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NEAR EAST

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Strained Egyptian-Sudanese Ties Discussed  [Cairo AL-WAFD 10 Jan] ........................................ 1
Sudanese Minister Hails Iranian Economic Ties  [Tehran IRNA] ....................................................... 2
Ethiopian-Sudanese Talks Said ‘Going Well’  [Khartoum SUNA] ..................................................... 2

ALGERIA

New Plan Anticipates Significant Number of Jobs  [EL MOUDJAHID 27 Nov] ................................. 3
Improvement of Textile Industry Urged  [EL MOUDJAHID 25 Nov] ............................................... 3
Increased Demand on Skikda Dams  [EL MOUDJAHID 23 Nov] .................................................... 5

ISRAEL

Ideology of City of David Settlers  [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 27 Dec] ............................................. 6
Economic Complications in Palestinian Autonomy  [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 13 Dec] ..................... 11
Demographic Aspects of Civil Guard Formation  [HA'ARETZ 29 Dec] ......................................... 12

LEBANON

Aspects of Water Situation in South Viewed  [AL-SHIRA' 14 Oct, 11 Nov] ................................. 13

MOROCCO

Hassan on Mideast Peace, Algerian Elections  [Paris LE FIGARO 9 Jan] ........................................ 20
‘Mercenaries’ Reported Occupying ‘No-Man’s-Land’  [L’OPINION 4 Jan] ................................. 23
Rights Organization, Press Welcome Royal Releases  [MAP] .................................................... 23
Visit of Opposition Parties to Mauritania Reported  [L’OPINION 28 Dec] .............................. 24
New USFP First Secretary Appointed  [Rabat Radio] ............................................................... 24
Oil Pipeline Said Operating Despite Leaks  [L’OPINION 31 Dec] ............................................. 24
Figures on Increased Cost of Living Reported  [L’OPINION 31 Dec] ......................................... 25
Increasing Trade Deficit With EEC Discussed  [L’OPINION 28 Dec] ........................................ 25
Effects of 1990-91 Harvest on Economy Detailed  [LE MATIN DU SAHARA 26 Dec] ............. 26

SUDAN

RCC Official Defends Country’s Human Rights Record  [SUNA] .................................................. 28
Official Says Sudan ‘Strongman of Africa’  [SUNA] ................................................................. 28
Islamic Front Leader Departs Eritrea  [Voice of Eritrean Broad Masses] ................................. 28
Shantytown Residents Clash With Police  [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 23 Dec] ............ 29
Al-Bashir Stresses Police Role  [SUNA] .......................................................... 29
University Officials Resign in Protest  [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 2 Jan] .................... 29

WESTERN SAHARA

Intervention Urged To Liberate Moroccans ‘Held’  [Rabat ALMAGHRIB 4 Jan] ....................... 30
Risk of Uprising in Camps Suggested  [Rabat L’OPINION 27 Dec] ......................................... 31
REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Strained Egyptian-Sudanese Ties Discussed
NC1901114592 Cairo AL-Wafd in Arabic 10 Jan 92 p 7

[Article byn Ambassador Salah Basyuni: "Egyptian-Sudanese Relations Crisis"]

[Text] Having been reassured at the early stages of the coup about Egyptian support, or at least about the fact that Egypt was reluctant to get involved in Sudan's internal affairs, it seems that the Sudanese regime believed it could pursue certain policies which conflict with Egypt's national interests and security. It looks as if Hasan al-Turabi, who regards himself today as the commander and the general guide of the Islamic movement, thinks that, through maneuvers and false statements, he can conceal the schemes he is harboring for Egypt.

When things reach that point, we will have to pause for a moment and try to clarify this regrettable stand without using slogans. Apart from our fraternal feelings as Egyptians toward our brother Sudanese—feelings which are far from falsity and politics—there are Egyptian national interests which any Sudanese government should consider.

1. Water is a common issue for both Egypt and Sudan, and is governed by the 1959 agreement. It is in both countries' interest to insist on that agreement before any Nile country refuses to recognize it or the acquired rights it entails for the two countries. But the Sudanese stand on Egypt is questionable. Despite the continued meetings of the Egyptian-Sudanese joint committee to discuss cooperation on water resources and the statements which reiterate the continuation of that cooperation, the Sudanese Government is trying, through contacts with Ethiopia, to establish a new formula for direct Sudanese-Ethiopian cooperation without Egypt's involvement. This conflicts completely with the 1959 agreement and shakes the legal foundation on which this agreement was built. The ongoing negotiations on dam projects for the Atabah River and the al-[Murawah] Reservoir, which would serve both Ethiopia and Sudan, directly affect Egyptian interests. Sudan is well aware of this and still pursues a dual policy: On the one hand, it reiterates its commitment to the 1959 agreement, and on the other, it seeks to ruin this agreement.

Oddly enough, Sudan is aware that any infringement on Egypt's quota of Nile waters, either by Sudan or any of its neighbors, is a direct threat to Egypt's national security, which compels Egypt to stand up to it with the necessary resolve.

2. The ruling group in Sudan knows very well that the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa represent a strategic security belt for Egypt, and that Egypt's interest in these two regions is not dictated by its greed for control and hegemony, as much as it is linked with its direct interests in connection with water, navigation, or cooperation with these countries. Sudan is supposed to share this strategic view with Egypt, but what is happening is both surprising and unforeseen. The present Sudanese policy seeks to drive a wedge between Egypt and Ethiopia. Sudan thinks it is capable of winning over the Eritrean revolution and the future Eritrean state. It seeks to ruin Egypt's policy of establishing cooperation with the Horn of Africa and Nile states. Over and above, Sudan's involvement in reigniting armed struggle in Chad is no secret.

3. Although the Sudanese regime is aware that Egypt's sovereignty over the area of Halaib and Shalatayn is undisputable, that the region is an inseparable part of Egyptian soil, and that Egypt's willingness to leave the region's administration to Sudan to make life easier for the tribes on both sides of the border does not mean Egypt has relinquished this dear part of its land, not a single day passes without Egyptian nationals in the region or Egyptian fishermen in the regional waters being arrested on charges of infiltrating Sudanese territory! We know that the Egyptian Government overlooks such provocations, but this does not mean that Egypt will overlook or relinquish its sovereignty on these areas. If we have avoided raising this issue out of eagerness to safeguard fraternal relations and integration with Sudan, this does not mean that Egypt—which refused to let Israel seize a single kilometer of the Sinai in Tabah and regained control over it—accepts such bizarre practices from Sudan, a neighbor and brother.

Malicious intentions reached their summit when the Sudanese began to object to any international or other organization charting a map that shows Halaib and Shalatayn as part of Egyptian territory!

4. Freedom of travel between the two countries has been the established practice. Egypt always has been the tolerant side, never denying a Sudanese the right to visit or immigrate to Egypt. The Sudanese Government, on the other hand, places all kinds of obstacles before Egyptians' travel or work in Sudan. Everyone knows about the incidents in which Egyptian nationals were insulted or expelled.

5. Meanwhile, we find Hasan al-Turabi's government attracting hundreds, or rather thousands, of Egyptian youth and opening Sudan's doors before them to train and prepare them to join the Islamic jihad. I believe the Egyptian Government is fully aware of this destructive policy by al-Turabi's government.

The great Sudanese leader believes that the Islamic Salvation Front's success in Algeria, his tight control over Sudan, and his role in Jordan do not satisfy his ambition as long as Egypt is outside the circle of his control. Therefore, he pursues a new approach with Egypt. Unfortunately, his approach is far removed from understanding and rapprochement, and instead, is based on terrorism and is absolutely rejected by Egypt. He did not try to conceal his intentions when he declared before the 40-member council in Khartoum on 23 October that there was no going back on the policy of giving assistance.
to the soldiers of Muhammad [Muhammad's Army] in Egypt and that Islam is coming eventually, no matter what.

6. This mentality was behind the new military and political alliance between Iran and Sudan. It is no secret that both think that they have tightened the rope around Egypt's neck. Therefore, it was natural for the Egyptian foreign minister to make statements which made it clear to all in Tehran and Khartoum that Egypt's message is: Quit this dangerous game with Egypt!

A review of the history of Egyptian-Sudanese relations reveals a basic fact: All Sudanese governments that pursued a hostile policy toward Egypt did not survive long. This was not due to Egyptian interference, media campaigns, or economic pressures. It was due, rather, to the fact that these policies aimed, first and foremost, to cover up the failure of domestic and foreign policies in Sudan. The al-Turabi/al-Bashir government is going too far in these policies, as well as in its maneuvers and conspiracies. I believe it will continue this foolish policy, depending on its new holy alliance with Iran against Egypt and the other Arab states. As the saying goes, "you can fool some people some of the time, but you can't fool all of the people all of the time."

