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SOCIAL

BULGARIA

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[Emerllahu] What is your message in these “bad times,” and what do you think of the idea of national conciliation? Do you think that the Albanians will achieve this conciliation?

[Kadare] I have answered this question very precisely. This will be one of the greatest and most difficult tests for the Albanian nation. It will be a test like that of the Turks in the year 1300 and something, in the 14th century, when the Turks began to arrive, and in the 15th century, when their onslaught reached its peak and the Albanian people were faced with a severe test. Earlier, many Balkan countries incurred a degree of blame and made various mistakes that cost their nations dearly. Later, they made up for these mistakes, but their liberation from Ottoman domination cost a great deal of blood and sacrifice. The Albanian princes made mistakes. These Balkan countries made many mistakes. It was a test, in which the Albanian people later, in their heroic struggle in the 15th century, made a kind of spiritual correction of these errors.

This is now also a testing time for the Albanian people, and it is no time to make mistakes. Mistakes today are totally unforgivable, and I think that the road of national conciliation in every sense is the only way. No doubt repressive forces within the Albanian nation, wherever they may be, are against this road. However, there are also other forces that pretend to be democratic who are against this road. It sometimes happens that a group or what might be called a detachment of adventurists and revanchists puts its own personal spite and passions before all interests of the country and its history. These groups and these people think of nothing beyond giving vent to their rage. According to them, it is enough for their hatred to be expressed, and then let happen what may. The philosophy of happen what may is the most impermissible and dangerous in a country’s history. Happen what may is an idea of dictators, an ugly pattern of the mind of criminal dictators.

Events are taking place in Iraq now. We see and realize what evil a dictator can do to the very people from whom he has come, when he says “happen what may,” let the people be sacrificed. I therefore said in my book that the idea of death is one of the most barbaric that can be associated with a people. A people opposed to national conciliation inevitably becomes reconciled to the idea of death and reconciled to a criminal dictator. The Albanian people must therefore thrust this idea away as something hateful, because it is an idea, even though a mistaken one, that awakes a kind of sympathy and dons the garb of heroism and principle. In other words, it has a deceptive disguise.

[Emerllahu] And would we also say vengeful?

[Kadare] Of course, vengeful too. In other words, personal spite, revanchism, and revenge appear in the garb of heroism among highly “resolute” people. These people are often regarded kindly by others, who say they are not to blame, because they have suffered and now
have the right to vent their rage! They do indeed have a right to their rage, but not at the expense of the Albanian nation, because this turns them into criminals, identical to those criminals against whom they are now rising.

I do not like democracy always to be thought of as something mild or what you might call silky. Genuine democracy also has its own iron fist at the proper time, especially when the nation's interests are concerned. In other words democracy must be merciless against those who rise against it.

[Emerllahu] Is not the fate of Kosovo and the Albanians in Yugoslavia enough to mobilize their kin-state, in order not to cause conflicts on both sides of the border, or can the events in Kosovo be viewed without any special kind of obligation?

[Kadare] I think that the Albanian people living within their state borders have the right viewpoints and feelings about Kosovo, but the bureaucracy has not had and still does not always maintain this stand. No doubt, this is one of bureaucracy's normal, ugly characteristics, because all bureaucracies in the world, by virtue of being bureaucracies, are alien to national interests. The first sign of a bureaucracy is when it abandons national interests, as it always does.

The message of Kosovo would no doubt be enough to bring even a bureaucracy to its senses, but these bureaucrats are abnormal creatures. Bureaucracy is an abnormal, monstrous conception of things, so that bureaucrats can never be expected to understand such things properly. Of course, one does not have to be a great philosopher to realize that the very existence of Kosovo and its problems should have been a constant point of reference to put an end to the mental turmoil of many Albanians within Albania's borders. This means that if they enter into intellectual conflict, which is unavoidable because of their mental confusion, let them think of Kosovo. Recalling Kosovo and how close it is would bring them to their senses, clear their minds, and explain many things. The fact that such a thing has not entered their heads shows that there is something abnormal about the way they think, and this is cause for concern!

[Emerllahu] Do you think that the historical trauma of the Albanians in their struggle against the Slavic-Asiatic world and their efforts to find rescue from this world have been a disaster for the quintessentially European Albanians, or do you think that Europe will eventually, as you yourself have put it, open its doors for the Albanians?

[Kadare] I must repeat once again something that I said in an interview in the Albanian press. It seems to me that we mention the word Europe very often and have more illusions than we should about Europe. However, Europe has its weaknesses and failings. It too suffers from mental confusion. As we seek help from Europe and unity with Europe, we must also help ourselves and behave as friends toward Europe, so that Europe will understand us better. We cannot expect Europe's commitment and understanding alone to solve our problems, because Europe itself, as we can see for ourselves in the events of these days, has muddled matters and has sometimes lost its sense of justice and truth. It has also sometimes embarked on unnecessary adventures. Just see, for example, how Europe scatters aid throughout the world, while remaining unforgivably oblivious to some members of its own family. Of course, if you involve yourself every day from morning to suppertime with the problems of Lebanon or the Middle East, you will no doubt forget the problems of your own peoples and this is a very sad thing. This happens because the chancelleries of Europe remain chancelleries. The Albanians therefore have a great deal of work to do to explain their problem to countries at a greater or lesser distance, and to different regions, so that it will be clear to Europe what the genuine problems of the Balkan peninsula are. Nevertheless, I hope that in the future these problems will be the concern of Europe, whether the chancelleries like it or not, and this has in a way started to happen.

[Emerllahu] How do you view the Albanian question within the context of processes of European integration, especially Helsinki II? Can it be expected that the Albanians too, like Germany, will solve their problem?

[Kadare] I think that the problems with which history faces a nation are those for which a solution comes, because there is no other way. Even when solutions seem most remote, they are sometimes very close, although one has grown used to thinking of them as insoluble. I think that the Albanians too will achieve this solution.

[Emerllahu] Do you think that a democratized Albania would help the cause of Kosovo much more and would solve this problem more easily?

[Kadare] Yes, without doubt. This has been said several times and is beyond dispute.

[Emerllahu] You have been the guest of the Foundation in Geneva. What do you consider the function of this foundation in promoting and affirming Albanian science and culture?

[Kadare] The Foundation is something very important. It is a very-long-term project, and although some long-term projects may seem excessively premature, especially when there are dramatic and immediate problems, their importance is indisputable. I think that this foundation headed by Asllan Gjinovci is one of the long-term projects for the Albanian nation that are paving the way for its entry into Europe. The more such projects succeed, the better for the nation. Especially in the present dramatic times, it is projects of this kind, not very spectacular, and unrelated to others, which are much more important than spectacular ones. I think that by helping this project, Albanians will directly help themselves.

[Emerllahu] Both Albania and Kosovo need friends and help. You have many influential friends in the West, as
is shown by the meetings you are now holding in Switzerland. To what extent will your friends also commit themselves to being friends of Albania and Kosovo, and to helping both?

[Kadare] This is of course a natural thing and not accidental, and something that can always be supposed. This has happened and always will. Of course one cannot imagine that I would not try hard, because I have done so and will continue.

[Emerflahu] What can readers expect after your most recent book *From One December to the Next?* What project have you in hand?

[Kadare] I do not know what to say. The novel *The Monster* will be published. I sent it to the press in Albania, but I fled and its publication was suspended. It will be published in French in France this fall. Perhaps it will be published in its final form simultaneously in French and Albanian.

**BULGARIA**

Bulgarian Socialist Party Briefing Reported

AU0901811491 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] The political situation in the country against the background of last week’s events was the main topic of the weekly briefing of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], which took place today in Sofia. Our reporter Nina Spasova was at the briefing:

[Begin Spasova recording] It is impossible to attain democracy through undemocratic means, Prof. Chavdar Kyuranov said at today’s briefing, which dealt with the country’s political situation. He briefly reviewed our recent history in order to support his thesis that, in every case where a freely elected parliament was toppled by force, the consequences for the country were negative.

The demand by part of the opposition to dissolve the parliament does not cause any panic among us, but it has to concern us, Professor Kyuranov continued. The BSP will use all legal means to preserve the Grand National Assembly.

Dimitur Yonchev commented on the intention of some of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] deputies to walk out of the Grand National Assembly on 19 April and noted that the correct reaction in such a case would be to set by-elections for the seats of the deputies who have been elected on the basis of the majority system, while the seats of the other deputies should be filled by the persons whose names appear next on the proportional list.

Mr. Yonchev described the decision that was adopted last Thursday [4 April]—namely, to continue the activity of the parliament as a result of the sober personal assessment of most of the deputies, rather than as the result of preliminary political consultations.

We must not allow a group of people to walk out of the parliament before the commission on personal files has published its report, Filip Bokov said. Otherwise, the impression will be created that people with unclean pasts are trying to impose their wills on the rest.

I shall end with a news item. The Socialist deputy Lyuben Gotsev will leave the parliament because of his appointment as ambassador. He will be replaced by the person whose name appears next on the BSP proportional list. The curious fact is that, in the meantime, this person became a member of the Alternative Socialist Party. [end Spasova recording]

**Popov, Ludzhev on Reforms, Foreign Relations**

AU1204141891 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 8 Apr 91 p 5

[Article by Alexander Andreev: “Popov: First Steps Toward Success”]

[Text] “It was prophesied that our government would have a quick death,” Bulgarian Prime Minister Dimitur Popov said in an interview with DIE WELT in Sofia. “We were given one month, at most, but we have been able to win the trust of the political forces and of parliament. We have proved that we are able to tackle the reform program,” Popov says. It is now about 100 days that the government in Sofia has been in office.

Popov sees changes, in particular, regarding the agricultural reform (the law that is to return nationalized soil to its former owners is already in force), the curbing of inflation, and the destruction of the totalitarian state structures. The liberation of prices as of 1 February has earned the government many reproaches. Popov says that this was not simply an administratively ordered price increase, but also the first step toward a free market economy.

As proof of that, the prime minister cites the fact that the price level on the black market started to decline slowly after the liberation of prices, which is a sure sign of the functioning of market-economy mechanisms. “Until recently, it was only the black-market prices that counted because, in the state shops, there was simply nothing to buy. We did not have anything to eat and lived only off our modest stocks. Now there are at least goods, the range is not small, and it is getting broader day by day,” Popov says.

Among the economic successes of the Cabinet, the prime minister also counts the declining rate of the U.S. dollar as compared with the national currency. The decision to close down the foreign-currency business as of 1 April, and the joint steps of the government and the banks regarding the free purchase and sale of hard currencies have reduced the dollar exchange rate from 30:1 in February to 18:1 at the beginning of April.
Asked about the structures and the functions of the Interior Ministry and the State Security Service, Popov said that the government has stopped the possibility of exerting political influence on these authorities and has thus practically eliminated the omnipotence of the State Security Service. “These institutions are no longer a repressive apparatus, but mechanisms that have to ensure order and security on the basis of the laws.”

This claim can be confirmed by the officially announced personnel changes in the security organs. “We know very well which forces hinder the reforms in our country, and we are taking corresponding measures,” Popov says. “Of course, there are things that we cannot make public; this is the nature of these things. However, I would like to stress that we have not forgotten the duties of the executive power.”

Deputy Prime Minister Dimitur Ludzhev gave more details in an interview with DIE WELT. The specific occasion was that, as had been just become known, the personnel file of writer and dissident Georgi Markov, who was killed in 1978 in exile in London with the infamous “Bulgarian umbrella,” cannot be found and the claim by former KGB General Kalugin that the Soviet intelligence services had participated in the preparations for this attack.

Ludzhev thinks that Markov’s file was made to disappear in order to hinder the investigations, which had made good progress. “We are trying to prove that this practice was something usual in our society,” Ludzhev said. “This is not the only political assassination, and the traces always lead to the top men in the state.” In Markov’s case, Ludzhev says, “We already have sufficient material; we are cooperating with the authorities in Great Britain, France, and the United States, and we are trying to establish contacts with the Soviet authorities. Thus, I hope that the prosecutor’s office will soon deal with this case.”

Popov is not afraid that the rapprochement between the CSFR, Poland, and Hungary might have an unfavorable effect on Bulgaria. “The time at which Bulgaria will be integrated into the European structures does not necessarily depend on these countries,” he says. “They are trying to gain a certain lead, but, in my view, it is not impossible that Bulgaria might join them. If this does not happen, we will make efforts for bilateral cooperation with these countries.” Regarding Bulgaria’s relations with the FRG, Popov is hoping for an agreement that will be the political basis for long-term contacts. “Bulgaria and Germany are traditional partners,” Popov explains, “regardless of the enormous difference in the potential of the two countries. However, I do hope that this difference will not have a strong effect on the desire for cooperation.”

Local Political ‘Crisis’ Emerging in Sliven
AU1204144091 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 12 Apr 91

[Text] Today the leaders of the united opposition in Sliven held a news conference at which they submitted to the representatives of the mass media a declaration on the emerging situation of crisis in the provisional local government.

The authors of the document declare that a legitimate local government organ cannot function properly as long as the chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee is a member of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. The declaration demands that the leadership of the local BSP municipal government should provide political guarantees for its willingness to cooperate in unmasking and prosecuting BSP members who are obstructing the economic reform in their functions as economic managers.

The declaration requests that all political parties and organizations in the municipality should openly reveal the truth about the value of their real estate and other properties.

In the meantime, the BSP Municipal Council also declared its stand on the situation of crisis. It was expressed by Yordan Draganov, leader of the local Socialists. Mr. Draganov pointed out that, by withdrawing its representatives from the local Provisional Executive Committee, the united opposition is committing an illegal act and places itself above the authority of the Council of Ministers. The local BSP leadership appealed to the opposition to demonstrate more common sense under the current difficult circumstances.

The viewpoint of the Sliven Socialists, which was adopted at a plenum of the BSP Municipal Council last Wednesday [10 April], became known only today through the local newspaper, our correspondent Venislav Gandev announced.

Positions of Fatherland Labor Party
91BA0408A Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian 5 Feb 91 p 18

[Interview with Mincho Minchev, deputy chairman of the Fatherland Labor Party, by Zina Sokolova; place and date not given: “Wherever the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] Operates, There Is No BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union], SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], or BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]”]

[Text] [Sokolova] Mr. Minchev, how did relations between the Movement for Right and Freedoms [DPS] and the All-National Committee for the Defense of National Interests develop after your joint 1 March 1990 declaration?

[Minchev] The declaration was also signed by the Rodolyubie Union. It stated that the three organizations
would take matters into their own hands through discussions and not by public meetings. Unfortunately, other political forces were unwilling to understand this. Once again, actions took place behind the scenes, including those by the Committee for National Conciliation. A variety of factors interfered, which blocked the good intent.

[Sokolova] Did the intent imply cooperation among your organizations?

[Minchev] I would not describe it as cooperation, but the agreement we reached at that time was to resolve jointly existing arguments. We held a joint meeting in Kardzhali and a meeting in Krumovgrad with representatives of the government. The meetings ended at that point because the separate entities began to play their own games.

[Sokolova] What is your attitude toward the DPS?

[Minchev] We have no view concerning the DPS. We have a view concerning the state. If you review our actions, you will see that not once did we oppose the movement. We oppose the laws that compromise our national interests.

[Sokolova] How was the initial Law on Names passed?

[Minchev] The law was passed on 5 March with total consensus among all political forces. It was opposed by Neshka Robeva and Anzhel Vagenshtayn. However, the DPS accepted it with no objections whatsoever.

[Sokolova] What led to replacing a judicial with an administrative procedure?

[Minchev] We wanted a judicial procedure because a large percentage of people with Turkish ethnic self-awareness and Bulgarian Muslims were unwilling to change their names. In the period between 1972 and 1985, many children were born who had never had Turkish names and who did not speak Turkish. Now, because of a grandfather or father, they were asked to change their names. This led to fearful conflicts. Furthermore, the imams were warning them that they would not be entitled to Muslim burials.

The judicial procedure would have prevented the use of pressure on anyone. Yet, such pressure exists, of this I am convinced. It was the same as during the time of the expulsion. It is claimed now that everyone was expelled. This is not true. It was only a certain group that was expelled. However, all of this is not exclusively the result of the actions of the Bulgarian Government.

[Sokolova] Your committee categorically opposes the dropping of the name suffixes "ov" and "ev."

[Minchev] Yes, this has resulted in the fact that some people now want to have five names each. I can show you petitions to this effect. They state that they would like their names to be consistent with the Turkish and Arabic name system. This proves their lack of education.

The Turkish name system is one of nicknames and has been the law since 1934. Take, for instance, the name of Ayse Shengyl, which means Happy Rose, and so forth. The Arabic name system, on the other hand, involves the use of conjunctions such as "ibn" and "al."

[Sokolova] Your party insists on the overall resolution of the national problem. How do you conceive of this in practical terms?

[Minchev] This problem cannot be settled "piecemeal." We told Mr. Mikhail Ivanov, the adviser to the president, not to try to settle ethnic relations piecemeal. Such matters cannot be resolved on the basis of the prevailing situation.

That is precisely why we reacted on 29 December 1989. At that time, many people did not understand us. They thought we were opposing a "democratic" act. We understand the democratic act, and we believe that it is correct. I personally was angry when they were changing their names.

However, bearing in mind the historically charged nature of this problem, we believed that some time should pass before the scientists could deal with such problems and develop a just concept on the national problem.

[Sokolova] You have frequently insisted that various political forces are speculating on this matter....

[Minchev] Both the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] are constantly involving that population in their speculations, a population that accounts for 12 percent of the whole. I am speaking generally of the Muslims and not exclusively of people with Turkish ethnic awareness. What I do not understand is the reason that Islam is being confused with a feeling of some kind of national affiliation. Muslims may be found throughout the world, and not all of them are Turks. A statement was signed by Sheik Poyuklu (Poyukov) that said that, in the Western Rodopi, Turks have lived, live, and will continue to live.

Yet the population there is one of Bulgarian Muslims. He himself comes from Bansko. He was elected to represent the SDS for the sole purpose of preventing the election of a communist. He is a member of the DPS. This is the result of idiotic speculation with the national problem.

[Sokolova] Do you not believe that the tension is a result of the failure to name the specific culprits responsible for the so-called revival process?

[Minchev] Yes. This process has its ideologues, and one of them is Aleksandar Lilov. The matter is currently under study. To me, this cannot be a "revival process" but a shortsighted political act.

Even to us, the personnel of the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs], it came as a total surprise that the names of absolutely everyone had to be changed. Only the week before, officers had been punished just for
saying that it would be best to change everyone's name. Previously, it was only the offspring of mixed marriages that had their names changed. Everywhere virtually everything developed calmly, although, to be sure, in the presence of the militia. Obviously, it was not pleasing to the people any more than it would please me if someone were to change my name.

There also were casualties. Recently, a memorial meeting was held in Benkovski, where three people had been killed. The particular occasion was the death of a child crushed by the crowd. His mother was carrying him, she stumbled and fell, and the crowd marched over her.

The husband grabbed an automatic weapon. The weapon was loaded and... a woman was killed. Somewhere else a hunting rifle was fired, and a young soldier became confused and shot and hit a woman. As a rule, however, shots were fired in the air or into the ground and not at the people.

[Sokolova] Why did you reject the Committee for National Conciliation?

[Minchev] To begin with, there was no one to conciliate. The entire action was based on a wrong concept that, unfortunately, is being supported to this day—the concept held by Kiril Kertikov and a few other scientists, who claim that the Bulgarian nation is an assembly of ethnic groups. To me, this is a mediocre and primitive concept. The official documents state that the Bulgarian nation is one and indivisible.

We include representatives of different ethnic and religious groups, people with Turkish ethnic awareness, Jews, Gypsies, Armenians, Russians, and Greeks. We cannot say, however, that they all are members of minorities, something for which the people with Turkish ethnic awareness are struggling, because at that point we would become a country like no other in the world.

[Sokolova] What do you reject in the draft law against discrimination on an ethnic basis?

[Minchev] According to it, I am generously being given the right to be served in the Bulgarian language in Bulgarian stores in Bulgaria. The law states that “no one can be deprived of the right to be served in the official Bulgarian language....” This is ridiculous. However, its inclusion is not accidental because, in some stores in Kurdzhali Okrug, people are served in Turkish.

[Sokolova] What is your reaction to the idea of the study of the Turkish language?

[Minchev] I have nothing against the study of that language, if it is considered native. This is allowed by the Constitution. However, nowhere does it say that this should take place in Bulgarian schools, with the funds of Bulgarian taxpayers and with foreign teachers promised by Turgut Ozal. Let them study the language wherever they want, in reading rooms or mosques, although it would be more suitable to study the Koran in such places, if they are all that religious. However, they must study the Koran in Arabic because it is sacrilegious for it to be translated into another language.

[Sokolova] These people, too, are taxpayers....

[Minchev] Yes, a minority of them. Yet Medi Doganov is already clearly speaking of the existence of two nations in Bulgaria, of two cultures, of two religions—that is, we have here the Cypriot variant applied in a more benign way.

[Sokolova] It has become clear from some articles published in our press and the admissions of some Cypriot Greeks that, in the past, the Greek nationalists on the island, as well, were also to be blamed for this conflict. What do you think about that?

[Minchev] Yes, there is a Turkish song that, translated, says, “Greeks, Keep Your Dogs on Leashes.” At that time, that song was being sung in Bulgaria, and there were even volunteers to fight on Turkey's side. For the sake of 17 percent of the Muslim population, Turkey occupied 47 percent of the island. What is giving Turkey the right to interfere?

[Sokolova] Nonetheless, could we not find a common language?

