JPRS Report

Arms Control
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SOUTH AFRICA

Armscor Weapons Reportedly Supplied to Iraq

MB0308201390 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 3-5 Aug 90 p 1

[By Mark Gevisser]

[Text] The Iraqi Army almost certainly used South African weapons in its invasion of Kuwait yesterday.

Many Iraqi artillery gunners—central to yesterday’s military action—have been trained by South African experts who would also have supplied maintenance, spare parts and ammunition.

According to military experts based here and in the Middle East, the South African arms producer Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] sold enough heavy artillery to Saddam Hussein’s army in the 1980s to balance South Africa’s budget.

Local press reports have made the same claim, and have suggested that the weapons were exchanged for oil from Iraq.

Most of the exchanges involved South Africa’s G5, said to be the world’s most advanced heavy artillery system, with a firing range of 42 km and a highly sophisticated fire control computer tracking device.

Press reports from the mid-eighties allege a direct exchange of at least 100 G5s for $1-billion worth of oil. The London-based AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL newsletter has reported that “hundreds of the G5 version have been sold to both Iran and Iraq.”

Military experts claim that South Africa was doing such a brisk Gulf War trade in G5s, that it depleted its own reserve just when it needed it at the time of the Cuito Cuanavale battle in Southern Angola in 1987.

Iraq now has an arsenal of 450 heavy artillery launchers, and Associated Press reported last week that much of this force had been moved to Kuwait’s border.

“It is highly likely that the G5s are in Kuwait,” says Helmoed Heitman, South Africa correspondent for JANE’S DEFENCE WEEKLY, “It’s the best gun they’ve got, and it’s fairly mobile too.”

“We know,” says AJ. Venter, the Africa—iddle East Correspondent for the INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, “that South Africa has been supplying Iraq with G5s since at least 1981. What came out of the Angola war was battle-tested, and ideally suited to the Gulf War, so Iraq latched onto it.”

Venter says that “originally both sides were supplied,” but Iraq, the larger buyer, threatened to cancel its contract if South Africa kept on selling to Iran.

The contract apparently involves a personnel exchange as well. “The G5 is sold with a training package,” says Heitman. “This means that either the Iraqis came here or the South Africans went there.”

Heitman believes that even if the Iraqis are no longer buying G5s, Armscor must still be involved in maintenance, spare parts and ammunition supply. He also says Iraq also uses South African anti-tank mines and radio equipment and, he adds, “there are strong rumours that Iraq has also bought a consignment of Kukri air-to-air missiles from Armscor.”

Iraq is developing its own 155mm and 210mm self-propelled guns and, says Heitman, “the basic vehicle for these is similar to the G6, which means that Armscor must be involved in an exchange of plans.”

Other sources claim that South Africa has also made its sophisticated MRLS (Multiple Rocket Launch System) available to Iraq.

An Armscor spokesman said yesterday that “we never comment on who we buy from or sell to. It’s up to the countries involved to comment.”
Prospects for Future U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Testing
90WC0072A Shanghai GUOJI ZHANWANG [WORLD OUTLOOK] in Chinese No 8, 23 Apr 90 pp 5-6


[Text] Nuclear testing has been a necessary method for developing nuclear weapons, and it has always been adapted to the needs and pace of nuclear weapons development. More than 40 years of nuclear weapons testing has produced an enormous stockpile of nuclear weapons, and has spurred generation changes in nuclear weapons. Because of this close relationship, nuclear testing is regarded as a distinctive measure for judging the level and rate of nuclear weapons development.

Nuclear Testing Faces A New Turning Point

There have been two major turning points in the more than 40-year history of nuclear testing. The first was the creation of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, which forced all Soviet and U.S. testing to be conducted underground. The second (turning point) came in 1974, when the U.S. and Soviet governments tacitly consented to a treaty limiting the size of weapons for underground testing: the treaty limited the destructive power of U.S. and Soviet nuclear tests to less than 150 kilotons of TNT.

In the wake of the general increase in the nuclear weapons arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, the maintenance and replacement of an every expanding arsenal of nuclear weapons has become a serious burden which both sides are finding difficult to shoulder. In 1983, the Reagan administration proposed the tremendously costly “Strategic Defense Initiative,” which expanded the arms race into outer space, while repeatedly slashing the funds the government used for nuclear weapons and nuclear testing. Since taking office, Bush has spared no effort in promoting the strategy of “beyond containment,” and using the policy of “peaceful evolution” in the struggle with the Soviet Union. Funding for nuclear testing has been reduced again. Since Gorbachev took office in 1985, the Soviet Union has greatly revised its domestic and foreign policies. The Soviet Union has turned from a one-sided pursuit of military power towards developing the domestic economy and strengthening comprehensive national strength, and shifted the guiding principle of national security from a vigorous offensive posture to one which emphasizes a rational, sufficient defense. It has also adopted a set of new initiatives and actions. Examples [include] a unilateral suspension of nuclear testing, the resumption of U.S.-Soviet test ban negotiations, and facilitating the signing of the INF treaty.

U.S. and Soviet revisions of the policies of the nuclear arms race have led to an atmosphere that is the most relaxed since the advent of nuclear weapons. This means that nuclear testing could be facing a new period of change, and the United States and the Soviet Union could both further limit nuclear testing, such as reaching new agreements on lowering equivalent weight limits and reducing the frequency of testing. This would mean reducing the scale and slowing the pace of the nuclear arms race; nuclear testing would become increasingly difficult and complex, and theoretical calculations and test simulation technology would play an increasingly greater role.

Trends in the Development of U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Testing

[If one] differentiates the nuclear testing conducted by the United States by purpose, it includes primarily testing weapons development, the physics of weapons, weapons effects, and stockpile reliability. Of these, the primary mission is testing weapons development. In the last several years the United States has achieved remarkable success in the area of weapons development testing, and has fully completed nuclear tests of a 155-mm nuclear warhead and the MX intercontinental missile nuclear warhead. The U.S. has also begun testing and verification of the nuclear device design for the submarine-launched Trident (DS-1) missile nuclear warhead, completed testing of the prototype warhead for a strategic, earth-penetrating shell, and conducted partial equivalent weight testing of model devices. Testing of weapons physics, which is presently receiving more and more attention, is done both in order to explore the requirements for third-generation nuclear weapons concepts, and in order to store up “logistics” for future nuclear weapons development. Testing of weapons effects, which has grown continuously in recent years, is concentrated primarily in three areas: First, testing the lethal power of new nuclear warheads and the ability of some important weapons systems to survive in a nuclear environment. Second, conducting research on new testing methods. Third, coordinating development of an earth-penetrating warhead and conducting shallow underground tunnel detonation testing. Under the pressure of spending restrictions (and the Soviet peace offensive), a sizable number of current U.S. nuclear testing safeguard measures and basic research projects have been cut back, and some major nuclear testing plans have also been repeatedly postponed.

All nuclear testing done by the Soviet Union can be classified as either “military purpose nuclear detonation” or “peaceful nuclear detonation.” The former has two purposes: “testing and verifying results of nuclear blast physics” and “improving military technology.” The first of these is similar to U.S. weapons effects testing, while the second is similar to weapons development and effects testing. In recent years, because Gorbachev has repeatedly given ground on the question of nuclear testing, the use of “military purpose nuclear detonations” has clearly decreased, and the proportion of “peaceful nuclear detonations” has steadily increased. According to a report issued in December 1987 by the Soviet Atomic Energy Commission, Soviet “peaceful nuclear detonations” are often used for petroleum and natural gas deep seismic prospecting, or for stimulating
oil wells to increase output. The Soviet Union has resolved to slow the pace of its own nuclear testing, an approach which is well-suited to its new national security strategy. In addition to seeking political and foreign policy benefits, [the Soviet Union] can reduce the economic burden of nuclear testing, and can use “peaceful nuclear detonations” to serve the economy. At the same time, this policy will help bring about a U.S.-Soviet nuclear test ban treaty, which would compel the U.S. to limit and slow the pace of its nuclear testing, thereby preserving the present U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance.

Prospects for the Development of Nuclear Testing

Up to now, no new weapon has been found that can realistically replace nuclear weapons as the mainstay of the U.S.-Soviet deterrence strategy. Complete destruction of nuclear weapons is not possible in the near era. [By] using mature, nuclear weapons manufacturing scientific knowledge and technology, both the United States and the Soviet Union could produce a new stockpile of nuclear weapons within a few days. For this reason, both countries proceed from their own interests, and have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear weapons are produced, they must be tested. The facts indicate that there is an enormous latitude for developing current nuclear weapons, and each step in their development cannot be divorced from testing. For this reason, nuclear weapons testing cannot be completely halted for a very long time to come.

However, due to the tremendous difficulties facing the Soviet domestic economy, it is already very hard for the Soviet Union to match the United States in the nuclear arms race. Thus the Soviets wish to do everything possible to limit U.S. development of third-generation nuclear weapons. Having weighed the pros and cons, the Soviet Union has adopted an offensive initiative of striding forward in banning nuclear testing. In addition to the proposed steps described above, at the UN General Assembly in October 1987 the Soviet deputy foreign minister also proposed the first tentative target plan for gradually limiting nuclear testing; [he] proposed that each side have no more than four tests per year, with the equivalent weight of each test not to exceed 1,000 tons. The United States has not been willing to limit nuclear testing; however, in the face of the aggressive Soviet foreign policy offensive, and under international and domestic pressure, it has had to slow the pace of testing. In reality, in recent years the U.S. government has already begun researching the possibility of limiting nuclear testing. The U.S. government has already directed relevant departments to study how reducing nuclear testing equivalent weights to less than 1,000 tons or less than 10,000 tons will affect the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. [They are also directed] to finish scheduling such things as the required target timetables. Also, because of the continuous rise in technological levels, the number of tests required [when] developing a new warhead has decreased greatly compared with the past. This makes it possible to progressively limit the equivalent weights and testing frequencies of nuclear tests. In June of this year the United States and Soviet Union will hold a summit conference and could reach an agreement on reducing strategic weapons. This would surely help the two countries to reach further agreements on limiting nuclear testing.

The next several years will be a preparatory period for producing new agreements on limiting nuclear testing. Both the Soviet Union and the United States can bargain at the negotiating table while launching intense publicity campaigns on the testing grounds. It is highly likely that the pace of nuclear testing could accelerate. The frequency of nuclear testing could not clearly decrease, the scale of large equivalent weight tests could increase, and nuclear weapon simulation and monitoring methods could develop more rapidly.

Evolving Strategic Structure in Europe Analyzed

[Article by BAN YUE TAN's special correspondent Shi Lujia [2457 7627 0163]: “The Changing Strategic Structure in Europe”]

[Text] Drastic changes in the world situation have led to the emergence of a new strategic structure in Europe. Since the second half of last year, the most profound changes in the situation in Europe over the past 40 years since the war have taken place: East European countries one after another are leaning gradually to the West after taking the road of political “pluralism” and a market economy; the issue of the reunification of the two Germans has not only been put on the agenda, but its progress has been speedy; the tendency toward independence in Western Europe is intensifying, and new progress has been made in bilateral and multilateral cooperation; the process of disarmament negotiations has accelerated, and military confrontation has been reduced; and the capacity of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, to control the affairs of Europe has declined. The changes in the situation in Europe indicate that the old political, military, and economic order is being dismantled while a new structure is taking shape.

Politics: The Disintegration of the ‘Yalta’ System

A situation of divided rule emerged in Europe because of historical reasons at the end of World War II: All of Europe and Germany were divided in two. The United States and the Soviet Union pulled some of their allies over to their side and put them under their control, thus resulting in the formation of the two large military-political blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, the two superpowers stationed massive troops in their respective spheres of influence, thus resulting in a direct confrontation. This setup, based on the “Yalta” agreement, has been known as the “Yalta” system, whose
charactertistics include the existence of a clear demarcation between the two big blocs, different political systems and ideologies, and a close balance of forces. Neither side has been able to “eat up” the other.

A tilt has emerged in the balance of political power in Europe following the drastic changes in the political situation in Eastern Europe. One wing of the “Yalta” system has almost disappeared following the drastic decline of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Right on the heels of these developments, the issue of the reuniﬁcation of the two Germanys was again put on the agenda. At present, the two Germanys have reached an agreement on creating an economic and monetary alliance as the ﬁrst step toward reuniﬁcation. Intensive bilateral and multilateral negotiations centering on the internal and external questions of reuniﬁcation are under way. After reuniﬁcation, Germany’s territory will encompass 356,000 square km. Its population will total 78 million people, with a gross national product (GNP) (according to current standards) of 2.4 trillion marks, second only to the United States and Japan. A Germany with such a vast territory, huge population, and powerful economic strength is bound to become a political power which both the United States and the Soviet Union cannot control. This has not only broken the cast wing of the “Yalta” system, but is also posing a threat to its west wing. At the same time, with the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, West European countries are demanding to be the master of their destiny. Politically, they have stopped obeying the orders of the United States, and have put forward independent proposals on such issues as policies toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the reuniﬁcation of Germany, and Europe’s future political security structure. The leadership position of the United States has been shaken, while the west wing of the “Yalta” system is about to fall apart.

What kind of political order should be established in Europe in the future? The United States, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe all have their respective plans. The essence of the idea of building “a common European home,” raised by Gorbachev, is to drive a wedge between Europe and America, disintegrate NATO, eliminate the U.S. military presence in Western Europe, and, ﬁnally, exclude the United States from Europe’s political arena, so as to preserve the Soviet Union’s special status in Europe. The United States put forward “Atlanticism,” demanding the continued presence of U.S. troops in Western Europe and NATO, and insisting that Germany should remain within NATO after unification. The United States also demanded that the European Community (EC) remain open to it and that the role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe be increased. The intent of the U.S. is to preserve its strategic and economic interests in Europe and maintain its status as the leader of Europe by all means, and under this premise, to build “an integrated free Europe” which includes Eastern Europe and is based on Western values. Western Europe, however, has raised the slogan of “a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals,” hoping that the “Yalta” system will be discarded totally. This slogan shows that Europe neither wants the Soviet Union nor the United States to interfere in European affairs. On the other hand, it wants to center European economic and political integration around the EC and establish the leading role of Western Europe in Europe’s political arena. Obviously, these ideas are incompatible with one another. A ﬁerce struggle is expected to emerge among the United States, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe on this basic issue.

Military Affairs: The Foundations of the Two Big Blocs Have Been Shaken

The basis for the existence of the NATO and Warsaw Pact military blocs for dozens of years has been each side’s claim that its formation was necessary to deal with the military threat posed by the other side. This was also one of the reasons for the escalation of the post-war arms race in Europe. In the wake of U.S.-Soviet Union detente and the new changes in the political situation in Europe, military confrontation has been reduced substantially. Following the signing of the treaty for the total destruction of intermediate- and short-range-guided missiles in Europe by the United States and the Soviet Union in December 1987, the Soviet Union announced in December 1988 that it would unilaterally reduce its armed forces by 500,000 men before 1991. In December 1989 it again announced its intention to withdraw all of its overseas troops before the year 2000. In this respect, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have reached an agreement on troop withdrawal, while the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland and East Germany is now only a matter of time. Because of the East European countries’ successive demands for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the Warsaw Pact military alliance already has ceased to exist except in name. Furthermore, Democratic Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria have announced troop reduction plans in an attempt to cut defense spending.

Influenced by the disarmament tide from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries, some NATO countries have also indicated their intention to reduce their defense commitment to the alliance. Belgium has announced that it will withdraw 50,000 troops from West Germany, and the Netherlands is also planning to withdraw some troops from that country. At the same time, Western Europe’s call for U.S. troop withdrawal is becoming louder with each passing day. At the request of its allies, Bush recently announced the abandonment of a plan to replace short-range-guided missiles and nuclear artillery pieces deployed in Western Europe. He also indicated his willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union on the total destruction of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The United States also has clearly indicated its intention to withdraw some of its regular troops in Western Europe. Obviously, military solidarity within NATO is weakening.
At present, the United States continues to energetically advocate the preservation of NATO. Other NATO members also oppose the Soviet's proposal to dissolve the two big blocs immediately and simultaneously, but their objectives are obviously different from those of the past. Western Europe hopes to rely on the strength of the alliance to pressure the Soviet Union into making more military concessions, because, although the Warsaw Pact is on the brink of disintegration, the Soviet Union remains so powerful militarily that Western Europe cannot match it. The United States still wants to counter the Soviet Union. Besides, it still wants to control Western Europe through its relationship in the alliance, and particularly Germany. This is the objective of the Bush administration when it put forth a proposal for reducing NATO's military functions while at the same time increasing its political role.

Economy: The European Community Is Rising Swiftly

While post-war Europe was divided into two big blocs politically and militarily, there also have been two economic entities—the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The CMEA has become increasingly less active following the changes in the political situation in Eastern Europe and the gradual disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. On the contrary, the EEC is becoming stronger and more and more important with each passing day. The total population of the EEC member countries is 323 million people, and their total GNP is $3.782 trillion, second only to the United States; per capital income is $11,690, second only to the United States and Japan. If after German reunification, the GDR portion becomes part of the EEC, its strength will become even more impressive. In the past two years, the EEC has accelerated its advance toward its goal economic integration. A unified European market is to be established by the end of 1992 according to the plan. Moreover, there is a tendency within the EEC to expand toward Eastern Europe and thus to become an overwhelming force in Europe's economic arena.

In the process of expansion, the EEC will not only infiltrate Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but is also bound to elbow out other Western economic powers, particularly the United States. The United States has been at a disadvantage in its economic relations with Western Europe. Because of this, there have been frequent quarrels between the two sides, and trade friction is a common occurrence.

The change in Europe's strategic structure has just begun. A new structure has yet to be formed, but we can be sure of the following: the bipolar U.S. and Soviet systems in Europe are about to come to an end; the European economic and political alliance developed on the basis of the EEC will assume an increasingly greater role, and a unified Germany, as a new superpower, will occupy the central position in the EEC. International analysts have predicted that a situation will emerge in Europe in which the three superpowers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Germany, will exist side by side, and that there will be fierce rivalry among the three.

NATO's Strategic Adjustment Viewed

HK2507065190 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 29, 16 Jul 90 p 30

[Dispatch issued from London by Xue Yongxing (5641 3057 5281) and Wang Shengliang (3769 3932 5328): "NATO Decides To Adjust Its Strategy"]

[Text] Leaders of the 16 NATO countries held the most important summit meeting in the organization's history from 5 to 6 July in London. After the meeting, they issued a "London Declaration," putting forward a series of measures for adjusting its strategy. The meeting also issued an invitation to Soviet President Gorbachev to deliver a speech at the next NATO summit.

Several hours after the declaration was published, the Soviet Union immediately expressed its welcome. Gorbachev said: "I am ready to go there at any time." Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also issued a statement, saying that the decision of the NATO summit paved the way for the future security of the entire European Continent. "Since the West has stretched its friendly hands to the East, we are also ready to stretch our hands to them."

U.S. President Bush said: The "London Declaration" marked a "turning point" in NATO's history. It will satisfy the Soviet Union, because NATO will no longer be a threat against the Soviet Union's security. "NATO has decided to take a new road leading to peace." He indicated that he may personally give a telephone call to Gorbachev to brief him about the results of the NATO summit.

The six-page "London Declaration" included 23 points, and the main content can be summarized into the following points:

First, it is proposed that a joint statement be issued by members of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to solemnly declare that both sides will no longer "take the other side as the enemy" and will not use force or threaten to use force against each other. The Warsaw Pact and NATO may establish "constant diplomatic ties" and increase high-level contacts, including contacts in the military field.

Second, NATO will "adopt a new nuclear strategy, and turn the nuclear weapons into weapons that will be used after all other weapons." NATO will adjust its "flexible reaction" strategy, and will shift to a new strategy from "forefront defense."

Third, NATO will strive to sign the first European conventional arms treaty within this year and then hold the second-stage negotiations on restraining the military strength in various European countries, including that in
post-reunification Germany. At the same time, talks will be held with the Soviet Union on the issue of short-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Efforts will be made to dismantle all nuclear warheads deployed in Europe with the Soviet Union.

Fourth, the role of the European Security Conference in the building of the “new order” in Europe should be strengthened. NATO supported the holding of a summit meeting of the European Security Conference in Paris next autumn, and also proposed to hold one government leadership or ministerial meeting every year in the future, establish some permanent organs of the European Security Conference, including a secretariat and a parliament.

Since the NATO summit meeting in May 1989, the post-war Yalta pattern of the confrontation between two large blocs and the division of Europe by these two large blocs has undergone unexpected changes. Military confrontation between the East and the West has been attenuated; and the pace of reunification in Germany has been quickened. People in both the East and the West began to consider whether the existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact was necessary and how to build the future security structure in Europe. In early June, the foreign ministers of the NATO countries held a preparatory meeting in Scotland to pave way for the summit meeting. At the same time, the Warsaw Pact countries also held a summit meeting in Moscow to decide the new orientation of this organization by changing it from a military-political organization into a political-military organization. The Warsaw Pact also required NATO to follow suit, in order to eventually disband the world’s two largest military groups at the same time in the early 21st century.

The NATO summit meeting not only attracted close attention from the West, but also attracted attention from the East. Gorbachev particularly wrote a letter to British Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher who played host to the summit, expressing his special interest in the results of the summit. Gorbachev said: The result of the NATO summit will affect the Soviet Union’s policy toward Germany’s reunification. He also invited NATO Secretary General Woerner to visit Moscow after the meeting. This was an unprecedented event in the history of relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Woerner accepted the invitation and planned to start his visit to Moscow on 14 July.

The London meeting had two aims: externally, to eliminate the Soviet Union’s misgivings about NATO, especially about the NATO membership of post-reunification Germany; and internally, to show the public in the Western countries that the existence of NATO as a pillar of Europe’s security is still necessary although profound changes have occurred in the European situation.

Observers here held that the “London Declaration” was drawn up mainly in light of the proposals put forward by the United States and was also the product of the compromise reached by the 16 leaders. Before the summit, President Bush put forward a series of proposals, which were supported by West German Chancellor Kohl. On the issue of nuclear weapons, Kohl went farther than Bush, and Kohl required that West Europe join the Soviet Union in becoming a nuclear-free zone. However, British Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher and French President Mitterrand both opposed this idea, and they held that nuclear weapons should still be taken as an effective deterrent force for the Atlantic Alliance. Since 1967, NATO has continued to pursue the “flexible reaction” strategy. According to this strategy, when NATO encountered large-scale attacks with conventional weapons, it could use nuclear weapons to carry out counterattacks. Mrs. Thatcher said: “We cannot use the means of inflexible reactions to replace the means of flexible reactions,” and NATO can never say that it will “not” be the first to use nuclear weapons. She suggested that the U.S. forces and nuclear weapons continue to be deployed in Germany’s territory. She also warned that “we must maintain our self-defense capacity.” The phenomenon of “making no preparations” before World War II must not reappear on the side of West Europe. She said that “the Soviet armed forces are still formidable.”

On the one hand, the “London Declaration” called for reviewing NATO’s nuclear strategy and reducing dependence on nuclear weapons; on the other hand, it also stated that in order to safeguard peace, NATO must maintain nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future and will modernize the nuclear weapons if necessary. Therefore, although the “London Declaration” made some verbal revision of NATO’s nuclear strategy, NATO did not decide to stop using nuclear weapons.

After the “London Declaration” was published, it was highly valued in both the East and West. Some people even called it a “milestone” in NATO’s history and in Europe’s history. It seems that the declaration will have a major impact on Europe’s future situation.

**Future of Warsaw Pact Viewed**

*HK2707153390 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 21 Jul 90 p 6*

[“Roundup” by Hu Xijin (5170 6932 6651): “Views on the Future of the Warsaw Pact”]

[Text] The violent changes in the East European situation over the past year or so and the process of German reunification are pounding at the traditional position and role of the Warsaw Pact. “Where will the Warsaw Pact go?” This has become a subject often talked about by the member states of the organization and the world media.

At a summit conference of the organization held last July, Soviet leader Gorbachev proposed to change the Warsaw Pact “from a military political organization into a political military organization.” He emphasized that
every member state of the organization “has the right to work out its own political line without external interference" and that it is necessary to “promote multilateral cooperation on the basis of peace and mutual respect.” The statement issued by the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, which was held at the beginning of June this year, said that "to a great extent, the image of the enemy in the ideological field is eliminated by the common efforts of both East and West." Therefore, "effort will be made to restudy the nature, functions, and activities of the Warsaw Pact." As a matter of fact, the changes that have taken place in the political situation of various East European countries over the past year beginning from last July have brought about great changes in the internal structure of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union held that the time “has gone” when the Soviet Union was able to make decisions unilaterally. At present, the Warsaw Pact “is attaching greater importance to analyzing and considering all kinds of viewpoints.” The Soviet Union has started to withdraw its troops from the territories of some allies and to negotiate with some others on the issue of troop withdrawal. With the rapid development of the merger of Democratic Germany and Federal Germany, Germany will leave the Warsaw Pact after reunification, and this seems to be an inevitable outcome. On 26 June, the Hungarian parliament adopted a resolution. It formally announced that Hungary will withdraw from the Warsaw Pact “as soon as possible.” Moreover, the same voice of withdrawing from the organization can also be heard in other East European countries. According to Western news agencies, Eppelmann, defense minister of Democratic Germany, recently disclosed that all military establishments of the Warsaw Pact, including the common supreme headquarters, will be abolished within this year. At present, on informal occasions, people, including the Soviet people, even ask: Has the Warsaw Pact “disintegrated?”

In view of this situation, some Soviet leaders have repeatedly emphasized that the Warsaw Pact should continue to exist. On the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Yazov emphasized that being a defense alliance, the Warsaw Pact was an important factor of stability and security in Europe and the whole world. “Although generally speaking, the international climate is becoming warmer, the danger of war is still far from being eliminated.” “There is an objective necessity for the existence” of the Warsaw Pact. General Lushov [Lu she fu 4151 5287 1133], commander in chief of the joint armed forces of the Warsaw Pact, also emphasized that the obligations of various signatory states to the Warsaw Treaty are still there. At a recent meeting of defense ministers of the member states, which was held in Berlin, both senior Soviet military leaders reiterated that so long as NATO is still there, the Warsaw Pact should also continue to exist. At the political consultative meeting of the organization, held at the beginning of June this year, when talking about the fact that the member states of the Warsaw Pact “differ from one another in thousands of ways," Gorbachev also emphasized the “common interest” and mutual “trust” among them. However, as the current relationship between the Soviet Union and the East European countries is quite different from that of the past, it seems there are still problems whether the latter can accept the viewpoint of the former.

