. More than being athletic, he was adventuresome. Although there were strict regulations prohibiting cadets from going off the campus, he used to take fellow cadets to swim and dive in a pond at the nearby Samyuk Seminary."

The 11th class consisted of 8 groups of 20 cadets each assigned by scholastic class ranking (class 1 had 20 cadets with the best scholastic records). Many of us remember cadet Chong Ho-yong was usually in class 2.
Six months after the 11th Class started its cadet life, it was followed by the entering freshmen (the 12th Class) in July 1952. Cadets of the 11th Class began to enjoy a relatively easy academy life without upperclassmen. With the truce, the academy moved from the Jin-hae campus, its home for 2 years and 6 months, to the present location in Tae-neung.

After moving to Seoul, the 11th Class went through a bit of turmoil such as the issue of class designation (the headquarters' order to change class designation from the 1st Class to the 11th Class and from the 2d class to the 12th Class was protested) and the delayed graduation (graduation originally scheduled for June 1955 was delayed by 4 months due to an increase in the number of credits required for graduation). The 11th Class finally graduated from the academy on 4 October 1955 after 3 years and 9 months, holding its ceremony at the Tae-neung drill ground. After compiling a total of 6,325 class hours (44.6 percent in general studies, 30.6 percent in military studies, 12.6 percent in physical education, and 12.2 percent others) (quoted from "Oh, Hwa-rang-dae"), the 11th Class cadets were commissioned second lieutenants.

Out of 200 some entering cadets, 156 graduated. The honor of the first place in the class (the presidential award) went to cadet Kim Song-Chin (retired brigadier general; former minister of the science and technology center; at present, director of the Korea Electronics Production Academy) who also entered the academy as the top cadet. The second place honor (the minister of national defense award) went to cadet Kim Yong-kun (retired brigadier general; director of the Office of Legislation; at present, attorney in private practice) who was the first among academy graduates to have passed the State Law Examination while the third place honor went to cadet Yi Chin-paek (retired colonel; representative of the O-gok Metal Work Company).

Cadet Chong Ho-yong who graduated in the upper ranking went on with his classmates to the Kwangju Infantry School to receive elementary military class education. Upon completing his education in February 1956, he requested an assignment to the 7th Division where he had served as an enlisted soldier. He soon became the commander of the very platoon he had served in earlier (information supplied by his brother Eul-yong).

Although he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant in September 1957 and to captain in September 1960 along with his classmates, he was not included among the first 20 classmates of the 11th Class who were promoted to the rank of major on 1 September 1960. He was included in the second wave of promotion to major in September 1963 (Captains Chon Tu-hwan and Son Yong-kil were in the first wave, while captains No Tae-u and Kwon Ik-kyon were in the second wave of promotions). Classmates of the 11th Class were all promoted to captains at the same pace, but from there on their promotions started to vary. Graduates of the 11th Class protested such a discrepant promotion system. While he was a lieutenant, he completed a psychological warfare program at the U.S. Psychological Warfare School (from February of 1960 to June of 1960). In addition, he was able to pursue his adolescent dream of becoming an engineer by obtaining an MA in civil engineering at Seoul National University (April of 1961 to February of 1963). When he was a major, he served as a
liaison officer for Korean Forces in the U.S. First Military Corps. This experience has enabled him to acquire a command of English which makes it unnecessary for him to use an interpreter.

Dispatched to South Vietnam as a Lieutenant Colonel

In early 1965, the infusion of Korean Armed Forces into the Vietnam war was expanding at an accelerated pace. Graduates of the 11th Class and those following, who were lacking in combat experience compared to their seniors who had acquired combat experience during the Korean war (although many participated in combat as enlisted soldiers), eagerly applied for an assignment in Vietnam. He was promoted to a lieutenant colonel in September 1967 while attending the Army College, and he applied for a Vietnam assignment in January 1969 and was made a battalion commander in the White Horse Forces. In this capacity, he completed his 1-year tour of duty.

When his Vietnam assignment was officially announced, he speeded up his wedding which he had postponed until the age of 36. His brother Eul-yong explains the deferred marriage as follows, "Our family believes in self-sufficiency, and my brother until then thought that he was not ready."

He was promoted to colonel in November 1970 and served as regiment commander and division chief of staff. It was on 1 January 1974 that he finally became a general, an object of envy for everyone. He was 42 then and had served in the army for 28 years and 3 months. His classmates who were promoted at the same time with Minister Chong included ruling party chief No Tae-wu, former deputy commander of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Yi Sang-hu (retired general), and a member of the National Center for Diplomacy and Security An Chae-sok (retired major general; former ambassador to Sweden. One year prior to this promotion, on 1 January 1973, four members of the 11th Class had been promoted to brigadier generals. These men were Chon Tu-hwan, Kim Tok-tong, Son Yong-kil, and Choe Song-taek. Five of the 11th Class graduates have now become full generals which include Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-we, Chong Ho-yong, Lee Sang-hoon, and Yi Ki-Paek (chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, current minister of defense.

Upon promotion to brigadier general, he served as deputy division commander and commander of the Air Transport Brigade. When he became a major general, he was assigned command of a division which was stationed near his hometown. It was at this time that he was able to get together and renew his friendships with classmates from the Kyongbuk High School. His friends welcomed a classmate who returned home as a general, by hosting welcoming parties. There were frequent weekend games of tennis and golf as well.

He was division commander until the 26 October and 12 December incidents of 1970. After the 12 December incident, he was assigned the additional post of commander of the Ranger-Commando Force. On the same day, Major General No Tae-wu, who was said to have played a key role in the 12 December incident, became the commander of the Capitol Defense Force. Minister Chong became a permanent member of the National Emergency Defense Council, which was established on 31 May 1980 under the emergency martial law proclaimed after the
17 May incident. He served until 27 October of the same year when the National Security Legislative Council was established. (He returned to the army without serving in the Legislative Council.)

On 13 August 1980, Maj Gen Chong Ho-yong was promoted to a lieutenant general along with five other major generals, including No Tae-wu, Kwon Yong-tal, Kim Tok-Tong, and Yi Kwang-no. These lieutenant generals reported to President Choe Kyu-ha, who in turn pinned insignias on each of them. Minister Chong's appointment to the Army deputy chief of staff in March 1981 was followed in December of the same year by a promotion to full general and appointment as the Army commander. On 16 December 1983, he became the Army chief of staff. Among the graduates of the 4-year military academy he was the first to have become the highest commander of the army.

"I Am a Believer in Democracy"

The previous account provides a contrast to the string of key posts in the Fifth Republic held by No Tae-wu. Since his retirement on 15 July 1981, 4 days after his promotion to the rank of general, No tae-wu has held such posts as the second minister of political affairs (16 July 1981), minister of sports (20 March 1982), minister of home affairs (28 April 1982), chairman of the Seoul Olympics Committee (13 July 1983), and chief delegate of the DJP (23 February 1985). On the other hand, Minister Chong has held key posts in the military since the 12 December incident.

While pointing out this contrast, one member of the ruling party offers an explanation that one top member of the leadership concentrated on military matters while another, i.e., No Tae-wu, was at the forefront of political matters.

While Minister Chong was the Army chief of staff, he had made the following comment to the reporters in a half-joking manner.

"When I was a 6th grader, the war broke out and I had to join the army as a private. I became a professional soldier by entering the military academy. However, I have always been a believer in democracy, and I feel my personality is not best suited to the life of a professional soldier. I was thinking of quitting when I was a major, but was promoted to a lieutenant colonel; I was thinking of quitting when I was a lieutenant colonel, but then I got promoted to a colonel. This cycle has lasted to this day. My family at the time advised me to quit military life and take over the family business."

When asked about the 12 December incident as well as the Kwangju incident by reporters, he half glossed over the query by commenting that "one should take the national perspective of a forthcoming crisis...."

In the Army chief of staff memoir, he made the following entry:

"The time as a private when I was involved in countless hand-to-hand confrontations with the enemy during the bitter Korean war; the time as a cadet when I had to endure the penetrating cold wind of the Jin-hae Bay while
absorbing the concept of responsibility and duty; the time spent in the mid-east front as platoon and company leader; the time spent in the Vietnamese jungle as battalion commander searching for Viet Cong members; the time spent as the commander of the Ranger-Commando Force when I used to proclaim 'If impossible, make it possible. One only dies once.'; and the time spent as the army commander when I was preoccupied with establishing a ladder-type educational system to implement the notion that military life is at once an educational training.... As I recall these times, I realize that the army was my entire life and the purpose of my life."

At the transition ceremony held on 16 December 1985, for transferring the post of Army chief of staff after 2 years' tour of duty to General Pak Hui-to (the 12th class of the military academy), Minister Chong made the following remarks:

"During my 2-year tour of duty as the Army chief of staff, I have tried to further expand the shining tradition of our army established by my predecessors. At the same time I have made an effort to reform our mistaken values and obsolete ideas by means of a quiet revolution.... I sincerely wish that the army's quiet revolution will continue through the foundation I have laid."

After retirement from the post of Army chief of staff, he spent quiet time reading on national defense matters at the Il-hae Research Center. At each cabinet shuffle, he was mentioned as a strong candidate for the post of minister of national defense. At one time he was rumored to be the successor to the director of the Road Construction Company Youn Pil-yong.

One member of the ruling party, who is also a graduate of the military academy commented that "the 1-year period since his retirement must have done him a lot of good. Because he spent 30 some years in a rather special world called the military since his adolescence, it is only natural that there developed a 'gap' between Minister Chong and the real world. It must have been a valuable lesson for him as a citizen to have listened and talked to a wide variety of people." In making this comment, the speaker was referring to his personal experiences as well.

At the relatively late age of 36 (at the time a lieutenant colonel), he married, through a matchmaker, a woman who was 13 years younger than himself, Kim Suk-hwan (born in So-san, Chungnam Province). He advanced the marriage ceremony, which he had been deferring, reasoning that anything could happen in combat and he wanted to leave children behind, according to his brother Eul-yong. He is without any formal religion, but he has a clear view of life and death: Death is not to be feared and life is at the mercy of divine will. He has four daughters, the oldest of whom is in high school, and the youngest in elementary school. Their names are Kotnim, Nani, Nana, and Juri, which are all pure Korean alphabet names thought of by Minister Chong himself. Minister of Justice Kim Song-ki is a cousin on his maternal side.

His classmates from the Kyongbuk High School include the ruling party representative No Tae-wu, Kim Yun-hwan (the Blue House First Secretary for
Political Affairs), Kim Sang-cho (Blue House staff member), Chong So-yong (former Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries), Chong Chun-taek (former President of the Bank of Commerce), Ku Pon-ho (Dean of the graduate school, Hanyang University), O Chae-hui (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), Yi Nam-ki (Ambassador to Italy), Yi Won-wuk (Ambassador to Oman), Nam Wun-chong (inspector, the Korean Broadcast Advertisement Corporation, retired army brigadier general), Yi Maeng-hui, Chon Sang-ho (president of the Samsun-Hewlett Packard company), Kim Pyong-chin (president of the Dae-rim Engineering Company), Sin Hyon-taek (director of the Seoul Kangnam Hospital), and Choe Tal-su (professor at Korea University).

In this politically charged year of 1987, which will decide whether democratization is going to proceed forward or to be postponed once more, what will history record of his role and achievement?

It should be noted that due to his schedule, this article was written without the benefit of a personal interview with Minister Chong.

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COUNTRY TO INVEST IN SECURE FOREIGN OIL WELLS

SK070906 Seoul YONHAP in English 0846 GMT 7 Aug 87

[Text] Seoul, 7 Aug (YONHAP)—South Korea plans to invest a total of 315.6 billion won, an equivalent of 389.6 million U.S. dollars, to secure five already-developed oil wells by 1990, the Energy and Resources Ministry said Friday.

Sources at the ministry said that the plan is part of an overall strategy to stabilize the procurement of major energy resources in the event of worst-case scenarios, such as the escalation of the Iran-Iraq war.

The five wells exclude those of West Madura, Indonesia, and Marib, North Yemen, where the Korea Petroleum Development Corp. and Korean firms have poured capital in.

The state-run corporation is expected to form a consortium with private firms at a 6:4 share ratio and then the consortium will participate in each of the oil projects, obtaining around a 20 percent share.

The government will finance 50 percent of the total funding that the consortium needs when it obtains the 20 percent share. Korea substantially depends on imported oil for its energy needs.

With its participation in the seven projects, including oil development projects in Marib and West Madura, Korea is expected to fill 20 percent of the total domestic demand from the wells by 1990.

The government has also decided to lower the interest rate of the supporting fund for the consortium from 8 percent to 6 percent per year.

Meanwhile, the government plans to support overseas investment in development projects of such resources as iron ore, copper, and uranium.

