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emphasized by Lenin all other "characteristics" of becoming "totalitarianized," would you find the

Now that your anti-Communism is on the way to

part. That is also how the publication of "Fashizmut

[Text] Dear Zhelyu,

Shumanliev's wish for the tone of our polemics was

splendid. But I don't have sufficient sense of humor—
especially now after your rally yesterday (25 February).

That is why the "ambivalence" that I express by the

heading and salutation of this letter is not an attempt at

a joke and is sure to make my exposition difficult. But it

is precisely that ambivalence—to be more precise, it is

precisely the tension between my "human" and my

political attitude towards you that compels me to write

to you. The disparity between my old picture of Zhelyu

Zhlev and his new public role is so great that either the

former must collapse or the latter must change.

Despite the brilliance of such colleagues of yours as Asen

Ignatov, Nedialko Merdzhanov, and Petur, I long ago

had noticed you in the students' lecture hall. For me, you

were more "of the people"; in you I saw the embodiment

of the sound good sense and perseverance of a Bulgarian

country boy who had gained from our revolution the

opportunity to evolve and show his worth.

And because of this impression and for the sake of

freedom of discussion, later I, together with your other

teachers, opposed the repressions that lay in store for you

in connection with your criticism, as a post-graduate

student, of "Lenin's Definition of Matter." I have that in

the course of time you have succeeded in coming to an

appreciation of the principled character of our position:

We did not share your concepts because we well under-

stood that without the "objectively real existence"

emphasized by Lenin all other "characteristics" of

"matter" might be illusory. But we defended you because

we were—and remain—both Communists and demo-

crats.

In recent years your "image" has been enhanced in my

mind because of my admiration of the unexaggerated

facts of your boldness, steadfastness, and tenacity, man-

ifested during your unemployment and forced silence.

I will always challenge the rumor that during Lyudmila

Zhivkova's time you were "patronized" by her. For me, this

"information" is solely a mean-spirited attempt to

cast a dark shadow in one direction and a favorable light

in another. Your appointment to the Institute of Culture

took place because of the strong pressure of "liberal Communists" and without any compromises on your

But I would not want you to think that my resignation

betokened complete agreement with you or any very high

estimation of your book... I don't want to offend you—I

value your theoretical ingenuity. But I had already read

both Hannah Arendt and Karl Friedrich and other

investigators of totalitarianism, so I should agree, for

example, with your admiring writers, in whose opinion

you had discovered the "mechanism" of the totalitarian

state! For me, you were—and you remain—biased and

unconscionable in insinuating an analogy between Hit-

lerism and Stalinism. Moreover, it—that analogy—was

ancient news for us. I recall, among other things, that

back in our early student days Bernard Muntyan ven-
tured a joke like this: He read passages from Alfred

Rosenberg about the party-mindedness of art and made

us guess their author—we tried to list the names of the

greatest Marxist-Leninists....

In any event, it wasn't we, your Communist friends, who

were able to learn something fundamental from "Fash-

izmut." And if we rejoiced over its being printed, it was

because we ourselves desired the democratization of our

society and the overcoming of our homegrown totalitar-

ianism.

Now that your anti-Communism is on the way to

becoming "totalitarianized," would you find the

stamina to acknowledge that the social esteem in which

you were held during the years of repressions was due
to the many Communist intellectuals who wanted

ideological disputes to be solved solely by ideological

means, was due to the strong democratic current in the

Communist Party? Or have you inwardly already

joined those who no longer elevate their "nonparty status"
to the height of some kind of moral exploit and are

unwilling to listen even to "their own" Havel and

Solzhenitsyn when they talk about common guilt? Is it

with those who always voted for everything presented
to them and who often toadied to everybody they are

dependent upon, but who now pretend to be purer than

all and sundry "dirty Communists"—is it with these

that you could reach closer rapprochement?

But when—despite my resistance—it was sent to the

printer's, I signed (on 8 November 1982) a letter to the

Secretariat of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party]

Central Committee in which I stated that "the possibility

of my fulfilling my duties as editor in chief" was thereby

ended and I requested "to be relieved of the concerns of

editing FILOSOFSKA MISUL."

But I would not want you to think that my resignation

betokened complete agreement with you or any very high

estimation of your book... I don't want to offend you—I

value your theoretical ingenuity. But I had already read

both Hannah Arendt and Karl Friedrich and other

investigators of totalitarianism, so I should agree, for

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with those who always voted for everything presented
to them and who often toadied to everybody they are

dependent upon, but who now pretend to be purer than

all and sundry "dirty Communists"—is it with these

that you could reach closer rapprochement?
To wind up our recollections, let me take you back to your defense of your doctoral dissertation. I assure you that at least half of your qualified Marxist examiners did not take seriously the "relational theory of personality" that you presented—first, because almost every personality theory almost always has been relational; second, because this relationality has been formally recorded even in reference publications such as the French "Universal Encyclopedia"; third, because in your case the theory is very sketchy with inadequately clarified premises (do you remember your best friend Ned’yalko Merdzhanov stating his views during your defense?). But what for us was incomparably more important was that our Zhelyu, the mercilessly persecuted brave fighter for freedom and justice, was defending his doctoral dissertation.

Here I pause and ask myself whether I’m not striving now, for purposes of the political struggle, to strip you of your halo of thinker that your fanatical UDF crowds see around your head. I don’t think so. I would rather think that all of us who want true values to occupy their true place should oppose their present anticultural "transfer" from one area into another, for example, from politics into literature or philosophy. Would you agree to turn into a philosophical myth because you have become a political leader?

No, I don’t want to offend you! As your teacher and frequent reviewer, I think that I have correctly appraised your good qualities and capabilities. And now I have a right to be disturbed not only by the extreme apologies of your followers, but also by the initial symptoms of your own inadequate self-appraisal (for example, in the new preface to "Fashizmut").

But what disturbs me most is your present political role. You have become the most influential leader of the opposition. Your Communist friends—from the Club for the Support of Glasnost and Perestroyka—have injected you into this new orbit. But you see, the logic of confrontation leads both you and Petko and other former “good boys” to what, in my opinion, is an intolerable trinity of historical injustice, theoretical nonsense, and political reactionarism.

These are harsh words. But even harsher are the realities behind them.

Your greatest historical injustice is the thesis that Communist rule has from the start been both totally disastrous and immoral. But if by some miracle you have forgotten some merits of the nomenklatura [bureaucracy], the apparatus [apparatus] and the totality [totalitarian power], as some of you are already inclined to call the entire party, then direct your attention a little more seriously at least to the civilized West. There you could find fairly authoritative non-Marxist specialists who say that the “communist system” worked very well during the period of extensive development that ended somewhere in the 1970’s when there began the stagnation and then the degradation, caused by the excessive centralization, incompatible with the requirements of the new information technology and intensive development. It was then, precisely in leading party circles, that the idea was born and the struggle for perestroyka began. But you, for all your pseudoscientific Westernizing views, began to prefer over such analyses a native antihistorical and [passage missing]. As for the peculiarity of most recent Bulgarian history, I simply cannot believe that you have forgotten what you directly experienced.

I will not draw contrasts, invidious for our opposition, between it and the dissidents in other countries, nor will I make comparisons, flattering for the BCP, between it and other communist parties. But could you sincerely deny, Zhelyu, that the tenth of November was not a result mainly of opposition (now declared to be “popular”) pressure; that concern for consolidation and “civilization” of the opposition and for the opposition’s prestige through the “round table” was manifested first of all by the Communist reformers; that most of the plans for perestroyka were theirs, repeated afterwards in countless declarations in other people’s name?

An unpleasant curiosity for me was that in theoretical respects you had turned into an apostle for “democratic capitalism,” into a discoverer of every kind of socialism, such—according to Petko Simeonov’s statement at your last rally—as nobody had either heard of or seen before, while others of your people say that “democratic socialism” is something like a “round square,” an absurd contradiction, for “socialist” as a rule cannot be “democratic…”

Excuse me, but your ears are not at all European, for otherwise after World War II you would have had an earful of “democratic socialism,” for example, in German Social Democratic and English Labor circles. And you could also have seen it, for example, in the “welfare state,” which for a long time was represented by Sweden.

I know, Zhelyu, here again you will say that Swedish socialism is no kind of socialism. But you will say this in pathetic unison with our dogmatists, for your argument is: What kind of socialism can we have there, where 85 percent of the means of production are in private hands? If, however, you could loosen up a little your stiff “old Marxist” thinking about the category of "ownership," simple considerations such as the following, for example, would come to your mind: No refined differentiation between ownership, disposition over, and use could obscure the elementary truth that whatever you have at your disposal, whatever you have authority over, i.e., whatever you can use for your own purposes and interests, is yours. This is why the capitalist, restricted by the state, is not necessarily a hypocrite when he complains that “socialist bondage” weighs heavily on him. The dialectic of possession and distribution is a two-way relationship—not only does the former determine the latter, but also the latter is a measure of the former.

And that is why Swedish socialism is socialism. And in general, the “welfarism” established after World War II,
which has to evolve on the basis of the third technological revolution, is socialist to the extent to which it actually ensures the welfare of the people. Democracy would hardly be complete though, unless the people had power over the fruits of their labor, i.e., unless that power bore the characteristics of socialism.

This kind of organic linking of the two concepts is reminiscent of an old propaganda cliche. But in this instance democracy extends beyond purely political relationships, while socialism encompasses as well social forms, which the Stalinists used to say were a camouflaged bourgeois dictatorship. This rich humane synthesis of democracy and socialism has all the qualities to be a worthy goal of a revitalized Communist Party.

But if my cursory remarks about power and ownership are justified and if you sincerely intend, after the “election victory,” to establish social justice and protection of the socially weak, then your democratic capitalism would very much begin to resemble socialist capitalism! Between it and the “democratic socialism” of our present party leaders there would be a “convergence,” resulting in their being conceived of as identical. Therefore, do not interpret out-stretched hands and concessions as weakness—people are genuinely people and think that the worthy struggle is a struggle of principles rather than of persons. But what do you all think?

Your position is much complicated by a confession, made recently by Petko Simeonov. With his authority as a sociologist, he reminds us that 40 percent of the secondary school graduates and 60 percent of the graduates of higher educational institutions in our country are Communists. I assume that the percentage of Communists at still higher levels is still greater....

Talk as you will about the “criminal” past and “hypocritical” present of the BCP, you could not deny the fact that, due not only to its great numbers, but also to its having been a ruling force for many years, it has placed under close obligation to it almost all serious specialists in all spheres of public life. And however much some of them amuse or irritate us with their unseemly present game of mutual smearing with Zhivkovist muck, their party-mindedness or party-hack pasts at previous rallies. And I saw not only well-nourished, until recently, party hacks but also descendants of the former bourgeoisie—in the old expression of Zakhari Stoyanov, “rabid foxes”—whose eyes, until recently cast downwards, now flash rapaciously. It seems to me, however, still more are ambitious mediocrities who want at all costs to find a social culprit for the discrepancy between their self-appraisal and the social recognition they have received or not received. I refer to the wingless creatures whose feeling of inadequacy can best be expressed by Khristo Radevski’s verses of a former time, slightly modified by me:

Whither, whither might I by now have flown,
But totalitarianism held me back?

Ner are they few, the socially unconstrained rowdies, whose most disruptive instincts are readily unleashed in the multitude....

From a humane, democratic, and scientific perspective, what could you put up against a truly revitalized Communist Party, resolved, for example, to work for the election of an effective parliament, composed of the best specialists capable of solving most competently the acutest problems of our country in the best interest of the largest possible part of its population? If you were faithful to your original impulses, you would all simply have to join this party in behalf of the public good and national harmony. But you aren’t doing this. Why?

The hypothesis is likely that in this case morality has turned into politics. Among your people there are power- and glory-seekers who want to be chiefs. Are you one of them, too?

The normal human mind is ashamed of the nakedness of such motivation and strives to conceal it, sometimes even from itself. And lo and behold, you have all begun to change your emphases. Petko, in his address at a rally, extolled private ownership with no reservations whatsoever and tried to put down every kind of socialism. I fear that with such reorientation you will all turn into parochial spokesmen not of progressive, but of neocorporatist forces in the modern capitalist world; your social goal may become not some kind of “democratic,” but a dog-eat-dog capitalism.

Doesn’t this prospect shock you? Or for you all and for your ambition to be chiefs, is the main danger that any Communists—even if “reformed,” but not “mothballed”—might remain on the “commanding heights”?

Have you noticed how, in keeping with your ideological reorientation, your social basis has begun to change, too? Actually, well-behaved, critical, and democratic people still predominate at your rallies. But there has been an ominous increase in both the comparative proportion and in the aggressiveness of vehement anti-Communists....

At your rally the BCP was again branded with slogans as mafia, composed of executioners and gluttons. Things even went as far as a bold “seizure” of the Mausoleum rostrum. Who are they, these “heroes” of yours—for they are yours? I got a good look at the anti-Communist “elements” at previous rallies. And I saw not only well-nourished, until recently, party hacks but also descendants of the former bourgeoisie—in the old expression of Zakhari Stoyanov, “rabid foxes”—whose eyes, until recently cast downwards, now flash rapaciously. It seems to me, however, still more are ambitious mediocrities who want at all costs to find a social culprit for the discrepancy between their self-appraisal and the social recognition they have received or not received. I refer to the wingless creatures whose feeling of inadequacy can best be expressed by Khristof Radevski’s verses of a former time, slightly modified by me:
What! Are you glad you can rely on the anti-Communist rabble who would timorously scatter and hide if the times of repressions had not passed—our native rabble, who have nothing in common either with the Soviet restructuring, or with the long-time, multimillion-strong Polish Solidarity, or with the historic Prague Spring, or with the East German striving for unification? Will they continue their covert or overt incitement against Communists as against inveterate criminals who should be hounded to death? I ask you seriously—not rhetorically, but as a matter of fact: To whom are you closer—your former democratic and Communist friends or to the potential fascists, who believe in Hitler's discovery that whoever controls the street controls the country?

They are not going to take possession [of the government]. But I want to warn you that if they should win out, they would discard you like an antiquated "rocket carrier"—they would not forgive your former party membership and your long devotion to Marxist historical materialism. But they will not win! They could only impede the overcoming of the neo-Stalinist past....

You must not underestimate the political growth of our people, who are rapidly rising high. They, these people, very soon will be able to distinguish demagogues and careerists from leaders who are selfless and clean. Where will you be numbered? It still depends on you yourself.

Podkrepa, Other Labor Leaders in Televised Debate
90EB0320A Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 5 Jan 90 pp 3-4

[Text] As we promised our readers, we are publishing today the full text of the minutes of the television discussion which took place on 28 December. The initial plan was to have the television invitation extended to Krust'o Petkov, chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee of the Bulgarian Independent Trade Unions, and Konstantin Trenchev, chairman of the Podkrepa Independent Labor Federation. Subsequently what we saw was essentially a roundtable discussion involving the participation of experts.

The present publication is the textual recording with all the inconsistencies of a spontaneous discussion.

Moderator: Our television discussion is beginning at a rather late hour. I hope that you will be patient. We have invited to the studio of Bulgarian Television Dr. Konstantin Trenchev, chairman of the Podkrepa Independent Labor Federation; Plamen Darakchiev, federation secretary; Georgi Spasov, member of the federation council; Prof. Dr. Krust'o Petkov, chairman of the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions; Asen Rizov, secretary of the Commission for the Protection of Labor; and Dimitur Kamenov, head of the labor conflicts group. As you can see, these are leaders of the trade union or, of late, as you say, of the syndicate movement. Indeed, over the past two days there has been a great deal of talk about strikes, "for" and "against." Many questions were raised related to the trade unions and the trade union movement and its present development, and it is entirely normal for the interest shown by the Bulgarian working people in the further development of the trade union movement in our country to be quite justified and natural.

I hope that in this evening's discussion in the studio of the Bulgarian Television we shall be able to answer some of the questions.

The discussion, dear viewers, to be conducted this evening has no specified rules. There will be no five-minute rounds, according to the wish of either side. Nonetheless, we shall attempt, in the course of a tolerant discussion, to provide equal time enabling anyone who has anything to say to defend his idea in front of the television audience.

I suggest that we begin with a question addressed to the two of them, to Dr. Trenchev and Prof. Petkov and, naturally, anyone of the other comrades who would like to participate should be free to do so. How do you assess the events of the last days of the last month of the year, what is the situation in the country and, against this background, what are the tasks of the trade union movement, of the workers and employees organized in trade unions? Who would like to begin? The other one will be given the opportunity to conclude the discussion. Who would like to start? Please, Dr. Trenchev.

Trenchev: I would like to review the last few days of the year and the month within the context of the events which occurred that year not only in Bulgaria but throughout Eastern Europe. I can boldly claim that that year, 1989, has been historical for the countries in Eastern Europe. More than ever before, that year the totalitarian systems which had been established for more than four decades in those countries proved its total lack of foundation and its dismantling was undertaken. This is taking place at different speeds, for a variety of reasons, in the individual countries and there is nothing astounding in this. Our country is no exception. The personnel changes which took place 45 days ago provided a strong impetus to the natural processes of dismantling of the totalitarian society and, within this framework, the trade unions as well have their emphatically established position. Like a big social organization, they were bound to find their place in this natural process and let me say that they are persistently seeking their position within a civilian society and that it is precisely this type of society that we would like to build and to break with totalitarianism once and for all. Within such a civil society, both the different parties which are now being formed and the various movements, associations, and many other formations of independent citizens, the trade unions as well, which have the opportunity to be the biggest organizations, for the simple reason that labor is the basic human activity, are also finding or stubbornly seeking their place in the building of such a society. In this sense the Independent Labor Federation, which has a very short history, having been created only 10 months ago, is already gathering
strength and has become a social force which is heeded by the authorities, one way or another, although we have not been officially registered. Furthermore, we believe that our trade union demands cannot be separated from political demands, for in practical terms we are firmly convinced that without political changes the totalitarian system cannot be dismantled and that our economic program, which is part of the overall program of the federation, cannot be fulfilled.

I would define this year as being an exceptionally dynamic one, a year of stubborn and difficult struggle, and let us hope that next year, 1990, will be much more constructive.

**Moderator:** Yes, thank you.

**Petkov:** I would agree with the overall assessment made by Dr. Trenchev concerning the processes which developed in our country this year and what is taking place in the other socialist countries, as well as the connection among them. I would only like to add a characteristic feature of the situation now, in the final month or month and a half of the year: the incredible intensification of the political atmosphere although there are those who believe that the pace is slow. This may apply to the official pace of change but tension is growing within the life of the society which, to a large extent, is a logical development. Our impressions are that the Bulgarian people are concerned. Many people are worried about their families and their children and their income about the availability of produce in the stores, and I think that this is manifested in the numerous statements made by the citizens. This very evening, on television, you showed this situation; we also have data, however, about so-called skeptics in Bulgaria who, worried by this circumstance, hesitate about the position they should take and would like to identify, to see the true face of the new organizations, to see whether the old totalitarian structures are disappearing.

At the same time, on either end there are other people—I would not call them extremists—some of whom are engaged in very active political struggle.

The country finds itself in a very difficult economic position. We are categorically displeased by the evaluation which was provided at the preceding plenum concerning the country's economic situation. We find it excessively general. The data which were quoted began to make the rounds a few days before the plenum. No full and overall picture of the Bulgarian economy at present was provided. There was no analysis which we could consider, as trade unions, or which society could see and assess. Naturally, this would have helped people to orient themselves. Otherwise, the feeling of the specialists and the economists with whom I have spoken is that we have hit the bottom of the economic crisis. Whether such is the case, however, remains to be seen.

Finally, let me say that, particularly in the past few days, there has been a great deal of concern about the round-table discussions just on the eve of the new year; there have been many unexplained events as well as an appeal to strike. Since yesterday we have been holding a discussion with Dr. Trenchev. We had to define positions or change them, which made the hesitations even stronger. Generally speaking, at this point Bulgaria is restless. That is the way I would put it.

**Moderator:** Yes, our television audience may be curious to know and I would ask both of you to satisfy its curiosity and to see you as you are, seated side by side, for some people are quite convincingly promoting the idea that we are almost at the point of some kind of street warfare. You have been part of the leadership for a very short time and have been its chairman for no more than a few days. Are you embarrassed by such a close dialogue?

**Petkov:** Yesterday I was, to a certain extent, on the purely personal level, for this was the first time that I met Dr. Trenchev, after only hearing about him. As we sat down in hall No. 1 of Sofia University, I was astounded by his physical appearance: a slightly-built person. I thought that he would be physically bigger. After the discussion was started, however, I believe that it became clear, as the records show, that there was a great deal of respect and that this was not a conversation between two people alone. It was a debate with the very broad participation of both Bulgarian and foreign journalists. Because of the delay in the opening of this discussion, while waiting, we spoke about a number of things and it was actually then that our debate began. Therefore, there are elements of negation and experience, particularly among some of our militant members who call for such people to be removed, crushed, and thrown out of the enterprises. I believe that all such things should take place in a most democratic and civilized manner. The Podkrepa Trade Union is a fact. Yesterday Dr. Trenchev reported that it has 70,000 members and if such is the case, this indicates the existence of a large union. They do not have to register. Our legislation does not have such a rule. This is a de facto existence in our social and political life. Such is my interpretation but I may be wrong.

If anyone tries to suppress or limit their activities, it means that such people are misinterpreting the laws of the country, however imperfect such laws may be.

**Moderator:** Yes, Dr. Trenchev is a more experienced chairman than you are. He has held this position for the past 10 months. So, what is your view on this matter?

**Trenchev:** I believe that yesterday's debate was very fruitful. Some doubts were eliminated, a personal contact was made, and I believe that the type of society we would like to build is governed by a single principle, which is tolerance. It seems to me that yesterday we proved in practice our support of such a principle and there is nothing astounding in this fact.

**Moderator:** Yes. Let us now consider the essential condition of the country. Both parties in the debate consider that at the end of 1989 our state found itself in a difficult
situation. What are your programs and what are you suggesting in your programs as the solution? Where do you look for such a solution?

Trenchev: I think that the past experience of the Eastern European countries could become the starting base. We see unequivocally that economically these countries are not in good condition. I would even say that some of them are in a state of clinical death and that they are stubbornly seeking a solution. Most of them saw a market-oriented economy as such a solution, and pluralism in ownership. In our own economic program, and we do have such a program, we have expert commissions and, in particular, a commission of economic experts whose basic ideas are pluralism of ownership with constitutional guarantees of equality among the three types of ownership, i.e., state, cooperative, and private. I believe that we should no longer be apprehensive when we mention that word. It is an objective need. We believe that free competition among these three types of ownership will lead to the establishment of an optimal balance and that in a totalitarian society, with its monopoly of ownership, which is exclusively that of the state, in practice it disheartens human labor while the introduction of pluralism will properly motivate it. As to the fears of how to convert to the system, that is a different matter. Personally, I have no doubt that we shall reach that point. The question is not what line we have taken but how to reach that point. I think that this will be the main difficulty, the way I would identify it as a physician: a conversion from a pathological state—I cannot provide any other qualification of the present condition of the economy and the state as a whole—to a normal condition will be related to social upheavals.

The target is clear. What we must determine is how to reach it, the way, the mechanism which we must choose. Perhaps we must have the courage to prefer faster solutions which would also set our economy faster on a sensible, a firm foundation. If we are fearful, I think that we risk letting society sink into a profound crisis, at which point the solution to all problems will be even more painful.

Moderator: Do you fear that the fast way [to solve these problems] will result in additional phenomena appearing in our social life, which would shake up society and create difficulties in the course of the development process?

Trenchev: I understand what you are saying. Unquestionably, all steps must be considered with a view to their consequences from the psychological and many other viewpoints. However, personally I favor a faster transition. Naturally a sensible one, not a risky one, for a long crisis, whatever the situation, is more dangerous. It leads to a separation of Bulgaria from the already developing new European family. The fast way, the sensible way, is preferable.

Kamenov: Dr. Trenchev, forgive me, you quite frequently speak of the privatizing of property. Do you have any idea how this could be accomplished under Bulgarian conditions?

Trenchev: I think that we should begin by taking a few factors into consideration. There is a specific Bulgarian constellation of attitudes toward ownership. Naturally, the totalitarian system tried intensively to deform and literally to destroy many of these foundations and relations. I think that we should start by privatizing petty ownership, such as land, farming, services, small businesses, and only after an initial capital has been accumulated by these owners or even at the very beginning turn to the stockholding principle. This sector—the cooperative—will be small but with a tendency to grow and to take over ever new sectors from the state sector. I believe, however, that in principle the state sector should account for a certain share. Its size will be determined by social practice. In some countries it may be greater than in others. I think, however, that whatever the situation, in a few years, if we indeed undertake some daring economic reforms this optimal balance will be established and society will advance.

Kamenov: Therefore, you are saying that in a few years this could be accomplished....

Trenchev: Yes, it could.

Kamenov: Yet at the same time we are speaking of fast action.

Trenchev: When I say slowly I think in terms of decades.

Kamenov: Ah, yes.

Petkov: Yes, for our program....

Moderator: Yes, for your program and if you can, as you explain this question, see if there are some nuances in the program which are supported by Podkrepa and which bother you or in which you find points of disagreement.

Petkov: There are serious nuances but, above all, we have very substantial coincidences as far as the trade union part is concerned. In terms of that part of the program is concerned, their demands call for a protection of the interests of the working people of various categories. They emphasize more categories related to intellectual work which, naturally, is fair. Some of their demands are less maximalist compared to ours which may seem more radical, I am referring here to the resolution. In the political area, however, yesterday we discussed the fact that differences are quite substantial and that if you are interested we could clarify them. Above all, however, I would like to speak about our own program.

At the present time we are formulating parallel programs and are trying to apply two of them: a tactical and a strategic. In the strategic we are still weak. Only a few days ago we started asking ourselves the meaning of general agreements and a series of general agreements with the government, and whether we should have a
social contract or not. Today, between 1700 and 1900 I
discussed this matter with some 10 economists. In the
tactical part, we are implementing the content of our
resolution adopted at the sixth plenum. It took some 10
days for a resolution to be passed providing guarantees
to laid-off workers and social insurance, something
which the government has had since March or April. We
updated the packet of documents on minimal and max-
imal pensions which we had added at the last plenum.
Let me say that today, in our meeting with the represen-
tatives of the government, we objected to the fact that no
mention was made that this was done on our request or
at least that our viewpoint had been considered. Today
we were given an explanation for the reason for which
our other viewpoint on the minimal was not considered.
Therefore, we are taking such tactical steps, day after
today. Today we set up a group which will monitor and
help labor conflicts. At the present time I am referring to
labor conflicts and strikes not of a political nature and
which, according to our data, account for 90 percent of
the strikes in the country and which continue to build up
tension.

For the time being I am unable to say anything about
the strategic part. Perhaps at the beginning of January, in
connection with the roundtable meetings we shall be able
to do something. At this point, however, there is an
essentially important feature and I would like to appeal
to Dr. Trenchev. We cannot formulate a strategy without
information. Access to information. The biggest prob-
lems of the Western trade unions involve access to
information. Today a high percentage of the information
is either given in general plans or is considered classified.
I am referring to information related to the budget, finances, etc. Without this we can simply imagine things
but not formulate a strategic program.

**Moderator:** Yes, what you said a while ago, you have a
printed organ and you will certainly be sharing with your
readers when something is being done on the basis of
your suggestion without mentioning you.

**Petkov:** I thought we had agreed that this will be pub-
lished in tomorrow's TRUD. There was an additional
comment made by Minister Belcho Belchev at the
meeting which we held at the Central Council. He
apologized most correctly. He said that I had been
editing... You see, currently we are experiencing some
difficult transitions. So far the perennial references were
to the Council of Ministers and the Central Council of
Trade Unions. For the past month this has been lacking,
or was it two months? In general, however, no mention is
being made of what the trade unions are doing. We
simply have no experience in speaking a democratic
language. I am not saying this with any kind of sense of
indignation but simply noting the fact.

