SPECIAL NOTICE

Effective 1 June 1987 JPRS reports will have a new cover design and color, and some reports will have a different title and format. Some of the color changes may be implemented earlier if existing supplies of stock are depleted.

The new cover colors will be as follows:

CHINA...................aqua
EAST EUROPE................gold
SOVIET UNION..............salmon
EAST ASIA..................yellow
NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA...blue
LATIN AMERICA...............pink
WEST EUROPE................ivory
AFRICA (SUB-SAHARA).......tan
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY.....gray
WORLDWIDES...............pewter

The changes that are of interest to readers of this report are as follows:

The SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT (SEA) will be titled EAST ASIA/SOUTHEAST ASIA (SEA).

The JAPAN REPORT (JAR) will be titled EAST ASIA/JAPAN (JAR).

The KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT (KAR) will be titled EAST ASIA/KOREA (KAR).

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KOREA: KULLOJA (AKU) will be issued as a separate series under EAST ASIA.

VIETNAM: TAP CHI CONG SAN (ATC) will be issued as a separate series under EAST ASIA.

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Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

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INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

WORLD LEADERS ENCOURAGE NORTH-SOUTH POLITICAL, MILITARY TALKS

Kim Il-song Sends Reply To Benin Leader

SK081014 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1005 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang 8 April (KCNA)--Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, sent a message on 6 April to Mathieu Kerekou, chairman of the Central Committee of the Party of People's Revolution of Benin, president of the Republic, head of State and chairman of the National Executive Council, in reply to his message of solidarity supporting the proposal for North-South high-level political and military talks advanced at the first session of the 8th Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The reply message says that the message of solidarity sent by President Mathieu Kerekou in support of our proposal for North-South high-level political and military talks constitutes a great encouragement to the Korean people in the struggle for the independent and peaceful reunification of the country.

The reply message expresses the belief that the friendly and cooperative relations firmly forged between the two parties, two countries and two peoples on the road of anti-imperialism and independence will further expand and develop in the future.

WPTU President in 'Campaign for Peace'

SK081019 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1010 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang 8 April (KCNA)--Sandor Gaspar, president of the World Federation of Trade Unions, participated in the international signature campaign for peace in Korea and her reunification now being held on the initiative of the international liaison committee for the reunification and peace in Korea.
The paper to which he put his signature on 29 March says:

I affix my signature supporting the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea and the proposal for founding the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo, demanding the realisation of North-South high-level political and military talks and tripartite talks involving the North and the South of Korea and the United States and the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone and expressing solidarity with the South Korean people in the struggle for democracy, freedom and reunification.

/12913
CSO: 4100/161
INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

SEOUL EDITORIAL URGES NORTH TO PROVE SINCERITY OVER DIALOGUE

SK110036 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English 11 Apr 87 p 8

[Editorial: "Inter-Korea Dialogue"]

[Text] The letter Prime Minister No Sin-yong sent to his North Korean counterpart yesterday is another example of Seoul's unceasing effort to persuade Pyongyang that realistic steps are required if both sides are to resolve pending issues peacefully.

This letter is a follow-up to the concrete proposals Prime Minister No made March 14. Pyongyang's response March 30 was totally devoid of any substance or sincerity, creating doubt whether Pyongyang has any will or interest at all in settling mutual differences by means of dialogue.

Pyongyang seems only inclined to make it appear as though it agrees to Seoul's proposal for a premiers' meeting while shying away from taking any steps to make the meeting productive.

As the record bears out, Seoul's consistent and logical position has been that the building of an atmosphere for mutual trust and confidence is a prerequisite to make inter-Korean contacts fruitful.

For that reason, the South urged the North to immediately resume the inter-Korean Red Cross talks and economic representatives' meeting, both suspended unilaterally by Pyongyang. Seoul also proposed that a South-North water resources meeting be held to discuss Mt. Kumgang Dam, now being constructed just north of the DMZ in an obvious scheme to launch a water offensive against the south.

Now, if Pyongyang agrees to hold these meetings both parts of the divided peninsula can make meaningful progress. This progress, in turn, can contribute to the building of mutual trust, which is badly needed for any practical south-north talks. Mutual confidence, then, would lead to a productive premiers' meeting as the South has suggested all along.

In view of Pyongyang's boycott of all existing channels of South-North talks; however, it seems that the North is not interested in, nor has it any will for, dialogue. One can only conclude that its peace overtures are all propaganda.
Now is the time, therefore, for Pyongyang to prove the sincerity of its professed desire for dialogue by accepting our proposals. After all, the northern Communists' past behavior, such as the Rangoon atrocity in 1983, has been the cause of the accumulated distrust.

The elimination of this mutual distrust is the key to improved inter-Korean relations and easing of tension on the Korean peninsula. Since this distrust was wrought by North Korea's treacherous behavior, Pyongyang should undo it by building a base of cooperation and accommodation. Pyongyang must understand that any further gimmicks will only discredit itself. Earnestness will be to its own good.

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CS0: 4100/166
OLYMPICS

BRIEFS

ETHIOPIA SUPPORTS CO-HOSTING—Pyongyang 8 April (KCNA)—Tsegaw Ayele, chairman of the National Olympic Committee of Ethiopia and chairman of the Ethiopian Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission, stressed that the Workers' Party and Government of Ethiopia supported the constructive Olympics co-hosting proposal put forward by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In his speech at a meeting of the National Olympic committee of Ethiopia, he said: If the 24th Olympic Games are held in South Korea alone, this will increase the tensions prevailing on the Korean peninsula. Ethiopia is following with good faith the struggle for the peaceful reunification of the two parts of Korea. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 1008 GMT 8 Apr 87 SK] /12913

CSO: 4100/163
SEoul Daily carries text of chon 13 April speech

SK130500 Seoul Hanguk ILBO in Korean 13 Apr 87 Special Edition p 1

[Text of television address by ROK President Chun Tu-hwan from presidential residence on 13 April]

[Text] My fellow countrymen, today I wish to speak personally to you about my thoughts regarding the constitutional issue that has attracted great public concern and to ask for your understanding and cooperation. It is often said time flies like an arrow. Now only about 10 months are left in my presidency. At this very moment, I feel a heavy sense of responsibility. This is because the national tasks that must be accomplished during the remainder of my tenure are so momentous and the potential consequences of the choices that we are going to make are so critical. We must make the right choices if we are to nurture the rewarding fruit of achievements that we have attained through concerted hard work. In view of the importance of this period and the urgency of the political agenda, I think the majority of the people hope that the constitutional issue will be resolved one way or another so that we can keep moving forward.

Fortunately, our steady efforts over the past seven years have not been wasted, and we have grown and developed impressively in many fields. To our chagrin, however, it is also true that the political situation over the past year or so has not lived up to public expectations, bringing instead disappointment and frustration. Deplorably, the efforts to amend the Constitution by consensus as so ardently desired by the public have not made even an inch of headway. Serious partisan and factional antagonisms and confrontation have only persisted. The entire people are worried that if things continue to go on like this, there will be no way to unravel in concert the knot of a constitutional amendment and that there will be nothing but public divisiveness and social confusion, eventually making it exceedingly difficult to achieve a peaceful transfer of power in a proper manner.

Fellow citizens, ever since I assumed the presidency, I have been exerting all my energies to realize a peaceful change of government with an unflagging commitment to root democracy in this land by all means.
The task of a peaceful change of government has not been accomplished even once in the 40 years since we adopted liberal democracy as the founding ideal of the Republic of Korea. It is a long-standing problem that no chief executive, no political party and no politician has solved. This clearly illustrates the core element of democratic development in Korea.

A peaceful transition of power is the fundamental and most important precondition for accomplishing genuine democratic development in this land. As you all know well, the current Constitution has introduced a single term presidency for the first time in Korean constitutional history in response to the dictate to terminate the vicious cycle of protracted personal rule and to establish democracy. The current Constitution ensures a peaceful transition of power more thoroughly than any previous one.

The strength of the public desire for a peaceful transfer of power was demonstrated by the overwhelming public endorsement of the Constitution in a national referendum 7 years ago. I believed that it was the responsibility of the President to observe and implement the Constitution just as it was because it had come into force by a courageous political decision of the people. I continued to believe that it is not wise to amend the Constitution even before the single-term presidency clauses—the kernel of the Constitution—had been implemented even once.

Yet, about a year ago on April 30, 1986, I met with the leaders of the three major political parties and stated that I would not object to amending the Constitution during my tenure, if the government party and the opposition could agree on and recommend a good bill to do so. The way to constitutional reform by consensus was thus opened. I made that decision in view of the serious confrontation between the ruling party and the opposition at that time over the issue of whether or not to revise the Constitution and the consequent clashes in the streets, and out of a fervent desire to prevent social chaos and political strife and to build a new framework for mature democratic politics based on grand national harmony. Accordingly, with the expectation that earnest efforts to forge a consensus through dialogue and compromise would be made in the National Assembly Committee for constitutional reform, it has accepted without hesitation. Moreover, the agreement that the committee be made up of an equal number of ruling party and opposition members represented an extraordinary concession hardly thinkable for a majority party.

Above all else, the ruling party changed its previous policy of opposing any amendment to the Constitution and worked out and presented an amendment bill providing for a parliamentary cabinet system. This was yet more evidence that the Democratic Justice Party was upholding a true spirit of compromise. Furthermore, the government party exerted every possible effort to normalize the ad hoc committee at a number of meetings between the representatives of the political parties in and out of power and also by indicating its willingness on every possible occasion to positively consider various opposition demands. In that way, the ruling party earnestly sought to conduct negotiations. In spite of such steadfast efforts, the opposition stubbornly stuck to its demand for a direct presidential election system and has yet to yield even an inch of ground.
It is difficult to understand how on earth the minority party intends to resolve the constitutional issue and to practice democratic principles even while rejecting any and all forms of compromise. It is mere delusion for them to think that democracy will fully blossom if only the Constitution is amended even while they do not properly observe the existing laws.

This point is eloquently illustrated by our political history characterized by revisions of the Constitution on as many as eight occasions. I want to make it clear that since my commitment to a single-term presidency is unwavering, I do not have any personal stake in the Constitution. However, being a President due to step down shortly, I think I am in a better position than anyone else to consider the constitutional issue with an open mind, from a fair viewpoint, and in a long-term perspective for the future of the country and the people.

Any political system is bound to have its own merits and demerits. It is true, however, that we are relatively well accustomed to a direct presidential election system since we have experienced several versions of it in the past. However, that experience was nothing to be proud of and far from being something desirable. Under the pretext that the people wanted it, there were frequent constitutional changes to prolong an individual's hold on power, leading to the numerous negative consequences of protracted one-man rule. Thus, all endeavors to effect a peaceful transition of power failed.

Furthermore, overzealous election campaigns throughout the nation bred rampant terrorism and violent disturbances. Candidates for public office made grossly unrealistic campaign promises in super-abundance and huge sums of campaign funds were expended, causing economic crises. What is more, regional antagonisms were inflamed, sharply dividing the people. We still vividly remember all such woes. Especially noteworthy is the fact that in all the six direct presidential elections in the past, the government party was invariably the winner. Accordingly, the widely accepted conclusion has been that a direct presidential election system inherently favors the ruling party. Accordingly, even after an election was over, the opposition refused to accept its result, causing serious lingering after effects. Thus, all-or-nothing struggles were repeated over and over again. It is because of such defects and dangers that the presidential system, together with our unfortunate constitutional history, was buried in the past.

To try to revive a superannuated system today when the nation has been rapidly developing and the people have attained a matured political attitude, is tantamount to trying to turn the clock back. To look at foreign examples, over 40 developing countries included among the 170-plus nations in the world have adopted direct presidential election systems. However, peaceful transfers of power have been properly effected in only few such countries.

So if we are to revise the Constitution after all, it is logical to try to change it into an even better one. In adopting a constitution or any other institution, the historic background, cultural tradition, political realities and other factors must be taken into account. The Democratic Justice Party has proposed a parliamentary cabinet system as a compromise alternative to the
present system after taking all such problems into consideration. The DJP-proposed system would be capable of satisfying the diverse desires of the various segments of the pluralistic society that we have today and would make it possible for the government party and the opposition to coexist as partners in government, rather than be embroiled in obstinate confrontation. It would be capable of ensuring democratic development and would be conducive to accomplishing the current task to advance into the ranks of the developed nations on the strength of private initiative and openness. This is why the parliamentary cabinet system is often called the quintessence of democracy.

This point is supported by the fact that most of the advanced democratic countries, especially those in Europe which is the home of democracy, have adopted this form of government. This is also why the past orthodox opposition parties in Korea vocally advocated a cabinet system. There have been few foreign examples of a government party taking the initiative in proposing to switch from a presidential system to a cabinet system.

My fellow countrymen, as you know well, the ruling party has voluntarily proposed a cabinet system. But the opposition has not only adamantly rejected it but has also made the prospects for any constitutional reform by consensus extremely dim by involving itself in severe intraparty chaos and infighting. I believe that the majority of the people now wonder if it will be possible after all to shape a consensus with the opposition who seems unable to resolve its own internal problems through dialogue and compromise, and is thus heading for catastrophe. In view of the mess in the opposition camp these days, it is not difficult to see that the implementation of our political agenda would be greatly set back if we continued to wait indefinitely for it to come around.

If such is the case, all of us must think together what we must do at this juncture if we are to successfully carry out a peaceful transfer of power to open a new chapter in the development of Korean democracy. I do not think it would be appropriate for the ruling party to unilaterally ram through a constitutional amendment bill by dint of the number of votes it can command. A constitutional amendment by nature should not be forced through unilaterally by either the ruling party or the opposition. It is self-evident that if the Constitution is amended arbitrarily it would cause unreasonable strain, and no matter how well meant, would hardly achieve its intended results. It would only deepen social and political chaos and strife. We must not tolerate such a development in view of the lessons of our political history and also of the political maturity of the Korean people. Especially when we already have a Constitution, we cannot find any urgent reason to resort to such a high-handed method in revising the basic law.

My fellow citizens, as I have noted earlier, the DJP has been making steadfast efforts to amend the Constitution by consensus. However, it has now become evident that the prospects for constitutional reform by consensus have become hopelessly dim. Moreover, time has run out and we cannot wait any longer for a consensus to emerge.
Such a state of affairs poses a truly grave dilemma especially for me in view of my unchangeable commitment to honor the pledge to step down at the end of my term of office. The political agenda for transferring the reins of government must be smoothly carried out. To that end, it must be decided, first of all, what Constitution can serve as the basis for the scheduled transition of power.

Accordingly, I have been waiting more eagerly than anyone else for constitutional reform by consensus to become a reality. Up to now, however, there has been no progress. Since I must keep my promise by all means, I think you can fully understand the depth of anxiety that I have been experiencing because the way to fulfill my pledge is being blocked, although time is quickly running out. The time left for us at present is not even enough to carry out the necessary political agenda and make practical preparations for a change of government.

To amend the Constitution, several months will have to be spent on debate, the subsequent voting process in the National Assembly and a national referendum. Even after the constitution has been amended, another several months will have to be spent on preparing and passing revised election laws, over which the interests of the government party and the opposition are apt to sharply conflict, on preparing numerous other attendant laws and finally on holding elections under the modified laws.

If we deal with matters relating to the birth of a new administration hastily and crudely because of the pressure of time, this in and by itself would be a cause of controversy and confusion. To do so would thus be irresponsible and would adversely affect the future of the country.

At this critical juncture, I must thus make a momentous decision in light of the urgency of time and also of the overall domestic situation. Having determined that it has become impossible to amend the Constitution during my tenure, I hereby announce that in accordance with the existing Constitution, I will turn the reins of government over to my successor on February 25, 1988, when my term of office ends. At the same time, in order to ensure the successful accomplishment of the two major national tasks of a peaceful change of government and the Seoul Olympics, I declare the withholding of counterproductive debate on constitutional change which would only split public opinion and waste national energies.

This decision is based on the conclusion that it is realistically the best way to break through the current impasse and to attain national goals. I earnestly solicit wholehearted public support and trust in my decision.

I am confident that we will find the best way to promote the long-term interests of the nation, if we deliberate the constitutional amendment issue over a sufficient length of time after we have accomplished the other two major national tasks. In accordance with the decision I have announced today, I will expeditiously carry out the political agenda necessary to effect the scheduled peaceful transition of power. I will do my best to guarantee that
by virtue of fair election administration, the elections of a presidential electoral college and presidential elections will be implemented within this year in a climate conducive to free competition. The DJP presidential candidate will be chosen at an early date from among persons deserving public support at a DJP national convention in accordance with the democratic procedures prescribed by the party charter.

My fellow countrymen, a peaceful transfer of power cannot be achieved only through the departure of the chief executive from office at the end of the prescribed tenure. We must fully realize that the true significance of a peaceful change of government can be realized only when the reins of power change hands with the active participation of all politicians, in and out of power, and the general public. When you consider the fact that in the whole world, there are only about 20 countries that practice democracy properly, changing their governments peacefully by vote from time to time, then you can see that the simple fact of my departure from office in accordance with the Constitution will mark an epochal milestone in our democratic development.

I want to emphasize again that the true meaning of my decision lies in my commitment to prevent a debacle so that I will be able to honorably retire pursuant to normal constitutional procedures. If some segments of society continue to be engrossed in futile factional strife over the constitutional issue, and to attempt to create social chaos through illegal activities and violence, thereby destabilizing the life of the nation, I make it clear that I will resolutely deal with them by exercising all the powers vested by the Constitution in the office of the President in order to protect the livelihood of the people and maintain public order.

As I have repeatedly stressed in the past, we now stand at a crucial crossroads, one branch leading to a new glorious era of democracy, advancement and unification and the other toward retreat and a vicious cycle of underdevelopment, backwardness and poverty. We must not waste this important period when we must decide the destiny of the nation by continuing to be absorbed in counterproductive conflict, confrontation and antagonism. To do so would deepen our internal schisms and dissipate national resources, thereby endangering the very existence and survival of the nation. Such a worry is further intensified by the increasingly messy international situation caused by the shifting patterns of the conflicting interests of the big powers surrounding the Korean peninsula.

In particular, the North Korean Communist regime, which has been constantly threatening our national security for the past 4 decades, is taking the mistaken view that the tribulations attendant on a change of government in the South are affording them a decisive opportunity to attain their goal of communizing the entire peninsula. Moreover, they are making all sorts of attempts to scuttle the Seoul Olympics out of jealousy over the bright prospects for its success.

What could political instability and social confusion bring us in this crucial period? The answer is nothing but a threat to the basis for self-reliant
growth which we have built up through hard work for so many years. In view especially of the fierce trade war currently raging in the international community, it will be impossible to boost our exports and capital investment, if our society is plagued by anxiety and confusion. The only logical consequences will be rekindled inflation, unemployment, recession, poverty and stagnation. This will only restart the vicious cycle of economic decline leading to national crisis.

Even apart from that, radical leftists, who have gained influence in some segments of society, are maneuvering, are they not, to establish a Communist society through violence, illegal actions and agitation under a false banner of democratization, even though they totally reject liberal democracy. I will sternly deal with violent leftists intent on overthrowing the liberal democratic system and will rigorously restore social discipline, which tends to become lax in any transition period, so that the national foundation will be further consolidated.

Fellow citizens, now that we are undergoing a major historic transitional period, I believe that as the President of the Republic, I have so many things to do during the remainder of my term. I must keep my eyes focused not only on the current situation, but also on the long-range future of the country, including its political dimension. Because the political legacy thrust upon me was so onerous and depressing, my honest desire is to leave behind me the seeds of much healthier traditions so that my fellow citizens will be able to progress forward even more smoothly, no matter who may succeed me as the chief executive. It is because of my belief that I must not hand down the antiquated political legacy I inherited that I am determined to abide by the single-term presidency clause of the Constitution and to achieve a peaceful transition of power.

With the conviction that politics must be developed in step with the growth and advancement of all of Korean society, I will even more courageously press ahead, during the remainder of my tenure, with measures to broaden the basis for democratic progress and enhance social stability and national harmony.

As part of such efforts, I plan to progressively put into force a system of local autonomy designed to expand public participation in the political process. If this issue is expeditiously resolved and local autonomy is begun during my remaining tenure, yet another solid cornerstone for democratic development will have been laid.

Another point I wish to make in this connection is that there must be steady renewal in political life in keeping with the changing times and the continuing social development. We must not entrust the future of our advancing nation to the hands of superannuated politicians from a bygone era. In this sense, I believe that political parties must urgently strive to accept and nurture a new generation of untainted and competent politicians who will be capable of leading the country in this transitional period.
If our politics is to develop in step with the current of the times, not only politicians themselves but all other citizens will have to devote themselves even more enthusiastically to improving the political climate through attitudinal reform.

We have now reached a point where we must completely free ourselves from the fetters of the vicious circle left behind by the Republic's tortuous 40-year political history. We must get rid as quickly as possible of the strange political climate in which distrust and hostility prevail between rival political groups, politicians are afraid of dialogue and compromise and the backwardness of extremist struggle persist, wasting national energies through violence and demagogy. Now that the evil vestiges of protracted one-man rule are being liquidated, the guiding principles for all of us, but especially for politicians in this transition period, must be trust, mutual concession, patience, and self-restraint.

Needless to reiterate, the objective of politics is to promote the national interests and public welfare. We must now begin more serious efforts to evolve a political tradition in which much more importance is attached to competition between policies designed to meet the diverse desires and needs of the public and in which politicians tackle major national issues from a suprapartisan standpoint in the interests of the people and national prosperity. We must develop a mature political modus operandi in which politicians will not cause public anxiety and worry through greedy obsession with personal gains, but will be able to sacrifice personal interests and thus inspire public trust and hope.

I hope that all politicians will open-mindedly accept my decision to put constitutional change on hold and will actively participate in planning and building a new future for politics on that basis. At the same time, I ask all my fellow citizens to discharge your civic responsibilities as democratic citizens and take the lead in ensuring national progress under conditions of stability. If and when all such efforts are combined to perpetuate democratic development, I am confident that the economic and social progress that has been set in motion on the strength of your participation and cooperation will be further accelerated, leading to greater national development.

Indeed, if the general public, the government and all politicians work in concert to smoothly carry out a peaceful transition of power and to successfully stage the Seoul Olympics, we will be freed from the fear of war and also from the yoke of underdevelopment, and will enter, with soaring hopes, a nineties of peace and prosperity. In that sense, the coming 2 to 3 years will afford an ideal opportunity for us to join the ranks of the advanced nations. How can we, who have already demonstrated great inner resources and an infinite national potential in the face of even greater difficulties, fail to seize this precious opportunity?

My fellow countrymen, it is only about 10 months before I leave Chongwadae (the presidential office and residence), ridding myself of the heavy
responsibility of office. I think it will be a great honor to fulfill my earlier promises to you thanks to your enthusiastic involvement and cooperation. I wish to ask for your unswerving support and encouragement to the end.

I have no other personal political ambition than to conclude my momentous tenure with your blessings. My modest hope then is to enjoy a happy life as a humble citizen of a rising country, sharing joys and sufferings with all of your. Believing that the day my personal wishes are fulfilled, by virtue of your support, will see the dawn of democracy in Korea, I once again earnestly solicit your continued cooperation.

I am confident that the mature wisdom of my fellow countrymen who are living in this era of great challenges will provide fertile soil for democracy to bloom in this land. The proud success story of Korea's advance into the forefront of development and achievement of the long-standing goal of national unification will thus be written.

I wish all of you and your families good health and happiness as we greet his balmy spring.

Thank you.

/6662
CSO: 4107/162
SEoul DAILIES ON CHON'S 13 APRIL STATEMENT, DECISION
TONG-A ILBO

SK140830 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 13 Apr 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Tragedy of Korean Politics"]

[Text] The constitutional revision issue, which has aroused great concern at home and abroad, and which has split national consensus, has at last come to a head with President Chon's 13 April special statement. In other words, the political situation in which the stand of "protecting the Constitution" was switched to "possible constitutional revision" as a result of the Chongwadae meeting on 30 April last year of representatives of the three political parties, has returned to the stand of "adhering to the current Constitution."

On 13 April, President Chon Tu-hwan stated his decision, in the form of a special statement, declaring that "having determined that it has become impossible to amend the Constitution during my tenure,...I will turn the reins of government over to my successor on 25 February next year, when my term of office ends" and that discussion of the constitutional revision issue can resume after a peaceful change of government and the Seoul Olympics. At the same time, he made clear that in accordance with this decision, electoral college elections and the presidential election will be conducted this year and that the DNP's presidential candidate will be nominated in a national convention at an early date.

Along with this, the statement declared that counterproductive debate on constitutional revision, which would only split public opinion and waste national energies, should be withheld.

Our people are stunned by this declaration, asking "Why have so much time and energy been spent debating constitutional revision?" We strongly feel disappointment and even hatred toward all of our politicians. We still vividly remember the remarks of ruling and opposition politicians that "constitutional revision by consensus is the only way to live." We still vividly remember the politicians who persisted in their assertions exclusively. We also vividly remember the leaders of the ruling party who pledged not to protect the current Constitution, even if their efforts for constitutional revision fail to bear fruition.
We are also concerned about the future of the opposition party, which has been split in two due to the conflict among their political ranks in connection with the constitutional revision issue. In fact, many people suspected President Chon's decision would be deferred, since the opposition party is now building its new structural system and the representative of the ruling party who has reportedly received full authority has not had enough time to exercise it.

