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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

PDS Commission Head on Environment Policy

[Interview with Helmar Hegewald, head of the Environment Commission of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) by Holger Becker; place and date not given]

[Text] [NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Comrade Hegewald, the PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] has recently presented a discussion offer: "For an Environment Worth Living In." If I understand it correctly, this paper is based on two German states in the perspective of a united Europe. Meanwhile, however, Prime Minister Modrow caused surprise with his concept "for Germany, united fatherland." Could we not leave the contemplation of environmental problems to Herr Toepfer or his successor?

[Hegewald] That is a reasonable question. But it should be stated: We do not want a German Europe but a European Germany. For this reason, environmental policy must and can proceed only on the basis of the European dimension. Under this premise, we should give thought to this: What constructively brings the GDR into the process that can lead to state unity through a contractual association and confederation in accordance with the Modrow plan.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Do you also mean that with respect to the environment, where we are considered to be among the worst offenders, at least in Europe?

[Hegewald] In view of these facts, it certainly sounds paradoxical but it seems to me that we have the opportunity to introduce something on our own precisely in this area, namely the rudiments of an ecologically oriented way of production and life. The movement in the direction of democracy that began in October and November has this chance. A precondition is that we are now successful in controlling matters politically and legally in such a way that a far-sighted and ecologically founded rational adoption of nature is the basis of stable long-term economic growth. New national economic structures are to be organized in such a way that energy-intensive processes can be reduced and the corresponding enterprises closed down—I am thinking, for example, about the synthetic gas production in Leuna, the replacement of the carbide production or the lowering of cement exports. That extends to the setting of prices that give producers as well as consumers a material interest in the economical use of raw materials, energy, and water. An advantage could also lie in one of our previous disadvantages—the fact that industrialization is not as advanced here as in the FRG.

It is necessary, however, to set the course in the indicated direction now.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Where, then, should be the start? Give an example.

[Hegewald] At the meeting of the Dresden Regional Assembly recently, I spoke about an urgent measure. If we now shift to the market economy, this will be linked with a substantial development of small and medium-sized industry and of enterprises of the most varied kind of ownership. It is necessary to look into the environmental compatibility of every project in which there is investment. There are already legal regulations for this. They were set forth in GESETZBLATT [law gazette] 1/26 from December 1988, but heretofore they have not been applied consistently. But we need structures or institutions that guarantee this environmental compatibility. I see the possibility for this if economic offices are now created for the individual Länder in the course of an administrative reform. For the emerging Land of Saxony, I have proposed that the tasks of this office must include the appropriate strictly regulated approval procedures. The suggestion was received favorably.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] You mean a barrier to future environmental stresses?

[Hegewald] Exactly. It is a matter of preventive environmental protection. Only in this way can we avoid losing control of this in the territories in the course of the process of rapprochement or unification. In no case should it happen that new diffuse and extensive environmental stresses arise with the investments in the small and middle class sector. It is apparent in the FRG as well that faulty developments of this kind are difficult to correct. We should not allow them in the first place. Otherwise, an ecologically-oriented market economy remains just empty words.

One must know that the investigation of the environmental compatibility of new investments has not played any role in German-German relations heretofore. It is not dealt with seriously between our Ministry for Environmental Protection and the ministry of Herr Toepfer. Here we rank below the level of developing countries. When firms from the FRG want to invest there, namely, such checks are necessary.

This, however, is a matter of fundamental interests of citizens. For this reason, the central Green Table set up with the environmental minister will take on this task. In my opinion, it is important now, before it is too late, to outline the basic ecological conditions for the planned step-by-step process of the unification of Germany.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Where did the idea for the Green Table come from?

[Hegewald] It came from a conversation with Pastor Dr. Gensichen, head of the ecclesiastical research home in Wittenberg. He took hold of it and wrote a letter to Hans Modrow, who then induced the Ministry for Environmental Protection to call to this Green Table.
[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] The big Roundtable also welcomed the idea.

[Hegewald] Not just that. When we were debating about ecological problems there, Herr Boehme as a representative of the SPD [Social Democratic Party], for example, shared our opinion that we must bring such a form of competent articulation of citizens' interests, as represented by the Green Table, into the process of rapprochement of the two German states as a sign of the revolution in this country.

The October uprising also sets standards for the development of democracy in the FRG. If it comes to a united Germany, we will introduce there much of what was won in the GDR. Including, above all, the idea of a peaceful, demilitarized and completely disarmed Germany. The direction of the thinking of the PDS is thereby disarmament for environmental protection. That could and ought to be a program for a future Germany, indeed for a future secure and ecologically oriented Europe.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] You are thereby formulating a vision that is certainly worth pursuing. But the Left was not poor in visions before either. I am thinking only about the theoretical heritage of a Karl Liebknecht, who believed that the comprehensive development of the personality presupposes a life in harmony with nature. But that which has heretofore been called "real existing socialism" contributed substantially to the present ecological threat.

[Hegewald] I see the roots in the fact that in the early years of the Soviet Union the system of productive forces known by capitalism and working at the expense of nature was simply copied. And this was done increasingly in league with the mechanisms of the command system. That actually contradicted the Marxist understanding of producing rationally, that is, not just at the expense of nature but in equilibrium with it and also not at the expense of the health and dignity of the individual. These ideas were never taken seriously in the development of socialism. What we are really dealing with here is an early phase of socialism in terms of world history. Thus, it ultimately remained true to an understanding of progress that it had taken over from capitalism.

In the GDR, in turn, all we did was copy this copy. Added to that was the self-sufficient economic and energy policy, this walling ourselves under the motto: we can do everything by ourselves. This is how the country was ruined. That is probably the only way one can put it.

But to take up Liebknecht's idea once again, our position is: we are not pursuing environmental policy in general but for the individual, for a healthy and rich way of life. For us, the environment is the world of man, in which he can develop himself intellectually or richly and live in dignity and socially secure. That is the humanistic way of thinking that we view as our ideal in the sense of a democratic socialism, in the sense of a left wing movement in Germany. When it comes to this Germany, there ought at least to be a trail of the Left precisely in this respect.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] So away from a technocratic approach in environmental policy?

[Hegewald] That is how I see it. But I also see that at the present time in our Ministry for Environmental Protection the problems are approached too technologically and too economically. But it is a matter of people. When I began in Berlin as head of the Environmental Commission under the party board, one of the first paths led me to the Health Ministry. There I found that relations between this ministry and the Ministry for Environmental Protection were disturbed. This was the reason for our demand that the representatives of other ministries report at the central Green Table on how they cooperate with the Environmental Ministry. The motto is supervision of cooperation. The environmental problems are complex and must also be handled in a comprehensive manner.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] The ecology paper of the PDS states that environmental protection must finally be a part of social policy. But when it is now necessary in our country to shut down enterprises that are a great burden on the environment—in the coal or chemicals industry, for example—social conflicts are programmed in advance.

[Hegewald] That is already leading to justifiable fears. For this reason, politically farsighted decisions must be made. We need a clear concept for such restructuring immediately to ensure the right to work. The current economic policy does not seem decisive enough to me. I see a great chance for the creation of new jobs in small and middle-sized industry. It is urgently necessary to tackle projects—in the reduction of carbide production in Buna or copper production in Ilsenburg, for example—that provide for alternative jobs in the respective territories, including the corresponding retraining. The talks at the Roundtable last week proceeded in this direction. That will be a primary field of municipal policy. Precisely the comrades in the communities along with the trade unions must also stand up decisively for this. Because the interests of the workers are the focal point for us as a party of democratic socialism. Practical action for social security—I also mean that when I talk about the trail of the Left. We and the Social Democrats are objectively allied here.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Catchword energy policy. Everyone will accept a radical reduction of the much too high consumption of current as part of the solution. But energy must continue to be produced. Do we have a chance to get out of the dilemma of "brown coal or nuclear power"?

[Hegewald] In any case, we must get away from the high use of brown coal as quickly as possible. The Mittag policy of brown coal at any price led to environmental
allies, ties, especially communist parties, saw themselves for are then affected. But I also know that we will have many Program. Unfortunately, however, many left-wing par-

but very specific and certainly very tough for those who probably no longer been the case after the Godesberger repeatedly. And that is no general talk about the left wing saw itself as atheistic. But to my way of thinking, that has trail of the Left about which I have already spoken difficulty with the SPD, namely to the extent that it also

entire European area. Democratization of the produc-

consequences in this regard as well, possibly even for the [LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG] But why the SPD?

But the employees of the nuclear power plants, exercise control without the employees of the nuclear power plants. But

In my opinion, a uniform energy concept would be necessary for a future Germany, a concept that considers the great capacities that the FRG already has so that an increase in the production of nuclear power in this country might not be necessary.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Whereby we remain with the subject, for a substantial part of these capacities come from nuclear power plants.

Hegewald] In principle, I had nothing against nuclear power as long as it can be safely controlled. But I consider it to be extremely significant that this theme is finally no longer taboo in this country and that the nuclear power plants are becoming accessible to demo-

control. The Greifswald Nuclear Power Plant that has been in the headlines shows how necessary that is. I say: if, on the basis of the corresponding expertise, we citizens come to the opinion that the production of nuclear power is safe, it should continue. If in the course of democratic control, however, it turns out that con-
tinued operation is irresponsible, then it must be cut back. Not so that it is shut down from one day to the next but so that one establishes possibilities in a staged program to compensate for these losses.

And nothing, absolutely nothing, ought to be decided without the employees of the nuclear power plants. But we cannot afford a second Chernobyl in Europe. In this sense, we, as the PDS demand that the citizens' commit-
tees together with experts, to which I also include the employees of the nuclear power plants, exercise control over the production of nuclear power. We presented a proposal along these lines at the Roundtable last Monday.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] Democratic control of nuclear power in a future Germany as well? The nuclear lobby of the FRG has heretofore avoided this control.

[Hegewald] Their uncontrolled power must also be broken. The revolutionary process in the GDR can have consequences in this regard as well, possibly even for the entire European area. Democratization of the produc-
tion of nuclear power in Europe—that too would be the trail of the Left about which I have already spoken repeatedly. And that is no general talk about the left wing but very specific and certainly very tough for those who are then affected. But I also know that we will have many allies.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] That all sounds quite Green.

[Hegewald] I do not have any problems with this. In the old SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany], I was considered an exotic Green bird that—many know it—stood in opposition to the government's official environmental policy, which I criticized publicly. Whereby I also allied myself with representatives of the church. Thus, many reacted not just with frowns when Dr. Ducke, today moderator at the Roundtable, and I participated together in a forum on the ecological rebuilding of the society in the spring of 1989 at the Church of Reconcili-

ation [Versoehnungskirche] in Dresden.

At that time, I also brought to mind words of Seneca, who wrote that we are born to live together. And our community is like an arch in which the stones prevent one another from falling. Put into today's terms, that means for me: regardless of parties and world views, we have the common duty to preserve nature and to make it worthy of human beings. The members of my party, the PDS, should do their share with practical steps in the enterprise or residential area. Because every step of true movement is more important than a dozen programs, as Marx wrote to Wilhelm Brucke in 1875 in connection with the Gothaer Program. It thereby should not be a matter of narrow party politics but I would like to say that it is a matter of ecological conscience so that truly the best ideas are implemented. And together.

[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND] A good conclusion, I think. Thank you very much.

SPD's Schorlemmer on Socialism, Election, Ecological Problems

90EG0195A Leipzig LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG in German 3-4 Feb 90 p 11

[Interview with Pastor Friedrich Schorlemmer (SPD) by Harald Lachmann; place and date not given: "The Future Is Green or Else There Is None"]

[Text] LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG You are a protestant pastor, you helped found the Democratic Awak-
eining and now you belong to the SPD [Social Demo-
cratic Party]. Why did you not choose a Christian party?

Schorlemmer] I have always had trouble with parties that call themselves Christian, because that raises very high expectations that cannot be fulfilled politically. Nor do I believe that Christian teachings can be transferred directly to politics.

LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG But why the SPD?

Schorlemmer] Christians have for a long time had great difficulty with the SPD, namely to the extent that it also saw itself as atheistic. But to my way of thinking, that has probably no longer been the case after the Godesberger Program. Unfortunately, however, many left-wing par-
ties, especially communist parties, saw themselves for
too long as ideological parties and also understood socialism as an ideology, as a kind of dogma that is represented by one party.

[LEIPZIGER VOLKSTEXT] In times in which the concept of socialism is considered to be discredited and adulterated through decades of SED-uniformity [Socialist Unity Party of Germany], do you have the courage to continue to speak openly about socialism?

[Schorlemmer] I think about socialism as a life style of people, that is, how all can achieve their rights as individuals as well as a community. So a person cannot live his freedom at the expense of the freedom of someone else. And I consider socialism to be the organization of this balance. In this sense, Jesus is a socialist. In this sense.

[LEIPZIGER VOLKSTEXT] It is striking that lawyers and pastors are now prominent at the top of political parties. Coincidence?

[Schorlemmer] Certainly not. Those were two areas in which people could think independently and were also versed in expressing themselves publicly. But I think that it is necessary for pastors as well as lawyers to perceive this as a temporary role and for them to let others grow up. And soon. It would not be good for policy to be determined by pastors. Especially since we have enough need for pastors in our parishes. The people need us to help them interpret the Holy Scriptures, to strengthen and console them or to give them guidance.

[LEIPZIGER VOLKSTEXT] You are a symbol for many democrats in this country and not just in the SPD. Must your party do without you?

[Schorlemmer] No, but I am not going to be a career politician. I am not hard boiled enough for that. And I do not want to be divisive. I want to bring people together. But when I am in a party, I am divisive. Part means to divide. Nevertheless, I will stand up for certain causes in my party. But I am still looking for people from all camps who are upright and I simply do not believe that there is such a dichotomy: if I am in one group, I am good and I am bad in the other. But what is human has proven itself in all camps.