**Moderator:** Yes, Dr. Trenchev mentioned that we could
find useful a similar experience gained by some Eastern
European countries and apply this experience in our
country. What is your feeling on this matter?

**Petkov:** Actually, I did not understand this specifically,
for Dr. Trenchev presented it in most general terms.
There is such an aspect. I would say that we should study
the experience of the Eastern European countries which
sought earlier than we did, and more radically followed,
the path of restructuring. However, since they have
several years of experience—in Poland roughly since
1980, with an unfortunate year of upheavals—let us see
what is positive and what is negative in those matters.
Furthermore, I do not imagine that we could take the
best from all countries, socialist and Western, as Lech
Walesa said, and make a cocktail of Bulgarian society.

It seems to me that we must seek a Bulgarian way of
coming out of the crisis and normalizing the situation for
I agree that we must begin by normalizing society and, as
for democracy, we shall struggle, day after day; but we
still have no democracy for we have no normalized
relations.

**Moderator:** Yes, unquestionably. In your case it is more
difficult. Naturally, the newspaper TRUD is serving the
Central Council of Trade Unions.

**Kamenov:** It is also serving Podkrepa.

**Moderator:** Are there such cases? Are some of your
suggestions printed in TRUD?

**Petkov:** The call for a strike. TRUD gave it priority.

**Spasov:** It seems to me, however, that the call to strike
was issued but not very specifically. In different words,
so that TRUD would not oppose it. It seems to me also
that we are speculating once again with the word
“strike,” the way we until recently speculated with the
word “extremism” and are still doing it. We suggested a
political strike, which means that if it is a two-hour strike
and the demands are met, these two hours will be
subsequently worked out; if the strike lasts a whole day,
that day will be worked out later. It seems to me,
however, that we should deal in depth with differences
which are real, I would say essential, and which could pit
us against each other in a certain sense. What am I
referring to? You say that your electoral speech—the new
alphabet—is our solution to the Independent Bul-
arian Trade Unions. It is your new alphabet and it is
our old alphabet which we are currently updating and
which we offered to our society as a trade union on 18
September in a semi-legal condition, at a time when Dr.
Trenchev and Todor Gagalov were with the Main Inves-
tigative Administration.

**Petkov:** Are you referring to the first declaration?

**Spasov:** Not the first but the second programmatic
declaration which was issued on 18 September. This
applied already to the broadened functions of the Pod-
krepa Trade Union.

**Moderator:** Spasov, is there anything bad in this?

**Spasov:** In what?
Moderator: That the independent and new alphabet is also the old alphabet.

Spasov: No, but also there are many differences. The main difference is that I am not about to speak about the extent to which they are still independent, and so on, but also there are some basic differences: They say that the Bulgarian Trade Unions believe it to be their basic obligation and main responsibility to represent and defend the rights and socioeconomic interests of the members and the labor collective. You say in your speech that we are formulating political demands and are thus aspiring to political power. We consider this an erroneous interpretation. We are not after political power and the purpose of our political demands is the dismantling of the totalitarian system, for the main theme in your speech is the following: So far the Bulgarian Trade Unions were not real trade unions. There were no trade unions whatsoever for, as you said, there was a totalitarian system of management. That is why we believe that there cannot be any real and true trade unions as defenders of the interests of the working people and the intelligentsia without the dismantling of the totalitarian system. Our political demands are based on this fact and our objective is not power but the democratization of society. I would like us to consider this as a starting base.

Petkov: I am very pleased that the question was raised. This is a watershed. It means that what we recently said quite accurately indicates our attitude, with the exception of the term "no trade unions whatsoever." This is a terminology used by Ivan Angelov, the new spokesman. In January he described us as "no trade unions whatsoever" and I can explain why. It is because we, too, were faced by the question of the attitude toward politics and the political struggle which is being waged at the moment, for we have developed essentially a second political opposition center of which Podkrepa is a member and could be almost considered as its strike force. Naturally, this is their right. This reminds me of the Solidarity model. I said in my speech that Solidarity will be the booster rocket for lifting certain political forces. At the present time it is regaining its trade union positions. These are things which I took from the discussion which we held two weeks ago in London, with my Polish colleagues. At the present time there is a confusion in Solidarity and a certain loss of membership. The reason is that Lech Walesa is now forced to pass to the other side of the barricade and to launch his appeals on the basis of another viewpoint. The question which faces us is the following: Should we be indifferent to politics or remain neutral? We decided that if we remain neutral we would betray the interests, the interests you mentioned—labor, social, and economic—of our members. I still believe that these members number in the millions although there is.... Excuse me, we said here that there are only two trade unions. However, there also are independents who are affiliated with neither. Consequently, we are faced with this question and we decided that we shall not become a political party or a political movement but we shall formulate political demands in the forthcoming struggle. I cannot imagine that the millions of trade union members would be indifferent to the outcome of the talks and as to who will prevail. This would be is as naive as to assume that it is all one and the same. How will this be accomplished? We believe that it cannot be accomplished without a sharp political struggle and in the electoral campaign we want to have our own platform and our own representatives.

Spasov: Could you explain your statement in your resolution at the fifth expanded plenum, according to which the trade unions are an organization with a single authority: the authority of its members, operating within the framework of a socialist choice. Actually, to be within the framework of a socialist choice you are defending at this point the power of the Communist Party, for it alone at this moment has made this choice. However, the moment a conflict appears, you call for the democratization of society by defending the party which created, strengthened, and developed the totalitarian power system and which, as of now, should begin to dismantle it. I see this as a serious contradiction, a contradiction which is bound to prevent you from defending the real interests of the working people.

Petkov: You are... may I answer?

Moderator: Of course.

Petkov: You are right. This is a contradiction which, for the time being, we are unable to resolve. This is because we have remained within the framework of the socialist choice. If you read the minutes of our fifth plenum you would see what fierce struggle was waged. People stood up and wanted to make us put on the record that we are acting under the party's leadership. This was printed in TRUD. I stood up and asked why was it that before 9 September the trade unions did not state that they acted under the party's leadership and did they defend at that time the interests of the working people any the worse? This was deleted, which means that we are politically independent but for this time being this is merely a statement. In our sixth plenum as well we wish to act the same way, to go forward.

As to the socialist choice, historically thinking, I entirely agree with you and I explained this in the article which I published in DELO. However, this is my theoretical concept and I cannot impose it upon the organization which I represent. This would not be right. I also believe that we not only have a socialist choice under the pressure of a single party which, in Bulgaria, was actually imposed and was a transfer of the Stalinist model borrowed from the Soviet Union. This was done. Let historians decide whether we had any kind of choice or alternative during that period. As for now....

Kamenov: The socialist choice does not mean choosing the present form of socialism. Let us agree on the
concept. A socialist choice exists in Sweden. The social democrats have made a socialist choice. We too say at the beginning of our resolution that we are in favor of socialism, which is a socialism for man. This will be a different, a new socialism. It is not clear yet as to the type of socialism this will be. We have yet to work on it, for no one can tell us, and those who say that we are working within the framework of socialism and on the basis of socialism, if one were to ask them precisely as to the type of socialism that is, they would be unable to answer you. The socialist choice, however, cannot and must not be interpreted as the type of socialism which so far... this type of socialism no one wants any longer. This is clear.

Spasov: Well, now. No one wants this kind of socialism but neither are you able to describe the type of socialism we shall be creating. Therefore, there is no clarity. You, however, would like to lead, if no one else, at least the working people in this state, and they are numerous. Actually, where are you leading them to if there is no clarity? We have quite a great deal of clarity. It involves the dismantling of the totalitarian system regardless of whether through confrontation or peaceful means, depending on the extent to which the ruling party and the state will truly follow the path of democratization. You are offering no such clarity. We believe that there can be no pluralism of ideas unless the ideas are crystallized in interests and they can be crystallized in interests whenever they are crystallized first in ownership, for the main question which is now facing us is one of dismantling, it is the attitude toward ownership. State ownership absolutizes state interests and what hides behind state interests is precisely that class which we are already openly naming: the nomenclature, the apparat, the party-state bureaucratic apparatus or the Red bourgeoisie as the people have described it quite aptly.

Petkov: Yes, yesterday, as we came out of the discussion, I was asked by a group of teachers and journalists: Are you in favor of socialism? I asked them: What kind of socialism? But tell us your idea of socialism. I cannot conceive of it. I refuse, and I appeal to my serious scientific colleagues to put an end to drawing abstract models which we throw at or impose on the people. This is like a religious belief. Let us think pragmatically. What is it that we need?

First, we need to normalize and improve living standards, etc. As to democracy, you are in favor of democracy and we are in favor of democracy; a new model of human rights; a normal economy and not the present artificial planned economy, whether it will be of very mixed or less mixed. I am in favor of pluralism of forms of ownership, I have said so, but bear in mind that the state is private, the monopoly state is also private, as was confirmed in our country. It became the property of a single person, our former leader who, with one signature....

Spasov: No, it became the property of a class, of a class which supported him....

Petkov: This is true, this is true, we reached that point of absurdity.

Spasov: For example, in my view he remained in power for 35 years because not for a moment did he threaten the interests of that class. He always allowed it, in addition to the privileges which it enjoyed, to plunder as much as possible and as much as it could.

Petkov: Yes. I agree with you as far as the nomenclature class is concerned. I simply wanted to add this: We want humanism, we want equality, and so on, and when you pointed out that last yesterday, the comment was that you are no different from the others. My answer is the following: Those who are leading us today to exhaust one another arguing as to whether there will be capitalism or socialism, democratic or any other type of capitalism, are the same people who today would like to channel the energy of the people into such a struggle instead of letting us really confront and change society. Naturally, we know the direction we are following, we are bound to know it. But let this take place in the course of a dialogue with the people and if we are to change the constitution let us ask the people as to the direction we should be following. It is considered that the people are incompetent, is that not so? However, I think that a new constitution, a new social system, could be achieved only after we have applied a democratic procedure for asking the people, so that we will not have another constitution drafted by some 10 people and instilled in society through the mechanisms of the political struggle. That is why we, as a trade union, say that we shall be politicized and watchful.

Moderator: Good.

Rizov: Nonetheless, we are looked at and listened to above all by the ordinary working people. I believe that they will make their choice and will have the right to make their choice. We are trade union organizations and I believe that it would be more accurate if, above all, we concentrate our attention on the following problem: How do we conceive of the mechanism for the defense of the rights and interests of those whom we represent, those who are our members? This is a question which, in my view, is occupying at present a broad audience which is looking at us.

Moderator: Well, why don't you begin? How do you imagine this type of protection of rights and interests, for this is a serious matter....

Moderator: It is truly basic, for it will determine the relations among people. I would like to correct you somewhat concerning ordinary and unordinary audiences: All of us are regular and ordinary.

Rizov: Yes, naturally.

Moderator: Let us stop classifying society into ordinary and....

Rizov: There are people who are uneasy, who expect from us a more specific view on individual matters.
Moderator: Well, I merely introduced this as a remark. Let us hear your view on the question which you yourself raised.

Rizov: Let us think. I suggest that we think collectively, jointly. I believe that a social mechanism for the defense of interests, which would include the trade union organizations and the syndicates, would involve above all—as in any civilized society—a law or several labor laws, as in our case with the Labor Code. I will not discuss the extent to which it may be perfect or imperfect. All of us are convinced of the fact that the Labor Code, as it is now, and as it is surrounded by a number of other laws and legal standards, which block its implementation, is unable to perform its purpose.

Moderator: Therefore, what should be done?

Rizov: For that reason, we believe that by firmly supporting the Labor Code as a supreme law of the country, we must take steps for all other legal stipulations and standard laws which conflict with it to be repealed. In that area as well we are currently at work. We are reviewing all these laws and legal acts and documents and we want to bring to light the contradictions existing between the Labor Code and these documents and, on this basis, formulate a firm position in the National Assembly and the government, asking for corresponding changes.

Petkov: With one addition, however: depends on the changes in the forms of the ownership. The Labor Code should be such as to tolerate a change, for yesterday at our plenum, or the day before, the question was asked, what is taking place with those, how many were they, 150,000 people, who are employed by private companies, and so on, in accordance with Resolution No. 35. However, we had no answer to this question from the viewpoint of the trade unions. Therefore, we must not stubbornly stick to the Labor Code exclusively. This legal instability, however, which was artificially introduced in our country after 1985-1986 was no accident. It is a very major hindrance.

Moderator: You surely realize that you must solve this problem quickly, for there has been talk for a long time about standard laws which conflict with each other, and the people have come to listen to such talk and to believe that nothing is changing. Therefore, now we must turn from talk to change, truly, and within very realistic deadlines. In this case as well perhaps we should hurry and not wait any longer.

Petkov: Today we held talks with Mincho Yovchev and Belcho Belchev—I am mentioning them by their names and not their positions. Since we had a few demands concerning the Labor Code, on this matter we achieved an agreement in principle except for the question of companies, the company level. However, in the case of enterprises, what the bulk of the working collectives want now is not to be referred to as branches but as enterprises, to convert to the status of enterprises; they ask for more democratic procedures to be applied and to eliminate the other stresses related to their loss of independence as individual units, and to be granted economic autonomy. On that we were promised that this will be settled within the shortest possible time. In the matter of companies, their argument was as follows: If we start now to change things in that area as well—for economics has its own laws—the economy will start sliding backwards. As it were, a number of such contradictions have already piled up. I think that this is an argument worth thinking about.

Darakchiev: I would like to draw your attention to another question or, actually, to broaden yours. On the one hand, legislation is a good thing. On the other, however, we must not forget that we have millions of people who are neutral; they are neutral toward trade unions and have no specific trade union awareness. We see them at enterprises but we also see them engaged in a different dialogue. By this I mean the discussion held in Zemlyane with drivers and their employers, as well as talks at urgent medical aid stations. It seems to me that here we can find a serious reserve, i.e., that this is the hard work that must be done. In my view, the organization of trade unions from the start, at least in our case, has indicated that wherever independent trade unions are established and wherever a new awareness appears, wherever people oppose the administration, a process is initiated which is quite indicative: A pressure is applied on employers, rising toward the government, exerting pressure on the government. Currently, at this stage, the government is acting by passing resolutions. Tomorrow the government may change and grant rights to the employers, being unable to cope with all the collectives. It is precisely this pressure from below that may be of great help in resolving some difficult problems of our economy. However, we must not forget that this pressure could solve a great many problems, the drivers of Zemlyane stated at one point, realizing that there was a law which prevented them from budging, they said, we are a manpower commodity, we are on the market and we would like to set our own price. We are not interested in any kind of legal documents. Now this is already a trade union.

Rizov: Yes, this is absolutely accurate. At the same time, the drivers working for the city trolley bus transportation system and the collective of the streetcar transportation system in Sofia, rallied within our trade union organizations, also formulated an ultimatum addressed at the Sofia City Council, to the effect that unless an agreement has been reached with these collectives as well, they too intended to start direct actions. Therefore, such an approach is adopted not only by the Podkrepa leadership and units but also by our trade union organizations throughout the country.

Petkov: Can I add something to this?

Rizov: Yes.

Petkov: Since the concept developed by Plamen Barakchiev is quite accurate, that there can be no true trade
thing new. somewhat, for we do not have the necessary technology existed before that?

Darakchiev: Does it mean that no agreements had choose. between the two sides is a different matter. ment. As to what type of government it will be, this is not now we are already developing an equal dialogue cratic country we must be talking with some govern-

Rizov: Let me add that these are not the first such agreements. The Labor Code itself allows for such type of agreements. They are naturally not widespread but they are one of the practices applied. The question that now we are already developing an equal dialogue between the two sides is a different matter.

Darakchiev: Does it mean that no agreements had existed before that?

Spasov: Precisely, a dialogue among equals is something new.
and are unfamiliar with such social technologies for reaching agreements. You have no agreements as yet on the lower levels, by which I mean enterprises and federations, reaching all the way up to the government.

Petkov: We do not! We favored the other procedure. May I explain?

Darakchiev: Yes, of course.

Petkov: Therefore, we shall act as follows: Bearing in mind the demands of our labor collectives or our trade union organizations which represent labor collectives or other groups, we shall draft a common platform which will be described as a general agreement which will be the minimal basis of agreement with the government. From that point on we shall use all classical trade union methods; each organization will have the right, each federal or any other system, shall have the right to reach an agreement and go on from that point. If it falls below that point, that becomes its own affair. As far as we are concerned, once we have agreed with the government that is what we shall observe. As to the technology, we are drafting it and so far we have not seen another general agreement with the government. We are in no hurry to draft it. On the third of the month, in Plovdiv, our Provisional Executive Committee will be debating it openly at the software equipment company. If you wish to discuss it jointly with us in order not to divide the people, assuming that in an enterprise you want one thing and we want something else, let us seek on the basis of the trade union aspect of the agreement common points. This does not apply to political demands. This is quite possible, is it not? If you are unwilling, we shall be forced to adopt that option.

Spasov: Excuse me. Today a few workers asked me, along with some employees, to ask you to commit yourselves to something. For example, today a woman, member of the arbitration, I do not even know precisely what type of institution the arbitration is, but she said that that is the way their administrative manager describes it, anyone who does not pay his membership dues by 1630 should consider to be the first to be laid off. Such things—membership lists, regardless of the fact that our trade union members have already switched to our own organization, their wages continue to be withheld and coercion applied against them. Would you commit yourselves to stating that this is illegal and that one should not proceed thusly, and also that it would be more equitable now, when there are alternate trade unions, to dismantle the trade unions now and then let every individual, as he chooses, to submit a petition or request to his preferred trade union, and which he believes will protect his interests.

Kamenov: The question is somewhat incorrectly put.

Petkov: On the contrary, it is quite correct.

Kamenov: This is because I do not know of a single case of a director to involve himself with union dues.

Petkov: Do not be so sure.

Kamenov: If anyone were to stop me today on the street and tell me something and I would use it as being a universally valid fact, this would not be right.

Petkov: This means that you are unfamiliar with trade union work.

Kamenov: No such thing.

Petkov: I wish to make a statement, a declaration....

Spasov: Let us ask on camera that people send us letters about how to proceed with the membership dues, etc.

Kamenov: Let them report to the television cases of the director collecting membership dues.

Spasov: If not the director, another member of the management....

Kamenov: You should not use such facts....

Spasov: No, no, it is a question of collecting money according to personnel records, this is the administrative way....

Kamenov: Of course.

Darakchiev: Let me tell you that we come across such cases on a virtually daily basis. The membership dues are withheld from the worker wages, which is in violation of Article 272 of the Code, which stipulates precisely what could be withheld. This is occurring almost on a daily basis. If you wish, it will be reported to you but will you take steps as is stipulated at the end of the Code?

Petkov: The steps are: Trade union members of the Bulgarian Trade Unions, do not pay your membership dues, do not agree to pay through the payrolls. Anyone who wishes to be with us must not do so through the payroll. This Labor Code was developed by us with the broadest possible participation. During the old stage, when we were official trade unions, we voted for this article. This is our position. As to your second question....

Kamenov: Let me add to this question. To me this is a technical matter: If the trade union member requests that he make his payment through the payroll this means that he finds it convenient. Let me point out to you that in virtually all Western countries this is the way to collect membership dues. Let it not be thought that every day someone will be passing by to collect and thus be wasting his time. The question is for this to be done on a voluntary basis. This would be convenient both to our trade union member and the trade union activist. It will be a waste of time to stop with a notebook in front of every single member and collect the membership dues.

The question is that there must be a written request, a personal one, stating that the member wishes his membership dues to be withheld, being a member of the trade unions. In my view, this is a technical matter.
Darakchiev: At the present time it is a political rather than a technical matter.

Kamenov: If a request has been filed, and I believe that this principle must be adopted by us, dues will be withheld only if a personal request has been filed by the trade union member. Why make life difficult for people carrying various notebooks around and primitively collect membership dues personally. If the people wish to pay through the payroll, let their wish be honored. Why do we have to instruct the people how to collect membership dues?

Darakchiev: You see, many people are seeing and hearing us now. It is precisely these people who are in a situation in which their dues will be collected almost by force. We have a great deal of complaints and we have seen such things in a number of enterprises. The people are now listening to and watching us. Let us admit that this is a very serious matter and let us quote once again Article 272 of the Code.

Petkov: I have no objections whatsoever. I apologize, I forgot the second question. You asked me, after the discussion became heated somewhat, for a clarification other than for the membership dues or was that unimportant.

Moderator: Well, we skipped that. I think, Comrade Kamenov, that the question of voluntary participation....

Kamenov: Voluntary contribution is....

Moderator: At the present time it is precisely this voluntary aspect that is not clear, for no such petitions have been filed and the question has been rightly raised, i.e., membership dues can be collected but under what circumstances....

Petkov: This would mean disbanding the trade unions, for this is an essential matter.

Spasov: Since no one has submitted the request to become a member of this trade union, this becomes automatic.

Petkov: What we are asking of our primary organizations is to undertake a cadre renovation from the bottom up. Those who wish to join us let them do so; those who do not shall not be kept by force. We shall report our activities on a weekly basis. I assume that we shall have a certain loss of membership but I do not agree that this would happen overnight, that there are no longer Bulgarian Trade Unions, for that is precisely the reason for which we held the two plenums, to be revived as trade unions.

Spasov: Forgive me, here is another very important matter. At this point the trade unions, your trade unions, receive from the state, i.e., from the owner, some assets from the centralized funds.

Kamenov: How much and what kind?

Spasov: It is a question of the following: They participate in the allocation of housing, they participate in the distribution of rest vouchers and other features of the collective labor contract and even in some places goods in short supply have been distributed. I have heard of this but have not seen it personally....

Petkov: Be specific.

Spasov: I heard that there was a distribution—well, let us consider housing—do they participate in this? Are vouchers issued and are other social gains provided from the centralized fund? Is this not so? It is thus that they keep in a state of subordination their trade union members although this should not be the case, for these are centralized funds, they are not....

Kamenov: In our country is housing built with centralized funds?

Spasov: Was housing built by the Bulgarian Trade Unions?

Kamenov: Were they paid out of the state budget?...

Spasov: No, but did the trade unions build such housing?

Kamenov: Housing is built by the enterprises out of enterprise funds....

Spasov: This is state ownership, i.e., the state as the owner gives such funds to the trade unions so that with such funds they can control the trade unions. It seems to me that in this area as well something is not quite right.

Petkov: Are you in favor of the Swedish model of trade unions, do you like the Swedish model or, in general, the Scandinavian model?

Spasov: Listen, I have not concerned myself with models and with foreign trade unions. I have proceeded from the needs of Bulgarian society, the Bulgarian workers, the Bulgarian....

Petkov: No one said that there are no trade unions in Sweden, in the FRG, etc. They too keep their members with the help of social funds, pensions, and other gains. This is a possible option. The entire matter is whether the union members accept this. Therefore, there are politicized trade unions which insist only on the acceptance of the platform and the struggle; there are also others, until recently we described them as reformist or, perhaps, as more human trade unions. As to the state, I do not know whether it has contributed to the housing fund of the trade unions, telling them, here, distribute such funds being trade unions....

Spasov: Please, there are special funds.

Petkov: No, just a minute, let me specify this: The trade unions participate in the distribution. They participate and I believe that this is a matter to be reviewed. If we have true trade unions and if the collectives agree that such trade unions should represent them, let them participate; if not, let them participate directly through their
own commissions. This question should be considered. We must not use state resources, on that point you are right, for the sake of ensuring for ourselves power functions.

Spasov: Such is precisely the case.

Petkov: The opposite is entirely possible as well.

Spasov: I am pleased that you got my meaning.

Rizov: There are some procedures included in trade union work, such as permits, coordination documents, which are extraneous to the trade unions. We believe that these should be eliminated.

Moderator: That is correct. As you can see, there is some understanding. The public is sending us signals that they do not wish the telecast to be interrupted. Dear viewers, those participating in the discussion are quite tired, considering the hour when we started, they were already at the end of their strength. Let us spare them, for otherwise we could go on until the morning and I am convinced that there are many problems. We are as yet, however, to hold meetings and roundtable encounters where the positions will be clarified.

To wind it up, Dr. Trenchev and Professor Petkov, I would like to ask you what is your view of the immediate and somewhat more distant future of the Bulgarian Trade Unions, of the trade union movement in our country. How do you imagine it?

Trenchev: I believe that our relations are largely determined also by political developments and I would not try to separate economic from political changes, for in practice some depend on and are closely related to the other. For example, here we could struggle and defend the rights of our members who have been laid off. In other words, they have certain rights which have been violated and which must be defended. However, they were not laid off for political reasons. I am referring to the quite huge population groups of a certain ethnic origin. I also believe that the legal acts are the inevitable consequence of the totalitarian system, for the system is based on irrational foundations and there always are social stresses which are created and in that sense the social entropy increases. It is precisely with the help of such laws that the authorities are trying to make things fit some kind of sensible limits without, however, wishing to abandon what is irrational and, in this sense, such tensions are steadily being recreated. I believe that in terms of the basic ideas it would be desirable for us to engage in a dialogue and, after we have found common grounds, also to cooperate.

Spasov: A specific suggestion addressed to them: We are in a very unequal position. We asked TRUD several months ago to publish our program and some other programmatic documents which remain unpublished to this day. We now have made certain changes in the documents but we could—that is a base for cooperation—if you were to publish your resolution we would contribute our program—we could hold on this subject a big discussion to understand what the working people want, what the intellectuals want, and what the employees want, so that, starting on the basis of their wishes and demands and insistence, we would be able to draft a program. Otherwise things will remain the same. Now a resolution was passed at the fifth expanded plenum. It was expanded because of 150 representatives attending, etc. However, does this mean that you know exactly what are the wishes of millions of people, for at that time and to this day you remain the representatives of such million-strong masses. Hence it seems to me that once again you are doing something dictated from above. You believe that such should be the case. However, you do not know exactly what your trade union members want.

Kamenov: Well, as to your own resolution, did you ask all of your own union members or else did you draw up a declaration and made it public and saw who supported it?

Spasov: No, we discussed the declaration.... At that time there were so many of us, that we could gather together....

Kamenov: You now claim that you have 70,000 members, that these 70,000 members have rejected the declaration?

Spasov: They accepted it, naturally, having joined. The declaration was drafted. They wrote: “I accept the programmatic declaration and the statutes.”

Kamenov: But they did not participate in drafting it....

Spasov: They did not.

Moderator: At the end there is a debate, I can see! But Professor Petkov....

Petkov: What was your question?

Moderator: The same question was addressed to you....

Petkov: Yes. Let me say something about TRUD. Starting with tomorrow we shall ask the newspaper TRUD to become the organ of the Bulgarian Trade Unions and not of the Central Council and its leadership. However, without asking the millions of trade union members and organizations, which continue to pay membership dues, I cannot determine whether it will become an organ of all trade unions in Bulgaria. This matter must be resolved democratically. Personally, I heard yesterday Dr. Trenchev say that discussions are already taking place on subsidies and that they may come out with their own publication. This matter will be resolved. I apologize that we do not have the opportunity to issue their declaration now. But let us consult a number of issues of TRUD and we shall see that there are comments on their views, published in recent months. We do have the right to comment on your protest, do we not?
Trenchev: And yet we do not, for we do not have our own publication.

Moderator: You see, when you start publishing a new luxury newspaper you certainly will allow the Central Council....

Spassov: Of course.

Moderator: To publish its materials.

Spassov: On the front page....

Petkov: Actually, is it accurate that you have bought the newspaper OTECHESFEN FRONT or is this a rumor?

Trenchev: What happened was that OTECHESFEN FRONT suggested to publish materials of the Union of Democratic Forces and we are its principal member.