[Minchev] We can and must. However, they want to be considered a separate ethnic community or minority. This is dangerous because this means a division based on the territorial principle, on the ethnic principle. We have now given them the opportunity to separate themselves politically, as well. Bear in mind that, in the areas where the DPS is active, there is no BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union], SDS, or BSP.

They are saying that here we shall live as neighbors of the Bulgarians. What does this mean? It means that they will have Turkish schools, theaters, police, and trade unions. According to the present law, it is the mayor who appoints the militiaman, the teacher, and the doctor. This means that we shall take what is ours and live with the Bulgarians as neighbors. Pardon me, but it means living as the neighbors of Turkey.

They list Turkish as their native language but name Bulgaria as their homeland. In Turkish, Anavatan means "mother homeland." It turns out that they have two homelands. We have no homeland other than Bulgaria. They would like everything to be theirs, from Silistra through Kurdzhali to Dospat.

[Sokolova] The DPS officially proclaimed its support of territorial integrity....

[Minchev] We could let you hear a recording of one of their meetings, where they were instructed to buy land, land, above all.

[Sokolova] If it is permitted to buy land, how would they be forbidden to purchase it?
Minchev) They would obtain land only if they are owners. Land in Bulgaria is not state property. There is no document to this effect. There is land that belongs to municipalities, churches, and reading rooms, and there are urban and river areas that belong to the state. Henceforth, the land will be owned by those who possess documents to this effect. However, all the land in Bulgaria is Bulgarian territory.

[Sokolova] What is your attitude toward Bulgarians in Bessarabia?

[Minchev] If we are to develop a concept of the national problem, objective historical truth must play a serious role in it. However deeply we may get into the area of emotions, this remains a fact. We cannot change history, and a people without history has no future. We know very well why the Bulgarians went there: It was to flee during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828 and to escape the slaughter.

We must also know about the way the Turks came to Bulgaria. The Bessarabian Bulgarians were not to be blamed for being forced to flee. Therefore, in general, we cannot draw a parallel. The Bulgarian people are quite hospitable. Why is it, for example, that the Jews, Armenians, and Gypsies in our country are not complaining? It is only the Turks who are complaining that their rights are being violated.

[Sokolova] Their rights were violated....

[Minchev] The only right that was violated was that of their names. Going somewhat further back, let us see the privileges they have enjoyed and are enjoying to this day. For example, they can leave for Turkey, taking an entire freight car full of luggage. What Bulgarian citizen, regardless of his ethnic self-awareness, is allowed to take so much luggage out of the country? Furthermore, they leave as tourists; they do not go to resettle. They sell their stuff in Turkey, convert their funds into dollars, come back, convert their dollars into Bulgarian currency, and so on. There also are paradoxes: Some leave the country with tourist passports and come back with Turkish passports, without their names being stricken from our records.

Anyone can be what he wants to be, but he must observe Bulgarian laws. These laws must be created by us, the Bulgarians, the masters of this land.

Fatherland Party Describes Platform at Congress
AU0604184591 Sofia BTA in English 1742 GMT 6 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 6 (BTA)—At its first congress today, the Fatherland Party of Labour [OPT], which has one seat in parliament, described itself as a centrist opposition. According to its spokesman, the party has many supporters, and its priority is the nationality problem. The party demands a “legislation that will guarantee the Bulgarian nature of the country.” It opposes a total commitment of Bulgaria to the United States and believes that the country should seek closer ties to the European countries, the Soviet Union and Greece.

The OPT stands up for “strong centralized power.” According to the OPT spokesman, the party members consider themselves republicans, but they have nothing against monarchy, although they prefer a presidential republic. They also support the existence of a “limited private sector.”

VMRO-SMD Leader Dimitur Gotsev Interviewed
91BA0396A Sofia ZORA in Bulgarian 26 Feb 91 p 10

[Interview with Docent Dimitur Gotsev, chairman of the Executive Committee of the VMRO-SMD [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies] by ZORA; place and date not given: “The VMRO Is a Symbol of Bulgarian National Unity”]

[Text] ZORA] Mr. Gotsev, what is most topical in the activities of your organization?

[Gotsev] The difficulties that accompany democratic processes in our society have not bypassed our union. For this and many other reasons, the VMRO-SMD [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies] has not been able to acquire the form, content, and dynamics in its work toward which its leadership aspires in the course of its overall development and activities. Let me immediately add, however, that in no more than two months following the First VMRO-SMD Congress, in which 60 societies participated, its number exceeds 80. What is most pleasing is that the new societies consist mainly of young people. This means that our ideas are being accepted and revived precisely by circles with the greatest future—the Bulgarian youth.

[ZORA] At the First Congress of the Union of Macedonian Cultural and Educational Societies, your organization took the name “VMRO-SMD.” What made this change necessary?

[Gotsev] I am being asked this question quite frequently, although the supporting arguments were presented at the congress. At the risk of repeating myself, let me say that we adopted this name not for the sake of frightening anyone with it (as has been hinted by some) but because this was the name under which our grandfathers and fathers fought for the liberation of the Macedonian Bulgarians. Although some people sought in the name VMRO strictly negative features, it proved to be, both for us and for the world, the symbol of Bulgarian struggle and Bulgarian national unity, as well as the Bulgarian essence of Macedonia. Scientists throughout the world are accepting Bulgarian history in Macedonia through the VMRO and its huge documentary, ideological, and moral legacy, because it is precisely the VMRO that is the organization that, for nearly a century, in an organized way (until 1934) and, through its ideas, to this day,
has been struggling and maintaining a Bulgarian national cultural way of life in Macedonia. It is also no accident that it is precisely the name VMRO that is today most popular among our brothers in Vardar and Aegean Macedonia, as well as among the many emigres throughout the world. These are some of the reasons for which we have taken the name VMRO, and we shall not allow anyone to take it and use it for anti-Bulgarian purposes. That is my answer to this question.

[ZORA] On whom are you relying in your activities?

[Gotsev] Our activities are voluntary and, in addition to membership dues, paid mainly by refugees and descendants from Vardar and Aegean Macedonia, who have deliberately dedicated themselves to the ideas we serve, we are relying on all patriotic Bulgarians who believe they have a duty to their nation and their homeland, to the fate of our brothers separated from freedom and scattered throughout the world. We particularly would like to rely on the full support of our work by the young Bulgarian intelligentsia and the entire Bulgarian youth.

[ZORA] The objectives and activities of the VMRO-SMD are related mainly to the Macedonian problem. Do you believe that its resolution is possible, and how could this take place?

[Gotsev] Historical processes are developing in such a way that, sooner or later, they will lead to the resolution of even the most entangled problems that have become an integral part of the national aspirations of an entire nation. Look at what is taking place today in Vardar Macedonia. For years, propaganda from Belgrade and Skopje claimed that the Macedonian problem had been resolved, that there is a "Macedonian state" in Yugoslavia, and so forth. All of a sudden, however, all of this collapsed literally in front of us, and it turned out that Macedonia is a province that executes only what is being ordered in Belgrade. Furthermore, tens of thousands of Bulgarians were cruelly repressed and accused of being members of the VMRO. Today in Vardar Macedonia it is precisely the VMRO that won the election and became the ruling party. Consequently, the Macedonian problem is bound to be resolved in accordance with the will of our brothers in that area. The Greater Serbia solution, which was supported with such effort and number of casualties, in my view experienced a historical failure, although it is still trying to seek ways to survive.

[ZORA] What would you say about the activities of the Ilinden OMO [United Macedonian Organization] in our country?

[Gotsev] When we speak of democratic processes and the new phenomena in the Balkans, this does not mean in the least that Serbian chauvinism in Belgrade and some circles in Skopje have become reconciled to them. Conversely, the greatest threat to them is the aspiration of the populace in Macedonia to be free from Serbian oppression, like in Slovenia and Croatia. In the struggle to preserve the Serbian domination of Macedonia, Greater Serbianism has resorted to the help of the Ilinden OMO, to the detriment of our brothers who have been struggling for decades for its liberation. Let me mention that Serbian agents have operated in Bulgaria at other times, as well, but have never been able to prevent the defeat of Greater Serbianism in Macedonia, particularly when it is being fought (legally today) by the entire Macedonian population.

[ZORA] You have been called a "Yanisary" in their writings and compared to Ivan Mikhaylov.

[Gotsev] In both cases, the Ilinden OMO has been executing a foreign mission. I have heard such accusations for years on end from their friends in Belgrade.

[ZORA] Tell us something about the publishing activities of the VMRO-SMD, such as the newspaper MAKENSONYA and the periodical MAKEDONSKI PREGLED.

[Gotsev] Publications are the mirror of any national-cultural organization such as our union. For the time being, the VMRO-SMD is publishing the newspaper MAKENSONYA as its organ. We believe that it has still not achieved, in terms of form and content, the level it needs in order to become a modern newspaper. However, slowly, it is advancing toward that objective. At present, the first issue of the periodical MAKEDONSKI PREGLED is being printed. Our ambitions, however, do not end there. We would like to develop our own publishing house, which would initiate the publication of a series of works on our national problems.

[ZORA] What is the strategic objective of the VMRO-SMD concerning our national problem?

[Gotsev] At our last congress, a number of programmatic documents were adopted as an answer to this question. However, at the risk of repeating myself, it is that the VMRO-SMD does not have any higher objective than that of the preservation and defense of national unity of the Bulgarian people and the enhancement of national cohesion among all Bulgarians, regardless of where they live, and irreconcilable struggle against foreign anti-Bulgarian propaganda that is eroding Bulgarian national self-awareness domestically and abroad. Naturally, this is a general Bulgarian task, as well. Our union has undertaken this task because today there is no overall Bulgarian institution that would undertake to deal with these extremely serious national and governmental problems.

Naturally, our main objective remains Macedonia, with its old, new, and future problems.

[ZORA] We have read a number of your studies, articles, research papers, and monographs on the struggles waged by Macedonian Bulgarians. You are one of our best historians. Are your scientific activities hindered by your excessive involvement in public work?

[Gotsev] This is what hurts me the most: Social activities, however noble they may be, consume all of my leisure time. To the scientific worker, this is time we can...
never recover. Let us hope that the time will nonetheless come when I can at least complete initiated projects.

[ZORA] Do you read ZORA, and what is your opinion of it?

[Gotsev] Let this not sound like the compliment of a guest, but ZORA has indeed earned its name and reputation in our society both at home and abroad for its impeccable presentation and content.

[ZORA] Finally, would you share with us what are the most immediate tasks facing the VMRO-SMD?

[Gotsev] The tasks are exceptionally numerous, and I would say that they are more than topical. Let me list a few of them. On 4 March, the VMRO-SMD will officially celebrate the 110th anniversary of the birth of Todor Aleksandrov, the great Bulgarian revolutionary. We are planning on holding a scientific session and a solemn evening, with musical program, at the People's Palace of Culture. On 20 March we shall suitably celebrate the 120th anniversary of the birth of Damyan Gruve, the apostle of the national revolution in Macedonia and the Odrin area.

Let me also mention that the union is preparing to hold the 2d Great Macedonian Rally, which will take place from 24 to 27 May in Sofia and Blagoevgrad. I hope this will be one of the loftiest celebrations of the Bulgarian spirit and our national unity. These are merely aspects of the tremendous and comprehensive national-patriotic activities in which the VMRO-SMD is engaged together with all of its branches in the country.

President Zhelev Proposes Declaration of Intent
LD1504021391 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 14 Apr 91

[Interview with Bulgarian President Zheleu Zhelev by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given; Zheleu speaks in Bulgarian with superimposed Hungarian translation—recorded]

[Excerpts] The Bulgarian head of state will visit Hungary in the coming days. As East Europe changes, in general, the democratization process takes place in Bulgaria, if more slowly and more cumbrousely. But it does so, inevitably. Naturally, it takes place in different circumstances, under different social conditions and with peculiarities that are different from those we have in Hungary. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] How, in your view, can the affair of the Turkish and the Macedonian minorities be solved?

[Zhelev] First of all, there are no minorities in Bulgaria. We think of these as ethnic communities, and we ensure their individual human rights. This applies to the Turks in Bulgaria, and we sort out their problems in accordance with the Bulgarian Constitution and the international documents signed, or to be signed. In this sense, Bulgaria does not lag behind the West in any way. Regarding the Macedonian minority, it is an invented concept. The problem does not exist. It is only an excuse to find failures, not by our neighbors but by us.

[Correspondent] Hungary and Bulgaria are no longer linked by fraternal friendship, which in the old days was mentioned only as a formality. Our economic contacts have declined recently. With what expectations and ideas are you now traveling to Hungary?

[Zhelev] I think we could sign a declaration of intent, the way we have done with Czechoslovakia, about the principles of developing relations.

Justice Minister Penev News Conference Reported
AU1204165591 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 12 Apr 91

[Text] A national conference attended by chairmen of okrug, military, and other major courts of justice was followed by a news conference of the Ministry of Justice.

Minister Pencho Penev made a short statement, stressing that judicial power in our country exists today only on paper. It has no substance and is practically nonexistent. To establish equal rights between legislative, executive, and judicial power, we should adopt the new constitution as soon as possible, he said.

The same demand was expressed in a declaration submitted to the Grand National Assembly by the aforementioned national conference, which ended today.

Minister Penev also answered questions about the future position of the investigation authorities. He stated that they should be integrated into the law-dispensing system by restoring the status of the investigating judge as it existed prior to 1947, which everyone should remember.

Today, the investigation authorities, such as the court of arbitration and the district courts, are separate and individual units of the whole law-dispensing system, which is not a unified institution but subordinate to the government authorities and thus an obstacle to the normal functioning of the institution, Minister Penev pointed out.

The national conference reportedly adopted a decision on prolonging the judges' terms of office until the adoption of the new structural laws.

Interior Minister on Illegal Border Trespassers
AU1204195291 Sofia BTA in English 1826 GMT 12 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 12 (BTA)—In connection with an MP question why fences along the southern border are not removed, Minister of the Interior Mr. Khristo Danov said that every day a large number of illegal aliens from Third World countries cross into Bulgaria, destroy their passports, procure new ones, and leave for Northern Europe. It has been established that the issue of such a passport costs between $2,000 and $3,000. He also said
that, at present, there are about 2,000 immigrants from Ghana, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, and Romania here. Neither Greece nor Yugoslavia is willing to admit them.

Club of Killed Writer Markov's Friends Founded
AU1004071491 Sofia BTA in English 2059 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 9 (BTA)—Today’s central news program of Bulgarian Television informed of the forthcoming setting up of a Club of Friends of Bulgarian Emigre Writer Georgi Markov, assassinated in London in 1978. Bulgarian emigre writer Dimitur Bochev, now working for Radio Deutsche Welle, voiced his indignation over the fact that Markov’s physical and moral murderer is still not known. He added that things have not made progress, despite the recent disclosures by former KGB General Oleg Kalugin about the role of the Soviet Secret Service in Markov’s assassination.

A high-ranking official of Bulgaria’s former State Security told Deutsche Welle that the incumbent chief of the Soviet Secret Service, Mr. Vladimir Kryuchkov, will do his best to hide all trace of Soviet participation in Georgi Markov’s assassination because Mr. Kryuchkov himself was involved in it.

According to this official, the KGB considered the Bulgarian State Security as a subsidiary of the Soviet Secret Service. The KGB recruited agents from State Security. Following are the names of KGB agents according to this official: Mr. Dimitur Stanishhev, former secretary of the Central Committee [CC] of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP]; Mr. Nacho Papazov, former minister and secretary of the CC of the BCP; Mr. Petur Mladenov, a long-serving foreign minister and Politburo member, who was general secretary of the CC of the BCP and head of state for a short period after the changes of 10 November 1989.

Mr. Chavdar Tepeshanov, former employee of Department Six of State Security [Political Police], also spoke in the central news. He said that he would be surprised if Georgi Markov’s assassin did not belong to Department One [External Intelligence Service]. Mr. Tepeshanov said that now all the blame is being put on the 300 employees of the former Department Six.

Mr. Tepeshanov asked what the other State Security departments were doing, and were they not giving information to Todor Zhivkov. He stressed that the whole truth about State Security should become known.

POLAND

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 3-9 Mar
91EP03504 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 10, 9 Mar 91 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

The first congress of the Center Accord was held in Warsaw. The Accord is transforming itself into a Christian-democratic party. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, a close associate of Lech Walesa and head of the presidential chancellory, was elected party president. He received 368 votes to the 40 votes received by his rival Jan Andrzejewski. [passage omitted]

Qian Qichen, the Chinese minister of foreign affairs, expressed satisfaction with his visit to Poland. “Our mutual relations have withstood the test of time.” At a press conference, he also said that President Lech Walesa had accepted an invitation to the PRC and recognizes there is only one China, the PRC. The head of China’s diplomatic service emphasized that Taiwan is a part of China and that states maintaining diplomatic relations with the PRC can develop unofficial economic relations with Taiwan. During the Warsaw talks, no one raised the problem of human rights in China or the events in Tiananmen Square. President Walesa said that it is necessary to observe the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries.

Roman Bartoszcze, president of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], said that during the next election his party will enter into an alliance with the Christian National Union [ZchN] and the Labor Party [SP]. [passage omitted]

The Senate rejected the candidacy of Deputy Wieslawa Ziolkowska to be president of the Supreme Chamber of Control [NIK] (68 senators against, 5 for, 8 abstentions). It also protested against Gen. Tadeusz Hupalo’s holding the position; he has already announced his resignation from the position.

After a meeting with President L. Walesa, Barbara Piasecka-Johnson declared that her decision to rescue the Gdansk shipyard was “a purely political decision,” dictated by the interests of the election campaign of 1989. The money which the shipyard would have consumed, B. Piasecka is now being invested in other areas of the economy (the pharmaceutical industry) and in cultural facilities (the construction of an agricultural library, saving the arcade of the Warsaw castle).

The government agreed to the sale of a majority of the stock in the Polam partnership in Pila to the Dutch company Philips. “We want this to be a positive signal that it is worth entering Poland,” said Prime Minister Bielecki at Polam. GAZETA WYBORCZA reported, following the German weekly DER SPIEGEL, that Philips is in financial trouble.

The Committee to Defend the Polish Church of the Carmelites, which is to be given to the faithful of the Byzantine-Ukrainian Church for five years, protested in front of the bishop’s residence in Przemysl. The Przemysl Region of NSZZ Solidarity has come out in support of the Committee’s position. The cathedral is essential for Bishop Iwan Martyniak to be able to take over his diocese, where on 2 June 1991 Pope John Paul II is to
meet with members of the Greek Catholic Church. In the end, the protest was broken off.

Bronislaw Komorowski, deputy minister of defense, in a PAP [Polish Press Agency] communiqué declared that “having a civilian take over the position of minister of national defense is inevitable and it can happen even before the elections.” In a comment for POLSKA ZBOJNIA, Minister Komorowski added that no sensation should be attached to the issue.

Marian Krezaklewski, the new chairman of Solidarity, on his family heritage said in an interview for TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC: [Answer] My family roots reach to the Eastern periphery of Poland. My great-great-grandfather on my mother’s side of the family came from Moscow with Dwernicki; after the collapse of the November Uprising he was twice exiled to Siberia. One of my relatives in the next generation, Jozef Toczyński, minister of the treasury in the National Government, was executed at the Citadel with Romuald Traugutt. In each of the next generations the independence tradition was very strong: one of my grandfathers was a member of Pilsudski’s Legion, my father, a surgeon by profession, was persecuted by the communists because he had been one of the commanders of the medical forces for the Home Army in the Stasiulowski district. After the war, he was held in a Stalinist prison at the castle in Rzeszow. [Question] You have, as is frequently said, a genetically coded anticommunism? [Answer] Yes, my parents by their example warned us against entering into any kind of relations with the Reds. (TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC 1 March 1991)

The T. Sendzimir Steelworks in Krakow has received credit guarantees of $80 million for the construction of a continuous casting process line from the German firm Hermes.

The Press Market. PRZEGlad TYGODNIOWY has changed its editor in chief; Andrzej Nierzychlo, the current deputy, known from the television program WYDARZENIA, has become the editor in chief. Artur Howzan, previously the editor in chief, has become the head of the partnership that has published PRZEGlad since it became independent. According to a decision of the Liquidation Commission for the Workers’ Publishing Cooperative. DZIENNIK BALTYCKI has been sold to the partnership Prznekaz (the Solidarity Region in Gdansk and the French group Hersant). The journalist cooperative Dziennik and the partnership Kadeks have appealed the decision to the courts. The latter’s offer, although higher, was rejected. The court issued an injunction halting the sale. The Liquidation Commission decided to sell the printing plant on Nowogrodzka Street in Warsaw to the Solidarity Foundation. In Warsaw a symbolic ceremony was held marking the joining of the Polish Press Agency (PAP) with the prewar Polish Telegraphic Agency, which operated under the emigree government and issued its final report on 8 January 1991. Jaroslaw Iwaszkiwicz’s “Marginalia” appear in the last issue (February) of TWORCZOSC.

They are notes about the poets whose poems appeared in the anthology Polish Poetry 1914-39 published in 1962 by Czytelnik: “I thought to myself that perhaps it would be amusing if I noted in the margins of this book what comes to mind.” WIEDZA I ZYCIE has become the property of its journalist cooperative; the editors have announced the end of the delays; they will print the journal in Austria instead of Bialystok. [passage omitted]

A group of peasant deputies and activists has founded the Movement for the Defense and Development of Family Farms (ROiRG) “We will not leave the land.” Prof. Jan Szczepanski was elected honorary president.

