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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Abu-'Ayyash Describes Support for PLO

91AE0395A Nazareth AL-SINNARAH in Arabic
26 Apr 91 pp 12-13

[Interview with Radwan Abu-'Ayyash, president of the Association of Palestinian Journalists in the Occupied Land, by Vida Mash'ur and Khalid Badr: "In Exclusive Interview with AL-SINNARAH Radwan Abu-'Ayyash Says: 'There Are No Distinctions Between Our Palestinian People Who Are Living in Palestine and Those Who Are Living Outside the Country; We Are All One Nation, United Behind the Leadership of the PLO';" place and date of interview not given]

[Text] Radwan Abu-'Ayyash, who is considered a prominent Palestinian leader, serves as president of the Association of Palestinian Journalists in the occupied land. A political activist who is always talking about the importance of peace in the region, Abu-'Ayyash was arrested several times in the past and spent long periods of time in Israeli prisons. He was arrested about six months ago and held in administrative detention by the Israeli authorities, but he resumed his activities of political strife when he was released from prison a short time ago. After his release from prison Abu-'Ayyash received an invitation to visit the United States of America. AL-SINNARAH conducted a lengthy and comprehensive interview with Abu-'Ayyash and talked with him about his views and opinions on the solutions which are being proposed.

[AL-SINNARAH] What is your evaluation of the recent meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Baker?

[Abu-'Ayyash] As Mr. Faysal al-Husayni and Mrs. Hanan al-'Ashrawi said, the third meeting was better than the two which preceded it. Mr. al-Husayni and Mrs. al-'Ashrawi said that the atmosphere at the meeting was positive and encouraging. Baker asked that a judgment on this meeting not be made in haste, and he said that the peace process was a very complicated process that required staying power. Baker was able to answer questions which the Palestinians asked, especially about the international authority, the settlement issue, and the identity of the delegations which will be participating in the talks. He answered other questions also which had been raised in the past.

"Palestinians Found Some of Baker's Answers Satisfactory"

[AL-SINNARAH] Was answering those questions all that Baker was able to do, or was he able to provide positive answers to those questions?

[Abu-'Ayyash] Palestinians were satisfied with the answers which Mr. Baker was able to provide to some of the questions. Some questions remained unanswered, however, and getting answers to them requires Mr. Baker

to go back to the Israelis to ask them for further clarifications about the extent of their commitment. Baker said he would start applying diplomatic pressure of some sort on the Israelis because Palestinians have done all they can do to keep the peace process moving and they cannot do any more. There are lasting Palestinian principles which govern every possibility for action. I recall that the Israelis asked us at the outset to recognize UN Resolution 242. They said that our recognition of that resolution will enable them to fling the doors of peace wide open. But what happened after we recognized the resolution? Once again the Israeli government denied that it was willing to negotiate on the basis of 242 and on the basis of the principle of "land for peace." What Shamir said about implementing Resolution 242 in Sinai was heard, but what about the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Arab Jerusalem?

And what about the settlements? While Baker was saying that the settlements were an obstacle to peace, the Israelis built three settlements in one week. How credible then are those meetings which are being held? Furthermore, our people are not happy about those meetings. This is what I heard in the camps and in the villages, and it is what I heard among intellectuals who are saying that these meetings are going nowhere. How can average Palestinians reconcile these meetings with the settlements and with the arrests and deportations that are continuing? How can they reconcile these meetings with what is happening on the ground?

There are two formulas then: one Israeli formula which is being carried out officially on the ground, and a verbal formula. There are steps, however, which Israel must take at least to establish good will. What are the principles, the peace principles, which Israel must proclaim? Israel must say this: "We are willing to make peace with the Palestinian nation, not with the Palestinians." Israel must address us as a nation because we are a nation, not just a group of people. The second step which Israel must take if it wants a just and comprehensive peace is this: it must talk with those who are accountable to the Palestinian people. It must talk with the leaders of the Palestinian people, and that means talking with the PLO.

Israel may or may not like the PLO, but the PLO is a domestic, Palestinian issue, and Israel should not be fussy about it.

"We Are United as One Despite Differences in Points of View"

[AL-SINNARAH] There are rumors about the makeup of the Palestinian delegation, and it is also being said that there are disputes between the PLO's leaders in Tunisia and the leaders of the intifadah [uprising]. What are the true facts about this matter?

[Abu-'Ayyash] There are no distinctions between our Palestinian people who are living in Palestine and those who are living outside the country. We are all one nation, united behind one leadership, the leadership of the PLO.

What is happening does not go beyond making it possible to consider [various] points of view, but the decision remains first and foremost that of the leaders of the Palestinian people. At any rate, the makeup of the recent delegation was determined by considerations that were purely technical, not political. That was the case, for example, regarding the fact that the name of Radwan Abu-'Ayyash was proposed as a participant in the recent delegation. The number of people taking part in that meeting was supposed to be limited, and that meeting was also supposed to be a follow up meeting on the two previous meetings. First of all, there were several questions which had been posed to Mr. Baker, and it was therefore more appropriate and more proper that those who had raised the questions be at the meeting to hear the answers. Second, Radwan, who has just come out of prison, does not have the particular details on everything that happened while he was in prison. That is why I need a little time to study all the files and documents about what happened. Third, the makeup of the delegation was declared abroad by the PLO. But the announcement which was made inside the country was made by Radwan Abu-'Ayyash at a press conference which was held in his home. There is no dispute here because I sat at the same table with Faysal, and I started the press conference. What we wanted when I announced the makeup of the delegation was to tell our Palestinian people that we were united as one even though our points of view may differ. We will not allow anyone to drive a wedge between us.

"We Should Be Discreet About Our Dirty Laundry and Not Air It in Public"

[AL-SINNARAH] And yet, leaflets against the meeting were published, and people who opposed the meetings made different statements about it. Such statements were even made on Israeli television. Can you say something about that?

[Abu-'Ayyash] It is true that leaflets were published and press conferences were held attacking the meeting. And yet, all these leaflets and conferences may be considered expressions of independent judgments or other opinions. Ours is a democratic nation, and each one of us is allowed to express his opinion. But no harm came to any one of the honest nationalists who took part in the meeting.

What I want to say is that discussions should always be held. These discussions should be peaceful, and they should be held privately not publicly. Discussions can be held privately, but when we appear in public, we must be united and we must be in agreement. We should be discreet about our dirty laundry and not air it in public. As far as we are concerned, when someone is appointed by any government in the world to carry out a task, that person has to carry out that task regardless of his identity. What matters in such a case is not the identity of that person, but rather carrying out the task. The present stages are only exploratory stages.

"The PLO Named the Three People Who Took Part in the Third Meeting"

[AL-SINNARAH] Did PLO leaders in Tunisia name the members of the delegation?

[Abu-'Ayyash] Yes, the leaders there issued a statement in which they named the three individuals. They are the same names that I mentioned.

[AL-SINNARAH] But the news which is being promoted by the guided media we are facing contradicts what you are saying.

[Abu-'Ayyash] Wafa, the official Palestinian news agency, issued a report on the eve of the meeting, that is, on Friday evening, which said the following: "After a lengthy meeting for Palestinian leaders, the PLO agreed that a few Palestinian nationalists in the occupied land could meet with U.S. Secretary of State Baker. The PLO has entrusted this task to Mr. Faysal al-Husayni, Mr. Zakariya al-Agha, and Mrs. Hanan al-'Ashrawi." That PLO decision was the product of deliberations between all groups of the Palestinian people.

"Palestinians Did Everything They Could To Get the Peace Process Moving"

[AL-SINNARAH] Is it your observation that the American administration is serious?

[Abu-'Ayyash] We will find that out when we meet. Baker has been saying that he is enthusiastic at this time in particular in the wake of the Gulf war and that he is anxious to deal with the Palestinian question by using the same standards he used when he dealt with the Gulf question. We as Palestinians did not ask the United States to bring its battleships, its military vessels, and 1 million soldiers to surround and bomb Tel Aviv. We did not ask the United States to bomb the bridges in Haifa and Acre. We did not try to set up a state in the Negev for the Bedouins and a state in north Palestine for Palestinians. We did not ask for any such things, but we are asking the United States to say, to prove its credibility, that it will use similar measures to solve the question of Palestine and that it will apply financial, political, cultural, and economic pressures to Israel. It is the Israeli government, after all, that is saying no to peace. The Palestinians went as far as we can go to keep the door open to a peaceful solution.

[AL-SINNARAH] Are you noticing early signs of an American decisiveness this time?

[Abu-'Ayyash] I cannot say that I am. The Americans are talking about good intentions. I would be able to make a judgment if their words were accompanied by actions. Now, however, we are engaged in exploratory talks, and nothing more than a preliminary examination is taking place at this stage.

"No American or Israeli Commitments Came Out of These Talks"

[AL-SINNARAH] Abu Iyad stated one year ago that America changed its policy and its positions.

[Abu-'Ayyash] We certainly hope that it did, but time will tell if it did. America is being tested, and its credibility is being tested. America lost the credibility it had in the Arab homeland because of the Gulf war, but I hope it will regain that credibility by standing up for the national rights of the Palestinian people. I do not wish to speak about Palestinian, Arab, or international standards, nor do I wish to speak about standards of truth, but I do want the same American standards to be applied here. No American or Israeli commitments came out of these talks.

[AL-SINNARAH] Bush said that peace will have to be achieved in accordance with Resolution 242 and the principle of land for peace. However, the tool by means of which that will be achieved remains to be determined. What tool does the PLO think should be used?

[Abu-'Ayyash] The PLO's desire for peace has been its declared and lasting position. Our need for peace is greater than that of any other nation because of the persecution which is practiced against us. The PLO thinks that if a total and just solution to that dispute is being sought, an international conference with full powers can come up with a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. This conference would be attended by the United Nations, Europe, America, and the parties to the dispute, foremost among which would be the official PLO delegation. The PLO thinks that any other proposals which are made to it will be investigated, discussed, and scrutinized. As far as I am concerned, however, what road we take to achieve our goal of an independent Palestinian state is not what matters. What matters is a declaration by the other party of its willingness to proclaim principles that include the following: the principle that the Palestinian people have the right to determine their own destiny, and the principle that the Palestinian people have the right to establish a homeland and an independent state. Looking into the details which would lead to that outcome is the subject of discussion and debate. It makes no difference to me whether we travel from Ramallah to Jerusalem by airplane, rocket, or car. It makes no difference to me even if we were to go on foot, as long as we have recognition of the main principle, which is recognition in advance that we will get to Jerusalem.

[AL-SINNARAH] Was that matter brought up during the meetings with Baker?

[Abu-'Ayyash] It certainly was. My colleagues informed me that it was, and the minutes of the meetings, which I read, told me that all matters which have to do with the bases of a settlement and all matters which have to do with the considerations on whose bases a solution could be reached were brought up at the meetings.

[AL-SINNARAH] What was the atmosphere like in the meeting with Baker? What did you hear about that from those who took part in that meeting?

[Abu-'Ayyash] The atmosphere was optimistic according to those who took part in the meeting. According to what I heard from Mr. Faysal and Mrs. Hanan, that optimism was tempered with caution. We should not be telling the Palestinian people that a solution will materialize after two, 10, or 20 meetings. The Palestinian people must rather understand that this is a lengthy and complicated process that requires time. And we have to realize that time is a decisive issue.

We must not be drawn into the maze of time. We must not wait for one Israeli government to be disbanded and for new elections to be called for, nor should we wait for one American administration to go out of office and new elections to be called for. We must not relegate the Palestinian file to oblivion once again. This is something that our Palestinian people have to understand.

[AL-SINNARAH] You said on Friday that the meeting which would be held on Saturday will be crucial. Will the delegation meet with Baker again based on the outcome of that Saturday meeting?

[Abu-'Ayyash] That decision will be made by Palestinian leaders. What I want to say is that those of us in the occupied land are messengers. We do not have the authority to make decisions on anything, but we can meet; we can listen; and we can serve as messengers.

[AL-SINNARAH] Shamir knows that the Palestinian delegation met with Baker with the consent of the PLO. Did Baker convey any reservations from Shamir about that?

[Abu-'Ayyash] No. As far as I know he did not convey any reservations. At any rate, no one has to point out the obvious.

"We Don't Have the Time To Say Yes or No Without Explaining Why"

[AL-SINNARAH] It is rumored that some people threatened to leave the PLO if it agreed to a regional conference. [Is that true?]

[Abu-'Ayyash] I have not heard anything about that. What I did hear is that there are different points of view. Some of these points of view support these meetings, and some do not. It is my hope as a Palestinian citizen working for the unity of the Palestinian rank that this unity remain strong and intact because it is the only assurance and safety valve guaranteeing that the Palestinian people are moving clearly toward their goals. I do believe, however, that all these issues will have to be reconsidered if visiting or meeting with a few officials will lead to differences that polarize and divide Palestinians. If that happens, I believe that we will have to settle these differences by means of a peaceful and balanced democratic dialogue. We should not be saying no or yes

without giving reasons why we are saying no or yes. We don't have the time to say yes or no without explaining why.

"All Attempts To Create an Alternative Leadership to That of the PLO Will Fail"

[AL-SINNARAH] The ministers of foreign affairs of eight Arab countries ignored the PLO in the statement they issued in Damascus after the Gulf war. Attempts are also being made in Syria to create an alternative leadership. Does the PLO still have access to channels of communication with Arab regimes in spite of these attempts?

[Abu-'Ayyash] Some of these channels are not accessible to the PLO, but some still are. The PLO is doing its part to maintain a favorable atmosphere with all the Arab countries for the liberation of Palestine. But when the Arab countries forget about the question of liberating Palestine and when they go too far in keeping those channels of communication closed, we tell them that it is the Palestinian people who decide who their leaders and representatives will be. We tell these Arab countries that no regime has the right to decide for us who our leaders should be. I would say that any attempt by any regime to set up leaders for the PLO will end in failure.

[AL-SINNARAH] Can you say how many such attempts were made?

[Abu-'Ayyash] We don't have to do that. Before the war these attempts were few, but they increased significantly after the war.

[AL-SINNARAH] What is the PLO's attitude toward the role played by the Soviet Union?

[Abu-'Ayyash] It is up to the Soviet Union to determine its position on the region, but it seems that the Soviet Union has moved away a little from the positions that are based on principle which governed it. There are many changes in the Soviet Union on all levels, but we hope that the official relationship between the Soviet Union and the leaders of the Palestinian people will continue to be one that is distinguished and based on moving the Palestinian people's efforts toward liberation.

[AL-SINNARAH] What about the French position?

[Abu-'Ayyash] France's position is good, but I believe that Palestinians have to try developing it. I believe that French officials understand what is going on in the region, but I also believe that understanding is not enough. France has to play a bigger role in the European Common Market to move the European position in its entirety closer to the achievement of a just solution in the region.

[AL-SINNARAH] What is the Palestinian people's assessment of the Gulf war?

[Abu-'Ayyash] An analysis of the Gulf war and its consequences and also of the circumstances that led up to that war requires volumes. I believe that the political consequences of that war have not yet taken shape. What is happening now in our region may be a part of the political consequences of that war. The outcome of the Gulf war will be determined by several factors, including that of Arab solidarity, a solution to the Palestinian question, the new U.S. strategy, and the East-West problem. What I can say now is this: the United States managed to get several Arab regimes to agree with its objectives and to go along with the American position.

[AL-SINNARAH] Given the new changes in the Arab world, the absence of the Soviet Union, and the continuation of the intifadah, what is the minimum that the Palestinian people will accept?

[Abu-'Ayyash] The Palestinian peace initiative is the minimum which the Palestinian people were asked to offer to start [the quest for] a just solution. Can we give the Palestinians anything less than a homeland and a state? Can we offer the Palestinian people anything less than their own identity? Can the Palestinians negotiate for anything less than that? The Palestinian initiative is the minimum, and no one can make concessions about that minimum solution. There are many issues which are not clear. What will be done about the 1948 refugees? What will be done about the Palestinians abroad? And what about the questions of water and land? What will be done about them and about the other questions that are pending and require clarification?

[AL-SINNARAH] It is being claimed that Yasir 'Arafat disqualified himself from the task of shaping a political solution because of his support for Saddam Husayn.

[Abu-'Ayyash] Regardless of all that, let us settle this matter with those who claim that Yasir 'Arafat is no longer a suitable leader for the Palestinian people. These people also claim that 'Arafat is therefore not suitable to negotiate [on their behalf]. Did the countries or ministers who are making such a claim have the Palestinian state "in the bag" before losing it because of Yasir 'Arafat's position? Such statements are intended to become another episode in the major conspiracy that is being contrived to get the PLO directly or indirectly out of the picture. This is what happened: no person can take a stance against himself. These were the feelings of a vanquished people who sided with that party which, they thought, could secure their salvation. Should we hold the Palestinian people accountable for their national emotions and feelings? Did those feelings translate themselves into tanks, half-tracks, airplanes, and military ammunition which were sent to Iraq? How can we ask a nation which has been subjugated for more than 24 years to side with a party that is against it?

"The Israeli Left Is Working for an Israeli Peace, and It Must Not Punish Us for the Way We Feel"

[AL-SINNARAH] What is the assessment of the PLO's leadership of the Israeli left and of its stance during the war?

[Abu-'Ayyash] We had an answer during the war to the positions of the Zionist and the non-Zionist Israeli left. When a certain peace movement or a certain group of leftists adopt certain principles, those principles must not be capricious or based on changing positions. They must instead be based on convictions. At any rate, that left wing group works for an Israeli peace, and when we have a Palestinian left wing group or left wing fighters, they strive for a Palestinian peace. Israeli left wing groups do us no favors with their movement, and we do them no favors with our movement and our struggle. Peace is an issue which the Palestinian and the Israeli peoples have in common. I believe that a new process is underway of formulating all the positions that were taken. I do not believe that the Palestinian people should be punished for the way they feel. We have not yet punished people for what they did. Some people made mistakes, but we did not set up courts to put them on trial and to punish them. The Israelis should not be talking about feelings because that is an issue that concerns the Palestinian people. It is an issue that stems from continued pressure and subjugation. If the Israeli government had been perceptive, it would have offered a solution guaranteeing peaceful coexistence in this region.

[AL-SINNARAH] We are hearing today about the Kurdish question, and we are seeing an extraordinary interest worldwide in that question. What do you have to say about that?

[Abu-'Ayyash] The Iraqi government opened the door to those who left their homes and their towns during the war. It is letting them go back to their homes, and it is making it easier for them to do so. I believe that what is happening as a result of the war should not be allowed to happen at the expense of human beings wherever they may be. I would say that we should not be investigating the outcome without getting into the reason for that outcome. For example, why weren't the Kurds driven out of their homes before the war against Iraq, and why weren't the Shi'ites driven out of their homes before the war against Iraq? We should not be considering the question of refugees without looking into the reason why these people became refugees, namely, the U.S. aggression against Iraq.

We as a people support the return of the Kurds to their homes in Iraq under the legitimate government that was elected by the Iraqi people. We do not want anyone driven out of his home, but we are asking those who are shedding tears for the homeless Kurds to take a look at the homeless Palestinian people. What about those homeless Palestinian refugees in Sabra, Shatila, al-Yarmuk, Shinlar, and al-Husayn? We do not like the sight of any homeless Arab. That is why Kurds and Shi'ites should go back to their homes and solve their problems in the context of their own country.

Birth, Death Statistics in Gaza Strip

91AE0421C Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 4 May 91 pp 47-48

[Article by Rashad al-Madani: "Statistical Readings Regarding Births and Deaths in the Gaza Strip"]

[Text] Childbearing in Palestinian society is one of the basic goals of Palestinian social life. The Palestinian strives to get married, have a family, raise children, and care for and teach them, so that they will support him in the future, serving the family and nation. Palestinians, in general, have been noted for their love of having children, especially in the Gaza Strip, where the number of births each month for the past three years fluctuated between 2,500 and 3,000 births. This means that there is a continual, natural increase in population, through the annual increase in births. Accordingly, population growth rates, and the annual increase, impact on the demographic and economic composition of the population. Therefore, all nations and societies exert efforts, devise plans and programs, and adopt necessary measures and procedures—in all fields—to contain this natural population increase.

Live Births in Various Years

The number of births in the Gaza Strip for 1970 was 16,000. In 1980, the total was 21,436 births, rising to 33,142 in 1990. (See Table No. 1)

Table No. 1

Live Births in Gaza Strip 1970-90

Year	Number of Births in Thousands
1970	16,000
1971	17,500
1972	18,300
1973	19,500
1974	21,100
1975	21,600
1976	22,400
1977	22,000
1978	22,800
1980	21,400
1981	21,900
1983	22,200
1984	24,200
1985	23,500
1986	25,200
1987	26,100
1988	27,375
1989	32,463
1990	33,142

The following data is clear from Table No. 1:

The number of births in the three year period 1971, 1972, 1973, totaled 51,800. In the years 1976, 1977, 1978, total births were 67,200. In 1985, 1986, 1987, the total was 74,800, while in 1988, 1989, 1990, births totaled 92,800. (There were 180 additional births in the last three years, as differences in decimal fractions.)

This means that there was a continual increase in numbers of births. By comparing the number of births in the three years before the incidents, which total 74,800, with the 92,980 in the next three years, it is evident that there was a large and significant increase in numbers of births, which the population of the Gaza Strip had not previously attained. The cause of that is attributable to the considerable propensity of the Palestinians for childbearing, as well as the large, significant increase in marriages, because of the reduction in doweries, as a result of deteriorating economic conditions, and the people's need for family continuity and stable social relations. The number of marriages in 1988, 1989, and 1990 totaled 24,471, compared to 17,906 marriages in 1985, 1986, and 1987.

Place of Birth

A large number of births took place in governmental and non-governmental hospitals and clinics, and at home, by means of midwives. See Table No. 2.

Table No. 2

Births in Hospitals and Clinics for Various Years

Year	Number of Births in Hospitals and Clinics
1981	8,905
1982	10,973
1983	11,031
1984	12,507
1985	11,852
1986	13,468
1987	14,198
1988	21,877
1989	20,705
1990	21,459

Number of Births at Home (See Table No. 3)

Table No. 3

Year	Number of Births at Home
1985	11,648
1986	11,732
1987	11,915
1988	5,498
1989	11,758
1990	11,683

Live Births From 9/12/87 to 1/3/91

The number of births in the Gaza Strip from the start of the incidents until 1 March 1991 was 99,994, distributed as to time period as shown in Table No. 4.

Table No. 4

Distribution of Births in Gaza Strip by Time Period from 9 December 1987 to 1 March 1991

Time Period	Numbers of Births
9/12/87 - 31/12/87	1,470
1/1/88 - 31/12/88	27,375
1/1/89 - 31/12/89	32,463
1/1/90 - 31/12/90	33,142
1/1/91 - 1/3/91	5,544
Total	99,994

Distribution of Live Births in Last Three Years, According to Region (See Table No. 5)

Table No. 5

Region	Number of Births, 1988	Number of Births, 1989	Number of Births, 1990
Northern Region	4,931	6,330	5,973
Gaza	10,178	12,597	12,260
Central Region	3,474	4,212	4,472
Khan Yunis	5,452	5,838	6,553
Rafah	3,340	3,486	3,924
Total	27,375	32,463	33,142

The following data is clear from Table No. 5:

The largest number of births was in Gaza—including al-Shati' Camp—inasmuch as the total for those three years was 35,035, i.e., an average of 973 births per month. The northern region, which includes Jabaliyah Camp, Bayt Lahiya, and Bayt Hanun, ranks second after Gaza, with a total of 17,194 births in those three years.

The following data is clear from Table No. 6:

Table No. 6

Distribution of Births According to Place of Birth (1988-90)

Place of Birth	Number of Births, 1988	Percent of Total Births	Number of Births, 1989	Percent of Total Births	Number of Births, 1990	Percent of Total Births
Al-Shafa' Hospital	10,069	36.8	9,068	24	7,858	23.7
Agency clinics	5,786	21.2	5,742	17.7	7,979	24.1
At home	5,498	20.1	11,758	36.2	11,683	35.3
Khan Yunis Hospital	4,474	16.3	4,448	13.7	4,015	12.1
Al-Shaja'iyah Clinic	692	2.5	566	1.8	332	1
Dayr al-Balh Clinic	471	1.7	205	.6	127	.4
Al-Ahli Hospital	385	1.4	671	2	622	2
Tal al-Sultan in Rafah	—	—	5	—	44	—
Mahdi Hospital	—	—	—	—	447	1.4
Society of Friends of the Ill	—	—	—	—	35	—
Total	27,375	100	32,463	100	33,142	100

The largest number of child deliveries occurred at home, the three year total being 28,939. Despite the fact that this number of births was officially recorded in the health offices concerned as being home deliveries, the definition of home delivery includes certain centers, clinics, and doctors who carry out child deliveries on their individual and private responsibility. Some investigatory medical sources in the Gaza Strip point out that the real percentage of at home deliveries, carried out by midwives, does not exceed 16 percent of the total of all births.

The number of deliveries in al-Shafa' Hospital is in second place, according to official reports, with the three-year total at that hospital being 26,995 births. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of actual child deliveries in that specific hospital, al-Shafa' has the largest number of births.

Child Deaths

If the number of births gives a special indication of the socio-economic structure of society, the ratio of child deaths is another important indicator that reflects a picture of health conditions in any society. The ratio of child deaths is the number of children who die for health reasons, during the first year of their lives, per 1,000 births. Despite the fact that most studies cite different ratios for child deaths in the Gaza Strip (43 per 1000 births, or 120, or 80), investigatory medical sources concerned in the Gaza Strip confirm that the ratio of child deaths in the Gaza Strip—in general—fluctuates between 30 and 35 deaths per 1,000 births, while this ratio does not exceed 17 per 1,000 in Israel.

The basic causes for child deaths in the Gaza Strip are contagious intestinal diseases and diseases of the respiratory system, in addition to anemia and malnutrition.

Deaths for Various Years

The number of deaths in the Gaza Strip in 1970 was 7,200, with 7,400 in 1973 and 8,700 in 1978, compared to 2,715 deaths in 1987, 2,724 in 1988, and 3,073 in 1990. (See Table No. 7)

Table No. 7

Deaths in Gaza Strip for Various Years

Year	Number of Deaths
1970	7,200
1971	6,900
1972	6,800
1973	7,400
1974	7,900
1975	7,800
1976	7,600
1977	6,700
1978	8,700
1987	2,715
1988	2,724
1989	2,792
1990	3,073

Table No. 8

Distribution of Deaths in Gaza Strip by Age for 1988, 1989		
Age of Death/Year	Number of Deaths 1988	Number of Deaths 1989
0-1	760	735
1-4	186	159
5-19	230	248
20-44	178	159
45-64	536	490
65+	834	1,001
Total	2,724	2,792

Table No. 9

Distribution of Deaths in Gaza Strip by Region for 1990	
Region	Number of Deaths
Northern Region	526
Gaza	1,071
Central Region	458
Khan Yunis	635
Rafah	383
Total	3,073

Sources:

1. Gaza Strip hospitals and clinics
2. Personal interviews with certain doctors
3. Shar'iyah Appeals Court—Gaza
4. AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI—numerous issues
5. POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE IN GAZA STRIP by Dr. Mahmud 'Ukashah, Arab Intellectual Center, Jerusalem, 1990.

ALGERIA**Article Examines Army Role With Bendjedid, FIS**

9IAA0451A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
16 Jun 91 p 3

[Article by Qusayy Salih al-Darwish: "Army in Bendjedid's Calculations Not an Independent Force"]

[Excerpts] Paris-Algiers (AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT)—Events in Algeria have spotlighted the army. Its intensified presence and the broad powers that have been granted to it have raised many questions about the reality and extent of its role and the possibility that it will develop toward steering the country's political affairs. Some have gone so far as to say that the soldiers who have entered politics this time through the front door will not leave it through the window. Others think that recent events in Algeria have revealed that the military establishment is still the most important card on the

Algerian political scene, despite the great strides that Algerian democracy has made, and despite the army's theoretical avoidance of politics—an avoidance that in practice has been translated into the withdrawal of military men from the FLN and a separation between the military establishment and its political wing, the FLN.

Recent events certainly did not reveal this reality. They merely confirmed it, for no observer, serious politician, or political party has left the army out of his calculations in dealing with Algerian reality.

Recent events therefore did not return the army to the arena of political decisionmaking, which it had never in practice left. They did, however, restore the army's standing. In the wake of the army's violent intervention to halt the disturbances in the streets, people now feel that it has paid for the bloody events of October 1988. From this point of view there is justification to believe that the army has come out ahead in the confrontation that the FIS began in the streets.

Those who have been in contact with decisionmakers in the military establishment in recent months say that there was a red line that the military men would allow no one to cross. In this talk, it was difficult to distinguish what the army's military or political leaders were saying from what the president was saying and intending. In fact, ever since Colonel Chadli Bendjedid assumed the presidency of Algeria 12 years ago, his relationship with the army has been circumscribed by the following equation: Chadli Bendjedid is president of the republic and commander of the army; more than that, he is its symbol, and the army is an instrument of governance and political standing for President Bendjedid.

Many people mistakenly imagine that the army used to be an institution independent of President Bendjedid. Although Bendjedid has not interfered in the daily life of the military establishment as his late predecessor Houari Boumedienne used to do, he has never lost sight of it. The withdrawal of military men from the FLN was not a spontaneous decision, as was imagined at the time; it was a decision of President Chadli—part of a political program that he presented, or rather adopted and ordered implemented. [passage omitted]

Since Taher Zbeiri's attempted coup in 1968, the Algerian army has shown no desire to go outside the framework of legitimacy. On the contrary, the Algerian army throughout this period has shown particular sensitivity for the stability of the country. This may spring from the fact that the Algerian army is an organic historical extension of the FLN, which believes in its collective conscience that the Algerian state is the real expression of the independence for which the FLN fought. This belief is especially strong because Algeria was deprived of the existence of an independent Algerian state for nearly a century and a half.

Role of Military Intelligence

Unlike the late President Houari Boumedienne, Bendjedid has not used excessive and premature wariness in dealing with senior military men. True, he retired a large

number of them; however, he also reduced the importance of military intelligence, whose influence had culminated during the time of Kasdi Merbah, so that then every senior office was under intensive surveillance. He restored the standing of the army's leadership by again creating a general staff organization, after it had been abolished in the wake of Zbeiri's attempted coup. Furthermore, he restored the standing of the Defense Ministry. For the first time since Houari Boumedienne's coup on 19 June 1965, he appointed a defense minister. Although Chadli Bendjedid watches from a distance what happens in the military and intervenes to decide certain things, he has not supervised the details of army affairs directly and on a daily basis as his predecessor Houari Boumedienne used to do, who kept the Defense Ministry as part of the presidency. [passage omitted]

During the past two years, as chaos has begun to increase with the progress of democratic practice, Bendjedid has given certain military officials room for political expression in the information media. [passage omitted]

Although the influence of Khaled Nezar today seems decisively important, there is nothing to prove that he has become a power center independent of the president. To date, the army and the defense minister have not departed from the framework that Bendjedid has defined and sanctioned. The two times the army intervened, it did so at the personal decision of Bendjedid. Some go so far as to say that Bendjedid's interest today requires that he say or that it be said that the army is exerting pressure and that its tolerance for the chaos of democracy is limited.

To date, there is nothing that permits one to say that there is a conflict of interests between the institution of the presidency and the military institution. In addition to the military side of Bendjedid's personality, the secretary general of the presidential staff, Major General Larbi Belkheir, is a military man who continues to hold his military rank. General Belkheir preferred keeping his military uniform to remaining in the FLN and its leadership bodies. The director of protocol in the presidential staff is a military man, Colonel Noureddine Kartobi. The president's adviser for security affairs is a military man, Major General Hocine Benmoualem. Along with the defense minister, the head of the national police (Major General Abbas Ghozil), and the head of military intelligence (Major General Tawfiq), these men form the innermost circle around the president. They participate directly or indirectly in drafting the most important resolutions that are presented to President Bendjedid for his decision. [passage omitted]

Obscure Aspects

The clearly visible relations between the military leadership and the presidency today do not negate the existence of obscure and shadowy aspects in the picture of the military establishment. These aspects can be translated into basic questions that are crucial for an understanding

of how the Algerian army's role may develop in the political arena under various future contingencies.

One pressing question to which there is virtually no answer concerns the extent to which fundamentalists have infiltrated the army, particularly at the junior and noncommissioned officer level. Some people have offered ideas on the subject, but they are more like guesses than information. One can say that to date no one has heard of a movement of liquidations in the army on the charge of belonging to any fundamentalist movement.

Another question concerns the true relationship between groups of army officers, particularly second-echelon officers, and historic FLN figures who are now on the sidelines—at least for the time being. Foremost among them is former Foreign Minister Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi. For a number of years he has been showing great interest in developing his personal connections in the military establishment—so much so that some journalistic circles have been led to believe that he could be the army's candidate. There are indications that Taleb Ibrahimi is quietly nurturing such talk and encouraging its spread. Another figure is Colonel Mohammed Saleh Yahiaoui, a member of the Council of the Revolution (before it was dissolved) and former coordinator of the party apparatus. Although Yahiaoui left the military establishment during the mid-seventies to assume the task of building up the FLN party on commission from Boumedienne, he maintained something of a military identity. He even kept his military position for a number of years, while devoting himself to working inside the political organization. He also kept up his many army connections that were formed during the period when he supervised the graduation of several generations of officers as director of Cherchell Military College for many services over many years and during his previous period as field commander for several sensitive military districts.

Another question concerns the position that military leaders will take toward the regime if Bendjedid relinquishes the presidency, however this may occur. If Bendjedid is no longer president, will the map of power relations within the military establishment itself change in view of the fact that Bendjedid was not merely the controller of these relations, but also their creator and protector?

Coexistence With the Parties

It would seem that these questions must be answered if one is to answer a broader and more important question: Can the Algerian army accept coexistence with a doctrinaire political regime, whether of fundamentalist tendency like the FIS, or of Berber tendency like the FFS? Can it coexist with another president who is nonmilitary? If yes, what might power relations be like between them? Will a president who comes from the political party community—a civilian president who has not come from the military establishment—be able to control the army and keep it out of politics as has happened

until now under Bendjedid or as happened in a different way under Houari Boumediene?

What is certain today is that no president can come to power whom the army opposes or does not approve. This fact may have played a part in destroying the dream of Hamrouche, just as it once blocked the dreams of Kasdi Merbah.

It should be mentioned that the FIS, particularly Abassi Madani, and to a lesser extent Ali Belhadj, realize this fact and deal with it as a given. Abassi Madani has therefore been careful until now to avoid attacking or criticizing the army. Thus, when Moustafa Chelloufi issued his notorious statement, the FIS leaders replied to him personally, not to the military as an institution.

The problem, as an Algerian diplomat told me last weekend, is that some political parties that are raising the slogans of democracy have not yet understood this fact.

New Human Rights Minister Discusses Role in Crisis

91AA0505A Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Jul 91 p 6

[Article by Georges Marion: "Human Rights Minister States: 'If I Am Only an Alibi, I Will Resign'"]

[Text] Because he is convinced that even under a regime during a state of siege, and particularly under such circumstances, his role is of the first importance, Dr. Ali Haroun, minister of human rights, would hardly appreciate not having his mission taken seriously. This lawyer said: "I had nothing to gain in this matter." During the 1960's and 1970's, under the iron rule of President Boumediene, he took part in several political trials. He stated: "If I see that I am only an alibi and that my powers are considered to be of no significance, I will resign."

Working out of a modest office in the hills of Algiers with his secretary and a telephone, he has to start from scratch. How can he, the first minister of human rights in the Arab world, share his concerns with his colleagues and particularly with the military, who are charged with restoring order in the country? This is a tough question to which he has no set answer. So he is feeling his way. He trusts people because in any case he cannot function in any other way. Later on he will see whether he was right.

He said: "I am convinced that the army is prepared to play the game of democracy, of clarity, and of openness." In any case it is the military who assembled the statistics that the minister has available. From 30 June, when the army began its operation against the FIS [Islamist Salvation Front], until 3 July at 0600 a total of 1,286 persons were interrogated. They are being held in the prisons of five military regions.

Not a Display

There are 297 detainees in the military region of Blida; 176 in Oran; 182 in Constantine; and 126 in Algiers, among whom are Madani, Benhadj, and six other members of the board of directors of the Islamist movement. All of them are being held in the military prison of Blida. The southern part of Algeria does not seem to have been affected by the troubles. Only four persons were arrested in the military region of Bechar and none in the military region of Tamanrasset. On the other hand, in the military region of Ouargla the security forces for some reason showed unexpected zeal by interrogating 501 persons.