Petkov: I apologize. This means that on your question as to the trade unions, I see Bulgaria as having strong trade unions. There will be pluralism, there is no other way, for such is the situation now. But let us not allow people to assume power or dominate democratic circles which could demand after a while for Bulgaria the level of trade unionism for which we are jointly struggling to drop to two to three percent, or, in general, that there be no trade unions. I personally would oppose this. That is what will happen with Solidarity now unless it fights back.

Two weeks ago the Bush Commission, which was assigned to hold talks with the new government, made three statements concerning Poland on the subject of the Polish proposal of investing American capital.

First: We cannot invest for there is a strong Solidarity, which is torn by contradictions and is fighting for power; the management is low.

Second: We cannot cooperate because the level of their enterprises in which there are strong Solidarity organizations. We shall not invest in them.

This must be taken into consideration, for there will be free elections in Bulgaria.

Moderator: Yes, if you agree, let us end at this point, for, I repeat, this discussion could last much longer. I would truly like to take into consideration what you warned me about before we began: There is a great deal of fatigue and it is true that the roundtable which is now beginning and the roundtables which may be telecast—as you can see, although not for too long—are still offering the opportunity, providing a rostrum for the expression of new views. The purpose is for the millions of working people in Bulgaria to understand the type of trade unions that are being discussed, what path to be followed, what battles await them along this path, what are the difficulties. For in the final account all of us wish to build a free truly democratic state in which we can live normally as Bulgarian citizens. Let me thank you very warmly and sincerely for your participation this evening and apologize for the delay in the program but as you can see there are many meetings, many declarations, many steps being taken, and all of this is being reflected in our information broadcasts. Let me wish you success in the new 1990 and more successful dialogues so that there could indeed be more people who are more actively following this path of renovation. Thank you, dear viewers....

Spassov: We too would like to thank you for giving us the opportunity, finally, to present, albeit a little bit, our platform. Let us hope that this will not be the last time.

Moderator: I am convinced that it will not be.

Petkov: I apologize for the slightly heated tone which developed. However, it was not directed against you. On such matters we are excited. Let us meet again in the future. I am in favor of this. However, it should not be all that frequently, for we also have other commitments.

Moderator: You must also go to work. Dear viewers, the questions which you asked as agreed in advance will be submitted to Dr. Trenchev and Professor Petkov. They are certain to be useful in their specific work. I hope that you will answer the viewers who showed an interest. Good night and good-bye.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Slovak Democrats Against Postponing June Elections

90CH00012A Bratislava CAS in Slovak 3 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by M. Krajcovic, of the Democratic Party's center: "Postponing Election Date? United Democratic Current Against Totality"]

[Text] The Trend of the Third Millenium Party, Independent Democrats' Party, Social Democratic Party, Republican Party, Free Democrats' Party, Democratic Union of Romanies Party, and finally also the National Liberals' Party are jointly demanding postponement of the election date because they are not adequately prepared. They also call the preparation of a political program the sole requirement for participation in the election and recommend acceptance of the offer made by foreign organizations to monitor orderly election conduct.

The arguments are generally known—inadequacies in the election law and unequal conditions for all parties. But what is the voters' view? Most are already showing distrust and see in the alarmingly growing number of new parties a political game of democracy, concealing personal aspirations of ambitious individuals. That's the only explanation they can find for the vehemence with which parties with a membership often reaching hardly a hundred, demand participation in roundtable talks, or their frequent and often rather uncivil attacks on the established political parties and movements. Little is known about their programs and the proposed ways of
their implementation, and you find absolutely no information on what these parties would do in the case of an electoral success.

Nevertheless, I reject this argument even though it has a logical basis and the fears that voters may be deceived are justified. My own argument is simple. Not all can automatically enjoy equal conditions because we are not yet living in a democratic society. Indeed, democracy is still in the process of being born. In our struggle against totality we must proceed as a united democratic current. History offers lessons. The Communist Party found it very easy to manipulate the National Front right after Gottwald succeeded in "diluting" it with social organizations. At their helm stood the most determined Communists. And look here for the explanation why even today there are forceful attempts to keep alive a defunct National Front. I wish to remind the enthusiasts of "revolution has won" of Gottwald's famous phrase, "...we will agitate, disrupt your composure, we won't leave you a minute of peace, we go to the Russian Bolsheviks to learn how to twist your necks!"

As for the recommendation that we hold the elections under someone else's supervision let me say only this: he who is unable to organize a free election is not worthy of freedom. Besides, such proposals cast doubt on the political and moral credit we have earned in the world.

I respect and welcome all new partners in the great family of democratic parties. I am convinced that all will get along. Impatience expressed in the proposal to postpone the election date could have unforeseen effects, especially for the new parties. We must understand that such a proposal may be interpreted as a vote of no confidence in the government of national concord, which would be to devalue politically even the most sincere effort.

Today it is the major political parties and movements which have assumed responsibility for completing the struggle against totality by being victorious at the polls. Their victory will then provide the essential condition for a future blossoming of all political parties. By the time of the next elections this will have set a common starting point for everyone.

Demise of National Front
90CH0014A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
7 Mar 90 p 6

[Interview with Josef Bartoncik, chairman of the People's Party by Milena Geussova; place and date not given: "Goodbye to National Front"—first paragraph is LIDOVE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] A meeting of representatives of political parties associated in the CSSR National Front decided to end the activity of the organs of the National Front's Central Committee. The meeting was chaired by Josef Bartoncik, Doctor of Laws, chairman of the Czechoslovak People's Party. We asked him:

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Lacking an organizational structure, central committee or a top leader, how will the Assembly of Parties [Shromazdeni] be able to carry on any actual work until the elections?

[Bartoncik] We have agreed to dismantle the existing structure completely, that is, effectively eliminate the activity of National Front organs, its entire vertical hierarchy. The National Front ceases to exist in its institutional form, it has no political function. Where continuity is of practical significance a platform for it has been preserved. Yet we remain an entirely open association and we anticipate the participation of all registered organizations which show interest. No prior decision was made concerning possible divisional arrangements, for instance by region. The Assembly of CSSR parties and organizations does not elect a permanent committee. It can be visualized as the largest and the most widely accessible roundtable, with changing chairmanship and convened as needed—that is, irregularly, without being committed to any preconceived timetable. So I could not even abolish myself since as an individual I am merely the current, temporary chairman; this role I took over from the first chairman, Dr. Bohuslav Kucera.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] What will happen with the National Front's apparatus?

[Bartoncik] In each apparatus there are competent as well as incompetent people, those with only political qualifications and others with genuine expertise. People who did the actual managing of such institutions, especially where the operations or economics were involved, are frequently the most useful at a time when the apparatus loses its bureaucratic power positions and enables them to show independent initiative and develop their qualifications. I am convinced that like everywhere else, we too in the pluralist political system will need high-quality political service which will in a managerial fashion provide both paid services to customers such as political parties, movements, organizations, and funded services for the State itself. There are many extensive agendas, for instance for nongovernmental organizations, information services, organizing various conferences, the logistics of roundtable talks, and the like.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] What is the content of the proposed principles for financing political parties and social organizations from the State budget in 1990?

[Bartoncik] For now we are operating contingent upon a budget. The newly emerging parties are supposed to receive a certain amount of support to get started, but so far it has not been clearly decided what the exact amount will be. As for the election campaign, it will be possible to obtain loans for the candidates, but in practical terms this is a matter of banks and banking practices. Various suggestions are being aired, loans have to be repaid but the impact may be mitigated by some sort of a write off depending on the number of votes won. Interestingly, there is still the erroneous notion that being in the
National Front brings some material advantage, that there will be continued handing out of stacks of money or other material perks.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] The basic ideas of the Assembly of representatives of political parties and social organizations will probably find theoretical agreement among all. But the absence of the overlords along with diminished or depleted pocket money is still a factor that has not been digested psychologically. The emerging vacuum will be more painful for many new as well as old politicians than would have seemed beforehand.

Prague Linguistic Circle Revived
90CH0014B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 7 Mar 90 p 5

[Article by Miroslav Cervenka: “Forty Years of Silence”]

[Text] On 15 February 1990, after 40 years of enforced silence, the Prague Linguistic Circle resumed its activities. Thus returning to us is a group that was anything but an impersonal institution. It was formed thanks to personalities of the rank of Vilém Mathesius, Roman Jakobson, and Bohuslav Trnka in the mid-1920’s, following up on the older circles of Russian formalists and establishing contacts with contemporary groups of avant garde artists. The Prague Linguistic Circle (PLK) harmonized perfectly with modern artists; together with them it fought for and got a niche for literary creation unbound by the prejudices of linguistic purism. The Circle did not have “Europe” or “Czechoslovakia” in its name, but the force of its ideas soon exceeded these boundaries. As so many of the Central European cultural initiatives it brought people together not on the basis of nationality or ideology, but on the basis of a jointly developed school of thought. In the case of the Circle this scientific school of thought can be most succinctly characterized by the categories of structure and function.

In the notorious post-February discussion of Communist TVORBA—alas, also with the participation of some prominent representatives of PLK—structuralism was handed a primitive condemnation, but since the end of the 1950’s, despite resistance from Stalinist watchdogs, new generations worked within its tenets. At the time structuralism’s importance was again powerfully enhanced by developments in the humanities, in both West and East. Not even the Russian occupation and the ensuing ideological terrorism succeeded in uprooting the PLK’s ideas from our cultural consciousness. These ideas were elaborated, revised, confronted with methodological advances in the humanities at dozens of legal, semi-legal as well as illegal meetings, seminars, and discussions.

Revival of the PLK’s activities was carried out in conformance with its original bylaws. Participants were members: Professors Vachek, Skalicka, Horalek, and J. Novakova. The first named was elected the Circle’s honorary chairman. By virtue of their work to date over 30 linguists and literary scientists of the older and middle generation became new members of the Circle. This number will gradually increase. Participation in the Circle will not be tied to any compendium of preordained theses; the functional and structuralist view is encompassed in various areas of philological research and a conscious development of this tradition will constitute the axis and purpose in the activity of members of the revived Circle. The Prague Linguistic Circle will have as its goal work guided by methods which are well thought out, consistent, guided by conscious reflection, work capable of defining its position in the sum of methodology as a whole. We will soon hear more about the lecture, discussion, and publication activity of the Prague Linguistic Circle (directed by the newly elected working committee of Dokulil, Danes, Leska, and Cervenka).

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Bishop Forck Interviewed
90GE0066A East Berlin WOCHEINPOST in German Vol 37 No 14, 6 Apr 90 pp 4-5

[Interview with Dr Gottfried Forck, Evangelical Bishop of Berlin-Brandenburg, date and place not given: “The Church—a Shelter for Those Who Think Differently”—first paragraph WOCHEINPOST introduction]


[WOCHEINPOST] Bishop, you have been active for years on behalf of solidarity and of a just society. You consistently opposed state reprisals and, long before the turning point, condemned the massive election fraud of May of last year. What were your motives? Where did you get the courage to publicly and repeatedly defy the Ulbricht-Honecker Administration?

[Bishop Forck] The point of departure for my conduct as pastor is the Gospel. I am obligated to heed the Gospel and to proclaim it. The Gospel of Jesus Christ and what He did for the world also has political and social consequences. Christ made love the principle of human conduct. It is for that reason that justice in society must be the fundamental motive for people’s conduct. That is why I advocated it again and again—often based on
passages from the Bible, often based on incidents such as occur in everyday life. I think that a church may not simply ignore politics and society, but must take a specific stance on such things. I therefore regarded myself as justified in so doing and, if you will, even encouraged to do so.

[Bishop Forck] That probably came about because from the very beginning of this republic the churches have been taking a stand on social and political questions in their synods and in the pronouncements of their pastors. If you look at the synod resolutions, you will find many critical positions in regard to the peace issue, human rights, etc. This practice of the church of speaking out in regard to problems that otherwise could not be discussed publicly caused many people, even non-Christians, to hold on to the church in order to have a free forum there for discussions—discussions about the preservation of the environment, about justice, and about the maintenance of peace. We frequently had a hard time with that because those who came to us did not exactly speak out of Christian motivation but had other motives. But in time we gradually recognized that speaking out for justice, peace, and the preservation of creation is indeed a concern of the Gospel, and that we are charged to do so. And to that extent the groups indirectly did a good service for the church. We have grown together very well, even if almost all of those in the new groupings which have been in existence since September 1989 have now become politically active and only maintain loose contact with the church anymore. There are a few who found their way to the church—and those are not all by any means. Many are now active once again in the political realm.

[Bishop Forck] At one time this formulation meant that, as a church, we are not against socialism and not for socialism, but are within socialism. And that was meant to designate the location where Christians were to prove their Christianity. To that extent, it is surely a formulation that has thus far been vindicated. Since we are no longer influenced by a socialist environment, new formulations will have to be sought. I think, however, that the church should always be in the midst of the community which is formed by society and it should prove itself there. In that regard, new tasks, arising from the changes in society, will present themselves.

[Bishop Forck] In the past this state and its educational system have regarded themselves to be primarily—if not exclusively—committed to Marxism and atheism. Do you regard that as a sin which has to be made up for?

[Bishop Forck] Yes, I believe that it is a matter of a past which we have to work our way out of. We now have to institute a system whereby Marxism, along with other theories, world-views, and even religions, is presented in the schools in such a way that the students can choose for themselves among that which is offered to them and will no longer be forcibly compelled to accept Marxism.

[Bishop Forck] I do not think anything of it. That would be the reversal of the present circumstances. Up until now it was the church, so to speak, and convictions dear to Christians, that were excluded—and traditional philosophy, to a great extent. That must not be reversed now, resulting in the isolation of Marxism. Permit me to recall that indeed in principle, Marxism means something very similar to what the Christian faith also wants. When Marx said in his introduction to Hegel's "Philosophy of Law" that all conditions under which man represents an enslaved, demeaned creature, should be changed, then something is being described there which must also be the concern of the church. And it is precisely this which should not be excluded, but must be presented along with other things—to be sure, without creating an obligation to accept it either—or even having to prove that the students are convinced of it.

[Bishop Forck] Who was for you the principal actor in regard to the turning point in this country?

[Bishop Forck] I think the people. I liked the slogan "We are the people" the best. I was astonished that people who heretofore had not shown themselves to be very courageous suddenly worked up their courage and joined in—in Leipzig, for instance, or then in Berlin, where a half million people demonstrated in early November. That is, I believe, the decisive factor. It was only because of that that the rulers really realized that they no longer had the confidence of the people, but would now have to...
work against the people quite openly. They therefore
could not maintain themselves in power and had to bring
about other conditions.

[WOCHENPOST] Renewal, as we are experiencing it
today, aims at a universal democratization of public life.
Can you envision this process also taking hold in the
internal life of the church? How democratic is the
church?

[Bishop Forck] Of course there are tendencies in this
direction. Now in all friendliness it must be noted,
please, that we in the church cannot simply make our-
O. selves dependent upon majorities that contradict that
which has been told to us by our Lord Jesus Christ. We
in the church ought to follow Jesus Christ. The grass-
roots—the church members—may ask the church lead-
ership. And the church leadership the grassroots. We
must mutually help each other remain in imitation of
Christ. But then that is not democracy in the strictest
sense because otherwise it could happen that a majority
decision to do otherwise could be made. If, for example,
the majority of a synod passes resolutions that are not in
accord with the Gospel, then for the sake of the Gospel
this majority decision must be contradicted. That is the
reason why we can certainly adopt democratic models to
a great extent, but we cannot totally subscribe to them.

[WOCHENPOST] At the same time, does that not
describe a difference of opinion between the church
leadership and the rank-and-file church members, the
grassroots church?

[Bishop Forck] Yes, to a certain extent. But it is precisely
in talks with representatives of the rank-and-file church
members that I have repeatedly stressed—and found a
certain degree of understanding in the process—that the
foundation of our faith is the Gospel. That is why I ask
again and again, please tell me how what you want on
this or that occasion can be justified in the Holy Scrip-
tures?

[WOCHENPOST] Bishop, what ideas about the future
of the GDR did you have in early October 1989?

[Bishop Forck] I hoped that gradually more travel would
be allowed and I hoped for a change in the government’s
position in regard to developments in the Soviet
Union—that is, for a similar development as there. I did
not foresee that the kind of transformation we subse-
quently experienced would come about.

[WOCHENPOST] And what do you think about the
future of this country today?

[Bishop Forck] I think that it can be a legitimate expec-
tation when many citizens say: We must see to it that we
grow together. But I emphasize: grow! Not wildly inter-
twining. Growth is a process. It could happen that the
GDR and the FRG might also enter into a closer
relationship within the framework of a united Europe.
But all that may only occur with the approval of the
other European states, and particularly with the
approval of Poland and the Soviet Union, who suffered
especially under occupation by German troops in the last
war. That should not be done too rapidly, however, and
with the shoving aside of all other—particularly social—
problems.

[WOCHENPOST] What can and what does the church
of this country want to contribute to the future unity of
the German nation?

[Bishop Forck] First of all, of course, its calling to
proclaim the Gospel, which, as far as is possible, is
directed towards all people who live in a society. And, in
the present time of upheaval, I particularly mean the
spirit of reconciliation. I think that during demonstra-
tions and on other occasions now there are frequently
very strong thoughts of revenge, and that many people
want to make up for their past by washing themselves
clean of all involvement with the bad developments of the
past 40 years at the expense of individuals whom they set
up as scapegoats. I believe that it is precisely now that the
church has the task of helping people to honestly come to
terms with their past so that they recognize where they
themselves acted incorrectly in order to gain experience
in regard to how things can be done better, with more
freedom and with greater courage, in the future. And the
church has the presumable task of accompanying people
in this—a task, which surely will be supported by many
others, but one which can also be particularly its own.

[WOCHENPOST] You are actively cooperating at the
behest of the round table in the dissolution of the State
Security Service and its successor, the Office of National
Security. How did that come about and what is your
assessment of the current status of this very problemat-
ic task?

[Bishop Forck] It came about in the following manner:
There had formerly been a government commissioner
who was having difficulties with this assignment. He was
censured and recalled from this office. Then the round
table proposed appointing three trustworthy persons
with equal authority, and so one representative each was
designated from the Peasants’ Party, the opposition, and
the church. We were to oversee this dissolution of the
State Security Service and, where possible, to speed it up
a little and get it going now and then—in cooperation
with the citizens’ committees and working groups that
were established for security issues by the round tables in
the Kreise and Bezirke.

On the one hand our problems concern what to do about
what has been going on there until now. What, for
example, should be done with the equipment and build-
ings of the various headquarters? What should be done
with the extensive documentation? Where can it be
locked up? Those are questions that concern us. And
finally, we have to consider what to do with those people
who are losing their jobs there. We feel that even these
former employees must be given a genuine opportunity
to really participate and have a place in reconstruction if
they are willing to. Many shouted during the demonstrations “Stasi to the factories,” and there are many today who want to refuse to do this socially useful work. That must not be. We must find additional possibilities in this case... That is a very difficult job. I was allowed to participate in this task with only an advisory vote because otherwise I would have had to accept a commission from the government and I would like to act only on behalf of the church.

[Wochenpost] What degree of state security do you regard to be necessary in the future? Do we need a new secret service?

[Bishop Forck] That has to be thoroughly thought out. It may be that it is needed in certain places. If it comes to a closer association of one kind or another with the Federal Republic, there will again be one in any case. There are certain tasks that perhaps have to be taken care of. I believe, however, that we should examine that very cautiously and not make transitional arrangements too quickly—for example, that employees of the State Security Service be transferred into the Federal Republic’s equivalent unit. I do not consider that to be wise.

[Wochenpost] Do you believe that the secret services in the Federal Republic are subject to democratic oversight?

[Bishop Forck] That is said to be true. That must be very carefully checked, however. I believe that that is specifically a task of the Federal Republic and of the citizens there. If we should come together with them in a form of unification, of course it will then be a task for us as well—but only then. We ought to be very vigilant that that does not again lead to spying upon people which creates insecurity and is indefensible in human terms.

[Wochenpost] What does a bishop dream about in the GDR after the turning point?

[Bishop Forck] I usually do not vividly experience my dreams—I always know only approximately what I dreamed about. In a figurative sense, however, I think that if we became a society in which every citizen knew and lived up to his common responsibility, I would consider it to be splendid. If this could really lead to more humaneness, more justice, and more democracy, then I would regard that as good.

HUNGARY

Rush To Get Rid of Communist Monuments Observed
25000691E Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
24 Mar 90 p 4

[Unattributed article: “Show Some Patience for the Monuments!”]

[Text] The Ministry of the Interior conveyed the following statement to MTI [Hungarian Telegraph Agency]:

Several times in recent weeks the public has learned from the press, radio, and television that in response to group initiatives monuments have been removed from, or damaged in public areas of certain cities and villages. The ideological content of these monuments is not consistent with the actual values of our historical past.

In due consideration of the situation that has evolved, the Ministry of the Interior emphatically requests council bodies having jurisdiction to reexamine the matter of public monuments on a priority basis, and to make decisions in regard to the future of such monuments based on consultation with parties and social organizations.

The Ministry of the Interior requests the populace to manifest patience regarding this issue. It would be a mistake to burden the public mood with unnecessary tensions in the hours just prior to free elections.

SZDSZ Acting Chairman Kis’ Pre-election Interview
25000691D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
20 Mar 90 p 7

[Interview with Janos Kis, SZDSZ acting chairman, by Lajos Pogonyi; place and date not given: “The Free Democrats Are the Natural Opposition to the MDF”—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] Janos Kis has been a representative of the democratic opposition since the mid-1970’s. Beginning last fall he served as the executive of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]. As of March 1990 he became the party’s acting chairman.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Whether this was stated or implied, in an ominous radio comment one of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] leaders made reference to the SZDSZ leaders when he mentioned the “Lenin Boys.” Did you take this remark personally?

[Kis] If the question is whether Istvan Csurka’s pointed remark was aimed at the SZDSZ, my answer is yes. Incidentally, this has since been confirmed by another MDF presidium member on the pages of NEPSZABADSAG. On the other hand, if you ask what I regard this remark as, I will say that I view it as an outlandish election trick.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Have the oft-mentioned speaking terms been restored between the SZDSZ and its opposite, the MDF? Or, more accurately: Did you receive Denes Csengey’s letter on this?

[Kis] It has not yet arrived.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Would you like to be on speaking terms with the MDF?
In a functioning political democracy there is a need to be on speaking terms with competing parties, even if essential political differences and differences in outlook separate us.

What is at the core of the irreconcilable difference—to use the fashionable term—between the two parties?

I do not believe that this expression is a fortunate choice. Pluralism is tied to the essence of democracy. Opposing differences in outlook and politics can be reconciled in a democratic society. The SZDSZ is a liberal and social-liberal party, meaning that in matters political it stands for the separation of powers, and for the constitutional protection of the rights of individuals and of ethnic, religious, racial, and cultural minorities. In terms of economics, we advocate a market economy based on the primacy of private ownership; at the same time, however, we feel that strong social protection is indispensable, and must be accorded to persons swept to the edge of society temporarily or permanently by the market economy. We support a strong, grass roots, independent trade union movement.

Let's stick to the relationship between the two parties for the time being. Could there be a forced marriage consummated between the SZDSZ and the MDF, as Peter Tolgyessy or Ivan Peto stated, that is, could a coalition be formed on this basis?

Let There Be a Parliamentary Rotation Economy

It is true that we are not engaged in thinking about establishing a joint government with the MDF. We would find it natural and desirable for there to be a parliamentary rotation economy. In our judgment the MDF is the natural opposition for the SZDSZ, and this is also true in the reverse. A situation could emerge, of course, in which the simultaneous absence of both parties would not produce a stable government. At that point we would think of joining in coalition with the MDF exclusively, because of a sense of responsibility we feel for the fate of the country, but otherwise we do not feel that such a coalition is desirable.

Insofar as the rest of the parties are concerned, the SZDSZ also has arguments with members of the small coalition that was formed before last November's popular referendum.

I believe that it would take too much audacity to discuss the chances of coalition prior to the elections. In my view, even if arguments separate us from each other, these may be resolved through compromises reached in the course of negotiations to form a government. Several parties compete because they focus on different goals, different methods of solutions, and different interests, after all.

Apropos, whom does the SZDSZ represent, and how many members does it have?

I regard the SZDSZ as a people's party in the Western European sense. By now it has more than 20,000 registered members.

What should be understood by the term "people's party"?

The fact that very broad strata of society are represented in our party, ranging from skilled workers to independent small operators, and from entrepreneurs to members of the intelligentsia.

Forgive me, but not too long ago you made a statement in Paris according to which the SZDSZ was a left-of-center party, and that it would like to occupy the same place in the Hungarian political arena that is occupied by the socialist and the social democratic parties in Western Europe.

This is inaccurate as stated, and in this form we are being quoted much rather by our opponents.

Let's clarify it then!

In Hungary today the public regards the communists as the left. The SZDSZ was established by people who waged an open struggle for 15 years against the communist party-state.

But at one time you were also on the left, after all....

That is being mentioned everywhere by the MDF, our rivals in the elections. It is not worth pressing the issue that among the SZDSZ executives I am the only one who has ever been a Communist Party member. Similarly, it is not worth pressing the issue of how many former Communist Party members there are in the MDF presidium. Fifteen years ago they did not undertake the struggle we undertook. In contrast to the MDF, we never said that we are in between the opposition and the governing party. In contrast to some MDF leaders we never said that after the elections we would be prepared to form a government with the Communists.

As long as we are discussing the changes in positions taken by individual party leaders, how do you view the fact that previously the SZDSZ supported spontaneous privatization, while these days it calls for controlled privatization. Did your view not change as a result of the approaching elections?

Controlled and Rapid Privatization

We never supported spontaneous privatization. It is not the Free Democrats who changed their position, but our political competitors who try to present us as the advocates of wild privatization. Just read the resolution brought by our October meeting of delegates. If there is a difference between us and our opponents it amounts to this: We urge a controlled and rapid privatization because we believe that the immeasurable overweight of state property is the primary force that is choking the Hungarian economy.
[NEPSZABADSAG] I get the impression that you are arguing with everyone: with the MDF, the Smallholders, the Social Democrats, and as of recently even with FIDESZ [Association of Young Democrats]. Isn't this a bit too much?

[Kis] I think that this is natural. Everyone is competing with everyone in the election campaign. I am convinced that after a new parliament based on a multiparty system is formed, new strains of force will come about, along with which the arguments will be ranked differently. At present the many arguments are not disturbing; it is, however, disturbing that it is not clear what the real important matters are, and what constitute side issues. Incidentally, we do not have substantive arguments with FIDESZ. In our judgment FIDESZ and the SZDSZ may count more or less on the same voting public. For this reason I am not amazed that FIDESZ representatives try to delimit themselves from us. I understand all this, but I do not regard this as being in good taste in every instance. On the other hand, judging one's relationship to another party is not a matter of having good taste.

[NEPSZABADSAG] As long as we are discussing this, with regard to other parties the SZDSZ has said several times that Hungary has slowed down, so to speak, as compared to the rest of the neighboring countries.

[Kis] I would not say that we have slowed down. I would rather say that the liberating experience of a revolution did not materialize, the one that could be felt, for example, in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. In Hungary, transformation did not mean a direct experience to millions of citizens. The experience which shows that they were the ones who toppled the old system is missing. But as far as the pace and thoroughness of transformation are concerned, we are not behind our neighbors, moreover, in many respects we are ahead of them. We are ahead primarily in regard to the fact that in Hungary a truly multiparty system exists, and the competing parties did not line up under some protective umbrella having the character of a united front, as happened, for example, in Poland.

We Would Like To Acquire 25 Percent

[NEPSZABADSAG] I would think that the reform communists also had something to do with the fact that fortunately, in Hungary, some shaking revolutionary events did not take place.

[Kis] I will not question the great role that these people played in bringing about the Hungarian party-state's recognition of the unavoidable, not on time, but not with a delay as they did in the GDR and in Czechoslovakia. The persons you mentioned acquiesced in the fact that there is a need for a multiparty system. I would doubt, however, that we received a democracy based on a multiparty system as a gift from the reform-minded persons in the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP].