According to a survey by the Center for Research on Public Opinion done on 18 and 19 February 1991, 75 percent of adult Poles believe that the problem of the legality of abortion should be settled by a referendum; 83 percent think that the issue is not among the most important for Poland; 75 percent doubt the effectiveness of the proposed law; 38 percent oppose abortion, but as much as 58 percent oppose the proposed law to protect conceived children. Those in favor of the law consist primarily of individuals with an incomplete basic education or a basic education, who are older than 60, and young people 18-24. Among the occupational groups, those in agriculture.

At the end of January 1991, there were nearly 1.196 million unemployed individuals registered (including more than 611,000 women), which is 8.9 percent of those employed outside of private agriculture. The number of job offers declined (45,300 at the end of January). At the end of January, there were 158,400 school graduates registered as unemployed.

Who’s Who. The new deputy minister of national education is Roman Duda (age 56), PhD in history, opposition activist since 1976, member of NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity, interned under martial law, senator, and deputy chairman of the Citizens Parliamentary Club.

Some of the ideological theses of the Christian-Social Union (UCHS): “Our movement is decisively opposed to those who raise chauvinist and anti-Semitic slogans in Poland, who are quick to point out that they are Catholic and more than once have identified Catholicism with Polishness. We respond to them with these words: ‘Poland is not the exclusive property of Catholics, however numerous they may be.’ We are for ensuring the national and religious minorities living in Poland the opportunity to practice and develop their historical and cultural traditions. How harmoniously we live together with the national minorities will affect our relations with other nations, especially with our immediate neighbors.” [passage omitted]
Opinions

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, prime minister:

(Interviewed by Jacek Kubik in the Austrian weekly PROFIL 11 February 1991)

[Question] The president himself has no economic program. His comments on the economy are rather generalities or jokes.

[Answer] That is a question of Lech Walesa's political personality, which communicates important political thoughts in the form of anecdotes or jokes, proving, however, his political astuteness.

Stanisława Grabska, president of the Warsaw section of the Catholic Intellectuals Club:

(GAZETA WYBORCZA 11 February 1991)

"If we are to maintain the great tradition of religious pluralism of the Poland of the past, then it is necessary to mobilize the teachers to make a special effort in teaching respect for all religious and atheistic attitudes and to search for what we have in common. It would also be a sign of pluralism if the state authorities in inviting clerics to participate in state ceremonies remembered ecumenism and invited representatives of all the religions and faiths present in Poland. An alliance of the throne with the altar never turns out well for the altar, although it can provide no mean support for the throne. I am afraid that some of the Catholic activists are drawn by a vision of such an alliance."

Stefan Kisielewski, journalist:

(Interviewed by Piotr Gabryel, WPROST 24 February 1991)

[Answer] Walesa's comments made during the radio conversation with the listeners...that the president will put things in order, that the bloodsuckers are exploiting us, that we all have equal stomachs, that we must equally divide Polish poverty—frightened me and they should be seen as a departure from the reform slogans. If the president is inclined to such positions....

[Question] For instance that he is a communist in the style of, let us say, the late Gomulka....

[Answer] No, I think that he is rather a propaganda demagogue who, seeking popularity, says things people want to hear from him. For, at the same time, this same Walesa named Balerowicz to direct the economy. I am afraid, however, that electoral struggle will lead to still greater chaos, will strengthen the attacks on those who are growing rich. But without them, no capitalism makes sense. It is the rich who invest, guarantee work, are the motor of progress. And we have no other road.

Janusz Okrzesik, deputy of the Democratic Union (UD), previously of the Citizens Parliamentary Club (OKP):

(Comments for KRONIKA BESKIDZKA February 1991)

"My conflict with the union apparatus was unavoidable. As Kazimierz Grajcar, deputy chairman of the Region Board, declared publicly, a Solidarity deputy is obliged to act in accordance with the resolutions of the Regional Board. I do not work this way. I was not a politician 'on call' during the communist years, which is why I was in Solidarity. I will not act according to the commands of officials under Solidarity either, and so I will not have its officers support either. Thus, it is plain to see my place is in the opposition.... The test of my effectiveness can only be the elections, which I hope will be held soon, and then the votes of the voters will decide, and not a dozen or so members of the apparatus of the new leading force."

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 10-16 Mar
91EP0351A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 11, 16 Mar 91 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

Jacek Merkel has been removed from the position of advisor for security affairs. President Lech Walesa has entrusted the position to Lech Kaczyński.

The Sejm rejected the spring date for the elections and announced the end of its activities (self-dissolution) in the fall. The elections, which the president will ordain, should be held no later than 30 October 1991. There were 314 votes for, 18 against, and 40 abstentions. [passage omitted]

The Conference of Citizens Committees sharply attacked the Sejm's decision: "The results of Saturday's vote are an embarrassment, and for the deputies not in the Citizens Parliamentary Club, i.e., from the Democratic Union Parliamentary Club, they are a betrayal of the interests of the nation." At the same meeting, Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of Center Accord, forcefully criticized the Sejm decision. [passage omitted]

The price of 94-octane gasoline dropped 300 zlotys; it will now cost 3,800 zlotys a liter. The price of diesel fuel has not changed. The decline is temporary.

In a [legal] order, the government made more definite the circumstances under which it can introduce police and military units to restore public order and under what circumstances these forces may use firearms. Close order formations of police can be put into action when large social disturbances (but not strikes) occur, when they threaten massive destruction and constitute a general threat to life. The prime minister will make the decision to use these units upon the request from the minister of internal affairs. The voivodship commandant will order the use of arms when there is a direct attack on life or when a call to lay down arms or other dangerous objects is not heeded, when attempts are made to disarm policemen, or when there is a danger that an attempt will be made on the offices of the highest state authorities. The president can put the military into action at the request of the prime minister, it can use arms at the order of the minister of defense.
Minister Andrzej Zarebski, the government spokesman, discussed the costs of the Pope’s visit to Poland with journalists. According to current estimates, the costs will total 238 billion zlotys [Z]. Of this sum, Z9 billion will cover the organization of the press center; Z44 billion, the purchase of a mobile satellite station and radio apparatus; Z50 billion will go to the Ministry of the Internal Affairs for maintaining order and transporting 50,000 functionaries; Z35 billion will go for the purchase of television equipment; Z100 billion will go to 15 voivodships to pay for sanitary services and to provide for public order.

The education ministry intends to conduct another verification of management personnel in the schools. The competitive commission, which is to evaluate the candidates, including the current school directors, will consist of the local school superintendents, representatives of the local authorities and administration, and representatives of the trade unions. Minister Robert Glebocki, asked by a journalist for KURIER POLSKI, whether party members can say good-bye to their positions, responded: “I am not a utopian and I am aware that some members of the commissions will have their own political options. And it is not the point that they do not have their political options, but that in the final analysis, issues of merit—the ability to direct a complicated institution like a school—not political issues be decisive. However, I do not exclude the possibility that in some situations political aspects may have significance.” The paper cites the opinion of one of the school directors: “A good specialist who was a party member at sometime has no chance. Contenders who attack communism and announce that they will finally show how one must teach and train, will win.”

A. Druczymski, the president’s spokesman, announced that in the near future, Lech Walesa will meet with President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Rita Susmuth, chairman of the Bundestag, during a meeting with the residents of Glogowek in the Opole section of Silesia: “If you think that the FRG has given this area to the Poles then you must ask whether you live in Germany or in Glogowek. I understand your feelings, and I know that expulsion was painful; however, we now live in a Europe in which we want to ensure a future for everyone. After I return to Germany, I will seek assistance for this region, including economic assistance, so that you can live here.”

More mining disasters. As the result of a large collapse at the Wujek mine, four miners suffered injuries. At the Halemba mine, five miners died as a result of a collapse in the ventilation shaft. In 1991, coal mining accidents have already claimed 26 lives. In 1990, 107 individuals died in coal mining accidents (131 in all mining), or one-third more than in 1989. The total number of accidents during this time has risen by 26 percent. GAZETA WYBORCZA cites a comment by A. Lipko, deputy minister of industry: “ Mines are saving money on safety. They earned more than 2 billion zlotys in profit in 1990, but none of them spent a zloty on improving safety. Everything went toward wages.”

The Public Opinion Research Center on television: 70 percent of the viewers in March think that today television is more interesting than before, and 69 percent that it tells the truth more; 85.8 percent think that television wants to please the church, and 83.3 percent that it wants to please the president and his administration. [passage omitted]

At the end of March 1991, the president will form a Council for Polish-Jewish Relations, which is to combat anti-Semitism. Among the council members are supposed to be Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, Jan Blonski, Krystyna Kersten, and Jerzy Turowicz. [passage omitted]

Kazimierz Strzyczowski, chairman of the Liquidation Commission for the Workers’ Publishing Cooperative, told journalists that 40 newspapers were transferred to journalist cooperatives and 34 were sold by 7 March 1991. No offers were received for 20 titles. The liquidation of the publishing section of the Workers’ Publishing Cooperative should end during the first 10 days of April at the latest. [passage omitted]

Between 1 June and 31 December 1990, 125 individuals received an early retirement or a special pension which Prime Minister T. Mazowiecki awarded. Prime Minister J.K. Bielecki presented a list of these individuals to the Sejm marshal. Among them were 38 voivodes, deputy voivodes, city presidents and deputy presidents, 22 prominent individuals (including Jerzy Jozwik, former minister of trade and leader of the Democratic Party [SD]; Boleslaw Kapitan, former chairman of the Office of Censorship; Wladyslaw Lorenc, former head of the Office for Religions; Roman Malinowski, former leader of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and Sejm marshal). Special pensions were awarded to 43 members of families of individuals killed by the Citizens’ Militia (including those at the Wujek mine), to 11 individuals who worked in particularly difficult conditions for several decades, to three victims of the Stalinists and the Germans, and to two Solidarity activists.

At the Zacheta, there is an exhibit of photographs from Lvov gathered during a competition. Aleksandra Barlicka is in charge of the exhibit.

The BGW Publishing House organized an evening to promote Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski’s book How It Happened. [We printed fragments in No 8, 23 February 1991.] [passage omitted]

The auction paper ART AND BUSINESS devoted to the art and antique market has become a monthly. It is published by the Poznan publishing house Epoka Dialog.

Who’s Who. Zbigniew Romaszewski has declared that he never was a member of the Presidential Advisory Committee and that the rumor that he will take over the position of president of the Main Customs Office is also
false. (POLITYKA reprinted that rumor following the dailies.) Jacek Mazierski has become the chairman of the Main Board of Center Accord. Jacek Szymanderski, a deputy of the Citizens Parliamentary Club and an activist for Polish Peasant Party Solidarity [PSL Solidarity], has become the new head of the Center for Research on Public Opinion. [passage omitted]

Opinions
[passage omitted]

Hanna Swida-Ziemba, sociologist:

(KULTURA NIEZALEZNA January 1991)

"Internally, our society never accepted Stalinism. But naturally, people had to put on masks, while working in an institution, not going to a meeting marking May Day was unthinkable. On the other hand, various ways were invented to behave in an ethical manner in spite of everything, in order not to enter into the implementation of the system more than was externally demanded. It was sufficient in such a case to tell students under your control: 'On Friday at 1700 I will check whether you are studying together.' That is what I did. A committed activist would check them without warning. One 'did not notice' that the pupils were dancing a samba. One did not isolate oneself from the families of the persecuted or of those who were fired from their jobs or were harassed at work. Such a person received many tokens of friendship from his colleagues. A vacuum did not develop around him....

"A worker who greatly exceeded the production norms in order to earn more, which in effect increased the norms for the entire workforce (and also reduced the workers' earnings), became the object of boycotts, aggression, and even of popular justice. A worker who kept silent about increasing the required working hours in order to gain a promotion or a better position when others protested or who even supported the increase became an outcast. But the same behavior by someone threatened with represstion was treated with understanding. After all, he 'had to.'"

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 17-23 Mar
91EPO3684 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 12.
23 Mar 91 p 2
[Excerpts]

National News

The Paris Club, which consists of 17 of Poland's creditors whose loans are guaranteed by government institutions (three-quarters of Poland's debts), has offered to reduce Poland's debts by at least 50 percent. The reduction would be done in two stages: the first reduction would be by 30 percent, including an 80 percent reduction of interest payments. The remaining 20 percent would be removed in the fourth year of the implementation of the economic program which Poland would negotiate with the IMF. In conjunction with the reduction, Leszek Balcerowicz told TRYBUNA: "Do I personally feel satisfied? I think it is a success for all of Poland, all of Polish society, which has agreed to the variant of reform proposed by me and accepts its implementation."

Yuriy Kashlev, the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw, conveyed to Lech Walesa an invitation from Mikhail Gorbatchev to make an official visit to the Soviet Union. The president accepted the invitation; the date for the visit will be determined through diplomatic channels.

The party of Stanislaw Tyminski has been registered in Warsaw under the name of Party X. The three founders who applied for registration announced unofficially that the party already has about 40,000 membership applications. Mr. Tyminski, who is not one of the founders, declared that he is only a member of the group being formed.

At a press conference, Prof. Wieslaw Chrzaniowski, minister of justice and prosecutor general, announced that proceedings against Wladyslaw Ciaslon and Zenon Piatek, generals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, suspected of participation in the murder of Father J. Popieluszko and under temporary arrest, will be extended. The investigation of the fire set at the apartment of J. Jachowicz, a journalist for GAZETA WYBORCZA, will be suspended because it has not been determined who was responsible. The investigation into the death of Grzegorz Przemysk is moving toward its end. The materials gathered justify issuing charges against both of the functionaries maintained innocent in 1985. In 1990, crime rose by 61 percent in comparison with 1989, but only 40 percent of the criminals were arrested, including 19.2 percent [of those responsible] for thefts and break-ins at private buildings. In Warsaw the rate was 6.2 percent.

Jacek Mazierski, chairman of the Main Board of Center Accord, answered a question from KURIER POLSKI: [Question] Will Center Accord pursue a policy of pressuring the parliament to hold the elections in the spring instead of the fall? [Answer] Definitely. That is clear from the resolution we adopted on the date of the elections. In this part of Europe, Poland is the last state without a democratically elected parliament.

At a press conference, Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz: "In the second half of 1989, it was thought that inflation would reach 2,000 percent annually. In 1990, it was 250 percent. The price increases for energy sources planned for the second quarter of 1991 are not large; given an appropriately hard macro economic policy, they will not undermine the predicted rate of somewhat more than 30 percent annual inflation." (According to the Central Office of Statistics, inflation in February was 6.7 percent in comparison with January; the finance ministry predicted a higher rate. 8 percent.)

"Who Is Governing Here?" is the title of a summary in GAZETA WYBORCZA of a survey done by the Public
Opinion Research Center. The conclusion is that society, the farmers, and workers have too little power; the [Catholic] Church, Balcerowicz, and the former nomenklatura have too much. The army, the press, television, and the police the right amount. In more detail: In the opinion of the respondents, the following, in order, have too much power: the church, 67 percent; Balcerowicz, 42 percent; the former nomenklatura, 37 percent; Solidarity, 31 percent; the Jews, 31 percent; the Solidarity Citizens' Committees, 30 percent.

Minister Andzej Zawiak told journalists that General Motors is the most serious partner of the FSO automobile factory (during the television program "Sto Pytan,"
he was even more particular, advising his interviewer to draw conclusions from the fact that the minister is to accompany the president on his trip to the United [passage omitted])

[passage omitted]

President Lech Walesa met with Wojciech Jaruzelski at the Belweder. The former president described the exchange of thoughts as "frank and beneficial." The meeting was held at the initiative of both sides.

From a survey done by the Center For Research on Public Opinion. In March 1991, support [approval ratings] for politicians was weaker than in surveys done in December 1990. Prime J. Jęgr, 70 percent (in December 74); K. Skubiszewski, 52 (48); L. Walesa, 52 (63); J.K. Bielecki, 47; A. Michnik, 44 (42); T. Mazowiecki, 43 (54); J. Kuron, 41, (40); M. Kozakiewicz, 36 (34); A. Stelmachowski, 35 (36); B. Geremek, 31 (35); and L. Balcerowicz, 29 (31). In comparison with January 1991, there was a decline in trust in such institution of public life as the Sejm by 8 percent; the Senate by 6 percent; NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity by 3 percent. Trust in the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Union Agreement] increased by 3 percent. Of the respondents, 47 percent think that the economic situation is worsening (there has been an increase of 17 percent in such opinions since January); 31 percent do not believe there will be any improvement in the material living standards during the next three years; 34 percent think it is possible.

The Branch Unions of Farmers have proposed a Farmers Forum be formed that would evaluate the situation in agriculture once each quarter and seek ways to solve difficult problems. [passage omitted]

Representatives of 10 organizations, movements, and parties of Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Germans have decided to form a Council of National Minorities. The council is to develop its own proposal for a constitutional provision on minorities. The Main Council of Germans of Upper Silesia has been formed. It is "to pursue a policy for the joint creation of conditions for the gradual transformation of Upper Silesia into a modern Euroregion."

Who's Who. Piotr Nowina-Konopka, secretary of the Democratic Union [UD], has drawn attention by stating that, "European norms of democracy do not allow for two closely related individuals to hold the position of
Opinions

Andrzej Urbanski, journalist:

(TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC No 11, 15 March 1991)

"I ask more forcefully because people ask me about it. Would it not be better if the only democratic institution in Poland—the office of the president—provoked a constitutional crisis and ordered the election according to the same principles that were used in West Germany after the overthrow of the Nazis if the 'Magdalene Sejm' refused a majority law?"

"I ask further, for it is still permitted. Whether in politics, during historical crises, one ought to be directed by the dead letter of the law or whether, on the contrary, by the spirit of that law. Whether the blind principles of democracy are more important than the essence of democracy—in other words, than a refusal to allow all sorts of swindlers and frauds to take advantage of its rules. For those who do not know what I am asking about, I mention that Hitler won in democratic elections and that Stalin subordinated the party to himself using democratic rules."

Leszek Balcerowicz, deputy prime minister:

(Interviewed by Andrzej Jonas and Slawomir Majman, THE WARSAW VOICE 3 March 1991)

[Answer] If someone thinks that in difficult times the best policy is to minimize social dissatisfaction then he is making a mistake and is in danger of falling into a trap. If he strives to avoid social dissatisfaction in the short term and pursues a policy, especially an economic one, that in the long run will not improve the situation or will even make it worse, then in the end he will encounter an even greater social protest. Only a little later. One cannot pursue a policy in difficult times that does not have associated risks. The problem lies in his choice of the variety of risk.

Ryszard Juszczewicz, senator of the Circle of Independent Deputies and Senators, Citizens Parliamentary Club:

(Comment for TYGODNIK CIECHANOWSKI 1 March 1991)

"I do not belong to any political party, although at one time I considered a lasting relationship with Christian democracy. I have not retained my association with the ideology of that organization, but I have with some of the people whom I met. The fanaticism of those people, the overly simplified understanding of the social teachings of the church, and the unwavering attitude, not so much their resolve as their enmity, toward people of slightly different views or color of eyes and hair paralyzed me.

Future Foreign Policy Priorities Outlined

[Article by Rudolf Hoffman: "Priorities of Polish Foreign Policy"]

[Text] At last Tuesday’s session of the government [the Council of Ministers] the aims of Polish foreign policy were discussed, with reference to, among other things, safeguarding national sovereignty and security, supporting the process of democratic changes and economic growth, and reinforcing the authority of the state.

There is green light for any measure intended to strengthen Poland’s European orientation. Our road to Europe leads through the conclusion, even before this year is over, of an agreement for association with the EC. Poland’s admission to the Council of Europe, and fostering good contacts with NATO and the West European Union. These efforts of Warsaw are to be accompanied by others, leading in a straight line to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA.

The second priority is efforts toward building a new European security system, including Poland’s continued participation in disarmament negotiations, and in building trust and security. It is difficult, however, at present to define Poland’s negotiating position and weight in these negotiations subsequent to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact when our country will be located in the so-called gray zone between the mighty Soviet Union and the strong NATO.

The third priority is the realignment of relations with our two powerful neighbors on the basis of close cooperation negotiated in the form of bilateral treaties. With respect to the Soviet Union, this possibility is contingent on the prior settlement of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland and adherence to the principle of the two-track approach (i.e., identical relations with the center and with the republics).

Relations with Germany will be much warmer and more cordial, based on the currently negotiated treaty of cooperation and good neighborly relations which will serve as the mortar for building a favorite concept of the head of the Polish ministry of foreign affairs, namely, a Polish-German community of interests. What Kaiser Otto III failed to accomplish may now, God willing, be accomplished by Minister Skubiszewski.

Also perceptible is a definite leaning in the direction of the foreign policy of interwar Poland. On the basis of the Visegrad Declaration and the resolutions of the Baltic Conference in Ronneby, new regional ties binding Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, and the Baltic states are to be established.
The next priorities include a further expansion of relations with the Apostolic See, continued efforts to reduce our indebtedness, and broadening of contacts with Poles abroad.

The Council of Ministers discussed a letter of intent to the International Monetary Fund and a three-year economic program for Poland.

"That will be a basis for signing new agreements with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This will concern new credit, the reduction in indebtedness expected in April, and the changes in the social and economic system of society in Poland," stressed Government Press Spokesman Andrzej Zarebski. On Thursday the Council of Ministers will hold a special session devoted to these issues.

The Council of Ministers took a general position on the question of reprivatization. As known, by now the government has declared its support for a draft law restoring small enterprises such as flour mills, brick kilns, tourist boarding homes, etc., to their original owners.