Nevertheless, people have noticed that in the recent period, most East European countries have said that they will continue to discharge their obligations to the Warsaw Pact. On some public occasions, they expressed their support for the following viewpoint that the Soviet Union has repeatedly reiterated: Reform should be carried out by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact simultaneously so that the military confrontation between the two groups can be changed into political dialogue and so that the two organizations can be disbanded at the same time in the future and be replaced by an all-European security system.

The media held that Poland and some other member states have certain misgivings about the changes in the European situation, especially the reunification of Germany. At present, they feel safer to remain in the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, in economic affairs, these countries are relying on their ties with the Soviet Union to a great extent. Therefore, it is reckoned that on the question of withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, they will adopt a cautious attitude.

According to observers’ analyses, for a period to come, the Warsaw Pact will continue to exist. But it is possible that it will not be the Warsaw Pact in the past sense and will be politicalized very soon. This change may weaken the position of the Warsaw Pact in its disarmament talks with NATO. But it may also promote changes within the latter at the same time. On the internal changes of the Warsaw Pact, the views of NATO politicians are also changing. The result of NATO’s London summit meeting at the beginning of July showed that such changes are really taking place. For example, NATO has expressed its willingness to sign a joint declaration with the Warsaw Pact to announce that both sides “are no longer opponents.” It has also invited Gorbachev and the leaders of East European countries to give lectures in the organization. It was also announced that NATO will revise its “flexible response” strategy it has practised for a long time and adopt a more flexible stand on the issue of arms control. However, on the tentative idea of disbanding the two big blocs simultaneously, NATO is still taking a negative attitude. Under this situation, the trend of development of the two European military blocs, especially the future of the Warsaw Pact, has attracted people’s attention.
INTER-ASIAN AFFAIRS

Pacific Forum on U.S. Chemical Arms, Ecology

**CW Destruction Main Topic**

**BK2907131890 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0500 GMT 29 Jul 90**

[Text] The Australian prime minister, Mr. Bob Hawke, has joined other regional leaders in Vanuatu to the annual meeting of the 15-nation South Pacific Forum. Radio Australia's South Pacific correspondent, Jemimah Gareth, reports from Port Vila that environmental issues will dominate the meeting. Gareth says the United States Army’s plan to incinerate chemical weapons on Johnston Atoll is likely to generate the most heated debate.

Island nations downwind to Johnston Atoll are concerned about its impact on their marine resources. Mr. Hawke supports the burn and had said he will seek a compromise at the forum. After his arrival the Australian prime minister joined other heads of government for a day of informal and private talks. Other environmental issues on the agenda include drift net fishing, the greenhouse effect, and the new South Pacific Environmental Protection Convention.

**'Low Profile' Urged for Australia**

**BK3007082290 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0500 GMT 30 Jul 90**

[Text] The confidential briefing paper prepared in the lead up to the South Pacific Forum says Australia should aim to take a low profile on the controversial chemical weapons burn-off on Johnston Atoll and to give the prime minister, Mr. Hawke, maximum impact at the Port Vila summit.

From Port Vila, South Pacific correspondent Jemimah Gareth says Australia is the only Pacific nation to give Washington's incineration plans its backing. The confidential cable said that, providing proper environmental safeguards were observed, Australia supported the incineration of those weapons already on Johnston Atoll and the United States weapons stocks now located in West Germany at the Pacific burn site.

The document said Australia aimed to maintain a low profile in the run-up to the forum so that the Australian position could be put by the prime minister with maximum effect. The cable said Australia was concerned that if the West German gas was not destroyed soon, it could undermine international efforts for a worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

Last night, New Zealand's prime minister, Mr. Geoffrey Palmer, said New Zealand opposed the transportation of weapons from elsewhere but supported the destruction of weapons already on the atoll, since the facilities were very good.

The United States plans to incinerate six percent of its deadly nerve gas on Johnston Atoll, southwest of Hawaii, an amount which includes all its stocks now in West Germany.

**Chemical Arms To Divide Forum**

**BK2907135190 Hong Kong AFP in English 1245 GMT 29 Jul 90**

[By Michael Field]

[Text] Vila, July 29 (AFP)—U.S. plans to burn off chemical weapons on Johnston Atoll south of Hawaii will divide South Pacific nations meeting here this week, New Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer said Sunday. He predicted that the leaders of 15 independent countries in the South Pacific Forum, due to begin formal sessions Tuesday [31 July], would not reach a consensus on the issue.

"The debate on Johnston Island will be a very important and significant one," Mr. Palmer said after a pre-forum, informal retreat for the leaders, who gathered early to celebrate Vanuatu's 10th anniversary of independence Monday.

Mr. Palmer said some Pacific nations wanted no chemical weapons destroyed on the Micronesian island and some favored destroying only the stocks already stored there by the United States.

Australia and New Zealand appeared to view the weapons' destruction as good for the world, if not for the South Pacific.

Meanwhile, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke ruled out any go-between role for his government in resolving the issue, but he said Australia could "provide information that (Pacific nations) have a limited potential to obtain." Mr. Hawke said he would present forum leaders with scientific assessments that showed the U.S. chemical weapons incinerator at Johnston atoll had adequate environmental safeguards.

Mr. Palmer said he regretted that the United States last week began moving nerve gas stocks from West Germany for their destruction in the South Pacific. "I don't think it is a slap in the face for the forum but there could have been greater consultation," he said. Mr. Palmer said the atmosphere at the informal retreat, the first in three years, was "cooperative and very friendly."

Mr. Hawke said he expected that the forum, in addition to the chemical weapons issue, would discuss developments in French-ruled New Caledonia. "We must make sure we get a common position for the United Nations," he said.

Representatives from six additional countries with interests in the region were also to attend the forum. They were Britain, Canada, China, France, Japan and the United States.
On the question of Nauru's bid in the International Court of Justice for 72 million Australian dollars (56 million U.S.) compensation for environmental damage from pre-independence phosphate mining, Mr. Hawke said the tiny island state was entitled to sue Australia. "But the only people who will prosper in these situations are the lawyers," he warned. Mr. Hawke said Australia had an obligation to help Nauru as part of its general approach to the Pacific but had no further obligation.

New Zealand Study on U.S. Plan
BK3007120490 Hong Kong AFP in English 1132 GMT 30 Jul 90

[By Michael Field]

[Text] Vila, July 30 (AFP)—The destruction of U.S. chemical weapons on a Pacific island south of Hawaii will not harm humans or the environment, a New Zealand scientific study released here Monday said.

But the environmental group Greenpeace immediately disputed the study, which was based on data provided by the United States. The group flew a University of London toxicologist here to Vanuatu with a 66-page study to convince leaders of the 15-nation South Pacific Forum, due to open Tuesday, to halt the destruction of the toxic chemicals. The burnoff of the chemical weapons, now being moved to Johnston Island atoll from their cold war storage bins in West Germany, was expected to dominate environmental debate at the forum.

Australia and New Zealand have taken a pro-burnoff stance. But Vanuatu Prime Minister Walter Lini said that even though he had not yet formed an opinion, some of Johnston Island's neighbours might not go along with U.S. wishes.

Greenpeace has "substantial concerns" about the way the chemicals are to be destroyed and favours a different method, said toxicologist Dr. Paul Johnston. "It's an unproven technology," he said.

The study was released by New Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer. It was compiled by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) with data provided by the United States.

"DSIR believes that operations at the atoll will be as safe as the claims state, and that environmental effects will be limited to those resulting from residence of a few additional army personnel on the atoll," the study said. "The technology described and the measures adopted to ensure safe operation reflect a determination to achieve the best possible result without regard to cost or effect," it said. "The disposal facility represents a sincere concern for human safety and environmental protection."

The DSIR said there was insufficient time for detailed discussions with the United States, and that the weapons' destruction should go ahead as planned.

Concerning the procedures for moving the gases from West Germany, the study said that if precautions were adhered to "the chance for mishaps will be negligible." It said the process at Johnston Island has many safety interlocks that would ensure prompt and orderly shutdown in the event of equipment problems, and was "virtually immune to human error."

But Dr. Johnston said Greenpeace was concerned that vapours could leak from containment buildings, and that other countries—such as Australia and the Soviet Union—would begin to use Johnston Island as a dumping ground for their own chemical weapons stockpiles.

Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke said he has a study supporting the New Zealand conclusion, which will be released shortly.

Greenpeace's Pacific campaigner Bunny McDiarmid said the organization could take direct action to stop the weapons' destruction. But she said it would not be directed at the ships of the facilities themselves because it "would be too dangerous." "If we take direct action it will be in a form not usually associated with Greenpeace," she said.

Johnston Island has been a storage site for U.S. chemical weapons, including the Vietnam War defoliant Agent Orange, for 40 years.

Scientific Study Proposed
BK3107110490 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0800 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Australia's Prime Minister Mr. Hawke says he urged the South Pacific Forum to send an independent scientific mission to assess the American chemical weapon incineration plant on Johnston Atoll, and he said if any serious safety problems were found, it would be (right) for Australia to campaign against the burn.

Radio Australia's South Pacific correspondent, Jemimah Gareth, who is in Port Vila, says Mr. Hawke admitted that island nations had raised serious questions about the incineration. The prime minister said his support for the plan was based on the condition that the weapons to be burned be limited to those already on the atoll, those located in West Germany, and others in the Pacific region.

No Consensus on U.S. Plan
BK0108070490 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0500 GMT 1 Aug 90

[Text] The 15-nation South Pacific Forum appears to be having difficulty reaching consensus on the United States chemical weapons incineration program on Johnston Atoll. In Port Vila, South Pacific correspondent Jemimah Gareth says that although the forum's final communiqué had been expected by lunch time, the
heads of government have adjourned for the break without a resolution of the issue.

At a brief media conference, the Australian prime minister, Mr. Bob Hawke, said that during formal discussions, he presented three scientific reports on the issue and urged the forum to send an independent scientific mission to the incineration site.

Mr. Hawke, would not go into details of the discussions other than to say there had been a difference in emphasis, that the heads of government were still trying reach a resolution.

'Disappointment' Over Japan
BK3107090390 Hong Kong AFP in English 0811 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Vila, July 31 (AFP)—Leaders of 15 South Pacific countries expressed disappointment here Tuesday at Japan's failure to enter substantive negotiations on the future of fishing in the region.

The annual Pacific Forum welcomed Japan's decision—announced on July 17—to stop drift-net fishing this season, one year earlier than the deadline stipulated in a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly. But it agreed that Japan had not gone far enough and resolved to continue exerting pressure on Japan.

The forum spokesman, Papua New Guinea's Prime Minister Rabbie Namaliu, said the heads of government "expressed disappointment at Japan's continued reluctance to enter into a multilateral fisheries arrangement with forum island countries." The island nations had tried to persuade Japan that it was "in their interests as well as in our interests to negotiate a multilateral treaty," he said. "Of course we welcome the decision by Japan to stop drift-net fishing, but we also agreed that the pressure should not stop there, and should continue until this practice is ended."

Asked at a news conference after Tuesday's forum session to specify what kind of pressure the leaders had in mind, Mr. Namaliu was evasive. He said: "All members of the forum fisheries agency must stand united on the minimum terms and conditions" relating to access to their exclusive economic zones.

The Japanese decision stopped short of a full ban on drift-net fishing, which has been condemned by conservationists and Pacific countries alike because it indiscriminately eliminates all species and sizes of marine animals over vast areas. Drift nets are sometimes 30 miles (50 kilometres) long and have been dubbed "walls of death."

Japan said that its decision to suspend drift-net fishing would remain in force until "appropriate conservation and management arrangements" were reached for South Pacific albacore tuna resources, and "appropriate regulatory measures on drift-net fishing" concluded.

China Reacts to Taiwan Proposal
BK0108053790 Hong Kong AFP in English 0513 GMT 1 Aug 90

[Text] Vila, August 1 (AFP)—China reacted angrily Wednesday to a South Pacific forum proposal to include Taiwan in its post-conference officials' dialogues. Chinese Foreign Ministry official Wang Yongju, made it clear in a brief statement here that his government will reject the proposal.

The forum said Tuesday that it wanted to include Taiwan—along with Germany, France, the United States, Canada, Japan, the European Community and China—in its dialogue, which discusses forum developments.

Mr. Wang said there was only one China, that the People's Republic was its "sole legitimate representative" and that Taiwan was an integral part of Chinese territory. "It is our hope South Pacific forum leaders will guard against any plot to undermine currently friendly relations with China and all member states," Mr. Wang said.

Forum Ends; Communiqué Issued
BK0108090490 Hong Kong AFP in English 0854 GMT 1 Aug 90

[Text] Vila, August 1 (AFP)—Leaders of 15 South Pacific nations ended their annual conference here Wednesday and issued a communiqué which expressed "concern" about U.S. proposals to destroy stockpiles of chemical weapons on Johnston Atoll.

The South Pacific Forum's final communiqué issued more than five hours after the scheduled end of the conference fell short of calling for a ban on the destruction of chemical weapons. But it also stopped short of endorsing an Australian proposal to approve of the destruction of weapons shipped from West Germany.

"While noting the stringent precautions being taken by the United States the Forum remained concerned by the substantial potential risks to the environment and peoples of the Pacific of the whole operation, including in particular shipments of chemical weapons stockpiles from F.R.G. (West Germany)," the communiqué said.

The Forum also called for "early discussions with the United States" on the issue.

New Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer told reporters that the leaders had had "a humdinger of a debate" but had agreed that "the Pacific must not be used as a dumping ground for chemical weapons or toxic substances of any kind."

Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke presented three scientific reports arguing the case that on balance it would be desirable from the point of view of international disarmament to ship chemical weapons from West Germany and to incinerate them in the Pacific. Mr.
Hawke dismissed as "infantile" a reporter's suggestion that he had been rebuffed over the issue.

New Zealand's Mr. Palmer explained "Our real concern is that we did not want a precedent set that you can send hazardous substances here. We are all against that."

**Indonesian Addresses Conference on Disarmament**

**BK3007112190 Jakarta ANTARA in English 0938 GMT 30 Jul 90**

[Text] Jakarta, July 30 (OANA-ANTARA)—Indonesia has said that the arms race absorbs far too great a proportion of the world's resources and that the decrease in international tension should lead to a reallocation of defense expenditure for international development.

Hadi Waaayarabi, minister counsellor at the Indonesian permanent representative to the United Nations, in Geneva Monday presented his government's views on various questions before the ongoing United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. He said that despite the magnitude of military expenditure which still contrasts dramatically with economic and social underdevelopment, misery and poverty, there are new and positive developments towards the reduction of armament. That will allow a greater redeployment of resources used for the arms race to development.

There was a profound need of awaking the spirit of internationalism in order to oppose any underestimation of national defense expenditure, on the grounds that the decrease in international tension should lead to a reallocation of defense expenditure for international development, he elaborated.

During the last few years, he further said, there had been a widely shared expectation that the chemical weapons convention was within reach. The idea to rephrase challenge inspection, to inspection on request, was constructive. That type of verification should not be conducted on the basis of a strong motivation of suspicion, he added.

The idea to link the destruction of all chemical weapons to the adherence of certain categories of states could lead to the continuing existence of such weapons by including states which had not possessed chemical weapons to acquire them prior to the entry into force of the chemical weapons convention, he said.

As the conference wished to conclude a convention with universal adherence, he said, it should consider the interests of majority of states which did not possess, or intend to possess, chemical weapons. The convention, however, should not hinder international cooperation or trade in chemicals for peaceful purposes, he said. As a non-chemical weapon state, Indonesia has always stood for the total prohibition and destruction of existing chemical weapons, Hadi Waaayarabi stressed.

**THAILAND**

**General Comments on U.S. Weapons Procurement**

**90WC0083B Bangkok BAN MUANG in Thai 17 May 90 pp 1, 18, 19**

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] In his capacity as the chairman of the committee to consider purchasing tanks from the United States, Lieutenant General Chatuchom Kanlong, the deputy army chief of staff, talked with reporters about the procurement of weapons for the army. He said that in procuring weapons, the army is constantly considering things based on the need to obtain something or to replace something. This includes various types of weapons. He said that the army stresses efficiency, and the price must not be too high. The price must be in line with our limited budget.

As for the agreement reached by the committee, a contract has been signed for the purchase of 10 U.S. 1 S, or Huey, helicopters. These are used helicopters, but they have been improved and are like new. We can use these for many years. We purchased these at a very low price. The cost of a new helicopter is approximately 60 million baht, but we purchased these for only 20 million baht each. These are scheduled to be delivered in the near future. They will be assigned to army units. There are many units that need helicopters. Two helicopters a month will be delivered, which means that this should be completed by the end of the year.

Lieutenant General Chatuchom said that the matter of purchasing tanks from the United States is now under consideration. The United States has sent data for us to study. The United States is reducing the number of U.S. forces in various places in the world and so it has surplus war materials to sell to its allies. They have informed us of this, too. But as for how much they will sell, we will have to wait until they provide us with more data and information on how much they will allocate for allied countries in need of these weapons.

A reporter asked when he planned to go look at the weapons that they plan to sell, particularly the M-60 tanks. Lt. Gen. Chatuchom said that he probably wouldn't go himself. Instead, a delegation will be appointed. But we must first obtain certain data. In principle, the United States will sell weapons to us, but whether we get everything that we want is another matter. We have told them what we need. This will probably take time. This must be considered carefully. As for whether the United States will sell us everything that we want, Lt. Gen. Chatuchom said that we will have to wait and see. They have already begun demobilizing units. They may want to get rid of other types of surplus weapons. But we hope to obtain the things needed.

As for budget funds for purchasing these tanks, Lt. Gen. Chatuchom said that the budget should not pose a problem. The army has already submitted this matter to the government. In purchasing these tanks, the army will use its own funds. It will not purchase them as part of a
credit sales program (FMF). The United States has greatly reduced this program. Thus, we will purchase the weapons using our own funds. This is a government-to-government purchase. No middlemen are involved. The army is now emphasizing direct purchases. There is no need to be concerned about this, because we will purchase these at a low price.

The reporter asked what other weapons besides tanks will be purchased from the United States. Lt. Gen. Chatchom said that this depends on what items that they inform us of. We will consider whatever they offer to sell.

Sources Comment on Weapons Deliveries, Availability

90WC0083C Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai
28 May-3 Jun 90 p 10

[Text] Warships Carrying Helicopters

The navy is trying to procure ships that carry helicopters. These ships are different from large landing craft such as the Si Chang landing craft. Combat ships that carry helicopters are known as logistic support vessels, which have been described previously. At present, the navy has three frigates that carry helicopters at the stern of the ship. These are called multi-purpose frigates. The ships known as fleet surface combatants are not yet true helicopter carrying ships. Pictures of all three types of ships are shown so that the differences can be seen.

Wait

The previous issue discussed the Commando Stingray 106 tank. It was stated that the sixth payment, which is 20 percent of the price, will be paid by 1 May 1990. The money, $72,168,000, will come from the 1991 budget. There will be two payments left on these tanks. The fiscal 1992 payment, which is another 20 percent of the purchase price and which totals $72,168,000, will be made by 1 November 1991. The final payment, which is 15 percent of the purchase price and which totals $24,126,000, will be paid from the 1993 budget. As for the tanks costing 4,136,804,796.90 baht and the Stingray tanks, on which five payments have already been made, 17 months after the agreement was signed on 30 September 1987, five tanks have been delivered. In the 28th and 29th months, another five tanks will be delivered. By then, we will have paid about 65 percent of the full cost, but the contract calls for the delivery of 26 tanks.

M-48 A.5 Tanks Have Been Delivered

As for the 40 M-48 A.5 tanks purchased from the U.S. Department of Defense using the FMF method, 322,977,850 was paid from the 1987 budget, 223,795,338 baht was paid from the 1988 budget, and 601,294,330 baht was paid from the 1989 budget. The first two installments were paid from the holding account with the U.S. Department of Defense. As for the final payment, some of the money came from this holding account, with the rest coming from the army's 1989 budget. Delivery of the M-48 A.5 tanks has been much quicker than in the case of the Stingray tanks.

Weapons Market—Depressed Sales

A senior military officer who has been involved in procuring weapons for the military told this column that on the the world weapons market, the cost of weapons has dropped at least 25 percent. The European countries that manufacture weapons are "looking for markets" to which they can sell their weapons. Europe is stocked full with weapons. This stems in part from the fact that weapons dealers never dreamed that the war between Iraq and Iran would end so soon. They thought that the war would drag on another 10 years. Thus, they produced large quantities of weapons, intending to sell them to the combatants. This includes tanks, artillery, personnel carriers, and AAA guns. All of these weapons, which are ready to be sold, have been painted in "desert" camouflage colors. If they are sold to someone in another part of the world, they will probably have to be repainted.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Update on Soviet Withdrawal From CSFR

Troop Withdrawal on Schedule
LD2607181290 Prague CTEn English 1750 GMT 26 Jul 90

[Text] Prague, July 26 (CTK)—31,346 Soviet soldiers of the total number of 73,500 have left Czechoslovak territory so far.

The number of Soviet military advisers has been reduced from 402 to 7 and the withdrawal of family members of Soviet soldiers and of Soviet military hardware also continues according to the timetable, Czechoslovak Defence Ministry official Major-General Svatozar Nadovic told newsmen here today.

The withdrawal of Soviet soldiers from Czechoslovakia began on February 26, 1990 on the basis of a Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement signed on this day by Soviet and Czechoslovak foreign ministers Eduard Shevardnadze and Jiri Dienstbier. Under this accord the withdrawal should be completed on June 30, 1991.

73,500 Soviet soldiers were deployed on Czechoslovak territory on the basis of "the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement on the conditions of a temporary presence of Soviet forces on Czechoslovak territory" of October 16, 1968, aimed at crushing the revival process in the country. East German, Polish, Bulgarian and Hungarian troops, which also took part in the invasion, left Czechoslovak territory during autumn 1968.

The Czechoslovak Government as well as the Warsaw Treaty summit in Moscow in December 1989 called the invasion a gross violation of the norms of relations among states.

Further on Withdrawal of Soviet Units
LD2707090790 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0400 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] It was announced at yesterday's news conference in Prague that the withdrawal of the Soviet artillery brigade from Jesenik is ending. The air regiment with its SU-27 aircraft has completed its departure from Hradcan. More than 31,000 Soviet soldiers and 17,000 of their families have so far departed from Czechoslovakia. A tank division will start its withdrawal from Milovice from 1 August. This will be followed by the withdrawal of the motorized riflemen division and helicopter regiment from Zvolen and then by the units from Mlada Boleslav. Only one motorized riflemen division of the Soviet Army should remain in Czechoslovakia by the end of February.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

USSR Envoy Briefing on Ties, Chemical Weapons
LD2507131790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1121 GMT 25 Jul 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The members of the Western Group of Soviet Armed Forces are striving for good and friendly relations with the citizens of the GDR. This was affirmed by Soviet Ambassador Gennadiy Shikin at a news conference in Berlin today.

Asked whether recently reported cases of confrontation between German citizens and members of the Soviet Army and the escape of three Soviet soldiers to the FRG have impaired the Soviet Union's relations with the GDR, the diplomat said there can be no question of that. Any conflict is regrettable, but the main thing is the readiness on both sides to resolve problems in a businesslike and unemotional manner. This also applies to the elimination of environmental problems linked to the presence of Soviet Army members on GDR territory.

During the relaxed briefing, which the ambassador holds monthly in his office, there were also questions from journalists on the stationing of chemical weapons outside the USSR, the USSR's attitude toward the process of German unification and its relations to neutral states, and on other aspects of Soviet foreign policy. Ambassador Shikin referred to President Gorbachev's clear statement that the USSR has stationed no chemical weapons outside its territory.

Regarding the process of German unification, a breakthrough was achieved at Gorbachev's meeting with Chancellor Kohl. "The toughest nuts have been loosened," and experts on all sides involved are, to his knowledge, working on the specific formulation of the text for the documents for the conclusion of the two-plus-four talks.

He continued to attribute great importance to the neutral and nonaligned states in the shaping of a peaceful Europe.
EAST EUROPE

FRG Said To Find No Chemical Weapons in GDR

AU0308121390 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 1 Aug 90 p 2

[ADN report: "NVA Does Not Have Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] Geneva—The inspection of installations of the National People’s Army (NVA) by a team of Bundeswehr experts has shown that no chemical weapons are stored in the GDR. Yesterday, at the plenary session of the Geneva disarmament conference, GDR Ambassador Dr. Peter Dietze pointed out that immediately after the emergence of rumors about chemical weapons in the GDR, the GDR Government invited an inspection team from the FRG to inspect NVA installations of their choice. According to Dietze, only small amounts of chemical substances were found in the inspected installations; these substances are used in the authorized research for the development of protective means [Schutzmittel].

Eppelmann on Presence of Soviet Nuclear Weapons

AU0708082990 East Berlin HORIZONT in German No 21/90 (signed to press on 30 Jul 90)

[Interview with Disarmament and Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann by unidentified HORIZONT reporter; place and date not given: “Need To Act on the Question of Nuclear Arms”]

[Text] [HORIZONT] What is your position on the objective of freeing the territory of a united Germany from all nuclear arms? Do you find it conceivable that such an option might also be conducive to solving the question of the status of Germany in terms of security policy? Are you taking any steps to achieve this objective or are you planning such steps?

[Eppelmann] The GDR Government has a clear concept concerning the objective of freeing the territory of a united Germany from all nuclear arms. It is well known that in his 19 April government declaration, the prime minister stated that the GDR dispenses with the production, sale, possession, and stationing of nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons. A similar declaration should be made by the parliament of a united Germany.

Such a self-limitation, which is binding under international law, would strengthen the determination repeatedly expressed by the GDR and the FRG to do everything to ensure that war will never again emanate from German soil, and it would be an essential contribution to stability and security in Europe.

