Arms Control

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U.S.-Soviet Conventional Arms Accord Viewed
HK2310133890 Beijing ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN
BAO in Chinese 9 Oct 90 p 2


[Text] U.S. Secretary of State Baker and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Shervardnadze pronounced in New York on 3 October, that the two countries have reached an accord in talks on all principled issues concerning conventional weapons reduction in Europe. The two countries finally made a breakthrough in their talks that had been going on for more than a year.

The talks between Shervardnadze and Baker took place at the site of the USSR delegation to the United Nations, and lasted some five hours.

Eventual Results After More Than a Year of Argument

The breakthrough in the recent talks was made with the two sides removing the last hurdle on limiting the number of fighter planes. Shervardnadze told reporters that the USSR made an "overall concession" on this issue, and the talks concluded on 3 October.

Based on the principled agreement reached by the two sides, as the WASHINGTON POST disclosed, the USSR and its former East European allies will eliminate 19,000 of their tanks, 51,000 cannons, and 40,000 armored vehicles. Part of the tanks pulled out from East Europe will retreat to east of the Urals, namely, 2,000 miles away from the USSR-Polish border. In this way, it will be impossible for the USSR to rapidly deploy these weapons in Europe again.

Because the USSR and its allies have great advantages in conventional weapons against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], the agreement requires the United States and its NATO allies to cut only 4,000 tanks so that the remainders may be kept on a par with the 20,000 tanks the USSR and its allies are to maintain in Europe.

As stipulated in the agreement, both the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries will each deploy, in Europe, 20,000 tanks, 20,000 cannons, 30,000 armored vehicles, and 2,000 helicopters after the reduction; the number of fighter planes, however, is kept a secret for the time being. From the angle of the volume of weapons, both sides will cut one-third of their weapons deployed in Europe. Such a large-scope reduction in conventional weapons will be the first in history.

The U.S.-USSR talks on conventional weapons reduction in Europe began in March 1989, but failed to reach an agreement. The major dispute between the two sides in the talks was the USSR possessing a huge number of land-based naval fighter planes, which were equipped with anti-vessel missiles. The NATO countries attempted to include aircraft in this category in the treaty of conventional weapons reduction in Europe, but met with Soviet opposition. Whereas, the USSR attempted to counter U.S. advantages in aircraft on aircraft carriers with the aforesaid aircraft. During the recent talks, the two sides reached an understanding on restricting the total number of fighter planes and aircraft in other categories with the exception of helicopters. Hence, progress was made in the talks.

Viewing the result of the talks between Baker and Shervardnadze, it seems that all hurdles have been removed for the United States and the USSR to initial the treaty on conventional weapons reduction in Europe at the Paris 34-nation Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [CSCE] this coming November. Should that be the case, President Bush will attend the said conference, and initial the treaty. Earlier, Bush stated that he would not attend the conference if it was impossible to initial the treaty of conventional weapons reduction in Europe at the CSCE to be held in Paris.

No Carelessness Can Be Afforded in Details to Avoid Getting "Stuck"

Although the two countries have reached unanimity on the basic principle of restricting conventional weapons in Europe, they are liable to get "stuck" on some minor issues in view of past experiences of talks between the two countries. Therefore, it is still hard to tell whether or not the treaty in question will be initialed at the Paris CSCE in November.

At a press conference on 3 October, U.S. Secretary of State Baker stated, that from reaching principled agreement to initialing the treaty, there are still some problems that must be settled: 1) It must obtain the allies' consent. Opposition is unlikely because during the talks, both sides promptly consulted with their allies and have already got their consent. 2) The two sides have not yet arrived at unanimity on such minor issues as restricting the number and categories of helicopters, and the number of troops to be stationed in some specific nations; those minor issues might affect the talks' progress. And 3) The principled agreement reached will have to be written into a documentary treaty by negotiation experts of the two countries through technical operation; such procedures are liable to delay the initialing of any treaty.

Therefore we can see, despite the fact that there is still some way to go before the initialing of the treaty of conventional weapons reduction in Europe, it will not be too far away.

Besides, the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Shervardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State Baker will hold another talk on restricting strategic nuclear weapons to find solutions to some issues in the said talks between the two countries for Bush and Gorbachev to initial the relevant treaty in Moscow before the end of 1990.
BURMA

Government Said To Plan CW Use Against Insurgents

BK3010021590 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 30 Oct 90 p 2

[Text] The Burmese Army is planning to use chemical weapons [CW] from China in an attempt to wipe out the country's ethnic insurgents, Karen National Union leader General Bo Mya claimed yesterday. General Bo Mya said an arms shipment that included chemical weapons arrived in Rangoon in March.

According to the Karen leader, whose forces make up the largest group of armed insurgents along the Thai-Burmese border, the shipment came from China. General Bo Mya said the arms shipment to Burma was the first to contain chemical weapons.

Recently there were small clashes between Burmese and Karen forces which the general described as "a prelude to a major offensive to come." The military junta intended to undertake this large-scale offensive "in order to divert people's attention from the internal affairs to the border," he added.

Asked whether he was prepared for a chemical attack, he said, "We trust in God."

NORTH KOREA

Article Urges Disarmament on Korean Peninsula

SK29110052990 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0511 GMT 29 Oct 90

["Disarmament Must Be Realised First on Korean Peninsula"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, October 29 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today dedicates a signed article to the opening of a disarmament week worldwide October 24.

What is important in disarmament is to begin it in the area where the danger of war is the biggest, the article says:

The Korean peninsula is an area where the danger of war is the biggest on the globe now. It is an urgent demand of the world peace to remove the danger of war and ease the tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Disarmament is going on in other areas of the world today. The U.S. imperialists, however, are increasing their armed forces of aggression in South Korea.

They are stepping up war preparations still further, converting South Korea into the largest nuclear forward base in the Far East, the frontline attack base of their anti-socialist strategy.

In order to ease the tensions and ensure a genuine peace on the Korean peninsula, it is necessary to drastically reduce the armed forces in the North and the South and withdraw foreign forces and nuclear weapons.

Conscious of its noble responsibility for peace, the government of our Republic put forward a series of reasonable disarmament proposals and is making all sincere efforts for their implementation. The South Korean authorities said that they would cut arms and resolve the non-aggression problem. If they meant what they said, they should affirmatively respond to our disarmament proposal and not hesitate to adopt a non-aggression declaration between the North and the South.

If the United States also wants truly detente on the Korean peninsula and improvement of the DPRK-US. relations, it must come out to the DPRK-U.S. talks or tripartite talks at an early date and accede to signing a peace agreement.

The Korean people will in the future, too, energetically struggle to check and frustrate the arms race and war policy of the imperialists, realise the disarmament as a whole and defend world peace in firm unity with the world progressive people.

NEW ZEALAND

New Prime Minister To Continue Antinuclear Policies

Stresses Ties With U.S., France

BK2710992990 Hong Kong AFP in English 0905 GMT 27 Oct 90

[By Jack Taylor]

[Excerpts] Te Kuiti, New Zealand, October 27 (AFP)—Rebuilding bridges with the United States will be among the top priorities for the conservative government voted into power Saturday, New Zealand's new Prime Minister Jim Bolger said.

In an exclusive interview with AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE hours before his victory was declared, Mr. Bolger referred also to New Zealand's need to improve relations with France, to develop new trade with former Eastern bloc countries and to soothe Japanese sensitivities bruised by recent events here. But there would be no departure by his government from the policy adopted by his Labour predecessors banning nuclear capable ships in New Zealand ports.

He and his National Party have been forced by public opinion to embrace an increasingly "green" posture on some issues although he remains strongly conservative on most others. [passage omitted]

In a long election campaign, Mr. Bolger made hundreds of speeches and handled scores of radio and television
interviews, stumbling badly only once because he was judged to have been too cuttlingly quick-witted in putting down a heckler.

He blamed his predecessors, especially former Prime Minister Lange, for souring relations with the United States by "going out of their way to be critical of it." "Mr. Lange talked about hoods going to the White House, clearly angered Washington and his whole demeanour was one of aggression which was not in New Zealand's interests," he said. "From my perspective, we have to avoid locking ourselves into the South Pacific ... we have to be international in outlook." "We therefore need to be on positive terms with all major trading groups and that certainly includes the United States," he said.

"I want to open discussions with Washington at an early date to work through rebuilding relationships which historically have been very warm and friendly and to re-establish mutually acceptable security arrangements. "That is a high foreign policy priority as far as I am concerned." With France, he said, relationships had never been the same as those with the United States.

On top of that, the Rainbow Warrior affair had seriously damaged relationships. "But we should not allow one act that angered New Zealand across the political spectrum to sour our relationships on any permanent basis," he said.

He said the French premier Mr. Rocard was due to visit soon—"and I will be very happy to welcome him to try to work through some outstanding issues and to build a relationship with France that is constructive from both perspectives." [passage omitted]

Hopes To 'Work Something Out'

BK2910071690 Hong Kong AFP in English 0657 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] Wellington, October 29 (AFP)—New Zealand will attempt to reach a new security arrangement with the United States, Prime Minister-elect Jim Bolger said here Monday.

On the first working day since Saturday's landslide election victory for his National Party, Mr. Bolger's was speaking after a press report quoted a senior U.S. official as saying Washington wanted a change in New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy.

The outgoing Labour government effectively ended the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and United States) military pact by passing laws banning nuclear weapons and nuclear power from New Zealand. American warships could enter New Zealand waters provided they confirmed they had no nuclear weapons aboard, but U.S. policy is to neither confirm nor deny this.

Earlier this year while in opposition Mr. Bolger said the National Party had endorsed Labour's position and would keep New Zealand nuclear free. Speaking Monday he said his party's policy was very clear but said "we can work something out (and) if that's interpreted to mean we can reach a position where both countries find it mutually acceptable for security, fine. I've said all along I want to reach a mutually acceptable security arrangement with the United States."

The Wellington EVENING POST quoted Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon as saying Washington welcomed National's victory. "It's very much our hope that New Zealand can return to the ANZUS fold, but it would require a reconsideration on their part that would enable them to understand the importance of (the neither confirm nor deny) policy and their ability to work with their allies," the POST quoted Mr. Solomon saying.

New Prime Minister Hopes for Improved U.S. Ties

BK3010083590 Hong Kong AFP in English 0814 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Wellington, October 30 (AFP)—New American initiatives in the South Pacific announced by President George Bush offered hope that New Zealand-U.S. relations will improve, Prime Minister-elect Jim Bolger said here Tuesday.

In a brief statement he welcomed initiatives in aid and on political issues such as driftnet fishing announced by Mr. Bush at the end of his weekend summit with Pacific leaders in Hawaii.

"President Bush has recognised the concern of Pacific nations on a wide range of issues," Mr. Bolger said. "The initiatives demonstrate the affinity of interest between the U.S. and New Zealand on matters of Pacific policy and confirm my hope that we will be able to improve relations between our two nations in the near future," Mr. Bolger said.

Relations between the two countries have been strained since the outgoing Labour government made New Zealand nuclear free and in 1985 turned away a proposed visit by a U.S. warship because Washington would not confirm or deny whether it carried nuclear arms.

Nuclear-Ship Calls Ban 'Permanent'

BK3010105690 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0803 GMT 30 Oct 90

[From the "International Report" program]

[Excerpts] New Zealand's conservative prime minister-elect, Jim Bolger, says he (cannot wait to meet) his Australian counterpart, Bob Hawke, and he is looking forward to an early meeting to discuss issues, such as closer defense ties between Australia and New Zealand and trade matters. [passage omitted]
[Begin recording] [Chase] Now, does the election result give your party a mandate to reenter the ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-U.S. Defense Pact] alliance, and are we likely to see a resumption of joint Australian-New Zealand defense exercises?

[Bolger] Well, there are joint Australian-New Zealand defense exercises now, and I would like to see those not only continue but expand. On the broader question of ANZUS, which is a tripartite agreement between ourselves, Australia, and the United States, there is a lot of work to be done before that can be put in any form that reaches what is a central [word indistinct] to what is a mutually acceptable security arrangement between New Zealand and the United States, and that, of course, has not even started to get off the ground, other than the election of new government, is positive.

[Chase] On the nuclear issue, is it a priority for you to have talks with the Americans and perhaps the Australians about nuclear ship visits to New Zealand ports?

[Bolger] Well, the legislation that the Labor government passed, we have agreed to accept the matter. Apart from very, very severe constraints on ships coming to New Zealand ports and certainly no nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships can come. Now that's permanent. The next stage is ready to sit down and talk with the two former ANZUS partners, and in particular, talk with the United States. So those discussions will start in the near future, but of course, no time has been set on them. [passage omitted]
Disagreement on Arms Quotas Denied
LD2410130690 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Announcer-read report on remarks by an unidentified Hungarian Foreign Ministry spokesman at an “international news conference” held by Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky on 24 October; place of news conference not given]

[Text] The Foreign Ministry spokesman denied that the Budapest session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee has been postponed because they would not have been able to agree on the disarmament quotas. He also added that in the past two days, in Warsaw, the envoys of the governments concerned have held a session in this matter and the discussions are being continued.

Fourth Round of Pact Arms Talks Set for 26 Oct
LD2410175390 Prague CTK in English 1609 GMT
24 Oct 90

[Text] Prague, October 24 (CTK)—The fourth round of the controversial discussions by a special Warsaw Pact commission for conventional disarmament, which is to define the quotas of tanks and guns each Pact member state is to have, will be held here on October 26-27.

The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry has stated that the discussions will be conducted, equally as the previous ones, at the level of deputy foreign ministers. An official ministry report did not say whether the fourth round would be attended by representatives of the army general staffs of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania.

The third round, held in Prague on October 9-10, failed to distribute quotas from the 20,000 tanks which the Warsaw Pact is to have in line with the Vienna conference on conventional disarmament. Although the Pact member states could divide also the quota earmarked for the former GDR, the demands exceed the ceilings by 450 tanks.

Agreements on the numbers of combat planes, helicopters and vehicles have been reached at the previous three meetings.

A treaty which is to wind up the long-lasting Vienna negotiations on conventional weapons should be signed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact participants at the summit in Paris.

Tank Ceilings Agreed
LD2710211390 Prague CTK in English 1808 GMT
27 Oct 90

[Text] Prague, October 27 (CTK)—Warsaw Pact deputy foreign ministers agreed today on the number of tanks each of the member states will have under an accord with NATO on conventional weapons ceilings, Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Robert Harencar told journalists after the meeting here today.

The agreement is to be signed by the six states’ foreign ministers in Budapest on November 3.

This was their fourth attempt to remove the last stumbling block to their agreement how they will share out the contingent of 20,000 tanks and artillery pieces fixed at the Vienna talks on conventional disarmament. Harencar said that the Soviet Union offered to reduce its demand by 150 tanks and thus made it possible to reach agreement on the 490 tanks by which the member states demands exceeded the ceiling. The Soviet Union will have 13,150 tanks.

He noted that “the maximum limits of weapons and hardware that each Warsaw Pact state is allowed have
now been fixed”. The states had agreed on their shares of 2,000 combat helicopters and 30,000 combat vehicles at the previous meetings.

“Today's results will be of crucial importance for the session in Paris”, Harenčar said referring to the planned signing of the agreement between the Warsaw treaty and NATO at the Conference on Security and Cooperation [in Europe] summit on November 18.

Harenčar confirmed that the weapons ceilings are to remain in force also after the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact.

Pact Conventional Arms Talks Begin in Prague
LD2610230590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Oct 90

[From the “Vremya” newscaast]

[Text] The fourth round of talks within the framework of the Warsaw Pact special commission on conventional arms began in Prague today. Quotas for tanks and artillery weapons within the Warsaw Pact are to be established. Little time has been set aside for the upcoming talks between the deputy foreign ministers due to the Paris meeting of leaders of the CSCE participant countries planned for November.

General Lobov Eyes Reduction of Pact Forces
LD3010102790 Berlin ADN International Service in German 1703 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow (ADN) — According to Army General Vladimir Lobov, chief of the general staff of the joint armed forces, the total number of Warsaw Pact troops has been reduced significantly and unilaterally. In an interview with the independent agency INTERFAX, the general said on Monday [29 October] that the USSR, Poland, Hungary, the CSFR, Bulgaria, and Romania have reduced their manpower by over 600,000. The number of tanks has been reduced by 10,000. Other equipment and combat technology has also been reduced. Further, as a result of German unification, the army of the former GDR has left the Warsaw Pact.

Lobov said that lack of military balance would be counterbalanced through the political situation. The chief of staff expressed his regret that although negotiations are being conducted by NATO on troop reductions, real results are not being felt. The practical realization will be linked to the fulfilment of the future decisions to be prepared at the Vienna negotiations. The continued transformation of the Warsaw Pact must be synchronized with the development of the Helsinki process and the creation of an all-European security system, which also envisages a symmetrical reduction of the NATO military organization, Lobov said.

BULGARIA

Chemical Warfare Troops To Continue Functioning
AU2310112890 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 19 Oct 90 p 2

[Interview with “Officer Tsvetkov, head of administration in the unit in which Officer Panayotov serves,” by Senior Lieutenant Petyo Kostadinov; place and date not given: “Chemical Troops Do Not Face ‘Pensioning’”; first paragraph is NARODNA ARMIYA introduction]

[Excerpts] A young, vital, and pleasant looking officer met me at the office’s door. He still did not wear the recent senior officer's rank he received. Frankly, I was pleasantly surprised by the fact that a commander with such a rank was able within a few minutes to eliminate the distance between us and develop a frank and friendly conversation.

[Kostadinov] Can we talk about a “new wave” in the central organs of the military management?

[Tsvetkov] Yes, some people say that I am a representative of the “new wave.” In the administration there are officers with longer service than I and with higher ranks. However, this did not cause any shocks and confrontations. Disputed issues emerged only in connection with the interest of the Army. Therefore, we think together before we adopt decisions.

[Kostadinov] In this sense, how did you assess the implementation of the specific plans of the chemical warfare troops during the last training year?

[Tsvetkov] I would say that significant results were achieved in implementing the tasks of combat training. The standard work of the units was eliminated with a view to using them in several directions. A new approach was mandatory. [passage omitted]

[Kostadinov] During an inspection I heard from foreign military specialists many kind words about the automation in the chemical warfare troops. What is the real situation?

[Tsvetkov] We really have software for all units of the troops. The only difficulty is related to supplying the troops at all levels with reliable calculating and multiplying equipment.

We regularly conduct training with the means we have at our disposal and we believe that this is the road we must follow. However, until sufficient and reliable equipment is supplied and the level of troops’ training improved, this issue will be resolved with great difficulty.

[Kostadinov] Finally, against the background of the international tendencies, are you optimistic about the future of the chemical warfare troops?
[Tsvetkov] I am often confronted with this question. Let us look soberly at the situation. According to the most optimistic forecasts in the West, in the next 20 to 30 years the chemical weapons will remain one of the decisive factors in combat activities. Even if the arsenals of chemical weapons are destroyed, modern chemical industry can produce anything it wants within hours, simply because a significant part of the combat poison substances and the raw materials needed for their production also are raw materials for peaceful production. In addition, at least in the near future, there will always be countries such as Iraq, which will threaten close and distant countries with the use of mass destruction chemical weapons.

The chemical warfare troops must also resolve other tasks. Therefore, we intensify the multiple-goal-oriented approach in training the chemical warfare troops.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CSFR Delegation Head on CFE Stumbling Blocks

[AU1610160290 Prague HOSPODARSKÉ NOVINY in Czech 15 Oct 90 p 4]

[Interview with Dr. Ladislav Balcar, head of the CSFR delegation at the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) talks, by Josef Vesely in Vienna on 12 October: "Work Is Almost Complete at No. 34 Blassstrasse"—first paragraph is HOSPODARSKÉ NOVINY introduction]

[Text] Last Friday [12 October] just before 1500, when we said good-bye to Dr. Ladislav Balcar at the gates of the villa on Blassstrasse, a quiet street in Vienna's 19th district, the working week was still far from over for the head of the CSFR delegation at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces. In fact, he was rushing off to another round of the talks on whose final outcome—to a certain extent—the success of the summit planned for Paris in November involving European countries, the United States, and Canada is dependent. Inside the Czechoslovak villa in Vienna we had previously been joking that following the unification of Germany and the departure of the GDR from the Warsaw Pact, the negotiations involving the 23 states of both alliances had now turned into discussions involving just 22 countries and so the negotiators can now—following the reduction in the number of tables—sit closer to each other. However, we then began gathering much more serious information for our readers.

[Vesely] What is the current situation in your negotiations and which issues still remain open prior to Paris?

[Balcar] Before a treaty on conventional armed forces can be signed at the highest level, an agreement still has to be reached determining the overall number of air forces and artillery. As far as air forces are concerned, the main issue involves the number of assault helicopters. The so-called sufficiency level per country—that is, what maximum percentage share of the conventional forces in Europe each country may have at its disposal—must also be definitively determined. There has been a great deal of discussion on this issue because, until recently, we held divergent views on whether this should involve 30 percent of the total armed forces (this was the NATO states' position) or "not less than 40 percent" (USSR). Even prior to the meeting between James Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze in New York, it was obvious that the 40-percent demand was unrealistic, although—as far as air forces are concerned—this matter has to be considered according to the size of the countries and other geographical criteria. It is something completely different to guarantee air cover for territory in Belgium and for territory in the USSR. The CSFR and Hungary have submitted their own proposal on the sufficiency level; this level should amount to one-third of the ceiling. We are able to say that our point of view was realistic and was confirmed by the outcome of the U.S.-USSR talks in New York. Both countries, which are practically involved in these ceilings, agreed on this quota for tanks and armored combat vehicles. The quota for helicopters should come to 37.5 percent and to 34.3 percent for artillery.

[Vesely] The de facto dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, which is taking place more rapidly than could possibly have been envisaged when the collective ceilings were originally determined, must also certainly play a role here. Could you give us more details on how this has been reflected, or is being reflected, in the negotiations?

[Balcar] After an agreement is reached, the collective level will really have to be divided into a national level on account of the fundamentally altered situation within the Warsaw Pact. The above-mentioned New York meeting helped to resolve this issue as far as helicopters, armored combat vehicles, and air forces are concerned; however, problems have arisen with the distribution of tanks and artillery. For example, the Warsaw Pact has been left with 1,060 tanks following the exclusion of the GDR, however, Bulgaria is demanding more than 1,070 tanks. The same applies to Poland and Hungary. Czechoslovakia is insisting upon the originally agreed quotas. However, the total is such that it exceeds the collective ceiling agreed upon. It is a fact that the original distribution did not reckon with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. This pact's individual member states are also no longer reckoning with a common defense shield and have changed their ideas about the need for conventional means for the individual defense of their countries.

[Vesely] Could this situation make the signing of a pan-European treaty at the Paris summit impossible?

[Balcar] Theoretically, yes. Although very few people would like to take on such political responsibility.

[Vesely] If we look at the fate of Czechoslovak initiatives in this area—I have in mind the speech delivered by President Vaclav Havel to the Council of Europe parliamentory assembly in Strasbourg where he outlined our
pragmatic approach toward Warsaw Pact and NATO disarmament negotiations—we have the feeling that these approaches are now somehow applicable to the Vienna negotiations.

[Balcar] The influence of those factors which the CSFR president spoke about in Strasbourg is still evident. We feel this influence as participants in these important talks. Indeed, we have a mandate to work on a bloc basis whether we want it or not. We have to conduct the negotiations in such a way to make sure that the NATO countries have a partner. From this point of view, we have all only managed to proceed within the framework of the mandate by making a great effort. At the same time, each negotiator feels that this approach is an anachronism. The next phase after Paris will—from this point of view—obviously, be more difficult because Hungary will, with all probability, leave the Warsaw Pact. However, it may be expected that we will have to proceed further as a group of countries.

[Vesely] How long do you think we will have to continue with this contradictory method of negotiating?

[Balcar] Obviously, until the highest level pan-European conference planned for Helsinki in 1992; a second agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe should be signed there. The Paris summit should give us a mandate for negotiating this agreement. It should concern the number of troops and all the other unresolved issues which could not be included in the first treaty for chronological reasons.

[Vesely] And what then?

[Balcar] We envisage that after the Helsinki meeting in 1992, disarmament talks that should take place on a non-bloc basis. Perhaps with the participation of the original 35 states (besides the United States and Canada, the 33 European states; however, minus the GDR—as opposed to 1975—but, possibly, plus Albania).

[Vesely] Of course, this means that for your negotiations as well as for the talks on measures to increase trust and security in Europe it will be necessary to draft a new mandate?

[Balcar] All the CSCE participatory states—until recently, with the exception of the United States—support such a point of view. Understandably, this stance made Washington frown. Therefore, all of us here gratefully accepted the statement made by Secretary of State James Baker in connection with the talks involving the U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers in New York. He said that the United States is now willing to participate in such talks.

[Vesely] In this context, how do you and your partners in Vienna evaluate the Czechoslovak proposals oriented toward abolishing the Warsaw Pact military organization?

[Balcar] As confirmation of the CSFR’s desire to hold serious negotiations about this future mandate in harmony with both our NATO partners and our current partners in the Warsaw Pact. Our country’s proposals fully fit into this context.

CSFR’s Pirek Addresses UN Arms Policy Committee
LD1810122790 Prague CTK in English 0929 GMT 18 Oct 90

[By CTK correspondent]

[Text] New York, October 18 (CTK)—Efforts to set up a new international order based on transferring the functions of military blocs to the all-European structures are in the forefront of Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy orientation. Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Zdenko Pirek has said here.

In his address in the Political and Security Committee at the 45th General Assembly session yesterday, Pirek stated that the effects of the cold war can be removed only through collective efforts and within a community of democratic states, which will guarantee non-militaristic approaches to the protection of peace.

Pirek said Czechoslovakia attaches primary importance to conventional disarmament and is actively working to achieve progress in this sphere. He recalled Czechoslovakia’s contribution to the elaboration of principles of arms control and disarmament, the halt to Czechoslovak arms supplies to areas of tension, unilateral cuts in armed forces and armament, publication of data about military spendings and termination of arms production in a number of enterprises.

As regards global questions, Czechoslovakia considers it urgent to complete the treaty on banning and eliminating chemical weapons, to accelerate nuclear disarmament and draft a general nuclear weapons’ test ban treaty, Pirek said.

Last Soviet Helicopters Leave 22 Oct
LD2210175590 Prague CTK in English 1631 GMT 22 Oct 90

[Text] Bratislava, October 22 (CTK)—The remaining 59 Soviet combat helicopters Mi-24 and Mi-8 took off from the Sliac airport in central Slovakia today, thus ending definitively the ‘temporary’ deployment of Soviet Air Force on Slovak territory.

The withdrawal of Soviet helicopters was monitored by a parliamentary commission and deputies to the defence and security committees of the Federal Assembly (parliament) and the Slovak National Council (Slovak parliament).

The withdrawal of Soviet troops is being carried out in harmony with an agreement signed in Moscow on February 26-27, 1990. 78 per cent of Soviet tanks, 66 per
cent of armoured vehicles, 79 per cent of artillery technique, 81 per cent of planes, 58 per cent of soldiers and 53 per cent of civilians have left Czechoslovakia by October 18. By the middle of 1991 the withdrawal should be completed.

Havel Sends Message to Conventional Weapons Talks

LD2510152190 Prague CTK in English 1422 GMT 25 Oct 90

[Text] Vienna, October 25 (CTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel has said in his message to the Vienna talks on conventional weapons that the essential transformation of the Warsaw Pact will be completed at the talks of its Political Consultative Committee in Budapest (which will probably be held after the Paris summit of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe in November).

President Havel said in the message, read to the talks plenary session by Czechoslovak parliament deputy chairman and chairman of the House of Nations, Milan Sutovec, today that the military structure of the Warsaw Pact will be abolished and the Pact will fulfill only a consultative political function with emphasis on disarmament during a limited period.

Vaclav Havel stressed that the treaty on conventional weapons, which is being completed by the NATO and Warsaw Pacts, will rid Europe of the burden of dozens of thousands of weapons.

Czechoslovakia links great hopes to the Paris CSCE summit, which will mark an important milestone in building a new security structure in Europe, and will fully support the joint effort in this sense, the president’s message said.

CSFR General Outlines Armament Reductions

LD2910222590 Prague CTK in English 2037 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] Prague, October 29 (CTK)—Czechoslovakia will reduce the number of its tanks and artillery pieces by two thousand each after the Warsaw Pact countries agreed here at the weekend on how they would share out the 20,000 quota for this weaponry agreed with NATO.

