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HUNGARY

Factional Stress Tests Breaking Point of MSZMP Unity
25000179a Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 3 Mar 89 p 25

[Article by Ferenc Varnai: "Testing the Breaking Point"]

[Text] In February the MSZMP CC [Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party Central Committee] met twice within the span of 10 days, and discussed issues that may fundamentally influence the future of the country. The topics they addressed were of no less significance than the fact that, after several decades, we will once again have a multiparty political system, and the political and social life of the country will be regulated by a new Constitution that guarantees the realization of citizenship rights, ensures the controllability of governmental activities, and prevents the abuse of power.

The Danger

At the same time, the resolution of the CC does not ignore such matters as this: “At the present time, our society is not prepared to face the rapid and spontaneous ‘explosion’ of a political structure based on a multiparty system. Serious societal threats may be represented by a destabilization or uncontrollability of processes, or by the development of anarchic situations. Neither the nation, nor any political force having a sense of responsibility for the fate of the nation, could benefit from such developments. What we need is a gradual transition, the reliability of political processes, and the elimination of suspicion. It would be equally harmful to forcibly accelerate events, or place artificial obstacles in their way.”

In his report, Karoly Grosz also openly stated that (in part because of the mistakes made during the recent 1 and ½ decades) there is much illusion, and expectation of miracles accompanies the idea of a multiparty system, even though states based on constitutional legality are not limited to those that have several political parties; rather, they are defined by such factors as legally instituted regulations for the operation of society which include the responsibilities and rights of citizens as well as defining the consequences of breaking the laws. It is possible to conceive states based on legality without a multiparty system; after all, such a system is nothing more than a variant form of implementing democracy in public life.

However, in view of the fact that significant forces in our society expect a multiparty system to promote development, the MSZMP does not wish to exert its energies on dispelling such expectations, but on influencing the transition to the new system and preserving its own leading position in the new situation. It does this especially in view of the possibility that, if we fail to keep the power struggle and political tug-of-war necessarily accompanying the creation of a multiparty system within limitations demanded by national interests, that it could mean a shortage of resources to be used in combatting the extremely grave problems of indebtedness and the transformation of our industrial structure.

The calm and responsible leaders of the newly developing alternative organizations and parties, even while taking a stand against the weaknesses and errors, by and large remain distant from extreme positions and refuse to become associated with anarchistic tendencies. At the same time, the extremist wing of the opposition organizations attempts to sabotage the spirit of cooperation, and makes every effort to turn the masses, already suffering from economic worries, against the system.

Of course, there are certain points on which both segments of the opposition agree: They both try to segment the MSZMP into “reform” and “Stalinist” wings. They do this because they they wish to reduce the MSZMP’s influence, and would like to attract to their ranks some of those who break away from the center.

For example, the political scientist Mihaly Bihari, one of the founders of the New March Front, stated in his interview with the BBC that “there are at least three parties actually present within the MSZMP, and these three will have to break with each other.” His analysis referred to segments in the MSZMP as “conservative supporters of law and order,” “moderate supporters of law and order” and “socialist supporters of reforms,” making it quite clear that, in his view, “these three parties would, sooner or later, have to part from each other.” He even encouraged the “reform-communists” to initiate such a break. Evidently, he would like to use the breakup of the MSZMP for accelerating the formation of a multiparty system, and for “developing the infrastructure of the various parties,” as represented by a distribution of facilities, telephones, access to the press and material resources. A few days later, in a statement given to the French LE MONDE, speaking as the newly appointed managing secretary of the Social Democratic Party (who, by the way, is presently appealing his expulsion from, and requesting his readmission to the MSZMP), he confidently stated: “The Social Democratic Party will be the most important political organization. There are 100,000 MSZMP-members ready to transfer to this party.” Evidently, he wished to use the MSZMP’s membership to create the mass basis for his own party. However, barely 2 weeks later, Mihaly Bihari departed not only from his post (resulting from the personality clashes that arose among the Social Democrats’ leadership) but also from the party. (A similar process can be observed within the Independent Shareholders’ Party, which has already become fragmented.) All of this serves to underscore that no alternative organization can match the MSZMP’s readiness to govern and its role in preventing anarchy.

A Power Able to Govern

Because of these external attempts to fragment it, and because of attempts to seduce the membership, it is especially important for the MSZMP to safeguard its
political and organizational unity, through the use of democratic debates. In this regard, we have seen a noteworthy event: For the first time since the MSZMP's founding in late 1956, the CC openly referred to a statement made by a member of the Politburo as hasty, because it revealed a tendency to over-simplify and gave rise to misinterpretation.

Clearly, the weakening of the MSZMP would contribute to the growth of anarchy and would conflict with the interests of the nation, because there is no other force ready to assume governing power in the country at the present time.

The MSZMP carefully considers all of the above in its attempts to develop collaboration with all constructive forces and its efforts to bring about a correct partner-like relationship with them. At the same time, it does not lose sight of those who, instead of trying to improve socialism, would like to eliminate it through peaceful means. When it comes to these forces, the party is ready, if provoked, to wage political struggle.

Three Demands

The MSZMP considers the following three demands to be the possible basis for a compromise:

The acknowledgment of (1) socialism as a historical alternative; (2) Hungary's membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the need for the simultaneous elimination of the two opposing military blocks; and (3) a proclamation of a desire to prevent the worsening of crisis and to preserve social stability.

As for Hungary's membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, Europe as a whole is interested in maintaining a stability that rests on the balance of power between the two military blocks. It would benefit neither side to see this balance disturbed by certain member nations' departure from the alliances. Solution is represented not by neutrality, but by the simultaneous disbanding of the two military alliances.

What may be the most important, and also most complex, part of this three-part prerequisite is the acceptance of the socialist alternative. This is also the issue around which the present constitutional debate revolves.

The MSZMP urges that while the new Constitution should reflect the (previously ignored) legal continuity of Hungary's 1,000-year-long history, it should also recognize all of the positive achievements of the past 40 years, and provide no opportunities for attempts at bourgeois restoration.

This is prompted by the fact that certain of the opposition organizations (which like to claim that they speak "in the name of the people") are trying to exclude socialism from the Constitution by claiming that "it" has no legal content and, moreover, it directly represents an "institutionalization of a Stalinist concept."

The CC does not use socialism either as dogma or as an adjective; rather, it urges its establishment in the country's basic law as the desirable and exemplary direction of social development. In other words, the Constitution should indicate that this society is constructing a free, democratic and socialist state, which guarantees for its citizens a growing equality of opportunities, and which desires to make progress toward a broadening of societal justice, social security, and individual liberty, as well as interpersonal solidarity. This is exactly why it assigns a decisive role to collective property, even while it wishes to ensure equal opportunities for the various proprietary forms. All of this coincides with the wishes of the majority in Hungarian society. (Of course, it still will not be compulsory to like socialism. However, it is only right that everyone will be expected to obey the laws.)

Without Formal Declarations

Obviously, the MSZMP wants to remain the leading force of society. It does not strive to obtain a guaranteed position of hegemony, that is, it does not wish to see its leading role formally declared in the Constitution; rather, it strives to implement it by becoming a party that participates in the country's political life; a party that convinces citizens of the correctness of its goals and mobilizes them in the struggle for realizing those goals. At the same time, it demands constitutional safeguards against unconstitutional movements that go against the country's social and political establishment.

Multi-party Constitutional State Seen as Goal of Revision

25000227 Budapest PARTELET in Hungarian
No 4, 1989 pp 8-12

[Article by Matyas Budzsaklia, deputy department head within the MSZMP (Hungarian Socialist Workers Party) Central Committee: "On the Concept of the New Constitution"]

[Text] A constitution is a set of fundamental laws that contains in an orderly manner the most important aspects of a given country's state regulations, and in this sense it is superior to any other laws. At the same time, it conveys and sums up prevailing political views, sanctified at the highest level, and in this sense it is also a political document.

People's familiarity with the constitution of their country depends on whether or not it directly influences their lives, their rights, and their duties. Under a political system that is completely shaped and regulated from above, one needs to know relatively little of the constitution. In a state based on laws, however, where initiatives from below are as important as those from above, familiarity with the constitution is, of necessity, part of
general culture. In the first case it is enough to create a brief and rather abstract set of basic laws, which is only needed to create further regulations and has no real significance in everyday life. Emphasizing and generalizing upon the most important laws cannot be avoided in the second case, either; however, in order for citizens and their organizations to incorporate constitutional measures in the behavior and activities of their own lives as well as those of their organizations, they must receive the necessary guidance from the constitution itself.

The idea of revising the present Hungarian constitution was based on the resolution passed by the MSZMP's national congress. In the course of preparing the congress it became clear that in order to solve the tasks facing Hungarian society, the country needs a new constitution, rather than just a revision of its present set of basic laws. It was the concept of this new constitution that was discussed in February by the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, and in March by the National Assembly. In addition, to inform everyone about the new system of considerations, the concept was published in its entirety in the MAGYAR HIRLAP, as well as the MSZMP's Newsletter for Basic Cells.

The work has just begun. Everyone, citizens and social organizations alike, will have a chance to collaborate in shaping the final text for the concept as well as the new constitution. The opportunity (indeed, demand!) for this is revealed in the report dealing with the MSZMP CC's meeting held on 20-21 February 1989. The MSZMP feels that no political force must be excluded from the constitution-creating process, and no political force must be allowed to have exclusive right over the process; including in this the MSZMP itself.

When it comes to the methods of creating a constitution, significant political differences can be observed between the MSZMP and certain independent political organizations. The MSZMP raises no doubts concerning the present National Assembly's right to create a new constitution. At the same time, it does not insist on putting the new basic law before the National Assembly during the present legislative cycle.

The value of the new constitutional concept can be judged on the basis of answers revealing its sources, character and functions. First of all, we are justified in examining: How much does the concept rely on Hungarian and international (primarily European) constitutional and state development? When it came to the 1949 ratification of the constitution currently in force, the 1936 Soviet constitution was used as an example, which basically considered the state as the instrument of class oppression and viewed Hungary's liberation and its coalition period as new, nearly unprecedented chapters in the state's development. By doing this, we distanced ourselves from values such as the nation-maintaining role of our centuries-old statehood, as well as the European principle of separation among branches of authority.

Our party firmly believes that when it comes to the character of the new constitution, it must have a socialist orientation. Principles relating to this demand (while sufficiently generalized and at the same distinct) provide a basic definition for every chapter of the constitution, the entire legal system and, thereby, the operation of the economy and society and the state. In this regard, however, it is of fundamental importance to define the bases of our work, the values we would take into consideration and the image of our future. Our starting point must correspond to our real social circumstances: our new constitution must be based on their constant factors and values.

It is the recommendation of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party that our country's new constitution should not primarily contain a program, but rather be a set of fundamental laws that could be applied on its own and without specific executive regulations when it comes to the most important issues. It should be understandable by everyone, so that it could become part of the citizens' general knowledge. It should build on the lasting values of the Hungarian state's 1,000-year-old legal continuity, as well as those of universal constitutional development, the achievements of our socialist society during the past 4 decades, our real social circumstances and preclude the possibility of reestablishing capitalist conditions. It should be a lasting document, should not hinder social progress with unreasonable demands and should not contain theses that could become dogmas. Its structure should also suit the modern practices of creating constitutions; that is, its references to the rights and responsibilities of citizens should be among the first chapters, instead of the last one. At the CC's meeting it was strongly emphasized that the new constitution should assert that Hungary is a free, democratic and socialist state, and its form should continue to be a people's republic.

After a debate during the CC meeting, the view was also formed that our new fundamental laws should not try to comprehensively regulate our social, economic, and political order, but rather to define the principles that serve as the basis for that order. Primary among these is the principle of popular sovereignty, according to which the exclusive source and depository of all power is the people. As a consequence, no single organ or organization can lay claim to power. Any given state organ may possess only as much power as it is given by the sovereign people, in accordance with constitutional provisions and reenforced by parliamentary or council elections. When it comes to exercising authority and legal power, the primary principle should be that activities specified by law are forbidden. In the relationship between state and society, the right to territorial or professional-corporate self-government should be a basic principle. The principle of equality should be a thesis of fundamental significance in the new constitution, and this should include equality before the law (with the prohibition of both advantageous and disadvantageous discrimination), and in regard to forms of proprietorship it should promote neutrality among the various sectors
of our economy. The new fundamental laws should establish constitutionalism in economic life, the substance of which is that collective and individual property are equal (though the first one has greater determining role), our economy is a market-oriented one influenced by socialist aspirations, and economic units and citizens have the right to acquire and freely manage property. In accordance with the above, and in order to more fully implement the principle of popular sovereignty, in the future the MSZMP's Central Committee will not call for a constitutional declaration of its own leading role, although based on its political activities it intends to perform a decisive role in guiding society. At the same time, it wishes to collaborate with every other political or social organizations whose goals, programs and activities are in accordance with the constitution.

Modern constitutions unequivocally declare the value of human and civic rights, along with the requisite duties. To defend these values, the fundamental law should define the constitutional system and duties of state organs. With this also in mind, the MSZMP CC recommends that, in accordance with our national interests and obligations set forth in international treaties, human and civic rights and responsibilities be given a comprehensive treatment in the new constitution in proportion with their significance and backed up by sufficient guarantees. The idea of a state based on laws should be implemented when it comes to defining human and civic rights and responsibilities as well. The new fundamental laws should make it clear that every Hungarian citizen who lives in this country and considers himself to be a member of a non-Hungarian ethnic group is entitled to certain rights of nationality, in addition to the human and civic rights ensured by the constitution.

The MSZMP's CC proposes that the new constitution should create the institutional preconditions suitable for a modern state. As a principle of the state's exercising authority, it should establish a separation among the various branches of power. This means that the National Assembly, the President of the Republic, the Council of Ministers and its attached administrative machinery, the constitutional court, the system for the administration of justice and the local-regional autonomous organs are not organs of power in general, but merely the holders and users of well-defined licences of authority. The new fundamental law should state that, in accordance with the principle of popular rule, the National Assembly is the bearer of fundamentally significant rights, but also that it is not the sole depository of popular sovereignty. It should ensure that besides the National Assembly (the legislative authority), there should be opportunity for the Council of Ministers and the attached administrative organs to operate as the executive branch, while the judiciary branch should also have full sovereignty. Based similarly on the principle of separation of powers, the constitution should also delineate between the licences of the central and local-regional authorities. It should ensure that the various branches of authority should also act as each other's mutual controls. In order to promote this, the CC supports proposals concerning new state institutions, namely for establishing the post of the President of the Republic, setting up a constitutional court and the creation of a state comptroller's office.

In the MSZMP's opinion, Hungary needs a National Assembly that embodies actual power and operates on a regular basis. In view of this, it seems logical to consider whether electing a bicameral legislative body would be practical. As for the president of the republic, the person filling that office should be suitable to represent our country as head of state, and as the "supervisor" of the authority branches he should be able to ensure their harmonious operation, preventing, if need be, the prohibited concentration of power in one organ. We should also make sure that the president of the republic should not, and could not, accumulate more power than is prescribed. The constitutional court should operate as the special organ for protecting the constitution. Its main task should be to examine laws and other regulations for their constitutionality. Among other things, it should keep records on the political parties, prevent them from undertaking unconstitutional actions and, if need be, disband them. The primary task of state comptroller's office is to exercise control over implementing the bud- get determined by the National Assembly and over managing state property, as well as collaborating in the parliamentary supervision over the economic policies set by the Council of Ministers. The jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister and the cabinet members should be in accordance with the principle of separation between legislative and executive authority. The prime minister and other cabinet ministers should not be elected as parliamentary deputies. The National Assembly should elect only the Prime Minister, after which the latter should introduce members of his cabinet to the legislative body. Another acceptable course of action is for the National Assembly to select state ministers and members of the cabinet from a list proposed by the prime minister.

The MSZMP's CC concurs with the view according to which a fundamental requirement of a state based on laws is that only the courts should be involved in administering justice. Thus, it supports efforts to create a unified, independent and objective administration of justice, based on centuries-old principles; along with the establishment of administrative courts. In the area of judicial practice, the CC also proposes that, based on thorough examination, a decision should be made concerning the place of prosecutors in the state machinery.

When it comes to creating a constitutional state, it is especially important that the councils should become genuinely autonomous organs of administration. We must provide constitutional guarantees for the local-regional administrative units to organize themselves on the basis of self government, and for them to manage their own material resources independently. Central organs of the executive power should have lawful authorization to interfere with the lives of local-regional
autonomies. In principle as well as practice, it is one of the fundamental theses of the new constitution's concept that the subjects of local-regional self-government, the residents of community, are citizens. They are the ones who determine, through the means of plebiscites if the issue is of a particularly great importance, the social, economic, and political circumstances of their local environments. Councils exercise authority on behalf of the electorate as institutions of indirect democracy. Thus, their operation demands economic and legal guarantees for their independence, to be created by a new law on the councils. In this regard, it should be thoroughly examined whether conciliatory self-government is required also at the county level, and if so, what constitutional guarantees should be introduced to protect the right to self-government of towns and communities.

Elections belong to a subcomponents of the political system which, while a very important tool in shaping political power relationships, only influences and does not determine the structure of power. Thus, the political goal of national elections is to obtain a majority in the government, instead of changing society's authority structure. The basic task of council elections is to create organs of self-government operating as parts of the state machinery; on the one hand, these take care of local administrative affairs, and on the other supervise the local execution of governmental measures. In other words, parliamentary and council elections have different purposes, and this should also determine the electoral process. For this reason, the MSZMP's CC proposes that the National Assembly create a new electoral system or new laws that are in accordance with the new circumstances of exercising political and state control.

Under the circumstances created by our history, until the most recent time the existence of other parties besides the MSZMP, and their recognition, was considered to be the "paramount" practical question. During the past few weeks, this problem has been simplified. Nor is it really questionable, in my view, how, or whether, the existence of parties should be represented in the constitution. Creating parties is primarily a societal issue, to be decided by two criteria: One is, do the citizens wish to take advantage of their right to form parties, and the other, does society accept the newly formed parties? As for the already existing parties, they must decide how they will relate to the newly created ones. This is a constitutional issue, in that it appears logical for the constitution to prescribe neither a 1-party nor a multiparty system. One thing must unavoidably stated is that only those parties and social organizations can operate in Hungary whose goals, programs, and activities are in accord with the fundamental law.

When it comes to national symbols, it is the crest that had provoked the most debate thus far. There is a growing feeling that in this regard, too, we should reach back to our national traditions. We must select a symbol that reflects the historical roots of our statehood. Probably two previously used symbols can suit this requirement best. The oldest so-called shield with a crown, or the "Kossuth shield." They share one feature, in that they both contain elements (such as the double cross) that refer to our statehood. As for the Kossuth shield, we know that it has been historically connected with the republican form of government. On the other hand, we should not consider it heraldically absurd to enrich one of our historical emblems with the addition of a contemporary motif.

When it comes to our new constitution's function, the primary question is, how would it contribute to the creation of democratic state based on laws. In such a state, the constitution, which represents the apex of the legal system, defines those parameters and limitations within which organs of the state can operate, ensures human and civil rights, describes the citizens duties, the freedom of action and the relationship between state organs and their "clients." Important components of such a state are popular sovereignty, the implementation of direct and indirect representative democracy and a democratic exercise of authority. It is this kind of a state that the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party proposes to create during the coming years.

New Politburo Member Vastagh, Others on Party Situation
25000229 Budapest PARTELET in Hungarian
No 3, 1989 pp 12-21

[Interview via mail questionnaire with Jeno Nemeth (first secretary of the Barcs Municipal MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party] Committee), Laszlo Szarvas (party secretary at Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences), and Pal Vastagh, first secretary of the Csongrad County MSZMP Committee] by PARTELET:
"Where Is the MSZMP Heading? Three Questions Addressed to Three Politicians"; date and place of interview not given; first paragraph is PARTELET introduction]

[Text] Domestic political developments, including also several articles that have appeared in our journal, indicate that party members as well as the general public are dissatisfied with the results of perfecting our system of political institutions. The questions are multiplying regarding the party's situation and renewal. Among others, such questions as: Which way is the MSZMP heading? In conjunction with this, we addressed three questions to three politicians, namely: Jeno Nemeth, first secretary of the Barcs Municipal MSZMP Committee; Laszlo Szarvas, party secretary at Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences; and Pal Vastagh, first secretary of the Csongrad County Party Committee. In the following we present their answers to the questionnaire we sent them.
PARTELET: In your opinion, what is the social base of our party's support? Whose party is the MSZMP or whose party should it be?

Jeno Nemeth: The social base of the MSZMP's support will depend in future, even more than up to now, on the party's ideological platform, its political objectives, and on how effectively it functions. The decisive factor here will be the size of the masses that identify with, and espouse, the party's objectives and aspirations. As a movement and political force, the party will be able to exert its influence within the framework of a socialist constitutional state; in other words, under social conditions more advanced than at present.

The question is often asked these days: What kind of society do we wish to build? If a socialist one, then what will be its essential features? The essence of socialism, in my opinion, is that it is founded on society's value-creating work, a way of life acceptable also in modern times. In other words, it is founded predominantly on workers who perform their duty rationally, and hence consciously. Socialism, of course, is a way of life under which not only society's but also the individual's potential to do value-creating work is realized. This provides spontaneous organization and enterprise as nationwide opportunities. But if the foregoing are not to remain just principles and declarations, then naturally we must also have in place a system of guarantees typical of a socialist constitutional state. The MSZMP's view of society has not changed on the most important fundamental question: on wanting to work toward creating a socialist society. But the essence of the problem today must be sought particularly in the meaning and details of that designation.

How the MSZMP identifies itself—as the party of the people, the workers or classes, for instance—will not be of decisive importance in future, in my opinion. What will be decisive is who espouses, and how, society's objectives and their realization. On this basis the citizen may become a sympathizer, a supporter or a party member. The broader the social base that the party wants to influence, the more it must confront the various interest relations.

The MSZMP, in my opinion, must be a party striving to create a socialist society, and it must have a broad social base of intellectual and manual workers. In this case the interests and standpoints the party must represent, over and above the basic issues, are realized through internal agreements or platforms that are based on compromise but may differ in their details.

The approach to the MSZMP's mass support is controversial. The traditional approach is founded on political interests stemming from class relations. In my opinion, this basic principle has changed. The already developed or developing system of political objectives and values is what ensures the party's mass support. (For it is natural that persons belonging to different strata may also have identical or similar interests.)

The way I see it, the MSZMP is now going through an essential transformation of its structure of interests that developed in the preceding decades. But at present we still fail to take adequately into consideration the fact that the political interest relations of a large part of our membership have changed in the meantime. Self-examination is now in progress, and that is why many people are saying: "This is not the party I joined." Indeed, the overwhelming majority of the membership joined a party whose views were different from those of today's MSZMP. The future will decide who among our members embraces the objectives, program and views of a movement undergoing continual change. There will probably be also many members on whom an MSZMP undergoing renewal will make no favorable impression, because they are linked solely to the past and do not understand the interrelations of the changes, or perhaps have become indifferent specifically because of these interrelations. By "labeling" and occasionally shaming them, we tend to drive many people away from our ranks, without debate or any attempt to convince them; and these people then regard the formation of a new party as the way to guarantee the assertion of their views.

Organic change can be achieved, in my opinion, only by clearly articulating the party's internal segmentation, through honest debate that is based on platforms. Freedom to present platforms strengthens a new but viable view, broadens it into a camp, and makes it clear.

Laszlo Szarvas: Several possibilities exist. I believe, in the present turbulent political situation and amidst the deeply hidden process of restructuring. The two versions outlined below appear feasible from a social theory and a political theory approach. Consider the first version: Utilizing the results of scientific research to date, the party determines and summarizes the objective trend of society's development and the country's advancement. It then presents the realization of this objective trend as the core of its political program. It seems that this can be a new, modern version of socialism, with an efficient economy, mixed forms of ownership, commodity production and market forces; here the economy and politics become separate within society, and there develop a "socialist civil society" and a democratic constitutional state. The new model enables human rights and spontaneous activity to unfold, and it harmonically blends the humanistic, socialist, and collective national interests. This socialism can be a society of quality, knowledge and voluntary associations. Initially such a society is class-determined, but its segmentation into classes will cease in the process of its evolution, and within nations the "large social groups" will be formed along different dimensions.

Present-day sociology seeks and finds in the cross sections of power, knowledge (education), division of labor, and places of residence (settlements) the most important
large interest groups formed within a society that is becoming homogenized. Accordingly, the political organizations do not function on the basis of the class principle. Within entire society they rely instead on those groups whose interests the outlined program's realization would best serve. Therefore the MSZMP can count and rely primarily on those collectives within whose activity the proportion of creative intellectual effort is the dominant, and which—specifically for that reason—work more independently and effectively, with a greater sense of responsibility, demand political actions that conform to their interests, and are suitably prepared for democratic public life.

According to our present thinking, the MSZMP can fulfill its real leading role within society by relying on the highly skilled manual (but by now not entirely manual) workers in any branch of the economy, as well as on professionals and intellectuals, as its social base. And even within this (as a sort of secondary differentiation), special attention must be devoted to the employees of the socioeconomic sectors that act as engines of growth: to the specialists in modern industries and production plants, in modern agriculture and the infrastructure, and in education and science. Only with such a social base can the MSZMP best serve the entire nation's advancement. Or to put it differently, the interests of these groups are the most likely to coincide with the interests of entire society. (It is of course natural and self-evident that, individually and on the basis of having recognized the interrelations, members of other social groups may also strengthen and support the party.)

Regrettably, another version is also conceivable on the basis of the earlier simplifications, mostly ideological and political ones. After the program's elaboration, there is no differentiated search for the party's social base. Or conversely, the program itself treats without differentiation the best of the "working class," "working peasantry" and "intelligentsia." Unfortunately, certain stereotyped traditions seem fairly firmly established. These are the traditions which present the working class as politically united (and idealistic), regardless of its actual performance in politics and production; which still downgrade intellectuals to the function of "mates," despite their ever-greater role in society's material processes; and which still think in terms of the 19th-century definitions of classes. If this version were to come about, then the base of socialist renewal could come into conflict with the MSZMP, or the aforementioned social base (as a whole) would be incapable of renewing socialism.

The way in which the social base and the political party "find each other" is far more differentiated in practice than what I have described in the two versions. But an outline of the possible trends' extremes may be edifying at a time when fortunes are changing.

Pal Vastagh: If we consider merely the party's name, then its social base is the working class. But it is common knowledge that society's every stratum is represented within the party's membership. (In Csongrad County, for instance, the MSZMP currently has 34,000 members, in the following breakdown: manual workers, 36 percent; intellectual workers, 33 percent; cooperative farmers, around 9 percent; and employees, about 11 percent.) The proportion of party members who are past retirement age is likewise significant. But among our party members there are also private entrepreneurs, artisans, and persons of other occupations. Thus the MSZMP professes to be the party of the working class, but the most diverse strata are represented within its membership.

I do not think that any party could conceivably draw its membership from only a single class or stratum. We, too, must strive to make our party's social base as broad as possible. Those whom we are able to convince, and the ones who are attracted by our program and activity, have a place in the MSZMP. I believe, nevertheless, that a modern party cannot be imagined without a strong worker base, otherwise it would not be able to function effectively. But the MSZMP must be a modern mass party. In my opinion, the MSZMP will have to strive also in future to retain its worker base. At the same time, however, intellectuals may and must play an important role. The modern mass party needs its public activity, intellect, and creative ability at least as much as it needs its worker base.

But the question is, How can the mass party articulate and assert the interests of every social class, of every stratum within its membership? All this is not easy to achieve. It would be desirable that the real interests and value judgments of every group and stratum within the membership surface in the party's work and before its forums. From these interests and value judgments the party could form jointly acceptable and promotable aspirations, which it would have to raise to the level of the political will and political force.

PARTELET: To what extent and in what way are ideological and political unity interdependent?

Jeno Nemeth: We categorically set, and often overemphasized, the rigid requirement of ideological unity for our movement and social activity in the past.

Current comparisons with other ideological systems, and the debates that normally accompany regular ideological development and change, were essentially omitted. Thus there actually developed within the MSZMP a sham unity that was merely formal.

Then what course should we follow in future? Should we perhaps create an ideological system for socialist society, by means of a new or original concept?

I expect that the main supporting pillars will survive also here, but the other structural elements will have to be rethought, and clarified in tough debates and through bitter experience. In my view, the primary requirement we have to set for party members in the present process...
of restructuring is not ideological unity—for that simply cannot be forged at present—but political unity. We now have to develop a unified political standpoint, a concept of our fundamental social objectives, of the current phenomena and their assessment, and of the interest relations that can be supported in united action. But the development of a unified political standpoint is not only a central and regional task; it is at least as much the task of the local party committees and basic organizations as well.

In our thinking and practice to date, the so-called levels of reflection and action were often separate. That is why we found it easier to demand political unity in decision-making, and to criticize the absence of political unity in the course of implementation. But now, I believe, there can rarely be unity when formulating a timely social objective at the reflecting level, and not even decision-making can be unanimous, which is only natural. The real standard for measuring political unity is the unity of support and the unity of action. This depends to a large extent on faith in the movement, on comprehension, on being well informed, and on personal interests.

For that very reason, political unity may be relatively firm and displayed formally, and at the same time weak in its social impact.

But is there an alternative socialist society, one that reflects a model decisively different from what our concept of socialist society has been so far? Or is there just one socialist society? And have we chosen just the wrong model, rather than the wrong objective? Regarding the model, a large part of the structural characteristics in the so-called socialist alternatives are basically different. Therefore, the question must be reworded as follows: What is still socialist, or what is no longer socialist?

In my opinion, the answer to the first part of the stated range of questions presupposes the unambiguous possibility of several parties striving to achieve socialist objectives. And the second part presupposes at least the need for different views, platforms, within the party, and not even the emergence of factions can be ruled out.

The search for alternative ways, and their debate and assessment, can invigorate political movements. As society changes, so do the political interest relations. The interests of a small part of the party's membership may always differ from those of the majority. Even a split may occur when political interest relations cease. Problems arise in the movement when the interests and views of the larger part of the membership—of the majority, in other words—differ from the principles to be upheld or from practice.

In my opinion, the party as an organization is undergoing constant change. It may lose and also gain supporters and members. What is essential is the quantity and quality of the balance. Who are the ones leaving, and who are joining? Are taproots being severed that are vital to the tree's survival? Or are shoots appearing that hold promise of the tree's spreading?

The appearance of something new always excites great expectations. But, in the final outcome, it is the actual product that will be decisive, the watershed.

Laszlo Szarvas: Theoretically, ideological and political unity mutually presuppose and dialectically form each other. Ideological clarification and unity contribute toward shaping the specific policy and organizing the practical actions. And conversely, practical political experience may strengthen ("reconfirm") the ideology and also induce modifications and changes—in other words, it may also have an "ideological unity-disrupting role."

But the dialectic relationship also makes disharmony between the two possible, their divergence in terms of time and details; already because of the two factors' dissimilarity, if for no other reason. Although it is a very complicated relationship, ideological unity changes more rarely than policy does, because it applies to a system of coherent and essential views and opinions. In the processes taking place within the party in recent years, political unity long appeared to be constantly flexible, changing, and recreated from day to day, while ideology proved to be firm and constant. But the disintegration has occurred also of ideological unity, primarily under the pressure of reality. The "results" of political practice have not "confirmed" the theory.

At present, in my opinion, ideology and policy are in "harmony" within the MSZMP, in the sense that neither is unified! The party membership's views and opinions differ regarding the present situation, and the ways and prospects of extricating ourselves from it, and there is also uncertainty on the question of which way we should be heading. Concerning economic policy, party members find it difficult to accustom themselves to relations of supply and demand (in part because they often experience only the drawbacks of such relations). Many party members consider allowing the operation of mixed enterprises, the flow of capital, and the surfacing of unemployment, as the betrayal of socialism. Others want an end to the monopolies of power and are urging the replacement of society's excessively centralized and paternalistic management. Opinions are sharply divided also on the question of the party's leading role. Many party members interpret as a weakening of the party's leading role any curtailment of individual spheres of authority or of the ability to take specific action, while others still regard as excessive the party organs' government functions (for instance, the right to nominate, the pluralism of state and party offices, etc.).

The political uncertainty and the divergence of views are the most serious regarding the assessment of the most important stages in our recent history, and of the tasks necessary for political consolidation. In my experience,
the party membership is completely divided on how to view the processes taking place in 1953-56, and hence also on how to judge 1956. The view is gaining ground that Rakosi and his associates have to be condemned at least as much as counterrevolutionary terror, and there is a growing demand to present a more nuanced picture of Imre Nagy's role. But others are speaking even today of "revisionist betrayal" in conjunction with the dogmatic "mistakes." Within my circle of acquaintances there are very extreme views on certain questions of political consolidation, a multiparty system, a democratic constitutional state, and the plan to share power.

Although ideological clarification and political unity could unfold at the same time and in the same process, it nevertheless follows from the preceding that this will not occur simultaneously and in a mutually reinforcing manner. Today the ideological uncertainty tends to weaken, rather than strengthen, political action. But the road to ideological unity leads through political unity, through rallying within the party. That is why it is essential to conduct a debate within the party on the questions and events that are causing tensions, because settling these matters reassuringly will not only free political strength and enhance cooperation with our political partners, but will also provide more tranquil conditions for the clarification of ideology and can lay the foundation for theoretical work as well. There is one thing I have not mentioned, but it must be borne in mind: neither ideological nor political unity can be imagined in their earlier, monolithic, hierarchized, and schematized forms.

Pal Vastagh: Ideological and political unity must not and cannot be separated. And it would also be wrong to absolutize one or the other: the two presuppose each other. It may happen, of course, that political unity develops on some specific question even when there is no general ideological unity. But this cannot be maintained in the long run and in every respect. Ideological clarification and debate are necessary to develop the party's basic system of values, and its political aspirations and strategy. From these debates there can emerge ideological unity on the most important questions, but it may not be considered closed once and for all. The maintenance of ideological unity is a constant process. If it were not, then the ideological principles which the party's members once formulated in constructive debate, and then adopted, would have become rigid dogmas. In the long run, no party is able to dispense with ideological unity.

Political unity is already something of a less steady nature. It must be renewed day after day. The party must be very careful of its political unity, and of the quality of its political practice. The wrong policy casts doubt also on the ideology. If the party pursues the right policies, then it can gain acceptance also of its ideological objectives.

Today our party's earlier, dogmatic and often only seemingly existing, ideological and political unity appear shattered. During the past decades we mysticized the unity of reflection and action. That hampered the development of the party's vigorous and militant nature, and its internal ideological and political renewal. We now openly admit that in many respects our earlier theses and practice were wrong. But we find that this has confused a not insignificant proportion of our membership. They are speaking of an ideological vacuum, because we have not been able to offer well-formulated, readily understandable, new basic principles and objectives in place of the reviewed and rejected theses. This is why these party members feel that the party is constantly on the defensive and is surrendering step by step its earlier principles and system of values.

There is much ideological and political uncertainty among the party's members. In the past, every assessment and formulated objective were handed down to us from above. This made us disaccustomed to being independent. Many party members are expecting ready-made recipes even now, although that practice can no longer be maintained. Every party member, too, must assess and influence the processes and events taking place around him.

The flourishing of openness, and the entry onto the scene of the various movements and political organizations with their systems of values and aspirations, are overwhelming society—including the MSZMP membership—with a confusing array of ideas and political objectives. The party membership is not united in its assessment of these phenomena. The party's governing bodies and members are now forming their attitudes to them. Party members must get used to the idea that they have to place themselves at a certain point on the colorful scale of political values. They must be able to decide also on their own what to accept, and from what to distance themselves. The basic principles of a new ideological unity could be forged in the process now taking place. Frankly confronting the past period and clarifying what we did well, and where we erred albeit well-meaningly, could play a role in forging this new ideological unity. We have to accurately identify our mistakes, and the economic and political systems' shortcomings that must be remedied. We must incorporate into our thinking also new values, new ideological principles and new political aspirations. The political processes now taking place in our society play an important role in this. The various alternative political movements and organizations have formulated many valuable ideas that will influence also the thinking of our party membership. Thus our new ideological unity will emerge from the following: reassessment of the past; continued acceptance of the values of our collective and movement; rejection of the erroneous theses and practice; and formulation of new, widely acceptable values and objectives. This process, of course, will be neither quick nor easy. But this is our only opportunity for renewal. The new ideological unity may generate political and action
unity within the party. This ideological, political and action unity must be flexible and continually developing. There must be agreement on the main questions, but the party's members and its basic organizations must have wide autonomy on questions of detail.

