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Arms Control

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MOSCOW TV CARRIES OVERVIEW OF SDI ISSUES

LD230052 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1600 GMT 22 Dec 86

["Repercussions" program on the theme "The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative: Its Objectives and Consequences; the Plans and Reality; Who Is For It and Who Is Against It?" introduced by political observer Georgiy Zubkov with the participation of USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh; Academician Vitaliy Iosifovich Goldanskiy; Major General Yuriy Viktorovich Lebedev, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Treaty and Legal Directorate; Andronik Melkonovich Petrosyants, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy; and political observer Boris Aleksandrovich Kalyagin — live, except for recorded video introduction]

[Excerpts] [Begin recording; video shows series of unidentified people interviewed on the street]

[Woman] I am very worried by the problem of SDI and by Mr Reagan's behavior.

[Man] Are the people in the United States being sensible? What does the Reagan administration hope for? After all, 10 percent of these warheads will reach their territory anyway. What are they hoping for?

[Man] I have thought a little about this U.S. defense initiative which, of course, is a foul act against mankind. Doesn't it seem to you that the next President after Reagan will make a start and — even if only for publicity considerations — simply return to the existing level of approximate parity?

[Man] How long can this go on?

[Man] After all, they do not have any intention of launching an attack, so they say. So, where does the answer lie?

[Man] There is yet another question with regard to the plans for cooperation in space. Is there still some sort of hope that Soyuz and Apollo, even if under different names, at some future time will fly into space, after a period of time has elapsed, in maybe 5 or 10 years? Well, that is what I'd like to find out.

[Man] I know a bit about the SDI program and what specifically it represents. People all around us have no idea what it is.

[Woman] If there is peaceful cooperation in space then there will never be a war. I have a verse of my own and I will recite it:
I believe that the Earth's destiny is to grow wiser within the universe,
Our home — our own planet — will not perish;
Its savior will be matchless combination
Of mighty reason and the power of light.

I have our sun in mind. [end recording]

[Zubkov] Good evening, comrades. Our broadcast today is devoted to various aspects of
the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative of the United States. It is a most topical
and a most important subject. The SDI program has turned out to be the central point
of solving such vitally important international problems as nuclear disarmament, the
strengthening of security, and the lessening of international tension.

And even conversation that took place with passers-by in the streets of Moscow is a
kind of viewers' introduction to our broadcast. It shows both your interest in the
subject that has been chosen and a multitude of questions which arise in connection
with the SDI program.

The participants in our broadcast today will help answer them. Let me introduce them
to you:

Deputy USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh, who has been
engaged in diplomatic work since 1957; he worked in Washington and was head of the U.S.
Department at the USSR Foreign Ministry;

Academician Vitaly Iosifovich Goldanskiy, Lenin Prize winner, known through his works
in chemical and nuclear physics, is deputy chairman of the Board of the All-Union
Knowledge Society and takes an active part in the International Pugwash Movement of
Scientists for peace and disarmament;

Major-General Yuriy Viktorovich Lebedev, deputy chief of a directorate of the USSR
Armed Forces General Staff, graduated from the Dzerzhinskiy Military Artillery
Academy, served in the troops and was a participant in the Soviet-U.S. disarmament
talks;

Andranik Melkonovich Petrosyants, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the
Utilization of Atomic Energy, mechanical engineer by education, worked in production
and occupied leading posts in the engineering industry, and for many years has been in
charge of research in the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. He is
academician of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences;

My colleague Boris Aleksandrovich Kalyagin, political observer of Central Television,
was, as you remember, our television correspondent in Delhi and London.

Our talk today is the first live broadcast with replies to viewers' questions on
international affairs, so its success does not only depend on the broadcast's
participants, but also on your activeness, comrades, on your responses which we shall
receive here via the telephone numbers that are shown in our Central Television
studio. Some questions have already been received. They are contained in the letters
addressed to Central Television and we shall use them, too.

Proceeding from the name of the broadcast that has been announced, let us examine three
chapters of the SDI program: its objectives and consequences, the plans and reality,
who is for it and who is against it. I repeat: We are waiting for your questions
concerning these problems. And, for the time being, let us recall that the SDI program is linked to President Reagan's initiative on strategic defense. It was announced in one of Reagan's speeches, in March 1983 almost 3 years ago. What is SDI, the program of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative? Let us examine its military, scientific, and political aspects. Obviously, all the participants in our broadcast will have their say. Well, evidently you, Yuriy Viktorovich, will have the floor.

[Lebedev] All right. Before I say what SDI is, I would like to state unequivocally that it is a program for making arms which was announced by President Reagan on 23 March 1983. The world finds this program literally disturbing, and this has already been the case for a few years. What do they intend to do? What do they intend to create by keeping this program? It envisages the creation of large-scale ABM system, an antiballistic missile defense system with space-based elements. And, apart from that, in the context of creating arms for this kind of system, it is planned to develop offensive space weapons capable of striking targets equally in space, in the air, on earth, or on the surface of water. What will comprise the ABM system?

Well, antimissile missiles -- the antimissile missiles for long-range interception of ballistic targets and the antimissile missiles for close-range interception, that is to say interception already within the atmosphere -- are, as is known, the classic, traditional way of combating ballistic missiles worked out back in the sixties.

Well now, those who are developing [razrabatyvat] the SDI wish to deploy weapons, offensive weapons, in space. This makes it possible in practice to strike targets on the territory of any state in very brief periods of time. It is proposed to deploy in space the target detection devices, guidance devices, and target destruction devices. Moreover, these devices are being developed [razrabatyvat] on the basis of new physical principles. These include kinetic weapons, that is to say these can be ballistic missiles, guided missiles, directional beam weapons, such as laser weapons and, finally, electromagnetic emission weapons.

And so you have hanging over our planet weapons that are intended to intercept a ballistic missile along the whole of its flightpath and destroy it. The destruction of such missiles is supposed to happen both in the initial, or active, phase of the flight of such a missile, in the phase of separation of the warheads from this missile, the so-called ballistic phase of a missile's flight, and finally, in the descent phase of the missile, where existing and most highly developed weapons, so to speak, have been used and evidently will be used -- these are the short-range and long-range intercepting antimissile missiles. Thus the antimissile defense system and weapons being created [sozdat] under this program are, as I have stressed, weapons which the creators of this system claim are absolute. But there are no such weapons, so that the emergence of a new kind of weaponry, as is being developed [razrabotat] under the SDI program, will inevitably give rise to countermeasures, that is, there will arise a new impetus for the arms race, an arms race in both defensive and offensive weapons.

[Zubkov] We will undoubtedly be looking at this again in the second part of our program, but now, Vitaliy Iosifovich, would you please outline the scientific aspects of the SDI program? What is the essence of it?

[Goldanskiy] Well, it seems to me you could put it this way, that it concerns the development [razrabotka] of scientific and technological aspects of a very wide range of pulsed destructive effects on matter. And as Yuriy Viktorovich has already said, it
is a matter of effects which will be implemented both in space and from space; that is, all the means for creating such effects would be connected with space or put into space. I would also like to stress that in the program, a very great role, a big part, is given over to planning for the maximum use of computerization; that is, there is an extremely broad application of computer technology. In essence, the destiny of mankind is being entrusted more and more to computers. This is particularly dangerous, since less and less time is given to making various decisions on different signals while the complexity of the task that has to be performed becomes greater and greater.

As far as these pulsed attack effects themselves are concerned, what is the meaning of pulsed effects here? Basically it is a matter of compressing the energy at our disposal as much as possible, either in time, that is, increasing the power of the effect by making it a very short-lived and powerful pulse, or, compressing it in space, which is even more to the point in this case, in the framework of this program.

Speaking specifically about one of the important elements of the SDI program, this means a nuclear-pumped X-ray laser — you hear about this very often. What do they have in mind? What they have in mind is that the energy of a nuclear explosion, which in a normal nuclear weapon is spread equally in all directions, should be concentrated in certain given directions by the rays, the several dozens of rays, of this X-ray laser.

Thus the energy is provided by the explosion itself, while the effect is directed so that the power in these chosen directions becomes extremely enhanced. So it is clear that we are dealing with the task of creating [sozdaniye] what are weapons based truly on new principles.

[Zubkov] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, of course we shall be returning frequently to the political aspects of SDI, which have become important in resolving the problem of nuclear disarmament. But could you begin by speaking about how important the SDI program now is for the whole of today's international situation?

[Bessmertnykh] I think we have already established that this concerns the creation [sozdaniye] of a new kind of weapon, not a type but a kind. We have spoken a little about the fact that ways exist for the scientific-technological attainment of this aim. All this is yet to come, to a certain extent; that is, the program is gathering pace. As a political problem, however, SDI already exists. It is already hampering international life, it is undermining opportunities to achieve accord, and it is complicating in the extreme the talks between the Soviet Union and the United States, as is shown by the meetings between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and President Reagan last year in Geneva and in Reykjavik in October this year. In fact, the problem of SDI was pivotal and central at these meetings as well. That is, as a political problem, SDI is a very resounding one, if one could put it like that.

Furthermore, the specific effect of SDI on talks and on public opinion lies in the fact that, as I see it, we are dealing with one of the greatest mystifications that has ever occurred — political mystifications, that is. SDI has been given a very attractive package, and Mikhail Sergeyevich once said plainly about this, that it is attractive packaging for very suspicious and dangerous goods. It is particularly dangerous right now precisely because it upsets the normal course of international affairs, normal contacts and dialogue, and just as the iceberg kept undermining the Titanic, so this undermines the possibility of progress on the most vital issues of our times. And so it is understandable that it is the political aspect of SDI — and by the way we have
borrowed the name SDI from the Americans, in fact it has been created by all the yardsticks of advertising, it means Strategic Defense Initiative; all the words are very fine, but the essence of SDI is very ominous. And so in order for us to carefully come to grips with this problem, once again we must look behind these fine words, which are very attractive, and I think that is what we shall be doing today.

[Zubkov] Thank you very much. Now what we are waiting for from you, Andronik Melkonovich, is for you to speak about whether SDI is really a defense initiative, as indicated in its own terms, or whether it is an offensive weapon, and so, could you begin with this?

[Petrosyants] From the brief conversations so far it is very clear that SDI is by no means a shield, by no means a defense but an outright offensive weapon. SDI as a shield is an unconcealed propaganda trick, behind which they are trying, or so far have been trying, to conceal direct action weapons. And (you have all) spoken quite correctly concerning the fact that SDI will in its turn force a counteraction. Every action has its reaction.

[Zubkov] Unfortunately, that is a fact. The first questions are already coming in, and one is from Comrade Aleksandr Alekseyevich Nagorniy from Moscow: Is there any point in taking any notice of SDI? Perhaps we should ignore it and deal with our own problems.

[Petrosyants] Well, I'll go on anyway, thank you. What I want to say is this, that SDI has as its foundation the X-ray laser with a nuclear pump. And what is that? It combines a high level of power (removed from a unit of volume of the medium) with a high level of energy in the pulse. And Vitaliy put it very well.

It is indeed in this respect that the carrying out of nuclear explosions is very important. Without the carrying out of nuclear explosions, without those, neither we nor anyone else would get any nuclear pump. And, what's more, this is why the United States are insisting so stubbornly on continuing nuclear explosions. Of course there is a whole range of other considerations, too, but these include precisely this: the obtaining of a nuclear-pumped X-ray laser.

[Zubkov] As we expected, very many questions have already come in -- here they are gathered together in a single bundle. These are the questions, but essentially they are boil down to this: How are we going to respond to the SDI program? What will our response be? Albert Petrovich Limakov, an engineer from Moscow; Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zagasin, an electrician; Nikolayev, a lathe operator from Nikolayev; and other comrades ask about this. Perhaps we will first of all give an answer to these and then continue the discussion, Yurii Viktorovich?

[Lebedev] Yes, we certainly must answer these questions.

[Zubkov] Essentially the questions boil down to one thing: How are we going to be able to reply? Those that I have read, this bundle of questions, put it in different words, but, yes, go on.

[Lebedev] Essentially the questions are about what it is that makes SDI dangerous.

[Zubkov] And they are about our countermeasures.
[Lebedev] Yes, and they are about our countermeasures. But I have already said that SDI first and foremost is a weapon, and primarily an offensive weapon, first because this weapon, in space augments the strategic offensive potential possessed by the United States; that is to say, this weapon, deployed in space, is capable of creating the illusion that the possibility of a Soviet retaliatory strike would be undermined. In that event there could be those capable of reaching out for the "button" in order to try and test their strength. Consequently, this is fraught with the danger of war breaking out. Besides, these weapons, deployed in space, are intended to destroy the eyes of the other side, and I am referring to the struggle against the satellites, the artificial earth satellites, the purpose of which is to monitor [kontrol] and to give early warning of missile attack. In destroying them the enemy could, of course, find himself in a difficult situation. So all of this is aimed at creating conditions for delivering a first nuclear strike.

[Zubkov] (Defense comes afterwards)

[Lebedev] Certainly. But of course hopes of achieving any rights of that kind for the United States remain illusory. The Soviet Union is a state which is capable of responding in a fitting way to intrigues which threaten its defensive capability. What ways do we choose for this? We have great possibilities. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has already spoken of the fact that our scientists and our engineers have been given the task: They are working on the measures that we can pit against SDI. It has to be stated directly that both U.S. and Soviet scientists have said that measures, countermeasures, against SDI can be much cheaper, much simpler, and developed much more quickly than the antimissile system itself which is being developed [sozdanitsya] under the SDI program. Even Western specialists say that both defensive means and active — that is to say, offensive — means can be used here. What are the means that we will choose? Well, evidently this will be decided by our specialists depending upon the situation that comes about.

One thing is clear: We are of course not going to go along the road that the United States is proposing to us. We are going to choose our own road. And I think that that road will be effective and that the U.S. antimissile defense will of course not allow the United States to hope that the Soviet Union will be incapable, in a counterstrike, of giving a fitting response to those plans which the United States is currently hatching.

[Zubkov] Thank you. Boris Aleksandrovich, could you tell us about the arguments that are being used by Western propaganda in support of the SDI program?

[Kalyagin] The main argument used by U.S. propaganda, by the U.S. Administration, is to be found in the title of this program: It is called a defense initiative, and we have already spoken about that. That is why President Reagan took offense when Edward Kennedy, the well-known Democratic senator, called this program "Star Wars." But no matter what President Reagan did in his attempts to get rid of this very meaningful description, nothing came of it; it became fixed very firmly to that concept. And so U.S. propaganda asserts that what is intended is the development [sozdat] of defensive nonnuclear weapons that are targeted not against people but only against nuclear missiles, and that in the event of their being launched, in the event of their being used as first-strike weapons, they do not, before, represent any danger to us. But this has already been discussed very well by other participants in this meeting.

I can add further the fact that SDI envisages the development [sozdat] of weapons with a range of 4-5,000 km. What kind of defensive weapon is that? It is an all-purpose weapon, and of course it can be used for all purposes.
And there is also the following argument which President Reagan likes to use, that SDI will lead to the withering away, to the obsolescence, of nuclear weapons and will render them unnecessary — in other words, the role virtually of deliverer of mankind from the nuclear threat is being ascribed to the Star Wars program, to the SDI program. But the U.S. Administration is playing upon the fear that people quite naturally have in the face of the nuclear threat. Reagan sometimes says that the concept of mutual assured nuclear destruction is in effect immoral, that it must be replaced, and that SDI will help to do that.

Well, indeed, such a concept does exist. It means that an outbreak of nuclear conflict is deterred by the understanding that in it there will be no victor, that both sides have enough weapons to destroy each other. We do not consider this to be an ideal situation either. And we have proposed a clear and direct path — the path of rejection of nuclear weapons, which has been set down in the well-known historic statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. In Reykjavik, too, we proposed that strategic arms should be given up and that there should be no embarking upon SDI.

All would appear to be clear, but the United States is refusing. Reagan says that SDI is essential as an insurance policy for the United States. An insurance policy against whom? If we agree to eliminate strategic nuclear arms there will be no ballistic missiles, so against whom is the insurance policy? It could be better described as an insurance policy for the arms manufacturers, one that will guarantee them increased profits. But the United States — particularly the President himself — says that at some time a madman will suddenly make his appearance and will want to reinvent nuclear weapons and use them against the United States for purposes of blackmail. But in my view making sledgehammers for cracking nuts is a much more sensible proposal than the version proposed by the President, that $1 trillion — and now they are even saying that it will be more than that — should be spent, and that hundreds of thousands of tons of the most complicated equipment should be put into space purely because a madman might turn up.

In my opinion making guns to shoot sparrows would be a much more reasonable proposal than the option being proposed by the President. And, furthermore, if those crazy terrorists do appear, they are most likely to use not a ballistic missile, which is difficult to construct and still more difficult to conceal; they would use a different, miniconventional method, so to speak, like a concealed van in which they could convey a nuclear warhead; so SDI would be of no avail. There are, of course, quite a few other arguments. For instance, it is claimed that the Soviet Union is very afraid of SDI, that it was SDI that forced us to sit down for talks. I think it would be better if Aleksandr Aleksandrovich answered this question.

[Zubkov] There are already some questions.

[Bessmertnykh] There are some questions. I would like to start with an interesting question. It is asked by Comrade Viktor Borisovich Maslov, from the town of Nezhinsk: What are the Americans counting on? It is a very simple and clear question. I think, if it were like that, everything would be simple; the conspiracy would be so obvious, the whole world could see the offensive weapons. Well, in that case, why is this program still on the wave of public support; in America it is even quite popular, and so on?

The question cuts to the core of the subject, so to speak. I think in order to understand the SDI program more thoroughly, the task of creating [sozdanite] the new type of weapons of which we speak has to be placed in the context of strategy. Without
that, nothing can be understood. I would not want anyone to gain the impression that this weapon is precisely and only of an offensive nature. This is the feeling we may be getting in this discussion. No, this weapon possesses both an offensive element and also a very strong defensive element. So, where does its danger lie?

The very strategic concept of the United States now is definitely offensive, and this weapon inserted in the core of this concept provides its really dangerous nature. Why? Well, insofar as the offensive element exists, it is clear: An offensive element is a weapon or an offensive type of weapon that destroys something. Either it will destroy our systems in space — not only missiles — or it will destroy targets on earth. But the defensive part of this concept is not quite understood, although I consider it to be no less dangerous than the offensive part.

Here you have already correctly said, comrades, that it is impossible to create a 100 percent impenetrable system, such a shield as would protect the United States from offensive types of weapons from, say, the other side. But the Americans — experts are stressing this now — realize that such a system cannot be created. So it is a question of creating a kind of umbrella with holes in it. And, of course, an umbrella with holes in it is no use to us when we get into a downpour, although it may play its part when it drizzles. And herein lies the dangerous defensive part of the system. For it is a non-100 percent system that ensures, provides a temptation to mount a nuclear first strike. What is the calculation? A strike would be mounted against Soviet strategic systems, against its administrative systems. Naturally, the weakened retaliatory strike wouldn't be a nuclear downpour but something weaker, and the Americans reckon they will be able to cope with that, with the help of this system.

Incidentally, there is a very important aspect which has to be borne in mind. They have been saying, especially Reagan, and for some time his secretary of defense, Weinberger, that the SDI system will replace nuclear weapons. So far he is showing us that this is not so. All systems of offensive strategic weapons are starting to be developed at accelerated rates, like the MX missiles, for instance. It is very curious that they are being located in the silos of existing Minuteman missiles.

Quite recently — Yuriy Viktorovich will confirm this — the United States was saying that the Minuteman missiles were very vulnerable because they were located in silos. So why now are the MX's going to be shoved down the same silos? Because they will be useful in the event of a first strike, that is, if the Soviet missiles get to the area of these missile fields there will not be any MX's there. They will have left already, so to speak.

[Zubkov] There are now some specific questions to do with our second, more fundamental part, on the plans and realities of SDI. Here is a specific question about the nuclear laser trigger and other, more detailed ones, but as an introductory visual preface we also want to show a small film clip, which we now offer you.

[passage omitted: 3-minute video film shows the history of wars from the earliest times to the present time, beginning with old swords and guns, the earliest planes, World War II footage, modern film of missiles, killer satellites, and ending with "Star Wars" film footage]

[Zubkov] Good, well, we now come to the second part of our program in which we have decided to discuss the SDI plans, that is the actual real projects and the realities which now exist. Here there are many questions which boil down to one thing, which we will cover in more detail now, about what the United States has managed to do in the
past years for a real implementation of the SDI program. Well, we could start with you, Vitaly losifovich, because if I am not mistaken you have personally and directly visited all, or rather, one of the three U.S. laboratories where the SDI program is being developed [razrabatvyavetsyaya].

[Goldanskiy] Yes, several years ago I went to Los Alamos, the main laboratory for SDI.

[Zubkov] What does it look like? Is it an underground fort, or what?

[Goldanskiy] No, no. It is a plateau in New Mexico; there is a little brook flowing there. At one time, 40 years ago, it was entirely desert; then it was chosen for developing the Manhattan Project there. Now it is a typical U.S. township not far from the big city of Santa Fe. There is a residential town there as well, near the laboratory itself, which was for a long time the main weapons laboratory of the United States.

[Zubkov] And what went on inside?

[Goldanskiy] As for what went on inside, naturally I did not see everything that went on there. However, when I was there, I met in particular with people who worked at Los Alamos with another type of problem concerning shortwave lasers, including those in the Angstrom range — this is the so-called Gamma laser. Well, we had meetings with them and it should be said that, even prior to that, people from this laboratory, just like people from Livermore, visited the Soviet Union and took part in a conference held in Novosibirsk in 1974, organized at that time by Rem Viktorovich Khokhlov, our very prominent scientist who at that time was also dealing with this problem. Incidentally, one of the questions here...

[Zubkov, interrupting] Is about nuclear pumping, yes?

[Goldanskiy] Well, there are not many questions about X-ray pumping lasers or, generally, about the nuclear aspect...

[Zubkov, interrupting] If at all possible, explain this in layman's terms as much as possible.

[Goldanskiy] Well, I have already tried to say a little about this and I wish to say that maybe later on I will return to it, but here we have a question from Bursak, an engineer from Moscow; that promises were made in the United States to hand over to the USSR the SDI technology. Will a direct request be made along diplomatic channels concerning the transfer of this technology? Well, at the end of my reply, maybe I will say a few words on this score.

Well, first and foremost, I wish yet again to emphasize that the nuclear aspect is a very important part of the SDI program. It is, in essence, the transfer of nuclear arms to space, thus constituting a violation of the entire system of treaties, beginning with the 1967 Space Treaty, and the 1972 ABM Treaty — which is basically the foundation of security and is an international treaty. It is also the main obstacle to be found at present to the halting of nuclear tests. I had occasion to see this for myself for the umpteenth time 2 months ago when I was in Canada, attending a very specialized and, I would say, a very responsible conference on monitoring and banning nuclear tests. This was attended by people from both Livermore and Los Alamos.
Well, the fact that it is proposed to bring nuclear arms for SDI into space is giving rise, one must say, to a great deal of indignation among numerous U.S. scientists, and this serves as a very important argument for them. Maybe toward the end, when we have returned to the question of who is for and who is against SDI, I would like to analyze the U.S. scientists' views more extensively; here I would just like to quote from what possibly are very typical letters.

Well, an American writes, that is to say a U.S. physicist writes in the magazine PHYSICS TODAY -- he is a man who earlier, in 1983, in the same journal supported the Presidential initiative -- that over the past few years SDI activities have dramatically increased in scope. One direction of SDI which worries me more than any other is the development of X-ray lasers pumped by nuclear explosions. This approach to SDI not only contradicts the nonnuclear defense announced by President Reagan, it can also lead to a dangerously unstable situation which will render the very concept of SDI ineffective. The deployment [razmeshcheniye] in space of nuclear weapons, even if for defensive purposes, will inevitably lead to the development of offensive nuclear space arms, thereby invalidating the SDI concept.

Here we have yet another precise statement. It is of particular interest in view of the fact that it is a statement by (Silan Rockwood), director of the SDI department in Los Alamos. He writes: What would you think if a satellite of this kind — he is referring here to a space-based X-ray laser [words indistinct]. Well, he is talking of just one of them. Multiply this by thousands and you will then get the same question in an even bolder relief. What would you think if a satellite of this kind passed over Washington five times in any 24-hour period, knowing that nuclear arms are on board the satellite?

Would you believe that this is only defensive armament and not something that could be dropped on your head without any prior notification or warning? Well, here we have a man who has formulated the political aspect with great clarity. I will now return to this question.

[Zubkov] Let's return, because, yes, let me just, maybe I will here simply, very simply, read what was written in the paper, the French magazine LE POINT.

[Goldanskiy] Yes.

[Zubkov] Well, it is written in very simple language here; please provide a scientific commentary on this.

[Goldanskiy] Maybe I, too, will try to provide it in simple language?

[Zubkov, laughing] Now be kind enough to let me read it, yes? After a missile has been launched — this means that these missiles are, as it were, Soviet missiles: there is talk of the enemy here — it could be possible to explode in space a nuclear device from a U.S. submarine, a device that is compatible with a laser gun. The energy of the explosion, having turned into radiation of very great power in the laser tubes, would be turned forthwith against the enemy's missiles, thousands of kilometers away, and these missiles would be destroyed. Well, this scheme...

[Goldanskiy, interrupting] Let me try, so to speak...
[Zubkov resumes] Yes, please, so that the essence of this nuclear pumping, this nuclear explosion, is understandable. And it is necessary, because of that, generally, so to speak, to call these weapons nuclear weapons.

[Goldanskiy] Undoubtedly nuclear, since the energy needed for the laser to operate later on is created through a nuclear explosion. After all, imagine a nuclear bomb in space, of whatever capacity. This bomb is surrounded by a system of needles. Several dozen such needles contain atoms which subsequently function by the radiation of these very same X-rays. During a nuclear explosion a very great number of X-rays are released. During a normal explosion, this X-ray radiation — as I said at the beginning — is spread uniformly in the space surrounding the center of the explosion. In this case, the main idea is this: The X-ray radiation will immediately excite the atoms of, let us say, iron or some other element that forms part of the composition of these needles, and it will immediately excite them to such an extent that you will have more excited atoms in these needles than atoms in their basic state. I am forced to use scientific terminology a little. Then, given this, these atoms, these needles, will become not absorbers of X-ray radiation, but sources of radiation, sources of this stimulated, as they call it, X-ray radiation. And that is why the energy of the explosion is transformed into the energy of X-ray radiation, but this time it is guided radiation. The X-rays will be directed, guided along the direction the needles are facing.

The computers' task in all this — and maybe it is this that shows right away just how insanely complex this whole task is, just how unrealisitic is this task of this alleged defense initiative — a task to be performed in very short time intervals — the computers are supposed to recognize and identify the missiles in flight and, moreover, to orient each and every needle in such a way that the X-ray it emits is directed against some specific missile, whose trajectory must be computed with the speed of lightning, and thus several dozen missiles would be hit simultaneously.

Well, that is the basis of the X-ray laser. Another question that I have here...

[Zubkov, interrupting] I have a request: Please let us have questions that are somewhat shorter, since we have very many questions, so that we shall be able to answer most of them.

[Goldanskiy] I think that scientific questions are less comprehensible, and maybe this is the reason why it is necessary to explain them in greater detail. And the question here is this: Won't the nuclear pumping, with the aid of nuclear explosions, lead to a nuclear winter? Nuclear winter is an extraordinarily dangerous thing, one that generally threatens mankind's existence in the event of a nuclear war, but the pumping of these lasers has no direct bearing on nuclear winter. The only bearing it has is that it increases the danger of nuclear war, because nuclear winter comes about as a consequence of explosions taking place in cities, in forests, where enormous quantities of dust are thereby thrown up into the atmosphere.

[Zubkov] Furthermore, there are some questions, some very specific and practical questions along the same lines and dealing with approximately the same subject. Take, say, the question from Comrade Lev Georgiyevich Kovalev, who is an electrical engineer. He asks, Yuriy Viktorovich, what will happen to the warheads when missiles are intercepted in the air, say, and hit? Will they explode? This question is for you, Comrade General. And where will they explode?

[Lebedev] How is the question put? Please repeat it for me.
[Zubkov] If missiles are intercepted will their warheads explode or will they not explode? Where will they fall, these nuclear explosions? Where will they take place? In the atmosphere? On earth?

[Lebedev] If they are intercepted by our means, these...

[Zubkov, interrupting] No, it means by the U.S. defensive means.

[Lebedev] Ah, by the U.S ones, is that it? Yes, certainly they will explode, and the scenario of intercepting warheads, say, during the final part of the trajectory of intercontinental ballistic missiles, is an extremely risky venture, for I want to say that these warheads can be created [sozdany] in such a way that they will have some kind of time fuses [distantsoinnyy vzryvatel] and these explosions, taking place over cities, will still inflict very serious losses upon cities, both upon the population and the targets themselves.

[Zubkov] Thank you. There have been some very important questions dealing with international affairs connected with SDI.

[Bessmertnykh] I think that our discussion is getting to this point because it's getting quite useful with everything that we've been talking about. Perhaps we ought to be fighting to ensure that this doesn't happen.

[Zubkov] We have questions not just from Moscow and from other cities in our country, but from Bratislava, too, so (?I mention it) especially.

[Bessmertnykh] Comrade Andrey Gennadiyevich Kondrakov from Moscow asks the following question: In his speech, Comrade Gorbachev said that we are not afraid of the SDI program. Why, then, did he not sign the treaty? There is a similar question from Akim Sadykovich Yakubov, a driver from Moscow. And Romi Ataliyevich Zadayev put it like this: When are we going to stop indulging this actor from the United States?

I feel that it is not just the scientific and technical aspects of the problem but the political ones, too, that are not all that clear to all our comrades, for they really are very, very complex. What happened at the talks? And what are we speaking about when we say we are not afraid of SDI? We really are not afraid of the SDI as a military program -- this was stated by our party general secretary -- insofar as possible countermeasures to possible alternative forms of deployment [razvertyvaniye] of the very weapons themselves are already being studied. Scientists and military specialists have been given tasks and, as far as I understand it, they have worked out definite responses and concepts of responses directly as far as the weapons are concerned.

However, why then did we not enter into some accords concerning nuclear arms reduction in Reykjavik? The fact is that while we have no fear of SDI as a military and technical problem, we see all the enormous dangers of this program for the overall military and strategic situation and for the survival of mankind as a whole.

Why? Well, in the first place because new types of armaments are being brought into being, and we have already discussed this aspect. We do not even know yet what they will be like. Here we are sketching some possibilities that our imagination suggests to us. However, perhaps there will also be something quite different.
Besides this, SDI spurs on the modernization of armaments in the whole broad spectrum of both strategic and even conventional armaments. These armaments are capable of taking something from this program. But the main thing is the fact that SDI, if it is deployed [razvernut], would inevitably lead to a situation in which the other country, even before a conflict has broken out — so far we have been sorting out conflict situations, but once the missiles fly we shoot them down and vice versa — now the most likely situation might be one in which the SDI system has been developed [sozdatav] but that nevertheless the missiles are not in flight. [sentence as heard] And by the very fact of its existence, and even by the fact of its imminence, SDI is destabilizing the international situation.

What happened at Reykjavik? We put forward broad and far-reaching proposals: That strategic offensive weapons should be cut completely over a 10-year period, first cutting them by 50 percent, and then by a further 50 percent, or in other words taking them down to zero; that medium-range missiles in Europe should be eliminated completely; that medium-range missiles should be reduced to 100 warheads in Asia, and that the United States would get the same number. But just imagine a situation in which the United States would develop [sozdatav] this self-same SDI, the offensive and defensive component of which is now so clear to us, at the same time as we undertake such serious measures for real disarmament. And what did the United States demand and ask for in Reykjavik? In the first place that they should be permitted to carry out research and tests of this system in space; and in the second place that they should be given the right in any event 10 years from now to deploy this system, irrespective of the way in which things are going with us.

Under such conditions, which really place our security in such a serious situation, could the Soviet side undertake such far-reaching scenarios, shall we say, of nuclear disarmament? That is simply impossible because then we would naturally be in a very complicated military and strategic situation. Besides SDI, the United States would of course also be left with its forward-based system in Europe and so on and so forth.

Political and state caution, therefore, obliges us to achieve a situation in which SDI is not deployed. We gave the Americans the possibility of doing some work on it, so to speak, to research it, to test it in laboratories, by all means, but let that be enough.

[Lebedev] I would like to add to what Aleksandr Aleksandrovich has been saying here: Comrade Valeriy Petrovich Voynov from Moscow continues in a way what Aleksandr Aleksandrovich has been saying. He says that if we reached an agreement on disarmament in Reykjavik, then what would there be left for the United States to defend itself against? Well, the question and an accord about nuclear disarmament being possible was indeed specifically raised in Reykjavik. And our proposals were accepted by the U.S. side. And of course in that case SDI would appear to be quite unnecessary; there would be nothing to defend themselves against; no nuclear weapons. But evidently the fact that the United States has made the SDI into an obstacle to the implementation of this practical accord shows that words about being committed to nuclear disarmament remain for the present nothing more than words, and that the United States is not prepared for nuclear disarmament.

[Zubkov] There are some related questions about the talks in Reykjavik; It's a fairly interesting question.

[Bessmertnykh] Were we counting on the agreement of the United States during the statement [as heard] by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and during the talks in Iceland or in Geneva? Were we able to count on the opposite being the case? And what
conclusions ought to be drawn from this? That is to say, were we counting on reaching an accord? The concept of the meeting in Reykjavík, and of the meeting in Geneva before that, amounted to this, to proving and demonstrating to the President -- if he still failed to see this -- the whole of the dangerous consequences that go hand in hand with his program.

Mikhail Sergeyevich understood perfectly that Reagan had linked his political fate with this program. He is very committed to it. And taking, so to speak, a step toward meeting the U.S. President, he proposed that they should sort out carefully what it is about. In Geneva the U.S. President was told directly by our general secretary: We understand that you are very much involved and attracted by this problem; I have asked scientists and specialists to sort it out, and I report to you the conclusions that we have reached. This is where the danger of this program lies. Let's think it out together, let's think about how this can be avoided. In Reykjavík there was a second discussion, a very serious one, once again with the evidence produced, with very convincing arguments.

So, our policy on this is absolutely pragmatic, realistic; no one is floating in the clouds, thinking that the United States would give up SDI after two sets of talks. Finally, we have not yet asked them to give up the SDI program. This point has to be borne in mind. We have said to them: Please, we know from our calculations what SDI is. Our experts have given us the answer. If you are still not convinced, Mr President, go on studying in the laboratory; you have 10 years. Don't leave it, look into it, and you will come to the conclusions that we have obviously come to. If you reach such conclusions, then you must of course draw the only correct conclusion from them, namely that security must be gained by liquidating the nuclear weapons against which you are creating this SDI. Why are you taking such a crazy roundabout way to security by creating some kind of shield, weapons that can be simply destroyed, to ensure security that way?

So, there was no mood of unfounded expectations; it was an attempt to convince the U.S. President by serious argument of the need once more to give a well considered, responsible answer as to where all this was leading.