However, the problem is whether or not the "new theory on protecting the current Constitution" of the ruling party can be smoothly implemented. It is difficult to say that no great change has taken place in the political motives and background between the time when the stand of "protecting the current constitution" was switched to the stand of "revising the constitution" and today, a year later. Our worry is how the present political situation will develop.

Of course, the stand of "a possible revision of the constitution" was a step to cope with the developing political situation. Likewise, the "new theory" of protecting the constitution" declared this time is also a political step to cope with the present political situation in which the possibility of constitutional revision by consensus has been completely eliminated. In particular, it is true that the main opposition party is not a partner with which dialogue can be smoothly carried out. However, this cannot become a reason for the ruling party to block dialogue with the opposition party.

The ruling party, which has considered a peaceful change of government and the Seoul Olympics in 1988 the major national tasks, may say that President Chon's decision was inevitable.

No one denies that a peaceful change of government in 1988 will be a great cornerstone for democratic development. However, it is also important to prepare for our future by reflecting our will for democratization in a new constitution to liquidate all old property left since the 1970's.

In this sense, we urgently hope that President Chon's decision this time will become a breakthrough in opening the route of the stranded constitutional revision by consensus, rather than become an indication of the termination of debate for constitutional revision.

When will the day come when the tragedy of Korean politics ends?

CHONSON ILBO
SK160413 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean 14 Apr 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Having Witnessed the 13 April Decision--A Conversion in the Political Situation and Problems in the Future"]

[Text] 1. A major change has occurred once again in the political situation characterized by the endeavor for constitutional revision, which has prevailed since the 30 April Chongwadae meeting. The theme henceforth is not the discussion of constitutional revision but the development of a timetable for the transfer of government under the current Constitution. The timetable is that the presidential election will be held this year and that President
Chon Tu-hwan will transfer the government to the new president elect next February. Accordingly, discussion of constitutional revision will be excluded from the political agenda for a certain period of time, and the hitherto controversy over the direction of constitutional revision will be suspended from now on, at least officially.

Lying behind President Chon's decision seems to be his deep concern that in view of the present situation, if the political situation drifts further than it has, there will be a crisis that will make it impossible to properly carry out even his pledge for sticking to single term under the present Constitution, not to mention constitutional revision, in view of the time left and the situation being developed.

Witnessing President Chon's decision, we appreciate once again the importance, in the first place, of the fact that it is now firm that the supreme rulers of the state will be changed next February, regardless of the circumstances so far and the controversy over constitutional revision.

Although this transfer is not to come about under a revised constitution but under the present Constitution, we think its significance and implications are very great. Not only from the historical context that there has never been a precedent in our political history where the President fulfilled his term of office and left it voluntarily in a normal way, but from our traditional situation where all power has been centered on one supreme ruler, the transfer of the President will be a big event that will bring about a big change.

Admitting the unavoidability about a change in the political situation, however, we, as a nation, cannot help feeling it distasteful. This is the perplexity and sense of futility we feel as the hands of the clock of history have been reversed, as if time has stopped all of a sudden after the noisy rackets of both the ruling and opposition camps over the past year, as if constitutional revision were the only political task facing the ROK at present.

We not only resent and deplore the conclusion made, but think about who should be held responsible for the failure of a ruling-opposition agreement. Would it not be possible to question whether the decision was made by the government and the ruling party after exerting utmost efforts and patience?

2. We believed it the best way to bring about the peaceful transfer of power, the ardent desire of the people, under the revised constitution brought forth through amicable agreement between the ruling and opposition parties amid the satisfaction of both the ruling and opposition parties, and have ardently called on the political circles to do so. However, to our regret, such an agreement has failed to come about despite the ardent desire of the people. Therefore, the people's interest and probing for the possibility of such a development now has to be postponed until after the advent of the next government. The people's curiosity is focused on this point.

On this point, President Chon said in his speech: If the issue of revising the Constitution is considered again with sufficient time for it after fulfilling the two big state events, I am convinced that a good plan will be found. This suggests that we can hardly conjecture at present the time of resuming
the discussion of constitutional revision and its method. What we note, however, is the possibility that some answer might be given to this curiosity some time this year when the "successor" appears to the fore.

Now the dye has been cast. The government and the ruling party will face various policies, measures, and tasks for the people of various strata in the process of developing the timetable. We would like to call upon them in this connection not to disappoint the people any further but to make efforts to conform as best as they can to the people's expectations despite this situation where they failed ought to do is to implement steps for democratization which the government and the ruling party can do if they wish to do so and to rectify daringly the authoritarian practices and legal systems which the government and the ruling party can do if they wish to do so even under the present Constitution.

Finally, all parties concerned should reach the final "agreement" to explore the best policies to solve this political impasse. In view of the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula, the fierce trade war, the heavy burden of division and confrontation, and, above all, the withering of the people's activities and lives, we urge both camps to restrain from the extreme situation of confrontation with deep thought and in a considerate manner.

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CSO: 4107/162
DAILY ADVISES DJP ON STAND TOWARD NEW PARTY

SK121142 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 10 Apr 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Engage in Politics by Paying Attention to the People--The DJP Should Steadily Take Measures To Achieve Democracy"]

[Text] Watching the split of the New Korea Democratic Party and the process of founding a new party, the people in general displayed two types of reaction. One is an affirmative view, saying that it was unavoidable. The other is a negative reaction, asking, "Was it unavoidable?"

Some people view that the occupation of and sit-in in the NKDP building by members of the party chapter of a national assemblyman who was the target of punishment and the police attitude of refusing to intervene after being asked by the NKDP presidential party served as an excuse for the party split. Those people who express their regret at the party split said that the lack of political capability and magnanimity on the part of the two Kims posed a problem.

It is easy to guess how the DJP views the split of the party and the movement to found a new party. It is not difficult to guess that the ruling party, which has tried in various ways to achieve constitutional revision through reaching an agreement, is greatly displeased. Regardless of the true, hidden intention of national assemblymen belonging to respective factions, it is natural for those concerned to say that now that the two Kims have left the party formally, the issue of constitutional revision through reaching an agreement has become defunct.

Because of this, the DJP has issued a statement and expressed the feeling of displeasure toward a move to found a new party. Barring the ruling party's unyielding reaction, the statement expressed the strong feeling of repulsion against dialogue with the two Kims, who are responsible for the party split.

However, the ruling party should not take a firm attitude under the pretext that the opposition party has assumed a strong nature. The stronger the attitude of the opposition party becomes, the more composedly the ruling party should view the development of the situation. This is the way the ruling party, which is responsible for state affairs, should follow.

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Of course, the opposition party is a political rival and counterpart, which has always kept the ruling party on guard. An athletic team can play a good game when it has a strong counterpart. This is true as far as politics are concerned. When a strong and united opposition party emerges, the ruling party will be compelled to foster its fighting capability and develop new tactics.

Viewing thus, we feel that the ruling party appears to have been inclined to play games by choosing counterparts that are easy to deal with. However, now is the time when the ruling party should make preparations for a struggle against a strong opposition party, which is about to emerge.

Although the DJP is forced to strain its nerves because of the move of the opposition bloc, it does not need to become anxious if the opposition party does not move as it desires. We rather urge the ruling party to discard the method of carrying out every work in reaction to the opposition party, and to engage in politics by taking the people and history into consideration. In other words, it should steadily attain achievements in carrying out work for democracy not for the sake of opposition party but for the sake of the people. If the ruling party acts for the people and if it heads in the right direction, it will win support from the people.

If the ruling party reacts strongly under the pretext that the opposition party assumes a strong attitude, it will be difficult for us to know what direction the development of the political situation concerning constitutional revision is taking.

We believe that calmly watching the reorganization of the opposition bloc, the DJP should make preparations to quietly and resolutely take steps for democracy.

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CSO: 4107/162
DAILY OBSERVES 19 APRIL STUDENT UPRISING OF 1960

SKJ92257 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 18 Apr 87 p 2

[Editorial: "The 19 April Uprising and Democracy"]

[Text] The historic day of 19 April is again upon us. We do not necessarily have to define this year's date as the 27th anniversary. The historic day of 19 April comes to us every year with the great outcry of the message of history, the dispute as to whether it was an uprising or a revolution notwithstanding. The message was "a great national consensus that vowed to embody democracy."

In retrospect, on that day our brethren vowed, deep in their hearts, to achieve freedom, justice, and democracy and to develop our national survival. Consequently, the dictator surrendered his power before the national consensus and stepped down.

However, we cannot say that today's reality has been faithfully developed in conformity with the national consensus that we agreed upon at that time. The dark clouds of April that prevailed today may probably cast a shadow that has resulted from the retrogression of the national consensus we achieved at that time. With the switch from seeking constitutional revision to again adhering to the current constitution, headlines in all of our newspapers have been covered with gloomy letters.

Such words and letters in the headline of newspapers as, "Strengthening Judicial Sanctions Against [opposition] Lawmakers," "Class-A Special Alert Issued to Police Throughout Country," and "Stern Punishment for Statements That Agitate Demonstrations" are by no means merely "print types of April." The voices of the opposition side are just as tough and resolute. Thus, the sharp confrontation does not end.

Such repeated confrontation is bound to result in bringing only pain and victimization to our people. To our regret, some say that such pain and victimization may be, in a sense, inevitable because our history of deepening democracy has been short. However, frankly speaking, our views are entirely different.
Considering that the tragic 25 June Korean War was, in a sense, our pain and victimization in defending liberal democracy, the pain and victimization that we have offered to the so-called altar of democracy since are by no means small. The pains and victimization that we suffered during the following April and May were also not small.

The length of the history of democracy cannot be calculated arithmetically alone. There are enormous differences in time between the premodern era and the modern era in terms of density. It has been 42 years since national liberation was achieved in 1945. The weight of that 42 years may be compared to the previous several hundred years.

However, of course, we have not wasted the 42 years. The 19 April student uprising out of which we achieved the great national consensus for democracy is a clear proof of this. Now is definitely not the time for us to step backward on the road of history. We should not waste our time stepping backward again.

Either power or counterpower should stand at the origin of consensus born out of the 19 April student uprising. We should correctly establish the political "center" on the axis of national consensus for freedom, justice, democracy, and development for national survival. By so doing the differences in "details" that have been based on the common stand of revising the constitution can be smoothly adjusted through dialogue, and not confrontation.

By so doing vicious circle of resorting to violence can be eliminated. As long as both sides of power and counterpower fail to trust the democratic "center" and suspect each other, the politics of dialogue to overcome confrontation cannot be expected. Therefore, we believe that both sides should first make a firm determination to liquidate the antidemocratic "way of thinking," the source of the vicious circle in politics.

We should not overlook that the accidental happening on that 19 April this year falls on Easter. This is because we want Easter to revive the spirit embodying democracy our students demonstrated 27 years ago.

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CSO: 4107/162
S. KOREA/MILITARY AFFAIRS

RECENT RESHUFFLE OF TOP MILITARY POSTS ANALYZED

Tokyo SEKAI in Japanese Mar 87 pp 85-97

[Article by Takao Goto, editor in chief of KOREA REPOTO: "Something is Moving Inside the ROK Military"]

[Text] On the night of 24 January 1987 Chong Wa Dae (Presidential Office) spokesman Lee Chong-yul announced that Minister of Home Affairs Kim Chong-ho and Director of National Police Headquarters (director general for the National Policy Agency) Kang Min-chang were replaced, and that former Army Chief of Staff Chong Ho-yong and Seoul Police Bureau Chief Lee Yong-uk were appointed as the next minister of home affairs and director of National Police Headquarters respectively. However, these appointments were such "blitzkreig appointments" that the staff of the presidential Secretariat of the same Presidential Office had not been notified in advance, and were also "appointments in absentia" carried out while Prime Minister No Shin-yong was on trip abroad.

What was more surprising than that, and than anything else, was an "unexpected appointment" made by President Chon Tu-hwan. That is, the fact that he appointed Chong Ho-yong, his classmate at the Korea Military Academy (KMA class 11) as the new minister of home affairs.

When it was announced that Army Chief of Staff Chong Ho-yong was assigned to reserve duty as of 16 December 1985 and that Third Army Commander Pak Hui-to was appointed as his successor, everyone was sure that this appointment was something which implied the appointment of General Chong Ho-yong as minister of national defense. South Korean newspapers too reported that Chong Ho-yong was assigned to the reserve in order to provide back up from within the administration until the end of President Chon's term of office in February 1988. Moreover, in Seoul this kind of cynical view also circulated: "Minister of National Defense Chong Ho-yong" was actually something which placed the "post Chon" period within range, and that President Chon has in mind abdication of political power in favor of the "leading reform forces" of the February 1979 military coup d'etat, to be precise, "Chairman No Te-u (KMA class 11) of the ruling Democratic Justice Party would be made president and Chong Ho-chong would be made prime minister."

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On the following 7 January 1986, President Chon resolutely carried out a major reorganization of the cabinet, changing 10 ministers centered on economic ministers. But the name "Minister of National Defense Chong Ho-yong" was not on the published list of reorganization appointments; as the new minister of national defense, there was the name of former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Yi Ki-paek, who, as might be expected, was KMA class 11. Of course in Seoul speculation was rampant concerning this unexpected reorganization appointment. It was explained as being because President Chon had accepted advice from a close associate to the effect that there is no precedent in the past for the transference of an army chief of staff to minister for national defense soon after he has been assigned to the reserve, and that military power should not be concentrated in a specific person, even if he is a "comrade of the revolution." And the view also circulated that actually there was a big conflict of opinion between President Chon and General Chong, and that is why he was separated from the center of power. However, it appears very much as though the true situation is that the assignment to the reserve of General Chong, whose cherished opinion is that "the military should not meddle in politics," was necessitated by pressure from the hard-line, young generals groups within the military. Be that as it may, contrary to rumor, Chong Ho-yong was not only unable to become minister of national defense, in the summer of the same year he suddenly tried to flee overseas.

Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts. It is said that South Korea's ambassador to America, Kim Kyong-won, a Harvard graduate, himself requested of International Studies Institute (ISI) Deputy Chairman R. Brown that Chong Ho-yong be accepted as a visiting researcher, and that on the U.S. side as well Consul K. Quinones [phonetic] of the U.S. Consulate General in Pusan approached Harvard by the State Department route. Thus Chong Ho-yong's study in America materialized, and from the fact that groundwork was laid by Quinones, the State Department's top Korea expert, who has experience of military service as a member of a U.S. Army intelligence unit during the Korean war, and who later completed the doctor's course at Harvard University under Professor Wagner, a specialist in the modern history of South Korea, before entering the State Department, it is clear that this "overseas study" was a matter agreed to by America and the ROK, that is, that it was done with the understanding of President Chon. In point of fact, Chong Ho-yong departed from the ROK with the title of advisor to the (Ilhae) Foundation, which is said to be a "receptacle" for after the resignation of President Chon. That is Chong Ho-yong's visit to America was certainly a flight abroad, but if a distinction is to be made, it was a shade closer to taking temporary shelter from his homeland.

Why did he have to take shelter? And why was Chong Ho-yong welcomed into the Chon Tu-hwan government this time shortly after returning from America.

The key to solving this riddle lies in the military appointments which were carried out twice in the 6-month period beginning in December 1985. In the regular personnel shift at the end of December 1985, Third Army Commander Pak Hui-to (KMA class 12) was appointed to replace Army Chief of Staff Chong Ho-yong who had entered the reserve, Army Deputy-Chief of Staff Choe Se-chang
(KMA class 13) was appointed as the new commander of the Third Army, Fifth Army Corps Commander Chong Tong-ho (KMA class 13) was appointed the new army deputy-chief of staff, Third Army Chief of Staff Chang Chun-ik (KMA class 14) was appointed as the new Fifth Army Corps commander, Army Headquarters Operational Staff (G III) Chief Min Kyong-pae (KMA class 14) was appointed the new Second Army Corps commander and Major General Mun Yong-il was appointed as the new chief of G III.

Chong Ho-yong was promoted to army chief of staff in December 1983. However, in June 1985 the Chon Tu-hwan government revised the law, extending the terms of office of the Army, Navy, and Air Force chiefs of staff by 1 year, making them 3 years. This was understood as being because President Chon had the aim of causing General Chong Ho-yong, a reliable "comrade of the revolution," to continue to command the military at least while the ROK hosted the Asian Games which were scheduled for September 1986. Nevertheless, at the end of 1985 President Chon decided to assign General Chong to the reserves. But it is said that that was not his real intention.

According to a military intelligence source in Seoul, it is said that in 1984 the setup of the military and Chong Ho-yong was as firm as a large rock, but when it got to be the following year, 1985, the sense of crisis of the hard-line faction centered on the military's young general group, which was shaken by the drastic changes which occurred in the domestic and foreign situation throughout that year, deepened, and the hard-line faction began to criticize Army Chief of Staff Chong Ho-yong, who advocated "non-interference in politics."

In the spring of 1985 the South Korean student movement took on a stronger "anti-American" tinge, and its form of struggle took on becoming more and more extreme. Beginning with the incident of the occupation of the American Culture Center in Seoul, which occurred on 23 May, U.S.-Government-connected facilities in South Korea were attacked one after the other. Students of Korea University rushed into the U.S. Embassy in Korea (15 August), students of Seoul National University occupied the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (4 November), students of Pusan National University besieged the Pusan branch of the Bank of America (13 November), students of Chonnam National University occupied the Kwangju American Cultural Center (2 December) and so on.

The Shock of "Secret Contacts"

It was after the beginning of November that students began to embark upon the radical tactics of occupations and sieges. Invasion of the headquarters of the Saemaul (New Community) Movement (4 November), occupation of the Democratic Justice Party's central training center (11 November), occupation of the Suwon Office of the Ministry of Labor, (12 November), invasion of the Pusan headquarters of the Democratic Justice Party, setting fire to the Kwangju office of the Ministry of Labor (13 November), occupation of the waiting room of the Minister of Labor (15 November), siege of the Democratic Justice Party's central training center in Yongsong (18 November)—incidents
of student attacks or occupations occurred almost every day throughout the nation. The students' assertions were focused on such economic and labor problems as revision of the Labor Law and opposition to U.S. pressure on Korea to open its markets; it was truly something serious to the government of Chon Tu-hwan, which was troubled by U.S.-ROK economic friction and the generation of a large number of unemployed due to a long-term recession. And, all the more so because many labor disputes were occurring due to sluggish business conditions and reduced-volume management, there was extreme fear that the student movement, which was pursuing the path of radicalization, and the labor movement, which was beginning to have its extension throughout the country, would unite. Furthermore, the students reached the point of declaring that "America is neither a protector of democracy nor a friend," and of naming the Reagan administration, along with the Chon Tu-hwan government, as something to be overthrown. In the incident in which 176 students of Seoul National University invaded and occupied Democratic Justice Party facilities, the occupying students held a ceremony on the roof of the training center in which they burned two figures in effigy; one symbolizing President Chon and the other symbolizing President Reagan.

The ones who reacted most strongly against the "anti-American, radicalization" line of the student movement were none other than the military, and particularly the young-general group centered on graduates of the KMA classes 17 and 18. There are those who say that the hard-line faction equals the nationalistic faction, that is "anti-American," but that is not necessarily true. An "incident" occurred which was still more shocking to the hard-line group of the military.

It was the "secret contacts between North and South." It came to light only in mid-September that for 3 days beginning on 4 September, WPK Politburo member and secretary (chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Homeland) Ho Tam, the DPRK's person in charge of dealing with the ROK, had paid a top-secret visit to Seoul and had met and talked with President Chon Tu-hwan and Agency for National Security Planning (the NSP is the later manifestation of the former Korean Central Intelligence Agency) Director Chang Se-tong. Furthermore, 1 month later it was discovered that this time NSP Director Chang Se-tong had gone to Pyongyang and met and talked with Chairman Kim Il-song and Politburo member Ho Tam.

Toward the realization of a North-South summit meeting between President Chon Tu-hwan and Chairman Kim Il-song, close associates of the two leaders had paid secret visits to north and south. The military's reaction when it was first informed of this fact was quite strong, all the more so because both sides had conducted the matter with the utmost secrecy. It is said that a very few military leaders including Army Chief of Staff Chong Ho-yong had received notification beforehand, but it appears that the commanders of each army corps (lieutenant generals), not to mention the division commanders (major generals) who are protecting the front line, as well as persons of the class; the director of the Ministry of National Defense Intelligence Agency (a lieutenant general) and the commander of Army Intelligence Command (major general), who
are in charge of intelligence, were completely ignored. All the more so because of that, the shock suffered by the military was immeasurable.

The "Seven Young Noblemen"

According to what the aforementioned military intelligence source told me directly, the hard-line faction within the military is made up of a group of young generals who are graduates of KMA class 17 through class 21, and is a group led by Capital Armored Division Commander Kim Chin-yong, an alumnus of the KMA class 17. The members of the KMA class 17 can be called the ROK's "postwar group" generation which graduated and were commissioned as second lieutenants in 1961, the year in which the late President Pak Chong-hui assumed political power through a military coup d'état. Furthermore, the graduates of the 21st class graduated in 1965; in this year the ROK accepted a U.S. request and dispatched a regular military unit to Vietnam. In either case, they learned U.S.-type civilian control while being indoctrinated with thorough anti-communist education.

And though the ROK of that time existed in the narrow confines of the structure of the fierce U.S.-Soviet cold war, it was also a time in which the dynamism "before the dawn" of the high-growth period of the 1970's could be sensed. Major General Kim Chin-yong is an elite military man, who in this stirring time received from an early time within the military the reputation of being "certain to be a future army chief of staff." Major General Kim, who was born in Japan, was raised in Japan until junior high school, and his attitude toward Japan is so harsh that one view holds that, for that reason, it might have been necessary for him to strongly set forth an "anti-Japanese stance" after returning to his homeland. Be that as it may, Kim, who graduated from the KMA at the top of his class, had great hopes pinned on him from an early time as "the ace of his class," and truly followed an elite course.

One of the "leading reform forces" who led President Chon's 12 December 1979 "army purge coup d'état" to success, is Kim Chin-yong, who at that time was commander of the 33d battalion (lieutenant colonel) under the umbrella of the Capital Garrison Command (currently the Capital Defense Command). President Chon who roused himself to action was at that time commander of the Defense Security Command, and among his many close associates, those who were the closest of the close, who Commander Chon particularly trusted, were called the "seven young noblemen."

Lieutenant Colonel Kim Chin-yong was, of course, one of them. In addition there were Chief of Intelligence, Defense Security Command, Kwon Chong-tal, KMA class 15 (at that time a colonel, later appointed as the first secretary general of the Democratic Justice Party, currently a Democratic Justice Party member of the National Assembly and Chief Delegate for the South side to the Conference of South-North National Assemblies); Chief of Staff, Special Forces Headquarters Ko Myong-sung, KMA class 15 (at that time a colonel, later deputy director of the Presidential Security Forces--as brigadier general, chief of personnel, 3d Army and army headquarters chief of staff for personnel--as
major general, and commander of the Capital Defense Command, currently
commander of the Defense Security Command—as lieutenant general); Chief of
Staff 1st Airborne Brigade, Special Forces Group, Chang Se-tong, KMA class
16 (at that time a colonel, later commander of the 30th group of the Capital
Garrison Command—as a brigadier general, commander of the 3d Airborne
Brigade, director of the Presidential Security Forces—as a major general and
is currently director of the NSP); Secretary General of the Defense Security
Command Ho Hwa-pyong, KMA class 17 (at that time a lieutenant colonel, later
presidential first senior secretary for political affairs, currently a
visiting researcher at the Asia Research Center of America's Heritage
Foundation); Chief of the Personnel Department of the General Affairs Section
of the Defense Security Command, Ho Sam-su, KMA class 17 (at that time a
lieutenant colonel, later presidential senior secretary for protocol,
researcher at the University of Hawaii's East West Center, currently a
researcher at America's Stanford University's Hoover Institute); Chief of the
Anti-Communism Section of the Defense Security Command, Yi Hak-pong, KMA class
18 (at that time a lieutenant colonel, later presidential senior secretary for
civil affairs, currently second deputy director of the NSP).

In 1980 when the Chon Tu-hwan government started out, the "seven young
noblemen" were referred to within the government as "meritorious retainers who
contributed to the founding of the state." Among the seven, only Lieutenant
General Ko Myong-sung and Major General Kim Chin-yong are now still on active
service, and from this fact too, is clear that Major General Kim has continued
an advancement consonant with his reputation as the "future army chief of
staff."

When we examine Major General Kim Chin-yong's career in detail, most things
can be understood. It is said that one of the greatest reasons for the
success of the coup d'état is the fact that at the time of the "army-purge
coup d'état of 12 December," Lieutenant Colonel Kim Chin-yong opposed the
order of his superior officer, Capital Garrison Command Commander Chang
Tae-wan, and rose to action in concert with Defense Security Command Commander
Chon Tu-hwan. Kim Chin-yong ended up turning about and arresting Major
General Chang, one of the military mainstream faction of the commander of
martial law enforcement at that time, Army Chief of Staff Chong Sung-hwa,
tried to thwart by force Major General Chon's rallying of the coup d'état.