PARTELET: What can the MSZMP expect of its members? How should the party function?

Jeno Nemeth: This is indeed the question we have been asking so far. But now, in my opinion, we are experiencing such a crisis of confidence that this question ought to be turned around. The question we ought to consider first is, What can the member expect of his party? What kind of party does he want?

Many people are saying that we have to rethink the essence of our movement from its very foundation, because we chose the wrong model, rather than the wrong objective. As I have indicated earlier, a large proportion of our membership has begun this rethinking, specifically of the question: Why is he a member, and why should he be a member in future? Some of the party members will also be considering which organization would suit them best in future. The citizens of our country will eventually choose a party whose program comes closest to their views and interests, and within whose collective their own activity can be fruitful.

The MSZMP and especially its basic units, the basic organizations, must first of all be collectives. A real collective always possesses the following characteristics: a community of interests, emotional attachment, openness, and solidarity. Only a well-functioning collective is able to form an authoritative opinion, establish a practice and gain support. The collective's cohesive force is the members' sense of community that is based on the rationale of their interests, and not merely on the organization's pronouncement. Up to now we have not been paying much attention to why we individually are members of this political collective, and that is the reason why mainly the organization's objectives have been in the forefront of our attention. This manifested itself very often in the incomprehensible formulation of the tasks. That is why many party members will be forming their verdict of the party in future on the basis of its ability to develop a supportable standpoint on the social processes and the phenomena affecting various strata, and how it upholds that standpoint in practice. From the Central Committee down to the basic organizations, therefore, the joint forming of the current authoritative standpoint must become the movement's decisive tool. This clear and understandable concept can serve as a basis of comparison with other organizations, for gauging whether the standpoint can be upheld, and for forging a unity of action. The party members must know their place and be aware of their own importance within the movement, and of their personal influence on the social processes. This, in my view, is similar to the cell's role in biological processes: the cell is vital and independent, but it is able to exert its biological effect only by means of the entire organism.

Our outlook narrowed to the level of the pronouncements also in this respect. The struggles we had lived through jointly were not perceptible in our everyday work, and the joy of our victories became merely narratives and reminiscences. It is indeed very simple to criticize the mistakes of the past, and that is why we have become bogged down in dissecting our party's mistakes in the way it functions. What we need is an objective assessment, to help develop a viable movement for the future. In other words, we have to construct a picture of the MSZMP's future: to formulate what a democratically functioning mass party must be like that brings to perfection the socialist constitutional state, assumes a decisive role in its functioning and serves the interests of its members.

Laszlo Szarvas: As a prerequisite for the MSZMP's renewal, the party membership's role must change or be changed. The party membership must abandon its policy-implementing role, subordinate to the resolutions adopted by the party's governing bodies. We need party members who actually shape policy and, therefore, are more forceful in implementing and upholding that policy, who assume the role of overseeing implementation, and who are able to think and act independently. But the party can have expectations regarding its members only if its policy reflects the members' will and views. Only if the members clearly see that they are able to influence the operation of the party as a whole. Only if they can play a role in electing the party's leaders and in overseeing their work. This way it can be hoped that the party member "will do his duty"—i.e., that he will firmly espouse the party's policy and will defend it if necessary.

But if these favorable changes are to come about, the circumstances and conditions within the party must be altered. The party's new rules of organization and procedure are now being elaborated. In the course of this work we are able to examine many proposals, including also the following.

—in my opinion, the MSZMP's operating principle and practical mechanisms must be examined extensively, and modified. According to the rules of organization and procedure now in force, the party's operating principle is democratic centralism. Several authors have already discussed the modernization of this principle, and the resolution of the 1988 National Party Conference directly states that the important thing in the present situation is to strengthen party democracy. Today, I believe, more than that is necessary: first, a review of the principle of democratic centralism; and secondly, the "incorporation" of additional principles among the present operating principles.
“Democratic centralism,” in my view, can be a “dialectical relationship between the two aspects” only under exceptional circumstances. The adjectival construction itself reflects this: centralism is first and foremost, and is “softened” by democracy. It might be worthwhile to research party history to find out how the relationship between the two aspects asserted itself in the past. On the basis of my own practical experience, I find that the conditions are in place mostly for the assertion of centralism. The rules of organization and procedure themselves are more explicit in defining centralism (as “subordination”).

As the party’s operating principle, therefore, first of all democracy ought to be reinstated in its rights! The party should set an example in the application of democracy. The party membership’s greater influence and policy-shaping role can be realized through democracy. This is in harmony also with principal processes of society’s development.

In addition to democracy, of course, centralism must also be retained among the operating principles. For this principle is able to enhance political action, and the effectiveness of cooperating with other political forces. In other words: democracy and centralism.

—Openness, an indispensable principle of the democratic politics of persuasion, must likewise be included among the operating principles. And then there are also the freedom to present platforms, and the principle of the party bodies’ independence. In addition to articulating the principles and gaining their acceptance, of course, there must be in place also the mechanisms for their operation and assertion.

Among these mechanisms belongs the proposal regarding the party’s electoral system, the debate on which is now in progress. That is the reason I do not wish to say anything more about it here. It is gratifying that openness within the party is spreading. There are several possibilities for expanding it further. For instance, the party ought to ascertain the membership’s views more frequently, and more exactly, on important issues; then evaluate the membership’s views openly and draw the necessary conclusions. There are tasks also in making the work of the party’s governing bodies better known, and in revealing how the debates, the differences of opinion, and the compromises developed. One could go on listing the proposals (the strengthening of horizontal relations, the organization of party debates, etc.), but this much will perhaps suffice to provide some idea of how important the required changes are!

Pal Vastagh: I do not consider the question of what the MSZMP should expect of its members as a very apt one. The MSZMP’s existence depends far more on what the party members expect of their own organization, and whether they find that their expectations are being realized. The party members today want a democratic, modern, flexible, and dynamic party that is able to adapt to the circumstances. A party that can abandon once and for all its dogmatic theses and bad conditioned reflexes, and rid itself of all remnants of the Stalinist structure. A party that functions democratically, enabling its members to express their views and to effectively transmit their will. A party in which there is constant contact between the membership and leadership, and where the membership retains its leaders only as long as they are managing the party and represent the membership in accordance with the latter’s will and expectations. A party capable of influencing the economic processes so that our country will be able to join the ranks of the developed countries, and we may enjoy prosperity and secure livelihoods. A party that recognizes the right of society’s members, who espouse different ideologies and systems of values, and who have different interests, to articulate their views and interests also in an organized manner in politics and public life. In my opinion, the MSZMP’s membership wants an efficiently operating economy and democratic socialism. But we have yet to think through the operating mechanism. We have to debate, together with the membership, the place and role of our party under the conditions of a possible multiparty system.

Party Influence Within Workplace ‘Outdated’
25000224b Budapest PARTELET in Hungarian No 4, 1989 pp 86-87

[Article by Ferenc Nemeth: “The Old Views Persist”]

[Text] With the reform of party activity, the debate related to regional and workplace party organization seems rather one-sided, because, among other things, the new situation resulting from the assembly law is being ignored. In reality, questions of organization and operation are being discussed within the framework of a 1-party system although both present and future political conditions are developing differently. At any rate, more than a few party members have the opinion that the party’s workplace organization has been outdated for a long time and definitely hinders the efficient functioning of the economy. Workplace party leadership (and not the membership) became part of the enterprise or institution management. It gained this right from its cadre authority and in fulfilling its role in the development of economic strategies and allocating revenues. In practice, the declared one-man accountable leadership was replaced by collective leadership. It also has been evident that collective decisions have been characterized by compromises, with all of the latter’s negative consequences. It has been apparent that allocation, short-term planning, and interest—in revenues instead of assets—became emphasized. The question of ownership was incessantly raised. This problem remained constant even after the introduction of self-management.

In my judgment, the workplace’s organizational model is exclusively the command planning system’s workable model. This is indicated also by the fact that the reform of the economic mechanism did not, in itself, with an unchanged political sphere, bring about the desired results.
It is clear to me that in a specific historical period workplace party organization had its own role and function and also performed it decently. This period lasted until the introduction of the new economic mechanism. However, the mechanism’s change would have required different political, organizational, institutional, and operational conditions. We did not recognize this, and the direct consequence is the present situation. It seems that old views persist unchangingly and that every effort is directed toward proving that our problems are not organizational but merely operational.

The birth of political pluralism created a new situation. I feel that most people ignore this in the debate. They ignore the fact that the political arena has moved to the regions and residential areas. This is where the amount of influence the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] has in the power (people represented) organizations, and the ways in which it can assert its policy, will be determined. Public debate on the draft laws has already revealed significant amendments to the original draft, but party members played hardly any role in this, for few of them participated in the debates.

Is it conceivable in a multiparty system for only the MSZMP to keep its workplace organization? Obviously not. And if not, then how could the workplace be made the political battleground of the parties? If this would come to be, how would it affect the economy? I believe it is unnecessary to expound on this.

If we want to take into consideration the realities, then the debate must take a new turn. And the subject of the debate can only be area organization. This does not mean, of course, that members of the MSZMP would lose their influence in the operation of the workplace or institution. Possibilities for this are offered by activity in the trade unions, participation in self-management, as well as by attendance at various levels of economic and institutional management.

It is clear to me that this change would conflict with individual interests, for even the party membership is divided because of old habits and responses. But no matter how painful it may be, change is unavoidable. If we would, nevertheless, continue to strive to maintain the earlier conditions, then not only the party membership but the entire society would be the loser.

We should not, in the midst of changed social conditions, relate to these essential questions with undecision, shyness, and hesitation. This is certainly the main cause of our problems. We procrastinate about issues that are ripe for change. We think that social shock is avoidable in the present political situation. This is how we “bundle” before us our economic and structural problems and everything that burdens and upsets both our society and the party membership.

Unfortunately, the debate also makes it obvious to me that the old views persist. Instead of carrying out radical and necessary changes, the characteristic trend is to use the cautious tactic of taking small steps, of endeavoring to correct and change existing things while keeping the essence unchanged. There is a great need to finally rid ourselves of our bad practices, our old working habits and the outmoded methods that created the present situation.

If we fail to do this before the party law goes into effect, then we will be late again, and the MSZMP will lose even more of its mass support and further restrict in its political field of action. I fear the conservative powers within the party will enforce their wishes again; however, all of us will be compelled bear the consequences.

Soviet Rejection of Military Depotolitization Reported; Fejti Quoted
25000179b Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 16 Mar 89 p 7

[Unsigned MTI report from Moscow: “Analysis by the KRASNAIA ZVEZDA; No ’Depoliticization‘ of the Army in Hungary”]

[Text] The Friday issue of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, answering a letter from a reader, analyzed the effect of the multiparty system on Hungary’s Armed Forces.

As examples, the Soviet Army publication mentions that more than one party has existed for some time in several socialist countries, such as East Germany and Poland, but, when it comes to the armed forces, the leadership role of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] or the UPWP [United Polish Worker’s Party] is generally recognized. The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA emphasized that as of now there is still only one party operating in Hungary. At the MSZMP’s [Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party] February meeting, a decision was made concerning the development of political pluralism. However, it was emphasized at the same CC [Central Committee] meeting that the MSZMP wishes to play a decisive role within Hungarian society, and the party proposes to implement this aim through political means, primarily its programs, and through agitation.

Obviously, the Hungarian People’s Army cannot remain untouched by the changes that have occurred in the country, the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA’s reporter emphasizes. He recounts how, prompted by the reader’s letter, he sought additional information from Hungary’s military attaché in Moscow, Major General Laszlo Varga, who told the reporter about a speech made by Gyorgy Fejti, CC secretary, made at a recent meeting of party cadres.

Outlining the situation now developing, the paper of the Soviet Army mentions that the law concerning parties will be discussed by the Hungarian National Assembly in August, but in the Armed Forces of Hungary there are
already debates on such topics as: Can officers, most of whom are now members of the MSZMP, belong to other political parties? There have also been proposals to make the Army "politics-free," and obliging people on active duty to remain outside parties.

Quoting Fehti, the paper emphasizes that there is no talk (and there will not be any talk) of "depoliticizing" the Armed Forces in Hungary; after all, without the leadership role of the MSZMP the Army could not fulfill all of its functions, it could not be the stabilizing force in the country, could not ensure that defensive responsibilities will be met and Hungary's obligations to her allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organization will be satisfied. Nor are other opinions realistic in proposing that the various political parties be given "equal standing" in the Army, and be allowed to establish party cells and undertake recruiting activity among active duty personnel.

The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA adds that, naturally, there will be members of the other parties among the conscripts, but this will not alter the fact that the new parties will have hardly any direct influence on the life of the Armed Forces. This is notwithstanding the fact that in the National Assembly and in other forums where they will be represented, these parties will, obviously, have the opportunity to participate in discussions concerning the country's defense, the determination of military policies and the military budget.

On Improving Relations With Emigres in West
25000224a Budapest PARTELET in Hungarian
No 4, 1989 pp 76-77

[Article by Janos Toth: "Building Relations With Hungarian Emigres Living in the West"]

[Text] There are many studies which deal with Hungarian emigres living in the West. However, few of them deal with nationals who have left Hungary even though their number is not small. We know little about their lives and destinies, about how they have tried and are trying to preserve their native language, customs, and traditions, and about their relationship with present-day Hungary.

According to the daily SUBURBAN SCENE, published in Northampton, Pennsylvania, there is no village in Hungary, nor in all of Europe, from which as many people have emigrated to the United States as from Szentpeterfa. This settlement is a village of 1,250 Croatian nationals in Vas Megey, next to the Austrian border. I am doing a survey using questionnaires which I sent to those who emigrated from here and I have drawn my examples from the returned questionnaires.

According to the information I have gathered so far, almost as many Croatian families from Szentpeterfa live abroad, especially in the United States, as in the native village. Those living abroad probably number about 310-330. Every one of those who left the village spoke both Croatian and Hungarian. Later they also learned the language of their host country. It only complicated the situation that many Croatian men took American or German wives. Szentpeterfa's Croatians live scattered across the United States. Most of them live in Pennsylvania, with about 100 families in Northampton and another 70 families in Nazareth. But some of them live in New York, Florida, and Chicago, to mention just the more significant concentrations.

Preserving the awareness of a kinship with Hungarians (for to this day Szentpeterfa's Croatians consider themselves Hungarians) requires a great deal of effort on the part of the scattered families. However, several examples indicate that with form determination parents can raise their children as Hungarians even in this situation, without lessening the latter's "Americanisms." In fact, there are even cases where the family communicates in Croatian and Hungarian even though the mother was born in America.

I venture to state that their awareness of being Hungarians, and the resulting trilingual and tricultural atmosphere, has been beneficial for them. It has given them strength, by using the possibilities offered by American society, to rise above the intellectual level and achievements of the average American.

One of the respondents wrote, "Most of us came here as unskilled workers but most of our children, and especially our grandchildren, already have a college or university degree." The adherence to being Hungarian, and to the Croatian language and culture, has proven to be beneficial to these people in other respects also, such as in keeping their inner equilibrium. It is well known that one of the greatest problems of American society today is the question of individual identity. Many people living in America feel rootless and do not see themselves as belonging anywhere. One remedy for this is an adherence to a group or culture that is close to the individual, which results in a feeling of security. Those, then, who identify themselves with Hungarians and Hungarian feel that they belong somewhere and are able to rise above the insecurity of their given situation.

Paradoxically, the emigration has also benefited the expatriates' native village. Already in 1929, when almost half the village was destroyed by fire, they organized a collection and sent a 10,000-pengo [Hungarian prewar currency] contribution to the village mayor for the reconstruction. They have continued to support the village to this day. More than half of the village's car owners have received their car as a gift. The acquisition of many of the special fixtures and much of the equipment in the homes was also made possible by this support.

Most respondents praised the development of Hungary and within it, their village. Many of them suffer from homesickness. At the same time, they seem to have
preserved in their consciousness the conditions, circumstances, and occurrences that they experienced before they left. The changes presently occurring in Hungarian politics and society will no doubt dissolve these contradictions.

**Religious Orientation of National Scout Movement Supported**

25000233C Budapest REFORMATUSOK LAPJA in Hungarian 23 Apr 89 p 4

[Interview with Dr Szabolcs Nyiredy, national managing director of the Hungarian Scout Association by “L.K.”; “For Youth on Religious-Moral Grounds; Conversation About the Hungarian Scout Association”; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Our experience based on letters from readers, telephone calls, and conversations prompts us to say that there is a great uncertainty when it comes to the issue of the scout movement. This is a period of transformation and, as it is often the case at times like this, our public life is not free of developmental phenomena that are frequently confusing. Organs of mass communication release a great many accounts of new initiatives; and it is not surprising that the citizen who wants to be informed at times becomes lost.

The issue of the scout movement was one of those that caused considerable excitement. While it was long considered “taboo” to even talk about this tradition of educating youth (because of the negative adjectives attached to it), within the past few months the scout movement became a topic of conversation and even of debate. No wonder, therefore, that confusion is frequently evidenced among interested individuals.

The need to clarify the issues prompted us to contact Dr Szabolcs Nyiredy, national managing director of the Hungarian Scout Association, who is also deputy head curator of the Hungarian Unitarian Church, to provide some guidance to our readers. We did this especially because in the meanwhile the Synod’s Presidential Council published its own stand on the scout movement, asserting that “the Presidential Council has decided to support the reviving scout movement.” As revealed in the following conversation, the Hungarian Scout Association aspires openly to use religious and moral principles as bases for its work with the children and youths who voluntarily join its ranks.

[REFORMATUSOK LAPJA] We are happy to see that, after several decades of enforced hiatus, the scout movement of Hungary appears to be reviving. At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that this reawakening is accompanied by certain disturbing circumstances. According to press reports, which we have also published (on the basis of information we received), in addition to the Hungarian Scout Association, an Association of Hungarian Scout Troops has also been formed. It appears that the reviving scout movement has already been split, causing considerable confusion among those who are interested in it. As the national managing director of the Hungarian Scout Association, how would you describe the recent events associated with reorganizing the scout movement?

[Nyiredy] As the result of private initiative, 38 former scouts met on 12 October 1988, in the back room of the Museum Café in Budapest. The organizers of that meeting aspired to announce that reestablishment of the Hungarian Scout Association. Their announcement evoked a lively debate. Some of the organizers’ opponents considered such a step premature, while others thought it was against the law. Of we who were present at the meeting, 17 signed a statement announcing that “on this day, we have founded the Hungarian Scout Association.”

The signers of the above statement met once again on 20 October, joined by 30 additional former scouts who wished to add their signatures. At that time, we elected a 5-person board of managers, headed by Dr Janos Urheleyi (whom I proposed.) He made consistent efforts to create unity with those who did not sign the 12 October declaration, and who were grouped in part around the former leaders of the “troubadour-scouts,” and in part around scout leaders from the Pilis region. Several meetings have been held; finally, on 1 November, we formulated a position paper on behalf of the Association’s temporary national management committee, which was also published by some of the daily press.

During the next few weeks, there have been several privately initiated meetings in Budapest, attended by additional scouts, scout leaders and interested individuals, who stated their own views and asked questions without knowing the preceding events.

On 30 November 1988, there was a meeting of the enlarged managerial committee, to which the president invited (in addition to the members of the temporary committee) those who signed the 12 October statement in the Museum Café and those who joined our ranks in the interim; a total of 91 individuals. Unfortunately, the atmosphere of that meeting was not productive, primarily because several committee members objected to the presence of individuals they called “outsiders.” The acceleration of events prompted the committee’s president to call an extraordinary meeting for 23 January, the day before the new law on association was to go into effect. About 100 scout leaders, coming from various points of the country, attended that meeting where the fundamental rules were accepted, with one dissenting vote. On 24 January, after the minutes of meeting and the fundamental regulations were presented, the Budapest Court entered the Hungarian Scout Association as Number 1 in its registry of social organizations. With this, the Hungarian Scout Association became a legal entity.
We had our first regular public meeting on 11 February, and it was attended by more than 400 people. At this meeting, we approved the shortened version of the fundamental regulations, elected the presidential council, the central leadership and members of the National Managing Committee.

Those of us who founded the Hungarian Scout Association were always supportive of the old scout movement, which was controlled by no party, organization or association, and which strives not to allow in the future, either, that the organization's members, the youth, become involved in daily politics. We emphasize the signal importance of the 10 scout commandments and the scout pledge.

[REFORMATUSOK LAPJA] Members of the religious public are mainly interested in what role does the Association attribute to religious and moral considerations?

[Nyiredy] I have already answered this question when I referred to the 10 scout commandments and the scout pledge. What those things imply is that we consider religious foundations indispensable.

[REFORMATUSOK LAPJA] If the Hungarian Scout Association wishes to deal with youths in a Christian spirit, is it probable that you wish to be in contact with the churches. Has that contact been established yet, and has there been any negotiations on this?

[Nyiredy] We have met the leaders of every denomination, including those of the Calvinist Church, and they have assured us of their support. We were happy to learn that the Presidential Council of the Calvinist Synod issued a resolution supporting the establishment of a Christian scout movement. In accordance with the traditions of the Calvinist Church as I know them, however, I would like to interpret such support in an ecumenical sense, to accord with the statement in our fundamental rules: "In the course of admission and in their activities, the Association and its troops will make no distinction on the basis of denominational or other differences." (This means that a troop supported by a Calvinist church will also admit Roman Catholic children, just as the reverse is also the case. It is also to be understood that our fundamental rules do not contain the word "Christian"; after all, we expect that, for example, Jewish religious communities would also establish their own scout troops, as they had before the war. We would also consider it natural that Jewish youths would be admitted to scout troops made up primarily of Christian young people. The emphasis is on belief in God; Within that, each individual is expected to obey the prescriptions of his own denomination.

[REFORMATUSOK LAPJA] How can interested people contact your organization?
could negotiate and manage affairs in the future. Since
the state now considers monastic matters to be the
church’s internal affairs, it is desirable that all those
who are still able to start anew should proceed and start
their communal life and service. They should strive to make
a fresh start, seek out ways to become active and visible in
the life of the church. They should wear their monastic
habits; contact the senior priest in their districts and ask
for their assistance in finding a way to settle down. The
situation of male monastic orders is somewhat easier,
because their former churches could serve as starting
points for their new activities. The reorganization is
aided by the recollection services scheduled to take place
in the university chapels. Similar immersions may also
be desirable at the district centers.

The districts’ senior priests offer the empty rectories in
their jurisdictions for the use of the sisters, so they could
settle there as smaller communities and take care of
some spiritual duties (teaching, common prayers, etc.)

There are opportunities to establish monastic organiza-
tions that have not previously existed in Hungary, that
is, orders that have been created since World War II.
They should also contact the district bishops, present
their regulations and their intentions to settle, and indic-
ate the aspiration and method of their spiritual activi-
ties.

Following the briefing by bishop Takacs, Asztrik
Varszegi, auxiliary bishop of Esztergom, offered a few
practical recommendations. After this, the participants
made their comments, which revealed the following:

—They asked the bishops of Hungary to take a princi-
pled position and request the government to return, as
soon as possible, at least one central house to each
monastic order; after all, community life is impossible
without a house.

—A clarification is needed as to the legal entity of orders,
their opportunities and working conditions.

—When making assignments, the bishops were asked to
take into consideration those communities that wish
to be active at monastic parishes; they do not wish to
interfere with spiritual work, and would welcome the
chance to work at nearby parishes as well.

—They ask the bishops to request the state authorities to
inform administrative heads and local councils in the
countryside about the facts and implications of
monastic reorganization, so that in the event of nego-
tiations the latter be prepared to deal with their
clients’ cases.

—It is further desirable that the local clergy inform the
faithful about the reviving of the monastic orders and
related opportunities; in this effort, the UJ EMBER
will be helpful, in that it will present the various orders
if provided with background information.

—We should expect to encounter a number of questions
and problems that arise in the course of starting up
operations.

—To clearly present the past and establish historical
accuracy, efforts should be made to collect the names
of those monastic persons’ names who have been
persecuted or imprisoned during the past decades on
account of their sense of mission and their conscien-
tious convictions.

Bishop Nandor Takacs closed the nearly 3-hour-long
meeting, indicating the need for another similar discus-
sion, the time of which will be disclosed by the Roman
Catholic press.

Catholic Media Optimism Toward Recent State
Measures
25000233B Budapest UJ EMBER in Hungarian
16 Apr 89 p 2

[Unattributed report: “Religious Freedom in a Constitu-
tional State”]

[Text] On Wednesday, 5 April, among other things the
MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party] Politburo
discussed the proposed law concerning the freedom of
conscience and religion, as well as the issues of church-
related policies. Following the session, spokesman Lasz-
ló Major held a press conference, during which Barna
Sarkadi Nagy, deputy director of the State Authority on
Religious Affairs, answered reporters’ questions con-
cerning the basic principles involved in preparing the
law on religion. He stated that in the recent years the
state’s religious policies did not aggravate tensions; on
the contrary, the state and the churches had a balanced
relationship. Still, that relationship needs to be revised,
with primary emphasis on adjusting to the new circum-
stances and being appropriate for a democratic constitu-
tional state. The deputy director said that preparatory
work is now being performed on a law on freedom of
conscience and religion, which is necessary because no
constitutional state can be imagined without freedom of
conscience. He pointed out that churches are important
components of Hungarian society. When it comes to the
relationship between the state and the churches, a genu-
ine partnership is promoted if the principle of church-
state separation is implemented in all its details. Of
course, separation does not mean isolation. However, it
is clear that churches should not take on functions of
public life. In answering a related question, the deputy
director said that by public functions we should under-
stand primarily political and partisan ones, instead of
such popular representative duties as being elected to
local councils or to the National Assembly.

While preparing the law, it was revealed that in the
decisive majority of cases the filling of church-related
posts no longer requires preliminary state approval.
Exceptions are those high denominational posts to which
appointments are made by foreign bodies or dignitaries.
Tibor Czibere and Calvinist bishop Karoly Toth, and discussed the matter of returning to church ownership those educational institutions which were left to be managed by the Calvinist Church by the 1948 state-church agreement and were appropriated by the state in 1952. They agreed that such a transfer can only be accomplished in a consistent and gradual manner. As a first step, they discussed returning the building of the former Bear-Madas Gymnasium. The need to continue operating the Zsigmond Moricz Gymnasium, which presently occupies the building, was recognized by all parties as important. By creating a new building, the government will provide the opportunity for the continuing operation of the Zsigmond Moricz Gymnasium. To facilitate this, the Budapest City Council will make available a site in the Second District. The participants thought it important to undertake preparatory work in 1989 and the start of construction in 1990. They will make proposals accordingly to the Second District Council and to the Hungarian Calvinist Church, asking both to study the possibilities for opening the Calvinist high school by September 1990.

The meeting was also attended by Imre Miklos, president of the State Authority for Religious Affairs, and Robert Cravero, vice president of the National Planning Bureau.

POLAND

Gdansk PZPR Secretary on 'Elites,' Decision Implementation
26000512c Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
29 Apr 1 May 89 p 3

[Interview with Marek Holdakowski, Politburo candidate member and First Secretary, Gdansk Voivodship PZPR Committee, by Alicja Matynia-Bonik: "We Exist for Others' Sake"; date and place not given]

[Text] ZYCIE WARSZAWY You took part in the roundtable at which the coalition-government side reached an agreement with the opposition side on crucial national issues. It is being said, however, that the roundtable was a meeting site for the elites, both those of the party and government and those of the opposition, which made decisions on behalf of the society, a society that is not thorough or completely convinced about these decisions. What do you think of that?

[Holdakowski] "The meeting of the elites" is one of those locations in common currency that are as effective as they are inaccurate. Of course, prominent intellectuals and politicians were present at the roundtable, but there also were persons who came directly from their workplaces and have strong bonds with their constituencies. Are not Alfred Miodowicz [head of the regime-sponsored trade unions], Zbigniew Sobotka, Jozef Slisz, and many others, such persons? Please note also that the coalition-government side acted on the basis of mandates granted to it by by broad party groups. The
representatives of the PZPR, for example, obtained such a mandate in the form of the position taken by the Central Committee as a result of a memorable nocturnal discussion during the 10th Plenum. Lastly, consider that all public opinion polls indicated approbation for the roundtable initiative and a hopeful and impatient expectation that it would produce results. Suppose for a moment that someone now would turn back the clock and “invalidate” the results of the roundtable. Imagine the society's reaction to such a situation. So much for the “meeting of the elites.”

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] How are the decisions taken at the central level being reflected at the voivodship, local, and gmina [rural township] levels?

[Holdakowski] The party is approaching the implementation of the concluded agreements loyally and thoroughly, with goodwill and in good faith. It treats these agreements as a great opportunity for Poland, an opportunity for removing the obstacles to development, for mobilizing to this end the creative energies of many forces and individuals who had previously for various reasons been unable to find room for themselves in this process. As an opportunity for accommodating the opposition within the political institutions of the state instead of making it a raver of the economy. As an opportunity for genuinely surmounting the 9 year long social conflict. As an opportunity for the consolidation of realistically minded social forces and neutralization of extremists of various ilk. I think that the party will view in precisely this manner the new situation and genuinely act in the direction of exploiting these opportunities.

I think also, however, that party members will attentively watch the conduct of the opposition. For the course of the roundtable signaled that, while much was said about pluralism and democracy, some of its representatives cannot rid themselves of the desire to supplant the old monopoly with... a new one, that they reject all the transformations that took place during the 45 post-war years, sometimes in a manner that is derogatory to the society, that they are generally blind about their responsibility for enfeebling the economy during the years 1980-81, and that they view the world in black-and-white terms, that is, as a world that exists only in fairy tales. As a result, certain party organizations, especially those which not so long ago had experienced on their own skin the confrontation and the aggression, are questioning the adherence of the opposition to the spirit and letter of the agreement, and their questioning may be justified. We on our part are and remain fully determined to stick to the terms of the agreement and act in its spirit and in that direction. Naturally enough, we expect that of the opposition, too. For the price of ruining what had been agreed upon with such effort would be tremendous.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] In Gdansk you have been meeting with secretaries of plant party organizations and with party activists from various communities. What problems and doubts are they raising in the discussions?

[Holdakowski] We held several such meetings, before and during the 10th Plenum as well as during the roundtable. All the time we held a dialogue about the premises for and purposes of the roundtable initiative and about the possible developments of the situation. I think that we reached an accord. Most people are reacting in a rational and mature manner. The differences are linked chiefly to the different situations at discrete enterprises and communities, with varying relations between party members and the opposition in each. In some plants these relations were, I would say, those of a realistic coexistence, particularly when the representatives of the opposition acted within the legal organizational structures of the enterprise, as for example in the worker council. In those cases the roundtable was no surprise but, on the contrary, it legalized the actual and long-existing reality. But there also were other situations; for example, when a party or trade union organization was in acute conflict with Solidarity and was the subject of aggression. It is readily seen that in those places the current situation is more difficult but, I believe, tends in the rational direction.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] A radical change has taken place in the country's political structure. New and acknowledged forces have appeared on the political arena. In such a situation, how does the party intend to define its political position in the loyal constituencies, particularly considering that a substantial segment of the society, and even of the working class, is indifferent to it, and that the bonds linking even the party members themselves are weakening?

[Holdakowski] I shall consider the latter questions in a moment, for they cannot be left without a commentary. But as for the principal question, let me answer it as follows, in a nutshell:

The party's political position in the new situation is, first, to boldly pursue reforms in every constituency—intraparty reforms and political reforms, and economic reforms. This is an antidogmatic position, using ideology as a creative and developmental factor rather than a limiting and confining factor.

Second, it is a position of consistency of action, based on deeds. This consistency also means awareness that the terms of the roundtable agreement, especially those concerning economic affairs, are not some wonder drug that would spontaneously, “past us” and “for us,” as it were, bring Poland into a state of happiness and prosperity. Pluralism merely affords an opportunity and will not remedy by magic the difficult economic situation. Streamlining the economy and making it more effective will entail some social costs of varying nature and affecting differently different segments of the society, but these costs have to be borne. Unfortunately, this has not been stated with sufficient clarity in the documents concerning the economic aspects of the roundtable agreement. At the roundtable, such words as work, duty, responsibility, and discipline were rarely uttered, as has
been astutely pointed out several times by Professor Mikolaj Kozakiewicz. Likewise, Professor Andrzej Tymowski bitterly commented that many interests were articulated at the roundtable, but the interests of the state, the paramount and common interests of us all, were rarely articulated. This should be constantly borne in mind by the party.

Third and last, the party's political position following the roundtable is that of "opening" to the society. For we do not exist for ourselves. We exist for the society, and we come from the society. We are neither the government nor some superagency of the government; we are a political force which, acting by political means for the society and on behalf of the society, shall promote and struggle for its wellbeing.

Now let me answer your questions about the bonds linking party members and the society's indifference toward the party. Such generalizations are difficult to accept, particularly after the 10th Plenum and the roundtable. Nowadays the situation differs from place to place, just as party organizations, communities, and individuals do differ. I could enumerate many instances of communities in whose quotidian life the party organizations play a leading role, life in a practically exemplary manner, without posturing and specchifying, as for example when a party organization guides a gmina toward rational initiatives and sensible growth while at the same time cooperating with the local PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth], people's council, and gmina office, and with the party organization's secretary enjoying great authority locally. There of course are communities in which the situation in this respect is poor. But I believe that accusing the party of decrepitude is premature, particularly now, after the 10th Plenum and after the roundtable, with many interesting processes still ahead of us.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] In other words, all this depends on the individual.

[Holdakowski] Of course. This is an elementary conclusion and one that is always true.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] There exists a noticeable gap between the energetic actions of the members of the Central Committee and the passivity, even, of the activists of basic party organizations. Are not you afraid that party echelons will have no influence over the basic party organizations, which are experiencing a crisis?

[Holdakowski] I fear such categorical appraisals, such artificial pessimism, which is so fashionable and so carefully nurtured in certain milieux. After all, it was Stalinism that had been the greatest and most dramatic crisis in the party's history, and from which we are just now definitely emerging. That had been a crisis which in its time paralyzed the party and deprived it of the basic features of a political force and a social movement. It deformed many political, social, and economic processes. By contrast, what is happening nowadays is, to be sure, difficult and painful changes, but they are changes that serve us to get rid of that crisis, a crisis which had brought socialism to the brink of collapse as a system of society. Nowadays we have a chance to discard that baggage and rebuild the possibilities for socialism. That requires imagination, boldness, and the determination to endow the changes with a pace and direction serving to completely surmount the crisis features of Stalinism.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] You are first party secretary for a voivodship which is often said to be "the capital of the opposition," on the one hand, and, on the other, "a forward rampart" for combatting the opposition. What will the situation be now?

[Holdakowski] That was indeed so. This is Gdansk's place in history. There used to be indeed a period when Gdansk's role could be characterized in this way. For some time now things have changed, and I think that they will keep changing. After all, Gdansk cannot forever live in the past and wage a permanent struggle "contra." Societies which are incapable of formulating rational developmental hierarchies of values are condemned to oblivion and insignificance. Gdansk is too important a center on the map of Poland, and its potential is too great, to afford that. Gdansk is not only the capital of the opposition but also among the centers with the largest number of innovative and forward-looking enterprises and with the best private home construction in Poland. Fourteen liquid waste treatment plants are being built in Gdansk, and soon now the Tri-City [Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot] will cease to pollute the Bay. These instances can be multiplied. Gdansk is also a center of reform initiatives and genuine reform processes. Yet in the national view it bears a certain label [the capital of the opposition] and it let itself be thus labeled. Looking toward the future is the main objective we are working on, and one which is also often mentioned by Lech Walesa. He mentioned it many times during the roundtable talks, and he still talks about it now. He talks about paramount, future goals. I think that in Gdansk there are arising the social, political, and psychological conditions for the hierarchy of values and goals to become rational and serve growth and the future. I believe that it will rally round itself all the rational and creative social forces.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] There is growing publicity about the Gdansk Self-Government and Economic Initiative. What is it about, and what are its purposes?