Sudanese Minister Hails Iranian Economic Ties
LD1401105992 Tehran IRNA in English 1735 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Tehran, Jan 13—Visiting Sudanese Minister of Finance and Economic Planning Abd-al-Rahim Muhammad Hamadi held talks with Iran's minister of commerce, Abdolhoseyn Vahaji, on expansion of bilateral ties here today.

Hamadi said Sudan is to purchase 500 tractors and related agricultural machinery from Iran and expressed readiness to export resin, cotton thread, and livestock to the Islamic Republic. He called for setting up direct air and sea links between the two countries to boost the volume of commercial exchanges.

Hamadi, who arrived here last Saturday at the head of a delegation, appreciated the willingness of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Company to carry Sudan's merchandise to Jordan, Syria, and Libya. He also welcomed Vahaji's proposal to organize an exclusive Iranian trade fair in Khartoum and to sell Iranian products.

Vahaji, in reply, announced Iran's readiness to provide Sudan with cargo shipping services as requested. On importing livestock from Sudan, he said that since it was the first time such a trade was being discussed, all relevant aspects, including veterinary and quarantine measures, as well as the cost of live animals, should be evaluated. Vahaji said Iran will soon set up an exclusive trade fair in Khartoum and will also supply Sudan with medicines.

In a separate meeting with Iran's minister of economic affairs and finance, Mohsen Nurbakhsh, Hamadi and his delegation showed interest in utilizing Iran's experience in economic planning. Nurbakhsh stressed the need for expanding economic relations and expressed Iran's readiness to share its experiences with Sudan.

Ethiopian-Sudanese Talks Said 'Going Well'
EA2212221591 Khartoum SUNA in English 1625 GMT 22 Dec 91

[Text] Khartoum, 22 Dec—Uthman al-Sa'id Sa'di, Sudan's ambassador to Ethiopia, who is a member of the Sudanese side in the joint Sudanese-Ethiopian ministerial committee meetings, said in press statements that the technical committee meetings are going well, pointing out that the political committee concluded its meetings with an mutual understanding in the fields of security, refugees, border conflicts, and displaced people. The two sides agreed to boost bilateral coordination between the two countries' foreign ministries and strengthen diplomacy by opening two Ethiopian consulates in al-Gadaref and Damazin, besides the opening of two Sudanese consulates in Gambela and Gonder, said al-Sa'id.

He added that agreements will be signed in the fields of transportation, electricity, water, border trade, foreign policy, and other fields.

The Sudanese diplomat pointed out that the political committee had discussed the Somali question when it was briefed on the recent situation in Somalia.

On the other hand, the Ethiopian minister of energy and mines, Izz-al-Din Ali [name as received], expressed hope that the Sudanese-Ethiopian joint committee meetings would adopt recommendations that would push forward the developing bilateral relations between the two countries. He said that the committee had given property for realization of security and stability in the Horn of Africa and realization of peace in Somalia.

Meanwhile, the social committee held its meeting which was chaired by member of the Revolutionary Command Council [RCC] Brigadier Ibrahim Nayil Edam and Health Minister Professor Muhammad Shakir al-Sarraj on the Sudanese side and the Ethiopian information and tourism minister. [The] meeting discussed joint agreements on culture, higher education, and health, in addition to three separate agreements on youth and sports, information and radio, and tourism, which will be submitted to the higher ministerial committee for endorsement.

Sudanese-Eritrean Naval Maneuvers Conducted
PM16011554792 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 15 Jan 92 p 1

['Uthman Mirghani and Sayyid Ahmad Khalifah report:
"Sudanese-Eritrean Naval Maneuvers With Iranian, Yemeni Participation"]

[Excerpts] London, Jeddah—Sudanese military sources have described the joint naval maneuvers conducted over the past few days by the Sudanese and Eritrean navies as the largest joint naval maneuvers in Sudan's history.
Although not much has been said about these maneuvers in Khartoum, and the Eritrean radio was content with a brief report about the military personnel's performance during the maneuvers, Sudanese military sources who AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT contacted by telephone from London described the maneuvers as comprehensive, saying that they lie within the framework of a new approach adopted by the Sudanese Government, with support from Iran, to strengthen its force in the Red Sea.

From what Eritrean radio reported, it is understood that forces from other states—believed to be Yemen and Iran—took part in the maneuvers, which lasted three days and were conducted in Port Sudan, Jubayt, and Sudanese territorial waters in the Red Sea. [passage omitted]

In Cairo, sources said that Egypt was looking with suspicion at the Sudanese-Eritrean military maneuvers, conducted with the participation of forces which Cairo believes are not concerned with the region, like the Iranian forces, from which military units or groups—albeit symbolic—were reported to have attended these naval maneuvers.

**ALGERIA**

**New Plan Anticipates Significant Number of Jobs**
92AF0243A Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French
27 Nov 91 p 3

[Article by Y. Merabet: “80,000 New Jobs”; first paragraph is EL MOUDJAHID introduction]

[Text] The draft annual plan calls for creating 80,000 new jobs, a large percentage of which will be in education, local administration, and the vocational training system.

Yesterday afternoon’s session was marked by speeches by several ministers, particularly Medelci, Keramane, and Harrati, before a sparse audience.

Mourad Medelci, minister delegate for budget, answered several questions from the deputies relative to the main features of the budget and especially such priority actions as the exploitation of national mining and hydrocarbon resources and the promotion of activity to develop new lands in the country’s southern regions.

It should be noted that the draft annual plan for 1992 calls for the creation of 80,000 new jobs. Most of them will be in the sectors of education and training, local administration, the vocational placement system, and agriculture.

**Revival of Industry and Mining**

For his part, the minister of mines and industry, Abdenour Keramane, pointed out that several Sonelgaz centers were planned and would be built in the near future and said he was proud that the electrification of our country was 90-percent complete, adding that the remaining 10 percent was being attended to by the proper authorities.

Keramane also stressed the priority of the mining sector by saying that a few weeks previously he had presented the Government Council with a voluminous dossier, which has been the subject of lengthy debate. New measures are planned for the mining sector as a means of giving the national economy a better boost.

Concerning the moving of the headquarters of certain firms, he said that the government had not issued any directive on the subject. The autonomous firms can do so through a decision by their boards of directors.

The minister of mines and industry also said there was a joint program by the Ministry of Energy and Naftal [National Enterprise for Refining and Distributing Petroleum Products] to improve hydrocarbon storage capacities, basically in the northern governorates.

A deputy then questioned Keramane about the plan to move the Adrar plant, which “they want to trivialize,” and said he was in favor of moving it to the south so as to create jobs there and encourage inhabitants in the north to leave the cities and go to work in the south.

**Equipment: Plans and Laws**

Minister of Equipment Mostefa Harrati focused his speech on water resources, public works, town planning, and housing.

Concerning water resources, the minister spoke at length about the situation with water resources in Algeria and the means to be used for improving the storage and distribution of water.

On the subject of public works, he noted that major road and highway projects would be carried out in this decade, but not next year [1992]. The year 1992 will be spent maintaining the system already in existence.

As regards ports and airports, several projects have been completed, examples being the port of Djén-Djen and various airports in the governorates in the interior. Other projects are under way, particularly the Algiers International Airport, which will be worthy of the greatest capitals.

Concerning town planning and housing, Harrati promised that 1992 would see implementation of the laws in force and that land suitable for urbanization would be developed. He also promised that 1992 would see the introduction of new legal instruments and the establishment of a reliable legal framework making it possible to continue the operation.

In the case of housing, the minister pointed out that his ministry had buckled down to organizing the sector through new laws and to helping the most needy families.

**Improvement of Textile Industry Urged**
92AF0243B Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French
25 Nov 91 p 9

[Article by O.M.: “Breakdown”; first paragraph is EL MOUDJAHID introduction]

[Text] For the information of those who do not know, the prize-winning [cotton] samples in France during the 19th
century were produced with cotton grown in Algeria. Who would have thought it? The textile industry, which had every chance of experiencing great expansion, is sick today.

What is happening in the textile industry? While every hope was justified for businessmen in that industry before adoption of the 1991 supplementary budget, when there was a possibility that the compensatory tax would be eliminated, the situation now is more critical than ever, and one after another, the factories are closing their doors. Over 1,300 private factories out of a total of 1,400 are at a standstill, and 100,000 out of a total of 300,000 jobs have been lost. What it means is that this job-creating industry is dying.

