Near East & South Asia
PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

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Report Says Woolsey Testimony on Arms Shows Bias
93AA0018A Nicosa FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH
in Arabic 93 pp 23, 24

[Article by Basim Barhum]

[Excerpts] Should the United States secure effective control on conventional and nonconventional armament in all of the countries of the area, it would no longer need to conceal Israel's nuclear capability. This capability is not for use, but for disarming the others.

New CIA Director James Woolsey's testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, as reported by the media, calls for making a general observation, as well as other relevant observations. Woolsey's testimony last February clearly reflects the United States' double-standard policy toward the Arab and Islamic world, and even toward many Third World countries. While Woolsey spoke at length about conventional and nonconventional armament programs of the Arab and Islamic countries and the danger these arms may pose to U.S. security and foreign policy, he evaded answering a question by Senator John Glenn regarding the truth of the report by the Russian Foreign Ministry that said that Israel possesses 100 to 200 nuclear bombs. He said that the answer to this question requires a closed committee meeting.

Thus Woolsey's testimony once again underlines the U.S. policy toward Israel, which it regards as an exception. It completely excludes Israel from the spotlight that is now focused on the current attempts in the Middle East and by a number of Third World countries to develop nuclear and nonconventional weapons programs. Washington also protects Israel and provides it with the necessary political cover while it commits crimes against the Palestinian people and blocks any international attempt to politically and economically penalize Israel. In other words, when the matter concerns Israel, the United States cannot do anything but use a double-standard. [passage omitted]

Woolsey's testimony before the Congressional committee reaffirms this U.S. policy toward Israel—that Israel is an exception that should not be touched. On the contrary, this exclusivity should be strengthened by all means available. [passage omitted]

Such intense focusing on Arab programs uncovers the United States' intentions to abort every Arab attempt in the field of military industrialization and even put an end to it. In the meantime, Washington persistently pledges to maintain Israel's quantitative and qualitative superiority in the field of defense and security. [passage omitted]

It is obvious that in light of the above, U.S. security policy in the next stage will focus on watching and aborting nonconventional arms programs in the Arab and Islamic countries, as well as in other Third World countries. It will bring pressure on these countries, just as it is did in the cases of Iraq and Libya, as it is now doing in the case of North Korea, and as it will probably do in the future with Iran or Pakistan.

As for Israel, it will remain an exception indefinitely. In fact, Tel Aviv is trying to take advantage of the fundamentalist wave now sweeping the area by projecting this wave as the enemy of the West in place of the Soviet Union. In other words, substituting the "communist danger" with "fundamentalist danger." Hence Israel will present itself as the spearhead in the confrontation with this new danger in order to ensure that the "taps" of U.S. and Western aid to it will remain open.

For the sake of objectivity, it must be said that the mere discussion, even indirectly, of the Israeli nuclear program in the congressional committee also suggests that excluding Israel from such a discussion can be subject to bargaining within the context of the peace process in the Middle East. Israel would accept putting its nuclear installations under international control by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its bombs under direct U.S. control, in return for which the Arab and Islamic world will end all efforts in this field and, likewise, place all its nuclear installations under IAEA control. But truly we must point out that even this allusion reflects this same policy, in which the double standard is evident. In other words, this means preserving Israel's nuclear capability while all Arab and Islamic efforts to develop nuclear programs are banned, which means maintaining the essence of the U.S. biased policy that ensures for Israel its quantitative and qualitative supremacy over all of its neighbors, coupled with the capability to reach deep into the Arab and Islamic world.

PLO Publication: VOA Reporting Improving
93AA0018B FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
7 Mar 93 pp 24, 25

[Article by Ahmad Sayf]

[Text] [Passage omitted] The new U.S. Administration has finally dropped the project to build a powerful VOA radio station in the Negev Desert in southern Palestine. It is not yet clear whether the idea of the project has been canceled or if negotiations are under way in order to find another location and obtain better terms.

According to several press sources reports, the transmitter station is likely to be built in Kuwait the U.S. Administration has not abandoned the project. This would be true if the financial obstacles are overcome and the necessary facilities are provided, including Kuwait refraining from imposing conditions concerning the transmission power, the project's objectives, and its administration.

The negotiations to build a transmission station in the Negev began more than five years ago but faltered several times because of the conditions imposed by the
previous Israeli Government, which was headed by Shamir. Accepting these conditions would have practically led to turning the station from a U.S. project into an Israeli project, providing services for the VOA and not the other way around. Israel wanted to seize the opportunity to boost its transmission to the Jewish communities in the world, particularly those in what used to be known as the Soviet Union, in addition to transmitting in other languages on the short and medium waves to several Arab and other areas.

There has also been Israeli demands regarding expenditure, administration, and staff. The project was expected to create for Israel 600 job opportunities and investments totaling $400 million. The objective of building a station in the Negev was to boost transmitting power and providing clear reception for the peoples and republics of the Soviet Union before it fragmented into several states, nationalities, and conflicting minorities. The project is part of a large-scale U.S. technical development plan that started in the mid-1980's and that includes building boosters and increasing transmission hours in more languages. As a result, the United States is becoming the world's largest broadcaster of foreign languages.

Given the developments of the situation, the building of this station or stations is undoubtedly part of a new media policy that gives priority to U.S. policies in the Arab Gulf area and the U.S. attitude toward Iraq and Iran. It seeks to expound, explain, and enable inhabitants of the area to hear the views of the U.S. Administration on events. This, of course, is in addition to obtaining intelligence information through close monitoring of and interfering with the military transmission networks of the countries of the area, particularly Iraq and Iran. [passage omitted]

The VOA is subject to direct control by the U.S. State Department, which, in turn, submits periodical reports on broadcasting to the U.S. President, the commander in chief of his country's forces. U.S. officials directly and daily, through consultation with the news bureau, determine the most important news, as well as the subject of the daily official commentary. Therefore, it is difficult for the Arab VOA staff to influence the news being offered. Naturally, the news policy reflects the interests and priorities of both the previous and present State Department. This was evident in VOA's recent handling of the issue of the Palestinian deportees, for example.

While the Arab radio stations and those that broadcast in Arabic and are heard in the area were leading their news bulletins with UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali's statement about the need for Israel to comply with Security Council Resolution 799 regarding the repatriation of the deportees to their homes, the VOA ignored the statement in an attempt to belittle its importance, despite the strong repercussions it caused in the area and the world. The VOA was content with mentioning Butrus-Ghali's statements in its news bulletins, but without the usual intensity with which the radio deals with issues of such importance.

It is noted in this example how the U.S. State Department, which, as we already said, determines the news to be broadcast, reduced to the minimum—without taking into consideration the media technicalities—the significance of Israel's expulsion of hundreds of Palestinians. This was preparatory to the United States' subsequent statement on the issue and its strong objection to the Security Council's interfering to implement the resolution calling for repatriating the deportees.