The government predicts that, by 1990, it can meet 20 percent of the total domestic demand for iron ore, copper, and zinc and 30 percent of the uranium and coal demand by participating in the overseas resources development projects.
PROGRESS IN DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ROBOTS

Multijointed Robots

Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean 7 Jun 87 p 5

[Article by Pak Se-han]

[Text] The Bupyung plant of Daewoo Automobile has just installed a total of 20 robots. The welding operation and the window pane installation are now performed by robots in an automated manner. With this automation of an industrial process, the assembly time can be shortened; for example, it is possible to cut 2 minutes per unit off of automobile production time.

In the Ulsan plant of Hyundai Automobile, most of the welding, painting, and assembly operations are performed by robots. At present, 40 percent of the welding operations, which consists of 144 units of robot welders, 21 painting robots, and 18 assembly robots are used in the production lines. The number of robotic units will be increased from a current 183 units to 307 by the end of this year, then 55 percent of the welding operations will be performed by robots.

The move toward industrial automation in this country is very intensive and is being promoted. In the eighties, industrial automation has been promoted and the importation of robots increased, and now industrial robots are manufactured and exported to other countries.

The firms which are currently engaged in the manufacture of industrial robots are Hyundai Heavy Industry, Daewoo Heavy Industry, Samsung Aerospace, Tusun Machinery, and Kolon Ship Building. Also, KAIST and the Korea Mechanical Engineering Institute are engaged in the development of industrial robots.

In 1984, for the third time in history, a multijointed robot, Nova 10, was manufactured by Daewoo Heavy Industry, and these robots are being exported to U.S. automakers. The Nova 10 can perform arc welding, cutting, and assembling. The error in the operation is less than 0.2 mm and is known to have an excellent degree of precision.
Daewoo is promoting the export of robots to West Germany and France, and is planning to manufacture 1,000 units per year in the near future.

Since 1985, Hyundai has been manufacturing robots jointly with Nachi-Fujikoshi Corp. of Japan. Last year 100 units of welding robots were manufactured and this year, production will be increased to 300 units. Notably, Hyundai is planning to install arc welding robots in the Hyundai automobile plant in Canada.

Samsung Aerospace has also been developing 4-axis multijoint robots in conjunction with IHI of Japan, while 3 kinds of assembly robots are being manufactured currently. Samsung has been using an assembly robot, Wiseman, in both the camara parts production line and the VTR assembly line. Their performance has been superb and the company is planning to export Wiseman.

Kolon and Fanuo of Japan jointly formed Korea Pneumatic and robots are being manufactured currently. The ship building group developed and is producing robots which can perform scraping and cleaning operations and painting operations.

Other firms such as Kumsung Communication, *tusan Machnery, and Tongil have invested in robot development and are increasing their investment.

Industrial robots were introduced in the sixties in the production lines, and currently the number of units exceeds 160,000. Among them, Japan has 44 percent, the United States 40 percent, and Europe 33 percent.

The size of the industrial robot market was only $80 million but it increased to $1 billion in 1980 and to $3.5 billion in 1985. The projection is that it will increase to $8 to $9 billion by 1990 which would be a $110,000 per year increase.

The domestic market size was 1 billion Won in 1983, but it has drastically increased to 9.6 billion Won in 1986. It has been projected that the market will increase to 21.1 billion Won in 1988 and 50 billion Won by 1990. The labor cost for the production of industrial robots is steadily increasing. However, the investment could be completely amortized in 2-3 years, and for this reason, the robot industry is one of the growing and promising industries.

Most importantly, the value per kg of product for industrial robots is $110 as compared to $1.66 per kg for passenger cars and $9.97 per kg for color TV sets. The robot industry is an excellent one for countries without abundant resources, and it is an export oriented industry.

For this reason, in the developed countries, the development of robots with visual functions began by departing from the original development of a simple assembly oriented robot. It is expected that by 1990 an intelligent robot might arrive.
The domestic robot industry is still in its infancy. KAIST has successfully produced a robot with a chronological sense. Certainly, this will be a step in developing an intelligent robot.

Manufacturing Moves Into High Gear

Seoul MAEIL KYONGJE SHINMUN in Korean 17 Jun 87 p 5

[Text] Hyundai Heavy Industries (executive: Lee Chun-rim) has manufactured 100 robots.

On the 17th, the industry reported that Hyundai Heavy Industries had delivered the first welding robot to Hyundai Motor Co. Ltd. in February. As of the 16th, it has sold over 100 units.

Most of the robots were installed in the Hyundai production line, and they are now operational.

Hyundai Heavy Industries will manufacture 200 welding robots this year, and it is planning to deliver 70 units to the Hyundai plant in Canada as soon as the plant starts up.

Also, there are negotiations taking place so that Hyundai will export to (Hiramatsu) of Japan, an automation machine producer.

Currently, Hyundai Heavy Industries is testing an x-y axis robot which is Hyundai's own development. As soon as the test results are available, it is planning to go into mass production.

The x-y axis robot operates fast and accurately, and it is commanded by using Hangul. It has been said that this kind of robot is very versatile.
NORTH'S 'MILITANT' ORIENTATION TOWARD ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION

Seoul NAEWOE TONGSIN in Korea No 537, 15 May 87 pp 1R-9R

[Text] (Seoul-Naewoe) In the latter part of April of this year (21 to 23 April), North Korea adopted the Third 7-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy at the second session of the Eighth Supreme People's Assembly and made it public. Of late, they have mobilized almost fully the propaganda and agitation organizations, accelerating an agitation campaign designed to maximize the labor mobilization of the people. Thus various labor scenes throughout North Korea have recently been jammed with the following combat slogans, making them closely resemble battlegrounds: "A tense labor battle"; "Speed battle of loyalty"; "A blitzkrieg war"; "The march speed of the 1980's"; "The revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and arduous struggle"; and "An assault battle of stepping up production." In such an atmosphere, it is reported, workers in North Korea are being forced into compulsory labor which is more intensive than ever before.

Immediately after the setting forth and announcement of the Third 7-Year Economic Plan, North Korea's propaganda and agitation media repeatedly emphasized, in various sections of the media, that "today we are faced with a very heavy and stupendous task." Laying bare the seriousness of a difficult economic situation, the result of chronic stagnation, the media pointed out that in order to salvage the situation, it was imperative to successfully carry out the tasks set forth in the Third 7-Year Economic Plan. Then in order to do so, it urged all workers of North Korea "to carry out absolutely and unconditionally" the "tasks" assigned to them by the party. Thus it is wildly attempting to effectuate the labor mobilization of the people.

In this way, as soon as it set forth and announced the Third 7-Year Economic Plan, North Korea spurred on labor mobilization of the people and became enthusiastic about labor agitation at labor scenes. One may relate this fact to the following effects: the Commission is doing its best to resolve the difficult economic situation by means of maximal mobilization of labor in the realities of North Korea's economy that lacks capital and technology; and they are taking the opportunity to reduce the margin of discontent of the North Korean people.

Along with such an intensive labor agitation being launched consecutively, day after day, all the press and broadcasting media of North Korea are vying with

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one another to introduce various examples of spearheading labor agitation and urging workers in North Korea to follow those examples. All these labor scenes are flooded with all kinds of militant slogans and the slogans of loyalty toward Kim Il-song, father, and Kim Chong-il, son. This provides a picture for us of the phenomenon of "becoming labor barracks" throughout North Korea.

Cited below (original passages are quoted) are the state of labor scenes in various districts of North Korea as reported by the North Korean broadcasts in early May.

Scenes of Railroad Construction in Northern Region (4 May, Central Broadcasting Committee)

"Of late members of the Kaesong City Youth Shock Brigade and the Ch'ongjin Construction Unit who vigorously launched into the construction of railroads in the northern region are constructing two-line tracks at a fast speed.

"These shock brigade members, who vigorously launched into construction with a burning resolution of finishing ahead of schedule the first stage construction of the northern region railroad construction [project,] are overfulfilling the daily combat target with the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and arduous struggle, while building whatever they do not have and making up for any deficiency.

"Members of the First Company of the Kaesong City Shock Brigade, with a high feeling of loyalty toward the leader and the leader comrade, launched a speed battle, building many meters of railroad line over the daily plan...."

Labor Scenes of Cooperative Farms Which Are Looking for New Land (4 May, Central Broadcasting Committee)

"Agricultural workers and members of Three Revolutions Teams in various districts, who vigorously launched into the farming battle with a burning desire for success in producing bumper crops this year, first year of the Third 7-Year Plan, are aggressively pushing forward in the struggle to acquire more new land, carrying out the agricultural battle in good time. Responsible functionaries of cities and counties are paraphrasing and explaining, among the workers, engraving deep in their hearts, the instructions of the dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il for acquiring new land. They are calling upon them to struggle toward this end...."

Yonp'ung Youth Coal Mine (4 May, Central Broadcasting Committee)

"The mettle of fighters of this coal mine platoon who have always engraved the lofty will of the party and the leader on their hearts is further increasing tunneling speed with the help of their close-knit combat organization of and ever watchful work attitude.

"Fighters in the battle here who have been forcefully firing solemn gun shots of consecutive blasting are overcoming unfavorable conditions of all hues with the same indomitable spirit displayed by hero fighters during the Fatherland
Liberation War (the 25 June War of Aggression of the South). Thus they are vigorously carrying on the march in order to accomplish the first year goals of the Third 7-Year Plan...."

Kaesong Textile Plant (5 May, Central Broadcasting Committee)

"The party members and the workers of the Kaesong Textile Plant here, highly upholding the instructions of the leader and the policy of the dear leader comrade toward increasing production of export goods are rendering fresh meritorious services every hour on the hour, and day after day to achieve the first year goals of the Third 7-Year Plan. And thanks to their burning passion of loyalty, the flames of the speed battle of the 1980's are vigorously rising everywhere on the battle ground.

"With the burning passion of loyalty toward the party and the leader, fighters of the textile plant here are accelerating production with the feeling of sending ammunitions to the frontline.

"In particular, cloth weaving workers of the First Cloth Weaving Shop of the Red Flag of Three Revolutions have achieved an innovative method to weave more cloth by increasing the rotational frequency of weaving machines by 10 rotations over the existing frequency...."

The Scene of the P'anp'yon Dam Construction (5 May, Central Broadcasting Committee)

"Members of this construction shock brigade, displaying the heroism of our people, are actively overcoming difficulties they are confronting with an ever-victorious spirit of revolution. Thus they are pouring concrete at an unprecedented record.

"The 1-a-match-for-100 men of valor, upholding wholeheartedly the intentions of the party and the leader, set forth a struggle target of pouring more than 10,000 cubic meters of concrete a day and are launching an assault battle...."

Labor Scenes at Irrigation Works (5 May, Central Broadcasting Committee)

"Functionaries of the irrigation field and members of Three Revolutions Teams in various districts who vigorously launched out on their resolution to accomplish bumper crops this year, the 1st year of the Third 7-Year Plan, accelerated spring planting, and have energetically launched the struggle to secure more water.

"Functionaries of the irrigation field in various districts who have deeply understood the significance and importance of the struggle designed to secure water for this year's farming, highly displayed the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance, and have taken measures to prevent losing even a drop of water. They are launching a blitzkrieg struggle to find water resources...." Chongju Railroad Freight Transport Scenes (6 May, Central Broadcasting Committee)
"Transport fighters of the Chongju Locomotive Unit and the Sinuiju Locomotive Unit forcefully launched the 18 May movement, set forth by the party, for attaining no-accident-and-on-schedule hauling ahead of schedule and are increasing results of the imminent transportation battle.

"Transport fighters here who took the lofty responsibility for the railroad transport battle forcefully launched struggle to increase transportation. Thus they hauled almost 300,000 more tons of freight than the assigned amount of hauling of last month...."

Coal Mines in South Pyongan Province (Pyongyang Broadcasting)

"Fighters of coal mines here who are launching a forceful struggle in all blind ends of mine galleries with the same feeling of returning the great love and solicitude of the dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il, who has repeatedly visited them. They have increased coal production, and are engaged in an all-out assault battle with the same determination they fight and annihilate enemies, and have rejected with unshaken conviction the action of the South Korean side who has been seeking only a war while refusing a dialogue...."

Scene of Transplanting Corn Seedlings (6 May, Hamhung Broadcasting)

"Cooperative farms in Toksong County are accelerating in a blitzkrieg to transplant corn seedlings in humus pots.

"The agricultural workers in Toksong County who vigorously launched out to score successes in producing bumper crops this year, a significant year, thoroughly met the requirements for the chuche-oriented farming method in all farming processes, including preparations for farming. They are launching a significant battle to finish transplanting corn seedlings. In particular, in sub-workteams of cooperative farms, primary level workers took the lead and organized battles efficiently; they have been bringing about great results from the beginning...."