By way of comparison, the industry employs 400,000 people in Tunisia, while in Algeria, that same industry, which has received investments on the order of 20 trillion centimes (including 15 trillion centimes in the public sector), is not able to achieve the objectives assigned to it.

Although the supplementary budget for 1991 provided tax relief in the case of finished products, raw materials are still subject to the previous taxes and customs duties. The rates set by that same law seem absurd, according to officials in the textile industry.

For example, the raw material (yarn) is taxed at 25 percent, while paradoxically, imported fabric is taxed at 15 percent. It is obvious that such a measure encourages imports to the detriment of domestic production. It means that the added value obtained by processing the raw material is not being sought, the result being lost jobs and, consequently, the hampering of economic recovery. That situation leads Mebtouche, president of the National Federation of the Textile Industry (FNIT), to say: “To revive this industry, 10 billion dinars would be needed to cover domestic requirements and carry out spinning mill projects. That is why 476 projects or import licenses totaling 1.167 billion dinars have been approved. But they are still in the planning stage.

“Among the factors hampering their execution and the development of this sector, we need to mention the compensatory tax, banking procedures and problems (interest rates, the short term of loans, and so on), and the requirement that businessmen maintain sizable cash flows—a new procedure whose implementation is slow in coming.

“Among the other causes, we need to mention the obsolete nature of equipment and the scarcity of qualified personnel, both of which are factors in the slump. Increasing profit margins (30 percent on production and 60 percent on sales) is not a solution in itself. It is not a matter of raising prices but of increasing production, because while the first-named solution suits the tax collector, the second strengthens the national economy and protects the purchasing power of the citizens,” Mebtouche explains.

As regards taxes, the compensatory tax, which was supposed to bring in new revenues, has in fact killed off all the other traditional taxes, such as the TUGP [single total production tax] and the TAIC [tax on industrial and commercial activity], by shrinking the tax base. This leads some manufacturers to say that the compensatory tax must be purely and simply abolished.

Another important factor severely penalizing the industry is imports without payment. According to Graba, a manufacturer who belongs to the FNIT, “entire containers that either escape detection by the customs inspectors or benefit from laxness have flooded the market. That ‘suitcase trade’ accounts for 90 percent of the market in textile goods.”

Some say that the circular of April 1991, which deals with imports without payment by requiring that the bank account in foreign exchange be domiciled in Algeria, has also discouraged some foreign suppliers because of the more lengthy collection procedure.

The minimum threshold for a bank domiciliation transaction is set at the equivalent of between 30,000 and 10,000 dinars. This means that there are safeguards to protect the market from the parallel economy. At present, in order to obtain a line of bank credit, businessmen are required to have imports valued at more than $2 billion. That is considered an obstacle because only state-owned enterprises can come up with such a huge sum.

But state-owned enterprises are not being spared the crisis, either: they are carrying about 1 billion centimes worth of unsold inventory on their books.

It is true that the public sector does not express its discontent as much, but is that only a matter of self-restraint? While the public sector’s problem is primarily one of unsold goods and dilapidated equipment, the private sector, for its part, is suffering mainly from the upstream problem of supplies.

There is currently an interest in bulk buying through trading companies: that would save foreign exchange and reduce the pressure on the latter.

In the case of equipment imports, some proposals mention the acquisition of used equipment, provided, of course, that such equipment has undergone a prior technical inspection by the appropriate departments.

Last, in the area of training, a great deal remains to be done at all levels—among engineers, designers, high fashion designers, and so on—in order to satisfy the requirements and tastes of an increasingly demanding population. It is certain that only a sense of creativity and imagination will be able to improve the quality of textile products.
At the international level, the industry is undergoing redeployment and delocalization in all the southern countries. Perhaps it is time to ask ourselves some questions—and above all to take protective measures—concerning this new division of labor. What can one say today when one realizes that cotton was once important and of good quality in our country and that the prize-winning samples in France in the 19th century came from cotton grown in Algeria?

**Customs Duties and VAT: Lower Rates**

Lower customs duties and a lower value-added tax (VAT) on imported goods will guarantee the revival and protection of domestic textile production, said the FNIT during a meeting held by the Financial and Economic Committee of the APN (National People's Assembly) in preparation for the 1992 budget and the new Customs Code.

The FNIT is proposing in particular:

1. A low customs duty of 3 percent and exemption from the VAT for all imported raw materials.

2. A customs duty of 7 percent and a VAT of from 7 to 13 percent, depending on circumstances, in the case of thread, which is considered a finished product but classed as a raw material for the processing industry.

3. A customs duty of 40 percent and a VAT of 21 percent on fabrics that are regarded as finished products in certain cases but as semimanufactures for the purposes of processing.

As for finished articles (ready-made garments and so on), they should pay a 60-percent customs duty and a 40-percent VAT plus an additional tax of from 20 to 100 percent depending on the article being imported and the needs of the market.

The representatives of the FNIT say they "met with a favorable reception on the part of all the participants" to the idea of reviving and protecting domestic production.

Attending the working meeting were the director general of Enerim, the director general of Cotitex, and representatives of the Customs Service and the Ministry of Economy and Planning.

**Increased Demand on Skikda Dams**

92AF0243C Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 23 Nov 91 p 5

[Article by Rachid Souilah: "Water in Abundance"; first paragraph is EL MOUDJAHID introduction]

[Text] The Skikda Governorate has two dams with a total capacity of 135 cubic hectometers [hm³]. They are the old Zardezas Dam (15 hm³) in the El Harrouch District and the new Guenitra Dam (120 hm³) in the Tamalous District.

The Zardezas Dam supplies drinking water for the towns in the lower valley, namely Zardezas, Salah Bousba, El Harrouche, and Ain Bouziane. It has a water treatment plant that is going to be renovated. The operation has already been scheduled and the contract signed with an Algerian company. The capacity of this dam was originally 45 hm³, but it has been considerably reduced to 15 hm³ mainly because of silting.

According to the governorate's director of water resources, there is a proposal to schedule a dredging operation for this year.

The Guenitra Dam, which went into service two years ago, has a double function. It supplies drinking water for the city of Skikda, the surrounding towns, and the industrial zone, and it is also intended to provide irrigation water for the areas in Emdjez-Edchich and the Saf-Saf Valley, which cover 5,600 hectares. The construction work in those areas is being done by an Algerian company (Hydro-Transfer). Delivery of the fourth sector of Emdjez-Edchich (1,240 hectares) is scheduled for the start of the this year's irrigation season.

It should be noted that the work is tremendously behind schedule, apparently because of missing building materials.

It should also be noted that despite its water resources, the governorate does not yet have any irrigated areas. Because of that, an irrigation policy is being implemented to rationalize the exploitation of agricultural land.

Along with irrigation, supplying drinking water for the rural inhabitants is one of the governorate's priorities. Plans call for carrying out a drinking water project for the commune of Oum-Toub and its towns.

Drinking water will be supplied from the Guenitra Dam. Work on this project, which will include a water treatment plant, will start in the very near future, according to the governorate's director of water resources.

In order to develop the sector of water resources (drinking water and irrigation water), two dams are under construction in the governorate. One is the Zit-Enba Dam in the commune of Bekkouche Lakhdar (Azzaba District) with a capacity of 120 hm³, and the other is the Beni-Zid Dam (Collo District) with a capacity of 40 hm³. Work on the Zit-Enba Dam, which began in November 1989, should take 48 months from start to finish. It is being done by a foreign company.

The dam in question will provide irrigation water for the 7,500-hectare area that will be developed on the Zit-Enba Plain and for which the project studies are under way. The other hydraulic structure is intended to irrigate the Beni-Zid area (1,600 hectares), the feasibility study for which is under way, and also to supply drinking water for seven towns in the Collo District. The design study for the drinking water projects is already complete, and work is scheduled to begin sometime this year.

As far as water resources are concerned, the governorate also has 32 hillside reservoirs with a total capacity of 1.6
NEAR EAST

hm³. It also has a water treatment plant in the commune of Hamadi-Krouma with a treatment capacity of 1,200 liters per second. That plant treats drinking water for the city of Skikda and its surrounding towns as well as for the industrial zone. The governorate has also sunk 118 wells with a total capacity of 1,722 liters per second and plans, as part of the 1991 annual plan, to complete 400 linear meters [as published] for supplying the new centers with drinking water. The governorate’s director of water resources also points out that 82 drinking water and sewage projects included in the PCD’s [communal development programs] are under way throughout the governorate. That shows the importance assigned to this vital sector, for which great efforts have been made and sizable funds allocated by both the state and the governorate. It should also be noted that another important operation that has been scheduled involves the building of a sewage treatment plant for the city of Skikda and its surrounding towns.

