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13 September 1991

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Chief Mufti Discusses Beliefs, Policies

91BA0935A Cairo AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI
in Arabic 30 Apr 91 pp 16-19

[Interview with Dr. Nedim Ibrakhim Khafiz Gendzhiev by As'ad Taha; place and date not given]

[Text] At the Austria office of the Islamic Minorities League in East Europe, we interviewed His Eminence Dr. Nedim Ibrakhim Khafiz Gendzhiev, the mufti of the Muslims in Bulgaria, who was a guest of the league, which promised to respond to his requests for help in printing one book on the religious sciences and another on “How We Read the Koran” in Turkish and Bulgarian; establishing an advanced Islamic institute in Sofia and an Islamic school in Shumen; and renovating several damaged mosques in Bulgaria.

Although past events and the massacre to which Muslims in Bulgaria were subjected—which resulted in the annihilation of a million Muslims—are still fresh and painful, I chose to pose these questions to his eminence the mufti, which concern the current situation of Muslims in Bulgaria, so that we could perhaps gain a sense glad tidings for the future for our brothers and people there, whose time for rebirth has arrived, God willing.

[Taha] Your eminence the mufti: The Office the Grand Mufti in Bulgaria, which you occupy, is concerned with the affairs of Muslims in Bulgaria. Could you tell us how its operates and how the mufti is elected?

[Gendzhiev] There are now more than 1,000 mosques throughout Bulgaria. Each mosque is administered by a group of three to seven persons, depending on the density of the Muslim population in the area it serves. Each group elects a chief to administer the mosque, and each group of mosques in an area elects its own mufti. In the Kurdzhal area for example, there are 220 mosques with 220 heads who elect a mufti from among themselves. Bulgarians is divided into eight regions with eight muftis, who form what is known as the Pan-Bulgaria Muslim Consultative Council. They elect a mufti from among themselves for all of Bulgaria for a six-year term. He is considered the official representative of the Muslims in Bulgaria. I have held that position for almost a year and a half. The state pays the salaries, which are very meager. The Muslims also have religious endowments represented by houses, land, and storehouses. The income from these endowments is spent on our activities or needs.

[Taha] Are you thinking of re-evaluating the role of the Office of the Mufti and reorganizing it administratively?

[Gendzhiev] I believe that it is the best system for serving Bulgaria's Muslims. It has existed for more than 100 years and it guarantees good distribution. It is worth mentioning that Muslims of Bulgarian origin, who call themselves al-[Bumak], previously had their own Office of the Mufti and their own mufti. However, when I entered office, they joined us under a single Office of the Mufti. This provoked many non-Muslims, who fear Muslim unity. I would like to say that the al-[Bumak] are known for their strong adherence to Islam.

[Taha] However, have the Muslims in Bulgaria sensed a real change in attitudes toward Muslims since major changes started occurring in East Europe? Or has the matter been limited to the cessation of the policies of annihilation and massacre?

[Gendzhiev] Since 10 November 1990, after the presidency of the republic changed hands, there has been a new policy in Bulgaria of cooperation with the Muslims. I sent a message on this to all the imams of mosques in Bulgaria, telling them to reopen and to hold prayers throughout the day and week, not just on Friday, and to perform Islamic religious ceremonies, weddings, funeral services, etc.

A human rights movement was also formed in Bulgaria. It represents an Islamic tendency somewhat, although it includes a few non-Muslims. It is represented by 23 seats in the popular councils. However, I have reservations about it, because I do not believe that everyone who is of Muslim origin is, in truth, a Muslim. True adherence to the religion and its teachings is needed.

I also met with the president of the republic in December 1990, and I called for the restoration of Islamic [personal] names. However, this call stirred up several racist tendencies, which sparked demonstrations that advocated that Muslims be denied their rights!

In early January 1991, all representatives of the opposition from every current held a large meeting which resulted in the formation of a committee to represent the opposition. This committee, on which I serve, is composed of eight persons. We formulated all of the opposition's demands, which include the problem of racism and Muslim names. The previous People's Assembly had promulgated a law on the restoration of Islamic names. I reject this law, because it stipulates that Islamic names be restored through the court, which played no role five years ago when the state was forcing Muslims to change their names. I sent a letter to the current People's Assembly advocating that [this stipulation be dispensed with]. I also met with the president of the republic about two weeks ago and called for a review of this matter and a remedy for the racism problem. These racists do not wish to be persuaded of the existence of Muslims of Bulgarian origin. They falsely believe that every Bulgarian must be Christian, that every Muslim must be Turkish, and that there are no Muslim Bulgarians. People outside of Bulgaria find this incomprehensible. However, unfortunately, it is our reality. I also presented the president of the republic with the Turks' demand to educate their children in Turkish, if only for three hours per week.

[Taha] What has the Office of the Mufti accomplished recently, and what are your plans for the future?

[Gendzhiev] This year, the office issued a book entitled “How to Read the Koran” in Turkish and Bulgarian. It is the first Islamic book in Bulgaria in over 40 years. I ordered all imams to teach the children the noble Koran this summer. In the period of May to September, 4,000 Muslim Bulgarians actually finished the Koran, which aroused the resentment of several racist newspapers, which
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published provocative reports on the instruction of children in the noble Koran! We received 10,000 copies of the noble Koran from the Islamic World League in Saudi Arabia.

In addition, on 1 November 1990, an advanced Islamic institute was opened in Sofia for the first time in the history of Bulgaria. Sixty students were admitted to it, out of an original 2,500, who applied immediately after the establishment of the institute was announced, a week before it opened. Within two years, God willing, this institute will evolve into an Islamic law [shari‘ah] college. It admits youths over 22 who have completed their bachelor's studies and intermediate education. We have also opened a three-year Islamic school in the city of Shumen for children over 15. These achievements were extremely difficult to accomplish, because we receive no support from the government or from any official organizations. Also, the World Islamic Charity Society was established by resolution of the government, another difficult accomplishment, especially in a Christian country. We see it is a very great accomplishment, because, for example, if we receive financial aid from a source in the Islamic world, it could be deposited directly into the society's account without having to resort to banks that engage in usury. There is also a religious committee in Bulgaria that is, of course, headed by a Christian. If we receive any material aid we have to ask its permission [before we accept it]. However, after the establishment of this society, the law permits us to go around it. We hope that his society will establish Islamic centers and renovate mosques. For example, in the city of Shumen, there is a 500-year-old mosque. However, it requires renovations costing 6 million lira, when the annual budget of the Office of the Mufti is only 1.5 million lira, which is for the imams' allowances. We also hope that the society will send students to study in the Islamic countries.

We have also obtained a plot of very good land from the municipality of Sofia on which we want to build a large Islamic academy that includes a Islamic law college, internal departments, an office, a mosque, and a restaurant. This center alone requires $1 million.

In addition, a newspaper is now being published on a biweekly basis to date, in Turkish and Bulgarian, entitled AL-MUSLIMUN [The Muslims]. I have also prepared a book in the two languages entitled “The Religious Sciences,” and I have applied to the Islamic Minorities League in East Europe for help in printing this book. I am also currently writing a book on the history of Islam and the life of Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him salvation. I should note that there have been no Islamic books [in Bulgaria] in the past 50 years, and Muslims have been denied this blessing.

Also, radio and television permit us to address Muslims on religious occasions, such as the Feast of Greater Bairam, Ramadan, and the Prophet's Birthday, may God bless him and grant him salvation. I consider these opportunities a chance to express the true Islam, not the Islam embedded in the minds of the people by some media that depict Islam as a religion of violence and the sword. We want to explain to the people that Islam is social justice and equality between people. It was the first religion to speak of human rights.

I also asked the education minister to permit us to teach religious subjects in the official schools. We have also sent four students to study in Jordan this year, six students to the Islamic Law College in Syria, and three students to the Islamic Missionary school in Libya. We hope that Saudi Arabia will permit us to send a group of students there. Finally, I would like to emphasize that we are making every effort to recover the Islamic endowments that were seized during the communist period.

[Taha] Have popular and official Islamic organizations given any support at any level to the Muslims of Bulgaria?

[Gendzhev] So far, we have received only promises. Unfortunately, we have yet to receive any real assistance. All of the material and projects that we presented in the past will remain dreams if the Islamic world does not help us achieve them. The modest resources of the Muslims in Bulgaria do not enable them to implement these projects. It is well known that recent Muslim suffering was not limited to the religious sphere, but also included employment. Muslims work only in lower positions and are prevented from obtaining administrative or governmental positions. Their material capabilities are extremely limited. About 300,000 Muslims emigrated to Turkey last year, half of whom returned to find that the government had sold their land, property, and homes, although it had promised not to do so. This means that about 800 Muslim families are now without shelter. Where is the aid of the Islamic world? Who will assume responsibility for the reconstruction of these destroyed mosques? We also need new mosques, and we are willing to name each mosque for the person who builds it. We need material aid and we need Islamic books in Turkish and Bulgarian. I also call on businessmen and the Islamic investment companies to establish joint Islamic companies with Muslim Bulgarians. It is well known that the Arab states import large quantities of meat, cheese, and honey from Bulgaria. Why do they not do so through us and thereby obtain their needs from Islamic sources? Most of the people involved in agriculture in Bulgaria are Muslims. There are many fields for Islamic investment. The Christians in West Europe and the church in the West have provided enormous aid to their brothers in Bulgaria. Recently, a large center costing $5 million was established for Protestants in a Bulgarian city. The church in Bulgaria requested aid from all of its branches in the world, which responded immediately to its call.

[Taha] Municipal elections are now beginning in Bulgaria. Is it hoped that the Muslims in Bulgaria will have a political role?

[Gendzhev] As I said previously, there is a human rights movement comprising mostly Muslims, with which I have close relations. I hope that its members will truly adhere to Islam. However, in any case, the Muslims will enter elections, God willing, and will run in areas where Muslims are a majority. Regarding a political role for Muslims,
the law in Bulgaria prohibits the establishment of any party on a racial or religious basis. Nonetheless, the racist current is very strong. There is even a party that advocates deporting all Muslims to Turkey. They are accusing the human rights movements of being a Turkish, racist, religious movement! This racist current is now standing between the democratic bloc and the socialist bloc. If one of these blocs inclines toward the Muslims, the racist current would quickly align itself with the other bloc!

There is actually democratic activity in Bulgaria. There are 60 parties representing currents of the right, left and middle. However, it is important to remember that the government is still weak. I am trying to consolidate the greatest possible number of gains for the Muslims. Even if certain currents gain ascendancy, seize power, and tell me to stop, I would accomplish as many of these gains as possible.

[Taha] Would you like to direct a message to the Arab, Muslim readers?

[Gendzhev] I would like to tell our brothers that Bulgaria is democratic now, and that all currents and trends are waiting for aid from any quarter. The Christians are waiting for aid from West Europe. We are waiting for aid from our Muslim brothers in the Islamic world. I would also like to say that the Gulf crisis does not have to stand as an imposing wall between our needs and our Muslim brothers.
Protection of Competition Law Explained Briefly

91CH0852C Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 1 Aug 91 p 4

[Unattributed article: “The Rules of the Game—Extracts From Law No. 63/1991 on Protecting Economic Competition”—first paragraph is HOSPODARSKE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] Protection of the market is closely connected with the transition to a market economy. It has turned out that even free competition requires a certain amount of regulation, or, better said, requires certain cushions within which it must operate. Similar laws exist in all developed market economies. The law on protecting economic competition is not only based on the traditions of our legal system from the 1930’s, but also on European laws, particularly on the German cartel law. In the opinion of foreign experts, our law is at a good level and is fundamentally compatible with European standards. It will do no harm, however, to remind readers of this important law, at least through the vehicle of a brief cross section.

The law applies to entrepreneurs who engage in entrepreneurial activities in the CSFR, to organs of state administration and organs of communities to the extent to which it deals with their jurisdictions which are directly or indirectly connected with economic competition (excluding state monopolies recognized by the law) and is also applicable to foreign entrepreneurs who have an enterprise on the territory of Czechoslovakia or who have their permanent domicile here.

The law regulates the unpermitted restriction of competition. This regulation is divided into three fundamental parts as follows:

1. Cartel-Type Agreements

Basically, this is a designation reserved for agreements and other forms of mutual understanding between entrepreneurs which lead or could lead to the exclusion or restriction of economic competition (exemptions are possible either on the basis of law or they can be, in exceptional cases, permitted by the authorities on the basis of a justified application).

The following are particularly not permitted:

- The direct or indirect setting of prices or other commercial conditions.
- An obligation to restrict or control production, sales, technical development, or investments.
- The apportioning of a market or of purchasing resources.
- Tying the acceptance of one type of goods to the acceptance of another type.
- A promise by the participants in the agreement that they will apply differing commercial conditions (discrimination).
- An undertaking to restrict access to the market by entrepreneurs who are not members of the agreement.

Agreements which are permitted are stipulated, but they require approval by the authorities before they become valid. It is stipulated when an exemption can be granted. The general clause consists of the fact that an exemption from the agreement is necessary for reasons of the public interest, particularly in the production of goods or in support of technical and economic development. Exemption from the prohibition may not exceed the bounds necessary for satisfying the public interest and it is necessary to take special account of the interests of consumers. An exemption can be nullified if the conditions have changed substantially or in the event the exemption is abused.

2. Agreements To Amalgamate Enterprises (Fusions)

Such agreements are subject to official control if the fusion leads to or could lead to restricting economic competition in the relevant market. A fusion is also considered to be an agreement as a result of which one entrepreneur acquires the legal or factual opportunity to exert control over the enterprise of another entrepreneur or over a part of that enterprise. The danger of restricting competition is considered to be present if the share of the participating enterprises exceeds 30 percent of the total turnover in the relative market.

3. A Monopoly and Dominant Position in the Market

Entrepreneurs who occupy this position are subject to official control and are obligated to report the acquisition of such a position.

A monopoly or dominant position must not be abused. Abuse is considered to be particularly the following:

- Enforcement of incongruous conditions in contracts.
- Tying agreement with concluding the contract to the condition that the other side will purchase even additional unconnected products.
- Halting or restricting of production, sales, or technical development of goods for purposes of gaining illegal economic benefits at the expense of the buyer.

Jurisdiction of the “Authority”

Federal authority:

- Protection against restricting competition, protection against agreements and phases which establish or could establish a participation share of more than 40 percent in the relative market, both in the Czech Republic and also in the Slovak Republic.
- Representing the CSFR in interstate negotiations and agreements involving the authorities of other states.
- Legislation.

Republic authority:

- Protection against restricting or eliminating competition which could bring about consequences on the territory of the republic, provided these matters are not under federal jurisdiction.
On the basis of stipulated conditions, the authorities can yield cases to each other for negotiation and decisions (the principle of the efficiency of the executive).