It has been observed that in recent years, the VOA has been avoiding a repetition of this pattern of broadcasting, which is contrary to what used to take place a decade ago. Several studies have proved that it is biased in favor of Washington's friends. "Objectivity" and balanced news broadcasting have been relegated to a very low level, as an analysis of the contents of the Arabic news bulletin shows. The study was conducted between November 1983 and April 1984.

According to this study, the percentage of positive news concerning a number of countries was as follows: Kuwait, 77.78 percent; Saudi Arabia, 66.67 percent; Jordan and Egypt, 65.85 percent; and Sudan, 62.5 percent.

The percentage of negative news concerning other countries was as follows: Libya, 96.30 percent; Syria, 75 percent; former Yemeni Democratic Republic, no news at all. With regard to the PLO, the percentage of negative news was 60 percent, and the percentage of positive news was 40 percent.

It can be observed that there has been a change for the better in the VOA's performance from a technical aspect. It has shown some balance in the news offered. This is primarily due to the inclination to reduce the elements of direct propaganda because of the end of the "media war," since it has become possible now to pursue and implement a long-term propaganda strategy, that is, there is no longer a need to respond directly to what the other radio stations say.

It has been noticed that in the past two years there has been an improvement in the radio's general performance. It has certainly increased its listeners and boosted its ability to compete. One of the reasons is that it has given its Arab employees a better opportunity to have a say in the matter, coupled with a tangible improvement in dealing with Palestinian news. The manner with which such news are handled still reflects, as Western broadcasting quarters admit, the proportion of the radio's negativism or positivism.

Finally, building a powerful radio station in Kuwait or in any other part of the Middle East aims, among other things, at developing the VOA's Arabic language program in the post-Cold War era, since the end of "radio wars" and the absence of ideological conflict calls for a comprehensive review of the means and objectives in light of the need to defend U.S. interests from a media and moral standpoint.
Hamas Views on Tunis PLO Meeting Discussed
93AE0423A London FILASTIN AL-MUSLIMAH
in Arabic Feb 93 pp 28-29

[Article by Majid Ibrahim: "Hamas Meeting With PLO Leadership in Tunis: Demands and Results"]

[Text]

True Nature of 'Arafat's Invitation and Hamas's Participation

The first thing to attract attention in this issue is the effort to understand the motives that urged 'Arafat to invite Hamas to this meeting and the reasons that motivated Hamas to agree to attend this meeting despite its refusal to participate in the PLO unless certain conditions are met.

Perhaps the significant motive that urged 'Arafat to invite Hamas to take part in these meetings is the great popular momentum that Hamas has gained in the wake of its daring operations, which resulted in killing four Zionist soldiers and wounding two others in just one week. This means that one cannot continue to disregard Hamas or to clash with it under any justification. It seems that the domineering Palestinian leadership has realized that the deportees' cause must be embraced and that it has to move closer to Hamas in an attempt to soften the negative image that has pursued the PLO, especially Fatah, since it joined the negotiations for a settlement with the Zionist entity and reduced military action at a time when Hamas has been escalating its military operations that have been received and continue to be received with great welcome by the Palestinian people.

There is no doubt that the Palestinian leadership is well aware that Fatah did not achieve its popular proliferation among the Palestinian people until it had carried out daring military operations against the Zionist enemy, especially the al-Karamah battle in 1968. Therefore, it is a grave mistake to disregard the positive impact of the current military operations on Hamas and their negative impact on Fatah, which continues to believe that it has the greatest popular asset in the Palestinian arena. Moreover, this leadership is obsessed with the concern that Hamas will dominate the PLO if it is given representation befitting its weight on the Palestinian scene and that this possibility has become greater in wake of the recent military operations.

Thus, it is not surprising that 'Arafat invited Hamas to participate in the Palestinian leadership meetings in Tunis. He wants to soften Hamas's opposition to the Palestinian leadership's tendencies concerning the settlement negotiations. He also wants to make sure that Hamas does not seek to dominate the PLO and override his direct authority over it. But if Hamas refuses to take part in these meetings, then this rejection could be exploited at the propaganda level to accuse Hamas of seeking to split the Palestinian ranks and of rejecting dialogue with the Palestinian people's "legitimate leadership."

But the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) has sought to accomplish several objectives through its participation, most significantly:

- To utilize the meeting to bolster the deportees' cause and to compel the PLO to support this cause and to transform it into a general Palestinian concern that is not confined to Hamas alone.
- To alleviate intensity of the propaganda campaign launched against Hamas by 'Arafat personally and confront its accusations directly and in front of all the other Palestinian factions.
- To embarrass the Palestinian leadership and demonstrate its insistence on carrying on with the negotiations despite the negative results they have produced and despite the continued crisis of the deportees.
- To establish new relations with the Palestinian factions enrolled under the banner of the PLO, to establish new bridges of understanding, and to exchange viewpoints with these factions, most of whose leaders are found in Tunis and with whom it is difficult to meet outside Tunis.

It can be said that the timing is one of the most significant reasons that prompted Hamas to decide to participate, considering that Hamas refuses to participate within the framework of the PLO institutions. However, Hamas decided that attending the PLO leadership meeting just once will not be understood as a change in Hamas's opinion of the conditions for participation in the PLO. Moreover, the circumstances engulfing Hamas's participation would give Hamas the opportunity to project its opinions and visions more strongly than ever before.

What Was Presented at the Meeting

The dialogue and debate focused on the memorandum which Hamas had submitted to the second meeting, held on 25 December 1992, and in which it had demanded agreement on a joint action program based on the following:

- Supporting the deportees' decision to stand fast at al-'Awdah camp until they are repatriated and closing the door in the face of any attempt to take them anywhere else.
- Immediate and final withdrawal from the negotiations.
- Escalating and developing the intifadah [uprising] and establishing it as an irrevocable popular option.
- Embracing armed struggle as a strategic option to confront the usurping enemy.
- Inviting all the Palestinian factions to a comprehensive national dialogue based on the abovementioned demands in order to bolster national unity and to rebuild the PLO according to new principles to ensure that it represents all of the Palestinian people's influential factions and forces.
There was a lengthy debate on the points of this program that was proposed by Hamas. Many, rather the majority, believed that there was agreement on the memorandum points, except for withdrawal from the negotiations. Three different opinions were presented on this issue:

The first represented the viewpoint of the domineering tendency within the PLO, which saw that withdrawal from the negotiations at this time would give the Zionist entity the pretext to accuse the Palestinians of not wanting peace and would divert attention from the deportees' issue to the negotiations issue and to the inflexible Palestinian position on this issue. This tendency also used the argument that the negotiations are a "compulsory pass" that cannot be abandoned and in which one must stay, even though it does not lead to accomplishing what the Palestinian people and their leadership want, and that the Palestinians cannot withdraw from the negotiations unilaterally because the other Arabs are determined to carry on and continue with them, as proven by the communiqué that was issued in the wake of the meeting of the five frontline states (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine) and that calls for continuing the negotiations in accordance with the conditions and bases on which they have been convened.