The same sources report that beginning on 6 June, the day after the proclamation of the state of siege, and up to the morning of 3 July a total of 184 persons were wounded, including 19 members of the security forces. During the same period 30 persons were killed, including four military and police personnel. Doctor Haroun admits that some victims may not be included in this list. However, as a whole, these figures seem reliable, and he has no reason to question the integrity of those who prepared this list. Doctor Haroun said: "All of my requests have been met, without exception. Why should I have any doubts in the absence of evidence to the contrary?"

A committee for safeguarding public order was created in each of the 48 "wilayas" (prefectures in Algeria). Headed by a military officer with responsibility for expressing his views on the exceptional measures that have been taken, the "wilayas" include the "wali" (prefect), a police commissioner, a commander of the Gendarmerie, and, the decree setting up the state of siege added: "Two persons known for their devotion to the public interest." The minister stated: "This last provision is not a trick. We have been careful to ensure that the persons in question are not left to be mere figureheads. Because they know what repression means, the two persons whom I chose for the 'wilaya' of Algiers are a woman lawyer and a veteran soldier who had been imprisoned and tortured by French troops during the war of independence."

Recent decrees also provide for the possibility of appealing a decision that violates individual freedoms before a higher level office, the Council for Safeguarding Public Order, which includes in its ranks three persons "chosen for their devotion to the public interest," and who will shortly be appointed by an interministerial council. The minister added: "The army accepts the need for a check on the state of siege. It understands that repression is not a long-term solution. It is inevitable that in a short time I will no doubt be appealed to by prisoners or their families regarding violations of their rights. You may be sure that I will intervene. We will not let this kind of thing continue." The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) should quickly come and see at first hand what is going on.

EGYPT

Editorial Expresses Annoyance at Cheney Visit

91AA0461A Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic
12 Jun 91 p 17

[Mamduh Lutfi Editorial: "Cheney's Joke"]

[Text] It seems that U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney is aware that the Egyptian people love a joke. So he decided not to leave Cairo without trying his luck at telling a joke as a courtesy.

Answering a question during his visit to Cairo last week, Cheney said verbatim:

"To my knowledge, Israel has never declared that it has any nuclear capabilities."

Thus, Cheney has embraced a constant U.S. policy position defined in refusing to acknowledge that Israel possesses atomic weapons and in giving the false impression that it possesses no such weapons.

It seems that the U.S. secretary of defense is an extremely humble man who wants us not to imagine that the United States is a superpower and not to be misled by the reports reiterated about its artificial satellites and its listening and other espionage equipment that can pick up the rustle of tree leaves and can photograph an embryo in its mother's womb. Cheney wants us not to exaggerate regarding the CIA's capabilities and not to believe its successive reports since the 1960's to this time about Israel's nuclear capabilities. Israel is not a nuclear power or anything of the sort!

We wish we could believe Richard Cheney and could be reassured by his words. But what can we do when the logic of things, proofs, and evidence say something different?

The fact is that from the time Israel was created in 1948, one of Ben Gurion's objectives was atomic energy as a means for acquiring a nuclear military power that makes Israel an unrivaled force in the Middle East and that provides the definite guarantee of Israel's survival. What can we do if the CIA analysts concluded in the late 1960's that Israel was creating a striking nuclear force based on submarines, especially because submarines are the most secure missile-launching pads and because it is difficult for an enemy to determine their positions? What can we say to the U.S. TIME magazine which, relying on intelligence reports, reported in late 1973 that during the 6 October War Israel deployed its Phantom warplanes in the air to use them to drop atomic bombs as a last resort against the pressures it was facing on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts?

What shall we do with Moshe Dayan's statement in 1976 that the Israeli nuclear option was no longer secret and that he believed that such things should not be concealed?

In 1980, the ex-chairman of the French Atomic Energy Commission, a man closely connected with the Israeli nuclear program, stated that Israel had the capability to produce one to two bombs annually. What shall we do with the story of Mordekhay Vanunu, the nuclear technician who exposed the Israeli nuclear program a few years ago and who was kidnaped from Italy by Mosad agents, tried in Israel in 1988, and sentenced to an 18-year prison term as a traitor?

What does Richard Cheney say to the admission ex-Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin made in a lecture he gave at Haifa University last Thursday that Israel possesses nuclear weapons and mass destruction weapons capable of annihilating any country!

Israel is the Middle East's first nuclear power. It has been and it continues to be the region's sole nuclear power. Western reports say that it possesses 100-200 atomic bombs. Washington keeps a tight lip on and ignores Israel's nuclear arsenal even though it detonates one uproar after another vis-a-vis any Arab attempt—just an attempt—to acquire sophisticated technology. Cheney has tried his luck at telling jokes in Cairo but nobody has laughed at his jokes.

Extremist Activities Near al-Minya Reported

Jihad Activity in Biba

91AA0509A Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 3 Jul 91 p 3

[Article by Muhammad Ibrahim 'Uways: "Biba Incidents Sparked by Escape of Jihad Organization Member; Security Agencies Conceal News for Fear of Questioning"]

[Text] Prosecution investigations have shown that the Biba town incidents were the result of the escape of a prominent Jihad Organization member in Bani Suwayf Governorate. Security agencies continue to conceal the news of his escape for fear of scandal and questioning, especially since the governorate witnessed two months ago the escape of Safwat 'Abd-al-Ghani, a defendant charged in the assassination of Dr. Rif'at al-Mahjub, in almost the same manner.

Security forces cordoned off Jihad's area of influence on the fourth of the al-Adha holiday in an attempt to seize 'Id 'Ali 'Abd-al-Jawad, the escaped defendant. This led to violent clashes between the two sides in front of al-Rahman Mosque. As a consequence, Jihad member 'Abd-al-Ghani 'Abd-al-Hakim was killed and four other Jihad members were wounded seriously. Five policemen were also wounded by bricks and stones hurled at them by the group members.

Investigations have also revealed that the group's leader and the escaped member were inside the mosque during the security forces' attack and that they were able to escape anew!

The prosecution has decided to jail members for 15 days for interrogation. Counselor 'Umar Burayk, the public prosecutor for Bani Suwayf, has told the inhabitants that investigations have proven that the police opened fire only for the purpose of intimidation, that the surprise sprung by the group member against the police created a "necessity," embodied in the need to avoid injuries, and that this is why the police used weapons.

Mahmud Shadi, the Biba town prosecution chief, has added that the prosecution is awaiting the medical report on injuries and that it may summon a number of police officers, including Colonel Hasan Shalqami, the governorate's criminal investigations chief; Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Hasan, the Biba town investigations chief; and Mu'awwad Abu-Jalil, an officer in the investigations section. On their part, the security agencies have arrested another number of Jihad members and their relatives without referring to the prosecution. This chain of events started on the day prior to the al-Adha holiday when escaped defendant 'Id 'Ali 'Abd-al-Jawad collected donations to buy meat for the poor. When the police confronted him, he attacked them and beat First Lieutenant Ramadan Manaf. As a result, the Jihad member was arrested and detained at the Biba police station.

On the following day, a number of Jihad members were caught distributing pamphlets entitled: "Flow, Martyr's Blood." The prosecution decided to jail 'Abd-al-Nasir Mansur for 15 days. Others fled, including Muhammad Ahmad Khalifah, the group's current leader, and 'Abd-al-Ghani 'Abd-al-Hakim, his deputy. The prosecution instructed that these two be arrested and detained on the strength of the same case.

The escape from the Biba police station occurred at noon on the third day of the holiday under circumstances and conditions similar to those under which Safwat 'Abd-al-Ghani had escaped. During a visit by his relatives, the defendant took advantage of the inattention of the guard who were preoccupied with another escape and slipped away quietly, fleeing in the opposite direction.

In view of the critical nature of the situation, the Biba police station did not inform the Bani Suwayf Security Directorate of the escape and tried, with the help of a lawyer, to persuade the defendant's family to hand him over. But the family procrastinated until they were certain that he had disappeared. Thus, the Biba police were compelled to inform the directorate on the dawn of Tuesday, 25 June.

Central security and counter-terrorism forces were summoned from al-Minya Governorate and arrived at noon on the same day. They cordoned the area around al-Rahman Mosque, Jihad's stronghold in Biba. The two sides exchanged fire and five security members were wounded, including First Lieutenant Ayman Muhammad 'Id, Warrant Officer 'Abd-al-Wahhab Dakruri, and Staff Sergeant Muhammad 'Imran. Four Jihad members were also wounded, namely: Khalid

'Uways, Sa'id Muhammad Badawi, Khalid Zakariya Zaki, and Ghanim Husayn, and were taken to Bani Suwayf General Hospital because of their serious wounds. 'Abd-al-Ghani 'Abd-al-Hakim, nicknamed 'Abbud, was killed on the spot. [Words illegible] the prosecution has also heard the statements of the Biba police station commander and of other police officers and policemen.

On the other hand, the town of Biba and the surrounding villages are witnessing the arrest of numerous young men without reference to the prosecution.

During his tour of the town, an AL-AHALI reporter was told by many citizens that Jihad's influence has proliferated recently because Jihad leaders are tied to some National Party leaders by interests connected with land formed by the river's alluvial deposits.

On the other hand, Jihad members have opposed the youth and social affairs directorates and blocked all outlets for youth and social activities that swerve from their plan without any opposition from any official circle. Thus, their influence in the area has proliferated.

Anti-Christian Campaign

91AA0509B Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 3 Jul 91 p 3

[Article by 'Abd-al-Rahim 'Ali: "Radical Groups Parade Their Muscle in al-Minya While Security Pursues Citizens on Pretext of Offending Decency"]

[Text] In the past few days, the city of al-Minya has witnessed muscle-parade processions staged by members of radical religious groups on the occasion of the al-Adha Holiday. During the processions, pamphlets inciting hatred for Christians were distributed. On the other hand, the security forces staged inspection campaigns against hotels. A diplomatic crisis was about to erupt as a result of the arrest of a Belgian tourist and his girlfriend on the pretext of offending public decency. Meanwhile, the al-Minya police precinct was filled with a large number of citizens who were arrested on no specific charges.

The religious groups have regained their influence recently in the wake of the release of their leaders from jail, including Muhammad Mukhtar and Muhammad Abu-Tabanjah, and the escape of others from the al-Minya police jail, namely Sharif Abu-Tabanjah, Mustafa Abu-al-Hawa, and 'Ala' Sabir. Moreover, they have regained control of al-Rahman Mosque after it had been decided that it would be annexed to the religious trusts.

Immediately before the holiday, the religious group marched in the streets of south al-Minya to collect donations and then held an enormous celebration in front of al-Rahman Mosque and distributed a pamphlet instigating hatred for Christians by virtue of their being the cause of the ordeal that has afflicted the group and its supporters. Nobody from the police confronted the march. Meanwhile, Colonel 'Abd-al-Haqq al-Rubi was

leading an inspection campaign against hotels and arresting a number of cafeteria clients who were presented to the prosecution on the charge of indecency. But the prosecution released them without bail and decided to file the case away because the Ministry of Tourism has issued a license permitting these tourist businesses to operate throughout the day.

In a serious development, the security forces arrested a Belgian tourist and his girlfriend on the pretext of public indecent exposure because they wore shorts. But the station officer refused to issue them a citation when the tourist threatened to inform his embassy.

On the day of the holiday, more than 50 masked men went to the home of Ahmad Husni, a student at the Fine Arts College, to discipline him for swerving from the morals of Islam, as the student himself has said, adding: When I went to the police station to report the incident, I was referred to the prosecution and detained at the station where some radicals attacked and beat me severely in front of the station officers. They then put me in the criminal detention section where I was again beaten, where my belongings were stolen, and where I was threatened with rape if I repeated my complaint!

This incident was enough for the AL-AHALI reporter to fabricate a fight that would lead to his arrest. His plan succeeded and he infiltrated the jail officially. There, numerous other amazing tales were told.

Detention and Detention

Inside the police station jail rooms, AL-AHALI noticed that radicals enjoyed good treatment in a special room provided with an air conditioner and furniture. Moreover, they were allowed to have private visitors. On the other hand, the detention section combined ordinary citizens with habitual criminals and with people who have a criminal record. What was surprising is that many citizens were detained unjustifiably and that they had all been involved in ordinary quarrels with other people. Those citizens included:

'Abd-al-Ra'uf Hassan, a retired worker whose release was ordered by the prosecution on 15 June. He is still detained and nobody knows anything about him.

'Abd-al-Nasir Amin Jabir, a house painter, whose release was ordered by the prosecution on 11 June. He is still detained.

Rabi' Farraj Hasan, a 60-year old roving vendor, who has been detained without reference to the prosecution because of a quarrel with his half-brother who works as an informer with the police section.

Muhsin Ahmad 'Abd-al-Hakim was released on 12 June. He was subjected to torture in an attempt to make him work as a police informer.

When confronted with these details, Muhammad Sultan, the district capital prosecution chief, said that the police agency is empowered to detain a citizen for 24 hours

only. Any detention beyond this duration is a crime subject to investigation as soon as it is reported.

Regarding the treatment of citizens at the police station, the prosecution chief said: If this is true, then it is illegal. Prison regulations have classified criminals according to type of crime. It is unreasonable to detain somebody brought in because of a car accident or an ordinary quarrel in jail rooms housing hardened criminals. More than one place must be set aside for detention. If the police are not doing this, then we must investigate the matter. We inspect detention in police stations periodically. In case it is proven that violations exist, investigations are conducted immediately.

Sa'd 'Abbudah, a member of al-Minya Local People's Council, has said that he will raise the issue for debate so that these conditions from which the citizens suffer could be eliminated and so that the slogan of the "police in the people's service" could be truly implemented.

When AL-AHALI tried to interview Major General Rafiq Hijazi, al-Minya security chief, to explore his opinion, he declined to be interviewed and said that he has strict instructions from the minister of interior not to make any press statements.

Article Gives Facts From Mahjub Murder Investigation

91AA0461B Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic
12 Jun 91 p 11

[Article by Ra'fat Butrus: "After Latest Fall, Jihad's Military Wing Fragmented"]

[Text] How did the security forces manage to blockade Bulaq al-Dakrur? How did terrorist Yasir 'Abd-al-Hakam die? Why is the military wing of the Jihad Organization disjointed and doesn't have leaders? How was terrorist 'Ala' Abu-al-Nasr, the sixth defendant in Dr. Mahjub's case, wounded? What is the significance of the downfall of these two terrorists, with the first killed and the second wounded and arrested to be tried?

Last Saturday, the Bulaq al-Dakrur area witnessed a major battle between police forces and some elements of the Jihad Organization. As a result, one of these elements was killed and another suffered serious wounds.

It has been found that the individual killed is terrorist Yasir 'Abd-al-Hakam Khattab, the seventh defendant in the assassination of Dr. al-Mahjub. 'Ala' Abu-al-Nasr, the wounded terrorist, is the sixth defendant in this case.

Initial reports received by the state security agencies indicated that there had been some activity among elements of the Jihad Organization recently, that the movement covered the governorates of Cairo, al-Jizah, and al-Qalyubiyah, and that those involved in the activity are dangerous terrorists, some of them escaped defendants involved in Dr. al-Mahjub's assassination case.

The reports added that Safwat 'Abd-al-Ghani, an escaped defendant, had begun to come out from his hiding place for quick visits to some places where these elements are found to prepare for the perpetration of more incidents.

Total Blockade of Area

The security forces were able to determine these places which are used as dens for these terrorists in the areas of al-Haram, al-'Imranyah, and Bulaq al-Dakrur.

Information received through a concerted surveillance of these areas indicated that some elements of the organization were frequenting the Bulaq al-Dakrur area and meeting there at times inside Nur al-Islam [Light of Islam] Mosque and at other times in apartments set aside for the purpose.

Through their surveillance activity, the security agencies were able to ascertain that terrorists Yasir 'Abd-al-Hakim and 'Ala' Abu-al-Nasr had made an appointment to go to this mosque to meet some Jihad Organization members there before noon prayers.

Quietly, the security agencies were studying the area thoroughly—its entrances, its exits, and the spots where the forces can hide while waiting for the set appointment.

Moments before the call for noon prayers, the two terrorists appeared at the beginning of the street. Just before heading for the mosque, where they were to meet with the other terrorists, the two men became aware of the presence of the police forces. Terrorist Yasir pulled out his gun quickly and started firing with the purpose of killing security men.

There was an exchange of fire and terrorist Yasir was hit by 13 bullets which killed him immediately while 'Ala', his colleague, was hit in the head and was taken to al-Haram Hospital under heavy guard to be treated there.

In those moments, the security forces, acting on orders received, proceeded to blockade the area located behind the Arts Academy and the Sayyid Darwish Hall and attacked some of the dens of these radicals, managing to arrest four of them.

It is well known that next to Safwat 'Abd-al-Ghani, a terrorist who managed to escape recently, terrorists Yasir 'Abd-al-Hakam and 'Ala' Tantawi are considered two of Jihad Organization's most dangerous members. They are members of the radical groups in al-Jizah and they embrace the ideology of the Jihad Group in particular. They, along with the escaped Safwat 'Abd-al-Ghani, had agreed with others to assassinate a number of public and security figures in order to spread chaos in the country and to disturb its security.

Jihad's Military Wing

On the day Dr. Rif'at al-Mahjub was assassinated, the terrorists proceeded to a spot through which they were certain Dr. al-Mahjub was going to pass and laid their ambush at the point where Qasr al-Nil Bridge meets the Nile Corniche Street across Semiramis Hotel. When Mahjub's motorcade arrived, terrorist 'Ala' Abu-al-Nasr hastened to open fire on the guard vehicle accompanying the motorcade while terrorist Yasir 'Abd-al-Hakam threatened and terrorized the citizens found at the site of the incident.

It has also become evident from the investigations conducted at the time that these terrorists had prepared a number of counterfeit official documents to be used for fleeing the country. They also had motorcycles waiting and they used them to escape after assassinating Dr. al-Mahjub.

It is worth noting that the recently-wounded 'Ala' Abu-al-Nasr is one of the most important cadres of the military wing of the Jihad Organization and that he had participated more than once in attempts at the life of Minister of Interior Major General 'Abd-al-Halim Musa. The most serious attempt was made when 'Ala' brought a big explosive charge, a barrel filled with explosives, and several grenades to use them to blow up the motorcade of the interior minister upon the minister's return to his home.

His attempt failed but he did not despair. 'Ala' tried again, enlisting the help of six terrorists from the same organization. But God be thanked, all those attempts failed.

One element arrested behind the Arts Academy is terrorist Tariq al-Sayyid Musaylihi, a man accused of staging the attempt on the life of ex-Minister of Interior Major General Zaki Badr. His role was to prepare and ready the explosive charges to be hurled at the ex-minister when his car passed by. This is recorded under case No. 711/89—a higher state security case.

Also arrested was terrorist 'Ali Muhammad al-Dinari who perpetrated a series of acts of violence and arson in the town of Abu-Qurqas, al-Minya Governorate. His case is recorded under case No. 1447 of 1990.

With the fall of these terrorists, it is believed that the Jihad Organization has been fatally wounded. The military wing has become disjointed with the escape of Safwat 'Abd-al-Ghani, the death of 'Abd-al-Hakam, and the fall of others in the hands of the security forces.

Turkish Firm To Explore for Oil

*TA1706162091 Ankara ANATOLIA in English
1510 GMT 17 Jun 91*

[Text] An agreement was approved here on Monday by the Egyptian Parliament to allow oil exploration to be

conducted by Turkish Petroleum International Company (TPIC), an affiliate of the state-owned concern Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO).

The agreement will take effect once it is signed by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak.

Under the agreement, TPIC will have the right to search for oil in Egypt's western desert for the next four years, during which time the company will invest \$10.5 million in research in Egypt.

TPIC officials say exploration will start in the second half of this year.

The move is seen as an important step for TPIC, which will have priority for further exploration in the region if oil is found there.

IRAQ

Jasim Addresses Labor Unionists, Praises Reconstruction

JN086150591 Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Network in Arabic 1400 GMT 8 Jun 91

[Text] Latif Nusayyif Jasim, member of the Ba'th Party Regional Command and secretary of the Central Bureau for the Professional and Popular Organization of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, has praised workers' efforts to rebuild what was destroyed by the aggressors.

Addressing an expanded meeting of the General Federation of Trade Unions and the heads of the local workers' unions, he asserted that Iraqis are determined to overcome the results of the aggression and achieve reconstruction under the leadership of President Saddam Husayn, who surprised the enemies and foiled their plans to harm Iraq's dignity and sovereignty.

Jasim then reviewed the various aspects of the imperialist-Zionist conspiracy to weaken the Iraqi will, stressing that the destruction caused by the mobs and demagogues is a link in the chain of that conspiracy.

Professor Analyzes U.S. Influence in Gulf Politics

91AE0429E Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 19 May 91 p 3

[Article by Hani Ilyas Khadr al-Hadithi, Baghdad University, College of Political Science]

[Text] The Arab Gulf region has witnessed a number of forms of cooperation between neighboring countries. Most of these forms are in the interest of foreign powers, specifically the United States and the traditional colonialist countries. This cooperation is attributed to vital, geostrategic considerations regarding this region, and to the fact that the interests and fate of important international forces are bound to it, which, in the past period, has subjected it to competition between forces seeking international influence.

The former regime of the Shah of Iran and Saudi Arabia became linked to the Western strategy in the region. Because of their size, especially their economic stature, and their geopolitical importance and influence in the region, they played the role of the two central pillars of the American strategy in the region. This state of affairs lasted until 1979, when Khomeini obtained power in Iran and promoted the slogan of hostility toward the United States, which was considered the "great Satan."

Between the establishment of the Baghdad Pact of 1955 and 1979, Iran was linked with Pakistan and Turkey in regional cooperation embodied by the agreement of 1964, which was established under the slogan of developing regional, economic cooperation in the region. Actually, this regional cooperation formed one of the organizations of the CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] Pact. Hence, it was part of an American strategy that sought to develop and consolidate the abilities of the allied or friendly regional countries, so as to strengthen the Western presence in the region through those countries.

However, in the years following the political change in Iran in 1979, the force of this agreement was frozen, and competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia emerged. This competition was based on the new Iranian regime's attempt, under the banner of religion, to spread into all countries of the Arab Gulf, overthrow the political regimes in them, and establish new client regimes under the slogan of the so-called "export of the Islamic revolution."

However, matters did not continue in this way. Iraq opposed the Iranian aggression, whose first move toward the region was an attempt to abort the strong link, "Iraq." Also, during the war, the Gulf Cooperation Council came into being as a regional organization that sought to protect Gulf regimes from the possible expansion of the scope of the Iraqi-Iranian war.

During the Iraqi-Iranian war, a secret relation—as it has clearly emerged subsequently—developed between the United States and one of the main executive branches of the Iranian political regime. Hashimi Rafsanjani represented this branch, which is characterized by flexibility, high maneuverability, and willingness to cooperate with the American administration. This led to the conclusion of a large arms deal, which came to light in the Irangate scandal.

Such a development is not unusual in the scope of American political behavior, because the American administration, as is known, constantly seeks to reinforce its relations with political regimes and opposition wings within those regimes, even if those wings are outside the framework of official power. It does so based on the following principle in which it believes:

1. When a political regime is friendly to the United States, the United States must not neglect the maintenance of a relation with that regime's political opposition, based on a view that looks ahead toward possibilities of exerting pressure on that regime if the latter wishes to deviate from the United States' desire.

2. When a political regime is hostile to the United States, the opposition becomes the United States' primary interest, with a view toward removing that regime and establishing an alternate, friendly regime.

In any case, the United States seeks, through its two-track behavior, to guarantee alternatives inside and outside a given regime.

In the light of the preceding, the United States sought to win over important elements in the Iranian regime. This was expressed clearly by former American President Reagan after the disclosure of the Irangate agreement, when he stated that it was based on the American administration's desire to develop relations with "moderate elements" in the Iranian regime, with a view toward serving American interests in the region.

Based on the preceding, the United States encouraged its [illegible words] in regimes neighboring Iran, specifically Turkey and Pakistan, to develop relations with Iran with the intent of drawing it into regional cooperation to distance it from any rapprochement with the Soviets and move it toward what the United States wanted to achieve in the region, [illegible words] basic Arab [force] opposed to a foreign presence in the region [illegible words] toward the achievement of the end of Arab solidarity in confronting American-Israeli schemes in the region.

In order for the United States to achieve these combined objectives, it sought to strengthen the desire of Iran's rulers to continue the option of war against Iraq, because the United States believed that the prolongation of the war based on parity between the two warring forces would weaken both of them and force them to accept the American strategy in the region and perhaps participate in playing an important role in it.

Here, we find that Iran, since 1984, has complied with the desire of Turkey and Pakistan to revive regional cooperation between the three countries, which is what actually happened, which indicates how close Iran has come to the American strategy.

The organization for economic cooperation between Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan was revived in the same period that witnessed an important development in Saudi Arabia's relations with Pakistan and Turkey. That development pushed the three countries to develop relations with each other based on common interests linked primarily to U.S. interests and U.S. policy in the region. Many forms of cooperation developed, including in the areas of economic aid, military arming issues, and security agreements. Relations between the three countries reached the point where talk of establishing a Saudi-Pakistani-Turkish alliance became an officially

stated matter through the statements of high-level officials in the pertinent countries. These statements, in addition to declaring a desire to implement a joint, development program, were provided with the cover of resistance to Soviet moves to exploit the outcome of the Iraqi-Iranian war and to consolidate opportunities for a Soviet presence in the Arab Gulf region linked to the consolidation of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, which created, or posed, an external challenge to all of the countries engaged in the said regional cooperation.

Perhaps this explains why Saudi Arabia's relations with Turkey and Pakistan were not negatively affected by the development of relations between those two countries and Iran during the war. Accordingly, it became clear as early as the mideighties that some form of regional cooperation was taking shape. We indicated as much in a conference at the Arab Gulf Studies Center at al-Basrah University in 1986, when we pointed to the possibility of such cooperation and the dangers which it posed to Arab national security in the Gulf region in general and to Iraqi national security in particular, due to geopolitical considerations surrounding Iraq, which adheres to an independent foreign policy having national objectives that arouse the sensitivity of the powers allied with the United States, including "Israel," especially inasmuch as Iraq, during and after the war with Iran, has promoted the Palestinian cause.

This [possibility of such cooperation] required the other Arab countries to rise to the level of the foreign regional and international challenges by strengthening their abilities to interact positively with international developments, which began to witness moves toward the establishment of large regional blocs to cope with new developments in the international order that were beginning to result from the Soviet retreat from exercising its role as a superpower opposite the United States.

However, the facts indicate that the Arab regimes are, for the most part, a part of the international political game in the region. This was demonstrated by their positions during the Gulf crisis and the American-Zionist foreign aggression against Iraq.

Based on these facts, the roles of neighboring regimes in the region and the above-mentioned Arab regimes are moving on a prescribed course, waiting for a suitable opportunity to emerge on the political arena as a regional organization that constitutes a part of the new world order led by the United States. This development has now begun to emerge in earnest, inasmuch as the American administration, through its Secretary of State, Baker, is playing an active role to exploit the consequences of the Gulf crisis and the declaration of war against Iraq, with a view toward achieving coordination between all parties concerned with regional cooperation and determining each party's role in this regional cooperation. This constitutes the groundwork which the United States has begun to consolidate as a basis for achieving a political, regional settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, so as to guarantee U.S. hegemony

throughout the entire Middle East region as a means to strengthen U.S. hegemony throughout the world.

The preceding explains, in no uncertain terms, why a number of countries which are party to regional cooperation in the Gulf region aligned themselves with the United States. Pakistan contributed an estimated 10,000 troops from different combat branches to the Gulf war, while the Turkish Government exerted economic pressure and allowed hostile aircraft to take off against Iraq from airports in Turkish territory. As for Iran, it pursued a tactical method in keeping with the slogans that it promotes in its foreign policy on the United States, while preparing to realize other aims, which it had failed to achieve during the Iraqi-Iranian war, by supporting and backing sabotage groups and the rabble against Iraq.

Thus, these forces have come to have a prescribed role that is reflected, and will be reflected in the near future, in the character of regional security arrangements for the Arab Gulf region. If the mideighties witnessed the beginning of a regional security arrangement based on two cooperation triangles, one of which was formed by Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, the other by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the present and future could witness the transformation of the two triangles into an integrated bloc.

Some believe that several parties in this bloc suffer from discord or competition in well-known areas of activity. This is the case regarding Saudi Arabia and Iran for example. The facts also indicate that this competition frequently surfaces in bilateral or regional relations regarding matters that pertain to the self-interests of each country, far from international calculations or influences. However, when circumstances are, as they are now, based on a role that each party can fulfill in the service of the international interests of the predominant international power, rapprochement and cooperation, supported from abroad, emerge in the arena of regional dealings. Accordingly, security arrangements in the Arab Gulf region could entail a number of integrated, interactive spheres, the primary sphere being formed by the countries directly on the Gulf, and the other sphere being formed by the countries which surround the region and are concerned with its security, such as Turkey and Pakistan.

These spheres will find themselves interacting with the sphere of mutual regional security that Israel and the United States are striving to achieve, which includes Egypt, Syria, and other direct parties to the conflict with Israel.

The calculations of the interests of decisionmakers in these countries, and the extent to which these calculations affect these decisionmakers' positions and external, political behavior, become evident in the light of the preceding. However, the political arena, and the interaction of regional and international relations within it, continue to hide many surprises. Secrets are also hidden in the recesses of policy. This means that, regardless of

the ability of the decisionmakers in the political arena to discover possible alternatives, other alternatives sometimes remain unseen or unavailable; however, these alternatives do not remain as such subsequently. Inasmuch as the parties to regional cooperation continue, despite several common denominators, to retain elements of disagreement with each other and with other regional or international parties, many alternatives can become suited to confronting the blockade efforts which the parties to regional cooperation—which is linked to subordination to the United States—are seeking to impose on countries with independent, external political behavior. Such a country is Iraq, which is seeking to maintain its independence despite the efforts that have been made to put an end to the foundations of this independence, which, as President Commander Saddam Husayn emphasized in his recent remarks, remains the basis for the continuation of Iraq's vital, important role in this region.

In any case, the said parties to regional cooperation have interests and security requirements that must compel them to examine positive relations with all of the countries of the region. Otherwise, regardless of positive signs in their relations with the United States, they could become subject to attempts to dismember them, each according to its national structure, in a way that achieves several American ambitions [similar to American ambitions] in the seventies, which called for the dismemberment of all of the countries of Southwest Asia and the southwestern Soviet Union as a part of the strategy of repartitioning the world to ensure the emergence of petty powers or states unable to protect themselves and forever compelled to remain under the American umbrella. Will these countries awaken to pursue their long-range interests?

Minister Interviewed on Oil Policy

91AE0429C London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
6 Jun 91 p 10

[Interview with 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Hiti (?) by Zandah Taqi-al-Din in Vienna; date not given]

[Text] Iraqi Oil Minister Asamah 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Hiti stated, in an interview with AL-HAYAH in connection with the recent OPEC conference in Vienna, that Iraq continues to export 50,000 b/d of oil to Jordan. However, these exports are not within the scope of commercial arrangements, given that prices have not been discussed. He added that, although the greatest damage afflicted on Iraqi installations is that which struck oil installations, Iraq can repair the damage relying on its special capabilities with respect to expertise, labor, and construction materials.

He stated that, if the blockade on Iraqi oil exports is lifted, Iraq would be able to regain its full production and export capacities through all outlets in the second half of the coming year.

Al-Hiti informed AL-HAYAH that Iraq will not broach the matter of sanctions at the OPEC conference, because it does not concern the organization. Al-Hiti made these remarks before the announcement made yesterday by the General Secretary of the organization, Dr. Subaru. That announcement stated that the organization rejected the undertaking of efforts on the part of the United Nations to lift the blockade imposed on Iraqi oil exports, in view of the fact that the issue is "of a purely political nature." News reports have stated the Iraq opposed the extension of Subaru's [tenure] in the general secretariat of the organization. However, Minister al-Hiti denied the accuracy of these reports to AL-HAYAH.

The following is the text of the interview:

[Taqi-al-Din] What would be the value of lifting the international blockade imposed on Iraq in terms of Iraq's export and production capacity after the war?

[Al-Hiti] If the blockade is lifted, we can regain all of our capacities regarding production and export through all outlets in the second half of the coming year. Also, despite our lack of precise information for appraising some of the damage, the general estimate is that we will be able to return to our regular capacity at the said time.

[Taqi-al-Din] What do you mean by "our regular capacity"?

[Al-Hiti] I mean that we abide by our quota determined in OPEC, which is 3.24 million b/d, if the quotas are not reviewed.

[Taqi-al-Din] What is Iraq's current, domestic production level?

[Al-Hiti] After the end of rationing on 28 April 1991, there is no longer a problem in Iraq regarding the availability of refined oil products. However, we are now seeking to raise the quality of refined products by introducing improvement units, because our first concern is to cover domestic demand without resorting to rationing. Domestic demand is currently about 11 million liters of gas per day.

[Taqi-al-Din] Is Iraq still exporting oil to Jordan?

[Al-Hiti] Exportation to Jordan is continuing. We supply Jordan with its oil needs after other countries cut off their supplies to it. Our exports to Jordan fluctuate between 50,000 and 55,000 b/d. However, these quantities are not within the scope of normal commercial arrangements like those which we use with other buyers. We have an agreement with Jordan, and we continue to supply it. We are calling it "supply," because we are not discussing the matter of prices with them.

[Taqi-al-Din] Do we understand from your remarks that Iraq's production capacity did not drop after the war?

[Al-Hiti] On the contrary, major damage was inflicted on oil installations on Iraq. The greatest damage incurred by Iraqi installations during the war was incurred by oil

installations. However, we can repair the damage. We have proven that we have the abilities to rebuild. I mention by way of example that we were compelled at the Biji Refinery to replace 120 km of 30-inch pipes and larger pipes. Very important centers and collection points were hit, and tanks for refined products were destroyed, as were several fields in the south. However, we are in the process of returning them to normalcy.

[Taqi-al-Din] How can you repair the damage when the Iraqi economy is in a shameful state?

[Al-Hiti] First, we are using domestic Iraqi manpower, and the materials which we are using are available, having been purchased previously. We will of course need other materials to restore these installations to their former normal state from a technical standpoint. However, regarding the operational situation, we can produce, provided that we gradually develop production technically.

'Sharp Increase' in Dysentery, Hepatitis, Typhoid Noted

*JN087075391Z Baghdad INA in Arabic 0723 GMT
8 Jul 91*

[Text] The Ministry of Health has announced a sharp increase in the spread of epidemics and a number of contagious diseases in Baghdad and some Iraqi governorates.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Amir al-Tamiri, director general of the medical prevention and environmental protection department, said in an interview with the newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH published today that the health departments in Baghdad and the governorates have noticed a sharp increase in cases of typhoid, amoebic dysentery, and hepatitis A, during the current stage.

He said that the increasing spread of these diseases is the result of a huge shortage of the medicines and medical supplies needed to protect people from these diseases, in addition to the huge damage to services and health facilities all over Iraq as a result of the U.S.-NATO-Zionist aggression.

Thirteen Cholera Cases Registered Over Past Six Days

*JN1206122391Z Baghdad INA in Arabic 1121 GMT
12 Jun 91*

[Text] Health departments in Iraq registered 13 new cholera cases over the past six days.

A report issued by the Health Ministry today said that the cases were distributed as follows: four in the al-Muthanna Governorate, three cases each in the Baghdad and al-Basrah governorates, and one case in each of al-Qadisiyah, Wasit, and Ninawa governorates.

The report notes that the patients are improving and that they are receiving intensive treatment in hospitals and health centers.

ISRAEL

Soviet Immigrants' Kibbutz Experience Profiled

91AE0430B Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
(Economic Supplement) 28 May 91 pp 6-7

[Article by Idit Pelekh]

[Text] A group of immigrants from the Soviet Union, who wish to establish a kibbutz, has formed of late and is steadily growing. Six families are already in the first stages of their training in Eyn HaMifratz, and about 25 more families will join their fellows as soon as trailer parks are set up. Together they will face for the first time in their lives the way of life of the Israeli kibbutz. The entire process is backed by the Kibbutz HaArtzi's (National Kibbutz, affiliated with Mapam, United Workers' Party) Settlement Division, which has already singled out Kibbutz Pelekh as the home of the new Russian kibbutz.