Labor Scenes of Scrap Iron Collection in North Pyongan Province (6 May, Sinuiju Broadcasting)

"Upholding the tasks the leader set forth in his new year's administrative speech this year, the party members and the workers in this province are forcefully launching a struggle to collect scrap iron.

"Organizational and political activities are being launched efficiently so that the work of collecting scrap iron may be launched as a movement of all the masses under the guidance of the provincial branch of the party, which is upholding the leader's instructions and the will of the party. In particular, functionaries of administrative and economic organizations in the municipal and county party branches, including the administrative and economic guidance committee of the province, go down among the party members and the workers and summarize to indoctrinate the instructions the leader gave regarding the
collection of a great amount of scrap iron. And they are accurately giving tasks of collecting scrap iron to organizations, plants, business enterprises, and cooperative farms...."

Scenes of Producing Household Furniture (7 May, Wonsan Broadcasting)

"The party members and members of the Kosan Household Furniture Cooperative are efficiently conducting facilities management with the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance. They are operating every machine at full capacity and thereby overfulfilling their daily combat target of household furniture production at 120 percent.

"Under the guidance of the party organization, members of the cooperative move among members of work teams, giving priority to political and organizational works. They organize production in such a way that daily tasks may be unconditionally overfulfilled.

"In particular, fighters of the timber cutting platoons, who are in charge of the first combat process of household furniture production, are enhancing their roles; and several joint innovations are being effected in the process of assembling household furniture...."

Scenes of Preparations for "Rice Transplanting Battle" in Kaesong (6 May, Kaesong)

"Agricultural workers in Kaesong City, as the season of rice transplanting battle gets close at hand, are accelerating the work of building ridges between rice fields and greatly achieving combat successes.

"In order to make a thorough preparation for the battle of rice transplanting, cooperative farms and state-operated farms here are forcefully fanning the flames of speed battle everywhere. They are energetically accelerating the work of building ridges between rice fields in order to finish it in a few days."

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CSO: 4107/211
KIM CHONG-IL WORK ON CHUCHE IDEA LAUDED

SK260039 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2128 GMT 17 Jul 87

[NODONG SINMUN 18 July special article: "The Chuche Idea Is a Great Revolutionary Theory ThatScientifically Elucidates the Way To Liberate Mankind"]

[Text] The dear Comrade Kim Chong-il's work entitled On Some Problems of Education in the Chuche Idea is a valuable work that enriches the treasure storehouse of the Chuche idea with endlessly profound ideology and theory, providing another milestone in developing mankind's advanced thinking and carrying out the cause of independence, and is a true textbook that scientifically elucidates the way to liberate man and enables mankind to lead valuable lives.

By strongly demonstrating in Part 1 of his work, with propositions of rare beauty and iron logic [cholui nolli], that the Chuche idea is a revolutionary theory that elucidates most scientifically the way to liberate man, the dear Comrade Kim Chong-il has provided us with a firm theoretical foundation for adhering to the Chuche idea as the only guiding ideology of our party.

Comrade Kim Chong-il, member of the Political Bureau Presidium and secretary of the party Central Committee, has noted: The Chuche idea is a thorough revolutionary ideology which puts forward defending and realizing chajusong—the life of a social human being—as the fundamental objective of the revolution and demands that the revolution be carried on to the end until this objective is completely fulfilled.

This formula elucidated in the work defines anew the Chuche idea from the standpoint of its mission and ideological history. The mission of the Chuche idea is to make mankind complete masters of the world and their destiny and to elucidate the way to mankind's eternal happiness and prosperity; its position in ideological history is that it is a revolutionary theory that has most scientifically and completely elucidated the way to liberate mankind.

The objective pursued by the Chuche idea as a revolutionary ideology conforms with the ultimate objective of the revolutionary struggle of the popular masses. The objective of the Chuche idea is to elucidate the way to realize the liberation of mankind most thoroughly. The Chuche idea has proclaimed the
truth that the way to liberate man—the way for the popular masses to become the masters of the world and their destiny—can be pioneered not by means of improvement or illumination but by the revolutionary struggle to defend Chajusong, and that the revolutionary struggle should not be stopped halfway but that it should be carried on to the end thoroughly. Herein lies the fundamental characteristic of the Chuche idea as a revolutionary ideology; the immortal achievement of the work is that it has contributed to the ideological history of mankind and the cause of independence of the popular masses by formulating this characteristic intensively and sagaciously.

The work has clearly elucidated that the Chuche idea's being the most scientific revolutionary theory for the liberation of man is attributable primarily to the fact that it is based on the man-centered world outlook.

Comrade Kim Chong-il, member of the Political Bureau Presidium and secretary of the party Central Committee, has noted in the work: The Chuche idea is a revolutionary theory that most scientifically elucidates the way to liberate man because it is based, above all, on the man-centered world outlook.

The foremost requirement in elucidating the course of liberating man is to have a true philosophical world outlook. We should correctly establish the theory, strategy, and tactics of the struggle. The work has elucidated that the Chuche philosophical world outlook is a man-centered philosophical world outlook and that the essential characteristic of the Chuche philosophy is that it has been developed and systematized placing man at the center.

The Chuche idea is a revolutionary theory that most scientifically elucidates the way to liberate man because it places man in the position of master of the world and elucidates the inevitability of the nature of the world and its changes and development. Clarifying the emphasis laid by the philosophical world outlook on its development and systematization is a matter of key significance in clarifying the world outlook. The system and the overall content of the philosophy are defined depending on the emphasis at the center of the philosophy, and its scientific and revolutionary nature also depends on this.

The objective world outlook, which is developed with the divine existence and objective environment at the center, prevents man from correctly seeing his position and role in the world; the subjective world outlook, placing the individual consciousness at the center, prevents man from having perception and from engaging in practical activities in conformity with objective reality.

The document profoundly demonstrated the basis which proved that the man-centered world outlook is the most scientific world outlook. The scientific nature of the man-centered world outlook emerges from the characteristic nature of man, from man's position in the world, and from elucidation of man's role in the development of the world.
Because man is master in the world as a most developed material existence and as the summit in material development and plays a decisive role in developing the world and in shaping man's destiny, one should deservedly view the world with man as its center.

The chuche idea elucidated for the first time that man is the only independent and creative existence in the material world. Thus, it formulated a most scientific and Chuche-oriented view of man's position and role in the world and of the world in which man lives today under the condition in which general characteristics of the material world were already made clear.

That man occupies the position of master in the world and plays a decisive role in world development is a Chuche-oriented view of the world in which man lives today and a philosophical principle based on the Chuche idea.

Thanks to the Chuche idea, the position of man as the master of the world and his creative role in reforming the world were made clear. Thus, one of the most important issues was scientificaly resolved to serve as a theoretical basis in realizing to what degree the world has developed and in what direction the world will develop, as well as in shaping the destiny of man.

With the formulation of the Chuche-oriented view of the actual world—the Chuche-oriented philosophical principle—the basic characteristics of the world in which man lives today, the existence of the world, and the characteristics of movement were comprehensively elucidated. It has been made clear that up to now the phenomenon of the individual subject of the world was developed from a lower to a higher place and from what is old to what is new. However, the issue concerning the direction of world development was put aside from the people's attention.

Thanks to the Chuche-oriented view of the world—the Chuche-oriented philosophical principle—the position of man as ruler of the world and his decisive role were constantly enhanced, the sphere of man's domination of the world was expanded, and the world was reformed and developed so as to serve man according to his independent demand. This has proved to be true.

Thus, the Chuche-oriented view of the world—the Chuche-oriented philosophical principle—placed man as the genuine master of the world and his own destiny and enabled him to glorify his dignity and value at the highest position.

The significance of the Chuche-oriented view of the world—the Chuche-oriented philosophical principle—is that it scientifically illuminated the path to shape man's destiny and emancipate him. In order for the philosophical principle to serve as a basis for the revolutionary theory's world outlook, which illuminates the path for man's emancipation, it should become a principle illuminating the path to shape man's destiny because the basic mission of the philosophical world outlook is to illuminate the path to shape the man's destiny.
Man's destiny is defined in relation to the world. Thus, the fact that man is the master in the world and plays a decisive role in world development means that man plays a decisive role in shaping his destiny as the master of his destiny.

Thanks to the Chuche-oriented philosophical principle, the popular masses became aware for the first time in history of their positions and roles as the masters of nature, society, and their own destinies and rose more vigorously in carrying out the cause of emancipating man in order to shape his destiny with his own strength.

Indeed, the Chuche-oriented philosophical principle is a most scientific and revolutionary principle which makes a man the complete master of the world and his destiny and which illuminates the path for mankind's permanent happiness and prosperity.

Thanks to the Chuche idea, the basic principle of the Chuche-oriented philosophical world outlook scientifically illuminated the path to shape mankind's destiny. Thus, philosophy became a popular philosophy for the first time in the history of the development of philosophy which truly contributes to the cause of emancipating man.

The document on "Some problems arising in education in the Chuche idea" clearly showed that the man-centered philosophical world outlook comprehensively includes the principle which elucidates the general characteristics of the material world, the essential characteristics of man, and man's position and role in the world. Thus, the document scientifically explained the theory of the world which is included in the Chuche-oriented world outlook and gave a most profound and comprehensive explanation of the essential nature of the world and the issue of man's destiny by overcoming the one-sided nature reflected in past philosophical world outlooks.

Several thousand years have passed since man came into existence. During this period, a number of philosophers proposed theories, however, they merely advanced the primary principle which elucidated the general characteristics of the material world.

Thanks to the Chuche idea, the two principles which elucidated the essential nature of man and his position and role in the world were made clear. This historic event was a decisive turning point in the development of philosophical ideologies. The work scientifically explained the principle of the world included in the Chuche-oriented philosophical world outlook and its basic structure. Herein lies the important significance of this document.

In the document, dear Comrade Kim Chong-il not only defined the independent and creative state as the basic content of the Chuche-oriented philosophical world outlook, but also formulated it as the basic state and basic method which should be maintained in epistemological and practical activities.
The basic state and method which should be maintained in epistemological and practical activities are the principle of contemplation and action which was formulated on the basis of the philosophical principle and the view of the world. Correctly formulating this principle is of great significance in successfully shaping the destinies of the popular masses and emancipating man by carrying out the epistemological and practical activities based on the correct state and method.

In order to make the principle of contemplation and action most scientific, placing man, the busject of epistemology and practical action, in the center of the world should be assumed. The independent and creative state are the basic state and basic method which should be maintained in all epistemological and practical activities, because these states emerge from the Chuche-oriented philosophical principle and embody this principle.

Proceeding from the philosophical principle that man is the master of the world and plays a decisive role in world development and in shaping his destiny, the Chuche idea demands that one should handle everything independently by placing man in the center and should creatively carry out activities contributing to enhancing mankind's position and role.

The independent state embodies independence and enables man to firmly safeguard his position as master in the world. The creative state embodies creativity and enables man to thoroughly ensure his decisive role in developing the world and shaping his destiny. Herein lies the basis of the fact that the independent state and creative state are the basic state and basic method which should be maintained in all epistemological and practical activities.

Thus, for the first time, the principle of the most correct contemplation and action to be maintained in epistemological and practical activities was elucidated. The popular masses were able to victoriously advance the sacred cause of emancipating man without deviation along the straight road by taking the independent state as the basic state and the creative state as the basic method.

Herein lines another brilliant achievement made by the Chuche idea in the cause of emancipating man and in the development of the revolutionary ideology.

The document "On Some Problems Arising in Education in the Chuche Idea" explained that the essential nature of society and the inevitability of its change and development can be correctly understood only by placing man at its center. Thus, the work vigorously proved that the Chuche world outlook—the man-centered world outlook—is the most scientific world outlook.

Correctly elucidating the essential nature of society and the inevitability of its change and development and formulating a scientific outlook on social history are the basic methods for the revolutionary struggle for emancipating man and shaping the destinies of the popular masses and are necessities in correctly establishing strategy and tactics.
The document made clear that a society consists of men, the social properties they create, and the social relations that combine men and properties and that man is the master of society. In other words, the work defined society as part of the material world with man at its center based on the elements constituting society and on the method of combining such elements. The document explained that man, the master of society, has the cause and driving force of social movement, and based on this, the document made clear the inevitability of change and development in society.

Regarding man as the center of society, the Chuche idea elucidates the fact that social assets are to be created and social relations are to be improved in accordance with the development of man's independent ideological consciousness and his creative ability necessitates the inevitability of change and development in society.

Society consists of men, their creation, and combination. Therefore, their movements prompt social movement. The inevitability of social development is defined according to what is changed and what is developed. Man is the master of society. Thus, social assets are to be created by men, and the social system is to be established and changed by men.

