Arms Control
Arms Control

CHINA

Warsaw Pact Organization Viewed [ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO 11 Jun] ........................................... 1
Diplomat on Nuclear Proliferation Responsibility [XINHUA 21 Jun] ................................................... 1
‘Analysis’ Views NATO, Japan Defense Ties [XINHUA 22 Jun] ......................................................... 2

EAST ASIA

NORTH KOREA

International Conference for Disarmament Held ................................................................. 4
Delegates Arrive for Meeting [KCNA 18 Jun] ................................................................. 4
Conference Opens in Pyongyang [KCNA 19 Jun] ....................................................... 4
Kim Yong-sun Gives Address [KCNA 19 Jun] ............................................................... 4
Kim Kuk-hun Speaks [KCNA 19 Jun] .................................................................................... 5
Kim Yong-sun Speaks [KCNA 19 Jun] .................................................................................... 5
Further on International Disarmament Conference ...................................................... 6
Participants Adopt Agenda [KCNA 19 Jun] ........................................................................... 6
AAPSO President Gives Address [KCNA 19 Jun] ......................................................... 8
Further on Pyongyang International Conference ....................................................... 9
USSR Supports Unity Policy [KCNA 20 Jun] ............................................................... 10
Kim Il-song Meets Delegation [KCNA 20 Jun] ............................................................. 11
Sends Letter to Kim Il-song [KCNA 20 Jun] ........................................................................ 11
Letter to Kim Chong-il Adopted [KCNA 20 Jun] ............................................................ 11
AAPSO Issues Communiqué [KCNA 20 Jun] .............................................................. 12
Closing Speeches Made [KCNA 21 Jun] ............................................................................. 13
Conference Concludes 20 Jun [KCNA 20 Jun] ............................................................. 13
‘Full Text’ of Korea Resolution [KCNA 20 Jun] ............................................................ 14
Kim Yong-sun Attends Party [KCNA 21 Jun] ................................................................. 15

SOUTH KOREA

North Korea’s Atom Bomb Development Examined [WOLGAN CHOSON No 4 1 Apr] ................. 15
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development Discussed [CHUNGANG ILBO 18 Jun] ......... 19
Reports on North’s Nuclear Ability ‘Speculation’ [YONHAP 19 Jun] .......................... 21
Daily Speculates on North’s Nuclear Capability [SEoul SINMün 19 Jun] ...................... 21
Daily Says North Stockpiling Biochemical Weapons [YONHAP 23 Jun] ..................... 22
Daily Calls for Withdrawal of Nuclear Weapons [HANGYORE SINMün 26 Jun] .......... 22

THAILAND

Air Force Plans F-16 Upgrade [MATICHON 8 Apr] ............................................................. 23
Air Force Plans Armored Platform Anti-Aircraft Missile [LAK THAI 23-29 Apr] ............... 24
Weapons Acquisition Plans Reported [LAK THAI 14-20 May] ................................ 24
Navy To Buy PRC Exocet Missiles [LAK THAI 21-27 May] ........................................ 25
EAST EUROPE

BULGARIA

Warbas Pact's Current Status, Future Role Viewed [E. Gospodinov; POGLED No 25, 18 Jun] ......................................................... 26

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reduction in Size of Army Planned [VERSEJNOST 18 Jun] ......................................................... 27
Official on Production of Armaments [CTK 20 Jun] ......................................................... 27

HUNGARY

Assembly Meets; Pact Withdrawal Resolution ................................................................. 27
Hegedues Addresses Assembly [I. Hegedues; Budapest Radio 26 Jun] ......................................................... 27
Katona on Warsaw Pact Resolution [T. Katona; Budapest Radio 26 Jun] ......................................................... 28
Resolution Outlined [Budapest Radio 26 Jun] ......................................................... 30
Horn on Pact Withdrawal, Soviet Troops [G. Horn; Budapest Radio 26 Jun] ......................................................... 30
Tamas on Soviet Withdrawal [G. Tamas; Budapest Radio 26 Jun] ......................................................... 31
Antall on 1956 Decision [J. Antall; Budapest Radio 26 Jun] ......................................................... 32

POLAND

Past, Present 'Morality' of Polish Arms Sales Viewed
[J. Tycner, PRAWA I ZYCIE No 17, 28 Apr] ......................................................... 32
Soviet Commander Confirms Naval Base Existence [GAZETA WYBORCZA 13-14 Jun] ......................................................... 34
Ministry Official on Importance of Arms Trade [Warsaw Radio 18 Jun] ......................................................... 34
Soviet Troop Withdrawals From Torun Continue [PAP 22 Jun] ......................................................... 35

SOVIET UNION

Seoul Positive on DPRK Arms Reduction Proposal [Moscow International 12 Jun] ......................................................... 36
Nuclear Threat to Asia-Pacific Region Examined [Barsov; Moscow International 14 Jun] ......................................................... 36
Aleskeyev on China's Nuclear Disarmament Stance [Moscow International 15 Jun] ......................................................... 37
New Aircraft Carriers, Carrier Operations Viewed [Moscow TV 16 Jun] ......................................................... 37
Pentagon 'More Intent' on New Weapons [V. Bogachev; TASS 18 Jun] ......................................................... 43
U.S. Military Reductions 'Lagging Behind' USSR [V. Bogachev; TASS 19 Jun] ......................................................... 44
Chemical Weapons Talks To Be Held in U.S. [Moscow TV 19 Jun] ......................................................... 45
Air Defense Staff Chief Views Open Skies Issue [N.M. Malisev; KRAVAYA ZVEZDA 19 Jun] ......................................................... 45
'Come the Nuclear Test Ban' Said Possible [TASS 20 Jun] ......................................................... 46
DPRK Nuclear Secrecy Seen Arousing 'Suspicion' in Seoul [M. Petrow; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 20 Jun] ......................................................... 47
U.S. Commander Urges Stronger Nuclear Deterrent [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 20 Jun] ......................................................... 47
USSR Suggests Nuclear-Free Baltic Sea [IZVESTIYA 21 Jun] ......................................................... 48
Cheney's Armed Forces Cuts Plan Viewed [PRAVDA 21 Jun] ......................................................... 48
Defense Ministry on Chemical Arms Destruction [Moscow International 22 Jun] ......................................................... 49
U.S. Chemical Weapons Experts, Counterparts Meet [A. Sidorin; TASS 22 Jun] ......................................................... 50
Foreign Policy Aides View Future of NATO [B. Stenquist; Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER 22 Jun] ......................................................... 50
Col Gen Buralakov on Troop Withdrawal From Hungary [TASS 23 Jun] ......................................................... 51
U.S. Military Cuts, Simultaneous Increases Noted [V. Bogachev; Moscow Radio 23 Jun] ......................................................... 52
Soviet Delegate on Copenhagen CSCE Conference [Yu.A. Reshetov; PRAVDA 23 Jun] ......................................................... 52
Military Outlook on Unification, Role of NATO [V. Nikanorov; PRAVDA 24 Jun] ......................................................... 53
Shevardnadze Defends Arms, Alliance Policies [F.A. Shevardnadze; PRAVDA 24 Jun] ......................................................... 54
Yazov Interviewed on Concerns About NATO [M. Yazov; RABOCHIAYA TRIBUNA 26 Jun] ......................................................... 58
Cheney Argues for U.S. Military Presence Abroad [S. Lunev; TASS 26 Jun] ......................................................... 60
U.S. Begins Removing Chemical Arms From FRG [V. Serov; TASS 26 Jun] ......................................................... 60
WEST EUROPE

AUSTRIA

Defense Minister's Spending Plans Viewed ......................................................... 61
French Missiles Sought [PROFIL No 17, 23 Apr] .................................................. 61
New Planes for Air Force [A. Wurm; PROFIL No 18, 30 Apr] ................................. 62

CANADA

TORONTO STAR Opposes TASM Development, Testing [THE SATURDAY STAR 12 May] .... 63
Canada To Cut Troops in Europe If Arms Pact Signed [THE WINDSOR STAR 17 May] .......... 64

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Stoltenberg Plans To Stop Low-Altitude Flights [DIE WELT 22 Jun] .......................... 64
Eppelmann Against Army 'United Supreme Command' [DPA 24 Jun] ......................... 64
First U.S. CW Shells Loaded for Disposal [DPA 26 Jun] ........................................... 65

FRANCE

'Silent' Submarine Production Discussed [LIBERATION 9 May] .............................. 65
Thomson Radar Cooperation With Marconi [LES ECHOS 18 May] .......................... 66
Leclerc Tank Battalion Operational in 1995 [LIBERATION 23 May] .......................... 67

GREECE

Plans for Nuclear Weapons Emplacement [D. Nikolakopoulos; TO VIMA TIS KIRIAKIS 13 May] ................................................................. 68

SWEDEN

No Comment on USSR's Nuclear-Free Proposal [DAGENS NYHETER 17 Jun] .............. 69
Warsaw Pact Organization Viewed
HK2106140690 Beijing ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO in Chinese 11 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by Song Cheng (1345 6134): “Warsaw Pact Summit Explores the Future”]

[Text] On 7 June, the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee held its regular meeting in Moscow. The heads of governments and states, foreign ministers, and defense ministers from the seven member states—the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Greece, Democratic Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania—attended the one-day meeting.

The meeting listened to Gorbachev’s report on the recent Soviet-U.S. Washington summit and discussed the question of Germany after reunification. It particularly discussed the future of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

A joint declaration issued after the meeting pointed out that the political transformation in Europe may put an end to the situation of separatism in Europe. Therefore, “it is necessary to reconsider the regulations and nature of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.”

The Warsaw Treaty Organization was established in 1955. It was an outcome of East-West confrontation and the “cold war” after World War II. In October 1948, a military bloc headed by the United States, NATO, was established. After that, from 11 to 14 May 1955, the Soviet Union, Democratic Germany, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania signed a “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” in Warsaw, the capital of Poland. The treaty was then called the “Warsaw Treaty.”

The treaty stipulated that “if any signatory state or states to this treaty are attacked by any other country or group of countries, all the other signatory states to this treaty should...individually or by reaching agreement with other signatory states, take all necessary means (including the use of armed forces) to aid the attacked.”

During the past 35 years since the signing of this treaty, there has been a long-term confrontation between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, during which there were several high tides of “cold war.” This has been a symbol of the East-West confrontation. In recent years, violent changes have taken place in the world situation, especially in the political and social situation of Europe. This has, to a great extent, affected the foundation and stability of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Although the Soviet Union and the United States are still rivals, due to their respective needs, the forms of confrontation have been changed and the degree of their confrontation has been lowered. At the same time, the trend toward dialogue and trust has been strengthened. This has brought about a relative relaxation in East-West relations.

Since the second half of last year, the pace of reunification has accelerated in Germany. This has also shaken the foundations of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Democratic Germany was originally an important member of this organization and an important base for the Soviet Union in deploying its troops and carrying out its strategic and tactical schemes. But now the reunification of Germany will soon be realized. The United States and other Western countries insist that after reunification, Germany should become a member of NATO but the Soviet Union has shown opposition to this. This issue has thus become the key to the reunification of Germany and the new political and military relations between East and West.

Judging from the current situation, it seems that Germany cannot become a member state of the Warsaw Treaty Organization after reunification. Moreover, great political changes have also taken place in some other East European countries. This can be seen from the personnel structure of the delegations attending the Moscow meeting.

An article carried by Soviet PRAVDA on 6 June pointed out: In the past, the delegations attending the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee meeting were all led by the general secretary or first secretary of the various communist parties and worker’s parties. But this time, because some communist parties and worker’s parties have lost power and become opposition parties in some East European countries, the meeting was attended by the supreme leaders of the Warsaw Treaty Organization states. As a result of the political changes, these countries have demanded that the Soviet Union withdraw its troops and military equipment from their territories. Some have even demanded withdrawing from the organization and joining the EC. All these changes make it very difficult for the Warsaw Treaty Organization to continue its original purpose and nature. The communiqué from the meeting says that a committee has been established to work out concrete proposals for reform of the organization. The proposals will be submitted to the special summit of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in November.

We still cannot predict the nature of the organization after the great changes, but it is quite possible that it may become a loose organization for political coordination. The joint communiqué says: “The new role of the Warsaw Treaty Organization should be linked with disarmament and the establishment of a pan-European security structure. The Warsaw Treaty Organization is prepared to consult with the NATO states and various neutral states and make common effort with them to strive for stability in Europe and the signing of a disarmament agreement.”

Diplomat on Nuclear Proliferation Responsibility
OW/2206113390 Beijing XINHUA in English 1444 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] Geneva, June 21 (XINHUA)—A Chinese diplomat said here Thursday (21 June) that the most effective means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons was the fulfillment of the special responsibility by the United States and the Soviet Union in halting their nuclear arms race and effecting nuclear disarmament.

Hou Zhiting, the Chinese ambassador for disarmament affairs, urged the two superpowers which have the largest nuclear arsenals to immediately put an end to their nuclear arms race, take the lead in stopping the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and reduce all kinds of nuclear weapons they have deployed both on their own territories and abroad.

"Only in this way can genuine conditions be created for the realization of the fundamental goal of ending all forms of nuclear proliferation and effecting complete disarmament," he said.

He was speaking at a colloquium on the non-proliferation on nuclear weapons. The colloquium, sponsored by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, a special consultant to the United Nations secretary-general, was attended by academicians, experts and diplomats from some 50 countries.

Ambassador Hou stressed that nuclear-weapon states should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. This commitment is of great significance to curtail nuclear non-proliferation, he said, because "asking the non-nuclear-weapon states to forgo the choice for nuclear weapons while refusing to undertake to provide necessary security assurance for them would put these countries into a discriminated and unequal position."

He also indicated that the non-proliferation on nuclear weapons should not affect or harm the legitimate right of all countries, particularly the developing countries, to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The ambassador reiterated that China does not advocate, encourage or engage in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and oppose nuclear proliferation in all its manifestations.

‘Analysis’ Views NATO, Japan Defense Ties

OW2306015590 Beijing XINHUAN in English

0537 GMT 22 Jun 90

["News Analysis: NATO, Japan Seek Defense Cooperation (by Yang Yuanhua and Li Hubing)"—XINHUAN headline]

[Text] Brussels, June 21 (XINHUA)—High-ranking officials from NATO and Japan ended a series of meetings at the small coast town of Knokke-Heist, Belgium, on Wednesday [20 June] after having discussed their future cooperation for world security.


According to reliable sources, the two-day sessions concentrated on how NATO and Japan could enhance cooperation in security and defense. Woerner noted that developing a partnership with Japan has become more important than ever.

Although NATO-Japanese defense cooperation has not yet become reality, observers believe it could be part of NATO’s future.

First, they say it indicates a change in NATO’s concept of security. According to NATO officials at the meeting, the cold war is over and the new threat comes mainly from economic problems, regional conflicts and the spread of nuclear and chemical weapons technology.

Woerner said NATO will have to pay more attention to threats from outside of Europe, where Japan is able to play an important role.

Wolfowitz also urged NATO and Japan to take joint military actions to deal with future crises outside Europe. The United States used to believe that Europe was more important than Asia in security problems, but the situation is different now, the U.S. undersecretary of defense said.

The change in NATO’s concept of security also shows that the United States and its allies have extended NATO’s function from strictly military to political as well.

Because of the changing international situation, NATO and Japan realize they will benefit from security cooperation.

As a defeated nation in World War II, Japan has been restricted in many ways, despite its emergence as a world economic giant.

To have more say in world affairs and to become a political power and even a military power have been the aim for Japanese governments for years. Therefore, to establish a partnership with NATO will be a shortcut to this aspiration.

With NATO’s help, Japan will increase its political influence in Asia and lay a foundation for its role in Europe. In this matter, NATO harbors more complicated motives.

First of all, NATO’s internal cohesion is weakening under the influence of the moves toward global disarmament and the profound changes in East-West relations. Its mere military function can no longer suit the needs of the present-day situation.
To expand its political function and realize its global security strategy has become a pressing task for NATO. So, the alliance's quest for Japanese cooperation is a practical move.

By cooperating with Japan, NATO can also fully tap Japan's economic and technological strength to reduce its defense expenditures, enlarge its political influence in Asia, and put further pressure on Moscow to force it to make more political and military concessions.

The tendency toward the establishment of security cooperation between NATO and Japan has shocked some NATO member states.

France firmly opposes it, and refuses to attend the Knokke-Heist meeting. Paris thinks that NATO is breaking its charter by extending its influence into Asia.

Although NATO-Japanese cooperation is still a long way from reality, its development is worth attention.
NORTH KOREA

International Conference for Disarmament Held

Delegates Arrive for Meeting
SK1806154090 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1521 GMT 18 Jun 90

[Text] Pyongyang, June 18 (KCNA)—Delegations and delegates of different countries to the International Conference for Disarmament, Cooperation and Development in the Asia-Pacific Region arrived here today.

Among them are a delegation of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization [AAPSO] led by its president Mourad Ghaleb [as received]; delegate of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity organization of Bangladesh M. Ahmed, vice-president of the Organization; delegate of the Malagasy Solidarity Committee Randriamaro Joel, national secretary of the Committee; delegate of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Committee of Nepal Babukaji Basukala, presidium member of the Committee; delegate of the Philippine Peace and Solidarity Council Honesto L. Cueva, chairman of the council; delegate of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Association of Sri Lanka D.E.W. Gunasekara, secretary general of the association; a delegation of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the Soviet Union headed by Vladimir Tolstikov, first vice-president of the Committee; delegate of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of Vietnam Nguyen Trung Lieu, vice-president of the Committee; delegate of the Yemen Peace and Solidarity Council Ahmad Joubran, first deputy general secretary of the council; delegate of the Asian Information Centre of the AAPSO Tran Minh Quoc; delegate of the World Federation of Democratic Youth [WFDY] Ravdangin Samdandoy, member of the bureau of the WFDY; and delegate of the Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition Paul Petersen, member of the National Coordinating Committee of the coalition.

The guests were met by Kim Kuk-hun, chairman of the Korean Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and officials concerned.

Earlier, on June 17, delegate of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of Mongolia Usukhbayaryn Togoo [as received] and delegate of the New People’s Patriotic Alliance of the Philippines Baltazar A. Pinguell arrived here.

Conference Opens in Pyongyang
SK1906050100 Kangmyong KCNA in English
0446 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] Pyongyang, June 19 (KCNA)—The International Conference for Disarmament, Cooperation and Development in the Asia-Pacific Region opened here today.

The conference, sponsored by the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, will discuss the present situation in the Asia-Pacific region, the withdrawal of foreign troops and military bases from this region, the creation of a nuclear-free, peace zone, economic development and cooperation in culture, science and technology among the countries in this region.

Kim Yong-sun Gives Address
SK1906051090 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0448 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] Pyongyang, June 19 (KCNA)—Kim Yong-sun, secretary for international affairs of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, made a congratulatory speech at the international conference for disarmament, cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific region which has opened here today.

Saying the universal situation tends toward detente, but the situation in the Asia-Pacific region still remains tense, Kim Yong-sun noted that the Korean peninsula is one of the most strained zones in this region.

He further said:

The division of the Korean peninsula has caused and aggravated confrontation, tension and the danger of war for nearly half a century and this is inevitable as long as the division continues.

The Korean people will never allow any form of “two Koreas” plot.

If Korea is to be reunified peacefully, there is no other way but to introduce confederation that leaves the two systems as they are on the principle of co-existence, neither side conquering the other or being conquered, under the circumstances in which different ideologies and systems exist in the north and the South.

The respected leader Comrade Kim Il-song put forward long ago the proposal for founding the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo and recently laid down a new five-point policy to carry it into effect.

The reunification question of Korea is our nation’s domestic issue and, accordingly, it should be decided by our nation itself and no outside force has right to interfere in it.

The South Korean authorities’ “two Koreas” plot such as the “northern policy” and “membership of the United Nations” is a flunkeyist and traitorous act to keep Korea divided indefinitely with the help of big countries and betray a half of the country and the nation to the outside forces.

Our people will increase in every way the might of our socialist system they chose and built with their own efforts and staunchly fight to accomplish the cause of national reunification as early as possible with the concerted efforts of the whole nation and through dialogue.
and negotiation, closely rallied around the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song and under the leadership of dear Comrade Kim Chong-il.

Our people will, in the future, too, make every possible effort to turn the Asia-Pacific region into a zone of peace, cooperation and trust and a nuclear-free, peace zone without aggression and war, domination and subjugation.

Kim Kuk-hun Speaks
SK1906104090 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0458 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] Pyongyang, June 19 (KCNA)—Addressing the plenary meeting of the International Conference for Disarmament, Cooperation and Development in the Asia-Pacific Region which opened here today, Kim Kuk-hun, chairman of the Korean Committee for Asian-African Solidarity, said that in order to activate the endeavours of the Asia-Pacific countries for the development in a peaceful atmosphere and to propel cooperation for the same purpose, the ambition of the U.S. imperialists to dominate this region must be eradicated and the climate be appeased.

To this end, the U.S. policy for converting this region into a military base must be banned, its armament reinforcement schemes be frustrated, disarmament including nuclear disarmament be enforced and this region be turned into a nuclear-free, peace zone, Kim Kuk-hun said, and continued:

We resolutely claim that all the foreign military bases in the Asia-Pacific region must be dismantled and all the foreign troops and nuclear weapons must be withdrawn from there at the earliest possible date.

In effecting disarmament and ensuring peace and development in the Asia-Pacific region, an important thing, first of all, is to relax tension and secure permanent peace on the Korean peninsula.

For the relaxation of tension and for durable peace on the Korean peninsula, the North and South must adopt a nonaggression declaration guaranteeing that the both sides refrain from invading the other, the DPRK and the United States must sign a peace agreement, the armed forces in the North and the South must be reduced drastically and nuclear weapons and foreign troops must be withdrawn from South Korea.

The Korean people will exert all their possible efforts to independently and peacefully reunify their country divided by the foreign forces and will make great contribution to ensuring peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region by achieving peace and reunification of their land.

For common prosperity and progress of the Asia-Pacific people, cooperation among the countries in this region should be further intensified in the field of development.

The Korean people guided by the ideal of independence, peace and friendship will further to develop cooperation with the countries in this region and will exert all their efforts for common prosperity and development of the Asia-Pacific region.

Kim Yong-sun Speaks
SK1906111190 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1016 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] Pyongyang, June 19 (KCNA)—Kim Yong-sun, secretary for international affairs of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, made a congratulatory speech at the International Conference for Disarmament, Cooperation and Development in the Asia-Pacific Region which has opened here today.

Saying the universal situation tends toward detente, but the situation in the Asia-Pacific region still remains tense, Kim Yong-sun noted that the double-faced stand in opening the door of “detente” in one part of the globe and inciting confrontation in other part reveals the crafty and dangerous policy of aggression and war pursued by the U.S. administration.

The people in the Asia-Pacific region should heighten vigilance against the nuclear war moves of the imperialists behind the curtain of “detente” and “dialogue” and more persistently wage a joint struggle for the withdrawal of foreign aggression forces and military bases and elimination of nuclear weapons, he said, and continued:

The Korean peninsula is one of the most strained zones in this region.

The elimination of nuclear weapons, arms reduction and drastic disarmament are the only way to remove the root cause of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and preserve peace.

The division of the Korean peninsula has caused and aggravated confrontation, tension and the danger of war for nearly half a century and this is inevitable as long as the division continues.

The Korean people will never allow any form of “two Koreas” plot.

If Korea is to be reunified peacefully, there is no other way but to introduce confederation that leaves the two systems as they are on the principle of co-existence, neither side conquering the other or being conquered, under the circumstances in which different ideologies and systems exist in the North and the South.

The respected leader Comrade Kim Il-song put forward long ago a fair proposal for founding the democratic confederal republic of Koryo which gives a most practical way to reunify the country through confederation, and recently laid down a new five-point policy for national reunification to carry it into effect.
For an early achievement of the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea, it is imperative to realise the five-point policy for national reunification—to ease the tension on the Korean peninsula and create a peaceclimate for the country’s reunification, effect free travel and full-scale open door between the North and the South, create an international climate favourable to national reunification such as the joint entry of the North and the South into the United Nations as one member, develop dialogue for the reunification of the country and form a nationwide united front for the reunification.

The reunification question of Korea is our nation’s domestic issue and, accordingly, it should be decided by our nation itself and no outside force has right to interfere in it.

The South Korean authorities’ “two Koreas” plot such as the “northern policy” and “membership of the United Nations” is a flunkeyist and traitorous act to keep Korea divided indefinitely with the help of big countries and betray a half of the country and the nation to the outside forces.

We maintain that Korea must join the UN as a unified country. If the North and the South are to enter the UN before Korea’s reunification is achieved, they must not hold two separate seats but enter it jointly as one member.

The United States, as a party which is directly responsible for the Korean question, must look straight at the current of the situation and refrain from seeking a permanent division of Korea, and other countries concerned, too, should maintain the principled stand which is helpful to the reunification of Korea.

If the Asia-Pacific countries harmonize their development strategy and develop cooperation on the principle of equality and mutual benefits, they will be able to turn great possibilities into reality for coprosperity, said Kim Yong-sun, adding:

We will develop economic, cultural and technical exchange and cooperation with other Asia-Pacific countries and positively contribute to achieving common progress and prosperity of the peoples in this region on the principle of South-South cooperation and collective self-reliance.

Our people will, in the future, too, make every possible effort to turn the Asia-Pacific region into a zone of peace, cooperation and trust and a nuclear-free, peace zone without aggression and war, domination and subjugation, in close unity with the peaceloving people in Asia and the rest of the world in accordance with the idea of independence, peace and friendship.

Further on International Disarmament Conference

Participants Adopt Agenda

SK1906122190 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1116 GMT 19 Jun 90


The conference sponsored by the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation will discuss the problems of getting foreign troops and military bases withdrawn from the Asia-Pacific region, guaranteeing peace and security there and strengthening cooperation among the countries in this region.

Participating in the conference are a delegation of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) headed by its President Mourad Ghaleb, delegations and delegates of the Afro-Asian solidarity organizations of Bangladesh, India, Madagascar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Yemen, Australia and the DPRK delegations and delegates from the Asian Information Centre of the AAPSO, the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Women’s International Democratic Federation, the International Organization of Journalists, the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace and other international organisations.

Delegations of the South Korean National Democratic Front and the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (CHONGNYON) are also present at the conference.

Kim Kuk-hun, chairman of the Korean Committee for Asian-African Solidarity, made the opening address at the conference.

Kim Yong-sun, secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, delivered a congratulatory speech and President Mourad Ghaleb made the keynote report.

Then followed the plenary meeting.

The following agenda was adopted:

First, the present situation in the Asia-Pacific region.
Second, withdrawal of foreign troops and military bases from the Asia-Pacific region and establishment of nuclear-free, peace zone.
Third, cooperation among and role of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region in economic development and in the cultural, scientific and technological fields.

Chairman Kim Kuk-hun made a supplementary report at the plenary meeting.

The Yemeni, Soviet, Nepalese, Indian and other delegates took the floor.
The speakers stressed the need to strengthen friendship and solidarity among the anti-imperialist, anti-nuke and peace organisations in the Asia-Pacific region in the struggle to ease the tensions, realise disarmament and achieve the independent development of the country in this region.

The conference continues.

Kim Kuk-hun Blames U.S. ‘Domination’

SK1906114290 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1037 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] Pyongyang, June 19 (KCNA)—Kim Kuk-hun, chairman of the Korean Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, made an additional report at the plenary meeting of the International Conference for Disarmament Cooperation and Development in the Asia-Pacific Region which opened here today.

The reporter said: Whereas in Europe the “cold war” structures are gradually collapsing and a phase of disarmament and detente is about to emerge, there is no sign of such kind in the Asia-Pacific region but, on the contrary, the situation there is getting more strained.

The responsibility for this entirely rests with the United States which is obstinately sticking to its wild design to maintain its domination over this region.

In other regions the United States is reportedly alleviating the situation and reducing its armed forces, but in the Asia-Pacific region it is furthering reinforcement of strategic forces and staging adventurous military exercises more frequently, thus intensifying its aggressive system of military alliances.

In this region the United States is trying to further improve the system of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea triangular military alliance and, using it as a centre force, rig up a comprehensive military bloc like NATO so as to further cement political and military ties with its junior allies and satellite states.

The U.S.-backed moves for the revival and rearmament of Japanese militarism cause a serious apprehension among the Asia-Pacific countries and the world people.

The arms buildup and war manoeuvres of the United States in this region render the situation there more strained not only politically but also militarily and cause great obstacles to the cooperative efforts of the countries there for development and prosperity.

In order to activize the endeavours of the Asia-Pacific countries for the development in a peaceful atmosphere and to propel cooperation for the same purpose, the ambition of the U.S. to dominate this region must be smashed and the situation be eased.

We resolutely claim that all the foreign military bases in the Asia-Pacific region must be dismantled and all the foreign troops and nuclear weapons must be withdrawn at the earliest possible date from there.

In effecting disarmament and ensuring peace and development in the Asia-Pacific region, the important thing, first of all, is to alleviate tension and secure permanent peace on the Korean peninsula.

What is needed for relaxing tension and securing perpetual peace on the Korean peninsula is the reunification of the country.

In his historical policy speech the great leader President Kim Il-song reaffirmed the justness of the proposal for founding the democratic confederal republic of Koryo and set forth a new 5-point policy to realise the independent and peaceful reunification of the country.

For achieving reunification of Korea at the earliest possible date, tension on the Korean peninsula must be eased and a peaceful climate be created; the barrier of division must be removed and free travel and a full-scale open-door policy effected between the North and South.

For the relaxation of tension and creation of a peaceful climate on the Korean peninsula, the North and South must adopt a nonaggression declaration guaranteeing that the both sides refrain from invading the other, the DPRK and the United States must sign a peace agreement, the armed forces in the North and the South must be reduced drastically and nuclear weapons and foreign troops must be withdrawn from South Korea.

The DPRK Government in its disarmament proposal for peace on the Korean peninsula called for a phased reduction of armed forces of the North and South, so that the forces could be cut below the level of 100,000 men respectively in the North and South, withdrawing all foreign forces from the Korean peninsula and turning this region into a nuclear-free zone.

Nevertheless, the U.S. and South Korean authorities do not accept this proposal but, instead, are spurring on the armament reinforcement.

They even deny the existence of the concrete barrier built in the area South of the Military Demarcation Line, although it is universally recognized and are unwilling to pull it down and are tenaciously clinging to the plot to create “two Kores” clamouring about the “Northern policy” and the “UN entry”.

Korea must join the United Nations as a unified single state under all circumstances.

If the North and the South are to join the United Nations before reunification is achieved, they must join it not with two separate seats but with one seat jointly in favor of the reunification cause.

The Korean people will exert every possible effort to reunify independently and peacefully their country divided by outside forces and will make a contribution to
ensuring peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region by achieving peace and reunification of their land.

For common prosperity and progress of the Asia-Pacific people, cooperation among the countries in this region should be further intensified in the field of development.

The reporter stressed:
In order to achieve economic independence of the developing countries, the old international economic order created by the imperialists should be destroyed and a new one be established.

The DPRK Government has consistently maintained that the inequitable international economic order should give way to an equitable one and, for economic independence of the developing countries, economic and technical exchanges and cooperations should be encouraged between these countries on the principle of South-South cooperation and collective self-reliance.

The Korean people guided by the ideal of independence, peace and friendship will further develop cooperation with the countries in this region and will exert all their efforts for common prosperity and development of the Asia-Pacific region.

By intensifying solidarity and cooperation in the struggle for disarmament and development, the Asia-Pacific countries should build a new peaceful, prospering and independent Asia.

AAPSO President Gives Address
SK1906115290 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1057 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] Pyongyang, June 19 (KCNA)—Mourad Ghaleb [name as received], president of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, made a keynote report at the International Conference for Disarmament, Cooperation and Development in the Asia-Pacific region which has opened here today.

He said disarmament and security has long since been and still remains the first and foremost problem to be settled in the Asia-Pacific region. He continued:

No material alteration has been made so far in the maintenance of foreign military bases and of military alliances in the region. On this forum, the United States should be condemned for its efforts to perpetuate nuclear bases in South Korea, the Philippines and Diego Garcia, to maintain U.S. military alliance with Japan and South Korea, and to conduct war games with its allies in the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States is still maintaining a network of as many as 350 military bases in the Pacific strategic ARC which is connected with the one in the Indian Ocean.

South Korea, with 49,000 U.S. troops endowed with nuclear weapons and 600,000 U.S.-equipped South Korean troops, is regarded by the United States as an ideal trampling board for an assault on the Northeast Asia mainland. And only recently, the U.S. has obviously shown its intention to stay for long in South Korea.

Considering the U.S.-Japan alliance as of both regional and global character, the pentagon has deployed in Japan 50,000 troops in some 120 bases, with U.S. Warplanes carrying nuclear weapons based in northern Japan and U.S. Navy ships controlling Northeast Asian straits.

It should be noted in this connection that there is now a fear that, with the new developments in the world, especially the improvement of relations to the extent of “partnership” between the two super-powers and its eventual effect on the military situation in Asia-Pacific, Japan might be tempted to increase its military strength to safeguard its maritime trade arteries and its investments in East-Asia.

The Subic Bay Naval Station and Clark Air Base in the Philippines, known as the largest U.S. military facilities in the Asia-Pacific region, are meant to support American military deployment in the Western Pacific, Southeast Asian waters and the Indian Ocean. For the time being the United States is trying its best to extend the agreement on the lease of these military bases.

We in AAPSO would like to express full support to the struggle of the Korean people for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea, for a nuclear weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula and in North East Asia.

We express our support to the persevering anti-nuclear movement of the Japanese people and their opposition to the U.S.-Japan military alliance; our support to the demand of the Philippines people not to extend or renegotiate the RP-U.S. military bases agreement; our support to the anti-bases movement in Australia, and the movement for establishing nuclear weapon-free and peace zones in various parts of Asia-Pacific.

In Asia-Pacific, relations between China and the Soviet Union have been normalized, and much effort has been devoted over the past years to resolve regional conflicts and disputes by peaceful means, especially in the cases of Afghanistan and Cambodia.

We in AAPSO hold that an end should be put to such foreign interference and that inter-Afghan dialogue should be promoted so as to establish a broad-based Afghan Government and to materialize a peaceful, independent and non-aligned Afghanistan.