Kibbutz Pelekh, in the Tefen region, has known many adversities since it first settled on the land. The little kibbutz, resting in one of the most beautiful spots in this country, has won a name for itself as a special settlement with special people whose outlook is different, who spend their days spinning thread at the Pelekh [distaff] and their evenings in deep heart to heart talks. Over time, Pelekh has become deserted, and today there remain only four members, a few paid watchmen, and several members of groups in training to form other kibbutzim.

The news that soon this beautiful spot will have new life, has created new hope among its inhabitants, who, in spite of everything, will not give up being a source of attraction for those who are searching for an innovative and unique kibbutz, a little different, but still a kibbutz.

At the head of the group of immigrants, who already tried out communal life while still in the Soviet Union, stand the couple, Ela Gorvitz and Aharon Sirkin, neither of them young, but filled with desire to realize the kibbutz idea, which is not foreign to them at all.

Gorvitz and Sirkin, parents of three daughters (two in Israel, the third still in Moscow), arrived in Israel a little less than a year ago, after ten years as refuseniks in Russia. They have had many difficulties in their lives, suffered from various illnesses, and when they despaired of finding hope in conventional medicine, decided to learn on their own the secrets of alternative medicine. In time, they founded the health club, "Healthy Family" in Moscow, and cared for thousands of "patients."

The British Have Left

From the moment they arrived in Israel, Ela Gorvitz understood that their biggest problem was time, or more accurately, the lack of it. She estimated that only one year was at their disposal from the moment the immigrants got to Israel until the day they would no longer be supported by the Ministry of Absorption.

Gorvitz decided to concentrate the effort in the first year, and to prepare the immigrant members of the group for communal living. To this purpose, she organized seminars and group meetings, and when they end, she intends to send the participants to their target kibbutzim.

Gorvitz understands that the matter is not simple. This course will oblige the kibbutzim to change their codes and perceptions. The Russian immigration includes all ages, and the kibbutzim will have to absorb entire families, including some people who have passed the age of 40, the cutting off point today for acceptance to kibbutzim.

She believes that those who pass the selection and the seminars will be people of high quality, able to contribute to the kibbutz despite their mature age. As she sees it, their contribution to the kibbutz will return the pioneer spirit which has long been missing in our society. Ela believes that to create a healthy kibbutz society, one must find the balance and the right relationship between all the components of the community: children, adults, and the elderly. She says this knowing that the groups are actually likely to end up at young kibbutzim.

The much worn figure of speech, "an historic hour," returns in the words of Ela and Aharon again and again. They contend that the kibbutzim have the responsibility to show readiness and openness and to accept the members of the groups that have crystallized lately. "For," she says, "there will not be enough room for all of them in Pelekh."

They do not believe that absorption like this will turn the kibbutzim into a train station. It is just the opposite. Their intention is to bring stability to the kibbutz movement as a whole and to Pelekh in particular.

Among themselves, they use the expression "the new pioneers," and ask that one remember that the British are gone, and the riots that held back the pioneer enterprise are over. "Today's pioneers are not the pioneers of the past, and people must accept that not everyone who comes to a kibbutz will be young," they say.

Since the project became public, after Ela was interviewed on the Russian radio program, the two have been deluged with a wave of applications. One hundred and seventy families have registered for the process and others are waiting in line.

Like everything else concerning them, moving into Pelekh is just a matter of time, probably at the end of the

summer. They have visited the site, and have already begun to make connections to build cooperation with the neighboring kibbutzim, Tubal and Kishor. They also are not lacking in words of praise and thanks for the people of Pelekh, because they did not abandon the place, and cared for it even in difficult moments.

The Golem May Turn on Its Creator

In the Settlement Division of Kibbutz HaArtzi, they relate to the group scheduled for Pelekh differently than they would toward any usual absorption. "The work," says Orna Burla of Eyn HaHoresh, "is being done with complete cooperation between the Division and the members of the group. They have been given a permanent adviser, Yosi Gazit, from Eyn HaMifratz, and since we are speaking of a group rather than individuals, it was decided that the selection be carried out by Ela Gorvitz, rather than by Kibbutz HaArtzi."

The position of the members of Pelekh, Orna admits, is a somewhat sensitive point. "In spite of the possible tension, all the possibilities have already been tried, and therefore the Division does not see any possibility of acting except with the agreement of those who are still there," she says.

Ofir Abarbanel, in Pelekh a year and a half and one of the four members who remain, responds, "The truth is that we do not know much about the Russian group and we have no idea what their timetable is. In the beginning there were a few doubts and reservations, but that was because a large group was arriving at such a small kibbutz, not because they are immigrants. Personally, I intend to remain here after they arrive, with the goal of trying to live together. The rest, as far as I know, are still mulling it over.

"When the members of the group spent a weekend here, I met them and also spoke with Ela Gorvitz. My impressions were very positive. She is a serious woman who invests of herself beyond any accepted norm. Along with that, it is important for me to emphasize that we expect Israeli families to join too. We do not want to remain here a minority within a way of life very different from our own. To succeed with the plan, there must be a balanced mix of Israelis and new immigrants."

In the Settlement Department, they promise that immigrant benefits will continue after the group has moved to Pelekh, and the members of the kibbutz will be given all the conditions customary for new kibbutzim. "Because we are dealing here with the first experiment of its kind," emphasizes Orna, "There are many problems whose answers will come clear as the process unfolds." In the division, they agree with the group members' approach, which speaks of changing the age limit for absorption, but in the meantime, they are putting off the decisions in matters where agreement has still not been crystallized.

Orna and Yosi do not hide their admiration at the level of preparedness and readiness of the group members. "We are speaking," he emphasizes, "of serious people,

most of them college graduates, for whom cooperation is not foreign, and for whom the desire to do something for this country, and for immigration, comes before personal desire."

They imagine that in the future a situation may develop in which the golem will rise against its creator, but are referring to the positive side of the matter. The possibility that members of the group could, after a few years cause Kibbutz Ha'artzi to face penetrating questions, does not have to preclude, in their view, carrying out the idea.

Yosi Gazit: "This "Hevra" (group of friends) is filled with curiosity and hungry for every bit of historical, social, and intellectual information about kibbutz life. There is a toughness in them, in the best sense of the word. Sometimes I ask myself if the whole business will not break up two or three days after the revolution. Meanwhile things are developing and gathering such speed that there is no stopping it, and from my point of view, being among them has simply been a profound human experience."

At this stage, the various people in power are not concerned with the political opinions of the Russian group. There are those who believe that the Russian immigration has a rightist political orientation, and Kibbutz Artzi has some fear of this too. In any case, in the Settlement Division they estimate that with the involvement of the Kibbutz HaArtzi's Secretary, Elisha Shapira, who has been given the settlement portfolio by the secretariat, will not let those who work with the new settlers avoid dealing with the subject in the future also. "In time," they say in the division, "we will look into that issue, too."

The future settlers also testify that nobody has spoken to them about the political issues as yet, and we must just hope that in the future, these people, so worthy of admiration for their pioneering ways, will not turn into the political bad boy of Kibbutz HaArtzi.

Multicorps Training Exercises Described

91AE0446A Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew
29 May 91 p 23

[Article by Lea 'Eshet: "Armor Attacks, Engineering Breaks Through, Artillery Softens Up and Infantry Cleans Up"]

[Text] The multicorps exercise is undoubtedly one of the crown jewels in IDF [Israel Defense Forces] training. Cadets who are about to complete their officer's course and get the longed-for platoon commander pin and insignia (rank of Second Lieutenant) move around the sands with tanks, self-propelled guns, 7.62 Israeli-made machine guns, and bridging tanks. The force is made up of armor cadets nearing the end of the armor officer course, infantry cadets nearing the end of the course at training base 1, engineering cadets nearing the end of the engineering officers course, and artillery cadets.

The multforce exercise, in which cadets serve as squadron and platoon commanders, is the wrap up of a multicorps week in the south. The series was opened with a lecture series by battalion commanders from the various corps who explained the capabilities of their weapons and the advantages and disadvantages of the corps. That was followed by an exhibition from which the cadets had not yet managed to calm down.

'Asaf, a Giv'ati commander declared: "The exhibition was amazing. They showed exactly what the objective was for each corps, for each tool and what each was capable of doing." Ziv Nebo of the paratroopers says that the exhibition was an unusual vision and a unique opportunity for the platoon commanders who do not continue on as company commanders to see an exercise with this kind of cooperation.

When people think of a joint exercise involving four services, they might imagine endless competition and conflict over which corps is the best and most important. It turns out that things are a bit different in reality. 'Amram Shindler of the paratroopers, the company sergeant major on duty, whose friends say that he is the funniest thing that happened to them in the officers course, says that there is no competition during the multicorps week. "I learned just how to appreciate the extent to which I need the other assisting corps. There is no scorn for any soldier; on the contrary, from a technological point of view, all the others are much more sophisticated. I particularly appreciate and love armor, and only here did I come to understand why."

Nissim Bar Sheshet, from engineering, said: "Each corps has a different objective; there is therefore no room for competition." Shlomi Hoffman of artillery claims that every corps wants to boast about its devices and capabilities, and Ziv Nebo of the paratroopers talks about a war between the corps. "There is unit pride that begins all the way back in boot camp. Everyone tries to catch the other corps in screwups."

The multicorps exercise is divided into two parts. At one in the morning the artillerymen leave to deploy the guns. At three the first shell is fired. In the opening exercise, commanded by an armor battalion commander, armor had the main role and the rest of the corps were merely auxiliary. Artillery opened fire to soften up the targets, while armor carried out the assault with the infantry following in their footsteps. After a second conquest of the objectives they encountered an obstacle, at which point it was the turn of the engineering corps, which broke in with artillery assistance that fired a smoke screen to isolate the engineering soldiers from the enemy. After breaking through the obstacles, the tankers and infantrymen captured the rest of the objectives and the air force planes evacuated the simulated wounded.

In the second part, the infantry was predominant, commanded by an infantry battalion commander. The air force also had an important function this time. Skyhawk

planes began the exercise by bombing targets with artillery assistance, while infantrymen were organizing themselves on helicopters that landed them in the target area. The goal was the conquest of a mountainous axis, while overcoming natural and artificial obstacles with engineering assistance. In the final breakthrough to the objectives, the infantry was assisted by armor's tanks.

Present at the exercise were the commander of the Ground Forces Command General 'Emanuel Saqel and each corps' chief officer: the chief armor officer Brig. Gen. Yitzhaq Rabin, the chief paratroop officer Brig. Gen. David 'Agmon, the chief artillery officer Brig. Gen. Doron Qadmi'el, the chief engineering officer Brig. Gen. Yishai Dotan, and all the training base commanders.

Gen. Saqel stressed the importance of the relatively new multicorps exercise to the cadets: "We on the ground determine the outcome of the war. That is a message that makes us stand tall and that we can be very proud of, but, by the same token, it carries a lot of responsibility. In the Gulf war, with all the aerial success, the war was not decided until two armor regiments were introduced. Ground forces are the ones that touch the target line. Without cooperation between the branches, it is impossible to win the ground war, and with proper coordination between them there is great power. In the multicorps series the men of the four branches got to see each other intimately and each learned about the other. In the exercise we saw the integration at the micro level—with an infantry APC moving alongside an engineering APC and with an armor company advancing together with an artillery company."

Similar pronouncements were heard from the cadets. 'Asaf from Giv'ati: "This is the first time we understand the possibilities for exploiting the force that works with us—when it is preferable for armor to do the capturing, when, for infantry, and how to have artillery and engineering assist you."

'Avi Meno, artillery: "You learn here that someone can give you a hand. As a gunner I am used to helping the other guy, and suddenly engineering and the air force are helping us. Up until now each corps worked independently, but no one saw his part in the overall scheme of things. No one corps will decide the war; each will contribute his smaller or larger part. As an officer, I will come to the battalion with the understanding that I do not work alone but cooperatively."

Mushiq 'Ovadia, Giv'ati: "The goal of the multicorps exercise is to get the best from each corps and have it expressed through cooperation. Engineering concentrates on breaking through the main obstacles. Armor is the fire basis for splitting up targets, artillery softens targets and infantry concentrates on mopping up."

Nissim bar Sheshet, engineering: "I felt almost like at war; this week taught me to appreciate my corps more than in the past." 'Amram Shani, paratroops: "Despite the fact armor and infantry are the fighting forces and engineering and artillery provide assistance, from the

point of view of importance they are just like us. I came to appreciate just how much I need the other corps."

All of them return dusty, the sand penetrating into every nook. The cadets measure the thickness of the layer of dust—powder, as they call it—and say that despite the fact that it is hard to breathe and despite the fact that whoever sees them coming back from the exercise becomes frightened, they have already gotten accustomed to it. Everyone's biggest desire now is for a hot shower, but lacking hot water, they have to make do with a cold one—and thus you can see a whole group of fighters, without any distinction as to corps, color, helmet, or fighting equipment, with only a towel around them, marching off to the shower.

Reduction in Standard of Living Urged

91AE0433C Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew
27 May 91 p B1

[Article by Yossi Grinstein: "Moda'i: The People's Standard of Living Must Be Lowered"]

[Text] The Ministry of Finance's plan for increasing employment will provide employment to 36,000 new workers, of which 11,000 will be in infrastructure works and 10,000 will be in construction. The cost of the plan will come to approximately NIS [new Israeli shekels] 1 billion per year.

In the introduction to the plan, Minister of Finance Yitzhak Moda'i says that the creation of half a million jobs in five years cannot be based solely on market forces, and that government intervention is required in the short term.

According to him, the plan must not undermine stability, and consequently it is necessary to lower the standard of living of the public in general. According to the forecast of the Ministry of Finance, it is expected that the civilian labor force will increase by 5 percent in 1991, 5.9 percent in 1992, and 7.7 percent in 1993. At the end of the year, the number of those entering the labor force will increase four times and will come to 40,000 job seekers for the quarter. Even at growth rates of 9 to 10 percent per year in the business sector, the unemployment rate will go up.

Here are the details of the plan:

- An increase of approximately NIS 2 billion in infrastructure investments will employ 11,500 persons. Of this—1,800 persons in road-building (NIS 200 million); 1,000 on the railway and in the ports (NIS 285 million). Among the others—a commuter train in Haifa, the linking of the southern and northern stations in T-A, the doubling of tracks and the purchase of railway cars.
- In communications, 2,300 (NIS 430 million)—the moving and installation of 156,000 lines and the creation of infrastructure for 190,000 new lines and the improvement of international communications

- 2,600 employees in energy and electricity (NIS 650 million)—the construction of power stations in Hadera, the completion of the Ruttenberg Station, gas turbines and infrastructure of hookups to consumers
- 1,000 workers in water and sewer (NIS 110 million)
- 1,000 in education (NIS 140 million)—the construction of 1,000 new classrooms
- 500 employees in airports (NIS 65 million); and 800 workers in tourism and industry (NIS 38 million) who will be employed in building industrial parks and tourist sites.
- The construction branch will absorb 10,000 new workers at the minimum wage, and after one year the workers will receive a grant of NIS 4,500. The government will finance the employment of the workers and two-thirds of the grant. The cost will be NIS 50 million.
- Intensive employment courses. In the first stage, 2,000 students will be absorbed in 10 large organizations (such as Kayil, Bezek, Teva, the Electric Company, the Ports Authority, Delta, the refineries, Motorola, El-Op, and Osem, for a period of two years, completely financed by the government. In the future, the framework will be broadened for the absorption of 10,000 to 20,000 new students. The students will not be covered by the labor agreements and will not replace veteran workers.
- Vocational training. Another 50,000 workers will be brought into the framework of in-plant training. One thousand engineers will receive advanced training in engineering firms at government expense. The firms will have to employ them for four years.
- Additional measures in the plan—marketing grants of NIS 100 million per year; the encouragement of investments and employment in government corporations; the attraction of foreign investors and the increasing of orders of foreign plants from Israeli manufacturers working as subcontractors; the establishment of a joint investment firm of the government and business interests. The firm will invest approximately NIS 120 million in high-risk economic projects that do not receive conventional financing from investors and banks.

'Spiritual Absorption' of Immigrants Discussed

91AE0430C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
24 May 91 p 2b

[Article by Avirama Golan]

[Text] A certain child named Sasha, relates the new strictly Orthodox weekly, "Mishpaha" ("Family"), arrived in Israel several months ago. He descended from the plane and was put on a bus that brought him to a yeshiva for young people, founded without party funds and without currying favor, by people for whom the fate of Judaism, the paper states, touches their hearts directly. The yeshiva building is spacious, the beds new, the furniture excellent, and the children receive new clothes.

"Where does the money come from?" the reporter asks the principal of the yeshiva, and he answers, "From donations, and from heaven." The children, says the reporter—who like other female reporters in the strictly Orthodox newspapers, publishes incognito—are taking their first steps, like a child learning to walk. All this because until now they knew nothing at all about Judaism. Now they already know something.

When Sasha went home for the first vacation, his mother served him meat and cheese on the same plate, and "the trauma he experienced cannot be described." Something similar happened to another child, who broke out in bitter tears when his father turned on the television in the house. The conclusion the boarding school principal came to is illustrative: the children are not sent to their homes any more. The parents come to visit them at the boarding school. Maintenance like this obviously costs a lot of money. "But," as the principal says, "there is no overdraft here. Everything comes from donations and from heaven." Because the article does not cite actual sources and names, we will leave the question of donations and heaven in doubt.

Other activities of the strictly Orthodox and moderate Orthodox bodies are handled completely through three government Ministries, with their direct or indirect funding, and cost a great deal of money. The goal is to educate the new immigrants in the "spirit of ancient Israel," or in simpler terms, according to the Orthodox doctrine. The foundation stone is that the new immigrants are a clean slate; cut off from Judaism, confused, and unacquainted with Israeli and Jewish reality. If so, this immigration must not be abandoned to the hands of secular powers, but must be drawn close to the religion by all possible means. Undoubtedly, the religious parties do not define the immigrants from the Soviet Union as a "clean slate" only out of the patronizing approach accepted in the strictly Orthodox world toward "children who were taken captive," but rather understand very well the electoral potential of somebody who receives today to pay back at the polls tomorrow.

The details below, which try to draw a picture of the state of spiritual absorption '91, rely not a little on a strenuous work of exposure and data gathering carried out in the field by the Movement for Progressive Judaism and Mapam (United Workers Party). It was not easy to get direct information from most of the official bodies, nonprofit organizations and officials, especially where sources of funding and extent of spending were concerned. The strictly Orthodox and moderate Orthodox press, in contrast, reveal a bit more, and announce their intentions directly.

The concept of "spiritual absorption" was created in the days of Minister of Absorption Aharon Ozen, who, precisely out of a pluralistic approach, and to speed up the solution of Halachic problems concerning the immigrants from the Soviet Union and Ethiopia, appointed Rabbi Toledano head of his ministry's section for spiritual absorption. The section, says former Minister of

Absorption Ya'akov Tsur, was small—Toledano and one assistant. The budget was also tiny, and came mainly from the Ministry of Religion.

Some hagadahs were distributed, the bureaucratic processes in the religious councils were speeded up, and complicated questions of personal status were solved through the peaceful, understanding ways characteristic of Rabbi Toledano. Veterans in the Ministry of Absorption remember how Rabbi Toledano used to go in person to put up mezuzas in immigrant homes. This little section has swelled in the last year, and turned into a branch, which concerns itself, among other things, with printing Passover Haggadahs and prayerbooks, and distributing tefillin—topics naturally in the realm of the Ministry of Religion, which actually does these things too. But the branch is also active in religious monitoring of the Ministry of Religion's ulpan, and in the swift spread of the network of moderate Orthodox and strictly Orthodox ulpan run by supposedly independent nonprofit organizations. The network is directed by the nonprofit organization, "Ya'ale veYavo," connected to Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians), and as time has passed, other nonprofit organizations have joined it, like "Toda'a," connected to Degel HaTora, "Morasha vaHessed," connected to Agudat Israel, and "Emuna," connected to the National Religious Party. For the sake of demonstration, in Jerusalem alone 70 religious ulpan are active today, and clearly, in a place where a religious ulpan exists, as for example, in Gilo or in Neve Ya'akov, the Ministry of Absorption does not free money for another ulpan. And an immigrant who arrives there is directed, without any possibility of choosing, to the religious ulpan.

The newspaper, "Erev Shabat (11 Jan 1990), demonstrates well the importance of the matter: "The moderate Orthodox and strictly Orthodox parties have a responsibility," he proclaims, "to free themselves completely from any other activity...and to devote themselves totally to obtaining appropriations in every way possible—'special' or not 'special'—for the spiritual absorption of the immigrants. On the contrary: Let the party contest in the field begin. The need is great, and it is possible also to carry out a geographical division: the organizations and people of Degel HaTora will absorb the immigrants from Vilna, the Hasidic members of Agudat Israel will absorb the immigrants from Riga and Georgia. The members of Shas will absorb the immigrants from Buchara, and the immigrants from Moscow and Leningrad will be divided among them all..." The appearance of the field teaches that all of them are divided among them all. The Ministry of Absorption is also active, as is known, in sending immigrants to dine on Sabbaths and holidays in private homes and in Torah institutions (and an examination revealed that the hospitality in the yeshivas was free and that the families who accommodated immigrants on Seder night, for example, were reimbursed for the costs of the hospitality), and in organizing of lectures, study circles and days dedicated to study, led by rabbis. The Minister of Absorption

himself said proudly in the Knesset that he is taking part in these days dedicated to study, held in a hotel in Jerusalem.

Answering a question, the Minister said that on these days dedicated to study, he speaks only on religious subjects. The Minister of Religion, Avner Shaki, said, in answer to a question by Knesset member Hayim Oron, that his ministry included a body named "Initiative for Spiritual Absorption." This body, whose budget derives mainly from the section responsible for ritual articles (reliable sources say that, after a short time, they sell the tefillin in exchange for basic food supplies. A pair of tefillin is worth 500 shekels in the open market today). The "initiative" also actively supports circles for Jewish Studies, arranges circumcision ceremonies, Bar Mitzvas, adoption of families, holiday hospitality, Torah lessons, and more. All this, according to Minister Shaki, is done through the Religious Councils.

"It is not right that immigrants who were cut off from the bosom of Judaism for so many years," Minister Shaki said in an announcement published in the supplement to "Ha'arezt," by the Ministry of Religion on 30 October 1990, "should be defined as nonreligious!" In that same publication, he also declared, "The Ministry for Religious Affairs is responsible for the spiritual absorption of the new immigrants." And indeed, as part of the events celebrating the 70th anniversary of the chief rabbinate, the Ministry organized a Bar Mitzva ceremony for immigrant children, including "laying Tefillin (phylacteries), and a Bar Mitzva banquet in the 'Baba Sali' synagogue in Netivot, with a visit to the zaddik's (righteous man, saint) grave." (Announcement by the Ministry of Religion, "Hatsofe," 3 Feb 1991). As is known, the Ministry of Religion is active in the subject of spiritual absorption in the Soviet Union as well. "All the activities," the announcement published in the "Ha'arezt" supplement goes on to say, "are meant to let the Soviet Jews know something about their religion, and to encourage them to immigrate to Israel, to settle in it and to live the life style they choose." And "HaModia" of 19 March 1991 says, "The emissaries who went out to Russia were mainly from NRP (National Religious Party) circles."

The above duplication of activities and the involvement in Ulpan studies (to be discussed further on), testify that the religious parties not only did not divide the task between them, they are even carrying on a strong competition for the soul of the new immigrant, all within a state framework, with its approval and budget.

The distress of the NRP, which is losing strength in the face of the strictly Orthodox stream, is well known. National Religious education is fighting for its life, said Mati Dagan, the director of the religious education department in the Ministry of Education: "All the immigrants' children should have been sent to National Religious education, without any conditions, to equalize their situation with that of the secularists." (HaTsofe, 1

April 1991). And perhaps also so they will not be sent to the competing Torah educational system, and thus add to their budget.

Complaints have reached the Movement for Progressive Judaism from immigrants whose children study in strictly Orthodox schools in Jerusalem. In their words, clerks in the Ministry of Absorption convinced them that it was worthwhile to register with these schools on the grounds that they were on a higher standard than the secular schools: because in them the children could study an extended day, including a hot meal and clubs, without extra fees. It is not in vain that the NRP fought furiously against the special funds, and not in vain that it stood silent when it, too, got its cut. The competition that the National Religious stream faces is not considered.

"Yom HaShishi" (6 April 1990), reports with satisfaction hospitality projects on Passover and Succoth: "The education center in Mevaseret Zion holds an eight day seminar for immigrants, 4,800 souls; Agudat Shamir, (funded by Agudat Yisrael's "Torah and Yahadut La'am" held seders for 4,000 people in Mevaseret Zion and Jerusalem. The "Yisrael HaTzair" organization, which works jointly with the absorption division of Agudat Yisrael, gave hospitality to 6,850 immigrant families; Habad gave hospitality to 1,000 families, and so on. The newspaper does not bother to mention the sources of funding, but a letter to the editor on 20 October 1990 rebukes it: "We enjoyed very much the item you printed about our project on Succoth giving hospitality to 650 immigrants...but there was one thing missing; for some reason you forgot to mention the part of the Ministry of Absorption, and especially that of Ms. Tzvia Duma, through whose help the Ministry offered us most of the budget, 15,000 new shekels, and helped us to find additional funds."

This letter leads toward the grey area of the activities of the private nonprofit organizations that draw their funds, as we know, from the special funds and the bequests, and are actually busy returning people to the religion in the way described by the cloying article in the weekly paper, "Mishpaha." Sasha is not the only "Jewish heart that has felt," as the article expresses it. Many immigrant children get the chance to know the warm Jewish feeling in various religious camps set up all over the country. The lavish publicity pamphlets sent to immigrant homes by the organization "Ya'ale Veyavo," for example, do not give even a hint that they are talking about a religious camp. On the contrary, they promise a free vacation "in a peaceful village atmosphere, including sporting and cultural activities." The newspaper, "Yated Ne'eman," (27 September 1990) quotes the Minister of Absorption as saying that at the assembly for spiritual renewal at the "Or Moshe" institutes in Tel Aviv, about 5,000 children took part in the Torah camps, among them about 2,200 children in 19 NRP summer camps. The Ministry of Absorption shared in funding the camps.

The complex problem of the various nonprofit organizations active in spiritual absorption of immigrants from the Soviet Union, and competing against each other for the lost spirituality of the new immigrant, can be illustrated through the strange experiment, covered in a mist of denials and unclear explanations, of the joint ministerial committee. In February 1991, the newspaper, "HaTzofe," published an item announcing the establishment of a new joint ministerial committee set up by the Ministry of Absorption, together with the Ministries of Religion, Education, and Welfare. The committee, it said further, would centralize on a national level the work of all the organizations dealing with spiritual absorption of the immigrants. Up to here, all is well and good, except that it becomes clear that the secretary of the committee, Rabbi Shmu'el Abramovski, is also the director of a private nonprofit organization called "A.L.H.," an organization that encourages immigration; and in the name of the committee, some of whose members are senior representatives of the four ministries mentioned above, and on official paper of the nonprofit organization, Rabbi Abramovski turned to "the organizations and institutions that deal with spiritual absorption (more than 150 organizations and institutions) in the language of an appeal, and announced to them that: "There has been a decision to gather data on the organizations and the extent of their activities. A.L.H. is carrying out the work of data gathering and these data will serve for the joint ministerial work as a basis for decisions about dividing resources among the organizations and their various activities."

The letter, dated 7 February 1991, was sent to all the organizations: all the religious organizations. Among other things, it included an invitation to participate in a planning meeting that would center on the topic of Passover activities. The Minister of Absorption and the managing director of his ministry were supposed to attend the meeting, which was to be held on 17 February 1991, at the Ramada Renaissance Hotel in Jerusalem. Strangest of all is the fact that when we turned to senior officials in the Ministry of Absorption, we were told that they did not know anyone named Shmuel Abromovski, and had never heard of a joint ministerial committee of the sort that "HaTsofe" and the letters mentioned above had announced.

It is difficult to get a chance to talk to Rabbi Abramovski in the office of the nonprofit organization. The secretary, and one of the workers, who refused to be identified by his full name or to say if he was a paid worker or a volunteer, said that the rabbi headed the nonprofit organization, and did not work in any other place, and that the nonprofit was active in spiritual and material aid to immigrants, and they did not know of any committee but you must ask the rabbi. A retired teacher, who asked to join the volunteer activities of the nonprofit organization, and told them that she was not religious, was answered that "you must speak with the rabbi. We work with a religious community, but you must check. Maybe he also works with another community." It is

hard to explain how a community that was defined a few months ago as "a clean slate," has so quickly achieved the title of a "religious community."

What has begun to arouse sparks of public debate of late is the subject of the ulpan. Notices have appeared in the press about freezing the tenure of the veteran teachers in the Education Ministry's ulpan, and about putting female soldier-teachers to work in the ulpan. Sixty female soldiers have already begun work, and the Ministry of Education intends to put to work another 1,000 female soldiers, and 500 religious young women within the framework of their national service. "An 18 year old teacher who appears before the new immigrants in uniform is the most attractive representation of the State of Israel," says Yehiel Nahshon, superintendent of the division for adult education. As to the many hours of Jewish Studies the ulpan directors claim the Ministry of Education is forcing on them, Nahshon said that the Jewish Studies are "to let the immigrant know who he is and who his ancestors were; why we have absorbed him." The NRP's fight for survival stands out prominently in the problems of the ulpan. The Ministry of Absorption, not satisfied with paying the teachers' salaries, sent to the ulpan religious "monitors of Jewish practice," who have been teaching several hours a week on Jewish topics. By freezing the tenure of teachers, the Ministry of Education succeeds in cutting itself from the budgetary stranglehold of the Ministry of Absorption, and handles by itself the teaching of Judaism in its own institutions.

The teachers claim that this "spiritual" competition has created an unbearable situation. They were told that they can teach six months of ulpan instead of five, on the condition that the sixth month go for hours of Jewish Studies. "We received irritating and tendentious briefings about the holiday of Shavuot," claimed one veteran teacher, a Sabra (native Israeli) with years of experience teaching Hebrew and citizenship in high school, "that obscured the connection to the earth, and did not mention the Zionist renewal at all, and instead went on endlessly about the Torah and thanking G-d [the substitute word used by Orthodox is employed here to avoid saying the name of God]. I do not oppose Jewish Studies, on the contrary. But it cannot be that the program of studies in the ulpan will not include elementary topics like democracy, free elections, the structure of the Israeli government, and the history of Zionism. We do try, privately, to organize activities on our own initiative.

"On Memorial Day for the Israeli Army Dead, for example, there was no special program for the students of my ulpan. I explained the importance of the day to them, and went out with them into the street so that they could soak in the atmosphere, and they stood during the siren along with the others. On Shavuot eve, on the other hand, a bus came and took them to "Mercav HaRav" in Jerusalem. They were guests there for two days, ate and drank and enjoyed the best the land had to offer, and said later that it was not for them. The hospitality did not cost them a penny. Who has funds to compete with

a seductive suggestion like that?" The "soldier-teachers," says the teacher, "are girls, very sweet, but what do they know that they can pass on, from the point of view of values and of knowledge of the culture and the country, to mature people? It is not true that the immigrants are a clean slate. They are very touchy over any indoctrination. In the best case, they simply rebel against religious pressure. In the worst case, they are convinced that Israel is not a free country, and that here too people live a lie with defined rules."

And we have still not said a thing about the activity of the religious councils on the subject of circumcision in Israel, the activity of the chief rabbinate on the subject of selection of Jews and non-Jews in the Soviet Union, and the doubtful activities of the rabbis sent by the nonprofit organizations and Habad (the Lubavitcher Hassidim) to the Soviet Union, which was revealed not long ago.

This seems, at first glance, to be something marginal—spiritual absorption—which, compared to the other problems hampering the absorption, seems even more marginal. But the matter is really much more serious: three government ministries, and especially the Ministry of Absorption, have deviated from their jurisdiction, and they are making use of state funds for ideological-factional purposes. It is clear that the religious parties are strengthening their position, at the taxpayers' expense, for the coming elections. Perhaps on the background of the latest scandals, and after the serious reports of the state comptroller about the nonprofit organizations, the religious parties fear that the tap of the special appropriations is about to be turned off, and they are opening a new channel for themselves. No less serious than this, of course, is the fact that an insignificant minority is forcing its world view on the education and absorption of hundreds of thousands of immigrants, with the stamp and seal of the government. That the method is not new, those close to Yitzhak Peretz will say. The Labor movement forced its value on entire waves of immigration in the past. But even if this is so, the Labor movement represented in its time the majority of the Israeli public. It is true that Peretz, Shaki, Porush and the other religious party leaders did not create the method, but they have perfected it to the level of an art.

[Box p 2b]

Knesset Member Hayim Oron (Mapam): "The spiritual-religious absorption is done within a party framework, relying on tax revenue and supposed to represent all of the opinions in the State of Israel. At the source of the matter is hidden the blatant assumption that the religious parties have a monopoly on Judaism. We have a serious dispute with them, and I am not ready for it to be carried out on the backs of the immigrants. My dispute is with the Minister of Absorption of the Government of Israel. The populace must understand the force with which the things are being conducted."

Rabbi Uri Regev, Movement for Progressive Judaism: "As a progressive Jew, I am repelled by the ultra-Orthodox tone of the well-funded effort to bring the immigrants over to a world view opposed to the way of life in the State of Israel, and to the way of life of most of World Jewry. As a citizen, I see here another symptom of contempt for Zionism and for government authority, and of the decline of normal public administration in Israel."

MAURITANIA

Text of Draft Constitution Issued

91AA0495A Nouakchott CHAAB in French
12 Jun 91 pp 3-6

[Text] On Sunday, 9 June 1991, the Military Committee for National Salvation met in a special session led by Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya, its chairman and the head of state.

During this session, the Military Committee of National Salvation examined the draft constitution, the sole item on its agenda. It has decided to submit the draft constitution for the approval of the people in a referendum.

12 July 1991 has been established as the date on which this referendum will be held.

The text of the constitution thus proposed is as follows.

Proposed Constitution

Preamble

Confident in the almightiness of Allah, the Mauritanian people declare it their will to guarantee the totality of their Territory, Independence, and National Unity and to embrace their free political, economic, and social evolution.

Drawing strength from their spiritual values and from the light of their civilization, the people formally declare their attachment to Islam and to the principles of democracy as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948 and by the African Charter of the Rights of Man and of Peoples of 28 June 1981, as well as by the other international conventions to which Mauritania is a signatory.

In the belief that the liberty, equality, and dignity of man can be ensured only in a society that holds the law to be supreme, and seeking to create lasting conditions for harmonious social evolution that is both in keeping with the precepts of Islam, the sole source of right, and responsive to the exigencies of the modern world, the Mauritanian people specifically proclaim the following rights and principles to be irrevocably guaranteed:

- the right to equality;
- the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual;
- the right of ownership;

- political freedoms and trade union rights;
- economic and social rights;
- the rights pertaining to the family, the fundamental unit of Islamic society.

Aware of the need to strengthen ties between brotherly peoples, the Mauritanian people, a Muslim, Arab, and African people, declare that they shall work to achieve the Unity of the Greater Maghreb, of the Arab Nation and of Africa, and to consolidate peace in the world.

TITLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Article 1. Mauritania shall be an Islamic Republic, indivisible, democratic, and social.

The Republic shall guarantee equality before the law to all citizens without regard to origin, race, sex, or social condition.

Any particularistic propaganda of a racial or ethnic nature shall be punishable by law.

Article 2. All power derives from the people. National sovereignty shall belong to the people who shall exercise it through their elected representatives and in referenda.

No segment of the population nor any individual shall appropriate the exercise thereof.

No decision to relinquish sovereignty in part or in full shall be taken without the consent of the people.

Article 3. Suffrage may be either direct or indirect, under the conditions established by law. It shall always be universal, equal, and by secret ballot.

All citizens of the Republic of either sex having reached the age of majority and enjoying full civil and political rights shall be qualified to vote.

Article 4. The law is the supreme expression of the will of the people. All shall be required to comply with it.

Article 5. Islam shall be the religion of the people and of the state.

Article 6. The national languages are Arabic, Pular, Soninke, and Wolof; the official language shall be Arabic.

Article 7. The capital of the nation shall be Nouakchott.

Article 8. The national symbol shall be a green flag bearing a gold crescent and star.

Article 9. The motto of the Republic shall be "Honor, Fraternity, and Justice."

Article 10. The state shall guarantee public and individual freedoms to all citizens, in particular:

- freedom to travel and settle in all parts of the Republic's territory;
- freedom to enter and leave the country;

- freedom of opinion and thought;
- freedom of expression;
- freedom of assembly;
- freedom of association and the freedom to join the political or labor organizations of one's choosing;
- freedom of commerce and industry;
- freedom of intellectual, artistic, and scientific creation

Freedom shall not be restricted unless by law.