Minister Janusz Lewandowski declared the return of assets seized by the state to be a definite element of ownership transformation in Poland. The assets to be returned will be principally those that had been expropriated in an unlawful manner. Any broader extension of this formula would, the minister emphasized, involve a huge cost to society while benefiting just a few citizens.

The Council of Ministers took a position on the draft legislation being prepared in the parliament with respect to trade unions, employer organizations, and arbitration of collective bargaining disputes.

Government Press Spokesman Andrzej Zarebski reported to the Council of Ministers on the changes in information policy. Radio Committee Chairman Marian Terlecki, who attended the session, proposed isolating broadcasts representing the government’s rationales and making them more interesting with the object of attracting listeners who are discouraged by the traditional, relatively incommunicative forms of mass media.

Bielecki’s FRG Visit, Relations Assessed
91EP0355A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 11, 16 Mar 91 p 11

[Article by Adam Krzeminski: “Acceleration in the Fog”]

[Text] The Polish prime minister was 15 minutes late for a working meeting with the German chancellor. It is hard to say whether a fog at Okecie was to blame or the fact that the flight service of the government TU-134 forgot to add this dozen or so minutes needed for taxing on airport grounds. At any rate, this delay could not be made up in flight. This has been the case in our relations with the Germans—sometimes we are off schedule, and sometimes the Germans keep delaying. A visit to Bonn by Jan Krzysztof Bielecki was supposed to erase this lack of coordination in time and to enhance the pace and intensity of our relationship. It will soon become clear whether this was the case. At any rate, they say that the chancellor and the prime minister found the right chemistry and tone within 15 minutes. Is this a good sign for the future?

The delay in building normal neighborly relations between the Germans and the Poles is obvious. The so-called great treaty was supposed to be negotiated before the end of January and, together with the border treaty, ratified by the end of February. Visa requirements for us were supposed to be abolished first from the [Christmas] holidays on, and subsequently from the beginning of the year... However, are we in a position to point fingers at those guilty in Bonn, given that these delays are to a great degree a dreadful consequence of our acceleration inside the country? To be sure, resistance in Germany to opening up to Poland is also there—after all, the former GDR alone causes a lot of difficulties—therefore, why add to them on account of the little-loved and hardly predictable neighbor from the East?

Also, there is nothing to complain about. This delay resulted from presidential elections in Poland and a change of government, but also from the war in the Persian Gulf and a frost in the Soviet Union. Within several weeks, the atmosphere in Europe changed; Shevardnadze left, the military showed its claws in the USSR, and the Americans demanded that the Germans support them in their confrontation with Iraq. In our country, overnight foreign policy became nobody’s domain, except for Minister Skubiszewski, who alone continued to hold his post. The president at first sized up the Belweder and waited for a visit to the Vatican. The prime minister put together a government and defended the PPWW [tax on excess wage growth]. The withdrawal for making policy with regard to Germany was not there.

It looks like this acceleration is beginning. From all accounts, there has never before been half a year like this one. The president has visited the Vatican and Visegrad, and he is going to visit the United States, France, Great Britain, Brussels, Israel, and probably Moscow. The prime minister has visited Sweden, Switzerland, and Germany. The minister of foreign affairs is also away on visits or continuously hosting guests from elsewhere in the world. They talk ever more expressly about “strengthening the European policy of Poland,” about linking us to the West, about the strategic goal of joining the EEC as early as this decade, joining the Council of Europe, and even NATO. The visit by Prime Minister Bielecki to Bonn and Frankfurt last week was supposed to be an essential element of this offensive.

However, the point is that postwar Polish-German relations have suffered due to the sickly lack of coordination in time, regardless of the lack of symmetry in economics, politics, and the development of civilization. More than
once during the past quarter of a century the phases and temperature of feelings have crossed each other. We were distrustful when, in the 1960's, a considerable segment of the war generation formed a lobby in West Germany favoring reconciliation with Poland. Subsequently, under martial law many people in our country said that they wished that Germany would unite because in this manner the West would come closer to Poland; however, when the wall fell, the ill disposition of a considerable segment of the population of the GDR toward us came as a response. When later we started proudly parading the achievements of the first phase of the Balcerowicz plan, the Germans began to point out to us the Polish market in Berlin and our illegal workers. Further on, when we found upon Germany's failure to keep the promise to cancel visas for us, due to the resistance of a group from Schengen, we find in the German periodicals stories about the Polish mafia which smuggles drugs from Gdansk to the West, engages in vodka, caviar, and cigarette trafficking, and brings stolen cars to the East. When we talk about a return to Europe and say that our road leads through Germany they write that Poland is becoming the trash heap of Europe, and that the illegal transportation of wastes full of arsenic, mercury, and lead to Poland could not be easier. After all, for 1,000 German marks a Polish "entrepreneur" can be found who will carry this contraband across the border and dump it somewhere in the forest or on a river bank. Corruption and chaos make this business easier, writes SPIEGEL. The recent scandals at the border crossing in Slubice, Gubin, and Zgorzelec became for many people an occasion to jeer the Polish road to the West.

This lack of coordination in time is also due to generational changes, to the departure, especially in Germany, of an older generation of intermediaries in the mass media, journalists, essayists, and writers who have done a lot to represent "a suffering and heroic" Poland, one which is entitled to sympathy and help for historic reasons. Their place is gradually being taken over by the postwar generation which is free of historic sensitivity. If it does take an interest in Poland it applies to us the yardstick of efficiency of civilization, democratic trustworthiness and ability to modernize. The journalists of this generation frequently have difficulty understanding our attitude which is excessively geared to the past.

However, it is not better in our country either. It would appear that our young generation which has invaded the mass media vigorously, but so far with mediocre results, should be free of Polish complexes and already acquainted with the real world. Meanwhile, this is not the case. It is precisely the younger people who perpetuate aggressive black-and-white stereotypes, and their unfamiliarity with the world is directly proportionate to superficial familiarity with foreign countries.

What Kind of Treaty

This is why it is hard to count on any greater movement "for reconciliation." It is hard to count on a union of intellectuals because the latter are steadfast in their self-knowledge both in Poland and in Germany. Journalists from the two countries do not speak in the same voice, and teachers do not cooperate, at any rate, not to a degree that would make it perceptible. Therefore, all we can count on are small-time "entrepreneurs" who want to do business from Zgorzelec to Goerlitz, and from Slubice to Frankfurt, and the gminas which belong to the Union of Western Gminas along the border, as well as associations which try to establish bridgeheads on both sides of the border rivers without much support, such as Via Regia in Zgorzelec and Goerlitz.

The stage at which we now find ourselves in Polish-German relations does not resemble anything we have known since the war. In the 1960's churches, writers, cinematographers, musicians, politicians, and journalists with an unorthodox way of thinking were the driving forces of reconciliation and rapprochement, frequently in contradiction to the policies of both governments. At present, it appears that those are the driving forces of "the commonalty of interests" who rush to the West, shoulder the burden of working as "migrant workers," and learn the language, but at the same time do nothing to remove German apprehension and contempt by their boorish behavior and banditry.

Under the circumstances, even more depends on politicians who support this practical impetus for a rapprochement between the Germans and the Poles, frequently contrary to the statistical will of the two societies. And this is indicated in the results of public opinion surveys. In Germany, we rank toward the bottom, on a par with the Gypsies and the Turks. The Germans in Poland have not climbed up high on the scale of sympathies. We should appreciate the fact that there are German politicians who, together with us, aim at a far-reaching opening.

The Polish lobby is not too large among the German elites. If we were to ask to whose heart the rapprochement with Poland really lies close among the ruling Christian Democratic Party, usually we would hear the fast response: "Of course, Rita Suessmuth, the chairperson of the Bundestag." They would go on to mention the name of Bernhard Vogel, the former prime minister of Rhineland Palatinate, and finally that of Chancellor Kohl. If we were to ask the same question concerning liberals, several names would also be mentioned. This would also be the case with regard to the Social Democrats, as it were, among the older generation rather than the younger one. In addition, there are hundreds if not thousands of those who are interested in Poland on occasion, those who know us and are friendly to us. However, if the upper echelon began to block relations with us would this lobby of ours be capable of overcoming the bad fortune?

This is why rapprochement should come from the upper echelon this time as well. This is the burning question of the political will of the elites governing Germany and Poland, that of the will and vision of the future of Europe. It is to this will and vision that the great
Polish-German treaty is subordinated. It has already been 90 percent negotiated and, as was agreed upon during Prime Minister Bielecki's visit with Chancellor Kohl, is to be ratified before the summer recess of the Bundestag.

A new situation in Europe, the unification of Germany, and the return of Poland to Western values form the basis of the treaty. The preamble and the first articles of the treaty will refer to the commonality of values. Subsequent articles will touch on the issues of security, disarmament, and the case of threat. The treaty provides for extensive political consultations at all levels, and economic, regional, and cultural cooperation. It will also correlate with our movement to the EEC and European institutions, and in addition to certain partial consular and legal problems and care for the monuments, outstanding issues include primarily the notorious Article 15 referring to national minorities.

The Polish side holds the unchanged position that the issue of minorities should be regulated according to international standards rather than, as was the case before the war, with well-known consequences, bilateral arrangements which made it possible for the German state to extend its power to Germans living abroad. The German side has in principle accepted the European philosophy of solving the issue of minorities on the basis of the documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. However, it has been under pressure from the Union of Expellees, which demands that Germans in Poland have special rights, including legal protection of the German minority by the FRG and an autonomous status for Silesia. The Polish side has responded that this runs counter to international law because no minority may be used and managed from abroad, since they are Polish citizens subject to Polish legislation, and they should not have a formal dual loyalty. It appears that this issue has been formally resolved during the visit by Prime Minister Bielecki. The meaningful statement by Bundestag Chairperson Professor Rita Suessmuth to the effect that the behavior of the Union of Expellees in opposing the border treaty is unacceptable was an express confirmation of the intent of the Bonn government.

However, there actually should be no illusions. The retort by the leading figures of the Union of Expellees, and the tactlessness of some representatives of the German minority in the Opole area, indicate that a lot of water will yet have to flow in the Odra before a generation comes to the fore whose mental horizons have not been formed by the German people's school circa 1937, by the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] past, and by a complete indifference to the complex reasons for the human tragedies of the Polish-German borderland, not only in 1945 but also somewhat earlier.

Debts and Visas
There are no longer differences as to the great treaty after a meeting between Prime Minister Bielecki, the chancellor, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher. As negotiators maintain, one session will be enough to iron out the text and finally settle on details.

However, it is not the treaty itself that preoccupies the public opinion of the two countries the most but the cancellation of visa requirements and the prospects for reducing our debt, with the support of Germany for our economic and modernization changes in the background.

Germany is already our main trading partner. It has outpaced the USSR and has garnered half of our trade with the EEC. Germany also accounts for one-third of our debts. Recently, progress has been made in economic relations. However, German entrepreneurs are still quite reserved in assessing our political, economic, and banking stability. Nine hundred and eighty-one enterprises with the participation of German capital have been registered; however, their capital comes to merely $100 million. It is obvious that the Germans go for quantity rather than quality. To be sure, there are several plums, such as Siemens or Adidas. However, most are small fries, often Germans of Polish background who have little capital. At the same time, the unification of Germany has resulted in tremendous losses for us—about 60 percent of the GDR market. The Polish delegation discussed all of this in Bonn and Frankfurt with politicians and representatives of the financial and economic community.

The prime minister was satisfied after the first round of talks: “I would like to stress the significance of Poland’s strategic goal—integration with European institutions and the search for a road to Europe through Germany. This is the case with the issue of the Polish debt. It is fundamentally significant for us. Poland does not want to replicate its experience from the 1970’s when the communist government obtained credits and, incidentally, had easy access to them. All we want is to get a chance, the chance that Germany once got, to pursue economic development based on our own resources. We also need to gain credibility with foreign investors; to be sure, we are doing a lot for our part. The current government has prepared a new law on companies with the participation of foreign capital which is much more liberal than the one currently in effect.”

Bielecki is aware that time is short. He says unequivocally that debt reduction is necessary right away. “It may so happen that a 100-percent reduction in a year or two would amount to merely unnecessary solace for Poland which would be facing a difficult situation...” This was a clear signal. On the following day, the issue of debt reduction appeared to be the key issue during negotiations with Minister of Economy Moellmann, Minister of Finance Weigel, and Head of the Federal Bank Pohl. The situation is vague, and it is additionally complicated by the jealousy of other countries, such as our partner from Visegrad, Hungary, who are unhappy that Poland will be granted some special preferences whereas they will not. The amount of eventual reductions is not clear. The Polish side is referring to 80 percent. the Americans
to 60 percent, the Japanese to 20 percent (and even then reluctantly), whereas the Germans are in the range between the Japanese and the Americans; they are talking about 40 percent, 50 percent tops. In turn, our side is saying that we are not in a position to pay even if the American variant were accepted. However, there are also those who are saying that a well-prepared reduction of a lower magnitude may have the same effect as that of a greater magnitude "given a number of additional arrangements," as we learned from the prime minister aboard the plane.

On the way back, Krzysztof Bielecki was clearly pleased, though he was irritated by excessively importunate questions regarding the percentage of debt reduction and whether the Germans would help us to get rid of the Soviet troops. After all, the issue of the transit of troops from Germany is still poisoned and obscure. Our mistakes made several months ago come to haunt us in the form of a lack of understanding and ill will on the part of the Germans. This [appeared in] a commentary of FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG on the day of the visit of our prime minister: "Understandably, every Pole would like the Soviet troops to leave now rather than in two years, but some of the tones and the music accompanying this demand contain alarming elements. Germany prefers to have a Polish neighbor who would have matter-of-fact relations with them and with others. Bielecki certainly has the same view of things. He will have to convince Kohl of this." He did convince Kohl, but he announced on the plane that he would visit Moscow for negotiations.

It appears that the young Polish prime minister established good rapport with Helmut Kohl. Bielecki did make a good showing next to the chancellor, despite the difference of age, posture, experience, and the potential of the countries which they represent. He was business-like and sovereign, and he did not bring in any ideology. He made it his goal to establish good contacts, and he achieved it, exchanging phone numbers with the leading Germans. Asked whether he felt like a schoolboy in the presence of Kohl, he answered that neither he himself nor perhaps the chancellor had this impression, because after a dozen or so minutes the latter complemented the Pole by saying that they think and talk similarly. The prime minister was also on the same wavelength with the chairman of the Federal Bank because "the chairman quoted my speech in Davos and came out as a supporter of prompt, full EEC membership for Poland." It appears that [the atmosphere] was cooler in the case of Weigel, but this minister has always taken the hard line on us.

**Good Contacts**

This visit was neither "a turning point" nor "going hat in hand"; this is why there was no obvious yardstick for success or failure. This was seen from the uncertain response of the press in both Germany and Poland.

In our country, the newspapers managed to splash large headlines on the first day, subsequently kicking information on the results of the visit into the corner. Only ZYCIE WARSZAWSKIE, always diligent and comprehensive when German affairs are concerned, did not yield to extremes. In turn, in Germany either arrogance was encountered, as in DIE WELT which in an introductory comment lectured us that if we want to go to Europe we should get rid of nationalism on the issue of the German minority, as if this daily did not have its own shortcomings, or dry, short reports were fired off. For many of ours, success was to be measured in hard cash, as was the case in the 1970's, for many Germans, it was to be measured in our bowing to them.

However, this is not [the proper] scale. The success of this and following visits on the banks of the Rhine or Spree will be measured not only in issues resolved over the phone—credits, debt reductions, and "election gifts" in the form of canceling visa requirements (very soon), the signing of treaties, and repaying debts of honor, such as those to the prisoners of concentration camps and involuntary laborers—but by the continuous presence of a neighbor in one's own way of thinking and projecting the future. We will have succeeded when, due to frequent and intensive contacts, we come to be present on a daily basis in German strategic thinking about Europe, and when the Germans cease to represent for us the myth of the stable mark, the Prussian boot, and the overlord wanting us to run in circles, when we learn to look for and find partners who will be in a position to neutralize and reverse our gravitation toward the past. Prime Minister Bielecki took a good step in this direction.

**Democratic Party Head on Coalition Possibilities**

LD14042000491 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1800 GMT 14 Apr 91

[Text] The 15th extraordinary congress of the Democratic Party [SD] ended in Pulawy. Aleksander Mackiewicz, the party's chairman, speaking about the approaching parliamentary election campaign, admitted that an alliance is possible with the peasant forces in politics—the Polish Peasant Party and Rural Solidarity, as well as forces programmatically close to the party. In certain provinces, he indicated, those in which our position is good, we will enter the elections alone. Mackiewicz said that the SD is a strong and independent party, ready for talks with all persons and institutions which may influence the fate of Poland.

**Mazowiecki Notes Possible Party Unification**

LD1604063491 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 2100 GMT 15 Apr 91

[Text] The main difficulties on the road to unification of the Forum of the Democratic Right, the Citizens Movement—Democratic Union (ROAD), and the Democratic Union have either been overcome or they are approaching that point, said Tadeusz Mazowiecki during a meeting in Warsaw's Palladium Theater. The
former prime minister criticized the idea of decommunization if it was thought to prevent members of the former Polish United Workers Party from taking any state posts. These actions are contrary to basic human rights and glaringly incompatible with the ethos of Solidarity’s struggle, Tadeusz Mazowiecki said.

**Bujak Leaves Democratic Union, Forms New Party**

*9IP20313A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 27 Mar 91 p 5*

[Article by (AS. knysz): “Bujak Criticizes”]

[Text] “I am definitely parting company with the Democratic Union. I have decided to form my own organization,” said Zbigniew Bujak, member of ROAD’s [Citizens Movement—Democratic Action] social democratic wing, during a meeting on Sunday [24 March] with Krakow residents. “The Union is just not the right answer for demands of the current economic and political situation in Poland,” Bujak added.

In his opinion, support for the Balcerowicz plan threatens the Democratic Union by placing it on the fringes of political life. “Before long, Balcerowicz plans will be implemented only by the use of force,” Bujak argued.

The former ROAD leader also thinks that the figure of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, leader of the Democratic Union, awakens much controversy. Bujak revealed that he tried to persuade Mazowiecki to step down and let Wladyslaw Frasyniuk become the head of the Democratic Union. According to Bujak, Mazowiecki would not agree to this. Bujak also charged Mazowiecki with responsibility for the breakup of ROAD.

“Two minuses do not make a plus. Linking the criticized Union with the growing lack of trust in ROAD will not strengthen these parties,” said Bujak in response to accusations that “Mazowiecki’s former camp” can be successful in the elections only by maintaining unity. In Bujak’s view, one does not apply mathematical principles to politics.

In criticizing the Democratic Union, Bujak referred to some of its undecided positions vis-a-vis “certain of the church’s maneuvers.”

The Democratic-Social Association, as Bujak’s party is to be called, most certainly will not be in alliance with the Democratic Union in the elections, although Bujak himself did not exclude the possibility of cooperation with the new parliament. He did instead forecast an electoral alliance with Jan Jozef Lipski’s PPS [Polish Socialist Party] and with Ryszard Bugaj’s Labor Solidarity.

In response to questions about other leaders of the Democratic-Social Association, Bujak said only that they are new names on the political scene.

In the parliamentary elections, which Bujak’s Association wants to enter with an alternative economic program to the Balcerowicz plan, Bujak wants above all to gain the votes of the workers and peasants, as well as of employees in the budget sphere.

Bujak is counting on the votes of the Tyminski, Cimoszewicz, and Miodowicz electorate, and he hopes that in this way he will be able to prevent their supporters from taking power.

**Democratic-Radical Party Formed in Wroclaw**

*9IP20311A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 27 Mar 91 p 5*

[Article by (M.P.): “Well-to-Do Polish Radicals”]

[Text] The Polish Democratic-Radical Party, registered Friday in Wroclaw [22 March], forecasts an uncompromising struggle with those forces that do not understand the changes going on in Poland.

The founder of the Party is Ksawery Borowik, head of the Retropol company, which last year took over Wroclaw’s Partisan Hill, where there is a historical group of buildings. Retropol converted them into an elegant, profitable casino.

**Leftist Figures Call for Electoral Alliance**

*9IEP0245A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 1 Mar 91 pp 1-2*

[Article by (par): “W. Cimoszewicz and A. Kwasniewski Propose a Leftist Electoral Alliance”]

[Text] “It is high time that the left present its program and seek the possibility of joining forces as speedily as possible. The initiative of creating an Electoral Alliance of the Left is a decision Alex and I have reached,” said Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz at a press conference at which he appeared jointly with Aleksander Kwasniewski on Thursday, 28 February.

The Electoral Alliance of the Left is therefore an open proposal for various groups and individuals who identify with the leftist value system. It is being proposed not by organizations, but by private individuals. “We have the interesting experience of the period of the presidential election,” said Aleksander Kwasniewski, “when an interesting set of forces and influences gathered around the Cimoszewicz candidacy. We are at present conducting discussions with various organizations and with people who command recognized public influence. If we are successful in creating such an alliance (and prospects are promising), there is a chance that in the parliamentary elections the left will get a result matching the support that it actually has. Also, this support continues to grow.”

The appeal issued by Cimoszewicz and Kwasniewski, entitled “Things Cannot Continue as They Are,” is therefore an element of acceleration to the left (although
both gentlemen admitted that on the lips of leftist the word “acceleration” is ambiguous. In the appeal, they write: “Poland requires basic changes. These can be made only with the consent of the citizens. For this reason, speedy parliamentary elections and the formation a Sejm with a mandate of public trust are indispensable. Today that trust is abused. Poland is governed by a right-wing government comprised of representatives of parties that were not subjected to democratic electoral verification.”