In my view such a step would also help to counter all reservations against a united Germany and make the solution of the problems in connection with its military status easier.

I am fully aware of the fact that any war in the center of Europe, and particularly a war that involves nuclear arms, would lead to the destruction of Germany. This is why I think that one of the important objectives of a future united Germany should be to have an ever decreasing number of dangerous weapons systems on its territory and—the earlier the better—to eliminate all nuclear arms that are stationed on German soil.

Starting from this we are trying to make an active contribution to the elimination of nuclear arms. For example, the GDR supports the proposal of the Warsaw Pact states to assume negotiations on reducing tactical nuclear arms in Europe. Therefore, I welcome the fact that at the recent NATO summit meeting in London there were signals that showed the readiness to open talks on the reduction of tactical nuclear arms once the first agreement on the reduction and limitation of conventional armed forces in Europe is concluded.

[HORIZONT] As the minister for disarmament and defense, do you know what nuclear arms the USSR has stationed on GDR territory? If what we are presuming is not the case, do you see any need to act?

[Eppelmann] When I received your question concerning the nuclear arms stationed in the GDR, I recalled your articles in HORIZONT INTERNATIONAL, which deal with this problem.

You have pointed out that the USSR Defense Ministry emphasized the secret nature of these facts and that it therefore refused to pass on any information to you. Now you want me to answer this question. First of all, I have to tell you that the Western Group of USSR Armed Forces is stationed on GDR territory, but that it is not under the command of the National People’s Army. This means that the Soviet side only briefs us about all military questions to a degree that is indispensable for the cooperation of the two armies.

As far as the specific question of Soviet nuclear arms stationed on GDR territory is concerned, I can only rely on Western publications that are accessible to us. According to these, the Western Group has a total of about 2,200 delivery systems for nuclear arms. This includes dual-purpose weapons such as artillery systems that can use conventional ammunition as well as nuclear shells. According to the same source, this is somewhat inferior to NATO’s arsenals of the corresponding systems stationed on FRG territory. The nuclear delivery systems of the Western Force are land-based missiles, fighter bombers, and artillery systems. All these arms belong to the sphere of tactical weaponry.

Land-based intermediate-range nuclear arms, that is to say missiles with a range of more than 500 km, have been withdrawn in accordance with the INF Treaty.
As far as the nuclear warheads that belong to these nuclear delivery systems are concerned, you must understand that I can neither confirm nor deny their existence here. This is a question that can only be answered by the Soviets.

Concerning the second part of your question, I start from the assumption that currently the most important thing is to create a favorable atmosphere for the two-plus-four talks on regulating the external aspects of the unification of the two German states.

Once these are concluded successfully, the question of nuclear arms and their withdrawal will have to be clarified of course in a new agreement on the stationing and withdrawal of arms with the USSR. In this sense there is a need to act.

HUNGARY

Latest USSR Troop Withdrawal Figures Listed
LD3007161290 Budapest MTI in English 1450 GMT
30 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 30 (MTI)—In the course of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, 29,460 Soviet citizens left the country until [as received] Monday morning. Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, spokesman for the Ministry of Defence, told MTI. Altogether 14,730 soldiers, 4,078 civil employees and 10,652 family members have departed, and 6,800 pieces of military equipment and 147,800 tonnes of material have been pulled out.

Up to Monday morning, 215 troop-trains and 185 trainloads of equipment, altogether 410 trains, crossed the Hungarian-Soviet border. This means that 30.3 per cent of all trains agreed upon have left the country. According to schedule, 428 trains must leave until late July. The deadline will most probably be met, Keleti said.

Since the beginning of the troops withdrawal, 31 passenger trains and 35 container trains have left for the Soviet Union. Together with them, a total 476 trains, 26.9 per cent of all, have left the country.

POLAND

Amiguities of Soviet Troop Withdrawals Reported
AU0608115390 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 3 Aug 90 p 2

["Fed"-signed report: "Soviet Troops in Poland—Unexpected Switches of Locations"]

[Text] The process of withdrawing Soviet Troops from Poland looks somewhat chaotic. The total number of soldiers who are scheduled to leave our country is only known in a very approximate form, and information which is issued on this subject is inaccurate. Very often, troops are not withdrawn, but merely change their place of stationing.

The Soviet fighter regiment stationed in Brzeg (Opole Voivodship) is being disbanded. One squadron will leave for the Soviet Union, and two will be relocated, stated General Mieczyslaw Debicki, Polish government plenipotentiary for Soviet troops stationed in Poland, on 2 August 1990.

The information issued by the office of the plenipotentiary in mid-July on the withdrawal of the air regiment from Kolobrzeg was incorrect, he admitted. In fact, the Kolobrzeg air regiment had not been withdrawn but was amalgamated in June 1989 with the Brzeg air defense regiment. Its place was taken by two squadrons of heavy helicopters. Brzeg is now the base for all light helicopter squadrons.

A battalion of engineers in Torun is being withdrawn to the Soviet Union along with its equipment, ammunition, and stores.

There is still controversy about where the headquarters of the Northern Army Group of Soviet Forces ultimately will be located. Residents of Swidnica are in favor of transferring it to Legnica. If this were to happen, Swidnica would gain some 1,000 dwellings, 20 barracks, two hospitals, two sports complexes, a school, and a kindergarten. However, the Legnica authorities are strongly against this solution, saying that such an increase in military personnel will swamp the city.

General Debicki believes that due to the relocations, two main effects have been achieved. First, the number of Soviet garrisons in Poland has been reduced, and second, the nuisance caused by the stationed troops has been significantly reduced (the planes no longer break the sound barrier over Kolobrzeg or Brzeg).

Officially, there are 34 Soviet garrisons, and, at the beginning of this year, there were 58,000 Soviet troops in Poland. By the end of this year this number will drop to 48,000 or 42,000, nobody seems to have precise details.

Soviet units are being withdrawn, renamed, or regrouped. The reduced number of troops will only be known at the end of 1990. A detailed timetable of troop withdrawals will only be available early next year.

The office of the plenipotentiary informed us that very soon there are to be imminent talks on the withdrawal of a fighter regiment (Su-23's) from Szprotawa.
Study Warns of Near Capability To Make Bomb
90SM0197A Sao Paulo JORNAL DA TARDE
in Portuguese 3 Jul 90 p unknown

[First paragraph is JORNAL DA TARDE introduction]

[Text] Scientists from the Brazilian Physics Society warn that if the military nuclear programs are not rigorously supervised, Brazil may soon have the atomic bomb.

Physicists from the Committee for Monitoring the Nuclear Issue, which is an agency of the Brazilian Physics Association (SBF), issued a warning in Rio de Janeiro yesterday, saying that Congress urgently needs to make preparations for supervising the Armed Forces nuclear programs. The physicists feel that if there is not strict supervision, Brazil may develop the atomic bomb within a very short time. At the Navy's Aramar Experimental Center in Ipero near Sorocaba (Sao Paulo), uranium (the fuel for nuclear reactors and atomic weapons) is being enriched to over 20 percent, and this worries the physicists, since the Aramar plant is part of the (military) parallel nuclear program and is not under the supervision of civilian society and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose headquarters are in Vienna, Austria.

According to an SBF report sent to the speaker of Congress, Senator Nelson Carneiro, a month ago, about 3,000 centrifuges (machines capable of enriching uranium) would enable the Navy at the very least to produce about 20 kg of uranium enriched to an estimated 90 percent (enough to produce a bomb). A report published in the JORNAL DA TARDE yesterday [2 July] revealed that the Aramar Experimental Center currently operates 999 centrifuges and is expanding its nuclear research facilities so as to produce enriched uranium on a large scale. The SBF's physicists also issued another warning, saying that with 150 kg of uranium enriched to 20 percent, the Aramar Experimental Center would be able to obtain 20 kg of 90-percent uranium within a week.

Technical Supervision

Physicists Luiz Pinguelli Rosa, Odair Dias Goncalves, and Fernando Souza Barros of the SBF are issuing those warnings and pointing out that so far, they have not been invited to participate in a broad debate concerning the report they submitted to Congress. The document shows that Brazil is reaching the point where it will be able to produce the atomic bomb.

"We want technical supervision of the nuclear programs, not just courtesy visits to a few units such as Aramar where all we do is drink coffee," commented Souza Barros. According to him, the SBF is not opposed to the progress of technology, but it advocates the supervision of all projects in that field both within the parallel nuclear program and outside of it.

Pinguelli Rosa says that the independent scientific community is waiting to see what is going to happen to the Brazilian nuclear program and "whether the emphasis will be on the parallel program, where the Navy is obviously the leader." Another concern of the SBF's physicists has to do with the report that the task force set up by the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs in Brasilia has recommended a $2-billion budget for the parallel nuclear program so it can build eight reactors for the Navy, the Army, the Air Force, and the National Nuclear Energy Commission.

No Comment

In Brasilia, the military ministers chose not to comment on the JORNAL DA TARDE's report. "Any information on that subject must come from the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs," according to the Information Office in the Ministry of the Army. The response was the same at the Ministry of Aeronautics. As of 1900 hours, Secretary Pedro Paulo Leoni Ramos had not commented on the matter, nor had the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs issued any official communiqué on the subject.
Varennikov Responds to Complaint on Kattakurgan Article
90WC0093A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
24 Jun 90 4

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Efficiency Service": "Answer From the Ministry of Defense." See JPRS-TAC-90-016, 30 May 1990, for text of 20 April PRAVDA VOSTOKA article.]

[Text] The article "There Are No Rockets in Kattakurgan" was published April 20. In brief, it said the following. The staff correspondent of PRAVDA VOSTOKA for the Samarkand oblast V. Karimov, having read in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY a list of USSR population centers where rocket theater bases are located, found Kattakurgan in it. But the journalist was out of luck... The rockets had been removed and destroyed in accordance with the Treaty between the USSR and USA on short- and medium-range missiles. But even so he found a reason for an article in the paper.

The rocket forces left behind them well-built structures which the local state breeding farm wanted to acquire. But the military authorities asked such high prices that there was no point in doing business.

As the saying goes, they refused to sell wholesale, but at retail it was a trifling matter to buy floorboards, doors and windowsills. The ensign left behind with the order to guard the site opened up a regular real estate business.

The publication's author wrote about this. But the military censor's office at the headquarters of the Turkestan military district perceived in the material a daring attempt to publicize an army secret, and did not give permission for its publication. The editors got the "okay" at the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

Our article was answered by the USSR deputy minister of defense, commander in chief of land forces, Army General V. Varennikov: "Investigation has revealed that the critical portion of the article 'There Are No Rockets in Kattakurgan' fully corresponds to reality."

Army general V. Varennikov reports that the commander of forces of the Turkestan military district, Colonel-General I.V. Fuzhenko, has been given the order:

— to conduct an investigation into the decommissioning of the third "site" of the rocket theater base and the squandering of construction materials, and to bring those responsible to justice;

— to conduct a study of all military facilities being taken out of commission and to reach a decision on their future use.

The commander in chief of land forces has suggested to the commander of forces of the Turkestan military district, Colonel-General I.V. Fuzhenko, to inform the editors of the newspaper "PRAVDA VOSTOKA" of specific measures undertaken in the wake of the article, by June 15.

We are grateful to the country's higher military leaders for such a thorough answer. But June 15 has already passed, and the district headquarters have not yet informed our newspaper of the measures taken. Apparently, the answer did not arrive due to factors independent of I.V. Fuzhenko. As a military man, he knows that orders must be unquestioningly carried out, exactly and promptly.

As soon as we receive the district headquarters' answer, we will inform our readers right away. For its part, the editors have instructed their own correspondent V. Karimov to again visit the former rocket base and find out whether the order has arrived from Moscow.

Chemical Troops Chief on Selection of CW Destruction Sites
90WC0096A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK in Russian No 29, Jul 90 p 9

[Article by S. Petrov, chief of Chemical Troops: "Chemical Weapons: A Formula for Destruction"]

[Text] "As is known, during M. S. Gorbachev's visit to the United States an agreement on the destruction and nonproduction of chemical weapons was signed between our countries. How will we comply with this agreement if the plant at Chapayevsk, constructed at government order specifically for this purpose and the only such plant in the country is being reconfigured due to public pressure?"

V. Kuznetsov, Kuybyshhev

S. Petrov, chief of chemical troops, USSR Ministry of Defense, explains how this problem is being solved.

Modern chemical weapons are based upon the latest science and technology. Because of their high toxicity, the destruction of these substances is as complicated a problem as their manufacture. It is practically impossible without preliminary research on its technology and without careful design.

Back in the beginning of the 1970's in our country the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry conducted the scientific research and experimental design work necessary to develop technology for destroying chemical weapons and for constructing the appropriate ecologically safe industrial facilities. At the first stage they succeeded in destroying only individual warheads in emergency situations. This
made it possible to prevent emergencies during the storage of chemical weapons.

The development of mobile equipment for destroying chemical weapons was a result of work during the 1970's and 1980's. The USSR Ministry of Defense has enough such mobile equipment to assure the safe storage of chemical weapons. However, for both ecological and technical reasons it cannot be used for the mass destruction of chemical weapons. Also, even if they worked 100 days a year, 10 such units would take 150 years to destroy all chemical weapons stocks. Doing this within acceptable deadlines—7 to 8 years—would take 500 such units. They would cost as much as a single large scale stationary facility.

The research done in the 1970's and the practical experience later acquired made it possible, in the mid-1980's, to quickly design and build, near the city of Chapayevsk in Kuybyshev Oblast, the country's first stationary plant for destroying chemical weapons. Its design embodied the most modern achievements in personnel safety and environmental protection. In 1989 its construction was completed and there were comprehensive tests of its equipment on inert substances. However, because of the social tensions in the region, tensions due not only to the construction of this facility, but to years of neglect towards the environment by the chemical enterprises here, it was not possible to conduct comprehensive tests on toxic chemicals. Heeding public demands, the USSR Council of Ministers ordered that the plant be reprofiled into a training center. This reprofiling is to be completed by 1992. Naturally, this decision has created considerable difficulties for plans to destroy chemical weapons.

In view of the generally positive international situation and the successes of the Geneva talks on the outlawing of chemical weapons, there was a government decision on the need for a scientifically based program for further action in disarmament—the development of a state program for the destruction of chemical weapons in the USSR. This research was conducted and this March was presented to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The site selection methodology for the chemical weapons destruction facilities worked out during the research is based upon the following principles.

The location of such facilities and the destruction process should not cause any social or political difficulties in a region. The chemical weapons destruction process should be ecologically safe to the public and to the environment. The selection of routes for hauling chemical weapons, the system for traffic management and tracking and the technical and organizational measures should be focused on the minimization of chances for an accident during transportation.

A system of measures for response to emergencies should be compiled and put into operation in order to localize and quickly eliminate the consequences of accidents (including accidents taken into consideration during design).

In making proposals for selecting regions preferred for the location of facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons full consideration was given to the requirements of the appropriate IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] documents for locating nuclear power plants and to domestic and worldwide experience in locating other especially dangerous facilities.

In selecting regions for the possible location of facilities there was a comprehensive approach to analyzing the country's territory. This work made use of experts in economics, ecology, law, sociology, transportation, technology, chemical weapons, major construction and also party, state and public figures. Research showed that the present level of science and technology it is in principle possible to safely locate facilities for destroying chemical weapons even close by populated areas if all public and environmental safety measures are observed. However, as shown by experience in locating the facility near Chapayevsk and by research, there is the so-called radius of psychological safety, defined by the negative reaction of people to the location of a dangerous facility near them.

Surveys by experts show that facilities for destroying chemical weapons should not be located near zones with the following: an especially strained social-political situation, ecological disasters, intensive agriculture, high population density, increased danger of natural calamity or extreme climatic conditions. Experts also determined the radius of psychological safety, taking into account the reaction of the population to a dangerous facility. Research showed that this radius is considerably larger than the radius of ecological and accident safety. Because of this, the optimal location of facilities is based not only on ecological factors but above all on requirements for the safety of the public and the environment and upon psychological and social-political factors.

However, this does not mean that techno-economic indicators were not taken into account. It is mandatory that they be, but priority in selecting regions nevertheless should be given to assuring the safety of the destruction process. Also the selection of possible sites took into account the risk of emergencies (airplane crash, sabotage, etc.) Based upon the possible spread of toxic substances in such an emergency, the safe distance of populated areas from the facility was determined.

This comprehensive approach to selecting facility sites made it possible to determine several possible sites for the construction of such enterprises. The draft to the state program makes provisions for several alternative sites. In the opinion of the USSR Ministry of Defense, it is most advisable to build 1 or 2 facilities for destroying chemical weapons in sparsely populated localities. This will assure the required public and ecological safety. In the final account the USSR Supreme Soviet will make the decision about selecting sites for these facilities. The draft to the state program also makes provisions for state and expert review of the facilities at the end of the design stage and prior to beginning construction.
It must be kept in mind that practically no alternative site for chemical weapons destruction facilities can avoid transportation. To assure transportation safety there are provisions to rebuild and strengthen railroad track, build special containers and make up special trains. There will be other safety measures during transportation. For example, the proposed routes for transporting chemical weapons will not pass through large populated areas. Regions in which this is impossible will be excluded from the site selection process.

During the meeting of M. S. Gorbachev with President Bush on Malta they reached a fundamental accord on working out a bilateral agreement between the USSR and the US on the destruction and nonproduction of chemical weapons and on measures towards a multilateral convention outlawing chemical weapons.

This agreement was signed on 1 June in Washington. It provides that the parties will begin the destruction of chemical weapons not later than 31 December 1992 and that prior to 31 December 1999 will have destroyed at least 50 percent of their stocks. After 31 December 2002 the remaining stocks of chemical weapons should not exceed 5,000 tons.

Thus, a political decision has been made to undertake the large scale destruction of chemical weapons stocks in the USSR. This, in its turn, requires specific technical decisions to implement the intergovernmental agreements. First of all this requires constructing facilities with the required capabilities. There are provisions for this in the state program for the destruction of chemical weapons that has been presented to the USSR Supreme Soviet. It includes alternatives for the creation of facilities, including for purposes that satisfy the pace and deadlines for chemical weapons destruction as provided for in the agreement.

Spokespersons Air Opposing Views on Semipalatinsk Test Site

[Discussion led by A. Khokhlov with Olzhas Suleimenov, writer and leader of the “Nevada-Semipalatinsk” movement, and Colonel Nikolay Petrushenko, co-chairman of the “Soyuz” deputy group: “And An Eight-Legged Stallion Appeared To Me At the Test Site...”]

[Text] On 12 June, two USSR people’s deputies from Kazakhstan sent notes to the President at the session of the country’s Supreme Soviet, inquiring about the fate of the main Soviet nuclear test site. One decisively demanded that the test site be closed, and the other no less decisively—that everything be left as it was. The President responded to both of them, but did not introduce full clarity. Today we give the floor to people with diametrically opposing views on the problem of the test site—the leader of the “Nevada-Semipalatinsk” movement, writer Olzhas Suleymanov, and the co-chairman of the deputy group “Soyuz”, Colonel Nikolay Petrushenko.

Olzhas Suleymanov

During the work of the first congress of “World Voters Against Nuclear Weapons” which took place at the end of May in Alma-Ata, the documentary film “Poligon” [Test Site] was shown. It was a shock to each of the congress participants. Of course, this film did not include all the facts. But even that which the cinematographers showed us was for any unprejudiced person an argument against nuclear technology in general, and nuclear weapons in particular.

It was then, while viewing the film, that I understood: Having nuclear weapons makes the policy of any state dissolve and amoral.

It is impossible to defend ourselves with them. We have taken our military doctrine entirely from the middle ages. I can understand that the sword might have been just. I can even suppose that Kalashnikov’s machinegun might have served patriotic goals of defending the homeland. Yet one cannot make the hydrogen bomb a righteous weapon.

People of goodwill throughout the world have grown tired of playing the role of extras in watching the work of the governmental commissions on disarmament. Of course, Geneva is a very beautiful city where one can pass the time in a very “cozy” manner. The diplomats take their time placing commas, while in the 25 years of their work the nuclear arsenals have increased several times over.

Dissatisfaction with the weakness of “officious” efforts to put an end to the threat of nuclear war has spurred the strong growth of mass popular movements throughout the world. They were consolidated at the international congress in Alma Ata. And here is another important thing. Today we have changed the tone of our addresses to the leaders of countries who are members of the “atomic” club. The time for requests and exhortations has passed. Now we will make demands.

For many years, secrecy has hindered the emergence of the anti-nuclear movement. Only the time of glasnost has allowed certain facts to come to the surface. Yet these few pieces of information have proven to be enough to evoke an outburst of public indignation. Of course, today military propagandists are making great efforts to embellish the real state of affairs, to prove that the test site is almost beneficial to human health. But here the military men, while performing their duty, are going against their own conscience.

I must also express my dissatisfaction in regard to the conclusions of last year’s interdepartmental commission working in Kazakhstan. It included Kazakhstan doctors, but was made up primarily of specialists from the center. What could the small commission determine in just a few weeks, when it was necessary to perform a detailed
study of a huge region comprised of five blasts? It merely took a passing glance at the surface, without delving into the depth of the 40-year history of the test site’s existence.

We must not forget that for a period of 14 years, aerial and ground-level nuclear blasts were conducted not far from Semipalatinsk. And for the next 27 years—underground tests were conducted. The intensity of the tests may be judged at least by the year 1984 alone. Kazakhstan residents experienced 94 earthquakes that year. They grew tired of being the rattles in that patriotic rattle toy which we humbly call a test site.

For 27 years they tried to convince us that underground explosions are absolutely safe and harmless. Yet on 12 February of last year, the emission of radioactive inert gases in the region of the small village of Chagan became the achievement of glasnost. The background [radiation] had increased to 3,000 microroentgens per hour. I must add that Chagan is not located on the windward side. Usually the winds carry the radioactive gases emitted from the cracks in the granite bedrock of the test site in the direction of the livestock raising regions, where, unlike this village, there were and still are no monitoring devices...

On 22 May the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution on closing the test site. It represented the collected hopes of the people of Kazakhstan and many millions of people.

Unfortunately, the President did not read my note at the session. In it I asked whether the leaders of the USSR and USA, with all their numerous steps toward a nuclear-free world, understand that 50 percent of nuclear weapons does not put off the threat of war by a single step? Because all the while, nuclear weapons are being modernized.

Our country, as the initiator of a nuclear-free world, must take the first step by adopting such a law...

The “Nevada-Semipalatinsk” movement will continue its work, which we are firmly convinced is important. We are motivated not by “regional” patriotism, but by that which lies at the foundation of the new thinking. I hope that our aspirations are correctly understood.

Nikolay Petruschenko

I also saw the film “Poligon”. It was made by professionals who had a good knowledge of human psychology and who considered the inertia of our movement toward a “country with an unpredictable past”. Yet there is one thing they did not consider: That the nuclear missile shield has reliably protected our country for 40 years.

I am somewhat sorry to see that the documentary film makers did not refrain from using unreliable facts. T. Slyambeckov again appeared on the screen, maintaining that the military was performing experiments on people. His statement in the film is a direct insult to the memory of A. D. Sakharov. The USSR people’s deputies from the “Soyuz” group who recently studied the state of affairs at the test site and around it were given archive documents which irrefutably prove that thanks to the persistence and principle of young Sakharov, all the residents were moved out of the test areas well ahead of time.

The conclusions of the interdepartmental commission under the chairmanship of Academy of Medical Sciences corresponding member A. F. Tsyba remained outside the scope of the film. Yet it was specifically this commission which named the real reasons, unrelated to radiation, which were responsible for the illness and mortality rate. These were poor quality and structure of nutrition, weak medical base in the region, and low living standard of the population.

I interpret the results of the international congress in Alma-Ata as being disconsolate for the “Nevada-Semipalatinsk” anti-nuclear movement. During its work, or more precisely on 25 May, a scheduled blast roared through the American nuclear test site in Nevada.

Do not mistake me for a “hawk”. I am wholly and entirely for peace and for elimination of the nuclear threat to mankind. Yet how can we overlook the realities of the world in which we live?

Reading a stenographic account of the congress meetings, I did not cease to be amazed. The Americans are calling upon us to renew the moratorium on testing, and in return they are offering... the applause and gratitude of the world community. Meanwhile, they themselves intend to complete their national nuclear program within 10 years. And only after this do they intend to sit down at the negotiating table with the USSR to discuss the probable possibility of discontinuing testing...

We must admit that excess secrecy around the test site gave rise to many rumors and conjectures before. Now, after the informals have fanned the anti-test site passions, the public has developed a real radiophobia. Yet here is the truth: In an ecological sense, Semipalatinsk is the cleanest nuclear test site in the world. Two years ago, when preparations were being made for the joint Soviet-American experiment, our guests from Nevada at first thought that the “insidious Russians” had brought them not to a nuclear, but to a general military test site.

No one is making any secret of the fact that there were two above-ground blasts, in 1949 and 1953, which were harmful to people’s health. I believe that each person who suffered radiation effects should be paid compensation today. For all others living in the area of the test site, the tests conducted on it are harmless.

The leaders of the “Nevada-Semipalatinsk” movement are today rather concerned by the incident with the emission of gases near the village of Chagan. Yet they are not telling the population that the dosage which they received from this does not exceed 5 microroentgens. Each of us may receive exactly such a dose by flying in an airplane, for example, from Semipalatinsk to Moscow
and back. I would be interested in learning who it is that is now "veiling" secrecy around the test site. As for the military, they have declassified everything today except the character and purposes of nuclear tests. Everything else—here you are, please, take it. But no, there are no "buyers" for the "goods". Perhaps because in that case the leaders here will not have any reason for getting money and materials from the "center"?

The test site, of course, is not a perfume factory, but it is also not that hellish monster which the informalists try to depict. Let me express my personal opinion. Many of the leaders know the truth about the safety of the tests being conducted here, yet publicly they frown at the test site passions for the sake of political dividends. They are bent on making a career for themselves, galloping full speed on mutants from radiophobia—eight-legged stallions, although such wonders have been known to science even since the days of Peter the Great's chamber of oddities.