The second opinion represents the viewpoint of some of Fatah's military figures and some of its Central Committee members and calls for suspending the current negotiations and linking their resumption to two fundamental issues:

- Settling the deportees issue by repatriating them.
- Improving the conditions of participation in the negotiations to ensure the Palestinian people's right to determine their future and to enable the PLO to play an influential role in the negotiations. This opinion can be considered a middle-of-the-road opinion between the tendency calling for continued negotiation and the tendency calling for withdrawal from the negotiations.

The third opinion represents the opinion of Hamas, the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine], and the DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine]. It calls for withdrawal from the negotiations because of the humiliating conditions imposed on the Palestinians and because of the results produced by these negotiations. This is in addition to the opinion that Hamas alone holds to the exclusion of all others, namely the rejection of the principle of negotiation with the Zionist entity and insistence on demanding the return of all of Palestine, from the sea to the river.

This tendency's opinion on the necessity of withdrawing from the negotiations is motivated by the following reasons:

- The unjust and unfair conditions imposed on Palestinians to participate in the negotiations.
- The concessions made by the PLO concerning its agreement to self-rule, with all of its disregard for the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination.
- The Zionist entity's intransigence, its insistence on the self-rule plan, and its refusal to implement Resolution 242 or to cede Jerusalem or the settlements.
- Mere suspension of the negotiations in protest of the deportation decision is not enough, because it means resuming the negotiations if the deportees issue is settled.
- The deportation of 415 Palestinians from the occupied territories is a convenient opportunity for the Palestinian side to rid itself of the injustice inflicted upon it and to renounce the concessions it has made as a result of participation in the current negotiations. The opportunity must be taken to reshuffle the cards and to overcome the current dilemma, or the so-called "compulsory pass."
- Not withdrawing because the Arabs do not wish to withdraw is an unacceptable justification. This is because with their participation in the current negotiations, the Palestinians are providing a cover or an umbrella for the Arab states' participation, not vice versa. Palestinian withdrawal from these negotiations will embarrass the Arab states and make them reconsider their participation because they cannot conclude any treaty with the Zionist entity as long as no solution is achieved for the Palestinian issue and as long as the Palestinians have not signed to the solution.

If the Arab countries try to conclude a treaty, this will expose them to the Arab masses, and they will be responsible for liquidating the Palestinian cause.

It can be said that what Hamas projected in its program was not impossible or difficult and that it was not alien to the Palestinian arena or to the Palestinian leadership. The fact is that, excluding the domineering PLO tendency, there was a large degree of agreement among the conference on Hamas's program. As for those who proposed suspending the negotiations, the inner convictions of most of them are opposed to the current negotiations and against carrying on with them, but they do not wish to display true opposition to the domineering tendency's inclinations because of numerous calculations that cannot be listed here.

What Is the Decision?

Now that the Palestinian leadership's true tendencies have been understood, a question arises: What is the decision that was adopted on the focal points of the dialogue, namely the deportees, the intifadah, military action, and the settlement negotiations?

To answer this question, one must understand the nature of the Palestinian leadership meetings. The Palestinian leadership is an intermediary authority between the PNC [Palestine National Council] and the Central Council and it is supposed to issue the appropriate decisions in case the PNC cannot convene. This leadership includes representatives of all the Palestinian factions participating in the PLO. But it does not vote on
proposals, and it has no specific and codified agenda. Consequently, whoever wishes to talk does so, and meetings end without voting on any projected proposal or idea. In the latest meeting that was attended by Hamas, there was no vote on Hamas’s proposals. Rather, they were discussed in a general way. After numerous demands by a number of leadership members urging that this body issue a final statement, Abu-’Ammar formed a committee to draft the statement (without agreement on its contents). This committee included Hamas and Fatah representatives who were later joined by a PFLP representative. In the debates on drafting the statement, Fatah representatives refused to include the memorandum submitted by Hamas, with its various points, in the final statement. They were content to point out the disagreement between the two sides on withdrawal from the negotiations. A press statement was issued in two versions to describe what had taken place, without saying that any specific resolutions had been taken. What had actually happened is that even on the agreement points, there had been no attempt to codify those points and to sign to them as a specific agreement among all factions—an agreement that would result in certain mechanisms to be applied on the real ground.

Conclusion

It is evident from the above that the meeting did not emerge with specific results or resolutions. Hamas had not banked on such an outcome, as we have already noted. However, the meeting could be considered a step bringing Hamas and the PLO closer to each other. Through the meeting, Hamas was able to project its viewpoint strongly, and this viewpoint received broad support in the Palestinian leadership meetings. Despite this, the failure to adopt specific resolutions on such sensitive and important issues confirms the viewpoint that contends that the PLO’s domineering leadership controls matters in the organization and that “Palestinian democracy” is a one-legged democracy because, if projected opinions disagree with the leadership’s tendencies, they are not embraced or voted on. Perhaps this reinforces Hamas’s proposal that urges restructuring the PLO according to new democratic bases to ensure realistic representation of all the Palestinian people’s influential forces. Neither Hamas nor others can introduce change into the PLO if the PLO’s frameworks and institutions lack a democratic consultative approach and suffer from domination of the PLO’s resolutions and institutions by certain individuals.

In any case, it is hoped that Hamas’s meeting with the Palestinian leadership in Tunis is a prelude for achieving an effective Palestinian national unity based on escalating the intifadah, on armed action, and on rejecting peaceful solutions that are in conflict with the Palestinian people’s right to their land in its entirety and undiminished.

Hamas, Fatah Prepare for Gaza Withdrawal

93AF0474A Tel Aviv HA’ARETZ in Hebrew
25 Mar 93 p B2

[Article by Guy Behor: “In Principle, They Are Ready To Confront the Challenge”]

[Text] The declaration of the spokeswoman of the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, the day before yesterday, that the PLO would be willing to accept control in the Strip after an Israeli withdrawal from there, did not reflect an ideological vacuum on this question in the Palestinian camp, but rather a lively debate that is now going on behind closed doors, mainly due to the sensitive nature of the subject. An open symposium was supposed to be held on 11 March in the YMCA building in Gaza, but it was cancelled. The Palestinians were uncomfortable about standing out in public on the question of Gaza.

In the past, Palestinian spokesmen refused to relate to the idea of Gaza first, for fear of severing the Strip from the whole Palestinian problem. The assumption was that there is an intent to detach Gaza from the West Bank and to intensify the schisms in the Palestinian camp. Today, the picture has changed due to the evaluation, perhaps even the fear, that Israel is likely to discuss seriously a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, and due to the necessity of preparing accordingly.

Many more senior persons in the Palestinian camp are willing to confront the challenge, mainly due to the real dangers that threaten the Palestinians if they do not prepare themselves for a move of unilateral withdrawal, even on the level of principles. Danger is expected mainly from the increasing rivalry between the national tendency (PLO) and the fundamentalistic tendency (the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad).