In addition, the work now under way includes the downstream stabilization of Wadi Zeramma to protect the city of Skikda from flooding. This work involves widening the wadi and paving it with concrete. The governorate’s director of water resources notes, however, that this operation would be very inadequate if work to stabilize the catchment area (upstream) were not assured as well.

ISRAEL

Ideology of City of David Settlers

92AE0151A Tel Aviv YEDIOT AHARONOT in Hebrew
27 Dec 91 pp 20-22, 28

[Article by Tzur Shifez: “Two Nights in the Sweet Valley”]
[Text] “The neighborhood is called Wadi al-Hilwa, the Sweet Valley, said Qar’in Shahadi, the 70-year-old head of the family, a fireman since 1946 and until a few years ago. From the balcony, which the settlers call “upper observation point,” one can see Ras al-Amud, the upper neighborhood of the village of Silwan, on top of Mount of Olives. “Silwan is divided into three parts: al-Fuqa, al-Wusa, and al-Tahata.” “And there?” I asked, pointing to the south. “That is Abu-Tor, above the Shiloah. Across from the Niqbat-Hashiloah lived the Yemenites. We lived next to them. They used to say: ‘Ya jarna (our neighbor), come light the stove on the Sabbath, and they would give me sweets. Later they moved to the Jewish quarter and I do not know what became of them.” The Yemenites immigrated in 1885, settled in Silwan, and were then evacuated in 1937 during the Arab rebellion.

I came down through the Old City. I had not walked here for years. I had missed it. There are two cities than never disappoint any visitor: New York and Jerusalem.

I looked at the wall built by Suliman the Magnificent. Among the stones there are some Herodian ones. They are easy to spot because of the way in which the edges are cut. I went down through the market. Only English and Arabic spoken. I bought some green falafel, drank an orange juice, and slowly descended under the arches.

I went up by way of the Ge Street and crossed through the Jewish quarter. Border troops’ jeeps, police cars belonging to the special patrol unit, and settlers’ rented American vans stood in the parking lot.

A dirt road leads from the road to the disputed house. On the right side stands a makeshift hut belonging to the settlers, protected by high chainlink fences and barbed wire; a white demarcation line runs along the fence. On the left a settler’s house, close to it the house of the Sha’abani family, and above it, the Qar’in house. The entire neighborhood used to belong to the Qar’in family.

Columns of demonstrators marched up and down the quarter alleys, among the houses close to the wall and between the Isabel and the ‘Abasi house, which is located above Fir Waran and Bet Meyuhas below it. “You know what?” said Muhammad Qar’in, Shahadi’s brother, “went up and down. You go into the houses, sit quietly. Why demonstrate? For some idiot to provoke you?”

Qar’in and ‘Abasi are large families. The Qar’ins count 5,000 of the 30,000 inhabitants of Silwan. The ‘Abasi family is even larger. An additional house purchased in the village belonged to the Sumrayn family, another of Silwan’s huge clans.

The settlers carried large Israeli flags, moved in groups, their front and rear guarded by border policemen. Among them there were agile young men with Uzis, finger on the trigger. I went down slowly after them. Alone, not part of the hubbub. “Are you crazy?” shouted one of them, “You are endangering yourself.” Only myself. I smile a silly smile at anyone I meet and bid them peace. A dangerous word.

I went back up to the Qar’in house. The police stopped the demonstrators from continuing along the path to the Qar’in and Sha’abani houses. One of the patrol unit policemen put a foot in the yard and plucked a handful of mint. The mint was already chewed to the ground.

“Do you always pick mint from other people’s gardens?”

“The lady of the house gave me permission.”

I would have given him permission, too. Especially to dozens of policemen.

I sat down next to Zuhayr Sha’abani, a mechanic at a garage in Jewish Jerusalem. “Twenty-five years ago my family came to Wadi al-Hilwa from the Old City. I was born here. We rented the apartment from Fatimah Qar’in before the war. There are five families here: Qar’in, Sha’abani, Zaydan, ’Amar, and Suhayla. Tawil Suhayla fled. Has not been found. He lived here from 1974 and was with us until last Thursday, with the lawyer who defends us in court. Tawil sold a rental apartment, not legally. He uses drugs. The Qar’in say
they did not sell and that they have titles for the land with the Land Register, not only for the houses.

“At 0600 the settlers entered the Tawil house and the Qar’in house. The families were inside. The Qar’in did not want to get out. They summoned police to get them out by force, into the rain. They cut a new path here and pulled up trees.

“It is not a matter of one house,” Zuhayr Sha’abani said, “it is a matter of one village and one Jerusalem. All of Jerusalem. This house was built in 1936. Aside from the Western Wall and the Jewish quarter, which I know, we never heard of Jews buying here.”

I went up on the balcony. The light was fading. Men sat around the small brass table on the balcony; the Jerusalem cold had gathered them around a water pipe, pulling on tobacco brought in from Nabulus.

“This was the house of Fatimah Qar’ in, my grandmother. She cared for her grandmother until she was old and could not move any more. And before she died she said this house should go to Fatimah and no one else. I poured 800 shekels worth of tar, so that rain will not get in,” said Shahadi.

The dispute in court is whether the Qar’in family had possession of the house or whether the house was abandoned. The settlers claim that on the first night they came into the house, it was empty. The Qar’in family claims that was not so. There are times when a bit of tar can signal good care. Like in Taybah.

I went down from the roof of the Qar’in family house into the living room of the Sha’abani family.

“Is this a Christian or a Muslim village?”

“Most of the village is Muslim,” Zuhayr Sha’abani said, “Christian or anything else, it does not matter. Believe me, we are not against Jews coming in here, but not these. Every family has lost someone. My brother, Yusuf, worked in Gila. In 1983 he was coming back from work, was sitting on the road, and his watch blinded someone on the bus. Five settlers descended on him and knifed him to death. That was before the intifadah anyway. Believe me, the state had no law here. There were no stones between us and no nothing. He was 16 years old. It is not a personal matter between me and the settlers. It is between us and them. They did not spend time in jail. The main killer did not get anything. Exactly at that time I went to jail.”

“For what?”

“I was wild when I was small. I robbed tourists at the Wall. I spent 10 months in jail. Yesterday we held a party for the house that was returned to us. The police came to us, that we should not make noise and a mess. Today you saw how they came in.”

“What if I wanted to buy a house here?”

“If you bought, why not. It is not the religion that bothers me. What bothers me is that they come with strength and with the strength of the police. We have houses in Qatamon, in the Valley, in Yafo, and in Haifa. But we cannot get into them, because those are Israeli territories. So why do they come into ours? We have documents and everything in Yafo. The Land Register. We do not try to go in there. So they should not come near us.”

In the room above the living room, where the television was on, Vidad switched to the news in Arabic, the news from Jordan, then back to the 2100 news. The newscast from Romema. Special fund allocations and other clamoring. The wonders of special democracy in the Middle East. On the wall hung a portrait of the son Yusuf lying stabbed and bleeding on a green lawn. The mother, Vidad, is pouring tea into cups. She comes from a Christian family and bore Mustafa eight children, six sons and two daughters. All seven children are crowded in the room.

“Where did you learn such good English?”

“I worked as a stewardess for the Jordanian airline for eight years. In the beginning we flew Dakotas, then Boeing [B6], then DC 4, DC 6, and finally Caravelles.”

The earth is shaking and we talk about airplanes while waiting for al-Husayni, who will come for his daily visit. The door is open despite the cold; waiting for guests, if they will come. Family members from the entire village are coming up to the houses to spend the night. To be inside them. Teddy Kolek’s envoy comes into the room. “City Hall is helping us. They offered a lawyer at their expense and a hotel.”

I went down the sloping road to Christine, the German archeologist who lives in the next house. Before the settlers came there was no fence between the houses. One could cut through the trees. The trees have been uprooted and a fence was built in the yard. Christine opened the curtained glass door. I went into the small living room. Outside, the generator hummed in the hut in the yard between the Sha’abani and Qar’in families and Christine’s house.

“Are you good friends?”

“Between you and me, what are good friends?” Christine cut me short. “I come from another culture. We are neighbors. I have been living here nine years already. I do not believe in the law anymore, nor in the police. I do not want to get involved. Yesterday one of the settlers attacked me and shouted PLO at me. I had to push him away from me.

