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**21 MARCH 1990**

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Obroda Functionary on Future of Democratic Socialism

90EC0296A Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
9 Feb 90 p 7

[Interview with Zdenek Hradilak, Jr., member of the executive council of Obroda, by Miroslav Siska; place and date not given: "The Future? A United Left"]

[Text] Many political parties and various civic initiatives have emerged recently on the Czechoslovak political scene. Most of them were organized after 17 November 1989, but some had begun to function even before that watershed event. Among them is Obroda [Renewal] Club for Democratic Socialism. I posed a few questions to Zdenek Hradilak, Jr., member of Obroda's executive committee.

[RUDE PRAVO] What has brought you into the ranks of Obroda?

[Hradilak] I must have been genetically "branded" with interest in social action and with an appetite for involvement. In 1988 I was a college student; I had just completed a year in military service and I was looking for a place where I would fit in. I was thinking about signing Charter 77. But thanks to my father and his friends, toward the end of 1988 I witnessed the drafting of Obroda's statement of purpose. Its essence—the idea of democratic socialism—expressed precisely what I felt deep in my heart. Another significant impulse for my decision was my profound respect for the people associated in the incipient Obroda; that feeling is still with me.

[RUDE PRAVO] The idea of democratic socialism appealed to almost the whole nation 22 years ago. What does it say to your generation today? I should mention that you are 24 years old.

[Hradilak] I can say with assurance that it has very little appeal for my generation which remains quite cool to it and often rejects it.

[RUDE PRAVO] How do you explain that?

[Hradilak] My generation has never lived in any other atmosphere and never experienced anything else but "normalization." It has seen the devastation called socialism. The CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party] had discredited the idea of socialism and set our society far back. The very idea that after the events of 17 November any leftist group could succeed in promptly restoring our generation's confidence in socialism is absurd. In my opinion, it will be quite a long, demanding and very painful process for the left wing as a whole. Its situation now is very difficult.

[RUDE PRAVO] Obroda applied for registration in February of last year when it issued a declaration expressing its convictions of the humane, ethical and social values of the socialist social system. What was the response of the CPCZ leadership at that time to your initiative?

[Hradilak] I would characterize its action as unmitigated duplicity. We were neither banned nor permitted to function. That was because we had sent our declaration to all leftist socialist parties in Europe, including the CPSU, and it is possible that the fear of their reaction prevented harsh measures against us.

In this context I should point out that Mr. Jakes told a lie in his recent interview with the daily ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY. He was asked why he kept refusing so long and so obstinately to initiate constructive contacts with his opponents; he replied: "That is not quite true; first contacts were started with Obroda, and we wanted to continue them and to start discussions with Charter 77."

[RUDE PRAVO] Why did you get so angry? Were there no contacts?

[Hradilak] It is true that the representatives of our committee, which at that time was getting organized, met twice with the representatives of the CPCZ Central Committee, but no specific agreement was reached. The Presidium of the Central Committee would not accept our declaration; it rejected our characterization of the condition of our society as a situation of crisis. In addition, we were accused of fomenting tensions.

The Presidium fundamentally disagreed with us also because we rejected the leading role of the party; what disturbed them most was the fact that in our semi-illegality we would not cut off our contacts with other independent initiative groups. On the contrary, we persistently demanded that, if the CPCZ meant its declarations about the restructuring, it make every effort to initiate a dialogue and negotiations with other groups and cease to persecute them and treat them like criminals.

Another unsuccessful meeting took place sometimes in early May 1989. Soon afterwards (17 June) Obroda held its plenary session at which its board of representatives and executive committee were elected. Then the actual hunt for Obroda started in earnest.

[RUDE PRAVO] The hunt?

[Hradilak] Yes, the hunt. I am using that word intentionally. That was how the third stage of the CPCZ's dialogue with Obroda started—wasn't it what Mr. Jakes had in mind? I should like to mention that on 17 June we were forbidden to hold our meeting in a Prague restaurant. At that moment the CPCZ leadership regarded us as the most dangerous among independent initiative groups. Because we stood for democratic socialism, we were challenging the monopoly on the interpretation of the meaning of socialism which until then was the prerogative of the CPCZ. I don't think that it is necessary to mention the correlations with the developments in the USSR.
But to be specific: After June there were no more contacts with the CPCZ. In September “two gentlemen” appeared in my home looking for me. They wanted to get me. Fortunately, at that time I was working in Beroun. My father was also lucky—a business trip saved him. Nevertheless, “they” asked about us in our work places. Another Obroda member, Vaclav Vrabc, was seized at a streetcar station on his way to a meeting in our place. Early in November a seminar on Stalinism in Vladimir Kolmistr’s apartment was broken up. As recently as 19 November, Milos Hajek (chairman of our club), M. Kotrc and other members of the executive committee were still behind bars in Pankrac and other prisons. That was the way, according to Mr. Jakes, the contacts with Obroda continued. What he said about it discredited us considerably and I am glad that in behalf of Obroda I can refute it right in RUDE PRAVO.

We tried to approach the members of the communist party. We drafted a letter “To All Members of the CPCZ.” When the officers of the State Security Corps seized Milos Hajek, in his possession they found a draft of that letter. So the CPCZ organization hastened to hold teach-ins about the great danger to the case of socialism posed by Obroda. At that time the CPCZ considered us more dangerous than Charter 77.

[RUDE PRAVO] What is the current relation of Obroda to the CPCZ?

[Hradilak] Most of Obroda’s members wish that the CPCZ would transform itself into a modern left-wing party. We do not want to write it off or to cut it off. We realize that there are great many decent and diligent individuals among its current members. We completely reject any notion of collective guilt. Even though in the coming days it will be a complex problem, we must and want to build bridges to our future contacts.

After 17 November certain contacts have been made upon the CPCZ’s initiative. We keep them on the same level as with any other political party in Czechoslovakia, and not because they are with the CPCZ. We approach it as equal partners. Nevertheless, the question of cooperation and potential creation of a joint front cannot be considered in the near future and certainly not before the elections. Even after the CPCZ’s extraordinary congress—despite some indisputably positive changes—the CPCZ has not turned into a political force with which we could cooperate or enter into close working relations.

[RUDE PRAVO] And how about the Democratic Forum (of Communists)?

[Hradilak] We wish that the CPCZ would reform and purge itself, so that people do not have to fear its ideology. This may be accomplished by the DF(K) [Democratic Forum of Communists]. However, Obroda and DF(K) are absolutely not fraternal organizations, as Pavel Smuty, one of DF(K)’s representatives, declared not so long ago.

[RUDE PRAVO] How do you see the future of the left-wing movement in our country?

[Hradilak] The leadership of Husak and Jakes committed many crimes against socialism—and I am using this harsh expression without any hesitation. I am sure that this will be reflected in a greater differentiation of the Czechoslovak left-wing movement. It may take a long time before a new integration. On the other hand, the integration of the right wing (in the political sense of that word) will certainly be stepped up considerably.

Nevertheless, I am not worried about the future of the left because it has its tradition in Czechoslovakia and thus, also something to build on and something to start with. I would be glad if the CPCZ would really reform and purge itself thoroughly and if it would find a common language and create a joint left-wing bloc and a coalition with Obroda—which has no ambition to turn itself into an independent political party—and with the Social Democrats, the Party of Democratic Socialism in Slovakia and other leftist movements and trends.

[RUDE PRAVO] Thank you for the interview.

June Election Procedures Explained

90EC0309A Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 14 Feb 90 p 3

[Interview with Federal Assembly member Petr Kucera by Martin Denemark; place and date not given: “What Will the Elections be Like?”—first paragraph is SVOBODNE SLOVO introduction]

[Text] FREE ELECTIONS—that was one of the most frequent rallying cries of the November revolution. They are written and talked about often, but few know what they will actually be like. Our editorial colleague, representative of the coordinating center of the Civic Forum, member of the Federal Assembly Petr Kucera provided us with more detailed information.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] When will a definite decision be made about the form the elections will take?

[Kucera] We expect that the Federal Assembly will approve the election law by the end of February.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] For more than 40 years elections here have been a farce. Do you think that this law will be able to give them a form which the absolute majority of voters would consider ideal?

[Kucera] Speaking for the Civic Forum, I can say that our preparations for drafting this law were very thorough. We had the opportunity to consult many experts from abroad. The proposed election law agrees in its main principles with our ideas. Its details are the result of round-table discussions among political parties. The law is based on the principle of proportional representation. A majority system was rejected, because in our circumstances it would culminate in an encounter between the two main forces—the Civic Forum and the
CPCZ. It would eliminate the possibility for other political parties to effectively share in the composition of the future Federal Assembly. Proportional representation provides far more opportunities for small political parties as well, and reflects more accurately the true ratio of powers on the political stage. We can return to the majority system in the future when the political situation is sufficiently stabilized so that enough contenders are able to 'play this game'.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] The system of proportional representation was the preferred choice, but the authors of the draft law tried at least to combine the advantages of the proportional and the majority systems.

[Kucera] We came to the conclusion that one of the ways of doing that is to create large election districts, where prominent personalities would run for election rather than people too closely connected with regional interests. An election district will have roughly 920,000 to 930,000 voters. We emphasized the role of personalities also through the way we constructed the slates of candidates, where room should also be made for independent candidates.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] Nine hundred thousand voters is a lot of people. How many representatives will represent them?

[Kucera] In every district, 12 representatives each will be elected to the Federal Assembly and the Czech National Council, and nine representatives to the Chamber of Nations, who will not have a local affiliation nor will they be recallable. Nevertheless, the voters' control should be what it is in most developed nations, it should not be less than it has been until now, but, on the contrary, greater. The media will play an invaluable role. Representatives will be professionalized, they will be relieved of other duties in order to pursue this activity and will be paid for it. That should help improve the quality of their work. They will represent nationwide interests. Local interests will be defended by members of lower representative bodies, and a significant role obviously will be played by the mechanisms of self-government. The representatives will not be bound by their political affiliation, either. The party which proposed them on their slate cannot influence them once they have been elected, their mandate should be entirely representational. Even a switch by representatives to another political party during election time cannot be ruled out.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] What will the slate of candidates look like?

[Kucera] Compared to the previous practice, it will be comparatively complicated. At the end of June we shall elect representatives to the Federal Assembly and the National Councils. The voter will receive a slate with roughly 20 names on it. The sequence in which candidates will be listed will be decisive to a considerable degree. But the voter has the right to choose—he can check off four individuals whom he prefers to the others.

If a candidate receives the number of votes set by the election law, he will go to the top of the slate, ahead of the candidates chosen by those who made up the slate.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] In free elections there will not be a single slate. The voter will be given several slates. For whom shall we vote for, the parties or the candidates?

[Kucera] There will be two choices to make. First we shall choose the party or the movement we wish to vote for. On its slate we shall then select the candidates whom we prefer to the others. The voter should receive the slates three days before election time. They will be delivered to him by election workers together with a pamphlet explaining the election system. He will receive from each party slates of candidates to the Federal Assembly and the National Councils. We estimate that in the Czech lands the number of parties and movements with candidates running for election should be somewhere between six and eight. Similarly in Slovakia. Members of small political parties and independent candidates should appear on the slates of the Civic Forum.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] The voters will not have a simple job compared to the past, but, of course, the commissions that will count the votes will have a much more complicated job yet...

[Kucera] The counting will be indeed complicated, and even with the help of computers it will take two to three days. A simple vote count for the parties will not be so difficult, but the determination of the sequence of the candidates will require some time.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] In theory it could happen that one political party receives all 12 votes in an election district to the Czech National Council. Do you think that it is likely?

[Kucera] Theoretically yes. Similarly, an opposite situation can arise, when all groups having candidates will receive mandates. But I consider it most likely that the strongest parties and movements will gain three to four seats in each individual district.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] Which political parties will be able to take part in the elections?

[Kucera] Those parties and movements which are duly registered and which requested registration for elections will be able to take part in the elections. They can qualify only if they have 10,000 members or an equal number of signatures of people who support their candidacy. The signed petitions will be checked regularly in order to prevent falsification. Besides that, gaining a seat in the parliament is conditional on receiving 5 percent of all votes in the Czech or the Slovak part of the country. If the party does not receive the necessary number of votes it will not have the required quorum, it will fail and will not have a seat in the representative body. So that the
first task of the counting commissions will be to determine which parties in fact are entitled to be represented in the parliament.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] How will the Civic Forum participate in the elections?

[Kucera] The Civic Forum will have its own slate of candidates. Most places on it will go to non-party candidates, who make up the absolute majority of the adherents of the Civic Forum. Representatives of the new parties will also be on it—Social Democracy, Czechoslovak Democratic Initiative, Christian-Democratic party, Club Obroda, and other smaller movements. At this time it is difficult to say anything about the post-election activities of the Civic Forum. Our goal is not only to contribute to a smooth course of the elections, but also to the creation of a strong post-election coalition. We consider it to be the main task.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] You spoke about the fact that representatives cannot be recalled. But a certain possibility of it will surely be included in the law in case of an absolute failure of a representative....

[Kucera] Of course, a certain possibility of recall must be retained. For example, if the representative engages in some illegal activity, he will naturally lose his mandate. It is assumed that a professional representative should not be at the same time also a judge, a prosecutor, member of armed forces, etc.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] Representatives should become professionals. Is that expected now, immediately after the elections?

[Kucera] That is connected with the wish to change the work of the parliament from the occasional short sessions to a regular activity. The parliament should be in session practically without interruption. That also assumes an uninterrupted work by the representatives, and thus they must become professionals immediately after the free elections. At issue will not be only legislative work. The parliament should also be the place where political questions are solved, where policy is formulated. The views of various political parties and movements on the concrete demands of the day and the concepts of the longrange orientation of the state should crystallize in debates held every day.

[SVOBODNE SLOVO] What will be the main task of the new parliament?

[Kucera] It will have many tasks, but the main one will be to draft a new constitution. After the constitution is adopted, the work of the parliament will obviously be over, which could happen as early as in two years, and then new elections will be called which would be already fully democratic. Taking part in them would be a greater number of politically sufficiently mature parties and groups which would represent a whole spectrum of voters’ interests.
Could you tell us what, other than the mentioned share of state taxes, should be included, according to opinion of the Association, in the jurisdiction of the self-government in this country?

If the village will have its own financial resources, it should also have its communal or village ownership of land as well as enterprises and workshops. It should be able to build its own administration and at its own discretion pay for the experts it needs. The setting up of local police forces is also under consideration. Most important is the system of development plans and budgets, which will be created by having the national committee receive proposals of organizations and citizens in the locality, compare their usefulness, efficiency, and financial backing, and then deciding on a program which is acceptable to the citizens.

What is your complaint about today's representatives?

That in the existing system they have been unable or did not have the possibility to defend the interest of the villages. In the systems of the advanced countries it is obvious that politicians who function in the central government have had previous experiences in local politics, in community and enterprise politics, and have an understanding of them. After all, politicians mature in the arena of local governments, not just in some rhetorical sense, but also in the sense of having the knowledge and ability to make the village, enterprise, or state prosperous. When an individual has achieved something in a locality, only then can he go on to a higher level.

Since you mention community politics, village ownership and entrepreneurship, what is to be done to develop them?

For example, somehow express numerically the value of the environment or the damage done to it, make the value of land more realistic. More exacting economic rules must apply generally. In fact, in the existing system of allocating resources, for example, you cannot tell if a national committee has a school dating from 1890 or 1980. And so they wait until the school falls into disrepair, and then try and look for funds even up to the level of the State Planning Commission and parallel authorities, instead of retaining write-offs in the village for the upkeep of facilities. Enterprises doing business in localities must keep in mind that they will pay for everything. Or in other words, they will not be able to spread themselves around the area, as was the custom here until now.

Is the Association of Villages able to introduce the conditions we have been talking about into practice?

It will be pushing them, in any case. After all, it is in our articles of association that we shall represent towns and villages before the representative bodies and the government. We shall ask that they consult with us about proposals for legislative measures—constitutional, legal, administrative, economic, and others, which touch on the interests of towns and villages, and we will also present proposals ourselves.

What do you consider to be most important for the future arrangement of the state and local administration in Czechoslovakia?

Experience shows that what is imposed from the center is never as successful and effective as something that is proposed and implemented directly in the locality where it is to be executed and used, whether it be a power plant, shopping center, or even a small chapel. To exaggerate a little, a chapel, if it becomes as famous as Lourdes, can bring more to a village than an entire power plant.

But I consider as most important the jurisdictional division between the central agencies of state administration and the local governments, thus also putting into effect the claim of the villages to a budget separate from the resources of other administrative structures. We are pushing for a two-level system of management, and we advocate creating areas (oblast) out of existing districts (okres) and regions (kraj). Areas (oblast) should be created according to social and economic as well as geographic features. Why, for example, was it necessary to divide Sumava into three districts when this area has an altogether uniform character?

What will you offer first, as a new organization, to the towns and villages?

Consulting services. In our sectors we want to have available experts who will serve them by providing certain expertise, projects, proposals for solving local problems. But we also want to establish, beginning 1 April, a council of territorial development. It would function on a broader scale as an association of research facilities or their teams and individuals who have the competence to solve problems of territorial development and forecast future trends.

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Faith in spiritual values, if you wish, in God, years of socialization of our countryside brought about nature, but also experts. System, decisions are made by elections, elections are cannot deal with such concentrations, and not only Party Central Committee, since in a pluralistic political together in herds of thousands of heads, when nature at the recent 12th Congress of the Czechoslovak People's approve excessive concentrations of livestock raising exceeding. As party chairman Dr. J. Bartoncik emphasized like, the Stalinist expanses of fields. Neither can we program. It must be said that in this effort it is suc--

We cannot approve the large conglomerations--or if you free, independent political party with its own political for health services and medications for our citizens, determined to return to its Christian-Democratic and toll in the form of disproportionally high expenditures November last year, the party made it clear that it is--promote the reduction of chemicals used in our [Text] Following the victory of the movement for [67x190] the cost of lower yields per hectare. We want to effec-

fullest. We shall not only be interested in but also

promote the production of unadulterated food, even at [Article by Petr Novacek: "People's Party on the Move"]

We intend to enforce natural ecology to the fullest. We shall not only be interested in but also promote the production of unadulterated food, even at the cost of lower yields per hectare. We want to effect-

ively promote the reduction of chemicals used in our agriculture, because the use of toxic substances takes its toll in the form of disproportionally high expenditures for health services and medications for our citizens.