Due to that meritorious deed, Lieutenant Colonel Kim advanced at one stroke to
brigadier general in the regular shift of staff of December 1980, and was
selected chief of the intelligence office of 3d Army Headquarters, a vital
point in field-operation forces. In addition, he subsequently tread a favored
path with such posts as aide to Minister of National Defense Yun Song-min; in
the appointments of December 1983, in which the so-called Chong Ho-yong setup
is considered to have been firmly established, he advanced to major general as
the first of KMA class 17 to attain that rank, and advanced to commander of
the Capital Armored Division under the umbrella of the Capital Defense
Command.
The Capital Garrison Command was reorganized into the Capital Defense Command in 1984, and was strengthened by leaps and bounds. Being welcomed as the commander of the Capital Armored Division of that Capital Defense Command, and with the support of the young officers behind him, Major General Kim rapidly increased his influence within the military. It can probably be said that the reason lies in the fighting strength (power) possessed by the Capital Armored Division.

An ordinary army division has a total strength of approximately 11,000 men, there are 3 infantry brigades and 1 artillery brigade, in addition to which there are 1 company each of engineer, reconnaissance, supply and tank units, and the rest is made up of communications and anti-aircraft missile companies and so on. But the equipment of the Capital Armored Division is the most advanced; the most superior personnel are assembled, too, and there are approximately 15,000 officers and men, surpassing other divisions. And when it comes to its main mission, it is an actual fighting unit which protects the capital area, being responsible for all guarding of all sorts of public facilities such as all government agencies, including the Blue House (the Presidential Office), and broadcasting stations. In other words, it is the crack division among the 21 divisions of the ROK Army.

In the early period of Chon Tu-hwan's rule, that is, in the first half of the 1980's, due also to the fact that President Chon had been commander of the Defense Security Command, the influence of the Defense Security Command was so strong that it was said that "even crying children shut up for the Defense Security Command." But after February 1984, when Chang Se-tong became commander, the NSP, the former Korean CIA, regained power, and from about the second half of 1984, the influence of the Capital Guard Command, which was supported by the Capital Armored Division led by the powerful Major General Kim Chin-yong, also grew stronger. The power structure of the military constantly changes. Power is held by the section which is led by the strong man of the moment.

Be that as it may, the sphere of influence of the hard-line faction young-generals' group of which Major General Kim Chin-yong was the nucleus went on expanding gradually. From being centered initially on alumni of the KMA classes 17 and 18, it went on expanding as far as alumni of the classes 20 and 21. Then, in the autumn of 1985, when, as mentioned previously, the domestic situation was becoming more chaotic every day due to an upsurge of an antigovernment movement centered on the constitution-revision movement, the "Committee of 30," a social organization of alumni of the KMA class 17, planned together and made a direct representation to President Chon.

That is, they unfolded criticism of the supreme commander of the military, saying that, with things as they were, if the military stood idly by the situation would keep getting worse, and that one reason for that lay in the fact that Army Chief of Staff Chong Ho-yong was creating an airless atmosphere by confining the advice within the military on the strength of "the neutrality of the military." It is said that this "break in discipline" was a considerable shock to President Chon.
Due to the loud demands of the young generals, ultimately, General Chong Ho-yong's assignment to the reserves was made unavoidable. Of course, even so, President Chon's trust in Chong is strong; so much so that from 28 December, immediately after his assignment to the reserves was announced, to 10 January 1986 Chong paid a top secret visit to West Germany under secret orders from the president, and returned to the ROK after having decided on the purchase of a large volume of West German-made arms including the (Messer-Schmitt, Bell Co. and Broughm [phonetic]) Model MQ-105 small military helicopter.

'Expulsion of Kim Chin-yong'

But this is what happened 2 months before Chong Ho-yong set out for America. Capital Armored Division Commander Kim Chin-yong, the very leader of the military's hard-line faction who is considered to have devised the assignment of Chong to the reserves, ended up being "demoted." The personnel shift dated 19 June 1986 was something completely unexpected. As shown in Figure 1, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Chong Chin-kwon (KMA special class 8), Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Headquarters Lieutenant General Choe Ung (KMA class 12) and Deputy Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Chong Tong-ho retired from military service, and 2nd Army Commander Oh Cha-pok (3rd class of the army armored school), 1st Army Corps Commander Yu Sung-kuk (KMA class 13) and 6th Army Corps Commander Pak Myong-chol (18th class of the Artillery Leaders School) were appointed as their respective successors. In addition, Defense Security Command Commander Yi Chong-ku (KMA class 14) was appointed the new commander of the 2nd Army, Capital Defense Command Commander Ko Myong-sung (KMA class 15) was appointed the new commander of the Defense Security Command, Superintendent of the 3rd Military Academy Kwon Pyong-sik (KMA class 15) was appointed as the new commander of the Capital Defense Command, Army Headquarters Operations Chief of Staff (G III) Mun Yong-il (KMA class 14) was appointed the new commander of the 1st Army Corps and Chief of Operational Headquarters of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Na Byong-son (KMA class 14) was appointed as the new commander of the 6th Army Corps.

It was a broad shift of personnel which, beginning with the chairmanship of the joint chiefs of staff, included such important posts as army deputy chief of staff, commander of the Defense Security Command and commander of the Capital Defense Command, and it is worthy of special mention that Major General Kim Chin-yong of the Capital Defense Command was changed, and was appointed to succeed Lieutenant General Kwon Pyong-shik as superintendent of the 3d Military Academy. The post of superintendent of the 3d Military Academy, which are located in Yongchon, Kyongsangbuk-do, is clearly a demotion. The normal tour of duty for a division commander is 2 years, and it is usual for persons who have finished a tour as division commander to transfer next to a general staff officer at Army Headquarters or to chief of staff at an Army Headquarters.

At the time, the posts of commander of the Defense Security Command, commander of the Capital Defense Command and commander of Defense Intelligence Agency
**Figure 1. Current Set of the Chon Tu-hwan Government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cabinet Ministers</th>
<th>Blue House</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prime Minister</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chief, secretariat</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Sin-yong(56) (Remained)</td>
<td>Pak Yong-su(57) (Remained)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vice PM/Director</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chief, secretariat</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(for ENP)</td>
<td>Kim Yun-hwan (54) for Political Aff. (Former Vice Min-ister of Culture &amp; Information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Man-chol (53) (Remained)</td>
<td><strong>1st Senior Secretary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minister of Foreign Aff.</strong></td>
<td><strong>2nd Senior Secretary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choe Kwang-su(52) (Former Amb. to the UN)</td>
<td>Kang U-hyok(48) for Political Aff. (Remained)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minister of Home Aff.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Senior Secretary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chong Ho-yong(54) (Former Army Chief of Staff, KMA 11)</td>
<td>Kim Chong-kon(52) for protocol (Remained)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minister of Finance</strong></td>
<td><strong>Senior Secretary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chong In-yong(52) (Remained)</td>
<td>Kim Yong-kap(48) for Civil Aff. (Remained, KMA 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minister of Sports</strong></td>
<td><strong>Senior Secretary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi Se-ki(58) (Former Speaker of NJP)</td>
<td>Yi Chae-sik(50) for General Aff. (Remained, KMA 15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minister of Unification</strong></td>
<td><strong>Senior Secretary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho Hoon-to(46) (Former Min Sr. Secretyary for Political Aff.)</td>
<td>Sagong II(46) for Econ. Aff. (Remained)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minister of Transportation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Senior Secretary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch’a Kyoo-hiong(56) (Former KMA member, KMA 8)</td>
<td>Yi Chong-kun(51) for Legal Aff. (Remained)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minister of National Def.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chief, Presidential An hyon-Teal(47)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yi Ki-pack(55) (Remained, KMA 11)</td>
<td><strong>Security Forces</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Director of Agency for NPS</strong></td>
<td><strong>Security Forces</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Se-tong(49) (Remained, KMA 10)</td>
<td><strong>Security Forces</strong></td>
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<tr>
<th>Agency for National Security Planning (NPS)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st Vice Director</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi Hae-kuk(48) (Former Governor of Kyenggi Prov.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2nd Vice Director</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi Hae-pung(47) (Former Min Sr. Secretyary for Civil Aff. KMA 18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Director of Agency for NPS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Se-tong(49) (Remained, KMA 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Director of Defense Intel.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yun T’ae-kun(52) (KMA 13)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chief of Staff</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chief of Staff for Army</strong></td>
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<tr>
<th>Ministry of National Defense</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vice Minister</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Thang In-su(53) (KMA 12)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>First Assistant</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch’a Sang-ho(53) (KMA 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Director of Defense Intel.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yun T’ae-kun(52) (KMA 13)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chief of Staff</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chief of Staff for Army</strong></td>
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<tr>
<th>Joint Chiefs of Staff</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chairman</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>O Cha-pok(55) (Army Armored School Class 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HQ Commander</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu Song-kuk(52) (KMA 15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chairman</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No T’ae-u(54) (KMA 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secretary General</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi Ch’un-kui(52) (Former Vice M. of Home Aff. KMA 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Speaker</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi Hae-tong(52) (Former Chief of HI Secretarite)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advisor</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwon Ik-hyon(54) (KMA 11)</td>
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(As of 28 January 1987)
(Major General Yi Chin-sam), which are under the direct control of Army Headquarters, were each occupied by graduates of the KMA class 15, so the new appointment which was conceivable for Kim Chin-yong, whose 2 year term had ended and who was racing along an elite course, was the post of an Army Headquarters general staff officer from G I through G VII. However, there are also specialists who explain it by saying that the situation was such that all four of the seven chiefs of staff were still members of the class 14, so, in the end, there was no suitable post other than that of director of the 3d Military Academy. That is, they say it was not a demotion.

But I have collected information through all kinds of sources concerning the subsurface fighting surrounding this appointment, and the more material I collected the deeper became my conviction that it was an appointment for the purpose of "expelling Kim Chin-yong."

Information (1) Senior Presidential Adviser on Civil Affairs Kim Yong-kap who is, like Kim Chin-yong, a graduate of the class 17, was transferred in the appointments of January 1986 from chief of the NSP's Office of Inspection, Planning and Adjustment to the Presidential Office and, pushed to the fore, began to use his influence to make the opinion of the hard-line military faction reflected in politics. Adviser Kim Yong-kap is, so to speak, a person with direct personal connection to President Chon Tu-hwan, having accompanied Chon Tu-hwan as an aide when Defense Security Command Commander Chon entered the old Korean CIA as acting director immediately following the October 1979 incident of the assassination of President Pak Chong-hui. Major General Kim Chin-yong, who tried to apply pressure to the Presidential Office via a person such as Kim Yong-kap, incurred the wrath of President Chon.

Information (2) On 20 April President Chon stopped off at Seattle on the way back from a visit to Europe, and there met with former senior secretary for political affairs Ho Hwa-pyong, who was once his most trusted confidante. At that meeting, along with expressing his opinion on policy, Ho asked to be reinstated in government office. Major General Kim Chin-yong appealed to the Presidential Office for reinstatement of Ho, who had returned to South Korea soon after, but it came to the attention of First Lady Yi Sun-cha, who detests Ho, so Kim Chin-yong was looked upon with more and more disapproval.

Information (3) In the "Incident of the Inchon Disturbance" which occurred on 3 May, the military's hard-line faction sense of crisis grew stronger due to the upsurge of the constitution-revision movement centered on the opposition (New Korea Democratic Party) and they thought that the cause of the disorder was the fact that in April President Chon had transferred much of his power to determine policy to the Democratic Justice Party's Chairman No Tae-u, so they proposed to the Presidential Office that the line of talks with the opposition parties promoted by No be withdrawn. According to a reliable U.S. source in the ROK, in mid-May seven hard-line faction generals centered on the class 17 entered the Presidential Office and appealed directly to President Chon to rally a "reborn coup d'etat." But President Chon debated with the rash group of generals, saying "I will resign after 2 more years. I want by all means to accomplish a peaceful change of government by my own hand. If we brought
about a coup d'état at this point, the military would end up becoming totally isolated from the people of the nation. Please give up this idea." And President Chon judged that it was Major General Kim Chin-yong who from behind the scenes had manipulated the group which had appealed to him directly.

Information (4) The "Committee of 30," which is led by Major General Kim Chin-yong, was formed centered on members of the KMA class 17 and these members of the hard-line faction judged that in order to return to the "starting point" of the army-purge coup d'état of December 1979 and the 17 May situation of May 1980, there was no way but to bring about a "reborn coup d'état." And they input into the Capital Defense Command's computer the names of 5,000 persons who should be eliminated through the "reborn coup d'état" (among which there is said to have also been the name of President Chon's younger brother, Chon Kyong-hwan, former chairman of central headquarters of the Saemaul Movement). However, when Major General Kim revealed this story at a banquet with the rallying faction, in a turnabout he was reported to the NSP and exposed.

Information (5) (Then) Defense Security Command Commander Yi Chong-ku strongly advised President Chon that he should relieve Major General Kim Chin-yong of his duties in order to prevent reckless action by the young-generals group centered around Major General Kim. Lieutenant General Yi is a Chon follower of long standing who was a company commander when President Chon was serving as commander of the Capital Garrison Command's 30th Battalion. Lieutenant General Yi, a member of the KMA class 14, very recently surfaced suddenly as the "post Pak Chong-hui" advisor to the army chief of staff. Furthermore, NSP Director Chang Se-tong, too, felt uncomfortable about the existence of Major General Kim, who was very popular with the military's young officers, whose nationalistic, or hawkish, political speech and action stood out, and yet who also had strong ties with Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea General William J. Livesey, Jr. And Lieutenant Yi Chong-ku and Director Chang Se-tong, acting in concert, asserted strongly that "Kim Chin-yong should be fired," so finally President Chon took the plunge and relieved Major General Kim of his position as commander of the Capital Armored Division.

When we begin to look at it thusly, it becomes clear that the December 1985 change of Army Chief of Staff Chong Ho-yong was due to the pressure of the military hard-line faction, and that, on the other hand, the June 1986 demotion of Capital Armored Division Commander Kim Chin-yong was an appointment which stemmed from fear that the hard-line faction would act recklessly.

Next is this time's appointment of the minister of home affairs. What is it that ties these three appointments together? In order to examine this point, it is necessary to take a look at the recent dealings of the Reagan administration with the ROK.
America's "Asia Team"

On 6 December 1986 a high official of the U.S. State Department went to Seoul via Tokyo. It was Intelligence and Research Bureau Chief Morton Abramowitz, who is said to be Secretary of State Shultz' "personal adviser." The ROK press reports treated Abramowitz' visit to the ROK lightly and did not view it as being all that important. They said that during his 4-day stay in the ROK, in addition to holding a meeting with such important government figures as Prime Minister No Shin-yong and Minister for Foreign Affairs Choi Kwang-su, Abramowitz "gathered material" energetically concerning the ROK internal situation, holding meetings with No Tae-u, chairman of the ruling Democratic Justice Party, Yi Min-u, president of New Korea Democratic Party, the leading opposition party, leaders in religious circles who are opposition forces and key members of the mass media.

But it is said that there was a time-gap in Abramowitz's formal schedule in Seoul which remains a riddle. According to information obtained in Seoul, it is considered that Intelligence and Research Bureau Chief Abramowitz secretly contacted Chang Se-tong, director of the Agency for National Security Planning (NSP) and also met with the person in charge of the military's intelligence-related organs.

Why did Abramowitz have to act in secret? If that information is correct, is it a matter of a "space" for the sake of meeting with the head of South Korea's intelligence services? In order to answer this question we must examine Abramowitz's career as a /diplomat/.

Morton Abramowitz was born on 20 January 1933 and is 54 years old. He is a China expert who completed a Harvard University M.A. program (majoring in modern Chinese history) after graduating from Stanford University. He entered the State Department in 1960, thereafter working continuously in the field of intelligence, and went to the Department of Defense in 1972. Beginning in that year he served for 1 year as special adviser to Secretary of Defense Laird under the Nixon administration, and in 1974 was promoted to deputy assistant secretary of defense (in charge of East Asia and the Pacific). In 1978 he returned to the State Department, and at the same time was appointed ambassador to Thailand. While serving at his new post in Bangkok, he is said to have been giving advice secretly to the Thai Government regarding its mopping-up operations against guerillas while he dealt with the Cambodia problem.

In 1983, when strains began to appear in Indonesia's Suharto government, Abramowitz was appointed ambassador to Indonesia by Secretary of State Shultz, but there was an "incident" in which the Suharto government declared Abramowitz "persona non grata" and refused to accept his credentials, so in the end this appointment was withdrawn. In 1983-84 he served as chief U.S. delegate to the U.S.-Soviet MBFR (Central European Conventional Arms Reduction Negotiations) in Vienna, and in 1985 he assumed his present position as director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. In January 1986 he was also appointed concurrently to the newly established post
of assistant secretary of state for intelligence, and is a central figure with personal connections to Secretary of State Shultz.

It is now a widely known fact that the operation of deposing Philippine President Marcos, which America's NBC network named the "smiling revolution," was actually carried out by the Reagan administration's Asia team which was organized centered on the Department of State. But there are few persons who know that Abramowitz was one of its central members.

There participated in this team, which was led by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost, from the State Department: in addition to Abramowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz (currently ambassador to Indonesia), from the Pentagon: Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense for International Security Richard Armitage, from the CIA: Deputy Director Robert Gates (at that time assistant director of the intelligence bureau), and from the White House: Special Presidential Assistant Gaston Sigur of the National Security Council (currently assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs).

It was Abramowitz who served as coordinator for this Asia team which engaged in subsurface "secret maneuvers" with the approval of Secretary of State Shultz. Just before the collapse of the Marcos dynasty a large number of operatives went to Manila from CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and an operation team selected from the State Department's Terrorism Countermeasures Office and Political and Military Affairs Bureau was also dispatched to the Philippines, and it is considered that Abramowitz was the person on the spot who was in charge of operations. Former ambassador to the Republic of Korea Habib was dispatched as a special envoy to give the coup de grace to President Marcos, but it is said that this, too, was because Secretary of State Shultz accepted the advice of Abramowitz.

After all is said and done, it is natural to take the view that there was some special objective in the visit to the Republic of Korea by State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Director Abramowitz, a diplomat/who can be said to be a professional at intelligence gathering and operations. It may said to be certain that a high official of the Reagan administration is visiting the Republic of Korea at an important juncture in the ROK political situation which has been shaky since the end of last year.

On the day following 17 October, on which New Korea Democratic Party Assemblyman Yu Song-hwan had been arrested for a statement in the National Assembly, the NSC's Special Presidential Assistant James Kelly (formerly deputy assistant secretary of defense) arrived in Seoul. Furthermore, on 30 October, when there began to be whispers in Seoul of a "theory of a November crisis" and on which occurred the "incident of the occupation of Kon Kuk University" in which as many as 1,300 students were arrested at one time, the newly appointed deputy assistant secretary of state (for East Asian and Pacific affairs) William Clark visited the Republic of Korea via Tokyo. Furthermore, on the 6th of the following month, Assistant Secretary of State Sigur, the Regan administration's person responsible for drafting policy
Figure 2. Power Structure of the Chon Tu-hwan Government

Chon Tu-hwan (KMA 11) - President

No Sin-yong (Diplomat) - Prime Minister (originated from NK)

PERSONS FROM NORTH KYONGSIANG PROV.

No T'ae-ju (KMA 11) - DPF Chairman
Yi Chin-san (KMA 15) - Commander, Third Army Corps
Chung Ho-yong (KMA 11) - Minister of Home Affairs
Kim Yun-hwan (formerly with TONG-A ILBO) - BH senior Secretary for Political Affairs
Kum Chin-ho (Formerly Assistant to prime minister) - Previous Minister of Trade and Industry
Ahn Chang-tal (KMA 11) - Former Secretary General of the DPF
Chung Sun-tok (KMA 16) - Former Secretary General of DPF
Yi Se-ki (Previous Speaker of DPF) - Minister of Sports
Kim Chong-ja (KMA 11) - Chairman of the koreas Olympic Committee and the DPF support Council chairman
Pak Se-chik (KMA 12) - Chairman of Seoul Olympic Committee
Kim Pok-tong (KMA 11) - President of Korea Mining Co.

PERSONS FROM HONGAM & OTHER AREAS

Chang Se-tong (KMA 18) - NSP Director
Ko Myong-sung (KMA 15) - Commander, Defense Security Command
Ahn Pyong-sik (KMA 15) - Commander, Capital Defense Command
An Hyon-t'ae (KMA 17) - Chief, Presidential Security
Ch'a Kye-hyon (KMA 8) - Minister of Transportation
Ho Yun-to (formerly with CHIGUN ILBO) - Minister of national Unification Board

Yi Hak-tong (KMA 18) - Second Vice Director of the NSP
Yi Ki-bae (KMA 11) - Minister of National Defense
Pak Chun-pyon (KMA 12) - DPF's National Policy Committee Chairman

Yi Ch'un-ku (KMA 14) - Secretary General of the DPF
Ko Cha-pok (Armct Tnp. 2) - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Pak Myong-ch'ol (KMC 18) - Armed Deputy Chief of Staff

-- Antagonism exists between No T'ae-ju and Chang Se-tong
-- KMA 15 rivals - Yi Chin-san, Ko Myong-sung, Ahn Pyong-sik
-- Chang Se-tong and Yi Ch'un-ku served under Pak Se-chik when he was commander of the Capital Garrison Command
-- Group loyal to Pres. Chon - An Hyon-t'ae, Ho Mun-to
-- Friction between office of Blue House (BH) senior secretory for Political Affairs and the group loyal to Pres. Chon
-- KMA 12 rivals - Pak Se-chik, Pak Chun-pyon
-- Hardline group against opposition parties - Ho Mum-to, Yi Hak-tong, Yi Ki-bae, Pak Chun-pyon, Yi Ch'un-ku
-- Group advocating dialogue with opposition parties - Chung Sun-tok, Kwon Chang-tal, Yi Se-ki
-- Olympic connection - Kim Chong-ha, Pak Se-chik
-- Power struggle between Kim Yun-hwan and An Hyon-t'ae at the BH

(As of 28 Jan. 87)
toward the Republic of Korea, visited the ROK and on the following day paid a courtesy call on President Chon.

American sources in Japan explained that such successive visits to the ROK by high U.S. officials was one link in periodic tours of Asia, but it had no persuasive power whatsoever. If one learns of two appointments which were carried out before and after this rush of visits to Seoul, they too were something to be expected. In October the CIA's Seoul station chief was replaced. The CIA's number four man, Assistant Director for East Asian and Pacific Affairs John Stein was newly appointed to the position. Furthermore, former chief of the NSC Political Affairs Bureau James Lilly was decided on as the new ambassador to the ROK. In particular, the new ambassador Lilly is a person who had been employed in intelligence activities in the CIA for a long period and gained the evaluation as an "operational pro."

As we have seen above, since the autumn of 1986 the Reagan administration, while on the other hand deploying in Seoul a line-up of persons with CIA connections, has dispatched to Seoul in succession Korea-policy planners and experts on intelligence and operations—however one views it, this cannot be said to be normal dealings with the ROK. Clearly, this was an action designed to grasp the real situation because the Reagan administration judged that at that time an "abnormal situation (emergency)" was in the process of occurring in Seoul, or rather, within the Chon Tu-hwan government...

The Rise of the Honam Faction

Well then, what exactly was occurring, or is occurring? As is clear also from Figure 2, a great change can be seen in the power structure of the Chon Tu-hwan government.

What can be called a legacy left by the former government of Pak Chong-hui is appointments which "favor Kyongsang Province." Above all, persons who originated in the late President Pak's home region of North Kyongsang Province were promoted to positions of trust both in the executive and the military. Due to the fact that the so-called "leading reform forces" led by President Chon Tu-hwan, which seized power in December 1979 through a military coup d'état, were being strengthened by persons from Taegu in North Kyongsang Province, far from being corrected, that tendency grew still stronger.

It might be mentioned in this connection that things were such that immediately after the coup d'état the four persons who were President Chon's "comrades of the revolution," Democratic Justice Party Chairman No Tae-u, Minister of Home Affairs Chong Ho-yong, Korea Mining Promotion Corp. President Kim Pok-tong (KMA class 11) and Audit and Inspection Board Director Hwang Yong-si (KMA class 10) were called "the four-man team from Taegu." To that extent, even after the Chon Tu-hwan government got going, the appointments "favoring Kyongsang Province" continued and grew still stronger.

However, as the end of President Chon's term in office approached, strains deriving from differences in the opinions of various strongmen concerning
Chon's successor began to be conspicuous at the center of the government. Exactly at such a time Chang Se-tong assumed office as director of the Agency for National Security Planning, and as he increased his voice within the government, he came to possess influence not only on appointments in the executive, but also on military appointments. In terms of results, the "favoring of Kyongsang Province" was corrected. Of course, as might be expected of someone called "Chon Tu-hwan, the appointment expert," up to that time as well President Chon had been carrying out superb appointments in regard to cabinet members, members of the Democratic Justice Party, and the military. However, in 1986 when a shadow began to appear on President Chon's leadership due to such things as the alienation from power of some of his close associates, the stampede on the part of the military's hard-line faction and the alienation between the Presidential Office staff and Democratic Justice Party leaders, which had become public in the closing days of the government, he began to appoint "peoples from Honam [and other areas]" to positions of confidence.