It is our belief, in AAPSO, that the final outcome of all endeavours on the Cambodian problem will be the exercise of the right to self-determination of the Cambodian people through free and fair general elections, and the guarantee of the permanent neutrality of Cambodia in the context of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia.
We hope that, in South Asia, with the goodwill of all parties concerned, radical settlements will soon be found to regional disputes which time and again flare up there.

We fully support the struggle of the Korean people in both zones for peaceful national reunification. To this end, we hold that the New Year 1990 proposal made by President Kim Il-song to remove the concrete wall bisecting the country and realize free travel is a contribution to such process.

We support the peace-making mission of the United Nations in the Iran-Iraq conflict and hope for an early political solution to this problem, in full implementation of the Security Council Resolution 598.

The majority of nations in Asia-Pacific, having become masters of their destiny, are now in a position to cooperate in a concrete way. Priority is given to collective self-reliance, to South-South cooperation, whereas universal cooperation, North-South cooperation are also advocated.

Cooperation and solidarity in different spheres will strengthen our national independence and consolidate peace.

In my opinion, Asian developing countries can cooperate first in providing a favorable environment for development, namely in opposing aggression and interference, in jointly striving to resolve regional conflicts and to secure superpowers' concurrence in nuclear and general disarmament. Then, many areas of development such as trade, industry, energy, environment etc. Can be brought within the scope of cooperation.

Especially in the initial stage, cooperation by sharing experiences in solving problems relating to development has revealed itself to be very necessary and effective.

AAPSO is continuing to support the national liberation movements, to work for disarmament and for peaceful solution of regional and national conflicts. Meanwhile, as an organization of the people in Third World countries, we are more and more deeply concerned about problems of economic development, economic security of the developing countries. We are concentrating efforts on elaborating scientific and practical projects which could help the developing countries to find solutions for their economic problems.

The reporter expressed the belief that the international conference will contribute to the promotion of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Further on Pyongyang International Conference

U.S. Withdrawal Urged

SK2006102590 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0959 GMT 20 Jun 90

["Participants in Pyongyang International Conference Calls for Guarantee of Peace and Security in Asia-Pacific region"]

[Text] Pyongyang, June 20 (KCNA)—Speaking at the plenary meeting of the International Conference for Disarmament, Cooperation and Development in the Asia-Pacific region which opened here on June 19, many delegates called for getting foreign troops and military bases withdrawn, guaranteeing peace and security and strengthening cooperation among the nations in this region.

Ahmad Jibreran, delegate of the Yemen Peace and Solidarity Council, said:

I believe that all the initiatives to dismantle the foreign military bases in the Asia-Pacific region including the Korean peninsula and convert this region into a nuclear-free, peace zone will certainly be realized.

Vladimiro Tolstikov, head of the delegation of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the Soviet Union, said:

New peaceful initiatives of the DPRK were given a favorable appraisal. It proposed to adopt a declaration of non-aggression between the North and the South. Major steps of military detente are suggested to ensure its implementation. I hope that Pyongyang initiatives will find a positive response in South Korea and lead to an atmosphere of trust on the Korean peninsula and in the region as a whole.

B. Basukala, delegate of the Nepal-AAPSO, said:

The withdrawal of all the U.S. military setups and nuclear weapons and its troops from South Korea is the factor of the building of the basis of Korea's reunification and guarantee of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The peace and reunification of Korea is one of the most important matters in this region.

Shekhar Ganguly, delegate of the All-India Peace and Solidarity Organisation, said:

With wild ambition for aggression on and domination over the Asia-Pacific region, the United States is scheming a permanent division of Korea and has built hundreds of military bases and deployed the Seventh Fleet carrying nuclear weapons in this region. All these military bases and aggression forces must be withdrawn.

M. Rahman, delegate of the Pakistan-AAPSO, said:

The countries of the Asia-Pacific region which have become the masters of their destinies should achieve cooperation in various ways. To this end, precedence should be given to collective self-reliance and South-South cooperation.

To achieve peace and reunification on the Korean peninsula, a peace agreement must be signed between the DPRK and the United States, a non-aggression declaration be adopted between the North and the South and disarmament be realised and the U.S. Forces and nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from South Korea.

Nguyen Trung Lieu, delegate of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of Viet Nam, said:

The policy put forward by the government of the DPRK to achieve the reunification of the country by means of founding the democratic confederal republic of Koryo
and its proposals to realize free travel and full-scale opening between the North and the South, pulling down the wall of division, are realistic steps for the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea.

Stating that no outside forces can decide the destiny of Asian and Pacific peoples, he said the countries in this region hold today an unshakable position in the world arena by expanding cooperation in the economic, cultural and scientific fields.

D.W. Gunasekara, delegate of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Association of Sri Lanka, said:
The United States which is directly responsible for the creation of the Korean question continued and still continues to be the stumbling block barring the way for a solution to the Korean question.

The United States must therefore play a positive role on this question and the united nations must, in all seriousness, help to settle this question peacefully and impartially.

Cho Il-min, chief of the mission of the South Korean National Democratic Front, said:
Withdrawal of foreign troops, the abolition of nuclear weapons and the establishment of nuclear-free zones have come to the fore as a main trend of the times all over the world, but in South Korea, a colony of the United States, the U.S. Troops and nuclear weapons are reinforced both quantitatively and qualitatively and the atmosphere of war prevails more than ever before contrary to the above-mentioned trend.

He appealed to all other progressive international organizations and the entire peace-loving people of the world to extend a sustained strong support to and solidarity with the South Korean people in their anti-American and anti-war, anti-nuke peace efforts to terminate subordination and sufferings of division.

Baltazar Pinguel, delegate of the New People's Patriotic Alliance of the Philippines, said:
Many U.S. Military bases, troops, nuclear weapons and destroyers are massed in the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Guam, etc. We can say about world peace only when disarmament is realized in the Asia-Pacific region and this region is converted into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

Expressing concern over the conversion of the United States and Japan into a military and economic power in this region, he stressed the need for the countries in this region to strengthen cooperation in the struggle against the inequitable international economic order and foreign debts.

Tran Minh Quoc, delegate of the Asian Information Centre of the AAPSO, underlined the need to strengthen cooperation among the countries in the Asia-Pacific region in the economic development and the cultural, scientific and technological fields and its significance.

This cooperation, he said, will promote development of the countries and deepen mutual understanding and trust.

M. Ahmed, delegate of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation of Bangladesh, pointed to the appearance of a trend of ending arms race in the world political arena at present. But we must not slacken vigilance even a moment, he added.

Paul Petersen, delegate of the Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition, said:
We should focus on the question of the Korean peninsula when we discuss the disarmament in Asia and the Pacific. It is because the Korean peninsula, more precisely, South Korea has been turned into a comprehensive nuclear storehouse which is filled with all kinds of nuclear heads, means of nuclear delivery and nuclear bases and the breeding ground of nuclear war which is threatening peace in Asia and the rest of the world.

Kim Tae-hui, head of the delegation of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongnyon), charged that the Japanese authorities are pursuing a consistent policy of creating "two Koreas" and antagonizing the DPRK, suppressing the just patriotic movement of Chongnyon and conniving at collective assaults on Korean students.

In their speeches the delegates unanimously welcomed and supported in full the five-point policy advanced by the great leader President Kim Il-song for national reunification, the proposal for founding the democratic confederal republic of Koryo and expressed firm solidarity with the Korean people in the struggle for their realisation.

USSR Supports Unity Policy
SK2006103890 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1019 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow, June 18 (KCNA)—The Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the Soviet Union, on behalf of the Soviet People and public circles, resolutely supports the five-point policy for national reunification in which Comrade Kim Il-song indicates the most reasonable ways for the achievement of the independent and peaceful reunification of the country and the consolidation of peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region.

V.G. Tolstikov, first vice-president of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the Soviet Union, said this in an interview with a KCNA correspondent in Moscow in support of the five-point policy for national reunification put forward by the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song in his policy speech.

His policy speech is an important program indicating the road of overcoming the state of division of the Korean nation, creating a climate favourable for reunification and realising the reunification of the Korean nation which has long suffered pain, he noted, and stressed:
We consider that the national reunification policies and the way for the U.N. membership of the North and the South of Korea set forth in the policy speech are very important and principled, indeed.

This constitutes a great progress toward a decisive solution of the question of Korea’s reunification.

We, therefore, fully support once again the policies put forward by Comrade Kim Il-song in his policy speech.

The Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the Soviet Union will stand on the side of the Korean people in the struggle to carry through these policies and contribute to realizing them by making all its efforts possible.

Kim Il-song Meets Delegation
SK2006105690 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1038 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Pyongyang, June 20 (KCNA)—The great leader President Kim Il-song today received the delegation of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) headed by its president Mourad Ghaleb [spelling as received] which participated in the international conference for disarmament, cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific region.

On hand were Kim Yong-sun, secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and Kim Kuk-hon, chairman of the Korean Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity.

President Kim Il-song conversed with the guests in a warm and friendly atmosphere.

He received a gift from them.

Sends Letter to Kim Il-song
SK2006110390 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1041 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Pyongyang, June 20 (KCNA)—A letter to the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, was adopted at the international conference for disarmament, cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific region which closed here today.

The letter says:

The reflection of respected Your Excellency as president of the DPRK at the first session of the Ninth Supreme People’s Assembly, which was held some time ago, is an expression of the unqualified support and confidence of the Korean people in Your Excellency.

Your Excellency in spite of your heavy preoccupation, you received responsible persons of the Afro-Asian peoples solidarity organization and gave them valuable advice regarding the work of the AAPSO.

The advice of Your Excellency has encouraged the AAPSO and the entire participants in the conference very much. The participants in the conference rendered full support to the five-point policy for national reunification which was advanced by Your Excellency at the first session of the Ninth Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK and the new disarmament proposal of your government for peace on the Korean peninsula, and expressed firm solidarity with the Korean people in the struggle of realizing them.

We strongly hold that for the peaceful reunification of Korea, the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from South Korea and the Korean peninsula be turned into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

We express our confidence that with their united efforts, the Korean people will realize the historical cause of national reunification by founding the democratic confederal republic of Koryo, thus making the 1990s a historical decade of national reunification.

We assure Your Excellency that we will firmly stand by the Korean people who are striving for peace and national reunification, and will wage more vigorous solidarity movement for them.

The letter wishes President Kim Il-song a long life and good health.

Letter to Kim Chong-il Adopted
SK2006110990 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1047 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Pyongyang, June 20 (KCNA)—A letter to dear Comrade Kim Chong-il was adopted at the international conference for disarmament, cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific region which closed here today.

The letter says:

The participants in the conference paid deep attention to the Korean issue which is the focal point of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, and expressed their firm resolve to support the Korean people in the just struggle for the independent and peaceful reunification of the country and to promote international solidarity with them.

We render full support to the five-point policy of national reunification put forward by respected His Excellency President at the first session of the Ninth Supreme People’s Assembly and to the national reunification proposals and peace initiatives advanced by the Government of the DPRK, including the new disarmament proposal for peace on the Korean peninsula.

In this year of the 10th anniversary of the advancement of the proposal for founding the democratic confederal republic of Koryo [DCRK], we will wage more actively the movement for international solidarity with the Korean people in their endeavours for peace and national reunification.
We are firmly convinced that the Korean people will prevent the country from remaining divided permanently and will reunify the country by founding the DCRK on the basis of the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity, thus making the 1990s historical decade of national reunification.

The letter wishes Comrade Kim Chong-il a long life and good health.

AAPSO Issues Communiqué
SK2006111290 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1052 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Pyongyang, June 20 (KCNA)—A communiqué was issued at the international conference for disarmament, cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific region which closed here today.

Follows the full text of the communiqué:

The international conference for disarmament, cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific region sponsored by the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization [AAPSO] was held in Pyongyang, the capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on June 19 and 20, 1990.

The conference was attended by 39 delegates from 24 countries and international organizations.

The conference discussed the present situation in the Asia-Pacific region and the issues concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops, dismantling of foreign military bases, establishment of nuclear-free, peace zones and cooperation among countries in this region in the fields of economy, science, technology and culture.

The conference emphasized that all efforts leading to the creation of conditions for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region would be a great contribution to ameliorating the international situation at large and to securing a stable peace in the world.

In spite of indications of detente in the international arena today, the situation in the Asia-Pacific region still remains tense and complicated. This is primarily due to the policies of aggression and war of the imperialists in the region.

The participants in the conference are of the opinion that the United States while professing the ending of the cold war is making every effort to perpetuate its domination in the region.

The United States still maintains its military bases, armed forces and nuclear weapons in Asia and Pacific and continues its routine military exercises to increase tension in the region.

The conference expressed a deep indignation concerning the fact that the Korean peninsula has been turned into a hotbed of tension owing to the nuclear arms build-up and war provocations of the United States.

The conference attached importance to the interrelationship between disarmament and development.

In view of the above, the conference felt that it should be an urgent task of the peoples in the region to frustrate the imperialist design and to promote economic and social progress and independent development, and called for the unity of the peoples of the region towards this end.

The conference considered that these vital demands of the peoples could possibly be realized with success only when the foreign troops are withdrawn, the foreign military bases are dismantled, arms reduction is carried out and the old international economic order is replaced by a new and just one.

The conference welcomed the proposals and initiatives of the countries in the region for the relaxation of tension and for ensuring peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

The conference also hails the independence of Namibia after years of arduous battles. The conference expresses its deep satisfaction at the release of Nelson Mandela after 27 years of prison life. The conference sincerely hopes that apartheid and racism will be totally dismantled in South Africa and the basis for a non-racial, democratic South Africa will be laid down sooner than expected.

For disarmament, development and cooperation in the region, this international conference demanded:

- That all the foreign military bases should be dismantled and the foreign troops be withdrawn from the Asia-Pacific region;
- That nuclear disarmament should be carried out and nuclear-free and peace zones be established in the region;
- All nuclear weapons should be eliminated, the region should not be allowed to be a nuclear testing site and a dumping ground of nuclear wastes. No port of any country in the region should open itself to ships carrying nuclear weapons and to nuclear powered vessels.
- That all military alliances like the proposed U.S.-Japan-South Korea pact should be abandoned and large-scale military exercises such as “Team Spirit” and “Rimpac” should be discontinued;
- That naval and air forces of foreign countries should be substantially reduced and military activities on the sea should be gradually reduced to the minimum.
- That the international solidarity should be intensified with the Korean people in their struggle to ease tension and secure peace in Korea, to pull down the concrete barrier built in the south of the country, to realize full-scale opening and free travels between the North and South and to reunify the country by founding the democratic confederal republic of Koryo;
- That disputes and conflicts in Afghanistan and Cambodia should be solved peacefully through dialogues and
negotiations between the parties concerned, in conformity with their interests and the cause of global peace. Some mechanisms should be devised for the purpose.

- That in order to achieve economic security of the developing countries in the region, the struggle to abolish the old international economic order and to establish an equitable and just one should be intensified and the South-South cooperation be developed on the principle of collective self-reliance.

While the whole world is demanding that the Indian Ocean should be converted into a zone of peace, it is deplorable that the United States, France and the United Kingdom have recently withdrawn from the U.N. ad hoc committee on the Indian Ocean. The conference firmly demanded that the proposed conference on the Indian Ocean-zone of peace must be held under U.N. auspices without further delay.

It is high time for all the countries of this region to explore all possibilities to devise ways and means for meaningful dialogue and necessary steps for unity and cooperation.

The conference called upon all peace forces to intensify the joint struggle for peace, disarmament and development in the Asia-Pacific region.

Closing Speeches Made
SK2106103090 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1007 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] Pyongyang, June 21 (KCNA)—Delegates of various countries and international organizations made speeches at the plenary meeting of the international conference for disarmament, cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific region that preceded its closing session on June 20.

O. Togoo, delegate of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of Mongolia and the international organisation of journalists, said:

Tensions persist and outstanding problems still remain in the Asia-Pacific region. They should be settled by common efforts of the peace-loving forces in this region.

The Mongolian People’s Republic voices full support to the proposals and initiatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to get foreign troops withdrawn from the Southern half of Korea, realize disarmament and adopt a non-aggression declaration between the North and the South, hold a wide-range dialogue and turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone and to the five-point policy for national reunification and new disarmament proposal.

Randriamaro Joel, delegate of the Malagasy Solidarity Committee, said:

We must remember that the United States is crying about “disarmament”. The nuclear military bases scattered over the world are a grave threat to all people.

He condemned the scheme of the U.S. administration to keep South Korea under its influence and the manoeuvres of the South Korean authorities supported by it.

Honesto L. Cueva, delegate of the Philippine Peace and Solidarity Council, said:

The U.S. forces and nuclear weapons must be withdrawn from South Korea and the concrete wall, a symbol of Korea’s division, be pulled down and free travel between the North and the South be carried into practice.

The peoples of the Asia-Pacific region should wage a powerful struggle for disarmament.

Ravdangiin Samdandov, delegate of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), said:

Top-priority tasks in our region are the struggle for disarmament, for eliminating nuclear weapons, for ensuring durable peace and security in the region. Apart from the large armed forces concentrated in this region, there is a large quantity of nuclear weapons deployed on highly mobile naval crafts. The barrier of division must be pulled down and free travel and full-scale door opening between North and South realized. WFDY reiterates its support to and solidarity with the people and youth of the DPRK in their efforts for the peaceful and independent reunification of the country.

Chandrajact Yadav, delegate of the World Peace Council, touched on the danger of nuclear weapons and said that the world people should continue to wage the struggle for realizing disarmament.

Bright is the future of the Asia-Pacific region with rich resources, enormous potentials and a huge population, he said, and pointed to the importance of the establishment of the relations of cooperation and good-neighbourhood and working out of a common action program by the countries in this region.

Conference Concludes 20 Jun
SK2006114690 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1120 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Pyongyang, June 20 (KCNA)—The international conference for disarmament, cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific region which opened here on June 19 closed today, successfully concluding the discussion of the agenda items.

A communiqué of the international conference for disarmament, cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific region was made public and a resolution on Korea adopted at the closing meeting.

The conference adopted letters to Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Central Committee of the
Workers' Party of Korea and president of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and dear Comrade Kim Chong-il in the name of the conference. A letter to 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, president of the Presidential Council of the Republic of Yemen, on the reunification of North and South Yemen and a letter to Nelson Mandela, vice-president of the African National Congress of South Africa, on the occasion of his birthday were also adopted. A debate on items on the agenda continued at the plenary meeting held prior to the closing meeting.

Delegates of different countries and international organisations made speeches.

The speakers stressed that the peoples of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region should firmly unite with each other in the idea of independence, peace and friendship and make every possible effort to turn the region into a zone of peace, cooperation and trust free from aggression and war, domination and subjugation, a nuclear-free, peace zone.

'Full Text' of Korea Resolution
SK2006213090 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1500 GMT 20 Jun 90

["Full text" of a "resolution on Korea" adopted at the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) international conference for disarmament, cooperation, and development in the Asian-Pacific region in Pyongyang on 20 June]

[Text] Pyongyang, June 20 (KCNA)—The international conference for disarmament, cooperation and development in the Asian-Pacific region held here adopted a resolution on Korea.

It's full text reads:

Resolution on Korea

The international conference for disarmament, cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific region held in Pyongyang, the capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 19 and 20 June, 1990, paid deep attention to the tense situation prevailing over the Korean peninsula and the struggle of the Korean people for peace and reunification.

Today when disarmament and detente have become a world trend, the southern part of the Korean peninsula broadly trails against this mainstream.

Recently in South Korea where 1,000 nuclear weapons and 40,000-odd U.S. soldiers are already deployed permanently, armed forces are redeployed under the cloak of "reduction," more up-to-date military hardwares including nuclear fighter bombers with ultra-sophisticated techniques hurled in, and nuclear war rehearsals are being staged one after another.

At the same time, the “two Koreas” policy which is aimed at perpetuating the division of the Korean peninsula is persistently being followed under the wirepulling of the United States and brutal suppression on the forces calling for democracy and reunification is being intensified.

The danger of the perpetual division of the nation and of a nuclear war is growing on the Korean peninsula.

There is no acceptable pretext or ground whatsoever for the U.S. to keep stationed and to reinforce its troops in South Korea.

The DPRK has been making every possible effort to remove the danger of a nuclear war and achieve peace and reunification on the Korean peninsula.

In his policy speech made at the First Session of the 9th Supreme People's Assembly, President Kim Il-song reaffirmed the proposal for founding the democratic confederal republic of Koryo on the basis of the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity and put forward the five-point policy for national reunification.

Furthermore, the DPRK has recently come out with a new disarmament proposal for a sharp reduction in the armed forces of the North and South and for withdrawal of the U.S. Armed Forces and nuclear weapons from South Korea in order to guarantee peace on the Korean peninsula.

The international conference for disarmament, cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific region warmly supports and welcomes the five-point policy put forward by President Kim Il-song, and considers it as the most reasonable and rational one for Korea's reunification and peace, as an important initiative which accords with the cause for peace in Asia and the world. It is to be hoped that the United States and the South Korean authorities will respond positively to this proposal.

The conference, recognizing that the achievement of peace and reunification on the Korean peninsula at present is an important and urgent issue in guaranteeing peace in Asia and the rest of the world, holds:

- In order to ease tension on the Korean peninsula, a non-aggression declaration must be adopted between the North and South and the DPRK's new disarmament proposal for a sharp arms reduction be realized as soon as possible;
- The United States, in order to promote peace and reunification of Korea, must sign a peace agreement with the DPRK and immediately withdraw its troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea, and the Korean peninsula be turned into a nuclear-free, peace zone;
- The concrete wall built in the area South of the Military Demarcation Line on the Korean peninsula should be removed and free travels and a full-scale open-door policy be realized between the North and the South;
- No peace-loving countries should be embroiled in the plots of the separatists aimed at perpetuating Korea's
division and they should reject any attempt to legalize the division through the U.N. or other forum.
- All kinds of laws including "National Security Law" and other repressive machineries in South Korea must be abolished, fascist repression on people be stopped, and Rev. Mun Ik-hwan and co-ed Yim Su-kyong and all other people arrested and imprisoned on groundless charges be set free at once;

The conference expresses firm solidarity with the workers, youth and students and people of all walks of life in South Korea who are launching a vigorous struggle for national sovereignty and reunification, upholding the slogan of independence, democracy and reunification.

The conference strongly appeals to the governments, political parties, parliaments, the Non-Aligned Movement, social organisations, international organizations and the people of all strata in different countries of the world to consider the situation created on the Korean peninsula with the seriousness it deserves and expand and strengthen the solidarity with the Korean people through various channels.

Kim Yong-sun Attends Party
SK2106053690 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0428 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] Pyongyang, June 21 (KCNA)—The Korean Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity gave a reception Wednesday evening at the Ongnyu Restaurant in honor of the participants in the international conference for disarmament, cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific region.

Invited there were the delegations and delegates of different countries and international organizations, a delegation of the South Korean National Democratic Front and a Delegation of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongnyon) which had participated in the conference.

Kim Yong-sun, secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Kuk-hun, chairman of the Korean Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity and other officials concerned were present.

Speeches were made there.

SOUTH KOREA

North Korea’s Atom Bomb Development Examin
902C0182A Seoul WOLGAN CHOSON in Korean
No 4, Apr 90 pp 220-255

[Article by Cho Kap-che: "The Nuclear Game on the Korean Peninsula—North Korea’s Atom Bomb Development and South Korea’s Counter-Strategy"]

[Excerpts] North To Succeed in Atomic Bomb Develop

In the judgment of most of the dozens of nuclear scientists and engineers whom this reporter has met to collect materials for this report, the purpose of the research nuclear reactor which is in operation in Yongbyon, North Korea, is to produce plutonium for use in the manufacture of nuclear bombs. A U.S. Government agency has asserted that the rectangular building next to the reactor is a reprocessing plant to separate plutonium formed in the research reactor. These Korean scientists also are in agreement with this judgment on the part of the U.S. scientists. Among the scientists sharing this view are those who participated in President Pak Chong-hui’s secret nuclear weapons development project in the 1970’s and who are familiar with the formula of atom bomb development in developing nations.

Korean scientists and military experts are generally of the opinion that North Korea will succeed in atomic bomb development and that it would be difficult for the United States and the Soviet Union to pressure North Korea to suspend this development. According to these scientists and experts, there is not much these superpowers can do about this development because North Korea is operating the research reactor and the reprocessing plant by its own nuclear technology which it has accumulated single-handedly since the 1950’s.

North Korea sent engineers to the Soviet Union in the 1950’s and 1960’s and to Pakistan, which was secretly developing atomic bombs, in the 1980’s to learn nuclear technology. Subsequently, it quietly engaged in some kind of secret project by securing a large group of research workers estimated at approximately 2,500 in number.

A tangible outcome of this project was the research reactor the construction of which was undertaken in 1980 and completed in 1987 with its own technology. North Korea upgraded the capacity of the 1,000-kilowatt research reactor to 2,000-kw and again remodeled it to further upgrade the capacity to 4,000 kw. Through this remodeling process, North Korea learned reactor designing technology, and on this basis, it built a full-scale research reactor of its own. After accumulating its own technology step by step in this way, North Korea is now venturing to develop atomic bombs. Accordingly, its potential cannot be ignored.

Since it has been established that this reactor with a 30,000-kw capacity is of the classic type which converts domestically available natural uranium into plutonium by using graphite as a moderator, the United States has sent warning signals to North Korea through the Soviet Union.

Nuclear scientists say: "Atomic bomb manufacturing technology is not something that is difficult to master. As a matter of fact, reprocessing technology is far simpler than running an oil refinery. The research reactor which North Korea has built according to its own blueprint is something more difficult to build than a facility to produce an atomic bomb. Atomic bomb manufacturing
is not so much a matter of technology as a matter of
determination." It is not because the ROK and Japan
lack technology that they do not manufacture atomic
bombs. It is rather because they are under international
inspection and, what is more, they do not see any need
for it. This is to say that when there is a political leader
who has such strong will power that he is ready to brook
international pressures and criticisms resulting from
atomic bomb manufacture, he is bound to produce an
atom bomb.

System Suited to Secret Development

Han Pil-su, director of the Atomic Energy Research
Institute, said that "If North Korea accepts International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection, it will receive
many benefits, such as the introduction of nuclear energy
technology for peaceful use; but I wonder why North
Korea is continuing its secret project while subjecting
itself to various disadvantages." According to the ana-
lytical view of another nuclear scientist, "North Korea's
nuclear development system is one under which North
Korea independently operates a nuclear fuel cycle of
natural uranium produced in North Korea- the research
reactor- the reprocessing plant, without relying on for-
gn countries." In such a case, there is no way for any
foreign country to intervene, and diplomatic pressures
will be of no avail. The same scientist said, "The Soviet
Union is to build a commercial reactor in North Korea,
and when this takes place, the Soviet Union will be in
a position to exercise influence." Our nuclear scientists are
of the opinion that the North Korean social system is
most suited to the manufacture of atomic bombs."

They say: "The greatest technological difficulty in
dealing with plutonium is safety. How to dispose of
radioactive wastes and how to handle strongly radioac-
tive spent nuclear fuel is the focus of reprocessing
technology, but in North Korean society, they do not
have to be concerned about these safety aspects. They
need to import a shielding installation and intricate
remote control devices in order to build a reprocessing
plan on their own. Even so, all they have to do is to
develop these installation and devices themselves by
making a huge amount of investment without regard to
efficiency. What is more, this will suit their purpose to a
T because they are assured of secrecy, into the bargain."

That atom bomb manufacturing technology has nothing
do with the average standard of living in a particular
country is quite evident from the fact that even poor
India and China with no nuclear power plants have
become nuclear powers. North Korea, in particular, is a
military power which has sacrificed the living standard
of its people for armament. According to a military
strategy expert, North Korea must have thrown the
nuclear energy-related technical personnel who have
been nurtured these 30 years or more into research work
aimed at producing atomic bombs, and the time has
come at last to reap the fruit.

This expert who holds a key post in our government said:
"It is expected that North Korea will possess an atomic
bomb in 1993. The information in our hands indicates
that the North Korean research reactor has the capacity
of producing an amount of plutonium sufficient to
manufacture one or two 20-kiloton atomic bombs equiv-
talent to the one dropped over Hiroshima. Other coun-
termeasures, in addition to diplomatic pressures, are
under study. If North Korea refuses to suspend nuclear
development, public opinion will come to demand that
we, too, develop atomic bombs in response."

The prevailing view is that if the development of an
atomic bomb by North Korea becomes a reality at a time
when it is engulfed by the gale of democratic movement
in the communist bloc, and when Kim Chong-il is ready
to succeed to power, the military balance on the Korean
peninsula will be radically destroyed and security based
on this balance will also become shaky. The current
military balance is based on this equation: North Korea's
overwhelming conventional military power + the infe-
rior ROK conventional military power + the nuclear
weapons of the U.S. forces in the ROK. North Korea has
already begun to use its nuclear bomb development as a
political weapon by demanding the withdrawal of U.S.
nuclear weapons in South Korea in return for accepting
international inspection of its nuclear facilities.

Nuclear Engineer Kyong Won-ha Invited From United
States

There is a basic difference between reaction to reports
about North Korea's nuclear development and that to
North Korea's Mt Kumsong Dam construction. With
respect to reports about the waterworks project of the Mt
Kumsong Dam, the United States was skeptical while
South Korea was certain. On the contrary, with regard to
reports on North Korea's nuclear development, the
United States is more certain, and South Korean nuclear
experts go along with the U.S. view.

In 1981, a U.S. intelligence group briefed high-ranking
ROK authorities on the fact that "the research reactor
North Korea has started building in Yongbyon is aimed
at manufacturing nuclear weapons." Last summer this
same intelligence group reported to concerned South
Korean officials that "North Korea seems to have com-
pleted a reprocessing plant in addition to the research
reactor, and that North Korea is expected to turn out a
nuclear weapon in 1990." In addition to the research
reactor and the reprocessing plant, the Yongbyon
nuclear center has a trigger testing ground on the white
sandy river bank. Rumor says that a U.S. spy satellite
captured a trigger testing scene.

Some nuclear scientists recently analyzed the pictures of
the Yongbyon nuclear facilities taken by a French satel-
ite, and came to the conclusion that the North Korean
research reactor is not, contrary to the original specula-
tion, the gas-cooling type using natural uranium as fuel
and graphite as a moderator, but is the heavy water-
cooling type using uranium as fuel and graphite as a
moderator. In their opinion, the reactor is too small to be of the gas-cooling type. Canada’s NRX is a common type of heavy water-cooling system. The annual plutonium generating capacity of North Korea’s 30,000-kw research reactor is 8 kilograms, equivalent to the amount needed to produce a 20-kiloton atomic bomb. (The specific gravity of plutonium is about 19, and the mass of 8 kg of plutonium is as large as a baseball.) Some estimate the plutonium separation and extraction capacity of the Yongbyon reprocessing plant at 6 kg per year.

In connection with the report that the research reactor is of the Canadian type, a concerned ROK agency turned its attention to Kyong Won-ha, former nuclear engineer in the United States. He took part in the manufacture of nuclear bombs at Los Alamos National Scientific Laboratory in New Mexico, and later while serving as professor at McGill University in Canada, he reportedly entered North Korea. Kyong is said to have entered North Korea with a large quantity of technological data, including data concerning the research reactor developed by Canada, adding spurs to nuclear development in North Korea.

ROK nuclear scientists also have a high appraisal of Yi Sung-ki, director of the Yongbyon Nuclear Energy Research Center. Dr Yi—the dean of the School of Engineering, Seoul National University, before the Korean war broke out—majored in fiber engineering in Kyoto University, and he is well known worldwide as a chemist who invented vinylon after choosing to live in North Korea.

Kim Il-song trusts Yi so much that when Kim visited the Yongbyon research center, he stayed with Yi in the same room. Chong Kun, a 1942 graduate of the Department of Physics of the Keijo Imperial University [predecessor of Seoul National University] in 1942, is also marked as a key figure in the atom bomb development project. Generally speaking, North Korea is strong in the area of chemistry. Chemical processes such as reprocessing and the operation of research reactor being the key to atom bomb manufacture, North Korea has a sound foundation for such manufacture.

Another reason that North Korea can develop an atomic bomb without any technical help from a foreign country is that it has uranium deposits.

The concentration rate of uranium ores abundant in South Korea is so low that it is not fit as fuel for research reactors, but the concentration rate of uranium ores available in North Korea is between 0.5 and 0.8 percent and can be used in the research reactor after going through the refining process.

A scientist who was a key participant in the nuclear development project in the days of President Pak Chong-hui said, “in those days there was a lot of confusion surrounding our nuclear development plan; but inasmuch as there is consistency in the direction of development in North Korea and there is a solid foundation, North Korea is ahead of us compared with the level of our technology in the 1970’s.”

Last Means of Deterrence

[Passage omitted] One of our government officials made this significant remark: “North Korea is developing means of delivering nuclear bombs. By remodeling Scud-B missiles introduced from the Soviet Union, North Korea is conducting tests designed to extend their range to 500 kilometers. We will ask the Soviet Union to stop North Korea from manufacturing nuclear bombs. I think when we take action, we will need understanding on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union.”

A concerned government official said that North Korea seems to have a psychological as well as an economic purpose.” According to him, North Korea has set it as an immediate goal to succeed in nuclear testing, rather than build a full-fledged nuclear force, and after developing one or two nuclear bombs, it will try to reduce its conventional force and pare down its military outlays.

For North Korea to become the world’s seventh nuclear power will give a great deal of self-confidence to the North Korean inhabitants. The same official said, “the next two years is the problem. First, we will wait for the United States and the Soviet Union to hold North Korea in check. Bush is so concerned that he is asking Gor-bachev to intercede. If the Soviet Union fails to check North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, it would become a stumbling block to U.S.-USSR disarmament talks.”

To assess our capability to counter North Korea’s atom bomb development, we should examine the nuclear development project in the period of President Pak. Some aspects of this project were overly exaggerated in the past. This reporter located the participants in this project and related top secret materials. [passage omitted]

Easy To Build Reprocessing Facility

Dr John R LaMarche [name as published] also pointed out that information necessary for designing an atom bomb is included in literature already made public, and parts and materials necessary for construction can be purchased on the open market. Uranium, plentiful everywhere in the world, is available at not too great a cost. He said that despite the international rules prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it will be impossible to block these countries [small and developing countries] from pushing the development of nuclear bombs. He concluded by saying that “it will be rather desirable to convince them logically that they have no need to develop nuclear weapons.”