[Zubkov] We are coming to the third section of our program, to these questions -- and there are very many of them -- as to who is for and who is against SDI. Well, the position of our Soviet Government and leadership has already been partially expounded in your replies, but before we go on to this section of the program I would like you to see a small film subject, another figurative, visual epigraph to the third section of our program. It is a song, because today after all, people are expressing themselves for and against SDI not only in discussions, at demonstrations or at meetings, but with their songs. One of them will now be heard. It is a song sung by Harry Belafonte. Remember that he heads the organization Cultural and Artistic Figures for Nuclear Disarmament. The song has been going for some time and began as the hymn of the U.S. black civil-rights movement. Then it became the song of the campaign against intervention, against the U.S. war in Indochina, in Vietnam. Now people opposing nuclear disarmament are taking this song into the streets. So, the song. [passage omitted: video showing Greenham Common and then Oktoberfest in Munich, with Harry Belafonte leading the singing of "We Shall Overcome"]

[Zubkov continues] There are very many questions. We thank you for them and will try to answer most of them. Later we will answer you in our other programs. Many of your questions are about the situation not being irreversible. That is the gist of these questions.
I recall a conversation with you and your marvelous quotation from a great scientist about this criminality and uncertainty, and what tremendous danger there is in these experiments.

[Goldanskiy] Yes, I remember. It is about the whole logic of the development of science. The fact is, as a rule, science, fundamental science, and its fundamental technical consequences are unpredictable, and in this context there is a very interesting example. In 1933 Rutherford, a man who can perhaps be called the creator of nuclear physics, said: Anyone who expects to obtain energy from the transformation of the atom is talking nonsense. That was said 6 years before the discovery of fission, 9 years before the first reactor, and 12 years before Hiroshima and Nagasaki.


[Goldanskiy] That's unpredictability. Now, under conditions when there is industrialization of unconventional science, when studying high energy physics costs an enormous amount of money — accelerators used in peaceful research and delving into the secrets of matter are specific targets — it is now proposed to devote a trillion dollars to expand pulse strike destructive effect. Such is the deliberate aim of the research.

I think that it is hard to say now what will be the entire scale and depth of what will come of this. Imagine, in 1933, someone saying: I will develop and invest money in the nucleus and in 10 years I will tell you what has come of it. You can imagine quite well what came of that. Now this is not $2 billion like the Manhattan Project, but a trillion dollars. So this is an economic challenge, too. It is a drive to economically undermine, ruin all rivals by a kind of game of all-or-nothing without a precise understanding of what finally...

[Zubkov, interrupting] And you know countermeasures...

[Goldanskiy, interrupting] They are cheaper...

[Zubkov] Cheaper maybe, but countermeasures bring counter-countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures bring counter-counter-counter-countermeasures, so the question of ruination, it will cost...

[Goldanskiy, interrupting] Instead of disarming, there is this drive to stake more and more, like a gambler, putting more and more and more on the bank.

[Zubkov] Your answers, please.

[Petrosyants] Vitaliy Iosifovich has just snuck in with what I wanted to say. We are talking about SDI. We are going on as if it was a fait accompli, a reality. Nothing of the sort! SDI today is just a project in rough, as we engineers say. SDI faces tremendous scientific and still greater technical difficulties.

That is why it is correctly said that it will require, firstly, much time, many years, and an extraordinarily great sum of money and material resources. Incidentally, it seems to me for some reason that, well, they often say and I know this, I have read this, that President Reagan is devoted to the SDI and that it is his obsession. I think that indeed, the current White House administration daydreams about the laurels President Roosevelt won when he helped implement the creation of an atomic bomb.
They daydream about the laurels of President Truman who dropped, ordered to drop, atomic bombs on Japanese cities during the war. Well, President Reagan's picture is also more or less like this: maybe something will come out of this? Here he is bringing enormous levers into play, enormous resources. This, of course, must be borne in mind and fought. With what can one fight it? It seems to me that there is only one thing: It is beyond doubt, essential that the public opinion in the countries throughout the world should categorically oppose it and that it should demand of the U.S. Administration that it halts nuclear testing. If there are no nuclear explosions, neither will there be nuclear pumping, nor will there be the SDI. This is one of the most radical questions and it is necessary to fight for it with all one's might. If we manage to do this, we will attain what we desire. I have here a number of questions.

[Zubkov] Please, please, go ahead, we are listening to you, yes.

[Petrosyants] Well, I think that these questions are, more or less, concerned with this. Well, one question which, incidentally, crops up again, is about nuclear winter: How long does it last, what influence will it have on man, will man survive it, and so forth.

Well, I am bound to say that if there is, indeed, nuclear war, then you will have a violation of our planet on a global scale, of the atmosphere, troposphere, the earth, and so on. It is something that is incalculable. That is why mankind should remove the question of nuclear war from the agenda. There is nothing that would make it possible to counteract this global destruction during a nuclear war.

The next question is from Vadim Yefimovich Korotkov, war veteran from the city of Moscow. Do the tests carried out in testing ranges — nuclear test ranges are what is in mind here — have any influence upon volcanic eruptions or earthquakes? Well, it must be said that nuclear explosions are, properly speaking, tiny earthquakes, incidentally speaking. In what sense are they tiny? What charges must be used? Smaller, or maybe bigger? No cases have so far been found involving nuclear explosions causing a spontaneous, natural earthquake. But if these explosions are carried out in regions of seismic activity, it is very probable that they will have an influence and an earthquake will entail.

[Zubkov] Boris Aleksandrovich, would you like to give a brief list of attitudes toward the SDI, who is for it, who is against it, both in the United States itself and in the Soviet Union?

[Kalyagin] I am afraid that there are very many questions here.

[Zubkov] That's perfectly true, perfectly true.

[Kalyagin] Let me start by giving a short question that perhaps has no direct bearing on the SDI. Svetlana Mikhaillovna Romanova asks why television was not directly present during the talks between both sides in Reykjavik. Well, it is quite clear why — so as not to be in the way of the participants in the talks conducting their dialogue.

Television was in Reykjavik and it did some filming, but the talks and, in particular, a significant part of the talks were conducted eye-to-eye, between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and President Reagan, with only interpreters present. Everything was done to facilitate the conducting of a dialogue. Well, Valery Petrovich Burkovskiy from Moscow asks how many countries support the SDI program. Well, I have to say that an overwhelming majority of countries are against this program and even numerous U.S. partners in the alliances and agreements are also against it.
In particular, I can name countries that have announced their unwillingness to be involved in the SDI on the state level -- for instance Australia, Canada, France, Norway, Denmark, and Greece.

Five, so to speak, closest partners are in support of the SDI program: Great Britain, the FRG, Italy, Israel, and Japan. Moreover, these decisions were also not arrived at immediately. If we take, let us say, a partner such as Great Britain, one of the closest partners -- I would say that its attitude to the Star Wars program does not, to put it mildly, stand out by its consistency. In the first place we remember the statement made by Howe, the foreign secretary, in which the SDI program was criticized. It was said in London that there is opposition there against deployment of arms in space. But Mrs Margaret Thatcher arrived in the United States, held talks with Reagan in Camp David, and naturally pressure was applied on her. She said there that Great Britain supported the SDI and supported the SDI research program, but if the question of deploying an antimissile system in space arises, then the Soviet Union and the United States should sit down at the negotiating table. A kind of proviso was made here, showing that London is, as it were, ultimately against the deployment of antimissile weapons in space.

It continues to be said in Britain that they are in favor of, so to speak, a firm observance of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty of 1972. Well, generally speaking, a consistent implementation of the SDI will lead to this treaty being undermined. That is why there is, of course, and without a doubt, an inconsistency in this position. Well, attempting to justify their policy, the British Conservatives say that if they failed to join in the SDI they would begin to lag behind in modern technology. Prime Minister Thatcher herself even said that, having joined in the SDI, Great Britain has been given an opportunity of exerting influence upon the formation of U.S. policies arising from the SDI agreement. Well, it seems to me that all these arguments are rather illusory. In the first place, we know that the current U.S. Administration pursues its policies without regard to the interests of even its partners, and that it sometimes fails to consult them. At times these policies are pursued in secret from them, as has, for instance, been shown by the Trangate affair. As for the opportunity of joining in the use of the state-of-the-art technology, we have, for the time being, seen the reverse process: On the contrary, it is the United States that is trying to get its hands upon the best minds and achievements in Western Europe and other Western countries, so as to develop the SDI with their aid.

Here Alla Mikhailovna Rappaport from the second group of those who live in Moscow asks what Japan is counting on, after having joined in the SDI program. After all, the Japanese themselves experienced the effects of atomic bombs. And, after all, nuclear weapons are now much more powerful -- or else did they have in mind something in the way of protection against radiation? No, no such protection has been devised as yet, not in Japan or anywhere else.

It must be said that in Japan, support for the SDI was not a simple matter, either. For a long time the Nakasone government pretended that it was hesitating, that it was unable to arrive at a decision. This is explained rather easily. In the first place, the very constitution of Japan bans the waging of war and the buildup of arms. In the second place, there exist three so-called nuclear-free principles against the import or manufacture of nuclear weapons on the territory of Japan. Finally, there were resolutions of the Japanese parliament concerning the use of space only for peaceful purposes. Well, in the end, the Nakasone government finally discarded this mask of irresoluteness and announced its support for SDI. Moreover, it tries to sell its position also by reference to the fact that the SDI is an American program and that is
why the resolutions of Japan's parliament do not affect it. As for the nuclear-free principles, again the nuclear testing is done on the territory of the United States and not on the territory of Japan. That is also why this is neither here nor there, as far as that country is concerned.

What is most important, a treaty on security has been concluded between Japan and the United States. It follows from this treaty that the Japanese should support the United States. Well, this shows once more how dangerous this treaty is.

How many years is the SDI program calculated to take? What is the attitude of Americans themselves to the program? Are they aware of the danger of all this? Well, it is surely rather complicated to say how many years this program is calculated to last. What is known is that in the period of 1983-1986 already $4.2 million have been spent on its implementation. In the 1987-1991 period it is planned to spend a further $3-4 billion. Well, how long the United States intend to continue will, apparently, depend on the results obtained.

(We proposed to Reagan) that for 10 years, research on the SDI program should be confined to the laboratory and should not be carried out in space. At the same time we made great concessions and great compromises for the sake of getting this agreement. Yet, nevertheless, the United States did not agree. If you will permit me I will give you a very interesting quotation from Edward Markey, chairman of a subcommittee of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress, who said that in Reykjavik Reagan was offered the best deal the Russians have ever offered an American President since the time of the Alaska purchase. All the President had to give in return was a promise that the United States will continue to strictly adhere to the 1972 ABM Treaty. But the President refused and was wrong. That is Markey's view.

In this connection, the questioner asks: What is the attitude to the SDI program of the possible Democratic and Republican Party candidates for the U.S. Presidency? The politicians have not yet put forward their nominations; the elections do not take place until 1988, but we can say that there are some figures in the Democratic Party who sharply condemn this program. We have already talked about Edward Kennedy. We can also mention Jesse Jackson, one of the contenders last time for the Democratic Party. Gary Hart has been in Moscow, as you recall, and he was asked a direct question by a television correspondent about his attitude to SDI. I would say that he gave a veiled reply, although there was a report yesterday that he has called for restrictions on the SDI program, so his position as such is not absolutely clear. Perhaps Aleksandr Aleksandrovich can add something.

[Bessmertnykh] Yes, some very curious processes are taking place in the United States, and in Congress in particular, right now. First of all, Reagan and Weinberger's number one fairytale about an impenetrable shield being created has crumbled, one can say. Out of all the major figures, they are virtually the only two who still try to say something on this topic. The remainder talk about a completely different SDI, about a partial SDI, and so on and so forth. But it must be admitted that the current U.S. President — and until recently he has been fairly popular — has nevertheless managed to secure a situation in which the broad public supports this program. We judge this by the so-called public opinion polls that are carried out by sociological institutes of different kinds. However, I must reveal in a couple of words the secret of all this. If someone asked you the following question: "Do you want to support the SDI program which will ensure your complete survival or do you want to fall victim to the ballistic missiles of the Soviet Union?" then of course the answer is clear. Pollaters therefore received replies indicating that between 64 and 67 percent of Americans in
general are in favor of SDI. As far as Congress is concerned, there is some stratification taking place. Approximately 200 senators and congressmen come out clearly and definitely in favor of the SDI. These are conservative and right-wing figures from the Republican and Democratic Parties. All the same, there is a wider stratum in Congress that is more cautious: You were quite right there when you were talking about Hart. This is in general characteristic of the liberal section of Congress.

Not many of them speak directly like Kennedy. Nevertheless, the majority of them believe and say that they are against the SDI but are in favor of carrying out the research part all the same. The whole problem of American liberalism lies in this vagueness.

[Zubkov] Please don't forget the question from Bratislava. We promised to answer it.

[Bessmertnykh] Yes, I'm going over to it right away. While talking about the reactions of those who are in favor and those who are against, we cannot fail to deal with the question asked from Bratislava by Comrade Spanier. What is the attitude of the Third World and the developing countries to all of this? The answer here is a short one: The developing world looks with great fear at what is taking place in this area. In the first place, it is troubled by the prospects of further tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the second place, they see that enormous resources are starting to be spent in a nonproductive sphere, and this at a time when it is precisely hope of disarmament which is offering them the chance of seeing the wealthy North giving them the appropriate resources, so to speak, as a result of disarmament taking place. At their international conferences and in bilateral contacts, they say definitely that they are opposed to SDI.

[Zubkov] A letter -- a question -- or rather an assessment, if you like, of our program comes from Valentina Georgiyevna Safran. She has phoned it in and asks why such a small amount of time has been allocated for this interesting program with so many different questions. Well, in the first place, this has been our first experience; thank you for your assessment. We hope that we will have further discussion of the SDI, no doubt on more than one occasion, for this is an important and a crucial problem. But time is already bearing down upon us and if you will permit me we will return to the question -- there are very many of these questions: You know that the bundle...

[Unidentified voice, interrupting] There is another very important question that we haven't dealt with.

[Zubkov] We'll get back to it in a minute. [indistinct interjections by several participants speaking at once] Absolutely, and this is natural, you know, because in the first place people are entering into a discussion with us; like participants in our conversation, they naturally take an interest, and at the same time we have more to say. But nevertheless I repeat that there have been very many questions about what countermeasures our country is taking. Perhaps we are not [word indistinct] our viewers very much. I think that you wanted to sum up these questions. Please go ahead. And then we will certainly deal with [word indistinct]; these are very important questions.

[Petrosyants] In the course of this conversation we have now been talking about the way in which SDI is an enormous piece of work involving science, technology, and cash. It is impossible to carry it out just like that, whether in 1 year, in 2 years, or
whatever. In this connection I want to mention the fact that the possibilities that the Soviet Union has for countermeasures, for a counter-SDI, are enormous. Our potential is so powerful that I can illustrate it with just one fact, with just one example. The United States, in developing the atomic bomb, took 2 years and 7 months from the start-up of the first research atomic reactor in Chicago; 2 years and 7 months elapsed before the test of the first atomic bomb was carried out. The Soviet Union began in 1943, during wartime, essentially a time of destruction, the army, the war. We took 2 years and 8 months from the start-up of the first research reactor. I repeat: 2 years and 7 months for the United States, the wealthiest country and one in a state of peace, in the sense that practically speaking it has not endured any war.

[Unidentified participant] Its territory (?remained inviolate).

[Petrosyants] Of course, of course. And how casualties did it suffer? As many as it loses in road accidents and other accidents and railway accidents. That's all. And we took 2 years and 8 months. That's the might of the Soviet Union! If, therefore, we really do set about preparing countermeasures we will do the job and we'll ensure its completion. But, this is something that does not have to be done. We are against this. We believe it to be unnecessary, not needed. What we have to do, therefore, is to apply our entire strength and resources -- and in this sense those of all our allies -- and the whole Third World to bring about an end to nuclear weapons tests. As soon as the testing of nuclear weapons has ended, I repeat, there won't be any X-ray laser, there won't be any nuclear pumping. It is impossible to create the same kind of pumping by other methods and by other means. It can only be done by nuclear arms.

[Bessmertnykh] Some listeners themselves suggest measures to counteract it.


[Bessmertnkh] Comrade Gvozdetskiy from Odessa says this: Does the designed trajectory of the SDI cross the space of the USSR? Can our law on the state border be used in order to destroy these elements even before the development [formirovaniye] of the SDI has been finished as elements violating our borders? Unfortunately the state border ends at the atmosphere. Space does not belong to any state, although I have to admit that we have not yet agreed with anyone about where the atmosphere ends and where space begins. What we propose is that this is somewhere higher than 100 to 110 kilometers. We know, therefore, that the designed trajectory of the SDI does of course cross the territory of the Soviet Union as it does that of other states. However, we cannot do anything here before the development [formirovaniye] of the SDI has been finished. Nevertheless, we do have to reach agreement to ensure that it does not become a reality.

[Zubkov] Vitaliy Iosifovich, to prevent this from becoming a reality there is a mass of questions about whether or not it is possible to have cooperation and joint efforts by scientists throughout the whole world to counter the SDI -- the creation, say, of laboratories, I don't know, collective laboratories in opposition to these efforts.

[Goldanskiy] I think that I've got less than 1 minute left...

[Zubkov, interrupting] Perhaps they won't be too hard on us if you take just a tiny bit more.

[Goldanskiy] All right. We have also had a lot of questions about attitudes of scientists in general to the SDI. I wanted to stress that unlike the population of the
United States as a whole, a majority of U.S. scientists are opposed to the SDI. That is the main group. A comparatively small group of apologists for SDI -- sometimes these are the authors of plans, and sometimes motives of ambition can play a part here -- sometimes they are those who feed from the SDI table. There is an interesting third group consisting of those who are engaged in deception, those who pull the wool over the eyes of the Pentagon, making out that they are working for the SDI and they, too, so to speak, try to get some money out of this business.

[Zubkov] Do you have an example of that?

[Goldanskiy] I am not going to give specific examples here but those are the impressions I have without a doubt. As far as the main point is concerned, as a rule, the opponents of the SDI are moved by considerations of principles, while those who support it act from considerations of their own personal interests in one way or another, whether they be financial, ambition, or so on. Particularly important here, moreover, is the opinion of the computer equipment specialists. I'll give you one figure: They compare the SDI program with the task of putting together a library of 5,000 books, each of 300 pages, without a single misprint, and this done without any proofreading in the manufacture of these books. That shows how great is the danger of any mistake here. As far as the international scientific community is concerned, the Pugwash Movement is one example of international opposition to nuclear war and opposition to SDI. Without any doubt there are great opportunities for cooperation, and as we know our country has proposed this, including cooperation in space, cooperation in peaceful thermonuclear uses, in the use of thermonuclear energy for peaceful purposes. If this were done, if we are talking about shortwave lasers and X-ray lasers, for example, then we should be thinking about pumping them not by nuclear explosion but by other means. On this basis, say, we should think of developing molecular holography and learning how to see the molecule in three dimensions, as it looks in reality. One can undoubtedly give many examples in high-energy physics, in astrophysics, and in neutrino-astronomy where international scientific cooperation is perfectly possible in substitution of military goals and in opposition to military goals.

[Zubkov] Well, let us, with this wish, conclude our broadcast. Let us say a big thank you to the television viewers for the numerous questions. It turned out that there were several hundred of them and we will try -- I hope you will not mind -- with the aid of the participants in the broadcast and by ourselves to try and reply to your questions, all of them, both in writing and, possibly, in subsequent broadcasts devoted to this important problem, in the subsequent "Repercussions" broadcasts.

Thank you. Thank you for taking part in the broadcast. All the best.

/6091
CSO: 5200/1196
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: SDI PROGRAM TO BRING 'STRATEGIC CHAOS'

LD172009 Moscow TASS in English 1952 GMT 17 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 17 TASS — By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

Washington stubbornly refuses to join the unilateral Soviet moratorium on any nuclear explosions. One of the main causes being the development in the United States of nuclear weapons of "a third generation," intended, above all, for the Star Wars programme. The U.S. Administration is ignoring the danger coming to the world from militarisation of outer space. The U.S. SDI will lead to disappearance of the very notion of strategic stability, it will bring strategic chaos which is determined by a number of aspects.

First, there is a close interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive armaments, efficient measures of limitation of ABM systems are a substantial factor in restraining the race of offensive armaments and are called upon to lessen the danger of war with the use of nuclear weapons. The violation, the disregard for this interconnection inevitably leads to the disruption of strategic stability.

Second, the bringing into the pattern of strategic forces of a qualitatively new component, which is the broad-scale ABM system with space-based elements, introduces an element of uncertainty into the system of strategic balance, heightens apprehensions of the sides as to emergence of disbalance in the strategic potentials.

Third, strike space armaments, which are considered also as anti-satellite weapons, even provided limited proportions of their deployment, will be destabilising the situation since the sides will not be confident of the reliability and security of their satellite systems of nuclear missile attack warning, systems of control and observation.

Fourth, establishment of broad-scale ABM systems will be a strong stimulus for a quantitative build up of strategic offensive armaments, both delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads. This may refer to intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine ballistic missiles and also to ground and sea-based long-range cruise missiles, the deployment of which it is difficult to control.

Fifth, the development and deployment of the anti-missile system will lead to accelerated development and perfection of systems of counteracting defense, means of breaking it by strategic offensive armaments, that is to the addition of one more fundamentally new element to the strategic equation and, consequently, to its still greater uncertainty.
Sixth, in reply to the development of means of counteracting the ABM system, the sides will develop weapons to combat them (counter-counteraction weapons), which will add the third new element to the strategic equation and will also act as an "amplifier" of its uncertainty.

Realisation of the Star Wars programme will therefore lead to destabilisation of the situation, bordering on a crisis, and will make the situation even more explosive. The SDI is a reckless game also with the security of the United States itself. The Star Wars technology, warn sober-minded American specialists, might one fine day boomerang the United States. The White House and the Pentagon should think over this warning.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR GENERAL CHERVOV DETAILS 'DESTABILIZING NATURE' OF SDI

AUL61324 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 11 Dec 86 p 6

[Report on statement by USSR Colonel General Nikolay Chervov given to NOVOSTI military commentator Vasily Morozov: "The Destabilizing Nature of the So-Called Strategic Defense Initiative; the United States Acts Against the Antimissile Defense Treaty" -- date and place not given; first paragraph is newspaper's introduction]

[Text] Since the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik, Washington representatives have been trying to claim that the American so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program and the Soviet-American treaty on antimissile defense are, on the whole, mutually compatible. In a talk with NOVOSTI's military commentator Vasily Morozov, Soviet military expert Colonel General Nikolay Chervov comments on these statements by Washington representatives:

The U.S. Administration invokes the well-known Agreed Statement (D) on the antimissile defense treaty and asserts that the United States is "legally and morally entitled" to realize the SDI program and that this program is being carried out "in full compliance with the antimissile defense treaty." In so doing the U.S. Administration deliberately distorts the substance of the issue and relies on the lack of information. Judge for yourself: It is possible to speak about some sort of legal entitlement to SDI when Article 1 of the antimissile defense treaty prohibits the deployment of such a system on a country's territory or the creation of the foundation for any such sort of defense? Article 5 of the treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of space-based antimissile defense systems or components, regardless of the kind of technology on which they are based. The U.S. activity oriented to transporting antimissile defense components into space is directly aimed against these fundamental provisions of the antimissile defense treaty.

The Agreed Statement (D) is an integral part of the antimissile defense treaty and cannot be set against the other provisions of the treaty, particularly Article 5. This Agreed Statement (D) permits the development and testing of antimissile defense devices based on physical principles other than those that existed at the time of the signing of the treaty, but only within the framework of a limited sphere of antimissile defense (with a range of 150 km), which is defined for each side by Article 3 of the treaty and which applies only to deployment of stationary ground systems in that area. Thus, the United States is neither legally nor morally entitled to realize the SDI program.

From its very foundations, the SDI program is at sharp variance with the antimissile defense treaty. It robs the treaty of its purpose, and thus disturbs the mechanism for
stopping the process of a feverish arms buildup. It is directly oriented toward the
deployment of weapons in space and as a result it will inevitably become a strong
catalyst of a feverish arms buildup in all respects. It will greatly weaken the
security of both the USSR and the United States, as well as the security of the whole
world. This program is the main obstacle in the way of a nuclear-free world.

It is no coincidence that in the United States, efforts to maneuver around the
antimissile defense treaty have begun: Various interpretations of it have been put
forward and even a proposal that this treaty be replaced by some sort of new agreement
that would not be at variance with the SDI program and would provide for the deployment
of antimissile systems in space. Considering that, in Washington's view, the SDI is
not at variance with the antimissile defense treaty, one might well ask why in
Reykjavik the U.S. President proposed a new agreement to replace the existing permanent
antimissile defense treaty at the same time as an agreement on reducing strategic
offensive weapons? It is precisely in answering this question that it is possible to
expose two approaches to the problem.

The USSR would like to strengthen this treaty; it would like the two sides to pledge
not to exceed its framework as long as possible or to undertake anything that would
disturb the limits prescribed by the treaty. The United States -- even though it
agrees not to exceed the framework of the antimissile defense treaty for a certain
number of years -- would like to work within the framework of the SDI program during
these years in such a way as to be able to carry out tests of antimissile defense
components in space so that when the deadline for not exceeding the obligations defined
in the treaty expires, it could immediately begin deploying new offensive space weapons
the following day. In other words, the USSR regards the antimissile defense treaty as
the fundamental basis for ensuring stable strategic mutual relations between the two
sides and is firmly and consistently for strengthening the order established by the
treaty. The United States expresses its "concern" for the fate of this document in
word only; in reality it is bent on disturbing it and undermining it not only as a
whole, but also in its individual parts.

The U.S. Administration alleges that the SDI is defensive. Well, it is an exclusively
military program. Within the framework of this program the most modern weapons are
being developed (laser, ray, and kinetic weapons; electromagnetic cannons, self-homing
missiles and projectiles), weapons that have great destructive power and the ability to
selectively destroy objects in space thousands of miles away and on earth from space,
within a brief span of time and on a mass scale. By their range these weapons are
global weapons: Deployed in orbit around the earth and equipped with maneuvering
systems, they would be capable of appearing at any time over the territory of any state
and genuinely threatening its security.

The offensive space devices that are being developed by the United States are,
according to their properties, offensive weapons. First, they can be used to destroy
the other side's most important space satellites unexpectedly, with the objective of
"blinding" it, surprising it, and thus depriving it of the opportunity to launch a
retaliatory action for a nuclear attack.

Second, space devices have a very long range -- 4-5,000 km. Can a weapon with a range
of 4-5,000 km be regarded as defensive? Of course not. It is a universal weapon,
capable of destroying objects in space, and objects on earth from space.

The SDI program concentrates on acquiring a first-strike capability and gaining
military superiority over the USSR and other countries with the aim of blackmailing
them and foisting its will on them. This means that, in a purely military sense, the SDI today undermines the existing strategic equilibrium.

Why is the White House pushing this program and giving it priority? It is doing so, above all, for the benefit of the military-industrial complex, which will make huge profits. According to an estimate by American experts, in the stage of research and test-construction work within the framework of SDI alone, industrial companies could make $70 billion profit in 10 years. The SDI is the "insurance" for the prosperity of the arms manufacturers.

At the meeting in Reykjavik the U.S. Administration revealed its true intentions: Proclaiming its dedication to the regime of the antimissile defense treaty, it tried to get the USSR to accept the testing and deployment of space components of the antimissile defense system, while simultaneously reducing the USSR and U.S. ballistic missiles by 50 percent. What is the objective being pursued here?

With the agreement of the Soviet Union, during the agreed period (10 years), the United States, while formally adhering to the antimissile defense treaty, would like to develop and test everything that is required for deploying an extensive antimissile defense system with space elements. When this work has been completed and the feasibility of the SDI proved the United States will begin to deploy its space antimissile defense system and simply brush the antimissile defense treaty aside. By that time, according to Washington's plans, the two sides would have carried out a far-reaching reduction of their ballistic missiles, to the level of 4,500 warheads for example, and that would already make the buildup of a space antimissile defense much easier and create faith in its reliability.

It must be clear to everyone that we will not help the United States to render us defenseless against it. The Soviet Union regards the SDI program is being directly aimed against itself. This military program must be halted (with the exception of laboratory research and tests). Here, no compromise is possible. If the United States continues work on the SDI program, and thus also carries out tests of antimissile defense components in space, the USSR will be forced to adopt appropriate retaliatory measures which will devalue the SDI. The USSR is able to do so. Our retaliatory measures will make it necessary for the United States to search for a response to them. And where will that lead? To a feverish arms buildup which will drag on for decades.

In Reykjavik Mikhail Gorbachev submitted proposals that would create a new situation between the USSR and the United States, including at the talks in Geneva. If the United States really wishes a radical disarmament, this task could be solved now: The USSR is willing, in the event agreement is reached on strengthening the regime of the antimissile defense treaty, to come to an agreement on a deep reduction of strategic offensive arms and the elimination of intermediate-range weapons in Europe.

/6091
CSO: 5200/1196
TASS: PERLE PRESSING TURKEY ON NUCLEAR ARMS, SDI

LD111129 Moscow TASS in English 1051 GMT 11 Dec 86

[Text] Ankara December 11 TASS — Richard Perle, assistant to the U.S. defense secretary, has begun talks here on the prolongation of the Turkish-American agreement on cooperation in the fields of defense and economy. The agreement expired almost a year ago. The talks are reportedly to cover the size of American military aid to Turkey and problems of economic cooperation which have become lately a stumbling stone in relations between the two NATO allies.

While seeking additional privileges for its military bases in Turkish territory, Washington ignores Turkey's demands for equal economic partnership. It refuses specifically to lift discriminatory restrictions on Turkey's traditional export items which go to the USA, and this undermines Turkey's foreign trade balance. Nor is there any solution in sight to such a pressing issue as postponement of payments on Turkey's enormous foreign debts. Shutting its eyes to these and other claims of its ally the Washington administration, pleading the mythical "threat from the north", is putting massive pressure on Ankara in order to install new types of nuclear weapons in Turkish territory and to hitch Turkey to the notorious "Star Wars" program.

The newspapers say that the American emissary has brought here a "package of compromise proposals" on cooperation in defense and economy. They are now being studied by Ankara.

At the same time the Turkish public and a number of opposition parties do not want Turkey to be drawn into the United States' adventurist plans in the Middle East and protest against Turkey being tied more closely to the aggressive NATO bloc.

/6091
CSO: 5200/1196
EC OFFICIALS ON ROLE OF EUREKA IN OVERALL R&D STRATEGY

Private Industry Starts Projects

Bonn DAS PARLAMENT in German 16-23 Aug 86 pp 2-3

[Article by Jean-Pierre Contzen, Director General of the Joint Research Agency of the EC Commission, Brussels, and Professor Paolo Pasella, Director General of the Directorate General for Research, and Development and Joint Research Agency of the EC Commission, Brussels: "The Great Strategic Orientations--Perspectives of the EC Technology and Development Program"]

[Text] In the second half of the eighties the selection of scientific and technological activities will be guided more than ever by the need to strengthen the international competitiveness of the EC, in particular in the industrial sector, thus safeguarding employment. The establishment of research programs such as ESPRIT, BRITE, BIOTECHNOLOGY, the more recent initiatives of the commission in the area of telecommunications (RACE), and in the field of materials is due to this concern about competitiveness.

However, this issue must not divert the attention of the EC away from the other concern: to ensure an improved quality of life for all citizens. This is the justification for the R&D (research and development) activities in the areas of environment, health and security--in the broadest sense of the word. Moreover, it is important to strengthen the European scientific and technological potential in a non-discriminatory manner, in particular by breaking down structural barriers and increasing the mobility of researchers. A solid scientific basis is an essential prerequisite for the success of our future technological development; a true Europe of researchers must emerge, and we are working on it.

Finally, several EC policies require a solid scientific basis. This applies to the utilization of agricultural raw materials, energy supply, processing of primary raw materials, and development aid. The EC has developed a number of specific activities and will continue to pursue them with the goal of supporting the implementation of these policies on a scientific-technical basis.
We have been and will be concentrating our research and development activities more and more around a limited number of specific strategic goals:

---industrial competitiveness;
---quality of life;
---a Europe of researchers;
---specific services for policies in particular fields.

Added Value of Joint Research

The majority of these goals is certainly not specific to the EC; they can be found with different emphasis in the scientific and technology policies of all our European countries. Where then does the usefulness or even the necessity come in; how do we determine the added value which is derived from joint action?

We believe that this added value is determined by the following factors:

---The EC allows for a synergy of efforts and abilities; it thus favors the implementation of cost advantages by larger capacities and critical masses and offers diversification opportunities which are necessitated by a rapid and costly scientific and technical development.

---The joint action creates its own fertile ground for the growth of creativity and the cooperation of scientific and industrial operators in the strategic programs and in the high-priority and significant projects.

---The EC framework allows the implementation of operations of such a magnitude which would be impossible or very difficult for individual member countries considering the means required.

---The EC framework connects the technological initiatives with the large European market. In 1992, this market will offer the technology projects open public markets which will be based on common standards and a joint policy of industrial property.

---The EC framework also establishes a connection with a dynamic trade policy by strengthening and supporting the activities of researchers and of industry.

---Finally, the EC offers a framework of coherence which makes it possible to optimize the efforts of the member countries, to support their specific potential, to avoid duplication of efforts, and all this to the benefit of the whole EC and its regions. In this respect the EC tries to solve the difficult task of combining in one and the same policy the goal of competitiveness towards the outside with the goal of coherence within the EC.
The smallest common denominator approach will certainly not make it possible to solve such a task; on the contrary, each individual country must be held to the attainment of ambitious goals in accordance with its potential and special circumstances so that the scientific and technological level of the whole EC will be raised. This means to be unyielding in the demand for quality and not to give in to the convenience of the "juste retour".

This is basically our approach in the area of science and technology. In our opinion, it justifies the scope of our activities which we desire. However, these developments must not be exclusive. They must be closely integrated into the general framework of the scientific and technological policies as they are being developed by our member countries; in addition, they must be largely open to the outside.

Strengthening the EC's activities in research, development, and technology does not mean that the EC should insulate itself in the scientific and technical field within its geographic and institutional boundaries. On the contrary, this strengthening must go hand in hand with expanded cooperation on an international level, in particular in fields such as thermonuclear fission, and this in particular in the European area. In this respect the close ties as they exist with the European Science Foundation, the European Space Agency, CERN, and the European Council should be cultivated further and expanded by the implementation of joint projects.

In our opinion, the cooperation with the countries of the European Free Trade Association will reach a new dimension, both by a rejuvenation of the multilateral cooperation as it is being implemented within the COST-framework, and by the establishment of bilateral general agreements for scientific and technical cooperation, which have been signed already or are close to being signed.

How does the problem of relations between the EUREKA-initiative on the one hand and the efforts of the community in the fields of science and technology on the other hand fit into the framework of all these crosslinks?

The EUREKA-initiative is an expression of the political desire of the governments of 18 European countries to face the challenges posed by the development of new technologies and their integration in the industrial innovation process. The commission has supported this initiative from the very beginning guided by the consideration that community programs and the resulting projects—if they are carried out coherently and in symbiosis—and the EUREKA projects complement each other and thus constitute a unified whole. They can increase the productivity and competitiveness of industry and of the national European economies on the world market and thus contribute to the development of prosperity and employment.