A typical example is Chang Se-tong, himself. Chang, who comes from Chollanam-do, is a person who from early on stood out as a close associate of President Chon; all the more so because more than half of the center of power was made up of persons who came from North Kyongsang Province, Chang holds his present position because he gave loyalty which could be called excessive.

To President Chon, Chang has been a loyal subordinate since his time with the Airborne Special Forces Group (airborne unit); when President Chon was promoted to Airborne Special Forces Group battalion commander in 1964 Chang was a company commander. And also in November 1970 when President Chon served in war as commander of the 29th Regiment (colonel) of the White Horse Division, an expeditionary force stationed in Vietnam, Chang Se-tong accompanied him as an intelligence staff officer attached to the same regiment. He was also with Chon when he returned to the ROK 1 year later to assume the position of commander of the 1st Airborne Brigade of the Special Forces Group (brigadier general). Incidentally, Major General An Hyon-tae, director of the Presidential Security Forces, served under him as a battalion commander.

Chang Se-tong remained in the Special Forces Group even after President Chon was promoted to major general and transferred to commander of the 1st Division in December 1977. And when Chang was operations staff officer for the 1st Airborne Brigade (colonel) he took part in rallying the coup d'état; later, after serving as commander of the 30th Security Group of the Capital Garrison Command (brigadier general), in July 1981 he was promoted to major general at the top of the KMA class 16, and was chosen as director of the Presidential Security Service. It was from that time onward that Chang Se-tong came to be paid attention by Korea watchers in the ROK and abroad. And in February 1984, at the same time that he was promoted to lieutenant general, he was assigned to reserve duty and appointed as director of the Agency for National Security Planning (NSP).
Now Chang Se-tong, who stands at the summit of the Honam personal connections, has accomplished the "expulsion" of Major General Kim Chin-yong, one of the two persons among the "seven young noblemen" of 1979 who stayed in the military, and he is teaming up with the other, Defense Security Command Commander Ku Myong-sung, likewise a native of (South Cholla Province), in a tag wrestling match. And it can be said that the design in which this Chang Se-tong challenges No Tae-u, who is widely rumored to be closest to winning in the "post Chon" race, most accurately expresses the present power structure in the Chon Tu-hwan government.

The aftereffects of the change of Defense Security Command Commander Kim Chin-young, a symbol of the military's young-general group and hard-line faction, still remain. The dissatisfaction of the hard-line faction is still smoldering. To put it another way, President Chon cannot ignore such forces. What occurred on top of that was "the incident of the torture death of Pak Chong-chol." It resulted in new ammunition being given to the opposition New Korea Democratic Party, which had begun to be beaten in the constitutional revision debate by the pace of the ruling Democratic Justice Party. The government and the ruling party are making the end of March the deadline for the constitution-revision problem. In the event that agreement on revision of the constitution cannot be gained through talks at the National Assembly level, this will probably mean the handing down of the "grave decision" which was contained in the New Year's administrative policy speech which President Chon Tu-hwan made on 12 January via radio and television.

That is, President Chon has firm up his resolve to realize the government and ruling party's plan for constitutional revision within the Parliamentary Cabinet system even by the use of /extraordinary means/. Is this not why he has now placed his "trump card," Chong Ho-yong, in the key post of minister of home affairs?

There is also this kind of story. It is unconfirmed information, but it goes that a plan was discovered for a number of graduates of the KMA class 16 to start a coup d'état under former Korea General Chemical Corp. President Paek Son-yop, a military elder who served as army chief of staff in the time of Rhee Sung-man, and was disclosed to the Capital Defense Command in mid-November. And a story has also begun to go around to the effect that No Tae-u visited President Chon at the Presidential Office and strongly advised him that discipline within the government would break down unless he eliminated the influence of Chang Se-tong.

In any case, with the debate on constitutional revision and the problem of a presidential successor becoming intertwined in a complicated way, the internal situation in the ROK is one in which conditions require vigilance, and future developments will depend upon how President Chon Tu-hwan has /disposed of/ the "emergency" within the military.

(Written 25 January)

(Takao Goto, editor in chief, KOREA REPOTO)

12373/9599
CSO:  8129/3624
PROCEDURES FOR EASING TRADE FRICTION WITH U.S. ANALYZED

Seoul MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN in Korean 13 Mar 87 p 3

[Article by reporter Sim Hong-sop: "Let Us Avert Pressures for Won's Revaluation by Buying What We Should Buy"]

[Text] (MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN Editor' note: With the U. S. pressures on the ROK to open its markets to U.S. goods continuing to mount since the beginning of this year, the concerned government and industrial circles are at a loss as to how to cope with these pressures. Less than a year after negotiations based on Article 301 were concluded last July, the United States resumed its pressures on our country to open our markets wider and revalue the won currency, touching off a second round of trade friction between the two countries. With the separate visits to the United States by our deputy prime minister and minister of trade and industry and with the momentum of other moves that are afoot, trade frictions between the two countries is entering a new phase.)

In his New Year's press conference, Deputy Prime Minister Kim Man-je said, "I would say that the two most difficult problems which we must address ourselves to this year will be how to stabilize the basic trend toward a trade surplus, and how to resolve our trade frictions with the United States at the same time." He stated that depending on how we deal with the U.S. pressures for further opening our markets, it is possible that our economy will undergo change in its appearance.

From the outset of the New Year, the United States pressed for a revaluation of the won, and it now pressing for an additional opening of our markets even though the 1st quarter has not ended yet.

The United States, particularly in a much louder tone than last year, has been demanding that the ROK open its markets wider. Considering the trade imbalance between the two countries, we can fully understand this demand on the part of the United States. Nevertheless, we feel that the demand is too excessive, and it is as impatient as it is shortsighted.

Nevertheless, we cannot ignore their demands when we take a realistic view of the enormous quantities of our goods being exported to the United States.
Under these circumstances, the separate visits paid to the United States by Deputy Prime Minister Kim Man-je and Minister of Trade and Industry Na Ung-pae afforded an opportunity to state our position and to try to alleviate the get-tough attitude of the United States.

At his "exchange rate" talks with U.S. Treasury Secretary Baker on 26 February, Deputy Prime Minister Kim stressed that an excessive won revaluation will have an adverse impact not only on the ROK but also on the United States. Noting that the ROK economy is not only burdened with staggering foreign debts, but also must bear a huge defense burden which accounts for 6 percent of the GNP, he stressed that the ROK should not be treated in the same way Japan, Taiwan, and other countries are being treated. Secretary Baker reportedly said: "We understand the peculiarities of the ROK. Nevertheless the ROK should not turn away its face from the difficulties of the United States."

Trade and Industry Minister Na Ung-pae, who is currently visiting the United States leading a trade mission made up of representatives of major Korean firms, met with U.S. Trade Representative Yeutter, during which he also briefed the USTR on the ROK efforts to narrow the trade gap. At this meeting, Yeutter demanded that the ROK open its markets quickly to beef, wine, and other U.S. farm products and purchase additional manufactured goods including computers.

Despite persuasive arguments from ROK trade policy planners, the United States only repeated its strong demands. This indicates that the United States will continue in various forms to press its demands for opening our markets wider and for the won's revaluation.

On 19 February the U.S. administration came up with a bill on "strengthening trade, employment, and productivity" (a package trade bill), to provide a statutory foundation for punishing countries which are passive in opening their markets.

This bill provides for an amendment to Article 301 of the U.S. Trade Act and strengthens Article 337 (providing for retaliation to violations of patent rights and copyrights) of the Customs Act.

With U.S. public opinion eager to see the United States regain its position as the world's leading economic power, chances are good that the United States will launch a two-prong policy of stepping up, on the one hand, pressures on its trade partners to open their markets and, on the other, mounting protectionist pressures against them.

If this trade policy is to be applied indiscriminately to all countries, it will necessarily have a devastating impact on the ROK economy, which has at last succeeded, at this late season, in placing itself on a tack of trade surplus.

The ROK trade balance with the United States turned from a deficit of $400 million in 1981 to a surplus of $4.3 billion in 1985 and recorded a $7.4
billion surplus in 1986. The surplus is expected to reach $8 billion this year.

Last year, in particular, the ROK emerged as fifth-ranking country in the world in terms of trade surplus with the United States. As a result, the United States is becoming increasingly alert concerning its trade with the ROK.

This explains why the United States began to press for the won's revaluation at the outset of the new year, and since then it has been continually tightening its trade noose on the ROK.

But our technical standards remain low, and our industrial structure is still weak, and what is more, we have to devote a huge sum of money to national defense.

Moreover, our foreign debts exceed $40 billion, and our economic foundation is still so shaky that only last year, for the first time, we managed to register a surplus in our balance of international payments.

During his latest trip to the United States, Deputy Prime Minister Kim Man-che presented our case to the U.S. side. As a result, the United States agreed to shelve its appeal to GATT concerning beef. Despite this partial concession, the United States maintains a tough attitude regarding its overall demands for an additional opening of our markets.

In the final analysis, as long as the United States remains our major export market, all trade issues will depend on when we will open our markets wider and how much wider we will open them.

The consensus of opinion of experts is that an additional opening of our markets is inevitable if we are to ease the U.S. pressure for the won's devaluation. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the consequences of any hasty market-opening measures.

The impact study of the July agreement reached on the basis of Article 301 has not yet been completed. If additional market-opening measures are taken under these circumstances, it will be awfully difficult for our economy to absorb the impact of these measures.

Particularly, any opening of service markets, such as advertisement and maritime transportation, should give the concerned sectors an ample time to readjust themselves.

The same is true with any lowering of tariffs on manufactured imports and any additional opening of the market to these imports.

For this reason, the policy of opening an additional market early which the government is currently pushing ahead with should be accompanied by a careful evaluation.
In the case of farm products, the government should cope with the U.S. demands by analyzing the possible domestic impact. In the case of beef for hotel use, the government continues to resist the U.S. demand, considering the psychological effects on the farmers. But with this kind of attitude alone, we will get nowhere.

For us to buy some and sell more in return is to earn that many more dollars.

Our auto exports to the United States are expected to exceed 450,000 cars this year, and the United States still remains the golden market for our steel, electronics, textiles, and other products. Accordingly, for the time being, how we will manage this market will directly affect our trade balance. Concessions should be made when they are inevitable, but we hope that the government will deal with trade issues in a more flexible manner.

### Trends in Trade Balance With the United States
(in 100 millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>59</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>108</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Major Nations' Trade Balance With the United States
(in 100 millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>Rate of Increase (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>19.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-8.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13311
CSO: 4107/154
U.S.-ROK 'TEAM SPIRIT' EXERCISES REPORTED, DENOUNCED

NODONG SINMUN on Amphibious Landing Exercise

SK051232 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2151 GMT 3 Apr 87

[NODONG SINMUN 4 April commentary: "Fire Clouds of War Come From the South"]

[Text] On 1 April, the U.S. imperialists and the puppets staged another joint landing operation codenamed "Ssangyong-34" on the east coast of South Korea where the gun powder of the "Team Spirit" war exercise ceaselessly reeks.

This war exercise started in the early morning of that day with frantic shelling from warships at an imaginary enemy coast and with bombings from aircraft. During this exercise, the U.S. Seventh Fleet and the puppet naval ships staged a frenzied war racket, saying that they will crush the enemy and seize a bridgehead.

The enemies raved that they demonstrated their powerful combat capability during the landing exercise which was conducted that day amid the atmosphere of an actual war.

As is known, the U.S. imperialists and the puppet clique staged the [word indistinct] landing operation in Pohang on 27 March. Following this, on 31 March, they staged another landing operation exercise on the east coast. This landing operation exercise was the third one since the start of the "Team Spirit-87" war exercise.

In the 11 years that the U.S. imperialist aggressors and the puppets have staged the "Team Spirit" war exercise in South Korea, staging landing operating exercise each time, never have they staged landing operation exercises three times on end as they have done this year.

This proves that the military exercises escalated by the U.S. imperialist aggressors in a step-by-step manner have reached a very dangerous stage. The U.S. imperialists have reduced South Korea to a military stronghold to realize their ambition for domination of the world and are now unscrupulously running amok to conquer the northern half of the Republic.

The U.S. imperialists and the puppets perpetrated the air mobilization operation, which they staged during the deployment stage of the "Team Spirit" war
exercise this year, again in the full-fledged operational stage. A few days ago, they repeatedly staged a frenzied commotion of attacking and counter-attacking each other while conducting a river-crossing operation.

All this clearly shows how frantically the warmongers are running amok to familiarize themselves with a northward aggressive operation.

What we should consider serious is that the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets regard the landing operation as the peak and the basic offensive operation in the "Team Spirit" war exercise. From the beginning, the landing operation is designed for an armed invasion of other countries. As the enemies themselves admit, the landing operation exercises staged in South Korea assume an attack on the coastal cities in the northern half of the Republic.

That the U.S. imperialists have repeatedly held landing operation exercises during the ongoing "Team Spirit" war exercise shows that they intend to ignite a war on the Military Demarcation Line and stage, simultaneously with this, landing operations against coastal cities in the northern half of the Republic.

The U.S. imperialists not only made the period of "Team Spirit" longer this year than in previous years but also brought the aggressor troops into South Korea on the very day of the start of the exercise and even mobilized command aircraft for a nuclear war, thus showing a series of ominous moves.

The offensive nature and criminal contents of this war exercise are being more clearly exposed with each passing day. We are making all sincere efforts to alleviate the acute tension created on the Korean peninsula and to ensure peace. At this very moment, the U.S. imperialists and the puppets are increasing the tension and driving the situation to the brink of war by reeking gun powder while undignifiedly revealing their intention for an armed invasion of the northern half of the Republic. This is an open challenge to peace and the cause of reunification of Korea.

Although the U.S. imperialists and puppets are paying lip service to relaxing tension and dialogue, the powder smoke covering South Korea shows that the rascals' talks is nothing but a deception to mislead public opinion at home and abroad.

We are following the reckless military exercise of the enemy with heightened vigilance.

VNS Scores Chon Tu-hwan Remarks

SK060529 (Clandestine) Voice of National Salvation in Korean to South Korea
1200 GMT 3 Mar 87

[Text] During this hour of station commentary, I will talk about the bellicose remarks that Chon Tu-hwan made during his prowl around the "Team Spirit 87" exercise.

On 2 April, Chon Tu-hwan, together with Lilley, U.S. ambassador the South Korea, Livsey, commander of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, and his
[Chon Tu-hwan's] cohorts, including Yi Ki-Paek, [South Korean] minister of national defense, and the commander of the Third Army, visited the South Korea-U.S. Joint Operations Command Post and commands of U.S. military units—sites of the "Team Spirit-87" exercise—and made bellicose remarks there. On this occasion, while saying that the maneuvers by the North to hinder the Seoul Olympics will be intensified and that the situation concerning security in South Korea will go through the most dangerous period in the next year or two, Chon Tu-hwan enumerated nonexistent threats of southward invasion and also said that because of this, the "Team Spirit" exercise is more important than ever.

Saying that the "Team Spirit-87" exercise is a defensive one, Chon Tu-hwan also begged the United States to (extend more active cooperation to the South Korean forces) and to lessen damage to be caused by this exercise. While prowling around sites of the criminal "Team Spirit-87" exercise at a time when all the people unanimously hope for an end to tension on the Korean peninsula and for peace and peaceful reunification, Chon Tu-hwan made such absurd bellicose remarks. This is a violent challenge to the earnest hope of the people and an unforgivable traitorous act.

Not only our people but also the international community publicly recognizes that there is no threat of southward invasion on the Korean peninsula. Even though successive South Korean rulers babbled about all sorts of rumors of southward invasion for decades, there has been neither a southward invasion nor the threat of a southward invasion. The only threats of invasion that have existed on this land are threats of northward invasion by the United States and the Chon Tu-hwan ring, not those of southward invasion.

Because of the "Team Spirit-87" war exercise that the United States and the Chon Tu-hwan ring are conducting, the situation on the Korean peninsula has been aggravated to the extreme and an acute situation in which it may spread into an actual war at any time is being promoted there. Nevertheless, to justify the "Team Spirit-87" exercise that he is conducting together with his U.S. masters, while babbling about nonexistent threats of southward invasion, Chon Tu-hwan said that the will for defense was being displayed. This is nothing but a clumsy excuse by the warmonger.

The "Team Spirit-87" South Korea-U.S. joint military exercise is an offensive exercise designed to invade the North with force of arms and is a criminal test nuclear war designed to provoke a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula. This exercise is causing numerous sufferings and harm on our people. Because of this exercise, our people are suffering serious spiritual agony, uneasiness, and economic loss and moreover, some are being killed. During the "Team Spirit-86" exercise, five South Korean workers who were mobilized in this exercise drowned to death off the coast of Kangnung and beasts of the artillery battalion of the U.S. 25th Division gang-raped and killed a pregnant female teacher of Pyongyang Elementary School. Even though Chon Tu-hwan begged his U.S. masters to reduce damage caused by the exercise, with no machination can he escape from the responsibility for his crime of aggravating the situation on the Korean peninsula, of pushing the situation to the brink of war, and of causing massive harm on our people. To prevent another war on the Korean peninsula and to realize the wishes for peace and peaceful reunification, our
people will boldly wage a pan-national anti-U.S., antiwar, and antinuclear movement to check and frustrate the criminal "Team Spirit-87" war exercise and to withdraw U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from this land and will overthrow the bellicose Chon Tu-hwan group at any cost.

Chon's Visit to Military Units Denounced

SK061230 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 1150 GMT 4 Apr 87

[Commentary by station commentator Cho Tong-il: "Excited with Fever of Confrontation and War"]

[Text] As the "Team Spirit-87" joint military exercise is frenziedly being staged on a full scale, on 3 April, the puppet traitor Chon Tu-hwan visited the combined Operational Command of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces and the puppet army and the headquarters of the U.S. Air Force. During his visit, he instigated war frenzy, noting that the forthcoming 1 or 2 years are the most dangerous period and so forth while preposterously slandering us.

In a meeting of the so-called emergency planning officials on the same day, the puppet prime minister stressed that every preparation should be made by the military, the government, and civilians to immediately cope with an emergency, thus repeating the same remarks as the puppet traitor.

These are the bellicose remarks showing the true nature of those who are engrossed with confrontation and war. With the "Team Spirit-87" war exercise at its peak, the puppets rave with one voice as if we were going to invade the South while instigating war fever. This is the same as a thief shouting: Stop thief!

Today the situation created on the Korean peninsula clearly shows who threatens whom and who is aggravating tension and is going to provoke an aggressive war. The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets staged the large-scale Pohang landing operation, assuming an attack on the coastal cities in the northern half of the Republic. Following this, they ran amok with offensive operations for northward invasion including a river-crossing operation and an air-life operation while continuously moving toward areas close to the Military Demarcation Line.

As for the river-crossing operation and air-lift operation staged by the rascals on 1 April, these were offensive operation exercises designed for the enormous aggressive forces to reduce someone else's defensive position to a sea of fire through an air-ground attack and to occupy this position after crossing the river.

Needless to say, this is aimed at a northward invasion. The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets, engrossed with ambition for northward invasion, are attempting to perpetrate even chemical warfare against the northern half of the Republic.

That the rascals staged a war exercise on 1 April to overcome the contaminated area while blasting smoke shells and dropping gas bombs is such an example.
The rascals rave as if we were going to invade the South while frantically staging the northward aggressive war commotion in the air, on the land, and in the sea in South Korea by mobilizing modern mass destruction weapons including nuclear weapons and more than 200,000 enormous troops. This is indeed preposterous.

That the Chon Tu-hwan clique is instigating war fever while raving that the forthcoming 1 or 2 years are the most dangerous period and slamming us is related to the crisis in its fascist rule. The forthcoming 1 or 2 years will be a very difficult time for the Chon Tu-hwan clique to maintain its existence because political disorder will be further deepened due to the mass advance of the South Korean youths, students, and people from all walks of life for independence, democracy and reunification and due to confrontation and internal conflict between the ruling and opposition camps in connection with the change of power.

The Japanese magazine (?MILITARY REVIEW) noted that the true threat created in South Korea today is not the nonexistent armed southward invasion but the threat from inside—the political unrest within South Korea.

Thus, the Chon Tu-hwan puppet clique is attempting to overcome its crisis by blocking the mass advance of the people, using violent means on the pretext of a threat of southward invasion, and by realizing the extension of its power and the Olympics. It is attempting to find a way out by triggering a war against us at any time if the situation does not develop as it wishes.

All facts show that dialogue, easing tension, and so forth raved about by the U.S. imperialists and the puppets are a deception and what the rascals want are confrontation, division, and war. The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets should clearly realize that they will not gain anything from the path of confrontation and war and that this path will only expedite their own destruction.

If they continuously advance along the path of war despite our repeated warnings, they will be held totally responsible for all consequences arising therefrom.

DPRK Soldiers’ Meetings

SK101046 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1030 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang 10 April (KCNA)—Meetings of soldiers of the Korean People's Army, employees of industrial establishments and cooperative farmers are being held in succession at different places in denunciation of the aggressive "Team Spirit 87" joint military exercise of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique.

Speakers at a meeting of soldiers of the unit of the Korean People's Army to which Comrade Chon Mun-uk belongs said:

The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets are resorting to all sorts of sophism to conceal the criminal nature of the current military exercises, talking about "defensive exercises" and "annual exercises."

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All the military movements for the last two months, however, clearly show that the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppet army are more desperately holding the aggressive war rehearsal with main emphasis on offensive operations against us including landing operations.

Speakers at a meeting of soldiers of the unit of the Korean People's Army to which Comrade Cha Tok-hwa belongs seriously warned the U.S. imperialist aggressors and their stooges, the Chon Tu-hwan puppet clique, not to act recklessly clearly mindful of the revolutionary will and invincible might of the Korean people and the People's Army firmly rallied around the party and the leader.

Speakers at meetings of employees of the Yongsong Machine Complex, the Kaesong Garment Factory and other industrial establishments branded the powder-reeking war rehearsal of the enemy as an open challenge to peace in Korea and to the cause of her peaceful reunification and repeatedly urged the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets not to resort to fraud and trick to mislead public opinion at home and abroad but approach our sincere peace efforts with honesty.

They called upon the entire workers in the North and the South to play the role of the vanguard in a nation-wide struggle to check and frustrate the enemy's war rehearsal.

They said with emphasis: the working class in the northern half of Korea will make greater leapling advance on all fronts of socialist construction in the spirit of assisting the brothers in the South in their struggle and promoting the reunification of the country.

Speakers at meetings of farmers held on cooperative farms including the Wangjaesan Cooperative Farm in Onsong County, North Hamgyong Province, and the Kim Che-won Cooperative Farm in Chaeyong County, South Hwanghae Province, branded the South Korean puppets as accursed flunkeyist and dirty traitors for all ages who think nothing of the interests of the country and nation but offer everything to the foreign imperialists.

These traitors will surely be unable to escape a stern judgement of the nation and miserable end, they emphasized.

The speakers called for boosting the agricultural production, always maintaining a tense and mobilized posture in face of the ever intensified new war provocation moves of the U.S. imperialists and their stooges.

SNU Wall Posters

SKII026 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1015 GMT 11 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang 11 April (KCNA)--Wall papers opposing the "Team Spirit" military exercises and calling for the co-hosting of the Olympic Games by the North and the South of Korea were pasted up at various places in the Seoul University, thus throwing the puppet clique into a state of discomfiture, according to a report.
A wall paper was pasted up on the bulletin-board of the Cultural and Social Science Hall of Seoul University on 30 March.

The paper called for the "complete abolition of the 'Team Spirit' nuclear military exercises which may destroy the fellow countrymen and plunge the Korean peninsula into flames" and "co-hosting of the Olympics by the South and the North to provide an occasion for national concord and genuine unification," etc.

A wall paper calling for the "complete overthrow of the fascist group sharpening the sword for such feast of frenzy" as the '88 Olympics and "of a handful of Zaibatsu parasitic on the group" and for "establishment of a People's Republic through revolution," etc. was also pasted up on 31 March.

On 27 March, a wall paper was pasted up on the bulletin-board of the Cultural and Social Science Hall of the University. Noting that "although the North Korean authorities have repeatedly clarified their will not to invade the South, the South Korean authorities have not clarified that they have no intention to invade the North," the paper said: "We call for North-South high-level political talks."

Upset at this, the fascist clique, crying that the contents of the wall papers were similar to the assertion of someone and talking about the "second wall paper case," hurriedly put Yi Nam-kyu and Choe Yon-kyu, students who stood for the chairman of the General Student Council, on the "want" list on 1 April, connecting them with the wall papers.

Statement of Chuche Meeting

SK131035 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1022 GMT 13 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang 13 April (KCNA)—The third enlarged meeting of the executive committee of the board of directors of the International Institute of the Chuche Idea held in Pyongyang made public a statement on 12 April on the "Team Spirit 87" joint military exercises being staged by the U.S. imperialists and South Korean puppets in south Korea with the mobilization of huge armed forces for aggression.