The journalists were interested in the projected composition of the leftist alliance. Aleksander Kwasniewski said that the Social Democrats of the Polish Republic would undoubtedly be an element, and it pained him to learn that the directors of the All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement (OPZZ) at present excludes the possibility of an agreement in this matter, but he said that discussions continue with various trade unions. But this is only at the stage of consultations.

The journalists asked whether discussions are also being conducted with representatives of leftist groups coming from Solidarity. They had heard that such discussions are not taking place on the premises of the parliament, but Cimoszewicz and Kwasniewski have a high regard for the Labor Solidarity program (the group of Bugaj and Modzelewski), and are very much interested in the activity of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and Bujak’s Citizens Movement—Democratic Action (ROAD) faction.

The press conference also became an occasion for evaluating the present situation in the country. Kwasniewski and Cimoszewicz speak for speedy parliamentary elections and are technically prepared for either time, May or eventual fall elections. Cimoszewicz is of the opinion that the building of a democratic system in Poland is threatened—there is a tendency toward strengthening presidential authority (at the moment, this is being done in accord with the constitution), but the left is for a strong parliament. Kwasniewski said that the first three months of Lech Walesa’s presidency was a game of superficialities. The proposal to create a Political Council was a superficiality; the discussion as to whether elections should take place in May or in the fall is a superficiality; the discussion on the new administrative division of the country is a superficiality. Poland has more serious problems. It seems that groups that demand more speedy action only want power and have no programs in their desk drawers.

In this situation, the leftist forces are in great need of dialogue and agreement. The left is necessary if only, in the words of Lech Walesa, for psychological well-being and it must not allow itself to pushed aside. In proposing an electoral alliance, Cimoszewicz and Kwasniewski believe that in parliamentary elections, they would get a result similar to that which Cimoszewicz got in the presidential elections; they would like to find themselves among the three or four main forces in parliament.

**Senate Antiabortion Bill Receives Support**

AU1504132591 Warsaw PAP in English 2207 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Warsaw, April 10—Eighty-nine percent of persons who signed 290,000 letters sent to the Sejm came out for the Senate draft law on legal protection of the conceived child and 11 percent were against.

All in all, the letters were signed by 1.7 million persons. This number includes 1.4 million people who signed collective letters or one of the forms collectively sent in packages as part of a broader action, most often carried out by Catholic parishes. Individual letters account only for five percent of the entire correspondence.

These are the results of the public consultation carried out from mid-February till the end of March, published by the Sejm Office for Studies and Expert Reports today.

**Presidential Council on Polish-Jewish Affairs**

91EP0363B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6 March 91 p 1

[Article by (K.G.): “A Retrospective View: The Council for Polish-Jewish Affairs”]

[Text] In two or three more weeks a council on Polish-Jewish relations will be definitively formed within the Office of the President. The council is to consist of 20 Polish scholarly experts on this topic. Their membership in the council was solicited by President Lech Walesa.

Undersecretary of State Arkadzisz Rybicki, who is organizing the council on behalf of the President, declared that the importance and sensitivity of the problem prevent him from identifying even now the names of the council members.

As we have learned from other sources, one of the council’s members will be Stanislaw Krajewski, a representative of the American Jewish Congress in Poland. Others invited to serve on the council include Wladyslaw Bartoszewski [age 68, Poland’s ambassador to Austria, historian, chronicler of Polish rescuers of Jews], Jan Blonski, Andrzej Friedman [neurologist and president of the Polish-Israeli Friendship Society], Krystyna Kersten, Bishop Muszynski [Henryk Muszynski, chairman of the Committee of the Polish Episcopate for Dialogue with Judaism], Jerzy Turowicz [age 78, editor in chief of TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, leading magazine of the Catholic intelligentsia]; and Stefan Wilkanowicz.

“The council,” Arkadzisz Rybicki said, “is to concern itself with preventing anti-Semitism in Poland. It will be assisted therein by appropriate educational programs, a youth exchange, and exhibitions. Another purpose of the council will be to explain complex Polish-Jewish problems to world opinion. Lech Walesa declared that, so long as he has something to say in Poland, he shall not
allow anti-Semitism to grow. The council is to be an institutional reflection of the president’s commitment to this matter.”

Andrzej Drzycimski, the presidential press spokesman, declared that, in establishing the council, Lech Walesa wants to “purify the atmosphere” surrounding the problem of anti-Semitism in Poland.

“For the worst that may happen,” the spokesman said, “is when we try to gloss over an issue or pretend that it is nonexistent. The president would like to resolve all the Polish-Jewish issues through the council, even the most difficult ones.”

Further, Drzycimski said, “During the electoral campaign anti-Semitism was a prominent issue raised at nearly every voters’ meeting, so much that we were surprised on the rare occasions when it was not raised. Yet in Poland, a Roman Catholic country, this problem should not be existing at all.

“At the same time,” Drzycimski added, “the political discussions held in Poland are often interpreted abroad through the prism of anti-Semitism. The president desires to gather together in the council persons who are superbly conversant with Polish-Jewish affairs, either in their capacity as scholars or as persons of Jewish culture or faith.

“These two nations, so sorely tested by modern history, have much to say to one another. They cannot turn their backs on one another. Both countries want to be open to Europe, to belong to the European mansion. For this to happen, a prerequisite is an objective look at the past.”

Inspector Bogusław Strzelecki, deputy chief of police, told us that not all the activities of his proteges are in order. Strzelecki knows of 48 complaints of brutal police activity, as opposed to the 90 cases reported by the committee. The prosecutor’s office is already investigating 19 of these cases. “In none of the cases were policemen considered guilty of brutality. In fact, policemen actually suffered injury in two of them.” Strzelecki said.

“The case of the death of Tadeusz Nowicki cited in the letter is being investigated,” Strzelecki said further. “The autopsy has revealed that Nowicki died as a result of delirium tremens (the final stage of alcoholism).” He also said that the police are not involved in any investigations into the behavior of policemen. Such investigations are initiated by the prosecutor’s office, following the lodging of a complaint by the victim or a report by the head of the detention facility, who is obliged to report every case of maltreatment of detainees.

Strzelecki did admit, though, that detainees suffer injuries when they put up resistance. “Police are authorized to use direct force,” he said.

Inspector Strzelecki said it is not true that the police prevent detainees from writing complaints. “Every detainee is under police custody for only 48 hours, after which he can even write letters to all the saints,” he said.

OBSERWATOR: New Neutral Daily Planned
91EP0363C Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
13 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Jacek Lutomski: “The Newspaper OBSERWATOR”]

[Text] It may be that the first, trial issues of the new daily, OBSERWATOR, will appear in May. That will be a news-oriented daily newspaper, and it should definitely appear on the publishing market one and one-half to two months before the coming parliamentary elections. The newspaper is chiefly addressed to the viewers of the television newscast “The Observer,” who are estimated at 1 million.

The publisher will be the Henryk Rzeczowski Foundation, and an honorary founding committee has already been established. According to Marcin Krol, an officer of the foundation and editor in chief of REPUBLIKA [RES PUBLICA], the new newspaper will be characterized by three qualities: quality, courage in raising difficult issues, and absolute neutrality. The OBSERWATOR is to be patterned after the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG.

The needed funds, ranging at several dozen billion zlotys, will be provided by Republika-Press International, which counts on participation by Western (Norwegian-Danish-Dutch) capital. But the share owned by the publisher must be sufficiently significant to shape the personality of the newspaper. To be profitable, a
minimum circulation of 100,000 copies is needed, and the newspaper is to be edited by 60 journalists, led by the team of Damian Kalbarczyk. For the time being printing will be done by the DSP [House of Polish Literature], where OBSERWATOR will rank second in size next to GAZETA POLSKA. In the near future, however, a large rotogravure press is to be imported and installed.

**Former Dissident Publisher Moves to Television**

91EP0263D Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 15 Mar 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with Miroslaw Chojecki, founder of the Nowa and Kontakt publishing houses, by Joanna Stempien; place and date not given: “The Word Depicted”]

[Text] [Stempien] How did it happen that you, a famous Solidarity publisher and the founder of Nowa and Kontakt, are now concerned with commercial television, that is, a domain that has little in common with your earlier ambitions and interests?

[Chojecki] This disparity is only apparent. I have always been concerned with cultural affairs, with language. All that has happened was a change in media. Nowadays I am more attracted to the depicted word than to the written word. I found this change of interest to be much easier because I have never felt myself to be a writer. I view myself as an organizer, a manager, rather than as a creative artist.

[Stempien] In our society the “depicted word,” that is, television, is clearly dislodging other forms of cultural contacts.

[Chojecki] True. This is demonstrated by, e.g., poll findings. The statistical Pole watches television nearly three hours daily, and nearly five hours on holidays. This is much more than in Western societies. This fact cannot be ignored. It is simply that everything should be done to magnify the cultural benefits of this currently most important medium. Kontakt attempted to bear this in mind.

[Stempien] How do you define good television?

[Chojecki] Television which is not viewed while having supper. Television which is viewed actively from particular standpoints and on becoming emotionally and intellectually involved. Poles are passive vis a vis television. They turn it on, but... they do not watch it. The fault is chiefly that of television itself. For a long time now it has been resembling radio rather than a discrete medium. At the same time, it is a medium which seems an intruder in our homes, being artificial, affected, and alien to the problems of the viewers. An aggressive but not persuasive medium, and one which does not prompt the viewer to want to identify himself with it, one that employs an incomprehensible language, to boot.

[Stempien] That is an acerbic assessment. How can these mistakes be avoided, in your opinion?

[Chojecki] Television must above all be an independent institution. By this I mean its independence from the government, from political parties, from social and ecclesiastical organizations, etc. Television may not serve as an instrument for accomplishing something. A journalist should express his own thoughts, not those of others.

[Stempien] You want to establish a national television channel. That is a very ambitious goal. Would not it be easier to begin with a local TV station?

[Chojecki] Easier, certainly, but that does not interest me, that would be a less exciting project. I believe that after spending nearly 10 years in France, nearly one year in the United States, and many months in Germany, England, Sweden, and Switzerland, I can tell what is good and what is bad about television. This knowledge will, I think, enable me to organize a structure that will emulate the world’s best examples. For the past six to seven years my Parisian company has cooperated very closely with many European, and not only European, television networks. This experience should deserve a national rather than a local audience, all the more so considering that in Poland local television is not some smaller counterpart of national television but something completely different, meaning that local issues on the Seacoast hardly resemble those in Rzeszow Voivodship or in Silesia. Local television has to be adapted to the interests and needs of these parochial groups, whereas national television must reconcile these diverse interests, and this clearly influences its nature.

[Stempien] What are the organizational and legal aspects of your project?

[Chojecki] Several institutions and firms are involved in establishing this national channel. They include the Krakow CZAS, GAZETA BANKOWA, the monthly RES PUBLICA, the Czytelnik Publishing House, the Wydawnictwo Literackie Press, the National Cinema-theca, the Documentary Films Studio, Krzysztof Zanussi’s Tor Film Studio, and of course our own Kontakt Television Studio. These are the main shareholders in a company founded last year. We also found partners in West Europe. The well-known French journalist Gabriel Meretik is assisting us greatly in these negotiations. We are planning satellite broadcasts of Channel 3 programs. This affords much greater opportunities than a ground distribution system. Suffice it to mention that in this way our Polish language programs will be received throughout Europe. We shall thus be able to reach millions of Poles abroad. I hardly need to expiate on the advantages stemming from this fact.

[Stempien] We have been discussing the technical model of Channel 3. What would be its structural model?

[Chojecki] I intend to employ 250 persons, needed to broadcast round-the-clock programs. Moreover, cooperation with Polish producers will be then indispensable. That is because we want to be, only to a limited extent, a producer of original programs. Our aim is rather to
create a market for audiovisual producers, i.e., to create competition among them, so that the best partners could be selected for our television programs instead of relying solely on broadcasts produced by our own staff. I believe that 80-90 percent of our broadcasts would originate outside our network. Here we are patterning ourselves on the operating modes of the leading Western television networks. Besides, in some countries no network may own more than 20 percent of the programs it broadcasts. Another advantage of this model is that it prevents the formation of monopolies.

[Stempien] What kind of network do you intend to develop?

[Chojecki] Generally speaking, one-third of our broadcast would be originally Polish. The remainder would be European and American. In no case will we resort to doing foreign programs translated into the Polish. I think that our network, which is sponsored by such important Polish cultural institutions, has every opportunity to serve as a disseminator of culture, knowledge, and education.

ROMANIA

Minister of Culture on Role of Intellectuals

91BA0459A Paris LE MONDE in French 28 Mar 91 p 22

[Interview with Romanian Minister of Culture Andrei Plesu by Costin Cazaban under the rubric "In the East"; place and date not given: "The Modesty of Doubt and Solitude"—first paragraph is LE MONDE introduction]

[Text] What is the role of intellectuals in post-Ceausescu Romania? How is freedom of the press faring? How can you impart dignity to politics, when the very word itself has lost all credibility? Here are the responses of Andrei Plesu.

Andrei Plesu, philosopher and art critic, became minister of culture of Romania the day after the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime in December 1989 (see LE MONDE, 1 February 1990). One year later he submitted his resignation to protest the lack of dialogue among the members of the government in connection with the expulsion of King Michael from Romania, who had come on a private visit to spend Christmas in his homeland. The discussion that followed took place two days after the meeting of the cabinet at which Andrei Plesu withdrew his resignation after the government had made a commitment to improve the quality of the debate within the executive branch of the government and to ensure the representativeness of all decisions. In France Andrei Plesu published Ethique de Robinson [The Ethics of Robinson] (Herne Editions), in which he substitutes "a modest morality of doubt and solitude" for the universal morality.

[Cazaban] What have you written since you became minister of culture?

[Plesu] A statement, published last 15 June, in which the ministry spelled out its position with respect to the miners’ expedition to Bucharest, and more recently my letter of resignation, which I have just withdrawn following the meeting of the Council of Ministers. I don’t have time to write, and rarely time to read. Since I became minister of culture I have ceased to be an intellectual.

[Cazaban] Does this job give you other satisfactions?

[Plesu] Under the present conditions, the possibilities for a cabinet minister are very limited, all the more so because I am a beginner in this area. On the one hand I want to leave it to the decisionmakers at all levels to discharge their responsibilities, and on the other hand I do not regret this experience, which I had never dreamed I would have.

[Cazaban] The government has promised to improve communication and dialogue in the executive branch. Are you reassured by this commitment?

[Plesu] Yes, but I am waiting to see it confirmed in practice. In my view, governmental solidarity should not be of a disciplinary nature. I view it as a living solidarity, as the product of discussion rather than as a permanent consensus that is taken for granted. Above all, this solidarity should manifest itself at the time the decisions are made.

[Cazaban] Do you regard yourself as a political minister, as a technical minister, or as a representative of civilian society?

[Plesu] I began by regarding myself as a technician, as a specialist in my field. I subsequently learned, as all Romanians did at that time, that you cannot get away from politics. I also pointed out on various occasions— at the cabinet meetings—that this government risks becoming too technical by ceasing, in a sense, to debate problems of general strategy. I have proposed several subjects for discussion, such as the relations between the government and the intellectuals and the problem of the government’s credibility. It is true that we are pressed for time: We rarely have the opportunity to concern ourselves with theory. Without a measure of reflection, however, we risk remaining in a primitive stage of politics. By “politicization” I do not mean a partisan commitment, but rather a definition of the course the nation should adopt.

[Cazaban] In Romania there is, at the present time, an opposition and a dissidence. These are two civic attitudes which at bottom are mutually exclusive.

[Plesu] I, too, find this ambiguity to be unproductive. I believe that Romania is urgently in need of an organized opposition that can be a counterbalance to the government in power. Unfortunately, this opposition is slow in developing really precise contours. On the other hand,
certain “associations” call themselves nonpolitical but are very active politically. Every group that has a political program and political demands continues, with a kind of false innocence, to call itself “nonpolitical.” I find that to be ingenuous.

[Cazaban] Isn’t what we have here a kind of complex stemming from the devaluation of the concept of politics?

[Plesu] The fact is that for 43 years politics here has been synonymous with propaganda and lies. We must restore its real meaning. You can change political reality only by engaging in politics. As for the insincerity, I must say frankly that we had few genuine dissidents before the fall of the dictatorship. You couldn’t ask anyone to risk his neck and his freedom. We now find ourselves facing an “inflation” of dissidents who want to “consummate” an episode from which they have been unable to profit. Any dissident who writes in the daily press that no one can write the truth in the newspapers is not credible. We have today too many judges and too few active doers. Too many Romanians have a negative attitude and too few a positive outlook. What we need now is a clear, constructive, and committed opposition. The dissidents basically obstruct the political process, whereas the opposition wants to improve the government and, if need be, replace it.

[Cazaban] You were speaking just now of the beneficial use of the freedom of the press. We can also find examples of the misuse of that freedom. Would it not be possible, by means of an appropriate law, to limit the nationalist gesticulation that we see in certain newspapers, the defamatory slander buttressed with gross lies, and the barely concealed anti-Semitic attacks?

[Plesu] I am personally in favor of a law dealing with the press. Many Romanian journalists, however, especially those who work for the opposition newspapers, do not want to hear of it. They regard even the concept of such a law as inherently restrictive and therefore destined to restrict as much as to protect. But it’s an old reflex. The atmosphere here is such that if I were to translate the existing press law of any Western country and recommend it to our journalists, they would all cry “Stalinism - ” “totalitarianism,” and “the death of freedom of expression.”

[Cazaban] Because these laws also serve to guarantee the several freedoms, could consideration not be given to placing television under the authority of an independent entity that would act as guardian of the impartiality of the news?

[Plesu] I hope that will come to pass. In any event, there is a trend in that direction. The new television got off to a very bad start but has evolved to some extent toward a more assertive objectivity and a greater receptivity to differing points of view. Even at the risk of having a number of subjective television broadcasters, genuine diversity will only be attained when there are several independent networks. That will perhaps become a reality some day.

[Cazaban] Culture, in Romania, has often been a kind of refuge. Aren’t artists apt to be shocked by this excessive emphasis on economic considerations, or more prosaically, by the rush to make a profit?

[Plesu] The establishment of a new economic system— it is still in its beginnings—does in fact give rise to a certain atmosphere of gloom and uncertainty among intellectuals. In the communist era there were institutions such as the unions of creative artists, for example. They were charged with controlling the artists. Paradoxically, however, they made it possible for artists to enjoy relative independence and in certain cases even a measure of material tranquility.

[Cazaban] These unions had been diverted, in a sense, from their original mission of surveillance....

[Plesu] It seems clear now that these unions will disappear. Life will become more difficult for the creative artist. I recall that when Andrei Glucksmann came to Bucharest in December 1989, he warned us that because of the political change in our country the life style of people of culture and artists would be rendered more difficult. This is obviously true. The printing of books will be handled differently at the publisher’s; it will be impossible for the prices of books to remain unchanged; and materially, artists will never again encounter the situation they enjoyed before the revolution. It is dramatic, but true.

[Cazaban] Certain artists who had lived abroad for a long time—directors and producers such as Andrei Serban and Lucian Giurcescu—have returned to Romania. Hasn’t anyone in the field of music made an appearance?

[Plesu] We have had no proposals from that quarter. Maybe we have not listened closely enough.

[Cazaban] People often say that the Romanian intellectual suffers from a certain lack of appetite for music.

[Plesu] In the circle in which I myself move, it is true that music does not play a major role. Constantin Noica, our master thinker, was a genuine music lover as a young man. Later on, though, he hardly listened to music any more. Although we are a nation of musicians, Romanian intellectuals are by nature more inclined toward books. They are not yet sufficiently sensitive to what Noica called “the little soul that sings,” thereby denying music entry into the spheres of the mind.

[Cazaban] The government is at present totally subsidizing the world of music. Will it be able to maintain, at its expense, all the orchestras and lyric theaters that are currently active?

[Plesu] Romania has a considerable number of theaters, both dramatic and lyric, and many symphony orchestras.
These institutions are a burden, and are not all on a high level. Some of them remain in existence only because we are still operating according to communist logic, that is to say, we subsidize them automatically. In a genuine market economy, some of them—those that have been deserted by the public—would close their doors. Even at the Bucharest Opera, when Swan Lake is presented, there are more people on the stage than in the audience. A relative decline in interest in culture is explained by the competition from the politics of the day—for example, the televised debates, a form of expression completely new to us. There is also the competition from the print media. But if the cultural product, so to speak, is good, it will emerge victorious against this competition. La Trilogie Antique [The Antique Trilogy], produced by Andre Serban at the National Theater, was a smash hit.

[Cazaban] Are you still part of the Group for Social Dialogue [GDS]?

[Plesu] Yes I am, although I almost do not participate any more. Since January 1990 I have attended only one or two meetings. Many of my friends belong to it. I have questions as to whether its activities have been successful. When the GDS was formed in December 1989, we envisaged that it would evolve along different lines. Some persons who participated subsequently were motivating factors for eccentricity, and as a consequence the political activities of the movement did not succeed in producing the anticipated stability and dialogue. The GDS even provoked, following several strategic errors, a measure of animosity among the public that might have been avoided.

[Cazaban] Is there not, in these reactions among the public, a mistrust of the intellectual—a sensitivity that has been wounded?

