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International Military Climate, Developments Viewed

HK1607141530 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 22 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Li Dianren (2621 3013 0088): "A Preliminary Analysis of the Trend in International Military Developments"]

[Text] During the first half of this century, mankind experienced two World Wars. After World War II, and during the 1980's in particular, military activity has been increasingly confined to a small scale. A conspicuous manifestation of this is that in handling their conflicts of interests, nations or allied groups usually assign war a very low priority. War's extreme objective of eliminating the enemy state has now been changed, and war is now regarded as a cautious action subjected to limited political aims. Military confrontation is being gradually replaced by political dialogue. Military activity has mainly manifested itself as a kind of theoretical phenomenon, namely, a contest in the "quiet battlefield" which people have usually talked about.

These changes have shown that mankind has a new understanding of war and that the starting point of military policy in various countries has also been considerably readjusted.

I. In recent years, people have shifted their attention from nuclear war to limited conventional war. In particular, after scientists in the West have put forward the theory of a "nuclear winter," both the United States and the Soviet Union have further realized that nuclear war means the destruction of both sides. The so-called "first strike" does not mean the end of war and it will inevitably be followed by a counterattack. The so-called "limited nuclear war" may mean the start of a nuclear war because nobody can guarantee that it will not be expanded. On the other hand, the threat of a limited conventional war, and war of low intensity in particular, has become increasingly obvious. It has become a practical danger facing many countries. It is precisely because of this many countries have in recent years changed and readjusted their military power to conform with the peculiarities of limited conventional war.

First of all, marked changes have taken place in the system governing the authorized strength of an army. In the past, in the U.S. and some West European armies, the proportion of heavy troops in the ground force was as high as 60 percent to meet the demand of fighting a major warfare in the battlefield of Europe. As a result, the entire ground force lacked operational flexibility. It was difficult for the ground force to deal with various kinds of contingencies. Thanks to reforms in recent years, in the course of continuing to strengthen their combat effectiveness against the Soviet Union, the United States and some West European countries have emphasized development of light and special troops. Their attention is very much focused on a war of low intensity. The ratio between heavy and light troops in U.S. ground force units has been reversed, and the proportion of light troops has reached 60 percent.

Various countries have attached importance to providing useful conditions for the application of new technology to expand and reorganize their mobile forces. In 1985, France officially established a mobile force consisting of nearly 50,000 persons. Its main unit, "Air Mobile Division," consisted of 6,000 persons armed with more than 200 helicopters of various kinds. The main task of the division was to support combat operations on the forward position in Europe. Great Britain also reorganized an armored brigade under its Rhein Army into an air mobile brigade whose main task was to check tank groups of the Soviet Union and the operational attack of the Soviet Union in particular. Italy is planning to establish a "prompt intervention unit" formed by its ground force, air force, and navy with an authorized size of two brigades. Its main task is to carry out urgent operational duties in the Mediterranean region. The U.S. Army established a command of mobile deployment forces as early as in 1980. In 1983, the command was upgraded to central headquarters directly under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At present, mobile deployment forces under the command of central headquarters have consisted of nearly 300,000 persons, including 5 ground force divisions, 7 tactical air squadrons, and 3 naval aircraft carrier columns. Mobile forces in various countries are characterized by their prompt response and strong combat effectiveness. For example, air mobile units of the U.S. ground force and aircraft carrier columns of the U.S. Navy can make their response within one hour after receiving orders. A brigade under the 82d Division of the U.S. Army can be deployed in Southwest Asian region within 48 to 72 hours.

Special troops are good at dealing with eventualities. In the 1980's, in the course of restoring its military equipment and facilities, the United States regarded the development of its special troops as a priority. By 1990, it plans to increase the members of its special troops by one-third, and their weapons and facilities will be fully updated. During the combat operations in the invasion of Grenada and Panama, special troops demonstrated that their role was irreplaceable by other troops.

Judging from the general trend of development, one realizes that present-day combat forces should be composed of heavy troops, light troops, and special troops in appropriate proportions, and that they are shock forces with a very strong capability for meeting contingencies.

II. For a long period of time in the past, maintaining enormous military armaments was regarded as an important factor indicating that a certain country was strong and powerful. It was regarded as an important measure for crushing other rival countries, safeguarding its security, and a driving force for promoting its prosperity. However, more than 40 years after World War II, the arms race between the two major military groups became increasingly acute. As a result, the arsenals of
some countries and superpowers in particular, expanded, and their economic development was adversely affected. With the two rival groups unable to overturn the balance of power, a demand for arms reduction occurred. At present, the disarmament of the United States and Soviet Union is actually aimed at reducing their arms, rather than completely giving up the arms race. The arms they reduce are actually those which are obsolete or redundant. Their aim of doing so is to use their money to manufacture new weapons and facilities, or to invest it in economic construction.

In the meantime, many countries, superpowers, and developed countries in particular, have never relaxed their efforts to build up their military power. The only difference is that they are seeking new ways of development to meet structural demand in the future. U.S. military authorities have held that the period after 1972 is the third postwar "peacetime period" which will last longer than previous ones. Military buildup in this period is not aimed at arms expansion and war preparation. It is aimed at fully promoting the modernization of the army, and enhancing its actual combat effectiveness in light of the international situation at the end of this century and early next century. The guiding principle observed here is: Maintaining a capable and active military force, reducing personnel expenses of the three armed services, and concentrating financial resources on enhancing the quality of servicemen and facilities. In 1981, personnel expenses for American servicemen accounted for 48 to 50 percent of total military spending. It has now been reduced to less than 40 percent. In recent years, under the guidance of the principle of "rational" and "full use," the Soviet Union has also focused its attention on reducing the size and enhancing the quality of its armed forces. It has further attached importance to developing conventional weapons and new generation strategic defense systems. According to U.S. official statistics, over the past 10 years, the Soviet Union spent $150 billion on developing its strategic defense system. At present, some 10,000 scientific and technical personnel are engaged in study in this regard in a bid to work out countermeasures against the U.S. strategic defense system.

In a word, the development of contemporary military forces has revealed the following fact: Excessively large and enormous superior military facilities are no longer an ideal pattern for development. Armed forces of various countries are striving toward the target of enhancing their powerful combat effectiveness and high quality.

III. In history, almost all new technologies were first applied to the military field. In modern history, the first Morse telegraphic machine, the first airplane invented by the (Wright) brothers, the first V-1 missile manufactured by the Germans, the phenomenon of atomic fission of uranium nucleus discovered by German chemist (Otto Hans) and (Strausman), the first valve computers produced by the Americans, and the first satellite launched by the Soviets, which represented advanced technological levels of the time, first showed their prowess in the military field without exception.

Furthermore, in the most advanced branches of science, the proportion of military items has been fairly high. For example, in a period of more than 30 years since the launching of the first satellite, more than 4,000 satellites have been launched by various countries in the world, about 40 percent of which were satellites for military reconnaissance. The percentage of nuclear technology applied to the production of satellites was much higher than that applied in other fields. Military nuclear technology is also much more advanced.

However, things are different nowadays. High-grade, precision and advanced science and technology are no longer restricted to serving certain purposes or fields. Priority is no longer given to military purposes. On the contrary, they are widely applied to various fields. The previous situation in which the development of the technology for civilian use was slower than that for military use is also being changed. Moreover, the newly developed military technology is very often promptly used in civilian and commercials fields.

Mankind has stepped into the end of the 20th century. We have now a more sober understanding of the value of comprehensive national strength, and mutual relations between economics, the military, and science and technology. Nowadays, more and more countries are making use of their military science and technology, and high technology in particular, to fully promote a new scientific, technological, economic, and military development. The "Star Wars Program" of the United States is obviously not aimed at military purposes alone. The greater benefits of the program lie in making use of space technology to bring along the study of biological genetic engineering (for example, the finished product percentage of space experiments on insulin is 100 times that carried out on earth); making use of space microgravity to produce integrated chip materials for new generation computers; making use of such factors as high altitudes, microelectronics, cryogenics, and the sun to exploit space resources; and opening up the new fields of beam energy and microcomputer technology in the course of developing laser weapons, particle beams, microwave weapons, and smart weapons. In other words, the "Stars War Program" is used to extensively promote high technology to push the U.S. scientific, technological and economic power to a still higher level to fulfill its aim of contending for hegemony. The "Eureka Plan" of Europe, "Major Scientific and Technical Program" of Japan, and "Strategy for Speeding up Social and Economic Development" of the Soviet Union are of both military and civilian in nature. The civilian coloring of the "Eureka Plan" is particularly obvious.

It is obvious that making use of military means to explore and open up unknown scientific and technological fields in the interest of using advanced military science and technology in commercial, civilian, and
social sectors is one of the characteristics of the competition for national strength at the present and in the future.

Military development trends of the contemporary world can indicate to a great extent the process and track of the military development in the world in the next century. There is no doubt that this has caught the attention of Chinese servicemen, because our future success or failure is determined by our understanding of the situation and our actions taken today.

XINHUA Views NATO Readjustments
OW0807091190 Beijing XINHUA in English 0809 GMT 8 Jul 90

[By Fu Quansheng and Wang Shengliang: “News Analysis: Readjustment of NATO Strategy”—XINHUA headline]

[Text] London, July 7 (XINHUA)—The North Atlantic alliance (NATO) has finally offered the Warsaw Pact a declaration, saying they are “no longer adversaries” and the cold war which has lingered over more than four decades between the two military blocs becomes what NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner called “history.”

The declaration was welcomed by the Soviet Union. President Mikhail Gorbachev called it “a first step in right direction.”

U.S. President George Bush, who brought a blueprint for a transformed NATO strategy, was exuberant to call the London summit, which wound up Friday, a “turning point” and said it will make the Soviet Union no longer regard NATO as a threat to it.

But a question would derive from all these expressions and remarks: What is the justification for the continued existence of NATO after all?

There was no answer from any NATO leaders except Mrs Thatcher, who claimed at the summit that the Soviet military might was still “formidable” and NATO had to be “one of resolve in defence”.

It was, to some extent, to her insistence that the declaration included some traditional NATO terms like “there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted” and NATO should “maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, kept up-to-date.”

In fact the declaration also said that “no one would be certain of the future,” implying uncertainty of the West about the track for the Soviet transition, hence the need for continued pressure.

Thatcher also indicated early this year that there exists instability outside Europe, particularly in the Middle East, which would be a threat to the Western interests, even when confrontations in Central Europe has dwindled. That means the West is likely to play the role of “world gendarme” as in the old days.

NATO leaders, however, have agreed to make fundamental changes in alliance’s military strategic doctrine to “match time” after the drastic changes in Eastern Europe.

Nuclear weapons to be used as “last resort” was written into the declaration, a shift away from long-standing “flexible response” policy.

“Forward defence” philosophy was replaced by a phrase of “reduced forward presence” and force structure will be also undergoing a thorough review, changing to smaller and more active forces.

Observers here said NATO was abandoning its traditional defence strategy, known as the “layer cake” formation of troops in favour of the less expensive “current bun” system.

The theory of the “layer cake” is that NATO’s individual armies—American, British as well as force from other NATO countries—guard their own sectors of West Germany, which reflected post-war division of Germany, to encounter large-scale attacks from the Warsaw Pact.

In view of the current changes in Eastern Europe and claims it faces “threat”, the increasingly self-confident Germans become intolerable to the arrangement.

So NATO planners have been preparing plans to switch to the so-called “current bun” system.

The system contains smaller, but highly-mobile multinational units positioned around West Germany, under which, they argued, a potential aggressor would not know where the NATO troops were.

The disappearance of the once clear confrontation line between the two military blocs after German unification is the main consideration for NATO to make reforms in its strategy.

There are other considerations for these changes as well: First, West European opinion is demanding a “peace dividend” by virtue of cuts in defence expenditure as the bi-polar is becoming less antagonistic. Secondly, the Americans simply can no longer afford to keep 300,000 troops, stationed in West Germany.

The transformed strategy reflected wishes of both President Bush and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who are, according to Britain’s newspaper THE FINANCIAL TIMES, deciding “a shape of the new Europe”.

INTER-PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS

Thai Commander Urges ASEAN Arms Production

BK19070113790 Bangkok THE NATION in English
19 Jul 90 p 2

[Text] The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should be self-reliant on security matters and enter into joint arms production in the face of a global change in the balance of power. Supreme Commander Gen Sunthon Khongsomphong said yesterday.

Gen Sunthon said after returning from a trip to Manila that “half” of the six-member ASEAN countries had already agreed to the idea but declined to single out who were “for” or “against such a programme.”

ASEAN as a group had to maintain its defence posture amidst the changing balance of power on a global scale which was causing a power “vacuum” in the region, he said.

“If we cannot depend on our collective forces, a new power would inevitably influence and dominate us in the future,” Sunthon added. “We should therefore stick to each other to defend our common interests.”

He said the joint arms production of ASEAN was possible because of the high productive capacity of Singapore and Indonesia in the arms industry.

The joint effort should take the form of producing weapon parts in particular countries with the parts being assembled in others.

An ASEAN joint military exercise, other than those which presently which were bilateral in nature, should also be discussed to strengthen the proposed idea of the group’s self-reliance in defence.

Gen Sunthon, however, said the programme had to pass through a long discussion among ASEAN countries and said he did not expect an implementation of the scheme in the near future.

Asked whether he discussed the US military bases in Philippines with Philippine leaders, the supreme commander said he had informed President Aquino that Prime Minister Chat Thai Chunhawan supported the US presence in the republic.

“I told her (President Aquino) that our prime minister told (US President George) Bush in Washington last month that the US should pay the rent (of the bases) as demanded by the host,” Gen Sunthon said.

Gen Sunthon said President Aquino had high praise for Thailand which sent 500 tons of rice as immediate relief to the Philippines which suffered from a devastating earthquake this weekend.

AUSTRALIA

Evans Comments on U.S. Chemical Weapons Plan

BK1807072590 Melbourne Overseas Service in English
0500 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Australia’s foreign minister, Senator Gareth Evans, says he is satisfied that the environment will not be at risk from America’s burn off of chemical weapons at Johnston Atoll, southwest of Hawaii. Senator Evans says his assessment is based on an Australian scientific study and on the United States’ own environmental impact statement.

He says the Johnston Island incineration of weapons from Germany should be supported if that is the only way of disposing of them practically in a realistic time and with environmental safety. Senator Evans has qualified his statement with the observation that the issues are difficult when argued that disarmament is in conflict with the environment [sentence as heard].

Scientists Oppose Plan

BK1707062890 Melbourne Overseas Service in English
0500 GMT 17 Jul 90

[Text] A group of more than 600 Australian scientists opposed to nuclear weapons says it has serious reservations about American plans to destroy chemical weapons on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. The group, called Scientists Against Nuclear Arms, says the United States plans to destroy the weapons on the atoll for four years after transporting them there from West Germany.

The group’s president, Professor (Gerry Rolfe) says during this time the weapons will be available to American defense and will therefore pose a threat in the Pacific region. Prof. (Rolfe) says it is not acceptable to Australia and Pacific countries to be disadvantaged by chemical disarmament in Europe.

He said that the United States has ignored the protests of small Pacific nations which are opposed to the incineration of chemical weapons in their region.

FIJI

Government Objects to U.S. Chemical Weapon Plan

BK1307132290 Hong Kong AFP in English 1302 GMT 13 Jul 90

[Text] Suva, July 13 (AFP)—Fiji’s Government Friday [13 July] told a visiting team from the United States that it objected to Washington’s plan to destroy chemical weapons at Johnston Atoll near Hawaii.
Robin Yarrow, Fiji's foreign affairs secretary, raised Suva's concern when he met a U.S. Government delegation here which was touring 11 Pacific island countries to convince them that the chemical weapons program was safe. Mr. Yarrow said that Fiji "was naturally concerned about the American plan."

Lieutenant Colonel Joe King from the U.S. team told reporters that it would be more risky to ship the weapons from West Germany via the U.S. mainland. "Every time you change the mode of transport, the more problems you are going to have. The safest way of transporting is directly by sea," he said.

Another member of the team said Washington was not asking for the weapons to be dumped in the South Pacific. Johnston Atoll was part of U.S. territory, he said.

NORTH KOREA

Spokesman Attacks Bush Remarks on Nuclear Issue

SK1607003090 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2200 GMT 15 Jul 90

["Press statement" by DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman denouncing U.S. President Bush's statement at the Houston summit meeting of the seven Western industrial states; dated 15 July—read by announcer]

[Text] U.S. President Bush a few days ago issued a so-called chairman's statement as the chairman of the summit meeting of the seven Western industrial states.

In the statement, he said that our Republic is causing grave concern because it has not signed a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Authority [IAEA] pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

His statement completely distorts the truth. In the statement, the U.S. President completely failed to mention the fact that the United States has deployed numerous nuclear weapons in the South of the Korean peninsula and is posing a constant nuclear threat against the DPRK.

Entering into the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the DPRK Government had the natural expectation that this would promote turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, as stipulated in the treaty.

After signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the government of our Republic made efforts to sign a safeguard agreement with the IAEA. At the same time, it made proposals for the realization of disarmament and for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, proposing negotiations with the United States on a number of occasions.

However, the United States rejected all our proposals, and has instead, continued building up nuclear arms in the South of the Korean peninsula, thus intensifying the nuclear threat. This is a breach of not only the publicly acknowledged principles of international law on not threatening by force or using force against the territorial security and political independence of any state, but also of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty itself, whose fundamental ideals are to eliminate the danger of nuclear war and save humankind from a nuclear disaster. This is also in breach of the commitment announced by the United States itself in connection with the signing of this treaty that it will not threaten non-nuclear member states with nuclear arms.

Under the condition in which the United States continues to threaten us with a nuclear cudgel, it has become very difficult for us to sign the safeguard agreement. We are fully ready to sign a safeguard agreement with the IAEA at any time if the United States removes the nuclear threat against us.

It is quite natural that we, as a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, should demand that the nuclear threat posed directly against our national sovereignty and right of existence be eliminated. The fact that the United States ignores this reasonable demand we are making and unilaterally urges us to sign a safeguard agreement is an act utterly in discord with the contents of the treaty itself. This unjust position taken by the United States has been delaying indefinitely the signing of the safeguard agreement between our Republic and the IAEA.

If the United States truly desires the signing of the safeguard agreement at an early date, the alleviation of tensions on the Korean peninsula and in Asia, and the elimination of the danger of nuclear war, it should not shift the blame onto someone else, but should take steps to immediately eliminate the nuclear threat against the DPRK. Everything depends upon the attitude of the United States.

[Dated] 15 July 1990, Pyongyang

Foreign Ministry Rejects U.S. Nuclear Demands

SK1607052890 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0511 GMT 16 Jul 90

["Statement of Foreign Ministry Spokesman"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, July 16 (KCNA)—The spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in a statement on July 15 said that if the United States removes a nuclear threat to us, we are fully ready to conclude a safeguard agreement under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) any moment.

The spokesman of the Foreign Ministry categorically rejected the unilateral demand that we should sign a
safeguard agreement under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was made by U.S. President Bush, ignoring our just demand, in his “statement” a few days ago in the capacity of chairman of the “summit of seven Western industrialized nations”.

Bush said that the DPRK causes “grave apprehensions” as it does not conclude a safeguard agreement under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with the IAEA.

His “statement” totally reverses black and white.

The U.S. President in this “statement” didn’t refer at all to the fact that the United States is posing a constant nuclear threat to the DPRK by deploying many nuclear weapons in the south of the Korean peninsula.

When joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the DPRK Government duly respected that this would promote the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone according to the treaty obligations.

After joining the treaty, the government of our Republic put forward the proposal to put into effect disarmament and make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone and repeatedly proposed negotiations with the United States while striving to sign a safeguard agreement with the IAEA.

But the United States refused all our proposals and is increasing nuclear threat, constantly building up nuclear armed forces in the south of the Korean peninsula.

This does not accord with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty itself whose basic idea is to remove the danger of nuclear war and save mankind from nuclear disaster, to say nothing of the publicly recognized principle of the international law that no threat of force should be made or strength be used against territorial integrity and political independence of any state.

This is also contrary to the commitments of the United States itself that it will not threaten non-nuclear nations with nuclear weapons in the future upon the conclusion of this treaty.

As the United States continues to threaten us with “nuclear stick,” it has become very difficult for us to sign a safeguard agreement.

If the United States removes nuclear threat against us, we are fully ready to sign it with the IAEA any moment.

It is quite natural for us to demand the removal of direct nuclear threat to our national sovereignty and right to existence as a member nation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The United States unilaterally urges the signing of the safeguard agreement while turning a deaf ear to our just demand. This is an act which does not confirm at all with the content of the treaty itself.

This very unjust stand of the United States is endlessly delaying the signing of the safeguard agreement between our Republic and the IAEA.

If the United States truly wants an immediate signing of the safeguard agreement, easing of tension on the Korean peninsula and Asia and removal of the danger of nuclear war there, it must take a step of immediately removing the nuclear threat against the DPRK, rather than shift responsibility on to the other.

Everything depends on the attitude of the United States.

Papers Decry U.S. Nuclear Policy on Peninsula
SK1907053090 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0502 GMT 19 Jul 90

[Text] Pyongyang, July 19 (KCNA)—The U.S. administration intends to go ahead with the modernization of reactors and nuclear plants so as to turn out new nuclear bombs till the mid 21st century and replace the existing tens of thousands of nuclear bombs with “newer” ones, according to a report.

This is the topic of a NODONG SINMUN commentary today, which says:

This nuclear arms modernization plan of the U.S. imperialists tells that they intend to continue developing new nuclear weapons behind the facade of “nuclear disarmament” and invariably follow the policy of strength for overpowering the socialist forces.

This shows that their talk about “disarmament” and “detente” is nothing but a humbug to deceive the people and disarm the socialist countries.

Recalling that the U.S. imperialists have deployed more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons in South Korea and are continually replacing the old nuclear weapons with new ones, the news analyst goes on:

This suggests that newly-produced nuclear weapons may be deployed in South [and] war will grow all the more on the Korean peninsula.

The U.S. imperialists, who are increasing the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula, have the audacity to claim that we should sign a safeguard agreement under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The U.S. imperialists now talk as if they would not use nuclear weapons, clamouring about an “end to the era of the cold war.” This is a whapping lie and a mockery of public opinion at home and abroad. Imperialism would never lay down arms of its own accord, much less give up aggression and war. Only through a vigorous anti-war, anti-nuke struggle can the world’s peace-loving people check and frustrate the imperialists’ policy of aggression and war.

The U.S. imperialists must stop following the anachronistic line of showdown of strength which runs counter
to the world people's desire for peace, stresses MINJU CHOSON in a commentary, warning: Those who are fond of playing with fire are bound to be burnt to death.

**Talks With U.S. Linked to Nuclear Inspection**

**Pyongyang Said Seeking Breakthrough**

*OW2107041390 Tokyo KYODO in English 0124 GMT 21 Jul 90*

[Text] Tokyo, July 21 (KYODO)—North Korea has proposed direct talks with the United States as a precondition for accepting on-site inspection of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Authority, Japanese sources said Saturday. The sources said the Pyongyang proposal is aimed at creating a breakthrough in talks with the U.S. Government.

**Further on Proposal**

*OW2107031190 Tokyo KYODO in English 0250 GMT 21 Jul 90*

[Text] Tokyo, July 21 (KYODO)—North Korea has proposed direct talks with the United States as a precondition to accepting on-site nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), the Foreign Ministry and other sources said Saturday.

The North Korean proposal was made in the middle of this month when Pyongyang sent a delegation to the IAEA in Vienna. The proposal called for direct talks with the U.S. Government to obtain a U.S. guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used against North Korea, the sources said. North Korea ratified the 1970 nuclear nonproliferation treaty but did not conclude a related accord with the IAEA that allows the agency to make on-site inspections to determine whether a country without nuclear arms uses nuclear substances to make nuclear weapons. In response to an IAEA advisory to accept the inspection, North Korea demanded that it would comply only if the U.S. promised to launch a nuclear attack against the country and to withdraw nuclear arms from South Korea.

In Washington, U.S. sources also confirmed the report from Tokyo, but refused further comment on it. According to data obtained by U.S. military satellites and other means, North Korea is constructing nuclear development facilities at a site some 90 kilometers north of Pyongyang. It is strongly suspected that they include spent nuclear fuel cycling facilities. Experts said the cycling facilities may start operating in the fall of next year. Foreign Ministry sources said they view the North Korean proposal for direct talks with the U.S. as a push for breakthroughs in the Pyongyang-Washington talks.

North Korea agreed in May to return to the U.S. the remains of five American soldiers killed in the Korean war. A U.S. State Department official welcomed the decision as a positive step in bilateral relations.

**Envoy to China on Conditions**

*SK2107021490 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2300 GMT 19 Jul 90*

[Text] Our embassy in China on 18 July conducted a news conference on the U.S. slander against us regarding the signing of a nuclear safety agreement according to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NNPT]. Chinese newspaper, news agency, and broadcast reporters attended.

Chu Chang-chun, our ambassador to China, addressed the conference. He denounced the United States, saying that a few days ago, in a so-called statement by the chairman of the summit of the seven Western industrial countries, U.S. President Bush raved that our Republic's failure to sign a nuclear safety agreement that accords with the NNPT has aroused grave concerns. Chu Chang-chun said this completely reverses black and white. He condemned the United States by saying: The government of our Republic not only has made efforts to sign a safety agreement with the International Atomic Energy Authority [IAEA] after joining the NNPT, but it also has advanced a proposal to realize disarmament and make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone. On many occasions it has proposed negotiations on this to the United States. The U.S., however, has refused all our proposals and has continued to strengthen its maneuvers for nuclear threat by constantly reinforcing nuclear armed forces in the southern area of the Korean peninsula.

Ambassador Chu Chang-chun said: Such maneuvers by the United States not only run counter to the principles of international law—which prescribes nations possessing nuclear weapons should not use force against any other country—and to the NNPT itself, but also go against the commitment the United States made when it signed the treaty—that it will not use nuclear weapons to threaten states without them.

Saying that to observe its commitment the United States first should eliminate the nuclear threat prevailing on the Korean peninsula, Ambassador Chu Chang-chun continued: If the United States eliminates its nuclear threat against us, we are ready to sign a nuclear safety agreement with the IAEA at any time. It, too, is only natural for us as a member state of the NNPT to ask for the elimination of the nuclear threat which infringes on its national sovereignty and rights of survival. That the United States has unilaterally urged us to sign a nuclear safety agreement while turning away our reasonable demand is an act that does not accord with the content of the NNPT itself.

He stated if the United States wants a safety agreement signed at the earliest possible date, it should take steps at once to eliminate its nuclear threat against the DPRK. He stressed if the United States does so, the issue of signing a safety agreement will easily be resolved.
SOUTH KOREA

Possible North-South Arms Reductions Viewed
SK0707085290 Seoul WOLGAN CHOSUN in Korean
Jul 90 pp 160-169

[Article by Chi Man-won: “North and South Korea Can Reduce Their Armies to 300,000 Men Each”]

[Text] About the author: Chi Nam-won was born in 1942 in Hoengsong in Kangwon Province. He matriculated at the Korea Military Academy in 1962 as a member of Class 22 and served as a senior researcher at the National Defense Research Institute from 1981 to 1987. After retiring from the Army as a colonel, Chi taught business management at the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School.

Openness and Reconciliation Are Shortcuts to Force Reduction

The ROK-Soviet summit in San Francisco imbued all Koreans with a strong hope in the possibility of reduced tensions between Seoul and Pyongyang.