[LEIPZIGER VOLKSTEXT] What made the SPD so sympathetic to you?

[Schorlemmer] It is a party that need not be ashamed of using the word “left.” That is gauged in its basic values: in the first place, the value of liberty, that is, the safeguarding of the dignity and development opportunities of the individual; everyone is a beloved creature of God and he must also be able to sense that. Secondly, I name the value of justice. That is, the social gap must not become so large that one person does not know whether he can earn his bread and someone else does not know what to do with his money. And the third value is solidarity, which I can continue to use properly only in the left wing party, although this value has also been tarnished. Solidarity means that people turn to one another and go beyond themselves. And today that means for me that one also sees world problems: the Third World, for which we share responsibility, and also solidarity with the nonhuman world of nature that surrounds us and from which we live.

[LEIPZIGER VOLKSTEXT] You see yourself as belonging to the left wing of the SPD. How would you want to define this left wing?

[Schorlemmer] More accurately: I would like to strengthen the left wing. This is why even the rightwingers in the country thought that I along with Egon Krenz would get a strangle hold on the SPD. That is what the CSU-West [Christian Social Union] said about the SPD-East. I find that shameful, to put it mildly. For me, left means that I would like to hold on to what has been called democratic socialism. At the same time, however, I see that because of the need to avoid negative terminology it will not be possible for a while to speak of socialism here. For the Mielke-socialism has ruined this word. And I know what I am talking about. But this is no cause for me to stop believing in an honest socialism, although not so that a vanguard, now under the leadership of the SPD, will again perform experiments on people. I do not think that there will be any experiments at our party congress in Leipzig.

[LEIPZIGER VOLKSTEXT] How do you see the election chances of your party? The conservative camp is accusing the SPD of profiting most from the earlier date.

[Schorlemmer] The time is too short for us to have established real organizational structures. We are far from being so far along. It is a tremendous task that we are setting for ourselves just to have elections on 18 March. As for our chances, I hope that they remain good and I hope very much that a primitive election campaign does not begin—or that it is not carried out, for it has already begun—with people saying that the SPD is a version of the SED. I think that would be the vilest thing that one could do here. As I said, we are in favor of the people having a social perspective in a democracy and not being harassed in their thinking by some power structure. On the contrary, we need their independent thinking. For we need the wisdom and the preparedness of all the people so that precisely the SPD does not become a party of functionaries. Let me paraphrase Brecht: justice is the bread of the people; we need it abundantly, wholesomely, and daily. And who is supposed to bake the bread? All the people.

[LEIPZIGER VOLKSTEXT] You have already given the key word: do you see the SPD in danger of being infiltrated by the SED?

[Schorlemmer] I would definitely like to reject that. There must be a numerical limit for people who had a function in the SED. That in any case. Secondly, there must be a waiting time and not just for the sake of appearances. But I do not want to see a witch hunt either. I think that whoever takes over affairs in this country on
18 March will not be able to do without people from the old state apparatus, as long as they were not guilty of anything. At the same time, however, one must bring about a fundamental change in the structures of this system and must abolish the Stalinist merging of the SED with legal and security agencies, schools, etc. Certainly we must respect the voice of the people when they reject former functionaries. But at the same time, we must make it clear that we cannot say who are no longer allowed to participate without answering the question of who can. But I do see—in Leipzig, for example—that there are many police who belong to the people.

[LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG] Does the PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism], heir to the old SED, still have a chance?

[Schorlemmer] Alas, alas I say that for the SED there is such a thing as being too late. Scarcely anyone believes in its reformability, for it has not demonstrated this on its own. The people forced it into reforms and now all it can do is tag along. Its excellent papers in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, most recently on the environment, are, I think, quite marvelous. If they had been written a year ago....

[LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG] You originated the hope of a future Red-Green coalition in the country. With whom?

[Schorlemmer] I can only give my personal opinion on this: for me, the Greens and the Peasants' Party would be partners. I liked what the DBD [Democratic Peasant Party of Germany] said at its recent party congress. I believe that it has competent people.

[LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG] Would Ibrahim Boehme suit you as prime minister after March?

[Schorlemmer] I consider it conceivable that he will be prime minister and I hope that there will be many experienced people in the cabinet who will support him.

[LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG] ...and Oskar Lafontaine as the future chancellor of a united Germany?

[Schorlemmer] I cannot imagine anyone better at the present time. For three reasons: as a German politician, he also thinks in European terms. He truly consistently Europe, I am all for it. But it must be a peaceful factor in the present time. For three reasons: as a German politician, he also thinks in European terms. He truly consistently Europe, I am all for it. But it must be a peaceful factor there, as that will be the future chancellor of a united Germany?

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POLAND

Solidarity Journalist Questions SDRP, USRP Ideological Transformation

90EP0361A Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOŚC
in Polish No 6, 9 Feb 90 p 5

[Article by Wojciech Gielczynski: “Since Monday Like New”]

[Text] The energetic gentlemen who dispersed the founding meeting of the PPS [Polish Socialist Party] in December 1987 were undoubtedly social democrats themselves, just as Fidel Castro, according to his hagiographers, was “an unconscious communist” in his early youth. But perhaps there are two subspecies of social democrats: the one conspires in the name of freedom, the other rounds up the first in the name of “law and order.”

There remained only a handful of people made of the hardest reinforced concrete who did not enter the party of Kwasniewski or Fiszbach. Instead, Wojciech Garstka, spokesman of the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs], not only entered, but also ran for the leadership of the social democrats.

Stop! That is a sufficient display of wit about the surrealistic spectacle that was played out in the Congress Hall, for it is not fitting to repeat the bothersome facetiae about the devil that dressed in priest’s robes and the maiden of easy virtue whose virtue was stitched.

Because the issue, though funny, is serious—and in fact welcome: it is at last apparent WHO IS WHO.

For confusion has existed for a long time. A multitude (as many as 300 apparently) of factions, platforms, clubs, and movements came out of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] in swarms. They strived to create the impression that the party ranks were ablaze with reformism, were settling accounts with the past, and were raising new ideological banners. It was difficult to figure everything out, but a certain hope existed that there would indeed appear here and there some formation of the democratic left, some trustworthy socialist or social democratic group that would break with everything that had come before—and become one of the buds of “the second leg” of the Polish political system, the left leg. Walesa has spoken many times of the need for it to exist.

Nothing came of it. Instead of a leg, there is an artificial limb—the SDRP [Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland]. And there is a stump—the USRP [Social Democratic Union of the Republic of Poland]. Will a whole and healthy limb grow out of this stump like a tail on a salamander?

Tadeusz Fiszbach, by creating the USRP, gained the gratitude of uncounted ranks of comrades, who sighed with relief that they had at last been freed from partisanship; for if it had not come to a crisis, all of the members of the PZPR would have been automatically enrolled in “social democracy”—probably they would have taken a resignation pledge. And so it is necessary to sign up with one of the parties. Is it worth it? Is it perhaps better to remain without a party like Jaruzelski?

It should also be noted that for a week before the liquidation-foundation congress, as one of the last thoughts of the communists, a program commission was convened with the participation of the party professors. The program that comrades Mieszczankowski, Ney, and Łukaszewicz urged upon that meeting in the Congress Hall was not to have any program at all—or more precisely, to hold it in its bosom, but not to reveal it, God forbid, to society, thus settling for “a tactical retreat” suitable to the situation.

In the end nothing came of it. A completely different text of the declaration—an exquisite collection of slogans—was discussed. After all, hardly anyone was worried about ideals, because everyone was thinking about the immediate situation in order to save what could be saved of the party’s property, to preserve a “good cadre” through the difficult years, and to patiently await the proper moment to join the counteroffensive. Without superfluous babble, the overwhelming majority of delegates strived above all to not leave the Congress Hall “by many exits.”

And they almost succeeded. There were only a few consistent delegate-communists who chose proud isolation on the red sofa, and likewise there were just a few delegate-reformers who preferred to walk out behind Fiszbach rather than feign unity.

An element of tactics was also “the stake on youth,” the ostentatious emphasis that these new, pure ones take the wheel. The father-communists anointed the son-parvenus, the ideologues were supplemented by the technologists of power, as in the case of the Wiatr clan, two generations of which entered the leadership of the SDRP. The role of fish out of water was entrusted to a determined girl from secondary school, who wildly excited the delegates.

The new leader, Aleksander Kwasniewski, is also a skillful advertising trick that is supposed to symbolize complete renewal. He is a politician in the Western style: eloquent, flashy, dynamic, self-assured. He has many years of advancement ahead of him. To be sure, one may doubt whether someone who did not know how to clean up one iota of the sports mess [as president of the Polish Olympic Committee] is able to repair the party—but that is not our problem... We should be grateful to him that through his passionate conviction that “it is not a matter of repainting communists with the social democratic color,” he was able to convince everyone who could still have any doubts that it indeed was a matter of this, precisely this, and only this.

The paint was dripping in the Congress Hall.
They were painted in haste and Stefan Opara, the once intrepid stalker of revisionism, Ireneusz Sekula, who pinned both shoulders of the economy to the floor, and Ryszard Lukasiewicz, whose own group at EXPRESS WIECZORNY, which had up to that point complied with party directives, refused him allegiance, entered the Chief Council. Apparently, even Kubaszewski, the titan of the hardheads, was a bit lacking when it came to being promoted. That was a great shame, because his presence in the leading bunch of the SDRP would have dotted the “i,” most forcefully characterizing the spirituality of the newborn “social democrats.”

Those who were repainted thus marked themselves as people with whom no one from the democratic left should enter into agreements, alliances, or gossip.

Andrzej Malanowski immediately announced in the name of the PPS that the “theft of the PPS’s banners and organizational forms” had taken place, and he refused to accept the metamorphosis that the PZPR had executed.

Grzegorz Ilka (TKK-PPS [Provisional National Committee Polish Socialist Party]) testified that he does not and will not believe in any changes in the PZPR, which, in his opinion, was not even a party of communists anyway, but a “trade union for the owners of the PRL [Polish People’s Republic]” (which, after all, Adam Michnik had said considerably earlier).

Piotr Ikonowicz (leader of the PPS-RD [Polish Socialist Party-Democratic Revolution], in which there also exists a social democratic faction) defined the pupation of the communists as “a means of preserving the apparatus.” However, he added, the new party may constitute a left-wing opposition that is “convenient for the government because it is not credible,” one that blocks the way of the authentic left.

All the agitated members of the PPS express the unanimous conviction that the newborn social democrats’ trick of joining the Socialist International, which was their stated intention before they formally began to exist, will not succeed. I am less sure of this, because Rakowski’s grace already subdued Willy Brandt long ago.

There is, however, a certain loss associated with society’s indubitable gain from the self-identification of the PZPRists. Lots of people who could have been useful to society as individuals have signed on with the nomenklatura’s cloakroom, which is stamped with the letters SDRP, but as members of the new-old structure they will on the contrary be hindering society. Among the former members of the former SDRP (what I will say is unpopular but certain) are many respectable, personally unstained, valuable people—sometimes excellent in their professions. They are honest engineers and enterprising managers, professional diplomats and officers of the WP [Polish Army]—and many other experts, whom we do not have and will not find for a long time in our own ranks. They could not only take part in the repair of the country without giving up their leftist views, if they still entertain them, they could even in the future become a component of an authentic leftist formation of the sort that sooner or later must arise if a normal arrangement of forces is to exist in Poland: right—left—center. (Or the more desirable arrangement of a “dual center”: center-left and center-right, driving both extremes—nationalist and Marxist—to the sidelines).

Joining the SDRP, with whom forming a coalition, or even a “nonaggression pact,” is rather unlikely, these people gave up (perhaps not forever) the chance to cooperate with the Solidarity camp—in favor of the mirage of regaining authoritarian power, if the revocation of democratic reform (which is always possible) were to come about. It is their business; that is what they chose to do. Too bad.

Perhaps this loss will be lessened by the fact that a portion of the delegates declared itself for Fiszbach, who without ceremony or any beating around the bush, condemned the entire past of the PZPR, including martial law. Fiszbach is worthy of trust. In 1980, the year of the August Strike, he resisted the pressure of the leadership of the PZPR, a portion of the governmental commission, and also the high officers of “the blue berets” and the MSW, who declared themselves in favor of a “forcible solution” and made appropriate preparations. I was an eyewitness to Fiszbach’s effective struggle, his efforts that it would not come to smashing the strikers. He paid for it when martial law was introduced by being expelled from political life and by being ostracized by his old comrades. Fiszbach has been a consistent adherent to the understanding with Solidarity. He accepted the role that he obtained, and he has no difficulty in finding a common language with Walesa. He did not hide his social democratic views when the communists considered them the most threatening infection within their own ranks.

It is another matter that Fiszbach’s trustworthiness does not yet extend to his entire, incipient USRP. Opportunists have already tried to adhere to it, and others are suspicious that they will fulfill the command of the currently hidden “precise direction” mafia, which decided to distribute “its boys” among both parties in order to maintain control over both—and wait for events to develop. However, the USRP’s first decisions, like renouncing material inheritance from the PZPR and building the party’s program and ranks gradually from below, allow for the hope that THIS social democracy will not be an artificial phantom or a spore-like form of the communist virus, but rather a potential substance from which the democratic Polish left might be made, one of its future component parts.

That is but a nebulous chance. This left is at present chaff. Experience teaches, however, that when the need for some political current exists, then it appears as if by order. And such a need, already visible today, will be all the more obvious when not only the favorable, but also
the negative effects of free market reforms, privatization, and the harnessing of our nag to the European coach make themselves known.