It is possible to indicate three tendencies from the ensemble of statements and responses—generally cautious—that were voiced up to now: a growing readiness to confront directly the idea of a unilateral withdrawal, and Ashrawi’s declaration was made on that background; responses of apprehension and fear of the unknown; clear support for an immediate withdrawal by Israel. The supporters of the third tendency include mainly the terror bands, both of “Az E-Din Al-Kassem and the Fatah Eagles.

The supporters of the first tendency believe that the declarations that are being made in Israel express heavy pressure being exerted on the government, and in their estimation, the unilateral withdrawal that is being talked about today is more realistic than in the past. Haiidar ‘abd E-Shafi, who emphasized a few weeks ago that such a withdrawal would be in the nature of a “crime,” and would bring a bloodbath, adopted a more flexible position and says that such a step is not to be feared. In his opinion, the Palestinians cannot force Israel to remain where it does not want to be, but it has the obligation in
such a case to give the Palestinians time to organize, and mainly to invite foreign forces to the region to maintain order.

'Abd E-Shafi noted in an interview to the daily EL-QUDS that, in any event, the subject under discussion is not diplomatic negotiations, and that the Palestinian delegation, as a political factor, would not be willing to discuss the "Gaza first" plan except within the general framework of the Palestinian problem. The Palestinian delegation member Zakhri'a El-Ar'a also noted that if there would be a unilateral Israeli withdrawal, it would have to be carried out according to a timetable coordinated with the Palestinians.

Similar statements were heard among the PLO leadership in Tunis, which, according to the daily E-SHARK EL-AWAASAT that is published in London, clarifies that an exclusively PLO plan was crystallized, which was not coordinated with the Hamas, for confronting the difficulties in the field and filling the vacuum that would be created. The plan, according to the sources who told about it, has not yet been completed.

At the head of those in the PLO who support the achievement of a kind of Palestinian independence, if only in the Strip, stands the head of the Political Department, Farouk Kaddumi. Palestinian sources said that the head of the PLO, Yassir 'Arafat, recently held urgent consultations with President Husni Mubarak in order to convince him that Egypt should temporarily take control in Gaza. Mubarak, according to the sources, rejected the idea.

The withdrawal is feared mainly by industrialists and businessmen in the Strip, who fear instability and chaos, and laborers, whose livelihood in Israel would be denied. As'ad Siftawi, a Fatah activist in the Strip, asserts that the necessary mechanisms to ensure the continuation of normal life for the populace have not yet been constructed. In his opinion, in a situation of withdrawal, Israel will impose an economic siege on the territory and would prevent the continuation of work in its territory, and would also act to protect the settlements that it erected within the Strip. In this way, the Strip would be divided into several small cantons. Siftawi defines the Israeli declarations about withdrawal as irresponsible.

The spokesman of the Hamas movement in Jordan, Ibrahim Rosha, noted that the seizure of power in Gaza by Fatah alone would lead to violent interorganizational struggles, and that, too, is cause for great concern among the residents of the Strip.

The extremist groups in the Strip support the use of terror in order to spur Israel to withdraw. A Hamas leaflet that was discovered in Rafiah asserted that "the authorities are thinking about withdrawing from the Strip in the wake of activity that is being conducted by the 'Az E-Din Al-Kassem squad," so that the "purification of Palestine" must be continued by means of terror and bearing weapons. From this viewpoint, any additional pressure in Israeli public opinion for withdrawal from Gaza is received with satisfaction among the radical elements in the Strip.

The position of the Hamas with regard to the withdrawal is not unambiguous, and it adjusts itself to the circumstances. Despite Rosha's warning about an Israeli trap, that would require a re-entry of the Israeli army into the Strip, the heads of Hamas are now calling on the PLO representatives to coordinate positions with them and to prepare for the Israeli withdrawal. They are motivated mainly by the fear that control in the region will go over to the PLO.

The timing of the move, from their viewpoint, is to the benefit of the PLO, thus the urgency that they give to coordinating positions and the warnings that they voice about a bloodbath, if the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad are ignored. This is the context in which should be viewed the declaration of Muhammad Niz'al, the representative of the Hamas organization in Jordan, regarding the willingness of Hamas to establish a Palestinian state in part of Palestine.

**Fatah, Hamas To Resume Talks 27 Apr**

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has information that says that a new round of discussions between the two organizations [Hamas and Fatah] will be held in Khartoum on 27 April under the sponsorship of the leader of the National Islamic Front [NIF] in Sudan, Dr. Hasan al-Turabi.

Information circulating in Palestinian circles says that Hamas informed Fatah that it will not attend the new round of discussions unless Fatah makes changes in its delegation's membership and replaces Revolutionary Council Member Abu-'Ali Shahin, who is considered the one most hostile to Hamas.

Nasr Yusuf, a Fatah Central Committee member, visited Khartoum during the last few weeks, where he met with Dr. al-Turabi and complained to him that Hamas is trying to avoid a dialogue with Fatah, which began through his mediation and sponsorship. It has been established that the NIF leader is the one who set 27 April as the date to resume these discussions, and that he pledged that representation for both delegations would be as it was in the previous formula. [passage omitted]

**Hamas Representatives Warn Against Replacing 'Abd-al-Shafi**

[Excerpt] Muhammad Nazzal, the Hamas representative in Jordan, has announced that the intent behind including Faysal al-Husayni in the delegation to the bilateral negotiations is to divert attention away from the
deportees issue and to prepare for the Palestinian delegation's participation in the upcoming round in Washington on 20 April.

In an exclusive statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, Nazzal added that this step is also intended to put pressure on current delegation chairman Dr. Haydar 'Abd-al-Shafi, who Nazzal said is the one most staunchly against agreeing to attend the negotiations before resolving the deportees issue.

Nazzal warned that the Palestinian people, which insists on the return of all the deportees, will not let pass easily any attempt to dodge the deportees issue, and that the Palestinian delegation's participation in the negotiations will face Palestinian popular and political rejection.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Aziz al-Rantisi, the spokesman for the Palestinian deportees in Marj al-Zuhur, had warned against making any changes to the Palestinian negotiating team, especially regarding delegation head Dr. Haydar 'Abd-al-Shafi, who clings strongly to anything related to the deportees issue, and links its resolution to [UN] Resolution 799 as a condition for resuming the peace negotiations. [passage omitted]

AL-Husayni: Occupation in 'Last Days'
93AE0487A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 3 Apr 93 p 5

[Telephone interview with Faysal al-Husayni, head of the Guidance Committee of Palestinian Negotiation Delegation, by 'Ali Nun; place and date not given: "Israeli Actions Indicate That Occupation Is in Its Last Days"]

[Text] London—Faysal al-Husayni, head of the guidance committee of the Palestinian negotiation delegation, asserted that the current Israeli escalation in the occupied territories indicates that the occupation "is in its last days," and he warned that the "danger will be comprehensive" unless what is going on is ended. He has also held Yitzhak Rabin's government responsible for putting the "region at the edge of a volcano."