But how do we determine this complementarity and avoid conflicts?

First, let us remember that the Hanover declaration of 5 and 6 Nov 1985 states more precisely that "the EUREKA-projects are not aimed at replacing existing
European technological cooperation—such as the programs of the EC—... or their future development. Rather, it is their goal to increase and complete this cooperation.

In this respect, the following pattern can be developed:

While the EC on the one hand carries out the development of programs with scientific and technological motives and structures it functionally according to goals, criteria, and priorities which have been defined together with the governments and industries of the member countries, the EUREKA projects on the other hand are carried out primarily on the basis of specific initiatives by companies which want to join their efforts. These companies are responsible for carrying out these projects and—in most cases—for their financing. These projects are primarily geared towards the joint development of advanced technologies which are close to the market or of infrastructures of transnational interest.

If a dialogue on the projects which have been announced or which are in preparation is organized early on, it appears entirely feasible that a clear and coherent interface between the EC activity and EUREKA-initiatives can be reached.

No Unproductive Rivalries

In addition to the special aspects related to the implementation of EUREKA projects the EC can also make a significant contribution to the so-called "additional measures." The EC efforts could consist primarily of a contribution to the organization of the large market, in particular:

—promoting joint standards;

—harmonizing tax measures;

—free movement of goods and capital;

—opening public markets.

Within the framework of its competitive policy, the EC could also facilitate R&D cooperation between industries as well as the utilization of results. From a legal point of view the creation of a "European Grouping of Economic Interest" should also encourage cooperation between companies.

Finally, the EC could contribute its own finance engineering systems; in addition to the operations of a still modest scale which are being prepared in cooperation with the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) of the "Venture consort" type, the commission is considering more ambitious initiatives such as the creation of one or several investment companies—Eurotech Capital—whose start-up capital would be strictly private, as well as the establishment of a guarantee mechanism—INSUR—with both public and private funds and covered by the Eurotech Capital-companies.
All these initiatives are intended to facilitate innovation, development of new processes and new products, in particular among small and and medium-sized companies.

In view of the internal and external challenges Europe cannot afford to waste its efforts in non-productive rivalries, promote duplication of efforts and encourage scientific and technological feudalism. The success of an enterprise which will have a decisive influence on its future depends on the coherence of its efforts. All efforts of the EC must be directed towards this goal.

EUREKA as SDI Response

Bonn DAS PARLAMENT in German 16-23 Aug 86 p 11

[Unattributed article: "A Civilian Response to SDI"]

[Text] As Brussels well knows, EUREKA is criticism, reaction, and response to the slowness of the EC bureaucracy. And this is why EUREKA counts on the market forces of research.

EUREKA is also intended as a civilian response to SDI. Here, it is obvious that civilian and military research cannot always be separated completely. This led to a controversy between the socialist and Protestant People's Party factions in the European Parliament in June which finally resulted in the defeat of motion for a EUREKA resolution. The Social Democrat Rolf Linkohr had called EUREKA a balloon and myth. The Christian Democrat Bernhard Saelzer called EUREKA a desirable research and technology policy. A separation of civilian and military research would mean the end of all research policy in Europe.

This summer, the EUREKA initiative received unexpected support from a report which had been prepared and written by the Bonn Association for Foreign Policy [For translation of this report, see JPRS EUROPE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY EST-86-032 dated 31 Oct 86]. Its basic idea was: Western Europeans should consider themselves a "space power of the 21st century". Neither the FRG nor the other Western Europeans could leave space flight to others, since it has become an essential factor of foreign and security policy and also has an innovative effect on the economy as a whole. Therefore, more commitment and joint efforts are required. This report also spoke in favor of a German financial participation in the French space glider project Hermes of 30 percent.

The Fourth EUREKA Conference will probably take place in Stockholm in December.

FS: Incidentally, the EUREKA secretariat will be established in Brussels, in the Rue d'Archimede. Nomen est omen.
CPSU POLITBURO MEMBER ON POST-SUMMIT SITUATION AT KIEV PLENUM

AU191345 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 9 Dec 86 pp 1-2

[Unattributed report on speech delivered by V. V. Shcherbitskiy, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee first secretary, at the 8 December 1986 plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee--passages between slantlines published in boldface]

[Excerpts] Following the Reykjavik Soviet-American meeting, a qualitatively new situation has emerged in the world. The efforts of the CPSU and the Soviet Union have met with a growing support on the part of the international public and of political circles in various countries.

Well, and precisely when historic chances have emerged to improve the international situation, the U.S. Administration resolved to bury the provisional 1972 agreement and the 1979 SALT Treaty, thus striking a blow to the structure of basic accords in the field of limiting strategic arms, a structure created over 15 years.

In its statement, the Soviet Government had its principled and convincing say about this major error and provocations committed by the U.S. Administration, about the attempt to check the trend toward relaxing international tension.

The need to invigorate the efforts to make a progress in limiting arms, and the practical ways of and prospects for settling a number of present urgent problems were convincingly explained by M.S. Gorbachev during his visit to India, a visit that had a wide response all over the world. In our work among people, the highly important CPSU Central Committee documents concerning foreign political issues should always be kept in the center of attention.

/9274
CSO: 5200/1199
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS HITS U.S. REVISION OF REYKJAVIK, NATO'S INF POSITION

LD081820 Moscow TASS in English 1804 GMT 8 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 8 TASS — Military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

The White House continues to make grand statements about the need to ensure progress at the Geneva talks on the basis of the accords reached in Reykjavik but in practice retreats from all the positions that were agreed upon at the last Soviet-American summit.

In the Icelandic capital the leaders of the USSR and the United States agreed to reduce their strategic forces by 50 percent by the end of 1991 to an equal number of delivery vehicles and warheads. The remaining nuclear arms would be dismantled in the course of the next five years, that is by 1996. In Reykjavik President Reagan agreed to convey this understanding to the delegations in Geneva to prepare a treaty to this effect.

But as soon as Ronald Reagan returned to Washington the White House "specified" that when speaking in Reykjavik about liquidating by the end of the two five-year periods all nuclear devices, including bombs, battlefield weapons, cruise missiles, intermediate range systems, etc. the President in reality had in mind not all nuclear arms but only ballistic missiles. Soon the White House altogether stopped mentioning any whatsoever reductions of nuclear weapons after 1991.

Several days ago the director of the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Kenneth Adelman declared that the elimination of all ballistic missiles remains the administration's long-term aim. When the White House speaks of its "long-term aims" in disarmament this always means a flat refusal by the United States to agree even to minimum reductions of any weapon systems. In this particular case Adelman explained that Washington is no longer making the emphasis on proposals to liquidate all ballistic missiles over a period of ten years.

Washington gave the European NATO countries the main role in undermining the Soviet-American accords on the issue of medium-range missiles that were reached in Reykjavik.

As though responding to a command a number of leaders of these countries, including Thatcher, Kohl and Chirac, expressed "alarm" at the possibility of withdrawal of American medium-range nuclear missiles from Western Europe.

At the regular session of the NATO committees in Brussels nobody ever "remembered" the NATO double-track decision of 1979 and the "zero option", as well as the incantations about NATO's desire "to liquidate a whole class of medium-range nuclear missiles".
The NATO officials did not even dare send an answer to the concrete proposals of the Warsaw Treaty countries concerning the programme of a large-scale reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals. Instead, the NATO military committee sets the following problem as the bloc's most pressing task: how to secure greater public support for the NATO strategy and make people understand that NATO's own armaments do not create a threat. A really impossible task!

Washington has set out to revise the positions on the most pressing problems of war and peace that have been agreed upon in Reykjavik.

Every time the Soviet Union takes a step to bring closer the positions of the sides of the field of arms control Washington invariably makes a step back from its former positions apparently in fear of the very prospects of an improved climate of international relations.

The American side has kept to these tactics in matters related to strategic arms, to medium-range missiles and also to banning nuclear tests.

/9365
CSO: 5200/1173
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR RADIO ON U.S. POST-REYKJAVIK STANCE, KOLA SS-5 WITHDRAWAL

LD291645 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 29 Nov 86

["Top Priority" Discussion program presented by Vladimir Pozner, with Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov]

[Text] [Pozner] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. This is Vladimir Pozner presenting "Top Priority." With me on the panel as usual, are doctors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov.

October 24th marked the 25th birthday, if you wish, of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the ACDA, and I think that that event can serve as the kick-off for today's discussion. As you know, as we all know, the director of the ACDA is Mr Kenneth Adelman, who before becoming its director was quoted as saying that arms control is a sham in general. After Reykjavik, looking at what has happened on the American scene, I think that perhaps Mr Adelman's words take on a special meaning. Anyway, I'd like to begin in the general framework of this 25th anniversary, birthday anniversary, and in general what has happened after Reykjavik.

[Bogdanov] I am really puzzled, you know, what is the correlation between Kenneth Adelman's position and the President's position? You know, the President was about to make a written agreement with the Soviet leader on most substantial points of the arms control.

[Pozner] In Reykjavik.

[Bogdanov] In Reykjavik, you know. And his director of Arms Control [chuckles] Agency, you know, is actually making a campaign against what his own President has done. That's (?)my difficulty). I don't understand, you know?

[Pozner] That brings us to a logical question that I would like you, Dr Plekhanov, to take a look at. As you know, and as I think we all know, indeed it looked at one point like President Reagan was indeed ready to sign a very important agreement in the area of the reduction of strategic nuclear offensive weapons, yet in the days and weeks that passed after Reykjavik there has been a general tendency not only to deny that or to try to confuse people but a direct onslaught on the agreements that were in principle accepted by the American side in Reykjavik. There has been a retreat from the entire idea of Reykjavik. My question to you is twofold: Why bother to go to Reykjavik at all, seeing what happened today? [as heard] Why did the Americans go? And second, why this radical change, it would seem?
[Plehanov] Well, to the question of why go to Reyjavik, I think the President did need some kind of an appearance of successful negotiation with the Soviet Union because that's one of the weak spots of his record, the fact that he has been the only President since Eisenhower who has not been able to find any arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. And it is happening at the level of the arms race which is getting increasingly dangerous. He did promise that he would try in good faith to reach agreement and that's part of his mandate, so he needed the semblance of progress in Soviet-American relations. At the same time, I think, needing a semblance, he was not prepared — and he is not yet prepared, as far as I can see — to really change his original posture on Soviet-American relations, which effectively prevented any progress in arms control and in fact has led to the dismantlement of the existing arms control agreements. In fact, I think it's very significant that in the weeks since Reyjavik we have seen the long-announced step by the U.S. Government to violate the terms of the SALT-II treaty. The 131st B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles has been rolled out of hangar; it stands on the tarmac at some air force base and we have heard the official announcement that in December it will be actually deployed.

[Pozner] Well, who is the President? Which man is President Reagan? The man who almost signed these important agreements in Reyjavik or the man who today is again announcing a crusade against communism and going back almost to the rhetoric of the evil empire? Which of these is President Reagan? Who are we dealing with?

[Bogdanov] I wonder if anybody around this table has the right answer to that. Maybe you, Vladimir, you are the wisest among us and I hope you will explain to us. [chuckles] But that very important question you put to us because, if you look at the Soviet-American relations, that's quite a serious matter. You would not deny that. And that question, with whom the Soviet side has to deal, that's a crucial question, you know. If you have a President who after 2-3 days goes back on the most important, you know, agreements or understandings, if you like, and if he is telling that I never did it — oh, but he did it — my question is: Should we really trust, should we really, you know, deal with the kind of man we are dealing now? My question is: Suppose for a while that we got a written agreement at Reyjavik, signed by the American President, what would happen after he comes back to the USA? Now I tend to believe that even with that paper in his pocket he would say no, I have no paper, I haven't even signed anything, you know. That's really, it's becoming a very serious problem in the Soviet-American relations.

[Pozner] Professor Plehanov, could you tell me in your opinion why this very clear-cut and strong effort on the part of the Administration to impress upon Americans that Reyjavik really never existed? This real retreat, this, you know, like: No, no, no! We don't want to talk about it, forget about it, it was never there. What's happening?

[Plehanov] Well, the election is behind, that's an important factor. The Administration is entering some very stormy waters, what with Irangate and the economy and many other problems. And I think that Soviet-American relations have been put on the back burner. They were never at the top of the list of priorities for this administration. They have been forced to put it at the top of the list for a while in terms of rhetoric, in terms of some [pollsters] that they've taken in diplomacy, but in terms of their strategic thinking the Soviet Union is important only as a bugaboo to scare the people into voting for SDI and huge defense budgets and what have you. So I think that they are now in a kind of a more normal mode of their thinking and behavior. They are more concerned about other issues which they have, and of course uppermost on their minds is the question of what they are going to do with Irangate.
So in this situation it's logical for a political leader to try to rally around him those who have been with him from the start, and that means the extreme right, in politics. And therefore I think it was significant that his speech, the President's speech, at the Center for Ethics and Public Policy at the Georgetown University was reported extensively by only one newspaper, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, which is the ultra-conservative newspaper in Washington, D.C. — a Moonie newspaper. The other papers didn't bother to report on it because the speech was really astounding in the kind of rhetoric. I mean, it was early 1950's all they way. And he didn't mention the evil empire but he coined a new term, sea of darkness. I mean, now we are a sea of darkness and the other things, the crusade, anticommunist crusade, and even almost a promise to liberate the Soviet Union from communism. [as heard] I mean, that's astounding. Nobody can take it really seriously.

[Pozner] You mean we should vote for Reagan, that's the idea right? [laughter] Let me get back to something else here. You recall several years ago the Soviet Union announced that it would withdraw a certain number of tanks and servicemen from the German Democratic Republic. I believe it was 1,000 tanks and . . .

[Bogdanov, interrupting] Twenty thousand.

[Pozner] Twenty thousand men. Which was done, and in the West and particularly in the United States the reaction to that was oh, you know, that's insignificant. Of course at that time I said if we had said we were introducing an additional 1,000 tanks and an additional 20,000 men I could see the headlines screaming about, you know, how many more conventional forces the Soviet Union was moving into Europe. Now, in this period of President Reagan's tenure the Soviet Union has done several unilateral things. It has to begin with over a year now, well over a year, been on a unilateral moratorium concerning all nuclear testing. Okay, that's number one. Number two: the Soviet Union has taken out the SS-5's from the Kola Peninsula. Okay, that's another one. The Soviet Union has withdrawn troops from Afghanistan.

Now in all of these three gestures, each of which is important, the United States has said that it's of no importance, they are irrelevant. When those SS-5s were on the Kola Peninsula they were considered a threat to European safety. When we take them away, that is insignificant. What I am asking you as I speak about this is: do you think there is anything the Soviet Union can do to impress the U.S. establishment about its intentions? Number one. And number two: Do you believe the Soviet Union should do this kind of thing? In general, is there any sense in doing it?

[Bogdanov] Well, let me start with the second part of your question and I would express my very personal opinion. I would not do anything, you know, because I believe that whatever it is done at this end that would be dismissed by the American side as a propaganda ploy or something like that, because basically they need a bad image of the Soviet Union, that's the core of the American, you know, domestic policy. If you dismantle that, a bad Soviet Union, you have no, you know, reasons to appropriate money (?)for defense).

[Pozner] Now wait a minute. Are you saying we should not do the moratorium, or we should not take out those SS-5's?

[Bogdanov] Well, that's my very personal opinion.

[Pozner] You think so?
[Bogdanov] I think so because my experience is that whatever you do would not satisfy the American side. But there is another, you know, side of the matter, which is the fact that the USA, it's not the end and beginning of everything, you know, the whole structure of international relations is more complex than just Soviet-American relations. If you cannot convince them, or you cannot expect them to accept your real, you know, deeds as a real signal for real improvement in the Soviet-American relations then of course you have millions and millions of people all over the world, they will judge after all what is wrong, what is right with the Soviet Union, you know. And that really encourages me very much that we should no, not for them...

[Pozner, interrupting] Not for the American establishment...

[Bogdanov] Not for the American establishment but the sake of the whole people in the world, because at the final end — and I very strongly believe in that — that would bring very positive results in the overall, you know, environment in the world.

[Pozner] Dr Plekhanov, how do you feel about that?

[Plekhanov] Well, I think that we shouldn't really be discouraged by the negative reactions from the Reagan administration to some of our gestures. I mean, some of those reactions are entirely predictable. When the other side does something which you don't like you either try to dismiss it or try to put a blackout on the news about it or something else. In fact that may mean that, well, we're doing the right thing. But I think that what Dr Bogdanov said was very important, that the Reagan administration has no monopoly on world public opinion, or even on the American public opinion, or even in the opinion of the American elite. Policy making in any state is the sum total of pressures and influences and views which are brought to bear on the government from all sides, inside the country and outside. That's normal political process, it happens everywhere. We are reacting to world events and the American establishment has to react to world events. I think that our actions have had and are having an increasing impact on the way the world perceives East-West relations, prospects for arms control and disarmament, and that is important. That means changing the environment, to which the U.S. Administration has to react.

[Pozner] I think you are absolutely right and I think this is supported by what is happening right now, by what has happened in the relationship between the Soviet Union and India in the meeting between the two leaders. There again you can see that the world does not hinge only on Soviet-American relations and that the Soviet foreign policy is something that affects more than simply the United States. You wanted to add something to that?

[Plekhanov] Yes, I just wanted to add something about the visit to India. The other day I heard news about a public opinion poll in India which was taken on the eve of Comrade Gorbachev's visit there. Indians were asked which country they think is the best friend of India. Ninety-three percent of them said the Soviet Union. Only 6 percent said the United States. I am sure that 25 years ago polls were giving a different picture or perception.

[Pozner] And I am sure that the moratorium has something to do with that.

[Plekhanov] Oh, absolutely.

[Bogdanov] Oh, yes, moratorium, it's a global issue. It's not a Soviet-American problem it's a global issue and I insist on that, you know.

[Pozner] Well, fine. I want to thank you both for participating today. On the part of "Top Priority" this is Vladimir Pozner wishing you good listening and inviting you to tune in a week from today at the same time.
MOSCOW TV CONTRASTS UN, NATO NUCLEAR ARMS DISCUSSIONS, FIRST-USE THREAT

LD072213 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1555 GMT 7 Dec 86

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov]

[Text] Hello, Comrades! In New York over the past few days they have been talking about disarmament and security; in Brussels, during the same few days, they have been talking about armaments and security. No disagreement about the objective, it would appear, though how different are the means that are being recommended for achieving it! Resolutions on issues relating to disarmament -- 45 resolutions -- were adopted at the UN General Assembly session in New York. If they are carried out, peace is guaranteed. One of the resolutions is about preventing and arms race in space. But was this not negotiated about 1 year ago at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva? No one votes against: 154 countries vote in favor, with one solitary country abstaining, and it is not difficult to calculate that this country is the United States.

The United States is not alone when it comes to the resolutions opposing nuclear weapons tests. Britain and France also say no to this. This Western trio changes its composition somewhat in the voting on the resolution banning radiological weapons. It is the United States, France, and Israel that are opposed to banning these. That is what happened in New York. With the abovementioned exceptions, the world community expressed its desire for disarmament.

In the meantime, the so-called Atlantic week -- or to be more precise the Atlantic 10 days -- began in Brussels. Paradoxically, there they are talking about the ideas of Reykjavik in topsy-turvy fashion. In Reykjavik, the talk was about nuclear disarmament, an idea that is so popular that it is not easy to oppose it directly. Everyone will point the finger, as if one were the nuclear renegade. The NATO documents, therefore, pay courtesy to Reykjavik. What comes next is not simply a virtual denial of Reykjavik but an attempt to make use of it in order to step up the arms race. Reykjavik, it seems, gave rise to something else beside hopes.

In the view of French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, Reykjavik gave rise to fear to a much greater extent, and this is not just his concern.

First and foremost, it is being asserted that one cannot do without so-called nuclear restraint, because it is indeed the West's threat to make first use of nuclear weapons that holds back the threat of attacks from the East using conventional armed forces and armaments. That, for example, is the opinion of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. She says: We cannot build our defenses solely on conventional armaments. Furthermore, both Thatcher and Chirac are to some extent pleased with Reykjavik, in that it has been the jolt that has shaken a drowsy Europe out of its characteristic state of equability.
The conclusion they offer from Reykjavik is that they must upgrade their weapons as a matter of urgency; that they must hold on more tightly to their own nuclear forces; that U.S. nuclear missiles must be retained in Europe; and that it would be a good idea to add new ones to them, those of so-called reduced intermediate range, that is to say operational-tactical ones.

All this means that the situation in Europe is looked upon as if it were a situation of ancient military confrontation. Jacques Chirac has proposed that a charter of principles governing the security of Western Europe be worked out. The main principle runs as follows: Nuclear restraint remains the sole means for preventing any war in Europe. There is no alternative to it within the foreseeable future. With the proposed charter, Chirac would like to consolidate the community of views of the countries of Western Europe on the role of nuclear restraint. Of course, these views include nuclear disarmament.

All the signs are that the forthcoming sessions of the NATO organs will bring Western Europe new decisions to increase their armaments. Such is the philosophy of confrontation which ignores the olive branch that is being held out by the East, and which refuses to discuss the Warsaw Pact states' proposals on reducing conventional armaments and armed forces.

Or, perhaps it is simply a matter of the profits for those who deal in death, as they used to call the military industrialists? Perhaps it is all very simple. Perhaps there is not any anti-Soviet philosophy at all?
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: NATO PLANNERS IGNORE SALT VIOLATION, SUPPORT SDI

LD052313 Moscow TASS in English 2214 GMT 5 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 5 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

How can one assess the declaration of the striving for a more stable East-West relations, the declaration made by the session of the NATO Military Planning Committee that just ended? The session's communique does not even mention the United States biggest provocation, the breach of the SALT-2 Treaty. But then it proclaims "support" for the U.S. SDI program which is aimed essentially at spreading the arms race to space and turning near-earth space into a place d'armes for the establishment of U.S. hegemony and breaking another important treaty, the ABM Treaty.

The SALT-2 treaty which has sealed military paritiy between the USSR and the USA and limited the nuclear arms race for a whole number of years in its central area -- the field of strategic offensive arms -- has now been trampled underfoot by Washington. This step has been dictated by nothing other than Washington's desire to beef up the U.S. arsenals of strategic systems and assure itself of military superiority. The U.S. militaristic circles are frightened with the prospects of the improvement of the international situation, of the advance toward a nuclear-free world, that opened in Reykjavik due to the Soviet initiatives. And the abandonment of the SALT-2 treaty is a logical link in the campaign of attacks on Reykjavik's historic opportunities.

Another component of this sinister campaign is the striving to "rewrite" the "package of accords" achieved in Iceland in such a way as would suit the United States. Specifically, the present statements of officials of the U.S. Administration that it is elimination of strategc ballistic missiles and not complete elimination of strategic offensive nuclear arms and nuclear weapons altogether that should be sought also pursue the aim of achieving strategic superiority for the United States, at the negotiating table. For apart from heavy bombers the United States will also keep forward-based systems: 560 nuclear delivery aircraft based at 14 aircraft carriers, hundreds of nuclear delivery aircraft based close to the Soviet Union's borders, while the Soviet Union has no additional systems within reach of the U.S. territory.

Then what is the worth of Washington's declarations about its adherence to a nuclear disarmament?

One would like to remind to the present U.S. Administration and other NATO rulers of the advice of Senator Edward Kennedy about the need to give up the obsessive idea of getting nuclear advantages, to abandon the dangerous delusion that the more megatons, the greater the number of trump cards. It is high time certain persons in the West realize that the nuclear arms race is not a game of poker. It is a matter of life or death of peoples of the Soviet Union, the United States, the Warsaw Treaty countries, and NATO countries. Political wisdom and simply an instinct of self-preservation are now needed more than ever.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR RADIO SHOW ON INF, REYKJAVIK, U.S. SALT II VIOLATION

LD052310 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 5 Dec 86

["International Situation: Questions and Answers" program, conducted by Vladimir Pasko, All-Union Radio foreign affairs commentator, with B.D. Pyadyshev, first deputy chief of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry; Washington correspondent Vladimir Dunayev; TASS foreign editor V.Y. Chukseyev; and Kim Gerasimov and Sergey Pravdin, who are not further identified]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted: Pyadyshev speaks on the importance of the Delhi declaration, with quotes from foreign papers]

[Pasko] I would like to put another question, from Comrade Zhiklin of (Sredneraskovets) in Kursk Oblast. He asks: Why did the Soviet Union earlier reject the so-called zero-option of President Reagan 4 years ago concerning medium-range weapons in Europe, when it was included among our package of proposals at Reykjavik?

[Pyadyshev] This question concerns the U.S. medium-range weapons being deployed in certain countries of Western Europe, the Pershing II's and cruise missiles, as well as the Soviet SS-20 missiles. This issue has been developing, moving; positions over time have taken on new outlines, both our position and the U.S. position. However, as regards the Soviet Union, our aim here was and remains unchanged. We are for the full elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in the European zone.

I shall recall that in the 15 January 1986 program for a nuclear-free world their complete elimination is envisaged in the first stage. In addition the United States must undertake not to supply its strategic missiles and medium-range missiles to other countries, while Britain and France must not build up their weapons in this category. To simplify things, the Soviet Union went so far as to leave aside the British and French nuclear potential, which is far from being something insignificant. The British and French medium-range missiles represent a fairly serious force; even so, for the sake of removing concern in Europe connected with the presence of U.S. and Soviet missiles, we went as far as this step.

In Reykjavik the Soviet leadership proposed an even more radical solution to this problem. We removed the conditions mentioned above. But it was precisely the radical nature of our new stand that demands that the issue of medium-range weapons should be examined in a package with other measures, in particular along with the issues of not exceeding the ABM Treaty limits for a period of 10 years, cutting strategic offensive weapons and their complete elimination over a period of 10 years, and lastly, nuclear tests prohibition. This is the Reykjavik package. All the issues contained it, including the issue of medium-range weapons, must be resolved as an interconnected set; only in this way can the stability of the strategic situation be maintained.

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What of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva? Our delegation in Geneva is ready to continue — if the United States shows constructiveness — to draft separate provisions and formulations for a possible future agreement. The aims have not been lost; we continue to base ourselves on the position that the issue of medium-range weapons in Europe can be one of the most promising.

[Passage omitted: Pasko says that opinion polls are used by the U.S. Administration to influence the public into accepting unpopular decisions and to influence voting; Dunayev comments on the Iran arms supply scandal, saying Reagan is losing his popularity as President, detailing allegations made, citing opinion polls and giving a profile of Carlucci]

[Passage omitted: Meanwhile, time is not waiting. The problems of disarmament are persistently knocking on the door. The Soviet proposals made at Reykjavik are on the table in Geneva. The Soviet idea of saving the world from nuclear weapons by the end of the century is so grandiose, so attractive, that even today, almost a year after it was put forward by Comrade Gorbachev on 15 January, it is being widely debated by people.

If there was a reply to our proposals, "Iranagate" would fade into the background. Washington has decided to divert attention from the scandal not by positive initiatives but by breaking one of the basic agreements with the Soviet Union — SALT II. For his purpose they commissioned, 1 month ahead of schedule, a bomber carrying cruise missiles.

Our faithful listener Viktor Petrovich Glushkov from Fedorovskoye, in Kalinin Oblast, asks on behalf of workers at the fishery there how the world reacted to Washington's step? The chief foreign news editor for TASS, Vitaliy Yakovlevich Chukseyev replies;

[Passage omitted: The announcement by the U.S. Defense Department that the 7th Air Wing at Carswell base had been supplied with another B-52 bomber, equipped with nuclear cruise missiles, at first glance could hardly presage such a widespread and agitated reaction throughout the world. Naturally, one such plane, the first of which was dispatched by the Boeing company to the armed forces in 1955, is only a drop in the ocean of the current vast program to modernize U.S. weapons. However, its transfer into the active Strategic Air Force meant the latest step, exceptionally dangerous for the cause of peace, undertaken by the White House.

The 131st bomber, equipped with nuclear weapons, broke the limits introduced by the Soviet-U.S. SALT II agreement. It is widely accepted that this agreement served, until recently, as one of the most effective factors holding back the arms race, and although its violation was no surprise — Washington has long been heading this way — Reagan's decision aroused sharp criticism and anxiety both in the United States and in various countries of the world. [passage omitted quoting U.S. senators and opinion in Europe]

Recent facts show that the White House decision contradicts the statements of the U.S. side after Reykjavik on their devotion to talks on disarmament. On the contrary, this unceremonious step further complicates the search for and approach to disarmament. [passage omitted: Gerasimov reviews role and training of Israeli Army, and its ties with the United States; Pravdin comments on the history and situations in the Ivory Coast and Cape Verde; Pasko comments on Grenada, noting the worsening economic and unemployment situations]
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR’S AKHROMYEYEV INTERVIEW ON SDI, INF, TESTING, SALT II

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 48, 8 Dec 86 pp 6-8

[Interview with Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Soviet chief of general staff]

[Text]

The hopes pinned on the Reykjavik summit soon evaporated. The Americans continue to adhere to their SDI plans and reject proposals to end nuclear testing. Will the U.S.S.R. still abide by its disarmament initiatives?

Soviet moves to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons are fundamental to Soviet foreign policy, and we do not seek any one-sided advantage. In Reykjavik the U.S.S.R. offered concessions on a range of issues to get the U.S. to respond with its own concessions and embark upon real disarmament. However, in chasing after phantom superiority over the U.S.S.R. the U.S. killed possible accommodations in Reykjavik. The Soviet Union is convinced that the reduction followed by the elimination of nuclear weapons can be secured on the basis of parity and equal security.

Does this apply to a future administration or the Reagan Administration as well?

I am a military man, but you are asking a purely political question. The Soviet delegation is not having an easy time of it at its talks in Geneva with the representatives of the Reagan Administration. Nonetheless, we are not ruling out accommodation, though only on the basis of parity, provided the U.S. leadership agrees. A new administration will be taking over two years from now. For the time being we do not know what kind of policy it will conduct.

Which means you will not let the U.S. demoralize you?

Our policy has always been and will remain that set out at the 27th Congress of the CPSU. It is the Soviet Union’s long-term policy in the effort for peace and nuclear disarmament.

Since Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary, the Soviet Union has withdrawn from many of its positions which had for many years blocked nuclear disarmament talks with the U.S. Is this possible with respect to SDI?

We never blocked negotiations. In the past we sought and secured accommodations with the U.S. based on equal security. Only reciprocal concessions enabled the two sides to secure such major agreements in the 1970s as the ABM treaty, the interim SALT-1 agreement and the SALT-2 treaty. The Soviet proposals put forward in Reykjavik made the radical reduction of nuclear armaments possible. But what did the U.S. offer in return? Nothing. When we offered concessions in the sphere of strategic nuclear weapons and medium-range missiles, the U.S. should have replied with concessions in the sphere of space armaments. SDI is a programme for developing and deploying strike weapons in space, which will drastically destabilize the world situation. Hence the U.S.S.R. cannot modify its attitude to SDI. We cannot end the arms race on earth and simultaneously start it in space.

Why does the Soviet Union hope that a global solution will be possible ten or twenty years from now, although so far the progress made on problems
of disarmament has been rather modest.

I do not agree that the progress made has been “modest.” After a military equilibrium was reached between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization in the early 1970s, the ABM and SALT treaties were signed, which impeded and curbed the arms race. Reykjavik further showed that agreements on a radical reduction of nuclear potentials are possible. What is unrealistic about our proposals? President Reagan agreed with Mikhail Gorbachev’s proposal to eliminate strategic nuclear weapons over a ten-year period. The only obstacle in the way was the U.S. “star wars” programme. All the peoples of the world, the Americans included, want to prevent an arms race in space. Only the military-industrial complex and influential reactionary forces in the U.S. ignore this.

Does that mean a stalemate?

If the U.S., in reply to the Soviet proposals and concessions on nuclear arms, fails to put forward any positive proposals and continues to escalate work on the SDI programme, I do not see any chance of making progress at the disarmament talks with the U.S. Today the ball is in the U.S. court.

The Soviet position is one of “all or nothing.” But we might end up with “nothing.” Is it not possible to discount SDI for the moment and advance consistently?

You are misstating our position. We reject the “all or nothing” principle. Our programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons has three phases, which means a gradual solution of the nuclear problem step by step. In Reykjavik, the Soviet Union was prepared to offer concessions of no mean order to secure a radical solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament. We proposed halving strategic offensive weapons without taking into account the U.S. forward-based nuclear potential as well as the complete elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe without taking into account the British and French nuclear arsenals. We agreed to such a solution, which was not an easy one for us. The package of Soviet proposals, incorporating the total elimination of strategic offensive weapons and, accordingly, steps to consolidate the ABM treaty regime, as well as the elimination of medium-range missiles and a complete end to nuclear testing is a package of mutual interests and concessions. Were any of the proposals to be excluded from the Soviet package, the military equilibrium would be tilted in favour of NATO. The U.S. wants to take the concessions from our package and give nothing in return. We will not consent to that. The Soviet Union is prepared to discuss all the issues at negotiations, and work out accommodations, but their entry into force will be possible only if they are taken as one composite package. As Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out, “If there is no package there will be no concessions.”

Many think SDI will never be operative and is only a chess move by the Americans to achieve a greater gain.

You see, I am no scientist, I am a practical military man. Should a country undertake to build a national anti-missile system against a definite number of strategic warheads—say, 6,000—that system could perhaps be built with a certain degree of likelihood of living up to its mission. However, by taking appropriate measures, the other side could depreciate that system.

Some Western politicians regard Mikhail Gorbachev’s disarmament proposals as evidence that only power politics can get the Soviet Union to negotiate.

That is a deliberate untruth, deliberate misinformation. The Reykjavik meeting was held on the Soviet initiative. The U.S. is responsible for blocking the agreements. Today the whole world sees who it was that really frustrated the accord in Reykjavik. The Americans want to develop and deploy strike weaponry in space in order to achieve military superiority over us. However, SDI will not help the U.S. to do that, for an appropriate response to its “star wars” programme will be forthcoming from the Soviet side.

What will that reply be?

Every educated person, without being a major military expert, will realize that no absolute weapon exists. Every measure has its countermeasure, and an appropriate system can be developed to any system. It is very hard, even impossible, to build a reliable national anti-missile defence system unless one knows what the prospective enemy intends to do: increase or
qualitatively improve strategic armaments, use manoeuvring warheads or improve ways of protecting them. For unless agreement is reached to ban the deployment of a national ABM system, there will be no agreement either as concerns the reduction or some limitation of strategic offensive weapons. The U.S. Administration has experienced, educated people, and they apparently understand that. However, it evidently has other objectives, which do not permit it to abandon SDI.

You are doing research in the military use of space. How far have you advanced in this sphere?

We are not conducting any research to develop space-based ABM systems. We are carrying out work to improve missile attack warning systems, means of control, communications and navigation, and to develop a ground-based ABM system within the ABM treaty limits. We are implementing the ABM treaty fully and scrupulously.

How would you prove the view that SDI is really an offensive system?