According to Dr LaMarche [name as published], the minimum amount of plutonium necessary to make one nuclear bomb is four kg, and that of uranium necessary to make one enriched uranium nuclear bomb is 11 kg. The best type of research reactor that can be chosen by a country like North Korea which has no atomic power plant is a reactor which can use unprocessed natural
uranium as fuel and which can use graphite as a moderator and gas as a coolant. This primitive type reactor is similar to the world's first reactor built in 1942 at the University of Chicago by Enrico Fermi, the pioneer of atom bomb manufacture.

The detailed blueprints of this type of early reactor have long been made public; accordingly, it is easy to build a reactor by copying them. According to Dr Lamarche's [name as published] calculation, one construction engineer, one electric engineer, two mechanics, one metallurgical engineer, and three nuclear engineers are all that is necessary to command and supervise the construction of such a reactor. He maintains that in four years following the commencement of the construction project, the reactor will be in operation, and that in another year, a sufficient amount of plutonium to make one small atom bomb will be generated in the spent nuclear fuel. North Korea built its research reactor, which resembles the one described in Dr Lamarche's [name as published] report so much that it gives the impression that North Korea had followed his formula exactly.

Dr Kim Tong-kun, chief of the project group for the K-MRR (Korea multipurpose research reactor), which the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute has been building since last year at a cost of 70 billion won, had this to say: "The North Korean research reactor is extremely simple. If only we had had a desire to build one similar to that, we would have built it a long time ago. Compared with our K-MRR in particular, the North Korean reactor is terrible as far its engineering is concerned. However, the problem is that our research reactor, built with advanced technology, is for peaceful use, whereas the North Korea reactor, which is very crude in quality, is suitable for the production of plutonium.

Dr LaMarche [name as published] also submitted a research report on the nuclear fuel reprocessing capabilities of developing countries. His findings from this research were similar to those on the reactors for the production of plutonium. By using published literature and parts available in the open market, developing countries can easily build reprocessing plants and operate them. To extract weapons-grade plutonium by the reprocessing method, the fuel which has been burnt for about a year in a research reactor must be removed from the reactor and put in a reprocessing plant.

The natural uranium used in a 25,000-kw research reactor is about 60 tons, from which about nine kg of plutonium is generated. The spent nuclear fuel taken out of the reactor is stored in water for about 120 days to reduce its radioactivity. In the case of the spent nuclear fuel removed from the research reactor used for the production of plutonium, its radioactivity is reduced to about 55,000 curies per ton in 120 days. This is about 1/50 of 2 to 3 million curies per ton for the spent nuclear fuel removed from a commercial nuclear power plant.

The greatest technical problem involving reprocessing is how to move, break up, cut, analyze, dissolve, and separate the highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel by remote control after containing it in a shield. The construction, installation, and operation of the shield to seal off radioactivity and the remote control devices used in this process are the heart of the reprocessing process. This is to say that it is much easier to build and operate a research reprocessing facility for the extraction of weapons-grade plutonium, which handles much lower doses of radioactivity than commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities.

There are a lot of blueprints for plutonium reprocessing plants which have been made public. According to Dr LaMarche [name as published], the blueprint of the Barnwell reprocessing plant in South Carolina is available at libraries or can be purchased. He said that there is no need for highly trained personnel in designing, building, and supervising a reprocessing plant, and that these seven engineers would be sufficient: two chemical engineers, one construction engineer, one electric engineer, one mechanical engineer, one metallurgical engineer, and one nuclear engineer. According to his calculation, $25 million will be needed to build a reprocessing plant for plutonium extraction in the United States. [passage omitted]

Nuclear Issue Needs Public Discussion

As the saying goes, "for the sake of peace, we have to be prepared for war." In order to prevent war clouds from hanging over us by not permitting North Korea to develop an atom bomb and break the military balance on the Korean peninsula, the ROK will have no choice but to secure means necessary for the manufacture of atom bombs on the premise that it will not go so far as to actually manufacture them.

Any atom bomb in the hands of Kim Il-song and his son, who ordered the 21 January raid on the presidential mansion, the Aungsan bomb explosion [in Burma], and the blasting of KAL 858, is different from any other atom bomb in the world.

The man who stands near an adversary armed with a knife does not have to take up a club first, but he should have a club ready within his arm's reach.

In this case, the club means a reprocessing plant. Possessing a reprocessing plant is an important issue of national security strategy in two respects, namely, from the point of view of attaining self-support in atomic energy and from that of securing atom bomb manufacturing potential.

If this issue is left to bureaucrats or scholars, they will conduct research into reprocessing technology in such a manner as if they were stealing something, always trying to see how the United States feels about it.

Without exception, the concerned government officials or scientists the reporter met demanded that politicians,
diplomats, and journalists come out to make a public issue of this important matter. The issue of a reprocessing plant is not a simple question of whether or not to build just another factory.

In the event North Korea comes into possession of nuclear bombs, what will be the option of the ROK? One option will be to ask the United States to retain its nuclear weapons in Korea, but this would increase ROK subordination to the United States and further enhance U.S. influence on the situation on the Korean peninsula.

If South Korea is to secure a nuclear development capability as a countermeasure, it should call the United States to account for its failure to prevent North Korea’s nuclear development, before proceeding to build a reprocessing plant for peaceful purposes.

Kim Chong-il is clever and has quite an artistic propensity into the bargain. He is such a movie buff that he engineered the kidnapping of Sin Sang-ok and Choe Un-hui. The film library in Pyongyang built by him is said to be the world’s largest in scale. Director Sin said that in this library he saw the films of his own movies which cannot be found in South Korea.

Proof is turning up piece by piece indicating that Kim Chong-il, whose artistic obsession is so intense that he seeks to attain his objective by sacrificing everything once he sets his mind, is now pouring his passion into the development of a nuclear bomb.

It is in the military field in which North Korea, which trails South Korea in the diplomatic, economic, and ideological fields, is trying to hold an edge over South Korea to the end. A nuclear bomb may be a reliable security for North Korea, which is in crisis, and for Kim Chong-il, who is in the period of power transfer.

Making North Korea Realize Its Fallacy

Inasmuch as the nuclear bomb is a vital issue, it cannot be glossed over, for either side of North and South Korea. As is evident from Israel’s attitude, when a state feels its right of survival is in danger, it will instinctively take action in self-defense.

Inasmuch as Kim Il-song and his son have a strong obsession for nuclear development, South Korea’s determination to block North Korea’s nuclear development will grow stronger.

After the nuclear testing in 1974, India did not go so far as to manufacture nuclear bombs. Pakistan, too, although it has secured all necessary materials for nuclear bombs, is reportedly not proceeding to assemble them. Israel, although it possesses dozens of atom bombs, has made no formal admission of this fact and is rather engaged in psychological warfare by leaking the fact of possession to the press to scare the Arab countries. Some observers expect that North Korea will stop at succeeding in nuclear tests and then do its utmost to use this success as a political weapon. But it will anyway touch off a nuclear game on the Korean peninsula. The most desirable solution will be for South Korea to declare its intention to develop nuclear reprocessing technology for peaceful use on the basis of its powerful system of nuclear energy technology and make North Korea realize that its nuclear development will only court a far powerful counter-development on the part of South Korea, thereby inducing North Korea to abandon nuclear development voluntarily.

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development Discussed

SK2106030090 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean 18 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by reporter An Song-kyu]

[Text] A Western press report that says North Korea will be capable of producing nuclear weapons in six months is making the world nervous. If this report is true, another deadly tension factor will be added to the situation on the Korean peninsula, which is still not witnessing any lessening of military tension, and it will significantly disturb the overall military balance in Northeast Asia.

In particular, the six-month period noted in the report completely overthrows the previous Western appraisal of North Korea’s nuclear capability.

So far, North Korea’s nuclear capability has been expressed this way: “The present technological level of North Korea has not reached the stage where it can produce weapons; however, since it may try to produce weapons, we ought to place it under international surveillance.”

Wolfowitz, U.S. under secretary of defense, speaking last April on the potential development of nuclear weapons by North Korea, said, “North Korea has quite a way to go before it can produce nuclear weapons.”

The United States had faith in the Soviet Union’s thorough control over nuclear proliferation and North Korea’s lack of its own nuclear technology. Therefore, the Bush-Gorbachev talks and the subsequent U.S.-Soviet foreign ministers’ talks were focused on the potential future development of nuclear weapons by North Korea.

Moreover, there recently have been hints that North Korea might accept inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reducing worries about North Korea’s nuclear capability to a certain degree.

However, the recent report is all the more shocking because it overturned the current premises about North Korea’s nuclear capability. This is because the source of North Korea’s nuclear technology is East Germany and Romania, which are outside Soviet control. It is also because North Korea will be producing nuclear weapons in six months rather than five or six years, and because
North Korea’s acceptance of international nuclear inspection is not suitably workable.

Also, the fact that this information came from the Soviet Union is fairly convincing. Some consider it a mystery as to why the Soviet Union, which has so far thoroughly exercised its thorough control over the nuclear status of East Europe and the Third World with its enormous intelligence capabilities and which has not worried about North Korea’s nuclear capability to date, should have disclosed the information so suddenly, as if it had not known about it at all.

Because the United States has never disclosed any direct evidence about North Korea’s nuclear status, the Soviet official’s remarks remain unsupported by concrete proof.

Therefore, it is too early to assess the truthfulness of the Soviet official’s information. Some speculate that he may have made these remarks to exert international pressure on North Korea because, despite North Korea’s hint of accepting IAEA inspections, there still are unsettled problems between the Soviet Union and North Korea, or to exert pressure on North Korea to extensively transform itself.

Editorial: Vigilance on North’s Nuclear Weapons
SK2006125090 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
18 Jun 90 p 2


[Text] A report from London and Hong Kong on 17 June that North Korea is going to have nuclear weapons within six months greatly shocks and concerns us. If this report turns out to be true, it will inevitably pose a great threat not only to the Korean peninsula, where an atmosphere of detente and disarmament appears to be in the offing, but also to the political situation in East Asia as a whole, not to mention that it could have harmful effects on both. Moreover, if this is true, we should review our arms control policy as a matter of course, while it could also have an immediate effect on Japan’s military buildup.

What we must be particularly vigilant against at this juncture is North Korea’s double-dealing strategy. Although North Korea has recently presented to the South a conciliatory face, it has been quickening the development of formidable nuclear weapons behind a veil of proposals for disarmament and peace. According to an analysis of photographs taken by French and U.S. satellites, North Korea is believed to be capable of producing at least one nuclear weapon a year with the plutonium extracted from the spent uranium fuel at the research reactor in Yongbyon which has been in operation since 1984. Military experts believe that if North Korea has received technical assistance for producing nuclear weapons from East Germany and Romania, then it will be able to produce nuclear weapons within a short period of time. This theory is backed by the fact that North Korea has already deployed in areas close to the frontline improved, Soviet-made Scud-B missiles, which are thought to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

These new ballistic missiles have all of South Korea within their range. Furthermore, the problem is that North Korea last 31 May proposed disarmament talks with the South in a very active peace offensive, calling for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, for the signing of a declaration of nonaggression between the North and South, and for reducing armed forces below the level of 100,000 in both the North and South. We should remember our past experience and should be very careful and vigilant in responding to such proposals. Shortly before carrying out its southward invasion during the 25 June Korean war, North Korea was perfectly prepared to attack and then surprised the South with a peace offensive by proposing to hold North-South talks before carrying out the attack. It also proposed to hold talks with the South shortly before attempting to strike Chongwadae in 1968.

Each and every time, we have fallen victim to such double-dealing strategies. Experts around the world say that given the progress made in North Korea’s nuclear development, it may be too late to apply brakes to its nuclear development, even if North Korea signs the nuclear safeguards accord. Why is North Korea developing its nuclear weapons in such a hurry?

First, North Korea seems to have realized that given the economic capabilities of the North and South, the South will have military strength far superior to its own in a few years and that the best and simplest way of coping with it will be the development of nuclear weapons of its own.

Second, North Korea seems to think that once it has its nuclear weapons, it could force the United States to come to negotiations over the issue of withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea, its ultimate goal, as well as the removal of nuclear weapons that the United States has neither admitted nor denied having in the South.

Third, North Korea may seek to convince its reliable followers in the South that its strength is rising, not diminishing, and encourage them to continue to support North Korea. North Korea has not yet abandoned its ultimate goal of “liberating South Korea by force.” All this shows that North Korea is bent on acquiring nuclear weapons in order to have the upper hand in negotiations with the South over the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and in disarmament talks as well.

What we must do at this juncture is, first, fully mobilize our diplomatic effort in order to drive home the point as was discussed in the first Korean-Soviet summit talks, that North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons will jeopardize peace on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia and then to persuade the countries throughout the world to keep North Korea from getting nuclear weapons. Second, we must, without fail, make the topic.
of North Korea's nuclear weapons a precondition in our still-emerging arms control proposal to North Korea and stress the point that if North Korea pushes through the production of nuclear weapons, there is no point in continuing arms control negotiations or disarmament talks. The Korean peninsula is a place very sensitive and weak regarding nuclear weapons. We are very much concerned about this and, therefore, should be vigilant against North Korea's double-dealing strategy.

Reports on North's Nuclear Ability ‘Speculation’
SK1906100790 Seoul YONHAP in English 0905 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] Seoul, June 19 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korean Science and Technology Minister Chong Kun-mo on Monday responded cautiously to reports that North Korea will develop an offensive nuclear capability by the end of the year.

Returning from Vienna, where he attended an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors' meeting, Chong told reporters that it remained simple speculation whether North Korea had acquired the technological know-how indispensable for developing nuclear weapons.

"North Korea has a 30,000 kw-class experimental nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, 90 kilometers north of Pyongyang, and we cannot deny that it could make plutonium out of nuclear fuel used in the reactor, but it has not been confirmed if North Korea is equipped with processing facilities to extract high purity plutonium," he said.

Assuming that North Korea is now ready to develop nuclear weapons, he said, it is highly likely that they would use plutonium rather than concentrated uranium as raw material for the weapons, agreeing with foreign news reports. The 51-year-old Chong is an atomic expert and chairman of the IAEA General Assembly.

"The development of nuclear weapons is a matter of politics rather than of technology and primitive nuclear weapons can be made out of 1940s' technology, though state-of-the-art nukes are a different story," he said. "University students have the technological know-how to make a nuclear bomb."

North Korea has invited worldwide suspicion by refusing to sign the IAEA's nuclear safeguards agreement for 36 months after lapse of the 18-month signing period that began when it joined the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in december 1985.

"During the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, representatives from 20 nations, including the United States, the Soviet Union and East Germany, out of the 35 board nations, strongly urged North Korea to sign the agreement," Chong said. Signing would require Pyongyang to open its nuclear facilities to international scrutiny, and so far North Korea has repeatedly said it would sign the agreement only if all U.S. troops and all nuclear arms were first removed from the South.

"As North Korea informed the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, if Pyongyang sends negotiators to Vienna around July 10 and signs the accord, a provisional Board of Governors meeting will be held immediately to deal with the matter," Chong said. "However, if the North keeps withholding its signature without reaching the right conclusion, my sampling of international public opinion (in Vienna) tells me that North Korea will come under open fire from lots of nations.

"The possibility of North Korea's signing the accord is 50-50 and we have to wait and see what North Korea comes up with in two months. The bright side lies in North Korea's willingness to send negotiators and in its camouflaged but apparent bid not to be isolated."

Daily Speculates on North’s Nuclear Capability
SK2406121690 Seoul SEOUL SINCUN in Korean 19 Jun 90 p 5

[Article by reporter Yi Chang-sun: "Shocks and Ripple Effects of Speculation on the North's Manufacturing of Nuclear Weapons in Six Months"]

[Text] Is speculation on North Korea's nuclear development turning into a reality?

The foreign news report that says North Korea will possess nuclear weapons in six months shows that speculation on North Korea's development and manufacturing of nuclear weapons—speculation that has stirred a great deal of controversy but has remained just speculation—may possibly become a reality.

It is very likely that North Korea's development of nuclear weapons will not only aggravate tension on the Korean peninsula, the last showcase of the cold war, but also significantly threaten the overall military balance in Northeast Asia and the world in general.

Speculation on the possibility of North Korea's nuclear development did not just start yesterday. This speculation has persistently continued for several years. In addition to the nuclear power station that North Korea has been building in Yongbyon, U.S. satellite photos have shown facilities there that appear to be nuclear test sites and a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.

Nevertheless, experts in the United States and Western countries have so far been skeptical about North Korea's capability of manufacturing nuclear weapons. Last April, Wolfowitz, U.S. under secretary of defense, expressed doubts concerning the North's capability, saying that it is far from having the technology to develop nuclear weapons.

The United States has thought that even if North Korea may choose to manufacture nuclear weapons with Chinese assistance, it will take at least five years for it to
manufacture nuclear weapons and that it cannot manufacture nuclear weapons using its own technology because the Soviet Union has thoroughly controlled nuclear proliferation. The Soviet Union recently suspended the sale of four nuclear reactors and pertinent technology and materials to North Korea.

It has been generally agreed that North Korea's current technological level with regard to its nuclear capability is insufficient for it to manufacture nuclear weapons and that, merely because it may possibly manufacture nuclear weapons, it must be subjected to international scrutiny.

In particular, even North Korea itself recently hinted that it may sign the nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. On 14 June, Chong Kun-mo, minister of science and technology, who had attended a meeting of the IAEA Executive Committee, said that North Korea had notified the IAEA that it would send a delegation to the IAEA in July to discuss the issue of signing the nuclear safeguards agreement and that this notification was a meaningful "step forward" toward its signing of the agreement.

Under these circumstances, the foreign news report that North Korea will possess nuclear weapons in six months is shocking because it has fundamentally reversed the "established theory" on North Korea's capability for nuclear development. This report pointed out that North Korea can possess nuclear weapons in six months, not in five to six years, and that it acquired technology and materials necessary for manufacturing nuclear weapons from the previous regimes of East Germany and Romania, neither of which the Soviet Union had been able to control. This is a matter of grave concern.

Of course, we think that, because the Soviet official who leaked this story did not present evidence, this story is still speculative. However, the very fact that it is a Soviet official who leaked the story on North Korea's possible manufacture of nuclear weapons is noteworthy. Some people say that it is unexplainable why the Soviet Union, which had kept silent over North Korea's nuclear development, suddenly disclosed this information. Some other people say that this is a strategy to apply international pressure on North Korea to get it to sign the nuclear safeguards agreement.

However, it is a well-known fact that North Korea has done its utmost to develop nuclear weapons in an effort to acquire military superiority over South Korea. We think that, especially since Gorbachev's new thinking led to reforms in Eastern Europe and global reconciliation, Kim Il-song has felt it all the more necessary to possess nuclear weapons to counter the Soviet Union's pressure to open up. Kim Il-song may believe that if he possesses nuclear weapons he will be able to free himself from the Soviet Union's one-sided control or influence, at least to a certain extent.

Therefore, it is very likely for North Korea to further hasten its nuclear development, and some experts say that, irrespective of whether North Korea signs the nuclear safeguards agreement, it is already too late to brake its development of nuclear weapons. North Korea's efforts for nuclear development run counter to the era of East-West reconciliation. Moreover, they could likely turn the Korean peninsula, where signs of detente have resulted from the recent Korean-Soviet summit, into an area where a grave nuclear danger exists.

**Daily Says North Stockpiling Biochemical Weapons**

*SK2306021290 Seoul YONHAP in English 0159 GMT 23 Jun 90*

[Text] Seoul, June 23 (YONHAP)—North Korea has developed toxic gases and germ weapons and is stockpiling about 250 tons of those biochemical weapons for use in an emergency, the NAEOVE Press, Seoul's watcher of communist affairs reported Saturday. Quoting an expert well versed in the North Korean affairs, NAEOVE said North Korea has completed a mass production system of the biochemical weapons.

North Korea's strategy is to deal a critical blow to the South Korean armed forces by infiltrating commandoes into the South and let them spread a massive amount of the biochemical weapons in densely-populated areas in case of a war.

NAEOVE said that North Korea's three institutes, including the Microbic Institute of the Academy of Sciences for Medicine, began the development of the germ and gas weapons since November 1980 at the instruction of North Korean leader Kim Il-song.

North Korea produces 14 tons of a wide variety of biochemical weapons, including phosgen, mustard and nerve gases, a year in factories in eight regions, including Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province, and Shimneuju, North Pyongan Province.

The 250 tons of those weapons are stockpiled in six areas South of the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, including Sariwon, North Hwanghae Province, to save the time needed to be transported to the front areas in case of hostilities, it said. Pyongyang is about 220 kilometers North of the border with the South.

**Daily Calls for Withdrawal of Nuclear Weapons**

*SK2706045790 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean 26 Jun 90 p 2*

[Editorial: "Nuclear Weapons on the Korean Peninsula and Ending the Cold War"]

[Text] The United States has neither admitted nor denied the deployment of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. This has been the policy of the United States. Therefore, the types and number of nuclear weapons deployed on the Korean peninsula and in the area around it have not been officially released yet. Many foreign experts on military affairs, however, have
insisted that a considerable number of nuclear weapons have been deployed on the Korean peninsula and in the area around it.

According to the data announced by Selig Harrison of the Carnegie Foundation at the Cato Institute, there are 60 nuclear bombs for F-16 fighters stockpiled at Kunsan base, and 21 nuclear mines, 30 155-mm nuclear launchers, 40 eight-inch nuclear launchers, and 20 lance missile launchers capable of firing nuclear warheads are deployed in South Korea.

If Harrison’s report is true, it is clear South Korea—which has been known to be in a favorable position in the political and economic fields—has an advantage, in the military field as well, over North Korea, whose possession of nuclear weapons has not been confirmed. It is difficult to deny, granting there is no nuclear weapon deployed in South Korea, that South Korea, which is now under the strong military assistance and support of the United States—which has deployed powerful military forces equipped with nuclear arms in the area around the Korean peninsula—has an advantage over North Korea.

This notwithstanding, the two countries of South Korea and the United States have made no effort to reduce nuclear weapons and military strength deployed in this region, simply under the excuse North Korea is superior to South Korea in military power and that North Korea has not renounced its “wild ambition for a southward invasion.” They instead have urged North Korea to sign a nuclear safety agreement, which is an obligatory provision in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

For the United States to urge North Korea to sign a nuclear safety agreement while deploying numerous nuclear weapons in South Korea and the area around the Korean peninsula lacks persuasive power. As long as North Korea feels the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea, as well as the nuclear weapons it claims to be deployed there, is a threat to it, it is difficult to expect North Korea will sign a nuclear safety agreement, as urged by the United States, or accept any other disarmament proposal.

Therefore, if South Korea and the United States truly have the will to induce North Korea to come to the table of dialogue, they should first take steps to assure North Korea the nuclear armed forces deployed in South Korea and the area around it are not a threat.

The United States and the Soviet Union have declared the end of the cold war. But there have not been any moves for disarmament reported in Northeast Asia, as seen in Europe. Therefore, if the United States and the Soviet Union truly want to end the cold war system, they also should make efforts for disarmament in Northeast Asia.

THAILAND

Air Force Plans F-16 Upgrade

90WC0081A Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 8 Apr 90 pp 1, 2

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] A news report from the Government House informed MATICHON that at the cabinet meeting held on 4 April, the cabinet authorized the air force to sign an agreement for the purchase of two ATLIS Laser Designation POD for installation on F-16 aircraft. This will increase the capabilities of the F-16 fighter aircraft and enable this aircraft to carry out its combat mission in an efficient manner.

The report stated that the air force wants to purchase these two sets of equipment along with ground equipment, technical manuals, and parts over a two year period. It wants to purchase these items directly from the French Thompson-CSF Company at a CIF price at the air base in Korat, Nakhon Ratchasima Province. The total price will be $14.970 million, or 396,705 million baht (the exchange rate is 26.5 baht to the dollar).

The report stated that the cabinet has authorized the air force to use $2.994 million, or 79,341 million baht, in 1990 budget funds and $4.491 million, or 119,000,150 baht, and $7.485 million, or 198,3525 million baht, in 1991 and 1992 budget funds respectively to make the purchase.

The report stated that in accord with the F-16 purchase program, the air force has ordered a total of 16 aircraft. It has already received 10 aircraft and will start receiving the other 6 aircraft at the beginning of 1991.

Mr. Phichet Limsuwan, a physics instructor with the Faculty of Science at the King Mongkut's Institute of Technology, Thonburi Campus, said that he is a member of the Joint Armed Services Committee for the production of lasers for use by the military. The three branches of the service are very interested in lasers. He said that he is presently engaged in building a laser named YAG (yttrium aluminum garnet) to measure distance. This can be used in guidance systems to destroy enemy targets. It is thought that the laser systems installed on the F-16 aircraft that have been ordered will be of the same type. They will be used to guide missiles to their targets.

Mr. Phichet said that lasers are now being used a lot in industry and medicine. But they are still not used that much in the military. One reason for this is that Thailand cannot produce lasers itself. The Thai military has to spend at least 4 billion baht a year to purchase lasers. Thailand, particularly the Thai military, should produce lasers itself so that it doesn’t have to spend such huge amounts to purchase lasers from abroad.

A report from the air force informed MATICHON that this equipment is used for target searches and air-to-ground fire control. ATLIS stands for automatic
tracking laser illumination system. This system is suitable for use in low-attack, high-speed combat. The F-16 is the air force's only aircraft with such high performance capabilities.

The report stated that this system, which uses lasers to locate targets, is used by the air forces of many European countries. This is because it is very efficient and effective. This equipment weighs about 160 kg and is attached to the underside of the aircraft. This equipment is being purchased in accord with the air force's 10-year weapons purchase plan. [passage omitted]

**Air Force Plans Armored Platform Anti-Aircraft Missile**

90WC0081B Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 23-29 Apr 90 pp 11

[Text] Articles about events in the air force have appeared in several successive issues. This issue has a story about a new weapon being purchased by the air force. The air force is in a period of developing its weapons systems. As has been said, this is an "important period," because unless steps are taken now, it will not be possible to keep up with the changing technology and, what is important, prices will increase, too.

The weapons system discussed in this issue of LAK THAI has not yet been deployed in the air force. The air force is now trying to purchase this weapon. Air Chief Marshal Kaset Rotchananin, the RTAF CINC, has already approved the purchase. The matter will be submitted to Supreme Command Headquarters and then to the Ministry of Defense, which will have to find the budget funds for this.

The air force plans to buy this state-of-the-art ATLAS type anti-aircraft missile from the Thompson CSF Company. This air-to-ground missile has four tubes, and the missiles are guided to the targets by infrared beams. As is said, these missiles almost always hit the target.

Originally, the air force planned to purchase shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles in place of the "Bollbite" missile, which is now outdated. It was considering purchasing a shoulder-fired missile from China. But after considering the fact that we already have Sky Guard radar and the fact that this missile can be linked to that system, it was decided to purchase this missile, which will be more effective.

The air force plans to purchase four systems at a total cost of about 500 million baht. If everything goes as planned and the contract is signed, this weapons system should be deployed in about three years.

This 4-tube ATLAS missile uses an armored vehicle as a mobile firing platform. This purchase does not include the purchase of armored vehicles. Instead, the missiles will be installed on modified V-150 Commando vehicles. The RTAF Security Force already has such vehicles.

**Weapons Acquisition Plans Reported**

90WC0081D Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 14-20 May 90 pp 10, 11

[Text] Chinese Missile and Frigate

Work on the first "Chiang Hu" class frigate ordered by the navy from the Shanghai dockyard has now been completed. It uses a European engine. You will have to ask Udomsak Uchachin which make it is. The frigate will be equipped with Chinese-made C-801 missiles, which cost about 500 million baht apiece. This is a ship-to-ship missile. It is built by CPMIEC, or the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation. There is also the weapons equipment of the naval Anti-Aircraft and Shore Protection Command. The navy will purchase this equipment from China, too. This includes thirty-six 37-mm AAA guns. The air force has already purchased such AAA guns and deployed them in the AAA Regiment of the RTAF Security Force. The air force calls these 74-type AAA guns. These Chinese-made guns are quite well known. They are radar controlled and have a fire-control system. They are fired by highly skilled gunners. These guns are very accurate at a range of 3,500-4,500 meters. They weigh only 3.1 tons, which makes it easy to move them into place and set them up. Even though these were purchased on a government-to-government basis, China has a representative here, that is, the Natthaphon Company, which has a monopoly on Chinese weapons.

**Strengthen the Artillery**

Major General Suwit Chaiprapha, the commander of the Artillery Division at Lopburi, recently returned from a trip abroad, where he observed artillery activities. The Artillery Division will soon take delivery of the self-propelled artillery that was purchased last year. Most recently, the cabinet authorized the purchase of another 20 GHN-45 A.1 type 155-mm guns from Australia, logistics vehicles, and parts. This type of gun is said to have the longest range of any gun in the world. This column has previously reported the details about this gun. The guns that are being purchased will be deployed in the cavalry divisions so that they have their full complement of weapons. The artillery regiment of the Marine Division purchased six of these guns last year to supplement its existing guns.

**New Fighter Aircraft**

General Sunthon Khongsomphong, the supreme commander, said that Thailand has definitely decided not to purchase Chinese-made F-7 M aircraft. LAK THAI has reported on the air force's attempt to find an aircraft to replace the A-37 following a crash at the Muang Khom aerial weapons testing grounds at Lopburi. The air force grounded this aircraft while investigating the cause of the crash. LAK THAI has reported that the air force plans to purchase AMX aircraft from Italy to replace the A-37 aircraft. LAK THAI once published a picture of this type of aircraft. The picture showed an aircraft that was
taxiing down the runway early in the evening. Thus, the picture wasn’t clear. Thus, we have published another picture showing the AMX in flight so that readers can see a clearer picture of the fighter aircraft that will be deployed in the Thai Air Force.

Navy To Buy PRC Exocet Missiles

90WC0081E Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 21-27 May 90 p 11

[Article by M.C. Wan]

[Text] The navy has decided to procure Chinese-made C-801 Exocet missiles for deployment aboard the “Chiang Hu” class frigates that the navy has purchased from China. The international abbreviation for this type of missile is S.S.M. (surface-to-surface missile). Thus, some people wonder why the navy has decided to deploy this type of missile on its new Chinese-built frigate. A senior naval officer told M.C. Wan that China developed this weapon based on the French Exocet missile and that it has the same capabilities as the French Exocet. We chose the Chinese missile because it is much cheaper. In deciding which type of missile to deploy aboard the frigate, the navy considered almost every type of missile available, including the Harpoon, Tomahawk, Grabriel, Sea Killer, and Seagull. But one missile that was not considered was the Wiang Feng, a Taiwan-made weapon based on the U.S. Grabriel missile. We can’t purchase a ship from China and equip it with weapons made by Taiwan.

China modeled its missile on the Soviet SS-N-9 Siren missile. Later on, after stepping up its missile building program to export missiles to world markets, it purchased production plans based on the Exocet missile, the same type produced by West Germany together with the Exocet called the Franco-German A.N.S.

This is a very accurate missile. It is equipped with special equipment just like the Exocet, that is, it has ESM (electronic counter measures). It has a target and direction selection system and can be fired at the target ship using an indirect route.

After selling the C-801 missile to Thailand, China “proposed” selling us two other types of missiles, that is, the SY-3, which is a coastal missile used to sink ships at sea, and the SQ-2 J, which is an anti-aircraft ground-to-air missile. The SQ-2 J is a large missile that China has modeled on the Soviet-made SA-4 Kanef missile, which is installed on armored vehicles.
BULGARIA

Warsaw Pact’s Current Status, Future Role Viewed
AU2106174090 Sofia POGLED in Bulgarian
No 25, 18 Jun 90 p 6

[Foreign policy commentator Encho Gospodinov article: “The Warsaw Pact Is 35 Years Old and Seriously Ill”]

[Text] After 35 years of existence, after certain successes (now questioned), some failures (such as crushing the Prague Spring of 1968), after gigantic expenditures and the loss of large tracts of land crushed under weight of tanks during military exercises, the Warsaw Pact is now facing an unprecedented crisis in its history. However, those who are pressed to pronounce the diagnosis: “On the verge of death,” may be greatly disappointed. The Warsaw Pact is just seriously ill.

Mikhail Gorbachev, the reformer of our decade, hardly expected that his ideas on the common European home would so rapidly precipitate the Warsaw Pact organization into a state of partial paralysis. The stormy political changes in East Europe, Germany’s reunification, the new psychological atmosphere of mutual trust between Moscow and Washington, the emerging, considerable reductions of arms and armies, the new national interests of the European countries and the new priorities in their foreign policy—all these things contribute to the uncertain future of this military bloc and of its generals.

The Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders was in drastic contrast to the former “encounters of the third kind.” Gorbachev, De Maziere, Antall, Mazowiecki, and the others are already partners in a common dialogue and Moscow no longer plays the role of the “chief” in the political context of the present state of affairs. Hungary does not conceal its intentions to eventually withdraw from the organization. Havel also has his own ideas in this respect, proposing the establishment of a European security commission. The Poles are hesitating, while the Romanians, at least for the time being, are not up to discussions on the subject, while the East Germans, at least according to their present leaders, are ready to join NATO. Under these circumstances, Gorbachev’s idea of transforming the bloc from a military bloc into a political organization seems to find understanding. It is quite probable that at the next session, scheduled to take place in Prague, in November 1990, we may witness the total transformation of this organization which has evoked so many contradictory reactions over the last decades.