[Holdakowski] A Gdansk intellectual told me that if that Initiative had not existed, it would have to be invented and publicized, precisely in order to propose goals other than the struggle [between the opposition and the regime] to the public. But of course the Gdansk Self-Government and Economic Initiative is not just a psychological maneuver. It also is a list of proposals addressed precisely to the society, to creative centers and
individuals. These proposals could be reduced to four lines of action. The first line is that of designing some mechanism of economic linkages between major enterprises of the Polish economy and the Tri-City, so that there would be mutual interest in growth and one would be not a necessary evil to the other but an incentive for mutual growth. The present situation is characterized by acute disproportions between the strongly developed potential of the maritime enterprises and the neglected social and municipal infrastructure. The classics say, "the sea makes people rich." But in the 1960's and the 1970's it rather contributed to the degradation of living conditions of the inhabitants of the Tri-City. Thus the heart of the Initiative is to alleviate these disproportions.

The second line of action, a derivative of the first, is the principle that the substantial funds earned by the maritime enterprises should not be returned indirectly to Gdansk via Warsaw through the command- allocation system, that they should be utilized directly on site, in the Tri-City, in an appropriate proportion that would be determined in advance. So that the entire Tri-City would be interested in the growth of the seaports and the maritime economy. So that the entire process would be harmonized and linked by mutual interests.

The third line of action is granting sovereignty to local self-government bodies. The power to take all decisions that do not have to be taken at the voivodship level should be transferred to local governments, to cities and gminas. This refers to transfers of rights, assets, and responsibility, so that every self-government body would and could be personally accountable, and so that every such body would correspondingly explore on its own ways of strengthening its local economy.

The fourth line of action is that of full opening to economic initiative [private enterprise], particularly as regards enterprises providing direct consumer services. The economic structure of the Coast is characterized by the fact that big local maritime enterprises produce goods chiefly for marketing outside the voivodship and abroad, while at the same time augmenting the purchasing power of the voivodship's population. But as for the voivodship's enterprises that produce consumer goods and provide consumer services, they are greatly underdeveloped. Therefore, the structure of the voivodship's economy is highly unbalanced. Unleashing the economic initiative, especially as regards consumer goods and services, is therefore necessary to restore the balance.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Will there be any changes in the style of work of the first secretary of the voivodship PZPR committee?

[Holdakowski] I think that this chiefly concerns addressing our proposals much more broadly to the smaller communities, so that words will be increasingly accompanied by deeds. I believe that we shall cooperate [with the opposition] wisely and harmoniously as regards the things that matter most.

‘Progress and Democracy’: Ultra-Left Association Emerges in Lodz
26000477 Warsaw PRZEGŁAD TYGODNIOWY
in Polish No 17, 23 Apr 89 pp 8-9
[Article by Krzysztof Spychalski: “Left, Forward March”]

[Text] Indeed, they exist. On 15 April, they could be heard in Lodz. They define themselves as an independent organization of the Polish national left, constructive opposition on the left; they call themselves the PiD [Progress and Democracy] Association. Having been registered on 30 December 1988 in Warsaw, they are now giving it a try in the recruitment campaign all over Poland. The Lodz organizational meeting was a part of it.

They do not want to be equated with the PZPR. They organized the meeting beyond the Lodz [PZPR] Committee headquarters. They decided that the Feliks Dzierzynski Enterprise will be the most proper place to meet, the hall of the enterprise House of Culture where a monumental bas-relief of the head of the Soviet security organs hangs on one of the walls. They set up the table of the presidium exactly under his bust, and decorated the interior of the hall with red and white-and-red flags. There were more white-and-red flags, because the name of the national left had to be expressed by a graphic symbol.

Among the white and the red, the co-founder of the association Marian Tupiak greeted the veterans of combat and labor. This rang very true. Tupiak may count himself among the former and the latter—a PZPR KD [Neighborhood Committee] secretary in the 1970's, creator of the political-defense battalion of the Lodz PZPR Committee after 13 December [1981], at present a retiree without a party assignment. A functionary and a combatant—in both cases—also greeted the youth of the independent left: several young people who spent a couple winter nights 7 years ago in the building of the Lodz Committee safeguarding the security of the headquarters of the voivodship echelon. Some of them, while creating the cells of the new KZMP [Communist Union of Polish Youth], thought that they would soon find themselves in the mainstream of the political life of the country organized in keeping with the legislation of martial law.

What are they today? It follows from the ideological declaration of “Progress and Democracy” that they are "a commonwealth of people from different communities and with different worldviews, who are united in their concern for the future fate of the Motherland, the fate of socialism in Poland."

On the eve of the meeting, chairperson of the PiD Lodz chapter Lucyna Nazarow-Zielinska tried to explain this to me in simple terms:
“We attract people with various affiliations—the PZPR, ‘Reality,’ Grunwald, the Christian left, those who do not like the existing political and administrative practices, those who do not hold, say, Mr. Kubiak [PZPR CC member, formerly PZPR CC secretary] in high esteem, and cannot agree with the idea that a segment of the PZPR leadership is entering into some strange arrangements in order to just cling to power.”

In short, according to Ms Nazarow, these are the people to whom the corset of the official organization of the Polish left does not appeal. After all, things of this nature have not agreed with Lucyna Nazarow for a long time. To be sure, for several years she was the PZPR committee secretary in charge of propaganda in one of the neighborhoods of Lodz. However, as early as 1986 she became a co-author of the “Draft of New Wording of the PZPR Program.” Even then, she knew that the reason for the reign of evil was “the continuous political and ideological pressure by imperialist forces, and activities of the internal opponents of socialism.” She also noticed “mistakes in the policy of the party and the state,” but nonetheless, as the document stated, “imperialism encourages and supports internal enemies, and strives to weaken socialist states.”

“The Draft” did not gain recognition at the Central Committee, and Ms Nazarow-Zielinska soon lost her job at the neighborhood committee. The ideological disquiet continues to haunt her, despite her recently becoming director of the Lodz “Estrada.”

The association found 46 similarly “dissatisfied” individuals in Lodz, including Tupiak. According to chairperson Nazarow: “Some people hold the association in contempt despite not knowing its program. As we see it, investigations of who comes from what circles of the left do not make sense. The members find their identity in the PiD.”

In what manner? Thus far, it is not known exactly how. This was set forth in very general terms in the program resolution of the PiD: “The main direction of our activities is to consider the most important problems of Polish reality, and to develop democratic solutions, with a preference for social justice, based on the accomplishments of the Polish socialist, people’s and national movement...” Chairman of the Main Board of the PiD Association Stanislaw Kuszewski believes that the general wording of the resolution and the ideological declaration will be filled out with suggestions, considerations, and conclusions of the membership.

Tupiak’s speech was brief.

“Beginning in 1980, there were only the official left and right. Different things were happening to us, but attempts to organize were forfeited. An opportunity opened last year; so we have the association. Even the name suggests what it is about—progress and democracy without adjectives, but socialist democracy [nonetheless]. We need zealous people, those involved on the side of unambiguously interpreted democracy.”

Apparently, all was clear, but Lucyna Nazarow thought that she needed to say that as it was. She read the main points of the program resolution.

The reform is fine, but not at the expense of the working people; in no case may “crafty fellows” profiteer “on the backs of millions”; funds should not be dispersed for construction, they should be concentrated in a single echelon, or, better yet, a national plan should be developed; the noose of the debt should be untied; the principle of the same law for everyone should be restored; the natural environment should be protected from ecological disaster, and people from the influence of cultural trash. The chairperson read: “It is inadmissible to propagate muck, or under the guise of propagating world culture, spread and emulate its patterns which are alien to the Polish national identity, and are deprived of value.”

As the statements suggested, much evil is taking place in Poland. However, the members of the association know the source of it. They wrote in the ideological declaration: “This is happening because, under the slogans of renewal, certain forces in effect are striving to return our country to the era of early capitalism. It is not only the social ownership of the means of production, but also the civic and social accomplishments of the working people that they find objectionable.” Inasmuch as the forces of the counterrevolution could only be referred to as “certain,” the declaration named the names of creators of progress: “At issue is the prestige of the working-class community in public life. In these issues, we give our full support to the movement of class trade unions belonging to the OPZZ [National Trade Union Accord], whose stance meets with understanding and recognition on the part of the Polish people’s left.”

The atmosphere of mutual understanding, trust, and the relaxation these engender prevailed in the hall.

Creative disquiet was supposed to be introduced by a statement of the representative of “the young ones.” Zbigniew Owczarzyczky said:

“Issues currently of concern to us have been analyzed in the documents of the association. We are united in not negating the accomplishments of the past 40 years, as a majority of the mass media, after all, reporting to my party, are doing. Socialism has not compromised itself. It is the people who introduced it that got compromised. They now want to explain the practical mistakes made by errors in the theory.”

The speaker wanted to be brief: “So much in order to help the comrades in subsequent discussion without boring them.” He added at the end, “for inspiration
only,” that, when he learned about the roundtable in general high school, it was about King Arthur, whereas at present, for reasons unknown, it is about the [office of] the president.

This statement would have produced immediate effect had it not been for the fact that one member of the association fainted unexpectedly. The grief of all was certainly captured in the phrase somebody uttered all of a sudden: “Now we will go eight abreast into the other world.”

After an intermission, the hall came to life.

Władysław Oleksiwicz asked whether the 10th Plenum had gone too far to the right, and who entitled the Central Committee Secretariat “to do all these things.” The conclusion he drew was as they laid it down in the PiD Main Board documents: “While emphasizing the principle of pluralism itself, we believe, however, that the mode and manner of proclaiming it... are in themselves a violation of the democratic and the very pluralistic principles. Unfortunately, this lends credence to the opinion that vital issues affecting the country and the people are still being resolved only on the basis of the so-called dialogue of the elites.”

It became obvious that, since the association accepts the 10th Plenum only in principle, as its documents proclaim, it “has the right to demand from the PZPR access to the mass media.” It was recognized that their own weekly would be most proper. A calming element was introduced by the announcement by Main Board Chairman Stanisław Kruszewski that on 30 March the board had given a letter to the marshal of the Sejm stating that a nationwide referendum should be held on amendments in the constitution on creating the Senate and the office of the president.

The announcement by the chairman was accepted with joy, because, as Jan Kontusz said, the way in which this was settled at the roundtable is an obvious example of violating the law. Creating 100 senator seats “in a situation when there is already a Sejm, and the worker already has one superstructure to support means acting against the will of the people.”

It was not only the issue of “rationed democracy.” Marian Ptak, one of the speakers who introduced himself to me as a retired officer, was concerned with something else.

He said: “I wonder about the ethnic composition of people at the roundtable. According to the statistical yearbook, we have about a million Jews. However, judging by ‘the table,’ and both its sides at that, there are many more of them, and all of them are great Zionists. Only [Romuald] Spasowski and [Zdzislaw] Rurarz [former Polish ambassadors to the United States and Japan respectively who quit in protest after the imposition of martial law in December 1981] are missing from the political scene.”

It turned out that ethnic issues also have historical significance.

Jan Kontusz said: “I am interested primarily in the Stalinist period. Certainly, many of us in the past discharged a function of some kind. This should be criticized, and specific names, and if possible, ethnic background should be indicated. Only in this manner will we embark on the proper path, so that the Pole will not be a second-class citizen for work only, whereas for government there will be other people whom God has given special privileges.”

Stanisław Porebski carried on the topic: “I agree with my colleague entirely. They call us Stalinists, but we were only carrying out [orders].”

Those assembled assented again, and Porebski spun a new thought.

“I cannot understand why a state enterprise cannot generate funds for remunerations like a cooperative. The same people cannot do it working for the state, but in cooperatives they can. Privatization is the pits.”

A malicious person could have accused Mr Porebski of ignorance of the rules of economic play in effect. However, there is no way that such a person could have rebuked Porebski for the absence of methodological persistence. Stanisław Porebski has long known how to handle doubts of this nature, how to learn who is who among the promoters of Polish economic life. You just need “to take a closer look at these gentlemen.”

Porebski heard about what sabotage is in the years of his professional youth. However, at that time, he did not hear about “the debt noose,” as well as all other veterans. The heart of Jan Kontusz bleeds when he talks about Romania:

“They’ve paid their debt, and what about us!? We should declare that we will tighten our belts for 3 or 4 years, but after that will be smooth sailing. So what? This concept was not accepted! The people who govern us are to blame for that.”

You also cannot be too militant in the superstructure, or the sphere of culture, if you will, especially “when clericalism is lording it over” all around us. For example, there is no convincing Tomasz Staszic that “good literature may only be created by the opposition.” After all, he could have quoted yet another couple of “statements by Wajda which are quite as characteristic.” Therefore, the association should keep an eye on the “peddling of various ideas which run counter to progress and democracy.”
The problems are many, and the association “Progress and Democracy” is only one. The economy should be powered out of the crisis, and care should be taken on this occasion of the moral health of the nation while “destalinizing reality.” There is a multitude of issues facing the 5,000-strong (by their own calculations) organization of the independent people’s left. There are also purely theoretical tasks. After all, an answer should be found to the question of what the left is at present, and especially the “people’s left.”

No answer was found in Lodz, despite almost 5 hours of comprehensive searching. However, Chairman Stanislaw Kruszewski is certain that it is not the heritage of the ND [People’s Democratic Party] and contemporary “Grunwald.” Despite what Lucyna Nazarow states, he says that no PiD member belongs to “Grunwald.” He talks about it as if it were a life or death issue, as if there were no people in the hall with “Grunwald” pins on their lapels.

So much for organizational debates, especially given that even the theoretical ones do not equally impress all PiD members. For example, they are of infinitesimal significance for Mieczyslaw Wlodarczyk.

“As far as progress is concerned, why do we have to look for the label ‘left’ right away? ‘Progress’ for the good of the country and the entire globe is enough.”

As they used to say at one time, this is simple, powerful, and obvious.

Kania on 1970 Events, 1980 Behind-the-Scenes Maneuvers
26000504 Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY
in Polish No 21, 21 May 89 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Stanislaw Kania, former PZPR first secretary, by Piotr Grochmalski, granted to both WPROST and PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY: “I Do Not Fear the Judgment of History”; date and place not given]

[Text] [PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] I am familiar with your background and I can hardly err in stating that one of the turning points in your political career was when you enrolled at the 2-year Party School under the PZPR Central Committee.

[Kania] Yes, that was important, but was it a turning point? To be sure, when I arrived in Warsaw as a young man, 23 years old, I was even then conscious of my political choice. I was raised in a very interesting, progressive milieu in the Subcarpathians. I began my activities during the occupation as a liaison person for the Peasant Battalions and, after the Liberation, in the Fighting Youth Union, the Union of Polish Youth, the PPR [Polish Worker Party], and the PZPR, thus rising from the lowest level to the voivodship one.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] While at school you met Gierek?

[Kania] An acquaintance. Of course, I knew about him and his background. Edward Gierek was a second year student and I talked with him not more than twice or thrice. Various generations met at that school; some were young like I, but a majority were activists of the prewar PPS [Polish Socialist Party] and KPP [Communist Party of Poland] from occupation times. There also were people who had been active in the revolutionary and independence movement during tsarist times.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Later you turned up as a member of the Main Board of the ZMP [Union of Polish Youth].

[Kania] I handled rural youth affairs there as a department director and member of the Presidium of the ZMP Main Board.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] In 1958 you were promoted to director of the Agricultural Department at the Warsaw Voivodship PZPR Committee. Ten years ago you already were director of the Administrative Department under the PZPR Central Committee. That is a dazzling career for a former youth activist.

[Kania] That was of course a promotion, but what is dazzling about it? Previously, for 8 years, I used to be a secretary of the PZPR committee of a large voivodship. In those times that was the normal route to a leadership post in the party.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Szlachcic stated in a recently published interview that on 18 December 1970 you summoned him by telephone from Gdansk to Warsaw, whereupon he met with Babiuch, you, and General Jaruzelski. It was then apparently that it was proposed that Szlachcic go to Gierek and offer him the post of first secretary.

[Kania] True, I did make that telephone call, which was followed by the conversation between Edward Babiuch and myself and Franciszek Szlachcic in his apartment. But there was no one else present.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Directly after that conversation you and Szlachcic traveled to see Gierek in Katowice. Szlachcic claims that this was a tremendously risky undertaking on your part.

[Kania] This is an exaggeration. I do not recall feeling that way. At most, I could have lost my post. So then, what tremendous risk was involved? On departing I was aware of the drama of the situation, of the position of many Central Committee members who felt that the continuing bloody, tragic December events [workers' massacre in Gdansk] had to be stopped. That was necessary and possible only by political means, through
personnel changes in the highest party and state leadership. These changes were carried out by the Central Committee on 20 December 1970 without any objections from its members. Years later, by then as first party secretary, I had occasion to discuss these matters with Władysław Gomułka.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] How did it happen that you were “assigned” to the Coast?

[Kania] I was simply sent there to hold meetings with plant workforces, and I stayed, for years. To this day I still recall the tense hours-long meeting, soon after the December 1970 events, with the workers of the Paris Commune Shipyard in Gdynia, a city where the December events were particularly dramatic. My numerous contacts with the Coast permanently influenced my views and my character. There, I met many people and familiarized myself with interesting problems of the maritime economy and difficult living conditions. I have many friends there. It all began by my assuming a duty, but in time I became forever emotionally attached to the people of the Coast.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] In April 1971 you became a Central Committee secretary. You handled party-political activity in the armed forces, the security forces, public health, and religious policy. You had certainly met with eminent Catholic Church individuals.

[Kania] That is a subject for special reminiscences. I spoke several times with the Primate of Poland Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński and with Józef Cardinal Glemp. My most frequent contacts were with Archbishop Bronisław Dabrowski, and I talked many times with Franciszek Cardinal Macharski. Together, we prepared the first visit by Pope John Paul II to our country. I handled the state’s preparations for his visit. I also had the opportunity to get to know Archbishop Jerzy Strobe of Poznan. I recall my highly interesting conversations with Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, including one on 25 August 1980, prior to the Jasna Gora ceremonies. At the time a great wave of strikes was surging throughout the country. The Primate was interested in the overall assessment and details of the situation. He voiced the view that we were dealing not just with a mutiny by hired workers but a civic protest. He also asked about the nearby countries. I answered that they were no less worried than we. The Primate was greatly troubled, fearing that the strikes would turn into a nationwide conflict.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Whereupon the Primate delivered his well-known homily in Częstochowa on Jasna Gora Mountain.

[Kania] Yes, but it would be too much to think that the homily was linked to my conversation with him. I also held many serious talks with Agostino Cardinal Casaroli, the current secretary of state of the Apostolic See, an eminent churchman and the architect of the Vatican’s Eastern policy. The Polish-Vatican dialogue in 1974 resulted in an institutionalization of relations and the first portentous agreement between Poland and the Vatican, defining precisely the principles and nature of mutual contacts. I also spoke with Pope Paul VI during a visit by Edward Giezek to the Vatican.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] That was like trying to reconcile fire with water.

[Kania] I do not agree; our relations with the church varied, but they were never hostile. Relations with the church require patience and tact, but also great determination. After all, what matters most is laying the foundations for the integration of the society, for a positive mood among people as citizens of a common Fatherland. I am convinced that a lasting settlement of relations between the church and the socialist state is possible and necessary, relations based not just on a mutual truce but broad cooperation. My party and the socialist state have traveled a long road before they could understand this truth. We have accepted the idea that religion, the church, awaken in man lofty motivations, moral and patriotic ones, and that they are needed by broad segments of the society. In the past, our attitude was oversimplified and we made mistakes and treated the church unjustly, but similar problems were encountered by the church in Poland and throughout the world, including the Apostolic See. I recall a conversation with an eminent churchman to whom the philosophy of history is a hobby. He stressed that the church sustained terrible losses by failing to view the French Revolution constructively, and that it may lose much more still unless it perceives the lasting nature of the consequences of the still more extensive changes initiated by the year 1917. The process of that “gradual perception” is going on throughout the world, despite various obstacles and resistance. It can be clearly seen in our country, or perhaps particularly in our country. Mutual rapprochement and cooperation are promoted considerably nowadays by the party’s political thought and the practical pursuit of the state’s religious policy.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] By virtue of the offices you held, you also had easy access to information, including extremely confidential information. Hence, the year 1976 could not be a surprise to you.

[Kania] Of a certainty that was a perturbing period of growing signs of social discontent. The related information was sufficiently extensive and reached those who needed it. No one among the former leadership can claim that he did not know what was happening. The nature of the price operation was disputed among the leadership. We allowed for the possibility of social protests against the decision to raise prices, not only owing to the extent of the price hikes but also because during several preceding years people became accustomed to thinking that the prices of staple consumer
goods would remain unchanged despite the cost increases ensuing from higher wages and higher prices of producer goods. That was our mistake, too, the mistake of the leadership.

I wish to emphasize that the memories of the December 1970 tragedy had been so great that in 1976 it was decided that the militia throughout the country would not be provided with firearms when maintaining law and order once the price increases would be announced. This was the first decision of its kind. I am convinced that the absence of bloodshed in Radom was due to that decision.

[PRZEGŁAD TYGODNIOWY] Four years later, in August 1980, Gieriek allegedly insisted on dislodging the strikers from factories by force. Gen Jaruzelski refused to use the army. As for you, you supported resolving the conflict by political methods.

[Kania] It is true that the individuals who had the most say on the use of force were the greatest opponents of resorting to force against worker protests and supporters of the conciliatory approach. Other views were represented too, but they did not prevail. Why then discuss it.

[PRZEGŁAD TYGODNIOWY] But the issue was in the balance until 24 August 1980, because it was only then that the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum supported negotiating with the striking workers on the Coast.

[Kania] Not quite so. The negotiations were initiated much earlier. The strikes surged across Poland since the beginning of July. The view that force can solve nothing and can only result in escalating the conflict had prevailed fairly early among the party leadership and in the government, and it was besides consonant with the position of the ZSL [United Peasant Party] and SD [Democratic Party] leadership. That was why the demands of the strikers, which initially were socially oriented, met with a favorable response. Of course, some of the strikers had other, insane notions.

On the Coast the strikes were of a new quality. Yet there, too, negotiations were initiated quite early. They were conducted in a serious manner by the government’s representatives in Gdansk, Mieczyslaw Jagielski, and in Szczecin, Kazimierz Barcikowski. In Jastrzebie that role was played by Aleksander Kopeć in talks with the striking miners. That happened a little later. I recall the dramatic plenary session of the Gdansk Voivodship PZPR Committee on the night of 18 August 1980, that is, at the peak of the strike wave. I took part in these deliberations together with the then Chairman of the Council of State Henryk Jablonski. I remember how much bitterness accompanied them; the tears of certain speakers, the apprehensions about Poland’s future. In my speech following a severe condemnation of the excesses committed during the strikes at certain plants, I expressed the view that the causes of the strikes are not just local and limited to Gdansk, that much has to be changed in national governance, and that the sole way to resolve conflicts is by political means, by the conciliatory approach.

[PRZEGŁAD TYGODNIOWY] That speech was not published. Why?

[Kania] That was not up to me. But its tape has been preserved.

Well, back to the Fourth Central Committee Plenum. Its importance consisted in that it acknowledged negotiation as a way of resolving strike conflicts. Was it too late? The Central Committee took the position, once it could meet, when its members were summoned to the session. At its subsequent Fifth Plenary Session on 30 August 1980 the Central Committee expressed its approval of the signing of the well-known August agreements which led to the rise of Solidarity.

[PRZEGŁAD TYGODNIOWY] Late in the evening of 5 September the Sixth PZPR Central Committee Plenum had met, this time without Gieriek, who was hospitalized. It resolved unanimously to elect you to the post of first secretary. At the time your only major rival was Stefan Olszowski. But your position in the party was not that strong. You had enemies.

[Kania] Anyone who is active in a major way has enemies. I was indeed elected by acclaim to the post of first secretary, even though certainly not all preferred me. No other candidates were nominated.

[PRZEGŁAD TYGODNIOWY] At the time, most Solidarity activists believed that only Solidarity’s pressure on the authorities could extort democratization of life in this country.

[Kania] I do not deny that the pressure on the authorities was a factor in accelerating their measures. And I am not either questioning the merit of Solidarity where it has indeed been tangible. But it should be borne in mind that it was neither the sole nor the main cause of the pressure toward the democratization of life in this country.

Consider what had happened within the party prior to its Eighth Congress, and the party’s critical view of the domestic situation; this also applies to ZSL and SD activists and to the major intellectual circles and various elements of the trade-union and youth movements. Neither can the criticism and reservations expressed by the church leadership be underestimated. Similarly, the Sejm executed its duties with increasing clarity and effectiveness. It was precisely all this that had caused the party and its leadership after September 1980, without any pressure by Solidarity (because at the time it still had not existed [as published]), to follow the orientation toward deep reforms in the economy, in political life, and in governance. We understood that our mission is not simply to calm the society but to bring about
fundamental changes in the socialist system of society, in the role and internal life of the party, and to explore roads toward a lasting national reconciliation.

I also voiced these thoughts in my speech following my election to first secretaryship.

[PRZEGŁAD TYGODNIOWY] Words...

[Kania] Of course, words, words expressing a political orientation. We proved these words with numerous deeds shaping the line of socialist renewal. No one can deny that, starting in September 1980, when no pressure was yet exerted on us, various reform measures took place on a broad front. I could enumerate quite a few of them, beginning with the legislation subordinating the Supreme Chamber of Control to the Sejm in early September 1980, the appointment of the Commission for the Economic Reform by the Politburo and the government, and the relinquishment of the principle of chairing people's councils by first secretaries of party committees.

[PRZEGŁAD TYGODNIOWY] Yet critical opinions about the activity of the party and of the authorities in general kept growing within the society, and it was the society that was the base of Solidarity.

[Kania] One reservation. The society was the base of not only Solidarity but also all the organized social forces. And the situation was very complex and it could not be expected that the society would evaluate the party solely according to the announcements or implementation of even the socially most acceptable reforms. Among broad segments of the society there was an unusually strong demand for the assessment and [acceptance, by the party and the government, of] responsibility for all crises. The actual culprit was the government and the party leadership, but the fire of criticism was directed at the entire party, and that criticism reached an unprecedented level. This was compounded by demands for accountability and accusations of a moral-ethical nature, whether justified or not. At one time, during a meeting at the Kremlin, I discussed the attitude that should be adopted toward the part of the agreement obligating the authorities to allow miners to stop working for the personal needs of various managers. There was indeed such a provision in the Jastrzębie Agreement. All this caused the unrest to reach its peak. Solidarity grew by feeding on this discontent of millions of people. This was exploited by opponents of socialism who desired a change in the system of society, as well by some who supported overthrowing the system by any means. No one can deny the vast scale of their actions destructive to the economy and to the state structures. I recall with great bitterness the fate of the appeal of Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski for 90 calm, strike-free days.

[PRZEGŁAD TYGODNIOWY] Within the party apparatus, especially at the middle level, there were many opponents of your policy. It was in their interest to encourage, by means of various provocations, a mood of confrontation with Solidarity.

[Kania] Political divisions were not and are not so sharp that the top is enlightened, the bottom noble, and the whole evil is concentrated at the middle level. The causes of the resistance to the policy of socialist renewal are to be perceived not only in conservatism, in traditional habits, but also in the results of that policy. Consider the state of the economy in those times, the empty store shelves, the internal wrangling not only in many workforces but also in families. There was growing awareness that the blame for the country's situation, for the living conditions, had to be attributed not only to the authorities but also to other social forces, especially Solidarity. I see no grounds for linking the wave of destructive actions to the attitude of the personnel of the party apparatus.

[PRZEGŁAD TYGODNIOWY] But what about the Bydgoszcz Provocation?

[Kania] What you call the Bydgoszcz Provocation was explained at the time. Could primitive actions by various elements of the authorities have happened? Yes; although I am not aware of any such cases, I do not preclude their possibility. But that is not the reason for the lack of response to the numerous reform measures of the government and the party. That is also why unusually great determination was needed to hew to the reform policy which was, as we know, being pursued under unprecedented circumstances in Poland, in the presence of a vast social turmoil and a deep economic collapse. We understood the great need for a national accord. Without that accord the reforms can hardly succeed and the crisis encompassing the country cannot be surmounted. Some people found it difficult to accept the axiom that at the time the program for bold reforms could be neither drafted nor effectively defended nor implemented without the party.

[PRZEGŁAD TYGODNIOWY] Poland's problems have attracted worldwide interest. From the vantage point of the present, what aspect had been of the greatest interest to the Soviet Union in those times? What is your opinion?

[Kania] Of course, it was interested in tranquility in Poland. That was the main thing. That was why it provided us with special material assistance on favorable terms. As early as in October 1980 the Soviet Union granted us US$465 million in nonreimbursable credit. The response to various anti-Soviet activities was very sharp. However, the position of the then Soviet leadership was handicapped by an extremely simplified assessment of the process taking place in our country. Now the
salutary and historic changes in the USSR, known as perestroika, reveal the depth of the deformations and their causes in that country.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] But should not you in particular have tried to explain the situation to Brezhnev, calm him, persuade him that what was happening in Poland was not a counterrevolution but a great social experiment whose success could be of tremendous significance to other socialist countries? Instead, you let the Soviet interpretation of those events be imposed on yourself.

[Kania] What grounds do you have to make such facile appraisals? But let us consider the substance of your question. Yes, it is true that a great social experiment unprecedented in the history of People’s Poland was unfolding. But it was accompanied by another orientation—by manifestations of anarchy and counterrevolutionary peril. And lastly, don’t you think that the assumption that we are providing a model for other socialist countries to follow is a conceit, belief in a messianic mission? At the time my only thought was to do what was good for Poland and Poles, for national accord, to remedy the destitution in Poland, and to lay the foundations for a modern and democratic development of this country. In all my talks with the Soviet leadership—and in addition to those published in the press there were many unofficial talks, dozens of highly important telephone conversations—I consistently adhered to my own assessment of the events in Poland.

I can sleep peacefully; I do not fear the judgment of history. I have always been consistent, whether here in Warsaw, or in Gdansk, Poznan, or Krakow, and also during the talks in the Crimea, in the Crimea, and or wherever else they were held. And what was my position? It is sufficiently clear to anyone who dispassionately analyzes the period during which I served as the first party secretary. It was the Ninth Congress that assessed the situation most fully and drafted the most comprehensive program. Everyone knows, too, because this is being bruited around, that at the time [in 1980] important Soviet decisionmaking circles had been inclined toward armed intervention. But it should not be forgotten that, despite several genuine perils, that intervention did not take place.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] The first peril occurred early in December 1980.

[Kania] Here a calendar is not necessary. There also occurred extremely difficult moments. I can say briefly that, concerning the matters you are asking about, I did not have to resort to guesswork and assumptions. Besides these matters were not that secret to the world. Nowadays the movements of an army battalion can be accurately followed from outer space, let alone mighty armies. We did not need satellite monitoring; even without it the pressure of facts was horrible.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] At the time what was decisive to preventing the tragedy? Some people claim that this was due to the resolute stance of the West, chiefly to Carter’s intervention, while others think that it all was decided by your own and Gen Jaruzelski’s stance.

[Kania] It is said that success has many fathers and failure is an orphan. What is most important is that the tragedy did not take place. True? The Soviet leadership in those times cannot be viewed as a monolith, as it, and even more its entourage—its most important elements and services—included reasonable individuals, persons who were well-disposed toward our reform measures and who understood the complexity of the Polish situation and the need for fundamental changes in the socialist system of society, persons who were well-disposed toward our reform measures. Thus there could be no dispute about the Polish issues as well. At that critical moment, early in December 1980, there was a summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries. It was attended by first central committee secretaries, prime ministers, central committee secretaries, and ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and internal affairs. The deliberations were almost totally devoted to Poland. We were indeed completely in accord with both Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski and the then Prime Minister Jozef Piekoszewski in our assessment of the situation. In addition to the plenary session at which I presented the assessment of the situation and our policy, I had a private conversation with Leonid Brezhnev on my own initiative, for which I had asked even before leaving for Moscow. I need hardly say that all these talks were difficult and, as they say in diplomatic language, frank. And the finale? Tranquility for Poland.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] You did not say much.

[Kania] That is enough for the present. All this is still too recent. I have plenty of material for reminiscences of that period. To me at any rate it matters greatly that, despite all those dangers, apprehensions, and domestic and foreign pressures to relinquish our program goals and methods of action forming the line of socialist renewal and to prevent holding the Ninth Congress, that congress could be held, and with such fruitful results at that.

Please bear in mind that it was precisely the awareness that something great and extraordinary had occurred in Poland, that the August events are not some “work accident” that could be diluted by some gestures, that warranted the need to convene that extraordinary congress. Already in my first speech as first party secretary I stated that the Congress was urgently needed by the entire party.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Why is it then that it took so long to prepare that congress?

[Kania] Not a month longer than was necessary. A party congress is not something that can be improvised on the spot.
[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] On the one hand you greatly feared the movement of horizontal structures [local party branches desiring greater autonomy] within the party and on the other you feared as much the "mole-like burrowing" by dogmatists from the central apparatus.

[Kania] I feared them, because they both were extremes, detrimental to the policy of "opening."

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] You feared such persons as Grabski or Olszowski much less than you feared the horizontal-structure activists.

[Kania] And I was right, because, while there was some good about the activities of these structures, they also acted in an unimaginative way. My apprehensions were not so much about the activists, among whom prevailed enthusiastic and interesting individuals, as about the place of the horizontal structures and some of their slogans. The possibility of directing the party and the party's ability for effective action had to be preserved. Various perils arose. The horizontal structures conceived the idea of not electing delegates to the congress from the central level. If we juxtapose this with another rule that was operative at the time, namely, that one cannot be elected to the central party leadership unless one is a delegate to the congress, it can be clearly seen that a situation in which, following the congress, the Central Committee might no longer include experienced central activists, could not be allowed to happen. There is no political party in the world, and no leadership of such a party, that would tolerate this.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] The elections proved that these fears were unwarranted.

[Kania] Because most of the voivodship party conferences preceding the congress acknowledged the validity of the position taken by the party leadership. Consider for example my personal intervention during the voivodship party conference in Poznan.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] The conference did not approve including four candidates recommended by the Politburo, which at the conference was represented by Grabski, in the list of nominees for candidates to the Congress. Thereupon, as a sign of protest, Grabski left the auditorium. In such a situation, according to the then mandatory statute, the conference should have been discontinued, yet it continued, and it elected representatives who negotiated with you by telephone.

[Kania] This is inaccurate, because the statute contains no such provision. The negotiations you refer to did indeed take place, and to this day I remember them well. The conference's representatives—and they were highly authoritative activists—wanted somebody else to attend on behalf of the Politburo. I told them that Tadeusz Grabski would return. And this indeed happened. I also told them that they should nevertheless vote for the delegates recommended to them by the central party leadership, because that was not a local Poznan affair alone.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] A compromise was achieved. They agreed to elect General Edward Lukasiak, the current first secretary of the Poznan Voivodship PZPR Committee, and General Stanislaw Zaczkowski. Professor Jerzy Wiatr and Leslaw Tokarski, the editor in chief of PERSPEKTYWY were deleted from the nominations.