[NEPSZABADSAG] Have you ever erred?

[Kis] No party could claim that it never erred. I would mention this only as an example: We erred when we did not recognize on time the manipulations that were going on in the background of the trilateral negotiations.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What do you mean by manipulation?

[Kis] I would not want to voice unsupported statements; I would rather suggest that they make public the films made during the Opposition Roundtable sessions. The SZDSZ has been urging this for a long time. We did not veto this matter. The public interested in politics should become familiar with these recordings.

[NEPSZABADSAG] A timely question prior to the elections: What percent of the voters do you count on?

[Kis] We would like to acquire 25 percent, by all means. This is indispensable if we want to participate as a significant factor in forming a parliament and a government after the elections.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Finally, permit me a personal question. Don't you miss Marxism and philosophy?

[Kis] I transcended Marxism some 15 years ago. I was kicked out of my job because I told them why Marx' socialism cannot be reconciled with the fundamental values of human freedom. In my view Marxism is a past episode, not only in my life, but also in the history of Eastern Europe. Insofar as philosophy is concerned: I really miss that. I am very fortunate that this year I will be teaching at the Laszlo Rajk specialized college of the Karoly Marx University of Sciences, and thus I will be forced to take time and practice my profession.

Implications of Personnel File Changes Discussed

25000691B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 20 Mar 90 p 7

[Interview with Mrs. Laszlo Szekely, Budapest 6th district council personnel manager; Ferenc Dobay, ELGEP Enterprise human resources manager; and Ildiko Ficze, Ministry of Culture personnel and training manager, by Sandor Rege; place and date not given: "Are We Painting the Skies Blue? Feverish Work at Personnel Departments"]

[Text] They are rewriting personnel materials. Above all, the redrafting of resumes is going on in response to a Council of Ministers decree promulgated early this year. It requires that personnel files be depoliticized.

"Only material which does not infringe upon personal rights may be left in personnel files. Accordingly, if a person feels that he does not wish to leave something in the file, he may remove that material," according to Mrs. Laszlo Szekely, 6th district council personnel manager.

I asked this question: Should this be understood to mean that a person can walk up to the personnel officer and remove from the dossier whatever he does not like? That
is exactly the case, as it turned out. Moreover, in very many places the personnel officer has summoned the workers to review their files.

[NEPSZABADSAG] “Will a person who has held four or five jobs have his personnel records in four or five places, or does that person carry these records along with him?”

[Szekely] “This was handled more strictly within state administration, so we tried to gather the earlier records. The situation is more simple with regard to those who did not perform classified functions. Incidentally, people did not extensively take advantage of the opportunity to review and redraft their personnel files.”

[NEPSZABADSAG] “Would it be conceivable that the future holds punishment for a decoration received a long time ago?”

[Szekely] “I don’t think so. Many of us would be involved.”

At ELGEP Enterprise I sought information from Ferenc Dobay, head of the human resources department, the department with a nice name. Or rather: I would have requested information.

[Dobay] “Just what’s going on with the personnel files? Should I say that they are sitting there, they exist, and nothing has happened to them? Our organizational unit was combined; previously I served in labor affairs. The personnel manager fell ill, he was hospitalized, and everything is locked up in his room.”

[NEPSZABADSAG] “And who will comply with the new decree concerning personnel?”

[Dobay] “I am happy that I am still alive. I had 21 people working for me; now there are only three of us. Aside from that, this firm has been in the process of transforming since 1 January.”

Finally we asked Ilidko Ficze, Ministry of Culture personnel and training division head, about the fate of personnel files.

[Ficze] “We depoliticized the files consistent with the new legal provision. This means that we prepared new data sheets; these no longer include questions regarding a person’s party affiliation and the level of his political education. The autobiographies also had to be reviewed in this conjunction. Those who wanted to do so also rewrote their resumes.”

[NEPSZABADSAG] “Is rewriting a matter of ‘must’ or ‘may’?”

[Ficze] “Whether it has to be rewritten or may be rewritten is the subject of debate. The legal provision states only that certain data need not be included.”

[NEPSZABADSAG] “What will happen to the superfluous material?”

[Ficze] “Whatever a worker prepared concerning himself will be returned to the worker. The materials that were prepared about the worker will be destroyed in part, and the rest will go to the archives.”

[NEPSZABADSAG] “Are we not destroying the past as a result?”

[Ficze] “An employee receives the materials given to him with an inventory listing. The materials to be destroyed will also be listed in an inventory. Incidentally, these materials include items like data concerning pay raises that were granted a long time ago. Older qualifying statements concerning one’s life path will be transferred to the archives, consistent with the legal provisions.”

[NEPSZABADSAG] “Don’t you have the feeling that the past is being repainted as a result of transforming personnel data?”

[Ficze] “I call this the Onibaba effect.”

“Perhaps not everyone knows about this famous Japanese movie. It is set in the 14th Century, when fighting, plundering soldiers wore masks so that they would not be recognized. Onibaba fell in love with one such soldier, and wanted to see his real face. But the moment the soldier tries to remove the mask it turns out that the mask has grown to his face, and that it can be taken off only together with the flesh.”

PESTI HIRLAP Director Blamed for Missed Publishing Date

25000691A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
20 Mar 90 p 5

[Text] Thus far newspapers have reported only one side of the PESTI HIRLAP affair: Lajos Fodor, the heretofore managing director of the limited liability corporation which published the newspaper, shifted responsibility onto the Athenaeum Press for not being able to place PESTI HIRLAP in the readers’ hands on 15 March. According to information received, Lajos Fodor was relieved of his duties on Sunday, nevertheless we believe that we should hear about the background of this case from the other interested party: Athenaeum President Andras Szlavik.

[Szlavik] Mr. Fodor evaluates and interprets everything the way he would like to have it, whereas that oft-mentioned draft contract says nothing about 15 March—PESTI HIRLAP would have received the green light beginning on 1 July.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Every statement we have heard thus far accuses the printer of extortion—they claim that Athenaeum wanted to force unacceptable prices on the editorial office.
Reasons for, Desirability of Foreign Ownership of Press Probed

90EC0365A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 17 Feb 90 p 19

[Radio roundtable discussion with Zsolt Bajnok, MAGYAR HIRLAP editor in chief; Pal Eotvos, NEPSZABADSAG editor in chief; Istvan Horvath, MAI NAP editor in chief; Mihaly Galik, executive of the Openness Club; and Peter Popper, a psychologist acting as public interest spokesman; with Gabor Rekai and Janos Simko as program hosts; edited by Gyorgy Vamos: "Should We Sell Out the Hungarian Press?"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] At the beginning of February, the guests on the Sunday afternoon Agora radio roundtable discussed foreign investment in the Hungarian press, which might create a qualitatively new situation. The guests were the editors in chief of MAGYAR HIRLAP, NEPSZABADSAG, and MAI NAP, along with an executive of the Openness Club, and a psychologist who was invited to act as public interest spokesman. Gabor Rekai and Janos Simko were the program hosts. Although our editor has slightly abridged the discussion, he has endeavored to retain the style of the participants' contributions.

Gabor Rekai: We have learned from the editor in chief of MAGYAR HIRLAP that he will be leaving his post once the joint venture to produce and publish the newspaper is formed. Do you disagree with the appearance of foreign capital, with its penetration into the Hungarian press?

Zsolt Bajnok: The basic question is why foreign capital is penetrating the Hungarian press; why is it able to do so; indeed, why is its penetration into this area inevitable? We have had, and are still having, bitter experience with all of this, simply because the Hungarian press is lagging so far behind modern requirements in terms of its technical, technological, and financial level, and is so strapped for cash, that it regards and seeks Western capital assistance everywhere as a lifeline. The West is where the money is, and therefore this is almost predestined. Concerning MAGYAR HIRLAP, the negotiations extended over many months. Actually, it was by accident that we met with the Maxwell group. But then a series of very purposeful, serious, and thorough preliminary negotiations followed, supported by many calculations. These negotiations were essentially summed up in a preliminary agreement signed several months ago. Then came the details, and that is where I came into conflict somewhat with myself, with my former self, and with the contract. There were also all kinds of oral agreements supplementing the written preliminary agreement. In the specific negotiations, however, the conditions that had not been laid down in the preliminary agreement became ever stricter, for a variety of reasons. So much so that I finally reached the point where I said that the agreement, in my opinion, was no longer acceptable.

Gabor Rekai: Could you briefly list the points that you no longer found acceptable?

Zsolt Bajnok: Not briefly, but I could mention one or two as examples. One point was the valuation of MAGYAR HIRLAP's goodwill—i.e., of its reputation and prestige. In the preliminary negotiations its value was set at nine percent of the total capital. Which meant, to begin with, nine percent of the votes when deciding the affairs of the corporation. But in the specific negotiations it turned out that a nine-percent valuation was out of question, and only five percent at best could come into consideration.

Gabor Rekai: How can there be an argument over this? Someone states the value from here in Hungary, and then the foreign negotiating partner says no, it is worth much less....

Zsolt Bajnok: As a matter of fact, it is difficult to define the value of goodwill.

Janos Simko: Is it possible to argue only from a position of strength?

Gabor Rekai: In other words, the one who has the money wins the argument?

Zsolt Bajnok: That is what happened in practice. Or consider another point: At the start of the negotiations we failed to take into account—although we should have, and we have no one to blame but ourselves—that the capitalist is profit-oriented. There is no question of loyalty, political support, or perhaps solidarity. He is profit-oriented, and that has certain consequences. For instance, it is necessary to put out a paper that appeals to readers, and it is almost indifferent at what cost that appeal is attained. It becomes unambiguously clear that...
there are indeed certain requirements which will probably shift MAGYAR HIRLAP toward becoming a tabloid in the pejorative sense.

**Gabor Rekai:** Istvan Horvath, you returned home at midnight from talks with Mr. Murdoch.

**Istvan Horvath:** Before discussing those talks, allow me to revert to your original question. The press, like the entire Hungarian economy, needs foreign capital to become dynamic and to develop. This fact has additional consequences from those who provide the capital. The desire to make a profit is natural, but something else is also at stake here. Rupert Murdoch was not the first with whom we have held talks since MAI NAP was founded. The Springer group was also here, for instance. They seem to be competing with one another on how to gain a foothold in a changing Eastern Europe. That is something the "big fish" simply cannot afford to miss.

**Gabor Rekai:** Is this nothing more than just an economic bridgehead?

**Istvan Horvath:** I do not think it is just an economic bridgehead. Much more is involved.

**Pal Eotvos:** The present situation is special in the sense that in Hungary the economic and political objectives overlap, so that there is room for the foreign capitalist.

**Mihaly Galik:** After all, it is no accident that specifically the Hungarian press is getting this injection of capital, while no foreign capital is flowing into, say, the shoe industry and the textile industry. Therefore industries do differ, and let me add modestly that the media, too, are an industry. Everywhere in the world this industry—i.e., television, radio, broadcasting, and newspaper publishing, to mention only the most common forms—is treated somewhat differently than other industries: Special regulations apply because this industry has something to do with the sense of national identity and with national culture. For this very reason it is unambiguously clear that this is a very attractive area for the penetration of foreign capital.

**Istvan Horvath:** I am glad that Mihaly Galik has said this, because now I will attempt to demonstrate, using MAI NAP as an example, how it is possible to guard against the undesirable tendencies lurking behind the fears and reservations we all have. The MAI NAP Corporation was founded on 1 July 1989, and its articles of incorporation are an industry. Therefore industries do differ, and let me add modestly that the media, too, are an industry. Everywhere in the world this industry—i.e., television, radio, broadcasting, and newspaper publishing, to mention only the most common forms—is treated somewhat differently than other industries: Special regulations apply because this industry has something to do with the sense of national identity and with national culture. For this very reason it is unambiguously clear that this is a very attractive area for the penetration of foreign capital.

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**Istvan Horvath:** I am glad that Mihaly Galik has said this, because now I will attempt to demonstrate, using MAI NAP as an example, how it is possible to guard against the undesirable tendencies lurking behind the fears and reservations we all have. The MAI NAP Corporation was founded on 1 July 1989, and its articles of incorporation conform to Hungarian law. The articles of association also contain specifications: This is the first independent daily. The adjective means keeping all politicians at an equal distance, and that the rights and obligations of the editor in chief and of all staff members are defined. The paper's journalists know what their professional interests are, and they hold 10 percent of the capital stock, or rather just five percent after the sale. But even this five-percent stake in the corporation gives them a certain influence over editorial policy. When the corporation was established and functioning, along came Mr. Murdoch and bought a 50-percent interest. But he has been unable to create a situation that would have changed the rules already laid down. The joint venture agreement gives three of the six seats on the board of directors to foreigners, and three to Hungarians. But the chairman of the board is also a Hungarian, and his vote could be decisive in a given situation.

**Peter Popper:** This may sound completely naive and stupid, but let me ask anyhow. I once heard that 51 percent of the capital stock is the critical point, and whoever holds that much stock controls the corporation. Is this not also true in newspaper publishing?

**Istvan Horvath:** I agree completely with what you said. For that extra percentage point, in my opinion, Mr. Murdoch would be willing to pay at least as much as he paid for his 50 percent.

**Gabor Rekai:** Rumors are circulating that NEPSZABADSAG is also about to start out on a similar road or is holding talks to attract foreign capital.

**Pal Eotvos:** I do not know just what we are starting out on or just what we are ending. The left wing press, too, must take note of what is happening in the Hungarian press in general. Six months from now, when NEPSZABADSAG will be under very heavy economic and political pressure, we could hardly afford to be much worse off financially and technically than our competition. In other words, something must be done. As to whether we are conducting negotiations? Anyone scanning advertisements is already negotiating, because there is a certain inclination or willingness on his part. Incidentally, very many people have contacted us, and in this sense we are having talks. But where these talks will lead to is an entirely different question. Let me tell you about a ten-minute meeting I had a few days ago with someone who could have bought NEPSZABADSAG, lock, stock, and barrel, with just his loose change. He asked me what kind of newspaper NEPSZABADSAG was. I told him that it was a socialist-oriented popular newspaper that espoused or advocated socialist values. He asked me whether that was negotiable. I answered that it was not. Well, he had thought otherwise. This was something he, as the representative of a large Italian industrial group, could not accept and therefore was no longer interested. Whereupon I asked him whether he could ever imagine OSSERVATORE ROMANO, the Vatican's newspaper, transforming itself within a year into a newspaper sponsored by bicycle manufacturers? He said he could not. Neither could I, I replied, and thanked him for his visit. And that was the end of those talks.

**Janos Simko:** Now that we are at this point, let me ask you a question. How does the political force behind your newspaper—i.e., the Hungarian Socialist Party—relate to foreign capital?

**Pal Eotvos:** Like everything else in Hungary at present, its attitude is perplexing and difficult to define clearly. Actually, I cannot even negotiate with a Westerner, because NEPSZABADSAG is not a separate legal entity.
Peter Popper: What have we been saying here all along is that the press needs capital, and that capital is in the West. If the capitalists merely want to earn a profit on their investment, then I am reassured. As a reader, I think that there are people in Hungary who hold many different kinds of political views. Consequently, even newspapers with different political standpoints can be profitable, if profit is truly the only thing the capitalists are looking for. I find that to be an honest capitalist attitude. The capitalist wants profit, and his intentions can be honorable or dishonorable, just as the requirements that the state sets for a newspaper or periodical it subsidizes can be honorable or dishonorable. If this is not so, because fulfillment of certain political demands is a precondition for the capital investment, then I sense danger. Within a year or two a situation could arise such that newspapers professing to be leftist might be at a serious disadvantage, because no one is investing in newspapers of such persuasion.

Gabor Rekai: Are there no wealthy leftists?

Pal Eotvos: There are. Any go-between wishing to find us a partner will obviously look around in such circles. But one must proceed with extreme caution even in the case of such partners because, over and above the financial interests, foreign and domestic political interests also crisscross here. Allow me to revert to the contradiction that Mihaly Galik brought up. It is indeed curious that the process which should be taking place is doing so in reverse. Industrial capital is staying out, expecting to be coaxed in. But foreign capital is flowing into newspaper publishing, and foreigners are showing a very keen interest in the press. If a similar process were taking place in France and, say, West German capital were expanding aggressively into the mass media, that would probably cause serious political upheavals there.

Mihaly Galik: Hungary is unprepared. We have a press law that was not good even when it was enacted. Now, after some tinkering and minor corrections, that law is still not interested in confining within certain legal limits the possible role of foreign capital. I attended the meetings of the so-called codification committee, at which various experts were advising the Justice Ministry’s legislation-drafting main department on what to take into consideration. MAGYAR SAJTO, the journalists’ professional magazine, published the resulting legislative bill. In it I find little evidence of heeding the advice to emphasize in the bill’s provisions that the mass media are not just an ordinary industry, but something special. For instance, the availability of the frequencies that carry radio and television programs is physically limited. It is difficult to imagine that statutory regulations do not specify in some way the conditions under which foreigners may be allocated frequencies. The refusal of the legislative and executive branches to face this question is, in my opinion, a very serious omission.

Gabor Rekai: Could you, Mihaly Galik, give us some examples of how this question is regulated in other countries?

Mihaly Galik: There are, of course, as many different regulations as there are countries. I have here a volume of reports that investigated specifically the question of the extent to which foreign capital may or may not establish radio and television stations or invest in newspapers in the individual countries. On this occasion I will stick to radio and television as our example, and to the conditions that existed on 30 July 1986. In France, foreign capital is not permitted to establish radio or television studios. Foreigners are not allowed to hold shares in national radio and television stations. The same can be said to apply to Canada as well. I know that the regulations have been relaxed since then. But Hungary’s attempt to protect its national interest by setting legal barriers to the influx of foreign capital would not have been unprecedented. Precedents do exist abroad. And I do not think that we should adopt the attitude that all this may be true in other countries, but we do not have to bother with such things.

Zsolt Bajnok: Maxwell’s representative, a highly experienced journalist, asked me why our front pages were so boring. The terrible thing about all of this was that the front pages were truly boring. But it is one thing if I say so, and quite another thing if my negotiating partner says so. It is common knowledge that its front page more or less reflects a paper’s character, policies, and disposition. Thus a boring front page leads to the conclusion that the paper is conservative and moderate. But what will make the paper interesting? Reporting on the front page, rather than on page seven, the birth of a freak calf with two heads? Featuring on the front page any scandal that breaks out? My discussion with Maxwell’s representative was not in secret; my colleagues were also present. MAGYAR HIRLAP began to investigate the reasons why our front pages were so boring. Just compare our front pages now with what they were six months ago. What I am saying is not that this is a change for the worse, but that it is also possible to intervene indirectly.

Gabor Rekai: In a changing situation there is also a question of whether the journalist has the right to follow his convictions and perhaps write against the owner’s political or business interests. Is this already a real problem in our country? Or is it one that we will have to face sooner or later?

Zsolt Bajnok: That seems to me to be a fiction, I must admit. The journalist may have the right to follow his convictions in one or two instances, but may not have that right in a third instance.

Peter Popper: What will he not have, the right or the opportunity?

Pal Eotvos: Things are arranged more sensibly than that. The journalists who like to write about blue will not go to work for a newspaper that is partial to green. That is why the world wisely “channels” itself. Within a developed press structure, I expect that every journalist will find a forum that meets his standards.
Istvan Horvath: When discussion is on the journalist's conscience, the question immediately comes to mind of whether a staffer of, say, MAI NAP may write against the market economy if doing so is obviously in conflict with the interests of the paper's capitalist owner? Already the question itself almost frightens us. But let me ask you nonetheless: During the past 40 years here in Hungary, did anyone ever dare to write something other than what the person commissioning the writing wanted?

Gabor Rekai: Let me turn your question around. Not so long ago the emergence of an independent press and independent journalism caused joy. Today there are people who feel that a year has elapsed and now the press, or the journalist, is being controlled from another direction.

Istvan Horvath: I think that independence determines not only who owns a newspaper but also the paper's policies. If a paper is independent, and if an owner accepts that fact and invests money in the paper, it may still remain independent.

Peter Popper: What the newspaper advocates is one question, and on what level it does so is another question. It is possible to advocate at the level of a tabloid and also at the level of a newspaper of quality, the same blue or green that Pal Eotvos mentioned. The outcome of possible attempts to influence always depends upon how resistant the journalist is, upon how much he lets himself be influenced. That is a question of integrity. I will attempt to prove that I do not regard what has been said merely as talking of the devil. Lately I have noticed signs of deterioration in the press: Intolerance is again on the rise; news and commentary are again mixed up; political, economic, and ethical values are mutually interchangeable, and thus it is possible to gain esthetic laurels for political reasons; a personal, distorting, and sometimes abusive style of debate is replacing arguments and is again becoming dominant. I worry whether the Hungarian press will have sufficient moral resistance to withstand economic influence.

Pal Eotvos: The question, to my mind, can be formulated as follows: Will the mentioned red, pink, green, or whatever other colored newspapers be able to appear and compete under equal conditions? Regardless of their journalistic levels, of course. If intolerant journalistic standards are adopted, then their effects will also mean that certain political views cannot be advocated honorably, because they would discredit both the journalist and his paper.

Janos Simko: The financial situation of journalists must also be mentioned. Here it was said that our colleagues will go to work where they are able to write what they like, what constitutes value according to their convictions. Are they certain to do so, or will they prefer to go where they are offered much money?

Mihaly Galik: Money cannot be regarded as a universal value. Everywhere in the world newspapers of quality have greater prestige than tabloids, although the latter offer higher incomes.

Zsolt Bajnok: Allow me to be more gloomy. MAGYAR HIRLAP now employs 80 journalists. Many of them will eventually have to go.

Gabor Rekai: Is that the foreign partner's request?

Zsolt Bajnok: Not a request. A much stronger word would be more appropriate. I am not at all optimistic, and I fear for the journalists' morale and political commitment, in whatever direction that may lie. I foresee the unfolding of a definitely negative period.

Mihaly Galik: Zsolt Bajnok would be entirely right if we were shifting from an absolutely perfect state of affairs to a less perfect one. That is not the case at all! Admittedly, this rearrangement will have personal losers in the press, in the same way as there will be losers in metallurgy or in some other industry.

Gabor Rekai: Let us give the last word to Peter Popper who has been invited to speak for the reader and the listener.

Peter Popper: I have found this discussion very edifying, because from the outside it is not evident on what marshy ground or between how many reefs the Hungarian press is being reshaped. After this I will probably feel more solidarity with journalists and will be a more tolerant reader. My other feeling is that of alarm at what I as a "consumer" of the press am exposed to, and which is not simply the relaying of some kind of intellectual value.

Report of Committee Investigating Internal Security Activities

90EC0363A Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 3 Mar 90 p 4

[Unattributed article: ―Report of the Parliamentary Committee Investigating the Activities of the Interior Ministry's Internal Security Service‖]

[Text] On 5 January 1990, representatives of the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Alliance of Young Democrats filed a misuse-of-authority complaint with the Budapest Chief Public Prosecutor's Office. They demanded the institution of criminal proceedings because they had learned from an officer of the Internal Security Service that organs of the Interior Ministry had been illegally gathering data on the activities of certain opposition parties and politicians, and had been including such information in their various reports. The parties attached to their complaint a copy of daily report No. 219 of the Interior Ministry's No. III/III-7 department, dated 10 November 1989. At their press conference they made several other similar reports public.

On 25 January 1990, the National Assembly enacted the Law on the Provisional Regulation of Granting Authorization To Use Special Intelligence-Gathering Devices and Methods. Then on 31 January 1990 the National Assembly appointed a committee to oversee the granting of such authorization by the minister of justice, and "to investigate the activities of the Internal Security Service."
The time available to the committee to investigate this entirely unfamiliar subject was limited, because the committee interpreted its commission to mean that its report had to be submitted no later than the last sitting of the current National Assembly. Therefore the committee decided to limit its investigation to several important, well-defined questions. (Supplement No. 1 lists the details the committee investigated.)

I. The means and methods used for surveillance and preventive measures, and defense against the activities of inimical elements. But it also stated that the state security organs, in carrying out their duties, “may employ the means and methods specified by law.” Order of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers No. 1/1975, issued on 2 June 1975, regulated the means and methods that could be employed to defend the state’s security. Article 2 of that order permits “secret operational-technical eavesdropping,” “secret interception of mail,” etc. By their own admission, neither the minister of the interior nor his deputy in charge of state security was familiar with the last two fundamental, secret statutory regulations. Yet, over a hundred Interior Ministry orders, instructions, and measures were subsequently based on them, regulating in a very detailed and bureaucratic manner the use of secret technical systems and methods.

This mode of regulation, under which low-level secret statutory regulations limited the civil rights guaranteed in the constitution, violated fundamental legal principles. For, according to the Hungarian Constitution’s wording that was in effect in 1975, “The Hungarian People’s Republic guarantees the personal freedom of its citizens, the inviolability of their person, the privacy of their correspondence, and the sanctity of their home” (Section 66).

In the committee’s opinion, even more serious than the formal legal defects was the secrecy-shrouded method of exercising political control. (According to Article 8 of Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 6000/1975, for instance, “the minister of the interior must regularly present situation reports on state security to the party and state leaders concerned.”)

Admittedly, even countries that respect civil and human rights employ such methods, and open regulation has long been delayed in some countries. But that cannot serve as an excuse for the conditions in Hungary. The party-state in our country—alert to suppressing domestic tensions and attempting to conceal the repression and deception—found internal secret regulation more expedient. It thereby placed certain restrictions on the secret police, but retained more control for itself over the use of the means and methods in question, and over the selection of the persons to be kept under surveillance.

The party-state’s political weapon was to draw the enemy’s political profile and to specify its political characteristics. In 1970, for instance, the interior minister issued an order to place under operational surveillance those “who wish to replace the state’s cultural and educational policies and its guiding role with their own policies and the activities of their own groups” or “who send literary works, political essays, or works of art abroad illegally.”

In 1978, the aforementioned order was amended to also require reporting on the harmful political actions of reactionary churchmen, and the inclusion of information on hostile, nationalist, or “dissenting” individuals, their meetings, and the preparations for such meetings.

One area of such state security work was the No. III (against domestic reactionaries) Directorate of the Interior Ministry’s No. III (state security) Main Directorate. The directorate itself was subdivided into several departments. They carried out wiretapping regularly, from the late 1970’s on against politicians and activists opposing the government. From the autumn of 1988, they maintained “directorate files” on the organizing political parties, and intercepted and read their mail. According to the testimony of one witness, for instance, the mail arriving to the Lakitelek address of the Hungarian Democratic Forum was intercepted and opened. The committee established that from 3 October 1989 through 5 January 1990 mail addressed to the Molnar Street, Budapest office of the Alliance of Young Democrats was intercepted.

Detailed and accurate data were not available to the committee because files had been destroyed. On the basis of the testimony of witnesses, it may be assumed that about 1,400 files were destroyed in the Interior Ministry in September 1989 and early January 1990. The committee has no knowledge of what happened to the data that was stored in computers. The fact that department chiefs had the authority to approve the monitoring of domestic telephone calls provides some indication of the frequency with which operational-technical methods were employed.

2. The turning point from the viewpoint of the committee’s investigation was 23 October 1989, the day the Constitution of the Hungarian Republic was promulgated. The one-party system ceased; the profile of the dissident, of the enemy, vanished; human rights and
their constitutional guarantees were entrenched unambiguously in the Constitution.

Within the State Security Service, however, the necessary changes did not occur. Plans were drawn up to create a new National Security Service; there were scientific conferences, as well as meetings and briefings for the directorate and department heads; but no definite and clear decisions were made and put into writing. The old internal, secret regulations remained in force: the old organization continued to run like a flywheel. The gathering of data on dissidents and their organizations continued; secret devices and methods (mail intercepts and wiretaps, for instance) were used occasionally; and the compilation of internal reports on these activities went on. Over and above this, there were also a few cases of surveillance that seem warranted for reasons of state security.

