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KUWAIT

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[Interview with Muhammad Abu al-Hasan in Kuwait; date not given]

[Text] Kuwait—Kuwait's permanent representative to the United Nations, Muhammad Abu al-Hasan, emphasized that the Iraqi regime is still putting off the implementation of Security Council resolutions regarding the return of Kuwaiti property and the release of Kuwaiti prisoners and detainees. He stated that there is an authorized international team tasked with monitoring developments in this regard.

In an interview which he granted yesterday to Kuwait Radio, Abu al-Hasan stated that the Kuwaiti Government is closely monitoring the case of Kuwaiti prisoners and detainees, the demarcation of Kuwait's border with Iraq, and the elimination of the chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons which the Iraqi regime possesses, given the danger and threat which they pose to the entire Gulf region. Muhammad Abu al-Hasan stated that the Iraqi regime's commitment to implementation of the comprehensive resolution issued by the UN Security Council is only a superficial commitment. He added that the Iraqi regime is disregarding the resolution which nullified the annexation, pursuant to which specific mechanisms were formulated regarding other commitments and promises made by the Iraqi regime. Implementation continues to be a sham and is characterized by the same method of deception, delusion, and the desire to procrastinate for which the Iraqi regime has become famous based on its past practices and international dealings. The following is the text of the interview with Abu al-Hasan:

[SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI] How do you view the role of the international force stationed on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border and this force's ability to oppose any type of Iraqi aggression?

[Abu al-Hasan] The mission of this international force is to provide early warning of any Iraqi mobilization on the Iraqi side of the border, Kuwaiti massings on the Kuwaiti side, or even a war. The committee's mission does not include preventing incursions into the demilitarized zone. Rather, its mission is to alert and notify the UN secretary general and Security Council as quickly as possible of a penetration and to clarify whether the penetration is merely a passing incident, such as the entry of a military person or a small group of soldiers into the territory of the other side, or a clear military intervention. In the latter case, the Security Council is convened to take the necessary measures against the side that penetrates the demilitarized zone.

[SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI] What is the status of the issue of indemnities, the demarcation of the border, and the monitoring of Iraq's nuclear capability, which have been the focus of a number of UN resolutions?

[Abu al-Hasan] It is not only Kuwait that is concerned with this matter. The United Nations in general and the Security Council in particular are also concerned. Everyone attaches great importance to these matters, based on their intense awareness of the Iraqi record of trickery and procrastination, and the long-term goals of the Iraqi regime. Consequently, there is extremely great doubt regarding that regime's credibility and willingness to yield to international will. Measures are being implemented now to return what was stolen, and a UN delegation is in Baghdad for this purpose. Within a few days, Iraq's willingness to return the stolen items will be tested, after the appropriate mechanisms have been established and an agreement is reached on the details.

Borders

[SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI] Can you bring us up to date on the demarcation of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border?

[Abu al-Hasan] Two rounds of technical discussions on this matter have been held in Geneva. A third round is now underway. The results of the previous two rounds were positive, inasmuch as Iraq's intentions were tested. Most unfortunately, we sensed a lack of determination on Iraq's part to demarcate the borders during the first two rounds of discussions. However, the third round now underway in Geneva is decisive. During this round, the British map that served as the basis for marking the border, which is based on the 1932 Agreement, will be translated into practical, well-considered reality, following the laying of the groundwork in the first and second rounds.

[SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI] What is your appraisal of Iraq's intent to disassemble and destroy its nuclear capability and chemical and biological stockpile?

[Abu al-Hasan] Some theoretical progress has been made. However, when we moved toward making practical progress, we found Iraq dealing again in an underhanded manner and attempting to deceive international society by evading the surrender and destruction of all of its stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the UN secretary general was compelled to recall the international team assigned to take possession of Iraq's nuclear stockpile.

Major efforts are now being made in the Security Council to examine Iraq's flagrant violation of international resolutions. Everyone is convinced that Iraq was, still is, and will continue to be an untrustworthy regime. The insincerity of all of the Baghdad regime's statements regarding the nuclear aspect has been revealed again to the Security Council. Recently, Iraq scandalized itself by firing on the UN team assigned to inspect Iraq's nuclear capability. It also refused to place all of its nuclear sites at the disposal of the UN team.
No UN Resolution Needed

[SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI] President George Bush stated that if there is a [further need for a] military deterrent, there is an international resolution [that provides for such a deterrent] without the Security Council having to meet again. What is your comment on that?

[Abu al-Hasan] That is correct. I assure fellow citizens that Resolution 687, which arranged the ceasefire between the allied forces and Kuwait on the one hand, and Iraq on the other hand, gave the Security Council the right to use immediate military force in the event that a blatant Iraqi violation is recorded, be it an attack against Kuwait, a penetration into demilitarized zones in Kuwait, Iraq's refusal to implement international resolutions, or Iraq's refusal to return prisoners, which is currently our main concern. When Iraq's refusal to adhere to its international commitments is decisively established, the allied countries and Kuwait—and Kuwait, in any case—have a legal right and international backing to use military force. Accordingly, the Iraqi regime should be well-aware of this process, because international society opposes aggression and rewarding the hostile Iraqi regime for its aggression.

[SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI] What is the extent of the international commitment to Kuwait based on international resolutions? Is this commitment subject to future priorities or changes in governments?

[Abu al-Hasan] The international commitment which safeguards Kuwait within the borders stipulated in 1963, which is based on the 1932 Agreement, is a legal commitment not only for Kuwait and Iraq, and not only for the UN Security Council, which is the highest authority in the United Nations, but also for all of international society. This commitment is contained in Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, to which the 159 UN member countries are bound. Each one of them is committed to pressuring Iraq—each according to its ability—to prevent it from violating its commitments to Kuwait. The Security Council members are committed, regardless of the present or future governments in their countries, to maintain the security of Kuwait's borders pursuant to the 1963 Agreement. The Security Council has pledged to take responsibility for the defense of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border as stipulated by the 1963 Agreement, as mentioned above, to prevent the Kuwaiti people or regional security from being exposed to danger again.

Existing Danger

[SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI] Does the Iraqi regime still pose a danger to Kuwait's security? How great will this danger be in the future?

[Abu al-Hasan] The danger exists. We must not underestimate it. We must not ignore it as long as the Iraqi regime—with its goals and symbols—exists. This danger threatens not only Kuwait, but also regional stability and the Iraqi people itself. We maintain that, despite the guarantees from the Security Council which God granted us success in obtaining, and despite international awareness of the danger posed by the current Iraqi regime, extreme caution must nonetheless be the basis of our international relations with the Baghdad regime. This is so, because even though the removal of a regime is the responsibility of the people which that regime governs, there is an international responsibility to be on guard against the danger posed by the Iraqi regime in particular, because this danger goes beyond the scope of that regime's national and regional policy. I always advocate extreme caution regarding the current Iraqi regime and refrainment from relying on its promises, because it has proven that it breaks them readily.

[SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI] Could the Arab force deter a possible Iraqi attack now or in the future?

[Abu al-Hasan] We cannot imagine any attack at present, because the ground rules are changing. However, I believe that there must be a deterrent that prevents Iraq from making any attack. This deterrent must make the Iraqi regime perceive not only an Arab force, but an international force as well. Deterrence is the basis for making the Iraqi regime understand that any attempt to commit an aggression is a foolhardy adventure, regardless of its type, that will be repelled with much greater effectiveness and force than the effectiveness and force with which its previous aggression was repelled. If Iraq senses that the Arab region is capable and on guard for any Iraqi surprise, I believe that it will think twice before embarking on any of its stupid acts. Unfortunately, the Arab League Charter is a group of mute stipulations. There is no commitment to heed them. Nor is there any sincerity to implement them. We believe that the important thing is to be morally committed to these stipulations. The Baghdad regime, which is a member of the Arab League, has proven that not only does it not comply with the Arab League Charter, but it also does not comply with the teachings of the true Islamic religion, to which it claims it belongs. In this framework, the Damascus Charter is the product of the bitter experience of Kuwait and the entire region. It includes good ideas. A tireless effort is currently being made to ensure that these countries honor their promises. This applies to the declaration of Damascus and Kuwait. Thank God, they have proven their full commitment to all of their promises regarding the Gulf Cooperation Council. We have great esteem for Egypt and Syria for their role in fulfilling their international commitments. If I add the Egyptian and Syrian roles, their will, and their respect for international commitments to the Gulf will, the Damascus Declaration becomes a model legal framework for regulating regional organizations.

[SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI] Given the current situation and the outcome of the crisis caused by the occupation, who, in your opinion, is responsible for Kuwait's security?

[Abu al-Hasan] Kuwait's security is primarily the responsibility of Kuwaitis, but there is also an inherent Gulf, Arab, and international responsibility. Through an
awareness of this security, we can remove any threat to Kuwaiti cohesiveness and the unified Kuwaiti position in support of the political leadership headed by his excellency the emir of the country and his excellency the faithful crown prince. This is the safety valve, the control belt, and the link to Kuwait's security. The entire Western media supported and defended Kuwait in its darkest hour. However, some were swept away in the interest of obtaining a cheap media scoop. They focused on several marginal, isolated practices, inflating them, not in pursuit of a scoop, but because they were led astray by several Arab agencies that were moving in the orbit of the Iraqi regime. However, some of these members of the Western media will inevitably regain their credibility after uncovering the spuriousness of the line which they took recently.

The Palestinian Problem

[SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI] What is Kuwait's current position on the Palestinian problem?

[Abu al-Hasan] Again, we have seen proof of the extent to which the perfidious Iraqi aggression subjected the Palestinian cause to ruin and delay. Throughout the months of the aggression, international society paid no attention at all to the Palestinian problem. However, the nightmare of the Iraqi aggression was hardly over when the problem began to take its place among the Security Council's concerns. Most unfortunately, those in charge of the Palestinian leadership are harming the Palestinian cause through their behavior and relations with the Arab countries. The clearest example of this is perhaps its relations with Kuwait, and currently, with the legitimate Lebanese Government.

[SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI] How do you evaluate Kuwaiti diplomacy at present?

[Abu al-Hasan] Kuwaiti diplomacy is active and fast-paced. Perhaps the meeting that was held between Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Shaykh Salim al-Sabah and Kuwaiti ambassadors to the European, North American, and South American countries, and several Arab countries to examine the vicious media attack against Kuwait provides a glowing picture of the harmony and accord of Kuwaiti diplomacy regarding every new development. It is a reflection of Kuwait's safety valve and the Kuwaiti reputation.

[SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI] How do you appraise your role as Kuwait's permanent representative to the United Nations?

[Abu al-Hasan] Kuwait’s permanent deputy must be responsible for ensuring greater concern with Iraq’s statements on Kuwait and very careful monitoring of Iraqi behavior on the part of everyone. We must also not forget the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry’s responsibility, the responsibility of everyone at home or abroad who loves Kuwait, and the need for every citizen to be acutely aware of what Iraqi propaganda organs are doing, so that each citizen can judge Iraq’s credibility regarding the full implementation of UN Security Council resolutions.

Deputy Prime Minister on Domestic, Foreign Affairs

91AE0525D London SAWT AL-KUWAYT in Arabic 21 Jul 91 p 3

[Interview With Shaykh Salim al-Sabah al-Salim, Kuwait’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, by Madi al-Khamis; place and date not given, “Salim al-Sabah, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, to SAWT AL-KUWAYT: It Is Time for ‘Countryless’ To Reveal Their Identity; Prisoners Issue Is Primary Topic We Discuss With Every Visitor to Kuwait; We Ensure Our Security and Stability With Unity and Solidarity; Else, We Open Door to Saboteurs and the Destructive; There Will Be Changes Among Ambassadors and in Diplomatic Corps; We Will Establish Studies Institute at Ministry; We Have Severed Our Relations With Iraq Only; Our Embassies Are Present in Other Countries; We Are Arabs and We Will Not Abandon Our Arabism; Palestinian Cause Is Our Cause”]

[Text] Kuwait—Shaykh Salim al-Sabah al-Salim, the deputy prime minister and foreign minister, has stressed that the fundamentals of Kuwait’s foreign policy will not be changed and pointed out that the Palestinian cause is Kuwait’s cause, that Kuwait is above lies and vituperation, and that the PLO’s weak position will not influence Kuwait’s support for the Palestinian cause.

This was stated in an interview which the deputy prime minister and foreign minister has given SAWT AL-KUWAYT and in which he has pointed out that there are three main issues which must be resolved, namely: captives, borders, and stolen property. He has also announced that there will be changes among Kuwaiti ambassadors abroad and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will establish a diplomatic institute to provide instruction on diplomatic work.

At another level, the deputy prime minister pointed out that there is nothing in the universe called “countryless” (bidun, which means “without”) because every man must have roots. He stressed that these people must reveal their identities.

Shaykh Salim al-Sabah has also talked of the conditions which must be present to improve Kuwaiti and Gulf relations with the countries that have taken unfriendly positions toward Kuwait, stressing that Kuwait will carry on with its policy. He pointed out that there are strong and firm relations among the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] member states, that Iraq cannot move a finger, and that the Kuwaiti people must not be shaken because they have proven that they are people that cannot be harmed by anything.

Following is the text of the interview which Shaykh Salim al-Sabah has given SAWT AL-KUWAYT:
[Khamis] What is the strategy of the new foreign policy?

[Salim] The fundamentals of Kuwait's foreign policy will not change because it is built on Kuwait's belief that it is a part of the Arab world and its belief that it is a part of the Islamic world. We are also a part of the world as a whole.

We believe in the Arab League, in our Arab belonging, in the Islamic Organization, and in the United Nations and its principles. These are the firm bases of Kuwait's foreign policy.

Issues still crop up from time to time. A position must be taken on these issues. A decision based on and connected with the circumstances of the issue must also be made. There are fundamental Arab causes which are really our causes, especially the Palestinian cause. As a cause, the Palestinian cause is Kuwait's cause. As for other matters, there is another perspective. This is the policy of the Kuwait Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Above Vituperation

[Khamis] What is the diplomatic and propaganda plan to answer the tendentious campaign launched by the PLO against Kuwait abroad?

[Salim] We will not descend to the level of lies and vituperation. We are above such things. The rumors and lies launched against Kuwait are exposed by the facts. The proof of this is that Kuwait's policy, with its poise and with the leadership of Kuwait's amir, its crown prince, and Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, the architect of its foreign policy, has motivated the world to support us unanimously for the first time in history.

I wish to stress that this PLO position will not influence Kuwait's support for the Palestinian cause. The PLO is one thing and the Palestinian cause is another.