When the peasants unite, which is near, when the nationalists gather together and the ranks of liberals unite, when a wide-ranging center party (certainly under the discreet protection of the eminent figures of the Church) crystallizes out of the Solidarity movement—then the democratic left, under the pressure of the resentful employees, will begin to aim at a difficult consolidation, uniting those who make up the “left wing” of Solidarity, those who founded the authentically social democratic PPS, those who extricated or are extricating themselves from the ideological magma left behind by the PZPR, and those who for years waited in solitude for the formation of a left that was not contaminated by authoritarian aspirations, extremism, or shameful privileges.

For now, there is no one to be seen who could make these dreams come true. Those who could be most depended upon and depended upon without hesitation, meddling in dangerous relationships with the party idols as if they had become befuddled recently, are the continuators of communism. What are these flirtations with the coquettes of salvation for? It is a small pleasure, and one can catch some sort of virus.
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Arms Trading in Third World Detailed
90EG0193A East Berlin HORIZONT in German
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pp 31-32

[Article by Klaus-Dieter Stefan: “Hot Iron—The GDR Delivered Weapons to the Third World”]

[Text] The “Third World” is right at the top of the delivery lists in international arms trade. What the GDR has available in this sector is not on display at the large arms fairs in Cairo, Baghdad, Ankara, Jakarta, Singapore, or Kuala Lumpur, but rather in Horstwalde, a small village about 40 km south of Berlin. There is an Engineering-Technical Foreign Trade (ITA) exhibition center there for foreign customers, mainly from the “Third World,” a small fairground whose visitors prefer to keep to themselves.

Since 1967 the GDR has been involved in military dealings with the “Third World.” Egypt and Syria were its first customers. This was after the Six-Day Israeli War. Since then the scope and level of deliveries to such countries has grown. In the “Hot Iron” series of articles HORIZONT is presenting hitherto rigorously guarded facts about GDR arms deliveries to the “Third World.”

In our country there is (still) no law which regulates arms and military equipment exports. Everything that happened in this sector was based on government regulations and instructions, as for example the “Special Export Regulation” issued by then government head Stoph on 30 September 1986.

If in what follows the subject being discussed is GDR arms exports to the “Third World,” then everything cited pertains to activities of the ITA foreign trade enterprise and not to IMES Limited, which was controlled largely by the former SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] leadership under Honecker and would have to be considered separately. In the past 10 years a total of 20 countries have received deliveries from ITA.

1980

Iraq, Syria, Uganda, Angola, and Mozambique. The main exports were automatic rifles and ammunition, tents. In addition, repair work on aircraft and radar stations.

1981

Iraq, Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), Libya, Syria, Ethiopia, Guyana, Uganda, Nigeria, and Mozambique. Among other things, the delivery lists included automatic rifles, ammunition, repair and maintenance vehicles, field kitchens, tents, communications cable, camouflage sets, and replacement parts for weapons.

1982

Iraq, YAR, Syria, Libya, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. These countries mainly ordered automatic rifles, ammunition, hand grenades, infantry mines, launching facilities for reactive shells, camouflage sets, communications cable, field kitchens, and tents. Iraq also had aircraft, jet engines, and radar stations repaired.

1983

Iraq, YAR, Libya, Algeria, Syria, Nicaragua, and Mozambique: automatic rifles, ammunition, mobile medical equipment, tents, communications cable, repair and maintenance vehicles, launching facilities for reactive shells, telescopes and repair work, for example, on helicopters and aircraft.

1984

Iraq, YAR, Algeria, Libya, Nicaragua, Syria, and Guyana: among other things, deliveries included automatic rifles, ammunition, mines, medical equipment, and tents; for example, the YAR ordered 30,000 automatic rifles and 10 million rounds of ammunition. Iraq, Algeria, and Syria also had jet engines repaired.

1985

Iraq, Algeria, Syria, Nicaragua, Guyana, Libya, YAR, and Angola ordered—each according to need—automatic rifles, ammunition, hand grenades, locating devices, field kitchens, tents, repair and maintenance vehicles or—in the case of the first three countries mentioned—necessary aircraft repairs.

1986

Iraq, Algeria, Syria, Nicaragua, and India. Iraq had radar stations repaired and ordered 200 repair and maintenance vehicles, a mobile field printshop, battle cable, even 10,000 hand grenades. India bought eight sets of bridge-laying equipment.

1987

Iraq, YAR, Algeria, India, and Nicaragua. Among other things, Iraq took delivery of 200,000 hand grenades and 400 drag parachutes for aircraft. The YAR ordered 20,000 automatic rifles, 17 million rounds of ammunition and medical equipment. India acquired 52 pieces of “Product 09” (tank aiming device with a laser rangefinder).

1988

India, Iran, Iraq, YAR, Nicaragua, Algeria, Syria, Romania, Yemen, Botswana, Uganda, and Congo. For Iran there were tank repairs, for Iraq aircraft and radar equipment repairs. Nicaragua, for example, ordered 1,275 tents and shoes, socks, knapsacks, mobile medical equipment and field kitchens. Botswana received 500 automatic rifles, Uganda six repair and maintenance vehicles.
1989

Algeria

Repairs on UTD-20 (tracked vehicles) engines, tanks, ship engines, jet engines and helicopter drive units; delivery of 1,480 rounds of M-43 and ammunition and 638 starting batteries for armored vehicles.

Iraq

Test stands and equipment for "Product 09"; 1,000 aircraft drag chutes; replacement parts for repair and maintenance vehicles; repairs on aircraft, jet engines and radar equipment; preparation of aerial photography film and signal equipment; delivery of 50 ETZ-250 F motorcycles.

Ethiopia

Some 59,000 AKM automatic rifles and 16.9 million rounds of ammunition; delivery of 152 T-55 tanks, including 30 as noncommercial assistance.

India

Tank replacement parts and aiming devices; 7,500 AKM automatic rifles and 1.8 million rounds of ammunition.

Iran

Replacement parts for armored vehicles.

Uganda

Some 50 ETZ-250 F motorcycles and two repair and maintenance vehicles; 17,500 pairs of laced boots.

Argentina

Modest services (repair technology) amounting to $0.54 million.

YAR

Some 6,500 batteries for armored vehicles; mobile medical equipment; water tank trailers; light field cable; cloth for uniforms.

People's Democratic Republic of Yemen

Some 30,000 pairs of laced boots and 500 batteries for armored equipment.

Nicaragua

Some 3,100 batteries for armored vehicles; 700 tents; 100,000 pairs of laced boots; 30 ETZ-250 F motorcycles.

All these years business with the "Third World" in this sector was an added profitable source of foreign currency for the GDR. Between 1980 and 1989 the ITA profited from valuta income amounting to $400.43 million, converted, which flowed into the GDR's treasury. All deliveries and services were based on commercial contracts with the defense ministries of the respective countries, most of which involved terms of credit. GDR "special production" products—as the experts say—were the main export, that is, automatic rifles with the appropriate ammunition, equipment items, telecommunications equipment and on a lesser scale even retired NVA [National People's Army] equipment (obsolete weapons); in this connection the delivery of tanks to Ethiopia which took place in 1989 on the order of then party and government head Honecker played a special role. The arms business with the "Third World" was known both to the State Planning Commission and to the Ministry for Defense and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which worked closely with the then responsible GDR Ministry for Foreign Trade.

Over the years the GDR's major arms business customer was Iraq. As far as the scope of deliveries was concerned, it ranged far ahead of Nicaragua, the YAR, India, or Mozambique. Even during the Gulf War, Baghdad continued to be a priority GDR arms customer. The fact that our country was involved in the arms business with Iraq and Iran, the two warring sides, is among the dark—and morally unjustifiable—chapters in GDR foreign relations which for many years enjoyed respect and prestige in the world arena because of its commitment to peace and disarmament, for peaceful resolution of conflict and cooperation.

The activities of IMES Import-Export, Limited, which were shrouded in secrecy, can no longer be kept secret. This is a foreign trade enterprise in the commercial coordination (KoKo) sector of Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, former undersecretary in GDR foreign trade, who at the beginning of December of last year fled to the West. For many years the company earned foreign currency for the GDR by exporting arms. Since December of last year the enterprise has been in the process of being dissolved by order of the Modrow cabinet. HORIZONT spoke with the former general director of IMES, Limited, Erhard Wiechert.

[HORIZONT] How did IMES, Limited come into being?

[Wiechert] IMES was founded in 1982 by then Under Secretary Schalck Golodkowski as a company with limited liability and by virtue of a corporate resolution it was registered in the commercial register at the Berlin Mitte city Bezirk court. That gave the enterprise the right to implement foreign trade operations and business endeavors.

[HORIZONT] Was the general model for IMES, Limited, specified for you?

[Wiechert] From the very beginning IMES was to earn foreign currency specifically by exporting arms, ammunition, and military equipment which was released by the armed units or which came from GDR "special production." For all business undertakings we had the appropriate approvals which were issued by KoKo or which to a certain extent were required a priori by the
then chairman of the Council of Ministers, Stoph, as part of the so-called deliverability plan.

[HORIZONT] Can you give any specifics about the kinds of arms and military goods which IMES exported?

[Wiechert] It was largely retired equipment from GDR armed units, for example, aircraft and obsolete armored vehicles which were ready to be scrapped, it involved repair services, the sale of know-how from the repair industry, replacement parts for various kinds of military equipment, rifles and ammunition. But let me add here that we also sold items which basically were not at all destined for active use in armed units, but rather were intended more to satisfy the needs of collectors, for example, old pistols or carbines which were available from the inventory of the People's Police.

[HORIZONT] Did you actually find a sufficient number of customers for these old weapons?

[Wiechert] It was not exactly as if people were waiting on the doorstep for them, but there was naturally a certain demand and with the appropriate marketing activity it was also possible to find a sufficient number of customers.

[HORIZONT] With what countries did you have commercial contacts?

[Wiechert] These included, for example, Egypt, YAR, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Uganda, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Ethiopia, Argentina, Botswana, Peru, Iran, Cuba, and even Poland and Hungary as well as the PLO. For example, we delivered arms to Belgium and Austria which actually had more value for collectors. These involved the 08 pistol and the K96 carbine. Moreover, we also had imports, for example, from Sweden when one of our CSSR suppliers of gunpowder was no longer in action.

[HORIZONT] With what countries did you activate new contractual agreements in 1989?

[Wiechert] In 1989, among others, we agreed to deliver ammunition to Hungary for free foreign currency; we concluded contracts with Jordan to deliver rifles, with Uganda to export radio equipment and with Botswana to provide rifles. In addition, there were training measures for Iran related to aircraft repair. This was also true of aircraft repairs for Egypt or the delivery of technical know-how to Argentina. Most contracts contained secrecy clauses.

[HORIZONT] How big were the arms business profits?

[Wiechert] Between 1982 and 1989 IMES showed a profit of about $318.9 million. The foreign currencies thus acquired were surrendered. A portion was given back to us to refinance credits.

[HORIZONT] Did IMES deal only in arms and military goods, or was it given opportunities to act as an intermediary?

[Wiechert] IMES also engaged in nonmilitary business. For example, for foreign trade we sold transport machines, type W 50 trucks. If I remember correctly we either directly exported about 18,000 trucks or acted as an intermediary in such ventures with Iran, Egypt, Jordan, and Uganda. There was no activity as an arms intermediary, rather we implemented these business deals in our own name and on our own account. For example, we repaired 50 T-55 tanks in the GDR for Iran. That was spring 1989. These were tanks which Iran had captured from the Iraqi Armed Forces. I cannot recall where the individual tanks came from. I do not think that these tanks came from deliveries from the GDR.

[HORIZONT] There were rumors circulating that IMES evaded or violated our country's obligations to the Warsaw Pact and that there were even deliveries to NATO countries.

[Wiechert] In a totally binding way I can state here that IMES did not implement any arms or ammunition deliveries to NATO countries. The only thing that we once did concerned rifles manufactured in the GDR which were passed on to England in 1986-87. At the most this was on the magnitude of 10 rifles which were made available as samples or to be looked at. It is customary throughout the world to introduce arms in this way to interested parties so that they can reach the decision to buy on the basis of a sample. It is quite likely that England would not have bought them. But it is, of course, possible that countries which once were English colonies might, for example, have been interested in ordering such arms via an English arms dealers, for example, Nigeria or the UAE.

[HORIZONT] Did orders come directly from the Hon- ecker, Mielke, and the Mittag governing circle?

[Wiechert] Orders for our company in every case came from the commercial coordination sector, but because of background information I do know that many of these orders were based on instructions or commands on the part of those people you named.

[HORIZONT] Did IMES, Limited cooperate with armed forces?

[Wiechert] Yes, that happened. This happened because of the need for a number of technical adjustments. They were then implemented with experts from the armed units and also came as a result of the need to guarantee transport from the producing enterprises to our warehouses or to ship from the warehouses. That had to be coordinated in keeping with the regulations in effect, for example, with the Ministry of the Interior.

[HORIZONT] How were your relationships with the former Ministry for State Security?

[Wiechert] The relationships with the former Ministry for State Security can be reduced to the purely business level. Here I include the fact that the warehouses which
were maintained by us—like the one in Kavelstorf—were managed and guarded by this ministry.

[HORIZONT] Did you also deliver “nonbusiness” services for the former Ministry for State Security and the foreign trade enterprises which operated within its sphere of intelligence?

[Wiechert] I can definitely exclude that here. We were not involved in any intelligence tasks for the Ministry of State Security, and did not carry out any such tasks.

[HORIZONT] Is there any presumption that this ministry was involved in arms deals on its own account?

[Wiechert] I cannot exclude the possibility.

[HORIZONT] From today’s vantage point what is your view of the activities of your company?