Man is to carry out the creative movement to reform nature and society in accordance with the level of development of his independence, creativity, and consciousness and to push ahead with social movement to shape his destiny. Man, not the objective condition, plays a decisive role in the development of history.

However, the activities of men and popular masses are actions which reform objects to comply with their demand. Thus, only when the characteristics and the rule of movement of objects are defined based on a correct, scientifically formulated method can the revolution and construction and the cause of emancipating men be successfully carried out.

Indeed, the fact that the man-centered principle is thoroughly applied to the view of social history by elucidating the essential nature of society and the inevitability of its change and development with man at its center and that a most correct ideological and theoretical basis for the revolutionary struggle of the popular masses for independence is an important ideological and theoretical achievement made by the document in developing and enriching the Chuche idea.

Next, the Chuche idea is a revolutionary theory which elucidates most scientifically the path for man's emancipation because it teaches the most perfect revolutionary theory, strategy, tactic, leadership theory, and leadership method to completely achieve the independence of the popular masses. The document stresses this idea.

Comrade Kim Chong-il, member of the Political Bureau Presidium and secretary of the party Central Committee, has indicated: The Chuche idea not only gives correct the view and outlook on nature, society, and man based on
the philosophical principle which elucidates man's position and role in the world, but also teaches the most perfect revolutionary theory, strategy, tactics, leadership theory, and leadership method.

As indicated in the document, the Chuche idea—our party's revolutionary idea—teaches the most perfect revolutionary theory, strategy, tactics, leadership theory and leadership method. The characteristics of the revolutionary theory, strategy and tactics are developed by placing the working masses in the center of everything and are formulated on the basis of the role of the working masses.

The Chuche leadership theory and methods are the most active and revolutionary leadership theory and methods to make the popular masses the genuine masters of revolution and construction and to actively hasten the victory in revolution and construction by having their revolutionary zeal and creativity thoroughly expressed; they are also the most realistic and creative leadership theory and methods that solve all the problems arising in the revolution and construction in conformity with the demands of the prevailing situation and specific reality. Therefore, when we adhere to the revolutionary theory, strategy, tactics, leadership theory, and leadership methods elucidated by the Chuche idea, we can advance the struggle of all stages and forms to realize the chajusong of the popular masses in an unbiased and straight manner.

In his work, the dear Comrade Kim Chong-il has strongly prove that the Chuche idea is the most complete revolutionary theory to evolve on the road of developing mankind's advanced ideas, contributing to the cause of liberating man.

The Chuche idea is an original and innovative revolutionary ideology which is epochally distinguishable from other advanced ideological trends because it is based on the man-centered world outlook. Yet the Chuche idea is not an exclusionary ideology that is isolated from man's history of advanced ideology. The Chuche ideology decisively rejects narrow exclusivism in ideological fields.

As the development of all things have two aspects of inheritance and innovation, so the Chuche idea has two aspects of inheritance and innovation in its relations with preceding ideologies. The Chuche idea is an original ideology of a higher plane that evolved on the basis of inheriting and accomodating all ideologies that can contribute to enhancing man's position and role and to the cause of liberating man in mankind's history of advanced ideologies.

The Chuche ideology evolved on the basis of inheriting and developing the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism. Viewed from the standpoint of the mission of the revolutionary ideology, the Chuche idea and Marxism-Leninism have a common nature as scientific communist theory.

The Chuche idea inherits the revolutionary position of the working class, the materialistic and dialectical principle, and scientific theory which are consistent with Marxism-Leninism. The Chuche philosophy presupposes the materialistic and dialectical principle and scientifically elucidates man's special position and role in the material world, thereby further completing the materialistic dialectic.
The Chuche ideology can contribute to the cause of liberating man; and as the Chuche idea accommodates this within its own ideological system, it becomes a monolithic idea that illuminates the popular masses' road of struggle for the cause of independence, and no other ideologies except the Chuche idea can be a guiding ideology for our party and people.

The work published by the dear Comrade Kim Chong-il is a valuable work that made an outstanding contribution to the development of the working class revolutionary ideology by giving profound scientific answers to the urgent problems arising in carrying out the cause of mankind's independence. The work thoroughly confirms that our party's Chuche idea is the most scientific and revolutionary guiding ideology and that our party's Chuche idea indoctrination is monolithic idea indoctrination.

Our functionaries and workers should deeply study and learn the principle from the work that the Chuche idea is the most perfect revolutionary theory elucidating the road to man's liberation and should wage a vigorous struggle to adhere only to the Chuche idea and think and act as demanded by it and to complete the revolutionary cause to the end under the Chuche banner.

/9738
CSO: 4110/215
IMPLICATIONS OF SUCCESSION ISSUE EXAMINED

Seoul CHONGYOK ANBO in Korean Feb 87 pp 25-32

[Article by Yu Sok-yol: "North Korean Succession Crisis and Inter-Korean Prospects"]

[Text] 1. Introduction

As is already well known, Kim Il-song decided on his son as his successor a long time ago, and he has gone to great lengths to consolidate Kim Chong-il's power. At one time, he even had to withdraw Kim Chong-il from the political arena in the face of strong objection from opposing forces, but it seems that his place as successor has been firmly secured with the consolidation of his position as second in command at the Sixth Party Congress in 1980. In the matter of selection of a successor, the bylaws of the Labor Party specify that the decision should be made after appropriate democratic discussion, but at no time has Kim Il-song formally presented this matter to the Party Central Committee.

There are various kinds of difficult problems connected with determining and promoting Kim Chong-il as successor. Most important, there is opposition from both inside and outside the circles of power. From past experience, Kim Il-song knows very well that these forces are by no means insubstantial.

On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the party in October 1975, Kim Il-song did his utmost to legitimize Kim Chong-il as his successor on the first of the year. But, in the face of the strong opposition of the north Korean inner circle of power, Kim Il-song had no recourse but to cease for the moment trying to install the successor he had planned for and been promoting. This situation has changed somewhat today. Nevertheless, not only is there no way to stop the forces of opposition to Kim Chong-il but in case of a sudden change in the situation, such as the sudden death of Kim Il-song, etc., it is possible that the opposing forces could surface as the main forces in a power struggle and cause a serious clash. In his instruction of May 1986, Kim Il-song affirmed his view of "the matter of succession through national settlement," and at the meeting of the Politburo to discuss the results of Kim Il-song's visit to the Soviet Union on 30 October, Kim Il-song stated that "Comrade Gorbachev gave high marks to the strong arrangements the party leadership has made to hand on our revolutionary cause."

Nevertheless, in order to firmly launch the the Kim Chong-il successor system, the elderly, middle-aged and young forces in the North Korean leadership strata must be won over, and this is viewed as no easy matter. Thus, the path of launching the Kim Chong-il successor system is by no means smooth and easy.
2. Forces of Resistance to Kim Chong-il's Succession

Even with the system of thorough surveillance and control in North Korea which is without precedent anywhere in the world, the challenge and opposition of domestic forces to the plan for Kim Chong-il to be the successor cannot be stilled. The forces in opposition to Kim Chong-il's accession to power can be analyzed according to social strata or grouping as follows.

First: With the opposition of the inner circle of power to the rise of the Kim Chong-il forces, the complaints of a portion of the old forces and non-mainstream forces and discord between new and old forces are growing. While young party members in their forties are significantly gaining power, numerous middle-aged local party cadres in their fifties and sixties are being weeded out, leading to a confrontation in viewpoints between the younger and older cadres. For instance, as power is transferred from the key partisans that represent the first generation of the revolution to the third generation, the opposition of the second generation, the middle-aged bureaucrats who are left out of the power center, is great. (CHOSON ILBO, 1 October 1980)

The fact that there is a force within the inner circle of power in North Korea that is opposed to Kim Chong-il's ascent is evident even from the speeches of North Korean leaders. The chiefs of the North Korean judicial organization, Yi Chin-su, minister of public security, said the following in the report to the Sixth Party Congress: "The Workers Party must thoroughly suppress antirevolutionary elements and devote its main effort to gaining class victory." (NAEWOE TONGSIN, No 307, 26 November 1982) He asserted that North Korea was concerned about handling so-called antiparty elements hiding within the party nucleus rather than overt forces of dissension.

When Kim Chong-il stated in a theoretical article in NODONG SINMUN on 17 October 1982, "Today we must decisively eradicate unwholesome elements within the party which weaken party unity and solidarity, such as factionalism, nepotism, provincialism, etc." (NAEWOE TONGSIN, No 303, 198, 29 October 1982), he frankly admitted the existence of forces in opposition to Kim Chong-il within the party.

Second is a force critical of Kim Chong-il's succession comprised of the elders of the pro-China economic bureaucracy who advocate economic construction. They are the pragmatists who give priority to economic construction and oppose Kim Chong-il's adamant pro-Soviet, militarist policy. The ordinary technocrats, including economic cabinet members, comprise the mainstream and receive substantial support from the inner circle of power. Nevertheless, they preserve a very cautious, moderate attitude, and the possibility of their rising up as a separate force opposing the launching of the Kim Chong-il system is unclear.

Vice President Kim Il, who died on 9 March 1984, was forcibly hospitalized and taken care of by the Kim Chong-il faction after he presented a three-point opinion to the 3-day Eight Plenum of the Sixth Party Central Committee held 29 November-1 December 1983, calling for: 1. unification of the party leadership system; 2. enactment of a new economic policy like
the PRC; 3. a change in the peaceful line in the policy toward the South, etc. (CHUNGANG ILBO, 13 March 1984). Moreover, Vice Premier Kim Kyong-yon, who was in charge of finance, was purged after he voiced opposition to Kim Chong-il’s ignoring the primary policy of economic construction and squandering finances on piling up testaments to the divinization of Kim Il-song (Gate of Triumph, Chuche Tower, costs amounting to 50 million in U.S. dollars). (NOEWOE TONGSIN, No 307, 26 November 1982)

Third: Another of the forces of discontent with Kim Chong-il is a portion of the military leadership. Prior and subsequent to the Sixth Party Congress, Kim Chong-il replaced elder officers below the rank of division commander with younger officers; set an upper age limit for commanders of 32 for company commanders, 34 for battalion commanders, and 40 for regiment commanders; and removed older commanders. Moreover, in the past, retiring military cadres were given civilian jobs commensurate with their military rank, but recently, not only have a large number of older military cadres been discharged without any special treatment but they have become greatly disgruntled when the majority of older cadres have been left idle with nothing to do as a result of the severe interference and control of the young political officers. (NAEWOE TONGSIN, No 301, 15 October 1982)

Today, Kim Chong-il is demonstrating that he has established a considerable support base in the military, but in fact, due to complexity of the forces within the military, a two-faced attitude toward Kim Chong-il is appearing. Consequently, to plumb the depths of this phenomenon, "three revolutions teams" were recently dispatched within the military and are now carrying out surveillance not only of divisions and regiments, but of brigades and companies as well.

Fourth: Forces of dissatisfaction with Kim Chong-il's succession exist within Kim Il-song's family. Kim Yong-chu, blood brother of Kim Il-song, who was sixth in the line of power at the Fifth Party Congress in 1970, as party secretary and chief of the organizational and guidance department waged a serious succession struggle with Kim Chong-il.

A source of serious discord and confrontation with the Kim Chong-il forces can be found in Kim Il-song's present wife, Kim Song-ae, chairwoman of the Women's League. Disharmony between Kim Chong-il and Kim Song-ae is of long standing, but this disharmony appeared as open discord after the Sixth Party Congress when the Kim Chong-il system came to the fore. As the position of Kim Chong-il as successor gradually became more certain, steps were taken to entrench adulation of Kim Chong-suk, Kim Il-song's previous wife and Kim Chong-il's mother, while at the same time minimizing the position of Kim Song-ae.

Stemming from this, Kim Song-ae's dissatisfaction with Kim Chong-il suddenly reached its zenith.