There are five reasons for this. Gorbachev has emerged as a world-class leader of great ability, who in short order forced ajar the door to reconciliation between East and West, opened East Europe, and reduced force levels in Europe. As the father of communism, the USSR is positioned to exert significant influence on North Korea, both militarily and economically. North Korea's persistent isolationism is an irritant to the USSR's efforts at openness. Moscow's only course is to demand strongly that North Korea itself open up. South Korea and the USSR maintained a most antipathetic stance toward each other from the beginning of the Korean war until the 1983 shoot-down of the KAL [Korean Air Lines] airliner. When even these two former enemies evolve a new openness and reconciliation, it symbolizes that the entire world is riding a racing wave of progress. In fact, then, North Korea cannot remain an exception forever.

Pyongyang's doors remain closed because its leadership sees great danger in opening those doors. At the same time, however, North Korea's leaders probably do not want to risk becoming an international orphan by continuing to hold out alone against a world tide. Although the recent ROK-Soviet summit meeting will be helpful in reducing tension between North and South, the degree of tension reduction and its timing depend very much on our own actions.

We must now see real advances in reconciliation, openness, and arms reduction with Pyongyang as necessary elements to reduce tension between North and South. We must see these three as having the potential for opening up a shortcut to peace and unification. Reconciliation, openness, and arms reduction comprise a single package which does not admit of division, and these same three elements comprised the chisel used to sculpt changes in Europe.

If neither reconciliation nor openness are achieved, then arms reduction negotiations between North and South Korea can amount to nothing but propaganda. Why? Because arms reduction places a great burden of danger on each country based on the fact that each must entrust a large measure of its national security to an untested arms reduction agreement. And if a foundation of reconciliation and openness pounded out on the basis of mutual interests has not preceded arms reduction, then arms reduction simply will not be possible.

The minimum steps necessary to set the stage for practical arms reduction include an exchange of visits between the presidents of North Korea and South Korea, Pyongyang's permitting on-site IAEA [International Atomic Energy Authority] inspections to assure compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, expanded exchanges of every kind, increased economic cooperation, and allowing more and more visits between the people of North and South.

Seoul's position on North-South force reductions has been that the South will participate in practical arms reduction negotiations only after small-scale, confidence-building measures have succeeded. Pyongyang's position has been to demand practical arms reductions first, starting with withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, removing nuclear weapons from the South, and reducing force levels on each side to 100,000 men. We have believed, however, that the North Korean proposals on force reductions were either pure propaganda removed from reality and lacking in sincerity or that their proposals were part of a larger strategy to unify the peninsula under communism by force of arms.

South Korea Must Be More Positive

If the United States and the Soviet Union continue military spending at current levels, their economies will fall behind those of Europe, Japan, and Asia's newly-prosperous countries. Therefore, Moscow and Washington must reduce their military expenditures by tremendous amounts.

European nations in recent years have reduced their defense budgets sharply, reaching levels approximating only three percent of GNP, or even less. The advanced nations of the world are all reducing their defense outlays and putting the spurs to their economies. The countries of Europe, Japan, and newly-prosperous industrialized states are seeking to boost their competitiveness on the international market by increasing the scale of their heavy industry or by bringing heavy industries under quasi-government control.

In view of this trend toward increased international economic competition, the faster North and South Korea can achieve military force reductions, the greater will be the payoff in prosperity for all Koreans, North and South. It is time for all citizens of this Republic to appreciate that in negotiations between Seoul and Pyongyang, we have the advantage, we occupy the high ground. It is up to us to make the huge effort necessary to
realize practical results in arms reduction. It is up to us to shoulder the burden of this crucial mission.

A nation builds up its military strength to counter a "threat," and if that threat abates, then the nation must reduce its military force commensurately. If we are to see significant force reductions on the Korean peninsula, then, we must reduce the threat we project toward the North, and they must reduce the threat they project toward us. North-South force reduction negotiations will begin, then, from that moment when North and South no longer feel the same level of mutual threat that each has endured for decades. Talks will start when the threat level decreases. Force reduction talks can be realized when each side prepares detailed arms reductions proposals and makes the major elements of these proposals public.

Before each side presents conclusive arms reductions proposals in a lead-up to negotiations, the two sides must first accomplish the following. Each side must recognize that the other feels threatened. Each side must foster a popular and governmental perception that force reductions are necessary. Both sides must agree on the philosophy and principles of arms reduction.

An enormous amount of patience will be required for North Koreans and South Koreans, who have lived for decades in societies at opposite poles on the social and political spectrum, to meet across a negotiating table and tackle arms reduction, the thorniest issue of all. Therefore, if each side comes to the table and drops down its own agenda of proposals, without prior agreement on the principles of force reduction, endless argument will result.

Reductions in Europe were based on the fundamental philosophy that the two sides needed to "establish the lowest level of military power to maintain a balance." North Korean arms reduction proposals, on the other hand, are seen as an expedient to weaken the South while actually increasing Pyongyang's military strength. Indeed, the motivation for North Korean force reduction proposals seems to run contrary to common sense and violate international standards of fairness. True force reduction will turn on the amount of military force the North and South can tolerate. The lower this level, the less threat perceived by the other side.

The Offensive Defense Strategy Must Be the First Thing To Go

Force reductions will never be realized on the Korean peninsula so long as both Seoul and Pyongyang cling to an offensive defense strategy, the principle that "the best defense is a good offense." The reason for that is simple. Current estimates are that South Korea will not attain an offensive defense capability until after the year 2000. If we cling to the offensive defense strategy, then we must continue to build up our military strength, not negotiate it away.

Just what levels of military strength in North and South are appropriate to foster peace on the peninsula? In Europe the appropriate level of military strength was that force needed to guarantee "reasonable sufficiency."

This term was proposed by Soviet civilian scholars and is habitually used in the process of reducing force strengths in Europe. The level of military power associated with reasonable sufficiency is that level required for a "defensive defense." Force levels necessary for an offensive defense exceed reasonable sufficiency.

"Defensive defense" means "to abandon the ability to mount a surprise attack" and to "forego the ability to conduct a large-scale offensive." The defensive defense defines the force reduction goal in Europe. This clarity of concept in regard to force-reduction objectives removes a great burden from the backs of the arms reduction negotiators in Europe. Theoretic and actual examples of methods which would serve to reduce the perceived threat in Korea include actual reductions of existing military force levels, decreases in military expenditures, relocation of offensive units to rear areas, and imposition of controls over weapons and ammunition at the production or import stage.

The North Korean threat felt by the South is based on the fact that North Korea has the "intent" to occupy South Korea within eight days via a large-scale surprise attack and infiltration and the fact that North Korea possesses "large-scale offensive forces." The deployment to positions just north of the DMZ of large-scale armored and mechanized divisions provides Seoul with almost no chance for advance warning of a surprise attack. Meanwhile, North Korea's light infantry forces could push some 10,000 men an hour through the estimated 20 tunnels under the DMZ. These troops can occupy South Korean defensive fighting positions before our own forces can get there, because ROK troops occupy barracks which are removed from the main combat positions and because our troops must dress, arm, and have battle kit in hand before proceeding to these fighting positions on foot.

North Korean heavy artillery and multiple-rocket launchers are positioned in tunnels very close to the DMZ. From the relative safety of these prepared, underground positions and without the need to displace forward, these weapons can provide direct fire support to North Korean assault units until they enter Seoul. The North Koreans have many AN-2 aircraft. These low-altitude, radar-evading, mini-stealth aircraft can infiltrate large numbers of special force troopers to attack key installations in the South and can also lay mines that will block key lines of maritime communications and blockade our ports. On top of this palpable threat, a flurry of recent reporting on North Korean nuclear weapons development dumps another tremendous threat on our heads.

For many years now, the North Korean threat has been deterred successfully by United States forces stationed in
Korea. Once these forces are gone, however, and we must deter the North via our own military strength and our own operating concepts, then frankly we may not be up to the task.

A "line defense" concept developed in Europe because both East and West possessed nuclear weapons and because the terrain lacked the hills necessary for a strong-point defense that is so effective in crushing attacking units. The line defense, then, was adopted almost by default.

Replace the Line Defense With a Strong-Point Defense

The line defense utilized in the Republic of Korea was acceptable so long as the presence of U.S. forces made it virtually certain that war would not break out. Moreover, the line defense was very effective at containing North Korean espionage agent infiltration. Once U.S. forces are gone, however, if we persist in a line defense concept, maintain our present force level, and even if North Korea relocates its military forces away from the front, we will then have only a "defensive defense" capability.

The reason for this is that in circumstances where U.S. forces are no longer stationed in Korea, if we want to provide a watertight defense from the East Sea to the West Sea we will need many more troops than we have now, and even if we draft the extra troops we will still be far short of that strength necessary to defensively defend against an attack from North Korea. So long as we adhere to a line defense strategy, then, we ourselves cannot permit force reductions between North and South Korea. An example I had in Vietnam may serve to illustrate this point.

A company of Vietcong were in a small Vietnamese village. A regiment of ROK soldiers surrounded the hamlet watertight, our soldiers deployed virtually shoulder-to-shoulder. The regimental commander was very satisfied. But during the night the Vietcong separated into two groups and attacked the surrounding net at two places, breaking through and escaping. We suffered numerous casualties at the two points where the enemy massed his forces, but the Vietcong managed to make good their escape without spilling a drop of blood. As our soldiers at the locus of the attacks fought for their very lives, the rest of the Korean force had no way to participate in the firefight.

Another Vietnamese combat experience was the antithesis of this one. In Vietnam a mountain larger than our Mount Wankan was covered with thick jungle foliage and boulders and served as a base camp for Vietcong units. A huge force of ROK troops deployed in a large-scale attack on this mountain, but only the Korean side suffered any casualties. There were no visible defenses on the mountain, and our forces occupied parts of the redoubt with no resistance from the Vietcong. Yet the enemy would attack our units during the night every night. And they ambushed our small units as they advanced through disadvantageous terrain, while they were resting, or when we were otherwise unawary.

The Vietcong used the mountain as their base, and although they had not built watertight defensive positions around it and despite the ease with which Korean troops could occupy a given portion of the mountain, the fact was that the mountain was a death trap for our troops. A fly caught in a spiderweb had a better chance of survival than our units on that mountain.

Although the line defense concept suggests a watertight seal, in fact if the enemy penetrates the line at a single location even a little, the integrity of the entire sector is threatened. Thus, the line defense is inherently vulnerable, and in the mountainous terrain prevailing along the DMZ in Korea, a line defense is even more porous. In our situation, then, a strong-point defense will more efficiently stop the enemy. Even the most stouthearted commander would not be so foolish as to venture onto low ground surrounded by hills held by dug-in enemy forces.

Thus, we can see that there is a vast difference between the number of troops necessary for a successful "defensive defense" of a "line defense" and the much smaller number required for a "large force strong-point defense."

The threat that North Korea feels from the South includes the nuclear weapons they believe to be located here, the reinforcement potential of U.S. forces stationed in the South, and American air power. To prevent U.S. forces from employing nuclear weapons in the event of hostilities, the North Korean strategy is to attack by surprise and infiltrate large numbers of light infantry in the early hours of combat so as to place their assault forces in close proximity to our units, foreclosing the possibility that their first echelon can be kept from its objectives by nuclear weapons. In other moves related to their concern about tactical nuclear weapons, North Korea has deployed most of its military force as close as possible to the DMZ.

The Stationing of U.S. Forces in Korea Will Help Arms Reduction

Even after a degree of confidence develops between North and South Korea, Pyongyang will have no choice but to continue to demand the withdrawal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from the peninsula. From our viewpoint, however, reduction of U.S. forces in Korea must be postponed as long as possible to serve as the last and most crucial element to foster force reductions. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger said, a major paradox in national security is the fact the only way to attract the enemy to the table to negotiate arms reduction is to have enormously strong arms. The existence of U.S. forces in the South is the most fortunate lever we have to attract the North Koreans to the table and keep them there. It is foolish, therefore, to regard U.S. forces in Korea as themselves an early subject of force reduction negotiations.
If Washington merely were to hint that U.S. forces were to be removed totally from South Korea, we would never be able to induce North Korea into arms reductions negotiations, and in fact, to compensate for the gap in our national defenses left by a total withdrawal, we would be obliged to increase military expenditures, and we would be the ones reluctant to sit down at the table to discuss force reductions.

It is easy for Koreans to regard the existence of U.S. forces in Korea as a stumbling block to North-South arms reduction negotiations or as impairing Seoul's self-confidence during any negotiations, but such views are superficial and rest on unrealistic, moralistic theories. Part of our task is to convince not only some among our own population but North Korea itself that the existence of U.S. forces in Korea is a spur to force reduction negotiations.

Regarding this, it is well to remember that U.S. forces in Korea do not have intrinsic military strength sufficient either to mount a surprise attack on North Korea or to stage a large-scale offensive and that the entire world community can authenticate the fact that the United States of America has no intent to attack North Korea. U.S. forces in Korea become an element of threat to Pyongyang only in the event that North Korea invades the South.

The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea in 1949 opened the door to the Korean war of 25 June 1950. That war started when North Korea invaded us. Therefore, North Korea's continued demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea means precisely that Pyongyang still harbors an intent to invade the South.

We must convince North Korea of the logic of this position if our leverage is not to be snatched from us in arms reduction negotiations. We may not be able to convince Pyongyang ourselves, and need to be ready to enlist the aid of the United States and the Soviet Union to use their contacts with the North to convince them of this logic.

Convince Them of the Economic Need

Many believe that confidence-building must precede arms reduction talks between North and South Korea. Every negotiation, however, cannot be undertaken solely on the condition that it has been preceded by confidence-building measures. As a point of fact, a structure of confidence has not been created between the ROK Government and the South Korean people, and many of us distrust the administrative branch of our government. We do not believe that our own government enjoys a wide degree of public trust, and even less do we believe the North Korean Government is worthy of public confidence.

Arms reduction between Seoul and Pyongyang will progress along a continuum in which the promises made by each side have credibility because they have measurable impact on national security. If confidence-building must be an absolute precondition to arms reduction, then at the present time we could not consider force reductions even in our dreams. Force reductions, however, can precede confidence-building.

We can bring the North Koreans to the arms reduction negotiating table in this way. First, we work against the backdrop of our superior diplomatic position and our present massive military power. We then use all manner of persuasion and demand to convince the North Koreans that for the sake of the prosperity of our people as well as their own, both sides must reduce military expenditures. We must stimulate them to understand that it is their duty to pursue economic revival.

We have a number of elements of power that will smooth the way. We are riding a worldwide wave of reconciliation, openness, and arms reduction. We have achieved a vast diplomatic advantage as the result of our northern policy. And we enjoy not just a mutual defense treaty with the United States but we have U.S. forces stationed in Korea.

North Korea's long-awaited "decisive moment" will not come so long as U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea. North Korean leaders have come to understand if they continue defense expenditures at present rates or increase them, they face the very real danger of national atrophy. About now their leaders must be feeling the need for economic development very keenly indeed.

We can expect results in the pursuit of arms control only during that span of time when U.S. forces remain planted firmly on our soil. In fact, right now, today, may be the best time for force reduction negotiations because right now all the necessary conditions are in place to achieve real results.

The concept of arms reductions is very simple, but the process of actual arms negotiations is arduous and rocky. In the case of Europe, the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks started in Vienna on 30 October 1973. Even though the two sides had reached agreement on the philosophy of arms reduction and on those areas targeted for reduction, 10 years passed without substantial progress because the two sides differed significantly on the goals of force reduction. The East and West differed on their views and demands in regard to how much military power constitutes balanced military strength. They encountered problems over how to deal with reduced numbers of weapons and how to permit on-site inspections. They failed to make an inch of progress.

To negotiate agreement on the degree of threat perceived in the disparate and complex elements that compose the military machines of North and South—numbers of weapons, amount and type of stored ammunition—is a very technical process that will be accompanied by many disagreements. Force reduction negotiations, per force, are very lengthy and might even continue until after unification.

A Bold Political Decision at a North-South Summit
If one side adopts a narrow-minded approach in any negotiation, then the other side must respond in narrow-minded ways. Thus, arms reduction negotiations between the two Koreas can hope for practical results only when they occur as the result of a bold political decision made at a summit meeting held between the presidents of North and South Korea.

Gorbachev's unilateral arms reduction statement delivered at the United Nations on 7 December 1988 was regarded as a "political Pearl Harbor." In a simple statement containing a mere 253 words, Gorbachev managed to reduce thousands of pages of NATO arms reduction proposals spanning two full years to so much wastepaper. His arms reduction statement achieved military force objectives that hundreds of billions of dollars could not have purchased for the NATO nations. Gorbachev did it because his statement removed or reduced threats to the Soviet Union. While Gorbachev was making his huge calculations, working level arms-reduction officials of the NATO member countries were killing themselves making small calculations. Had Gorbachev not been content to settle for the vast calculation, the huge calculation, and prompt decisiveness, the East and West arms reduction negotiators would be arguing over the bean count to this day.

North and South Korean force reduction proposals are summarized below.

—South Korean Proposals:
1. Establish a direct telephone link between top military officials of North and South Korea.
2. Demilitarize the DMZ.
3. Exchange visits by military officials.
4. Inform each other about large-scale military exercises and invite the other side to send observers.

—North Korean Proposals:
1. North and South Korea should make public statements of non-aggression.
2. Cease all combined exercises and exercises above division level.
3. Turn the DMZ into a peace zone.
4. Establish a direct telephone link between military officials of North and South Korea.
5. Reduce troop levels over a three- to four-year span, paring down to 300,000, to 200,000, and finally to 100,000.
6. Make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone.
7. Establish a North-South joint military committee.

South Korea's proposals amount to suggestions for tension reduction and confidence-building and strictly speaking are not force reduction proposals at all. This reflects our strongly held policy that we must have "confidence-building first, force reduction later."

The North Korean proposals include measures for tension reduction, as well as actual force reduction elements. In the latter category, however, proposals about reducing force levels to 100,000 men, making the peninsula a nuclear-free zone, and stopping serious military exercises are short on realism and sincerity and appear to have been advanced merely for their propaganda value. It is simply not possible to maintain a military force while at the same time ceasing to conduct significant exercises.

North Korean proposals on non-aggression, making the DMZ into a peace zone, creating a direct telephone link, and establishing a joint military committee are tension-reducing measures which our side could accept very easily.

However, northern proposals and southern proposals both fail to consider the fact that arms reduction negotiations are not being handled as part and parcel of political negotiations. Arms reduction can be realized only when it is part of a package including annual North-South summit meetings, increasing exchanges of every variety between North and South, expanding visits back and forth, removing barriers to trade, and a variety of measures for reconciliation and openness.

South Korea must assume the position of leadership on questions of North-South force reductions because our position is more advantageous, and we have more negotiating leverage. We must discard the namby-pamby line of "confidence-building first, force reduction later" if we are to realize historic and practical force reduction outcomes.

Abandon "Confidence First, Force Reductions Later"

Force reduction is no exception to the rule that capable people who want to work will succeed even when there is only a one percent chance for success, while those who are neither capable nor industrious will find only excuses even if the chance for success is 99 percent. Even after North and South Korea conclude a "peace treaty," if there are no changes to the "elements of the threat" between the two, the peace treaty will be meaningless.

As we claim that we want to conclude a peace treaty, then, any force reduction proposal that does not include practical measures for actual force reductions becomes a logical contradiction. When we evaluate the above proposals solely on logical grounds, South Korean proposals are inferior to North Korean ones. And when we review the North Korean arms reduction proposals solely on the basis of logic itself, we find nothing to criticize. They are all positive.

The reason I say that we must not separate arms reduction proposals from political initiatives like "reconciliation and openness" also appears here. If North and South Korea genuinely desire peaceful coexistence, then both Seoul and Pyongyang must take "reasonable sufficiency" as their military power objective and must be satisfied with a "defensive defense" capability. This they must do because these concepts originated from the lengthy, painful process of arms reductions negotiations completed in Europe.
A "defensive defense" capability that allows for a "surprise attack capability" or a "large-scale offensive capability" is not acceptable. Japan’s Self-Defense Force aims at maintaining precisely this level of military force.

Among the most effective ways to remove surprise attack and offensive capability from the military capabilities of the North and South are the following, all of which can be subject to negotiation. Reduce existing military strength, both manpower and the equipment associated with the manpower. Deploy to rear areas and disperse offensive weapons such as tanks, field guns, fighter aircraft, armed helicopters, and AN-2s. Limit the types of units and numbers of men (say, rifle divisions and 50,000 men) who can be stationed within a set distance of the military demarcation line (say, 50 to 60 kilometers). And limit the manpower level and number of offensive weapons that can be stationed in any given province.

One thing I must emphasize here is that Korea has an advantage that European arms reduction negotiators did not enjoy. Pyongyang and Seoul already have a method to use in reducing troop levels. In Europe’s case, East and West clashed for a decade on the question of whether existing force levels should be reduced by a given percentage or by an absolute number of troops. In Korea’s case, however, North Korea had already proposed reduction in terms of absolute troop numbers, that is, reducing troops through 300,000 to 200,000 and finally to 100,000 men. South Korea must accept the absolute numbers approach to facilitate force reduction negotiations.

Determining an appropriate force level for a “defensive defense” need not involve complex calculations. It can be determined on the basis of military insight and feelings. For instance, neighboring Japan maintains just under 300,000 troops, NATO member countries devote less than three percent of GNP to military expenditures, and within a few years even the United States will part with only about four percent of her GNP for defense.

Lessons Learned From Japan’s National Self-Defense Force

If South Korea were to maintain only 300,000 troops, our defense outlays would approach only three percent of GNP. This seems to be, then, a good departure point for an arms reduction proposal.

Although present force levels should be reduced gradually, the ultimate troop strength figure should be agreed upon in the course of negotiations as the “target level.” The target level must be known in advance in order to adjust weapons acquisition, logistic plans, tactics, strategy, and to efficiently operate the military establishment so that each of these elements relates appropriately with the target troop level and the time when this level is to be reached.

Powerful on-site inspection methods must be put in place to check force reduction progress. Inspection teams should include U.S. and Soviet personnel in addition to representatives of both North and South Korea and neutral nations as well. The realization of actual force reduction proposals will require the help of the United States and the Soviet Union, so it will be more effective if we consult with these two countries before we announce arms reduction proposals.

It is absolutely necessary that North and South simultaneously reduce force levels if tension is to abate, Seoul and Pyongyang are to peacefully coexist, and all the Korean people are to enjoy the benefits of economic prosperity. Simultaneous reductions are equally necessary if a post-unification Korean military is to rely on science and professionalism to combine in joint defense against those nations which fill the role of Korea’s assumed enemies at that time.

In circumstances like our own at the present time when we must maintain massive numbers of men in our armed forces but are not in a position to raise defense expenditures enormously, then in the area of modernizing military equipment we fall way behind a military establishment like Japan’s Self-Defense Force. As we face the heated battles of the international economic war, however, we simply cannot raise defense expenditures.

We must reduce the size of our military establishment and increase its professionalism. We must find scientific ways to utilize our equipment and operate our military establishment, and we must appreciate the fact that the need to do this is greater now than at any other time.

We must not overlook the massive capacity of the 298,000-man Japanese Self-Defense Force to threaten enemies nor must we fail to wonder at its spectacularly advanced suite of equipment. If we are to realize substantial force reductions, we must devise ways to break away from inflexible ideas and fixed ways of thinking, like, “Even so, you have to put troops all along that defense line.”

If we are to achieve realistic force reduction levels, then we must see to it that the military and the defense industry both stop calculating with their own beads on the abacus.

Of course, we have no guarantee that swift force reductions will occur just because we table a force reduction proposal. However we can exploit North-South summit talks and diplomatic initiatives to expedite the process. And if we establish at the outset that reductions will leave Seoul and Pyongyang with identical force levels, then political boldness and decisiveness will make force reductions very possible indeed.

DPRK Scholar Interviewed on Arms Control
SK1107123090 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean 9 Jul 90 p 5

[“Gist” of interview by unidentified Korean reporter with Yi Hyong-chol, North Korean delegate to a seminar]
on arms control on the Korean peninsula, held at Stanford University; date not given]

[Text] [Reporter] What is the basic position of the North Korean participants in this seminar?

[Yi] Our basic position is to remove tension on the Korean peninsula and, as a prerequisite for peaceful reunification, our position is to widely reduce arms in the South and North; reduce and withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea; adopt a nonaggression declaration; and conclude a peace agreement between the DPRK and the United States. From these positions we want to find methods to ease tension and achieve peace. This is the basis for the 31 May disarmament proposal.

[Reporter] Is the 31 May disarmament proposal a precondition?

[Yi] The four issues between the North and South—creating an atmosphere for confidence, reducing arms, withdrawal of foreign troops, and disarmament and guaranteeing peace in the future—represent a scope of issues that must be agreed upon. We can carry out discussions on the method of achieving disarmament according to this.

[Reporter] Do you think that there is a possibility of reaching an agreement here?

[Yi] There can be different views on the concrete proposals but one can move forward only when one has a sense of trust in the other side and confidence in achieving one's goal. I believe that we can move forward to reach an agreement. We must agree on what kinds of measures to take. If there is a will and determination, measures can be taken unilaterally on military exercises and the "Team Spirit" exercises. There are measures that can easily be taken, such as notifying in advance of the military exercises, inviting observers, and the prevention of accidental clashes.

[Reporter] Before carrying out these kinds of military measures, don't you think confidence between the South and North must first be created?

[Yi] Trust was established in Europe. No trust has been established on the Korean peninsula. Your side sent us a letter of invitation while, at the same time, it was carrying out the "Team Spirit" military exercises. Sending us a letter of invitation while holding military training, pointing a gun at us, is tantamount to ridiculing us.

[Reporter] Does the 31 May proposal mean that your side will accept bilateral talks?

[Yi] Yes. We proposed to hold tripartite talks in 1984. But, since there was no positive answer from your side and changes were taking place on the Korean peninsula, we could not wait for the tripartite talks to take place.

[Reporter] What was your impression of the seminar?

[Yi] Everyone says that tension on the Korean peninsula must be eased. It seems that South Korea and the United States are working to find ways to realize this. I am optimistic about this. Even though we are only scholars I believe that it was helpful to meet each other and exchange opinions.

However, there are differences in opinion. In particular, we are not optimistic, but rather somewhat pessimistic, about the prospects for reunification. During the seminar, South Korea and the United States proposed that the North and South take measures to restore confidence first as was seen in Europe, before achieving arms control and arms reduction. Experiences from the European model can be applied. However, there are many problems in the case of the Korean peninsula.

If we take action after assuming temporary division to be complete division, this will perpetuate division. It is not appropriate to establish confidence by adhering to the current situation. We are not under peace conditions, the war has not ended yet, and military confrontation is still continuing.

[Reporter] What was your impression after holding discussions on these issues?

[Yi] Regardless of differences in opinion, I believe the seminar was beneficial. Scholars from the United States and South Korea agreed with me on this fact.

[Reporter] This seminar was held at a time when developments were being made to hold South-North dialogue.

[Yi] I believe it was an opportune time to hold the seminar. It was not planned in advance to hold the seminar at this time. Maybe it just happened naturally, or maybe the seminar was held at this time because of the situation on the Korean peninsula.

[Reporter] The depth of mistrust has been too great in the past. What do you think are the prospects for disarmament?

[Yi] We have met to remove mistrust. I recognize that there are differences in opinion, but I believe these differences can be narrowed.

[Reporter] [South] Korea is asserting that confidence be established first and then arms reduction...