We cannot approve the large conglomerations—or if you like, the Stalinist expanses of fields. Neither can we approve excessive concentrations of livestock raised together in herds of thousands of heads, when nature cannot deal with such concentrations, and not only nature, but also experts.

Although I agree with progressive factors in modern agricultural and food production, I cannot help the feeling that a kind of alienation from the means of production is taking place. Indifference, disinterest are on the rise, on the one hand, and on the other, there is also the economic dictatorship of market mechanism. How do you see the human values?

We fully endorse the ideas of His Eminence, Cardinal Tomasek, who called for 10 years of moral and ethical revival. We proceed from our traditions and we have adopted the program of Dr. Svehla who prevented the church's separation from the state.

It is indisputable that the 40 years of socialization of our countryside brought about also many positive achievements. The drudgery was reduced and in particular, the JZD's have a very good standard of social programs. In spite of that, the injustice that went hand in hand with the collectivization drive is still very much alive for many people. Are you discussing ways to rectify it?

First we want to rehabilitate all those who were stigmatized by the Kosice Governmental Program; many of them were forced to emigrate. Our attorney from the law office, T. Hoffmann, Esq, and his colleagues are studying the problem of rehabilitation. We are aiming at a party with a democratic character, and we are trying to return confidence to all honest people.

Thank you for the interview.

People's Party Prepares for Election Campaign

90EC0294A Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 23 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Petr Novacek: "People's Party on the Move"]

Following the victory of the movement for renewal in the Czechoslovak People's Party at the end of November last year, the party made it clear that it is determined to return to its Christian-Democratic and Christian-Socialist traditions and become a modern, free, independent political party with its own political program. It must be said that in this effort it is succeeding. As party chairman Dr. J. Bartoncik emphasized at the recent 12th Congress of the Czechoslovak People's Party Central Committee, since in a pluralistic political system, decisions are made by elections, elections are
now the number one priority for the People's Party. The center of its attention will undoubtedly also be rural areas and villages, particularly in Moravia, where the party has two-thirds of its 80,000 membership base. Besides the Christian world view, a certain part of the rural population could be attracted to the economic part of the People's Party program, which calls for the establishment of all forms of ownership on an equal basis. Among other things, the People's Party asks for the abrogation of the absurd legal norms according to which the owner of the land has far fewer rights than its user. They are in favor of reviving the elemental relationship of the farmer to the soil on which he farms, and to the place where he lives.

At the 12th Congress of the Czechoslovak People's Party Central Committee, speeches on the subject of agriculture were given by MVDr Antonin Sucharda from the Mlada Boleslav area, and Jaromir Slapota from the Unified Agricultural Cooperative Citonice in the Znojmo area. Dr Sucharda criticized ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY for its practically monopolistic promotion of the Czechoslovak Agricultural Party. According to him, the Agricultural Party is encountering considerable distrust in villages because, by hiding behind the authority of the directors of unified agricultural cooperatives, it gives preference to large-scale agriculture production in enterprises which suffer from a mania for gigantism. Dr Sucharda spoke in favor of smaller cooperatives that would engage in farming only on land surrounding each individual village. A political party which speaks up in defense of villages in this spirit can score a great success in the elections, he said, and he made it clear that such a party should be precisely the Czechoslovak People's Party.

J. Slapota from Citonice thought, on the contrary, that a re-privatization of agriculture without the necessary distribution system and conditions would be a risky step, particularly in the area of corn-growing. He suggested that the People's Party, mainly in cooperation with the Public Forum, should help stabilize the existing agricultural enterprises, particularly their leadership. "Of the 17 unified agricultural cooperatives in the Znojmo area, the chairmen of eight of them no longer want to perform their functions. Spring work could begin here in six weeks, and what will it be like if the leadership of the cooperatives organize them knowing that by harvest time the cooperative will be managed by someone else. Every government must be concerned about providing food for the country. We should keep that in mind and do nothing that would endanger the food supply." said J. Slapota.

Two opinions, of which the second one is more realistic in my opinion, do not, of course, represent the view of the entire party. In any case, however, the People's Party makes it obvious that even in the villages it will have to be seriously reckoned with. For whatever reason, particularly in areas where religion is strong, the primary image of the Czechoslovak Agricultural Party as a party more to the left can be a trump card in the hands of the People's Party in the pre-election battle.

**GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC**

**Schnur's Police Connections Detailed**

90EG0213A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German Vol 44 No 11, 12 Mar 90 pp 18-22

[Unattributed article: "That One Was a Top Source"]

[Text] With the weight of his name and the authority of his offices, Helmut Kohl vouched for the cause and figures of the conservative "Alliance for Germany" in the GDR election. Standing alongside the three chairmen of the alliance—which he himself hammered together—of CDU-East [Christian Democratic Union], Democratic Awakening (DA), and German Social Union (DSU), he extolled the reliability of his new fellow party members, Lothar de Maiziere (CDU-East), Wolfgang Schnur (DA), and Hans-Wilhelm Ebeling (DSU), before voters in Erfurt, Chemnitz, and Magdeburg.

Kohl's standard phrase: "These are men who deserve your trust."

The fact that he was perhaps speaking an untruth was something that the chancellor had known for some time.

Last Friday in Rostock, DA leader Schnur was not to be seen at Kohl's side. Schnur had suffered a circulatory collapse, according to an announcement by his party the day before. It looked like an escape to safety through illness—to save whatever of the reputation of Kohl's ally and of the party could still be saved so soon before the People's Chamber election.

Schnur's reputation as the lawyer to civil rights activists and Protestant church figures in the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] state and, since last summer, as democrat and head of the DA, has been jeopardized ever since an independent inquiry commission in Rostock made up of citizens without party allegiances came across files of the Ministry for State Security indicating that jurist and church supporter Schnur was a Stasi informant for many years, and was even decorated for his activities.

From his sickbed Thursday afternoon, Schnur, after an emergency nighttime meeting of the DA executive committee, instructed DA Minister Rainer Eppelmann to read an announcement: "I hereby declare definitively that I have never worked for State Security, and that I have never been decorated by the Ministry for State Security."

Eppelmann, who had personally looked into the matter in Rostock, conceded at the same time that the inquiry commission enjoys "general respect and recognition in Rostock." Moreover, Eppelmann admitted with reference to the Rostock investigators "that Wolfgang Schnur..."
was a go-between for State Security”: “As far as they can
tell, this is indicated quite clearly by these files.”

What to do? Schnur, if he is being justly accused, could
gain critical breathing room until the election through a
decision by the GDR Council of Ministers stipulating
that all Stasi files must initially—until judicial action is
taken—remain sealed; if he is unjustly suspected, then he
must wait patiently until then.

Confident of this position, the DA leader refused to
justify himself to DER SPIEGEL concerning his Stasi
activities. Schnur: “Show me the files.”

Schnur, 45, has known that his fate hangs very much in
the balance at least ever since an anonymous letter dated
3 January was received by the Roundtable, stating that
“attorney Schnur has been active at least since 1970-71
as an unofficial employee of the Ministry for State
Security, Rostock Bezirk Division, Department XX,
under the code name Torsten.”

At that point, Schnur was already the head of Demo-
cratic Awakening. Furthermore, it appeared certain at
the time that evidential documents would not be found.
However, the Rostock files that have now turned up
confirm the information provided by the anonymous
writer of the letter.

There was immediate support from big brother in Bonn.
For CDU Secretary-General Volker Ruehe, it was
obvious: “Now people are resorting to the shabby old
Stasi methods of slander.”

The only thing that is obvious is that a man who wants to
become the new prime minister of the GDR is very much
incriminated. And how could the Stasi, which has been
in the dissolution process since December, have pro-
duced or falsified the Schnur files afterwards?

The Ministry for State Security headquarters in Rostock,
where Schnur was active as a lawyer until 1989, was
occupied and sealed off in the early morning hours of 5
December 1989. In sorting things out, files have been
discovered containing Schnur’s real name and his code
name, “Torsten.” The commission has clear indications
of the existence of at least 20 file folders with informer
reports.

Did Chancellor Kohl consciously accept a high—or
excessively high—risk with his partner?

The head of the government in Bonn had been warned
weeks ago. The FRG Ministry of the Interior had
informed the Office of the Chancellor that according to
information from counterintelligence in Bonn, it was not
possible to rule out the possibility that Schnur worked
for the Ministry for State Security until only recently.

According to the information, several Stasi defectors
under questioning had charged Schnur with years of
covert cooperation with State Security offices. Schnur,
because of the special position of trust he held with
opposition figures and his close contacts with church
circles, was allegedly a valuable informer on opponents
to the regime.

Kohl decided to ignore the warning. FRG security
experts declared themselves unable to check out the
validity of the charges. The chancellor did not want to
distance himself, on the basis of suspicion alone, from an
ally whom he needed in the election against the Social
Democrats, who according to polls were in the lead.

In ignoring the reports, Kohl knew exactly what the
devastating consequences of this type of suspicion would
be for Schnur and the conservative alliance as a whole. In
the GDR, still thoroughly infected by the Stasi, an
atmosphere of mistrust continues to prevail.

As early as last December, tips—albeit anonymous
ones—had been received by the Roundtable. Doubts
concerning Schnur had been raised among the leadership
of the Bonn CDU by concerned inquiries from the DA
leadership circle about whether there were skeletons in
the chairman’s closet. The decision was made to
approach the suspicion openly with the new partner.
CDU Secretary-General Ruehe and CDU Land
Chairman for Bremen Bernd Neumann reported that the
problem was discussed “in general terms.” The accused
was said to have a completely clear conscience. Neu-
mann pointed out that a lawyer in the GDR could only
help his clients, including those wishing to escape, “if he
came to terms with the ruling forces, and somehow came
to an accommodation with them.” At a private meeting
of the three “Alliance” leaders with Kohl at the chancel-
lor’s office on Thursday before last, “the rumors”
(Ruehe) were discussed, but with no conclusions.

Four days later, last Monday, Schnur was asked by the
Rostock commission in charge of securing and exam-
ing files from the former Stasi Bezirk headquarters to
appear for questioning, by way of a telephone call to his
secretary in Berlin. Schnur, touring the GDR for the
election campaign, did not respond.

Then, on Tuesday afternoon, a three-person delegation
from the inquiry commission paid a visit to DA head-
quarters in Rostock. Through a “chance discovery,” they
had allegedly come across files that “clearly confirmed”
the suspicion that Schnur had been an “unofficial
employee” of the Stasi.

The trio said that they were interested in clearing up the
matter discretely. The members of the commission, they
said, had pledged not to publicly disclose information
gathered from examining the records left behind by the
Stasi; Schnur could draw his own conclusions.

DA Secretary Karl-Ernst Eppler, extremely alarmed, sent
a messenger to Magdeburg, where Schnur was making a
campaign appearance with Kohl on Tuesday evening.
Schnur’s reaction: He would account for himself to the
commission in due course, if his campaign commitments
so permitted. The investigators, he said, should first
hand over the files, after which he would comment on
them. The commission rejected this proposal, and renewed its invitation to Schnur to appear, this time on Wednesday evening—again in vain. Eppler: “In order to spare the democratization process any further harm, I have personally asked Mr. Schnur to suspend his candidacy.”

The “chance discovery” by the Rostock commission is, according to information from the group, “highly explosive.” According to Stasi file material, Schnur supposedly:

- reported to State Security regularly on information learned from contact with his clientele of conscientious objectors and civil rights activists, as well as on internal details of the Evangelical Church in the GDR, for a period of around 16 years, ending only recently;
- received honors and decorations, whereby the value of Schnur’s information about the church, among other things, was explicitly acknowledged;
- operating under the code name “Torsten,” worked together with and received money from, in succession, three top Stasi officers named Kuhfahl, Felix, and Geiger over the course of the years.

In the files on the decorations, Schnur’s real name is used. The files with his reports are kept under the code name “Torsten,” but it is clearly possible to identify the information as coming from Schnur. According to the commission, numerous examples prove that only he could have had access to such knowledge. Schnur reportedly provided much more information than could be reconciled with a role as intermediary between his client and the church on the one hand and the regime on the other.

Top officer Felix, who held the rank of colonel when State Security was dissolved, told DER SPIEGEL about his cooperation with the attorney last Monday. He said that he took over responsibility for Schnur as an “unofficial employee”—“IM” in Stasi jargon—from State Security officer Ekkehard Kuhfahl, who was fired for official transgressions. “After that, I directed Schnur from the end of 1980 until 1984,” said Felix, the Rostock Stasi official responsible for Nazism, reactionary forces, and churches.

Always after making an appointment by telephone—“sometimes I called his office, sometimes he called my section”—they “saw each other on the average every six to eight weeks, in urgent circumstances more often, mostly in ‘safe’ apartments in and around Rostock, or sometimes in the ‘Stadt Berlin’ Hotel in East Berlin.”

Sometimes, Schnur allegedly brought reports in writing, while other times he spoke into a tape recorder during the meetings. Reports and notes were then “piled together,” at the Rostock office, and his superior decided “what of it, naturally always under the code name ‘Torsten,’ went to headquarters in Berlin.”

Felix said that he paid Schnur for his services—“around 200 or 500 marks.” Sometimes it was as much as 1,000 GDR marks for several reports. Schnur signed his receipt “Torsten,” but “sometimes not, it was up to my discretion.”

Felix was willing to talk only in general terms about the content of the deliveries by the informer. “Torsten,” he said, always tried to provide “useful information.” Felix: “After all, Schnur was also involved with conscientious objectors. He had contact with a number of pastors. He provided us with information on particular proceedings with which he was entrusted. He reported to us on tendencies and connections in conjunction with these proceedings and his clients.”

The Stasi officer also remembers: “Schnur provided us with very factual reports about the church and its general situation. He evaluated certain things, concerning leading church figures and their relationship to the state”—such as Greifswald’s Bishop Horst Glenke, and the consistorial president of Berlin-Brandenburg, Manfred Stolpe.

From time to time, however, State Security was dissatisfied: “At the time, he did not give us what we would have been interested in with regard to conscientious objectors.” He said he even began to have some doubts about whether the attorney was not playing both sides of the field, not least of all because of Schnur’s many trips to the West. “I asked myself whether we were directing Schnur or Schnur was directing us—under orders from the BND [Federal Intelligence Service, FRG].” An answer to this, perhaps, was provided by the parliamentary state secretary in the FRG Ministry for Inner-German Relations, Ottfried Hennig: Schnur worked as an informer for the FRG Government for many years, reporting to Bonn on illegal political trials involving GDR citizens. For this, Hennig said, he risked life imprisonment.

In 1984, Felix said, he turned IM “Torsten” over to State Security Major Geiger, who was “in charge of him until the very end.”

Geiger, who has taken over as a department head in a Rostock VEB [State enterprise] since the dissolution of the Ministry for State Security, confirmed to DER SPIEGEL that he directed Schnur as a Stasi IM from 1984 to 1989. His last meeting with “Torsten,” he said, was on 7 October 1989, right in the middle of the radical changes in the GDR.

At that time, Schnur was already active in Democratic Awakening, which had been founded in August 1989. Pastor Eppelmann, a friend of Schnur for many years, brought him into the eight-person group of DA founders as a legal advisor. Thus, if Geiger’s information is correct, the Stasi was well-informed from the very beginning.

Schnur repeatedly warned against transforming the political association into a party. At DA meetings, he
emphasized that he was not after a leadership position in DA, preferring instead to limit himself to legal assistance. Then, suddenly, he was the chairman. The delegates at the constituent assembly at the end of October liked his reserved manner of speaking, on top of his aura as a lawyer for the persecuted.

Around August and September, when the democratic movement in the GDR was growing, Schnur attempted to disassociate himself from the Stasi, according to information provided by top officer Geiger. Allegedly, Schnur repeatedly criticized “wrong decisions” made by the state and party leadership in Geiger’s presence. “But that’s all nonsense, there’s no reason for it,” Schnur is reported to have said. State Security subsequently indicated to him that one cannot “simply throw in the towel when something goes wrong” (Geiger).

One person’s word against another’s: Schnur now says that if the files secured by the Rostock inquiry commission state that he was awarded a Ministry for State Security decoration on 7 October 1989, then this is belied by the mere fact that he was not in Rostock on that day. Geiger differs: “Torsten,” he says, was awarded the “Medal of Merit of the National People’s Army” in gold on 7 October.

Geiger too charged that Schnur, as an “important informer,” regularly received Stasi money. For good performance, there were premiums, besides hotel and gasoline expenses. Geiger too mentioned sums of “up to 1,000 marks.” And the subject matter was always this: “Everything that interested us and that he was involved in was covered in our talks.

“We could expect from him all the things that were current issues.”

To all appearances, Schnur was controlled and supported by the Ministry for State Security from the beginning of his law career. In 1973, after law study by correspondence course and a one-year practicum, he applied for admission to the Rostock bar. Erich Wirth, at the time the department head responsible for lawyers at the East Berlin Ministry of Justice, reported that at that time he learned from the chairman of the bar, Helmut Alkewitz, that the Rostock Bezirk office of the Ministry for State Security had put in a good word for Schnur. According to Wirth, the “organs” declared that the chairman and executive board of the bar “should be favorably disposed in the matter.”

State Security appeared on the scene again in 1977 when Schnur applied for admission as an independent attorney—in those days a practically hopeless undertaking. Herbert Kern, state secretary in the Ministry of Justice until 1988, handled Schnur's application. He recalls: “The critical factor—and this is why I remember it so well—is that two or three weeks before Schnur’s application, an employee of the Ministry for State Security called on me. He must have been a lieutenant colonel. He came to me under orders from his superior, he said, bringing with him notice of this application and asking that we be very favorably disposed towards this application and decide on it in accordance with his wishes.”

And that is just what happened. On 1 January 1978, Schnur was granted the admission. And since then, the Rostock jurist, who emphasized his “religious faith as a Christian” in his application, has been considered the confidential attorney of the Evangelical Church. Whenever church activists and civil rights advocates under the protection of bishops came into conflict with the SED state, Schnur was there to represent the persecuted before the GDR system of justice. Because under the unjust conditions of GDR justice the accused had no hope of leniency or fairness, they must have been happy to even find a lawyer who understood their motives and was at least given a hearing by the prosecutors of the Stasi state.