Firstly, the weapons the SDI programme envisages—such as laser and beam weapons, electromagnetic guns and homing missiles—are strike weapons by means of which the U.S. hopes to destroy space-based nuclear missile strike warning craft in order to "blind" the other side, render it deaf and mute, catch it napping and deprive it of the possibility to retaliate to a nuclear attack. Secondly, with an operation range of 4,000–5,000 km, these weapons may destroy targets on land and sea. They enhance the strategic offensive potential and make it possible to deliver the first strike in the hope of remaining safe. For just that reason is SDI an offensive weapon.

Does that mean you are afraid of SDI?

No, we are not afraid. We have the potential for developing a reliable counter-means, which will be cheaper than SDI. You see where the U.S. is taking us! Towards an endless, unbridled arms race. Who needs that? The Soviet Union does not need it, nor do most of the world's other countries.

Why is the U.S. doing this?

The motive behind it is to use the arms race to keep the Soviet Union in a constant state of tension and prevent it from fulfilling its planned social and economic tasks.

Does not the Soviet Union fear that, through SDI research, the U.S. will gain a new technological impulse as happened after the Moon landing programme, and thus stride ahead beyond the U.S.S.R.'s reach?

There is no need of an arms race to achieve that. Did the Soviet Union ever oppose the Moon landing programme? At the time we simply followed another course. We shot at the Moon not manned vehicles, but automatic craft. Currently, in opposition to SDI, we propose international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space, which holds out great prospects for employing sophisticated technology both in space and on earth. We are ready to compete in peaceful space exploration and, equally, to cooperate in this field.

A question on a military subject. Can you say by what proportion the nuclear potential should be cut to completely offset chances of retaliation?

That's a tricky question.

Would a 10 or 20 per cent cut be enough?

Military experts dealing with this matter proceed from the quantities of weapons the sides have at their disposal today. However, after all, both sides have agreed to halve strategic offensive weapons. Apparently that would be enough to ensure security for both sides. As for lower figures, we should then speak of other systems: medium-range potential and American forward-based systems in Europe should necessarily also be reduced. Only thus would it be possible to guarantee equal security to both sides.

Yet even given the halving of potentials the nuclear danger is nevertheless still too great.

Of course. For which reason the Soviet Union proposes completely eliminating nuclear weapons.

You said that if SDI remains, there will in that case be no agreement on medium-range and short-range missiles. For Western Europe that is particularly unfortunate.

That is not quite true. I said that agreement on medium-range missiles could not be reached outside of the package, but I did not say that with regard to missiles with an operational range of up to 1,000 kilometres. If NATO accepts the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty states to begin negotia-
tions on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, then it will be possible to discuss within the context of future negotiations the question of reducing operational tactical nuclear armament, by which we mean missiles with a range of up to 1,000 kilometres, carrier aircraft of tactical aviation and nuclear artillery.

The Soviet Union has not conducted nuclear tests since August 1985. What will happen if the moratorium ends on January 1, 1987?

A nuclear test ban has two aspects—political and military. Politically our moratorium is the touchstone of the sincerity of one or other country as concerns disarmament. The U.S. Administration failed this test of political maturity. It is obstinately continuing with nuclear testing. However, nuclear tests are linked to the military equilibrium in the world.

What about the military aspect? Will the Soviet tests be resumed?

Since our moratorium was introduced, the U.S. has staged 23 nuclear explosions. Though it has not been easy for us to observe a moratorium for a year and a half, we understand the need for it as a political measure and are all of one mind about it. Analyzing U.S. actions, the military are doing everything necessary to keep our leadership informed of the situation and be able to assess it correctly. It is in the Soviet government’s competence to decide how to act after January 1, 1987.

If the U.S. were to discontinue its nuclear explosions our moratorium would continue. Any of our measures on disarmament, including the moratorium, has its limits, which derive from the security interests of the Soviet Union and its allies.

Disarmament implies confidence. But how can you have confidence if you traditionally make a secret even of population statistics?

When the matter is one of confidence, the Soviet Union furnishes all the information required. This was the case with regard to data for strategic armaments, medium-range means and missile launchings. As for SS-20 missiles, we made known not only the quantity, but also provided tactical characteristics. Hence, allegations as to Soviet secrecy in the military sphere are unfounded. As for other areas, including the economy, the information our press furnishes, our openness and disclosure of shortcomings and their causes likewise refute these allegations.

Last summer President Reagan secured congressional endorsement for the manufacture of a new chemical weapon. At the same time, while in Bonn a Soviet delegate at the Geneva talks said a complete ban on chemical weapons was supposedly possible before the end of this year. What is true here? I cannot speak for what the U.S. government does. The U.S. evidently intends to open up one more channel for the arms race, a chemical one. We advocate the complete and general prohibition of chemical weapons, the elimination of available stocks of such weapons and the dismantling of facilities for their manufacture. Here we also support such intermediary moves as ridding the whole of Europe of chemical weapons, creating zones free of chemical weapons in Northern and Central Europe, and the Balkans, banning the transfer of chemical weapons and their deployment in the territories of other countries. Should the U.S. and other NATO countries wish it, it would be possible to conclude an appropriate convention as early as 1987.

Back to Reykjavik. Of course, that meeting was historic. Can it be repeated?

We think agreements are possible. All our efforts are directed towards that end. We have not budged an inch from the proposals we put forward in Reykjavik. However, the American side has abandoned much on which agreement had been reached. At the talks President Reagan agreed to having all Soviet and U.S. strategic weapons without exception eliminated over a ten-year period. Now the Americans say no, ballistic missiles can be eliminated, but not intercontinental bombers and cruise missiles. What President Reagan said in Reykjavik was quite different.

Hence Reykjavik remains the point of departure for further advance.

The Soviet Union is of that opinion.

There is also the argument that Western Europe cannot be left defenceless in the face of the Warsaw Treaty states’ military superiority in conventional armaments. France is saying that, for instance.

Why only France? There are also many politicians who support that view.
in the F.R.G. On that score I can say the following: that is not true, the intention is to deceive people. Militarily we have today in Europe an approximate balance in conventional armed forces and armaments.

Talks on this question have been going on in Vienna for ten years.

When the Vienna talks began—and they have now lasted thirteen years—

the two sides evidently did not altogether correctly assess the situation and delineated a square of European territory. With regard to NATO, this meant the armed forces of the bloc stationed in the F.R.G., Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg; with regard to the other side, the armed forces of the G.D.R., Poland and Czechoslovakia and the Soviet troops stationed in that area.

Today we have arrived at the conviction that it would apparently be easier to resolve the problem of cutting back on armed forces and armaments were we to consider the armed forces of the two sides across the whole of Europe, from the Urals to the Atlantic.

[Question] And now a question that does not have to do with troops and armaments. Would you not think it a pipe dream that we or our children should live to see a world without nuclear weapons?

[Answer] Why call it a pipe dream? We Communists are not dreamers. We are realists. And we believe in the existence of a world without nuclear arms and are striving to achieve it. In the fifty years of my conscious life, public awareness has greatly advanced. The opinion of the peoples plays an immeasurably greater role than before. Eventually the peoples will compel the opponents of disarmament to reach agreement and end the nuclear arms race. However, there is the danger that before we reach that point, war may end everything. That is why we are striving so persistently for a world without nuclear arms.

[Question] At the talks there is no progress and the danger of a deterioration of the situation in the disarmament area has appeared. In December the U.S., plans to exceed the number of atomic bombers stipulated in the SALT-2 treaty by equipping the 131st B-52 bomber with nuclear cruise missiles. What will you do then?

[Answer] What do you mean, what will we do? If the U.S. violates the SALT-2 treaty, then the Soviet Union is entitled to consider itself no longer bound by the treaty's commitments.

[Question] In that case the SALT-2 treaty will be invalid?

[Answer] It is not a unilateral treaty. It is a bilateral one. If one side scraps it, it is no longer binding on the other side.

[Question] You advocate the elimination of all types of nuclear weapons. However, in the West it is asserted that it is necessary to maintain at least a small nuclear arsenal in case some mad statesman from a Third World country would threaten the superpowers with atomic weapons.

[Answer] My reply will be extremely brief. This is merely an excuse by people who do not want to disarm and eliminate nuclear weapons. Were such powers as the USSR, the U.S., China, Britain and France to abolish their nuclear potentials, they would find the ways and means of persuading other countries to join them in the attainment of that high objective.
SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES CHIEF ON SDI COUNTERMEASURES, SALT II

SDI: First-Strike Weapons

AU101320 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 6 Dec 86 pp 1, 4

[Article by USSR Army General Yuriy Maksimov, deputy minister of defense: "'Star Wars' in Breach of the Treaties on Arms Limitation" — dispatched through NOVOSTI]

[Text] I cannot hide the fact that the USSR missile units with strategic functions are armed with the most modern weapons and equipment. However, it must be stressed that the USSR missile power does not threaten anybody. Unlike the United States, which in August 1945 used nuclear bombs against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we have never used nuclear weapons and we have promised that we shall never be the first to use them.

All talk about the so-called "Soviet military threat" or about some Soviet "superiority" over the United States in the area of arms does not correspond to the truth. Even American leading figures have repeatedly referred to the military-strategic parity with the USSR. However, strategic parity of power does not at all mean identity of structure. The historical situation has developed in such a way that (because of the characteristics of the geographical location of the two countries, among other factors) the USSR has developed mainly ground-based strategic missiles, while the United States' missiles are deployed in submarines and heavy bombers. Naturally, the USSR will not disrupt the structure of its strategic forces. Neither can we allow our security or the security of our allies to be harmed.

Let us turn now to arms limitation. I can cite the following statistics: From the moment SALT II was signed until today the USSR has dismantled [demontiral] 72 launching platforms for intercontinental ballistic missiles and 21 heavy bombers. The USSR has eliminated 340 strategic carriers in accordance with the SALT I agreement and SALT II treaty, whereas the United States has only eliminated 168. Commentary is superfluous, as they say.

The claim that the USSR has created and is developing a second type of intercontinental ballistic missile also does not withstand scrutiny. We have tested only a single type of intercontinental missile -- the RS-22. This is allowed under the clauses of SALT II. As far as the claims that the USSR is testing a second type of intercontinental ballistic missile are concerned -- this is an overt slander. I mean the RS-12M missile, which is a modernized variant of our old RS-12 missile. The United States has deliberately distorted the clear clause of SALT II on the composition of the elements included in the so-called "launch weight" of the missiles. Specifically, the weight of
the old RS-12 missile, as presented by the United States, does not include the weight of some of its elements. However, when they speak of the "launch weight" of the improved R-12 missile they illegally include the weight of the equipment used only during the tests. The goal of such machinations is clear. The United States has already created a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile — the "MX." Now, despite the treaty, they are creating a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile — the "Midgetman" — and are trying to find a justification for this.

The lies about "violations" of the agreements on limiting nuclear weapons by the USSR were needed by the U.S. Administration in order to justify its refusal to observe the agreements between the USSR and the United States and divert the attention of the world public from the course to fully implementing a broad program for increasing its nuclear arsenal which has been adopted. Specially, the Americans intend to deploy 50 additional units of "MX" intercontinental ballistic missiles and accelerate the creation of a new cruise missile, in addition to arming the B-52 and B-1B bombers with long-range cruise missiles.

Work related to the creation of American space weapons within the framework of the "Star Wars" program is continuing. The Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] was the main obstacle to an agreement in Reykjavik.

The space weapons being developed by the United States under the SDI program are first-strike weapons. These weapons have nothing to do with security and defense. The use of the "space shield" only makes sense when the country that has it attacks first. However, even now specialists in the USSR and abroad have been assessing dozens of countermeasures, which can create many complex problems for the SDI. These possible countermeasures were mentioned in the report of the Committee of Soviet Scientists, which has been published.

The scientists consider that the tactics of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at the "attrition" of the space antimissile defense by activating it early, well in advance of the responsible strike, could be an effective response to the SDI. This could be achieved by means of the combined launching of intercontinental ballistic missiles and "dummy" missiles, the launching of intercontinental ballistic missiles with wide variations of trajectory… All this would lead to great expenditure of energy resources by the SDI space units, rendering the X-ray lasers and electromagnetic guns powerless, and other premature losses in the firepower of the SDI system.

In addition, the qualitative improvement in the intercontinental ballistic missiles will cause many additional difficulties for the detection system. It will cause a sharp reduction in the effectiveness of the interception system and the guidance system for the striking means. The increase in the number of missile warheads will also lead to similar results.

The other way of countering the SDI considered by the specialists is the creation of means for destroying the combat space stations. This function can be performed by small missiles deployed in different ways and by "space mines." These are satellites launched into orbit close to the orbits of the stations, and armed with sufficiently powerful combat charges that explode by order from ground control. In other words, it is impossible to achieve military superiority through SDI. In any event, the responsive strike against the aggressor will be inevitable and crushing.

The USSR is struggling against the deployment of any weapons in space. We believe that by the year of 2000 it will be possible to stop the arms race and free the planet from nuclear weapons. However, if despite our arguments, the United States implements the "Star Wars" program, then, as Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said, we shall quickly find a response, which will not be the one expected by the United States. It will, however, be a response that will render the "Star Wars" program valueless.
USSR ICBM Vulnerability

LD101315 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 10 Dec 86

[Text] The latest issue of APN's military bulletin [voyenniy vestnik] was published today. It includes an article by Army General Comrade Maksimov, commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops.

He writes in particular: The vulnerability of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles will increase in connection with the development of the U.S. Star Wars program if we fail to take measures in response.

Within SDI the United States is planning along with the creation [sozdaniye] of antimissile defense elements, to deploy [razvernut] space strike weapons for strikes against Soviet strategic installations. Our task is to find a reliable way of countering combat platforms in space. We see real ways to preserve the invulnerability of our ICBM's even if the United States should deploy SDI.

The Soviet Union understands strategic balance as being the approximate equality between the strategic weapons of the USSR and the United States in terms of quantity and combat strength as required to maintain equal security for the powers. Any attempts to gain unilateral superiority over us will be parried in time, concludes the commander in chief.

So why are they spending trillions of dollars on SDI? The APN military bulletin observer suggests one possible reason: If one starts from the premise that for the United States the USSR is the number one enemy, then it may be presumed that there are enemies with other numbers as well. Perhaps Reagan's Star Wars program is intended basically for those countries that are unable to create anti-SDI systems. It is even possible that this is one of the basic aspects of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.

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CSO: 5200/1173
YUGOSLAV CP CHIEF IN MOSCOW: REYKJAVIK, SALT II, CDE

Gorbachev Dinner Speech

Ldl10020 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1737 GMT 10 Dec 86


M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, delivered a speech at the dinner:

The exchange of views on world affairs held an important place in the conversations with the Yugoslav comrades. We are unanimous in the understanding that preventing nuclear catastrophe is the most important task facing mankind.

This approach stems from the very nature of the socialist countries, from the fact that the peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia suffered immense casualties during World War II.

We are striving towards a lasting and fair peace based on respect for the rights of every people to independent development, on mutually beneficial cooperation.

The Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik offered a unique chance for burying the hatchet, that is, for ending the arms race and starting the abolition of nuclear weapons.

The militarist forces, however, have done everything to prevent a turn for detente, for disarmament.

The siren of the "crusade" against communism, silenced for a while, has been turned up to full capacity. It is being claimed that disarmament is impossible as long as the existing order, communist ideology, remains in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
And this is being said by the people who accuse us, communists, of the intent to impose by force our views on the rest of the world.

The U.S. Administration is throwing into the wastepaper basket agreements and treaties designed to restrain the spiraling of the arms race.

Faithful to its commitments, the Soviet Union has not exceeded by a single unit the limit set by the SALT-II treaty, has not conducted a single nuclear explosion since the introduction of the moratorium. We are prepared to continue that path if the United States responds in kind. The point at issue is security of nations and this security can be built in the nuclear age only on the basis of reciprocity.

We hope that Washington officials will be able to weigh possible implications of their actions in a responsible way. It seems to me that a weighty word can be said by U.S. allies and other countries whose governments welcomed in public on several occasions the Soviet restraint but dare not utter a word about America's lack of restraint in the field of the arms race.

Every cloud has a silver lining -- the events following Reykjavik have enabled many people to see better who are truly in favor of peace and disarmament and who only pay lip service to this subject while in reality being unwilling to renounce the banking on nuclear weapons, on power politics.

I already said and I want to repeat again: Mankind is running short of time. If the arms race is not stopped today or tomorrow, if the door to its transfer into outer space is not shut, the world may encounter a baneful heightening of international tension and unpredictable consequences.

The situation is alarming and it calls for immediate actions. No one is now entitled to a position of onlooker, limiting one's activity to general calls for peace.

We not only recognize but also uphold the right of all states -- big and little -- to active participation in the solution of topical problems of the times.

The importance of that can be judged from the fact that the success of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures in Europe was largely due to the constructive position of the neutral and nonaligned countries of the continent.

The USSR stands for the further growth of the role in world affairs of the authoritative force, that is the Nonaligned Movement, in which Yugoslavia has played such an outstanding part.

Today's meeting with the Yugoslav comrades and the recent visit to India demonstrated the consonance of our notions about ways of creating a nuclear-free world that would be safe for all.

This is the world that will make it possible to concentrate the collective efforts of mankind on overcoming backwardness, eradicating hunger and illiteracy, resolving other global problems of the times, and placing all achievements of scientific and technical genius at the service of humanitarian aims.

We are convinced that the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia will interact with ever greater friendship and efficiency in this direction.
In conclusion let me wish on behalf of our entire party and the Soviet people the Yugoslav Communists and all peoples of Yugoslavia successful resolution of the problems facing the country, in keeping with the decisions of the 13th Congress of the LCY and advancement along the road of socialism.

Let friendship and cooperation between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, between the fraternal peoples of our socialist countries, strengthen and develop!

Renovica Reply

LD102325 Moscow in Serbo-Croatian to Yugoslavia 2000 GMT 10 Dec 86

[Announcer-read speech by Milanko Renovica, president of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee, at a dinner given in his honor by CPSU Central Committee Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on 10 December in Moscow]

[Excerpts]

Esteemed comrades, the LCY feels that the characteristic feature of our epoch is the struggle of nations for complete national and social liberation, for peace in the whole world and the equality of nations, for the democratization of international political and economic relations. The proponents of the struggle for these noble goals are the numerous socialist, national liberation, anticolonial, and other progressive and democratic forces throughout the world, which are not divided by frontiers either of countries or continents. In the struggle for the realization of these goals a major and irreplaceable role is played by the movement and policy of nonalignment as an independent, nonbloc, and global factor of international relations. This orientation of the Nonaligned Movement was reaffirmed at the recent eighth summit of the nonaligned countries in Harare. As one of the founders of this movement a quarter of a century ago in Belgrade, Yugoslavia sees in the policy of nonalignment the way to the realization of the ideals of peace, security, freedom, independence, equality, unhindered development, and prosperity for all nations and countries.

The contemporary international situation is characterized by the exacerbation of international relations, the continuation of the arms race, the danger of its extension to outer space, the further worsening of the difficult economic position of the developing countries, and the exacerbation of existing and the appearance of new hotbeds of crisis which threaten peace and international security.

This is precisely why it is more necessary than ever before that the entire international community should take as wide a part as possible in the struggle to halt the negative processes in international relations and to overcome the existing divisiveness and confrontations; to preserve peace throughout the world and promote the equal cooperation of all peoples and countries on the principles of active peaceful coexistence; to establish a new international economic order in opposition to the policy of force, interference, and pressures, and in opposition to all forms of aggression, domination, and subjugation.
The LCY and SFRY are making their own great contribution to the efforts of all peace-loving forces that advocate an improvement in the international situation. We consistently advocate halting the arms race and starting a process of universal and total disarmament. We feel that the arms race is one of the key problems of the modern world, the consequences of which touch upon the interests of all countries and peoples; therefore, all have the right and duty to take part in the efforts aimed toward seeking the solution of that problem. Every initiative, every step toward disarmament, deserves acknowledgement and support. We highly appraise and support the initiatives and efforts of the Soviet Union and of you personally, Comrade Gorbachev, which aim to win disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament.

Joint Communiqué

PM121716 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Dec 86 Morning Edition pp 1, 4

[IZVESTIYA headline: "Joint Communiqué on the Visit to the USSR by an LCY Delegation"]

[Excerpts] An LCY delegation headed by M. Renovica, president of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, was in the Soviet Union 9 through 12 December 1986 on an official friendly visit at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee.

Talks took place between a CPSU delegation headed by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the LCY delegation headed by M. Renovica, president of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, in a friendly and frank atmosphere and in a spirit of mutual respect and mutual understanding.

An in-depth exchange of opinions took place on a wide range of international problems. The participants in the talks expressed concern at the persisting tension in the world, and especially the continuing arms race and the danger of its spreading into space. The economic situation of the developing countries is deteriorating, existing crisis situations are worsening, and new ones are arising. All this gives rise to profound contradictions in international political and economic relations and creates a serious threat to peace and international security.

It is the firm conviction of both sides that in present conditions urgent actions are needed by all states and political and social forces in the struggle for general disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament, and for detente and peaceful coexistence. The two sides assess positively any constructive initiative and any effective step in the direction of arms reduction and disarmament. In this context M. Renovica expressed acknowledgement and support for the Soviet Union's initiatives in favor of peaceful talks, disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, the prevention of the militarization of space, and the ending of nuclear weapon tests.

The sides came out in favor of stepping up the discussion of disarmament problems at the United Nations, the Disarmament Conference, and other international forums with a view to the speediest elaboration of measures to ensure the elimination of arsenals of weapons of mass destruction and the channeling of the resources now spent on military purposes into the needs of socioeconomic development.

Reaffirming profound commitment to the all-European process, whose viability is attested by the results of the Stockholm Conference, the participants in the talks noted that the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia consider it necessary that at the Vienna meeting of states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe a balanced development of the provisions of all sections of the Helsinki Final Act be achieved. Great significance would be attached to the holding of talks on a substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe.
The growing role was noted of the Nonaligned Movement as an independent global factor in international relations and in the struggle for peace, equal rights, and mutual understanding, against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, and all forms of aggression, interference, domination, and hegemony in the political and economic spheres, and for the creation of a new international economic order. Emphasis was placed on the importance of the decisions of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Nonaligned States in Harare, decisions aimed at consistently asserting the principles of the political and economic independence of all peoples and their right to exercise sovereign choice as to their paths of development, at lessening tension, and at developing international cooperation.

M. Renovica stressed that socialist Yugoslavia, as an integral part of the Nonaligned Movement since its foundation, sees the aims and activity of the movement, based on its original principles, as the embodiment of its own commitment to the ideals of peace, progress, and socialism.

M.S. Gorbachev stated that the Soviet Union, regarding the Nonaligned Movement as an authoritative progress force of today in opposition to war and aggression, is prepared to cooperate actively with the nonaligned countries in resolving the complex problems which face mankind.

M.S. Gorbachev and M. Renovica stressed the need for still more resolute actions by all peace-loving and progressive forces in order to turn peaceful coexistence into the universal principle of international relations. Expressing the conviction that the resolution of burning issues can only be ensured by peaceful means, they pointed to the role of the United Nations as an irreplaceable instrument of security and cooperation.

During the exchange of opinions on the communist and workers movement it was stressed that the independent elaboration and implementation by each party of its own political strategy and equal, constructive dialogue excluding a monopoly of the truth by any one party are important prerequisites for the development of cooperation in the struggle for peace and social progress.

M.S. Gorbachev and M. Renovica expressed the conviction that the exchange of opinions which took place will promote the further strengthening of friendship between the two countries' peoples, the strengthening of trust, and the deepening of collaboration between the CPSU and the LCY and the USSR and the SFRY in the interests of peace and socialism.

In the context of European problems, the tense situation in the Mediterranean region was examined, and the sides reaffirmed their readiness actively to promote the region's transformation into a zone of peace, security, good-neighborliness, and cooperation.

The creation in Europe and on other continents of zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons would be a significant contribution to the cause of strengthening peace.

M. Renovica, president of the LCY Central Committee Presidium and member of the SFRY Presidency, on behalf of the LCY Central Committee Presidium and the SFRY Presidency, conveyed to M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, an invitation to pay an official friendly visit to the SFRY in 1987. The invitation was accepted with thanks.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: FURTHER BRIEFINGS OF FOREIGNERS ON REYKJAVIK

Kapitonov in Romania

PM011137 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS reports under general heading "Friendship, Cooperation"]

[Excerpts] Brasov, 27 Nov--The Brasov motor vehicle plant is one of Romanian industry's largest enterprises. Its output is widely known both in Romania and beyond its borders. On 26 November the thousands-strong collective warmly welcomed the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by I.V. Kapitonov, chairman of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission and USSR Supreme Soviet deputy.

A Romanian-Soviet friendship meeting was held. Welcoming the Soviet guests, the plant's General Director V. Diaconescu noted that firm bonds of friendship link the peoples of the Soviet Union and Romania, and that the two countries' traditional cooperation in the economic, scientific, and technical spheres is expanding.

I.V. Kapitonov addressed the meeting. He conveyed Soviet people's fraternal greetings and best wishes to socialist Romania's working class and all working people.

The situation in the world, the delegation head went on, remains alarming. The real threat of nuclear war has still not been averted. The arms race goes on through the fault of imperialist forces, and primarily the United States.

Under these circumstances the Soviet Union, together with Romania and the other socialist community states, is building up the efforts aimed at averting the terrible military danger hanging over the planet.

We have put forward an entire package of major proposals on the destruction of mass annihilation weapons, the radial reduction of conventional arms, and the liquidation of seats of international tension.

M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with R. Reagan in Reykjavik was a major event. We submitted at that meeting bold plans for the elimination of nuclear arsenals within a short time. But the U.S. side strove to preserve the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative," come what may.

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The United States is thus pursuing one goal -- to create [sozdat] new types of weapons which could be used for aggression and blackmail against any state. Now it is perfectly clear that the U.S. desire for military superiority is the main obstacle in the way to radical disarmament.

At the same time the meeting showed that the quest for peaceful solutions must not be terminated and that accords are possible. The peaceful offensive must continue to be waged from new and higher frontiers.

Joint actions to prevent the nuclear threat are today more necessary than ever before. For this purpose the USSR Supreme Soviet last week addressed an appeal to all the parliaments and peoples of the world to resolutely speak out for a practical transition to the building of a nuclear-free world and the creation of reliable security that is equal for all states.

In conclusion I.V. Kapitonov wished all the working people of the Socialist Republic of Romania new major successes in building a developed socialist society and implementing the 13th RCP Congress decisions.

Shevardnadze Message to Florence

LD091711 Rome International Service in Italian 1555 GMT 9 Dec 86

[Text] The Soviets are ready to move forward following the results at Reykjavik and to set out in Geneva the various agreements on the reduction of medium- and long-range nuclear armaments to the smallest details. These agreements should be operative because of the new and further verification of the talks on the U.S. SDI regarding the ABM Treaty. [sentence as heard] This is in brief the message sent today by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze through his Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin to Foreign Minister Andreotti.

The meeting between the representatives of the two foreign ministries took place in Florence this morning at the Palazzo Vecchio. It was at the start of the International Conference on Overall Security in the Year 2000, organized by the UN Department for Disarmament and the Florence Forum for Problems of War and Peace. At the end of the meeting), Andreotti said that there is a strong will on the part of the Soviet Union to continue the East-West negotiations and that the Soviets have reiterated their readiness to negotiate with U.S. representatives at this moment. For his part, Adamishin accused the Americans of going back even on the hypothesis of agreement discussed at the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Reykjavik. In his address at the conference, Foreign Minister Andreotti expressed the hope that the two superpowers will reach even partial agreement on disarmament. He added that a stagnant situation is dangerous.
Dobrynin, Zagladin to PCF's Grenetz

PM101409 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Dec 86 First Edition p 4

[PRAVDA headline: "Conversation at the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Excerpts] Anatoliy Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Vadim Zagladin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, met at the CPSU Central Committee on 8 December with Maxime Gremetz, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party.

The sides discussed topical problems of the international situation, especially problems of campaigning against the threat of war, for ending the arms race and for preventing the militarization of outer space.

It was noted that the Soviet initiatives directed at radical cuts in nuclear and conventional arms and the program for eliminating all nuclear weapons by the turn of the century created new conditions for the campaign for peace and disarmament.

The movement in favor of nuclear disarmament was on the increase in all countries.

The quarters in the United States and Western Europe, however, alarmed by the prospect of disarmament and the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe mounted resistance, it was pointed out.

Both sides stressed the need for developing cooperation and dialogue among the broadest political and public forces — irrespective of political and ideological differences — on questions of the campaign for peace, security and disarmament in Europe.

The sides came out in favor of the further development and consolidation of relations of cooperation and solidarity between the CPSU and the PCF in the interests of the struggle for peace, disarmament and social progress, for friendship between the Soviet and the French peoples.

Dobrynin, Belgian CP Chairman on INF

PM151433 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Dec 86 Second Edition p 4

[PRAVDA headline: "Friendly Conversation"]

[Text] Anatoliy Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, had a meeting 6 December with Louis van Geyt, chairman of the Communist Party of Belgium who is here on a visit at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee. During their comradely and friendly conversation they compared notes on a number of pressing international problems.

It was pointed out that the far-reaching, bold and constructive Soviet foreign-policy initiatives and the course of strengthening peace, promoting disarmament and removing the risk of nuclear catastrophe, followed by the USSR and other socialist countries,
help create a felicitous atmosphere for a further increase in efforts by political and public forces to build a world free from nuclear arms and are instrumental in the search for new ways of solving the problems of disarmament and cooperation in Europe. It was said, among other things, that European countries, including medium-sized and small ones, have far from exhausted their possibilities to lift the obstacles standing in the way of fundamental improvements of the international situation, put an end to the continued deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons, secure their dismantling, and achieve reductions in conventional armaments in Europe. Yu. I. Zuyev, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Section, took part in the conversation.

/9365
CSO: 5200/1173
GORBACHEV RECEIVES THATCHER NOTE

LD151830 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1757 GMT 15 Dec 86

[By Chris Moncrieff, PA chief political correspondent]

[Text] Britain's ambassador in Moscow had a 90-minute meeting with Soviet leader Mr Mikhail Gorbachev in the Kremlin today, an event regarded in government circles as of major diplomatic significance. The talks involving Sir Bryan Cartledge centered on arms control. It was the first time a Soviet leader has summoned a British ambassador since 1963 when the then envoy, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, was called in by Mr Khrushchev.

Today's meeting in essence gave Mrs Thatcher's response to the message she received from Mr Gorbachev just before she set off for Washington and Camp David last month. Her reply today reflected the priorities in arms control agreed with President Reagan during that visit. Mr Gorbachev and Ambassador Cartledge also touched on human rights and humanitarian issues as well as discussing the prime minister's planned visit to Moscow, expected to take place next spring. The ambassador spelled out Britain's hope that progress could be made on all aspects of arms control on a balanced and verifiable basis. And he expressed the British hope that the Russians would not again link moves on intermediate nuclear weapons with the American "Star Wars" system. Sir Bryan said Britain felt that in their respect a step back had been taken at the Reykjavik summit. He also spoke of Britain's hopes for a ban on chemical weapons and repeated the call for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Afghanistan.

/9365
CSO: 5200/1173
USSR REPORTS, COMMENTS ON U.S. SALT 'BREAKOUT'

Doubts on U.S. Good Faith

PM151021 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 12 Dec 86 First Edition p 1

[Aleksandr Mozgovoy "International Review": "Who Is Breaking the Olive Branch"]

[Text] The U.S. coat of arms shows an eagle clutching a bunch of arrows and an olive branch in its talons. The arrows symbolize military might and the branch dedication to peace. At the moment it is evident that the U.S. Administration wants to increase the number of arrows and make them sharper. At the same time, an effort is being made to conceal militarist preparations with the olive leaves. There have been speeches in Washington too about nuclear disarmament and calls for "mutual restraint" and so forth. But there is clearly not enough camouflage material. The words are fundamentally at odds with the actions.

A B-52 heavy bomber landed at Carswell Air Force Base, Texas, at 1502 hours on 28 November. This aircraft, assigned to the U.S. Strategic Air Command 7th Bomber Wing, was the 131st to be equipped for long-range nuclear cruise missiles. By taking this step and at the same time failing to dismantle an equivalent nuclear weapon delivery vehicle to compensate for it, the United States exceeded the Soviet-American SALT II Treaty aggregate limit of 1,320 launchers for strategic ballistic missiles with MIRV'ED warheads and heavy bombers with cruise missiles. Thus, as the Soviet government statement stresses, "the treaty which enshrined military parity between the USSR and the United States and which had limited the nuclear arms race for a good number of years in its central direction—in the sphere of strategic offensive armaments—has been trampled upon." This very important agreement ensured strategic stability and was the springboard for the quest for ways of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons.

In order to observe the SALT II limits the United States originally planned to take the nuclear-powered submarine "Alexander Hamilton" out of service and dismantle its Poseidon missile launchers. Then it performed a u-turn—the navy was ordered to spend $160 million on modernizing the submarine. It is hardly likely that those who made the decision chose that boat deliberately,
but the fact is highly symbolic. The point is that Alexander Hamilton, one of the "founding fathers" of the United States, was the author of the "enlightened self-interest" concept—a fundamental concept of U.S. foreign policy. What is this concept? Briefly, it is the right to have a "free hand" in international affairs. "A treaty which is destructive to the state," A. Hamilton preached to the first American president, George Washington, "is in itself invalid, even if there have been no changes in the position of any of the contracting parties." That is, there is nothing sacred and permanent apart from the United States' own interests at a particular moment. If I see an advantage I sign the treaty, when the situation changes I tear it up. From the bourgeois, mercenary viewpoint the logic is irrefutable. But if you follow Hamilton's behest, the question nevertheless arises: Is the SALT II Treaty "destructive" to the United States today?

During his stay in India Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev called the U.S. violation of the treaty a "big mistake." Perhaps a somewhat stronger expression should have been chosen in this case? But, as you appreciate, strong language comes under the heading of emotion. What is needed is an accurate political assessment of the event. And that is precisely what the Soviet leader provided. It is no accident that it is reiterated and shared by the vast majority of the people in the world, including the United States. And this is natural. An ABC opinion poll in the summer showed that two-thirds of Americans are opposed to the administration abandoning the SALT II Treaty. And only recently the U.S. Congress demanded that the President continue to voluntarily observe the limits laid down in the treaty as long as the Soviet Union does the same. But the White House did not see fit to heed the people's opinion.

The stance adopted on the treaty by the U.S. Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff, which comprises five top Pentagon generals and admirals, is also indicative. They declined to recommend to the government either observance or violation of the agreement's provisions. "The question of SALT," the Joint Chiefs of Staff report says, "is a political decision for the President and not for the military." The generals' evasiveness is easily explained. In fact, their service promotion and comfortable future retirement depend on people in the administration (as one senior U.S. officer said in this connection, "unless you know what is expected of you, you will never become a four-star general"). But by and large, the military leaders were unenthusiastic about the White House's intention to exceed the limits indicated in the treaty.