[Yi, interrupting] It would be good if measures to remove mistrust were sincere. A general confidence must be assumed first in disarmament. Carrying out negotiations and making agreements are all ways to establish confidence. Confidence can be further established in the premier-level talks.

[Reporter] Don't you think it would be difficult to realize disarmament without restoring confidence since the North and South have already suffered a war?

[Yi] There are some parts I cannot understand in the South's assertions. Your side would like to hold personal, material,
and cultural exchanges. There is a an inconsistency in logic in this assertion. Since dialogue itself is often suspended, how can exchanges be carried out well? We can carry out the establishment of confidence and arms reduction simultaneously. The order is not a problem. The South side is proposing to establish political confidence but we believe this can be discussed in the representatives' talks. Therefore, this was excluded from the disarmament proposal.

[Reporter] In the 31 May disarmament proposal it says that without achieving disarmament, confidence between the South and North cannot be achieved and dialogue for reunification cannot be successfully carried out. Also, cooperation and exchanges cannot be realized and the nation's peaceful reunification cannot be achieved. Does this mean that disarmament is a prerequisite for all these?

[Yi] Disarmament, as discussed here, should be considered in a broad sense, not a narrow one.

**SOLOMON ISLANDS**

**U.S. Chemical Weapons Disposal Concerns Ministry**

*BK1207062790 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0500 GMT 12 Jul 90*

[Text] Solomon Islands has expressed disappointment that the United States did not consult Pacific countries before deciding to destroy stocks of chemical weapons on Johnston Atoll, south of Hawaii.

The Foreign Affairs Ministry in Honiara conveyed its reaction to an American delegation which has been visiting Solomon Islands as part of a regional tour to explain how the weapons will be destroyed.

The ministry said Solomon Islands was concerned because the environment of the region would be affected no matter what method was used to dispose of the chemicals.

There has been strong opposition from regional nations and environmental groups to the burning of chemical weapons on the atoll.

Meanwhile, the United States Army have been granted approval to burn chemical weapons at Johnston Atoll until late in December. The temporary 180-day permit was granted by the United States Environment Protection Agency in San Francisco. The ruling covers only materials stored on the atoll and means that the Army would require further permission to ship in stocks of chemical weapons for destruction. The Army had planned to bring stockpiles of nerve gas from West Germany to the atoll by the end of the year for eventual incineration.
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Soviet General Explains Delay in Troop Withdrawal

LD1607081790 Eastern Berlin ADN International Service in German 0305 GMT 16 Jul 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Today the Western Group can no longer be represented as "supposedly the most important factor for stability." This view was expressed by Major General Vasily Kazachenko of the Western Group of Soviet Armed Forces in an interview with NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, published on Monday. As a result of the Soviet Union's activities in the diplomatic and political area, confrontation has lessened. Military issues are being discussed at virtually all negotiating levels.

Kazachenko referred to the Vienna negotiations and the reduction of forces presently deployed in the GDR from the present 380,000 to 195,000 men. How long Soviet troops remain on GDR territory will also depend on the two-plus-four talks.

Concerning the unilaterally agreed withdrawal of Soviet divisions from the GDR, which have meanwhile been halted, the general said: "Our intention was to withdraw four divisions from the GDR, as well as tank divisions, airborne troop units, about 4,000 tanks, and a number of special units. The withdrawal of troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, however, changed our plans. The reasons: first, the military balance that has to be maintained and second, the social security of those military members who are returning to the USSR. It is for that reason that the concept of troop withdrawal from the GDR was changed. This affects two divisions, about 2,000 tanks. Last year we withdrew 1,988 tanks, as well as a few other units. Once the necessary conditions have been created these remaining troops will also leave the GDR."

Referring to the social problems linked to the withdrawal, Kazachenko said that the housing problems affect not only members of the Western Group. "After the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary there are 200,000 members of the military who are looking for homes. To this will then have to be added the Western Group. A relevant social program has been worked out to provide roofs over our heads back home." At the same time work, kindergarten places, and jobs for family members are being created. "Funds for these purposes have been approved and all the building capacities of the Armed Forces for this project deployed. I would estimate that this issue will be solved in three to five years."

Chemical Service Troops Inspection Begun

LD18071114490 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1053 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Beeskow (ADN)—A twelve-man team of experts from the federal Defense Ministry today began inspecting Chemical Service troops of the National People's Army [NVA]. The group, headed by the verification expert Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang Buttler, was invited by the GDR side to convince themselves that the NVA did not have any chemical warfare agents. There have been allegations in the press over the past week that the NVA had stockpiles of several thousand tonnes of chemical warfare agents, some of which were administered by the NVA itself.

The chief of the NVA Chemical Service, Major General Karl-Heinz Nagler, expressed the hope, in a briefing before the start of the inspection at the Chemical Service exercise ground 10 kilometers south of Storkow, that the inspection would help to dispel doubts and to further confidence. He said that NVA members from all sections of the Armed Forces would be trained on this ground in the reconnaissance of, defense against, and decontamination of chemical agents. To this end, the NVA did have a limited amount of chemical warfare agents at its disposal.

According to the general, the GDR Armed Forces has a total of 705.6 grams of chemicals damaging to the nerves, 206.1 kilograms of chemicals damaging to the skin, and 38.9 grams of psychotoxic chemicals [all unit measurements as received]. These warfare agents are used for examination and training purposes, exclusively on the exercise ground, at the military-medical section of the Ernst-Moritz-Arndt University in Greifswald, at the former military-technical institute in Koenigs Wusterhausen, and at the Loebau officer training college. These supplies were under constant supervision and had earlier been made public for the Geneva negotiations. In addition, the NVA possesses irritants, including those of the former Ministry for State Security, and also 650 kilograms of adamsite as a leftover from the war, since it is not possible to dispose of this. Otherwise, only imitation substances are used for training purposes.

On behalf of the federal government, Lieutenant Colonel Buttler welcomed the swift offer of inspection made on Friday by the GDR Disarmament and Defense Ministry. The inspectors will take a close look this afternoon at the training area, including the laboratory bunker containing the most toxic chemicals. Tomorrow they hope to continue their mission in an NVA camp near Genthin.

No Evidence of Soviet CW Depots Found

AU2007151790 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 20 Jul 90 p 6

["cas"-signed report: "No Evidence of Poison Gas Depots in the GDR"]

[Excerpt] Storkow/GDR—The commander in chief of the National People's Army [NVA], Admiral Theodor Hoffmann, and the head of the "Chemical Services Administration" in East Berlin's Disarmament and Defense Ministry, Major General Karl-Heinz Nagler, have stated that the GDR possesses no chemical
weapons in the form of shells or bombs, and it never possessed such weapons in the past. After 11 FRG experts examined the central exercise area of the Chemical Services in Storkow near Fuerstenwalde, Nagler stressed that the NVA had limited stocks of chemical weapons at its disposal for training purposes. The general also emphasized that the NVA did not execute plans for the production or development of chemical weapons either.

FRG experts—ten representatives from the Defense Ministry and one expert from the Foreign Ministry—are currently in the GDR to verify this. They were invited to visit the GDR last Friday [13 July] after reports were published that tens of thousands of Soviet chemical weapons were stored in depots in the GDR, which are allegedly partly guarded by the NVA. The reports also claimed that the GDR had produced chemical weapons under Soviet supervision. The Dresden work that was mentioned in this connection has vehemently rejected the claim.

The list of alleged chemical weapons depots that State Secretary Aflag received on 13 July, includes two NVA sites: Storkow and the “chemical workshop and camp 2” in Bretten near Brandenburg. Both sites are being examined now. During the first hours when the FRG experts checked the exercise area in Storkow, no chemical weapons were found. The inspection will continue. The delegation head, Colonel General Wolfgang Buttler, praised the competent NVA authorities for their willingness to cooperate.

State Secretary Aflag stated in Storkow that representatives of the Soviet Armed Forces had assured him again in the past few days that the Red Army had not stored chemical weapons in the GDR. Admiral Hoffmann and Major General Nagler pointed out that they did not see any reason to question these statements. Aflag suggested that the Soviet Army should also allow controls at its sites, by U.S. experts, for example.

According to Nagler and Hoffmann, there have never been any joint Red Army “exercises concerning the defensive use of chemical weapons,” as had been claimed. No maneuvers took place in the past few years, during which the use of weapons of mass destruction was used, Hoffmann stated. Only situations requiring the protection and defense against a chemical weapons attack, as well as decontamination and disinfection exercises were simulated, Major General Nagler pointed out. [passage omitted]

**HUNGARY**

**Burlakov on Soviet Withdrawal From Hungary**

**Calls Withdrawal Halt ‘Unrealistic’**

*AU1307094890 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 12 Jul 90 p 1*

[Interview with Matvey Burlakov, commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group, by Csaba Poor in Moscow; date not given: “Halting the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops Was Burlakov’s Personal Opinion”; first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] Colonel General Matvey Burlakov himself does not regard the idea of halting the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary in order to put pressure on the Hungarian Government as realistic. Matvey Burlakov, who is a deputy at the 28th CPSU Congress, gave an interview to MAGYAR HIRLAP in Moscow.

[Poor] In a recent interview for IZVESTIYA, you said that you might even halt the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary if the accounts for the Hungarian installations, already evacuated by the Soviet troops, are not settled in accordance with Soviet demands. Is this an official opinion, or your personal opinion?

[Burlakov] First of all, I did not say this exactly, and my words were slightly distorted. I said that there were three ways of settling the accounts: We could set up mixed enterprises by making use of the property of the Southern Army Group, and with the participation of Hungarian firms or third country firms. Then, in order to ensure that the accounts are settled properly—we have already handed over more than 30 military areas worth approximately 300-350 million transferable rubles—and to draw attention to the problem, we could treat this whole issue at governmental level and settle this issue at a higher level. This is what I also told Mr. Antall and Premier Ryzhkov when I arrived for the CPSU Congress in Moscow. I think they will have to solve this problem because we soldiers are unable to come to an agreement.

As for the possibility of halting the withdrawal of troops, this is not an official position but simply a proposal aimed at hastening the settling of accounts.

[Poor] Thus, this is your personal opinion.

[Burlakov] Yes, a personal, and not an official, opinion.

[Poor] The issue of environmental pollution is closely related to the issue of settling the accounts. On 10 July, you told a TASS correspondent that the Soviet soldiers regularly cleaned up the shooting ranges and were not leaving any military materials behind. At the same time, a large quantity of ammunition was found in Kiskunsag National Park....

[Burlakov] Who found it? Did you see this ammunition?

[Poor] It was also shown in Parliament.

[Burlakov] As far as I know, ammunition belts were presented in Parliament, belts used by both the Soviet and Hungarian Armies. In order to state clearly that these belts originate from the Soviet troops, they should be examined. It is easy to find out what kind of ammunition this is because we keep track of our ammunition by coding it. Besides, these machine-gun cartridges are not materials that can blow up and cause human casualties.
[Poor] But they do pollute the environment.

[Burlakov] I cannot deny this. But we invited a group of experts who investigated the issue, and a group of people representing the public paid a visit to our barracks in Veszprem and nobody found any basis for accusing us of polluting the environment.

[Poor] However, a few days after Deputy Gabor Demszky found this ammunition, a committee visited Kiskunsag National Park where, if I am not mistaken, Soviet troops also carried out military exercises and this committee also confirmed the existence of environmental pollution.

[Burlakov] I know where this field is located. We both use it. Our exercise field is adjacent to the Hungarian Army's exercise field. I do not want to talk about the origin of this ammunition now, whether it is Hungarian or Soviet ammunition, but it is certain that I do not necessarily believe in Mr. Demszky's statements either. When we negotiated with a parliamentary group, he accused us of engaging in arms trade. I told him to give us an example, but he was unable to come up with any such example. Why then is he talking about such a thing?

[Poor] In conclusion, taking every problem into consideration, do you consider a possible halt in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary to be realistic?

[Burlakov] No, I think this is unrealistic. I regard intelligent dialogue as realistic. Economists should examine the problems, and the accounting should be carried out honestly and under equal conditions. Of course, the withdrawal of troops should continue.

Reaction to Burlakov Comments
LD1207115590 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0400 GMT 12 Jul 90

[Interview with (Zoltan Illes), deputy state secretary in the Ministry of Environmental Protection, by unidentified studio announcer; place and date not given]

[Text] [Announcer] In this morning's issue of MAGYAR HIRLAP, there is an interview with Colonel General Burlakov, who says that when he spoke of halting the Soviet troop withdrawals, he was giving a personal opinion. He continues to deny the fact of environmental pollution, and he says that he does not believe Gabor Demszky, who not long ago supplied parliament with evidence of this. Our guest in the studio is (Zoltan Illes), deputy state secretary in the Ministry of Environmental Protection. What do you say to Col.-Gen. Burlakov's most recent statement?

[Illes] The Soviet formations used 22,000 hectares in Hungary. I do not allege, nor does anyone allege, that all of the 22,000 hectares are polluted. However, allow me to say that, for example, 8,000 hectares of the 30,000-hectare area of the Kiskunsag National Park are protected, and 700 of these strictly protected 8,000 hectares are seriously damaged. This damage amounts to approximately 120-130 million forints; this includes soil-damage from (bulldozing) and fire damage. At the same time, the damage to the protected plants and animals that have been destroyed is not included in this.

[Announcer] Allow me to interrupt. Col.-Gen. Burlakov constantly says that these drill grounds were used by Hungarian soldiers together with Soviet soldiers.

[Illes] There is a shooting ground in the Kiskunsag National park, one sector of which is used by the Hungarian Army, but it is not tanks that shoot there; soldiers carry out live firing maneuvers. At the same time, the fire damage stems from the impact of various shells. Therefore, it is not the Hungarian Army that caused this damage, and at the same time the Hungarian Army uses that firing ground only temporarily and occasionally.

[Announcer] Allow me to ask: It seems to me that the Hungarian and Soviet experts sometimes do not speak the same language. Does the concept of environmental pollution mean the same to us and to the Soviet Army?

[Illes] The Soviet side says that we want to force up our demands by mentioning environmental protection problems, too. Until the most recent discussions, they denied environmental pollution. At the same time, they are compelled to recognize that, for example in the Veszprem area, there is such oil pollution, soil pollution, that the cost of repair work exceeds one million dollars. At the same time, $20-30 million are necessary for environmental pollution at the 18 bases that have already been handed over this year. I believe that no matter how much they would like to ignore the damage caused to the environment, they will be compelled to acknowledge it.

[Announcer] Do you not fear that if you and the Environmental Protection Ministry's leading officials are so resolute and do not allow for compromise when defending Hungarian interests, the threat mentioned by Burlakov, even if as he said it was a personal opinion, might take place—that Soviet troop withdrawals might come to a halt?

[Illes] I believe that this remains his personal opinion. I do not fear this. At the same time, allow me to say that we have asked the Soviet side to send its own experts, too. So we do not want arbitrarily to establish the sources of pollution, but work together with Soviet military and civilian experts.

[Announcer] Thank you.

Official on Soviet Troop Withdrawal
AU2007092590 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 17 Jul 90 p 7

[Interview with Deputy State Secretary Zoltan Illes by Peter Vajda; place and date not given: "The Soviet General Became Very Sad—Zoltan Illes Expects More Openness From the Withdrawing Troops"]
[Excerpts] [Vajda] Mr. Illes, I would like to begin with a topical issue: The U.S. firm Martech is starting work on cleaning the areas evacuated by the Soviet troops. What kind of activity is this and how much will it cost?

[Illes] In addition to the Veszprem area, there are 18 other former military bases evacuated by the Soviet troops, and their examination will begin gradually. Hungarian experts will also participate in this activity, and the U.S. firm has strong contacts with the Bakony Metal firm in Varpalota. The U.S. experts organized four-day courses for the participants and their activity has also created jobs. The experts will examine the former Soviet bases and shooting ranges together with Defense Ministry and Environmental Protection Ministry experts....

[Vajda] How long will the cleansing of the Veszprem area last and how much will this activity cost?

[Illes] The U.S. firm is making use of its contacts in Congress. I have recently been informed by their representatives in Budapest that the Senate will also support this activity from the military budget. This is an advantage because money that we originally wanted to use for this activity will also meet other needs. As for the schedule of this activity, first we will take soil samples. Cleaning the Veszprem area will probably last one year and this is a serious task, but this area is not the most polluted one. As for the costs, cleaning the areas to be handed over this year will cost approximately $30-40 million, or about 2.5 billion forints. [passage omitted]

[Vajda] The Soviets are calling for a settlement of the accounts for each evacuated base, a request that, if I understand it correctly, is impossible given the environmental and cleaning technology considerations....

[Illes] Yes, this request has been submitted, but will not work. The Soviet troops used 22,000 hectares of land in Hungary. Determining the environmental pollution of such a big area does not happen overnight. Initial examination alone will take several months. Therefore, we asked the Soviet military leadership to make their people understand that they should not try to hide the problems.

[Vajda] What does this mean? Do they try to hide the problems?

[Illes] We have an agreement according to which the evacuated areas must be clean. What if they hand over these areas in a "clean" state in which polluting materials are dumped in concrete-covered ditches and we must uncover them in order to neutralize the poisonous materials? We will also present the bill for this activity. [passage omitted]

Updated Figures on Soviet Troop Withdrawal
LD2307172390 Budapest MTI in English 1640 GMT 23 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 23 (MTI)—In the course of the Soviet troops pullout from Hungary, altogether 448 trains had left the country by Monday. This was 25.3 percent of the 1,769 trains that are to leave until the withdrawal is completed, MTI was told by Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, spokesman for the Ministry of Defence.

Since the beginning of the pullout, 202 troops-carrying trains and 185 trainloads of equipment crossed the Hungarian-Soviet border. This means that 28.6 percent of the 1,352 trains needed for transporting the troops and their equipment have left the country up to now.

29 passenger trains and 32 container trains have also left, carrying the families and personal belongings of the Soviet soldiers.

POLAND

Trade Minister on Concessions for Arms Trade
AU1207133990 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 6 Jul 90 p 3

[Interview with Foreign Economic Cooperation Minister Marcin Swieicki by Joanna Krawczyk; place and date not given: "One Should Not Vilify The Arms Trade"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Krawczyk] When can we expect a real demonopolization of the arms trade?

[Swieicki] I think various economic units will be granted concessions to trade with weapons and military equipment before the end of the year, but the granting of such concessions will by no means be automatic. Not every applicant for a concession can count on obtaining it. Concessions will be granted to units that directly manufacture a given type of weapon or equipment, do not wish to avail themselves of the mediation of the "Cenzin" and "Cenrex" brokerage companies, and are able to guarantee proper conditions and service on international markets. They will have to assume the financial burdens, however, such as the payment of license fees for any products they manufacture on the basis of foreign licenses.

Also envisaged is the possibility of granting concessions to trade companies created by producers of military equipment, but only those created for the express purpose of trading in this equipment, and in which the producers hold over half the shares. The plan does not foresee concessions for brokers—people not engaged in the manufacture of weapons and equipment. All those who receive concessions will still be bound by the restrictions on arms imports and exports, a sphere that is controlled solely by the Foreign Economic Cooperation Ministry. The process of gearing the arms trade to market principles must be different from the same process concerning other spheres of foreign trade.

Trading in weapons is not like trading in potatoes. In the West, the arms trade remains firmly in state control, and we in Poland will not depart from this principle.
Removal of Soviet Garrison in Swidnica Planned
LD1307151190 Warsaw PAP in English
1259 GMT 13 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 13—Following the suggestions of
Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki that the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Poland should be coupled with
efforts aimed at decreasing the number of Soviet garri-
sions, steps were taken to liquidate the Soviet garrison in
Swidnica, south-west Poland, Poland’s government
plenipotentiary for the stationing of Soviet troops in
Poland, Division General Mieczyslaw Debicki told PAP.

By the end of the year, the commanding staff of the
Northern Group of the Soviet Army now in Swidnica
should be moved to Legnica from where another major
commanding staff designed to operate on the Central
European operational and strategic line has already
started to withdraw. The Soviet side pledged that this
commanding staff, far bigger than the commanding staff
of the Northern Group will be utterly withdrawn from

By the end of the year, the number of Soviet troops will
be reduced from 58,400 to some 48,000 servicemen.

The further process of withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Poland depends on the process of forming a new system
of European security, including the process of German
unification, and on the final decisions to be taken during
Vienna talks. Hence the schedule of withdrawing Soviet
troops from Poland for the year 1991 and later can be
worked out no earlier than at the end of 1990, General
Debicki said.
BRAZIL

Monteiro on Missile Development for Iraq
90WP0109B Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 25 Jun 90 p A8

[Report by special correspondent Roberto Lopes in Brasilia]

[Text] An attempt at self-promotion. That is the way Minister of Aeronautics Socrates Monteiro views the interview given by Brigadier General (Reserve) Hugo de Oliveira Piva last month to announce that his consulting company, HOP, had hired and sent to Iraq 23 Brazilian engineers with the capability to develop a sophisticated air-to-air missile in that country.

“He (Piva) said that the news item was a dirty trick they played on him,” the minister said. Actually, Brig. Gen. Piva does not make much of a secret of his activities. Early last month, en route from Paris to Sao Paulo, Piva met with a businessman on the plane who represents several Israeli manufacturers in Brazil. During the flight, the owner of HOP told the man the same story he had leaked to the press.

He said to this friend that the Iraqi authorities have a lot of money to invest in the project and that its objective really is to develop an air-to-air missile. According to Monteiro, the plans for the Brazilian “Piranha” missile—which, according to the news report, would serve as the foundation for the Brazilians’ work in Iraq—“are kept in a vault.” Monteiro insists that the Brazilian Government has nothing to do with the work those 23 Brazilians are doing in Iraq.

Whether or not it is merely an attempt to promote his own image, the fact is that Brig. Gen. Hugo de Oliveira Piva managed to make news on the international scene. His interview was reproduced in newspapers in the United States, France, West Germany, Switzerland, and elsewhere. Last week it was still having repercussions. On Wednesday morning the Mexican TV network Televisa sought out the minister of aeronautics to try to interview him on the subject of the “Piranha.” Monteiro assigned Sergio Ferola, director of the Aerospace Technical Center (CTA), to meet with the Mexican reporters, and recommended that he make it clear that the government has nothing to do with HOP’s business deals.

The news item has also created a rift in Brazil-Israeli relations. It was the subject of a report by the Israeli Embassy in Brasilia to its government in Tel Aviv. Israeli officials became concerned about the matter and immediately responded that the news was not good. Itamaraty was also informed about the discomfort caused in Tel Aviv by the reports of cooperation between the Brazilians and the Iraqis.

Brig. Gen. Piva has been known for his daring initiatives. He won fame in the first half of the 1980s as director of the CTA, at the time when the “Piranha” was considered a priority program. The idea was to develop a missile capable of hitting an enemy aircraft head-on (i.e., with the target reduced to its smallest possible area). At that time, Piva was also involved, secretly, in another ambitious project: the building of a military base in the Cachimbo mountains in southern Para State, to be used for underground nuclear testing. Lately, HOP has been doing consulting work for the Sao Paulo firm of Orbita, established in January 1987 to manufacture missiles and rockets but which, ever since last year, is trying to acquire some capability in the area of artificial satellites. Orbita was also involved in the “Piranha” program, but was forced to stop work on it in 1988 for lack of funds.

Military Projects Proposed for Nuclear Program
PY11072156/90 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 4 Jul 90 p 4

[Report by Regina Eleuterio]

[Text] Rio de Janeiro—The work group in charge of reviewing the Brazilian nuclear program will propose to President Collor the investment of approximately $2 billion (172 billion cruzeiros on the parallel market) in military projects and privatization of several activities in the nuclear sector. The proposals include a preliminary report that foresees the conclusion of Angra 2 in 1996 (according to Brazilian Nuclear Industries plans, it could be concluded by 1994), and Angra 3 in the year 2000.

Civilian associations in the energy and scientific areas see the proposals as a sign that the government will give priority to the parallel program developed by the Armed Forces—to the detriment of civilian projects. The final report will have approximately 100 pages slightly different from the preliminary reports. The work group will meet tomorrow in Brasilia to prepare the final report to be handed over to President Collor.

This group, organized in March, is made up of representatives of the Armed Forces, the Environment and Science and Technology Secretariats, the Infrastructure and Foreign Ministries, and the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) president, Jose Luiz Santana de Carvalho.

The report, which outlines the nuclear program up to at least the year 2000, suggests that the production of uranium concentrate be given to private companies, which will be charged with research, mining, and operation of the enterprise. For this, they will receive, free of charge, geological and technological information that is in the hands of the Brazilian Nuclear Industries (INB). Joao Manoel Barbosa, 41, of the Economists Union and the Association of INB employees, has stated that the Constitution establishes that the exploitation of nuclear services of any nature must be exclusively in the hands of the state.

The report proposes abolishment of the Uranium of Brazil enterprise, an INB subsidiary in charge of mining uranium ore, its production, and enrichment, and of the
Separation Factors Factory (FES) [fabrica de Elementos de Separacao], which specializes in manufacturing elements for uranium enrichment. Nuclemon [Nuclebras Monazite and Associated Elements, Ltd.], which is in charge of mining and enriching monazite elements, is among those to be privatized.

During the presidential campaign, Collor said his government program foresees the conclusion of Angra 2 and revision of the agreement for construction of Angra 3. The work group is keeping the two, but has postponed the INB schedule (Angra 2 in 1994 and Angra 3 in 1997). The group foresees the creation of specific managements within Furnas Electric Power Plants, Inc. to administer the two plants.

As for the $2-billion investment in military programs, this includes resources for reactors to be built by the Army and Air Force. The Army project foresees a graphite nuclear reactor, which is used in other countries to manufacture the atomic bomb.

Country Positioned To Obtain Bomb Elements
PY11072311090 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 7 Jul 90 p A 6

[Report by Jose Coronado]

[Text] Brazil is already in the position of obtaining the necessary elements to manufacture a nuclear bomb. This statement was made by Jose Goldemberg, science and technology federal secretary, during recording of the "Economic Moment" program presented by journalist Salomao Schwartzman, of Rio de Janeiro Manchete Television. This program will be aired within the next few days, although no date has been set yet. Goldemberg admitted that the Armed Forces plan to install a plant for the treatment of enriched plutonium, a substance that can be used in manufacturing nuclear bombs.

Schwartzman asked Goldemberg whether Brazil has gone "into labor" prior to giving birth to an atomic bomb. Goldemberg answered that the country is in a position to produce nuclear weapons, but that it will attempt to use the resources for peaceful means—the generation of energy and the production of nuclear submarines. He added that a commission made up of several ministries, including the Army, was created at the beginning of the Collor government to study the Brazilian nuclear model. This commission has submitted several recommendations to President Collor, among them the installation of a plant for the treatment of enriched plutonium.

Goldemberg said that there are always military groups interested in the production of nuclear weapons. He added that one of the commission's recommendations was that the plutonium be used for peaceful means. Goldemberg said that personally he opposes the use of nuclear energy for military purposes.
INDIA

UN Delegate Notes Concern Over Arms Treaties
52500035A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English
6 Jun 90 p 5

[Text] U.N. H.Q., June 5—India has expressed concern
over some nuclear arms control agreements between
the Soviet Union and the USA that provide for the further
improvement of weapons, and called for a comprehen-
sive test ban treaty, reports PTI.

A comprehensive test ban treaty would be the single-
most far-reaching measure for curbing the nuclear arms
race, the Indian Ambassador to the U.N., Mr C. R.
Gharekhan, told a U.N. committee.