Major-General Jiri Jindra, chief of foreign relations at the Defence Ministry, told CTK that the Czechoslovak Army will have 1,435 tanks and 1,150 artillery, 2,050 armoured vehicles (3,000 less), 345 combat aircraft (60 less) and 75 helicopters (30 less than at present). The Warsaw Pact totals are 20,000 tanks and artillery pieces each, 30,000 combat vehicles and 2,000 helicopters.

General Jindra commended the Soviet Union which offered at the last round of the talks on Saturday to reduce its tank quota by 150 although it had agreed on 13,300 tanks with the United States. He said that Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia had agreed soon on their limits and had been an example to negotiations on “the south wing”—Bulgaria and Romania.

Asked if the Czechoslovak Army will remain capable of defence General Jindra confirmed it will, naturally in harmony with Czechoslovakia’s new military defense-based doctrine. He said that the 30 helicopters for instance would be disarmed and turned over to the air ambulance service and other hardware will be converted for humanitarian purposes or melted to be used as high-quality material.

HUNGARY

Hungarian Delegate to Vienna Talks on Warsaw Pact

AU2410112090 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 24 Oct 90 p 4

[Interview with Istvan Gyarmati, Hungarian chief delegate at the Vienna disarmament talks, by Burkhard Bischof in Vienna; date not given: “Our Goal Is a Cooperative Security System in Europe”]

[Text] [Bischof] Mr. Ambassador, despite several attempts, the Warsaw Pact members have not yet been able to agree on the national quotas for tanks and artillery which will be due to them in line with the reductions agreed on in the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe: What is the problem?

[Gyarmati] I would not dramatize this matter. Six weeks ago we began with the discussion about the distribution of the national quotas; in NATO such a discussion normally takes six months. It is a process which needs time, because it involves real and hypothetical security interests of individual states.

Second, the agreement in New York between Foreign Ministers Baker and Shevardnadze set down figures too high for the Soviet Union. The issue is a few hundred tanks and artillery pieces, which are perhaps not particularly important for all of NATO and the Soviet Union, but which mean very much to the smaller Warsaw Pact countries. We assume that it cannot be a big problem for the Soviet Union if it gets 300 fewer tanks: If it can defend itself with 13,300 tanks, it can also do so with 13,000.

Third, in our alliance we are not yet skilled in solving problems democratically and as equal partners. Discussion often means just the repetition of well-known positions, and some delegations are not able to negotiate properly. They can only find out positions and then they have to get new instructions from their capital cities.

[Bischof] There are already agreements on national quotas within the Eastern alliance concerning combat planes, combat helicopters, and infantry combat vehicles. It has not yet been officially announced how many combat planes the Soviet Union will be permitted to keep in the end.
[Gyarmati] We assume that the upper limit for planes for one alliance will be about 6,800; of these the Soviet Union will be permitted to keep 5,150.

[Bischof] Is the quarrel about tank quotas the last major problem within the Warsaw Pact or are there still other unsolved questions?

[Gyarmati] We still have to find a regulation, within or outside the treaty on conventional disarmament, on how one distributes the active inspection quotas—that is, how many inspections one individual state is permitted to make in the other 21 states. Furthermore, a mechanism for cooperation among the six states for implementing the treaty must be found. We assume that this cooperation will not take place within the Warsaw Pact, but within the group of states that has been founded for the purpose of the treaty.

[Bischof] When do you expect the still-unanswered questions to be resolved? Will the heads of state and government have to deal with these questions themselves at the summit that has been planned for Budapest at the beginning of November?

[Gyarmati] On Friday and Saturday [26-27 October] another meeting is scheduled in Prague, which will deal with solving the still open questions. I am moderately optimistic that an agreement will be possible. The planned summit of the heads of state and government of the Warsaw Pact will not deal with the agreement on conventional armed forces but with the transformation of the alliance.

[Bischof] What does Hungary expect from this summit? There is the proposal by CSFR President Havel to dissolve the Pact's supreme command within six months. Does this also correspond with your ideas?

[Gyarmati] We expect that the military structures—not only the Supreme Command—will be dissolved by the end of 1991 at the latest. The Hungarian Armed Forces, however, will already no longer be subordinate to the Warsaw Pact Supreme Command as of 1 December 1990—de facto, this is already the case. Our Armed Forces are now integrated in the military structures only to a very limited extent. Even though we still have some representatives in Moscow, we no longer participate in military exercises.

At the same time, we have always stressed that we do not want to leave the alliance alone. We would prefer a joint decision for dissolution by the member states. We hope that the establishment of new security structures in Europe over the next months or years will also make it possible for the Soviet Union to do without the Warsaw Pact.

[Bischof] Can you describe how the working atmosphere within the Eastern group has changed for you as the representative of Hungary since the beginning of the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE]?

[Gyarmati] During the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, and at the beginning of the CFE, Hungary was isolated within the group of Eastern states. We were convinced, however, that our path pointed in the right direction, even though we were subjected to strong political and psychological pressure at that time. Now this is totally different and we are no longer alone. Now we are trying to prevent the Soviet Union from being isolated.

There are also hardly any joint Eastern proposals anymore. Most proposals are introduced in the negotiations on a national basis. The differences in opinion and interests within the Warsaw Pact today are probably greater than in NATO. Certainly, we also have fewer possibilities to influence the Soviet Union than the European NATO allies have to influence the United States.

[Gyarmati] What exactly will the first treaty on conventional disarmament bring to Hungary?

[Gyarmati] With this we take the first step toward establishing a new cooperative security system in Europe. If such a system is not established in the near future, we will not be able to limit our defense efforts to the extent that we want because, if our membership in the Warsaw Pact then ends simultaneously, we could find ourselves in a security policy vacuum. We want to avoid this. Our goal is a cooperative security system in Europe, and the conclusion of a treaty on conventional disarmament is the basis for this.

Second, we believe that after the agreement is signed, we will have a better chance of reaching a consensus on the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Third, we believe that this treaty not only changes the relations of power on the continent, but will also normalize the relations of power in Central and Eastern Europe. Fourth, the treaty will allow us to maintain an army which can be financed in the end. Fifth, we think that the effects of the treaty go far beyond the military dimension: The exchange of information and the regulations on verification, which are set down in the treaty, are new approaches to forming cooperative security structures.

Army Leader Says No Nuclear Warheads in Country
LD2710115790 Budapest MTI in English 1013 GMT 27 Oct 90

[Text] Brussels, October 26 (MTI)—There were no nuclear warheads, only nuclear carriers, on Hungarian territory, Laszlo Borsits, chief-of-staff of the Hungarian Army, told the Brussels correspondent of MTI. Borsits commented on the Friday news conference of General Moiseyev, Soviet chief-of-staff, in Brussels.

The BELGIAN NEWS AGENCY quoted General Moiseyev as saying that all nuclear weapons had been
removed from the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian territory, and their quantity had been sharply cut in Germany.

Borsits recalled that the Soviet Union had deployed SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 missiles in Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Although the missiles were suitable for carrying nuclear warheads, it is not known whether they had been provided with them.

According to official Soviet information, the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary were only equipped with nuclear carriers, Borsits said.

The 27 carriers of the Hungarian Armed Forces have never been equipped with nuclear warheads and their number has been reduced to 14, the Hungarian chief-of-staff said.
Spanish Military Sources Confirm Chilean FAE Test

PY2310022890 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1938 GMT
22 Oct 90

[Text] Madrid, 22 October (EFE)—Spanish military sources today confirmed to EFE that a Fuel Air Explosive (FAE) bomb, which was manufactured by a Spanish enterprise, was tested in Chile. This bomb is highly destructive and is, therefore, called the “mininuclear bomb.”

The sources added that the tests were carried out on unspecified dates by C-101 aircraft sold to the Chilean Air Force by the Spanish enterprise Aeronautics Constructions [Construcciones Aeronauticas].

Another Spanish enterprise, Alaveses Explosives, Inc. (Expal), manufactures the FAE according to a secret contract signed with the Spanish Defense Ministry seven years ago.

The FAE is made with ethylene oxide and has a destructive power similar to that of a small nuclear bomb; its shock wave can penetrate areas protected from conventional explosives.

At the beginning of last month, an Israeli radio station reported that Spain was one of countries that had the FAE, in addition to Iraq, Israel, and the United States.

The Spanish Defense Ministry declined to comment on this report, because “armament issues are secret,” the spokesman said.

However, the Spanish weekly TIEMPO reported this week that the Spanish bomb had reached Iraq through Chilean arms smuggler Carlos Cardoen.

According to TIEMPO, the operation consisted of selling Cardoen the necessary technology to make the bomb, but Cardoen later sent it to Libya and, from there, to Iraq.

Through his official spokesman Ismael Vicuna, manager general of Cardoen Industries, Cardoen told TIEMPO that together with a Spanish enterprise, he is investigating the possibility of developing and producing the FAE bomb in Chile.

According to Vicuna, the explosions recorded last August in the Chilean desert of Atacama, some 800 km north of Santiago, were the result of tests carried out to compare the FAE’s pressure curve with that of other bombs. [no opening quotation mark as received]

Spanish, Iraqi Role Alleged in FAE Bomb Project

‘Spanish Job’

91P20017A Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish
22 Oct 90 pp 98-104

[Article by Felix Garcia Perez: “The Spanish Bomb in the Hands of Iraq”—first paragraph is TIEMPO introduction]

[Text] Engineers from the Spanish company M.S. System and from the Chilean company Incar [Industrias Cardoen] tested six FAE [Fuel Air Explosive] bombs in the Chilean Atacama Desert in order to perfect the technology for the bomb, which would then be transferred to the army of Saddam Husayn with the help of Libya. These tests took place during the latter part of August, following the invasion of Kuwait. Among arms traffickers, this operation is already known as the “Spanish Job.”

M.S. System and Incar have for some time collaborated closely on the development, manufacture and sale of weapons on the international market. According to what this magazine has been able to find out, the Spanish company manages the technical aspects, while the Cuban partner, with factories in Cantabria and in Iraq, is in charge of production and distribution.

The weapon which these two companies have perfected and placed in the hands of Saddam Husayn, thus breaching the international blockade with the help of the Libyan Government, is known in Spanish as the BEAC (Bomba Explosiva de Aire Combustible) and in English as the FAE (Fuel Air Explosive) bomb. It has a destructive force similar to that of short-range tactical nuclear weapons.

Spain has done research on the FAE project since 1983 when it first appeared in the General State Budget. The well-known disarmament expert, Vicenc Fisas, mentions it in his book La Militarizacion de la Ciencia (“The Militarization of Science”) filed under number 00037 at the General Headquarters for Weapons and Materiel. Although this project is classified secret, the fact that it was mentioned in the media last week led Minister of Defense Narcis Serra to refer to it and announce that the Defense Ministry will soon make public those aspects of the issue which are deemed appropriate.

The key man in this Madrid-Chile-Libya-Iraq connection is the well-known arms trafficker, Carlos Cardoen, an engineer, businessman, and owner of Incar. His international contacts enable him to trade in this type of weapons, which the Spanish company develops. A protege of General Augusto Pinochet since 1980, he has accumulated an enormous fortune selling air-launched bombs to Iraq, which, according to Chilean sources, can sell for as much as 40 billion pesetas. His specialty is cluster bombs, of which he now controls half of the world’s production.
The Person

Carlos Cardoen has owned the Spanish metallurgical factory, Industrias Metalurgicas Estrategicas Canti-bricas de Santander (IMECSA), located in Pontejo since 1988. This modern industrial plant manufactures cluster bomb parts for Iraq. At one time an attempt was made to assemble helicopters there, but the project never got off the ground.

Cardoen built two weaponry factories on the outskirts of Baghdad; one for the manufacture of air-launched bombs and another for fuses. The technology used for the latter was acquired primarily from the South African companies Reutech and Puchs, which sold licences to Cardoen, the trafficker. It was with this technology that he set up the plant in Iraq, which was almost completed when the invasion of Kuwait occurred. The factory has more than 300 high-precision machines procured from the Matrix Churchill, Battanfeld, and Anglo-South African ERG firms.

Carlos Cardoen’s contacts in other countries, including Spain, are not often made through the Chilean firm Incar, but, instead, through another intermediary known as Swisstoc, headed up by Augusto Giangrandi, who is also vice president of Incar.

Sources from the Spanish secret services have assured TIEMPO that they have watched Cardoen’s every move and that his activities in Spain are controlled. However, as in the case of other well-known arms traffickers, they are allowed to operate, while under surveillance, in exchange for information and favors.

The deaths of two British reporters who tried to expose Cardoen illustrate just how dangerous it can be to delve into the activities of this protégé of Pinochet. On 15 March a 31-year old British reporter, Farzad Bazoft, was accused of spying and hanged in a Baghdad jail. Bazoft, who was visiting Iraq in September 1989, had reported that a missile factory had exploded near Baghdad and that 500 people had died in the catastrophe. At the time, 21 Chilean engineers sent by the businessman Carlos Cardoen were working in the factory.

British reporter Jonathan Moore went to Chile following Bazoft’s lead, and barely 15 days after the execution of his colleague, Moore was found hanged in the closet of his room in the Carrera Hotel in Santiago, Chile.

Carlos Cardoen’s representative in Spain, who served as a point of contact between the Chilean trafficker and the Spanish firm M.S. System, is Jorge Valdivieso, a Peruvian national who lives in Madrid, travels with a U.S. passport, and works for Incar.

Preparations

During the latter part of August, an M.S. System delegation comprising five Spanish technicians and headed by Jose Allepuz, arrived in Chile. The group left Santiago for the northern city of Iquique where they stayed in the Churmutan Hotel. During the next few days, a motorcade travelled from the city to the Incar bomb factories at Alto Hospicio. From there, they would travel several kilometers into the Atacama Desert, the hottest and most barren in the world, until they reached a plain similar to a lunar landscape.

Every day they would follow the same routine; slow preparations for a series of static explosions, in other words, the FAE bombs were placed on the ground and activated by remote control. This explosion is based on the mixture of the gas in the bomb with oxygen from the surrounding air and the result is a powerful shockwave which destroys everything within its reach.

Once in the desert, the Spanish and Chilean technicians assembled the military device. The FAE bomb appears innocuous. It consists of a yellow cylinder, approximately one meter in length, which is loaded with gas and sub-munitions. In describing the process in graphic detail, an observer said, “it was like loading disposable gas lighters.”

According to this source, the explosions that were witnessed were devastating, and the observers, under shelter more than a kilometer away from the bomb, felt the ground shake all around them.

The first FAE bomb prototypes were developed by the United States and used during the Vietnam war. Unlike other conventional bombs, the FAE bomb utilizes oxygen from the air to cause its explosion. While 40 percent of the weight of conventional bombs is made up of oxygen, the FAE bomb utilizes this space for other highly destructive materials. This bomb is so dangerous because it produces a huge, expanding shockwave, the result of the tremendous pressure produced by the release of gas during the explosion.

The main reason why the United States decided to use FAE bombs in Vietnam was due to its ability to destroy shelters. The freed gas expands at ground level, leaving no trench or bunker untouched by the shockwave which occurs less than a second later. People are annihilated for hundreds of meters in the surrounding area; vehicles, airplanes, and other war materiel are destroyed, while the shaking explodes any underground mines that might have been placed in its radius of action.

Terrible Effects

An American expert familiar with these bombs affirms that the expansive shockwave “does not spare even a root in an area about the size of a stadium.” In an open space like a desert, the effects of the FAE bomb are even more terrible. Israeli sources say that Saddam Husayn’s “stone” missile could carry a FAE bomb 2,000 kilometers.

During the 12 days which the Spanish and Chilean engineers spent in the Atacama Desert, there was a total of six test explosions. The last day the Spanish firm M.S.
System invited all those who had participated in the project to a delicious codfish meal.

The bombs, which were developed and tested by M.S. System and Incar, were to go to the Libyan Government of Muammar al-Qadhafi, and, according to foreign intelligence services which were following the trail of the "Spanish Job," the original plan of the Libyan leader was to deliver the bombs to Baghdad by way of Paris. Two Incar executives were to travel to Paris to meet with two Libyan representatives, Dr. Dokali Megharief and El Aref M. Tawil of the General Arab African Company, headquartered in Tripoli. These two men were to transport the FAE's to Baghdad. This is not the first time that Spanish weaponry arrives in Iraq by way of an international trafficking network. Chemical weapons manufactured by Explosivos Alaveses (EXPAL) were used by Saddam Husayn to annihilate the Kurds, many of whom recovered from their burns at the Gomez Ulla Hospital in Madrid. At that time, in contrast to what has occurred this time, the international network which allowed Spanish weaponry to reach Iraq was not discovered.

**Embargo Violations**

91P20017B Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish
22 Oct 90 p 102

[Article by Vicenc Fisas Armengol, member of the CIP [expansion unknown] and disarmament researcher at the UNESCO Center in Catalonia: "Spanish Technology to Iraq"]

[Text] One of the clearest lessons of the current Gulf conflict has been with regard to the risks involved in the wholesale export of weaponry. The great world powers have, for some time, used the export of weaponry as one of the preferred ways to increase their influence in certain areas of the planet, while, at the same time, generating substantial revenues for a reduced number of firms. For less pretentious countries like Spain, the export of weaponry has been viewed exclusively in terms of trade benefits and making investments profitable.

What is certain, in one case as much as in the other, is that the sale of war materiel contributes decisively to rearmament or the militarization of many countries, without any guarantee that the countries buying this flow of weapons will become permanent allies. Today's ally can be tomorrow's adversary, and the history of the past two hundred years is full of examples of this.

The terrible thing about this is that nothing was learned from the wholesale export of weapons to Iran during the 1970's, and, in spite of the very high human, political, and economic costs which we are now paying, there seems to be no regret about the attitude toward Iraq. Moreover, the offer to sell more war materiel to Saudi Arabia, worth 20 billion dollars, is visible proof that we are doing everything possible to ensure that what we lament today will repeat itself in the future.

Spain is not cut off from these dynamics, nor exempt from the responsibilities stemming from the current situation. Over the past 10 years Spanish firms have sold war materiel to Iraq worth 32 billion pesetas, and 300 billion pesetas' worth to the entire Middle East. The embargo on some of these countries has been systematically ignored, and in spite of accusations and warnings, they have been provided with the technology for the development of long-range missiles and nuclear and chemical weapons.

It is urgent, therefore, that we think seriously about all the consequences deriving from an arms export policy. The Gulf crisis offers an excellent opportunity to begin a process of strict control over these exports, which inevitably must entail a reduction and reconversion of the arms industry, aimed at making it less dependent on exports. Even the European Parliament has recently approved some directives on the subject. But until there is a sense of regret for what has happened, there will be no resolve to do better. We will all pay dearly for the irresponsibility, thoughtlessness, and blindness of some.

**Peruvian Government Concerned About Chilean FAE Bomb**

PY2710123290 Lima LA REPUBLICA in Spanish
23 Oct 90 p 13

[Excerpts] The Peruvian Government is seriously studying the ramifications of the fuel-air explosive bomb (FAE). The production of this bomb by a Chilean private company has awakened concern throughout the continent.

It has been explained that this bomb is as powerful as a tactical nuclear device.

Peruvian Foreign Ministry and Armed Forces experts and their advisers from the Peruvian Institute of Nuclear Energy are preparing a study on the characteristics of the new bomb and the consequences of its use.

Peruvian Government sources have indicated that the study will probably be ready in two weeks.

The sources added that the production of this bomb, even by a private company "introduces an element of confusion and distrust into the atmosphere of understanding achieved between Peru and Chile," according to a reliable Peruvian Foreign Ministry source. [passage omitted] Peruvian nuclear physicist Modesto Montoya has confirmed that Chile cannot manufacture a nuclear bomb, but it can produce one whose basic component is ethylene oxide, a gas that evaporates at 12 degrees centigrade and is usually used as a fungicide to preserve food.

He said that the Chilean bomb is not based on this principle, but that ethylene oxide has other properties. It reacts with other substances and becomes "ethylene glycol," which is highly explosive.
Montoya explained that the FAE is five times more powerful than any other conventional weapon, and its shock wave expands very swiftly in a large radius.

It may reach a temperature of 200 or 300 degrees centigrade, enough to kill living organisms while buildings are left standing. [passage omitted]

Felipe Osterling, chairman of the Senate Defense Committee, voiced his concern over the reports that Chile may have a bomb similar to a tactical nuclear device.

Osterling said that it would be very unfortunate if this were the case at the very time when the countries of the region are making an effort to use their resources to resolve problems.
INDIA

Indian Chemical Weapons Capability Examined
9140111A Cochin THE WEEK in English
30 Sep 90 pp 14-16

[Article by R. Prasannan: “Chemical Killers—China Has Them; Pakistan Is Developing Them. Is India Twiddling Its Thumbs?”]

[Text] Imagine this: The fourth Indo-Pak war is on. A Pakistani offensive is being beaten back as our artillery, tank formations and strike aircraft unleash their devastating fire-power. Suddenly a sinister-looking F-16 fighter-bomber appears from behind the fast-retreating Pakistani ground forces, dodges the flak and air-to-air missiles and lofts a few bombs.

In less than two minutes our advancing men feel their skins scaling. There is a lightness in the chest, the nose runs, the stomach convulses, the lungs burn, the eyes dilate, the limbs paralyse and then men die. All this takes less than five minutes, before the medical teams arrive, that is if they have the protective gear. Even the men in the thickly armoured tanks collapse in their dingy chambers. The Indian counter-attack is stopped in its tracks.

This scenario, though hypothetical, could well be enacted in case hostilities break out. What bomb did that imaginary F-16 drop? Nothing more than a container of an ordinary chemical or a compound of chemicals which becomes lethal at the time of explosion. Just as ordinary as hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, cyanogen chloride or chloropicrin. But their action is so swift that the bad old mustard gas, a chemical of World War I vintage which takes nearly three hours to kill, seems harmless in comparison.

There are more lethal chemicals with superpowers—advanced chemical weapon systems like chemical artillery shells, chemical landmines and chemical warhead-tipped missiles. And Pakistan is seeking to possess chemical offensive capability, according to CIA report to the U.S. Congress.

There is no way of knowing whether the British-build chemical weapon facility in Rawalpindi still exists. It was established in the 1940s for studying the problems of using chemical weapons in a hot and dry climate. But it is reported that Pakistani army officers attended chemical and biological warfare courses conducted by the U.S. army between 1958 and 1964.

Iran and Iraq used chemical weapons extensively in their conflict of the 1980s. The Afghan guerrillas (where did they get it from?) and the Soviets allegedly used them against each other in Pakistan’s backyard the United States allegedly used them in Grenada in 1983 and the Vietnamese used them in Kampuchea. In June this year, toxicologist Auburn Heyndricks of Ghent University, Belgium, confirmed that chemical weapons had been used against the Angolan rebels in 1986.

China has a formidable chemical weapons arsenal. Having been victims of Japanese chemical attacks during World War II, the Chinese have even been conducting chemical warfare exercises. Even the United States and the Soviet Union rarely conduct such exercises, despite having the capability. And the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), has chemical warfare subunit incorporated within its regimental-level units.

SIPRI says the Chinese exercises “were earlier confined to the large summer manoeuvres in northern and central China every year. But in August 1988 a fairly large-scale divisional exercise took place in the Tibetan military district with observers present from the military region headquarters at Chengdu and PLA headquarters at Beijing.”

The comprehensive exercise was preceded by theatre studies and and-model exercises. The first phase consisted of defensive measures against a chemical attack. The second phase was advance over a chemically contaminated area. The last phase was a chemical counter-offensive, first to isolate and then to neutralise the objective.

All this when even the other chemical powers are satisfied with conducting merely defensive exercises, like acclimatising soldiers to protective gear. Moreover, this was the first reported chemical warfare exercise in Tibet and military observers believe that the ‘intended’ target is India.

According to Air Chief Marshal S.K. Mehta, India has already made a modest start by training abroad some of its men in defending themselves in a nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) attack. And reports of various defence institutions indicate that India is serious about preparing itself against an NBC attack.

The rapid deployment force that India constituted in the 1980s is reported to have the ability to operate in a chemically-contaminated area. The PLA daily of China noted early last year that this force has the capability “to react to sudden developments and fight in varied natural conditions as well as the ability to conduct operations under aerial, amphibious, nuclear and biological war conditions.”

Already, tank crew at the School of Armoured Warfare in Ahmednagar, Maharashtra, are being trained to operate and defend themselves against an NBC attack, complete with protective masks and suits. The air headquarters, according to their chief, has set up an NBC cell and an NBC school at an undisclosed place. Special decontamination drills are being practised and perfected.

According to a defence medicine expert, if the chemical agent used is a sternutator (that which induces sneezing, tears and vomiting), inhaling chloroform would bring instant relief. “Chloroform ampules can be crushed in a wad of cotton wool or a handkerchief and pushed inside
a gas mask. The mouth should be rinsed with water which must not be swallowed. Eyes and skin should be washed with water. The skin (most of the chemical agents are absorbed through the skin and so gas masks offer little protection) should be washed with a small dose of a solution consisting of 6.7 percent sodium bicarbonate, 3.3 percent sodium carbonate and 0.1 percent benzalkonium chloride."

Elaborate research is on at various defense research and development establishments (DRDEs) to develop chemical radio-protectors, probably to be woven into protective suits or to be applied on the skin. In curative medicine, radio-sensitisers are being developed to treat soldiers and civilians affected by poison gas.

Techniques to detect gases in battlefields are apparently being prepared at DRDE, Gwalior. The oldest method is use of chemically impregnated filter papers (known as detector papers) which change colour in a toxic atmosphere. However, as there are specific chemicals for detecting each toxic agent, a soldier may have to shuffle through a large bunch of papers to get the correct reading. Yet another problem is that these papers cannot be produced in large quantities and stored since their self-life is short. Not very different are detector tubes containing solutions which change colour when exposed to certain gases.

The NATO troops use detector button, which is actually a chemically-treated filter paper and a moistened paper disc attached to a gas mask. Inhaled air passes through the button, but nerve gases such as tabun, sarin, soman and V-agents are inhibited by an enzyme present in the filter paper.

There are various other alarm systems which can be fixed on tanks or armoured personnel carriers. A specially suited and masked crew can drive their vehicle into an area unsuspected to be contaminated and warn or give the all-clear signal to their colleagues.

The Indian defence establishment is reluctant to reveal which type of system it is adopting. Vaccines are being developed in many western countries and the Soviet Union to protect troops in biologically-contaminated fields (where the enemy would have unleashed disease germs). India's position is a defence secret.

However, material published in various defence journals indicates that the Radiation Biology Group at Manipal is working on a radio-protective combination of WR 2721 and MPG or Tulsia extract. The Institute of Nuclear Medicine and Allied Sciences (INMAS), New Delhi, has been working on a combination of hydroxytryptophan and sulphydryl drugs for protection against gamma irradiation.

While all this is at the pure research level, the Defence Bioengineering and Electromedical Laboratory (DEBEL) in Bangalore is designing and developing personnel protection instruments. And the main battle tank 'Arjun,' which is to be deployed in the next couple of years, is being fitted out with special protective systems which will enable it to operate in NBC-contaminated areas.

Various study groups in the medical corps of the army are preparing drills to manage chemical casualties. The chemically wounded have to be treated in isolation to avoid contamination. A favoured drill seems to be the 'chemical triage' which is quite elaborate. A primary decontamination is done with water and soap or certain solutions before the casualty is evacuated (otherwise he would contaminate the unventilated aircraft or ambulance and its crew). At the treatment centre, chemical casualties are segregated. The contaminated clothes are removed and the casualty is taken to a separate treatment centre. Only after he is completely decontaminated and declared safe by a doctor is he moved into a general ward.

Systems followed by other countries are also being considered. For instance, there is the West German 'decontam' drill by which all the decontamination processes are done in one standard shelter. The men enter the shelter from one side removing contaminated clothing and pass through showers of water and certain solutions before getting new uniforms. The entire system can be moved on one truck.

Even metallic equipment is not safe from contamination: tanks and other vehicles that have operated in a contaminated area have to be washed with water and soap or, better still, chlorinated lime, chlorates or industrial alcohols. The U.S. army gives its troops the portable M-13 apparatus and the Soviets have TMS-65 and ARS-12D. Indian defence R&D establishments are believed to be developing their own kits. But according to defence experts, anti-chemical armour has many chinks. Even the elaborate decontamination procedures offer little protection in a large-scale chemical attack.