The assessment of the Warsaw Pact has never been unanimous. Today, however, it appears more clearly than ever that many East European countries hurt themselves and promoted their own political stagnation by sending their tanks to Prague in 1968. How many billions were wasted for the development of new weapons, which are now subject to reduction and destruction. How many talented scientists were engaged in developing new ammunitions and warheads, while millions of people in their countries are still dreaming of simple stoves, refrigerators, and washing machines. Nevertheless, the Warsaw Pact, which emerged under the pressure of cold war, has its supporters. They say that, perhaps thanks to the Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria’s security was more stable throughout the last years, considering that our country is condemned by historical and geographical circumstances to be Turkey’s neighbor. This applies in particular to the period following the occupation of Cyprus. The existence of the Warsaw Pact served perhaps as a psychological barrier against some more belligerent NATO strategists. It may also be assumed that the Warsaw Pact cooled some of the passionate hatred between its members, such as Romania and Hungary for example, which were rather exasperated at a certain moment, following the ethnic crisis and Ceausescu’s insane plans on dealing with the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Is it perhaps a coincidence that the majority of the Polish people welcomed Germany’s reunification in a civilized manner, while secretly relying on the Warsaw Pact in remembering their bitter experience with the Third Reich?

The picture is rather multicolored. Nevertheless, it is more than evident that things shall never be the same as in the past. The face of the enemy is fading. Europe’s political landscape is changing, and even some of its former state borders are disappearing. The former countries “where real socialism existed” are so engrossed in their economic difficulties that they are desperately looking for ways and means of reducing their expenditures, including their military ones, and the maintenance of the bloc is an expensive hobby today. The ethnic problems which some of these countries are confronted with, and this applies to the USSR in particular, make the danger of domestic conflicts more tangible than the possibility of an external military threat. Last, but not least: The elimination of the “big brother” role from the game calls for new rules. It is no coincidence if a Polish delegate in Moscow requested that the bloc’s future leadership be based on a rotating principle, and if the (still) tremendous combat strength of the Warsaw Pact should not be permanently entrusted to a Soviet general.

The requirement for change is evident. It is, however, also evident that, as long as the “bloc thinking” persists, as long as NATO remains on the scene, and as long as the German question has not found a generally satisfactory solution, the Warsaw Pact, although ill, is expected to live on, especially as long as no all-European security system has been established. Only in such an event could the two military blocs assume a purely political character, or even die a natural death—which would be perfect.

For the time being, however, they remain alive, and a 5-million strong army of soldiers, armed to the teeth, remain with them on both sides of the demarcation line—which is rather sad.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reduction in Size of Army Planned
AU2106185190 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak
18 Jun 90 p 3

[Unattributed report from the “In Brief” column]

[Text] CSFR Defense Minister M. Vacek has granted an interview to the Austrian daily A-REPORT. In the interview he stated that there are plans to reduce the size of the Czechoslovak Army from 200,000 to 140,000 men by 1993. By the end of the century, the Czechoslovak Army should gradually be transformed into a professional army which, however, would continue to be dependent on reservists. These should be trained in three to five-month training courses.

Official on Production of Armaments
LD2006212690 Prague CTK in English 1716 GMT
20 Jun 90

[Text] Prague, June 20 (CTK)—So far, the Czechoslovak armaments factories do not know whether their production will be limited, stabilized or developed, the Czechoslovak economic daily HOSPODARSKE NOVINY wrote here today.

The answer depends mostly on the results of the Vienna talks, on the new Czechoslovak defence doctrine and on the export possibilities, director of the special equipment department of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Metallurgy, Engineering and Electrical Engineering, Ladislav Nemec, said in the daily.

He pointed out that the production of special military equipment, including infantry arms, ammunition, telecommunications equipment, radars, equipment for pilots’ training and various kinds of artillery equipment, continues in Czechoslovakia.

As the world demand for arms is decreasing (the 1991 demand for tanks is only 10 per cent of that for 1988) the production must concentrate on the export of prospective types of special technique, e.g. the Army pilots’ training system “L 39” and the new “L 39MS” consisting of a plane, trainer and diagnostic equipment. For the production of this technique, Czechoslovak enterprises should seek partners abroad, even outside the CEMA countries frame, the Czechoslovak Government recommended.

Foreign countries have also shown interest in the Czechoslovak 9 mm hand gun, model 75, Ladislav Nemec said.

HUNGARY

Assembly Meets; Pact Withdrawal Resolution

Hegedues Addresses Assembly
LD2606114690 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0850 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Speech by Istvan Hegedues, deputy chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, at the National Assembly session in Budapest—live]

[Text] Esteemed Mr. Speaker, Esteemed National Assembly! I would like to return to the history of the proposal first. Indeed, as Miklos Vasarhelyi mentioned, we are considering the original proposals on our agenda submitted by him on behalf of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] as an emergency proposal, about one-and-a-half months ago. As you well remember, the House at that time did not accept the emergency provision, and the proposal was referred to the Foreign Affairs or Defense Committee for further consideration.

As Miklos Vasarhelyi said, this proposal has since been modified in several respects. First, it was modified with certain amendments proposed by FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats]. But the modifications were mostly a result of debates and work carried out in the committee.

The essential principle has changed on which Parliament will now—if they accept our proposal—state in the proposed motion the intention of leaving the Warsaw Pact. This reason is stated in paragraph 62 of the Vienna Convention, and not the Imre Nagy government declaration made on 1 November [1956]. This does not mean, however, that the committee differs in any way from the original point of view of the 1956 Imre Nagy government declaration; it only means that in terms of international law, we managed to find a better, more fortunate justification.

All six parties, which are represented in the committee, found that the 1 November 1956 Imre Nagy statement expressed both the will of the people of the revolution and the six parties represented in the committee. The spirit of the national will expressed during the elections this year reaches back to this Imre Nagy government declaration. I repeat once more that only the legal justification was worded differently by the opinion of the six-party committee.

I would also like to continue with what Miklos Vasarhelyi suggested, that this proposal is a joint effort by the six parties, and the significance of this must not be underestimated. We managed to prepare a balanced text which is acceptable to all.

I imagine that here, in the detailed debates, every party will have the opportunity to add their own observations and input to the proposal.
It is also extremely important that there is no question of a unilateral intention of leaving the Pact. The proposal clearly states that our leaving the Warsaw Pact should be carried out on a negotiated basis by the government.

I do not wish to read out the proposed motion, as it must be in front of every member of parliament; I would only add a few short observations to a number of points.

I have already talked about the first point, which links the basis of the justification for leaving the Pact to the Vienna Convention. I want to draw your attention to the sentence which says that it is desirable for the government to carry out negotiations about leaving the Pact with every member state.

I would add a short comment to the second point. According to the text, the government, as a first step toward leaving the Warsaw Pact, would suspend participation in the military organization of the Pact. This point must also be interpreted that during the negotiations about leaving, withdrawal from the military organization should be the first aim. I want to add that this statement, to some extent, as Miklos Vasarhelyi indicated, is linked to a previous proposal put forward one-and-a-half months ago indicating that, even if time runs out, the proposal relates to the existing situation.

What has happened is that the government, during the Moscow discussions, adopted sections of the proposal which are not included in the one presented to Parliament. In spite of this, I think that a parliamentary motion, even if it is in tune with the daily activities of the government, naturally reinforces the government, gives it greater authority if it is known that some of their activities enjoy the support of all six parties, or that the government acted in accordance with the wishes of the six parties concerning the question of leaving the Warsaw Pact.

To the third point—that is the third point of the proposed motion—I would add a short comment. Concerning the interests of Hungary; we tried to word the text in a dynamic sense, trying not to start from a static position. Therefore, the text demands that the government fulfill Hungarian interests.

I do not wish to add to the fourth and fifth points; they are self-evident. The question here is the creation of an all-European security system, toward which the government must make every effort; concerning the member states of the Warsaw Pact, we wish to continue fruitful cooperation, while at the same time it is obvious that the bilateral friendship and cooperation treaties have to be reexamined; because these were made earlier, their spirit and content are largely, or completely, obsolete.

Naturally, as a presenter for the Committee, and once again stressing that all six parties supported the proposal without reservations, I can only recommend that the House accept the proposal. Thank you!
between two blocs. Between the two world wars Germany was also squeezed between rival blocs. This became dangerous for Europe.

Likewise, we would consider it dangerous if the United States and Canada were to pull out of the European processes and if we were to now use the current political situation to push the iron curtain further to the East and to try to exclude the Soviet Union from Europe. An isolated position for the Soviet Union could be extremely dangerous for Europe. And naturally, the government is trying to do its utmost so that Hungary, having left the Warsaw Pact, would not end up in an isolated situation. First and foremost, the government has already begun to reexamine the bilateral friendship and mutual assistance treaties, not only to delete from these treaties all the points which guaranteed the possibility of military intervention,—which have left behind bad memories—but also to conclude bilateral agreements with all of the countries which up to now have belonged to the Warsaw Pact; so that we establish what the treaty has meant for us up to now.

Obviously, our obligation to withdraw from the military agreement means that we do not participate in this year’s military exercises, nor permit anything of this type on Hungarian territory. Along with bilateral negotiations, we would like to pursue the possibilities within regional cooperation, both trilateral agreements and possible Alps-Adriatic cooperation—thus pentagonal relations, too—so that the country will not be threatened by remaining outside Europe. We would like to achieve a sort of cooperative status [kooperativ status] in Europe.

The government proposed at the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee that the consultative body should decide to set up a special government commission. It will be comprised of ambassadors and special representatives, which will reexamine the character, functions, and operations of the Warsaw Pact, and will, by the last quarter of this year, make concrete proposals to the consultative body, including the gradual deletion of sections on military cooperation, taking into account the development of the European security and cooperation process. Budapest is willing to provide a venue for this objective in November for an extraordinary session of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee.

In conclusion, I would like to mention another one of the government’s intentions: The government wants to examine the possibilities for developing an initiative in which we would launch in Hungary the operation of a permanent Warsaw Pact—NATO working (‘body), which would constitute one of the achievable elements of an all-European security structures.

I recommend that the National Assembly’s draft resolution—that of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Defense Committee—be adopted, not only because it fully accords with the government’s intentions, but also because it means a sort of special authorization for the government, which it can rely on more than the three government parties’ natural solidarity. This will always be our intention in Hungarian foreign policy, in Hungarian security policy. We want to pursue a policy which meets with the agreement of the entire house, all of the six parties. [applause]

Assembly Supports Pact Withdrawal
LD2606144390 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1320 GMT 26 Jun 90

[From the live relay of the National Assembly session in Budapest]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [National Assembly President Matyas Szuro] Esteemed National Assembly;

Now follows the vote. I ask the esteemed National Assembly whether it wants to adopt the draft National Assembly resolution on the relationship of the Republic of Hungary and the Warsaw Pact. Please vote.

[Unidentified correspondent] The resolution asks the government to begin negotiations on leaving the Warsaw Pact—first and foremost—based on the clause in the Vienna convention which refers to a fundamental change in the circumstances in which the treaty was concluded. First, Hungarian participation in the Warsaw Pact military organization must be halted.

A total of 232 deputies have voted in favor without any votes against, and there are four abstentions. [passage omitted]

Defense Committee Supports Soviet Withdrawal
LD2606151790 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0858 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Speech by Defense Committee Chairman Gyorgy Balogh at the National Assembly in Budapest—live]

[Text] Mr. Speaker, esteemed National Assembly. During the election campaign, the people repeatedly demanded that the Soviet soldiers leave our country’s territory as soon as possible. This demand, and related inquiries, was noticed abroad. When I participated in discussions of delegation leaders at the Bonn session of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, nearly every delegation leader focused on the matter. A few weeks ago, the Italian defense committee visited our country, and Soviet withdrawal was one of the most important topics of inquiry for the committee. Yesterday, when the U.S. military delegation visited us, they were also primarily interested in this issue.

Therefore, the motion submitted by Miklos Vasarhelyi is topical, timely, and the National Assembly should deal with it. Because of the way it was submitted, it not only fell incorrectly under the purview of the [National Assembly] Foreign Affairs Committee, but also under the purview of the Defense Committee, and this is explained in the second and third points of the draft resolution. Before I approach an analysis of the issue
from the Defense Committee's perspective, allow me to say that Hungary, at the end of World War II—as a result of its geopolitical situation—figured as a boundary for interest and ideological spheres. This resulted in its entrance into the Warsaw Treaty, along with the military component of the Warsaw Treaty, because it had lost its independence. Hungary was unable to discuss having an independent military doctrine, instead it became part of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty—more specifically—of the Soviet Union.

This necessarily raises the requirement for us to shape an independent Hungarian military doctrine, and from a military viewpoint, this is currently the primary task. It is easy to say that within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty—which represents a political and military complex—we should immediately and impatiently abolish our membership, but the realization of this—I emphasize that I approach the matter from the aspects of military policy—is not so simple. Why not? The Soviets have to transport back to the Soviet Union a standing military force some 1,769 trains. According to current plans, they will meet their obligations by some 70 percent by the end of 1990, 20 percent by next February, and 10 percent by the end of next June. Included are some 260 trains, whose fate has not yet been decided, as the Hungarian state may need some of them.

There is a basic problem we have to resolve here. Not only are there political objectives, but economic and accounting objectives as well. We consider it expedient if we separate the accounting responsibilities, as their implementation requires much more time than actually transporting troops out—that is pulling them out. What do I mean? The claim that the Soviets have submitted amounts up to 50 billion forints—that is 2.7 billion rubles—to us; due to a lack of time, I won't detail what is involved, and why the Hungarian side can accept this claim only to a value of 10 billion [forints]. While settling accounts, one must weigh the past and determine what the value of use of the premises is, which was never taken into account, how many Soviet investments have been liquidized. Overall, in the final analysis, this would stop at 10 billion. We must pay attention to these responsibilities, and to how the military assets are freed during disarmament, assets which must be altered for civilian use; how this will take place, and how defense, which is more important than anything else from the Hungarian nation's perspective, is realized in the independent Hungarian military doctrine.

All in all, the Defense Committee accepts the draft resolution, and asks the National Assembly to adopt it as well.

Resolution Outlined
LD2606162590 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungary 1520 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Report by unidentified correspondent from the National Assembly session in Budapest—live relay]

[Excerpt] I shall turn to today's outstanding event, to the National Assembly's adoption of the resolution on the Republic of Hungary's relationship with the Warsaw Pact.

Hungarian legislature asks the government of the Republic of Hungary, on the basis of the 62d clause of the Vienna convention, referencing the fundamental change in circumstances in which the treaty was concluded, to begin negotiations on the withdrawal of our country from the Warsaw Pact. The preamble of the resolution recalls that on 1 November 1956, the Hungarian Government stated its intention to leave the Warsaw Pact. However, at that time, the military intervention on 4 November, which overthrew the government, prevented the statement's legality. For this reason, the newly elected National Assembly now—again—states that our country intends to leave the Warsaw Pact.

The resolution also states that it is desirable to negotiate an agreement with every member state, every member state of the Warsaw Pact, that our country should not and will not be a member of the Warsaw Pact.

The resolution continues that as a first step, the government should halt Hungarian participation in the Warsaw Pact military organization. The Hungarian Army should not take part in joint military maneuvers, nor should the troops of the Warsaw Pact be able to hold military exercises on Hungary's territory.

The National Assembly asks the government, in the course of the negotiations, to pay attention to our country's security, political, legal, and economic interests, and it should ensure that these interests are asserted.

It is also important that the National Assembly asks the government to begin negotiations with the Warsaw Pact member states on reexamining the bilateral friendship and mutual assistance treaties. It is necessary to delete from these treaties everything which gives authorization for military intervention or, in some other manner, violates our country's sovereignty.

In conclusion, the National Assembly resolution declares that the Republic of Hungary wishes to live in peace and friendship with all of its neighbors. It will not allow anyone to use the country's territories for the purpose of attacking or threatening a third state. The Hungarian Government will also be committed to creating an all-European security system, and it will inform the Warsaw Pact member states—with whom it will strive for future, fruitful economic and cultural relations—about these diplomatic efforts. [passage omitted]

Horn on Pact Withdrawal, Soviet Troops
LD2606155490 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0920 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Speech by Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gyula Horn at National Assembly session in Budapest—live]
This past month has given us the opportunity to debate the most important elements of the proposal from the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free democrats] faction, according to Miklos Vasarhelyi. I personally believe that the main problem with the proposal was that it did not consider all the interests and perspectives which are indispensable for a question of such import. For a country as small as Hungary, it is extremely important to first consider, analyze, and then take concrete steps. I must say, and as Miklos Vasarhelyi has also acknowledged, the Foreign Committee has not only done much work on the subject, but has also implemented very many concrete correctional steps in the text.

Regarding the operational activity of the government: I can agree with what our delegation represented at the Moscow summit, and our government's negotiations—it initiated a new way without causing unbearable tensions. And yet, the Hungarian Government was left standing alone in Moscow with its intentions.

If we consider the stands expressed in Moscow of the other member states it is unequivocal that the Warsaw Pact Organization must be modernized, restructured—but nobody supports any kind of hasty decision or step which would, for example, aim at the premature or immediate end of the Warsaw Pact. I would recall Havel's foreign policy, which was formulated in Warsaw and Copenahgen, that it is the interest of the Warsaw Pact and all of Europe that the Soviet Union remains inside this alliance, for without this, the Soviet Union would be shut out of Europe.

So, we have to implement a withdrawal—and the Foreign Affairs Committee supports this—which does not cause any damage to our national interests, and to the process of detente. Nor should it endanger the country, particularly if we consider the tensions of our neighbors manifesting themselves, and the anti-Magar outbursts.

I also consider it extremely important that the Foreign Affairs Committee also very thoroughly analysed the international political, economic, and other elemental factors connected with the withdrawal. As a matter of fact there was agreement in this as well, albeit with great difficulty.

Concerning negotiations which the government wishes to carry out, I would like to raise the following—that is, draw it to the attention of the government. First, we must make every effort not to unsettle, or perhaps make impossible, the Hungarian negotiating position in Vienna on the 23rd. This is a crucial interest not just for Hungary but for the whole process of detente; without this, the disarmament steps which we are expecting from this agreement cannot be implemented in Central Europe, southeastern Europe, all of Europe.

Second: I also consider it extremely important to begin negotiations as soon as possible, along with the negotiations concerning Warsaw Pact, to guarantee Hungary's security. I call my esteemed deputy companions' attention to the fact that this among other things is also a condition of Hungary's ability to join the Western European integration systems. They can only accept us if Hungary has adequate guarantees of security at her disposal. The signing of new bilateral agreements, first and foremost with out neighbors, must be initiated. I am thinking of the agreement which we initiated last year with our Moscow partners: Hungarian-Soviet relations must have new contractual bases. The same applies in a wider sphere, primarily—apart from our Warsaw Pact neighbors—with Italy, which is very important from our strategic position, as it is in the same situation. It is also worth considering how a valid and modernizable bilateral agreement between the GDR and Hungary can be asserted in the case of the new unified Germany.

I do not need to go into our interests connected to this. So, I would call it to the esteemed government's attention that they should definitely incorporate these points of view—assert them during the course of negotiations.

One more thing: Gyorgy Balogh, my fellow deputy, spoke about the stance of the Defense Committee. I am sorry that the related arguments were not voiced, but I think the Defense Committee will debate and analyze what will become of Hungary's future military procurements, the sources for modernizing its army, and so on. It is a generally known fact, for example, that around 100 billion, forints would be needed to finance a reorganization of air defense alone.

It is also obvious that we must turn attention to a modernization implemented with circumspection, especially given the situation which has emerged. I would also call Gyorgy Balogh's attention to the fact that we should not formulate any kind of prior sum, concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In my opinion, when both negotiationing delegations consider everything, it is conceivable, moreover desirable, that not one filler compensation will need to be paid. [applause]

I would also emphasize that this can and must be achieved through negotiations, but with a very determined representation of Hungarian interests. Thank you for your attention.

Tamas on Soviet Withdrawal
LD2606164390 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Speech by National Assembly duty speaker Gaspar Miklos Tamas at the assembly session in Budapest—live]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Our deliberate and gradual distancing from the Warsaw Pact has another aspect too; it is the Soviet troop withdrawal. Here I need to call the attention of the esteemed house in connection with this. I must refer to two statements, one made by the deputy chairman of the defense committee of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the other by Colonel General Burlakov, Commander of the Soviet Southern Army...
Group, the commander of Soviet troops which—
hopefully—this time really are stationed only tempo-
arily in our homeland.

Both statements urge compensation and material repara-
tion from the Hungarian state in the case of various
assets left behind by the Soviet troops. I do not want to
go into the various book-keeping calculations—I think
that these sums are debatable—this is not what I would
want to talk about, but about the fact that Colonel
General Burlakov and his colleagues too must learn that
they cannot speak in this tone to the sovereign Hun-
garian National Government. [applause]

I am not saying this because I believe that the leaders of
the Soviet Union need be lectured by the Hungarian
National Assembly. I think that they are considerate
politicians, and if such a statement is voiced then we
really must take it seriously in this way—that we reject it.
[passage omitted]

Antall on 1956 Decision

LD2606123490 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1031 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Speech by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall at the National
Assembly session in Budapest—live]

[Text] Excuse me, Mr. Speaker, I shall be very brief. In
order to reassure my fellow-deputy and friend, Imre
Mecs, I should like to say that not only in the resolution,
but in Moscow—in the course of political talks and at the
conference itself—it was said in the Hungarian Govern-
ment delegation's submissions and is in the documents,
that in 1956, Imre Nagy's revolutionary government
passed a firm decision on Hungary's withdrawal from
the Warsaw Treaty. Thus, in the course of the talks in
Moscow, it was stated in an official speech and placed in
the minutes. Therefore, the question of 1956 and what
the stance of the Imre Nagy government has been
explained: it is contained in the documents. That is one
thing I wished to say.

The other thing, which was said by fellow-deputy Bela
Kiraly, refers specifically to the 1956 stance, one part
being a Government statement. Precisely because these
matters are arising—on several occasions both abroad
and here at home—we have said that there occurs
historical situations in which, precisely because there is
not even the last straw [of hope], political morale comes
to the fore. In 1849, the Olmutz constitution justified the
measure—much-disputed politically—that resulted in
the 1849 dethronement. The historical reflex in 1956
was exactly the same as the 1849 dethronement.
Everyone knew exactly that in this historical situation,
there was no more chance. In this historical situation, the
Government stated its intention that there should be no
possibility of an argument for direct intervention. We
knew that it did not alter the historical facts, and agrees
with reality exactly as Bela Kiraly said. After, or rather
parallel to, the statement, the committee designated for
cease-fire talks was set up—Geza Losonczy, Jozsef
Kovago, and others, I also had the fortune to go with the
delegation. I have exact knowledge of the details; this
agrees with it, and this entire 1956 experiment, and its
legal, political, and moral aspects constitute part of our
talks in Warsaw. I should like to reassure all those who
might have wished for divergence of any type; this exists
in exact form, and is in the minutes.

The third thing: such matters arise in the course of talks
abroad. Now, too, they have arisen. Naturally, these
questions are asked, and I believe that in every case we
have been able to reply that Hungary did not wish, in the
past period either, to promote conservation of a status
quo, and as part of a new European and political security
system, it chooses to play the role of front-runner in
these matters. Therefore, we, now too, are seeing that
this is carried out, and if we raise the issue—not through
unilateral talks, but through the appropriate procedure
of negotiations and not unilateral withdrawal—the
Western great powers may accept this, just like—
hopefully—our partners will, in the appropriate time.
Thank you. [applause]

POLAND

Past, Present ‘Morality’ of Polish Arms Sales Viewed

90WC0078A Warsaw PRAWO I ZYCIE in Polish
No 17, 28 Apr 90 pp 1,12

[Article by Janusz Tycner: “Let Us Not Be Death Mer-
chants: Poland Should Not Sell Arms”]

[Text] We have at last lived to see the day when in
Warsaw, too, the matter was posed clearly: Poland is
selling arms and military equipment, and not in sym-
bolic quantities at that. An until recently “nonexistent”
issue suddenly appeared in official comments and in the
press as a most ordinary issue. Politicians and journalists
discuss commerce in death as if it were like any other
business.

“There is nothing to be ashamed of,” TYPONIK
GDANSKI argues. “Arms have always been good busi-
ness, and usually one certain of making profits. On
condition that they are sold for cash or to customers
whose chances for military or political success are good.”

“The Others Are Making Deals, So Why Not We Too,”
was the heading of a report on a press conference
attended by Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation
Marcin Swiecicki and dealing with arms exports, pub-
lished in RZECZPOSPOLITA. “Arms are traded by
many countries, even the neutrals. Why should not
Poland also sell them, especially considering that it can
thus earn hundreds of millions of dollars? Let us have
the courage to begin, at least in this field, to score financial
successes.”

Several days later the same RZECZPOSPOLITA com-
plained because “Our arms exports do not include even
one fighter plane or homing (intelligent) missiles of the, e.g., ground-to-air or ground-to-ground types. It is precisely for these kinds of arms that buyers with suitcases stuffed with hard currency are most readily found."

Following the disclosures about the previously supersecret Central Board of Engineering [CENZIN], a foreign trade enterprise with monopoly on concluding transactions of this kind, it turned out that Poland, although ranking only in the third 10 of arms-exporting countries, has plenty of arms to offer. We sell An-2 transport aircraft, Iskra training aircraft, Mi-2 helicopters, T-72 tanks, armored transporters, cutters and assault ships, armor-piercing projectiles, grenades, firearms, artillery ammunition, and handgun ammunition.

Such sales have been prompted until recently by their high profit margins. As recently as 2 years ago Poland was paid $33 [US] for every kilogram of a tank's weight, $36 for every kilogram of a cannon's weight, and $228 for every kilogram of a rocket projectile's weight, while at the same time it was paid $6.2 for every kilogram of a tape recorder's weight and $1.75 for every kilogram of a passenger car's weight. The tank factory in Lądek alone has so far earned $1.5 billion and 2 billion rubles from its exports.

"Unfortunately," RZEZCZPOSTPOLITA deplores, "each year the revenues from arms exports have been markedly declining. Thus while in 1986 they totaled $234 million, last year they totaled only $73 million."

That is because Polish military equipment is becoming obsolete, the number of regional conflicts has markedly declined, and the world is disarming. In this connection, the employees of Polish armaments plants are threatened by unemployment, the more so considering that the Polish army itself is reducing its orders and the huge funds needed to modernize production are not available.

Thus, a debate concerning the manufacture and sales of arms has just begun in Poland. In the thicket of imposing figures, rational arguments about profitability, and assurances that anybody who does not sell arms is a sucker because then competitors sell them and profit from them, are lost the rationales of incorrigible "lofty souls" who, instead of counting dollars, ask how many people have been put to death by the somewhat obsolete but still, as CENZIN asserts, reliable weapons and ammunition "Made in Poland."

If the claims of our traders are to be believed, everything was done in accordance with the rules binding on "civilized" arms trade. They do not sell armaments simultaneously to both sides in a conflict, and they do not engage in any transactions with terrorists. Nevertheless, the terrorists who had several years ago perpetrated massacres in a Parisian synagogue and on the Ankara airport, fired Polish-made RAK submachine pistols. They landed in their hands through a circuitous route, without the manufacturer's knowledge. Even so, the world has learned that Polish arms served as an instrument of crime.

Like their colleagues abroad, Polish officials try to produce the impression that the arms trade is divided into "moral" and "immoral" trade. Of course, they engage in the former, pose hard terms, verify the buyer's reputation, and sell only marked and recorded weapons.

That is how the list of confidential customers for Polish arms included Colonel Qadhafi and the President of Iraq Sadam Hussein. The former is universally accused of supporting international terrorism and the latter of launching a horrible war against Iran and gaining notoriety by bestial tortures and mass executions of political adversaries as well as the extermination of the Kurdish population. In addition to all kinds of weapons from the world over, Hussein's soldiers also had at their disposal the somewhat obsolete but reliable arms "Made in Poland."

At present all that we know about the Polish arms trade is what the persons practicing it want to tell us. Their disclosures were compelled by circumstances, and specifically by the assault of Eritrean guerrillas against a Polish freighter, "Bolesław Krzywousty," which clandestinely supplied arms to yet another trusted and tested customer of our armaments industry, the dictator of Ethiopia, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, whose regime has on its conscience the lives of tens of thousands of human beings. As for the manner in which it wages war against the obstinate Eritreans with the aid of, among other things, Polish arms, it is simply barbaric.

That precisely is why it would be good if a competent Senate or Sejm committee would start investigating all such transactions from the standpoint of respect for human rights. We should know the entire truth—not in order to pour salt into wounds but in order to prevent instances of this kind in the future. For only openness, only public knowledge of actions that have been totally secret in the past, can result in our ceasing to be the suppliers and thereby also de facto allies of regimes having, to say the least, an ambiguous reputation.

For the last few weeks the authorities have been trying to produce the impression that a new and improved era has arrived in Polish arms trade. The time of shamming that there is no such trade is over, and tanks will be no longer listed on bills of lading as tractors, nor will ammunition be listed as nuts and bolts for railbeds. The monopoly of CENZIN is over. Any producer and middleman is now free to sell arms abroad on his own, of course after obtaining the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which will prepare a "blacklist" of countries with which arms trade is prohibited.

Unfortunately, these changes promise nothing good. The elimination of the State's export monopoly on the lucrative arms trade will necessitate monitoring henceforth not only but some 15, and in the not distant future several score companies of which a majority will certainly be private and struggle to survive. By what methods? At the moment, many companies are applying for export permits (also including
permits for the exportation of explosives). Six enterprises of the armaments industry also have submitted permit applications.

Our system for licensing the arms trade is to be made similar to the Western system. But it suffices to glance through Western newspapers in order to see that the Western system is far from perfect.

In Linz right now there began a trial of 18 employees of Nordicum, a state company, accused of supplying to Iran, during the war with Iraq, arms worth US$300 million even though Austrian law prohibits transactions of this kind with countries in a state of war. The company was threatened by bankruptcy and so leading politicians (the chancellor, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of internal affairs, and the minister of finance) closed their eyes to the fact that the accused forged bills of lading in order to conceal the true destinations of the weapons. The shipments were supposedly addressed to Argentina, Brazil, Yugoslavia, Libya, and Thailand, and one ammunition shipment was even supposedly consigned to Poland.

Despite the rigorous prohibitions, blueprints for building a modern submarine reached South Africa from the FRG, from which also facilities for building an atomic bomb reached Pakistan. Swedish companies have been supplying arms to Israel for a long period of time, while numerous Italian enterprises have been regularly and fully supplying the needs of terrorists in the Near East, etc., etc. Not a year passes without at least several scandals of this kind breaking out in West Europe and the United States, on which we are to model ourselves.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is currently drafting the aforesaid “blacklist” and soon we are sure to learn which countries it names. It should definitely name a majority of the Third World countries, because they are plagued by either guerrilla warfare or turmoil, or by an unstable political situation that threatens to erupt into violence at any moment. We could export arms with a clear conscience to Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, or the FRG, but the problem is that in those countries nobody needs our somewhat obsolete but still reliable armaments.

It looks like we shall continue to sell arms to the Third World and pretend that everything is just hunky-dory. Yet, it can be readily foreseen that, now that the CENZIN’s export monopoly has been abolished, Polish submarine guns, grenades, and armor-piercing projectiles will increasingly end up where they are not supposed to be. To prevent this, the Polish military intelligence service should be expanded so that it may verify the reputation of arms buyers, trace the ultimate recipients of arms shipments, and explore a market which, by its very nature, does not bear close watching. This market is ruled by absolute laws, as experienced by the seamen from “Boleslaw Krzywousty” on their own skin, and as may in the future be experienced by the staffs of Polish embassies, tourists, and passengers on Polish aircraft.

The issue of the arms trade will soon begin to be deliberated by the Sejm. Instead of erecting relatively ineffective barriers, should not Sejm deputies gather the courage of deleting Poland from the list of exporters of homicidal weapons?

**Soviet Commander Confirms Naval Base Existence**

AU1806183790 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13-14 Jun 90 p 2

["Fed"-signed report: "The Base Exists"]

[Text] “Four missile boats and the same number of antisubmarine-warfare craft equipped with torpedo launchers make up the Soviet small naval combatant brigade in Swinoujscie,” said Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Kudryavtsev, commander of the base, on 12 June. This information was made public for the first time on 12 June: In theory the base has not existed until now.

**Ministry Official on Importance of Arms Trade**

LD1806151790 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1005 GMT 18 Jun 90

[Excerpts] Ladies and gentlemen, things that were once taboo can be talked about today without any inhibitions:

[Begin recording] [Unidentified reporter] Now one can talk openly about the fact that we have been trading in arms for many years and that we are doing a perfectly good business from it. Many people are employed in this economic sector and the possible liquidation of these industrial enterprises would quite simply be tragic for Poland right now. Hundreds and thousands of people would be thrown out onto the street. Director Krzysztof (Jakubiszyn) from the Ministry of Overseas Economic Cooperation: Director, we trade, make money, and we are paid by everyone?

[[Jakubiszyn]] Nearly everyone pays us. There are cases where some, fortunately not many, of our partners are behind in their payments for the delivery of arms. One should mention Syria here. We are in the process of negotiating now on ways to obtain the money owed to us. We are prepared to accept the money in the form of goods—of course, goods that would be useful to the Polish economy. Also, at a certain time, there were difficulties in obtaining money owed to us from Iraq, but at the beginning of this year that was brought to a happy end by minister Swiecicki’s talks in Baghdad. In the first days of May, as a result of negotiations, we came to an agreement, and we are receiving a considerable portion of the money owed to us as crude oil.
[Reporter] Iran, however, does not owe any money?

[(Jakubiszin)] Yes, Iran is solvent. It is a country with a very good financial standing. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] As we can virtually talk about anything, please tell me what we are selling. I am thinking about arms.

[(Jakubiszin)] Yes. Ammunition, fire arms, armored vehicles, tanks, naval craft, aircraft, radio tracking stations, radar components. Very, very various things, some of which have an enormous content of very modern technology. [end recording]

Soviet Troop Withdrawals From Torun Continue
LD2306021190 Warsaw PAP in English 1851 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] Torun, June 22—The first stage of withdrawing Soviet troops from Torun ended today when the last column of forty lorries with left the town.