In a telephone interview conducted with him by AL-HAYAH, al-Husayni denounced the killing of civilians, wherever and whoever they are, but "we are under occupation," and most of the latest confrontations "have been between armed people." In a related development, al-Husayni noted that the Palestinian delegation's talks with U.S. officials have been good so far. "There are positive signs, but they still need a great deal of definition," he said. He emphasized that the Israelis have to "take some steps" if they want the peace negotiations to be resumed. He also urged people to wait for the outcome of the Palestinian leadership's meetings in Tunis, where the leaders will discuss the question of participation or nonparticipation in the next round of bilateral negotiations. The following is the text of the interview.

[Nun] What is your view of the latest Israeli escalation and of the measures that the Rabin government has taken, in accordance with which the occupied territories have been turned into a big, sealed prison?

[Humayni] Before anything else, these are signs that the occupation is in its last days. When such measures are taken, when an authority loses its confidence to such a degree, and when people lose their confidence in their army to such a degree, then this indicates that the occupation is in its last days. We say that unless Israel takes certain steps to end this situation and terminate this logic, then the danger will be comprehensive and will threaten this state and its institutions with collapse.

[Nun] Some people, especially in Hamas, say that the Israeli escalation is in response to the latest Palestinian escalation?

[Humayni] The escalation comes from Israel. We are an occupied people who cannot do anything but wage battles on the ground and at the political and negotiating levels. We are waging our battle at all levels. Palestinian escalation is a response to the Israeli escalation, not vice versa.

Threat to Peace

[Nun] In your opinion, could this escalation develop, and could matters move to other phases, such as the use of arms, thus posing a threat to the entire peace process?

[Humayni] We must focus our attention on avoiding such an outcome. We must also avoid reliance on such means and must not involve ourselves in them. If we consider ourselves a part of the world's political map and if we work within this world and at the center of its developments, then it is difficult for us to take steps of a certain kind. But if we accept being outside the political process and outside this world's political map, then the forces that have intentions that are well known to everybody can exploit this [situation].

[Nun] In your opinion, does the killing of Israeli civilians fall within the framework of serving the goals of the people who have these intentions, and what is your opinion of these killings?

[Humayni] In principle and in deed, we are opposed to killing any civilian, wherever he may be. But we are a people under occupation, and the recent incidents were mainly among armed elements.

[Nun] Between armed Palestinians and armed Israelis?

[Humayni] A large part of what has happened recently is connected with Israeli soldiers who were killed in confrontations. We say again that insofar as civilians are concerned, we denounce the killing of any civilian because we do not like killing in the first place. Of course, we are talking here of Palestinian civilians, as well as Israeli civilians.

[Nun] How do these operations affect your meetings with Israeli groups that support the peace process and your attainment of positive results in such meetings?
[Husayni] We believe that these groups must move in their arena, not in ours.

[Nun] Do you think that the steps taken by Rabin’s government since it assumed power last July indicate a desire to attain a peaceful settlement?

[Husayni] The measures taken and not taken by this government have not stopped us from carrying on with the peace process. Force will only lead to escalating the confrontation, and this does not serve the peace process.

Responsibility for Delay

[Nun] Yosi Beilin, director of the Israeli foreign minister’s office, who has been tied by special relations to the Palestinians in the occupied territories, has accused the Palestinians of dragging their feet in discussing the means to end the occupation. What is your response to the minister?

[Husayni] I can tell Beilin and others that Israel is the party that has caused the peace process to slow down because of the steps Israel has taken and obstacles it has erected. We had warned against the danger of the adoption of certain measures and of the negative impact of such measures on the ongoing peace process, but the Israelis would not back down. They are the ones who have put the region on the edge of a volcano.

[Nun] What are the issues that your delegation has discussed with the U.S. administration and with Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and what is the outcome of the discussion?

[Husayni] The issues we have discussed include the deportees issue, the issue of how to deal with the peace authority, the issue of the required guarantees and letters in this connection, and similar fundamental issues that are needed to resume the peace negotiations.

[Nun] Such as Resolution 242 and Jerusalem?

[Husayni] Resolution 242, Jerusalem, and the principle of land for peace. These are issues that the Israelis try to disregard with all means and methods.

[Nun] What was the U.S. response to this projection?

[Husayni] I believe that our talks in Washington have been good so far. There are positive signs, but they still need a great degree of definition and channeling.

[Nun] Positive signs in what connection? And what are the issues that need defining?

[Husayni] In part, they are connected to deportation, considering that we have had people deported before. Since 1967, there have been 1,200 deportees. These people must not be disregarded.

[Nun] Again, what was the U.S. response to you?

[Husayni] I believe that the United States understands our projection. I will not dwell on details.

[Nun] Some people have talked about a comprehensive U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli deal.

[Husayni] As I have already said, I do not wish to talk about details now. But generally, we do not talk about details now, but about specific proposals that we have presented and that have been presented to us.

[Nun] What is your assessment of the Israeli position on this issue?

[Husayni] I believe that the Israelis have to take some steps if they wish to resume the negotiations.

[Nun] An opinion expressed by Dr. Nabil Sha’tih, Palestinian Chairman Yasir ‘Arafat’s adviser, calls for having the Palestinian side and the Israeli side address letters to Washington on the disputed issues and the required commitments. Do you think that this is possible?

[Husayni] There has been a lengthy debate about who should declare his position first. Should we declare ours and address a letter to this effect to Washington and then have Israel declare its position and address a letter to the effect, or vice versa? In our opinion, this kind of procedure can be settled by having the two letters dispatched simultaneously.

Resuming Negotiations

[Nun] It seems that U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher is convinced that the negotiations will resume on the 20th of this month in the presence of all parties concerned. Do you share his opinion?

[Husayni] Foreign ministers of the Arab frontline states have decided to postpone a decision on this matter. They have declared their meetings to be open-ended so that they can follow up on the developments. The Palestinian leadership will meet and discuss the matter and then make its decision. Let us wait and see.

[Nun] Is it true that you are awaiting the outcome of President Husni Mubarak’s talks with President Bill Clinton in Washington, especially because the Palestinian leadership has sent a message with President Mubarak on this issue?

[Husayni] This question should be addressed to the Palestinian leadership in Tunis. We address our messages and what happens with us to this leadership, and then it decides whether to dispatch or not dispatch messages.

'Araraf Says Military Option Still Open

93P50144A Paris AL-DUWALIYAH in Arabic
10 Mar 93 p 8

[Text] Yasir 'Arafat has denied that the Arab side's entering into negotiations with Israel [means] abandoning the military option. In a press interview published by AL-JIL [The Generation] magazine in its latest issue, the Palestinian leader said that if the negotiations fail, the region will be immersed in a conflagration of
Balkanization. He added: "We entered the negotiations as a Palestinian party while the intifadah is escalating greatly and keeping one-quarter of the Israeli Army busy in the West Bank and Gaza. This has great significance, especially because we are entering our sixth year of the intifadah and the blessed resistance." Responding to a question on directing PLO budget expenditures, 'Arafat answered: "For 32 months, no funds have entered the PLO. I am entitled to ask international public opinion why it does not deal with us as it dealt with the Kurds and others."