India has so far not talked of an offensive chemical capability though China has it and Pakistan is suspected to be acquiring it. Even the ever-suspicious SIPRI has accepted India's 'no chemical weapons' promise. However, India is not a signatory to the biological weapons convention of 1972 (neither is Pakistan) and has declared that it would not ban the manufacture and trade of thionylchloride (a weapon-grade chemical) in the absence of a chemical weapons convention. Western chemical warfare expert Edward M. Spiers wrote in the early 1980s that the British had established a chemical research facility in Cannanor, Kerala, to assess the impact of warm and humid terrain on chemical dispersal in a jungle battlefield. Another British establishment was said to be somewhere in northern India and the SIPRI report of 1973 said that its "present status is not known."

Anyway, the Indian statement in the document of the Conference on Disarmament in 1988 was categorical: "India does not possess any chemical weapons, nor does it have any intention of producing or acquiring them in the future." Pious words, indeed, but are they out of place in the world's new offensive chemistry?
GENERAL

France's 'Minimum Deterrence' Nuclear Strategy
904M0015F Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 90 (signed to press 17 Jul 90) pp 105-112

[Article by Vladimir Andreyevich Manzhola, candidate of historical sciences; assistant professor, Kiev State University]

[Text] A nuclear-free world: to be or not to be? The total eradication of nuclear arms cannot be viewed as other than a gradual and quite prolonged process. East and West can go through the first stages of this process together without renouncing their views: we, with our orientation toward the principles of a nuclear-free world, and the other side with its orientation toward nuclear "deterrence" at extremely low levels of nuclear arms. The reciprocal and multilateral approach to the conception and practice of "minimum deterrence" gives mankind a chance to avoid a situation in which it is overarmed with nuclear weapons.

Of unquestionable interest in this respect is the experience of nuclear policy in France whose leadership is declaring its dedication of almost 30 years standing to the principles and practice of "minimum deterrence" based on the conception of sufficiency. It appears in this connection that many Soviet assessments of French nuclear deterrence strategy were not always correct, were tentative, or were lacking in depth. Occasionally they were less the result of objective analysis and were more the expression of the correlation of feelings of sympathy or antipathy toward French foreign policy depending on one or another step taken by Paris in the international arena.

The stability of nuclear thinking in French official circles and the quite broad support for the doctrine of "deterrence of the strong by the weak" (the French version of "minimum deterrence") on the part of the basic political forces and the nation's population are a phenomenon that has historical, political, economic, and psychological roots, without the serious study of which it is difficult to find ways of involving France in the nuclear disarmament process.

Sources of Nuclear Thinking in French Foreign Policy

An explosion at the Reggane test site (Sahara) early in the morning on 13 February 1960 announced that France had joined the "atomic club." The power of the atomic blast was estimated at 60-70 kilotons. General De Gaulle, France's president, sent those in charge of the French atomic program a telegram of congratulations: "Vive la France! As of this morning, she has become stronger and freer." France had joined the nuclear arms race.

The creation of nuclear potential and its transformation into one of the key elements in the nation's military and foreign policy stimulated the emergence of a "power" and "nuclear" direction in French foreign political thought. In their theoretical explorations, French researchers invest nuclear arms with certain "properties" and "capacities" vis-a-vis numerous phenomena in international life. These properties are frequently presented in the form of "laws" of the nuclear age.

Thus, while investigating the influence of the nuclear factor on the structure of international relations, French theorists frequently conclude that the presence or absence of this weapon in the state arsenal decisively influences the status of the latter in the system of international relations, is the basic criterion for the differentiation of states, and determines the character of relations between them. This thesis has for more than 30 years been one of the principal arguments of official Paris in favor of the development and modernization of France's nuclear potential which is a kind of mandate enabling the nation to join the "great powers' club."

One more "law" of the nuclear age was formulated in the thesis of the "equalizing" power of atomic arms, i.e., their ability to equalize or level the military-political power of states that differ in their economic and demographic potential, in area, and in geographical location. This principle has become the cornerstone of modern French military doctrine. "The strategy of nuclear deterrence," "of the deterrence of the strong by the weak is based on this principle," states General L. Poirier, prominent military theoretician. J. P. Chevenement, who is presently France's defense minister, referred to the "equalizing" force of atomic weapons in a speech at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (April 1989).

In the opinion of French specialists, one of the most important consequences of nuclear weapons is that they have been followed by substantial changes in the nature and effectiveness of military-political alliances in today's world. Advocates of the thesis of the so-called "disunifying" power of atomic arms maintain that alliances have lost their meaning in the atomic age and that "nuclear logic has quickly devalued the very concept of alliances. This thesis is based on the notion of the indivisibility of nuclear risk, under the conditions of which it becomes unthinkable to use nuclear weapons to protect the interests of other countries because it can only serve the goals of protecting the highest interests of a nation, its actual existence. This thesis played an important part in the ruling circles' substantiation of their criticism of NATO, their withdrawal from the bloc's military organization, the maintenance of the present "modus vivendi" between France and NATO, and the conclusion as to the impossibility of France's making nuclear guarantees to other nations.

Considering the catastrophic character of the policy of direct violence in the nuclear age, French theoreticians are emphasizing the expansion of the "non-violent" function of military power in its nuclear expression, viewing it as a material factor for exerting political and
psychological pressure on the opponent with the aim of dissuading or forcing him to undertake or not to undertake certain actions.

“There can be no victors in nuclear war”—this conclusion was written in the White Paper on National Defense back in 1972. French specialists consider the most rational form of realization of military power in the nuclear age to be such application of it that makes it possible to attain the desired foreign policy goals without resorting to war. They propose “deterrence” as such a form and explain its strategic goal as being to exert a psychological influence on the enemy. It is designed to restrain the enemy from taking steps that might threaten the subject of “deterrence” without resorting to violence, while allowing diplomacy to make effective use of military power. "Nuclear arms," J. P. Chevenement emphasizes, "are not arms that are used in battle but are the diplomatic weapons of equilibrium and resistance to any kind of blackmail from any source."2

However, while revealing their concept of “deterrence,” the French authors in large measure disavow their rejection of violence. “Deterrence” is indeed seen, first, as the existence of a nuclear force capable of inflicting “unacceptable damage” on the enemy; second, as the permanent threat of using this force; and, third, as the possibility of its actual application. The threat is the central element of “deterrence.” Thus, it by no means excludes, but to the contrary, presupposes direct violence and the possibility of the actual use of military power.

French theorists do their utmost to camouflage the integral interrelationship between “deterrence” and direct violence, to give “deterrence” the most “nonviolent,” “peace-loving” character possible. To this end, several terms intended to denote different variants of such application of force that is based not on its real use but on the threat of such use have been put into scientific circulation. French authors distinguish between “persuasion,” “intimidation,” and “dissuasion” and try to formulate fundamental differences between these concepts.

Considering that the strategies of “intimidation” and “persuasion” are closest in their content to the strategy of war, French theorists consider themselves the interpreters of “dissuasion” as a peace-loving, preventive, defensive strategy to which military violence and aggressiveness are alien. They characterize “deterrence” as the defensive strategy of “prohibiting” aggression which is the exact opposite of the strategy of “intimidation.” According to General L. Poirier’s definition, “the strategy of nuclear deterrence is intended to create the prohibition effect by threatening such a level of nuclear reprisals as would force the enemy to evaluate potential losses and destruction as unacceptable compared with the benefits of conflict.”3

Nevertheless the permanent threat of using military force and nuclear reprisals, which inevitably creates tension in international relations and stimulates the arms race continues to be the alpha and omega of “deterrence.” This is also acknowledged by the creators of the French version of “deterrence.” “The political-strategic situation resulting from deterrence,” states L. Poirier, “is a peace situation or at least a crisis that does not turn into war,”4 which is reminiscent of the famous “Brinkmanship” doctrine.

The theories of French “realists” have been an attempt at the political-philosophical substantiation of the power approach in French foreign policy.

The Fifth Republic’s foreign policy strategy demonstrates the stability of nuclear thinking and deep dedication to the conception of nuclear “deterrence.” This phenomenon can be traced back to the postulates of General De Gaulle’s political philosophy. The Gaullist idea of the nation as an absolute value determined the special understanding of international relations, a characteristic feature of which is the affirmation of the absolute priority of national interests over regimes and ideologies. The national factor in the Gaullist understanding is integrally connected with the absolutization of the force factor, with military might, and with the possession of the most sophisticated weapons. Therefore, the very fact that nuclear arms exist and that other countries possess them is sufficient foundation for [France’s] possession of its own nuclear potential. France, General de Gaulle stated, “must acquire nuclear arms because others have them. Otherwise she will not be able to decide her own fate.”5

The basic ideas of Gaullism on national interest and the force factor found their concentrated expression in the conception of “national grandeur,” that defined the basic goal of France’s foreign political strategy—maintaining the rank of a great power with “worldwide responsibility.” It was specifically within the framework of the creation of a strong France and the restoration of its former grandeur that the question of creating nuclear potential, which for de Gaulle was the confirmation of France’s status as a great power, was raised. While paying tribute to such choice, J. P. Chevenement noted in November 1988 that de Gaulle’s greatest service was that he identified the concept of national interests with the concept of nuclear deterrence.

De Gaulle and his successors in the presidency tried to make maximum use of the nuclear factor, transforming it into a means of foreign political bargaining, maneuvering, pressure, and even blackmail. Such injection of the nuclear factor into foreign policy leads to the emergence and realization of nuclear diplomacy in foreign policy. The existence and development of the nuclear potential and the implementation of the “deterrence” are increasingly transferred from the military-strategic to the political-diplomatic sphere. The history of the Fifth Republic attests to the fact that the ruling circles viewed nuclear arms more as a foreign political rather than a military instrument. The nuclear factor acquired the character of a key power category linking the nation’s military and foreign policy to its diplomacy.
Even today France sees nuclear arms as a most important element in its military and foreign political strategy. President F. Mitterand has emphasized that France's nuclear potential and the strategy of nuclear "deterrence" are the basic guarantee of the nation's independence and security. While maintaining that it is specifically the equilibrium of nuclear forces that made it possible to keep the peace in Europe during the postwar years, he emphasized that France possesses the third nuclear potential in the world, which makes it possible for it to "strike any target at any time, anywhere in the world." Characteristically, these are practically the same words as were spoken by de Gaulle in November 1959 on the readiness of France's "strike forces" to deploy at any moment, any time, and in any place.

The Strategic Model of "Deterrence of the Strong by the Weak"

The formation and development of the Fifth Republic's conception of military strategy were directly connected with its first president—de Gaulle. He was able to soberly assess the essence of strategic situations in the world in the late '50s and early '60s which were characterized by the formation of nuclear-missile parity between the USA and USSR, the tendencies in its evolution, and the resulting consequences of this for France.

Doubting America's guarantees as an ally and fearing that Paris, contrary to its interests, might be drawn into a conflict by U.S. policy in the international arena, de Gaulle concluded that France must take care of its own security. De Gaulle saw the means of attaining this goal to lie in an independent military policy based on the doctrine of nuclear "deterrence." The doctrine was based on the absolute priority of nuclear forces in military organizational development, their independence of NATO's military integration mechanism, the independent national character of strategic conceptions of their use, which presupposes orientation not toward waging but toward preventing war (or at least, the noninvolvement of France in a war that is contradictory to its national interests) through the constant threat of an immediate massive retaliatory strike against the enemy's demographic and economic centers.

Based on priorities defined by the president, French military thought tried to find such a form of "deterrence" that would correspond to the real potential of their country, which was expressed in the French variant of "deterrence of the strong by the weak."

The theoretical possibility of such a variant of "deterrence" is based on General L. Poirier's law of political-strategic calculations of "benefits and risks" of the nuclear age. French theorists maintain that the total asymmetry of "benefits and risks" makes the "deterrence of the weak by the strong" possible because the "weak" can resort to using nuclear reprisals to "punish" the aggressor, whereas the "strong" will hardly subject themselves to such a risk in order to realize secondary interests through aggression.

This model is also based on a number of other "laws." In addition to the "leveling" and "disunifying" force of atomic weapons which we have already examined, they include the theses of the "proportionality" of deterrence and the "sanctuarization" of national territory.

The thesis of the "proportionality of deterrence" is one of the fundamental principles of the French model. Hence, its second name—the strategy of "proportional" or "minimum," "deterrence." According to this thesis, in order to "deter" an enemy, it is not necessary to possess nuclear power equal to that of the enemy. It is sufficient to strike several powerful blows, the damage from which would be proportional to or would exceed the enemy's potential acquisitions in the event of his success. According to French views, the possession of nuclear weapons transforms a state's territory into a "sanctuary," i.e., makes the territory entirely inviolable against encroachment from without. This gives nuclear states a special political status that combines sovereignty and "sanctuarization," in other words, total inviolability.

A strategic model that contained the aggregate of conceptions, principles, and elements of the mechanism of practical realization of the French variant of "deterrence" was developed on the basis of "laws" that substantiated the theoretical possibility of "deterrence of the strong by the weak." Its basic principles were reflected in the doctrines of Ayere (1967) and Fourquet (1969) and in the White Paper on National Defense (1972).

The central element of the model of "deterrence of the strong by the weak" is the concept of the "critical threshold of aggressiveness," the violation of which would threaten the existence of the French nation and would justify the decision to use nuclear weapons. This "threshold" is at the level of the "sanctuarized" space of national territory and the "unsanctuarized" space of "approaches," i.e., neighboring states adjacent to France. Nuclear deterrence is thus extended to national territory (a constant) and to France's "vital interests" (a variable that is determined only by the nation's president as the guarantee of "deterrence" depending on the concrete circumstances of the crisis situation).

French military experts reject NATO's "flexible response" as unacceptable to the "weak" and consider an "instantaneous mass strike" the only acceptable response to any form of aggression that crosses the nuclear threshold. In its initial version, this conception was known as "all or nothing."

If "deterrence" is to be successful in fulfilling its function of "prohibiting" aggression, it must have a definite level of validity, i.e., must ensure a sufficient prohibiting effect. In the area of nuclear forces employment strategy, the "weak" can create the necessary effect only by striking at the enemy's demographic objects. From this
followed the choice of "strikes against cities" as the only possible option for the "weak" and the rejection of the American "counterforce" conception.

In the organizational development of nuclear forces, the validity of "minimum deterrence" concept is connected with the concept of sufficiency—one of the fundamental principles of France's "deterrence" concept. The sufficiency principle defined the minimum level of nuclear potential that, in the event of a retaliatory strike against the enemy, would inflict damage equal to or greater than the benefit to the aggressor.

According to the official estimates, the initially planned level of sufficiency of the (quantitative) development of France's strategic nuclear potential was attained in the second half of the '70s when the ability to inflict "unacceptable damage" on any potential aggressor was evaluated by Parisian officialdom as the possibility of placing one of the "superpowers" in a "decisive disequilibrium" given the existence of military-strategic parity between them. At the present time, France defines the sufficient and valid level of nuclear "deterrence" as the ability to destroy 150-200 demographic, economic, and other vitally important targets on enemy territory. This level of sufficiency was to be secured in the early '90s by continuous patrolling by three (out of the existing six) atomic missile-carrying submarines (48 missiles with approximately 300 warheads) or four submarines (approximately 400 warheads) during a period of crisis.

The question of the role and place of tactical nuclear weapons is one of the most complex and contradictory elements of the strategic model of minimum "deterrence." Its most important functions were defined: "testing" the enemy to determine the degree of aggressiveness; the function of "extreme warning," i.e., denoting the fact that the enemy has reached "vitaly important interests" ("sanctuary") and demonstration of the resolve to employ strategic nuclear forces if the enemy becomes more aggressive. In the opinion of French specialists, such an understanding of the function of tactical systems makes it possible to integrate them into the strategy of "nuclear deterrence."

The striving for greater "commeasurable reliability of retaliatory actions" curbed the desire for distancing from the extremes of the "all or nothing" concept. At the same time it was noted that within "testing within the framework of deterrence" has nothing in common with "flexible response" or with controlled escalation that predetermine the possession of tactical nuclear weapons in a volume comparable with the enemy's and their recognition as battlefield weapons. According to the French conception, they are intended not for fighting but for "facilitating" strategic deterrence, which does not require a large number of tactical systems.

The "three circles" concept, which defines the following geopolitical zones of French interests—national territory; Europe and the approaches to Europe; and the rest of the world—is an important element of French military discipline. At the same time, it is emphasized that notwithstanding the geographical contiguity of the first and second circles, their spaces are strategically heterogeneous. While the strategy of autonomous "nuclear deterrence" is operative in the first circle, the classical strategy of military actions involving conventional armed forces is operative in the second.

The White Paper on National Defense noted, incidentally, that owing to tactical nuclear weapons, "deterrence" strategy opens the zone not only of the national territory, but also the approaches to it which, in addition to the adopted concept of employment of tactical nuclear forces injected a certain contradictory and ambiguity into the French "deterrence" strategy and influenced the "purity" of its national purpose, the proclaimed renunciation of escalation and conduct of military operations.

The Evolution of Nuclear Doctrine

The strategic model of "deterrence of the strong by the weak," the basic principles of which were recorded in the White Paper on National Security, retains its significance even now. At the same time, it could not fail to bear the stamp of the very heated debates on strategic problems that were unabating in the nation in the '70s and '80s and of very definite attempts to modify France's "deterrence" doctrine in order to bring it closer into line with the NATO strategy of "flexible response" and to adapt it to Paris's aspirations in the sphere of European politics.

The first mass attack on "deterrence of the strong by the weak" took place in the second half of the '70s. A unique signal to launch this attack was given by the signing of the Ottawa declaration on Atlantic relations of nations participating in NATO in June 1974, that made a high assessment of the independent role played by French and British "nuclear deterrence forces contributing to the general strengthening of the alliance's deterrent forces." Thus, the interconnected and complementary nature of U.S., British, and French nuclear forces at the level of the final goals of their existence were officially recognized and approved. It was the articulation of this principle that determined the general course of evolution of French military strategy.

The thesis of the "relativity of deterrence and atomic actions" (the announcement by General Guy Meir in the autumn of 1975), followed by the concept of "deterrence at all levels"—from "ballistic missiles to rifles" (a statement by Premier R. Barre in the summer of 1977), which presupposed the modification of France's "deterrence" doctrine, were advanced as a counterweight to the Gaullist concept of "absolute deterrence" based on the "prohibition" of aggression.

First, the striving to decisively break with the "all or nothing" concept led to the adoption of the idea of the gradualness of the deterrence process, within the framework of which tactical nuclear weapons were recognized...
not only as a means of "deterrence," but also as battlefield weapons, the possibility of the real application of which makes it possible to avoid the choice between universal destruction and total capitulation.

Second, the "deterrence" concept based on the "prohibition" principle was relegated to a secondary position, giving way to the idea of "battle" as the basis of military doctrine. Thus, the thesis of the "renunciation of doing battle" was supplemented by the opposing idea of the employment of tactical nuclear weapons in a "nuclear engagement," which created the basis for drawing closer to the NATO strategy of "flexible response."

Third, the "expanded sanctuary" concept, which meant the possibility of extending the action of French "deterrence" to other territories, especially the Federal Republic of Germany, was advanced in place of the "national sanctuary" concept. This concept determined the evolution of French military-strategic principles in the direction of their greater degree of compatibility with the NATO doctrine of the "forward defensive line" and was oriented toward the recognition of the existence in Europe of a "single conflict space," within the framework of which a possible "engagement" will be "the same" for France and its allies.

The "new reading" of the model of "deterrence of the strong by the weak" by President V. Giscard d'Estaing and General Guy Meri generated sharp criticism and resistance on the part of Gaullists, advocates of "absolute deterrence," and the country's leftist forces. The president was blamed for French military strategy's "jump" 10 years backward, for his corrections that undermined conceptual principles and eroded the strategic model of "deterrence of the weak by the strong" that dissolves and vanishes in the conception of the "expanded sanctuary" leading to the reintegration of France in the NATO military mechanism and to the danger that the country will be drawn into a war that is alien to its interests. The burden of such accusations ultimately led to the practical immobilization of the realization of new military-strategic principles. This was accompanied by the further intensification of the ambiguous French doctrine of "deterrence" and by the accumulation of internal contradictions. In the late '70s and early '80s, this doctrine was midway between the model of "deterrence of the strong by the weak" and the French variant of "flexible response."

In the '80s the struggle continued between two basic trends in the development of the French doctrine of nuclear "deterrence": the trend toward the further departure from Gaullist principles and the trend toward the "neo-Gaullist" reading of the principles of "deterrence of the strong by the weak." After adopting the course of "purging" military doctrine of the legacy of his predecessor, F. Mitterand at the same time, through a number of foreign policy principles, set certain "slippage angles" for French military policy, which significantly complicated the realization of the chosen course.

The primary point at issue was the slippage of French military doctrine in the direction of Atlantism, which was reinforced in the political declaration signed by F. Mitterand at the Williamsburg meeting of the Seven in May 1983, which emphasized that Western security is "indivisible" and must be viewed from "global" positions. The thesis of "decisive solidarity" with the North Atlantic alliance was advanced. The second "slippage angle" was determined by the mounting interest of Paris in the Europeanization of its nuclear policy, in forcing integration processes in Western Europe, and _inter alia_, their military measurement. The strengthening of the "Eastern" azimuth of military doctrine, which was reinforced in the preamble of the law on the military program for 1984-1988, determined the content of the third "slippage angle."

These trends intensified during the "coexistence" of President Mitterand, a socialist, and J. Chirac, the right-wing prime minister, who made one more attempt to substantially alter the French doctrine of "deterrence." Evaluating the consequences of the signing of the Soviet-American INF Treaty as a blow against the validity and effectiveness of the "flexible response" strategy, the Chirac government inclined increasingly toward supporting NATO strategy. A. Giraud became the Fifth Republic's first defense minister who in October 1987 positively evaluated NATO's "flexible response" strategy at the official level.

Speaking in December 1987 at the Higher National Defense Institute immediately after the signing of the INF Treaty in Washington, J. Chirac evaluated its consequences as a "challenge" to Western Europe and noted that Paris should draw a number of conclusions from it. First, the lessening of the differences between France and her allies in respect to the "deterrence" conception makes it possible to speak of the coexistence of French strategy and NATO strategy as the basis of interaction in the military-political area. Second, the territory of neighboring states is no longer a "defensive rampart," but is a "single strategic space" together with the territory of the nation proper. Third, encroachment from any quarter on this space must be regarded as "encroachment" on France itself because there "cannot be a separate battle for Germany (the reference is to the FRG.—V. M.—med) and a separate battle for France." Fourth, such an "encroachment" should be answered not only by conventional arms, but by tactical nuclear weapons as well.

Such military-political and military-strategic principles in the spirit of the radicalization of theses developed under V. Giscard d'Estaing led to the deep revision of Gaullist principles of "deterrence of the strong by the weak in the direction of bringing French nuclear strategy closer to U. S. and NATO strategy in Europe and the striving to lend a "European ring" to the nation's nuclear strategy.

The Chirac government's interpretation of the concept of using tactical nuclear weapons was one more step in this direction. The reference was to the development of
strategic and tactical nuclear forces, to the establishment of a direct relationship between the maneuvering of conventional armed forces and the possibility for the application of tactical nuclear weapons within the framework of such a maneuver. The use of such a weapon as the "last warning" presupposed the admissibility in such an interpretation of a short-term nuclear battle in Europe by inflicting a "diversified and deeply echeloned" strike by tactical nuclear forces with the aim of stopping the aggressor. It was essentially proposed to create a second echelon of "deterrence" as a stage of nuclear escalation of the conflict in Europe entirely in the spirit of the "flexible response" strategy.

F. Mitterrand came out as the principal opponent of attempts to revise the "deterrence" doctrine. The historical paradox was that the Gaullist prime minister was in favor of the reorientation of the strategy of "deterrence" in the spirit of departure from its Gaullist beginnings while the socialist president favored a return to these beginnings and a "neo-Gaullist" reading of the model of "deterrence of the strong by the weak."

The Mitterrand presidency confirmed practically all the basic principles of the strategic model of "deterrence of the strong by the weak": from the thesis of the "equalizing" power of atomic weapons and the "indivisibility of nuclear risk" to the concept of the "antidemographic" strike and the principle of sufficiency, dedication to the independent and autonomous character of nuclear "deterrence." The "national security" concept and the "three circles" theory were "reinstated."

The president of France emphasizes the necessity of returning to the initial essence of the "deterrence" conception, the goal of which is not "to win a war, but to prevent one."

In the opinion of F. Mitterand, such a prospect is opened up by the elimination of Soviet and American medium- and shorter-range missiles, which makes it possible to return to "true deterrence," which is realized through strategic forces: "deterrence" directed toward the "prohibition" of aggression. The emphasis on the prevention of war has been accompanied by sharp criticism of the NATO "flexible response" conception as being obsolete and having lost strategic meaning, which is confirmed by the elimination of the two intermediate stages in the nuclear escalation process as a result of the INF Treaty.

Attempts were made to rethink the place and role of tactical nuclear weapons as part of the effort to impart a purely strategic character to France's "deterrence" doctrine. In 1983 the decision was made to abandon the term "tactical nuclear weapons" in favor of the concept of "prestrategic" nuclear forces, to take the latter away from the army command and to make them directly subordinate to the General Staff of France's armed forces. In this way it was emphasized that the "prestrategic" nuclear forces comprise a unified ensemble together with strategic forces and are "at the very beginning of the nuclear deterrence process."

The conception of "extreme warning" was assigned a purely strategic character aimed at opening up the possibility of conducting "extraordinary" negotiations on the regulation of crisis before making the decision to activate strategic nuclear forces. It was emphasized that such an interpretation strengthened the "deterrence" strategy, making it possible to abandon the primitive "all or nothing" concept, but that it on the other hand excludes attempts to bring French doctrine closer to the "flexible response" strategy that contains the idea of "nuclear engagement" in Europe which is unacceptable to France.

The French leadership has rejected all attempts to regenerate the "expanded sanctuary" idea, to rigidly fix the zone of France's "vital interests" on the FRG's eastern border, to extend French nuclear guarantees to West Germany, to include the French armed forces in the "forward defensive lines," and to place them in one of NATO's "gunslots."

Many questions, vaguenesses, ambiguities, and contradictions still remain in the French doctrine of nuclear deterrence. The following can be included among them: the contribution of France's nuclear strategy to the "globality" and "indivisibility" of Western security, attempts at the expansive "European" interpretation of the concept of "vital interests" and the principle of sufficiency, which also occasionally acquires "European" measurement; the question of the place of nuclear strategy in French plans for the construction of a "military Europe" within the framework of the West European integration process; the idea of creating a "European deterrence pole" based on French and British nuclear forces; the space aspect of nuclear strategy, etc.

At the same time, it is possible to say that the principles of "deterring the strong by the weak," notwithstanding repeated attempts to revise them thoroughly, demonstrate enviable viability and even today comprise the foundation of France's nuclear "deterrence" doctrine. This is the pragmatic, nationally colored variant of the "minimum nuclear deterrence" doctrine that is presently attracting the attention of many specialists and politicians in the West and East. The many-sided transition to the conception and practice of "minimum deterrence" could become an important step in the decisive and deep reduction of nuclear potentials to the lowest possible levels and an important step toward a nuclear-free world.

Let us sum up certain results.

1. Nuclear thinking and the conception of nuclear "deterrence" demonstrate their viability in the mentality of France's political and military circles. The doctrine of "deterrence of the strong by the weak" has been and in the medium term will evidently continue to be the basis of France's policy in the spheres of defense, security, and disarmament. The assumption that France will liquidate its nuclear potential in any stage of the nuclear disarmament process, up to and including the notorious process, is unsubstantiated.
2. The French variant of “minimum deterrence” contains a number of conceptions, principles, and elements that are harmonious and comparable with the new Soviet military thinking, with our conception of rational sufficiency. Among them: the recognition of the fact that there can be no victor in a nuclear war and that it is absolutely irrational; the thesis that nuclear weapons are above all a political instrument; the orientation toward preventing rather than waging war, toward the “prohibition” of aggression; the understanding of the principle of sufficiency as the minimum quantitative and qualitative level of development of nuclear potential capable of inflicting “unacceptable damage” on the enemy.

3. The strategic character of the conception of “extreme warning” is of definite interest for tactical (“prestrategic”) nuclear forces oriented toward the minimum level of such forces. In the event the NATO forces refuse to conduct negotiations on the “third zero” for tactical forces in Europe, this conception could promote the determination of parameters of the goal of such negotiations—the reduction of tactical nuclear forces in Europe to the lowest possible levels—that are acceptable to the various parties.

4. Soviet-French dialog in the military-strategic sphere, comparison of military doctrines on the basis of the conception of rational sufficiency and the conception of “minimum deterrence,” and the reduction of differences between these doctrines could be instrumental in the development of flexible equivalents of nuclear potentials of large and medium-size nuclear powers in the process of determining the further route to a nuclear-free peace after a 50-percent reduction in Soviet and U. S. strategic offensive arms.