“The first years were wonderful. I dug at Lakhish and in the City of David, and I lived here with the girls, alone. I did not know fear. I have a complex about police authority. But where shall I go from here? I am an archeologist, my work is here, I want to finish a few other things before I die. Do you not see how everything is
deteriorating? I do not want the settlers to cut my tires tomorrow morning. I am not that rich.

"I am sure there may be nice people among them, but the foundation is not moral. How can you come at night, toss [people] out, and seize the place like an enemy country? What about neighborly relations? There were a few without skullcaps who popped over here on 9 October, during the Madrid summit. I went out into the yard when I heard noise at 0300 in the morning, and I found two inside the chicken coop. Those are professionals. It is an organized group that does things, not only here."

"So how do you see the future?"

"How do you see the future? What is the hope? How will you bring down the government? I had pinned great hopes on the Russian immigrants coming here. They are wonderful, but they are being brainwashed. They do not know anything about the situation in the country. And the beatings that these Palestinians keep getting."

Earlier, after lunch, Shahadi Qar'in, the grandson of Shahadi the fireman, told me: "The situation of the one who is counting the blows and the situation of the one who is getting them are not the same."

Christine, an archaeologist with a doctorate in economics from the University of Basel, came to the country 23 years ago. Israeli friends brought her here. "We had a horse farm at Bet Hanina. My daughter had many Israeli friends. We toured the whole country. Now most of them have left the country.

"A national-religious country does not belong to this century, it belongs to the Middle Ages. Everything we take from the past has a negative impact. There is no national-religious state that is also democratic. We see that with the Arabs."

"You will be cold," Christine said and gave me a sleeping bag. I went back to the Sha'abani house.

In the morning there were only guards left in the village; sentries and policemen stood on roofs and in the street. I started on my way back to the Old City. I bought a green falafel across from the Dung Gate and allowed a reservist to rummage in my bag. At the exit from the Western Wall tunnel reservists were carefully checking the bags of first graders, book by book. Let them learn. Young men with knitted skullcaps and small walkie-talkies marched in pairs. Young tourists with big backpacks looked for hotels in the crowded bazaar. Had I been a young tourist who wanted to live in Jerusalem, I, too, would stay in the Old City. Arik Sharon has a point.

In the al-Amud Street, a big menorah stood on top of his house. Via Dolorosa gets here from the Lions Gate, takes a turn to the south, and climbs up to the bazaar across from "Abu Shuqui." I bought some Turkish delight and sat down at Jaffar's to eat half a portion of sweet [kanafa]. A delicate incense smell was in the air. I went to a tailor to have two pockets sewn in my coat for five shekels, then I went up Strawberry Alley to the New Gate. I decided to go back to Silwan through Ge Ben Hinnom. No Jews, no Arabs, just garbage.

A green half-track with a powerful headlight stood on a hill under an olive tree, looking down on Neqba and the village. I went up to the Meyuhas House.

"You are not allowed to go in, and you are not allowed to take pictures," the guards said.

"And with whom can I talk?"

"Go down and tell Rani that Danny said to call Yig'al."

"Wait outside!" shouted Danni or Rani, talking on the walkie-talkie, answering the phone, and beeping people. On the walls hung guard duty shifts, alert and preparedness regulations. A proper general quarters.

I sat on the gravel that the new inhabitants of the house had spread on the terraces. Yig'al Kanaan, spokesman of the ELAD (To the City of David) association, arrived after being beeped. We went into the house; a prayer chest and ark curtain, radio equipment, and beds with mattresses. Double sink for meat and milk.

"You got me out of a class on the philosophy of history that Yermiahu Yuval gives," said Yig'al, a 43-year-old Phantom navigator from northern Tel Aviv who takes history and philosophy at the University and lives in Romema.

"What is ELAD?"

"It is a nonprofit association having to do with the national-religious. Not a branch of any known body. I am a student of Netivot Emuna, which is along the lines of Merkaz Ha'Rav (founded by Rabbi Kook, the spiritual father of Gush Emunim). We have common studies with the rabbi in the evening, within the framework of independent studies. We study mostly the deep, philosophical aspect of faith. I came to the faith eight years ago through studying philosophy and through involvement in the Israeli society. I was going in the direction of Peace Now, but I realized that it was a dead end."

"Why?"

"The society built here was a Zionist socialist society which worked well until 1967. That belief in conquest, labor, and construction became inadequate. Now we have to make the connection to Judaism. The side of socialist Zionism is dead. During the Lebanon war I began talking to a relative who was a student at Merkaz Ha'Rav. I realized that the state was acting against the humanistic aspects. And then I began to think about Jewish roots. In the beginning I viewed Judaism as a museum. A venerable grandfather who lived then and was irrelevant today. While devoting myself to the writings of Rabbi Kook I discovered the connection to our present life. A new Israel. From a political viewpoint, it brought me from the Labor Party to MAOFDAL [National Religious Party]."
“And how did you come to ELAD?”

“Before the immigration wave from Russia began, Anatoly Shahransky talked about one million Jews expected to come, but no one was doing anything about it. We began a public campaign and we staged demonstrations before the Knesset with Ida Nudel. There I met Avi Maoz, who was behind the campaign to release Shahransky and other people who had been denied permission to emigrate. He is one of the activists and initiators here. He spotted me and put me in charge of relations with the press.”

“A kind of Uri Zohar of ELAD?”

“God forbid. I may have been naive, but I did not think that it would cause such a to-do. We established contacts with the Housing Ministry, with David Levi and Arik Sharon. The purchase goes through Amidar. We sign a protected tenant contract with them and pay a symbolic amount of a few dozen shekels.”

“The first time you invaded was during the Madrid talks, and now during the Washington talks.”

“Our concern is 95 percent with Jerusalem and 5 percent with the talks. In other words, we are interested in Jerusalem, not in the talks. There are some who hitched a ride on our wagon: members of Knesset and of the Israeli Government. But we are Jerusalem proper.”

“What about the big picture?”

“Ah, yes, it is connected to Arik Sharon. We turned to the future. There is still a lot of work to be done to restore these houses and there are five other houses in the process of being purchased. There is nothing to hide here, there are other bodies at work in Abu-Tor and Jabil Muqbar. The idea is to create a Jewish continuity and we are talking about areas that are not densely populated (the continuity that has been achieved is in a straight line from the Jewish Quarter, through the Wadi-Hilwa neighborhood in Silwan, to Abu-Tor and the Governor's Palace, thus shifting the line of Jewish Jerusalem east by 500 meters). From a tactical viewpoint we would not have chosen Silwan. It is crowded, difficult to defend, and hostile.”

Yig'al Kanaan means that a deep wadi separates between most of the village of Silwan on Mount of Olives, and the relatively new neighborhood of Wadi Hilwa, which is located above the City of David, and it is this neighborhood that is the bone of contention. “This is not Silwan,” Kanaan continued; “Silwan is the opposite hill. We are in the City of David. The public thinks that we are sitting in the middle of the pile, in the middle of the village. Not at all, there are empty areas here for us as representatives of the state, and there are plans to build in the style of the Jewish Quarter—few stories, terraced, a rustic style on piles. The press wrote about 200 units in the City of David, which I think is correct.”

“Do you have a plan?”

“Yes. I would not go into that if there were not something concerning the state. We got in with documents from the Housing Ministry, the Ministry of Justice, the Israeli Land Administration, and the Development Authority. Only the timing was not known. The timing was due to the fact that the police advise anyone moving into houses in the Muslim Quarter to do so at night. There were 30 families and 10 bachelors due to get in. That is more than 200 people, trucks, protection equipment, and personal gear. We were afraid that if we came during the day we would be stuck in traffic jams. We were scheduled to take five houses in an Arab area. We prepared a military operation.”

“The Qar’in family says that you burst in at night and threw them out of the house into the rain.”

“The Qar’in family live in Dir-Yiob and Ayn Rogel, not here. The house called the 'Upper Scout' belonged to the father of Fatimah Qar’in and was for years abandoned. There was no property tax, telephone, or water. The night we came in, we were chased away by Trener. The next day the Qar’in family moved from Dir-Yiob to the Upper Scout house. After all, this is a Byzantine state, in which Shamir is the omnipotent prime minister. Like a king. There has never been such a situation. He is the only one to make decisions and under him there is chaos. Until he says something, no one knows what to do, and when he does say something, everyone agrees. Trener thought that Roni Milo thought something else, and Milo thought Shamir thought something else. Shamir said we had to get out, but that settlements were to continue. Without the support of the state, I would not have done it.