Article 11. Political parties and groups shall serve as a means of shaping and expressing the political will. They shall come into existence and exercise their activities freely on the condition that they abide by democratic principles and are not prejudicial in their goals or actions to the national sovereignty, territorial integrity, or the unity of the Nation and the Republic.

The conditions for the incorporation, functioning, and dissolution of political parties shall be established by law.

Article 12. All citizens may accede to public functions and service without condition except as stipulated by law.

Article 13. All individuals shall be presumed innocent until guilt is established by a duly constituted court of law.

No one shall be prosecuted, arrested, detained, or punished except for causes defined by law and in a manner prescribed by law.

The honor and private life of the citizen, and the inviolability of the individual, his domicile, and his correspondence shall be guaranteed by the state.

Any form of moral or physical violence shall be proscribed.

Article 14. The right to strike is hereby recognized. It shall be exercised in accordance with the laws that regulate it.

Strikes affecting services or activities of vital interest to the Nation may be banned by law.

Strikes in the domain of national defense and security are hereby forbidden.

Article 15. The right of ownership shall be guaranteed.

The right to inherit shall be guaranteed.

The property of foundations and wakf [endowment] are hereby recognized: Their disposition shall be protected by law.

The law may limit the exercise of ownership if the demands of economic and social development so warrant.

No expropriation shall take place except for compelling reasons in the public interest and not until just compensation shall have been given.

The law shall establish the legal considerations applicable to expropriation.

Article 16. The state and the society shall protect the family.

Article 17. Ignorance of the law shall excuse no one.

Article 18. All citizens shall have the duty to protect and preserve the country's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

Treason, espionage, defection to the enemy as well as all breaches of state security shall be punished with the utmost rigor of the law.

Article 19. All citizens must faithfully fulfill their obligations to the nation as a whole and respect public and private property.

Article 20. All citizens shall be equally subject to taxation. Each must take part in the public financial obligations according to his ability to contribute.

No tax shall be instituted except by an act of law.

Article 21. All foreigners legally present in Mauritania shall enjoy the protection of the law with regard to their person and their property.

Article 22. No one shall be extradited except in accordance with extradition laws and conventions.

TITLE II. THE EXECUTIVE POWER

Article 23. The President of the Republic shall be the head of state. He shall be of the Muslim religion.

Article 24. The President of the Republic shall be the guardian of the Constitution. He shall embody the state. Through his arbitration, he shall ensure the continued and lawful functioning of the public powers.

He shall be the guarantor of nation's independence and territorial integrity.

Article 25. The President of the Republic shall exercise the executive power. He shall preside over the Council of Ministers.

Article 26. The President of the Republic shall be elected for six years by direct universal suffrage.

He shall be elected by an absolute majority of the votes cast. If none of the candidates obtains such a majority in the first round of balloting, a second round shall be held on the second consecutive Friday. Only the two candidates to have obtained the largest numbers of votes in the first round and having not withdrawn their candidacies shall compete in the second round.

Only natural-born Mauritanian citizens enjoying their civil and political rights and having attained the age of at least forty (40) years shall be eligible to the office of President.

The electoral process shall begin at the summons of the President of the Republic.

The election of a new President of the Republic shall take place at least thirty (30) days and at most forty-five (45) days before the expiration of the incumbent President's term of office.

The conditions and procedures for the acceptance of candidacies as well as the rules applicable in the event of the death of candidates to the office of President of the Republic or their inability to proceed shall be determined by an organic law.

Candidacy documents shall be received by the Constitutional Council which shall determine their validity and which shall proclaim the outcome of the balloting.

Article 27. The duties of the President of the Republic shall be held incompatible with the exercise of any other function, public or private.

Article 28. The President of the Republic may be re-elected.

Article 29. The newly elected President shall assume office upon the expiration of his predecessor's term.

Article 30. The President of the Republic shall determine and conduct the Nation's foreign policy as well as its policy of defense and security.

The power to appoint and the power to remove the Prime Minister shall belong to the President.

On the proposal of the Prime Minister, the President shall appoint the Ministers, to whom he may delegate by decree certain of his powers. He shall remove them from office after consulting the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister and the ministers shall be accountable to the President of the Republic.

The President of the Republic shall communicate with the Parliament by means of messages. Such messages shall not be the occasion of any debate.

Article 31. The President of the Republic may, after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Presidents of the Assemblies, declare the National Assembly dissolved. General elections shall take place at least thirty (30) days and at most sixty (60) days after dissolution.

The National Assembly shall by full right convene fifteen (15) days following its election. If this meeting falls outside the periods established for ordinary sessions, a session of fifteen (15) days' duration shall, by right, commence.

The National Assembly may not be dissolved in the twelve (12) months following these elections.

Article 32. The President of the Republic shall promulgate the laws within the period of time established by Article 70 of this Constitution.

He shall have the power to regulate and may delegate a part or all of it to the Prime Minister.

He shall make appointments to civilian and military posts.

Article 33. Decrees of a regulatory nature shall be countersigned, should the case arise, by the Prime Minister and the ministers responsible for their execution.

Article 34. The President of the Republic shall be the supreme commander of the Armed Forces. He shall preside over the higher councils and committees of national defense.

Article 35. The President of the Republic shall accredit the ambassadors and special envoys to foreign powers. The ambassadors and special envoys [of other countries] shall be accredited to him.

Article 36. The President of the Republic shall sign and ratify treaties.

Article 37. The President of the Republic shall have the power to grant pardons and to remit or commute sentences.

Article 38. The President of the Republic may refer a matter of national importance to the people by means of a referendum.

Article 39. When the institutions of the Republic, the security or independence of the nation, or its territorial integrity are threatened by an imminent danger and the normal functioning of the constitutional powers is impeded, the President of the Republic shall enact the measures required by such circumstances after official consultation with the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the Assemblies, and the Constitutional Council.

He shall inform the nation of these measures in a message.

These measures, being inspired by a desire to ensure the speedy reestablishment of the continued and lawful functioning of the public powers, shall cease to be applicable in the same manner once the circumstances that gave rise to them shall have ended.

The Parliament shall meet by full right.

The National Assembly shall not be dissolved during the exercise of exceptional powers.

Article 40. In the event of a vacancy or inability to discharge responsibilities declared permanent by the Constitutional Council, the President of the Senate shall temporarily replace the President of the Republic for the

purpose of disposing of ordinary matters. The Prime Minister and the members of the government, deemed to have offered their resignations, shall see to it that ordinary matters are disposed of. The Interim President may not remove them from office. He may not consult the people by means of a referendum nor dissolve the National Assembly.

The election of the new President of the Republic shall, unless a case of force majeure is declared by the Constitutional Council, take place within three (3) months of the declaration of a vacancy or permanent inability to discharge responsibilities.

During the interim period, no modification to the Constitution may be made either by referendum or by parliamentary means.

Article 41. The matter of a vacancy or a permanent inability to discharge responsibilities may be referred to the determination of the Constitutional Council by:

- the President of the Republic;
- the President of the National Assembly; or
- the Prime Minister.

Article 42. Under the authority of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister shall define the policy of the government.

He shall assign tasks to the ministers.

He shall direct and coordinate the Government's action.

Article 43. The Government shall ensure that the general policy of the state shall be implemented in keeping with the guidelines and choices established by the President of the Republic.

It shall have at its disposition the civil service and the Armed Forces.

It shall ensure that laws and regulations are published and executed.

It shall be accountable to the Parliament in accordance with the conditions and procedures set forth in Articles 74 and 75 of this Constitution.

Article 44. The duties of members of Government shall be held incompatible with the exercise of any parliamentary office, professional representative function of a national character, professional activity, and in a general manner, any public or private employment.

An organic law shall establish the conditions under which the holders of such offices, duties, or employment shall be replaced. Members of Parliament shall be replaced in accordance with the provisions of Article 48 of this Constitution.

TITLE III. THE LEGISLATIVE POWER

Article 45. The legislative power shall be vested in the Parliament.

Article 46. The Parliament shall consist of two (2) representative Assemblies: the National Assembly and the Senate.

Article 47. The deputies to the National Assembly shall be elected for five (5) years by direct suffrage.

The senators shall be elected for six (6) years by indirect suffrage. They shall ensure the representation of the territorial units of the Republic. Mauritians residing abroad shall be represented in the Senate. Every two (2) years, one-third (1/3) of the seats in the Senate shall be put to an election.

Mauritanian citizens enjoying their full civil and political rights are eligible to the office of Deputy on attaining the age of twenty-five (25) years and to the office of Senator on attaining the age of thirty-five (35) years.

Article 48. An organic law shall establish the conditions for the election of the members of Parliament, their number, their compensation, the conditions of eligibility, and the provisions governing ineligibility and incompatibility.

It shall also establish the conditions under which persons shall be elected to replace deputies or senators, in the event of a vacancy, until full or partial elections to the Assembly concerned shall be held.

Article 49. The Constitutional Council shall rule, in the event of a challenge, on the validity of the election of parliamentarians and on their eligibility.

Article 50. No member of Parliament may be prosecuted, made the subject of a search, arrested, detained, or tried as a result of the opinions or votes expressed by him in the exercise of his duties.

No member of Parliament may, during parliamentary session, be prosecuted or arrested for criminal or correctional matters without the authorization of the Assembly of which he is a member except in a case of flagrante delicto.

No member of Parliament may be arrested, when Parliament is in recess, without the authorization of the secretariat of the Assembly of which he is a member, except in the cases of flagrante delicto, authorized prosecution, or final conviction.

The detention or prosecution of a member of Parliament shall be suspended if the Assembly of which he is a member so demands.

Article 51. No Member of Parliament's vote may be dictated by his electors.

The right to vote of the members of Parliament is personal.

The delegation of the right to vote may be authorized in exceptional circumstances by organic law. In that event, no member may be delegated more than one vote.

Any deliberations held at a time or place other than those established for parliamentary sessions are null and void. The President of the Republic may request a declaration by Constitutional Council nullifying such deliberations.

The meetings of the National Assembly and the Senate shall be public. The record of debates shall be published in the Journal Officiel.

Each assembly may meet in secret at the request of the Prime Minister or at the request of one-fourth (1/4) of its members.

Article 52. Parliament shall meet by full right in two (2) ordinary sessions a year. The first session shall begin in the first two weeks of November and the second, in the first two weeks of May. The duration of an ordinary session may not exceed two (2) months.

Article 53. Parliament may be convened in a special session to consider a specific agenda at the request of the President of the Republic or the majority of the members of the National Assembly. The duration of a special session may not exceed one month.

Special sessions shall be opened and closed by decree of the President of the Republic.

Article 54. The members of Government shall have access to the two (2) assemblies. They shall be heard when they so request. They may be assisted by commissioners of the government.

Article 55. The president of the National Assembly shall be elected for the duration of the Assembly's term of office.

The President of the Senate shall be elected after each partial reelection of the Senate.

TITLE IV. ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS

Article 56. The law shall be approved by the vote of Parliament.

Article 57. The following shall be deemed within the realm of the law:

- the fundamental rights and duties of persons, in particular the provisions related to public liberties, the protection of individual liberties, and the obligations imposed by the national defense upon the person and property of citizens;
- the nationality, status, and legal capacity of persons; marriage, divorce, and inheritance;
- the conditions governing the establishment of persons and the status of foreigners;
- the definition of crimes and misdemeanors as well as the punishment applicable to them, criminal procedure, amnesty, the creation and structure of courts, the status of judges and prosecutors;
- civil procedure and avenues of execution;
- provisions governing customs, the issuance of currency; banks, credit, and insurance;

- the electoral system and the drawing of district lines;
- provisions governing ownership, property rights, and civil and commercial obligations;
- general provisions governing water, mines, and hydrocarbons; fisheries and the merchant marine; wildlife and the environment;
- the protection of the historical and cultural heritage;
- general rules pertaining to education and health;
- general rules pertaining trade unions, employment, and social security;
- the general organization of the executive departments of the state;
- the free administration of local communities, their responsibilities, and their resources;
- the basis of assessment, rate, and methods of collecting taxes of all types;
- the creation of categories of public establishments;
- the fundamental guarantees granted to civilian and military personnel of the state, and the general schedule pertaining to the civil service;
- the nationalization of companies and transfers of property from the public sector to the private sector;
- the general rules pertaining to the organization of the national defense.

The laws of finance [enactments of budgets] shall determine the financial resources and obligations of the state in accordance with the conditions and reservations to be established by an organic law.

The objectives of the state's social and economic endeavors shall be defined by laws and programs.

The provisions of the present article may be further detailed and supplemented by an organic law.

Article 58. Parliament shall authorize the declaration of war.

Article 59. Matters other than those which fall within the domain of the law shall be subject to regulation.

Legislative texts adopted with regard to such matters may be modified by decree if the Constitutional Council determines them to be of a regulatory nature by virtue of the preceding paragraph.

Article 60. After obtaining the consent of the President of the Republic, the Government may, in order to carry out its program, request authorization from the Parliament to enact measures by ordinance and for a limited period of time, when such measures would otherwise fall within the domain of the law.

Such ordinances shall be adopted at meetings of the Council of Ministers [cabinet meetings] and shall require the approval of the President of the Republic who must sign them.

They shall take effect upon being published, but shall become null and void if the bill for their ratification is not submitted to Parliament before the date established by the enabling law.

Upon expiration of the time period mentioned in the first paragraph of the present article, ordinances may not be modified except by law in those matters which fall within the legislative domain.

The enabling law shall become null and void if the National Assembly is dissolved.

Article 61. The right to initiate laws shall belong concurrently to the Government and the members of Parliament.

Government-sponsored bills shall be discussed in meetings of the Council of Ministers and shall be filed with the secretariat of one of the two Assemblies. Finance bills shall be submitted first to the National Assembly.

Article 62. The Government and the members of Parliament shall have the right of amendment.

Parliamentary bills or amendments that would, by their adoption, result either in a reduction of public revenues or in the creation or increase of a public financial obligation shall be inadmissible unless accompanied by a bill to increase revenues or savings correspondingly.

Parliamentary bills or amendments may be declared inadmissible if they concern a matter of a regulatory character by virtue of Article 59 or are contrary to a delegation granted by virtue of Article 60.

Should the Parliament refuse to acknowledge an objection of inadmissibility made by the Government on the basis of one of the two preceding paragraphs, the President of the Republic may refer the matter to the Constitutional Council which shall rule within a period of eight (8) days.

Article 63. The discussion of government-sponsored bills in the first Assembly to which submitted shall pertain to the text submitted by the Government.

The Assembly to which a text has been submitted after passage by the other Assembly shall deliberate on the text transmitted to it.

Article 64. Government and parliamentary bills shall, at the request of the Government or Assembly to which they have been submitted, be sent for study to committees specially chosen for this purpose.

Government and parliamentary bills for which such a request has not been made shall be sent to one of the permanent committees, the number of which is limited to five (5) in each Assembly.

Article 65. After debate has begun, the Government may oppose the examination of any amendment that has not previously been sent to committee.

If the Government so requests, the Assembly concerned shall express, in a single vote, its decision on all or part of the text under discussion, retaining only the amendments proposed or accepted by it.

Article 66. Every Government or parliamentary bill shall be examined successively in the two Assemblies with a view to the adoption of an identical text.

In the event of disagreement and when the Government has declared a matter urgent, a Government-sponsored bill may, after one reading by each of the two Assemblies, be sent to a joint committee charged with proposing a text concerning the measures still under discussion.

This text may be submitted by the same avenue to the two Assemblies for adoption. No amendment shall be admissible in this case.

Should the joint committee fail to propose a common text, or should such a text not be adopted by the two Assemblies, the Government may, after another reading by the two chambers, ask the National Assembly to rule definitively.

Article 67. Laws characterized by the Constitution as organic shall be passed and modified under the following conditions:

The Government or parliamentary bill shall not be put to deliberation and a vote in the first Assembly to which it has been referred until a period of fifteen (15) days shall have elapsed after the bill was filed.

The procedure set forth in Article 66 shall be applicable. Nonetheless, in the absence of agreement between the two Assemblies, the text may not be adopted by the National Assembly on final reading unless approved by an absolute majority of its members.

Organic laws relative to the Senate must be approved in the same terms by both Assemblies.

Organic laws may not be promulgated until the Constitutional Council has declared them to be in accordance with the Constitution.

Article 68. Finance bills shall be approved by a vote of Parliament.

Finance bills shall be referred to Parliament as of the opening of the November session.

Should the National Assembly fail to reach a decision on a first reading within thirty (30) days after a finance bill has been filed, the Government shall refer it to the Senate which must rule within a period of fifteen (15) days. The procedure set forth in Article 66 shall then be followed.

Should Parliament fail to approve the budget before the end of its session, or should only one chamber approve it, the Government shall, within fifteen (15) days, resubmit the proposed budget to the National Assembly convened in a special session.

The National Assembly must rule within eight (8) days. If the budget is not approved by the end of this period,

the President of the Republic shall establish it by ordinance on the basis of the previous year's revenues.

Parliament shall supervise the execution of the budget for the state's activities as well as ancillary budgets. At the end of each six-month period, a report on expenditures of the previous six-month period shall be given to the Parliament. The final accounts relative to a fiscal year shall be filed during the budgetary session of the following year and approved by an act of law.

A Court of Accounts shall assist the Parliament and the Government in supervising the execution of finance laws.

Article 69. Discussion of government-initiated and parliament-initiated bills accepted by the Government shall be included, as a matter of priority and in the order determined by the Government, in the agenda of the Assemblies.

One meeting every week shall be reserved, as a matter of priority and in the order determined by the Government, to the government-initiated and parliament-initiated bills accepted by it.

One meeting every week shall be reserved, as a matter of priority, to questions by the members of Parliament and to answers by the Government.

Article 70. The President of the Republic shall promulgate the laws no sooner than eight (8) days and no later than thirty (30) days after they are sent to him by Parliament.

During that time, the President of the Republic may return a government- or parliament-initiated bill for a second reading. Should a majority of the National Assembly's members vote in favor of adoption, the law shall be promulgated and published within the time period specified in the preceding paragraph.

Article 71. The President of the Republic shall have the power to declare a state of siege or a state of emergency not to exceed a duration of thirty (30) days.

The duration may be extended by the Parliament. If not in session, the Parliament shall meet by full right.

The law shall define the exceptional powers conferred on the President of the Republic as a result of a declaration of a state of siege or a state of emergency.

Article 72. The Government shall be required to account to Parliament for every aspect of its governance and its actions for which such accounts shall be asked of it and in the manner specified by law.

Article 73. Once every year during the November session, the Prime Minister shall report to the National Assembly on the Government's activity during the previous year and shall outline his program for the year to come.

Article 74. The Prime Minister and the ministers shall be jointly accountable to the National Assembly. Political accountability shall be brought into play as a result of a question of confidence or a motion of censure.

After deliberation by the Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister shall make the Government responsible to the National Assembly for its program and, if applicable, for a statement of general policy.

A motion of censure approved by the National Assembly shall place the Government's responsibility in question.

A motion of censure introduced by a deputy must be explicitly identified as such and bear the signature of its author. Such a motion shall not be admissible unless it is signed by at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the National Assembly.

A vote may take place no sooner than forty-eight (48) hours after the question of confidence or the motion of censure has been filed.

Article 75. A vote of no confidence or the adoption of a motion of censure shall result in the immediate resignation of the Government. They shall be adopted by no less than a majority of the members of the National Assembly; only votes of no confidence or votes in favor of a motion of censure shall be counted.

The resigning government shall continue to dispose of ordinary matters until a new Prime Minister and a new government shall be appointed by the President of the Republic.

Should a motion of censure be rejected, its signatories may not introduce another such motion during the same session, except in the case provided for in the following paragraph.

After deliberation by the Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister shall make his government responsible to the National Assembly for the adoption of a text. In such a case, the text shall be deemed adopted unless a motion of censure, filed within the ensuing twenty-four (24) hours, is approved in accordance with the conditions specified in the first paragraph of this article.

The Prime Minister shall have the option to request the Senate's approval of a declaration of general policy.

Article 76. The adjournment of an ordinary or special session shall, by right, be delayed if necessary in order that the provisions of Article 75 of this Constitution may be applied.

Article 77. Should two changes of government occur within a period of thirty-six (36) months as a result of a vote of no confidence or a motion of censure, the President of the Republic may, after consulting the President of the National Assembly, declare said Assembly to be dissolved.

In this case, new elections shall be held within a period of forty (40) days at the most. The new National Assembly shall meet by full right three (3) weeks after its election.

TITLE V. ON TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Article 78. Peace treaties, treaties of union, commercial treaties, treaties or agreements relative to the organization of trade, treaties or agreements relative to international organization, those which commit the state's finances, those which modify legislative provisions, those relative to the status of persons, and treaties relative to the nation's borders may be ratified only by an act of law.

They may take effect only once they have been ratified or approved.

No cession, exchange, or addition of territory shall be valid without the consent of the people who shall express their determination in a referendum.

In the case specified in the last paragraph of Article 2 of this Constitution, the majority required shall be four-fifths (4/5) of the votes cast.

Article 79. Should the Constitutional Council declare unconstitutional a clause included in an international undertaking referred to it by the President of the Republic, the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, or by one-third (1/3) of the deputies or senators, the authorization to ratify or to approve said clause be given only after the Constitution shall have been amended.

Article 80. Treaties or agreements lawfully ratified or approved shall, once published, have an authority superior to that of the laws, subject to the application of the given treaty or agreement by the other party.

TITLE VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL

Article 81. The Constitutional Council shall consist of six (6) members appointed to nonrenewable terms of office lasting nine (9) years. One-third (1/3) of the Constitutional Council shall be replaced every three (3) years. Three (3) of its members shall be appointed by the President of the Republic; two (2) by the President of the National Assembly; and one (1) by the President of the Senate.

The minimum age of the members of the Constitutional Council shall be no less than thirty-five (35) years.

They may not be members of the governing bodies of political parties. They shall enjoy parliamentary immunity.

The President of the Constitutional Council shall be named by the President of the Republic from among the members he has appointed and shall have an overriding vote in the event of a tie.

Article 82. The duties of members of the Constitutional Council shall be held incompatible with those of members of Government or Parliament. Other incompatibilities shall be established by an organic law.

Article 83. The Constitutional Council shall ensure the lawfulness of elections to the office of the President of the Republic.

It shall examine complaints and shall proclaim the outcome of the balloting.

Article 84. In the event of a challenge, the Constitutional Council shall rule on the lawfulness of the election of deputies and senators.

Article 85. The Constitutional Council shall ensure the lawfulness of referenda and shall proclaim the outcome thereof.

Article 86. Organic laws, before promulgation, and the rules of the parliamentary Assemblies, before implementation, must be submitted to the Constitutional Council which shall determine their constitutionality.

To the same end, laws may be referred to the Constitutional Council, before promulgation, by the President of the Republic, the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, or by one-third (1/3) of the members of either the National Assembly or the Senate.

In the cases described in the two preceding paragraphs, the Constitutional Council must rule within a period of one (1) month. Nonetheless, at the request of the President of the Republic, if the matter is urgent, this period shall be shortened to eight (8) days.

In these same cases, referral to the Constitutional Council shall suspend the time period stipulated for promulgation.

Article 87. Any provision declared unconstitutional may not be promulgated or implemented.

The decisions of the Constitutional Council shall have the authority of "res judicata."

The decisions of the Constitutional Council may not be appealed. They must be accepted by the public powers and by all administrative and judicial authorities.

Article 88. An organic law shall determine the rules under which the Constitutional Council shall be organized and function, the procedure to be applied in matters involving the Council, and the periods of time allowed for referring disputes to it.

TITLE VII. THE JUDICIAL POWER

Article 89. The judicial power shall be independent of the executive power and the legislative power.

The President of the Republic shall be the guarantor of the independence of the judiciary.

He shall be assisted by the High Council of the Judiciary over which he shall preside.

An organic law shall establish the status of the judiciary, the composition, operation, and powers of the High Council of the Judiciary.

Article 90. A judge shall obey no dictates but those of the law.

In performing his mission, he shall be protected from all forms of pressure of a nature detrimental to his free will.

Article 91. No one may be arbitrarily detained. The judicial power, as guardian of individual liberty, shall ensure this principle under the conditions stipulated by law.

TITLE VIII. THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

Article 92. A High Court of Justice shall be instituted.

It shall be composed of members elected by the National Assembly and the Senate from among their members and in equal numbers, after each general or partial election to these Assemblies. The High Court of Justice shall elect its President from among its members.

An organic law shall establish the composition of the High Court of Justice, the rules by which it shall function, and the procedure applicable in matters involving it.

Article 93. The President of the Republic shall not be held responsible for acts committed in the exercise of his duties except in the case of high treason.

He may not be impeached unless an absolute majority of the two Assemblies shall so decide in an open vote on identical terms; he shall be tried by the High Court of Justice.

The Prime Minister and the members of Government shall be held criminally liable for acts committed in the exercise of their duties and defined as crimes or misdemeanors at the time they were committed. The procedure defined above shall be applied to them, as well as to their accomplices in the case of a conspiracy against the security of the state. In the case provided for in the present paragraph, the High Court of Justice shall be bound by the definition of crimes and misdemeanors as well as by the determination of punishment resulting from the criminal laws in force at the time the deeds were committed.

TITLE IX. ADVISORY INSTITUTIONS

Article 94. An Islamic High Council consisting of five (5) members shall be instituted under the authority of the President of the Republic.

The Islamic High Council's president and other members shall be appointed by the President of the Republic.

The Islamic High Council shall meet at the request of the President of the Republic.

It shall formulate an opinion on the questions submitted to it by President of the Republic.

Article 95. The Economic and Social Council, at the referral of the President of the Republic, shall give its opinion on the executive branch's proposed laws, ordinances, and decrees of a social and economic nature, and on the parliamentary bills of the same nature that shall have been submitted to it.

The Economic and Social Council may designate one of its members to present to the Parliamentary Assemblies the opinion of the Council on the government- and parliament-initiated bills that have been referred to it.

Article 96. The Economic and Social Council may also be consulted by the President of the Republic on any question of an economic and social nature of interest to the state. Any plan or government bill to initiate a program of an economic and social nature shall be submitted to it for advice.

Article 97. The composition of the Economic and Social Council and the rules governing its functioning shall be established by an organic law.

TITLE X. ON TERRITORIAL UNITS

Article 98. The territorial units shall be the communes as well as those entities on which the law shall confer like status.

These units shall be administered by Councils elected under conditions established by law.

TITLE XI. ON AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION

Article 99. The initiative for amending the Constitution shall belong concurrently to the President of the Republic and the members of Parliament.

No proposed amendment introduced by the members of Parliament may be discussed without the signatures of at least one-third (1/3) of the members of one of the Assemblies.

All proposed amendments must be approved by a two-thirds (2/3) majority vote of the deputies and by a two-thirds (2/3) majority vote of the senators in order to be submitted to a referendum.

No amendment procedure may be undertaken if it challenges the existence of the state or is prejudicial to the nation's territorial integrity, to the republican form of government, or to the pluralistic nature of the Mauritanian democracy.

Article 100. The amendment shall be effective after approval by a simple majority of votes casts in a referendum.

Article 101. Nonetheless, the proposed amendment shall not be submitted to a referendum when the President of the Republic decides to submit it to Parliament convened in a Congress [joint session]. In this case, the proposed amendment must be approved by a three-fifths (3/5) majority of the votes cast. The secretariat of the National Assembly shall serve as the secretariat of the Congress.

TITLE XII. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Article 102. The establishment of the institutions provided for by this Constitution shall begin no later than three (3) months after its promulgation and shall be completed no later than nine (9) months after its promulgation.

Article 103. Until the institutions provided for in this Constitution are established, power shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Constitutional Charter of the Military Committee for National Salvation dated 9 February 1985.

[Note, p 6]

The Military Committee for National Salvation has also decided that the regulatory texts relative to the freedom to organize political parties and the freedom of the press shall be taken no later than two weeks following the adoption of the Constitution.

Obstacles Face Democratization Effort

91AA0503A Nouakchott MAURITANIE DEMAIN
in French May 91 p 8

[Article by Habib Ould Mahfoudh: "Ticket for the Future"]

[Text] Colonel Ould Taya never appeared more isolated than on the morning of 15 April. He had broken with his colleagues on the CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation] after cutting himself off from his people. The speech in which he had just announced the prospective beginning of a democratic process leading to general elections threatens to be, in one way or another, the beginning of the end of the power of a man who has not been spoiled by circumstances. He is far from feeling very comfortable! The hopes aroused by the coup d'etat of 12 December have been swept away. Gone up in smoke are the promises of a fraternal future.

The third model of the CMSN has wound up resembling in all aspects the CMSN led by Colonel Haidalla, of which it sought to be a reformed version. Military officers know very well that you can change your aim without hitting the target. In short, with few exceptions the present situation is the same as it was on 10 July 1978, when a military committee replaced the single political party. The well-known Communiqué No. 1, a laborious dissertation and profession of faith, promised, after the end of the Saharan adventure, "the establishment of democratic institutions."

Some 13 years later the military are still there. The dye is fresher, the stomachs are a little more prominent, and the bank accounts are much more substantial. The promises are also there. You must accept that the commitments of 10 July 1978 were in fact only promises of promises. However, it is never too late.

The speech of the president of the CMSN was expected. From all of the evidence Col. Maaouya Ould Taya intended to say that the opening toward democracy is "a response to the wishes of the majority of the people." The phrase is important because it seeks to dispose of the idea of any "foreign pressure," meaning pressure from France. The appearances were observed. This was a repositioning and not a forced withdrawal. Perhaps this is what explains the fact that certain political movements, "advised" by the government, have come forward over the past few months to complain in any way at all.

The extent of the anger felt by public opinion over the massacre of the black detainees in military prisons served to catalyze an elite group that has kept its temper and its frustrations in check for the past five years. As if it were raining, open letters, petitions, motions, and leaflets have flooded Nouakchott.

There were strong feelings in the higher levels of the state. "They" understood that the wind was about to change and that it would get stronger. It was necessary to make some adjustments.

In fact, once again, this did not amount to much. A promise is worth what it is worth. People have the impression that Col. Ould Taya wants to buy peace and tranquillity for two or three years, waiting to see what will happen. That shows how little the president has convinced the mass of the people.

However, the people do not make up democracy by themselves. And political figures, even those who are skeptical, see the need for playing the game to the very end. It is necessary to take the president at his word by trying to start the machinery of democratic life immediately. The principal problem is one of timing.

That is why everyone must demand EVERYTHING BEFORE [previous words as published] the end of 1991.

And where it is considered necessary, even against our best instincts, we must support Col. Maaouya Ould Taya:

- First of all against the CMSN. A majority of its members, interested in safeguarding their privileges, is not prepared to resign and return to barracks, resuming their role as big, dumb oxen, dusty and poorly paid.
- Against the colonel's entourage in the government, aware of their mediocrity and seeing themselves already out of the game.
- Against the colonel himself and his inclination to take in hand a situation that people close to him will not

fail to picture as catastrophic and dramatically in a state of disorder.

However, the three principal dangers that threaten Col. Maaouya and his temptation to move toward democracy remain:

(1) The army, with its junior officers (lieutenants and captains) divided into two, principal but not mutually exclusive groups. One group consists of the officers who admire what Nasser did and are now oriented toward al-Qadhdhafi, obsessed with the memory of Nasser's Free Officers' Movement. They entered the army as a group between 1982 and 1986. The other group consists of officers who are less clearly ideological and who have bet on the army because it was the winning horse. In both cases they will not allow their slice of the cake to slip away from them just when they were going to get their hands on it.

(2) The security services (the more or less secret services, the RG [General Intelligence Service], the political reporters, and the more or less honorable intelligence agents). They do not have a taste for sacrifice and still less for democracy. It is difficult to imagine that they will destroy themselves. Their strength is in hiding away "plots" as they wish, to see them everywhere, and particularly to be able not to see them, when that is convenient for them.

(3) The Mass Education Program (SEM). This is a bastard structure that is essentially antidemocratic. It constitutes a danger over the short, medium, and long term. It is a means of organizing people and therefore of controlling them. It galvanizes them at present, and as long as it does not disappear, it is a negation of any opening toward democracy. The state-controlled media must be included in the SEM. It will be necessary to watch the SEM to make sure that it does not become the future party of the state. This is a danger.

The future prospects are uncertain. How far will Col. Ould Taya be able to go? Where does he want to go? Meanwhile, the political pot is boiling. The different political groups are active. All of them have already had a more or less prolonged flirtation with the military. The present oppositionists only became opposed to the government after they were dismissed from their jobs or despaired of obtaining political advancement.

So it is up to everyone to discover his democratic soul. People are buying a ticket for the future. But what if it is not a genuine ticket?

SUDAN

Numayri Calls for Abolition of September Laws

91P40343A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
1 Jul 91 p 4

[Text] Cairo, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT bureau—The Sudanese Democratic Unity Party [DUP] has voiced its

total rejection of the federalist system announced by the government of Lt. Gen. 'Umar al-Bashir. In a communique published yesterday the party said that the present government does not have the authority to decide a crucial matter like this in the name of the Sudanese people.

Mr. al-Tum Muhammad al-Tum, the official spokesman for the party, mentioned in the communique that under present circumstances Sudan is not capable of carrying the enormous financial burdens connected with federalism; also, that the party sees this as the National Islamic Front [NIF] taking refuge in the federal system in a desire to solve its own problems, not to solve the problems of Sudan as a whole.

The position of the DUP essentially states the need to apply regional rule after first reviewing it and making needed course corrections in conformance with local aspirations and by establishing genuine cooperation. [It adds that] this should be done within the framework of national unity, distributing power between the central government and the regions.

It also demands a review of the laws and systems of local popular rule in light of previous experience and their reformulation upon a more democratic basis for the purpose of bringing about a system capable of collecting its own revenues and providing all local services. It furthermore demands that a solution to the southern problem be achieved within the framework of regional rule through dialogue, understanding, and reconciliation with the southerners. In addition, "The Alliance of Sudanese National Forces [ASNF]" issued a communique in Cairo calling for the total abolition of the laws promulgated in 1983 and known as the September Laws.

The ASNF's communique, issued by Marshal Ja'far Muhammad Numayri, declared: "The evil exploitation of these laws and the resultant damage to national unity, obstruction of development and deterioration of Sudan's foreign relations have forced the ASNF to make this decision, especially after the practices of the NIF in the name of Islam, which have led to a deepening of the chasm of conflict and animosity among the sons of the one nation."

Communist Head Discusses Gulf War, National Politics

91AA0439A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
24 May 91 p 5

[Interview with Muhammad Ibrahim Naqd by Kamal Hamid in Khartoum; date not given]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] It is well-known that Muhammad Ibrahim Naqd has been the exclusive leader of the Sudanese Communist Party for 20 years, specifically, since the execution of its first leader, 'Abd-al-Khaliq Mahjub in 1971. We found an appropriate opportunity to meet with Naqd after he left prison. [Passage omitted]

[Hamid] As communists, have you declared this opinion [that maintains the inevitability of the fall of the Communist Party, because of the backwardness of the one-party rule system], or are you declaring it now after this system has fallen and its flayers have become many?

[Naqd] Actually, it is history and not a claim. The Sudanese Communist Party declared, in its general convention of 1967, that the socialist experiment does not have to be linked to a one-party system. [Passage omitted]

The Islamic Awakening

[Hamid] Do you not agree that youths in our world, after perceiving communism's shortcoming, are moving to deepen religion in their lives?

[Naqd] I agree that the emergence of the so-called Islamic awakening began when the socialist system began to corrode. However, I believe that it coincides primarily with the defeat of 1967, which is a turning point. I have reservations about the term "awakening," because Islam is an idea, and an idea neither sleeps nor awakens. Rather, the activity of the Islamic movement has expanded in general, and people have returned to their roots and identity. [Passage omitted]

We Lost Palestine and the Soviet Union

[Hamid] What is the nature of the Arab crisis produced by the Gulf crisis? Is it that Arab solidarity is the aggressor or the victim of aggression?

[Naqd] No, the true crisis began before Iraq invaded Kuwait. Before that, we, as Arabs, lost the primary strategic ally in our causes, which is the Soviet Union. Our loss of the Soviet Union is almost as great as our loss of Palestine in 1948. As for the current Gulf crisis, which I consider the peak of the Arabs' ordeal, it began as early as the Iraqi-Iranian War. However, the latest war is the peak of the tragedy, despite the great effort that has been made to stop it. If only such an effort had been made to prevent the setback of 1967.