Proceedings Before the Authorities
Participants in proceedings, which are initiated on the basis of a proposal or on their own initiative, are stipulated. The participants have the right to express their opinion regarding the proceedings. The proceedings are generally held in accordance with the "administrative code," unless the matters being ruled on are precisely cited in the law.

Penalties
For violating the law, the authority is authorized to exact a fine of up to 5 percent of the volume of sales for the preceding closed fiscal year. This fine can be assessed repeatedly. If property benefits resulting from violation of the law are documented, the fine shall be at least equal to this benefit.

The cartel register is maintained by all three authorities. The law stipulates that anything that is listed in the register is public information; everyone has the right to have an extract from the cartel register issued to them.

Incursions by State Administration and Community Organs
These organizations are not permitted through their own measures, through obvious support, or by any other method to restrict or eliminate economic competition. If these organizations violate the law, the authority is authorized to demand rectification.

Jurisdiction During "Privatization"
In transferring state property, the organs of state administration are obligated to stipulate the specific conditions which, if fulfilled, will result in eliminating the monopoly position of an existing enterprise or will prevent the development of a monopoly standing for a newly arising enterprise. With respect to newly arising enterprises, where it can be expected that they will acquire a dominant standing, the organs of state administration must support the working out of an analysis, the content of which is precisely stipulated by law. This analysis is submitted to the authority which has jurisdiction over the location of the enterprise. The authority shall express its position regarding the analysis (as a part of the privatization project) and, if there is disagreement with the ruling, the matter is decided, upon the proposal of the organs of state administration, by the government. Under conditions stipulated in the law, it is possible that the ruling of the authority can be waived. Similar provisions also regulate the approach of community organs.

The Government of the CSFR is authorized to issue legal regulations for implementation of the law.

The seats and organization of the authorities mentioned above are stipulated by the appropriate governments.

Therefore, it is clear from the above as to what is the sense of this legal arrangement. In recent times, entrepreneurs are frequently confusing the provisions of this law with the provisions governing unfair competition. Unfair competition is a totally different problem and has, for the time being, been totally inadequately solved by the provisions of Sections 119d and 119e of the Economic Code. The problem will not be resolved in a totally new and fundamental manner until adoption of the Commercial Code, which is scheduled to be discussed by the Federal Assembly in the fall of this year.

[Box, p 4]

Protecting Economic Competition
The adoption of Law No. 173/1991 by the Czech National Council on establishing a Czech authority for economic competition, was the culmination of the legislative process, the goal of which was to create a system for protecting economic competition. Creation of the system was actually already initiated last year with the establishment of the Federal Office for Economic Competition in Bratislava and the Slovak Antimonopoly Authority, with its seat in the same city. Whereas the Federal Office for Economic Competition was not staffed until January of this year, the Slovak Antimonopoly Authority began to be constituted immediately and thus gained a head start of virtually a full year. The rules of the game are stipulated in Law No. 63/1991 on protecting economic competition, which went into effect on 1 March 1991.

Progress, Outlook for Privatization Criticized
91CH0852A Prague SVET HOSPODARSTVI in Czech 19 Jul 91 pp 1-2

[Article signed E.K.: "How Will Management Behave?—An Analysis of the Laws Pertaining to Small and Large-Scale Privatization"]

[Text] Small-scale privatization is far from proceeding at the anticipated speed. Experiences connected with it reveal the existence of a real problem—the ambivalent position taken by the majority of companies on privatization: As consumers, we wish it would come about as quickly as possible; as employees of state enterprises, it is more than unpleasant for us. Representatives of state enterprises who had complained for years about problems brought about by the existence of state ownership are now desperately wondering how they can evade privatization or delay it to the maximum possible extent. They are not encountering many difficulties in getting the employees of their enterprises to be on their side, because even they know that privatization signals the decline of state paternalism, the decline of soft budgetary limitations, the opportunity to engage in private entrepreneurial activities at the expense of the state and the taxpayers; it means the end to going unpunished for making irresponsible decisions, an end to the opportunity to ignore the requirements of the legal code, and the end to the surfeit of jobs for surplus, unneeded work.
Small-scale privatization has also revealed the realistic strength of enterprise management to put an effective defense against privatization if this privatization is not accomplished in line with its aims. It has also revealed the extent of all possible evasions of “hard” methods of privatization, to which public auction undoubtedly belongs. The attention of the public was aroused by the conflicts surrounding the Ahold Joint Stock Company, which were dramatized and personalized. The problem was and remains more general. If various ways of acquiring property exist, the easiest way is chosen, the way which is least expensive. Given the current validity of the law on small-scale privatization, which requires that foreign capital not join in public auctions until the second round, which is accessible to foreign participants, and in view of the law on enterprises with foreign capital participation, which makes it possible for foreign capital to be directly deposited into privatized enterprises and not pay the state for acquiring such enterprises, it is not surprising that both foreign participants and enterprise management elected the strategy of joint undertakings.

The escape from small-scale privatization had and has even numerous other forms. They include particularly a request to be exempt from small-scale privatization or its silent boycott, which is incomparably more advantageous for enterprise management, or escape into the area where small-scale privatization has not, for the present, been applicable—into the area of cooperative property, culture, the health industry, and education, escape by sheltering as municipal and community property with advantageous utilization of the newly approved law on municipal property and property of communities, which goes far beyond the framework of traditional general ownership and makes possible the transformation of state entrepreneurial activities into municipal entrepreneurial activities. A substantial portion of the strategy of enterprises is then made up by shifting to the area of large-scale privatization, which has, thus far, meant a delay in the final solution, but is simultaneously connected with numerous advantages by definition for enterprise managers.

The fundamental keystone of large-scale privatization is the privatization project. Section 7, Paragraph 2, of Law No. 92/91 states that “the proposal for a privatization project is generally worked out by the enterprise which is the object of privatization”; Paragraph 1 of this section states that “the founder is responsible for working out the proposal for a privatization project” (that is to say, normally, the sector ministry—the ministry of industry, agriculture, commerce, and tourism, etc.); Section 10 states that “the privatization project shall be published and approved a) by the Federal Ministry of Finance, if it is a founder of the enterprise or if it exercises the rights of the state pertaining to property participation of legal entities of the federal central organ of state administration, b) the appropriate organ of the state administration of the republic carries out these duties in other cases” (that is to say, the Ministry for the Administration of National Property and Its Privatization of the Czech or of the Slovak Republic). On the day the enterprise is disestablished or on the day part of the property is exempt from privatization, privatized property passes to the Federal Fund of National Property (provided a federal central organ of state administration is the founder). The Fund of National Property of the Czech Republic or the Fund of National Property of the Slovak Republic (Section 11) then conclude, in their own name, contracts according to the approved privatization project and take care of other legal tasks.

Translated from the language of the legal provisions, privatization in accordance with Law No. 92/91 is based on the logic of the sequence of the following steps:

1) The working out of the privatization project, generally done by the privatized enterprise.

2) Evaluation of the privatization project by the founder, that is to say, normally the pertinent ministry.

3) Approval of the privatization project by the appropriate central organ of state administration which, in the majority of cases, is the Ministry for the Administration of National Property of the Czech or of the Slovak Republic.

4) Transfer of the privatization property to the appropriate Fund of National Property.

5) The actual privatization, accomplished by the appropriate fund, which is bound by the approved privatization project as far as its procedures are concerned.

The above sequence of five basic steps involved in large-scale privatization makes it clear, or, rather, should make it clear, that Law No. 92/91 operates with a similar division of labor between the enterprise sphere, the ministries, and the economic center (in the given case represented by the ministries for the administration of national property and its privatization) much like a hierarchically arranged centrally planned economy. The law implicitly anticipates that it is possible to make meaningful and efficient use of the existing institutional arrangement and of traditional procedures during the process of privatization, where the enterprise is the proposer of the solution, the ministry is the approving arm, and the state is the decisionmaker. It further anticipates that it is possible to make use of traditional approaches under the given institutional arrangement which successfully combines the principle of equality of approach to property, which should result in public competition or public auction.

Rational arguments in favor of solving the problem of privatization in line with the selected law (No. 92/91) can be seen in the recognition of the relevance of the fact that the information required in conjunction with privatization, namely information on the extent and structure of the property held by the state, information on the current and potential prosperity of the enterprise, the need to restructure it, the situation in the domestic and foreign markets, the interests of buyers as well as the interest of foreign capital in property participation, are concentrated primarily in the management of state enterprises or state joint-stock companies and that the various ministries have
many years of experience in controlling the enterprise sphere and can make use of these experiences even in the process of privatization.

Privatization accomplished on the basis of the law on large-scale privatization operates with existing institutions, existing information flows, existing personnel arrangements, and, to a certain extent, reduces the need for new, temporary institutions created especially for purposes of privatization.

Apart from its positive aspects, each of the selected solutions also has its negatives and its pitfalls. The same reasons definitively lead to the same consequences; therefore, it is possible to express justified expectations that large-scale privatization will be accompanied by secondary negative effects which are known from the practices of a planned economy and that the state will be compelled to again make use of traditionally known instruments in order to change them.

In its essence, Law No. 92/91 is a de facto acknowledgment of the political and economic forces of enterprise management, an acknowledgment of management's rights to make decisions regarding the method of privatizing state property, but also a de facto recognition of its rights to have priority access to this property. By this provision, the law breaks down the aversion of the current "administrators" of state property, lessens their opposition to privatization, acquires the unwritten approval of the management of state enterprises of privatization, the unwritten approval of the law which affords management extraordinary advantages during the process of privatization.

All essential decisions are placed in the hands of enterprise management on a de facto (not on a de jure) basis. It is the management of the enterprise that proposes whether the enterprise or a part of it will be sold at public auction or whether there will be a public competition, or whether the enterprise will be sold directly without an auction and without public competition to specific interested parties (insurance against an inefficient sale, in the latter case, is supposed to be the approval by the government of the privatization project); it is management that proposes the legal form of the commercial company being established; in the case of joint stock companies, it is management that proposes the method of distributing securities, the size and type of these shares, as well as the extent to which investment coupons will be used.

It is highly likely that the effects of the information monopoly enjoyed by the enterprise sphere will play a role. Currently, one can fear that the Ministry for the Administration of National Property and Its Privatization will fall into a similar information trap into which the economic center fell during the period of the planned economy. In order to reduce the influence of the enterprise information monopoly and in order to be able to make decisions from positions of the deepest and widest familiarity with the problem, the ministry will demand that privatization projects be worked out on the basis of a detailed methodology. However, the more detailed this methodology will be, the more formal a task will the ministries, as well as the Ministry for the Administration of National Property, be sentenced to. In the direction of increasing the formality of approvals, a role will also be played by the requirement for rapid privatization. "The principles for compiling a register of enterprises and state properties destined for privatization" determine the privatization projects of enterprises and state properties and must be submitted, as part of the first wave of privatization, by 31 October 1991 to the founder and the founder must submit these projects, along with a position paper, to the Ministry for the Administration of National Property and Its Privatization by 30 November 1991 (for the second wave of privatization, the deadlines are 31 May 1992 and 31 July 1992, respectively). The control task of the founder is reduced to a minimum by the short deadlines for taking a position on a privatization project (even if no other factors were involved, namely the tie-in between the information available and the information carrier). On the other hand, however, it can be anticipated that, even in the process of privatization, the principle of the inverted management pyramid will be at work, where representatives of the various ministries—founders—will, as members of interest coalitions, be aiding the assertion of the privatization strategy chosen by the enterprise.

To find an answer to the question as to what this strategy will generally be is not a simple matter—large-scale privatization has hitherto not begun. However, experiences gathered in the course of small-scale privatization represent a depth probe into the conduct of representatives of state enterprises. Based on this conduct, it is possible to formulate several justified expectations.

It can be anticipated that privatization projects worked out by enterprises being privatized will only sporadically contain proposals that the enterprise or its parts be sold at public auction or as a result of public competition, because both forms signify equal access for all potential applicants for the property who have sufficient capital at their disposal. From the standpoint of the current administrators of state-owned properties, this form is unequivocally disadvantageous, it disrupts their priorities. It can be expected that marginal privatization is more likely to be proposed, as in the case of unattractive money-losing operations which exert a negative influence upon the operations of the privatized enterprise. The shortage of attractive offers of enterprises or their parts to privatized will clearly promote the potential collision between the state and private entrepreneurs, which are handicapped by the law. While, theoretically, they have the opportunity to work out a competing privatization project and to propose that an appropriate operating unit or the entire enterprise be subject to public auction or public competition, they will be at a disadvantage even here, in view of the functioning of the information monopoly and the inverted management pyramid. It will be difficult for them to work out a project intended to acquire the leftover property of the enterprise so that it is likely that the approving authority will prefer the total comprehensive privatization project worked out by the enterprise and recommended for approval by the founder.
The strategy of enterprise management will obviously tilt in the direction of proposals for the direct sale of privatized property—as is indicated already by some of the experiences gathered—that is to say, it will propose the sale of enterprises and state property, where the buying side (the seller will be the Fund of National Property) will be represented by a newly established commercial company, whose stockholders or shareholders will be the very representatives of management of the privatized enterprise or foreign entrepreneurs.

In the latter case, it is likely that a proposal to sell to a foreign entrepreneur will be combined with a proposal to sell management shares or possibly (with the objective of obtaining the agreement of the employees) along with a proposal to sell employee shares. The problem brought about by direct sales, which will be difficult to avoid, even in cases where privatization projects are approved by the government, is the depression of the price of privatized property. If management acts as the proposer of the sale, as well as acting (directly or covertly) playing the role of the buyer, it has an interest in having the enterprise valued as low as possible. Enterprise management is not even interested in raising the price in the event of a sale to a foreign investor; rather, it has a common interest with this investor in the lowest possible price.

A specific of the Czechoslovak privatization accomplished in accordance with Law No. 92/91 are investment coupons. The use of the nonstandard method of coupon privatization is generally connected with the fulfillment of three goals.

The first goal is mentioning the consequences of a shortage of real capital, its substitution by artificial capital—investment coupons—and acceleration of the privatization project. The level of savings by Czechoslovak citizens does not make possible an adequately rapid privatization and, at the same time, the job of creating real owners with their rights, obligations, and responsibilities toward property is urgent.

The second goal is to overcome the problem posed by the nonexistence of real prices of capital and the capital market, achieving a relative valuation of privatized property by iteratively bringing supply closer to demand through the creation of balanced prices expressed in investment points.

The third goal is more political than economic. It involves the brokering of access to property even for less affluent strata of the population, guiding their interest in privatization, and getting them to agree with it.