Stating that nuclear weapon states hold the key to the
success in achieving such a treaty, Mr Gharekhan said
that to be truly effective, it must be universally observed.
Though welcoming the nuclear arms control agreements
between the USA and the Soviet Union, Mr Gharekhan
regretted that none of these prohibit the “upgrading”
of the existing weapons systems and “some even specify the
permitted areas for further improvement”.

Mr Gharekhan said that experts maintained that nuclear
weapon testing was no longer indispensable for ensuring
the validity and credibility of nuclear stockpiles. Rather
it is related to the development of a new generation of
nuclear weapons. This could be effectively impeded by a
comprehensive test ban treaty, he said.

The Indian Ambassador was addressing a meeting con-
vened to exchange views among State parties to the 1963
Test Ban Treaty and to discuss preparations for the 1991
conference that will seek to convert the treaty into a
comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Mr Gharekhan said that when the Partial Test Ban
Treaty (PTBT) was concluded in 1963, it was unani-
mously regarded as the first step towards a comprehen-
sive test ban treaty. “We now find, over two-and-a-half
decades later, this expectation has been belied”.

The PTBT, he said, accomplished a sharp diminution in the
radioactive contamination of the atmosphere, oceans
and land. “It did not, however, lead to the arrest of the
quantitative or qualitative nuclear arms race”, he added,
pointing out that 147 nuclear tests have been conducted
in the last five years.

ISRAEL

Arrow, Patriot Missile Systems Under Discussion

Arrow Test To Occur
TA200713Z90 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew
1300 GMT 20 Jul 90

[Text] The Air Force commander says that Iraq's self-
confidence is growing, increasing the likelihood that it
could attack its Persian Gulf neighbors. He pointed out
that Jordan is likewise playing with fire with its military
cooperation with Iraq.

Replying to a question on whether Israel would test the
Arrow missile within two weeks, Major General Bin-
Nun replied: This would be a safe assumption.

He was speaking at a news conference with foreign
reporters in Tel Aviv.

Arens Says Patriot Sale Off
TA210717Z90 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew
1700 GMT 17 Jul 90

[Text] Defense Minister Moshe Arens has said that in
light of the license the United States gave Israel to
continue to develop the Arrow antimissile missile and its
pledge to invest approximately $250 million in the
second stage of the missile’s development, the Patriot
project has been struck off the agenda. The Patriot is a
similar missile developed by the United States.

Our correspondent Ya’ir Stern reports that, after
meeting with his U.S. counterpart, Richard Cheney,
Arens told reporters that the Patriot cannot satisfy
Israel’s defense needs while the Arrow will offer a
satisfactory response to the threats.

Major General Bin-Nun, the commander of the Air
Force, said that he believes the Arrow could become
operational within five years.

IAF Chief Sees Need for Both
TA220711Z90 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew
1005 GMT 22 Jul 90

[Report by military affairs correspondent Karmela
Menasha]

[Text] The first tests following the initial stage of develop-
ment in the Arrow missile project are due to be held
within a few days. The Arrow project is a missile defense
system. Last Friday the defense minister stated that the
U.S. Administration had promised to support the second
phase of the Arrow’s development at a cost of about
$200 million, compared to the $158 million invested
during the initial stage. Israel’s commitment to purchase
the Arrow system upon its completion in approximately
five years had constituted one of the conditions for
continued U.S. support since the project’s inauguration.

Nevertheless, it has now been decided that Israel would
instead pledge to integrate the project in the IDF’s [Israel
Defense Force] multiyear work plan. Purchasing orders
are submitted within the framework of such a plan, and
some of these orders are completed toward the plan’s
end. A multiyear plan is based on projected threats and
current IDF exigencies, as opposed to future dangers.
Therefore, the integration of the Arrow missile into the
multiyear work plan means that Israel indeed intends to
acquire the missile. The fact that Israel refused to sign
the commitment, however, could mean that the defense
estabishment is unwilling to commit itself right now. In any case, sources in Israel Air Industries expressed satisfaction with the agreement and with the administration's support for the second stage of the project. The project, they said, would bring us significantly closer to an integrated system.

It was further learned that the decision not to procure the Patriot antiaircraft missile system was made on 19 July in the defense minister's office. The chief of staff, the chief of the Planning Branch, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) commander, and other elements also attended the meeting and briefed the defense minister on the Patriot system's capabilities. Over the past two months experiments and tests have been conducted by experts, who claimed that the Patriot system is limited in its firing ranges, cannot furnish a response to the problems posed by ballistic missiles, and could never achieve the level exhibited by the Arrow.

Major General Avihu Bin-Nun, the IAF commander, said during a meeting with military correspondents that it was necessary to integrate the two systems—the Patriot and the Arrow—in order to furnish an adequate response to the threat posed to Israel by Arab surface-to-surface missiles. During the same meeting, the IAF commander also said that Israel is examining the possibility of leasing the Patriot missiles.

**No Plans To Revive Lavi**

*TA2207201590 Jerusalem Television Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 22 Jul 90*

[Excerpts] Security sources said this evening that there are no plans whatsoever to revive the Lavi project. Speculation about the Lavi emerged after Defense Minister Moshe Arens proposed to the Americans that they consider choosing the Lavi as an assistance aircraft to ground forces. The Lavi did not feature in the meeting between Arens and Richard Cheney in Washington. Our military affairs correspondent Moshe Shlonsky reports from the studio:

On the eve of important strategic decisions on his agenda, Minister Arens met his U.S. counterpart Richard Cheney. As far as is known, he heard what he wanted to hear on the main issue: The United States will be prepared to go on financing the Arrow project. This antimissile missile is still in the development stage, and the United States would be financing some 80 percent of the project's cost. We should like to stress that no mention has been made of the United States financing its production. Neither has the United States asked Israel to commit itself now to finance the missile's production, which would begin not earlier than 1995. [passage omitted]

The launch of the Arrow missile is expected within the next few days. It is important to note that there is no connection, at this point at least, between the Arrow project and the U.S.-made Patriot missile, an antiaircraft transformed for missile warfare. Nevertheless, Israeli Army sources fear that the purchase of the Patriot might be used as an excuse by the Americans to sell it to Israel's neighboring Arab countries. This alone is good enough reason not to buy it. In any case, there is as yet no decision concerning the Patriot, but the chances of its purchase are small.

As for the Lavi, Minister Arens proposed to the Americans to use the systems of the technological aircraft Lavi-3, not to revive the project. After all, the project had been financed by U.S. funds. The chances that the Americans might accept the proposal look rather dim at this point.

**IDF 'Very Angry' With Arens**

*TA2307091590 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 23 Jul 90 p A2*

[Report by 'Imanu'el Rosen and Ran Dagoni]

[Excerpts] IDF [Israel Defense Force] circles are very angry with Defense Minister Moshe Arens for making a decision on the Arrow project and the Patriot system which runs counter to the recommendation of the chief of staff and the Air Force commander. Senior Army elements said yesterday. The significance of the defense minister's decision is that in the next six years, at least, Israel will have no answer to the missile threat. [passage omitted]

Security elements said yesterday that entering the Arrow project is "an adventure whose end is impossible to foresee; in addition, it is doubtful whether the IDF will have the funds for the procurement phase." Furthermore, unlike the Lavi, which had an American alternative, "the Arrow has no alternative." [passage omitted]

**JORDAN**

**Libya Reportedly Provides Antiaircraft Missiles**

*JN1107184390 Jerusalem in Arabic to the Arab World 1430 GMT 11 Jul 90*

[From "With the Events" feature]

[Excerpt] The British newspaper THE TIMES reported yesterday that Jordan recently received SA-8 antiaircraft missiles from Libya. It should be recalled that, during the recent Arab summit in Baghdad, Libyan Leader Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi promised to supply Jordan with weapons. These missiles are of Soviet manufacture and were purchased by Libya from the Soviet Union in 1988.

Jordan now has 20 such missile systems that constitute an air defense network to support armored and infantry forces in the battlefield. The missiles are mobile and have an 11-km range. Jordan wishes to purchase additional systems of these missiles from the Soviet Union. However, its poor economy has forced it to give up such desires, because the Soviet Union currently demands cash in hard currency from those purchasing weapons. [passage omitted]
Feasibility of Tactical Nuclear Arms Talks Questioned
904M0009C Moscow MIROYAVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 2, Feb 90 (signed to press 16 Jan 90) pp 29-40

[Article by Sergey Vadimovich Kortunov, candidate of historical sciences and adviser to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Administration for Arms Limitation and Disarmament Affairs]

[Text] After the Brussels session of the NATO Council (May 1989) reached the “compromise” decision on the modernization of the American Lance missiles, the issue of talks on tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe, which had just recently been a matter of such great concern to the Europeans and had been the focus of debates within the North Atlantic alliance, seemed to lose its relevance and became a secondary issue in world politics.

In my opinion, this impression is deceptive and, in general, reflects only the external side of the matter. We cannot seriously believe that the fundamental differences of opinion between NATO countries on TNW, which were revealed when the Brussels decision was being hammered out, disappeared all at once, nor can we assume that the heated debates which broke out in spring 1989 and were splashed all over the pages of Western newspapers and magazines were no more than a well-orchestrated “propaganda show” intended for the domestic and foreign consumer but having no effect whatsoever on the “monolithic” unity of NATO.

To be fair, we must admit that the President of the United States was able to take the edge off the problem temporarily by redirecting the attention of the European allies to the conclusion of an agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe as soon as possible. This, however, did not eliminate the acute conflicts over the TNW. In the final analysis, they are not the main problem. They are important mainly as an indication that the commencement of talks on TNW is not as simple a matter for NATO as it might have seemed at first.

Why the West Has Not Agreed to Talks

What could be bad about negotiation? After all, the parties hammer out mutually acceptable decisions. No single side—provided, of course, that the sides are equal partners—can force the other to accept decisions infringing upon its security. Negotiation is a search for compromises and the removal of mutual apprehensions. Why then, we might ask, have the NATO countries been so obstinate in resisting TNW talks? After all, if anyone should be concerned, they should: The Warsaw Pact states have several times as many tactical nuclear missiles. Besides this, if a nuclear war should break out in the European theater, the Western half of the continent would suffer much more than the Eastern half by all conceivable methods of calculation because of its dense population, its high concentration of industry, and the mere accumulation of wealth and physical property within its territory.

Then why has the West still not agreed to begin even preliminary consultations on this matter? Apparently, the reason will not be found within the confines of purely military factors, although the influence of military considerations cannot be denied. The debates between the NATO countries were useful precisely because they provided convincing proof of this. They revealed that the issue of TNW was not an exclusively military matter, but represented a tight knot of the most diverse European and world problems—the military, political, economic, and even moral-psychological problems connected with the elimination of deeply entrenched mental stereotypes and various layers of emotion accumulated during the years of “cold war.”

The essence of the problem is probably the fact that tactical nuclear arms are an integral element of the political structure that took shape in Europe in the postwar period. The removal of this element presupposes its profound transformation, if not its complete dismantling. Why?

The system of military-political relations between European states, which has existed on the continent for the last few decades, is distinguished by a high level of military confrontation, mutual suspicion, and mistrust, liberally laced with ideological dogmas and militaristic thinking. For a long time the states of the East and West were prey to false, often caricatured descriptions of one another which stimulated an arms buildup. As a result, colossal military strength, clearly surpassing all conceivable criteria of defensive potential, was concentrated in the center of Europe.

At this time it would probably be useless to try to figure out who was more to blame for this situation—the East or the West? This would not bring us any closer to the move from over-arming to reasonably sufficient defense.

It is also obvious that our tendency to put too much trust in the quantitative parameters of military strength, reflected in the clearly excessive military potential of Soviet tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and tactical missiles, was interpreted in the West as physical proof of the USSR’s aggressive intentions and aroused the West’s worries about its own security. In this context, the tactical weapons deployed in Europe were expected, according to West European thinking, to serve, on the one hand, as a shield in the event of an invasion by “fleets of Soviet tanks” and, on the other, as a major component of the so-called “nuclear guarantees” of the United States, guaranteeing a “transatlantic linkup” with U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

In turn, the Americans began to regard TNW as a means of exerting strong pressure on their allies to keep them within the rigid confines of “Atlantic control.” For this reason, when they spoke of “superior Soviet military strength,” they wanted to keep the “enemy image” alive
in the minds of their allies so that they would pattern their actions on the “worst-case scenario.” This is why the “over-arming” of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states worked to Washington’s advantage by objectively reinforcing this image.

The United States’ interests were also served by the Soviet Union’s strong infrastructure for “limited nuclear war” in Europe. Although the Soviet Union verbally denied the possibility of this kind of war and refused to admit that there were plans for preventing its escalation to the point of a full-scale nuclear conflict, it established an impressive potential here—the “Eurostrategic” weapons (the SS-10, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles and the Tu-22, Tu-22M, and Tu-16 medium-range nuclear bombers), operational-tactical weapons (the SS-12 and SS-23 missiles), and tactical weapons (the R-17, Luna, and Tochka missiles, 152, 155, 203, and 240 mm nuclear artillery, and the Su-7, Su-17, Su-24, MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-27 tactical aircraft). In terms of their missile component, all of these weapons surpassed NATO weapons several times over. With complete justification, the West interpreted all of these actions as a sign of agreement with the American theory of “limited nuclear war”—despite the officially declared principles of the Soviet military doctrine.

All of this essentially promoted the perpetuation of the military-force model of security in Europe, based on “nuclear deterrence”—i.e., on the sides’ creation and maintenance of equal danger to one another. Under these conditions, TNW became something like a “sacred cow” in the West, because they were regarded as a unique symbol of the security cementing the “Atlantic partnership.”

For this reason, our appeals for the “third zero”—i.e., for the complete elimination of TNW in Europe—were always regarded in the West, even though they were certainly dictated by the very best intentions, as an “encroachment” upon this partnership and as an attempt to “drive a wedge” between the United States and Europe and deprive NATO of the “nuclear shield” which had been established as a counterbalance to the USSR’s superior conventional armed forces on the continent. In the West’s opinion, the elimination of TNW would have led to an unavoidable crisis in NATO, which might have resulted in the eventual collapse of this organization, because it would have been followed automatically by the Americans’ “departure” from Europe and, consequently, by the United States’ refusal to give the allies any kind of “nuclear guarantees” whatsoever.

All of these facts seem to offer a fairly convincing explanation of why the very term “third zero” has aroused such an extremely bitter reaction in the West and has essentially played into the hands of the people insisting on the retention of TNW in Europe. It is indicative that in spite of all the differences of opinion among NATO countries on the TNW issue, they have taken a common stance on the unacceptability of their complete elimination in Europe.

The Soviet position on TNW was adjusted in line with this. In particular, an announcement was made at the highest level to explain that the Soviet Union regards the elimination of these weapons as a sequential process. The Europeans could travel part of the distance separating us from the complete elimination of nuclear weapons without giving up their common stance: The USSR could remain true to its nuclear-free ideals, and the West could remain true to the idea of “minimal deterrence.” This would require the clarification of the term “minimal” and some explanation of the point at which the potential for nuclear retaliation turns into the potential for attack. The Soviet Union proposed that experts from the USSR, United States, Great Britain, and France, and from the states where nuclear weapons are deployed, discuss all of these matters in detail.

There is no question that this description of the issue is more acceptable to the West. Nevertheless, it needs further clarification. Some European groups are still afraid that the USSR will lure the NATO countries into a trap: It will achieve sizable reductions and then propose a “zero option” which will be difficult to refuse without suffering serious political losses.

The groundlessness of these fears was pointed out recently by FRG Foreign Minister H.D. Genscher: “The United States is negotiating a 50-per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms with the USSR, but we are not trying to discourage this on the pretext that it could lead to the complete elimination of strategic nuclear arms.” He also cited the following argument in favor of talks: “Only negotiations can produce results acceptable to both sides, and results that are binding and, consequently, irreversible. Unilateral reductions are better than nothing, but they are worse than treaties because they can be annulled.”

The Modernization of Weapons and the Inertia of Thinking

One of the most distressing problems in connection with the TNW is the question of their modernization. What, exactly, is the problem? After all, once a weapon exists, its updating is a completely natural process. The removal of military equipment from operational status after it has become obsolete and has outlived its usefulness is practiced in every army in the world. As far as TNW are concerned, the Warsaw Pact states and the NATO countries have consistently updated their tactical nuclear missiles and their nuclear-capable aircraft and artillery systems. Until recently, no one ever over dramatized the issue. What has happened in the last few years?

First let us take a look at the facts. At the present time the balance of power between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the sphere of TNW is the following. The Warsaw Pact has around 12 times as many launchers of tactical nuclear missiles with a range of up to 500 km (1,608:136), whereas NATO has a slight edge in nuclear-capable strike aircraft with a range of up to 1,000 km (4,075:2,783). There is an approximate balance in
nuclear-capable heavy artillery with a range of 60 km (more than 6,000 units on each side).

As for the balance of power in terms of tactical nuclear warheads, no precise ratio can be cited at this time because the Soviet Union still has not published any data on its potential. This gives the West a chance to cite a figure which is most probably overstated—up to 10,000 units for the USSR as compared to 4,000 units for NATO.

In the missile component of tactical nuclear arms, the NATO Lance missile systems (with a range of up to 120 km), which are deployed in the FRG, Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, and the French Pluto systems (120 km) are opposed by the R-17 systems, or the SKAD-V (300 km), Tochka, or the SS-21 (70 km), and the Luna, or Frog (70 km), deployed on the territory of the Warsaw Pact states.

Of course, in view of the operational connection between TNW and central strategic nuclear systems, parity in this sphere between NATO and the Warsaw Pact does not have any great military significance. The number and type of nuclear systems aimed at targets on national territory, however, are of the greatest significance to both sides.

Now let us move on to modernization. If this implies the replacement of obsolete missile systems with more modern ones, this was conducted in Warsaw Pact groups of forces in the 1980's. In particular, the Luna missile systems (adopted in 1964) were replaced with Tochka missile systems (adopted in 1975).

It is an important point that the replaced Luna systems and the replacement Tochka systems have approximately the same range—up to 70 km. As for the R-17 tactical missiles (adopted in 1962), they were partially replaced by the Oka operational-tactical missiles (SS-23), but these were eliminated in accordance with the INF Treaty. Other components of tactical nuclear arms—aviation and artillery—are updated in accordance with plans, and the data on these have not been published yet either.

The fundamental decision NATO made at a session of the Nuclear Planning Group in Montebello (Canada) in 1983 on the need to “modernize” the TNW was substantiated by the Warsaw Pact countries' superiority in this sphere. This was also where a decision was made to withdraw 1,400 tactical nuclear weapons (demolition charges, antiaircraft missiles, and Honest John missiles) from Western Europe by the end of 1988 in addition to the 1,000 units withdrawn prior to 1980. Therefore, the “Montebello Plan” envisaged the removal of some obsolete TNW from operational status along with the deployment of more effective ones from the standpoint of explosive force, accuracy of delivery to the target, and range of fire.

According to the definition in the “Soviet Military Encyclopedia,” the term “modernization of military equipment” means “the renewal of obsolete models of military equipment by changing the design, material, or manufacturing technology for the purpose of considerably improving their characteristics and enhancing the effectiveness of their use.”

Let us take a look at the NATO countries' activity in the TNW sphere from this standpoint.

In the United States the Lance-2 missile system with a range of up to 480 km began to be developed in November 1988 as a replacement for the Lance system and is scheduled to enter the operational inventory in the middle of the 1990’s. In all, up to a thousand missiles are to be produced. This has been accompanied by the full-scale development of the SRAM-T air-to-surface guided missile with a range of up to 500 km as a replacement for free-fall bombs on virtually all American and allied tactical aircraft in Europe. Besides this, the obsolete B-28 and B-43 aerial bombs have already been replaced with the new B-61 bombs. Nuclear artillery is being re-equipped with new W-79 shells for the 203.2 mm howitzer (in place of the W-33 shells). New 203.2 mm neutron shells began to be produced in 1988. At the end of 1989 the 155 mm W-48 shells were replaced with W-82 shells of the same caliber. According to some data, despite the reduction in the number of shells, their overall explosive force doubled.

In France the Hades missile system (with a range of up to 350 km), with a conventional and neutron warhead, is being developed as a replacement for the Pluto system (and is expected to enter the operational inventory in 1992). In all, the production of up to 90 of these systems is planned. In the French Air Force, the Jaguar and Mirage-III E planes began to be replaced by Mirage-2000N planes equipped with ASMR air-to-surface missiles (with a range of up to 350 km) at the end of 1988.

Besides this, the possibility of deploying additional F-111 fighter planes and FB-111 bombers on U.S. air force bases is being discussed in NATO. These are to be equipped with the same SRAM-T air-to-surface missiles and will be subordinate to the tactical air command and the supreme allied commander of NATO forces in Europe. In all, as a result of the “modernization,” the number of English and French nuclear warheads capable of reaching the territory of the USSR more than doubled. This list of projects alone clearly indicates that several of the measures NATO has taken “without any fanfare,” as the saying goes, were intended to “compensate” for the elimination of American intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in accordance with the INF Treaty. West German Admiral E. Schmeling compared this “modernization” to the exchange of “an old heap” for a Mercedes plus a BMW plus a Porsche.

The most indicative example is the Lance-2, which will replace the American Lance missile systems deployed in several West European countries and slated to lose their fitness in 1995. The U.S. administration is soliciting
congressional approval of allocations for the continuation of the development of the new missile system in the next 2 years. Congress, however, wants certain guarantees that the NATO countries, especially the FRG, will agree to the deployment of these systems on their territory. This is the reason for the pressure Washington tried to exert on its allies in spring 1989.

As we know, there has been some ambivalence in NATO with regard to the modernization of the Lance system. When Secretary of State J. Baker toured the West European countries in February 1989, he was unable to convince the allies that a decision should be made in favor of “modernization” in the near future. No decision was reached on the matter during the session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Brussels on 29 and 30 April 1989 either. The session communique contains only the general statement that NATO nuclear forces “should be maintained on a modern level wherever necessary.” This wording made its way into the report approved at the Brussels session of the NATO Council on 30 May 1989 on the comprehensive theory of arms control and disarmament. The report also said that “the question of the adoption and deployment of the system which will replace the Lance system will be considered in 1992 with a view to the overall situation in the security sphere.” In this way, the question of “modernization” was effectively shelved until 1992, although the allies did acknowledge “the value of the continued financing by the United States of the research and development of the system which will replace the present Lance short-range missile to preserve alternative options in this area.”

The doubts of the United States’ allies about the expediency of modernizing the tactical missiles were completely understandable. After all, the Lance-2 is not simply an updated model, but a fundamentally different class of missile with a range comparable to the range of operational-tactical missiles (also known as shorter-range missiles), particularly the Soviet Oka missiles, which are to be eliminated in accordance with the INF Treaty. In this context, the U.S. efforts to develop the Lance-2 missile can quite justifiably be regarded, if not as direct violations of the law, then at least as an attempt to circumvent this exceptionally important agreement.

Although the Lance-2 program has the greatest political emphasis and is now the central topic of debates in Europe, the key element of “modernization” from the military-technical standpoint is probably the improvement of aerial systems. This is corroborated not only by the fact that air-launched missiles can be deployed in much greater numbers than land-based ones, but also by the plans for the deployment of additional American weapon-platform aircraft in Europe.

In combination with their highly accurate homing guidance, the range of these missiles will guarantee the delivery of munitions to the target without any need for the weapon-platform plane to enter the enemy air defense zone. It is clear that this considerably lowers the anticipated level of losses of the side’s own planes and devalues the Warsaw Pact superiority in fighter-interceptors.

Therefore, the situation with regard to TNW modernization is the following. The Warsaw Pact and NATO have updated their combat equipment in recent years, but whereas the basic characteristics of the Warsaw Pact’s updated systems, including range, are comparable to the characteristics of the weapons they replaced, and whereas the replacement of tactical nuclear missiles has now stopped, NATO intends to re-equip its tactical nuclear arsenal with weapons completely comparable to shorter-range missiles. This will lay the material foundation for the new American doctrine of “air and land battle,” envisaging strikes by tactical nuclear arms against the second and third echelons of Warsaw Pact combat formations.

According to former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense R. Wagner’s interpretation of the “Montebello decision,” it presupposed a “departure from the reliance on systems with a small combat radius and a shift in favor of longer-range systems as something more useful from the political standpoint and, as the possibility of destroying targets in the depths of defense increases, as something augmenting...military potential.”

Therefore, the inertia of the military-political thinking of the “cold war” days clearly affected views on the “modernization” of TNW in NATO. This is understandable: After all, the decision in Montebello was made in 1983, when the East-West dialogue on disarmament issues was essentially at a standstill. It was at that time that the talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe and on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms were broken off.

The present situation is different. The INF Treaty has been concluded and is being implemented successfully. Talks on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe have begun, and there is a chance that an agreement will be concluded this year. The Soviet Union is carrying out sweeping unilateral reductions of its armed forces and arms in Europe and also of some tactical nuclear arms: In 1989, 500 nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the territory of its allies (166 airborne, 50 artillery, and 284 missiles); TNW delivery systems are also being reduced, including 24 tactical nuclear missile launchers.

Against this background, the “modernization” of TNW in Europe definitely sounds out of tune. The arsenal of systems the advocates of modernization would like to have by the middle of the 1990s does not fit into the present dynamics of East-West relations at all. Obviously, the time has come for a serious discussion of the precise issue of TNW modernization.

Of course, any serious expert on disarmament issues must know that it would be unrealistic to insist on the renunciation of modernization “altogether” under present conditions, particularly in view of the fact that
all tactical nuclear systems—missiles, planes, and artillery—are essentially dual-purpose systems. As long as the weapons exist, they must be updated. During this process, they are naturally improved.

In this context, it would probably be best to strive for an agreement on the strict regulation of modernization instead of its mutual renunciation. This kind of agreement would presuppose, for example, the prohibition of the following: the augmentation of the number of nuclear-capable tactical systems; an increase in the range of land-based and air-launched missiles; the development of new types of nuclear munitions; an increase in the number of missiles and bombs for which various types of planes are equipped. This, in turn, could aid in defining the parameters of “minimal deterrence” for Europe. It will be important to break out of the vicious cycle of “modernization in response to modernization,” which is a generator of the arms race.

Therefore, the issue of modernization is one of the key elements of the entire subject matter of TNW, ultimately deciding the role of these weapons on the European continent and, to a considerable extent, the entire situation here. This is precisely why this issue should become the object of the closest scrutiny by Warsaw Pact and NATO countries in the near future.

Are the Positions of the Sides Really That Far Apart?

There are still serious differences of opinion between the NATO and Warsaw Pact states on the start of TNW talks. To be fair, however, we must admit that the differences have recently been less pronounced, especially since the Brussels session of the NATO Council.

On the one hand, the NATO countries are no longer categorically rejecting the very idea of negotiations. Furthermore, they have essentially expressed a willingness to begin these talks, but only on certain conditions. On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact countries are no longer insisting so categorically on the immediate elimination of TNW in Europe and have shifted the emphasis to asymmetrical reductions to the point of equal quantitative levels.

The positions of the sides are obviously closer together, and this is a positive sign. How do these positions differ?

First of all, the Warsaw Pact states propose the commencement of TNW talks as soon as possible, and without any links to the resolution of other disarmament problems. The NATO countries are willing to start the talks only after the agreements on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe begin to be carried out.

Second, the Warsaw Pact wants all of the Warsaw Pact and NATO nuclear powers to be party to the talks, as well as all other interested states belonging to these alliances, particularly those with nuclear-capable tactical systems and those with TNW deployed on their territory. The NATO countries, as we know, have expressed a willingness for USSR-U.S. talks, although they have admitted the possibility of “consultations with interested allies.”