Because of the destruction of files, the commission has been unable to determine who ordered actions that violated civil rights, and how many times. But evidence has been preserved that shows, for instance, that telephone conversations between Miklos Haraszti and Istvan Csurka on 8 December 1989, not related in any way to unconstitutional activity, were monitored and reported; and that a private conversation held in Miklos Tamas Gaspar's home was also recorded on that date.

3. The committee investigated in detail the matter of the various reports, because the media had been speculating about their content and circulation, and had drawn conflicting conclusions. The committee encountered several types of reports.

The daily reports of the No. III/III Directorate also contained information obtained by methods that violated personal rights and freedoms. These reports were intended for the information of the directorate's chiefs, and a secret code was used in them to identify the sources of information. The daily report for 10 November 1989, which had been attached to the complaint, also belonged in this category. Identifying a wiretap as a source of its information, the report placed on record the telephone conversation between Ferenc Koszeg and a foreign friend. It was possible to determine from a similar report the already mentioned monitoring of telephone calls between Miklos Haraszti and Istvan Csurka.

Also using the reports of the No. III/III Directorate, the Main Directorate's secretariat compiled daily operational information reports that went to the interior minister, the state secretary, and the deputy ministers for state security and public security, respectively. These reports identified the directorates from which the information had originated, but made no reference to the manner in which the information was obtained. Even after 23 October 1989, these reports contained illegally obtained information provided by the security service. Officially the reports mentioned so far did not circulate outside the Interior Ministry.

In addition to such internal reports, the Interior Ministry also compiled daily information reports for the top state leadership, and for certain leaders of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] and—after 18 October 1989—the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party]. An internal, secret statutory regulation prescribed what these reports had to contain: statistical data on the development of police measures restricting personal freedom; statistics on particular types of traffic accidents; information about events significantly affecting order on the country's borders, etc. These reports made no reference to the sources of their information, and usually they did not contain intelligence data.

Special ad hoc information reports were attached to the daily reports from time to time. Of the seven such reports available to this committee and prepared between 25 October and 5 December 1989, most dealt with political matters—the activities of the Alliance of Free Democrats, for instance—and bore a top secret classification. It was possible to establish that some of the reports also contained unpublished information about the opposition parties. The reports did not indicate whether the information in them had been obtained by illegal methods. (Supplement No. 2 presents the circulation list for these reports.)

It can be established that, in addition to certain members of the government, a few MSZMP officials also received these reports.

4. In their testimony before the committee, the former interior minister, Dr. Istvan Horvath, and his top associates (Ferenc Pallagi, the former deputy minister, and Dr. Jozsef Horvath, the former head of the [No. III Main Directorate]) mentioned repeatedly that they had intended numerous measures to promote a peaceful transition, but had run out of time to implement them. It is undeniable that in the Interior Ministry the reform process had begun already in 1988 and had accelerated during 1989. A committee was formed to draft new regulations, and a scientific conference was held.

In cabinet (on 3 July 1989), the interior minister introduced a proposal entitled “The Questions of State Security in the Present Domestic Political Situation.” The proposal designated the protection of constitutional order and compliance with the laws as the principal directions of state security activity. The cabinet adopted a resolution that called for drafting the necessary changes in the statutory regulations.

Within the framework of the political coordination talks, the question of reorganizing national security work was raised repeatedly at the sessions of the No. I/6 Working Committee (on the Creation of Legal Safeguards Against Arbitrary Solutions), but was not included among the essential pieces of legislation that most urgently needed to be enacted. The pace of events accelerated, and economic issues shifted to the forefront of attention.
Section 39, Paragraph 2 of Law No. XXI/1989 Amending the Constitution gave the Council of Ministers until 30 April 1990 to submit to the National Assembly the legislative bills necessary for the law’s implementation, and to complete the legislative tasks within the purview of the Council of Ministers.

Meanwhile, additional proposals were drafted for reorganizing the Internal Security Service. The work on reforms continued, but the review and modification of the old regulations were neglected. There were plans at the top for changes; but definite, unambiguous measures were not put into writing—not even after 23 October 1989—to set the direction of intelligence-gathering and to change the methods used. Only in late December 1989 did Dr. Jozsef Horvath issue an official communication instructing all members of the service to employ secret intelligence-gathering devices that violate personal rights and freedoms only in the case of crimes against the Constitution or the Criminal Code.

5. The committee’s fact-finding efforts have been greatly hampered by the fact that the Interior Ministry’s No. III/III Directorate summarily destroyed practically all of its files, and the Budapest and county police headquarters did likewise.

Internal regulations permitted or even prescribed the regular, protocoled destruction of documents. This was warranted by the practically unlimited information-gathering that either yielded very little information of real value, or yielded information that largely became worthless within a short time. In December 1989, however, an unwarranted large-scale destruction of documents began at the No. III/III Directorate. At first only the truly old files were discarded; then the ones whose retention became illegal due to the changes in the Constitution and the Criminal Code. By the end of December, however, files were being destroyed practically without any sorting. Among other things, about 1,400 personal files were destroyed: Only four “live” files were found by the time the Military Prosecutor’s Office began seizing files. On the instructions of Deputy Minister Ferenc Pallagi, the regulations in force were set aside and no protocols were prepared of the destruction of documents from 22 December on; in some places, moreover, even the old protocols were destroyed. At some of the police headquarters in the provinces, the public prosecutors seized files only around 15 January.

II.

In the committee’s opinion, political responsibility can be apportioned as follows:

1. In 1989, the leadership of the Interior Ministry and of the State Security Service, respectively, launched many policy studies, mostly theoretical ones of a preparatory nature, and regularly said that changes were warranted. Yet no provisions were made to introduce the most urgent changes in conformity with the Constitution. But a review of the internal regulations, the issuance of new instructions, orders, and measures, and effective training of the personnel for the new political and legal situation were neglected.

On the other hand, it is likewise indisputable that the accelerating pace of political events shortened the time available to prepare for these tasks. Many unforeseeable developments (the funeral of Imre Nagy and his associates, the 23 October anniversary and proclamation of the Hungarian Republic, and the 4 November anniversary) also kept the service busy, and the ensuring of a peaceful transition assigned the entire organization substantial tasks of a different nature.

The most significant omission was that the internal regulations were not rescinded when the new constitution went into effect, and the continuation of past practices, which by then were obviously illegal, was tolerated. The actions taken in January 1990 indicate that the country would have suffered less shock and political damage if the top officials of the Interior Ministry had taken the same actions at the right time and with due circumspection.

2. On the basis of our findings it may be assumed that Interior Minister Istvan Horvath had been misinformed by subordinates when he incorrectly claimed, in his answer to the question addressed to him by Deputy Erno Raffay, that documents were being destroyed only in the manner and on the scale that the regulations permitted. Although this question in Parliament, in the committee’s opinion, was also meant as a warning, the minister neglected to look into the matter. And this is how it was that on 22 December, the day after the minister’s statement in Parliament, the deputy minister not only ordered the further large-scale destruction of documents, but also made it possible by issuing, on his own authority, instructions that were contrary to the regulations.

III. Conclusions

1. The State Security Service’s Internal Security Directorate was established to support the party-state. Its organizational structure, composition, operating mechanism, and secret statutory regulations were tailored to a constructed enemy profile. Every dissenting individual or collective was an enemy. The statutory regulations governing the organization and its operations violated even the constitution that was then in force.

2. The use of special intelligence-gathering devices after 23 October 1989 violated the Constitution of the Hungarian Republic. Dr. Istvan Horvath, the former interior minister; Ferenc Pallagi, the former deputy interior minister in charge of the State Security Service; and Dr. Jozsef Horvath, the former head of the No. III/III Directorate, bear personal political responsibility because each of them could have prevented the employment of unconstitutional methods at his own level. In late December, Dr. Jozsef Horvath’s official communication prohibiting the use of unconstitutional devices spread the circle of responsibility even wider.
3. The committee regards as proven the fact that when the party state’s disintegration seemed inevitable, the State Security Service did attempt to adapt to the changed political conditions, but Dr. Istvan Horvath’s measures in this area proved inadequate.

4. The available reports reveal that certain members of the government also received information about the opposition. From the reports themselves it is not possible to determine unambiguously whether one could have drawn conclusions regarding the methods by which the information was obtained. The government as a whole cannot be held responsible for the fact that some of its members received reports containing, as the committee subsequently established, items of information from intelligence sources.

5. The committee established that practically all the files of the No. III/III Directorate had been destroyed in December 1989 and the first half of January 1990. In view of the fact that the gathering of information by methods violating personal rights and freedoms continued even while files were being destroyed, the committee did not find the argument that the files had to be destroyed because their very existence was unconstitutional to be acceptable. Seizure of the documents typical of the party-state, but destroyed during the last months of its existence, would have made it possible to preserve those documents for posterity’s edification. Ferenc Pallagi must bear the primary responsibility for the destruction of documents on such a large scale.

6. The committee considers it unconstitutional that—as a survival of the practices under the party-state—two leaders of MSZMP who did not hold government office also received copies of the reports, even after 23 October 1989.

7. The committee came to the conclusion that the resignations of Dr. Istvan Horvath as interior minister, Ferenc Pallagi as deputy interior minister, and Dr. Jozsef Horvath as directorate head had been warranted.

Budapest, 28 February 1990

POLAND

Ultranationalist Group Outlines Ideology, Objectives

90EP0456A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 11, 17 Mar 90 p 6

[Article by Jan Dziadul: “Return of the Nationalist Spirit”]

[Text] They appeared independently for the first time in Opole, on the Sunday of the supplementary Senate elections. They demonstrated beneath flags of red and white bearing the symbol of a hand holding a sword in the center. They shouted: “Silesians—yes! Volksdeutsche—no!” They called out: “Poles must remain the owners of their own country!”

“There isn’t a German minority in Poland,” activists from the Silesian section of the National Rebirth of Poland, or NOP [Narodowy Odrodzenie Polski] assured the people dashing off to vote. “There are only Silesians, the original residents, a Slavic tribe. The economic contrasts, the communists’ destruction of the Polish national ethos, have led to the phenomenon of the mass renegation of their homeland. The Polish people must not allow the existence of fifth column prepared to assume the leadership in an economy bought up by West German capital.”

It seems so clear, but they are not entirely understood. At NOP headquarters, in a little room that the rector of Silesian University in Katowice has assigned by the hour—the Confederation for an Independent Poland, the Polish Green Party, the Polish Socialist Party, and the Polish National Front are cosponsors—there is a flag hanging on the wall. Next to the symbol on it taken from the prewar National Radical Camp and Young Nationalists Union, some unknown hand has added a swastika, undoubtedly to create embarrassment.

“We’re standing on the foundation of nationalism seeking political independence,” emphasizes Bogdan Koziel-Salski, who is the leader of the Silesian branch and a senior majoring in political science. He asks that they place special emphasis on the qualifier, because of the totalitarian Fascists clinging to them. “We are an organization above the party level, joining society to a national ideology.”

NOP is not a new color on the country’s political map. The Organization was founded in Warsaw in the fall of 1981, in connection with the publication JESTEM POLAKIEM. It undertook “sporadic activity” under martial law. At the beginning of 1989, it was joined by the Szczerbiec political group in Katowice (which has a publication entitled SZCZERBIEC). The strongest groups are in Warsaw and Katowice, which includes the voivodships of southern Poland. An NOP branch is now forming in Poznan.

“We have developed out of the tradition of Polish nationalism, Roman Dmowski’s thought, and the Great Polish Camp (Oboz Wielkiej Polski),” Koziel-Salski explains, “but we aren’t letting ourselves become fenced in by this. We are also in contact with European models for the reborn history of the Spanish Phalange and the nationalist movements in other countries.”

In an anonymous article entitled “The National Rebirth of Europe” in an issue of SZCZERBIEC last year, the author approvingly emphasized the electoral successes of Jean-Marie Le Pen and his National Front, the Flemish nationalists in Belgium, and the renewed MSI [Movimento Sociale Italiano], as well as the West German Republican Party. On the other hand, it notices a resonance with nationalism in Eastern Europe, Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Croatian, and Russian nationalism.

The conclusions are clear: “The spirit we mentioned before is what links these two phenomena. Not ideas, not
ideology, not doctrine, but "spirit," a national spirit expressed in deep respect for the past, for national traditions and history, in the attachment to the soil of our homeland, in the sense of bonding and community with our nation, with people who have the same blood and language. This national spirit creates an instinctive reaction to all the dangers which pose a threat to the national community, whether they be in the form of new arrivals from abroad or of a foreign system and antinationalist ideologies..."

The democratic national state which will undoubtedly be built up will be based on national rule: a universal self-government system from a block self-governing group right up to a chamber in the parliament. The interests of the individual, group, or class must not go beyond the national interest. For this reason the socioeconomic system will have a third way: neither communism nor capitalism but a regime which corresponds to our mentality and is adapted to our national characteristics, putting a premium on Polish ingenuity and enterprise. Private ownership in agriculture and crafts, cooperative ownership in trade, and state ownership in large industry, based on employee shareholders.

"The national question has been worked out in our country," the head of the Silesian NOP branch says, "after all, Poles make up 92 percent of society. Nonetheless, we are cultivating differences in ethnicity, culture, and customs. No nation may put itself above others, but national minorities should not derive any privileges from their status either. No subsidies, no favoritism in parliamentary or self-government representation. They must exist under the same laws as the Polish nation."

The greatest threat to the nation and nations which the nationalistic movements must firmly counteract is the progressive unification of Europe and the creation of a joint European government.

"We oppose the concepts of homogenization of the nations and their cultures," Koziel-Salski says. "We back each nation's right to cultivate its own singularity, innate values, and native culture. This is the only mosaic which will create a European culture. We don't agree to a multinational society fed with cultural pap created by the mass media."

It is true that nobody yet has been able to create a framework in which the nation would be above the government (the nation the supreme sovereign), but the vision is not too far off, as we can read in SZCZERBIEC:

"The communist-socialist-liberal empires of lying and slavery are starting to crumble. You can already see the deep lines and breaks, which the light from the flame of national rebirth is starting to break through. The inevitable day is coming in which a New National Europe will rise on the rubble of the old communist-liberal European order."

Before that day comes, we should refute the rumors: It was not the members of the NOP who beat up the African students in Wroclaw who were celebrating the release of Nelson Mandela but a group of hooligans, skinheads, and neofascists, who have nothing in common with nationalists. It is true that the branch has its own skinheads, but they are good people. The spray painting of swastikas on Katowice walls is something else to discuss. It is being done by GKS supporters, who for some reason have taken a fancy to this symbol. The NOP does not take part in rabble-rousing or riots. It holds has contempt for all those who smash things up, set fires, and throw things. It is true that they went out into the streets in Opole, but only to exist in the propaganda terms, and it worked.

The NOP program is large. We should ask about the organization's numbers.

"There are 79 of us in the Silesian branch plus a group of sympathizers," the NOP leader tells me unenthusiastically. Overhearing our conversation, an anonymous nationalist adds: "But we'll check on them, because not all are true nationalists."

The National Party and the Christian-National Union are the closest on the country's political map, but they cannot get closer to them because of "those organizations' obsessive attitude toward Jews and Freemasonry and the pathological hate for Pilsudski-ite traditions."

Koziel-Salski warns: "That's why we're independent and and are going to stay that way. Please don't treat us like an add-on to those parties, because there's already an effort to pigeonhole us. After all, they consider us to be a product of Freemasonry."

And what are we to do with all this? Forward march four abreast. The nation, the homeland, the border. But, after all, people say you do not march into the same river twice.

ORMO Dissolution, Control of Access to Firearms Viewed
90EP0439A Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC
in Polish No 10, 9 Mar 90 p 1, 13
[Article by Jan Strekowski: "The Name's Been Changed, the Weapons Remain"]

[Text] The ORMO [Volunteer Reserve of Citizens Militia], which was dissolved by the Sejm on 23 November 1989, has not left favorable memories behind. We can say along with Deputy Tadeusz Kowalczyk of the OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club]: Let the ORMO depart into oblivion with its bad reputation, just so long as no new organization comes along with a large number former ORMO members signed up.

The voivodship court registered the Association for the Support of Public Order on 10 November 1989. The MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] announced on 31 October that it had approved the scope of activity, in keeping with the law on associations dated 7 April 1989. This law requires that the MSW approve the scope of
The association recently received the MSW's license to carry on economic activity, for example, selling gas, sports, and hunting weapons, explosives, and ammunition for personal and property protection, for entertainment, and for detective services.

Therefore, everything is fine from the legal point of view, because the formation of any company is subject only to the regulations of the law on conducting economic activity, but in this case having to obtain a license from the MSW is a further restriction, and the association has met this requirement.

The fact of using armed members of the association to protect property (that of the Central Committee) is another matter.

Firearms Permit? Go Right Ahead

The regulations of the law on weapons, ammunition, and explosives, dated 1961, regulates the way permits are issued: "Permission from appropriate bodies of the MO must be issued for firearms produced after the year 1850." Article 7.1 of this law says that firearms permits may not be issued to minors, the mentally ill, alcoholics, drug addicts, persons without a fixed place of residence and employment, or "people feared to be inclined to use the weapon for purposes contrary to the interests of state security or the public order."

Lt Krzysztof Zagozdzinski, director of the MO Main Headquarters' Office of Control and Analysis, gives out licenses on behalf of the MSW to companies engaged in personal and property protection and detective services. Asked whether these companies automatically receive firearms permits, he replied: "They have to apply for firearms in the regular way according to the 1961 law, but we think that a gun is needed for the protection of money. If the property protection service doesn't involve the transportation of money, we won't issue a firearms permit."

In order to receive a permit for a military weapon, members of companies that are going to transport money must file individual applications. Then they receive state weapons and pay an annual fee for their use.

"We have generally said that we wouldn't grant permits to private parties for personal protection," Lieutenant Zagodzinski says. Permits are granted only for gas, hunting, and sporting weapons, and permits to sell firearms do not include military weapons. There are exceptions:

"There's a small group of people with permits for such firearms." These are former members of the military and militia, veterans who can ask to be given firearms as souvenirs.

Lieutenant Zagodzinski emphasizes: "This weapon must not be used to render any sort of service."
Defenders of the Central Committee

"Where did the association members get the firearms to patrol the Central Committee?" Lieutenant Figura has some difficulty responding to the question. "Some of us have a private weapon by our own permission... Maybe somebody has a gun... Some individual could have a gun."

But he says decisively: "We forbid the use of weapons under the agreement, for political reasons."

The fact that the association does not have a clear conscience here can be indirectly proved by the absence of any correction to the ZYCIE WARSZAWY blurb, with which the association's administration is familiar.

At present more than 300 companies for personal and property protection and detective services have been formed. Ryszard Czerniawski wrote in PRAWO I ZYCIE that companies of this sort are not monitored after they receive their licenses. Until an official complaint comes in, the MSW cannot do anything, because it is theoretically authorized to revoke a license it has issued. Returning to the association, to the social administration department of the Warsaw office, the person authorized to oversee the association does not know whether the Association for the Support of Public Order has an MSW license for economic activity. There is routine monitoring once a year, but Inspector Lucja Slowinska says that the newspaper comment referring to weapons does not fall within the scope of their interests.

Lieutenant Zagodzinski stated: "If we were to learn that a souvenir weapon was being used in rendering any sort of service, we could revoke the permit."

The comment in the newspaper is not a basis for intervention, especially since data on the individually issued firearms permits are held in this case by SUSW [Capital Office of Internal Affairs], the body wjocj issues permits in the field.

It therefore turns out that both in the case of associations protecting public order and that of companies of a similar nature, there is practically no possibility of monitoring them or keeping them from violating the law. This is all the more dangerous in that their action can be a real threat to the security of the citizenry. It would be worthwhile here to draft a law to defend security and public order and for the regional self-governing bodies to take a look at these forms of self-organization, with a view either to transferring all jurisdiction related to public security to state and self-government bodies or to putting both associations and these sorts of companies under stricter supervision.

It would also be worth looking at the principle of awarding "souvenir" weapons to veterans of the military and the militia, because the trust which the national defense and interior affairs ministries show these people has not been equalled by that shown the public, at least not up until now.

When asked about firearms, the people from the association guarding the gates at the Central Committee headquarters sent me off to the author of the squib in the newspaper. They did not allow me to contact the Central Committee's internal administration department, which made the agreement with the association. They behaved impolitely, to put it mildly, in the manner in which the members of the ORMO have accustomed us to in years past.

"Through our action we want to reach society," association chairman Marian Figura said. "When we expand our action, once we have broader contact with society, then we won't be afraid of confrontation."

Weakness in Reform Proposals for Internal Security Cited

90EP0439B Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish No 10, 9 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by Pawel Moczydlowski: "What Sort of Regime? What Kind of Police?"]

[Text] The reform of the institutions which defend legal order should be rooted in a vision of the new state and the resulting new concept of defending public order and security. There is clearly no such concept in either the draft of the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] or that of the Social Legislative Council adopted by the OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club].

The MSW draft seeks to retain as much of the old as possible. The OKP wants to tone down the department, prune it, split it up, and take its power away. It also allows it to retain more supervision over its bodies, but it does not change its fundamental essence. Both of them agree on depoliticizing the department. The OKP wants, and rightly so, to separate the police from the SB [Security Service] and make it institutionally independent. The MSW opposes this move. The OKP is proposing to split the previous SB jurisdiction between the police and the State Defense Office, which would include the former SB, along with intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

The OKP draft has a number of good things in it, particularly insofar as it calls for a decisive departure from the need to maintain any form of SB janissaries of communism and the MSW centralist model that issued forth from the old political system in the Polish People's Republic, but it contains no cohesive, positive concept of protecting public order and security. This lack is particularly obvious in the proposal to create a state police. Except for chiseling it out of the previous functions and detaching it from the MSW, there is no difference between it and the MSW proposal. Both drafts are closer in spirit to the police world initiated on 7 October 1944 than that expressed in the manifesto of the PKWN [Polish Committee for National Liberation]. Electoral national councils were to create "a Citizens Militia subject to those whose task it will be to maintain order and security." This notion even came close to being realized.
Next, on 27 July 1944, the PKWN ratified a decree establishing the MO [Citizens Militia]. That document states in Article 1: “Each People’s Council of a city, town, or gmina will set up a Citizens Militia to guard public order and security in its sphere of operations.” Then in Article 2 it goes on to say: “The local Citizens Militia is subject to the People’s Council that established it, in economic and budgetary terms and from the point of view of public supervision, and operates on the basis of ordinances from the head of the public security ministry.” The National People’s Council unanimously approved this decree on 15 August 1944. It was published in the DZIENNIK USTAW, No. 2, but the entire printing disappeared (as was wont to happen in those times). This unimplemented 1944 draft is closer in spirit to the direction in which the world is presently headed. We cannot write legal documents creating public security institutions with our imagination full of old fears of thieves and policemen. Today’s thinking about the civilized defense of public order begins with concern for the protection of mothers with children in the neighborhoods, parks, and streets.

Institutionally alien police will no longer be trusted. If the citizenry does not have control over the police, one will never know what they will do with what they find out. Such a guard will again create artificial institutional means of contact with society, seeking informers by gathering compromising facts and material to blackmail people and turn them into TW (confidential informants) and OZ (trusted persons), pressuring them to seek such information about others, and drawing them into their sphere of control. Secret funds will be sought for their services. Bureaucracy will be expanded, crediting itself with achievements not its own. All this so that citizens can be forced to do work which should to a great extent be done by the policeman, if locally organized society is the source of his authority and power.

Such a policeman has no need of “place of contact” surrounded by the “myth” that the owner went abroad and hired someone to look after things. Some family after all might live there. They can now invite the policeman in, tell him about their fears, and at least not have feel [the stigma] of being an OZ or TW.

Police operations cannot be eliminated. By the very nature of things the police operate on the fringe of the law, but one should not strive for a police model that the police should be used to the least extent possible. Increased control of the police to limit their extralegal operations may greatly limit their effectiveness. We should be concerned to see that the legal situation of the police makes it possible to control them and therefore trust them, rather than limiting their action or causing them to become paralyzed.

Today the police should be more of a public service than a body of pursuit. But time presses on. The January 1990 criminal statistics for Warsaw indicate that crime is up about 200 percent compared to January 1989, but detection has dropped by two to four percent.

Citizens Militia Officer Criticizes Proposed Fusion of SB, MO

90EP0439C Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish No 7, 16 Feb 90 p 4

[Interview with Lieutenant Lech Kacprzycki, NSZZ Citizens Militia Functions administration, Piotrkow Voivodship, by [jesz]; place and date not given: “Exchanging Identification Badges”]

[Text] TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC What’s happening with the militia?

[KACPRZYCKI] Reorganization, or what’s called “restructuring.”

TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC What does this entail?

[KACPRZYCKI] The problem is what to do with the SB [Security Service]. They decided at the ministry to have the SB functionaries absorbed into the militia wing, what we’d like to have called the “police.”

TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC But what’s the difference between the militia and the police?

[KACPRZYCKI] The militia wants to turn into the police, because it wants to serve the citizenry and break with the tradition of political subordination. The militia protects the party and its interests. The state police will defend the citizens’ interests. That’s why we want the changes.

TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC The changes at the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] are being widely broadcast.

[KACPRZYCKI] But it’s all show, because the changes consist of shuffling personnel back and forth. These changes are disintegrative and often upset the police community. In the field, such changes are made without any managerial or personnel orders.

TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC How does this work in practice?

[KACPRZYCKI] SB functionaries simply turn in their old identification badges and get new militia badges. In Piotrkow Vovodship our union demanded that the chief of the WUSW [Voivodship Office of Internal Affairs] immediately block this sort of practice, until the new police law goes into effect.

TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC Why don’t the militia people want to have the SB folks in their ranks? After all, most of them are college graduates, and you’ve got a chronic personnel shortage.

[KACPRZYCKI] It has to do with competence. The SB had other duties, and we think that they have little or no aptitude for detective work. The paradox is that an SB officer can become a member of the militia from one day to the next but has to learn from a sergeant, who earns less than he does to boot. What’s happening in the militia...
today is a top-down merger of the militia with the security service. We can't agree to this sort of reform concept. There are social considerations too.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Is it true that educated SB functionaries have no ability at all to do criminal or police work?

[KACPRZYCKI] If you consider hunting people down for their political beliefs to be a skill, then they have it, but what do you need that for in the state police?

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Is this “reorganization” going on in the field unbeknownst to the MSW?

[KACPRZYCKI] No. The central office sent down a paper on “the principles of the ministry’s restructuring.” It was signed by Lt Leszek Lemparski. Among the important matters we read that the people transferred from the SB to the MO should be given new identification badges. This is what this restructuring is leading to.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Is there animosity between the MO and the SB?

[KACPRZYCKI] Yes. But it’s caused not only by the fact that for the many years the SB enjoyed greater privileges than the militia but also the SB’s “traditions and contributions,” if we can put it that way. We don’t want the public to attribute to the police the SB’s “contribution” to the police.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] I don’t think that members of the public with any awareness will do that.

[KACPRZYCKI] But if the MO is merged with the SB, the public’s assessment of that fact will be unanimous.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Can’t the militia’s central authorities, the General Command, for example, counteract the practice of whitewashing the police who used to hunt down political dissidents to look like the police who hunt down criminals?

[KACPRZYCKI] Our branch was not represented on the commissions that transferred the SB people to the militia. We can only protest the move outside our own ministry.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] And do you?

[KACPRZYCKI] Yes, indeed. We’re providing information on the situation to commissions of the Sejm and Senate.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] But there must be some way besides protest to permit a genuine police reform, one which will produce trust in this very important segment of the state apparatus.

[KACPRZYCKI] At a session of the Senate Commission on Civil Rights and Law and Order, Cpt Roman Hula, the chairman of our union, proposed verifying the ranks of the future police. Such verification would benefit both the police itself and all society.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] What sort of criteria do you propose for this verification?