While the beginnings of privatization were connected with the notions that coupon privatization will be its fundamental, if not exclusive, method, it seems that, currently, its importance is receding somewhat into the background. The unfavorable secondary effects of coupon privatization are beginning to be seen.

The anticipated use of investment coupons is slowing down interest on the part of foreign capital which normally shows a lack of confidence in and even aversion to this nonstandard method and is stipulating that it will join a Czechoslovak enterprise only if in the specific case coupons are not used. Coupons cannot replace real capital, they are not connected with the influx of new technologies or know-how. Their use on an extensive scale with the immediately following unrestricted tradability of securities acquired in exchange for coupons brings along with it the danger of hot money and inflation; their use while prohibiting the tradability for a certain time delays the establishment of a capital market and makes it more difficult.

Last, but not least, investment coupons represent scattered ownership, which is definitely worse than ownership by one or a few owners. The extensive use of investment coupons—particularly if the securities acquired for coupons may not be traded—means a prolongation and strengthening of the rights of existing management and a delay in real privatization.

Conclusion

The standardized arrangement for Czechoslovak privatization is a reflection of the existing institutional arrangement and the existing distribution of political forces within society. Given the present state of developments, it gives the green light to privatization, it makes it possible. On the other hand, the privatization process will be connected with expenditures which will have to be paid by society. They include particularly the opaqueness of the entire process, the collision between individual social strata of applicants for property, resulting from various approaches to the privatized property, a potential opportunity to accomplish spontaneous privatization, accompanied by bribery and corruption, and, last, but not least, the sale of privatized property well beneath its value.

Concept of Relevant Market Discussed

91CH0852D Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 1 Aug 91 p 5

[Article by Vaclav Bartik, deputy chairman of the Czech Authority for Economic Competition: “The Relevant Market—A New Concept in Czech Legal and Economic Practice”—first paragraph is HOSPODARSKE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] Law No. 63/1991 on protecting economic competition uses the concept of a relevant market. How should this concept be understood?

In outlining the relevant market, what is involved is the classification of individual products into a single market group on the basis of established criteria. If the criteria show a preference for production and physical-technical viewpoints, then we are dealing with a so-called production concept of outlining the relevant market. To the extent to which viewpoints reflect the possibility of the mutual interchangeability of goods and services in terms of their consumption and availability, we speak of a substitution concept.
A Bit of Theory...

The predominant criteria involved in the production concept of outlining the relevant market are those which are based on the method of production or processing, on the type of technologies or materials used. In many cases, identical characteristics of goods do not mean that there is a possibility that they could be substituted from the standpoint of the consumer. A typical example are goods produced from classical natural materials and of synthetic materials. The industrial concept, of course, categorizes them into various groups, but from the standpoint of consumption or utility these goods are frequently interchangeable. The current classification of products (the JKPOV) is created precisely on the basis of this concept. This fact is essential in formulating conclusions regarding the possible utility value of industrial statistics for the area of protecting economic competition. With certain reservations these statistics will be usable in the evaluation of concentration processes because the latter are evaluated precisely from the standpoint of supply or production and, for purposes of computation, use is made of the so-called Hischman-Herfindalov index (HHI). This index represents a weighted average of the squares of relatively high production numbers for goods, where the relatively high number of products is used as a weighting factor.

Therefore, the substitution concept is far more important with respect to outlining a substantively relevant market. It is based on the fact that variously strong substitution relationships exist between individual products or their groupings. Within the framework of this concept, there exist several theoretical approaches, some of which have become the starting point for practice. The procedure which starts from the assumption that a grouping of mutual interchangeable production is created by those products which are capable of satisfying the same specific need appears to be usable. The selection of such a group of products or services can be objectivized with the aid of expert evaluations or by various methods of inquiry by consumers. Consumer polls can be considered primarily in cases involving production consumption.

To accomplish such analyses, countries with long years of tradition in protecting economic competition have worked out various methodological instructions, having varying degrees of validity. In Germany, product X is considered to be interchangeable with product Y if a nonspecific deterioration of a certain parameter involving product X on the supply side stimulates a sizable number of customers to purchase product Y. In these connections, the parameters of the product are mainly prices, quality, delivery conditions, etc. The American explanation of the interchangeability of products is formulated in a far more pregnant manner: Products Y and X belong to the same substantive relevant market if raising the price of product X by 5 percent motivates the representative consumer to make a shift to consuming product Y instead of product X within one year.

It is possible to determine the substitution capability of products or services even on the supply side. In this case, it is assumed that there are mutual ties between the manufacturers offering their product as a result of the interchangeability of their production. For example, it is possible to analyze the impact of changes pertaining to the offered quantity of production upon the conduct of others making such offers. In this procedure, it is necessary, however, to take structural market viewpoints into account. The structure of the market, which is given by the number and standing of market entities and by its degree of homogeneity, to a considerable extent predetermines the variants of market conduct on the part of the suppliers.

...Resulting in...

In how much detail, how accurately, and by what methods it is useful to outline the substantive relevant market depends, to a considerable extent, on the purpose for which this outlining of the market is to be used. As long as we are only concerned with the quantification of concentration, it is possible to start with the production concept and make use of the numbers provided by state statistics and use these statistics also to devise a method for creating product groups (aggregation key).

After deciding which of the authorities for the protection of economic competition has the jurisdiction to make a ruling regarding a certain matter, it will be useful to consider whether information on deliveries to the market by manufacturers or by groups of manufacturers is adequate. More thorough and more labor-intensive analyses of the substantive relevant market will be required in deciding on exemptions from cartel agreements and in judging abuses of the standing in the market. Detailed analyses, using several approaches to outline the relevant market, would also be suitable in judging privatization projects, particularly in such cases in which it will be purposeful from the standpoint of the competition policy, to require the deconcentration of a privatized organization. But in view of the demands of time and the personnel staffing of the authority, it will probably be necessary, at least in the beginning, to make do with quantification of concentration.

It is possible to augment the substitution concept by the added viewpoint of production flexibility. This concept is based on the finding that competitive relationships in the relevant market are not formed only with regard to relationships among existing competitors, but that each of them must take into account, and in fact probably does take into account, other potential competitors. The smaller the obstacles to entering the relevant market are, the more entrepreneurs must take potential competition into account. An analysis of the potential competitive environment ("of the potential relevant market") concentrates mainly on establishing the magnitude of obstacles to entry into the market.

Simultaneously, consideration is also given to obstacles to leaving the market because their magnitude also influences the considerations of potential competitors. There are a large number of obstacles to entry into and exit from the market; they are classified in accordance with various viewpoints into economic obstacles, political obstacles, geographic obstacles, demographic obstacles, and many
others; however, their detailed description would be beyond the scope of this article. Augmenting the outlining of the substantive relevant market by considering the potential competition must be considered as being essential in judging cartel agreements and, mainly, in judging privatization projects. Moreover, evaluating the effect of potential competition stresses the necessity to consider time connections affecting the relevant market.

Sellers, buyers, products, and services are part of the same relevant market if there are real opportunities for the exchange of relevant production or a relevant service among sellers and buyers within the same time period. The market can be time-limited for a number of reasons. For example, there are legal reasons (closing time in stores is stipulated by community officials or by community representatives), there are natural reasons (seasonal sales of fruit and vegetables), and, primarily, there are technical-economic reasons. In the latter category are all those reasons which prevent competitors, including potential competitors, from reacting immediately to changes in demand.

From the standpoint of the law on protection of economic competition, it is necessary to consider the territory of Czechoslovakia or the Czech Republic or the Slovak Republic as being area-relevant markets. From the standpoint of judging the impact of the conduct of economic entities, however, it will be necessary to outline the area-relevant market according to where goods and services actually meet and at what distances the seller still finds the opportunity for sales, in view of transport and other costs.

In other words, outlining a relevant market is always a combination of substantive, area, and time viewpoints. Within the framework of substantive viewpoints, only a substitution concept, augmented by an evaluation of the possibility that potential competition could develop, be it through another competitor entering the market or as a result of imports, is the only acceptable one for organs engaged in protecting economic competition. The most useful procedure appears to be the determination of the substitution capability of goods on the consumer side. This is true for outlining the relevant sales market, that is to say, in those cases involving violation of economic competition by suppliers. As long as cases of restricting competition are analyzed on the demand side (for example, in a concentrated wholesale enterprise), then the mirror image procedure is applicable, that is to say, the substantive relevant market is examined from the viewpoint of suppliers.

...Activities by the Authorities

From all that has been listed thus far, the magnitude of the task confronting the authorities for protecting competition can be seen. The federal as well as the Slovak authority have the advantage in that they have existed for some time. The situation is somewhat different in the Czech Republic. The Czech Authority for Economic Competition began its activities virtually on 1 July. It is headquartered at Brno, in Jostova ulice No. 8. The government of the Czech Republic appointed the Czechoslovak National Council delegate of the Czech People's Party and member of the Presidium of the Czech National Council, Eng. Stanislav Belehradak, to head it. The authority also has a permanent work location in Prague, where it was established from what used to be the Department of Antimonopoly Policy of the Ministry for Economic Policy and Development of the Czech Republic. This provision has resulted in the preservation of continuity regarding work under way which had been handled by the department from the end of last year until the establishment of the Czech Office for Economic Competition.

It has been possible to concentrate numerous cases of alleged violation of economic competition and, at least in outline form, there also already exists an overview of the concentration and monopoly structures within the Czech economy. Concurrent with its development, the office will devote its efforts to reexamining allegations already received, it will initiate several investigations on its own initiative, and will particularly have to concentrate on expressing its position regarding privatization projects in the immediate future.

In the process of privatization, the various authorities for economic competition at the republic level occupy a unique position. According to Sections 19 and 20 of the law on protecting economic competition, organs of state administration and, in special cases, even organs of communities are obligated to stipulate specific conditions whose fulfillment would result in eliminating the monopoly standing of existing enterprises or would prevent the development of monopoly positions for newly arising enterprises during the transfer of state property, including transfers to state joint stock companies. With respect to newly arising enterprises whose share in the relevant market can be expected to exceed the limits stipulated in Section 9, Paragraph 2, of the law (in other words, 30 percent), organs of state administration shall assure the performance of an analysis which must be presented to the Authority for Economic Competition which has jurisdiction over the location of the enterprise. In the event the organ of state administration disagrees with the ruling by the authority, the matter will be decided by the appropriate government, upon the proposal by the organ of state administration. In other words, there exists the presumption in the process of privatization that existing economic structures will be demonopolized and deconcentrated and that this will result in the creation of a basis for a functioning market economy.
Numbers Cast for District Candidate Lists
91EP06844 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Aug 91 p 4

[Communique of the State Electoral Commission—first paragraph is RZECZPOSPOLITA introduction]

[Text] Communique of the State Electoral Commission, dated 23 August 1991, on the course of drawing nationwide uniform numbers of district lists of candidates for deputies registered by the Election Committees that have notified the State Electoral Commission of their intent to file lists of candidates for deputies in more than one electoral district.

On 23 August 1991, the State Electoral Commission, proceeding from Article 67, Section 1 of the Law, dated 28 June 1991, on Elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, carried out at its meeting a drawing of nationwide uniform numbers of district lists of candidates for deputies filed on behalf of 65 election committees that, pursuant to Article 65, have given notice of their intention to file lists of candidates for deputies in more than one electoral district.

Authorized representatives of the election committees were notified of the time of the drawing.

The drawing was held in the following manner:

1. Cards with the names of all election committees which had given notice of their intention to file lists were prepared, as well as cards with numbers from 1 to 65 for the lists of candidates. Each card with the name of an election committee was placed in a separate container, and all of these containers were placed in one large container. Cards with the numbers of the list of candidates were placed in other, separate containers, and put in a second large container.

2. The drawing was effected by members of the State Electoral Commission, whereby one person drew a card with the number of a district list of candidates and at the same time another person drew a card with the name of an election committee. The cards thus drawn and combined into a single entity formed an annex to the protocol.