Schnur was able to provide that. Just like attorney Wolfgang Vogel, Honecker’s special agent for humanitarian questions, Schnur also conveyed to his clients the special conditions under which the Stasi regime was willing to make concessions.

Nevertheless, the attempt to please both sides became increasingly difficult as the years went by. In particular, he had problems representing the civil rights activists who were imprisoned in connection with the counter-demonstrations to the commemoration of the 69th anniversary of the murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in January 1988. At that time, the SED found it imperative to prevent a rapid expansion of the opposition movement and to immediately deport the arrestees.

Several of the prisoners awaiting trial report that Schnur gave them wrong information—if any at all—about the actual mood in the country and the depth of the solidarity movement.

“My lawyer Schnur,” civil rights activist Ralf Hirsch recalls, “painted a somber picture of my future if I refused to leave the country. Ten years in jail or emigration.”

Thus, little by little, nearly all the arrestees agreed to accept the offer of deportation to the West. Only Vera Wollenberger, who adamantly wanted to stay in the GDR, resisted for some time, until Schnur finally managed to talk even her into agreeing to emigrate to England.

Director Freya Klier is someone else who was not satisfied with her lawyer. After emigrating to the FRG, she wrote in a book about Schnur and the country’s rulers: “Didn’t he in fact join forces with them?”

Now, after discovery of the files in Rostock, counterintelligence in Bonn is viewing the information from Stasi defectors in a new light. Specialists at the Ministry of the Interior in Bonn indicated last Thursday that they can “no longer simply assume” that this is a well-orchestrated slander campaign. It was assumed to be
practically certain that the Stasi placed its people in the new parties and groupings early on. Given the earlier extent of the informer network, this would come as no surprise.

The spy-hunters in Bonn are now reexamining their file on another high-ranking politician in Kohl's GDR alliance as well. Martin Kirchner, the secretary-general of the CDU-East, has also been severely incriminated by Stasi defectors. According to a top official in the Verfassungsschutz [Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution], "They actually say, 'That one was a top source.'"

Kirchner, 40, since 1986 a member of the Evangelical-Lutheran Land Church Council for Thuringia, soon to be its deputy chairman, as well as a member of the Conference of Evangelical Church Leadership in the GDR, and finally a member of the church assembly, has always had extensive insight into the internal goings-on of the counterforce to the SED state.

A Verfassungsschutz [Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution] official in Cologne says that Kirchner was incriminated by a former Stasi man responsible for the church. The Stasi allegedly recruited the current CDU man back in 1971 and directed him under code names.

Kirchner, sick with the flu, has left the election campaign. He refused to comment to DER SPIEGEL over the phone from his sickbed in Eisenach.

Schnur's ally and professional colleague, CDU chief De Maiziere, explained last week that every GDR lawyer is exposed to hostility and challenges. "I have always told them to give up their earlier contacts." Lawyers as well as church people have repeatedly come into contact with the Stasi, he said: "You can't see into anyone's heart."

In view of these and other problems in the GDR campaign, CDU minister president Lothar Spaeht is being cautious with his commitment. You have to be careful, he feels. If you are seen arm in arm with a new party colleague over there, together lambasting an SPD [Social Democratic Party] man, you could be in for an unpleasant surprise. It could very well turn out that only six months ago the party colleague was with the Stasi and the SPD man was in prison—because of the party colleague.

Footnote

1. Names changed by the editors at the request of the persons in question.

HUngary

MSZP's Agh Envisions Post-Election Opposition Role for Party

90EC0303A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 20 Jan 90 p 17

[Article by Attila Agh, deputy director of the Foreign Affairs Institute: "Acceptance of Opposition Existence"]
progress would genuinely contribute to, and represent, a clearly defined stand in this debate.

Party Politicians or Statesmen?
Let’s cut to the core! The parties are making ambitious predictions about the upcoming elections. They are following with concern the results of public opinion polls, and are trying to define the categories of victory and defeat in terms of percentages. Unfortunately, the Socialist Party has also joined this game, thus becoming captive to issues pertaining to continuity and the past. I do not wish to cast doubt on the importance of the outcome of an honest election, particularly not from the point of view of consolidating the party. Nevertheless, we must face up to the fact that even though it has become one of several parties of equal stature, in many respects the Socialist Party will not be able to divest itself from its past before the elections. Only belatedly have we realized that for months now we have been slowly undermined by our ambiguity and transience, in other words, by whatever little power or impression of power we have left. With the elections only a few months away, the Socialist Party has fallen completely hostage to the continuity that has made it possible for a peaceful transition to take place in Hungary. Other parties have been criticizing this continuity, while at the same time enjoying its benefits. The Socialist Party has not formally broken with the governing power, but even though it is no longer in actual control, it has constantly been held accountable for its mistakes.

I do not believe that a party of the left must automatically prepare to play an opposition role just so that it can properly fulfill its function as a provider of social criticism. Moreover, in light of our current grave crisis, I believe that the role of opposition—not opposition for opposition’s sake—is precisely to offer constructive alternatives and to make positive contributions to crisis management; in other words, to take part in forging a social consensus. Just as playing an opposition role cannot be set as a goal in itself, however, being a part of the governing power—in this case participation in a coalition government—cannot be viewed as paramount, as a strategy to be pursued at all cost. If for no other reason, because it is still an open question whether or not a left-wing party can accept in good conscience a new election-based power configuration, and conversely, whether this new governing power will accept the left, or if it intends merely to drag it into a bad compromise. And in general, whether or not it is realistic to expect to have a crisis management model to which the left can lend its name and support without inflicting long-healing wounds on itself. This is why I consider it important to give careful thought to, and to generate open debate about, the question of whether joining a coalition or playing an opposition role is the best strategy; at the same time I would note that in view of the events of recent weeks and months, the opposition strategy appears to be more and more a preferable option for the Hungarian Socialist Party.

In the western democracies it would be ridiculous to criticize a minister for also being a party politician, and for continuing in his capacity to organize or support his party’s election campaign. Only party politicians can become statesmen, as one of the fundamental rules of parliamentary democracies is that the rise of party politicians to positions of special statesmen—let us say, to president of the republic—is not just something that happens in isolated instances; through a system of mutual checks and balances, party politicians are actually required in their capacity to behave like statesmen from the outset. In our country, on the other hand, under our present circumstances, playing such a dual role is viewed as something perverted and distorted, forcing the party to be on the defensive, constantly having to explain something which in the West is considered to be accepted practice.

Let us concede, of course, that the two situations are not exactly the same. The leaders of the reform wing themselves are statesmen who have managed to hold onto their role amidst continued and radical denunciations of the single-party state, and who, until the elections, will thus remain prisoners of the very party-state which they had set out to dismantle. The only way to break out of this faulty circuit is by making it clear that after agreeing to provide continuity to ensure a democratic transition at our own party’s expense, we do not wish to be a part of another period of involuntary continuity.

The way for us to prepare for the elections is not by counting percentages and weighing from the outset our chances of becoming a part of a coalition, but rather by cutting all ties with continuity and by calling for a new system, espousing the radical denunciation of the past, and by beginning to think within the framework of the goals of a strong left-wing opposition party. Moreover, I would suggest that we favor this strategy, without completely abandoning the option of joining a coalition.

What has earned the reform wing respect in this country and elsewhere in the world is that it has been willing to take the initiative and to act boldly. Given today’s East European scenario, this is the image we need to continue to project. There is a real danger that a parallel will be drawn between us and the collapsing former leading parties of other East European systems through fraternal-party analogies which we cannot accept under any circumstances. We cannot predict what kind of party systems, and within them what types of left-wing parties, will emerge from these countries’ political developments, hence we will not be able to talk about them until they have actually come on the scene. Until then our general sympathies should lie with the opposition movements of the past and their currently organizing parties, just as they had expressed their support for the reform wing of the old Hungarian party.

In this new, confusing situation, therefore, we have an opportunity to make a fresh start. There is no need for anyone to try to take or wrench the power out of the hands of the reform wing, for its aim has always been to
share and effect a peaceful transfer of power. We can offer new proof of this by declaring our intention to become a strong opposition party which after the elections will assert the values of democratic socialism through parliamentary means, along the lines of party politics.

Confused About Its Role

Beyond making a good international impression and winning people's confidence at home, our own narrowly defined party policy interests also require that we take this step. The whole party is confused about its role in its current state of mock control which is reflected in the structure and organizations of the party, but especially in the behavior of its leaders. They are suffering amidst the existing sticky and ailing governing conditions, and only belatedly—if at all—have they recognized the need for a change of roles. The old reflexes are still working, they still behave like old-fashioned statesmen, and even though they may not be ashamed or secretive about their party affiliation, they feel that they need to rise above it in order to honestly fulfill their governmental functions. This is why for some time now Rezso Nyers has been uncertain about what his state function is as the chairman of a semi-leading party, and why Imre Pozsgay has been paralyzed by his premature acceptance of the candidacy for president of the republic, and why Miklos Nemeth still cannot decide what kind of a relationship a prime minister should have with his own party. And finally, the person who is at the height of this total confusion about roles is the provisional president of the republic, Matyas Szuro, who sometimes acts as a party member, and sometimes does not, and who sometimes appears in the role of president of the republic, standing above all parties, and sometimes campaigns as a presidential candidate in search of supporters. We could put an end to this ambiguity by clearly admitting that the goal of becoming an opposition party will strengthen us, while the possibility of remaining in power, perhaps as part of a future coalition, will weaken us, for the latter would force our leading politicians to continue to think not in terms of party politics, but in terms of their role as statesmen.

Yet the new mentality not only offers, but demands that we move in the opposite direction. In the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] it was impossible, and even forbidden, to learn how to act like party politicians. Disassociating oneself from the main line of the party and expressing one's own separate opinion were signs of political courage, and offered the only way for one to commit oneself to a democratic future. By now, however, these old reflexes have become absurd and self-destructive. We must, therefore, free ourselves of having to disavow our affiliation with the party, and assume a completely new identity.

Adopting the goal of becoming a strong opposition party is not a defeatist program, but rather the first big step toward organizing the long-term offensive of the Socialist Party under the slogan of country and progress. It would also put an end to some of the artificial and unimaginative theories about us wanting to preserve our power, and thus to the possibility that other parties might turn this legend into political capital. We must preserve our pride, for we can be justly proud of the fact that we had initiated certain changes in the eastern half of Europe, and that we were the first ones to persistently represent the leftist perspective of democratic socialism. Let us protect this well-earned pride by relinquishing our intra-party opposition functions in favor of playing an opposition role within a multiparty system. After all, the reform wing has fulfilled its historical role, even though in the current maelstrom of false histories certain parties and small groups have made exclusive claims to having, in their words, single-handedly "smashed" and "brought the party-state to its knees." Although only the passing of time will put a complete end to this political cabaret, even if these legends are untrue, the hazy power relations currently in place are still lending them an appearance of believability.

The Future of a Democratic Europe and the Left

All of the parties are talking about joining a democratic Europe, but they are all scrambling to disassociate themselves from the left, and thus from openly accepting its European traditions, including the values of solidarity and social justice. On the other hand, many are murmuring the often heard platitude that the left is on the defensive in Western Europe, ignoring the possibility that in the 1990's the winds may shift, and a renewed left may gain strength within a European Community faced with the task of forging a common social policy. In the course of becoming a genuine party, our own Socialist Party must look beyond the elections and join the socialist and social parties that are in the forefront of dictating the course of a European renewal, and look at the future of the Hungarian left not in terms of months, but in terms of decades.

The year in which parties and the party system were formed was 1989. Today the limits of the newly created party system are near and tangible. The new beginning has given us renewed strength, hence we should not voluntarily accept these limits, i.e., the strategy of narrow-minded party politics. Thinking in terms of a coalition only limits our freedom of movement, as it not only connects us with the tasks of collective crisis management, but also compels us to make peace with everything that is provincial and antiquated in the policies of our potential partners. In our present situation it is difficult for us to criticize and formulate demands, for first of all we must criticize our own past and place demands on ourselves. As a solid opposition party, however, we can rekindle the strong spirit of social criticism that has been so characteristic of the left, and can demand that our country emulate the examples of progressive leftist Europeanism. Clever and dynamic careerists no longer join our ranks by mistake; they have already forsaken us. We do, however, still have among us tired apparatchiks who have been unable to completely break with the past. Organizing ourselves as an opposition party would help
to set clear limits in this respect as well; it would put an end to pointless debates about forming a “left-wing unity” with the new-old MSZMP, which in its present form is everything but a left-wing party. But this kind of a clear break would also open up the possibility of an opposition left-wing alliance with parties and trends that constitute real social force, and represent genuine progress.

The only option open to the new government that will be sworn in in April 1990, will be to resort to shock therapy and firm crisis management measures as it prepares to lead the country out of its current crisis. We must support this effort as a constructive opposition, while at the same time reserving the right and seizing the opportunity to take part, in accordance with our party’s profile, in helping to break down the power of economic oligarchies, and to reassert the credibility of a new left-wing party policy that represents the interests of the defenseless and silent masses. As a result of the unsettledness of our present party system, and of the acute program shortage and small-mindedness of the existing parties, unfortunately it appears more and more probable that this year’s elections will be followed by a series of government crises, and it is even possible that the next elections will not wait until 1995 as currently scheduled. Government crises and the uncertainties they entail are not in the interest of the Socialist Party; even in its opposition role, its real interest lies in furthering the consolidation of democratic transition. Nevertheless, this expected uncertainty means that the party needs to take a very limited role in any future coalition-related negotiations. For as a strengthened, reorganized, and once again self-confident and mass-supported party it will have a chance, already in the near future, to participate in the work of government under more settled conditions.

While the clashes among other parties might separate the slogans of country and progress, the Socialist Party must do everything in its power to preserve their unity by following a European, and at the same time leftist, course. If we persist in adhering to this strategy instead of striving to assume power or a slice of it within a coalition, then we can regain the reform wing’s earlier dynamism and its sincere and radical need for change.

We will find a home for progress, and progress for our homeland in the spirit of democratic socialism.

**Parties Characterized: Unclear Identities Create Confusion**

90EC0321A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
1 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Attila Agh: “Fever To Change the System”—first paragraph is FIGYELO introduction]

[Text] Are there political parties in Hungary? Only seemingly, in the author’s opinion: Although about 50 parties have been registered on the basis of the new Law on Political Parties, they lack clear identities and unequivocal bases of support.

The average citizen finds the multiplicity of political parties simply confusing, especially when the parties use variations of a few attributes in their names. Who is able to distinguish among five christian democratic parties, or perhaps even among three social democratic ones? A person probably can tell two smallholder parties apart, when they are loud enough. But such proliferation of political parties is quite normal and is to be expected in any democratic transition. During Spain’s democratization, for instance, the number of political parties that emerged there was several times higher than in Hungary at present.

The existence of political parties is very audible indeed, and yet they do not really exist. To wit, registration alone is not enough for a party to exist. In the developed democracies there are two simple criteria for a party’s real existence. One criterion is the emergence of the party’s distinct personality and self-awareness (party identity), on the basis of which one party can clearly be distinguished from another. The other criterion is the development of groups that closely and organically identify themselves with the given party (party identification), those who permanently accept its platform as their own. None of the Hungarian political parties at present would be able to pass this stricter test. Real parties with distinct personalities have not yet appeared on the scene; therefore their bases of support have not been able to solidify, either. Alarming is not only the fact that, in opinion polls two months before the elections, more than a third of the respondents are still undecided; but also that even the decided respondents are extremely uncertain, as evident from their answers to subsequent questions. They hardly know anything about the party of their choice, and thus they might alter their decision at any time.

**Fault Lies With the Parties**

When discussing the public’s political indifference, the political parties and activists occasionally cite its appreciable causes, particularly the economic difficulties. But the fault lies with the parties, rather than with the public. It is difficult to tell these political parties apart, and to accept them as real parties. In defense of the political parties, it can be said that the blurring of their identities also stems from the existing situation, from the fact that efforts to extricate ourselves from our crisis also produce a consensus that is difficult to transcend at the start of transition. The party system is now organized around principles that are very venerable, but date back to the 19th century, and—with the exception of certain marginal groups—there is no political force in Hungary at present that does not espouse the spirit of a late bourgeois revolution. The slogans of patriotism and advancement, of nation and progress, have been hoisted on every party’s banner. In other words, every party accepts two basic principles: emphasis on national interests, including protection of the Hungarian minorities; and
leading party is rapidly declining. Among the small have to endure the birth pangs of an organically evolving political attitude is solely a vote against the former One way or another, Hungarian society will inevitably opinion polls show that the proportion of voters whose But "frequent elections" are not necessarily a bad thing. outcome, however, a 'no' vote on everything up to now is utres of crisis management.

The March 1990 elections will cause a considerable shock in the party system's development, but not even these elections will produce the final changes. There will be a shakeout of the small political parties, but not even the remaining six to eight parliamentary parties will be able to survive in their present forms. The elections will at most mark the end of the first phase of democratic transition, to be followed probably by further destabilization, rather than consolidation, because the parties are still spouting cliches and, absorbed in their negation of the past, are mostly voting 'no.' That cannot continue after the elections. From the viewpoint of the elections' outcome, however, a 'no' vote on everything up to now is losing its significance at an exceptionally fast rate: Opinion polls show that the proportion of voters whose political attitude is solely a vote against the former leading party is rapidly declining. Among the small parties, the ones floundering in ‘no’ votes will eventually disappear. And the fate of the large opposition parties will be to “win themselves into ruin” in the elections: They will no longer be able to avoid behaving as political parties should, but they are not yet ready to do so.

It is extremely difficult to predict the outcome of the elections. Because there are as yet no real parties, random factors will play an important role: not only the ability to come across as a “good Hungarian” or to play the part of the “fearless radical,” but also superficial personal traits and stage presence before a radio or TV audience—i.e., emotional appeal—and the momentary domestic and international developments; in sum, all the factors that make a political system uncertain. At the same time, the role of the stabilizing factors of the parties' distinct identities and platforms, will be much smaller.