5. The definition of such flexible equivalents could be based on the French interpretation of “proportional deterrence,” sufficiency, and “acceptable damage” as damage at such a level that would be equal to or greater than the enemy’s potential gain in the event of his victory, i. e., would correspond to the “stake” of a given country in the “game.” Obviously, the “stake” of a large state differs from the “stake” of a medium-size state. By comparing economic, demographic, and military resource potentials and the size of the territory of medium-size and large states, it is possible to adduce certain coefficients that would form the basis of flexible equivalents.

6. Let us assume that the equivalent of the nuclear potentials of medium-size and large states is 1.5 and let us compare with widely discussed plans for the 75- and 95-percent reduction of nuclear potential. In the first instance, the nuclear arsenals of large nuclear states—the USA and the USSR—would drop to the level of 3,000 nuclear warheads. In such a case, maximum level of nuclear arms of such a country as France would be 600 nuclear warheads. This number of warheads corresponds to existing plans for the development and modernization of French nuclear forces up to the mid-’90s. Thus, with a reduction of nuclear potentials by 75 percent, the 600-unit ceiling projected for France would create a basis for including Paris in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament problems under conditions that are entirely acceptable to it.

7. If nuclear potentials are reduced by 95 percent, i. e., if the “prezero” level is reached, it is assumed that the USSR and the USA will have 600 single-warhead ICBMs with various basing modes. In such a case, the level of the French nuclear potential would be set at 120 such missiles. At the present time, France has 96 sea-based missiles and 18 land-based missiles. It is also assumed that this level will be maintained in the ’90s.

8. Thus, the balance of multilateral minimum nuclear “deterrence” would be achieved at the “prezero” level. The fact that all “poles” of nuclear “deterrence”—the USA, USSR, People’s Republic of China, and Western Europe (with two national autonomous centers)—would possess equal or comparable levels of nuclear potentials would promote the stabilizing role of such a balance.

Footnotes


France Plans To Revise Nuclear Stockpiles

91WC0010A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Union Edition p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "Truncated Triad?"]

[Text] Paris—The French authorities are studying the question of eliminating a component of the country’s nuclear triad, on which the doctrine of nuclear deterrence—the cornerstone of national defense—has been based for approximately a quarter of a century.
What nuclear arms does France possess today? Five submarines (a sixth will be commissioned in 1994), 20 Mirage aircraft equipped with intermediate-range missiles, and 18 surface-to-surface missiles deployed on the Albion Plateau. It is the latter, specialists observe, which will most likely be sacrificed (or their modernization program, at least), whereas the so-called ocean-going strategic force will remain the "core" of deterrence.

J.-M. Boucheron, chairman of the Defense and Armed Forces Commission of the National Assembly, considers "ideal" a system of defense which consists of nuclear submarines and the latest Rafale aircraft equipped with missiles with a range of up to 1,500 km, which will replace the Mirages in a few years. This viewpoint is shared by many military officers also.

For its part, the French Defense Ministry believes that it is essential to preserve all credit intended for the nuclear arsenals—and this means 33 billion francs [Fr]—even if a component of the triad is eliminated.

The scheduled revision of nuclear stockpiles would be a part of a revision of the entire defense concept. The new concept would take account of the fundamental changes in the international situation and the unprecedented progress in the disarmament sphere and also the country's far from unlimited financial resources. It should also take account of the danger centers which have emerged recently, primarily the conflict in the Persian Gulf region.

At the same time the people on the banks of the Seine are also counting to a certain extent on cooperation with Britain in the creation of the latest missile with a greater range. This would permit a marked reduction in costs. As a whole, J.-M. Boucheron advocates a reduction in defense spending from 3.5 to 3 percent of GNP by the year 2000, which would provide a savings of Fr120 billion.

Many correspondents in the Paris press are currently accusing the Defense Ministry, the General Staff and General Arms Directorate, which deals with the manufacture of combat equipment, of a lack of strategic thinking and an inability to adapt to the changed conditions and formulate new approaches to defense.

President F. Mitterrand, who is commander in chief of the Armed Forces, will in the next few days announce the main directions of France's military strategy in the conventional and nuclear arms sphere for the coming years.

Despite the possible elimination of a component of the nuclear triad, the commissioning in the 1990's of a new class of submarine, new aircraft and the Hades tactical missiles will expand France's offensive potential considerably. For this reason many people here believe that it is time for Paris to draw a line under its nuclear stockpiles and abandon a further buildup there, the more so in that the Soviet Union and the United States intend to continue reducing their nuclear offensive arms.

As far as the "inviulnerability" of the submarines is concerned, on which, to judge by everything, France is now counting, as the local press observes, quoting the American journal AVIATION WEEK, the Soviet Kosmos 1870/Almaz surveys and photographs the oceans to a depth of 300 meters.

'Positive Results' Seen From Cheney Visit to Moscow

PM2210145190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Oct 90 First Edition p 2

[Report by Major M. Zhegrov: "Visit Over"]

[Text] U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney, who was paying an official visit to our country at the invitation of Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, member of the Presidential Council and USSR defense minister, visited the "Znamya Truda" Plant 19 October. The guest was given an opportunity to study the production of aviation technology and meet with specialists employed at the enterprise.

On the same day, R. Cheney and his entourage left the Soviet Union. They were seen off at Sheremetyevo Airport by: Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov; Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister; Army General V.I. Varennikov, USSR deputy defense minister; Army General I.M. Tret'yak; Colonel General of Aviation Ye.I. Shaposhnikov; Army General V.M. Shabanov, and other officials.

The send-off party included J. Joyce, U.S. charge d'affaires ad interim in the USSR, and Brigadier General G. Govan, defense attache at the U.S. Embassy in the USSR.

The U.S. and USSR state flags were hoisted at the airport, an honor guard formed on the airfield, and the two countries' national anthems played.

Before R. Cheney's departure, the USSR and U.S. defense ministers held a news conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center.

Speaking at the news conference, USSR Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov and U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney assessed highly the significance of the official visit by the U.S. military department head to our country. A broad range of problems in Soviet-U.S. relations were discussed and the role of the Soviet Union and the United States in the modern world examined during meetings with USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze, and in the course of talks at the USSR Defense Ministry. Attention centered on disarmament problems above all, along with the situation in the Near East. Noting the importance of dialogue, the U.S. defense secretary expressed confidence that it will help to further develop mutual understanding and deepen trust between our countries.
Answering numerous questions from Soviet and foreign journalists, R. Cheney stressed that the United States is currently making fundamental changes to its military strategy, which was founded on the possibility of global confrontation with the USSR.

No one can now deny that positive results have been attained in the development of arms control, notably, for instance, progress in the sphere of conventional arms cuts. Moreover, the Soviet Union is today cutting back its troops and withdrawing them from Europe. In this connection over the next five years, R. Cheney noted, the United States intends to reduce its Armed Forces by roughly 25 percent. The number of American servicemen in Europe will be reduced by 40,000 men. There will be 12-14 instead of the current 18 regular troop divisions. The naval forces will have roughly 450 instead of the previously planned 600 warships. This will ultimately result in a significant reduction in the military budget.

The United States no longer regards the Soviet Union as a potential adversary, R. Cheney said, it wants constructive cooperation with it and regards the future with optimism. Fruitful dialogue is under way between our countries, but this does not mean that all our differences have disappeared. I would not recommend that the United States abandon strategic offensive arms, R. Cheney said, since the USSR possesses such weapons. But it is important to point out that this concern may be relieved at the appropriate talks.

Answering questions about the situation in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. defense secretary expressed hope that the political and economic sanctions adopted by his country and other states will ultimately compel Iraq to end its aggression and withdraw its troops from Kuwait. The United States is not abandoning this policy, but does not rule out other options for settling the crisis.

Answering the same question, Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov once again recalled the importance of seeking political solutions to the Persian Gulf conflict. In his opinion, the use of military force there is undesirable.

He also said that it was problems of preserving peace and not problems of arms that were the main topic of his conversations with the U.S. defense secretary. D.T. Yazov explained certain aspects of the modernization of strategic offensive arms. The Soviet defense minister linked this not with the USSR's desire to constantly increase the number of its missiles, but with the technical need to replace them. He said that there will be a corresponding reduction in missile production following strategic offensive arms cuts.

The USSR defense minister received many questions concerning the country's domestic problems and relating to the life and activity of the Armed Forces. For instance, journalists were interested in the possibility of reducing the military budget next year. D.T. Yazov said that this question is being resolved by the USSR Supreme Soviet but has still not been resolved. However, it can be said for starters that this reduction will total 5-6 billion rubles.

He categorically denied—as groundless—the rumors of the possibility of a military coup in the country. "The USSR Armed Forces are part of the Soviet people and will never act against them or against their will," D.T. Yazov said.

With regard to the future of the Warsaw Pact, D.T. Yazov said: "We are becoming convinced that its military organization is unnecessary. In the near future this question will be examined officially at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee. As for the future existence of the Warsaw Pact's political structures, until recently none of its member countries, barring the GDR, said that they were leaving the political alliance, the minister stressed."

Answers were also given to other questions from journalists.

France Debates Future of Nuclear Triad

"91WC0012A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Oct 90 First Edition p 1"

[Article by Vladimir Bolshakov: "What Awaits the Triad?"]

[Text] Paris—French President F. Mitterrand, through his prime minister, M. Rocard, instructed Minister of Defense Jean-Pierre Chevenement to prepare a final proposal for the French Defense Council by the end of this year "with the aim of guaranteeing the future of the French nuclear deterrent forces and maintaining their reliability on the eve of the next century."

New debates have recently started up again in the French Ministry of Defense and parliament with respect to the future of the French nuclear "triad."

France has consistently refused to cut its nuclear forces as long as all the other nuclear powers, first and foremost the USSR and the United States, do not reduce their own nuclear forces to a level equal with that of the French. It is not accidental that the five-year program of modernization of the armed forces, which was adopted back under the rightist government of J. Chirac, was handed over as if in a relay race to the government of socialists that succeeded it.

The debates that have arisen regarding the future of these forces are associated not only with the traditional fall discussion of the state budget for the next fiscal year but also with the development of the international situation. The French military cannot help but admit the obvious, that the NATO classification of the Soviet Union as a "potential enemy" has become obsolete. Especially now when there is talk of French and USSR
harmony and cooperation and the more active participation of our country in the process of European integration, not to mention the actual dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Taking into account the progress in the negotiations on the reduction of USSR and U.S. nuclear forces, and the progress at the Vienna talks in connection with the unification of Germany, President F. Mitterrand has already issued instructions on the need to cut France’s military budget in the near future by four to five billion francs.

It should be noted, however, that these reductions did not envisage lowering expenditures on France’s nuclear forces. When LES ECHOS, a newspaper for business circles, reported the other day: “France plans to cut its nuclear forces,” this served as a signal to many that a decision was made at the very top about a review of the structure of the French nuclear “triad,” or the elimination of one of its parts.

The development of events in the Persian Gulf area would seem to speak in support of such a version. The newspaper LES ECHOS openly raised the question about a review of the structure of the nuclear “triad” and the need to develop an adequate answer to the “new threats on the part of the south,” for example Iraq, not even excluding the employment of the neutron bomb. Thus, does the question in these debates concern a future French strategic concept of a new potential enemy or a repudiation of previous enemies?

From the instructions issued by the president to the minister of defense, only one thing is now clear—the president as the supreme commander of all of the Armed Forces of France does not foresee the elimination of national nuclear forces.

Zholkver on ‘Beneficial Conditions’ for Disarmament
LD2310215890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 23 Oct 90

[Commentary by political analyst Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] Following the UN and the World Peace Council appeal, the action week for disarmament has been marked for several years now and, it seems, has become a routine and rather ineffective measure. However, I think that this time new, rather more beneficial conditions for solving disarmament problems have been created.

First of all, I refer to the principal changes in Soviet-U.S. relations. As was noted during our president’s recent meeting with the U.S. defense secretary, the realization that war between the USSR and the United States is impossible has already moved from the area of philosophical speculation into the sphere of practical action. Indeed, the U.S. and Soviet medium- and long-range missiles are being destroyed and an agreement to reduce the strategic offensive weapons of the two largest nuclear powers by half is in the works. Our chief of general staff is visiting the secret underground U.S. air defense center and the Pentagon chief is acquainting himself with the aircraft factory producing our MIG’s. U.S. chemical weapons and 40,000 U.S. soldiers are being withdrawn from West Germany and our troops are getting ready to leave East Germany. Besides, the issue does not rest with a reduction only in the Soviet and U.S. military potential. Even France, which perhaps was the most jealous of the nuclear triad, is now talking about two of its three components probably being wound up in the near future.

The general agreement on a substantial reduction of conventional NATO and Warsaw Pact weapons in Europe is being prepared for next month and these organizations themselves are transforming more and more into political unions.

But, of course, we shall not become euphoric. Mountains of weapons have been accumulated in the world, not least with our most active participation. And, God forbid, they might start talking loudly in the Persian Gulf. And even if our testing grounds have been silent for a year already unfortunately nuclear explosions in Nevada have not ceased.

So, there are still enormous and sufficiently difficult tasks which present themselves before disarmament. But there are factors which facilitate their solution. The present acute debates in Washington on the problems of the U.S. budget deficit show that the arms race is beyond the means even of the richest countries such as the United States.

START TALKS
7 Nov Red Square Parade To Feature SS-25’s
PM281092890 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Oct 90 First Edition p 1


[Excerpts] In accordance with the presidential decree, a military parade to mark the 73rd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution will take place in Red Square on 7 November. For the first time, the ICBM’s known in the West as SS-25’s will take part. [passage omitted]

The very fact of the participation of modern strategic missiles in the parade and the openness with which we are to show them is, I believe, a sign of the times and an aspect of the new thinking. The last time similar weapons were shown was 15 years ago. [passage omitted]

And another, prosaic, note. The missile men value their time and know how to look after public money. Therefore, their preparations for the parade have been incorporated into planned combat training.
SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Zorin Questions Current Viability of SDI Program
LD2110103690 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 21 Oct 90

["Moscow Viewpoint" program prepared by Valentin Zorin; read by announcer]

[Text] The new man in charge of the SDI program, Henry Cooper, declared recently that the aims of the program would be altered considerably. According to Cooper, it will no longer be meant for protecting the country from a massive attack of thousands of ballistic missiles, but will meet much more modest purposes, protection from limited nuclear attacks. As we can see after each revision, the idea of the project becomes more and more detached from its original variant proposed by the then president Reagan in 1983. There is no talk today about the need to build a shield in outer space over the United States. Now the Pentagon plans to use land-based missiles instead of space weapons at the program's first stage.

To my mind all this serves to confirm that certain technical faults were discovered in the Star Wars program. When the realization of the program began reports appeared shortly afterward saying that the scientific aspects of the program were not substantiated and verified enough. It so happened that Ronald Reagan put more trust into the prestige of physicist Edward Teller, known in America as father of the H-bomb and also as the author of the SDI project, than into an objective scientific analysis. As the work on the project progressed more and more, reports appeared telling about its scientific and technical unsoundness. Three years ago a group of American experts discovered serious errors in Teller's calculations that made the project practically unfeasible, at least in the foreseeable future, and that happened when billions of dollars had already been spent on the realization of the program. The White House found it difficult to draw the necessary conclusions at the time, tell the American people the truth, and abandon the costly unrealistic idea.

But why is it that today the current administration refuses to face the truth and give up the hopeless idea? Though the Pentagon's request for allocations has been cut down considerably by the Congress, billions will still be spent in the current fiscal year on the Star Wars plan, and this is despite the fact that technical considerations in favor of the cancellation of the program have been complemented now by political arguments as well.

We may recall at this point that the idea of the SDI program was put forward at the very height of the Cold War period, when the Soviet Union and the United States looked at each other as potential enemies. Military programs were drawn up with an eye to nuclear confrontation concepts. But now the situation has changed, why does the United States continue its work on the SDI program even in its changed form? We all know that today the Soviet Union and United States act more and more as partners on the international scene. It means that in these conditions the SDI program is just a waste of the American taxpayer's money. As for Soviet-American relations, it can only be a source of suspicion and mistrust, and I am convinced that this extremely costly, technically erroneous, and politically false project is not worth any spending.

Effect of Cut in U.S. SDI Program Noted
PM3010153190 Moscow KRASNAya ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by TASS correspondent P. Vanichkin: "Does 'Star Wars' Have a Future?"]

[Text] Washington, 26 October—The reduction in appropriations for the "Star Wars" program proposed by Congress will postpone for at least two years a decision by the U.S. Administration on creating an ABM shield and placing it in space. H. Cooper, director of the SDI Organization, has announced this.

President G. Bush originally requested $4.6 billion from Congress for SDI in fiscal 1991. However, wishing to reduce the huge U.S. budget deficit, the Senate agreed to provide $3.7 billion for the "Star Wars" program, and the House of Representatives agreed to $2.3 billion. A compromise—$2.9 billion—was reached in the congressional conference committee.

According to the SDI Organization spokesman, the proposed reduction in the organization's funds will mean the abandonment of a number of its most ambitious projects.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Reporter's 'Conjectures' on SS-23's Dismissed
PM2310111890 Moscow KRASNAya ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Oct 90 First Edition p 5

[M. Ponomarev report under the "Observer's Rejoinder" rubric: "Whose Purpose Do Conjectures Serve?"]

[Text] The journalist B. Gertz, citing the Pentagon and the U.S. intelligence organs recently in THE WASHINGTON TIMES, got involved in conjectures about the OTR-23's [Operational-Tactical Missile] (these missiles are classified as SS-23 in NATO) that were transferred (sold) at one time by the Soviet Union to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR. The USSR is accused of no more and no less than violating the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles (the OTR-23 is classified among the shorter-range missiles, up to 1,000 km).
What is the situation in this sphere, in fact?

Soviet OTR-23 missiles did indeed come under the list of missiles to be destroyed. As of today, all missiles of this class and their nuclear warhead cases have already been destroyed in full accordance with the procedures stipulated. As for the missiles that B. Gertz is now making a fuss about in THE WASHINGTON TIMES, the Soviet Union has repeatedly officially stated that it sold a certain number of non-nuclear-armed OTR-23 missiles to its Warsaw Pact allies and consequently they are under their full jurisdiction now. Moreover, this sale took place before 1 June 1988; that is, before the treaty entered into force. Thus the above-mentioned missiles cannot in any way come under the effect of this Soviet-American document.

Representatives of the American administration could confirm this quite easily if they asked the countries that received the OTR-23 missiles. Furthermore, the missiles that were at one time sold to the GDR are today the property of the unified Germany which belongs, like the United States, to NATO.

Evidently the conjectures published in THE WASHINGTON TIMES were necessary to someone who is trying to ruin the good relations between the USSR and the United States which are being established at present or to those people who want to avoid the need to explain what happened to the nuclear warheads from the Pershing-IA missiles (these missiles belonged to the FRG and their nuclear warheads belonged to the United States). According to the spirit and letter of the treaty, intermediate- and shorter-range missile warhead cases belonging to the USSR and the United States are to be destroyed.

The initiators of such conjectures should look at the prevailing situation in the world more often and not look for ways to exacerbate it.

Chervov on Asymmetric Number of INF Inspections

91WC0015A Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17, Sep 90 (signed to press 29 Aug 90) p 74-75

[Gen-Col N. Chervov: “USSR-USA: 117 and 32”]

[Text] “Why does the number of inspections conducted by American military specialists on USSR territory in connection with the destruction of missiles exceed many-fold the number of similar inspections conducted by Soviet military specialists in the USA?”

Major A. Sekachev
Red Banner Siberian Military District

Col-Gen N. Chervov Responds:

“As was stressed in the Joint Soviet-American Summit Declaration adopted in Washington, the INF Treaty [Treaty on RSD (Intermediate Range Missiles) and RMD (Shorter Range Missiles)] is an historical one both in terms of its goal—total destruction of an entire class of nuclear weapons of the USSR and USA, and in its novelty and the scale of verification measures stipulated in it. This is the first treaty embodying the idea of all-embracing verification and inspection. The effective and strict verification system is based upon the use of national technical means of verification, and on-site inspections.

“Conducting on-site inspections is stipulated both on USSR and US territory, as well as on the territories of the countries in which the missiles to be eliminated are stationed: the GDR and CSFR on the one hand; and the FRG, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, on the other. During a 13-year period, about 310 one-time inspections may be conducted by the Soviet Union, and about 540 by the United States.

“The difference in the number of inspections is explained by the fact that the USSR has a larger number of sites [obyekt] associated with the missiles to be eliminated. We are eliminating 117 Soviet sites, and the Americans 32 sites.

“It is namely this excess that makes it necessary for the American side to have a larger number of one-time inspections, but only in the first three-year period—the period of elimination of this class of missiles.

“Verification of initial data during this period was accomplished by one-time inspections, in accordance with the Memorandum, for a two-month period at indicated sites, and the fact of elimination of operational missile bases and auxiliary missile sites is being monitored. In addition, inspections of these bases and sites may be conducted on a quota basis—of 20 inspections per year. Also being inspected within the framework of these quotas is the ban on production of launchers for the missiles being eliminated. Summation of the number of such inspections for the first three years is as follows: the Soviet Union will conduct about 180 inspections, and the United States about 420.

“During this three-year period, other inspections stipulated by the Treaty will take place on a permanent basis as well: verification of non-production of missiles at the exit of the manufacturing plant is to be carried out for the 13-year period in the city of Votkinsk (USSR) and the city of Magna (USA); and inspections of the process of elimination of missiles and their launchers at the destruction site.

“In the decade following the elimination of the missiles and sites, the number of inspections for both sides is stipulated on an equal quota basis: 15 inspections per year over the course of five years, and 10 inspections every year in the course of the remaining five years. In all, there will be 125 inspections for each side in the course of 10 years.

“The experience of implementing the INF Treaty already indicates that since the moment of the signing of the treaty, not a single loop-hole that might have been
utilized against our country has appeared. The treaty is a document that is based on a regulated balance of forces. The verification methods stipulated in it were worked out on an equitable basis and permit both us and the Americans to have complete confidence in the reliability of Treaty observation.

"In evaluating the Treaty, serious politicians and commentators come to the conclusion that it does not provide military advantages to either of the two sides. Therein lies the guarantee of its effectiveness and viability. It is also clear that, on the basis of the experience of working out the INF Treaty, including the experience of solving the verification questions, the Soviet Union and the USA will be able to move more rapidly toward preparing a Treaty on 50-percent Reduction of Offensive Strategic Weapons for signature."


CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Norwegian CDE Inspectors Visit Kola
91WC0007A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Sep 90 p 3

[Article by I. Losev: “Our Hills Are So Much Alike...; NATO Inspectors at Units of the Leningrad Military District”]

[Text] At 10:00 o’clock on 15 September 1990, representatives of the Norwegian Armed Forces concluded their 2-day inspection visit to one of the rayons of the Leningrad Military District. The group of inspectors included Colonel Sverre G. Everland, Colonel Ule Henrik Henriksen, Lieutenant-Colonel Ture Kusli, and Major Bjøri Hejmsh.

Quite recently the representatives of the “army of the probable enemy” (and Norway, as we know, is a member of NATO) were not even allowed to come to our military facilities, and here four Norwegian officers had spent 2 days acquainting themselves with the Leningrad Military District units stationed in the Arctic region near our northern neighbor’s borders.

This was made possible by the agreement reached in September of 1986 at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe [CFE], which went into effect as of 1 January 1987. The Agreement was signed by 34 European states (including the Soviet Union) and the United States of America.

“The purpose of the Conference,” states the concluding document, “consists of the step-by-step implementation of new, effective and specific actions directed at the development of progress in strengthening trust and security and in achieving disarmament in order to implement and express the responsibility of the states to refrain from application of force or threat of force in their mutual relations, in their international relations in general, against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, as well as by some other means incompatible with the goals of the United Nations... No means may be used to justify resorting to the threat of force or to its application in violation of this principle”.

The states participating in the conference resolved to inform each other ahead of time regarding certain types of military activity undertaken at their initiative or on their territory, to invite observers, as well as to grant the right of military inspection by any participant state in the zone of application of measures for strengthening trust and security.

According to the agreement, no more than three inspections may be performed on the territory of a state within a year. Moreover, the same state may perform no more than one inspection a year there. The agreement stipulates the conditions of inspection. Specifically, it determined that there may be no more than four inspectors in the group, who may split up into two subgroups during their work. The response to a request for inspection must be given by a state within no more than 24 hours, and the group of inspectors is permitted entry onto the territory of the hosting state 36 hours after submission of the request. The inspection may last for no longer than 48 hours.

Representatives of the Soviet Armed Forces have twice—in 1988 and 1990—made inspection visits to Norway, but this is the first time our neighbors have come here. We might add that this was the first such inspection on the territory of the Leningrad Military District. The head of the Norwegian inspection group, Colonel Sverre G. Everland, told about its results at a press conference.

[Question] What prompted your inspection visit, which was so unexpected? Was it doubt, or some other consideration?

[Everland] The reason for our coming here was the concluding document of the Stockholm Conference. The USSR has already twice inspected the territory of Northern Norway, and our government sent us here merely as a return visit and to convince ourselves that everything really is going in accordance with the Stockholm document. We are strengthening our mutual trust by means of such reciprocal measures. Therefore, the reason for our visit to the Soviet Union was not suspicion about some unannounced military activity.

[Question] Tell us, how was the inspection review of the troops conducted?

[Everland] In accordance with the Stockholm agreement, we had the right to split up into two subgroups and to utilize ground as well as air transport. You see—there are four of us. We split up and utilized Soviet automobiles and helicopters for the inspection. To this I must add that the transport and everything associated with the
provision of normal activity of our subgroups was organized at the highest level. We are fully satisfied. The automobile stopped and the helicopter landed wherever we asked.

I must also report that the Soviet side allowed no violations of the Stockholm Conference document. On the territory of the inspected region we were given the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the course of planned combat training of the troops. In the course of this inspection we were always convinced of the sincerity of the Soviet side's intentions.

[Question] What facilities were you able to visit in 48 hours?

[Everland] We visited units of various types of armed forces: motor rifle units, artillery units, we met tank crews, and we saw some marine infantry units...

[Question] And what about anti-aircraft defense? What about aviation?...

[Everland] According to the Stockholm agreement, we do not have the right to inspect air force units. We were able to meet and talk with the commanders of individual anti-aircraft defense units which were within the inspection zone.

[Question] Did your plans include only observation, or also direct communication with military servicemen, specifically with the soldiers?

[Everland] According to the agreement, we have the right to talk to military servicemen, including conscripts, in order to gain an understanding about their status and morale. I must report that all our contacts were very pleasant. We received satisfactory answers to all our questions. There was communication on a purely human level, and we are very pleased with these contacts with the Soviet soldiers.

[Question] Colonel, do you get the feeling that you were inspecting the "army of the probable enemy", as it was customary to say in the recent past?

[Everland] I must say that I do not consider the units which I inspected to be my probable enemy.

[Question] Have you made any friends among the Soviet officers?

[Everland] I and the members of my group believe that we have become friends with all the officers with whom we worked here together. I must particularly mention Colonel Dunin, who has already twice made inspection visits to the territory of Norway, and we were very glad to meet him a third time here, where he greeted us in the role of host. Naturally, we consider ourselves friends.

And one more thing. Of course, we have heard very much about the traditional Russian hospitality, but what we found here surpassed all our expectations. We were given a phenomenal reception.

[Question] Does it not seem to you that after such contacts it would be very difficult to take aim at one another?

[Everland] I agree with you completely, gentlemen. I believe that such contacts are directed at improving our mutual relations and cooperation. As you know, negotiations are currently underway regarding the curtailment of conventional weapons; I believe that what we have done in these 2 days also represents a small step in the direction toward the signing of an agreement on reduction of conventional weapons and toward the development of these positive processes.

Several hours later we were returning to Leningrad. The airplane was gaining altitude and through the windows one could see hills. Somewhere down there was the Soviet-Norwegian border, but it was impossible to see the string of border posts from this altitude, and our hills did not differ in any way from the Norwegian ones. They were the same, covered with the yellowish-red autumn forest. I recalled the firm parting handshakes of the Norwegians, their open glances, their sincere smiles, and once again I recalled the words uttered by my colleague at the press conference. Now it really would be very difficult for us to take aim at one another.