3. As a result of the effected drawing, the district lists of candidates filed on behalf of the election committees referred to in Article 65 of the Law on Elections to the Sejm were given the following numbers which are uniform nationwide:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of List</th>
<th>Name of Election Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List No. 1</td>
<td>Election Committee of Trade Unions in Defense of Society, Warsaw, 5 Lwowska Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 2</td>
<td>National Election Committee Polish Peasant Party, Programmatic Union, &quot;PSL,&quot; Warsaw, 4 Grzybowska Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 3</td>
<td>National Election Committee &quot;Labor Solidarity,&quot; Warsaw, 82 Marszałkowska Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 4</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Republican Coalition, Poznań, 7 Fredro Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 5</td>
<td>All-Polish Election Committee of the Mikolajczyk Peasant Party “Providers and Defenders,” MSL “Providers and Defenders,” Warsaw-Radosc, 9 Izbicka Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 6</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Orthodox Believers, Białystok, 13 Antoniuk Fabryczny Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 7</td>
<td>National Election Committee “Christian Democracy,” Warsaw, 10 Bagatela Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 8</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Democratic Party “Democratic Party-National Election Committee,” Warsaw, 9 Chmielna Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 9</td>
<td>Election Committee of Craftsmen and Small Entrepreneurs, Warsaw, 14 Miodowa Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 10</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Silesian Autonomy Movement, Rybnik, 7 Liberty Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 11</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Independent Sovereign Labor Party in Gdańsk, headquartered in Sopot, 11 Majkowski Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 12</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Citizens Center Accord “POC,” Warsaw, 13 Ujazdowskie Lanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 13</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Peasant Movement “Peasant Accord, “Election Committee of the Peasant Accord,” Warsaw, 24 Chmielna Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 15</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Polish Integration Party, “KW PPL,” Warsaw, 14 Znaniecki Street, Apt. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 16</td>
<td>All-Polish Election Committee of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union of Policemen “OKW NSZZP,” Warsaw, 148 Pulawska Street, Apt. 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 17</td>
<td>Election Committee “Catholic Election Action-WAK,” Warsaw, 28 Twarda Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 18</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Alliance of Anti-Dogmatic Forces “USA,” Group 11, Apt. 2, near Grudziadz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 19</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Party X “KKW Party X,” Warsaw, 29, Nowy Świat Street, Apt. 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 20</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the German Minority “German Minority,” Opole, 61 First of May Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 21</td>
<td>Center National Rebirth National Election Committee, Grojec, 3 Koscielna Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 22</td>
<td>Election Headquarters “Movement for Comprehensive Ownership,” “RPW,” Warsaw, 54A Wilcza Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of List</td>
<td>Name of Election Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 23</td>
<td>National Party, “SN,” National Election Committee, Warsaw, 6 Pickarska Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 24</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Cooperative Movement “Rainbow,” Warsaw, 72 Nowy Świat Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 25</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Coalition of Women’s Communities, Warsaw, 13 Elektoralna Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 26</td>
<td>Independent National Election Committee of Railway Workers under the Main Council of the Trade Union of PKP [Polish State Railroads] Locomotive Engineers, Olsztyn, Third of May Constitution Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 27</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Association for Protecting the Unborn, Radom, 13 Sienkiewicz Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 28</td>
<td>Election Committee “Citizens Committees of the Lublin Area,” Lublin, 62 Krakowskie Przedmiescie Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 29</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Independent Association for Responsibility and Justice, Warsaw, 4 Obserwatorow Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 30</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity KKW NSZZ Solidarity, Gdańsk, 24 Waly Piastowskie Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 31</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Polish Prosperity Party, “PPD,” Warsaw, 51 Wilcza Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 32</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Liberal-Democratic Congress, Warsaw, 53 Jerozolimskie Lanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 33</td>
<td>Election Committee “Confederation of Employers,” Warsaw, 30 Copernicus Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 34</td>
<td>Public Election Committee “Common House,” Katowice, 35C Klownowa Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 35</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Movement of Free Democrats, Wrocław, 2 Raclawicka Street, Apt. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 36</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Christian Social Union, “Covenant Christian Public Movement,” RChS-Przymierze, Warsaw, 3 First Army of the Polish Armed Forces Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 37</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Ecological Union of Democrats “EUD,” Kraków, 5 Topolowa Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 38</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Party of Reason “Members and Sympathizers of the Party of Reason,” “CiSPR,” Warsaw, 1 Przy Bernardyñskiej Wodzie Street, Apt. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 39</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Democratic Public Movement, “National RDS Election Committee,” Warsaw, 17 Grojecka Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 40</td>
<td>All-Polish National Election Committee of the Polish National Commonwealth-Polish National Party, Warsaw, 62 Hoza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 41</td>
<td>All-Polish Election Committee of the Confederation for an Independent Poland “KPN,” Warsaw, 18 Nowy Świat Street, Apt. 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 42</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Union for Real Politics, Warsaw, 41 Nowy Świat Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 43</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Coalition of the Polish Ecological Party and the Polish Green Party, Warsaw, 9 Zgody Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 44</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Polish Catholic Union “PUK,” Warsaw, 16 Grzybowska Street, Apt. 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 45</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Conservative-Liberal Party “KKW-PKoL,” Warsaw, 21 Chmielna Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 46</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Freedom Party, Wrocław, 41 Kotlarska Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 48</td>
<td>Belorussian Election Committee, Białystok, 11 Warszawska Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 49</td>
<td>All-Polish Election Committee of the Peasant-Christian Bloc, “BLCh,” Warsaw, 18 Nowy Świat Street, Apt. 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 50</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Social Justice Party, Wrocław, 4 Gabriela Zapolska Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 51</td>
<td>Election Committee “Polish House,” Gdańsk, 47B Rzeźnicka Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 52</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Polish Association of Tatars, Kraków, 7 Szczepański Square, Apt. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 53</td>
<td>“Healthy Poland”—Election Committee of the Polish Ecological Alliance, the Independent Ecological Federation, and Supporting Movements, Warsaw, 26 Żurawia Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 54</td>
<td>Election Committee “Democratic Union,” Warsaw, 30 Jerozolimskie Lanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 55</td>
<td>Minority Election Bloc “WBM,” Warsaw, 73 Czerniakowska Street, Apt. 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 56</td>
<td>National Committee “Election Bloc of the Unaffiliated,” “BWN,” Łódź, 10 Rojna Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 57</td>
<td>Election Committee of the VICTORIA Party, Kraków, 8 Victora Street, Apt. 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 58</td>
<td>All-Polish Election Committee of the Polish Western Union, Association of the Movement for Polish Silesia, the Polish Movement of Pomerania, the Polish Warmia and Mazury Movement, the Movement of the Polish Land of Lubusko, and the Movement for Polish Western Borderlands, Warsaw, 18 Nowy Świat Street, Apt. 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 60</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Union of the Democratic Left “SLD,” Warsaw, 44A Rozbrat Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List No. 61</td>
<td>Election Committee of the Christian Democratic Party, Warsaw, 14 Bagatela Street</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Communique of the State Electoral Commission Dated 23 August 1991

Proceeding from Article 66, Section 1 of the Law, dated 28 June 1991, on Elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland (DZIENNIK USTAW, No. 59, Item No. 252), the State Electoral Commission announces that, in conjunction with Article 66, Sections 2 and 4 of the Law on Elections to the Sejm, the following election committees have been added to the list of election committees which have given notice of their intent to file district lists of candidates for deputies and candidates for senators in more than one electoral district:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Name of the Election Committee, Acronym of the Name, and Address of the Election Committee</th>
<th>Full Names of Parties, Political or Public Organizations, or Groups of Voters Creating the Election Committee</th>
<th>First and Last Names of the Authorized Representative of the Election Committee</th>
<th>Notice Applies to Elections to the Sejm/Senate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>All-Polish Election Committee of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union of Policemen OKW NSZZP; Warsaw, 148 Pulawska Street, Apt. 150</td>
<td>Independent Self-Governing Union of Policemen</td>
<td>Stanislaw Kraszewski</td>
<td>Elections to the Sejm and the Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>National Election Committee of the Independent Sovereign Labor Party; Sopot, 11 Majkowski Street</td>
<td>Independent Sovereign Labor Party in Gdansk</td>
<td>Piotr Rozwora</td>
<td>Elections to the Sejm and the Senate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The present communique is a supplement to the Communique of the State Electoral Commission dated 19 August 1991.

Koszalin Profile: Unemployment Anecdotes, Issues 91EP06894 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 28 Aug 91 p.4

[Article by Halina Lesnicka: “Anatomy of Unemployment”]

[Text] “Can I get my benefits earlier, because I am about to leave the town?”

“I’ll give my husband an authorization for picking up the money because I don’t have the time.”

“I won’t commute 15 km to work; that is too far for me.”

Such comments can be heard daily at the Koszalin District Labor Office. In this city with a population of 120,000 there are by now more than 14,000 unemployed, 13.5 percent of the able-bodied labor force, one of the highest indicators in this country. In the adjoining townships served by this labor office, such as Karlino, Biesiekierz, and Polanow, all the local enterprises have shut down; at Polanow there already are 1,000 unemployed and not a single job vacancy.

In September these figures will be swollen by some 2,000 job seekers discharged from the Koszalin Kazel Plant and SPHW [Labor Cooperative for Trade and Crafts]. In a week or two, farmhands from the bankrupt local state farms, totaling about 11,000 persons, will also register with the labor office. There are no big-industry plants in Koszalin; the Plytolen [Fiberboard] Plant has shut down, and as for the Karel Plant, which used to belong to the Unitra [Electronic and Telecommunications Equipment Industry] Association, that is a typical plant built for reasons that had nothing to do with economics and is therefore unsalvageable—its bays have been standing vacant for months and could be used as a warehouse, but no one is interested in them even for that purpose.

The indigenous capital is being invested chiefly in stores and kiosks, and a little also in service establishments, but this does not create many new jobs. There is no work for fitters, lathe operators, or milling machine operators. There is a demand for canvassing agents, tradespeople, customs and insurance experts, and secretaries who know foreign languages, but so far no one has been training them here. Almost all of the local graduates of vocational and secondary schools, nearly 1,500, have applied for unemployment benefits. Furthermore, graduates of higher schools are coming here upon completing their studies in other cities, but there are no jobs for them.

The director of the District Labor Office, Engineer Jerzy Mlodnicki, said, “We wanted to offer language and computer courses for canvassing agents, but there were not enough applicants. For the unemployed the fee of several hundred thousand zlotys for such courses is too high, and
our office cannot pay for them because subsequent job placement is not a sure thing.”

Young girls who were offered work as kitchen help in resort hotels prefer to collect unemployment benefits. Only 15 have applied for the 60 job vacancies, and of these only two began to work.

Director Młodnicki said, “The present employment law is bad and actually demoralizing by mandating equal treatment of people who lost their jobs after many years of work and have no source of support and people who apply only for unemployment benefits [without ever working]. Should white-collar jobs be available, many people would rather give up their unemployment benefits than accept these jobs, because they are not that interested in working. But other applicants include broken, desperate individuals who go so far as even to threaten suicide, single mothers, a father of three—an unemployed widower, and underage girls carrying babies.

“Mothers of little children are a special category of the unemployed. As known, they are unemployed under law for three months, and if the child reaches six months we must register them. They cannot afford paying for a nursery or kindergarten, and in practice they are reluctant to accept work, and so we pay them unemployment benefits instead of education allowances. Similarly, unemployment benefits are paid for half a year to political appointees discharged from the state administration who at the same time collect pensions and high severance pay. On the other hand, people who say, break their legs and are hospitalized are ineligible for unemployment benefits since they are incapable of working.

“Some kind of screening is needed to separate the genuine unemployed from ordinary chiselers. Perhaps the revised Law on Unemployment will play this role?

“But for something to be done there is first a need for capital, money, of which there is still too little. By mid-1991 45 billion has been paid out in unemployment benefits—a sum sufficient to open a small food-processing plant. A private plant producing processed and cured meats, at which 200 persons found jobs, was much cheaper. There are people with entrepreneurial ideas, but there is also a shortage of capital.

“Loans from the Labor Fund were granted to 71 persons, and they are being granted to barely five or six persons per month, chiefly for the development of more consumer services. Small barbershops, beauty salons, and transportation and construction outfits are being established. Many young people are interested in opening shops of their own and need relatively small amounts of capital on the scale of 5-10 million zlotys each for the acquisition of tools and machinery, in order to open, e.g., a television repair shop or an appliance repair shop. Unfortunately, the Labor Fund lacks the funds for this purpose and these people cannot afford the [high-interest] bank loans.

“If we could withhold the interest on the loans that were already repaid, several dozen people monthly could obtain additional loans, but unfortunately we must transfer all that money to the [state] budget,” said Director Młodnicki.

The Solidarity Economic Foundation is trying to help the young. The sociologist Jolanta Hetmanczyk-Krol, also unemployed as of recently, is trying to organize emergency and seasonal work projects, but it is only students who apply, while the real unemployed show no interest in them. A special fund has been set up to buy equipment for operators of the local television station, which has recently started operating and is the pride of the denizens of Koszalin. Five graduates found jobs there.

But the city is awaiting stronger stimuli for economic growth, chiefly ideas and capital. Jerzy Pelczar of the Regional Growth Agency is a proponent of bootstrap growth, of starting from scratch with small family enterprises, utilizing local resources, and promoting tourist attractions.

This year the number of tourists has not been very high, but some day they will come. The city has recently grown very beautified and the appearance of the local stores is no worse than in the nation’s capital. “What worries us most,” Director Młodnicki said, “is the dim future of the state farms. Their employees had housing and various kinds of allowances on these farms and their life used to be quite comfortable. But once they will be let go, they will apply to us, because they will be unable to afford land of their own and, what is even worse, there is a lack of legal solutions that would make such land purchases possible.

“We dread winter, which in these parts is long and gloomy, with gusty and chilling winds and much rainfall. Even now crime in the city is rising, with a growing number of larcenies and burglaries. What will happen once unemployment doubles?”

**Number of Economically Active Enterprises Falling**

90EP0678A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 31 Jul 91 p IV

[Article by Ryszard Barczyk, Małgorzata Kokocinska, and Wiesława Przybylska-Kapucinska: “The Economy in Enterprise Assessments: Recession Deepens”]

[Excerpts] There has been a decline in the number of economically active enterprises that make up the group at the forefront of the systems changes. This is the conclusion that emerges from the last quarterly assessment of the enterprises’ economic activity that the Poznan Economics Academy’s Institute of Economic Theory performed using a business climate test.

The research report for the first quarter of 1991 (RZECZPOSPOLITA, No. 112, 1991) presented the hypothesis that, from the viewpoint of subjective enterprise assessments, there has been a return to the point of departure, that is, to the period when the basic systems changes were introduced.
Two synthetic indicators presented in the text below demonstrated this fact:

—The business climate indicator, the arithmetic mean of the synthetic indicators for the current quarter and of the indicators of the forecast for the next quarter, constructed on the basis of specially selected elements defining the diagnosis and prognosis of the economy [passage omitted].

—The indicator for the overall assessment of the economic situation, the arithmetic mean of the indicators for the current quarter and the indicators of the forecast for the next quarter, constructed on the basis of just one specific indicator concerning the first overall assessment of the economic situation in the specific enterprise [passage omitted].

The business climate indexes are the results of many elements that sometimes operate in various directions. Therefore, the amplitude of their fluctuations is not so great as in the case of the index of the overall assessment of the economic situation, which reflects the subjective relationship to the economic activity of the enterprises themselves.

During the first quarter of 1991, both types of indicators pointed at the same time to a trend toward a deepening of the recession. The forecast for the second quarter of 1991 projected a further decline in production along with more restricted demand, with obvious consequences for the enterprises’ financial condition.

The research results for the second quarter of 1991 clearly confirm this negative forecast. They are the worst of the entire period analyzed, that is, the past three years. The business climate index was 18.9 points, which represents a decline of 8.8 points in relation to the first quarter of 1991, and the index for a general assessment of the economic situation reached the lowest point ever noted, 46.9 points. This means a 17 point increase in negative response.

Neither index in the realm of pessimistic attitudes is matched by a corresponding index in any quarter previously analyzed. Everything goes to show that the next few months will be not only the ultimate test for most enterprises but also a breakthrough period for Polish economic reforms. Fewer and fewer state enterprises are successfully adjusting to free market rules of play. The forecast for the third quarter of 1991 suggests that this is a group accounting for only about 15 to 20 percent of the entire population being examined.

The following data prove this: In the third quarter of 1991, 17 enterprises anticipate an increase in the volume of production sold, 14 percent are counting on increasing their file of orders, 6.7 percent expect to improve their financial condition, 18.4 percent are planning to raise prices on their products, and 10.7 percent of their workers can count on an increase in real wages. In the forecast for the second quarter of 1991, such activity, running over to the plus side, still applied to about 25 percent of enterprises.

Current indicators have proved to be worse than anticipated, however. The following factors played a decisive role during the second quarter of 1991:

—A further decline in demand for the enterprises’ products. During the first quarter of 1991, 70 percent of the enterprises asked said that demand for their products was below current production levels, but by the second quarter of 1991, this figure had increased to 77.8 percent. Only 5 percent of the enterprises were in a situation where demand exceeded production levels.

—A continuing decline in the volume of production. As many as 48.8 percent of the enterprises stated that they had sold less than during the previous quarter. Compared with the first quarter of 1991, this means an increase of 10 points in negative assessments.