[Wiechert] From a moral perspective, the arms and ammunition trade is problematic because humanity is striving for peace and disarmament.

I have tried, and I can say this on behalf of the entire IMES collective (30 people), in our activities we were always careful to see to it that the arms and ammunition which we exported did not fall into the wrong hands. And in this respect I certify that the products in which we dealt were never delivered to Israel, South Africa, Chile, or to organizations such as the IRA. And neither chemical nor other kinds of a mass annihilation products were ever on the delivery lists.

Morale Problems Detailed in Armed Forces
90EG0206A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German No 10. 5 Mar 90 pp 34-48

[Unattributed Article: “A Heap of Feelings”: The National People’s Army of the GDR: Rebellious Soldiers and Intimidated Officers”]

[Text] In the stairway of the staff building of the Max Buerger Barracks in Schwerin, hang banners, friendship streamers, pennants for the best and a wooden board on which “Everything for Socialism” stands in large brass letters.

“That probably will not remain here much longer,” jokes Lt. Col. Bodo Schwarzer, press officer of the 8th Motorized Rifle Division of the National People’s Army (NVA).

Division commander is Maj. Gen. Manfred Jonischkies, 48, a small wiry man with the start of a belly that he tries to hold in.

“Please, go ahead and ask,” says Jonischkies with a voice that is much too loud, one that is used to commanding. He probably has to give himself courage: a visit from the West! In front of him on the spic and span polished desk lie a ring binder and, in a perfect line, six pencils.

For the G-2 officers of the Bundeswehr with responsibility for enemy reconnaissance, the Schwerin division is considered an especially good and reliable formation: in an emergency, flanked by the 94th and 21st Soviet rifle divisions, it is supposed to thrust across the border to the north toward Schleswig-Holstein between Luebeck and Gudow.

Jonischkies disputes that: the NVA has been put “on the defensive” since 1987; his armored regiment stationed in Goldberg has been disbanded and the “operational plan changed.”

Jonischkies would like to meet “his counterpart,” Maj. Gen. Klaus-Christoph Steinkopff, commander of the 6th Armored Infantry Division in Neumuenster, quite officially as comrade to comrade and “not as a supplicant.”

But Steinkopff is not that far along yet. He is not allowed—that is secret—to say who is opposite him “on the other side.” He has “no fear of contact, naturally not,” the primacy of politics applies for him. But perhaps just a little fear? Or concern about the loss of the accustomed enemy image?

Nothing is any longer in order in the once so sound world of Germany-East and Germany-West since the opening of the borders four months ago. The NVA is offering brotherhood and the Bundeswehr is resisting the impetuous embrace. The NVA officer, brought up to hate the aggressive imperialists, suddenly no longer knows “any enemy.” The Bundeswehr officer, committed to tolerance and openness, must offer delaying resistance, because Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg and Chief of Staff Dieter Wellershoff must adhere to old directives.

“The events,” says Jonischkies somewhat bitterly, “have had a profound effect on the morale of the troops. There are many officers and noncommissioned officers who cannot cope with that.”

As early as the beginning of December, a month after the opening of the borders, soldiers’ councils had been formed in many posts of the Schwerin division and called for a “more human climate”; more freedom and less drill, going off base in civilian clothes, renunciation of bullying and participation in the formulation of duty rosters. “The people, some 500 of them, suddenly stood on the mat and wanted to discuss things,” says Lt. Col. Uwe Ziegler, 35, commander of the “Ernst Moritz Arndt” Rifle Regiment stationed in Hagenow near Schwerin. “We had the very first demonstration in the Army,” Ziegler acts “without instructions from above,” as he says. He allowed elections of soldiers’ councils and gave them the order “to go ahead and write down their demands” and then they would see.

Jonischkies, warned by Ziegler, sought advice in the Defense Ministry in Strausberg near Berlin but no one there wanted to take responsibility. The deeply shocked comrade generals were busy with themselves and the revolution.
“So I thought: as commander, you must act as though you wanted to be elected,” Jonischkies asserts. Suddenly his voice becomes quiet and despondent as though he still cannot believe what has taken place.

The protests in Hagenow could still be hushed up in an army drilled for secrecy. But then came Beelitz—today synonymous for the first uprising in the NVA.

The motive was rather insignificant: several soldiers had asked their officers if for once they could toast one another with a glass of champagne on New Year’s Eve in the barracks. The answer was a harsh no.

The soldiers, long-term noncommissioned officers and draftees, withdrew annoyed to their rooms and the mood became one of rage. None of those involved any longer knows who actually had the idea of the soldiers’ revolt.

In no time the members of the NVA in Beelitz reproduced a catalog of demands that was really only intended for their superiors; they wrote “Strike Call” on it and “For everyone, for everyone!”

They made banners out of cardboard and cloths and marched up to the barracks: “Only when the militaristic Prussian remnants in our army are eliminated will it deserve the name of ‘National People’s Army.’” Democracy ought not to stop before the barracks’ gates.

The spark caught fire and suddenly Beelitz was everywhere: in Rostock and Brandenburg, in Schwerin and Erfurt, in Cottbus, Basepohl, Neusseidin, Sassnitz, and Warin. Soldiers refused to carry out orders, had officers stand at attention, passed bottles around, elected soldiers’ councils and took to the streets in droves: a “mutiny” that in accordance with Paragraph 259 of the Military Court Rules of the NVA is punishable with “imprisonment of up to eight years.”

Rigorous action of the kind recommended by some generals of the Army command was no longer possible. Adm. Theodor Hoffmann, 55, just named defense minister by government head Hans Modrow, had to go to Beelitz on 2 January and face the mutinous soldiers. The very next day Hoffmann issued a “directive” that shocked officers and career noncommissioned officers:

No longer 85 but just 50 percent of the soldiers must continually remain combat-ready in the barracks; identity card and passport, until then confiscated and kept by their superiors, remain “on the man.” For the soldiers, this means: free travel to the West; leave in civilian clothes, including off post; in the barracks, they are now allowed—it was previously strictly forbidden—to watch Western television and they no longer have to march in cadence—“three, four, a song”—when they go eat; there is no more early sports and they no longer say “comrade soldier” and “comrade captain” but “herr soldier” and “herr captain.”

“Perestroyka at supersonic speed,” comments Maj. Gen. Rolf Lehmann from the Friedrich Engels Military Academy in Dresden, who as early as November of last year with some other officers had demanded a rapid military reform in the NVA (DER SPIEGEL No. 49, 1989) but who was repeatedly curbed by his comrades in the Defense Ministry.

And DER MORGEN, the newspaper of the old bloc party LDPD [Liberal Democratic Party of Germany], which used to praise the socialist virtues of the NVA in the highest tones, exulted somewhat clumsily:

“Thus the times are past when one hustled over barracks grounds to the point of exhaustion of feet, nerves, and ear drums and sang marching songs whose hollowness in part greatly exceeded any civilian notion of the products of feeble-mindedness. The times are past when they simply said ‘Kindly keep your mouth shut!’...A goodly number of officers are now being forced to drop out of all the clouds of arrogance.”

Hoffmann’s first blow was followed by others: shortening of military service time to one year, introduction of a civilian service and early release of those still inducted for 18 months of drill after 12 months. Honecker’s generals, the “truest sons of the working class,” were suddenly made ready for reforms.

Col. Gross from the Dresden Military Academy asked whether it was really right that now “the future of the young people was to be determined by the old people.”

“By whom else?” the old asked back: after all, almost all NVA officers were SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] members and outsiders understand nothing from the business of the military.

The People’s Army, for decades at a strength of between 170,000 and 180,000 men including the currently training reservists, has been shrinking from month to month since last November. Almost daily several dozen depart “from the flag” and go to the West.

In October 1988, still under orders of Erich Honecker, 10,000 soldiers were sent home and into production. In December, 20,000 reservists received their discharge certificate early and on 26 January 25,000 draftees of the third service half-year and 15,000 noncommissioned officers left the army. They were mainly urgently needed specialists who made use of the opportunity to have themselves “deobligated” after just 24 months.

Almost overnight the proud NVA became a 100,000-man army—on paper; for thousands of soldiers are still working in hospitals and factories, in agriculture and in transport enterprises.

Wherever one looks in the Army, the barracks look abandoned and the sentries are sluggish and sullen. Soldiers ask about the sense of military service and officers worry about their livelihood.

Combat training is continuing, says Maj. Gen. Jonischkies; his division is still “combat-ready,” although with great limitations.

Really?
There were again disputes in the intelligence battalion of the division. The commander wanted to have his people move out for an alert exercise on 6 February. The soldiers refused: "We have no enemy and do not want to shoot any more." Since neither threats ("That is refusal to obey orders") nor exhortations ("Things must go on") helped, the exercise was called off and the commander fired. "He was not a bad soldier," says Jonischkies, "he wanted to tighten the reins and just went too far."

Meanwhile, "Kolya," as the members of the NVA call Soviet soldiers, is asking what is wrong with the NVA, which up until now has been considered exemplary and reliable, "typically German"—just like the Bundeswehr in NATO.

"What you are doing no longer has anything to do with an army," Jonischkies was told a few days ago at a "friendship meeting" by a high Soviet officer who had studied with him at a Soviet military academy. "Yes, you are under shock, we have known this for five years now."

The supreme command of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces knows the mood precisely: the NVA, now considered no longer dependable, is hardly used any more in joint maneuvers after the soldiers of an infantry regiment in Stahnsdorf near Potsdam refused to bivouac with their Soviet "class brothers." "Our halo is gone," says Jonischkies. "Kolya no longer trusts us," adds a lieutenant colonel.

The reputation of the NVA had been made into a myth in Moscow in the last 15 years: no Army of the Warsaw Pact paraded more smartly on festive days than the NVA and no Army had better shooting results and availability of tanks, aircraft and ships. And the story of the maneuver "Druzhba 88" was told repeatedly.

Col. Gen. Stechbarth, then chief of the GDR ground forces, allowed the weak positions of the "blue defenders" to be overrun by the "red attackers" led by Soviet generals; then, after a rapid thrust on the flanks, he took the Reds in a pincer attack. The maneuver had to be stopped, because the attackers could no longer be victorious. Stechbarth, a close friend of Honecker, who is now being investigated on suspicion of corruption, was rebuked and Moscow's generals calmed down.

All over. All over.

To be sure, most of the draftees in the NVA are again obeying orders after the stormy days of November and December but with every opportunity they are asking critical questions about the sense of military service. Their superiors are in a state of despair. They have learned to give orders and discussion was and is foreign to them. And how should they answer?

Almost all of their soldiers have now been in the FRG and have met people of their same age, who have everything imaginable running through their heads—discos and girls, for example, but never a thought about storming the East with a rifle in their hand.

"The enemy image is gone," says Lt. Col. Schwarzer. "Before, yes, there..." He leaves the sentence unfinished.

Previously there was the "aggressive imperialist class enemy" in the West and, in accordance with Paragraph 22 of the Military Service Law, orders had to be carried out "exactly" and "without contradiction." The officers and noncommissioned officers counted for something in Erich Honecker's state. They were paid better than their friends in industry, education, and administration. With extra pay, captains and majors could make 2,000 marks a month (engineers: 1,000, professors, and physicians: 1,500) and colonels and generals could even make 3,000 to 6,000 marks a month. To be sure, career soldiers could, in contrast to their comrades in the Bundeswehr, be dismissed at any time but they could count on transitional assistance and civilian "working conditions of equal value": personnel managers, administrative employees, military science teachers and instructors in civil defense and the "Society for Sport and Technology," which was responsible for the premilitary instruction of students and apprentices.

Generals and colonels of the Defense Ministry had privileges that everyone knew about but did not discuss: there were shopping vouchers for the diplomat-shops in East Berlin supplied with goods from the West, guest and holiday houses in the nicest areas of the republic, cars with drivers and high class official residences. In addition, there was a vigorous trade in automobiles: the Army offered its discarded Volgas and Wartburgs for 2,000 to 3,000 marks. The soldiers of the motor vehicle battalion of the Defense Ministry had to repair the vehicles and there were never any problems with spare parts.

Whenever anything was lacking, the order form with the red line and the impression "LVO" (National Defense Organization) was easy to obtain. Automobile workshops and trade and industrial enterprises had to "give preference" to LVO-orders.

The cars selected by the Army could be picked up completely overhauled 14 days after sale and could still be resold three or four years later for 20,000 marks.

"A functioning system in a disfunctional society," judges a technical officer of the NVA-ministry. "LVO was like an order with Neckermann, regardless of whether it involved tires, toilet paper, water faucets or gutters." The "red corners" on the accompanying papers—"Confidential Classified Material" or "Secret Classified Material" guaranteed that the public did not get wind of anything. Paragraph 272 of the Military Court Rules: "Anyone revealing military secrets without permission will be punished with imprisonment of up to five years or with a sentence with probation or with criminal arrest."

Times have changed. The "Command 1/90" of the Defense Ministry reduced the procurement plans and existing orders were cancelled. The forces, which always had plenty, is just muddling through.
Lt. Col. Ziegler, commander of the Hagenow Infantry Regiment, complains that practically all that his soldiers must do is stand guard. Training through the end of March is possible only on 14 days. There is a shortage of spare parts and fuel. After the discharge on 26 January, he was left with four of 30 drivers of armored personnel carriers, three of 15 motorcycle drivers ("regulators") and four of 14 cooks. Ziegler: "Now the fitters are cooking."

"Lost time," grumble the draftees in his presence, "loafing."

"But someone must guard the weapons so that they do not fall into the wrong hands," answers Ziegler; he cannot at this time think of any other tasks for the NVA.