[KACPRZYCKI] One criterion: the way the person behaved after 4 June of last year.

**POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup**

90EP0395A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 7, 17 Feb 90 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

The Sejm restored the crown to the eagle. The president, taking advantage of his right to offer legislation, proposed the law. Prof Andrzej Heidrich gave the face of the eagle its final form, following the 1927 model of Prof Zygmunt Kaminski. The changes consist of removing the fringe around the shield and improving the proportions and the ornaments at the ends of the wing bands in order to avoid association with a five-pointed star. The law was adopted by a vote of 316 to 3 with 52 abstentions.

An unpleasant incident took place during the Sejm debate on the state symbol. Deputy Jan Lopuszanski (Citizens' Parliamentary Club) turned to the leftist deputies saying they had no right to vote and advising them to leave the chamber during the voting. In the name of the Citizens' Parliamentary Club, Deputy Henryk Wujec disassociated the club from that statement, and Deputy Marian Orzechowski condemned it in the name of the Democratic Left Club. More than 100 deputies of the Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left and the Polish Peasant Party “Rebirth” asked the presidium of the Sejm to take parliamentary disciplinary action against J. Lopuszanski in accord with the parliament’s rules. [passage omitted]

Wojciech Jaruzelski, in an interview with the PAP correspondent in Geneva, discussed the decision to introduce martial law. TRYBUNA KONGRESOWA has printed these “personal admissions”: “I will attempt to approach the subject with complete honesty. I am only a man and my view of these issues is as subjective as that of every man who makes one decision or another in good faith.” “No one who chooses a lesser evil over a greater one can count on applause. Evil always remains evil.” “In historical terms, the final balance is important,” said the president.

Following the declaration by Gen Franciszek Kaminski, president of the Polish Peasant Party, and Kazimierz Olesiak, president of the Polish Peasant Party “Rebirth” on their joint efforts during the coming election campaign to the self-governments (we reported the declaration in the previous issue in the section National News), there have already been disputes in the leadership of the Polish Peasant Party. The chairman of the deputy club Roman Bartoszcze said that Gen Kaminski had not signed the declaration, and K. Olesiak in announcing the
Public Opinion on 22 and 23 January 1990. In first place a cabin costs 75.2 million zlotys beginning 5 February. The popularity ratings of various leading Polish political combines have again risen. The Bizon-Super with services will increase only by 6 percent. Factory 70 million zloty and the Car Factory 50 billion, fold higher than in January 1989 but only slightly higher payments from profits, and wages were more than nine came immediately thereafter. The Office of Statistics will announced it by 20 February surprising that immediately after the publication of the increase in prices was 65-70 percent according to the estimates of the Central Office of Statistics reported in torship imposed on Poland in 1944, and on 30 May he declared by A.W. Wysocki, I responded and called for宣言 at the national congress. (He received 197 of the 304 valid votes.) Bogdan Lis, Jacek Merkel, and Lech Walesa members and refused cooperation with the new city authorities. The new president told ZYCIE press discussion between Adam W. Wysocki, the former press spokesman of the SD Central Committee, and Jerzy Nowak, secretary of the Central Committee. Wysocki: “The weak, indecisive policy of the television management (which was an indirect argument in his dispute with A. Jakubowska), and then as the spokesman of the Citizens’ Parliamentary Club, he printed the declaration of the Association expanded by a few names, including Jakubowska’s” from the official version reported by PAP. “I am convinced,” writes Zorawski, “that in this situation the only honorable solution is the resignation of Mr Jacek Zakowski from his social position in the Association of Polish Journalists.”

Press discussion between Adam W. Wysocki, the former press spokesman of the SD Central Committee, and Jerzy Nowak, secretary of the Central Committee. Wysocki: “The weak, indecisive policy of the television management (which was an indirect argument in his dispute with A. Jakubowska), and then as the spokesman of the Citizens’ Parliamentary Club, he printed the declaration of the Association expanded by a few names, including Jakubowska’s” from the official version reported by PAP. “I am convinced,” writes Zorawski, “that in this situation the only honorable solution is the resignation of Mr Jacek Zakowski from his social position in the Association of Polish Journalists.”

Real wages fell by 40 percent in January assuming that the increase in prices was 65-70 percent according to the estimates of the Central Office of Statistics reported in GAZETA WYBORCZA. The official index of price increases may be higher; the president of the Central Office of Statistics will announced it by 20 February 1990. The average wages in January were 616,900 zlotys in the five basic sectors of the economy, including payments from profits, and wages were more than ninefold higher than in January 1989 but only slightly higher than in December 1989. GAZETA WYBORCZA is predicting that in February inflation (prices of goods and services) will increase only by 6 percent.

In the course of just a few days, the prices of agricultural combines have again risen. The Bizon-Super with a cabin costs 75.2 million zlotys beginning 5 February 1990, and the Bizon-Rekord, 89 million zlotys.
Jacek Kuron met with the hungry, homeless carriers of the AIDS virus, greeting them, he kissed them, which GAZETA WYBORCZA showed in a picture.

A survey by ZYCIE WARSZAWY showed that there are already 55,000 unemployed of whom 51,000 are eligible for relief in February. It reported there are 35,000 vacant jobs. [passage omitted]

PRZEGŁAD ORGANIZACJI, a journal for managers and supervisors at all levels, has already published 600 issues.

The number of apartments turned over for use in 1989 is—according to the last communiqué from the Central Office of Statistics—the lowest in more than 26 years. Per 1,000 inhabitants, four apartments were turned over (in the 1980's the index was 4.9-5 and in 1978, 8.1). The percentage of the private sector in housing construction rose to 36.8 percent in 1989 from 31.6 percent 31.6 percent in 1988, and in this sector the average floor space rose to 108.3 m2 while in the socialized sector floor space declined to 59.3 square meters. In 1989, nearly 75 percent fewer hospital beds were completed than in 1988 and more than 44 percent fewer spaces in elementary schools.

The daily journal of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland is titled TRYBUNA. As Tomasz Nalecz, the deputy president of the party and leader of the 8 July movement, said in choosing TRYBUNA we took up the Pilsudski tradition.

The Democratic Forum as a confederation of groups competing with "communist and postcommunist organizations and the Citizens' Parliamentary Club" has been joined by the Labor Party, the Club of the Free and Solidary (formerly Fighting Solidarity), the Confederation for an Independent Poland, the Christian National Union, and NSZZ Solidarity 80 (of Marian Jurczyk located in Szczecin).

Opinions

[passage omitted]

Prof. Dr. Janusz Ziółkowski, senator from Poznan:

(Interviewed by Włodzimierz Braniecki, GŁOS WIELKOPOLSKI 3-4 February 1990)

[Answer] Personally, I think that too many of us Poles are speaking about the questioning of Poland's Western boundary. That boundary is certain. It is ensured by international agreements, the decision of the three powers at Potsdam, the Helsinki Accord, and declarations, as, for example, the one by President Bush. For our own good, it would be better if we did not raise the problem of our boundaries so much. The less we speak of it the better. We accept that boundary as a fact. And in Germany, there are declarations by Willy Brandt and the president of the FRG, and the Bundestag, and the SPD (Socialist Party of Germany-FRG) on this issue. Thus, let us not react in a slightly schizophrenic manner because it shows our concern, and we should be certain of ourselves in this matter.

Prof Dr Stanislaw Stomma, chairman of the Primate's Social Council, senator:

(Interviewed by Łukasz Wyrzykowski, DZIENNIK ZACHODNI 2-4 February 1990)

[Answer] I say that if one speaks calmly of this time, the period of 1945-89, it cannot be described as completely lost time. There were some very bad experiences, but there were also some good experiences. In judging the more than 40 years of the existence of a state, one cannot be directed only by superficial emotions.

[Question] Is it necessary to have such prestige, such a position, such independence and, excuse me for adding, so many years in order to allow oneself such an unpopular and independent opinion?

[Answer] Each period is characterized by a simplified view of its predecessor. It is seen in black and while. I must tell you that wise men do not have such a single-hued view of the past decades.

[Question] Somehow there are very few of these wise men.

[Answer] Well, there have never been many wise men. Mazowiecki, Stelmachowski, Wielowieyski, Trzeciakowski do not think uniformly alike. Even Geremek, who was in the party for some years, does not think that way.

The opinions and views voiced in this section do not always agree with the views of the editors.

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup

90EP0395B Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 8, 24 Feb 90 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

"Poland demands the regulation of the Oder-Neisse border by a treaty. It desires to participate in that portion of the conference of the four powers and the two German states that directly concerns the security of our country. We have a full moral, historical, and legal right to that." With these words Małgorzata Niezabitowska, spokesperson for the government, laid out the position of the Polish State authorities on the current phase of the development of the German problem. As M. Niezabi-towska stated, the GDR has reacted to this demand "with full understanding." [passage omitted]

W. Jaruzelski and T. Mazowiecki had telephone conversations recently with Mikhail Gorbachev. They discussed problems associated with the recent visit by
Chancellor H. Kohl to Moscow. Following the discussion with Gorbachev, the president's spokesman mentioned the congruence of the president's position with the Soviet views, and in that context also responded to a question about the status of Soviet forces in Poland. They constitute a "structural element ensuring stability in Europe and are an essential factor guaranteeing the security of our Western borders. Removing them could be a result of favorable developments in the situation in Germany and Europe, including the final recognition of our boundaries. Poland should also receive guarantees in this matter from the great powers. The Soviet Union has given us such guarantees."

Premier T. Mazowiecki met, in order, with a delegation of the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement] led by A. Miodowicz (6 February) and with representatives of the Presidium of NSZZ Solidarity, including Lech Walesa (16 February, including members of the government). The press published a commentary by the representatives of the OPZZ and a declaration of the spokesman for Solidarity after these meetings. OPZZ representatives are satisfied with the position of the government whose response was "vague, evasive, and generally rejected our most crucial proposals." The OPZZ demanded wage increases sufficient to keep the decline in their real value in January below 20 percent. On 22 February 1990, the OPZZ Council is to discuss a motion for an appeal to the Supreme Court on arbitration; the next step would be a strike. The Solidarity spokesman declared on television that near the end of March when more specific data will be available, "serious talks" on protecting the living standards and unemployed will begin. The union expressed "sharp dissatisfaction due to the uneven rate of economic and political change." (It looks as if the government is protecting the nomenklatura," said Walesa.)

Prof. Dorota Simonides has been elected senator for the Opole region with 67 percent of the valid votes. Her opponent, Henryk Krolik a representative of the German minority, received 32 percent of the vote.

Wojciech Jaruzelski in an interview for an American publication said that perhaps he will leave the position of president before the end of his six-year term. "I think that I will not remain in my position that long," he said, "I would like only to ensure the shift to full stability in a fully established democratic system. And how long that will last I cannot say."

Hans Modrow, the GDR premier, paid a one-day visit to Poland: "We have high regard for the fact that our Polish neighbor recognizes the Germans' right to self-determination and the building of state unity. The GDR government accepts for its part the undeniable right of Poland to the certainty that no state of the German nation will again threaten the life, property, and existence of the Polish nation and its state. We support complete guarantees for the proper and special interests of Poland, its people in the question of assurances of the inviolability of its boundaries and security." [passage omitted]

The Tipto model will be produced in Zeran. An agreement on cooperation with Fiat is to be signed in the summer; for now a so-called "initial study of economic viability" has been adopted.

Wages and prices. The final computation by the Central Office of Statistics say that prices overall increased by 78.6 percent in June, including food by 79 percent, services by 149 percent, nonfood goods by 72.3 percent, and alcohol by 41 percent. In the so-called five sectors, the average wage, however, was 616,900 zloty. (The real decline in comparison with December 1989 was 43.3 percent, while nominal wages were 1.3 percent higher.) Recently prices for medicines increased by 200 percent.

In the press. Wlodzimierz Kosinski, editor-in-chief of TRYBUNA OPOLSKA, has resigned his position; he had held the post for nearly 20 years. A declaration in TRYBUNA says that they want "to help create a paper open to all of the important political and social forces that basically accept the constitution" and that they recognize the immediate need to form a social editorial council "reflecting the current political relations in the region." An editorial "A Few Farewells and a Few Reflections" by Zygmunt Lichniak, the editor-in-chief of KIERUNKI, says farewell to the readers of the weekly published by Pax. ("The paper is being suspended for an indeterminate period of time."). In absolute terms, it was forced out by the market laws, which have elbowed their way into the cultural sphere; the publisher cannot afford KIERUNKI.

A grain for a grain. GAZETA WYBORCZA reports the next round of names of individuals and institutions that have contributed to Premier Mazowiecki's fund: NSZZ Solidarity at the Katowice Steelworks, 80,000 zlotys, the Society of the Friends of Lvov, the Lvov Eagles Club of Gdynia, 639,500 zlotys.

Miners have appeared on the list of the unemployed. GAZETA WYBORCZA reports that in Slask there will be at least 65,000 unemployed in the fall. According to reports from 500 enterprises, about 25,000 individuals will be released during the first six months of the year. "Among the list of plants planning the greatest reductions, many are associated with mining." The Budryk mine intends to release 760 individuals; Czerwone Zaglubie, 293; Sosnowiec, 570; General Zawadzki, 600; Moszczzenica, 700. "A complete breakdown in mining can occur after the introduction of new coal prices," writes GAZETA WYBORCZA. The Janina, Siersz, and Jaworzno mines along with a few others will probably go bankrupt. [passage omitted]

In this section in the previous issue, we noted the exchange of opinions between K. Zaworski of Polish television and J. Zakowski, spokesman of the Citizens' Parliamentary Club. In conjunction with that exchange, an explanation by M. Ilowiecki, acting president of the
Association of Polish Journalists, that J. Zakowski had not manipulated the organization's declaration appeared in RZECZPOSPOLITA. The declaration "was adopted at a meeting of the Main Board of the Association of Polish Journalists on 30 January 1990. Next the Main Board changed its declaration, and its final text was printed by the daily press on 1 February 1990, with corrections published the next day." J. Zakowski was not informed of the later changes in the text. [passage omitted]

Opinions

Przemyslaw Cwiklinski, journalist:
(ITD, 4 February 1990)

"According to rumors, Senator Karol Modzelewski is to be the new minister; another version mentions Deputy Jan Rokit. At present, in Western police academies (including those in Belgium), there are about 200 individuals associated with Solidarity (for example, Zbigniew Bujak), who after their return are to take important positions in the police and the Office of State Protection. Asked about this, a high official at the Ministry of Internal Affairs neither confirmed nor denied these rumors."

Doc. Dr. Jadwiga Staniszewska, sociologist:
(TYGODNIK KULTURALNY 11 February 1990)

"Today when the communist party has collapsed (which does not mean that the local cliques joined by material links and social loyalties have collapsed), electoral success of the plebiscite type (as in June 1989, for Walesa and against the regime) will not be so obvious. The former opposition then faces the dilemma of every government in the consolidation phase: how to get through the sudden legitimation gap after the collapse of the previous opponent? When it is difficult to point to successes—overcoming the crisis is lasting a long time—it is easiest to create a new opponent: how can one justify the renewed majority and block form of elections without an opponent (for example, the mythical "right"), when it is more attractive in the consolidation phase? The funeral of the PZPR is a challenge to the previous opposition: if no pluralism now, then when?"

Jerzy Giedroyc, editor-in-chief of KULTURA published in Paris:
(Interviewed by Marek Zielinski, WIEZ No 10 of 1989)

"The most important role of KULTURA, I think, is providing material for political and cultural thinking. Not imposing some conception, but providing material for thinking. The great misfortune of Poland over these years from the occupation through the postwar period has been that our political thinking completely disappeared. Only now is it beginning to timidly sprout again. It is terribly worrying that so far Pilsudski and Dmowski are ruling Poland from the grave. I myself in a certain sense am a follower of Pilsudski. I think the Marshal is a fascinating figure and a number of his ideas and conceptions are close to me. But that is prehistory. Today in such a changed situation, treating Pilsudski or Dmowski as a source of directions is nonsense. It is evidence only of great weakness in our political thinking.

Gen. Marek Ochocki, head of the Lodz Voivodship Office of Internal Affairs:
(Interviewed by Marian Zdrojewski, ODGLOSY 18 February 1990)

[Question] What do you know about the criminal world in Lodz?

[Answer] There about 30,000 individuals in the agglomeration, who to various degrees have had trouble with the law and about whom we must remember. There are about 220 murderers, about 3,500 bandits... These people have served time and now are living among us. There are also 4,600 individuals who have broken and entered, about 8,000 thieves... We also have about 1,000 rapists, about 1,500 prostitutes, about 400 drug addicts, and about 2,500 juvenile delinquents with whom we have had varying degrees of difficulty. Among these people, there are about 2,500 individuals who have repeatedly broken the law. The most dangerous ones number about 800 individuals, who are under constant militia supervision. That is the involvement which is not seen regularly. Thus, perhaps there is no militiaman who should be out on patrol because he must constantly watch particular places, groups of the criminal element.

Aleksander Hall, minister for contacts with political parties and social organizations:
(Interviewed by Aleksandr Kropiwnicki, PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI 18 February 1990)

[Answer] It is generally thought today that it will be very difficult to maintain the four-year term planned at the roundtable. Many journalists and political activists think that these elections will be held earlier. And it would be good if that happened. The Confederation for an Independent Poland has promoted this issue the most; however, I feel no direct pressure from this or any other party to hold the elections now in a week, a month, or a few months. Obviously, the current system will have to be reviewed by society in free elections, but precisely in order for that review to be authentic, everyone needs time. The parties only just now aiming a parliamentary representation also need time; I would even say that they need it most of all.

The opinions and views cited in this section do not always agree with the views of the editors.

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup

[Excerpts]

National News

In February 1990, the production of socialized industry was 24-29 percent lower than in February 1989; the
greatest decline, as in January, occurred in the food industry (more than 40 percent). These are estimates from ZYCIE GOSPODARCZGE.

The SD [Democratic Party] has chosen a new head; he is Aleksander Mackiewicz (age 46), an economist; since 12 September 1989, he has been minister of the domestic market in the cabinet of T. Mazowiecki. In a secret ballot, he received 54 votes of members of the Central Committee; his only rival Tadeusz Bien, head of the SD deputy club, received 16 votes. Jerzy Joziwka, the previous chairman of the Central Committee, resigned.

“The status of Soviet forces in Poland must be altered,” declared Gen Mieczyslaw Debicki, plenipotentiary of the government for affairs associated with the presence of those forces in Poland. The proposed changes agree in many points with those proposed by S. Podemski in POLITYKA, among others. [Passage omitted]

Leszek Miller, secretary general of the central executive committee of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland, submitted a declaration in which he opposed the violation of the civil rights of individuals “whose views and convictions differ from those officially recognized by the political forces and groups dominating today.” The problem involves a campaign of slander, refusals of the right to work in one’s occupation, and refusal of employment; L. Miller appealed to all democratic forces to counteract such acts and announced that the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland will work for respect for human rights and the dignity of the individuals threatened. (Information should be reported to the Group for Legality and Human Rights of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democracy of Poland, Warsaw, tel. 21-03-41, ext. 580).

The fates of the voivods—a supplement to the reports from the previous week. The following voivods have resigned: Sylwester Samola, Jelenia Gora; Franciszek Strzalka, Bielsko-Biala. The Plock Voivodship People’s Council gave Antoni Bielak, who had been attacked by a confederation of the Solidarity Citizens’ Committees, a vote of confidence.

The Main Council of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland has proposed to turn over the “White House” to the students, in particular to Warsaw University. The Council recognized March 1968 as a “disgraceful page in the history of Poland.” It appealed for the annulment of the dismissals from universities, the military, and state institutions, and for the restoration of Polish citizenship to those wronged during the post-March wave of repressions. [Passage omitted]

The orders of the head of the Main Training Board of the Polish Army ensure, among other things, all individuals performing military service the freedom to practice or not to practice a religion, by making it possible, for example, to possess cult objects, individual prayers, or listen to radio and television broadcasts of the mass. “Participation in religious practices outside of the area of the barracks or military units is implemented individually and in principle outside of military duty time.”

A group of senior scouts and instructors has occupied the Main Quarters of the Polish Scout Union in support of the slogan “restore the Polish Scout Union to society.” The appeal says, among other things: “We can no longer conspire and pretend to subordinate ourselves to the old compromised methods of action and the structures adopted from the old stalinist Polish Youth Union. We have simply had enough.” Those occupying the building demanded the resignation of the main officers of the Polish Scout Union and the formation of a Temporary Congress Commission, which “will take over the executive functions and prepare an Extra-Ordinary Congress of the Polish Scout Union.” Anna Radziwill, deputy minister of national education, participated in the negotiations.

The Episcopate Commission for Social Resources of Communication announced an appeal concerning the Catholic press and book publishing. “We should take all the essential initiatives to ensure the survival of the Catholic press.” The appeal calls for organizing parish kiosks or stalls to sell the Catholic press and publications. [Passage omitted]

A proposal made by A. Szypulski in GAZETA WYBORCZA (No 24) to name Zbigniew Brzezinski, president of Poland has gained support in the letters of the daily’s readers. “No nation which has undergone the process of intellectual castration practiced by the grinder of Russian civilization in various historical epochs, is able to create out of itself any of the values which lie at the foundation of a modern Western state... In order to break with the terrible circle of Russian infantilism in Polish society, we should bring as many specialists of Polish origin from the West who, free of the stiame of Russianness, will be able to solve our problems in a manner practiced in normal states,” writes one reader of GAZETA WYBORCZA. [Passage omitted]

Zdzislaw Najder, long-time head of the Polish section of Radio Free Europe has been named by Lech Walesa to head the work of the Citizens Committees under the chairman of NSZZ Solidarity. In an interview for ZYCIE WARSZAWY, he says that he agreed to Walesa’s proposal after hesitating for three minutes.

On 1 April 1990, Bronislaw Wildstein (age 36) in 1982-87 editor of the Paris monthly KONTAKT and a contributor to Radio Free Europe, will take over the management of the Krakow radio station.

Jan Kulakowski (age 60), who has lived in Belgium since 1946 and was a Belgian and international union activist (secretary general of the World Confederation of Labor), has been named to the position of Polish ambassador to the European Community in Brussels. [Passage omitted]

The National Mining Commission of NSZZ Solidarity met in Katowice with deputies representing the Citizens’ Parliamentary Club. The participants sent a letter to Premier T. Mazowiecki and called for decisive counteraction to the
economic coercion of work by miners on Saturday; they demanded the immediate rescinding of resolution 199 of 1981 regulating these matters.

According to the Public Opinion Research Center, 56.3 percent of Poles are for privatizing the economy; 11.5 percent are against. Private investment in large industrial enterprises is supported by 40 percent of the respondents, while 40 percent is either against or for it only in special situation. Of the respondents, 65 percent declared that they have no savings and would not be able to purchase stock in enterprises.

The new regulations of deposits and loans by the Polish Savings Bank: deposits in demand accounts will earn 3 percent in March 1990; six-month deposits, 6.5 percent; year deposits, 10 percent; three-year, 10.5 percent. Loans will carry interest rates of 10 to 12 percent.

A list of the titles of periodicals that have been liquidated or are threatened with liquidation (according to TRYBUNA): ARGUMENTY, ARCHITEKTURA, FAKTY, FILM, FILATELISTA, FUNDAMENTY, GAZETA MLODYCH, KULTURA, KURIER POLONIJNY KONTYNENTY, LEKKOATLETYKA, MIETEJEZNIK LITERACKI, MYSZ SPOLCZNA, MYSŁ MARKSISTOWSKA, NADODRZE, NASZA WIES, NURT, ODRODZENIE, PROFILE, POLSKIE PERSPEKTYWY, POBRAZJE, PISMO ARTYSTYCZNO-LITERACKIE, PRZYJAZN, POLSKA—ZACHOD, POEZJA, POZIĄNY SWIAT, PROBLEM, RZECZYWISTOSC, (RONDO), STOLICA, SPRAWY I LUDZIE, SUGESTIE, SZTUKA, TYGODNIK POLSKI, TYGODNIK KULTURALNY, TYGODNIK ROBOTNICZY, (ZMIANY), URODA, WIDNOKREGI, WALKA MLODYCH, WARMIA I MAZURY, WIES WSPOLCZESNA, WYBRZEZE, ZARZEWIE, ZA WOLNOSC I LUD, ZA I PRZECIW, ZWIERCIADLO, ZAGLE, ZYCIE LITERACKIE, ZYCIE I ZDROWIE, ITD, and KIERUNKI. [passage omitted]

The Krakow Market has sold shares in the partnership Arka which is to publish the daily CZAS, produce films, and conduct antiquarian activities. The founders include, among others, the deputies Rokita and Gil and editor Szumowski. The stock with a par value of 500,000 zloty was sold for 1.4 million zloty, are 43 and 51 percent, respectively. Of the respondents, 46 percent thinks that television presents the opinions are. In response to the question, "Do you trust what television has said in recent weeks about the affairs of the nation and society?", 64 percent said they either trusted or rather trusted it; 29 percent that they either rather distrusted or distrusted it. In November 1989, the figures were 65 percent and 29 percent respectively. Does television realistically present the various areas of life in the country? Food supplies: realistically 75 percent, unrealistically 15 percent. The general index of price increases is estimated at 23 percent, which would mean a decline in real wages in comparison to January of about seven percent.

The evaluation of television programming in February 1990 according to a survey of the Center for Research on Public Opinion: 59 percent of the respondents have noticed changes for the better; in November 1989, 48 percent had. The higher the level of education, the more positive the opinions are. In response to the question, “Do you trust what television has said in recent weeks about the affairs of the nation and society?”, 64 percent said they either trusted or rather trusted it; 29 percent that they either rather distrusted or distrusted it. In November 1989, the figures were 65 percent and 29 percent respectively. Does television realistically present the various areas of life in the country? Food supplies: realistically 75 percent, unrealistically 15 percent. The percentages were similar in regard to the economic situation in the country. However, as regards the mood of society, 46 percent thinks that television presents them realistically; 30 percent that it presents them unrealistically; as for the situation in agriculture, the figures are 43 and 51 percent, respectively. Of the respondents, 59 percent think that television is pluralistic; 21 percent that it presents primarily the point of view of the authorities and the forces supporting them.

Last week, we presented a list of periodicals which have either ceased publication or are threatened. The following have also disappeared from the market: DELTA, ROBOTNIK ROLNY, NOWE DROGI, PREZENTACJE, ZAGADNIENIA I MATERIAŁY, OSWIATA I WYCHOWANIE, FAZETY I KOMENTARZE, POKOLENIA, KIERUNKI, TWORCZOSTE ROBOTNIKOW, KULTURA FIZYCZNA, BOKS, TATERNIK, MAGAZYN RAZEM, ZYCIE PARTII, IDEOLOGIJA, POLITYKA, PLOMIENI, and SLASK. However, in spite of the warnings, ZWIERCIADLO, FILM, PROFILE, URODA, ZARZEWIE, and ITD have held up, and RONDO has written us that in spite of the report in
TRYBUNA it is not threatened either with liquidation or suspension. The total single press run of the periodicals that have ceased publication is more than 1 million copies.

RZECZPOSPOLITA has again revealed the compensation of the members of the government. The premier beginning in January 1990 earns 3.02 million zlotys (including 378,000 zlotys in longevity pay), the compensation of a deputy premier is as high as 2.71 million zlotys; a minister, 2.46 million zlotys. The compensation for a voivod vary between 1.86 and 2.18 million zlotys. These are gross amounts and are subject to taxation.

Price reductions: Through the end of March, it is possible to buy a small Fiat for 17 million zlotys or 4 million zlotys less. The Ursus plant has also reduced the price of tractors built on licenses through the end of March. For example an MF 4512—institutes of 69 million and change—has been reduced to 58 [million].

Variation in the valuation of the assets of the Gdansk Shipyard: The experts of B. Johnson-Piasecka estimated the value at $4.5 to $6 million; the British consulting firm Apeldor at $374 million; Polish specialists at $111.3 million.