—An increase in stocks of finished goods essential to ensure continuity of supply to customers. In relation to this figure, 64.3 percent of the enterprises admitted that the level of their stock of finished goods on hand was too high, compared with 51.1 percent during the first quarter of 1991.

—An increase in hidden unemployment calculated in terms of the size of employment in relation to ongoing production capacity. Yielding to employment excesses is becoming more and more of a predicament. During the first quarter of 1991, one-third of the enterprises had this problem. During the second quarter of 1991, 42 percent of those enterprises responding were aware of employment excesses in their enterprises.

—The declining financial situation, as a consequence of all the above-mentioned factors. A decided majority of the enterprises asked (80.6 percent) stated that their financial situation was worse than it had been during the previous quarter.

The forecast for the second quarter of 1991 calls for a continuation of this adverse trend and creates no basis for expecting a change in the economic climate. The following factors may be included among the adverse conditions being forecast:

—Expectation of a further decline in production by 31.7 of the enterprises responding. Seventeen percent of the enterprises queried expected an increase in production. Overall, this index is far worse than the corresponding index forecast for the second quarter of 1991, when a like number of enterprises predicted production expansion and decline (about 22 percent). The forecast for the third quarter of 1991 is probably more realistic.

—Expectation of a further decline in demand, approximately in relation to expected production changes. In this case too about 30 percent of the enterprises conclude that orders for their products will decline, while only 14 percent are counting on an increase in orders. The balance of the positive and negative responses is decidedly worse than in the forecast drawn up for the second quarter of 1991. The ratios in the realm of demand and production apply to both domestic and foreign demand. On the basis of anticipated changes in export, it may be anticipated that the third quarter of 1991 will bring about some growth in this area. Nearly half of the enterprises are expecting export values in
convertible currencies to increase this quarter. At the same time, during the second quarter of 1991, there will be a significant increase for the first time in the frequency that private export competition will constitute a barrier. One enterprise in every four mentions this aspect.

—A further decline in real wages is anticipated. This decline will be noted in one enterprise out of every three. In the previous forecast, this factor applied to only one out of every four enterprises.

The worsening adverse phenomena during the second quarter of 1991 and the decided worsening of the climate and conditions under which the enterprises will be operating during the next few months testify to a general inability to adapt to the hard rules of play of a free market. As has already been mentioned, there has been a decline in the number of enterprises in the group with a high level of economic activity, the group that could be considered to be at the forefront and to be a market monitor. From a purely economic point of view, there is such a thing as telling oneself the truth about the state of the economy. The only question is who is going to buy up the state enterprises, and whether there will be any way to pay for massive unemployment.

**Planned Ecological Improvements Enumerated**

90EP0678C Warszawa RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 31 Jul 91 p IV

[Article by Antoni Kowalik: “Power Industry Still Harming Environment”]

[Text] Will restructuring the fuel and power complex finally permit reconciliation between energy policy and ecological policy? Many provisions that should favor such reconciliation have been written into the program of goals.

Last year, for example, more than 7,000 installations on the list of mining damage underwent improvements at a cost of more than 623 billion zlotys, compared to needs totaling 821 billion. The mines have drawn up programs for the next five years for the protection of these areas. According to the plans, 7,000 installations will be upgraded each year for a total of about 1.3 trillion zlotys.

The second problem is the recultivation and management of these lands where industrial operations are being conducted. The mines own more than 10,000 hectares of land. Operations should be concluded on 1,466 hectares of this land, and following recultivation, the land should be transferred to other users. Last year about 48 percent of this land was put under a management program, which cost 28.7 billion zlotys. This year the expenditures for this purpose are projected to be 68.2 billion, which should be enough for the recultivation and management of about 600 hectares.

The next problem concerns coal strippings. Last year the mines produced more than 64 million tons. In connection with limiting extraction and preparation, as well as a concerned effort to minimize the production of waste, the amount fell below 1989 levels, for example, but there is still the problem of use. The main issue is the area of dumping grounds, which, according to estimates, will be filled by 1995. Then the mines will have the problem of finding new dumping areas. In this connection, this year and in coming years there are plans to focus efforts on further reducing the production of coal strippings from extracting and preparation and on putting more of them underground than before. There will be greater use of them in the production of building materials, too. Up until now the usage has not been too great. Last year, for example, 3.5 tons of strippings were utilized. This is 1.3 million tons less than the year before. This is the result of the cuts in building transportation lines and the slowdown in construction.

Water and air protection is a separate problem of exceptional importance. The air protection problem will be mitigated, among other things, by the program for building plants to remove sulfur from coal dust. This project is one of the priorities of energy policy. The implementation of this program should be concluded next year with the result being reduced sulfur dioxide emissions.

The investment tasks planned for this purpose will include modernization of the mines, the construction of fluidizing boilers, and installation of equipment to remove dust and sulfur from emissions, alongside the desulfurization of coal dust. The investments for this purpose are to total 526.1 billion zlotys this year and 400 billion next year. The mining industry is also trying to obtain foreign credit, for example, from Japan, the United States, and Germany.

The programs show that during the next few years there should be substantial improvement in reducing salty mine wastewater contamination. A pilot station to remove salts from pit water from the Budryk and Debiensko mines is currently under construction. The contract is to be completed by the beginning of next year. Given the desalination plant already in existence, this project should completely resolve the problem of wastewater from these mines.

There are plans to carry out in the mines between 1991 and 1995 a total of 49 investment projects and research and development projects to prevent excessive salinity in surface waters, at an estimated cost of about 9.1 trillion zlotys. Priority will be given to projects related to eliminating the disposal of water contaminated with salts from those mines that are key polluters of the Vistula, that is, the Piast, Czeczot, and Ziemowit mines. These mines are presently responsible for about 74 percent of the salts that hard-coal mining releases into the Vistula.

On the basis of contracts with specialized foreign firms, there are plans to build a joint desalination plant in 1992-1993 for the Piast and Czeczot mines. A similar investment is also planned for the Ziemowit mine, for a total cost of 2.9 trillion zlotys.

Alongside this, there are plans to complete eight domestic sewage treatment plants, to modernize and expand three pit settling ponds, and to build eight water treatment stations.


Whether or not the above-mentioned tasks will all be carried out depends upon the flow of funding from the budget and from NFOSiGW [National Environmental Protection and Water Management Fund] and on foreign aid, because the mines themselves do not have adequate funds. According to the plan for this year, for example, environmental protection funds from NFOSiGW are being allocated to finance about 600 million złotys worth.

**POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 28 Jul-3 Aug 91**

91EP0669A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 31, 3 Aug 91 p 2

[Excerpts]

**Around the Country**

Elections 1991. In Warsaw, two electoral coalitions have been formed—both with the participation of the Center Accord and part of the Citizens Committees. The State Electoral Commission has registered the PSL's [Polish Peasant Party's] electoral bloc, Program Alliance, which is made up of the PSL, the ZMW [Rural Youth Union], the KZRKiOR [National Union of Farmers, Agricultural Circles, and Agricultural Organizations], and the Rural Women's Circles. The PKW [State Electoral Commission] has been informed that candidates for deputy will be offered in every district by the National Electoral Commission of the Alliance of the Democratic Left (Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz is chairman), which is composed of the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic], the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement], the PKLD [Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left], the ZSMP [Union of Socialist Polish Youth], the Democratic Union of Women, the Working People's Movement, the (Independent) PPS [Polish Socialist Party], the Chief Cooperative Council, some federations of trade unions, and other organizations. Karol Modzelewski, the leader of "Labor Solidarity," and Zbigniew Bujak, leader of the Democratic-Social Movement, have announced the creation of a joint electoral slate. In Opole, the National Electoral Committee of the German Minority has been created. General Wojsciech Jaruzelski has excluded the possibility of running for parliament in the next elections. There is more about the preparations for the elections in J. Paradowski's article on page 1.

The group initiating the creation of the Catholic Journalists' Association met in Czestochowa. Bishop A. Lepa, chairman of the Commission of the Episcopal of Poland on the Means of Social Transfer, participated. [passage omitted]

"Rural Solidarity" has proclaimed that after 15 September of this year farmers will make all payments to the state in kind. This is supposed to be a protest against the government's agricultural policy.

Research on the morale of professional soldiers in the WP [Polish Army] conducted in June by the Military Institute of Sociological Research indicates that 53 percent of the examined cadre believes that the state's foreign policy makes them fear for the security of the country, and 36 percent perceive a threat of war to our country.

The Democratic Party will come out with a full list of candidates for deputy and candidates for half the seats in the Senate. The chairman of the SD [Democratic Party], Aleksander Mackiewicz, is counting on 20 seats in the Sejm.

**Nominations**

The president has named the poet Ernest Bryll to be the RP's [Republic of Poland's] ambassador to the Republic of Ireland. The premier has appointed Andrzej Podchul, a member of the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland], to the position of voivode of the Suwalki voivodship and Janina Sagatowska, an activist in Solidarity and the Citizens Committees, to the position of voivode of the Tarnobrzeskie Voivodship. [passage omitted]

The Chief Council of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy reproached Minister of National Defense Piotr Kołodzięczyk for "inflaming relations between the people of Silesia and those of other regions" as well as for suggesting that there exists in Silesia "a sort of closer, undefined fifth column." This occurred after the minister's statement on "the rebirth of German sentiments in Silesia which... could constitute the foundation of activities striking at the security of the state." The minister's press secretary found such an interpretation of the statement to be "unjustified and too wide-ranging."

According to GAZETA GDANSKA, the CENZIN company, which is involved in the arms trade, (67 percent of the shares are owned by the state, the rest are divided among 34 Polish arms producers) earned about 50 billion złotys in profits in the first half of this year, and it lent another 100 billion to the Army, which does not have the means to pay for the equipment it has acquired, and to failing weapons plants. [passage omitted]

Losses to the natural environment brought about by the forces of the USSR stationed in Poland have been tentatively estimated at about 53 trillion złotys. [passage omitted]

**Opinions**

**Jacek Kuron, deputy chairman of the Democratic Union:**

(In an interview with Andrzej Tetlak, SLOWO PODLASIA, 18 July)

[Tetlak] In your opinion, how will the autumn elections look?

[Kuron] No one will win these elections by a landslide. There will not be a large turnout for the elections. There will be a great dispersion of votes as a result of the current state of social attitudes and moods. No system will help in this regard. It simply has to be this way, because this is in accordance with the building of a democratic order.)
POLAND

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 11-17 Aug 91
91EP06704A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 33, 17 Aug p 2
[Excerpts] [passage, omitted] Prof. Rafał Krawczyk, leader of the New Poland Movement, charged that the Ministry of Industry, in selling to the Italian Polish firm "Legler-Polonia" real property belonging to the Łódź firms "Bistona" and "Roltex," exposed the State Treasury to great losses. Former deputy minister of industry S. Padykula, who signed the contested contract, in commenting on R. Krawczyk's charges in KURIER POLSKI and TRYBUNA, acknowledged them as reelection sniping and rejected them. S. Padykula views the charge that the "Partner" consulting firm received 600 million zlotys [Z] for preparing a liquidation plan for both companies, which is an overstated amount, as unwarranted, since a group of experts from Łódź's NOT [Chief Technical Organization] also entered into it, yet the plan itself is in use. But he did concede that the fact that the headquarters of "Partner" is located in the Ministry of Industry building and its head is former deputy minister Krzysztof Lis "may indeed bring bad things to mind."

Zbigniew Bujak, leader the Democratic Social Movement, proposed at a news conference the "forming of a supergovernment of distinguished people, regardless of their membership in a party or miniparty, or their lack of membership," he announced that three weeks before the elections he would introduce his "shadow cabinet." When asked if L. Balcerowicz might be a member of that cabinet, he answered, "If a prime minister with an equally strong personality and knowledge of the economy were to be found, I would no longer be in awe of Balcerowicz's power." [passage omitted]

From OBOP [Center for Research on Public Opinion] surveys: To the question, "How do you assess the policies of Lech Wałęsa as president," 3 percent of those surveyed responded "very good," 17 percent "fairly good," 46 percent "somewhat good, somewhat poor," 19 percent "fairly poor," and 11 percent "very poor" (4 percent—"hard to say"). On the question, "How do you assess the policies of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki as prime minister," 3 percent of those surveyed said "very good," 26 percent "fairly good," 41 percent "somewhat good, somewhat poor," 15 percent "fairly poor," and 4 percent "very poor" (11 percent had no opinion).

Average wages of workers in the socialized economy in the second quarter stood at ZŁ698 and increased by 2.5 percent compared to the first quarter. It is anticipated that average wages in the third quarter will be ZŁ702 (these data are used to calculate pension benefits). [passage omitted]

"A Present for Delegate Niesziołowski—Tens of Millions From the Pockets of Television Viewers." Under that headline KURIER POLSKI reports that "on the personal recommendation of President Markiewicz the Łódź television center is shooting a documentary film about delegate Stefan Niesziołowski, the leading member of ZChN [Christian-National Association] and a candidate for the
future Sejm.” The producer of the half-hour film explained to KURIER reporters: “I do not allow him to talk about party, politics, or beliefs. I end the film in 1976 when Niesiolowski leaves prison after five years following his conviction of attempting to blow up the statue of Lenin in Pronnina.” [passage, omitted]

Overseas telephone calls will go up in price an average of 30 percent. An increase in postal rates for overseas mail is also expected. In September, PKS [State Air Transport] (an average of 20 percent) and PKP [Polish State Railroad] (by 50 percent) tickets will also go up. As of 19 August, paper produced at the plant in Kwidzyn will be more expensive (the firms blame increased energy costs, changes in currency exchange rates, and recent increases in tariffs).

Wojciech Fibać has bought the rights to the title of the monthly magazine EKRAN for Z200 million.

Some 1,749,900 people were unemployed at the end of July. This represents 9.4 percent of those professionally active and is one of the highest ratios in Europe. Some 872,000 unemployed are women, 204,000 graduates, including 60,000 of this year’s graduates. The highest levels of unemployment are in Suwałki Voivodship (16 percent), Olsztyn (15.2 percent), Ciechanow (14.9 percent), Jelenia Gora (14.8 percent), Koszalin and Lodz (14.3 percent). Over 21 percent (21.8) of the registered unemployed are not eligible for benefits. [passage, omitted]

Citizens Center Accord—that is the name of an electoral coalition created by the Center Accord, citizens committees, and the “Heritage” Popular-Christian Forum. Among the members of the accord’s election committee are Roman Bartoszcze, Hanna Chorazyna, Adam Glapinski, Jaroslaw Kaczyński, Lech Kaczynski, Jacek Maziarski, Zdzislaw Najder, Jan Olszewski, Jerzy Stepień, Romuald Szemietiew, and Wojciech Wlodarczyk. [passage, omitted]

At the Jewish cemetery in Warsaw, graves have been desecrated, several headstones have been overturned, and anti-Semitic writing has appeared on others. The perpetrators have been caught—they were two minors—and their actions bore the mark of hooliganism. President L. Walesa and Cardinal Primate J. Gelpn have condemned anti-Semitic acts of vandalism.