There cannot be any question of closing or moving the test site. The cost of the fixed capital alone in this unique scientific center comprises over 6 billion rubles. For our science this would be a blow analogous to "mowing down" genetics and cybernetics.

The national nuclear program is in danger. It must be saved by all the sober-minded forces of society.

**Plutonium Reactor's Shutdown Threatens Layoffs**

*PM1807133790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 17 Jul 90*

[Report by S. Sergeyev and Yu. Trofimov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] At a major defense industry enterprise in Chelyabinsk Oblast a reactor for producing weapons-grade plutonium has been shut down. Our correspondent Sergey Sergeyev reports from the scene of events:

[Correspondent] This enterprise—the Mayak Production Association—was established in the southern Urals 40 years ago. All its installations are carefully guarded and until recently they were top secret. However, the favorable development of Soviet-U.S. relations and the bilateral nuclear arms reduction program have made the event which we are attending possible.

In a few minutes' time a reactor which has been producing weapons-grade plutonium for many years will be shut down. This is plutonium which was used in the manufacture of nuclear charges for bombs and missiles. [video shows interior of plant]

And so the reactor has been shut down, what will your personnel do now?

[V.I. Sadovnikov, director of the reactor plant] Shutting down a reactor is not an instantaneous operation, you do not just throw a switch. The cover has been dismantled and personnel will now carry out neutron and physical measurements throughout the active zone in accordance with a special program as well as other measurements on the metal structures and individual sections of the reactor. [video shows staff at work] Then the reactor will be completely unloaded, and the fuel will be stored and replaced by technological pipes for the subsequent installation of a system of sensors in the reactor which will be monitored.

Personnel will carry out this monitoring for some five years, and when this period expires we will proceed with the mothballing of the reactor.

[Correspondent] What will happen to your staff laid off as a result of the conversion of military production.

[Sadovnikov] The fate of these people is a great worry. Unfortunately, despite our having raised more than once the question of drafting a law or a resolution on conversion, this has not yet been done.

Our powerful scientific and technical potential and our traditional cadre training school are suddenly of no use to society today, although the situation may change sharply tomorrow. Therefore we are having to find our own, local solution. We are developing radiation technologies, but they will provide jobs for only some 20 percent of our personnel. The fate of the others is uncertain.

**U.S. Proposal To Reduce Naval Arms 'Very Timely'**

*LD2407201790 Moscow TASS in English 1956 GMT 24 Jul 90*

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshov]

[Text] Moscow, July 24 (TASS)—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress adopted a special provision to the draft military budget for fiscal 1991. It contains recommendations to the Pentagon and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to compile a report for Congress on limiting armaments at seas, including nuclear armaments.

The Senate committee's decision, which increases pressure on the Defence Department and the command of the U.S. Navy to secure from them a real shift in the approach to the problem of naval armaments, seems to be very timely.

It's time for the Pentagon to renounce the outdated and dogmatic stance that does not accept any proposals for curbing and reducing naval weapons.

Now that the signing of a Soviet-U.S. treaty to reduce strategic offensive armaments and a treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to lower significantly conventional military potentials in Europe has become real, the issue of naval fleets is assuming an increasingly greater importance.
Armed forces are a uniform mechanism, in which land forces, air force and naval forces interact, supplement and reinforce each other. Only a comprehensive appraisal makes it possible to draw a general picture of the correlation of military potentials of countries and blocs.

Agreements at the Vienna talks and their implementation will ensure a balance of forces in Europe at a lower level of conventional armaments of land forces and the air force. Would it be fair in this case to leave aside the parties' naval forces?

It is common knowledge that in the field of naval armaments NATO surpasses the Warsaw Pact in navy combat aircraft and the number of large surface ships, including aircraft-carriers. The Warsaw Pact has some advantage in submarines equipped with missiles and torpedoes. In view of the Vienna agreements, it would be logical to begin balancing the naval potentials of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the United States and the USSR.

The Soviet Union's stance on this problem has been consistent and definite. In pursuing the concept of the integrity of the disarmament process, it regards as inadmissible to leave naval armaments outside the talks. The parties to the talks should also be guided by the concept of nonoffensive defence. The Soviet Union stands for finally excluding the possibility of a surprise attack at seas, too.

**Missile Installation Destruction Causes No Damage**

**PM2607141990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 24 Jul 90**

[Report by V. Batalov, V. Zhuravlev from the “Vremya” newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Of late, reports about the elimination of missile launching installations have become commonplace. The Soviet Union faithfully honors its obligations under SALT II. But on occasion, the destruction of military installations does not proceed as smoothly as we might wish. “What Is the Cost of Rumors?” is the title of our correspondent’s reportage:

[Correspondent] Evil rumors hit the small village of BorisoVo, in the Novgorod Oblast forests. It was claimed that during the destruction of a missile launching installation, to be carried out in accordance with SALT II, houses in the village would be damaged and the village itself would sustain irreparable losses. After all, only just over 400 meters separated the village from the scene of the explosion. The villagers’ concern was understandable. At a peasant rally it was decided to sound the alarm.

[B.V. Lebedev, chief of the combined unit political department] USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Minister of Defense Dmitry Timofeyevich Yazov addressed this problem personally. You might think: such a small village, only 25 houses. And yet the minister of defense deemed it possible to personally telephone the commander of the combined unit; experts were called in to explain the situation to the people; to persuade them, we even took people on helicopter rides to villages located at similar distances from military installations subject to destruction. But unfortunately, our arguments were not sufficient.

[Correspondent] The destruction of the missile launching installation was postponed. The original calculations were checked and rechecked. There were no errors. The explosion presented no danger to the village. This was reported to the minister of defense.

Then, on 18 July, the inhabitants of BorisoVo heard a big bang and saw a big cloud rise above the forest. [video shows explosion]

[Unidentified villager] When we heard the explosion we rushed back and looked at the houses. Everything was fine, there was no damage.

[Correspondent] The destructive force of the rumors that had been started by someone had been greater than that of the powerful explosion. They had sown confusion and alarm in people’s hearts, and above all they had instilled doubts as to the ability of Army specialists to guarantee safety and security during the operation.

Now all this is a matter of the past. But the peasants find it difficult to look the military in the face when they meet them. In my opinion, if anyone tried now to sow mistrust in the Army here, he would not have much success.

**Batenin on NATO, GDR Troop Withdrawal**

**AU2507114590 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 25 Jul 90 p 5**

[Unattributed interview with General Goli Viktorovich Batenin, disarmament expert in the CPSU Central Committee; place and date not given: “Moscow Will Regard NATO as a Partner Against Threats by Third Parties”]

[Text] [Question] How could one conceive a new security structure in Europe from the Soviet point of view?

[Batenin] With a certain degree of optimism one may claim that the Europeans will achieve a cooperative nonaligned security structure. What is important today is the transition period, in which one will have to eliminate, above all, military confrontation between East and West in central Europe.

The security structures of the blocks will change, although in different ways. One can assume that NATO will preserve its military organization and even make it more perfect, while at the same time it will politicize its institutions and adapt the conditions as well as the character of its activities to the EC.

The Warsaw Pact will lose its military centralization in many respects. It will be transformed to a political
organization of the East European states, and I believe that it will focus on bilateral military relations between the USSR and the member states. Relations between the USSR and Poland might even become closer as a consequence of loosening relations with other Warsaw Pact states.

During this transition period the all-European security model will probably rely on the transformed blocks and new CSCE institutions. In the future, united centers might emerge to control security, stability, and disarmament on the basis of regional—the Eastern (Warsaw Pact) and the Western (NATO) military-political centers—which would have to be created by reshaping the existing military commands.

For this purpose, NATO must first of all change its orientation toward possible sources of threat from outside Europe, and second, as far as internal European tasks are concerned, it must be able to fulfill informative and coordinating functions for maintaining the military potentials of the European states on a level that is sufficient for defense purposes.

[Question] Is USSR membership in NATO possible?

[Batenin] Well, without giving it enough thought one might believe that this idea is absurd, since, after all, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were created to oppose each other. Today they both have a high combat power and are able to carry out attacks. Stability and reducing the danger of a war in Europe to a minimum have been achieved only through political means.

Yet complete security for the Europeans will be guaranteed only by considerable and decisive troop and arms reduction on the continent, by essentially extending confidence-building measures, by legitimizing all conceivable measures of control and inspection in the sphere of military potentials, and by renouncing strategic military objectives of establishing battlefields in Europe. Institutionalizing the CSCE would basically be enough to maintain stability and guaranteed security.

Thus, the blocks would lose their current internal importance and the USSR would regard NATO as a partner in the all-European security system against external threat or, as is sometimes said, against a threat by a third party. This might create conditions under which it would be useful for NATO and the USSR to join a uniform military organization. The sphere of pooling security potentials from the Atlantic to the Urals would certainly become bigger.

[Question] How long will Soviet soldiers remain in Germany (GDR)?

[Batenin] The troop withdrawal would probably take us three to four years. This was mentioned by Mikhail Gorbachev in his meeting with Helmut Kohl. In this stage of perestroika, the withdrawal of the Western Group of the Armed Forces poses a major socioeconomic problem to the USSR, which, in view of the internal and international effects, must be systematically solved as an important political task of the USSR and a united German state.

U.S. Chemical Arms Pullout From FRG Hailed
LD2607133190 Moscow TASS in English 1322 GMT 26 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, July 26 (TASS)—"The withdrawal of U.S. chemical weapons from West German territory, announced earlier by the West German Defence Ministry, began today," Stanislav Petrov, colonel general, head of Soviet chemical forces, told TASS.

He noted that he considers this event "positive and constructive."

According to Petrov, U.S. specialists have to withdraw and destroy 102,000 artillery shells outside the West German territory by October 1. The shells contain nerve gas.

"This advance towards cutting and then banning chemical weapons has become possible thanks to the strengthening of security and arms cuts," Petrov said.

The USSR and the United States have achieved and are implementing bilateral understandings on chemical weapons, which provide for confidence-building measures," the general stressed.

"Along with positive changes in the world, we sometimes witness relapses of the cold war," Petrov noted. Some Western circles are spreading rumours about a "Soviet chemical threat."

A report was recently circulated in West Germany that 30,000 tonnes of chemical weapons are kept at nine depots of the Western Army Group stationed in the German Democratic Republic.

The report also said that the Soviet Union allegedly has 32 chemical arms depots outside its territory.

"This is pure fabrication. The USSR has no chemical weapons outside its territory," Petrov concluded.

Conference on Arms Conversion Previewed
LD2707082390 Moscow TASS in English 0730 GMT 27 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Kochetkov]

[Text] New York, July 27 (TASS)—The conversion of the military industry has evoked growing interest lately, UN Undersecretary General for Disarmament Yasushi Akashi told a news conference at UN headquarters on Thursday.

The news conference was devoted to the United Nations conference in Moscow (from August 13-17), devoted to conversion's economic regulators in the era of arms reduction.
SOVIET UNION

The conference, which will be attended by representatives of 40 countries, will consider problems of conversion and how different nations have addressed them.

A few days ago, Akashi said, the governor of an American state, where conversion resulted in unemployment, spoke about the need to take as close a look at the seamy side of peace dividends as at their bright side.

The UN undersecretary general said he was confident that dividends from the brighter side of conversion would prevail in the long term, but this victory requires minimizing the complexities of the transition from military to peace-oriented production.

In the long term, economies will undoubtedly profit from conversion, but efforts are needed during the transition period to retool military facilities and retrain labour. Of course, it is an additional headache for enterprises, but it has to be borne, Akashi said.

In his address to the United Nations, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev stressed the importance of conversion and the Soviet Union’s determination to begin it on a broad scale, the UN undersecretary general said.

It has been suggested that the United Nations should establish a conversion information centre. The conference in Moscow will be the first UN forum devoted to the issue. Akashi said he expected an open exchange of views and experience on this important issue.

Troop Withdrawal From Mongolia Ahead of Schedule

LD27071105490 Moscow TASS in English 1024 GMT 27 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Dugar Sanzhiiyev]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, July 27 (TASS)—Colonel D. Dorzhgotov, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Mongolian People’s Army, answered questions concerning the Soviet troop withdrawal at a news conference at the Mongolian Foreign Ministry.

In March this year the two countries’ governments are known to have decided on the final withdrawal of Soviet troops that had been in Mongolia temporarily at the request of the Mongolian Government.

“The withdrawal is now proceeding ahead of schedule. Eighty-two percent of Soviet servicemen have already returned home now,” the Mongolian spokesman said.

“Another several units are preparing to withdraw. Soviet troops have completely left the cities of Nalaikha, Sainshad, and Choibalsan.

“Fifty-two military townships, about 300 barracks and 30 military hospitals have been turned over to Mongolia free of charge,” Dorzhgotov said.

Gerasimov on U.S. Chemical Weapons Withdrawal

LD2707135790 Moscow TASS in English 1337 GMT 27 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, July 27 (TASS)—The Soviet Union welcomes the withdrawal of American chemical weapons from West German territory, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman told a briefing here today.

Gennadiy Gerasimov said that “until quite recently it would have been hard to imagine that this American decision would fit perfectly well into the context of current international relations as a whole, Soviet-U.S. relations in particular.”

Gerasimov said this “rather quick” decision by the United States was largely due to a succession of Soviet-U.S. contacts on the elimination of chemical weapons, which were capped by the signing of the bilateral Soviet-U.S. agreement by Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush in Washington in May.

Discussing chemical disarmament, Gerasimov said the Soviet Union “paid attention” to Thursday’s speech at the disarmament conference in Geneva by a Dutch representative, who stressed the need to attain specific results at the talks on chemical weapons and favoured holding a meeting of foreign ministers from the conference member-countries.

The Soviet diplomat voiced satisfaction over the fact that an agenda for the common European meeting was coordinated at the first session of the preparatory committee of the CSCE summit conference, planned for November. He also hailed agreement on the need to hold regular meetings of heads of state and government and welcomed the participation of an Albanian delegation as observer.

Replying to a question on the possibility of restoring diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Albania, Gerasimov said: “We favour the restoration of diplomatic relations with Albania. This is our position. So one can assume that they will be restored.”

General Staff’s Ladygin on Arms Talks Outlook

PM3107085590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jul 90 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Major General F. Ladygin, chief of an (unspecified) USSR Armed Forces General Staff directorate, by an unidentified KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: “There Are Difficulties, But They Can Be Overcome”—first two paragraphs are an editorial introduction]
Major changes are taking place in the world. M.S. Gorbachev’s visit to the United States ended with significant results. The Warsaw Pact and then NATO have taken definite steps to transform both alliances from military-political to political-military alliances, with a view to reducing military confrontation in Europe and creating all-European structures of security and cooperation.

However, the material foundations for military confrontation—USSR and U.S. strategic offensive forces, the mighty conventional armed forces groupings and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, chemical weapons, and major naval groupings—are still there, although it is well known that talks on many of these problems have been under way for many a year now. This begs a number of questions.

[Correspondent] What is the state of affairs at the nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva following the Washington meeting between the USSR and U.S. presidents? Have there been any advances here? What are the main obstacles?

[Ladygin] The recent meeting between the USSR and U.S. presidents was an important stage on the road toward concluding fundamental treaties in the sphere of cuts in and limitation of armed forces and arms. The adopted decisions are of crucial significance for progress at the disarmament talks.

The documents signed in Washington regarding the fundamental provisions of a strategic offensive arms treaty, long-range sea-launched cruise missiles [SLCM’s], and future talks on nuclear and space arms and on the further strengthening of strategic stability are of fundamental importance for the Geneva nuclear and space arms talks. They enshrine accords on such fundamental questions as the range of air-launched cruise missiles [ALCM’s] and SLCM’s—600km; the number of nuclear ALCM’s on heavy bombers; and the rules for counting these missiles. A solution has been found to the problem of limiting nuclear SLCM’s (a level of 880 units) on the basis of annual unilateral statements of a politically binding nature. Other important questions have also been “unraveled.” The result is that there is a real possibility of completing the elaboration of a strategic offensive arms treaty and submitting it for signing by the end of 1990.

Of course, intensive, painstaking work still lies ahead at the Geneva talks. A quest is under way for mutually acceptable solutions on questions that have still not been fully agreed. They include quite complex issues, such as, for instance, the interconnection between strategic offensive arms cuts and compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty. This is a key element in the nuclear and space arms talks associated with the need to consider the objective organic interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive arms. The reality is that a strategic offensive arms treaty can only function if the ABM treaty is observed in the form in which it was signed in 1972. It is inadmissible for strategic offensive arms and ABM defense to be separated. Our side has proposed ways of resolving this problem. Time will tell how events develop in this respect.

There is no need to list the other unresolved questions. They come within the purview of both the Soviet delegation at the nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva, and people here in Moscow. The main thing is to find mutually acceptable “solutions” in conjunction with our U.S. negotiating partners and to elaborate a treaty. The conclusion of a treaty would constitute a realization by the two great powers of their special responsibility for averting the threat of nuclear war and for strengthening peace and peoples’ security.

[Correspondent] Talks on conventional armed forces in Europe are under way in Vienna. Will it prove possible to complete the elaboration of an agreement by the end of this year? What is holding things up today?

[Ladygin] The agreements on conventional armed forces in Europe under preparation in Vienna are effectively the foundation needed in conjunction with the change in the political climate on the continent to ensure stability and create the future structure of European security.

I can say that there is complete mutual understanding at the Vienna talks between all parties. The talks are being conducted in a businesslike, dynamic way. This allows us to hope that the political decisions adopted by the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic alliance states at the Moscow and London conferences to conclude an agreement by the end of 1990 will be fulfilled.

To all intents and purposes, the talks have now entered the final stage. Important questions of defining the categories of arms to be cut back, lists of the types of arms, information exchange, verification, and the procedures for eliminating arms have been agreed or are in the final stages of being agreed.

But there are also problems which have not yet been resolved. One being the problem of aircraft. We have made a number of major advances on this kind of arms with a view to attaining mutual accord. But not everything depends on us.

NATO countries are insisting that the future treaty encompass not only air force warplanes but also land-based naval aircraft, although naval forces, including naval aircraft, are not by mandate part of the talks. We are of course agreeable to reaching an agreement on cuts in naval aircraft too: however, not only land-based but also carrier-based aircraft, which form the basis of naval combat air forces in NATO, particularly as far as the United States is concerned. Cuts of this kind should be an integral part of separate talks on naval forces.

The Western countries also hold an unbalanced position with regard to the Soviet Union’s air defense fighter force. It has developed as a counterweight to such U.S. offensive air weapons as strategic and carrier-based
aircraft and long-range ALCM's and SLCM's, and is designed exclusively to protect facilities in the heart of Soviet territory against airborne strikes. The country's air defense air force is unable to operate against ground-based facilities and poses no threat to other countries.

Other uncoordinated questions are also in need of solution. It is important to bear in mind the fact that the rapidly changing situation in Europe is having a great effect on the Vienna talks. The Western countries' failure to take these changes into consideration, their unyielding stance, and refusal to seek mutually acceptable solutions on various problems have held up the talks. Some Warsaw Pact states' withdrawal from their previously agreed positions, above all regarding the levels of sufficiency of arms for one country and national levels, does not help the negotiating process either.

We firmly cleave to the fundamental principle of the Vienna talks—equal security for all parties at all stages of the disarmament process. The difficulties that arise can be overcome.

[Correspondent] How are things at the chemical weapons talks? What effect has the recent Soviet-U.S. agreement in this field had on these talks?

[Ladigin] The talks on banning chemical weapons entered their final stage at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. The text of a draft convention, many of whose provisions have already been agreed, has been prepared. The convention envisages a broad range of verification measures, ranging from allowing international organs to check information regarding activity relating to the convention to accepting inspection on demand, without right of refusal, anywhere in the event of a suspected violation. Many of the participants in the talks think it quite possible that the work of preparing the convention may be completed within the next 18-24 months.

The Soviet-U.S. documents on the procedures for conducting inspections on demand and on the elimination of chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities are of great importance for the elaboration of the convention, as is the USSR-U.S. statement of intent to be the initial parties to the convention.

The Soviet-U.S. agreement on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate the multilateral convention undoubtedly promotes progress at the multilateral talks on the elaboration of a convention. Without waiting for the convention to be concluded, the Soviet Union and the United States have pledged not to produce chemical weapons and to radically cut back—by more than 80 percent—their stocks of chemical agents. At the same time the USSR and the United States have said that a multilateral convention which ensures the elimination of all chemical weapons stocks worldwide is the best long-term solution to the problem of eliminating chemical weapons from military arsenals.

[Correspondent] What are the future prospects in the sphere of talks to reduce and limit armed forces and armaments and to bring them into line with the concept of reasonable sufficiency? Are talks scheduled on tactical nuclear weapons and naval forces?

[Ladigin] The Soviet Union consistently advocates cuts in military arsenals, given strict compliance with the principle of equal security. That is our fundamental position. It fully accords with the principle of reasonable sufficiency, with an eye to which in-depth reform of the USSR Armed Forces is under way. The smaller the military danger, the fewer forces and weapons are needed to ensure the country's defense.

That is why we believe that the disarmament process cannot and must not be interrupted. One agreement must be followed by others. Moreover this process must be both deep and wide.

The Soviet-U.S. accord in Washington has already preordained that, following the signing of a strategic arms treaty, there will be further talks on nuclear and space arms and on the strengthening of strategic stability. The involvement of other nuclear powers, above all Britain and France, in these talks would indisputably further the aims of securing a nuclear-free, nonviolent world.

The problem of the limitation and reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe is palpably topical right now. In the wake of the Warsaw Pact states, the North Atlantic alliance countries have come to realize this. However, I cannot agree that cuts in nuclear arsenals in Europe should be confined solely to nuclear artillery and short-range, ground-launched, tactical missiles, as NATO would like. Talks leading to the phased, total elimination of tactical nuclear weapons must include all nuclear components, including aircraft.

Now, prior to the close of the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe involving 23 countries, consensus has already been secured to all intents and purposes regarding their subsequent continuation, probably with a different mandate—with 35 states involved.

Our fundamental position regarding the need to begin talks to limit and cut back naval forces is beginning to meet with increasing understanding. Ruling naval potentials—where the United States and NATO have a considerable advantage—out of the talks, while evening out other components of the sides' military might at lower levels, would drastically upset the military equilibrium and undermine the entire disarmament process. Awareness of this, notably in Western countries, gives us reason to expect that this sphere—naval arms—will also be incorporated in the talks.
Afanasyev Views Need for Naval Disarmament
PM3007150190 Moscow SOVETSKAIA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Jul 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by V. Afanasyev: "Banking on Strength. The United States Building Up Its Military Potential"]

[Text] It was a memorable event. A festive atmosphere, national flags flying, everyone in good spirits. President G. Bush delivered a speech to suit the occasion. It was the "baptism" of a new nuclear powered aircraft carrier, the George Washington, which was launched on that day, Saturday 21 July, from the slips at the Newport News (Virginia, United States) shipyard.

Fitted with two nuclear power units enabling it to develop speeds of up to 30 knots, the aircraft carrier represents an impressive force. It can carry 85 aircraft and a crew of 6,000 on board. U.S. journalists noted in this context that now there are six U.S. aircraft carriers in different parts of the world, with a further eight in U.S. ports, and each one of them, when at sea, costs the U.S. taxpayers $1 million a day.

An expensive pleasure, of course. But there is nothing Washington would not do for its favorite offspring—the U.S. Navy. After all, according to high-ranking Navy spokesmen, "even without the Soviet threat, modern aircraft carriers offer the President the necessary flexibility in his policy." Oh, this famous "flexibility!" Speaking at the ceremony to launch the ship, President Bush declared: "U.S. might is, like before, that force in the world which is of paramount importance for ensuring freedom.... We—and this is inevitable—are the leader of the free world's defense, a connecting link in the global alliance of democratic societies, the main factor of stability."

The Navy gives the United States considerable superiority in men, equipment, and weapons at sea, and the United States is firmly determined to maintain it. Is this not the reason why it refuses to conduct naval reduction talks with the USSR?

At the end of last year, during M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with G. Bush off Malta, there was no reply from the U.S. side to the Soviet side's proposal to start talks on naval reductions. Hardly anything changed after the summit meeting in the United States in late May and early June this year. Soviet-U.S. talks and the Vienna talks on naval reductions were postponed until the next stage.

The reasons for maintaining a high level of military expenditures, a sizeable proportion of which goes to the Navy, were substantiated by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney when he addressed members of the San Diego Chamber of Commerce and of that Californian City's Council for International Affairs at the end of April. He emphasized that the high level of expenditure is due to the fact that the United States intends to preserve the existing system of alliances to which it belongs. These alliances, he noted, "are to a considerable extent based on our readiness to maintain forward-based forces abroad." Furthermore, the United States would like to "maintain the status of leading naval power."

"We intend to have the forces," he added, "which were required to accomplish that which we did in Panama last December." And "we intend, like before, to have an industrial base enabling us to produce complex armaments." All these considerations, Cheney noted, demand major military expenditures "even under the most optimistic scenario for the development of relations between the United States and the USSR."

R. Cheney requested a vast amount—$295.1 billion—for fiscal 1991 which begins 1 October. On 1 May, however, the House of Representatives approved a draft budget providing for defense expenditure cutbacks of $11.5 billion. Even larger cutbacks—$13 billion—were introduced in the Pentagon budget version approved by the Senate. Consequently, during the second half of June, R. Cheney submitted to the leadership of Congress general proposals on the possibility of a 25-percent reduction of U.S. Armed Forces over the next five years. Including a reduction of warships in service with the Navy from 566 to 455. It was proposed to reduce the number of aircraft carriers from 14 to 12 (even though critics say that even six would be enough) and reduce the naval air arm accordingly. But these reductions do not affect the U.S. Navy's basic potential.