[Kania] That was not so. There was no compromise. It is simply that the representatives I talked with presented my viewpoint to the conference, which resolved to vote on all the nominations presented by the Politburo. The results of the elections were as you specified. There were more interventions of this kind at other voivodship party conferences. And they had to be made in order to accomplish what matters most—a good party congress. That was the point, and for a time it was in doubt.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] You are referring to the well-known letter of 5 June 1981 of the CPSU Central Committee, which declared, "We believe that it is still possible to prevent the worst, to prevent a national catastrophe... Time is very short. The party can and should find the energy to halt the course of events and, even before the Ninth Congress, orient them in the proper direction..." Our position was clearly presented in the statement by Comrade Leonid Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress: "We shall not leave socialist Poland, fraternal Poland, in the lurch and we shall not let it be harmed." The Polish society interpreted this as the threat of an intervention and as explicit support of the "hardliners" in the party.

[Kania] Let us be fair. The anxiety of the Soviet leadership was due not only to its own political ailments, which were most severely judged by the CPSU itself, but also to what caused us, too, grounds for anxiety. The point was, what conclusions would be inferred from assessing the situation. If the abovementioned letter is considered attentively, it will be seen that it, of course, is critical of my actions and those of Wojciech Jaruzelski, which was interpreted as encouraging our replacement. However, two other conclusions could be drawn from reading that letter, and basically they matter most. One conclusion was that the Congress should be postponed indefinitely and the other that the aspects of the Polish situation that the Soviet leadership found most disturbing should be immediately remedied by radical measures. Neither conclusion was acceptable.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Several days after that CPSU letter you ceased to be first party secretary. At the Eleventh Plenum your political line was bluntly attacked, with Tadeusz Grabski declaring, "In view of the situation that arose within the party, and in view of the danger threatening our nation, I wish to answer the
question asked: is the current membership of the Politburo, headed by First Secretary Comrade Kania, capable of resolving the country's political crisis? I do not think so." The brunt of the polemics was assumed by Barcikowski and Rakowski. When the latter spoke, the audience stamped its feet and shouted. A vote of confidence in you was taken. You won it decisively.

[Kania] Not quite so. Our policy was attacked, but it also was defended. Never before were the deliberations as tense and contested, and never before were the differences in views enunciated with such passion. The feeling was that the fate of Poland rather than that of a group of individuals was being resolved. Of course, Kazimierz Barcikowski and Mieczyslaw Rakowski also took the floor. The line of socialist renewal had quite a few opponents at that plenum, but it had even more numerous and determined defenders who included members of the party leadership active in the armed forces. The records of that plenum are very telling. I think that a time will come when this can be discussed more fully.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] It is known that members of the highest Soviet leadership, Suslov and Gromyko, arrived to hold talks with you.

[Kania] True, but each came separately. Mikhail Suslov came in April and Andrey Gromyko in July, even before the Ninth Congress. The talks with Gromyko lasted 11 hours. What is important is that the Ninth Congress took place as planned, and we debated our new party program. That was a memorable and very good congress. It crowned an unprecedented and fruitful party activism and the vast intellectual awakening of party members. The congress was marked by unusual democratism and resulted in the formation of a genuinely worker-peasant-military Central Committee. It resolved a program for political and economic reforms and a new PZPR statute defining the foundations for intraparty conflicts. Despite the marked tensions and sharp conflicts in the country, the Congress supported building a broad national alliance, a national accord, including also cooperation with Solidarity. But that congress also represented a great warning; its deliberations took place under the slogan that socialism has to be defended like national independence.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] And after the congress?

[Kania] There were many meetings, considerable optimism about a clear party program of changes, about the party's creation of models of democracy on its own. The new Central Committee appointed commissions grouping all of its members, which contributed to their influence on the course of events, on social life. It considered worker self-government issues and defined its position on the draft decrees on self-government and enterprises. These were fundamental acts of the economic reform.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Yet, the tensions did not diminish.

[Kania] Unfortunately. New and grave tensions arose. It was precisely after the Congress that street demonstrations began to be organized under various and sometimes provocative slogans. That was a harbinger of a new quality of the conflict. Not only the party's rank-and-file became increasingly terrified. The basis for the policy of broad opening was crumbling. There were growing demands for radical measures, and growing criticism of my policy. I resolved to resign in favor of somebody new who would have new credit of confidence but also follow the road of the Ninth Congress and would be able to act more effectively, and this is what happened at the Fourth Plenum on 18 October. My resignation was accepted by a majority of votes in secret balloting. As known, Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski was elected the new first party secretary.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] You resigned because you would not depart from your philosophy of resolving conflicts by political means alone, did you not? I understand that you received appeals for acting more resolutely.

[Kania] You know, I have often encountered the following reasoning. "I gave my word of honor that I shall never opt for the last resort [force], and therefore, ... etc." How romantic. Are you aware of the gigantic pressure one labors under when a nation's fate is in his hands? What a monstrous sensation it is to know that any error in judging the situation might affect Poland's life adversely for dozens of years ahead? There was no room for error. What does it mean, "word of honor"? Who am I and what right do I have to put my word of honor above the interests of the nation and state? Thus, the point was not just keeping my word of honor but staying true to my policy, based on cool and thorough reflections.

And resoluteness? We associate this concept with the highest devotion to lofty aims. A person who engages in an act requiring great courage resolves even to sacrifice his own life and often the lives of his loved ones as well. Such is the highest price of personal courage. But what does that mean to a person who has the greatest influence on the most important state decisions? Above all, it must be borne in mind that the fate of millions of compatriots is placed in the balance and influenced. There occur crucial moments in a nation's life when much must be sacrificed in order to save everything. That is a maxim of Kosewiczko, his legacy. The converse can never be true: everything should not be sacrificed for the sake of saving much. That is why one must always bear in mind the inseparable combination of resoluteness with deliberate reflection and develop in oneself the feeling of responsibility for the nation and before the Polish nation.

Historical Society President on Historical Deformations, Katyn
26000495a Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI
in Polish No 17, 23 Apr 89 pp 4-5

[Interview with Prof Andrzej Ajenkiewicz, president, Main Administration of the Polish Historical Society, by Slawomir Godera, on 15 Jan 89 in Warsaw: "On the Healing of History"; first paragraph is PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI editorial note]
This text was not approved for publication by the District Office for the Control of Publications and Entertainment (KPiW) in Warsaw on 3 March 1989. Following the author's appeal to the Main KPiW, publication was permitted on 28 March 1989 following the censoring of four passages. [passage deleted from original text and replaced with notation: Law of 31 July 1981 on the Censorship of Publications and Entertainment (Article 2, Point 3, DZ.U. No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983, No 44, Item 204)]

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] Do you agree with the claim that the politically and ideologically conditioned manipulation of history over the last 40-odd years not only contributed to distorting the historical awareness of our society, this being the worst consequence, but also harmed the historian community by depriving it to some extent of authority, adversely affecting the assessment of its accomplishments, and casting the accusation of opportunism on historians?

[Ajenkiew] I think this judgment is too severe, as far as the historian community as a whole is concerned. On the one hand, after the war, we had been dealing with what could be defined as a tendency toward a highly critical view of the recent past. On the other hand, the possibilities for historians in Poland were influenced by the curtailment of our national sovereignty as well as by the awareness of the links between the Polish postwar government and the USSR. It is precisely this dependence that caused the motif of Polish-Russian and Polish-Soviet conflicts to be eliminated from our history. If these conflicts were mentioned at all in history books, it was only in the context of our prewar mistaken policy of eastward expansion, initiated by the marriage between Queen Jadwiga and [the Lithuanian] Jagiello and continued by the entire course of events culminating in the rise of the Republic of Both Nations.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] But it was not only Polish-Russian relations that were manipulated by historians.

[Ajenkiew] True. For example, the fate of our nation under the Hitlerite occupation was utilized by some historians, who were encouraged in this course by the authorities, to reinterpret the entire past history of Polish-German relations, from Cedynia [site of the battle between the troops of Mieszko I and the German Margrave Hohann, ending in a Polish victory, in A.D. 972] to the Berlin of 1945, as a history of incessant enmity between Poles and Germans, in a chauvinist, Endecki [referring to the prewar nationalist National Democratic Party] edition. The proof was to be the then still vivid memory of Hitlerite crimes and of the persecution of Poles in the Prussian-occupied part of Poland during the Partition Period. Conditions were simply lacking for pointing to the fact that the history of German-Polish relations took varied turns, that for entire centuries our frontier with the Germans was the quietest one, and that it was not always that we had to deal with a single German state. Indirectly all this served a very particular purpose, that of obscuring in Polish-Russian relations whatever muddied the idyllic picture of the fraternal love between Lech and Rus. Yet, Russian policy toward Poland was characterized, at least since the beginning of the 18th century, by tremendous territorial lust and imperialism.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] History textbooks interpret these matters quite differently. This probably is linked to what Prof Manteuffel perceived as the presentation of Poland's history by our historians from the standpoint of a foreigner who is ill-disposed toward Poland.

[Ajenkiew] Such a presentation implied the fact that the authorities [passage deleted from original text and replaced with notation: Law of 31 July 1981 on the Censorship of Publications and Entertainment (Article 2, Point 3, DZ.U. No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983, No 44, Item 204)] believed that aspects of Polish-Soviet relations should be presented in accordance with the principles of proletarian internationalism which, by its very premise, is identical with the interests of the Soviet (Russian) state. Please bear in mind that as late as in the 1950's Soviet textbooks still referred to... Kosciuszko's "rebellion" [against tsarist-Russian rule in Poland], and therefore any move by the Soviet side was objectively right, being subordinated to an overall longterm goal [passage deleted from original text and replaced with notation: Law of 31 July 1981 on the Censorship of Publications and Entertainment (Article 2, Point 3, DZ.U. No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983, No 44, Item 204)].

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] Such was the ultimate result of the fascination of many historians with Marxism, regardless of its Stalinist aspects. Why is it precisely among historians that this ideology could be so easily implanted?

[Ajenkiew] I must say that a majority of Polish intellectual milieu was fascinated by that ideology. This also includes historians for whom that ideology proved true in many particular cases. Please bear in mind that Marxism provided a relatively facile key to the solution of many problems of the past. At the same time, it provided an explicit and exact prediction of the future. At the same time also, the historians realized that there existed an objective necessity of rendering justice to social groups which had previously remained in the shadow. They faced what they thought to be highly promising prospects of investigating processes, mass movements, with the object of focusing attention on these neglected groups.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] Are you suggesting that the predominance of the class orientation in history did not seem suspect?

[Ajenkiew] Sure, it was suspect, but it did not necessarily have to be rejected a priori. Marxist ideology was also present in the works of such historians as Adam Prochownik and it did not at all disqualify the works he had
written during the interwar period. Unfortunately, everything implanted in Poland after the year 1945 became contaminated by Stalinism. Until 1956 [the year of workers' bread riots in Poznan] we had been dealing with a monolithic view of history in which all elements of the historical process, i.e., facts and their appraisals, were to form a single whole. But the classical Stalinist model of Marxism, if such a definition can be employed, existed only for a relatively brief period and probably not completely. Many historians wanted to be Marxists but had not yet "matured" for it, because they employed old methods and retained, in coded form, respect for facts and research principles developed earlier. There also were several historians, such as Prof Henryk Werezycki, who could be called "the conscience of the historians."

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] What role was played by ordinary human fear in the motives of the historians?

[Ajenkew] Certainly a big one. I believe that, irrespective of their verbal articulation, all the historians, though perhaps not at once, were affected by awareness of the fate encountered by people living within Stalin's empire. The terror was present since 1944, but it did not affect all to an equal degree. It must be admitted that the authorities tried to win over the intellectuals, especially the better-known ones, and that only a relatively small proportion of the intelligentsia became victims of Stalinist repressions. These repressions rather affected such social strata as workers, who in their mass were anonymous, and peripherally the peasantry. They also affected, of course, individuals linked to the country's past political life, especially conspirators. But in this case at least the authorities attempted to create appearances of validity of the repressions.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] However, after October 1956, or perhaps even earlier, isolated bricks began to loosen from the "monolithic" structure you refer to, and the previously binding principles began to be eroded. What happened then?

[Ajenkew] The undermining of general principles lasted until the moment at which the compromised ideological principles—the viewing of everything in terms of a primitively construed class interest—were supplanted with geopolitical principles, with a uniquely construed raison d'état. Henceforth even those who were at the beck and call of the authorities, or of what they considered to be the authorities' expectations of them, abandoned what I term the Stalinist-Marxist model of thinking and valuation.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] The period of the legal operation of Solidarity, 1980-81, contributed to reassessing our attitude toward history.

[Ajenkew] The experience of recent years, the Solidarity period, and the public's reception of the social teachings of the church, resulted in rehabilitating the integrative aspect of the history of the society, the nation, and the state, in the sense that Solidarity, as the greatest mass movement in our history, as a movement of a broadly conceived community of working people, pointed to a factor uniting the society, namely, the national community. It seems to me that to a large part of the intelligentsia the rise of Solidarity caused a shock or even a kind of "moral revolution." This is being followed, as a continuing process, by the abandonment of Doublethink (an Orwellian term), the return to the world of real values, the cleansing of language to remove futility. The words "strike," "demonstrations," "elections" are gaining their present-day connotation, and thereby they also sound better for the past. Similarly, as a complement to this train of thought, such concepts as "the Nation," "Poland," and "Polishness" are becoming renovated. The period of the legal existence of Solidarity also caused a large proportion of historians to establish ties with the recipients of historical knowledge and co-creators of history. To us historians as persons operating with only partial truth, this confrontation was extremely painful.

[The imposition of martial law] on 13 December 1981 not only caused a shock but also introduced an unusually essential factor, namely, a return to the system of values linked to faith. This factor, together with the integrative motif, is important in a situation in which the general belief is that the Polish state is not completely sovereign, because we are dealing with various forms of dependence which precisely at present are becoming loosened, within the framework of the geopolitical Warsaw Pact.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] It is readily seen that every crisis in postwar Poland has been accompanied by demands to elucidate the truth about the near and distant past. Who needs most this truth, whose revelation is nowadays being demanded not only by the historian community?

[Ajenkew] I think that a fundamental feature of the existing system in its crisis form is the Doublethink I mentioned. This Doublethink is a terribly dangerous phenomenon, because it opens to doubt the system of values and the genuine knowledge of facts. When we are dealing with Doublethink, the range of assessments of history is extremely broad, from nearly total acceptance to nearly total rejection. This engenders what might be called the ambivalence of assessments. In recent decades history exercised to some extent a compensatory and at the same legitimizing and evaluating function. Replanting history in the soil of exact facts would be a salutary action.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] Meaning truth as a form of therapy?

[Ajenkew] Yes, even when truth is not very pleasing at a given moment. The point is that we should again root ourselves in reality instead of in imagination. For years our society had been learning how to live according to a formula which a satirist described as "an egg that is partially not fresh." We must therefore switch to lucid
and clear assessments, because when certain things are made public that will also be of portentous importance to the present by limiting the possibilities for falsification and preventing an exploitive approach to changes by those advocating them.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] Can truth enhance the credibility of the authorities?

[Ajnenkiew] I think so, contrary to appearances. If the authorities become willing to admit that such is their past, but that now they will genuinely strive to be a government for the people and by the people, then of course [passage deleted from original text and replaced with notation: Law of 31 July 1981 on the Censorship of Publications and Entertainment (Article 2, Point 3, DZ.U. No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983, No 44, Item 204)], but of a certainty they will gain credibility in the eyes of the public.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] This would also result in demolishing certain national myths, such as that during the Hitlerite occupation when the entire society, practically every man, combated the invader, which of course is untrue because, despite the absence of an organized political collaboration, it was in a way normal for people to "somehow" accommodate themselves to that occupation.

[Ajnenkiew] Or another myth, that of the alienation of the Stalinist regime from the public. After all, the government, though introduced with the aid of foreigners, had relatively rapidly gained broad social support. Besides, the Stalinist period was not a time during which five publicly known high-ranking Security Police officials and the five Politburo members directing them, and no one else, bore the responsibility for the deformations. There was also the well-organized huge apparatus which executed its tasks zealously and with pleasure, and a substantial segment of the society viewed that situation as normal or perhaps a transitional one. At any rate, the division into "us" and "them" markedly oversimplifies what really happened.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] Would you apply the term "blank spots in history" to these matters, too? How do you define that term?

[Ajnenkiew] Generally speaking, I construe that term as referring to problems or facts of history which, although known in broad outline, cannot be fully presented owing to interdisciplinary reasons, or more exactly, owing to the restrictions imposed by external factors, most often by censors, on the historian. A "blank spot" may also arise when access to certain materials is deliberately blocked with the object of complicating research into prime sources relating to a problem. This phenomenon occurs both in the domain of facts and in the domain of interpretations.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] I have the impression that certain historical topics are trumpeted by propaganda solely with the object of obscuring other, more essential topics that may be more troublesome to the decision-makers. For example, Katyn or 17 September 1939 [when Soviet troops invaded Poland] can hardly be considered classical "blank spots," because these matters have already long ago been elucidated in the works of Polish emigre historians or Western historians. I do not suppose that some propaganda campaign has changed the public's appraisal of these facts.

[Ajnenkiew] I would hardly agree with these two examples, because both 17 September 1939 and Katyn are, as a rule, treated in isolation from the general Soviet policy toward prewar Poland and toward the Polish population which after 17 September 1939 found itself under Soviet rule. So far, Katyn functions in our propaganda as a term whose use does not explain what it really is all about. To be sure, the embargo on that term has been abolished, but the circumstances, time, and place of the murders are not being made public. Nowhere in the official Polish press have I found any mention that Katyn is a place where Polish officers, inmates of the P.O.W. camp in Kozieg, were murdered, and that, according to all the materials we have on hand, these murders took place between March and June 1940 in an area which during that period was held by the Soviets, and that the murders were performed by special NKVD units. I suspect that this mention will also be absent from our present interview, once it is published.

What is being published instead is indirect criticism of the assumption that this crime was perpetrated by the Soviets. In this connection, the advocates of this mind-boggling defense ignore the articles by Roy Medvedev published in our official press, including also articles on Kuropaty [near Minsk, the site of a Stalinist massacre] which, as not all may know yet, was a Katyn on a much greater scale, the only difference being that there the Soviets perpetrated the crime on their own citizens.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] I conclude from this that, as a historian, and particularly as the chairman of the Main Board of the Polish Historical Society, you do not associate yourself with the works of the interparty commission of Polish and Soviet historians working to eliminate the "blank spots."

[Ajnenkiew] Let me begin by saying that that commission is a political body, and therefore expecting of it a scientific breakthrough in this field would be rather unrealistic. I at any rate feel skeptical about its work. As far back as in 1987 the Main Board of the Polish Historical Society presented to the government a list of problems which, we felt, need to be researched; we also declared our readiness to take part in that research. Unfortunately, that offer met with no response. With all
due respect to the historians taking part in the Commission’s work, we cannot consider that work so far as having produced substantive results. I happen to know that some of the Commission’s members themselves view the situation likewise.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] If only at least the Commission would succeed in securing access to Soviet sources for our historians.

[Ajenkiew] I think that even if only access to Polish sources still remaining on USSR territory could be secured, that in itself would be a huge accomplishment.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] But what if these sources, Polish or Soviet, no longer exist owing to, for example, their destruction?

[Ajenkiew] Fortunately, historians are familiar with the concept of substitute sources. After all it is not possible to destroy all archives. Assuming that archives on the Katyn crime and the liquidation of prisoners have ceased to exist, somewhere there must still survive documents on camp food supply, medical care, units assigned to guarding prisoners, etc. On the basis of these documents much can be elucidated. After all, scholars specializing in antiquity can reproduce an accurate image of the past on the basis of a remnant of several words. We, contemporary historians, have the comfort of being inundated by a sea of documentation, and I do not believe that such a sea could completely dry out. Not to mention the possibilities of indirect inference: if the archives are missing, in whose interest was it to destroy them?

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] About the Commission, I fear that its performance serves the public as a criterion for evaluating historians.

[Ajenkiew] This exactly worries me most. The historian community cannot but be perturbed by that body’s name, the “Polish Commission of Historians,” which should rather be named the “Party Commission Appointed by the PZPR.” Likewise, the information we are receiving about the work of that commission is unacceptable to us; for example, it has decided that no position may be taken on the secret protocol added to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, on the grounds that the original of that pact was not found in Moscow. For there exist many facts, though the information about them is indirect. Among other things, Volume 4 of Jan Szembek’s “Diarus i tekli” [Diary and Files] published in London in 1972 contains on pages 757-759, next to German-language text, a photostatic copy of the Russian text, that is, of the Soviet version of the secret protocol—a document which supposedly does not exist. There would be nothing easier for interested Soviet historians than to analyze that document.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] I believe that an analysis of our entire emigre historical literature could be very helpful to the Soviet side.

[Ajenkiew] Soviet policy after 23 August 1939 cannot be explained unless we consider the fact that since that date there had been far-reaching Soviet-German cooperation [passage deleted from original text and replaced with notation: Law of 31 July 1981 on the Censorship of Publications and Entertainment (Article 2, Point 3, DZ.U. No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983, No 44, Item 204)] in the Baltic republics, where besides the secret protocol to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact has since been published. I appreciate the importance of that publication to unmasking the Stalin-era genocide and I feel tremendous respect for the people who, despite the obstacles, undertook that publication.

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] In your opinion, what is to be expected of the discipline of history in Poland in the near future?

[Ajenkiew] In this country, too, something has begun to be done about the matters we have been discussing, although effects of serious research have yet to be awaited. I believe that our starting situation is good. Here considerable credit belongs to underground authors and their publications as well as to emigre historians, even though their works are not yet accessible in domestic libraries. I think that it is the paramount duty of domestic historians to undertake broad documentation research, compile materials, and coordinate a campaign to collect reminiscences relating to modern history. This also concerns undertaking extensive research into the Stalinist model of rule in Poland as well as into the system of terror and repressions as an organic element of that model. Of course, we are interested in the work of the party commission. But to us the most important thing would be to gain access to sources so far closed to Polish historians. It would also be important to know the Soviet position on Katyn and on the fate of the P.O.W.s from Ostashkov and Starobielsk, out of consideration for the moral aspect of the matter. This also applies to the secret protocol. But even if these questions were to be presented in a manner consonant with our knowledge of them and our feelings about them, this should not mean shutting off further research into them. For it is the duty of the historian to constantly verify the present knowledge of the past. Only a thus conceived science of history can serve to accomplish its purposes. This also applies to attempts to explain the present.

Postscript

[PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI] Professor, our interview is being published almost 3 months to the day from the date it was held. Would you care to comment on these 3 months, during which so much has happened, also in the discipline you represent?

[Ajenkiew] First of all, I am glad that, despite difficulties over which you, the editors, and I myself, had had no control, the interview will finally be published. But what is more important is that we are talking at a moment when the roundtable talks with their well-known positive
According to the GAZETA, farmers buying saltpeter were required to show not only tax receipts (for recording sales of fertilizers) but also their identity cards and to sign their names (on the nominating petition for Chadamik). It is hard to say which is supposedly more incriminating: the availability of saltpeter (let us clarify that this saltpeter was not suitable for inclusion in hams, shoulder joints, or... the electoral kielbasa) or the presence of a nominating petition to be signed.

As if there were more suitable places than gmina cooperatives for gathering signatures for the nomination of a Samopomoc Chlopska candidate! Places like, maybe, Centrum department stores in the Nation’s Capital, the Lodz Central, the SPHW companies, or maybe stores selling religious paraphernalia? No such thing. The right places for gathering such signatures are the fertilizer depots, procurement stations and sales outlets of gmina cooperatives, for it is there that people come to buy and sell things. And as for the fact that the Skierniewice gmina cooperatives offer saltpeter for sale, that they have merchandise to sell at all, is that supposed to be so terribly incriminating?

Large USSR ‘Polonia’ Voices Need for More Action
26000502 Warszawa RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
5 May 89 p 8

[Article by Lech Kantoch: “We Existed, Yet We Were Nonexistent,” under the rubric “Poles in the Soviet Union”]

[Text] Poles in the Soviet Union at present are greatly ambitious to foster Polish culture and language, owing to the Soviet perestroika and Polish “renewal” in recent years. Previously this issue was treated differently and not only the possibilities were lacking but difficulties—sometimes considerable—were present.

This was discussed, among other things, by representatives of Polonia organizations who recently visited Poland. During a press conference in the House of Soviet Science and Culture many bitter words were said about the past, about the last and so difficult 50 years. The saddest thing was, as Mrs Ita Kozakevich of Riga said, “We were treated like in Slawomir Mrozek’s play, ‘We existed, yet we were nonexistent.’” Yet the Polish ethnic community in the USSR is the largest in any country except the one in the United States. According to Soviet statistics for 1979, it numbers approximately 1,200,000 people residing in not only the European but also the Asian parts of the Soviet Union. Its origins and the reasons why it exists in the USSR vary.

In this connection, they do not want to be termed Polonia [i.e., emigres], saying, “But we never emigrated. We have been living here for centuries.” True, for historical reasons they found themselves living outside Poland’s boundaries. A majority, nearly a million, live in Belorussia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine. About 60,000 or...
70,000 live in Kazakhstan, and many fewer in the region of Irkutsk. The others are scattered throughout the huge territory of the Russian Republic.

They are best-organized in Lithuania, where the newly formed Union of Poles in Lithuania, based on the year-old Social and Cultural Association of Poles in Lithuania, recently held its first congress. That was a truly historic event, and it was attended by representatives of other organizations of Poles living in the USSR. At that congress it was resolved to form the Union of Poles in the USSR. It is worth noting that this project was discussed during the visit to Poland.

Still, much remains to be done. This was mentioned by Jan Sienkiewicz (the chairman of the Union of Poles in Lithuania) and by representatives of Polish associations in Belorussia, the Ukraine, and the distant Irkutsk. The latter were discussed by Izolda Novosilova of the Vistula Club (active since October 1969); she recalled that Poles have been living in Irkutsk for more than 200 years. The first Poles there were the Confederation of Bar insurgents, deported in the late 1760's and early 1770's. Later, other Poles appeared in distant Siberia, including the grandfather of Izolda Novosilova, an 1863 insurgent, Wojciech Koperski.

The Poles from the USSR said somewhat ruefully that in recent years there appeared in Poland a large number of various societies of friends of Vilnius and Grodno, as well as the Union of Siberians, which focus chiefly on the upkeep of graves and the popularization of the history of these cities and territories in Poland. Yet, the Poles living in the USSR have many problems, and what they are doing at present could be termed organic work, including the teaching of the Polish language from scratch, because it often is absent from schools.

The organization of Polish-language schools in the USSR is a major topic. The situation in this respect is satisfactory only in Lithuania, being much worse or very bad in the other Soviet republics. There are no Polish-language schools at all in Kazakhstan, where there exist entire Polish villages inhabited by people deported from the Polish autonomous districts of Belorussia and Lithuania during the years 1937-38.

Schools are the basis without which national consciousness cannot be raised. It also is necessary to organize Polish-language press. The newspaper CZERWONY SZTANDAR, published in Vilno, is so far the only Polish-language newspaper to be published in the USSR. There still persists a shortage of Polish-language books, and those provided from this country, chiefly through the efforts of the Polonia Society and the Democratic Party, still are a drop in the bucket. The problems enumerated above are only the beginning, as the activists of Polish organizations in the USSR are aware.

Direct Polish-Soviet S&T Cooperation Encouraged
26000501 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
4 May 89 pp 1, 8

[Interview with Mikhail G. Kruglov, minister, deputy chair of USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, in Warsaw in early May by Regina Dabrowska: "Fewer Topics, Greater Effects: Polish-Soviet Scientific Cooperation"; place of interview not given; first three paragraphs are RZECZPOSPOLITA introduction]

[Text] Talks are being held in Warsaw on May 3, 4, and 5, between the Office for Science and Technology Progress and Applications and the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology on the coordination of plans for direct scientific and technical cooperation between our countries.

In both countries an updating of the program adopted under the longrange plan for scientific and technical cooperation and the determination of targets for the next 5-year plan period are needed. It is necessary to accelerate progress and assure the resources for the immediate application of research results to production.

During these deliberations, I asked the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and technology, Minister Mikhail G. Kruglov, for an interview.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Is the Soviet perestrojka also evident in science and technology?

[Kruglov] It applies to all domains of our life, and hence also to science. This has become reflected chiefly in the way science is financed. As of last January, all research entities were converted to cost-effective accounting. Such a reform of the organization of our science and technological progress should produce tangible results in the very near future.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] What is the principal purpose of your present talks?

[Kruglov] We arrived here to accomplish two purposes: to draft conclusions on science and technology cooperation between our two countries for the next 5-year plan period, and to determine more precisely our longrange program for joint research. I wish to emphasize that nowadays we aspire toward a cooperation that would primarily encompass the domains with a broad social resonance. Hence, we want to expand both the production of consumer goods and cooperation in medicine, environmental protection, and construction. We also are thinking of including new domains in the cooperation: bioengineering and biocybernetics. On the other hand, some objectives specified several years ago have either ceased to be important or simply became no longer
timely and have to be abandoned. This also is the purpose of our present discussions. We want to focus only on the domains producing maximum social and economic results.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] You are scheduled to visit some of our research institutions. What is of special interest to you?

[Kruglov] We would like to speed up our production of new-generation television sets. As known, quality leaves something to be desired both in our country and in yours. That is why a corresponding objective for the next 5-year plan period will be included in the program for bilateral cooperation. Accordingly, we plan a visit to the Warsaw Television Works. I also would like to meet with the chairman of the State Atomic Energy Agency and to have a look at the electronic materials manufactured by the CEMAT Plant.

Abortion Rights ‘Women’s Defense Movement’ Formed
26000512b Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
9 May 89 p 5

[Article by (mb): “Women’s Defense Movement”]

[Text] Bydgoszcz. In this city was formed the Women’s Defense Movement, which is resolutely opposed to the draft Decree on the Legal Protection of the Fetus.

In this city of 400,000, flyers detailing the nature of that draft decree, prepared, as emphasized by the flyers, by a team from the Polish Episcopate and signed by 78 Sejm deputies, are being distributed.

Three originators of the Movement, Joanna Buszkowska, Halina Lewandowska, and Małgorzata Reszczyńska, provided their home addresses in the flyers and offered advice to all those interested in this problem. On 8 May they spoke on the “Radio-Echo,” a popular morning radio program, about the program assumptions of the Movement, and answered questions from listeners.

It is worth noting that several days ago some university students supporting the draft decree organized in Bydgoszcz a demonstration which met with a resolute counter-demonstration by the opponents of that decree.

Christian Democratic Club Elections, Regional Branches
26000495b Warsaw LAD in Polish
No 18, 30 Apr 89 p 3

[Text] On 8 April 1989, a meeting of the Main Board of the Christian Democratic Club (KChD) was held. A 10-member Secretariat of the Main Board, headed by Secretary General Tadeusz Zembrzuski, was formed. The director of the Office of the Secretariat is Wojciech Matysiak. The Main Board of the KChD is housed in Warsaw at 45 Mokotowska Street, Apartment 12. Phone: 29-17-58. The office is open daily (except on Saturdays and holidays) between 1200 and 1600 hours.

Editor Maciej Letowski became the press spokesman of the Christian Democratic Club.

At the same time, the Main Board established nine voivodship clubs and authorized the following persons to operate them: Wiesław Kownacki, Lebki Wielkie, 06-456 Ojrzen, Cichanow Voivodship; Marek Rusakiewicz, ul. Koniewska 19/4, Gorzow Wielkopolski, Gorzow Voivodship; Kazimierz Switon, ul. Mikołowska 30, m.7, 40-066 Katowice, phone 514-919, Katowice Voivodship; Zigniew Szczochwika, al. Wolności 14, m. 14, 67-200 Głogów, Legionica Voivodship; Ryszard Bender, ul. Solna 5/7, Lublin, phone 26-947, Lublin Voivodship; Bolesław Paszkiewicz, ul. Marka 8a, m. 41, 16-400, Suwałki, Suwałki Voivodship; Grzegorz Gorksi, ul. Rydygiera 16, m. 86, phone 87-100, Torun, phone 481201, Torun Voivodship; Marek Hulubicki (same address as that of the Office of the Secretariat of the Main Board), Warsaw, Warsaw Voivodship; Walery Piotrowski, ul. Gorna 15, phone 65-269, Zielona Gora, Zielona Gora Voivodship.

At the same time, the Main Board admitted as a sponsoring member (Paragraph 12 of the Statute) the “Truth and Justice” Political Association of Bydgoszcz. It is represented in the Club’s leadership by a member of the Main Board, Bronisław Pastuszewski.

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup
26000480 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish
No 18, 6 May 89 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

[Passage omitted] The congress of the Union of Socialist Polish Youth met at the Palace of Culture and Science. The organization has nearly 1.5 million members. They discussed which character—more political, mass, oriented to meeting varied needs of young people—the organization should adopt. The congress elected a new chairman; he is Grzegorz Dittrich (age 26), political scientist, previous chairman of the Union of Socialist Polish Youth in Katowice voivodship, member of the PZPR. [passage omitted]

The National Executive Commission of NSZZ Solidarity made structural changes in its membership: now it will be composed of two bodies—the so-called permanent branch in Gdansk and the so-called mobile branch. The National Executive Commission has authorized Ryszard Bugaj to direct the work of the organizations associated with forming an Institute for Socio-Occupational Studies. It designated Jaroslaw Kacynski chairman of a special commission which, according to the decisions of the roundtable, is to deal with taking over the union
symbols. A decision was also made to form an equipment and operations commissions chaired by Grzegorz Boguta to deal with printing and communications problems. Mr Nowina Konopka announced that on 9 May 1989 Lech Walesa will go to Strasbourg to receive a human rights award given by the Council of Europe.

The daily press has published the program report of the Second National Conference of PZPR Delegates, the election program of Solidarity [passage omitted], and the OPZZ election declaration. We read in the declaration: "In selecting our candidates, remember that they are to have abilities and knowledge suitable for work in the Sejm and the Senate, courage and determination in defending the working people and the support of the trade unions."

Zbyslaw Rykowsky, deputy press spokesman for the government announced at a press conference that an agreement on the boundaries between ocean areas in the Gulf of Pomerania has been initiated. A set of boundaries between the territorial waters, on the continental shelf, and in the fishing grounds has been initiated, or "practically speaking all of the issues between the GDR and Poland in the Gulf of Pomerania have been resolved, leaving no open questions." The spokesman responded to questions about the new regulations in the law on censorship in preparation. "Primarily, according to the proposal, some limitations on freedom of speech and printing will be liquidated. The list of publications and publishers not subject to censorship will also be broadened. The anachronistic regulation of records for copy machines will also disappear. The general implication of the changes is thus obvious."

Candidates for deputy and senator are appearing. As we learn, in Wroclaw signatures are being collected for Antoni Guwcynski (PZPR), director of the Zoo, who is well-known because of his television appearances with his wife, and for Prof Jozef Kaleta (PZPR), the aggressive, much published economist, as candidates for the Senate. Solidarity has nominated Prof Roman Duda and Doc Karol Modzelewski, an historian at the Wroclaw University. Prof Stanislaw Kwiatkowski, the popular head of the Public Opinion Research Center, member of the PZPR, well-known to readers of POLITYKA, indicated his willingness to run for the Senate on the Panorama television program. [passage omitted]

Adam Doboszynski, prewar activist of the Nationalist Camp, sentenced to death 40 years ago on a charge of spying for Germany and after the war for the Americans and later executed, has been cleared of all accusations, which were the basis of the sentence. The extraordinary review, brought by the first president of the Supreme Court and supported by the prosecutor, was examined by a 7-member panel of the Supreme Court chaired by Judge Wladyslaw Ochman. [passage omitted]

Jozef Pilsudski has been chosen the patron of the Gdansk Repair Shipyard at the request of the social organizations and management of the plant.

A record for car markets was recorded in the last issue of VETO: at Bemowo in Warsaw 133 million zloty was asked for a Mercedes 560 SEC in the American import version. The asking price for a new Passat was 57 million zloty.