Foreseeably, the political parties' election campaigns will likewise have unduly great significance. The parties' correct assessment of the situation and their use of clever tactics are regarded as desirable in the West. But there the political parties actually target their election campaigns only at the wavering, undecided, and uncommitted voters who account for five to 10 percent of the electorate, and the election victory of a party is based on its “external” membership, its permanent supporters. But when the proportion of undecided voters exceeds one-third, their momentary decision— influenced by the election campaign—does not constitute permanent support. Indeed, such support might switch to disillusionment after the elections; then the outbreak of dissatisfaction on a mass scale might erode the political system and plunge the political parties into a crisis, and hence also Parliament and the cabinet.

Regrettably, the outcome of the March elections is fairly easy to predict in the sense that, on the basis of our present underdeveloped party system, there will hardly be a "final" decision regarding the (foreseeably coalitional) government and the first multiparty Parliament. Thus the next government and, what is even worse, the next Parliament will hardly last their respective five-year terms. The underdeveloped party system will probably collapse under the pressure of the enormous crisis-management task; a series of cabinet crises and alternating coalitions can be expected, which, unfortunately, will worsen further the external and internal conditions of crisis management. What threatens us is not the Italian model, where there is political and economic stability behind the cabinet crises. Instead, the threat is the Yugoslav model, under which the absence of economic and political stability produces a succession of governments, each blaming its predecessor for the failures of crisis management.

But "frequent elections" are not necessarily a bad thing. One way or another, Hungarian society will inevitably have to endure the birth pangs of an organically evolving
party system, in other words, of a party system comprising political parties that rely on voluntary interest-representing organizations as their vehicles, have distinct identities of their own, and are clearly distinguishable to voters as well.

Distorting Mirror

Having listed the party system's infantile disorders, we cannot avoid a more delicate question: the listing of the individual larger political parties' shortcomings and the illustration of their lack of awareness of their own identities. The parties are very sensitive about such dark sides of their existence, therefore they probably will not welcome with undivided enthusiasm the following, perhaps slightly ironic, presentation.

The customary approach classifies political parties into three large groups and distinguishes nationalist, liberal, and socialist center parties. The average voter, however, sees a confusion of the following types of parties:

1. “Euphoric” parties: The first-generation parties—in other words, the stronger opposition parties—are of this type, namely, the MDF, SZDSZ, and FIDESZ [Association of Democratic Youth]. In spite of their development, these parties are concentrating on how they will run honor laps around their own greatness, rather than on what kind of positive programs they will have after the elections.

2. “Paranoid” parties: These are second-generation or “historical” parties, such as the Social Democrats and the Smallholders. They suspect moles and crypto-Communists behind every bush and anathematize heretics, thereby effectively deterring their future supporters.

3. Parties of “The Mouse That Roared”: These are small parties that exist for the most part only in the media, and call attention to their few dozen members through successful small happenings from time to time. The Hungarian October Party and the Radical Party are of this type.

4. “Premature” parties: These are parties that strive for post-materialistic sets of values and usually concentrate on a single social issue. The Green Party and the Health Party are of this type. The voices of such parties are lost in the newly forming party system's general cacophony, but these parties do not wish to join bigger ones.

5. “Professional pseudo-parties”: The Patriotic People's Front and the SZOT [National Council of Trade Unions] are such pseudo-parties. Caught between the old one-party system and the new multiparty system, they are unable to decide whether to consider themselves as voluntary interest-representing organizations due for renewal, or as political organizations that are to remain. For the time being, they do, and do not, behave like parties.

6. The “pardon my existence” party: The Hungarian Socialist Party is huddled timidly on the empty left, from where all the other parties have fled, but it has not yet shed the empty shell of its lost power. Hence only a successful role as the opposition can probably restore its self-confidence and rid it for good of its past.

7. The “leftover” party: The new-old MSZMP is the shed snake skin of the old one-party system. This party advocates the unity of the left. As a true neo-Stalinist party, however, it never was leftist. It has been and remains a conservative, right-wing party. Now at best its members can only argue over whether the party should be modernized, on the basis of principles that were timely ten years ago.

The formation of the new-old MSZMP deserves the following brief further comment: The existence of the new-old MSZMP will continue to conjure the specter of state socialism as long as it remains unable to make up its mind about undertaking as a real party—i.e., as the “Communist” Party—the representation of certain strata and principles. Roland Antoniewicz and Robert Ribanzski may be the darlings of the media, but not even political melodrama or comedy is now able to rally people into a negative unity. In other words, the rejection of these personalities has also become commonplace.

Disintegrating Both the Past and the Future

However, all the other parties did inherit something from the MSZMP. Not just keener interest in the statesman's role than in state affairs themselves, and not just intolerance of the views of others, but mainly what the new-old MSZMP is resorting to even now: pretending to be something other than what it really is. If we begin with “we are the real Hungarians,” or “we are the true democrats,” the party system's distortion already becomes evident. Because these statements directly or indirectly imply not just that the other parties are not “real” Hungarians or democrats, but also that, for the aforementioned reason, they either are not really opposition parties or are even engaging in politics irresponsibly, by giving their opposition free rein.

All of this dates back to the Hungarian party system's birth defect, to the emergence of the MDF and SZDSZ on the political scene as centers of organization, but with politically blurred identities. Until September 1989 it still seemed that the roles of the political parties would become clear. But the 18 September break between the signatories and the rejectors, respectively, of the agreements reached in the trilateral negotiations proved fatal for the party system's immediate future. The reform wing of the MSZMP, which until October 1989 had played an important role in the changeover from, and the dismantling of, the old neo-Stalinist system, was unable to maintain its earlier momentum once it became the new Hungarian Socialist Party. It became uncertain and entangled in the remaining power structure. Under the new party, the former institutions of power rested on a layer of ice that was thinning at an accelerating rate.
Here and there the institutions fell through the ice, while the media rewarded this production with ever-louder malicious glee.

Organized into the largest opposition party, the MDF occupied center stage in politics in the autumn of 1989. After the interparty talks, it already began to prepare for the tasks of forming a government. However, the identities of the groups within the MDF as an umbrella party were unclear, and this lack of clarity was evident at the party's second national conference. Because of this, the MDF was unable to assume a strong leading role in the new political situation and to direct the political transition. This manifested itself clearly in the runup to the November 1989 referendum and in the evaluation of its results. The growth of the MDF was arrested; much of its self-confidence vanished; and representatives of the Smallholders—an umbrella party themselves—once before—began to win over the masses of the MDF's potential members and supporters. The MDF invariably remains the largest party within the new party system, but it will be unable to retain its leading role without undergoing more extensive mutation and acquiring a more distinct identity.

The SZDSZ has been setting the pace of politics since the autumn of 1989. It selects the political issues for debate and decides what is to be debated and how. As the political system's changeover has not yet occurred, the disintegrating influence of the SZDSZ also plays a positive role. In the course of setting the pace of politics, however, this party has maneuvered itself into a role in which it is disintegrating not only the remnants of state socialism, but—well in advance—also the developing democratic system of the 1990's, including the party system. Through its constant initiatives and spectacular diversions of political problems into other channels, the SZDSZ—itself an extremely heterogeneous party—is helping to further blur, rather than to make more distinct, the identities of the political parties. With its success, the SZDSZ is shifting the parties' balancing of power in its own favor. Instead, by forcing the other parties on the defensive, the SZDSZ is distorting their development, as is already evident in the small coalition governments. This manifested itself clearly in the runup to the November 1989 referendum and in the evaluation of its results. The growth of the MDF was arrested; much of its self-confidence vanished; and representatives of the Smallholders—an umbrella party themselves—once before—began to win over the masses of the MDF's potential members and supporters. The MDF invariably remains the largest party within the new party system, but it will be unable to retain its leading role without undergoing more extensive mutation and acquiring a more distinct identity.

I do not wish to exaggerate, or especially to demonize, the SZDSZ's role. But the SZDSZ, by having carved for itself a role among the principal actors on the political stage, has also condensed in itself both the negative and the positive features of this political system. It is to be feared that many of its members will continue to behave like good partisans, emerging from the woods to blow up trains even when it is time to rebuild the railroad. An indication of this is the statement of the SZDSZ that it intends to remain an opposition party even after the elections. Incidentally, it is a paradox that the SZDSZ is potentially a left-wing party on the basis of its principles, yet in itself is exerting a strong rightward pull on the entire Hungarian party system.

Well, that is how things stand. We can expect alternating cabinets and frequent elections. We are only now beginning to realize that not just the beginning of democratization is difficult.

Nominating Process: Legislative History, Safeguards Described

[Article by Lajos Bodnar: "Election Digest: The 'Dangers' of Open Nomination"]

[Text] Although witches no longer exist, the hunting of witches has become an expression voiced with increasing frequency in the ongoing election campaign. Many fear that as a result of the uncontrolled fate of nominating slips, data on persons making nominations may end up with unauthorized persons, who may use them after the elections to conduct so-called witch hunts.

Aside from the obvious shortcomings in today's Hungarian political culture, these concerns may be traced to gaps in regulations. Initially the election law did not provide for the fate of nominating slips. Accordingly, Parliament acted properly when it did not sweep the increasing number of complaints under the rug, and, though with a delay, it amended the law. It is not fortunate, of course, to have to change the rules of the game after the game has started; a number of legal, moral, and political arguments could be presented against such practice. But the supplementary decision made by Parliament concerning the fate of nominating slips under law truly fills a gap in legislation, and therefore reservations with regard to that decision may be set aside.

Let us take a look at what new rules were added to expand the law. First of all, a provision states that election committees in voting districts based on individual nominations must safeguard the nominating slips in a secure place, in closed, sealed bundles. As long as no objections are raised with regard to voting, the nominating slips must be destroyed on election day in the presence of the nominee or his representative. If a person seeks legal recourse challenging the election committee's decision, quite naturally the nominating slips must also be preserved, but only as long as is necessary. The committee is obligated to destroy the nominating slips once the process of legal recourse is complete.

Openness may be regarded as one of the fundamental principles of the election process. This is underscored by a parliamentary decision, according to which the data and facts available to election organs must not be classified. At the same time, Parliament also observed the guarantees when it stressed that the openness of the election process must not violate the secrecy of the election, nor can it violate personal rights. An example of this is the rule which prohibits election day inspection of
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voter registration documents, even by those otherwise authorized by law to inspect documents related to elections.

**Diminishing Interior Ministry Described**

25000667 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 17 Feb 90 p 7

[Interview with Dr. Zoltan Gal, state secretary and acting minister of the interior, by Attila Gy. Fekete and Tibor J. Keri; place and date not given: "No Reason To Worry? Interior Is Angry at the World; Councils Falling Apart, Frightened Bureaucrats, Overworked Police-men"]

[Text] Will the Ministry of the Interior fall apart before the elections? Are the police able to protect us; will government administration remain operational? In the interest of peaceful transition and political stability, it is important that we be able to answer both questions in the affirmative. But can we say "yes" to these questions? Our reporters conversed with Dr. Zoltan Gal, state secretary and acting minister of the interior, on these issues.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Mr. State Secretary, public security has collapsed. The populace is afraid of the police, the police are afraid of the populace. What's your view?

[Gal] That is an exaggeration, although it is true that the number of criminal acts is on a continuous increase. Last year criminal activities reached a critical level.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What do you mean by that?

[Gal] There is an underworld; organized crime and brutality have become common, and brutal murders are no rarity either. Understandably, all of this shocks the people. And robberies and theft present an existential threat; they keep the populace in fear.

'We Have Fallen Behind....'

[NEPSZABADSAG] Last year two-thirds of known criminal acts remained unresolved. Should this be explained by the professionalism of criminals or by the unpreparedness of the police?

[Gal] Unfortunately we inherited the fact that the police of the "police state" are backward and small in numbers. Fifteen years ago there were predictions that by the 1990's the number of criminal acts would be more than 200,000 annually. But the political sphere never recognized this, just as it adhered to the sole presentable value definitions of "public security is firm," "basically firm," and "satisfactory." For this reason the political sphere always provided much less money than the ministry needed. Thus we have come to the point at which the police are virtually helpless in resolving the 225,000 criminal cases that were reported last year.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Could the separation of the National Police Command from the Interior Ministry help in this situation?

[Gal] This will not provide more money to the police.... The essence of the solution is for the National Police Command to acquire maximum professional independence: Direction and execution must be separate from one another.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Pursuant to the Council of Ministers decision, you must complete this by 1 March....

[Gal] We have fallen behind. And I will most certainly request a one- or two-week extension from the Council of Ministers. But thus far most of the time we have had to be satisfied with the organization of joint seminars. In the future we would like to see an increasing number of officers and noncommissioned officers who perform operative work travel to the West for an exchange of job experience. But we have to be careful that we do not exchange Eastern advisers for Western advisers. We need a well prepared Hungarian police. It has been an encouraging sign during the past weeks that the public values our efforts.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Certain parties—they make no secret of it—would start being involved in government administration at this point already. Is it true that council workers are afraid?

[Gal] Yes, they are scared. The mood of government administration workers is very bad. Some 40,000 people are concerned that they may find themselves on the street as a result of the change in regimes. This fear is only reinforced by statements and summary judgments about layoffs, exchanging cadres, and leading officials and managers having to show their colors.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What else depresses the officials and council leaders, in addition to fear?

[Gal] The fact that they have never been paid adequately for their work. The earlier political sphere always asked them to stand up, and did not expect them to complain about being overworked, low salaries, and an adverse work environment. But they did not receive anything in return for their endurance. Is it any wonder, then, that the apparatus is angry at the world, at everyone—and rightfully so.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Can this mood be pacified?

[Gal] Definitely not by making them deliver nominating slips. On top of this, they worked on the popular referendum, performed the census, and now they have the new election commotion on their backs. And the present budget crisis is not suitable to remedy their concerns. But they cannot expect salvation from the new government either: The state coffers will not permit them greater freedom. Once the public service law is prepared, perhaps it will be possible to calm down this stratum without some spectacular central measures.
The Apparatus Just Stands There and Watches

[NEPSZABADSAG] Why didn't you expedite this important law?

[Gal] We prepared several alternative proposals. Preparation of this law was encouraged by the opposition during the political conciliation talks. They felt that the fact that no one could be removed from government administration on the basis of his political affiliation would provide some security to them. But the world has turned around since then. Now the opposition feels that there is no need for this law: Why protect those whom they do not want to retain...?

[NEPSZABADSAG] Accordingly, the fear of the apparatus is justified.

[Gal] I would like to mention, only as a matter of fact, that government administration requires special professional knowledge. It is no coincidence that the Bolsheviks left the Czar's apparatus intact, just as Rakosi did in the 1950's. And let us not forget that a "change" like this is not so inexpensive. It cannot be accomplished within a short period of time without endangering government administration.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Many question the legitimacy of councils. This also contributes to the fact that the apparatuses are becoming uncertain of themselves. When will there be local elections, which are just as important from the standpoint of exercising power?

[Gal] Under no circumstances before the fall. Local elections cannot be announced prior to the adoption of the law on autonomous government, because the populace must be aware for what tasks it is electing representatives. In my view, the law on autonomous government will not come before Parliament prior to the end of May. Before the new Parliament, that is, which will be elected by the country with the cooperation of this apparatus.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Now, at the time of a crisis budget, when they are arguing about "pennies" in Parliament—how much will the elections cost?

[Gal] Five hundred million forints were appropriated; my associates constantly scare me by saying that this will not be enough.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Why?

[Gal] The delivery of nomination slips alone cost some 50 million forints. And this was far cheaper than the mail would have been: eighteen forints a piece to 7.5 million voters. Previously this would not have become an issue, just as schools would not have asked rental fees for the use of their premises for voting purposes. MAHIR [Hungarian Advertising Enterprise] is also asking for money for posting the election notices. And the councils are asking the question: Are the elections important to them? They are not important to them. So then let them pay for the overtime work performed by the apparatus. In earlier days it was an honor to take part in the administration of elections, and political work, for which a reward was due. But by now... Sometimes I have the feeling that everyone wants to get rich on this election.

The Ministry Has Diminished

[NEPSZABADSAG] Is the Ministry of the Interior going to be the subject of debate during this parliamentary session? Do you have a proposal?

[Gal] Although some of the parties do not regard the two sessions ahead of us as important, I expect to have a few important things to do. In the next session the parliamentary investigative committee will present a report concerning the Duna-Gate case. I think it is likely that the representatives will ask some questions, to which I will have to respond. I may also have a pleasant job: to propose on behalf of the government that all those who have been deprived of their citizenships during the past decades be rehabilitated.

[NEPSZABADSAG] In your view, which party may receive the Ministry of the Interior after the elections?

[Gal] I don't know, but I think that there will be no great rush for the Ministry of the Interior. This ministry has lost power as a result of the removal of state security from under its direction, and by then the police will have become independent. The remaining tasks do not promise spectacular political success; instead they hold out the promise of even more detail work.

Social Democrats Report on Berlin Congress

25000662A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 14 Feb 90 p 5

[Article by "(r. n.)": "Press Conference at SZDP Headquarters: 'A Live Link in the Chain of the European House'""]

[Text] At Tuesday's Social Democratic Party of Hungary [MSZDP] press conference, Social Democratic Party [SZDP] press chief Sandor Csurdi first reported that in the course of the election campaign, 171 of the 176 candidates have already received the necessary nominations, and thus the party will run on a national slate in the 25 March elections.

Miklos Berenyi briefed those present on the Berlin Congress of the Common Market Social Democratic Alliance. He said that during the congress representatives of several West European sister parties had sought out the Hungarian delegation, and had successfully discussed future cooperation in organizing economic relations.

Gabor Szilagyi, a member of the SZDP leadership, stated that at the congress special emphasis was laid on the future image of a socially oriented Europe, the anticipated possibility of unifying the two Germanies, and the future of reform processes in the Soviet Union.
Adrian Wolfgang, an associate at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and Peter Jankowitsch, the representative of the Austrian socialist democratic party, were present at the briefing. Both confirmed that the reorganized MSZDP chaired by Anna Petrasovits is an authentic establishment of social democracy in Hungary.

Anna Petrasovits briefly reported on the recognition the SZDSZ received at the Berlin congress.