Noting that the U.S. imperialists stage criminal "Team Spirit" manoeuvres involving huge armed forces of aggression over 200,000 strong every year, the statement says:

This is the most notorious provocation which opposes the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and gravely threatens peace not only in Korea but in Asia and the world.

If another war breaks out in Korea it will bring in numerous misfortunes and sufferings to the Korean people. What is worse, it will soon turn into the world war and given inconceivable calamities to mankind.

Hence, the question of preventing the danger of a new war and safeguarding peace in Korea is one of the most important questions in defending the world peace.
We, the advocates of the chuche idea, who regard it as a sacred duty to defend masses' Chajusong, staunchly condemn the criminal actions of the U.S. imperialists and their stooges who are trying to make Korea, the fatherland of the chuche idea, a source of a new war.

Together with the peace-loving people of the world, we, who attended at the 3rd enlarged executive committee meeting of the Directors' Board of the IICI, stoutly demand the U.S. and South Korean authorities not to play jokes on the world people but to stop immediately the "Team Spirit 87" joint military exercise and withdraw from South Korea with all its aggressive army and nuclear weapons at once.

On this opportunity we sincerely appeal to the peace-loving people, in union, who oppose aggression and war, to further create the world opinion against the "Team Spirit 87" joint military exercise which is now conducted by the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppet cliques and extend strong solidarity to the just cause for safeguarding peace and security in the Korean peninsula.

U.S.-ROK River Crossing Exercise

SK090435 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0419 GMT 9 Apr 87

[Text]  Pyongyang 9 April (KCNA)--The U.S. 2nd Infantry Division occupying South Korea and South Korean puppet army units staged a large-scale river crossing operation exercise simulating northward invasion in the areas around the South Han River on 8 April at a time when the provocative "Team Spirit 87" joint military exercises were at the climax, according to a radio report from Seoul.

The U.S. imperialist aggression forces and the puppet army mobilized in the frantic river crossing operation exercise from the dawn crossed the river by attack boats and armored vehicles supported by the firing from planes and artillery unit and took a bridgehead, "prevailing over" someone.

This frantic exercise shows that the "Team Spirit" joint war rehearsal of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique is assuming more provocative nature as its theatre nears the military demarcation line.

UK Labor MPs' Resolution

SK100457 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0431 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text]  Pyongyang 10 April (KCNA)--Labour members of Parliament of Britain on 17 March submitted two draft resolutions for peace and reunification of Korea to the Parliament.

A resolution signed by 35 members of Parliament calls upon the British Government to exercise its influence in international field for the realisation of Korea's reunification.

The other resolution signed by 32 members of Parliament denounces the "Team Spirit 87" joint military exercises of the United States and South Korea on the Korean peninsula and points out that such large-scale military exercises heighten tensions in northeast Asia.
The British Government should express to the U.S. Government apprehensions about this and call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Korea, stresses the resolution.

Sea-Borne Logistical Support Exercise

SK110431 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0420 GMT 11 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang 11 April (KCNA)--The U.S. imperialists on 9 April held a sea-borne logistic support exercise on the east coast of South Korea for the first time since the start of the "Team Spirit" military exercises, according to a report.

Reportedly mobilized in this exercise was an advance disposition fleet which was set up by the U.S. imperialists to quickly send combat equipment from the sea to a designated area.

The third advance disposition fleet consisting of four cargo ships under the U.S. Maritime Transport Command kicked up much ado that day, discharging over 1,400 pieces of mobile equipment including tanks, landing attack vehicles, a large quantity of oil and ammunition.

The fact that the U.S. imperialists mobilized in the "Team Spirit 87" war rehearsal even the advance disposition fleet set up for overseas aggression brings into a bolder relief its aggressive and provocative nature and evokes greater indignation and protest at home and abroad.

/12913
CSO: 4100/161
CHON'S 13 APRIL STATEMENT FLAYED

Chon, DJP Scored for Attempt To Stay in Power

SK161101 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1044 GMT 17 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 17 (KCNA)--Papers here today denounce the traitor Chon Tu-hwan and the gangster group of the "Democratic Justice Party" for scheming to stay in power indefinitely.

In his "special press statement" on April 13 the traitor announced an "important decision" to "transfer the government" by the present "constitution" under the pretext that an "agreed constitutional revision" has been impossible owing to the split of the "New Korea Democratic Party" and the "political program is pressing", a signed commentary of NODONG SINMUN notes, and says: This is an official proclamation of the reassumption of power by the "Democratic Justice Party" and one more shameless coup d'etat for power.

The traitor Chon Tu-hwan insisted on the "absolute defence of the present constitution" at first and then expressed the will to revise "the constitution" and announced that a "constitutional revision" would be possible during his "term of office." This was a deceptive trick to put down the strong demand of the opposition party, dissident and democratic forces and popular masses for the overthrow of the dictatorship and direct presidential elections so as to escape the same miserable end as that of Marcos who was ousted from the Philippines.

It was also a base trick to bring the struggle of the opposition party for direct presidential elections into the "National Assembly" under the pretext of constitutional revision and drive a wedge between the opposition party and popular masses and disorganize the opposition party itself.

The "special press statement" of Chon Tu-hwan the puppet is a proclamation of a new fascist offensive against the democratic forces of South Korea which demand the democratisation in socio-political life against the fascist dictatorship.

In his "statement" Chon Tu-hwan the puppet threatened that under the authority of the president he would "resolutely deal with" the illegal action of resisting the step for extending the "constitutional amendment", creating
"social disorder" by "illegal" and "violent" action and making "people's lives unstable."

It is the U.S. imperialists who inspire and encourage the Chon Tu-hwan clique's schemes to reassert power.

They fully revealed their sinister aggressive intrigues and crafty double-faced tactics by actually manipulating behind the scene and backing the extension of the office term and fascist tyranny of the Chon Tu-hwan clique, while talking about "democratic development" through "negotiation" and "compromise" between the ruling and the opposition. What the U.S. imperialist aggressors are most interested in is not democratic development in South Korea but to keep it as their colony and military base by backing up the pro-American dictatorial "regime".

At a time when the U.S. imperialist aggressors brought large armed forces of aggression for the "tam spirit" military exercises, the Chon Tu-hwan clique is plotting to put down with the backing of the masters' "strength" the resistance of the opposition party and dissident and democratic forces and step up its "political program".

But, the machinations of the U.S. imperialists and the Chon Tu-hwan clique to extend the fascist dictatorship are bound to go bust.

The South Korean people will never allow the schemes of the traitor Chon Tu-hwan and the ganster group of the "Democratic Justice Party" to seize power again.

Chon's Scheme for Long-Term Power

SK180536 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0503 GMT 18 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 18 (KCNA)--NODONG SINMUN today in a signed commentary denounces the Chon Tu-hwan group for having embarked in an undisguised way upon the road of extending its power under the cloak of "peaceful change of power".

The commentary says:

The "important decision" of the traitor Chon Tu-hwan to keep as it is the present "constitution" is an open political coup d'etat to extend the present fascist dictatorial "regime" for an indefinite period. With this the "constitutional revision" he had advocated through outwardly has become a pie in the sky and the military dictatorship come to prevail again.

With this perfidious act the Chon Tu-hwan group has virtually raised the curtain of a new fascist offensive to block and stamp out the anti-U.S., anti-fascist democratic forces which are growing steadily in South Korea and realise the permanent office of the "Democratic Justice Party".
The Chon Tu-hwan group is trying hard to rig up the reassumption of power by the "Democratic Justice Party" under an undeclared state of emergency in which all political adversaries are locked up and people are ruled at the point of the bayonet.

The outrageous suppressive rackets in South Korea show with increasing clarity that "democratic development" and "peaceful transfer of government" much vaunted once by this group are nothing but a mask to veil its greed for long-term office and the Chon Tu-hwan group is a band of "power" robbers without an equal in the world.

Although the Chon Tu-hwan group is scheming to extend its power by brandishing the bayonet against the people, it is of no use. The successive dictators of South Korea met a miserable end without exception, while brandishing the bayonet. The end of the traitor Chon Tu-hwan who is following the spectre of his predecessors will not be otherwise.

Clandestine Radio's Denunciation

SK181538 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1509 GMT 18 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 18 (KCNA)--The Central Committee of the South Korean National Democratic Front made public on April 14 a statement on the situation in connection with the suspension of the debate on constitutional revision by the Chon Tu-hwan fascist clique, according to radio "Voice of National Salvation."

The statement recalled that the "Democratic Justice Party", which has disorganized the "New Korea Democratic Party", disclosed on April 11 its brazen-faced attempt to host the Seoul Olympics singlehandedly and monopolize "power", "resolutely coping with" the "important change of the political situation", and that in his "special press statement" on April 13 the traitor Chon Tu-hwan jabbered he would suspend the debate on constitutional revision, keep in force the present "constitution" and "severely deal with those who are disobedient" to it.

The statement said:

This is a sort of political coup d'etat to change the signboard from the present military dictatorship to the dictatorial "regime" of the "Democratic Justice Party" and extend it, which is an intolerable insult to the will of the people and an unpardonable act of perfidy against the nation.

Owing to the brutal suppression and crafty machinations by the Chon Tu-hwan military dictatorial "regime", elementary liberties and human rights are all stamped out in this land, campuses, factories, rural villages and churches have turned into a pandemonium of bayonets, the constitutional revision movement of the popular masses for a democratic government is running up against the allround challenge of the fascist clique, dissident forces are in the throes of split and undergoing twists and turns, a darker shadow of one-party
dictatorship is heavily hanging over our people and an adverse current of unprecedented fascist frenzy is pressing on all over South Korea.

The United States is the very one who has caused this grave situation in the South today.

With an ulterior design to secure the vested rights of the South as a forward base against the North and the Soviet Union and maintain the stability of the colonial ruling system, the United States has spared no efforts to interfere overtly and covertly in the political program of this land and lead the political situation to the reassumption of power by the military dictatorship, holding a trap of "great conservative coalition" in one hand and a stick of military coup d'etat in the other.

This clearly shows once again that U.S. imperialism is not only the principal offender who caused the Kwangju bloodbath but also the chieftain of fascism and the inveterate enemy of the people in the South.

The "transfer of government" which the Chon Tu-hwan clique is now going to stage under an undeclared state of emergency in which all political opponents are put under detention and the eyes of people blindfolded their mouths gagged and their ears stuffed at the point of the bayonet, means the reassumption of power by the "Democratic Justice Party" and is nothing but the reappearance of the military fascist dictatorship.

The Chon Tu-hwan group is now trying to cancel the debate on constitutional revision by force and achieve the reassumption of power by the "Democratic Justice Party", but this is a miscalculation.

The U.S. imperialists scheme to bridge over the crisis of their colonial rule by backing the pro-American dictatorial "regime". But, it will only result in touching off a higher wave of the anti-U.S. sentiments of the people in the South.

Our people will certainly bring on the dawn of independence, democracy and reunification to this land by putting an end to the colonial domination of U.S. imperialism and overthrowing the military dictatorship through their vigorous anti-U.S., anti-fascist struggle.

DFRF Statement

SK190906 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0845 GMT 19 Apr 87

[Text]  Pyongyang April 19 (KCNA)--The traitor Chon Tu-hwan on April 13 issued a "special press statement", in which he put forward a so-called "important decision" that he would "transfer government" under the present "constitution" as an "agreed constitutional revision" was impossible because of the disruption of the "New Korea Democratic Party." In denunciation of this, the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland made public a statement on April 18.
The statement says that this fully reveals the fascist nature of the traitor's "power" robbery aimed at realising the wild ambition for the reassertion of power by discarding the mask of "peaceful change of power" and veil of "plan for constitutional revision for parliamentary-cabinet system" and invoking the present fascist "constitution" by force.

Pointing out that the "important decision" of the traitor Chon Tu-hwan is in fact an undeclared "martial law" and a declaration to prolong the military fascist dictatorial "regime" through a "coup d'etat", it continues:

His "important decision" is a product of premeditated plot stepped up under the back-stage manipulation of the U.S. imperialists.

When the anti-U.S. struggle for independence, anti-fascist struggle for democracy of the South Korean people sharply mounted and the opposition parties and dissident democratic forces launched the 10 million signature campaign for constitutional revision, the U.S. imperialists placed in the hands of the traitor Chon Tu-hwan a script of the "agreed constitutional revision" through the "compromise between the ruling and opposition parties" in order to prevent South Korea from becoming a second Philippines, and when this failed, they let the Chon Tu-hwan group propitiate and buy over some people of the "New Korea Democratic Party" to disrupt the party.

The traitor Chon Tu-hwan intends to reassert power through "coup d'etat" by another "martial law" with his "important decision" and thus maintain as ever the U.S. imperialists' military occupation of and colonial rule over South Korea and further strengthen the military fascist dictatorship to realise his wild ambition for long-term office at any cost.

The Chon Tu-hwan group must draw a lesson from the disgraceful end of the successive puppet rulers who fell in face of the massive resistance of the people, while trying to keep their puppet regimes by force, and step down from power at an early date.

Student Demonstrations

SK171034 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1026 GMT 17 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 17 (KCNA)--More than 13,000 students of 24 universities in South Korea held anti-"government" rallies and demonstrations on April 16.

Over 600 students of Sogang University in Seoul staged a demonstration, chanting slogans "down with dictatorship" and "United States, stop supporting the dictatorial "regime"".

On the same day students of 8 universities in Seoul and 16 universities in local areas held anti-"government" rallies or fierce demonstrations.
Earlier, on April 15, over 400 students of Yonsei University had an anti-
"government" rally on the campus.

Students of Seoul University and Kukmin University in Seoul also held anti-
"government" rallies and demonstrations on April 14.

Meanwhile, more than 4,300 students of 11 universities staged demonstrations
under the slogan "Let us inherit the spirit of April" and "We oppose long-
term office" in one day of April 13 when the attempt of the "Democratic Jus-
tice Party" for long-term office became undisguised.

Puppet Clique Ransacks Seoul Universities

SK171021 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1010 GMT 17 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 17 (KCNA)--The puppet Seoul police Bureau searched
17 universities in the city including the Seoul and Koryo universities at night
on April 15 and at dawn next day, according to a report.

The puppet Seoul Kwanak police station ransacked the student hall and open-air
theatre of Seoul University Wednesday night, the puppet Seoul Songbuk police
station eight buildings of Koryo University including the student hall and the
law house and other police stations the Songgyungwan, Tongguk and other uni-
versities.

In the search, they seized more than 5,510 articles for demonstration includ-
ing 3,900 sheets of handbills and 18 placards.

Meanwhile, the puppet Seoul West Gate police station totally banned the entry
into Yonsei University of students of other universities from early in the
morning under the pretext of preventing the April 19 cultural festival of
West District universities scheduled at Yonsei University Thursday from develop-
ing into a demonstration.

Earlier, Wednesday night, the Chon Tu-hwan fascist clique called together police
station chiefs and police bosses in Seoul and issued them a represesive order
to put down demonstrations by hurling police force onto campuses.

New Opposition Party's Denunciation

SK190831 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0816 GMT 19 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 19 (KCNA)--The Party for Reunification and Democracy
(tentative name) which is taking shape as a new opposition party in South
Korea published a statement denouncing the "special statement" of the traitor
Chon Tu-hwan seeking long-term office, according to a report.

The statement says that Chon Tu-hwan's decision to shelve even "debate on
constitutional revision" is "an unpardonable act" and declares that "the Party
for Reunification and Democracy will fight to have the constitution amended for
direct election."
The statement came in the wake of a meeting of the sponsors of the party on April 13.

Kim Yong-sam is the chairman of the preparatory committee for the inauguration of the Party for Reunification and Democracy which is in the making as a new opposition party embracing more than 70 "National Assemblymen" from the "New Korea Democratic Party" out of the 90.

The South Korean Social Democratic Youth League in its statement of April 15 said the Chon Tu-hwan dictatorial "regime" was, in actuality, seeking a long-term office, though it was talking about "successful hosting of the Olympics" and "peaceful transfer of power."

It called for "winning a democratic constitution."

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CSO: 4100/170
NKDP SPLIT SAID DUE TO U.S.-BACKED SCHEME

NODONG SINMUN Commentary

SK111032 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1021 GMT 11 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang 11 April (KCNA)--The split of the "New Korea Democratic Party" in South Korea is an offspring of the U.S. imperialists' backing to the long-term office scheme of the Chon Tu-hwan group for saving their colonial military fascist rule from the crisis and a direct product of the criminal intrigues of the puppets to get rid of the political opposition forces, declares NODONG SINMUN today.

In a signed commentary captioned "What Does Breakup of 'NKDP' Indicate?" the paper says:

The "NKDP" has left the stain of breakup on its name because of the "Democratic Justice Party" clan and the United States commanding and manipulating it behind the scene.

"NKDP's" split shows that, in such colonial fascist society as South Korea, an opposition party disagreeing with the United States and its lackeys in political view cannot properly operate, but meets its end in the long run, lacerated under the sword of "government" power.

It suggests to what crafty and mean extent the Chon Tu-hwan group has gone in its bid to maintain its power by incapacitating the opposition party and reducing it to a waiting maid, bossing the show in the "National Assembly" and forcing "a constitutional revision for a parliamentary cabinet system."

No sooner had the "NKDP" been split and disintegrated than the "DJP" clan revealed its intention to go ahead with the "political timetable," beating the drum of "single-handed handling of the matter" and "constitutional revision in April." It means to build a legal foundation for its stay in power before the opposition party regroups itself.

But everything will not go as the puppets wish.
Memorandum Denounces South

SK131543 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1517 GMT 13 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang 13 April (KCNA)--The Consultative Council of Former South Korean Politicians in the North for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification on 11 April published a memorandum denouncing the U.S. imperialists' manoeuvres to disrupt and disorganize the South Korean opposition parties and Democratic forces.

The memorandum says that the U.S. imperialists are viciously scheming to split and disorganize the South Korean opposition parties and Democratic forces to back up the reassumption of power by the Chon Tu-hwan military fascist clique, their colonial puppet, with the approach of the so-called "Change of Power in South Korea.

Pointing out that a powerful drive has been waged since last year for the revision of the present fascist "Constitution" to realize "direct presidential election" under the direction of the "New Korea Democratic Party," the Council for the Promotion of Democracy and other dissident Democratic forces in South Korea, it says: such drive for constitutional revision as the 10 million signature campaign for constitutional revision has further deepened the crisis of the colonial rule of the U.S. imperialists.

Pointing out in detail that as the confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties surrounding the constitutional revision grew acute, the U.S. imperialists have schemed to split and disorganize the opposition parties by applying the so-called "strategy of compromise between the ruling and opposition parties" since February last year, it continues:

The U.S. imperialists' slogan of "great collaboration between the ruling and opposition parties" did not mean at all that the ruling party should "closely collaborate" with the "New Korea Democratic Party" for constitutional revision for "direct presidential election."

This was a vicious instruction assuming the nature of a big "political coup d'etat" to bridge over the crisis of the U.S. imperialists' colonial fascist rule over South Korea at present by means of changing the ruling form of the dictatorship by the puppet president into that of the dictatorship by the military fascist "Prime Minister."

The internal strife of the "New Korea Democratic Party" has resulted from the [words indistinct] instruction for "great collaboration between the ruling and opposition parties" went awry, the [word indistinct] imperialists created factional strife, division, and alienation among the different groups in the party to make the party give up its "proposal for constitutional revision for direct presidential election" and "compromise with the "proposal for constitutional revision for the parliamentary Cabinet system" by the "Democratic Justice Party," seeking "coalition of conservatism."

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It says:

Entering the new year, the unity of South Korean students, opposition parties and dissident Democratic forces has been strengthened and the anti-U.S., anti-fascist joint struggle has again gained momentum since the torture murder of Pak Chong-chol, student of Seoul University, by the U.S. imperialists and the Chon Tu-hwan military fascist bandits, the colonial puppets.

Upset by this, the U.S. imperialists have more openly schemed to totally disrupt and disorganize the "New Korea Democratic party" before its internal strife has been resolved.

Graphic instances of this are that on 8 January Gleysteen, former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, flew into Seoul to preach "negotiations for constitutional revision" to the opposition party figures and present U.S. Ambassador Lilly, claiming that "Democratic system" will be established through "dialogue" and the "meeting" at the "National Assembly," forced the opposition parties to accept "constitutional revision on agreement" for "parliamentary-cabinet system" and on 6 March U.S. State Secretary Shultz crawled into South Korea and encouraged the moves for a constitutional revision for "Parliamentary-Cabinet system" and crack down upon the people and dissident Democratic forces, prattling about "dialogue" and "compromise" between the ruling and opposition parties.

Owing to such moves of the U.S. imperialists, today the "New Korea Democratic Party" is at the point of split and [word indistinct] integration surrounding the discourse on constitutional revision and scramble for power in the party.

All facts clearly prove that the U.S. imperialists are not only the manipulator of the fascist outrages unprecedented in history against the patriotic South Korean students and people who have turned out in the anti-U.S., anti-fascist struggle but also the vicious ringleader splitting and disorganizing the "New Korea Democratic Party," other opposition parties and dissident Democratic forces of South Korea and backing up the reassumption of power by the Chon Tu-hwan military fascist clique.

Dissidents, Police Clash Near Kim's House

SK120906 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0809 GMT 12 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang 12 April (KCNA)--Kim Yong-sam, co-chairman of the Council for the Promotion of Democracy, and more than 300 persons clashed with the puppet police Saturday morning in front of the house of Kim Tae-chung, according to reports.

They intended to meet Kim Tae-chung who is under house arrest for an indefinite period.

Kim Yong-sam and persons led by him clashed with the riot police for nearly one hour, 20 metres off the Kim's house. The house was surrounded by more than 600 plain-clothes and uniformed police.
Kim Yong-sam and his group broke through the picket line of the police blocking three roads to the house and resolutely resisted, chanting "down with dictatorship," "withdraw house arrest of Kim Tae-chung" and "away with police," when the police frantically pounced upon them.

That day, the institute for Democratic constitutional government, a dissident organization, issued a statement and declared that it would launch struggle throughout South Korea in protest against the house arrest of Kim Tae-chung.

The Chon Tu-hwan fascist clique which placed Kim Tae-chung under house arrest from 8 April cried that it was its "policy" to continue the house arrest until Kim Tae-chung "officially states" that he would discontinue his political activities.

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CSO: 4100/161
FOUNDING OF 'THIRD GENERATION PARTY' IN SOUTH REPORTED

SK171038 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1029 GMT 17 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 17 (KCNA)--The third generation party was founded in South Korean on March 2, according to a report.

At the inaugural congress in Seoul, president of the party and chairman of the congress were elected and a political programme including the introduction of "direct presidential elections" and freedom of speech was adopted.

Earlier, initiators and promoters of the founding of the party made public a message of the general purport of the founding.

The message stressed:

It is high time of history that the 'outside forces' 40 odd year-long policy of national suppression was liquidated and a big turn made towards independence, democracy and reunification.

The immediate task is to secure the chajusong of the nation.

A bright state of the reunified nation should be realised where bread and freedom are affluent and a genuine life of the people free from exploitation and oppression ensured.

We should make the might of the people the motive force of historic development by pooling their demand that the political ruin, economic bankruptcy and social corruption which have reached the limit owing to the harsh dictatorial politics depending on the foreign forces should not be tolerated any longer.

We knock at the gate of history with might and main to fling open a true "door of the times for the people" so that the past disgraceful history of ordeals may be eliminated from its root, the will of the people conveyed freely, their being the master and the welfare of the people ensured to the maximum.

No foreign forces and no anti-national and anti-democratic group will challenge us based on the firm support of our people who have the unlimited power of self-reliance.

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CSO:  4100/170
KAESONG MASS MEETING WELCOMES ROK ARMY 'KATUSA' DEFECTOR

SK101036 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1026 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Kaesong, 9 April (KCNA)--A mass meeting was held on 8 April in Kaesong in welcome of Kim Chong-un who broke off his service as a Katusa (a Korean attached to the U.S. Army) and came over to the northern half of Korea.

A souvenir in the name of the Kaesong Municipal Administration and Economic Guidance Committee was handed to Kim Chong-un at the meeting.

Pak Yon-o, vice-chairman of the Kaesong Municipal Administration and Economic Guidance Committee, made a welcome speech and Kim Chong-un spoke in reply.

Kim Chong-un said he came over to the North because he could not live any longer in South Korea, a corrupt and ailing society where the Yankees' colonial rule and fascist suppression prevail and "the rich get richer and the poor poorer." He said that he was subjected to the lot of colonial slave as a Katusa after he was conscripted into the "Rok Army."

What I wanted most coming over to the North was to have a stable job, not subjected to national humiliation but having human rights guaranteed. In the North I see that this has been realized for everyone. I often think what a wonderful paradise on earth the North is.

Now the South Korean people deeply revere the great General Kim Il-song and the dear leader Mr. Kim Chong-il who administer the affairs of state genuinely for the people and nation as the sun of the national and lodestar of reunification and ardently long for the DPRK.