The transport of equipment to the USSR by rail is also under way. So far, over 100 freight cars have been sent and the operation is to end in December 1990.
Seoul Positive on DPRK Arms Reduction Proposal
SK16060341790 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 12 Jun 90

[Commentary by station commentator (Igor Levezev) read by announcer (Kim Yong-nam)]

[Text] According to reports from Seoul, the South Korean Government has affirmatively assessed the DPRK's recent proposal to alleviate tension on the Korean peninsula. In connection with this, our station commentator (Igor Levezev) writes as follows:

This is an assessment by the participants in a meeting of the Security Affairs Committee, which includes leading officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defense and the National Unification Board in South Korea. I must stress the fact that officials in Seoul have clearly and constantly called for alleviating tension in Korea, holding dialogue with North Korea, facilitating exchanges between North and South Korea, and peacefully resolving disputes. As you know, the DPRK has proposed a ban on all forms of joint exercises with (?foreign) forces and preparations for combat; military exercises in which military units as big as or bigger than division-level military units are mobilized; and all forms of military exercises conducted along the Military Demarcation Line. For example, the peaceful initiative by People's Korea foresees that the DMZ will turn into a peace zone and that North and South Korea will take measures to promote trust and prevent accidental disputes; will gradually and mutually reduce their forces in three to four years; and will set the number of their troops to 100,000 each. Will this be able to markedly normalize the situation on the Korean peninsula if this proposal is realized? Of course, I think it will. However, I must point out that whenever it is time to translate their words into deeds, both Pyongyang and Seoul try to find appropriate excuses to leave everything as they were.

These excuses are the concrete wall, which divides the Korean peninsula, and mountains of weapons that North and South Korea built during the past confrontational era which spans decades. For example, Seoul finds, in the North's military superiority, excuses for the presence of the U.S. forces in South Korea. In a word, North and South Korea have not been able to reach a consensus on complicated issues on alleviating military and political confrontation or to find ways toward dialogue under an atmosphere in which they suspect each other. For example, I hope the fact that the international situation in Asia and the Pacific, including the Far East, has become favorable will affirmatively affect the situation on the Korean peninsula. [Words indistinct], what representatives of North and South Korea have officially said leads one to believe that the two sides favor political dialogue and [words indistinct]. A YONHAP report said that the South Korean Government said that it will make a reply to the DPRK's new proposal after elaborate negotiations with the highest-level leadership of the country.

Nuclear Threat to Asia-Pacific Region Examined
OW2406205190 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1200 GMT 14 Jun 90

[Commentary by Barsov: "An Important Factor for Security"]

[Text] People in the Asia-Pacific region are very sensitive about issues with latent nuclear threats. This is understandable. Here, in Asia, the first atomic military attack took place. Two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were demolished by U.S. atomic bombs. Here in the Pacific, the tragedy of Bikini horrified the world when residents of the island became victims of U.S. nuclear tests. Here in the Asia-Pacific region, three of the five nuclear powers are located.

Eight years ago, on 16 June 1982, when the Soviet Union, following China, undertook the obligation of not being the first country to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, people in the Asia-Pacific region responded most favorably to the Soviet declaration. They had hope that other nuclear powers might emulate such good examples, thereby greatly reducing the threat of nuclear war.

The important decision of two of the three nuclear powers in the Asia-Pacific region also gave a strong impetus to the relaxation movement in the region. In the movement, the Soviet Union and China regard each other as allies struggling for a nuclear-free world. The two countries are correct to believe so. In December 1986, the Rarotonga Treaty, which declared the pan-Asia-Pacific region a nuclear free zone, entered into force. Fifteen countries and regions in the South Pacific signed the treaty. Joining the treaty as soon as it became effective, the Soviet Union signed the relevant protocol and became a guarantor nation ensuring that the region would be kept free from nuclear weapons. Shortly after, China declared its endorsement of the Rarotonga Treaty.

As for the other three nuclear powers—the United States, Britain, and France—they refuse to endorse, under all kinds of pretexts, the efforts by the countries to eliminate nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. We have witnessed a similar situation in the mentality and attitude toward turning Southeast Asia into a nuclear free zone. The Soviet Union and China have all along sided with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on this issue. However, the Western nuclear powers have opposed the ASEAN member nations' aspirations to keep the region free of nuclear weapons. The pretext used by the Western nuclear powers to cover up their opposition has become increasingly unharmonious with the reality in the world today, much less with the interests of the people of countries in the region.
Soviet leader Gorbachev's recent visit to the United States and his talks with U.S. President Bush have given rise to new hope of a decrease in the confrontation between the two major powers in the Asia-Pacific Region. The growth of their mutual trust and cooperation in relaxing tension will increase the possibility of eliminating nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear war in the region.

**Aleksyev on China's Nuclear Disarmament Stance**

*OW/1806224490 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 15 Jun 90*

[By Station Commentator Aleksyev; From the "Current Events and Commentaries" Program]

[Text] At the Soviet-Chinese consultations in Beijing, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev briefed Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on the outcome of the Soviet-U.S. summit.

Qian Qichen said: We welcome the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations, and the understanding reached at the Soviet-U.S. summit over the reduction of offensive strategic weapons.

Qian Qichen hoped that the Soviet Union and the United States will formulate details of the treaty and put it into effect as soon as possible. Our station commentator Aleksyev writes:

The Soviet-U.S. treaty on reducing offensive strategic weapons probably will be signed this year. This was announced by Soviet President Gorbachev at the USSR Supreme Soviet on 12 June. Based on its principle and disarmament stance, the Chinese Government has considered the treaty very important. The Soviet Union thinks highly of Beijing's resolute position and its proposal for the destruction of all nuclear weapons. China was the first nation to pledge never to use nuclear weapons first. The Soviet Union also has made such a pledge.

After the signing of the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty in 1987, China clearly indicated its view on the reduction of Soviet-U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. At that time, Beijing had expressed the belief that if Moscow and Washington could reduce their offensive strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent, it would be a great breakthrough toward the destruction of all nuclear weapons.

I would like to mention China's attitude on other nuclear powers participating in nuclear disarmament. A recent article in RENMIN RIBAO noted that the Soviet Union and United States should make the first move to greatly reduce their nuclear weapons. After that China and other countries with nuclear weapons will join in nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union understands this position. Now that preparations for the Soviet-U.S. treaty to reduce offensive strategic weapons will soon be underway, the stage for other nations' participation is drawing near. This is a happy event, because it is only possible to destroy all nuclear weapons in the world if every country in possession of nuclear weapons participates in disarmament.

**New Aircraft Carriers, Carrier Operations Viewed**

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2130 GMT on 16 June carries the scheduled "Serving the Fatherland" program, devoted to development of Su-27 Flanker fighter aircraft for carrier operations in the new aircraft carrier Tbilisi. The program begins with a review of the development of the Su-27 fighter, with video of the aircraft in arctic conditions and taking part in the 1989 Singapore Air Show. As video shows the aircraft at the show, the narrator notes that it flew nonstop from Moscow to Singapore, where it became the star of the show. Test pilot V. Pugachev is shown strapping himself into the cockpit and taking the aircraft through its paces, as the narrator describes the aircraft's maneuverability. The "Pugachev's Cobra" maneuver is shown, after which Pugachev talks about the tactical advantages of the maneuver.

The narrator discusses the complex tasks of test pilots, particularly in carrier-borne operations, as video shows early ill-fated tests of the Yak-38 vertical and short take off and landing [V/STOL] aircraft. As video shows an aircraft splashing into the sea by the rails of a ship, the narrator notes that the first test of a Yak-38 on 27 December 1979 ended with the aircraft crashing as a result of control system failure. The program shows several aircraft disasters at sea, including a Yak-38 ditching off the end of a Kiev-class cruiser, hull number 042, and the ensuing search and rescue operations.

Video cuts to the scene of an aircraft crash in a wooded area, with houses among the trees, as the narrator notes that there were also problems with the Su-27. He says the crash occurred due to multiple systems failures and the test pilot, Nikolay Sadovnikov, ejected at minimum height. After showing technicians sifting through the wreckage, the program goes on to show a series of shots of the Su-27 Flanker in various stages of flight and a montage of shots showing various static and rocket sled tests of aircraft components as the narrator talks about the outstanding qualities of the aircraft and its development. Among the shots are scenes of an Su-25 Frogfoot aircraft in a static weapons firing test.

Video then cuts to an unidentified journalists interviewing M.P. Simonov, USSR people's deputy and general designer of the P.O. Sukhoi Experimental Design Bureau, in a study. Simonov relates the development of the bureau up to its present 50th anniversary, the legacy of its early designers, and the bureau's commitment to conversion today. Talking about the new generation of designers Simonov says: "Among our best designers, we have a new generation. For example, there are such excellent designers as Aleksandr Ivanovich (Blinov), who today is working on the [words indistinct]-3 supersonic
passenger aircraft and (Suevam Kurgenovich Martivras)
who is working in the sphere of surface effect aircraft
(Ekranoplan), and it appears that this technology will
make great advances very soon.”

Simonov then talks about the need to switch to new
economic methods and decrees official obstruction pre-
vailing defense industry enterprises from adopting
leasehold methods of enterprise management. He points
out the contradiction, saying that “for example the Law
on Leases was adopted, yet parallel to this, at the same
time, they excluded enterprises of the defense branches
of industry from this process. In other words, the most
qualified and the best tuned enterprises.” He adds: “But,
if we have this great potential here, why not use it in
the cause of perestroyka?”

Simonov then notes that he was told that his enterprise is
on “Ryzhkov’s list” and cannot become a lease holder
and says: “I consider this to be direct obstruction of
perestroyka and of the development of a new economy.
If we slow down everything in the most efficient part of
our economy, then what is there to hope for?”

Simonov goes on to criticize the fact that the enterprise
is not allowed to take over the scientific production base
at its disposal, noting that this is an expression of distrust
in the collective, which in the past 50 years has more
than earned the right to take it over.

As video shows an Su-27 Flanker coming to a halt after
landing with the aid of an arresting hook and cable and
then folding its wings, the narrator talks about the latest
work of the design bureau in developing a version of
the aircraft for carrier operations. He says: “It is of stronger
construction than its conventional brother. A special
hook ensures its short landing with the aid of a cable,
while the folding wings will permit it to fit on the hanger
deck. This carrier aircraft has been designed for basing
on the new heavy aircraft carrier Tbilisi.” Video cuts to
show a port side view of the Tbilisi’s bow and an aerial
view of the ship at sea. Video abruptly cuts to show
journalist Sergey Yurakov, identified by screen caption,
interviewing Vice Admiral A.A. Kuzmin, deputy com-
mander in chief of the USSR Navy, identified by screen
caption, in an office.

Yurakov asks: “Why does our country, which is generally
a land power, need aircraft carriers?” Kuzmin replies:
“The fact of the matter is that modern aircraft carriers;
submarines, including atomic ones with cruise missiles;
surface ships, as well as strategic aviation aircraft, are
capable of delivering a blow against the territory of our
country from a great distance from our shores, a distance
of approximately 700 to 1,300 kilometers from our
coast. Their capabilities are such that from these areas
they can destroy practically any target on the territory of
our country. That is why the Navy’s task is to prevent
this kind of blow against our country. Now in order to
solve this task effectively this strike must be prevented,
and this means that the probable enemy must be met
even before he reaches these areas. So this means that we
must move our strike antisubmarine forces to precisely
that distance from which the enemy could not approach
those areas from which weapons could be employed.”

Video cuts abruptly to show Yurakov in an office talking
to G.A. Arbatov, USSR people’s deputy and director of
the United States of America and Canada Institute of the
USSR Academy of Sciences, identified by screen cap-
tion. Arbatov says: “I do not want to portray myself as a
major military specialist. But simply on the basis of
common sense I have very great doubts about the need
for the mission which these so-called aircraft-carrying
heavy cruisers must fulfill. After all, must we always try
to match the level, have the maximum that the other side
has? If the Americans start leaping from the roofs of
skyscrapers should we follow them? The Americans
would be very happy to see us sink just as much money.
We would ruin ourselves completely.

“After all, from the very beginning of the cold war the
arms race was to a great extent an economic race. The
intention of our most bitter enemies lay in bleeding us to
death, taking into consideration the fact that the gross
national product of the United States was twice as big us
ours and together with its allies it was some three to four
times bigger, and to eventually create social and political
violations and so do us in.

“The estimated life expectancy of an aircraft carrier in
the case of a major war is some 30 to 35 minutes because
of course it would be one of the most favorite and
important targets for strategic ballistic missiles, regard-
less of the location of these ships. Now their cost is
enormous. For example one battleship (linkor) in the
United States costs 3.5 billion. Its aviation and support
ships add another 18 billion, while maintenance of every
one of these aircraft carrier groups, with one aircraft
carrier and its support group, costs another 3.5 billion.
Now this is in one year.”

Video cuts to show Yurakov talking once again with
Kuzmin. Kuzmin says: “Well, I would not agree with
that. An aircraft carrier is an extremely mobile and
maneuverable base for naval aviation which is capable of
moving some 1,000 or more kilometers a day. And to
locate it in the ocean or distant parts of the sea is not that
easy. Besides, an aircraft-carrying ship or aircraft carrier
represents a fairly strong structure that is simply both
difficult to damage and even harder to destroy. Esti-
mates show that in order to knock an aircraft carrier out
of commission it would require direct hits from seven to
12 missiles. In order to destroy it would require at least
20 missiles or 25 torpedoes.

“So you can imagine that in order for these missiles or
torpedoes to hit the aircraft carrier or reach their target,
as the military say, it would be necessary to launch
several multiple salvos more of them. This would require
the concentration of very large forces. In addition to the
aircraft carrier, its support ships are being built. And all
of this, of course, together with the fleet of aircraft, really
would cost somewhere in the order of 18 billion. The cost
of our aircraft-carrying cruiser is considerably less. This is because our construction is less costly and besides we are not creating the kind of system that is being created by the Americans."

Video cuts abruptly to show Yurakov talking to Major V.N. Lopatin, USSR people's deputy, identified by screen caption. Yurakov asks: "What is your attitude towards the program of construction of heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers in our country?" Lopatin, shown in dark Air Force uniform, replies: "On the one hand this program is dictated by the need to catch up with the United States Navy, whose naval forces considerably surpass ours both in numbers and in aircraft carriers and in their structure and tasks. But on the other hand, the way this task is being attained leads me to seriously doubt that this will be achieved with the greatest efficiency and the least expenditures.

"So my attitude to this program is not straightforward insofar as the genuine need for this program is not clear, if you take the information that is presently available in the USSR Supreme Soviet. There is a lack of complete glasnost. Once again everything is being prepared behind some seven seals. Secondly, my attitude is also not straightforward because according to available information and estimates from specialists that have reached me—specialists visited me, I talked with them, and they sent me letters—well, as they say, we are seeing the latest swindle, and in particular in the case of the aircraft carrier Tbilisi."

Video cuts to show Yurakov in a study talking to Colonel Yu.A. Koltsov, USSR people's deputy, identified by screen caption. Koltsov, shown wearing an officers uniform with aviators insignia, says: "I consider that the cruiser Tbilisi, which is under discussion, is a major achievement of our military industry, an achievement of the Ministry of Defense. And I can explain why. It is generally known and has been mentioned in the press that we have ensured the basing of Su-27 and Mig-29 aircraft on the cruiser Tbilisi. These are the most modern aircraft. There is one aspect of this and that is that in types of aircraft based on ships, we have achieved the very same level as that of the United States. I mean in terms of the combat aircraft's quality. Of course in terms of quantity of ship-based aircraft we have absolutely no parity, but we have reached the qualitative level."

Video again cuts to show Lopatin who says: "Specialists are coming to the conclusion that the military industry is attempting to introduce a steamship (parokhod) into the complement of naval forces, into the complement of combat naval forces, and not a combat vessel, insofar as today there are no effective weapons on its decks."

Video cuts to show Semenov, who says: "I know the ship Tbilisi well, if only because I, along with the flight director of the Flight Testing Institute, supervised Pugachev's first flight deck landing on that ship—this was a first in the Soviet Union, so it was new, interesting, and difficult—and therefore I have gotten to know the ship pretty well. And I should say that I have, I make airplanes, not ships, so I can objectively evaluate this vessel. This is of course a very high-quality vessel. It is a remarkable vessel, and as an engineer I admire it. I am satisfied that we were able to land our plane first and that the aircraft complements the ship's weaponry."

"As far as its basic characteristics are concerned, I must say that there have been many discussions on whether or not we need aircraft carriers. There were such discussions at the second congress and at the third congress and therefore, willingly or unwillingly, one is forced to consider this question, and a very simple circumstance comes to mind. Aircraft are the most deadly enemy of the entire Navy. Surface vessels are even less protected than submarines, and something is needed to cover them against attack. Therefore in other countries, for example the United States, one of the primary tasks of carrier-based aviation is to provide air defense for the fleet. The aircraft based on the Tbilisi's flight deck have the same mission. Our Su-27 is a ship-based fighter, primarily an air defense fighter as we say, and it is designed to protect the formation to which the carrier Tbilisi is itself assigned."

Video cuts to Lopatin: "Specialists have come to the conclusion that the continued delivery of MiG and Yak aircraft is simply madness and a waste of state resources. This is what experts who are specialists on the given systems are writing."

Lopatin picks up a report and reads: "Pressure is now being exerted on the leadership of our naval aviation and the Navy to accept the MiG-29K. This plane has good combat qualities, but it does not have a sufficient action radius. Having studied the ship and its ability to ensure aircraft operations, it can be stated that the ship's combat potential can only be fully utilized if its planes can remain aloft for at least two hours. Only in that case can carrier-based fighters provide the formation with reliable air defense and attack aircraft reach their targets."

"Otherwise, according to the estimates of specialists, the entire complex becomes little more than a pile of metal. Out of several dozen combat aircraft, only 16 to 20 from the first group will be able to carry out their combat missions. The second group will hardly have time to get its aircraft out of the hangers and be ready to take off when the first group is coming in to land. That goes for the MiG-29 as well."

"A take off from the ski jump [trampoline], also according to specialists, as well as a short take off—although a short take off to a lesser degree—is possible only when the weight of the aircraft is approximately equal to the thrust of its engines. We were saying here that in connection with a short take off, there is a decrease in fuel and its volume and consequently the opportunities for remaining aloft improve. In other words, a decrease in thrust will have to be compensated by dumping fuel. Now in this case even an Su-27K—and we are talking about a modification, not the aircraft in its original
form—will have a radius that is less than the estimated one. If the ship is located in a combat zone where temperatures are higher, the flying time can decrease to one and a half hours in the worst case. This also is according to the estimates of specialists.

"Additionally this gets worse because we have no spare airfields, and we have no other ships to receive groups of aircraft that are airborne, in case of an accident. We also do not have refuelers for refueling the aircraft in flight to extend their flying time." In addition, in the case of an accidental snap of the arrestor cable on the deck, five or six aircraft could find themselves overboard in the sea."

Video returns to show Yurakov talking with general designer Semenov, who says: "On the contrary, the carrier version of the aircraft is more developed than the land-based version. It has a somewhat greater time in the air on patrol flights. In other words we are fulfilling presently the times we have been set for patrol flights, and furthermore, there are opportunities and means for doubling this time. We carry more powerful weapons than the land-based version. We know that no one will be supporting us out on the ocean; quite the opposite. We, that is our fighters, have to protect the ship and fleet formation. Thus, there are no detrimental versions. The fact that our aircraft takes off from a ski jump does not in any way make us decrease the aircraft’s characteristics.

Video cuts to show Lopatin, who has a pile of correspondence on his desk. He says: "In a word, one needs to have complete information to be able to say 'yes' or 'no' to this program. Presently complete information on this program is not available. But I am against the realization of this program again in secret from the parliament, the USSR Supreme Soviet. We should probably arrive at a situation in which things can be controlled.

"We are talking about not permitting this kind of (thing again), because the keels of new ships are being laid at the wharves of our shipbuilding plants. New billions are being spent. What will be the effectiveness of these billions? What will the effectiveness of these expenditures be?"

Video then cuts to show Yurakov again talking with Kuzmin. Kuzmin says: "The cost of one displacement ton of a patrol ship is greater than one displacement ton of an aircraft carrier, if one considers the effectiveness of this aircraft carrier when compared to that of the patrol ship. Besides, calculations show that the use of aircraft-carrying cruisers as part of our diverse strike and antisubmarine groups increases several times over the efficiency of the actions of these groups, due to the availability of air cover.

"Besides, if we take a criterion such as the size of the prevented losses—in other words, the cost of the submarines, ships, and aircraft that are not destroyed in combat as a result of fighter cover—then this sum cost will be considerably greater than the cost of the aircraft carrier itself. Therefore, this category, this cost effectiveness criterion, is undoubtedly to the advantage of aircraft-carrying cruisers."

As video cuts to show a Yak-38 V/STOL aircraft landing on the stern deck of a ship at sea and in other flight situations, the narrator notes that this aircraft is presently the only carrier aircraft in the Soviet Navy. He further notes that 15 years ago, it represented a major success of Soviet aviation design, but today its characteristics do not meet the requirements of a modern carrier aircraft. The experience of the Anglo-Argentine conflict, the narrator says, demonstrated the need for fighter cover for navy ships, when just a few carrier aircraft can cause great losses.

Video next pans the superstructure of what appears to be a Kiev-class carrier while the narrator notes that the Navy was faced with the acute need for powerful fighter aircraft with a large radius of action that are also capable of landing and taking off from ships in a conventional way. The Tbilisi, he adds, was designed for basing this type of aircraft. As video shows a variety of weapons systems on the Kiev-class carrier, the narrator notes that "in addition to the fighter carriers, it will have other weapons systems similar to those installed on the aircraft-carrying Kiev-class cruisers."

Video cuts to an aerial view of a shipyard, while the narrator says: "The first of the new series of heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers, the Tbilisi, is of impressive size. Its length is 300 meters, and its width is 70 meters. Nevertheless, it is still more than 30 meters shorter than the American Nimitz class aircraft carriers, its displacement is one and a half times less, and it can carry only one third the number of aircraft on its decks." Video next shows workers engaged in ship construction, then cuts to show the bow of a ship on a slip way. The narrator says: "The second heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser, the Riga, has also been launched."

Video shows the launching ceremony of a ship with the name Riga clearly visible on the bow. Crowds can be seen on the wharf as the ship slips into the water and drops its anchors. The superstructure of the ship is bare, and a tug boat stands nearby. The narrator continues: "There are more than 3,000 compartments in its massive hull located on 27 levels, while the total length of its passage ways is 16 km. More than 7,000 enterprises cooperate in the construction of heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers at the Black Sea Shipbuilding Plant. All Union ministries supply a variety of equipment and materials for these cruisers. Essentially the entire country is building these ships."

Video cuts to show Yurakov interviewing Koltsov, who says: "Any aircraft carrier, or our aircraft-carrying cruiser—in terms of the financial expenditures used to create it and the cooperation required in industry—cannot be relegated to any one ministry, as is being done here now, or to a branch of the Armed Forces, that is, the Navy. It is a national system in terms of the volume of
resources, and I consider the cruiser Tbilisi, with its aviation armament and ships, an achievement and result of very intensive, risky, and protracted work of many large collectives. So it should yield results in our policy and in our actions in general. One must not say today that, yes, we have an achievement, but it will ruin us and create a totally negative attitude. In my opinion this is impermissible. We have to draw capital from this.

"Let me explain. Major technical achievements have always been used in connection with politics. Presently we have in hand this unique achievement of our country. We do not have parity. The United States and NATO are not very willing, to put it mildly, to start talks on a reduction of naval forces. I consider that we can and must, in my opinion, tell them that we have this achievement. One does not want to reduce large ships, aircraft carriers in particular. You are forcing us to ponder what to do with this achievement. Since you are not agreeing to reductions, we will have to make further use of this achievement in order to augment it.

"If, on the other hand, we were to see movement towards us on the part of the United States on reducing large surface ships, then immediately an option of setting some limit to the development of our aircraft carrier fleet, and reaching an agreement despite a lack of parity, would appear in favor of this movement. There is a location, a committee where work on elaborating a position on this issue relating to the program of construction of large aircraft-carrying ships, should be carried out. This is the Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security.

"Presently the following is happening, and it reflects a failing in the committee's work. For example, at the second session [of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies] such respected and competent deputies as Arbatov and Felshin spoke. In their speeches, they spoke negatively about the program of construction of large carriers. Nobody else spoke on this issue at the congress, so this negative and somewhat dubious assessment remained, an assessment based on a questionable attitude to these programs was heard, and that was how it remained.

"During the congress, on 19 December I had the opportunity to speak at the committee. I said that the committee must urgently formulate its position. After a deputy has spoken, a representative of the committee should come forward and say that this issue has been reviewed, that the committee's position is as follows, that some things have not been finalized, that we have not cleared it up, but overall, the committee's position should be outlined.

"The committee is lagging behind the development of these events, particularly in this area. But it should be in the forefront. Public opinion perceives all the information and sees that something absurd is taking place. We are pursuing a policy of disarmament and reductions, while at the same time all of these deputies speak about the fact that along with this there are huge expenditures for the construction of aircraft carriers. Deputy Travkin recently mentioned this (?in the Supreme Soviet). And so in some ways public opinion is bewildered. The committee should formulate all this and outline a concept for the public."

Video cuts to show Yurakov meeting Arbatov. Yurakov holds a microphone as Arbatov says: "Creation of the Supreme Soviet Committee For Defense and State Security is undoubtedly a step forward. But 30 percent or more of the committee members are representatives of the military-industrial complex. So it is not even its lobby. In America we talk about a lobby, in other words those who are paid, officially registered. They are not swindlers or bribe-takers—although undoubtedly they sometimes engage in this also—they are official organizations that defend someone's interests. Yet here we simply have representatives of these interests, heads of major companies. One of them heads the committee, and so forth. So it is still not 'the' committee."

Video cuts to show Yurakov talking with Semenov, who says: "I would say we have a very high quality committee and a very professional committee, and when there is talk of this kind...[Semenov changes thought] I too have heard it said that it is a gathering of general designers and so on. This is far from the truth. In fact one could count the number of general designers there are on one's fingers. Many of our Soviet people, and that concerns people in the committee too, experienced the past war and have a very good first hand idea of what war is all about. In our family—mine and my wife's, (Yekaterina) Fedorovna's—all the men went to the front and not one of them returned. So we have a very good idea of what war is all about.

"We receive many letters from Soviet people who ask: Will we not make reductions to a dangerous degree? Will we not have to urgently build everything up at considerably greater costs and losses? Therefore, the arms reduction program must be managed by very competent people, and we have such people working in our committee. So, on the contrary, we are lobbyists for disarmament. We are lobbying for decreasing funds for the development of new kinds of weapons. Hence we are striving to see that more funds are released for the development of our economy.

"It is true that there is a widely held point of view here, and unfortunately this is a fallacious point of view. We are paying a great deal of attention to arms spending. But make your own estimates. If we completely reduce all expenditures on arms to zero—on maintenance of the army, on maintenance of general officers, on development of equipment—if we stop everything, we will save less money than the size of our budget deficit today. Now if the budget deficit remains, then the economic system will differ little from the one in existence today. So the root of all evil lies in the fact that we simply are not changing over to a normal economy."
Video cuts to show the aircraft carrier Tbilisi at sea, as the narrator notes that a normal and effective economy is essential for the creation of high technology products, and in particular military equipment such as the aircraft carrier Tbilisi. He says that test flights on the Tbilisi began in November last year. Video shows a variety of shots of the ship’s flight deck and superstructure, as well as crew and civilian technicians on the bridge observing an Su-27 making touch-and-go approaches on the deck. A close shot shows the aircraft flying overhead, clearly revealing canards on the forward fuselage.

After noting the difficulties of carrier landings, the narrator introduces video footage showing carrier landing disasters on U.S. ships. These shots are closely followed by shots of the Su-27 making its first landing on the Tbilisi with the aid of an arrestor cable. The following shots show the jubilant spectators greeting test pilot Pugachev on his success, with similar scenes following shots of landings by a MiG-29 and a “test version of a Su-25 carrier training aircraft” from which two pilots emerge. Semenov can be seen among the onlookers.

Video cuts to show the Su-27 on the deck with both its wings and horizontal stabilizers folded, shots of flight deck tractors being hoisted from the hanger to the deck on the aircraft lift, and crews preparing the aircraft, blast deflectors, and deck antennas for take off. The Su-27 is shown preparing for a short take off from a position forward of the superstructure. As exhaust gases can be seen rising over the blast deflector the narrator notes that the launch failed, and the aircraft is then moved into position for a long take off over the ski jump. The Su-27 is then seen taking off with full afterburners, dipping only slightly as it rises off the deck.

Video shows Arbatov talking with correspondent Yurakov. Yurakov comments to Arbatov: “According to the Ministry of Finance, we saved R11 billion on military expenditures during the last two years. Unfortunately, it has not become easier to live.”

Arbatov responds: “Look, if 40 percent of our machine building output goes for defense—the figure given by Comrade Ligachev—a normal country cannot live with this. Do you understand? If Mikhail Sergeyevich said in Sverdlovsk that not long ago we spent 18 percent of our GNP on defense, that is impossible.”

“You remember last autumn the Supreme Soviet tried to raise the pensions of the most destitute people. It turned out that we can’t even come up with R3 billion. We have to raise prices on beer, tobacco, and movies. So 10 billion is not small change. We spend 25 billion for all our health care, so 11 billion is not small change. That is a large sum. Yet here it is just scraping the surface.”

Yurakov asks: “What part of our defense expenditures do you think we should cut first? That used for financing scientific research and experimental design work or on military mass production?”

Arbatov replies: “We have an awful lot of military mass production, far beyond most parameters. It doesn’t make sense to produce so much. Even by political or economic considerations we cannot do this. It contradicts military reform and so forth.

“As for experimental design works, they sometimes create the beginning of that inertial chain which later draws us in very large and often unnecessary expenditures. Take strategic weapons, for example. The U.S. President often makes appearances, and behind him you can see diagrams. Now he has the American Minuteman-II, the Trident, and now the D-5. Now for us he recites SS-7, SS-13, SS-18, SS-19, SS-23, SS-24, and so forth. I ask: Why? I am told that in order to create competition we often place orders with two or three different design bureaus. After accepting one, we do not want to hurt the others, so we simultaneously start turning out two or three.

“I am not sure that this is how it happens. I am not judging from the inside about this, but judging by the number of different weapons systems that we have when compared to the Americans, it appears that this is so.”

Video again shows Semenov, who says: “Strategic weapons can in fact be cut by one half or two-thirds. Conventional weapons can be eliminated or, let us say, cut by two-thirds or at least in half. All of this can be done, and it is somehow being solved quite simply, although it may appear simple from a technical point of view, because if we consider the diplomatic difficulties that our representatives have to solve, they are worthy of all due respect. In the technical group, they reached agreement and made the reduction. They destroyed 20,000 tanks, 10,000 aircraft; that is, they solved the problem of reducing weapons. But how do we stop the arms race?”

“There are still few people thinking about this issue and few talking about it, but it is an unbelievably complex issue. Why? Because, unlike our socialist economy and our socialist industry, every capitalist, every joint stock society, and every enterprise of that type tries to turn out products which earn the greatest profit—and weapons systems earn the greatest profits. It is the most complex system. As a matter of fact, here this may not give us profits and we all earn a normal wage, not as large as many think. A chief designer, for instance, earns the same amount as a qualified bus driver; that is, his salary is R500 to 600. Therefore, we do not work for profit, but primarily because we are interested in our work. And where is that capitalist or that joint stock society that would refrain from producing something that earns a large profit and begin producing something providing a small profit? Therefore this question exists and if it was up to me I would recommend the following approach. It has not been discussed anywhere; therefore, I hope it provides a true solution.

The initiators of the cold war, that is, those detonators of explosives, are the scientific research and experimental
design efforts in the sphere of new types of weapons—new types of combat aircraft, new types of submarines, missiles, and others. Therefore, it would probably be correct to at least consider the following approach. If we agree with the Americans to reduce by 50 percent expenditures on scientific research and experimental design work in the sphere of developing and studying military technology, we would cut the pace of the arms race by half, because after scientific research and experimental design work come test models, and after test models comes mass production. We should find, as Lenin said, the main kernel and wipe it out. That kernel is the military scientific research and experimental design work. I realize that such a proposition might cause unpleasantness or misunderstanding even among my colleagues, who are also designers. I am a designer myself, and our design bureau exists by creating military technology and has only recently begun to create civilian technology.

Nevertheless, if we consider things from the level of the life of our families, our country, and the whole world, we must find the switch, we must find how to switch off the arms race. This switch is a decrease in spending on scientific research and experimental design work—but a symmetrical one. We must propose cutting ours by half and theirs by half, regardless of the sums being invested today. This is a simple, easy to understand principle, and generally it could be adopted. Then, after we reach this level, we can propose further cuts, say another 50 percent, and so on until the (?end) of the arms race.

"This will release enormous funds. For example, take the B-2 bomber. Its experimental versions alone cost from $7 to $10 billion. In other words this is a program costing many billions of dollars. If you cut it by half it would release enormous funds for other peaceful spheres, of which there are many, not only in our lives but in the United States too, where there are many peaceful spheres as well.

"My proposal would be as follows: Cut by half the expenditures of both sides on scientific research and experimental design work in the arms spheres."

As video shows a montage of operations on the Tbilisi and U.S. aircraft carriers, the narrator says: "Of course the peaceful dividends from ending the arms race are needed very much by both the Soviet and American peoples, and a reduction of military spending can only be welcomed. However it is fair to expect that the reductions will be mutual; otherwise, the strategic balance will be upset. The principle of mutuality is particularly important if we talk about the financing of scientific research work in the defense sphere. One-sided cuts here are extremely risky. They are fraught with an irreversible lag in the quality of arms.

"Aircraft-carrying cruisers are one of these qualitatively new types of weapons, moreover since they will be commissioned against the background of a major cut in our fleet. In recent years, the number of submarines and ships sent to the scrap yard will exceed hundreds of units. The cruiser Tbilisi is presently the only Soviet ship capable of carrying modern deck aviation. However, it has not been completed yet, and there are no aircraft for it. The United States on the other hand has 15 operational aircraft carriers, on each of which are up to 100 flying machines. With a sevenfold supremacy in large ships the United States has hundreds of times more deck aircraft. Why does the United States need this kind of supremacy? Why does it profess its peaceful disposition and at the same time maintain a powerful offensive fleet? Why, after all, do U.S. leaders stubbornly reject talks on reductions of naval forces?"