Shevardnadze Interviewed on Vienna Talks
LD2110213490 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1750 GMT 21 Oct 90

[Interview with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze by Soviet journalists on board a plane flying back to Moscow from Vienna on 18 October; introduced by correspondent B. Kostenko—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent B. Kostenko] Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, was here [in Vienna] on a brief working visit. On Thursday, 18 October, he met French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas. At the center of the agenda were questions connected with the forthcoming two-day working visit by USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to Paris, and his talks with French President Francois Mitterrand. This visit will be an important element in strengthening bilateral relations and will certainly be an event of world importance.

During their talks in the Austrian capital, the foreign ministers of the USSR and France also discussed the situation in the Persian Gulf and the course of the Vienna talks in preparing a draft treaty on reducing armed forces and arms in Europe. The talks took place in the Soviet Embassy in Vienna.

Comrade Shevardnadze gave an interview to Soviet journalists as he returned to Moscow.

[Shevardnadze] The importance of today's meeting is that we will sign a new treaty. Again, it is the European problem that I would put at the forefront. After all, we are speaking of a truly new Europe, of new relations, of
new principles, of a new disposition of forces, and the final overcoming of confrontation and opposition—the military standoff. And here I want to stress in particular the significance of the document that will be signed, and which will certainly become the basis for new relations between the Soviet Union and France, precisely in the general European context, the general European context.

When we speak of a new Europe, this is a common proof of this common European home of ours, or, as French political language says, the confederation. It means a common declaration, common consultation, common obligations, a common political climate that is suitable, necessary, and essential for every country; and this is a common political atmosphere that is being asserted and is being strengthened by bilateral relations, by bilateral obligations.

What we are doing with the united Germany, with France, Britain, Italy, Spain, and the other European states in the sense of establishing common European security structures, I think we are working for the Union, for Russia, for the Ukraine, for the Baltic, for everyone. This confirms civilized relations between states, and we are removing the military threat; we are removing military confrontations. And this is in everyone's interests, after all.

How these processes will proceed inside the country is another question. I think that without our new foreign policy, it may not be modest to talk of this now, but just imagine what difficulties we would have come up against inside the country politically if we did not have a certain mutual understanding with the Western powers, the United States, France, FRG, and other countries—Britain and so on.

Apart from everything else, let us just count up how much we are now getting in material support. This is all an advance. They could give just nothing at all, by the way. And credits, the most favourable conditions, the most favourable conditions. They are all helping; they are all supporting us. Why are they supporting us? Because, in the final resort, we have become civilized people in the field of foreign policy. They are supporting us because they are not afraid of us. We have gotten rid of this fear. As Andreotti once said: We used to be afraid of you, and now we are not afraid of you. We have started to trust you. Why was the president awarded the Nobel prize? Because they trusted him. It is a recognition of the new policy, of new thinking, of the principles of the new thinking.

[Reporter] Your latest speech in the USSR Supreme Soviet aroused a certain amount of criticism, especially from military deputies. How does the work of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs fit in with the military department, from the point of view of the process of arms reductions talks and so on?

[Shevardnadze] You know, these talks are a very complex process—it truly is a process—particularly when we are talking about such a sensitive sphere a defense and security, arms reduction. It is very difficult for all of us to part with these weapons. They are our potential, that is how we regarded them, and still do, the military potential, the defense potential of the country. When we are conducting talks, when we speak of real agreements and overcoming military confrontation, we certainly have to take into account the interests of our partners; where their interests are, that is to say, what they are interested in, and what we are interested in. When we come to a balance, reach a balance of interests, and take each other's interests into account, then we can manage to agree.

[Reporter] Tell us, Eduard Amvrosiyevich, what is the greatest obstacle today for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Shevardnadze] Internal instability. Internal instability. That is the greatest obstacle today. As for the rest, we shall argue, and as for talks, so to say, we shall find solutions. We shall be guided by the country's highest interests and those of each people, of each republic. I am certain that the world really is warming up for important decisions, so to say. There will be order in the Near East, and in the Persian Gulf, if the country does not let us down.

Last Soviet Helicopter Regiment Leaves CSFR
LD2310083790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 22 Oct 90

[Report by correspondent A. Samylin; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The Siliac military air base in central Slovakia has on more than one occasion been criticized by the Czechoslovak public. The residents of nearby towns and villages complained about the loud noise. There were also accidents and instances of environmental pollution. There are large fuel storage tanks here, which are now being dismantled.

Today the last Soviet helicopter regiment left Czechoslovakia from this military base. It consisted of 59 combat aircraft. There is a special commission at the CSFR parliament to monitor the troop withdrawal, chaired by Michael Kocab. He is pleased at the way the withdrawal of the Soviet units is going: everything is according to schedule, and even ahead of it. Relations are correct and friendly. The path to these relations was a difficult one but, in this case, we have proven in actions that we know how to keep our word.

As I found out from a conversation with Soviet military spokesmen, it is not always yet possible to determine precisely the scale of the damage caused. Moreover, many of our garrisons were located at former Czechoslovak bases. So experts from both countries are investigating what is whose fault, and where. But the main thing remains that it has possible to set up normal
cooperation—that there is a mutual interest in putting 
the final full stop to the sadly well known events of 
August 1968.

Officer Remarks on Troop Withdrawal From 
CSFR

LD2310152990 Moscow International Service 
in Czech 1800 GMT 22 Oct 90

[Interview with Colonel Vasily Danko, representative of 
the staff of the Central Group of Soviet Military Forces, 
by Moscow Radio military commentator Colonel Vadim 
Solovev; place and date not given—Danko and Solovev 
comments in Russian with superimposed Czech translation] 

[Text] [Announcer] The withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from Czechoslovakia has come to a stage when the 
amount of work that still needs to be accomplished is 

eactly the same as that which has already been done.

Basically the withdrawal of troops is proceeding 
according to plan, or even slightly ahead. But there are 
also problems, which Moscow Radio military commen-
tator Col Vadim Solovev discussed with Col Vasily 
Danko, representative of the staff of the Central Group 
of Soviet Military Forces. We would now like to inform 
you about their discussion.

[Begin recording] [Solovev] To organize the withdrawal 
of a military contingent consisting of thousands of men 
is without doubt not an easy task. Everything which is 
connected with the withdrawal of Soviet units and 
formations is closely monitored by a special group from 
the Soviet Defense Ministry. And the withdrawal of the 
troops from the CSFR is at the same time the main 
activity of the Military Command of the Soviet Troops 
in Czechoslovakia.

[Danko] The main task facing those working with the 
soldiers leaving Czechoslovakia is to explain and assure 
that every officer, soldier, worker, and clerk as well as 
members of their families understand that the troops 
withdrawal is an important political task. To speed up 
the pace of the withdrawal, an additional railway link 
through Poland was established on 27 October. Also an 
operational group has been set up to work in the 
reloading area of the Cop station near the border. How 
the time schedule is being fulfilled is controlled by 
special groups both in the staff of the Central Group 
of Military Forces and in all the divisions and regiments. 
At the same time there are commissions working within 
the Soviet military units whose task is to hand over military 
townships to the Czechoslovak side.

[Solovev] One of the problems that worries 
Czechoslovak citizens is the ecological situation in places 
where the military units are stationed. What measures are being 
taken by the Soviet command at various levels to put 

things into order?

[Danko] Detailed instructions have been worked out and 
put into coordination with the Czechoslovak security 

bodies which secure the implementation of measures 
concerning protection of the environment and organiza-
tion of work aimed at eliminating negative effects on the 
ecology. The work of the group within the Central Group 
of Military Forces inspecting the protection of the envi-
rонment has been coordinated with the work of relevant 
Czechoslovak bodies. Also very active is a joint Soviet-
Czechoslovak commission for ecology that had been set 
up at the initiative of the Soviet command. In order to 
measure the degree of the environment contamination 
and determine possible damage, the Soviet State Com-
mittee for Nature allowed taking space photographs of 
those areas on the Czechoslovak territory where Soviet 
troops had been and still are deployed. Under the 
circumstances of unusually strict deadlines for the troops 
withdrawal a decree has been approved stating that the 
main effort should be focused on ecological problems 
and that operations would be carried out in those places 
where the danger of water contamination has been 

found.

We have already handed over to the Czechoslovak side a 
number of territories where our units used to be stan-
tioned—Brungal, Brno, Frenstat, Libava, and others, 
without any objections on the Czechoslovak side.

[Solovev] Also the issue of the current mutual relations 
between Soviet soldiers and Czechoslovak citizens is 
quite important. What could you say on this matter?

[Danko] The withdrawal is proceeding according to plan. 
We provide our citizens with regular information about 
this issue and that is the important thing. Most of the 
friendly contacts between our soldiers and local citizens 
have remained unspoiled, even if we sometimes have to 
face prejudice and lack of understanding. I am con-
vinced that this is only a temporary thing and that 
everything will improve sooner or later. [end recording]

Spokesman Backs French on Paris CSCE Summit

LD2310162190 Moscow TASS in English 1609 GMT 
23 Oct 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Kanish-
chev and Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow, October 23 (TASS)—A Soviet Foreign 
Ministry spokesman today welcomed French Prime 
Minister Michel Rocard’s remarks that the Paris summit 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) should mark the start of work to build a 
pan-European security system.

Spokesman Yurii Gremitskikh said: “We welcome con-
structive statements and initiatives which accord with 
the spirit of the times and are geared to building a new 
Europe on the basis of equal partnership, trust and 
balanced interests.”
Gremitskikh, who was commenting at a briefing on Rocard's speech at the French National Defence Institute on Monday, also said that the Soviet Union attaches much importance to the forthcoming CSCE summit in Paris.

He welcomed Rocard's remarks that "one result of the Paris conference of the heads of state and government of CSCE countries should be the start of work to create a system of pan-European security" and that contacts within NATO and the Western European Union should therefore be supplemented with closer relations with Eastern European nations.

**Ladygin Interviewed on Conventional Arms**

**PM2410152590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Oct 90 First Edition p 3**

[Interview with Lieutenant General F. Ladygin, chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff Directorate, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA military observer M. Ponomarev. Place and date not given: "In the Interests of Security"]

[Text] [Ponomarev] As we agreed, the subject of today's conversation, Fedor Ivanovich, will be the completion of the preparations for the treaty on conventional arms cuts in Europe. USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze's recent report at the USSR Supreme Soviet sitting, statements issued by statesmen from a number of countries, and Western and Soviet mass media comment on the results of recent meetings between the leaders of the USSR and U.S. foreign policy departments in New York have pointed out that it has proved possible to remove virtually all the obstacles standing in the way of the signing of this treaty. Thus, should we hope that the treaty will nonetheless be ready by 19 November when the meeting of CSCE leaders opens in Paris?

[Ladygin] The date on which the CSCE leaders' meeting opens can, I think, be regarded as a kind of catalyst activating the work of drafting this treaty and stepping up the quest for solutions to unresolved questions. After all, there were until quite recently still a considerable number of serious fundamental problems preventing the completion of the work on the treaty.

It has not, for instance, proved in any way possible at the Vienna talks to resolve the problem of the level of sufficiency of arms for one country and, consequently, the question of the distribution of national levels of arms. There were major differences of approach on aviation, particularly naval aviation, the problem of the so-called "regional split" [regionalnoye delenie], and also on questions of inspections in the interests of monitoring compliance with the treaty and the conversion of the armored equipment to be cut back for use in the national economy. These and certain other questions were the focus of attention at the New York talks between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state. Bilateral accords have been secured on them. However, this does not mean that the treaty is already ready for signing. There is still a considerable amount of work to be done, not only on technical formulation, moreover. But the participants in the talks are now proceeding from the premise that the requisite work will be completed in time.

[Ponomarev] Are you saying, Fedor Ivanovich, that there was a problem with this, but that it has now been removed? The readers are by no means uninterested in the practicalities. You realize that it is not a matter of inquisitiveness, but to do with the fact that it is a question of extremely serious matters concerning the foundations of our security. The Soviet press has carried very few specific figures, although it is said that the Americans made them public right away. Admittedly, the foreign minister's report at the USSR Supreme Soviet session did cite many of the figures. But the full text of the report has not been published.

[Ladygin] As for why the full text of E.A. Shevardnadze's report has not been published, that is not my province, that is rather a matter for you journalists. But I see no reason to hide anything. Especially since we're talking about figures on which an accord has already been secured. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers and all Soviet people are fully entitled to know everything so that they can judge everything in an aware manner. That is why I am prepared to divulge the relevant data.

[Ponomarev] That will be very nice. But you know that some people are voicing misgivings saying that during the talks in New York it was a one-way game, so to speak. They say; is the reason why we have to make do with such paltry information not that we were the ones to make the fundamental concessions in all areas, while the Americans have kept their positions inviolate? A number of members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, including servicemen, have also voiced misgivings of this kind in their speeches.

[Ladygin] Excuse me, but the concept of a "one-way game" is hardly applicable to the practical work of talks, especially those directly relating to questions of the country's security. Talks constitute a complex difficult process of seeking compromises. The main thing is not who makes more or fewer concessions, but to ensure that concessions do not overstep the limit marking the minimum requirements for defense. During the initial stages of the New York talks I was charged with representing the General Staff as a military expert. I can say quite definitely that it was not only the Soviets but also the Americans who made concessions there.

Let us look at the facts. It is well known that the participants in the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe agreed long ago to the idea that the collective ceilings for each group of states—Warsaw Pact and NATO—in respect of the arms liable to cuts cannot exceed 20,000 and 30,000 for tanks and armored combat vehicles. Ceilings have also been agreed for artillery (20,000) and helicopters (2,000).
But that is for a group of states. What is the maximum level of arms that one country can have? And, in particular, the USSR? It has not proved possible to resolve this question in Vienna.

The Soviet Union's position was to ensure that our country's level of sufficiency was set at 40 percent of the total quantity of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and helicopters in the possession of the 22 countries involved in the Vienna talks remaining in Europe. It is important to stress that we regarded this level as the right to have a corresponding quantity of arms. We would, in effect, in accordance with this position have fewer arms for individual categories, for instance 14,000 tanks, that is, 35 percent. NATO countries, notably the United States, pressed for the USSR's level of sufficiency not to exceed 30 percent while some Warsaw Pact countries insisted on 33 percent on average (plus or minus two percent).

It did prove possible to unravel this knot in New York. It was stipulated that the USSR would receive the right to have 15,300 tanks (33.3 percent), 20,000 armored vehicles (33.3 percent), 13,700 artillery systems (34.3 percent), and 1,500 combat strike helicopters (37.5 percent). The agreed upper limit for frontline tactical aviation combat aircraft, air defense fighter interceptors, and combat trainer aircraft is 5,150 for a single country, which in percentage terms is roughly 37 percent of a collective level of combat aircraft for each single alliance of 7,000. Admittedly, I would stipulate that this figure has not as yet been definitively agreed. But it is important that both sides have abandoned their initial values for levels of sufficiency of 40 and 30 percent, and it is now roughly 35 percent on average plus or minus two percent.

Let me say a brief word about how certain other problems were resolved. With regard to ground-launched naval aviation. The essence of the disagreements in principle resides in the fact that we do not regard this kind of aircraft as a subject of the Vienna talks (they should be discussed at separate talks on naval problems), whereas the United States and other NATO countries insisted on including ground-launched naval aviation in the overall number of aircraft liable to cuts. In New York the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state agreed to solve this problem by means of a politically binding statement outside the framework of the treaty. By this statement the Soviet Union is to pledge, in particular, not to have more than 200 Tu-22M aircraft within its naval aviation. There is already a precedent for this approach. This was the way it was decided to act at the Vienna strategic offensive arms talks with regard to sea-launched cruise missiles. As a preliminary basis the leaders of the USSR and U.S. foreign policy departments reached agreement on the problem of the regional split, which boils down to establishing a balance of forces not only for the whole European continent but also for its individual subregions—at the center and on the flanks. I must say that this problem, which is difficult per se, is complicated for us by the need to resolve new tasks involved in siting the troops withdrawn from Eastern Europe.

Lastly, an agreement was reached in New York on a mutually acceptable basis on questions of verification of compliance with the future treaty—what will be the subject of the inspections and the number of inspections accorded a particular state.

[Ponomarev] Everything that you have said, Fedor Ivanovich, dispels doubts to a certain extent. But I would like to draw your attention to an article in THE WASHINGTON POST regarding the progress of the talks on conventional armed forces. It said, in particular, that "it would be stupid" to postpone the meeting of CSCE leaders at which the treaty is to be signed "because some minor nut or bolt doesn't fit." But we are not, after all, talking about "nuts and bolts" but about the material means of ensuring international security. Aren't the direct "negotiators" as they are called beginning to treat tanks and aircraft like "lumps of iron" of no great significance? Aren't there disagreements on these issues between Foreign Ministry representatives and the military members of our delegation?

[Ladygin] As for "nuts and bolts," we will leave that to the conscience of THE WASHINGTON POST. As you have said, our "negotiators," regardless of their departmental affiliation, treat the business with which they have been entrusted in a responsible manner, guided by general state interests. But there are, of course, disagreements between Foreign Ministry representatives and the military members of our delegation on some specific issues. (Let me note in parentheses that the Americans tried during the New York talks both at the talks themselves and via the mass media to set Soviet military and diplomats against one another). Both the USSR Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry bear equal responsibility to the Soviet people for elaborating disarmament treaties that will result in arms cuts, reduce the burden of military spending, and at the same time not be detrimental to the country's defense and security. But it must be stressed here that the Defense Ministry bears direct responsibility for ensuring the state's reliable defense capability and is therefore guided not so much by transitory considerations based on the prevailing international situation as by potential unpredictable changes in this situation in the long term. What is more, it is primarily the Defense Ministry that has to fulfill the conditions of disarmament treaties with all their attendant political, economic, social, and, indeed, military and organizational-technical consequences.

In this connection, I think that the accords elaborated in New York on individual issues—and they did not of course concern minor "nuts and bolts"—could have been somewhat different. Take, for instance, the problem of the regional split. The accord on this question does not fully take into consideration an important new factor like the Soviet troop withdrawal from Eastern Europe,
particularly the Western Group of Forces, and their
deployment within our national territory.

To be frank, the United States tried to exert pressure on
the Soviet side: “If there is no treaty, we will not go to
Paris.” (Other participants in the Vienna talks also resort
to this sometimes). Yet they need the treaty and the Paris
“summit” as much as we do. Incidentally, an under-
standing of this was reflected in the reaction of a number
of members of the USSR Supreme Soviet during the
discussion of E.A. Shevardnadze’s report on current
international life and the USSR Foreign Ministry’s work
to safeguard the country’s interests and security. This
security is, certainly, attained by political means. But not
political means alone. The preconditions have by no
means been created for military means of ensuring
security to be consigned to the archives. Contemporary
conditions—and for the foreseeable future—do not
demand that political means be pitted against military
means (the following words have become popular: “Fewer
weapons means greater stability”) but an optimum
combination of the two.

I think that it is appropriate in this connection to say
that our American negotiating partners—even under the
conditions of the arms cuts and their planned reduction of
the numerical strength of their Armed Forces over the
next five years by roughly one-fourth—plan to have
the kind of military potential to safeguard U.S. interests
on a global scale.

Ponomarev] There have been reports that major
progress was made in New York on the problems that are
holding up the work on a strategic offensive arms treaty.
This is obviously another matter. I would, however, like
your consent to return to it, Fedor Ivanovich.

Ladygin] Yes, progress was also made on strategic
offensive arms. I think that we will talk about this again
specially.

Moiseyev on Upcoming NATO Meeting, Soviet
Force Cuts
LD2410092990 Moscow TASS in English 0843 GMT
24 Oct 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, October 24 (TASS)—Soviet Chief of
Staff General Mikhail Moiseyev left Moscow this
morning for a three-day visit to Belgium.

Before his departure, Moiseyev told TASS that he was
scheduled to meet the Belgian military leadership in
Brussels and give a lecture at the Supreme Royal Defense
Institute today.

During the next two days, he is due to meet the leader-
ship of the NATO International Secretariat, attend the
closing stage of the NATO Military Committee’s autumn
session at the level of the chiefs of staffs and meet the
commanders of the NATO allied armed forces.

“Relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact are
now being built on a new basis,” Moiseyev stressed. He
said it was his wish to exchange views with the NATO
leadership on an extensive range of questions.

New thinking in the military sphere, Moiseyev said, has
led to a considerable reduction of the intensity of Soviet
military activity, cuts in the number of major exercises
and manoeuvres and greater restraint in day-to-day
activities.

Moiseyev said that it was desirable that NATO reciproc-
ate by cutting the scale of its exercises of the Wintex
type. This is most important at a time when confronta-
tion is being replaced by the policy of cooperation and
mutual understanding, including in the military sphere.

Moiseyev said the Soviet military doctrine with its
defence orientation was graphic illustration of the Soviet
Union’s peace policy. The doctrine’s central idea is that
of focusing efforts to prevent war and solve all interna-
tional problems by political means. This doctrine is the
basis of military reform in the Soviet Armed Forces.

On changes in the Soviet Armed Forces, Moiseyev also
said: “A major cut in Soviet Armed Forces by 500,000
men is now under way, with 370,000 already released.

“In Europe, cuts comprised more than 20,000 tanks,
20,000 artillery systems, more than 860 combat aircraft,
26 submarines and 45 combat ships.

“The entire structure of the Soviet Armed Forces is
being changed in line with the defensive military doc-
trine,” he stressed.

Soviet troops will be fully withdrawn from Hungary and
Czechoslovakia in 1991, and from Poland and Germany
later, he said. The defence of the Soviet Union will be
organized only within national boundaries on the prin-
ciple of reasonable sufficiency.

Progress at Vienna CFE Talks Viewed
PM2510102590 Moscow SOVETS'KAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 24 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences Colonel V.
Chernyshov: “What Will We Cut Back. The Elaboration
of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Approaching Conclusion”]

[Text] Could the shortage of time act as some sort of
catalyst at the disarmament talks? I think it could, but
subject to two absolute conditions. First, given a positive
state of relations between participants in the talks.
Second, given the sides’ sincere desire to reach accord. In
this case, the sides are trying to meet each other halfway,
putting forward compromise proposals.

This is today’s state of affairs at the Vienna talks on
conventional armed forces in Europe—talks in which all
Warsaw Pact and NATO countries are taking part. It
must be said straight away that they have not lasted all
that long—just some 18 months, since March 1989. But other talks on arms reduction and limitation have by now traversed a much longer path. Look no further than the previous Vienna talks—on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, in which I happened to participate. They lasted 15 years, and became known among journalists as “Sleeping Beauty.” They ended fruitlessly—the “Vienna Beauty” simply failed to wake.

It seems to me that the following factor was of decisive importance in “docking” the Vienna talks with the changed military-political situation. Following a proposal by the USSR, which was backed by all CSCE countries, it was provisionally decided to hold a meeting of heads of state and government in Paris in November of this year. It should lay the foundations of a new all-European security. But some countries, primarily the United States, imposed a condition: The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe must without fail be ready for signature in Paris.

Of course, quite a lot had already been achieved at the Vienna talks by that time. Agreement was reached that cutbacks should apply to offensive and most destabilizing arms like tanks, armored vehicles, artillery systems, combat aircraft, and helicopters. A common understanding on cutback levels for tanks and armored vehicles was successfully worked out in June. It was envisaged that the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO would each retain 20,000 tanks and not more than 30,000 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles).

But accord on artillery systems, combat aircraft, and helicopters seemed unattainable. For example, the sides’ disagreements on the question of setting a maximum level for artillery systems boiled down to this: NATO suggested a ceiling of 16,500 units for each of the blocs against the 20,000 suggested by the Warsaw Pact Organization. As for aviation assets, the North Atlantic alliance insisted on the treaty extending not only to air force combat aircraft but also to land-based naval aviation. The Soviet Union for its part, evidently quite logically, suggested: If naval aircraft were to be included on the list of arms categories to be cut back, then a certain proportion of carrier-borne naval aviation (on aircraft carriers which are, so to say, “assigned” to Europe) should also be subject to elimination. The Western “logic” was perfectly clear: The USSR has more land-based naval aircraft and the United States has more carrier-borne aircraft—therefore it is necessary to strive to make the first category subject to cutbacks and exclude the second, thus putting the Soviet Union at a disadvantage.

Judging by everything, however, arguments centered mostly on the question of the so-called “sufficiency rule,” which sets the maximum level for various arms for individual countries in each of the military-political alliances. NATO was proposing that not a single state should hold more than 30 percent of the volume of weapons in various categories set for the two blocs. The Soviet Union initially felt that this “ceiling” should be at least 35-40 percent, but its position hardened recently and it doggedly insisted on a 40-percent “sufficiency level.”

First of all, I would like to mention that maximum limits on the numbers of basic armaments for the two military-political alliances have finally been set. Each one will be able to have 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery systems, 30,000 armored vehicles, and 2,000 combat helicopters in Europe. The threshold level for combat aircraft has not yet been announced, but this delay is due to the desire of the USSR and the United States to discuss this question with their allies. Here it is important to stress the fact that, thanks to Moscow’s and Washington’s joint efforts, the disputed question of both land-based and carrier-borne naval aviation has been successfully and altogether taken off the agenda.

Agreement has also been reached on the “sufficiency rule.” Now any country (we are primarily talking about the Soviet Union) will be able to have arms within the framework of the following levels: up to 13,300 tanks (33.3 percent), up to 20,000 armored vehicles (33.3 percent), up to 13,700 artillery systems (34.3 percent), up to 1,500 helicopters (37.5 percent), and up to 5,150 combat aircraft. Thus, the “average” percentage for “sufficiency rule” purposes stands at 33.6 percent.

It can be assumed that the announcement of the aforementioned maximum levels of arms which the Soviet Union can maintain in Europe will provoke an ambiguous response in our country. Some people will say that we have again “given in” and made concessions to the West, deeming the retention levels too low in conditions when the Warsaw Pact’s future existence appears highly doubtful.

What could one say to the “doubters”? First of all, it seems to me that critics should be sufficiently clearly aware that any talks are primarily a matter of bargaining, with each side initially asking for more than it can realistically expect in the end. This is what NATO is doing, we are acting in a similar fashion. And so now, when considering the “sufficiency problem,” the side made reciprocal compromises, met each other halfway, and ultimately chose an approximately “median” option of 33.6 percent based on the full range of figures (from the 30 percent “requested” by the West to our 40 percent).

As regards sufficiency in terms of the limits actually set for our arms, some serious thought must be given to this matter. A single country is allowed to have more than one-third of the total volume of arsenals. Is this volume high or low? I think that such an arsenal would be quite substantial, since the remaining two-thirds will be somehow distributed among the more than 20 other Warsaw Pact and NATO states.

In my view, two more factors ought to be emphasized. The first is that the Soviet Union has succeeded in obtaining from the West a highly important pledge:
Following Germany's unification, the numerical strength of the FRG Bundeswehr and the GDR National People's Army will be reduced from a total of more than 600,000 to 370,000 men, in other words it will be almost halved. And the second: The NATO countries (specifically the United States, Britain, Belgium, and Canada) are announcing, one after another, forthcoming reductions of their military contingents deployed on Germany's territory, in other words, to use the North Atlantic alliance's terminology, along NATO's "forward defense lines." There is no doubt that all this also leads to an easing of tension.

New EC Alliance Plans Termed 'Ill-Timed'

LD2510182490 Moscow TASS in English 1638 GMT 25 Oct 90

[By TASS political observer Albert Balebanov]

[Text] Moscow, October 25 (TASS)—The proposal to establish a new defence alliance within the EC framework was voiced at the recent meeting in Brussels of the foreign ministers of the European Community's member-countries and the leaders of the Europarlament and the Commission of European Communities. The meeting decided to submit the matter for consideration to the European Council summit in Rome in late October.

Present chairman of the Commission of European Communities Jacques Delors originated the idea of creating a defence alliance within the EC. He first voiced it four years ago, but the idea was torn apart by the public and the governments of the 12 member-states shelved Delors' proposal.

It was revived by Delors recently and is now being debated extensively. The discussion of plans to expand EC functions to the military field has gone so far that Ireland, one of the EC members, has started to think about shedding its neutrality.

The Delors initiative assumes that the creation of the military union will naturally follow the creation of the political, currency and economic union within the European Community.

But is it really necessary or unavoidable for the Community to assume military functions?

The EC leaders seek to avoid a direct answer to this pivotal question. There appears to be no absolute necessity to create such a defence alliance, all the more so since Europe is heading towards a common European home. Will this home need a new artificial partition devised by the EC?

I believe that the Delors initiative is at variance with positive tendencies of the present European situation. A situation that is characterised by the termination of the cold war era and the transfer of East-West relations from confrontation to interaction, including on matters of European security.

The second Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is due to meet in Paris in November. The summit is expected to consider, among other issues, the creation of new continental-scale collective security structures within the CSCE framework.