This is understandable. Violation of the agreement will give the United States no military advantages. According to Western experts, the Soviet Union is capable of making up any ground in the strategic sphere very quickly and with ease. And no matter how hard the White House tries to disrupt military parity in its favor, nothing good will come of it. In fact, playing around with weapons is bound to lead to less security for the United States.
It is interesting to note the time chosen by the White House to destroy the SALT II Treaty. You would expect, after the Reykjavik meeting, which paved the way for a nuclear-free world, a display of maximum restraint, not a bout of saber-rattling. But here we have Washington organizing an overt provocation in an effort to halt the trend toward relaxation of international tension. Having dealt with SALT II, they are also casting threatening glances at the unlimited-duration Soviet-American ABM Treaty. C. Smith, former leader of the U.S. delegation at the ABM negotiations, put it bluntly: "Having abandoned the SALT II Treaty, the administration has its sights on the ABM Treaty, which plays an important part in preventing arms control [as published] from getting completely out of control."

The Reagan administration exceeded the SALT II limit at a moment when the wave of exposures connected with illegal U.S. arms supplies to Iran was mounting. Coincidence? No. "This step is an attempt to suppress the scandal over arms supplies to Iran with another scandal," Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, angrily stated. But the administration's trick did not work. It was instantly exposed. As Senator Albert Gore noted, the breakaway from the SALT II Treaty is "the kind of mistake that led to the Iran deal."

In fact, U.S. political life is producing the kind of tortuous plots that not even writers of detective novels could have dreamed up. And we are all following the development of "Iranagate" with interest. But ultimately we are not really bothered which member of the Reagan team contributed most to this scandalous business. There is something else worrying us: When is U.S. policy going to take the path of realism and when will it be possible to have a productive discussion with the United States as a reliable partner?

This question is being asked not only in Moscow, but all over the world. The U.S. agency AP admits that the United States even failed to enlist the NATO allies' support for the decision to violate SALT. Although London and Bonn are equivocating, saying that this decision is the business of the United States alone. In other words, they want to remain blameless and make capital. The highly authoritative FRG politician Willy Brandt, chairman of the Social Democratic Party, sharply criticized these maneuvers. "There can be no justification for violating the SALT II Treaty," he stated and demanded that the federal government address an urgent appeal to the U.S. Administration to get back within the limits set by the treaty. In the United States itself several congressmen have reported that at the forthcoming session of the country's supreme legislature measures will be adopted to make the government carry out the terms of SALT II.

As the Soviet government statement notes, in connection with the U.S. actions our country considers itself released from its commitments under the SALT I and SALT II Treaties. But, in view of the enormous importance of the matter for all mankind and of the need to preserve the key curb on the strategic arms race, the USSR will refrain for the time being from exceeding the limitations under these agreements.
Such is our good will. And although the U.S. Administration is doing its utmost to dissociate itself from the positive results of Reykjavik, it will not succeed. Reykjavik is not an episode in Soviet-American bilateral relations, but a process in which all countries are involved. It was reflected in the Delhi declaration, in the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the UN General Assembly. The new political thinking in international affairs is clearly replacing the dogmas of power politics. "The Soviet Union will never retreat from Reykjavik," M.S. Gorbachev said in conversation with Norwegian Prime Minister G.H. Brundtland. And we hope the American people's innate common sense will prevail on the other side of the Atlantic.

Army Paper Deplores Breakout

PM150951 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 12 Dec 86 First Edition p 3

[Colonel M. Ponomarev "Commentator's Notes": "Provocation: United States Flouts SALT II Treaty"]

[Text] In the past, when trying to explain and justify the refusal to submit the Soviet-U.S. SALT II Treaty for ratification, the administration often used to cite the treaty's "inadequate" or "limited" nature. It was claimed that this treaty, signed in 1979, cannot curb the arms race and is therefore useless.

There was not a scrap of truth in those claims, of course. In actual fact, the SALT II Treaty, like the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty, signed in 1972, formulated on the basis of the observance of the principle of the sides' equality and identical security, not only reflected the military strategic parity achieved between the USSR and the United States at the beginning of the seventies but also limited the arms race and placed a significant obstacle in its path. In this context it may be recalled in particular that under article 5 of SALT II, launchers of ballistic missiles equipped with MIRV's and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km are limited to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,320.

Even though the SALT II Treaty was not ratified, both the USSR and the United States observed its main provisions. Thus it curbed the nuclear arms race and proved an effective factor for strategic stability. And in fact this has now been acknowledged in Washington too. It was acknowledged when Washington saw for itself that the treaty in fact prevented the strategic arms race from being extended. It acknowledged that fact not in words but by its unprecedented and provocative actions when it actually exceeded one of the main limitations enshrined in the SALT II Treaty by bringing into service with the 7th Wing of the Strategic Air Command the 131st B-52H bomber equipped for cruise missiles.
Does that mean that the SALT II Treaty did put a brake on the nuclear arms race and was an obstacle to it? Otherwise, why are they about to abandon it? And does that mean that those high-ranking figures in the U.S. Administration who reviled the treaty in every way and distorted its purpose and nature were simply deceiving their own people and the world public? It looks that way.

Sometimes people in the West say: Has anything special actually happened here? The United States used to have 130 heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles, now it has 131. Thus the potential of the U.S. strategic bomber fleet has increased by a fraction of 1 percent, and if you take the strategic nuclear forces as a whole the figure is even smaller. This may not be particularly good but is it all that terrible either?

That is seemingly right. The approximate military equilibrium between the USSR and the United States will hardly be affected by the addition to the U.S. nuclear arsenals of just one bomber armed with cruise missiles. However, it is not a matter of just one aircraft. The fact is that in order to carry out its militarist programs and pursue the illusion of military superiority, the Washington administration is derailing the system of legal treaties which enshrined the military parity between the USSR and the United States and for a number of years limited the arms race in its central sphere—the sphere of strategic offensive armaments. Having trampled the SALT II Treaty underfoot, Washington has cynically breached the process of the cardinal reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.

Even now in America they are continuing to say that the United States will go on showing "restraint" in the sphere of the development of strategic offensive armaments. But their understanding of this lamentable "restraint" is highly unusual. The President once promised not to deploy more "strategic nuclear delivery systems" or "strategic ballistic missile warheads" than the USSR had. But there was no mention of equality in heavy bombers or air-launched cruise missiles. In that regard the United States wants at least a three-fold superiority without granting the Soviet Union the right to compensate for them by ballistic missiles, which are the main Soviet means of strategic deterrence. Nor was there any mention of sea-launched cruise missiles, of which the United States plans to have several thousand, and medium-range missiles in Europe, which are strategic weapons as far as the USSR is concerned.

Figures in the Washington administration kept quiet about this only for a certain time. Then they broke that silence. But how? In a recent TV interview U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger, asked whether the United States would accept the elimination of strategic and intermediate-range (in Soviet terminology, medium-range) missiles, replied with a categorical "no." The secretary went on to state literally the following: If reductions were implemented in this sphere, "the U.S. bombers and cruise missiles would still remain. We are clearly slightly ahead in this type of hardware
at the moment, so I do not believe that we will give up this superiority." You cannot be any clearer than that. Just in case, though, Weinberger decided to dot all the "i's." "We shall continue doing what we are doing now," he said, "modernizing our nuclear potential."

Even in the United States there are people who understand what the present powers that be in Washington are driving at. The administration's decision to deploy the 131st B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles, THE BOSTON GLOBE writes, for example, "suggests that the United States intends to be the main violator of arms control. Violations of the SALT II Treaty's quantitative limits are a provocation to the Soviet Union and an insult to Congress and America's allies."

Indeed, neither the very actions by which the U.S. Administration is torpedoing the SALT II Treaty nor the moment that it has chosen to do it can be viewed as anything other than a major provocation and an attempt to halt the trend toward the easing of international tension. This move is a logical link in the campaign of attacks on the historic opportunities of Reykjavik, which opened the way to a nuclear-free world--a world which, it turns out, frightens the U.S. militarist circles so much.

What is the USSR's stance in these difficult conditions fraught with irreversible consequences? As the Soviet Government's statement of 5 December this year points out, the U.S. decision gives the Soviet Union every reason to consider itself free of the commitments it assumed in the 1972 Interim Agreement and the SALT-II Treaty. At the same time, the Soviet side believes that it is still possible to halt the dangerous development of events which the present U.S. Administration is provoking by its actions. Mindful of the question's tremendous importance for all humanity and the need to retain the crucial limiter of the strategic arms race, the USSR is for the time being refraining from exceeding the limitations contained in the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty.

But will the USSR's unilateral observance of the SALT II Treaty not affect its security? I put that question at a recent press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists on the theme of the Soviet Union's position on the system of agreements concerning strategic arms limitation. Here is the answer.

While remaining within the limits envisaged by the SALT II Treaty, the Soviet Union will carefully evaluate the development of events and keep track of the U.S. actions. We know whom we are dealing with. All the actions taken by the USSR, including unilateral ones, are carefully considered and weighed up to ensure that they do not jeopardize its own security. The USSR will not allow military superiority to be gained over it.

Reagan's decision to abandon SALT II is an attempt to act from a position of strength. However, the USSR is a mighty, proud, and great country which will never forgo its own security or independence or permit anyone to dictate to it. Neither by means of "star wars" nor the nuclear arms race

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will the United States succeed in achieving military superiority. We have
every ability—economic, intellectual, and military-technical—to meet
any U.S. challenge that arises. The Soviet Union does not claim greater
security, but neither will it accept less—this decision of the 27th CPSU
Congress and the Soviet people is being sacredly fulfilled. That will
continue to be the case.

That will continue to be the case. And that should be remembered by those
in Washington who opened the floodgates on the path of the arms race
and released the brake. Without brakes nothing but disaster lies ahead.
And that disaster, which could affect all mankind, must be averted.

U.S. Senators' 'Serious Concern'

LD160051 Moscow TASS in English 2148 GMT 15 Dec 86

[Text] Washington, 15 December (TASS)—Fifty-seven senators sent a message
to President Reagan expressing serious concern over the violation by the
United States of the SALT-II Treaty. The 131st B-52 bomber re-equipped
to carry cruise missiles with nuclear warheads is known to have been put
into service with the U.S. strategic forces. Thus, the United States
unilaterally demolished the restrictions imposed by the SALT-II Treaty.

"It is especially damaging to U.S. security interests and the prospects
for a new arms agreement for the U.S. to be the first to breach a central
sublimit of SALT-II", the document points out.

Speaking at a press conference where the text of the letter to the President
was circulated, Senator John Chafee, Republican of Rhode Island, called
the President's decision to abandon SALT-II a tragic mistake. Senator
Dale Bumpers, Democrat of Arkansas, who also took part in the press
conference, drew attention to the dangerous consequences of the United
States break with the treaty. The more nuclear armaments on earth, the
less security we will have, he said.

New Arms Race Round

PM181309 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

[Nikolay Kurdyumov "Commentator's Column": "Militarist Fever"]

[Text] A spokesman for the Pentagon has declared that hard on the heels
of the 131st heavy bomber equipped with cruise missiles, the United States
is to add another, the 132d B-52 bomber, to its strategic forces in January
next year. At the same time another, the ninth, Trident-class submarine
will be launched at Groton (Connecticut). It will be the first submarine,
also known as Trident-2, equipped with D-5 nuclear missiles. According to
the AP news agency each of these first strike ICBM's (the submarine is to be
fitted with 24 of them) can carry between 10-15 nuclear warheads.
In this way Washington, which has recently exceeded the aggregate limit of 1,320 on the number of launchers of MIRV'ED strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles, is starting up another round of the arms race.

The militarist fever that prevails across the ocean and the cynical attitude of the R. Reagan administration toward international agreements are making the administration's true intentions plain to the whole world. It shows that despite the declarative assurances of its readiness to seek ways of "curbing" the arms race and even "reducing" arms, the United States is in effect working toward a forced buildup of its strike potential.

The U.S. provocative actions in torpedoing the SALT II Treaty and the new moves in the arms race have been undertaken at a time when, thanks to the bold Soviet initiatives, historic opportunities have emerged which pave the way to a nuclear-free world. The Soviet Union, in countering the irresponsible line of the present U.S. Administration with a course aimed at peace and genuine international security is persistently exhorting Washington to implement a realistic, sensible policy which would take account of both American and other states' interests. As is known, it takes two to tango. The arms race can be stopped only through a joint effort. Yet the new Tridents and other mass destruction weapon systems are a step backward from Reykjavik and Geneva, they are a course toward achieving military superiority.

Washington's dangerous and reckless actions aimed at the disruption of the entire system of treaties curbing the arms race justly met with sharp condemnation. The peoples of the world demand that the U.S. leadership shake off its militarist fever and take real steps toward arms reductions instead of just talking about them.

Facts 'Louder Than Words'

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 50, 21-28 Dec 86 p 1

[Text] According to the U.S. President, America's ultimate goal is a nuclear-free world. There must be a means to achieve this end. Reykjavik has shown that such means do exist. But as long as they are rejected, pompous words about the ultimate goal sound somewhat doubtful. Facts speak louder than words.

The 131st heavy B-52 bomber armed with long-range cruise missiles has emerged from a hangar to break the SALT-II "ceiling". The United States has exceeded the cumulative limit stipulated by that Treaty, thus sharply increasing the distance to America's alleged goal.

The entire philosophy of Soviet-American negotiations on strategic armaments rests on the principle of parity acknowledged by a number of treaties. It took many years to negotiate SALT-I (which includes the IBM Treaty) and SALT-II. These treaties had kept the arms race in check, while
in no way obscuring the aim proclaimed by the present U.S. administration. However, the said administration has not signed a single arms control, let alone a disarmament agreement. Perhaps they fear lest such an agreement should impede headway towards their real aim, as distinct from the openly declared one?

The new MX, Midgetman, Stealth and Trident missiles do not fit into SALT-II. SDI is incompatible with the IBM Treaty. Therefore, the United States has violated SALT-II and seeks to undermine the IBM Treaty. It is the philosophy of parity that is being violated and undermined. Achieving military superiority is now the objective that has engulfed and submerged all solemn U.S. declarations.

As is emphasized in the Soviet government's Statement, the Soviet Union has taken into consideration the issue's immense significance for all mankind, and has decided for the present to continue to abstain from going beyond the limitations of SALT-I and SALT-II. For all practical purposes, this is yet another one-sided moratorium—the one constraining the buildup of strategic offensive weapons, in addition to the moratorium on nuclear testing.

The Soviet Union is trying to keep unswervingly to the goal it set forth on 15 January 1986: To rid the world of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Our means fully coincide with our ends.

/12858
CSO: 5200/1207
BRIEFS

U.S. USING CANADA AS B-52 TEST RANGE—Ottawa, 18 December (TASS)—The Pentagon uses more and more actively Canadian territory as a test range. A Pentagon spokesman in Edmonton, Alberta Province, said that the flights in northern Canada starting June 1987 would involve up to twenty-five U.S. B-52, B-1B strategic bombers and F-11B fighters equipped to carry nuclear weapons, Canadian press reports. They will fly by the country's northwestern territories and the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan. Apart from practicing the tactics of interception by Canadian and U.S. fighters of low-flying aircraft, the two countries will test the bombers' capability to elude detection by radar and interception during a simulated attack on the Soviet Union. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0802 GMT 18 Dec 86 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1207
ROLE OF AUSTRIA, OTHER NEUTRALS AT CSCE EXAMINED

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 15-16 Nov 86 p 5

[Article by Engelbert Washiel: "Referee or Night Watchman? Austria's Role in Europe"]

[Text] The foreign ministers have gone home, the CSCE follow-on conference is working: There are good indications that the process started in 1975 with the final CSCE accord in Helsinki has entered a key phase with this Vienna round. This phase involves not only decisions on further opportunities for cooperation among the European nations, but also the substance alluded to by the much overused words "trust" and "security." This is a question that must be faced squarely, particularly by a small neutral state, which, along with other like-minded states, has deliberately entered into these discussions. It offers splendid opportunities, but also contains the danger of a deception that would not manifest itself until long afterward.

Conference strategies used to date—together with the successes and failures brought home by the delegates to the different rounds of negotiations falling between the landmark conferences at Helsinki, Belgrade and Madrid in 1975, 1978 and 1983, respectively—have in the meantime become so tightly integrated with developments at other conferences and with the power politics objectives of individual states that no government any longer regards the CSCE as a distant catchall for foreign policy activities. The CSCE process has turned into a giant sponge that absorbs any conceptual developments emanating from foreign ministries. It has a satisfying, self-contained existence, but, like any other sponge, its secure consistency depends on remaining untouched—otherwise it will start leaking.

Austria supports this undertaking to the best of its ability and is fully involved in it. This has so far proven to be justified. There is no reason to change this policy in the future, nor is any such change contemplated. What is urgently required, however, is an objective investigation of the inner mechanics of this process in order to prevent future disappointments and to deal with any inherent potential dangers. Eleven years after Helsinki, Austria must gain some insight into what the process—whose extreme critics call a total failure—has accomplished, and what its future is to be.

Both its advocates and its critics must concede one thing to the CSCE movement: In the year 1986, reinforced by the attitude of Soviet party chief Mikhail Gorbachev and the summit diplomacy of the superpowers, it is more obvious than
ever before that the broad public of many nations is experiencing a growing desire for a world in which conflicts and threats can be resolved through the agendas of various conferences—the equivalent of lighting lanterns in an Asian wilderness to protect oneself from tigers. One side promotes and supports this mood in a resourceful manner at all levels—Moscow.

A book entitled "Armed Neutrality," authored by a Hungarian international law expert, Janos Szabo, has attracted much attention in Switzerland, but very little in Austria, despite the fact that Szabo's statements are particularly disquieting for Austria because of their implications for its neutralist policy. He divides the four neutral European countries into two sets of two. In his view, Switzerland and Sweden are somewhat distanced from the East European bloc, since they base their security and their neutrality upon a strong military defense capability. Finland and Austria, on the other hand, have opted for "neutrality based on trust," i.e., they do not rely primarily on their armed forces, but rather on the fact that the community of states considers their neutrality to be useful and necessary. Strange as this evaluation appears, the author makes no secret of his personal preferences, either. He is unequivocally in favor of the "more dynamic" trust version, specifically in the context of the ideological confrontation in Europe:

"At the same time the capitalist bloc, or one of its wings, is continuing its efforts to absorb the neutral states. One of its means to this end is the support it gives to the traditional interpretation of international law, according to which the neutral state must have military capabilities sufficient for self-defense. Inasmuch as in this age of modern weapons of war this is beyond the ability of small neutral countries to attain, this constitutes a front for the ulterior motive that the armed forces of a neutral state might turn into potential allies.... Thus it is not the advocates of trust neutrality who represent a paradoxical viewpoint, but rather the partisans of the military power version."

There is no clearer way for an East bloc specialist to tell Austria that its affinity with the "capitalist bloc" of the West has implications for its defense readiness and capability—and that it is therefore undesirable.

Szabo's train of thought is well integrated with Moscow's general concept of replacing conflict resolution with conference activity. Within a few years, "trust" has degenerated from a perfectly sensible instrument, also courted with some success by the CDE, into a skeleton key that allegedly locks all doors securely. The Socialist Party of Germany (SPD) wants to bring about a "structural incapacity for aggression by states on both sides of the bloc borders" through unilateral West German initiatives, because, according to the SPD's security policy concept, "peace can be achieved by risk-taking." During the CDE in Stockholm there were months of negotiations about renunciation of power, even though this is implicit in the final Helsinki accord, though not in treaty form.

Just as it is important to maintain the CSCE process as a forum for conducting dialogues that transcend the blocs (experience indicates that it can remain in operation even when contacts at other levels collapse) it will be of equal
importance to take the special Soviet strategy into account, without falling victim to any illusions. With its new proposals, Moscow has attained its ultimate form of expression for arms control and conference methodology.

At the Reykjavik summit and apparently even thereafter, party chief Mikhail Gorbachev seemed ready to conclude a major weapons-technological deal with U.S. President Reagan for Europe: The medium-range nuclear missiles that had been installed on both sides of the bloc borders as part of the arms and counterarms buildup would disappear, without any formal detente in the other sectors of military confrontation. No agreement was reached at the MBFR conference concerning conventional arms restrictions in central Europe. Short-range nuclear missiles are not the subject of any arms control negotiating forum.

It would represent a turning point in arms policy thinking in Europe if the USSR were to simply drop out of MBFR and permit the unfinished soldier and tank counting program to wallow in the diplomatic quagmire of yet another conference. Thus an arms control undertaking that so far has failed to come up with concrete results for the relatively well circumscribed central European area through the efforts of the immediately concerned states—neither as to objectives nor as to verification—would be dropped, like a bankrupt estate, into the lap of the representatives of 35 governments.

The transfer of MBFR problems to the second phase of the CDE conference, currently under consideration, would have the undeniable advantage of including France, thus eliminating the fact that current disarmament talks would silently disregard French military potential, as it is the case in the Vienna MBFR conference. It would, however, have the serious disadvantage of shifting the focus of the disarmament talks outward from the zone of maximum confrontation, namely central Europe. This is relevant for Austria as well, as it would continue in its role as an impotent witness the fact that adjacent south German territory is viewed by both military blocs as an operational area for offensive defense.

This assessment is borne out not only by next year's German-French military exercise in the Munich-Passau region and by the actively pursued inclusion of France in the FRG's defense plans. A comparison of forces conducted by the Science and Policy Foundation states that in case of conflict "the threat would be greatest in the northern and southern sector of the FRG," and that in view of an imbalance of conventional weapons the Warsaw Pact military planners might be tempted to impart greater importance to a conventional war against NATO in this part of Europe than to the risks arising therefrom.

While Austria's foreign policy appears tilted toward the belief that the all-European round of disarmament talks is unavoidable and therefore desirable, there is total confusion on one essential point: Can a neutral state like Austria—which bases its defensive capability mainly on area defense with minimum resources—permit itself to become tied to arms reduction agreements, even if it is merely a provision prohibiting an upgrading of its weaponry? At CDE the neutral and nonaligned states defeated the NATO proposal for advance notification of the mobilization of their armed forces and to subject this
process to observation by foreign military experts. Switzerland reinforced this freedom of action for self-defense by a separate "interpretive declaration." Thus it can be assumed that Switzerland too will approach disarmament in a highly restrained manner. Austria is still holding back and plans to base its decisions on the outcome of the talks. Basically, however, there is a possibility that should the bloc states agree on an extensive reduction of armaments, Austria, too, could become an arms reduction state. Says the Foreign Ministry's chief of security policy and CSCE delegation head Rudolf Torovsky: "We must comply with our mission of military neutrality. But should the military policy of the outside environment so change through the disarmament of other states that we can still fulfill this mission despite arms reduction measures of our own—why not?"

Austria's "why not?" applies even more to its services to the cause of securing the peace. It is a fact that during the last phase of the Stockholm CSCE Conference the service potential of the neutral and nonaligned states increasingly became the central feature of deliberations on the monitoring of military activities. Neutrals traditionally regard this as a positive contribution. However, problems connected with this increase in proportion to the increase in responsibilities. This is true primarily in a technological sense: While Switzerland at one point in the negotiations proposed a neutral verification satellite, the question arises how Switzerland would obtain the necessary competence in advanced technology. Developing this point further with respect to all other neutral states, it would mean that in the future the neutrals would have to decide if, with the best of intentions, they would agree to sit in front of control panels whose innards are a mystery to them, and that they would therefore have to depend entirely upon software furnished by the superpowers.

As desirable as it might be to have the neutral and nonaligned group soften hardened positions in negotiations between representatives of the military alliances, these representatives of the military blocs must nevertheless be informed unequivocally that they are not entitled to order a few disadvantaged states into fulfilling a service function. Neutrals in the role of dealers in second-hand ideas or as nightwatchmen for European security would either be inappropriate or demeaning. Just as the European NATO states became uneasy over the far-reaching discussions between Reagan and Gorbachev, small nonaligned states might someday resent being taken for granted at the conference table as a commodity that is liable one day to be stuck into a monitoring aircraft or at some other time remodeled into a verification center.

This lends even greater importance to the slow but sure process of communications among the neutrals themselves, whose main problem was correctly diagnosed at a recent meeting in Salzburg: In view of their neutral status, they are basically incapable of forming a bloc with which to confront the other blocs. They must nevertheless cooperate because they would otherwise be incapable of dealing with the technical and strategic requirements of conference diplomacy.

Foreign Ministry General Secretary Gerald Hinteregger sums up the problem as follows: "The question is whether or not the two blocs really see a task for the neutrals. Until now, we have played the role of honest broker. When the great powers arrive at an impasse, the neutral and nonaligned states search for a compromise, with the encouragement of both sides."
Austrian diplomats learned long ago that it would be a mistake to think that the superpowers would ever entrust a part of their security to the neutrals. In the words of Torovsky: "In view of this, we can never act as referees."

To the extent that the CSCE process deals with military problems, the neutrals will increasingly be asked to lend their services. Anyone assuming verification tasks must be aware of the fact that in a controversial situation he could incur the displeasure of one of the treaty partners, and he must not exclude the possibility that he would be subject to pressure on the part of the latter.

To cite an example, Austria has, by signing the CDE documents, incurred the responsibility, along with the other states, of permitting inspection overflights upon demand. Thus by 1 January Brigadier Josef Bernecker will have an aircraft with special navigation equipment on alert status, prepared to undertake a night flight without ground support, because theoretically Austria, too, might receive a request for a monitoring mission. At the moment this is highly improbable. However, inasmuch as that type of request, which could be made by any state, would simultaneously constitute an overt act of mistrust because it would presuppose doubt about Austria's adherence to the treaty, this instrument might someday be refashioned into a war of nerves against Austria.

Austrians have noted with great interest the fact that the present Soviet leadership is accepting the entire spectrum of neutrality politics, at least for the moment—not only the CSCE obligation (which is obvious) but also the European policy efforts in the direction of the EC, which the Soviets cannot have failed to notice. Upon his departure from Austria on 6 November, Foreign Minister Edvard Shevardnadze heaped generous praise upon this country: "Without fear of exaggerating, I should like to state that the relationship between the USSR and Austria represents a model of cooperation between states subscribing to differing socio-political orders."

Austria—a "model" in Soviet eyes? Obviously, this is a double-edged form of praise. It could happen that a slight change in those words would convert them to a demand for exemplary behavior. This is neither a chimera nor an aspect of uniquely bilateral relations between Moscow and Vienna, but rather a minuscule factor in a large-scale process. Europe's future is at stake, and CSCE is merely a visible portion of the stage. Just as it is important for Austria to be a participant, it will be necessary in the forthcoming phase of the negotiations for Vienna's representatives to observe but one priority, irrespective of all encomiums: Austria should be involved in the process without serving as anybody's errand boy.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

CPSU JOURNAL CONTRASTS USSR, U.S. MORATORIUM STANCES

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[Article by G.I. Gerasimov: "In Connection With the History of Moratorium: Who Is Against It"]

[Text] The Soviet test site in the Semipalatinsk region where nuclear tests had previously been carried out has already been silent for many months now. Newspapersman and representatives of television companies and information agencies were able to convince themselves of this fact when they were admitted to this "sanctum sanctorum" at the end of September this year. They sensed the silence, smelled the bitter scent of wormwood, and saw wild rams on one of the granite rock peaks. The tunnels for exploding the nuclear warheads have been closed. (Footnote 1) (PRAVDA, 30 September 1986)

This is a concrete manifestation of the peace-loving policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Union which, as M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has stated, "is inspired by the fact that there is a conviction becoming increasingly firmly established throughout the world in the mind of peoples and political and social forces of the most diverse orientations and world outlooks -- a conviction that the very existence of the human species is now at stake and that the time for resolute and responsible action has come." (Footnote 2) ("Statement by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on Soviet Television on 18 August 1986." Moscow, 1986, pp 5-6) At his own proposal, M.S. Gorbachev held his second meeting with U.S. President R. Reagan in October this year.

At that meeting the Soviet Union placed on the negotiating table a whole package of major measures concerning the strategic offensive weapons, medium-range missiles, the ABM Treaty, and the banning of nuclear tests. (Footnote 3) (PRAVDA, 15 October 1986)

The topic of banning tests had its own important place within the framework of that package. The American side adopted a negative position on this topic as well as on the topics of the ABM Treaty and SDI ("Strategic Defense Initiative"). Speaking on Soviet television on 14 October of this year, M.S. Gorbachev asked: "How can it be possible to come to an agreement on eliminating nuclear weapons if the United States will continue to perfect them? (Footnote 4) (Ibid)

In the sharp discussions in Reykjavik it became clear once again that, believing in its technological advantage, the Washington administration hopes to also achieve a military advantage through the "Star Wars" program. (Footnote 5) (PRAVDA, 14 October 1986) For this purpose it finds it necessary to continue nuclear tests.

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Under these conditions the Soviet unilateral moratorium represents a bold step that requires that all "pros" and "cons" be taken into account. Let us turn to the history of the moratorium to have a better understanding of this fact.

The Soviet Union was the first nuclear power and the CPSU was the first party whose representatives have proposed the banning of nuclear weapon tests as the initial step on the way to eliminating the threat of a new war. The idea of concluding a corresponding convention was raised by our country in the subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission on 10 May 1955. An integral disarmament program was proposed and the banning of tests occupied a central place in this program.

The West failed to respond to this Soviet step.

Later in the same year the question of banning the tests was submitted to the 10th session of the UN General Assembly for consideration.

The West did not support it.

The Soviet proposals introduced in the subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission on 27 March 1956 raised the idea of solving the problem of tests independently from the problem of achieving an agreement on disarmament questions.

The issue was singled out as a separate independent question. The Soviet Union expressed its readiness to immediately renounce tests as soon as other powers also assumed the same obligation.

In subsequent years there have been many and various resolutions, proposals, negotiations, and drafts and counterdrafts. Just as they do it now, during that time the influential forces in the United States advocated a continuation of the arms race; they hindered negotiations and drowned them in a quagmire of technical arguments about possibilities of verification [kontrol].

The Soviet Union was in favor of general and complete banning of tests "now and forever," but it declined not to miss the chance and consented to the proposed partial banning.

The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water was signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963. At the insistence of the Soviet side, the preamble of the treaty included a statement of aspiration of its parties to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

As early as during the ratification of the treaty in the U.S. Senate, the military-industrial complex took care [pozabotitsya] of future tests in violation of the purport of the document. The White House gave a written promise to senators to expand the program of underground tests as well as corresponding guarantees to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The signing by the United States of the Moscow treaty banning nuclear tests in the three environments was immediately followed by an expansion of the program of underground tests and a corresponding increase of expenditures. As the saying goes, "by hook or crook..."

The U.S. military circles adopted the idea of underground nuclear weapons tests for political and practical considerations. From the political viewpoint, the tests were thus removed from the view of the public, which had become especially alarmed over the
damage from explosions to human health and the environment. From the practical viewpoint, the underground tests — even though they are undoubtedly more expensive — provided additional possibilities for concealing their nature, and they were not dependent on weather conditions.

The program of underground explosions was worked out by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1956 and the initiative for this program has been attributed to nuclear scientist E. Teller, the Herostratus [ancient Greek who burned down temple of Artemis in 356 B.C. in order to gain fame] of science, "father" of the hydrogen bomb, and inspirer of the incumbent President concerning "Star Wars." The first underground test was carried out on 19 September 1958.

The number of American underground tests reached a record level in 1962 when the possibilities of that environment were probably accurately determined prior to renouncing explosions in other environments. An increase of U.S. tests in the atmosphere was observed in 1963, this time with a simultaneous sharp decline in the number of underground tests. During subsequent years the United States carried out several times more underground tests than the Soviet side. In his television speech entitled "The Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests as a Step to Peace," then U.S. President John Kennedy said in this connection that the United States would prefer a complete banning of tests.

Preference for one thing was expressed in words but preference for something else was demonstrated in deeds. The nuclear arms race continued, having assumed an externally less visible form as well as a form that was less dangerous to the environment.

In the years preceding the signing of the Moscow treaty, there was a strong movement of the world public against nuclear tests; this was based on two arguments.

One of these arguments concerned the future and the threat of a devastating nuclear war. During those years the results of such a war looked devastating but not suicidal. The banning of tests was considered as a brake on the arms race.

The second argument concerned the present. Nuclear explosions in the atmosphere at that time sent radioactive dust around the world, and the direct danger of feeding children with contaminated milk and depositing radioactive Strontium-90 in their bones provoked concrete protests against this threat, more understandable at times than the abstract danger of war. Alas, no one has yet abrogated the saying "As long as thunder is not heard...." However, it is necessary to struggle against nuclear war before it begins.

The banning of nuclear tests in the atmosphere eliminated the second argument and, unfortunately, to a considerable extent "took the wind out of the sails" of the antiwar movement. The sails dropped down.

However, the nuclear arms race has continued since 1958 and has only changed its form.

The next step to limit the tests was made only as late as in 1974 when a "ceiling" of 150 kilotons was set for the yield of individual tests.

But the corresponding treaty has not been ratified to this day, because the U.S. Administration considers the provisions of the protocol on verification [kontrol] and inspection [proverka] measures attached to the treaty as being insufficient. In 1974 these measures were considered completely sufficient and the protocol was signed by the U.S. President.
Now the U.S. Administration proposes to "renegotiate negotiations" and to use the new method of "corrxtex" [defined below as "continuous reflectometry of radius as a function of time"] for precisely determining the yield of explosions. In this connection it admits that a long time will be needed to renew [perezhaklyucheniye] the treaty. But time does not wait.

New and even more lethal nuclear weapons systems are forthcoming. At the same time, no one disputes the fact that nuclear arsenals are already oversaturated, that there are enough weapons to destroy the world several times over, that this "overkill" coefficient itself is superfluous and senseless, and that it is superfluous and senseless to increase it even more. But the inertia in the movement of military-technological thinking under capitalism leads to an abyss. The supermonopolies strive for superprofits.

"We must understand that just as it is impossible to cure a drug addict by giving him ever larger doses of drugs, it is also impossible to save from war a world that has become accustomed to armaments and the accumulation of ever greater arsenals. The time has come to put an end to this." This statement is taken from the "Mexican Declaration" adopted by leaders of the countries of the so-called group of the "Delhi Six" — Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden — in Ixtapa (Mexico) in August 1986. (Footnote 6) (PRAVDA, 24 August 1986)

In January 1985 this group of "the Six" called for immediate discontinuance of nuclear tests as the first step on the way to concluding a treaty completely banning such tests, for discontinuance of production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons and delivery systems for them, and for banning tests, production, and deployment of space weapons.

Washington keeps repeating now and then that wars are begun by men and not by weapons. This argument is analogous to the argument in favor of free trade in weapons, the argument used by the American Rifle Association. Weapons do not fire on their own, they say; it is people and not Colt revolvers who are guilty of murders. These statements represent a dangerous simplification that is especially dangerous if it is applied to nuclear weapons.

Yes, decisions are made by people — that is, at least at present, although the "Star Wars" plans propose to transfer decision-making to computers in the future because time will be counted in seconds. But people, politicians, may turn out to be influenced or even ruled by technological fanaticism. Indications of this process in Washington are evident because tests have been turned there into a fetish: Perish the world, long live the tests, long live "Star Wars!"