/12913
CS0: 4100/161
N. KOREA/GOVERNMENT, POLITICS

NODONG SINMUN ASSAILS POLICE SUPPRESSION IN SOUTH

SK061136 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2153 GMT 5 Mar 87

[NODONG SINMUN 6 April Commentary: "In an Attempt to Stifle Patriotism"]

[Text] The puppet director of the National Police Headquarters said that he would designate a period of 2 months from this month to May as a period of roundup of three major crimes and that commotions for large-scale arrests, including the strengthening of checks and searches by mobilizing all the police throughout South Korea, will be kicked up. Moreover, he said that guns will be used in these roundup operations. Although in his statement he is pretending to work for the people, he means that he will conduct another round of operations for bloody suppression.

The puppet said that their commotions for arrests are designed to round up so-called felons in an effort to tackle the felonies that are frequently taking place these days. This means that the puppets themselves admitted that South Korea is a den of crimes largest in the world where murderous hooligans are rampant and is a very frightful place where security for the people's lives cannot be guaranteed. However, that violence will be used to crack down on such crimes is a false statement. The Chon Tu-hwan ring is a group that has turned against the people and that is capable of doing nothing to prevent the people's lives and property from being violated. The puppets have frequently run amok to crack down on burglars. However, killings have continued and burglary and other felonies are more rampant. Those whose blood has been shed in the puppets' game of rounding up burglars are only patriotic democratic forces and innocent people, not burglars.

The operations for suppression under the pretext of cleaning up crime have other points of focus as well. In view of the scale of the mobilized suppressive forces and the timing of their mobilization, the operations are surely aimed at patriotism. The puppets' inclusion of so-called security-related criminals in their targets of roundup points to this. During their checks and searches on the night of 3 April, the rascals arrested approximately 690 individuals who possessed impure leaflets and whose indictment had been suspended. The Chon Tu-hwan ring is not in a position to pay attention to arresting burglars and thieves. Their headache is the rapid growth among the youths, students, and people of the trend of the anti-U.S. and antifascist struggle to make the new spring of independence, democracy, and reunification come earlier.
Moreover, spring has become a traditional season of struggle in South Korea. The 19 April people's uprising, the May Kwangju people's uprising, and other large-scale popular struggles that greatly shook South Korea's colonial, military and fascist rule erupted in the spring. The current South Korean situation suggests that another Kwangju uprising may erupt. Foreign press reports say that the South Korean regime is on top of a volcano ready to erupt.

By covering all areas of South Korea with the police suppressive forces under the pretext of cracking down on crimes, the Chon Tu-hwan ring is attempting to strifle the patriotic democratic forces and to block the advance of popular struggles in advance. However, the South Korean people are not ones to give up in the face of guns and bayonets. The more rampant the colonial, military, and fascist dictatorship of the U.S. imperialists and the Chon Tu-hwan traitorous clique will be, the more boldly the people will rise up in a desperate resistance struggle, upholding more highly the banner of struggle against the dictatorship.

/12232
CSO: 4110/115
STUDENT CRACKDOWN IN SEOUL REPORTED, DECRIED

KCNA Denounces Student Mobilization

SK090428 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0413 GMT 9 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang 9 April (KCNA)--The Chon Tu-hwan military ruffians mobilized by force more than 4,440 students of Konguk and Yonsei Universities in Seoul in a military drill on 6 April, according to a report.

This was timed to coincide with the provocative "Team Spirit 87" military exercises which are now frantically going on.

One thousand five hundred ninety students of Konguk University herded into the barracks of frontline units of the South Korean puppet army are put on the alert in the frontline areas.

This is a criminal scheme to emasculate the fighting spirit of students mounting on the threshold of the 19 April popular uprising anniversary and whip up a consciousness of confrontation among them.

3 Arrested for Violating Security Law

SK100105 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English 10 Apr 87 p 3

[Text] Police yesterday arrested three former college students on suspicion of listening to North Korean radio broadcasts in violation of the National Security Law.

They are Han Song-mun, 24, a Seoul National University expellee; Ha Yon-su, 25, a former sophomore of Hanshin University and Miss Pae Mun-chong, 22, another SNU expellee.

Han listened to North Korea's anti-Seoul propaganda broadcasts at his rented room in Sadang-dong, Tongjak-gu, around July last year, police said.

Together with Ha and Miss Pae, he conducted seminars at his room from last December using 19 blacklisted books as textbooks. He distributed 630 of the 900 leaflets he made from the broadcasts to Seoul National, Korea, Yonsei and other schools in Seoul, police said.
Police confiscated from them a total of 320 items as evidence. They included two Japanese-made tape recorders, 13 tape recordings of North Korean broadcasts, and 19 blacklisted books and leaflets.

University Students Hold Demonstrations

SK100522 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0459 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang 10 April (KCNA)---Students of Seoul University staged a fierce demonstration on 9 April in demand of the withdrawal of unreasonable disciplinary steps taken against those involved in the joint sit-in strike at Konguk University, according to a report.

More than 250 students of the University who rose again, indignant at the rejection of their just demand, demanded yesterday afternoon an interview with the president of the University, shouting "the discipline is unjust," "President, awaken" and other slogans.

Over 5,000 fascist police, 20 times greater than the number of the fighting students, ran wild in suppression, firing tear gas at random, but the indignant students persistently fought, resisting them with rocks.

Effigy of U.S. Ambassador Burned

SK110527 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0455 GMT 11 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang 11 April (KCNA)---Over 1,500 students of Seoul University on 10 April held an anti-U.S., anti-"government" demonstration, chanting "down with the military dictatorship," "drive out the Americans" and "out with the parliamentary-cabinet system," according to a foreign press report. They burnt an effigy which they said represented U.S. Ambassador to South Korea.

Frightened at their fighting spirit, the Chon Tu-hwan fascist clique sent more than 4,000 riot police into the campus. The police sprayed massive amounts of teargas from mobile pepper gas throwers and hand-held teargas launchers.

The indignant students attempted to march out of the campus, hurling rocks at the helmeted police.

The students held fierce four-hour see-saw battle with the helmeted, club-wielding and teargas hurling riot police at the campus gate.

/12913
CSO: 4100/161
ANTIGOVERNMENT STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN ROK REPORTED

Pyongyang Meeting Marks 19 April Uprising

SK181030 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1019 GMT 18 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 18 (KCNA)--A Pyongyang meeting commemorating the 27th anniversary of the April uprising of the South Korean people was held this afternoon at the Central House of the League of Socialist Working Youth of Korea.

The meeting was attended by Ho Chong-suk, secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, and other senior officials.

Chon Kum-chol, director of the Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, made a report.

The April popular uprising, he said, was an eruption of the rancour and indignation of the South Korean people pent up for a long period under the colonial rule of U.S. imperialism and its stooges and a massive anti-U.S., save-the-nation resistance involving millions of people of broad segments across South Korea.

Referring to the fact that the traitor Chon Tu-hwan in his "special press statement" on April 13 said that "debate on constitutional revision" should be totally prohibited and "elections" be held under the present "constitution," the reporter said the Chon Tu-hwan group, failing to induce the struggle of South Korean democratic forces and opposition parties for "constitutional revision" into the "National Assembly" under the manipulation of U.S. imperialism, bought over some members of the leading opposition "New Korea Democratic Party" to break up the party and openly announced its intention to stay on in power under the present "constitution," while shifting the blame for the breakup onto opposition democrats.

This is a sort of "coup d'etat" designed to prolong the present military fascist system for an indefinite period and an outrageous challenge to democracy, he stressed.
Daily Marks 19 April Anniversary

SK190926 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0856 GMT 19 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 19 (KCNA)--NODONG SINMUN, MINJU CHOSON and PYONGYANG SINMUN today dedicate editorials to the 27th anniversary of the heroic April 19 popular uprising of the South Korean people in 1960.

NODONG SINMUN in an editorial headed "Righteous Struggle of the South Korean People for Independence, Democracy and Reunification Will Surely Emerge Victorious" says:

The April popular uprising which toppled down the Syngman Rhee dictatorial "regime" suffered a failure because it was not guided by a revolutionary party and had no correct strategy and tactics and broad segments of workers and peasants, the basic masses, did not participate in it, and people were deprived of the cost for their blood by other stooges of the U.S. imperialists.

Subsequent developments gave a precious lesson that as long as the U.S. imperialists remain in South Korea and their colonial rule continues, there can be no affirmative change in the socio-political life of the people.

The present Chon Tu-hwan military fascist system in South Korea is a murderous suppressive system, one-party dictatorial system and a system for national division and war, unprecedented in ferocity and viciousness.

The Chon Tu-hwan group which has ruthlessly trampled underfoot the South Korean people's desire for independence, democracy and reunification over the past six years openly entered the road of extending its power by suspending the debate on constitutional revision and publishing an "important decision" to "transfer government" under the present "constitution."

The deterioration of the political situation surrounding constitutional revision and extreme intensification of the plot of the "Democratic Justice Party" for long-term office in South Korea are an inevitable outcome of the U.S. imperialists' systematic colonial enslavement policy.

Now, the Chon Tu-hwan group intends to "transfer government" under an undeclared emergency martial law which binds all political opponents hand and foot and blindfolds the eyes of the people, gags their mouths and stuffs their ears at the point of the bayonet.

This is no more than a "DJP's" reassumption of power and an extension of the military fascist dictatorship and one-party dictatorship.

All the patriotic and democratic forces and dissident forces in South Korea should turn out in the struggle in unity to decisively smash the Chon Tu-hwan group's anti-popular freezing of constitutional revision and its moves for extension of power and win a democratic constitution.
The Chon Tu-hwan group must stop the suppression and moves for reassertion of power going against the trend of the times and step down from power without delay as demanded by the people.

The South Korean people will never tolerate or overlook the reassertion of power by the traitor Chon Tu-hwan and the group of "DJP" ruffians but will bring the dawn of independence, democracy and reunification by abolishing the U.S. imperialists' colonial enslavement policy and the dictatorial rule with an all-nation anti-U.S., anti-fascist struggle.

16,000 Students Stage Demonstrations

SK190825 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0812 GMT 19 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 19 (KCNA)--More than 16,000 students staged anti-"government" rallies and demonstrations at 40 universities all over South Korea on April 17, according to a report.

In Seoul over 1,000 students rose in an anti-"government" demonstration at Kyonghui University. They fought undauntedly in the teeth of the crackdown of riot police.

Students held anti-"government" rallies and staged fierce demonstrations at 39 other universities in Seoul and local cities.

Loud slogans such as "Down with military dictatorship" burst forth from the students who turned out in the struggle with bitter anti-"government" sentiments.

Meanwhile, students of Pusan University who had been continuing struggle for several days in demand of campus democracy wrested from the university president on April 17 a promise to accept all their seven-point demand for the democratisation of campus including the transfer of the editing right of the university newspaper to the students, abolition of campus press censorship, official recognition of joint circle meetings, recognition of the rules of the student council revised by the students and control on the entry of detectives into the guard room.

Demonstrations at 6 Seoul Universities

SK180447 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0428 GMT 18 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 18 (KCNA)--Students' demonstrations against the long-term office scheme of the traitor Chon Tu-hwan continued at six universities in Seoul on April 17 following the previous day, according to a foreign press report from Seoul.

About 2,600 students of Koryo University, brandishing torches, held an anti-"government" rally, denouncing the traitor's intrigue to prolong his power.
After the rally, about 1,500 students went over to a demonstration, trying repeatedly for about two hours to break through police ranks.

Many students of Yonsei, Tanguk, Seoul, Hongik and Tongguk universities staged demonstrations after holding campus observances of the April 19 uprising.

The student protesters angrily shouted incessantly "Down with the military dictatorship planning to prolong its rule" and "Drive out the United States which supports military dictatorship."

Emergency Alert Order Issued

SK180521 Pyongyang April 18 (KCNA)--The Chon Tu-hwan fascist clique issued an "A-class emergency alert order" throughout South Korea on April 16, according to a report.

They set the period from April 18 to 21 as a period of "A-class emergency alert" for the general mobilization of repressive police force, crying that meetings and demonstrations of students and opposition forces are foreseen around the 27th anniversary of the April 19 popular uprising.

In this period, the fascist clique ban all meetings and even memorial church service of Christians.

/6662
CSO: 4100/170
KCNA REPORTS 'HANMINJON' MESSAGE TO KIM IL-SONG

SK170540 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0513 GMT 17 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 17 (KCNA)--The Central Committee of the South Korean National Democratic Front (Hanminjon) on April 15 sent a congratulatory message to the great leader President Kim Il-song on the occasion of his 75th birthday.

The message, representing the unanimous desire and wishes of all the members of "Hanminjon" and people of all strata, extends highest glory and warmest blessings to respected President Kim Il-song.

It says that his birth was a grand sunrise of history when the people greeted their great savior and outstanding leader peerless in history and a solemn declaration announcing the sailing of a new Korea and the advent of a new era.

Noting that he embroidered the long course of his revolutionary activities spanning 60 years with matchless feats and immortal exploits, the message says:

You, among other things, spread a vast vista and bright future of Korea of chuche by building flawless organisational and ideological foundations of the Workers' Party of Korea and successfully solving the question of carrying forward the cause of chuche.

For these great feats performed by you, the homeland of chuche has greeted the biggest heyday of great national prosperity and grandeur and our brothers and sisters in the North are decorating with new constructive exploits the grand course of modeling the whole of society on the chuche idea under the tested leadership of the dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il, upholding the centre of leadership, the center of unity, with their whole heart.

You, from the first days of territorial division, have put forward one great program of national salvation after another permeated with patriotic ideas and roused the entire fellow countrymen to a nation-wide movement for reunification, leaving undying marks of leadership feats on the noble course of the independent and peaceful reunification of the country.
The consciousness of the masses has undergone a fundamental change and the patriotic democratic forces are rapidly growing in strength in the colonial south swept by a furious anti-U.S. storm. This historical fact is a result of the struggle waged by our "Hanminjon" and the patriotic people with the immortal chuche idea as their guiding idea.

Our "Hanminjon" and people of all strata, feeling in every fibre of their being that a nation-wide struggle is the only way of national survival, will turn the colonial south into an active volcano of the anti-U.S., anti-fascist national salvation struggle by closely uniting as one under the banner of the chuche idea, and thereby bring earlier the glorious day of independence, democracy and reunification.

The message wholeheartedly wishes President Kim Il-song a long life in good health.

/6662
CSO: 4100/168
PROMOTED 'PACKAGE TOURS' OF NORTH KOREA FOUND DISAPPOINTING

Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 24 Mar 87 p 4

[Article by Paris correspondent Yi Tae-hun and Hong Kong correspondent Kim Chong-so]

[Text] "Twenty two days with Quoni on a tour of China, North Korea, and Manchuria." "From Beijing to Pyongyang." These are the catch phrases appearing in the "Guide to North Korea Tour" separately published by Quoni, a Swedish tourist agency in Paris, and VPS, an agent in Paris for British tourist agency Avis Travel.

Quoni and Avis Travel, which are among Europe's top-ranking travel agents, offer similar tour packages in London and Frankfurt to lure travelers to North Korea.

Quoni offers five 22-day package tours of China and North Korea this year departing on 13 April, 18 May, 13 July, 3 August, and 7 September. The tour groups will arrive at Pyongyang via Beijing. The North Korea tour will include Myohyang Mountain, Kaesong, and Panmunjom, in addition to Pyongyang. This will be followed by a tour of Manchuria, Shanghai, Suzhou, and Nanjing. (The stay in North Korea will be 6 nights and 7 days.)

VPS, on the other hand, offered two 11-day package tours departing on 15 February and 22 March, with the course covering Beijing, Pyongyang, Wonsan, Mt Kumgang, and Beijing. The stay in North Korea will be 4 nights and 5 days.

The North Korean portion of the package tours offered by these two agents also include a tour of Kim Il-song's birthplace, the Chuche Monument, the Chollima Statue, the Children's Palace, as well as the viewing of a revolutionary opera and a circus performance—all these are North Korea's propaganda showcases. In addition, Panmunjom was also included.

However, the tours planned by VPS for February and March did not materialize, and Quoni's March tour plan was also canceled because there were not enough people interested in the packages.

In the case of the Quoni plan, the package will cost 27,900 francs (about 3,627,000 won), including the air fare and the hotel accommodations and meals. In addition to the high cost, the troublesome visa requirements were
also responsible for the failure. Travelers must obtain a North Korean visa 20 days before the date of departure.

The price of the VPS plan is 17,820 francs. In view of the difficulty in selling the package plan, Quoni plans to reduce the original five package tours to one or two. Just in case this new plan should also fail, Quoni is drawing up another plan to reroute the oriental tour to include South Korea in the package deal for those European tourists who desire an Asian tour but do not want to visit North Korea.

When a Quoni official led a European tour group to Red China in 1985, a North Korean official sounded him out on the possibility of Quoni's organizing a package tour of North Korea. Subsequently, North Korea invited Quoni President (Louis Pierrot) and his director of tourism promotion to Pyongyang to express North Korea's readiness to open the country to tourists. This prompted Quoni to organize the aforementioned package tour plan.

Last year North Korea organized two 2-week North Korea tours for Frenchmen through the "Youth Leisure and Vacation Committee," a French Communist Party front organization. The price of one tour was as low as 8,500 francs including the round trip air fare and the hotel accommodations and meals. Forty Frenchmen participated in these tours, which seemed more inspection tours in nature, being limited to communist party members. The 48-story hotel construction project which had been under way in North Korea with a credit from (Groupe Accorde), a French hotel chain, were suspended some time ago due to North Korea's inability to pay back foreign debts. Recently, a move has been afoot to resume negotiations on the credit deal, with a view to resuming the hotel construction.

North Korea reportedly began to promote North Korea tours for West Germans 4 or 5 years ago and, subsequently similar tours for British tourists 2 or 3 years ago. This closely coincides with Red China's enactment of a "Joint Venture Law" which followed her adoption of an open-door policy.

North Korea's move to resume the hotel construction with a French credit clearly stems from its persistent strategy for "co-sponsoring the 1988 Seoul Olympics."

A via-Beijing North Korea tour is currently being promoted in Hong Kong. For this tour, a Chinese civilian airplane will take the tourists to Beijing from Hong Kong, and a North Korean civilian airplane will pick them up in Beijing and fly them to Pyongyang. However, there has been little noticeable response to this tour promotion among Hong Kong residents because a North Korea tour is "not interesting enough to be worth the money you have to spend."

That is why the North Korean authorities concerned are going so far as to subsidize tours to Pyongyang to lure foreign tourists around Kim Il-song's birthday on 15 April. Great Wall and Jetway travel agents in Hong Kong are currently promoting North Korea tours. They reportedly sent two or three tourist groups to North Korea last year, followed by an additional 20 tourists sent during the lunar New Year's season this year.

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However, more than half of each tourist group took the tours as an opportunity to visit Pyongyang on business. Originally, these two travel agents had planned to send a tourist group to North Korea once a month, but there were not enough people interested to form a tour group, so the business has turned out to be unprofitable.

Those Hong Kong residents who took the North Korea tours unanimously said: "Tourism is at such a low developmental stage in North Korea, and North Korean guides hang around us so persistently that we felt as if we were spending money for the trip only to have our freedom curtailed. We found our trip totally unattractive and that is not the kind of place worth visiting for a second time."

North Korea is feverishly trying to promote North Korean tours in Australia, in some Asian countries, and in Europe, but most Hong Kong residents doubt that North Korea's current tourism promotion campaign will bear any tangible fruit.

13311
CSO: 4107/154
N. KOREA/GOVERNMENT, POLITICS

BRIEFS

SEOUL STUDENTS STAGE RALLY, DEMONSTRATION--Pyongyang April 14 (KCNA)--Students of a number of South Korean universities held demonstrations Monday in protest against the long-term office scheme of the traitor Chon Tu-hwan, according to a report. The protesters put up wall posters demanding the resignation of the traitor. About 500 students sharply denounced traitor Chon Tu-hwan's scheme to remain in power long, holding a rally to commemorate the 27th anniversary of the April 19 popular uprising on the Yonse University campus in Seoul. The wall posters pasted up on walls on the Yonse University campus said: "Overthrow the Chon group scheming for prolonged rule," "Chon Tu-hwan step down," "Don't fool the people" and "Win direct presidential election through people's power," the foreign press report said. Meanwhile, Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam, co-chairmen of the Council for the Promotion of Democracy, strongly denounced the fascist clique's scheme of prolonged rule. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 1007 GMT 14 Apr 87 SK] /6662

CSO: 4100/168
COMPARATIVE NORTH-SOUTH MILITARY STRENGTH VIEWED

Seoul CHONGYOK ANBO in Korean Feb 87 pp 16-24

[Article by Yu Kwang-chin, "Changes in Military Strength of North and South Korea and the Security of the Korean Peninsula"]

[Text] 1. The Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula

The fundamental goal of North Korea, in a word, is to bring about the communist unification of the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, the basic means for the attainment of this goal in its military aspects is military power. To this end, as is universally known, North Korea has steadily continued to increase its military power from liberation up to the present.

Attesting to this fact is the U.S. Department of Defense annual military report for 1987, published this past January, which points out that "the strengthening of North Korea-Soviet military cooperation following Kim Il-song's visit to Moscow threatens the security of northeast Asia. North Korea is increasing its military power by means of Soviet aid and has the capacity to conduct a large-scale attack with minimal warning time, in spite of the presence of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK), and which warns of the danger of North Korean aggression against the South.

Moreover, the report emphasized the fact that "after Kim Il-song's 1984 visit to the Soviet Union, Soviet and North Korean military power has steadily increased and the security of East Asia is clearly threatened." The report also disclosed the fact that the Soviet Union has received rights for its bombers and reconnaissance aircraft to fly through North Korean air space and for its ships to call at the ports of Wonsan, Nampo, and Najin in exchange for increasing its military assistance to North Korea.

In particular, North Korea has spent more than 20 percent of its GNP on defense, despite its economic bankruptcy, in the course of increasing its military power. They have deployed their forces in forward positions and reduced the time for an early warning of an attack on the ROK.

The military modernization plan being pursued by North Korea includes widespread reorganization, forward deployment, and an increase in North Korean special forces, which are the second largest in the world. They are in an
offensive posture in order greatly to increase the opportunity for surprise attack. The Soviet Union, which remains close to North Korea, continues to expand its military power and influence in northeast Asia and the Pacific region, deploying some 50 divisions and 2,000 tactical aircraft in the Far Eastern area as well as deploying 1/3 of its mobile SS-20 missiles in the region. The Soviet Union has massive military power, including an augmented Pacific fleet, and backs up North Korea's aggressive ambitions.

Meanwhile, on 12 January, 2 days after publication of the U.S. Department of Defense report, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 1987 report to Congress on defense posture also disclosed that "North Korea continues its policy of unification of the Korean Peninsula by force if the situation becomes advantageous and is strengthening its air defense capabilities with MiG-23/FLOGGER aircraft and SA-3 anti-aircraft missiles provided by the Soviet Union." The report warned of the never-ending danger of North Korean aggression against the South. The report goes on to emphasize the necessity of close military cooperation and cooperation for collective security by the United States and its allies and friends due to the threat of communist power in the northeast Asia and Pacific region.

In the same fashion, the Department of Defense report also discloses that "U.S. and ROK Armed Forces are steadily modernizing and are also jointly participating in five military exercises annually." The report reveals that there is no change in U.S. resolve concerning the defense of the Republic of Korea. The report promises that "the United States will address the continued threat from North Korea through continued stationing of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea and the provision of assistance for the autonomous defense of the ROK." Noting that U.S. military power in the region, including U.S. forces in the ROK, play a necessary role in restraining powers that threaten the security of nations friendly to the United States, the report also promises assistance in coping with further worsening of the military imbalance between North and South Korea caused by the strengthening of North Korean military power due to Soviet military assistance.

Nonetheless, even the United States itself believes that North Korean policies toward the South and increases in the military power of North Korea "make it possible for North Korea to carry out a large-scale attack with limited preparation time." This is further confirmed by an examination of the actual increases in North Korean military power which create this danger.

2. Trends in the Strengthening of South and North Korean Military Power

General Livesey, commander in chief of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, gave a lecture in April 1986 titled "The Security and Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula," in which he noted that "overall North Korean military strength, which numbered 435,000 men in 1976 has increased to more than double that number in the past 10 years, reaching 875,000 in 1986." One may divide periods of rapid increase in North Korean military power over the period of some 30 years since the conclusion of the armistice agreement as follows: (1) the period beginning in 1965 and 1966, when under the so-called "four major military lines" policy North Korea was deemed to have attained, to a certain extent, a level of military power sufficient to carry out an attack against
the South on its own, without Soviet assistance; (2) the period in 1974 and 1975, when the United States withdrew from Indochina and the Vietnam war ended; (3) 1978 and 1979, when the plan to reduce U.S. forces in the ROK was carried out at the beginning of the Carter administration; and (4) the more recent period, dating from Kim Il-song's visit to the Soviet Union in May 1984 and following the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev.

Examining the increase in North Korean military power in the 1970's first, for 10 years from 1965 to 1974 and 1975 North Korea steadily carried forward the "four major military lines," investing about 30 percent of its GNP on defense and attaining its quantitative goals in domestically produced weapons systems while experiencing qualitative improvements with the receipt of advanced Chinese- and Soviet-made light and medium weapons.