“The reception gave us affirmation that our party has come home to Europe, that it is an organic part of the ‘live chain’ that spans between the Western and Eastern parts of Europe, and that the MSZDP plays a pioneering role in constructing the European House,” according to the chairwoman.

**SZDSZ Press Conference Reported**

25000662B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 17 Feb 90 p 4


[Text] “There is a way out.” At least that is what every Hungarian voter may soon receive information about. The Free Democrats [Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ] plan to forward to the voters an excerpt of a paper which bears the subheading “Economic Uplift.” At a press conference held at the Kossuth Club it seemed as if statements made by the lead SZDSZ managers were being made on behalf of a party which had already won the elections.

We learned that the organization distinguishes its economic program from the perceptions held by its political competitors as follows: Their program is (1) professionally based, and (2) free of demagoguery. Only FIDESZ may brag of similar virtues, according to Karoly Attila Sos.

Janos Kis felt that it was important to state that they are asking voters to hold them accountable after one or two years of governance if they do not fulfill their promises. “We are not promising miracles, we only promise things that are possible to realize,” Kis said, and then went on to enumerate the most important tasks which the SZDSZ can perform. These include, above all, the harnessing of inflation, which by now has reached a critical level and may at any time change into a galloping multi-digit deterioration of the money. But the SZDSZ will aim for reducing the inflation rate by 1994 to a tolerable five-percent level. They would accomplish this primarily by reducing budgeted expenditures, defense spending. Another method of reduction would be to discontinue uneconomical socialist exports and to shut down bankrupt enterprises. As a result of this, one could count on 100,000 unemployed persons, but they would not permit the number of unemployed to increase above that level.

Several questions were asked of SZDSZ representatives following the managing director’s introductory remarks. Foreign journalists probed how they intend to halt inflation, render the forint convertible, and reduce taxes, all at the same time and as part of a consistent program. We learned that this was possible, but only if considered actions are taken. The SZDSZ would reduce taxes mainly by discontinuing present benefits. Budgetary savings would be achieved through the selective discontinuation of subsidies, and by further reducing state administrative expenditures. Only the lowest pensions could be increased. They added that the idea of curtailing special pension payments also occurs, but only a very small amount could be gained as a result. Journalists also asked how the SZDSZ would realize the reduction in foreign indebtedness, as promised in the document. Journalists did not receive a specific response to this question, but they did receive encouraging references to the effect that, after all, “this is in the interest of Western policy.”

SZDSZ leaders deflected questions inquiring about names of their future candidates to head ministries and for prime minister. “Unlike other parties we do not distribute ministerial positions in coffee houses; instead we work hard on the campaign,” it was said. Kis jokingly remarked that they insist on holding on to the Ministry of Defense, only because they want to discontinue the permanent army.

The economic program of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] differs from that of the SZDSZ in that it does not go as far in introducing a market economy, and in that the MDF program is anti-commerce, and it would privatize state property only in the longer term. They also caught the MDF by saying that certain of its leaders would proclaim a price freeze (as Denes Csengey did in one of his earlier statements). The SZDSZ is not conducting coalition negotiations with the MDF, because the SZDSZ wants to win the elections. A joint government could come about only as a result of constraint.

We learned that some 320 SZDSZ groups have 15,000 registered members. They have received the 5th district party headquarters as their headquarters, but before they move in the Democratic Youth Organization [DEMISZ] must move out of that building, they said.

**ASZ Finds MSZP Financial Statement Incomplete, Inconclusive**

25000662G Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 20 Feb 90 p 5

[MTI report by Josef Bartha Szabo, includes statement by MSZP spokesman Viktor Polgar: “The MSZP Financial Statement—Viewed By the State Accounting Office”]

[Text] As charged by the National Assembly, the State Accounting Office [ASZ] made a detailed audit of the Hungarian Socialist Party’s [MSZP] financial statement
submitted to the courts on the occasion of its registration. The MSZP is the legal successor to the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP]. ASZ experts have completed their work and have issued a brief statement to MTI [Hungarian Telegraph Agency] in this regard.

In the course of the audit it was established that the financial statement filed by the MSZP on 16 November 1989 showing the legal predecessor MSZMP's assets and liabilities as of 30 September 1989 cannot be regarded as complete. The documentation that serves as the basis for the financial statement is not suitable for the presentation of the financial situation as of 30 September. In the course of preparing the financial statement they did not perform the necessary inventory functions, nor did they perform the prescribed accounting functions.

The ASZ submitted its summary report to the MSZP presidium; the party made some comments regarding the report, but it does not dispute the findings made by the ASZ.

Based on all of this, the ASZ chairman presented his report to the acting president of the National Assembly, and recommended that they discuss the matter with the parliamentary committee on planning and the budget.

Our reporter asked MSZP spokesman Viktor Polgar how the MSZP feels about the ASZ position.

[Polgar] The MSZP financial statement was prepared by the financial experts of the MSZMP for the October 1989 congress. The MSZP forwarded those without change to the Budapest Court when it requested that it be registered as a party.

Based on a decision made by Parliament concerning the popular referendum, the ASZ audited the financial statement. The ASZ forwarded its preliminary report for comments to the MSZP. Party Chairman Rezso Nyers responded by submitting eight pages of comments. With this, the MSZP feels that it has satisfied the legal requirement, and subsequently Parliament is entitled to weigh and render a decision concerning professional, financial technique and accounting issues. For this reason the MSZP does not wish to deal substantively with the ASZ report prior to a decision rendered by Parliament, because it feels that an advance clashing of opinions could be as influencing the Parliament's decision. The MSZP intends to present its objections not to the MTI, but to the National Assembly committee on planning and the budget, and thus to the public.

Scientific Workers Demand Openness in Foreign Scholarship Awards

25000663 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 12 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by "K. J. T.": "TDDSZ General Meeting: Let Foreign Scholarships Be Made Public"]

[Text] The Scientific Workers Democratic Union [TDDSZ] held its delegates' meeting on Saturday and Sunday [10, 11 February]. Some 150 delegates represented more than 5,000 members of the trade union in the ceremonial room of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences at Orszaghaz Street.

Participants in the two-day meeting adopted a report concerning activities that had transpired since the first meeting of the delegates, changed the bylaws and the program, and elected new organizational bodies for the trade union.

After lengthy debate, the meeting of delegates adopted a position concerning various scholarships and credits granted by Western governments and intergovernmental organizations to foster the sciences, research, education, and higher education. The delegates determined that full openness in regard to available opportunities, that is, easy access to detailed information by concerned institutions and individuals, is of fundamental importance. Further, the delegates demanded that, along with representatives of the professions, the trade unions, professional organizations, and interest groups should also have a voice in the organizations that are to be established for exercising societal control over the allocation of funds.

A position was also established on state property. The meeting determined that loopholes in the Law on Business Organizations and the Law on Transformation, as well as in supplemental legal provisions, provide opportunities for the irresponsible management of state property and for the enrichment of certain individuals and groups. A recommendation was made that the National Assembly and the government suspend without delay the transformation of state enterprises and planning and research institutes, as well as the sale of their real estate and other property.

The meeting of delegates expressed its firm view that Parliament should not adopt additional laws prior to the free elections, unless absolutely necessary to assure peaceful transition. They objected to the idea of this National Assembly discussing the legislative proposal concerning the direction and organization of social security, the so-called legislative proposal on autonomous governance. In their view this legislative proposal involves an issue that affects every Hungarian citizen, over which societal debate has not even begun. Legislative action in this regard could only serve to set back democratic transformation. They called upon all trade unions, interest groups, and workers councils to join in their demand.

The meeting also rendered a decision with regard to the neutrality of the TDDSZ with respect to parties. The trade union will continue to develop its political positions independently, and will not make such positions dependent on the position taken by any party.

The meeting of delegates expressed solidarity with the just, peaceful movement for the achievement of official
White collar workers were gentlemen. They were entitled living in every village, but next to him one could find the their knees before them. Reverends and right reverends served for the Sunday meal. centuries-old families; their persons represented history. and in his home, where fried or paprikash chicken was gary was its past. It had its upper nobility, descendants of

The Jewish merchant and innkeeper made a peaceful High priests were the earthly vicars of God; people fell to

speak: This is what respect demanded, wanted to see. Newspapers were written and edited in

child would not have uttered a sound when parents what to write. Theaters performed what the audience

fashionable in those days: The wife stood at the table The intelligentsia could voice their views freely, inde-

grew in backyard lots. Stables had horses and cows; there were pigs in the sty, and an army of hens, ducks, and geese filled the chicken yard. A steaming pot, a flavorful meal prepared by the housewife's busy hands awaited the farmer upon his return from work. A nice custom was fashionable in those days: The wife stood at the table while serving her master, who was tired from work. The child would not have uttered a sound when parents spoke: This is what respect demanded.

A watch chain adorned the Hungarian worker's vest— the one who wanted to work that is, and did not waste his God-given strength on alcohol and idling. There was a radio in the diligent worker's home, clean clothing in his cabinet, and not just work boots, but even gentlemen's half shoes. He did not frequent the Danube quai, he felt at home among his own; in the tavern where he soberly argued world affairs over two glasses of soda and wine; and in his home, where fried or paprikash chicken was served for the Sunday meal.

The Jewish merchant and innkeeper made a peaceful living in every village, but next to him one could find the Hungarian language by Hungarians in Transylvania. The meeting identified itself with the goals of that movement, because in the opinion of the TDDSZ the movement is fighting for the fundamental human rights of Transylvanians.

The meeting of delegates resolved that the national steering committee should render a decision as soon as possible with regard to the TDDSZ' relationship with the National Council of Trade Unions [SZOT]. It proposed that the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions publish information on a regular basis, and that the new national steering committee initiate negotiations in the future with significant parties concerning strategic issues that involve scientific and educational policy, and that it attempt to reconcile views.

The meeting of delegates called the attention of the government and the State Wage and Labor Affairs Office to the need to establish continuing education, retraining, and job placement service funds for persons with higher education who have become unemployed.

**Editorial Mocks Smallholders' Rhetoric**

2500674A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 5 Mar 90 p 3

[Editorial by Laszlo Gyurko]

[Text] Compatriots! Brothers and sisters! Hungarians!

For almost 50 years they told us lies day and night. The television and radio told lies, the newspapers lied, and so did official statements and paid speakers. The time has come for you to learn the truth.

There was more than dust in Hungarian villages. Acacia foliage filled the streets; there were geraniums on window sills, and verbena, hollyhock, and anemones grew in backyard lots. Stables had horses and cows; there were pigs in the sty, and an army of hens, ducks, and geese filled the chicken yard. A steaming pot, a flavorful meal prepared by the housewife's busy hands awaited the farmer upon his return from work. A nice custom was fashionable in those days: The wife stood at the table while serving her master, who was tired from work. The child would not have uttered a sound when parents spoke: This is what respect demanded.

The industrialist and the entrepreneur performed work of great sacrifice, and took high risks to create jobs for workers. They built swimming pools and cultural homes for employees. Both white and blue collar workers lived in family homes; they had cabins at the marina, and auditoriums in which to argue over their fate. Owners were interested in the welfare of workers, not just in profits.

The intelligentsia could voice their views freely, independent from any and all power. Writers were not told what to write. Theaters performed what the audience wanted to see. Newspapers were written and edited in such a way that they were grabbed from newsboys' hands.

The Honveds indeed defended the homeland; the homeland, not some foreign interests. The officers' honor was a concept akin to the Holy Scriptures.

The country had a moral and political foundation: the doctrine of the Sacred Crown. A thousand-year-old Hungary was its past. It had its upper nobility, descendants of centuries-old families; their persons represented history.

High priests were the earthly vicars of God; people fell to their knees before them. Reverends and right reverends
were the people's guardians, justices in disputes, the teachers of the people, the fathers of holy baptism and of last rights. On Sundays people cleansed their souls from the everyday dust in church with devout prayer and song.

People had their amusement parks to enjoy themselves freely. They had movies where they could see the truth, the good, and the beautiful. Celebrated idols were born on the screen; they became idols because they were able to define and engrave in people's souls what the nation felt and wanted. They were able to make people laugh and cry, because humans must also cry in order to be humans.

They lied to you Hungarians, day and night, for half a century. Brothers and sisters, the time has come for you to learn the truth, so that you will know for which world to cast your vote.

(All of this was recorded in journeying across the country, attending election rallies and listening to campaign rhetoric, by the chronicler, Laszlo Gyurko.)

**Nyers on Wiretapping Scandal, Extremism**

25000674B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 3 Mar 90 p 1

[Article by Lajos Pogonyi: “Reparations for Mistakes Can Be Made”]

[Interview with Rezso Nyers, MSZP party chairman, by Andras Sereg in Budapest on 2 March: “Peaceful Transition Threatened”]

[Text] The Socialists held a grand election rally last night at the Hungarian Optical Works cultural home. Socialist Party Chairman Rezso Nyers took part in the meeting.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What is your view of Parliament's closing report on the wiretapping scandal?

[Nyers] Ever since its establishment, the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] has not operated as a state party. We have not brought forth a preliminary resolution on a single political issue. For this reason we did not request detailed information on daily events from the government. After October the Interior Ministry [BM] was clearly placed under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers, thus the Socialist Party could not provide a single directive to the BM. We received information from the BM, but we returned such information without using it. Accordingly, we did not make use of the information, and we did not even want to. Incidentally, none of the information showed that it was acquired through secret channels. I agree with the investigative committee's view, and I believe that the information was useless. I can only confirm that the MSZP approves of the regulation of information acquisition in a manner consistent with the constitution.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Following the parliamentary session that was just concluded, many are expressing concern about peaceful transition, and they worry that three weeks before the elections the democratization process will come to a halt and the country will be swept to the brink of anarchy.

[Nyers] Peaceful transition is threatened not only before the elections, but also after the elections, if extremist forces opposed to democracy, or forces which are not extremist but ultimately manipulate with extremist methods, disturb the process. As, for example, that Smallholders' leader who spoke of his political rivals in a vulgar tone of voice the other day. Independent of all of this, I am confident that peaceful transition will be determined not by the extremists, but by sober-minded people who constitute the decisive majority of the populace, and also within political parties.

**MDF, MSZDP Reassure Government Officials**

**MDF: Conciliatory Tone**

25000674E Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 26 Feb 90 p 5

[Article by Lajos Pogonyi: “Reparations for Mistakes Can Be Made”]

[Excerpts] “We do not want any kind of witch hunt, and we do not want people to feel that their situation is uncertain. We would like everyone to think that they are needed, that historical justice will be made in Hungary, and that reparations for mistakes can be made,” according to Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] National Chairman Jossef Antall, the celebrity speaker of yesterday afternoon’s national meeting. [passage omitted]

In his speech Antall stressed that rumors to the effect that the MDF will institute layoffs are not true; on the other hand, not everyone should count on staying in the same position. Their goal is for everyone to find his place in the new Hungary. [passage omitted]

Several leaders and members of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] are fed up with the party-state, just as opposition organizations are. [passage omitted]

**Layoffs Alien to MSZDP**

25000674E Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 26 Feb 90 p 5

[Article by P. L.: “Expertise Shall Be the Controlling Factor in Establishing a New Government”]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Anna Petrasovits, chairwoman of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary, said that socialist politicians have a place in the new Hungarian government if in a given ministry they are the best suited persons from a professional standpoint, as a result of their knowledge. [passage omitted]
Petrasovits explained that disintegrating the specialized apparatus would be senseless, and that in the Social Democratic Party's vocabulary, the term "layoff" is unknown.

ROMANIA

Romanian Deputy Minister of Education Interviewed

90EB0249A Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 20 Jan 90 p 7

[Interview with Attila Palfalvi, Romanian deputy minister of education, by Pal Bodor on the Cluj-Bucharest express, date not given: "What Is the New Bolyai University Going To Be Like?"—first paragraph is MAGYAR NEMZET introduction]

[Text] In our 17 January issue, Mihai Sora, Romania's new minister of education, presented in broad outlines his position on restoring instruction for the minorities in their native language. Now we are publishing a more detailed and more specific interview with Professor Attila Palfalvi, former rector of the Kolozsvar [Cluj] Polytechnic Institute and the newly appointed deputy minister of education in charge of minority affairs. The timing of the interview was perfect: at night, on the Kolozsvar-Bucharest express, enroute to the Romanian capital, where the professor was going to take up his new duties. He told us with what plans in mind he would be occupying his seat as deputy minister of education.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] With what fears, doubts, and feelings of joy are you anticipating your first day in office? What are your ideas on organizing higher education for the ethnic Hungarians in Romania? Let us consider your answer as an inaugural statement.

[Palfalvi] First of all, it is necessary to restore Bolyai University since it was allowed to whither away after its merger [with Babes University]. This is a difficult task, and we are not even certain whether it will be fulfilled successfully in every respect.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] How do you mean that?

[Palfalvi] In the sense that I hope the restoration of Bolyai University will be successful but in the present situation there could yet be some unpleasant surprises in store. In other words, much hard work still awaits us. Bear in mind that it is now January and we are hoping to start classes in the new Bolyai University on 15 September. Which leaves us only nine months in all.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] What is your greatest problem? The selection of instructors and organization of the faculties?

[Palfalvi] No. In my opinion, the greatest problem will be to overcome the enormous opposition to it.
What is the combined total university enrollment in Romania at present?

To my knowledge, about 150,000.

Let us turn to the question of Hungarian as the language of instruction in secondary schools.

This is perhaps an even greater problem. In secondary schools, the use of Hungarian as the language of instruction gradually approached zero during the past 25 years. Thus we first have to restore the situation that existed a quarter century ago, and only then will we be able to begin real development. The Hungarian classes ceased in countless schools. With time, Romanian classes appeared in the “all-Hungarian” schools. Today there is practically not a single Hungarian school; there are only mixed schools. The number of Hungarian classes also sharply declined in the elementary (primary) schools. Numerous Hungarian village schools also ceased or were converted into Romanian schools. These schools should now be restored. All this has to be thought through and carried out with due consideration for changed conditions. Consider, for instance, how much the population’s breakdown by nationality has changed in the towns of Transylvania. All this also affects the network of schools. Hence it is not possible to start out in every case exactly from what existed 25 years ago. Nevertheless, that must be our yardstick in the first phase.