Third, the Warsaw Pact wants the talks and, consequently, the reductions to cover all categories of TNW—land-based missile systems with a range of up to 500 km, frontal (tactical) aviation and artillery capable of using nuclear munitions, the nuclear components of these systems, and nuclear mines and demolition charges. The NATO countries are willing to conduct talks only “for the purpose of the partial reduction of American and Soviet land-based shorter-range nuclear missiles to equal and verifiable levels.”

The fourth and final difference is that NATO is essentially demanding the Soviet Union’s unilateral reduction of its “short-range missile systems to the existing level in the unified NATO organization” (i.e., not counting French systems) before any action is taken on the results of the talks in Vienna on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe. In line with this approach, “agreed reductions to a level below the present level of their short-range nuclear missiles will not take place until the results of these talks are implemented.”

As we can see, there are still differences of opinion, and they are quite sizable. The declaration the Warsaw Pact states adopted at the April (1989) session of the Warsaw Pact Committee of Foreign Ministers says, however, that they “are willing to consider any other possible proposals and measures leading to the reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear arms in Europe and promoting stronger stability on the continent at ever lower levels of military potential, with the observance of the principles of equality and equivalent security and the guarantee of effective verification of compliance with agreements.” Besides this, the same document says that “other mutual undertakings of a multilateral and unilateral nature could help in achieving the goals of the reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear arms.” When M.S. Gorbachev spoke in Strasbourg in July 1989, he announced the Soviet Union’s intention to undertake further unilateral reductions of tactical nuclear missiles in Europe just before the TNW talks.

Therefore, the position of the Warsaw Pact states is flexible enough and does not exclude the possibility of alternative solutions to the problem of TNW. This flexibility, however, is limited to the interests of stronger stability in Europe and the equivalent security of the sides.

In any case, the very fact that the Warsaw Pact and NATO positions on TNW talks have been made public testifies that although the issue has not been included in direct East-West dialogue yet, it is firmly enounced on the international agenda. If nothing else, the NATO countries are starting to understand that TNW talks cannot be escaped and will have to start at some point. The results—the elimination of TNW, the retention of a
specific number, or, possibly, the decision to carry out modernization on a legal basis—are another matter.

In principle, this is a fundamental shift of all the circumstances surrounding the TNW issue. The reason apparently can be found primarily in the rapidly changing situation in Europe as a whole, in the NATO countries' reassessment of the level and nature of the military threat from the Warsaw Pact, and the main thing—the seriousness of these countries' appraisal of the perceptible progress at the talks in Vienna.

In this context, the TNW issue objectively rises to the surface of the debates on the future of Europe. In the final analysis, disarmament is not a goal in itself, but only one of the means of arriving at a qualitatively different state of the world, which will be based not on the guaranteed danger of the use of military force, but on the guaranteed absence of this danger.

It is from this vantage point that the process of European disarmament should also be viewed. The Warsaw Pact states are willing, as they have announced repeatedly, to eliminate all existing imbalances and asymmetries, but this would only be the first step toward the main goal of the complete elimination of the possibility of offensive operations and, on this basis, the complete elimination of the very possibility of war. The main thing in this process would probably be the phase of reductions following the elimination of imbalances (we could refer to it as "Vienna-2"), as a result of which the military potential of the Warsaw Pact and NATO would be limited to the kind of strictly defensive structures that would allay the sides' worries about their own security.

The purpose of the talks, consequently, would not be a simple lowering of the level of mutual confrontation in Europe, but the use of this lowering and the reorganization of the armed forces and military organizations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as a basis for the eventual elimination of the military confrontation between these alliances, which would establish the prerequisites for the elimination of the whole bloc approach to continental security.

Of course, the talks of the "23" and "35" cannot take care of all of the problems arising in this connection. If we want the genuine stability and security of the military situation in Europe, we must also consider the influence of other types of arms, which do not even enter into the mandate of the talks of the "23." They include tactical nuclear weapons.

Obviously, the connection between the reduction of conventional armed forces and the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons is not direct or rigid. On the contrary, there can be some degree of flexibility in defining the sequence of the discussion of various issues, and this was the basis for the Warsaw Pact's consent not to include TNW in the mandate of the Vienna talks. Leaving them completely out of the arms reduction process is a different matter. This is totally inconsistent with the joint Warsaw Pact-NATO goal of giving the forces of the two sides an exclusively defensive nature. In fact, this is the main reason for the Warsaw Pact states' insistent appeals for separate talks on tactical nuclear arms reduction in Europe.

Of course, no one is trying to link the issues of conventional armed forces and tactical nuclear weapons at this time. It would be impossible, however, to ignore the connection between them, which is of an objective nature. In particular, it is clear that tactical nuclear weapons and conventional arms are closely interconnected, primarily in the operational and organizational sense. For this reason, the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe, including dual-purpose systems, will inevitably reduce the potential of the sides to deliver tactical nuclear weapons. Incidentally, this interconnection is reflected in the Soviet Union's inclusion of reductions of tactical nuclear systems in its plans for the unilateral reduction of its forces and arms in Europe.

On the other hand, the achievement of positive results at the multilateral talks in Vienna on deep cuts in conventional armed forces in Europe and the removal of the most destabilizing types of conventional weapons from the arsenals of states will considerably reduce and then completely elimination the mutual threat of surprise attack and of broad-scale offensive operations using conventional weapons. This will eliminate every reason for the retention of tactical nuclear arms in the military arsenals of the countries of the continent—at least in their present quantitative and qualitative parameters. Incidentally, this has also been acknowledged by many Western experts. The assistant director of the London International Institute of Strategic Studies, G. Bennendijk, for example, admitted that when imbalances and asymmetries in conventional forces have been eliminated, NATO will require a much smaller quantity of TNW "for effective deterrence."*

The opposite connection is also self-evident: The failure to resolve TNW problems could halt the progress at the talks on deep cuts in conventional armed forces in Europe in the near future. After all, it is obvious that the retention, the unrestricted modernization, and, what is more, the continued buildup of TNW, with their tremendous destructive potential and their capability for use in a first strike, could have an increasingly destabilizing effect on the military-political situation in Europe even if other arms should be reduced.

For this reason, we should strive for a situation in which the actual measures to reduce conventional arms and tactical nuclear systems will supplement and reinforce one another in the consolidation of stability on the continent and in securing a lower level of military confrontation between the alliances, especially if we seriously want to eliminate this kind of confrontation. In this context, the first phase of TNW reduction, in line with the original Vienna agreement on the elimination of imbalances and asymmetries, could consist in the reduction of all of the main categories of TNW to equal quantitative levels far below the present levels of either
side in a zone of agreed width—for example, in the zone of the first strategic echelons of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This could be followed by deep reductions of TNW throughout the entire zone from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Other approaches to the issue of TNW are also possible. The talks could concentrate, for example, on the substantial reduction of tactical missiles and nuclear artillery first. “Minimal deterrence” could be maintained in the future by a certain agreed number of weapon-platform aircraft with nuclear bombs and air-to-surface missiles. In this context, an agreement should also be reached on the permissible parameters of the modernization of these components, including the limitation of the range of missiles.

One of the difficulties in the talks from the very beginning will be the question of nuclear components of dual-purpose systems. A possible agreement on their elimination would give rise to the need to resolve the complex issues of the verification of the elimination itself and, possibly, of the production of fissionable materials. This has not been discussed at the talks on nuclear disarmament to date. In this connection, there is the possibility that the first phase will have to be confined to the reduction of the number of delivery systems, with the postponement of the discussion of weapons to a later phase. Even the limitation of delivery systems represents a difficult problem, however, because part of them—aircraft and artillery—are already being discussed at the Vienna talks because they are dual-purpose systems. Apparently, it will be necessary to set limits on nuclear-capable systems and to agree on their external characteristics and functional features.

Finally, it will probably be difficult to involve France in talks at this time. As we know, it regards its short-range nuclear systems as “pre-strategic,” and not tactical, systems (“final warning systems”). In this connection, and in view of the fact that France is not a member of the NATO military organization, people in Paris are taking every opportunity to stress that the issue of TNW does not pertain to France. In contrast to the Americans and English, the French are implying that their “pre-strategic systems” (the Pluto missile systems and the Jaguar and Mirage-III E weapon-platform planes) are intended for purposes other than “compensation for Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional arms.” Therefore, according to their line of reasoning, even after the imbalances and asymmetries between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the sphere of conventional arms have been eliminated, France will still have to keep its “pre-strategic systems.”

In view of this position, the first phase of the talks might be of a bilateral Soviet-American nature. The other nuclear NATO powers would become party to them later, as the Vienna talks progress and as the overall political situation on the continent improves. When the TNW talks start, however, these powers certainly should display some restraint with regard to their nuclear systems. As the report of the Frankfurt Peace Research Institute correctly points out, “it would be impermissible for Great Britain and France to continue augmenting their strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals while the United States and USSR are reducing theirs.”

Therefore, the level of “minimal deterrence” for Europe cannot be regarded as some kind of permanent quantity. It will probably change in response to the evolution of East-West relations as a whole. The goal of completely surmounting “deterrence” could be set following even deeper cuts in conventional armed forces and the limitation of naval forces and arms, when the objective prerequisites will exist for the comprehensive resolution of the problem of guaranteed European security.

In the overall context of the rapid evolution of East-West relations, the discussion of TNW is essentially a discussion of the role of nuclear weapons in general and, in the broader sense, of what peaceful coexistence should be in its realistic ideal state.

In this sense, the TNW issue is something like the “litmus paper” of current changes. For this reason, to a considerable extent, the start of Warsaw Pact-NATO talks on this issue will probably be regarded as a turning point for Europe and the world as a whole. It will probably also signify a fundamental shift in the West’s attitudes toward what is happening in the Soviet Union.

The gradual removal of the nuclear component from the European military equation will be, without any doubt whatsoever, another sign of the dismantling of the security model based on military force and the beginning of the construction of a qualitatively different world, based on normal civilized relations between the East and the West.

Footnotes

1. PRAVDA, 7 July 1989.
2. These missiles are referred to as HOTL (Follow-on-to-Lance) and ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System); they are to be installed on the multiple rocket launchers (two missiles on each launcher) located in all of the NATO countries. The Pentagon hopes to equip them with the warheads from the eliminated intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.
3. The TACM (Tactical Missile) Program.
7. The Peace Research Institute of Frankfurt has proposed the option of leaving no more than 300-400 nuclear weapons on the planes.
8. PRIF REPORTS, No 6-7, 1989, p vi.

Artificial Intelligence and Conventional Arms Reduction

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[Text] The progress in the information sciences and computer technology is having a significant effect on the military sphere as a whole, including the disarmament process. The scientists and specialists analyzing this topic usually focus their attention on changes in the tactical and technical parameters and economic characteristics of existing and potential systems. During this process, as we have already pointed out, they overlook one of the central questions connected with the new technology: It does not simply represent additional technical potential for the attainment of earlier goals; it engenders a completely world, built in accordance with previously unknown principles.

The recognition of the nature of this “new world,” as the major technical breakthroughs of the 20th century demonstrate, is an extremely slow process. The conceptual definition of ongoing changes is generally delayed for some time. New problems arising in connection with radical changes in the world arena are either ignored or continue to be discussed in traditional terms, with the use of the familiar set of methods employed for years in the resolution of similar problems.

This seems to be the present situation in the sphere of conventional arms. In recent years military-industrial groups in several industrially developed countries have designed new types of weapons of equal historical significance, in our opinion, as the nuclear bomb. These are the self-contained weapons systems designed for combat missions with minimal participation (or none at all) by the human being. It is precisely in this area that many experts anticipate a major scientific and technical breakthrough in the next few years.

These self-contained systems are primarily of the non-nuclear type. This is a result of the “stalemate” in the nuclear arms race, in which the continued buildup of nuclear arms will not produce any special advantage, and qualitative improvement is possible only on a limited scale. Automation brings about two types of changes. First of all, there are the radical changes in the weapons themselves, which can be called revolutionary without any fear of exaggeration. Second, there are changes in the role and place of weapons in human civilization because this self-containment presupposes systems with their own peculiar type of “behavior.” We will take a more detailed look at these aspects.

Revolution in Conventional Arms

The incorporation of elements of artificial intelligence in weapons systems leads to qualitative changes in the weapons themselves and in the methods of their use. The military conflicts of recent years have demonstrated that many expensive types of military equipment which were once thought to be the most effective systems are too vulnerable to the relatively cheap and easily transportable weapons of the new generation. A modern tank costing around a million dollars, for example, can be destroyed with 95-percent accuracy by a relatively cheap antitank missile; after firing a few rounds, cannon artillery becomes a good target for portable infrared guided missiles; attack aircraft and combat helicopters are easily destroyed by portable antiaircraft missiles, etc. Because of this, many combat tactics which are based on the use of traditional types of military equipment and which were employed successfully in the recent past, now seem senseless (for example, tank or air cover for advancing ground troops, artillery preparation fire, etc.).

In essence, we are witnessing the birth of a new situation in which many traditional offensive types of weapons are becoming ineffective against troops equipped with weapons of the new generation. A similar situation arose in the history of the development of weaponry when firearms came into being, making many types of edged weapons almost useless and completely changing the principles of defense fortification construction. The result was a revolutionary change in the organization of armed forces and in the strategy and tactics of warfare. The structure and functions of whole categories of forces changed. The cavalry of mounted knights in armor, for example, became an easy target for firearms and was replaced by the lightly armed but highly maneuverable cavalry.

In our opinion, the present situation could be just as revolutionary. An analysis of the military conflicts of recent years (the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the Falkland conflict) attests not only to the complete superiority of the new types of weapons, but also to radical changes in combat methods. In the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, for example, the British troops equipped with weapons of the new generation conducted a successful assault with forces numbering only a fraction of the defending troops, armed mainly with traditional weapons.

The changes in the appearance of the armed forces cannot be instantaneous, and all of the possibilities of the “intellectualization” of weapons will not be revealed at once. The first to be intellectualized will be the guidance systems, leading to a dramatic advance in target kill effectiveness. This is the first generation of “smart” weapons, but further means of intellectualization are already apparent, including the automation of data collection, situation analysis, and decisionmaking. The Phalanx system being developed in NATO, for example, can identify potential targets and decide the sequence of their destruction. Another method will
entail the use of expert systems to enhance the individual's ability to make quick decisions. The highest level of intellectualization will be represented by the integrated battle management systems, which will gather operational-tactical and strategic information, analyze it, and make decisions on the command and control of troops.

The enhancement of the effectiveness of weapons as a result of their intellectualization lies at the basis of many of the current changes. The traditional methods of enhancing the effectiveness of offensive arms were based on the theory of probability: A high rate of fire created the necessary shell density and kept the target from escaping the field of fire; increasing the explosive force of a weapon created the necessary coverage area with few targeting errors, etc. These were replaced by the intellectualizing methods, which permit the control of the weapon throughout the entire cycle of its use, and not only up to the moment of fire (or launch). This produces almost 100-percent kill probability and frequently makes excessive projectile speed and weight unnecessary. The control factor becomes the limiting factor, whereas increasing the speed and weight leads to reduced control, heightened inertia, and, consequently, lower effectiveness.

Now the emphasis in combat between offensive and defensive weapons is shifting in favor of the control factor. The more controllable and maneuverable weapon system will win this battle. A tank, for example, is inferior to a missile in all respects. It moves slowly and has virtually no capacity for the flanking movements that are so important in the evasion of flying missiles. The colossal weight of a tank reduces its maneuverability and requires a powerful engine, which presents the ideal target for infrared homing missiles. In this way, armor plate ceases to represent effective defense and turns into a factor diminishing the effectiveness of the tank as a weapon system in a battle with weapons of the new generation. In this sense, the ideal design is a flying disc on an air cushion which can move easily in all directions and is armed with missiles of various types.

This example demonstrates that the very first phase of intellectualization should already lead to the radical transformation of weapons systems and the methods of their use. The next phase, in which automation encompasses the decisionmaking processes involved in the use of weapons, could bring about radical changes in the organizational principles of armed forces. It will robotize the battlefield and lower the numerical requirements of armed forces dramatically while setting much higher requirements on the quality of soldier and officer training. The operators of the weapons systems of the new generation will require psychological and physiological training comparable to that of test pilots. They will have to be able to analyze a situation quickly and accurately, make instantaneous decisions, and endure considerable stress during the complicated maneuvers connected with defense and the evasion of a missile attack. During this phase there will probably be changes in the structure and functions of different branches of the armed forces. There might be radical changes, for example, in the design of armored carriers and tanks and in the functions of armored forces in general.

Even in the first phase of intellectualization, the central command and control facilities (or headquarters) will become easy targets for homing missiles because of their high radiation in the distant ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum, or for missiles equipped with guidance systems with target identification elements. There will be an urgent need for the dispersion of command and control systems.

The logical result should be changes in the methods of armed combat. We can assume that forms of forcible confrontation and pressure will be discarded in favor of flexible and maneuverable forms and a return to the ideas of the "blitzkrieg." In any case, there will certainly be an emphasis on organization and controllability and on the high intellectual potential and proficiency of personnel. Today these qualities are associated only with the personnel of the armed forces, but in the new situation much of the "intellectual support" will be "isolated" in control systems and in the weapons themselves.

In the intellectual arms race, competition might not take the form of the quantitative accumulation of arsenals, but of the augmentation of the possible varieties of programmed behavior in weapons systems. Within the framework of today's existing systems and programming methods, this would dictate the need for the advance analysis of as many variations as possible of the situations in which the self-contained system might be involved. Just as in a chess game, the machine would find the preplanned variations instantaneously but would take a long time to calculate unfamiliar situations, so that the probability of error would rise dramatically. Competition would take the form of the accumulation of intellectual potential "isolated" in a programmed product.

Therefore, the incorporation of the information sciences in the military sphere would not simply change the specifications and performance characteristics of weapons, but would create a new military-political situation differing radically from the one which existed when the intellectualization of weapons had just begun. For this reason, attempts to solve problems in conventional arms reduction with the traditional method of establishing parity in existing types of weapons cannot provide any reliable guarantees. The factor of the new weapons will distort the picture too much and introduce considerable uncertainty.

Valueware of Self-Contained Systems

The contemporary achievements of scientific and technical progress have made it possible to design technical systems operating outside the direct control of the human being—the so-called autonomous or self-contained systems. In the beginning, these were relatively simple devices like thermoregulators, and the functions
they performed were also simple. In recent years, however, the rapid development of the information sciences and computer technology has led to the invention of more and more active systems, performing functions which are beginning to approach the functions usually performed by the human being. These systems are radically transforming the fields of human activity in which they are used. In the 1980's this was most apparent in the processes accompanying the robotization of the production sphere. As the functions of the self-contained systems become more complex and approach the level of human behavior, and as they are integrated into social processes, there is a need to coordinate the criteria for the evaluation of these systems with the criteria of their functioning, the criteria used in society to evaluate human performance. This need is dictated by the use of modern complex systems in situations in which they interact with the human "on an equal basis." The society frequently has to judge the results of the combined actions of the human and robot instead of judging their actions separately. This goes against our traditional beliefs about the tools of labor and their place in the production process.

This contradiction is particularly pronounced in the case of self-contained weapons systems. The best-known weapon of this kind today is the cruise missile, which begins detecting a target while it is in flight and then destroys it autonomously. Many other types of self-contained weapons have been developed and have been tested by the armies of different countries in recent years. The functions performed by these systems are still fairly simple, but these are only the first steps, and continued progress in the information sciences will lead unavoidably to quite complex systems of this kind.

We will attempt an analysis of several new scientific and social problems arising in connection with the appearance of self-contained military systems.

In discussions of the problems of using these systems, most authors focus attention primarily on the reliability of the hardware and software. These are technical problems, however, and they will be solved sooner or later. The main thing would seem to be something else, namely the targets and missions set for the robot killers, the people responsible for setting them, the criteria used in the choice of targets and missions and of the specific types of robot behavior in changing situations, and the changes in these criteria.

There are two interrelated aspects of the process of the converging evaluations of self-contained technical systems and social systems.

First of all, people mistakenly ascribe human personality traits to technical systems and evaluate the systems with the criteria commonly used in judgments of human behavior. This phenomenon was described by American psychologist S. Terkel in the well-known book "The Second I." As long as the practice is confined to toys, workbench tools, and so forth, it is not particularly alarming and can be regarded as a scientific phenomenon requiring analysis.

The situation changes dramatically when we begin ascribing human traits and judgments to the self-contained weapon. One of the main arguments in favor of the computerization of weapons, for example, is the belief that computerized systems are better, quicker, and more accurate at doing certain things than the human. The concepts of "good" and "bad," however, are moral criteria and are nothing more than value judgments. Their use to substantiate the mass incorporation of computers in self-contained weapons systems indicates the extension of evaluative criteria and standards of a social nature to these weapons systems, and any departure from this kind of evaluation is then impossible.

Furthermore, the use of judgments of this kind has a reciprocal effect, and many military experts are beginning to replace the human and political criteria for the evaluation of military events with strictly technical criteria. The effectiveness of the weapons systems and of combat operations as a whole is usually used as the central criterion. The use of the traditional criteria of victory, connected with stifling the enemy's will to resist, in the broad political context is being replaced with the use of the criteria of proportional expenditures of resources (ammunition) to achieve a single goal (to destroy a unit of military equipment or a unit of military force), with the reduction (of expenditures) serving as the main justification for the use of the self-contained systems.

Another popular argument in favor of self-contained weapons is the assertion that the speed and complexity of combat operations are so much greater today that the human being is incapable of controlling the situation. An analysis of this assertion points up two important facts.

First of all, it is based on the completely indefinite models of decisionmaking founded on the well-known ideas of systems analysis, in accordance with which any decision is a rational choice of one of several alternatives in line with an assigned list of valuative criteria. The questions of the generation of alternatives and the hierarchy of valuative criteria are virtually ignored. Time is not present as a variable in this model and is used only as one of the criteria. In other words, decisionmaking in traditional systems analysis does not depend on time. This alone proves that this procedure cannot be used for the complete analysis of decisionmaking in dynamic situations. There are also other fundamental objections. For example, the set of analyzed alternatives is not determined by the systems model of decisionmaking but is assigned by circumstances external to the given situation. The generation of alternatives is carried out by experts on the basis of their knowledge and their analysis of incoming information. Therefore, systems analysis represents the rational choice of one of several subjectively determined possible courses of action. The same applies to the valuative criteria of the alternatives, which
are set by experts and, consequently, are not only socially determined but are also poorly reflected.

In the second place, the complexity of the combat situation cannot be examined within the confines of a single scale of measurement. It consists of qualitatively different levels connected with purely technical, sociotechnical, and social interaction. Consequently, the procedures of systems analysis, using only quantitative parameters and criteria, can only be fully suitable on the level of technical interaction.

On the remaining levels, the methods of evaluating the situation and making decisions must include the consideration of social parameters and processes. The society uses moral and ethical standards for judgments of this kind. Today these moral and ethical standards are regarded only as regrettable limitations on the development of various technical systems, and the problems of the social responsibility of the scientist and engineer are given an extremely skewed interpretation as the responsibility of the scientist for the results of his activity posing a potential threat to humanity.

There is another aspect of this acute problem of technical development, however: the inclusion of moral and ethical criteria in the systems themselves, in their design. Only the development of research into artificial intelligence created the real prerequisites for this. Even in this area, however, the problem is still far from obvious! We can draw a certain analogy between the processes of the analysis of knowledge in artificial intelligence systems included in social activity and the processes of coordinating human decisions with moral and ethical standards. Valuative structures make up something like a program defining the behavior of the individual in a certain set of circumstances. It is here that the most serious scientific problems arise. There is still no clear idea of how the system of human values can be formulated.

Several experiments undertaken within the framework of formal logic have produced only the most meager results. Building a logical series of values turned out to be an exceptionally difficult task because evaluations are closely related to the structure of the evaluated situation, whereas formal logic is distinguished by the use of extremely abstract and linear structures with a specific content. The frame approach seems to be much more promising in the modeling of value systems. It is based on the linguistic interpretation of a word, represented in the form of a frame, with the slots to be filled in line with the features of the specific situation. This means that situations can be classified according to their most significant elements and that certain categories of situations can be identified as having the same valuative basis. It must be said, however, that this approach necessitates a great deal of linguistic work.

The most serious problem is the definition of the hierarchy of values and the dependence of this hierarchy on the context. It is here that the most disastrous errors are possible. Even the human being makes grave errors not because of the lack of a valuative standard or because of its misinterpretation, but because of errors in constructing the hierarchy of these standards. Situations with conflicting evaluations are common. Something that is extremely desirable according to one evaluation might be undesirable according to another. This conflict has to be resolved with the aid of the hierarchical relationship between values. Even the hierarchy can change, however, depending on the situation. The precise description of the dependence of the hierarchy of values on the situation is an exceptionally difficult task for the logic of natural lines of reasoning. We can see that the theory of artificial intelligence has not been developed sufficiently for the technical resolution of these problems. It will probably take more than one year to work through these problems and to reach the stage of programming.

At this time one of the greatest problems in world development is the compatibility of sociotechnical systems. Paradoxically, in light of the talks on arms reduction and disarmament, this problem also pertains to military support systems in connection with the need to maintain strategic stability.

The treaties concluded at different times on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on the prohibition of the use of bacteriological weapons and certain types of projectiles and bombs, and others present a good example of this. Taken together, these documents make up a valuative structure and serve as the basis for judgments of the "good" or "bad" and "just" or "unjust" type in the case of extremely complex technical structures and systems.

It is significant that decisions made in this area can be evaluated only with the aid of specific criteria like stability, equal security, and so forth. In this area, as the latest research indicates, it would be dangerous to use criteria based on simple numerical assessments, and the idea of using the onesided criteria of optimization is dubious at best. We can say with sufficient certainty that the criteria to be used on this level must represent a coordinated set of valuative, political, and moral and ethical criteria.

When a human being first encounters an unfamiliar situation, he tries to understand it, and it is only on the basis of this understanding that he begins to plan his behavior and make decisions. This is how human behavior differs from the behavior of machines, at least in the current phase of machine development. Understanding does not depend on the amount of information derived from the person's surroundings, but on completely different factors: experience, intuition, ethical and moral standards, personal values, etc.

Therefore, this means that the self-contained systems imitating the behavior of human beings in military situations must be included in the system of international standards and values recorded in agreements
pertaining to warfare. What does this mean in reference to a robot? It appears that this question must be clarified through the concerted efforts of the international scientific community. International legal regulation will be needed in this sphere.

Many questions connected with possible unauthorized actions by self-contained systems require consideration. The situation is complicated by the fact that we are only in the initial stage of the revolutionary transformations in weapons and in warfare as a whole in connection with the self-contained systems.

In view of the fact that valueware will be an important element of the self-contained systems, we must first understand what this means and then insert the kind of valueware in the self-contained systems that will agree with the valutative structures recorded in existing treatises.

We must always remember that sociotechnical structures are extremely inert. If we cannot understand the nature of valueware (and this will require intensive research) during the present stage in the development of self-contained weapons, and if we do not take measures to plan some of the general conditions of its development, valueware could be created haphazardly, and then it would be much more difficult to coordinate it with existing valutative structures. This haphazard creation of valueware at a time when we do not completely understand the operational principles of valutative structures will lead unavoidably to conflicts (on the level of the valutative imperatives directing the self-contained systems) which could cause serious difficulties in world affairs.

Today the issue of the valueware of self-contained systems is clearly not being given enough attention. The first published works on this issue are not even analyses, but only acknowledgements that a problem exists. There is still the widespread belief that the self-contained robots will do the “dirty” work while skilled personnel will be responsible for the “clean” part of the armed conflict. According to the supporters of this point of view, this should “relieve” soldiers of the need to participate directly in dangerous operations.