Another force of dissatisfaction is the so-called Kim Il-song family faction, dubbed the "sideline gang," composed of Kim Song-ae's five children. They were not rivals to Kim Chong-il when they were young, but as they grew up, they directly joined the power struggle and formed the core of the anti-Kim Chong-il forces.
Fifth: Ordinary citizens are showing a negative attitude toward the consolidation of Kim Chong-il as successor. The tyrannical and overbearing attitude of the "three revolutions teams", whose first goal is to consolidate the guidance system of Kim Chong-il, is provoking strong dissatisfaction and overt opposition from the ordinary citizenry. Because these "three revolutions teams" have ignored law and order and status under the guise of promoting the three revolutions, thereby causing extreme confusion in social order, it is already known that angered by this, KPA major generals subordinate to Yi Yong-mu held a rally in 1977 to remove Kim Chong-il and get rid of the "three revolutions teams" cadres. Such discontent with Kim Chong-il's accession to power on the part of the North Korean people occasionally surfaces as opposition these days. One recent example is the report of violence in the latter part of April and beginning of May 1982, when workers and youth opposed to the Kim Il-song-Kim Chong-il system destroyed Kim Il-song's statue and the burial place of Kim Chong-il's natural mother, Kim Chong-suk, in the Yangang and North Hamgyong Province areas. (UNIFICATION DAILY, 20 May 1982) In addition, there was the serious opposition of college students to Kim Chong-il's accession to power when riots by college students broke out in the fall of 1981 at many colleges, including Kim Hyong-chik Teachers College named after Kim Il-song's father), Kimchaek Engineering College, etc. A student riot occurred at Kim Il-song University in 1982 as well. (UNIFICATION DAILY, 13 April 1982)

A fairly large popular insurrection was reported as having occurred at the Wonsan port in early April 1983 by a Japanese crew who were in the North Korean port when two port warehouses were set afire, and the insurrection was barely put down by hastily mobilized military troops. Also worthy of note, an uprising occurred at a military base situated in Kangwon Province near the DMZ, an instance of resistance by the military occurred in Pyongyang, unsuccessful explosions occurred in several places such as the Mansudae Assembly Hall, and an underground organization known as the "Taesong Democratic Union" formed around the children of powerful North Korean cadre was uncovered. (UNIFICATION DAILY, 17 March, 1984)

Something resembling a challenge to the Kim Chong-il system occurred subsequent to the alleged coup d'état in July 1985. This alleged abortive coup was first disclosed in "Nineties," a Hong Kong newspaper, which reported that two ringleaders of high rank in the North Korean military defected to communist China.

After the alleged abortive coup, Kim Il-song announced confirmation of Kim Chong-il as his successor, thereby indicating that he had succeeded in consolidating the base of the Kim Chong-il system. Recently, however, O Chin-u, number three in rank, has not appeared in public for 4 months as a result of a traffic accident, thereby telling us that all is not well in the internal affairs of North Korea.

3. Critical State of Power Succession

Kim Chong-il's position as successor to power is not due to his personal capability or eminent revolutionary experience, but rather to Kim Il-song's aura, and it is considered that serious crisis and turmoil would result in North Korea in the event of Kim Il-song's death. One can consider such a critical state in several ways.
First of all, there is the predicament stemming from social unrest. Even after Kim Il-song's demise and the appearance of the Kim Chong-il system, should Kim Chong-il's personal ruling base appear weak or confront resistance from opposition forces, it is highly possible for provocations against the South to be instigated in order to appease domestic forces of discontent. In this event, the tension between South and North Korea would be heightened. Particularly because it is difficult to believe that some of the forces of discontent in the 50-60 age group within the military would accept the Kim Chong-il leadership system as is, it is thought that the likelihood of such an occurrence is very high. Should North Korean society show such symptoms of unrest, the North Korean economy would worsen further and the policy of augmenting the armed forces would brook no delay.

Consequently, the possibility is great for the North Korean system to become engulfed in a morass in every facet of the political, economic and social arenas.

Second, there is the predicament arising from North Korean diplomacy vis-a-vis China and the Soviet Union. Under the premise that Kim Chong-il's accession to power would be successful. A big problem facing North Korea would be its diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Union. For some time, an experienced Kim Il-song has pursued an adroit diplomatic strategy as senior dictator in the absence of Stalin in the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong in China, but there is a great possibility that an inexperienced Kim Chong-il would unintentionally lean more strongly in the direction of either China or the Soviet Union, thereby threatening the other.

In such an eventuality, North Korean would, in effect, be drawn into the Sino-Soviet controversy, thereby resulting in a threat to North Korea's very existence. The possibility would then arise of this spreading to the party, resulting in a violent internal power struggle.

Should Kim Il-song die before Kim Chong-il's power base is firmly consolidated, China and the Soviet Union would attempt to exercise influence on North Korea. The more competition for North Korea heats up between China and the Soviet Union, the more difficult it becomes for North Korea to maintain independence, making it impossible to categorically reject the possibility of North Korea being divided up by China and the Soviet Union.

Third, there is the predicament arising from the struggle after Kim Il-song's death. Kim Chong-il's position of power is by no means firm under the aura of the fabricated, quasi-charismatic dictatorship of Kim Il-song.

After Kim Il-song's demise, the likelihood is substantial that, Kim Chong-il's power notwithstanding, the collapse of the Kim Chong-il system would come about more rapidly than predicted. Above all, Kim Chong-il cannot inherit Kim Il-song's fabricated charisma or deification, and it is predicted that a sacrificial counterattack would be waged by noteworthy forces that have been sacrificed in the process of promoting the Kim Chong-il system.
It is not an easy task to predict the victor in the power struggle between the Kim Chong-il forces and the opposing forces, but it is likely that a protracted battle would ensue. Even supposing that it would end in a short time, the political unrest would continue for a long time.

Fourth, there is the predicament arising from the opposition struggle of the citizenry. Should such a centralized system waver, the North Korean people, who have been suppressed for 40 years, would perhaps suddenly rise up in a struggle against the government for the restoration of human rights, in which case the possibility cannot be rejected that the military would push Kim Chong-il aside and seize power to restore social order. Regardless of who would seize power, however, he would not be able to carry on a concerted suppression of the North Korean citizenry in the ruling style of Kim Il-song. To unify the party and bind the people together around the party, he would, as a minimum, have to gain loyalty through the voluntary participation of the party members and ordinary citizenry.

To this end, he would have to relax control of the citizenry to some extent and possess the political capability of leading them to a bright future, but the situation is such that one cannot expect this from Kim Chong-il or any other ruler. Inherent in such a situation would be the remnants of endless struggle and clashes between the ordinary masses and political leaders in North Korea.

Fifth, there is the predicament arising from promoting a new dictatorial system. It is possible that Kim Chong-il, who not only does not possess charisma in any shape or form, but rather is known to possess an erratic personality, would not hesitate to employ fearful tactics and exercise cruelty to consolidate his own unstable power.

Perhaps Kim Chong-il would obtain the powerful support of the military, including O Chin-u and O Kuk-nyol, adopt a hard line to completely eliminate the anti-Kim Chong-il forces and intensify control and suppression not only of opposition forces but also of the populace, thereby promoting a dictatorial system worse than before. Such a situation would obviously place the North Korean citizenry in a serious predicament.

4. Prospects of South-North Korean Relations

Changes in the North Korean power structure or power succession and prospects for South-North Korean relations stemming from this cannot go beyond pure guesswork from the present vantage point. One evident fact, however, is that changes in the North Korean power structure and South-North Korean relations are deeply connected with the period of Kim Il-song's death. In fact, many North Korea specialists believe that this count will not portend momentous changes in the North Korean power structure nor in South-North Korean relations. But considering the ramifications, one can conclude that the North Korean power succession and the prospects for South-North Korean relations are closely connected with the period of Kim Il-song's death.
First, let us consider the case of the early death of Kim Il-song. It has already been pointed out that Kim Il-song selected his eldest son, Kim Chong-il, as his successor to carry on his own political convictions and his absolute authority after his death, and he consolidated his position on the occasion of the Sixth Party Congress in 1980. Nevertheless, Kim Chong-il's place on the throne under the aura of Kim Il-song is still not firm, so that should Kim Il-song die within 1-2 years, Kim Chong-il's position would be considerably endangered despite his authority.

Having acceded to power in this case, Kim Chong-il would initially strive to consolidate his uncertain power base domestically while hastening to maintain the status quo in foreign and South Korean relations. Nevertheless, if Kim Chong-il should decide that his power base had become somewhat consolidated, he would take the lead through more positive proposals in regard to South Korean relations and strive to obtain ratification of the legitimacy of his system from the North Korean citizenry. If he should judge that his power base was being seriously challenged by domestic forces of opposition, however, the likelihood is very great that Kim Chong-il would perpetrate anti-South Korean provocations in search of a way to purge and suppress the forces of opposition.

On the other hand, should Kim Il-song die this year, one can foresee the forces opposing the Kim Il-song system as gaining strength in the ensuing power struggle. It is possible that the anti-Kim Chong-il forces that would gain strength in this case would form a collective leadership system and adopt a communist China line more reasonable and pragmatic than the erstwhile Kim Il-song-Kim Chong-il line, choose a line of South and North Korean peaceful coexistence rather than adhering to the irrational line of reunification under communism, and engage in a competition of systems keyed to surpassing South Korea. In such a case, it would be possible for South-North Korean dialogue and exchange to progress more rapidly than in the past.

Second, the case that Kim Il-song will live a long time can be considered. In this case, Kim Chong-il would probably hone his governing capability, eliminate opposition factions one at a time under the aegis of his father's power, and bring about a transition to a new era in which the party and state organizations would be more loyal to Kim Chong-il, thereby continuing to consolidate his power base. In this case, it is judged that Kim Chong-il would thereby maintain his power and Kim Il-song's ideological system would continue to be maintained.

It is foreseen that Kim Chong-il would strive to gain the support of the North Korean citizenry in order to achieve his smooth accession to power. One of his methods would be to attain unification by inducing a dialogue in regard to South Korean relations. The presumption is that Kim Chong-il would adhere to the anti-South Korean revolutionary line while intensifying bogus peaceful overtures in accordance with changes in the South Korean domestic situation. With the objective of enlivening the stagnant North Korean economy, he would hold South-North Korean talks, while striving to attract advanced technology and capital from Western nations.
### SOUTH-NORTH KOREA
Comparison of Key Economic Indices (end of 1985)

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NODONG SINMUN ON IDEOLOGICAL INDOCTRINATION

SK091000 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2142 GMT 2 Aug 87

[NODONG SINMUN 3 August special article: "Unitary Ideological Indoctrination Is Important Work To Strengthen the Party and the Revolutionary Ranks"]

[Text] At a time when our party has been unprecedentedly strengthened in organizational and ideological areas under the slogan for the chucheization of the party, we have meaningfully observed the 13th anniversary of the publication of the dear Comrade Kim Chong-il’s document "On Vigorously Acceleration the Chucheization of Society by Basically Improving and Intensifying Party Work."

On 2 August 1974, dear Comrade Kim Chong-il published the programmatic document elucidating the fundamental questions to be adhered to for the chucheization of the society. The document comprehensively elucidated the guidelines on strengthening the party and enhancing the party’s leading role questions on seeking the chucheization of society as a general task of the party, strengthening the party and the revolutionary ranks, improving and intensifying party guidance over socialist economic construction, and improving the system and method of the party work. Thus, the document has become an immortal synthesis of the ideas and theories on building a chuche-oriented party and on party work.

Over the past period, the document has displayed great vitality in party-building work and in carrying out party work. All party organizations and functionaries have thoroughly implemented the ideas and theories of the document. Accordingly, a revolutionary turn has been made in party work and in party-building work.

Under the leadership of dear Comrade Kim Chong-il, the slogan for the chucheization of society has been thoroughly implemented. As a result, the overall party work has been basically improved, and the ranks of the party have been unprecedentedly strengthened.

Now, based on this success, we must continue to vigorously carry out the document. In upholding and carrying out the ideas and theories of the document, one of the important questions facing us today is to organizationally and ideologically strengthen the party and the revolutionary ranks by intensifying the unitary ideological indoctrination of the party.
Comrade Kim Chong-il, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau and secretary of the party Central Committee, has noted: Above all, we must further qualitatively strengthen the ranks of the party by indoctrinating and disciplining the party members in a revolutionary manner.

Intensifying the unitary ideological indoctrination of the party among the party members and working people is the most powerful means to strengthen the party and the revolutionary ranks. The solidness of the party and revolutionary ranks is precisely political and ideological solidness. What is basic in this is to enhance the political and ideological level of the party members and guarantee the ideological uniformity of the party and revolutionary ranks.

The chuche idea is the unitary ideology of our party. Thus, to guarantee the uniformity in the ideology and will of the party and revolutionary ranks, chuche idea indoctrination must be ceaselessly intensified as the unitary ideological indoctrination.

The unitary ideological indoctrination of the party, above all, nurtures party members and working people as truly chuche-oriented communist revolutionaries with a firm revolutionary outlook on the leader. By so doing, it makes it possible to strengthen the ranks of the party.

The party is a political organization of the masses of party members. Therefore, making the party and revolutionary ranks invincible ranks of combatants depends on politically and ideologically preparing the party members. Only when the members of the party and revolutionary ranks are prepared as true revolutionaries with a firm revolutionary outlook on the leader can the entire ranks be strengthened as invincible ranks of combatants.

Nurturing the party members and working people as true revolutionaries with a chuche-oriented revolutionary world outlook and with a firm revolutionary outlook on the leader is possible only by intensifying chuche idea indoctrination—the unitary ideological indoctrination of our party.