In a letter to the prime minister, delegate Włodzisław Serafin has challenged the conversion index of farm income per hectare, which forms the basis of accounting and benefits for the farming population. It was calculated at Z22,23,000—almost twice the previous index (Z890,000), yet farmers have experienced no increase in income; on the contrary, prices for farm production supplies have increased while prices for farm produce have fallen.

In Krakow six gang members have been arrested; among other things, the gang bribed officials, extorted financial obligations, and staged the execution of death sentences against debtors. Among those arrested are the heads of “Art-Poluć,” “Agri-Polex,” and “Komiwjazor.” The investigation revealed that only criminal activity was carried out under the aegis of the firms. [passage, omitted]

The PPS [Polish Socialist Party] Main Council, which met under the leadership of honorary chair Lidia Ciolkoszowa, who came to the session from London, on her personal motion dismissed the governing body of the periodical ROBOTNIK, along with editor in chief Piotr Ikonowicz. The council reelected Jan Jozef Lipski as its chairman.

Information has appeared in SZTANDAR MŁODYCH suggesting that not only lay and religious catechists but also priests teaching religion in the schools are receiving compensation from the MEN [Ministry of National Education] budget. GAZETA WYBORCZA published an explanation by Bishop Alojzy Orszulik, from which it is apparent that the bishops strictly forbid this, because “Polish schools are poor and a priest can survive without a state salary.” The ministry reports that about 8,000 lay and religious catechists are receiving a salary, which with over 500,000 teachers constitutes a “marginal problem.”

An automatic telephone connection between Poland and the United States and Canada has been put in service—one dials 0-01, then the number of the other party. The cost for a one-minute conversation—Z18,000.

Andrzej Szczypiorski, senator and writer; “...The point here is not about the old ‘nomenklatura,’ as the Center Accord wishes, nor Walesa’s authoritarian tendencies, as the Democratic Union wants, nor whether there are too few Catholic priests on television, as the gentlemen of ZChN say, or whether there are too many, as Bujak and Labor Solidarity have found, but about the very material fact that in Poland there are many people who do not want a free market, do not want social relations based on capitalist principles, and do not want political pluralism. These people cannot be condemned, they cannot be faced with absurd charges that they do not understand anything, because they do understand that things are bad for them today, often worse than before, and this usually has fundamental significance for a human being.

“These people must be drawn into a great discussion on the subject of Poland’s future; they must be brought over to the program of reforms and then to sacrifice for those reforms, so that they will bear the burden consciously, so that they would pick it up themselves, without coercion, without the whole foolish performance in which they have to participate...” (GAZETA POZNANSKA, 2 August) [passage, omitted]
Civic Alliance's Blandiana Interviewed
91BA1034A Bucharest BARICADA in Romanian
30 Jul 91 p 16

[Interview with Ana Blandiana, president of the Civic Alliance, by Liviu Valenas in Bucharest on 7 July: "The Prime Minister Is the People's Servant"]

[Text] [Valenas] You have been elected president of the Civic Alliance. How do you feel about that?

[Blandiana] We were among the first to understand that a Civic Alliance Party is necessary, even if for us, for the Civic Alliance, it means a great effort. This party was necessary because our analysis of Romania's situation demonstrated that an alternative was needed at a time when the party that now leads Romania has sharply lost its following, to the point where it no longer represents the majority. By the same token, the historical parties, those that are truly democratic, did not succeed in attracting the former Front sympathizers. The Front did of course create some satellite "dishe" with populist leanings that were supposed to draw those who were unhappy with the FSN [National Salvation Front]. As such, the real opposition needed a modern party that matched Romania's real conditions at this time. Since the Civic Alliance showed itself to have the greatest impact on public opinion, it had to move beyond its initial option of simply serving as a binder for the opposition, and had to create its own political party. The historical parties, and especially the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party (PNT-cd), which had always been at our side, understood that the only important thing during this period will be which of the honest forces represent the true opposition, forces that can secure the population's votes against the forces that want to retain the old structures. We now hope that in the next parliament the representatives of the Civic Alliance will be as numerous as possible, and that they will fight to establish a true democracy in this country.

[Valenas] You mentioned a modern party; this sounds like a rather strange idea. Why should a party that is 100 years old, such as the Social Democratic Party in Germany, not be "modern"? Or in our country, why is the Civic Alliance Party more "modern" than the PNT-cd?

[Blandiana] The answer is very simple. The PNT, with its extraordinary presence in Romania's history, did not have a mass foundation at the time it was established: On 22 December 1989 there no longer existed a Romanian peasantry, as it does not exist at present! Romania's peasantry was purely and simply obliterated during the 45 years of communism. The same is true for the National Liberal Party (PNL), which lost its bourgeoisie under similar conditions, also exterminated by communism. These categories, the peasantry and the bourgeoisie, will be created and will undoubtedly surface behind these historical parties. Romania will certainly move to a market economy, to democracy, and under these conditions it is impossible for the historical parties not to develop. But until then, the present seems to belong to organizations without any specific shading, such as the Czech Forum or our Civic Alliance. Similarly, I can cite Poland's "Solidarity" or the Hungarian Democratic Forum, forces which now lead their respective countries. To summarize, I would say that it is now important to destroy the old structures! It doesn't matter who will destroy them; what is important is to replace them with other, modern structures.

[Valenas] Nevertheless, you did not answer in which way the Civic Alliance is a more modern party than the PNT-cd. I don't believe the mass foundation can be invoked, because on one hand we all know why the historical parties have a smaller mass foundation, and on the other hand that even from this reduced mass foundation they have supplied the Civic Alliance. So why?

[Blandiana] But the Civic Alliance has members in other parties even now! You are in fact continually asking me questions which you should ask Mr. Manolescu, who is the president of the Civic Alliance Party. I represent the Civic Alliance itself! And this Civic Alliance, which was formed around noble ideals, was the only organization that drew a quarter of a million people into the streets even at the time of its formation! And the ideals of the Civic Alliance are the ideals of the entire nation, and they are the ideals of our parents, who in their youth were active in the historical parties and who afterwards were indiscriminately killed in prisons, no matter whether they supported the peasantry or liberalism.

[Valenas] But why didn't the Civic Alliance completely transform itself into a party? Many people cannot understand the current situation; the Civic Alliance is like an army which in a serious situation splits into two parts, one of which leaves for the front, while the other sings martial music in the parks!

[Blandiana] Maybe the situation cannot be understood. From my standpoint, however, the objectives of the Civic Alliance are infinitely more important than the objectives of the Civic Alliance Party. The latter will fight to enter Parliament, and even to eventually win the elections. The Civic Alliance however, is fighting for lasting objectives. While our party is fighting to enter the chambers of Parliament, the Civic Alliance is fighting to bring the Romanian people into the chambers of History! From the first moment, our plan was to teach Romania's citizens the alphabet of democracy. And that is not saying little. We want to recreate (although in fact, perhaps for the first time) the Romanian state of law and the civilian society of which we all dreamed. We want to teach the people that they are not the ones who depend on the prime minister, but rather that the prime minister depends on the people! Every leader must be aware that he is a servant, and not a parent of a "boss." We must create the civilian society in which each citizen will be aware of representing a link in real democracy, in which there cannot exist any possibility that a "boss" will become a dictator.

[Valenas] Have you considered moving to the Civic Alliance Party, becoming the president of the party? Why have you chosen the "civilian" Civic Alliance, if I may use that expression?

[Blandiana] I have not considered it for personal reasons. To begin with, I don't regard myself as a political person!
Valenş Is Mr. Manolescu a political person?

Blandiana I believe he is. As to myself, do not think that it is out of arrogance that I do not regard myself as a political person. I have been a fighter and not a political person! I don’t know how to make concessions, I don’t know how to be flexible, I never give ground.

Valenş Walesa has also been a fighter, but he is also a great political man!

Blandiana Of course he is! Except that I, unlike Walesa, am faced with the threatening question that 10 years later, when Romania will certainly be better off than it is today, when Romania will have achieved democracy, no one will ask me what I did during these years! They will ask me what books I have written during these years! Unlike Walesa, I have to choose between history and literary history. And I will always choose the latter!

Valenş But as president of the “nonpolitical” Civic Alliance, your work is, let us say, still political. And in addition to that, you have a great responsibility!

Blandiana That is true! To be honest, I normally should not even have accepted this position! In fact, it is the first time in my life (and I am convinced that it is also the last) that I have accepted a position. In fact, as an old maid who brags about the number of suitors she has turned down, I also have an impressive list of positions I have refused! But at the present time the situation is so serious that I could not stand on the sidelines. My colleagues convinced me that I must make this sacrifice and accept the presidency of the Civic Alliance. I hope with all my heart, and I am perhaps even convinced of it, that I will be writing at the same time.... But no one will give me back the time I give to the Civic Alliance, and that time will be stolen from my books! In any case, that is not a cause for jubilation!

Valenş It has been said that as president of the Civic Alliance, you, Ana Blandiana, have made recommendations regarding the leadership of the Civic Alliance Party. Is that true?

Blandiana No! As you know, the vote was not to have overlapping names in the leaderships of the Civic Alliance and of the Civic Alliance Party. I suggested that Gabriel Andreescu (in whose mind the idea of the Civic Alliance was partially created) move to the Party. However, just like me, he opted for the “nonparty” Civic Alliance...

Valenş There are those who have interpreted your suggestion as pressure on the “party.” In fact, don’t you feel that the Civic Alliance is a single unit, as Mr. Manolescu himself has stated, and that this “division” has been artificially created?

Blandiana It is something like that. Ideally, after some time, the two parts should fuse, if I may use this expression. In terms of ideas and ideology, the Civic Alliance Party is based on all the documents written by the Civic Alliance. That is its backbone. The basis of the party is the connotation of the Civic Alliance in people’s minds. It is an unequaled connotation, the gift the Alliance has offered its offspring, the Civic Alliance Party! The dowry is thus particularly valuable! All we want is for the Party to harvest its crop! It is genuine wealth which should not be wasted.

Valenş Thank you very much Mrs. Blandiana for your kindness in granting us this interview, and let me sincerely wish for God to help you and the new Civic Alliance Party!

Manolescu on Ideology of Nationalist Parties

91BA1034B Bucharest ROMANIA LITERARA in Romanian 15 Aug 91 p 2

[Article by N.M.: “Extremist Ideology and Political Gamble”—first paragraph is ROMANIA LITERARA introduction]

[Text]

Behind Chauvinist Manifestations and Public Reaction to These Manifestations, an Increasingly Clear Political Meaning Is Recently Shaping Up

After the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress condemned anti-Semitism in Romania, Prime Minister Petre Roman had to take a position by threatening to suspend several Romanian and Hungarian publications. This position proves that the government is concerned by the escalation of statements that endanger the already reduced credibility of the current government, suspected—not without justification—of collusion with some ultranationalist pressure groups. It remains to be seen whether the promised measures will in fact be adopted. Liviu Mureşanu, in charge of foreign affairs in the FSN [National Salvation Front] administration, holds a totally different belief, which is that the extremists should first of all be heard. As if until now they had been shouting in the desert! It must also be added that nationalism is not an exclusively Romanian phenomenon: it has been exhibited with some virulence in all the countries of central and Eastern Europe during this phase of transition from totalitarianism to democracy.

Analyzing the recurring themes in the arguments used by chauvinist groups in Romania, we note some particularities which might not be absolutely specific, but on the contrary, might indicate a type of political attitude associated with the evolution taking place in all the countries of the former communist camp. Extremist ideology conceals the rigor of a political gamble. Two types of issues and two different vocabularies converge in the East European arguments of the past two or three years. At a superficial glance, the first kind appears to originate in the fascist traditions of the prewar period extending to 1944-45. There are striking similarities between the language of such publications as EUROPA or ROMANIA MARE, and that of Legionari newspapers and magazines in the 1940’s and early 1950’s. The strongest obsession is with the danger presented by foreign elements.

One of the current newspapers states in black and white that the Romanian people, literate since 1948, no longer want to be led by “those of foreign kin and country”
(giving the names of some Jews serving in political positions immediately after the December revolution). It would appear that certain ministries, and even the government as a whole, are derelict as a result of a “non-Romanian political and national overture.” In this negative picture, the foreigners are joined by “turncoats,” by those in the pay of foreign groups (from the CIA to Free Europe, from the National Endowment for Democracy to high Jewish finance). While the Jews are asked to sign their “filthy” articles with their true names, the turncoats are prodded to “explain” their alliance with “foreigners,” going as far as suggesting a possible Semitic descent.

Anti-Hungarianism goes hand in hand with anti-Semitism. The Hungarians as a whole are accused of irredentism; there are no shadings. Ultimately, the foreign component, no matter which one, becomes the major issue for rejection in the name of the Romanian “people” and its presumed desire for racial “purity.” Eminescu is most often mentioned, with verses from his Doina, for this hatred that supposedly is burning inside the “good Romanians” against foreigners and turncoats of all kinds.

So far, none of this is new. The Legionar ideology used the same slogans and examples; but some of them are missing. The new fascism only exceptionally calls upon topics frequently used during the era between the wars, such as the denominational ones referring to orthodoxy, to blood, and to ancestral ruralism. ROMANIA MARE has only recently opened a campaign against Uniates and Catholics, although interdenominational confrontations have existed—especially in Transylvania—in connection with the failure of the official Orthodox Church to reconstitute goods that belonged to the Greek Catholic Church before 1948.

The Second Group of Issues in Extremist Arguments Comes From the Communist, and More Exactly, Ceausescu Arsenal

Ceausescu is known to have founded a Romanian National-Communism. At the start, this attitude was anti-Soviet as well as anti-Semitic. Ceausescu was the first to cast an ideological anathema against Jews, Hungarians, and Russians who led the PCR [Romanian Communist Party] from its establishment in 1921 until the Dej era of the 1950’s.

A famous secret 18-point document existed which guided the PCR after 1971 in selecting management staff for state and party institutions. Some of these points referred directly to ethnic origin, to relatives abroad (the majority of the Jews were thus automatically excluded from any party and state function), and to acts of an anti-Romanian nature. If we carefully read the charges raised by the extremist newspapers against notables from the opposition or from the present administration, we can note their similarity to some of the famous points in the Ceausescu staff specifications.