[Plesu] The fact is that Romanian intellectuals had lost contact with the people long before the revolution. They have not reestablished contact since that time and continue to maintain a superficial attitude in their public relations. In this way the GDS has gradually taken on the appearance of an intellectual elite that makes very acute political analyses and holds firm positions but has to some extent lost contact with the real social vectors. Romanian intellectuals no longer have the feeling for dialogue that they had retained until World War II. They are no longer so concerned about communication, about a productive exchange of views with the population, or about genuine mutual understanding.

Footnotes
1. Constantin Noica (1909-87) is the most important Romanian philosopher of the second half of this century. Under the Communist regime, and after a number of years in prison, he was able to conserve his intellectual independence and, although marginalized, to transmit his precepts to a few rigorously chosen disciples including Andrei Plesu, Gabriel Liiceanu, and Sorin Vieru.

2. A group formed in December 1989 by intellectuals of repute with the aim of constituting a venue for reflection and meditation among the various social partners. The GDS publishes the weekly "22."

YUGOSLAVIA

Dimitrije Rupel Assesses Visit to Germany
91BA0451A Ljubljana NEODVISNI DNEVNIK in Slovene 22 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with Dimitrije Rupel, Slovene secretary for international cooperation, by an unidentified NEODVISNI DNEVNIK journalist; place and date not given: "Step by Step: The Germans Would Accept Slovenia's Secession With Understanding"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 22 March—We just asked Dr. Dimitrije Rupel, the republic secretary for international cooperation, who visited the FRG for two days as a member of a Slovene delegation (headed by President Milan Kucan), to give NEODVISNI DNEVNIK a brief assessment of the visit, which was given considerable attention in the German news media. We were interested in whether any specific economic agreements had been reached, and how German political circles currently viewed Slovenia's secessionist aspirations in light of the latest events in Yugoslavia.

Dr. Rupel said that although fully specific agreements were not adopted during the visit to the Baden-Wurttemberg province, their intermediators, especially Hermann Schaufler, the minister for the economy, medium-sized enterprises, and technology, asserted that they were prepared to assist Slovenia as partners in the economy, science, and technology. Possibilities are opening up in the area of the automobile industry and within the framework of so-called technological parks. We will certainly have to speak about this in more detail with our Minister Tancig.

[Rupel] The problem, of course, is that it is difficult to attract foreign capital until the situation here is settled. I explained that Slovenia was a safe area and that Slovenia's tourism facilities were far away from the "hot" parts of Yugoslavia. In this regard, we were shown understanding and sympathy.

With respect to the German attitude toward our aims, we can state that the recent events in Belgrade, and time in general, are working for us. In this regard, we must take into account a certain significant fact: Belgrade and Serbian political circles have much greater opportunities to explain their policy to the world, not least of all through the network of embassies, which conduct a policy that does not suit Slovene interests and is not in accordance with the actual situation in Yugoslavia. They have TANJUG, which formulates news intended for foreign countries in its own particular way, and also most of the foreign correspondents are located in Belgrade. In spite of that, the visits made—for instance, to the
Benelux countries and to the FRG—are improving that picture, and step by step, one can perceive progress. Although one can see that these are very small steps, if we compare things a year ago and today, we can nevertheless determine that the attitude is changing.

The meetings with Stercken, the chairman of the Bundestag’s foreign policy committee, and with Foreign Minister Genscher were significant. In particular, the latter said some things that are more favorable to us than before. I hope to say that we have achieved a new understanding of the previous statements by the Twelve, which were misinterpreted in Belgrade as support for the unitaristic forces and the Army. They accepted our explanation and said that they would mediate to have the order of priorities in those statements revised. Minister Genscher said that they could not accelerate the collapse of Yugoslavia, which is understandable, but that the FRG would accept Slovenia’s secession with understanding. It seems significant to me that in Yugoslavia’s case he used the word “nation,” and certainly in the past they talked mostly about ethnic conflicts. He clearly repeated twice that the FRG would not accept the use of force to settle Yugoslav conflicts.

[NEODVISNI DNEVNIK] Did you perhaps agree on any visit from the FRG?

[Rupel] Minister Genscher will come to Yugoslavia, and he will also meet with representatives of the republics, which is something new. The same is true of Hans Stercken, who is awaiting an opportunity to come to Yugoslavia. Let us not forget that some time ago he was rudely rejected by the federal government, and we tried several times to mitigate that unpleasant event. As you know, the Slovene parliament invited a delegation from the German parliament to visit Slovenia.
BULGARIA

Negative Aspects of Depoliticization of Army

AU1404210191 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 8 Apr 91 p 6

[Article by Stefan Prodev]

[Text] By the end of the 20th century, a cross will again adorn the Bulgarian military flag, as in the old days. In the meantime, inveterate “patriots” are talking about the appointment of military chaplains. Some even-more-enthusiastic zealots propose that Saint George should be the protector of our Army. For the time being, the questions of the crown [on Bulgaria’s coat of arms] and the question of reintroducing the system officers’ orderlies are still untouched, but they will certainly be raised. I hope that, in the not so remote future, writers such as G.P. Stamatov and Anton Strashimirov will again be banned from the libraries of Army personnel. Considering that we are returning to the epoch of “Orderly Dimo” and “Officer Gnoynishki,” such prohibitions would be natural.

All this “renewal” of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, which is proceeding partly under cover and partly in public, is accompanied by initiatives whose sources of inspiration are quite transparent.

Monarchist parties and societies are established, officers’ religious services are held, the combat flags that were consecrated in the fire of the Drava and Stracin battles are trampled upon, the glory of Russian military art is discredited, the monuments of the Soviet Army are desecrated, venerated memorial plates of dead heroes are destroyed, museums and document collections of the antifascist struggle are being closed down, and, naturally, Atlantic alliances, NATO, and Lieutenant Koli [name as transliterated] are more and more frequently invoked.

Discreetly at the beginning, but more and more openly today, certain forces in our society are taking advantage of depoliticization in the military sphere in order to achieve revanchist goals. Under the cover of slogans about democracy, the same forces are doing everything within their power to transform the Army from a protector of the people and of national security into an instrument of selfish political interests.

We are living in a dangerous time for our motherland. Any effort to undermine the Bulgarian soldier’s morale is likely to confront us with a national tragedy. Our borders are not yet the peaceful borders we are longing for. No one is standing behind us now that the Warsaw Pact has been dissolved. It is a delusion to hope that, in times of difficulties, NATO would offer us its selfless assistance. We are not Kuwait, and the Western democracies would not lose anything if someone like Saddam decided that he needed Thracia and invaded our country. Therefore, the only support we can rely upon is our own military strength. Only our own Army is capable of protecting us. Viewed from this aspect, even the most innocent-looking efforts to play around with the established order in the Army and with its self-confidence might be disastrous.

Naturally, Army life cannot be separated from the life of our society, and it needs democratic trends. Our Army will further develop and improve. However, this does not mean that it should be subject to changes that are likely to disgrace or disrupt its modern structures. Neither crosses, nor Saint George, nor any old-fashioned traditions and amateurish ambitions are likely to improve our soldiers’ morale and professional skill.

The road to Europe is not a military concept. We would hardly come across people with many courage along that path. However, unlike the market economy, the Bulgarian Armed Forces have their own path, which begins and ends on our native territory. Its only objective is to protect Bulgaria. For this reason, our soldiers should revere the nation, rather than Saint George, as their saint.

POLAND

Army Officers To Study in Western Countries

AU1204143791 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 9 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by (ord): “Equipment From the USSR. Know-How From the United States”]

[Text] “Over 14,000 professional soldiers left the Army in 1990 and this year the criteria determining discharge from the Army (age and education) are even more stringent,” said Gen. Bde. Ryszard Muchalik, chief of the Personnel Department of the Ministry of National Defense, at a news conference on Monday.

He announced that the Ministry will send Polish officers to study in the West, especially to the United States, Great Britain, and the FRG. “But we do not know how much this will cost,” he said. He reported that U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, during his Polish visit, had said that a U.S. delegation would come to Poland in April in order to establish conditions for the acceptance of Polish soldiers to study in the United States.

“At present, the FRG is training a few of our officers free of charge, and the Italians have also offered to do so,” said Gen. Bde. Muchalik.

He said that Poland has withdrawn every single Polish soldier from the USSR Military Political Academy, but there are still 74 officers studying at other military colleges in the USSR. “We cannot give up this training completely (it involves learning how to use equipment, not academic studies), because the Polish Army possesses Soviet equipment,” he said.

“The Soviet Army wants to withdraw its 32 officers who are studying in Poland, but has still not conveyed to the Ministry any official communication on this matter,” said Gen. Bde. Muchalik.
The personnel department chief also discussed compensation for those discharged from the Army for political reasons. He said that the ranks of soldiers who had fought in the Polish-Bolshevik War, the September 1939 campaign, the Home Army, Peasant Battalions, and the Polish Armed Forces in the West would be honored, and that such soldiers would receive decorations and promotion.

Soldiers discharged from the Army for political reasons, said Gen. Bde. Michalik, have been divided into three categories. The first category comprises those discharged between 1980 and 1990, the second comprises those discharged between 1967 and 1968, and the third those discharged between 1944 and 1979. Some 261 cases have been reviewed, in the first category 104 cases in the second category, and 236 cases in the third category.

"Those who were not actually readmitted into the Army have received compensation in the form of a personal letter from the defense minister, a higher rank in the reserves, a revocation of the old decision depriving them of their rank, or a payment of up to 5 million zlotys," said Gen. Bde. Michalik.

"We intend to adopt a system of contractual military service," Gen. Bde. Michalik continued. "This means that soldiers will be able to sign on for, say, five years of service, with the possibility of extending it for another five years. Until now, resignation from professional service has only been possible with the prior approval of one's superiors."

The general said that the Army will solve the problem of personnel shortages by means of attractive financial incentives for young soldiers to become professionals.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Polish-Bulgarian Transportation Firm

91BA0391A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
22 Feb 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by Lev Kokushkin, Warsaw-Sofia: "The Polish Baby of SOMAT [International Automotive Transportation Economic Association] is Already Walking and Has Set Aside 80 Million Zloty for the Bulgarian Children"—first paragraph is DEMOKRATSIYA introduction]

[Text] Furthermore, POLMAT is preparing to transport the rest of the Red Army from Germany all the way to Ashkhabad.

"The company has a good income, and I believe we earned it thanks to our associates of SOMAT. We would like the 80 million zloty from our share of the profits to be used to buy food for Bulgarian children."

"At the beginning of the 1980's, when the only thing the Polish stores could offer to customers was vinegar, I well remember how loads of Bulgarian food, gifts, and toys reached us. Now it is we who shall help you."

The first statement was made by Jozef Smuga, general director of Transbud; the second was made by Jerzy Zaskorski, president of KRAINPO. Last September, these two Polish companies, together with SOMAT, created the POLMAT Mixed Transport Company, the initial results of which were reported last week in Warsaw.

Toward the end of September of last year, when the first Mercedes trailers, which were sold by SOMAT, started on their journey from Sofia and Pazardzhik to Lodz, where the seat of POLMAT is located, the Bulgarian personnel became concerned: "Our leadership is providing work to Polish drivers, while we remain idle. The bosses are citing the crisis in the Middle East, but how can the Poles settle it, and why should we share the Western market with them?"

Insofar as I understood Anastas Vulkonov, deputy general director of SOMAT, the main reason for the creation of POLMAT is that the company's markets in Western Europe and the Middle East have limited prospects. The Middle Eastern area has been politically rather unstable for quite some time, and, in that area, the activities of the Bulgarian company have been either booming or sharply down.

As for Western Europe, SOMAT itself cannot independently enter the area because of a basic requirement: It must mandatorily cross Bulgaria when hauling freight between two European countries, which is ineffective. The possibility of creating a mixed company of the "joint venture" type with a Western company is quite problematical because, in that area, already-established haulers are at work, and taxes are quite high.

"Poland's tempestuous economic growth was our main reason to turn precisely to it," Mr. Vulkonov explained. "We obtained information that there were huge volumes of goods for export and import in that country, but the local transportation companies were unable to handle them. For that reason we decided that it is precisely Poland that could become the first country from the former socialist camp through which we could enter the Western market. We have acquired some experience and are already engaged in talks with colleagues in Moscow, the Ukraine, and the Baltic area, as well as in Czechoslovakia and Romania."

It was decided that the joint company would operate, at least in the beginning, essentially with trucks provided on credit by SOMAT—that is, the Bulgarians will be selling them and participating in the profits from their activities.

"I would like to emphasize this feature, the selling of the trucks," Mr. Vulkonov said. "This is very difficult from the psychological standpoint because the situation in our country is tense, unemployment is developing, and labor collective are becoming particularly sensitive to the loss of any jobs. However, we must think of the future of the association and, therefore, the future of those who work in it. We delivered the first trucks to POLMAT at a time when our haulage had dropped by about 20 percent, as compared to 1989, due to the occupation of Kuwait and the boycott of Iraq. Under those circumstances, some of the 3,500 Bulgarian trailers would have been idle. Therefore, the 46 Mercedes we sold are an insignificant percentage of our fleet—slightly over 1 percent. Now, as a result of the events in the Persian Gulf, a substantially higher number of trucks at SOMAT remain idle every day."

"Mr. Vulkonov, I was informed that you are selling your best trucks."

"We sold to our Polish partners truck tractors, most of which are 10 years old; usually, they are written off after seven or eight years. The Poles have to keep these Mercedes trucks in running condition. By marketing these trucks, SOMAT made an economically expedient deal because our share participation in POLMAT is $62,000, and, in less than three months, our profit was $42,000. The indications are that in six months we shall pay off our share, whereas, ordinarily, it takes three years for investments to be recovered."

"I would like to clarify something," added Petur Angelov, POLMAT president. "We obtained, also, 17 1988-model trucks. These are three-axle trucks, which are even more profitable. Currently, I am the only Bulgarian representative in the joint company. It is likely, however, that Bulgarian drivers and mechanics will come to Lodz if this is deemed expedient."

"We are operating according to the rules of economics," Vulkonov emphasized. "In this case, Polish manpower is less expensive because, if we send a Bulgarian to Lodz,
we would have to pay him more than the average local wage, which would make POLMAT noncompetitive on the local market.”

Incidentally, at present there are thousands of hauling companies in Poland. Most of them, however, own two or three trucks. POLMAT was able to quickly earn a good reputation, thanks above all to the fact that it is backed by a giant such as SOMAT. Actually, the benefit is reciprocal.

“SOMAT has always had to overcome a number of obstacles in crossing Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, where the road-usage fees for it have been exceptionally high,” Angelow noted. “Now we engage in hauling freight inaccessible to a Bulgarian company, such as from Poland to Sweden, Italy, Austria, and Germany, and back from Germany to the Soviet Union. Therefore, we are not competing with SOMAT, but, conversely, it is providing us with good income in foreign currency.”

“Where will this money come from?”

“One of the major shipments offered to us for 1991 has been the transportation of the ordnance of the Soviet troops from the former GDR to the USSR. We have been offered thousands of runs from Germany, including Berlin, to Ashkhabad.”

It may seem to a Bulgarian, who has already lost all hope in the labyrinth of poverty and economic confusion, that all that has been said so far is like a beautiful advertising poster. POLMAT, however, could not have started in such a good way without the specific Polish economic conditions of which, at this time, we can only dream. At the time the company was being set up in Poland, a packet of economic laws had already been passed that opened wide the gate of a market economy. The commercial code that supports any sensible economic initiative is being actively applied. A system of encouraging steps has been developed. Thus, for example, the profit earned by SOMAT can be transferred from Poland to Bulgaria without restrictions. For three years, POLMAT will pay no taxes, and this term could be extended by another three years.

Nonetheless, it was not clear to me why it was that Transbud and KRAPO had been actively looking for an associate in a semicomunist country with a collapsed economy.

“It is true that, when we decided to engage in this ‘joint venture,’ we relied, above all, on attracting a noted Western company,” explained Weslaw Andrys, POLMAT’s commercial director. “I knew, however, that the Bulgarian SOMAT enjoys a higher reputation in Europe and the Middle East. The managements of Transbud and KRAPO met with Mr. Angelow, who at that time was the representative of our association here, and he was able to convince us of the good opportunities of a Bulgarian-Polish transportation company. It is thus that POLMAT became the first joint enterprise to be organized last year by Poland with one of the former socialist countries.”

**BULGARIA**

**National Bank Raises Ceiling for Commercial Loans**

*AU0604200191 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 2 Apr 91 p 1*

[Report by Dimitrina Aleksandrova]

[Text] The board of the Bulgarian National Bank has decided to give the commercial banks, before the end of June, the right to increase their total debt in leva by 9 percent, as compared with the figure on 31 December 1991.

In this manner, the Bulgarian National Bank is trying to help the enterprises and companies. If they need credits in order to increase their production, they now have a chance to obtain them.

In practice, the decision does not affect the State Savings Bank, which recently has not been subject to limits on the maximum amounts of credit it is entitled to grant. The high interest rates form a natural barrier against the excessive appetites of prospective borrowers.

The interest rates also have a restraining influence on the enterprises, but some of them are nonetheless obliged to take credits—for example, for their circulating capital. In February, loans granted rose by 4 percent as compared with the end of December.

“The Bulgarian National Bank would not like to be accused of deepening the economic recession and therefore decided to raise the permitted credit limits,” said Lyubomir Filipov, director of the bank’s Bank Regulators and Analyses Department. “Nevertheless, we believe that credits should not be granted indiscriminately. We recommend that commercial banks grant loans primarily for the purposes of overcoming the decline in production and increasing supplies of consumer goods. The Bulgarian National Bank has no right to instruct the commercial banks on how they should grant credits, but we hope that they will bear in mind our recommendation. In any case, our economy is already oversupplied with credits.”

At the end of last year, enterprises and private individuals held in their hands amounts of money that exceeded the gross national product by about 6 percent. This means that there exists vast amounts of leva that are not covered. The precise term is an “excess of cash” in the economy, and Mr. Filipov asserts that no other country permits itself such a luxury.

Despite this, the IMF agreed to a certain increase in credits granted, as compared with the end of last year. In conditions of recession, this is the maximum extent by
which the Bulgarian National Bank can allow financial conditions to be liberalized.

"It would be more advantageous for producers and traders if we cut the base interest rate," Mr. Filipov considers. "The most important thing for us as a central bank is to halt inflation. However, at the moment, one cannot claim that no danger of a sharp rise in inflation exists."

The IMF specialists consider that the base interest rate of 45 percent, which is regarded as very high in Bulgaria, is in fact too low. In their view, it should be about 61 percent.

SDS Deputy Details ‘Equal Start’ Program
91B40406A Sofia DELOVI SVYAT in Bulgarian 25 Feb 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Nikolay Bliznakov, representing the SDS-Federation of Clubs for Glasnost and Democracy [Union of Democratic Forces-Federation of Clubs for Glasnost and Democracy], from the 103d Plovdiv Electoral District, and coordinator of the Equal Start Deputat Group, by Mariya Georgieva; place and date not given: "Is There (Finally!) an Economic Opposition to the Government?"; please see earlier interview published by DUMA on 29 Dec 1990 in JPRS-EER-91-016, 5 Feb 91, pp 18-19]

[Text] [Georgieva] What is the nature of the Equal Start program? Is its name an accurate description of its content?

[Bliznakov] Equal Start is an economic program for conversion to a market economy. The name Equal Start has led to some conflicting interpretations and unnecessary arguments. It is a metaphor. It is not a question of total equality. Our aspiration is to make a start in a market economy on the basis of more equitable positions. The program is based on the developments by the group for independent analyses and strategies. After this, we 25 SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] and BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] deputies created the Equal Start Deputat Club. In October, we submitted an updated program in the Grand National Assembly. Unfortunately, the program has not moved ahead since then. However, Equal Start is the only integral program other than that of the Lukanov government ever submitted to the assembly.

[Georgieva] What are the “foundations” of Equal Start?

[Bliznakov] The program is aimed at attaining a macro-economic balance in our country through radical monetary reform. The other fundamental difference between Equal Start and the intentions of Mr. Popov’s government is the approach to privatization.

[Georgieva] A great deal has been written and spoken in our country about an eventual monetary reform. Still, what does Equal Start offer?

[Bliznakov] We are contemplating a radical monetary reform with an even currency exchange up to a specified amount. Any sum in excess of that level—to be decided later but, let us say, 50,000 leva (this is only an example)—will no longer involve a parity exchange but less advantageous ratios, let us say 1:5 or 1:10. In practical terms, it will be a question of confiscating particularly substantial savings.

[Georgieva] What would be the consequences, and to what extent is such an act justified?

[Bliznakov] We proceed from two assumptions. The first is that, as a rule, it was impossible in our country to accumulate particularly substantial savings honesty. It is not out of the question that individual citizens may have accumulated them honestly. In rare cases, relief could be granted to some individuals. The confiscatory part of the monetary reform would unquestionably affect the people. According to our calculations, it would affect 2-3 percent of the population. Meanwhile, at present, millions of people will be affected by the interest rates charged on old loans. Our second consideration is that money is a bearer of information. However, the Bulgarian leva does not provide any information on the value of an individual or his contribution to our economy. A professor may have saved 2,000-3,000 leva; meanwhile, a speculator could be carrying 200,000 leva in a small bag. The money does not show the value of these people but is like a computer program contaminated by a virus.

[Georgieva] Does your Equal Start program stipulate some other steps along with the monetary reform?