According to OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement] calculations, the social minimum in February for a worker family of two was 425,3000 zlotys a month per person, for a worker family of four, 401,700 zlotys per person, for a retiree family of two, 347,500 zlotys per person. [passage omitted]

GAZETA BANKOWA which has been published until now by Management and Banking has associated itself with the French publishing concern Eurexpanision which publishes economic journals in nine European countries. It is controlled by French capital, and J.L. Servan-Schreiber is the president of the group.

Gromada has leased the Dom Chlopa for 20 years to a partnership that includes West German capital. It is to be made into a high class hotel.

The Kelles-Krauze Foundation has been formed in Warsaw to support the social sciences in Poland. It bears the name of a Polish theoretician of socialism, an activist of the Polish Socialist Party, and scholar. Among the founders are F. Ryszka, S. Gebethner, T. Nalecz, and S. Wiatr.

Who's News. Gen Lucjan Czubinski, deputy ministers in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, has been recalled. The new deputy minister is Krzysztof Kozlowski (age 59), deputy editor-in-chief of TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, a Solidarity activist. GAZETA WYBORCZA writes "a man known for always applying moral reasons to politics, a handsome man with impeccable manners." Artur Howzan, editor-in-chief of ZYCIE WARSZAWY and PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY has resigned from the position of president of the Association of Journalists of the Republic of Poland and from his position on the presidium of the Main Board. Gen. Roman Paszkowski, as chairman, has put the Council for the Conservation of Monuments to Struggle and Martyrdom at the disposal of the premier. The premier recalled the council and has named a new one led by Stanislaw Broniewski, Orsza, head of the Grey Ranks. The president of the Workers' Publishing Cooperative has recalled Henryk Szydlowski from the position of editor-in-chief of GAZETA KROWSKA; he is to be replaced by Andrzej Urbanczyk (age 44), philologist, journalist, recently editor-in-chief of ZDANIA (the journal of the intellectual club Kuznica). The editorial group of DZIENNIK LUDOWY has given Jerzy Kania a vote of no confidence (of 47 votes cast, 43 against, four abstentions).

Willy Brandt, leader of the Social Democrats in the FRG, met with the residents of Slubice and representatives of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland on the bridge in Slubice. In an interview for TRYBUNA, Brandt said, "I hope that good relations between German and Polish Social Democrats will have important significance not only for both states but will also stimulate the further development of cooperation throughout Europe. My meeting here on the bridge with Slawomir Wiatr and other representatives of the leadership of Polish Social Democrats with whom, in a moment, I will attend an election rally in Frankfurt on the Oder, is also to serve this same end." [passage omitted]

Opinions

Jan Jozef Lipski, senator, chairman of the Polish Socialist Party:

(In response to a survey by DZIENNIK LUDOWY titled "Who to the Belvedere?," 19-20 February 1990)

[Answer] I assume that after the shortened term of President Jaruzelski, the only real candidate will be Lech Walesa. I have not seen any reasons that might trip him up in this matter. Even though I may have seriously considered another candidate, I will not name that person because there is no sense in it.

[passage omitted]

Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski:

Interviewed by Ryszard Rybus, GAZETA KROWSKA)

[Answer] I want to say that Jaruzelski has always been completely honest with me. And he has not changed to this day. There can be no talk of me having been sacrificed. He is the only politician, so far, who has said several times publicly: Rakowski was right and not I; I was wrong, not he, in evaluating the development of the situation in the 1970's, in the 1980's. All attempts to convince public opinion that Jaruzelski—following his egoistic interests—played my card are unjustified. I assume that people speak of my activities in a variety of ways, but I will not give up one trait, loyalty.
Cpt. Lech Kazanecki, leader of the Founding Committee of the NSZZ of the Functionaries of the Citizens' Militia in the Torun Voivodship Office of Internal Affairs:

(Interviewed by Aleksandra Walczak, NOWOSCI 23 February 1990)

[Answer] The principles for the verification are not yet binding and are only a proposal of the National Coordinating Committee developed for the Sociopolitical Council of the minister of internal affairs. In 11 points, we lay out who in our opinion should and who should not work in the militia (police). To be sure, not the graduates of the Political Academy and of the schools of the ministry of internal affairs in the USSR (simply we do not want the KGB among us), not individuals employed previously in the board to protect functionaries (the cell for "snitching" on militiamen), not functionaries of the Security Bureau who held supervisory positions, not individuals recently released from the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] committees and "adopted" by our ministry, and also not those who do not gain acceptance by the trade union.

[passage omitted]

The opinion and views cited in this section do not always agree with the views of the editors.
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

PDS Official Reveals Extensive Ecological Mismanagement

90GE0043A East Berlin JUNGE WELT in German
9 Mar 90 p 6

[Initial interim report issued by Prof Helmar Hegewald, director, PDS Commission on Environmental Policy: "Who Steered the Boat Into the Eco-Crisis?"—first paragraph is JUNGE WELT introduction]

[Text] Ecological crisis in the GDR. How could it come to this? As it turns out, deformed structures and a deformed policy have had devastating consequences for our country and people in this area too. JUNGE WELT is making an attempt to uncover some of the most important root causes of the GDR's ecological calamity. At the direction of Prof. Helmar Hegewald, director of the Commission on Environmental Policy of the PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] Executive Committee, a fact-finding commission looked into the negligent practices of the former leadership. As an exclusive, we are publishing the following from the initial interim report:

First: All decisions regarding environmental issues were made in the "Mittag Office." Only two aspects were of interest in this regard: a) Relevance to economic development (and even this only on a short-term basis); and b) Conformity to the desired image of socialism. Data about the environment from the testing and monitoring systems were not only usually neglected or underestimated, but in recent years were mostly ignored or outright falsified.

Second: The environmental reports that were published up to 1974 were still accessible to all members of the Council of Ministers as officially classified documents at least until 1978/79. From 1982 on, they were forwarded—stamped with the highest secrecy classification and only in three copies—to Guenter Mittag, Willi Stoph, and Erich Mielke personally. The environmental ministry apparently never received responses to its individual measures/proposals. This "one-way street" characterized their collaboration. In the last 30 years neither an SED CC [Socialist Unity Party of Germany Central Committee] plenum nor the weekly meetings of the Politburo ever dealt extensively with environmental issues. Even the meager public education work done by the Ministry for Environmental Protection met with the greatest mistrust in the CC, and reprimands and even dismissals were the result. In contrast to Willi Stoph's attitude, the terms "ecology" and "environmental protection" could not be used in the vicinity of Erich Honecker, and eventually not around Guenter Mittag either, without arousing their ire.

Although there had been no strategies or plans of any kind for solving the problems of the environment in existence since 1972, all decisions in this area were made in the "Mittag Office" at the level of the chief of the Department of Basic Industries, or by staff members as well. The importance of environmental issues to the former CC is illustrated by the fact that of the economic secretariat's hundreds of staff members, not one was directly concerned with problems of the environment.

Third: Hans Reichelt, the GDR's former minister for environmental protection, apparently knew all along (and demonstrably did so as of late 1989) of his circumscribed latitude in getting a hearing for urgent problems. Foreign policy pressure in regard to environmental issues proved to be partially successful, but even here grotesque situations developed. Although, for example, the GDR has the highest SO₂ emissions rate in Europe, Hans Reichelt was not going to sign the "30-Percent Reduction Agreement" of 1984 in Munich. The actual course of the conference required the signing, which then became possible after prior telephone conversations with Mittag and the latter's consultations with Honecker. The investigations needed for technical implementation repeatedly bogged down, however, so that ratification of the treaty with force of international law was postponed from year to year. Reporting on this matter to the international community was done using intentionally falsified data. The last published figure on this subject purported to be the truth came directly from Honecker.

Fourth: Sentiment against this policy of a de facto nonpolicy regarding the environment was disciplined in the Council of Ministers, in scientific circles, and among the public in the usual way. From 16 November 1982 on, the basis for this was the infamous Council of Ministers' resolution that declared virtually all the usual data regarding the state of the environment relating to the soil, water, air, and living things, to be a monopoly of the bureaucratic-administrative system and to be secret. Parts of the GDR's environmental administration developed into pure alibi-agencies—that is, accomplices in putting out disinformation to the citizenry.

Basic, preliminary research in the scientific academies and universities relevant to environmental matters suffered especially severe deformations. Ecology research was supported only as an alibi. No genuine data on damage to the environment were available to atmospheric researchers, ecotoxicologists, city planners, or environmental hygiene specialists.

Despite the general faith in engineering and the hostility to science in broad quarters of the party and state apparatus subordinate to Mittag, the fact that some of the environmentalists' disciplines—to be sure, diverted into minutia and always suspiciously monitored—were at least able to survive on the back burner, is personally attributable to Hans Reichelt. The recommendations concerning changes to specific situations that now and again were made hesitatingly and, of necessity, only internally, were nonetheless just as consistently ignored as were those of the artists and the churches. The entire so-called environmental policy as a "unity of ecology and economy" was from the very outset a policy dominated
by economic factors and motivated in the beginning by a stubborn (and later a helpless) ignorance regarding ecological needs.

Fifth: The shortsightedness, coupled with ignorance in regard to ecological trends in Guenter Mittag's economic apparatus, and the almost total lack of macroeconomic thinking over a sufficiently lengthy period of time, is astonishing and will be the subject of further investigation. This applies particularly to agriculture, energetics, and the chemical industry, as well as the national economy's almost complete lack of provisions to take ecological requirements into account.

Sixth: There are plans to secure the available documents in a body and to make them available for a thorough economic and scientific-historical examination.

**Increased Health Care Costs Explained**

90GE0042A East Berlin JUNGE WELT in German
26 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Helga Schoenwald: “Expensive Health; JUNGE WELT Staffer Helga Schoenwald Investigated the Calamity in the GDR’s Health Care System—New Health Regulations Are Only a First Step”]

[Text] So now it is all settled—the matter of extra money for most people working in public health. The Central Executive Board of the Public Health and Social Services Workers Union, just elected in late January, signed the agreement. It has a lot more planned for the future. By 1 June, in a cooperative effort with representatives of the professional associations, it wants to have a completely new wage system worked out.

Many people will now ask: More money for doctors and nurses now and later on a new wage system as well? The answer is relatively simple: The agreement that was reached on Thursday and that will go into effect on 1 March is an urgently required—one indeed overdue—immediate measure. It was not until early February that the Council of Ministers, at the urging of the minister and workers in the public health and social services sector, was finally able to make up its mind to appropriate the necessary funds (some M 1.3 billion—by the way, more than at any other time in the last 40 years). “There was only very little time for apportionment. We therefore decided,” said Prof. Hans-Joachim Hicke, PhD in economics and deputy minister, “to raise all health care wages”—for nurses and other medical technical school cadre, for example, by M 300; for physicians and other university graduates in the natural sciences, by M 400; for ambulance personnel, by M 250; and for other persons employed in the field (such as heating plant personnel, for example, or the women in the laundries), by an average of M 150. Moreover, the ministry involved representatives of the professional associations in the relevant discussions on this matter. The latter two parties view things the same way that the union does: The imbalances within the public health field essentially remain despite these immediate measures. A completely new wage system thus becomes necessary for the necessary stimulation of performance.

Of course: Public health belongs to the nonproducing sector—that is, to the large field of social services that must be supported by the state. But that was not done very generously in our case. At about five percent of the national income—excluding sick pay—that was about half of what other European countries devoted to their public health sector. As a consequence, therefore, there are enormous imbalances in wages in addition to a decayed physical plant and antiquated or lacking medical technology. Pay in the health care sector was, on a statistical average, some 14.2 percent below that in trade and industry. The following provision—instigated by the Minister for Health—was an attempt in October to do immediately whatever was feasible: Wage monies not paid out because of unfilled positions are to be paid to those who also attempt to do the work of those who are missing. But these unpaid wages become available only if, during the course of the current year (!), additional colleagues desert a staff which is frequently undermanned anyway. Thus, for the months of October, November, and December of M 120 were forthcoming for a nurse in the extremely busy children's surgery ward of Potsdam Bezirk Hospital.

The agreement of 1 January 1990 on shift work incentive pay touched off the next sharp discussions in the health care sector. It is a fact that this agreement between the ministry and the union applies to all employees. For every evening and night shift worked, premiums of M 10 are paid. An initial good-sized step involving higher base wages is now being added to these little toddling steps—but the road to an efficient health care and social services system is a long one.

[Box, p 3]

**Deficit After Studies**

I was born in 1957 and I live and work in Zwickau as a specialist in internal medicine... While I was studying, I was dependent upon my parents' support. My former classmates from Potsdam Secondary School were able to put together a considerable financial base for themselves during these years. After completing my studies and having become 27 years old in the meantime, I took up my work as a physician at a monthly net wage of M 714. From the start of my studies up to now (having been a doctor now for six years), my real average income has been M 715 net per month... For every hour spent on call, specialists of all seniority levels receive only M 7 in their pockets. Would a skilled worker get out of bed at night during his time off for that amount?... [signed] Dr. Ingolf Weiss, MD, Zwickau

After three years of specialized study, we physical therapists receive a net wage of M 550 per month, which goes up only M 20 every two years. We are aware that a semi-skilled helper in industry earns considerably
25 APRIL 1990  

JPRS-EER-90-055

Local Daily Investigates Alleged Landfill Hazards
90GE0022A Halle FREIHEIT in German 27 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Uli Briese: “Will We Soon Be Suffocated by Daily Garbage?—Surprised in the Past, but Urgently Explosive”—first paragraph is FREIHEIT introduction]

[Text] How safe is the notorious Lochau waste landfill site near Halle? FREIHEIT investigates on the basis of numerous readers' letters from the location.

In Dieskau and elsewhere, shocking things are whispered about the Lochau dump. There is talk of garbage from the West, and also of contamination of the groundwater. Even kilometers away, garbage along the side of the road pit which is never full swallows 1.4 million cubic meters into the former mine. It is hard to believe that the mine could be severe smoke pollution in the communities of Lochau and Groebers. Mayor Karin Franke of Lochau says: “It was really bad in June, 1989. We were quite concerned about our children. They were powerless against it."

Station 1: Dieskau. “Up to 6,000 vehicles per day drive to the expired Lochau open-pit mine,” reports our guide. Some percent of them take this route, and that is where all the garbage along the road comes from. This is the basis of the justified annoyance of the Dieskau residents. According to Juergen Will, the primary cause of that is foreign vehicles which in violation of the law do not have their garbage covered with a net. They are powerless against it, as is the Dieskau ABV and the mayor.

Mile-Long Tracks of Garbage Point the Way to the Dump

Playing off an argument of the district police, they point to the fact that it is impossible to personally inspect the installation. Along with the continuous pollution, this also affects the reckless race through the Dieskau eye of the needle. “Some 70 or 80 sacks in the mine is no rare occurrence,” according to Mayor Gisela Brokkelt.

From Dieskau to the dump. On the way to the scrap hunt over there, a generous tour trailblazer surfaces. His employer is the VEB [state enterprise] Shoe Factory Weissenhof, as we learned from the colleagues in the little landfill guard shack. Question: can't the criminal's license plate number be written down and given to the police?

The motor pool is right behind the entrance. Nothing better than a dumping ground for ancient rusty-tracked vehicles. They are all broken down and being repaired in the open. “We have a total of nine caterpillars—all garbage!” says Juergen Will with casual resignation. The life expectancy has been exceeded in some cases by five times.

“...That is why we are generally behind in our work. Sometimes, only one or two caterpillars are running. Like in January when we had to close the dump.” There may be two caterpillars coming from the West soon. Since the landfill opened in 1976, there have been hopes of improvement. Up until now, with no success.

Great Concern About Children and Numerous Landfill Fires

After the visit in the “open-air museum,” we go down into the former mine. It is hard to believe that the mine pit which is never full swallows 1.4 million cubic meters of garbage annually. Imagine this volume as a 120 meter diameter mountain and 365 meters high. Prosperity (garbage) society GDR.

Arriving at the bottom, we first drive by people who diligently rummage through the private garbage dump for salvageable materials. On weekends, the dump becomes a perilous pilgrimage site. Despite being illegal and having locked entrances, as Juergen Wills reports.

A hundred meters further is the so-called normal landfill for large deliveries. Smoke is rising here and there. “That just helps with pushing in the garbage,” declares Juergen Will. All well and good, but what happens when no caterpillars are operating? Then, if a fire spreads, there could be severe smoke pollution in the communities of Lochau and Groebers. Mayor Karin Franke of Lochau can sing a tune about that: “It was really bad in June, 1989. We were quite concerned about our children. They would have suffocated soon.” The dump has had a fire watch since this extreme case. Will follows up that such a fire is theoretical, but is thoroughly possible again.

A locksmith who was at the fire then reported: “It was blazing. Barrels flew through the air.” So is it true then that Lochau is a poison dump? And even possibly with waste from the West? Juergen Will strongly denies that. Nothing has come in from the West so far. “There is only village refuse and industrial waste products stored under here. Dumping approval is only granted after a long approval process, and is observed by us before entrance. But who knows,” he speculates, “what might possibly hide under a load's inconspicuous surface cover? How should and could we always inspect that? With our eyes and noses alone? You can't do that.” Besides, the possibilities of analytical probes are quite restricted in reality.
Lochau. For that reason, the facility is primarily dependent on other control agencies. But even that is not always possible. "Many drivers simply ignore the lights on the gate." There is currently a seven-year wait for gates in the GDR. And until they are delivered, an individual is not in the position to inspect so closely as would be necessary. Really? Can't a security service take over that job? Of course, you would have to find people to do it. It doesn't matter which is chosen, but in any case a quick solution must come out of it. In addition, an estimate of unauthorized or even toxic wastes must continue to be calculated.

**Apparently No Danger to the Ground Water**

Location change. We drive to the deepest point in the dump. One of the three dump lakes stretches out in front of us, a so-called drainage pit. We are now approaching what is certainly the most important point of our investigation—the dump's impact on ground water quality. "There is no reason for concern," says Juergen Will. "We don't have any problem with that. The ground water level here is almost 100 ft higher than the garbage. The water collecting here is precipitation and surface water as well as water from protruding slopes." However, some of the water spilled through the garbage container areas and was enriched with hazardous materials. In order to inhibit that for the most part, drainage trenches are currently being dug out around the container areas. In addition, better equipment could compact the garbage sufficiently so that almost no rain would penetrate the container areas. Could and would—the alleged equipment problem appears for the umpteenth time. Juergen Will frowns. He would rather optimistically approve ongoing studies by the Lignite Combine Geiseltal and by the SDAG Wismut, which strives for better technologies and safety measures. In this regard, there is a water treatment plant planned, among other things, which will clean the water pumped from the collection area into the dump basins before it is released from the area. And that even though the runoff is currently supposed to be diluted by the dump water, as Juergen Will claims. Is he right?

Adieu Lochau, we are leaving to go to the District Council, to the State Waterway Control Board, to the Environmental Inspection as well as to the District Hygiene Institute. Each of those institutions can only help a little. We were finally able to inspect test results, though, which show proof of a reported improvement in runoff water quality due to the dump water. Just the chloride contamination alone is considerable, according to the professional environmentalists, which is naturally determined by the composition of the mine substrata.

Our search trail ends with this information. For those responsible for the dump and the environmental officials, however, there is another completely different search. The search for money and equipment, to be specific. Hopefully they will be found soon.
models indicated that generally speaking, exports had a tendency of inversely reacting to world market signals as reflected in prices: The volume of goods exported increased when international prices dropped (to compensate for the effects of this drop on the value of returns) and dropped when international prices rose, leaving the latter to contribute to achieving the planned value objectives.

This situation also explains the preference for working with value figures and the total absence from foreign trade statistics and analyses of references to export and import price indexes.

Evidently, such a mechanism of relating to foreign markets did nothing to contribute to the structural adaptation of the national economy in the 1970’s, despite the two “oil traumas” that shook the world economy.

The above-mentioned econometric models implicitly warned that the continuation of the existing institutional system will lead to further deepening of the economy’s foreign imbalance. Similarly, they showed that attempts to correct the foreign imbalance without restructuring and improving foreign trade and the national economy mechanism will result in shifting the imbalance from the foreign to the domestic realm.

Despite the obvious interdependence between economic growth and export performance on the one hand, and imports on the other, commercial balance surpluses to repay foreign debt were obtained by drastically reducing imports and forcing exports in every branch, regardless of whether their technologies and production had been designed to meet foreign demands.

At a time when an extensive process of industrial restructuring was taking place in the world, concentrating research and development efforts on substituting imports caused fixed assets to become outdated, while at the same time weakening the quality of production inputs which, due to the interbranch transmission effect, negatively affected primarily domestic consumption, but did not spare exports either. In point of fact, econometric calculations showed that the good performance of Romanian production and exports coincided with periods in which there was a more intensive transfer of technology.

“Sacrificing” the short-term economic efficiency of foreign trade on the grounds of qualitative effects, in the long term could not be exploited in the 1980’s because of the dramatic modification of variable factors, so that the structure of Romanian exports to industrialized markets deteriorated, market quotas were lost, and disadvantageous average prices were obtained, mainly in favor of recently industrialized countries, which practice an aggressive and flexible export strategy and which optimally combine imports of technology with domestic research and development, services, and marketing.

To illustrate the effects of the foreign trade policy practiced in the 1980’s in Romania on our foreign competitiveness, we chose to observe the reaction of industrialized markets to Romanian export offers. In countries with a market economy, the competition between foreign and domestic firms is designed to secure the highest possible share of the most dynamic markets, and competitiveness consists of the ability of the firms to design, produce, and market better goods and services than the competition.

In view of the fact that in the 1980’s processed products made up the most dynamic sector of world trade, and that within that the differentiation criterion among the various products was their technological intensity (measured by the share of research and development expenditures of the production value), we will try to concretely illustrate the situation of Romanian export competitiveness in industrialized countries from the angle of this criterion.

By the mid-1980’s, imports by industrialized countries from Romania were as follows: 50 percent fuel, raw materials, and foodstuffs; over 33 percent goods with a low degree of processing; four percent machinery; and eight percent chemical products.

In comparison with the average situation of the groups of industrialized, recently industrialized, and East European countries, high and average-tech products still made up a small share of Romanian exports to industrialized countries: 15.7 percent in 1980 and 14.9 percent in 1985. During the 1980-85 period the share of high-tech products even dropped from 2.1 percent to 1.2 percent, average-tech products remained stationary (13.6 percent), and low-tech products increased from 84 to 86 percent.

The competitiveness of Romanian exports of processed products, gauged according to the volume of industrialized countries’ imports of such goods, deteriorated with regard to high and average-tech products from 0.03 percent and 0.12 percent in 1980 to 0.02 and 0.10 percent respectively in 1985.

The low competitiveness of Romanian exports is proof of the fact that our own research-development and management efforts did not suffice to compensate for the lack of technology and know-how imports and that we did not achieve the qualitative leap from imitation to innovation both because of the absence of an appropriate mechanism to prompt innovation and initiative, and because of the lack of marketing and the break with foreign markets.

Thus, the surplus commercial balances obtained in foreign currency were mainly attained by decreasing the value of imports more than that of exports.

The unfavorable structure of Romanian exports to industrially-developed countries, centered on noncompetitive products, for which international prices either stagnated or fell in the 1980’s, in combination with a fast
rise in the price of imports of highly processed industrial products suggests an unfavorable exchange ratio for Romania in relation to those countries (the relation between the index of export prices and that of import prices), which was responsible for losses in foreign trade activities. In point of fact, the data published show that for the overall foreign trade, Romania's exchange relations during 1982-83 showed either a loss or broke even.

The foreign and domestic imbalances and the losses recorded in foreign trade, illustrated by Romania's exchange relations, proved the negative impact of certain international economic exchanges carried out primarily on voluntaristic bases rather than on the basis of the criterion of economic efficiency.

To restore Romanian foreign trade to a rational economic base, we believe that we should gradually pursue a foreign trade model based on the successful experiences of countries involved in an economic development process similar to Romania's.

The role of foreign trade in the national economy depends on resources, the size of the domestic market, and the level of economic development. As a medium-sized country in a process of selective industrialization, Romania must foster an open economy, in which foreign trade plays a very important part.

To ensure that Romania's foreign economic exchanges can contribute to economic growth, we must gradually discontinue activities designed to replace imports at any cost, and opt for a policy geared on exports, which will give producers similar incentives whether they sell in the domestic or foreign market. This will help allocate resources in accordance with comparative advantages and permit a more complete utilization of the production capacities and exploitation of the advantages of mass production, more substantial technological improvements introduced in reaction to foreign competition, and a better utilization of the manpower. Similarly, such an orientation will permit economic growth at lower investment costs.

In this context, exports must be viewed as an integral part of the final demand placed on production and primarily as a source of profit, so that payment for imports can be derived from exports in economically efficient conditions.

The structure of the production and of foreign trade will have to be tailored on the nature of domestic resources and the structure of domestic and foreign demand. Imports must serve as a supplier of materials which we have in short supply and of production factors, as well as a means of efficiently participating in interbranch international specialization and of providing the required foreign inputs for exports.

At a time when efforts are being made to reestablish the internal balance of the economy and to normalize production and organizational structures, imports may show a tendency to grow faster than exports, and their structure may tilt in favor of machinery, installations, and other industrial products. Possible balance of payments deficits may be financed from foreign credit, on condition that it can be repaid later by a more productive economy.

Similarly, it can be expected that during the period of restructuring, the rate of export will be exceeded by the rate of production; this constitutes a transition toward a normal situation (once again manifested in international trade in recent years) in which exports will grow faster than the production, something that will be reflected in an increased share of exports in production.

The development of the structure of exports and imports will follow the change trends emerging in the production factors of the national economy under the impact of technical progress.

Domestic resources will have to be utilized by harmoniously combining our own research and development efforts (sufficient funds and creating a favorable environment for innovation and initiative) with a steady flow of imports of key technologies, in close correlation with international market trends. Mature industries may once again be made competitive by an influx of key technologies.

In view of the fact that certain European countries are adapting to the new conditions prevailing in international markets, Romania, too, must strive to adapt its major production facilities to modern demand and must abandon the system of big mass production of quantities of products demanded by various market segments.

In view of the fact that research and development is very expensive, products have a short life cycle, international competition is intensive, and commercial and financial risks can be very high, Romania must participate in international cooperation especially in the area of key technologies, as well as in marketing products from that and other technological areas.

Considering international trends, as much as possible of Romania's international economic exchanges should take the form of cooperation.

**Necessary Changes in the Foreign Trade Mechanism**

Efficient participation in international economic exchanges will require changes in the foreign trade mechanism and in the national economy in the form of decentralization and bringing the economy closer to the world market.

One measure of foreign trade profits in the form of increased national income will have to reflect a favorable (surplus) exchange ratio: The price of one export unit must be higher than the price of one import unit, so that the same import unit can be purchased with fewer export units.

Proceeding from the fact that any country's foreign economic relations mechanism is an extension of its
domestic economy, in a market economy the model for Romania's foreign trade behavior will bear the characteristics of that type of economy.

In many respects, international transactions involving goods and capital will be motivated and carried out on the same bases as those of domestic and interregional trade: prices and profits, specialization and division of labor. The specific element will be the rate of exchange of the national currency (through which the prices of the Romanian economy are translated into those of another economy and currency exchange rates are established).

The enterprises will no longer be under a foreign trade monopoly. They can develop direct contacts with foreign firms, something that will permit an efficient communication between producers (exporters) and customers (importers or end users). The decision on what to export or import will be made by the producer and customer, which will enjoy the independent status offered by the forms of ownership existing in a mixed economy.

The enterprises will be guided by market conditions in deciding what and how much to manufacture, to whom to sell, from whom to buy, and at what prices. Changes in demand will be reflected not only in the volume of production, but also in changes in prices and profits. Price variations will play an important part in allocating resources and balancing the supply-demand relationship.