The faces of Wladyslaw Anders, Stanislaw Maczek, and Stanislaw Sosabowski appear on new stamps in honor of the 45th anniversary of battles fought by the Polish Armed Forces in the West (80, 85, and 130 zloty). [passage omitted]

On the Left

[Passage omitted] Is it possible to compare the current situation in Hungary with the one prior to October 1956? Maria Ormos, a member of the MSZMP Central Committee, well-known historian and rector of the University in Pecc: At present there is a similar social mood. People are demanding democratization, constitutionalism, and explanation of the causes of the crisis. They want to know who is responsible for the crisis. They are also demanding rehabilitation of those illegally sentenced. Differences: a calm democratization is now possible, even if introduced very quickly. Today the MSZMP identifies with the reform; it itself is breaking up its previous monopoly of authority. It is making it possible to form other parties, making it possible to study the past. "History has never seen such actions."

The decision of the court in the case of N. Kolev has been annulled after an intervention by the Bulgarian Committee to Defend Human Rights and its chairman K. Tellalov (in Bulgaria there is also a dissident committee). N. Kolev, a writer and translator, was arrested on 18 March and sentenced to 18 months in a labor camp on a charge "of not performing socially useful work."

Reactions and polemics after A. Dubcek's interview for Hungarian television: the CSSR ambassador to Budapest protested, and a spokesman for the federal government of the CSSR, M. Pavel, announced that the CSSR ministry of foreign affairs had expressed amazement at the actions of Hungarian television and the conviction that such undesired actions would not be repeated.

In Slovenia, a new, independent political group has been formed, the Slovene Christian-Social Movement. "More than 40 years ago we as Christians were excluded from political life and treated as second-class citizens," Peter Kovacic-Persin, one of the activists of the new movement, told an AFP correspondent. The new organization wants to nominate candidates for the elections to the legislative bodies in 1990, either independently or together with other opposition groups that have formed in Slovenia in recent months.
The Hungarian Communist Youth League changed its name to the Democratic League of Hungarian Youth by a vote of two-thirds at its congress.

Janos Kadar's illness does not permit him to comment publicly. "We should not expect his comments for posterity. It is not impossible that his appearance at the last plenum of the MSZMP Central Committee was his last appearance on the political stage," commented Rezsö Nyers, member of the Politburo and minister of state. "We should make an analysis of the epoch of Kadar as quickly as possible, but the evaluation of the role of Kadar includes everything associated with the epoch bearing his name, not just the recent period or particular stages."

On 25 April, the withdrawal of the Soviet military from Hungary began. By the end of 1990, one-quarter of the personnel and one-third of the tanks are to be withdrawn.

In Zagreb, as the AFP termed it, the first independent, political paper REPUBLIKA, which is published by the Association for the Yugoslavian Democratic Initiative, has appeared.

Pastors and members of the independent human rights movement active in the GDR have stated that they will not participate in the elections to local authorities scheduled for 7 May 1989 because "there is no choice between candidates representing various political conceptions."

From Jan Ciechanowicz's interview for CERWONY SZTANDAR. [Question] On the day prior to the election, some of your voters received flyers beginning with the words: Jan Ciechanowicz or Ivan Tikhonovich? Two names, two faces? What do you have to say about your name and nationality? [Answer] As regards the methods of election campaigning, probably the flyer and a number of the attacks against me in the mass media show that our society still lacks a culture of political discussion. As regards my real name, given name and nationality, unfortunately in my documents, as in the documents of many Poles, they were distorted. It is no secret that after the war not only were the first and last names of Poles distorted but their nationality was also frequently changed without their consent. I assure all interested persons that I am a Pole and so for the time being the only candidate for USSR deputy of Polish nationality from the Lithuanian SSR. In terms of the percentages of the nationalities in our republic, there should be at least three Polish representatives. But, as they say, democracy is democracy. [passage omitted]

Opinions

Witold Gintowt-Dziwiatkowski, delegate to the 10th PZPR Congress from Elblag:

(From a comment during a regional conference of delegates, GLOS WYBRZEZA 24 April 1989)

"We frequently encounter cases of stifling criticism. In the party, we have never made a complete accounting with the past. We must finally end this matter and stand on a pure road. I wonder whether we need a National Conference of Delegates, which the congress deprived of the ability to make crucial decisions. Shouldn't we express our trust with a secret ballot at the National Conference of Delegates on the report of the members of the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee?"

Edward Lipiec, activist in Solidarity of Individual Farmers from Zielona Gora Voivodship:

(Interviewed by Ryszard Rowinski, NADODRZE 29 March-11 April 1989)

[Lipiec] We propose a return to the traditional notion of the head of a village.

[NADODRZE] A gmina [rural township] administrator is insufficient?

[Lipiec] A gmina administrator is nominated, and he performs his service function to the community for better or worse. But in fact, however, he is primarily a representative of the interests of those who put him in that position. He is a sort of plenipotentiary of the administrative authorities, a governor. But we want the village head to be responsible, not to his superiors, but to the community he is to serve. This can be achieved through an elective system. If the people of the gmina elect the village head, his responsibility to the community will be completely different.

Dr Grzegorz Mazur, historian at the Jagiellonian University:

(Interviewed by Przemyslaw Osuchowski, GAZETA KRAKOWSKA 8-9 April 1989)

[GAZETA KRAKOWSKA] In recent years, much has been said about the inaccessibility of certain "secret" archives. In your opinion, how are things now?

[Mazur] Things are better than people generally think they are. For example, there is much unused, unsearched material in the available archives of the Central Archive of the PZPR Central Committee or of the Military History Institute. There is much work here for very many historians. It is also easier to gain access to emigre archives. Unfortunately, everything is dispersed. Establishing a clear policy regulating access for scholars to the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is a separate problem. That is practically the last of the significant areas to which we still do not have access. The opening of the archives of the USSR special services, which is for now still a dream, would contribute much information.
Witold Karczewski, chairman of the Voivodship Trade Union Confederation in Bialystok:

(Interviewed by Wieslaw Kobylinski, KURIER PODLASKI 21-23 April 1989)

[KURIER PODLASKI] You have not only run afoul of the government. It has also been said that Miodowicz has violated party discipline by presenting officially a position different, in many questions, from that adopted by the Politburo. This shocks many people, especially party members.

[Karczewski] I am not in the business of evaluating the chairman of the OPZZ as a member of the Politburo. However, the political innovation is real. I am thinking of the open solidarity Miodowicz has expressed with the rank-and-file membership which has not been too pleasant for the ears of the other members of the highest party authorities.

Zofia Wasilkowska, minister of justice in 1956-57:

(Interviewed by Piotr Biernat, TAK I NIE 21 April 1989)

[TAK I NIE] What was Gomulka’s attitude to the process of rehabilitation?

[Wasilkowska] The initiation of this process belonged to Ochab, and the first rehabilitations began under him. Gomulka obviously supported them, but only those that concerned issues from 1949-53. He opposed the revision of earlier sentences, because first they fell during the period of the civil war, and second he was responsible for some of them. Thus, Gomulka never admitted his mistakes; he decided to lower a curtain of silence over the period of the civil war and the sentences handed down then.

[TAK I NIE] Is that why the rehabilitations could not be completed then?

[Wasilkowska] Yes!

From the resolution of the Executive of the Gorzow PZPR Voivodship Committee:

(ZIEMIA GORZOWSKA 21 April)

The PZPR Voivodship Committee formulated a recommendation on 8 September 1988 to . . . apply to the Central Committee for approval of a decision to release the PZPR weekly from the obligation of serving one party. . . . This is also associated with the development of a policy line and set of tasks for the paper that responds to the characteristics of the new period. . . .

Since during the recent period, the next stage in national reconciliation—the roundtable—has occurred and is causing deep changes in the operations of the press and the use of paper in the changed circumstances (in practice, whoever has the resources can start a new paper), this recommendation, which aimed at a self-limitation of the party’s ability to promote its policy against the legal operation of the opposition, would be a gratuitous gesture. Thus the Executive of this Voivodship Committee, taking into account the persistence of the view of the Central Committee toward voivodship party offices’s statutory right of supervision of the paper, has decided to present the plenum with a proposal to annul the recommendation to “de-party” ZIEMIA GORZOWSKA. [passage omitted]

YUGOSLAVIA

‘Clash’ Between Suvar, Milosevic Discussed

28000110a Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 18 Apr 89 pp 9-11

[Article by Jelena Lovric: “Clash of Personalities or of Concepts. Our Whole Movement Will Run Headlong Into the Temptation To Clash With Itself and With Its Own Heritage”]

[Text] On the same day the Central Committees of our two largest republic party organizations—those of Serbia and Croatia—passed diametrically opposed resolutions on the same question. In Serbia they are determined that the coming LCY congress should be considered extraordinary because that is “what the charter requires”; in Croatia they are convinced that there are not sufficient arguments for making it an extraordinary congress, not just because the Vojvodina initiative to that effect is defective, more like an improvisation than a proposal worked out in accordance with the charter, but also because they view the insistence on making the congress an extraordinary one as an effort to reduce issues at the congress to just leadership changes and organizational issues, to ensure, as Stipe Suvar put it, that the so-called antibureaucratic revolution proceeds at a forced pace. The Communists of Croatia are leaving the decision as to the status of the congress to the LCY Central Committee [CC] but they are insisting the congress be well prepared. Thus, this was an extremely sharp and unpleasant manifestation of the division which had already been keeping the party leaderships busy recently, not seldom provoking bewilderment and disapproval among party members and the public, who are unable to grasp what lies behind this verbal sparring. This dilemma was supposed to be resolved by the LCY Central Committee on Friday but after spending the entire day in debates on party reform, at the decisive moment, late at night, when at last the Central Committee should have started to unravel or cut through the Gordian knot, it broke off the session with the intention of resuming it on Wednesday. Some assert that this postponement was due to the fact that the Sava Center, where the plenum was being held, was reserved for a children’s masked ball on Saturday, while others feel that in the meantime party leaders will try yet once more to reconcile the irreconcilable with some sort of balancing
act. Thus, they might declare that the coming congress will be known as the “Fourteenth Congress of the LCY (Extraordinary),” which everyone could accept, thanks solely to the lucky detail of the parentheses, without feeling themselves vanquished in advance.

But in the meantime in the course of getting across the river of party debates and quarrels, a new episode occurred which brought the divisions to white heat: right after the start of the LCY CC meeting, Mihailo Milojevic demanded that Suvar not preside since he felt that would be a “disgrace” after Suvar’s pre-election speech (at the LCC [League of Communists of Croatia] Central Committee meeting 2 days before), which Milojevic said represented a “blow intended to bring about the breakup of Yugoslavia, to produce a clash between Serbs and Croats.” Milojevic had discovered that the essence of Suvar’s political program was “hatred for Serbia” and that his “crazed attack on Serbia was quite without precedent in this country’s recent political history.”

Although Milojevic was not alone in his proposal and although he cited the “many” who shared his views in the LCY CC, when his amendment was put to a vote, it received only 23 votes. Thus Suvar emerged once again from the—if our memory does not deceive us—fourth successive challenge to him (that same group keeps on fabricating them with incredible persistence) with an almost incredible show of confidence in himself, more so each time. Is it not time for the “inspirers and organizers” of such attacks to finally reflect on that fact? Because as Suvar’s authority grows, the authority of those who keep on challenging him—it seems only to benefit him—decreases. Nonetheless, it still came as a surprise that there was such a small number of votes in favor of depriving Suvar of the chairmanship. It means that not even all the members of those circles whence the missile was shot voted for the proposal. Is that because the blow against Suvar was launched in such a brutal manner, with such shrill and pogromic words that not even those who have recently become accustomed to all types of political coarseness were able to tolerate and support it? Or was the vote affected by the fact that Suvar’s election speech was given at a meeting of the LCY CC and that afterwards he was triumphantly elected to the Assembly as a member of the federal governmental presidency? Or—as one heard in the corridors—were members of the LCY Central Committee aware that it was unfair to mention only Suvar by name, since other inflamed and irreconcilable voices have been heard as well?

Because if Suvar threw down a gauntlet to the Serbian leadership, Slobodan Milosevic threw down something more than a gauntlet at the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. Or are there more and more people with reservations not only about the manner in which such political wanted posters are nailed up but also about the policy that inspires them, most often creating intentional rows about other persons to distract attention from the policy? Or is there some fifth element at work? Only now, when in a sense Stipe Suvar and indirectly Slobodan Milosevic find themselves facing off once again, do we wonder whether this is a clash of two personalities who cannot get along (it does not matter whether that is because they are too similar or because they are totally different) or a clash between two nations (as some have suggested recently, pronouncing the dichotomy between the Serbs and the Croats a fundamental one) or a clash of two political concepts.

** Tried-and-True Recipe **

We will not argue now about whether it was advisable for Suvar to use the meeting of his own republic’s party leadership to keep his old promise about calling a spade a spade, which as a federal official he ought to have done at the federal level, and whether it was honorable of him to give that frank speech when he already had one foot in his new job and thus was not risking anything. What is indisputable is that once again Suvar delivered his pre-election speech according to the tried-and-true recipe that you should tell your voters what they want to hear. It is virtually beyond doubt that even without this Suvar would have been elected, but probably not with that degree of support which has almost promoted him now to “leader of Croatia.” Naturally the artificial creation of a “ Croatian Ban” [historical title for a provincial governor] does not accord at all with the interests and democratic yearnings of Croatia as a pluralistic community, but it does accord with the wishes of a frightened Croatia, which like a panicked chick would rather seek the security of some political setting then than assume responsibility for one of those strenuous options, including the “Yugoslav synthesis,” that demand every individual’s commitment. Although there are those who assert that Suvar is not cut out to be a leader, there are others who consider him made to measure for the allegedly institutionalized and depressed “Croatian being.”

But, without regard for what the future will bring Suvar and what he will bring it—which is also unknown—we can assert with total certainty that his pre-election speech, although it was quite determined and resolute, cannot be considered an insult to any nation because Suvar nowhere mentioned Serbia and the Serbian nation by name. It is quite another thing if in two places he spoke critically about the practice of “some leaders of the League of Communists” which “think, it seems, only of their nation or of what they say are ‘their nations’ and forget that there are other nations and leaders as well. They forget that it is impermissible, to put it mildly, in the name of their nation or their nations to charge the others with backing counterrevolutionary tendencies; to charge other leaders—including the LCY CC—with being strongholds of bureaucratic counterrevolution (strongholds which is it urgently necessary to demolish); and to threaten with calls for national meetings in other parts of the country, with visits by those whom no one has invited, with downright punitive expeditions, with statements that the people will awaken in other republics
too and overthrow the leaderships there." Of course it is not hard to guess who Suvar was thinking about there, just as it is very easy to guess who he is aiming at when he says that there is an illusion that it is possible to take the LCY CC by storm, imposing decisions to ensure an automatic majority and the adoption of policies "thought up by the person in question or by someone from the leaderships." Nonetheless, it is not at all possible to say that his remarks pertained to whole nations. Suvar said that the most difficult task politically would be to defeat "enraged behavior by nationalisms," the imposition of national programs, the launching of national leaders, and sieges by national governments, which lead to catastrophe and clashes without end. Here he added that "I am not talking only about Albanian separatist nationalism," that "today all nationalisms are striving to break up Yugoslavia or to change her to fit their requirements." Insisting that nothing must be allowed to threaten either national freedoms or the equality of all nations and nationalities, Suvar said that for "everyone the most important thing is that Yugoslavia not become weak, and that no republic's strength come at Yugoslavia's expense," and that "Yugoslavia cannot bear a Serbian or Croatian or Slovene stamp or that of any particular nation: nobody can hold primacy in Yugoslavia."

The Croats Draw Closer Together

It is difficult then to see anything very provocative in Suvar's speech. But the question arises not only why the Yugoslav Communists' number 1 man waited so long to speak out (some feel too long) but also to what extent his own insufficient clarity in the past, his own scheming have poured oil on the fire which is now mercilessly burning us all. People still have not acquired the habit of judging politicians by their deeds rather than by their words so honors go to those whose economies are collapsing or there is loud support for those who have finally abandoned their rigid concepts. In any case, with the "adoption" of Suvar by the "Croatian nation" and his explicit support for the Croatian leadership, it appears that the Croats are now drawing closer together in view of the homogenization of Serbia. The Croatian leadership has not changed its positions except that it is expressing them more decisively and resolutely now, presumably because of the realization that fear can be politically destructive and that it is necessary to encourage the Croatian nation. But this does not necessarily mean there is a Serbian/Croatian dichotomy. Even when there is such a dichotomy, it is not possible to reduce the whole wealth of Yugoslav interrelationships, differences, and disputes just to that and to express everything only in those terms, even though sometimes people want to and even insist on doing so. Thus, for instance, the polarization over the extraordinary congress/regular congress question, which is only a metaphor for some far deeper differences of opinion about Socialism and Yugoslavia as our two fundamental institutions—and thus also about reforming the party, which derives from the first two—shows that the line of division is rather different than is usually suggested in black and white terms. Only Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Serbia were expressly in favor of an extraordinary congress, while all the other republic party organizations expressed explicitly nuanced reservations toward that proposal. Thus they decided their own republic congress meetings would be regular and demanded or supported having the federal-level congress be extraordinary, or else they still have not yet expressed an opinion on their own congress (Serbia), which naturally is the supreme proof of a principled position. To that extent it is difficult to accept the idea that the substantive, national, and ideological clash is occurring today primarily along the Belgrade-Zagreb axis.

But one could perhaps guess from some minor details that we are moving toward a change in the correlation of forces in the gradual growth in the reservations felt toward certain proposals coming from Serbia. We might think first of the small number of votes in favor of removing Suvar from the working presidium or of the large number of invalid ballots when they elected the new members of the presidium at the last meeting of the LCY CC. While there was not a single invalid ballot in the vote for the candidates from Bosnia-Hercegovina, there were seven for those from Kosovo, and 27 invalid ballots when they voted for the candidates from Serbia. Naturally that may not mean anything but then again it may, particularly since invalid ballots have become a very common method of expressing political will or obstruction in recent years. Politicians can react to those signs by self-examination or by pounding the drum about unprincipled coalitions, hatred for a certain nation, and foreign phobias, which, judging from the news from the rest of the world recently, is apparently no longer unique to Yugoslavia but is occurring all over the world.

But if we leave behind us this sort of irrational talk, where the dominant categories are love and hate, faith and blasphemy, then it is easy to see that the fundamental clash in Yugoslavia is occurring between two political concepts, between the blocs of reformist forces, the forces of a new Socialism, and those who cry out for the party to take a commanding role, for centralization and majority rule in national policy, and for centralism in leading society. In this sense Suvar's introductory speech at the last session of the LCY Central Committee is incomparably more important and far-reaching than his reelection speech. There Suvar unambiguously took his stand on the side of the reformist forces, presumably applying to himself his statement that "we have gradually come to question and in the end to reject much of what just yesterday we were defending in theory and attempting to apply in practice, but which did not stand up to the test, which was not successful, and which led us down the wrong path." In opposing the models of "a conflicted and divided society which wears itself out to the point of self-destruction in the production of hostility, truly producing misery and poverty, unrest and fear," Suvar said—and I quote—that "Socialism must be
the product of social practice, made to the measure of man" and that "change in the LCY must be founded and carried out on the basis of a new concept of Socialism."

Differences as to the goals, scope, and meaning of reform in the LCY arise from differences in the kind of society people want. Some would like genuine systemic change in the LCY's role, others would only change and perfect the methods and forms of its rule so that the party could once again legitimize itself socially, while still others would like it to revive its monolithism and commanding role from the past. But the very idea of change, Suvar says, expresses the need for the LCY to change with respect to society first of all and not only to carry out internal modifications or minor corrections in the form or manner in which it is organized. If it wants to remain a historically relevant and simultaneously democratic organization, the LCY cannot and must not retain its current role in society, not only because it is impossible to call a society democratic in which the crisis of one organization or the ability of one tenth of the total population determines the political and economic fate of the entire country, but also because the crisis that has arisen in the LCY's role and activity proves that the problem lies first of all in the LCY's systemic position. The basis for change in the LCY is change in its role in society, which would bring to the fore the issues of the political system, direct elections, freedom of association, political pluralism, the rule of law, the economic integration of labor and capital, markets and technology, freedom of action for trade unions, youth, new social movements. And the fundamental prerequisite for thorough reform of the political system is that the LCY be committed to political pluralism, Suvar says, so that his new political profile fits in perfectly with the largest section of the bloc of reform forces.

Line of Division

But there is no way he can be the founder of that bloc; at this moment he is only an associate of it, although a valued one. If any politician personifies that line, it is Milan Kucan, who can be pleased that he has brought Suvar too over to his Socialism with a human face. That other line is personified by Slobodan Milosevic, however. Although there was some question which direction he would move in and how after his triumphant "unification of the republic," there is now considerably less question after the latest meetings of the central committees. A chest-pounding "reform" policy which charges others with being in favor of the status quo essentially reduces radical change of the party to a change in leaderships, and that by way of the so-called antibureaucratic revolution, quarrels, punishments, and exclusions. Since that change has no intention whatsoever of changing the party's current systemic position as a priori avant-garde—indeed it wishes only to insist on it—we can see that its radicalness really is false and manipulative, like that illusion it also has about simple solutions to the crisis. Drago Dimitrovic remarked of that illusion that it "is interested in who will rule rather than in how we will produce better and live better. For production, development, competition, and seeing who wants to do better and can, we need agreement about the possibilities. If we are interested in production, then some degree of difference can actually act as a driving force, but we need to ensure that the best always come to the fore, that we do not strangle initiative, individuality, and interest. If we are interested in production, we need to create associates, not enemies. The ones who always need enemies are the ones who cannot survive using their own hands and head." Naturally the line of these divisions is not determined by nationality nor by republic boundaries. To go back to Dimitrovic, our whole movement will run headlong into the temptation to clash with itself and with its own heritage. Many want to avoid that and are working hard to find enemies so as to conceal their own inability and incapacity. In this regard we will get to know who is who in the League of Communists in the coming months and that could—Dimitrovic says—divide us again at the congress.

This understanding may help us view and explain the new radicalization that has occurred in the last few days in Serbian political fora, just when we hoped that Serbia, having become the equal of—indeed more equal than—the other republics, would really move on to the issues of reform. However, some political messages of the last few days, which sounded almost like declarations of war, may really testify to the effort to avoid coming face to face with oneself, which in this case, far from being idyllic, could be deeply painful and disturbing—both for individuals and for policy as a whole. The economic indicators are the worst in Yugoslavia: for instance, not only does Serbia without the provinces have the biggest losses (because social peace was purchased by pay raises for which there was no money), but the economy in this republic is the most heavily burdened in Yugoslavia. As for politics, the politicians are having to use various ruses to avoid responding to the question of why they are not moving toward multiple candidates in elections as other areas are, and more and more voices are saying that now that a firm line has succeeded in bringing about constitutional unification, Serbia must move toward political pluralism by means of democratization. That fissure between the thinking part of society and the political leadership, which adheres totally to a Bolshevik party line, is being bridged over for now by the search for new enemies. But despite the frenzied and varied activities of our diplomatic representatives, the fissure that has arisen with the internationalization of the Kosovo problem will cast a dark shadow across the entire country, because, as Suvar said, curiosity about seeing arrests announced at meetings is "one of the reasons why Europe and the world are viewing political events in Yugoslavia with more and more skepticism and concern."

Thus we are seeing not a clash between two personalities in Yugoslavia (regardless of what they think about it and what they would like in this regard) nor a clash of two or
more nations (although that very often seems to be precisely the case), but rather a clash between two totally opposite political lines. It really is a choice between the past and the future.

**Suvar Seen Gaining in Popularity**

28000115a Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
25 Apr 89 p 14

[Article by Gojko Marinkovic: "Suvar the Wonder"]

[Text] Today, it is clear even to blind men that we are running in a circle, that we are marching in place, or perhaps the people are right who say that we are turning into an enormous crab without claws (he walks backward, but cannot bite in front). From the 13th congress to this very day, at least as far as the party is concerned, and unfortunately it is still the only measure of things, we have taken exactly 22 steps, some of them large, some of them small, backward. At one point (the First LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] Congress), it seemed that on the notorious three reforms, which I prefer to call the triple reform, a consensus had been found that would change the crab's direction, but what today is left of those resolutions unanimously adopted? History truly seems to be repeating itself. Dr Dusan Bilandzic would say that Yugoslavia is a land of wonders. At the sixth congress in 1952, did we not settle accounts with Stalinism, and before that proclaim self-management, and then go on in the same old way? And then after that did we not try three more times to escape the jaws of Stalinism and state socialism, but every time we returned to it like a first love we never got over? And all of this was done by the same people who simply were unable to escape the fact that politics is a game for power and a game with power. The people tend to compare politics to trickery, and isn't trickery symbolized by the fox who changes his coat, but never his nature. Is that happening even today, are the politicians now saying one thing, doing another, and contemplating something different from either? What happened with that unanimous first conference at which the attempt to institute the state of emergency was frustrated? Well, in brief: amendments were adopted to the Constitution whose greatest value is that they institute various types of ownership, which deals only the first blow to state socialism, which in our version has been hidden behind the imaginary concept of social ownership. And that is virtually all, but we have piled onto the other pan of the scale so much that this little constitutional triumph seems nothing more than a feather. We have reached the point where our largest bank note is worth $5, in one part of the country there is almost a state of war, through another they are carrying the bones of dead saints and the icons of living saviors, entire republics and nationalities are being accused of conspiracy and anti-Yugoslavism, and university rector's are being accused of espionage. Propaganda warfare, which is what some people call the exchange of fire between the republics, is raging. It is true that it takes at least two to make war, but is history not full of examples when wars were declared unilaterally? But there is no need to waste too many words describing what we ourselves are aware of, since we are more or less all convinced that nationalisms are on the march, with the sole difference that many people refuse to acknowledge their own, but only see the other fellow's. What has actually happened, what has set the people in motion?

There is much here, we have to admit, that is irrational, but the main reason, the cause of our crisis, lies in the fact that the inhabitants of this country no longer want to live on promises, nor in a system which is historically condemned to ruin. And such "revolutionary" situations are ripe for manipulation. Clever politicians, fighters for the rights of the nationality, easily rally the people with promises made lightly, thus creating new illusions. And even after the 1971 crisis did not the people trust that new leadership which later brought us here where we are now? We have to believe that this present deception will not last as long, since there are no longer those additional billions of dollars which we would blow like drunk billionaires. But these turbulent crisis states are also ripe for other options. One of them is in fact pluralism, which does not recognize pacification of the nationality and the argument that the main thing is being a Serb, a Croat, a Slovene.... The other component of this option is democracy; in our context, that means multiple candidates and direct elections. If they had adopted the Serbian recipe for coronation in Vojvodina, the "revolutionary economist" Draoko Zarkovic would now be sitting in the SFRY State Presidency and not writing letters to the Assembly like an insulted child and accusing it of autonomism. Had it not been for the secret ballot and multiple candidates, I am convinced that the Macedonian Jakov Lazarovski would now be among the magnificent eight, and if the players in the shadows had not become involved, who knows but what Bosnia and Herzegovina would have been represented by none other than Dr Nenad Kecmanovic. The congress will soon be taking place in Montenegro; even now, many people are saying that it will be a triumph for Milosevic's line. I would not be too hasty with such assessments. Let us wait a few more days. Not that I am playing at being a fortune-teller, but still, who says that Slobodan Milosevic would win by a landslide in secret elections in Serbia? True that he has united Serbia, but in that renewed Serbia 33 percent of the population is non-Serb, nor is the opposition to "the leader" negligible. Even Dobrica Cosic, I have read in certain foreign newspapers, has withdrawn his loyalty, and then where are those who have been differentiated and those who sympathize with them? Surely, "Only Concord Saves the Serb" is not the principal slogan for all Serbs. Many people who today have to think in public the way the militant leadership thinks, should they find themselves alone with their own conscience, who knows whose name they would circle on the ballot. And did not the episode concerning the vote of confidence in Dr Stipe Suvar at the 22d Plenum of the LCY Central Committee demonstrate that what is called Sloba's bloc is not really so united? There were barely 23 hands raised, but what if it had been secret? And even this is something that was generated by this marching in
place: Suvar has definitively become a Yugoslav figure and it was Milosevic who organized the basis for that. Suvar is an astute politician, a player in for the course, one, to be sure, who often may be counterproductive, but it is a mistake to think that he has won the favor of Croatia (and not only that of Croatia) because he has changed his shirt and because he has turned into the first fighter for what is referred to as the new socialism. The father of targeted education and advocate of the idea that work is liberating, the author of the "white paper" and the man to whom it was not foreign to assert that any socialism would be better than any capitalism, a man for whom Lenin’s NEP was only a tactical move and concession (presumably to the counterrevolution), for whom the Stabilization Program was a program of fire-fighting measures, is today a fighter against the party state, against the monopoly of a single opinion, and a fighter for democracy and pluralism, for the law of value, and for the market. Perhaps I am mistaken, perhaps I am too much a holder of grudges, but I cannot escape the impression that Suvar has become enamored of that realm of ideas which is favored by his base. But let us suppose that Suvar’s transformation, although accomplished in an amazing short time, is sincere and real; he still has Milosevic’s assault troops to thank for his return home and triumph in the Croatian Parliament. It is incontestable that Suvar has definitively imposed himself as a man to be reckoned with over the long haul. If at this point we overlook Milan Kucan as a third significant figure on our political terrain (though I do so reluctantly), Suvar and Milosevic appear to be the antipodes. Some people are ready to see the two of them as representatives of the two basic lines, the left and the right, to use the old vocabulary, one in favor of reform, and the other using an antibureaucratic revolution as a screen for a new firm hand, one in favor of the market, the other for a subvariant of the consensus economy, and so on, and so forth.... Suppose that that is so? But a little bit of history is never amiss: Have not even the greatest advocates of reform in Yugoslavia known, whenever it was necessary to them, to cast their fundamental commitments in the mud and to move over to the position of the struggle for power? Why should it not also work in the reverse, since we are a land of wonders which now only a miracle can save? If that wonder should be a Suvar who has become conscious, who now at last for once in his life has agreed to learn something from others, and even to bury a few hatchets, then let it be Suvar and what he now personifies. I am not persuaded, but—you live and you learn.

Failure To Legalize Association for Democratic Initiative Deplored
28000110b Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
18 Apr 89 pp 23-24

[Article by Jasna Babic: “Spoken and Retracted. Why the Croatian Secretariat for Internal Affairs Refused To Register the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative”]

[Text] The Secretariat for Internal Affairs [SUP] of the Croatian Socialist Republic has refused to register the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative [UJDI], currently the largest and certainly the most respected political organization among the new “parties” of—allegedly democratized Yugoslavia.

This news spread through Yugoslavia without fanfare and without commentary: first of all as a blow at the Croatian leadership, which had promised its citizens free political competition and a new “Yugoslav synthesis.” However, the best experts on conditions in the republic at the boundary between “North” and “South” had long since predicted precisely such a decision by the police, although they had anticipated a different justification for it: that they would refuse to legalize the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative because its Charter does not include provisions on mass defense and social self-defense, although the Law on Social Organizations and Associations of Citizens explicitly requires that. Or possibly because it has not established a self-managing control body.

But things turned out differently. To explain the rejection of the organization of Yugoslav democrats, the 3 April Decision by the republic “ministry” for internal affairs cited its programmatic documents, its Manifest and Charter, whose goals and purposes—according to the “competent authority”—“go beyond those of associations of citizens.” This leaves these political “alternativists,” who by no means wish to see themselves branded as an illegal and therefore hostile or counterrevolutionary group, with only one possibility: it, the association, can proclaim itself a social organization and, thus rechristened, once again request police blessing.

But however obstinate and fastidious it may seem—are an association and a social organization not all the same thing, as long their political program is not affected?—the UJDI’s ideologists did not accept this quiet suggestion with much sympathy. Four days later, on 7 April, they published a statement containing the following message to the ministry for internal affairs:

Tactics

"...It is quite clear that the Decision is based on a political, more precisely on a tactical political, position, because the law in no wise states unambiguously that associations of citizens are a lower form of organization, the nature of which the UJDI’s goals exceed... The members of the Executive Committee of the UJDI, on the basis of what has been said, do not accept the SUP’s Decision as a correct point of view and will strive to get the Decision annulled and simultaneously will continue to work for the further spread of democratic ideas and practise."

And it is true: if it is impossible to assign the organization of Yugoslav democrats to the category to which belong associations of citizens such as the Croatian Fruitgrowers Society and the Association of Secretaries of Croatia, it is no more sensible to assign it to the class of social organizations, to which belong the Beekeepers
Alliance and the Auto-Moto Society. Although Article 2 of the Community Provisions of the Law on Social Organizations and Associations of Citizens ascribes to social organizations "social matters" and to associations "community interests and the carrying on of various activities," the difference between the social and community, the matters and the activities is so vague and unclear that the act of categorization can in truth only be arbitrary one. Whether something is an association or a society depends first and foremost on the form the newly-founded organization ascribed to itself and secondarily on the free judgement of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs charged with registering it. Thus, the difference between the two, at least according to the letter of the law, is determined by a political decision: an association of citizens has the right to act autonomously based on the self-management decisions of its own assembly, while a social organization, in order even to register, must obtain the "recommendation" of the Socialist Alliance of Working People [SSRN] which for its part determines whether it is socially justified, necessary, and acceptable.

The Yugoslav democrats' insistence on the status of association—which is written into the controversial constituent documents themselves—is not therefore a question of formalistic pedantry. This time—perhaps on political instructions from somebody—the Administrative Affairs Section of the republic SUP is attempting by means of its negative decision to push them into the ranks of an existing political institution, while they on the other hand want to preserve not only their programmatic but also their organizational independence from the Socialist front—a degree of independence not achieved by even one of the Slovene "parties" in their far more liberal political environment. Will the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative succeed?

The Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative has a considerable ideological advantage over the Slovene alliances. The world of official politics, under siege by symbolic/nominal manifestations, naturally is not inquiring as to the democratic nature of the association as long as it has the word "Yugoslav" in its name. While other political organizations in Slovenia and Croatia, with their national or republic names, must constantly be proving that they were not created for separatist and anti-Yugoslav purposes, the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative has long been pulling off inconceivable political moves—not because it speaks for "citizens" but because it is "Yugoslav." For the first time in a long time none of the "national" big shots reacted to the thinking about Kosovo which the UJDI laid out in its first communiqué on the occasion of the Trepcë miners' strike: Kosovo as the result of a mistaken political method and not of counterrevolution.

Absurd

And yet—or perhaps precisely because of this, because of its Yugoslavness—the UJDI has found itself in a more absurd situation than the other political "alternatives" as they have started life. As a Yugoslav organization, the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative cannot and does not want to become part of any particular republic front, including the Croatian SSRN, its leaders and ideologists explain. It cannot and does not want to act through the Federal Conference of Socialist Alliances either, since that body is merely the sum of the republic organizations. If the Yugoslav democrats accepted social organization status, which would deprive them of their autonomy and require joining the universal front, each individual branch—its has them in three Yugoslav republics—would literally drown in the existing scheme of republic-federal relations which is based on the nations' exclusive sovereignty. The UJDI, however, supports a new sort of Yugoslavia, one whose national arrangements too would derive from the rights of Yugoslav citizens.

"There really is a problem," admits the already ubiquitous Marinco Panic, the member of the Croatian SSRN Presidium responsible for social organizations and now also for "self-managing political pluralism" (!). "But the problem isn't with the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative, it's with the contradictions in our system, our Constitution, laws, institutions. There isn't a word in the Yugoslav Constitution forbidding independent associations, societies, and certainly not new sociopolitical organizations. What is more, it provides for them: besides the enumerated sociopolitical organizations, the Constitution also refers to "and others"... However, our legal experts say we can't interpret the Constitution only by what it says. The obligation to work through the Socialist Alliance follows from its general goals. They call that the spirit of the Constitution."