Habash Discusses Party, Terrorism, PLO
93AA0019A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
18 Mar 93 p 6

[Interview With PFLP Secretary General Dr. George Habash by Mahir 'Uthman; place and date not given; "We Seek To Foil Settlement; We Are Eager for Unity, Democracy, and PLO"]

[Text] London—PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] Secretary General Dr. George Habash has stressed that the PFLP made "a tactical error in the period from 1967 to 1972 based on pursuing the enemy everywhere," but in 1972 "we decided to end that mistake. From that date to this moment, we have continued to hold this viewpoint." Dr. Habash also noted that honoring the late leader Dr. Wadi' Haddad at the PFLP Fifth Congress was a "purely organizational gesture that need not be loaded with more significance than it has."

In an interview with AL-HAYAH, Habash has said that he "attacks no hopes to the current settlement.... We seek to frustrate and foil it because it seeks to kill the Palestinian people's rights."

['Uthman] You abandoned external operations many years ago but it has been reiterated that in the latest congress, you have reapplied the slogan of pursuing the enemy everywhere. If this is true, then does it mean that you plan to resume external operations?

[Habash] Reactions have been coming in succession to our congress since it was concluded. On my part, I have been watching this with interest. What has truly drawn my attention is this strong, rather extraordinary, emphasis on the issue of the rehabilitation of martyr Wadi' Haddad and the connection between this rehabilitation and the slogan of "pursuing the enemy everywhere." In this regard, I wish to give myself the right to clarify the PFLP's true position on this issue.

Since its inception, the PFLP charted a clear military course based on fighting the enemy in the occupied Palestine and across the Arab borders surrounding it, whenever this is possible. Moreover, the PFLP derived from this course in the 1967-72 period a tactical course based on pursuing the enemy wherever he could be reached. The PFLP followed this course in harmony with its analysis of the nature of the circumstances engulfing the Palestinian cause at the time. In our third congress, which convened in 1972, we examined this tactical course and said that it had exhausted its purposes and that the dictates demanding it had ended and we adopted an explicit resolution putting an end to it. This is because what determines our tactical military course is our tangible analysis of the tangible reality. From that date to this moment, we have continued to hold this viewpoint.
I wish to point out without any reluctance that if we in the PFLP believed that the aforementioned tactical course could serve our national cause in this current moment, we will not be afraid or shy. All that is there to the matter is that we do not believe that this course responds to the dictates of the current phase of our people’s struggle.

[‘Uthman] What is the significance of your honoring of Wadi’ Haddad in this phase? Is this an internal organizational gesture or does it have political ramifications connected with the current circumstances in the Middle East?

[Habash] Regarding the issue of the rehabilitation of marty Wadi’ Haddad, I wish, as a start, to ask this question: Who is Wadi’ Haddad? Briefly, he is a prominent Palestinian leader, a model of the struggler who gave his life to a cause in which he believed, and a man with an extraordinary planning and tactical intellect. This is Wadi Haddad in our Palestinian people’s conscience and in the conscience of the Palestinian revolution’s cadres and fighters. He is one in a list that includes the names of Abu-Jihad, Ghasan, Abu-Amal, Abu-al-Walid, and others. This on the one hand. On the other hand, we refuse to see martyr Wadi’ Haddad with the eyes of the agencies that are hostile to our people’s cause and that view Haddad as a terrorist and a person wanted by justice. This is why he was rehabilitated in our fifth national congress.

The congress’ resolution is a purely organizational gesture that need not be loaded with more significance than it has. The PFLP cadres and leaders cannot forget Dr. Haddad’s constituent role or his military role in the early phases of the PFLP’s struggle. The tactical course embraced by the PFLP at the time, and embodied through the activities of Wadi’ Haddad and his comrades, contributed to making accomplishments connected with clarifying the true nature of our people’s struggle and the true nature of the extreme injustice inflicted on our people as a consequence of the occupation of their land, their displacement, and their dispersal in refugee camps and in the diaspora.

Thus, what we have before us are purely organizational considerations that have no connection with “pursuing the enemy everywhere.” This rehabilitation does not mean the revival of external military operations, contrary to what is reported by some papers.

[‘Uthman] Lenin’s statue was shown at your congress, keeping in mind that it has been toppled in numerous countries, especially in East European countries and in the former Soviet Union. Does the PFLP continue to cling to the Marxist-Leninist course?

[Habash] The issue of theory received special attention in our fifth national congress. This is why the document on theory was the first to be listed on the congress agenda. I can also say proudly that debate dominated the congress. As a result, it was decided that we will seek our guidance from the path of historical dialectical materialism, considering that it is the path that represents the spirit of the theory—a path that has maintained its vitality and its novelty, which is compatible with the development of life and with the facts life produces. I can say that through the debate that took place in the congress, we have embraced the correct concept of Leninist Marxism. We have adopted the concept that sees, in theory, a guide to action and does not see it as rigid theory. But at the same time, we have the profoundest regard for those who have devoted themselves to struggle for principles. In our opinion, Lenin continues to represent a prominent and distinguished revolutionary and internationalist leader. Moreover, he is a unique and cultured intellect that led the Bolshevik Party to victory. We continue to see in Lenin’s person and in what Lenin represented a set of values and ideals that inject a spirit of enthusiasm and struggle for the people’s, homeland’s, and toilers’ causes. This, briefly, is our position on method and personalities.

[‘Uthman] What is the nature of the current relationship between the PFLP at home and its organization abroad?

[Habash] The answer to this question is extremely simple, even though I am aware of the background on whose basis such questions may be asked. My answer is that the PFLP inside and outside the homeland is a single united organization that has its united leadership bodies, including the Political Bureau and Central Committee. In this connection, geographical separation has no special organizational indications.

For example, before being approved by the congress, the documents of the fifth national congress were sent as draft resolutions to our brothers at home, and they debated them and expressed their opinions and remarks on them. Numerous amendments were made in accordance with those remarks. There are numerous other details. What I mean is that we have before us a process of organizational integration which is based on unity of the organization and of its bodies, of the documents, and of the program and, consequently, of the will for action.

With this fact established, we must point out that our national congress examined a very important matter, namely understanding the significance and indications of the transfer of the national action’s center of weight into the homeland and the consequences of this transfer at the organizational, financial, and military levels.

I can sum up the issue here as follows: The basis is unity of the PFLP as an organization at home and abroad, plus a scientific understanding of the nature of the phase which the Palestinian national struggle is undergoing so as to understand the significance and indications of the transfer of the national action’s center of weight into the homeland.