A legitimate question arises in this connection: Aren't plans to involve the EC in military activities ill-timed? Is the participation of the EC member-states in NATO and the West European Union, which are endowed with functions in the military field, not enough? These plans acquire a special significance in view of the radical reorganisation of the Warsaw treaty organisation.

Some observers believe that the creation of a defence alliance within the EC frame is designed to manifest Europe's independence from the United States. But Western Europe is sufficiently independent as it is. What is the point of staging yet another affirmation at a time when the interdependence of states is growing stronger and deeper?

In addition, building a common European home is inconceivable without the participation of the United States, as is the creation of collective European security structures.

The appearance of a new defence alliance on the map of Europe will not impart greater confidence to inter-state relations. It would sooner engender uncertainty in the morrow and undermine the drive towards stronger trust and mutual understanding in international relations.

Talks on Troop Withdrawals From CSFR Continue

LD2510212290 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Oct 90

[Report by correspondent V. Beletskiy, including interview with CSFR National Assembly Deputy M. Kocab; from the "Vremya" newscast—Kocab's remarks in Czech with superimposed Russian translation; recorded]

[Text][Announcer] Today in Moscow a working meeting took place between members of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on State Security and a delegation of the CSFR Federal Assembly's Committee on Defense, State Security, and the Armed Forces.

[Beletskiy] Property and financial questions connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia were discussed. Already 58 percent of the soldiers have returned home, as have half of the family members of officers and warrant officers. Most military equipment and weaponry has also been withdrawn.

The Soviet side drew the attention of their colleagues to the fact that not all the agreements previously achieved
have been observed by the Czechoslovak side. In particular, there is some uncertainty with regard to deliveries to the USSR of prefabricated houses and hostels for housing for families of Soviet soldiers. The USSR people's deputies consider that it is expedient to implement these deliveries in payment for the value of the bases belonging to the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia.

[Kocab] I must say that the withdrawal of Soviet troops is taking place within the established timetable, in implementation of the timetable earlier planned by both sides. And in this sense, we are completely satisfied.

I would also like to mention the meeting yesterday with Mr. Shevardnadze, who said that Soviet soldiers are leaving Czechoslovakia as friends of that country. This gladdened us greatly.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Unilateral Nuclear Test Moratorium Urged
91WC0006A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Oct 90 Morning Edition pp 1,3

[Article by Olzhas Suleymenov: "A Moratorium Declared by the People: Will Nevada Follow the Example of the Semipalatinsk Test Range?"]

[Text] Do Not Miss the Moment!

On the thematic spectrum of issues that our society is struggling to resolve, the problems of global peace and war are losing their vividness: extremely urgent social needs have obscured the threat of global conflict, but it has not, for this reason, become less dangerous.

On 7 January in New York a UN conference will begin on amendments to the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, on land and at sea. The question of extending the ban to underground experiments will be considered.

As long as nuclear laboratories and plants are in operation, even substantial reductions of tactical and strategic weapons do not solve, but rather, complicate the problem, since modernized weapons replace systems that are written off. Disarmament results in conventional rearmament. It is when the testing is stop that the idea of a nuclear-free 21st century that M. S. Gorbachev proclaimed in 1986 on behalf of all living human beings will begin to be realized.

A public campaign in support of a comprehensive treaty is developing in the world. What are we taking to the conference?

The Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground has remained silent for nearly a year. Since October 1989 the Soviet Union has not conducted a single test. The country and the world do not know about this. There have been no official reports by the USSR president and the government. The mass media have been silent. Why? Because the testing has been stopped by a decision "from below."

The Semipalatinsk test site is not significant in and of itself. It is a link in world production of nuclear arms. And a factory can work as long as all of its units are functioning. The removal of a single link strikes at the interests of the military industrial complexes, which are as interconnected as Siamese twins. In struggling with one another, they strengthen one another.

If one grows weaker, the other is also unhealthy. They suffocate without the oxygen of tension.

Until the beginning of last year, the problems of the Semipalatinsk test site seemingly did not exist.

Other nuclear powers, too, try not to make public information about the dangerous consequences of nuclear production. That has affected, in addition to everything else, the development of medical radiology, which is becoming, alas, one of the most important disciplines in health care.

In 1957 a special institution known as the Antibrucellosis Clinic No 4 was established in Semipalatinsk. Where the first three were located and what they did, we do not know. But this one, in absolute secrecy, was supposed not to treat but to study the effect of "military radiation" on the human organism. All of four physicians, who were supposed to conduct observations of a control group of 6,000 people, were supported on meager funds. Not all of those who fell ill were put in the hospital, but those who were "lucky" enough to end up in the building behind the solid stone wall were released to their relatives with a certificate indicating that they had died from brucellosis or other common diseases.

Perhaps the real histories of the illnesses are preserved in the USSR Ministry of Health's Third Chief Administration (which is under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense), but experts in the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement have not been given access to them. It has now become possible to partially declassify the clinic. Now it is officially called a radiological clinic. In this connection a substantial part of the archives (on 17 scientific topics) have been moved to the testing ground. But even what remains is sufficient to substantiate the statement by B. I. Gusev, the clinic's chief physician, that specific harm has been caused to the health of the population in the regions adjoining the testing ground.

In official "Information" provided to a commission of the Atomic Energy Institute imeni Kurchatov that visited the testing ground in September 1990 under the leadership of Ye. P. Velikhov, Gusev reports certain data drawn from the declassified archives. The preamble, for example, contains the following information: "For residents of the aforementioned communities (the text gives the names of villages in Semipalatinsk Oblast—O. S.), the first atomic explosion (1949) was a real disaster. The radiation consequences of that explosion for the population were no different than the radiation consequences of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the first hours following local radioactive fallout, the strength of the dose in the area (the village of Dolon) was 200 roentgens per hour. The dose of external gamma radiation received by the public in the first 24 hours was 60 roentgens, in the first week—100 roentgens, in the first month—130 roentgens, and in the first year—160 roentgens. Subsequent explosions conducted tens of times a year from 1951 through 1963 resulted in the contamination of the territory of Semipalatinsk Oblast with fission products and caused the exposure of the population to ionizing radiation in various dose ranges." For my own part, let me explain that a dose of up to 20 microroentgens is considered allowable.

Figures are cited only for several villages in one oblast that were selectively studied in the immediate aftermath in 1949.

In the year before the declassification of the archive, the subject of testing was commented on for the first time on Central Television and in the newspapers. The report "No Danger for People" appeared in IZVESTIYA (No. 193, 1989). It mentioned, among other things, Clinic No. 4, but not as an antituberculosis clinic: "This clinic was established in Semipalatinsk to provide care for those who been exposed to radiation. So far no one has yet required such care."

The Soyuz deputies' group has been organizing a press campaign for defense of the testing ground. Judging from the items that have been published, individual deputies are not specialists simultaneously in the several areas of knowledge that must be touched on. And for that reason, it would hardly be fair to suspect them of deliberate incompetence. In the case of G. Lezhnko, for example, it is clearly unintentional: "In order to calm public opinion, scientists took samples of those emissions (of radioactive gases—O. S.) from the testing ground and deliberately breathed them to prove their harmlessness" (ZHURNALISTICHESKIYE NOVOSTI).

How is that possible in practical terms? Can the deputy imagine a picture of gas emissions following an explosion? Further, in order to reinforce the opinion of the scientists' self-sacrificial nature, an even more impressive picture is drawn: "During the explosion, the wind rose is specially directed at the city of Kurchatov, where the families and children of the testers live. Why? In order to convince the public of the dependability of safety procedures in the explosions. Nonetheless, the fighters noisily demand: 'Close the testing ground!' They do not believe the military.'"

And the military would not believe such a thing. G. Lezhnko has a higher technical education and, it would seem, should know that the wind rose is not a cinematic gust of wind that can be directed wherever the film director wants. It is the prevailing direction of winds that have been established in the region over millions of years. A chart illustrating it ought to be published. But then the need would arise to explain that throughout the world testing-ground camps are built taking the local wind rose into account, on the windward side, in order to protect the testers.

The state of Utah is downwind in relation to the testing ground in Nevada. It is first to receive the radioactive dust. And the antinuclear movement in that state is, in fact, called Down Wind. The movement has distributed throughout the country a color map showing the Nevada wind rose. Bearing no resemblance to the flower that is sung of in romances, it is a blood-red broom that builds up sharply from west to east and covers half of America.

Our downwind country will sometime find out that the testing ground has not just stricken those who are nearby. The petals of its crimson effect are subordinate to neither oblast nor republic borders. But the highest concentration is in the nearby territories. And for this reason G. Lezhnko's statement, "Not a single person in the region has become sick with radiation disease!" (SELSKAYA ZHIZN), can attest, at best, to his ignorance of the true situation.

And what do the specialists say? Gently smiling, Lt Gen Zelentsov, who oversees the USSR Ministry of Health's Third Chief Administration, said in an interview with a journalist from the Japanese television network Hiroshima Terebi: "During the period of testing at the Semipalatinsk test range, there may have been several cases of radiation disease, but no one died!" (The director superimposed those words over shots showing the last minutes in the life of leukemia patient in the Semipalatinsk hospital. In August the interview was broadcast twice to all of Japan).

In forty years of tests, when in open tests alone charges with a total power equivalent to 20,000 Hiroshima bombs were exploded in direct proximity to hundreds of human settlements, there was not a single victim. Is it possible to believe that?

An American hydrogen bomb was tested in the 1950s over the atoll of Bikini. The evacuated inhabitants have not been returned to this day. The level of contamination is still dangerously high.

From B. I. Gusev's "Information": "A thermonuclear device was exploded 12 August 1953. Before the explosion the population of several communities in Abaysky Rayon was removed to a safe zone. In the first hours following the explosion the size of the dose in the area of the settlement of Karaul was 250 roentgens per hour, while that in the area of Sarzhay and Kaynav was 150 per hour. The tragedy of the situation is that the population of the settlement of Karaul was returned to the settlement on the ninth day. Until 1963 the population of every rayon in Semipalatinsk Oblast without exception was subjected to daily exposure to ionizing radiation in various dose ranges. Practically no serious protective measures (the removal of the population, the decontamination of the area) were carried out. We are certain that the state of existing physical facilities and equipment, as well as the need to keep the work that was being done
secret, contributed to the failure to carry out any of the aforementioned measures. Unfortunately, even after 1963 there were cases in which territories were contaminated and people were exposed to radioactive fallout. According to our calculations, during those years at least 500,000 people living in the Semipalatinsk region were exposed to ionizing radiation.”

For other oblasts surrounding the testing ground (Karaganda, Pavlodar and East Kazakhstan oblasts and Altay Kray of the RSFSR), no research has been done.

And now people are trying to convince us that Soviet hydrogen bombs are environmentally cleaner than American ones. Absolutely no consequences. “The truth is that the Semipalatinsk test range is the cleanest testing ground in the world!” USSR People’s Deputy N. Petrushenko categorically declared to a KOMSOMOL-SKAYA PRAVDA correspondent.

The statements quoted are voice tests by the military-industrial complex. It has not yet had any experience in public debate. Previously there was no need to justify the consequences of its activities.

But our opponents are failing to take the main thing into account—we have crossed a frontier, looked back, and realized the full extent of the disrespect the state showed for its citizens.

Trying to persuade us of the harmlessness of the testing ground is like trying to demonstrate the usefulness of the hydrogen bomb to human health. For me, the following modest fact from the latest census carries more weight than many volumes: in Abayeyskoy Rayon, where there are some 10 children in every family, in two five-year periods there has been zero population growth. In Yegendybulakskiy, Mayskii and Lebyazhinskii rayons, one child in three is either stillborn or born deformed. Speaking at an August rally in Hiroshima, the artist Karibek Kuyukov said: “The newspapers try to assure me that underground atomic explosions cause no harm to human beings. I was born along the border of the testing ground. I am 22 years old. I was born without arms. And there are many such people, and not just among us, because every testing ground takes away the reason, arms and beauty from every person on earth. I have no arms to stop the testing ground...” And thousands of open palms raised up over the stony silence of the square. Those are Karibek’s hands; now there are millions of them on every continent.

People in Kazakhstan can take pride in their contribution to the country’s defense. There is nothing to reproach us for. This contribution has not just been the entire arsenal of our resources. We accepted the atomic burden as a burden of patriotic duty and bore it as long as there was an extreme need to do so. But we do not want to take part any longer in the great powers’ senseless nuclear races at the price of the life and health of present and future generations. It will be given to us to take pride in the fact that the first step in real nuclear disarmament—the closing of the testing ground—was taken in multinational Kazakhstan.

The Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement arose in 1989 in Alma Ata. In a matter of days it had become a broad public movement. It was begun by students and the creative intelligentsia, and workers joined in. Karaganda’s striking miners made the demand that the testing ground be closed. They were supported by the machinery builders of Pavlodar, the metallurgical workers of Ust-Kamenogorsk and Dzechhkazan, the oil workers of Guryev and Mangyslak, and the miners of Akmolinsk. The livestock workers refused to sell their products to the state. All the republic’s public organizations—the trade unions, the Komsomol, the Communist Party, and the unofficial groups—adopted resolutions in their congresses calling for the testing to be halted and the facility’s scientific and technical potential to be shifted to civilian concerns. By a majority vote the newly elected Kurchatov City Soviet adopted a proposal by the new chairman, the engineer Ye. Chaykovskiy, to work out a conversion program (which has now been approved by Ye. P. Velikhov’s commission, Kazakhstan’s Academy of Sciences, and the republic president). Incidentally, the city soviet includes not only civilian specialists, but military men, who make up more than half of it.

In November the USSR Supreme Soviet instructed the government to consider the question of closing the Semipalatinsk test range. And at its first session in Alma Ata, the newly elected Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet voted for a resolution supporting the demand of the republic’s population. Kazakhstan’s Basic Law will include an article prohibiting the production and testing of weapons of mass destruction on the republic’s territory. In order that all the world’s constitutions some day include such words, we must not retreat; we must make the popular moratorium at the Semipalatinsk test range permanent. Not to recognize it means to show disrespect for the republic’s nascent sovereignty. That is how the question has been put to the center.

Nevada-Semipalatinsk is uniting with a kindred movement that has arisen in northern Russia. We oppose moving testing to Novaya Zemlya. We hope to gain the support of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. In a June interview with the newspaper the Guardian, B. N. Yeltsin resolutely expressed his vision of the problem: nuclear tests would not be carried out on Russia’s territory. If not in Kazakhstan and not in Russia, then where? It is hardly likely that any other republic will set aside land for a testing ground. A situation that promises salvation for the planet! That is the only way it should be assessed, in all its emotion, by all who speak of peace in earnest, and not just out of duty. How important at this key moment the expressed position of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the country’s president would be! Not to miss the moment, but to permit humanity to take advantage of this unique opportunity for a positive answer to Hamlet’s question.
Who Will Break the Vicious Circle?

We often use the term "new thinking," but what is it without the proper knowledge? The democratic system is capable of functioning only when all of its units—voter, legislator, and government—are equally well informed. Some deputies' inquiries make the generals bristle: "The CIA spends millions trying to find that out!" Let them spend it if they have it to spare. But it is not superfluous for the people to know how much higher or lower the level of external threat is than the threshold of danger created by defense work.

Public opinion surveys in the United States and the USSR produce similar results: Most Americans are certain that the Soviet Union no longer threatens their country; Soviet citizens are of the same opinion about the possibility of aggression from the West. Then in the name of what is the military industrial complex striving to develop nuclear weapons? What basic reasons does it cite?

I saw a film that was shot this summer in the Pacific Ocean on the atoll of [Murua]. The oceanologist Jacques-Yves Cousteau was studying costal waters following the latest underground test. He discovered emissions of radioactive iodine and cesium. On the screen the researcher asks the testing ground's scientific director: "Why is France continuing testing? Can it be that the weapons that have been built are insufficient?" The general smiles: "Because others are setting off explosions." If the scientist were to ask his question at the other testing grounds—in Nevada, at Semipalatinsk, at Lob Nor—the answer would be exactly the same.

The military testers' argument persuasively affects presidents, parliaments and tax payers. It is a vicious circle, and no one can make up his mind to break it.

In November at the Supreme Soviet's second session, a group of deputies including Academician Sakharov raised the question of a unilateral, open-ended moratorium. A weighty argument against it was advanced in April, at the third session, by I. S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who oversees the military-industrial complex: the Americans have conducted 300 more tests. Halting our tests would mean allowing them to widen the gap even further. In order for there to be discussion, the terms of the problem need to be expressed more fully; there are too many unknowns in the equation that is offered. A table comparing the number of tests for at least our two countries has not been published. In other countries such information is not considered secret. How many of the more dangerous above-ground and atmospheric—that is, open—explosions have been carried out? Some Western sources give 89 for Semipalatinsk. And our sources? We are forced to use "personal" information. A. D. Sakharov cited only the total number of tests at Soviet testing grounds—179. Gen F. F. Safonov, deputy director of the Semipalatinsk test range "for explosions," once spoke of 103 tests at Semipalatinsk, and on another occasion he cited 138. In the document previously cited, B. I. Gusev gives different figures: ...we have in our possession information pertaining to explosions conducted in the atmosphere at the nuclear testing ground near Semipalatinsk from 1949 through 1965. By modest calculations, 266 such explosions were conducted, of which 138 were above-ground explosions and 128 were atmospheric."

In the aforementioned interview with KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, the deputy Col. N. Petrushenko offers his own version of an answer: "No one makes any secret of it: there were two above-ground explosions...."

Why such disagreement? It is impossible to understand who is sincerely in error, and who is right. Considering that the system of mutual verification is just getting set up, it is perfectly likely that many explosions at the Soviet testing grounds were not recorded by the Western services in the first decades. Therefore, one may suppose that their data on the number of our tests are objectively too low. A military employee of the testing ground may have a stake in understating the figures. The chief physician is using figures from the declassified archives of the clinic, whose specialists were required to conduct measurements after each test and reflect the results of their observations in documents. For this reason, I consider that report to be the most reliable.

The Ministry of Defense could clear the matter up conclusively. A deputys' inquiry has been sent to Marshal Yanzov. After two months, there has been no answer.

Stages in the Nuclear Race

Because of the lack of a Soviet table, I offer for consideration one put together by the Americans. If the Ministry of Defense gets any doubts as to the correctness of certain comparisons, it will be easy for it to present its own version for discussion.

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### Existing Data on Nuclear Tests in the United States and the USSR for the Period 1945 Through 31 December 1989 (Continued)

<table>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>921</td>
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</table>

In the first period America surpassed us by 146 episodes. Nonetheless, the round goes to the Soviet arms specialists: They developed a superpowerful 60-megaton hydrogen bomb, which was exploded in 1962 at Novaya Zemlya.

That qualitative leap reduced the Americans' advantage in number of tests to naught. As Academician Sakharov reported, in terms of the total power of atomic and thermonuclear devices tested up until 1963, the USSR substantially surpassed its rival (451 megatons versus 141). In all fairness, one must subtract 146 from the total difference.

In 1963 the next stage of the nuclear race began. The shift to the more complex technology of underground testing proved easy for American industry. Moreover, they were driven by the Soviet superbomb and the fear that gripped America after the Caribbean crisis.

We were technically incapable of accepting the proposed pace. Two years went into trying to put the underground method in place. In 1965 a "product" was tested at a relatively shallow depth of 150 meters. The result was an explosion with a mushroom cloud and the discharge of tremendous masses of earth. (The crater was filled with water and became a lake.) The next test was a little deeper, and once again it produced a pit.

While Semipalatinsk-21 was trying to adapt to the unfamiliar technology, our rival went far ahead: by the end of the 1960s the United States had surpassed the USSR by 229 explosions. That was the answer to Khrushchev's superbomb. But at that same time their leadership in terms of number of tests was coming to an end: the period of detente in relations between our countries set in, the United States cut its number of annual explosions in half, and since then—for two decades now—it has never once raised that number to its former level. That is despite our side's growing activeness (it's as though we acquired a taste for underground testing).

It would be interesting to know whether the Council of Ministers is studying the above table. It would be also be useful for the Presidential Council to look into it. Questions arise. Is it really so necessary to catch up with the Americans in number of tests? After all, in order to overtake them it would be necessary to open up several new nuclear laboratories and dozens of testing grounds. And are we really behind?

It would probably be more correct not to compare the total number with the total number, but to compare the numbers as broken down by decades. And then it works out that the USSR won the final rounds in terms of the number of tests, conducting 64 tests more in the past 20 years. And that is despite its unilateral moratorium in 1985-1987 and the subsequent unforeseen reductions.

Is it really so important how many laps one loses at the start of a marathon, if one overtake's rivals in the final lap? Do we really need to pick up speed now? Can
it be that we have already crossed the finish line and are hurrying farther in a sweat, drawing our rivals along with us?

One must assume that we are not behind in modernization, either. In any case, our leading specialists in the level of nuclear weapons do not ardently dispute that thesis. The subject should be elucidated in more detail by specialists in the departments concerned. They will report what their colleagues are working on in the Livermore and Los Angeles laboratories—deep-penetrating warheads, nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers, etc. That is, they will rehash what we know from Western newspapers.

And what are our own Mephistopheles doing? In what geography are their laboratories located? It has become commonplace to say that the Cold War has ended. Marshals do not dream at night of the gloomy image of the enemy. But why are the projects and plans of the military-industrial complex still deeply hidden? The competition among research collectives in the country's supersecret laboratories is undiminished.

T. Taylor, designer of the American atom bomb, speaking in Alma-Ata at the congress titled "World Voters Against Nuclear Arms," told about what an emotional lift, what an awareness of creative power the scientist in arms development feels when he succeeds in developing a bomb that is 50 kilograms lighter than the previous one but more powerful. It is easy to persuade the military that the adversary has a similar one. And thereby to pay money from the government and provide new orders for the testing grounds and secret plants. It is really a military-research-industrial complex! The psychological mechanism that supports the race is rather simple and reliable in its performance.

Prof. I. [Roblat], chairman of the Pugwash Conference, who also knows about the work of nuclear laboratories firsthand, offered the following conclusion from the congress's podium: the reason for the escalation of the development of weapons of mass destruction in such countries as the United States, the USSR and France is not the ambitions of politicians but the creative egoism of the new systems' developers. One cannot help thinking of good King Louis (or Ludwig), who sent the first inventor of the machine gun to the guillotine.

The opportunity to stop the production of nuclear weapons has occurred at least twice.

Sakharov tried to persuade Khrushchev to make the trilateral moratorium begun in 1959 open-ended. The academician related that episode in his last interview, on 14 December 1989, with the Nevada-Semipalatinsk film group: "Khrushchev recognized only one policy, policy from a position of strength. He said: 'I would be a wimp if I listened to such people as Sakharov!'"

In 1961 the USSR violated the moratorium and conducted a series of tests consisting of 50 explosions. The United States reacted accordingly and set its own record the following year—96 explosions.

In an answering series, the USSR exploded a superbomb. There was an explosion of indignation in the northern countries! A wave of protest against the growing killing of the biosphere reached the storm level. For the first time, the Soviet academy showed character. And in 1963 the Moscow Treaty banning open testing was signed. Khrushchev took that step having the 60-megaton bomb in his arsenal.

The documentary film "Poligon" [Testing Ground] that will soon come to screens includes shots from a film chronicle from late 1962. A reception in the Kremlin, Khrushchev making vigorous gestures: "Why are we making a bomb? To use it! I'll tell you a secret: scientists have promised to make a 100-megaton bomb! 100!' And he raises his finger like an exclamation mark. Such enthusiastic revelations by the Soviet leader heated up the temperature of the Cold War. According to Sakharov's calculations, open testing with a power of one megaton would take tens of thousands of lives. No matter where it is carried out—whether in the desert, or on an island lost in the ocean—it still reduces the totality of human life on earth. The 629 megatons exploded by the nuclear powers in two environments killed and maimed millions of people. And how will those experiments detonate in the genes of subsequent generations? But do you possibly think about that when you need at this very moment to pound your nuclear fist on the podium and make people respect you?!

Khrushchev's short-sighted policies and the maximalism and unpredictability of his character prevented America and Great Britain from signing the Moscow treaty in the radical Sakharov version: it was concluded with an American amendment permitting underground testing.

At the end of the second millennium, the idea of world domination has run its course. Totalitarianism has demonstrated its antihuman essence. Democracy is winning. The colors of tyrannical governments are being erased from the political map. The billions-strong masses are starting to appropriate the right of civic responsibility.

Gorbachev's policies have imparted acceleration to the process of planetary democracy. Just five years of consistent concessions and impossible compromises! How many situations have there been that demanded and justified a return to the politics of force, but the Policy, pretending to be lost and indecisive, is proceeding, disarming howling great-powerism and tribalism of all stripes by virtue of its vulnerability. If only to keep from falling through, if only people will have time to understand—that which is happening with peace is the main thing, without which our plans and projects cannot be carried out.

We are reaching an understanding that the concepts of "independence," "patriotism" and "national defense" must be regarded through the prism of universal human interests. In this light it is obvious that the means of total destruction cannot preform defensive functions. A general moral and psychological atmosphere has been created that is favorable for the elimination of all types of imperial weapons.
Formula for Parity

The first unilateral moratorium was Gorbachev’s work. America did not immediately believe in the sincerity of his step.

Prior to halts that were prepared in advance, the sides would try to carry out more explosions. Before the “Gorbachev” moratorium, there was no feverish upswing in the pace of work. Even the fact that the testing ground did not fall silent at the very beginning of the year allows one to believe in the unplanned nature of the halt.

If our politicians had paid attention at that time to one encouraging nuance in the American side’s behavior, they might have found grounds for extending the moratorium and making it open-ended.

America did not ignore the Union’s peacemaking gesture: the following year it already cut the number of its tests (for several years the United States had carried out 17 explosions a year, but in 1986 it cut back to 14). For three years it has maintained that level.

In 1989 the actions of the antinuclear movement forced the USSR government to reduce its annual program by nearly two-thirds. The United States responded with another restructuring of its own plan: that year it exploded 11 devices instead of the anticipated 14. Once again, minus three. Truly a holy number!

Since October 1989 the Semipalatinsk test range has halted its activities. The United States has not ignored that event: It has announced its 1990 program: eight explosions. For the first time in several decades, it has cut back to a single-digit number.

The pattern identified makes it possible to predict the development of events: if the USSR officially recognizes the popular moratorium and makes its open-ended, in 1991 (even if the January treaty is not signed) the number of tests in Nevada will be cut to five, in 1992—to two, and in 1993—.

“Zero-zero” is a formula for attainable nuclear parity.

America is not attempting to take advantage of our situation and cover the quantitative test deficit that has developed in recent times. It has shown a tendency to cut back its national nuclear program, although that does not square with the statements of the Department of Energy. But I place more belief in the facts and the logic of their development. This year staffs of the leading U.S. nuclear laboratories are being cut by one-fourth (from recent reports by the laboratory directors in a Senate committee). Staffs at enterprises in the nuclear industry are being cut. In one year 86 U.S. military bases have been closed. Congress is working on a bill providing for a substantial reduction in expenditures for conventional and nuclear weapons.

In December the mayors of America’s biggest cities are meeting in New York under the motto: “The cities say no!” It is in the municipalities’ power to stop dangerous production facilities in their megalopolises. A petition by veterans of all 20th-century wars demanding the signing of the January treaty gathered millions of American citizens’ signatures.

If your want peace, prepare for peace! Do not frighten off the peaceful silence that is setting in. Do not set off an explosion inadvertently. Otherwise there will once again be a splash overseas. And once again, the vicious circle.

The Americans will stop Nevada earlier than predicted if they manage to retool their death factories for civilian output. The universal flexibility of the Western economic system should manifest itself fully here. Intellectual potential and resources will rush into science and industry. In such a competition, we do not want to lag behind!

Great Britain uses the testing ground in Nevada. If the United States stops testing, Britain will not continue.

Mitterand recently stated to journalists: “France will not be the last country to stop nuclear tests!” Not a single president of the republic has gone back on his word yet.

Great China will not want to remain alone.

In 20 countries work on the bomb is close to completion. That is why the Big Five must disarm in time. The first step toward that is a Treaty Banning Tests in All Environments. The second is a Treaty Banning Research on and the Development, Production, Storage and Proliferation of Weapons of Total Destruction. That document should provide measures for the strictest international verification and sanctions that are not just economic.

The basis of this legal mechanism should be the agreed-upon postulate: the possession of weapons of genocide is no longer the internal affair of any state, since it threatens the life of all humanity.