The elimination of the system of irrational prices that do not reflect the impact of supply and demand will permit the utilization of world prices in all commercial transactions. This will result from the decentralization of economic activities, including foreign trade, which will allow us to abolish the inconvertibility of Romanian products (by not exposing them to foreign competition). In these conditions, the rate of exchange of the leu will become functional. It will lead to eliminating the practice of bilateral balancing of the trade balance and to promoting a multilateral principle in Romania's commercial relations, with all the advantages derived thereof for intensifying exchanges. By attributing a real economic function to the rate of exchange of the leu we will be able to use it as a tool of macroeconomic policy in the process of adjusting the country's balance of payments by encouraging exports and discouraging imports. A rational rate of exchange and rational domestic prices will allow us to evaluate what can be profitably exported and imported.

To protect national industry, imports will be monitored by a protective system based on customs duties, quotas, etc., and exports will be helped to confront foreign competition through subsidies in the form of credits and other methods of promoting state-financed exports. This system will replace the indirect protectionist system provided by the foreign trade monopoly and the centralized planning of foreign trade. Efficient custom tariffs will permit real negotiations on the most-favored-nation clause, which should result in effective mutual lowering of import prices and increased imports.

In consequence of the elimination of total and centralized control of imports, we will have to take antidumping measures to protect the domestic market from disloyal competition.

The decentralization of all economic activities will permit Romanian exports to become more competitive in Western markets of processed products. This will be achieved first of all by creating competition conditions in the domestic market. The elimination of the penury maintained by the system of rigid planning will allow us to shift from a "producer's (seller's) market" to a balanced situation between markets, and even to a "consumer's market." Similarly, the disappearance of quantitative plan tasks derived from material balance sheets will permit us to place the emphasis on quality and improved technologies.

The balancing and innovative role will be played by our spirit of initiative (entrepreneurship). Technical progress will advance at a fast pace by putting risk capital at the disposal of the enterprises to establish small plants capable of developing new ideas, new products, new services, and new technologies. The creation of a competitive spirit in the domestic market will make it easier for Romanian enterprises to become competitive in Western markets, thus allowing us to make up for our lags in the areas of quality, technology, marketing, etc.

We can help make Romanian products competitive in Western markets also by promoting a favorable image of the country through intensive cultural and tourist exchanges, exchanges of information, and so forth. The loss of advantages from bilateral relations and planning within CEMA will compel our country to pursue a profit-loss relationship in trade through the effects of the creation and deviation of normal exchange flows.

Along this line, Romania's participation in customs associations will have to be based on rational economic bases, rather than on military and political considerations.

Foreign Trade Official Discusses Privatization
90BA0016A Bucharest TRIBUNA ECONOMICA in Romanian 2 Mar 90 pp 11-13

[Article by Ion Sandulescu, director at the Ministry of Foreign Trade: "The Limits of Production Privatization and the Current Role of an Organized Foreign Trade System From the Viewpoint of Profitability and Efficiency"]

[Text] Editorial note: We reproduce in full and as received the article by Mr. Ion Sandulescu, director at the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Without for a moment questioning the ideas and arguments presented in the article, we wonder whether it reflects only the views of the author or also those of the ministry. We will also
carry a different viewpoint, and we hope to receive further suggestions from the readers.

There has been much talk of the need to privatize material production; the question that naturally arises in this context is what changes will appear in Romania's foreign trade in its wake.

The economic realities currently prevailing in Romania CANNOT JUSTIFY eliminating the state monopoly over foreign trade for at least the next four-five years.

The issue of state monopoly over foreign trade, as well as the country's hard currency monopoly can be examined from an economic viewpoint only in direct relationship with the forms of ownership of the means of production.

Thus, we must objectively assess the evolution of the forms of ownership of the means of production in the coming few years, assuming that whatever party or coalition of parties wins the 1990 elections, it will give priority to:

— the interests of the nation and of all the people, especially the producers of material assets and those who labored and continue to labor to produce Romania's national wealth;
— the supreme obligation of all the citizens to protect the national wealth and not allow it to end up in foreign hands.

Along this line, we can anticipate the following developments:

The major and medium-sized industrial enterprises, whose production makes up the majority of the economy, cannot and should not be privatized; the same applies to transportation (rail, maritime, and air transport), the mining and power industries, and post and telecommunications, in view of the fact that they are of a major national importance.

What private factor could be capable of organizing and managing the production of or now purchasing a major industrial enterprise (such as the Bucharest Heavy Machinery Enterprise, the Galati Metallurgical Combine, or Romania's maritime fleet) whose fixed assets are worth a fortune? Obviously, no one in this country. Of course, foreign big capital could do it in short order. But would the Romanian people, the workers, and all those who built them and who suffered so many deprivations in the course of time, agree to sell major industrial plants to foreign capital? It is doubtful that the overwhelming majority of the Romanian people would agree to that.

Naturally, urgent measures are required to initiate and expand cooperation or associations with reputable firms in developed countries, to modernize technologies, and to refurbish enterprises with a view to increasing labor productivity and as soon as possible obtaining high quality, competitive products at international level and at low cost. However, the forms of cooperation chosen must not allow Romanian capital to trickle out of the country, but must be based on equitable means of payment.

Small enterprises, especially local industry or in the cooperative or service sectors, may be gradually privatized, so that free initiative and competition can lead to substantially improving production efficiency and increasing its contribution to both the consumer market and export. It is possible that these sectors can yield a large number of manufacturer units entitled to export their wares, but their share within the overall national economy and foreign trade (export, import, cooperation) cannot be significant, i.e., of a nature to determine the abolishment of the state monopoly over foreign trade. As far as this sector is concerned, with the limited currency volume involved, the Foreign Trade Ministry will of course not attempt to exercise any control over its production or exports. Each unit, in a spirit of free initiative, will make its own decisions and will last or go bankrupt according to its own management. If it is competitive, it will be able to export efficiently and survive, and if not, it will go bankrupt in accordance with all the rules of a market economy.

One thing will continue to be obligatory for this sector, too, as well as for the state sector, namely obtaining export and import licences from the Foreign Trade Ministry, as is done in all the countries.

In the agricultural sector, the peasants will decide to what extent they can grow crops on their private plots of land taken over from agricultural production cooperatives; they will be responsible for deciding whether to preserve group ownership, according to geographical areas and specific village conditions. Uniform prescriptions cannot be imposed for the entire country. Obviously, under the agrarian policy pursued until December 1989, the peasants were alienated from the land, dispossessed of their tools, and impoverished, and the process of their economic recovery will take a few years, but the outcomes of their recovery will have a favorable impact on the domestic produce market.

However, in the coming few years exports of agricultural produce can be still based on the centralized state stockpiles, made up of the crops of state agricultural farms and purchases from agricultural production cooperatives.

But neither does this reality call for immediate changes in the state foreign trade monopoly.

Neither have other East European countries, which began to democratize their socioeconomic life before Romania, hastened to abolish the state foreign trade monopoly. Hungary, for example, after many hesitations, decided that it was not in the interests of its national economy to eliminate the state foreign trade monopoly. Poland is struggling with a large foreign debt—approximately $40 billion—an unemployment
that has grown to 1.7 million, a 600 percent rate of inflation in 1989 and continued galloping inflation since last January.

Naturally, we should adopt an economic model that will protect us from inflation and unemployment and from dumping the painful consequences of the crisis on the shoulders of the people.

Thus, there can be no question of abolishing the state foreign trade monopoly before finding out the changes that are objectively possible in the forms of ownership and in production relations.

That would be like putting the carriage in front of the horse and would seriously harm the country.

In view of the above considerations, in the coming few years it appears necessary to maintain the specialized foreign trade enterprises, which should work as intermediaries or independently by purchasing from manufacturing enterprises in Romania and efficiently selling at export, or by deriving profits from export-import operations with foreign goods.

Simultaneously, specialized foreign trade departments can be established at plants that want to manage their own exports, private small producers entitled to export from local, cooperative, or service sectors, as well as joint production and marketing associations formed with foreign capital, etc., in accordance with the law that will be adopted by Parliament.

All those enterprises will be in a position to engage in foreign trade activities on the basis of export and import licences issued by the Foreign Trade Ministry which, as is the case in every other country, is the body in control of foreign trade activities.

Under several coexisting forms of ownership and until a stage is reached at which all the producers will be capable of competitively and profitably manufacturing and marketing their production, it is in the interests of the country to maintain the Foreign Trade Ministry as a factor of coordination, systematic guidance, support, and control, with a view to ensuring efficient foreign trade and preempting a leakage of national income abroad.

During this period of transition and change in the forms of ownership and production relations, some problems naturally arise concerning the planned monitoring of foreign trade efficiency, the relationship between the plan and the market, the financial-banking activities of manufacturing and foreign trade enterprises, and methods of ensuring competitive and profitable exports.

To reduce centralism and bureaucracy in foreign trade planning, as of the first semester of 1990 the practice of establishing foreign prices for products and groups of products under the plan, as contract limits (minimum limits for export and maximum for imports) and returns for products and groups of products (maximum for exports and minimum for imports) was discontinued as a tool of calculation in lei for manufacturers and customers.

As long as production continues to be planned in the state sector or for strategic products, the plan must continue to feature guidelines for foreign prices, at the level of real market prices, for estimating the annual plan. Similarly, approximative rates of return will have to be established for products and groups of products (without constituting a domestic means of calculation), so as to be able to calculate the financial and budget effects of foreign trade activities and to estimate the average rate of exchange of the leu in relation to the dollar for export and import purposes.

Once all planning is eliminated, there will no longer be any need for foreign trade price guidelines nor for return rates guidelines.

However, it does not appear feasible to discontinue the planning before having established and verified in practice a real economic mechanism to act as an authentic lever for conducting all our economic activities, including foreign trade, without centralism and bureaucracy, with a view to: ensuring maximum efficiency and profitability in all the units, regardless of their form of ownership; ensuring domestic supplies and goods available for export; ensuring a positive commercial balance (so that we don't have to pay for imports with loans, but out of current exports); ensuring a healthy system of domestic prices, simultaneously with an abundance of products capable of supporting the national currency and gradually preparing for making it convertible.

For that purpose we must mobilize the best economists of the country from the Ministry of National Economy, the Finance Ministry, the National Bank, the Foreign Trade Ministry, the Romanian Foreign Trade Bank, the Institute of Economic Research, the Higher Institute of Economic Education, and the ministries in charge of coordinating material production, to hammer out and propose such an economic mechanism still this year.

To be correct, the relationship between the plan and the market in foreign trade must proceed from a few principles, namely: a) We must manufacture goods that are in demand in domestic and foreign markets; b) the goods manufactured for export must be competitive and sell at prices that will allow the recovery of production, marketing, and sales costs and leave a minimum of profit; c) we must not export goods that are required in the domestic market and if there is a shortage of the respective products, in view of the fact that consumer supplies have the priority; d) imports must be planned so as to ensure normal economic activities; ensure satisfactory consumer supplies, especially of products not manufactured domestically; and not to lead to foreign debts, i.e., remain within the limits of the currency reserves derived from export.

From these viewpoints, the Ministry of National Economy must cooperate with the economic ministries
and the Foreign Trade Ministry to guide production, exports, and imports on the basis of programs, so as not to arrive at a situation of economic chaos and anarchy.

A variety of serious mistakes made in the past have left us with a difficult legacy from the viewpoints of quality, technical-functional parameters, competitiveness, and efficiency regarding many of the products manufactured in Romania for export:

—products are qualitatively not on a par with competitive products; the so-called “organization and modernization programs” that should have ensured state-of-the-art products, were fictitious;
—Romanian products were frequently criticized, but conditions were never created for permitting the industry to produce in accordance with foreign market demands;
—since production costs in lei were high, some export products were not competitive, the consumption of materials and energy was uneconomical, and labor productivity was low because of outdated technologies and equipment;
—foreign prices did not allow us to completely recover the production costs calculated in foreign currency, but only partially, as well as material expenditures (previous labor); the small positive margin did not permit an appropriate capitalization on the labor invested (newly created value).

In developed countries, all producers aim at completely recovering their production expenditures (material and others), as well as marketing and distribution costs, and making a profit.

We, however, failed to achieve this objective. There were some small exceptions in the case of products whose price rose steeply in international markets in exceptional conjunctural conditions, as happened in 1988. The situation, however, became unfavorable when market demand and obtainable prices dropped considerably, as a result of which in some cases we did not recover even our material expenditures at foreign prices; the enterprises did not have the means to devise solutions to counterbalance the effects of market-imposed foreign prices, either by reducing production costs or improving the structure, quality, or technical-functional parameters of products so as to be able to rise prices abroad and ensure profitable production and exports.

In other words, regarding the large majority of products, Romanian industry is still not able to compete abroad: this increases the risk of losses and bankruptcies during the transition to a market economy before having achieved technological innovations apt to considerably raise the competitiveness of our products from all viewpoints.

We must find a mechanism to provide incentives for units that manufacture for export to increase the efficiency of their production, keep costs and production expenditures under control, and remain flexible and adaptable to foreign price fluctuations, with a view to preparing to confront the competition in accordance with all the rules of international trade.

How long this period of preparation of producers who are not yet in a position to confront real competition will last is difficult to estimate; it may take several years and it may be a costly process that will force us to increase imports and foreign currency investments, if domestic efforts fail to ensure the introduction of appropriate technologies and equipment in manufacturing units; a perfect cooperation will be required between the foreign trade enterprise and the producing enterprise, which must help each other deal with production and marketing in a spirit of a competitiveness capable of ensuring exports without losses for the national economy, in the tough conditions imposed by foreign markets.

Foreign trade is a particularly complex process which requires thorough specialized preparations, in view of the fact that international relations are a very sensitive and subtle area.

The Foreign Trade Ministry, as a specialized economic body, will further have to play an important role for ensuring such specialized preparations across a very wide front incorporating both the fields of production and marketing during this period of transition, which must ensure an efficient transition to a market economy.
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Foreign Student Statistics, Problems Outlined

90GE0024A East Berlin DAS HOCHSCHULWESEN in German Vol 38 No 3 Mar 90 (Signed to press 16 Jan 90) pp 94-96

[Article by Dr Peter Heilmann, research assistant at the Central Institute for College Level Training in East Berlin: “Some Aspects of Higher Education for Foreigners in the GDR”]

[Text] In recent years, foreign citizens studying in the GDR have become an important component in the system of training and continued education at universities and colleges.

Within this framework of training and continued education, students from Asian, African, and Latin American countries (AAL) constitute a significant part, going back to the beginnings (1951) of higher education for foreigners [here].

History

One of the principles for training young cadres from AAL countries was already postulated in 1949.

Otto Grotewohl announced the basic foreign policy attitude of the new state, the GDR, in the first government declaration: “The new way is the way of democracy, of peace and friendship with all peoples... We only aspire to a democratic state which overcomes the terrible heritage of fascism and militarism and maintains friendly relations with all peoples of the world.” Based on that premise, the GDR developed its relations with the nations of the world, of which the training of students is an integral component both of cultural foreign policy as well as higher education and science policy.

“For the GDR’s universities and technical institutes, higher education for foreigners was virgin territory both as to organization and substance, since...there were hardly any progressive traditions of bourgeois Germany to fall back on...” But individual examples prove the education of foreigners in the spirit of the Enlightenment. Thus in “1730... Anton Wilhelm Amo from Guinea in Africa was registered at the University of Wittenberg. Four years later he graduated from this university in the Electorate of Saxony. After six years’ residence in Wittenberg, the ‘black philosopher' taught as a docent in Halle until 1739, and subsequently for eight more years at the University of Jena.”

In later years, the training of foreigners gained greater importance. “The beginning of large-scale and organized studies by foreigners at the University of Leipzig, which attained particular significance for the Slavic region, can probably be traced to the year 1767, when Catherine II sent a group of 11 Russian students to Leipzig for several years of legal studies.” and in the 1910/1911 winter semester, the University of Leipzig's register lists 4,906 students, among them 588 from 17 European countries and 46 from America and Asia. In the GDR, the training of foreign citizens began in 1951.

At the Workers-and-Peasants department (ABF) of Leipzig University, in addition to 102 students from the Korean Democratic People's Republic (KDPR), 11 Nigerians began to prepare for their studies.

With the development of higher education in the GDR, expansion of international relations and the creation of young national states, the number of foreign students kept rising. For the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America the idea of solidarity was decisive in the training of cadres for the state, the economy and the building of the respective college systems. That is still the basic premise to this day—in addition to earning foreign currency on the basis of commercial contracts—in contrast to the “brain drain” of Western countries.

Quantitatively, studies by foreign citizens in all fields developed very rapidly in the GDR. In 1970, there were not quite 5,000 of them; in 1987 there were already some 12,400 students from 130 countries annually residing in the GDR for training and continued education. Of these roughly 12,400 foreign citizens, approximately 3,500 fulltime students from Asia, Africa, and Latin America are studying at GDR universities and colleges.

Students' Geographic Backgrounds

Of the approximately 12,400 foreign citizens pursuing training and continued education at GDR universities and colleges, at present 5,036 are fulltime students.

The breakdown is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialist European countries</td>
<td>1,453</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalist industrial countries</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia, Africa, Latin America</td>
<td>3,446</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,036</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If one differentiates between the individual regions of the AAL countries, students come from:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab countries</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African countries</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian countries</td>
<td>1,073</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American countries</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,446</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The qualification of cadres from AAL countries primarily deals with delegates from countries with close political and economic relations (for instance, friendship treaties), and countries with economic interests (students...
on a commercial basis). That is reflected in the following actual figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampuchea</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Democratic People's Republic</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,033</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>793</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab Countries</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen Arab Republic</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Democratic Republic of Yemen</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>476</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>301</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Social Composition and Distribution of the Sexes

If one looks more closely at the social background of the students from the AAL countries, it reflects the present socioeconomic and political situations. It must be taken into consideration, however, that there are different models of social stratification—both bourgeois and Marxist.1

In order to somewhat clarify the social background, the operational category "father's occupation" was used. Even that does not permit a clear-cut classification since, for instance, the occupational designation "farmer" is extremely differentiated and may range from subsistence farmer to plantation owner and reflects a wide spectrum of social and property conditions. Nonetheless, relatively certain statements can be made.

Except for the upper classes, in principle all important social groups are represented. In general it is evident that a large proportion of the middle classes exists, particularly of the university educated (among them teachers, physicians, scientists) and higher-level employees (functionaries, civil servants, members of the Army and police). Also relatively strong is the farm element, while workers and above all the self-employed (craftsmen, tradespeople) are listed less frequently.

In concrete terms, this demonstrates the development stage of various countries and regions, the predominat share of individual states among the students, and the policy of delegating—resulting from the influence of the politically leading groups.

Thus the small degree of urbanization in black Africa, i.e., a high percentage of rural population, and the political regimes are reflected in the strong representation of higher-level employees and farmers, while in Latin America members of the university educated, the working class, and to some degree employees are predominantly represented.

With a relative assimilation of many social groups in Arab countries, farmers and the intelligentsia stand out somewhat, but not significantly so. The extremely small percentage of self-employed indicates that they are not part of the politically influential groups. The situation in Cuba is similar where the intelligentsia, employees, and workers dominate, while the self-employed and farmers play no role. In the Arab states, primarily employees and the intelligentsia dominate the picture.

In analyzing the social background it must be taken into account, however, what importance is given in the individual countries to studying abroad in general, and studying in a socialist country in particular. Without a doubt it is true that many, both governments and students, prefer studies in the United States, Great Britain, France, and also the FRG. This also applies to the so-called socialist-oriented countries. However, insufficient facilities in their own country in view of the large numbers of high school graduates; the necessity to train qualified cadres; the status symbol of having graduated from a university (sometimes "white collar"); the nonexistent possibility to study in a Western country; the relatively low cost of training in the GDR, and a certain solidarity with the GDR (for the most varied reasons, but clearly political in the case of some countries); all that makes it imperative [for them] to utilize every opportunity offered in the GDR.
Structure According to Sex

Distribution according to sex among fulltime students sometimes shows significant differences. The following ratios exist overall:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total number</th>
<th>Of these, female</th>
<th>Percentage of females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fulltime students, total</td>
<td>5,036</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist European countries</td>
<td>1,453</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalist industrial countries</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAL countries</td>
<td>3,446</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It becomes clear that the relatively high proportion of female students from socialist European states and capitalist industrial countries is lowered to about one-third since of the delegates from AAL countries, only one in four is female (it has such a strong effect because two-thirds of all students come from one region). These differences indicate that the different role and position of women in individual regions of the world are also reflected in the policy of delegating persons to study abroad and in the educational level of women in those societies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch of study</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>actual</td>
<td>actual</td>
<td>actual</td>
<td>actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math/Natural sciences</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical sciences</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>1,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural sciences</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy, history</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal arts, sports</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature, linguistics</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,272</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td>3,375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hochschulstatistik..., op. cit.

It demonstrates that enrollment is particularly high in those branches of study which are relevant to the development of AAL countries, in particular the technical sciences in all regions, mathematics/natural sciences in Africa and Latin America, medicine in Africa and Asia, and agricultural sciences in Africa.

Adjustment Problems

Students from AAL countries are confronted with a number of problems in the GDR.

They have been transplanted into a politically, economically, socially and culturally different environment and society, where they have to live and work for several years, where questions of integration and adaptation are vital and important for success, but without giving up their independence and personality, the characteristic traits of their background, etc., so that later on they will to be able to reintegrate into, and readapt to, their autochthonous societies with little difficulty.

With the goal of temporary adjustment to conditions in the GDR and simultaneous maintenance of typical cultural characteristics of their homelands, a synthesis of divergent traits of lifestyle must take place. In order to achieve the purpose of their stay, foreign students—particularly those from AAL countries—are forced, to a relatively great extent, to adapt to the intellectual-cultural, political-ideological, social, and economic as well as ethical-moral and everyday ideas of the host
country which are legally regulated or determined by traditional values and standards, customs, practices and habits, ideas, interests, and needs of GDR inhabitants. On the one hand, that extends from the large complex of the cultural sphere, from language to eating habits, dance, theater, television, movies, literature, clothing, housing conditions, to the system of spiritual values, represented by certain standards governing social behavior; on the other, to specifics such as the climate, but also to economic and political peculiarities such as the existence of two German states and problems resulting therefrom, which sometimes also touch foreign students, for example in questions of visas. Among other things, there is a further problem—fistfights (and also knife-wielding confrontations) between the foreigners themselves and also between foreigners and GDR citizens are on the rise. It is becoming ever more evident that many GDR citizens show resentment toward foreigners, particularly toward colored people. Racial prejudice is growing, and also comes out in remarks such as "the blacks are to go home." (In many cases one can also speak of animosity toward foreigners, xenophobia and racial hatred, particularly since larger contingents of laborers from Poland, Vietnam, and Mozambique have been working in the GDR.)

This trend is strengthened by the fact that, for many different reasons, most foreigners are forced to spend much time in public places, for instance in restaurants, at dances, etc. They do it because generally they also spend their weekends and free time in the university town, where living and working conditions in the student dormitories frequently do not correspond to the projected and internationally accepted standards. They cannot afford private apartments due to their lack of availability and the obligation to pay the rent in foreign currency. Also, the chance to travel home (for vacation, holidays, etc.) hardly exists; the great geographic distances and payment for tickets in freely convertible currency make it almost impossible.

But there are also many professional problems for students from AAL countries.

Often they do not have the educational entry level adequate for GDR standards, which shows up above all in the mathematical-natural sciences and technical fields. It is aggravated by a lack of practical experience so that frequently special arrangements have to be made. Different working hours (nightshift workers), insufficiently developed study forms and methods, sometimes a lack of motivation to study—both by GDR students and foreigners—in some cases prevent harmonious integration in seminar groups, and hence, effective work. A great obstacle, particularly for the technical sectors, is the difficulty of placing foreigners in factories for practical work (up to now mostly justified by reasons of security and protection of secrets), so that they miss a fine opportunity to gain practical experience. These problems are aggravated overall by sometimes inadequate knowledge of German, the teaching of which during a year at institutions preparing them for university studies does not meet the requirements of many foreign students.

Footnotes
1. After the "History" section, the remarks refer to fulltime students at universities and colleges, above all from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p 5.
9. See Hochschulstatistik der DDR 1988 [Statistics of Higher Education in the GDR 1988], Ministry for University and Technical School Affairs, as of 30 Dec. 1988, table 112—these countries include the Mongolian People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, the Korean Democratic People's Republic as well as Cuba; excluded are Japan, Israel, Cyprus, Turkey and the United States which are counted among the capitalist industrial countries.

European socialist states are recorded according to the classification used at present; the political changes and declarations which occurred or were announced, respectively, in the course of 1989 have not yet been taken into consideration.

10. The data on geographic origin were taken from, and computed according to: Ibid.
11. Among the numerous monographs and collective volumes on the social structure in AAL countries, only the following are pointed out here: K. Ernst, H. Schilling, Entwicklungslande: Sozialökonomische Prozesse und Klassen [Developing Countries: Socioeconomic Processes and Classes], Staatsverlag der DDR, Berlin 1981.

12. The data on structure according to sex were taken from Hochschulstatistik, op. cit.

13. This complex of problems will be presented in detail in another article.

ROMANIA

Finns Report Suceava Plant Pollution
90EB0330A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT
in Finnish 27 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Antti Vahtera: “Emissions Destroy Cities in Romania; Cellulose Factories Are Feared To Have Poisoned All Life in Suceava”]

[Text] At least seven workers have died and 250 have been disabled in the city of Suceava, Romania, because of the discharges from cellulose factories. The pollutants are feared to be gradually destroying all life in the city and nearby surrounding areas.

Because of the poisoning incidents and the public opinion storm that was caused, the Romanian Government recently shut down the part of the cellulose industry complex that produces the dangerous carbon sulfide. The other facilities, however, are still operating and pollute this city of 100,000 inhabitants. The matter was reported by SVENSKA DAGBLADET reporters, who were sent to the scene.

“Suceava Syndrome” Destroys the Central Nervous System

The illness that hundreds if not thousands of city residents are suffering from has received the name “Suceava Syndrome.” The main source is carbon disulfide (CS₂), which is known to cause serious damage to the central nervous system and peripheral nerves. It also affects reproduction and causes long-term muscular paralysis and respiratory difficulties. Carbon disulfide is used in converting cellulose into artificial fibers.

The gigantic cellulose complex, which employs a total of about 20,000 persons, is situated only a few kilometers from the center of the city, which is located in Moldavia in northern Romania. The emissions have gone on for more than 10 years and are feared to have caused permanent damage to nature and, through it, to future generations.

According to local physicians, 90 percent of the 2,800 persons who work in the department using carbon disulfide have acquired toxic contents that could kill them or ruin their lives in their final years. The incidence of children with birth deformities and miscarriages as well as of deaths caused by cardiovascular diseases is very high.

A local physician, Ioan Ietcu, has established the environmental movement called “Pro Natura,” which is among the first in Romania and which has its own newspaper and its own local organizations. Only recently, after the revolution, has he begun to express his opinion publicly.

Environmental Destruction Just Being Revealed

In recent weeks thousands of persons have expressed their opinions against pollution. Not everyone joins in their position, however, because a substantial fraction of the workers are concerned about their employment.

Nicolae Ceausescu visited the city in 1988 when the government had heard about the poison scandal. The city officials, however, closed the factory temporarily in good time, about a week before the visit. Ceausescu proclaimed that all of the concern about pollution was groundless.

The scope of the destruction caused to the environment by the Ceausescu regime is only gradually being revealed. There have been a number of environmental catastrophes, and some of them may be worse than Suceava.

The Romanian ecological movement, which is supposed to act as a sort of umbrella organization, was founded only two days after the revolution, on 24 December. The author Toma Maiorescu was appointed chairman of its executive committee, and it soon gathered thousands of members.
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