When we find that there are circles that are worthy of our response, such as the Arab League and the United Nations, then we answer them factually and scientifically.

[Khamis] How harmonious are the positions of the Damascus Declaration member states on security arrangements in the Gulf region?

[Salim] Regrettably, the world press, with a certain goal and objective in mind, tries to exaggerate things. What I mean is that when the meeting of the Damascus Declaration member states was delayed, a major clamor was created over the so-called "presence of disagreement," and so forth.

I am not telling journalists and politicians not to analyze things. I just ask them not to overload matters. For a certain reason and because of special circumstances, one of the member states asked that the meeting be postponed, and it was. This meeting was then held in a magnificent atmosphere abounding with cooperation and understanding.

The GCC member states, Egypt, and Syria believe in the fundamental principles of the Damascus Declaration concerning political, economic, social, and security conditions. They are prepared to supply us with any forces that we request to participate with the Gulf and Kuwaiti forces in protecting Kuwait.

Primary Issue

[Khamis] It has been proposed that the International Military Committee convene to discuss the position of prisoners and of the missing. What is new at this level?

[Salim] Yes. We are in communication with Ahmad al-Fahd, our ambassador to Saudi Arabia, who is engaged in talks with the parties concerned in Saudi Arabia and with the other forces to request another meeting.

The prisoners issue is the primary issue for all of us. As his highness the amir, his highness the crown prince, and all the Kuwaiti people say, we will not rest until all our captured sons return hale, safe, and sound. Moreover, I personally have relations with all these prisoners, be they Kuwaiti civilians to whom I am tied by fraternal bonds, such as brother Faysal al-Sani' and 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Muzayyin (civilians), or security and army officers to whom I am tied by personal relations and for whom I harbor utter love and appreciation.

I wish to stress that since I took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the paternal leader and his highness the crown prince have brought up the prisoners issue as the primary issue discussed with every guest who has come to Kuwait.

Next to the prisoners issue comes the border issue. The issue of the property stolen by Iraq from Kuwait follows.

[Khamis] Are there new developments in these three issues, i.e. the prisoners, borders, and stolen property?

[Salim] Iraq has agreed to return the gold it has plundered from the Central Bank. Through Richard Foran, assistant UN secretary general, Iraq has also promised to return to Kuwait the books, gold, and articles stolen from the museum. But Iraq continues to procrastinate on setting a delivery date.

We will pursue Iraq unwaveringly and we will continue to pressure the United Nations until Iraq returns all stolen property. As for the borders, the committee will meet anew on the 12th of next month, God willing. After their [first] meeting, they have taken a break to examine some points.

As for the prisoners, I again stress that they are our main preoccupation and that we will persist in pressuring the oppressive Iraqi regime until it releases them.

There are committees that are demanding release of the prisoners. The Red Cross, Amnesty International, and all humanitarian organizations are demanding release of the prisoners.
Diplomacy Institute

[Khamis] What new things have you introduced since you took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Salim] We have discussed Kuwait's new diplomatic strategy with Kuwait's ambassadors abroad. There has to be new blood and a new concept of diplomacy. On this basis, I have considered establishing a diplomatic institute for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What I mean is that when a young man graduates from college and joins the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he will not be attached to an embassy until he has spent a nine-month study period in the institute to learn what diplomatic work is, how to draft reports, and how to do research. We will bring in prominent people in the diplomatic field who may include former European and Arab heads of state, ex-prime ministers and foreign ministers, and diplomacy professors. The institute will cover information, diplomacy, and political affairs, and will provide intensive courses. Whoever passes these courses will join the diplomatic corps. Those who fail can join the administrative affairs section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such people may be transferred to the diplomatic corps, but only after a long time.

[Khamis] Will there be changes among Kuwait's ambassadors abroad?

[Salim] There will be changes among Kuwait's ambassadors abroad because this is the nature of diplomatic work. An ambassador who spends a certain period of time in a country has to be transferred. A diplomat has to be transferred also. Such transfers are routine. We are in the process of forming a committee in the diplomatic and consular corps. This committee will develop a program on the basis of instructions given to it.

[Khamis] Does the government plan to resolve the problem of Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaiti citizens who live outside Kuwait as a consequence of the Iraqi invasion, especially since some of these husbands are from nationalities that are not wanted in Kuwait?

[Salim] We, as the government, set priorities for issues. Important as it is to this group of Kuwaiti citizens, this issue is equally important to us as government. But there are more important issues that take priority. There is no doubt that this issue is one of the points we will include in the list of issues to be examined, so that a final decision can be made on it.

[Khamis] What is the fate of Iraqis living in Kuwait?

[Salim] The guilty will be punished and those who are not guilty should have no fear. The case of those who have proven their love for Kuwait and who have worked for it will be considered.

The Countryless

[Khamis] What is the fate of the "countryless" [al-bidun] and what measures will the government take toward them?

[Salim] I wish to stress that there is nothing in the universe called "countryless." Man must have roots. Those who allege that they are "countryless" must reveal their true identity and their nationality because they will have thus displayed goodwill.

As for those who continue to allege that they are countryless, they will continue to be pursued and decisions will continue to be made against them until they reveal their true identity. It is difficult for one to abandon his homeland and his affiliation with his country.

But this doesn't mean that when one belongs to a certain country one will lose his rights in Kuwait.

When I was minister of interior, I personally issued nearly 170 residence permits a month to whomever came and revealed his true identity. Some of those people are artists and some employees and they all continue to live in Kuwait and to work in their field of specialization.

We learned their true identity and we told them: As long as you work and you continue to preserve this country's security and stability, then you will stay here and will earn your livelihood. But when we feel that you constitute a threat to this country, you will be punished.

This is why I say that this group has to reveal its true identity. There is nothing called "countryless." Even a stone has its origins and its makeup. It will not hurt anybody to reveal his identity, be he from Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Oman. But to find some people who cannot understand Arabic and who claim that they are "countryless," it is unreasonable. We will give those who fail to reveal their origins and their identity the option of going to any country that they choose and that will accept them.

The truth is that a solution must be found for this problem sooner or later. It is premature to talk of giving them Kuwaiti citizenship.

[Khamis] What are the necessary conditions to improve Kuwaiti and Gulf relations with the countries that have taken unfriendly positions toward Kuwait?

[Salim] We are people who have been subjected to aggression. Honorable and noble Arabs supported us. They supported justice on the basis of their principles and ethics. The world also supported us on this basis and only because of the principles and fundamentals in which it believes. We are Arabs and we will not abandon our Arabism. We are Muslims and we will not abandon our Islam. We belong to this world. As to those who have done us an injustice, the question should be addressed to them, not to us. We are now in our country and we will carry on with our policy. Whoever wishes to deal with us must proclaim his position frankly and clearly.

We have not severed our diplomatic relations with any country other than Iraq, and we are entitled to do so. All the Kuwaiti people are entitled to demand the severance
of relations with Iraq. As for the other countries, our embassies are still there and we have our diplomatic representation with them.

**Gulf Rapprochement**

[Khamis] The post-war conditions dictate a Gulf rapprochement at the institutional level and a strengthening of relations. Are there tangible steps in this direction?

[Salim] Gulf relations are what motivated the Gulf states to oppose Iraq in 1961 before there were any GCC treaties or anything else.

This position emanates from the belief of these states, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in our natural unity and natural solidarity.

When Saddam Husayn and his clique invaded Kuwait, the Gulf people supported, embraced, welcomed, backed, and financed us. They all supported us. This is higher and more sublime than anything else because it is the basis from which the GCC proceeds.

As for unifying passports, driving licenses, and some other simple and routine things, the unification is taking its normal course. We must not be more emotional than necessary and must not make our decisions hastily. The decisions must be studied adequately so that we will not face a negative reaction.

Practical developments confirmed the basis of our principles and made clear the nature of these principles when the Gulf soldier stood with the Kuwaiti soldier to defend a GCC member state. These are the bases that concern us. As for other things, we must not rush them because it is only a matter of time and because, moreover, they involve some sort of financial expense due to the difference of agencies from state to state.

In all our life, we in Kuwait have stood with the Gulf citizen, have given him opportunities, and have treated him as we treat Kuwaitis. We have never stood against the Gulf citizen.

[Khamis] What about the Islamic states foreign ministers’ conference which will convene in Istanbul on 3 August 1991?

[Salim] This is an annual conference that prepares for the summit in which Kuwait will participate in the person of his highness the country’s amir, who has been and continues to be the session chairman. We will play our role in this regard. Kuwaiti facts must be clarified to the brother conferences so that they can become familiar with the picture and aware of what is going on. We must confirm these facts to them and must contribute whatever is necessary to make the conference successful.

**Crippled Iraq**

[Khamis] Do you think that Iraq will dare launch another aggression against Kuwait?

[Salim] Iraq cannot move a finger. Iraq’s true intentions have been exposed.

Nuri al-Sa’id [Iraqi monarchy’s last prime minister] tried to annex Kuwait diplomatically. But Shaykh ’Abdallah al-Salim became aware of his intentions and foiled them.

’Abd-al-Karim Qasim declared these intentions openly.

He tried to arouse the army but failed. Then Saddam Husayn came and implemented the intentions.

The Kuwaiti people must not forget this historical progression. We will not restore our relations with Iraq as long as this clique and these intentions continue. This is my personal opinion.

I believe that the Kuwaiti people must not be shaken and must have no fear.

Inversely, they must continue to work in order to restore life to their country and to rebuild and develop what Iraq’s tyrant and his followers have destroyed. They must prove to the entire world that they are firm and strong people. The Kuwaiti people have taken an honorable stance of which I personally proud, on which I train my children, and about which I talk to them.

Nothing will hurt these men and women, and they will not encounter anything worse than they have already encountered.

The best word said here is the word of God, may He be praised and exalted: “And hold fast, all together, by the rope which God (stretches out for you) and be not divided among yourselves” [Koran 3:103]. Today, our strength lies in our unity, our solidarity, our compassion for each other, our serious work for the future Kuwait. We must not give others the opportunity to manipulate or divide the ranks. It is with this that we can ensure our security and stability. Without this, we open doors for all manipulators, saboteurs, and destructive people.

**Series Considers Relationship Between Democracy, Unity**

91AE0531A London SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI in Arabic 15, 17, 19, 21, 23 Jul 91

[Article by Khalil Haydar]

[15 Jul p 13]

[Text] An extensive debate has gone on for years in the Arab world regarding the relationship between Arab unity and democracy and the degree to which they are inseparable.

In his book *A Second Look at Arab Nationalism*, Dr. Fu’ad Mursi presents four views of the concept of the Arab nation:

- One view denies the existence of an original Arab nation and is content with the reality of numerous Arab nations in a number of Arab countries.
Another view maintains the existence of an Arab nation, which was actually formed during the time of the Islamic conquests, but was subsequently split up due to external aggressions, especially during the imperialist or colonialist period.

A third view emphasizes the Arabic language, but denies the existence of an Arab nation, and is content with the existence of an Arab culture that unites all Arabs.

A fourth view rejects the idea of an Arab nation and the idea of any nationality, arguing that there is only one nation, the Islamic nation.

The author presents the contempt shown by Western writers toward Arabs and their depiction of the Arabs as "tribes under national flags"!

In February 1984, the periodical AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-'ARABI [THE ARAB FUTURE] published a collection of articles on the relationship between democracy and unity. Contributors to the collection include Dr. 'Ismat Sayf-al-Dawlah, Dr. Muhammad al-Baqi al-Harmasi, and Prof. Sayyid Sa'id.

Dr. Sayf-al-Dawlah makes good use of his French education and specialization in the law. He begins his discussion by dealing with the roots of democracy from a historical standpoint. Among the 43,000 citizens in Athens, the number of persons who attended any meeting of citizens and who voted did not exceed 3,000. They would express their bond [with democracy] by declaring an oath at the start of every popular meeting. Every citizen would swear to "fight, with word, idea, hand, and action, if I am able, anyone who attempts to overthrow the system of democratic rule in Athens. If a coup succeeds, I swear to retaliate against any person who aligns himself with oppression or helps the oppressor. If another citizen precedes me in killing such a person, I swear to testify to his innocence before the gods on the basis that he killed an enemy of the people, and I swear to sell all of the possessions of the killed tyrant and give half of them to the killer. If a citizen perishes while fighting or attempting to kill those traitors, I swear that I will glorify him and his progeny. I also swear that I will nullify and cancel any oath of loyalty made in Athens to the armed forces or others for the sake of abetting despotism against the Athenian people."

After the start of the 17th century, the torch of democracy was passed to the European bourgeoisie, which continues to exist. It is rare for a reader to read about the origin of the bourgeoisie and obtain information having the degree of clarity as that presented by Dr. Sayf-al-Dawlah, who states:

"The bourgeoisie arose primarily among itinerant merchants who moved from place to place, carrying their goods on their shoulders, or loading them onto animals and walking beside them. They were thus called the "dusty footed" (commercial courts in England still bear this name). Their activity was to "chase" after profits anywhere, and they had no feelings of attachment to any place or society.

In the first half of the 13th century, they were able to "purchase" from Pope Innocent IV a formal legal opinion permitting usury if they lent to finance commercial or industrial activities. The bourgeoisie's activity expanded and its status rose, inasmuch as Europe's prosperity had come to depend largely on commercial activity. Together with the development of the economic role of this class, there was an increase in the "rights" which the bourgeoisie enjoyed from the feudal class.

These rights, which were unprecedented, were needed for commercial activity. The merchants acquired them for themselves and then for their class."

Among the most curious aspects of Dr. Sayf-al-Dawlah's analysis is his tracing of the word "bourgeois" to an Arabic origin. He states:

"The first requirement of commerce is freedom of movement. In exchange for a price, the merchants obtained documents that exempted them from having to settle on a feudal estate and protected them against any interference. Commerce required secure places in which to store goods. The distribution centers were in the corners of cities, at crossroads, or on rivers. In exchange for a price, the merchants obtained the right to establish, fortify, and defend commercial stations. These stations became known as "al-abraj [towers]," and the merchants took this designation as their name, becoming known as the "bourgeoisie." The Arabs used to apply the word "burj [tower]" to a building with fortified corners. We think that this is one of the many Arabic words that entered European languages through cultural contact. This class was also called the middle class, inasmuch as it was neither a producing class nor a party to the production relationship that prevailed between the feudal lords and the peasants.

Dr. Sayf-al-Dawlah presents the conflict between the middle class and the nobility. He notes that the outcome of this conflict in France did not differ from its outcome in England, despite different origins of the conflict in each place: In England, the bourgeoisie allied itself with the kings, until the nobility and clerics aligned with each other, attacked the kings, and seized power.