This point of view does not stand up to thorough analysis. In essence, there are two possible ways of using the self-contained systems: a) robot taking action against robot; b) robot hunting humans. Actions of the first type will not solve the main problem in an armed conflict: They will not subdue or vanquish the enemy. The experience accumulated in warfare in the 20th century has shown that battles between machines do not decide the outcome of the conflict. Armed actions of the second type will unavoidably include people, and the thesis then loses its strength. Furthermore, the use of robots to kill people in military operations will complicate the problem of valueware even more. These robots will have to be programmed for selective killing in line with certain criteria. The very attempt to define these criteria seems immoral. Can we set the value of the robot’s existence above the value of a human life?

At the very dawn of robotization, American science-fiction writer Isaac Asimov formulated his famous “three laws of robotics”:

1. A robot will not injure a human being or allow such injury to be inflicted through inaction.

2. A robot must carry out the orders of a human unless they contradict the first law.

3. A robot must protect property unless this contradicts the first and second laws.

Without going into the vague implications of these laws, which the author himself pointed out (for example, should the robot prevent surgery because it will injure the patient’s organism?), we should note that the wording of these laws establishes a definite relationship between the value of the human and the value of the robot. They actually put the robot in the position of an ideal slave who must give up his own life to serve the interests of his master. Asimov’s laws establish a definite hierarchy based on the values of human society, in which human life is the highest value. There is no room in this system for machines with the right to murder at will.

The self-contained systems represent a genuine revolution in military technology. This is the first category of machines with delegated responsibility for the deliberate murder of people without being controlled by other people. These would be the robot killers so prevalent in “horror fiction.” The reality, however, would be more horrible than the most sinister literary plot. As a rule, robots in science fiction novels become killers because of malfunctions. In real life, on the other hand, man would deliberately plan the design of machines for the sole purpose of murder, for the sole purpose of hunting for people, tracking them down, and killing them.

This is why the issue of the potential danger of self-contained weapons systems and the related moral and ethical problems deserve as much consideration today as the issue of nuclear disarmament.

New Problems

The combination of these factors (radical changes in weapons systems and the appearance of the new category of “self-contained” weapons) will require a fundamentally new approach to the issue of disarmament. Today the world of the “intelligent weapon” has not been studied sufficiently and is not completely understood, and there is no real experience in its use on a broad scale. The prevention of this use, however, will be a central objective of the movement for disarmament. This contradiction can be neutralized by including the methods of historical and structural-functional analysis in the investigation of the new situation.
The main distinction of the "intellectual" weapons is this intelligence, which will magnify the ability of warring armies to concentrate their forces in certain maneuvers or to use them selectively and with the highest precision. This ability will be secured by the intellectualization of all levels of armed forces command and control, from self-contained systems to decisionmaking systems on all levels.

As the previous discussion proved, an increase in intelligence (or controllability) allows relatively small forces to achieve their goals. Under these conditions, the simple lowering of the level of conventional arms without consideration for the intelligence factor could have unpredictable consequences.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the level of "intelligence" in weapons systems is virtually impossible to verify by external characteristics. The arms race is moving into the sphere of software: The richer the variety of possible forms of behavior by self-contained systems or of previously mapped-out alternative decisions (or of planned moves), the more effectively the side can use its resources.

To a certain extent, an army equipped with intelligent weapons is similar to a karate fighter, who can perform miracles with the minimum of weaponry because of his superior discipline! This metaphor raises the important question of methods of disarming the karate warrior: Can an unarmed man be disarmed? How can the tremendous destructive potential of karate be put under social control?

The method of control worked out in the past consisted in instilling a special moral and ethical code in the mind of the karate fighter which would not allow him to use his "lethal arts" against the weak and permitted him to use them only in the name of virtue, justice, etc. Anyone who violated the code was driven out of the community and was punished severely. The higher the rank of the karate master, the more highly developed his mechanisms of moral and ethical control.

The conclusion which can be drawn from this analogy between the intelligent weapon and karate primarily points up the need to elaborate a moral and ethical code of behavior for countries with intelligent weapons. Furthermore, the development of moral and ethical forms of control must begin in the very earliest stages of the design of the new weapons systems. Self-contained systems must observe the standards common to the world community in their behavior, and these standards must be built into their software. Besides this, this should be done by creating a mechanism for the mutual coordination and adjustment of the structural principles of programs in the intelligent weapons systems. This mechanism should be established as quickly as possible: The longer the isolated development of "smart" self-contained systems continues, the more pronounced the contradiction between the valuative structures lying at the basis of intelligent systems will be. The reinforcement of strategic stability in the sphere of conventional arms under the new conditions cannot be expected unless these matters become the subject of serious negotiation by interested parties.

**Footnotes**


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Shevardenazde Comments on European Changes, Security

[An interview with Eduard Amrosevich Shevardenazde, USSR minister of foreign affairs, member of the Presidential Council, by NOVOYE VREMYA political observer Galina Sidorova: "European Metamorphoses: Opponents Yesterday, Partners Today, But What About Tomorrow?"]

[Text] Sidorova] Eduard Amrosevich, you frequently speak of the need to create new all-European institutions and security structures—in the language of diplomacy this sounds like an institutionalization of the Helsinki process. It is surely not possible to use what already exists in a new way? After all, it is not only in the Soviet Union that people have developed an allergy to bureaucratic organizations, but also in other countries...

[Shevardnadze] The question is that of how security will be guaranteed in Europe—by means of politics or, once again, by means of the arms race. Up until now, everything has looked quite simple: two opposed military blocs with armies numbering millions of men, tens of thousands of tanks, thousands of aircraft, and nuclear weapons.
Today, the division of Europe is being overcome. The Berlin Wall has fallen. The barriers along the border between East and West have been taken down. New forces have come to power in the countries of East Europe. Soviet troops are leaving Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and, in part, Poland.

However, the outcome is this: The military map and the political situation have changed, but the entire cumbersome military machine has hardly budged. We cannot remain in such a situation for long, for anything might happen. Management of these processes requires intensive all-European dialogue. Everyone is of the same opinion here—there is agreement on holding a meeting of heads of state and heads of government of the 35 states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (plus, possibly, a representative of the 36th European country—Albania) at the end of this year. The meeting may bring a great deal, if only because one-half of politics lies in knowing one another's intentions and understanding the interests and concerns of one's partners. Everything that we have achieved today with regard to a reduction of the military threat and to disarmament has come about through dialogue and talks. I believe that for this reason it is necessary to institute regular meetings at the highest level, and to make provision for more frequent conferences of the ministers of foreign affairs.

It is also important to agree on some kind of mechanism for dealing with the emergence of extraordinary situations. Since the conferences would be held in each of the participating countries in turn, this role could be fulfilled by the former, present, and future chairmen of meetings of leaders and ministers. For the purpose of regular contacts, a consultative mechanism might also be created at the ambassadorial level of all 35 countries in one of the capitals. It goes without saying that there will also be a need for an administrative and technological base in the form of a small CSCE secretariat.

[Sidorova] As I understand it, you are speaking about creating a center for political cooperation, but what of military problems?

[Shevardnadze] There will naturally be dynamic changes in the military situation in Europe. Somewhere these changes must be fixed; information gathered and distributed about the military activity of the states; and measures of control, verification, and confidence-building coordinated. Someone will have to come forward as an intermediary should friction or arguments arise. Hence the idea of establishing a center or centers for averting and regulating crisis situations. In the final analysis, we must decide what situation it is that we want to achieve: one of a unified Europe, or of a Europe broken up into political and regional pieces. I think that an institutionalization of the Helsinki process and joint or, as it is still referred to, cooperative security will be far cheaper for the Europeans than an individualization of efforts on strengthening defense capability.

[Sidorova] Is the emergence of all-European structures realistic before we have overcome the inertia of thinking in terms of blocs?

[Shevardnadze] I see a difference between thinking in terms of blocs and the existence of various alliances. Colossal changes have already occurred at the level of representations. The ideology of confrontation is becoming a thing of the past, together with the cold war. The process of a transformation of the blocs into political alliances has begun. Moreover, we are now speaking of the possibility of fundamentally different relations between them and of concluding politically binding agreements. This was discussed at the meeting between the Presidents of the USSR and the United States in Washington.

What does this involve? A statement to the effect that the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO do not regard one another as opponents and are prepared to make a transition to relations of cooperation; that they will consult one another in all cases where complicated or acute situations arise; that they will not use force or threaten to use it; they will emerge at a higher level of openness in the military sphere, expand confidence-building measures, and create certain joint organs.

The alliances will begin to develop cooperation in the economy, environmental protection, science and technology, culture, education, and the humanitarian sphere. As a result, a situation will arise in which the present rigid barriers between them begin to be eroded and they interact to an increasing extent within the framework of all-European institutions. At the same time, we are proceeding on the assumption that the existing political-military alliances will remain a component part of the future European architecture.

[Sidorova] Is it possible in principle to create a security structure which would guarantee security in Europe irrespective of what happens in individual regions or countries?

[Shevardnadze] It is necessary to create it precisely because there is never certainty with regard to what will happen in one region or another. If the worst happens, and a military threat appears, the European structure may be an instrument for implementing the right of collective defense as recognized by the United Nations Charter. Any party tempted to commit aggression would have to reckon with the fact that he would meet with a collective rebuff. The European community could exert influence on those who represent a potential danger for others and correct their conduct by the application, for example, of coordinated stimuli or sanctions.

In the worst scenario, there will be a guarantee in the fact that one will not be left alone when in trouble, one will be helped. For many countries, such guarantees are the only thing which they can count upon.
[Sidorova] Do we not exaggerate the military aspect of security to the detriment of other factors, the ecological factor, for example?

[Shevardnadze] Previously we did exaggerate it. Now, we are correcting the distortions caused by our previous “tunnel vision” of the problem. This also relates to European security. We do not conceive it outside a common understanding of the human dimension of the Helsinki process. Shared values and ideals are the most stable foundation for security.

Today, the world and Europe are threatened not only by military dangers. For example, the ecological threat and the prospects of the destruction of the ecosystem have acquired no lesser dimensions. It is impossible to build a common European home without far-reaching economic integration, without a common economy, without joint information and communication systems, and without the broadest contacts between and exchanges of people. In principle, agreement already exists to the effect that we must create all-European areas—legal, humanitarian, economic, and ecological.

[Sidorova] Today, in my view, the economic crisis and international conflicts in the USSR and the difficulties in the countries of East Europe represent the greatest threat to stability in Europe....

[Shevardnadze] Security structures must be universal and function in any situation where the threat of a destabilization of the situation arises in one place or another and for one reason or another. It is important to understand that they will not be instruments of coercion but means of cooperation in solving emerging problems whereby there is absolute respect for the sovereignty of each country and observation of the principle of consensus, that is to say of general agreement.

The Soviet Union is interested in creating such structures. We do not rule out the possibility that we may be require the assistance of other European states in overcoming or alleviating the problems which arise in our own country. We would like to have the chance of recourse to the services and help of all-European institutions. I think that other countries are also interested in the creation of mechanism which might be used to avert and decrease the destabilizing influences of economic difficulties and ethnic conflicts. They may arise in the most diverse places.

[Sidorova] Nevertheless, if the Soviet economy delays, in the same way as before, a transition to a market and with reforms, will we not ourselves begin to hold back the implementation of our own ideas, including those of which we are speaking?

[Shevardnadze] This is another question. We will scarcely manage to answer it here. Debates are under way in the country at various levels. I do not know how everything will end. For the moment, we have quite decent credit in Europe and in the world. How long will it last—one year, one and one-half years, two years? It is impossible to say. Of course, it will then be difficult if we have not changed anything. Perhaps we should have undertaken sharp measures and radical reforms three or four years ago. Perhaps, but even at that time it would have been complicated. It has not become any easier now, but there is no other way.

[Sidorova] Our “home-grown” conservatives love to argue: We are losing everything, but in the West things are picking up. They are winning, we are losing.... What would be your answer to this?

[Shevardnadze] One must be specific. Has the security of the country decreased? Any normal person knows that it would take a madman to attack us. In point of fact, the country is under no real external threat today. It is quite likely that such a situation has never existed before.

Or, do we not enjoy respect in the world? An absolute majority of people in the European countries welcome perestroika and wish it success.

Perhaps people do not want to deal with us? So far we are not being refused credits. We can buy the goods which we need. Here we are limited only by our own potentials and not by external circumstances.

Our partners are responding to our steps in the sphere of disarmament by eliminating armaments, reducing military expenditure, and reviewing their military programs. Common sense is winning, democracy is winning, the people are winning, every Soviet person is winning. It goes without saying that our partners are also winning.

[Sidorova] Does it not seem to you that the strength of the Soviet Union today lies in the fact that we are more ready to see a present-day partner in yesterday’s opponent than they are?

[Shevardnadze] Evidently this is a question with a large subtext. However, I would reply thus: The power of the new political thinking lies in realism, in a sober evaluation of our own interests and the interests of our partners, and in a critical attitude toward ourselves and toward others.

[Sidorova] Who, indeed, is the adversary of the Soviet Union today in the understanding to which we have become accustomed and by which we have operated in our policy?

[Shevardnadze] In my opinion, an explanatory dictionary interprets the word “adversary” in this way. It is one who is opposed to, who has a hostile attitude toward someone or something. If we apply this definition to the perception of perestroika, we will see that at the corresponding level there are few in the world who oppose it, and even fewer who perceive it with hostility.

At the meeting in Malta, and thereafter in Washington, the USSR president had good reason to state that we are ready not to regard the United States as an adversary. In the political sense and in the sense of intentions this
SOVIET UNION

reflects the situation which arose with the ending of the cold war and the transition to a peaceful period of development.

From the point of view of military capabilities, our two countries could destroy one another. These mutual capabilities still have to be lowered, brought down to a level which corresponds to political realities. Talks on reducing military arsenals must, of course, be accelerated.

I think that our world is confidently growing out of the stereotype of "friend-enemy" and proceeding toward an understanding of the community of interests of mankind.

[Sidorova] If there are no opponents, is it not in our interests to join NATO? Why then must we object to the membership of Germany in this alliance?

[Shevardnadze] In my opinion, this is your favorite question. I regard it as a lawful one and not as belonging to the realm of fantasy. The president of our country has hypothetically allowed for such a variant in one of his speeches. I am not speaking of the fact that, in the past, the Soviet Union also formally raised the issue of joining NATO itself. However, I think that it would be premature to return to this today. It would be another matter if the process of a transformation of this bloc should begin in parallel with what is already happening in the Warsaw Pact Organization....

[Sidorova] You recently said to me that we in the Warsaw Pact have proclaimed a defensive doctrine but have not yet put it into practice. We are still at the start of the path....

[Shevardnadze] Well, real reductions are under way, both in our country and in the countries of our allies. They are leaving the necessary minimum of armaments. We have not only adopted a defensive doctrine, we have also started to implement it.

[Sidorova] Today, after all, NATO does not call the Soviet Union an adversary either....

[Shevardnadze] They have not in fact changed their doctrines. We continue to differ greatly and, with regard to a number of indices, to show little compatibility. Our interests are not by any means identical. It is scarcely possible to forecast that there will not be worse problems ahead. The reality remains that NATO is opposed to us, that it relies on an imposing military machine and on doctrines and strategy which are directed against us. For as long as such a situation persists, German membership of NATO is a serious problem for us from the point of view of the interests of national security.

[Sidorova] I cannot avoid the feeling that the USSR is dragging out the talks today, including those on the German problem, and is delaying the inevitable outcome of events. We have rights as a member of the four powers, but how can we prevent the unification of Germany or its entry into NATO? By force of arms? This is already inconceivable. What are we trying to achieve?

[Shevardnadze] We are using this short interval of time in order to create the necessary guarantees and security structures. This is one course of action. Another, and more promising one, is a transformation of NATO. NATO is promising to effect this in the near future. Fine promises. However, so far they are only words. At the very least, we must wait until the meeting of the supreme leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in London to see how far our partners are prepared to go in reforming NATO, in reviewing the military aspects of its activity, and in making a transition from confrontation to cooperation in the interests of European stability.

During my last meetings with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, I presented him with the Soviet vision of a transformed North Atlantic alliance and of the possible interrelations between the two military-political organizations. I had the impression that I met with understanding on his part in many respects. For us, this is now the most important thing: If NATO really transforms itself and renounces its old doctrine and strategy, the question of the military-political status of Germany will evidently look different.

[Sidorova] Does it not seem to you that for us, Germany's entry into NATO is less a security issue and more of a psychological problem which is bound up in our historical memory? We somehow forget that in recent years, the FRG has adopted moderate positions in NATO, has advocated a normalization and development of relations with the East, and has manifested restraint with regard to the military activity of the bloc. Might it be the case that a unified Germany, as a member of NATO, would emerge in the role of a locomotive of changes in this organization, an advocate of transformations?

[Shevardnadze] There is no doubt that memory and the past make their mark on our attitude to the German question. We cannot approach it as though the past did not exist. We must achieve a regulation of a kind which ensures that the past never recurs again.

At the same time, however, and here I am in agreement with you, we must not look at the situation as though nothing had changed. The entire international situation is no longer what it was even as recently as five years ago. Our relations with the two German states have changed beyond all recognition. We are conducting a political dialogue with NATO and are discussing the possibility of concluding an agreement on cooperation.

Thus, we must see everything as it develops and take account of the trends which are gaining momentum. In point of fact, we, the GDR, and the FRG take an identical view of the future architecture of Europe. Our cooperation in this area will be an important factor in the building of both European and German unity.

[Sidorova] What about ideology? Has it not become the major obstacle for us to uniting the German-NATO
knot? Are we not returning here to that from which, only quite recently, we resolutely departed—to an ideologization of international relations?

Shevardnadze: We want to obtain guarantees of security. This is our sole task and a quite natural desire for any state, especially for us. It seems to me that our partners in the West also understand this. What guarantees are we talking about? First, a real reduction of armaments; second, the formation of all-European structures; third, a reformation of NATO and new relations between the alliances. I regard the third point as decisive for us.

Sidorova: You have spoken of the necessity of transforming the blocs from military organizations into political-military ones for a start, and then into purely political ones. Today, only NATO has a well-groomed mechanism for cooperation on security questions. Taking this into account, would it not be better to extend membership to the USSR and the countries of East Europe and, on this basis, to create an all-European mechanism for maintaining security and law and order?

Shevardnadze: You are too categorical in this assertion. I know something about the way the North Atlantic alliance works; I have myself been at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, and from my colleagues from the NATO member countries I heard that, as far as cooperation is concerned, the state of affairs in NATO is not so very ideal. However, let us assume that the mechanism is up and running there and that we are ready to take everything valuable from NATO experience and instil it into all-European structures. There is no problem with this.

The fact is that all-European structures can hardly be a copy of something else. What is good for 16 states of approximately the same class is not necessarily good for 35 very different countries.

The way out here cannot be the kind which you propose—let us all join NATO and the result will be an all-European structure. What about the constitutionally neutral states? Switzerland, for example, is not even a member of the United Nations. Austria is bound by its State Treaty, which determines its neutrality. The Finns and the Swedes are in the same category.

It does not seem to me that the most simple path is to propose, in passing, as it were, changing the constitutions and status of one-half dozen European states. New European structures in the sphere of security must be built taking account of the interests of all 35 states, with their agreement, and on a basis which is acceptable to them. Such a basis can only be the Helsinki process, and the principles enshrined in the CSCE Final Act.

Sidorova: The USSR has often stressed that an extension of NATO’s zone of influence is unacceptable to it. Is it now possible to say that there are two zones of influence: NATO and the Warsaw Pact? Perhaps it is more justified to consider that there are, let us say, four European centers or groups of problems—the USSR, NATO, East Europe, and Germany?

Shevardnadze: It goes without saying that it is possible to compile different equations. However, we live in Europe, in which there are two alliances and a group of nonaligned and neutral countries. If we start making distinctions according to certain specific interests, we will obtain many variants and they will look much more complicated than your formula.

Sidorova: In Moscow, at the last meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, the participants expressed various points of view about the future of their alliance. For example, I know that Hungary wishes to leave it. The GDR does not hide the fact that it would suit it to join NATO upon the unification of the two German states. The declaration adopted in Moscow was compiled in elusive tones and does not touch upon the future of the Warsaw Pact. Does this mean that disagreements have really been overcome, or does it reflect a desire on the part of everyone not to be premature in dotting the "i"s"?

Shevardnadze: New leadership and new forces have come to power in the allied countries of East Europe. They are naturally thinking about elaborating their own foreign policy, including their attitude toward the Warsaw Pact. This is normal. The fact that they have different opinions is also normal.

I am not afraid to say in the name of everyone, that in its present form, the Warsaw Pact does not suit anyone, including the USSR. Everyone agrees that it must become a democratic alliance of equal, sovereign states, based on interests shared by all. The commission created in Moscow is charged with the task of restructuring our alliance on the basis of a new conception. If this is successful, the alliance will continue to exist. I believe that we will be able to deal with this and that it will play a positive role in the creation of new all-European institutions and structures. There is no doubt that much here depends upon the decisions which are made at the NATO Council session in London.

Sidorova: Nevertheless, there are now more disagreements between the Warsaw Pact member states than there are between the Pact and NATO. How may this influence the future of Europe?

Shevardnadze: If things were as you say—and I am of another opinion—this might have one practical consequence: It would not be difficult to agree, within the framework of the talks of the 23 [Conventional Forces in Europe], on questions of forming new European security structures.

Sidorova: You mentioned a reduction of armaments as one security guarantee. The impression forms that, today, it is no longer the factor of being "opposed" to someone or something which acts as a brake on the path
of further reducing military arsenals, but internal political inhibitors connected with the social costs of disarmament and psychological unpreparedness for it on the part of some of the population....

[Shevardnadze] These inhibitors undoubtedly exist. Today, it is not simple for us to resolve problems which arise in connection with troop withdrawals and arms reductions, and with the need to convert a number of defense enterprises.

However, I would like to single out another aspect. Defense of the motherland and maintenance of its defense capability at the necessary level are very complicated and emotionally charged concepts. Take the problem of sufficiency for the needs of defense. This cannot be decided on a computer, for it involves world outlook, ideology, patriotism, national pride, and even chauvinism. This theme can easily become the object of manipulation and speculation.

Unfortunately, at the official level, both previously and now, we have avoided and are still avoiding a discussion of evaluating the threat to the country, a comparison of variants of response to different threats, a definition of the mission of our Armed Forces, and many other questions, without the elucidation of which it is absolutely impossible to approach the sphere of the reasonable. We still have to discuss military questions correctly and calmly, according to the facts and not according to conjectures. However, for this, we need information and openness in military affairs. The situation here has now changed, although a certain amount still remains to be done.

We are often criticized for the fact that we conclude agreements of a kind which oblige us to destroy significantly more weapons than our partners in the talks. However, the fact is that our partners act like the sensible housewife who only buys as many foodstuffs as she needs to arrange lunch. When the guests leave, she never has much to throw away. Our psychology has been different—to buy as much as possible of everything, so that we could then reveal a mountain of excess.

One way or another, people are appearing who point to the inequality of one figure or another in an agreement and demand that someone be brought to account. However, the people who should be brought to account are those who—evidently in the struggle not against imperialism but for the honorable name of victor in socialist competition—filled barrels with chemical poisons at a time when no one in the world was producing them any longer.

I may say with all responsibility that we have never tried to place the defense capability of the country at risk, and that we will proceed in the same way in the future.

[Sidorova] Can it be said, after the Moscow session of the Political Consultative Committee, that the Warsaw Pact is ceasing to be a military alliance?

[Shevardnadze] Back in March, at the session of the committee of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, the task was formulated of weakening its military aspects and strengthening its political ones. This line also obtained support in Moscow at the meeting of the supreme leaders of the alliance member states. The depth of reorganization of the military aspect of Warsaw pact activity depends upon what agreements are achieved at the Vienna talks of the 23 on conventional armaments in Europe.

[Sidorova] Eduard Amrosiyevich, thank you for the conversation.

‘Uninterrupted Progress’ Urged on Disarmament

1410 GMT 2 Jul 90

[Text] There have been unconfirmed reports that the George Bush administration has invited its NATO allies to have all of the American nuclear artillery shells removed from West Europe on a stage-by-stage basis. An appropriate decision is expected to be taken by the NATO summit, scheduled for the end of this week. Earlier, Washington publicly refused to modernize its tactical nuclear Lance missiles stationed on West German territory. The Soviet Union, for its part, has been removing its nuclear weapons from East Europe. It withdrew 500 nuclear warheads from that part of Europe last year and is planning to withdraw another 1,500 this year. Does this mean both sides are moving towards a third zero in Europe, namely no more nuclear tactical weapons there? Radio Moscow’s Yuriy Solton sees it this way.

Obviously the two sides have taken measures to deal with the problem in a positive way. The main thing now is to ensure uninterrupted progress. Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Yazov reaffirmed a few days ago this country’s readiness to go all the way and remove all nuclear weapons from the allied countries’ territories, naturally if there is reciprocity from the United States. Early next year NATO and Warsaw Treaty representatives may be expected to open talks over specific moves towards a third zero in Europe.

In withdrawing from West Europe its nuclear artillery shells designed to control a possible Soviet tank attack NATO seems to be acknowledging the fact that this kind of a threat is no longer in existence and that a war in Europe today is less likely than ever before. Why, then, allocate funds in the United States for the development of new air-to-surface missiles to be mounted on Western Europe-based American aircraft capable of reaching Soviet territories? There have been reports that Washington is insisting on preserving NATO’s flexible response and first nuclear strike strategies and that the general process of NATO’s transformation into a political alliance can be expected to be slower and less comprehensive than the change expected on the part of
the Warsaw Treaty. It seems as if each side is probing the other for whether or not it is likely to break down and return to militarization.

Soviet officials maintain that there can be no half-confidence or half-security. It all boils down to this: either hostility, suspicion, and confrontation; or cooperation, openness, and partnership. If a transitional stage is necessary it should be based on mutual trust and predictability rather than confrontational aftereffects.

Hungary in Stalemate Over Troop Withdrawal Terms

90UM0716A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Article by V. Litovkin: “Disagreements Not Overcome”]

[Excerpt] Twenty-six military camps, transferred by the group command to the Hungarian side, stand with windows darkened. Five hundred and fifty-six buildings, 317 of them built just recently with Ministry of Defense funds, are empty, decaying, in some places quietly being pulled apart or falling into disrepair.

No one has lived for a half year now in most of the abandoned apartments. Our country receives no compensation for their cost, no reimbursement in money or construction materials, which are in such short supply now at the new garrisoning points.

Two hundred and sixty trains with gasoline, kerosine, diesel fuel, other petroleum oils and lubricants, and military property, which the Hungarian side promised to buy from the Soviet military or help them to sell, stand frozen on sidings, scattered among storehouses, warehouses, and storage tanks. By mutual agreement these trains are not included in the troop withdrawal schedules. But there have also been no payments made for them. And it is not known when, by whom, or at what price we will be paid for all this property. Or will they pay? Perhaps it will have to be returned home; our country is having a hard time with petroleum oils and lubricants. We urgently need them ourselves. And there are more than a hundred thousand tons of such goods.

The military airfield at Debrecen drowses in an unaccustomed half-slumber, the first of six such abandoned by our aviators. In terms of international classification it is one of the best in Europe. Two airstrips with monolithic pavement, not counting taxiways, length 2,500 meters, width 40 and 60 meters, which may be used by aircraft of any type. Next to them are flight lines for centralized aircraft maintenance, with reinforced concrete hangars and large underground fuel storage tanks, as well as technical maintenance buildings, living quarters, a school....