Indoctrination in the chuche idea makes it possible for all party members and working people not only to deeply master chuche-oriented revolutionary world outlook, revolutionary theory, and way of leadership, but also to firmly prepare themselves to become genuine patriots who are infinitely loyal to the party, the working class, and the people and who have the spirit of giving first priority to the nation, thereby strengthening the party and the revolutionary ranks. In particular, indoctrination in the chuche idea, by inculcating among all party members and working people that the leader [suryong] of the revolution is the center of the social and political organism and by letting them deeply understand the position and role of the leader in the political group of this society, makes it possible not only to foster them to become genuine revolutionaries with indomitable revolutionary outlook on the leader, but also of further strengthen the party and the revolutionary ranks.
Strengthening the party's unitary ideology constitutes a firm guarantee which makes it possible to constantly strengthen the unity and cohesion of the ideological will of the party and the revolutionary ranks. The unity and cohesion of the party is the unity of ideological will based on the revolutionary ideology of the leader.

The purity of ideological will of the party is precisely the basic source of its solidness and invincibility. The only way for the party and the revolutionary ranks to think and act according to one ideological will, the ideological will of the leader, lies in constantly strengthening the indoctrination in the party's unitary ideology.

The greatness of the chuche idea, the unitary ideology of our party, is precisely the guarantee that makes it possible to firmly ensure the unitary nature of the ideological will of the party and the revolutionary ranks. Therefore, the unitary ideological indoctrination of the party to arm all party members and working people with the chuche idea is precisely the ideological indoctrination work of firmly ensuring the unity and cohesion of the party and the revolutionary ranks.

When unitary ideological indoctrination work is strengthened and, consequently, all party members and working people think and struggle according to the demands of the chuche idea only, the party and the revolutionary ranks overflow with the chuche idea only and any other ideologies than the chuche idea cannot be infiltrated into the party and the revolutionary ranks. Thus, the party and the revolutionary ranks can be firmly turned into a pure body of ideological will which is firmly rallied around the party and the leader.

In particular, indoctrination in the chuche idea is conducted, adopting it as its most important task to educate party members and the working people so that they cannot only have a correct understanding of the subject of the revolution, but also firmly establish a revolutionary outlook on the leader. Therefore, indoctrination in the chuche idea plays great role in strengthening the unity and cohesion of the party and the revolutionary ranks.

In particular, indoctrination in the chuche idea deeply inculcates among the masses the principle that the unity of the leader, the party, and the masses forms a social and political organism and the principle that the leader is precisely the center, and that the social and political life of man lies in the leader of the revolution. Therefore, when indoctrination in the chuche idea is vigorously conducted, party members and the working people can deeply understand the principle of the revolutionary outlook on the leader, can cherish in their hearts loyalty to the party and the leader as firm faith, and, base don this, can rally around the party and the leader with firm ideological will.

Indoctrination in the chuche idea, by deeply inculcating among the masses the profound principles of the subject of the revolution and the revolutionary outlook on the leader, makes it possible to firmly form the masses of people
as a social and political organism and to deepen the party and the revolutionary ranks into invincible ones.

Therefore, to firmly deepen the party and the revolutionary ranks in conformity with the spirit of the dear Comrade Kim Jong-il's document "On Vigorously Accelerating the Work of Imbuining the Whole of Society With the Chuche Idea," the party's unitary ideological indoctrination should be constantly strengthened.

What is of particularly important significance in strengthening the party and the revolutionary ranks by deepening the party's unitary ideological indoctrination at present is to take the dear Comrade Kim Jong-il's document "Some Problems Which Arise in Indoctrination on the Chuche Idea" as a guideline and to thoroughly embody the document. This document is an important document which makes it possible to effect an epochal turn in strengthening the party and the revolutionary ranks by deepening the unitary ideological indoctrination of the party onto a new high stage.

The great significance of the dear Comrade Kim Jong-il's document in strengthening the party and the revolutionary ranks lies in the fact that the document makes it possible to more smoothly carry out the ideological dyeing of the party and the revolutionary ranks based on the chuche idea by making all forms of ideological indoctrination work in the chuche idea.

The document is a mighty weapon which makes it possible to deepen the party and the revolutionary ranks as a pure body of chuche-oriented ideological will by seeing to it that all forms of ideological indoctrination work toward firmly establishing the chuche-oriented revolutionary world outlook among party members and the working people.

The significance of the document in strengthening the party and the revolutionary ranks is to make the party and the revolutionary ranks overflow with the chuche idea only by further strengthening indoctrination in the chuche idea and, thus, to more firmly deepen the unity of ideological will of the party and the revolutionary ranks based on the chuche idea.

The document, by more deeply inculcating among all party members and working people the philosophical principle of the chuche idea, its social and historical theories, and the profound principles of the subject of the revolution and the revolutionary outlook on the leader, will make it possible for the party and the revolutionary ranks to become the ranks of genuine revolutionaries who have chuche-oriented revolutionary faith and a firm revolutionary outlook on the leader.

Therefore, we should concentrate greater efforts on closely combining the document "On Some Problems Which Arise in Indoctrination on the Chuche Idea" with the document "On Basically Improving and Strengthening Party Work" which was published on 2 August 1974 and on thoroughly implementing it.
The document on vigorously accelerating the work of modeling the whole of society after the chuche idea by basically improving and strengthening party work elucidates the problem of indoctrinating party members in a revolutionary manner, the problem of tempering them organizationally, and other important problems which should be firmly adhered to in party work and party activities.

By consistently and firmly grasping the ideology and theories elucidated in the document published on 2 August 1974 in the future, too, we should firmly deepen the party and the revolutionary ranks as a combat unit of chuche, strengthen the party's guidance over socialist economic construction, and further improve the system and methods of party work.

It is the great dignity of our party functionaries and party members to firmly grasp the programmatic documents which have elucidated the ideology, theory, and policies of building the chuche party and to brilliantly implement the cause of building the party, upholding the great party and the leader.

By deeply cherishing this dignity and honor in our hearts and, thus, by thoroughly safeguarding and implementing the ideology and theory of the party, we should effect an epochal advance in carrying out the cause of modeling the entire party and the whole of society after the chuche idea.

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CSO: 4110/216
WPK PRAISES BUILDERS OF PANPYONG DAM

SK100537 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2100 GMT 1 Aug 87

[Congratulatory message from WPK Central Committee to soldiers of the Korean People's Security Forces, construction workers, and volunteers, who performed labor exploits in building the Panpyong Dam and 40-kilometer waterway tunnel at Taechon power station]

[Text] To the soldiers of the Korean People's Security Forces, construction workers, and volunteers:

The WPK Central Committee extends warm congratulatory greetings to the soldiers of the Korean People's Security Forces, construction workers, and volunteers, who have successfully built the Panpyong Dam and 40-kilometer waterway tunnel of the Taechon power station into lasting edifices by displaying matchless courage and mass heroism by following the leadership of the party and the leader.

Advancing a proposal at the fourth plenary meeting of the Sixth Party Central Committee to build the Taechon power station to accelerate socialist economic construction by exploiting the rich water resources of the country and to build our fatherland into a wealthy and powerful paradise of the people, the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song assigned to soldiers of the People's Security Forces the honorable duty of building the Taechon No 1 and No 2 power stations and the 40-kilometer waterway tunnel and wisely led the struggle to perform this duty.

The Panpyong Dam and 40-kilometer waterway tunnel are large-scale hydraulic structures linked to the center of the Taechon power station.

Having risen in the work of building the Panpyong Dam and 40-kilometer waterway tunnel by responding to the call of the party, soldiers of the People's Security Forces, by fully displaying an unyielding fighting spirit, excavated 600,000 cubic meters of earth and tamped more than 595,000 cubic meters of concrete over a period of little more than a year to build the dam high enough to store water during the initial stage and performed over 5 years, the astonishing miracle of completing a 40-kilometer waterway tunnel construction project to pass 100 cubic meters of water per second.
The brilliant victory attained in building the Panpyong Dam and the 40-kilometer waterway tunnel is a great victory brought about by our party's policy of remodeling nature and another proud success attained by our people, who are vigorously struggling to accelerate socialist construction under the leadership of the party.

With the construction of the Panpyong Dam and with the completion of the 40-kilometer waterway tunnel, a breakthrough has been achieved toward accelerating construction of the Taechon power station at the earliest possible date and successfully achieving the goal of electric energy envisaged in the Third 7-Year Plan. At the same time, a bright prospect for much more successfully supplying irrigation water to a large area of tideland reclaimed in the west coastal area and increasing the production of grains has opened. The construction project has changed the scene of the northwest region of the fatherland into a much more beautiful region and greatly contributed to the daily lives of the people.

Military construction workers have vigorously displayed the heroic spirit of the army, of the party, and the people by building high the large dam by waging an assault with a passionate high revolutionary will to successfully implement the party's farsighted plan to achieve the people's happiness and prosperity for posterity, overcoming all difficulties, such as cold and hot weather and floods. With chuche-type revolutionary faith and matchless boldness, you comrades have completed at a single stroke the vast work of building a framework, such as construction of a concrete mixing site with a 6,000 cubic meter capacity. They then began to tamp concrete. They expedited construction work by inventing and introducing new innovative methods and by simultaneously forging ahead with work to prevent flooding with rudimentary construction work and tamping concrete.

You comrades have taped a peak of 8,000 cubic meters of concrete per day by independently manufacturing large quantities of equipment and by finding a source for hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of aggregate at the sites concerned by highly displaying the revolutionary fighting spirit of self-reliance and by vigorously carrying out a mass technological innovation movement. Thus, you have created on a daily basis new records and brought about innovations in work, including construction and transportation work.

Those scientists, technicians, and planners who participated in the construction of the dam have greatly contributed to building dams in our own style by destroying passivism, conservatism, and technical mysticism.

Those military construction workers who took charge of the construction of the waterway tunnel guaranteed the quality of work in excavating tunnels at the highest level by manufacturing new and efficient blasting powder and detonators, by independently producing and using plastic pipes and detonating fuses, and by studying and introducing new detonating methods and advanced work methods. While economizing on labor, materials, and funds, they greatly increased the speed of construction work.
In response to the party's appeal to the entire party, the entire country, and all the people to support construction projects, the working class at many plants and enterprises produced and supplied the machine facilities and materials needed in the construction of the dam and waterway tunnel in a timely manner. Working people throughout the country, including members of cooperative farms, youths, students, and medical functionaries, actively supported those military construction workers materially and spiritually. The beautiful behavior of unity between the military and the people, in which servicemen and the people are firmly united and follow the intent of the party, was highly demonstrated at the construction site.

Through the construction of the Panpyong Dam and the 40-kilometer waterway tunnel, servicemen of the People's Security Forces have been more firmly tempered as reliable combat ranks of our party which have been firmly prepared politically, ideologically, militarily, and technologically.

The servicemen and construction workers have not only vigorously demonstrated the boundless might of our army and people who have been firmly rallied around the party and the leader, as well as the great power of the self-reliant national economy, but have also bestowed firm faith in victory and new courage upon the working people of the country who are accelerating the struggle to implement the Third 7-Year Plan and achieve the complete victory of socialism by successfully building the mountain-like dam and the large-scale 40-kilometer waterway tunnel.

The labor exploits performed by servicemen of the Korean People's Security Forces who have created a miracle in the great nature-remolding work for the prosperity and development of the socialist fatherland will shine forever in the history of the struggle of our party and people for socialist and communist construction. At the same time, the party and the people will never forget the heroic exploits performed by the servicemen of the People's Security Forces.

The WPK Central Committee highly evaluates the brilliant labor exploits performed by servicemen of the Korean People's Security Forces, construction workers, and supporters who have greatly contributed to construction of the Taechon power plant and to the overall development of the national economy by building the Panpyong Dam with infinite loyalty to the party and the leader and by completing construction of the 40-kilometer waterway tunnel and who have not only safeguarded and defended the party and the leader, but also vigorously demonstrated to the world the invincible might of our people with great success in socialist construction.

Today, you comrades are faced with the heavy duty not only to more firmly prepare your combat ranks politically, ideologically, militarily, and technologically in conformity with the demands of the prevailing situation and to thoroughly make every preparation so as to cope with any unexpected situation, but also to more outstandingly contribute to socialist economic construction by actively participating in new construction projects.
The great leader Comrade Kim Il-sung has taught: In the future, we should build hydraulic power plants on a large scale according to the new method of developing water resources.

You, comrades, should effect continuous innovations and advances in building new projects by vigorously advancing forward with the same vigor and spirit as demonstrated in construction of the Panpyong Dam and the 40-kilometer waterway tunnel.

The servicemen of the Korean People's Security Forces should firmly arm themselves with the chuche idea—the revolutionary ideology of our party—should always think and act according to the idea and intent of the party, and should resolutely safeguard and defend the party and the leader politically and ideologically and live under any difficult circumstances. Thus, they should thoroughly establish the revolutionary spirit and habit of following unconditionally any order and instruction of the party to the end.