The Iraqi Mistake

[Hamid] Why have you not mentioned the problem, namely Iraq's refusal to withdraw from Kuwait?

[Naqd] That was a major error. I had hoped that he would withdraw from the crisis, which would have placed the Americans in a difficult, unenviable position. Saddam Husayn knows well that the West wants to strike at him.

[Hamid] What has the Gulf crisis added to our contemporary reality?

[Naqd] The Gulf war is the third world war. In it, the West used the same sophisticated, military, technical weapons and equipment it had hope to use against the Warsaw Pact. I reckon that plans will now be made to develop new weapons. The crisis is a lesson for us, which

we must comprehend well to change much of our reality. It has now become clear to the Gulf countries, which had feared communism and had been attempting to protect their oil wealth from the danger of communism, that the source of the danger is a state that opposes communism and revolutionism, which has made the Arabs now stand on both sides of the fence!

New Mass Movement

[Hamid] How does one emerge from the dark tunnel?

[Naqd] Inevitably, a new current will begin among the masses. The torch is being carried by the youths of the Palestinian uprising.

We are now facing a new world reality. Needed are a new outlook and new alliances in view of the emergence of new forces and the demise of traditional social forces. The greatest loser is one who deals with the new reality based on the same old outlook.

Multiplicity Is Necessary

[Hamid] In your opinion, what new outlook should be adopted for solving all Sudanese, Arab, and international problems at present?

[Naqd] The outlook which I consider to be the basic component of the coming period is summarized in the need to focus on multiplicity in our lives. We also need to provide for all human rights and the achievement of social justice in its broadest meanings. These components have no relation to the East-West problem. They also demonstrate, and I emphasize, that any political regime that isolates itself from the issues of justice and human rights has no future.

Sudanese Wounds

[Hamid] You speak now of multiplicity and justice, but I know that the Sudanese Communist Party has never practiced them, for it is to be blamed for emphasizing control by a single party.

[Naqd] I do not want to return to what has been described as "rigidity." However, the Sudanese Communist Party itself has paid a high price and has drunk from the same cup. There is no need to scrape the scab off the wound. The fact remains that a single-party system is ineffective.

[Hamid] What is your view of our contemporary world now that there are no longer two superpowers?

[Naqd] This situation will not continue for long, because one pole cannot act alone. The pursuit of peace and justice will continue and will crystallize someday in some form. Its outlines are unclear at present. However, until that time, the current situation will continue, and America will continue to be the sponsor of peace, and the foreign presence will have its legitimacy. It suffices that

the foreign forces currently in Iraq exceed, in terms of number and materiel, all of the British forces that colonized Iraq previously.

The Fundamentalists and the Nationalists

[Hamid] What is the status of the new alliance between the fundamentalists and the Arab nationalists? Will it continue, and what is the position of the communists on it?

[Naqd] This alliance is a new reality imposed by recent circumstances. Its continuation is determined by positions on the problems of the day. The revolutionary forces which have participated in this alliance have their position, as do those who have not participated in it, including us. The continuity of this alliance will be determined according to their position on multiplicity and national sovereignty. [passage omitted]

Sudan's Crisis

[Hamid] When will Sudan emerge from its chronic crises?

[Naqd] Sudan's crisis has two aspects. The first aspect is that which is shared in common with other crises in Third World countries. The second involves crises particular to Sudan. We have experienced circumstances that have not been available to others, including early independence, an influential neighborhood, and the Arab presence. However, all of these circumstances have been invalidated. We will not emerge from the crises if we do not recognize the true causes of the crises themselves. We have three main problems: the civil war, the movement of emigres, and the flow of refugees.

I do not view the future with confidence and optimism, because we are not coping with these three problems as we should. We will return to square one each time. All of us bear responsibility, because the problems exceed the capability of any one party or group.

The Failure of Democracy

[Hamid] I know your opinion regarding the three periods of military rule in Sudan. However, how do you explain the failure of the three democratic experiments?

[Naqd] Democracy in Sudan has its negative aspects as well as positive aspects, which outweigh the negative aspects. We were serious about remedying the negative aspects this last time, specifically during the transition period after the Numayri regime was swept away. However, we found no encouragement on the part of the transitional military council, which was determined to restore the same parliamentary composition and freedom-restricting laws, and which was not interested in an active presence on the part of new forces. The military council did not give a hoot for the Sudanese people's revolution.

[Hamid] However, will not history record that the military council and its chairman, Field Marshall 'Abd-al-Rahman Siwar al-Dhahab restored freedoms and transferred power to the people at the designated time?

[Naqd] That is true, and I actually respect and admire Siwar al-Dhahab. He has acted in an ethical and exemplary fashion. It was he who was personally determined to end the transitional period at the designated time, even though that was not the desire of the other members of his council. [passage omitted]

[Hamid] Let us conclude our interview with an important question regarding you personally. Why were you arrested and why did you elude the security personnel as you have done always?

[Naqd] I have been subject to arrest since 1953, when I was a student at Khartoum University. Because I participated in a demonstration against English colonialism, I was dismissed from the university. I was arrested again following the coup of Lieutenant General Ibrahim 'Abbud in 1958. I was tried in a military trial with my colleagues, al-Shafi' Ahmad al-Shaykh, al-Hajj 'Abd-al-Rahman, Shakir Mirsal, Qasim Amin, and others. I was arrested again in December 1959. After leaving prison in 1961, I disappeared from the sight of 'Abbud's men until the Sudanese people's uprising in October 1964. After the Numayri coup and a disagreement with him in 1971, I disappeared from the world until the April 1985 uprising. Most recently, I was arrested on the morning of 30 June 1989. [passage omitted]

High-Ranking Officers Ordered Into Retirement

91P40360A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
17 Jul 91 p 4

[Text] Abu Dhabi, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT bureau—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that the Sudanese Government has transferred some high-ranking officers into retirement.

The list includes Major General Ahmad al-Bashir, commander of the Artillery Branch; Maj. Gen. Ma'mun Hasan al-Nur Suwar-al-Dhahab, lecturer at the Higher Military Academy; Maj. Gen. Muhammad 'Uthman Ahmad, former defense attache in London; Maj. Gen. 'Abd-al-Hayy Mahjub, commander of the Third Infantry Division; Maj. Gen. Isma'il Mubarak, director of the Armed Forces Directorate; Maj. Gen. 'Abd-al-Baqi 'Abd-al-Rahim, director of the General Command Branch. Likewise, about 80 other officers were transferred to places outside of Khartoum, in particular to the Southern Region.

Government Reportedly Closes Local Eritrean Offices

91AA0516A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
3 Jul 91 p 4

[Article by Sayyid Ahmad Khalifah: "Sudanese Government Closes Offices of Eritrean Organizations and Asks Them to Leave or Halt Their Political Activities"]

[Text] Djibouti—Four united Eritrean organizations are trying to persuade the Sudanese Government to rescind its decision to end their presence in all Sudanese territories and to put an immediate stop to all their political, social, humanitarian, and educational activities.

In a communication with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, these organizations' sources have said: The Sudanese decision has not warned us or given us a grace period so that we can arrange our affairs. The decision was carried out immediately and the Sudanese security immediately closed the offices of these organizations in Khartoum, al-Qadarif, Kasala, Port Sudan, and other Sudanese towns and villages. The closure has included the offices of the Eritrean Educational Agency which manage nearly 37 Eritrean high schools in Sudanese cities and in refugee camps in East Sudan, in addition to hundreds of intermediate and elementary schools.

The sources have also said that the Sudanese decision calls for closing the Red Cross offices controlled by some of these organizations and that the contents of some of these offices have been either impounded or confiscated by the Sudanese authorities.

Eritrean sources say that in another development, the Sudanese authorities have summoned representatives of these Eritrean organizations and told them that they have to take one of three options: return to Eritrea and join the ranks of the PFLE [Popular Front for the Liberation of Eritrea], leave Sudan immediately, or stay in Sudan without engaging in any political, social, or educational activity.

It doesn't seem that the Eritrean organizations have agreed to any of these Sudanese conditions or demands and that they continue to hold contacts with Sudanese officials and with a number of prominent political leaders to modify these decisions and to reach an understanding on the Eritrean situation issues in a manner that takes into account and preserves the internal balances and that does not consider just the latest results of the 30-year war whose benefits have been reaped by the PFLE, even though this front is not the only party involved in accomplishing these results. These organizations believe that they have played historical and contemporary roles and that they have contributed greatly to achieving the decisive victory or whatever has been achieved in the wake of 30 years of joint Eritrean action.

In the meantime and while the four Eritrean organizations have been trying to circumvent the Sudanese decision and to alleviate its consequences, Eritrean military sources speaking in the name of these organizations have said that Sudanese forces have moved along three axes in East Sudan and besieged the Eritrean military camps which have formed the rear lines for Eritrean military units belonging to these organizations, the largest of which is the Unified Eritrean Organization.

The sources have said that advance information obtained on this Sudanese military decision enabled the Eritrean forces to withdraw their rear units, along with

all their military equipment and supplies, to the homeland and that the Sudanese forces took over these camps when nearly devoid of all military units, supplies, and weapons.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has asked an Eritrean leader about the outcome of these organizations' contacts with the Sudanese Government and he responded: "The Sudanese-Eritrean relations have been obviously confused with the Sudanese-Ethiopian relations because neither John Garang nor any other Sudanese opposition party has ever moved from Eritrean soil against any Sudanese regime."

This leader added that perhaps the Sudanese decision has been made as a result of considerations connected with the united position of the Popular Movement for

the Liberation of Eritrea and the Democratic Revolutionary Front which rules Ethiopia currently.

It is worth noting that the four united Eritrean organizations against whom the Sudanese decision has been made are:

The Unified Eritrean Organization, led by (Omar el Borj), the Revolutionary Council, led by (Abdallah Driss), the Revolutionary Committee, led by (Abdelkadir Jilani), and the Islamic Jihad Party which was created with the help of Sudan.

It is also worth noting that these organizations have recently agreed to the principle of conducting a referendum in Eritrea, as (proposed by the PFLE). However, the relations between these organizations and the PFLE have not improved but have continued to be tense.

IRAN

Commentator Views Arrest of FIS Leaders

LD0207165191 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 1004 GMT 2 Jul 91

[Station commentary]

[Excerpts] Five weeks after the outbreak of the internal unrest in Algeria which has left a number of people killed and injured, at last the government of that country, by taking over the headquarters of the Islamic Salvation Front [FIS] which is the principle opposition party, has arrested the leaders and a large number of that Front's members. The action of the new Algerian Government has been taken at a time when apparently government efforts aimed at defusing the recent unrest by political solutions have proved futile. Ahmad Ghozali, the new Algerian prime minister, who began his efforts through adopting a conciliatory approach toward the country's political parties, at first envisaged a solution in the diversion of the street clashes to negotiations on political solutions, hence [leading to] a gradual improvement in the country's critical situation. Ghozali's first action was to hold negotiations with the opposition parties, which was followed by the formation of a non-party cabinet, so that while attracting the country's various political factions, he could present the appointment of the new prime minister as a fundamental development in the trend of Algerian reforms, and moreover, ascribe the main responsibility for the growing opposition to the actions of Algeria's previous governments.

In spite of all this, the new government's inconsistent policy has brought about fresh tensions in the country, in connection to which the presence of the army as a means of exerting government pressure has been catalytic in once again transforming the streets of Algiers and the other parts of the country into platforms for voicing and spreading such opposition. [passage omitted]

In the present circumstances, the question which comes to mind concerns the extent of the Algerian Government's success in the alleviation of the internal tension, by virtue of arresting the leaders of the FIS. In reply to this question one should admit that on this issue, political observers have failed to reach a unanimous opinion. A group of them are of the opinion that even though the Algerian Government is likely to face angry opposition for its arrest of the FIS leaders, nevertheless in the long run it will be able to benefit from the absence of leadership in the FIS, and thus direct the internal situation toward a political solution. At the same time another group of political observers believe that the arrest of the FIS leaders cannot constitute a decisive solution to the recent tensions in Algeria, since similar experiences in that country have indicated that the detention and incarceration of opponents will not only

fail to defuse opposition, but will also give such opposition an aura of holy struggle, consequently heightening antigovernment opposition.

Of course, one should bear in mind that actions such as making arrests or adopting austere measures would be inconsistent with the government's intended reforms, and it will in any case disrupt the trend of these reforms. Now, how and by what formula the Algerian statesmen will be able to reconcile the freedom of political parties and the establishment of democracy with recent actions is a question worthy of deliberation. In any case, it seems that because the arrest of the FIS leaders has taken place in line with a series of actions through the adoption of which the government intends to test the effectiveness of each move in alleviating the recent tensions, the government will wait to see the outcome of the arrest of the FIS leaders, and then assess its impact on the trend of recent developments.

In conclusion, by taking into consideration the conditions prevailing over the country, and also bearing in mind the fact that the detention and the arrest of the opposition cannot alone be counted on as a solution to the recent crisis, it seems unlikely that the detention of the FIS leaders will continue for too long.

Exports Increase by 94 Percent

LD1007103991 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 0930 GMT 10 Jul 91

[Text] The fourth session of deputy cabinet ministers meeting was held last night in the presence of First Vice President Hasan Habibi. At the meeting, Commerce Minister 'Abdol Vahaji described the government's economic policies regarding distribution, supervision, pricing exports, imports, and transportation. He said that in the first two months of this year exports had increased by 94 percent compared to the same period last year, describing it as outstanding. He said that the growth in exports is a sign that recent government policy to provide export facilities is paying dividends.

He added the level of wheat purchases from farmers in the past few months increased by 11 percent compared to last year.

At the meeting, the commerce minister and his deputies answered questions from other participants.

PAKISTAN

Violence in Sindh Continues Unabated

Criminals Operate Confidently

91AS1055A Karachi DAWN in English 28 May 91 p 7

[Article by Shamimuddin Shamsi: "Why Dacoits Can't be Eliminated"; boldface words, quotation marks as published]

[Text] The forest belt stretched over hundreds of kilometres along River Indus basin in Upper Sindh has become a safe haven for the dacoits, kidnappers and hardened criminals. The people residing in this area are the most unsafe and live in a state of constant fear expecting the worst any moment.

According to roughly estimated figures, ten to fifteen persons are kidnapped daily in the Upper Sindh area. Those freed after payment of ransom every day are no less in number.

After the recovery of the Japanese students, it was publicised that a major operation against the dacoits has been launched to root out the menace once and for all. But in the entire operation, according to official sources, only two dacoits could be eliminated, and they too were 'lesser evils.'

The Inspector General of Police, Sindh, gave a statement that a change in the operation strategy was being effected to obtain better results and these would begin to appear in a month but, according to a survey, the operation met failure in Sukkur, Larkana, Jacobabad and Naoshero Feroze.

The causes of the failure included lack of will on the part of police to lay hands on the influential harbourers and arms suppliers. During the first phase of the operation, more than 100 informers of the dacoits were arrested but then one by one all were released on the grounds best known to the authorities concerned.

The failure of the operation paved the way for the kidnapping of three Chinese engineers and the dacoits now feel encouraged to operate more freely and confidently.

The dacoit factor has seriously hampered the development works in the interior of Sindh as none of the officials is willing to go there to work on the projects. The foreigners are equally, rather more, reluctant to continue their assignments there. Hundreds of school buildings proposed for interior of Sindh could not be constructed as both the officers and the contractors are not prepared to work there.

JUI Leader: The Secretary General of a faction of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Maulana Samiul Haq toured the Upper Sindh last week. In different gatherings and press conferences he gave an impression that his tour was designed to apprise the people that almost all religious schools of thought including the Fiqh-i-Jafria desired the passage of the Shariat Bill. But, it turned out later that it was an organisational tour aimed at raising the strength of his faction. The tour was organised by Mohtamim, Jama-i-Ashrafia, Sukkur Maulana Asad Thanvi who was later offered the presidentship of Sindh branch.

The other faction of the JUI led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman is of the view that the present tour of Maulana Samiul Haq was on the behest of IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] Sindh to build pressure on the Mulana.

City Ignored: Sukkur, the third biggest city of the province, is situated on the right bank of the River Indus and on left bank is its twin city Rohri. It has a population of slightly over a million. Basically, it is a commercial city and a market for the agricultural produce of the Upper Sindh.

It is an irony of the circumstances that the MNAs [Members of National Assembly] and MPAs [Members of Provincial Assembly] elected from Sukkur hardly stay here, and prefer to shift to Karachi or Islamabad. Once elected, they seldom care to see the plight of their own city. This city is awfully ignored. Even the basic requirements are being denied. Sometime back, a University for the Upper Sindh was sanctioned. But this was established in a smaller town, Khairpur. The establishment of an engineering college and a cadets college were also proposed but have been delayed for 'political reasons.'

The Mayor too has turned his eyes away. Now Sukkur presents a dismal view. Its roads are broken and patchy. No footpath could be seen anywhere in the city. The drainage system remains damaged and stinking water pools are a frequent sight. The vegetable market and the Victoria market are century-old and need repairs which are not carried out.

The Prime Minister had recently given a grant of two crore rupees to Municipal Corporation but nothing is known about its utilisation. But it is known that it has been received.

Government Lacks Credibility

91AS1055B Karachi DAWN in English 31 May 91 p 11

[Article by Shaheen Sehbai: "Sindh Action: The View From the Capital"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The power troika in Islamabad has lately been engaged in intensive internal consultations. Last week saw almost non-stop meetings between the President, the Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff. The subject was Sindh, the problem province where the authority of the government has been so catastrophically eroded that it has come to invite cynical remarks and even jokes about the country's rulership. Some of the jokes are attributed to diplomats.

One such joke is about the taking over of a country's government by a simple religious man after the king in that land died and it was announced that any one who enters the city gates first would become king.

A cleric did and became the king. The first thing he ordered was a plate of 'halwa.' Soon came the news that there was a rebellion cooking up. He ordered another plate. Then he was informed that enemy forces were advancing towards the capital. Another plate. The country went up in flames. Yet another plate. The rebel armies reached the king's palace. More halwa. The

palace was seized. The last plate. And then he solemnly walked out saying: "Of course, I was here to enjoy my favourite dish."

But in the capital's ruling circles, the Sindh situation is not a joke. It has turned into the most serious threat to the continuity and stability of the present political system with each option available involving disadvantages with no firm guarantee of positive results for the present power structure.

The recent developments are seen here as casting a lurid light on the extent of authority the Sindh Government enjoys. The chief of the Chandio tribe spilled the beans after he was humiliated by his own tribal folk. In wholly unambiguous and stinging terms has the chief of the Chandios accused the police and the administration of direct involvement in the continuing trail of kidnappings in the province. Of course many people believed that crime on such a large scale was simply impossible without the patronage or connivance of the influentials, in both administration and politics. But it was left to one of the most powerful tribal leaders to say clearly and directly what many believe to be the essence of the whole matter. The sequence of events that followed was mind boggling for almost every one. Chandio was given a helicopter to go to the Keti Jatoi jungle. He met the kidnapers of the Chinese in a bungalow owned by Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, who later revealed that he had made the place available to Jam Sadiq Ali. Police officers were there in large numbers, their jeeps were being used by the dacoits and they were asking Chandio not to press for the release of the Chinese without a ransom.

My sources say Chandio was required by Jam Sadiq Ali to go and negotiate. "He was virtually bundled into the Edhi Chopper," a minister disclosed. "He was given due respect by the kidnapers belonging to his tribe but they refused to release their victims as the police had assured them that a ransom was coming." These views were confirmed by the Chandio Chief later when he told newsmen that the kidnapers "respected the people who were providing them protection and ransom more than their chief of the tribe."

Islamabad policy-makers are worried about the credibility of the Sindh administration after the Chandio fiasco. "The man has dealt a severe blow at what was left of the Sindh Government's prestige, no matter how strong the rebuttals by the Chief Minister and how serious the threats by his Home Affairs Adviser to punish the Chandio tribe chief," a Federal Minister from Sindh admitted.

In these circumstances, the Prime Minister has chalked out his 'Action Plan' for the province and it was in this context that the President and the COAS [Chief of Army Staff] were being repeatedly consulted by the PM last week. But experts and politicians who know Sindh and its terrain, both physical and political, have reservations about the Nawaz Sharif Plan and its effectiveness. They are sceptical about any significant improvement being

achieved, given the widespread apprehensions about the involvement of sections of the police and the administration in the crime that is to be uprooted by the Plan.

A Senator from the interior of Sindh says any plan, without the army going into action, would mean nothing as the poor Rangers and the Frontier Constabulary men hardly know anything about the Sindh province and they have to depend entirely on local police. "This operation has to be basically directed against the men behind the dacoits—the police, the administration officials, the waderas, influential politicians, pirs and legislators, if it is to produce any lasting effect," he says. "If it has to be a propaganda job, with some dacoits, or some political opponents shot dead in the name of an anti-dacoit operation then it had better been avoided."

This crucial nature of the operation is thus the crux of the whole consultation between the political powers of Islamabad. General Mirza Aslam Beg has been on record as saying that the Sindh problem should be tackled politically. What he means by it has not been explained because it could mean so many things depending on your political leanings. It could mean a dialogue with the politicians harbouring or protecting the criminals; it could mean a dialogue between the major political forces in the province so that all agree on a joint action plan; it could even mean squashing the opposition all flat.

The army thus appears not to be mentally prepared for any operation that leaves loose-ends dangling. It has to know how far the operation has to go and under what legal or constitutional authority and with what sort of political set-up. Two options are openly discussed in this context. Either a military man is given full political authority to carry out the operation thoroughly, even-handedly and to the point needed, not sparing anyone big or small, influential or otherwise, if found involved in the crime or protecting the criminals.

The second is the handing over of powers under Article 245 to the armed forces, on the request of the civilian administration, with the present political set up in place. This option means that the jurisdiction of the superior courts would be cut and no action by the military could be challenged. But this option suffers from clear contradictions that could foul up the entire exercise. If the military has to proceed even-handedly and without discriminating on a political basis, then important elements of the civilian administration and ruling politicians would also have to be roped in, thus creating tensions and complications, both for the army and the Jam Sadiq cabinet.

Another important factor has also to be kept in view. If the Jam Sadiq set-up remains in place and the operation is launched, it would immediately be given a political colour and declared as an "anti-Sindh operation." That would increase the polarisation between Sindhis and non-Sindhis on ethnic grounds, maybe to the extent that the Sindhis are provoked into confronting the army with arms. That would be a tragedy of the first order and that

could mean involvement of the armed forces in Sindh for a long time, with the situation having repercussions across the border as well.

Thus any operation against the Sindhi dacoits has to be accompanied simultaneously with an equally strong and equally effective operation against the dacoits, kidnapers, and ruffians in the urban centres as well—a situation which leaves hardly any room and space for the civilian government to exercise its authority.

Thus in both the options, the continued existence of the Jam Sadiq cabinet becomes doubtful—a prospect which must be giving headaches and day-time nightmares to the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] bosses because they know that the Sindh cabinet's exit is certain to impinge upon the fortunes of the centre.

IJI Blames Government

91AS1055C Karachi DAWN in English 30 May 91 p 8

[Article by Ihtashamul Haque: "IJI Legislators Rap Sindh Government"]

[Text] Islamabad, 29 May—IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] MNAs [Members of National Assembly] and Senators on Wednesday expressed serious concern over the law and order situation in the country, particularly in Sindh, and called upon Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to take immediate steps to improve it.

According to IJI sources, the IJI parliamentary party's evening session, convened to discuss law and order, heard extremely critical speeches by some members, particularly by former Sindh Chief Minister Syed Ghous Ali Shah and Senator Ghaffar Jatoi, who demanded that the Prime Minister take notice of the fast deteriorating law and order situation in Sindh.

Mr. Ghous Ali in his speech invited the attention of the Prime Minister to the recent kidnapping of three Chinese Engineers and said the incident had brought a bad name to the IJI Government. He asserted that there was a total breakdown of law and order in Sindh and the administration had failed to do anything to improve the situation. "The crime rate in Sindh has increased by alarming proportions," Mr. Ghous Ali was stated by the sources as having said.

He was of the view that since the Sindh Government had failed to improve the law and order situation, it had no right to continue.

Sen. Ghaffar Jatoi also made an equally hard hitting speech, the sources told this reporter. He is reported to have said because of the worsening law and order problem, "Sindh is getting out of hand." He stressed the need for timely action and urged Mian Nawaz Sharif to "get hold" of officials of the administration who were party to all kinds of crime and had the protection of the highest authorities in the province.

Sen. Jatoi was of the opinion that the proposed action plan would never succeed because of lack of seriousness and sincerity on the part of the administration.

Mr. Nawaz Sharif is reported to have agreed with the two legislators from Sindh and assured them that the situation was expected to improve as a result of "some immediate action." But he reportedly declined to elaborate.

The Prime Minister is stated to have told the meeting that efforts would be made to introduce some legislation to curb crime in Sindh during the Budget session of the National Assembly.

Privatisation Threatened

91AS1055D Karachi DAWN in English 30 May 91 p 1

[Text] Islamabad, 29 May—Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif said on Thursday that the privatisation policy of the Government would not produce any meaningful results unless the law and order situation in Sindh is improved, and kidnapping for ransom is stopped.

The Prime Minister expressed these views while addressing a joint meeting of IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] parliamentary groups of both the houses held here on Wednesday under his chairmanship.

Briefing newsmen about the meeting, Prime Minister's Adviser on Information Sheikh Rasheed Ahmad said the Prime Minister told the meeting that the Government has taken some important measures to improve the economy but asserted that "measures like privatisation will produce no meaningful results unless the Sindh (law and order) situation is improved and kidnapping incidents stopped."

It is understood that the Prime Minister's concern was towards the increasing incidents of kidnapping of foreigners by the dacoits in Sindh because of which the foreign investors are reluctant to bring their money for investment in Pakistan.

Sheikh Rasheed said the Prime Minister informed the members that now the Federal Government's top priority was to restore peace in the troubled province of Sindh.

"Although law and order is a provincial issue but when foreigners are being kidnapped then it also becomes the responsibility of the centre (to control the law and order situation)," Sheikh Rasheed quoted Prime Minister as having said.

He said the Prime Minister told the parliamentarians that the Federal Government would provide every kind of assistance to the provinces to control law and order situation and added that para-military forces would be provided to the provinces for this purpose besides activating the federal intelligence agencies.

Asked whether any proposal came from any member to involve army in operation against dacoits in Sindh or to

remove the provincial government he said: "army will not be involved in any operation neither any member demanded the change of the Sindh government."

Sheikh Rasheed said the Prime Minister informed the parliamentarians that changes will be made in the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr. P.C.) and Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) to remove the lacunas in the present laws so that no culprit could escape from the grip of law.

The Prime Minister's adviser said the members, particularly those belonging from Sindh, briefed the meeting about the deteriorating law and order situation during the lengthy meeting which started at 9:00 a.m. and continued till 6:00 p.m. with one hour lunch break.

He said former Sindh Chief Minister Ghous Ali Shah and Senator Ghaffar Jatoi called upon the Prime Minister to take some "urgent steps" to control the situation in Sindh.

Some members, the adviser said, also suggested to establish posts on both sides of the river Indus, a complete shake-up of police department and to cut the forests.

Sheikh Rasheed said that the post-lunch session was completely devoted for discussing the law and order situation.

During the pre-lunch session, he said the members expressed their opinion about the annual budget and submitted their recommendations for improving them.

Criminal Activity Recounted

91AS1055E Karachi DAWN in English 3 Jun 91 p 11

[Article by Nafisa Hoodbhoy: "A Tale of Sleepless Nights Under Dacoit Terror"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] It was a bitterly cold night in Ghari village, Dadu, 14 February when the scene of marriage festivity turned into a nightmare as armed dacoits burst in from the direction of Mehar village. Opening Kalashnikov fire to terrorise the villagers, they began rounding up wedding guests to kidnap them to their dacoit strongholds in the forests of Ketty Jatoi.

Gunning down guard Haji Muznoon, who leaned over from the overlooking rooftop, the dacoits took nine villagers hostage at gunpoint and drove them like cattle herds across the rich fields. Furiously abusing and beating the kidnapped, the dacoits made them wade the Rice Canal, then traipse the Dadu railway line. By 6 a.m. the next morning, the caravan was being made to swim across the Dadu canal, the dacoits becoming more relaxed the further they drew from the village. At Bachao Bund, the kidnapers snatched camels from the Jats, taking turns with the hostages to ride them into Ketty Jatoi.

Ketty Jatoi—which has shot to prominence since reportedly the kidnapped Chinese engineers were initially kept

here—was only a stopover for the dacoits to avoid the law enforcement agencies. After three days, the nine hostages were taken to the Sohna Bindi forests. Together with the thickly forested Ketty Jatoi, Drabi Dand Dero, Maulvi Jo Bharn, Kalhoro Ji Ketty, Machiani and Pir Jo Goth the Sohna Bindi jungles currently provide the dacoits with a sanctuary from where they emerge to loot, kill and kidnap for ransom from the Indus Highway and adjoining villages. Ironically, in complete agreement with the environmentalists, the dacoits strive to preserve the forests, beating up villagers who chop trees for firewood.

In an incredible reversal to jungle law, incoming dacoits entering the forests fire Kalashnikov bursts in the air to let the hidden dacoit group know their arrival with a "catch" of hostages. The Ghari hostages, abducted by the Koraro Chandio group heard the Latif Chandio group (which originally kidnapped the Chinese) enter Ketty Jatoi with a triumphant burst of fire. Upon receiving return fire from Koraro, the dacoits entered, bringing young boys and an elderly man into the forest.

In the course of captivity, the Ghari villagers saw Dadu dacoit gangs led by Laiq Chandio, Latif Chandio, Sikander Chandio, Nazeer Chandio, Kadu Sarghani, Ali Ahmed Buledi, Ali Ahmed Burdi and Yusuf Sial walk in with their "catches." The kidnapped were kept separately by the dacoit groups in different parts of the jungles, but once in a while there was interaction between them.

The dacoit network appears to be gaining strength in Sindh because of the support of notable Sindhi 'waderas' (feudal lords), Government officials, corrupt police and law enforcement agencies and "purchasable" intermediaries. In Dadu, various reactions of society alleged that some top "waderas" were patronising the dacoits.

The Kuraro gang which initially grabbed the Ghari villagers because of their "bright, colourful clothes" began screening them for their money worth from the third day of captivity in Sohna Bindi forests. The dacoits recognised that among the nine kidnapped only Mir Thebo was the son of a landlord, and they accordingly demanded a million rupees for his release. They also asked Hafeez Dhayo for half-a-million rupees after learning that his brother worked in Saudi Arabia. The pressures on extorting ransom from Thebo and Dhayo increased after three of the hostages, Sajjad Zaheer (Jam Saqi's son), Hamza Ali and Khalid Junejo were released through political pressures and personal friendships and the remaining four were discovered to be landless peasants.

But in spite of their back-breaking poverty, these sons of landless peasants, Mohammed Parayal Kalhoro, Saman Bhutto, Gul Munir Bhutto and Hameed Soomro, were released only after their relatives paid ransom of Rs. [rupees] 18,000, Rs. 10,000, Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 11,000 respectively. Twenty-year-old Saman Bhutto, describing his fright and confusion at being kidnapped told this

correspondent in Ghari; "At first, I thought they would leave me because I was poor." But later confined in the jungles, he wished "I had money so they would leave me."

Mir Thebo, whom the dacoits called 'wadera' was kept for 56 days in the jungles because his ransom was not forthcoming. The dacoits made the hostages write their own ransom notes, in which they had to falsely claim that they were being beaten and would be killed if the ransom was not paid. Although illiterate, the kidnappers had someone read the notes to make sure that the messages they dictated were correctly written.

With anguished relatives out looking for their loved ones, middlemen known to both the dacoits and the villagers were sent out to communicate the ransom being demanded. Thebo was released after a police official and a landlord from Radhan intervened on his behalf and relatives and friends paid Rs. 80,000 in ransom. Dhayo's family paid Rs. 90,000 for him. Both Thebo and Dhayo are now trying to repay the loans taken by their families for their release.

During the weeks spent in the jungles, the dacoits used their victims to perform labour, including fetching water, cooking food and making tea. Food consisted of plenty of potatoes and bread, but sometimes lamb and chicken were also served when the dacoits had visitors. At times, sensing a raid by the law enforcement agencies, the dacoits would run from one section of the jungle to another, taking the hostages with them.

In more relaxed times, the dacoits and hostages played 'kabaddi' in the clearings. "In fact, at times we forgot we were prisoners," ex-hostage Hameed Soomro said with a smile. The victims were allowed to swim in the adjoining canals, with a warning though that they were never clear from the range of bullets.

The Ghari captives narrated seeing the insides of the jungles fortified by G-3 rocket launchers, light machine guns, Kalashnikovs and plenty of shotguns. The dacoits themselves spoke of obtaining the weapons from students, police, Rangers and intermediary suppliers who abounded in plenty. During conversations, the dacoits spoke of how some sections of the tehsil police then informed them when a bus was about to enter a particular locality, alerting them to loot and kidnap passengers.

At times, the dacoits joked with the hostages about the possibility of recruiting them in their gangs. Possibly lured by the power and freedom enjoyed by the dacoits, two ex-hostages from Ghavi said: "We asked them to let us go this time, with a promise that we would come back and join their gangs." But according to Thebo, the dacoits refused to recruit innocent people or those without recommendations from influential dacoits.

Most of the dacoits were illiterate peasants, but there was a matriculate and a graduate from Sindh University in the Buledi group. The graduate, a Sindhi nationalist, argued for Thebo's release because of the latter's political background. In general, the dacoits did not consider Hindus or Punjabis a part of Sindh and committed atrocities against them with greater impunity. They treated the kidnapping of women as a major social offence, socially boycotting dacoits who picked up a woman as hostage.

The dacoits were seen functioning as an organised police force, with a former constable in their ranks. They went home for vacations during Eid and at that time the number of hostages dwindled considerably. The dacoits lamented that they were leading risky lives for the sake of their families. In gentler moments, they made Thebo write love letters addressed to their dear ones. The dacoits were said to be so fond of Sindhi songs that the gang leaders had to rebuke their guardsmen for listening to music while keeping the look-out for law enforcement agencies.

While in captivity, the hostages were told that although the former PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Government had given amnesty to the Hot Chandio and Sarwar Chandio groups, the latter were still being tortured in jail. They made an appeal for amnesty, saying they wanted an assurance from the Government that they would not be persecuted by feudals or police, and could be settled like peaceful citizens. The dacoits reportedly put pressure on hostages not to file First Information Reports (FIRs) against them, so they could "slip back into society and live like ordinary citizens."

But the Ghavi hostages have not held back from filing FIRs against four locals, Ghulam Hussain Mir Baksh, Anwar Chandio, Jumo Bhurghuri and Gulzar Bhurghuri accusing them of conniving with dacoits to stage the kidnapping episode. While Mir Baksh and Chandio have been arrested, the Bhurghuris are absconding, allegedly after bribing the police.

Meanwhile, the murder of the luckless Ghavi guard, Haji Muznoon, has left behind a bitterly grieving household. Muznoon's grief-stricken wife, surrounded by her six children, showed the portrait of her dead husband. His mother has almost gone crazy with the shock, his grandmother sobs in disbelief and his sister-in-law says; "It would have been better if he was kidnapped, at least we would have got him back alive."

As night falls in Ghavi the guards appointed by the small feudal lords take position with rifles on the rooftops. Villagers walk around with Kalashnikovs, bought in bulk after the recent kidnappings. Only the howling of dogs in the moonlit night breaks the silence of the vast spaces, as villagers pass another suspenseful night under the dacoit terror.

Chief Minister Dishonest

91AS1055F Lahore *THE NATION* in English
29 May 91 p 4

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] It is just the first day of the government's 'action plan' against the dacoits of Sindh and already the credibility of some of its major actors has begun to erode. Mr. Murtaza Jatoi has said that if the government cannot stop the onslaught of the dacoits, how could his family do it. This interesting admission comes in response to the statement of Sultan Chandio, who claims to have found dacoits using Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi's house in Keti Jatoi. The Chief Minister denies having asked Sultan Chandio to negotiate the release of the Chinese engineers. If that is so, then how come a government helicopter came to be placed at Mr. Chandio's disposal? And how come he was taken to Mr. Jatoi's lands, where he saw the outlaws—whose presence has all but been acknowledged by Mr. Jatoi's family? The plot thickens with further revelations coming from no one else but Jam Sadiq Ali and Mr. Jatoi. The latter says that he allowed the former to use his vacant house in Keti Jatoi. And the former says that he borrowed its use for his anti-dacoit operations. If so, what were the dacoits doing, openly camping out there? The only part of this story that the Sindh government denies, is that the men seen there were not dacoits. Maybe so, but they were clearly not policemen or Mr. Jatoi's men. Then who were they? Sultan Chandio, a man of some standing and a tribal leader, has no reason to lie. Actually seeing the circumstances of the case, one cannot help feeling that he had no cause to get involved. Dealing with dacoits is a risky business. Also he, according to reports, is not even in good health. So he must have been pushed into this business. It is hard to disbelieve him as it seems hard to believe the Sindh Chief Minister.