Of course, the roots of the evil here are in the military-industrial complex. But technological fanaticism, defined as such a strong attraction to the means that the sight of the goal is lost, also moves in cordial agreement with the banal avarice of contemporary merchants of death and in tandem with the arms race. The arms race whips itself up and stimulates and inspires itself. It needs appropriations, and the enemy is needed to extort appropriations from a resisting Congress.

Temptation begets temptation. Yesterday it was multiple reentry vehicles (MRV), today it is cruise missiles, and tomorrow it will be nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers. But is it necessary to yield to temptations? If ensuring national security is the proclaimed goal, then this goal not only is not achieved but, on the contrary, is even further removed by whipping up the arms race.
The history of the arms race itself attests to this. For instance, the security of the United States was ensured more effectively before the appearance of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) than in the period after their appearance. When MRV was invented — and in that connection then Soviet Union proposed to the United States to jointly refrain from crossing that technological threshold — the so-called "window of vulnerability" appeared, that is, security was reduced. If the Soviet Union, being unable to wait indefinitely, resumes its tests in the face of American obstinacy, will U.S. security then be strengthened?

Of course, wars are not begun by armaments, but the armaments fanatics can fatefully influence political figures. As Raul Alfonsin, president of Argentina, has put it, the arms race "has ceased to be a simple consequence of political tension between the two superpowers and has turned into one of the main causes of this tension."

How can this vicious circle be broken and how can the impasse in the process of arms limitation be overcome? This is precisely the goal pursued by the Soviet moratorium. It was proclaimed on 6 August 1985. M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said in his Statement on 29 July 1985: "Striving to help end the dangerous competition in the increase of nuclear arsenals and wishing to set a good example, the Soviet Union has decided to unilaterally discontinue all nuclear explosions as of 6 August of this year. We urge the United States to discontinue its nuclear explosions as of the same date which is observed throughout the world as the day of the Hiroshima tragedy. Our moratorium is proclaimed for the period to 1 January 1986. However, it will also continue to be in effect beyond that date if the United States, for its part, refrains from carrying out its nuclear explosions."

"There is no doubt that a joint moratorium of the USSR and the United States on all nuclear explosions would also provide a good example for other states which have nuclear weapons." (Footnote 7) (PRAVDA, 29 July 1985)

What was involved in the Soviet moratorium proposal was a concrete and tangible measure in which the public saw the hope for slowing down and then stopping the arms race. It was received by the world with approval.

On 12 December 1985 the jubilee 40th session of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on immediately discontinuing and banning nuclear weapons tests. The resolution welcomed the discontinuance of nuclear explosions by the Soviet Union as of 6 August 1985 and expressed "hope that all other states which have nuclear weapons would also consider the question of joining this moratorium." On that occasion 120 countries voted "for" and only three — the United States, Britain, and France — voted "against." (Footnote 8) (PRAVDA, 13 December 1985)

The Soviet decision in August 1986 to extend the moratorium to 1 January 1987 was adopted after comprehensive and scrupulous weighing of all "pros" and "cons" and with full understanding of the responsibility for the fate of the world. The decision reflected the new thinking that corresponds to the realities of the nuclear age. (Footnote 9) (PRAVDA, 19 August 1986)

In announcing the extension of the moratorium, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, appealed to the reason and dignity of Americans, asking them not to miss once again the historic chance on the way to ending the arms race.

The Soviet leader also appealed to the U.S. President to impartially reassess the existing situation, to reject everything superficial, and to overcome delusions about the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. (Footnote 10) (Ibid)
An echo of approval resounded throughout the world, reflecting world public opinion about the Soviet Union's extension of its voluntary unilateral abstention from nuclear explosions. Words of gratitude were heard from the most widely varied sources and places.

Comrade Todor Zhivkov said that the ideas and positions proposed in the latest statements by M.S. Gorbachev have received a wide response in Bulgaria: "The working people of cities and villages see in them the embodiment of their own aspirations and interests." (Footnote 11) (PRAVDA, 10 September 1986) [paragraph continues]

The Czechoslovak press carried articles on the latest Soviet initiatives under headlines such as "The Age of Nuclear Weapons Demands Real Actions in the Name of Peace," "Responsibility for the Fate of Mankind," "In the Interests of General Security and Genuine Detente," and "The Key Significance of the Moratorium." The Japanese news agency KYODO noted: The Soviet leader emphasized that the USSR does not intend to temporize but will continue to use every opportunity to settle important international issues.

Washington's own views appeared almost completely isolated. U.S. President R. Reagan declared that the moratorium does not correspond to the security interests of the United States and its allies and friends.

As it turned out, the President did not have the mandate to speak on behalf of the "allies and friends." With the exception of London official circles, which hastened to express their "regret" over the extension of the Soviet "unilateral ban," the "allies and friends" welcomed Moscow's goodwill gesture" (the appraisal by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs). (Footnote 12) (Ibid) The FRG Government stated that it supports all efforts aimed at achieving a complete discontinuance of tests, something that could be advanced by the Soviet decision.

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the Soviet moratorium and pointed out that the United States should take steps together with the Soviet Union to completely halt nuclear tests. (Footnote 13) (PRAVDA, 9 September 1986) Thus, if the President's views are compared with the views of the "allies and friends," it turns out that his reference to "allies and friends" only exposes the fact that his views are just that, his own views.

But why does the United States believe that the moratorium does not correspond to U.S. security interests? Let us consider the U.S. arguments.

The standard reaction to Soviet proposals is to stick a "propaganda" tag on them. In English the word "propaganda" smacks of dishonesty.

Why do other countries welcome the "Soviet moratorium" if it is only a "propaganda trick?" "Can demanding an end to the progress of weapons of destruction really be propaganda?" The world progressive press asked. T. Downey, member of the U.S. House of Representatives and president of the international organization Parliamentarians for World Order, notes that the Soviet step corresponds to the interests of all peoples of the world. The appeal to the Soviet Union and the United States from the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden, who offered their goodwill services to achieve this goal as quickly as possible, also attests to this. And the U.S. Administration most certainly cannot call this step of the six states a "propaganda plot of Moscow."
The Soviet moratorium is not a mere word but an act, and it is not simply only a proposal but a good example that demonstrates the seriousness of intentions and the responsibility and humaneness of the CPSU's international policy.

Referring to accusations of "propaganda," M.S. Gorbachev said in his answers to questions from the chief editor of the newspaper RUDE PRAVO: "It is very unserious of people to want to transfer our responsible political actions to such a plane. This is not the approach to take at such a tense, one could say, turning point of world development.

"We do not want to win propaganda war. We do not even want to participate in such a 'skirmish,' considering it unworthy of the importance of the topic. Our aim is to take a real step toward real disarmament. And we sincerely invite the U.S. Administration to do the same." (Footnote 14) (PRAVDA, 9 September 1986)

The main argument of the U.S. Administration hinges upon verification [kontrol]. For instance, speaking in a television interview on 19 August 1986, that is, right after the extension of the Soviet moratorium, D. Regan, White House chief of staff, literally said: "We are not against general and complete banning of tests. We are against general and complete banning of tests without verification [proverka]. We want to have the possibility to verify [proveryat] what they are doing and, we think, they want to verify [proveryat] what we are doing."

If Regan's words were really sincere and if they reflected the U.S. position, the problem could be considered nearly solved, for the "possibility to verify" exists.

The technical aspects of the question are not really that difficult to understand, as attempts are made at times to present them as such by drowning the essence of the matter in technical details.

Nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water have been prohibited for signatories of the Moscow treaty since 1963, and not once has the question of "deception" been raised in that period. Considering the present low level of trust between the sides, this would be surprising if it were not for complete confidence in technology. And technology has now provided the sides as well as all others wanting them with detectors of nuclear explosions, such as, for instance, detectors of X-ray and gamma-ray radiation, which, installed on artificial satellites, can locate an explosion in space at distances equal to the diameter of the Earth's orbit around the Sun. An explosion in the atmosphere where X-rays are quickly absorbed will be detected by a satellite-carried "bhangmeter" [bhangmeyetr] designed to register the double flash that is characteristic of all nuclear explosions.

And now about underground explosions: Modern technical equipment and corresponding methods make it possible to register them precisely. The report of a group of American experts published in the Bulletin of the American Seismological Society in December 1982 notes that in the last 20 years the group "has not known of a single case in which the seismic waves of any of the hundreds of actual underground nuclear explosions might have been mistaken for earthquake waves."

The United States now already has effective national technical means. Moreover, the United States receives seismic information from nearly 150 stations located throughout the world, including around the perimeter of the USSR borders. The territory of the Soviet Union is controlled by these stations. According to estimates by American
experts, underground nuclear explosions of one-kiloton yield in any part of our country are detected with no more than a 0.9 margin of error.

The assistance of third countries can be used to supplement the possible accords between the USSR and the United States concerning the questions of verification [proverka]. Sweden has been a pioneer in this sphere by proposing the establishment of an international network of seismic observation stations. The highest representatives of the Delhi group of six countries have expressed readiness to participate in such a network. In their message from Ixtapa to the Soviet leader on 7 August 1986 the leaders of the Delhi group of six countries spoke about "their contribution to the task of verification [kontrol]." In his reply M.S. Gorbachev expressed readiness to use the "proposals concerning assistance for verifying the discontinuance of nuclear tests, including on-site inspection [inspektsiya], provided, of course, that this is also accepted by the other side." (Footnote 15-16) (PRAVDA, 24 August 1986)

Speaking at the meeting of the "Delhi Six" in Mexico, I. Carlsson, prime minister of Sweden, said: "We are convinced that the problem of verification [proverka] can be solved. It is not a technical but a political problem."

Let us move to the next American argument. In its statement of 15 August 1986 on the defense appropriations bill, the White House substantiated its objections to banning nuclear tests for 1 year, as envisaged by the bill, by claiming that the ban would allegedly leave the U.S. Armed Forces with weapons whose safety and reliability could not be verified.

This sole objection to the 1-year moratorium cited in the aforementioned statement by the White House is very important: What is involved here is the military budget.

This already is the second line of defense following the surrender of the first line of defense, the argument concerning inspection [proverka] and verification [kontrol]. D. Schlesinger, former secretary of defense, former secretary of energy, and former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission — that is, former leader of three departments where he dealt with nuclear armaments — has testified that inspection [proverka] is not the main problem; the main problem continues to be confidence in the reliability of stockpiled weapons for which, however, tests are needed.

There are even attempts to explain all current U.S. nuclear explosions by the need to maintain the proper combat readiness.

Speaking on behalf of the Department of Defense, F. Gaffney, deputy assistant secretary for nuclear forces and arms control, has stated that the present rate at which the United States is carrying out its nuclear weapons tests, and the 150-kiloton limit which it observes in this connection, represent the lowest level that takes into account the existing nuclear technical equipment and technology and the recognized security requirements for maintaining reliable and effective nuclear deterrence weapons.

Trying to prove the necessity of continuing the tests at the present level, within the limits of the 150-kiloton yield, Pentagon officials say that the weapons kept in storage undergo changes with time and that the reliability tests have demonstrated the need to eliminate certain problems.

If this argument is accepted as being really significant and not as being specially invented to sabotage the moratorium, it is possible to make at least three arguments against it:
First, nuclear weapons are not perishable lettuce leaves and it is probably possible to leave them unverified for just 1 year. However, the White House has hastened to use this argument in the struggle against the idea of a 1-year moratorium.

Second, the argument is equally applicable to both sides. If the United States wants to keep its nuclear powder dry, it must recognize the other side’s right to want to do the same, and vice versa. American fears must be analogous to Soviet fears, and these fears should cancel each other out and replace the notorious "balance of fear" with a balance of uncertainty for both sides.

Here Washington raises the objection that equal fear cannot be achieved because — it turns out — the nuclear systems of the United States, which is lagging behind, are considerably more complicated, and the more complicated the technical equipment is the greater the chances of its failure are. Therefore, it is said, the level of concern of the U.S. military circles about material conditions must be higher than that of the Soviet military circles. The crossbow is more troublesome than the bow.

This very specific objection, the false dialectical logic which turns out to be that "the better something is, the worse it is," is canceled by the logical counterargument: Your complication is explained by the striving to perfect your weapons, including their faultlessness; but perfection also presupposes greater reliability. For instance, new planes must not only be better in general but also, in particular, more reliable than the old ones; in the same way new nuclear missiles must not only be more accurate but also less capricious than their predecessors.

If, however, as they try to suggest to us, the reliability of weapons systems if inversely proportional to military-technical progress, then they are thereby presenting us with yet another argument against the arms race.

Third, if we agree with the claim that in the absence of periodically repeated verifications, nuclear weapons gradually engender among military circles uncertainty as to whether these weapons will function at a given moment under combat conditions, then this process of arsenal schizophrenia can be appraised in different ways. Perhaps this uncertainty, growing in time into a lack of faith in nuclear weapons, is very good news: If you are not confident, do not wage war!

If one still continues to adhere to the thesis of the need for tests to check the working order of existing nuclear weapons, then according to this logic the quantity of tests must not exceed a definite, not very high number. Accordingly, certain individuals in the United States propose that the number of tests be considerably limited and their power sharply reduced. Such a proposal was made in a letter sent to Secretary of State G. Shultz by former Defense Secretary G. Brown and four other highly-placed figures, as well as T. Cochrane from the Natural Resources Defense Council, who set up American apparatus to register nuclear explosions in the Semipalatinsk region in agreement with the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Such an approach may be criticized as an attempt at a halfway solution. But, on the other hand, it lays bare the excessive nature of the demands of those who love nuclear explosions and who hide behind this last bastion, the argument about checks, because in order to carry out such checks there is no need to conduct so many explosions as the United States is now doing.
Certain former designers of nuclear weapons have made statements to U.S. Congress commissions that the argument about reliability checks is a false one and that it is promoted by leaders of military laboratories who fear the consequences which a test ban will have for their own careers.

Dr. D. Legget, director of the Information Center for Technology Checks in London, wrote to the editor of the British GUARDIAN newspaper: "You are mistaken in accepting the U.S. Administration's argument that nuclear weapons in arsenals must be tested in order to be sure that they are in 'working order.' This is only necessary for more complex and more destabilizing weapons of a new design.

"As is usual in this controversy, it is becoming increasingly difficult not to resemble a defender of the Soviet Union. But the simple fact is that in this concrete sphere of human activity the USSR Government is right."

The falseness of the argument about the need for reliability checks was shown at several news conferences given by Soviet scientists in Moscow. To be specific, it was noted there that the United States more or less adheres to a "ceiling" limit of 150 kilotons for the power of nuclear explosions. [paragraph continues]

Explosions of greater power have not been conducted since 1974, that is, for 12 years now. All operational warheads of more than 150 kilotons apparently ought to become unreliable. But nothing of the sort has happened. One can name four types of American warhead: the B-28 of almost 1.5 kilotons, the B-43 of 1 megaton, the B-53 of 9 megatons, and the W-56 of 1.2 megatons. These are all operational, and no one doubts their reliability or makes this dependent on the continuation of corresponding underground tests.

Nuclear tests are only necessary when the development of new systems is under way. All this represents the elaboration of means of waging war, rather than the prevention of war. For instance, there are also discussions under way on no longer using plutonium as a primer, but instead such transuranium elements as californium, for example, the critical mass of which is dozens of times less. Of course, if this kind of new development becomes involved, then tests become necessary. Consequently, concern being shown is not about reliability but about a further nuclear arms race both in warheads and in vehicles.

Take conventional weapons, for example artillery shells. From time to time artillery men have to fire a certain quantity out of each batch of shells in order to check their combat readiness. As far as nuclear shells are concerned, all of the assemblies which make up a nuclear bomb can be checked without any nuclear testing. Each of these assemblies can be tested separately. Many methods for nondestructive control checks have now been developed, including defectoscopy and introscopy, that is, methods of looking inside substances, as it were. Such tests are much cheaper and at the same time make it possible to be sure of the reliability of shells.

M.S. Gorbachev made special mention of the problem of checking the reliability of nuclear weapons in his replies to the questions of the chief editor of RUDN PRAVDA. He noted that about 70 percent of both U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals are made up of munitions of over 150 kilotons, and that neither side has tested munitions which exceed this "threshold" in power since 1974. Why confuse the obvious? (Footnote 17) (See PRAVDA, 19 September 1986)
M.S. Gorbachev made a concrete proposal: "If the Americans doubt the stability of their nuclear arsenal, let them move toward the development of a test ban agreement, and our specialists will share with them the 'secrets' of checking the state of nuclear weapons without tests." (Footnote 18) (Ibid)

The reason for the United States' reluctance to stop is not concern for old weapons, but concern for new ones.

In a speech to the UN General Assembly on 24 September 1984, President R. Reagan proposed an exchange of experts to determine the power of nuclear explosions directly on test ranges.

Later the President invited Soviet experts to carry out measurements of the power of nuclear explosions on the Nevada test range.

The White House statement on 29 July 1986 in this regard stated that this proposal would be a unilateral step which would demonstrate the United States' intention to go the extra mile. (Footnote 19) (See "Statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev on Soviet Television on 18 August 1986," p 11)

In which direction? In a direction leading away from the goal of a general and total nuclear test ban.

"If the Soviet side has a serious attitude toward the moratorium, then it should display a readiness to discuss the issue of measures to improve the checking process which we have proposed." This was stated by White House Larry Speakes on 21 August 1986.

In general, the United States is apparently in favor of a nuclear test ban. Sometime.

But for the moment the United States is in favor of verification of [kontrol nad] the limitation of nuclear testing.

This position is, of course, better than unlimited freedom to rend the bowels of the earth with megatons, but it is worse than completely refraining from explosions.

However, this tenet, too, is already obsolete and very relative. According to the 1974 treaty on the limitation of nuclear tests, the United States and the Soviet Union bound themselves to limit explosions to a "ceiling" of 150 kilotons, this being "small change" which approximates 10 Hiroshimas. Twelve years ago they regarded the "threshold" as a step along the road to a total ban on all tests. Now the United States has made a boundary out of the "threshold": not a single step further.

The 1974 treaty stipulated appropriate measures for verification of compliance. These were the fruit of joint efforts by specialists of the two countries, and were considered sufficient.

In the protocol to this treaty the sides agreed to exchange data on the geographic coordinates of the boundaries of each test site, on their geological characteristics, and on the geographic coordinates of underground tests after they have been conducted.
In addition, the sides agreed to exchange data for two tests for calibration purposes from each geophysically distinct testing area where underground nuclear weapons tests have been and are to be conducted. This data included yield, depth, and coordinates.

Other measures were also stipulated, but those already enumerated are enough to convince one that the so-called technical aspects were developed in a detailed and thorough manner.

But this was under a different U.S. Administration, whereas the present administration accuses the previous one of being scatterbrained or even of treason; it considers the measures taken at that time to be inadequate and proposes that the "negotiations be renegotiated" on an agreement, which had already been signed, before the President will deign to send it to Senate for ratification.

Both sides agree that in view of the present very low level of confidence it is necessary to have verification [kontrol] of compliance with the agreement and also appropriate measures of inspection [proverka].

But the Soviet side considers that it is a total nuclear test ban which must be verified, while the American side adheres to the opinion that the limitation of nuclear tests must be verified. It is easy even for a nonspecialist to guess that it is easier to verify silence on test sites, this being a technical problem which has already been solved.

It is more difficult to engage in calibration and determine whether some explosion has not exceeded the "ceiling" of 150 kilotons. This opens up scope for intentional unscrupulousness, and Washington has made use of this scope to accuse the Soviet Union of "violations" of the "threshold" treaty.

Initial data has been juggled; for instance, in determining the yield of a Soviet explosion they proceeded from the geological characteristics of Nevada rather than of Soviet territory.

Leaving aside conscious cheating, however, there remain certain secondary technical details which the United States would like to discuss and define more precisely with the Soviet Union.

In mid-August 1986 the President submitted a report to Congress which had been prepared on the basis of a request made in 1985 by Senator G. Hart, who asked the administration to reveal the spheres in which it would be possible to jointly engage in perfecting verification methods. The report is entitled: "On Potential Areas of Cooperation Between the United States and the USSR in the Development of Potential for Arms Control Agreements." It notes that several steps for cooperation could be undertaken in order to "strengthen the basis of seismic detection and identification of low-yield nuclear explosions." One of the steps provides for joint scientific research into high-frequency seismic waves. In the opinion of many scientists, such research represents the best method of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions conducted secretly.

Another step is the creation of a network of seismic stations in the United States and the Soviet Union in order to reveal how effectively such stations can watch over
compliance with a nuclear test ban. A third step envisages joint study of new methods which make it possible to differentiate between powerful chemical explosions and low-yield nuclear explosions, this being one of the most difficult problems to solve in the sphere of verification [proverka].

The report praises the new method of verification known as "corrtex," which means "constant reflectometry of radius as a function of time."

For verification by this method it is desirable to construct a "twin shaft" ["shakhta-sputnik"], installing a coaxial cable there....

But enough technical details. It is more important to note that, as we read in the above document, "a wide range of problems which are of critical importance will have to be discussed in order to move from an agreement in principle to the implementation of on-site inspection [proverka na mestakh]. If any of these elements is not safeguarded in a proper manner, it may undermine the achievement of the final goal of a verification system. Although negotiations on such technical details are not so spectacular as the negotiations on various certain aspects of arms control, they are of critical importance and may take much time."

The report states that since much time will be required, it is desirable to begin Soviet-American negotiations more rapidly and thus to hasten the ratification of the 1974 treaty. A pessimistic note is added here: "It cannot be relied upon that analytic methods will make it possible to eliminate all unexplained phenomena [neyasnyy yavleniye]."

To put it more simply, they are proposing to Soviet experts that the technical details of calibrating explosions be worked on, and are meanwhile warning them that this will be a long process. At the same time the explosions will continue. All this is called an American "initiative," to which the Soviet side is apparently not responding in the proper way....

The U.S. Administration refuses to cease or even to halt for a time its nuclear explosions for a "strategic" reason, too--in order to maintain the so-called "nuclear deterrence." As long as a need for such deterrence continues to exist, tests will also be necessary.

The official U.S. position is that a total ban on nuclear tests should be discussed in the context of a time when we will not rely on nuclear deterrence for ensuring international security and stability, when we will carry out a broad, deep, and verified arms reduction, when we will significantly broaden the possibilities of verification [proverka] as well as measures to strengthen confidence, and when we will achieve a balance in conventional weapons.

As we can see, the list of conditions is long enough to postpone the solution of the problem till the cows come home.

In actual fact, tests for "deterrence" purposes are not necessary, because the excessive nuclear arsenals ensure "deterrence" with plenty to spare. They may say that it is necessary to recheck the effectiveness of "deterrence," but the contrived artificiality of this argument about verification of reliability has already been shown.
President R. Reagan frequently reiterates his words about the aspiration, even dream, of "making nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." It is true that he sees the road toward this irrefutably desirable goal in the "Strategic Defense Initiative" through "Star Wars." However, even he is not sure whether or not this road is leading to a dead-end. From our point of view, this road is leading to the edge of a nuclear abyss.

There is a real, rather than imaginary, possibility of making nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete: to begin stage-by-stage nuclear disarmament. But first of all it is necessary to stop. The cessation of nuclear tests is a starting line which is clearly visible and comprehensible to everyone, and is the link in the chain which, once it is grasped, will make it possible to draw the entire chain.

The linkage of a test ban to a "broad, deep, and verified arms reduction" which the official U.S. position reflects transfers the problem to the plane of the argument about which came first—the chicken or the egg. Theoretically it is possible to reduce nuclear weapons even without halting tests, and the SALT II Treaty envisaged such a possibility. But the reverse is also possible. While closing off the channel of the qualitative arms race—"whose are better"—a test ban leaves open the channel of a qualitative race—"who has more"—a channel which is tedious and senseless in "overkill" conditions, that is, in the conditions of obvious oversaturation of nuclear arsenals. But here it is possible to reach agreement on reduction, or as the Soviet Union has proposed, on eliminating nuclear weapons.

The thesis that a test ban is possible only under the conditions of disarmament makes a possible parallelism of efforts obligatory while sabotaging efforts in general. As has been said many times, including in the Mexican Declaration, a ban on explosions is the first step along the road toward the conclusion of a total test ban treaty and toward the cessation of the production and deployment of all types of nuclear and also space weapons.

It should also be noted that the renunciation of tests will not only place a barrier in front of the appearance of new, more refined types of nuclear weapons. Such a renunciation will also help timid sprouts of confidence to break through. Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou also said in Mexico that from the psychological point of view the cessation of tests will promote the creation of a suitable atmosphere for overcoming dead-ends in the disarmament process.

As far as the concept of "deterrence" is concerned, the realities of the nuclear age demand a new political approach, and also the complete renunciation of obsolete and dangerous doctrines in which war continues to be regarded as a means of achieving political ends.

This is the main conclusion of the report by UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar entitled "Deterrence: Its Consequences for Disarmament and the Arms Race, for Negotiations on Arms Reductions and International Security, and also for Other Issues Connected With This." This report includes documents (opinions) by governmental experts from different countries who, by decision of the UN General Assembly, held three sessions in 1985–86 in New York and Geneva to discuss these problems.
Analyzing the ruinous consequences which the deterrence doctrine — the official NATO doctrine for almost 40 years now — has for the international situation, the Indian (K. Subramaniam), chairman of the group of experts and director of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, stated that it is constantly whipping up the nuclear arms race. If the deterrence doctrine is not opposed by a normalization of political relations, it will be a constant source of distrust and suspicion in the relations between states.

In striving for a test ban, the world public, observers, and political figures are raising objections to the Americans' contrived arguments, and from the start are taking them seriously and proceeding from the assumption that the opponent is well intentioned.

It is necessary to act in this way, because these arguments are designed for people who have no opportunity, and sometimes no desire, to delve into detail. However, one must not forget to add the arguments, and specifically the moral and humanist ones, against the continuation of tests to the polemic against the arguments for tests.

What is involved is, after all, the improvement of weapons of mass destruction which are not selective in the age or occupations of their victims, and which do not differentiate between "ours" and "theirs." What is involved is weapons of self-destruction for the whole of mankind. If even a small part of the nuclear arsenals already accumulated were to be put into action, this would wipe out each and everyone. What is involved is the weapons of "Cliocide," the end of human history: According to myth, the ancient Greek muse Clio is responsible for history, but history will disappear if mankind dies in the "nuclear winter" which is an inevitable result of an aggregate of nuclear detonations.

Nuclear weapons are profoundly amoral and anti-human.

The concept of nuclear "deterrence" is equally amoral and anti-human, since it presupposes revenge on and destruction of a population which is regarded as a hostage.

It is curious that this is recognized by President R. Reagan, too, but he recognizes it within the context of his "Strategic Defense Initiative," which will supposedly free the world from "deterrence" and replace it with a "defense" which will not threaten the peaceful population. In actual fact the "Star Wars" plans are leading to an intensification of the arms race and to the other side's adoption of additional measures to overcome the planned ABM defense and maintain "deterrence," but at a more dangerous level.

"A ban on underground nuclear weapon tests...would correspond to almost universal wishes. By halting all tests of nuclear weapons, the nuclear powers would take an important step along the road to other measures to stop and roll back the arms race....It is clear to us what beneficial consequences a total test ban would have for the relaxation of international tension and for an improvement of relations between governments. In the light of these general considerations it is no surprise that the delay in agreeing on a general and total test ban has given rise to a feeling of disappointment and even annoyance in some places."
This was the argument of U.S. representative W. Foster when he spoke at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 25 November 1965.

It has to be said that a considerable part of the polemics around the problem of nuclear tests gives rise to a sense of deja vu. This applies equally to the present arguments about an ABM defense, which repeat the debates of the sixties.

"The cessation of tests would interrupt the development of defense systems which may in time be manufactured and which we need." This sounds contemporary, but it was said 37 years ago by L. Strauss [name as transliterated], chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

He has his imitators today.

"An agreement to ban nuclear tests would tranquilize the public and lead them to the conviction that the need for large defense efforts will disappear. Under these conditions it would be more difficult to have defense budgets confirmed at Capitol Hill." This sounds contemporary, but it was said by E. Vos [name as transliterated], an American journalist, 37 years ago.

He has his imitators today.

"There have been scientists who have feared that a test ban would lead to the closure of large laboratories needed to continue nuclear research." This was written by A. Dean, head of the American delegation at the test ban talks in those years, in a book entitled "Test Ban and Disarmament." (Footnote 20) ("Test Ban and Disarmament," New York, 1966) That was also what H. Kissinger wrote in his article "Nuclear Tests and the Problem of Peace," published in 1958 in the journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (Footnote 21) (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1958, April)

That is the way they write now, too.

"A test moratorium would not be in the United States' interests." This sounds just like Reagan. It was said in 1955, as the conclusion of an interdepartmental consultative group charged with elaborating the American position at the disarmament talks.

One could go on, but even the examples cited are enough to show that then and now in the United States there were and are influential supporters of the nuclear arms race who invent and recall all sorts of arguments just so that everything goes on in the old way.

"Whatever President Reagan and those who surround him may assert about their desire to achieve the total destruction of nuclear missile weaponry, their true intentions — which, incidentally the White House itself sometimes voices frankly — may be reduced to the creation of new weapons of mass destruction, including in outer space," attests Rear Admiral D. Laroque (retired), head of the Defense Information Center in Washington.

"When you dig deeper and deeper into the arguments which are expounded," Flora Lewis, a NEW YORK TIMES commentator, has written on this subject, "the basic argument floats to the top. It can be reduced to the following: The United States needs to have all the options at its disposal, and it wants to be able to create different and better nuclear weapons as soon as a new idea on this score appears."
"Regarding nuclear tests," M.S. Gorbachev stated after his meeting with R. Reagan in Reykjavik, "Here too it was clearer than daylight why the U.S. side does not want to conduct talks in earnest on this subject. It would prefer to make them endless, to defer a solution of the problem of banning nuclear tests for decades. For the umpteenth time we had to reject attempts to use talks as a screen for freedom of action in the sphere of nuclear tests." (Footnote 22) (PRAVDA, 15 October 1986)

In other words, the Pentagon is for a qualitative arms race, and not at all for a reduction — even less the elimination — of nuclear arsenals.

But that is the Pentagon.

People of goodwill welcomed our decision on a moratorium on nuclear explosions. We heard words of approval and support from all parts of the world. The Soviet moratorium was approved by the UN General Assembly — the world's most representative assembly of states. Politicians, parliamentarians, public figures, and mass organizations saw this action as an example of the correct approach toward contemporary problems and as a hope of deliverance from the fear of nuclear catastrophe. (Footnote 23) (See "Statement by CFSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev on Soviet Television on 18 August 1986," p 9)

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/12858
CSO: 5200/1208
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR RADIO ON TEST MORATORIUM, CHINA'S SPACE ARMS STANCE

LD200430 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 19 Dec 86

["International Situation — Questions and Answers" program with political observer Aleksandr Zholkver and commentators Vladimir Fedayev, Igor Charikov, and Vyacheslav Lavrent'ev; names of commentators replying to questions supplied when identified]

[Excerpts] [Question] Yuriy Aleksandrovich Abrasakhov says the following questions interest him. Won't the introduction of the moratorium on testing nuclear weapons in the USSR affect the defense capability of our Armed Forces? The United States has carried out 24 nuclear explosions; France continues testing, and Britain, the Republic of South Africa [RSA], Pakistan, and Israel possess nuclear weapons. And a second question: Would you discuss Soviet-Cuban relations on matters of war peace?

[Answer] Your question is perfectly understandable. Of late, the subject has been worrying very many Soviet people. Indeed, the acts carried out in Reykjavik by our leadership are so constructive and they go so far toward nuclear disarmament that some people are involuntarily asking if we are not weakening ourselves by these initiatives. The chief of staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal Akhromeyev, addressed a press conference and made it understood that, of course, it is not a simple matter. We have, after all, made this decision after serious consideration, but either way our defense might remain sufficiently firm and the views of our military leaders can serve as evidence that we are not in fact disarming ourselves; we are not becoming weaker from the point of view of our defense potential.

[Second commentator] I would like to say that this kind of question is being posed not only by you, but also quite often in the West, including among representatives of the antiwar movement. I was the television moderator of a broadcast consisting of a roundtable conversation with leaders of the antiwar movement in the FRG. It was entitled — not fortuitously — From Hasselbach to Reykjavik. Hasselbach is a place in the FRG where a major U.S. military base having cruise missiles is sited. At this roundtable we also talked about the fact that, of course, the Soviet Union cannot extend the moratorium infinitely. Taking care of our security is a matter for constant and attentive examination, both in the CPSU Central Committee and in our military leadership. It would be absolutely wrong to act in the way that certain politicians in the West have been acting. You'll recall, perhaps, that this was discussed during Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's meeting with Norwegian Prime Minister Brundtland. Those in the West have said that after 500 days of a Soviet moratorium, wouldn't it be good if there were another 500 days; wouldn't it be good if the Soviet Union adopted unilateral measures in the field of conventional weapons. But the Western politicians are misapprehending the situation, when the wish is always addressed just to one side.
Imagine for a moment what the outcry in the world would be if the United States had silenced its Nevada test site for 500 days and during this time the Soviet Union had carried out 24 explosions of nuclear weapons at Semipalatinsk. Suffice to imagine this situation, in order to understand just how great is the actual contribution that the Soviet Union has already made to nuclear disarmament. Of course, these acts cannot be limitless. This was also said sufficiently frankly by the Norwegian minister, and it was stressed that in order to move along the path that has already led to Reykjavik and to move along the path to nuclear disarmament, we need the will of both sides. We need actions from both powers, not just from the Soviet Union, but also from the United States.

In this respect, it must be said that the role of the antiwar movement both in our country and abroad is sufficiently great to apply pressure on certain circles in the United States so that they might follow our example.

[Question] Vasily Matveyevich Cherkassov, engineer, writes: In the mid-fifties, I was works Komsomol organizer and we met very many young people from abroad. I particularly remember meeting young Chinese people who were friendly and open. If you had told us then that our relationship would have a falling out, we would not, of course, have believed you; neither we nor they.