Naval Capt. Jans-Joachim Fechner, chief of the 4th Flotilla in Warnemuende, criticizes that "nothing has ever come down from above"; "After years of isolation, everything is open now and one must first learn to accept this."

"Our ships are still afloat," says Fechner. The reconnaissance ships are in operation, the antisubmarine ships are ready for sea and the rest is preparing for "future tasks." He is "just barely" able to carry out Command 100 of the Defense Ministry to secure a "minimum sufficiency for defense."

In January, Fechner had to discharge 550 noncommissioned officers and soldiers, mostly technical specialists, and the NVA lacks the means and the arguments for recruitment of new personnel.

And is there anything to the rumors that the Army had planned a coup in November, after the opening of the borders? "The Navy does not revolt," answers Fechner.

In the ground forces, especially in the guard regiment "Friedrich Engels" in Stralsund and in the staffs of the armored divisions in Dresden and Eggesin, there were, reported officers who fled to the FRG, vehement discussions in November and December about whether the Army ought to stop the "creeping decline of state authority" and take power. The discussions ended abruptly when the draftees revolted and the officers had to go to their troops to save what could still be saved of the Army.

Something similar happened in the Bundeswehr 21 years ago. In 1969 in the officers' mess of the III Corps stationed in Coblenz, after the change of government, some tipsy conservative officers loudly debated whether one could accept the fact that the Social Democrats, these "fellows without a fatherland," were taking over the state and supreme command of the Bundeswehr. Younger officers were shocked but did not report it. The "extraordinary event" remained a tightly kept secret for years.

The GDR officers, now used to forgetting and repressing things, no longer think at all about revolting. They have other worries.

"Everything is happening so quickly that we are being overrun by events," says Capt. Fechner. Control groups of the Defense Ministry go to the garrisons to see what the situation is with respect to morale and discipline. Officially that is called "help and instruction," scoffs an air force officer.

Lt. Col. Wolf Dietze, 38, commander of the fighter air wing "Heinrich Rau" in Peenemuende, has lost seven soldiers, three career noncommissioned officers and one officer—"not just any officer but an important one, the chief of the command post"—since the opening of the borders. He asked for neither disciplinary nor criminal action for desertion (imprisonment of up to six years, Paragraph 254 of the Military Court Rules): "Where shall I have them look for the men?"

The squadron used to be considered an exemplary formation. With the Lublin Nuclear Power Plant in sight, generals of the East Bloc Armies had the scrambles—two aircraft to be in the air within six minutes—demonstrated to them. They then listened with partiality to lectures on "the Peenemuende Research Institute," in which technicians like Wernher von Braun once had designed and tested the "retaliatory weapons" V-1 and V-2 for Hitler. Dietze's soldiers are now housed in the old barracks that had remained after the bombing attacks of the Americans and English and the dismantling of the facilities by the Soviet occupation forces: a washroom and a toilet for 80 men.

The air wing with 45 Soviet MiG-23's was previously allowed to fly 4,000 hours a year and now it is just 3,000 hours. The "support units" for maintenance, equipment, transport, and guard services have lost almost one-third of their personnel through the early discharges in January. There will hardly be any recruitment of new personnel.

The young men in the GDR born in 1972 will be registered for the draft from 19 March until 20 April. No one knows how many of the qualified persons born in the years 1968 through 1972 will actually enter military service on 8 May. The border to the West is open and the civilian service—12 months just as is the compulsory military service—has now been introduced.

In the evening, the lieutenant colonel must now travel to the Roundtable in Wolfsgast and provide information. Previously there were officially no protests against low-altitude flights and flight noise and now he must explain again and again that his pilots adhere strictly to the regulations and must avoid the Lubmin Nuclear Power Plant, which is not secure against aircraft crashes, by a lateral distance of 6,000 meters and at an altitude of at least 2,000 meters. No, air combat maneuvers and firing exercises no longer take place near the coast but far out over the sea.

Whether he is absolutely sure about that? Just 14 days ago, according to a citizen of Wolfsgast, a MiG had buzzed over the nuclear power plant "quite closely."

Dietze: "No one is free from human failure."
The morale in the air wing is depressed. The pilots repeatedly ask their superiors what they are supposed to do after the unification that "is coming for certain."

"We did not learn anything there except flying," complains a 25-year-old first lieutenant who has just finished his pilot training in the Soviet Union.

And Lt. Col. Karl-Heinz Walter, chief of the training squadron, says: "I am now 48 years old and ask myself whether my whole life was wrong. Everything was clear until the revolution but now everything is unsettled. Suddenly I can drive to the Reeperbahn in Hamburg on weekends."

A 24-year-old lieutenant relates that he is studying English every minute of his free time—"I may need it with Interflug or Lufthansa."

Whether he can imagine joining the Bundeswehr and an all-German Army after the unification?

Yes, he can imagine that but asks "whether they will take me?"

Considerably more than 2,000 officers and noncommissioned officers of the NVA have already put out feelers with the Bundeswehr about their chances. They had to return with no answer. The defense minister in Bonn wants to put off a decision until after the elections on 18 March. Officers will have hardly a chance. They are considered "pillars of the system."

The NVA officers were almost without exception members of the SED; maybe there was "a dash of conviction" involved, says one, but otherwise: "Anyone who wanted to be something had to join the party."

"Exposure to red light" is what they now call the ideological training. "Political instruction is better than no sleep at all, that is what we said." And the much-lauded "cultural work" was nothing other than the "continuation of politics with a nice appearance."

The officers live according to the motto: do not think about it or talk about it, it was a long long time ago.

The political officers, formerly chief deputies, sit in low level slots and the Stasi-officers, called "V-Null (Administration 2000), have disappeared. The main political administration is dead—and continues to reform merri ly," criticized Lt. Col. Christian Forberg in the magazine VOLKSARMEE.

Sometimes, one says, he is bothered by the question of what the NVA and he personally would have done if SED General Secretary Honecker had given the order to fire in the dramatic days of October.

"We were underage—like children," adds a captain. "Kindergarten, school, military, career, marriage, apartment—everything was regulated. No television from the West, no correspondence with the FRG, no conversations with Westerners, always just 'yes, sir' and 'at your orders.'"
The transition to a democratic form of society's existence and development can be made only with a new economic policy. The moment has come to let economic activity exist under the operation of the market economy's objective laws. Then will the growth, efficiency, productivity, and profit we so much desire come from market stimuli and mechanisms.

Ownership is the crucial problem in both the economic and political foundation of society. The monopoly existence of state ownership of the means of production and voluntarist and centralized administration have turned all workers in our country into hirelings, devoid of motivation for development, apathetic towards progress, shunning conscientious labor.

The criterion for the form of ownership of the means of production can only be the highest efficiency of their exploitation and the social effect for society. In this sense, the degree of development of the means of production and the scale of production determine the form of ownership: state, collective, private, or joint. The institutional system must guarantee in economic activity the complete diversity of types of ownership, without priority or discrimination, and with the opportunity of transition from one type to another.

Under the totalitarian state, state property is not social property. The state being an abstract and anonymous owner, the administrative and managerial system is master of it. A fundamental principle of the new economic policy is the recognition without delay of the National Assembly's supremacy over state property. We have had bitter experience with the attempt to transfer all state property for management by collectives, just as Yugoslavia did with self-management.

The accomplishment of socialist goals necessitates our setting about to balance socialization and privatization of state ownership, whereby all types of ownership will show up in the economic structures, all equally valid and all on a competitive footing. The first step is straightforward to sell some state property to the enterprises, to their collectives on the most advantageous terms of payment. In this way the collectives can exercise a stabilizing influence on the managerial activity of the enterprises and firms. The dividends will be used for social needs and benefits, etc. Profiting from the developed countries' experience, we can grant some property individually to the workers in the enterprises. Some state property, depending on the interest that is manifested, should be sold to foreign firms or citizens, thereby attracting capital.

In certain areas—light industry, the food processing industry, agriculture etc., it will be expedient to sell the bulk of state property to collectives, cooperatives, and citizens pledging their personal savings. Problems regarding the ownership of land must be dealt with in similar manner.

Administration of State Participation in the Economy

Modern doctrines regarding administration of economic activity through economic methods and by means of ownership have to do directly with that part of state property that will remain after the socialization and privatization thereof.

The independent state firms thus far set up will have no interaction with each other either by way of ownership or through financial obligation, which would prevent the normal existence and development of the technological relations established among them.

For the efficient administration of the rest of state property, an institutional system must be established that will relieve the owner of his anonymity. Any attempt at coordination and management of state property by counterpart ministries results in excessive centralization and a recreation in a higher degree of the administrative and managerial system and its fusion once more with the economic structures.

Proceeding from the experience of highly developed countries like Italy, Austria, Sweden etc. with a substantial share of state participation in productive capital, the state must transfer its owner rights to a few industrial and financial institutions—economic groupings. Depending on the goals, the scale of the activity and the methods of property management, there exist in the practice of the developed industrial countries two types of groupings:

Corporative type—established by amalgamation of the firms into a grouping that performs certain functions and missions of the corporation in various spheres of mutual interest;

Holding type—such as an owner grouping that exercises control of the firms' activity by virtue of the extent of the firms' property in its possession.

The practice of the developed countries shows that in the cases of predominant state participation in the firms, holdings are established by which the state controls and administers its property. Such holdings are ENI, EFIM, FACC (Italy); Oesterreichische Industrieholding AG and Steier Daimler Puch (Austria); Renault (France), etc. Firms with state participation that are included
within the holdings are joint stock companies by common law, are open to the participation of private capital and engage in their activity under conditions of competition or as licensees for public services.

In practice there is complete decentralization of the administration of production and sales and a concentration of resources and finances. In the case of chain financial participation there are the most diverse degrees of concentration and integration of the firms, which are completely independent and equivalent rather than a rung in the hierarchy. The concentration and integration through capital participation have as their purpose optimization of results financially rather than administratively. Every participating firm in the grouping settles accounts directly with the state through taxes.

The participation of state agencies in the administration of state property in the various oblasts, by commission of the National Assembly, should be accomplished by a Ministry of State Participation. Strategic planning functions should be granted to an Interministerial Strategic Planning Committee, which planning takes place by the economic and normative influence it exerts.

The National Assembly through a special commission exercises control over the groupings on the basis of information from the ministries (development programs, annual balance sheets, etc.). The National Assembly, on the minister of state participation's proposal, makes a decision regarding the appropriation of funds from the budget for the financing of certain programs, development activity and new directions to be taken.

After the emergence from anonymity, the first stage of socialization of state property is the transition of firms from state firms to joint stock firms, which is arranged by the economic groupings. In determining the joint stock capital, the authorized capital on hand (machinery, buildings, equipment, installations, etc.) is evaluated as liability component and asset component, determined specifically for each firm. Which depends on the efficiency of capital utilization (Is the firm profitable?), individual and group characteristics and behavior of the collective as reflected in the industrial property (documentation, know-how, patents), the social factor (proficiency, experience, activism, outlook of personnel, collective climate), reputation, and popularity of the trademark.

An important stage in socialization, whereby workers' alienation from the means of production will be overcome, is the sale, on most advantageous terms, of some of the shares to the collectives and to private persons for participation in ownership. The shares that the collectives and individuals receive are a social incentive to personal concern as co-owners.

The economic groupings conduct administration of and control over the activity of the firms constituting the groupings on the basis of share ownership in four basic areas: product and technology strategy, market strategy, investment policy, and personnel policy. The budget and balance sheet of the economic grouping are adopted by the National Assembly with the minister of state participation's evaluation. The firms of the grouping carry on entirely independent production and commercial and financial activity within the framework of their approved budgets.

The economic groupings possess over 50 percent of the shares of their principal firms and a varying percent of the shares of the rest. The principal firms possess the controlling block of their enterprises, which also become joint-stock firms in order to have greater independence, to socialize the means of production, and to attract free capital.

Apart from the process we have thus suggested for socialization of existing state property, new private, collective, obshchina, state, and joint firms will be created through original capital accumulation. The establishment and disappearance of firms, as well as the transition of their ownership from one form to another will be a natural process.

Market Economy

Our market policy must be determined by the strategic goal of full integration of our domestic market with the international market in Europe and the world, simultaneously with achievement of international standards of quality, productivity, prices, and efficiency.

In practice our economy is open and this is conducive to our integration with the European economy. We are already present in Europe, but first and foremost we are present in the CEMA countries where there is need of our commodities but our presence is under heavy attack from the competition. We must not permit ourselves to be forced out, for which reason we must rapidly adapt and build the infrastructure for marketing and service in the USSR and CEMA countries and must adjust to trading in convertible currency with our partners as early as 1990.

We must orient production in our country to commodities and products that are in demand in the developed countries' markets to secure cyclical advantages and penetrate these markets. Likewise we must integrate with the European and world economy by resolute actions to internationalize our production and commercial activity on the basis of a financial, industrial, and commercial presence in joint firms in all regions.

From a national perspective the new economic policy on our transition to a market economy means orienting ourselves towards actions for the free movement of resources, money and capital, labor and information, simultaneously with a focus on the consumer and a search for market spaces.

The macrostructure of the economy and the changes that will take place in it must assure normal conditions for
the functioning of a market economy and, above all, must assure a market of resources.

In 1990 the principal raw materials and energy sources are purchased at the state level, mainly by the USSR. It can be expected that in the years ahead this state function will gradually decline and be assumed by economic and trade structures through direct negotiation. Even after the achievement of a free market of resources, for especially scarce materials and in the event of market fluctuations the state will have to intervene with budgetary funds for imports or for temporary subsidization of production processes whereby the prices are supported and the producers are protected against financial disasters.

The structural changes in the economy (modernization, automation, modification of the configuration of production processes) that have as their goal an increase of productivity entail a higher level of skill, an alteration of structure and a workforce reduction plus a change in the employment rate in some branches of the economy.