[Bliznakov] Equal Start also calls for freezing citizens' deposits above a certain level and for a specific period of time, let us say one year. Below that level, let us say 1,000 or 2,000 leva, the money could be withdrawn freely. Above that amount, it could be withdrawn only in cases stipulated by the law, such as buying a house and acting through the bank. This means that the people will rely essentially on the “live” money they have earned plus, naturally, pensions, supplements, and so forth. The purpose is to prevent savings from flowing toward the market. We may expect that, once the accounts have been frozen and followed by a price liberalization, the necessary goods will appear on the market. Why? Because the companies will launch a feverish search for leva in order to be able to pursue their normal economic activities. Looking for goods becomes unprofitable. It is the goods that will start looking for leva and not the opposite. With this variant, the liberalized prices cannot jump as high as they are doing now. We are looking at an increase of 25-30 percent and a very normal rate of inflation. Furthermore, we are calling for the introduction of a steep one-time tax on large real estate and other holdings. This will also be a tax on company commodity stocks. A huge number of such companies have overinsured themselves and are now earning their profits because of the new prices. It was precisely such speculative activities that did not suffer from the steps the
government took. The victim was the ordinary person, whose savings have now been depreciated by a factor of 4-5. We are also suggesting a superprofit tax, mainly affecting the banks and brokering organizations.

[Georgieva] What are the arguments "against" the monetary reform? One is that the printing of new currency will be quite expensive....

[Bliznakov] I do not consider this a serious argument. The sum of 1 billion, which was mentioned as necessary for a monetary reform, could be compensated by amounts of Bulgarian leva illegally taken out of the country. According to expert evaluations, this amount is not less than 2.5-3 billion. With a monetary reform, this money would simply vanish. Furthermore, 50-leva bank notes have already been printed in our country. Now 100-leva notes will be printed; as for the others, we do not know the denominations. We are already printing notes to service inflation. The likelihood is high that, unless we succeed in controlling inflation, we would have to have another monetary reform. At that point, the cost of printing the notes would double. To control inflation, the government is taking very harsh measures. However, a restrictive credit policy necessarily leads to a recession in production. According to our preliminary expert studies, the drop will range between 20 and 30 percent, whereas, with a monetary reform, according to our calculations, the recession will not exceed 8-9 percent. The monetary reform would also reduce some of the debts of enterprises. Another objection to the monetary reform could be that it is a coercive administrative act. However, this is also the case with the currently applied options.

[Georgieva] You said that privatization is the second foundation of the Equal Start program.

[Bliznakov] Yes, privatization is the backbone of the reform. Equal Start suggests that the accumulated national wealth must be returned to the people free of charge, in the same way the land is being returned to the peasants. It is a question of confiscating the added value, or else for the mandatory contributions that were made in the development of our industry to be returned to the people. This is because you cannot sell to someone something that does not belong to you. This is simply a legal absurdity. It is morally unjustified, and we are proving that it is also economically ineffective. We view privatization as returning to every adult Bulgarian citizen a share of what was until recently known as national property, under the form of investment checks (vouchers). The citizens would receive a certain sum that they would use exclusively for stock purchases. The stock would be auctioned off. A variety of options are possible. A table of rates may be drawn up to determine, on the basis of labor seniority and age, who would receive how much. It is the principle that matters, and the rest will be a question of evaluation and specific agreements. We suggest that privatization take place quickly, on the basis of the value of the enterprise, according to its documents. Naturally, this would be only an initial bidding price.

[Georgieva] How will this approach to privatization reflect on the effectiveness of the economy, and what production incentives will there be?

[Bliznakov] We are contemplating granting some advantages to enterprise collectives. According to one of the options, the personnel may participate in the bidding along with any other person. However, after purchasing the stock, they would be given, let us say, a 30-percent discount. Another option is for some of the stock to be set aside for the personnel of a given enterprise, and for no outside competitors to be allowed to participate. The balance would be auctioned off to the public.

[Georgieva] What are your opponents' counterarguments?

[Bliznakov] I may sound somewhat bold in saying that no serious arguments have been "fired" at us. We were told that we are overvaluing the Bulgarian people and that speculators would buy such investment checks (vouchers) from the old people for a pittance. This argument is ridiculous and insulting to the Bulgarian people, who have a strong feeling for the market and would not be tricked all that easily. In Czechoslovakia, it is anticipated that between 30 and 70 percent of privatization will take place through vouchers. The same applies to Poland. Therefore, this idea is not some kind of wild Balkan concept—the more so inasmuch as the population does not have sufficient available cash for privatization. The money with which one could privatize is, in practice, the result of speculation. It is dirty money, and the ordinary person may have saved some 2,000 or 3,000 leva. Does this mean that we shall have to sell our capital assets cheaply? Naturally, at this point it could be said that foreign capital, as well, will participate in the auctions. However, we must be particularly careful about the penetration of foreign capital into our country. The second argument in opposition to our variant of privatization is that the property should not be dispersed among hundreds of people but should be concentrated in a smaller number of hands. In the West, a stockholding company is the main form of ownership, and there are no indications whatsoever that this type of company functions any worse than an enterprise with a single owner.

[Georgieva] One of the arguments against Equal Start is the fact that the foreign debt of the country cannot be divided evenly....

[Bliznakov] I do not understand the problem we have here. The way in which the state will be able to extract, in the form of taxes and by other means, some of the profits of the stock companies is not all that different from the way it would be able to extract this amount from single owners. In either case, this debt will be repaid by the state budget and not by individual citizens.
[Georgieva] How do you assess the initial steps taken by the government?

[Bliznakov] Clearly, the initial steps taken by the government are not aimed at the implementation of our Equal Start program. In our view, a price liberalization without a market, without competition or at least demonopolization, not to mention the privatization of enterprises and the formulation of a method for watching and controlling some prices, is senseless. Furthermore, it would be dangerous. Freeing prices would lead to tremendous pressure on the population, pressure that would not differentiate between the victims and the culprits of the economic catastrophe. The Equal Start program has a number of supporters in parliament. However, it would be difficult to say how many people would support it in an open fight against the intentions of the government. We clearly will constitute an economic opposition to the government. We would not like to hinder it, but we cannot remain silent, either. For a start, we intend to be useful by submitting our specific ideas.

POLAND

Negotiations with EC on Association Status

91EP03578 Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish No 30, 9 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Alexander H. Dijckmeester, chief representative of the Commission of the European Community in Poland, by Tadeusz Zielinski; place and date not given: “Building Bridges”]

[Text] [Zielinski] The European Economic Community engages in various forms of economic relations with nonmember countries. One rather rarely employed such form is association status. In view of the recent commencement of the related negotiations between the EC and Poland, could you please comment on the specific nature of such a status?

[Dijckmeester] An agreement on association status should not be identified with associate membership. To avoid misunderstandings, let me explain that this concerns integrating Poland to a greater extent with the European Economic Community, establishing ties at a higher level than that ensuing from the Trade Treaty of September 1989. The agreement currently being negotiated is of a different nature and comprises a number of sectors and fields: industry, agriculture, trade, and movement of capital and people. In addition, in some respects it is extended to cover cultural and political matters. Thus, this concerns greater rapprochement of economies and needed—in view of the weakening trade ties—assistance in building bridges linking Poland to the world economy. Such an agreement for association status is to cover 10 years and be divided into two stages. After the first five years, it is to be reviewed with the object of identifying domains in which cooperation should be enhanced. During that stage the Polish side will be able to cope with the anticipated requirements entailed in the conduct of further political and democratic reforms following the parliamentary elections. As regards the program for economic reforms, these will take a longer time and in that respect, too, help from the European Community can be expected.

[Zielinski] Poland’s ultimate objective in its relations with the EC is membership. In your opinion, which aspects of our economic policy would require priority in adaptive changes in order to reduce to a minimum the intervening period?

[Dijckmeester] Let me first of all refer to the estimates of the Polish government, which indicate that the implementation of essential economic reforms in Poland will take 10 years, that is, last until the year 2000. Poland often desires to be compared with the Spain of 1975. I do not think it a bad comparison. Well, that country needed about 10 years, and even after it became an EC member some of its sectors still availed themselves of the conditions of the transition period. I believe that a 10-year period would represent a good time frame and in practice impose a good orientation. To be sure, the treaty on association status does not specify that the ultimate objective is full membership, but it represents a very good instrument for assisting the government organized processes of adapting the economy to more international standards. A major but time-consuming direction of such activity is the adaptation of legislation and regulations, such as has already been accomplished by, e.g., Austria. Your government has already established under the Office of the Council of Ministers the Bureau for European Integration directed by Undersecretary of State Mr. Saryusz Wolski, who will initiate and coordinate these actions. All the ministries of state are to review their ordinances and regulations from this point of view. Among other important matters I would also, of course, mention the restructuring and privatization of the economy and strengthening the powers of the Antimonopoly Office. We also are cooperating with the Ministry of Industry, the Antimonopoly Office, and the Ministry of Ownership Transformations.

[Zielinski] Do you perceive in international political relations any new elements that could influence the speed with which the agreement for Poland’s association with the EC and the terms of that agreement can be concluded?

[Dijckmeester] My answer to this question would have to be personal and cannot be interpreted as the official position of the EC. I believe that in the event that the political situation in the Soviet Union deteriorates markedly, this would threaten such countries as Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia. And then new elements to be considered by the EC would appear. That is because we would be extremely disturbed should the present reforms be imperiled by events in the East. During the last meeting at Visegard the discussion also extended, as
I understand it, to aspects of security affecting cooperation among the three countries represented there. These are the factors I am referring to.

[Zielinski] Thank you for the interview.

**Canadian Foundation Aids Housing Development**

91EP0356B Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish No 26, 28 Feb 91 p 8

[Article by (AZ): “Polish-Canadian Apartments”]

[Text] Negotiations are under way on obtaining land parcels to be developed. The mayor of Warsaw and administrators of individual gmina-districts are reviewing the offer of the Canadian-Polish Foundation for the Development of Construction. This foundation was set up in November of last year by the Canadian company Sofram and the Echinus Investment Corporation. Its objective is to build in Poland modern subdivisions of residential housing together with commercial facilities and health care units.

The foundation was set up with a view to transferring the Canadian technology of construction of multifamily residential buildings, health care, service, and commercial facilities, as well modern equipment, and designs. Dr. Andrzej Kumor, chairman of the foundation’s council, informed RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE about the efforts already made which will serve to draw up prefeasibility studies for the enterprise and about marketing research to determine the purchasing power of Polish society. This has to do with apartments being made available in the buildings erected by the Canadian-Polish Foundation for the Development of Construction in one of three ways: Sales for cash, installment sales (20 percent down with the rest being payable over 25 to 30 years), or simple renting.

In the event of favorable decisions on construction, the Canadian side will ensure foreign credits, whereas the Polish side will take care of all matters associated with beginning construction. This also involves looking for Polish producers of materials and contractors. According to preliminary calculations, the construction of the houses of the foundation should begin within one and one-half years; the first residents will move in several months later.

**February 1991 Foreign Trade Figures Given**

91EP0356A Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish No 30, 9 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by (TER): “Foreign Trade: February”]

[Text] We registered high rates of growth in our foreign trade, recession trends persisting in the economy notwithstanding (product sales in industry in two months were 3.2 percent lower than last year). Therefore, alarmist predictions concerning the unfavorable influence of the stable foreign exchange rate of the dollar have not been confirmed; it does not appear to be excessively harming exports or excessively stimulating imports, with the exception of foodstuffs.

As has been the case with GUS [Central Office of Statistics] practices for several months now, the February data include the entirety of trade, including that by foreign companies, small-scale manufacturing enterprises, foundations, and individuals. In February, exports in constant prices were 19.8 [percent] higher than a year ago, and almost two times higher than in January. Correspondingly, imports increased compared to last year by 36.4 percent, but only by 9.3 percent compared to January. However, a marked deterioration of the terms of trade occurred. The average price of exports in dollar-denominated trade declined by 0.2 percent compared to January, but import prices jumped by as much as 10.9 percent. A deterioration also occurred in ruble-denominated trade in which export prices were 2.5 percent higher and import prices were 3.1 percent higher than in January.

Dollar-denominated exports amounted to $1,146 million in February, and were 46.4 percent higher than a year ago and almost 90 percent higher than in January. The growth rate of exports in the two months amounted to 53.4 percent. Exports of products of the electrical and machine-building industry grew the most, by 90 percent; they amounted to one-quarter of dollar-denominated exports. The growth rates of exports were similar in other commodity groups, ranging between 34 and 54 percent.

Imports amounted to $985 million, which was 63.3 percent more than last year. The value of fuel and energy imports, which accounted for 30 percent of the overall imports for convertible currencies, increased the most—by a factor of eight. The rate of growth in the remaining commodity groups varied. It amounted to almost 100 percent for the products of the food industry, to 80 percent for the products of agriculture, and to only 10 percent for the products of the electrical and machine-building industry.

Ruble-denominated trade picked up. Exports in February were 250 percent higher than in January, and amounted to 494 million rubles. This was one-half of last year’s level, whereas it was supposed to be only the arrears of last year’s contract. Products of the electrical machine-building industry accounted for three-quarters of such exports; chemical exports amounting to 52 million rubles in February ranked second. They grew compared to January by a factor of nine.

Ruble-denominated imports grew in February by more than 90 percent, to 265 million rubles, or 40 percent of the level of last year. Products of the machine-building industry, which accounted for 70 percent, likewise prevailed in imports. We succeeded in buying fuel for 16 million rubles, and foodstuffs for a similar amount. The rest of the items were marginal.
The positive ruble balance which amounted to 3.7 million rubles in January increased to 232 million rubles in February.

Credit Bank Corporation's Operations Viewed
91EP0356C Warsaw RYNNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish No 29, 7 Mar 91 p 5

[Article by (TEK): “More Bank Windows in Warsaw”]

[Text] The Credit Bank S.A. is one of the 15 banks entitled to engage in foreign exchange operations and cooperate with foreign countries in banking. It is beginning its operations by opening the first branch in Warsaw. The decision to establish the bank was made in August, and it was registered in September of last year.

The bank was set up in the form of a joint-stock company with a predominance of private capital. Initial capital amounted to 30 billion zlotys and was supplied by four founding shareholders. These were three limited companies—RDS Centrum, the Awalo Production, Service, and Trade Enterprise, and RDS Bankier. They, i.e., private capital, accounted for 60 percent of the initial capital. The State Credit Bank representing state capital received the remaining 40 percent of the shares.

At an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders at the end of last year, it was resolved to increase the stock of the company to 200 billion zlotys by issuing new shares. Seventy percent of the new issue was divided among the founding members. The remaining 30 percent ended up with 10 new shareholders. They include three individuals and three foreign trade organizations—Paged, Budimex, and Elektromontaz. It is not ruled out that subsequent issues of shares will end up in the exchange.

The Credit Bank S.A. is a universal bank. Its basic goal is to provide all banking services, and to continuously develop and modernize them. The extent of services offered is comprehensive indeed. They are available to both private persons [as published; “corporate persons” is called for] and individuals. In addition to the services enumerated in the announcement, the bank also provides services which include financial advice to its clients, as well as appraising assets used as collateral for the loans extended, and analyzing the financial and economic efficiency of projects submitted to the bank or requested by other financial institutions.

Despite its very short period of operation, the bank has already managed to underwrite 150 billion zlotys in loans; the amount of its balance as of the end of last year exceeded 300 billion zlotys.

The first multicurrency account has already been opened in Vienna at the Algemene Bank Nederland (Oesterreich) for foreign operations. Negotiations with other banks in Western Europe on opening correspondent accounts are underway.

The first branch, started in Warsaw, features a satellite system for telecommunication links and general computerization of banking operations. The bank plans many modern arrangements, such as automatic teller machines, credit cards, contacting clients by computer, and so on.

It is planned to increase the number of branches in various cities to six by the end of the year. The most progress has been made toward opening a branch in Gdansk.

Nonferrous-Metals-Processing Plant To Modernize
91EP0357A Warsaw RYNNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish No 27, 2 Mar 91 p 7

[Article by (hen): “Boliden Offers an Opportunity to Szopienice”]

[Text] Polish factories have become so impoverished as to be unable to afford major modernization and expansion projects. Even large enterprises which export an appreciable part of their output have too few funds for investing. A genuine opportunity for overcoming this impasse is afforded by cooperation with foreign companies, especially those offering modern technologies and capital support.

Among other plants, the Szopienice Nonferrous Metals Plant in Katowice, one of the largest Polish nonferrous-metals-processing enterprises, is trying to avail itself of these possibilities. Its expansion program envisages the modernization of both antiquated production facilities and those built as recently as 15 or so years ago.

Owing to ecological considerations the modernization of the lead department, and specifically of the facility for processing storage-battery scrap, is deemed to be the most urgent task. At present the country’s entire storage-battery scrap is being processed on the basis of antiquated and environmentally unusually deleterious technologies by two firms, Szopienice in Katowice and Orzel Bialy in Brzeginy near Bytom. The Szopienice plant intends to process all of the country’s storage-battery scrap (about 40,000 metric tons annually) and completely meet the demand of storage-battery and cable industries for fusible lead. This would require a thorough modernization of the existing facility, the introduction of a modern processing technology, and the installation of completely new equipment.

The Szopienice plant has succeeded in finding a partner interested in participating in this investment project and providing suitable technology and capital. It is Boliden, a Swedish company, which specializes in processing worn storage batteries and other kinds of electrical batteries. Its plant in Landkrona is a paradigm of modernity: the equipment operated does not pollute natural environment, and the facility itself resembles a laboratory rather than a metallurgical department. The technology proposed by the Boliden company assures not
only reducing to a fraction (one-fifteenth or so, compared with the traditional processing techniques) the emissions of impurities and lead but also total neutralization of the electrolyte present in old storage batteries, an electrolyte containing compounds of sulfur and lead.

The cost of the project, which the Szopienice plant would like to initiate as early as this year, is estimated at $20 million. The concept of establishing a joint venture in which both the Swedish and the Polish partners would share about equally, is being considered. Boliden guarantees a speedy implementation of the project.

In the 1970's, two modern—for those times—processing facilities were built at the Szopienice plant: a rolling mill for the cable industry and a copper and brass sheet and tape rolling mill. The first of these facilities is no longer in operation. The second must be modernized in order go broaden its processing scope and cope with the competition as regards quality. The cost of the first stage of its modernization is estimated at another $20 million. The plant cannot afford such an outlay.

As in the case of modernizing the facility for processing storage-battery scrap, the Szopienice plant is looking for partners interested in participating in this project. Italian companies, as well as several Polish ones, are being considered. Since the productive capacity of the rolling mill markedly exceeds domestic demand, the plant would like to find a partner who would not only contribute capital but also help it to market its products abroad. In this case, a joint-stock company is being considered.

It appears that enterprises of the nonferrous metals industry should not just recruit foreign capital. In view of their interdependence and technological ties, they should form joint companies and jointly implement many investments relating to, e.g., the production and processing of silver, zinc, cadmium, etc. This would streamline efficiency. A major obstacle to forming such joint undertakings seems to be, however, the complete disintegration of this industrial subsector.

Profitability of Coke, Coal-Derivative Exports
91EP0356D Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE
in Polish No 31, 12 Mar 91 p 7

[Article by (hen): “Exporting Coke and Coal Derivatives is Good Business”]

[Text] Compared to the massive exports of Polish hard coal, the exports of coke and by-products of the coking process are almost twice as profitable. Despite the fact that the coke industry is considered to be in decline, that there is a shortage of investment funds for it, and that ecologists see it as a considerable threat to the environment, we should be aware that every ton of coal which ends up in a coke oven ultimately becomes twice as valuable.

At present, it is difficult to determine how much coke and coal derivatives we export because the decentralization of economic management caused financial and economic data to be dispersed. Information obtained from one of the largest producers in this field, the Coke Chemistry Combine Zabrze, appears interesting from this point of view.

Last year, the value of exports from this enterprise amounted to 329 billion zlotys, that is, almost one-quarter of the total value of sales. Coke was the main export item (73 percent). A total of 385,000 tons of several varieties of this fuel were shipped abroad. Austria has been a constant purchaser of coke from the combine in Zabrze for many years now. Last year, 60,000 tons, worth about 64 billion zlotys, were sold to this country.

The profit margin of exported coke compared to inland prices was high. The contract price exceeded the domestic price for the grade nut coke-I considerably. The contract price for the grade nut coke-I was 40 percent higher, for the grade nut coke-II almost 60 percent higher, and in the case of the grade "quick coke," as much as 90 percent higher. The profitability gradually declined during last year due to an increase in the domestic price of coking coal and coke itself. Nonetheless, it is estimated that in the first quarter of this year the combine will sell abroad approximately 60,000 tons of this fuel. The export policy of the enterprise is based on the principle that the contract price should exceed the level of domestic prices in all cases.

Coal derivatives, that is, coal-tar pitch, benzene, light oil, tar camphor, sodium phenolate, and others, are other export items of the combine. A total of more than 80,000 tons of these products worth 87 billion zlotys were exported last year. The profit margin of exports with regard to individual items ranged between 20 to 56 percent. It should be stressed that coal derivatives are exported only to the countries of what was referred to, until recently, as the second payments zone [capitalist countries]. These exports are handled by an export bureau operating at the enterprise. Despite the certain profitability of such exports, this industry is still treated as a stepchild in our country. Yet, instead of exporting a plain raw material on a large scale, we should seek to "squeeze" everything technologically possible from coal.