The conclusion I have drawn from the policy statement of the Hungarian Democratic Union is that they again plan to base secondary education, with Hungarian as the language of instruction, primarily on the significant, independent Hungarian secondary schools. Am I right?

Take the situation in Kolozsvár. Here we ought to restore first of all the old, traditional, great Hungarian schools such as the Unitarian and the Piarist high schools, and the Calvinist Boarding School. These are schools founded four centuries ago! Their noble traditions and inherited, proven educational methods ought to be cherished and preserved. In other words, continued. But let us not forget that most of the one-time important classical schools are now vocational schools. Restoring them will not be easy. Not to mention that this raises the issue of church schools. The listed schools, of course, were church schools. Certain schools ought to be returned to the churches.

This will also be a problem in Romania because the Romanian churches—the Greek Orthodox Church, for instance—did not have any secondary schools between the two world wars. In other words, there is a discrepancy here between the churches of the two ethnic groups. After the Treaty of Trianon, the Hungarian church schools could obtain licenses to operate only as private schools. The official name of my school, for example, was Liceul Particular Piarist [Piarist Private Lyceum]. Have you reckoned with the problems and additional opposition that will stem from this difference?

I have not studied this question in greater depth as yet. What concerns me particularly is that now these once-rich churches would be unable to operate their schools without state subsidies.

What about the training of teachers?

This is perhaps the sorest point of all. The present great teacher shortage can be solved only by establishing more teachers’ colleges. This holds true also for the training of kindergarten teachers. Not to mention on this occasion that many Hungarian-speaking and ethnic-Hungarian teachers have abandoned teaching. They ought to be induced to return. There are very valuable, good teachers among them.

The language of instruction will truly be successful only if the schools turn out youths who have an excellent knowledge of Romanian and are able to compete in that language as well. That is a difficult task.

Yes, it is. It requires that the graduates of Bolyai University, or of the polytechnic institutes with Hungarian as the language of instruction, speak Romanian fluently and master the Romanian terminology of their professions. In other words, Hungarian students will have to study more and harder, because they will have to learn their professions in both languages. They will have to be able to compete with their Romanian colleagues. That will not be easy, either for them or for us.

In your opinion as former rector of the Kolozsvár Polytechnic Institute, has your average ethnic-Hungarian graduate been able to hold his own in life and in his profession?

Most definitely, such graduates have been able to hold their own very well. They have been sought-after specialists and have advanced far in their careers.

Will you be able to bear the workload and endure the tensions of your new duties?

I realize that my job will be a very difficult one, but I am starting it with great enthusiasm.

Do you know Iliescu?

I know him very well. We got to know each other more closely when editing the Great Hungarian-Romanian Technical Dictionary. The Technical Publishing House he headed was sponsoring the work. Without his support and help, we probably would have been unable to publish the dictionary. In the end we
published 800 copies for the domestic market, and Hungary took over 1200 copies. A ridiculously small run, but we lacked paper for a larger one. With Iliescu we had estimated the demand at a minimum of 5000 copies for the Romanian market alone. We are now trying to finally publish the second volume of the dictionary, the Romanian-Hungarian part. Perhaps it will also be possible to publish simultaneously a second edition of the first volume.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Are you confident that the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, as a sort of grand-coalitional organization for safeguarding the interests of minorities in the election, will be able to preserve its unity amidst the diversity?

[Palfalvi] There is unity now. We will be able to fulfill our great tasks only if we can rely on unity in safeguarding the interests of minorities. If that unity does not become fragmented.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] In your opinion, how many years will it take to implement the program you have outlined for restoring the use of the native language as the language of instruction?

[Palfalvi] At least three or four years will be needed to lay the foundation.

YUGOSLAVIA

List of Yugoslav Ambassadors Presented
90EB0206A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
20 Jan 90 pp 3-4

[Article by Mirko Klarin: "Major Change in Ambassadorial Corps—The People Who Are Representing Us in the World"; first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] Yugoslav ambassadors, regardless of the republic or province with which they are "affiliated," must be free of any and all particularistic approaches in performing the job with which they have been entrusted, consistently serving the interests of the SFRY as a whole, or those of each of its parts.

Next has the Yugoslav foreign service been under as much intense scrutiny by the party and the public as in the last year, subjected to merciless criticism and roll calls by the press at party plenums and congresses, at delegate assemblies, and, above all, at rallies of passers-by. Practically everything has been questioned: from fundamental orientations of foreign policy ("What does the summit means for us?" or "What are we looking for among these non-aligned nations anyway?") to concrete problems concerning relations with individual countries ("When will we finally establish relations with Israel?") and in particular with our neighbors ("To what extent will we tolerate such behavior by the Bulgarians, or Romanians, or Greeks... towards us and our minorities?")

But the most important target has been personnel policy in the foreign service. This began with the general question, "Who is representing us in the world," combined with the generalized charge that Yugoslav embassies have become a "refuge for incompetent and unpopular politicians" who, after being discredited in this country, are assured a "hard-currency livelihood" abroad. This was then followed by a further specification of these charges ("they lost the confidence of their base of support") and by their concentration on particular places (Paris, Washington...) and particular persons (Zivadinovic, Gagro, Kovacevic...). Some, as we know, were recalled and returned to this country, while others—also because of the "lost confidence of their base of support"—were removed (or, under pressure from a campaign, "had themselves removed") from the famous diplomatic lists of future ambassadors (the Orlandic and Vrhovac cases). The significance that has been given to these "personnel questions" is best reflected by the fact that a good deal of the extraordinary party congress of one of our republics was devoted to "taking apart" one of the candidates for the position of ambassador to Pyongyang! And naturally it was all because of the "lost confidence of their base of support." And, off course, amidst entreaties that the party renounce its monopoly on power.

However, if one bears in mind the fact that in the past year as many as 40 new Yugoslav ambassadors have been chosen and appointed—thus, nearly half of our total "ambassadorial corps"—it is truly a wonder that in a country with our domestic circumstances, from the "grass roots" to the "top echelons," it has all been accomplished with only two or three "incidental situations." Especially if we recognize that in recent years there has been increasing pressure on the relatively limited number of ambassadorial positions, as well increasing interest by the republics and provinces—or rather, their leadership structures—in seeing as many pieces of the "ambassadorial pie" as possible (and pieces that are as sweet as possible, of course) secured for themselves and "their people."

'Long' and 'Short' Lists

A little less than a year ago, BORBA published in four lengthy installments an "anatomy of Yugoslav diplomacy." Within the framework of this "anatomy," we published all the facts that were relevant and available at the time concerning the personnel and the policy towards them in the Yugoslav diplomatic corps. Thus, we published the names and basic biographical and professional information on all our ambassadors, consuls general, chiefs of legations and consulates, and directors of cultural and information centers, as well as the national and republican-provincial structure of these personnel. In addition, we published all the valid criteria concerning their selection and the "connections" that have to be considered by those who make these decisions (FSFA [Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs], FEC [Federal Executive Council], Presidency of the SFRY).
Finally, we described and analyzed in detail the procedure of selection and appointment of the 40 new ambassadors—from the initial “diplomatic list” drawn up in the republics and provinces and the first slate of candidates containing 116 names, through “long” and “short” lists obtained by checking on language knowledge and professional abilities, to the final proposal by the FEC and the decision by the Presidency of the SFRY.

At the time, we were planning to conclude the series by announcing the names of all the newly selected ambassadors. However, we were forced to abandon this idea for two reasons. First of all, aside from the small role played by the aforementioned “incident situations,” this was because the work of the Presidency of the SFRY in naming the new ambassadors was dragging on a little, so that when it was time to publish the last installation in our “anatomy,” six or seven ambassadorial posts were still vacant. And the other, more important reason: Just then we “remembered” that according to the provisions of the Vienna Convention, the names of newly appointed ambassadors may be announced to the public only after the countries to which they have been assigned have indicated their agreement—their acceptance of the appointment.

Ten months have passed since then and, believe it or not, only recently have the agreements for all 40 newly appointed Yugoslav ambassadors been concluded. The majority of them have already assumed their new duties, and the rest will do so in the coming days and weeks. The only post still vacant is that of ambassador to Finland—the procedure for his selection and appointment is, we understand, in progress.

Thus, BORBA is finally able to publish the names and basic biographical and professional information on all the newly-named ambassadors, whose selection over the course of the past year has elicited a great deal of interest among the public. However, since this is a “major change” in our “diplomatic corps,” we decided to publish a complete list of all Yugoslav ambassadors—old and new—to give the public a complete overview of who is representing us in the world today. Countries where an “ambassadorial change” took place at the end of last year or the beginning of this year are noted with an asterisk.

The lists and tables that we present here open up possibilities for various analyses, comparisons, commentaries, and conclusions. BORBA remains true to its focus from last year’s “anatomy of Yugoslav diplomacy”—“just the facts, and nothing but the facts,” and to leave commentary and conclusions to interested readers. In order to make this easier for our readers, we are providing—based on these lists and tables—a few more relevant data, remarks, and comments.

The Long Road of Establishing Residence

First of all, how does one become an ambassador?

The proposal for selecting the chief of a diplomatic mission is prepared by the federal secretary for foreign affairs, in conjunction with the competent republican and provincial authorities. The final proposal is drawn up by the FEC, while the ambassadors and chiefs of permanent missions are appointed (and recalled) by the Presidency of the SFRY through a decree.

Secondly, according to what criteria is the selection made?

According to the Law on the Conduct of Foreign Affairs and the current Social Agreement on Personnel Policy in the Federation, candidates for the post of ambassador must have “the necessary socio-political experience, the relevant political-diplomatic and specialized qualifications, the knowledge of foreign languages, and other qualities...” These other qualities, besides familiarity with the international policy of the SFRY and with broad international political and economic relations, include “socialist self-management morality,” organizational abilities, “culture and skill in international communication,” and, finally, a high level of specialized training (acquired or avowed).

Since Yugoslavia is a state with a federal structure, the Presidency of the SFRY must take into account the “uniform representation of all our republics and provinces” in deciding on ambassadors. What this means in practice can be seen from the table on the national structure and “republican-provincial affiliation” of Yugoslav ambassadors.

“Republican-provincial affiliation” generally means which “diplomatic list” the individual ambassador is assigned to, or “where his base of support is.” In the majority of cases, this affiliation is determined by the place of birth, although there are exceptions in terms of nationality. For example, born in Belgrade, “affiliated” with Bosnia-Hercegovina, while Croat by nationality. Thus, in some cases, “affiliation” is based not on the place of birth, but rather the place where someone worked and lived, where he was socio-politically active, and where he is regarded as “one of their own.” In this way, many Montenegrin diplomats face the danger of being without a “base of support,” or without a “republican affiliation,” since in that republic the fundamental position has been adopted that no one who does not work in Montenegro can receive support for appointment to leadership positions in the Federation, including diplomatic positions. This also applies to several already-confirmed diplomats from the Montenegrin “list,” who have been ordered to go and spend a certain amount of time in their “home republic” if they want to stay on that “list.” We understand that such initiatives are being undertaken in Bosnia-Hercegovina as well.

Whom do our ambassadors actually represent?

This question was raised in last year’s debate in certain circles here when people got the impression that our ambassadors are representing “the people” of this or that republic, or even their party, since confidence in
individual ambassadorial candidates was accorded or denied at party congresses?!

The question, of course, is unnecessary: All Yugoslav ambassadors, regardless of with which republic or province they are "affiliated," must be free of all particularistic approaches in performing the job with which they have been entrusted, consistently serving the interests of the SFRY as a whole, or those of each of its parts. At the FSFA, it is emphasized with pride that in practice as well this is ensured on the whole, and that republic-provincial and nationalist contention and conflict have not penetrated our diplomatic corps.

One more piece of information, which until recently has not been given particular attention, but which could soon become significant: All Yugoslav ambassadors are members of the same party—the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

These are readily available facts and information. We leave conclusions up to interested readers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of birth</th>
<th>Place of birth; Socialist Republic [SR]; Socialist Autonomous Province [SAP] affiliation</th>
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* Ambassadorial change in late 1989 or early 1990

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### NORTH AMERICA AND LATIN AMERICA

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*Ambassadorial change in late 1989 or early 1990

### OCEANIA

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* Ambassadorial change in late 1989 or early 1990

### PERMANENT MISSIONS OF THE SFRY

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### National Structure of Yugoslav Ambassadors

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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Future Energy Policy Discussed
90EG0178A Suhl FREIES WORT in German
15 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Karlheinz Kloppe, general director of VEB (State Enterprise) Energy Combine Suhl, by Dr. Berbel Escher: “Foul Air—How Long?”; place and date of interview not given—first paragraph is FREIES WORT introduction]

[Text] The energy industry is one of the most important vital veins of a country. On it depend to a large extent an effective economy, the standard of living of the individual citizen, and the state of our environment. In the past, official policy often proclaimed the unity of economy and ecology, but practiced it only halfheartedly. Change is needed. Discussion of this subject is vehement.

[FREIES WORT] Are there any signs of solutions on the horizon?

[Kloppe] The concept “horizon” stretches more or less into a vague distance. The fact is: An energy policy carried out over decades can be fundamentally reformed only in the medium and longer term.

Particularly in the last 10 years, the GDR succeeded in ensuring an annual growth of the national income by 2.5 to 3.8 percent with a primary energy increase of just barely one percent. This conceals great efforts by many workers. But the practice of putting quotas on energy sources is not a solution for the future.

No Time Lost, the Start Has Been Made

Two main tasks must be tackled: to produce energy efficiently and ecologically and to use it efficiently. We do not wait with practical steps until all concepts being worked on at present are available in detail. Even now, clear changes have been initiated.

[FREIES WORT] In what way?

[Kloppe] So far, we are not yet working according to balance sheet plan. The enterprises are to work out their yearly plans by 12 February. We have already informed the minister of the ideas our energy combine has. We based them on the assumption that the use of crude lignite will be drastically reduced by the beginning of the year.

In the Breitungen power plant we now use only bituminous coal. The Ettmarshausen heating plant is only supplied by half with crude lignite, the Bad Salzungen oil heating plant provides the balance. The Suhl heating plant also runs at half power, that is, with half the crude lignite, but instead we provide full output with the Bohruegel oil heating plant. Effective immediately, the minister has repealed the regulation previously governing the use of crude lignite for operating sectional boiler installations. The 4,000 tons of coal briquettes, which we shall use for the latter installations, will make an additional 9,000 tons of crude lignite superfluous.

With regard to the populace’s heating needs, we support the bezirk council’s demand that only coal from the Senftenberg lignite combine be delivered, which contains only one percent sulfur—traditional coal contained four percent sulfur. This is already being put into practice in Zella-Mehlis.

Energy Concept Demonstrates Creativity

[FREIES WORT] Would you like to speak even more concretely about your ideas?

[Kloppe] Why not? Compared to past practice, we want to reduce the use of crude lignite by more than half and instead use 50 percent more bituminous coal and 18 times the amount of heating oil. Based on present energy prices, however, this will cost an additional 50 million marks annually. On the plus side, however, there is less impairment of the citizens’ physical well-being, and the forest, our environment in general, will be burdened less, and finally, more effective work becomes possible—for example, fewer Reichsbahn coal freight trains are needed, and we have fewer problems with ash removal.

[FREIES WORT] So the decision lies with the government, first of all with your minister. Do you consider your minister competent to make the right decisions?

[Kloppe] The former Ministry for Coal and Energy was abolished, and we are now under the minister for heavy industry, Dr. Singhuber. According to what I had previously heard about his work style, the way I have gotten to know him in talks in the meanwhile, and above all by what I understand from the very concrete discussion material presented for a radical change in energy policy, he is a man of creative thought.

[FREIES WORT] Key word creativity. Premier Hans Modrow stated in a talk with a journalist: If one is willing to accept creativity, one can cooperate even with very clever people. Because, as a rule, less clever people are wanted where the manager does not do all the prior thinking and then watches that there is no one there who can think beyond him. This openness, coupled with the courage to make decisions and even to submit one’s resignation if the manager has no more to contribute, Modrow understands as a principle.

[Kloppe] I consider expert knowledge as important as the necessity of being surrounded by competent and honest partners when decisions have to be made. Both require independence, creative work, where limits had been set for us in past years. I was often forced to act vis-a-vis my collective not primarily as an engineer, but as a manager, who had let himself be persuaded about the necessary use of crude lignite; its cheapness, its availability in our own country, the so-called “freedom from [outside] disturbance”...Nonetheless: We did not risk everything. We did not tear down heating plants, for instance, that operate on the basis of oil, during our conversion to
different energy sources, as some colleagues in other Bezirks did. And we can again operate them. Incidentally, I do not expect one’s own opinion, one’s own original ideas in the energy combine alone, but also in the enterprises of the individual industrial sectors.

[FREIES WORT] The energy industry was a centrally managed sector. Should it remain so?

[Klopp] Despite the negative experiences with state management—yes, in principle. Because I consider it an advantage that all energy sources are “in one hand,” which makes it possible to implement an energy strategy uniformly. That means: The energy combines should operate on the principle of self-financing. To implement a uniform management, “united energy combines” must be created to be managed by a board of directors. The chairman at the same time would have to be the minister’s authorized state agent for regional energy supply, who implements an energy policy oriented on profit and sales, taking into account ecological necessities and a centrally determined price policy. Naturally, a decision in the individual case will be made together with the regional authorities. Financing will be charged to the VEB [State Enterprise]. The general directors of all 15 energy combines identify with these ideas. We have presented them to the ministry.

[FREIES WORT] According to information from your ministry, crude lignite mining will be considerably restricted. Energy experts advocate reducing an annual production of 320 million tons, originally planned for 1995, by at least 50-70 million tons. Presumably, so far no other energy sources have been considered. Where is the substitute to come from?