Seen against this background, two other developments seem rather odd. One is that Mr. Chandio has apparently not been taken off the case by the Sindh government. He has been asked to make yet another attempt to get the Chinese released. The second is that the dacoits do not seem to care much for the 'action plan.' This surmise would be evident if the story (though unconfirmed), that the police itself helped them abduct the Chinese, is to be believed. The story gets indirectly corroborated by Mr. Chandio's statement that he found many policemen fraternising with the dacoits and that the dacoits were using a police jeep. If the army is not going to be used, as everyone says that it is not going to be, and the police plus the local landlords are on the side of the dacoits, then what should one expect of the 'action plan.'

Shari'a Passage: Views, Perspectives

Bill Introduced in Senate

91AS1003A Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English
23 May 91 p 1

[Text] Islamabad, 22 May—The Enforcement of Shariah Bill was introduced by Minister of State for Law Ch. Amir Hussain in the Senate on Wednesday.

The debate on the Bill will be taken up in the Upper House on Saturday. Introducing the Bill, the Minister of State said in accordance with the rules, the members have been given two days' break before going ahead with the formal debate on it.

Opposition members Syed Abdullah Shah, Iqbal Haider and Gulzar Ahmed Khan moved a motion for referring the Bill to the standing committee of the house. When put to vote, the motion was rejected by a voice vote.

The opposition members pressed for giving three to four additional days, for a thorough study of the Bill. This was opposed by several Senators from the ruling alliance. Hasan A. Sheikh, also of the IJI [Islamic Janhoori Ittehad], suggested that at least four days' time be given for studying the bill before launching debate on it. The minister of state for law did not subscribe to the proposal. The plea taken by the minister was endorsed by Leader of the House Mohammad Ali Khan, Qazi Hussain Ahmed of Jamaat-i-Islami, Maulana Samiul Haq, Prof. Khurshid Ahmed and Alam Ali Laleka.

Senate Chairman Wasim Sajjad disagreed with the contention taken by the opposition members. He said the existing rules did not permit him to delay the matter. He said notice from the National Assembly about the passage of the Bill had been read out in the upper house three days ago.

Maulana Impels Senators

91AS1003B Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English
23 May 91 p 4

[Text] Lahore, 22 May—Those members of the Senate who will oppose the Shariat Bill passed by the National Assembly will never be forgiven by the nation. This was stated by the President of Jamiat Ulama-i-Pakistan [JUP] (Niazi Group) and President of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat, Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi in a press statement today.

He said that it was perturbing to learn from the press that some of the members of the Muslim League are trying to bring in amendments in the Bill to take away its effectiveness as well as a tactical move to delay and undermine the Shariah Bill becoming a law.

Maulana Niazi said that Quaid-i-Azam some months before his death in April 1948 addressing the Karachi Bar said that the Constitution and legislation of Pakistan would be the Shariah of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) as enunciated in the Quran and Sunnah which he said was as fresh and operative as it was 1350 years ago.

Maulana Niazi said that in the presence of the clear policy statement by Quaid-i-Azam the Founder of Pakistan, it is surprising that the members of his Muslim League should buckle to the pressures of those elements who were opposed to the ideology of Pakistan and the teachings of Islam and who were playing the role of agents of anti-Islam forces and the bureaucracy in the country.

Mr. Junejo has shown his apathy towards Shariah posture by not tabling the Shariah Bill during his premiership. These few Muslim Leaguers playing the tune to the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] call is simply astonishing, he said.

Maulana Niazi said that the anti-Pakistan and anti-Islam forces have whipped up propaganda lately against achieving the very objectives of Pakistan by opposing the Shariah Bill which had been the cherished desire and goal of the people of the country for the last 43 years. He said it goes to the credit of the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] led by the Muslim League leadership who now have the singular credit of having tabled the Shariah Bill in the National Assembly and who have passed it through a democratic process with a thumping majority against its opponents.

He said it is amazing that some members of the very Upper House who had passed the Shariah Bill having claimed the credit of passing it first in the Senate during 1990 in the days of the People's Party government are now trying to back out of this National achievement, whilst the nation expects from them to pass the N.A. Shariah Bill in toto without adopting any delaying tactics.

Education Islamized

91AS1003C Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
23 May 91 p 5

[Article by Mujtaba Akhter]

[Text] Islamabad, 22 May—The long-awaited draft national education policy which was to be announced some time this month has been delayed for an indefinite period following the Federal Government decision that the draft policy will be revised by a team of noted religious scholars and Ulema to ensure that there is nothing contrary to Islamic values and norms in the policy, THE MUSLIM learnt Sunday.

A high-level commission on the Islamisation of education will be formed for the purpose to have a close look on the draft.

The draft national education policy was formulated by senior educationists and Federal Government officials in consultation with the University Grants Commission.

The experts after having several detailed meetings with the provincial educationists and intellectuals formulated a draft policy which was to be put up before the Federal Cabinet. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif directed the educationists to reshape the draft by excluding all points which divided nation into more than one section. The new policy must ensure equal opportunity of education irrespective of individuals' socioeconomic and political status.

The idea behind the entire exercise is to make the country's future education purely Islamic and in accordance with the Shariah.

Drastic revision of the curricula has also been desired by the government to make the system future oriented.

The Federal Government has specifically asked the educationists to evolve methods through which double standard in the education could be discouraged. Similarly, the unending chain of the so-called English medium institutions must also be stopped as most of them had drawn a line between various sections of the society. Those charging exorbitant tuition fee will have to rationalise the chunk of money they get every month, by extending quality education to the students.

The government has also desired to abolish the co-education system in the country's educational institutions which the experts think has given birth to a number of socio-cultural problems. In the first phase of the programme the Islamabad-based Government Model Schools had been directed to end the co-education from the primary level. The very system will be introduced in the country's other institutions in different phases.

The new education policy will not encourage any sort of anti-Islamic material in the books, it is said.

Implementation Criticized

91AS1003D Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
23 May 91 p 6

[Article by Masud Ahmad: "Who's Afraid of Shariat Bill?"]

[Text] It is time to rejoice. The Assembly has passed the Shariat Bill. It will be flicked through the Senate before you can count how many ministers are gracing the front benches of the Upper House by their presence. It was indeed an occasion for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to lead a thanksgiving congregation at the historic Badshahi Masjid of Lahore. With the passage of the Shariat Bill, he informed the adorning assemblage, Pakistan will be made an ideal Islamic welfare State. He told them that he was going to make drastic changes in the administrative structure of the country and make it answerable to people. The most elevating part of his oratory was his tidings to the poor people. They will also be able to lead their lives with honour and dignity now, he assured them. I wish I could trace out Gul Mohammad in the wilderness of Lahore and read out the prime minister's propitious pronouncement to him and his wife. What a blissful prospect for them. They could now return to Sargodha and start life all over again, forgetting the horrific episode of the past.

In case you missed his story in "Roving Eye" week ago or in the April issue of NEWSLINE. Gul Mohammad was a poor grocer who earned the displeasure of the local sub-inspector of police for which he had to suffer untold torture and humiliation, including his being dragged to the police station along with his wife where torture followed until they were driven to leave their house and their shop and run away to disappear in Lahore somewhere. How to hunt them out and tell them that could

now go back to their hometown safely? Or, should they wait until administrative reforms, etc., etc., etc., have been carried out? Maybe, that will be a wiser course.

What is the difference between Shariat and Shariat Bill?

Answer: Puzzlement. Another answer: Ask Maulana Samiul Haq and Co. Another answer: The difference between doing and talking. I can tell you one thing. If Shariat, I mean real Shariat, not the "Bill-wali," is enforced here in the present climate, all those who voted for the Shariat Bill will migrate to more hospital lands converting the billions and millions they have been piling up into foreign bearer-bonds or whatever you call them before Islam really takes over.

Let me show you some "frightening" faces of Shariat (endearing faces for the more humane among us). The Holy Prophet (PBUH) banned the sale and purchase of land in the Islamic polity. Absentee land-lordism was declared an illegal practice. No believer was allowed to possess more land than his actual need. Extra land could not be sold. It was to be handed over free of cost to the needy Muslims. (Sahi Bukhari, Vol: 1, as quoted by Mohammad Shoaib Adil in his article "Islamic Welfare States" published in a Lahore daily.)

The Holy Prophet (PBUH) presented a model of simple living, and anyone deviating from it invited his disapproval. Once a Companion put up a lordly mansion. The Prophet (PBUH) started shunning him socially, until he was compelled to dismantle the major portion of his house (from Sunnah Abu Dawood, Vol IV: *ibid.*).

One of the luxuries of the time was to load oneself with gold ornaments. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) banned the wearing of gold ornaments by men, but later also disallowed even women to use gold ornaments which the poor could not afford, and the Holy Prophet (PBUH) did not like to create class distinctions. He said that women should use silver jewellery which all could afford.

Will I be making Maulana Samiul Haq blush (not a ghost of a chance—Maulanas don't blush) if I were to reveal to him that it was Indira Gandhi who imposed this injunction of our Holy Prophet (PBUH) on the Indian society and totally banned the use of gold ornaments? In our land, in the holy regime of Gen. Zia, someone in the Senate wanted to raise the issue of Pakistan's smuggling in 80 tons of gold every year. It was brushed off as a routine matter by no less a person than Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, chairman of the Senate at that time. The tonnage of smuggled gold must have doubled by now, seeing the mushrooming of jewellery shops in every market-place.

Again, in residential buildings, Hindu India is implementing the Shariat in a way. No one, not even the billionaires Birlas and Tatas, can have a residential plot larger than 1,000 sq. yds. (less than two "Kanals"). We have houses spread out on 8 "Kanals" and 10 "Kanals." And then the palatial stylizing in which Doric and

Gothic columns have become a must. You see house after house being broken to add the fashionable facades with a row of pillars.

Then the most disconcerting guideline about owing money: "And they ask thee to what they should spend. Say: What you can spare (of your needs)" (Surah Al-Baqra-219). Imagine the implications of this divine injunction! To quote from Mr. Adil's essay, our Holy Prophet (PBUH) ordered the believers not to stack up cash. A Musalman should not keep more than 10 thousand dirhams in his coffers. (Ahkam-ul-Quran, Vol 3, p. 122). But don't get panicky. The Shariat Bill of IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] will not be imposing that much of Islam on you. Look at the free hand the IJI government has allowed you to bring any amount of money in foreign currency, in millions or billions, drug, drug money, kickbacks or whatever—no question asked, no tax or Zakat deductions. Can you think of a more liberal approach? So do not be afraid of the Shariat Bill which has been called a "lollypop delivered to the people of Pakistan" by the IJI dissident Zahid Sarfraz. ANP [Awami National Party] leader Ajmal Khattak whose party voted for the Shariat Bill said it was neither "Shariat" nor a "Bill"—a witty remark but not wholly true. It may not be "Shariat" but you can't question its "Billness." We will take up the subject again next time.

Historical Perspective

91AS1003E Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 23
May 91 p 6

[Article by Syed Javed Hussain: "PM and the Shariat Bill"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The Shariat Bill has been passed by the National Assembly with all the aura and fanfare. Fretted opposition boycotted the proceedings once during the discussion on the Bill. It has finally passed through the mill of parliamentarians' criticism. There are still hard areas to sort out before the Bill is finally put into the psyche and lives of Pakistanis. The controversy over Sharia, is definition, and application is not a new one. It has centuries old historical bearings. It is the part of that grand fight going on between the radicals and the obscurantists, fundamentalists since ages.

A little walk down the lane of history will enable one to see similar panoramic, rhythmic fight going on which the fundamentalists regard struggle between the forces of evil and Kher; whereas the same fight is termed by intellectuals, radicals, the protagonists of Mullah, as a struggle between hard headed self interest and human aggrandisement, a fight between vested interests and selflessness, a duel between the inexplicable, a duel interpretation of dogma and intellectual freshness and forces of reason.

Historically, the radicals always won the duel punctuated by certain failures. However, the fight never ceased to excite. The dilemma of fundamentalists—which is one of the major causes of their failures—is that they want to

move forward by looking backward. They seek inspiration as well as guidance from the past ignoring the vital fact that civilisation has progressed through a very cruel momentum, and that there are no pauses and stops for them in it. Once they try to walk past the needs of the time and scale looking behind, they simply flatten and before long become redundant. The recovery is fast only due to the fact that the ideology fundamentalists hold remains relevant to all ages. Where does the fault lie? It lies in the way they interpret it. And that is where their biases crystallise into the immediate context of their own needs, ambitions and aspirations. And that is where Islam is mostly exploited.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan tried to enlighten the Muslim masses but was condemned. In fact, he tried to see in the future face forward so as not to fumble. He did not fit into the slot of the obscurantists. Allama Iqbal was another source of inspiration for the intellectuals. He too stood condemned. He was too radical to be accepted by the conservative Muslims, by these 'past seekers.' He also saw in the future face forward.

Then came Jinnah. He was a political man. He foresaw the conflict and tribulations the question of religion carried with it. He left it aside and gave a new message. He treated Muslims as a nation not as Suni, Bralvi, Deobandi or Shia. His radicalism did not appeal to many maulvis. So he too was condemned.

Since 1985 when the private Shariat Bill was passed, the clamour on Shariat has increased manifold. It was only during Zia's regime that the maulvis earned undue prominence and say in the day to day affairs of the country. He needed them to legitimise his illegitimate government. And the maulvis, in order to grasp the chance to defeat the radicals, pounced at the opportunity and lent full support—certainly ill advised and pernicious—to Zia.

Now JUI(F) [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i Islam (Fazlur Rehman Group)] has already dissociated itself from the government on the question of Shariah, and the Islamic Forum is pushing hard to see its amendments are incorporated in the Bill. There are other groups with vested interests too. It will be interesting to see how Nawaz Sharif wriggles himself out of this quagmire.

Shari'a Bill Viewed Unfavorably

Threat to Communal Harmony

91AS1054A Karachi DAWN in English 2 Jun 91 p 11

[Article by Anwer Pirzado: "Critical View of Shariat Bill"]

[Excerpt] Most of the Sindhi dailies under review took critical view of the Shariat Bill presented in the parliament by the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] government considering it detrimental to the cause of religious harmony in the country. While discussing the classical traditions of mysticism in the subcontinent and Sindh as

well as modern developments in the world of today pertaining to the technological revolution, the newspapers concluded that attempts in this direction were tantamount to the creation of sectarian hatred in the already divided Pakistani society. All newspapers discussed this issue in editorials and objected to the various statements given by the architects of this Bill against basic human rights meant for women and the minorities in the country. The daily IBRAT, Hyderabad, of 18 May observed in its editorial on the subject, "Such developments are likely to prove counter-productive so far as the religious harmony in the country is concerned. Secondly, the apprehensions about possible encroachment over the basic human rights of the women and the minorities are a matter of concern for every person having democratic mind. We shall therefore suggest to the IJI government to create complete consensus among the people of Pakistan before initiating such a controversial step, which might disturb the status quo in the country." The daily AWAMI AWAZ Karachi also disapproved of the scheme, "The main thrust of those initiating the Shariat Bill seems to have been an attempt to create a political tradition which could impede the way of any woman to ever come in power in Pakistan. In obvious terms, it seems to have been an endeavour of the IJI government to obstruct the way of Ms Benazir Bhutto to power in the future. It is therefore suggested that the Government should come out openly with its political designs and must not camouflage its politics in religious cover." The daily JAAGO dated 22 May observed in its editorial, "We strongly condemn Mullahism and fundamentalism. We oppose it today, we were against it in the past and we shall remain antagonist to it in the future. As a matter of fact, we believe that to oppose the present Shariat Bill is in consonance with the true Islam. And it is with the grace of God that we say that we are very much Muslims." [passage omitted]

Called 'Defective Code'

91AS1054B Karachi DAWN in English 1 Jun 91 p 11

[Article by Rifat Hamid Ghani: "A Limited and Defective Code"]

[Text] Two things vex the nation deeply: provincial autonomy and the Islamic aspect of the republic. The second is even more difficult to discuss than the first, although, in one sense, there is no disagreement about it. The perfection of example the Holy Prophet offers cannot be, and indeed never is, questioned. Yet, over the centuries, controversy has clung to minutiae and exactitude for purpose of application. The debate on the proposed content of the Shariat Bill offers such an instance.

An interpretation of Shariat having been conceded, the nature of its implementation and enforcement through legislation remains subject to question. How much and what manner of power is the state going to be allowed for regulating the lives of its citizens? Undue encroachment by the state tends towards totalitarianism. Critics of the

Bill fear a state that assumes the garb of religious injunction so that it is above question.

Such functioning is a far cry from the idealised system of governance presented in the example of the Khulfa-i-Rashdeen. The state and its agents of power will always be liable to error, and in the guise of a Shariat Bill, the power of the state to perpetrate its errors and protect them could be absolute. This would not be Shariat. In effect it would amount to an antithesis of the Holy Prophet's mode. And so, when the Shariat Bill is opposed it is important to recognise that it is not in any way Shariat itself that is opposed.

Nor do the opponents of the Bill deny the quest for an Islamic identity. Pakistan was conceived of as a homeland for the Muslims, a bastion of Muslim identity in the *melange* of the subcontinent. But whether this means giving the state the power to legislate what the specifics of this identity are for the already practising and believing Muslims within it, is another matter. At any time, state sovereignty is embodied in representatives chosen for a limited period and limited purposes. The choice is made under systems and through process that cannot be other than subject to the manifold imperfections of the mortal world, and the people that emerge through these processes or control and direct them are themselves but human and possess the inevitable quota of human failings.

Codification is a temporal process: when mere mortals seek to codify, they cannot do so with a claim to infallibility or immutability. Undoubtedly, they seek guidance and inspiration and offer service in complete sincerity to universal and eternal principles that are Islamic. But this universal law irradiates and illumines in infinitude: legalities are worked out in submission and reference to these laws but such legislation cannot be projected as having the inherent inviolability of its inspirational font.

The Constitution of Pakistan already forbids laws repugnant to the Quran and Sunnah. Nor would the general will of a Muslim people ever uphold or sanction such laws. From this point of view, the Shariat Bill is superfluous. The Bill is not a religious issue at all, it is a political one. Unlike economic decisions or other policy orientations in spheres like education or taxation, which have a separate reality in terms of their own disciplines and are then politicised, the Shariat Bill is political in its very origin and purport.

General Zia has not been gone from us long enough for an elaboration of his use of the promulgation of Shariat to be required. The induction of Shariat relates to the question of power. An appeal is made to an unquestionable religious commitment, and those who lay claim to a definitive interpretation of Shariat also seek to be the custodians of the power to enforce and uphold it. Obviously, the democratic system is not liable to cede power to them or they would not seek legislative authority in the name of religion, or attempt to project those who do

not get bypassed in the democratic process as indifferent to Islamic values. The debate between an hierarchic oligarchy and democracy in a Muslim country is not a clash between religious values and priorities, but between conflicting political interests.

Yet, the religious element could not be used to such effect if it did not relate to very real compulsions in our society. There is an undoubted search for the Islamic way. The conflicts arise when the search for this calls into question the validity and relevance of established democratic norms and values and negates a progressive and enlightened view of Islam's corporate principles. Must the Islamic ideal be characterised by the hide-bound, and must it tend towards isolating the Muslim and his world? Some of the argument around the Shariat Bill is also an argument about the kind of directions we would like to see our society and culture taking.

The argument surrounding the Shariat bill is multilayered, with deep and hidden origins. It is both rooted in, and clouded and confused by being stated in terms of a choice between the theocratic and the secular, the emancipated and the segregated, freedom and licence. Political stands on it should be seen for what they are, sectarian ones as sectarian, and sociological as sociological. For Islam is indeed a complete way of life in terms of fundamental principles of guidance, embracing every aspect of existence, and that is precisely why it is beyond institutionalisation or reduction to containment in political legislation and rigidities. Today, to be Islamic, a political system has also to be what is referred to as secular. The inquisitorial and hagiocratic powers that are sought in the name of Shariat are completely alien to the spirit of Islam.

But if obscurantism and authoritarianism and the tyrannous attitudes they engender are truly antipathetic to Islam, why are these faces more dominant in assuming an Islamic posture than the liberal egalitarian ones which are conveniently labelled Western and set aside? The sad truth is that we have permitted the decline of the liberal and progressive values in our practice of Islam. In the subcontinent, Muslims have nurtured a culture of grandeur and decadence. Rather than rediscover and reconstitute the liberal and enlightened values of Islam from within ourselves, developing and couching them in our own mould and cast, we have adopted Western phraseology and formulations to articulate our yearnings and aspirations. This is not inimical to the essential Islamic spirit, but it is not conducive to giving a native face to the liberal ethos. The liberal has no grassroots contact, and the common man is left open to the play of non-liberal elements, presenting themselves as orthodox and eastern. That is the equation progressive forces seek to change.

Most of our religious divines support the idea of "a" Shariat Bill, but cannot agree on the content of "the" Shariat Bill, that is there before them and this fact is

readily discernible as another form of political wrangling. This drift towards the trivialisation of religion is fraught with peril.

The Shariat Bill as placed before the Senate for consideration and then passed by it, is amorphous. It does not (nor could any such bill) provide a complete codification of the Shariat, around which the entire debate centres. The debate, therefore, will persist even after the promulgation of the Bill, which simply hands over the rights to determine the code to a hagiocracy. Qualification for membership to this body, authority within it, is liable to remain variable. No state can function with the constitutional fabric of the polity undefined.

Some of the practical consequences of the Bill being passed will be more than embarrassing. In the first place, it will make for uncertainty. Even within the format of one Fiqh the question of the application of doctrine for specifics remains. The complexities of a civilisation of technology would raise many issues. The gulf between the urban and the rural would widen: Maulana Kausar Niazi's knowledge, or Maulana Fazlur Rehman's rulings will be on a different plane from those of a village maulvi's. Inter-relation between Fiqhs would prove problematic: should a Shia and Sunni fall out in business or social contract, what will be a mutually acceptable and religiously incontrovertible basis for arbitration?

Clearly, the way to Shariat lies in grasping and interpreting the Islamic principles in dynamic, not static terms. The attempt to interpret literally and circumscribe ourselves within the expressions of a nomadic civilisation of more than a thousand years ago is not a spiritual restoration or Islamic renaissance, but a sociological exercise that inclines towards absurdity. Islam does not require us to be apologists for enlightened progressive values.

We do not need to take refuge in the sayings of the Quaid-i-Azam or the writings of Allama Iqbal. Ijtihad, ijma, the tolerance that characterises secularism in political and social exchange, are concepts that stand as Islamic in themselves. Muslims can be fearless supporting them. There is nothing un-Islamic about asking for a serious reconsideration of the merits of imposing a limited and defective code in the name of Shariat. To be called upon subsequently to revise or revoke such a code would be infinitely more damaging than questioning the nature of its passage.

National Interests at Risk

91AS1054C Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 18 May 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Fayyaz Ahmad Khan and Faisal Saeed Qazi: "Shariah Bill to Harm Pak Interests: Leaders"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] With the exception of Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) members, the adoption of the Shariah bill by the National Assembly has taken flak of the religious leaders,

poets, writers, scholars, students and politicians, a survey carried out by THE FRONTIER POST revealed on Friday.

Politicians maintained that it was a political gimmick of the IJI leadership to silence the aggressive clergy and argued that since the 1973 constitution provided almost identical securities, viz religion, the present bill was uncalled for. Intellectuals alleged that the bill was aimed at reducing the women-folk, almost 52 percent of the total population, to the status of second class citizens and would empower the fundamentalists.

Defence strategists and scholars of international relations observed that the resultant increase in power of the fundamentalists would certainly complicate the Kashmir and Afghanistan issues. They also feared that Pakistan's relations with secular India would suffer a setback and the passage of the Shariah bill would internationally be seen as a step-backward and an attempt to beef up the political stature of religious fundamentalism. They expressed apprehension that China would also feel uncomfortable in the wake of the bill because of its "militant Muslim" minority in Xinjiang.

The Awami National Party (ANP) also remained on the receiving end and its political rivals vehemently flayed its volte-face on the Shariat bill. Some even went to the extent of saying: "It has completely lost its character and direction." Meanwhile, the veteran politician of the country and ANP's *Rahber* (patron), Wali Khan, said, "the passage of Shariat bill was only a formality, because the provisions for Islamisation have already been provided in the 1973 constitution."

Maulana Mohammad Amir (Bijli Ghar), a leader of the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam [JUI] (F), said that if Shariah meant to cut a thief's hand, death by stoning to adulterators, lashes to alcohol drinkers and to force the women to wear the "white burqa" then we welcome it, otherwise we don't. He, however, added that it was still not clear whether or not Shariah would be ushered in through the bill.

Afrasiyab Khattak, general secretary of Qaumi Inqilabi Party (QIP), said, "Islam has always been used to acquire power in our country and the present Shariah bill is the most recent example in this regard." He maintained that in a country like Pakistan, where national and international policies were being dictated by the superpowers and the people were being denied their fundamental rights, the passage of such a bill would disgrace Islam as its outcome would be negative.

Speaking on the role of ANP in this regard, he said it was unfortunate that it had also joined the tug-of-war for power. He added that with its changing faces the ANP had not only put its own credibility at stake, but the whole political structure of the country. He advised the ANP and IJI to stop their childish games and plan something positive to solve the problems of the masses."

Celebrated writer and poet Zetoon Bano remarked that the initiators of the bill and its staunch supporters were hypocrites and therefore the bill should be rejected.

Dr Shireen Mazari, renowned scholar, was of the view that it was a sorry development that the same *Mullahs*, who had opposed the creation of Pakistan, had been given the right to dictate the people of the country as to what an Islamic polity should be.

"I can't accept a bill that will give a legal cover to second class citizenship for the women of Pakistan," she said. She feared that the Kashmir problem would be aggravated after the resulting increase in the political clout of the fundamentalist faction in the country.

Shabir Ahmad Khan, Amir of Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), Peshawar, district observed that the passage of the bill was the "first important step in the right direction." He, however, continued that the more important thing was the implementation of the bill and it remained to be seen as to how the government felt about it.

Fazle Haq, former governor and chief minister of the NWFP and a sitting IJI MPA [Member of Provincial Assembly], hailed the Shariah bill. He congratulated Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on keeping his election promise with the people, who voted him to power.

Maulana Binauri, Amir JUI (F), NWFP, strongly opposed the bill saying: "We do not accept the Nawaz Sharifi Shariah." He maintained that the Shariah guaranteed by the bill was incomplete and would not solve the problems of the oppressed people.

Dr Syed Riffat Hussain, a prominent scholar, was of the opinion that Russians would be suspicious because of Muslim majority in Central Asian states. He went on to say that our relations with Iran would be strained as Shias in Pakistan were against the bill.

He said that the bill would further divide the already segregated society by creating controversies.

The orthodox elements would criticise the government for not doing enough of Islamisation while the liberal intelligentsia for having done damage to the modern value structure. The citizen will construe it as an encroachment on their private lives by the state and an assault on their fundamental political and civil rights. "And, of course, many will fear that the government would use the Shariah stick to harass its opponents, intimidate its critics and witch-hunt all those who do not subscribe to the official Islam," he added.

Nasirullah Babur, a leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), bitterly slated the passage of the bill. He also equally criticised the political somersaults of the ANP, saying: "It has completely lost its character and direction." He alleged that Ghulam Ahmad Bilour and Ajmal Khattak of the ANP were expecting cabinet appointments and, therefore, they were compromising on sensitive issues like Kalabagh dam, Gadoon Industrial Estate and Shariah.

ANP stalwart Wali Khan was evasive about whether he differed with Khattak, the ANP president, on the issue. He said that Ajmal Khattak was in a better position to decide and he himself did not have first-hand knowledge about the issue.

Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan opposed the bill, saying: "State should not interfere in religious matters." When asked about the volte-face by the ANP, he refused to comment.

APP reported from Islamabad that several members of the parliament described the adoption of the bill as a landmark and an unprecedented achievement of the government.

The adoption of the bill by overwhelming majority in the lower house of parliament was the real motivating force behind the creation of Pakistan, they observed.

Former prime minister and the president of Pakistan Muslim League, Mohammad Khan Junejo, commented that the government had accepted its pledge given to the masses during the last general elections.

The passage of the bill, he remarked, was a step-forward to realise the goal of this Muslim state. All possible, sincere and devoted efforts were made to bring maximum consensus on the bill and both sides in the house were given an opportunity to express their views on this piece of legislation, he added.

Junejo expressed the hope that the adoption of the bill would immensely benefit the entire nation with the blessings of Almighty Allah.

Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, former caretaker prime minister, commenting on the passage of Shariah bill said the government had honoured its commitment.

Jatoi felt the need for a follow-up action to achieve full benefits of this legislation and to make it really meaningful.

He was of the view that the bill should be implemented at the earliest with the same spirit as it was passed.

Former minister and MNA [Member of National Assembly] from Okara, Mian Mohammad Zaman, bitterly criticised the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] leadership as well as legislators for passing sacrilegious remarks against the Shariah bill.

Talking to newsmen yesterday at a local hotel, Mian Zaman lashed out at Sardar Farooq Leghari and Aitzaz Ahsan for terming the bill as a conspiracy of the Zionists to defame Islam and that Shariah was revealed for those people of the desert who had no respect for wives, daughters and women.

He suggested to them to seek forgiveness from Almighty Allah for their sacrilegious utterances lest they should face divine wrath and punishment.

Mian Mohammad Zaman extolled Mohammad Nawaz Sharif for honouring his commitment.

Referring to PDA's charges about the curtailment of women's rights, he said, "unfortunately legal wizards representing PDA in the National Assembly do not even know the alphabets of Islam."

He called upon the Muslim women to abide by the golden principles of Islam and inculcate Islamic spirit in the minds of their children to make them good Muslims.

The former provincial minister and the sitting MNA from Chitral, Shahzada Mohiuddin, said the government had fulfilled the commitment it made to the people in its election manifesto. He said it was appreciable that the bill had been passed in a democratic way and all political parties had expressed their views on it.

Minister of state for sports Mohammad Ajmal Khan congratulated Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the adoption of the bill.

The minister added that the prime minister had taken a bold step and fulfilled the dream of the Muslims of the sub-continent.

Our reporter adds from Lahore, the speakers at a meeting of the Third Force while criticising here on Friday the passage of Shariah bill had termed it mullah's encroachment on the rights of the citizens.

Miss Hina Jilani, a renowned human rights activist, while speaking at the occasion termed the bill absurd. She added that this bill could have been in accordance to the will of a Qazi Hussain Ahmed or Maulana Samiul Haq but in no way was in accordance with the real Islamic junction.

Commenting on the effects of the Shariah bill on the womenfolk she maintained that it would be of two fold, firstly, being a member of the society and secondly being a woman. She termed them the most badly hit class in existence of this bill. She added that despite having a big proportion in the population they actually were the weakest segment of the society. She said that ultimately with the powers entrusted to mullahs in the Shariah bill the whole society would have to suffer.

She also criticised the government for keeping the bill uninterpreted thus leaving a lot of ambiguities in the society. She opined in the present state the bill could be said as principles of policy but never can be termed a legislation in itself.

Salman Taseer, a PPP leader, termed the Shariat bill as a political bill in the light of the way the IJI got it passed from the National Assembly. He sarcastically congratulated all those present for becoming a pure Muslim after the passage of Shariah bill.

While questioning approval of the bill he maintained that in the assembly of 237 members only 109 voted in favour of it. He continued that the government itself was

not sincere on this important issue as during the whole session they failed to maintain the quorum in the House.

He was surprised over the passage of the bill just after the discussion of three days which shows that the government was least interested in the real issue but just wanted to add another slogan in its golden event's book.

He said the bill would actually affect the lower and lower middle class living in the urban areas as neither our 70 percent rural population nor high class would feel any change in their daily life style.

He termed the Shariah bill a state of mullah's mind which would prove disastrous for the country. He maintained that whenever the mullahs were given power they just cannot justify it and created problems for the country. He said that as Article 30 of 1973 constitution clearly states that every possible step should be taken to make the state and individuals according to the Islamic rituals there was no need of this vague law. He said that even the bill was different from the first presented on the will of Ghulam Ishaq Khan.

He said that the PPP has always stood against the mullahism and would continue it. He appealed the people to strengthen the PPP for abolishing such 'black laws' from the society.

Earlier, the founder of the Third Force [TF] Sheikh Saleem Kabir briefed about the background of the TF and presented a joint resolution that encroachment of mullahs on people's rights would never be accepted and the TF would continue to demolish such inhumane and unjust laws. He also informed that the TF had formed three special committees, legislation committee, projects committee and voluntary committee.

Mrs Yasmeen Qaiser, secretary information Pakistan People's Party, women wing, Punjab, criticised the passing of "official Shariah bill" from the National Assembly and claimed that this bill had no concern with the Islamic Shariah.

In a press statement in Lahore, she maintained that the bill would give the *maulvis* an unprecedented power, which would lead to the destruction of democratic institution and rights of the women.

The PPP leader further said people were already hard pressed due to ever increasing price hike and aggravating law and order situation.

On the contrary, Bushra Rehman, former member of the provincial assembly, said that Shariah bill had given complete protection to women's constitutional rights and all rumours in this regard by the vested interests were absolutely wrong.

In a press statement she said Islamic Shariah was complete and developed system of life which would provide complete protection to the rights of all sections of the society including women. She said that a few western oriented intellectuals were trying to mislead the general

public through misrepresentation and wrong argumentation. She maintained that after the enforcement of Shariah, women would not be compelled to remain in the four walls of their house.

In Karachi the president of Sindh Muslim League and former chief minister Akhtar Ali Kazi and former federal minister Zain Noorani, have jointly welcomed the passage of Shariah bill.

They congratulated Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and members of the National Assembly for their spirit of accommodation by taking all sections of political opinion into confidence.

The secretary-general of Pakistan National Workers Federation, Khalilur Rehman in a statement congratulated Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the passage of the Shariah bill which he said would go a long way to ensure justice to the workers.

He said that the enforcement of the Shariah would herald an era of progress and justice to all sections of the society without any discrimination and further strengthen the cohesion and unity among the workers.

Khalilur Rehman said that mere passage of bill was not sufficient but it must be practised in letter and spirit.

Former Sindh ministers, Alhaj Shamimuddin and Syed Ahad Yusuf also jointly congratulated Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for the passage of Shariah bill, which they said, is a landmark and great achievement of our times.

They said by adopting the Shariah bill, foundations had been laid for a strong and united Pakistan. With such leaders at the helm of affairs, the country's future seems to be extremely bright, they added.

In Quetta, Pir Abdul Hakeem Shah, provincial president Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (Niazi group) hailed the passage of Shariah bill and said that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had made historical progress by solving the most serious problems faced by the country for decades.

Said Written by U.S. Envoy

91AS1054D Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 19 May 91 p 10

[Article by Altaf Saddiqui: "PM Incapable of Running Affairs: Sarfraz 'Shariah Bill Drafted by Oakley'"]

[Excerpt] Karachi—Mian Zahid Sarfraz, dissident IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] MNA [Member of National Assembly], pointedly criticising Prime Minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, said that he was not capable of running the state affairs. He went on to allege that Mian Nawaz Sharif was working for personal gains under the veil of his privatisation policy.

Addressing a press conference in Karachi on Saturday, he accused the government of being favourite of India and playing in the hands of international forces. Mian Zahid Sarfraz added, that if the present situation was not

mastered the people would take to streets and launch agitation against the IJI government.

He divulged that the Shariah Bill had been drafted by the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley. Despite vehement opposition from the IJI parliamentary party, Mian Nawaz Sharif got approved the same Bill from the National Assembly, he continued. Zahid Sarfraz maintained that the *Ulema* had also criticised the government Shariah Bill.

In accordance with the 1973 constitution no law repugnant to Quran and *Sunnah* could be passed in the country, he argued.

Zahid Sarfraz re-affirmed that Mian Nawaz Sharif was not fit for the prime ministerial slot. He asserted that effort was afoot to change the leader of the house. Under parliamentary democracy, the parliamentary party was empowered to change its leader, he contended. [passage omitted]

Shari'a Bill, Aftermath Probed

'Portents' Examined

91AS1093A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
13 Jun 91 p 6

[Article by Farhatullah Babar]

[Text] The clergy has won the first round, namely, the passage last month of the Shari'a Bill both by the National Assembly and the Senate and the subsequent Presidential assent to it reportedly on June 6. Though so far merely a declaration of pious intentions and vague promises, the Act has opened the door to sub-legislation for further Islamizing the society. What are its portents?