All things considered, the explanation for how the Law on Social Organizations and Associations of Citizens was applied may be similar: an interpretation not of the literal legal text but of its unspoken intention. It is true that the interpretations are not as numerous here as in the case of some other "spirits" since this law is a very new "discovery," only as old in other words as our 3-month-old freedom of political association—prior to that, who cared about the paragraphs laying down the norms for the activities of associations of blind Esperantists?—and now we still do not have experts versed in its provisions and formulations. In such a case it is easier to surrender new political organizations to the free judgment of the "competent authority," a judgment which only domestic legal theory puts up on a pedestal of Socialist, specific, and so humane legislation, which in this way examines each individual legal situation. In some other theories excessively numerous examples of the discretionary rights of the "competent authorities" represent the mere "filling in of gaps in the law," the real purpose of which is to create the appropriate precedents, which in our circumstances are most often ones of a political nature.
Illegal

"Is the Party registered?" That is the question therefore that Dr Ivan Pripic, the leader of the UJDI, will ask Communist leaders before the television audience.

Above all, the same question could also apply to the League of Socialist Youth and the veterans' federation, which have existed and governed as self-evident political facts for decades, although in contrast to the League of Communists, they are not "legalized" in the Constitution. Readers of the text of the Constitution who adhere strictly to what it explicitly says and therefore say that new political organizations are partially contrary to the constitutional order, do not remark, say, that the youth and veterans' organizations are not mentioned in the SFRY Constitution and by that criterion also fall into a nonconstitutional and unconstitutional category, or at least are no more legal than the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative.

Because if they are not mentioned by name in the Yugoslav Constitution, are the veterans' and youth organizations of any republic listed in the police Registry of Social Organizations and Associations of Citizens?

Knowing that they owe their survival not to guaranteed political rights but to an arbitrary political decision which could very easily be changed, 10 days before the publication of the decision not to register them, the activists of the organization of Yugoslav democrats produced a proposal for a new law to regulate political associations of citizens. This proposal contains only a single restrictive point: the activities of an organization can be banned by the legal judgement of a court if that association threatens the political, religious, national, racial, or sexual individuality or orientation of the population of Yugoslavia. The "Proposed Principles for a Law on Associations of Citizens" which the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative drew up was read for the first time at the first public meeting of the Socialist Alliance with the newly-founded political groups at an all-day round table devoted to political pluralism. The hosts—the Zagreb and republic organizations of the Socialist front—also invited some members of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia. Only two of them responded; neither of them uttered a word.

Not until 10 days from now will Celestin Sardelcic attend a meeting of the Presidium of the Croatian SSRN to ask the front to make a statement on the decision by the republic ministry for internal affairs to reject—as Sardelcic says—a totally legitimate initiative. By then it will already be quite clear that that decision has created huge difficulties for official policy. The largest, and also the ideologically "most suitable" "alternative" in Croatia has not been legalized. That therefore leaves the Croatian Social-Liberal Alliance as the representative of political pluralism in the suspect republic. It is true that it fully respects all the given rules of the game, it accepts its status as a social organization and as part of the SSRN, it is true that it contains a mixture of nationalities and has a program which certainly cannot be accused of nationalism, but yet the Liberals do not have the word "Yugoslav" in their name...

And so: if the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative does not succeed in defending its independence, the promised political pluralism will die before it is even born, at least in Croatia.

Editor of Youth Journal Explains Resignation

28000108 Zagreb POLET in Serbo-Croatian
25 Mar 89 p 4

[Letter of resignation and statement by Senad Avdich, former chief and managing editor of MLADOST, given to Eduard Popovic: "A Great, Heavy Darkness Is Falling Upon Thebes and Its Inhabitants"]

[Text] MLADOST, the newspaper of the SSOJ [Socialist Youth League of Yugoslavia], was considered until recently one of the last apolitical papers of a different type from what has been customary in our capital in recent times. What really is the "dark side of the truth," what role do the political events play in all of this, and what pressures led to Senad Avdich's resignation?

Resignation from the post of chief and managing editor of the SSOJ newspaper MLADOST

To the SSOJ Presidency

Esteemed comrades,

I am informing you that I am no longer able to perform the duties of chief and managing editor of the SSOJ newspaper MLADOST.

For several months now, I have been trying to avoid taking this step, which is caused by the general political circumstances (among other things, I intended to do this after the events in Vojvodina and Montenegro), and the fact that I did not do so is only a consequence of the (now quite clearly unfounded) hope and belief that Yugoslavia, in spite of everything, would find the strength to reaffirm the fundamental principles of its existence, and that it would succeed in constituting itself as a sovereign state, federal, socialist, and democratic, in all parts of its territory.

Concerned, sad, and afraid, I believed that the direct producers of the madness, the models of nationalism and brutal unitarism in Yugoslavia, would have to bow to the arguments of the federalist, socialist, self-managing, and democratic awareness that should be common to a majority of the citizens of this country.

To my regret, I was mistaken.
This is no longer the Yugoslavia that it was a year ago, when I assumed my duties at MLADOST. I am profoundly convinced that this is no longer a democratic socialist community of equal peoples and nationalities, but a sad confederacy of coexisting fears, frustrations, hatred, and anxiety. Even in their most optimistic wishes, the destroyers of Yugoslavia from 1945 to today could not have anticipated such a Yugoslavia. This kind of Yugoslavia is frightening and driving away from itself entire peoples and nationalities. How can it be different, when this Yugoslavia allows its inhabitants to be divided without penalty into the Serbs and the honest ones? And that has to alarm every honest person, especially if he is a Serb. That is why I think that in this kind of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav innovation is cynicism, or in the best case deceit.

I would not wish to burden you with personal reasons, because they are secondary. I only want to say that I do not have any right to the dramatic concern of my family and friends because I am working and living in an area in which tens of thousands of "majestic" people are demanding weapons and praying to God for the beginning of a fratricidal war. I do not have a right to disrupt the normal work and relations of my colleagues in the editorial office with my fears and alarms and anxiety, or to use my positions in the newspaper (which I do not intend to deprive it of in the future, or significantly modify them) to bring upon those not employed at the newspaper the odium and aggressive retaliation of the milieu in which most of them were born, and in which they live with their families. I also do not have the right to try to outwit the public prosecutor who is watching with increased alertness over every issue of MLADOST, or to gamble with the billions of dinars that every issue costs, even if it is banned.

And, finally, I do not have the right to secure myself so much trouble, fear, masochism, and anxiety because of reading VJESNIK on the streetcar, ordering Zlatarog beer in a tavern, or associating at home with an Albanian friend.

While thanking you for the support and understanding that you have given in the past to the MLADOST publishing house, to the newspaper's editorial board, and to me personally, I request that you honor all of these reasons, and at the first meeting of the Presidency, accept my irrevocable resignation from the post of chief and managing editor of the newspaper MLADOST.

I cordially greet you and wish you success in your future work. Belgrade, 8 March 1989

[Signed] Senad Avdic

[Statement by Avdic for POLET:]

The lack of confidence of the editorial board is a normal, constant factor, with which all of the chief editors of MLADOST have been living and working for more than 10 years now. That is because everything has been petrified at the MLADOST publishing house and in the editorial board for several decades now, and that idyll is only disrupted from time to time by the selection of a new chief and managing editor for the newspaper and the publishing house. The editorial board, accordingly, is a more or less compact and consistent entity (not so much ideological as psychological, aware that new people in top positions, especially if they come from other areas (outside of Belgrade and Serbia), must, in accordance with a certain existential/socializing inertia, become harmonized with the general and imperative rules of the game, as established by the editorial board.

As a result of this, as a rule there is insistence from the very beginning upon as deep as possible a gap between the editorial board and the chief editor, and thus distrust and suspicion arc turned into an instrument by which the editorial board tries to break the resistance of the chief editor, and mostly succeeds. That is the reason for the truth of the comment that someone made recently, that MLADOST mostly exists and functions in public only on the occasion of the selection of a chief and managing editor of the newspaper or a director of the publishing house, since it is only then that the editorial board manages to become serious and appear to be a factor among the public at large. In the interval between two such acts, MLADOST is a more or less respectable newspaper with an awfully small circulation, within the framework of an anachronistic, impersonal, and commercially inert house employing over 50 people.

Consequently, for the year that I was the chief editor of MLADOST, I had what is called the lack of confidence of the editorial board, which can be an uncomfortable fact, but does not have to be, because I was not too interested in establishing an artificial peace and trust, especially if it were not mutual. That is, my own lack of confidence in the editorial board of MLADOST was present to the same extent, and resulted, among other things, from skepticism that that type of people, enormous in number, and more or less professionally incompetent, and furthermore immovably gathered and stationed in Belgrade, averaging over 35 years of age, could produce the kind of Yugoslav youth political review that MLADOST more or less ought to be. Accordingly, the functioning of the editorial board naturally falls within the direct responsibility of the chief and managing editor, but only in the event that he has participated in some way in the formation of that editorial board. In this way, we have two mainly independent, parallel entities, each of which, for its own reasons, has a hard time consenting to any mutual influence. I am prepared to answer for the nonfunctioning and general atmosphere of an editorial board that I myself have formed, possibly as the one charged with doing so, but when it is a question of an editorial board that has remained unchanged for almost around 14 years, as least as far as the basic nucleus of about 10 people is concerned—then my responsibility ends completely with the fact that I did not "fit in." Fitting in, however, appeared unacceptable to me.
Pressures, Public Prosecutor, Yugoslavia

Consequently, my resignation cannot have any correlation with the pressures or distrust of the editorial board, because I worked with that distrust for a year: the resignation took place at a time when it was unbearable and impossible for me to report Yugoslav news in Yugoslavia as it is today, and to live all of that time in Belgrade, which is a volcano of negative energy and aggression.

The editorial board’s dissatisfaction, which tried to give the appearance of principled and professional annoyance, actually resulted, or had its cause in, an extreme political disagreement with the chief editor. The cause was a letter from the Belgrade public prosecutor, in which he warned that an article by Goran Beus-Richembergh, “Yugoslavia Must Fall Tonight,” was unacceptable, destructive, and finally, insulting to the leadership of the Serbian SR and to Serbian communist chief Slobodan Milosevic personally. Because of Beus’s article, the public prosecutor had the most serious intentions of banning that issue of MLADOST, and so in the letter that he sent to the MLADOST editorial board, he explicitly demanded (not to say ordered), that such contributions, i.e., those which were critical of the Serbian leadership and its great leader, no longer be printed in the newspaper. The position of the members of the editorial board mostly did not tend toward taking a position for or against that article, but rather for or against the way in which the chief editor, i.e., I, included that article at my own initiative (as was my right, after all), even though there were individual views that that article was destructive for the country. At that time I was in Kosovo, and after my return, the director of the publishing house arranged a talk with the president of the Yugoslav youth organization in connection with the public prosecutor’s letter and Beus’s article. Naturally, Branko Grganovic, as a bright guy, an adroit politician, and a good journalist, agreed with the basic tone of that article, but the position of the director and the members of the editorial board plainly suggested to me that there was no democratic political tolerance for such articles in the MLADOST newspaper, and particularly in the area in which that newspaper was being published. Later events, in which my attempt to take a different viewpoint in speaking out about the current events in Kosovo, of which I was a witness, and to take the gilding off the “magnificent” rally, i.e., the demonstrations in front of the SFRY Assembly, was designated by certain members of the editorial board and the director of MLADOST (also the coauthor of the book “Serbian Glory”) as a political provocation and opposition to the positions of the SFRY Presidency and the Yugoslav Assembly, were an unambiguous indicator that it was time to do what I had already been intending for several months—to resign.

On National Heroes and Graves

I came to Belgrade from Sarajevo, i.e., from an area with a completely different tradition and culture, primarily in interethnic relations, subtle and refined. In Belgrade and in Serbia at that time, around the middle of last year, an unbelievably aggressive and expressive drama was beginning to be performed, which dealt with several different variations on the theme of nationalism, in which, unfortunately, an army of millions of people became involved, having been given the illusion that for the first time they were participating in deciding their own fate. Without major problems, the national-bureaucratic leadership, using the quite real and justified issue of Kosovo and the constitutional changes, succeeded in bringing together and achieving national reconciliation (or harmony, as the ones with “Marxist inclinations” say in that leadership), and in that way establishing the ethnic hysteria that has swallowed up Yugoslavia bite by bite.

This is because Milosevic can be believed when he declares from the podium of the LCY Central Committee that Serbia’s claims are exclusively to parts of its own territory, but if all of that is said in the way that was introduced into Yugoslav ideological and political practice and promoted by the “Memorandum,” and that Memorandum also considers to be Serbian territory those parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina inhabited by the Serbian people, as well as all of Montenegro (that fried egg was cooked on the fire of the Serbian national program)—then that is a different story.

Living and working directly in such an atmosphere, and feeling the hot nationalist breath behind my neck, I found it harder and harder to function during the last half year; I felt more and more powerless, especially when I observed that in Sarajevo and Bosnia-Hercegovina the actors in this nationalist drama were not without their theatrical champions. My inability to contribute adequately, and in a way that would attract media attention, alarming the public about this entropic trend became greater and greater, just like the pressures aimed at preventing me from doing so. MLADOST, as a Yugoslav newspaper with its editorial board in Belgrade and people from that city who create it sitting in the editorial board and establishing criteria for what is progressive and backward, Yugoslav and anti-Yugoslav, seemed to me to be a microparadigm of an imminent defederalized, centralist, and unitarist Yugoslavia, throughout whose entire territory Serbia would finally constitute itself as a sovereign state. In such a somnambulist atmosphere I naturally had to yield and submit, but it is much more alarming that the same thing happened to much more capable and intelligent personnel and people. Finally, if I may illustrate this with the latest example, the current attacks upon the Alpe-Adria project, in which it is being presented as an anti-Yugoslav and reactionary creation, are nothing more than a realization of V. Tupurkovski’s senseless division into coalition and anticoalition, and are actually the first concrete step toward destroying Ante Markovic, who was one of the founders of the Alpe-Adria concept. I am therefore inclined to share in the concept of Milan Meden of Ljubljana’s DNEVNIK, who at the time called the resignation of Mikulic’s government “the last democratic act of Yugoslavia.”
After that, nothing could be so democratic any more.

After that remained Lazar Mojsov, who presented his private dream about Kosovo to the Yugoslav parliament, while calls for arrests, killings, and revenge resounded behind its walls. After that remained the unprecedented adoption of constitutional changes under the conditions of a state of emergency.

After that, there remained MLADOST, to which Mikulic gave his last interview as head of the government, and in which I, I have heard, violated a Yugoslav orientation and democracy.

After that nothing remained...

After that remained silence... or prison...

New President of Pristina Opština LC Committee Interviewed
28000115b Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
25 Apr 89 pp 21-23

[Interview with Dr Gani Jashari, new chairman of the Pristina Opština League of Communists Committee, by Milan Becejic: “We Have Had Enough Leaders”; date and place not given]

[Text] Since the state of emergency was established in Kosovo it has been difficult to obtain an interview with any of the provincial politicians, especially those of Albanian nationality. Above all for journalists “from the west,” as they put it here. Communication has mainly been reduced to announcements, individual statements, or rare press conferences. This was confirmed once again in the attempt to interview Gani Jashari, the new chairman of the Pristina Opština League of Communists [LC] Committee.

“To be honest, I have certain reservations about an interview for DANAS,” Jashari said, justifying the 2-day evasion of an interview previously agreed on. “I am aware that at this point it is exceedingly delicate to give an interview to a newspaper certain of whose journalists have not been reporting truthfully about the situation in Kosovo, but I believe that the comrades at DANAS will nevertheless report faithfully what we talk about here.”

Dr Gani Jashari, the father of three children, was born 37 years ago in Medvedja. He began to be involved in political work very early, first in the youth organization, and then he was responsible for the political-ideological effort at the university in Pristina. During the period when he was chairman of the action committee of the League of Communists of the Student Center, between 1984 and 1987, we learned that there were no outbreaks among the Pristina students. Before his present position, Jashari was executive secretary in the opština committee of the LC. He is otherwise the author of several textbooks and papers in the field of physics. It is of interest that he did his postgraduate work in Zagreb, where he also defended his doctoral dissertation in the field of lasers.

[DANAS] You recently said that the Pristina party organization would very soon become the main catalyst of constructive processes in Kosovo. How do you conceive that role in this complicated situation?

[Jashari] Pristina is a center for administration, business, higher education, and culture; it has one-fourth of Kosovo’s members of the LC—26,000. Everything that happens in Kosovo is refracted through Pristina. That immense potential must be set in motion to stabilize the situation, and that is something that will not occur unless the situation is straightened out here first. This presupposes not only the involvement of sociopolitical organizations and the working class of Pristina, but indeed of all structures in the province.

[DANAS] You are leaving less room for separatist activity in the legal bodies and institutions of the system. How is that same thing to be done more broadly, among the citizens, above all young people; where are the new personnel to come from?

[Jashari] That is the real question. For quite a number of years now the Albanian nationality has faced a nationalist and separatistic movement which now no longer threatens only it itself and Kosovo, but indeed the entire country. When it began 8 years ago, in spite of the models for political-ideological differentiation offered by the provincial committee and government agencies, that process was not terminated vigorously, consistently, and comprehensively. It is first of all a question of a mistaken personnel policy even here, but also in the LCY Central Committee. The slogan was conceived of “Let us preserve our cadres while we clean up the situation,” instead of preserving party members and all those who are in favor of the line of the LC and in favor of Yugoslavia. Especially those people in legal authorities and institutions. Those forces that were “preserved,” which in many respects were opportune, tried to maintain the status quo, especially between 1984 and 1986. At that time, it was said that the differentiation affected only the Albanian nationality, as though eyes were closed to the fact that Albanian nationalists and separatists had produced the counterrevolution. Years were wasted explaining an elementary truth to the Yugoslav public, but it also took too much time for Kosovo to be seen as a Yugoslav problem, not only a problem of Kosovo and Serbia.

Regardless of the statements to the effect that a great turnaround had been accomplished in personnel policy, the right people were still not in the important posts. Time quickly discredited them, and it turned out that knowledge was needed in addition to communist maturity and boldness. We can no longer count on people who
have only experience. At that time, people were coming from certain communities in which they could not have learned how to tackle hostile activity from all positions. At that time, there began to be suspicion of the legal authorities—were they doing things vigorously or not, consistently or not? This clearly facilitated the continuity of hostile activity, which was manifested in its last convulsions in November, February, and March. The national-bureaucratic elite in Kosovo lost its positions, not completely to be sure, but in its last attempts to preserve those positions it turned to the working class and to the people. We have to acknowledge that a segment of the working class actually was manipulated, but those are not workers who for a long time will blindly and obediently rush recklessly into something bad, especially if they are offered something more than the “ethnic.”

[DANAS] In assessing the “appeal” of 215 intellectuals, you said that it “clearly shows that the interest of the Albanian nationality is evident aside from the interests of others.” Would you like to clarify that?

[Jashari] I would say at once that not all of those 215 are intellectuals, nor will they be taken as such, primarily by the Albanian nationality. The content and timing of the “appeal” to the Yugoslav public were calculated to build resistance to adoption of the Constitution of SR Serbia. That “appeal” caused immense political damage in Kosovo. What is debatable in it and immediately obvious is that it nowhere mentions the concepts of the people, nationality, equality, brotherhood, and unity.... Second, since it was addressed to the Yugoslav public, the question is where and from whom it was seeking that support?

After we have condemned that “appeal” unanimously in a meeting of the committee, we have to establish thoroughly who were the inspirers, organizers, and authors of that text. At the same time, it must be said that all the signers are not enemies of Yugoslavia and are not people we cannot talk to. But in the meeting of our Presidium we agreed that we must make a gradation and evaluate individual responsibility. The Albanian nationality will not allow individuals to speak in its name, since we have had enough of that. And among the signers of the “appeal” are people, that is obvious, who have nothing in common with the League of Communists. Further, there are also those who in the last 8 years have not lifted a finger to stabilize the situation, though they could have done so. There is another category of those who earlier and even now have made mistakes which have escalated to unacceptability. They have to be talked to most vigorously and political-ideological steps taken. The third group would be those young people, experts in their field, on whom the signing of this “appeal” was certainly imposed. This text was thrust for signing to certain medical experts even during an operation in the middle of the night.

[DANAS] One gets the impression that in the process of differentiation the blow will come down hardest on the signers of the “appeal,” since only their names are known.

[Jashari] No, it will not. We did not commence the differentiation with the “appeal.” We began with all the basic organizations of the LC, this has only driven us and forced us to carry out the differentiation as vigorously as possible. Incidentally, we have to carry it out on a class basis, not on an ethnic basis. Second, the signers of the “appeal” are not the only ones to blame for this situation in Kosovo. There are many who as names are “weaker” than those signers, but their influence has been far more important. As far as individuals are concerned, the differentiation should have begun much earlier. The Pristina committee is the first in the province to undertake a showdown with the national-bureaucratic elite.

[DANAS] It is certain that the guilt of the signers will be established in various degrees; however, will the political trial be an occasion (an argument) for other trials—in the workplace and the criminal courts?

[Jashari] We are conducting the differentiation on the plane of political ideology. If there are elements for criminal prosecution, that will be done by the competent authorities. When it comes to educational institutions, we have to say once and for all to some people—stop. To stop poisoning children and young people with their ideas. They can no longer work in education, that must be clear.

[DANAS] What in practical terms is the replacement for those people? Will it be new people here or those who are to come to Kosovo as part of the announced professional and personnel assistance?

[Jashari] As far as the university is concerned, it is open to all, including that help from outside. However, there are quite a few cadres of Albanian nationality who can replace those who are leaving very effectively. That argument is no longer valid to the extent that the present team is the best one and there is no one better “than us.” That is not so. Those who will come will certainly be better than predecessors of that kind.

[DANAS] You often mention the differences in the destinies of Albanians in Yugoslavia that are manifested through their status in various parts of the country.

[Jashari] The Albanian nationality was rather frightened by the constitutional amendments. With good reason, when very important people were telling it that the constitutional amendments meant loss of its autonomy, its language, its culture, its education, and that their land would even be taken away. They were told that by precisely those people who should have been speaking differently. The real question that should be asked is this: What does a farmer or worker know about the constitutional amendments? It should have been made clear
precisely to them that they lost nothing with the constitutional amendments. It did little good for this committee to warn of the oversight and wrong moves even before November. It is a fact that the constitutional amendments have turned a new page in the history of living and working together in SR Serbia. It is clear that no one can be more concerned about the destiny of our Albanians in Kosovo than our nearest neighbors, the Serbs and Montenegris. No one else can encourage the Albanians in Kosovo. The comradex in Slovenia and Croatia ought to concern themselves with the fate of the Albanians living there with them. There are quite a few of them. Can those children go to school and receive instruction in their native language there? Yet we know that in Belgrade there is an elementary school where instruction is in Albanian, that in Belgrade you can also do university work in that language, since there is a department for Albanology, that there are secondary schools in the Albanian language in Bujanovac, Pancevo, and Medvedja. We need support which will strengthen us, not break us down on the road of liberation from Albanian separatism, nationalism, from the exodus of the Serbs and Montenegris. I would also say that the national-bureaucratic, "obedient" cadres from among the Serbs and Montenegro who have been brought in in the last 10 years have markedly careerist ambitions, with a single objective: to ensure themselves a high standard of living and a move in their careers to Belgrade. And we know how they are living today on Dedinje and Zvezdana.

[DANAS] I have concluded from talking with people here that there was a great deal of hesitation and fear associated with the constitutional amendments because of the frequent statements to the effect that the amendments to the SRS Constitution were only the "minimum." People wondered what the maximum was.

[Jashari] It is not true that that thesis came from the leadership of Serbia. It was mentioned in certain speeches and interviews by individuals from the ranks of the Serbs and Montenegris. This should not be taken seriously. People were merely intimidated with that. The constitutional amendments are the real basis for living and working together in the republic, and it is clear that Serbia must have full administrative power throughout its entire territory. There really were certain illogical aspects of the old constitutional provisions.

[DANAS] The Albanian nationality in Kosovo must believe in something or someone in order to move out from behind its present wall of silence, out of the boycott. They must, then, bind themselves either to an individual in whom they believe (and at the moment there is none such) or to a program in which they will find an appropriate interest or hint of a better life, above all for themselves.

[Jashari] For a long time, there has been no effective collaboration between the leadership of Kosovo and that of Serbia, so that people committed themselves through their leaders. Now that the Kosovo leadership has been renewed, it is obvious that people's confidence is being restored, especially that of the Serbs and Montenegris here. We in Kosovo have had enough of leaders, that is for sure.

[DANAS] Not only among Albanians here, but also in Belgrade, I have heard on occasion that the "removal" of Azem Vlasi was hasty and that his arrest was a counterproductive move.

[Jashari] I have said, and I stand behind it, that the Albanian nationality has had its fill of leaders and of the wrong policy which has been conducted. Everyone who is suspected must answer to the League of Communists and other bodies of the state. There can be no exception here. The Albanian nationality fully understands that now. I do not know what can be more grave than playing with the working class.

[DANAS] The mass "abdication" of Albanian personnel, which is quite obvious, was occurring even before the issue of their accountability was raised. How to fill the vacuum since there is not very much time to train new personnel, and yet to avoid bringing in people motivated only by careerism?

[Jashari] To hold a political post in Kosovo now is not an honor, nor is it a mortification, but a great obligation. Especially to the party. There are people in Kosovo who are outside the circle of decision-making and political office, but they could do extremely effective work. We should not harbor illusions that we are predestined for politics at birth. Political office can cover a man only for a time. Especially here, where one must always be on the alert against making any political mistake. The policy of the LCY must be implemented here in Kosovo, or we will cease to exist.

[DANAS] How, then, are the new people to be motivated?

[Jashari] We cannot be guided merely by an ethnic policy; we have to work together. These political developments in Pristina have not occurred now that Momcilo Trajkovic and I have come, but somewhat earlier, when this position was held by Husamedin Azemi.

[DANAS] Could a referendum be held in Kosovo at this point as to who, say, should be the member of the SFRY State Presidency from the province?

[Jashari] Every officeholder must enjoy the confidence of all the nationalities and ethnic minorities, not only his own. It is our intention to repeat that procedure, and we will have candidates no later than 5 May.

[DANAS] In some of your statements, you have taken very clear positions toward opinions and events coming from outside Kosovo. You were the first to condemn Horvat's book about Kosovo, you were the first to
criticize the proceedings in the Cankar Center.... In spite of your candidacy to be chairman of the Kosovo Polje Opstina LC Committee, certain reservations were heard. They were inspired by the fact that during the student strike the young people applauded you.

[Jashari] At that time, I went among them as a professor and party official. Let us be clear on this point, all the students who were there were not nationalists. On the contrary, they applauded me when I told them that I and all of my colleagues was willing to talk with them. I am not ashamed of that. However, when I later said that there were among them those who had no place here, that there were nationalists who did not care about this country, and I appealed to them to go back to their various schools and to continue the conversation there, as befits academic people, I was whistled down. They called me a traitor to my people, and they threw things at me. I did not want to talk in that kind of atmosphere, especially when I saw how "hungry" those students were. That is, thestorerooms were overflowing with various kinds of food. That was the whole truth. And the comrade from Kosovo Polje who had objections to my candidacy probably did that out of ignorance or some other reason unknown to me. Up to now, I have been quite welcome in Kosovo Polje, and that kind of criticism will not have any effect on our cooperation.

[DANAS] When you objected to the "assistance" being offered you from the northwest regions of Yugoslavia in a recent interview for EKSPRES, it was not clear whether you were thinking of the bodies of leaders there, since your criticism was projected onto MLADINA, DANAS.... What were your specific reproaches?

[Jashari] I think that it must be clear to people outside SR Serbia that it is most difficult for us here. We need support, but, as I have said, on the line of the LC, above all to stabilize the situation here in the struggle against Albanian nationalists and separatists. If that kind of help is not being offered, then we do not need any sort of verbal declarations made in speeches and through the news media to the effect that genocide is being carried out in Kosovo and so on. Kosovo is a Yugoslav problem, not only because of what is happening here, but much more because the LCY did not react at the right time and in the right way. Some people should have been told long ago to stop and that a policy cannot be conducted on two courses at once. Under the cloak of false democracy, alleged progress, and a better and happier life, no one can play with our destiny. People want security and the conditions for a normal life. They want to get rid of the fear and uncertainty which have been blocking us. Speculation and disinformation only cause us harm and detract from our work and creative energy.

[DANAS] We insist on hearing what your specific objections were to be written in DANAS.

[Jashari] It is thought that the newspapers have been at the service of "their" leaders and bodies of leaders. We have to frankly say that DANAS and especially MLADINA, as well as certain other newspapers, have not always offered a real picture of the events in Kosovo. Second, a newspaper at the Yugoslav level like DANAS cannot be identified with a newsman who has his own way of looking at the situation in Kosovo. It must both be on the line of the party, but also must write realistically about what Kosovo reality is. And that newsman, as well as others, must know that it is most difficult for us here, and in that sense we need help. You cannot look for the truth, for instance, among DANAS, RILINDJA, and POLITIKA.

[DANAS] While there is serious and fierce talk in Yugoslavia about political pluralism, in the light of the loose positions of the LC, is it mandatory in Kosovo to take the League of Communists as the point of departure in all respects? Isn't that a bit anachronistic?

[Jashari] That is true, I agree. It is late for that mode of reflection, since we have promised our entire effort to clear up the situation and halt nationalism on the activity of the League of Communists, and the most serious breakdowns occurred precisely at that level. We will have to be concerned with that for a long time yet, it is inevitable.

Researcher Queried on Decay in LCY Authority

28000111 Belgrade MLADOST in Serbo-Croatian 10 Apr 89 pp 14-18

[Interview with Zoran Obrenovic, researcher in the Center for Philosophy and Social Theory of the Social Sciences Institute, Belgrade, by Rasko Kovacevic: "Everyone Is Living on "Kosovo Credit"; date and place not given; first paragraph is MLADOST introduction]

[Text] Thirty-four years old. He works as a researcher in the Center for Philosophy and Social Theory of the Social Sciences Institute in Belgrade. He is working on a project of Prof Ljuba Tadic: "The Concept of Nationality in Contemporary Philosophy."

[MLADOST] All discussion of possible democracy in Yugoslavia (and chances of it) must necessarily be placed in the context of the victorious communist idea and its development. What are the basic a priori propositions of our ruling ideological paradigm?

[Obrenovic] The people's consent to the credentials with which the party has legitimized itself have to be understood not only in terms of the rights of the victor, nor solely in terms of the fact that after many years of suffering the party was the force under which a period of peaceful life began, nor in terms of its existing as the only force with a Yugoslav orientation in the minds of the people—but above all in terms of the fact that it found a mass social base for its legitimacy in the social advancement of a large segment of the young peasantry.
Communist ideology found in young people its true weapon. Just as every radical utopia begins, young people are that medium in which the break with tradition is made. The party drew its strength from the trivial fact of the radicalism of young people—who make up for lack of experience with life with fanatic devotion to an idea and for lack of emotional maturity with black-and-white perception of the world, which develops on an abstract feeling of good and evil (accentuated even more by the years of war)—that is, by some kind of extended wartime mentality. Constituting a closed logic and value system, the party made up the lack of knowledge with ideological faith in its possession of the objective meaning of history. This devotion to an idea was also accompanied by participation in the exercise of power.

[MLADOST] When do the mechanisms of legitimacy break down?

[Obrenovic] When the inability of authority to carry out its proclaimed goal becomes evident, then these mechanisms produced by the party begin to break down. This exposure was accompanied by a kind of change of generations in the mid-sixties. The process of delegitimization of the monopoly of power began back in the mid-fifties in culture, but it soon spread to university students, who interpreted their dissatisfaction with the accomplishments of the party state in the light of criticism of the political alienation of the existing party structure, without as yet, that is, making an issue of the ideological paradigm on which that structure rested. In the population at large, a dubious attitude toward authority appeared above all in the sphere of ethics and protests against social differences.

[MLADOST] The exhaustion of political legitimacy of authority in Yugoslavia has gone somewhat more slowly than in the other countries of real socialism. Why?

[Obrenovic] Above all because here there was a larger repertoire of legitimizing mechanisms. That is, the ideology of self-management (and the astute application of selective repression) made it possible to transfugire the demands for democratization into demands for development of self-management. The physical disappearance of charisma and the galloping crisis have finally made the situation more transparent: that is, self-management has proven to be no alternative to the party state, but rather a form that travesties real socialism (disguising the essence of it in ideological language).

In a situation where the traditional party mechanisms for legitimacy were exhausted, in the 1974 Constitution the party found its "new" legitimacy in politicization of ethnos, in promotion of the idea of statehood for the nationalities. Thus, the process of legitimation of the party ended—having begun at the poll of eschatology—at the poll of nature and tradition. At the same time, however, doubt of the system had been developing from moral condemnation of individual phenomena, through revisionist criticism of the party state which is not authentically Marxist—to radical doubt of the possibility of socialism on the premises of the classics, the upshot of which was the demand for rehabilitation of the liberal idea of civil society. As you know, that idea was promoted most strongly in Slovenia.

The Projected Ethnocracy

[MLADOST] Democratic breezes began to blow from there, it was truly thought to be so (formulation of the idea of the civil society, the alternative movements, and so on). I myself perceived those endeavors as attempts at serious formulation of pluralism, i.e., attempts to establish the idea that the citizen of Slovenia, the Slovenian national, would become an important political participant. However, at the moment when serious and vigorous endeavors for a return of Serbian statehood by amending the 1974 Constitution were launched in Serbia, Slovenian democracy began to legitimize itself quite differently with its own attitude toward these Serbian demands, which were altogether correct. How does one explain this break in the vertical line of Slovenian democracy that had just begun to be traced?

[Obrenovic] Dissatisfaction with the party state existed in intellectual circles all over Yugoslavia. In Serbia especially. Perhaps that is why the situation was always more repressive in Belgrade than in Slovenia.

However, a combination of circumstances—from the economic situation to the political environment, brought it about that the demands for a democratic state based on law in the early seventies gained particular strength through the media in Slovenia, facilitating the spread of those ideas and their penetration into public opinion. And it was precisely processes of that kind that were looked upon from Belgrade with great hope. The idea of a civil society was the central idea in criticism of the party state. But its capabilities were prematurely exhausted. It soon turned out that the political protagonists of this idea had hitched up the very idea to the cart of the struggle to guarantee statehood for the nationality, and to the premises of the 1974 Constitution, whose point of departure is the autonomy of the nationality, not the citizen of Yugoslavia (the subjective rights of the individual).

Why that occurred is not so very essential at this point. It is important that with the advocates of civil society the idea of the national sovereignty of the Slovene state greatly surpassed the struggle to constitute Yugoslavia as a democratic community. The fact that Yugoslavia had long before begun to be pluralized in a manner that was not modern in the least, through the formation of the ethnic states, was not made an issue by the advocates of the idea of civil society, but rather was radicalized. The absence of an alternative form of pluralization of Yugoslav space was an index of the democratic spirit and political maturity of the Slovenian opposition.
Thus, the Slovenian opposition, consciously or unconsciously, began at the global Yugoslav level to reproduce those power relations which had already been sketched out as the power relations within the Yugoslav ethnocracies.

The logical consequence of that was the negative attitude of opposition movements in Slovenia toward the mass popular protests in Serbia. Those protests, independently of their immediate occasion, resulted in a destabilization and potential redistribution of power relations in the framework of Yugoslavia. Preserving the privileges gained by the 1974 Constitution and at the same time insisting on the premises of bourgeois society is a political contradiction par excellence which certain leading ideologues of the alternative movements and the opposition scene in Slovenia attempted to destroy with the equally contradictory idea that the project of the civil society could be strengthened by augmenting "animosity toward the Serbs."

[MLADOST] What is the ideological background of this bit of intellectual legerdemain?

[Obrenovic] Well, by some strange logic Yugoslavia, as a state in which the 1-party monarchy rules, is an existential derivative of Serbia and the army. A radicalized form of this existential derivation looks like this: It is not the party as such that is dogmatic (take the example of the Slovene party), but rather the party is dogmatic because it is Serbian and Orthodox.