It is no secret that the U.S. Navy is superior to the Soviet Union's Navy by a factor of 2.5 in terms of major surface ships (battleships, cruisers, missile-carrying frigates), absolutely in terms of strike aircraft carriers (the USSR has no such ships for the time being), by a factor of 2.5 in terms of naval air arm aircraft, by a factor of 2 in terms of total fleet tonnage, and by a factor of 19 in terms of marines' numerical strength. "The U.S. stance in the naval sphere is clearly visible. Not to ease military pressure on the USSR from seas and oceans," Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev declared at the International Seminar on Naval Disarmament, held in Moscow last February. "To organize matter so as to ensure that the Navy remains one of the main—and maybe even the main—means to be used by the United States to implement its policy of strength toward the Soviet Union."

But the essence of the Soviet Union's proposals to reduce sea-based armaments [morskiye voruzheniya] is not to weaken the U.S. Navy to such a dangerous level whereby it would be incapable of defending its country's state interests. The USSR proposes that the potential of confrontation between the U.S. and USSR Navies is reduced in proportion to the declining military danger in the world. This would also reduce military danger for the USSR from the oceans.

Of course, the North Atlantic alliance—in its London Declaration adopted by the alliance's session 6 July this year—proposed to Warsaw Pact Organization states the adoption of a joint document which would solemnly proclaim that "we are no longer opponents." The Soviet Union appreciated this. Such a step can certainly be only welcomed. But the distance separating words and deeds is still too great. Like before, the United States enjoys superiority in terms of sea-based armaments.
The U.S. Congress is currently trying to determine a military program which would effect the bulk of budget cutbacks in military expenditures. After all, the budget deficit, running to $169 billion, is necessitating amendments in the legislators’ work.

A contribution was made by the Senate Armed Services Committee, which adopted a few days ago a special amendment to the draft 1991 military budget. It contains instructions to the Pentagon and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to complete by 1 February the drafting of a report on the question of limitation of sea-based armaments, including nuclear ones. “Despite the fact that the administration, and the Navy in particular, is categorically against any measures of sea-based arms control, the Senate Committee would like to receive supplementary information on the contribution which could be made to the strengthening of U.S. national security by broader initiatives in the sphere of sea-based arms control,” the committee’s instructions note. “The time has come to stop saying ‘no’ to Soviet proposals on sea-based arms control.” Ronald O’Rourke, well known military expert from the Congressional Research Service, declared. And P. Nitze, President R. Reagan’s former adviser on disarmament problems, called for the liquidation of all sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons.

The presence of nuclear fleets and weapons on the seas and oceans is in itself dangerous and poses a certain threat to marine flora and fauna and to littoral countries. But there is also another important and dangerous factor. As of 1 July, the United States and its allies lifted export controls on nuclear firing mechanisms [vzryvateli]. Now, as THE WASHINGTON POST put it, it is possible “to buy these firing mechanisms at any East European store counter. This can be done by Pakistan, India, Israel, the Republic of South Africa, and any other country trying to develop atomic weapons.” There are already 13 of them. At least there are 13 states that are close to having their own nuclear weapons. There is a great temptation here, especially if U.S. aircraft carriers, crammed with such weapons, are cruising off these countries’ coasts.

The new aircraft carrier George Washington will be added to the list of already existing ones, and will become an additional source of international tension and potential radioactive contamination of seas and oceans. The question of extending the disarmament process to the opposed sides’ navies is now more topical than ever before.

Worldwide Nuclear Test Situation Summarized

PM0108110990 Moscow KRAKAYA 2VEZDA
in Russian 29 Jul 90 First Edition p 3

[Text] It is a long time since I came across newspaper reports of nuclear tests. Have they been suspended? And what is the situation in other countries?

K. Kovalev, Moscow.

It is true that since 1989 silence has reigned at the Northern and Semipalatinsk Soviet nuclear test ranges. There are no tests being carried out. At the same time, the United States is continuing with underground nuclear explosions. Quite recently—25 July—another underground nuclear test was carried out at the American test range in the state of Nevada with the object of simulating the effect of a nuclear explosion in space. This was the fourth American nuclear test this year. It is another example clearly confirming that the United States is not suspending its work in further improving its nuclear potential.

Some other countries are also continuing to carry out nuclear tests. Since January of this year, France has carried out four nuclear tests. There was one explosion in China.

It is worth recalling that the Soviet Union consistently advocates a complete and universal ban on nuclear tests. But this problem must be resolved on an equal footing with the United States, without detriment to either side’s security and without detriment to the security of any country in the world. Unilateral disarmament on the part of the Soviet Union, and in particular closing our test ranges without reciprocal steps from the other side, which some people are calling for, will not promote the strengthening of our country’s security and stability in the world in any way.

U.S. Army Starts To Withdraw Chemical Weapons

LD3007093990 Moscow TASS in English 0927 GMT 30 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Kuznetsov]

[Text] New York, July 30—The U.S. Army has started implementing the Golden Python operation. It envisages withdrawal of some 100,000 shells with nerve gas from U.S. bases in West Germany and their subsequent destruction on a remote atoll in the Pacific.

The first consignment of deadly weapons has already been airlifted to the West Coast of the United States whence it will be carried by sea to Johnston Island lying 1,325 kilometres south-west of Honolulu.

American journal TIME reports, however, that the Golden Python operation evoked the concern of environmentalists, as well as residents of Pacific islands.

Concern has already been expressed by the authorities of New Zealand, the Marshall Islands, the federated states of Micronesia, Western Samoa, as well as the American state of Hawaii.
They, specifically, are anxious over the fact that the facility for the destruction of toxic agents situated on Johnston Atoll has not enough capacity to eliminate all these weapons.

It was used last in 1971 to eliminate some 12,000 tons of chemicals carried by the U.S. Army from depots on the Japanese island Okinawa.

In this connection, governor of Hawaii John Waihee demanded that the enterprise's operation be checked over 16 months.

The U.S. Defence Department keeps in secret the date when the vessels will sail for Johnston Island, as well as all other information about these vessels, saying that they might become the targets for terrorists.

The calculations made by the U.S. Army indicate that if there is an accident when chemical weapons are carried by sea, an area with a radius of over 84 kilometres will be contaminated, TIME writes this is hardly a consolation to 12 hundred residents of Johnston Island which is only three kilometres long.

**Israeli Development of Chemical Weapons Assailed**

TA3007180990 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Hebrew 1500 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Commentary by Dmitriy Prokofyev—read by announcer]

[Text] The U.S. Administration is prepared to seriously discuss in the next round of negotiations in the committee for strategic cooperation the possibility of establishing an independent Israeli chemical weapons potential. This was announced by the State Department spokesman. That was the U.S. Administration's reaction to the proposal by Science and Technology Minister Yuval Ne'eman to build up Israel's chemical weapons in order to neutralize the danger from Iraq and other Arab countries which already have these weapons. Our commentator Dmitriy Prokofyev has this to say on the subject:

When the media published Yuval Ne'eman's proposal, I was not taken by surprise and I was not especially concerned. It was made by neither the prime minister nor the defense minister. The issue over whether to develop an Israeli chemical weapons potential was not discussed in the cabinet, and as far as I know, it also has no intention of discussing the subject. In fact, this was an information offensive, nothing more. Furthermore, Minister Yuval represents Tehiya and not the Likud. His views are well known but only represent a relatively limited group of voters. By the way, whoever is at all interested in Israeli policy is aware of such tactics: A small party belonging to the coalition raises conditions unacceptable to the large parties so that they will enter into negotiations with it, while in the end they give it something in a completely different field. For the religious parties it was an amendment to the Law of the Return, or the Who is a Jew law. In return for giving up the demand in the Knesset for the amendment these parties receive places of honor on parliamentary committees and subsidies for yeshivas, etc.

For Tehiya, the key up to now has been the demand to build more settlements. At present it cannot demand new settlements since Tehiya is a signatory to the coalition agreement, which maintains settlement [words indistinct].

Professor Yuval Ne'eman decided to exert pressure on the government with his proposal to arm the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] with missiles with chemical warheads. That is what I thought, and that is what I believe circles in Israel also thought, but it appears that is not what the United States thinks. The declaration by the State Department spokesman is, in my view, very strange, especially since Washington and Moscow are preparing an accord on chemical weapons disarmament. The United States is also removing its chemical weapons from Western Europe. The United States, which is prepared to give up its potential for such weapons for mass destruction, plans to arm its strategic ally with them.

Everything is perhaps much simpler. When the administration provides legitimacy to the Israeli demand for chemical weapons, or it is perhaps more correct to say, when the administration raises this demand from the level of Israeli internal politics to the national level, only one thing can result: It can serve as an excuse for similar arming by several Arab regimes, including those at war with Israel. It is obvious that in order to neutralize the danger of chemical weapons there is a need for sophisticated and ultramodern measures. That means one cannot make do with the procurement of arms in Spain, India, or Brazil, and therefore the United States is the address. That means larger profits for U.S. firms belonging to the military-industrial complex. As for the Israelis, to be honest, I do not envy them in the current situation. In the Middle East there are too many hotheads prepared to press the red button at any moment.

**Progress of Soviet Troop Withdrawal Reviewed**

LD3107104690 Moscow TASS in English 1037 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, July 31 (TASS)—Units of Soviet troops are being withdrawn from East European countries and from Mongolia to the Soviet territory according to schedule, said Colonel-General Bronislav Omelichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. Today he gave an interview to TASS in connection with the conclusion of a stage in the Soviet troop withdrawal.

General Omelichev said that over 52,000 (or 65 per cent of the servicemen who are to be recalled to the USSR), over 900 tanks (some 58 per cent), some 900 cannons
(about 63 per cent) and 100 planes (some 72 per cent) will have been withdrawn by August 1, 1990.

Omelichev noted that the staff of the army corps, an armoured division and a motorised rifle division with logistical support, an anti-aircraft rocket brigade, an anti-aircraft rocket regiment, two rocket brigades, two air regiments, and several battalions were pulled out of Czechoslovakia.

The general said that two rocket brigades, one anti-aircraft rocket brigade, an anti-aircraft rocket regiment, four battalions, and three air regiments had been withdrawn from Hungary. The withdrawal of an armoured division is being concluded. In addition, some 3,000 servicemen were withdrawn from the Western Group of Soviet Forces in the German Democratic Republic and the Northern Group of Forces (Poland).

The second stage of Soviet troop withdrawal from Mongolia has been proceeding successfully since May 14, Omelichev said. He said that more than 27,000 servicemen (or 85 per cent of servicemen to be withdrawn), 514 tanks (100 per cent), 400 cannons (100 per cent) and 138 planes (100 per cent) will have been withdrawn by August 1.

The general said that the Soviet Union will undoubtedly meet the agreed-upon schedule.

Strategic Arms Cuts, ABM Treaty Interrelated
LD0208202190 Moscow TASS in English 2003 GMT 2 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, August 2 (TASS)—Strategic balance, stability, and the Soviet Union's and the United States' necessary confidence of attaining them can be ensured in a simple and reliable way—through thoroughly verified cuts in strategic offensive arms, Major General Vladimir Kuklev, deputy head of a department of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, told TASS today in view of the continuation of the Geneva talks on strategic arms reduction and on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence (ABM) Treaty.

The latest summit meeting of the Soviet and U.S. presidents in Washington was an important stage on the way to the conclusion of fundamental treaties in the field of reducing and limiting armed forces and armaments, Kuklev recalled.

"The joint statement issued in connection with the preparation of a treaty on reducing strategic offensive arms (S.T.A.R.T.) was indicative of resolving the most important differences between the two sides and of the possibility of preparing this treaty for signature before the end of this year," the Soviet General Staff spokesman said.

Kuklev believes that the sides' attitude to the observance of the 1972 ABM Treaty is the key issue, depending on which is whether the S.T.A.R.T. treaty will enter into force and will be implemented.

The Soviet side proceeded and continues to proceed from the assumption that the S.T.A.R.T. treaty can be effective only provided the ABM Treaty is observed in the form in which it was signed in 1972, the general emphasised.

Not to complicate the preparation of the Soviet-American S.T.A.R.T., the Soviet side stated its readiness to agree to sign and ratify the treaty even if no accord on the ABM issue is reached but the sides go on observing it in the form in which it was signed in 1972, Kuklev pointed out.

"This decision by the USSR opens the way for the signing of the S.T.A.R.T. treaty," General Kuklev said.

'Rumors' of European Chemical Arms Depots Denied
LD0208133490 Moscow World Service in Russian 1100 GMT 2 Aug 90

[Text] Stanislav Petrov, the USSR Defense Ministry's chief of chemical troops, has refuted rumors spread by Western media that the Soviet Army has depots of chemical weapons in GDR territory and other Warsaw Pact states. There are no grounds for these rumors whatsoever, the general stressed. All Army stocks of chemical weapons, which amount to 40,000 tonnes, are kept exclusively on USSR territory, Stanislav Petrov said. Now, in connection with the fact that the agreement between the USSR and the United States on the reduction of chemical weapons by 80 percent has been signed, a draft for their destruction has been created in the USSR. The process of their liquidation will be carried out under wide public and international inspections.

Reportage on Shevardnadze-Baker Talks in Irkutsk

Treaty Verification Broached
PM0208130990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Aug 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Ministers' Meeting"]

[Text] Irkutsk, 1 July—Disarmament, questions of bilateral relations, and regional problems—the attention of USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker was basically focused on this on the first day of their working meeting in the Baykal area.

Certain technical issues were broached, including methods for carrying out verification, the solution of which is essential in order to clear the way for the conclusion of a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. Other aspects of disarmament were discussed in a constructive spirit.
The ministers examined the progress of implementing numerous Soviet-American cooperation projects in such spheres as the economy, science, technology, medicine, the peaceful use of space, culture, ecology, and so forth. Areas were marked out for the application of further efforts so as to ensure the most favorable conditions for the maximum realization of the potential of such cooperation.

Taking account of the "distinctive geographical feature" of the meeting, a considerable time was spent on a review of the situation in the Asian-Pacific region whose role is steadily increasing in the world. The search was continued for additional opportunities to promote a settlement in Asian area of conflict—Afghanistan and Cambodia. The situation on the Korean peninsula was discussed. It was noted with satisfaction that even on the most painful issues encouraging signs have recently come to light of a possible rectification of the situation and of an emergence at mutually acceptable accords.

The processes taking place in Europe were examined from the angle of the impressive prospects for overcoming the split in the continent and for the advancement of the all-European process, a new impetus to which will be given by the top-level CSCE meeting at the end of 1990. A breakthrough in the settlement of external aspects of German unification occupies a fitting place in the firm establishment of positive changes in Europe and the world.

E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker had a brief outing on Lake Baykal. The protection of the lake's ecosystem also comes within the scope of Soviet-American cooperation.

The talks will be completed 2 August.

Vienna Arms Talks Discussed
LD0208121990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0400 GMT 2 Aug 90

[Report by diplomatic correspondent Viktor Levin on USSR-U.S. foreign ministers' talks in Irkutsk on 2 August]

[Text] At the concluding news conference, Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze noted that the place where the meeting was held, the large Asian city of Irkutsk, gave it a focus, and special attention was devoted to the problems of the Asian-Pacific region. As a result of the talks, a high degree of mutual understanding was reached on the basis of the fundamental assertion that in Asia, too, the USSR and the United States do not regard one another as adversaries.

You will agree that this result alone would be worth all the talks, but it is not the only result. Reporting yesterday's talks, I noted that the American journalists were displaying heightened interest in the problem of Afghanistan, conjecturing about what might be the meaning of the arrival of President Najibullah in the USSR and the appointment of a provisional president of Afghanistan.

To the reply that President Najibullah had come for a holiday, the American colleagues were skeptical. Today, I think, the skepticism has dispersed. Shevardnadze and Baker have affirmed a steady rapprochement of positions on Afghanistan and expressed hope that soon this would bear practical fruit. As I understood it, it is a question of a mutual desire to promote the earliest intra-Afghan settlement by means of holding free, fair elections taking Afghan traditions into account.

Progress was also affirmed on Cambodia. Here of course, a key role was played by the fact that the United States has taken a realistic position regarding the so-called coalition government.

The timetable of the first day's work turned out to be considerably confused, and the talks took up more time than had originally been set aside for them. Today the ministers could no longer permit themselves any liberties owing to time considerations. James Baker is expected on his first visit to Mongolia, and he must be there by a definite time. But the pressure of time did not affect the working character of the meeting. The ministers sat down at the table not at 1030, like yesterday, but at 0800 and talked for two hours. Incidentally, the talks took more than nine hours in all. The subject of today's talk is the Vienna talks on reduction of conventional forces and armaments. In Vienna the task is to reach agreement by the middle of November, that is, before the convocation of the conference of heads of state and government of the 85 countries of the Helsinki process, but for that it is necessary to solve several more complex problems, first of all the problems of air power and strength of forces in light of the unification of the two German states.

You will remember that on the first day of the talks, problems facing the USSR and the United States in drafting a treaty on reduction of strategic offensive weapons and regional problems were discussed. Much attention was paid to bilateral relations.

At the news conference today, Shevardnadze and Baker summarized the results. In brief, it boils down to mutual satisfaction. The next meeting of the ministers will take place in Moscow where, on 12 September, one can already say with a high degree of certainty there will be the last session of foreign ministers of the six countries discussing foreign political aspects of the union of the two German states. The arrival of the secretary of state in Moscow will, it seems, be used also for detailed bilateral talks.

Arms Treaty 'Key' Summit Issue
LD0208163190 Moscow TASS in English 1556 GMT
2 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, August 2 (TASS)—The elaboration of a treaty on strategic offensive weapons is, probably, the
key issue in the preparation for a new Soviet-U.S. summit, Valery Churkin, adviser to Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, told a briefing here today.

He was speaking about the main results of the Irkutsk meeting between Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.

The ministers agreed to set a, so to say, additional level of discussions of the strategic offensive weapons issue, Churkin said. They agreed to specify the issues that are yet to be resolved and propose them for discussion not only to their delegations in Geneva, but also at deputy foreign ministers level.

The next meeting between the ministers, scheduled between September 12-13, is expected to center mainly on economic issues, he said. The sides agreed that the secretary of state, who will arrive in Moscow to participate in the “two-plus-four” talks, will be accompanied by the U.S. secretary of commerce and a large group of influential U.S. businessmen. The group and, certainly, the secretary of state are expected to be received by the Soviet president.

 Speaking about a new Soviet-U.S. summit, Churkin said it is necessary to concentrate now on preparations for the summit that is expected to be held in the Soviet Union.

As for the Paris summit within the Helsinki process, “It is a separate issue. The sides touched upon it in Irkutsk, and the ministers confirmed the sides’ intention to prepare for it thoroughly,” Churkin said.

Asked about the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, Churkin said the final meeting between the ministers began to 3:30 Moscow time, and the discussion of the issue was rather general and “came mainly to regret that the sides expressed about the use of force in the Middle East.”

The spokesman stated that, unfortunately, the situation in the region is not so promising as the situation in Afghanistan and Cambodia and rapid results can hardly be expected there.

While discussing the situation in the Middle East, “the sides were rather pessimistic and this resulted mainly from the Israeli Government’s current position,” Churkin said.

August, he expects to meet with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher. It will probably take place in the Moscow area.

Turning to the problems hindering the development of economic relations between the USSR and the United States, as well as other countries, Shevardnadze expressed hope that the USSR Supreme Soviet will be able, in the autumn of this year, to finally adopt laws on investments and taxation, which are intended to create conditions for larger-scale cooperation with Western countries.

Shevardnadze also said that, at the meeting with Baker, the Soviets had lodged grievances over the mention of the northern territories issue in the Houston document. In the Soviet Union’s view, the Group of Seven should not be dealing with that issue.

These details of the talks were transmitted by our diplomatic correspondent Viktor Levin. Later in Panorama, we’ll return to the results of the Baker-Shevardnadze dialogue.

Shevardnadze Summarizes Meetings
LD0208173690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 2 Aug 90

[From the “Vremya” newscast]

[Text] Today in Irkutsk, a working meeting ended between Comrade Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State Baker. A report by our special correspondents:

[B. Kostenko] The results of the long and extremely intense talks which have taken place during these days on the land of Irkutsk were summed up at a short news conference organized for Soviet and foreign journalists. At the news conference Eduard Amvrosievich Shevardnadze, USSR Minister of foreign affairs, said in particular.

[Begins Shevardnadze recording] It is essentially the first time that we have so thoroughly and, comprehensively discussed the overall problems of Asia and the Far East, the issue of stability in that region—that extremely vast region—the problem of security in Asia and in the Pacific Region, the elimination of any remaining military confrontation, and the possibilities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation and interaction in that region.

What are these results? A high degree of mutual understanding on the basis of the fundamental statement that in Asia too, the USSR and the United States do not regard each other as adversaries. This is a general statement made at the Washington summit, and naturally it extends to Asia and the Pacific. It determines a fresh view of the region’s huge problems, and it is our profound conviction that the rivalry between East and West has been recognized as an outdated stereotype and is inapplicable to the new situation and the new circumstances. [end recording]
[Kostenko] At the meeting with journalists, a number of regional problems were also touched upon including European ones, specifically the issue of settling the external aspects of German unity. As at every meeting of the heads of USSR and U.S. foreign political departments, disarmament problems were discussed in detail, including various aspects of the talks on strategic offensive weapons.

[Begin Shevardnadze recording] Here in the Soviet Union, a decision has been adopted to stop the production of rail-based intercontinental ballistic missiles by 1991, and corresponding corrections will be made in our negotiating positions. [end recording]

[Kostenko] In his turn the U.S. secretary of state said that the conversations largely concentrated on the problems of the Asian and Pacific region, and welcome those efforts which have already been undertaken in the direction of strengthening cooperation and mutual understanding in Asia, just as Mr. Shevardnadze and I have managed to do in Europe. At this meeting, James Baker said, we noted once again the progress made in the matter of strengthening Soviet-U.S. cooperation, the potential of which is still far from being used. We touched upon almost the entire complex of Soviet-U.S. relations.

Today the secretary of state left Irkutsk for Ulaanbaatar. At the airport he was seen off by comrade Shevardnadze, Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, and other officials. [video shows Shevardnadze speaking at the news conference, and Baker being seen off at the airport by Shevardnadze and others]

Prior to his departure for Moscow, the USSR foreign minister gave an interview for the “Vremya” program.

[Unidentified interviewer] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, briefly for the “Vremya” program, in what basic direction was progress made at this Irkutsk meeting? What have you noted?

[Shevardnadze] Essentially, we discussed many questions, many problems; in particular on this occasion we brought our bilateral relations to the forefront and economic problems, too; economic cooperation; technical assistance in the development of our national economy. [We discussed them] in a fairly detailed and thorough manner. So we came to an agreement that during his visit to Moscow—the visit will take place at the beginning of the middle ten days of September within the framework of the two-plus-four mechanism—he will come together with a large group of businessmen, the secretary of commerce, and other prestigious representatives. All these problems will be discussed in a more specific and detailed way. At our level there will be an organized meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich and this group, and this will mark the beginning of what one might call a serious move precisely in this direction, a coming together.

[Interviewer] The meeting was the 16th and a working one, so what kind of purely working results are there?

[Shevardnadze] It is a good thing that we have this practice of a working meeting, without all kinds of measures of protocol. We have not been wasting time on superfluous things. Generally we have been concentrating on the problems under discussion. We also had a very thorough discussion of certain regional problems, especially the Afghan question. I said today our positions are growing closer, there was a very intensive and interesting discussion on Cambodia and on the situation in the Asia-Pacific Region as a whole, and in other regions. Generally speaking, what was said at the summit meeting—to move over from interaction to partnership, the principles of partnership—this is being implemented in practice. Thank you.

[Interviewer] Thank you and good-bye. [video shows interview on airport runway and Shevardnadze and entourage about to board plane]

Moscow Radio on Achievements
LD0208172190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 2 Aug 90

[Report by Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, diplomatic correspondent, from the “Panorama” program—live]

[Text] Today in the plane to Moscow, Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze invited a group of Soviet journalists for a talk. Well, I asked him, what do you think is the main achievement of the Irkutsk meeting? We have our meetings very frequently, the minister said. The meeting with the secretary of state in Wyoming, where it was agreed to go from mutual understanding over to cooperation, was particularly significant in conceptual terms. A decision was made to go over the principles of partnership at the meeting of Presidents Gorbachev and Bush in Washington and Camp David. This is fundamental.

From the words of Comrade Shevardnadze one could gather that the meeting in Irkutsk has begun the stage of practical realization of principles of partnership. Although at the same time at least one agreement has been achieved that could be considered to be an agreement of a conceptual nature. I mean the high level of mutual understanding on the basis of the principled ascertainment that in Asia the USSR and the United States do not see each other as adversaries. This understanding was reached in Irkutsk. You will agree this is one more—and if you take into account the scale, significance and role of the Asian-Pacific Region, in the world—an extremely important acknowledgement of the unacceptability of East-West rivalry in the present situation. Before, the minister said, a dialogue over problems of the Asian-Pacific Region did not work out between us. In Irkutsk much has been achieved in this respect. A high degree of agreement emerged on Cambodia, and interesting trends on the Afghanistan issue have taken shape. We and the United States have some
ideas in common, the minister said. By the way, the Afghan issue was of heightened interest for the American journalists. Some people rushed to the conclusion that because President Najibullah had gone to the Soviet Union for a holiday he had virtually decided to emigrate. To completely rule out all false interpretations we tried to get an exhaustive reply from Eduard Amvrosiyevich. Najibullah, the minister said, has no intentions of emigrating. As for our relations they remain very kind, reliable, and good. These relations have withstood the test of time.

Najibullah is now doing a tremendous deal and really is reconstructing the country. Eduard Amvrosiyevich stressed that it was the Najibullah government that put forward the idea of holding free elections.

Summing up the discussion of the Asian-Pacific region Shevardnadze said: I think there will be some important ideas on how to reinforce stability and security in that region.

The journalists wanted to find out some details about the declared decision to cease the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles based on railway platforms from 1991. This, said the minister back at the Irkutsk news conference also alters things at the Geneva talks. Well naturally, we hastened to ask him in the aircraft in what way and how this alters things. The minister explained that the decision makes it possible to substantially simplify and reduce the cost of monitoring without prejudice to its quality.