It now needs no reiteration that the Treasury acted in indecent haste in pushing the Bill through, first by tabling it in the National Assembly even after its rejection by the Select Committee to which it had been referred earlier, and, second, by allowing very little time for discussion by members. In spite of this, the government could not persuade the Alliance members of Parliament to vote for it, and the Bill was passed by the National Assembly by a voice vote with only 109 members out of a total of 217 present in the House. While the remaining half of the House cannot be said to favor the Bill, a number of the 109 members present may also have voted against it in the voice voting.

Soon after passage by the National Assembly on May 16, the Treasury presented it in the Senate where the government again failed to herd its own Senators, and only 43 out of a total of 87 Senators were present at the time of voting. The Senate endorsed the Bill by 40 members voting for and three against on May 28, just two days before the budget. Thus, a Bill purporting to seek amendments in the fundamental law was bulldozed with inexplicable haste through both the Houses in less than two weeks. Perhaps the Treasury was keen to have it passed

before the presentation of the national budget so as to be able to wrap white budget lies in the green Islamic label. This haste is in stark contrast with government's reluctance to take up the legislation banning floor-crossing by members as demanded by the public and on which a presidential ordinance has also been issued.

In order to prevent the Senators from proposing any amendment in the Bill which would have necessitated a joint sitting of Parliament and thus delayed its adoption well beyond the budget, the Treasury resorted to even more dubious practices. Dozens of amendments proposed by the Opposition were rejected off-hand. The seven amendments proposed by Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, the erst-while author of the private Shari'a Bill, were neutralized by a promise to him that he will be included in the Committee being set up for the purpose of subordinate legislation. Promptly the maulana withdrew his amendments. Amendments proposed by some other IJI [Islamic Democratic Alliance] Senators were also withdrawn, using a mix of coercion and inducements.

So much for the seriousness of purpose behind the Bill. The voting pattern which was more or less identical in both the Houses, also robs the Bill of the consensus earlier stressed on by the government of Nawaz Sharif. The People's Democratic Alliance (PDA) and the Pukhtoonkhawah Milli Awami Party (PMAP) both voted against it. The MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement], the JWP [Jamhoori Watan Party] of Nawab Bugti and the Pakistan National Party of Bizenjo, abstained. The JUI [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam] (F) boycotted, albeit for the reason that it did not fully meet the requirements of truly Islamizing the society. Only the IJI and the ANP [Awami National Party] supported the Bill.

Although the myriad implications of the Bill passed in such a dubious manner will be gradually unfolded with the passage of time, as also the manner the clergy bulldozes its own interpretation of the various clauses, some indications are already available as to which way we have started heading.

After the passage by the National Assembly, Pir Fazal-i-Haq, MNA [member of National Assembly] and an IJI leader, publicly threatened every one that he will "pull out the tongues of those who oppose the introduction of Shari'a in the country". It did not occur to him that out of the 304 members of both Houses, less than half (only 149) had endorsed it by a voice vote. And to perform the onerous task of pulling the tongues of almost half the nation's population, the Pir further warned that he had the backing of over one million dedicated and armed followers who were ready to do his bidding or die for the cause.

One would have dismissed the Pir's outbursts as outlandish, but then on its heels came a demand from another religion-political outfit. The clerics now decreed that after the passage of the Shari'a Bill, the lady politician from Jhang, Syeda Abida Hussain, could not be appointed to a Cabinet post and must, therefore, be

dismissed. The JUI(F) not wanting to remain far behind arranged a strike in Quetta last Sunday to press their old demand that the Zikri sect be declared a non-Muslim minority because "its members did not believe in Zakat, Haj and prayers."

Yet another Maulana, Hassan Jan from NWFP [North-West Frontier Province], during budget debate on Sunday demanded that in the light of the Shari'a Bill, those who did not pay Zakat be declared non-Muslim minorities. Few suspected that his targets were the Shias who have been exempted from compulsory payment of Zakat to the State in the light of their Fiqah. The NWFP Assembly witnessed an unprecedented uproar and a boycott by the Jamaat-i-Islami over the controversy generated by a Bill purported to force women to observe Purdah. And 21 commercial broadcasts were promptly banned by PTV [Pakistan Television] and PTN as their contents were found to be in conflict with our social and cultural mores" after the May 28 passage of the Shari'a Bill.

It is strange that while the clerics continually remind the "wayward and the deviant" of their obligation to adhere to their brand of Shari'a or have their tongues pulled out, they have not been questioned as to how much they themselves have been following the jurisprudence they claim to be adhering to.

Most of them who follow the Hanafite jurisprudence will never tell the people that Imam Abu Hannifa had given a verdict declaring the institution of Au-qaf as un-Islamic, because they themselves are the beneficiaries of this institution. They will never tell us that the Imam condemned absentee landlordism and had decreed that the tiller of the soil was the rightful owner of the land. They do not talk of these things because disclosure of such facts strikes at the very roots of their selfish interests.

Sanity has lost one more round, and clergy has secured the much-needed niche to assume the role of law-makers for promoting their own interests and dispossessing the elected parliament of its role. It is said that the Whites entered South Africa with bible in their hands but over time relinquished the Bible to the locals and themselves captured their lands powers and sources of production. The cleric in Pakistan might well be on his way to becoming the white of this land.

Constitutionality Questioned

91AS1093B Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English
14 Jun 91 p 6

[Article by Israrul Haque]

[Text] The Shari'a Bill in the National Assembly and in the Senate came under attack on the ground of violating the Constitution and at the same time on the ground of being a redundant and an unnecessary piece of legislation as it was alleged that the Constitution has already made sufficient provisions for establishing an Islamic

order in the country. Interestingly enough, both these mutually exclusive arguments were advanced alternatively by the same party, the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance]. The leader of the Opposition, Ms Benazir Bhutto, soon after the introductory speech of the Prime Minister, congratulated him as she saw in the impending Shari'a Bill the revival of the 1973 Constitution. It was, however, later that she opposed it tooth, and nail.

That it was violative of the Constitution was argued mainly on the ground that it seriously undermined the sanctity and the authority of Parliament and, thereby, the right of the people to be governed by their chosen representatives had been destroyed. A naive argument was engineered that under the Shari'a Bill Parliament as a legislative body had been completely superseded as according to the Bill all the laws already stand framed centuries back by Islamic jurists and the divines. The entire legislative process of a modern government would thus come to a halt. Whatever little legislation there would be would take place through the Shari'a Court and not through Parliament.

The Preamble, now an integral part of the Constitution, clearly lays down that the sovereignty of the universe belongs to Allah and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan has to be exercised within the limit set by Him and that this authority will be in the nature of a trust and not a delegation from Allah. It is within these prescribed limits that the people were to choose their representatives, and those chosen representatives had to strictly adhere to the prescribed limits in the exercise of their authority. Hence, no representative or elected institution, whether Parliament, the President or the Prime Minister, could exercise authority beyond the limit prescribed by Allah in the Holy Quran. The obedience to Allah, in the Holy Quran always finds mention in conjunction with the obedience to His Apostle. Whereas the obedience to Allah and His Apostle is unconditional, the obedience to the "duly constituted authority from amongst themselves" can be called into question on the ground of its non-conformity with the commandment of Allah and His Apostle (IV:59).

The Preamble further lays down that the Muslims shall be enabled to ordain their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam and set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. And the Holy Quran in turn firmly requires that the Muslims must decide all matters according to the Holy Book, and those who do not do so are amongst the fasiques, the zalims and the kafirs (V:44-49).

The Preamble, on incorporation into the Constitution, is no longer a piece of decoration, a mere sacred memory of the past, at best available to ascertain the intention of the Constitution-makers. The Supreme Court of Pakistan is deciding the State vs. Zeaur Rahman case (PLD-73) held that however, sacrosanct a document, it would not control the Constitution unless it was made a part of the Constitution, and that a Preamble to a Constitution could not enjoy any status superior to that of any other

Preamble. Now that the Preamble has been made a part of the Constitution through a constitutional amendment, it should enjoy a supra-constitutional status being the very *raison d'être* of the creation of Pakistan. The Shari'a Act draws its validity and legitimacy from the supra-constitutional law of the land.

Mr Aitzaz Ahsan has conceded on the floor of the House that the Shari'a Bill draws its legitimacy from the Preamble now part of the Constitution. The Shari'a Bill (now Act) is no ordinary legislation, even though introduced and passed as a sub-constitutional law.

Insofar as it translates the Preamble now part of the Constitution, into legislative and administrative fiat and makes the intention and the purpose of the preamble operational in all departments of life and activity, all laws, customs and practices that would now come into conflict with the Shari'a Act will give way to the provisions of the Shari'a Act.

What if any of the provisions of the Constitution itself comes into conflict with the provisions of the Shari'a Act? That would be difficult to decide. As a sub-constitutional law, the Shari'a Act, to the extent of being in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution, must give way: but in view of the judgement of the Supreme Court in the Zeaur Rahman case, the Preamble, upon incorporation into the Constitution, has now acquired the power to control the Constitution itself and insofar as the Shari'a Act operationalizes the Preamble it should be able to control the Constitution to the extent of removing the repugnancy, if any, to the purpose and intention of the Preamble. But in case of the present Shari'a Act, the position is not very clear.

More or less the same principle of law has been propounded by the Supreme Court of India (AIR 1967) in the *Goalkh Nath vs. state of Punjab*, whereby the court has ruled that the basic structure of the Indian Constitution or the basic ideal of Indian society are not open to the amendment process of Parliament and that the Indian Parliament cannot alter the basic structure of the Constitution or the ideals of the society even though the process of constitutional amendment. This principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court of India in *Indira Gandhi vs. Raj Narain* (AIR 1975).

The House of Lords in England in deciding *Shaw vs the Public Prosecutor* in 1962, elevated the norm of morality above the sovereignty of Parliament making a new epoch in the history of legal thought in England.

Lord Viscount Simon propounded his theory of law and morality while handing down the following historic judgement:

"There remains in the court of law, a residual power, to enforce the supreme and fundamental purpose of the law, to conserve not only the safety and order but also the moral welfare of the State and that it is their duty to guard and against attacks which may be more insidious because they are novel and unprepared for."

This judgement has a counsel of wisdom for those who balk at fundamentalism, for its mentions "fundamental purpose of law." For those who are allergic to the Shari'a Court's testing the validity of the laws on the touch-stone of the Holy Quran and Sunnah the House of Lords, without any enabling law of Parliament, has reserved for itself the residual power to enforce the fundamental purpose of the law to conserve not only safety and order but also the moral welfare of the State under a legal dispensation in which the British Parliament is the most sovereign of all parliaments in the world.

Chief Justice Marshall of the American Supreme Court has said that the Congress, no doubt, makes the law, but the law is what we declare it to be!

In all the leading democracies of the world, the right to interpret law and Constitution is vested in the judiciary and not in parliament. Hence the right and the power to test the validity of law made by parliament on the touch-stone of Quran and Sunnah in the fitness of things in an Islamic Republic should belong to the Shari'a Court or any other independent and competent forum like the Council of Guardians in the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the present Shari'a Act, being hedged in by conditions and expressly made subordinate to the Constitution, cannot by itself achieve this legal effect.

As to the naive argument, that with the enforcement of Shari'a, Parliament as the legislative body will be completely superseded, the most effective rebuttal is found in the constitutional system of the Islamic Republic of Iran where Shari'a is very much in force without in any way affecting the power and the importance of the majlis as the legislative body which makes the laws, passes the budget and takes strong position on foreign and domestic policies of the government. Consultation has been divinely ordained in the ordering of the affairs of the Ummah. The believers have to conduct their affairs by consultation, says the Holy Quran. Even the Prophet was divinely ordained to consult his followers in matters of the moment. Consultation, therefore, in an Islamic way of life, and government is charged with religious duty and sanctity.

The Shari'a Act, insofar as it declares only the injunctions laid down in the Holy Quran to be the supreme law of the land, suffers from a debilitating deficiency. The Holy Quran is not only a Book of Commandments but more so a book of guidance and criteria, norm and standard, all of which constitute the revelations by which all matters are to be judged and decided (V:51:52). The Holy Quran, for example, enjoins to establish what is maroof (virtue) and forbid what is munkar (evil). These Maroofs and Munkers have not been enumerated in the Holy Quran. These have to be gleaned out from different Verses scattered throughout the Book. This is an age of rapid changes in social economic and political spheres. Some of these changes fall in the category of Maroof and have to be embraced, and others fall in the category of Munkar and have to be shunned. How to tell the categories of these changes unless these are tested on the

touch-stone of norm and standard provided for and spread over the entire Holy Book? It is, therefore, of paramount necessity that the entire ideological framework enshrined in the Holy Quran is placed on the pedestal of the supreme charter of divine commandment and is made legally enforceable by the courts.

Women Call Bill 'Un-Islamic'

91AS1093C Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English
16 Jun 91 p 5

[Article by Arif Jamal]

[Text] Islamabad, June 15: Women Action Forum [WAF] once again rejected the Shari'a Bill by describing it as un-Islamic, retrogressive and opposed to the fundamental rights of all citizens as guaranteed in the Constitution.

The resolution passed at the general body meeting of the WAF said: "The Bill was passed in a hurry and without the prolonged debate which is normally permitted in Parliament for legislation that effects the nation so seriously". The WAF body pledged to continue its struggle against the future legislation which seeks to implement the Bill.

Ch Aitzaz Ahsan, MNA [member of National Assembly] and former Interior Minister, described the Bill as vague in his speech delivered in the WAF meeting. Calling the Bill 'pathetic', he said the Bill is a legislator's nightmare. A law should be crystal clear but the Shari'a Bill does not define the Shari'a. Neither does it say as to who would define the Shari'a.

Ch Aitzaz Ahsan said the state functionaries who are supposed to implement Shari'a in the country are the same corrupt people. He wondered as to how the corrupt state functionaries would implement the Shari'a.

The other point Ch Aitzaz raised about the Shari'a Bill was that the Parliament had abdicated its right to legislate by passing the Bill. He said the parliament is supposed to legislate and define rewards and punishments but this Bill has left this function to the functionaries of the state who can define it any way they like.

He said that the Shari'a Bill is not a majority Bill as only 107 MNAs out of 217 and 40 Senators out of 87 voted in its favor. He was of the view that the Family Laws are not protected in the presence of this Bill. He added that the Mullahs always spoke against the Family Laws Ordinance but married their own daughters under this law. They themselves married under this law, he added.

Javed Jabbar, a former Minister of State in the Benazir Bhutto Government, regretted that the forces of modernization had failed to represent the people of Pakistan and are only reacting now when the government has already passed its own Bill. He said Pakistani people's government would have imposed the people's Shari'a.

Javed Jabbar described the passage of Shari'a Bill as the "Historical and collective failure" which is shared by all of us. He said the Shari'a Bill is understood differently by different sections of the society. The Mullahs think they have prepared the way to implement their sect's Shari'a. They government thinks that they can go back to the people and say that they had implemented the Shari'a in the country.

However, the people respect the Shari'a Bill highly thinking that it would end their problems.

He was doubtful whether the Shari'a Bill would be implemented in a country where law has no respect. One dictator can suspend the unanimously passed law and nothing happens. Educated people violate the traffic laws and they feel justified. They violate the tax laws as they violate the traffic laws in this country, he said. He said the government feels proud of the fact that the Bill had been passed unanimously but "Unanimity is no guarantee for justiciability as was the case with the '73 Constitution.

Dominic Mughal, who gave the religious minorities point of view, rejected the Shari'a Bill by saying that the Bill did not guaranteed the rights of the religious minorities.

Federal, State Budget Allocations Criticized

Will Lead to Runaway Inflation

91AS1071A Lahore THE NATION in English
(Supplement) 31 May 91 p II

[Article: "Budget 1991-92"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The commitment made by the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] government to bring social justice to all seems an unattainable goal as far as the budget document for fiscal year 1991-91 is concerned. Whether this is due to the fact that the government was working under constraints as stated by the Finance Minister in his budget speech or as a direct offshoot of the 'revolutionary policies' that the present government has already implemented is open to speculation. Several argue that the special kind of privatisation and deregulation, which were enumerated as the crucial parts of the 'revolutionary policies' by Mr. Sartaj Aziz are themselves to blame for a greater income inequality than already exists. The beneficiaries are the rich who are to be made richer not only through gaining control of the targeted public corporations for sale since they are the only ones who can afford to bid, but are also to receive fiscal and monetary incentives in the form of tax reliefs. This, so it is claimed by the Finance Minister, would allow the government to realise its other targets like increasing employment opportunities and doubling the Gross National Product of the country within ten years. Such targets are unattainable simply because our industrialists have shown a marked preference for increasing the capital-output ratio over labour-output ratio; and by

raising productivity which may not find domestic markets because of higher unemployment levels than before and, not finding foreign markets either due to the quota restrictions it is likely that stockpiling will occur which heralds a recession. Yet another crucial aspect of social justice is ensuring that the inflation rate is controlled. But by increasing the budget deficit by 2.8 billion rupees in fiscal year 1991-92 it is doubtful if inflation can be controlled. However, if one adds reliance on external resources then the situation is much more acute this year. For all the rhetoric of the IJI cabinet members about self-reliance it is evident that this year the reliance on external resources exceeds that of last year by 6.9 billion rupees approximately. In other words the hectic activity by our ministers and notably the Finance Minister did pay off in terms of securing foreign aid despite the fact that America has withheld loans to us since September last year. Thus if one takes the total deficit, i.e. external resources plus the gap, then the 1991-92 budget envisages an increase of approximately 10 billion rupees which does not seem designed to reduce the pressure on prices; quite the contrary as a matter of fact. It was also revealed by the Federal Finance Minister that the money generated through the government's policy of privatisation would be pumped right back into the economy in its efforts to wipe out illiteracy and insufficient health facilities. That the government has increased expenditure on education by 13.4 percent this year is creditable to say the least. It is, however, pertinent to mention that Ms. Bhutto's government had earmarked an increase of 9.8 percent when it presented the budget for fiscal year 1990-91. Since she was in power only about two months after that the blame for slashing this rise to merely 0.8 percent falls squarely on the shoulders of the IJI government. One would hope that as the year progresses the present government does not slash its own budgetary commitment on education. A similar reservation can be expressed on the increase in allocations for population planning amounting to 11.5 percent and health totalling 5.4 percent over last years figures. But it is evident that via releasing its surplus cash realised through privatisation into the economy the inflation would rise not decrease.

Mr. Sartaj Aziz also announced that his government will continue to control the domestic prices of what it deems essentials. In effect he was implying that all the inflationary trends will be nullified through this blatant control over the market mechanism. But his insistence that the price of wheat, Pakistan's staple diet, will be increased because there is a discrepancy between the price charged by the government and the retailers, seems naive. Surely there is such a discrepancy in nearly all products whose prices are controlled by the government. And if the government is vigilant enough in enforcing its maximum price then it is equally obvious that scarcities develop and black-marketing thrives. It has become traditional in the government circles that when they talk of the poor they are reminded of women and minorities. Hence the social justice thrust of the new government would make available 5 billion rupees to women under

the Annual Development Programme and around 20 crore rupees to minorities. Nonetheless it is pertinent to mention that the present government does consider unemployment and inflation its top priorities since the budget speech did revolve around the realisation of this concept. But equally importantly we should have been told in the budget about how much the salary rise would be, since we were told it would cost about 6 billion rupees, yet the concerned people do not know which grade gets what percentage rise.

However, in the budget the government has made a serious effort to decentralise power to the District level through the establishment of District Committees. This would increase accountability and make the development plans more in tune with the needs of people in a specific locality. We were told by the Finance Minister that by injecting approximately one billion rupees in the agricultural sector, output would rise. The budget also lowered its commitment under the head 'National Calamities and other Disasters' by 44.8 percent. Sports and Recreation also suffered a decline in percentage terms of 22 percent in comparison to last year. But Religious Affairs witnessed a rise in allocation of 64.6 percent. What is evident is that the government is hoping for a disaster-free year.

And the IMF conditionalities are most evident in the allocation for environment for fiscal year 1991-92. The popularisation of this concept in the West has made this a key issue with governments of the Third World. But as continuously stated by the Finance Minister, since he took over control, all IMF conditionalities will be met barring that of controlling the deficit and that is the budget thrust in a nutshell. But there is one that has not been met. That includes the expenditure on defence. The present government has raised its expenditure on defence by 11.6 percent. This perhaps is the only surprise allocation in the budget. The rest was expected, specially given the fact that the bulk of the economic policies of the government were announced prior to the budget just as the utility prices were raised quietly before the budget. In short the budget 1991-92 singularly lacked any 'revolutionary' policies simply because all such policies had been announced previously i.e. from privatisation to deregulation to decentralisation. What remained was for the government to reveal its sources of finance. However only one policy of the government as regards its taxation proposals is likely to be vigorously opposed by a powerful pressure group. This policy is the increase in the export duty on yarn and the group likely to take exception to it is APTMA—All Pakistan Textile Mills Association. But then there has always been a conflict between the yarn exporters and the ancillary industry about what duty to impose on yarn exports with the government acting as a mediator. It is expected that the government will realise over 1.5 billion rupees from this export duty alone and hence it is not likely that the government would abandon this tax in the face of opposition easily. But in the past APTMA has successfully bargained with the government whenever it raised this duty. If APTMA

succeeds this time as well then the budget deficit would be that much more unmanageable. But then the government can always raise utility rates.

Contains Unreachable Targets

91AS1071B Lahore *THE NATION* in English
(Supplement) 1 Jun 91 p 1

[Article by Mahmood Awan: "1991-2 Federal Budget: A Shift From the Traditional; But Will It Deliver?"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] A matter-of-fact mix of relief packages for the poor and hard-to-swallow taxation measures for the rich, direction-driven, attaching high priority to equitable distribution of wealth, providing room for employment opportunities, aimed at reducing economic disparity among various segments of the society, standing out for accepting economic realities—the 1991-2 national budget has it all. Yet it is obviously overambitious.

The taxation measures are well worked out. The budget envisages generation of an additional revenue of as much as Rs. [rupees] 13.9 billion but almost without hurting any one. Where it is proposed that the business houses with a paid-up capital of more than Rs. 50 million be made to pay a maximum of its one percent as their contribution to the Baitul Mal, and one percent of all loans above Rs. 50,000 be deducted for the same purpose, the Budget also brings the maximum corporate tax on individuals down from 45 percent to 35 percent and that on registered firm down from 35 percent to 25 percent.

The importance of the capital market in the wake of the government's privatisation policy and the Prime Minister's promise of rapid industrialisation in the coming years has been kept in mind and the exemption of capital gains tax on shareholdings extended for another two years. Custom duties have been rationalised, making the imports easier and cheaper to allow competitive marketing of the imported products to improve the quality and control the prices of the local products.

Introduction of the capacity tax has also been promised in the coming fiscal year's budget. While the levy of this tax is estimated to bring an additional Rs. 2.5 billion to the government exchequer, it would rid the manufacturers of the "corrupt" Excise and Taxation Officers always on their backs obliging them to evade taxes "to the mutual benefit of both."

The Budget promises no plans of generating employment opportunities in the public sector, which is in line with the Prime Minister's favourite slogan of "the government's job is to run the country's affairs, not industries." The state-owned industrial enterprises are supposed to go in the end into the private sector, which is supposed to make them efficient and productive, allowing them to go for expansion and thus generate more job opportunities.

The proceeds of the sale of family silver—as many like to call the sale of state-owned commercial enterprises—once again go for the welfare and rehabilitation of the poor and the needy. The resources mobilised this way will be diverted to the provision of social services, health, housing, education and all. Standards of all social services will be improved. All this would be done at the grass root level. Committees will be formed at community level under the local bodies institution to identify where the funds have to go.

So far so good. What the Finance Minister and Mian Nawaz Sharif's government has offered through all these proposed budgetary measures is a set of radical policies, entirely new to the country and the people—A new system for the creation of a new society, dutiful, docile and content. But the realities are different.

The budgetary targets are too ambitious. Not even doubting the sincerity and devotion of the Minister and the government presenting it, the budget itself includes certain inconsistencies that do not match the sort of uprighteousness, efficiency and sincerity these budgetary targets demand from the business community, the taxpayer, the tax collector and the common man for their realisation.

The whole philosophy behind the budget, and the radical welfare oriented policies, as some would like to call them, seems to lack a proper base given the fact that the government plans to decentralise everything for once at once. The idea is not to oppose the concept of decentralisation by any means. But what the Finance Minister failed to highlight, and doubtlessly could not, was the answer to how the government plans to reform the corrupt state machinery and the local bodies institutions in just one month before the next fiscal year starts and the government starts allocating the huge sums it plans for the provision of social services to these institutions.

In fact this particular point gains the highest importance when seen in the context of the direction the budget claims to give. The budget envisages uplift of the rural masses, reduction of poverty and illiteracy, provision of health facilities and other basic amenities at the cost of raising the budgetary deficit and curtailing its own control over all this, this is simply impossible, though it might sound too academic and rhetorical, with the evolution of a system of accountability and check on corruption.

It comes as all the more a surprise because Mian Nawaz, deeply involved in the Punjab's finances—for a decade as Finance Minister and Chief Minister, attempted in 1987-8 to reform the system, saying pointedly that he knew half of the then unprecedented development funding levels were being embezzled or wasted, and thus development was not proceeding as fast as it should. The Finance Minister he set the goal, Ch Mumtaz Hussain, had to undergo a coronary bypass within eight months, and in the turbulence following 29 May 1988, the lofty goal was set aside. Mian Nawaz seems to want to give it

another try, even though his experience of the 'baseness of man' has been increased by the shenanigans of MNAs [Members of National Assembly] and MPAs [Members of Provincial Assembly] on both sides of the divide in the 'split-mandate era'.

Here, one might be obliged to note that the presentation of the Federal 1991-2 Budget on Thursday seems rather half baked. Many issues have been left for mutual consultations, high-powered commissions and committees. These issues are to be decided later. Whether it was because the government was in a hurry to present the national budget (it is the earliest presentation for more than a decade at least) or it has deliberately left these issues unresolved to solve them later through mutual compromise rather than consultation is to be seen only with time when the business community shuttles between its Karachi and Lahore bases and Islamabad to meet the Senator and others in government in closed-door meetings. The meetings have to be behind closed doors since the government is headed by an industrialist who is trusted and backed by other industrialists who would not like to damage his popularity by criticising the budgetary proposals in the open. The budget statement of the Finance Minister Senator Sartaj Aziz, a thorough technocrat who knows his job, emphasised also more on the welfare part of the government policies and seemed to evade, or at least failed to elaborate on, certain vital economic issues that needed to be discussed in detail. The issue of privatisation of SEOs [expansion not given] being one of them.

Though too early to make any observations at that since the original taxation proposals, or their details, are yet to be made public, the taxation proposals hit quite a lot of industrialists and businessmen quite hard. They would not concede it for after all it is all being done for the welfare of the poor and the downtrodden, they so sincerely feel for, but the way the businessmen—at least in Lahore—noted the taxation proposals was much of a surprise. The way those gathering to watch the budget speech telecast live through TV were thumping the desks when the budget speech started, and the way they puffed nervously on cigarettes and cigars out by the time the Finance Minister reached the part of the speech dealing with the taxation proposals was a treat to watch. The worried looks, heads in hands and heads shaking in dismay were all signs of their disappointment with one who belonged to their community.

The businessmen were reluctant to speak about the budget first but then they said what they had to say. "It was a good budget, looking at it as a whole. There is relief for the common man. Prices of essential commodities have gone down. It is a good beginning, if not a very good budget, you can say," was almost all they had to say soon after the budget speech. That was their first reaction, but by the time they had seen the budget in slight detail, they had realised they did not get a bad bargain after all. The budget was what it had to be, under the circumstances.

The budget drama finally over. The common man satisfied. Businessman uncertain but sure of getting a good deal in the end, there is one party left, partly unsatisfied—the watchdog of Pakistan's economic policies, IMF. There were no further increases in gas and electricity tariffs, the IMF so strongly recommended. No drastic cuts in the administrative expenditure. Further rise in defence expenditure, and that too by 11.6 percent over the ongoing fiscal year's revised estimates. What will follow now, will the IMF which has so devotedly been supervising the structural adjustments and policy-making in Pakistan leave it at that or there will be another mini-budget in the coming months. A mini-budget like the one announced just a couple of months back, increasing the prices of electricity and natural gas, and this time round withdrawing subsidies—a lot of them—here and there. We can just wait and see.

Economic Outlook Bleak

91AS1071C Lahore *THE NATION* in English
30 May 91 p 7

[Article by Ikramullah: "The 'Ransom' Factor and the Budget!"]

[Text] Of late the growing rate of abductions and alarming rise (in keeping with the rest) in the amount of ransom being claimed and offered (both in the private and public sectors), have given a sudden boost (even a boom) to this trade. Its mention on the eve of the budget is not without a purpose. No less a person than the Finance Minister of Pakistan confessed the other day while addressing the Press Institute of Pakistan that the abductions of the Japanese and Chinese in Sindh have dampened foreign investment and neutralised the past government's revolutionary measures of the past four months in this sector.

This situation, bleak as it is for the growth and promotion of the economic profile of the country, has been further compounded by the stunning allegations of Sultan Chandio, Chief of the Chandio tribe, a former Member of the Majlis-e-Shoora, a trusted friend of the government including late President Ziaul Haq, that senior members of the law-enforcing agencies were intimately involved in the ransom scandals as shareholders. One had heard of petty police officials at local levels protecting gambling dens of sorts, but not the SPs [Superintendents of Police] and DIGs [Deputy Inspector Generals] running rackets of this kind. Sultan Chandio's allegations amount to the government's patronage of gangsterism at the highest levels and call for a probe directly by the Federal authorities as the Prime Minister's own credibility to govern and establish an Islamic social order, seems to be at stake in Sindh. The integrity of Pakistan cannot be left in the hands of Jam Sahib, who should be persuaded to quit honourably, before it is too late. He himself should read the writing on the wall and follow the example set by the Governor, Mahmud Haroon.

All development work in the interior of Sindh has already come to a grinding halt. In a telephone conversation the other day, a senior Japanese consultant in Sindh summed up the situation thus: "We are very unsafe here, because we are very attractive." Jam Sahib has obviously failed to provide security to a province where more than 80 percent of Pakistan's industry is located. Reinforcing failure would amount to taking a risk that could spell disaster for the country's economy apart from other political upheavals, and could tear Sindh apart. God forbid, should that action and interaction get into motion, the entire Pakistan Army will find it difficult to control the situation. The prevailing anarchy in Sindh is no longer a provincial issue. The political and economic survival and the security of the whole of Pakistan today hinges precariously on the ability of the Federal Government to restore normal conditions in that province before it is too late. The alleged mission given to Jam Sahib to eliminate the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] in its home province has long since become totally irrelevant in the current context.

Thank God the Prime Minister seems to be conscious of the pivotal position that Sindh enjoys in the economic and industrial development of Pakistan. As a businessman he understands that just like fish cannot survive without water, no business, big or small, can survive without an environment of security. All the incentives given in the budget to turn Pakistan into a Korea or a Taiwan, would be neutralised without a proper climate. Just like mangoes refuse to grow and bear fruit in winter, in sandy soil or snow covered hill-tops, similarly economic growth declines to flourish on the terrain of instability interspersed with minefields of internal strife, population explosion, disease and ignorance, total lack of a technology base, threatened on all its borders by the neighbours and above all, overridden by foreign debts, which have already broken its back. Mian Nawaz Sharif does not have to be reminded about this basic rule of business. That is why he rushed to Karachi on his return from India and then rushed to GHQ on returning from Karachi. Next to the budget, Sindh is obviously and rightly, on the top of his agenda.

Apart from the rhetoric on the Shariat Bill and other hot issues like self-reliance, the Prime Minister has to grapple with the cold figures that stare him in the face with regard to the economic profile of Pakistan:

*Debt servicing has reached a staggering figure of Rs. [rupees] 70 billion.

*It will take 36 years to double the presently low rate of per capita income (Finance Minister).

*The national economy has been adversely affected due to numerous internal and external factors including the Gulf war, raising inflation to alarming 12 percent.

*The gap in the national budget is likely to touch the record figure of 72 billion rupees while deficit financing would register a hundred percent increase. According to

the Finance Minister, the current budget's deficit financing would be around Rs. 14 billion compared to last year's Rs. 7 billion.

*According to figures released by the Planning Ministry, the economic performance has lagged behind the growth targets in several sectors. Not only were the GDP [gross domestic product] growth, national savings and investment below expectations, but the performance over the past few years in social sectors was also poor.

*The lifting of strangulating economic controls and announcement of unprecedented incentives for industrialisation and privatisation to improve the investment climate have yet to show results. According to Shahzada Alam Monno, the fiscal law is that "money flows where it finds safety and security." That capital flight outside Pakistan is assuming serious proportions was brought out by a recent discussion on the subject in the Senate.

*The undeniable defence requirements and unavoidable debt servicing leave the national exchequer virtually empty. The ADP [Annual Development Program] is, therefore, going under the carpet. But there are election promises to keep if the Prime Minister is to honour his commitments of an Islamic Welfare State. The budget is, therefore, caught up in the web of too many conflicting signals.

*Addressing the Press Institute of Pakistan on 26th May, Dr. Munir Ahmed Khan not only painted a bleak picture about the resumption of U.S. aid, but also gave out the stark figure of 60 to 70 atomic bombs already in the Indian arsenal. Not a happy situation for any Prime Minister of Pakistan on the political, defence and economic front.

Mian Nawaz Sharif has to cater for the needs of 110 million people increasing at the rate of over 3 percent growth rate. This means the population will double itself in less than twenty years. According to the Finance Minister, the average income of a Pakistani will take 36 years to double. No matter even if we double our resources and our schools, hospitals, housing schemes and what have you, in twenty years with a magic wand, we will still be as poor and miserable as today, with the present scale of our population explosion. And yet the ulema are already charging Syeda Abida Hussain with planning to murder an unborn generation.

Syeda Abida Hussain's mission is as challenging as that of Syed Fakhr Imam, who is faced with an almost static figure of literacy ratio of 26 percent. The scientific base of education compared to India is unworthy of Islam which places so much stress on seeking knowledge. The civilian labour force comprising 33 million shows some sort of employment for only 30 million. There are thus 3 million unemployed, which includes the influx from the Gulf region. The Labour Ministry, therefore, faces no less a challenge than any other ministry.

The energy sector has been worst affected, with growing demands in the industrial, agriculture and domestic

sectors and limited capacity to meet these requirements. Loadshedding is, therefore, not only a major road block in growth and development, but also a demoralising factor from the psychological point of view. With a meagre installed capacity of approximately 3000 (MW) hydroelectric, 5000 (MW) thermal and 150 (MW) nuclear energy, political pressures have been overburdening the WAPDA [Water and Power Development Authority] by growing demands of electricity for more villages than the system can afford, particularly on the eve of elections. This trend must stop and attention devoted to development in the non-conventional areas.

Unfortunately, every time an advance is made in the nuclear sectors, heads are chopped off. Pakistan's nuclear programme was officially included in the 1976 Budget. Next year, in 1977, a "horrible example" was made of the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The programme was overtaken by the Afghan struggle and no one talked about it till 1985-86, when Mohammad Khan Junejo granted financial approval for Pakistani scientists to set up a nuclear reactor of our own. Junejo was soon thereafter shown the door and nothing was heard of the Pakistani reactor thereafter. Benazir is said to have picked up the threads. She met the same fate as the earlier two Prime Ministers. Now the ball is in Mian Nawaz Sharif's court. He is left with very few options. Even self-reliance needs a firm base. It cannot be acquired overnight. It needs funds and finances of a more solid nature than printing of notes. The problem becomes compounded when those in charge of the Government Security Press start the enterprise on a personal and private basis. When the police joins hands with the dacoits and official management of the Security Press start printing their own notes, the Federal Government is naturally pushed between the devil and the deep blue sea.

Under the circumstances the Federal Government ceases to be effective with the Mafia running a parallel economy and the dacoits running a parallel government—at least in Sindh. As if all this was not enough to put maximum strain on the Prime Minister on the eve of the budget, the following events have turned the situation from bad to worse.

*The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi has created a crisis in India, from the consequences of which Pakistan can ill-afford to escape.

*Minutes before the assassination, Rajiv's interview with a correspondent of the NEW YORK TIMES has raised new issues regarding some alleged settlement over Kashmir, the issue of Ziaul Haq's air crash and super-power intervention whenever India and Pakistan intend to get closer.