"The U.S. leaders do not hide their intentions to maintain their maritime branches of the Armed Forces at the level of the most powerful military power. But even the U.S. leader has said that a strategic balance is possible only with a parity of forces, and if there is no parity, there is no balance. So the risk of confrontation at sea is many times greater than on land. Can we under these conditions forget our defense? Hardly. Despite economic difficulties, defense capability will always remain an objective necessity for the state. Our country, to prove its peaceful aspirations, has come out sufficiently often with unilateral peace initiatives, and they cannot continue forever. A reciprocal [vstrechnoy] movement is essential. The success of the recent meeting between the presidents of the Soviet Union and the United States confirms the possibility of compromise in any, even the most sensitive, problems of reduction of arms and arms spending."

As the program concludes, a screen caption reads: "Program prepared on an order of the P.O. Sukhoy Experimental Design Bureau's press service and is the property of this organization. Use of video materials is possible only with permission of the owner." Screen credits list Sergey Yurakov as the author and Tatyana Popova as the producer.

**Pentagon 'More Intent' on New Weapons**

LD1806220690 Moscow TASS in English 2145 GMT 18 Jun 90

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, June 19 (TASS)—The Pentagon seems now more intent on using novel technologies to create new means of mass destruction and pays little attention to national security interests or the military-political situation in the world.

New military technologies go into production, and only after that they get strategic substantiation.

The United States is now considering building maneuverable nuclear warheads capable of piercing anti-missile defenses. This is a rather old project. The U.S. Administration abandoned it after signing the ABM Treaty in the 1970's.
Despite the current international thaw, the project has again been taken up by the Pentagon.

Robert Barker, assistant to the secretary of defence for atomic energy, spoke in a secret congressional testimony recently made public about work on an earth-penetrating warhead for attacking underground military-political command centres and a new nuclear depth bomb.

Pentagon is now considering the development of the hypervelocity glide vehicle, a winged nuclear missile that could evade defenses while plunging toward targets at supersonic speed. This is also a destabilising first-strike weapon.

The production of nuclear warheads in increasing, although in 1990 it will be lower than expected.

Warhead deliveries were supposed to go up 27 percent in 1990, according to a transcript of Barker's comments at a closed hearing of a house appropriations panel.

Production will, however, fall below target, but not because of the normalisation of the military-political situation in the world, but due to slips in U.S. military programmes.

Meanwhile, new varieties of nuclear warheads are being developed.

The U.S. military production machine has become a thing in itself that is by no means connected with national security requirements.

The Pentagon finds it difficult to convince tax-payers of the need to increase the U.S. nuclear potential. U.S. military leaders, however, seem unperturbed. They used to frighten Americans with the "Soviet military threat." Now they are resorting to abstruse rhetoric.

The U.S. modernisation programme should continue until such time as "we have a better chance to evaluate the direction this new future world will take us," Barker said.

Meanwhile, Senator John Warner, a Republican member of the Armed Forces Committee, maintains that changes in the Soviet Union make the U.S. star wars programme even more necessary because of growing political and military instability in the world.

According to Pentagon logic, rain or shine in the international situation, the United States should continue its nuclear build-up.

U.S. Military Reductions 'Lagging Behind' USSR
LD1906215590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1418 GMT 19 Jun 90

[By TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, 19 June (TASS)—The Soviet Union's proposal to start talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in autumn this year, irrespective of the time it takes to sign an agreement on conventional weapons, has been rejected by NATO. The representative of the North Atlantic bloc stated in Brussels that such talks can only be started after an accord has been reached in Vienna.

One cannot say that over the last few years the position of the United States and NATO regarding tactical nuclear weapons has not undergone changes. Individual shifts in the United States' attitude to nuclear weapons with a range of up to 500 km have taken place. There was a time when Washington rejected Soviet proposals regarding talks on these weapons in general. Later, President George Bush stated the United States' willingness to start such talks, but only after an agreement on conventional weapons in Europe had been signed. It was announced that Washington had rejected plans to modernize the land-based "Lance" tactical missiles and the nuclear artillery. These positive changes, however, were accompanied by the adoption of NATO plans for deploying new air-based nuclear missiles which should bring about nothing in terms of the significance of the talks on ground-based missile systems and the decision on rejecting plans for the modernization of the "Lance" missiles and the United States' nuclear artillery in Europe. The official U.S. representatives, moreover, are constantly stressing that the talks on short-range nuclear weapons should not pursue the aim of eliminating them completely.

On the other hand, last year the Soviet Union withdrew 500 nuclear warheads from the territory of its allies in Europe, and then took the decision to reduce its forces in the GDR, the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland by 60 tactical missile launching installations. In central Europe there is to be a reduction of 250 units of Soviet nuclear artillery. Throughout the area of the European USSR, tactical missile launching installations are to be cut by 140, and artillery nuclear warheads by 3,200 by the end of the current year.

A comparison of the practical actions of the USSR and the United States in the sphere of tactical nuclear weapons forces one to establish a regularity—the changes in the positions of the United States with respect to tactical nuclear weapons are considerably lagging behind the Soviet Union's initiative, both from the point of view of time and in terms of resolving the problem.

The fact is, evidently, that the Pentagon still has not rejected the conception of a "limited nuclear war" in Europe, at a great distance from U.S. territory. Just as before, NATO regards its strategy of "flexible reaction" as being of paramount importance, which envisages in the event of an armed conflict a gradual stepping up of the employment of weapons ranging from nuclear artillery to "Trident-2" missiles on submarines in European waters. The majority of unbiased experts also formerly assessed both of NATO's strategic aims as unrealistic. Under present conditions they have simply become absurd.
A session of the NATO Council, at the level of heads of states and governments, is to convene in London in July, and should also discuss in particular the problems of bringing the alliance's military strategy in line with the new situation in Europe. NATO's official rejection of the conception of a "limited nuclear war," and of the "flexible reaction" strategy, would not only lead to a further lessening of tension in Europe, but would also facilitate a solution to the problem of tactical nuclear weapons.

Chemical Weapons Talks To Be Held in U.S.

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1700 GMT on 19 June, in its "Vremya" newscast, broadcasts a video report by correspondent M. Osokin, identified by caption, on a Soviet delegation which is to hold chemical weapons reduction talks in the United States. The announcer introduces the program, saying that according to reports from the United States, a Soviet delegation will hold talks there on Wednesday and Thursday with representatives of the United States chemical troops, and on the agenda is the discussion of projects that it would have been hard to imagine yesterday.

The video report by Osokin then begins with shots of the U.S. Army Toole Army Depot and his description of the establishment as a "chemical storage facility" in Utah that has been visited by Soviet delegations.

Osokin goes on to say that the subject of the talks will be ways of dismantling "shells like these," while the video shows rows of canister-like objects. "According to an agreement signed in Washington, each of the sides undertook to destroy by the year 2000 all stocks apart from 5,000 tons and, for the first time, it is a matter of pooling efforts," he says. This commentary is accompanied by video flashbacks to the last Soviet-U.S. summit. The point is reinforced by a brief excerpt from Gorbachev's report on the summit to the USSR Supreme Soviet, in which Gorbachev says: "There was an exchange of views with the President on that subject, with a view to exchanging technology for destroying chemical weapons."

Osokin goes on to detail one of the "most amazing projects," quoting a WASHINGTON POST report that Soviet experts had proposed sending Soviet shells to a U.S. factory "so as to work out joint dismantling methods." "But how are the plans to be implemented?" Osokin continues, over video of a summit news conference, followed by pictures of a weapons-dismantling operation by U.S. troops. "Such scenes of shell destruction were to have become a reality at the Soviet factory in Chapayevsk, but it was closed in September under pressure from environmentalists," Osokin says. The U.S. was having similar problems, Osokin continues: the construction of three such establishments had been delayed for environmental reasons. The video at this point shows a U.S. Army tank decontamination operation, followed by troops donning chemical warfare protection suits.

Osokin goes on: "It is ironic that, for many years, chemical weapons were seen as an important and inexpensive deterrent but no one wondered what their elimination might cost." This experience, Osokin continues over video shots of scenes of Congress, led the U.S. Congress to take a close look at all Pentagon requests for money to build "cheap weapons." "Similar conclusions are also being drawn in our parliament, it seems," Osokin adds. "It is being said that, in general, the scale of the reduction poses the question of why so many weapons were created and that tight monitoring of all military programs will be needed in the future."

Over video of scenes from the USSR Supreme Soviet, Osokin comments: "The trouble over chemical weapons can serve as a lesson on how the two powers, having made so many weapons, now find themselves in a tricky situation when it is a matter of eliminating them. Incidentally, this does not apply to chemical shells only." This remark is explained in the following brief sequence, in which Gorbachev is again seen addressing the USSR Supreme Soviet, saying: "Making tanks. How many of them have we made and are now wondering what to do with?" The report ends at this point.

Air Defense Staff Chief Views Open Skies Issue

PM2106132390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jun 90 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel General of Aviation N.M. Maltsev, chief of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff, by correspondent Colonel A. Yurkin; place and date of interview not stated; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction: "Toward Open Skies"]

[Text] An international conference on the "open skies" problem has concluded its work in Budapest. Representatives of 23 countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact or NATO participated in it. At the same time, the USSR Supreme Soviet ratified a special protocol which supplements the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago in 1944 and then adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization as its statutes.

Our correspondent asked Colonel General of Aviation N.M. Maltsev, chief of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff, to comment on the results of the conference's work and the USSR Supreme Soviet's decision.

[Yurkin] Igor Mikhaylovich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has written about the "open skies" idea. Shouldn't we find out about this in more detail? Who was its creator? How does it coordinate with the practice of international relations?

[Maltsev] The "open skies" system envisages unarmed aircraft making flights over the participating countries'
territories on a voluntary and mutual basis with the aim of supervising military activity. That is the technical side of the question.

On a political level, the idea of “open skies” is intended to be an efficient means of strengthening confidence and eliminating possible suspicions and worries regarding the state and activity of the armed forces of the countries that agree to open up their airspace on a treaty basis.

The idea is not a new one; it was first proposed back in the postwar years. However, because of the military and political relations between the USSR and the United States at that time, it was not supported or developed. The possibility of returning to this idea has now emerged in connection with the changed international situation. The USSR, the United States, and Canada as well as other Warsaw Pact and NATO countries have started work on its practical implementation. An international conference on the “open skies” system was held in Ottawa in February.

After all, side by side with the political aspects, the military-strategic and military-economic sides of the problem must be taken into consideration in order to exclude any possibility of damaging a country’s defense capability.

Specialist groups have been formed at the Foreign Ministry and the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, which are involved in working on questions that arise, predicting the possible consequences of the decisions adopted.

[Yurkin] Unrestricted flights do not rule out the possibility of conflict situations. Instead of the people who made the decision to “open” the skies, will it not be servicemen from the Armed Forces and the Air Defense Forces who will bear the responsibility for the flights?

[Maltsev] The “open skies” treaty must envisage all possible cases, details, and procedures connected with the flights of the inspection aircraft which would fully eliminate the possibility of conflict situations arising. The USSR-U.S. government treaty on preventing dangerous military activity, which came into force in January of this year, serves as an example. It determines the actions of both countries’ air defense forces on duty to prevent incidents such as flights by our military aircraft and U.S. military aircraft in immediate proximity to the USSR and U.S. airspace border, as well as forced or unintentional flights into it.

Evidently, the actions of the Air Defense Forces within the “open skies” system must also be clearly defined. Should any conflicts arise, they must be examined by specially created international military commissions, and this is already widely practiced within the framework of existing treaties. At the same time, we understand that additional tasks are arising alongside the tasks laid upon our troops by the Law on the USSR State Borders—involving the supervision of inspection aircraft flights.

[Yurkin] Were all the problems resolved in Budapest?

[Maltsev] We were hoping that our work would be successfully concluded, but it became apparent in the course of the talks that the sides have different views on individual problems, for example on aircraft and onboard equipment. These and other questions are at the moment stopping us from setting a final date for the signing of the treaty. A great deal of work still faces us.

[Yurkin] And what is your attitude to the USSR Supreme Soviet’s ratification of the special protocol supplementing the Convention on International Civil Aviation?

[Maltsev] The Chicago Convention lays down the basic laws for air transportation and determines the principles of cooperation between states in the given sphere. One of the principles is flight safety. The countries that signed the convention have pledged that they will refrain from using weapons or opening fire on civilian aircraft that violate the border. They commit themselves not to use them for military or other illegal ends and to eliminate situations whereby such aircraft could enter foreign airspace....

[Yurkin] Will the number of violations not rise?

[Maltsev] The ratification of the protocol will doubtless bring new concerns. However, we must not forget that the above-mentioned document specifies that any aircraft that violates the border is obliged to carry out instructions and land on the indicated airfield immediately or to carry out other instructions with the aim of ending the airspace violation. In that situation, the state whose sovereignty has been violated has the right to resort to any measures in accordance with international law.

‘Complete Nuclear Test Ban’ Said Possible
LD2006185990 Moscow TASS in English 1809 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] The two protocols signed by the Soviet and American presidents on June 1 in Washington, which deal with the 1974 and 1976 treaties on the limitation of nuclear tests, are politically very important. They pave the way to further steps at the Soviet-American stage-by-stage talks on the limitation and termination of nuclear tests, Igor Palyonykh, head of a Soviet delegation at the talks, said today at a briefing in the Soviet Foreign Ministry Press Center.

The control mechanism contained in the protocols can be used to create a system controlling further limitation and a complete nuclear test ban, he said.

According to the Soviet spokesman, the Soviet Union, which proposed resuming talks with the United States early next autumn, does not intend to confine itself to bilateral diplomacy in tackling the problem of stopping nuclear tests. The USSR is ready to “tackle it jointly with all other countries at multilateral forums”. “At the same
time, we, of course, are ready to take the most radical decision—a complete nuclear test ban, if the United States is ready to follow suit, or to announce a moratorium jointly with the American side,” he continued.

Touching upon the 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, Palyonykh said that the treaties, together with protocols, would soon be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet. “We expect the Supreme Soviet to begin their ratification as soon as it resumes its work,” he said.

DPRK Nuclear Secrecy Seen Arousing ‘Suspicion’ in Seoul

PM2006153190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jun 90 p 3

[M. Petrov article: “The Bomb: The Korean Version?”]

[Text] The mass media often carry concerned reports on how various countries are conducting work with military applications in the nuclear energy sphere. As is well known, work of this kind presupposes a fairly high level of development of the industrial base, requires great material expenditure, and often cannot manage without outside help in one form or another. Pakistan, Israel, or Iraq usually feature in these reports. But are they the only ones?

The journal ASIA WEEK, which follows this subject closely, reports that as early as 1985 the American Government announced that it had intelligence information at its disposal on the establishment of a secret nuclear reactor in the DPRK. It claimed that a nuclear reactor which had not been registered with the IAEA was being built 90 km from Pyongyang, in the small town of Yongbyon. In July last year THE WASHINGTON POST reported that plutonium was being extracted from nuclear fuel at Yongbyon. In September 1989 the London journal JANE’S DEFENSE WEEKLY quoted North Korean sources as saying that the DPRK “will be able to produce combat nuclear devices within five years and the delivery facilities for them soon after.”

In the past, these deductions have been based on alleged satellite photographs and on the correlation of data: the existence of large uranium and graphite reserves in the DPRK, for example. Moreover, attention has been drawn to the fact that the DPRK has highly trained specialists, who the Soviet Union and China have been training for the last 20 years. In February this year, however, this was supplemented by photographs taken from a French artificial satellite. This photographic material has been underpinned by the results of a computer analysis conducted by Japanese Professor Sakata Toshibumi.

The situation surrounding Yongbyon could have been resolved by an international on-site inspection. Especially as, according to the journal ASIA WEEK, the DPRK’s Central Information Agency has confirmed the existence of a reactor in this region that is not registered with the IAEA. However, the Korean side rejects all these suspicions, claiming that the reactor at Yongbyon is for research purposes.

In 1977 the DPRK concluded an agreement with the IAEA which authorized the inspection of the two nuclear reactors built with Soviet assistance, and, in 1985, became signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As is well known, a signature to this treaty provides for drawing up within 19 [figure as published] months an appropriate document with the IAEA on monitoring all existing nuclear installations. However, ASIA WEEK claims, “Pyongyang is still working on this agreement and has not yet notified the IAEA of the reactor at Yongbyon.” According to the same journal, the DPRK is dragging out talks with the IAEA, making the signing of a multilateral agreement on the Korean peninsula’s nuclear-free status a preliminary condition.

It is not hard to try to understand the Korean position in this matter, particularly if you consider the existence of a considerable quantity of American nuclear weapons in the southern part of the peninsula. At the same time, it is impossible not to foresee that creating a veil of secrecy around Yongbyon could give rise to suspicion in South Korea and serve as a pretext for galvanizing South Korea’s nuclear energy program.

U.S. Commander Urges Stronger Nuclear Deterrent

PM2106095190 Moscow KRAZAYA ZIVEZDA in Russian 20 Jun 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: “J. Chain Statement”]

[Text] New York, 19 June—General John Chain, U.S. Strategic Air Command commander, has made a statement calling for a strengthened U.S. nuclear potential. In a letter published by the PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER he stressed that, despite all the changes in the contemporary world, the United States as hitherto needs “powerful nuclear deterrent forces.”

J. Chain thinks that the Soviet Union “as hitherto poses a massive strategic threat.” Therefore, he indicates, the United States must modernize its strategic forces. Here the general proposes that special attention be paid to implementing the B-2 “Stealth” bomber development program, which, in his opinion, will become “the central element of successful nuclear deterrence in tomorrow’s world.”

However, this bomber will surely be the ruination of the American Treasury before becoming a reliable deterrent. While the construction of an air armada of 132 bombers was estimated at $58 billion in the eighties, the U.S. Congress General Accounting Office has now determined that in actual fact the sum exceeds $70 billion.
USSR Suggests Nuclear-Free Baltic Sea
PM2006154190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 1

[“Own information” report: “Nuclear-Free Status for Baltic Sea”]

[Text] The USSR foreign minister has sent a letter to the foreign ministers of Bulgaria, Great Britain, Hungary, the GDR, Denmark, Norway, Poland, Romania, the United States, the FRG, France, Czechoslovakia, and Sweden on the question of imparting nuclear-free status to the Baltic Sea.

The letter notes that the effective solution of the problem of nuclear-free status for the Baltic is possible only on the paths of multilateral talks with the Baltic states and with the nuclear powers which use the waters of the Baltic.

The aim of these talks could be the Baltic Sea's complete liberation from nuclear weapons of any type and the geographical zone of operation of the future accord on this question would extend over the sea's entire area, including territorial and internal waters and islands in this water area, and also to the airspace above it and the seabed and the subsoil thereof.

The nuclear powers would undertake not to bring their ships with nuclear weapons on board into the Baltic Sea or to fly their aircraft with these weapons above it, and would also agree to the establishment of verification of the absence of nuclear weapons on board their ships entering the Baltic Sea or on it.

The coastal non-nuclear states of the Baltic Sea would undertake not to allow the appearance in the Baltic Sea of nuclear weapons belonging to other countries or to allow foreign warships with nuclear weapons on board within their territorial and internal waters, including in the form of calls at their ports.

Verification of compliance with the accord on the Baltic Sea's nuclear-free status would be implemented by national technical means; through cooperation between the states of the region and other signatories to the accord, including in the use of means for the long-distance detection of nuclear weapons on ships; through the exchange of the information requested on a compulsory basis; through the implementation, when necessary, of on-site inspections on demand without the right of refusal; and also in other forms on which agreement could be reached.

The letter also says that the Soviet Union has unilaterally embarked on the elimination of certain categories of sea-launched nuclear weapons in the Baltic Sea water area. As a first step, the USSR has withdrawn four of the submarines known in the West as “Golf” submarines from the Baltic Fleet's effective strength and before the end of this year it will eliminate the two remaining ones. The ready inventory of nuclear missiles designed for these submarines is also being destroyed. The USSR has decided unilaterally to renounce the emplacement in peace time of nuclear weapons on Soviet ships and combat aircraft either permanently or temporarily inside the water area of the Baltic Sea and the air space above it and also not to emplace nuclear weapons on the seabed or in the subsoil thereof in the Baltic Sea inside its territorial and internal waters.

Cheney's Armed Forces Cuts Plan Viewed
PM2206082190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 Jun 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: “R. Cheney’s Plan”]


Under the plan, details of which were announced by the secretary at a Pentagon press conference, this aim could be achieved by disbanding six regular Army and Marines divisions and four reserve divisions, reducing the U.S. Navy's warships from 366 to 455, and disbanding 11 tactical air wings. As a result of the decommissioning of obsolete B-52 bombers, the Pentagon will also be able to disband four strategic aviation squadrons, and it will be possible to cut naval aviation correspondingly by reducing the number of aircraft carriers from 14 to 12.

In all, R. Cheney stated, implementation of these proposals would make it possible to reduce the number of servicemen currently on active service by 442,000 (or 21 percent), and the number of National Guard units and other reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces by 260,000. The total number of U.S. Department of Defense civil servants could be cut by 145,000.

As for strategic missile cuts, R. Cheney noted that these would take place in accordance with the conditions of a future Soviet-U.S. agreement on strategic offensive weapons. At the same time, he stressed that his plan does not affect the current programs for modernizing U.S. strategic nuclear forces and does not envisage any cutback in appropriations for the “strategic defense initiative.”

Washington Exhibits Soviet, U.S. Missiles
PM2606155990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 Jun 90 Second Edition p 6

[Dispatch by own correspondent V. Gan: “Truly Historic Event Reportage From Exhibition of Intermediate-Range Missiles”]

[Text] Washington, 20 June—Until quite recently they had confronted each other, grayish-green and elegant in their own way. Now they were side by side. Ours was about six or seven meters higher. Its entire casing was covered with strange numerals—A-1, A-2, B-10, L-12, K-13.... Its U.S. neighbor was more straightforward with
just one meager cold inscription. They still produce a sense of fear which, thank God, the world did not get to know....

Such an event has never happened before in the annals of Soviet-U.S. relations, nor in international life in general. The two great powers have organized an exhibition of intermediate-range missiles which have now virtually been destroyed under the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. In Washington the title of the exhibition was similar to the Russian proverb “Trust but verify” which former U.S. President R. Reagan took as his slogan. At the U.S. National Air and Space Museum, where the exhibition was held, materials and documents showing how our countries had proceeded, with difficulty but successfully, toward this agreement—the first in human history—were also on display. This was the first such agreement because it stipulated not just the limitation but the destruction of the launchers of nuclear death. The Pershing 2 and our SS-20 quietly standing alongside each other could have destroyed the world but did not do so thanks to the good sense shown by both sides, goodwill and the realization of the absurdity of the suicidal situation whereby the launch of either would have brought human existence to an end.

General C. Powell, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, was unequivocal on this score when he said in response to my question: “I think that this is a truly historic event. I took part in the talks on the treaty as President Reagan’s national security adviser. Being here, I can see the real fruits of what we were talking about. For me this exhibition is very important. It shows what our two countries can achieve if they want to get around the negotiating table and discuss their problems. Discuss them directly without cunning, trickery, or attempts to gain unilateral advantage. As you can see on the stand, we have achieved this. The USSR and the United States have started feeling more secure. I hope that the treaty will be a model for our future talks and agreements. Above all, on strategic offensive weapons cuts, joint statements on which were adopted at the recent Soviet-U.S. summit.”

Here is the opinion of someone whose name has always been linked with the Soviet-U.S. history of arms control. In conversation with your correspondent, Paul Nitze, head of the U.S. delegation at the talks on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles, said: “For me personally this symbolizes the success of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. Currently we have already destroyed most Pershings and SS-20’s. Many people doubted that we would really be able to sign this treaty when both sides had an identical knowledge of its provisions, when they knew what would have to be done and in what way in order to fulfill it, and when monitoring and trust would complement each other. The Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles meets these criteria. And this means that we can have agreements not only on cuts but on destroying whole classes of nuclear weapons. This is shown by the current exhibition. It illustrates very well our countries’ potential both from the standpoint of talks and from the standpoint of forthcoming accords. Of course, future talks will be even more complex. But standing here now beside the intermediate-range missiles, we already know that accords can be reached and we can make sure they work.”

General Lajoie, leader of the Pentagon’s agency for monitoring the destruction of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, made no secret of his satisfaction: “I’m very glad that the sides are cooperating so constructively and positively on this too. The missiles on display in the museum are a graphic example to the whole world of our efforts at cooperation. As we Americans say, it was a good job. For me and for all people this is convincing evidence that both sides could work together and that they could reach agreement at the talks.”

...A ceremony was then held. There were speeches. A.A. Bessmertnykh, Soviet ambassador to the United States (who directly participated in the elaboration of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles), spoke. Ceremonially attired Pentagon men took snapshots of each other beside the missiles on the stands. And you thought—are we no longer enemies?

Defense Ministry on Chemical Arms Destruction
LD2206231890 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] It’s common knowledge that as a result of the Soviet-American summit in late May and early June an agreement was reached about sizeable cutbacks and elimination of stocks of chemical weapons. We turn for details to a military expert, Colonel Vladimir Nazarenko of the Ministry of Defense:

[Nazarenko, in Russian with superimposed English translation] At present, according to some American estimates, more than 20 countries have their armies equipped with war gases or have facilities for their production. And by the year 2000 at least 16 developing countries will have the technology to manufacture ballistic missiles, that is, weapons capable of carrying chemical warheads. It’s very important that the USSR and the United States do not wait for the completion of talks at the disarmament conference in Geneva where a convention is being drafted on comprehensive and full destruction of chemical weapons. Moscow and Washington have reached an accord on bilateral disarmament which will certainly urge other countries to conclude large-scale international agreement. Both sides agree to retain 5,000 tonnes of war gases each until the international convention has been concluded in Geneva on full destruction of chemical arms. It’s also important that the USSR and the United States have agreed not to produce any more chemical weapons. In view of the coming elimination of nuclear arms the USSR and the United States face some technical problems.

The task of eliminating tens of thousands of tonnes of lethal agents is a difficult one. The United States has
even offered technical aid to the Soviet Union which it really needs. Both sides have also agreed to cooperate in a search for the safest forms ecologically of destroying war gases. It's true, though, that the deadline for action on the accord is somewhat discouraging with its beginning scheduled somewhere late in 1992 and with the destruction completed by the year 2002. The period is really long. But, in any case, you'll agree that the move taken by the leaders of the two powers ought to be regarded as a major breakthrough in ridding mankind of the threat of chemical warfare.

U.S. Chemical Weapons Experts, Counterparts Meet

LD2206133490 Moscow TASS in English 1231 GMT
22 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Sidorin]

[Text] San Francisco, June 22 (TASS)—A group of American and Soviet diplomats and experts on chemical weapons met in Salt Lake City, Utah.

They inspected a new U.S. complex for chemical weapons destruction at Toole military base, where over 40 percent of U.S. chemical weapons stockpiles are kept.

The visit by a group of Soviet experts is the first of seven visits envisaged by the Soviet-American memorandum regarding the bilateral experiment to control and exchange data, signed last September by the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state.

The current meeting is part of building confidence and establishing glasnost in the military areas, says a statement of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States. The meeting helps create a basis for the exchange of specific data and the inspection of facilities where chemical weapons are kept.

Foreign Policy Aides View Future of NATO

PM2606151490 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Jun 90 p 9

[Dispatch by Bjarne Stenquist: “NATO Has a Role in All of Europe”]

[Text] Moscow—The Soviet Union is moving toward changing its attitude to NATO. From being depicted as a tool of imperialist expansion, a more political NATO is now being described increasingly often as a guarantee of democracy and stability in Europe.

Throughout Europe a discussion is taking place about what the new security order will look like after the liberation of East Europe from Soviet domination. The Soviet line has long been that both military alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—should be dissolved and be replaced by new pan-European cooperation within the framework of the CSCE. A similar view has prevailed at the Swedish Foreign Ministry.

But the further developments have moved since the dramatic fall of 1989, the more life’s realities have forced changes in this vision. The most important thing to have emerged is that NATO and the Warsaw Pact cannot be put on an equal footing. NATO was created as a result of voluntary cooperation between 16 democratic and affluent industrial nations. The Warsaw Pact came into being as a result of a Soviet policy of diktat over six economically weak single-party states.

Now that this Soviet straitjacket has been relaxed most of these states want to be rid of Soviet troops and Soviet influence.

NATO too is having problems in adapting to the new situation. But its cohesion is still strong, and it is pure wishful thinking to believe that the alliance will dissolve itself. On the contrary, it has a decisive influence on the disarmament negotiations in Vienna and is exerting a growing attraction on countries such as Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

In Moscow this has given rise to a changed view of NATO which varies from enthusiastic support to a cooler noting of the facts.

One of the positive NATO supporters is Professor Sergey Blagovolov at the World Economics and International Relations Institute:

“The situation in Europe is that the future of the Warsaw Pact seems very uncertain and that the CSCE still has no firm character. NATO is the only functioning and vital security structure that exists here and now. Weakening it or dissolving it would not promote the stability of Europe,” Prof. Blagovolov said.

He gave several reasons for this:

—NATO is not a military threat, either to the Soviet Union or to East Europe. The organization has a purely defensive thrust.

—Within NATO people have long experience of integrating and commanding military forces from several countries, some of which are former archenemies. This multinational control over military units contains valuable lessons for the countries of East Europe, where national antagonisms are again on the increase.

—NATO is the organization which can best control the military forces of a united Germany. Germany’s membership of NATO and the EC is crucial to the country’s integration in Europe.

—NATO has a unique role as a bridge between Europe and the United States and Canada. A continued U.S. interest in Europe is important for the maintenance of peace and stability.

—in the future the whole of Europe will face new military threats from countries which have acquired
nuclear arms, chemical weapons, and long-range missiles. Some form of collective military organization will be needed to meet these threats.

"The future inside and outside Europe will be no rose-strewn path to eternal peace," Sergey Blagovolin said.

His colleague, Vladimir Baranovskiy, head of the West European department at the World Economics and International Relations Institute, is less enthusiastic.

"I consider that NATO has a role to play in the Europe of the future. But we have to realize that the organization was created to counter militarily a threat from the Soviet Union. Now that this threat is disappearing, NATO is having problems in explaining its own existence to the Western European public. Whether the alliance can handle its own demilitarization is an open question.

"You also have to realize that future threats will not be primarily military. They will have to do with ethnic and national antagonisms, environmental destruction, and economic injustices. What can NATO do in these fields?" Vladimir Baranovskiy asked.

"That is why there will probably be some sort of division of labor in the future between NATO, the EC, CSCE, and the Council of Europe."

At the Soviet Foreign Ministry there is a clearly realistic view of NATO.

"NATO today is one of Europe's best functioning organizations, held together by strong countries. We should not count on its swift dissolution. In the future it will be also necessary to use existing organizations such as NATO, the EC, and so on," said Andrey Kozyrev, head of the Foreign Ministry's department for international organizations.

But he also issued a warning:

"If the Warsaw Pact does disappear, there could be a dangerous situation if the Soviet Union feels that it is meeting a strong military bloc on its own. If, on the other hand, NATO can be transformed from a military organization into a federation to support democracy and stability in Europe, then we are moving in the same direction," Kozyrev said.

Andrey Grachev, deputy head of the Central Committee's International Department, was the person interviewed by DAGENS NYHETER who expressed the most ideological view of NATO and called the organization a "war machine," for example. But even he was prepared to grant NATO an important role in the Europe of the future.

"There are significant gaps in a new European security order which could be filled by NATO or at least by certain parts of today's NATO. The CSCE and a NATO ready for political cooperation with the Warsaw Pact are all the building blocks of a future Europe," Andrey Grachev said.

There is another important reason why NATO will continue to exist for a considerable time. In the West, as well as the East, the increasing fragmentation of the Soviet Union is recognized as the greatest uncertainty factor in the development of Europe.

"The greatest danger in the future is civil war in the Soviet Union which is packed with both nuclear and conventional arms. I fully understand that in such a situation NATO is unwilling to run down its military cooperation," a Soviet observer told DAGENS NYHETER.

Col Gen Burlakov on Troop Withdrawal From Hungary

LD2306155190 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1410 GMT 23 Jun 90

[TASS special correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Budapest, 23 June (TASS)—"By the time that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary ends—by 30 June 1991—1,352 military trainloads are due to have left the territory of this country. To date 265 trainloads have already been withdrawn." This information has been given by Colonel-General Matvey Burlakov, commander of the Southern Group of Forces. He was speaking at a meeting of the military council of the Group devoted to a discussion of the progress of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. A group of USSR people's deputies—members of the USSR Supreme Soviet's committee on defense and state security affairs led by Valeriy Ochirov, deputy chairman of the committee—took part in the work of the military council.

According to data up to 23 June, Matvey Burlakov noted, over 20,000 Soviet servicemen have been withdrawn from Hungary. Three hundred and fifty three out of 860 tanks have been withdrawn. In all, 50,000 servicemen are to be withdrawn. Their families will leave with them. At the same time, the commander noted that 11,000 of the families of servicemen returning from Hungary do not have housing accommodation in the homeland.

At the first stage, which it is planned to be completed by the end of this year, 70 percent of all military units will leave the territory of the Hungarian Republic, including 65 percent of the Air Force. In the second stage, which will last to the end of February 1991, the number of withdrawn military units will reach 90 percent, including the whole of the Air Force. The remaining 10 percent of personnel will leave Hungary by agreement between the two countries before 1 July 1991.

It was noted at the military council that the Soviet side is leaving accommodation, service premises, barracks and diverse property and equipment valued at more than R1.5 million in Hungary. Regrettably, the Hungarian partners are in no hurry to provide compensation for the installations being left behind. "Should they refuse to compensate the USSR for the costs it has incurred,"
Valeriy Ochirov said in conversation with the TASS correspondent, "we shall approach the Soviet Government with the issue of the need to take effective measures to solve this matter on a fair and mutually acceptable basis."

U.S. Military Cuts, Simultaneous Increases Noted
LD230607390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0430 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Commentary by TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] The attention of the world public has been caught by U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney's statement on a possible 25-per cent reduction in U.S. Armed Forces over the five-year period of 1992-1997. Vladimir Bogachev, a TASS military observer, gives his opinion of this plan:

[Begin Bogachev recording] The figures in the Pentagon plan are truly impressive. The U.S. regular forces would be cut by 742,000; the number of tactical aircraft and naval ships would be reduced. This includes two aircraft carriers.