[Klopp] In my opinion, based on clear assessment, we must think without bias in many directions. Just one direction: Our Bezirk is situated far from large energy producers such as the gas combine, “Black Pump.” Some 70 percent of electric energy in the Bezirk—the largest substation is on the Suhl Friedberg—comes from Karl-Marx-Stadt. Expanded deliveries from there are economic nonsense. Now that official travel to the FRG has become longer any manual digging labor available in the region. As a rule, our colleagues mastered that well. As a rule, our combine management has tried to effect rapid changes wherever possible, for example, with bonus payments, and also to win over our colleagues for the implementation of a truly new energy policy. For some problems we see joint solutions, for others unfortunately not yet. Our gas fittings engineers, for instance, did outstanding preventive work in preparation for the 1989/90 winter, so that up to now no gas leaks from the pipe grid had to be reported. The problem is this: Although trained as gas fitters, our colleagues in Neuhaus were forced to spend about 80 percent of their working hours digging shafts because there is no longer any manual digging labor available in the region. As soon as the ground is free of frost, we shall have to start urgently with the reconstruction of gas pipes in endangered streets in Oberweissbach, Ernstthal, Lichtenhain, Limbach, Meuselbach. For the five kilometers of manual digging, we must definitely have help from the region!

[FREIES WORT] Many thanks for the comprehensive talk.

[Box, p 3]

Data

- Every GDR citizen annually requires approximately 5,700 kilowatt hours as his share of the net consumption. The per capita consumption in the CSSR and the USSR, for instance, amounts to approximately 4,750 kilowatt hours. In the FRG it is 6,100 kilowatt hours (as of 1986).
• While in the GDR 10,500 kilowatt hours annually are used per worker and employee, in the FRG it amounts to 14,900 kilowatt hours annually. This difference points to number one, an effectiveness reserve, and number two, the lesser equipment together with the relatively high per capita consumption indicates that structure and efficiency of our electric energy use compared to the FRG are less favorable.
• A large part of all electric energy, about 42 percent of the total consumption, is required for electric driving gears. The use of efficient electronic equipment in the driving gears makes possible speed control without losses, which could lower energy consumption by 30 percent and more.
• After the coal and energy industries, GDR households are the third largest consumers of electric energy.
• For electric energy [consumption], annual growth rates of two percent are expected in the GDR in the coming years, i.e., an increase of about 8,000 megawatts is necessary by the year 2000.

COMPiled from ADN [German General News Service] material.

HUNGARY

World Bank Vice President on Future of Hungarian Economy
90EC0310A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 16 Feb 90 pp 1, 4

[Interview with World Bank Vice President W. A. Wapenhans, by Maria Lakatos during the week of 12 February, place not given: "Changing Government, Permanent Goal"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] Once again this week a World Bank delegation paid a visit to Hungary to assess the changes that took place thus far, as well as the situation created by political transition, and changing Hungarian conditions. Following his negotiations we made an exception and questioned World Bank Vice President Mr. W. A. Wapenhans not about the specific results of the negotiations, but concerning Hungary’s economic possibilities, as seen from the World Bank’s viewpoint.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] At last year’s general meeting World Bank President Barber Conable mentioned the socialist countries as a bitter example, where economic growth has stopped despite foreign assistance. Since then Hungary has lost even its political significance. Viewed purely from an economic standpoint, is Hungary going to be able to remain attractive to foreign investors?

[Wapenhans] All that depends on how Hungary will manage its accumulated indebtedness, and on the policies to be pursued by the next government, of course. Will they continue to follow the present line, or will they begin negotiations to alleviate the debt burden. In our view the indebtedness is still manageable, but under no circumstances should it be increased. And Hungary must, of course, preserve the reputation it has achieved thus far, the fact that it is able to, and actually does, pay back the loans. Quite naturally the structure of the accumulated payment obligation may be changed to one that alleviates the country’s situation. And the fact that your trade balance is improving should warrant some hope. Once this improvement is also reflected in the balance of payments—if you make drastic reductions in the accumulated deficit—the country will have a good chance to preserve interest manifested by foreign capital. I will say this once again: I do not feel that a further increase in your indebtedness is conceivable and you must increase primarily your own savings, thus acquiring new resources.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] At the end of last year the Hungarian Government twice changed some basic economic indicators released earlier. These concerned gross indebtedness and the budget deficit. It admitted that the earlier published data were not true. How did you view this action?

[Wapenhans] It was a very sad announcement, but I regard it as a positive [indication] by all means, the fact that they did not drag on the earlier problems but instead accepted them and publicized the actual figures. And what we regard as most beneficial is that by now these figures are the final figures.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] The general view holds that the problems of the Hungarian economy may be resolved only by an upswing manifested by the private sector. Is the World Bank willing to assist this development?

[Wapenhans] I will make your question more specific. The World Bank group is able to assist privatization, to help the establishment of an appropriate framework; this is a matter that is part of the activities of the International Finance Corporation [IFC] within the group. The IFC has been present in Hungary for years, and its activities may be expanded. Transformation must be helped by all means so that as many as possible may become part of that sector. At the same time, however, there are problems like the matter of how to rally domestic resources. But do not think that entrepreneurial ventures will automatically increase in number. The appropriate conditions must be established to accomplish that. Even this way transformation will not occur suddenly, it will take a long time instead.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] You have met not only the leaders of the present government, but also the representatives of various parties. What kind of government program would you support after the elections?

[Wapenhans] Look, during the upcoming period there is a need for a broadly based consensus. What we found is that the goals are the same, the experts within the parties are very familiar with the economic problems, and have
as their goals a linkage with the world market and a growing private sector. They vary in terms of methods to be used to accomplish this and for the time being it is not clear just how transition is progressing, of course. But even at that the facts do not change. The new government needs people who work, who accept the tasks. A possible decline in the Gross Domestic Product [GDP] during the transition period would cause grave problems. You cannot afford to lose time, because some deep-seated changes are taking place in Hungary as well as in Europe.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] So much so that by now the unification of a divided Germany is on the agenda, moreover, so is the merger of the two German marks, and this blows up the CEMA system at its foundations. It is questionable whether Hungary is capable at all of adapting itself to this situation.

[Wapenhans] This is not a question. You have no other choice, you must adapt yourself. But do not limit yourself to consider only the challenge, take a look also at the opportunities that are being offered. You have been trading with the Federal Republic of Germany [FRG] thus far, why could you not settle your payments with the German Democratic Republic in convertible marks. As a result of artificial trading systems, some industries were able to feel completely secure because subsidies covered up deficits; efficiency was at the bottom of the list of considerations. And in your country bankruptcy still resembles God's wrath, while in developed countries it is an everyday event.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] The so-called societal cost of transition may be extremely high, several hundreds of thousands of people may find themselves on the streets if the new government implements all the steps the present cabinet has agreed to take, i.e. to make drastic reductions in the budget and in the deficit of the current balance of payments. And there may evolve some tension as a result of which Hungary must request an alleviation of its debt burden.

[Wapenhans] There is no such relationship between the two and Hungary cannot incur more debts than it has now, because even now your debt service is too high. Unemployment has existed thus far, but it was concealed, as can be seen from the huge subsidies. Now unemployment will present itself in the open, but I do not believe that it will occur in such an explosion-like fashion. We must create a flexible labor market, and along with that a social safety net which does not hinder mobility.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Would new World Bank programs be conceivable in the upcoming period?

[Wapenhans] Quite naturally, we will continue implementing the already existing projects. This is so because we are not supporting governments, we are supporting a country, specific concepts instead. Your program for 1990 was developed by the present government, but quite naturally, its goals remain valid in the future.

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### POLAND

#### Listing of Major Joint-Venture Companies Continues

90EP0305A Warsaw FIRMA in Polish
10 Oct, 11 Nov 89


[No 10 Oct 89 pp 21-24]

[Text] We are publishing a list of preferred fields of economic operations for companies with the participation of foreign entities (which appears as the annex to the resolution of the Council of Ministers dated 16 February 1989) due to the great interest of our readers in opportunities for establishing cooperation with foreign capital, as well as with a view to bringing to our readers information on the topic of what one must know and prepare for the needs associated with founding a joint-venture company. Operating in these fields entitles one to apply for extending the period of tax exemptions.

A point-by-point compilation of the data which should be contained in the abbreviated financial statement of a prospective company applying for a permit (at present, with investment under 150 million zlotys, which may be revised upward due to inflation) is also included.

We are publishing a set of required basic company data for the consulting units already in operation which would like to cooperate with the Agency for Foreign Investment.

List of Joint-Venture Companies (continued)

1. Haga Limited Liability Company—Gdansk; a West German-Polish production company for clothing
2. Hueber Limited Liability Company PBH Construction Industry—Lodz; a West German production and services company for construction materials and services
3. Interskaden Limited Liability Company—Szczecin; a Polish-Yugoslav production company for trailer homes and plastic products for health care and household use
4. Mercar Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; an Austrian-American-Polish services company for highway transportation, motor vehicle servicing, and tourism
5. Politalia Limited Liability Company—Siedlec near Bochnia; a Polish-Israeli production company for toys, plastic products, chemicals, plumbing fixtures, electronics
6. Izpol Limited Liability Company—Bytom; Israeli-Polish production company for toys, plastic products, chemicals, plumbing fixtures, electronics
7. Nowapol Import-Export Limited Liability Company—Rudno near Nowa Sol; a West German production and trade company for construction filler materials
8. International Fraternize Supply Limited Liability Company—Krakow; a Polish-Canadian production company for electrical and metal products

9. Hamilton Limited Liability Company—Wroclaw; a West German production and trade company for light industry, machine building, precision mechanics, the electronic, metal-working, and iron and steel industry

10. Fortune International Limited Liability Company—Tarnow; a Polish-West Berlin production and trade company for cosmetics, foodstuffs, clothing, footwear, and containers

11. Team Limited Liability Production and Trade Company—Katowice; an Austrian-Polish production, construction and trade company for construction materials, production of furniture and furniture accessories, finishing elements for housing construction, construction of homes

12. Eraga Limited Liability Company—Trade and Production Enterprise—Warsaw; a Polish-Austrian production and services company for electronics, farm goods and foods, clothing, construction materials, metal goods, products from plastics, computer training and marketing

13. D'Amico Limited Liability Company—Brzeziny; a Polish-Malaysian production and trade company for clothing, dress-making, fabrics

14. Cartem Limited Liability Company—Swiebodzice; a Polish-French production company for brushes

15. Baltic-Stal Limited Liability Company—Gdansk; a West German-Polish production, services, and trade company for ships, floating structures, and environmental protection

16. Tremail Limited Liability Company Production Enterprise with Foreign Capital—Goletów Leczyce 25a; a West German-Polish production company for screws and metal goods

17. Primapol Limited Liability Company—Krzyzmow, Gora Kalwaria Gmina; an Italian-Polish production company for construction materials, clothing, wood products, electric mechanical products

18. Cort-International Limited Liability Company—Zamosc; a Liechtenstein-Polish production and services company for construction materials, clothing, wood and electric mechanical products

19. Inter PPSO Limited Liability Company—Bydlin; a West German-Polish production and services company for wood and wood-chip accessories

20. Pol-Sam-Bitt Limited Liability Company Service and Production Enterprise—Zwierzyn; a West Berlin-Polish services company for laundry shops and car painting

21. Pro International Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Polish-Austrian production and services company for the products of precision mechanics and the electronic industry, data processing services, marketing, and advertisement

22. Albatros-Poland Limited Liability Company—Poznan; a West German-Polish services, transportation, and production company

23. JandJ Export-Import Limited Liability Company—Stanislawow, Leoncin Gmina; a Polish-West German production and services company for farm goods and foodstuffs, construction materials and services

24. Amis Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a West German-Polish production company for pastry, delicatessen, and drinks

25. Palsaro Limited Liability Company—Winow; a West German production and trade company for accessories, leather clothing, garments

26. Trend Limited Liability Company—Katowice; an Austrian production and services company for precision mechanics, the electrotechnical industry, and data-processing services

27. Bepol Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a West German-Polish company for breeding, purchasing, and exporting horses

28. United Systems Limited Liability Company—Poznan; an Austrian production and services company for food service and entertainment activities, construction and installation work, sound and video recording materials

29. ExPlonaft Limited Liability Company PPNH—Warsaw; a Polish-West German production company for high-grade refinery products

30. Twins International Company Limited Liability Company—a Polish-Norwegian production and services company for clothing, fabric decating and grinding

31. Polovat Limited Liability Company—an Italian-British-Polish production and services company for fibers, tiles, facings, and padding, transportation inside the country and abroad

32. Polstone Limited Liability Company—Krakow; a Polish-Dutch production and services company for procuring and processing stone and construction and assembly services

33. Hubertus Limited Liability Company—Dobrzyca near Pila; a Polish-West German production and services company for procuring and processing forest and farm goods, food service, hotel and tourism services

34. Agromex Limited Liability Company—Kobylnica; a West German-Polish production and services company for fruit, vegetables, nursery operation, and food service

35. I.F. Group Inc. Limited Liability Company—Zdunska Wola; Italian-Polish production and services company for the tanning industry, electronic equipment, and processing of farm goods and foodstuffs

36. Grant Limited Liability Company—Krakow; an American production and service company for garments, construction materials and work

37. Furdimex Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Dutch-Polish production and services company for crop farming and processing of fruit and plants, transportation and freight forwarding

38. Bosler-Elektronic Limited Liability Company—Raciborz; a West German-Polish production and services company for electronic devices, subassemblies, and transportation
39. Pegro-Caz Limited Liability Company—Rzeszow; a Polish-Syrian production company for dried vegetables and fruit, casein processing, and production of raw alcohol

40. Mc Kaye Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a West German-Polish production company for garments and tailor-made clothing

41. Europol Joint-Stock Company—a Swiss-Italian-Polish production company for baking, confectionery business, food service, and plastic products

42. East Point Limited Liability Company—Poznan; a Polish-West German production and services company for electronic equipment and software, textile products, and printing

43. Politex Limited Liability Company—Poznan; a Polish-West German production company for textile materials and products

44. Blommimpex Limited Liability Company—Koszalin; a Swedish-Polish production and services company for flowers, vegetables, fruit, farm goods and food processing, promotion and consulting

45. Aston Limited Liability Company—Gdynia; a Polish-Swedish production and services company for products from fabrics, knitted fabrics, and leather, marketing and consulting

46. Viamond OSF Limited Liability Company—Gdynia; a West German-Polish production and services company for detergents and brokerage services in the field of technology transfer

47. Gramex ZM Limited Liability Company—Lisi Ogon near Bydgoszcz; a one-person production and services company operated by a West German citizen dealing in plastics, containers, printing, and transportation services

48. Optomed Limited Liability Company—Bydgoszcz; a one-person production and services company for eyeglass frames, small medical products, grinding lenses for eyeglasses and contact lenses, optical and ophthalmic services

49. Ger-Pol Limited Liability Company Services and Production Enterprise Export-Import—Wola Rafałowska-Krzywy; a Polish-West German-American production and services company for plastics, the sawmill industry, production of farm goods and foodstuffs and construction materials

50. HIS Limited Liability Company—Biezcz, Brody Gmina; a West Berlin-Polish production and services company for wooden accessories, clothing, garments, hosiery, transportation, and freight forwarding

51. Viot International-Polen, Ceramic Dental Technology Laboratory Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a one-person company operated by a Dutch citizen for producing porcelain crowns and bridges (separate and in combination with precious metals)

52. Swedpol Limited Liability Company—Wyszkow; a Swedish-Polish production and services company for textile products, garments, chemical and lighting products, dressmaking, consulting services, commerce

53. ARF Limited Liability Company—Jelenia Gora; a one-person production company for construction materials, ceramics, machine building, and precision mechanics

54. POL-Skanska EJSYMONT Limited Liability Company—Swinoujscie; a Polish-Swedish production and services company for construction woodwork and construction services

55. ELAMID Construction and Services Enterprises Limited Liability Company—Gliwice; a Polish-Soviet production company for diagnostic systems, processing of natural products, and upgrading of industrial and construction waste to construction materials

56. Cobra International Limited Liability Company Production and Commercial Enterprise—Krakow; an Austrian-Polish production and services company

57. Telimenas Bis Limited Liability Company—Turek; a Polish-West German production and services company for clothing and trade

58. Personal Computer Studio Limited Liability Company—Wrocław; an Austrian-Polish production and services company for video electronics, video technology, electronics, electronic communications, optical equipment, production of data-processing devices, furniture, transportation, and freight forwarding

59. Sargopol Limited Liability Company—Brzozowa; a one-person company operated by a West German citizen for construction woodwork, furniture, wooden accessories, clothing, plastics processing

60. dBP Products Limited Liability Company—Rawicz; a West German-Polish production and services company for sound-absorbing, insulating, and steel elements and subassemblies, concrete and installed elements

61. International Business Services Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Polish-Canadian consulting company for operating a school of management, economic advice, legal aid, maintenance of a data bank, investment brokerage, promotional and trade-fair activities

62. Raimos Foto Limited Liability Company—Gdansk; a one-person company operated by a Finnish citizen for photography, accessories, equipment and materials for photography

63. Met-Lam Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a West German-Polish industrial company for non-ferrous metallurgy, foundry, metallurgical machinery and equipment, data processing equipment, cables, wires, electro-technical and plastic products

64. Kenpol Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Lichtenstein-Polish production, trade, and services company for the “Kenitex” plastering compound, construction and construction materials, and construction and assembly work

65. Madol Limited Liability Company—Mszana Dolna; a Yugoslav-Polish production company for lumber, semi-finished goods, furniture, semi-products and other carpentry products

66. Polotex International Limited Liability Company—Lodz; an American-Polish production, services
and trade company for hosiery, underwear manufacturing, the textile, hosiery, and garment industries, and plastic products

67. Sedar Limited Liability Company—Miedzyrzec Podlaski; a French-Polish production company for poultry farming, processing of feathers, farm goods, and foodstuffs, and production of animal fodder

68. NTT System Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a French-Polish production, services, and trade company for electronic products and transportation

69. Spolem Maximal Limited Liability Company—Bielsko-Biala; a Polish-West German trade company for domestic trade

70. Cord Limited Liability Company—Zielona Gora; a Polish-West German production and services company for construction and furniture woodwork, underwear production, the garment industry, and entertainment services

71. Metrum Corporation Limited Liability Company Production and Trade Enterprise—Kolbiel; a one-person production and service company operated by an American citizen for producing brake pipes and frames for glasses, screws, nails, and terminals for brake pipes

72. Renoma Limited Liability Company—Wloclawek; a Polish-British production and services company for construction materials, maintenance services, transportation equipment services, waste processing, and production of machinery and equipment