In France, the bourgeoisie allied itself with the people against the kings, nobility, and clerics, until the kings joined forces, attacked the people, and seized control. In both cases, the result was the dominion of "parliamentary democracy."

It would be truly interesting to ponder whether the European suitcase merchants had this important, historical role, and whether they were the source of democracy and the "people of the towers," and whether the suitcase merchants in Egypt who traffic goods in suitcases between countries do not have a similar role, despite the presence of towers in the country!"
The British philosopher of democracy, John Locke, established the liberal theory, which quickly spread to France through Montesquieu, a lawyer who inherited great wealth from his wife and the title of baron from his paternal uncle. Montesquieu devoted himself to writing. He traveled to England and resided there for a period during which he attended sessions of the British parliament. He then returned, bringing with him to Paris all of Britain’s political publications, chief among them the publications of John Locke. Montesquieu was not among the proponents of direct Athenian democracy.

“Because nature is miserly in apportioning talents, it endows only a few with the ability to make the complex calculations included in legislation. Consequently, just as a sick person turns to a physician, and the litigant turns to a lawyer, the majority of citizens turn to the most capable and competent among them to conduct the affairs of government.” John Tochar, in his book, “The History of Political Ideas,” states that Montesquieu was the French promoter of the English constitution and the theoretician of the separation of powers. He always emphasized that England is “a people which knows best how to benefit simultaneously from three great matters: religion, commerce, and freedom.”

[17 Jul p 13]

[Text]

If some Arab intellectuals, perhaps even most of them, express doubts about democracy’s relationship to unity and to the good conduct of affairs in a developing state, they are not expressing a new attitude in the world of political thought. The four formulas that comprise the cycle of progress, as far as the European bourgeoisie is concerned, are: trade as a function of wealth, wealth as a function of freedom, freedom promotes trade, and trade is the driving force behind a great state. However, this cycle has not been perfected easily, even in some European countries. Emanuel Josef [Spiese], a member of the state presidency council in the early Napoleonic period, states that “pure democracy, in the sense of government by the people, is barbaric democracy.” The majority of our citizens do not have the knowledge or the time to make decisions regarding public matters. Consequently, they deem it appropriate to be represented by people who are much more capable of making decisions than themselves."

Even Voltaire did not believe in equality: “Equality is the most natural thing and, at the same time, the most illusory.” He believed in the gradation of the classes, because “when the rabble takes up thinking, everything is lost.” (Tochar, Vol. 2, p. 42).

Rousseau advocated bringing the classes closer together and closing the gap between the rich and the poor in his book “The Social Contract”: “Do you want to strengthen the state? Then bring together extreme degrees to the extent possible. Do not be concerned with the wealthy or the destitute. Both are inseparable and both are equally damaging to the public welfare. The former produces the creators of tyranny, and the latter produces tyrants. They always trade general freedom between each other: One sells it and the other buys it.”

Prof. Sayyid Sa’id states that there are two broad currents regarding the definition of the relation between democracy and unity:

The first current believes that, if the choice were left to the Arab masses, they would give their loyalty to unity as a structural entity for solving their problems and setting the course of their progress. This current maintains that the “outbursts” which have occurred successively in Arab history are evidence that unity is the masses’ choice, especially when they sense that local governments and regimes are unable to oppose dangers threatening the entire Arab nation. The basic idea here is that “the masses are unionistic by nature.”

The second current denies the existence of a direct connection between unity and democracy, whether on the international or the Arab level. The German and Italian unifications were carried out by force, although other unifications in America and Switzerland were not. Europe’s impending unification is being effected peacefully and democratically. The general gist of this current’s view is that “democracy supports unity, but not necessarily directly.” Dr. Naim al-Baytar believes that “democracy can neither create countries nor achieve national unity.” He justifies this statement by citing the need for major changes and the requirements of economic development. He indicates that a unified Arab state would necessarily be based on “coercion and violence and have a centralized political authority.”

Prof. Sa’id indicates that there is a subcurrent within this group which “is based on the promotion of a political myth, the basis of which is that the Arab unity movement requires a leader who rises as a symbol of hopes for unification, who can unleash sentiments and convictions regarding unity among the masses, and who can lead them on the road to unification, skillfully and wisely, but with firmness and strictness, including the use of violence and autocratic methods.

Sayyid Sa’id observes that the myth of the leader who leads the way toward unity has developed into a group of myths that have spread throughout the world. These myths amount to nothing more than the myth of the virtuous hero that is spreading among popular movements. In our country, the myth of the virtuous hero is derived from the religious heritage (the idea of the imam) and from the heritage of the political culture (the idea of the just autocrat). It is also derived from our modern history (the nationalist, Nasirist legacy). However, a new aspect of this myth is its recent dissemination among nationalist intellectuals, especially in the climate of despair that followed the invasion of Lebanon and the emergence of the Arab regimes’ obvious inability to confront it.”

John Tochar believes that the expression “enlightened autocracy,” which is similar to “just autocracy” in the
Arab political lexicon, was invented by German historians in the 19th century. According to its definition "it is the creation of a rational state," and "the creation of everything for the people, and nothing by the people." Toclar adds that "Fritz Hartung, who devoted himself as a student to enlightened autocracy, arrived at the conclusion that "there is no basic difference between absolute authority and an enlightened autocracy."

**Sayyid Sa'id** emphasizes the role of the party and organization in achieving unity, because "there can be no mass initiative in an organizational vacuum." He calls for the creation of conditions "that will establish public initiative as a free right." He notes the need to distinguish between "the concept of a mass organization and the concept of the organization of the masses."

He believes that "a trend toward unification that is not liberationist or is opposed to Arab liberation is meaningless." Moreover, he regards unification as the outcome of such a trend as impossible. It is clear that what he means here is "liberation" from the Western world and from surrendering to imperialist aggression. He does not know if such expressions still have meaning after the major international ideological and political changes that have occurred, and after the elimination of the cold-war circumstances and other circumstances, and the emergence of new opportunities for international cooperation. The word "liberation" itself, due to its frequent use in the literature and the slogans of oppressive Arab regimes, has come to arouse the greatest doubts and fears among both ordinary and intellectual Arabs. The Arabs desire unification that will improve their living conditions. They do not want unification that will plunge them into a political-military conflict with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, transforming their lives in the Arab countries into a hell of fanaticism, suppression, and slogans.

Prof. Sa'id believes that "fundamental, collective economic independence should be one of the essential goals of unification." This is also another ambiguous demand that might provide an opening to political and economic oppression and suppression in the Arab world.

However, Prof. Sa'id's position in support of democracy is patently clear, especially regarding the relation of democracy to liberation and development: "The Arab mentality is a prisoner of the period in which it comprehended these relations as if they were negative. The current generation of Arab leaders attained power through military coups. Moreover, Arab governments have succeeded in spreading a coup culture that is hostile to democracy. Thus, the idea of democracy has become a code word among Arab writers for fragmentation and a call for isolationism." More serious than this is "that the influence, and moreover hegemony, of the coup consciousness, or, more generally speaking, the non-democratic ideology, has not been shaken substantially by the decline of the military regimes' political power. In other words, the majority of Arab citizens and intellectuals believe that changing the status quo is not subject to the people's collective will, which is exercised through established organizations and based on formal rules known in advance.
At the conclusion of his study on democracy and the problems of Arab unity, Prof. Sayyid Sa'id discusses an extremely important issue. Many accuse democracy of having a negative effect on economic development and development in general. Such an effect would be worse in underdeveloped countries, including the Arab countries. Unification is a construction process, and construction requires decisiveness. There is no doubt that the development process will be accompanied by innumerable forms of pressure, deprivations, and bad economic conditions. Perhaps some would argue the existence of a vicious circle: Political democracy weakens economic performance, which pulls the rug out from under democracy, plurality, and freedom of expression. The democracy that is desired for the Arab world must give full freedom to businessmen, workers, proponents of linkage with the Western world, proponents of isolation, proponents of industry, defenders of agriculture, tourism, and the banks, and both progressive and reactionary currents.

Such a situation seems frightening to the researcher and to many Arab intellectuals and readers. We see Prof. Sa'id attacking the "liberal concept," because, as he states, "it is based on an implicit similarity between the political market and the economic market. In other words, the basic assumption underlying the economic market also applies to the political market, namely, that one can arrive at the best choice and price given full, unrestrained competition between a multiplicity of political organizers." The researcher is not very sympathetic with the Marxist antithesis to liberalism. "It has been established by the available fund of historical experience that Marxist theory has been used to impose a permanent guardianship over the working class, paving the way for the decline of the political party and the emergence of bureaucratic interests within it. This has corrupted the relationship between the working class and the party. This relationship has thus evolved into one based on political and ideological oppression. Moreover, it has been proven that numerous theoretical problems cannot be solved within the scope of this theory."

Regarding the effect of democracy on economic performance, he believes that a shift to democracy might damage economic performance in the short term, especially in underdeveloped countries, because the initial period of the shift to democracy would be characterized by violent struggles and perhaps by a high degree of political instability, which usually damages economic performance temporarily. However, it can be said that the basic content of democracy, which is the creation of organizations for popular participation, represents, in the long term, a strong formula for economic development that is based on balanced foundations. True, several non-democratic regimes have succeeded in expediting their economic growth, such as South Korea, "however, such a result has not been achieved in our country, nor in the majority of countries that have been ruled for a long time by undemocratic regimes." This means that oppression might help temporarily in promoting development, "however, if political conditions continue to be held captive by an undemocratic regime, such a situation leads inevitably to economic decline." Here, we note that believing in democracy as a cultural need and the deepening of democracy in all fields of life is not an easy process. Therefore, all of the political, ideological movements take doubtful and hostile positions toward liberal democracy. Marxism views it merely as "bourgeois democracy," which protects the interests of the rich and reinforces their influence and control over the national economy and political organizations. The nationalist current is enthusiastic about liberal democracy only to the extent that it serves its unification tendencies, or opens the field to outflanking a leader, or preserves the domination of the ruling national majority. The fundamentalist, Islamic movements are no less hostile toward it. As far as they are concerned, it is a "Western, pagan innovation" which aims to sow the seeds of factionalism and division among the ranks of Muslims and open the field to political fragmentation and moral dissolution.

Unlike the nationalists, and less so than the Marxists, the fundamentalists are not inclined much toward seeking a relationship between democracy (or even consultation [shura]) and the idea of Islamic and Arab unity. There will no doubt also be conflicting judgments in this regard. Some fundamentalists might view Islamic unity as a goal to be achieved through the masses' zeal and belief in an Islamic solution and their rallying around the imam or the caliphate. Others might view it as a gradual, historical process that must cook on a low burner and be provided with the foundations that are essential for its success, including obtaining the opinion of the people, so that the [mistakes of the] nationalists' unification experiments are not repeated on the Islamic level. Still others might view Islamic unification as the will of destiny, which is to be carried out by a modern-day Salah-al-Din based on a founding Islamic state that would quickly expand to include other countries.

A fourth group would be content, temporarily at least, with the idea of an Islamic confederation, which would be merely a cultural, religious, apolitical association, because the political and economic unification of Muslims is not possible at present.

Dr. Muhammad al-Harmasi sees a direct relationship between nationalism and democracy. He believes that the goals of democracy [and] nationalism "intersect without necessarily meeting." This is because nationalism is essentially a movement that seeks independence from other nationalities and entities. According to him, nationalism is actually "stirred up more if we are ruled
by foreigners than if we are ruled without being consulted [by an indigenous ruler]." Therefore, a country might become liberated from the rule of foreigners, but it is not free! That is to say that the elimination of colonialism means installing a national authority, not a democratic one. Independence has always aimed merely to bestow legitimacy on the local elite.

Al-Harmasi emphasizes that any serious analysis of the Arab nation's political evolution cannot ignore the historical experience of Islam and its effects on collective thought and on the forms taken by successive regimes in Muslim countries since the advent of Islam. Dr. al-Harmasi notes that, since the 19th century, both the Salafi [an adherent of an Islamic revival movement founded by Muhammad 'Abduh] and the liberal have opposed the existing state: The former calls for an Islamic government, and the latter calls for a separation between religion and the state.

The call for the revival of the caliphate does not mean, in the mind of a Salafi, that the government under whose authority he lives is non-Islamic. He does not deny that government's affiliation to Islam. However, he opposes it and rejects it, because he finds nothing desireable in it. Likewise, a liberal Arab would not feel that he is living within the framework of a religious state, his call for "secularism" notwithstanding. On the contrary, he believes in the depth of his heart that he is living in a secular state, even if it bears the stamp of Islam. How can this dissimilarity be explained?

In Dr. al-Jabiri's opinion, the answer is: If we go back to the second half of the 19th century to examine the identity of the socially and religiously liberal Arab, we find him to be for the most to an enlightened member of a religious minority, especially the Christians. The Arab liberal sought from a secular state recognition of and respect for the political and civil rights of the minority. Such rights could be practiced only under a democracy. However, the Arab liberal at that time preferred to employ the slogan of secularism instead of democracy, not only because he wanted to distinguish or separate the Arabs from the Turks and build a nationalist state instead of an Islamic caliphate, but also—and perhaps this is the hidden reason—because democracy meant the rule of the majority and consequently the marginalization of the minority. The Salafis also avoided the slogan of democracy and insisted on the slogan of consultation for the same reason. The Salafis believed that the application of democracy, according to its meaning in its original European context, meant ceding government to the elite of the time, an elite to which he did not belong and which had begun to use its power to impede him in every field."

Al-Harmasi thinks that we in the Arab world have battled liberalism and failed at it, as indicated by the situation that prevailed in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq between the two wars. When the Arab regimes turned their backs on liberal democracy, they began to promote social democracy or what they considered its equivalent.

Prof. Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal describes the mentality of that era: "For example, it was said: 'Which of the two is closer to the essence of democracy—a peasant's ownership of a plot of land, or his possession of only a productivity card, which is actually used by the feudal lord who owns the land?'"

"It is also said: 'Which of the two is closer to the essence of democracy: A worker finding a place for his son at the university, or his standing in line in front of the ballot box?' It is unimaginable that there would be a majority against the achievement of independence, agricultural reform, the declaration of the republic, the construction of the High Dam, the construction of a solid industrial base, or the restoration of the social balance."

All of these decisive decisions were made by the Egyptian authorities and elite without passing through the channels of consultation and the opposition, and without an opportunity being given to the other side to express an opinion.