To assure social justice, the state needs must insure the support of persons temporarily unemployed for two years, but with monthly payments progressively declining from the rated to the minimum guaranteed amount. For this purpose an insurance fund is organized, for which the state and the trade unions conclude a contract.

During these two years the discharged person may retrain or continue his education, enrolling without restrictions in the educational institution he desires. He may work at temporary employment without a contract and receive remuneration without affecting his support from the insurance fund. During this same period he enjoys all his social security benefits. Unemployed persons registered after the expiry of this term shall be ensured payment of the social minimum.

On the other hand, in taking a job, free bargaining must be instituted for all categories of wage labor, with a minimum wage guaranteed and the top amount left free without restrictions.

The money and capital market should be backed up by the commercial banks after they are detached from the Bulgarian National Bank, which remains the central national bank of issue and intervenes only as an inflation control and a backup of the settlement system, determining the interest rate and ensuring reserves. The Bulgarian National Bank shall carry through a "step-by-step" devaluation of the lev towards a more realistic rate of exchange with a view to future convertibility. The commercial banks must be capable of standing on their own and independent of the state, providing a domestic market in leva and foreign currency in all forms, as well as providing access to foreign banks.

The unstable political situation in the country compels our industry to operate in a situation approximating a blockade—with lines of credit in convertible foreign currency severely hampered and with no guaranteed assurance of resources from CEMA. What is needed as a condition for getting the economy out of the crisis is national agreement on an economic platform and unification of all professional and moral forces of the nation.

**Strikers' Complaints at Electronics Plant Described**

90EB0257A Sofia NARODNA MLADEZH in Bulgarian 7 Dec 89 pp 1, 2

[Article by Galina Antonova, Ruse Oblast: "Strike—What Are Real Reasons for Workers' Seeking Glasnost From Ruse Systems and Electronic Technology Plant?"]

[Text]

**Chronology of the Event**

—23 November. Workers spontaneously leave plant buildings and make their way to the directors' floor, seeking more openness about present and future remuneration of managerial personnel at the plant. More than 1,000 electronic technicians initiate dialogue with directorial management. Only part of the questions are answered.

—27 November. The half-stated truths compel some of the workers to seek their rights at the office of Chairman of the Obshtina Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions Ivan Peychev.

—29 November. For two and a half hours workers from the autonomous printed circuits shop of the Photographic Printing Sector go on strike. Reason: confusion about certification system.


—4 December. Work process at plant restored. Worker Svetozar Kis'ov submits in written form all workers' questions so far unanswered by plant management. However, the queries of Svetozar and his colleagues from other shops were submitted on Friday, 1 December, to the correspondents' center of the newspaper NARODNA MLADEZH and to the chairman of the Obshtina Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions. With these and dozen of other opinions, imparted by plant workers, we cross the directors' threshold.

**Facts From the Plant's Records**

—in the months of October and November alone the plant had enormous plan deficits.

—at the moment there is a backup of 10 million leva worth of unsold output.

—Due to the poor indicators the firm has amended its plan for 7 million leva.

The conversation with representatives of upper management at the enterprise regarding the problems that had arisen lasted over three hours. (Incidentally, this terminology for the management staff is strange, but it gives a
clue as to how far it had distanced itself from the workforce.) We began with worker Svetozar Kis’ov’s questions [not further specified].

Tsocho Simeonov: I have a day when I keep office hours for this purpose.

Yordan Yordanov, deputy director: I hear workers’ complaints only after 1700 hours.

Strange position! In what code is it written that worker and director may talk only in regulated office hours?

Worker Svetozar Kis’ov was not scared off and publicly started asking his directors about everything that was bothering him. In the stenographic report we recorded all his reproofs against the directors. Who gave him permission in the presence of a journalist to seek an accounting from directors for their personal remuneration, dachas, cars, and even failure to fulfill the plan? Reproofs after reproofs....

Georgi Georgiev, deputy director: You’ve chosen a fine time to drag out the plant’s dirty linen in front of everybody!

Yordan Yordanov, deputy director: Why on earth should I give an explanation to a worker?

Sonya Gendova, deputy director: What do you intend to do? To make us out to be liars for not answering you?

Svetozar Kis’ov: It is time to get down to the nitty gritty of the conflict. Let’s talk about what has happened, comrade directors, and call things by their right name. The first strike you wanted to pretend was a meeting; the second and third you wanted to hush up. Although I have only two years’ service as a worker, I’m politically knowledgeable enough to make a distinction between these two terms.

And he handed me a list taken from a dictionary. Let me cite them: Meeting—political term meaning a public mass gathering on the occasion of important sociopolitical events; strike—a collective work stoppage with disruption of normal routine of workers and employees pending acceptance of their demands at a given enterprise or institution. Also a means of resolving social conflicts.

Let it be noted that the three workers who came to the correspondents’ center were unanimous: “The strikers have no political demands. Our problems at the plant are on a purely economic and social basis. Let the directors not minimize our protests; let them wrestle with precise concepts!”

Prime Causes

The Systems and Electronic Technology Plant is the first electronics enterprise in the Ruse region. Up till four or five years ago the plant was the sole printed circuits producer in the country. Gradually others also appeared in the country and conditions were created for competition; the plant was restructured one time as a combine, at another time as a unit of the INKOMS company. Imports in the direction of the second party declined; the Soviet partner became more exacting and rejected some of the orders for which they had precontracted. Gradually pay disparities showed up between the pay for workers, engineering personnel, and managers. There was discrimination in the awarding of bonuses. Director Tsocho Simeonov and his deputies categorically refused to give precise data.

To the attention of the Obshtina Committee for State and People’s Control: The workers’ proposal is that publicity be given to all earnings of managerial staff, engineering personnel, and working people.

Plamen Buyukliyski, trade union chairman: It grieves me that these data, as well as the amount of the Wage Fund, are concealed even from me. Are there transfers of some funds into others? I don’t even know what limits the economic management has set for all categories of pay!

We are refused such information as well, Comrade Buyukliyski.

To the attention of the BCP Obshtina Committee: The relations between the directorial staff and the party secretary are no secret to anybody in the plant. It is strange, but Tsocho Simeonov leveled against us the reproach that “You’re a creature of Orlin Simeonov (Author’s note: The reference is to the party secretary.) He has prompted you on what to write!”

Any argument in such cases has to be proved. We firmly declare that we are not “creatures” of Orlin Simeonov. We deliberately did not talk to the party secretary in this connection because the most important thing for us at the moment is that all workers’ questions should receive a concrete answer.

Plamen Buyukliyski: By no means am I asking to get out of this conflict blamefree. The entire management is at fault, including us. There must be an objective assessment of the circumstances under which the trade union council and the trade union chairmen of the individual autonomous shops work. Most of them are financially dependent upon the economic management and this foreordains to what extent they will take a stand against the directors. Last month there was total disregard of our suggestions for solving the workforce’s sorest points.

I have recorded in my notebook dozens of facts regarding the divergence in certification between the trade union council and the economic management. Most striking is the fact that among the members of the central plant commission for the introduction of the new base pay there figures the name of the former trade union chairman (?!?)

However, seen against the directors’ total incomprehension of direct dialogue with the workers, a single dialogue...
with its democratic approach stands out. I refer to the former party secretary of the plant, Tseno Iliev, now director of one of the autonomous shops.

Finally, to the attention of the Obshtina Committee of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union: So where is the Komsomol organization, the Plant Committee of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union, in this situation? Whose viewpoints is it defending? It has none—it is defending the collective opinion of the director and the trade union activists. I do not want to dump the entire burden on Nikolay Vulchanov, secretary of the Plant Committee of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union, for first of all we have to know what conditions he was working under, who sought contact with him and how much, after the directors were thinking this way.

Georgi Georgiev: I am categorical. Write this down and underline it. There shouldn’t be such an organization!

Tsocho Simeonov: Why do we need them?

And all this took place in a plant where at the moment there are employed as directors a party secretary and a trade union chairman, five recent secretaries of the Obshtina Committee and the former Okrug Committee of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union. I refer to Yordan Yordanov, Rosen Varamezov, Tseno Iliev, Orlin Simeonov, and Plamen Buyukliyski.

Finally—facts to be checked.

The signal started with Svetozar Kis'ov. After his certification, a basic pay of 270 leva was set, one of the highest in the plant. And the opinion of him as a worker is very good. So what if he signed a certification card that had been filled out in pencil. On this score the trade unions will judge how legal this operation is. Something else is more important: The conflict between workers and management at the plant is grounds for a serious assessment, and as soon as possible, because the point at issue here is not just money, is it?

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Prospects for Inner-German Agricultural Cooperation

90EG0194A East Berlin BAUERN ECHO in German 3-4 Feb 90 p 3

[Interview with FRG Agriculture Minister Ignaz Kiechle; place and date not given: "Good, Healthy Support—The Farmers in the East and West Are for That"]

[Text] [BAUERN ECHO] Good morning Mr. Secretary. You are a native of Bavaria, a Bavarian farmer?

[Kiechle] Yes. I am a farmer—a small farmer. I own the farm without actually working it.

[BAUERN ECHO] That is quite understandable in view of your ministerial responsibilities which do not confine themselves simply to agriculture...

[Kiechle] The official designation is Ministry for Food, Agriculture, and Forestry. The ministry also deals with the fishing and timber industry, and of late has taken on the protection of the environment and animal rights.

[BAUERN ECHO] Are you satisfied with the way the past year went?

[Kiechle] I am satisfied. We saw a good harvest in 1989, and livestock production was relatively high, in some respects too high. Overall, farmers had a higher income than in the previous year.

[BAUERN ECHO] The introduction to the publication the ministry is distributing during this Green Week has some pessimistic undertones. What worries you the most?

[Kiechle] I am worried by overproduction. We produce more foodstuff than we need within the EC. If we export to outside the EC, we have to lower our prices to compete on the world market. Firstly, this is a rather complicated procedure, and secondly, we make enemies of those whom we underbid. On top of that, it is costly. I worry most about how we can balance Production and consumption without causing structural damage.

[BAUERN ECHO] What is your reaction to the news that last year again 18,000 farmers had to give up farming?

[Kiechle] Agricultural statistics list farms with one hectare and above. Many small farmers can't survive without two incomes, and some ultimately decide against farming and turn tending the farm over to a neighbor. Some farmers don't have children to take over the farm. All of these situations are reflected in the statistics. The figures themselves are not intimidating as long as one keeps in mind the variety of farm sizes and the fact that more than half of all farmers in the Federal Republic have two incomes— with the farm as the secondary income. The figures also suggest that this structural change is not socially disruptive.

[BAUERN ECHO] The Green Week will soon be over. Do you see any changes on the horizon?

[Kiechle] We think that once the Green Week is no longer an isolated exhibition but returns to its former scope that the agricultural portion with its livestock and farm machinery displays will increase significantly—especially with regard to machinery. Today the livestock display is more or less for show, I hope this changes. We want to appeal to farmers. The Green Week is to remain a fair of interest to farmers as well as for the consuming public, but the emphasis needs to shift back to farmers.
[BAUERN ECHO] In your opening speech you described the Green Week as a showcase, well stocked with a variety of goods. Is this the ultimate reason behind the fair?

[Kiechle] It is very important to show consumers and the food processing industry what today's farmers can produce, because it takes both sides to function in an economy. The showcase analogy refers to the fact that whole world exhibits here. The visitor can see what Hungarian, American, or Columbian farmers contribute to the market and thus to the consumer.

[BAUERN ECHO] Until now, agriculture has played a marginal role in intra-German relations. Why didn't you get involved earlier?

[Kiechle] We did get involved. It is not as if the two countries had no contact at all in the agricultural sector. We had arranged for student exchanges, the sharing of scientific knowledge, and for cooperation on various ministerial levels. But now things are very different and it is not too late to cooperate in innovative ways. Minister Watzek and I want to create an independent blue-ribbon commission for agriculture—not unlike those created in five or six other sectors—and existing contacts will help speed up this project considerably. We want to start the groundwork independently of the GDR's upcoming election, and we also need to hear what the opposition has to say concerning new policies in agriculture. Our goal clearly is the creation of an independent commission for agriculture.

[BAUERN ECHO] Dr. Hans Watzek proposed such a plan at the congress of the farmer's party. You seem to share his vision.

[Kiechle] I heard what he said and welcome it. Agriculture is bound to play an important role, even in a Germany that I hope will soon be united.

[BAUERN ECHO] What do you think are the priorities of cooperation between the farmers of the FRG and the GDR?

[Kiechle] First, I would like to hear what the GDR plans to do about its agriculture. I assume there exists a consensus to give up central planning in favor a socialist market economy. That in turn implies private ownership of one kind or another, such as outright ownership, partial ownership, shareholding in a cooperative, and so on. It is important to know that capital allocated for agriculture ends up in agriculture. If such is a case, then it makes sense to discuss future possibilities. I don't mean to be critical, but I have always thought that it was a mistake to separate livestock from plant production. I hope experts in your country share this view. It won't be easy to determine what size farm will render optimal yield. I am not talking of plant production because it is easier to manage, but of livestock; 2,000 dairy cows or 5,000 to 10,000 beef cattle on one farm are something different altogether. Such an operation requires an incredible amount of fodder and the disposal of large amounts of animal waste. Besides, with so many animals in one place, they get treated as mere things without a trace of human warmth.

[BAUERN ECHO] Some experts in the FRG say that its agriculture shows clear structural disadvantages when compared to the GDR.