Military servicemen engaging in construction projects should further enhance their technical and skill levels and practical abilities, further improve and strengthen the technical provisions of their units, firmly build repair bases and spare parts production bases, repair and readjust construction machinery, and, thus, enhance the rate of their utilization to the maximum.

You, comrades, should gallantly overcome all sorts of difficulties in construction by demonstrating creative power and wisdom. You should also not only actively mobilize and utilize inner reserves but also economize on even one gram of steel or cement, and one nail. Thus, you should vigorously push ahead with construction projects.

At the same time, you should do away with conservatism, passivity, and technological mysticism, actively invent and introduce our own chuche-oriented construction methods and efficient production machinery by displaying original ideas and through bold practice, and actively introduce modern scientific and technological successes by strengthening creative cooperation with scientists and technicians. Thus, you should not only further increase the speed of construction, but also maintain the quality of construction at the highest level.

Commanders should perfectly establish operational plans and technical and practical measures in construction in conformity with the characteristics of construction objects and the situation of their units. They should also strengthen the work of controlling and supervising the implementation of their operational plans, thoroughly exercise the unified command on construction projects, and exercise guidance on construction in a substantial manner. Thus, they should vigorously push ahead with construction projects.

Discipline is the life of the military and the source of combat capability. Those military servicemen engaging in construction should establish the revolutionary discipline of implementing the orders of their commanders correctly and in a timely manner. They should also strictly abide by the
demands of military regulations not only in their routine lives, but also while engaging in construction projects and should always work and live in a revolutionary and romantic atmosphere.

You, comrades, should more highly display the traditional habit of unity between seniors and juniors, and love and care for each other. Commanders should lead the initiative when a difficult situation is met. Thus, they should see to it that all soldiers thoroughly protect the interests of the people and that soldiers and the people firmly unite and successfully carry out revolutionary tasks.

The WPK Central Committee firmly believes that soldiers of the Korean People’s Security Forces will outstandingly repay the party’s confidence and expectations by attaining greater success in their assigned tasks, following the leadership of the party. [Signed] The WPK Central Committee, 29 July 1987

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CSO: 4110/217
IMPROVEMENT IN INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT STRESSED

Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 17 May 87 p 3

[Article by Kim In-su: "The Trinity Consisting of the Party Secretary, the Manager, and the Chief Engineer Is an Important Guarantee in Improving Industrial Management"]

[Text] The great leader, Comrade Kim Il-song expressed his views on decisively improving the economic guidance and industrial management in order to successfully achieve the grand goal of the new long-term plan in his historic speech on the administrative policies and in the laws related to the Third 7-Year Economic Plan (1987-93).

The position of the responsible functionaries of the plants and industries is very important in improving the industrial management according to the intention of the great leader and the party. Only if the responsible functionaries who are directly in charge of a component of social production sufficiently fulfill their responsibilities and roles as a militant unit, can the industrial management be carried out well and our nation's overall economy improve rapidly.

The great leader, Comrade Kim Il-song long ago emphasized the importance of the duty of the plants' and industries' responsible functionaries and of carrying out the industrial management together with controlling and managing the socialist economy.

The great leader, Comrade Kim Il-song instructed as follows: "It is important that the manager, the chief engineer and the plant party chairman constantly discuss the plant control and management problems in order to guarantee the collective leadership of the plant party committee." ("Collective Works of Kim Il-song," Vol 15 pp 511)

He revealed the ideology instructing the party to carry out industrial management through the party secretary of a complex, the manager and the chief engineer as a threesome to support and lift high the great leader's lofty intentions.

The respected and dear leader, Comrade Kim Chong-il said the party secretary of a complex, the manager, and the chief engineer are the owners who are
responsible administratively, technically, and as a party for the complex works. He also pointed out that whether or not a complex is properly controlled and managed depends greatly upon the roles of the three.

This ideology that the respected and beloved leader Comrade Kim Chong-il revealed as outstanding accurately embodies the demand for reality in development, which makes up the basic component of socialist economic management and the importance of the duties of the plants' and industries' responsible functionaries in front of the party and the revolution; and the socialist economic construction has developed to a higher plateau, and the industries in the form of complexes which are our original and superior industrial organizational form, and it has become the basic component of the socialist economic management.

The fact that the party secretaries of the plants and industries, the managers, and the chief engineers become a trinity means that they altogether, in one body and mind, carry out the industrial management according to the party's ideology and intention.

To thoroughly embody this ideology revealed by our party is an important guarantee to improve the industrial management suitable to the reality of development according to the demand of the Taean work system.

The reason why the trinity is an important guarantee to improve the industrial management is that it enables, first of all, the collective guidance of the party committee to be carried out more efficiently.

To thoroughly achieve the collective guidance of the party committee is the most important issue which arises from the improvement of the industrial management. The party committee's collective guidance is the basic core of the Taean work system and is considered to be a superior characteristic of the system.

The trinity enables the party committee's collective guidance in the industrial management to be achieved more facilely.

The trinity, first of all, makes it possible to prepare a starting premise for the party committee's collective guidance by properly setting up the direction and method of the industrial management.

The direction and method of the industrial management being properly set up is a starting point and a prerequisite for the party committee's collective guidance.

In order for the party committee to collectively discuss and decide a precise direction and method of industrial management, a detailed and clear plan should be first discussed. One which sufficiently reflects the party policy's demands and the current status of the plants and industries. This can be successfully guaranteed only when the demand for the trinity is thoroughly understood.
The trinity makes it possible to prepare a substantial plan which can set up the direction and method of the industrial management suitable for the party policy's demand.

The party secretary, the manager, and the chief engineer are the revolutionary commanding members who should know the party line and policy in the plants and industries before anyone else, organize, and execute work to achieve them. If the three collect their wisdom and work in concert with one another, they may be able to find many good plans to thoroughly accomplish the party's economic policy. And if they bring these plans to collective discussion, they can sufficiently encourage creative ideas.

The trinity makes it possible to prepare a plan which can set up the most rational direction and method of industrial management which are suitable for the actual circumstances of each unit.

The relative position and detailed conditions that the plants and industries occupy in the socialist economic construction are not the same. They can differ in many respects such as the employees' ideological and psychological preparation status, the employees' technical and skill standards, the modernization standard of the production process, and the conditions of availability and transportation of raw materials, fuel and power. A plan which has considered all such detailed conditions can be a scientific plan which can set up an accurate direction and method for industrial management.

The party secretary, through common party works, knows the employees' ideological and psychological status better than anyone else. The manager and the chief engineer, through administrative economic works and the process of technical guidance, ascertain the employees' technical and skill standards, the status of facilities, the raw materials' guarantee status, and the support work status in detail.

Serious discussions among these three can properly set up the goal and policy to accomplish the party policy and the direction and method of the industrial management which has reflected the current status of the plants and industry in detail. And they can bring up these goals and policies to the party committee for collective discussion.

The trinity also enables the collective guidance to be achieved smoothly by enabling the issues discussed and determined by the party committee to be impartially accomplished.

Various problems can be anticipated in the process of executing the issues discussed and determined collectively by the party committee. Only if they solve these problems arising from the process of control and management of the plants and industries without any delay according to the direction determined by the party committee, can the collective guidance be smoothly guaranteed.

The trinity arrangement assures that the party secretary, the manager, and the chief engineer will resolve the problems discussed at the party committee by
seriously discussing the problems which occur frequently or need immediate solution and by devising countermeasures and executing them without delay. By so doing, they successfully achieve the goals of the collective guidance of the party committee.

Another reason why a threesome including the party secretary, the manager and the chief engineer is an important guarantee in improving the industrial management is that it properly combines the political and economic work in plants and industries.

A proper combination of the political and economic work can be effectively achieved when party, administrative economic, and technical economic units progress cooperatively.

The trinity properly combines the political and economic organization work by making the party, administrative economic, and technical economic units progress cooperatively at industrial plants.

If the three become a trinity, the party can push the administrative economic and technical economic units forcefully, while at the same time it guaranteeing work conditions of the administrative economic functionaries completely at the party level. Thus, it actively expands the administrative and technical economic units. It helps properly combine the political and economic organizational work by causing the party, administrative, and technical economic units be closely related with one another and continue making progress.

The trinity also enables the political and economic organizational units be combined properly by reinforcing the administrative and technical economic units in the plants and industries.

The trinity makes the manager and the chief engineer decisively carry out their work firmly believing in their own ability.

When this concept becomes a reality in industrial management, the responsible role of the manager and the chief engineer can be successfully realized; and thus the administrative and technical economic work will be carried out better. If so, the party secretary can expand the organizational political work more aggressively by concentrating his energy on the party work which is his primary responsibility. And furthermore, if the trinity is properly organized so that the manager and the chief engineer depend on the party organization more completely thereby making other functionaries participate in party life voluntarily and sincerely, following their practical example, the party policy can be better carried out.

All of these indicate that the trinity can properly combine the political and economic organizational work by forming a close union of the party, administrative, and technical economic works.

All the functionaries of plants and industries should endlessly improve the control and management work of the plants and industries so it is suitable for the current demands to highly support our party's sublime intentions and
enhance the practice of industrial management with the party secretary, the manager and the chief engineer making up a three-part leadership.

All of the economic guidance functionaries, and especially the responsible functionaries of plants and industries including the complexes should accomplish a proud victory in this year's rewarding battle and should brilliantly carry out the grand Third 7-Year Plan by decisively improving the industrial management to thoroughly embody our party's ideology and intentions concerning this three-part leadership.

13302
CSO: 4110/180
KCNA REPORTS PRODUCTION OF ROBOTS

SK121030 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1018 GMT 12 Aug 87

[Text] Pyongyang August 12 (KCNA)--The industrial establishments in different parts of Korea will produce hundreds of robots of various types this year.

Workers, scientists and technicians who have already built many robots in a short period are now striving to finish the building of more than 60 robots now under way at an early date and manufacture a large number of more robots.

In September of last year the great leader President Kim Il-song spoke highly of the efficiency of large-scale and special precision machine tools built through the "June 1985 let-one-machine-tool-make-another movement" and put forward a programmatic task to launch a robot-multiplying movement.

Our party indicated ways to powerfully push ahead with the robot-multiplying movement and wisely directs this drive to be waged as a mass movement.

The workers and technicians and three-revolution team members at the March 25 Factory manufactured robots including a robot for supplying materials of press work and a washing robot in a short period of time.

The workers of the August 1 Railway Factory, pooling efforts with the teachers and researchers of Pyongyang University of Railways, made a robot needed for the production of containers and other robots for the production of machines to be used in modernizing railways.

Many factories and enterprises, such as the Huichon Machine Tool Plant, the April 3 Factory, the October 5 General Automation Works and the Pyongyang Textile Machine Plant, built by themselves various types of robots needed for their production processes to raise markedly the production efficiency and quality of goods.

Researchers under the Academy of Sciences and teachers and researchers of Kim Il-song University and Kim Chaek University of Technology, joining efforts with workers and technicians, manufactured a robot serving machines, a gantry crane type robot, an articular-type assembling robot and a welding robot, etc.

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DAILY URGES DEVELOP OF S&T 'ONTO HIGHER-STEP LEVEL'

SK130341 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2133 GMT 5 Aug 87

[NODONG SINMUN 6 August editorial: "Let Us Constantly Concentrate Great Efforts on Scientific and Technological Development"]

[Text] Science and technology should be constantly developed to rapidly develop the national economy and to epochally improve the people's standard of living.

Comrade Kim Chong-il, member of the Political Bureau Presidium, and secretary, of the party Central Committee, has noted: Only when science and technology are speedily developed can socialist construction be facilitated, the national economy be exalted onto a new higher stage, and the question of improving the people's standard of living and the question of enhancing the might of the country be successfully solved.

At present we are living in an era of science and technology. Science and technology, an outcome of the creative wisdom of human beings, have reached a very high stage, and its role in economic development is unprecedentedly increasing.

Over the past period, science and technology have developed at a very high speed in our country. In particular, the scientific research work of resolving the problem of raw materials, fuel, and power relaying on our country's own materials and with our own strength has been vigorously conducted, and achievements in this work have been widely applied, thus even further enhancing the chuche-oriented nature and self-reliant nature of industry. Also, a great advance has been effected in modernizing mechanical equipment and technological production process and in boosting the level of the technical provisions of the national economy as a result of actively pushing ahead with scientific research work to develop the machine building and automation industries.

Our inexperienced science and technology, which made the first stride after liberation, have attained this rapid development. This is attributable to the respected and beloved leader Comrade Kim Il-song, who has put forth correct scientific and technological policies in every period and at every stage of the developing revolution, and to our party which has wisely led the struggle to implement them.
The Third 7-Year Plan is a plan for overall technological remodeling of the national economy. A firm guarantee for expediting the fulfillment of the new grand long-range plan by more than 1 and 1/2 years ahead of schedule lies in rapidly developing science and technology.