Why have the Arabs thought that social democracy represents an alternative to political democracy? Why have they thought that the only road to social justice and improved living conditions passes over the body of political freedoms? That is another study.

Dr. al-Harmasi believes that the national, patriotic program has exhausted its capacity for change, is currently blocked, and has nothing to offer. This requires us to seek a new formula. However, dialogue is neither represented by, nor can it be permitted to be represented by, a choice between nationalism and political freedom. Rather, "in an attempt to create political life in an international environment that is inundated with nationalistic tendencies," we must be well aware that "democracy is not a ready-made model which we have only to import. For everyone knows that freedom is not a commodity or a condition, but an ongoing, sophisticated process that is subject to willpower."

Arab democracy will not face pressures solely from above, because "there are entire generations of people in government, oppositionists, and intellectuals who were brought up to believe that the Arab nation is indivisible. They have dreamed of a model government in the hands of a just autocrat or a vanguard party, which is the functional equivalent of a just autocrat."

One intellectual states: "In my student days, I used to repeat, with a generation, the statement of Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani to the effect that the East needs a just autocrat. My view of matters has since changed. I am certain that an autocrat cannot be just, and that the people's matters cannot be borne by an autocrat. Only the people can bear them. I am certain that a state that has been rendered barren, so that it can produce only a single man capable of managing its affairs can find a place for itself only among the lowliest of nations."

In the conclusion of his article, al-Harmasi expresses hope that this type of awareness of the dangers of autocratic rule will spread among the intelligentsia.
We have reviewed many views regarding the relationship between unity and democracy. Let us ask ourselves: Is unification actually the road to democracy in the Arab world? Would not unification multiply instead of weakening the abilities of repressive Arab regimes?

A diversity of decisionmaking centers and a multiplicity of entities might strengthen democracy, protect the people from tyranny, and facilitate the flourishing of the economy and the disappearance of the bureaucracy. Rigorous unification, on the other hand, would facilitate the emergence of autocratic governments. Proponents of full, comprehensive consolidated unity no doubt have their arguments, which they would deem sounder and more powerful.

Thus, we believe that the relation between unity and democracy in the Arab world is still in great need of more discussion and dialogue.

**AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Retrospective on Invasion**
**91AE0546C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 1 Aug 91 p 14**

[Article by Huda al-Husayni]

[Text] During the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait a year ago, we were terrified by the chemical weapon. A year later we became obsessed with the nuclear weapon.

A year ago we were still innocent, but a year after the invasion, we grew up, we are no longer innocent, and we have become skeptics.

At dawn on 2 August 1990, we became divided and still are. Those who stood on the side of invasion lost, but do not admit it. The “hero” of the invasion believes that as long as he is alive and at the head of the government, then he has won.

He who was not required to side with anybody and not even to stand on the side of justice, but insisted on standing with the Iraqi leader “in one trench...until victory” did not admit defeat. Rather, he is calling for peace while nobody is paying attention to him. “Am I a ghost or a shadow?” [‘Arafat once wondered] As for the one on the eastern bank [of the Jordan River], he preferred to remain silent and to prepare for the peace process.

But the two biggest losers are two peoples: the Iraqi people and the Palestinian people. The tragedy of these two peoples stems from the miscalculation of their leadership and the leadership clinging to power even at the people’s expense.

While the international community calls for the Iraqi president to step down in return for lifting the economic sanctions, we hear him saying that the West wants to starve the Iraqi people by maintaining the economic sanctions. He is blaming the West, forgetting his responsibility, and is refusing to leave office in return for saving the Iraqi people.

During this year, disturbances broke out in many Arab countries; division has become rife; and several extremist organizations rebelled in several Arab countries, wanting to take over power. During this year, a certain politician met with Dr. Husayn al-Turabi, the Muslim Brotherhood leader in Sudan, who revealed to him the reason why he and his movement supported the Iraqi president and the occupation of Kuwait. Al-Turabi said that these [Islamic] groups did not believe that the Iraqi president has suddenly become a believer. Rather they stood with him because they believed, just as he believed, that the Arab peoples can be deceived with religious slogans and with resounding political slogans. They believed that these people will rise up and overthrow their regimes. Consequently, these groups will be ready to set up regimes that will rule these peoples. Al-Turabi added that they knew that the Iraqi leader was going to suffer a total defeat. They also expected his regime to fall as soon as the war ended, which would pave the way for these groups to set up a regime in Iraq loyal to them. And because al-Turabi’s estimates have failed in every respect, he joined the losers, although he continues to pretend not to care about the defeat by visiting the Iraqi president and reminiscing with him over details of the “victories” which their “trench” has achieved.

This year we heard a lot about the new world order, about peace, and about the window of opportunity.

Peace so far is enjoyed by Israel, because it wants peace to be tailored to its size; it accepts peace when it wishes and rejects it when it wishes.

Three months after the Iraqi Army’s defeat and tragedy, the Iraqi president toured the north. In front of a gathering of frightened Iraqis he stood on a balcony, pulled out a gun, and started firing defiantly. The Iraqi president was celebrating the fact that his method of rule still exists, forgetting that it does not compensate for his army, which was the fourth largest in the world, and that because of his gun and his method of resolving all disputes with force, he has destroyed himself, the Iraqi Army, and Iraq’s weapons, and consequently destroyed the most powerful strategic force that faced Israel. By invading Kuwait, Saddam Husayn has upset the balance of power in the area and destroyed all the possibilities of an honorable and just peace. Now that the world is “begging” Israel to accept exchanging land for peace, the Israeli prime minister must be wondering why should he accept this adventure. He is satisfied with this peace that is based on an imbalance of power in the area in Israel’s favor for the first time since it was established. Why should Israel withdraw from Lebanon? Why should it pull out its people, its weapons, its observation posts, and give up the Golan Heights? Why should it accept talks about the fate of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem? As far as it is concerned, the issue has
been resolved. The invasion of Kuwait, setting its oil wells on fire, killing its people, and defeating the Iraqi Army—which was expected to happen—have reversed all the principles of Arab pride. If they want to receive a little, the Arabs must give a lot in return.

A year ago, before that black day, we used to hear about the possibility of forming a Palestinian delegation to a peace conference including Palestinians from East Jerusalem and from the diaspora. One year after the invasion, the status of Jerusalem has come under question. Faysal al-Husayni, who had great hopes, is looking for somebody to listen to him and to allow him to participate as a representative of Arab Jerusalem or, at least, to be part of a Jordanian delegation, for he carried a Jordanian passport. But so far nobody is listening.

With the invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the Palestinians have yet again lost Palestine and Jerusalem. After one year, while the Palestinians are deeply afraid and concerned about their fate and their children, Judith Miller says that she looked for some feeling of concern, even if superficial, in 'Arafat but could not find it. He was sitting facing her with his left hand bandaged because of some skin disease. He was signing “bills” and grumbling. He would then say, with an air of surrealism: “We are at the top as far as support for us by the Arab masses, the Islamic nation, and the Third World.” A year later and after the Palestinian people lost even a safe refuge, 'Arafat claims that he is trying to mend the bridges between the Arabs but that “the United States is the one that wanted the war with Iraq, because it wants to deal with Arab leaders of its own creation.” Contradicting himself, he said that he stood with Iraq in the occupation of Kuwait in response to his people’s desire. “What can I do? It would be impossible for me to be a democratic leader if I do not follow my people,” he said. He added: “The Gulf countries are aware of this and they will again rally around me. There is no Arab who can abandon the Palestinian problem. They have found some excuses for King Husayn because he has some Palestinians, but I have all the Palestinians with me.” ‘Arafat’s megalomania is such that he believes that he himself is the Palestinian problem and without him, the problem does not exist."

This is the state of affairs bordering on delusion that 'Arafat is propagating and has been living since the invasion and the “destruction of Basrah” [Arab proverb meaning the loss of everything] and the destruction of the Palestinians. He lives in a world of his own imagination. This is strengthened by the fact that only he can sign financial documents. He also knows how to delay the convening of the Palestine National Council [PNC] if there is any slight hope of another leader being elected. He will not resign or stand down unless his critics are 50 percent plus one. The PLO under his leadership is the “oasis of democracy”.

Meanwhile, we do not know if 'Arafat is aware that the Palestinian people, that has once again been dispersed, call him “Abu Kharab” [father of destruction]. Just as defeat has made Saddam Husayn increasingly despotic and arrogant, it has made 'Arafat lose his mind; he became more obstinate and arrogant; he clings to autocratic decision-making and refuses anybody sharing power with him. One day he will wake up to find that all those around him have left in order to look for a new light away from his darkness. Kuwait has been liberated despite 'Arafat’s stand in the same trench with the occupier and his threat on the eve of the ground battle that, together with two of his brigades, he is ready to impede the advance of the allies to liberate Kuwait for two months. It remains to be said that Palestine can be liberated, provided that 'Arafat does not decide to mobilize two brigades to liberate it according to his military plans. Palestine is in need of a realistic leader who lives his people’s tragedy.

Next to the Palestinian tragedy that has worsened for a year since the invasion of Kuwait, comes the tragedy of the Iraqis. Not only have they suffered destruction and death, but they have also to endured the fact that the head of the state is the very man who has caused all this. Therefore, many people believe that, despite the fact that a cease fire was announced 100 hours after the ground battle began, the war will not end as long as the defeated president is still in power, although his control over everything in the country has diminished.

President Bush’s administration was prepared to coexist with the Iraqi leader after the war, and up to now it is hesitant and torn between its desire to keep him or to end the war in a decisive manner.

Before invading Kuwait and planning to go into Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi president was securing a balance of power in the area in a manner desirable to Washington. His steely and bloody grip has united Iraq and prevented it from disintegrating. He also prevented the Iranian revolution from spreading outside it borders. He then became a president who constituted a danger after invading Kuwait and looking toward Saudi Arabia. But after destroying Kuwait and destroying himself as a ruling head, Washington once again looked to him as a necessity that should be maintained in order to keep the balance of power in the area and to prevent the disintegration of Iraq. For this reason, the U.S. President did not support the Kurds’ revolution in the north or the Shi’ite revolution in the south. He also did not support any democratic movement in Iraq. Washington believed that the Iraqi president and his army have suffered a defeat that has done away with any possibility of him constituting a danger to the neighboring countries, particularly when Washington believed that its intelligence reports were “correct” and that all the Iraqi nuclear and chemical weapons had been destroyed. Washington was confident that the economic boycott and the blockade would lead to the downfall of the Iraqi president at the hands of Iraqi generals. Iraq would then be ruled with a military steel grip, though not Saddam Husayn’s.

Waiting for this to happen, President Bush felt that dealing with a weak and defeated Saddam Husayn would
be better than dealing with somebody else in the field, on the grounds that the evil you know is better than the evil you don't know. But it transpired that the "existing evil" is still trying to implement its nuclear program and to prepare for producing a nuclear bomb. A reappraisal of calculations was set in motion, particularly when many realized that the Iraqi president was preparing to settle his accounts with the neighboring Arab countries. Even the Soviets were astonished by Washington's stance of not supporting internal Iraqi revolutions. Even though the nuclear weapons and installations Iraq owned were bombed, it does not mean that the Iraqi president's intentions and readiness to sacrifice his people for the sake of staying in power has been destroyed. Washington should have realized that, when Saddam Husayn accepted the cease-fire terms, the Iraqi president was ready to cast off every shred of human pride for the sake of preserving his life and remaining in power.

The war did not end after one year since the invasion of Kuwait. Danger is still threatening the Gulf region and the Middle East. The Iraqi president has rearranged all his intelligence organs, entrusting the task of protecting himself to an organ headed by his son Qasim. He has become more violent and revengeful toward the Iraqi people, because so far he is unable to take revenge from the world. But he does not lack the intention nor the psychological readiness to take revenge from the other countries. Just as he had deceived everybody before the Kuwait invasion and made the Arab countries hold an Arab summit in Baghdad in May 1990 and acclaim him as a great leader, he will continue to indulge in deception as long as he is in power. The next time it will be even more vicious than the invasion which we describe as being the worst that happened in recent decades. If the West, and in particular Washington, wants to preserve its vital interests in the area, it should find out what the Iraqi people want. Quite simply, the Iraqi people want first to live and, second, to enjoy open channels leading to the main harbors and to areas of preserving its vital interests in the area. It should find out what the Iraqi people want. Quite simply, the Iraqi people want first to live and, second, to enjoy open channels leading to the main harbors and to areas

In summary, the naval operations based on the U.S. and European naval presence in the area has helped in creating active presence that boosted Western credibility in the area. Also, the unprecedented naval presence in the Gulf and the Red Sea supplemented other military operations, which led to strengthening and consolidating the political alliance.

The amphibious forces also created flexible possibilities for deployment during the early stages of the crisis. They also provided the necessary security in certain vital areas during the military build-up.

Although the Navy's role in transporting forces and equipment to the operations theater cannot be denied, Iraq's lack of a navy has facilitated the task of [allied] naval reinforcement traffic. By December 1990, all the ships in the area were ready and squads of mine removal experts were able to get rid of the floating mines and open channels leading to the main harbors and to areas of amphibious landing.

The alliance was anxious to demonstrate what it has on its mind by flexing its naval power that was already in the area, and by sometimes pushing these forces forward. The conventional concentration of U.S. naval forces in the area has helped in their rapid deployment.

As to how the alliance faced the likelihood of carrying out military operations against a numerically superior force, this was done through several axes, such as seeking to expand the scope of international support for the military, political, and economic moves against Iraq, as well as through U.S. naval operations which the United States carried out either unilaterally or as part of a multi-national alliance. In fact, the naval forces that included ships and planes from 20 countries implemented in a coordinated fashion Security Council Resolutions 661, 665, and 670. On 17 August 1990, warning shots were heard in the Gulf waters. The U.S. Navy also moved to prevent Iraqi ships from sailing on the high seas, and so its total naval domination enabled imposing economic sanctions against Iraq. The navy also succeeded in involving the whole world in a concerted military operations against it. It was natural for the sea blockade and the ban on routes leading to and from Iraq to exhaust the Iraqi civilian and military decision-making. Since the beginning of the operations and up to 24 June 1991 allied ships attacked [intercepted] more than 10,600 ships and turned back about 100 ships.

The alliance had some limited military options, which were deployment of naval forces in the Middle East, or launching long-range air attacks from aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. But the balance of power at that time was in Saddam Husayn's favor, since the execution of any of these available options would, if carried out, have created undesirable reactions before sufficient allied political and military preparations have been made in order to ensure political and military victory.