True, Cheney stressed that this is not a specific plan, but merely an illustration of possible U.S. actions which could be taken under certain circumstances. It is perfectly clear that the U.S. plan is a somewhat belated reaction on the part of the Pentagon to the unilateral reductions of Soviet troops, tanks, artillery, and aircraft. If Cheney's plan is implemented, it will be an important step on the road to reducing the level of military confrontation in the world.

That said, one fact stands out: This illustration does not affect the current U.S. program to modernize the United States nuclear forces. This is a very important element in U.S. military organizational development. The United States is examining a project to create evasive nuclear warheads for strategic missiles that would have the ability to overcome anti-missile defenses. This is quite an old project—back in the seventies the U.S. Administration turned it down because a treaty had been signed limiting anti-missile defense systems, and evasive warheads lost their significances.

It is worrisome that now, with the sharp reduction in tension in international relations, Washington has returned to this project. The U.S. plans envisage the creation of deep ground penetration nuclear charges to strike at the opposition's well-defended command centers. The United States is building a nuclear depth charge to strike at submarines. Plans are being drawn up to deploy supersonic cruise missiles that would be invulnerable to the enemy's defense systems.

So, it transpires that, with one hand the Pentagon chief is signing draft plans to cut conventional forces, while with his other hand he is signing definite plans to improve his strategic nuclear weapons.

What we see here is the old principle that any reduction of U.S. armaments in one sphere must unfailingly be compensated for by a buildup of arms in another sphere. One gets the impression that the modernization of nuclear weapons has become for the United States an end in itself which is no longer governed by national security considerations. The logic of the Pentagon is that the United States' new nuclear weapons should be built irrespective of the military-political situation in the world, come hell or high water as the saying goes. [end recording]

Soviet Delegate on Copenhagen CSCE Conference
PM2606132990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
23 Jun 90 Second Edition p 7

[Interview with Yu.A. Reshetov, Soviet delegation head at the second CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension in Copenhagen, by special correspondent A. Lopukhin under the "Our Interviews" rubric, datelined Copenhagen, June: "Human Dimension: Aspects and Opinions"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Debates in Copenhagen at the second CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension, the participants in which have already gone halfway toward their goal, are continuing in a constructive fashion without mutual sermonizing. PRAVDA's special correspondent put several questions regarding the progress of the conference to Yu.A. Reshetov, Soviet delegation head at this all-European forum.

Reshetov] The main efforts of the delegations from the 33 European countries, the United States, and Canada are currently focused on the four working commissions preparing the conference's final documents. The Soviet delegation holds constructive approaches on all the main problems under discussion there: We advocate the creation of a unified legal space in Europe; we favor granting national minorities more rights without, of course, upsetting stability anywhere; broadening humanitarian confidence-building measures; and lastly, gradually abolishing the death penalty and ensuring regular contacts between people and the basic freedoms of the individual.

[Lopukhin] How topical are the problems being discussed in Copenhagen today for safeguarding the vital interests of the peoples of Europe?

[Reshetov] Let us consider just one aspect which is typical of the significant changes on our continent. The democratization process has been mobilized in Europe today. The sentiments and will of the broad popular masses increasingly determine the nature of the development of internal political and international events. At the same time we are having to deal with explosive situations which pose a threat to positive processes on our continent. I would above all cite the threatening growth of nationalism, outbreaks of which can now be seen everywhere. This obviously stems from the fact that many pressing problems were either hushed up or
not resolved for a long time in a number of countries. The democratization process which has become part of everyday life is, unfortunately, now accompanied by intolerance toward others’ views and by attempts to resolve painful issues, which have built up over the decades, through pressure and sometimes force. For instance, despite the obvious will of the peoples, minority groups in various countries who were not effectively given a vote of confidence during national elections are trying to take revenge via “mob democracy,” as happened quite recently in Romania.

[Lopukhin] International human rights forums have always been the scene of tough clashes. The situation has presumably changed radically now. But recurrences of the past have probably not disappeared once and for all.

[Reshetov] Double standards are, regrettably, still making themselves felt in politics. Thus, any objective observer in Copenhagen cannot help but be struck by the following fact. During the meeting a whole series of official delegations have congratulated the Czechoslovak representatives on holding democratic elections in their country. At the same time some Western participants in the conference “forgot” to congratulate the Bulgarian delegation on their equally democratic elections. After all, virtually all the delegations gathered here support the idea that democratic elections are effectively the basis of progressive transformations in any country. We should certainly “take our hats off” to elections of this kind, whatever their outcome. The confrontational approach in the human rights sphere seemed to have been laid to rest, but this cannot all be said to be a thing of the past once and for all.

[Lopukhin] The actual development of events in the world promotes the realization that no one possesses the supreme truth, notably in the humanitarian-legal sphere. Is this realization producing any specific results?

[Reshetov] The Soviet delegation has been reassured in this respect by, for instance, the statement made by S. Hoyer, chairman of the U.S. Senate Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, at the conference. He spoke of democratic changes in Europe, pointed out the Soviet and U.S. achievements in this sphere, and also frankly shared his experience of combating some evils common to all mankind, primarily manifestations of racism on American soil. The Canadian and French delegations demonstrated the same self-critical and constructive approach. Naturally, we provide objective information about what is happening in our country. This mutual exchange enables us to get away from the practice of scoring points off one another and to move onto analyzing the experience of those countries that have succeeded in resolving various problems at home in a more sensible fashion.

None of the 35 states involved in the Helsinki process—and Albania has effectively joined them—are immune to dangerously explosive situations. In this connection, I think that the Copenhagen forum will ultimately help Europeans find new forms of solving various conflicts, of which there are a considerable number both in the Old World and in the United States and Canada. That is why it is not only governments but also, as they say in the West, the “man in the street” who are inspired with hope for a better future by the development of the Helsinki processes and who are strengthened in their belief in the irreversibility of the democratic processes in Europe and that these processes will not undermine the stable foundations of European civilization.

[Lopukhin] In addition to official delegations, various nongovernmental organizations—national and international—are engaged in active work at the Copenhagen conference. How can we assess the significance of their parallel events?

[Reshetov] First, their involvement in the Copenhagen forum helps us to take a more realistic view of all the urgent problems under discussion here. The parallel debates verify the correctness of the subjects we have chosen and supplement our work. For instance, the official delegations have somewhat shunned questions like the rights of young people and women. The representatives of nongovernmental organizations reminded diplomats in an extremely impartial manner of the need to resolve these issues within the framework of the Helsinki process.

Military Outlook on Unification, Role of NATO
PM2406183090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
24 Jun 90 Second Edition p 6

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov, staffer at the USSR Defense Ministry Press Center, in response to readers’ letters, under the rubric “From Competent Sources”: “Germany’s Future: A Military Man’s Viewpoint”—first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] PRAVDA readers in the USSR and abroad often write to us: we are mainly familiar with the viewpoint of Soviet politicians on the question of the future of a united Germany. But what do the professional military think on this subject? Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov, staffer at the USSR Defense Ministry Press Center, answers.

The military-political future of the new Germany is not, of course, a matter of indifference to Soviet people, who do not forget history’s terrible lessons. Therefore, in connection with that country’s joining the North Atlantic bloc it is necessary first of all to answer this question: what will its military role in NATO be and what will the role of the alliance itself be in a changing world?

Is it sensible to ignore the desire of certain forces in the West to retain for the North Atlantic bloc its former function as an instrument of policy from a position of strength? And how should we regard attempts to “compensate” for the weapons now being withdrawn from the territory of the FRG and other European countries under
the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles with other nuclear systems? In particular, I am referring to the plans being nurtured in NATO for siting on the territory of Germany and a number of other West European countries, as well as Turkey, new air-launched tactical nuclear missiles capable of reaching targets in the European part of the Soviet Union. Plans exist for using on these missiles the warheads of the medium- and shorter-range missiles now being eliminated.

One wonders: can we be indifferent to such plans and words? So if the entry of a united Germany into NATO implies simply an expansion of the North Atlantic alliance's sphere of military activity and its increased proximity to our borders, then this solution to the question can hardly be considered acceptable.

On the other hand, when it comes to the continuation of work to overcome the division of the European continent, thought should be given to the question of bringing existing military-political institutions into line with the unifying tendencies of the all-European process. The recent session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in Moscow laid the foundations for a review of the very nature of the Warsaw Pact in line with the radical changes in Europe. It is reasonable to expect an answering movement on the part of NATO, a movement toward a change in the alliance's military doctrine, which was born out of the cold war. In this context it would also be possible to resolve in an entirely new way the question of ensuring the security of a united Germany. For instance, to consider the idea of its belonging to the two alliances simultaneously, while they still exist. This dual membership could act as a basis for the creation of new all-European suprabloc security structures.

Thanks to the growing level of confidence between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, a real opportunity is arising today to make their relations nonconfrontational, an opportunity for active participation in the formation of the structures of an all-European security system.

If the United States and NATO accept the principle of rapprochement between the blocs in combination with the process of German unification, in the course of which there would be no change in the present commitments either of the FRG or of the GDR, and if a reform of both blocs is carried out in parallel, in an organic linkage with the Vienna and all-European process, then I think that in these circumstances there need be no objection to the new Germany's joining a renewed NATO.

Shevardnadze Defends Arms, Alliance Policies

PM2506213190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Jun 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister: "On Foreign Policy"]

[Text] The PRAVDA Editorial Office has asked me to answer the following questions:

"1. In their letters PRAVDA readers are increasingly expressing concern about our concessions to the West. What is your attitude to this?

"2. What lessons can we draw from the revolutionary events that have changed the face of the East European countries?

"3. PRAVDA readers are asking whether the Warsaw Pact Organization has any future. How will its activity be transformed under the new conditions?

"4. Do not events such as German unification and the planned inclusion of Germany in NATO call into question the successful building of the common European home? How, in your opinion, will the changes in Europe influence the Helsinki process, not least the problem of the inviolability of postwar borders?

"5. Are we not exaggerating the importance of Soviet-U.S. relations and playing down relations with the 'Third World'? What is the relationship between the resolution of global and regional problems?

"6. Can we talk about the success of the deideologization of international relations?

"7. Our country's mass media have carried criticism that our embassies sometimes spend foreign exchange—of which we have so little—to no purpose. Do you agree with that view?

"8. What changes to the Foreign Ministry would you call decisive following your arrival there?

"9. Have you started penning your memoirs?"

As you can see, the questions are varied. Most concern major questions of policy or, I would say, its basis and philosophy. Others are about details. That is why it seems to me more logical and justified to try to provide a more extensive answer to readers' main interest—whether we are acting correctly in our foreign policy or not. In choosing this subject for discussion, I am not planning to dodge any "uncomfortable" questions—I will also state my position on them, but in the "margins" of my thoughts on policy as it were.

I would like to begin with some general remarks.

In principle, in any state foreign policy more than any other sphere retains, as a rule, a high level of consistency and continuity in its goals and overall thrust. But at each stage it not only produces a different, modern reading of its mission but is also enriched by new, large-scale ideas and views and expands the professional tools at its disposal. This is a continuous process. The quality of policy is determined by the extent to which it is geared to progress, is receptive to emerging trends in social development, is realistic, and accords with the demands of the state and common civilized interests.
At the same time, foreign policy is quite an "inert" system. It is not so easy to change, and not only because dozens of departments and organizations and thousands of professional politicians, parliamentarians, diplomats, and specialists take part in its implementation. Other states' positions are also a most important factor in this area. New ideas can be put forward and any principles of new thinking can be formulated, but it will all just be empty words if there is no response or support from the international community. Any country—even the biggest and strongest—can by no means do everything. It will simply not be allowed to behave in the international arena the way it wants.

Foreign policy is viable when it is based on law, on convictions, on joint interests and goals, and on cooperation and collaboration. Strong-arm policy as a component of diplomacy or in its pure form always ultimately leads states to political bankruptcy or catastrophe. Great empires have passed away while states with essentially no armed forces flourish.

Foreign policy can only do what it can. If we go back to 1917, many people at the time complained to the foreign policy departments of Britain, France, and the United States, asking in alarm: how and why was a revolution in Russia allowed? How can we fail to remember the raucous and malicious witch-hunts in the United States against those who "lost China" in 1949? A speech in West Virginia back then initiated the charmed career of McCarthy and the black period of McCarthyism in U.S. history. McCarthy named names of State Department staffers who had weakened the United States in the struggle against world communism. Strange as it may seem, similar accusers have recently emerged in our country. You get the impression that some of them would like a zealous investigation into those who "lost East Europe."

It is a difficult and bitter experience for me to see that there are people who argue that the Soviet Army did not liberate certain European countries but virtually seized them as trophies of war. Chauvinist statements have been made demeaning the dignity of sovereign states.

I consider it my moral duty to apologize to the peoples of the Warsaw Pact states for these offensive and impermissible attacks by some of my countrymen.

We need to accept it as axiomatic that very many things cannot be resolved by diplomatic means. Just as they cannot be resolved with the use of force either. Foreign policy, like domestic policy, cannot defend deeds that are fundamentally indefensible; run counter to common human ideas of equality, freedom, people's power, or democracy; and go against the natural course of history.

Policy founded on ideology and imbued with ideology can only be meaningful if that ideology is based on the principles of goodness, fairness, humanity, and spirituality.

I needed this digression to state how the framework of a feasible, realistic, and sensible approach in foreign policy is envisioned in the context of the new political thinking.

The pendulum of public opinion, at least a certain proportion of it, is veering between two opposed views in our country: everything was good in the past, or everything was bad. I will not get into a debate on this topic. I just want to say that assessments of the past must show no less responsibility than the choice of a path for the future.

The pendulum of foreign policy does not stand still either. Periodically it swings to the right and then to the left. It can be given a push, and then its swings will be wider and more sweeping. But observe: there is a definite sector in the center where it spends most of the time. Foreign policy cannot exist outside of this constant segment of interests and goals. It existed yesterday, today it may be wider, but it has always been there.

"Does the Warsaw Pact Organization have a future?" people ask. Let's remember history. After all, it has not always existed. It appeared in 1955. I recall that NATO was set up in 1949. This means that there were times when we lived without either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Like any agreement, the Warsaw Pact is not everlasting—it was concluded for a specific period. It emerged under certain historical conditions and functioned during the long "cold war" years in an atmosphere of acute military and ideological confrontation. The problem was that our organization was unpreceptive to change, was not always in step with the times, failed to modernize, and did not upgrade its military and political structures. All this, of course, could not fail to have an impact now in a fundamentally different situation.

Nonetheless, the Warsaw Pact has existed and will continue to exist for as long as it answers the real needs of its member countries. At the recent Moscow conference of the Political Consultative Committee, a declaration was adopted setting out the agreed thrusts of the profound transformation of our union; its doctrine, strategy, goals; and the organization of all its activity. A commission was set up which will elaborate the corresponding recommendations.

Both in the case of the Warsaw Pact and in the case of the "revolutionary events changing the face of the East European countries" the lesson we can draw is the same: Anything based on the free will of peoples and states is strong and viable.

What can I say to those who ask why the changes in East Europe were allowed to happen and why we agreed to withdraw our troops? The subtext to this is clearly: why did we not use tanks to "restore order?"?

Can we seriously think that that is possible, that the problem can be solved that way? Have we really learned nothing; can we not remember the lessons of Afghanistan
if we have already forgotten those of 1956 and 1968? Haven't we had our fill of funerals and internationalist invalids?

But articles and publications appear again and again using precisely this subtext to criticize our "East European policy." Undoubtedly, we handle some things in foreign policy not that well and some things quite badly. But if people want to engage in serious criticism it should not dwell on the question: why didn't you stop it? We would then need to agree on every last thing. And the last thing would very often lead—moral and legal aspects aside—to a sharp deterioration in relations with other countries, to conflicts, and even to war. Anyone advocating a strong-arm policy should, in my view, turn not to state organs but to those guys who go on combat patrol, to their mothers, and to the people who would find themselves dragged into a war.

It is time to realize that neither socialism, nor friendship, nor good-neighborliness, nor respect can be produced by bayonets, tanks, or blood. Relations with any country must be based on consideration for mutual interests, on mutual advantage, and on the principle of freedom of choice. That is how we have started conducting affairs and, thanks to this, gigantic changes for the better have come about in the world. Yes, there have been problems too, but it could all end in tragedy if the changes were held up.

Some people now are trying to pretend that the question of the troop withdrawal from Hungary, the CSFR, Poland, Mongolia, and the GDR was decided behind the backs of the military. That is wrong. The main parties in all talks have been our military comrades. The questions were discussed and resolved in a collegial manner.

The fact that the social aspects of the cuts were badly worked out is another matter. We forgot about servicemen as people; we forgot their needs, their families, and their children. This is a major blunder that will have to be urgently rectified.

Clearly there is a need to investigate the situation linked with the all-European process.

The CSCE Final Act was signed in 1975. Soon after I became minister I took part in events to mark the 10th anniversary of its adoption.

It was already clear back then that the Helsinki process was fading away. It was also clear that the focus of the process should be the idea of detente and the eventual surmounting of the partition of Europe, the reduction of military confrontation, and the organization of cooperation among the 35 states in the security and other spheres. This was the germ of the idea of the common European home. It was put forward by M. S. Gorbachev during his first visit to Paris in the fall of 1985. I may even say that this was a major political idea ahead of its time. It was based on foresight about changes in Europe and on the understanding that European security should be built on a collective basis.

The Final Act reinforced the principle of the inviolability of borders in Europe. It was because of this that the question of the borders of a future united Germany is no particular problem now for the four great powers, Poland, Germany, or anyone else.

Yes, the prospect of German unification shook up memories and put many people on their guard—not only in our country. But let's try approaching this question from the other side. How long could the partition of Germany have continued? Years more, decades more, forever? How long would our soldiers have had to stand guard on the Elbe—years, decades, forever?

If we do not take account of moral factors then where is the greater risk—in maintaining the division of a great nation which will inevitably strive for reunification, or in unifying it in the context of an all-European settlement? In my view, only the second path leads to peace and stability. The question is thus about the quality and reliability of an international-law settlement which will be achieved along with the building of German unity. The problem is not that there will be one state instead of two, but that German soil should never again pose a threat to peace and that other European countries' legitimate interests be taken into account.

Right away people are worried about what will happen if Germany's planned membership of NATO takes place. Here we need to clarify a few things. First, the FRG has long been a NATO member. This means it can only be a question of increasing NATO's potential by the addition of the GDR when and if the latter becomes part of Germany. I by no means intend to say that the possible expansion of NATO does not concern us. We are by no means indifferent to Germany's future military-political status. But this question will probably be viewed differently depending on the changes which take place in Europe. These changes—and there is broad international agreement on this—will proceed in the following directions.

The building of German unity must be accompanied by a general and substantial reduction in troops and armaments in Europe—including the reduction of the German military arsenal—to the level of defense sufficiency.

At the same time, the Helsinki process will be institutionalized. As we see it, it is a question of regular summits, meetings of foreign ministers, political consultations at ambassador level, the institution of a CSCE Secretariat, and the creation of an information exchange center on activities in the military sphere along with a conflict resolution center.

We must not only transform blocs into primarily political alliances, but also agree on the definite principles of mutual relations between them and the states comprising them. The best option is to adopt a politically binding declaration on intentions vis-a-vis each other.
A very great deal will depend on the kind of decisions approved at the London NATO Council session in July. It can be said without exaggeration that the choice made there will have far-reaching consequences for both Germany and all of Europe.

Needless to say, the revision of political directives, doctrines, and strategies will take time, and its implementation will not happen immediately. That is why we need above all to agree on the transitional period during which there would not be any substantive military-strategic changes on GDR territory, and in particular during which there would be a continued presence for the contingent of Soviet troops.

I am talking about the key points of a future settlement of the external aspects of German unity. Needless to say, it will include many other elements. I am sure that within the “two-plus-four” mechanism we will be able to reach agreements that will take proper account of all sides' legitimate interests. Now I would just like to ask readers not to view the situation as one-dimensional or static. A united Germany will exist in a situation that will be significantly different—not least in military-strategic terms—from what existed yesterday or exists today.

We are also sure there will also be close economic relations between a united Germany and the USSR, and that we will be able to cooperate and collaborate in the interests of a future Europe and the world.

We are talking a great deal about stability in Europe and the world. I think we all realize how much in this area is connected with our “domestic” concerns, the state of our economy, a healthy political and spiritual atmosphere in our country, and the success of our perestroika. A strong and stable Soviet Union is a necessary element in the European and world balance guaranteeing peace for all.

Quite honestly, I have always been surprised by the complaints that Soviet diplomacy allegedly “exaggerates the importance of Soviet-U.S. relations and plays down relations with other countries.”

Relations with the United States have been and will continue to be central for us. They simply could not be otherwise. For only the United States has the potential to annihilate the USSR, and only we can respond in kind. A clash between us would be a global catastrophe. How can we fail to devote paramount attention to Soviet-U.S. relations!

It is not a whim but because we have a sense of responsibility that we conduct various talks with our U.S. partners, work out and conclude agreements and treaties, and are building really new relations with that great power. Constant dialogue, summits, and ministerial contacts are a sine qua non of the world's survival and the strengthening of international stability. They are in the interests of all countries, large and small, developed and developing.

I cannot accept the rebuke that Soviet diplomacy “forgets” about the “Third World.” In recent years we have raised both the scale and the quality of our ties with the developing countries. We have established or raised the level of our diplomatic relations with around a dozen states. How many “Third World” leaders have visited Moscow during the perestroika years? We have visited dozens of countries never before visited by such high-ranking Soviet representatives.

At the same time, we are not satisfied with our relations with the developing countries. Not so much in the political sphere as in the economic, cultural, scientific, technical, and other spheres. We are considerably restricted in this area by the state of the Soviet economy and the structure of our foreign economic ties.

The “Third World” also means the problem of regional conflicts and the resolution of such global sore points as ecology; development strategy; financial debt; the spread of peaceful advanced technology; and prevention of the spread of technology facilitating the creation of nuclear, chemical, missile, and other weaponry. Everything in this area is interlinked, and we can cope with it all if we do not divide the world into categories but approach it as an integral whole.

I am glad to be asked if we are not “conceding” too much to the West. I am glad because I have long wanted to speak out about these complaints. I acknowledge that readers raise this question with good intentions. But I would also like to reply to those who are directly responsible for the country's security, who give the go-ahead to the options we work out at talks, and who then criticize Soviet foreign policy in the press for its “incomprehensible concessions.” I would like to respond to certain articles like the one in RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA entitled “Free Cheese Is Only Found in a Mousetrap.”

We have always worked on the basis that arms reduction talks are totally necessary for the country's security and for peace. I will say bluntly that we not only need limitations but we above all need them since our partners—with their strong economies, better science, healthy finances, and higher living standards—can more easily withstand an “open” arms race. That is axiomatic for me. I would not advocate relying on the maxim that “necessity is the mother of invention.”

Exchanging three SS-20's for one Pershing-2 is advantageous and cheap, I would say. The Pershing could have hit our General Staff with confidence, while the SS-20's could not have reached their Pentagon. Surely the “specialists” who continue to compare the quantitative parameters of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles know that?

Sometimes complaints are made out of ignorance. The other day at the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Congress, one comrade stated that during a speech in Copenhagen I had allegedly announced the withdrawal of Soviet tactical missiles from central Europe without authorization.
I was not offended because he could not have known that I was speaking on the basis of a document signed by the defense minister and the chief of the General Staff. This position was elaborated for the talks at the Soviet-U.S. summit.

I will also explain the mechanics of talks on disarmament issues. The delegations to them are staffed by the relevant departments on a parity basis. Generals, colonels, other officers, and representatives of the military industry take part in the talks. The center for coordinating positions and elaborating directives is the General Staff—I will reveal that secret. The Foreign Ministry has one seat in the group that meets there and no chance of “imposing” its opinion. The group’s recommendations are submitted to the political leadership and, if necessary, reported to the country’s president. I want to emphasize this because all decisions are thoroughly worked out and positions formulated on the basis of consensus.

We are supposedly in the glasnost era. Diplomats are openly criticized for their “concessions”—most usually unspecific—and for allegedly damaging the country’s “security.” But isn’t it time to talk more openly about security too? Soviet taxpayers are entitled to know what kind of “security” they are getting for their money. In order to make an educated judgment about “concessions” people need to know the comparative features of the relevant systems, their reliability, and to have information about military programs and their cost.

We can only welcome the fact that the defense industry is helping the country to survive, to correct the economy, and is organizing the production of civilian output. But we must also talk about the problems. Why, for instance, are those who affected to strengthen the country’s security by manufacturing chemical weapons and continuing to produce them when no one else in the world was doing so, now keeping quiet? Now we either have to develop the technology and spend at least 3 billion rubles to destroy these weapons, or else these toxins will turn whole regions into wasteland.

It seems that certain comrades still do not believe the state’s policy is really to ensure that nuclear and chemical weapons are destroyed on a reciprocal basis, that troops and armaments are cut, and that we are guided by the principles of sufficiency and nonoffensive defense.

When people are in the know they will voice their opinions to diplomats and the military about where we should be firm and where we can compromise. I would welcome it if RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA readers told us just how much cheese can be bought with the money spent developing [sozdaniye] unnecessary, obsolete military hardware.

And I would like to reiterate that all decisions on foreign policy questions are not made by any one person inclined to compromise, but are worked out by the representatives of many departments. But, on the whole, I consider it normal that we have arguments. This will only be of benefit to the country and its defenses.

Now allow me to respond to some individual questions.

We have been trying to ensure that the diplomatic service becomes more professional, competent, bold, open, and democratic; to ensure that it accords with the demands of perestroika and helps it. Some things have succeeded, others not quite. I cannot claim to be satisfied with what we have achieved.

As for my memoirs, I don’t even have any plans in that direction. Quite honestly, I don’t even have the time to think about it, although I do of course have things worth remembering. I happened to be a minister at a most interesting time—without exaggeration, at a crucial period in world politics. I have been a witness to and often a participant in major events.

Most of all, I am glad that we succeeded in signing the Geneva agreement and getting our boys back from the war in Afghanistan without detriment to the dignity and prestige of the country, keeping Afghanistan as a friend and a good neighbor.

Yazov Interviewed on Concerns About NATO

[Interview with “Marshal D. Yazov, member of the Presidential Council, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and USSR defense minister,” by unidentified RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent; place and date unspecified: “What Concerns the Minister”]

[Text] [Correspondent] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, judging by the Warsaw Pact states’ declaration recently adopted at the Political Consultative Committee conference in Moscow, and the session of the Defense Ministers’ Committee in Berlin, your concerns as USSR defense minister have obviously increased.

[Yazov] Your comment is accurate. I do indeed have more concerns, above all in connection with the emergence of the need to review the nature and functions of the Warsaw Pact. We are entering the transitional period mentioned by the participants in the Political Consultative Committee conference. The new situation in the world and particularly in Europe has produced new tasks linked with the galvanization of the disarmament process and the forthcoming creation of a new all-European security system. We have abandoned the confrontational elements contained in our previous documents. I would note, incidentally, that there were also many such elements in past resolutions of the NATO alliance. The changes taking place as a result of our perestroika and the new political thinking proclaimed by the Soviet Union have not only changed our approaches to the military-political problems of the day, but are also changing us ourselves. We have long been committed to
making the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces defensive, cutting our troops, and withdrawing Soviet units from the territory of allied states.

As you can see, there has been no reduction in my concerns. What do I have in mind? As I understood it from the speeches by the participants in the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee sessions, their desire to see our organization more political than military is a temporary desire until new security structures are created in Europe. And in this context the natural, and I would say worrying, question arises of what the prospects are for developing these new all-European security structures if NATO has no intention of disbanning itself and is even planning to include a united Germany in its military alliance. In my view, the logic here is out of kilter. People are trying to present attempts to strengthen NATO even more as measures to ensure stabilization in Europe—measures which will allegedly benefit the USSR and its perestroika. It seems that, for all the fine assurances that we have been hearing from the West lately, in actual fact NATO takes little account of this concern of ours.

Yet the Defense Ministers’ Committee—still fully resolved to promote a growing level of trust between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO bloc, and wanting to make relations between them nonconfrontational in order to actively participate in shaping the structures for an all-European security system—expressed the hope and stated that this goal would be promoted by expediting the practical transition toward change within NATO. If the decisions being made by that bloc to alter its activities are implemented, such steps will not only affect a strengthening of the climate of confidence on the European continent but will also be an incentive to accelerate the disarmament process.

My colleagues on the committee stressed with particular satisfaction the importance of the Soviet-U.S. summit and the accords on the reduction of strategic offensive arms and the elimination of chemical weapons. We made a positive assessment of the results of the Vienna conventional arms talks. But we need to accelerate them.

I would like to stress that a joint commission has already been set up within the Warsaw Pact framework which is to submit a proposal, by the fall, on the prospects for the continued existence of the Warsaw Pact military organization, including the Joint Staff. The international public will clearly assess this decision of ours on its merits. It will undoubtedly have a positive political aspect to it. However, I cannot agree with the idea expressed by certain conference participants that each country should defend itself. There are many contradictions in that approach, particularly compared with what we observe in NATO. After all, NATO’s members are striving to strengthen that alliance and want to convince us that the presence of U.S. troops in the FRG and Britain makes the guarantee of all-European security—and, consequently, the guarantee for each individual NATO member—more reliable.

[Correspondent] Meeting with British Prime Minister M. Thatcher in Moscow recently, you drew her attention to the fact that NATO is sticking to its previous positions of forward-based defense....

[Yazov] I unfortunately received no reply from Mrs. M. Thatcher to my question about the possible restructuring of NATO and its new approaches to the changing situation in Europe. You witnessed that. What will such a NATO restructuring be like, what will its essence be, and will it be implemented? We have heard nothing on this issue. NATO, as is clear from the speech by M. Thatcher herself at the NATO Council session in Scotland, views its role in Europe as decisive.

Unfortunately I can state that, despite all the outward changes in the direction of improved relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization, certain forces in the West still adhere to the previous positions that the Soviet Union is the enemy of Western countries.

On the one hand, our Western partners are satisfied that the Warsaw Pact is being transformed into a political alliance. But, on the other, they are keeping their alliance a military-political alliance and allotting it a central role in the future. This does not add up. M. Thatcher says that political pledges and promises alone cannot safeguard security and that NATO must maintain strong defenses in the future. But they try to reassure us just with political promises.... Surely this factual state of affairs cannot fail to increase my concerns as the defense minister responsible for the USSR’s national security?

NATO currently has a partial force advantage. I still cannot shake off the impression that the NATO staffs are guided by the desire to unilaterally disarm the Soviet Union.

Take the following example. The United States categorically refuses to join in the talks on cutting its naval armaments. At the same time, it insists on the inclusion of our land-based naval aviation in the Vienna talks. This produces a strange picture, I would say. The United States and NATO are retaining around 1,500 ship-borne aircraft, half of which are carrier-based attack aircraft. And these will not be affected by any cuts since they are not part of the Vienna talks package. Yet we, in their view, should cut our land-based naval aircraft. Is that equivalent? Of course not. Or take the following fact. The United States has a 200,000-strong Marine Corps. Its equipment testifies to the offensive nature of its mission. It can be moved to any part of the world and conduct offensive operations. The size of the U.S. Marines allows the United States to create the necessary advantage in forces and materiel in any place at any time.

Here is the last point I would like to make. NATO advocates the retention of both conventional and nuclear U.S. forces in Europe. The question arises: against whom will NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons be targeted? I recall that Soviet units are being withdrawn from the East European states.
The British prime minister claims that, without modernized NATO nuclear arms deployed on forward lines, that alliance's defenses would be less reliable. As you can see, people still see us as the enemy. And, insofar as I can judge, this is done deliberately despite all our practical steps to strengthen universal security not only on the European continent but in the world as a whole. That is what concerns me most of all today.

Cheney Argues for U.S. Military Presence Abroad
LD2606092290 Moscow TASS in English 0901 GMT
26 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Stanislav Lunev]

[Text] Washington, June 26 (TASS)—The U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney said that despite substantial positive changes in the international situation, the United States should preserve its military presence in the territories of foreign states.

Richard Cheney was speaking on television on Monday.

He said that the current system of alliances with U.S. participation is the key element of U.S. national security. He said the United States should continue to keep U.S. troops at forward bases.

Cheney said this presence can be continued with smaller contingents of troops and at lower costs than at present, but that forward basing should still be preserved.

Besides that, the U.S. defense minister declared his opposition to deep cuts in areas of the Armed Forces that are [words indistinct] forward-based U.S. "troops in wartime. [single quotation mark as received]

He mentioned, specifically, the Fourth Division of the U.S. Army stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado, aimed at reinforcing U.S. troops stationed in Europe. He said the division's command inspects from time to time the forward bases of the division, while its units regularly participate in exercises on that territory. He said that the importance of this and other similar units of the U.S. forces might be substantially enhanced in the future.

Cheney said that U.S. forces might be reduced in the years ahead. He said that their volume will be determined by progress in reaching Soviet-American agreements on arms control, Soviet troop withdrawals from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland, the preservation in the coming five years of the positive tendencies observed over the past six to eight months. If this happens, cuts of forward-based troops could be considered. He noted, however, that even in that case the principle of forward bases should remain.

The U.S. defence secretary also warned about the need for U.S. servicemen discharged from active service to maintain their readiness, so that this process should not have a negative effect on the country's security.

He said that excellent specialists are needed for the armed services. He said that the Armed Forces might be smaller, but that he sees no reason why they should not be of the same high quality.

U.S. Begins Removing Chemical Arms From FRG
LD2606169790 Moscow TASS in English 1630 GMT
26 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Serov]

[Text] Bonn, June 26 (TASS)—The packing of projectiles with toxic agents, which are to be withdrawn from West German territory, began today at the American chemical weapons depot near Pirmasens, Rheinland-Pfalz. In accordance with an agreement reached by Bonn and Washington, all American chemical weapons should be withdrawn from West Germany by the end of the current year. The weapons include 100,000 artillery shells with a total weight of 7,000 tonnes, which are filled with nerve toxic agents.