[‘Uthman] You oppose the current peace negotiations even though you belong to the PLO. In this opposition, you meet with other factions, such as Hamas, despite the
big differences between you, considering that the PFLP is secular and Hamas is fundamentalist. How do you explain this?

[Habash] Speaking somewhat figuratively, one can say that there are three political tendencies in the Palestinian arena currently: A national bourgeois, a secular democratic, and a religious fundamentalist tendency. All Palestinian national action charters coexist within these tendencies. These factions also act according to their class and ideological vision of the conflict with the enemy. On the other hand, we as Palestinians are faced with a violent enemy from whom we cannot wrench our rights unless we are united. The challenge we face is in how to be able to work in unison despite all the differences in starting points, in political vision, and in class situation.

On the basis of this understanding, we have charted three main pivots for our unified national political action:

- The first is embodied in constant eagerness for the link of Palestinian national unity.
- The second is embodied in preserving the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and their national entity.
- The third is constant eagerness for the character of the democratic relationship that governs the Palestinian house.

The equation we have at hand here is complex. On the one hand, we find that the official bourgeois tendency goes along with the U.S. scheme and swerves from the course of the national consensus program. On the other hand, we find reflections of national action that are characterized by a low spirit of democracy and by the inclination of the fundamentalist tendencies, which oppose the U.S. settlement, to impose their opinion. Moreover, these tendencies' position vis-a-vis the PLO is not as clear as it should be, as in the case of Hamas.

So we are actually confronted with a real challenge that is embodied in being able to confront political deviation on the one hand and, on the other hand, to entrench democratic values in national action and to keep the Palestinian house united, all for the sake of the ability to accomplish the national consensus program and foil the self-rule plan.

[Uthman] What are your expectations for the peace process and what are your conditions for its success, that is if you attach any hopes to it in the first place?

[Habash] We do not attach any hopes to the current settlement. Therefore, we set no conditions. Inversely, we seek to frustrate and foil it. The reason is clear here, considering that we do not see in the projected settlement a settlement that is in harmony with our people's legitimate rights but rather a settlement that seeks to kill these rights.

As for expectations, this is how we see things: There are forces that seek to make the settlement successful, namely the U.S. administration, the Zionist enemy, the regimes, plus the official PLO leadership.

On the other hand, we find that the majority of our Palestinian masses and the intifadah masses raise the slogan of "freedom and independence." There is an ongoing struggle between these two tendencies. Even though we are aware of the balance of powers, we act on the basis that the success of this balance is not inevitable. We continue to demand implementation of the UN resolutions and to stress that the legitimate organizations must intervene because there are numerous UN resolutions that enable us to accomplish our national program, which calls for self-determination, repatriation, and the establishment of the independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital.

ANO Spokesman Elaborates on al-Tubasi Shooting
93AF0491B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 7 Apr 93 p 3


An ANO spokesman in Beirut said "this crime proves that Fatah is behind all the murders and assassinations that it has committed and that it always denied having anything to do with in the past."

He called on "all of the nationalist forces, factions, and personalities to act in order to put a stop to this scheme...." He said the assassination of Yunis 'Awwad and the attempt on the life of Fathi Zaydan were the result of internal clash within the framework of Fatah-Central Committee.

He warned that the Fatah leadership is planning to "sow sedition in order to cover up its intention to attend the peace talks in Washington on 20 April and to disregard the deportee issue." He reaffirmed "the ANO's rejection of the logic of internal fighting and liquidations" and called on all factions and forces to "bear their responsibilities."

Sources of the "Revolutionary Council" have confirmed that the [assassination] incident did take place, but declined to reveal where it happened or give other details for security purposes."

In the meantime, a symbolic funeral for Fatah official Lt. Col. Yunis 'Awwad took place in 'Ayn al-Hulwah camp. He was assassinated last Thursday by two armed men in Tallat al-Khayyat neighborhood in Beirut.

The mourners were led by representatives from Fatah movement, the Palestinian factions, and popular committees in the camps. The procession marched through
the camp. 'Awwad's body was then bid farewell at the camp's northern entrance. Later it was flown to Amman from Beirut international airport.

It is recalled that Fatah had issued a statement following the assassination of 'Awwad accusing the Mossad and Arab intelligence of murdering him.

Deportees Hold Seminar on Islamists' Future
93AE0424A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
23 Mar 93 p 5

[Article: "We Stand as a Stumbling Block in the Path of Settlement Until Important International Changes Occur"]

[Text] London—Under the title The Deportation and Its Effects, and the Future of the Islamic Movement in Palestine: How Islamists Think About Palestine, a seminar was held in the Palestinian deportees' camp at Marj al-Zuhur. Four deportees, prominent figures in the Islamic movement in Palestine, participated: Dr. Mahmud al-Zahhar, a lecturer at the Islamic University in Gaza; Dr. 'Aziz al-Duwayk, lecturer in al-Najah University in Nablus; Jamal Mansur, active in the field of journalism; and Isma'il Haniyah, a prominent young man, who is well-known in the Gaza Strip and who is now working as director of the office of the president of the university.

A number of questions were raised at the seminar: the state of the Islamic movement in Palestine and how it has been affected by Israel's decision to deport a large number of Hamas members, opportunities for action by the movement in the coming period, the movement's view of the Palestine issue, its role in the struggle, and its position on a peaceful settlement in the region.

Dr. al-Zahhar began the discussion by pointing to the results of elections in the trade unions and chambers of commerce. These results reflect the support [the movement] commands in the ranks of Palestinian society. "The deportation decision," he said, "inevitably will have positive effects benefiting those who represent the Islamic movement."

Dr. al-Duwayk said: "The Islamic movement has brought the Arab-Israeli conflict back to its root as a conflict between Islamic civilization and Western civilization and has given the issue its true dimension. These things, and the effective actions of the movement's leaders and their imprisonment in Israeli jails, have given the movement credibility and increased its hold over the hearts of the people." He added that the deportation decision was a blow that had recoiled to increase the Islamic tide in Palestine.

Haniyah said: "The Islamic movement's record in jihad has given the movement a large popular dimension. The deportation issue came to give credibility to the movement's thesis that the conflict with Israel is a conflict of civilizations and ideologies."

Concerning the Islamic movement's view of the Palestine issue, Dr. al-Zahhar said: "From the beginning, Islamists have said that they were living amid three concentric struggles. First there is the regional circle of Palestine, in which we agree with the other organizations that Palestine must be a heated arena and must have preference and priority. Second is the pan-Arab circle. Third must be a wider Islamic circle, so that there will be a clear strategic character—namely, that only the Islamic thesis can resolve the Palestine issue."

Palestine Issue

Mansur said: "The Palestine issue is a central issue of land and people. It is central because it is an arena of conflict in which God has decided that the end of wrongdoers will take place."