External factors that greatly encouraged North Korea during this period were: (1) the communization of the Indochina Peninsula, and (2) indications that the United States, under the influence of an anti-war mood, would leave Asia. These external factors caused a corresponding blow to the military power of the ROK Army. It was a period when the qualitative balance with the North was upset due to the effects of the disharmony between the ROK and the United States because of the U.S. plan to withdraw its forces stationed in South Korea. Because of these factors, the North Korean strategy toward the South was one based on superiority. This was also the period when ROK efforts toward self-reliant defense began to take place in earnest, in order to restore the balance.

Moreover, in the late 1970's, the Carter administration began its withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea (December 1978), causing North Korea to seek to provoke a so-called "great revolutionary incident." North Korea continued the buildup of its military power. Military manpower, 510,000 in 1978, increased to 630,000 in 1979, and North Korea increased the number of infantry divisions from 20 to 35. Trends in the South-North Korean military balance in the 1970's can be seen in reports of the Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS) in England. (table 1)

In this manner, after 1978 South Korea began to fall behind North Korea in military power and even to retrogress in terms of ground and naval forces. The North Korean Air Force continued to be ahead of that of South Korea going into the 1970's, showing how much effort North Korea was putting into increasing its air power.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Military Strength</th>
<th>Ground Forces</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>625,000</td>
<td>580,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>467,000</td>
<td>410,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>595,000</td>
<td>540,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>495,000</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>635,000</td>
<td>585,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>430,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>642,000</td>
<td>580,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>440,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>619,000</td>
<td>540,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>632,000</td>
<td>560,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast to quantitative aspects, one may examine in table 2 how in qualitative respects North Korea improved its position and how South Korea's position was markedly inferior.
Table 2. Trends in Increase of South and North Korean Military Equipment in the 1970's (1975-1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Vehicles</td>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>2,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus South Korea was unable to keep up with the North Korean strengthening trend in the area of equipment. This pattern became clear as the 1980's began.

Second, during the 1980's the trend toward increasing North Korean military power brought with it an epochal increase in military power, simultaneously carrying out both a qualitative shift to crack troops and quantitative increase using the Soviet Union for assistance, while at the same time domestically producing modernized offensive weapons systems to achieve mechanization, a shift to self-propelled [from towed] artillery, and chemical warfare readiness. Manpower and equipment aspects of these changes are presented in tables 3 and 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Military Strength</th>
<th>Ground Forces</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>543,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>32,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>678,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>601,000</td>
<td>544,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>32,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>782,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>51,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>601,000</td>
<td>544,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>784,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>51,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>622,000</td>
<td>560,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>784,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>33,500</td>
<td>51,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>622,000</td>
<td>560,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>784,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>33,500</td>
<td>51,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>598,000</td>
<td>542,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>838,000</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>33,500</td>
<td>53,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Trends in Increase of South and North Korean Military Equipment in the 1980’s (1980-1985)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Vehicles</td>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>2,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>2,650</td>
<td>4,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>2,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,650</td>
<td>4,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>2,825</td>
<td>4,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>2,825</td>
<td>4,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>2,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>2,825</td>
<td>4,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>3,425</td>
<td>4,650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. A Comparison of Current South and North Korean Military Power

After 1978 North Korea began to be quantitatively superior to South Korea, bringing about an actual imbalance in military forces. However, in the 1980's, and especially recently, there has been a worsening of the imbalance, presaging an impending danger to South Korea.

Moreover, as of the late 1980's, North Korea had moved and deployed more than 65 percent of its total ground forces to frontline areas, enabling them to conduct a surprise attack. Furthermore, North Korea built two new airfields near the armistice line, in addition to the 30 airbases already in existence south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, reducing the time for a surprise attack on the South Korean capital zone to 8 minutes. In terms of advanced equipment as well, the MiG-23’s deployed to Pukch’ang airbase (in South Pyongan Province) would take only 17 minutes to reach the capital zone, and the SCUD-B long
range surface-to-surface missiles, with a range of 270 km, can attack the South Korean capital from Pyongyang. North Korea also has stocked approximately 180 to 250 tons of chemical munitions, which have a capability for indiscriminate killing and injury.

In terms of total ground forces in South and North Korea as well, in 1985 South Korea had an army of 598,000 men, compared with North Korea's 838,000 (875,000 as of 1986). North Korea had reached 1.4 times the number of South Korean troops. This comes to 40.8 soldiers per 1,000 population, making North Korea second-ranked in the world in density of military manpower, following Israel with a ratio of 45 per 1,000. The numbers of troops North Korea is sixth-ranked in the world, attesting to its grossly oversized military service system.

In terms of reserve forces, we are in the lead in terms of numbers. However, as reported in the publication THE MILITARY BALANCE--1985-1986, North Korea "has active duty command and general staff organizations having responsibility for training, and has positioned a corps-level [reserve] headquarters in each of the nine provinces and the three directly administered cities. At other cities brigade-level organizations exist, with battalions, companies, and platoons, depending on the scale involved, at towns and villages and collective farms and factory enterprises. In addition the Red Worker and Peasant Militia can assemble more than 5 million reserves within 12 hours," the publication explains. It becomes clear that North Korea's "arming the whole people" line is at a high level of attainment.

Comparing the strength of the South and North Korean armies, North Korea numbers among its key combat units four mechanized corps headquarters, under which are five or six mechanized brigades. There are distinct artillery corps, as well as 40 combat divisions besides. Moreover, North Korea has special warfare brigades, comprising some 100,000 men in special forces units, including 3 special warfare brigades, 4 reconnaissance brigades, 1 river crossing combined brigade, 1 amphibious brigade, and 5 airborne regiments. The current situation with respect to major combat equipment supporting South and North Korean armies is shown in table 5.

Major naval power assets of South and North Korea include 8 South Korean PSMM-5 fast attack craft and one Asheville class patrol combatant and two Wildcat class fast frigates. Meanwhile, North Korean fast attack craft include 10 Soviet-made OSA-1 class boats and 8 Komar class boats. Moreover, South Korean antisubmarine warfare units comprise one air battalion and one helicopter battalion equipped with Hughes 500MD helicopters and 12 Alouette III helicopters.

On the other hand, North Korean coastal defense guided missile regiments comprise 6 Samlet SSM sites, and 122mm, 130mm, and 152mm coastal guns. South Korean marine corps units are uniquely under the navy, but North Korea has landing forces and irregular warfare commandos in each service arm and in its special forces units. (table 6).
Table 5. Current Major Army Combat Equipment (as of 1985)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tanks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-47</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>T-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-48 (A5,180)</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>T-54/55/62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(excludes 40 Marine Corps tanks)</td>
<td></td>
<td>T-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armored Vehicles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC: M-113</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>Recce BA-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiat 6614</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>MICA; BMP4; APC:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Field Artillery</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105-203mm</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>76-152mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rockets</strong></td>
<td>130mm in inventory</td>
<td>multiple rocket launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surface-to-Surface Guided Missiles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest John</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Frog-5/-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mortars</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-107mm</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>82-240mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recoilless Guns</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57-106mm in inventory</td>
<td></td>
<td>82-107mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-tank Guns (Assault Guns)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-18/36</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>SU-76/100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-tank Guided Missiles</strong></td>
<td>TOW/LAW in inventory</td>
<td>AT-1/AT-3 in inventory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Antiaircraft Guns</strong></td>
<td>Vulcan 44mm</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles</strong></td>
<td>Hawk, Mike</td>
<td>SA-7 in inventory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing Aircraft</td>
<td>Q-2 A</td>
<td>14 in Air Force inventory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>UH-1B 500 MD</td>
<td>in Air Force inventory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 6. Comparison of South and North Korean Airpower (as of October 1985)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>ROK (excludes Marine Corps)</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval Forces</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soviet-made Whiskey class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese-made Romeo class</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea-made 033 Romeo class</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships and Boats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvette</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Attack Craft (gunboat)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Attack Craft (torpedo)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Attack Craft (multipurpose)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Boat (large)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Boat (coastal)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeper</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Craft</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Ships</td>
<td>(supply, tanker)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antisubmarine Units</td>
<td>Fixed-wing and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>helicopter battalions 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Defense Units</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Guided Missile Regiments 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Units</td>
<td>Forces 22,000</td>
<td>Landing units are under each service arm and special forces units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Divisions 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brigades 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanks M-47 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LVT, LVTP-7 (in inventory)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Artillery 105mm, 109mm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(in inventory)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On order: LWTP-7 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing South and North Korean air power, (1) the total number of North Korean tactical aircraft is calculated to be about 800; (2) it is known that North Korea has secretly acquired 87 U.S.-made Hughes helicopters; (3) it is reported that North Korea has four MiG-23's, but there are estimates that in
1985, 26 of these aircraft were brought in for at least 1 air regiment and for training purposes; and (4) it is believed that North Korea has ordered not 32 but 60 MiG-23's, enough for an interceptor division. Introduction of the MiG-23/FLOUGER and SA-3 surface-to-air missiles were not included in the IISS publication for 1985. A comparison of South and North Korean airpower is in table 7.

Table 7. Comparison of South and North Korean airpower (as of October 1985)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Strength</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>53,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Bombers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike Aircraft</td>
<td>18 strike battalions</td>
<td>10 strike battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-5 A/B/E/F</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>MiG 15/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-19/Q-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SU-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interceptors</td>
<td>4 strike battalions</td>
<td>12 strike battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4D/E</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>MiG-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1B/H</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Aircraft</td>
<td>5 transport battalions</td>
<td>25 transport battalions (est)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-54</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>AN-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-123J/K,AC</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>AN-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS-748</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>IL-14/18/62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130H</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>TU-154B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>operated by army</td>
<td>Mi-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hughes 300/500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainers</td>
<td>T-28/33A/37C/41D</td>
<td>MiG-15/19/21U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>112</td>
<td>Yak-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-5 B/F</td>
<td>Chinese-made CJ-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-16 (est.)</td>
<td>MiG-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-to-Air Guided Missiles</td>
<td>Sidewinder, Sparrow (in inventory)</td>
<td>AA-2 Atoll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles</td>
<td>operated by army</td>
<td>4 brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 Site SA-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus in air power, North Korea has on the order of twice the amount of equipment that we have.
4. North Korean Military Trends and Our Security

As noted in the comparison of the quantitative change in increases of military power in South and North Korea to this point, it may be understood that South Korea is maintaining an unbalanced situation with respect to North Korea. Looking at an article in the March 1986 issue of the Japanese publication "Japan Military Review" (which was based on a presentation on North Korean military trends given by ROK Minister of Defense Yi Ki-pack), we see that North Korea has assembled 20 divisions and an independent brigade at the forward edge of the armistice line, and has deployed 10 additional divisions of troops to be able to insert these at once into the frontal area.

Moreover, the "Japan Military Review" stated that North Korean ground forces comprise 8 corps, 35 infantry divisions, 3 mechanized divisions, 20 armored divisions, 4 brigades, and 5 independent armored regiments, and that North Korea's 8 special forces corps include 4 reconnaissance brigades, 3 landing brigades, and 5 airborne battalions, making an increase in ground forces to 880,000 in all.

Such an increase in North Korean military power shows a resolution to act immediately when all preparations for aggression against the South are complete and the time when they are able to attack arrives. In particular, many world military specialists point out that the recent closening of Soviet-North Korean ties is a serious threat to the stability of the Korean Peninsula. In the area of changes in weapons system in particular, (1) North Korean armored units have been vastly increased in number with domestic mass production of a light tank of the same type as the Soviet-made T-62. (2) North Korea has also provided large numbers of armored infantry fighting vehicles to its infantry units in order to improve the effectiveness of joint infantry-armor operation. (3) North Korea has also carried out increases in armor, mechanization, and conversion of artillery to self-propulsion with domestically manufactured weaponry, greatly increasing the number of self-propelled artillery units, for example, in order to improve joint infantry-armor-artillery operations. Moreover, high-level precision munitions that cannot be supplied in this way through domestic production are being brought in from the Soviet Union. Principal examples of this are the formation of an air division with the advanced MiG-23 aircraft; the SCUD-B type surface-to-surface missile; and the SA-3 Goa surface-to-air missile.

As for military strategy, North Korea has formulated a multifaceted strategy of deliberate aggression by air, sea, land and undersea forces, through (1) forward deployment of main force units; (2) making clear a "quick war" strategy; and (3) maintaining 100,000 men in special forces units—the world's largest such force—as well as by possession of 87 Hughes helicopters of the same type as those held by the South Korean army, to say nothing of 280 AN-2 light transport aircraft, which are difficult to detect by radar, along with midget submarines. Moreover, these are backed up by the powerful aid of the Soviet Armed Forces, which truly add to the burden of the United States, the principal power assisting South Korea, through such actions as frequent reconnaissance flights above the armistice line, overflights by long-range bombers, and port calls by Soviet ships on the east and west coasts.
As seen above, the trend of increasing North Korean military power, together with the open Soviet assistance to North Korea, may even make it possible for North Korea to conduct some joint operations with the Soviet Union (for example, Soviet-North Korean joint military exercises). There are also evident signs that North Korea might dare to carry out a combination of regular and irregular warfare, preemptive surprise attack, and "quick decision" strategies in order to carry out such exercises. South Korea and the United States have jointly instituted a strategy of obstruction and delay to counter this, but the current gap in military power between South and North Korea imposes difficult burdens with respect to the counterforce required. This past 16 December the United States announced the end of loans to South Korea for the purchase of military equipment, thereby increasing our self-defense burden correspondingly. We must carefully take the urgent situation on the Korean Peninsula into account, and so on, to formulate a policy that will maintain such a counterforce.
N. KOREA/MILITARY AFFAIRS

ORGANIZATION, FUNCTION, STRUCTURE OF ARMED FORCES REVIEWED

Seoul PUKHAN CHONGCHIRON in Korean 1984 pp 280-291

[Text] Section 3. Organization and Functions of the Armed Forces

In terms of the organization and functions of the North Korean armed forces, several characteristics may be observed. In the following, the characteristics of the armed forces will be reviewed in several sections.

1. The Armed Forces and the President's Position

It may be said that the position that Kim Il-song as president occupies in the North Korean armed forces in accordance with the new North Korean Constitution, as revised in December 1972, has been further strengthened. Specifically, first, his position is that he is president representing the sovereignty of the state; second, he is the head of the Central People's Committee which integrates the party with the government; and third, because he is given the position of the chairman of the National Defense Committee, which controls the North Korean armed forces, it may be said that he has in fact completed a perfect military dictatorship.

According to Article 93 of the Constitution, the "president of North Korea is appointed commander in chief of all the North Korean armed forces and chairman of the National Defense Committee, and he commands and controls all military forces of the state." As a matter of fact, in terms of power Kim Il-song's position as president is expressed as the supreme commander of the North Korean armed forces. Kim Il-song, as chairman of the "Central People's Committee," a supreme organ of North Korean sovereignty, is bestowed, in accordance with Article 103, with the power to "guide national defense and state political security." He is also bestowed with the absolute power to "appoint or relieve important military cadres and general-grade officers and confer military titles." The position of Kim Il-song as president in the North Korean armed forces is given an almost absolute position, and what justifies this may be said to be the "unitary ideological system." It may be said that the guarantee of power for the unitary ideological system is, in the final analysis, supported by complete control of the armed forces.
2. Military Committee

This may be said to be a national defense structure for the wartime system organized in accordance with the decree of the Standing Committee of the "Supreme People's Assembly," dated 26 June 1950. Since there has yet been no apparent legal measures for dissolution, this structure may still be considered to be effective. NODONG SINMUN, dated 22 July 1964, referred to this as being effective.

Apart from this, in December 1962, pursuant to the so-called policy of arming all of the people and of fortifying the entire land, the "Workers Party Military Committee" was organized. Similarly, as the Military Committee during the Korean War was called, this is a newly organized national defense structure for emphasizing the military priority policy, if not "for the concentrated wartime control of state power."

The "Workers Party Military Committee" may be said to be Kim Il-song's council, which deliberates on North Korea's war preparations and military policies.

3. National Defense Committee

This is a newly created national defense structure by the new Constitution of 1972. The "National Defense Committee" was thus created within the Central People's Committee. This structure, which is separate from the "Workers Party Military Committee," is regarded as an organ that deals with national defense policy in peacetime under the People's Committee. The National Defense Committee is comprised of one chairman and nine vice chairman. Of these the president of the republic is automatically appointed concurrent chairman (Article 93 of the Constitution), and the positions of vice chairman and below are appointed with the president's recommendation. The National Defense Committee has the functions of deliberating on and deciding basic military policies adopted at the "Party Military Committee," and of commanding and supervising various posts that implement policies. Also, it may be said that this structure is a supreme guidance organ that will strengthen a state emergency mobilization system for wartime and at the same time plan for the prompt waging of war in an emergency.

4. Ministry of the People's Armed Forces

The Ministry of the People's Armed Forces may be said to be a structure under the guidance of the president who is the supreme commander of national defense and the National Defense Committee, which executes military affairs as military staff. The structure of the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces is comprised of the General Staff Department, the General Rear-Echelon Bureau, the Court Martial Department, the Military Procurator Bureau, and the Security Bureau. Under the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces are seven or eight vice ministers. The chief of the General Staff is also a vice minister and directly controls the armed forces. The director of the General Political Bureau is also chairman of the People's Army Party Committee and a vice minister and is in charge of party work within the armed
forces and assists the minister of the People's Armed Forces. However, he is under the direct command of the Workers Party.

The North Korean armed forces are based on the concept of integrated forces. The chief of the General Staff directly commands and integrates three army groups at the front and four army corps in the rear—the Artillery Command, the Mechanized Command, the Naval Command, and the Air Force Command.

Different from the separate forces system adopted by every other country in the world, the North Korean armed forces system treats the artillery and mechanized branches as equal service branches, and North Korean armed forces adopt the unitary command integration system which forms combat forces. The advantage of this is that it can in a concentrated manner manage military forces with efficiency. The national defense structure centered on the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces is on a separate table below. ("North Korean Encyclopedia," Vol 2, p 45)

National Defense Structure

Key:
1. Workers Party Central Committee
2. (Director General of) the General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army (Concurrently, Chairman of the People's Army Party Committee)
3. People's Armed Forces
4. Vice Minister, Concurrently Chief of the General Staff
5. Vice Minister, Concurrently Director General of the General Rear-Echelon Bureau
6. Political Security Bureau
7. Court Martial Department
8. Military Procurator Bureau
9. Operations Bureau
10. Reconnaissance Bureau
11. Combat Training Bureau
12. Military Mobilization Bureau
13. Communication Command Bureau
14. Engineering Bureau
15. Ordnance Bureau
16. Chemical Bureau
17. Geological Bureau
18. Machinery Bureau
19. Cadre Bureau
20. Rank Replacement Bureau
21. Inspection Bureau
22. Military Publication Bureau
23. Organization and Planning Bureau
24. Food Management Bureau
25. Clothing Management Bureau
26. Fuel Management Bureau
27. Transportation Bureau
28. Vehicle Management Bureau
29. Military Road Management Bureau
30. People's Army Concert Band
31. 8 February Physical Education Corps
32. 8 February Movie Studio
33. People's Army News House
34. People's Army Publishing House
35. Organization Planning Bureau
36. Party Organization Department
37. Socialist Working Youth Guidance Department
38. Propaganda and Education Department
39. Cultural Liaison Department
40. Statistical Bureau
41. Cadre Department
42. Inspection Department
43. News Department
44. Army Groups
45. Front
46. Army Corps
47. Rear
48. Artillery Command
49. Mechanized Command
50. Naval Command
51. Air Force Command
52. Ground Forces
53. Building Management Bureau
54. Military Commerce Bureau
55. Military Medical Bureau
56. Veterinary Bureau
57. Finance Bureau
58. Construction Bureau
59. Munitions Production Bureau
5. Military Organizations

Organizations of each armed force branch are as follows ("North Korean Encyclopedia," Vol 2, p 47):

Organization of the Naval Command

Key:
1. Minister of the People's Armed Forces
2. Chief of the General Staff
3. Naval Command
4. Security Department
5. Political Department
6. Navigation Department
7. Staff Department
8. Rear-Echelon Department
9. Technical Department
10. Coastal Artillery Department
11. Naval College
12. Naval Academy
13. Naval Technical Training Center
14. Central Naval Hospital
15. Namp'o Base
16. Sakot Base
17. Wonsan Base
18. Kim Ch'aek Base
Organization of the Air Force Command

Key:
1. Minister of the People's Armed Forces
2. Chief of the General Staff
3. Air Force Command
4. Air Force Academy
5. Branch School
6. Central Hospital
7. Aircraft Repair Depot
8. Air Navigation Materiel Depot
9. Central Warehouse
10. Ammunition Depot
11. Central Fuel Supply Office
12. Electronic Detection Instruments
13. Searchlights
14. Communications
15. Construction
16. Navigation Route Control
17. Transportation
18. Bombing Reconnaissance
19. Fighters Division
Organization of the Artillery Command

Key:
1. Minister of the People's Armed Forces
2. Chief of the General Staff
3. Artillery Command
4. Political Department
5. Staff Department
6. General Artillery School
7. Artillery Noncommissioned Officers School
8. Operations
9. Antiaircraft Artillery
10. Training
11. Ordnance
12. Ranks
13. Ordnance Department
14. Ammunition Depot
15. Antiaircraft Artillery
16. Howitzers
17. Rockets
18. Mortars
19. 203-mm Artillery

Organization of the Mechanized Command

Key:
1. Minister of the People's Armed Forces
2. Chief of the General Staff
3. Mechanized Command
4. Political Department
5. Staff Department
6. Operations
7. Ordnance
8. Training
9. Ranks
10. Tanks
11. Tanks
12. Guidance
13. Repair
6. Political Organizations of the Armed Forces

As has already been stated, because the North Korean armed forces are the "armed forces of the party," the armed forces are subject to two-fold and three-fold command and supervision by the Workers Party at various levels. In the armed forces are such organizations as military party committees, political departments, political secretaries, and the Socialist Working Youth. These organizations substantively interfere even in the aspect of military operations, and they possess the right to supervise military actions.

Also, these organizations penetrate down to the lowest squads and in fact are in complete control of the armed forces. These organizations are shown in the table ("North Korean Encyclopedia," Vol 2, p 48):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(5) 办公共</th>
<th>(2) 监督</th>
<th>(3) 执行</th>
<th>(4) 协助</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>纪委</td>
<td>中央纪委</td>
<td>中央纪委</td>
<td>中央纪委</td>
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<td>中央纪委</td>
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<td>中央纪委</td>
<td>中央纪委</td>
<td>中央纪委</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中央纪委</td>
<td>中央纪委</td>
<td>中央纪委</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中央纪委</td>
<td>中央纪委</td>
<td>中央纪委</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
1. Resolution
2. Supervision
3. Execution
4. Assistance
5. Workers Party
6. Central Committee
7. Military Party Committees
8. Central Party Secretariat
9. Ministry of the People's Armed Forces
10. People's Armed Forces Secretariat
11. General Political Bureau
12. Socialist Working Youth
13. Command
14. Control

7. Organization and Functions of Special Forces

Kim Il-song himself stated: "The decisive guarantee of the victory in war lies in the mixed use of regular and irregular warfare. By waging mountain warfare and guerrilla warfare with light infantry troops armed with light weapons and by the mixed use of mountain warfare and guerrilla warfare in an emergency, more effects than nuclear warfare can be expected." Various forms of military organization for "irregular warfare," as it is referred to here, may be called special forces.

The "124th Military Unit" created already in 1967 was largely increased and expanded after the 21 January incident on the basis of the lawfulness of modern warfare and revolutionary warfare declared in January 1969. This was further united with the 17th Airborne Reconnaissance Corps to form two brigades. This is called the VIII Special Corps.
Since 1973 North Korea has further increased and strengthened this to five brigades. Parallel with this, light infantry regiments have been increased and expanded to two brigades in each army group (NAEWOE T'ONGSIN, No 202, 18 December 1975; refer to VIII Special Corps).

The strength of this corps was 35,000 until about 1972, and it was under the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces. It is estimated that about 500 to 600 belong also to the Liaison Department of the Workers Party. It is estimated that the number has been increased and strengthened recently to about 80,000.

Thus North Korea has turned about 16 percent of the ground forces into guerrilla units. As to their functions, light infantry units are trained for stirring up behind our lines, and the "VIII Special Corps" is primarily in charge of penetrating our rear. In this regard North Korea is strengthening the organization of the special forces with the combined system of "regular warfare" and "irregular warfare" ("North Korean Encyclopedia," Vol 2, p 89).

### Organization of Special Forces

![Diagram of Organization of Special Forces]

**Key:**
1. Workers Party
2. Secretariat (General Secretary: Kim Il-song)
3. Secretary in charge of Anti-South Korea Operations
4. Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces
5. Liaison Department
6. Reconnaissance Bureau
7. 695th Unit
8. VIII Special Corps
9. Marine Special Units
10. Army Groups
11. Light Infantry Brigades

8. Organization and Functions of North Korean Militia

It may be said that the organization of the North Korean militia originated in the experience of the Korean War. During the Korean War, with primarily offensive strategy and tactics North Korea advanced militarily in one stroke to South Korea. However, when the North Korean forces front was cut off from the rear, beginning with the Inchon landing, North Korea was on the verge of a complete military collapse. It may be said that what saved this
was the rear area called Southern Manchuria. Out of the military failure, that is, the front without a rear, the reflection on this has now caused North Korea to promote strongly the military system.