Television Assembly Plant To Open in Mlawa
91EP0349A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 10, 9 Mar 91 p 4

[Article by Walerian Dziczkiewicz: "Mlawa Electronics"]

[Text] In Mlawa, which after last year's strike became the symbol of a rebellious Polish province, Japanese electronics are making an entry with the help of an American company managed by a Pole. The first OTAKE color television assembly plant in our country is already taking real shape. The timetable is precise; it is expected that in
mid-April of this year the first televisions will roll off the assembly line. The line has been ready and waiting for a few weeks already, and Mlawa is waiting to take a cultural step forward. Paraphrasing the clever slogan of the antiexcess wage tax demonstrations, one can say “OTAKE [this is the kind of] Mlawa we wanted” [a play on words].

First, however, Jerzy Lachut, director of the local Unitra [television plant], was concerned about saving the factory. After a few months of administrating, he came to the conclusion that there is no point in breaking down doors in electronics which are already open, if others already have methods which are good and are proven. The plant did badly last year, just as many other factories in this branch. Orders stopped coming in and mass layoffs began. Of the almost 1,000-man work force at the end of 1989, scarcely one-fourth remained 12 months later.

Director Lachut heard that Curtis International, which for three years has been selling electronics equipment in Poland made by the Japanese company Orion Electric, known in our country under the name OTAKE, intends to set up an assembly plant. Why not in Mlawa? But the first visit by a Curtis representative dashed all hopes for access to the latest electronics technologies. A much larger production floor was needed for the assembly plant than was available in the Mlawa Unitra. The chance at attracting American capital and Japanese televisions was slipping away.

The town’s leaders came to the director’s assistance. The mayor of Mlawa, Adam Chmielinski, made it a case of now or never. He found suitable production space, built recently, in the Voivodship Water Services Plant [WZUW]. The head of Curtis, Zbigniew Niemczycki, liked this idea, even though he had already investigated several other sites in Poland.

The production space was suitable, but its owners did not even want to hear the proposal made to them by the mayor, and later by the Ciechanow voivode.

“We did not fight for good working conditions in our firm just to move somewhere else now. It took us 33 months to build the production space we needed, a warehouse, and a social building, and suddenly the mayor and some American who wants to move into something readymade and do business there, have taken a liking to it. It is not a case here of the town’s interests, but of organizing a group of exploited labor Negroes to work,” argued the WZUW employees, defending themselves against a move of the plant to some other place.

It appeared that the old would collide with the new. Jerzy Pstragowski, the longtime director of the plant, came to its defense. A protest campaign began, using the slogans: “Water for the countryside, or televisions?” and “A television assembly plant is a blow to the voivodship’s agriculture.”

The plant builds water lines for the countryside and maintains the existing ones. But it uses State Treasury money and it was this money that was also used to build the firm’s new accommodations.

They did not understand the resistance of the plant’s official owner. There are over 3,000 unemployed in Mlawa and its environs, and when the creation of a few hundred new jobs with good pay is proposed to them, they begin to protest.

The meeting of the mayor and the deputy voivode, Michal Wojciak, with the WZUW workforce, the explanation that no one wants to liquidate the plant, that it is only a case of moving its headquarters while retaining its structure and working conditions, was not convincing. Three proposals for a new site were rejected by the director.

The voivode, Andrzej Wojdylo, as one of the plant’s originators, seeing what was happening and that the matter cannot be settled to the satisfaction of everyone, decided to invoke all of his powers. “I do not want to increase the unemployment in the voivodship, which is already one of the highest from the standpoint of the unemployment index. Therefore, when someone wants to invest in our area, creating new jobs and making it possible for us to come into contact with the latest technologies, he will have my support.”

Because the dispute was becoming protracted, the voivode dismissed director Pstragowski and appointed a new one. Then things began to move fast and a contract to lease the WZUW space for 40 years was signed. The present owner is moving to a new site, 300 meters away. The adaptive work, financed by Curtis International, is under way. And where the television assembly line is to be, work crews are scurrying around preparing the space to meet the Japanese requirements for quality and cleanliness.

Meanwhile, in the Mlawa Unitra, another group dismissal occurred—over 150 persons. This thickened the atmosphere around the first foreign investment in the town. Zbigniew Niemczycki came personally from Curtis by helicopter to a meeting with the Unitra workforce and explained to them what this is all about. He promised that with time, after the assembly plant is in operation, he will take care that Unitra, too, has something to do. A list of persons was compiled by those who had lost their jobs giving them priority in employment in OTAKE. The group in charge of the sequence on this list demanded that director Lachut sign a guarantee as to the validity of the list. But he promised only that as a future director of Curtis Electronics—that is the name of the assembly plant—he would take this into account in making a selection of employees. “I expect that about 70 percent of the workforce of the assembly plant will be former Unitra employees anyway. Those people are already familiar with electronics and it will be easier for them to master the elements of television assembly. The sooner we put the assembly plant into operation, the
sooner it will be possible to increase the number of jobs and good earnings," said Jerzy Lachut.

Zbigniew Niemczycki, head of Curtis International and vice president of the American firm SeerVaa, whose sales are $4 billion annually, confirmed this. He left Poland in the mid-1970's and went up the ladder very fast in the United States. He is a close colleague of Dr. Buert SeerVaa, President George Bush’s advisor on Polish affairs. “The assembly plant is the first step,” says Niemczycki in describing its prospects. “What comes next will depend entirely and wholly on the people in this area. We do not intend to send in anyone from the outside. Every employee, from the director down to the cleaning woman, will be a resident of Mlawa and its environs. After several months, if everything goes well, we want to set up a stamping press producing cabinets for the television sets. Unitra can soon assemble teletext plates. Later we will put in a production line to produce packaging. Insofar as possible, everything having to do with the production of televisions, along with packaging them, will be done here. Approximately 200,000 televisions a year will be assembled here and they will be the cheapest televisions in Poland.”

Many residents of Mlawa are asking: Well and good, but what does the city get out of this? Right now, not very much, although the mayor is happy that the first step was taken. With time, he believes, it should pay. The fees will increase the city’s coffers and the example of a successful investment may encourage other foreign investors to place their capital in Mlawa. Mlawa craftsmen are already looking for an “in” with Niemczycki because they want to coproduce with his firm. The Electronics Engineering School is also counting on cooperation and employment for its graduates. In any case, the head of the concern himself, Dr. Beurt SeerVaa, who visited Mlawa and said with satisfaction that his assistant chose a good place for the investment, has promised this.

The helicopter has become a symbol in Mlawa of better times for the city. Every flight by Niemczycki produces something new. For now, this is a beginning, possibly the beginning, as Dr. SeerVaa said in the television program “Economic Express,” of a future Electronics Center in Poland.

Privatization, although verbally accepted by the majority of society, is giving rise to many conflicts of interests and causing widespread differences in attitudes. The differences in views relate to the scope, rate, method, and goals of privatization, as well as its possible consequences—a drastic reduction in standard of living, and unemployment. Already in the first stage of privatization, conducted according to Western principles and methods, the social resistance, particularly that of workers and union organizations, is forcing some modifications to be made. Without social acceptance it appears doubtful that privatization plans can be implemented. To what degree, therefore, does society give permission for ownership transformations?

The lines of division in views toward privatization and its effects run not just through different socio-occupational groups. The views of the same people, on one hand enmeshed in conflict between short and long-term interests, and on the other hand bearing the high costs of the reforms being made, are not in agreement.

Unemployment is an example of a phenomenon which is perceived in different ways; not all categories of workers regard it as a real threat. Employees of state enterprises are those most often fearing a loss of employment and it is they who assess their chances of obtaining a new job as relatively poor. These fears are confirmed by Main Office of Statistics [GUS] information. At the end of January 1990, 1,195,656 jobless were registered, i.e., almost 10 percent of the workers in the national economy (outside of agriculture). Blue-collar workers constitute 67.8 percent of the total unemployed. There has been a large regres in employment in industry—in January 1990 there were 3,350,800 industrial workers, i.e., 13.6 percent less than in December 1989. Furthermore, in recent weeks unemployment has been rising precipitously, evoking particular social repercussions.

In the spring of last year the unemployment index was much lower, but even then our respondents felt a clear sense of danger and an uncertain tomorrow.

Cautious and Distrustful

Views on ownership transformations are quite uniform. On one hand there are the respondents who make up a proreform group: directors of enterprises, Solidarity activists, and self-management. On the other hand are the respondents who are cautious and distrustful of ownership transformations, especially if these transformations were to affect their place of work. In this group are the blue-collar workers and OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement] activists. Every second blue-collar worker and every second OPZZ activist feels that his job is at risk in the enterprise, while for the directors, the Solidarity activists, and the self-management, the prospects of losing a job appear to be lower (20-30 percent). These differences are affected also by the differences in branches: employees in the textile industry feel that they are the most at risk.
Over 30 percent of low and middle level managers are afraid that they will lose their jobs. The figures on feeling [a sense] of job security and “I don’t know” answers are the same.

The anxiety and feeling of threat of joblessness is affected by several factors, in a certain sense unrelated. First is the level of professional competence, and second—felt and perceived by others—affiliation with the victorious political camp (or lack thereof). The differences in the sense of security between managers, Solidarity activists, and self-management, is explained by this. Despite the fact that managers and self-management activists are people of similar education, occupying similar positions in the enterprise, self-management and Solidarity activists are perceived most often as those who, by their activity, contributed to the ongoing transformations. Managers, however, are believed rather to be the executors of the instructions of the previous government, or, at the most, as people who are passive in relation to the transformations taking place.

The situation of self-management and Solidarity activists is somewhat different. There are representatives of the victorious political camp in both groups, but on average the self-management activists have a higher level of education and professional competence than the Solidarity activists, which obviously has a bearing on a stronger sense of job security among the self-management group. An even more important factor explaining differences in the declared sense of security may be the fact that the workforce self-management still has broad ruling prerogatives, while the trade unions can take advantage mainly of “negative rule” (strikes, protests, etc.).

A declared threat of joblessness is connected both with how the situation in the workplace is perceived as well as with views on the subject of the consequences of joblessness—as a permanent and universal phenomenon. How do those polled assess the positive and negative effects of unemployment?

Every second blue-collar worker and every second OPZZ activist opts for full employment. Directors, Solidarity activists, and self-management activists take the position that unemployment is permissible. Directors are almost 100-percent advocates. Solidarity and self-management activists, as a rule, share the view that there must be unemployment, as do lower and middle level managers. There is a economic sector differentiation here. In the machines branch, 91.5 percent of the Solidarity representatives are in favor of allowing unemployment, while in the textile industry (where unemployment is the highest), the percentage of those allowing unemployment drops to 60 percent.

Unemployment is often regarded as a factor which hastens solutions to the country’s economic difficulties. That, as a rule, is what directors, half the Solidarity and self-management activists, and most OPZZ activists, think. Among blue-collar workers, one-third of those polled share this view, one-third is against, and one-third has no opinion.

Losses and Gains

The anticipated effect of unemployment on personnel policy has also been examined. Most of the polled directors, Solidarity and self-management activists, believe that under conditions of unemployment, the management personnel will have better opportunities to correctly evaluate and select employees. Managers, as usual, take an intermediate position here.

Is unemployment perceived as the loss of an important social gain in the labor world, i.e., a guarantee of employment?

That is exactly what more than half the blue-collar workers and two-thirds of the OPZZ activists believe. A decided majority of directors reject this view; however, self-management and Solidarity activists take an ambivalent position here.

These opinions are connected with views on the past system, which provided job security. Our respondents had three possible answers to choose from: 1. Socialism brought Poland nothing but losses; 2. Socialism, in addition to losses, brought many undeniable benefits; 3. Socialism, in its past form, suffered defeat, but the socialist idea may still be victorious.

The last statement was rejected by a predominant majority of respondents, including blue-collar workers. Socialism is not an idea with which any group of workers would like to link its hopes for the future.

But at the same time, most of those polled do not agree with the first answer. The view that socialism brought only losses is rejected by 76 percent of the directors, 76.2 percent of OPZZ activists, 55 percent of blue-collar workers, 55.4 percent of self-management activists, and 66.6 percent of low and middle level managers. The percentage of advocates of the view that socialism, in addition to losses, brought many undeniable benefits, is similar (although not the same).

This is shown by additional statements expressed voluntarily during the course of the polling. “The right to work was eliminated along with Labor Day.” “In socialism we were poor but more equal, and more respect was shown to the worker.” “Maybe it was just as on paper, but at least the working people and their work were praised, and not entrepreneurship at any price.” Solidary activists express a different view. It is the only group in which the majority (67.8 percent) finds nothing positive about socialism, saying that it brought only losses. Union activists, therefore, take a different position on this than the workforce whom they represent. The “self-managers”, for years involved in a struggle to have the workforce treated as people and not as objects, see the socialist system in a very complex way. Low level directors and managers include in the better side of socialism
the welfare functions of the state and the relatively open system of education, which made it possible to achieve high vocational positions. Perceiving the good sides of the socialist system does not change the fact that it is precisely from this group of managers that the most fervent—and most skillful—advocates of rational ownership transformations are recruited.

Like Vermin

There is a wide belief among enterprise workforces that unemployment will create new conflicts. The most disturbed by such prospects are OPZZ activists (92.4-83.3 percent, depending on sector), blue-collar workers (80.7-61.7 percent), Solidarity activists (72.7-68.0 percent), and self-management activists (75.0-68.3 percent). Most of the opponents of the thesis of the conflict producing character of unemployment are in the management group: depending on sector, from one-third to one-fifth of the representatives of this group do not perceive such a danger. In the director group fear of a growth of conflicts connected with unemployment there were 75-69 percent.

It must be believed that unemployment will be a factor which will greatly modify the structure of authority in the enterprises, and especially strengthen the position of the management cadre.

To the question: Will the existence of unemployment give directors additional opportunities to repress the people they would like to be rid of, almost three-fourths of OPZZ activists and blue-collar workers answered “yes.” The latter supplemented their opinions with statements such as: “Just open your mouth, brother, and you’re out the gate.” “Now you will have to bow low in order not to offend those on high and get kicked out.” “They’ll do what they want with us, treat us like vermin and not like working people.”

The fear that unemployment may bring about the practice of getting rid of politically undesirable workers is expressed in the following sequence: Solidarity activists (79.2-63.8 percent, depending on sector), self-management activists, and every other low and middlelevel manager. The degree of acceptance of this statement can be regarded as an indicator of the sense of threat of the polled from the management or the degree of distrust of it.

A surprising number of directors also agree with the statement that unemployment can create additional opportunities for management to repress politically undesirable people. In the machines sector, almost a third of the directors express this opinion, in the textile branch one-fourth, and in the pharmaceutical-cosmetics branch, 35 percent.

The growing unemployment is an increasingly serious economic and social problem, especially because the deepening recession and crisis in agriculture is making it impossible to absorb those dismissed from their jobs. Unemployment affects different socio-occupational groups in an unequal degree. Statistical data from both the state and social polling shows that mostly blue-collar workers are in danger of losing their jobs. They also see the fewest positive effects of unemployment for the economy. Of the remaining categories, allowance for unemployment is greatest among employees of state enterprises, and fear of it is relatively the lowest. Beliefs that its effects are positive are more frequent (especially among the higher management cadres).

But in this group, too, there is growing doubt as to whether unemployment is an element in the structural transformation of the economy or whether it is economic stagnation.

Important and Unimportant

A distinct polarization of views is occurring in relation to many aspects connected with the transformation of the economy. Blue-collar workers and OPZZ union activists are at the oppositional, maintenance of the status quo, pole. At the other pole are Solidarity activists and directors. The source of this polarization lies, it seems, in the economic effects of the reforms being applied, which have affected the blue-collar workers the most. It is they who most often feel that they have been endangered and wronged because they must bear the largest costs of economic reform. The drop in acceptance of Balcerowicz’s plan can be attributed to a particular public dissatisfaction syndrome, as indicated not only by the results of polls, but also by the generally perceived actions of the state enterprise workforces (compensation demands, strikes).

The public dissatisfaction syndrome is a complex phenomenon. It occurs at a time when the standard of living has dropped drastically, when people who were involved in rebuilding the political, social, and economic order in Poland had hopes for a better and more dignified life in the foreseeable future. The greater were the expectations, the greater was the disappointment. The feeling of injustice relates also to the disproportion between the concept of the “leading role of the workers party”, present in the social awareness, the awareness of its participation in the overthrow of real socialism—and the unanticipated sudden sense of inferiority in relation to other social strata. “It is we who raised them to the highest positions in Poland, and now they are treating us worse than the others did.” “Blue-collar workers are not important; the middle class is important—the dealers, merchants and speculators.” Along with this comes the depreciation of the value of hard, honest work, supplanted by highly touted resourcefulness and entrepreneurship. The result is a sense of social injustice, helplessness, and incapacity.

The chances of improving one’s financial situation or professional and social status are small, not only due to lack of the indispensable material resources but also because of the attitudes which prevail among the state enterprise workforces, attitudes of trained helplessness and waiting for the state (and now “our government”) to satisfy our material, housing, health, or education needs.
As a result, criticism of Solidarity and the Solidarity government is growing. Especially because the positive effects of the systemic changes are not clear, their negative effects increasingly painful, and the promises of quick improvement in the living conditions of hired workers are less and less credible. It makes the fact that the blue-collar portion of the workforces expresses views much closer to those of OPZZ activists, than to Solidarity, understandable. Because the latter rather fulfills the function of a political organization (a struggle for influence, firing of directors, etc.), while the OPZZ activists are fighting for higher earnings, larger allowances for the social and housing fund, i.e., the classic tasks of a workers trade union. If this state of affairs continues, there is a danger that Solidarity activists will become alienated from the workforces.

[Box, p 10]

Prof. Maria Jarosz is employed in the Institute of Economic Sciences in the Polish Academy of Science. Nationwide, representative, empirical studies on the subject of ownership transformations have been conducted at the Institute since 1983. The information analyzed in the article was collected in 1990 at randomly selected enterprises, differing from the technological, economic, and social standpoint. The respondents in 1,377 interviews were: blue-collar workers, managers (master and above), members of the enterprise management, and activists in worker self-managements, Solidarity, and OPZZ.

Pollution-Measuring Monitors To Be Installed
91P20312A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
27 Mar 91 p 5

[Article by (jg): “Eco-Peeping Toms”]

[Text] Ten monitoring stations will be installed this year in the Katowice Voivodship. They will serve to automatically measure air pollution and warn against ecological threats, according to Wojciech Beblo, director of Katowice’s Department of Environmental Protection. The entire monitoring network will be installed no later than 1993.

This initiative will be partially financed by the World Bank ($4 million), and the rest of the costs will be covered by the Voivodship Environmental Protection Fund. Director Beblo said that five or six times more [money] is needed for the entire project than the World Bank is providing.

The monitoring equipment will be purchased abroad, while installation and supervision of the station will be undertaken by Polish specialists.

The stations will be situated primarily in Upper Silesia, near industrial plants most responsible for environmental pollution.
BULGARIA

Consequences in Bulgaria of Chernobyl Accident
AU1604074091 Sofia BTA in English 2006 GMT
15 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 15 (BTA)—The culpable silence kept over the Chernobyl accident of April 1986 and the underestimation of its consequences may have some tragic effects on Bulgaria's population which will become apparent in the next 50 years. This is one of the theses of the indictment presented at today's opening of the trial of two of the main culprits for the failure to adopt the necessary safety measures to protect the population and for underestimating the possibility for a secondary contamination of people and animals.

So far there are no concrete medical observations, but an abrupt rise in the incidence of malignant diseases may be expected.

The high-ranking state officials of the former regime Grigor Stoichkov and Professor Lyubomir Shindarov will be held responsible for their culpable actions and inactivity in the months following the Chernobyl accident.

This was how events developed in Bulgaria after the accident. Measurements were started on April 30, 1986 when it was already known that the cloud would pass over Bulgaria's territory, which actually happened on the night of May 1 to May 2. The samples taken by the Central Hydrology and Meteorology Department with the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences then showed a great rise in radioactivity. The data surpassed the usual values from several hundred to several thousand-fold.

Then drinking water began to be monitored and the first "hot particles" were detected on May 5. On May 8 their concentration exceeded the admissible norms thousands-fold.

Measurements, taken on a mountain peak on May 3, showed an on-ground contamination of up to 120,000 Becquerels per square meter. In May on-ground contamination in southern Bulgaria ranged between 340 and 1,700-fold the usual values and in northern Bulgaria between 90 and 1,400-fold.

Some fifteen radionuclides were discovered in the different samples: iodine 131 and 132, caesium 134, 136, 137, strontium, barium and others.

On May 5 the Central Laboratory of Radioactive Protection and Toxicology established that the radionuclides in sheep's milk exceeded the admissible concentration of 500 Becquerels per litre 79-fold.

In a sample of milk the Sofia University experts measured a concentration of up to 150,000 Becquerels per litre.

But almost no measures were taken to protect the population. Precaution measures were taken only in the Army. Examinations made in the town of Sliven (southern Bulgaria) showed that the concentration of iodine in the thyroid gland of soldiers was ten times lower than that in the case of schoolchildren and adults.

Secondary radioactive contamination began late in 1986 when farm animals began to be fed with contaminated fodder.

At the beginning of May 1986, the caesium measured in men of the 19-30 age-group was up to 7.7 Becquerels per kilo. In March-April the following year it had increased to 320 Becquerels as a result of the intake of contaminated foodstuffs.

According to UN data Bulgaria ranked 11th among the European countries contaminated after the Chernobyl accident. But through the action or inaction of the Bulgarian authorities now Bulgaria tops the list by the iodine content in the thyroid glands of her population and by its caesium radioactive contamination.

This folly has a material expression, too. The economy suffered damages to the tune of more than 2 million and 600 thousand leva. But the other damages are immeasurable...
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