In that manner, through demonization of the Other, a modus was found whereby the Slovenian party was freed of the stigma of Bolshevism. The alternative scene perhaps in fact gained strength from that in Slovenia, falling captive to its own fictions.

[MLADOST] And where are we now?

[Obrenovic] As Lerotic and Ciril Ribicic have straightforwardly put it, on the rampart of our ethnic interests which Yugoslavia (or Serbia) is threatening. That is, at precisely the opposite pole from where we started. The demands for political pluralism are being realized as pluralism of parties confined to nationalities. The idea of the civil society has become secondary, the emblem of a hope that is fading. Political pluralism, in the words of its protagonists, must be at the service of defending the interests of the nationalities, which are threatened by current changes of power at the top of the Federation. Since the present communist bureaucracy of the nationality has been compromised with the people, it is not a reliable force that would be able to effectively oppose the penetration of the ideology of Bolshevism as that ideology which destroys the identity of the nationality.

In that sense, the parties which have grown along ethnic lines are the uncompromised and fresh force which could take over the function of strengthening the ethnic consciousness from a party which has become helpless. Here, the question of power is not the most essential one; the problem is to preserve the sovereignty of the bureaucracy of one's own nationality. It is clear that the protagonist of this unrest, the protagonist of the threat to that kind of ideology, has been projected onto the Serbian nationality and its political leadership.

The Country, Nevertheless, Is Sinking

Similarly, Ciril Ribicic has recently made the argument in a DANAS interview that the Slovenian party must enter into an effective coalition with the opposition if it is to be able to effectively oppose the pernicious hegemonic Serbian policy which is aimed at changing the nature of the Yugoslav Federation.

So, the terrain we are on is that of defending the ethnic interest against the Other. The light in which the Other appears is a matter of circumstances, but the upshot of all of it is that this country is sinking deeper and deeper.

[MLADOST] Constituting Serbia as a state which will have legal administrative power over its provinces threatens, then, even the present power structure at the global level. Is that also the reason for the unprecedented sympathy which the Slovenes have shown the Albanians?

[Obrenovic] Yes. And many stereotypes have been consciously or unconsciously instrumentalized for that purpose; beginning with the "identification with the underdog," with the small nationality, and running all the way to activation of the "myth of pan-Serb hegemony" (which easily finds a response in the people, which regularly incorporates a sense of being threatened into its identity). At the same time, the dissatisfaction with the party state that has built up is also projected onto the Serbian nationality, which is the pillar holding up that state. It is precisely this binding of Bolshevism and totalitarianism on the Serbs that made it possible for the Slovenian opposition to transfer with little effort the entire symbolic network which is invested in criticism of Bolshevism over to the Serbian nationality. The movement of a people which has been protesting the inability, or more aptly the unwillingness, of the party state to protect the rights of Serbs in Kosovo has all of a sudden been read by the Slovenian intellectuals in terms of the metaphor of "1933 Germany." That metaphor soon metastasized to cover the entire Serbian nationality, so that it became not only fascist, Stalinist, sexist, racist, barbarian, uncivilized, Cyrilic, and Byzantine, but also, as a Slovenian philosopher said in a somewhat shifted context, "the synthesis of various definitions which at first seem to be mutually exclusive." Unfortunately, there is not a single definition in that synthesis which is favorable. Such historical reactions far exceeded the utter lack of understanding for the mentality of the Serbian people. The Slovenian opposition public thereby voluntarily consented to the harness of the Slovenian national-communist oligarchy which by creating and accentuating the negative picture of the Serbs and by the effort to portray the status quo, Tito's legacy, and so on,
as the vital interest of the nationality, has again gained legitimacy for the dirty business of the party, the party has been portrayed as the benefactor making a present of the pluralistic state to the Slovenian people. This patronage of the party over the opposition is evident from the very fact that the latter owes its very existence above all to the goodwill of the party, not to realization of the premises of the system.

It is precisely from that perspective that Albanian nationalism was supposed to serve as a weapon against Serbian aspirations. The fact that it has not been possible to solve the problem of Kosovo for 8 years does not indicate Serbia's weakness, but the nonexistence of a Yugoslav consensus on this question. That antipropaganda was not launched solely from Slovenia, but also from Croatia. The oppositions within the nationalities have merely taken over the party pattern of desirable power relations at the level of Yugoslavia. This has among other things been the price they have paid to their patron. That's the joke: the opposition has not managed to free itself of certain ideological stereotypes that function in the framework of the official ideology, but has only radicalized them. The production of fear of the Serbs has been instrumentalized in order to defend the present status quo. The opposition groups have executed this successfully: emotional ties have been severed with no particular difficulties.

Ergo: It is difficult to believe that the support for Albanian separatism is support for democratic transformation of Yugoslavia. It is not a question here of interest in democracy (since there is the least of it in Kosovo and among the Albanian Marxist-Leninists), nor is this a concern for ethnic equality either, since the Serbs have been driven out of Kosovo. The key to this support should be seen in defense of the primacy of the ethnic rights over individual subjective rights at the level of Yugoslavia. The model of self-understanding has become the key to the entire outlook. The rights of the ethnics are above individual rights. That is why the idea of Yugoslavia has suddenly become suspect. This is that logic which continuously appeals to the fear of majority domination, and in the framework of that logic it has not been possible "because of the lack of information" to examine the true dimensions of the trampling of the rights of the Serbs in Kosovo.

Manipulation of Manipulation

[MLADOST] And the things being attributed to the Serbs are being attributed to them in order to rationalize the fear of a change in the present distribution of power, if I have understood correctly?

[Obrenovic] That is right.

[MLADOST] Why is manipulation mentioned so much?

[Obrenovic] Because the point of departure was not a political concept of the people that would make it possible for various ethnic interests to be legitimated through democratic institutions so that a dialogue could be entered into. On the contrary, the party started with the concept of the people as the working people, and it is the party itself that defines what the working people is. Insofar as the picture of that people departs from what is expected (given in advance), then that thing is proclaimed to be the result of manipulation. So, in that fashion the Serbs say that the Albanians are manipulated, the Slovenes say that the Serbian people is manipulated, it is only in the case of the Albanians that this topic is out of place. In common sense terms, then, it looks like this: if all are manipulated, then no one is manipulated any longer. The thesis of manipulation is not an attempt to seek the "truth" at all, but rather it is a struggle for power within a political concept. The dispute and the conceptual and terminological acrobatics in which it is played out would become senseless as soon as institutional mechanisms arise in whose framework individuals and collectives would be able to interpret their own interests. In that case, the category of manipulation would be replaced by the category of the responsibility of every political participant in the arena.

[MLADOST] Since we do not have that, we have a kind of interpretive war?

[Obrenovic] Of course.... Reality is interpretively experienced within the framework of the existing set of symbols. Which accounts for the startling production of mythologems in political discourse, which conceal the claim to power. For example, the story about pan-Serb hegemonism, independently of its real foundation, is becoming a political fact. It functions in political discourse and it structures the political acts of the participants involved, and then it produces the corresponding ideology. I have already said that the position has not offered new relations to the existing ideological matrices of the symbolic production of power, but inherited the attitude of the Communist Party of the nationality toward the Other. Thus, the initial tension between civil society and the party ended up as a consensus between the party of the nationality and the opposition of that nationality, founded on the interest of the nationality and professed by the attitude toward the Other.

[MLADOST] Fine, but what is the interest of the Slovenian party in all of this?

[Obrenovic] Strengthened legitimacy, paid for with a certain liberal rhetoric which has strengthened its position. Should that liberalism, that discourse in terms of opposition, jeopardize its power, it can always allude to the other dogmatic parties, against which it is now seen to be fighting. It is playing a game in which it cannot lose. For the West, it is democratic, for its own people it is eminently Slovene, and for Yugoslavia, nevertheless, it continues to be a Communist Party. Here, it is only the opposition that loses, since its initial thrust, summed up
in the project of the civil society—on which it continues to insist in rhetorical terms—is being compromised more and more. In the final analysis, it is democracy that has lost.

[MLADOST] I would say that the ethnic complacency in a project that is universal in its nature compromised the Slovenian opposition even before that and still more?

[Obrenovic] That additionally compromised it, to be sure. Renouncing Yugoslavia as the frame of reference for political activity and withdrawal into its own ethnic political preserve makes sense only on the assumption of Yugoslavia's disintegration, which I would say is an illusion. However, this inward turning was also accompanied by production of distrust of the Other. The distrust further produces predictions that the Other also has his interests. The interest of the Other may be suspended only if it appears in the image of a potential enemy. But a rapist can exist only if there also exists a potential victim. Thus the Slovenes, looking for help to the Albanians, have in the imagination of their intellectuals translated themselves into Jews expecting any moment the arrival of "protofascist and militant elements" from Serbia. The phantasm of the enemy has become the reference point of political activity. Every day we hear the appeals of the Slovenian intelligentsia for formation of a supreme headquarters to defend Slovenian sovereignty.

[MLADOST] Is there anything, then, which can be recognized in Yugoslavia today as a serious democratic thrust?

[Obrenovic] I think that the movement of the people in Serbia contains great democratic potential. Also, this backsliding of the Slovenian opposition and its having been harnessed into the fight for the state of the nationality, this undying dream of small nationalities, cannot invalidate everything that has been achieved. The provoking and promotion of new ideas has dynamized the political scene in Yugoslavia. But we must realize that those initial thrusts have spent their strength. Should other possible oppositions within nationalities establish ties with the parties of their own nationalities, as the Slovenian opposition has done, then the form of political pluralism will be definitively compromised in Yugoslav terms, and that even before it really takes on life.

Fortunately, all the opposition initiatives have not been profiled in that way. For example, the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative in Zagreb and quite a large segment of the critical public in Belgrade.

The Patchwork Serbian Opposition

[MLADOST] Is there a Serbian opposition? What are its features?

[Obrenovic] First, the very term "Serbian opposition" is not as clear as it might be. It is far easier to speak about various oppositional currents, or still better, about a critical public in Serbia. That is because what we might provisionally refer to as the opposition public in Serbia has long had a leftist and Yugoslav orientation. Its roots go back to the events with the students in 1968, when a sizable segment of the intellectual and university-student public came into conflict with the party, having realized that the processes of democratization could no longer be promoted through the party. The interpretive struggle over the Marxist legacy ended with a break between politics and the intellectuals. But the deficiency of this position, of this criticism of everything that exists, is precisely that the conflict with the party continued to develop more in ideological terms and less in the categories of reality. It is precisely from that perspective that the intellectual left has been criticizing the system as a revival of bourgeois society, while the system has been "treating" the intellectual left to expressions such as anarcholiberals, or the bourgeois right, and sometimes even the ultraleft. Each side sees in the other a common ideological phantasm.

[MLADOST] However, toward the end of the seventies, a segment of the intellectual left in Belgrade evolved in the direction of rehabilitation of the liberal legacy. Was that a real opportunity to articulate some kind of opposition political program?

[Obrenovic] Well, a political program was in fact formulated at that time. First in theoretical terms, pointing out that if Marxism is the point of departure, the critical paradigm, then the paradoxes of a socialist state cannot be resolved. In political terms, it was articulated in the demand for the state based on law, for abolition of the political monopoly, but also in the conception of socialism first of all as a product of democratic formation of the will, not as its prior prerequisite. That finished off the revolutionary phraseology which had been the trademark of the intellectual left at the end of the sixties and early seventies, but attempts were not made to examine political dynamics in the categories of the class struggle. It is actually only with the emergence of liberal criticism of Marxism that one can speak about a true political opposition. Philosophical revisionism exhausted its potential at the point when it in a way drove the system to search for a "new" legitimacy.

[MLADOST] How can the Serbian opposition today be defined?

[Obrenovic] As a patchwork containing both the radical left (made up of individuals who are still loyal to the ideals of 1968) and the Social-Democratic and liberal spectrum of ideas, but also those who represent themselves as protagonists of the Serbian national program. The "Serbian" opposition is an utter patchwork, but by contrast with the end of the sixties and midseventies, the
center of opposition activity has shifted more toward the so-called literary intelligentsia, and this has greatly increased the number of those exposed to oppositional discourse.

Abandonment of the Symbols

[MLADOST] Does any consensus exist, then, within the diffuse Serbian opposition you have described?

[Obrenovic] As far as I know, there is a certain consensus on the position that Serbia must have the same constitutional status as the other republics. In Serbia, the constitutional status of Serbia is not perceived as a question of power, but as an elementary injustice. The official authority, the opposition, and the people have thus for the first time found themselves together on the issue of Serbia's constitutional status. Milosevic's pleading for solidarity of Serbs has been established here. Homogenization has been achieved on that point. But the extent of homogenization in Serbia is far less than it appears in the eyes of its critics. Differences arise as soon as an assessment is made of the extent of those changes and what is to come afterward. (The debate between Mihailo Markovic and Zagorka Golubovic is highly interesting on this point.) At the same time, the logic of the situation that resulted in the Serbian party's conflict with Tito's ideological legacy has been the meeting place, more or less unstated to be sure, between the critical public and the party.

The Serbian opposition's advocacy of a solution for Serbia's constitutional status has been conducted not only with the logic of justice, but also through the advocacy of a strong federation, as well as advocacy of a democratic constitution of Yugoslavia that would be based on the principle of the rights of the individual as a separate entity. The Serbian opposition, then, by contrast with the opposition in the northwest, does not assume the ethnocentric principle in the way Yugoslavia is set up, since, as it sees it, this is not only the legacy of the Titoist ideology, but also something that does not belong in the political culture which has been developing on this soil. That is why the "Serbian" opposition advocates a chamber of federal units and a chamber of citizens in the Yugoslav Assembly, through which at least a minimum of common rights and obligations would be established as the foundation of Yugoslavia.

[MLADOST] Would the official authority in Serbia tolerate the formation of alliances similar to those in Slovenia?

[Obrenovic] That depends on many things. However, it seems to me that the absence of initiatives in Serbia to parallel the initiatives in Ljubljana should not be interpreted as fear, as anticipation of repression, and a lack of courage, as has quite often been done. The question which the critical public inevitably puts to itself is more serious: Do the prerequisites exist for something like that? Particularly in the situation of the domination of a single person in whom the expectations of a large segment of the nationality have for the moment been invested. And would not an attempt to form an opposition in such a situation be unproductive? There are dilemmas here, and a less outright repression, which, of course, cannot be precluded either.

[MLADOST] That kind of questioning is interpreted in the northwest as the Belgrade intelligentsia's consent to Milosevic?

[Obrenovic] The heedlessness of the expectations of the northwest opposition is fascinating; the expectation that the Belgrade intelligentsia will take over the role of the Serbian party in Broz's time, the role of the policeman against "pan-Serb hegemonism" at a time when the Serbian party has broken with the economy of power based on that myth; the expectation, then, that the Belgrade opposition will take over defense of Broz's legacy from the Serbian Communist Party is a derivative of that oppositional discourse which has taken under the inherited power structure at the level of Yugoslavia as an achievement of the party state, not as the free will of the majorities. Again, it is a question of an attempt to preserve privileges.

[MLADOST] Which presumably accounts for that most stinging objection that has been addressed to the Serbian party and the Serbian opposition: of avoiding the mention of Tito, of being anti-Titoist, and thereby unitaristic, since Tito was a proven fighter against that evil...!

[Obrenovic] It is true that in the vocabulary of the Serbian party, Tito and Tito's road have lost their privileged place. But that is a process inherent not only in the Serbian party, but in the people as well. The mythical gift which time has worn off shows us the exposed face of charisma. The road to the situation today was marked out by appealing to the ideological legacy of charisma and its intellectual alter ego: Kardelj. It is a fact that today Tito is a symbol of the conservative forces in Yugoslavia, beginning with those who continue to think in the discourse of the ethnics and the existing positions of power, and ending with the separatists in Kosovo. Here, Tito functions more and more as a hovering concept in which political participants, calling upon the strength of symbols, inscribe what they like. In that sense, it is not only politically courageous, but also politically rational to abandon that symbol, since it means opening up space to rational dialogue.

I think that here Milosevic, i.e., the Serbian leadership, has made a decisive move. Although this was probably a move made out of political necessity, it has great potential. The real discussion about Yugoslavia can begin only when the parties to the dispute have finally given up a set of symbols which does not make the situation clearer, but still more opaque.
[MLADOST] For example?

[Obrenovic] The question of Serbia’s constitutional status could be put rationally only at the point where the questions of what is the state and what is the Federation and what is autonomy cease to be viewed from the standpoint of the originality and specificity of the Yugoslav model of self-management, that is, at the moment of abandoning a language which had the power to neutralize every real issue by asserting that it did not belong in that network of symbols. The political homicide of the creators of the second Yugoslavia is a process that is taking place, at least in Serbia. Failure to mention the name follows logically from the need to break with that legacy which brought Yugoslavia as a whole, not just Serbia, to the place where it did.

An Ethnic Response to the Ethnic

[MLADOST] The next objection that is made to the current Serbian situation is contained in the phrase “populous democracy,” which is to say that a people that has gone to the streets is nothing more than a rabble, emotionally fired up, easily manipulated, so that there cannot be anything democratic at all in something of that kind. Is there or isn’t there?

[Obrenovic] Regardless of how someone may define the appearance of the people in the streets, it will contain two definitions: first, this is a protest against the consequences of the party state, and second, this is a protest against the trampling of elementary human rights. Neither of these definitions can be described as undemocratic. Third, the demonstrations made by the people have had a Yugoslav orientation. An analysis of the iconography of the protest rallies might tell us a great deal about that. One of the evident demands of those rallies was the demand for free and direct elections, and then the demand to do away with privileges, the demand for demystification of the past, which necessarily raises the question of the position of the party, and so on.

It is another matter whether beneath the antibureaucratic revolution processes are taking place of which their protagonists are not immediately aware and which will culminate in the form of stabilization and revitalization of the posttotalitarian elements of Yugoslav society. Personally, I am not convinced of this. I am more afraid of the accusations addressed to the people and of the political illiteracy of those making those accusations, who could easily compromise the idea of political pluralism and of the state based on law before a public that is not sufficiently enlightened about politics.

I base my moderate optimism on the fact that the people have become aware of their own strength, that the taboo against mass protest has been brought down, but also on a logic of the formation of political will which is taking place through those protests. The history of eastern Europe shows us that after that there is no turning back.

[MLADOST] How is that energy gathered around a demand, which after all is eminently political, to be redirected into the right field of social classes?

[Obrenovic] The structure of political space in which the political conflict has been articulated still does not allow that. The elements of social rebellion have been converted to an ethnic function. However, basically this has been a rebellion against the trampling on human rights; it has not been based on expansionist and imperialistic demands. This at the same time constitutes the basis for believing that that reorientation could occur. But this does not depend on the “rebels,” but on others as well. If others are constantly provoking and insulting, if they are constantly thrusting them into the channel of the ethnic, then the response will be ethnic as well. This is evident even now in connection with Kosovo. This has also been demonstrated in Slovenia. It is the Serbs being accused in Slovenia, not the working class.

[MLADOST] Is there any voice in Slovenia, one that is socially relevant, that looks at the thing through a different set of glasses?

[Obrenovic] Hardly any, if one excepts certain student eruptions. That is why it is not very likely that relations will be structured on a social-class basis. We can assert that the social issue is at the foundation of Albanian nationalism as much as we like, but we will not become much smarter politically for doing so, since the rebellion itself is articulated in ethnic terms, and there is no real social force that would articulate it on a social basis.

[MLADOST] Since Serbian national homogenization (Serbia, incidentally, is not the only one undergoing ethnic homogenization) has produced a certain ideological and then spiritual unisonance, can we expect in Serbia at least a minimal institutional tolerance toward those who think differently, and when can we expect it?

[Obrenovic] The party can be expected to tolerate a different ideological discourse only when the balance of power forces it to, as has occurred in Slovenia. So, if Milosevic should have the need for support of the opposition, it would be tolerated. Now, he has the great confidence of the masses. The people have identified their hopes with Milosevic.

And I do not think that Milosevic’s charisma leads toward revitalization of neo-Stalinism. The people do not identify with him because he is a Communist. Accordingly, Milosevic will be able to function so long as he has the confidence of the people. How long that will be is an unknown.

Epilogue of a Plasmatic Apparatchik

[MLADOST] Does that depend on how events develop in Kosovo?
[Obrenovic] Of course. If a kind of muffled civil war continues in Kosovo, Milosevic will always be able to use that to draw upon the emotional energy of the people. Accordingly, if the Slovenian opposition sees Milosevic as the main enemy, then I think that at least its pragmatic interest would be to solve the problem of Kosovo as soon as possible so as to not augment the charisma that exists or create new charisma. The Slovenian opposition lacks a feel for political reality. The Slovenian fears of what Milosevic could grow to become, then, can best be destroyed by solving the problems in Kosovo. But if they continue to support the Kosovar rebellion in one way or another, then they will be feeding precisely those energies which supposedly they are most afraid of. Milosevic is not merely a product of the Kosovo drama, but also a product of those who have been supporting that drama.

[MLADOST] Resolution of the problem in Kosovo would drive Milosevic into an area where a different type of legitimization would be required than what he has enjoyed up to now?

[Obrenovic] Yes, in that case he would have to meet certain other requirements. Social and economic above all. Charisma will perhaps be able to live for a time on “Kosovo credit,” but not for long. He has had to send the workers back into the factory once, perhaps he will be able to do it a second time, but I do not think that he would be able to do that a third time. The reason he will not is that a kind of social experience has been gained to the effect that regardless of all else the people can go into the streets and put certain demands.

[MLADOST] And finally, even in Serbia itself, first of all among the intellectuals, it is believed that Milosevic’s immediate political associates, those whom he himself has selected, have up to now earned credentials as being undemocratic and dogmatic. Aside from the fact that this might also be said of him himself, can one expect of such people a correct policy, in the sense of democratization, of course?

[Obrenovic] A very important distinction has to be made here. The logic of politics does not coincide with the logic of morality. In politics, there is always an element of pragmatism. Thus, we can agree with the fact that it is not really possible to conduct a good policy with bad people, but have we not had, not so rarely, a situation in which a bad policy was conducted by people proven to be good?

Accordingly, we should be mindful of the distinction between the demands of political logic and the demands of moral discourse to which intellectuals are above all inclined. What the relation is between these two factors cannot be abstractly defined, but obtained only from an analysis of the concrete situation. The situational imperatives of conducting a policy differ from the imperatives of morality. This intervention of the moral into the political is all the stronger the less developed the political sensibility. That is in fact to be expected, since a feel for political shades of difference cannot be formed under the prerequisites of the Bolshevik legacy, but only under the prerequisites of free formation of democratic will.

It is therefore unrealistic to expect a better personnel structure of Milosevic’s entourage, especially when we keep two facts in mind: the severing of communications between the politicians and the intellectuals, which has gone on for 20 years now, and the negative personnel selection which had favored the type of the plasmatic apparatchik. But with all those caveats, a certain progress has nevertheless been made over the situation of a few years ago.
HUNGARY

Homeless Estimated in Tens of Thousands
25000190a Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
6 Apr 89 p 5

[Interview with sociologist Peter Gyori, co-founder of “For the Homeless,” by Katalin Torok: “Living Under the Starry Sky? Yes: There Are Homeless People”; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] A social committee called “For the Homeless” was formed on the last day of February. As can be read in its founding document, Hungary, too, has large numbers of people afflicted with homelessness or its imminent danger, therefore, the undersigned want to help with the enforcement of the right to a home because the homeless are unable to protect their own interests.

I talked with sociologist Peter Gyori, one of the seven founders, about their important and extremely sympathetic goals.

[Gyori] During the course of my work, I spent a great deal of time with the homeless and at Budapest’s five temporary workers’ hostels. Four of them were built during past regimes, the “People’s Hostel,” for instance, was built by the city in 1912. After the war, or more precisely, after 1949, no one dealt with this problem anymore, thinking that the socialist system would dissolve it and poverty would be eliminated. In our regional cities, the idea of building such hostels was not even raised. In Budapest, the conversion of a decayed tobacco factory building “established” the hostel on Kalman Konyves Boulevard in the 1069’s. The total of five temporary hostels can accommodate 915 persons.

A Minuscule Chance

[NEPSZAVA] Is this sufficient for a city of 2 million people? At any rate, what is the number of the homeless, for I feel that it is very difficult to keep track of them and at least statistically to “catch them...”

[Gyori] Unfortunately, their number is much greater than the capacity of these hostels. One of our objectives in forming our social committee was precisely to make public administration deal with this issue, for until now the tacit understanding was that since these people do not report anywhere anyway, they cannot be registered and, therefore, their problem does not need to be dealt with. I can only guess at their number: There may be several tens of thousands nationwide. There are many more so-called potentially homeless people. I am referring, for instance, to people released from prison who have no place to spend even their first night. They have no stable point in their lives which could perhaps give them a minuscule chance to normalize their lives. I also include among them the so-called favor home users, i.e., those renting beds or rooms or living with causal acquaintances. Many among them grew up under state care, and live in extremely uncertain conditions, never knowing when their bed leases might be terminated, sending them to the streets. With these the number of homeless swells to 300,000-350,000.

[NEPSZAVA] I understand that the rent in temporary hostels has significantly increased recently.

[Gyori] That was one of the concrete reasons for setting up our committee. As of 1 November 1988, the rental fees were raised five-fold. I think this is a typical example of the nontreatment of a social problem.

A Minimal Living Space

[NEPSZAVA] What is the rent in a hostel?

[Gyori] It varies in each. The rent ranges between 250 and 800 forints. The monthly rent for a room with three or more beds was raised from 80 to 400 forints. Rooms with a single bed are the most expensive. These “rooms” are actually 1.5-by-2-meter cubicles.

[NEPSZAVA] A person’s living space is, therefore, not larger than the size of a small double bed.

[Gyori] Exactly. At the time of the increase, Tibor Ungi, a resident of the Kalman Konyves Boulevard hostel, wrote us, the national steering committee of the TDDSZ [Democratic Union of Scientific Workers], a letter. In it he stated that the drastic rent increase sends part of the people, living marginally to begin with, under the starry sky. Tibor Ungi also visited Representative Miklos Vida with his problem since the Kalman Konyves Boulevard hostel is in the latter’s voting district. Miklos Vida took the matter seriously, inviting to the residence of the National Assembly’s Vice President the responsible authorities, i.e., a representative from the Ministry of Social Welfare and Health and the Capital City Council, and seven of us: among others, myself, Szaboles Bogar DD who is known to have been occupied for a long time and with an honorable devotion, with one-time state foster children DD and sociologist Geza Gosztonyi, head of the Theresa City Family Help Center. Miklos Vida was to have questioned the minister about the rent increases but that did not come about after all; I think he was hindered by the flood of events. Our experience has been that the responsible authorities, especially Dr. Maria Foldi, head of the Capital City Council’s sociopolitical department, are urging and encouraging our activities.

Inhuman Treatment

[NEPSZAVA] What are the goals of the newly formed social committee?

[Gyori] We have made preparations for long-term activities. First of all, we would like to make people aware that the problem of homelessness exists and that, therefore, people who will deal with it are needed. There is a
need for more shelters, for the existing ones cannot house all the homeless people. Especially not now when more and more companies feel compelled to close their workers' hostels!

Other shelters should also be established. Of course, I am not thinking of new investment projects. Even in the past, there were so-called warming rooms in the capital. There people could stay for a day, literally warm themselves, and receive a bowl of soup. Some of Budapest's air raid shelters could be put at the disposal of the managing organs for such a purpose. Another concrete proposal of ours, for which we can also offer help, is to introduce adequate social care at the existing shelters; this task could be carried out by professionally supervised caretakers and mid-level health workers. For at present, untrained attendants dominate the scene, and often "treat" the residents, generally repeatedly wounded persons, under inhuman conditions, and actually hold them in check.

We sent 150 copies of our first report on the situation to the Capital City Council, to the ministries, to a group of supporters at court, and to the various organs of mass communication. I am happy to report that I received a lot of feedback. May the places and the officials "be born" who will work on this pressing problem and who will help those who spend the night at railroad stations and loiter in underground cellars. I am confident that the responsible authorities will prepare a program for the above objectives and will acknowledge and work on this hitherto silently existing problem. Our committee consists of experts, and we are willing to help at any time.

Dollar-Based Settlement Seen as Czech-Hungarian Trade Remedy
25000250a Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 5 May 89 p 4

[MTI report: "Convertible Currency Settlement May Be the Way Out"]

[Text] Changing to convertible currency settlement of Czech-Hungarian trade balances may represent the way out from the present stagnating situation. Related negotiations have begun between governmental organs of the two countries, and both parties are making efforts so that negotiations produce results as soon as possible, according to Ludovit Priciel trade counselor at the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Budapest. The statement was made on the occasion of a Thursday [4 May] press conference at the commercial offices regarding the two countries' 4 decades of economic cooperation. The counselor also stated that part of the merchandise exchange is already accounted for in dollars, and that exports of this nature amount to 300 million to 400 million dollars each year.

The matter of joint automobile manufacturing was also discussed at the press conference. Related negotiations have been going on for years. Initial expectations called for Hungarian industry to deliver certain component parts to Skoda, in lieu of which Hungary would have received 40,000 to 50,000 cars annually. The Hungarian party did not want to receive that many cars of the same type, and, thus, cooperative negotiations came to a halt. Now once again the possibility of cooperation was raised. With deliveries made by Pannonplast Synthetics Enterprise it is conceivable that we will receive cars in quantities beyond those specified in the contingent. Incidentally, no specific agreement exists in regard to some 2,000 cars covered by this year's contingent. If the Favorit cars perform favorably in Hungarian tests, an agreement for the shipment of these cars can be expected to be reached prior to the end of this year.

At the press conference it was stated that in this 5-year plan period mutual deliveries valued at 8.5 billion rubles are taking place. This amount is higher by 25 percent than the amount traded during the previous plan period. Between 1986 and 1988 the projection of long term commercial agreements were fulfilled to an extent of 60 percent.

Nyers Envisions 3-Year Economic Recovery Program
25000248a Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 26 Apr 89 p 5

[MTI report: "3-Year Plan for Recovery? Rezso Nyers' Statement at the Hungarian-Soviet Economic Committee Meeting"]

[Text] In recent times the economic reform process came under cross-fire in Hungary: on the one side financial actions may cross—moreover hinder—the purposes of progress, while on the other side within the process of democratization certain demands emerge which cannot be met. The way out may take shape in a 3-year plan beginning in 1990 and ending in 1992, which has as its goal revitalization linked to economic reform measures. During this period the establishment of economic balance would receive priority, while the fundamental institutional systems of a market economy could be developed. These would bring forceful pressure on the economy as a whole, making the evolution of balance possible without administrative pressure. All this was said by state minister and MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party] Politburo member Rezso Nyers in a statement delivered at the Budapest session of the Hungarian-Soviet economic committee on Tuesday [25 Apr].

According to the state minister, three issues must be concentrated on in the framework of Hungarian economic and political reform: political stabilization and related to that the transformation of the institutional system, establishment of financial stability, and the changing of the model for the establishment of a new type of socialist economic system.
Last May's turnaround pointed in the appropriate direction both in economic and political life, and the reform conception too manifested clear and determined endeavors. At the same time, however, there was no mature conception for political reform, and meanwhile domestic political events began to transcend in a radical direction the resolutions announced at the party conference.

Nyers urged that the CEMA cooperative mechanism be reformed by saying that the present practice based on distribution, and the confused system of financial relations henceforth will not serve as a compass for Hungarian entrepreneurs.

Nyers discussed in detail the steps that are planned to be taken in regard to proprietary reform. Today one cannot accurately judge what part of all property will be owned publicly and what share will be in private hands; nevertheless Nyers believes that private ownership will not be excessively large.

Our present-day economy echoes with accusations concerning financial and banking dictatorship, Nyers said. Enterprises are opposed to budgetary withdrawals, they voice opposition to credit practices while under the given economic circumstances they increase their profits almost exclusively by raising prices. Nyers went on to say that in Hungary the annual inflation rate is between 15 and 16 percent, and that as of today it is still manageable. Nevertheless, signs of spontaneous inflation have appeared. The economic leadership is searching for the possibility of formulating appropriate anti-inflationary policies.

In conclusion Nyers spoke about the effect on the economy of the new parties being formed. As of now their presence if not determinant, Nyers said, but in regard to issues like Bos-Nagymaros or the establishment of a nuclear waste dump they express their views forcefully. Undoubtedly these issues have divided also the political leadership. According to Nyers, there is no fundamental difference between the economic policy programs of the various new parties, or between the new parties and the MSZMP. Only the short range concepts differ, at most, and this in theory may help the establishment of a coalition.

Following Nyers' presentation the Soviet participants at the conference asked questions. In his response Nyers confirmed that a decision has been reached concerning the need for the 3-year plan, but that the plan itself had not been discussed for the time being. He mentioned the fact that a consensus is taking shape between those in power and others who brought up the idea of Hungary becoming neutral. They did so a bit foolishly, the state minister remarked. Namely, a large part of alternative organizations views this possibility only in the indefinite future. On the other hand, there is agreement concerning the fact that we must represent our national interests within the Warsaw Pact and that we need to pursue an independent foreign policy.

During an intermission Nyers spoke to the MTI reporter concerning the issue of an economic emergency condition which preoccupied public opinion in recent days and received publicity. "I accept the fact that there is an economic emergency situation in Hungary, because we find ourselves in such situation indeed. However, the terms 'emergency condition' and 'emergency situation' mean two different things, the former represents the totality of all state decrees, but such measures are not being developed. As I understand the matter the aforementioned expression was used in an informal discussion; the political leadership did not seriously consider the issue."

**Tungsram Becomes Multinational Firm**
25000248h Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 6 May 89 p 4

[Text] After several delays, a greatly significant business agreement was signed last Friday [5 May]. Based on the agreement the Austrian Girozentrale banking group purchased 49.65 percent of all Tungsram Inc. stock. Some 13 financial institutions, including French, Luxembourg-based, West German, and Liechtenstein-based banking institutions are part of the group. They paid a total of 110 million dollars for the stock to the Hungarian Credit Bank which owned 92 percent of the Tungsram stock. All of 8 percent of Tungsram stock will still be owned by the Hungarian state. This is the first agreement which, as a result of cooperation by an international banking consortium creates an international corporation out of an enterprise in a socialist country.

After signing the agreement the new stockholders had this to say at a press conference: Tungsram's management will be assisted by foreign managers in a way so that in 3 years the firm will multiply its present profits ten fold. Thereby, the more than 50-percent share of Hungarian ownership will produce three times as much profit to shareholders than what the 100-percent Hungarian-owned enterprise provided thus far. After Tungsram becomes an international multinational firm which determines the market, i.e., following reorganization the Girozentrale will have exclusive authority to introduce Tungsram in Western stock exchanges, to issue the stock it purchased, or to privately sell the shares sold for international investment.

Tungsram Inc.'s last year sales volume was 13 billion forints, its profits amounted to 235 million forints. At present the firm has no debts of any kind, its solvency problems were resolved recently by increasing the stock corporation's basic capital several times.

**Bogomolov Views Dollar-Based Settlement Favorably**
25000250b Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 28 Apr 89 p 3

[Article by "L.P.": "There Is a Chance for Hungarian-Soviet Economic Relations Reform—Press Conference by Oleg Bogomolov"]

[Text] Soviet scientists regard as well founded the Hungarian idea of changing bilateral economic and commercial relations showing signs of crisis to free foreign
exchange settlement based on world market prices, as well as the idea of changing the cooperative mechanism's central plan directive system so as to become responsive to market forces. All this was said by academician Oleg Bogomolov in response to a question raised by the NEPSZABADSAG reporter at Thursday's [27 Apr] press conference held by the Hungarian Soviet Economic Committee meeting participants at the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party] Political Academy, at the conclusion of the meeting.

Bogomolov deemed the Hungarian proposals as interesting and constructive, and added that they recommended the establishment of a mixed expert committee which could develop specific recommendations for political decisionmakers relative to the constructive resolution of problems that occur. Nevertheless, the academician made reference to the fact that realization of the recommended steps has its own risks. At least temporarily, settlement in foreign exchange and the application of world market prices could set back merchandise trade, and according to some opinions the damage would be inflicted largely on the Hungarian side.