[Kiechle] I go by numbers that measure productivity, and they do not support your thesis. Productivity per hectare and per animal is higher in the FRG than in the GDR. I mentioned the term optimal structure, and I suspect that the kind of large-scale agriculture you are familiar with does not render top results. On the other hand, we also know that a 15-hectare farm is far from ideal. But our system has flexibility. A full-fledged farm has to be a certain size—an average of 30 hectares in the FRG. If somebody enjoys farming; however, he can cultivate his seven hectares while working for Mercedes-Benz or for some other firm. Statistically, his seven hectares will lower the average hectare number, but he, nevertheless, enjoys a good income, farm property of seven hectares, and a hobby. From a simple production related point of view, we would welcome larger farms, but since we have always defended family based farming against centrally organized agriculture, we are quite pleased with this development. Looking back 30 years, a full-income farm had 18 hectares compared to today's 30. I doubt we will ever be able to determine absolute optimal size; 10 years from now, it may be 10 hectares more. We also must consider just how hard a man and a woman can work, because once the farm gets too big, the work load becomes unbearable.

[BAUERN ECHO] You have mentioned the exchange of future farmers. How could such a program be expanded to include agricultural economists and management?

[Kiechle] We hope that as our countries come closer and closer together, we also see an increase in academic exchange. We need to enrich the existing exchange program for future farmers by offering instruction as well as an organized exchange of experiences for those who can only stay for short visits. It should be easier to accomplish now because we no longer need special permission for every single exchange. I am also relying on private organizations, such as the Farmers' Association, the Raiffeisen Association, and others. I hope they will promote the exchange of people and experiences to an extent that allows all those interested to come.

[BAUERN ECHO] Economy and ecology are inseparable. This makes ecology a concern of the ministers of agriculture of both countries. Is your office troubled by unsolved environmental problems?

[Kiechle] Yes, we are. We are trying to understand what makes our forests die, and we have worked for years on a way that combines the use of low levels of pesticides with the custom tailored use of fertilizers to keep nitrates from filtering into the ground water. We want to keep chemical pesticides out of the environment by ensuring that they stay where they belong—on the plants. We
advise not to spray to ward off every little bug and to drop the practice of spraying according to a rigid time frame. We endorse using as small an amount of toxic substances as possible and to follow instructions meticulously. In case of a serious infestation, we encourage the use of pesticides especially developed for the case at hand. I have looked at some figures, and I believe we can meet somewhere in the middle, because what is at stake is our common soil and common ground water. The figures show that the GDR with a little over half as much agricultural land use as the FRG applies the same amount of pesticides—that is simply too much. Our two countries can learn from each other. There is no need for the GDR to research what we have already discovered, and vice versa. We, for example, can profit from your research in oil-bearing plant seeds. I don't want to go on and on about this; but I think such issues will command the attention of German research in the future.

[BAUERN ECHO] The Green Week has shown visitors from the GDR how a modern food and marketing industry can offer agricultural produce in an attractive manner. The GDR could learn something in this respect; the question is how?

[Kiechle] Quality production starts on the farm—large and small alike—or in your case on the cooperative. Next comes food processing, a step that requires great expertise and care. Today's densely populated urban areas demand produce with long shelf lives rather than fresh produce. Consumers want high quality produce that is safe to eat, tastes good, and is affordable. We try to fulfill these expectations, and we add produce packaging. Our product variety is such that consumers from Hamburg to Munich can buy the same things. Our industry worked hard to accomplish this, and it is my guess that we can learn a lot from each other in this respect.

[BAUERN ECHO] It seems our side has more to learn.

[Kiechle] We look at it this way: We don't want to indoctrinate anybody, but if the other part of Germany—the so-called "other Germany"—asks for such expertise, then we will give it. This is of course best accomplished via a free economy. Our food industry is willing to share its expertise with a wide variety of firms and cooperatives. As long as somebody produces an appropriate product and wants our advice, he can count on us.

[BAUERN ECHO] What do you think of the GDR becoming a member of the EC? And how would that affect farmers?

[Kiechle] I have no problems with this eventuality. The FRG has included a reservation in the EC treaty that allows for the admission of a second German state. This provision also allowed for a certain volume of intra-German trade free of EC duties. In short, a legal precondition provides for admission of either a unified Germany or, as a first and provisional step, the GDR. This is a distinct advantage for the GDR that other countries like Austria don't have. Farmers of course will have to fully comply with EC rules covering export and import. On the other hand, they will profit from EC promotions. In short, I expect that some day a unified Germany will be part of the EC.

[BAUERN ECHO] What is your personal view on this issue?

[Kiechle] I support this process all the way. Our farmers, as well as those of the GDR, will not have to cope with great changes.

[BAUERN ECHO] Farmers tend to take the long view. What do you think agriculture will look like in the year 2000?

[Kiechle] In the FRG, I see larger full-scale farms and fewer farmers. That's about it. Your agriculture will see production units that are smaller and easier to operate, although I can't give you numbers on acreage and heads of livestock. Apart from that, the EC will have among its members a unified Germany that will supply an integrated common market which in turn will supply Germany with goods.

[BAUERN ECHO] Thank you for this interview.

FRG Economist on GDR Industrial, Consumer Goods Production

90EG0211A Munich INDUSTRIEMAGAZIN
in German Mar 90 pp 46-47

[Article by Dr Cord Schwartau, GDR expert with the German Institute for Economic Research: "Sick From Top to Bottom"]

[Text] "As far as assistance to the GDR is concerned, the key words for me are cooperation and joint ventures. A relaxation of COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Strategic Trade Controls) regulations would facilitate the necessary technology transfer." —Hans Peter Stihl, president of the Central Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce.

Until very recently, statistics released by the GDR showed unrestrained growth. But, as authorities have since had to concede, the figures were outright falsified at the behest of chief planner Guenther Mittag. The fact is that industrial production in the GDR was on the brink of collapse—with or without the GDR's historical change.

In the last quarter of 1989 industrial production declined by two percent or M 2 billion. There was a shortfall of seven percent in planned net gains which amounts to M 3.5 billion. In 1990 the Central Bank will have to bridge this financial gap with credits. The SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] bosses' striving to achieve autarky not only isolated the economy from international innovation initiatives, but drove enterprises into an outright antediluvian production abyss. The little GDR, for
Wrong Decisions, and Neglect"

the surplus money—about M 15 billion. In any case, as much as in the FRG. this way, the state could simultaneously absorb some of 20 tons per square kilometer—approximately 10 times Government cannot pay for it, but there already are 2.2 million tons of dust are blown into the air. Pollution manufacturers of construction equipment. The GDR ture without any, or worn out, dust filters. Every year, for West German construction enterprises as well as for largest industrial enterprises, 10 percent still manufac-

20-30 percent of demand was supplied. Even of the Dresden, Karl-Marx-Stadt, Leipzig, and Halle are com-

pletely deteriorated. There is an enormous market here 20-30 percent of demand was supplied. Even of the health ministries, they were not expanded. Thus only filters—and despite demands by the environmental and there, also, successes were modest. There

abandoned the renovation and maintenance of older air clean, but here, also, successes were modest. There

domestic lignite coal. Today this ineffective fuel, high in toxic substances, provides 70 percent of the GDR's entire energy needs—and that is very high: With 233 gigajoules per inhabitant, the GDR—aft Canada and the United States—has the third-highest energy consumption in the world.

The destruction of the landscape, the growing loss of cultivated land due to strip mining of lignite is one of the consequences, exorbitant air pollution is another. The GDR far exceeds all other European countries in the emission of sulfur dioxide. In 1988, more than 5,200,000 tons of the harmful gas went into the air, which corre-

sponds to 48 tons per square kilometer. Even in Czech-

oslovakia, sulfur dioxide emissions with about 24 tons per square kilometer are only half as much; in all other European countries it is below 15 tons, mostly even below 10 tons per square kilometer. The 1985 conven-

tion, in which many countries obligated themselves to lower their sulfur dioxide emissions, so far has not been ratified by the GDR.

Dust emissions, on the other hand, could have been decreased. Past measures concentrated on it to keep the air clean, but here, also, successes were modest. There were not enough factories to produce the appropriate filters—and despite demands by the environmental and health ministries, they were not expanded. Thus only 20-30 percent of demand was supplied. Even of the largest industrial enterprises, 10 percent still manufact-
ure without any, or worn out, dust filters. Every year, 2.2 million tons of dust are blown into the air. Pollution varies greatly from region to region, being on the average 20 tons per square kilometer—approximately 10 times as much as in the FRG.
Pollution is particularly great in the Bezirks of Cottbus, Dresden, Halle, and Leipzig. There in particular the limits for dust and sulfur dioxide are frequently exceeded. According to data by the environmental minister, overall more than one-third of GDR citizens are “overburdened” to “very strongly overburdened” with dust. Some 26 percent of the people in the GDR must suffer excessive sulfur dioxide pollution, among them about three-fourths of the inhabitants of Halle, Leipzig, and Karl-Marx-Stadt.

On the other hand, the air in the GDR is much less polluted with nitrogen oxides than that in the FRG, where almost 3,000,000 tons of these toxic gases are still produced per year, almost 12 tons per square kilometer. In the GDR it is about 700,000 tons per year, an average of 6.6 tons per square kilometer. This may well be due to the lower combustion temperatures and less automobile traffic. The GDR is also one of the countries which managed to lower their nitrogen oxide emissions since the beginning of the 1980’s. Emission of nitrogen oxides was reduced by 15 percent, above all by shifting freight transport from the highways to railroads and waterways. Air pollution with 345,000 tons of volatile hydrocarbon emissions in the GDR is also noticeably lower than in the FRG where it reaches 2,450,000 tons, almost half of which stem from traffic.

Water, also, is a great source of concern, particularly since the GDR is a very arid country. While the FRG’s “water availability” amounts to 160 billion cubic meters on an average over the years, in the GDR it is only some 18 billion, in dry years only half of that. But almost one-fifth of the available water is so badly polluted that it can neither be used for drinking water processing nor for irrigation, even for industrial water it can only be utilized at an extraordinarily high expenditure. In the Halle-Leipzig area, for instance, the water quality has dropped so low that even the production of chemicals and cellulose has been impaired. To make up for the shortfall in 1988, textile cellulose and new installations had to be imported for 9.95 million valuta marks.

Neither industry nor the communities have sufficient purification plants, and “industrialized agriculture” contributes considerably to the water pollution. The organic substances contained in total waste waters correspond to about 66 million “population equivalents,” that is, the adverse effect of 66 million people. A little more than half is filtered out in purification plants, 31 million “population equivalents” go untreated into the bodies of water. In addition, there are heavy metals, salts, nitrates, and other anorganic harmful substances.

Two-thirds of industrial waste water are “purified.” However, the plants are often inadequate; they can hardly hold back particularly harmful substances such as chlorinated hydrocarbons or heavy metals. One-third of industrial waste water is completely untreated. A state control in 1987 and 1988 also found that the use and whereabouts of water polluting substances during production are not controlled, or only inadequately so. In 527 enterprises there was no control system at all. Only 127 plants had adequate installations for retaining escaped substances harmful to the water. But the danger of damage is very high in many production plants, storage capacities and fuel storage depots because of the high degree of wear and corrosion. According to information by the environmental minister, 85 percent of communal waste waters are purified, but often only mechanically. Biological and chemical purification phases are missing in many cases and furthermore, many purification plants are overburdened. Particularly in the Dresden, Halle, Karl-Marx-Stadt (Chemnitz), and Suhl Bezirks there exist “disproportions between the drinking water supply and waste water treatment.”

Through losses in transport, in storage and use of fertilizers, pesticides and growth regulators, further increasing amounts of toxins flow from agriculture into the waters. According to data by the Academy of Agriculture, the washout of nitrogen was lowered, but in 1987 it still amounted to 28 kilograms per hectare. Two percent of mineral fertilizers and one-fourth of organic fertilizers are lost in transport and storage, thus going directly into the environment. Nitrate has also penetrated into the groundwater. High nitrate amounts were found at nine percent of the places measured, and in another eight percent the limits were exceeded. According to information from the health ministry, 1.39 million people get drinking water with excessively high nitrate content. (In the GDR, a limit of 40 milligrams per liter was set in 1972, while in the EC a limit of 50 milligrams per liter was established in 1985.) Danger for the water also emanates from the “agrotechnical centers.” Often the pesticides are improperly packaged, the storage places for fertilizer are in such poor condition that the goods stored become moist or are washed away. Yet one-third of these agrotechnical centers are located in protection areas for drinking water.

Investments for waste removal so far have mostly benefitted industry. In 1988, 1,267,000 tons of toxic waste were removed to dumping grounds, incineration plants or illegal burning sites. But larger amounts of waste containing harmful substances continue to be stored without permission on factory grounds. In 1988, approximately 38 million cubic meters of domestic solid waste accumulated. Of these, 22 million cubic meters were stored at regular dumping grounds, the remaining 16 million cubic meters ended up at illegal dumps. A control survey counted 121 regular dumping grounds, 4,870 controlled storage grounds, and 7,437 illegal dumps.

Robotron Director on Cooperation With Western Firms
90EG0207A Duesseldorf VDI NACHRICHTEN
in German 2 Feb 90 p 13

[Article by Wolfgang Mueller: “Robotron Director Friedrich Wokurka in Duesseldorf Says: ‘Joint Ventures
The general director of the GDR Robotron Combine, Friedrich Wokurka, has already been engaged in collaboration with Western partners prior to the opening of the borders. He has a lot to say in the discussions regarding a new economic system for the GDR, as is already apparent from his visit to the Duesseldorf Epson facility. Wokurka—who only recently resigned from the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany]—has developed far-reaching plans for the future.