*The abduction of the Chinese engineers, the subsequent visits of the Speaker and Secretary-General PML [Pakistan Muslim League] to China and the arrival of a new

Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad. If the Chinese engineers are not recovered without any further delay, there might be a fallout on our economic relationship with a friend of very old standing.

*The Senate has chosen this moment to debate the Shariat Bill, while the Senate Chairman is proceeding to the U.S. as the Prime Minister's special envoy. It is a pity that no suitable replacement has yet been found for Sahibzada Yaqub Khan. The budget debate will hang in the shadows of Wasim Sajjad's U.S. visit.

*At this juncture the U.S. Ambassador has chosen to address the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and state what need not be repeated regarding U.S. policy towards aid to Pakistan.

*Some constitutional and religious experts have chosen the eve of the budget to comment upon the fiscal and taxation laws stating that the income tax, customs duty, wealth tax, motor vehicles tax, octroi duty, army licence fee, gift tax, import tax, excise duty, sales tax, water rates, fuel adjustment charges, airport tax, insurance, life insurance, stamp duty, court fee, passport fee, driving licence fee, toll tax, are all repugnant to the Quran and Sunnah.

*Commenting on the above controversy, a former Chief Justice of the Shariat Court has stated that these matters have to be challenged in a Shariah Bench and even if upheld, "the verdict is not final and anyone can take an appeal to the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court. Thereafter, it might take even about 40 years as in the case of Qisas and Diyat, as no time limit is provided in the Constitutions."

Such is the magnitude of the conflicting pressures, under which the Prime Minister has been placed, not to speak of the other strains amongst the trioka. It goes to the young Prime Minister's credit that he has chosen to tread carefully in the midst of a minefield and survived. In all his major decisions he has strived for consensus, whether it was the water distribution or accord on financial distribution between the provinces. He has shown willingness to forget the bitterness of the past as far as the Opposition is concerned. He has made a leap forward in economic cooperation between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey by signing a protocol to reduce the customs duty by 10 percent among these three countries. Similarly the new industrial, agricultural, health and education policies will improve the economic base of self-reliance and reduce the yawning gap between imports and exports.

It is never easy for any budget-maker in the Third World to bridge the perpetual gap between the resource mobilisation and expenditure. It is a never ending battle, which no government can win on its own, without the willing support of the people. The fruits of denationalisation and privatisation can only materialise if credibility is built in the continuation of these policies. But if the Opposition declares that the present fiscal policies will be reversed when they come into power, then love's labour is bound to be lost. It is, therefore, inescapable to

take the Opposition along in decision-making on national issues. It may look perfectly in order and quite innocent to make the Punjab Chief Minister sit around a table with donor countries' ambassadors and seek their aid for provincial annual development plans. Tomorrow other chief ministers could come into power in smaller provinces, who may seek such aid and get it over the head of the Federal Government. Let us not forget that at one stage, 5-1/2 of Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman's 6 points had been conceded. The final collapse came over half a point, involving foreign trade.

Causing Confusion

91AS1071D Karachi DAWN in English 8 Jun 91 p 11

[Article by Shahid Kardar: "Budget: Waiting for Next Round"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The Budget for the fiscal year 1991-92 has been announced, leaving a trail of confusion on the proposed measures and the sums of the budgetary exercise. This article will attempt to remove the pall of confusion, while concentrating mainly on the measures being undertaken to raise additional resources. During this discussion we will also try and identify those interest groups that have been favoured in the budget and those that stand to lose from the implementation of the proposed measures.

This year working out the key numbers, the size of the ADP [Annual Development Program], the overall budgetary deficit, etc. has become exceedingly difficult. The recent NCF [National Finance Commission] Award and the consequent increase in responsibilities of the provinces to finance their development programmes from their own resources, the removal of some public sector corporations from the ambit of the budget, etc. have, in the absence of detailed information, made this exercise mind boggling.

The Finance Minister's claim that he has reduced the overall deficit can only be verified by a more realistic comparison of last year's deficit and borrowings with the estimates for this year. For this exercise it would be necessary to include this year's borrowings of public sector units like OGDC [Oil and Gas Development Corporation] and T&T [expansion not given]. Some of the borrowings are now being shown in the accounts of these public sector corporations in the form of bearer and other interest bearing bonds being floated to attract investment. These are no longer reflected in the borrowings under the budget. As these funds are being borrowed at high rates of interest, it will reduce the profitability of public sector corporations and affect their ability to generate adequate surpluses, thereby only succeeding in postponing, for a future date, the problem of the crisis of resources.

Nevertheless there are some statistics worthy of note:

a) Expenditure on defence and debt servicing will absorb 99 percent of net revenues of the federal government

before this year's tax proposals, and 89 percent after taking into account this year's tax effort.

b) The overall budgetary deficit is around Rs. [rupees] 67 billion, approximately Rs. 12 billion higher than what has been agreed with IMF, which means that a second round to bridge the gap cannot be ruled out (see later below).

c) Debt servicing is the single largest item of expenditure. The combined impact of the external and domestic debt is awesome.

d) Whereas allocations for defence have roughly kept pace with inflation, debt servicing costs are projected to increase at more than twice the official inflation rate while that on the civil bureaucracy has been maintained below the rate of inflation. Much of the savings in the non-development expenditure (which has been increased by less than 9 percent) have come from a whittling down of the outlays on the social sectors—education, health and social services (however, see (f) below).

e) The Federal Government will still be unable to finance its non-development expenditure from its revenues. There will be a shortfall of over Rs. 15 billion.

f) The ADP allocations for education and health have been drastically reduced. The overall impact, however, can only be assessed after taking into consideration the allocations for these sectors in the provincial budgets. Only then will we be able to reconcile the allocations with the Government's claim that it is concerned about human resource development. Evidence to-date belies all such rhetoric. Development allocations for education, science and technology, health, social welfare and manpower development have taken a nose dive in real terms from Rs. 5.9 billion to Rs. 1.5 billion. However, a positive feature of the budget is the lowering of import duties on ambulances and hospital equipment.

g) Despite the tall claims of self-reliance, the dependence on external borrowings has in fact (compared with last year) increased in this budget.

Some proposals (also advocated by this writer in a recent column in DAWN like the excise duty on capacity basis, a fixed tax for shops, increase in the rates of taxes deducted at source are steps in the right direction. These measures will generate more revenues, expand the base of taxation, and also reduce the extent of contact between the tax payers and tax officials (and all the abuses that this contact entails). There is great potential for expanding the scope of such taxes. It is the implementation mechanism, however, for instance of the tax deduction at source, that does not make sense. The requirement that tax ought to be deducted before companies make payments for purchasing goods and services means that every time stationery of Rs. 100 is to be bought for the company, you would be expected to deduct tax of 2.5 percent before making any payment to the shopkeeper.

Moreover, some of the hopes pinned on improved collection measures are to a large extent illusory in nature. If only wishes were horses. Gimmickry and sleight of hand are being relied upon to balance the books. It is rather easy to under-estimate expenditures and over-estimate incomes.

As for the inflationary impact of some of the proposals on the domestic price level, the cost push effect will become clearer as we near the end of 1991.

Two proposals are likely to attract a lot of controversy, unless there is a drastic revision in their nature and the manner in which they are eventually implemented. These are:

The 0.5 percent tax on the turnover of companies that are either not paying income tax or are paying a meagre amount. Apart from the obvious problems of definition of what is meagre and what constitutes turnover it should be obvious that for a large number of companies, particularly those selling consumer goods, are in activities in which profit margins are low—partly on account of the nature of the products and partly because of competition (e.g. those manufacturing ghee, packing tea, distributing petroleum products, utility services like gas, etc.), the government would always be better off taxing turnover rather than incomes.

The amounts that would be generated by this measure alone would be far more than that collected by taxing incomes. Then of course there would be no need for taxing profits, no need for tax holidays, investment and depreciation allowances etc. Such a tax along with the withdrawal of the BMR [expansion not given] tax credit would discourage investment in new plant and equipment. It would perhaps also, prematurely, seal the fate of companies making genuine losses either during the first few years of their operation or for reasons beyond their control, for example, because of a slump in domestic or international demand for their products.

Moreover, such a charge would be of the nature of a sales tax. Would it not be simpler then to introduce a sales tax? What, however, it would do to the price level (as it would be passed on to the consumer) is another matter. Many entrepreneurs would, of course, be tempted to close down existing operations registered under their present names and 'restart' commercial activity in a new name with a 'reduced' turnover. The tax saved could then be shared between the potential tax payer and the officials of tax assessing authority.

Finally, the concept of the turnover tax also runs contrary to the government's professed desire to improve the documentation of the economy, as it does not appear to consider it useful to have properly maintained books of accounts.

The other proposal that is bound to get a hostile reaction is the 1 percent charge on loans in excess of Rs. 50,000. It is not clear whether it will be a one time charge at the time of loan disbursement, thereby pushing up project

costs, or a 1 percent charge on the amount of the loan outstanding, whereby financial charges, and thereby operational costs, will be pushed up significantly. If the latter, it could, through a cascading effect, have a large inflationary impact. In the case of WAPDA [Water and Power Development Authority], the gas distributing companies (SNGPL [expansion not given] and Southern Gas) etc. the heavy borrowers, the increased costs would have to be recovered through higher tariffs, with their inflationary consequences. That the feudals occupying seats in the legislature will be exempt from such charges on agricultural loans while middle income groups borrowing funds for house building will have to bear these costs will not escape the attention of many.

The budgetary proposals that will pinch the rich and the relatively affluent segments of society are the following:

The withdrawal of the investment allowance that qualified for a tax rebate and the taxation of investment incomes. How these proposals reconcile with the government's desire and the national requirement to improve the domestic saving rate has not been explained. The proposal to tax dividends at 35 percent and interest income at 10 percent runs contrary to the Government's expressed desire to promote the development of capital market, especially if it continues to exempt from taxation those who invest in Government sponsored saving schemes or does not apply pressure on provincial governments to tax capital gains arising from speculation in land in urban areas.

The scope of the sales tax has been extended to what are luxury consumer durables like refrigerators, airconditioners, televisions, sanitaryware, machine made carpets, etc.

Their impact, however, will be substantially neutralised by the measures that will in one form or another increase their disposable incomes.

a) The increase in the standard, tax free, allowance to Rs. 30,000.00 from Rs. 24,000.00.

b) The sharp reduction in the highest rate of income tax for individuals and registered firms from 45 percent to 35 percent.

c) Directors of private companies can now be paid in excess of Rs. 30,000.00, the tax allowable expenditure limit having been raised from Rs. 20,000.

d) Import duties have been reduced on imported consumer products like coffee, cigars, fruit juices, perfumes and cosmetics, footwear, bathroom fittings, butter, yogurt, confectionary etc.

The large farmers continue to be exempt from income tax, their fertilizer is still to be subsidised, for wealth tax purposes their lands are not to be valued on the basis used for granting agricultural loans (consequently, they will continue to be exempt from wealth tax), they will not be required to contribute 1 percent of their loan to the costs of running the Baitul-Mal.

The relief package announced for the poor is not exclusive to them; other income groups can also benefit. The Finance Minister has announced the Government's desire to bring down the price of atta to Rs. 3.25 per kg (other than the atta to be sold through the utility stores). The government, we have been told, is considering a scheme of achieving this objective. We will have to wait and see how this scheme is executed.

Again, although the import duty on palm oils is being reduced by Rs. 2000 per ton in the hope that the price of ghee will decline by Rs.2 per kilogram, the Finance Minister took care not to announce that he will ensure that the reduced costs of imports is passed on to the consumers. The total estimated cost of the programme specifically meant for the poor is a mere Rs. 400 million. Perhaps the argument is that a poor and bankrupt nation has no business to look after its poor.

Finally, to what extent has the Finance Minister succeeded in meeting the IMF's conditionalities. The overall budgetary deficit (using the IMF's definition) before this year's budgetary measures was Rs. 72 billion. Adding the Rs. 6 billion impact of the pay award that has not been included to date the budgetary deficit increases to Rs. 78 billion. The tax related proposals will provide Rs. 14 billion, out of which around Rs. 3.5 to Rs. 4 billion will go to the provinces under the new NFC [National Finance Commission] award, leaving the overall deficit at Rs. 68 billion, roughly Rs. 10 to Rs. 12 billion higher than permissible under the IMF programme. Come January 1, 1992, therefore, unless the international price of oil falls significantly, we should expect the government to start gearing up for a second round to balance the books. So, fasten your seat belts for the rough ride ahead.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that discontent can no longer be avoided. It is the class distribution of this discontent which will ultimately shape the nature of social and economic discontent in the motherland.

Optimism for Sindh Unfounded

91AS1071E Karachi DAWN in English 9 Jun 91 p 11

[Article: "Sindh's Finances"]

[Text] The optimism that marked the Sindh Finance Minister's budget speech on Thursday is difficult to share. The additional resources the province is to receive by virtue of the NFC [National Finance Commission] award guarantee a surplus budget after the lapse of a number of years. Yet they afford no assurance of stability, contentment and progress. Political commitment, sound economic management and honest implementation are essential if the budget provisions are to be translated into progress and development on the ground. Restoration of public order and of respect for the law is of course a pre-requisite for any betterment in any field. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the revenue receipts of the province will register a massive increase of nearly 54 percent (if one goes by the figures quoted by Mr. Jatoi

in his speech). From Rs. [rupees] 12,917 million in 1990-91 the current revenue receipts will rise to Rs. 19,927 million next year, largely on account of the increase in the federal transfers under the NFC award. The royalty on oil, development surcharge on gas, excise on sugar and tobacco and the annual grant, which are new heads, will together account for an additional Rs. 5,689 million.

But there are two worrying aspects of the matter which have not been tackled. First, the province's revenue-generating capacity remains as inelastic as ever. Nearly 83 percent of Sindh's current revenue receipts will come from Islamabad. As it is the bulk of the provincial tax receipts (84 percent) come from indirect taxes which burden the common man and fuel inflation. Hence the government's reluctance to tax higher agricultural incomes of the landowning lobby is difficult to justify. With this enormous wealth escaping the tax net, it is not surprising that the government has been unable to push up its tax revenues from the province by no more than five percent over this year. The second matter for concern is the province's debt burden which the NFC failed to address. As a result, Sindh will be paying Rs. 4,015 million next year towards interest on its debts. This will amount to 21 percent of its revenue expenditure—not a very happy state of affairs if it is borne in mind that this burden has been rising steadily over the years.

Another disquieting factor is that the massive augmentation of receipts from Islamabad notwithstanding, Sindh's surplus is not as impressive as the Chief Minister had promised it would be when the NFC award was announced. According to what Jam Sadiq Ali had stated on April 27, the province was to show a surplus of Rs. 1925 million in 1991-92 and the amount was to be used to finance the development programme. Instead, we are now told that the surplus will amount to Rs. 828 million. This just goes to show how unrealistically overconfident our leadership sometimes tends to be.

The revenue expenditure *prima facie* shows some positive features. The expenditure on General Administration will be somewhat reduced, though one is not so certain whether the nominal increase of Rs. 64 million on the law and order head will be sufficient to bring the crime situation under control in the province. The substantial increase in the education and health sectors—43 and 23 percent over this year—is to be welcomed though one cannot help voicing some scepticism. If the increase is to go mainly towards creating the 25,000 (arbitrarily increased to 50,000) jobs promised by the government without provision being made for supportive facilities, not much progress will be made. One intriguing aspect of the budget is that no provision seems to have been for the utilisation through an extended canal network of the 4.5 MAF [million acre feet] water the province has been promised under the Indus Waters Accord, which according to the Sindh Finance Minister will be used to irrigate an additional 1.5 million acres for cultivation. The revenue budget for 1991-92 shows a

nominal increase of nine percent under the irrigation head. As for the development programme, the irrigation sector is to actually receive Rs. 130 million less than what it received in the revised budget for 1990-91.

The development budget shows an increase of 22 percent over this year's development spending. Apart from the Rs. 4.4 billion ADP [Annual Development Program], there is provision for the Rs. 800 million SDP [special development programs] and the Rs. 2.5 billion Tameer-i-Sindh programme. Mercifully, education and health are to receive a boost of 19 and nine percent next year. But this might not really lead to a proportionate expansion of facilities for the common man because a huge chunk of Rs. 100 million will be diverted right away in each sector to the Foundations to be set up to fund private entrepreneurs. The decline on some of the heads such as agriculture, forests and wildlife, planning and housing, transport and communications and law and order have not been explained, hence it is difficult to comment on them. Neither have the details of the two development programmes outside the ADP been disclosed. The arrival of financial viability is an occasion for celebration. What remains to be seen is whether the great event means any relief from current anxieties and a genuine hope for betterment for the distraught people of this once dynamic province.

Sindh Budget Detailed

91AS1071F Karachi DAWN in English
7 Jun 91 pp 1, 11

[Article: "Sindh Budget 1991-92; Rs. 26.04 Billion Outlay With No New Taxes"]

[Text] Karachi, June 6: The Sindh Finance, Excise and Taxation Minister, Mr. Liaquat Ali Jatoi, presented on Thursday afternoon a total provincial budget of Rs. [rupees] 26.04 billion for the next fiscal year which has, for the first time in the last eight years, indicated a surplus of Rs. 828.2 million on the revenue side.

Mainly because of the additional inflow of Rs. 6.7 billion from Islamabad resulting from the recently announced award of the National Finance Commission [NFC], the Revenue Receipts of Sindh amounting to Rs. 19.93 billion has exceeded the Revenue Expenditure indicated at Rs. 19.10 billion for 1991-92 in Mr. Jatoi's budget.

In addition to the revenue expenditure, the provincial budget includes the Annual Development Programme [ADP] of Rs. 4.44 billion and the Tameer-i-Sindh development programme of Rs. 2.5 billion which is based on the commitment made by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to provide Rs. 10 billion to Sindh in the next five years.

Making the budget presentation on the floor of the Sindh Assembly in English, just after the opposition PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] members interrupted him and eventually walked out of the House, the Sindh Minister jokingly remarked that perhaps a surplus budget was not acceptable to them.

The Minister informed the House that the Federal Government was providing a sum of Rs. 3.41 billion for the Sindh ADP with a total outlay of Rs. 4.44 billion. The balance amount of Rs. 1.04 billion would be provided by the Sindh government which includes Rs. 828.2 million from the revenue budget surplus and remaining Rs. 209.4 million would be generated by way of adopting economy measures.

Since the budget is balanced, he said no tax was being levied during 1991-92 because "we do not wish to overburden the poor masses of the province with any additional taxes."

On the Special Development Programme [SDP] which was being funded by the Federal Government for the last six years he said that in accordance with the decision of the National Economic Council [NEC], the provincial government would allocate funds for the various SDP schemes.

A sum of Rs. 800 million is being provided in the 1991-92 budget for the SDP schemes including SAZDA [Sindh Arid Zone Development Authority] and the Multi-Dimensional Security Programme which essentially strengthens the infrastructure facilities of the law enforcement agencies.

Mr. Jatoi did not elaborate on the Rs. 2.5 billion Tameer-i-Sindh Programme hinting that the amount would be spent on the development of backward areas and arid zone of the province. He said a Planning Board under the chairmanship of Sindh Chief Minister has been set up.

Speaking on the financial position of the current fiscal year he recalled that it started with a colossal deficit of Rs. 3.44 billion. During the course of the year, the current receipts of the province increased by about Rs. 1.60 billion mainly because of additional allocation of Rs. 1.14 billion from the Federal Government and generation of Rs. 460.9 million from the provincial sources.

Simultaneously, the current expenditure also increased from the original estimate of Rs. 15.97 billion to Rs. 16.83 billion in the final counts mainly because of the impact of increase in ad hoc pay and pensions. Supplementary budget was tabled in the House.

The Minister said that Federal Government has been requested to meet the unbridged gap of Rs. 2.69 billion in the 1990-91 budget so that "we can start the new financial year without the burden of overdraft."

Major Objectives: In his speech Mr. Jatoi also outlined some of the major objectives of the 1991-92 budget strategy and informed the House that originally it was intended to provide 23,474 job opportunities which included 11,743 jobs in education, 2,048 jobs in health, 8,500 posts in Police. However, a meeting of the cabinet held on Thursday morning has decided to provide at least 50,000 new jobs during 1991-92 but he did not

specify whether the budget has provided resources for the additional jobs in Sindh Government.

He said that in addition to these jobs, thousands of more employment opportunities will be created both in the private and public sector because of the implementation of ADP and the Tameer-i-Sindh Programme.

The Minister announced the setting up an Education and Health Foundation with an initial capital of Rs. 100 million. These funds, he said, would be available on matching basis to the private bodies and non-governmental organisations setting up health and education facilities in the areas where these facilities are lacking.

He said Rs. 25 million have been provided for the Self-Employment Generation Schemes which would provide substantial opportunities to the skilled unemployed for earning their livelihood.

A major announcement in Mr. Jatoi's speech was about the denationalisation of two sugar mills under the Sindh Sugar Mills Corporation in accordance with the Prime Minister's policy of privatisation.

In his 40-page speech which was delivered in about 90 minutes, the Minister at the outset spoke on the law and order situation in the province maintaining that since the time the coalition government has taken over in Sindh "ethnic killings have been halted except for a few stray cases."

He, however, admitted that the Government's anti-dacoity and anti-kidnapping operations have "regretfully met with limited success."

Punjab Budget Detailed

9IAS1071G Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jun 91 pp 1, 9

[Article by Shaukat Ali: "A 10-Year Record; Rs. 2.5 Billion Surplus Punjab Budget"; quotation marks as published] txt

[Text] Lahore, June 4: For the first time in 10 years, Punjab will have a surplus budget for the fiscal year 1991-92 to the tune of Rs. [rupees] 2,500 million in a total outlay of Rs. 81,708.84 million.

This includes an all-time record Annual Development Programme [ADP] (Tameer-i-Watan) of Rs. 10,500 million, non-development expenditure of Rs. 36,506.50 million and public account disbursements of Rs. 33,513.40 million.

Revenue receipts stand at Rs. 38,566.70 million of which Rs. 28,137.90 million have come from the federal divisible taxes, which, for the ensuing year, are Rs. 9,515.10 million more than the current year.

Total receipts of the non-development account for the next financial year are Rs. 73,708.40 million as against the total expenditure of Rs. 71,208.40 million, resulting

in a net gain of Rs. 2,500 million, which the province plans to utilise for its development.

The Punjab Finance Minister, Makhdoomzada Shah Mehmood Hussain Qureshi, in his budget speech, televised live from the Punjab Assembly claimed that the easing of the province's resource constraints was made possible only because of the amicable settlement of the National Finance Commission [NFC] formula for the sharing of divisible taxes among the provinces.

"The flow of additional resources of about Rs. 11,418.20 million during 1991-92 to Punjab from Islamabad has in fact helped us to overcome our feel of deprivation for the past several years," he explained to an applauding House. Leader of the House, Mr. Ghulam Haider Wynn was also present.

Acknowledging that increase in the non-development expenditures by about Rs. 5,130 million seemed extraordinary, the minister argued that the enhancement was inevitable in view of the 'unjust attitude of the Federal Government in the past' which forced the province to shrink its non-development spendings to almost an impossible level.

"But we do not intend to spend the surplus income lavishly. Instead, we would continue our austerity drive to shed extra load on the public exchequer," he said and added that a special committee constituted this year for the very purpose of marking areas for government savings had prepared a number of recommendations to wind up all those government departments which had either lost their utility, or whose functions were being performed by some other government agency. The government servants thus rendered surplus would be placed in a surplus pool and given salaries as long as the government arranged alternative jobs for them.

The minister proposed to rationalise the lists of all types of property evaluation, which, he hoped, would fetch the Government an additional amount of Rs. 500 million. He also suggested levying stamp duty on hitherto exempted sale of property by the cooperative societies. The Government expects to earn an amount of Rs. 250 million through this measure.

He said the Government had set aside Rs. 500 million to build memorials of leading figures of the Pakistan Movement in Lahore. The Government has also decided to set up a writers' trust with Rs. 10 million for the welfare of journalists and other intellectuals of the print media, besides allocating Rs. 2.5 million for the construction of Lahore Press Club, the minister added. Another major plan of the Government in the coming year is to establish a trust with Rs. 500 million to invest in profit-making schemes to generate further funds to assist the outstanding students who could not afford their educational expenses, Makhdoom Shah Mehmood said.

According to the budget documents, the Federal Government will provide Punjab Rs. 1,260.9 million in addition to latter's share from the federal divisible pool

of taxes. This sum is on account of excise duty, royalty and development surcharge on natural gas, electricity profit and royalty on crude oil.

Other notable income is from the provincial taxes which is to the tune of Rs. 4,972.30 million, besides an earning of Rs. 1,578.30 million from economic services. Of the provincial taxes, Rs. 887.4 million are expected from the direct taxes, while Rs. 4,084.9 million will come from indirect taxes of which stamp duty is likely to contribute Rs. 2,603.7 million as the highest tax receipt of the Provincial Government.

The break-up of non-development revenue receipts of Rs. 38,566.7 million shows that the province would get Rs. 33,110.2 million as taxes, Rs. 3,022.4 million non-taxes and Rs. 2,434.1 million from transfer of grants mainly from the Federal Government.

Interestingly, the share of taxes from the federal divisible pool is 85 percent (Rs. 28,137.9 million) against 15 percent of the provincial taxes constituting Rs. 4,972.3 million for 1991-92. During the ongoing year, this ratio is 80 to 20.

The Punjab's contribution in the federal divisible taxes during the 1991-92 is likely to be a total of Rs. 28,137.9 million comprising Rs. 10,190.5 million (income tax), Rs. 10,601.3 million (sales tax), Rs. 1,407.6 million (customs), Rs. 4,222.9 million (excise duty on tobacco and tobacco manufacture) and Rs. 1,715.6 million as excise duty on sugar.

The largest chunk of non-development expenditures next year would go to the social sector services with a total of Rs. 13,827.7 million. Of this education would get Rs. 10,766.4 million, while the health department would receive Rs. 2,487.3 million. Housing and physical planning, however, received meagre allocation of Rs. 55.1 million which is even less than the revised estimates of Rs. 61.4 million for this department for the current year.

In the area of economic services, the government has put aside Rs. 2,432 million for irrigation while Rs. 1,758 million have been earmarked for agriculture and food.

On the community services like works, and public health services the government plans to spend Rs. 1,46.58 million.

Police and civil armed forces would get Rs. 2,719 million for keeping law and order in the province. This allocation is, however, less by Rs. 73.6 million from the revised estimates of the current year.

A sum of Rs. 3,453.7 million has been allocated for general administration, while the province would spend Rs. 9,039.1 million on debt-servicing and investable funds and grants during 1991-92.

The consumption expenditures during the ensuing year would eat up Rs. 26,637.3 million, while the rest of the non-development expenditure—Rs. 9,869.2 million—would be incurred on transfer payments.

The Punjab Finance Minister announced that about 62 percent of the total ADP, Rs. 10,500 million would be utilised on about 4,000 ongoing development schemes in the province, while the remaining amount would be considered for initiating about 500 new development schemes. The Minister was optimistic that by the end of the next financial year 2,300 projects would be completed.

Making a special reference to the self-employment and rural industrialisation schemes, the minister noted that the Punjab government wanted to inflate the total funds for these programmes to Rs. 5,000 million to develop a network of cottage industry. At present, there were 13 industrial estates in the province, the minister said and added that the government planned to set up an industrial estate in every district.

In the agricultural sector, the minister proposed insurance schemes for the crops, cattle and trees. He said cold storages would be built at every airport to multiply the trade of agricultural yields.

The government is also considering to appoint a specialist doctor at tehsil hospitals as part of its endeavour to strengthen basic health facilities. The minister said that the Government attached high priority to health facilities for the masses, which, he noted, was visible from the allocation of Rs. 1,380 million for the development of health services.

About 10.3 percent of the ADP has been set aside for education with a total outlay of Rs. 795.6 million. The hallmark of development schemes is the preparation of special course for technical education, including training in the agricultural sector.

Winding up his speech, the minister asserted that the real goal of the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] Government was to achieve the target of self-reliance. He expressed optimism that in the coming years the province would prosper by securing its rightful share from Islamabad and in the atmosphere of mutual understanding which the Federal Government had created amongst the federating units, he concluded.

Punjab Budget To Benefit Rich

91AS1071H Karachi DAWN in English 7 Jun 91 p 11

[Article: "Punjab Budget"]

[Text] The NFC [National Finance Commission] award notwithstanding, one cannot be certain how many extra benefits the Punjab budget for 1991-92 will bring to the common man. Thanks to the agreement on the new distribution of the Federal Divisible Pool, the province will receive over Rs. [rupees] 28 billion (Rs. 10 billion more than this year) from Islamabad as its due share of the revenues collected by the federal government. Additionally it will also be provided an amount of Rs. 1.2 billion as federal transfers and a development loan of Rs. 7.3 billion. But more of this additional income will be

swallowed up by the hefty increase of Rs. 5.8 billion in the revenue expenditure of the Punjab, which will constitute an increase of 18 percent over the revised budget for the current year. Social services, which include the all-important health and education sectors, will receive a fair chunk of the revenue budget as usual. But the increase of 19 percent over this year under this head pales into insignificance before the rise of 45 percent in the expenditure on General Administration. In this sector, the head Fiscal Administration accounts for more than three-quarters of the allocation of Rs. 4.1 billion for General Administration in 1991-92.

If this amount is to be spent on the provincial tax-collecting machinery, as one would logically understand it to be, its cost-effectiveness seems to be seriously in question. As it is the province's taxation base continues to be highly inelastic. Out of the Rs. 38.5 billion the Punjab government is to get as tax receipts, only Rs. 4.9 billion will be raised in the form of taxes by the provincial authorities and Rs. 2.9 billion will accrue from the administration's earnings on the services it provides—the rest coming from the federal government. The provincial taxes will register a meagre six percent rise over this year's revenues. What is worse, 82 percent of these taxes are indirect ones which primarily hit the common man. In this situation the continued reluctance of the government to tax high agricultural incomes is unpardonable. Given the powerful hold of the landowning lobby on the provincial politics, it would be unrealistic to expect the government to adopt a measure which would make the landlords part with a portion of their ample incomes. But wishful thinking though it might have been, one had only hoped that the pressure of public opinion on an elected government would induce it to bring under the tax net an affluent community which contributes nothing to the public treasury.

A significant feature of the Punjab budget is the development programme, christened the Tameer-e Watan Programme since last year. The funding for the TWP for next year shows a rise of 21 percent over 1990-91, mainly on account of the Rs. 1,777 million surplus generated in the revenue budget. Punjab will also receive an additional amount of Rs. 72 million in foreign loans. But what is disappointing is that many of the crucial sectors do not reflect a corresponding increase. Take the case of education. Its development allocation will go up from Rs. 1,151 million in 1990-91 to Rs. 1,230 million next year, an increase of six percent. Similarly, the health sector's development budget will rise from Rs. 1,350 million this year to Rs. 1,380 million in 1991-92, a rise of two percent.

The Education Foundation and the Health Foundation claim Rs. 450 million and Rs. 250 million respectively. Small wonder then that all the subheads notably primary education, secondary education, teachers' training, college education, rural health programme and teaching hospitals show a significant decline. Since the two foundations are designed to fund the private sector to set up schools and hospitals, they will not be reaching the

poorest segment of society which normally benefits when the government spends from the treasury to set up health and educational institutions. This policy of inducting the private sector in the area of human resources development has another pitfall which the government must guard against. While it would make officialdom complacent in respect of its responsibilities in the social sector, the foundations could provide an opening for favouritism and political patronage. The success of the TWP would depend a great deal on how the funds are actually used. Leaks, inefficiency and corruption are known to reduce the impact of financial planning.

There are some features of the Punjab budget which point to a positive strategy. This is particularly so in two key areas. The government plans to introduce technical and professional training in 300 high schools. If implemented efficiently, this plan could give a boost to technical education without calling for massive capital investment in technical institutions. The second area to benefit will be agriculture and irrigation. To utilise the water procured under the water accord the government has announced its programme to construct 1,800 miles of canals at a cost of Rs. seven billion. This will bring 25,00,000 acres of new land under cultivation. A programme of lining branch canals at a cost of Rs. 22 billion in five years should help conserve the water lost through seepage and prevent waterlogging.

Federal Deficit To Increase

91AS10711 Lahore THE NATION in English
5 Jun 91 p 6

[Article: "Punjab Budget"]

[Text] Despite the fact that the so-called historic National Finance Commission [NFC] Award released 19 billion rupees more to the Punjab Government nonetheless more resources are to be generated to meet the provincial expenditure targets for fiscal year 1991-92. The extra resources are to be realised through an adjustment in stamp duty on the valuation of property, estimated to increase government revenue by 500 million rupees. Exactly how the adjustment would affect the payees is not clear. Another 250 million rupees (at least) is to be generated by the reimposition of stamp duty for sale of property by Cooperatives. And control of corruption is targeted to generate 57.8 million rupees for the provincial coffers in fiscal year 1991-92. Thus the total budget is estimated to be around 39 billion rupees in terms of total revenue. Non-development expenditure is estimated at 36.50 billion rupees which gives a surplus of 2.50 billion rupees. Whether one can call this a surplus is open to speculation since this money is to be pumped into the Tameer-e Watan Programme [TWP] which is to have 10.50 billion rupees earmarked for it. The 8 billion still required for balancing the budget will have a shortfall of 510 million rupees since the federal government will make available 7.49 billion rupees for the Tameer-e Watan Programme. But this shortfall would lead to a surplus of 1.24 billion rupees when the special federal

grant of one billion rupees and 750 million matching grant from the federal government is added. According to the Provincial Finance Minister, Mr. Makhdoomzada Shah Mahmood Hussain Qureshi, the expected deficit for fiscal year 1991-92 was estimated to be around 30 billion prior to the historic NFC Accord. That it changed things dramatically for the province is evident from the much higher resources from the Centre.

The Tameer-e Watan Programme is designed on the same pattern as the federal programme under the same head with stress on education, health, Baitul Mal, Jahez fund, and instead of subsidising food the provincial government intends to continue with the seven-marla scheme. Farm-to-market roads, more industrial estates and more canals are also a crucial part of the development expenditure of the provincial government. Thus whereas the federal welfare schemes are based on subsidisation the Punjab welfare scheme is to be based on distributing government land and on the extra money generated through the NFC. Subsidisation can be withdrawn in the face of resource constraints but government land cannot be taken back—land which is the property of the public and not to be used for gaining political support. And the higher award from the NFC has led to an unprecedented rise in the federal deficit from whose effects the public of Punjab is not going to be immune. One wonders if the continuing preponderance of current expenditure over development expenditure in the Punjab budget and higher inflation as a consequence of the federal budget is the price that the people of Pakistan will pay for the NFC Accord, the subsidisation policy and indeed the distribution of free provincial land.

Cuts in Science, Education

91AS1071J Karachi DAWN in English 7 Jun 91 p 12

[Article by Chaghtai Mirza Eijazuddin, Karachi: "Deplorable Cut"]

[Text] The reduction in the allocation for science and technology in the Budget for 1991-92 is deplorable. Last year's allocation for research and development was over Rs. [rupees] 401 million. This has been reduced to Rs. 219 million.

The lack of emphasis on science education and research is simply appalling for a country which has to induct foreign technology at a very high cost. At present Pakistan is spending less than 0.2 percent of its GNP on science whereas the internationally accepted minimum standard is one percent. It is, therefore, not surprising that the output of scientists and technologists in the country is dismally low. This state of affairs can only be remedied if the authorities give higher priority and a bigger budget allocation for science and technology.

The low priority science has been accorded in this country is evident from the fact that no successive government has been able to formulate a national science policy.

Thus our technological backwardness could only be attributed to the absence of an enlightened science policy and inadequate funds for R&D.

Our successive governments never realized the importance of scientific research and its contribution to the building of economic future of the country. Our industrialists too, have contributed nothing to this field. In Western countries, private industrial establishments take care of most of the scientific and industrial research. It is the cut-throat competition which compels them to do so. But our industrialists prefer to buy obsolete technology from abroad to earn quick money.

For a developing country applied research is a better investment for quick results. Science has revolutionised agriculture and industry. This advance of scientific knowledge offers hope of a richer and better life to the people.

Unfortunately, due to lack of facilities, our scientists are mostly engaged in pure research. It may be pointed out that no country can develop without giving top attention to the growth of technology and applied sciences. Our scientists should, therefore, take up the work which has direct bearing on the development of our industrial potential, utilisation of natural resources and agricultural productivity.

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