Again, in response to a question raised by the NEPSZABADSAG reporter Bogomolov said that in his judgment the personnel-related decisions made at last week's session of the CPSU CC [Central Committee] contribute to the strengthening of the perestroyka direction. He added that according to information he received, views not supportive of perestroyka were also voiced at the meeting. This, as Bogomolov said, reflects the real situation, as well as the fact that transformation is confronted with difficulties. The mixed committee's Hungarian cochairman, Bela Csiskos Nagy emphasized at the press conference that from Hungary's standpoint it is not indifferent to which way bilateral relations with the Soviet Union evolve, and to the pace at which CEMA is modernized. We welcome any approach that points in the direction of increased cooperative efficiency, and which serves to better utilize opportunities implicit in CEMA. Viewed in this perspective the present conference was extremely constructive.

POLAND

Rural Needs, Free Market Economy Discussed
26000508b Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 8 May 89 p 3

[Interview with Zbigniew Michalek, Politburo member, PZPR Central Committee (CC) Secretary, and Chairman, CC Countryside and Agricultural Policy Commission, by Halina Dowda: “The Farmer Must Be an Optimist”; date and place not given]

[Text] TRYBUNA LUDU “The farmer must be an optimist.” You said that, Comrade Secretary.

[Michealke] Unless I am certain of a good harvest, why should I plant? Nature imposes discipline on the farmer. But it also makes plain the role of labor; unless he plants, he shall not harvest. This relationship between labor and its usufruct in agriculture is very palpable. Were that to be so throughout the economy, everyone would live better.

TRYBUNA LUDU Comrade, are you suggesting that [private] farmers should serve as a role model?

[Michealke] I would also recommend considering the laws of economics. Farmers get paid for the results of their labor, namely, for grain, milk, and meat, rather than for their labor itself. And that is a big difference. The changing economic rules favor such an interpretation of labor. Social acceptance is as yet needed for linking a good wage to good work.

We Need Neither Be Ashamed nor Improve Ourselves

TRYBUNA LUDU Has the farmer's optimism also infected the politician? I am asking, Comrade Secretary, because you have not broken off your ties with the State Farm Combine in Glubczyce. Does an assessment of the party's agricultural policy provide grounds for optimism?

[Michealke] We need neither feel ashamed nor radically turn agricultural policy around. After all, it was the farmers-party members themselves who were the first to declare and subsequently to prove in practice that private peasant farms do not undermine the principles of socialism. The permanence of family-owned farm holdings was supported by the PZPR even before the perestroyka. And no one can rebut the objective truth that private peasant farming developed and modernized itself in People's Poland. The equality of [state, cooperative, and private] sectors is another principle that was first applied to agriculture. And as for the economic reform itself, its principles have long before been applied to private peasant farming.

Let me therefore say that the reforms pursued in the state and in the economy are creating improved conditions for implementing the party's agricultural policy, because agriculture is part of the economy and can only develop jointly with it. The level of a country's economic development affects the state of agriculture; this is an objective truth.

West European countries often are pointed to as a model for our agriculture. It would not bother me if our grain harvests were as high as those in France or the FRG. But in agriculture, as in politics, there are no miracles. A high farm output must be based on a technological infrastructure, so to speak. Polish agriculture differs from the French, and from the Czechoslovak, too, in that it is only beginning to create that technology whereas those countries have long since been utilizing it and are continually refining it.
But for Whom is the Light Red?

[TRYBUNA LUDU] The “technological infrastructure” is being created too slowly in relation to not only the expectations of farmers but also the resolutions of the Ninth and 10th party congresses. Farmers are criticizing the party’s agricultural policy, and hence also they are criticizing the party secretary responsible for implementing that policy.

[Michalek] “Where is that green light?” farmers ask me at meetings. As a driver, I quote traffic lights as an example by saying that accidents are avoided because green lights turn to red.

In politics one should not speak of a green light unless one also specifies for whom the light turns red. In practice this is extremely difficult, as I know from personal experience.

Could more have been done for agriculture? Given limited resources, choices have to be made. If more is given to agriculture, then the resources have to be taken away from other branches—this is a dilemma we continually face. To use a popular expression, a consensus is needed on this matter, and speaking plainly, all the social groups would have to agree that agriculture and the entire food industry must be developed. There is no need for reaching an agreement that everyone has to eat and wants a more and more richly set table.

Half a Million Party Members in the Countryside

The agreement concluded at the roundtable brings closer also the solution of our agricultural problems, though I won’t say that this is easy to accomplish.

[TRYBUNA LUDU] For you personally, Comrade Secretary?

[Michalek] I am highly gratified to point out to you that this is not a matter for the party leadership but for the government. The political decisions were taken by the National Conference of Delegates. Incidentally, the party leadership is changing its style of work more rapidly than the ideas about that style are changing. While I had managed the Glubczyce State Farm I had the power to make decisions, but now as a Central Committee secretary I lack such power. When I tell this to farmers, they disbelieve it.

Recently, at a meeting in Olsztyn Voivodship, a private farmer declared that he would not for anything in the world have any dealings with all those “ceilings, stages, dividends” applicable to state farms. He was implying that my past as a state farm director is handicapping me, because state farms are being criticized more than ever.

ECONOMIC

That was supposed to be a telling criticism. The Glubczyce State Farm has no ambition to equal the Katowice Steelworks in magnitude. Why the reference? Because of the appellation “Combine.” Both that farm and that steelworks are called combines. All right?

[TRYBUNA LUDU] This is not funny to the employees of the Glubczyce State Farm, which is located on the sandy soil of Białystok and whose climate in no way equals that of Opole.

[Michalek] There is no consensus on the differentiation of sectors in agriculture. On private peasant farms the principal economic factor is farm income. Agricultural producer cooperatives also base their operations on that factor. Well, such an economic system should also be applied to state farms.

[TRYBUNA LUDU] This change in the system, i.e., the conversion to farm income rather than to profits as the operative factor, has long been postulated by state farm personnel. Comrade Secretary, if you....

[Michalek] Governing is handled by the government. The times when the party governed everything, including agriculture, are now past. A party secretary no longer has the power to summon people.... Is this worse for the party?

To be in the vanguard and to lead are two different things. If we say that the party acts through its members, we must be consistent. The membership of the PZPR includes 300,000 private farmers and approximately 100,000 employees of state farms, rural cooperatives, and agricultural service stations. If peasants who also work in plants and factories in their spare time also are included as well, party members in the countryside total half a million.

When we speak of socializing the party, we refer precisely to these rank-and-file members; they are councilmen, members of cooperative self-governments and village councils. Is it they who translate party policy into reality day by day. What if not all of them do this effectively?

Effective actions by rural party organizations and rural party members are more numerous than is commonly thought. This is demonstrated by the contest organized by the periodical CHLOPSKA DROGA, which rural party organizations and activists with notable accomplishments are joining.

Party members holding high offices should meet the same criteria as those posed to party members in the countryside.

[TRYBUNA LUDU] Recently a member of the ZSL [United Peasant Party] has become the minister of agriculture.
Agriculture has always been entrusted to a deputy prime minister belonging to the ZSL. Combining the offices of the deputy prime minister and the minister of agriculture is good for agriculture and I can only be glad about it.

The joint agricultural policy pursued by the PZPR and the ZSL is based on the joint directives announced by the Eleventh PZPR Central Committee Plenum and the ZSL Supreme Committee early in 1981. Likewise, both parties bear joint responsibility for that policy.

At the roundtable the ZSL waged a practically desperate struggle for the marketization of the food industry.

An ally [of the PZPR] like the ZSL is the better ally the stronger it is, as then it makes the party coalition [the PZPR, the ZSL, and the Democratic Party] still stronger. This is our common asset in the coming elections, there being many voters in the countryside.

Farmers with families already are in the minority among rural inhabitants.

That is a natural growth process: the number of those directly employed in farming is diminishing while the number of those employed by the broadly understood agricultural services (machinery repair, minor processing, but also barbers, etc.) is rising. When we speak of developing the communal infrastructure in the countryside we mean precisely educational and cultural facilities, stores, etc., as well as the creation of conditions encouraging young farmers to stay on the farm and young intellectuals to work in the countryside.

Now the Parity Must Be Preserved

But rural life has not improved. Until last spring peasant strikes had been something known only from history. The protests by peasants were so surprising that they were chided. Supposedly, so much is being done for farmers—[income] parity, demonopolization, marketization—yet they are demonstratively voicing their discontent. What else do they want? Such was the view of surprised outsiders. Yes precisely, just what did they want?

The same thing as workers want. I do not claim that town dwellers have it easy. But why do rural dwellers have it even harder? The inflation hurts us all, but it hurts agriculture more. Harvests take place just once a year, so that a farmer has to wait a long time to obtain the usufruit of his efforts. The spring is the season when once again, and more heavily, he exerts his efforts.

Another criterion is the wages paid in the socialized sector. If they rise—and they do rise—this changes the income ratio between town and country. To farmers the “chief director” is the government, which centrally fixes the procurement prices.

And once the prices become decontrolled, the “chief director” will be director no more?

The government does not intend to end its interventions in the agricultural market. Guaranteed minimum prices are an example of such interventions. On the other hand, profitability of production is the main argument in favor of marketizing agriculture.

Is the role of the parity principle [parity of rural and urban incomes] also changing?

The same minimum prices served to determine the parity. Nowadays income parity has to be considered not so much in purely economic terms as in terms of social justice. That was not how we had viewed the role of the parity when I and Jozef Kozioł, the then secretary of the ZSL Supreme Committee, proposed at the Joint PZPR-ZSL Eleventh Plenum the adoption of the principle of equal incomes in town and country. But now income parity must serve to protect the living standards of farmers and in this sense play the same role as [wage-price] indexing in the economy as a whole.

Let me utter a heresy: the free market creates illusions as to the prosperity of agriculture. In the countries where a marketized agriculture is a tradition, it is dominated by intense competition, with the weaker farmers losing out.

But we live in Poland and there can be no question here of any elimination of tiny or small farms.

A small farm has its advantages. Is it little if it “only” feeds a family? But it is another matter when the farmer is worn out by his solitary toil. Such a farmer needs social security—the proposals for a new old-age pension system must contain applicable solutions. The Commission for the Countryside and Agricultural Policy under the PZPR Central Committee intends to take the initiative in this respect.

Farming is differentiated, if only owing to differing natural and climate conditions. The regions in which farming is most difficult are becoming depopulated. Agricultural policy must allow for this differentiation. We have mentioned this at the 10th Congress, and our resolution contains a corresponding provision. Projects for regionizing the state's agricultural policy are being drafted by the government.

“Unwanted” land, meaning poor, low-grade soils, increases in size when farming becomes less profitable. The centrally fixed procurement prices were based on the conditions of the average farm. Now local markets with differing prices may arise.
Without Fortune-Telling from Coffee Grounds

[TRYBUNA LUDU] Will a free market suffice for everything? Will it accelerate the growth of livestock output? I do not mean the "abundance" of meat, because that can be achieved by means of decontrolled prices.

[Michalek] I sail against the current and persist in claiming that livestock feeds must be available before meat output can be expanded. In the 1970's we had given priority to meat production in our policy, so we have experience in it. We still are paying for the feed grains we had then imported, and the interest on this debt keeps growing.

I like to use a diagram on which three lines reflect grain imports and the output of meat and grain in the 1980's. In 1980 the imports of livestock feeds declined to 4.4 million metric tons from 8.9 million. Following its abrupt decline, meat output climbed to a level barely deviating from its historical peak. Grain output markedly increased. I emphasize: grain imports declined by 50 percent but meat output declined by 8.4 percent. The conclusion? The concept of basing meat output on domestically produced feeds has begun to prove itself in practice.

As regards grain output, agriculture has made tremendous strides: the harvests of grain per hectare rose from 23.4 quintals in 1980 to 31.1 quintals in 1987. To be sure, last year this figure decreased by 2 quintals per hectare. A bad year can always happen, as farming is still dependent on weather. In good weather—and this has nothing in common with fortunetelling from coffee grounds—the grain harvest will exceed 30 quintals per hectare on the average, because this is the production potential now achieved by agriculture, allowing for the skills of farmers, the available grain varieties and cultivation techniques, and even the limited quantities of fertilizers.

[TRYBUNA LUDU] Is such a high harvest expected by the politician, or is it the farmer who predicts it?


[TRYBUNA LUDU] Thank you for the interview.

Swedish Bilateral Trade Seen as Stable, Steady
26000482 Warsaw PRAWO I ZYCIE in Polish No 18, 6 May 89 pp 12-13

[Interview with Jerzy Borowski, councillor, Polish Embassy in Stockholm, by Piotr Lignar: "Scraps From an Abundant Table"; date and place not given]

[Text] [PRAWO I ZYCIE] Judging by what has been published recently on the economic relations of Poland with foreign countries, it is easy to get an impression that Sweden finds itself on the periphery of Polish trade routes. They lead to France, the FRG, Netherlands, and Belgium, i.e., countries to the West of us. In turn, Sweden and Scandinavian countries in general are second priority.

[Borowski] Statistics show otherwise. Sweden is one of the major economic partners of Poland. If we look at the numbers describing the volume of Polish exports, we will notice that amounts between U.S. $300 and $350 million dominate, regardless of the size of the country. Our exports to the United States amount to $350 million, to France $302 million, to Switzerland $350 million, and $300 million to Sweden and the Netherlands. Therefore, Sweden's ranking is respectable. If we take into account the size of the population, i.e., potential consumers of Polish exports, we might say that the results are good (Sweden only has 8.5 million inhabitants).

[PRAWO I ZYCIE] Why then the impression that Sweden is underestimated as a commercial partner? They eagerly use the example of, say, West Germany, the Netherlands, or France, but economic relations with Sweden are hardly ever heard about.

[Borowski] You have touched on an essential issue, specifically, the altogether astounding lack of knowledge of the economic life and reality of Sweden. However, in Sweden as well, they are indeed not very familiar with the Polish economic policy and the changes it is undergoing.

[PRAWO I ZYCIE] Could the reason be that we have fought the Swedes rather than traded with them?

[Borowski] This is true to a degree, but this is ancient history. Few people know, however, that there has been no better example of narrow specialization in our economic history than the direct exchange of raw materials in the iron and steel and coal industries between Poland and Sweden between the two [world] wars.

[PRAWO I ZYCIE] Polish coal in exchange for Swedish iron ore—I remember it precisely from my relatively recent geography lessons.

[Borowski] This stereotype survived for many years, but by now it is a matter of the past. To be sure, we still deliver coal to Sweden, more or less a million tons a year, but this accounts for barely 10 to 15 percent of our exports to that country.

[PRAWO I ZYCIE] Do we purchase the ore?

[Borowski] No. We do not buy it in Sweden, but rather in Brazil by virtue of a long-term contract. The Swedes cannot wait for this contract with Brazil to expire.

[PRAWO I ZYCIE] Is iron ore indeed still that significant an export commodity for Sweden?
[Borowski] Yes, despite what is said concerning the decline in the importance of raw material exports. Besides, Poland is a grateful recipient of the ore, given the low cost of shipping by sea.

[PRAWO I ŻYCIE] To what degree is Poland perceived in Sweden as an attractive trade partner? After all, we can easily point out several advantages working in our favor: transit routes from Sweden through Poland to the south of Europe, the sea we share, and the inexpensive transportation mentioned above which goes with it, as well as the need to maintain jointly the condition and resources of the sea. We can also be a good market for the sale of Swedish products which are, after all, modern. On occasion, our products may be purchased, which are no worse than those of others, and may be even cheaper.

[Borowski] Certainly, the advantages which you have brought up exist, as well as the experience gained in the past. However, in order to get a good idea of the place of Poland in the economic life of Sweden, we should understand that we account for 0.7 percent of the entire Swedish imports. For many years, Norway, Finland, and the EEC countries have been the most significant economic partners of Sweden. As much as 52 percent of Swedish exports are directed there. The next position is held by the United States, and only after that come other countries, including socialist. I am talking about this because it is necessary to understand that, everything notwithstanding, we are merely a small fragment of the landscape of Swedish economic life.

[PRAWO I ŻYCIE] Is this to say that to date both parties have not tried hard enough to boost economic ties?

[Borowski] Indeed, they may not have tried hard enough. The Swedes are satisfied with what they have accomplished in their economic cooperation with foreign countries, including, to some degree, Poland. Their contacts are long-lasting, with attention paid to detail. Their exports flow continuously to proven recipients of long duration. Therefore, there is no reason to look for new markets. The fact that Swedish industry operates utilizing 100 percent of capacity, at least for now, is another argument in favor of this policy. The portfolios of orders for Sweden are full for many years to come, and it is hard to see why any major producer would want to change something given this situation.

[PRAWO I ŻYCIE] To say nothing of getting involved with a partner having the bad reputation which we, unfortunately, have.

[Borowski] Certainly, the Swedes look at us through the prism of the debt we have contracted in their country. To be sure, this is not a large debt, especially against the background of our other obligations, as it barely amounts to $400 million. However, the problem is that, from the point of view of the Swedes, we are their foremost debtor. Out of 8 billion crowns, or about $1.5 billion, which the Swedes loaned to 80 countries, the Polish segment of the debt amounts to 2 billion crowns, or one-quarter. This makes us rank first among the debtors of Sweden; hence the unfavorable impression. This unfavorable impression interferes with all major economic issues of our country which we would like to take up with government institutions.

I am describing the situation which existed until recently, when we in Poland did not have the very interesting opening provided by new laws liberalizing economic activities and foreign trade. By now, the interest of Swedish industrialists in Poland has increased considerably. The chances for a pick-up in economic relations are good.

Large Swedish concerns are restrained where entering into complex capital arrangements is involved. Nonetheless, we may already note certain successes in cases where we have managed to get them interested in large-scale modernization projects in the Polish economy. I mean, for example, the Polish pulp and paper industry. It is in need of modernization, whereas the Swedish companies lead the world in this industry, and are interested in getting involved with Poland. I might say that very interesting negotiations on creating large-scale joint ventures have been under way for a while now. I keep my fingers crossed, wishing for this endeavor to come through. After all, other companies on the sidelines are already watching closely whether or not it will pan out for the first one.

[PRAWO I ŻYCIE] The opinion the Swedes have of us must not be all that bad after all if they go ahead with such contracts.

[Borowski] Nobody in Sweden is talking about the poor reputation of the Polish merchants and Polish trade. On the contrary, at the last meeting of the Swedish-Polish Chamber of Commerce, voices were even heard praising the quality of Polish goods.

[PRAWO I ŻYCIE] You surprise me.

[Borowski] What if I tell you that a plant in Krotoszyn, which produces muffs for Volvo truck engines, meets one-third of the needs of the concern with its products, and could sell still more, if it were not for the strategy of the Volvo concern which calls for purchasing from three independent suppliers? This is, perhaps, the best proof that merchandise of the highest world standard can be produced in Poland.

[PRAWO I ŻYCIE] What about the private, illegal trade carried on by Poles traveling to Sweden? Do you feel the consequences of their competition?

[Borowski] Unfortunately, this is a blemish on Polish honor, though opinions about the tremendous scale of this phenomenon are exaggerated. Recently, we explained to the Swedes that the data published by their
press, to the effect that last year Polish tourists supposedly sold in Sweden goods worth 60 million Swedish crowns, are untrue. They are based on the assumption that 60,000 Poles visited Sweden last year, and everyone of them sold 1,000-crowns worth of merchandise. Such calculations are oversimplified. In any event, this matter belongs among the embarrassing ones. During a recent visit to Poland by the Swedish minister of foreign affairs Mr. Anderson, both sides resolved to do everything possible in order to put an end to such practices.

[PRAWO I ZYCIE] The Swedes have been doing what they can.

[Borowski] They are trying to put pressure on pseudotourists from Poland through stepped-up inspections and continuous surveillance of locations where such trade proceeds. However, we should keep in mind the fact that Sweden only has 25,000 policemen, or too few in order to control all Polish tourists. You simply do not see policemen in the streets. The Swedish police are splendidly organized, and have a very efficient system of communications; as soon as something happens, policemen immediately arrive where they are needed. However, they are not around on a daily basis, and shady operators have a somewhat easier life. From time to time, a very unpleasant article appears in the local press, which brings us neither honor nor glory, and perpetuates the unfavorable image of Poland and the Poles in the minds of the Swedes.

[PRAWO I ZYCIE] Therefore, taking into account all that has been said, do you believe that real opportunities exist for establishing closer economic relations between the two countries at the level we achieved not so long ago, in the 1970's?

[Borowski] I deeply believe so, and I am working to exceed this level. As it is, statistically, Polish exports to Sweden already exceed the value achieved then. However, this is a very relative indicator, and we should not pay special attention to it. At issue for me is establishing and enhancing cooperation. It is usually very advantageous for us, though it does entail risk for the Polish partner who, having undertaken something, must honor his obligations. Preparing cooperation [agreements] calls for more time and careful negotiations, all the more so because the Swedes are an uncommonly demanding partner. This is a result of the fact that, being a small country, they have opted for the strategy of narrow specialization on a world scale. Large Swedish concerns are not that many, but every single one is a leader in his field, to mention just a few, the concerns Volvo, SAAB, and the Alfa Laval Co. which has no equals in the world in manufacturing machinery for food processing, including the famous separators. We cooperate with Alfa Laval in producing them.

One has to work like the plant in Krotoszyn, mentioned above, in order to establish permanent cooperation. Over there, they do not have anything out of the ordinary. High quality, punctual compliance with delivery schedules, and reasonable prices suffice. One cannot ask for too much. This is all there is to it. I must admit, however, that I do not know how the Krotoszyn plant would have coped with quality had the Volvo concern not furnished it various instruments necessary for quality control. Unfortunately, there are very few producers who have such highly advantageous cooperative links with Swedish companies; they account for a mere 3.5 percent of the value of Polish exports to Sweden.

[PRAWO I ZYCIE] What is the reason? Is nobody willing? After all, good money can be made that way.

[Borowski] Very good money. The market is stable. A good contract guarantees years of peace, which is comfort worth the effort. However, we have difficulties with the supply of exportable goods all the time. Whatever a plant or company produce is still snapped up without any effort on their part. Therefore, it is difficult to force them to struggle for clients.

[PRAWO I ZYCIE] In other words, in the first place, we have no guns.

[Borowski] Exactly. Secondly, merchants from the FRG, the Netherlands, and Austria are aggressive in the Polish market. As they penetrate it, they make an effort to sell some Polish products in their countries. On the other hand, the Swedes would rather wait for someone to come to them, and shower them with attractive offers. We all know what the situation really is. There is hardly a Polish skill or tradition of marketing. So, the results are such as they are.

Unlike our domestic market, the world market is that of the buyer, not the seller. In that market, the seller must persuade the buyer to make a purchase. The Swedes are not persuaded easily. However, if they are persuaded, they are very loyal partners. Meanwhile, as I know from the Swedes themselves, at times signing a cooperation contract with a Polish company takes 3 or 4 years. I admire the Swedish companies which go ahead with efforts which are that protracted, and to a large degree benefit Polish interests.

[PRAWO I ZYCIE] Why this horrifying sluggishness?

[Borowski] I have asked many Swedish businessmen about it. They believe that a lot depends on luck, which in commerce appears to be rather irrational. It is just that in one Polish company they encounter honest-to-goodness businessmen, and then everything develops rapidly. However, it happens that in another plant, which is of interest to the Swedes, a more, shall we say, conservative team exists, and then the patience of an angel is required. The changes under way in our economy should destroy this kind of opportunistic attitudes by promoting genuine managers. I see no other way out.

[PRAWO I ZYCIE] Thank you for the interview.
Igloopol Labor Force Opt for Joint Stock Company Structure
26000508a Warsaw ZYCIE WARSAWY in Polish
2 May 89 p 2

[PAP report: "Igloopol Becomes a Joint-Stock Company; Honored Employees Decorated"]

[Text] The Igloopol Farming and Food Combine has been deleted from the country's economic map—as a state enterprise. Upon the wish of its workforce, the combine has transformed itself into a joint-stock company.

During the celebrations of the 10th anniversary of existence of Igloopol, Edward Brzostowski, its director, declared on 29 April, "Utilizing the experience gained, we desire to maximally avail ourselves of the prospects unlocked by the current legislation and the government's economic policy."

The company's founding capital consists of 42,000 shares, purchased chiefly by the workforce, with an aggregate value of 42 billion zlotys.

To augment its capital, Igloopol intends shortly to become a partner in joint ventures with foreign capital.

"The presence of representatives of the central authorities at the ceremony is due not only to Igloopol's anniversary," said Deputy Prime Minister Ireneusz Sekula. The other reason is to point to enclaves of modernity and to those who prove that economic activity can be pleased better and more effectively." Further, concerning the conversion of this combine to a joint-stock company, I. Sekula declared that this should provide an example to be emulated. "The point is not so much exact imitation as emulation of boldness."

Merited employees of Igloopol were honored with state and ministerial decorations. The Order of the Banner of Labor First Class was awarded to Edward Brzostowski, Kazimierz Kotwica, and Tadeusz Podgorski. The Order of the Banner of Labor Second Class was awarded to Jozef Obere and Rudolf Skladzenski. The honorees were personally decorated by Kazimierz Barcikowski.

ROMANIA

Rapid Pace of Housing Construction Stressed
27000060 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian
7 Apr 89 p 1-2

[Article by Rodica Serban: "A Grand, Historic Accomplishment of the People, for the People—New Modern Homes"; first five paragraphs are SCINTEIA introduction]

[Text]

- Currently, 82 percent of our citizens live in new housing.
- Two-thirds of our urban population live in apartments built since the 11th Party Congress.
- In the villages, over 2.2 million homes have been built using citizens' funds and over 110,000 apartments have been built for specialists using state funds.

The home is one of the basic requirements of life for every person and every family. How can you work, how can you give to society that which is most precious — your competence and creativity—if you must worry about finding a decent place where, after work hours, you can relax and rest? Can you really imagine the family without a room where the children have space to play and learn, and where the parents have all that they need at hand for a peaceful life? Of course not. It is significant in this regard that the United Nations declared 1987 as the "International Year of Home for the Homeless," the number of people in this category being immense. It was estimated then that a quarter of the world's population, more than a billion human beings, do not have this essential right—a roof over their heads. Thus public opinion was sensitized to this phenomenon which gravely affects human rights—the shortage of housing which continues and takes on serious proportions in a number of the world's capitalist countries. It is closely tied to a shortage of money—a natural result of the increase in unemployment—which denies millions upon millions of families the ability to rent a home and which forces them to resort to the most bizarre improvisations or to sleep under the open sky.

It is a blunt reality which the mass media is constantly drawing to the attention of governments and international organizations to force corrective measures. In his message at the end of the "International Year of Homes for the Homeless," the UN Secretary General, stressing that this social phenomenon was one of the most distressing of our era and a critical problem for mankind, noted that access to appropriate housing is a fundamental human right. It is a right that more than a billion inhabitants of our planet are denied as the result of the social policy of many governments and the indifference of a society based on profit to those who do not have proper housing for themselves and their families.

This reality simply underscores all the more vividly the just and profoundly humanist policy of the Romanian Communist Party to ensure there is the material base so that this fundamental right is enjoyed by all citizens of our country wherever they live, in cities or villages. It was in Romania too, under the old order, that access to a comfortable home was but a dream for the country's majority. We too had people who lived in dilapidated housing, lacking the most basic facilities. Our most senior citizens no doubt remember the time when there was no guarantee of a place to live, and recall the great
effort to find a more humane landlord. If these realities are relegated to the dusty albums of the past, and if today they seem incredible to us, this is because of the consistent application of the policies of our party and socialist state which, from the very beginning did everything possible to liquidate this humiliating inequality between men. Even in the first years of the historic event of 23 August 1944, when our country’s economy was exhausted by the war and there were insufficient funds, housing blocks were built in a number of metropolitan areas. A member of the old underground in Resita told me how he felt the need to touch and caress the bricks of the first apartment blocks to be built for steelworkers so he could convince himself that they were not just a dream. With each year, with each 5-year period, the remains of war’s destruction were shove aside and the dilapidated housing on the outskirts, which appeared as blemishes on the faces of the reborn cities, was reduced and then eliminated. Whole blocks of new housing were constructed alongside the new or renovated production facilities of an economy built on a socialist basis.

Housing in Romania underwent spectacular development after the 9th Party Congress. In that memorable year of 1965, thanks to the long term, scientific policy promoted by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, the Party secretary general, there was a turning point with profound implications for the further development of the entire country. The scientific thesis of socialist construction with the people and for people was formulated through a series of measures which accelerated the rate of the country’s wide scale development and modernization. The territorial and administrative reorganization of 1968 opened the way for a balanced distribution of production forces and industry throughout the country. It allowed the sustained development of many localities and of entire areas, especially those which had lagged behind. The practice of an equitable distribution of national income between development and consumption funds made possible the allocation of considerable investment funds for the more backward counties. Their rate of economic growth outstripped that of the entire country primarily because of the strong development of industry. This permitted the elimination of economic inequalities between different parts of the country and raised the general standard of living and the level of civilization for all the people. Powerful industrial complexes were built in localities where before there had been only small workshops. These formed the basis for the socioeconomic development of cities and working centers which today would be places very difficult to recognize by anyone who had not visited them during the past 20 years.

There are certain counties we must mention in this context—Alba, Botosani, Buzau, Bistrita-Nasaud, Calarasi, Covasna, Gorj, Giurgiu, Harghita, Salaj, Tulcea, Vaslui, Vrancea, and others—all which have undergone vigorous industrial development during this period and along with it, remarkable urban growth. This is not only true for the county seats which have become municipalities, but throughout these counties. And it is not just these counties which have undergone such transformations. Practically speaking, there has been an almost general reconstruction of our country’s cities. Many small and middle-sized localities today are hardly recognizable, while new and modern workers’ centers have appeared and continue to appear on the map. It is noteworthy that over the past 2 decades, 54 localities have become cities, the number of urban centers has grown from 183 on 1965 to 237 at present, and many of the former marketplaces have become cities and municipalities with strong local architectural personalities. But these figures would not mean anything if we were not to add in this regard that the problem of housing is on route to being permanently resolved. Indeed, in some cities it has been resolved. The process of modernization has entered into the villages where, using personal funds, over 2.2 million homes have been built. Likewise, state funds have built over 110,000 apartments for specialists. Currently two-thirds of city and municipality dwellers live in apartments built since 1965 and 82 percent of the country’s citizens live in new homes. These are figures which tell the story of the innovative process which has taken in, practically, the whole country.

All of these figures illustrate, and are backed by incontestable facts, the correctness of our party, in the center of which is man, his well-being and happiness. The blossoming of all these localities is the result of this profoundly humanist concept, initiated and promoted with revolutionary persistence by the Party’s illustrious leader, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu. It is based on the fair and balanced distribution of production forces throughout the country, the basis for ensuring truly equal rights for all the country’s citizens, including the right to a modern and comfortable home in which one can live with dignity.

It is particularly significant to point out that Romania is among the world leaders regarding the rate and volume of housing construction. In the last 23 years alone, 2.6 million apartments have been built using state funds, as well as hundreds of thousands of homes built with personal funds. In the current 5-year plan, housing construction continues to be a priority concern. Over 750,000 new dwellings are slated for construction with a total area of 45 million square meters. Many of these have already been built and have contributed to the beautification of cities. This is certainly true of the Capital where such work is at an unprecedented rate. There are more than a few urban areas which in recent years have been enriched by whole new housing communities which are veritable architectural ornaments for the respective localities. A portion of the projected new dwellings in this 5-year plan were for rural areas particularly for a series of future agro-industrial cities.

These are facts which convincingly demonstrate the concern of our party and state for the continued improvement of the people’s living standards. No one
can argue with them because these deeds are here for everyone to see. The figures which we have cited can be seen again in the prosperous and ever more beautiful appearance of the localities and work areas where they are placed. But especially these figures have meaning in the millions of families who benefit from modern homes and in the numerous citizens who daily move into new dwellings.

The right to a home is not among those listed in the country’s Constitution. However the guarantee of that right is an integral part of the Party Program, in the very essence of its policy, in which man and the improvement of his standard of living and civilization represent the supreme goal of building socialism and communism in our fatherland. Along with the right to a job, an education and the opportunity to achieve the full potential of one’s personality, the right to live civilly and in comfort which in the past had been enjoyed by only the small stratum of the privileged, has become something natural. This is due to the great investments which our socialist state has allocated—and continues to allocate—for constructing new housing communities and new cities.

Without a doubt, this represents one of the most eloquent proofs of the full coincidence between word and deed in our party’s policy. Instead of phrases that are expertly crafted but empty of meaning which one hears frequently when some politicians talk of human rights, we offer deeds. Thus, this reality is at the foundation of our country’s policy in this regard, openly presented at international fora. A position which aims at ensuring the exercise of all human rights—and above all, of those most vital which includes the right to your own dwelling. In most of the western countries, they talk and write a lot about human rights but they do precious little to see that they become a reality. Romania prefers the path of deeds. On this road, clearly delineated by the Party and its secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, our people advance with profound trust. They are animated by the decision to work selflessly and with revolutionary zeal to achieve in exemplary fashion the objectives established by the 13th Party Congress and the Party National Conference for the current 5-year plan and for the long-range plan through the year 2000.
Why exactly did you choose this school? Almost all members of a 3d-level class replied to this question in the same way: because the level of instruction is high, the atmosphere is wonderful and the training is Catholic, as in our homes. The teenage girls respect the patience, dedication and sacrifice of their teachers. They know they can always count on the help of the sisters. Joanna Szczypke, from III-C, says: "We are one big family. This clearly shows during school and religious ceremonies. They furnish so many wonderful experiences that we will remember for the rest of our lives. They contribute so much to making us feel at home in school."

The lay teachers in the school express a similar opinion. There are about as many of them as there are teaching sisters. The Sisters of Nazareth also take care of the formation of about 100 resident girls in the school. A total of 40 people—including several men—work at the school. Family life classes are taught by Stanislaw Slawinski, who holds a master's degree in education, has three children, and is the author of several interesting family life books. Dr Krzysztof Plasota, scientific employee of the University of Warsaw, conducts optional biology classes.

The school is supported by the tuition payments of the students. Currently, resident students pay 20,000 zlotys a month, and day students pay 5,000 zlotys a month. The annual sum designated for the work of the parents' committee is 4,000 zlotys. Students from families with many children or from poorer families receive partial or total tuition exemption. One use of the funds received from tuition is to pay the salaries of the school's teachers and auxiliary staff (at the rate in effect in state schools). These monies are also used for purchasing instructional aids and for upkeep.

The principal says: "We do not complain about a lack of money. We try to use the money we have carefully. Sometimes we eat modestly or we work together with the girls to do work for which we would otherwise have to pay a lot of money. The Congregation of Sisters gives us financial help only when we are doing repairs at the school.

The problem that has plagued the high school for many years is overcrowding. "We hope, however, that the mayor of Warsaw will keep his word and that soon we shall get back another part of the facilities that other institutions took from us in the past," informs the principal. Currently the largest room in the school is the hallway. That is where physical education classes, dramatic productions, entertainment and even holy mass takes place.

According to MEN [Ministry of National Education] figures, there are 10 schools in Poland like the one run by the Sisters of Nazareth in Warsaw. The capital also has a PAX general studies high school. Religious orders, moreover, have five vocational schools. Labor cooperatives
and vocational improvement institutes run 280 vocational training facilities and 22 primary schools and schools that prepare one for a vocation. Caritas is the owner of 47 upbringing institutions and 7 child care facilities. To date in Poland, there are about 100 private preschools, each caring for 10 children; religious unions conduct 3 preschool facilities and the Society of Children's Friends conducts 14 preschools. In all of the nonstate schools, the program of studies follows MEN-approved programs, and their graduates have the same rights as young people from state institutions, e.g., in competing for acceptance to higher studies.