Take, for example, the speech by the representative of the PRC in the Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly: He said that China opposes all forms of the arms race in space and the militarization of space. But nevertheless, comrades, we cannot pass over what I would call certain attempts at putting the policies of the two powers, the Soviet Union and PRC, on the same plane. This was reflected in Beijing's attitude to the problems of Reykjavik. There was a statement from Beijing that China expected nothing good from Reykjavik, because over there they believed that in any event only two — as they put — superpowers are pushing ahead the arms race. True, they immediately added that in any event Beijing does believe that dialogue is better than military confrontation, and that they advocate the continuation of the Soviet-U.S. talks on disarmament.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

U.S. NUCLEAR SUBMARINE AT YOKOSUKA--Yokosuka, Kanagawa Pref., Dec 8 KYODO--The U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered submarine Olympia made the first port call at the U.S. naval base here Wednesday. The 6,000-ton Los Angeles-class submarine with a crew of 130 is capable of carrying Tomahawk cruise missiles and was commissioned in November 1984. It was the 28th port call here by U.S. nuclear-powered submarines this year. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0509 GMT 3 Dec 86 0W] /6662

VOGEL URGES END TO U.S. NUCLEAR TESTS--Bonn, 21 December (TASS)--The chairman of the Bundestag faction of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Hans-Jochen Vogel, today urged Washington to stop nuclear testing. "An end to testing," he said, "does not depend on issues of verification and is not connected with the need for lengthy talks. It depends exclusively on political will." Besides, he said, "there is no military need for continued nuclear testing." Vogel also described as very dangerous efforts to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons for space with the help of further testing. He spoke highly of the Soviet desire to reverse the arms race. "The Soviet Union, which has observed a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear blasts since the middle of 1986, has made an important step towards disarmament," the prominent West German politician said. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1710 GMT 21 Dec 86 LD] /12858

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS: UN ADOPTS RESOLUTION ON PEACE, SECURITY

LD051400 Moscow TASS in English 1246 GMT 5 Dec 86

[Text] New York December 5 TASS — The 41st session of the United Nations General Assembly has adopted a resolution on the "establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security" submitted for its consideration by the group of the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union. The resolution takes into account the opinion of many U.N. member countries which took part in the discussion of this issue. It sets out main directions of establishing a system of comprehensive security for all, stresses the role of the U.N. and provides for the continued discussion of the question at the next session of the General Assembly. The groundwork has thus been laid for the further extensive constructive dialogue with regards to the essence of the new philosophy of security in the nuclear-space age and practical ways for restructuring international relations on its basis. 102 votes were in favour of the resolution. The United States and France alone voted against. 46 delegations abstained (NATO members and some other countries). Following is the text of the resolution:

Establishment of a Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned at the tense and dangerous situation in the world and the danger of continuing down the path of confrontation and the arms race towards the abyss of the nuclear self-destruction of mankind,

Deeply concerned at the numerous threats to international peace and security resulting from the persistent violations of the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming the important role of the United Nations as an indispensable forum for conducting negotiations and achieving agreements on measures to strengthen international peace, security and cooperation and to democratize international relations,

Having in mind the necessity to strengthen international cooperation on the basis of existing consensus with a view to promoting the well-being and economic development of all countries, in particular developing countries,

Having discussed the question of a comprehensive system of international peace and security,
1. Solemnly reaffirms that the collective security system embodied in the Charter of the United Nations continues to be a fundamental and irreplaceable instrument for the preservation of international peace and security,

2. Also reaffirms the need to adhere strictly to the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of states, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs, non-use of force in international relations, peaceful settlement of disputes and the right of all peoples to self-determination,

3. Recognizes the invaluable role of the United Nations in the preservation of international peace and security, harmonization of the policies of the member states and the imperative need to strengthen and reinforce the United Nations,

4. Calls upon states to focus their efforts on ensuring security on an equal basis for all states and in all spheres of international relations,

5. Calls upon member states to make their contribution to practical measures to ensure compliance with an implementation of provisions of the Charter with particular regard to the crucial and interrelated areas of disarmament, crisis and conflict settlement, economic development and cooperation, the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

6. Further calls for the implementation of resolutions of the United Nations,

7. Decides to continue consideration of this question at its forty-second session under an item entitled "comprehensive system of international peace and security".

/6091
CSO: 5200/1192
Two draft resolutions on nuclear
and conventional disarmament
submitted by China have recently
been adopted by the 41st session of
the United Nations General
Assembly by an overwhelming
majority of 150 to 0 with 2
abstentions in one case and by
consensus in the other. This is the
first time that China has solely
sponsored and put to the vote
important draft resolutions on
dismament at the UN. This is
another manifestation of China's
independent foreign policy and of
its contribution to the mainten-
ance of world peace.

The resolution on nuclear
dismament urged the United
States and the Soviet Union,
which "possess the most impor-
tant nuclear arsenals," to "dis-
charge their special responsibili-
ty for nuclear disarmament" by
"taking the lead" in halting the
nuclear arms race and reaching an
agreement on the drastic reduc-
tion of their nuclear arsenals at an
early date. The resolution on
c conventional disarmament
stressed that the United States and
the Soviet Union "have a special
responsibility in pursuing the
process of conventional arma-
ments reductions," and that they
and their respective military bioes
should negotiate in earnest with a
view to reaching early "agreement
on the limitation and gradual and
balanced reduction of armed
forces and conventional weapons
under effective international con-
trol." The key to disarmament lies
in whether the two superpowers
will fulfill the special responsibility
they have by taking the lead in
dismament. The widespread
support given to the two
resolutions shows that China's
views and proposals are reason-
able and practical, and reflect the
common desire of people from all
parts of the world.

At present, the continuous
escalation of the nuclear arms race
poses a grave threat to world
peace. Over the years, the two
superpowers have fiercely vied
with each other in the field of
nuclear weapons, and are now
extending their arms race to outer
space. The various kinds of
nuclear weapons in their hands
now account for over 95 percent of
the world's total. Obviously, it will
therefore only be possible to relax
international tension and reduce
the danger of nuclear war if the
USA and the USSR take the lead
in disarming. Any viewpoint that
neglects, or evades or denies the
special responsibility of the
superpowers will thus prove
unacceptable to the world
community.
Under great pressure from the people of all countries, including their own, both the United States and the Soviet Union have advanced various proposals on nuclear arms control and disarmament. Both have declared that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought; and both admit their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament. Both have also declared their willingness, in principle, to take the lead by reducing their nuclear weapons by 50 percent. However, all this has so far added up to no more than mere propaganda and a succession of "peace offensives." Six rounds of arms control negotiations between the two in Geneva have resulted in no agreement. And summit talks in Geneva and Iceland between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev proved disappointing. As a result, the international community is becoming increasingly concerned about the escalation of the nuclear arms race and is demanding that both the United States and the Soviet Union adopt constructive and flexible positions and engage in serious negotiations to reach an agreement on the significant reduction of nuclear weapons which both helps relax international tension and does not infringe upon the interests of other countries.

While laying the emphasis on nuclear disarmament, China's resolution on conventional disarmament also points out the serious threat to world peace and international security presented by conventional arms, and the need for conventional disarmament. In the age of nuclear weapons, there can be no absolute demarcation between a conventional and a nuclear war. If a war breaks out in an area with a high concentration of nuclear arms, it is likely to escalate into a nuclear war. And with the advance of science and technology, conventional weapons have become increasingly deadly and destructive. Conventional wars since World War II have claimed tens of millions of lives and inflicted incalculable damage to property. It is a fact that all foreign interference in and aggression against sovereign states has been carried out with conventional forces. Conventional and nuclear disarmament are hence closely related and mutually complementary. China's resolution pointed out that the United States and the Soviet Union, "with the largest military arsenals," "bear a special responsibility in conventional armaments reduction." The possession of the largest and most advanced conventional arsenals by the two superpowers, coupled with the tension and confrontation between them, directly threatens world peace, and it is therefore necessary to urge the United States and the Soviet Union to be the first to reduce conventional arsenals.

Ardently desiring peace and firmly opposing war, the Chinese people urgently need a peaceful and stable international environment in which to pursue their programme of socialist modernization. China has always stood for the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear arms and has declared it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons, and will never use them against nuclear-free zones and non-nuclear-weapon states under any circumstances.
RELATIVED ISSUES

SOVIET 1986 ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES REVIEWED

LD211920 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1310 GMT 21 Dec 86

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by Nikolay Shishlin]

[Text] Hello, comrades. Not many days remain of 1986. Of course we are all preoccupied with today's affairs; but still, in thought, we try to sum up the departing year. And of course we ask the questions: What has the year been like, and what legacy will it pass on to the coming year? Seemingly simple questions, yet not so easy to answer. We have to take into account the sum total of the facts, phenomena and events in which this year -- proclaimed by the United Nations as International Peace Year -- has been so rich.

On this December evening, it may be appropriate to recall how the year began. It began with silence at the Soviet test sites. And as early as 15 January came the statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev unveiling the major Soviet proposals for an abolition by stages of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Then in February, the 27th CPSU Congress elaborated the foundations on which a comprehensive international security system could be built. And, incidentally, the main elements of the Soviet ideas have met with understanding and support at the latest session of the UN General Assembly.

The Soviet Union played an active part last year -- or rather, in the year now ending -- in drawing up proposals for reducing conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe, for instance, in the zone stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. And though those proposals are dated summer, 1986, and we are now in December, we have yet to receive a clear answer to them from the NATO countries.

The year has, indeed, been rich in Soviet initiatives; and it has been the year of Reykjavik. That must not be forgotten. And it was Reykjavik that revealed the possibility of a breakthrough to historic accords between the Soviet Union and the United States on the problem of our time: The problem of limiting and curtailing the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race. But in those days and hours of October, doubts were already creeping in as to whether the United States was willing to strike a historic compromise. The reason for the doubts was that the United States did not submit any proposals of its own at Reykjavik: All it did was react to the Soviet proposals. And as the days and weeks that followed were to show, those doubts proved well-founded. And it is not just a question of the United States' blind adherence to SDI -- the Strategic Defense Initiative. It is also a matter of such actions as the U.S. withdrawal from SALT II, U.S. actions in regional conflicts, and the latest outbreak of anti-Soviet rhetoric, which remains harmful even though it is something we have had to get used to.
And yet we should not be in a hurry to say that 1986 has been a barren year with regard to the creation of healthier international relations, or from the viewpoint of strengthening the foundations of universal peace.

Here, we should not be hasty. No. It is true, of course, that the world's armaments have not been reduced by even a single item. It is true, too, that the hotbeds of tension on the planet are still at boiling point; civil war rages in Lebanon; the Iran-Iraq war is being stoked by Washington, as has been shown clearly enough by the latest big scandal there, which revealed plainly that the United States is supplying arms both to Tehran and to Baghdad. Unrest continues in Central America and in southern Africa. All that is true. And of course, we must bear in mind that the possibility of achieving a historic decision to stop nuclear tests was very close -- only half a step away. But the way things are going, it looks as if the United States is, by their actions, cancelling that possibility, too. And this has been said, openly, honestly and in good time, in the Soviet Government statement. Now, a great deal -- a great deal -- will depend on the position of the United States: Whether we shall succeed in making the unilateral Soviet moratorium into a bilateral, Soviet-U.S. moratorium, or whether, in the interests of its own national security, the Soviet Union will have to resume testing.

However, in speaking of these dramatic pictures and dramatic situations of 1986, we must nonetheless see that, of course, all these initiatives, all these actions by the Soviet Union that we have mentioned, have of course augmented the potential for peace, added to the credit balance of peace; and along with the efforts of the other peace-loving states, they do, of course, make up the most important legacy of the old year to the new. And of course, the steps and the actions that have been taken by various political and public circles to make today's world a better world and a calmer world, have not been fruitless and have not been impotent. And perhaps the most important and most valuable thing from this viewpoint is the change in public attitudes that is beginning to take shape under the influence of the actions by the Soviet Union and by the other socialist countries, and by peace-loving social forces. And, you know, it is a very difficult thing to get through to the public consciousness in the capitalist countries, especially in the United States, where a powerful system operates to brainwash public opinion in favor of the tendencies by which the activities of the administration are dominated. Yet in this respect, 1986 has seen some changes -- precious changes.
RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA ON DANGERS OF NUCLEAR, SPACE WAR, CW, TESTING

PM101645 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Dec 86 First Edition p 4

[Article by V. Afanasyev: "The New Political Thinking"—capitalized words between slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] The most acute problem facing mankind now is the problem of war and peace. The problem as such is not new; wars have "accompanying" mankind throughout its history. Scientists have calculated that of the 4,500 years of recorded history only about 300 years were absolutely peaceful. During the remaining time people were fighting with each other in various parts of the world on a large or small scale. Until the present century it was a question of /LOCAL/ wars, limited in terms of both territory and the number of states taking part in them. Wars of this kind still take place today (the undeclared war against Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and so forth).

The 20th century has given birth to a new type of war — /WORLD WAR/ — in which dozens of countries and tens of millions of people take part. Mankind has survived two such wars. In the first, 38 states took part; 74 million people were mobilized; 10 million people were killed, and 20 million were wounded or shell-shocked. In the second, 72 states took part; 110 million people were placed under arms, and the toll in human lives amounted to 55 million.

The specter of a new world war, a monstrous thermonuclear war, is hovering in the air today. And what is more, it is not so much a specter as a real danger. The means of waging such war — stockpiles of nuclear weapons — are available, and there are people capable of detonating these stockpiles. They are the darkest forces of imperialist reaction.

Should such a war break out, it would probably be mankind's last war. The nuclear holocaust would reduce everything to ashes; the devastating nuclear blast would destroy everything in its path, and the lethal radioactive poison would put an end to human civilization and clearly destroy all life on earth.

To be or not to be — this cannot be a rhetorical question when it applies to mankind as a whole. How can the problem of war and peace be resolved in favor of peace? How can peace be preserved and social and individual progress ensured? These are very complex questions indeed.

In order to answer them, the former "pre-nuclear," "pre-space age" thinking in politics is no longer any use. What is needed is new political thinking in line with the present-day historical conditions.
V.I. Lenin stood at the cradle of this thinking. It is based on the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems. Lenin was deeply convinced that socialism would sooner or later triumph throughout the world. However, this victory cannot occur simultaneously in all countries. Depending on the level of economic development, the acuteness of the class struggle, the correlation of social forces, and other conditions, certain countries will achieve socialism earlier than others. Proceeding from this premise, Lenin drew the conclusion that during the long historical period when socialist countries and capitalist countries will exist side by side, they will have to coexist; they will have live with each other on earth. Lenin was an advocate of peaceful coexistence, and the Communist Party and the Soviet state have based their relations with capitalist countries on this Leninist principle.

Peaceful coexistence presupposes the renunciation of war as well as the use of, or threat of the use of, force as a means of resolving disputes; the settling of such disputes by means of negotiations; noninterference in each other's internal affairs and consideration of one another's legitimate interests; a people's right to decide their own destiny; strict observance of states' sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of their borders; cooperation based on complete equality and mutual advantage; and conscientious implementation of all obligations ensuing from generally accepted principles and norms of international law and international treaties that have been concluded.

V.I. Lenin lived, worked, thought, and fought at a time when science was only beginning to penetrate into the realm of the atom, and its nucleus remained a well-sealed secret. The nuclear danger which is now hovering over mankind did not exist.

Since V.I. Lenin's death, and especially in recent decades, the historical situation has changed radically; we have entered the /NUCLEAR AND SPACE AGE/. A nuclear monster has been created, and as a result mankind itself is in great danger.

History itself has set both theory and practice a task of fundamental importance, the task of preserving peace, preventing a nuclear holocaust, and -- without closing our eyes to social, political, and ideological contradictions — mastering the science and art of behaving with restraint and circumspection in the international arena and living in a civilized fashion. In other words, creating conditions of correct international conduct and cooperation. The CPSU has resolved this task. The /CONCEPT OF THE NEW POLITICAL THINKING/ provides the answer to the aforesaid situations.

The main ideas and premises on which this concept is based are contained in the materials of the 27th CPSU Congress. The present-day world has become too small and fragile for wars and power politics, the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the congress noted. The world has become fragile because it could shatter like a nut under the impact of even a small part of the stockpile of nuclear bombs. The world has become small because delivery vehicles have been built which are capable of sending these bombs to any part of the earth within minutes.

"The world cannot be saved and preserved," the report said, "unless ideas and actions which have for centuries been based on the permissibility of wars and armed conflicts are discarded resolutely and irreversibly."

/THE RENUNCIATION OF WARS AND POWER POLITICS/ in the nuclear and space age is the main premise on which the concept of the new political thinking is built. This concept was further developed in subsequent party documents and speeches by the Central Committee general secretary. M.S. Gorbachev's materials and speeches during his recent visit to India have contributed a great deal to its development.
THE CONCEPT OF THE NEW POLITICAL THINKING MEANS A PROFOUND AND UNPREJUDICED UNDERSTANDING OF THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE REALITIES OF OUR TIME, AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE FACTS THAT:

In our time, when weapons have been created which call into question the very existence of mankind, there is only one choice; namely, to coexist or cease existing. Thus it is not just a matter of rivalry and confrontation between two social systems but a matter of choosing between survival and mutual destruction;

The highly complex problems and profound differences and conflicts which prevail in the present-day world can be resolved only by political means, by means of talks rather than by means of science and technology; and still less by means of military force, the force of arms;

The differences in sociopolitical systems, ideology, and specific national, cultural, and other features are not an obstacle to dialogue for the sake of peace. While giving up none of its national pride, interests, or values, every nation must be able to channel them into the achievement of the main aim — saving human civilization;

All countries of the world are interconnected and interdependent; all people live on one planet, the earth;

Victory in nuclear war is unthinkable; there can be no victors — only the vanquished — in such a war;

The ideas of achieving military superiority are unrealizable and illusory;

Space belongs to all mankind, and its use for military purposes would be inhumane and illegal;

In order to survive, mankind must prevent the militarization of space and eliminate nuclear weapons from the earth;

All countries and peoples — be they big, medium, or small — must take part in the effort to build peace and reliable security;

The security of some countries cannot be ensured at the expense of others; security can only be identical, mutual, and comprehensive — international security, that is. There is only one world, and its security is indivisible;

Human values must be given priority since the world belongs to people, to the present and future generations;

Human life must be recognized as the supreme value, because only man is the creator of the material and spiritual values which society possesses, and only his creative genius ensures progress and civilization in conditions of peace.

In giving priority to common human values and human life and advocating a nonviolent world, the CPSU in no way renounces the party and class approach to social processes and wars. The CPSU's main aim has been and remains the ultimate aim of the working class — the building of communism. The CPSU supports the international workers, communists, and national liberation movements and wages an uncompromising ideological struggle against its class enemies.
Marxists are not pacifists; they regard just — defensive and liberation — wars as natural and normal.

In conducting their affairs in the international arena, the CPSU and the Soviet state are strictly guided by the principles of the new political thinking. The preservation and consolidation of peace and the reduction and subsequent complete elimination of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons is their main foreign policy task. And it cannot be otherwise. After all, peace — as Lenin himself said — is socialism's ideal. And peace is especially vital for us now, because only in conditions of peace can we implement the impressive programs of restructuring and accelerating the country's socioeconomic development.

The party is sparing no effort to achieve this aim — the preservation of peace.

The program for building a nuclear-free world put forward by M.S. Gorbachev in his 15 January 1986 statement is imbued with a sense of great responsibility for the fate of mankind and its survival.

Acting consistently, step by step, beginning with the current year, which has been declared International Peace Year by the United Nations, it is possible to implement and complete the process of delivering the earth from nuclear weapons. Provided, of course, that the creation of space strike arms is completely abandoned.

If this program were adopted, it would only take 15 years to translate it into reality. We could enter the third millennium free from the threat of "nuclear winter," under clear skies which will never be marred by lethal nuclear clouds. But in order to achieve this, tremendous efforts on the part of governments, parties, all peace-loving forces, and all peoples are needed.

The program makes provision for the complete elimination of chemical weapons and of the industrial base for their production, and also for a reduction in conventional arms and armed forces.

Important disarmament initiatives were put forward at the 27th CPSU Congress. The CPSU Central Committee Political Report contained a proposal to create a comprehensive system of international security and showed the basic foundations of such a system in the military, political, economic, and humanitarian spheres.

The question of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions is of exceptional, not to say key, importance for the cause of disarmament. A positive solution to this question would put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and pave the way for their reduction. After all, ultimately it is necessary to halt the senseless and extremely dangerous nuclear arms race, to put an end to it!

Clearly aware of this, the Soviet Union declared a moratorium on all nuclear explosions on 6 August 1985 (the 40th anniversary of the day the U.S. dropped an atom bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima). We have extended this moratorium four times in the hope that the United States would follow our example. It did not. On the contrary, around 30 nuclear devices have been detonated under the Nevada desert while our moratorium has been in force.

In October 1986, in Reykjavik, accords of historic significance were achieved. A world without nuclear weapons came into sight, not as a mirage, but as a possible reality which could take shape as soon as tomorrow — provided that both sides want this and
show responsibility. However, the reality did not materialize because of the notorious SDI program, which the incumbent of the White House literally clung to.

The Soviet Union, loyal to the spirit of Reykjavik, regards it as a point of departure from which we must advance in the cause of disarmament toward the reduction and complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the nonmilitarization of space.

Convincing evidence of the desire to implement the principles of the new political thinking is provided by the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons, signed by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi on 27 November 1986.

Building such a world, the declaration says, calls for specific and immediate measures aimed at disarmament; it could be achieved by concluding agreements on:

The total destruction of nuclear arsenals by the end of the current century;
A ban on the placement of any weapons in space, which is the common asset of mankind;
A total nuclear test ban;
A ban on the development of new types of mass destruction weapons;
A ban on chemical weapons and the destruction of the stockpiles of these weapons;
And a reduction in the level of conventional arms and armed forces.

The Soviet Union and India proposed that an international convention be concluded banning the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons until these weapons are eliminated.

There are still many difficulties hampering the implementation of these proposals, since the leaders of the United States and certain other Western countries do not want to think and act along new lines in politics and are clinging to the unrealizable idea of achieving military superiority.

It is true that they sometimes say good and useful things. Let us recall Geneva in November 1985 in this context. There, the U.S. President agreed "that nuclear war must never be unleashed and that there can be no winners in such a war." In the joint Soviet-U.S. statement the importance of preventing any war, whether nuclear or conventional, was emphasized, and the desire was expressed to "forestall an arms race in space and end it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms, and to strengthen strategic stability."

Sensible words. It was these words which engendered the "spirit of Geneva," the spirit of hope. It seemed that fresh, warm winds were about to begin to blow which would melt the ice of the "cold war." [PRAVDA in Russian on 5 December in its Second Edition replaces the preceding sentence with the following: "It seemed that fresh, warm winds were about to blow, and our planet would become warmer." ] However, this did not happen because these words of the U.S. President remained mere words, in contrast to his actions which have worked and continue to work against the interests of peace and people's security. The implementation of unprecedented military programs, the feverish efforts to translate the SDI plans into reality, the nuclear tests carried out one after another in quick succession, the breaching of the limits laid down by the SALT II treaty, the deployment of Lance missiles in South Korea, preparations for war against Nicaragua, and the barbaric raid on Libya -- this is by no means the full list of actions which are very far removed indeed from the ideals of peace and humanity. A truly militarist madness has seized the transatlantic globalists who aspire to world supremacy. They absolutely refuse to abandon the thesis that the only way to negotiate with the USSR is from a position of strength, a thesis whose bankruptcy was proved long ago.
The Soviet Union is a mighty, proud, and great country which will never give up its independence and will never tolerate diktat.

Throughout history, reason and madness have been eternal opposites. There have been occasions when madness prevailed over reason, but it was always a temporary victory. Ultimately, reason has always triumphed. We must believe that this is what will happen on this occasion, too. Mankind will not allow itself to be destroyed.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR: SHABANOV ON DANGER OF CONVENTIONAL, NUCLEAR ARMS

PM081621 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 46, 24 Nov 86 pp 7-8

[USSR Deputy Defense Minister V. Shabanov article: "'Conventional' Warfare: New Dangers"]

[Text] Preventing a conventional war in Europe is a pressing political and military-strategic objective. Such a war could bring untold suffering to the people of the continent and, further-more, would entail a considerable chance of its developing into a nuclear war.

The massive use of conventional weapons during the second world war had catastrophic consequences. Academician Moiseyev writes that when at the end of the war the British and Americans bombed Hamburg and Dresden, "the energy concentration was so high as to cause a fire storm or tornado—a self-sustaining chain reaction of combustion. Everything burned—wood, plastics, metal and reinforced concrete. The fires grew stronger and covered increasingly large areas. Clouds of black smoke obscured the sunlight." (This was later to prompt scientists to study the climatic effects of large-scale fires caused by nuclear explosions.)

A vast number of cities and villages were destroyed in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Britain, France, Germany and other countries. Untold damage was done to industry and agriculture. And yet it was a war waged by "conventional" means at the scientific and technological level of the time.

Today Europe has the two biggest groupings of armed forces in the world confronting each other. Mountains of the latest weaponry—nuclear, chemical and conventional—have been accumulated. According to some estimates, there are 20 times more weapons in Europe than the average for the planet.

The latest U.S. medium-range ballistic and cruise nuclear missiles deployed in the European NATO countries pose a particular danger. To the Warsaw Treaty countries, they represent first-strike weapons and their deployment is by no means a sign of U.S. concern for European security. The underlying aim is to ensure a capacity for "preemptive" strikes at Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and vital targets in the western parts of the USSR to weaken possible retaliatory strikes against U.S. territory.
More and more leaders, politicians and scientists the world over, including those in the U.S., are becoming aware that a nuclear war cannot be won.

According to NATO strategists, one way out of the "nuclear stalemate" is to develop and manufacture conventional weapons. At the same time, they continue the race in nuclear-missile weapons and do not rule out their use at a certain stage in the escalation of war.

The NATO Council session held in Washington in May 1978 adopted a military program for 1978-93 envisaging further improvements in general-purpose arms and military technology. Special emphasis is laid on raising the offensive capability of troops stationed in Europe. In 1984, the NATO countries committed themselves to doubling their allocations for the development of conventional forces.

The Pentagon is drawing up plans for "global non-nuclear warfare," a "major non-nuclear conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union" and a "full-scale global non-nuclear war."

So far "conventional forces" have only been used in regional conflicts, but even so they have claimed about 35 million lives since 1945. During this period U.S. imperialism, pursuing its political goals, has resorted to military force against other states and peoples some 250 times. So far, it has not dared to use force in Europe.

But is our continent ensured against such a trial of strength? Admiral Watkins, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, says in his report on naval strategy that it cannot be predicted where the first shot will be fired, but it is almost certain that the conflict will be linked with Europe. The "Rogers plan" (named after NATO supreme commander in Europe) envisages a non-nuclear warfare in Europe with conventional weapon strikes across the whole depth of the Warsaw Treaty defenses. General Rogers constantly demands that NATO countries further improve conventional weapons in line with the latest technology, with the aim of attaining military and military-technological superiority over the Warsaw Treaty countries. The U.S. and its NATO allies are increasingly using the achievements of modern science and technology in developing ever newer and more highly effective weapon systems. If the mass destruction of troops within the shortest time is a criterion of the effectiveness of a nuclear weapon, some models and systems of conventional weapons are already approaching the level of effectiveness of tactical nuclear arms.

The armed forces in the NATO countries have many cluster weapons, i.e., artillery and rocket shells, tactical missile warheads, aircraft missiles and bombs, special containers filled with large number of smaller shells of various designs and purposes to be used against people, unarmored or lightly armored vehicles, and tanks.
A salvo of one division of 240-mm MLRS rocket system carries several tens of thousands of subshells which targets over an area larger than that covered by artillery nuclear shells.

During the Vietnamese war the U.S. used so-called vacuum bombs which spray a mixture of air and fuel and blow up the clouds formed in this way. People caught in the area of the cloud die from the blast or suffocate as the oxygen burns up at the moment of explosion. Vacuum shells are about 4 times as effective as conventional high-explosive bombs of the same mass. The effectiveness of vacuum shells is increased by raising the heat value of the fuel, better spraying and ensuring optimal ignition conditions.

Napalm weapons and napalm itself are being improved: its burning temperature is being increased, and its degree of adhesion to clothes and the human body heightened; napalm is becoming self-igniting. New compositions of this type currently being developed have a much greater destructive effect.

Of late, the NATO countries have been concerned to improve the accuracy of fire, and create highly accurate shells which make it possible to destroy key small-sized targets within a minimum of time. The impact on the enemy's positions would be similar to that of nuclear warheads.

NATO headquarters are planning simultaneous deep strikes at Warsaw Treaty troops. Given quick military maneuvers, this would make vulnerable considerable areas of the Warsaw Treaty countries (cities, industrial and agricultural targets and the population) which would be the threat of hostilities.

Large-scale use of conventional weapons does not rule out deliberate or accidental attacks on the enemy's nuclear and chemical weapons, including stores of nuclear and chemical warheads, launchers, vehicles for storing and moving nuclear warheads and shells, transport-and-loading vehicles, etc. The consequences of this could be equal to the use of all these weapons of mass destruction, thus upsetting the parity of tactical nuclear weapons and triggering unpredictable retaliatory action.

Conventional fire strikes could destroy numerous nuclear power plants and energy installations in Europe. The result would be tantamount to a nuclear attack with consequences far greater than those of the Chernobyl accident. Most fire attack facilities in the NATO countries are "dual-purpose": the 155-mm guns which are standard in NATO, guns of larger caliber, multiple rocket systems, ballistic and cruise missiles, aircraft missiles and bombs can carry both conventional and nuclear (or chemical) charges. A switch from conventional hostilities to hostilities with the use of weapons of mass destruction can be sudden and unpredictable, which breeds mutual distrust and makes the sides seek to maintain a high level of combat readiness in their nuclear forces, thus increasing the danger of the eruption and escalation of nuclear war.
The use of automatic systems of troop and weapon management, the development of global interreconnaissance systems, and integrated automatic "search and destroy" systems, total mechanization and high mobility of troops and the use of military robots results in more and more control functions passing from man to automatic devices. The quick development of hostilities with sharp changes in the tactical and operational situation, swift advances of enemy troops, the spread of hostilities over large areas in several European countries simultaneously, deliberate disruption of communication channels, round-the-clock and all-weather military operations—all this prevents the political and supreme military command from sanctioning decisions due to shortage of time and information. In extreme cases this could lead to an irreversible escalation of hostilities, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Faced with an unprecedented NATO buildup of conventional as well as nuclear weapons in Europe, the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty countries naturally have to take countermeasures and develop and manufacture the necessary quantities of all modern types of conventional weapons to equip their armies. Created on the basis of modern science and technology, they are in no way inferior to NATO's weapons as regards their tactical and technical characteristics.

The qualitative and quantitative arms race, even if parity is preserved, brings down the level of security in Europe. But it also has an economic aspect to it. According to the Palme Commission, annual spending on conventional weapons is 5-6 times greater than on nuclear arms. The development and mass production of new conventional weapons places a heavy burden on the economies of all European countries, including neutral ones.

The USSR and its allies are continuing their persistent search for new approaches. They are coming up with new initiatives that make mutually acceptable agreements possible and pave the way for the reduction of arms and armed forces in Europe and the world.

The joint Budapest proposals, essentially supplementing the program to liquidate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, are exceptional significance. They provide for a 25 percent cut in the armed forces of both sides in the early 1990s (over a million men) and, as an initial step to show good will, cuts off between 100,000 and 150,000 men by the Warsaw Treaty and NATO forces within one or two years. All the reductions are to be carried out under reliable and effective control with the use of national technical facilities and international procedures, including on-site inspection. These proposals overturn suggestions that nuclear disarmament in Europe, given existing levels of conventional forces, would put the West European countries at a disadvantage and that the Soviet Union allegedly opposes effective verification of compliance with agreements. In fact, the USSR is even more interested that other states in strict verification of agreements, although it has always opposed verification without agreements.
Of particular significance is the document adopted at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The agreement is a package of political and military measures that reduce the danger of war in Europe. Its great significance also lies in the fact that it proves that agreements can be reached if there is political will and commitment on the part of the negotiators.

In his TV address on 14 October Mikhail Gorbachev said: "Europe deserves to be freed from nuclear weapons and cease to be a nuclear hostage." It is necessary to pave the way for detente in Europe, and to free the European peoples of the fear of a nuclear catastrophe. Relevant proposals have been submitted for negotiations. However, these historic agreements failed to be implemented because of the U.S. stand. This gain highlighted the U.S. Administration's neglect of the vital interests of its European allies. The Americans hope that SDI will bring them to the latest ("third-generation") nuclear weapons, as well as conventional arms. But this would inaugurate a new phase in the arms race, with dire consequences.

The modern world is too small and fragile not only for nuclear, but also for conventional wars. To eliminate war, to reduce confrontation by deep cuts in the levels of armed forces and armaments, bringing them to a level of reasonable sufficiency—this is a task that is crucial for the future of Europe and the world, the whole of civilization.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1183
MOSCOW: VISIT OF FINNISH CENTER PARTY DELEGATION

Shevardnadze Meets Minister

LD021959 Moscow TASS in English 1910 GMT 2 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 2 TASS -- Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet foreign minister met here today with Paavo Väyrynen, Finnish foreign minister and chairman of the Centre Party, heading a Centre Party delegation on a visit to the USSR at the invitation of the CPSU.

Shevardnadze and Väyrynen expressed satisfaction with the present state of and prospects for Soviet-Finnish cooperation that had been consistently developing on the time-tested basis of the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

They pointed at the special role of meetings between the leaders of the USSR and Finland in strengthening fruitful cooperation between the two countries.

The need to build up the efforts to consolidate what was achieved along the path towards a nuclear-free world in Reykjavik was stressed during the discussion of international problems.

The Soviet-proposed complex of initiatives was a good foundation for attaining this historic objective making it possible to ensure reliable security for all nations.

The concept of building a nuclear-free and non-violent world, advanced during the visit to India by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, followed the same path.

Shevardnadze said that the Soviet Union would not depart from its course towards establishing a lasting peace, towards diverting the nuclear and space threat from the world.

Väyrynen reaffirmed Finland's interest in reaching an agreement on ending the arms race on earth and preventing its transfer into outer space.

Finland would strive for a total ban on nuclear-weapon tests, including by its participation in the development of a seismic verification system, and would promote the all-European process and the adoption at the Vienna meeting of the decision to turn to considering disarmament issues at the next stage of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.
The Soviet side reaffirmed support for Finland's proposals for establishing a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe and on confidence-building measures in the naval sphere in respect to the region.

The Finnish side highly assessed the Soviet Union's consistent line and its latest steps directed at strengthening security in northern Europe.

The conversation was held in a warm, friendly atmosphere.

Meets With Ligachev

PM081419 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Dec 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "In the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received on 5 December P. Vayrynen, chairman of Finland's Center Party, who heads a Center Party delegation which has arrived in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee.

Topical questions of the international situation and of the development of Soviet-Finnish relations and ties between the CPSU and the Center Party were discussed during the conversation, which proceeded in a friendly atmosphere.

Ye.K. Ligachev dwelt on the CPSU's stance on contemporary international problems and emphasized the imperative need to organize constructive interaction between states, peoples, political parties, and all public forces with a view to averting the nuclear and space threat and ensuring mankind's future.

Note was taken of the high level of the relations of trust and diversified cooperation existing between the USSR and Finland and of the importance of contacts and ties between the CPSU and the Center Party and other Finnish political parties, and of cooperation between the two countries' public organizations, for its development.

The good-neighborly relations between the USSR and Finland, Ye.K. Ligachev declared, set an example of the practical meaning of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems.

P. Vayrynen highly appraised the efforts by the CPSU leadership in the struggle for peace and the elimination of arms, wars, and the military threat and noted the great importance attached in this context to the concept of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world, put forward during the visit by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to India. He declared that the Center Party, firmly pursuing the policy of Urho Kekkonen, its leader for many years and an eminent Finnish statesman, will continue to act energetically in the interests of peace, detente, and disarmament. He emphasized that the party will give particular attention to the strengthening of relations of trust and friendship with the Soviet Union as the basis of Finland's foreign policy course.