“The dispute is not about ownership, but about possession. They say they were there at night. If we had been extremists, going into any house, we could have gone in seven years ago. The reason we went in now is that those are legally closed cases. The buyer checked with the government legal adviser, who has no sympathy for us.

“The Tira house and the 'Abasi house above Fir Waran were inherited by grandchildren, from whom we bought them. There are three other apartments that 'Abasi refused to sell. He does not claim ownership, but possession—he has stuff here and there.”

The second night fell on Silwan. We climbed in the dark from the Meyuhas house to the 'Abasi house, the citadel above Fir Waran. We climbed to the third floor and crossed to the balcony on painted tiles. The village of Silwan spread on the back of Mount of Olives. Large Israeli flags were flying on the house balcony.

“What is the future of this country?”

“A great future.”

“That is mysticism.”

“The issue is the spiritual side. Every track we followed in the past 100 years was a new track. We are a state whose strength lies, much to my regret, in material areas.
We are good at farming and soldiering. I think that in the future there will be more spirituality."

"Has the individual been forgotten?"

"Our conscience is the Bible, not Chekhov.

"Our link to the country is very deep. When God gave us the country, it was inhabited by seven small nations. He could have easily given us an empty one. This is like loving a woman. It takes work."

"There is something suspect about a noisy love. Why do you have to conquer each time anew, why do you have to stick a flag in every hole, why do you have to dance and parties?"

"You say conquer, and you mean rape. That is how we are, joyful. I prefer to live together with the Arabs. In my country, in my Jerusalem. There are two sides: Concern for the self and concern for others. Concern for the self is more important. And for me there is more than the humanistic view. If we had been able to get in here peaceably, we would have preferred it.

"Getting into this neighborhood is like a microcosmos of the dispute. On the first day we left the hut without a fence; al-Husayni and Abu-Diyab came and one of the women stretched out on the ground and started yelling. That is when we put the fence up."

"Your fire will burn us all down."

"A legitimate sentiment. I know what power we have here. I am against the style of 'We will build us a little, happy Europe,' like the French and the Germans. That is worse than a mistake, because if it had not been for the Uzis and the straight-back, sharp old man, everything here would be like in David Roberts' drawings of 150 years ago. I have no doubt that the village of Lifta was built more beautifully than Romema above it. That is because the Arabs are closer to nature, while we have a greater spirituality. The more highly developed the animal, the longer its childhood. Puppies stand up very soon. It takes man longer. But we will get to that, too. I spent a lot of time in Judaea and Samaria, and I am bothered to see the Jewish settlements look like Herzliya, closing down on itself and sending off violence upon nature. The reality, however, requires compromise. We are the first generation. In the end we, too, will build beautifully.

"I did not come to the new house to establish neighborly relations. First comes my house, then neighborly relations. I have no problem with living next to Palestinians. All the people here are against Ghandi. That is the fearful Israeli."

"You know that Teddy is against you."

"You see, everybody experiences a period of takeoff, the leveling off, then landing. Teddy is now landing. He wants to have a little Vienna here, with waltzes and whipped cream. He does not want to touch."

"Am I not Israeli enough?"

"That is right."

"Because I do not study Rabbi Kook's philosophy and do not pour over the Zohar (main book of the Kabbalah)?"

"Yes. This is not the whole answer, but in short, yes."

"So I have a right to fight you?"

"You have a right to fight for what you believe. I see myself as an Israeli who has discovered another facet, but I am inferior to the Israeli of the future, who will be a mixture between myself, you, and him. Everyone is a letter in the Torah, that has to express himself in order to preserve the balance."

"Every Jewish person?"

"Every person. Including the Palestinian who lives here and the Israeli demonstrating against us. That is why I went and talked to the Peace Now members who had come here. They are sensitive, intelligent people who care for the peace of the state."

"Are you concerned about the state or about the future of Greater Israel?"

"The state. If I were cut off I would have followed some Messiah or Shabtay. In pulling forward one must not leave empty spaces, not become cut off from the Israeli society, like the Jewish underground movement did."

"Why not wait until there is peace, until the situation has calmed down, when you can come in as genuine neighbors?"

"It is not as if we had come to a sick country, burning with fever, which needs to calm down. There is no doubt that the Jews introduced disquiet into the world. That is why the Germans hated us. They realized that better than anyone else. The Jews are a factor of disquiet in the world. Like the disquiet in the City of David. The Jewish objective is the anxiety of pulling upwards. This is a dimension that if you do not view from the spiritual side, it is annoying. Like Rousseau's cow and the nobleman."

"Perhaps you are the mote in the Palestinian eye, annoying where one should be very delicate in order to not undo the last seam?"

"It is a mote in my eye. This is the City of David and the Jerusalem inside the walls."

"Is the Temple the next step?"

"I do not know. We are not one of the Temple movements. The Temple is not something corporeal. Just like real love does not begin with sex. We do not have the spiritual stature to build the Temple. Not now."

"What about the City of David?"

"Yes."
Yig'AL kanaan climbed into his subaru to go back to wife and home in romania, I climbed through the dark toward the dung gate. I thought about the herodian stones in the wall. What would happen if we pulled out all the Muslim stones, the ottoman stones, and the byzantine stones? What would be left of the walls of jerusalem? And of the city?

Economic Complications in palestinian autonomy
92ae0151b Tel Aviv Yedi'ot Aharonot in Hebrew (Financial Supplement) 13 Dec 91 p 2

[Article by gid'on eshet: "The autonomy trap"]
[Text] About one year ago there were only two top members of the economic establishment who were of the opinion that thought and planning needed to be devoted to the future economic relations between israel and the autonomy. one was dr. avi ben-basat, who was authorized by bank of israel governor professor michael Bruno to form a special team to examine various alternatives for such economic relations. the other was finance minister yitzhak moda'i, who shortly after ben-basat, established a think tank to advise him on the same topic. professor hayim ben-shahar was appointed to head the team. about one month ago, auxiliary committees were formed. professor gid'on fishelsohn headed the auxiliary committee for the territories and relations with jordan. as of this morning, neither of these two bodies has come up with any recommendations.

The internal discussions held to date highlighted three problematic areas, each one of which is in itself a bombshell: currency, compensation, and taxes. The view is that the palestinians will demand discussions on a list of additional topics: land, infrastructure, legislation, and water.

The present article will attempt to focus on purely economic matters in order to demonstrate how intricate and complicated the autonomy issue is, even in the view of a Likud government.

A. The currency issue. at first sight, israel has no economic reason not to want the autonomy to issue a palestinian currency. if there is a reason to oppose it, it is a political one. Currency is viewed as a clear symbol of state sovereignty and independence. Every republic seceding from the soviet union or yugoslavia hastens to print its own money. For that reason, israel will oppose a similar palestinian demand. From the economic viewpoint, the issue of palestinian currency will not make any difference either to us or to the palestinians. As it is, the globalization of the economy is already linking business to the hard currencies. At the time even the Begin government entertained the idea of indexing the shekel to the dollar. Local money is not what it once was when world markets were tightly closed.

The more interesting question is whether the self-administration will be authorized to borrow money in the world market and to receive grants. The Israelis fear that such a possibility will disrupt the monetary stability of Israel itself. Since Israel requests open borders between itself and the autonomy, any influx of money there may have an impact here. The assumption is that an autonomous administration in the territories can secure loans and grants on a large scale. Consequently, the request for open borders will shift some of the problem from the territories to Israel.

B. The taxation issue. the Israelis involved in the autonomy talks attach the greatest importance to the question of taxation. Direct taxes are not a problem. The Israeli public will not mind if the autonomous administration will decide to either cancel or greatly raise income tax. Even today there is no relationship between the level of income tax in Israel and in the territories. The main difficulty lies with the indirect taxes. For example: let us assume that the autonomous administration decided to lower the vat [value-added tax] to 5 percent or even to lift it altogether. When borders are closed, that is not a problem, but when the border is open, the problem is enormous. Lots of shopping centers will very likely appear in the autonomous territories to sell goods to Israelis. If the VAT difference is large enough, a very large percentage of trade may shift from inside the Green Line to the autonomous cities.

Seemingly nothing new there, either. In Israel there already is an area with no VAT: Elat. Recently there have been many reports of frequent smuggling from the Elat free trade zone. The Israeli customs, however, has opened a checkpoint north of Elat which can in principle take care of the problem. Moreover, the distance between the center of the country makes the smuggled goods more expensive.