The total cost of the property incorporated in metal, brick, and concrete is more than 65 million transferable rubles. And if you consider that the airfield is literally at the very center of a wonderful tourist and resort area of Hungary, the Hortobagy Pusta, that it lies on the route from Western European capitals to India, Japan, and Malaysia, and that the residences are tomorrow’s hotels, than the value immediately increases several times over.

Our country has still not received a kopeck for it. And it is not clear if it will. Just as for the other airfields—Tekel, which is in Budapest proper, and Kiskunlaszhat, Szarmelek, Kunmadaras, Kalcohe, and another seven others. They are a little lower in class, but capable of receiving and maintaining helicopters and light planes.

We do not know what will happen to the 150-person sanatorium at Balatonuruf with a hectare of excellent Balaton beach, or to the 500-bed hospital in the capital region of Rakoshpalot, equipped with the latest diagnostic and treatment facilities, which could fully accommodate a European center of modern medical technology with the participation of the leading specialists of our country and the world, and perhaps also a complex of Soviet institutions in Budapest. By the most approximate and clearly reduced calculations, the cost of all the Soviet installations is 2.5 billion transferable rubles. And it is not impossible that we will not receive a red cent for them.

Why? Because Hungarian representatives participating in the negotiations insist that all payments be made only after the withdrawal of all troops, on the basis of the total balance, when costs and their financial claims are combined. This was announced at a meeting with the commanding general of the Southern Group of Forces, Colonel General M. Burdakov, by the chairman of a parliamentary commission of the State Assembly of Hungary Miklos Vasharkhey.

I happened to be present at that meeting of leaders of the Group of Forces and experts visiting from Moscow, representing the Soviet embassy in the Hungarian Republic, with deputies of the Hungarian Parliament. The talk was pointed. Our partners presented many claims to us. Serious ones, such as the harm done to the environment of the republic, and unconvincing ones: that Soviet soldiers allegedly were selling weapons to the populace. Of course the parliamentarians did not cite a single specific fact to confirm their claim. But the detail is significant, reflecting, it seems to me, the attitude toward our troops.

This whole talk, as other impressions from trips through the republic, leads me to believe that they do not want to pay us and will do everything to reduce the payments to a minimum.

M. Burdakov told me, “The inter-government agreement ‘On the Legal Status of Soviet Troops Temporarily Located on the Territory of the Hungarian People’s Republic,’ dated 27 May 1957 and 1 April 1958, and the March agreement of this year say that we will transfer all installations to the Hungarian Army in their technical condition on the day of transfer, with allowance for their
further utilization. Our partners understand this provision in their own way. If they do not want some facility, they demand that we tear it down, haul it away, and recultivate the land. They are supposed to reimburse us in forints for our construction expenses. But again, pointing out that by Hungarian law everything constructed on republic land belongs to it, they avoid a decision on the payment question. We cannot submit to attempts at such overt pressure or acknowledge the priority of Hungarian laws over international ones.”

Matvye Prokopyevich continues. “The 1990 agreement has a special clause which says: ‘Property, finances, and other economic questions related to the troop withdrawal not settled by the agreements in force will be settled by special understandings. The sides will take steps for the most rapid attainment of such understandings, bearing in mind that these questions are supposed to be decided before conclusion of the Soviet troop withdrawal.’ But we still have not reached such understandings. For some reason neither the Soviet side nor the Hungarian government is in a hurry to conclude them. And time will not wait. I was forced to order that storehouses, prefab barracks, and other installations be dismantled and that all this equipment and construction materials be transported home, to new garrisoning points. And apparently I will be forced to put the camps, now without our families, under the guard of soldiers and officers remaining there. If the matter of payment of compensation for each installation individually continues to be dragged out, I will be forced to halt the withdrawal. Otherwise the people whom we are sending back to the Union without adequate housing will not understand me or the Group leadership. Nor will they understand our government.”

Where is the solution to this situation? I believe it lies in creating a standing intergovernmental commission, which should be headed on both sides not by representatives of a particular department, but at a minimum by Deputy Prime Ministers, in order that all questions be resolved quickly, effectively, at the state level, and with mutual benefit to both sides and both peoples. Also, after proclaiming the transition to the market, to a controllable market economy, it is finally time to get away from ideological dogmas, to learn to trade in what belongs to us according to market laws, using not only persuasion, but also economic levers in the process.

Our army is leaving Hungary today, but we still have to live as neighbors, respecting one another and cooperating tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, and for many years to come. We cannot cloud the future with today’s largely petty misunderstandings.

Before departure from Hungary I visited a Soviet tank regiment located in the village of Polgardy. The deputy unit commander, alumnus of the Hungarian Military Academy imeni M. Zriny, Maj. V. Belous told me:

“We were starting to remove the tin roof from the combat equipment storage parks when the chairman of the local Soviet Dyula Gubish came up and said, ”Don’t tear down the bays Vasiliy, I’ll give you the brick and the tin, everything for a technical maintenance point. The combines and tractors at our goskhoe are under the open sky....

“I took a chance,” the major says. “I stopped the dismantling, but I began to worry, what if the local bureaucrats or worse yet the public put a spoke in his wheel, and ours too?

Spokes in the wheels, just as the red light that some would like to put in front of the departing military trains, will never be a sign of state wisdom.

**Armed Forces Reduction on Chinese Border Planned**

*LD1207143790 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 12 Jul 90*

[Excerpts] Soviet and Chinese diplomatic and military experts have held four rounds of talks to appoint the date for future negotiations on Armed Forces reductions on the Sino-Soviet border. Under mutual agreement the negotiations will begin in Moscow this coming autumn, and our diplomatic correspondent Sergey (?Solntsov) reports the following:

[(?Solntsov)] [passage omitted] So what is actually to be out [as heard] is the first question to the leader of the Soviet experts, head of the Asian Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Genrikh Kireyev.

[Begi Kireyev recording, in Russian, fading into English translation] The reductions concern above all the attack components of the two sides’ Armed Forces along the border. The remaining troops are to be transferred into units of purely defensive character. An important point is that the agreement affects no earlier commitments by either side to any third state and is not aimed against any other interests. [end recording]

The next question to him: How do you evaluate the prospects of Sino-Soviet talks to be held in Moscow in autumn?

[Begi Kireyev recording] I do not expect the talks to be easy, since they concern a highly delicate sphere, the military. The two nations have been in a state of confrontation for decades, breeding mistrust and suspicion. The latest meeting on the question of procedure has shown, though, that both sides welcome compromise-seeking and finding mutually acceptable solutions. [end recording]

**U.S. Defense To Eliminate Chemical Arms Programs**

*LD1307140390 Moscow TASS in English 1345 GMT 13 Jul 90*

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshov]

[Text] Moscow, July 13 (TASS)—The U.S. Defence Department has announced plans to eliminate a number of programmes for the production and purchase of chemical weapons—155-mm chemical shells, “Bigeye”
binary bombs and chemical ammunition for multi-barrel rocket-assisted systems. The Pentagon has decided not to ask Congress for appropriations for the implementation of these programmes, earlier planned for the 1991 financial year.

I believe that this step should be welcomed as the implementation of the Soviet-American agreement signed at the Washington summit. The signing of the agreement was undoubtedly the result of the sound constructive approach of both sides to the elimination of the risk of chemical war.

The road to this important joint decision was long and not easy. Beginning the industrial production of binary artillery ammunition in December 1987 and later of large-calibre aviation bombs, the U.S. Administration promptly placed orders for their manufacture and assured arms manufacturers that everything should be done so that talks on this problem would not interfere with the development and production of binary weapon systems at least in the next five to seven years. This seriously hampered a Soviet-American agreement.

The Soviet Union, for its part, was consistently trying to clear obstacles to an agreement with the United States.

The Soviet Union has taken a number of specific steps to create an atmosphere of confidence and openness: It has terminated the production of chemical weapons, declared its stockpiles, stated that it will not supply chemical weapons to other countries and that it does not have chemical weapons abroad.

And, finally, all this has borne fruit: The Bush administration responded positively to the Soviet calls and the Soviet Union’s unilateral practical steps.

The Soviet-American agreement to start the reduction of chemical weapon and slash 80 percent of chemical weapons stocks was signed without waiting for the conclusion of a multilateral convention. Now the Pentagon is about to begin its implementation.

Nevertheless, the picture is clouded somewhat by plans of the U.S. Defence Department to request appropriations for research to create chemical ammunition for multi-barrel rocket-assisted systems. A Pentagon spokesman said that after the possibility of adopting this ammunition is determined, the programme will immediately be terminated. But why spend funds on the development of new weapons if you intend to eliminate all chemical arsenals?

**Pentagon Plans To Scrap Chemical Weapons**

*LD1307083390 Moscow TASS in English 0817 GMT 13 Jul 90*

[Text] Washington, July 13 (TASS)—Under the Soviet-American agreement to scrap chemical arms reached at the recent Washington summit, the Pentagon plans to junk several chemical arms production and procurement programmes, a U.S. defence spokesman said on Thursday.

U.S. Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney has already taken steps to implement the Soviet-American agreements.

He decided to scrap the production and procurement of 155-mm chemical artillery shells, the Bigeye binary air bombs and chemical ammunition for multiple missile launchers.

Cheney has decided against asking for the $141 million he previously wanted to produce and procure chemical arms for the fiscal year of 1991, the spokesman said. The abandonment of 155-mm chemical artillery shells programme will save the government $74.3 million and the Bigeye programme—$66.7 million.

The Pentagon will still ask for the $27.8 million for research and development of chemical ammunition for multiple missile launchers, the spokesman said. The money will be needed to complete research and to test these shells to check their technical reliability.

However, the programme will stop after developers are certain that the shells can be used by the army, he said.

All these steps are designed to prepare for the implementation of the Soviet-American agreement to scrap chemical arms, following its ratification by the two countries’ legislatures.

**U.S.-Israeli Antimissile Program Reported**

*LD1307100590 Moscow TASS in English 0959 GMT 13 Jul 90*

[Text] New York, July 13 (TASS)—Israel and the United States are cooperating in the development of an antiballistic complex designed to destroy short and medium-range missiles, ASSOCIATED PRESS reported from Jerusalem, citing THE JERUSALEM POST newspaper.

The first test of the anti-missile missile, called Arrow, is scheduled soon.

The first stage of work cost $158 million and was funded by the United States from the Star Wars budget.

The continuation and development of bilateral military cooperation was the focus of talks between visiting head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Arens and head of the Israeli Chief of Staff Dann Shomron.

In an interview with Israeli Radio, Arens spoke about the success of the talks and expressed hope that the United States would finance the second stage, the cost of which is estimated at $200 million.

According to Arens, the development of the Arrow is needed to counter Iraq’s threat to use missiles with chemical warheads against Israel.
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Plans Termed ‘Sacrilegious’
LD1607165790 Moscow TASS in English 1612 GMT 16 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, July 16 (TASS)—TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

Everything changes much more rapidly in the field of international relations in our dynamic age than, say, five years ago. Except, perhaps, American plans for the production of nuclear weapons, drawn up on the strength of Pentagon requests at the height of the cold war, but not reconsidered until recently.

According to THE WASHINGTON POST, changes have begun to manifest themselves in these plans as well, although not to bring them into line with the military and political situation in the world.

The U.S. Energy Department has worked out a new long-term programme, Complex-21, for the future production of nuclear weapons. It “calls for revitalising the existing network of factories and reactors so the military can make new bombs through at least the middle of the next century.”

Washington thereby intends to “breathe new life” into the production of nuclear weapons designed to destroy yet unborn people in the middle of the 21st century.

The statement by U.S. Energy Secretary James Watkins, who described the plans to establish “one or two super bomb building sites that would consolidate activities now spread across 12 states” as large-scale changes for the better, can only be described as sacrilegious.

According to the plan, a fully modernised nuclear weapon complex should come into operation in the year 2015, probably in South Carolina.

The implementation of the project will take at least $15 billion, according to preliminary estimates.

Energy department officials say they are anticipating a continued need to manufacture many new weapons with improved, safer designs that would replace those being retired or withdrawn as obsolete.

Several options for future American nuclear requirements in the year 2050 have been worked out. They envisage various levels right up to keeping intact the present arsenals of 21,000 units of nuclear munitions.

The CBS television network reported that a review of the strategic plan for the conduct of nuclear war would be completed in Washington by the end of this summer.

The plan will determine specific targets in the Soviet Union for each unit of U.S. nuclear weapons. Including probably those to be produced at the contemplated nuclear super complex.

Some U.S. Congress members insist that, under new conditions, the United States should reconsider not only the list of targets for nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union but also the very “philosophy” of warfare. They emphasise that far fewer weapons would be needed for “deterrence” than for a victory in nuclear war.

The Pentagon rejects these arguments. American experts point out with irony that, with the current strategy maintained, the U.S. military will constantly complain that they have much more potential targets on the Soviet Union’s territory than they have nuclear munitions necessary to hit them.

It is precisely this warfare “philosophy” that caters for plans aiming to intensify the nuclear arms race, opens the way for the establishment of new complexes in the United States for the production of weapons of mass destruction, destabilises the military and political situation in the world and enhances the risk of nuclear disaster.

Test Ban Committee Marks Progress in Geneva
PM1907092190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by unidentified correspondent: “Will Tests Be Banned?”]

[Text] Geneva—Considerable progress has been made at the summer session of the Disarmament Conference. The setting up of a special committee to ban nuclear tests will be announced on Tuesday at a plenary sitting of the session participants in Geneva’s Palais des Nations.

The new conference organ’s main task is to prepare an international treaty banning nuclear tests. The special committee, of which all the Disarmament Conference states will be members, is to study the measures required to monitor observance of the future treaty. Certainly, the special committee will consider all existing proposals on banning tests and the experience of work at the talks on an all-embracing ban on nuclear tests which were conducted earlier by the USSR, the United States, and Britain.

The idea of setting up the special committee was repeatedly put forward at the Disarmament Conference, in particular by the socialist countries. Japan, whose delegation put forward a draft mandate for the special committee in the spring, has made a major contribution to promoting the idea. The question of setting it up was discussed by the USSR foreign minister and U.S. secretary of state in Wyoming as one of the main topics for the Soviet-American summit. So it can be said that the establishment of the special committee is the result of joint efforts.
It is true that not everyone contributed equally to the solution of this problem. For a long time the U.S. delegation blocked the setting up of a special committee at the Disarmament Conference, and it was not until June, after the Soviet-American summit, that the Americans finally agreed to it.

A new stage of talks is now starting. At the outset it is necessary to define the framework of a nuclear test ban: whether it will extend to all types of explosions or only to those that have a military purpose. The structure of the system for verifying observance of the future treaty and methods of exchanging data, in particular the results of seismic observations, will be clarified. The treaty participants will obviously have to arrange for computerized information exchange.

Observers in Geneva's Palais des Nations wanted to know to what extent the PRC and France would be participating in the new special committee's work, since they often act alone in their nuclear policy, notably in the sphere of test explosions. According to many observers, the very setting up of the special committee could give momentum to positive changes in the positions of these and other nuclear states.

Soviet-U.S. INF Commission Ends Session
LD1907141590 Moscow TASS in English 1412 GMT 19 Jul 90

[Text] Geneva, July 19 (TASS)—The Soviet-U.S. special control commission, set up under the INF Treaty for eliminating medium- and short-range missiles, ended its 7th session here today after dealing with a number of issues related to the treaty's fulfillment.

Karpov Receives U.S. Open Skies Delegate
LD2007013190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1440 GMT 19 Jul 90

[Text] The seventh session of the Soviet-American special control commission set up in accordance with the treaty between the USSR and the United States on elimination of medium- and short-range missiles ended today in Geneva. During the session a number of issues relating to practical implementation of the treaty were examined.

USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov today received the leader of the U.S. delegation at the International Open Skies Conference, J. Howes. They had a detailed exchange of views on matters concerning the drawing up of agreements at the conference. It was arranged that during preparations for its next stage, the dates of which will be agreed separately, the sides will hold further consultations.

U.S. Senate Hearings on Nuclear Test Treaties Begin

TASS Report
PM2007102190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS correspondent I. Borisenko dispatch: “Ratification Process Begins”]

[Text] Washington, 18 July—The process of ratifying two Soviet-U.S. agreements—the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes—began in the Senate Tuesday. “I regret that it has taken 16 and 14 years, respectively, to win active support for these treaties from the administration,” Claiborne Pell, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated when opening the hearings.

The long delay in ratifying these agreements—which limit the yield of underground nuclear tests to 150 kilotonnes—occurred because successive U.S. administrations had reservations about the procedure for monitoring the agreements. The problem was settled after Soviet President M.S. Gorbachev and U.S. President G. Bush agreed new protocols on means of monitoring.

The exceptional importance of these measures was pointed out by State Department spokesman Paul Robinson. In his words, these are “unprecedented measures envisaging on-site verification [proverka].” In practice this means that the USSR and the United States are entitled to set up special seismic stations on each other's territory to monitor nuclear test yields. Three Soviet monitoring [slezheniye] stations have been set up in Newport, Washington, Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Black Hills, South Dakota. The three U.S. stations will be sited in the Moscow area, the Urals, and Siberia. As P. Robinson noted, although the U.S. aim is ultimately to abandon nuclear testing, this is still a distant prospect. “Tests guarantee the reliability of nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons guarantee stability in the world,” he stated. “Until we work out another formula we will have to stick to this position.”

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman informed this TASS correspondent that it is planned to hold another two open sessions and a closed briefing—at which lawmakers will be given intelligence information—to examine the two treaties. The question will then be studied by a special Senate committee on intelligence. The committees will draw up a report on the basis of the results of the hearings and it, together with their recommendations, will be submitted for examination by the full Senate in early September. The procedure for the examination of treaties by the Senate has not yet been determined, but a committee representative expressed the opinion that the ratification process will be completed before the end of the current session of Congress. “Of course, it is too soon to make forecasts,” he noted,
“but so far none of the speakers at the hearings has made a single objection against the treaties.”

**Bogachev Views Treaties**

*LD1907203490 Moscow TASS in English 2018 GMT 19 Jul 90*

[By TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, July 19 (TASS)—The U.S. Senate has begun the process of ratification of Soviet-U.S. treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and on nuclear tests for peaceful aims.

Dramatic events around the two treaties in the past 16 years clearly reflected wavering in the United States’ approaches to arms control as a whole and the evolution of the U.S. position on the complete nuclear arms test ban.

One of the treaties was signed in 1974, the other in 1976. In 1981, the Reagan administration declared its refusal to submit the treaties to the Senate for ratification. Earlier, Washington unilaterally disrupted the trilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain on the full ban on nuclear tests.

The United States responded to the Soviet Union’s unilateral moratorium of August 6, 1985 by a series of nuclear tests in Nevada. THE NEW YORK TIMES newspaper wrote then that the Pentagon tried not to make it seem as if it was interested in banning nuclear tests. Soviet nuclear test sites were silent for 18 months, while the United States and France were the only countries to continue nuclear tests.

Washington admitted that the termination of tests would create reliable barriers to the development of new and improvement of old mass destruction systems. But this was also the reason for the United States’ refusal to negotiate the full termination of nuclear tests, to declare a moratorium on nuclear tests and to ratify the 1974 and 1976 agreements.

Only in January 1987, President Reagan sent a message to the Senate informing it of his intention to submit the treaties for ratification. It took Washington three and a half more years to fulfill the promise.

Considerable positive changes have been introduced to the U.S. position on nuclear tests. Soviet and U.S. specialists have successfully tested devices to measure the power of underground nuclear tests.

Protocols on measures to verify the full implementation of provisions of the 1974 and 1976 Soviet-U.S. agreements have been coordinated. The ratification of the treaties by the Soviet Union and the United States will become an important step to nuclear disarmament.

Unfortunately, there are differences in determining final aims of the negotiations on nuclear tests. The Soviet Union considers full nuclear test ban its main aim, while the United States believes the elaboration of measures to control tests would suffice.

U.S. State Department representative Paul Robinson said, “The tests ensure nuclear arms’ reliability and nuclear arms ensure stability in the world” and claimed that much time will pass before the full termination of nuclear tests.

**Nuclear Scientist Mikhailov Favors Deterrent**

*PM1907113690 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jul 90 p 2*

[Interview with project leader Professor V. Mikhailov, by A. Khokhlov; place, date of interview not stated: “Third Generation Bomb”—first paragraph is KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] For the first time in the Soviet press, one of the country’s “hawks,” project leader Professor V. Mikhailov, gives an interview.

[Khokhlov] Viktor Nikitovich, you have spent all your life engaged in creating the most devastating, lethal weapons. Do you feel you have lived your life for nothing, in vain?

[Mikhailov] I was born in 1934. As a boy I saw the horrors of World War II. My father died in 1943 in the Bryansk forests, and a year earlier my elder sister had died of hunger and disease. I took it in with my mother’s milk that the defense of the motherland is a man’s most sacred cause. “Lofty” words are not in fashion today, but that is really true....

We did not start the nuclear race—it was the Americans. A terrible threat began to loom over our country in 1945. The U.S. monopoly in the sphere of fundamentally new, very powerful armaments also gave them another monopoly over all the peoples of the world—a monopoly of fear. It is to the credit of the Soviet people and their scientists that they succeeded in a surprisingly short space of time, in a poor country almost razed to the ground by the war, to create the antidote to the American bomb.

[Khokhlov] Fine, in the late forties there was a strategic necessity to work on the creation of the bomb. But surely now the improvement of nuclear weapons is contrary to what is now our genuinely peace-loving foreign policy?

[Mikhailov] Politics is the art of the possible. All slogans can only remain words unless they are backed up by concrete steps toward achieving the goals proclaimed. I am the most peaceful of men, but I am forced to remain in the ranks of the “hawks” as long as there is the slightest threat to the country’s security. I feel uncomfortable when I read in the newspapers the profound thoughts of esteemed politicians and scientists who assert that unilateral disarmament by the Soviet Union could lead all mankind to a nuclear-free world. That is
not true. The Americans have launched series production of artillery shells with neutron warheads, have perfected the “Trident-2” submarine-based missiles, and have carried out more than 30 tests within the framework of the creation of a third generation bomb. Against whom are these weapons targeted? Against Belgium, Nigeria, Mongolia? No, against us....

I find it hard to understand: Why is the Supreme Soviet unwilling or unable to assess this situation, why does the CPSU Central Committee not take steps? There is only one way to a nuclear-free world—the universal banning and destruction of nuclear weapons. Unilateral reduction is the path of a man in darkness, where it is hard to tell how many steps remain to the brink of the abyss—10 or one....

[Khokhlov] After five years of unrestrained euphoria in society, when we have all come to believe irreversibly in the possibility of living in peace, and not in an atmosphere of nuclear hysteria, your words come as a cold shower.... But were not you the leader of the “confidence experiments,” for the Soviet side?

[Mikhailov] Yes, for this purpose I was “declassified” for the first time in 20 years of work, and began to be called by my full name, instead of “Professor M.” The “confidence experiments,” in my view, are the most important things to be achieved in the sphere of control of nuclear weapons in all the years of our perestroika. In 1988 the USSR and the United States took the first real step away from the “blindfold” race to real verification of the achievements of both superpowers in the nuclear confrontation.

[Khokhlov] How were these experiments conducted? TASS gave so much “vague” information....

[Mikhailov] The American scientists proposed the “Cortex” hydrodynamic method of verification. It is based on the fact that after an explosion the ground behaves like a liquid as a result of the shock wave. The yield of the charge can be determined from the speed of progress of the shock wave. The Americans believed that this is the optimum method, providing no opportunity to find out, apart from the yield, anything about the fine structure of the kinetics of the explosion.

You should have seen the faces of the eminent nuclear physicists John Bini [transliterated] and Chuck MacWilliam, when after the August test in Nevada I told them “on the quiet” that the yield of their explosion was slightly too high! And into the bargain they have still not returned our tapes recording the precise processes. Evidently there are details there that we Soviet people should never have received, according to their calculations....

At first the Americans had a degree of self-satisfaction in relation to us: They know everything, can do everything. After our work together they realized that we were not born yesterday either. Our specialists showed themselves to be professionals of the highest caliber, and our apparatus, which, incidentally, has no parallels in the United States, worked 100 percent reliably. Which could not be said for the American apparatus.

After the 1988 experiments important verification procedures were included in the protocol at the Geneva bilateral talks.

[Khokhlov] All the same, despite all the “confidence” measures, work on improving weapons is continuing in both countries. Can you tell us what the third generation atom bomb is like?

[Mikhailov] It will be a weapon of directed, selective operation. The possible use of charges of a new type, if they are indeed created in the coming years, will not cause a global catastrophe for all mankind. And that is the greatest danger. It will be a very great temptation for irresponsible politicians who will have the opportunity to “clear” themselves in their peoples’ eyes. If you think you can drop a couple of hundred “little bombs” on foreign territory, the enemy is devastated, but for the aggressor there are no consequences....

[Khokhlov] So is mankind doomed? Sooner or later there will be a bomb, ours or theirs. Politics and responsibility to the people are words that are hard to use, except in speeches. Yet we so much want to believe that our children, if not we ourselves, will live in a world without weapons....

[Mikhailov] A world without weapons is a utopia. At least for several more generations of people. It is hard and painful to be a realist. But throughout our long history, communities of people united to form states have fought one another, by military, political, or economic means, for living space, spheres of influence, and simply a place in the sun. The forms of the struggle have changed, but the essence remains the same to this day.

All the same, I do not think mankind is doomed. I agree with Margaret Thatcher: We can all be saved only by nuclear parity, mutual deterrence in nuclear expansion. I have two granddaughters and a grandson. I want happiness and a peaceful life for them, as much as other people. But I see that the noble goal of achieving a nuclear-free world will not, alas, be reached for a very long time. Mankind can expect a thorny path. In order to ensure the fewest possible surprises, our science must not lessen its efforts to ensure the security of our native land.

[Khokhlov] And that means that our people have to put more and more money into the deep pockets of the military industrial complex? That way, the empty shelves in Soviet stores are not going to disappear in a hurry....

[Mikhailov] An opinion that is very characteristic of recent years.
The Americans spend half a billion dollars a year on their nuclear test program. Whereas we spend as many rubles as Moscow spends on food in a day.... Just compare it!

[Khokhlov] You will agree, then, that it is hard to understand why approximate nuclear missile parity exists between the world's richest country and our, alas, half-starving state. How, in what terms, do you explain that?

[Mikhaylov] In terms of the Russian character, the Soviet character. Not a material "substance," of course, but....

Do you know what most struck me personally in America, at the Nevada range? Don't bother, you won't guess. The excellent restaurant and the beautiful swimming pool. Yet our nuclear scientists live and work in the most difficult everyday conditions.

I can say with every confidence that all the public money spent on creating the nuclear shield, to the last kopeck, is used for its direct purpose—to protect the people.

[Khokhlov] Forgive me an intrusive question: What wages do you personally receive?

[Mikhaylov] Since becoming deputy USSR minister of nuclear power generation and the nuclear industry, I am registered on the payroll for R800. Until May 1990 I was paid 550. My wife jokes that as a breadwinner, I could not hold a candle to the worst kabob seller on the Riga Market.

[Khokhlov] Apart from your wages....

[Mikhaylov] No need to continue. In terms of the other good things in life, there is an official "Volga," a small two-room apartment in by no means the most prestigious district of the capital, and a dacha plot of six-hundredths of a hectare, where I have only managed to erect a basic living unit—I have no time for anything more.