Confidence was expressed that cooperation between the USSR and Finland will continue to develop successfully in all spheres, in line with the course set by the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, and it was noted that it is necessary to comprehensively protect Soviet-Finnish good neighborliness and resist any attempts to weaken it.
S. Kaariainen, general secretary of Finland's Center Party, and V.S. Shaposhnikov, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Section, took part in the conversation.

Communique on Talks

PMO81647 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Dec 86 First Edition p 4

["Communique on Talks Between CPSU and Finnish Center Party Delegations"—PRVADA headline]

[Excerpt] A Finnish Center Party delegation was in the USSR 1-5 December 1986 at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee.

Talks were held between CPSU and Finnish Center Party delegations. Taking part in them, for the CPSU, were A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (head of delegation); Z.M. Kruglova, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; V.K. Mesyats, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Obkom; and V.S. Shaposhnikov, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Section. For the Finnish Center Party — Party Chairman P. Vayrynen (head of delegation); Party General Secretary S. Kaariainen; M. Miettunen, member of the "Finland—Soviet Union" Society Board; Party Board Member E. Kuuskoski-Vikatmaa; K. Juhanatalo, member of the Party Board and chairman of its parliamentary faction; Party Vice Chairman H. Pokka; Party Board Members P. Vatanen and E. Aho; and P. Vuola and S. Pohjamo, chairmen of district party organizations.

Topical problems of the international situation and questions of Soviet-Finnish relations and the further development of contacts and cooperation between the CPSU and the Finnish Center Party were examined during the talks, which took place in a friendly atmosphere.

The Center Party representatives spoke about their party's activity in the spheres of domestic and foreign policy, noting that the party unreservedly supports Finland's foreign policy course — the "Paasikivi-Kekkonen" line.

The sides agreed that this line, based on the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between Finland and the Soviet Union, guarantees the steady development of friendship and cooperation in relations with the Soviet Union and expresses Finland's desire to pursue a peace-loving neutral policy in the interests of international peace and to maintain friendly relations with all countries.

The Center Party representatives noted that Urho Kekkonen, Finland's president for many years, exerted a decisive influence on the shaping of their party's domestic and foreign policy line. They emphasized that the Center Party will continue to consistently pursue his line, striving for broad cooperation with other progressive and democratic forces.

Both sides noted the outstanding contribution made by U. Kekkonen to the development of Soviet-Finnish relations and his activity to the benefit of international peace, security, and cooperation. It was agreed with gratification that Finland's foreign-policy line, now being implemented under President M. Koivisto's leadership, remains consistent and unchanged.
The CPSU representative spoke of the progress in the implementation of the strategic course laid down by the 27th CPSU Congress, of accelerating the country's socioeconomic development and comprehensively enhancing the material and spiritual level of the Soviet people's life, of the profound changes in all spheres of society's life, and of the basic guidelines of the CPSU's foreign policy activity.

The Center Party representatives highly appraised the initiatives and constructive activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state for the strengthening of peace and for the benefit of disarmament and international cooperation.

For their part the CPSU representatives noted the Center Party's important contributions to the establishment and development of friendly and good-neighborly relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. They highly appraised its activity aimed at strengthening security and cooperation in Europe and throughout the world.

The delegations noted the coincidence of the two parties' positions in evaluating the international situation. Both sides emphasized the imperative need to utilize the real opportunities for radical reduction of nuclear arms which came to light in Reykjavik. The importance of energetic actions by all states, peoples, governments, and public forces in the struggle for nuclear disarmament and prevention of the placement of any weapons in outer space was noted.

The CPSU and Center Party representatives expressed gratification with the fact that mutual agreement on a meaningful and balanced final document was reached at the Stockholm conference. This, coupled with the experience of the other all-European meetings since Madrid, creates favorable preconditions for holding the Vienna meeting. The sides expressed the hope that this meeting will produce accord on advancing the CSCE process in all spheres, primarily on extending the mandate of the Stockholm Conference and expanding it to specific disarmament measures.

Both sides deem that the successful continuation of the all-European process is important. In this context they noted the usefulness of dialogue and interaction between centrist, liberal, and agrarian parties, which uphold different ideologies and represent different socioeconomic systems, in the cause of promoting European security and cooperation.

The CPSU and Center Party representatives expressed support for the recent proposal by President M. Koivisto on confidence-building measures in the military sphere as applied to Northern Europe and the waters of its littoral seas.

The delegations attached importance to the achievement of confidence- and security-building measures in the North European region, most important of which is Finland's proposal to create a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. Declaring again their support for the idea to create such a zone, the CPSU representatives reaffirmed the USSR's readiness to further its implementation by means of specific actions. The Center Party delegation highly praised the USSR's readiness to further its implementation by means of specific actions. The Center Party delegation highly praised the USSR's additional steps on security building in Northern Europe announced by the Soviet side in Helsinki in November 1986.

The sides agreed that the September 1985 meeting between Finnish President M. Koivisto and M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, laid a firm
foundation for the further development of all-around relations between the two countries. The delegations noted with gratification the high level of relations between the USSR and Finland and declared their intention to continue to promote by all possible means their expansion and deepening in all spheres.

The CPSU and Center Party representatives give particular attention to the question of the present state of Soviet-Finnish trade and economic cooperation. Both sides were agreed that the trade level must be maintained at the highest possible level both in the immediate future and in the longer term, and declared their resolve to further the quest for new forms of mutually advantageous economic cooperation.

The sides agreed that they will protect and develop by all possible means trust and friendship between the peoples of Finland and the Soviet Union. The delegations noted the usefulness of ties between the CPSU and the Center Party, which help the positive development of relations between Finland and the USSR. The Center Party delegation invited a CPSU delegation to visit Finland in 1987. The invitation was accepted with thanks.

The representatives of the two parties confirmed their readiness to continue to develop mutual contacts and cooperation for the benefit of our countries and peoples and in the interests of peace and international security.

/6091
CSO: 5200/1192
RELATED ISSUES

USSR: DUTCH PM, SOVIET LEADERS DISCUSS REYKJAVIK, INF, CSCE, SDI

Security Issues on Agenda

PM241619 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 18 Nov 86 p 3

[Raymond van den Boogaard dispatch: "Moscow: Link Between Missile and Star Wars Agreements Indissoluble"]

[Text] Moscow, 18 Nov—On the eve of the visit of Prime Minister Lubbers and Foreign Minister van den Broek Soviet spokesmen are stressing the indissoluble link between an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe (INF) and an agreement on experiments for the U.S. SDI space defense system. According to Valentin Falin, one of the Kremlin's most important spokesmen today, in a conversation with this newspaper, a separate agreement on SS-20, Pershings, and cruise missiles is impossible, for the Western weapons form part of an integrated U.S. nuclear strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Falin, head of the NOVOSTI press agency in Moscow, accused the NATO nations of having deliberately kept medium-range weapons outside the SALT II negotiations which ended in 1979 in order to be able to establish a new threat to the Soviet Union through the deployment of Pershings and cruise missiles.

When in Paris a year ago Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a separate agreement on medium-range weapons—namely, reductions to 243 SS-20's in the Soviet Union's European zone in exchange for a halt to any further deployment in West Europe—the Western side did not take this proposal seriously, Falin said, and NATO continued to deploy.

According to the Soviet spokesman the number of combat-ready SS-20's in the Soviet Union's European zone has now fallen to below 243, after the recent announcement that the Soviet Union has withdrawn all the SS-20's stationed on the Kola Peninsula.

Moscow's tough stance on the impossibility of a separate INF accord is also seen in the answers from the NOVOSTI press agency to questions from the Netherlands press agency, ANP. The deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands, it was said, would "torpedo" the "summit agreement" on INF that was discussed in Reykjavik and would be in conflict with the desire for an agreement voiced time and time again by the Netherlands Government. Moscow,
according to the NOVOSTI statement which is said to have been produced by "competent Soviet circles," greatly values the visit of Lubbers and Van den Broek which begins tomorrow and takes the view that security issues are one of the most important points on the agenda after the exchange of ideas on the promotion of reciprocal trade and the like.

From the comments either published or obtained from individuals in Moscow it appears that what Moscow is most concerned to do is to give more detailed information about its unchanged views on the course of the Reykjavik summit.

Talks With Ryzhkov

PM241601 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Nov 86 First Edition pp 1, 4

["Talks in Moscow"---PRAVDA headline]

[Text] Talks were started in the Kremlin on 20 November between Nikolay Ryzhkov, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Rudolph Lubbers, prime minister of the Netherlands. The sides raised principled questions connected with the development of bilateral Soviet-Dutch relations and with the present-day international situation after the Reykjavik meeting.

The USSR and the Netherlands belong to different alliances and in many respects assess differently the world developments, which, however, is no obstacle for the development of a constructive dialogue on the key problems of peace and security. The heads of government emphasized the special importance of the consolidation of trust between the European East and West for resolving the priority task of today — the removal of the nuclear war threat. With this in view it is important to understand better the policy and actions of each other.

Nikolay Ryzhkov stressed that the new comprehensive proposals of the Soviet Union on nuclear and space weapons based on the Reykjavik accords open an opportunity to achieve in a short period of time a decisive breakthrough in the sphere of disarmament starting from the level that was already reached. The return to the obsolete schemes and approaches should not be permitted.

The common opinion was expressed concerning the role that Europe and every European country could play in the present responsible moment, when it is actually being decided how quickly the historic development will approach the creation of a nuclear-free world. The similarity of the sides' views on the question of the banning of nuclear explosions, on the need for the consolidation of the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and the banning of chemical weapons was reaffirmed.

The chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the prime minister of the Netherlands positively assessed the state of the bilateral relations in a number of spheres, such as economy, trade, science and culture. They expressed the intention of the governments of both countries to exert efforts for working out and using new forms of economic cooperation, for instance, production cooperation, the creation of joint enterprises and so on. They emphasized the need for the activation of contacts in the humanitarian sphere, of cultural and scientific ties, and of exchanges in the sphere of education and sports.

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Taking part in the talks were, on the Soviet side: N.V. Talyzin, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and chairman of the USSR Gosplan; V.S. Murakhovskiy, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; V.M. Kamensiev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission; B.I. Aristov, USSR minister of foreign trade; A.G. Kovalev, USSR first deputy foreign minister; A.I. Blatov, USSR ambassador to the Netherlands, and N.N. Afanasyevskiy, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry First European Section.

On the Netherlands side: H. Van Den Broek, foreign minister; H. Wijnaendts, foreign ministry director general for political affairs; F.A. Engering, ministry of economic affairs director general from foreign economic relations; J.P.M.H. Merckelbach, adviser to the prime minister; M.J.D. van der Voet, chief director of the government information service; J.J. Groeneveld, ministry of agriculture and fisheries director for the processing and marketing of agricultural products; A.J. Ettema, director of the foreign ministry department for Atlantic cooperation and international security; and other officials.

The talks will be continued.

Ryzhkov Kremlin Dinner Speech

PM251021 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Nov 86 First Edition p 4

["In a Friendly Atmosphere"--PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpts] A dinner in honor of Ruud Lubbers, prime minister of the Netherlands, and his wife was given by the Soviet Government in the Grand Kremlin Palace 20 November.

Ruud Lubbers was accompanied by Hans van den Broek, minister of foreign affairs of the Netherlands, and other Dutch officials.

The Soviet side was represented by Nikolay Ryzhkov and wife, Eduard Shevardnadze, Nikolay Talyzin, Vsevolod Murakhovskiy, a first deputy chairman of the Council of ministers of the USSR, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, ministers, and chairmen of state committees of the USSR; and other officials.

A speech was delivered by Nikolay Ryzhkov, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Speech by N.I. Ryzhkov

The Soviet Union and the Netherlands belong to different social systems and military and political alliances. This, however, should be no obstacle to serious businesslike cooperation and a joint search for ways to improve the international situation. We have commendable achievements in bilateral cooperation, specifically in the agro-industry. We hope that the Soviet-Dutch talks which have begun and agreements which we will sign tomorrow will offer opportunities for the broadening and invigoration of this cooperation.

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Naturally, relations between our countries are not confined to trade and economic matters, important as they are. At a time of dangerous world tensions, cooperation in international affairs should remain central to our dialogue.

There is need today for a new approach to many problems of our world. This is natural because the fates of the states of Europe and the world as a whole are intertwined so closely that group, bloc, and ideological interests should recede in the nuclear-missile age before the awareness that peace is the highest value.

The meeting in Reykjavik, where the Soviet Union proposed a package of carefully balanced and interlinked proposals on nuclear disarmament, demonstrated that we had never been closer to beginning to abolish nuclear weapons. Whatever one’s attitude to Reykjavik may be — and there are those who are already trying to misrepresent and debase the meaning of the accord reached there — it is beyond doubt that the Iceland meeting led the talks on nuclear disarmament to new frontiers. These frontiers must be defended today so that there should be no return to endless and fruitless discussions over the problems of disarmament against the background of the escalating arms race. Our stand is that progress should be made perseveringly and talks continued on the entire range of problems of nuclear and space weapons from the positions made clear in Reykjavik. Every country should most responsibly make its choice in that major undertaking. While the U.S.A., chasing military superiority, has cast its lot with the SDI program, Europe cannot help pondering the irreversible consequences of such a step.

The complex of our proposals, including those on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe, is offering the prospect of ridding the continent of nuclear weapons and clearing the way to detente. Dutch official spokesmen, as far as we remember, vigorously advocated such a prospect some time ago. All the Europeans stand to gain from efforts to achieve relevant agreements and have them implemented as soon as possible.

The arguments that Western Europe will feel "defenseless" without American nuclear weapons in the face of the armed forces and conventional armaments of the Warsaw Treaty countries do not sound convincing today either. Our proposals in that field are well known. Our allies and we have called for substantial and balanced reductions in the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe and we are still waiting for a NATO reply to our initiative.

Generally speaking, European affairs would make a far brisker progress if the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were examined in the West without bias and not misrepresented there as diplomatic traps and ploys. As Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has pointed out on more than one occasion, the Soviet Union does not at all believe that its security can rest on prejudice to the security interests of other countries, and we are consistently proceeding in our practical policy from this premise. Let us seek accords on the basis of common sense, political realism and the principles of peaceful coexistence with due regard for the worries and interests of every nation.

The Stockholm Conference, the success of which made a favorable impact on the Vienna meeting which opened recently, showed that Europe could advance in that direction. If the momentum of the European process is maintained in Vienna, greater security and a higher level of cooperation in every field will be achieved.

Clearly, detente cannot be confined to cooperation in any one field, even a very important one. The European process should be advanced in every area, all the more so
since the condition of cooperation in any area we take is far below the real potentialities and needs of European countries. This holds true, in particular, for the economy, environmental protection, science, technology, and the safe development of atomic energy engineering. We stand for more energetic cooperation in those fields and for a joint search for new ways and forms of such cooperation.

Lubbers' Reply to Hosts

PM251145 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Nov 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report on "Speech by R. Lubbers" (PRAVDA headline) at 20 November Kremlin dinner for the Netherlands' prime minister under the general heading: "In a Friendly Atmosphere"]

[Excerpts] For all the importance of bilateral relations between our countries they are not the sum total of our policy. We attach great importance to arms control, arms reduction, and nonuse of force, and we want to see not only peoples, but individuals as well developing freely. This also determines the significance the government, parliament, and public opinion in the Netherlands attach to human rights, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom of movement. The Netherlands is seeking to intensify dialogue on human rights.

The recent progress made in the military sphere at the Stockholm Conference does not give grounds for disregarding the human factor. We hope that the document adopted in Stockholm, the first in many years in the sphere of confidence and security-building measures between East and West, will generate a favorable climate for the meeting that has now begun in Vienna. We would like to think that all the participating countries will adopt a constructive approach.

Questions of limiting and reducing arms rightly occupy the central place in our talks. As for nuclear armaments, I want to stress that we attach enormous significance to the Geneva talks between the United States and the Soviet Union leading to substantial and verifiable agreements permitting a sharp reduction of nuclear arsenals. The Netherlands' prime minister expressed the hope that progress will be achieved at summit talks between Washington and Moscow. The talks in Reykjavik demonstrated, he continued, that there is a real and valid possibility of an agreement being reached which would reduce the medium-range system in Europe to zero and cut it very heavily outside Europe. Naturally, we are aware that such a step would not be viewed in isolation. At the same time, the Netherlands' prime minister objected to the linking of such an agreement to accords on strategic armaments and space.

Our government attaches the greatest importance to the speediest implementation of an all-embracing, worldwide ban on chemical weapons, R. Lubbers continued, and it was gratifying to see progress being made in that sphere in the summer, although we are aware that much remains to be done. We hope that through joint efforts in this sphere it will be possible to achieve specific results in the foreseeable future.

Certainly it is exceedingly important that we make advances in the sphere of confidence-building measures and are increasingly assuming that verification and on-site inspections are an essential instrument of arms limitation, of the reduction of tension, and positive cooperation.
The concept of reciprocal openness [otkrytost], which includes inspections, verification, and cooperation, is of great importance. It could also play a big part in the gradual limitation and reduction of nuclear weapon tests, which would lead to their cessation. Here again it is a matter of combining our efforts.

'Frank' Talks With Gorbachev

PM241547 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Nov 86 First Edition pp 1-2

"M.S. Gorbachev's Talks With Netherlands Prime Minister R. Lubbers"—PRAVDA headline

[Excerpts] On 21 November M.S. Gorbachev met in the Kremlin with Rudolph Lubbers, prime minister of the Netherlands. The sides had frank, friendly and informal talks, which at times were interspersed with lively discussions, on very topical problems.

The sides attached priority attention in the talks to the international situation since the Reykjavik meeting.

Mikhail Gorbachev made a reminder of the disarmament initiatives and proposals put forward by the Soviet Union in the recent period, proposals that more than took account of the real worries of the West European countries on every position, from nuclear to conventional arms.

The Budapest initiative of the Warsaw Treaty countries was also a manifestation of sensitivity to the West European worries. However, there has been no reply to it for half a year now, just as there has been no reaction to the proposal that the working groups of the two military alliances meet to begin work on the question of reductions in conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe. Neither did we meet with understanding when we posed a way out of the deadlock at the 13-year-old Vienna talks.

Rudolph Lubbers and Hans van den Broek agreed that the Soviet Union had no intention of "attacking" Western Europe but nevertheless failed to explain why NATO was clinging so stubbornly to positions that actually amounted to support for a policy of the arms race. They declined to explain, too, why the U.S. President had again called for a "crusade" against the Soviet Union just one month after the Reykjavik meeting.

The position of the West European NATO members since Reykjavik makes one wonder if they really have an interest in ridding Europe of nuclear weapons and drastically lowering the level of armed confrontation on the continent.

Mikhail Gorbachev gave a principled appraisal of the conduct of the U.S. Administration, which would like to mix up and misrepresent everything that had been achieved in Reykjavik, and in pulling backwards.

Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that the Soviet leadership would firmly adhere to the positions reached in Reykjavik and noted that working on its initiatives and proposals, the Soviet Union, as before, would strictly take account of the real interests and concerns of its partners. Otherwise there can be no progress to security that is acceptable to all. We are constantly watching it. Any attempt to outwit anyone and to put one's partner into an inferior position will fail. This is how we will advance on the road opened by Reykjavik to the beginning of real arms reductions.
Addressing the Dutch prime minister and through him the other NATO governments, Mikhail Gorbachev invited them anew to thoroughly think over everything that had happened in Reykjavik. It was not an ordinary event. We had been going for 10 years to such a rapprochement of our positions which had seemed unbelievable quite recently. [sentence as received]

The package of our major proposals is complex of concessions and interests. The striving to tear out of this package one thing here and another there can upset the balance and violate the principle of mutual security.

Mikhail Gorbachev explained in detail why the Soviet Union was dead set against the SDI program. He noted, inter alia, that the belief that SDI would make America more secure was an illusion. The very opposite will happen. Since this program is fraught with a fundamentally new, unpredictable round of the arms race and is intended to achieve military-strategic superiority, we have to counter it and we have already thought out this matter.

The intentions being cherished to exhaust the USSR with the arms race spring from bad delusions about its potentialities, from misunderstanding of the unbreakable links between the Soviet leadership and the people, from unwillingness to reckon with the mighty patriotic will of the Soviet people.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Rudolph Lubbers agreed that now is the right time really to achieve accords on actual arms cuts and on halting the arms race. But this chance can be missed.

Eduard Shevardnadze, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek and the ambassadors of the two countries, A.I. Blatov and Petus Buwalda, took part in the talks.

Meets Ryzhkov, Protocol Signed

PM250945 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 4

["Soviet-Dutch Talks"--IZVESTIYA headline]

[Excerpts] On 21 November talks between N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Dutch Prime Minister R. Lubbers came to a close in the Kremlin.

The sides continued to discuss in the practical plane a broad range of questions of bilateral relations and international problems. Summing up the packed talks, the two heads of government were unanimous that today it was more important than ever before intensively to conduct a dialogue between European countries both at international forums and through bilateral channels. The sides expressed their shared desire for more intensive exchanges of views between the USSR and the Netherlands to broaden areas of political understanding, primarily with regard to curbing the arms race. The sides displayed different approaches to some international problems, especially those related to disarmament.

Both sides noted the importance of Mikhail Gorbachev's talks with Rudolf Lubbers and Hans van den Broek to the further development of Soviet-Dutch relations, especially in the political field.

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RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW ON INDIAN-SOViet INFLUENCE FOR NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD

LD072007 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 7 Dec 86

"International Observers at the Roundtable" program with Dmitriy Antonovich Volkskiy, member of the editorial board of ZA RUZEHOM, and Vadim Borisovich Kassis, chief editor for GOLOS RODINY newspaper and OTCHIZNA magazine, presented by Boris Andrianov, All-Union Radio foreign affairs commentator

[Excerpt] [Andrianov] Judging from the world public's reaction, a special place in this year's chronicle will be taken up by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to India. It is no accident that is being called historic. It has been marked by a document of a truly global scale, that is, the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world. It reflects accurately and clearly the new political thinking which responds to the conditions of the nuclear and space age. The ideas and principles formulated in this document express the interests of the whole world community and the hopes and aspirations of all peoples. These ideas and principles are turned toward a peaceful future for mankind, which is why they are of permanent significance. The principles contained in the Delhi declaration have been tested by life itself; it is precisely this circumstance, the energetic actions by the Soviet Union and India on the international arena in the name of peace and for preventing a nuclear war, and the increased role of our states in world affairs that have given their leaders the moral right to address such an appeal.

[Volskiy] Already the days are passing by since the end of Comrade Gorbachev's visit to India, but the attention of the press, television, and radio of various countries to this important event is not lessening; on the contrary, it is growing. This is perhaps because there are events taking place in Asia and the world as a whole which are confirming the correctness of the assessments made during Comrade Gorbachev's Delhi visit. In regard to the Western press -- and the U.S. press, of course -- there one feels a certain absentmindedness, as though they are surprised as to why now, precisely at this moment, Soviet-Indian friendly relations have been given such a serious new impetus. What is the reason for this? Various versions are put forward with reference, for example, to the fact that allegedly, at the moment India is most apprehensive of Pakistan's militarization.

Pakistan's militarization is, of course, a dangerous thing for India and for Asia as a whole. But of course, it is not only here and not so much here that the main reason for the further rapprochement between India and the Soviet Union lies. They talk about the fact that the Soviet Union at the moment has some sort of special interest in
looking for states that might cooperate with it in Asia, and this is correct. But this does not mean that it cooperates with just one state and cooperates less with others. On the contrary, we have a wide range of partnerships in Asia, and Soviet-Indian relations are indeed a model of such mutual relations between states with different social systems, which are of an organic nature. Therein lies the value for all mankind — even for the whole world, I would say — of Soviet-Indian relations.

[Andrianov] Well, this value of Soviet-Indian relations for all mankind has been embodied, first of all, in the Delhi declaration and the principles of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world. There is no country, I think, for which this document does not have the utmost significance. Is that not so?

[Volskiy] This is first and foremost because new political thinking has been embodied in this declaration, which is so essential in our nuclear age, and it contains a profound, I would say, a worldwide or even a philosophical meaning. Indeed, take our societies: Soviet society and Indian society are different. They are by no means the same, neither in their social system nor in their ideological sources, but in their urge to protect civilization from destruction, they have united on a common platform expressed by the historic clauses of the Delhi declaration. This is very important, of course, not only for the Soviet Union and India, for the point here is whom they represent: The socialist countries on the one hand and the developing, nonaligned states on the other. That is already the overwhelming majority of mankind.

[Kassis] But, Dmitriy Antonovich, the Soviet-Indian talks have exerted a particular influence, obviously, on the situation in Asia, where our two countries are neighbors.

[Volskiy] Absolutely, Vadim Borisovich, although it is not such a simple issue. You know that the Soviet Union has lately devoted ever-growing attention to consolidating Asian security, and not only security and peace on the Asian continent itself as such, but also in the huge waters adjacent to it, on the Indian and Pacific Oceans. You remember the large-scale program for normalizing the situation in the Asian and Pacific Ocean region put forward by Comrade Gorbachev at the end of July, when he spoke in Vladivostok. We proceed from the fact that the significance of that region for world economics and politics is growing. That is why the all-embracing system of international security cited at the 27th party congress is a system which must extend without fail in the Asian and Pacific Ocean region. Without it, without stable peace there, there cannot be any stable peace in general.

[Andrianov] I think it would be relevant to recall how our country visualizes in practice the inclusion of the Asian and Pacific Ocean region into a system of international security, that is: regional settlements; a stop to the proliferation and buildup of nuclear weapons; a reduction in naval activity; the resumption of talks on making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace; a reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments; the elaboration of measures on confidence-building and the nonuse of force.

[Volskiy] Here one could and one should add our idea on holding a conference on the Asian and Pacific Ocean region along the lines of the Helsinki Conference in Europe. Of course we are not naive people; we do not think that all these initiatives can be implemented overnight. What is needed here is a very great deal of lengthy and difficult work, I think, work by all who are interested in this.

It is no accident that at the Delhi summit talks, in the discussion of the issues connected with the improving the situation in Asia, there was particular emphasis on the importance of a stage-by-stage approach to this matter, to normalizing the
situation and strengthening peace in Asia with a stage-by-stage approach which, one can recall, the Soviet Union has been proposing for some time now. After all, it is no secret that in certain circles, in India as well, there has been prejudice toward the Soviet initiative in Asia. It has sometimes been misinterpreted that allegedly only our country is interested in these Soviet undertakings. If one is to judge from press reports at any rate, it was at the Delhi talks that this process — which had already been outlined previously — found a continuation; this process of overcoming misgivings, overcoming alienation regarding Asian security issues, overcoming unsuccessful experience in this sphere, and past experience.

It is no surprise that at the moment, the U.S. press — and not only the U.S. press — is trying to belittle the significance of the visit. It is, so to speak, stirring up various points which could intensify the confrontational situation in Asia, which could bring about ideas there to the effect that confrontation and tension are something that is somehow unavoidable on this huge continent and in the adjacent regions. In this connection, one could recall that there is indeed a very great deal of local, or as one says now, regional conflict, precisely in Asia, in its various areas. But the United States and its propaganda speculates on this and is trying to paint the picture that inasmuch as these conflicts exist, it is difficult to consolidate the process of Asian security. This argument does not stand up to criticism. Would it not be easier to achieve a settlement precisely on the difficult regional problems if one could achieve an improvement in the overall political climate in Asia, which would also affect local situations? But Washington is in fact acting in the opposite direction, and I would even say, in two directions at once. On the one hand it is striving to block the general process of positive change in Asia and on the other hand it is fomenting regional conflicts there, and indeed, we have the scandal of U.S. arms supplies to Iran.

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CSO: 5200/1192
RELATION ISSUES

PRAVDA: WARSAW PACT MEETING ON SALT, ABM TREATIES, SDI

PM031707 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Dec 86 First Edition p 4

["Communique on a Session of the Warsaw Pact States' Defense Ministers' Committee" - PRAVDA headline]

[Text] A session of the Warsaw Pact States' Defense Ministers' Committee was held in Warsaw, capital of the Polish People's Republic, 1-3 December 1986.

Taking part in the session's work were:

Army General D. Dzhurov, minister of national defense of the Bulgarian People's Republic; Colonel General F. Karpati, minister of defense of the Hungarian People's Republic; Army General H. Kessler, GDR minister of national defense; Army General F. Siwicki, minister of national defense of the Polish People's Republic; Colonel General V. Milea, minister of national defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania; Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, USSR defense minister; Army General M. Vaclavik, CSSR minister of national defense; Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact States' Joint Armed Forces; and Army General A.I. Gribkov, chief of staff of Warsaw Pact States' Joint Armed Forces.

In addition, the session was attended by leading personnel from the Warsaw Pact states' defense ministries and the joint command of the Joint Armed Forces.

The minister of national defense of the Polish People's Republic chaired the session.

The participants in the session of the Defense Ministers' Committee discussed the question of the results and conclusions of the Reykjavik summit meeting. In their unanimous opinion, Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's proposals constituted a real and constructive contribution by the socialist countries to the cause of the struggle for disarmament and universal security.

The Defense Ministers' Committee emphasized the great importance of the large-scale peace initiatives put forward by the Warsaw Pact States' Political Consultative Committee at the Budapest conference (1986) for reducing the level of military confrontation, improving the international situation, and averting the danger of nuclear war. The allied states' proposals to considerably reduce armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe with a corresponding reduction in military spending, which form a weighty supplement to the program for the elimination of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons, are particularly topical.

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The session expressed profound concern at the worsened military-political situation in Europe and in the world resulting from the actions of the United States and NATO, which oppose the curtailment of the arms race and the halting of nuclear tests and continue to build up their military potential. At the same time, adherence to the treaties and agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament was reaffirmed, as was the need for the United States to strictly abide by the strategic offensive arms limitation agreements on and the ABM Treaty, whose nonobservance will lead to the intensification of the arms race and its spread to space and to the destruction of the basic of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms. The desire to further expand military cooperation among the allied countries and strengthen the unity of the fraternal armies was confirmed. Measures were outlined in the sphere of the Warsaw Pact countries' defense capability with the aim of preventing the military parity that has taken shape between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO bloc from being upset and of maintaining by joint efforts the combat readiness of the Warsaw Pact States' Joint Armed Forces, which guarantee security.

The Defense Ministers' Committee adopted a decision covering all the questions under discussion.

The session was held in a businesslike atmosphere and a spirit of mutual understanding.

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RELATED ISSUES

ZA RUBEZHOM REVIEW OF BOOK ON ARMS CONTROL

Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 37, 5-11 Sep 86 p 16


[Text] The Arms Race. This subject appears on the pages of newspapers and in radio and television broadcasts almost daily. However, even if you devote all of your attention to following just that which appears in the mass media, it would be very difficult, almost impossible, to obtain a complete picture of the problem on which the future of mankind hangs.

The book "Gonka vooruzheniy: Prichiny, tendentsii, puti prekrashcheniya" (primarily for propagandists, agitators and journalists) will assist in this. The collective of scholars gives a detailed analysis of the political, military and technological and social and economic aspects of the problem and portrays the struggle by world public opinion against the imperialist circles' increase of armed forces and arms. This book is especially timely. In reality, as M. S. Gorbachev emphasized in his speech on 18 August: "Mountains of nuclear and conventional weapons have been piled up and, nonetheless, the arms race is unabated, as a matter of fact it has increased its stride... The situation is becoming more and more intolerable."

On 15 January the USSR proposed a historic program to gradually rid our planet of nuclear weapons by the end of the century and to reduce conventional arms to the level necessary for self defense. As its reply to this important peace initiative Washington decided to abrogate the SALT-2 treaty. Also, there is very serious discussion in Washington of releasing another important brake on the arms race -- the ABM treaty.

Why is this taking place? Why do the ruling circles of the imperialist states, beginning with the United States, disregarding the will of the people, more and more pull mankind along the most dangerous path of expanding lethal arsenals and bringing the arms race to a qualitatively new, more dangerous phase by introducing all types of arms both nuclear as well as conventional and all types of military operations to all areas of the world? What are the details of this new phase of the arms race and how can this disastrous process
be stopped? These questions are answered in the book with a great deal of factual material.

The authors reveal the motives for the arms race and offer ways in which it can be "cut," many chapters add to and systematize the knowledge of the people who read about this problem which is constantly in the periodical press. It also raises some very important questions which newspapers and journals until now have not given enough attention.

This primarily concerns the combination of imperialism's military might. "One of the most clearly dangerous developments of imperialism's aggressiveness is the rapid process of combining its military power, making it a global system of existing and potential, both de jure as well as de facto multi- and bilaterally linked which are mutually interconnected more or less tightly with the United States and NATO and tied in one way or another to some degree to add their military and economic preparations to this bloc," the book states. Washington attempts to be more powerful than any probable opponent or rather the object of its attack in all areas of the planet in order to protect by force of arm the so-call vital U.S. interests. The resources of the United States itself are insufficient for this. The resources of the main U.S. partners outside NATO are very significant and, too, their military expenditures, to a great degree under pressure from Washington, have grown rapidly. Thus, in 1970 they were 36.1 percent of those of the Western European NATO countries, in 1980 they were 63.6 percent and by 1984 they reached 88 percent.

Outside NATO the United States uses a relatively flexible approach to combining military power. They do not attempt, it was noted in the book, to create a "strict" bloc with a precise organizational structure, but for many different reasons they direct their efforts toward establishing bilateral military and military-economic relations, even with countries which already belong to such an organization (for example, ASEAN).

The book convincingly shows that the desire of imperialism, primarily American, to halt the progress of the developing crisis in their system and to develop an broad attack against the forces of socialism and revolutionary-democratic and national liberation movements represents an enormouse threat to all the world's peoples. Militarist circles in the United States and the countries that follow it plan to break the socialist world and suppress the striving of people for social equality by increasing international tensions and whipping up the arms race to achieve military superiority and economically "exhausting" the Soviet Union and its allies.

However, there is no future in a policy of total hostility and military confrontation. Turning to the past is not so much a response to the call of the future as an act of desperation, but the situation is no less dangerous because of this and it must be changed by the forces of all people to whom peace is dear. Having read the book it becomes very clear how much we need a new way of thinking in the nuclear age. A clear example of this is the new extention of the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing until 1 January 1987.
RELATED ISSUES

BRIEFS

TASS: DISARMAMENT-DEVELOPMENT MEETING--New York, 17 Nov (TASS)--The First Committee of the UN General Assembly today recommended that an international conference on relationship between disarmament and development be held at the United Nations headquarters on August 24-September 11, 1987. This conference had to be convened, in keeping with the UN General Assembly decision, in Paris last summer. However, the United States and its closest partners thwarted the meeting in the capital of France. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1547 GMT 17 Nov 86 LD] /9738

PRC VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER MEETS USSR DISARMAMENT OFFICIALS--Beijing, 27 Nov (XINHUA)--Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Qian Qichen met and feted here last night L.A. Masterkov, department director of the Arms Limitation and Disarmament Bureau of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Earlier yesterday, the Soviet official briefed Li Daoyu, director of the International Organizations and Conferences Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, on the arms limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. Masterkov has come to Beijing as guest of the Soviet Ambassador to China O.A. Troyanovskyi. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 0856 GMT 27 Nov 86 OW] /9738

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