The Desert Storm air campaign basically aimed at paralyzing Iraq's ability to hold on to its occupation of Kuwait. The air campaign strategy was to cripple the Iraqi commanders' ability to defend or to attack, and to destroy Iraq's ability to threaten security and stability in the area, to render the Iraqi forces in Kuwait ineffective as a fighting force, and to lessen Iraqi civilian losses and the allied forces' losses.

In order to achieve all these objectives quickly, the allied forces directed many air strikes against 12 targets in Kuwait and Iraq. These were:

- The command facilities center.
- Electric power production serving the military systems.

AL-MAJALLAH Views Invasion 1 Year Later
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[Unattributed article: "Kuwait: One Year After the Invasion"]

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The amphibious forces also created flexible possibilities for deployment during the early stages of the crisis. They also provided the necessary security in certain vital areas during the military build-up.

Although the Navy's role in transporting forces and equipment to the operations theater cannot be denied, Iraq's lack of a navy has facilitated the task of [allied] naval reinforcement traffic. By December 1990, all the ships in the area were ready and squads of mine removal experts were able to get rid of the floating mines and open channels leading to the main harbors and to areas of amphibious landing.

In summary, the naval operations based on the U.S. and European naval presence in the area has helped in creating active presence that boosted Western credibility in the area. Also, the unprecedented naval presence in the Gulf and the Red Sea supplemented other military operations, which led to strengthening and consolidating the political alliance.

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In order to achieve all these objectives quickly, the allied forces directed many air strikes against 12 targets in Kuwait and Iraq. These were:

- The command facilities center.
- Electric power production serving the military systems.
- Control and communications posts.
- The integrated strategic and tactical air defense system.
- The Air Force and the air space.
- Centers of production and research of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
- Centers of production and stockpiling of Scud missiles.
- The Air Force centers and the port. [not further identified]
- Petroleum refining and distribution centers.
- Railroads and bridges linking the Iraqi forces to supply centers.
- Iraqi military units, including the Republican Guard, in the operations theater in Kuwait.
- Military depots.

The first air strikes attacked the base of the target as a whole in order to affect the rest of the aforementioned targets. This would bring pressure and destruction to bear on the fundamental Iraqi centers of gravitation. The primary and basic task was to achieve total air superiority by destroying the Iraqi integrated air defense system and leaving the Iraqi Air Force ineffective, and to prevent Iraq from using chemical and biological weapons. The air superiority has facilitated carrying out continuous air attacks. The alliance was able to put sustained pressure on the centers of command and control by using the stealth planes and missiles. Air strikes against the targets continued until the desired objective was achieved. Before the 43rd day [of the war] the Iraqi formations were divided between Iraq and Kuwait.

**Stage One: The Strategic Air Campaign**

The allied strategic air campaign utilized the alliance’s air force to attack the enemy’s centers of gravitation inside Iraq, after a careful selection of targets, which included centers of control and command that are of vital importance for Saddam.

During the first 24 hours, more than 1300 planes and 106 Tomahawk missiles were launched. After the Iraq regime’s vital functions and centers were knocked out, the air attacks continued in order to prevent any counterstrikes and to destroy other targets that were not known before. Altogether, more than 1800 offensive sorties were sent against strategic targets.

The first stage of the Desert Storm attacks began before sun rise on 17 January 1991. The clock showed 0300 local time. Earlier, Apache helicopters attacked Iraqi early warning systems with Hellfire missiles, and a few minutes before the offensive U.S. Air Force F-117A stealth fighters destroyed a powerful command center for air defense in southern Iraq. Thus the alliance achieved an operational, strategic, and tactical surprise. These strikes continued until a cease-fire order was issued after 43 days. When the time for the attack came, other pilots attacked selected targets in Baghdad after penetrating the Iraqi air defense system. Some 2000 pounds of explosives were on their way to attack a specified target area of communications and command centers as well as interior security and intelligence centers. These strikes were the beginning of an operation to destroy and put out of action targets of maximum importance nationwide for the Iraqi military and political command. Throughout the war F-117A stealth planes operating at night were the only planes attacking targets in the center of Baghdad. A few minutes after the attack, the U.S. Navy in the Red Sea and the Gulf attacked military targets (military bases, communications centers, and electric power distribution centers in Baghdad) in order to ensure maintaining pressure on the decision-makers.

Attacks continued all long the operations theater, and U.S. Air Force F-15s continued attacking Scud missiles and their launching pads in western Iraq. The U.S. naval and air forces as well as the allied forces contained the Iraqi strategic targets, especially the Iraqi integrated air defense and the command and control infrastructure, including electric power distribution systems which supported Iraqi military operations. The Iraqi air defense system was taken by surprise by these attacks and was unable to coordinate its defenses.

This strategic air campaign had a strong impact on the Iraqi infrastructure. Iraq’s domestic ability to produce and refine petroleum was destroyed, resulting in Iraq losing the ability to supply its tanks and planes and other military equipment (unlike the Iraqi crude oil production, which was not targeted). Saddam Hussein’s communication capability was also destroyed, and so he was unable to use satellites for propaganda purposes. He was able to use communication facilities only to influence his own people.

A large number of aircraft took part in this campaign. Naval planes attacked the air defense radar; they also attacked communication centers and military bases. As for the U.S. planes and the allied planes, such as the Saudi and British fighter-bomber Tornados, they attacked and destroyed supply centers. Air Force F-15s, Navy F-14s, and Marines F-18As quickly achieved air superiority. F-16 bombers were unleashed against all targets and so were B-52 bombers. The air forces undertook the task of hunting Scuds. As for the AV-8B planes, they launched attacks on enemy ammunition dumps north of al-Khafji.

The role the aircraft played in the success of this campaign was fundamental. It succeeded without the help of allied tanks. Quite a few allied military planes could not strike a number of targets inside Iraq [because they were already bombed]. The allied air operations could not have succeeded without supplies. The operations were able to achieve total air supremacy in terms of timing, distance, and targeted areas.
Also, mechanized counter measures were necessary to “subdue the defense” with the help of aircraft. The air force, the Marines, and the naval fleet took part in harassing certain positions, destroying the enemy radar, and attacking it with rapid anti-radiation [as published] missiles. Additionally, long-range missiles were used to attack Iraqi defense positions. The support planes benefited from these early attacks and from smashing the Iraqi defense system. Overpowering the enemy air defenses played a significant role in keeping aircraft losses minimal. The Air Force A-3 early warning aircraft operated non-stop in order to warn against Iraqi attacks with whatever was left of the enemy air force, and to provide air control. The combined radar system for attack targeting continued to operate all night in order to watch movements in the battlefield, including Scud activities.

The precise utilization of technological superiority during this strategic air campaign has led to lessening destruction and losses. It was proven that Saddam Husayn and his military machine are the enemy, and not the Iraqi people. Unfortunately, however, some civilian losses were sustained.

The most severe loss, however, was the destruction of a shelter in Baghdad used as military command communication center. There were numerous civilians in the shelter when it was destroyed, which resulted in the fall of many dead and wounded. One of the allied air force’s targets was to destroy Iraq’s offensive capability, including its ability to produce, assemble, stockpile, and fire Scuds.

The first anti-Scud missiles were fired against positions in western Iraq in an attempt to prevent firing Scud missiles on Israel. Chemical weapons positions were also attacked on the first and third days of the air operations. Attacks were also launched against areas of production and storage of long range missiles.

But when Iraq started firing its Scuds from mobile platforms, the allied forces went into action to look for those missiles and to destroy them. For this reason the task of attacking these targets, which would emerge from hidden positions, fire, and hide again, was entrusted to the equivalent of three divisions. F-16s operated in the west, A-10s in the east during daytime, and F-15s, F-16s, and A-6s for night surveillance. Also F-4s and F-14s went out to reconnoiter the areas from which Scuds were suspected to be launched. When such an area was spotted by the intelligence or by the air force, airplanes would go out to the targeted area in order to look for and destroy the launching pads. Eventually the number of launchings decreased, but the firing of Scuds did not stop. During the first 10 days, Scud launches averaged five per day, but by the end of the war they averaged one per day. A Scud missile hit an Army barracks in Dhahran, causing the heaviest casualties among the U.S. forces.

Most of the Scuds which Iraq managed to fire were either inaccurately aimed or were destroyed by the U.S. air defense missiles. On spotting the firing of Scuds, observers would send warnings and information to Patriot batteries. The Patriot air defense system shot down a large number of these missiles. Sometimes shrapnel of missile warheads that were not destroyed fell on civilians. Yet the Patriot system proved its ability to intercept Iraqi Scuds fired at innocent citizens, thus raising the morale among civilians and maintaining the cohesiveness of the alliance.

During the first three weeks of the air campaign, A-6 and F-18 airplanes and warships, sunk Iraqi ships armed with Silkworm anti-ship missiles. On 2 February, the Iraqi fleet was generally worthless. With the continued success of the strategic air campaign, the center of operations moved to the Kuwaiti front.

Stage Two: Air Superiority in Kuwait’s Operations Theater

The second stage was a short one, characterized by intensive and concentrated air attacks on the air defense system in Kuwait in order to achieve air superiority.

In fact, this stage coincided with the first one; it achieved air superiority in Kuwait and Iraq. This stage was a joint operation that included aircraft from several allied countries, naval units, and air force [as published]. The effect of the anti-alliance air effort was evidently weak from all aspects.

The Eighth and 18th Corps and a number of allied forces—more than 65,000 [figure as published] armored vehicles—moved toward attacking positions inside Iraq. These movements went on for 24 hours a day for more than three weeks before the ground battle began. These movements are considered the strongest movement of forces of annihilation in the history of wars. Whole formations fully equipped moved hundreds of miles on primitive and rough roads undetected by the Iraqis.

This, of course, has led to difficulty in movement and to complicating the management of these movements. In order to avoid traffic jams, detailed movement timetables were prepared; one vehicle passed every 15 seconds.

Therefore, large quantities of supplies were shipped westward by the 22nd support command. The supplies included materials for supporting the annihilation operation sufficient for 60 days. Some of these supplies had to be moved several times, first to the west and then to the north when the operations began. The conclusion drawn from planning these movements was that the United States lacked sufficient heavy transportation equipment and transport vehicles with equipment that enables them to move on these deserts and unpaved roads. These equipment and the necessary transport vehicles were obtained from other countries in the alliance.
At the same time, some deception measures were carried out by the special operations forces, the Marines, and the fleet and army units in order to deceive the Iraqi forces so they will not be able to know the alliance’s real intentions. These steps included artillery barrages, amphibious deceptive actions, ship movements, and some air operations. All this aimed at distracting Iraq’s attention so that it will not deploy its forces in the right place.

The alliance’s air superiority was one of the major factors in misleading Iraq about the alliance’s intentions and preventing it from being able to hit back should it somehow have correct information.

The efforts to prepare the battleground included some innovative approaches. The Iraqi artillery, which is considered modern by all standards, was no match for the allied artillery in terms of range. Undeniably, it played its role skillfully in the Iraq-Iran war. While the allied artillery was able to pin down the Iraqi ground forces in their positions, which in fact it did, the Iraqi artillery, left uncertain that it has been deceived, could grasp the meaning of the allied ground attacks. Iraq’s own artillery gave it a degree of flexibility which, if properly utilized, could have delayed implementation of the penetration operation long enough to enable the use of Iraqi counterattack units against the allies. Moreover, the likelihood of the Iraqi commanders using chemical weapons called for attention and caution. Consequently, the army and the Marines launched artillery attacks in order to destroy Iraqi artillery positions. The navy sent attack aircraft in order to strike at the Iraqi artillery which responded to such raids.

Yet another approach in the war was the intensive use of aircraft in order to pin point Iraqi observation and command posts. A number of reconnaissance and attack aircraft were sent out to destroy a number of those positions. This tactic also proved efficient in determining and destroying air defense positions.

Preparation and deception operations continued all day long. On G-1 day, the final preparations were completed. These were raids across the borders and artillery barrages. In the meantime, the units continued their move toward the areas of final points of assembly. On G-1 day, the Marine First and Second Divisions destroyed 18 tanks and captured 143 POWs and continued to stage reconnaissance operations. Eighth Corps continued reconnaissance operations and launching artillery and air attacks. This Corps was also charged with heading north-east in order to destroy the Republican Guard units in the Kuwait operations theater.

At four o’clock [not further specified] local time on 24 February the ground attack to liberate Kuwait began. Four support attacks were launched in order to paralyze or pin down the Republican Guard forces in the main attack. The MEF [expansion not given] began the attack at four o’clock together with the First Marines Division. They quickly penetrated the first and second “obstacle belt,” and continued the attack in the direction of al-Jabir airport. The military units succeeded in repelling several armored counterattacks throughout the day. At 0530 the Second Army Division executed penetration movements and continued the attack along the left flank of the First Marine Division. The operations were carried out with great efficiency, thanks to the detailed preparations which included reconnaissance, determining obstacles locations, and following all this up with intensive drills. At the end of the day, the MEF took more than 8,000 POWs. In the east, the JFC-E [expansion not given] succeeded in penetrating six lanes of the first “obstacle belt” and began moving forward at 0800 after securing its principal targets. It continued moving northward, taking a large number of Iraqi POWs. In the Gulf, the battleship Wisconsin bombarded some targets in Kuwait in support the ground forces. In the west, the First Cavalry Division continued to carry out deception operations in Wadi al-Batin between Kuwait and Iraq, the location from which the Iraqis were expecting the major attack to be launched.

The 18th Corps, together with the First Airborne Division, launched air attacks in order to secure targets on the road to the Euphrates. After less than seven hours, the Sixth French Armored Division, together with the 82d Airborne Division, continued to secure their targets. They continued the attack northward and the 24th Infantry Division, which was on the left flank of the 18th Corps, crossed the boundary line, stepping up the pressure of attack. On the first day the 18th Corps captured about 2,500 POWs.

Corps VII, which before the war was trained on carrying out operations in a totally different environment, crossed the boundary line 15 hours ahead of time, thanks to successful support attacks. Some 16 lanes of the obstacle belt packed with mines and barbed wires were crossed in the face of limited resistance. The First Infantry Division and the First and Third armored divisions crossed the boundary line, carrying the attack northward. The area of the attack was west of Wadi al-Batin, inside Iraq.

The Egyptian Third Mechanical Division also launched an attack against trenches. “Khalid Force” followed up the attack. The Egyptians set up “ready positions and barricades.”