What Kim II-song emphasized most in his strategic reflection at the P'yolo-ri Conference was the rear-echelon problem, and he pointed out the military deficiency in this. To quote him directly, "we had not quite prepared the rear-echelon military forces, and even partially prepared forces without complete training were subjected to assault by large enemy forces. Thus, with newly organized and untrained forces we had to fight the large enemy forces that landed at Inchon." Kim II-song had to confess this. In the Korean War North Korea advanced its front line south without the rear, and it may be said that this was the greatest factor that led to the total defeat of the North Korean forces.

What emerged as military countermeasures to this was the militarization of the rear. Thus even taking the form of militia organization, the militarization of levels of above the militia has been progressing to this date.

The policy of militia organization was started on the basis of the strategic defeat in the Korean War. If the militia organization of North Korea was started by the lessons from the Korean War, the direct motivation for its organization was prompted by the formation of the rear area due to the participation of Chinese Communist forces in the war with the rear base in Southern Manchuria. Finally, with the withdrawal of the Chinese Communist forces from North Korea, the problem of the rear was once again raised.

When the Chinese Communist forces occupying North Korea began the first stage of their withdrawal in April 1958, North Korea directly started the militia organization. Imitating the militia organization of Communist China, the militia organization of North Korea was the revolutionary dissolution of the self-defense corps which had been under the Ministry of Interior, and the Worker-Peasant Red Guards were organized as rear units on 14 January 1959. The Worker-Peasant Red Guards were placed primarily under the Military Department of the Workers Party, and the 500,000-strong Worker-Peasant Red Guards were formed.

Thus, beginning with the withdrawal of the Chinese Communist forces, militia organizations were newly formed. A full-scale strengthening of militia organizations may be said to have started with the policy of arming all of the people as was proposed at the fifth session of the Fourth Congress of the Workers Party in December 1962. The arming of all of the people and the fortification of the entire land were in the same category of military strategy or military tactics. It may be said that with the arming of all of the people, supported by the fortification of the entire land, the rear was strengthened militarily.

The militia structure thus organized did not adopt a Western European form. The Military Committee of the Workers Party is in charge of the militia organizations, and their control structure is placed within the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces. This tells how much importance is attached to the militia structure.
The system of militia organizations is shown below ("North Korean Encyclopedia," Vol 2, p 105):

System of Militia Organizations

Key:
1. Military Committee
2. Militia Central Control Structure
3. Air Command Anti-air Command
4. Central Anti-air Countermeasures Committee
5. Provincial (Directly Administered City) Anti-air Countermeasures Committee
6. City (District), County Anti-air Countermeasures Committee
7. Ri (Tong), Workplace Anti-air Department
8. Worker-Peasant Red Guards Command
9. Provincial (Directly Administered City) Worker-Peasant Red Guards
10. City (District), County Worker-Peasant Red Guards
11. Ri (Tong), Workplace Worker-Peasant Red Guards

The kinds of militia organization that belong to such categories of North Korean militia organizations are, first, the mainstream Worker-Peasant Red Guards, Red Youth Honor Guards, People's Constabulary, student military training units, and the civil anti-air organizations. Their characteristics and military significance will be briefly described.

a. Worker-Peasant Red Guards

In North Korea, the Worker-Peasant Red Guards are organized with discharged soldiers, especially with those old-age veterans who participated in the Korean War, at the center, and with 18 to 50 year old males among workers, peasants, and office workers. Also, 18 to 35 year old single women are included. At present, it is composed of about 1.5 million people.

Duties of the Worker-Peasant Red Guards include receiving almost complete military training while they are engaged in peacetime production. They are trained to be instantly mobilized in wartime as the reserve forces of the North Korean armed forces to join the war or to engage in guerrilla activities. Rather than being a militia on a Western European concept,
this is an active paramilitary system to take charge of the rear with complete military force in wartime.

Organization of the Worker-Peasant Red Guards

Key:
1. Workers Party Military Department
2. Worker-Peasant Red Guards Command
3. Control
4. Command
5. Provincial Party, Local People's Committees Military Departments
6. Provincial (Directly Administered City) Worker-Peasant Red Guards
7. Army Corps Level
8. County Party, Local People's Committees Military Departments
9. City (District), County Worker-Peasant Red Guards
10. Regimental Level
11. Ri, Tong Worker-Peasant Red Guards
12. Battalion Level
13. Workplace, Village Worker-Peasant Red Guards
14. Company-Platoon Level
15. Ministry of the People's Armed Forces
16. General Staff
17. Training
18. Military Affairs
19. Combat Training Bureau
20. Military Mobilization Bureau
21. Officers Guidance Corps
22. Provincial Military Mobilization Department
23. County Military Mobilization Department

In the early stage of organization, the weapons system of the Worker-Peasant Red Guards started out with wooden rifles, but today they are supplied with AKM rifles, Simonov rifles, automatic rifles, light machineguns, heavy machineguns, mortars, antiaircraft guns, antitank guns, and field artillery pieces. Since 1967 individual firearms have been supplied to almost 100 percent of the troops.
b. Red Youth Honor Guards

The Red Youth Honor Guards number 700,000. For the Red Youth Honor Guards, military subjects included in general subjects at each middle and high school were previously taught. However, students in the fourth grade of middle school and up and high school students are organized in a military fashion and are being trained by service branches and service arms. Since 1970, the Red Youth Honor Guards have been separated from Student Red Guards to become Red Youth Honor Guards.

Their training by service arm shows that they undergo training as radio operators, drivers, tank operators, pilots, paratroopers, and artillerymen. In their weapons system, almost 100 percent of them are supplied with AKM rifles.

c. People's Constabulary

Immediately following the armistice, the 38th Parallel Constabulary, which had been dissolved, were reorganized and were placed under the local Public Security Bureaus in the coastal areas. This may be called militia organization for coastal defense.

The People's Constabulary is under the Fifth Bureau (Security Bureau) of the Ministry of Public Security. And for coastal defense coastal security stations are established in provinces along coastal areas. Especially since 1965, the People's Constabulary has been strengthened with veterans and has become a militia organization for coastal security.

d. Student Military Training

Student military training at the militia level in North Korea is subject to strict state command and control. The command of student military training is directly held by the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces. Instructors at 4-year colleges are directly dispatched by the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces.

The contents of student military training are in Tables 5 and 6 ("North Korean Encyclopedia," Vol 2, p 109):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
<th>Annually</th>
<th>Total hours (including field training)</th>
<th>Training classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>320 hours (640 hours)*</td>
<td>Company and platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2d</td>
<td>hours</td>
<td>hours</td>
<td>10 days vacation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>3d</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>240 hours</td>
<td>Squad and platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>hours</td>
<td>hours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 6. Contents of Education by School Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Contents of Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-year College</td>
<td>1st year</td>
<td>Various forms of training (basic movements and drills without arms), guard duties, interior duty discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2d year</td>
<td>Weapons-handling training, squad and platoon-level training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3d year</td>
<td>Company and battalion-level training, command and leadership (movement drills up to company commanders, modern operational training, that is, training for scientific war)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4th year</td>
<td>Joint operations, tactical training, scientific warfare training, and training for command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-year College</td>
<td>1st year</td>
<td>Various forms of training, squad and platoon-level training, weapons handling training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2d year</td>
<td>Practice firing, movement drills as squad leaders and platoon leaders, scientific training, training for scientific warfare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Civil Anti-air Structure

The civil anti-air structure also originated in the strengthening of air supremacy following its complete collapse in the rear area during the Korean War.

As anti-air organizations are civil anti-air countermeasures committees centered on party and administrative systems and on warning and anti-air operations command under the Anti-air Command. In 1961, in accordance with the Cabinet decision, North Korea organized a civil anti-air structure, called the "Anti-air Countermeasures Committee." This is organized at the provincial, city, and county levels.

Its command system is outlined below ("North Korean Encyclopedia," Vol 2, p 112):
Table 7. Organization of the Central Anti-air Countermeasures Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) 中央反航空對策委員會</th>
<th>(2) 委員長：政務院 副院長</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(3) 道、特別市 反航空 對策委員會</td>
<td>(4) 委員長：道、特別市 地方行政委員會 副委員長</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) 市、郡 反航空 對策委員會</td>
<td>(6) 委員長：市、郡 地方行政委員會 副委員長</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) 委員：市、郡 地方人民委員會 委員長</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) 里洞、企業所 反航空部</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) ○ 1961.7. 組織</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) ○ 反航空事業及訓練主管</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
1. Central Anti-air Countermeasures Committee
2. Chairman: Deputy Premier of the Administration Council
3. Provincial, Special City Anti-air Countermeasures Committee
4. Chairman: Vice Chairman of Provincial, Special City Local Administrative Committees
5. City, County Anti-air Countermeasures Committees
6. Chairman: Vice Chairmen of City, County, Local Administrative Committees
7. Committee Members: Chairmen of City, County Local People's Committees
   Vice Chairmen of Military Departments of City, County Local People's Committees
   Directors of City, County Public Security Departments
   Directors of Military Mobilization Departments of City, County Local Administrative Committees
8. Ri, Tong Offices Anti-air Departments
10. Principally in Charge of Anti-air and Training

10372/6091
CSO: 4107/112
BRIEFS

CHONG CHUN-KI ATTENDS OPENING—Pyongsong 9 April (KCNA)—-An integrated circuit pilot plant of the electronic engineering institute of the Academy of Sciences has been commissioned. The plant built by a joint investment of Korea and the United National Development Programme will develop integrated circuits of various kinds for trial production and play the role of a training centre to bring up scientists, technicians and skilled workers in this domain. The commissioning ceremony of the plant was held Wednesday on the spot. Comrade Chong Chun-ki and officials concerned were present at the commissioning ceremony together with employees and builders of the plant. Present on invitation at the ceremony were Carl Wiberg, representative of the UNDP in Pyongyang, and officials of his office here. A speech was made there. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 0435 GMT 9 Apr 87 SK] /12913

CSO: 4100/162
KIM IL-SONG GREETs GROUP OF 77 MEETING

SK200530 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0520 GMT 20 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 20 (KCNA)—The great leader President Kim Il-song on April 18 sent a message of greetings to the sixth ministerial meeting of the group of 77.

The ministerial meeting will be of weighty importance in arranging economic demands to be presented jointly by developing countries to the seventh session of the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and promoting the work to restructure the old inequitable international economic order and establish a new equitable one, the message says, and notes:

Today, the developing countries are undergoing economic crisis in various domains because of all forms of inequitable and unfair international economic relations, and gap between the developing and the developed countries is growing with each passing day.

This is a serious international problem which renders the international situation unstable and endangers peace at present, setting forth an urgent task the solution of which brooks no delay.

Only when the developing countries are united closely to strengthen cooperation and take a concerted step, can they settle the problem.

The government of the DPRK has common aspirations and interests with the developing countries in the international economic relations and always makes every possible effort to carry out the joint strategy and action plans worked out by them.

Convinced that the sixth ministerial meeting of the group of 77 will make a positive contribution to strengthening the unity and solidarity among developing countries and finding out effective and affirmative ways for the forthcoming seventh mission of the UNCTAD by successfully discussing the agenda items, I wish the meeting fine fruition in its work.

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CSO: 4100/171
Kim Il-song Greets Mugabe on Zimbabwean Anniversary

SK180439 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0421 GMT 18 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 18 (KCNA)--Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, sent a message of greetings on April 16 to Comrade Robert G. Mugabe, first secretary and president of the Central Committee of the Zimbabwe African National Union and prime minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe, on the occasion of the 7th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

The message said that, after achieving the independence of the country under the leadership of prime minister Robert G. Mugabe, the Zimbabwean people have registered many successes on the road of achieving national unity and heading for socialism, surmounting manifold obstacles and difficulties.

The Korean people express firm solidarity with the Zimbabwean people in their just struggle to defend the revolutionary gains and achieve the independent development of the country, smashing the incessant armed invasion and subversive activities and sabotage of imperialists and the South African racists, it noted, and said:

Availing itself of this opportunity, I wish you greater success in your future work for your country's prosperity, the complete liberation of Africa and expansion and development of the non-aligned movement and express the belief that the friendly and cooperative relations between our two countries will consolidate and develop day by day according to the landmark set through our meeting in Pyongyang.

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CSO: 4100/171
REPORTAGE ON KIM IL-SONG BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION

Castro Hosts Luncheon

SK180451 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0434 GMT 18 Apr 87

[Text] Havana April 16 (KCNA)--Comrade Fidel Castro Ruz, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, president of the Council of State and president of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, gave a luncheon on April 15 at the revolutionary palace in congratulations of the 75th birthday of Comrade Kim Il-song.

Present there were party and government cadres including Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, vice-president of the Council of State and vice-president of the Council of Ministers of Cuba. Present on invitation were Korean ambassador to Cuba Pak Yong-se and his embassy officials.

In his toast, Comrade Fidel Castro Ruz stressed that many countries of the world were organizing significant functions and extending respect and love, reverence and solidarity to Comrade Kim Il-song as he is not only the great leader of the Korean people but also an outstanding anti-imperialist fighter and leader.

He continued:

Comrade Kim Il-song has, indeed, performed enormous exploits since he embarked upon the road of revolution at the early age of 14.

He beat down Japanese imperialists to liberate the country and defeated the U.S. imperialists in the fatherland liberation war, bringing freedom to the Korean people.

In the postwar period he built a new Korea on ruins.

Today, Korea has turned into a genuine society of the people as we saw it at first hand.

I sincerely wish Comrade Kim Il-song good health and a long life on this occasion.
Foreign Delegations Depart

SK180510 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0439 GMT 18 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 18 (KCNA)—Special envoys of presidents and governments of different countries and foreign delegations left here on April 17 after visiting Korea to celebrate the 75th birthday of the great leader President Kim Il-song.

They were as follows:

The party and government delegation of the Republic of Zambia headed by K.S.K. Musokotwane, prime minister of the Republic of Zambia;

The government delegation of the Republic of Botswana headed by His Excellency P.S. Mmusi, vice-president of the Republic of Botswana;

The Afghan party and state delegation headed by Saleh Mohammad Ziry, member of the Political Bureau, and secretary, of the Central Committee of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan and member of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council, who is a special envoy of Mohammad Najibullah, general secretary of the Central Committee of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan;

The delegation of the Socialist Party of Costa Rica headed by its general secretary Alvaro Montero Mejia;

The delegation of the Communist Party of India headed by C. Rajeswara Rao, general secretary of its National Council;

The delegation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) headed by E.M.S. Namboodiripad, general secretary of its Central Committee;

The delegation of the Communist Party of Argentina headed by its general secretary Athos Fava;

The party and government delegation of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau headed by Isfai Camara, vice-president of the State Council and minister of People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces;

The Ghanaian Government delegation headed by E.K.T. Donkoh, chief of staff of the Provisional National Defence Council of the Republic of Ghana;

The government delegation of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea headed by Francisco Boddein Ngalo, chairman of the People’s Chamber of Representatives;

The delegation of the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah headed by Mustafa a-Harrubi, general inspector of the Armed Forces of Libya;

The party and state delegation of the People’s Republic of Benin led by Imoron Garba, first vice-president of the permanent committee of the National Revolutionary Assembly of Benin;
K.C. Pant, minister of national defence, who is a special envoy of Rajiv Gandhi, prime minister of the Republic of India, and his party;

M. Mursalim, chief advisor to Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who is his special envoy, and his party;

Mamduh Salim, assistant to the president, who is a special envoy of Mohammad Husni Mubarak, president of the Arab Republic of Syria, and his party;

Joseph Kavaruganda, member of the Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development and president of the Supreme Court, who is a special envoy of his excellency Habiyarnama Juvenal, president of the Republic of Rwanda and president-founder of the movement, and his party; K.M. Kangai, minister of energy and water resources development of Zimbabwe, who is a special envoy of Canaan Banana, president of the Republic of Zimbabwe, and his party; Malik Nasim Ahmed Ahir, minister of education, health, special education and social welfare, who is a special envoy of Mohammad Ziaul Haq, president of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and his party; Raul Brakanssa, member of the Political Bureau of the Liberation Movement of Sao Tome and Principe, vice-president of the National People's Assembly and minister of defence and internal order, who is a special envoy of Manuel Pinto de Costa, chairman of the Liberation Movement of Sao Tome and Principe and president of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, and his party; Ahmed Mujuthaba, minister of transport and shipping, who is a special envoy of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, president of the Republic of Maldives, and his party; Boualem Benhamouda, member of the Political Bureau of the Algerian National Liberation Front Party and president of the National Institute for the Study of General Strategy, who is a special envoy of Chadli Bendjeddid, president of the Algerian Democratic and People's Republic, and his party; Wiltshire Johnson, minister of health, public service and youth of the Republic of Sierra Leone, who is a special envoy of J.S. Momoh, president of the Republic of Sierra Leone, and his party; the delegation of the Sierra Leonean National Committee for the Study of the Chuche Idea headed by V.J.V. Mambu, member of parliament and minister of works and labour of Sierra Leone; Felix Eloy Torres, member of the leadership of the Venezuela's movement for socialism who is a delegate of the movement; the Bolivian parliamentary delegation headed by Abel Ayoroo Argandonya, member, and chairman of the External Relations Committee, of the Senate of Bolivia; the delegation of the South West Africa People's Organisation led by Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, its secretary-general; Ruth Mompamiti, administrative secretary of the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress of South Africa, who is a special envoy of Oliver Tambo, president of the congress, and his party; and the government delegation of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic headed by Mohamed Ould Mubarak Ouldralah, member of the Political Bureau of the Polisario Front and president of the National Council.

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CSO: 4100/171
HWANG CHANG-YOP ATTENDS EGYPTIAN ENVOY'S RECEPTION

SK100518 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0454 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang 10 April (KCNA)--Muhyi Al-din Al-'attar, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Arab Republic of Egypt to Korea, gave a reception on the evening of 9 April on the occasion of the 75th birthday of the great leader President Kim Il-song.

Speaking at the reception, the ambassador said that the birthday of the great leader President Kim Il-song was celebrated in Egypt as in Korea.

Referring to the development of solid and excellent relations of friendship between Korea and Egypt, he stressed that this success was based on the intimacy between President Kim Il-song and President Muhammad Husni Mubarak.

He said that Egypt firmly supported the political initiatives and efforts of the party and government of Korea for the peaceful reunification of the country and for peace and security on the Korean peninsula.

Hwang Chang-yop, secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, spoke next.

Thanks to the wise leadership and deep benevolence of President Kim Il-song, he said, Korea has today turned into a dignified and prospering socialist state of independence, self-support and self-reliance in defence and the Korean people into a proud people who carve out their destiny, holding it in their own hands.

He stressed: Today our party and people have secured a firm guarantee for carrying through to completion generation after generation the revolutionary cause of chuche pioneered and victoriously advanced by President Kim Il-song, by holding dear Comrade Kim Chong-il in high esteem as the leader.

Pointing to the development of friendly relations between the two countries and two parties, he wished the party and government of Egypt greater success in the work for developing the economy, bettering the people's lives and consolidating the national unity under the leadership of esteemed President Muhammad Husni Mubarak.

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N. KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS, TRADE

NODONG SINMUN MARKS SYRIAN INDEPENDENCE ANNIVERSARY

SK171050 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1039 GMT 17 Apr 87

[Text] Pyongyang April 17 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN and MINJU CHOSON today dedicate signed articles to the 41st anniversary of the independence of Syria.

The signed article of NODONG SINMUN notes that over the past 40–odd years since independence the industrious Syrian people have registered remarkable successes in their worthwhile struggle to defend national dignity and territorial integrity and achieve social changes.

It says:

Today the Syrian people under the leadership of the Arab Socialist Baath Party headed by President Hafiz al-Asad are confidently advancing toward socialism, smashing the enemy's ceaseless provocative acts with a high degree of revolutionary determination and vigilance.

The government and people of Syria are actively struggling against the imperialist and Israeli policies of aggression on the Arab countries and for a fair and peaceful solution to the mideast issue.

The Korean people denounce the anti-Syrian moves of the imperialists and Israel and express support any militant solidarity for the Syrian people's cause.

We believe that the relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries will further expand and develop in the future in the idea of independence, friendship and peace.

The just struggle of the Syrian people to implement the decisions of the 8th regional congress of the Arab Socialist Baath Party, retake the occupied Arab land and achieve progress and independent development will bear fine fruit.

MINJU CHOSON says the Korean people rejoice as over their own over the achievements of the Syrian people in their strivings for national independence and building of a new life.

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BRIEFS

AGRICULTURE, HYDROELECTRIC DAM--Luanda, 11 April (ANGOP/PANA)--Angola and North Korea have signed an agreement for cooperation in the fields of agriculture, phosphates production, [word indistinct] and hydroelectric dam construction. The agreement was signed on Wednesday at the end of a four-day official visit to North Korea by Angolan President dos Santos. Under the agreement, North Korea will assist Angola to improve on its production of maize, rice, vegetables, and cotton for both domestic consumption and exports. The agreement also provide for a Korean participation in the building of a hydroelectric dam and the construction of a building to be used for cultural activities in Angola. A team of Korean experts is expected to visit Angola from 15-20 April for a technical study of projects to be undertaken under the cooperation agreement. [Text] [Dakar PANA in English 0912 GMT 11 Apr 87 MB] /12913

ANNIVERSARY OF DPRK-SOMALI TIES--Pyongyang 12 April (KCNA)--NODONG SINMUN today dedicates an article to the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Somali Democratic Republic. Noting that in the past 20 years the peoples of the two countries have made new advances in the building of a new life, maintaining the bonds of friendship, the author of the article says: Today the Somali people are striving to develop the national economy and national culture. Somalia is pursuing a non-aligned policy externally. The Korean people congratulate the Somali people on their achievements made in the construction of a new society and wish them greater successes in their future endeavours. To strengthen Korea-Somalia friendship conforms with the interests of the peoples of the two countries. Our people will, as ever, make efforts to develop the friendly and cooperative relations with the Somali people in conformity with the idea of independence, friendship and peace. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 0846 GMT 12 Apr 87 SK] /12913

WPK SENDS GREETINGS--Pyongyang 9 April (KCNA)--The Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea sent a message of greetings Wednesday to the National Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement of Bolivia on the 35th anniversary of the victory of the April revolution in Bolivia. The message says the victory of the nation-wide popular armed uprising in Bolivia 35 years ago marked a new turning point in the history of the Bolivian people's struggle to build a new life. The message expresses the belief that the friendly relations between the Workers' Party of Korea and the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement of Bolivia and the peoples of Korea and
Bolivia will grow stronger and develop in the future in the idea of independence, friendship and peace. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 0451 GMT 9 Apr 87 SK] /12913

MEETING MARKS BOMBING OF LIBYA—Pyongyang 9 April (KCNA)—A solidarity meeting was held in Pyongyang on 7 April upon the lapse of one year since the U.S. imperialists committed a brutal bombing raid on Libya. Present at the meeting together with working people in the city were Kim Pong-chu, chairman of the Central Committee of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea and chairman of the Korea-Libya Friendship Association, Chon Yon-ok, vice-chairman of the association, and other officials concerned. Also present on invitation were Muhammad 'Umar Al-baroni, secretary of the People's Committee of the People's Bureau of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and officials of the People's Bureau in Pyongyang. Speeches were exchanged at the meeting. The meeting adopted a letter to Mu'ammar al-Qadhdfahi, leader of the great September first revolution of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 0958 GMT 9 Apr 87 SK] /12913

DPRK DAILY MARKS ANNIVERSARY—Pyongyang 9 April (KCNA)—NODONG SINFUN and MINJU CHOSON today dedicate signed articles to the 35th anniversary of the victory of the April Revolution in Bolivia. The Bolivian people are struggling to defend the sovereignty of the country and achieve prosperity under hard conditions of continued interference of the imperialists and manoeuvres of the domestic reactionaries, NODONG SINFUN notes, and says: Pursuing a non-aligned foreign policy, the Bolivian government is developing friendly relations with its neighbours and many countries of the world. The development of the friendly relations between Korea and Bolivia accords with the interest of the two peoples and helps toward promoting the common cause of the developing countries against imperialism and for independence and strengthening the might of the non-aligned movement. The Korean people are convinced that the friendly and cooperative relations with the Bolivian people will develop in the interest of the two countries in the future. They wish the Bolivian people greater success in their efforts to build a new life. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 1004 GMT 9 Apr 87 SK] /12913

KHAMENE'I ENVOY BRIEFS KOREAN OFFICIAL—Tehran, April 17, IRNA—Special envoy of Iranian President Khamene'i, Mustafa Mir Salim met Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Yong-nam and a group of military and political officials in Pyongyang Thursday night. At the meeting, Kim Yong-nam said that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea attaches great importance to coordinating and cooperating the [as received] Islamic Republic of Iran on major world issues, and that it will continue to do so as it has in the past. Mir Salim, in response, briefed the DPRK foreign minister of the latest developments of the Iraqi-imposed war, especially the Iraqi Ba'thist regime's recent crime of deploying chemical weapons. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1525 GMT 17 Apr 87] /8309

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