The packing of chemical weapons into air-tight steel containers and their loading into special vehicles is the first stage of the withdrawal of chemical weapons from West Germany. From July to September the shells will be moved to an American depot in Misau, also in Rheinland-Pfalz. From Misau they will be transported at night by railway to the North Sea port of Nordenham, near Bremerhaven. They will be reloaded there to American ships, which will transport them to the Johnston Atoll to be destroyed.

The West German authorities pay special attention to ensuring the safety of the transportation of chemical weapons. Each transport will be escorted by about one thousand security and police officers.
AUSTRIA

Defense Minister’s Spending Plans Viewed

French Missiles Sought
90EN0625A Vienna PROFIL in German
No 17, 23 Apr 90 pp 24-25

[Unattributed article: “Robert Lichal’s 4 Billion Schilling Vision—Finance Minister Totally Unmoved by Defense Minister’s Missile Plans”]

[Text] Just in time for the upcoming election Defense Minister Robert Lichal would like to make a big splash. He wants to spend 4.2 billion schillings to buy surface-to-air missiles.

Lichal’s supplier of choice is the French arms conglomerate Matra.

Othmar Tauschitz, the army chief of staff, and Gen. Ernest Koenig of General Staff Group A have already sent out an advance party. Brigadier Rudolf Egger in charge of arms planning and Lt. Col. Michael Derman, the future military attaché to Sweden carried out an on-site inspection. On 5 March they took in lectures and lunch at both Matra and Aerospatial.

Understandably, the alarm bells went off at Bofors, the Swedish competitor. The Swedes would very much like to sell their RBS 70 missiles to the Austrian military.

Since systemic decisions are involved—and the procurement of highly expensive surface-to-air missiles costing some $80,000 each has a big impact on the defense system—and since the national defense council did give preference to the Swedish missiles, alarm bells went off all around. There is little understanding for the fact that Matra’s Mistral missiles are now being pushed hard.

“If Minister Lichal wants to ram through the purchase of such missiles no matter what make prior to the election,” says one high-ranking Bundesheer officer, “it will turn out to be just as much of a flop as the Draken purchase some years ago. It takes at least two to three years of preparatory time to set up a missile system. It takes infrastructure installations, spare parts facilities, repair shops and data transmission lines. The Bundesheer has paper—but that is all. It would be utterly insane to reach a decision now.”

A complicated infrastructure is required to target the missiles accurately—comprising not only the missiles themselves but also the so-called fire control system. The plan is to purchase Giraffe 40 missile chassis from Bofors and a compatible data link system from Thomson and to test the Matra missiles together with this equipment.

Series production of the Matra missiles commenced only a short time ago. Before that, there had been test failures. The fact that the missiles, the radar and fire control systems and the computers will all be supplied by different manufacturers and that all this is to be done within a very short time in the midst of an election campaign makes for a good deal of confusion. Understandably, SPOe [Socialist Party of Austria] and FPOe [Freedom Party of Austria] military experts have already warned against rushing into these purchases.

There are even more grounds for reservations in view of the fact that air defenses only make sense if a protective shield for all altitudes (up to 20 kilometers) and all distances (at least up to 50 kilometers) can be set up.

A dense protective shield cannot be built for a mere 4 billion schillings. But any potential aggressor will just laugh at a shield that does not do the job because it is full of holes. A comprehensive shield that would protect Austria from air attack would cost far more than 10 billion schillings, the experts say—perhaps even twice that amount. Thus, if Lichal plunges into these purchases now, billions will have to be made available in the years ahead in order to set up any system at all.

Disturbing news from sources close to Matra and Thomson has reached Austria. High-ranking military officers, so the story goes, have told Matra that the Bundesheer expects both the public and the political parties to oppose the project and that it is prepared to go through with it “on an unofficial basis.” Wilfried Schiffling, a defense ministry spokesman, is trying to play this down, however. It is the planning group’s job to propose the system it considers best, he says. “A final decision has not yet been reached.”

The Bofors Giraffe 40 platform which would serve to launch RBS 70 missiles on target is tailored to Swedish missile specifications. The pertinent “Target Data Receiver” electronics system and the radar equipment would be supplied by Thomson of France and Ericsson, a Scandinavian manufacturer. All these parts could also be used to handle Matra missiles, Bundesheer sources say.

The necessary contacts were established by Francois Saar-Demichel, the French armament representative. Saar-Demichel, for that matter, does not believe that the purchase is about to be made anytime soon. “It will take at least another year.”

Saar-Demichel has labelled the Matra missile “modern but a little too expensive.” Though it is a plus that it cannot be deflected by an aircraft, the range of the Matra missile is not long enough.

The Crotal missile produced by Thomson is not substantially more expensive and would guarantee “high-level hit probability” at a range of 10 kilometers.

“I would give the nod to the Crotal,” said the 79-year-old Saar-Demichel, noting that that is his own personal opinion.
In years past the Bundesheer engaged in lengthy discussions about the purchase of antitank missiles. The decision was made to acquire Bill missiles manufactured by Bofors which have a range of just about 3 kilometers at a cost of more than 1 billion schillings.

Now the Defense Ministry says that the Bill missile was not really a high-priority item but that it “was simpler” to start the introduction of antitank missiles with the purchase of the Bills.

The need for surface-to-air missiles was much more urgent, it is said. The latter are produced by various countries, e.g., Rapiers by Great Britain, Stingers by the United States, Igla by the Soviet Union, and Matra or Thomson missiles by France.

At a press conference in Vienna two months ago, Saar-Demichel spoke on behalf of Lichal, saying that the minister made the right decision in 1987 in purchasing expensive test ammunition from Oerlikon rather than the cheaper variety from Matra. The Saar-Demichel statement was merely of short-term help to Lichal who had run afoul of criminal law. Saar-Demichel’s argument that Matra Manurhin was not really in a position to deliver the 2-cm ammunition it had offered was grist for Lichal’s mill.

But now that argument may turn out to have the opposite effect for if Matra was unable to deliver ammunition worth a mere 15 million schillings, how is it that firm supposed to deliver missiles worth billions and to integrate infrastructure elements supplied by other manufacturers in a highly sophisticated overall system?

The Defense Ministry has an answer—confidential, of course. Because of the slowdown occasioned by the ammunition issue all contracts approvals are proceeding at an especially slow pace, it is said. At the end of this year 3 billion schillings will probably not have been allocated as yet. This kind of money cannot be used to purchase small items but can only be spent on major systems.

Accordingly, Lichal wants to buy the scurrilous “government aircraft” from Great Britain for 300 million schillings, arguing that Caritas will also be able to use the plane to transport aid shipments. Lichal’s contention that the aircraft could also be used to transport Draken engines to Austria from Sweden is particularly outlandish. Aside from the fact that there are only five [Austrian Air Force] pilots capable of flying the 24 Drakens, it is a fact that jet engines are transported by rail throughout the world.

Above and beyond that, Lichal wants to buy the missiles. If he did, he could really use up the billions he will still have in his budget at the end of the year.

Understandably, Finance Minister Ferdinand Lacina has called Lichal’s plans pipedreams. “My interest in this is close to zero—if not absolute zero,” Lacina says.

---

New Planes for Air Force

90EN0625B Vienna PROFIL in German
No 18, 30 Apr 90 p 28

[Article by Alfred Worm: “Large- and Medium-sized—Austrian Air Force Buildup: From Government Aircraft to Attack Helicopters”]

[Text] The world is disarming. Robert Lichal is arming. He is wild about surface-to-air missiles costing 4 billion schillings and a British Aerospace 146-200 STA (Side-loading Tactical Airlifter, military version) government aircraft.

“We are the only nation in Europe where something like this is criticized as a prestige trip,” Lichal told KURIER last December. “Everybody else tries to see to it that the valuable time of the members of the government is utilized as economically as possible.”

In the meantime, Lichal has gone into action. A few days ago he had a 146-200 flown over to Austria. The Bundesheer was even ordered to set up special project teams to deal with the subject of wide-body transport planes.

According to INTERAVIA, a professional magazine, the cost of one 146-200 amounts to 250 million schillings which is not really all that much money considering the fact that this four-jet engine military aircraft is capable of transporting loads of 7.5 tons.

But one aircraft will not really be enough. If maintenance work has to be done to the aircraft and a government delegation suddenly needs to fly off somewhere, then it might be forced to book its flight on AUA (Austrian Airlines). That must not be allowed to happen. Which is why the Army wishes to buy a second aircraft of this type.

But since the aircraft as such will not do and spare parts and an infrastructure are required, an additional $5 million per plane will have to be spent for the “system.”

Only recently a high-ranking officer cited some other reasons over ORF why these aircraft should be purchased under all circumstances. They could be used to fly Austrian UN contingents to their duty stations. Up to now, AUA took care of that and charged the United Nations for it. But it is more chic of course to have the members of the UN contingent board a plane daubed with Austrian-style camouflage paint. Another use to which the planes could be put would be to fly Draken engines for maintenance to Sweden. Small-scale enterprises like Swissair are so skimpy that they have maintenance work on their engines done at the AUA shop in Vienna International Airport in Schwechat. The sensual aircraft could not only be used to carry members of the government to every corner of the globe but also relief units to disaster areas, e.g. to Leninakan in Armenia. The only thing is that the Leninakan airport was also destroyed by the earthquake.

On the other hand, the 600 million schilling price tag for the two planes is so low that it is hard to understand why
Finance Minister Lacina and SPOe [Socialist Party of Austria] parliamentary leader Heinz Fischer are so dead set against the purchase.

Lichal, however, has some more investment schemes on his mind. The Bundesheer procurement program calls for leasing two Hercules C-130E transport planes soon at a cost of 40 million schillings each. These wide-body aircraft also have four jet engines.

Lichal is also looking for some medium-sized aircraft in addition to the wide bodies. The plan is to buy two Short Sherpas. Not so long ago some high-ranking officers took a field trip to Dublin in an Austrian military plane at a cost of about 300,000 schillings where the Short Brothers manufacture their twin turboprops. They were joined by Hans Drescher, a colonel in the militia who was on a military exercise just then. On an earlier occasion, Drescher had acted on behalf of the Bundesheer in the Draken purchase. He will no doubt succeed in arranging the purchase of the Sherpas as well—at about 50 million schillings apiece.

But since the Army is interested in variety, it is also thinking of purchasing two medium-sized Spanish Casa aircraft at a cost of a mere 20 million schillings each.

Whenever advertisements of certain products appear in DER SOLDAT, insiders know that these products will soon be purchased. On 11 April, DER SOLDAT carried an ad for Bell helicopters. This means that Drescher is eagerly awaiting a commission and a substantial addition to his bank account. The 42 present Bell helicopters are to be replaced—at least in part—by Apaches, manufactured in the United States. In all, no more than 12 to 25 new aircraft are to be purchased at $19 million apiece. It is certainly good to know that the Austrian Air Force has the money to pay for these purchases which will run into the billions.

It is public knowledge that letters of intent on the purchase of attack helicopters were sent to Italian and French helicopter manufacturers. It cannot be ruled out therefore that additional aircraft will soon be bought.

It is not yet clear what is to be done with the existing Skyvan aircraft which are soon to be replaced.

One thing is certain. Things are moving along in the Bundesheer. The Air Force is thinking.

The only problem is that we already twice as many aircraft as operational pilots.

But perhaps Robert Lichal will succeed in hiring the necessary pilots away from AUA. That would optimize the air readiness of our Armed Forces.

---

TORONTO STAR Opposes TASM Development, Testing
52200025 Toronto THE SATURDAY STAR in English 12 May 90 p D2

[Editorial: "Where's Canada on Arms Control?"]

[Text] At the very time the world is trying to turn back the Doomsday Clock, deployment of a new generation of air-launched nuclear missiles in Europe would be nothing less than foolhardy.

Yet that's exactly what the United States, backed by Britain, is asking the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to approve as the NATO military alliances rejigs its strategies for a post-Cold War era of peace.

At a meeting of NATO's nuclear planning group in Alberta this week, the Americans signalled they want to modernize NATO's European nuclear arsenal in the mid-1990s with a new short-range, air-to-surface missile.

It's precisely the wrong signal to send.

Surely, with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev saying he's prepared to rid Europe of nuclear weapons and with hopes rising for new limits on conventional forces, this is no time to be talking about new nuclear hardware.

Not only would development of the new missile (range: 400 kilometres) be provocative, peace activists note that the Pentagon already has approved a secret program to build a 1,000-kilometre model as well.

As the independent Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament says, both developments would appear to threaten the spirit of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement to rid Europe of mid-range missiles.

Unfortunately, the American position on nuclear weapons in Europe grows murkier almost by the day.

Recently, President George Bush cancelled U.S. plans to replace the aging Lance short-range nuclear missile with an advanced model. He accepted the German argument that it would have to target other than East Germany, soon to be united with West Germany.

Good. But when it comes to withdrawing nuclear-tipped artillery shells from Europe—mostly German—soil, the Americans haven't accepted the same line of reasoning advanced by West German and Dutch officials.

And what of Canada's position on the new NATO missile? The government's silence, and Defence Minister Bill McKnight's apparent willingness to consider a U.S. request to test it in Canadian skies, are deeply troubling.

How could Prime Minister Brian Mulroney argue that a brand new tactical nuclear weapon for Europe is anything but destabilizing? The gap between Ottawa's lofty
arms-control objectives and its desire to please Washington has seldom seemed clearer.

Canada To Cut Troops in Europe If Arms Pact Signed
52200024 Windsor THE WINDSOR STAR in English
17 May 90 p A10

[Text] Ottawa (CP)—Canada will reduce its troop strength in Europe if there’s an agreement to reduce conventional arms on the continent, Defence Minister Bill McKnight said Wednesday.

McKnight, speaking to the Commons defence committee, stressed that any reduction would take place in consultation with Canada’s NATO allies.

Canada has about 7,000 land troops and four squadrons of CF-18 fighter aircraft stationed in West Germany at an estimated cost of $1.2 billion a year. East-West talks to reduce conventional weapons in Europe are expected to culminate in a treaty later this year. The talks are aimed at reductions of tanks, artillery, troop carriers, fixed-wing combat aircraft and helicopters.

Progress has slowed in recent weeks, but diplomats remain hopeful an agreement will be completed in time for a 35-nation summit this year.

But McKnight also stressed a conventional arms deal hasn’t been reached yet and the recent political upheaval in central and eastern Europe has created a volatile and uncertain strategic situation.

That makes it difficult to revise Canadian defence policy, he said, urging patience until the changes can be completed later this year.

Senior military planners have been struggling for months to reconcile financial restrictions with the serious need for new equipment such as submarines.

Flanked by senior officers, McKnight told the committee the revised policy will be based on three guiding principles:
—The defence of Canadian territory and sovereignty within a framework of “collective security” with Canada’s allies,
—Arms control and disarmament,
—The peaceful resolution of conflicts.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Stoltenberg Plans To Stop Low-Altitude Flights
AU2506094790 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
22 Jun 90 p 7

[Report by RMC]

[Text] FRG Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg is willing to halt military low-altitude flights in those areas of the FRG where flights are permitted down to 75 meters above ground as quickly as possible and to drastically reduce in general all similar flights at low altitudes by the NATO air forces, which practice over FRG territory. According to information obtained by DIE WELT, it is still uncertain whether the other defense ministers will agree to this goal.

At the Brussels meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee at the end of May, Stoltenberg—in a way which was considered almost unusual for the cautiously and carefully acting Bonn defense minister—confronted his counterparts with his intention to bring about a decision on the changes in low-altitude flights in the FRG “by the beginning of the summer recess.”

Afterwards, the German minister went home and wrote a number of letters. In these letters he again made it urgently clear to his counterparts in the NATO capitals that, in view of the changing military security situation in Europe, the need for very strictly observed military low-altitude practice flights in the FRG can no longer be seen and that he, Stoltenberg, wants to drastically reduce the resulting noise in the interest of the population. Reportedly, the minister went one step further and told the other ministers that he will order the Bundeswehr Air Force to cease low-altitude flights on its own, if the NATO partners cannot come to a joint decision.

Stoltenberg has not yet received answers to his letter from all of his counterparts. In particular, what U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and British Secretary of State for Defense Tom King think of Bonn’s proposals is still not known. As DIE WELT has learned, it is obviously to be expected that the United States will not generally reject them. Whether London will be willing to cease practice flights in the German 75-meter regions for the Royal Air Force is still unclear. When a few days ago one of Prime Minister Thatcher’s closest advisers was approached about this topic by Christian Democratic Union Bundestag Deputy Bernd Wilz, the German parliamentarian could not yet see any British readiness for compromise.

Nevertheless, those in the circles around Stoltenberg are nurturing the hope that a decision will be possible by the end of June. The Defense Ministry considers it an acceptable compromise if flights in the 75-meter areas are completely abolished and if other low-altitude flights are carried out only down to a height of 200 meters above ground.

Eppelmann Against Army ‘United Supreme Command’
LD2406141290 Hamburg DPA in German 1313 GMT
24 Jun 90

[Excerpt] Hamburg (DPA)—GDR Minister of Disarmament and Defense Rainer Eppelmann (Democratic Awakening) has spoken out against a united supreme command for an all-German army. After unification the troops on the territory of the present-day GDR should be placed under the control of their own leadership and commander in chief, which have to be responsible to the
parliaments of the five GDR laender, Eppelmann said today in Hamburg's University for Economics and Politics. He does not wish to become commander in chief. The minister is the most prominent participant in the "Prospects for Cooperative Security for the Post-Military Era" congress.

According to Eppelmann there should be no Bundeswehr or NATO soldiers stationed between the Elbe and the Oder Rivers, should the united Germany remain in the North Atlantic pact. It is also conceivable that Germany could belong to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Then, however, the two alliance systems would have to deliver a mutual renunciation of violence. Eppelmann emphasized that leaving the Soviet Union "standing outside the door" in the development in Europe has to be prevented. All CSCE member states have to be enabled to participate in a future European alliance system. [passage omitted]

First U.S. CW Shells Loaded for Disposal
LD2606101990 Hamburg DPA in German 0945 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Excerpts] Pirmasens (DPA)—The starting shot for the withdrawal of all chemical weapons from the Federal Republic was fired with the loading of the first of about 100,000 U.S. toxic gas shells into airtight steel containers in the U.S. Clausen depot near Pirmasens on Tuesday. In the view of those responsible for the transportation from the military, police, and emergency services, the timetable is so far being adhered to.

U.S. armed forces specialists are packing the ammunition in Clausen twice over in the coming weeks, since the steel containers are immediately loaded onto military transporters, the so-called Milvans, in order to wait under guard the start of road transportation. [passage omitted]

The chemical weapons will be shipped in the fall from the North Sea port of Nordenham to a special incineration plant on Johnston Island in the Pacific.

FRANCE

'Silent' Submarine Production Discussed
90ES0911B Paris LIBERATION in French 9 May 90 pp 26-27

[Article by Jean Guisnel: "The Silent War"]

[Excerpts] Under the sea, sound takes the place of light. Submarines track each other, avoid each other, and try to hear each other, without being heard. With these big steel fish, the hum of an engine or the knocking of pipes can be more alarming than a missile. Technologies are now being developed to make submarines completely undetectable. Let's investigate the "silence people" in France's arms industry...

In the world of silence, noise is death. Engineers today are building a submarine so quiet that the sounds produced by its on-board machinery and its movement through the water are indistinguishable from the noise of the sea itself. This most recent round in the battle between sword and shield is being waged by "brains" slaving away in secret laboratories to sort out all the sounds picked up by underwater microphones (hydrophones), to distinguish those produced by enemy submarines from all the rest—acoustic clutter that includes everything from breaking waves to merchants ships. [passage omitted]

French engineers were not neglecting this aspect of things. [passage omitted] But now the battle is being waged in earnest. And it is precisely because the war against noise costs a fortune that the price tag for the Triomphant, the future strategic submarine that is to go into service in 1994, is so high: Fr15 billion. At the Center for Study and Research on Naval Acoustic Damping (CERDAN) in the bowls of the arms complex at Toulon, top arms engineer Sylvain Marcouyoux and his team has been given the task of finding new ways to reduce the noise output of the Triomphant. On a boat with some 500 pieces of machinery on board, it's not easy to muffle everything that can possibly produce sound. For there are all kinds of sound waves: the low-frequency hydrodynamic waves generated by the friction of the (ultra-streamlined) hull in the water; the pressure of the stuffing box against the propellers, which an ultra-sensitive microphone can sometimes detect; the noise given off by the engines; the vibrations of the auxiliary engines; the cavitation of the propellers and the vacuum bubbles they create, etc.

Everything is modeled on a computer, and anything that can't be suspended or isolated with special rubber is encased and cowled: For even after all sources of internal vibration have been muted, there is still the air contained in the submarine, which can transmit detectable low-frequency vibrations to the hull... Everything requires painstaking attention: The workers at the Cherbourg naval armaments yard who are currently building the Triomphant must be told not to attach their kilometers of cable to the walls, and above all not to fasten the screws too tight—at the risk, if these injunctions are ignored, of compressing the damping devices and reducing their elasticity... In this field, arms engineers can hope for civilian spinoffs. Shrewd home appliance makers are trying to recruit submarine engineers to work for them to design silent dishwashers!

All the calculations, all the hypotheses are tested on a scale model of the vessel which is lowered several times a day into the EDF [French Electric Company] hydroelectric reservoir at Castillon, a few dozen kilometers from Nice. There, beneath the vacant stares of a polychrome Christ and a papier-mache Buddha erected by a mystic-folkloric community, engineers with the aid of powerful computers and armed with hydrophones insulated from all sonic contamination study the precise relationship between the sounds emitted by the model
and the signal picked up by the sensors. Here they can simultaneously test the shield of silence and the sword that breaks it.

At Sophia-Antipolis, in Thomson-Sintra's submarine acoustics laboratory, the goal is underwater detection of artificial sounds, no matter how faint. For many years the firm headed by Alain Gomez has been one of the top outfits in the world in this domain. It's no mystery: Over the last 20 years, continuing and massive injections of funds have been poured into research on underwater acoustics to meet the operational efficiency requirements of France's sea-going strategic force. Today, says Bernard Toquet, director of Thomson Sintra's acoustics laboratory, research gobbles up 30 percent of the firm's turnover (Fr. 65 billion in 1989) and accounts for 70 percent of the engineers and technicians on the 2,500-person work force. Tracing residual noise, taking undersea soundings to extirpate the slightest vibration and analyze it: altogether a wide field for research. According to Toquet, "in water it may be rather simple to suppress propagation of the 10,000-Hz frequencies produced by the engines, but it is not so easy to stop the sound produced by water flowing across the submarine's hull."

None of these high-performance instruments would avail were it not for the experts specially trained to analyze underwater noise. These men used to be called the "golden ears," specialists capable of recognizing ships' sounds as soon as they hear them. Though we were given every opportunity during our visit to meet with researchers, for security reasons we were not allowed to tour the Navy's Center for Acoustic Interpretation and Recognition (CIRA) at Toulon. The permanent staff of this super-secret installation consists of 60 officers and petty officers who travel in pairs aboard the submarines. They are not part of the crew but remain attached to the center, bringing back after each voyage the magnetic tapes they have recorded, to reanalyze and compare them, let their colleagues listen to them and thus build up a living library of undersea sounds.

Ever since very low frequency listening systems became available several years ago, the hydrophones have been furnishing more information than the center could analyze: There simply weren't enough brains and ears—"golden" or otherwise. Now video screens provide visual imaging of the sounds and their various characteristics. One expert, for example, will be able to recognize the "line" (signature) of the auxiliary engine of a Soviet submarine—sometimes even the number of ball bearings it has—and can pick that particular vessel out of a group of 20. The vocabulary of these technicians is extremely precise, and they will discuss among themselves the difference between a diesel engine having "timbre and rhythm but not depth" and a turbine "with depth but no timbre or rhythm." The whine of a propeller is no mystery to them: They can distinguish the line of a propeller drive-shaft from a thousand others.

This specialty will soon go through some major changes, since artificial intelligence is fast moving into the field. At the Group for Studies and Research in Underwater Detection (GERDSM) at Brusc, a handful of engineers is currently working on automatic analysis of the sonic parameters of submarines and surface ships of all nationalities, in hopes that before long the process will be reliable enough to put into service. For engineers Christian Plumejaud and Philippe Le Ble, the leaders of "Project Diva," the performance enhancement offered by artificial intelligence will make it indispensable. Right now, cognitive systems experts are spending hours literally pumping out all the knowledge of the CIRA analysts, in order to record all their information and "tricks of the trade" into computer data banks. When this phase of the work is complete it will be theoretically possible, by connecting the listening system to the computer, to determine automatically the exact identity of the vessel in question. And if the intelligence is good enough, they may even know the age of the captain...

"The problem we as detectors face is to catch the noises the ship's designer forgot to muffle," says chief engineer Pierre Lefaudeux, leader of the underwater warfare group attached to the director of naval construction. But advances in noise suppression technology may one day make it possible for engineers to build completely undetectable submarines. When that happens, the detectors will have to start from square one again, relying on a tried and true device that has languished in storage rooms for some years: active sonar, which works by emitting a sound that is registered when it bounces back from the target. Active sonar has one major drawback—the emission is very easily detected. The result could be that the hunter becomes the hunted. The Fr500 million the Defense Ministry allocates each year for the development of antisubmarine technologies is only one-tenth what is spent by the United States. But French civilian and military engineers working on their own are satisfied with what they have been able to accomplish on a relatively small budget. Of course, in the world of silence one doesn't exactly go around shouting about one's achievements.

Thomson Radar Cooperation With Marconi
90ES0911C Paris LES ECHOS in French 18 May 90 p 12

[Article by Alexandra Schwartzbrod: "GEC-Marconi To Sign Radar Accord With Thomson-CSF"]

[Text] The two electronics firms, currently developing rival radar systems, have decided to work together on a radar for the 21st century...

Rising above the enmity which marked their relations in the past, GEC-Marconi and Thomson-CSF are getting ready to pool their know how to develop a radar for the generation of aircraft after Rafale and EFA [European Fighter Aircraft]. In an exclusive interview with LES ECHOS, the number two man at GEC-Marconi, David
Fletcher, disclosed this week at Hanovre that his group was on the verge of signing an agreement with Thomson-CSF for research on an airborne active-antenna radar for the next generation of European warplanes.

The accord is expected to be much like the radar agreement signed last July by Thomson-CSF and Ferranti, whose activities in this field have recently landed in GEC-Marconi’s lap.

“We want this new arrangement with Thomson because it is the best thing for us to do,” said Fletcher, noting that the new accord would be based on technology involving gallium arsenide components which GEC-Marconi has developed at its new center in Caswell.

The British group is also hoping to recruit an additional partner in the program—the “other” French electronics firm, Electronique Serge Dassault (last week renamed Dassault Electronique), with which it has been working closely for more than a year now.

Public Agreement With Electronique Serge Dassault

In January 1989 the two firms signed an accord for joint development of active self-guidance systems for anti-aircraft missiles. Since then they have been working on the homing head of the Mica missile which Matra is developing for the Rafale.

This accord should thus conclude the long series of shake-ups in the European radar industry which has finally led to the establishment of two centers in Europe: Thomson-ESD in France for the Rafale radar, and GEC-Ferranti (in cooperation with Germany’s TST, a subsidiary of Deutsche Aerospace) for the Rafale’s competitor, the celebrated EPA. The two centers are doomed to cooperate, since all available evidence suggests the next generation of combat planes will be a Europe-wide project.

SNECMA [National Company for the Design and Building of Aircraft Engines] and Rolls-Royce, having already understood this, are beginning to think about working together on an engine for the future aircraft (see LES ECHOS of 6 April 1990).

“The creation of a European arms industry is inevitable,” Fletcher maintains. “We must seize opportunities when they present themselves. Sometimes one can even give destiny a little push, as in a game of chess.” A game at which GEC-Marconi is obviously a past master, since in just the last few months it has acquired both Plessey (with Siemens) and Ferranti Defense Systems.

Not to mention the joint venture it has just begun with Matra (Matra Marconi Space), which propels it in a single bound to a leadership position in the European space industry, on a par with the Alcatel-Aerospatiale consortium presently being put together.

Leclerc Tank Battalion Operational in 1995
90ES0930A Paris LIBERATION in French
23 May 90 p 10

[Text] It’s big (54 tons), powerful (1,500 horsepower), heavily armed (a 120-mm gun), costly (Fr5 billion for development and 28.6 million in additional outlays for each vehicle delivered), low-centered, and entirely green. In addition, it can fight while moving, destroy anything bigger which the enemy may throw against it, and protect its three-man crew while operating in a nuclear environment. Some 1,400 of them will be built starting next year, if the Army gets its way.

According to all the standard criteria, the AMX-Leclerc, unveiled at Camp Satory yesterday before the press and officers of the armored cavalry, is a combat tank. But in reality it is not. According to the information in the press kits and explanations given yesterday by program officials with the General Delegation for Armaments (DGA), the AAMX-Leclerc is a “new concept,” an “electronic vehicle.” The video clip shown at the prototype presentation ceremony even managed never to talk about the tank, only about the “communication system” of which it is the hub.

This war machine—which, according to those who plan to use it for the next 30 years, will be the most modern in the world when it comes out—has a number of unusual electronic subsystems. With the help of a frequency-shifting transmitter (one which therefore cannot be jammed) the armored vehicle will automatically and continuously pinpoint its own location, while the tank commander will have at his disposal high-resolution imaging screens, computer data-coding equipment, diagnostic “expert systems,” etc. The general staff will get real-time information on the precise disposition of all its tanks as well as the results of the battle, which will be represented on video screens.

All the same, in the current environment of international negotiations on conventional arms reduction, the AMX-Leclerc tank is being looked at closely by influential officials involved in the budget process; parliament has already expressed more than once its opinion that the number of tanks the Army wants is too large and should be reduced. But there is no urgency yet about a decision, since mass production in the workyards of GIAT [Ground Weapons Industrial Group] Industries, the prime contractor, will not reach full speed for several more years. The French Government clearly hopes to sell the tank to a number of foreign governments (contacts have already been made with Saudi Arabia) and has even offered it—albeit with little hope for success—to the British Army, which is expected to announce by the end of the year which tank (the German Leopard-2, the American M-1 Abrams, or the British Challenger-2) will replace its current Challengers. The first Leclerc tank battalion will be operational in 1995.
GREECE

Plans for Nuclear Weapons Emplacement
90ES0899A Athens TO VIMA TIS KIRIARIS in Greek
13 May 90 p 36

[Article by D. Nikolakopoulos: “Nuclear Weapons in Araxos”]

[Text] Besides the “mystery” of the U.S. military presence in our country that will be resolved with the signing of the new bases agreement, the “mystery” involving the NATO nuclear presence in Greece will also be resolved in 1990. The overall issue, that will also be discussed at NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group meeting this fall, has been put “on the agenda” because of new developments that have appeared in the area of nuclear weapons installations in Greece.

These developments relate to the following:

1. The U.S. decision to abolish, together with the Ellinikon and Nea Makri bases, the 558th U.S. Army Artillery Group with headquarters in Elevis.

2. The question if, in the long run, 11 of the new TASM [Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles] nuclear missiles that NATO is readying to install on European air bases, will be stockpiled in Araxos.

Geographic distribution of nuclear weapons in Greece and the organizational structure of the 558th U.S. Army Artillery Group with headquarters in Elevis.

Key:
1. AirForce (Ellinikon)
2. Airport Liaison Service (Ellinikon)
3. 70th USAFAD [U.S. Army Field Artillery Detachment] (Ioannina)
4. 88th USAFAD (Drama)
5. Communications Center with Southeaster NATO Headquarters (Ellinikon)
6. 558th U.S. Army Artillery Group, Staff (Elevis)
7. Automated Communications Operations Center (Elevis)
8. 138th Ordnance Company (Elevis)
9. Vehicle Maintenance Service (Ellinikon)
10. 18th USAFAD (Ellinikon)
11. 76th USAAD [U.S. Army Air Defense Detachment] (Koropi)
12. 78th USAAD (Katsimidi)
The United States has already begun procedures "to develop" the Araxos base so as to be able to "receive" the new nuclear missiles. These procedures, according to TO VIMA's information, began even before the U.S. decision to close down the Ellinikon and Nea Makri bases was announced. The projects on Araxos that were completed during 1989 included improvement of the base's communications system as well as of existing facilities to stockpile nuclear warheads.

Presently, the 7061st Munitions Support Squadron has its headquarters in Araxos. Also there is the Communications Control Station that is directly linked to the 2140th Communications Group which has its headquarters at the Ellinikon base. In other words, the Araxos base constitutes a "connecting link" between U.S. and NATO installations in Greece.

Thus, the "map" of nuclear bases the United States maintains in Greece is changing. The process of change began when the United States decided to partially withdraw Honest John and Nike-Hercules nuclear warheads that are considered "outdated." The decision to eliminate the 558th U.S. Army Artillery Group, that TO VIMA revealed, is certain to mark the end of the stockpile of artillery nuclear missiles in four bases—the stockpile that NATO has in Greece. Besides Ellinikon and Elevis, there are similar stockpiles in Drama and Ioannina.

Besides the above, TO VIMA is today revealing the "identity" of the 558th U.S. Army Artillery Group that has control over nuclear weapons in Greece. The structure of the group is presented exactly as it has been described in official U.S. documents, something that is being done for the very first time.

As revealed in the makeup of the 558th U.S. Army Artillery Group, the bulk of the nuclear warheads that have been stockpiled on Greek soil up to now were located at a "breathing distance" from or even within inhabited areas of Attiki. U.S. artillery units are located in these areas that, together with Greek military authorities, hold the "keys" to the nuclear weapons. These units are staffed by U.S. artillery officers, specialized in nuclear weapons located at the Ellinikon base. The 138th Ordnance Company has its headquarters in Elevis. This company is responsible for maintaining the nuclear warheads.

The 558th U.S. Army Artillery Group also has a liaison service with the airport and an automated telecommunications operations center at the Ellinikon base. Also having its headquarters at the Ellinikon base are the Air Force Services and the Vehicle Maintenance Service that come under the 552nd [as published] U.S. Army Artillery Group. It thus becomes evident that the Ellinikon base played not only the role of a "pilot base" for almost all U.S. military installations in Greece but also the role of a "pilot base" for nuclear weapons located in Greece within the framework of NATO.
This is a U.S. Government publication. The views, policies, and attitudes of the author do not necessarily reflect those of the government.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.


The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.