We are in the presence of a left wing extremism, equally as clear as the one from the right. An editorial in EUROPA (August) unequivocally threatens all foreigners with expulsion from Romania if a group that includes members of (watch the names!) the PSM [Socialist Labor Party], the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], or the Great Romania Party should come to power. In this leftist perception, the poor economic management of the Roman government is explained by the fact that the country has been auctioned off. This is said to be a veritable “international conspiracy” intended to “turn Romania into a colony of the giant foreign capital.” “For the time being,” writes a EUROPA collaborator, “we can see how the conspiracy is being woven, and how the government irresponsibly accepts it.” It is not a coincidence that EUROPA generously prints the PSM’s announcements and those of subsidiaries of this party, the declared heir of the PCR, such as the Galati subsidiary which considers the PSM as “a legitimate successor” of the former PCR, and which requests restitution of its dues and property confiscated following a 1990 decree.

What is more, Gh.N. Straia, professor of Marxism and cabinet chief for Dumitru Popescu, and now in charge of propaganda for the PSM, published a violent attack against the prime minister, who is blasted for having no other feelings “except internationalistic ones.” The convergence of the fascist and communist lines is absolutely clear in Straia’s arguments. While the observation that Roman did not achieve his dream of becoming Ceausescu’s son-in-law is pure and simple calumny, the reason for this failure brings us back to the chauvinistic source of it all: He was supposedly rejected by Elena Ceausescu because he was “one of them,” meaning Jewish! The statement from the PSM leaders against the Roman version of the privatization law promises that if the PSM comes to power, it will renationalize the enterprises which it claims the Roman law privatizes abusively (and what does that mean?). The mix of communism (reinforcing public order and SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] agencies, salvaging the former Securitate, convicting EUROPA LIBERA, “agents” in general, “machinations” of the giant Western capital, and so on) and fascism (expulsion of foreigners, national purity, self-determined economy, hate of foreigners, and so on) is probably the most striking trait of the extremist ideology since December 1989.

This Coincidence Between Old Communist Ideas and Even Older Legionar Ideas Is the Originality of Today’s Extremist Concepts

No matter how many sources of inspiration we might discover for Ceausescu’s National-Communist doctrine, it ultimately represents a political confrontation essential for Romania’s current history and that of other countries that formerly belonged to the Soviet camp (including those in the Soviet Union). I believe that Dahrendorf is right when he maintains that the real struggle in the confrontation is between the followers of an open, integrated society in Europe and in the world, and the followers of a closed, autarchic society and of an ethnocratic state. The new fascism and new communism retain the important characteristics of their respective inheritances, but are defined
by blending into a different ideology arising under the geopolitical and moral conditions that followed the collapse of totalitarianism.

The birth of democracy is proving to be a difficult process that prompts powerful reactions. Because democracy means an opening in all respects, its establishment draws the fury of conservatives attached to tyrannical structures and mentalities. Any reform causes a counterreform. Reformists (radical or timid) run into the obstacle of minds hostile to renewal, which clearly manifest themselves as a combination of nationalism and communism. It appears that this internal contradiction does not prevent counterreform from achieving some success. The Pamiat organization in the USSR, or our own extremists, base this success both on a nationalistic component (the destruction of the last empires and federations in Europe, such as the USSR or Yugoslavia, imply a reawakening of the national soul, while the USSR's reduced capability for foreign domination leads to revisionist tendencies that could become alarming) and on a communist one (populism is flowering in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere, in the context of the inflation and unemployment made more or less inevitable by the introduction of economic reform).

Some of our commentators exaggerate in turn one or the other of these dangers. In reality, these dangers function simultaneously and it is difficult to establish which is more serious. Democracy, the open society, and the state of law being built in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe need not fear a simple return to communism or a fascist and military dictatorship, but rather the phantom of an unprecedented political order, in which the primitivism of the extreme right and the populism of the left are holding hands so as to build a regime based on a new ideologic fundamentalism that does not accept the values of individual freedom and of well-being and civilization for society.
Ministry of Justice on Government Reorganization
91BA1056A Ljubljana NEODVISNI DNEVNIK
in Slovene 20 Aug 91 p 6
[Article by Ivanka Mihelic: “Dangerous Rocking of the Government Boat”]

[Text Ljubljana, 20 Aug—Just as on countless occasions in the past, at yesterday's meeting the Demos Council dealt with organizational issues, with particular emphasis on reorganizing the government. That has been getting Slovenes excited for a good month now, and has caused very different speculations. In response to a question about what Demos thinks of this, the president of its Council, Dr. Joze Pucnik, told us yesterday that they have not yet discussed the details, since they still do not have a draft of the law on reorganizing the government in front of them. That means that they will probably resume the discussion of this next week. Then they will inform their deputies' club of their decisions, and then the parliament. At this time, it involves primarily a restructuring of the government ministries and a reduction in the number of ministers. There will not be a great deal of wrangling over this, but things will get stuck, of course, when quite specific names are put on the table. For the time being, Dr. Pucnik does not want to talk about this. He is only prepared to state that in his opinion, the position of prime minister could still be entrusted to Lojze Peterle, and that the reorganization of the entire government could be carried out by the end of this September.

Dr. Rajko Pirmat, however, is less optimistic about that time for carrying out the reorganization. His ministry—the Ministry for Justice and Administration—to be sure, has already prepared a proposal for reorganizing the government administration, and not for the first time. In fact, the government was already considering its own reorganization models (according to Dr. Pirmat, the files on them are about 10 centimeters thick!) as early as last fall, and again this January, but none of that went any further. It was only the recent proposal by Janez Jansa, which was then supported by the SDZ [Slovene Democratic Alliance] but rejected by Demos, that actually set off the avalanche again. A month, however, is certainly too little to make flour out of that grain. “In fact, the proposal for issuing the law, together with the draft, provides for a two-phase process, since it will be difficult to find convincing reasons for passing this law under urgent procedures,” Dr. Pirmat says. Furthermore, it is also necessary to think about the fact that the milestones have not even started to grind yet—the first is the government itself, the second is the Assembly commissions, then the deputies' club, and finally the parliament. The sword of Damocles, “political consensus,” which is more than necessary in reorganizing a body like the government, is hanging over all of this. All this is another reason why Dr. Pirmat thinks that actually, carrying out such a job in these times, which are very difficult and uncertain for real independence, is merely an unproductive waste of energy. “The fact is, namely, that the government will also operate under considerable pressure, awaiting changes, so that then we will be even less satisfied with the results of its work,” Dr. Pirmat says, and immediately emphasizes that in his opinion, it would be much better to seek solutions through better coordination of its work. Such a body already exists, just as do the three government committees, but they do not function at full power because their members, the individual ministers, are overworked.

And even though the “rocking of the government boat,” as the justice minister calls it, is not productive now, his ministry has nevertheless prepared a reorganization proposal. It is considerably different from the one what was publicly presented a short time ago by the group of four prominent Slovene experts headed by Dr. Peter Jambrek. To put it briefly, in Dr. Pirmat's opinion Dr. Jambrek's model is definitely too radical, since it provides for only 10 government ministries, and Minister Pirmat thinks that 14 is the smallest possible number, and at the same time, the optimum with which the models of almost all European states can operate. According to this proposal, Slovenia would have three groups of ministries. The first are the classic state ministries (internal affairs, foreign affairs, the army, finance, and justice). In this regard the only dilemma that arises is whether justice should be together with administration, or separated from it; this is already exciting judicial minds that aspire to independence. Dr. Pirmat, however, supports associating them, and asserts that this will by no means jeopardize the autonomy of the judicial system. The second one is the economic one. This is an innovation, in which the official proposal from the Ministry of Justice only differs from the proposal by Dr. Jambrek's group in that the former separates agriculture from environmental protection, but the latter does not. Most of the differences are with respect to the third group, which includes all so-called public services. Two subagencies are sufficient for Dr. Jambrek, namely one for health care, social policy and labor, and one for education. The Justice Ministry, however, thinks that this area should be divided into five independent ministries: for labor and social policy, for education, for health care, for science, and for culture.

Dr. Pirmat is aware that this reorganization is a very difficult task, since the government would lose eight of its former ministries and gain instead one very diverse one—the economic one. It seems that wrangling and arguments can also be expected over whether the deputy prime minister is to be an independent office, or whether it is to be handled by one of the ministers, and also, over what to do with the functions of the present ministers for legislation and information. According to the new proposal, those two ministries would become professional services for the government, but the dilemma that arises in that regard is whether the individuals who head those services will be members of the government or not. Dr. Pirmat thinks that they could certainly be ministers without portfolio, but that would increase the number of members of the government again. The fact is, as he says, that nevertheless a government consisting of 15 members (14 ministers and the prime minister) is not only theoretically, but also practically the easiest to manage and consequently also efficient.
The story of the government reorganization is thus just beginning. When we find out how it ends, if we do, will depend upon numerous factors, from all indications. And those are similar only with one observation: that things definitely cannot go on as they are now....

Data on Defense Ministers of Republics
91BA10854 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Aug 91 p 10

[Article by Cvijetin Milivojevic: "Ready for War"]

[Text] All that is left for the country of the once unified system of nationwide defense and social self-protection, in which we “lived as though peace would last 100 years, but were ready as though war would break out the next day,” seems to be that “unwelcome case”—war. How ready we all are individually for war can be told only by analyzing each of the six separate defense concepts. However, certain conclusions concerning the sovereign military conceptions certainly can be drawn from a passing examination of the biographies of their authors and those carrying them out. The defense ministers in three republics (Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia) are “civilians,” while in the other three (Serbia, Montenegro, and, until recently, Macedonia) they are professional military men.

The Cheerful Man from the Neretva

Jerkon Doko, Bosnia-Hercegovina defense minister, a man who from his “military” experience has only the rank of a reserve captain (for a time he also was involved in civil defense in the Mostar Opstina command center), jumped into the government at the last moment. The HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], which was entitled to that position according to the “quota,” had first “in mind” General Tomislav Blonidic, retired, at one time Spedelj’s deputy in the Croatian Defense Ministry. But since Blonidic had no genetic ties whatsoever with Bosnia-Hercegovina, the young economist (born in 1952) Doko suddenly sailed into the foreground. In just a few months after he took up his ministerial position, the “dust was raised” twice in connection with Doko’s name. The first time was on 13 July, when, according to VECERNJE NOVOSTI and some other media, the Bosnia-Hercegovina minister, in a “somewhat relaxed atmosphere” at the wedding of Ključi’s chauffeur, broke out in song: “The breeze is blowing, Croatia is growing, rise up, rise up, Ustashi, hearts are beating, they are drinking Serbian blood.” Doko also delivered an “inflammatory speech” and the police commander, Meko Music, who reported all this to the authorities (automatic weapons were also fired at the wedding) was removed from office.

The second time Jerko Doko filled newspaper columns had to do with the “report on improper behavior and unlawful acts of the defense minister,” which his deputy, Colonel Hazim Begovic, sent to the highest officials in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Among other things, Begovic asserted (and backed it up with examples) that the minister had most flagrantly violated the provisions of the Law on State Administration and the Law on Nationwide Defense. Among other things, Begovic said, Doko forbade the deputy minister, with physical threats, from coming to work in the uniform of an officer of the JNA [Yugoslav People’s Army], conducted an anti-Army campaign, unlawfully dismissed undersecretaries and established collaboration only with the defense ministers of Croatia and Slovenia, “furnished” 2.5 million dinars for his home in Mostar from the republic budget. In addition, the deputy wrote, Doko was constantly dragging out the final work on the new defense concept and actually was conducting defense policy in his own party. It was up to the highest officials in Bosnia-Hercegovina to take a position on Doko’s accountability.

Civilian Through and Through

The third defense minister since the multiparty elections in Croatia, Luka Bebic, unlike his predecessors Spedelj and Sime Djodan—is a civilian through and through. Before Bebic took office, he was vice president of the Chamber of Opstinas in the Croatian Assembly, and before that an enterprise director and opstina official for many years in his native Metkovic. Born in 1937, he “came of age” in politics between 1970 and 1975, while he was president of Metkovic Opstina (they say that his fiercest opponent at that time was Admiral Stanko Parkac), and as an agronomist by profession (an alumnus of Sarajevo University) he held directorial positions right up until the establishment of the HDZ in Metkovic. VJESNIK’s analysts say that “he is courageous,” but is “peaceful and avoids extremes.” In view of the fact that he beat the Slavonian “hawks” when the government was reshuffled, one might perhaps believe that. However, judging by the way in which he increased the tension on the eve of the Assumption (15 August) with his announcement of a “large-scale attack of the JNA on Croatia”—it is more likely that the defense conception of the new Croatian minister will not differ essentially from that of Gen. Spedelj and the former JNA officer and 30-day minister—Djodan.

From Peacemaker to Militarist

The 30-year-old reserve sergeant Janez Jansa, secretary for national defense of the Republic of Slovenia, even if he does nothing more in his military-political career—will go down in Slovene and Yugoslav political history with what he has done up to now. With a diploma from the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Ljubljana University (Department of Nationwide Defense and Social Self-Protection), in just a few years he “made the run” from columnist and antigovernment in MLADINA to builder of the Slovene army and “victor in the June-July war.” But that is only a general example of the metamorphosis of Minister Jansa. Among the more specific examples one should also mention the following facts: The present Democrat was formerly, according to what MLADINA has written, a big scrambler for positions as a youth official, was once the “victim of a plot by the top military leadership” because he divulged a military secret, and he himself, when he became minister, took to court a newsman of DELO PLUS for “divulging a state secret,” that is, an article on the illegal importation of American-made arms in January.
Another thing associated with Jansa's name that has gone unexplained and unknown is when, how, and with what money Jansa's secretariat imported arms (February) and his role in preparing the "putsch" (with Bavec and Kacic) against Prime Minister Peterle.... After the dirty war "against the Bolshevik generals" (in which innocent lads died in JNA uniforms), Jansa's positions in Slovenia have been so strong that he is already planning the long-range strategy of the Slovene armed forces: "The regular army would have a strength of 20,000, of which 5,000 or 6,000 would be officers (ground forces 17,000, air force 2,500, navy 1,000). With the first reserves, that would make between 40,000 and 60,000 soldiers, and in case of war, all 190,000." Until such time as sovereign Slovenia gains international recognition, Jansa is continuing to wage his personal "war" against his opponent on the "battlefield," Gen. Adzic—he has been divulging certain new "military secrets" about "Fortresses 1 and 2," he reads in public Adzic's "unsigned hectograph copies concerning plans for a renewed attack on Slovenia," and so on....