The Robotron Combine (annual 1989 turnover around DDM [GDR Mark] 11.4 billion) consists of 20 enterprises, in addition to the parent enterprise of Robotron-Elektronik Dresden, which employ a total of 68,000 persons. Of these individuals, 12 percent are in research and development. As a joint venture, involving the Data-Print GmbH in Berlin, a systems house for the dissemination of Robotron software is coming into being. Also, Robotron intends to increase its collaboration with the Japanese branch of Epson—a producer of printers and personal computers. On the occasion of a visit by Epson Deutschland GmbH in Duesseldorf, Robotron chief Friedrich Wokurka made his plans known.

The Robotron chief visualizes three principal directions of subsequent development: "For one, the expansion of fabrication in this country. We have set ourselves the goal—possibly in collaboration with Epson—to approach a minimum annual production of 500,000 printers in different variations. Toward this end, our fabrication depth, which is currently very great, should be systematically reduced. A second focal point is joint marketing. We have a multiplicity of experiences in the CEMA countries, as well as large representation. Robotron also established the first joint venture with a Soviet partner which exists in the GDR at all. In the first three quarters of the year, this project was successful, the planned profits were approximately quadrupled. A third key point is the utilization of new opportunities for collaboration with federal German enterprises, technology parks, and universities. For me, what is mostly of interest is collaboration with medium-sized enterprises, also, for example, for purposes of attracting third partners to such joint efforts. In principle, we want to get so far in 1990 that we could enter into specific contracts. However, this is only possible if the investment protection law becomes a reality." In Wokurka's opinion, the discussion pertaining to the 49:51-percent share need not heat up with respect to capital participation in GDR enterprises: "It is all the same to me; what is at stake is the specific project. This can involve a 10:90 or 15:85 or 20:80 ratio. Why should one set limitations? After all, there are joint interests here."

The Robotron chief appears self-confident: "For me, a joint venture is not a one way street; rather, I see it as a two way proposition." That is why, at present, he is preparing an application to the Federal Economic Ministry for approval of a joint firm for the distribution of Robotron products in the FRG. But he also sees strengths of the GDR in other areas: "I am quite familiar with the possibilities of firms in the Federal Republic, for example, also in the area of switching circuit design. But only a few have the opportunity of fabricating such chips themselves; most of them are produced in the United States. We, in the GDR, also have a highly qualified potential in terms of a group of scientists and engineers in switching circuit development. What is complicated, then, is the mass sale. But then we are not alone. There are also a number of federal German firms which are seeking ways to assure mass production. And I believe that it would be a great step forward if we could cooperate better, step by step, with the Americans and Japanese."
The totally overburdened communications and the deficient infrastructure in the GDR do not exactly contribute to an improvement in coproduction. Addressing this question, Wokurka stated: "There is enough copper in the ground belonging to the GDR. In principle, virtually every new construction area in the GDR is cable-connected. They could hook up a telephone in every apartment, but they have a shortage of digital communications equipment. That is one weak point. Secondly, terminal instruments are naturally lacking. In this regard, fabrication could be accelerated at a relatively rapid pace. In the negotiations with the postal minister, an investment sum of DM12 billion was mentioned. There must be a combined form of hard-wire communication and radiotelecommunications."
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Workers Fear Steel Plant Closing
90EG0183A Munich SUEDDEUTSCHZEITUNG in German 10-11 Feb 90 p 25

[Article by Rolf Thym: “Fear Stalks Maxhuette-East”]

[Text] Sulzbach-Rosenberg/Unterwellenborn—Of course the steel workers in the small town of Sulzbach-Rosenberg in the Upper Palatinate have read the history books and discovered that their steel works is not the only one that bears the name Maxhuette. The Maximilianshuette Iron Works Company, Maxhuette, was established in 1853, with its headquarters in Sulzbach-Rosenberg, and exactly 20 years later the first blast furnace was fired up in the Maxhuette in Wellenborn in Thuringia, 190 km northeast of the steel region in the Upper Palatinate. Both enterprises soon belonged to the Flick company, and during World War I and World War II—when steel became the bestseller for the armaments industrialists—it was an everyday occurrence for workers and employees, along with their families, to be transferred from Sulzbach-Rosenberg to Unterwellenborn or for steel workers from Thuringia to have a new job in the home plant in the Upper Palatinate.

A Chance Meeting

When the cold war broke out after World War II, the old company connection was pretty much forgotten, and the next generation(s) of steel workers in the respective plants only knew about the other Maxhuette from stories told by the older workers and from books. It is very likely it would have remained that way, if, first of all, the numerous, unbelievable changes had not occurred in the past few months in the GDR, and secondly, a German-German union meeting had not taken place in Gera: on this occasion factory/works councillor Albert Vetter from Maxhuette-West had a chance meeting with union member Juergen Oelsner from Maxhuette-East. For both of them it must have been somewhat akin to two distant relatives, who had only the vaguest notion of the other’s existence, meeting again.

Now the partnership which the employee representatives of the two Maxhuette [plants] have concluded, is one of the first of the 30 recently approved by the (board of directors) of IG Metall. A union delegation from Unterwellenborn has already been to Sulzbach-Rosenberg, and on Wednesday and Thursday this week six works councillors from Sulzbach-Rosenberg reciprocated the visit in Unterwellenborn. In many respects it was a highly remarkable meeting of union personnel, who have to be prepared for the fact that the very possible merger of the two Maxhuette steel works will not have positive consequences in every instance for the workers.

Bankruptcy on Maundy Thursday

Eventually/Finally, the same fate could overtake Maxhuette-East that has already struck Maxhuette-West:
factory councils, the workers in Thuringia should "not be taken for a ride" as part of the anticipated investment of FRG capital in the Maxhütte in Unterwellenborn.

**POLAND**

**Influence of Generational Differences on Opposition's Views**

90EP0352A Warsaw LAD in Polish No 2, 14 Jan 90 p 7

[Article by Jan Maria Jackowski: "The Absent Ones"]

[Text] Today there are two generations dominating the Polish political scene: the ZMP people (born in the 1930's) and the March Solidarity people (born at the end of the 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's). The first, the "reds," were an influential group during the country's decadent period of real socialism. A sizeable portion of these people have a tendency to bounce from wall to wall. On the threshold of the 1980's they suddenly went through a dazzling revelation and swelled the ranks of the opposition, with the zeal of neophytes. The others, the "pinks," comprise the major personnel resources for the roundtable opposition. Many ambitious individuals from the March Solidarity generation brought fresh blood to the PZPR.

A great deal has been written about the groups which came out of these two generations. We shall therefore not describe all their characteristics. It is worth repeating merely that Stalinism and the October renewal delineated the horizon of the ZMP group's experience and generational identity. On the other hand, the March 1968 demonstrations were a historic event for the older March Solidarity generation. They defined the generation's collective stance and established its hierarchy of values. The key point for the younger people was August 1980.

Both generations were raised in a state of real socialism and, whether they wanted to or not, they soaked up the vision of communism, the dialectic method of thinking, and demagogic slogans about a caretaker state. In this sense they are somewhat demoralized and demobilized in terms of the dynamic, offensive actions which the present moment requires. The ZMP generation surpasses the March Solidarity group in the skills and practical experience of exercising authority. It has perfected the tactics of staying on top, regardless of the development of the situation, the social costs, or the consequences, but it is less intelligent, less tolerant, and less educated. It is less familiar with the world and has greater problems with its identity and self-definition. It is doubtful anyone believes that they are revolutionaries or that they can undergo the evolution of reform.

The roundtable, especially the "Magdalenka Contract," approved the alliance between the "reds" and the "pinks." (Jadwiga Staniszewska, an advocate of the global concept, says this is "part of a larger whole" and inspired by stimuli from non-Polish army-security groups who think in imperial categories.) It saved the ZMP people, because it provided assurances that they would be inviolable and would not be called to account for the past, in the declaration on "marking off the past with a big dash." "Magdalenka" also indirectly protects the old system of "nomenclatura," because it recommends an evolutionary approach to economic change. A sudden plunge into the deep waters of a full market economy (as suggested by Western economists) would give everyone an equal opportunity. It would force new thinking and ways of acting on the old "nomenclatura."

As a footnote, it is also worth mentioning that the roundtable provisions are often criticized not only for their conciliatory nature but also in terms of psychological aspects, which may be more important. It is far easier for politicians from elite circles to come to an agreement and put out their hand. The process of reconciliation is far more difficult in just about all the professional circles, which have been antagonized. Those in the government should understand this!

The representatives of the rather disparate, alien, and reluctant generations have approached one another. (As the result of rather effective badgering, even yesterday the ZMP people battled not only the generations older than themselves but also the younger ones, including the March Solidarity generation.) What separates them is ability, education, sensitivity, experience, and an obvious conflict between the generations. They are linked by an ambiguous but unequivocal leftist inclination, a nearly genetic preconception as to the geopolitical structure's immutability (a presupposition which breaks down in the light of the recent events in Germany), a schematic framework full of stereotypes, and dogmatism in thinking and reasoning. Finally, the years of ideological training have implanted an aversion to the Western system.

The understanding of the intelligentsia and knowledge along with pragmatism and an absolute desire to stay with the flow provided the cement for the two groups and made them mutually dependent upon one another. Neither one could not do much without the other, certainly not run the country. Through a caprice of fate, ZMP and the 40-year olds are sitting in one boat sailing a stormy sea. They cannot set a very decisive course, because neither side is strong enough to dump the other or steer the boat independently.

This rather tragic—tragic because it is at the cost of the country's interests—intergenerational "enteleia cordiale" is proving to be a snare from which there is no escape, because it is forcing the two generational groups to muddy the waters of the proverbial pond. There is talk, on the one hand, about the market, free competition, and economic liberalism in general, and on the other, of the existing alliances, pacts, and conditions which determine realities and social expectations. It is simply that nobody knows the real thoughts or desires of this society they are speaking for.
This failure to cut the head off the Hydra of the "Hegelian sting" is becoming evident in such things as the rapture and pride that Poland has had "a revolution without revolution," that "power was seized without conflict" (we will see about that), that "we are living through a historic experiment," and so on, and so forth, because both generations have obscure notions and the naive conviction that we can create a perfect system and insure humanity of everlasting happiness. Conceit and lack of humility push them into the trap of creating the next Utopia.

Before this happens, ever wider social groups are lost in the multitude of concepts and programs and are disoriented by vague, cliquish divisions. They have identification problems. They do not know and cannot understand who is who or what it is all about. It is becoming increasingly difficult for people to hide their disappointment. Everything and everyone is criticized and disapproved. Society is blamed for not having matured to the historical change and for being stupid, thick-headed, and narrow-minded. (How quickly people forget that it is not society that serves the authorities but the authorities society). Advocates of renewal and the government technocrats babble gibberish, rendering society powerless.

Another reason the situation is so difficult is that the visions and goals being circulated are mutually exclusive and there are no clear rules of play. The fear of capitalism and the uncertainty over tomorrow are frustrating. Today's Poland is a paranoid conglomerate of opposing influences, ideas, and interests. Do the designers of the future perhaps think that this is easiest way to reach the goal?

But there are two particularly ominous dangers on this road (the road along which the very authors of "the new order" lost their way). It does not seem as though anyone has any control over everything anymore. Let us remember that alongside Solidarity, which is divided up into several control centers, there are the OPZZ, Belweder, at least several factions of the PZPR, the internal security forces, the army, the Church, nonparliamentary groups and parties, large industry, and the rural areas, whose political strength is ever increasing. In the name of the slogans and goals put forth, the mechanism is slipping out of control and operating on the strength of its own inertia, consistent with the theory of order. Second, this whole refined game creates the impression that it is a question of neutralizing society and making it justify conformity and opportunity. It is becoming increasingly difficult for people to hide their disappointments. They do not know and cannot understand what the multitude of concepts and programs and are disoriented by vague, cliquish divisions. They have identification problems. They do not know and cannot understand who is who or what it is all about. It is becoming increasingly difficult for people to hide their disappointment. Everything and everyone is criticized and disapproved. Society is blamed for not having matured to the historical change and for being stupid, thick-headed, and narrow-minded. (How quickly people forget that it is not society that serves the authorities but the authorities society). Advocates of renewal and the government technocrats babble gibberish, rendering society powerless.

Talking about the "thirty-year old adolescents," I am not going to mention such well-known problems as the housing shortage or low wages that make them dependent on their families for practical assistance, but they grew up in an atmosphere of great events and are tremendously careful. Very intelligent, they learned from the experience of older people and were able to draw their own conclusions. They were the first generation not to sign up en masse for the party and youth organizations and were resistant to indoctrination. They did not practice the Wallenrod "appeasement doctrine" or other like concepts basically intended to justify conformity and opportunity.

Having grown up during a period when the concept of the socialist state was falling apart, these people are far less Bolshevized or sensitive to the leftist bacilli. They know the industrialized countries the best, are flexible, and know how to adapt to all conditions. They are detached and critical of the way the changes are being implemented in Poland. One need not be a clairvoyant to predict that there are surprises in store for Polish public life. Regardless of how the situation develops or what turns lie in the road ahead, we are getting closer and closer to the time when society will decide who is going to speak on its behalf. Public support will be determined
by a concrete program, trust, and assurances of implementation. The sort of baggage one comes with, whether one is “clean,” will not be insignificant. For this reason there will undoubtedly be a demand and competition for new people unencumbered by sins of the past.

The ZMP group invested itself too heavily in signs and symbols. The March Solidarity group is already beginning to show its boring side. Today there is cause to doubt whether the present attitude and achievements will gain wider recognition for it, to fit its appetites and aspirations.

This is how the thinned out, embittered “thirty-year old adolescents” will assume power, in alliance with the “beautiful twenty-year olds,” introduced by the most seasoned players from other generations. The only question is whether there will be anything to inherit following the period of “historic changes and experiments.”