73. Italpol-Bud Limited Liability Company—Slupsk; an Italian-Polish production, services, and trade company for construction, installation, and assembly work, investment project trusteeship, concrete work, plastering, insulation materials, woodwork, construction of residential homes, and trade

74. Intrade Limited Liability Company—Lazy near Warsaw; a one-person production company operated by a Lebanese citizen for rubber and metal goods, lenses and frames for glasses, screws, nails, and terminals for brake pipes

75. Piomar Limited Liability Company—Gogolin; a West German-Polish production and services company for construction materials, woodwork, leasing of machinery and equipment, and transportation

76. Altrex Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Swedish-Polish production, services, and trade company for plastic products, wood products, farm goods and foodstuffs, housing construction, and consulting services

77. Moda-Textil Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a West German-Polish production company for garments, textiles, foodstuffs, fodder, utilization, electronics, and construction

78. Progres Limited Liability Company—Wroclaw; a Polish-West German production, services, and trade company for procuring and processing scrap metal, production of spare parts for machinery and equipment, transportation, leasing of containers, and municipal services

79. Connect Film Comur Service Limited Liability Company—Poznan; a Polish-West German production company for cartoons, book illustrations, comics, board games

80. Intertrans Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Polish-Austrian services and trade company for transportation, freight forwarding, exports and imports of textile products

81. Lubrol Limited Liability Company—Lubniewice; a West Berlin-Polish production, services, and trade company for farm goods and foodstuffs, waste utilization, production of containers, and processing of secondary raw materials

82. Eurowax Limited Liability Company—Straszynt; a Swiss-Polish production company for chemical and plastic products and packaging materials

83. Friend of Children Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Polish-Lebanese services and trade company for tourism, export and import of foodstuffs in short supply, dairy products, footwear, textiles, means of personal hygiene and toys

84. Formaexport LDA Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Portuguese-Polish design and production company for molds for plastic products, production of alloys, powders, and ceramics, design, innovation, production of agricultural equipment, development of natural deposits, and construction materials

85. Santa-Monica Institute Limited Liability Company—proprietary production—Kamien Pomorski; a Swedish-American-Polish services, production, and trade company for treatment, balneology, medical, laboratory, and hygienic products, processing of health foods, sanatorium and hotel services

86. Inter-Forma Limited Liability Company—International Enterprises for Industrial Design—Warsaw; a Polish-Soviet production, services, and trade company for artistic design, model development, cooperation, and brokerage

87. Wi-Kon Trading Limited Liability Company—Szczecin; a Polish-Swedish production and services company for producing and servicing containers

88. Roma Limited Liability Company—Lomianki; a West Berlin-Polish production company for clothing

89. Begatex-PL Limited Liability Company—Lodz; a Polish-West German production, services, and trade company for garments, clothing design, transportation, and trade services

90. RG Creation Francaise Limited Liability Company—Przerosl; a French-Polish production, services, and trade company for the agricultural and food industry, dress-making, international transportation, hotel and tourist services, trade

91. KMW Engineering Limited Liability Company—Solec Kujawski; a one-person production and services company for plumbing fixtures, air-conditioning, design, construction, planning, advice, transportation, and freight forwarding

92. Okimes Limited Liability Company—Gdynia; a Swedish production and trade company for sanitary products, electronic equipment, and domestic trade
93. Milex Limited Liability Company—Szczecin-Kijewo; a West-German-Polish production company for plastics, packaging, padding, and fixtures

94. Montana Corporation Limited Liability Company—Krakow; an Austrian-Polish production, services, and trade company for producing mineral, lime, and ceramic aggregate and raw materials, concrete industry, construction, repair and installation services, assembly of metal structures

95. Donau Laboratory Joint Stock Company—Warsaw; a West German-Polish production, services, and trade company for microcomputer systems, software, data processing, electronic and maintenance services, production of construction materials

96. Bioton LTO Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Polish-English production and services company for producing antibiotics, raw and semi-finished materials for biotechnology, medical equipment and machinery, diagnostic and maintenance services

97. Eurotex Limited Liability Company—Jezlesnia; a West German-Polish production and services company for the garment industry and confections

98. Bemmet Limited Liability Company Production and Trade Enterprise—Katowice; a Polish-American production company for fire fighting equipment and construction materials

99. Maz-Mac Limited Liability Company—Olsztyn; a Polish-Canadian production and trade company for the fishing industry

100. Edycja Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Swedish-Polish production and services company for publishing and printing operations, production of paper containers, advertisement and marketing

101. Albrecht Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a West Berlin-Dutch-Polish production and services company for wooden products, processing of farm goods and foodstuffs, planting of decorative plants, maintenance of pavements and road paving

102. Kar + P Limited Liability Company—Szczuczyn; a West German-Polish production and services company for precision mechanics, transportation, electric technologies, the chemical, glass, woodworking, and metalworking industries, tourism and recreation

103. Tebah Export-Import Limited Liability Company—Zabrze; a Swiss-Polish production and services company for construction materials, wood products, dressmaking, medical equipment, complete delivery services for machinery equipment, design and expert review

104. Drewtex Limited Liability Company—Gliwice; a Polish-West German production company for parquet floors, construction woodwork, furniture, foundry molds

105. Faust and Co. Limited Liability Company—Ciechanow; a West German-Polish services and trade company for repairing and selling cars and agricultural equipment and maintenance services

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[Text] 1. Enekol Joint Stock Company—Warsaw; a Polish-West German production and services company for power-generating equipment, steel structures, tanks, chemicals for water treatment, and maintenance services

2. Euromax Limited Liability Company—Krakow; an Australian-Polish production company for the production of flowers and decorative plants, vegetable processing, and imports

3. Weddpol Limited Liability Company—Rzeszow; an American production company for garments

4. Paul Arens Limited Liability Company—Tczew; a West German production company for plumbing fixtures, wood products, and construction materials and elements

5. Amerex Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; an American-Polish production and services company for printing, photography, athletic equipment, household appliances, textile products and garments, construction materials, hotel and tourist services

6. Polish Cable Television Joint Stock Company—Warsaw; a Dutch-Polish production and services company for building and operating a cable TV system and services in this field

7. Polindus Limited Liability Company—Krakow; a Polish-West German production and services company for producing mineral, lime, and cement, cement expectancy, vegetable protein

8. Trapex Limited Liability Company Production and Services Enterprise—Sopot; a Polish-West Berlin production company for furniture, construction woodwork, ships, spare parts for machinery and equipment

9. Drewtex Limited Liability Company—Poznan; a Swedish-Polish production company for wood products, hosiery, garments, and processing of herbs and forest ground cover

10. Texal Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; an Icelandic-Polish production company for plastic products, chemical equipment, and imports

11. Szaogpol Limited Liability Company—Borowo, Kartuzy Gmina; a West German-Polish production company for processing steel plates into rolled sections for housing and industrial construction, structures, and components of equipment

12. Duo Tourist Limited Liability Company—Opole; a West German-Polish services company for hotel and food services, tourist services, imports, and exports

13. Geber-BPBP Limited Liability Company—Bydgoszcz; a Polish-West German production and services company for construction materials, construction and assembly work, and transportation services

14. Sarex Limited Liability Company—Szczecin; a Swedish-Polish production company for construction machinery and equipment, and production of metal cargo boxes for dump trucks, construction materials, and nails

15. Thermoplast Limited Liability Company—Libiaz; a Swiss-Polish production and services company for construction materials, power and electronic communication cables, domestic trade, and production of manufactured homes

16. Budolux Limited Liability Company—Poznan; a Swiss-Polish production and trade company for construction materials, power and electronic communication cables, domestic trade, and production of manufactured homes
17. Labitech Limited Liability Company—Poznan; a Polish-West Berlin production company for metering equipment, medical and laboratory equipment, glass processing, construction woodwork, foodstuffs, dental equipment, and prosthetic materials

18. Merk Limited Liability Company—Gdansk; a West German-Polish production and services company for breeding pedigree dogs, production of electronic and electric equipment, foodstuffs, metal goods, locksmith and tourist services

19. Top-Sei Limited Liability Company—Gdansk-Stogi; a Polish-Belgian production company for the outfitting of ships and yachts, port equipment, plastic products, wood and metal products

20. Casjapolex Limited Liability Company—Dobra, Szczecein Voivodship; a Belgian-Polish production company for wooden accessories KGN [National Economy Classification]-177

21. Intercol-Polen Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Polish-West German production company for automotive goods, rust-proofing, sealing, and sound-absorbing materials, glue production

22. Peko Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a West German-Polish production company for technical equipment, design, retail outlets, and foreign trade

23. Elegancia Italiana Limited Liability Company—Szczecin; an Italian-Polish production company for clothing

24. West-Ost Reise Service Limited Liability Company—Olsztyn; a West German-Polish construction and services company for the construction of a hotel with food-service facilities, hotel, recreation, and food services

25. Solcon Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Polish-French production company for plastic products, cosmetics, processing of farm goods and foods, and pastry products

26. ACON Agency Limited Liability Company—Lublin; a West German-Polish services and construction company for tailor services, transportation, xerographic design, construction, and advertising services, construction of houses

27. Exi-Pol Limited Liability Company—Lodz; a Polish-West German production and services company for construction materials and design services

28. Mini-Maxi Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Polish-Syrian production company for plastics and metal products, construction elements, and sales

29. Swentexpol Limited Liability Company—Wroclaw; a Swedish-Polish production company for textile rubberized belts, hygienic tampons, and packaging of drugs

30. Interlok Limited Liability Company—Pila; a Polish-West German production, trade, and services company for repairing steam locomotives, production of sound-recording equipment, metal and construction products, publishing operations, chemical and construction products, printing services and trade

31. Proflex Limited Liability Company—Gowino near Wejherowo; a Swedish-Polish production and services company for construction ceramics—KGN-144, construction and design services, industrial design

32. Kings Casino Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a West German service company for operating casinos, currency exchange, and food service

33. Context Limited Liability Company—Slubice; a West German-Polish production company for the garment industry KGN-211

34. Europlast Limited Liability Company—Chyliczki near Warsaw; a Polish-Swedish production company for plastic products, cosmetics, chemicals, and technical accessories for plastic products

35. Witus Company Limited Liability Company—Poznan; an English-Polish production and services company for the restoration and reproduction of antiques, design and production of electronic equipment and devices, embroidery, and services

36. Warta-Tex Limited Liability Company—Warta; a West German-Polish production company for underwear and garments

37. Polskal Limited Liability Company—Lwowek near Warsaw; a Polish-Swedish production company for the procurement of natural stone and trade

38. Inter Wood Limited Liability Company—Miastawko; an Israeli-Polish production company for wood products

39. Marko International Limited Liability Company—Kedzierzyn Kozle; a Polish-West German production and services company for wood products, construction materials, leather products, purse-making services, and sales

40. Feldpol Limited Liability Company—Poznan; a Polish-West German production, trade, and services company for planting and processing modern strains of vegetables, breeding race horses, and agricultural services

41. International Technology Transfer Limited Liability Company—a West German-Polish production and services company; mining, and metallurgy equipment, environmental protection equipment, and design services

42. Turpol Limited Liability Company—Nowy Dwor Mazowiecki; an English-Polish production company for fur garments and accessories, production equipment for breeding fur animals, production of animal fodder, and organization of pelt auctions

43. City Homes Limited—Gdynia; an Australian-Polish production and services company for the construction of homes and production of construction materials

44. Badenia Salva Dent Limited Liability Company—Wrocław; a West German production and services company for semi-finished products, materials for the needs of dentistry, assembly of equipment and prosthetic services

45. Sodif-Pol Limited Liability Company—Krakow; a French-Polish industrial and trade company for the food and vegetable industry, the garments, fur, and toy-making industries, retail and wholesale trade
46. Grabietz und Lewicki Limited Liability Company—Krakow; a West German-Polish industrial and trade company for construction woodwork, construction materials, and trade
47. Komatom Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Soviet-Polish industrial company for the sawmill and tanning industry, non-ferrous metals, marketing, and advertising
48. Rudnik Limited Liability Company—Rudnik on the San; a Polish-West German industrial company for electronic equipment, construction woodwork, furniture, products of basketmaking, plastic products, and toys
49. Nexus Limited Liability Company—Poznan; a Swedish production and services company for packaging flowers, textile and wooden products, furniture, food and tourist services
50. Edelweiss Limited Liability Company—Szczecin; a Polish-West Berlin production and services company for washing machines and equipment, maintenance services
51. Christianapol Limited Liability Company—Poznan; a West German production and services company for furniture, light and heavy clothing, and services
52. International Textile Factory Limited Liability Company—Osieczna; a Belgian-Polish production company for sports clothing and hosiery
53. Inter Befa Limited Liability Company—Bielsko-Biala; a Polish-West German production company for the foundry industry and metal work
54. Nuova Alimar Limited Liability Company—Wadowice; an Italian-Polish production company for foodstuffs
55. Befama Limited Liability Company—Bydgoszcz; a Polish-West German production company for files and milling cutters
56. Pollas-Lazos Limited Liability Company—Lubstow, Koszalin Voivodship; a Polish-Greek production and services company for planting bushes, decorative trees, production of refrigerated products, processing of vegetables and fruit, and land-reclamation and planting services
57. Kodan Limited Liability Company—Boczki, Kocieniew Gmina; a Danish-Polish production company for the garment industry and services
58. Swea-Inwest Limited Liability Company—Magdalenka; a Swedish-Polish production and services company for construction and finishing materials and construction services
59. Scan-Trex Joint Stock Company—Karczew; a Soviet-English-Polish services company for repair services, maintenance services for agricultural machinery and services to the machine building industry
60. OHM Limited Liability Company—Gorzow Wielkopolski; a Polish-English production company for wood products, assembly of electrical and electronic equipment, and construction materials
61. Fashion House Telimena Joint Stock Company—Lodz; a Polish-Belgian production company for garments product and knitted goods, cosmetics, chemicals, and athletic equipment and devices
62. Daunex Limited Liability Company—Rzeszow; a Polish-West German production and services company for processing poultry, procuring feathers and down, food service, tourist and consulting services
63. Lechman Limited Liability Company—Bydgoszcz; a West German-Polish production and services company for special containers, production waste, sorting equipment, and construction services
64. Gatex Limited Liability Company—Wrocław; a Swiss-Polish production company for garments
65. Polho Limited Liability Company—Katowice; a Polish-West German production and services company for construction materials, coal concentrate, boiler equipment, and consulting services in the field of environmental protection
66. Opol-Rapp Limited Liability Company—Opole; a Polish-West German production company for construction materials and design
67. Irena Miller Limited Liability Company—Inowrocław; a Polish-American production and services company for glass products, consulting, and promotion services
68. John-Pol Limited Liability Company—Skala, Krakow Voivodship; a Canadian production company for knitted goods, hosiery, fur and leather clothing
69. Eurowars Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Polish-Danish production and trade company for clothing, cosmetics, packaging, and trade
70. Pro Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a West German-Polish production and services company for garments and freight-forwarding and transportation services
71. Runid Limited Liability Company—Ruciane, Krakow Voivodship; a Canadian production company for wooden containers
72. Voxel Limited Liability Company—Szczecin; a Japanese-Polish production company for manufacturing software for computers and micro-computer systems
73. Golda Favorit Limited Liability Company—Pyskowice; a West German-Polish production and services company for plastic products, transportation, freight-forwarding and tourist services
74. PIK Limited Liability Company—Polisch [as published] International Recycling—Poznan; a Dutch-Polish production company for electric motors, cables, wires, non-ferrous and ferrous metals, plastics
75. ABP-Polonia Limited Liability Company—Tarnowskie Gory; a West German-Polish production company for construction woodwork, plastic products, and finished elements for housing construction
76. Tesso Limited Liability Company—Krakow; a Polish-Swiss production and services company for clothing, underwear, fabrics, and tailor services
77. Elpact Ltd Limited Liability Company—Zabrze; a Polish-American-English production company for computer and electronic equipment, devices for TV relay, communications and software
78. Expac Limited Liability Company—Slupsk; a Swedish production and services company for packaging, wood-chip briquettes, printing, housing construction, transportation services, and repair of vessels.

79. Omega-Service Limited Liability Company—Wodzislaw Slaski; a West German-Polish services company for restoring and updating machinery, equipment, and communication devices, transportation services, freight forwarding and maintenance.

80. Polsim Limited Liability Company—Opacz Kolina; a Polish-Italian breeding and services company for breeding race, draft, and shepherd horses, and transportation services.

81. Scanwill Ltd Limited Liability Company—Poznan; a Swedish-Polish production and services company for the garment, hosiery, leather, foodstuffs, and herbal industry products and construction, repair, and installation services.

82. Alu-Color Limited Liability Company—Gdansk-Kokoszki; a Swedish-Polish production and services company for window blinds and assembly services.

83. Voran-M.K.P. Limited Liability Company—Katowice; a Polish-Austrian production and services company for agricultural and baking-industry equipment and repairs of used agricultural implements.

84. T.W.D.-I.B.A. Limited Liability Company—Kraszewo; a Swiss production and services company for wooden products, assembly and construction services, and design.

85. Matra-International Limited Liability Company—Wroclaw; a production company for metal products, machinery and equipment for the woodworking industry, electric equipment, household appliances, cosmetics, and construction woodwork.

86. Fortuna Limited Liability Company—Buk-Dobiezn near Poznan; a Swedish-Polish production company for plastic products, separators, and the electronic industry.

87. Balt-Tour Limited Liability Company—Sopot; a Polish-West German production and services company for wood products, farm goods and foodstuffs, tourist and printing services, and a currency exchange office.

88. Novum International Trade Investment Company—Jelenia Gora; a West German production and services company for construction materials, construction of service and office facilities, repairs and updating of buildings, and renting of space.

89. Montana-Enterprises Limited Liability Company—Gostynin; an English-Polish production company for clothing and knitted goods.

90. International Trade Center Limited Liability Company—Warsaw; a Polish-Austrian production and services company for construction materials, construction of service and office facilities, repairs and updating of buildings, and renting of space.

91. Repro-Service Pol Limited Liability Company—Kamien Pomorski; a Swedish-Polish production company for mechanical equipment, printing and reproduction, printing machinery.