Call that generous? The Americans told me that a similar specialist in the United States would be worth $300 million a year.

[Khokhlov] Indeed.... Viktor Nikitovich, apart from money, there is an even more gripping human passion—the lust for power. There is a great deal of talk now to the effect that the military-industrial complex holds sway over the state and party in our country. That all the threads of government are in its hands....

[Mikhaylov] There is, of course, a military-industrial complex in the USSR, as in any country of the world. But it did not lead the country or reduce it to its present state. It was "led" itself. And, thank heavens, not very "resolutely." It is simply lucky for the country that the apparatchiks who came up, one after the other, from Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] activist cradles, with their correspondence-course agricultural or pedagogical diplomas, were afraid to push their hairy hands into important science. If the nuclear scientists had also been "issued" with requisitions by the oblast and rayon party committees for "weeding" and "crop rotation".... I would like to believe that after the 28th CPSU Congress the attitude to science will change for the better.

[Khokhlov] So how do you assess the current conversion?

[Mikhaylov] Unequivocally: It is necessary. The military-industrial complex must help the country in difficult times. But in the form in which conversion is currently taking place, it is just another "corn" campaign.

Last year, by an "arbitrary" decision, they gave us a 20 percent cut in resources. Just stop production. Unique equipment and unique specialists can be lost at a stroke, it is the easiest thing in the world to ruin the only sector of industry in the country that is advanced as of today. As if to ridicule us, they set the nuclear scientists to "bail out" the meat and dairy industry. Special quality machine tools are now producing separators....

If only they had let us work out a conversion program, we would have made it a sensible one—instead of trying to grow corn in the Arctic and making aluminum bowls on machine tools with digital program control....

[Khokhlov] Viktor Nikitovich, you are a former country boy who has become a deputy minister, doctor of sciences, professor, and Lenin and State Prize winner. What do you still want from life?

[Mikhaylov] For myself, only one thing—new, interesting work that people need. I want something more for the country. I believe that the times of trouble will come to an end, that society will overcome its growing pains and find a new path in a changing world. But for the time being, be that as it may and whatever may lie ahead, the Soviet nuclear scientists will protect the country and world peace.

[Khokhlov] Thank you for the interview.

Perfilyev on Nuclear Test Ban Agreement

LD1907153490 Moscow TASS in English 1518 GMT 19 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, July 19 (TASS)—The decision by the Disarmament Conference in Geneva to set up a nuclear test ban committee is "exceptionally important," a Soviet spokesman told a briefing here today.

Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, confirmed Soviet readiness to facilitate the earliest conclusion of a reliably verifiable international agreement on a complete and overall prohibition of nuclear explosions. The Soviet
delegation at the conference has all the necessary instructions to facilitate the attainment of that noble goal in the most active and constructive way, he stressed.

Perfiliev welcomed China's decision to take part in the work of the special committee and expressed disappointment over France's refusal to participate in it.

He expressed hope that the French decision is not final, considering the great importance of this issue for the destinies of peace and international security.

Generals View Western Group of Forces' Withdrawal From GDR

Pull-Out Said To Take 3-4 Years
LD2007090490 Moscow TASS in English 1134 GMT 19 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, July 19 (TASS)—The Soviet Western Group of Forces, deployed in East Germany, should, sooner or later, return home, Army General Vladimir Lobov, chief of staff of the Warsaw Treaty countries' Joint Armed Forces, said.

Speaking in a TASS interview, he said that the presence of Soviet troops in East Germany, just as that of American, English and French troops in West Germany, was in keeping with the four powers' commitments after the Second World War.

"The decision to end the presence could be taken only with regards for the security interests of all states concerned," General Lobov said.

He said that the troop withdrawal should be accompanied by a decision concerning the stay in Germany of troops of other countries, stemming from the need to review the four powers' responsibilities to a united Germany.

In General Lobov's opinion, the withdrawal of both Soviet and other troops from Germany should be linked to the creation of pan-European security structures.

The possible starting date of the Soviet pullout, he said, could be linked to the completion of the transitional period of German reunification and of NATO's review of its political guidelines, doctrine, strategy and their practical implementation.

"The return of Soviet military contingents home, I believe, will take three to four years. This is due to many factors, including the Soviet Union's economic difficulties," General Lobov said.

Major General Assesses Withdrawal
AU1807124690 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 16 Jul 90 p 4

[Interview with Major General Vasily Kazachenko, commander of the Western Group of the Soviet Armed Forces, by Rene Heilig and Rainer Funke; place and date not given]

[Text] [NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] General, for how long will you be the commander of the Soviet troops in the GDR, do you think?

[Kazachenko] That depends, first, on the results of the Vienna negotiations and their implementation, which means that we will only keep three of our armies, or 195,000 troops, on the territory of the GDR.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] There are currently 380,000....

[Kazachenko] Second, in the two-plus-four talks, problems related to the deployment of the Western Group will also be discussed. We assume that we will maintain the parity between the troops of the Warsaw Pact and those of NATO in Central Europe. In addition, all countries that are interested in a European home have a comprehensive interest in transforming both blocs into political security structures. I think that this is a good philosophy and a good policy.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] The Soviet Union is currently having major domestic policy problems. We have heard the view expressed in some units that therefore, the military people, primarily the Western Group, have to assume higher responsibility than they have had before for stability in Europe, because the politicians have other work to do now. Do you share this view?

[Kazachenko] The Western Group has been a stabilizing factor in Europe for several years. However, we must be honest and say that military confrontation is not the best solution to political problems. Therefore, we are now trying to lower the level of military confrontation and to create different, meaning peaceful, guarantees.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] However, in connection with the German problems, some military people have the impression that they are now needed more than ever before.

[Kazachenko] I think that the activities of the Soviet Union in the diplomatic and political fields have mitigated confrontation. Military problems are being discussed on virtually all negotiation levels. Therefore, it is not correct to represent the Western Group as the most important factor of stability.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Let us continue discussing the Soviet Army. New political thinking is certainly a long and difficult process. How receptive are the armed forces to this process?
Kazachenko] The military members view this process positively and are feeling quite well in it. A soldier is not just a military person; he is an individual who has a family and a home country, and who wants the best for his children. This wish also includes disarmament and demilitarization.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Without any objections? The military members of the Western Group have no homes in the Soviet Union.

Kazachenko] The housing problem does not only concern the members of the Western Group. Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the CSFR and Hungary, 200,000 military members are looking for a home. In addition, there would be those of the Western Group. A social program has been prepared to give us housing in our country.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] As well as jobs?

Kazachenko] Yes, housing, jobs, kindergarten places, and jobs for our families. Funds have been appropriated for this purpose, and all construction capacities of the armed forces have been deployed for this project. I think that this problem will be resolved within three to five years.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Yet, the announced troop withdrawal from the GDR, that the USSR has undertaken to carry out unilaterally, has been halted....

Kazachenko] Yes. We intend to withdraw four divisions from the GDR, armored divisions, airborne troop units, some 4,000 tanks, and a number of special units. However, the withdrawal of troops from Hungary and the CSFR has changed our plans. The reasons for this are, first, the military balance which must be maintained, and, second, the social security of those military people who will be returning to the USSR. Therefore, the concept of the troop pullout from the GDR has been changed. That concerns two divisions and about 2,000 tanks. Last year, we removed 1,988 tanks and a couple of other units. However, the problem still exists. Once the necessary conditions have been created, the remaining troops will also leave the GDR.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Is the impression wrong, the impression we had during our visit to the Gossenheim Air Force division that the Soviet Army has increased its combat readiness?

Kazachenko] It is the Armed Forces' task to be always combat-ready. We are currently experiencing probably the best situation that we have ever had. The policy of new thinking has not only had an impact on our country; we believe that the situation is favorable for resolving all security problems.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] The NATO leadership and the GDR Government assume that the united Germany will become a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. Answering a relevant question, some of your soldiers said that they would then feel as if they were deployed on “enemy territory.”

Kazachenko] I do not see it that way. For instance, as for the alliance membership of a united Germany, it must come about in the framework of the pan-European home. That would include a reduction in both sides' military potentials. NATO would have to change its doctrine, as the Warsaw Pact has done.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] But does the Warsaw Pact still exist as an alliance? Does it have one political opinion, one political weight?

Kazachenko] We cannot give up the Warsaw Pact thoughtlessly. However, in the long run, there will be no blocs at all anymore. Pan-European political structures are emerging. The USSR’s position is this: The united Germany will, for some time, be a member of both blocs.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Positions are changing.... But you talked about philosophical thinking in politics. Do we have time for that?

Kazachenko] Yes, we have time for that. Without philosophically well-thought out concepts, we will not be able to carry out any politically sensible actions.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Is not policy forced to act much faster than the philosophers are able to think?

Kazachenko] You are aware that many of the present realities originate from such way of thinking. We now need the philosophy of the policy of new thinking which began to be developed five years ago. Gorbachev announced our military strategy in January three years ago. We are now gradually starting to implement it.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] You are responsible for political work in the Western Group. The problems we are discussing are evidently complicated.

Kazachenko] Let us take a soldier. In a few years, he will be a common citizen of his country again, representative of the new way of thinking. He will take part in the political processes in the country, in the implementation of our economic reforms, in the transition to the controlled market economy, and perhaps even in the privatization of our economy. We are having deficits in our economic thinking. That is one of the biggest obstacles on the road to restructuring.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Let us return to the military aspects. Could you conceive of a joint German army?

Kazachenko] That is not so easy. They will be the Armed Forces of a united German state. What they will be like, will be the German people's business. It is important that they do not create any negative consequences for the Soviet Union. You know that many
Poles and many Soviet citizens are worried. The people still remember well that World War II was started from German soil.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Following the recent Bundeswehr commanders' meeting, secret plans leaked out that the National People's Army should be totally reduced, and that then 100,000 Bundeswehr troops would be deployed in the GDR. Will NATO advance to the Oder river?

[Kazachenko] I do not see the future of a united German army in such a narrow way. As I said, at first the status of a united Germany must be defined in the two-plus-four negotiations, and in Vienna, the upper ceilings of the troops must be agreed upon. That will take a while. After that, the problems related to the deployment of a united German army will have to be resolved. The further development of the political structures will also lead to a reduction in the German army. This is the perspective.

Chernyshev Ponders West's Sincerity on Arms Cuts

LD2307212290 Moscow TASS in English 2109 GMT 23 Jul 90

[By TASS military affairs analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, July 24 (TASS)—President George Bush told the American military at the launching ceremony of the new aircraft carrier George Washington what they wanted to hear (in the opinion of the CBS TV company) most of all: Aircraft carriers are an indispensable weapon in U.S. arsenals.

Statements by the President during his three-day trip across Western states which was devoted to the forthcoming elections, contained elements which can satisfy not only the American military but also those in the Soviet Union who criticised, at the 28th Communist Party congress, the Soviet foreign and military policy based on new thinking.

At the same time his speech at the launching ceremony disappoints those in the USSR who insists on deeper cuts in the Armed Forces and armaments and who advocates the further reduction in military production on mutual conditions.

During his trip, Bush returned to the traditional theme of "peace from the position of strength" which was absent in his speeches for a long time. Such a relapse is quite surprising.

It does not tally with ideas about the end of the cold war and about considerable improvement in Soviet-American relations and East-West relations as a whole.

Bush's statement that the United States should continue "the policy of confrontation" also evokes concern.

The following question comes to one's mind involuntarily: Were statements by the United States and NATO that they do not see an enemy in the Soviet Union any more and extend it a hand of friendship and cooperation sincere?

Facts show that the United States continue to prioritise the production of military means to dominate over the Soviet Union. The U.S. key thesis says that U.S. security necessitates military supremacy by the improvement of nuclear and conventional technologies.

Top priority is given to the production of the third generation of nuclear weapons, space-based ABM systems under the SDI programme and new ultra-precise systems of conventional weapons.

Far from cutting its military presence in the world, Washington seeks to consolidate the grip on bases situated on foreign territories (Greece, the Philippines, etc.)

The United States tries to conclude new agreements to use foreign territories to support operations of its Navy (talks with Singapore).

The above shows that there is a gap between the West's declarations and real deeds.

The U.S. administration and NATO leaders have not yet understood that security needs deep cuts and not modernisation of weapons and that it is necessary to make radical changes in strategy to strengthen stability and not to achieve superiority.

Ovchinnikov Cited on Need To Cut Naval Arms

LD2307100190 Moscow TASS in English 0839 GMT 23 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, July 23 (TASS)—The process of disarmament can evolve successfully only if it is all-inclusive. Stability and trust cannot be built by limiting reductions to land forces and regarding the navy as "sacred," political news analyst Vsevolod Ovchinnikov writes in today's PRAVDA.

He comments on the results of an international symposium in Wellington "On Security in the Asia-Pacific Region."

Washington does not want to discuss with Moscow security in the Asia-Pacific region because the Americans are content with their present dominant positions in the region. At disarmament talks, the Pentagon seeks parity with the Soviet Union on land by maintaining U.S. superiority on the seas, the analyst points out.

U.S. Representative Richard Fieldhouse said in his report at the seminar that over the past four years the Soviet side has made many proposals to reduce naval arms.
However, the U.S. side invariably regarded them negatively. In particular the United States rejected the suggested elimination of all sea-launched nuclear systems, except submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Fieldhouse believes that such a measure could be the most important suggestion and concludes that the time has come to involve the Navy and its activities in the overall arms control process.

Ovchinnikov thinks that, apart from military-and-strategic considerations, there are serious trade-and-economic factors favouring the idea.

According to the influential American journal "FOREIGN POLICY," the main threat to the United States is posed not by Soviet military might in the region but by U.S. inability to compete against its military allies, which are at the same time its economic rivals: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

The relaxation of tension in the Asia-Pacific region in the military field would allow the United States to cut military spending, which amounts to $42 billion, and to focus on economic aspects of security.

The international symposium, which was held on the initiative of New Zealand Disarmament Minister Fran Wild, educated participants about how common dangers to mankind had brought nations closer together.

The inhabitants of secluded islands grasped the interrelationship of the present-day world and displayed an ability to think and act in a new way, in line with the call of the times, Ovchinnikov writes.
AUSTRIA

Ministry Confirms Weapons Export to Middle East
AU1107192690 Vienna Domestic Service in German 1600 GMT 11 Jul 90

[Report by Robert Stoppacher]

[Text] The export of Austrian tanks is again causing concern. While managers of Austria's state-owned industry are facing trials in Linz because of the illegal export of guns, it has become known that the nationalized Steyr concern is exporting newly developed wheel tanks [Radpanzer] to the troubled Middle East region.

The Interior Ministry in Vienna today confirmed corresponding statements by Greens Deputy Peter Pilz, but declined to name the country to which the tanks are being exported. The only thing that is known is that a country in the troubled Gulf region where human rights are not violated is involved. The Interior Ministry permitted the export and import of two Pandur wheel tanks, and drive purposes, as the ministry pointed out. However, the Steyr-Mannlicher company hopes for a large order from the mysterious country in the Middle East. Greens Deputy Pilz described the Steyr wheel tanks as a classical weapon used in civil wars and spoke of a scandal. The general manager of the Steyr works, Otto Voisard, stated that the new weapons developed by his concern are not only destined for export. The Austrian Army is interested in a new anticank gun, but is also said to be interested in the Pandur wheel tank. However, the Austrian Army claims no knowledge of this.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Government Spokesman on Poison Gas in GDR
LD1107155890 Hamburg DFA in German 1449 GMT 11 Jul 90

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—According to Deputy Government Spokesman Norbert Schaefer, the West has always assumed the Soviet Union has had chemical weapons deployed in advance positions. Thus, Schaefer commented to the press in Bonn on Wednesday on intelligence service reports that the Soviet Union has some 30,000 tonnes of poison gas stored in the GDR. If those figures should turn out to be correct, it “would not exactly be a surprise” to the Federal Government, Schaefer explained. The GDR Government agreed to look into the matter.

An FRG Defense Ministry spokesman said the Defense Ministry was taking the reports about Soviet chemical weapons in the GDR very seriously. The problems applied first and foremost to the GDR and the Soviet forces in the GDR. The spokesman declined to comment further, remarking that his ministry did not want to anticipate the examination of the matter by the GDR Government.

Schaefer pointed out there was a denial from Moscow and East Berlin. The spokesman of the East Berlin Ministry of Disarmament and Defense, Colonel Uwe Hempel, had given an assurance on Tuesday there were no chemical gas dumps on GDR territory.

Defense Ministry Said Interested in MiG-29
AU1507140990 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 11 Jul 90 p 2

[“ddp” report: “MiG-29 Instead of Fighter-90 for the Bundeswehr?”]

[Text] Cologne—According to information obtained by the West German Radio (WDR) television program “Monitor,” the FRG Defense Ministry is apparently considering buying Soviet MiG-29 fighter aircraft.

In a report it pre-released yesterday, “Monitor” referred to the chief of the planning staff in the GDR Foreign Ministry, Ulrich Albrecht. He told “Monitor” that, following the GDR’s cancellation of the purchase of further MiG-29s for the National People’s Army, “there were suddenly signals from Bonn that the Luftwaffe is obviously interested in this modern MiG.”

The Soviet jet is regarded as an interim solution for the controversial Fighter-90. Albrecht further stated that as far as the electronic equipment is concerned, the MiG is not as interesting as the Fighter-90, which would have certainly beaten it. “However, the FRG Defense Ministry has noted that it is not a problem, because the jets could be fitted with Western electronics.”

Moreover, investigations by “Monitor” of U.S. databases have revealed that Great Britain, Israel, South Korea, and even the U.S. Air Force are interested in buying the Soviet MiG-29 fighter planes.

Meanwhile, the FRG Defense Ministry has rejected the Monitor report as “not true.” The report lacks any foundation, it was stated. In Bonn yesterday [10 July], a Defense Ministry spokesman said that there have never been such considerations or negotiations.

U.S. Chemical Weapons Withdrawal Protested
AU1607123490 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 16 Jul 90 pp 57-58

[Text] Horst Kowarek, 36, Green local politician and spokesman for Westpfalz Peace Coordination, was able to rely on many fellow fighters. For years his party, the Peace Movement, the German Trade Union Federation, and many Social Democrats had organized activities with the goal of having the U.S. chemical weapons in the FRG, about 102,000 grenades with the lethal combat gases Sarin and VX, withdrawn “immediately.”

Now, one week before the beginning of the internationally unique action (codename “Operation Dragon”),
Kowarek and some of his fellow fighters want to stop the removal of the dangerous poisons from Clausen in the Palatinate.

The lethal cargo is to be taken to the Lower Saxony port of Nordenham by roads and railroads and then to the Pacific by ship. On Johnston Atoll, 700 miles southwest of Hawaii, the combat gases will then be burned at some time in the future, according to the plan.

First, however, the devil’s stuff will remain within the “national defense stocks” of the United States for several years, because, U.S. Defense Department experts said last week, the chemical weapons are “the bulk of the entire chemical weapons stockpiles.”

The Pentagon schedule says that it will take 70 weeks until the destruction facility on the Johnston Atoll is ready for use. After that, at least two-and-a-half years will be needed to eliminate chemical combat agents, which have been withdrawn from Japan. Only then will it be the turn of the poisonous stuff from the FRG, which will remain ready for use in the care of the “U.S. Army Chemical Activity, Western Command,” which is responsible for chemical warfare in Asia.

Before the poisonous cargo from Clausen begins its long trip, a community of complainers, who are financially supported by the Greens, now want a temporary injunction from the Cologne Administrative Court to force the FRG Government to cancel the risky transport for the time being. “The way the removal is planned,” argues Mannheim lawyer Guenter Urbanczyk, “it is a violation of the basic right of physical safety.”

Among experts it is particularly disputed whether the removal of the lethal weapons is not far more dangerous than further storage in the Palatinate. Thus, in the United States plans to take poison gas weapons deployed in their own country to a central collection depot to be destroyed have had to be cancelled. The transport of the nerve gas through inhabited areas seemed to be too dangerous for the Americans.

The chemical agents deployed in the United States are now to be incinerated in high-temperature ovens directly at the eight deployment sites. Bonn has rejected the Americans’ proposal to destroy the ammunition in Clausen on site. The reason: Removal is safer.

However, this is precisely what Manfred Mutz, Social Democratic Party of Germany mayor of Giessen, doubts; his city is located along the planned transport route. In a letter, he called on Chancellor Helmut Kohl to stop the “obviously precipitate removal.” Mutz: “Alternatives, such as chemical disposal (that is, the transformation of the substance into salts and sending them to the producer), have not been sufficiently thought through.” “In view of the population density,” the transport along the planned railroad track “cannot be justified.”

Angelika Beer, security policy spokeswoman for the Greens, complains about the “lack of any studies on the risks of transport and destruction.” And Rear Admiral Elmar Schmaehling sees in the removal of the highly poisonous substances “not a sign of reason, but a mark of favor by the Americans to the chancellor.”

Originally the Americans had scheduled more time for the operation—until the end of 1992. But because Kohl wants to be celebrated before the elections as the chancellor who removed the poison gas, the transport has to be concluded before. Beer has said, “Here speed has priority over safety.”

Thus, U.S. safety experts have found out that so far there exist no containers corresponding to the stresses on a container system for poison gas ammunition; a prototype might be available in December 1990 at the earliest.

So far Bonn has not published the details of how the chemical weapons are to be safeguarded during the removal. Even though RhineLand-Palatinate Interior Minister Rudi Geil (Christian Democratic Union) has announced comprehensive information, in fact what Bonn and Washington agreed on in a secret contract is valid: “the principle of restrictive information policy.”

The contract also sets down what may be published in the first place. Information is to refer only “to the joint steps undertaken to protect the population and the environment.” In every other respect the conditions of the withdrawal “are to be kept secret as long as possible.”

Urbanczyk says that this policy results in the fact “that the individual cannot even protect himself.” Shortly before a truck or train convoy starts on its way the population is to be briefed on the transport. However, Urbanczyk assumes that this is precisely what will “stagger the people.”

In the meantime, Interior Minister Geil is trying to reassure his uneasy subjects with deeds: He announced that during the removal he will “move to Clausen.”

Bundeswehr Verifying Soviet CW Removal
LD1807164590 Hamburg DPA in German 1518 GMT 18 Jul 90

[Text] Berlin/Bonn (DPA)—According to DPA’s information, the Western secret services assume that the Soviet Union is storing between 25,000 and 30,000 tonnes of poison gas in its Western frontline area. Secret service circles in Bonn outlined today that there are seven depots in the GDR, two in Czechoslovakia, and three in Poland. In contrast, a Soviet diplomat has told the Foreign Ministry once again that there are no Soviet chemical weapons on GDR territory. He also offered to allow any Soviet depot on the territory of the GDR to be searched for chemical weapons. Today a Bundeswehr inspection unit inspected two National People’s Army (NVA) sites in the GDR for suspected poison gas depots.
Secret service circles went on to report that a Soviet depot in Hungary had already been cleared. The Soviets had also closed down a depot in the GDR. According to these reports, around 15,000 tonnes were previously stored in the GDR. The Soviets are trying to transport the chemical weapons back to their country as quickly and unobtrusively as possible. Three NVA depots in Storkow, Brettin, and Oranienbaum have been cleared. The NVA had returned the poison gas ammunition to the Soviets, it was explained. It was therefore to be assumed that the Bundeswehr officers would “no longer find anything” on their inspection of NVA sites.

The 12 Bundeswehr soldiers under Lt. Col. Wolfgang Buttlar were welcomed by the head of the NVA Chemical Service, Maj. Gen. Karl-Heinz Nagler, at the exercise area in Storkow. He admitted that the NVA had limited stocks of chemical weapons at its disposal for training purposes. Nagler put the quantities at 705.6 grams of nerve gas, 206.1 kg of weapons harmful to the skin, and 38.9 grams of psychotroic chemicals. In addition, the NVA administered 650 kg of the weapon Adamsit, from World War I stocks, which could not be destroyed.

The checks took place at engineer units at their exercise areas in Storkow near Berlin and in Brettin near Brandenburg. DPA learned from the spokesman for the GDR Defense Ministry, Uwe Hempel, that the inspection sites were agreed last week during a visit by a GDR Defense Ministry delegation under State Secretary Werner Ablass to Bonn.

Greens Oppose U.S. CW Transport Plan
AU1807104790 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Jul 90 p 5

[Rene Wagner report: “The Greens Want To Prevent the Withdrawal of Chemical Weapons”]

[Excerpts] Mainz, 17 July—This seems to be a paradox: The Greens, who have always vehemently protested against the deployment of U.S. poison gas in Rhineland-Palatinate, now want to delay the withdrawal. During the weekend [14-15 July], 12 citizens who live along the possible transport route—between Pirmasens and Bremen—requested the Cologne Administrative Court to make a provisional decree in order to prevent a withdrawal under insufficient security regulations, as the Greens put it. [passage omitted]

The Greens—like the Bonn and Mainz governments—are in favor of destroying the chemical weapons. However, this should not take place as fast as possible but in the safest possible way, the Greens claimed. The shells have been stored on German soil for such a long time that it does not really make any difference whether they will be there for another one or two years, if safety can be increased during that period, some of them stressed. There is dissent among those who used to demonstrate for the withdrawal of chemical weapons as to whether the weapons should be destroyed on the spot. This had been demanded by the Saarland branch of the Association for the Environment and the Protection of Nature, but was rejected by the Rhineland-Palatinate branch. In addition, not all who demonstrated against the storage of the poison gas in Rhineland-Palatinate in the past few years support a delay.

The FRG Defense Ministry and the Mainz Interior Ministry are both against a destruction of the chemical weapons on the spot and against a delay of the withdrawal. On Tuesday [17 July] Interior Minister Geil (Christian Democratic Union) stated that the motion supported by the Greens is asking too much of the people living in this region. Geil attended the second exercise of the “lindworm,” a convoy of about 80 vehicles that moved from Clausen to Miesau. There, the over 100,000 artillery shells containing the “VX” and “Sarin” nerve gas arc to be stored temporarily, from where they will be taken to Nordenham by train and then shipped to the Pacific Ocean. The transport of the first containers with chemical weapons is scheduled for next week. The exact date will be set on Friday [20 July] by a government commission in Bonn, headed by the defense minister. [passage omitted]

TURKEY

Use of Chemical Weapons in 1988 Reported
NC2307080790

[Editorial Report] The May issue of the quarterly Cologne VOICE OF KURDISTAN in English carries an article on pages six to eleven on “Methods Used in the ‘Special War’ Waged by the Turkish Republic in Kurdistan.” A portion of the article under the subhead “The Use of Chemical Weapons by the Turkish State,” reads as follows: “The colonial Turkish government has made use of chemical weapons in its attacks on the fighters of the ARPK (Army of the National Liberation of Kurdistan). Based on the latest news and photographs at our disposal, we can verify this statement. The photos taken at Nusaybin prove the use of gas in the confrontation between the Turkish Army and the Liberation Army on 1st April 1988, where 20 fighters of the ARPK were killed. Peasants, who witnessed the fights in the neighbourhood of Hani Serin, tell... At one time bombs were thrown in the area where the guerrillas stayed. There was yellow smoke. A journalist from Mardin, who took pictures, described what happened to him in a letter. ‘At first we were not allowed to enter into these areas. Later we saw 20 bodies covered with a plastic, transparent sheet, so that they could be identified by the population. We had met similar cases before, in which we also took pictures and showed them to medical doctors and researchers. We started to write an article on all these events, but were threatened and fled abroad.’ In front of journalists who interviewed him, the special governor Hayri Kozakcioglu, denied the use of gas.”
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