On the second day of the ground battle the allied forces continued to press with the attack, securing their targets in the face of weak resistance and with slight casualties. But at this point the advance became slow because of the large number of surrendering Iraqis. The First Marine Division continued to reinforce al-Jabir air space, and penetrated 10 miles into Kuwait City. The two Marine divisions repelled an enemy armored counterattack, destroying or capturing 175 to 200 tanks in the battle field which was covered with smoke and fire of the burning oil wells. Then the amphibious landing began.
In the middle front, the attack, coordinated with Eighth Corps, continued. The Egyptian forces secured 16 square km on the bridgehead. The Egyptian Third Division continued the attack northward, capturing 1,500 POWs and two tanks and other units. Other units, including the Syrian Ninth Armored Division, prepared to follow the Egyptian Third Division.

In the Seventh Corps battle area, the British First Armored Division attacked positions along the battle line and, with the help of the First Infantry Division, destroyed the Iraqi 12th Armored Division. The First and Third continued with the attack northward. Units of Seventh Corps concentrated their efforts on destroying the Republican Guard forces, and 18th Corps continued with the support attack in order to isolate the Iraqi forces and disrupt their lines of communication.

The First Division continued to carry out deception operations in the three borders area. Additionally, some deception operations were successfully carried out by the naval and amphibious forces along the coast, involving about 10 companies. The special amphibious force carried out strikes against the islands of Faylakah and Bubiyan, coupled with naval aircraft attacks against the Kuwaiti coast, thus disrupting and paralyzing the Iraqi forces.

During this time, the mass retreat of the Iraqi forces in the eastern part of the operations theater began. The Iraqi units were totally dispersed. These forces joined some of the occupation forces in the city of Kuwait. In the early hours of 26 February, the retreat of military and civilian vehicles carrying Iraqi troops and good looted from Kuwait blocked the four main roads north of the city. In order to prevent Iraq from building a cohesive defense line, repeated air attacks were launched on these forces.

The allied forces continued to rapidly implement their operations and on 26 February, they were ahead of schedule. They successfully changed their lines twice, and by the end of the day the units consisting of Saudi forces and units from the GCC countries led the way to Kuwait City in the face of moderate resistance. The First Marine Division captured Kuwait International Airport. The operation continued until the airport was secured at 0330 on 26 February. The Second Marine Division secured major targets and roads west and northwest of Kuwait City. They also secured al-Jahrah and [Hafat Maltah] beyond Kuwait City and took control of movements inside and outside the city.

The alliance continued the attack, capturing the final targets before sunset. Then the Egyptian forces headed east, advancing 60 miles in order to capture al-Salam airport. The Seventh Corps infiltrated into Iraq and attacked armored and mechanized units of the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard. The [Seventh] Corps exchanged its position with that of the British First Armored Division, which continued the attack northward along the Kuwaiti borders. This had a great impact on destroying large numbers of the Republican Guard forces. After advancing 200 miles across the desert, the Mechanized Infantry Division reached the Euphrates river valley in order to continue outflanking Saddam's forces in southern Iraq and Kuwait. A large number of Iraqis surrendered. Elements from Eighth Corps and 18th Corps surprised the Iraqis, taking a large number of prisoners and destroying their equipment. At sunset on 26 February, the allied forces had advanced hundreds of miles into Iraq. They took more than 30,000 POWs and destroyed 26 Iraqi divisions out of 42. This operation took the Iraqi decision-makers by surprise, leaving the Iraqi command and its control hardly effective. They also forced the Iraqi Army to withdraw completely. The airborne [as published] 18th Corps secured the left flank of the alliance. Elements of the 101st Airborne Division and of the mechanized division took control of Highway 8.

The allied forces continued to advance on the night of 26 February, with Eighth Corps exerting the main effort in a coordinated attack against the Third Mechanized Division of the Republican Guard. With the beginning of this operation the First Infantry Division executed a night crossing, an operation considered difficult. It immediately engaged the Iraqi forces. In the north, the First and the Third Armored Divisions attacked eastward. The First Cavalry Division, which was committed to exerting the main effort on the left flank in order to prevent a protective deployment in this direction, continued the attack. At certain times it faced strong resistance which continued until the following day.

The allied air forces provided close and deep air support. The air forces' G-10s [as published] and F-16s were launched from Saudi bases during the first day. In the meantime, F-15s provided night air cover. The fleet carriers in the Gulf were prepared to strike targets distant from the firing line. The Navy in Bahrain attacked targets and responded to requests for air support in Kuwait. Navy Cobras and Apaches provided support for the land forces. Some of the aircraft were lost or destroyed when they were forced to fly in bad weather conditions.

The assault continued on the third day after 27 February against collapsing resistance. Positions south of Kuwait City were reinforced and contact with the forces which were preparing to enter Kuwait City from the west was established. The attack operations were completed, with their final targets being secured. These were the international airport and the western part of the city. This was completed quicker than planned, and Eighth and 18th Corps continued their attack in order to complete the offensive against the Republican Guard. The offensive operations stopped on 28 February.

After the allied forces decided to end the offensive operations on 28 February, the Iraqis agreed to attend military talks in order to discuss ending the aggression in accordance with the cease-fire resolution. They agreed to returning the POWs and taking into consideration
missing persons. A meeting was held on 30 March which lasted 90 minutes in Safwan airport in southern Iraq, immediately north of the Kuwaiti borders. This location was chosen because of its proximity to an airfield and for its being inside Iraq.

The Iraqi side included Lt. Gen. Sultan Hashim Ahmad al-Jabburi, the Iraqi deputy chief of staff, and 10 senior officers. They were accompanied by the Iraqi Third Corps commander. After the preliminary formalities, Staff Lt. Gen. Khalid Ibn-Sultan and General Schwarzkopf said they believed that Baghdad has accepted all the terms, otherwise there would have been no need for the Iraqi delegation to come to the meeting. The Iraqis said they have come in order to cooperate, although their demeanor seemed hostile.

During the meeting two points emerged that showed the extent of the Iraqi defeat. After Iraq giving an account of the number of POWs Iraq is holding, Lt. Gen. al-Jabburi asked the alliance delegation to give a report on the number of Iraqi POWs. The answer to that was that the counting of Iraqi POWs has not yet been completed, and that those counted so far exceed 58,000 soldiers. Al-Juburi was stunned. He asked the Third Corps commander if that was true, to which he replied that it could be true but he didn’t know.

Schwarzkopf suggested drawing a line on the map that would be binding to all sides and from which they will retreat one km at least in order to avoid clashes between the Iraqi forces and the allied forces. Al-Jabburi agreed, but when he saw the proposed line he asked about the reason why it erases the position of his forces. The answer was that this is the front line of the allies’ advance. Once again al-Jabburi seemed surprised. And when he asked the Third Corps commander, he said that this was possible but he didn’t know exactly. It became evident then that the Iraqi Army had been subjugated.
Investment Official on War Losses, Current Climate

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[Interview with Khalid al-Fayiz, the general director of the Gulf Investment Organization; place and date not given]

[Text] The Gulf Investment Organization, like other large commercial organizations, has incurred large losses stemming from Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. These losses stem not only from the suspension of the organization's operations inside Kuwait, but also from the freezing of much of its activity abroad.

The organization has nonetheless continued its foreign activity, despite the unavailability of staff. Its losses on its investments in Kuwait total about $10 million, in addition to losses pertaining to assets.

AL-MAJALLAH interviewed Khalid al-Fayiz, the general director of the Gulf Investment Organization, to learn about the organization's losses and its current activity in Kuwait.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What are the problems which the Gulf Investment Organization faced during the Iraqi invasion?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] Like other organizations, the interruption of our activity since August 1990 has been our basic problem. From a financial standpoint, our organization was less exposed than other organizations because we were able, on the first day of the invasion, to send our records to Bahrain, according to our emergency plan. We notified the organizations throughout the world that do business with us of our new headquarters. Therefore, our activity continued without interruption, even though the organization's employees were scattered throughout the world because they had gone to different countries. We required some time to ascertain who had traveled and who remained. We found that 25 out of the organization's 165 original employees had remained. Twenty of them were gathered in Bahrain. We asked the others to remain where they were, and the organization continued to give them their benefits until the situation became clear.

The current difficulty is how to regroup and continue operating here and in Kuwait. We will continue to operate in Bahrain until we see that circumstances permit all of our employees to return.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Did the Iraqis exert any pressure on the organization's deputy general director due to his presence in Kuwait?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] On Thursday morning (the day of the invasion) he arrived at the organization at 0730 with the auditors and the person in charge of operations. They stayed there until 1130. He then left Kuwait with his family.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What are the organization's losses stemming from the invasion—assets or other losses?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] We lost our investment in the pharmaceutical company in Kuwait. Our losses in the category of fixed assets, such as the organization's offices and buildings, are relatively limited.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What is your estimate of the volume of your investments in Kuwait?


[AL-MAJALLAH] Are these investments considered lost?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] Not entirely. We found our offices intact. Nothing was stolen from them. Regarding the pharmaceutical company, we have not yet evaluated its situation to ascertain what remains of it. However, we hope for the best.

[AL-MAJALLAH] As a Gulf organization, what support have you received from the governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council to cope with your problems following the occupation?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] Our situation is better than that of other organizations. Our need for support has been relatively limited to a need for basic support. The countries and organizations which had deposits with the organization have been supportive regarding their deposits. Also, the authorities of Bahrain have helped us operate in Bahrain without creating legal complications, which is a positive factor. The basic support which we have received has been through our presence in the International Gulf Bank, which helped us maintain our operations until some of our staff became available.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What is your estimate of the organization's total losses in the past period, until the organization resumed its activity?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] Our losses can be divided into two categories: direct losses, which include the loss of our investment in Kuwait, employees' homes, and our payment of the expenses of all employees for nine months while they were not working; and indirect losses, which stem from the loss of opportunities. In the first seven months of the year, we recorded excellent activity and good earnings. All of this perished in the five following months. We did not achieve the earnings that we had expected based on our estimates. We have not announced our earnings. The direct cause is not necessarily the invasion, but its effect on the domestic and international financial market. Thank God, our capital assets were not exposed to losses, and the rights of shareholders at the start and end of the year will almost be the same.

[AL-MAJALLAH] During the crisis, did you have balances in Kuwaiti banks?
[Khalid al-Fayiz] Yes, we had deposits in Kuwaiti banks. Each deposit in a Kuwaiti bank is guaranteed by the central bank, and there is no concern regarding our deposits in these banks.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What was the volume of your deposit?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] I know that the difference between the deposits of Kuwaitis with us and our deposits with them was in our favor. From this standpoint, our position is sound. The volume of deposits with them totals about $170 million to $180 million.

[AL-MAJALLAH] How much did you spend on employees and their families during the occupation?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] About $10 million was disbursed through the banks with which we transact.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What lessons have you gained from this experience?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] The main lesson is that a financial or commercial organization must have a contingency plan to cope with any emergency and any circumstance. We may not even need to use this plan, but planning costs little. In some cases, we might send the statements each day to a second place, or we might send records to another party. Such measures are costly, but in the event of an emergency, their cost is insignificant compared with the losses that we might incur. There is even a plan to use a backup computer at another site in the event of any incident or breakdown that affects our use of our primary computer.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What activities did the organization undertake during the occupation?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] We monitored our current direct investments and projects in which we have invested. For this task, we assigned personnel located at project sites, for example in Riyadh, Dubayy, or Oman, even though some of them were not entirely free to do this.

Regarding indirect investments, i.e., investment initiatives, we had to monitor them and ascertain their soundness.

We were discussing several projects with Gulf investors before the invasion. We monitored these projects with them, after noting that these investors were still interested in these projects, which involve investments in the Gulf, including aluminum extraction, the glass project in Oman, the Dubayy glass project, and copper pipes for air conditioners. There continued to be interest in these projects even if implementation did not begin.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Did you stop providing loans during the crisis?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] The organization provided loans to which it had committed itself previously. In the first week of August, we provided a loan to a Saudi company. We cannot say that circumstances prevented us from providing loans.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What is volume of the loans that you provided during the crisis?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] The equivalent of 150 million Saudi Riyals ($40 million). These loans involve previous commitments.

[AL-MAJALLAH] During the crisis, did you make contacts to provide new loans?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] It was difficult to commit ourselves to new agreements, because we were operating with others' deposits, and we did not know whether these deposits would be renewed. We did not even know whether the financial organizations with which we have financing lines would be able to continue supplying us with funds. Therefore, it was difficult to commit to anything new before knowing whether we would obtain financing. This situation has improved with time. All of the banks were subject to pressures caused by the overdrawing of depositors, whether of the private sector or others. This compelled many financial organizations to reduce their assets because they could not obtain financing. Fortunately, we relied less than others on the financial market for financing. Therefore, our liquidity was not pressured, as was the case regarding Gulf and Arab banks in general.

A Loss of $50 Million

[AL-MAJALLAH] Given the effect of the crisis on the economies of the world, and given that you invest in securities and shares, how much did you lose in this area?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] The preliminary estimate is about $50 million.

[AL-MAJALLAH] How can these losses be offset within the scope of the plan that has been formulated?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] I mentioned earlier that a large portion of these losses were offset in early 1991, because the level rose. These losses were paper losses, not losses that were actually incurred. They amounted to a drop in the value of our assets. We recorded these losses in our ledgers according to the market rate. This drop in the value of our assets is tantamount to a paper loss. We did not sell. Therefore, a large portion of the losses were recovered in the first quarter of 1991.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What measures are you taking to restore the organization's activity?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] The organization's activity has continued since the outset. True, it has been limited, but it has not stopped. After the war, we began to call in essential staff, such as department heads, so that the departments could restart their activity. We do not know if employees wish to return. We are now attempting to restore our basic activity, taking into account that our
current presence in Bahrain is temporary. Then, we will bring to Kuwait those who wish to work in Kuwait’s reconstruction and in the activities of the organization itself. God willing, by the end of the year, the system will be larger.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What role do you expect the organization to play in rebuilding Kuwait? Are there contacts in this regard?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] We have actually begun contacts. The requirements can be divided into a number of areas. For example, public sector services—water, sewerage, electricity, and telephone. The government, not commercial organizations, is financing these projects directly. However, the government might require financing, which is where I see a role for the organization and other banks. Domestic companies, companies from neighboring countries, or international companies will undertake these projects. These companies will require guarantees and the financing of working capital. Here, I see an opportunity for the participation of our organization and other organizations. Also, there are industrial companies in the private sector which have been affected. They require the reconstruction or reactivation of their factories. We are trying to become involved as a financier or a partner through the opportunities which we are finding in the industrial sector, more so than in the commercial sector, given the limited nature of our activity and the fact that we are not permitted to engage in retail financing.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Have you faced problems with foreign banks?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] If this situation—i.e., one country suddenly invading and occupying another and creating an unusual situation in financial organizations—had happened in any other place, I believe that financial organizations everywhere, including in Europe and America, would have behaved similarly, because those who are responsible for capital are unwilling to take chances. If we had gone to any foreign bank director and asked him to support our organization, would he take responsibility if responsibility had collapsed? Thus, foreign banks, and even domestic banks, are naturally cautious and will seek explanations for everything. Of course, behavior will differ according to the extent of an organization’s knowledge of the region. Foreign organizations and those who back them, and several European organizations, were more encouraging than Japanese and American organizations. They have comprehensive information on Kuwaiti domestic organizations. I am not blaming them completely for disassociating themselves from us. If I were in their position, I would do the same.