However, all the participants in the discussions know that there is no way of opening customs checkpoints on the Green Line. Their very existence would attest to the existence of a border between us and the autonomy. such an economic solution contradicts the government's policy. This may be a major problem, but not in the eyes of the palestinians. A palestinian economist told me: "If you force us to keep the Israeli VAT, we will simply not charge it and thus preserve a relative advantage."

C. The compensations issue. for years palestinian economists have been claiming that israel is robbing the palestinian treasury and demanding compensations for it. Israel claims that all the revenues from taxes collected in the territories go into the budget of the civil administration. In addition to local taxes, Israel channels money to the territories from two other sources: part of the social security dues collected from palestinians working in Israel, and direct money transfers from the Israeli state budget to the budget of the civil administration.

As far as the social security dues are concerned, Israel also says that this is not a subsidy, but the implementation of rights. since workers from the territories pay social security like Israelis but do not enjoy equal benefits, some of the money is rightfully transferred to the relief apparatus in the territories. As for money transfers
from the state budget to the administration budget. Israel views that as an Israeli subsidy. In 1991 the civil administration budget was about 850 million shekels; 27,000,000 shekels of that was money transferred from our budget to their budget.

If Israel is subsidizing the civil administration, what right do the Palestinians have to demand compensations?

An examination of the civil administration budget, which for some reason is kept restricted, reveals that the Palestinians have good reason to request compensations. It can be demonstrated that if the Palestinians demand approximately $100,000,000 a year for each year of occupation, such a demand will rest on sound economic ground. We will show the means by which Israel milks the resources of the civil administration/autonomous administration and arrives at a situation in which the territories subsidize Israel.

—Israeli workers. The civil administration employs about 1,400 Israeli workers. Those are regular army officers, policemen, and hundreds of functionaries at various levels. Similarly, the civil administration employs about 19,000 workers from the territories themselves. There is a gap of about 240 percent between the pay of the Israelis and that of the “locals.” The cost of the payroll for the Israelis is borne entirely by the civil administration budget. But that is not the end of it. According to Israeli law, income earned by an Israeli in the territories is taxed in Israel. So not only does the Israeli worker get a high salary out of Palestinian tax money, but the tax on that salary goes to Israel in its entirety. On the other hand, the tax paid by a Palestinian employed in Israel goes to the Israeli Government, not to the civil administration. The amount of 27,000,000 shekels that Israel transfers as a “subsidy” to the territories, more or less covers the entire cost and the tax (in terms of the percentages charged in the territories) of the Israeli workers in the territories.

—Settlers. Israelis living in the territories carry out extensive economic activities. According to the figures of the Central Office for Statistics, there are about 120,000 Israelis in the territories—not counting Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. All that economic activity generates taxes that go entirely to the State of Israel, not to the civil administration.

—Fuel. If a Palestinian buys a new car and has to pay purchase tax on it, the tax goes to the civil administration. If a Palestinian buys gas at a Deltek station in Ramallah, that tax for the gasoline (both the tax on the gas and the VAT) goes to the State of Israel. Why? Because.

—Customs duties. Let us assume that a Palestinian from Bethlehem buys a shirt made in Korea in his city. Such shirts are subject to customs duties. The store owner bought the shirt from an importer in Tel Aviv. Who gets the customs duty money? The State of Israel, not the civil administration. Why? Because.

—The Zakh document. For the purposes of the 1992 budget, Brigadier General Freddy Zakh, deputy coordinator of activities in the territories, calculated the amounts that, in his view, Israel owes to the civil administration. His estimate: about 300 million shekels a year, which is about as much as my estimate of $100 million.

Treasury economists raise several counterclaims against those calculations. According to the Geneva Convention, Israel is entitled to finance all its defense expenses in the territories from local taxes. According to that version, all the expenses of the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] for defeating the intifadah, which are currently borne by the defense budget, should be charged to the civil administration. In addition to the macabre aspect, there is another reason that Israel does not include the cost of defense in the territories in the budget of the administration: Israel does not view Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Strip as occupied territories subject to the Geneva Convention.

The treasury also claims that residents of the territories employed in Israel enjoy credit points not granted to other foreign workers. Not to mention Israel’s investment in the infrastructure of the territories, which the local inhabitants enjoy, too.

Demographic Aspects of Civil Guard Formation
92AE0151C Tel Aviv HA’ARETZ in Hebrew
29 Dec 91 p B1

[Article by Danny Rubinstein: “The Long-Awaited Demographic Victory”]

[Text] The government’s decision last week (taken in the forum of ministerial consultations) to establish a civil guard for the settlements in the territories put the official seal on a situation that has existed for many years. As it is, most of the settlers have permits for and carry weapons, most of which belong to the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces]. And they use their weapons, sometimes individually and sometimes in groups, not only for self-defense, but also in retaliations against Arabs. About 10 years ago, a commission headed by Judith Karp of the Justice Ministry disclosed a list of actions staged by settlers which got almost no satisfactory police attention. The Karp report caused a great stir at the time, but did nothing to change the situation.

The establishment of a civil guard in the settlements is one step toward granting legal status to the kind of Jewish militias in the territories that have been operating for some time in full or partial coordination with the IDF. What is involved are communication centers and settlers’ patrols designed to protect Jewish traffic; security guards from private companies; and official security coordinators, all of whom are civilians and most of whom are settlement residents.
At times the IDF has tried to restrain them, but it never actually stopped their activities because that is not possible. Amram Mitnza, who was the commanding general of the Central Command at the beginning of the intifadah, almost lost his job when he referred to Qiryat-Arba settlers shooting up the windows of Arab houses near the al-Duhaishah camp as a “vile deed.”

In view of the fact that the actions carried out by defense and retaliation teams of settlers fell in very well with the government’s settlement policy, it was impossible to stop them. This is even truer of the policy of the present government, among whose members are ministers like Yuval Ne’eman and Rehav’am Ze’evi, whose stand on the Arabs in the territories is even more extreme than that of many of the settlers.

In contrast to the classical approach of the Labor Party, which advocates defense settlements (along the Jordan) and in sparsely populated Arab areas, the Likud (and Gush Emunim) always called for a different kind of settlement, the reverse perhaps, in the heart of Arab centers: inside Hebron, in the heart of Samaria, or in houses in the City of David.

Ari’el Sharon and his friends transposed the anachronistic slogans of the labor movement about “plows breaking the boundaries of the Jewish settlement” from the domain of geography to that of demography. The Alignment continued to support concepts like the “wall and tower” [type of defense settlement built in the Mandate period] since the beginning of the settlement of the Jordan Valley and until the party congress last week, when it switched in favor of the Golan Heights settlements.

The Likud, on the other hand, does not fight for geographical security borders, but for demographic objectives, inside Arab settlements in the West Bank, in Gaza Strip, in Silwan, and among the Muslim quarter alleyways of Old Jerusalem.

This kind of demographic war requires large defense and security forces. In order to protect the Levinger family in the Hebron marketplace, or the yeshiva students at Yoseph’s Grave close to the Balatah camp in Nablus, or thousands of settlers like them, the IDF needs to assign a security team to almost every single settler, day and night. And as that is impossible, there is no alternative but to give weapons to Rabbi Moshe Levinger and people like him and to react leniently when he and his comrades use the weapons for what they think means defending their security.

In other words, the Likud’s “demographic settlement” requires some sort of Jewish militias in the territories. In fact, that is the objective of this obligation: To display Jewish force, control, and proprietorship inside Ramallah, Nablus, and al-Bira. To put it more harshly, it can be said that the settlements serve the quasi-military units of the settlers no less than the latter serve the settlements.

The objectives of the demographic war are also to strike out at Nablus, Qalqilyah, and Tul-Karm, to annoy their Arab inhabitants, and to impair their security, which stems from their only advantage, which is their large numbers. To show them who is boss. To keep them under pressure so that they will not have it too comfortable here, and then perhaps they may take off for the other 22 Arab countries and grant us the long-awaited demographic victory. For the demographic settlement, the settlements along the border, in the Bi’qa, and certainly on the Jordanian front in the empty wilderness are not that important. What is important is to move more and more Jews across the Green Line, because they represent, among other things, safe votes for the Likud and its partners on election day. Even if they grew up with the Shomer Ha’etzar [Labor youth organization] or RATZ [Citizens’ List] Youth and were lured by housing to Ari’el or Ma’ale Adumim, none of them will ever again vote for a party that threatens to toss them out of their homes.

That is the political track of Greater Israel, whose vanguard troops are the quasi-military units who are gradually acquiring a legal status. According to that plan, the IDF will defend the outer, geographical front, while the settlers’ units will defend the internal, demographic border.