If the global community succeeds in realizing its project in the next few years, the world will be saved from apocalypse, which the churches and the academies are already predicting. People united in the struggle against self-annihilation will be able to justify the meaning of our species, Homo Sapiens: reason, in truth, is intelligence multiplied by morality.

On 19 October 1989 the last explosion was heard at the Semipalatinsk test range. Whether that day goes down in history as the date of the last nuclear-weapons test in our country depends on us.

President, support the popular moratorium!

Give us the opportunity to declare: “Americans, we have done our job—stopped our testing grounds. Now it is your turn!”
Case for Nuclear Test Resumption Argued
PM2410150190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
24 Oct 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by Professor V. Mikhaylov, USSR deputy minister of nuclear power and industry, as part of the "Discussion Sheet No. 69: Society, Party, Perestroika" feature: “Why Should the Country’s Nuclear Test Sites Remain Silent?”]

[Excerpts] Commenting on Events

Yet another underground nuclear explosion was carried out at the U.S. test site in Nevada 12 October.

The last few months of this year have seen seven nuclear explosions carried out by the United States, four by France, and two by China.

For about a year now, our country’s nuclear test sites have remained silent. An alarming situation. Is such a political risk justified in our time?

The approximate parity of nuclear arsenals prevailing between the Soviet Union and the United States is the basis of contemporary stability in the world and, one could say, of the nature of political and economic relations.

Our country’s unilateral nuclear disarmament paves the way to a U.S. monopoly. Of course, we could be called upon to do this beneath the banner of peace in our planet, for the sake of ensuring mankind’s vital interests. But any monopoly, and especially a monopoly in a matter like this, is fraught with unpredictable consequences for the entire world community, with the world’s nuclear countries already inhabited by a population of more than 1.7 billion, in other words by one out of every three of our planet’s inhabitants. Are we likely to feel comfortable in this nuclear world? Recent history has already recorded one instance when the United States enjoyed a monopoly on nuclear weapons—in 1945-1949. We all recall that time with ache in our hearts. Even at that time, progressive people all over the planet realized the profound abyss the situation entailed and—why make a secret of it—some of them paid with their lives for helping us in the truly titanic work to create [nad sozdaniyem] the world’s nuclear shield. The first Soviet atom bomb, developed [razrabotannaya] under I.V. Kurchatov’s leadership, was tested at the newly set up Semipalatinsk test site 29 August 1949. In the hard postwar years, our people proved their great intellect and talent to the entire world. That was truly a triumph for our whole people.

Since the emergence of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has been waging a firm struggle to ban them completely, starting in 1946 when our country submitted to the United Nations a proposal for a complete ban on atomic weapons. [passage omitted]

The cessation of all nuclear tests is fundamentally important today in order to prevent the creation of third-generation nuclear weapons or the so-called directed-energy weapons, not to let this evil “jinni” move on from the stage of scientific quest to the stage of full-scale development [razrabotkiy]. On the one hand, these weapons should produce between 100 and 1,000 times less global radioactive pollution than existing weapons, and on the other hand they should be capable of striking at the opponent’s strategic targets both in space and on Earth. This is what causes alarm, because some rather hot heads could be tempted to use them in any local conflict.

In this context, it is a worrying fact that second-generation nuclear weapons could be destroyed—under the strictest international monitoring on the basis of treaty principles—apparently only as the West achieves success in the creation of third-generation weapons. It is very dangerous not to perceive such a course of the development of events. It is the responsible task of all mankind to prevent the creation of third-generation weapons.

Growing numbers of people in the world support the demand for a complete ban on nuclear tests but, on the other hand, there is really serious opposition by the West’s nuclear powers. International debates on this question are today pursued more persistently than ever before. The Soviet Union has advocated, and advocates within the framework of the new doctrine of sufficient defense, an immediate and complete cessation of all nuclear tests. And it is not the Soviet Union’s fault that nuclear tests continue. [passage omitted]

Does the Soviet Union need two nuclear test sites today? Taking the positive trends in the world into account, I do not think so. The country’s Supreme Soviet must have its say on the schedules for nuclear test sites’ operations with due consideration for the geographic location and geological structure of test site areas and the population density in adjacent regions, as well as on the rules of compensation for the degree of risk involved in living in these regions and the expropriation of land for the test sites. But the solution of this important question is dragging on, while confusion and muddle drive this problem into a blind alley. I think that, in the first place, it is necessary to halt nuclear weapons tests at the Semipalatinsk test site.

Decisions on the country’s annual nuclear programs, including nuclear tests, should be made by a special commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions and ratified by the USSR president.

Our test sites have remained silent since October 1989, but the Nevada test site is still functioning. True enough, the intensity of operations has somewhat declined, but it still remains at what I would describe as quite a high level. Looking over the last five years, our test sites have remained silent for virtually half this time. During this
period—between 1986 and 1990—the USSR carried out 43 nuclear weapons tests at nuclear test sites, against 64 tests by the United States in Nevada. Thus, the United States has always been ahead of the USSR in terms of the number of nuclear weapons tests. Even though the main point here is not “competition” but primarily national security interests.

Categorical statements by public figures on radio and television, in the press, from Supreme Soviet rostrums, and at rallies and meetings of informal public organizations about the cessation of nuclear tests in our country create public opinion in favor of the need for further unilateral steps.

There is no doubt that the majority of authors have the most sincere intentions of saving mankind from a nuclear catastrophe. In our country, however, the center of gravity of the struggle for universal nuclear disarmament has shifted over the last few years sharply in favor of its virtually unilateral nuclear disarmament. Could our country allow itself to become hostage of the other nuclear powers’ political ambitions? After all, nuclear weapons today—taking all the consequences of their use into account—are primarily weapons of global policy. The voice of professionals is drowned by the chorus of public commentators in a sphere where competence and caution are especially important. In actual fact, the mass media give expert professionals no opportunity to have their say, and outright slander, fabrications, and demagoguery often remain unanswered. As a matter of fact, we still remember the chorus of press statements under the slogan “Who Feeds You, Academician Sakharov?” We feel ashamed to recall this today, and I will be told that it happened in the “stagnation” times. No, history is repeating itself. As a rule, the floor is not given to alternative points of view. The “occupation” of mass media could bring incalculable damage to our country.

In these conditions, the population’s unpreparedness to objectively perceive reports about the nature and specific features of radiological and seismological conditions, the lack of information about measures to ensure safety, and the hard social and daily life conditions often result in passions being emotionally whipped around the country’s nuclear test sites. It must be noted in this context that, as was shown by the joint monitoring experiment at the Semipalatinsk test site which was attended by a large group of foreign and Soviet press representatives, the safety ensured by Soviet specialists during the conduct of underground nuclear tests is in no way inferior to that in the United States, while the costs of conducting them are 10 times less than in the United States! Realities here are such that the U.S. Department of Energy’s expenditure on the nuclear weapons complex is rising by 8-10 percent each year, while the corresponding expenditure in our country is dropping by 15 percent. This is the reality in which our collectives have to work. Incidentally, Soviet journalists did not attend the U.S. explosion under the joint monitoring experiment in Nevada, even though they were invited. In the situation prevailing in our country, it is deemed patriotic and progressive to utter any criticism against the Soviet test sites. As it always happens in such cases, several public figures exploit it to boost their own popularity, often acting as stage managers in the production of mass demonstrations.

Meanwhile, the United States and its NATO allies are continuing to improve their nuclear arsenal. A long-term program for the modernization of facilities associated with the development and production of nuclear weapons is under consideration. New and better forms for the management of this military-industrial complex are being created. The safety, reliability, and effectiveness of nuclear weapons over the next 20 years occupy a special place in the long-term program.

The enhanced safety of nuclear weapons in the event of accident or unauthorized access to them is perceived as one of the main demands as regards the improvement of nuclear weapons, taking into account the presence of radioactive materials like plutonium, uranium, and tritium. Underground nuclear weapons tests today represent the top priority experimental program for research and engineering work on the improvement and creation of new categories of nuclear weapons.

Intensive work is being done in the West to increase the target-hit accuracy of MIRVed warheads [boyevykh blokov s yadernym oruzhiyem razdelayushchikhsya golovnymy chastey raket], on the creation of weapons with enhanced survivability in conditions of antimissile and antispace defense and of weapons to strike targets deep underground. But these are first-strike weapons! And this is happening at a time when the NATO countries, in contrast with our country, have not pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons!

It must be noted that last September the U.S. Senate consented to the ratification of the 1974 “Threshold” Treaty subject to, first and foremost, guaranteed implementation of effective and permanent programs for underground tests of nuclear weapons, and the retention of modern nuclear laboratories and programs for the constant advancement of nuclear technology.

Could our country’s nuclear test sites remain silent in these conditions? Only a universal ban on nuclear weapons tests can prevent a new round of the arms race and put an end to the endless improvement and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We are constantly striving to put our own home in order, but things are still not working out smoothly. Many examples of this can be encountered at each step. Our home is not the only one on the planet, we all live in a complex and dynamic world. In the age of nuclear-space technology, this world’s space and time are extremely tight for each home.

There are still many regions in the world experiencing unstable political conditions and extremism of political feelings, including some right next to our own borders. Some “third countries” are working intensely on the
creation of nuclear weapons. Thus, the nuclear potential created at a time that was difficult for the country and its constant maintenance at a contemporary scientific and technical level guarantee the stability of peace on our planet and, I would say, also guarantee the success of the new thinking in talks on equal footing on the mutual limitation and cessation of nuclear tests. It is not a question of the number of missiles with nuclear warheads, it is a question of the country's scientific and technical potential which can flexibly respond to other countries' possible achievements in this sphere.

By cutting nuclear arms, we can save an incalculably greater amount of resources to meet the national economy's needs than under a unilateral ban on nuclear tests—the foundation of the country's scientific, technical, and military potential—until such time as a universal nuclear test ban is achieved. To prevent the decomposition of unique collectives of highly skilled professionals is much more difficult that to destroy everything. Now, taking the really complex social and economic situation into account, it would be much simpler to demand unilateral steps by our country. Was it easier for us during the postwar years, when we were creating our nuclear industry? Frankly speaking, lofty civic courage will be needed today—in the face of the situation prevailing around nuclear test sites and tests in our own country—to maintain high standards of responsibility and patriotism and not to succumb to the temptation of short-term benefits for the collectives of workers, engineers, and scientists when solving the questions of maintaining nuclear parity at all stages of disarmament.

The tender shoots of the new thinking, born out of the age of perestroika, are just about appearing in our planet's world politics. The truly people's structures of soviet power created during the age of perestroika are capable of competently solving these complex problems. The art of soberly assessing the situation, mutual understanding, and competence must replace the rhetoric, rallies, and gatherings for sake of retaining our Union as a great society.

Our country's nuclear arms complex belongs to the whole people, and it is impossible to divide it into separate bits and pieces, because this would be a disaster for all peoples.

I am convinced that our people will perceive and overcome the difficulties at the present stage. In conclusion, to paraphrase the famous call, I would like to say: "Dear compatriots, be vigilant!"

Nuclear Test Conducted at Novaya Zemlya
LD2410180190 Moscow TASS in English 1744 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow, October 24 (TASS)—The Soviet Union staged an underground nuclear explosion at its test site in the area of the Novaya Zemlya islands at 18:00 Moscow time today, it was announced here.

The blast, which had a yield of between 20 and 150 kilotons, was set off to confirm the reliability and increase the safety of nuclear weapons.

Radiation levels in the test area are normal.

Norwegian Cited on Novaya Zemlya Radiation Level
PM2410160190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 24 Oct in Russian 90 p 1

[Report by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent A. Baranov: "Off the Scale"]

[Text] Copenhagen—Data about the "excessive" level of radiation in the region of Novaya Zemlya, obtained by activists of the international organization Greenpeace during a recent illegal landing on the Soviet archipelago and offered up to world public opinion as a sensation, are overestimated by a factor of 1,000. This was the statement of the Norwegian scientist Britt Salbu, an isotope laboratory worker at the Norwegian Higher Agricultural School. Her expert analysis has shown that members of the Greenpeace landing team quite simply confused the units of measurement, making a calculation in milliroentgens whereas in fact the radiation was registering on the microroentgen scale. The actual radiation level on Novaya Zemlya, where, as is well known, a Soviet nuclear test range is situated, proved to be surprisingly low, the Danish newspaper LAND OG FOLK notes, citing B. Salbu's statement.

SPC Expresses 'Concern' on Novaya Zemlya Test
LD2510230490 Moscow World Service in English 2200 GMT 25 Oct 90

[Text] The Soviet Peace Committee [SPC] has expressed profound concern over the underground nuclear test in the Nordic Novaya Zemlya archipelago on Wednesday [24 Oct].

The committee points out in a statement that the resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union after a one-year break runs counter to the recent appeal by the Soviet parliament to the parliaments and governments around the world for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The Soviet public has also condemned the seven nuclear tests conducted by the United States, the four French explosions, and the two Chinese tests.

State Environmental Committee Protests Nuclear Test
LD2510224190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1910 GMT 25 Oct 90

[Statement by Nikolay Nikolayevich Vorontsov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection, at the 25 October Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, Supreme Soviet
Finally, I am fully convinced that yesterday's nuclear test is yet another blow by the military-industrial complex against our President Gorbachev. I do not envy Mikhail Sergeyevich, who in December will be presented with the Nobel Peace Prize—which he undoubtedly deserves—in Oslo. How will he look at that meeting after the tests. I think the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation should make a special statement on this matter. Thank you for your attention.

Kazakhstan Said To Ban Testing at Semipalatinsk

Sovereignty Declaration Adopted

LD2510211490 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh
1500 GMT 25 Oct 90

[Text] At today's morning session of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, a report on the structure of the bodies of state power and the management of the national economy in the republic was delivered by Nursultan Abish-ogly Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh SSR.

The decision was made that the draft law on the introduction of amendments and addenda to the constitution of the Kazakh SSR connected with the new structure of power and administration and a corresponding explanatory note are to be examined in committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet.

The proposed draft law will be discussed at the secondary plenary session of this meeting.

After that, on behalf of the Supreme Soviet Commission on the finalization of the Draft Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR, its chairman, Deputy (Zhananov), spoke.

At the evening session of the Supreme Soviet, there was an article-by-article examination of the draft declaration. Each article was adopted in open voting. The Supreme Soviet adopted the declaration on state sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR as a whole. Comrade Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh SSR, and Comrade Asanbayev, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, congratulated deputies and all the participants on this significant event in the history of Soviet Kazakhstan.

Semipalatinsk Testing Banned

AU2610124090 Paris AFP in English 1221 GMT
26 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow, October 26 (AFP)—The Soviet central Asian republic of Kazakhstan has adopted a sovereignty declaration, putting its laws above those of the Union and banning all nuclear testing on its territory, the INTERFAAX news agency said here Friday.

The declaration, adopted by a majority vote of deputies in Alma Ata, proclaims that the republic's territory, its natural resources, waters and air space will not be used without the republic's consent.
All property forms will be equally lawful; the declaration adds.

Deputies also ruled that all nuclear testing and the construction or operation of test sites for other weapons of mass destruction were banned on Kazakh territory.

A site at Semipalatinsk, in Kazakhstan, has long been the Soviet Union’s prime underground nuclear testing centre. Tests there were suspended over a year ago following public protests in the region.

**Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Novaya Zemlya Test**

*LD2610142390 Moscow TASS in English 1414 GMT 26 Oct 90*

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, October 26 (TASS)—The Soviet Union’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests has affected its security, and a decision was taken to conduct a test at the Novaya Zemlya testing ground, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told a briefing here today.

Commenting on the reasons that prompted the Soviet Union to conduct an underground nuclear test on October 24, Gremitskikh said Soviet testing grounds “remained silent for almost a year”. The Soviet Union believed that this would lead to a bilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, that other nuclear powers would join it. But the United States, France and China continued nuclear testing this year.

“Taking the serious decision, the Soviet political leadership weighed hundreds of various factors and circumstances. But the country’s security is a factor that cannot be neglected by any political leadership,” he said.

“The Soviet Union’s principal approach to the nuclear test ban has not changed. The Soviet Union has been a consistent supporter of a full ban on all nuclear tests as soon as possible, and it does not intend to shift its stand,” Gremitskikh said.

He noted that the Soviet Union is ready to begin working out a corresponding international agreement with other countries.

**No Increase in Radiation Detected at Novaya Zemlya**

*LD2610213390 Moscow TASS in English 2119 GMT 26 Oct 90*

[Text] Moscow, October 26 (TASS)—According to the information of the ground observation network of the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology, no growth of radioactivity was registered in the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk regions and the Nenets national district after an underground nuclear explosion at the Novaya Zemlya test site, conducted on October 24.

The radiation level in the cities of Arkhangelsk, Severodvinsk, Naryan-Mar and Vorkuta, and villages located on the coast of the White and Barents Seas was from six to 15 microrems after the explosion (the figure for the Murmansk region is close to 19), which did not exceed the level registered before the explosion.

A laboratory plane of the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology, which monitored the radiation of the atmosphere over the mainland south of the Novaya Zemlya island in the Arkhangelsk-Naryan-Mar—Vorkuta—Kamenny Cape—Pechora—Ukhta—Perm area, did not register the exceeding of the radiation levels over the background values.

**TASS on Swedish Protest Over Novaya Zemlya Test**

*LD2610105890 Moscow TASS in English 1026 GMT 26 Oct 90*

[Text] Stockholm, October 26 (TASS)—Sweden has expressed its regret over the Soviet resumption of underground nuclear tests after a year-long moratorium, according to Foreign Minister Sten Andersson.

The Soviet Union exploded an underground nuclear device on a test site in the area of Novaya Zemlya archipelago on October 24.

Sweden knew about the resumption but hoped Moscow would refrain, Andersson said in a statement issued on Thursday night.

This year Sweden and other northern countries raised the issue in contacts with the Soviet side, he said.

Sweden demands that all nuclear weapons states end tests and has worked for decades for a complete ban of such explosions, Andersson said. The Swedish Foreign Ministry also circulated a memo about the Swedish position on nuclear tests.

The Soviet Parliament is now discussing whether to move tests to Novaya Zemlya, but has yet to take a decision.

Apparently, this did not prevent (the Soviet Union) from holding Wednesday’s explosion on Novaya Zemlya, the memo said.

**Deputies Discuss Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Test**

*LD2910194790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1710 GMT 29 Oct 90*

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Ivan Ivanov, Vladimir Isachenkov, and Andrey Orlov from the Kremlin]

[Text] Moscow, 29 October (TASS)—The Soviet legislature today examined the circumstances around the
testing of a nuclear explosive device at the Novaya Zemlya test site on 24 October. Protests from deputies and the local population against the test, and the fact that it was held without warning, formed the basis for the examination.

Reporting to the legislature about the circumstances regarding the test, Professor Viktor Mikhailov, deputy minister of USSR Atomic Energy and Industry, assured deputies that the emission of radioactive products did not take place. The radiation level at a distance of one kilometer from the epicenter of the explosion was practically ambient—from six to 10 micro roentgen per hour, he said. Due to the fact that strong rocks situated in the test site region dampened the explosion, there was no seismic effect at a tester's settlement located within 250 kilometers of the epicenter, not to mention the adjoining sea area.

Viktor Mikhailov said the explosion would be the only test the USSR will carry out this year.

Numerous claims were voiced in deputies' speeches. It was noted that in a difficult economic situation “it is impermissible to throw billions of rubles to the wind.” Amusement was expressed at why the USSR Government had not notified local authorities about the test.

The speech by Aleksey Yablokov, deputy chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Ecology, was especially sharp. He said that if the explosion had been carried out a week earlier, “Mikhail Gorbachev would not have received the Nobel Peace Prize.” In Yablokov's words, the USSR now “will lose the injection of $500 million the northern countries were prepared to give.”

It was decided to further study the issue in parliamentary committees for legislation, defense, and ecology, and to prepare a corresponding decision.

**Domestic Reaction to Novaya Zemlya Test Reported**

**Arkhangelsk 'Top Leaders' Not Informed**

**LD2910154990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 29 Oct 90**

[Text] Only two representatives from Arkhangelsk Oblast were taken to Novaya Zemlya by the command of the nuclear test site. Only today did they visit the place where the nuclear test was carried out, although back in June an agreement was signed according to which the test site's command pledged to inform the leaders of Arkhangelsk Oblast of a test 24 hours prior to its start. But this was not done.

The command of the test site claims that it telephoned Arkhangelsk but could not contact the top leaders. The second section of the agreement on bringing members of the public of the oblast and people's deputies to the site on the following day was also not complied with. On this point, the command referred to the bad weather.

**Deputies Plan Protests**

**PM2710151890 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 90 p 1**

[I. Sichka report: "We Blast Without Warning!"]

[Text] The day before yesterday at around noon, USSR People's Deputy G. Borovik approached his colleague A. Vyucheyskiy and gave him a piece of news: That morning he had had a telephone call from Helsinki saying that there was going to be a nuclear explosion today at the test range in the Novaya Zemlya region. Since A. Vyucheyskiy is an activist in the “For a Nuclear-Free North” movement, G. Borovik wondered what he thought of this news. Vyucheyskiy stated firmly: This cannot be.

First of all, how could people in Finland know that an explosion is being planned? Second, no explosions have been carried out at the test range in the Novaya Zemlya region for almost two years now. Third and most important, after a deputy's question in October 1989, A. Vyucheyskiy received the following answer:

"...the question of carrying out tests on the Novaya Zemlya islands will be discussed with the republic and oblast leadership and with people's deputies from the relevant districts."

The answer was signed by I. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and L. Ryabov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for the Fuel and Power Complex.

Deputy Vyucheyskiy also knew that the military's attempt to take the question of choosing a new test range through Supreme Soviet committees had not yet met with success. He said all this to the worried G. Borovik, and on that note they parted.

Imagine their surprise when the very same evening the "Vremya" program broadcast an official report to the effect that at 1800 hours Moscow time 24 October an underground nuclear explosion was carried out in the area of the Novaya Zemlya islands. A. Vyucheyskiy immediately started ringing everyone who should have been notified that nuclear tests were starting again on Novaya Zemlya in accordance with the government’s promises. But neither Ye. Alekseyev, chairman of the Nenets Okrug Soviet Executive Committee, nor Yu. Shchegolkov, deputy chairman of the Arkhangelsk Oblast Soviet Executive Committee, nor A. Vishnyakov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Republic, knew about the planned explosion.

Thus, this is the latest example (how many have there been) of the government not carrying out its numerous promises. In this connection, a group of USSR people’s deputies from Arkhangelsk Oblast are now planning to lodge an official protest with the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
Yesterday Deputy Vyuchyeyskiy sent the editorial office an appeal for mass rallies to be held in the northern regions of the country demanding a ban on nuclear tests on the Novaya Zemlya islands, the resignation of I. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, because he deceived the people, and the resolute fulfillment of all government decisions on the Novaya Zemlya test range and adjacent territories.

Reassurances Given on Test Safety
PM2910150590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Oct 90 Second Edition pp 1, 6

[A. Pokrovskiy report: “‘Zero’ Plus One: We Report Details of Nuclear Explosion in Region of Novaya Zemlya Islands”]

[Text] Of course, I would have been more pleased to report fulfillment of the wish all we participants in one of the experiments to verify underground nuclear explosions wrote down on the seismogram that captured the underground echo of an event that occurred a hemisphere away from us: “Let us hope it is the last one.”

This was in 1986 at the North Kazakhstan Seismograph Station. And to this day I have kept the document, although our hopes have not fully materialized. This year alone the United States has already carried out seven explosions of new forms of nuclear weapons, France has carried out four, and China two. The Soviet Union had not carried out any until now.

Let us face the truth, however harsh it may be. To carry on “being silent” in these conditions would mean to lag behind the current level of armaments and jeopardize the country’s security. But it is not difficult to predict the mixed reaction to this event abroad, and indeed in our country. And, as has become customary in recent times, it will be surrounded by all kinds of conjectures and rumors. Therefore, on the basis of the strengthening principles of glasnost I asked permission to witness an explosion—as far as possible—in order to be able to speak honestly about everything I saw and heard.

To begin with, the nearest point to this event was the office of Vice Admiral G. Zolotukhin, chief of a Navy directorate. Apart from the boss, a group of the specialists who had prepared this test was here. And all information on events at the Novaya Zemlya test site was to be reported here promptly. My new acquaintances were not very talkative before the scheduled “zero” hour.

I understood, because they were visualizing that most tightly sealed deep gallery beneath the mountain where the “item” was sitting motionless; the numerous sensors of the “Splav” automatic system, designed to tell the experimenters about pressure, radiation, direction of air flow, and other results of the explosion; the “Tunel” remote-control automated radiation monitoring system on the surface; and, of course, their comrades the theoretical physicists, the designers of the “item,” the workers at the test site who were there now on Novaya Zemlya. It was for their benefit that helicopters would take off to hover above the ground and ships would be in full readiness as the “zero” hour approached—if something happened, people would have to be evacuated at lightning speed. Weapons will be weapons, and particularly experimental weapons. What is more, this one had been lying in the shaft for quite some time for various reasons, including waiting for the right weather from the sea. The wind must be able to carry a radioactive cloud toward the ocean if one should suddenly appear.

“Silence,” the admiral said. “‘Zero hour!’”

Literally a few minutes later we heard the following report:

“The experiment has been carried out successfully. According to preliminary data, the situation is normal.”

The admiral started reporting to his superiors, and I was told that the data from the numerous sensors was being examined, helicopters were circling the mountain, measuring the parameters of the atmosphere, while above them, a specially equipped airplane was doing the same thing.

Here it is, this detailed report. Of all the information, I will dwell on one thing—currently the most important thing—the level of radioactivity is the same as the natural background.

“Did you hear?” the admiral asked. “This is an official report that has not been embellished for the press in any way, which is something that some people are likely to accuse us of. Yes of course, a military test site is not the place for an evening stroll. We also have specially demarcated security zones there, which, incidentally, are a legacy of the surface experiments. But I and many of my comrades here have served at the test site for many years and have raised children there. Surely we are not our own enemies and we would not be silent if the radiation situation was not being monitored.

“Yes, I understand the concern of the population in the areas near the test site,” he continued. “The ecological situation there is alarming. But you have to ascertain where the influence of the test site extends, and where there is careless management. Finally, I would like to mention something else. The—admittedly uninvited—Greenpeace expedition to Novaya Zemlya confirmed our data about the level of radiation there, even to their own surprise.

“Now turn your attention to the following: The millionplus city of Los Angeles is about 500 km from the Nevada test sites. The vacation city of Las Vegas is only about 110-160 km away from them. This does not cause alarm among residents or vacationers. Now compare. Murmansk is 920 km from our test site. Arkhangelsk—1,100 km, and Naryan-Mar—620 km. Yet people constantly suspect us of something...”
He said the Soviet Union had not conducted nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site since October 18, 1989, and on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago since December 4, 1988.

“At the same time, the United States, France and China continued nuclear tests, and the Soviet moratorium began to affect the Soviet Union’s security,” he said.

“The Soviet Union has ever been an advocate of an early and complete ban on nuclear testing and does not intend to give up this policy. But this policy should be supported by other countries.”

Asked whether or not President Mikhail Gorbachev knew about the planned nuclear test, Ignatenko said: “It does not matter whether or not someone knew. And I do not know whether or not there was need for a document signed personally by the president. In any case, there has been no decree on this score.”

USSR Supreme Soviet Complains on Novaya Zemlya Test
LD3110113290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1010 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Report from the Kremlin by TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov, Vladimir Bachenkov, and Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow, 31 October (TASS)—The Soviet legislature adopted a resolution today “On the situation which has come about in connection with the staging of an underground nuclear explosion on Novaya Zemlya on 24 October 1990.” This results from the hearings which took place on Monday.

It states, in particular, that the relevant authorities—the USSR Supreme Soviet committees on defense and state security matters and on ecology and the rational utilization of natural resources, and the USSR State Committee for Protection of the Environment—were not informed in good time about this nuclear test. “The nuclear explosion which was carried out has also hampered the development of cooperation between the USSR and the countries of northern Europe in the field of joint steps to improve the ecological situation in the north”, the document says.

The resolution indicates to the government the impermissibility in the future of failing to notify the authorities in good time of the preparation and staging of nuclear tests. The USSR Council of Ministers is also instructed within a two-month period to complete the elaboration and to submit to the legislative committees on defense and state security matters and on ecology proposals on a nuclear test program for 1991, and also on a comprehensive program of nuclear tests.

The Supreme Soviet requested that the government speed up the preparation of a report on matters relating to the influence of subterranean nuclear tests in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago on the surrounding regions.
of the extreme north, and also to analyze the consequences of previous nuclear tests on the health of the population in the adjoining regions.