We would probably have been bad journalists if we had not asked whether the date of the next Soviet-U.S. summit had been discussed in Irkutsk. That summit, said Eduard Amvrosiyevich, must produce a specific result. There is an accord that a treaty on strategic offensive arms should be prepared for it. Persistent work is now under way. A working group was recently set up at the deputy foreign minister level to work on the treaty. In Shevardnadze’s view that work might end in December or somewhat later. From what he said I got the impression that it’s too early as yet to specify the time and name the day, but we should not forget that as early as September Shevardnadze and Baker will be meeting again and more than once—first in Moscow and then in the United States. So, the work is proceeding very intensively and this cannot fail to bring success.

Meetings Considered ‘Success’
LD0208141390 Moscow World Service in English
1110 GMT 2 Aug 90

[Commentary by Yuriy Solton]

[Text] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker have concluded their two-day meeting in the Siberian city of Irkutsk. Here’s a commentary written by Yuriy Solton.

The two men discussed a wide range of issues—bilateral relations, disarmament problems, regional conflicts. Their work produced no sensation, but it was useful and yielded good results. In principle, all questions relating to the external aspects of German unification were considered. This will make it possible to draft a final document in mid-September, when the foreign ministers of West Germany, the GDR, the USSR, the U.S., Britain, and France gather for another two-plus-four conference in Moscow. This conference is likely to be the last.

Further progress has been reached also in the talks on 50 percent cuts in the two countries’ strategic offensive weapons. One more obstacle was removed: Eduard Shevardnadze told newsmen that on 1st January the Soviet Union will stop the production of mobile strategic missiles based on railway platforms, [as heard], and that before that none of such missiles will be placed on alert. The two ministers agreed to send corresponding instructions to their delegations working on a draft treaty in Geneva. The treaty itself is expected to be signed during the next Soviet-American summit, which was also discussed in Irkutsk.

Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker pointed to the need to do all in human power to prepare an agreement on cuts in conventional forces in Europe by November, when a European summit with the participation of the United States and Canada gathers in Paris. According to their communique the two countries have further narrowed their differences concerning settlements in Afghanistan and Cambodia. They still have some discord as to the ways to reach a truce in Afghanistan and prepare general elections under UN supervision, and in regard to powers to be exercised during the period of transition by President Najibullah and by the coordinating committee to be formed by representatives of the various Afghan political forces. But some progress was reached. We continue to narrow our differences, said Eduard Shevardnadze, and soon this will yield practical results. And Secretary of State Baker said that in the next few days Soviet and American experts will gather in Washington to discuss details of an agreement on Afghanistan.

The talks were productive also in the field of promoting Soviet-American ties. The two men reviewed the process of implementing the numerous joint ventures in such areas as the economy, science, peaceful use of outer space, culture, and environmental protection. Secretary of State Baker will join the economic negotiations to be held in Moscow in mid-September by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Robert Mosbacher.

In my view, writes Yuriy Solton in conclusion, the meeting in Irkutsk was a success. It reaffirmed mutual desire to engage in closer cooperation in different areas.
 Talks Reflect ‘New Thinking’
LD0208192190 Moscow TASS in English 1851 GMT 2 Aug 90

[By TASS political news analyst Askold Biryukov]

[Text] Moscow, August 2 (TASS)—The recent Soviet-American summit in Washington yielded fruit from the viewpoint of solution of not only global problems but regional ones as well. This was particularly characteristic of the talks between the two presidents at Camp David where Mikhail Gorbachev reaffirmed that the Soviet Union would seek further relaxation of tension not only in Europe but also in Asia, making full use of the factor of cooperation and partnership with the United States.

One may have no doubt that the recently-concluded meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Irkutsk will give a new impetus to the development of positive processes in the Asia-Pacific region.

During a joint news conference Shevardnadze said that the Soviet Union and the United States “do not view each other as adversaries any longer” either in Asia or elsewhere in the world.

Baker, for his part, said he saw no obstacles for cooperation between the USSR and USA to be less fruitful in Asia than in Europe.

There is a rather considerable positive potential for such cooperation, he said. As Soviet-American relations improve, there arise more favourable opportunities for a settlement of regional conflicts in various parts of the globe, Baker said.

It must be recalled that only recently it was precisely such conflicts that were the source of serious complications in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. In a confrontation atmosphere that reigned in Soviet-American relations previously, practically any regional conflict automatically led to increased confrontation between East and West.

At present, as shown by the fact that resolution of a number of conflict situations in the world, a different approach, based on renunciation of the view of regional conflicts as an object of rivalry between the two superpowers, is beginning to prevail.

The new thinking led the Soviet Union and the United States to the realisation of the need to bring about an end to these conflicts as soon as possible by political means, not on the battlefield.

It seems that the Shevardnadze-Baker talks were held in Irkutsk precisely from this point of view. On Afghanistan, for example, the positions of the two sides continuously draw closer together, which makes it possible to hope for the attainment of practical results in the near future, the Soviet foreign minister pointed out.

Shevardnadze also described as “optimistic and inspiring hope” the talk on Cambodia. The United States took a realistic stand with regard to the so-called coalition government. There has emerged a basis for cooperation among all progressive Cambodian forces, as well as for a dialogue with China, the countries of Indochina, and ASEAN.

There was also talk on the situation on the Korean peninsula, where reassuring trends towards a dialogue have also appeared.

Relations between India and Pakistan and other regional problems were also touched upon during the Soviet-American dialogue.

During the Irkutsk meeting, there emerged a novel view of big problems of the region, which makes it possible to hope for a better future for Asia and the Far East.

 Talks Viewed at News Conference
LD0208220990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 2 Aug 90

[Text] The Soviet and U.S. foreign ministers ended their meeting in Irkutsk today. Our diplomatic correspondent, Viktor Levin, reports:

[Levin] This was the 16th meeting between Eduard Amvrosyevich Shevardnadze and James Baker over the past 18 months. It began, in effect, to imbue with practical substance the principle of partnership arrived at by the Soviet and U.S. presidents during their meeting in Washington. Speaking at a news conference in Irkutsk, this is how Shevardnadze assessed the outcome of the meeting:

[Begin Shevardnadze recording] Here on Russian soil, on Siberian soil, the secretary of state and I have decided to render an account, to inform you of what we have been doing for the last one and a half days—as we have not prepared, this will be very improvised—and what we managed to discuss and where we ended up. In Irkutsk, Mr. Baker and I spent, as we have just worked out, almost 10 hours at the negotiating table. Irkutsk is an Asian city, and it is no coincidence that we decided to have a very detailed and very thorough discussion of issues connected with the Asian-Pacific region here. The venue of the meeting itself in many ways lends direction to it and made it possible to select one or two main subjects.

For all intents and purposes, it is the first time we have had such a detailed and I would say comprehensive discussion of what I would call the general problems of Asia and the Far East—the issue of stability in this region, of security in the Asia-Pacific region, of removing the military confrontation that still persists, and the possibility of bilateral and multilateral cooperation and interaction in this region.
So what were the results? A high degree of mutual understanding founded on the fundamental acknowledgement that in Asia too, the USSR and the United States do not regard each other as enemies. This is a general acknowledgement that was made in Washington at the summit and it really does extend to the Asian-Pacific region.

This dictates a new attitude toward all the huge problems of the region, and we are profoundly convinced that East-West rivalry has been recognized as an obsolete stereotype that is inapplicable in the new situation and the new environment.

We had a serious and detailed discussion about Afghanistan, as you expected, and indeed you asked about it every day. I cannot say that we achieved any breakthroughs in this respect, but our common view and the conclusion we reached is that our positions are growing steadily closer and one may hope that this will soon produce real results. As you are aware, we—the Soviet Union and the United States—are guarantors of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan; hence we have a responsibility and a need to interact in this most important area. We marked out a few promising specific avenues and our experts will get to work on these problems in the near future. Our conversation on Cambodia was tinged with optimism and hope. Since the United States has adopted a realistic position with regard to the so-called coalition government and has also made a number of substantial shifts, the basis for interaction among all progressive Cambodian forces has arisen, and also for dialogue with China, the countries of Indochina, the ASEAN, and so forth. I consider that Mr. Baker’s trip to these regions was very important. We have hailed the beginning of the U.S. dialogue with Vietnam. This is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, so, in this region also, encouraging trends are discernible. In the very near future it will be possible to reach a definite accord.

An exchange of opinions on the situation on the Korean peninsula has taken place. As you are aware, certain encouraging trends have started to develop there—the North-South dialogue. We now have full mutual understanding regarding the fact that we can assist the development of this very positive process.

I think that we will be able to discuss certain regional problems, regional issues, in particular the issue of the state of affairs in the Middle East, on the Horn of Africa, and certain others after the meeting with you. If there is something very interesting, we will find suitable channels to relay it.

On Europe: We are in Asia, but we talked about Europe. The main subjects were the settlement of external aspects of German unity. We intend to have a document of the Six—that is, of the two-plus-four mechanism—for the 12 September meeting in Moscow.

Further, the transformation of blocs and the institutionalization of the Helsinki process; the pan-European summit; the progress of the Vienna talks which should be concluded in time—we discussed these issues yesterday and this morning.

The question of our economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with the United States loomed large. Regarding our bilateral relations, we agreed on conducting a broadened forum with the participation of the secretary of state, the United States Departments of Commerce, and a group of businessmen in Moscow.

In Moscow a session of the joint intergovernmental trade commission will take place. I hope that the secretary of state will be available to take part in the work of this commission. An accord has been reached that the participants of the forum will meet Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, president of the Soviet Union.

As always, we talked about various aspects of negotiations on strategic offensive weapons. We talked about monitoring [kontrol] and a monitoring system. We have made certain adjustments on these issues, I mean the positions that have been put forward by our delegation. They are changing to a significant degree. They are changing in connection with the fact—I informed the secretary of state about this—that the Soviet Union has decided to cease the production of rail-based ICBM’s from 1991. Correspondingly, adjustments in our negotiating position will be made. We talked about chemical weapons and nuclear explosions. In Paris, Mr. Baker outlined certain issues directly connected to monitoring [kontrolem]. We have decided to react to all questions set in written form (?to) save time. As you know, an agreement was reached in Washington concerning a new summit. It is also known that this meeting will take place in Moscow. It was very important for us to agree on the timetable of preparations for this meeting and the plans for setting specific dates and stages for work at the various levels—the levels of ministers, experts, and so on. We drew up a timetable for the meeting, our meeting—I mean the meetings of ministers before the end of this year—and naturally at these meetings all problems relating to Soviet-U.S. relations and our interaction in various areas will be discussed and considered. Our conversations will continue.

I think that we are satisfied with the results of our talks and there are grounds to express satisfaction. They passed in a (?)fruitful), extremely good, and warm atmosphere. I shall let you in on a secret; yesterday we allowed ourselves to take it a little easy and enjoy the sights of Lake Baykal. I hope that you have managed to see it. If not, I strongly recommend that you go and have a look. It is a wonder of nature. I should like to say a sincere thank you to the leaders of the oblast and town and to the inhabitants of Irkutsk for such generous Siberian hospitality and the wonderful conditions for the work of our delegations.

Mr. Baker will confirm that the meetings were indeed surprisingly warm and direct. Yesterday, as well as
meeting Soviet citizens, we met a group of young Americans who are familiarizing themselves with Siberia and Lake Baykal, and studying Russian—wonderful, likeable youngsters.

Thank you. [end recording]

[Levin] James Baker then made a brief statement.

I think that what the minister said about successful efforts aimed at the development of cooperation and interaction in changing circumstances, and also our efforts at cooperation in Asia along similar lines to what is happening on the continent of Europe, said the U.S. secretary of state, is of the highest importance. Mr. Shevardnadze and I spent a lot of time discussing Asian problems, in particular regional conflicts in Asia. I am convinced, Baker continued, that in this sense the United States and the USSR have a solid potential of opportunities that could be used to reduce the scale of such conflicts, and that applies not just to Asia, but also the world as a whole.

In addition, Mr. Shevardnadze and I touched on practically all the main problems of arms control, including the possibilities of concluding a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons and the issues of nuclear tests, open skies, verification measures, the problems of chemical weapons, and so on. We welcome the USSR's decision reported to us by Mr. Shevardnadze, that in 1991 Moscow will end the production of mobile strategic rail-based missiles. This is particularly important because the United States essentially does not have such weapons, said James Baker. The ministers intend to have another tete-a-tete discussion.

The news conference did not last long. The questions—in the circumstances they were being put by the Americans—did not, I think, add anything new. The next meeting between the heads of the foreign policy departments of the USSR and the United States will take place in Moscow at the start of the middle ten days of September.

PRAVDA Gives Overview

PM0308091190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Aug 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Results of Soviet-U.S. Meeting in Irkutsk"]

[Text] USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker held a working meeting in Irkutsk 1-2 August.

It was conceived and took place as an in-depth exchange of opinions aimed, above all, at ascertaining the possibilities of cooperation and interaction in resolving common problems of the Asia and Pacific region and conflict situations at individual points in it which serve as a source of instability and tension.

The analysis of the situation was based on the political statement made at the highest level that the USSR and the United States no longer regard each other as military opponents. The ministers agreed that the new state of Soviet-U.S. relations resulting from this requires a fresh look at the sides' approaches to questions affecting the sphere of security and development in Asia and the Pacific basin. These can no longer be determined by obsolete stereotypes like East-West rivalry but must be viewed in the context of the historical, political, social, cultural, and other factors of a specific region and a specific country. It is only in this way that the real roots of the problems and the right ways to resolve them can be found.

The Soviet Union and the United States see it as their role, together with other countries, to promote the shaping of processes which have, in the long term, a regionwide nature and lead to the assertion of equitable, mutually advantageous relations based on a balance of interests, freedom of choice, and the democratic organization of the life of society in every country.

The two countries' ministers noted with satisfaction the trends that have recently become apparent toward an improvement in the situation in the Asia and Pacific region and toward a certain reduction in military confrontation there and in the military presence on foreign territories. These trends need to be supported and developed. To these ends the sides deemed it expedient to hold consultations on a regular basis on military-political aspects of the situation in Asia. It is intended that the assessments so obtained will be submitted to the United Nations and other international organizations and institutions by the foreign ministers of the USSR and the United States for examination and to determine the need for appropriate coordinated actions.

The two countries' cooperation will be aimed only at promoting the stability, cooperation, and well-being of all states in the Asia and Pacific region. The USSR and the United States intend to cooperate closely in these efforts with China, Japan, Canada, India, Pakistan, the ASEAN countries, and individual states and regional organizations.

As guarantors of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan, the Soviet and U.S. sides once again emphasized their desire to promote a speediest internal Afghan settlement by means of holding free and fair elections with due regard for Afghan traditions.

Such elections must be held under UN auspices and with very active participation by the United Nations. The ministers stated that their countries adhere to identical or compatible views on many other substantial elements of an internal Afghan settlement. They recognize the importance of establishing a transitional period and the expediency of forming a representative coordinating organ which could take on the organization of preparations for the elections and tackle certain other questions relating to the transitional period. Certain forces could
be transferred to this organ to ensure public order and to ensure the proper conditions for holding elections.

The ministers confirmed their intention to continue close consultations with all sides involved in the internal Afghan conflict and to help find compromise solutions to the outstanding questions connected with a settlement and the conditions for holding elections. They highly evaluated and supported the UN secretary general's efforts in this direction and stated their countries' readiness to give him all necessary assistance.

In the ministers' opinion, the USSR and the United States have not exhausted their potential in the matter of achieving an internal Afghan settlement. They voiced the hope that their countries will be able to achieve greater mutual understanding and a higher level of constructive cooperation in this matter of exceptional importance to peace and security.

At the talks in Irkutsk, great attention was devoted to the problem of a Cambodian settlement. The Soviet side declared that the recent change in the U.S. position, Washington's decision to abandon support for UN representation for the "coalition government" of Cambodia, and the call for the speediest convocation of the Supreme National Council create a new situation from the viewpoint of the possibility of achieving a realistic settlement of the Cambodian problem. It may now be said that there exists a basis for a settlement around which all Cambodia's progressive forces can rally.

The active and constructive work of the UN Security Council "five" and the dialogue among the USSR, the United States, China, the ASEAN countries, and the states of Indochina provide hope of the possibility of a decisive breakthrough in the matter of a Cambodian settlement.

The Soviet Union confirmed its readiness to establish direct contacts with N. Sihanouk if the U.S. representatives establish analogous contacts with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. The U.S. side promised to examine this idea positively. An understanding was reached that the "Khmer Rouge" must participate in future elections if they recognize the very principle of free elections and their results and renounce violence against the civilian population.

The question of the possible ending of weapons deliveries to all the warring sides in Cambodia by all countries was also discussed. The situation on the Korean peninsula, where, in the ministers' opinion, positive changes have become apparent, and also the situation in relations between India and Pakistan, were discussed in a constructive, businesslike manner. Certain other regional questions were also examined: the Near East, Southern Africa, the situation on the Horn of Africa, and Central America.

An examination of other traditional items on the Soviet-U.S. political dialogue agenda was continued at the ministers' meeting.

The U.S. side welcomed the reaching of accords between USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and FRG Federal Chancellor H. Kohl which fully accord with the positions of the states involved in the "two-plus-four" mechanism.

Developing the mutual understanding attained at the Paris session of the six countries' foreign ministers, E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker exchanged opinions on external aspects of the building of German unity. They concluded that good preconditions now exist for completing, in the main, the elaboration of a document on a definitive settlement in international law with Germany in time for the meeting of "the Six" in Moscow scheduled for 12 September.

Also noted was the importance of thorough preparations for the proposed summit meeting of the CSCE participants countries in Paris, whose holding, as is known, is linked with the signing of an agreement on conventional armed forces and arms in Europe. The ministers advocated the speediest commencement of practical work by Warsaw Pact and NATO member states to draw up a joint declaration on establishing relations of partnership and mutual understanding between them.

The USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state discussed a number of problems of arms reduction and limitation. In particular, after examining certain questions relating to the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms, the sides voiced their intention to give their delegations additional instructions aimed at accelerating work on its text.

During a discussion of questions relating to the Vienna talks, the ministers devoted attention to the problem of aviation. Various options for the approach to this problem at the first stage of the talks were examined. It was agreed to discuss these options with the participation of allies on both sides.

Proceeding from the bilateral agreement on ending the production of chemical weapons and destroying them, the sides discussed in a constructive spirit questions of its implementation and also of Soviet-U.S. cooperation in the course of completing work on a multilateral convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

The ministers expressed the intention to promote the speediest ratification of the protocols, signed at the highest level, to the 1974 and 1976 treaties limiting nuclear tests. There was also an exchange of opinions on the problems of "open skies," conversion, and others.

During a discussion of bilateral and transnational questions E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker advocated continuing the sides' efforts to further improve the treaty-legislative infrastructure of Soviet-U.S. relations and to seek new spheres and areas of mutually advantageous cooperation. The U.S. secretary of state was handed a memorandum noting promising spheres for bilateral cooperation, where, in the Soviet side's opinion, specific results and accords can be reached in the very near future.
An accord was reached at the time of J. Baker’s visit to Moscow in September this year he will be accompanied by U.S. Commerce Secretary R. Mosbacher and a group of leading representatives of U.S. business circles. The next session of the Soviet-U.S. Trade and Economic Commission, which will examine the state of affairs in the sphere of consultative-technical cooperation between the USSR and the United States, will also coincide with that visit. The Soviet side evaluated positively the U.S. Administration’s recent proposals in this sphere and noted their large-scale nature.

Joint interest was expressed in completing work on a number of accords in the trade and economic sphere, including agreements on mutual encouragement and protection of capital investments and on avoidance of double taxation. The foreign minister and the secretary of state touched on certain questions of human rights and humanitarian problems.

Proceeding from the accord reached at the talks in Washington on a top-level meeting in the Soviet Union, the ministers agreed on a schedule for their contacts geared to preparations for that meeting and on the organization of work at corresponding talks, as well as between various groups of the sides’ experts.

The talks were of a constructive and frank nature and were held in a warm and friendly atmosphere.

Chemical Troops Chief on Destroying Weapons

[Text] At the Soviet-American summit meeting in Washington two months ago, alongside accords on nuclear and conventional arms reduction, a very important agreement was signed on an 80-percent reduction in chemical arms, to be followed by an accord on their complete destruction. A real prospect of ridding the earth of the terrible arsenals of “noiseless death” has arisen. The USSR and the United States bear their share of responsibility for the creation of such arsenals. It is noteworthy that it was these two powers that took on the responsibility for their reduction and subsequent elimination. And this task is by no means as simple as it may seem. The safe destruction of chemical munitions is a far more complex problem than their manufacture. Colonel General S. Petrov, chief of the USSR Defense Ministry Chemical Troops, tells us about this today.

[Nikanorov] First, Stanislav Veniaminovich, I would like to clarify this point: How large are our country’s stocks of chemical weapons? Can you reveal this secret?

[Petrov] There is no secret about it. We announced at one time that our stocks total no more than 50,000 tonnes of chemical agents, by weight. Now I can give you a more specific figure—40,000 tonnes.

[Nikanorov] And what types of chemical agents are stored in our chemical arsenals?

[Petrov] I will simply list them according to the international nomenclature: VX, sarin, soman, mustard gas, lewisite, and a mixture of mustard gas and lewisite. That is a list of the substances that make up our chemical weapon stocks. I would like to take this opportunity to stress once again that they are stored exclusively on Soviet territory. The rumors spread by certain Western mass media to the effect that the Soviet Union supposedly has chemical weapons dumps on the territory of the GDR and other Warsaw Pact states are absolutely unfounded. Incidentally, the groundlessness of these fabrications was confirmed the other day by an authoritative group of Bundeswehr representatives who carried out an inspection of military stores and other facilities of the GDR National People’s Army, using the most up-to-date West German equipment. No indications of the siting of chemical weapons on GDR territory were detected, nor could they have been.

[Nikanorov] Is the dissemination of these rumors associated with the recently commenced operation “Lindwurm” (“Dragon”) to remove American chemical weapons from FRG territory?

[Petrov] I cannot rule out the possibility of a connection. The population’s fear of the “chemical dragon” is great. According to available figures, some 102,000 American artillery shells containing combat chemical agents are stationed on West German soil. It is quite likely that the assertions of the existence of Soviet chemical weapons on German soil were supposed to provide a kind of propaganda cover for this operation and divert the attention of concerned FRG citizens from the American chemical arsenals which still actually exist for the time being on the banks of the Rhine.

[Nikanorov] But let us come back to our own chemical weapon stocks. How is it proposed to eliminate them?

[Petrov] We already have some experience in this sphere. From 1970 through the present day, some 438 tonnes of various types of chemical weapons have been destroyed. We have a certain quantity of mobile installations for the destruction of chemical agents (in 1987 they were demonstrated to the participants in the Geneva talks on banning chemical weapons at our military facility at Shikhany). With the help of such installations it is, of course, possible to destroy insignificant quantities of chemical weapons. But the full implementation of the task facing us undoubtedly requires the construction of permanent facilities in accordance with all the rules of environmental conservation.

At the end of last year a large-scale facility for the destruction of chemical weapons was ready to go into
operation in the region of Chapayevsk. Modern technology was stipulated for this enterprise, technology whose ecological safety had been confirmed by the findings of interdepartmental and governmental commissions. But the publicity work patently was inadequate, and people were not convinced of the total safety of the facility. In view of the public protests, the Soviet Government decided to redesignate this facility as a production training combine for the training and education of cadres for chemical weapon destruction enterprises. Thus the Soviet Union does not yet have any permanent facilities of this type.

[Nikanorov] What is the solution?

[Petrov] One or even two or three departments is too narrow a framework to resolve this really statewide task. A draft State Program for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons in the USSR has now been drawn up. It is a substantial document of several volumes. It was drawn up with the participation of 18 ministries and departments, including, of course, the Defense Ministry. The draft, which takes account of our own and worldwide experience in creating such facilities, examines questions of ecologically safe techniques for the destruction of the chemical agents we have and argues the case for various possibilities for the siting and operation of such facilities. The last word here belongs, of course, to the Supreme Soviet. But in my view the most desirable option is to create one or two highly automated, safe, and ecologically clean facilities located in parts of the country where there is a low population density. According to preliminary estimates, about R3 billion will be needed. The Americans will be forced to bear comparable expenditure. Thus in the near future, despite some people's rather naive calculations, we can hardly expect a major financial benefit from disarmament. But in the long term this will indisputably be advantageous, and it is worth investing capital in it.

Very little time is left until the date agreed by the Soviet Union and the United States for starting the elimination of chemical weapons (no later than 31 December 1992). I would therefore like to submit a request to the Soviet state's highest legislative organ, to speed up the adoption of the State Program for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons in the USSR, and first and foremost to decide on the sites of construction of the facilities where these weapons will be destroyed.

[Berger] We keep talking about destruction. is it not possible to utilize the accumulated stocks of chemical weapons by converting them into, say, fertilizers?

[Primakov] In principle, of course, it is quite possible to use certain types of phosphor-containing chemical agents to produce fertilizers. But this product would be like gold dust in terms of its cost. And the quantity of possible output would be rather small on a countrywide scale, if you take into account the relatively small stocks of the original raw materials. Nor should the purely psychological aspect be disregarded. Given that in our day there is a widespread highly negative attitude even to comparatively harmless agricultural chemicals, people are hardly going to want to use fertilizers made from "chemical bombs." But the possibility of extracting arsenic from lewisite should probably not be disregarded. We are studying this problem carefully in conjunction with the Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry.

[Berger] And finally, one last question, the answer to which concerns many people. How safe is the implementation of these plans?

[Primakov] This is one of the main problems, and we do not lose sight of it for a moment. Concern for safety in effect runs right through the draft State Program, which makes provision for major expert ecological reports and repeated monitoring of the reliability of the enterprises' work. Incidentally, a substantial safety margin is built into the designs of these facilities in the first instance. In the course of calculations, appropriate models were used to run through all kinds of situations, however improbable, such as an aircraft or, for instance, a meteorite falling on the site. Calculations confirm that even in such exceptional circumstances disastrous consequences could certainly be avoided. Let me add that it is proposed to station not far from each such enterprise a suitably equipped and trained chemical troops subunit—a kind of "fire brigade," to monitor the facility's work and prevent incidents of any kind.