Dr. al-Duwayk also stressed the centrality of the issue. He said that Israel wanted the conflict to be between it and the Palestinian people, so that Israel, representing the spearhead of materialistic Western civilization, could isolate the Palestinians. The Islamists, according to Dr. al-Duwayk, want to restore the balance of power to the advantage of the Palestinian people by bringing in the resources of the Arab and Islamic dimensions.

Concerning the role of the Islamic movement in the overall conflict and its position toward a peaceful solution, Haniyah said: "We Islamists cannot liberate Palestine by ourselves. Our role in this phase is to root the rejection process in Islamic reality." He added that the Islamic movement said in its literature that Palestine is the Islamic issue in order to place this Islamic spatio-temporal dimension at the disposal of the Islamic movement in Palestine.

Mansur said: "When we assess the entire process of peaceful settlement, we must bear in mind that this age is one of rapid, unexpected changes and international anarchy." He added that the peace process will continue, however strong the opposing forces may be; which does not mean that it is predestined to take place and be imposed on us. We must not treat it as a fait accompli. "Important international changes," he continued, "may take place, and our modest movement may have an influence on them. We now stand as a small stone, a pebble in the path of a settlement. We have been able to achieve much."

Dr. al-Duwayk said that whoever accepts Israel's conditions for peaceful settlement sets himself at odds with the Palestinian people and the Arab and Islamic peoples. The Palestinian thesis that Fatah and the PLO themselves represent wants Israel to allow the establishment of a state in the West Bank and Gaza.

He went on to say that if Israel gives up these lands, it will thereby abandon its historic right—in other words, lose the ground on which it bases its state. It therefore is unthinkable for Israel to give up the logical justification for its existence. Thus, the possibility for establishment of a Palestinian state is zero.
In the face of this, the Islamic thesis sets matters right and stands opposed to these solutions. Haniyah said: "The settlement will not reach conclusion. There are several possible arguments for this thesis. First, Israel does not want peace. The balances of power in the negotiations are incompatible, too. Second, the Islamic revival in Palestine or in the Arab region may block implementation of the surrender plan."

Dangers of ‘Lebanonization’ of Gaza Strip
93AF0474B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ' in Hebrew
25 Mar 93 p B1

[Article by Dany Rabinowitz: "Lebanonization of Gaza"]

[Text] The major general O/C [Commanding Officer] Southern Command is a consistent man. The media reported this week that he repeated to the forum of senior officers who are subordinate to him the order that he had given already one year ago—to erase the slogans from the walls of houses and buildings in the Gaza Strip.

The reason, according to Vilna'y, is that the slogans "create a revolutionary atmosphere" and they are "something improper."

If that is, indeed, the spirit of the words, then we have a nostalgic major general O/C. Such thinking, and such an order, reflect first and foremost some sort of naive faith that the Strip can be returned to the right path, that is, to the situation that preceded the intifadah, in which the residents refrained from expressing their opinions about the conquest. Vilnay, it seems, yearns for the good days when the anger and hatred towards Israel were suppressed in the Gazan pressure cooker and did not surface to demolish the Israeli illusion of the normalcy of the situation. The major general O/C command, in his naivety, assumes that the slogans are what creates "a revolutionary atmosphere," and that their erasure will contribute to an abatement and to "propriety."

There is not, and for some time there has not been, anything proper in the Gaza Strip. The self-explanatory disengagement of Egypt from the future of the Gaza Strip is, of course, involved with the fact that between 1948 and 1967 the Strip was an integral part of historical Palestine—in the nature of an unwanted appendix to Egypt.

Egypt benefited, perhaps, from Israel’s willingness to withdraw from its achievements in Gaza and in northern Sinai in 1949. However, it treated the Strip and its refugees as something disgusting. In contrast to Palestinians in Jordan, in Lebanon, and in Syria, the Gazan refugees were not even allowed to move freely within Egypt, and not to leave the Strip except for studies. Egyptian citizenship was not a subject for discussion.

For the Palestinians, the Israeli conquest in 1967 was no more than the changing of a dressing on a deep and festering wound. Today, there is no hope in the Strip and no direction other than the short-lived metaphysics of radical Islam. The reality is crowding and misery and physical and spiritual suffocation.

The only thing that can be deemed proper in Gaza—that human hell—in terms of poetic justice and mental balance, is civil revolt. And slogans on the walls are part of that, even if their function, perhaps, is first and foremost the demonstration of presence and scoring of points by the rival Palestinian factions in the public relations struggle that is going on between them.

The fruitless involvement of the major general in an attempt to impose in Gaza laws of clean walls is another indication of the deepening process among the security forces that serve in Gaza, and to a lesser extent also in the other conquered territories. The present wave of attacks substantiates the Gaza Strip's being a place that cannot be ruled.

What will another 1,500 policemen do against point activities of highly motivated lone knifers? What will be the benefit of another 10 barriers against highly defiant demonstrations of those who have no more to lose? What will be revealed by another 15 observation posts in the heart of the camps, other than their weakness before the escalating violence of the residents? And what exactly will be the definition of the missions of another 30 infantry companies?

The loss of military control is the first analogy between Gaza of today and Lebanon of 1984. The second analogy is liable to develop around the form in which Israel will leave the field. What could have been obtained for a real payment up to a year or two ago, will, as time goes by, look more and more like the frightened escape of someone who just wants to get rid of the goods.

No one will be surprised if the exit from Gaza of the 1990's will look like the unilateral abandonment of Lebanon by Peres and Rabin in 1985, when the entire people knew that every day saved there saved more IDF soldiers and Lebanese from harm.

It seems that in Gaza, as in Lebanon, Israel will learn the hard way the first rule of commerce: whoever blows up the negotiations at the beginning with tough and exaggerated demands, is left at the end of the day with the rotten fruit, which he must give away or pay someone just to take them.

And there is, perhaps, a third analogy between Gaza and Lebanon. The flight from Gaza, like Rabin’s “compromise” agreement on the expellees, is liable to come as part of the “agreement” between Israel and the U.S.A., at the expense of the passive Palestinians.

If the Palestinians are not offered a daring plan that would be truly attractive to them and would give them hope, Israel is liable to leave behind in the Strip hatred, bitterness, and unresolved business. Such a situation is
liable to lead to a demand for a security zone in the Gaza Strip a la southern Lebanon—a sure recipe for instability.

Financial Crisis Forces Bi’r Zayt To Close
93P50145A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 7 Apr 93 p 3

[Text] Bi’r Zayt, Media Services Center—The administration of Bi’r Zayt University, the oldest of the six Palestinian universities in the occupied territories, has announced its decision to close the university’s doors on 8 April due to the increasing severity of its stifling financial crisis.

Sources in the university’s Public Relations Department told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the university cannot continue its educational operations under the deficit. The university administration had tried to ease the severity of the financial crisis, which had worsened over the last two months, by increasing tuition. This decision created divisions between the Palestinian students and faculty, and compelled 15 students from the Gaza Strip to withdraw their files from the university because they were unable to pay tuition.
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