The prohibition of all forms of nuclear tests is one of the more important areas both of the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Soviet initiatives in this sphere, however, are not meeting with support from the United States, the resolution stresses.

**Arkhangelsk Leadership Protests Nuclear Tests**

*LD3110102490 Moscow TASS in English 1007 GMT 31 Oct 90*

[Report by TASS correspondent Vladimir Anufriyev]

[Text] Arkhangelsk, October 31 (TASS)—The leadership of Arkhangelsk region protested against nuclear tests on the Novaya Zemlya arctic archipelago. A statement to this effect and telegrams addressed to President Mikhail Gorbachev and Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov were read out at a news conference organized here by the executive committee of the regional council.

The archipelago—an area of northern test sites—is part of the Arkhangelsk region. However, there are no civilian institutions of power there and the military have complete control on Novaya Zemlya. It is difficult for representatives of the local authorities to visit the islands. It may so happen that they would not be allowed to visit.

The underground nuclear explosion carried out on the Archipelago on October 4 stirred up the public of the Russian north and prompted the regional leadership's resolute action.

**RSFSR Government Deplores Novaya Zemlya Test**

*91WC0018A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 3 Nov 90 First edition p 2*

["Statement of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the RSFSR Council of Ministers on the Conducting of Nuclear Weapons Tests at the Novaya Zemlya Test Site"]

[Text] On 24 October of this year an underground nuclear explosion in the area of the Novaya Zemlya islands was carried out in violation of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic [RSFSR].

This routine nuclear weapons test was not agree to by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, the RSFSR Council of Ministers or the local authorities.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet and government consider such a situation intolerable; they express their resolute protest and demand for the future unconditional compliance with the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR in all its aspects.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Council of Ministers address to the USSR president and to the USSR Supreme Soviet a proposal to urgently define the conditions and order for joint action in considering, carrying out and monitoring decisions in the area of the country's defense and security.

[signed]

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
The RSFSR Council of Ministers
29 October 1990

**NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES**

**Karpov Explains Proposal for Nuclear-Free Baltic**

*LD2210174490 Moscow TASS in English 1730 GMT 22 Oct 90*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, October 22 (TASS)—The Soviet Union issued a note last Thursday, addressed to the Baltic states, as well as the United States, Britain and France as nuclear powers, Soviet deputy foreign minister Viktor Karpov told a news conference here today.

The note proposes that these states begin talks on the Baltic's nuclear-free status.

Karpov pointed to a Soviet decision to stop installing nuclear weapons during peace on Soviet ships and warplanes in the Baltic and air space over it.

He noted that this step creates real conditions for giving the Baltic a nuclear-free status. He added that this move would be completed, even if other countries refuse to begin talks.

The USSR is sure of the need to step up efforts to make the Baltic nuclear-free, taking into account the great stabilising importance of Europe's north to the European process and the wish of peoples in this region to turn their countries into a reliable flank for a European and worldwide security system, Karpov continued.

However, he said, the efficient solution of problems connected with the Baltic's nuclear-free status is possible only through multilateral talks with the Baltic states, as well as nuclear powers using the sea.

In the run-up to such talks, it could be possible to hold consultations to study possible parameters of a future understanding, including control over its observance. In the opinion of the Soviet side, the complete withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the Baltic should be the aim of future talks.

This could mean a ban on the placement of nuclear weapons on ships patrolling the Baltic and aircraft in air space over the sea, the complete prohibition of calls into
the Baltic by ships with nuclear weapons on board from non-littoral states, non-emplacement of such weapons at sea, on the sea-bed or in the subsoil thereof.

It is important that the understanding on the Baltic's nuclear-free status should provide for firm guarantees of this status by nuclear powers using the Baltic and all littoral states, as well as for an effective control mechanism, Karpov stressed.

"We are sure that it is possible to make the Baltic nuclear-free if all interested countries actively participate in promoting this idea," he said.

Karpov emphasised that the Soviet initiative on the Baltic should be regarded in the broad context of other Soviet proposals, including the elimination of sea-based tactical nuclear weapons.

Representative of the Soviet General Staff Nikolay Markov, who participated in the news conference, said that there are Soviet nuclear [word indistinct] in the Baltic.

He pointed out that existing technical possibilities allow for monitoring the presence of nuclear weapons on warships and aircraft, even if they are "concealed" behind graphite of lead "jackets".

Appropriate experiments have already been carried out, Markov noted.
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Nordic States Protest Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Test

Issue Joint Statement
LD2910185490 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1600 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] The Nordic countries have issued a joint protest over the Soviet Union's nuclear test conducted at Novaya Zemlya. In their statement, the Nordic countries recalled the threat posed by Novaya Zemlya to the living environment of the northern regions.

The joint statement by all the Nordic countries has been submitted in Moscow to Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov. The Nordic countries propose that the Soviet Union invite Nordic experts to Novaya Zemlya to inspect the environmental arrangements in the test area. In addition, the Nordic countries are prepared to host an international meeting to discuss ways of preventing the spread of radioactivity from nuclear tests.

Soviet Minister Support Protest
LD2910190690 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1700 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] At the meeting of environment ministers in Helsinki, the Nordic countries received unexpected support for their protests against the nuclear tests on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago in the Arctic Sea. The support came from Soviet Environment Minister Nikolay Vorontsov, who said that the Nordic people are quite right to protest.

[Gustafsson, correspondent] Continue to put pressure on the Soviet Government. The only way to end these tests is for neutral states to protest, continued Soviet Environment Minister Vorontsov. He himself had no idea beforehand that the test explosions would take place, he said, and when he learned of it, he sent in a protest to his own government, a protest that, one can see, will not mean an end to the nuclear tests.

Minister Vorontsov also pointed out that it was quite necessary to protest to other nuclear powers as well over their tests. Otherwise, credibility will be lost, he believes. Once he had described his lack of influence in the government, the environment minister of the Russian Soviet Republic, Gavrilov, spoke. He was, if possible, even more upset. Novaya Zemlya is within the borders of Russia, and, he pointed out, they had not been consulted at all about this matter before the test took place, which meant that the Russian parliament, too, protested against the test.

The Estonian environment minister thereupon stated that 20 meters from the town of Sillamäe, on the north coast of Estonia, there is an 800-cubic-meter mountain of waste containing radioactive substances. He believes for his part that this ought to exercise the Nordic environment ministers much more, because it is directly polluting the Baltic. Nuclear tests up on Novaya Zemlya are nowhere near as dangerous, he claimed.

CANADA

STAR Calls for Debate on NORAD Agreement Substance
91WC0016A Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 1 Oct 90 p A12

[Words in italics as published]


This is the agreement under which the two countries agreed back in 1958 to start sharing the burden of airspace surveillance, air defence and missile warning systems.

With superpower tensions melting away along with the Soviet military threat, our U.S.-dominated continental defence umbrella faces an uncertain future. Must NORAD change with the time, and if so, how?

In this new climate, Canadians may wonder if NORAD is still needed, even though it's just one strand in an intricate web of more than 800 defence agreements—many secret—that bind Ottawa to Washington.

But Prime Minister Brian Mulroney so far has given no sign that he welcomes a debate over NORAD, or that he's prepared to give MPs real input into deciding the alliance's future course. He should.

In 1986, when NORAD was last renewed, he ignored widespread pleas for revival of a clause that had once ruled out Canadian participation in American antiballistic missile (ABM) systems.

Arms control experts have long feared the destabilizing effect of ABM systems—such as the former U.S. president Ronald Reagan's controversial "Star Wars" shield against missiles—on the global arms race.

If the Americans were to use the NORAD agreement (and Canadian soil) for high-tech ABM weaponry, they would put pressure on the Soviet Union to accelerate the development of new, deadlier offensive weapons.

But by reviving the defunct ABM clause, Canada would send a signal that it's serious about controlling the nuclear arms race and respecting disarmament accords, such as the Soviet-U.S. ABM treaty of 1971.

Another NORAD-related issue is Ottawa's 1987 defence white paper commitment—never debated by parliament—"to participate in research on future air defence systems in conjunction with the United States Air Defence Initiative (ADI)."
Washington devised ADI as a research program to develop new space-based radars and weapons capable of detecting and shooting down a new generation of radarpumped Soviet bombers, submarines and cruise missiles.

U.S. Gen. Robert Herres, a former NORAD commander, once saw no point in building a Star Wars “roof” against ballistic missiles without adding “walls” against air attack. Surely Canadians ought to worry about being dragged into dubious and costly commitments like these through NORAD’s back door.

Recently, Le Devoir of Montreal revealed that federal bureaucrats warned External Affairs Minister Joe Clark in May to be wary of both the NORAD renewal issue and new U.S. proposals for weapons tests in Canada.

External Affairs, however, won’t release their report, Canadian Security in a World in a World. But that ought not to deter MPs from launching a spirited debate—before Mulroney decides our future in NORAD by himself.

FINLAND

Government ‘Concerned’ Over Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Test

[Report by correspondent Jaana Kanninen, including recorded interview with Finnish Foreign Minister Perto Paasio; place and date not given]

[Text] [Announcer] Finland is concerned over yesterday’s Soviet nuclear test in Novaya Zemlya. According to a statement issued by Foreign Minister Perto Paasio, the Nordic countries hope for a complete ban on underground nuclear tests as soon as possible. The Finnish Government has not, however, contacted the Soviet Union about yesterday’s test, nor sought any new means of pressure against the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test.

Jaana Kanninen interviews:

[Kanninen] Foreign Minister Perto Paasio, Finland has received with concern the report about the Soviet nuclear test yesterday. How are we going to react to it?

[Paasio] This is, of course, already one way of reacting, when we express our concern over this matter. And I want to note that we have been acting here jointly with the other Nordic countries, and have expressed general concern over the fact that nuclear tests are being transferred to the Arctic area, very close to our territories. We have approached this, above all, from the point of view of the environment.

[Kanninen] The Nordic countries have, up to now—most recently in September—expressed similar concern, but yesterday’s explosion obviously shows that the

Nordic countries have not been listened to. How are you going to make sure that this time they will be listened to?

[Paasio] We have no other means of convincing them, and I would appreciate the preservation of the joint Nordic stance in the future also. We want to discuss this matter calmly, and we hope that it will be possible to progress now that world development in other matters is peaceful as well, especially between the superpowers. Thus there will be better possibilities for this than there were before.

[Kanninen] The statement issued by Foreign Minister Paasio this afternoon was intended only for internal Finnish use. The Finnish Government has not, according to Paasio, contacted the Soviet Union about the nuclear explosion.

Yesterday’s nuclear test has given rise to extensive reactions. The Norwegian premier reacted immediately, yesterday evening, in strong terms. The international environmental organization Greenpeace condemned the nuclear test, which broke the Soviet Union’s year-long unilaterally nuclear moratorium. Yesterday’s nuclear test is quite a sign of hypocrisy from a state whose president has just been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Greenpeace says.

Coincidentally, in Finland a group of experts assessing the environmental affects of nuclear tests met for the first time this morning. The group has promised to map out the risks caused by the tests to the Finnish environment by the end of January.

Yesterday’s nuclear test came as a complete surprise to Finland. The Foreign Ministry was told about the explosion only a couple of hours before it was carried out. Until then, it was thought in Finland that the Soviet Union had not even decided whether it would transfer its underground nuclear tests to Novaya Zemlya. How is it possible that information is given in such a way, Foreign Minister Paasio?

[Paasio] I cannot start assessing it here; the information is so new for me, too. But it is, of course, surprising in this sense, and we want to study it more closely to see what is concerned. We have no information that it would be a question here of a longer test series, or something like that—only that such an explosion has been carried out.

[Kanninen] As such, the Soviet Union did not violate international treaties, for it is permitted to carry out explosions of under 150 kilotonnes without announcing them. It is known that yesterday’s explosion was between 20 and 150 kilotonnes. After the Chernobyl nuclear power station accident, an agreement was concluded between our countries. This agreement says that information must be given about nuclear accidents if they threaten the neighboring country. According to current information, no leaks occurred in yesterday’s nuclear explosion. Moreover, the wind was luckily in the north-easterly direction, away from Finland.
Neutral Role in European Disarmament Talks Urged  
LD2710004190 Helsinki Domestic Service  
in Finnish 1600 GMT 26 Oct 90

[Text] The government's new security policy report, distributed to the Diet's Foreign Affairs Committee, outlines the changes that have taken place in the areas near Finland and in the development of Europe.

The report concludes, among other things, that all CSCE countries should be able to participate in the talks concerning disarmament and confidence-building measures. The problem for the neutral countries has been that the actual talks on reducing conventional weapons, the CFE talks, are being conducted only between countries belonging to the military alliances.

The government now notes, in its new statement, the following: Finland feels future measures for disarmament and confidence-building should be discussed between all the CSCE countries at a joint forum. This would guarantee equally the consideration of the special concerns of all countries.

The report says further that we are working to increase our chances of exerting influence on the establishment of a new joint forum to discuss military security. Finland is prepared to participate in such talks on the defense forces of all countries, at which the discussions will deal with reducing armed forces and increasing military confidence and openness on the basis of a jointly agreed mandate, says the government's report to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

The government also hopes that the naval forces will be included in the talks on disarmament and confidence-building measures. The government's report at the same time supports a complete ban on long-range, sea-launched cruise missiles.

The government's security policy report argues for the need for a joint disarmament forum of all the CSCE countries by referring, among other things, to the changes that have taken place in the areas near Finland and to the loopholes in the CFE talks, as follows: Finland is next to the northern flank of the CFE agreement area. The special problems of the flanks are given less attention in the CFE agreement, the government's statement says.

It also estimates that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the ally countries of the Soviet Union will also bring new armed forces to areas bordering on Finland, the Leningrad and Baltic military districts. After this, the report notes that Finland has asked at the information meetings in Vienna and on other occasions for additional information about the details of the stipulations in the CFE agreement concerning the stockpiling of weapons and the regrouping and transfers of troops. All in all, the government says that it is important, from Finland's point of view, that a unilateral reduction of European armed forces, based on agreements, apply in future to areas near Finland.

The government's report on security policy notes also that the political and military situation in the Baltic Sea area as follows: The Soviet withdrawal from its ally countries will move the Soviet defense line from the southern Baltic further east and north. This change will increase the importance of the Baltic area in the defense of the Soviet Union's own territory, and especially in its aerial defense.

Thus, the government's report to the Foreign Affairs Committee. From Finland's point of view, the military-political transition in the Baltic Sea area stresses the need for Finland to preserve a credible naval surveillance and defense capability, the report says. Immediately after that, the security policy report states in a well-known and concise way that the areas bordering Finland have a permanent strategic importance to the Soviet Union.

GERMANY

Bavarian Firm Said To Sell FAE, Missile Technology to Iraq  
AU2410131390 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German  
22 Oct 90 p 15

[Unattributed report: "Iraq's Helpers in Armament"]

[Text] The company Project Betreuungs GmbH (PBG) from Freising is suspected of having been another helper in arming Iraq. The Munich II public prosecutor's office has started investigating the managing director of the Bavarian company. According to Senior Public Prosecutor Friedrich Bethke: "This is a hot potato." PBG, which belongs to the Consen Group, is supposed to have played a key role in roundabout deliveries of important technology via Argentina and the Middle East, and it is considered an important partner of the Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) concern. PBG is said to have delivered to Egypt MBB's studies on the construction of a fuel air [FAE] bomb with an explosive force similar to a nuclear bomb; via this roundabout way, the blueprints went to Baghdad—Iraq now has the super bomb. Parts of the Condor missile system, which MBB had designed for Argentina's Air Force, also went to Buenos Aires and then to Iraq via PBG, according to findings by the investigators. Last year the FRG Government stated that it "cannot confirm" any involvement by PBG "in the establishment of a research and development center for the construction of missiles in Iraq."

GDR Chemical Weapons Aid to Iraq Detailed  
AU2310214090 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German  
22 Oct 90 pp 97-101

[Unattributed article: "The First Circle of Hell"]

[Text] The generals were listening patiently to Professor Karlheinz Lohs from Leipzig, who gave a lecture in
Baghdad on the reduction of chemical weapons. After the lecture, a senior Iraqi member of the general staff addressed the professor.

"You Germans have a great deal of experience in gassing Jews. We are interested in this. We would like to know how this knowledge can be used to destroy Israel," he stated. The chemical engineer and toxicologist Lohs could have provided the required information, but he did not want to. "I was shocked," he stressed. Since this incident in spring 1972 the GDR scientist has avoided Iraq.

It became clear to him at the time "that Iraq wanted to produce chemical warfare agents by all means." Saddam Hussein's strategists were trying to find specialists for this purpose—"people who had already worked in the first circle of hell."

At least seven managers of the Kolb KG company in Hesse and the Hamburg-based W.E.T. company [Water Engineering Trading GmbH] allegedly carried out this task in Iraq at a later point. They are suspected of building poison gas plants in Samarra and al-Fallujah. One was exempted from arrest, two were released on bail, and four are still in prison (DER SPIEGEL 34/1990).

The Darmstadt Public Prosecutor intends to bring a charge against the managers suspected of being involved in the construction of the poison gas plants, and the defending attorneys want to ensure the acquittal of their clients with the help of renowned scientists. One expert with a good reputation has been found—the 61-year-old former visitor to Baghdad Lohs from Leipzig.

Together with the Bonn lawyer Torsten Arp, the defending attorney of a detained former representative in Iraq, Lohs examined the confiscated material—four tonnes of evidence—at the Customs Criminal Institute in Cologne the Friday before last [12 October].

A lengthy trial is expected in which experts' reports may determine the outcome. The most important expert of the public prosecutor is the Swiss scientist Werner Richarz, who explicitly relied on the work of the former GDR citizens Lohs in his 50-page analysis.

The dean of the Technical University in Zurich came to the conclusion in his expertise ("expertise on the chemical technology used at the plants in Samarra/Iraq"), published on 19 July, that the chemical plants supplied by the Germans were especially constructed for the production of lewisite, prussic acid, and tabun.

According to official indications, the six plants named Ahmed 1, Ani, Mohamed, Meda, Ghasi, and Iesa [spelling as published] were said to be for the production of pesticides—a trick that is well known to Lohs. "The diabolical thing about modern chemical plants is that one can buy plants for the production of pesticides on the world market, which can later be turned into plants for the production of chemical warfare agents," he stated in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 16 August.

Some of Lohs' colleagues in the West are irritated about the fact that the chemical disarmament expert assumed such a mandate. A partial confession has already been achieved in the Kolb case. Lohs did not accept the task because of the money, he emphasized. "We have not even fixed the fee." He wants to assume the role of a "neutral person" in the trial, which is quite naive or quite shrewd.

Professor Dr. Dr. Karlheinz Lohs, with whose help the acquittal of the West German suppliers to Iraq should be ensured, is no ordinary scientist. The director of the Leipzig research center for chemical toxicology of the GDR Academy of Sciences was also an important political figure in the old state.

Lohs was a member of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] for 42 years, railed at the "German militarists," and frequently spoke at party congresses. He was also a travel cadre, which "was quite natural in his position," he stated.

As a scientific adviser of the GDR Government for chemical disarmament, Lohs participated in all important international conferences. He was chairman of the GDR committee for scientific questions concerning the safeguarding of peace and disarmament, and he was a member of the delegation that negotiated, together with the Bonn Social Democratic Party of Germany, a joint proposal for a chemical-weapons-free zone in central Europe.

Lohs enjoyed the confidence of SED Politburo member Werner Axen and of other senior officials, but he has also had a seat and a vote in the renowned Stockholm Peace Research Institute for two decades.

Thus, the researcher Lohs embodies the contradictions of great GDR careers. He is proud of the 68-percent vote of his colleagues with which they expressed their confidence, but there was also an anonymous letter to DER SPIEGEL on the bulletin board, warning against such "incorrigible" old "SED supporters" as Lohs.

The chemical weapons expert is being viewed with distrust by his colleagues in the West. Lohs admitted in West German papers that he is "partly responsible," which makes people even more skeptical. "Lohs is the Krenz of science," poison gas expert Klaus Hoffmann from Hildesheim believes.

The GDR warfare agents expert claims that he was never aware of the "real extent of research in our country." Only after the revolution did he learn that "the GDR's ultra poison laboratories were completely oversized," for example. "Science and researchers like me were skillfully misused as figureheads." Friendly military officials used to "serve me coffee, but they never told me the truth."
As a matter of fact, Lohs should have known the truth. However, the professor, like many of his compatriots, apparently repressed certain things.

Western intelligence services have meanwhile investigated the GDR’s role in Iraq’s arms buildup. It is true that East Berlin’s aid cannot be compared with the large-scale exports from West Germany, but it is more comprehensive than once thought.

The National People’s Army (NVA), for example, built a maneuver area for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons near Baghdad in the eighties, on the model of the training area in Storkow in Brandenburg. It included control towers for the emission of radioactive gamma rays, special buildings and tracks for the decontamination of vehicles, as well as a shooting range with dummy buildings. The chemical warfare expert Lohs did not know anything about that.

Former Defense Minister Eppelmann used to get furious about the fact that the GDR supplied 24 bridge-laying tanks to Iraq until the middle of the year. However, this was not everything: According to the CIA, the GDR supplied at least 50 T-55 tanks to Iraq during the Gulf War. The old weapons were intended to successfully resist ultra-fast shells and even the ultra-hot plasma jets of antitank missiles.

The British intelligence service discovered that the GDR also participated in Saddam Husayn’s missile program. Dozens of GDR technicians are believed to have worked on improving the old Soviet Scud-B missiles. By reducing the payload and enlarging the fuel tanks, the range of the missiles was tripled to about 900 km. Experts had assumed so far that perhaps only West German and Italian technicians participated in the modernization of the Scud-B missiles, known under the codes 124, 144, and 1728.

According to the latest findings, GDR technicians were at least accomplices in constructing the poison gas plants at Saranra and al-Fallujah. During interrogations, several witnesses referred to GDR involvement, and the secret services have made similar findings.

The West German Embassy in Baghdad must have known about the GDR’s involvement. When the builders of the plants for the alleged production of pesticides feared air raids by the Israelis, evacuation plans were prepared and exercises were carried out in the bunkers of Saranra.

During the exercises the question of who was responsible for the GDR technicians was raised. After consultations between Baghdad and Bonn, West German diplomats in Iraq stated that they were not responsible for the GDR fitters.

Professor Lohs, the neutral expert, claims to have heard “for the first time” about GDR involvement in the Saranra poison gas plant. He “did not have the slightest idea.”

As Lohs told NEUE BERLINER ILLUSTRIERTE recently, he briefed the GDR Embassy in Baghdad and the East Berlin Foreign Ministry about the wishes of the Iraqi general staff concerning poison gas for the fight against Israel.

Lohs said: “I closed my eyes, and as the saying goes—The leading comrades certainly knew what they were doing.”

Bundeswehr Forum Demands Disarmament Steps
LD2910235990 Berlin ADN International Service in German 1902 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—At a forum on “The Future of the German Armed Forces in Europe” in Bonn today, Bundeswehr officers demanded far-reaching disarmament steps and the creation of a defensive security system in Europe without the deployment of the means of mass destruction. This was announced by the chairman of the association, “Darmstädter Signal,” Major of the Bundeswehr Helmut Priess, in a statement published in Bonn today. Speakers in the discussion rejected an extension of the Bundeswehr’s sphere of action, for instance, to the Gulf.

The former Army Colonel Erich Hocke criticized the “antisocial handling” of the former soldiers of the National People’s Army by the Bundeswehr leadership. He demanded that disarmament and the size of the Bundeswehr should depend on an analysis of the actual threat and that “the cart should not be put before the horse.”

Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg and the former minister for disarmament and defense, Rainer Eppelmann, were invited but did not take part in the forum. The next working meeting of the officers and soldiers organized in “Darmstädter Signal” will take place in Leipzig from 7 to 9 December.

NORWAY

USSR Allows Survey Buoys Off Novaya Zemlya
PM2410152590 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Oct 90 p 22

[Report by Kare M. Hansen: “Norwegian Marine Researchers for Novaya Zemlya”]

[Text] The Bergen Marine Research Institute has been granted permission to deploy survey buoys northwest of Novaya Zemlya. Tests will also be made from ships to monitor radioactivity in the sea. By way of thanks for the permission granted, the Soviet Russians have been promised full access to the Norwegian research material.

“I must admit that we were surprised to be granted access to the waters around Novaya Zemlya. We raised the matter as long ago as 1986, but were turned down then. The military authorities rejected our plans to
deploy buoys with underwater anchors,” Roald Saetre, head of research at the Bergen Marine Research Institute, told AFTENPOSTEN.

“But suddenly things began to move, and the Soviet Russians have clearly changed their minds. Now we have signed an agreement which gives us an opportunity to collect scientific data off Novaya Zemlya, for example,” Saetre said.

Novaya Zemlya was most recently in the news a couple of weeks ago when four Greenpeace activists landed on the top secret island group. Their efforts were “rewarded” by arrest. According to confirmed reports, 29 nuclear tests have taken place on the more northerly island, and four on the more southerly. The last nuclear test took place almost two years ago.

Representatives of the Bergen Marine Research Institute visited Murmansk in September. Here they signed an agreement with the Soviet Union on a joint research program to show the “state of health” of the Barents Sea. There is a tradition of cooperation between Norway and the Soviet Union in the field of fisheries resources, but for the first time an investigation will be undertaken into the entire ecology of the sea. The sophisticated survey buoys will be deployed next fall. They will measure current, temperature, and salinity over a two year period, as well as radioactivity in kelp, sea tangle, and algae.

Leaders Protest Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Test
PM3010132590 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET
in Norwegian 25 Oct 90 p 10

[NORSK TELEGRAMBYRA report: “Slap in the Face”]

[Text] The Soviet Union’s nuclear test on Novaya Zemlya came as a slap in the face for the Norwegian authorities. Only a few hours before the nuclear test took place at 1600 hours Norwegian time Wednesday afternoon [24 October] Prime Minister Jan P. Syse had called on the Soviet authorities to refrain from such testing.

“We are very disappointed at the nuclear test. The Soviet Union has not heeded the many protests,” Prime Minister Syse told NORSK TELEGRAMBYRA.

It was the Seismological Department at Uppsala University in Sweden which reported the nuclear test detonation. The explosion registered 5.7 on the Richter scale. The explosive effect was between 20 and 150 kilotons. The last nuclear test on Novaya Zemlya was carried out 4 December 1988. That reached 6.1 on the Richter scale.

According to TASS, the test was carried out to test the reliability and to increase the safety of the use of nuclear arms. TASS reported that radioactivity in the test area is normal.

“I thought the Soviet Union would have behaved differently. The test took place close to Norway in a very ecologically sensitive region,” Syse said.

When the Norwegian authorities became aware that an exclusion zone had been introduced on the eastern side of Novaya Zemlya and that other measures in preparation for the test had been carried out by the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Syse contacted USSR Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov.

Yesterday Syse received a reply to the effect that a test would take place over the next few days. A few hours later the detonation took place.

“Norway strongly dissociates itself from what a neighboring state has now done. Without wishing to dramatize the situation, what has happened is a negative factor in relations between the Soviet Union and Norway. We have made use of all channels in our attempts to have the test halted. As recently as yesterday the other Nordic countries were asked to protest the Soviet Union’s plans,” Prime Minister Syse said.

“The Soviet nuclear test has spread negative reactions and given rise to fears—particularly in northern Norway. It is very regrettable that this has happened,” Foreign Affairs Committee Chairperson Gro Harlem Brundtland (Labor Party) commented to NORSK TELEGRAMBYRA.

Like the prime minister, she stressed that Norway had done everything that could be done to persuade the Soviet Union to refrain from carrying out the nuclear test.

“But it is possible that the decision for the nuclear test had been taken and the physical and technical preparations made more than a year ago. This would make it difficult to back off,” Brundtland said.

She also said that the juxtaposition of Mikhail Gorbachev’s peace prize and the nuclear test is regrettable. But she added that the prize was awarded on the general basis of the work Gorbachev has done to create changes in Europe.

Brundtland deems it regrettable that the nuclear powers have not reached agreement on a nuclear test ban. She pointed out that the United States, Britain, France, and China also carry out such tests.

Soviet local politicians from Arkhangelsk, in whose administrative district Novaya Zemlya is situated, were completely in the dark about the nuclear test while staying yesterday evening at Sorreisa Hotel in Tromso. The protests at the nuclear test are as strong in the Soviet Union in areas close to the test site as they are in northern Norway.

“This came as a complete surprise. The local authorities have not heard a word about a planned test at the present time,” oblast Soviet Chairman Pavel Balatskin told NORSK TELEGRAMBYRA in Arkhangelsk.
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