And in conclusion I would like to say that we intend to implement all measures to destroy chemical weapons in conditions of wide glasnost and openness. By the end of this year specific procedures should be formulated for carrying out mutual inspections of each side's fulfillment of its commitments. And not only the process of destruction of chemical weapons, but also the stockpiles stored in the dumps to await processing will be subject to verification. Naturally, we will provide wide information to the Soviet public on our activity in the destruction of chemical weapons. People will be able to see for themselves that the "chemical dragon" is safely under lock and key and that we will not let it break out.

President's Arms Proposal 'Overly Cautious'
LD0308143190 Moscow TASS in English 1413 GMT 3 Aug 90

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, August 3 (TASS)—President Bush supported the project to reduce the U.S. forces by 25 percent over the next five years. However, some participants in the debate on the military budget in the congress said that in the present conditions, when tension in international relations has eased, the measures planned by the U.S. Administration are overly cautious.

President Bush spoke in Aspen, Colorado, immediately after the House Armed Services Committee decided to appropriate for the military needs 24 billion dollars less
than the Pentagon requested. Congress demanded that
the administration discontinue the programme to manu-
ufacture B-2 aircraft bombers, cut appropriations for the
“star war” programme by almost half and halt the
production of mobile missiles.

Although recognising that the cold war is nearing an end,
Bush came out against recommendations by the congres-
sional committee on the U.S. strategic forces.

In his speech in Aspen, the President insisted that the
programme to manufacture 75 B-2 bombers be con-
tinued, that the construction of ten “Trident” subma-
rines, each with 288 nuclear warheads, be completed and
that the programme for new, smaller intercontinental
ballistic missiles be implemented.

Despite the fact that the Soviet Union decided to termi-
nate the production of mobile missiles as of January 1,
1991, Bush stated the U.S. intention to continue produ-
cing the powerful rail mobile intercontinental ballistic
missiles be implemented.

The President’s speech indicates that Washington
intends to continue with the “star wars” programme and
to deploy the ABM system, which is senseless from the
military viewpoint, when it is ready.

One gets the impression that the U.S. President has not
abandoned plans to involve the Soviet Union in a race of
costly space arms, which could negatively affect the pace
of the Soviet Union’s economic progress.

The intention to cut the U.S. Armed Forces is motivated
by the country’s balance of payments deficit and congres-
sional pressure. Nevertheless, a few years ago pro-
sals to cut U.S. Armed Forces by 25 percent over five
years would have been viewed by experts as futile
fantasies.

In view of changes taking place in the world the Presi-
dent’s programme advanced in Aspen could be more
radical. But even in its present form, it is heartening
evidence that the dated concepts of the cold war era are
being reassessed in Washington.

Problems in Chemical Arms Destruction Pondered
PM0608135590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Aug 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer Aleksandr
Golts under the rubric “Today: Problems, Opinion-
s”; “Difficult Start in Klausen”]

[Excerpts] A convoy of 80 heavy U.S. Army trucks
traveled 30 miles 26 July—from the village of Klausen to
the Army dump in Mizau [name as transliterated] in
West Germany’s Rhineland Palatinate. This convoy,
quite commonplace at first glance—lots of U.S. vehicles
travel around West Germany—-attracted attention not
only in the FRG but also throughout the world. After all,
the 15-tonne containers were carrying extremely dan-
gerous freight—chemical weapons. [passage omitted]

Thus, we are talking about a measure that is making an
important contribution to the strengthening of European
security. But here is a paradox. One would have thought
that members of the antiwar movements—those people
who have fought year in and year out to eliminate the
chemical weapons dumps on FRG territory—should be
pleased. But that has not been the case. On the contrary,
a number of public organizations and Bundestag deput-
ies have begun to protest and demand a legal ban on the
war gas shipments. What is at issue here? Alarm for the
safety of people in densely populated areas has given rise
to the idea that it is better not to touch the chemical
weapons dumps at all.

This is despite the fact that mega-strict security measures
have been taken and are being implemented with Teu-
tonie thoroughness. The first convoy was escorted by
1,200 policemen, along with several hundred
Bundeswehr servicemen and U.S. military specialists.
All the roads along the route were closed and even
aircraft flights were banned. But hundreds of trees have
been uprooted in Mizau. The organizers of the operation
even intend to rule out the possibility of some moldering
tree falling down.

It is not only people in the FRG, TIME magazine
reports, but also the authorities in Micronesia, New
Zealand, Western Samoa, and the U.S. state of Hawaii
that are displaying alarm. After all, estimates submitted
by the U.S. Army show that, if there is an accident while
the weapons are in transit at sea, the water within a
radius of at least 84 km will be subjected to chemical
contamination. The governor of Hawaii also doubts the
safety of the plant destroying the chemical munitions.
He has demanded 16-month tests on the entire complex.

As we can see, there are a considerable number of
problems. It is quite possible that they will increase
during the operation. However, it is a question of elimi-
inating barely one-hundredth of all U.S. war gas stocks.
At present another seven facilities, similar to the
Johnston complex, are under construction.

I suspect that when it comes to the point of eliminating
chemical weapons in the USSR, we will have the same
number of problems and protests. The fate of the Chapa-
veysk complex is convincing evidence of this. No one
likes “chemical death,” but nor does anyone want these
weapons to be destroyed in their back yard. We should
probably assess most attentively the operation being
carried out by the Americans. It is particularly important
that the U.S. and FRG military authorities have decided
in this difficult situation to lift the veil of total secrecy
and have tried to persuade the public that all safety
measures have been taken in reality, rather than just
verbally.

The beginning of the withdrawal of chemical weapons
from FRG territory also makes one think about more
general questions. Namely how complex the disarmament process is. After all, when we talked about problems previously, we were primarily referring to the difficulties involved in elaborating various agreements. However, it is now obvious that even consensus at talks and the signing of various documents are only part of the process. The implementation of these agreements requires organizational steps and financial means—quite considerable ones at that. Thus the elimination of chemical weapons has already forced us to develop new technologies for the construction of special capacities. All this runs into billions of dollars and rubles.

We cannot avoid this expense. The situation today is such that we are simply unable to freeze USSR and U.S. chemical arsenals and leave them until better times come along. The two countries' decision to eliminate chemical substances should be an incentive and example to other states. Mankind is increasingly distinctly encountering the possibility of chemical weapons being used in regional conflicts. Suffice it to recall the Iran-Iraq war and Iraq's and Israel's reciprocal threats. All this compels us to make haste.

There is often talk today of the "peace dividend"—that is, the money that has been saved as a result of disarmament and will be spent on people's needs. These discussions have generated considerable illusions. The world will, of course, obtain these dividends. Not in the next few years, only in the long term. At present we have to spend and spend in order to eliminate the material base of military confrontation and remove the threat of annihilation from mankind.

There will still be considerable difficulties and sacrifices. But the business of disarmament must progress.

Petrov Recounts Chemical Disarmament Progress
LD0408164590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1400 GMT on 4 August broadcasts a 10-minute talk by Colonel General Stanislav Veniaminovich Petrov, chief of the Chemical Troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense, who presents a textbook excursion into the history of chemical disarmament, with the USSR in the role of the protagonist.

In the mid-1980s, the USSR was the first to implement the idea of the new political thinking and put into practice the comprehensive concept of constructing a nuclear-free world by the year 2000. This concept is outlined in Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986. In 1987, the USSR suspended the manufacturing of chemical weapons.

Chemical security can be insured by concluding an international agreement on banning chemical weapons. With this aim, talks have been held in Geneva for more than a decade already. The talks have yielded some results. In addition, the USSR and the United States have started bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons.

In September 1989, a memorandum was signed on understanding existing between the two sides regarding the bilateral experiment on the verification [kontrol] and exchange of data in connection with banning chemical weapons. In 1990, Gorbachev and Bush signed a bilateral agreement on the scrapping and suspension of chemical weapons.

A state program for the elimination of chemical weapons has been drawn up; 18 ministries—including the ministries of railways, of environment, and of health—took part in it. The program envisages the development of ecologically safe operations geared toward the elimination of the USSR's chemical weapons reserves.

Petrov expands on the importance and problem of the environment. He then proceeds to talk about the duties performed by chemical troops: insuring the defense of troops from the chemical or nuclear weapons used by the enemy, and radioactive intelligence. Petrov proceeds to praise the performance of the chemical troops when eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident.

ABM Designer Sees 'Squandering' of Resources
PM0508192290 Moscow SOVETSAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 5 Aug 90 Second Edition p 4

[Interview with “Hero of Socialist Labor Grigoriy Kisunko, designer of the first Soviet ABM systems,” forming part of full-page feature prepared by V. Abramov; place and date of interview not given; published under the general heading “Money for Defense”: “Four Monologues on the Secrets of ‘Closed’ Science”—first two paragraphs are an editorial introduction]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Our interlocutor today is Grigoriy Vasilyевич Kisunko, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Hero of Socialist Labor, holder of a Lenin Prize, and general designer of the first ABM defense systems in the USSR.

Kisunko's opinions do not claim to offer all-embracing conclusions: He only talks about what he himself knows well, he only talks about one sector—albeit a major one—of the military-industrial complex. But his view is interesting precisely because it is an insider's view of our secret structures. Furthermore Grigoriy Vasilyевич's monologues—dramatic, sincere, full of heartfelt concern for the fate of scientific ideas—in themselves provide food for thought.

[Kisunko] [passage omitted] The absurd "projects of the century" show the effects of mutual cover-ups by people who realize that money has been wasted. In the presence of the top bosses, the clients praise the contractors, the contractors praise the clients, and everyone in unison praises the research itself. This general choronic harmony ensures that the product is accepted, if not into the armory, then at least for experimental operation.
A typical example is over-the-horizon radar stations. The idea of these—to record ballistic missile launches even on the territory of another hemisphere, with the help of short-wave radiation—is invalid in the first place. Even people who are not professionals know that short waves, reflected repeatedly from the earth and the ionosphere, produce a signal that is severely distorted and dirty. The pulse produced by a rocket flare is swamped by interference.

But adventurists, seizing on this idea that was slipped in from abroad, secured the creation of three over-the-horizon radar stations—in the vicinity of Nikolayev, Chernobyl, and Komsomolsk-na-Amure. More than R1 billion was spent and huge installations were built—hundreds of meters in length and height. And the result?

Curious, to put it mildly. The over-the-horizon radar “fans,” finding out in advance from the press or through other channels the date and time of a launch from U.S. territory, waited for the scheduled hour and reported through the appropriate channels that they had recorded a launch. A little while later, NASA would announce officially that the launch had been delayed for such-and-such a reason. Nonetheless, to this day military units are carrying out “experimental operation” of over-the-horizon stations. A cover story has emerged: We cannot detect launches of individual rockets, they say, but we will be able to detect mass launches. [passage omitted]

In the early seventies our people had the bright idea of “improving” the ABM defense system around Moscow on the model of the American “safeguard” system, which is designed to use nuclear charges to destroy missiles close to the targets it is protecting—superhardened ICBM launch silos. After all, a nuclear explosion nearby is nothing terrible for a silo! But in our country they decided to use a similar system to protect a city of 9 million people, and sited more than 50 nuclear antimissile missiles [protirovakety] on the perimeter of the belt highway. That is to say, they mined the capital in order to... defend it. And this in spite of the fact that as early as 1961 we had begun to use nonnuclear antimissile missiles on the testing range!

Incidentally, the “safeguardization” of the Moscow ABM defense remains a secret only to the Soviets. The Americans, not without irony, dubbed it the eighth wonder of the world. Mrs. Thatcher, in a Soviet television interview, was perplexed: “You are calling for a nuclear-free world, and yet you yourselves are installing new nuclear missiles under Moscow.” What can you say? This whole story looks particularly ridiculous in contrast to the successful work in the United States on creating ABM defense systems with nonnuclear antimissile missiles.

The dilettantes managed to make a substantial “contribution” to the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. With their consent, the Americans imposed on us a number of extremely disadvantageous provisions. For instance, the siting of missile attack early warning stations on the periphery of national territories. This forced the Soviet Union to relegate its radar stations to remote regions. Naturally, this “geography” required large additional expenditure.

And that is not all. After the adoption of the ABM Treaty we stopped the construction of a more economical and expedient radar warning system located around Moscow, although it was already half-built and was not contrary to the terms of the treaty. And so two 90-degree gaps were left in Moscow’s ABM radar field [v radiolokatsionnom pole PRO Moskvy]: one in the direction of Western Europe, and the other to the northeast. We tried to close these gaps with the Krasnoyarsk and Mukachevo radar stations, but instead, these stations themselves ended up closed. Now it only remains to pin our hopes on a warm climate in international relations. But however warm the climate may be, are such gaps in our defenses tolerable?!

Another problem (characteristic, incidentally, not only of closed research) arises when very competent people place the interests of their own “firm” above the state’s interests. They may be acting from good intentions: They are simply trying to introduce into production the brainchild of their own collectives, which often involve many thousands of people. But it is bad when the “brainchild” turns out to belong to yesterday’s science and technology.

In this way they introduced in our country peripheral radar stations in the one-meter radio-frequency band, suppressing the production of more sophisticated decimeter-band stations. That is the price of a victory for someone’s ambitions, backed by incompetence. [passage omitted]

It grieves me to see how indifference to the interests of the people and the state is gaining strength, while the decline in morality and incompetence lead to the squandering of our wealth. In the spheres I am familiar with, this is what happened with the dead-end avenue of work on creating a UHF weapon for ABM defense. This is based on the superficially tempting but technically absurd idea of destroying missile warheads not with antimissile missiles, but with focused radio waves in the ultrahigh frequency band.

I can understand the ignorant stubbornness and careerism of V.I. Markov, former deputy minister of the radio industry, who, having been given unlimited power in ABM defense and missile attack early warning systems, got the USSR involved in the Soviet “Safeguard,” in over-the-horizon radar, and in UHF weapons. But how can you explain the willingness of a number of scientists to conduct research on this topic, spending hundreds of millions of rubles on this research? After all, a UHF weapon that really works requires gigantic energy capacities, thousands (!) of times in excess of the total capacities of all the electric power stations on the globe. To milk the treasury for such an absurd idea is simply criminal!
However, the state forked out the money for the research, and civil and military scientific research institutes shared out this money between them. The institutes’ leaders initially misled the country, yielding to the temptation of benefits in terms of finance, expansions in staff, and the acquisition of equipment. Why did no one stop them? People were blinded by disinformation, even by pseudo-patents that arrived from abroad and were taken for the truth here. Years passed. In the event, instead of UHF weapons, we have nothing at all, at a cost of hundreds of millions of rubles.

I am sure that if such things had happened in the United States they would long ago have been the subject of special hearings in Congress. But what happens here?

I have also come across disinformation reaching the USSR about projects supposedly being implemented in the West. And this is the conclusion I have reached. Certain circles abroad skillfully manipulate the distortions in our organization of scientific and technical research and the production of weapons. They launch a ruinous canard in our direction, hoping that in the Soviet Union the mentality of the bureaucratic dilettante will do its job: “The Americans are not fools, they know what they are doing.” They also rely on the fact that there will without fail be some unprincipled person who takes up the rotten subject in the hope of being rewarded for scientific “audacity.”

I do not expect the disinformation to stop arriving. So our task is to identify it in time and prevent the thoughtless squandering of public funds. If we can establish rigorous personal responsibility, if we finally put an end to voluntarism, obsessive campaigns, and nepotism, if we place defense spending under the rigorous—and expert—supervision of the Supreme Soviet, if we make the sphere of secret work a battlefield for scientific ideas, rather than individuals competing for a place in the sun—then no disinformation will have any effect. [passage omitted]

General Petrov on Chemical Weapon Destruction
LD0608204907 Moscow TASS in English 2029 GMT 6 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow, August 6 (TASS)—Under the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the elimination and nonproduction of chemical weapons and on measures to promote a multilateral conventions on the full ban of chemical weapons, the two sides will begin to destroy chemical weapons not later than December 31, 1992, Colonel General Stanislav Petrov, commander of Soviet chemical troops, told the newspaper IZVESTIYA.

“Fifty percent of all chemical weapon stocks will be destroyed in each country by the year 1999. This will mean 20,000 tonnes of toxic agents for the Soviet Union and 15,000 tonnes for the United States.

“By the year 2002, not later than December 31, the two countries undertake to reach the minimum level of stocks—5,000 tonnes on each side,” he said.

The difference of 10,000 tonnes accounts for Soviet stocks of chemical weapons accumulated in the pre-war and war-time years. They are morally and physically obsolescent in the light of modern requirements, Petrov pointed out.

“The Soviet Union and the United States have parity as regards modern toxic agents—30,000 tonnes on each side. Way back in 1987 the Soviet Union officially announced a unilateral termination of the production of chemical weapons. The United States still continues to produce chemical weapons, moreover, a particularly dangerous variety of them—binary rounds.

“A draft state programme for the elimination of chemical weapons, the programme which is under consideration in the USSR Supreme Soviet, envisages five versions for the elimination of toxic agents.

“The versions differ from one another in amounts of toxic agents, in locations for the construction of disposal facilities, in capital investments and, respectively, by periods from the beginning to completion of the neutralisation of toxic agents.

“Only after the Soviet Parliament makes a decision to this effect, it will be possible to begin talks with local authorities and the population on the construction of chemical weapons disposal facilities.

“Expenses for the elimination will in many respects surpass expenditures for the development of the weapons,” Petrov said.

Slowdown in START Talks Due to Differences
LD0708175590 Moscow TASS in English 1735 GMT 7 Aug 90

[By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, August 7 (TASS)—Is it possible to finalise the elaboration of a Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty (S.T.A.R.T.) between the Soviet Union and the United States by the end of this year?

After the Soviet-U.S. summit in Washington it seemed that a solid foundation for the treaty had been laid. A number of complex problems that hindered the attainment of accord were resolved during the summit. At the time all that seemed to remain was the coordination of technicalities, a situation delegations in Geneva could easily resolve.

However, developments at the Geneva talks over recent weeks do not confirm this point of view. Work has practically ground to a halt due to differences on more than ten points.
The U.S. side demands larger cuts in Soviet heavy missiles than was agreed upon previously and on limitations on Soviet backfire bombers.

In addition, Washington's attempts to sever the connection between strategic offensive arms reduction and the observance of the ABM [Anti Ballistic Missile] treaty may become a serious hindrance at the talks.

The sides failed to agree on such issues as the possible use of nuclear warheads from dismantled strategic weapons, the transfer of U.S. armaments and military technologies to Britain, and measures to verify the observance of a future agreement.

Why did the decade-old debate suddenly gain new life at a time when the basic outlines of a new treaty have been formulated and virtually endorsed by President Gorbachev and President Bush?

Perhaps Washington's position has been influenced by those American circles that are interested in dragging out the finalisation of the treaty or "burying" it altogether.

There are ever more frequent calls in the United States, urging the administration "to raise the stakes" and seek changes in the already shaped accord, changes that would set greater limitations on Soviet missiles.

To follow this "advice" would mean to begin everything anew and to lose everything positive that has been achieved over many years through the efforts of the two sides.

The talks will not end upon the signing of the first treaty. The United States already agreed with the Soviet proposal to begin to discuss the possibility of elaborating a second treaty in order to give continuity to the nuclear arms reduction process.

The first treaty should be completed as soon as possible. Let it be a modest step, but it should make it possible to curb unlimited rivalry in the strategic field.

If Washington displays genuine interest in further cuts, it will have the opportunity to suggest them at subsequent talks. Moscow would fully support such an approach.

Karpov Remarks on U.S. Article on Arms Talks
LD0708205390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1800 GMT 7 Aug 90

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, by correspondent Viktor Levin on 7 August; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] The U.S. newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST has published an article on the progress of the Geneva negotiations on limiting strategic offensive weapons. The newspaper writes that the negotiations have practically ground to a halt. Our diplomatic correspondent Viktor Levin met USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Pavlovich Karpov today. Listen to an extract from the recording of their conversation:

[Begin recording] [Levin] The article in THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper has prompted a wide reaction in the world press, and I have noticed that even our friends from NEUES DEUTSCHLAND newspaper have drawn a very pessimistic conclusion on the progress of the negotiations on reducing strategic offensive weapons, on the basis of THE WASHINGTON POST piece. Therefore, I have this question for you. How far does THE WASHINGTON POST article correspond to reality, and how are the Geneva negotiations actually going?

[Karpov] I would say that the issues about which Geoffrey Smith writes are indeed being discussed at the Geneva negotiations. However, the interpretation is, of course, a matter for the author's own conscience. It is important to note the following: Time is indeed rapidly approaching the moment when the negotiations will have to reach an end and texts will have to be prepared for signing by the presidents of the USSR and the United States. There is less and less of that time remaining, and it has to be used effectively. From that point of view, we have serious complaints against the U.S. delegation at Geneva. It has to be said that they are working without taking account of what we regard as this time factor: slowly, vacillating, often citing their lack of instructions from Washington. Of course, that does not encourage progress.

As for the essence of the question, then yes, indeed, there are very serious questions connected with what I would call serious political problems. These are the question of noncircumvention of the agreement, the question of the deployment of strategic weapons on the territory of third countries, not only the territory of the USSR and the United States, but that of other countries too, and questions connected with verification. These questions are virtually the heart of what an accord will have to be reached on before we move on to the text of the treaty.

[Levin] Please, Viktor Pavlovich, say whether you consider it possible to draw up the treaty to a state where the presidents of the USSR and the United States will be able to sign it before the end of this year.

[Karpov] I would say that, all the same, such a possibility does exist. But this requires very energetic efforts, and this has been discussed now at the USSR foreign minister's meeting with the U.S. secretary of state in Irkutsk. [end recording]

[Announcer] The conversation with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov will be broadcast in full on All-Union Radio tomorrow.
Status of Arms Sales to Iraq Examined
LD0708130490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0230 GMT 7 Aug 90

[From the "120 Minutes" program presented by Yevgeniy Kiselev, with studio announcer Irina Mishina and Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and deputy director of the USA and Canada Institute]

[Text] [Kiselev] We have another interesting piece of information, namely that experts calculate that if the present levels of Soviet oil exports are maintained and the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict continues for a relatively lengthy period, the rise in world oil prices could, by the end of this year, bring about an increase of approximately $750 million in the volume of Soviet Union's foreign currency receipts. One nevertheless hopes that this war will end, and we will probably be willing to forego these $750 million for the sake of stability in the Near East.

And there is another topic we would like to discuss with you in more detail today. The fact is that for the first time in history, perhaps, in the course of the Iranian... sorry... the Iraqi-Kuwaiti changes thought undertaken by Iraq, a country with which the Soviet Union has friendship and cooperation. Furthermore, for the first time, the Soviet Union has officially and publicly issued a statement to the effect that it is stopping arms supplies to another country. This topic of Soviet arms supplies abroad is being commented on by virtually all analysts touching on one aspect or another of the problem of the Persian Gulf region conflict.

Regarding the role of the USSR in the world arms trade, we asked a specialist, an independent expert, so to speak, Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, deputy director of the USA and Canada Institute, to comment on this question. He is here with us in the studio.

[Mishina] Andrey Afanasyevich, I should like to start straightaway with a question. A few days ago, at a briefing in the USSR Foreign Ministry press center, I asked Gremtikh, deputy head of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, about the current state of contacts in the military sphere between the Soviet Union and Iraq. I was told, however, that the Foreign Ministry could not answer that, and I was advised to turn to a specialist. I should like to take the opportunity of putting that question to you now.

[Kokoshin] Unfortunately, we have no official Soviet data on our arms supplies to Iraq or to other countries, and people engaged in analyzing our policy, our military policy in respect of those countries in the Third World or in the world as a whole are compelled to make use of data adduced by various foreign organizations. According to this data, our supplies to Iraq are of course extremely huge. According to International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, for instance, the Soviet Union supplied Iraq with more than 70 percent of its current tank pool, about 60 percent of all the combat aircraft at Iraq's disposal. But it should also be pointed out that in addition to the Soviet Union, many countries supply arms to Iraq: France, Brazil, Italy, FRG, Austria, South Africa. And the Soviet Union's share in arms supplies to Iraq shrank to almost half in the 1980s, according to the data from that same institute, as the other countries increased their proportion.

[Kiselev] And what does this institute estimate the total volume of the Soviet arms trade to be?

[Kokoshin] One should regard these estimates with a great deal of caution, you know, because they are calculated on the basis of certain physical volumes which are then converted into dollars according to world market prices. According to all the estimates by foreign research centers, though, the Soviet Union has for a number of years been firmly at the top of the world list of arms suppliers.

[Mishina] Andrey Afanasyevich, do the ends always justify the means? Are the political dividends you receive as a result of backing certain regimes always great?

[Kokoshin] No doubt, you know, this is different in each case. Overall, I have to say that I think our costs—if one takes arms supplies to the Third World, the political costs—have for a long time at least been comparable to the dividends. It should be borne in mind that our policy on major arms deliveries began at a time when the process of national liberation movements was still active. That process has now, in its traditional expression, come to an end and did so long ago, while the supplies are provided to an ever greater degree on a purely commercial basis. They do, of course, on occasion provide us with considerable economic benefits but sometimes they result in losses since many supplies are made on the basis of credits and the credits are not then backed by those in receipt of our arms. I should like to say that the case of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, the invasion of Kuwait, has once again thrown light on the need for a very serious and profound reconsideration of our obligations to the Third World....

[Kiselev, interrupting] You know, in connection with....

[Kokoshin, interrupting] ...which was due long ago.

[Kiselev] I should like to draw attention to the following point. To start with: debt. IZVESTIA did not say that all of this debt consisted of arms supplies. We can, however, presume that the debt for arms supplies amounts to a sizeable proportion. And here is a curious fact: In an interview with the correspondent of DELOVYEE LYUDI [Business People] magazine, a new magazine being published in our country, the deputy USSR minister for foreign economic relations was asked how close to reality is the fact that according to certain sources, of the almost 90 billion rubles owed the USSR by other
countries, almost half is for supplies of military hardware that have not been paid for. Here is what Admiral Grishin, the deputy USSR minister for foreign economic relations, said in reply, answering, one must assume, the question on arms supplies from the magazine correspondent: What do you want? Another outburst of emotion among the public? It would be an information bomb—those are literally his words—if my answer is to the point. A second point. That was me trying to comment on what you have said. The second question is for you: To what extent are we governed by moral principles, do you think, when we supply this or that regime with arms?