A General for Volunteers

Although generals are a weakness of his, the Slovene minister will probably be less concerned in the future with the "career" of Lieutenant Colonel General Tomislav Simovic, the new Serbian defense minister, because he is no longer a direct "enemy." This is a general who has made two changes to high-level posts in short order. When General Zivota Avramovic departed for Zagreb, he inherited the position of commander of the 3d (Skopje) Military District, and then he became minister in the Serbian government.

Born in Donja Vrba near Kragujevac 57 years ago, Simovic has been in the Army since 1953. He reached the rank of lieutenant colonel general on Army Day in 1987 and the rank of colonel general this May. He has also held other commands and operational posts in the JNA and Serbia's territorial defense. An additional plus in his biography are two other things: first, he speaks Russian, German, and English, and he is not committed as a political party. Why was the latter particularly important?

In his first interview after being chosen (POLITIKA), the new minister said that in the future Serbia's defense would be the "obligation of the state, not of the party." He threatened the paramilitary structures in the republic "with appropriate legal penalties and greater activity on the part of the Serbian state to frustrate such intentions." Whether accidental or not, the very day when he came to head the ministry, the "populist" voluntary detachment at Zabljak Tisiny was disbanded. And although the leader of that band, Milan Parosi, for instance, complained of the previous minister, Adm. Miodrag Jokic ("he first gave us weapons, and now he is disabling us"), it is more likely that this was an action by the new government. What is more, it is during Simovic's tenure that the government has adopted the order on registration of volunteers for territorial defense. If one is to believe certain newspaper articles, he is on the way to establishing the first state voluntary camp (near Bor), in which Serbian soldiers will be trained by none other than Captain Dragan. In all of this, Minister Simovic, of course, continues to see the JNA as the first and only (true) army.

A Trap for the Colonel

It seems that his officer's uniform "was the end" of Col. Risto Damjanovski, until recently the Macedonian defense minister. A man from the "old politics" (republic secretary for defense in the former republic Executive Council), he spent too long in his ministerial post if one takes into account the fact that the strongest group in the parliament—the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity]—defines the Yugoslav People's Army as an "occupying army," Damjanovski also "contributed" in a specific way to his removal with his neutral posture in the correspondence between Gligorov and Kadjicevic over the status of Macedonian recruits, and particularly with the statement made to "Zastava-film" which was carried that same evening by Belgrade Television. After all, the former minister "dared" to say that serving in the army in one's own republic was yet another attack on the Army and led in the direction of its destabilization. Prime Minister Kjusev also reproached Damjanovski for "too frequent contacts with the command of the 3d Military District," and the minister's removal also eliminated the "danger of a Serbian-Macedonian coalition between Simovic and Damjanovski." Instead, according to the assertion of the former minister, the "putsch" was carried out by personnel from the Macedonian MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] within the National Defense Ministry. Until election of someone new, the defense portfolio will be taken over by Blaze Ristevski.

A Minister From the Shadows

Whether because of the joke that "Serbia's defense minister is enough for Montenegro" or the fact that Montenegro is the most peaceful Yugoslav region, the man who holds the defense portfolio in this republic is almost the only one who never appears in public. Col. Bozidar Babic, the Montenegrin minister, has spoken out in public only concerning the problem with mobilization of the reserves following the conflict in Slovenia. But even then—untypically of most of our military ministers—pacifically, seeking understanding for those who have fled from the reserves.... As though Col. Babic is one of the rare ministers who on military issues is absolutely on the side of that ridiculed (but legally in effect) unified conception of "SFY defense," and therefore the Armed Forces of the SFY are (for the present) the only Montenegrin army.

Slovenia Adopts Declaration on War in Croatia

91BA1089A Ljubljana NEODVISNI DNEVNIK
29 Aug 91 p 4

["Text" of declaration adopted on 28 August by the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia on the war in the Republic of Croatia—first paragraph is NEODVISNI DNEVNIK introduction]
The Assembly of the Slovene Republic discussed the increasingly dangerous expansion of the war in the Republic of Croatia. After the discussion, it adopted the following declaration:

**Declaration**

1. The Slovene Republic's Assembly, with anger and horror at the increasingly worse attacks against the civilian population of Croatian cities and villages, condemns the uncontrolled cooperation between units of the Yugoslav Army and armed groups of the Serbian minority in the Croatian Republic, and its support for terrorist and Cetnik units from the Serbian Republic. The Yugoslav Army is attacking the civilian population and units of the Croatian police and national guard with all available means, and is using for that purpose not only the units previously stationed on Croatian territory, but also units from other parts of Yugoslavia, especially those reinforced with additionally mobilized reservists of Serbian nationality. All of these facts say that the Yugoslav Army is acting as an aggressor on the territory of the Croatian Republic and is obviously cooperating in the occupation of a large part of the territory of the Croatian Republic, which Serbia wants to seize. The Yugoslav Army is thus trying to reestablish a unitary, totalitarian communist Yugoslav state, or at least to make possible the emergence of a so-called Greater Serbia through the occupation of territories where other peoples live.

2. The war in Croatia is of fateful significance both for the future of Slovenia and for the consolidation of the young democracies in all of former Eastern Europe. Consequently, Slovenia will offer Croatia concrete humanitarian and medical assistance, shelter, particularly for civilian victims of this sordid war, and material assistance. Slovenia will become involved in informing the international public, encourage institutions of a civil society that can contribute to halting the aggression (for example, the organization of parents of soldiers in the Yugoslav Army, etc.), and strive with all its power to contribute to a revival of the violated trust among the population of different nationalities in Croatia.

3. The Assembly of the Slovene Republic calls upon the parliaments and governments of all European and other democratic states to do everything possible to have the aggression in Croatia ended, and thus to make it possible for the Croatian Republic to realize democratically the Croatian people's right to self-determination and at the same time ensure the internationally supported rights of minorities in the Croatian Republic.

The Assembly of the Slovene Republic states that after the Yugoslav Army's aggression against the Slovene Republic and the Croatian Republic, it is no longer possible to renew Yugoslavia either as a unified state or as a real-socialist federation. It is necessary to prevent the emergence of a nationalist Greater Serbian state entity through the violent seizure of other republics' territories.

The Assembly of the Slovene Republic warns all those who are responsible for the violence that Slovenia will never recognize changes in borders between republics of the former SFRY that arise by violent means or are undemocratically coerced.

4. The Assembly of the Slovene Republic calls upon the parliaments and governments of European and other states to recognize the Slovene Republic and the Croatian Republic as sovereign and independent states as soon as possible, with full independent status under international law, and thus also contribute to accelerating settlement of the relations among the peoples on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and thus also to peace on that territory.

5. The Assembly of the Slovene Republic is addressing this declaration to the parliaments of all members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and to the assemblies of all the republics of the former Yugoslavia.

**Additional Decision I**

The Assembly of the Slovene Republic is charging the Executive Council of the Slovene Republic's Assembly with preparing a concrete program for assistance to sovereign and friendly Croatia, organizing that assistance, and reporting at subsequent sessions of the Assembly on the implementation of that program.

**Additional Decision II**

The Assembly of the Slovene Republic is charging the Executive Council of the Slovene Republic's Assembly with preparing everything necessary for formal recognition of the Croatian Republic as an autonomous and sovereign state with fully independent status under international law, and for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Croatian Republic.

**Additional Decision**

The Assembly of the Slovene Republic explicitly supports the efforts of the committees of parents of Yugoslav Army soldiers to halt the use of their sons in armed combat, and to have them serve their tours in their home republics and return home immediately after completing their regular military tours.

**Details on Rift in Slovene Democratic Party**

91BA1086A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
27 Aug 91 p 8

[Article by M. Laketic: "Rupel Avoided His Removal by Leaving the Meeting"]

[Text] Maribor, 26 Aug—the split, intolerance, and mutual exchange of accusations in the rank and file and leadership of the Slovene Democratic Party [SDS] have gone on for several months now in this most influential party in DEMOS, the coalition that is in power. A decision at last night's meeting of the party's governing board, after a lengthy and stormy debate, called for changes in personnel to be made at the congress which is scheduled for
October. Judging from the stormy meeting, the party has for all practical purposes been in shambles since this summer.

The party’s extreme right wing, led by Janez Jansa, Igor Bavcar, and Igor Omerze, made it clear last night to Dimitrije Rupel, who up to now has been the SDS president and the foreign minister, that he no longer has a place in the party. The conservative wing blames Rupel, Vice President Toni Persak, who is chairman of the commission for amending the republic constitution, Spomenka Hribar, who is a deputy in the Slovenian Assembly, and Rudi Siligoj, also a deputy and president of the Association of Slovene Writers, most of all for their part in the so-called Drobnic affair.

The reader will recall that Anton Drobnic, the republic's public prosecutor, is one of the principal figures in the resurrection of the Slovene White Guard and Home Guards. A few months ago Drobnic established an association of these quising organizations, to which Janez Stanovnik, former president of the Slovene Presidency, reacted publicly for the first time since withdrawing into retirement. Stanovnik’s initiative to replace Drobnic was backed up by Milan Kucan, Ciril Ribicic, Dimitrije Rupel, Toni Persak, Spomenka Hribar, and Rudi Siligoj, but Janez Jansa, Jelko Kacin, and Igor Bavcar saw this as Rupel's rapprochement to Milan Kucan and the other Communists, as they said, dressed up to look like lambs.

Rupel, Persak, Hribar, and Siligoj, however, did not pay attention to the charges of the three politicians who proclaimed themselves to be the winners in a “liberation war.” They continued to collaborate with the initiators by collecting signatures for Drobnic’s removal. Because of this “treason” of theirs, Andrej Stern, secretary of the party’s governing board, Rajko Pirnat, justice minister of the Republic of Slovenia, and the three people mentioned demanded that Rupel immediately submit his resignation. He did not do this, but rather, angry at those who until yesterday had been his friends, demonstratively left the meeting last night.

Because of his unforeseen departure from the meeting, Janez Jansa and his supporters decided to “freeze” this until the SDS congress, which is scheduled for 11 October.

In addition to Rupel’s removal, they are also demanding the resignation of Franc Bucar, president of the Slovene Assembly, who did not find it appropriate to attend the meeting at which the future destiny of his political career was being debated. Bucar, people say here, severed all relations with his party’s conservative wing a month ago when he heard that Jansa intended to pension him off.

Aside from the Drobnic affair, the split in the most influential political party in the “homeland” was also brought about by the slowdown of the revolution of the party faction headed by Rupel in replacing Alojzije Peterle, who up to now has been republic prime minister and whose post is to be taken by Igor Bavcar, up to now the police minister. The Slovene prime minister had this comment to make on this demand, initiated by Janez Jansa, in the daily newspaper SLOVENAC: “The move would only benefit me, because the Sloven Democratic Party represents different views from those adopted in DEMOS because of personal and political projects and benefits.”

The Democrats last night took this statement by Peterle as an unfounded accusation and they are calling upon Peterle to publicly explain what those benefits are or to issue a public apology. Otherwise, they will use all available means to frustrate his further political activity.

Data on Production of Armored Carriers in Croatia

91BA1086B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Aug 91 p 19

[Article by Ivica Profaca: “Gossip Stronger Than Armor”]

[Text] The appearance of the “first Croatian armored personnel carrier” (the HOT 001) on the streets of Split about a month ago evoked a storm of enthusiasm in the population here. The personnel carrier was immediately given the affectionate nickname “TIN” (after the great Croatian poet Tin Ujevic). And when recently the famous “TIN” was joined by successes, this time without high-sounding names of poets, the fascination of people in Split with their own firepower reached its apex.

People have engaged in a virtual contest to master such a matter as how many members of the Guards can fit in each of these carriers, that this number is half again as great as for the same type of vehicle possessed by the JNA [Yugoslav People’s Army], the kind of weapons it can carry... The only unknown has been where the personnel carriers were made. After all, in all the reports and ready comments only a phantom “factory near Split” is mentioned.

It was very quickly leaked that “TIN” came from the factory “Dalmacija” in Dugi Rat near Omis, a factory whose lines of business include the production of carbide and various measuring instruments. Now that list also includes armored personnel carriers. The secret of where the other “guard carriers” are manufactured was considered better kept, but even it did not withstand the strong onslaught of gossip.

According to altogether reliable sources, the HOT 002 and 003 are made in the “Split” shipyard, while according to certain other, less reliable gossip, another dozen such vehicles have been made there or are near the end of the production process. Thus, a paradoxical situation has been revealed in which the first Croatian personnel carriers are being manufactured in one section of the shipyard, while in another “special-purpose vessels,” which is a euphemism for the navy’s warships, is still in effect.

On its first drive through Split, people showered the first Croatian personnel carrier with flowers and decorated it with flags, and the newspapers received it as a solution to all the troubles Croatia is going through at the moment. The
name printed on the front caused the most confusion. The
100th anniversary of the birth of the great Tin Ujevic struck
someone as a good occasion to give his name to the
personnel carrier. However, there were also other interpre-
tations of these three letters. One of them, certainly the most
picturesque, has it that this is really an abbreviation for
"Tudjman i narod" (Tudjman and the people). Malicious
tongues shot back that in this case the letters on the armor
would be "TIP" (Tudjman i pucanstvo) (Tudjman and the
populace).

In the end, nevertheless, it was concluded that it was in bad
taste, to say the least, to give the poet's name to a weapon,
so that the 002 and 003 have gone unnamed. The lads from
FERAL TRIBJUNA had something to do with this when
they found in the "TIN" inspiration for satire, dubbing its
"successors" in the style of a recoilless cannon named
"Dobrisa" (Cesaric). In any case, the personnel carrier has
arrived, it has been followed by others which are new and
improved (according to certain statements, they were
modeled after those of Austria), and they were immedi-
ately sent to the battlefield, whence news still has not
arrived on how they proved to be in action.

It seems that these are the only examples in Dalmatia of a
reorientation toward war production. At least such items
have not turned up in the newspapers, nor has there been
any gossip to that effect. On the other hand, however, it
has been reliably known for months now that the Knin
screw factory "Tvik," which has been operating as a part of
the Zenica RMK [Mining and Metallurgical Combine] and
for years has been tiptoeing on the edge of bankruptcy, is
readily producing ammunition to meet the needs of the
increasingly numerous and diverse armed formations on
the territory of the so-called SAO [Serbian Autonomous
Oblast] Krajina. And not only ammunition, the rumors
have it, but also various explosive devices, grenades (in
addition to the ancient "krugujevka" [prewar hand gre-
ade], will we also have "knjinjanka"?), and even mortar
shells.

We do not know whether this reorientation will help all
these firms to extricate themselves from the problems that
trouble them. But who cares about that anyway? The
important thing is that we have something with which to
wage war.
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