[AL-MAJALLAH] How much time will foreign financial organizations, especially Japanese organizations, need before they regain their confidence in financial organizations in the region?

[Khalid al-Fayiz] The [difficult] period did not end with the end of the occupation. However, a fundamental change has occurred. Foreign organizations have begun to make deposits again, albeit not at the previous level. However, these organizations, including Japanese, European, and American organizations, the main banks, and large financial organizations familiar with the region, have begun to regain their confidence in the region’s financial market.

Editorial Considers Economic Development Issues

91AE0585A London SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI in Arabic 13 Aug 91 p 13

[Article by 'Abd-al-Jalil al-Gharballi: “Where Does the Revitalization of the Kuwaiti Economy Begin?”]

[Text] He asked me, having sipped his tea after a banquet at his house to which he invited me, “How can the Kuwaiti economy regain strength?”

I responded, “First, let us stop a moment at this ‘regaining strength’ point. Let us agree on its definition and its manifestations in order to better understand this economy. I am bringing up nothing new when I say that the Kuwaiti economy as a whole suffers structural imbalances. Specialists know this and it is, as I said, nothing new. I am elucidating on this only as a reminder. Such persistent imbalances are manifested in our dependence on a single source of income, the market’s limited size, a shortage of technical manpower, a weak production sector dependent for economic performance on the expenditure of government petroleum revenues, and other factors that gave rise to a consumer economy. We have no policy, short-term or long-term, to restrain or alleviate those factors individually or collectively.

“It may then be said that the return of strength to the Kuwaiti economy does not necessarily entail an effort to change those elements, or economic factors, in order to achieve a producer economy, for instance. Rather, this might merely mean resolving the problems emanating from the country’s economic crises and dealing with the consequences of the Iraqi invasion and its negative economic impact.”

He interrupted, “I agree, but where do we start?”

I said, “I’ll tell you if you’d allow me to proceed without interruption! The realization of that goal will not be through the banking system, i.e. through Kuwaiti banks, in the sense that resolving the problems of that system would restore to the economy its vitality even though structural imbalances would continue.”

He added, “But you claimed in one of your lectures that the problems of the Kuwaiti economy were problems of conscience and of morality. How do you reconcile that with banking system problems?”
He sat on the edge of his chair seemingly ready to pounce, believing that he put me in a corner as if, as the Egyptians would say, he had "dragged the wolf by its tail."

I replied, "I still hold that the banking system crisis remains a crisis of morals and conscience. Let us go back to the mid-eighties when the banks were faced with so-called nonperforming client debts during the minor catastrophe called "al-Manakh." The Central Bank devised a program dubbed a "Plan for Settlement of Difficult Debts" whereby each participating debtor would make a statement of financial condition, in which they would list their belongings, among other things. The technical terms are assets and liabilities or what the debtor owes and what he has coming to him. The Central Bank had neither the competence nor the capability to scrutinize those statements for accuracy and verify the true condition of debtors; and the job was therefore left to the banks. The Central Bank had two options. The first option was to expedite the submission of financial statements by debtors, enabling it to calculate the shortfall in what is called bank reserves, and consequently the volume and value of public funds needed to support the banks. The second option was to wait an indefinite period of time until the banks could verify those [financial] statements.

"The Central Bank chose the first option; asking that such settlements be certified by the Ministry of Justice and giving the banks a ten-year grace period to search for hidden assets that may be held by program clients inside Kuwait or abroad.

"A total of 1,260 clients, with aggregate indebtedness of some 2,200 million dinars, joined the program and completed the certification.

"Indeed, the program was a learned accomplishment and rightfully a cause for pride to all who had part in it. It was at that time a life-saver for banks through which they were able to breathe and gain time which was not in their favor. However, the program's weakness and flaw was its failure to establish procedures for identifying the true financial position of debtors. The banks had neither the expertise nor the capability to audit their clients and ferret out assets not listed under the program. Some banks were even averse to such an assignment which could require engaging specialized companies at considerable expense. By the same token, weak performance by banks in that regard may be attributed to their confidence that their aggregate shortfalls would be covered by so-called certificates of liquidity issued by the Central Bank. The Central Bank would support such banks through the deposit of noninterest-bearing funds which the banks would put to work and use the proceeds to build up reserves while guaranteeing a return to investors of no more than 5 percent.

"The banks therefore had no incentive to scrutinize and search. Some of the statements of financial condition reflected unconscionable lack of morals as most debtors sought to hide their assets from their creditor banks. Private sector wealth deposited with foreign banks ballooned to some $5 billion by the end of 1988, according to a statement on 23 Oct 89 by the governor of the Central Bank. Adding the value of real estate and other holdings, I would estimate that wealth at between $7 and $8 billion by the end of 1990."

My friend sharply interrupted, "But this is considered duplicity in dealing with swindlers. When some people were discovered by computers to have unlawfully acquired 500 dinars, they were brought up on charges even though their action had minor economic consequences. How, then, can we show leniency towards those whose fraudulent financial statements shook the very foundation of the national economy and exposed the banks to severe shock? I would even say that enthusiasm for the program was not coupled with equal diligence in pursuing the cheats who would enrich their coffers at the expense of the public treasury."

I responded, "This does not mean that officials are not aware of asset hiding schemes. AL-QABAS published on 22 Jan 90 a statement in which the Central Bank governor said 'There are cheats but we must find them out. We hear people saying that so and so owns such and such, I ask those people to help me with information. I call upon those with information to bring it to me with proof that such and such a person has hidden or smuggled or owns assets abroad.'

"I say that the way to uncover assets is not to wait for people to inform. We would have a long wait, incidentally, since nobody ever plays such a role and comes forward with information of this nature. The issue must be taken more seriously and specialists should be employed to expose the cheats."

Retorted my friend: "But after the quake that shook Kuwait and for many other reasons, don't you believe that they [the cheats] will rectify their books and that consciences will awaken after long stupors induced by overwhelming avarice? Don't you think that they will return to reason and help dress the wounds of the Kuwaiti economy? It is incumbent upon all of us to join that effort because the public treasury has neither the ability nor the capability to dress all wounds. They [the cheats] should be given one last chance to restore to creditors the wealth they spirited away. But in the absence of such efforts and initiatives on their part, how do you think we should deal with them?"

I answered, "I do not know whether there is willingness to deal with such grave breaches with the same candor and diligence it took to devise the program and implement it; or whether the intention is to turn the page and forgive and forget those who undermined the country's economy. The latter thought may have been contemplated prior to the invasion but things havev changed. The Kuwaiti economy is bloodied and its bleeding will stop only with proper measures to restore righteousness. The Kuwaiti economy will not regain strength until its
wound are cleaned of contaminants. It would not be far from the truth to emphasize that the road to recovery begins with exposing the cheats even at great expense and even if we had to collect contributions in order to uncover those who spirited away their wealth in order to evade paying their debts.

"Let firmness in the pursuit of justice be our guiding light on the road to economic recovery in Kuwait. Didn't I tell you it was a question of conscience and morals?"

**Minister on Housing Policy, Rebuilding**

*Kuwait-Muhammad 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-'Asfur, Kuwaiti Minister of State for Housing Affairs, by 'Abdallah al-Shammari; place and date not given: "Minister of State for Housing Affairs to SAWT AL-KUWAYT: ‘We Are Studying Possibility of Disbursing Rent Allowance to Owners of Damaged Homes’"

[Text] Kuwait—Muhammad 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-'Asfur, the minister of state for housing affairs, has asserted that the esteemed Council of Ministers is now considering a memorandum submitted by the Housing Authority on the possibility of disbursing housing allowances to citizens whose homes have been damaged as a result of the evil aggression.

In an exclusive interview with SAWT AL-KUWAYT, Minister al-'Asfur revealed that the Public Housing Authority will begin repairing damaged homes built by the council and that the task of rebuilding other homes will be entrusted to a number of other government agencies.

The minister asserted that the Housing Authority will force citizens who have seized and lived in Housing Authority homes during the occupation period to evacuate these homes, because other citizens are entitled to them and because the homes will be granted according to priority of registration in the housing welfare request records.

Al-'Asfur said that, to the degree possible, the authority will facilitate the task of contractors who had been working with the authority prior to the occupation, and whose equipment has been stolen and their workers deported by the aggressor. The minister of state for housing affairs noted that non-Kuwaiti workers accounted for 45 percent of the authority's workers prior to the country's occupation. He said that efforts are currently underway to rehire some of them in their previous jobs in case these jobs cannot be filled by Kuwaiti cadres. In a related development, the minister noted that, on the instructions of the Higher Housing Council headed by His Highness Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah, the crown prince and prime minister, the Housing Authority will continue, as soon as possible, to build the largest number of housing units, in accordance with the plans drawn up prior to the invasion.

Al-'Asfur said that there has been no new development regarding the fact that the law does not call for providing housing care for female Kuwaiti citizens married to non-Kuwaitis, regardless of whether the husband's citizenship is determinate or indeterminate, adding that this is in accordance with a 1989 cabinet decree.

He pointed out that there is no conflict between the Public Housing Authority's decisions and decisions made by other government agencies, as long as they are not ratified.

[Shammari] What steps has the Public Housing Authority taken to solve the problem of owners of damaged homes, and what is the number of such homes?

[Asfur] The authority has formed a committee of its specialized workers to receive owners of homes damaged during the oppressive Iraqi occupation in preparation to conducting on-the-spot inspection of these homes and drafting the necessary technical damage reports in order to find out if they are fit or unfit for habitation and, consequently, to provide shelter promptly to the citizens inhabiting them.

Considering that there are fewer housing units available to the authority than the number of requests made by owners of damaged homes, the Public Housing Authority has submitted a study on this issue to the esteemed Council of Ministers to consider disbursing a housing allowance to these citizens.

The number of applications submitted by the brother citizens for obtaining housing allowances have amounted to 735 applications to date.

[Shammari] What about damaged homes that have already been surveyed? Will the authority repair them?

[Asfur] The committee entrusted with inspecting these homes has found out that homes damaged as a consequence of the evil Iraqi invasion are divided into three categories: completely-destroyed homes, partially-damaged homes that can be repaired in the future, and homes sustaining damage that temporarily impedes their occupation.

As for repairing damaged homes, the authority will repair the government housing it had previously built. The task of repairing other homes will be entrusted to other agencies, even though a committee assigned by us is surveying these homes and technically determining the damage they have sustained. This does not mean that the authority will be responsible for repairing these homes.

[Shammari] What is the position of those who lived in government housing during the occupation, even though the houses they occupied had not been allocated to them by the Housing Authority?

[Asfur] Government welfare housing is a social service provided by the government to deserving Kuwaiti families. This service is governed by special rules and regulations that determine the citizens' rights, and that
acquaint the citizens with the limits of these rights, and with the duties they shoulder.

Because homes built fundamentally for deserving people according to the priority of application for welfare housing were occupied illegally by some families during the tyrannical invasion, the authority has warned these occupants to evacuate the homes so that it could carry out necessary maintenance work in preparation for awarding the homes to the people entitled to them.

[Shammari] What has been done about the local firms that were obligated, prior to the invasion, to contracts to complete some housing projects belonging to the Housing Authority?

[’Asfur] A committee of district chief engineers and directors of technical departments and contract oversight has been formed to check and reassess the contractors to make sure they can continue the projects entrusted to them. This committee has also been empowered to eliminate, to the degree possible, the obstacles hindering these contractors. It has become obvious from the committee’s preliminary meetings with the concerned firms that the impediments the firms face consist of the problem of making up for the equipment stolen by the oppressive aggressor and the problem of the departure of skilled labor. This is in addition to the fact that the main offices of these firms have been looted and their installations destroyed.

In cooperation with this segment of contractors, the committee will survey the damage inflicted on homes, schools, and mosques erected by the authority.

Reliance on National Cadre

[Shammari] Numerous Arab and foreign cadres were working in the authority’s technical sectors. Will they be replaced by Kuwaiti cadres?

[’Asfur] The non-Kuwaiti cadres working in the authority before the occupation represented 45 percent of the authority’s total labor. There is no doubt that the government’s general tendency to “Kuwaitize” jobs requires fundamental reliance on Kuwaiti cadres. On this basis, all departments of the authority have been instructed to determine their urgent needs for non-Kuwaiti cadres, in preparation for having these needs examined from the perspective of the government’s general tendencies.

[Shammari] Before the evil aggression, the authority had ambitious plans to reduce the waiting period for government housing. Does this continue?

[’Asfur] Reducing the waiting period to acquire welfare housing is one of the most significant objectives of the authority’s ambitious five-year plans. This issue also receives extreme attention from the Supreme Housing Council. In this context, we are eager to bolster this tendency to provide welfare housing to those who deserve it in the easiest way possible.

For Kuwaiti Families Only

[Shammari] What about a Kuwaiti female citizen married to a non-Kuwaiti, regardless of whether his nationality is indeterminate or determinate? Will welfare housing include such citizens?

[’Asfur] Application by Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis for welfare housing was done in accordance with special conditions and regulations provided for by the Council of Ministers’ decree adopted in session Number 46/83, held on 9 November 1983. According to these conditions, allocation of housing to this group depends on further research and study, keeping in mind that provisions of the welfare housing law issued in 1989 apply to Kuwait families only. To apply for welfare housing, it is required that the [male] head of the household be a Kuwaiti citizen.

[Shammari] The Ministerial Emergencies Committee has entrusted some housing projects to a number of international and Arab firms. Is this in conflict with the authority’s tasks?

[’Asfur] The authority’s five-year plans are referred to the Council of Ministers for approval after the Supreme Housing Council examines them and makes the proper recommendations on them.