[Kokoshin] You know, I'll start perhaps somewhere else. It is inevitable that that bomb will explode. Specialists from various fields need to be sitting down now and investigating the situation that has arisen regarding our arms supplies. Unfortunately, it seems to me that so far not even the Supreme Soviet or its committees have approached this matter. This state of affairs cannot continue. As for morality or amorality, yes, we have undoubtedly proclaimed new principles in our foreign policy and we are trying to stick to them. In general, we are doing so in the majority of directions. Here, however, in this direction, I think we still have vast, untried possibilities and unresolved tasks.

[Mishina] [Words indistinct] IZVESTIA carried an article about particular criticism of the Soviet Union's foreign policy, which said that we are often late with a specialist appraisal of regimes that have discredited themselves. Do you agree with this?

[Kokoshin] You know, I would put it like this, that we are late in general with a review of our relations with a great many countries of the world. If we have reviewed our relations fairly successfully with the developed capitalist world, when it comes to the Third World zone....

[Kiselev, interrupting] Evidently, reconsideration of these relations remains to be done.

[Kokoshin] That's right. And in spite of all the attempts by a number of scientists, for instance....

[Kiselev, interrupting] ...to raise this problem.

[Kokoshin] Right, to raise this problem, no headway is being made here.

[Kiselev] Well, Andrey Afanasyevich, you know, we may well bring you back once again, if you accept our invitation again and come onto our program. Thank you for your interesting comments. The time allocated for our conversation is now running out....

[Mishina, interrupting] We've got about nine minutes left.

[Kiselev] ...and our program is coming to an end. So thank you once again, and I think we will meet again.
For the time being there is parity between the USSR and the United States in terms of modern toxic substances. Each side has 30,000 tonnes. Why “for the time being”?

Because back in 1987 our country officially announced a unilateral halt of the production of chemical weapons and, as is well known, is strictly adhering to this commitment. The United States is still producing chemical weapons, and this includes particularly dangerous weapons such as the binary variety.

[Litovkin] Stanislav Venyaminovich, I would like to turn our conversation back to the prewar and wartime stockpiles. You said that these weapons are not just obsolete but also outdated. Why are they going to be destroyed only now instead of having been destroyed earlier? After all, the danger of an accident or some other disaster is only increasing with each passing day.

[Petrov] In those distant years, these weapons were made in such a way that they can still be stored for a long time with an absolute guarantee of safety. Indeed, believe me, we are protecting them very reliably from any accident. But why did they not start destroying them earlier?

There is probably no need to recall the international situation immediately after the war. Peace was then hanging by a thread, and it was not deemed expedient to part with such a fearsome “deterrence weapon” as it would now be called. Another aspect is that we reached parity with the Americans in the mid-1980’s, and it was then that the question of the elimination of old stockpiles arose, but there was no technology for destroying chemical weapons at that time. It was still at the development stage.

[Litovkin] What is the plan for the destruction of toxic substances?

[Petrov] An interdepartmental commission for elaborating a state program for the destruction of chemical weapons was created by a government decision at the end of 1989. It was submitted for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet in April of this year. Its draft envisages five options for the elimination of toxic substances which differ as regards the number and the siting of facilities for elimination; the amount of capital investments; and correspondingly, the timing of the beginning and completion of the neutralization of toxic substances.

In the elaboration of this program, scientific methods were used primarily in questions relating to the safety of the population; ecological systems; flora and fauna; marine life; and the forests, fields, and reservoirs. The population density in various regions was taken into account as was the presence of arable lands; plantations; railroads; gas, oil, and other commodity pipelines; air routes; the nature of the wind rose; and other indicators. Suffice it to say that over 300 scientists from various scientific research institutes have worked on the projects.

Only after a USSR Supreme Soviet decision has been adopted can we start holding talks with local organs of power and the population about the construction of facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons.

[Litovkin] People are alarmed about being provided with guarantees for their personal safety and the safety of the environment....

[Petrov] We ourselves desire such safety. The fact that the technology developed by the USSR Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry envisages a two-stage process for destroying our weapons serves as a guarantee of this. Incidentally, these norms are much tougher in our country than in the United States or the FRG.

[Litovkin] And the last question. Will the process of the destruction of chemical weapons need further capital investments?

[Petrov] Undoubtedly. The expenses involved in eliminating weapons are much higher than the cost of making them. But this is the price of disarmament, the price of trust and peace, when all is said and done. Mankind has to pay it.

But we can return some sums by reducing lewisite into arsenic trichloride, and then into arsenic of the highest purity which is used in the electronics industry. The conversion of our production is envisaged in a technical project specification.

But the main task today is to reduce military tension between East and West as much as possible. I believe that the agreement signed in Washington is a great step forward toward zero level.

Continuing Significance of ABM Treaty Argued
LD0908100490 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Aug 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major General V. Kuklev: “Not a Fortuitous Question: Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction and the ABM Treaty”]

[Text] The recent Washington summit meeting between the Soviet and American presidents marked an important stage toward concluding fundamental treaties in the sphere of reducing and limiting armed forces and armaments. The joint statement on the strategic offensive arms treaty issued during the course of it indicates the solution of the most complex problems, which had been the subject of disagreements between the sides, and the possibility of preparing this treaty for signing before the year is out.

The sides’ attitude to compliance of the 1972 ABM Treaty is the key issue in determining the entry into force of the treaty on strategic offensive armaments. The Soviet side has proceeded from and continues to proceed from the premise that the treaty on reducing and limiting
strategic offensive arms may operate only in conditions where the ABM Treaty is observed in the form in which it was signed in 1972.

So what is the problem here? Are we not placing artificial obstacles in the way of one of the most significant agreements aimed at substantially reducing Soviet and American strategic arsenals?

The question of the interconnection between reducing strategic offensive arms and limiting ABM systems was examined by both sides as early as the SALT I talks and its agreed solution was enshrined in the 1972 Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems. The preamble to the treaty reads: "...effective measures to limit antiballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons." The deployment of ABM systems for defense of the territory of the country and the creation of a base for such a defense are not allowed under the basic articles of the treaty. Other limitations are also stipulated, in particular, the creation, testing, and deployment of ABM systems or components thereof which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based are banned.

By signing the unlimited-duration ABM Treaty, the United States and the USSR acknowledged that the sides' voluntary renunciation of the possession of large-scale ABM systems is a very important condition for maintaining strategic stability, decreasing the strategic arms race, and reducing the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. Here, the following factors were taken into account:

First, both sides came at that time to the general conclusion that if one of them deployed an ABM system the potential of the other side to deliver a counterstrike was thereby reduced. This would force it to take measures to restore the effectiveness of its own strategic offensive systems, for which purpose it could follow the path of additionally building up strategic offensive arms or creating and deploying its own ABM system, or employ both approaches. As a result there would be a strategic arms race inspired in two direction simultaneously—offensive and defensive—with all the ensuing adverse consequences.

Second, both rightly considered that the deployment of a large-scale ABM system could induce in the side which had already carried out the said deployment a sense of confidence in its invulnerability to a counterstrike and as a result the temptation to use strategic offensive systems against the other side—that is to say, to carry out a first nuclear missile strike against it.

Mindful of these considerations and of the fact that neither the USSR nor the United States had yet deployed a large-scale ABM system to defend the territory of the country, the sides availed themselves of the historic opportunity and concluded the ABM Treaty, thereby creating a basis for limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms.

However, the United States later moved away from recognition of the organic interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive arms. They began implementing the SDI program, the ultimate objective of the work in this sphere being to create an ABM system for the country's territory with space-based elements, and proposed in this regard that the ABM Treaty be replaced with a new agreement geared toward creating and deploying large-scale ABM systems. In an attempt to justify its departure from previously agreed principles, the American side now claims that the joint transition by the USSR and the United States to a regime of strategic relations "with greater reliance upon defense" is useful, that ABM systems are "weapons against the warheads of strategic ballistic missiles rather than people," and so forth.

Unbiased analysis, however, shows that the mutual understandings developed by the sides in 1972 regarding the role of the ABM Treaty in curbing the arms race and strengthening strategic stability also hold true today. In fact, they are becoming increasingly relevant.

The main "theoretical" thesis of the advocates of large-scale ABM systems in the United States nowadays is that the parallel creation and deployment of such systems will not lead to the problem of an arms race because both sides will possess ABM systems. Moreover, the deployment of ABM systems will allegedly devalue strategic missile armaments and render them useless. The mistaken nature of such views becomes obvious once you bear in mind that even with the parallel creation and deployment of large-scale ABM systems, because of the practical impossibility of reliably assessing and comparing the effectiveness of such systems, objective incentives for both sides to build up their strategic potential persist. The point is that differences in the effectiveness of ABM systems, even insignificant ones, lead to a substantial upsetting of the strategic balance. To avoid emerging the loser, each side will seek to enhance its strategic potential by quantitatively building up and qualitatively improving both its defensive and offensive systems. Such a situation does not and cannot create a basis for further cuts in strategic offensive arms.

There also persists the danger that one side, in developing its ABM system, will come to believe in its "impunity" if it delivers a first strike. Moreover, with both sides deploying large-scale ABM systems the situation becomes extremely unstable, as the side launching a preemptive strike obtains an advantage. Yet it is obvious that strategic balance and stability and the certainty of achieving them which the sides need can be assured without vast expenditure of material and intellectual resources on ABM systems, and in a simpler and more reliable way, by carefully regulated strategic offensive arms cuts.
Thus the question of ABM Treaty compliance is not being raised by us at the Geneva talks fortuitously. I would remind you that back in September of last year the Soviet side, in an endeavor to prevent any hampering of preparation of the treaty on limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms, stated its readiness to sign and ratify this treaty even if an accord on the ABM problem is not achieved by the time the drafting of the treaty by the sides was completed, but the sides would continue to observe the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972. This Soviet decision has opened up the way to the signing of a treaty on strategic offensive arms.

At the same time the ABM Treaty retains its significance as the basis for the maintenance of strategic stability and as a condition for the implementation of accords on reducing strategic offensive arms. And if one of the sides were to breach the ABM Treaty this could threaten the other side's supreme interests and entitle it to withdraw from the treaty on strategic offensive arms. The retention and strengthening of the ABM Treaty is in the objective interests of the USSR, the United States, and the whole of mankind and creates the necessary basis in international law for subsequent steps to reduce armaments and strengthen strategic stability.

Chernyshev Views U.S. Stance on SS-18's
LD0808102990 Moscow TASS in English 1011 GMT 8 Aug 90

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, August 8 (TASS)—Soviet heavy missiles, known in the United States as SS-18s, are being used by Washington at the Geneva talks as an excuse to block an early formulation of a treaty on cuts in strategic offensive arms. It should be said that the stand of the U.S. Administration in this matter seems strange and illogical.

The Soviet Union agreed to cut by half those weapons in strategic nuclear potential that cause special concern in the United States—the number of SS-18 missiles will be cut from 308 to 154. The total number of warheads on ballistic missiles and the payload of ballistic missiles will also be reduced.

In addition, Moscow agrees not to install SS-18 missiles on mobile launchers and not to replace them with any new type of heavy missiles. The Soviet Union thus agrees to considerable restrictions on its heavy missiles.

U.S. representatives view this as one of the most important achievements at the talks. Thus, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, speaking at the hearings in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that not a single system will be subjected to so tough restrictions as SS-18 missiles.

He said that the Soviet Union's ability to modernise SS-18 missiles will not offset the 50 per cent cuts. He said that when the treaty goes into effect, Soviet heavy missiles, even after modernisation, will be "less menacing" than prior to the reduction.

It would seem the Soviet Union has done its utmost to ease the anxiety of the partners in the talks over the strike potential of Soviet strategic offensive forces.

Nevertheless, contrary to the obvious fact recognised even by Washington, U.S. negotiators in Geneva continue to demand further limitations of Soviet heavy missiles.

If Washington is really interested in an early drafting of a treaty on strategic offensive arms cuts, it should stop making ever more demands, especially in view of the fact that the statement about the future talks records the Soviet promise to discuss heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles during subsequent talks.

Karpov Discusses U.S. Article on Arms Talks
LD0808151890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1115 GMT 8 Aug 90

[Text] [Correspondent Viktor Levin] We offer for your attention a conversation with Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, USSR deputy foreign minister. Viktor Levin, diplomatic correspondent, is the presenter.

The article in THE WASHINGTON POST, which opines that the Geneva talks on reducing strategic offensive arms have practically ground to a halt, is the immediate reason behind this interview. Proceeding from this article, I asked Comrade Karpov to elucidate the essence of the matter. The first question I put to him during our conversation went like this: To what extent does THE WASHINGTON POST article correspond to reality, and how, indeed, are the Geneva talks going?

[Begin recording] [Karpov] I would say that the issues about which Geoffrey Smith writes are indeed being discussed at the Geneva negotiations. However, the interpretation is, of course, a matter for the author's own conscience. It is important to note the following: Time is indeed rapidly approaching the moment when the negotiations will have to reach an end and texts will have to be prepared for signing by the presidents of the USSR and the United States. There is less and less of that time remaining, and it has to be used effectively. From that point of view, we have serious complaints against the U.S. delegation at Geneva. It has to be said that they are working without taking account of what we regard as this time factor: slowly, vacillating, often citing their lack of instructions from Washington. Of course, that does not encourage progress.

As for the essence of the question, then yes, indeed, there are very serious questions connected with what I would call serious political problems. These are the questions of noncircumvention of the agreement, the deployment of strategic weapons on the territory of third countries, not only the territory of the USSR and the United States, but that of other countries too, and questions connected with
verification. These questions are virtually the heart of what an accord will have to be reached on before we move on to the text of the treaty.

As far as the noncircumvention of the treaty is concerned, we cannot allow a situation where the United States has an unlimited right to let anyone have its strategic arms.

[Levin] But do they have such a wish?

[Karpov] It may well be that they have no such wish. But as for renouncing, in writing, the existing agreement with Britain on cooperation in the field of strategic arms, here the United States is not yet ready to do this. We understand that the question concerning certain elements of cooperation with Britain in the field of strategic arms has been shaped by history and goes back as far as the time of the war, when the British let the Americans have all their secrets in the field of making an atomic bomb, and the British regard themselves as joint creators of U.S. nuclear arms. Cooperation has been continuing ever since that time. The cooperation between the United States and Britain now has the form whereby the Trident missile systems get handed over to the British. To begin with, these were the Trident-I systems. Now, in the nineties, the Trident-2 system is in the offing. We do understand that it is, in general, surely impossible to tear up this agreement which has been concluded; and we are ready to take this element into account. However, we must have clear guarantees that, apart from the Trident, the United States will not hand over any other strategic arms either to Britain or to anyone else.

For our part, we are ready to take upon ourselves identical obligations, either within a treaty or in connection with a treaty; therefore, the ball is now in the United States’ court. However, this question is so serious that I cannot imagine the treaty being concluded if the United States fails to take upon itself appropriate obligations in this connection.

As for the questions of deploying strategic arms on the territory of the third countries, here, too, there are serious differences. Our view is that during the period of reducing strategic arms, the entire arsenal of strategic weapons, both on the territory of the United States and the Soviet Union and beyond the confines of their territories—if such weapons are deployed beyond the confines of these territories—should be open to verification. Subsequently, when the reduction process has come to an end—that is to say toward the end of the seven-year period during which the treaty is in force—strategic arms should be deployed only on the territories of the USSR and the United States. Well, as far as this question is concerned, there is no accord as yet here either, and the United States is dragging its feet, prevaricating, and the question is not for the time being being tackled.

[Levin] Does one have here in mind the United States’ intention to deploy certain types of nuclear weapons on the territory of what is now the Federal Republic of Germany and what tomorrow will be the united Germany, if only in its western part?

[Karpov] Naturally we cannot rule out any developments of events if appropriate treaty guarantees fail to materialize. This is precisely why we are striving for such types of guarantees. The questions of verification are, of course, questions connected with making sure that both the United States and the Soviet Union are confident that all provisions of the treaty will be observed. It is within this context that it is important not only to create a system of verification, but it is also important to safeguard a system of eliminating weapons over and above the permitted ceilings and to safeguard verification over this, one which would ensure a situation in which it would be impossible—as is, for instance, proposed in the U.S. position—to simply stockpile missiles, subsequently to use them for any purposes, including, let us say, for testing the SDI system or for taking arms into space. A decision of this kind naturally makes completely worthless the limitations and reductions which could be provided for in a strategic offensive arms treaty. That is why what we support is that it must be clearly stated that weapons above and beyond the permitted quantities will be destroyed in accordance with procedures agreed upon and subject to strict verification. Some proportion of missiles, a very limited proportion, one that has been agreed upon and one that has undergone modifications, can be used to put peaceful cargo into space, but certainly not weapons. This we can agree to. But, if the United States insists on using missiles removed by it from alert duty to test antimissile systems in space or for other purposes of militarizing space, then this will be a profanity.

[Levin] Viktor Pavlovich, please tell me, as far as I understand the speed with which things are moving in Geneva leaves something to be desired. Are there any hopes for speeding things up? Can the Soviet Government’s decision to stop, from 1991, the production of ICBM’s on rail Flatcars serve as a factor for speeding things up?

[Karpov] We made this decision precisely because we wanted to make it easier to resolve the questions connected with these systems at the talks, the questions connected with verification, and so on. That is why we count on a positive response on the part of the United States after it studies this proposal. But the possibilities for speeding things up are, of course, connected with the solving of the questions I have already mentioned and with the solving of what I would call questions of technical nature, for this is what they are called. But these are essential questions, because they are connected with the procedures for eliminating the arms above and beyond the permitted numbers and with the procedures of carrying out verification. Here, there are very many questions each of which demands, I would say, an original solution. What is needed is not copying of the verification system agreed upon for the medium-range missiles treaty, but the working out of an effective and, at the same time, an original system for this treaty. After
all, where the medium-range missiles treaty is concerned, there were just over 200 facilities subject to verification. Where the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty is concerned, there will now be some 2,500 facilities subject to verification. You can imagine how many times the body of inspectors must be increased, as well as how much more it will cost to have the inspectors travel and be lodged, to make sure that they have the equipment they need and so on. In other words, the task is being made more complicated many times over. But is it really necessary to just mechanically increase the number of groups of inspectors and the number of inspections? Surely not. There are surely specific aspects within this treaty which make it possible to have a multitude of various methods of verification combined. This includes verification from space by satellites, verification by groups of inspectors, verification also with the aid of the appropriate technical instruments on the ground, done in such a way that it will be possible to effectively ensure the confidence of both sides that the treaty is being observed and, at the same time, that money is not poured down the drain just to increase tenfold the number of trips by inspectors, trips that may turn out to be redundant altogether.

[Levin] Viktor Pavlovich, please tell me whether you think it possible to still work out a treaty this year?

[Karpov] This is what I would say: That, all the same, a possibility like this exists. But very vigorous efforts are needed for this. And this was discussed in Irkutsk during the meeting between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state. Certain additional measures were adopted to speed up the discussion of the issues and to bring to the fore the most complex problems requiring solution now. This is so that it may be possible, during subsequent meetings between the ministers, to have these issues resolved and, finally, to sum up the results and do all the i’s during their meeting before the meeting of the presidents. This is the task that has been set. Let us now try to resolve it through, of course, joint efforts, that is how it must be done.

[Levin] I have no doubts that the Soviet side’s intentions are sincere. Can the same be said about the U.S. side?

[Karpov] I think that, as the English put it, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. During the course of the talks, during the additional contacts and meetings between the ministers we, too, will surely be able to convince ourselves at long last of whether or not the U.S. side is indeed ready to have the treaty ready for signing this year.

[Levin] In your view, when will this be clear enough for one to be able to draw definite conclusions?

[Karpov] If the presidents’ meeting for the signing of this treaty is planned for the end of this year, say in December, then around the end of October the treaty should be ready in rough outline. This is because very tedious but also very important and necessary work is needed to have the text edited to ensure that all its provisions are in keeping with one another. I think a month, or maybe a month and one-half is needed for this work.

[Levin] Thank you very much. [end recording]

Grinevskiy Sees ‘Tough Test’ in Vienna Talks
LD0908210390 Moscow TASS in English 2051 GMT 9 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, August 9 (TASS)—The ongoing round of the Vienna talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe will be the longest at the forum. Twenty-three participants in the talks from the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, determined to settle remaining problems and prepare a final treaty for the forthcoming European summit in Paris in November, have decided to scrap their vacations and retire only for a short, “technical break.”

Painstaking everyday work to prepare negotiated formulations is producing tangible results. According to some estimates, more than 30 per cent of the treaty’s final text has been agreed upon, as well as nearly half of the protocol on inspections and other documents.

The agreement reached on tanks in Europe has given rise to hopes for a quick settlement on disputed issues.

Major political developments, including the London NATO summit, West German Chancellor Kohl’s visit to the Soviet Union and talks with President Mikhail Gorbachev and the Paris two plus four meeting of foreign ministers, gave rise to more hopes.

However, the one and a half months that passed since the resolution of the problem of tanks and armoured vehicles have failed to produce equally tangible results.

The talks stagnated and there is now a threat of a deadlock.

This suits no one, according to negotiators from different countries.

German unification has offered a chance to bridge the rift in Europe. However, the process spawned several problems, including in the context of the European Security, that should be considered and reflected in the Vienna Treaty.

Efforts to link limitations on the united Germany’s armed forces with the negotiating process are one of these problems.

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed last month to limit these forces to 370,000 men within the next three to four years, chief Soviet negotiator Oleg Grinevskiy told TASS.
"Our specific task is to translate the agreement into the legal language in the framework of the Vienna talks," he said.

"This is a complex, delicate issue, that will require time and inventiveness," he said.

The united Germany, its membership in NATO and Soviet withdrawal from central Europe create a new situation in the region, he went on.

A question arises how to coordinate these changes with the framework of the regional division in central Europe and subdivide regional sublevels between two groups of member-states, he said.

The role of the principle of sufficiency of forces for a single country, limited under the treaty, is becoming even more important, he said.

"We also face several major problems from the previous stages of our talks," he said.

Aviation is one of them. The debate on the issue has been long and difficult, but has led to some progress. The sides have agreed on certain positions, giving rise to hopes for a possible solution, he said.

The remaining part of the current round will be a tough test for participants in the Vienna talks, Grinevskiy believes.

It will test their professional skills, flexibility, their ability to cooperate with partners and their capitals and take tough but vital decisions, he said.

"In this situation it is especially important to realise that we pursue a common cause and bear equal responsibility," he said.

Commentary Calls for ‘Preserving’ ABM Treaty
LD0908191690 Moscow TASS in English 1906 GMT 9 Aug 90


Why did Cooper need to make statements in this vein? In its work on SDI, which envisages building a large-scale anti-missile system, the Pentagon seems to have approached the point where the planned tests of weapons will constitute a direct violation of the ABM Treaty. This treaty begins seriously to stand in the way of the U.S. Defence Department.

At the same time, it is obvious that the SDI programme found itself on the threshold. Disputes about the programme in the United States have assumed a political nature.

Recent events such as sweeping changes in the Soviet Union and in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation as a whole, the erosion of the enemy image and the reality of reaching an agreement on drastic reductions in strategic offensive armaments at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva are crossing out any reasons for building strategic defence systems.

The popularity of SDI among Americans has nosedived. Attitude to this programme at the U.S. Congress has also become more critical. It is increasingly difficult for the Pentagon to push through appropriations for the project.

Small wonder, in these conditions Cooper is out to find some new reason for keeping work within the SDI framework going and for revising the ABM Treaty. But they look, to put it mildly, unconvincing.

Take, for instance, the argument that technical advances made during the development of the SDI systems will give the United States extra trump cards at talks with the USSR. But talks from the position of strength can hardly be productive today. This approach can only hamper the elaboration of mutually acceptable solutions.

Another argument by Cooper sounds even more surprising. According to him, changing the ABM Treaty is allegedly one area of the common interests of the United States and the USSR in the context of the talks. The head of the American programme is sure to know well the Soviet Union's stance.

The USSR firmly believes that the understandings regarding the role of the ABM Treaty, elaborated by Washington and Moscow in 1972, remain in force.

This treaty continues to preserve its importance as the basis of maintaining strategic stability, the mandatory condition for implementing accords to reduce strategic offensive armaments.

Preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty rather than revising it is in the interests of both the USSR and the United States. If one of the sides moves to violate the treaty, this could jeopardise the supreme interests of the other side and would give it the right to withdraw from a treaty on strategic offensive armaments.
FINLAND

Foreign Ministry Official on Nuclear-Free Zone
LD3007194390 Helsinki Domestic Service
in Finnish 1500 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Excerpt] [Announcer] The Finnish Government believes that the project to create nuclear weapon-free Nordic countries is still topical. A Foreign Ministry representative said to the radio news that political developments in Europe and the acceleration of disarmament directly strengthen the prerequisites for this project. The development of international security policy has been discussed in Kuhmo. Matti Vaeisaenen reports from there:

[Vaeisaenen] Discussion on establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic countries has been lying low in the media in the last few years but the famous proposal by President Urho Kokkonen in 1963 has, however, been just under the surface as an object of continuous scrutiny and discussions. The project of nuclear weapon-free Nordic countries is to strengthen the security and stability of the area by securing a real, nuclear weapon-free area. The proposal made during the cold war has so far not led any further than debates, scrutiny, and discussions. The different security-political tenets chosen by the different Nordic countries, for example, have been the background to this initiative. The view often expressed in the other Nordic countries that nuclear weapon-free Nordic countries will be possible only in a wider European context is now getting real impetus because of the rapid progress of political developments in Europe and the disarmament talks.

Markku Reima, deputy head of the Foreign Ministry Political Department, who introduced the topic at the Kuhmo summer meeting of experts, said that disarmament progress and a change in nuclear weapons doctrines mean that many basic targets of the project have been achieved in practice. When assessing the influences Reima said that the project is about to become a natural part of disarmament developments. [passage omitted]
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