Our party's determination and firm will are to smoothly solve many scientific and technological problems arising in socialist economic construction by concentrating great efforts on scientific and technological development and to elevate the scientific and technological level of our country onto a higher stage.

The functionaries in all fields and at all units of the national economy should deeply grasp the intentions of the party and constantly concentrate great efforts on scientific and technological development. This is, at present, the most primary question arising in implementing the party's call for developing science and technology at a high level and an important guarantee for elevating the science and technology of our country onto the world's level within a short period of time. This is connected with the fact that a rapid scientific and technological development is creative work which requires energetic study and constant contemplation and is achieved through protracted and steady efforts.

The guiding functionaries in the fields of the national economy should deal with scientific and technological problems with the high self-awakening of being the commanding personnel of the revolution, and plan and coordinate organizational work always paying attention to these problems. In particular, the functionaries of the committees and ministries of the State Administration Council, with a firm determination to solve assigned tasks with scientific and technological success, as assigned tasks are more grand and heavier tasks are assigned in succession, should plan and coordinate the organizational and political work of mapping out plans and arousing scientists and workers into fulfilling them.

What is important in rapidly developing the science and technology of the country is to correctly map out plans for scientific and technological development and to carry them out without fail. Only when plans for scientific and technological plans are correctly worked out and fulfilled without fail can the science and technology of the country be constantly developed at a high stage in conformity with the intrinsic demands of the socialist economic system.

The fields concerned--the committees and ministries of the State Administration Council in particular--should concentrate great efforts on mapping out long-range plans for scientific and technological development along with immediate scientific and technological development plans. Toward this end, the committees and the ministries of the council should formulate long-range plans for scientific and technological development by taking prospects for the national economic development and the world's trends of scientific and technological development into account. In addition, long-range plans for scientific and technological development should be worked out
so that they can clearly elucidate goals and stage-by-stage tasks, which should be attained and carried out in the scientific and technological field during the period of the plans, and methods to realize them.

All fields of the national economy should clearly recognize that like national economic plans, scientific and technological development plans are a task stipulated by law, and should mandatorily fulfill them.

The work of scientific and technological exchange with other countries should be vigorously conducted to rapidly develop science and technology, because this makes it possible to elevate the science and technology of the country into a higher level within the shortest period of time by actively introducing advanced science and technology. The fields concerned should organize and carry out well the project of vigorously conducting the work of scientific and technological exchange with other countries in various forms and by various methods during the period of the new long-range plan.

The scientific and technological development of the country largely depends on the role of scientists and engineers. Scientists and engineers are directly involved in executing the party's policy of science and technology and are core forces for scientific and technological development. Deeply cherishing a high pride in and sense of responsibility for upholding the chuche revolutionary cause with science and technology, all scientists and engineers should devote their energy and wisdom to scientific research work and technical innovation aimed at the chuche-orientation, modernization, and science-orientation of the national economy and at the realization of the grand 10-point long-range plan, thus genuinely contributing to the prosperity and flourishing of the country and the nation by constantly achieving scientific creations and technological inventions. To this end, the scientists and engineers should firmly arm themselves with the chuche idea of our party and eagerly study to continuously exalt their qualifications.

The State Administration Council and the fields concerned should ensure the scientists and engineers conditions for scientific research and living, build scientific research bases, intermediary pilot plants for industrial tests, and guarantee facilities and equipment in a timely manner.

Enhancing the party's guidance is an important demand for rapidly developing science and technology. The party organizations at every echelon should consolidate the ranks of scientific and technological functionaries and always render a party-level support to them so that they can fulfill their responsibility and perform their role. Also, they should treat them with hospitality in society and correctly assess their new inventions and research success in a timely manner.

Along with this, the party organizations at every echelon should orderly establish a work system to apply achievements in scientific research to production and should make active efforts to timely introduce success in the scientific and technological field into production by strengthening cooperation between scientific research organs and economic guidance organs.
responsible for production. Also, they should see to it that science and technology constantly develop through ingenious conceptions, active initiatives, and bold practice by enhancing creative competition between scientists and engineers and producers.

Science and technology are, after all, aimed at contributing to production. Technological creations are valuable only when they are contributed to production.

The fields and units of the national economy should exalt the science and technology of our country onto a higher-step level within the shortest period of time by planning and coordinating control, organization, and commanding work to correctly carry out scientific and technological work on the basis of the party's intentions.

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DAILY STRESSES NEED TO EXPLAIN KWANGJU

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[NODONG SINMUN 5 August commentary: "The Truth of the Kwangju Incident Must Be Explained Thoroughly and Then Dealt With Correctly"]

[Text] The need to explain in detail the truth of the Kwangju incident and deal with it correctly has emerged as an indispensable condition for the realization of democratization in South Korea.

In the wake of the June protest struggle, the people have insisted that the Kwangju incident be explained in detail, and that the murderers who inflicted indescribably enormous sufferings on the Kwangju citizens be brought to the justice of history.

The Kwangju incident was a great fratricidal brutality through which barehanded demonstrating masses who called for democracy were suppressed with the military force of several divisions and the streets were submerged in a sea of blood. The bloody tragedy in Kwangju has kept indignant not only the South Korean people, including the bereaved families, but also all the people who value human dignity, freedom, justice, democracy, and conscience of mankind.

The Kwangju incident, which has remained an object of social attention as a result of the great protest and uproar at home and abroad, has been kept in the dark since it erupted 7 years ago, without any explanation about its truth. It is intolerable that the truth of the incident in which thousands of innocent residents were massacred has been kept in the dark and that those who are responsible for it are alive and well.

It is possible to keep the lid tightly screwed on a massacre that was unprecedented in modern history, in view of its scale and the degree of brutality demonstrated in it, or can it be hushed up?

Even in the case of the torture death of Pak Chong-chol, a former student at Seoul National University, only the perpetrators have been ferreted out and those who are directly responsible for the killing are still at large. Such tragedies keep occurring even today because those who are directly responsible for the murders are protected in the dark.
Those who organized the massacre are employing brazen-faced machinations in a bid to cover up the truth of the incident and placate public opinion. Only a few days after his announcement of a so-called eight-point measure to bring the situation under control, No Tae-u uttered such sweet-sounding words as building a memorial tower for those who were sacrificed in Kwangju and granting compensation to their bereaved families and those wounded during the incident.

A thorough explanation about the Kwangju incident must precede the taking of measures of any kind. How can anyone describe the tragic state of affairs in Kwangju—drugged members of airborne special warfare units were ordered to run over the demonstrating masses with tanks, stab them to death with bayonets, kill pregnant women by slitting their bellies, bury them alive, placed bodies on top of bodies after beating them to death, and make the blood shed by the murdered masses flow in brooks on the streets?

So staggering was the scope of the crimes they committed that the murderers announced the number of the slaughtered people by drastically reducing the number to merely 100 and a few dozens.

Even according to the words of American eyewitnesses [as heard] who inspected the site of the massacre shortly afterwards, the number slaughtered was not 147 as officially estimated and announced by the authorities, but 2,000. Another source put the number of murdered demonstrators at over 5,000.

According to testimony by members of the Japanese Catholic Council for Justice and Peace who inspected the site of the slaughter, 475 bodies were found in the basement of the provincial government building in Kwangju alone.

Statistics compiled by the Kwangju Municipal Government show that the death rate of the citizens, which is normally 245 per month, stood at 2,627 in May 1980. This notwithstanding, 4 years after the incident the South Korean rulers said that the demographic statistics were wrong, but failed to produce acceptable facts to back up their assertions.

Although they can fabricate things as they please and try to make people believe them, the murderers can never deny the objective facts about the demographic statistics under any circumstances. Neither the national history of 5,000 years nor the histories of any other countries in the world has seen such murderers who killed their fellow countrymen in such a brutal manner.

Can the puppets persuade public opinion with fabricated data when countless number of people suddenly lost their parents, children, siblings, and husbands? One cannot dodge responsibility for the Kwangju incident with fabricated figures, nor can one make the people forget about it by building memorial tower or paying the bereaved families a small amount of compensation.

The popular masses re the impartial judges. The criminals should frankly admit to their crimes before the Kwangju citizens and the South Korean people
as a whole by making public the truth of the incident and then leave it to history to judge them.

It is none other than Chon Tu-hwan and No Tae-u who are directly responsible for organizing and commanding the massacre in Kwangju. They are the ones who should have been punished sternly after being judged by the nation and history, as a matter of fact, because of their never-to-be-condoned and indelible crimes of having massacred thousands of their fellow countrymen.

They should stop their deceptive lip service to such empty words as building a memorial tower or paying compensation. Such a deceptive conciliatory tactic designed to hoodwink the popular masses, who called for truth of the Kwangju incident, into believing their own version of the incident serves only as evidence proving that the Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u ring has not abandoned its wild ambitions to stay in power indefinitely by placating the people's antifascist and antidictatorial sentiment at any cost and by shelving their never-to-be-condoned massacre which infuriates the whole world. Such an attempt by the puppets will never be realized.

Making the truth of the Kwangju incident public and punishing those who are responsible for the murders is one of the preconditions for the democratic development of South Korean society.

The emergence of the Chon Tu-hwan military dictatorship was a breach of faith and an act of obliteration when it comes to the hopes and aspirations of those who rose up in the Kwangju uprising.

The period between the Kwangju uprising and the present was a time of medieval darkness during which a dark fascist current going upstream against the aspirations of the popular masses for independence, democracy, and reunification has swept through all of South Korea and the military dictatorship's reactionary offensive has viciously been conducted against the democratic force.

Because the murderers have stayed in dictatorial power and wielded bayonets in South Korea, while the truth of the Kwangju incident has been kept in the dark, the road to democratic development has been blocked and no political progress has been made over the past 7 years.

Only when this obstacle is removed will a road to genuine democracy be open in South Korea.

The bloody lesson drawn from the Kwangju incident and the course of development that followed demonstrates that it is imperative that the murderous Chon Tu-hwan be liquidated without fail in order to have the popular masses' aspirations for independence, democracy, and reunification in south Korea be fulfilled.

The South Korean youths, students, and people have put up a tireless fight to overthrow the dictatorship, to have the truth of the Kwangju incident
uneared, and to have those who are responsible for the burden punished, while keeping the spirit of the heroic Kwangju uprising alive amid the adverse fascist environment. Their struggle continues even today.

This is an expression of their indomitable determination to never forgive the murderers.

The Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u ring should make public the truth of the fratricide it has committed and apologize for it before the people as demanded by the South Korean youths, students, and people and then step down from power to wait for the stern judgment of history. Without this, there can be no political development in South Korea, nor will the door to democratic development open.

The Kwangju massacre carried out by the South Korean military fascist elements was according to the directives and the behind-the-scenes control by none other than the U.S. imperialists. The U.S. imperialists are responsible for having detached the puppet army divisions and armored units under the command of the U.S. Forces Command occupying South Korea and for having transferred them to the Chon Tu-hwan ring to be used in slaughtering, urging it to suppress them with an iron fist. The U.S. imperialists’ aggressive and predatory nature has been fully displayed once again in Kwangju.

The South Korean youths, students, and people have raised high the banner of the anti-U.S. struggle for independence designed to recover national pride and sovereignty by smashing the colonial shackles of the U.S. imperialists. Even at this moment, they are vigorously struggling in Kwangju, Pusan, Taegu, Chuchon, Seoul, and Inchon, calling on the aggressors to take responsibility and apologize for the massacre in Kwangju and to withdraw from South Korea, while setting fire to American Cultural Centers in these areas and burning the U.S. flag, the Stars and Stripes.

The U.S. imperialists, who controlled the Kwangju massacre from behind the scenes and are the author of it, should withdraw troops of aggression and nuclear weapons from South Korea and then take their hands of aggression and intervention off it.

The Kwangju popular uprising was also a stern warning that the aggressors and dictators who lord it over the people can never get away with what they have done and that they will never be able to avoid destruction.

So enormous and staggering are the crimes committed by the murderers that it is impossible for them to prolong their political lives by turning the bloodstained baton of military dictatorship over to the other murderer while making fun of public opinion with such words as the building of a memorial tower or compensation.

The people’s resentment of them fills the heavens. As long as the truth of Kwangju remains unknown and as long as the murderers lord it over the people, the southern land will be engulfed in another and another Kwangju incident.
without fail and the people will see to it that those who are responsible for
the sacrifice of the warriors who fell while participating in the resistance
struggle pay for the blood they caused to be shed.

The Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u ring will be made, without fail, to pay dearly for
the indelible crimes it committed before the country and people and will never
be able to avoid the stern judgment of history and the people.

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