As long as the Council of Ministers has not approved the 1990/91-1994/95 five-year plan in its final draft, then any decisions made by the council in this phase are not in conflict with authority’s tasks.

Importance of Arabsat Cited by Minister

91WT0157Z Cairo AL-ANBA’ in Arabic 4 Jun 91 p 3

[Article by ’Abd-al-Sattar Naji: “Dr. al-Ya’qub Says on Occasion of Restoration of Direct Communications via ARABSAT: GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) Countries Are No Longer Just a Place Where Oil Wells Are Located; They Are Now a Center for Education, Culture, and History’’]

[Text] Dr. Badr al-Ya’qub, Kuwait’s minister of information, spoke on the occasion of the restoration of direct daily communications for Kuwait’s television via Arabsat [Arab Communications Foundation], the Arab satellite. Dr. al-Ya’qub’s remarks placed emphasis on the outstanding, positive role which was played by the media in the GCC countries, and he assessed that role and its accomplishments. He hailed the part played by the media in the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic, and he condemned all the aggressive practices that were perpetrated against Kuwait as well as the theft and plunder to which Kuwait was exposed as a result of the brutal occupation. As evidence of these aggressive practices the minister presented the film, “Wa Tabqa al-Kuwait” (“And Kuwait Survives”). The text of his remarks follows.

“It gives us pleasure, brothers and sisters, to join you today from Kuwait by way of the Arab satellite. On this
occasion we join you to present a documentary film which provides a record of what the criminal Iraqi regime did in Kuwait when it took the liberty of invading that country and destroying all its vital facilities. This documentary film, "Wa Tabqa al-Kuwait," which we are showing today offers a true picture of the destruction, murder, and mayhem which the Iraqi regime wrought on Kuwait. Also, it shows clearly the considerable solidarity which the international community and the Arab world expressed for Kuwait as a result of the criminal invasion. It is that solidarity which recently brought about the liberation of Kuwait from aggression. Today's satellite transmission represents the culmination of the efforts made by our sincere citizens who worked tirelessly to restore media services to our country, Kuwait, after almost 100 percent of its media facilities were totally destroyed.

"Brothers and sisters, you are undoubtedly well aware of the fact that Kuwait would not be where it is today had it not been for the good offices of the GCC countries and the Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Syria. All these countries stood together with Kuwait as one. With assistance from friendly and fraternal countries, these countries stood by Kuwait until it was liberated and the aggression was removed. In hopeing today that these good offices will continue inside the country and abroad, we also hope that all these offices will have one goal: to tell the whole world that the effects of the criminal aggression which occurred in Kuwait have been negative and severe, not only in Kuwait, but also in the Arab and Islamic world. We want to tell the whole world that such aggression must never happen again in the Arab region or in any other region so that peace and security can prevail in the world.

"As you undoubtedly know, brothers and sisters, the mission which the media must fulfill in this regard is considerable. Its aim is to inform the world and report good news to it. Its aim is to show the world what we accomplished and to let it know that the GCC countries are no longer just a place where oil wells are located, but that they are a center for education, culture, and history. The aim of the media's mission is to let the world know that GCC countries are also a center for learning and for the arts. That is something which must be fully and clearly reported to the world. There is no doubt, as I said, that the media have an essential part to play in that regard.

"We hope, brothers and sisters, that Kuwaiti television will strengthen the progress of the media in our country by working, on the one hand, through the Arab satellite, the Federation of Broadcasters in Arab Countries, and Gulf Television. We hope that, on the other hand, the cooperation between them will be continuous so that the truth can be made known to the world. We hope that bilateral communications will continue between the media in the Gulf countries and the media in the Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Syria. We also hope there will be collective communications between all these countries as well as a collective agreement to make the media in our country flourish and prosper.

"On this occasion, brothers and sisters, we must not forget all those who helped Kuwait during its crisis and after its liberation. Nor should we forget what those people did for the Kuwaiti people during and after the crisis. On this occasion I would like to express thanks, appreciation, and gratitude to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of His Majesty, King Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the custodian of the two holy mosques. I would also like to express thanks, appreciation, and gratitude to the United Arab Emirates, under the leadership of Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan; to the fraternal state of Bahrain, under the leadership of Shaykh 'Isa ibn Salman al-Khalifah; to the state of Qatar, under the leadership of Khalifah ibn Hamad Al Thani; to Oman, under the leadership of His Majesty Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id, may God protect them both; to the Arab Republic of Egypt, under the leadership of President Muhammad Husni Mubarak; and to the Syrian Arab Republic, under the leadership of President Hafiz al-Asad. May God protect all of them.

"Acting on my own behalf and on behalf of all the Kuwaiti people I am expressing our thanks and our gratitude for what these countries did to liberate and to build Kuwait. If the opportunity presents itself, I would also [like to] mention what our brothers in the GCC countries, in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and in the Syrian Arab Republic did for the Kuwaiti people during the crisis. I would like to thank them for their continued efforts to restore Kuwait's culture and its radiant aspect.

"We promise you, brothers and sisters, that our efforts in the media will continue to keep you in touch with everything that is good. We will continue to offer something for everybody, and we also promise to rebuild Kuwait in every respect and to make it better than what it was, thanks to instructions from His Royal Highness, the Amir, may God protect him, and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister Shaykh Sa'd-al-'Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah, may God protect them. We promise to do this with the assistance of all the people of Kuwait. Standing by our side will be all the good people in Arab and fraternal countries who are true to Kuwait and to the world."
Expert on Military Lessons of Gulf War
91AE0525C Cairo AL-ANBA' in Arabic 2 Jul 91 p 3

[Interview With Military Expert Staff Major General Ahmad 'Abd-al-Halim by Fatimah Muhammad; place and date not given: “Military Expert Maj Gen Ahmad 'Abd-al-Halim: We Must Overcome Bitterness of Crisis and Plan for Future by Studying Reality”]

[Text] Military Expert Major General Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahim has asserted to AL-ANBA' that the Gulf crisis, which lasted seven months, has been the most serious regional conflict in the past two decades, because it occurred at a time in history which has been witnessing the end of confrontation between the East and West. It has also tested U.S.-Soviet relations. It seems that the United States has displayed its strength in the purposeful efforts it is contributing to the peace process through Baker's numerous tours. He also pointed out that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that carry such weapons must be curtailed.

[Muhammad] The Gulf war has ended militarily. But its political, economic, and psychological consequences have begun to put strong pressure on this region that is filled with problems and crises. How do we confront this pressure?

['Abd-al-Halim] Yes, the horrible earthquake has occurred and its aftershocks have spread to every place. It has not been confined to Iraq and Kuwait, but has expanded to include the Gulf region, the Arab Peninsula, and all parts of the Arab homeland. There is no doubt that the earthquake's negative consequences are large and numerous. But there are also positive results, which we must face and study carefully, and which we must not disregard from now on. The most significant of these results is that our Arab system is a brittle system that has helped create and multiply these crises throughout the years. We must change now and forget what has happened. We must try hard to overcome the tragedies and bitterness of this ordeal and look forward to a better future, for which we are now preparing so that the crisis will not recur and so that another Saddam cannot be born to lead us to perdition. We must study the situation carefully, frankly state all that it encompasses, and deal with all its negative features sincerely.

Future Changes
[Muhammad] What are the possibilities of policy changes in wake of all the consequences created by the Gulf war?

['Abd-al-Halim] We are well aware that democracy is the true inlet to a better and more ideal Arab system, especially in wake of the crisis that has caught us by surprise and the war which has awakened us, and through which we have restored, with utter awareness and logic, the revolution of democracy which had started in Europe and toppled extremely strong and influential totalitarian and communist regimes. This makes it necessary for us to take long strides toward true democracy, because our objectives are no less significant than their [East Europeans'] objectives.

On the other hand, it is noted that our governments are racing now to reach agreement on security and military arrangements to confront external dangers.

Generally, the negative political and economic ramifications of this devastating war may not all surface immediately but may remain latent, interact, and intensify day after day until they ripen. It is my opinion that crises and wars make people mature and help them think more profoundly about what is going around them. The war has not been just a passing summer cloud. We must pause before it and consider it well.

Peace Efforts
[Muhammad] Now that the crisis has ended, who is responsible for the region's faltering peace?

['Abd-al-Halim] It seems that every party is responsible for the faltering peace process in the Middle East, excluding the superpower tending the process. It seems that the United States has displayed its impartiality in the purposeful efforts it is making in the peace process that has been undertaken by a number of U.S. secretaries of state, beginning with Henry Kissinger and ending with Baker. However, there is cause for concern now that Baker has gone back from his latest tour without accomplishing the desired progress. It has become evident that Israel has not abandoned its intransigent positions, and this has blocked prompt movement toward the peace conference. Whereas Syria has clung to the need for fundamental UN participation in the conference, Israel has rejected any major UN role in the conference. Jordan has also shown reluctance. Egypt is the only Arab country that has declared its willingness to join any kind of a peace conference.

[Muhammad] Does this mean that Washington wants peace and the Arabs don't?

['Abd-al-Halim] This is what Baker said in his latest tour, whereas he and his boss had declared that when the Gulf crisis is ended, the window will be open for launching a new peace process. The fact is that the objective of the U.S. position is to alleviate the pressure by seeking immediate discussions on the Middle East because of Saddam Husayn's unacceptable linkage of the occupation of Kuwait and Israel's occupation of Arab territories. However, a sense of realism has engulphed the U.S. position. The White House, along with the British Government, has felt that it has taken too long to settle the Middle East problem and that the West is responsible for this fact.

[Muhammad] Baker and his British counterpart had said that the region would witness a "pressure" process when
the Gulf crisis ended and that Israel has to acclimate itself to the new international resolve to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict.

[A'abd-al-Halim] It seems that a feeling of sadness is prevalent now because of the new obstacles. But nobody has wondered about the role played by the war and whether it has made the peace path easier or more complex.

Everybody notices that the conditions are changing now, because the costs of this conflict are exorbitant and because all are hurt by it, even the United States, which is providing ceaseless aid to Israel. This is why a solution has to be found and why Israel has to accept the agreed-upon solution of land for peace. But regrettably, Israel continues to be suspicious of this solution and its prime minister tries to resort to trickery and deception to avoid the censure he will get for sabotaging the peace process.

Yet, the U.S. diplomacy continues to be unable to deal with the issues that inflame the situation, such as the issue of Soviet Jewish immigration, settlements in the occupied territories, and violations of Palestinian rights.

[Muhammad] Observers see that there will be no peaceful settlement unless the Israeli parliamentary system is changed.

[A'abd-al-Halim] These observations have been stressed by observers after division among the ranks of the Israeli right became evident when some people resigned from the Likud Party and formed the Renaissance Party in June 1990 and when the Israeli rightist alliance was created. Therefore, Shamir is incapable of performing the tasks of his position because the radical right controls his actions and because the rightist forces prevent him from embarking on what they consider some sort of concessions.

Eliminating Destruction Weapons

[Muhammad] The principle of deterrence and of vengeful retaliation is still present in international and regional conflicts. What is the criterion of security and peace in the Middle East?

[A'abd-al-Halim] The criterion is action to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction weapons and the missiles that deliver such weapons. There is no doubt that details are important when talking about the issue of disarmament. The phrase "weapons of mass destruction" has been always used by the Americans and the British when discussing the imposition of restrictions on weapons sent to developing countries. By this phrase, they have meant nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, warheads, and the systems for delivering them.

A few days after the war ended, there were signs showing that conventional weapons suppliers who had been annoyed by the reduced U.S. defense budget, began to look for new opportunities to sell their weapons.

According to analysts, weapons proliferation in itself has not become an issue, even though there are 22 countries that are known to possess ballistic systems. The U.S. central intelligence circles [as published] estimate that 15 more countries will be able to produce their own weapons in this area by the end of this century.

If we overlook the four major suppliers, namely the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and France, we would find that Israel possesses the best expertise, whereas Saudi Arabia possesses Chinese-made CSS-3 missiles, which have a range of 2,700 km. This is why the process to curtail the missile technology proliferation will achieve only limited success.

[Muhammad] What about the U.S. and Soviet position toward armament issues?

[A'abd-al-Halim] The United States is a military superpower by virtue of the superiority of its conventional military forces, its monopoly on the nuclear weapon, its economic strength, and its diverse natural resources. U.S. arms exports experienced a drop when a similar drop occurred in Middle East arms imports. This is due to two things: The dimensions attained by the Israeli military industry, which has become an arms exporter to nearly 33 countries. The second thing is the drop in the Arab Gulf states' oil revenues and these states' trend toward reducing public spending.

As for the issue of arms control, U.S. President Bush has declared very seriously that he will curtail armaments in the region. There is now a treaty that provides for arms control.

As for the Soviet Union, it has supplied its weapons to two basic groups of states:

The first group is the Warsaw Pact bloc and other close associates (Vietnam, North Korea, Mongolia, and Cuba). The second group consists of non-socialist countries such as Algeria, Libya, and Syria.

Generally, the two superpowers have agreed to conclude a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons.

For your information, I should point out here that Russia has stopped supplying weapons even to its traditional partners.

[Muhammad] It is obvious that trade interests play a role even in this sensitive area. How true is this?

[A'abd-al-Halim] Yes. This is confirmed by the allegation made by the Americans and the British that they have been able to put a stop to a project undertaken by Argentina with Iraqi backing, thanks to the economic and political pressures they exerted and to the lack of outlines governing space technology employed in legitimate national space programs.

It is worth noting that India is one of eight countries that have advanced nuclear programs and that have refused to sign the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty.
Because it feels worried about Pakistan's nuclear program, the United States has worked to suspend its military aid to Pakistan. However, the endeavors to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and materials have been feeble, like the other endeavors to stop the proliferation of other kinds of weapons. It should be noted now that Israel and South Africa are countries that possess nuclear weapons.

Even though the 15 countries that supply nuclear materials assert that it is necessary to adhere to safety regulations in the export area, only a few countries are required to make sure that both seller and buyer observe the regulations. Thus, France and Italy offered Iraq nuclear exports and facilities in return for guaranteed oil supplies.

It seems that the refusal of some developing countries to permit the inspection of their nuclear installations is connected with these countries' wish to acquire sophisticated non-conventional weapons. Third world security experts also reject the statement that the developing countries' acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is unacceptable and they consider this statement hypocritical.

The fact is that chemical weapons are a cheap alternative to nuclear weapons.

Under our current circumstances and while the world is trying to deal with the Palestinian issue, we find that the matter is connected with the political will to establish regional security zones and with mutual confidence and cooperation between countries, instead of international and regional aggression and conflicts.