LEBANON

Aspects of Water Situation in South Viewed
92AE0142A Beirut AL-SHIRA’ in Arabic 14 Oct, 11 Nov 91
[The second and third installments of a series by Engineer Ja’far Muhammad Jawad Sharaf-al-Din, a former minister: “Water, the South, South of the South” (second installment) and “The Water of South, Between Imbalance, Balance” (third installment); other installments are not available]

[14 Oct 91 pp 26-28]
[Text] In our previous discussion, entitled “The Litani River, Between Facts and Illusions,” our main aim was to move from a dream state to scientific awareness, and to arm ourselves with facts to confront the various forces positioning themselves to prevent the achievement of a national vision or a patriotic goal.

We would now like to maintain the logical progression of our presentation of the subject. We will begin by presenting the general Lebanese water balance on the western slopes, which include the south, the eastern slopes and the plain of al-Biqa’, and the eastern chain from Jabal Lubnan to Mt. Hermon (Jabal al-Shaykh) [see third installment (11 November 1991) below for water balance data]. We then review the hydrological (note: hydrology is the study of the temporal and spatial distribution of water) mistake made by the Lebanese administration when it implemented the Litani project.
We will then provide recommendations for remedying the national shortcoming in the concept for implementing the Litani project.

We would adopt this same approach even if water had not emerged as a regional issue, and even if political ideas that speak of Israeli designs on the water of the lower Litani had not been broached again as if they were an inescapable, accomplished fact or incontestable fate.

Therefore, we are obliged to present a reading of the facts that differs from current readings, but is closer to reality, in our opinion.

In our previous discussion, we clearly stated that if the Zionist [Jewish] Agency had been able to make the Litani the northern border of Palestine at the Paris Peace Conference in 1920, the river would have become jointly owned, and the issue of sharing it would have been settled. Or, had Moshe Dayan been able to extend his war in 1948 into Lebanon as far as the Litani, the thinking would have changed, and the proposals of the American Fourth Point would have been affected by Zionist orientations. We add that the Litani River is indisputably a national Lebanese River in terms of its source, channel, outlet, basin, land, and sky, not to mention from a legal, geographical, technical, and hydrological standpoint!

The answer comes to us, ringing out from a number of sources. The behavior of the United States toward us is not of the type which I mentioned. Rather, it is biased political behavior that disregards the law, hydrology, and the truth!!

It is a decisive, definitive answer, but it does not take into account several historical, political facts that have emerged since 1950. Therefore, our study is more technical-political than technical-hydrological, as might be presumed. This study aims to highlight the following matters:

- Israel's theft of more than 650 million cubic meters [m$^3$] of neighboring Arab water.
- Israel's desire that we forget this theft, so that the theft becomes an acquired right. It is attempting to realize this desire by focusing on new water needs to draw us into future negotiations resulting in new theft.
- We must liberate ourselves from the intellectual weakness caused by the series of past disappointments. Among the most minor effects of this weakness is surrender to the unjust power's every prescription.
- Any active scientific work is conducive to divesting Israel of fabricated pretexts which it might use to pave the way for its successive thefts. The mere introduction of the National Litani River Agency, for example, deprived Israel of its argument that the Litani's water was flowing wastefully into the sea.

1. Israel's Agricultural-Water Projects

Five years after it was established, the state of Israel was experiencing a stranglehold economic crisis, which is usually the case. Agricultural production did not even cover 50 percent of the country's domestic food needs. At the time, the Israeli High Council for Water Planning drafted a program to expand the country's irrigated land from 60,000 hectares to 180,000 hectares by the end of 1961, when Israel's population would be an estimated 2 million. This program, which also recommended ending imports and improving the balance of payments position, became known at the time as the 1953-1961 seven-year plan.

This plan included the following:

- A project to irrigate the Hula region after the drainage of its swamps (The drainage of water from swampy areas through channels that convey the water to a selected site).
- The Marj Ibn-'Amir and western Hebron irrigation project.
- The Tiberias-Bet She'an canal project.
- The al-Falujah-Nizzana-Negev irrigation project.

As declared at the time, the plan, whose costs were estimated at almost $280 million (half of it in Israeli currency), provided for an increase in water resources totalling about 920 million m$^3$.

2. Declared Water Sources in Israeli Seven-Year Plan

The supposed sources, as announced by the Israeli water council, were as follows:

- The drainage and desiccation of the [marshes in the] Hula area: 120 million m$^3$;
- The diversion of the Jordan River south of the Banat Ya'qub Bridge [located north of Lake Tiberias]: 340 million m$^3$;
- Pumping from the Lake Tiberias: 80 million m$^3$;
- Regional and domestic water sources: 380 million m$^3$.

The total of these sources is 920 million m$^3$.

3. Hidden Political Significance of Israel's Seven-Year Plan

Outwardly, the plan, as the Israelis marketed it, was "[an economic development plan intended to provide food and water to a homeless people returning to its land" (and so on). However, the political significance of the plan's hydrological aspect was clear. What is this significance?

a. The drainage of the Hula area signified an Israeli interest in talking with Lebanon about groundwater sources in the Jabal 'Amil area, or upper Hebron, as it is called by Israel and historically. Rain falling during the rainy season in the area extending from the al-Marj plain to upper Marj 'Uyun and Bint Jubayl seeps into calcic layers in the ground and moves toward what used to be known as Hula Lake. The drainage of the Hula region...
also signified an Israeli interest in studying the possibility of expanding the utilization of the said ground-water located between the coast and 'Uyyun in 'joint' projects!

b. The diversion of the Jordan River south of Banat Ya'qub Bridge was nothing but an Israeli move toward both Lebanon and Jordan to jointly exploit the water in the Jordan's upper basin (i.e., the al-Hasbani basin and the western slopes of Jabal al-Shaykh before it enters the Jordan valley, and the water of the Yarmuk River by storing it in Lake Tiberias).

c. The pumping of water from Lake Tiberias is considered a carrot-and-stick approach to Jordan, given its effects on the Dead Sea and salinity in the Jordan River bed, which lies in the valley extending between Lake Tiberias and the Dead Sea.

d. The biggest mystery hidden in the Israeli concept of regional and domestic water sources is Israel's effort to probe Syria's responsiveness to "joint cooperation." Such cooperation would begin in the economic realm, far removed from the political realm, and God only knows where it would end!

The Israeli plan was a skillful probe with time on its side throughout events and incidents. The plan's material base can be summarized as the construction of a diversionary dam on the Jordan River south of the Banat Ya'qub Bridge. The plan called for channelling the diverted water 14 km southward to a reservoir northwest of Tiberias in the al-Tabighah region. Israel hoped to exploit the 240-m difference between Lake Tiberias (200 m below sea level) and al-Tabighah (40 m above sea level) by building a 25,000-kW hydroelectric plant and a station to pump water from the lake if necessary.

According to the plan, the water was to channelled from the al-Tabighah reservoir to the Bet Netofa [al-Battuf] Reservoir north of Nazareth, from where it was to flow through pressurized, concrete-reinforced pipes to al-Falujah in the Negev.

The Litani and Johnston's Mission

4. Implementation Difficulties, Johnston's Mission, Only Time Litani Is Mentioned

The Arabs' negative reaction to the Israeli plan placed it before an insurmountable political obstacle. In addition, the Bet Netofa Reservoir's degree of impermeability failed to meet Israeli expectations, and its projected capacity was lowered from 1 billion m$^3$ to 150 million m$^3$.

Israel thus faced a difficulty that came under the heading of "regional and domestic water sources." It became clear that, as long as the concerned Arab states did not show an interest in negotiations, a critical situation was inevitable.

In this light, we can understand the technical-political significance of the American Johnston mission, which aimed at the implementation of a joint, regional irrigation plan between the countries of the region with U.S. financial aid. [The Johnston Plan, named after President Eisenhower's special representative Eric Johnston, was presented to the Arabs states in October 1953. It included the diversion of the Yarmuk into Lake Tiberias, the draining of the Hula marshes, the raising of the level of Lake Tiberias, the construction of two canals east and west of the Jordan River, and the damming of the Yarmuk River for power generation]. Johnston's regional plan elucidated the [same] "regional water sources" contained in theIsraeli seven-year plan!

When the implementation of the Israeli seven-year plan encountered the difficulties mentioned above, Israel proposed an amendment to it, which became known as the Coton plan. It was intended as a negotiating counterweight to Johnston's regional outlook. It spoke of a Lebanese-Jordanian-Israeli partnership encompassing the Yarmuk, Jordan, al-Hasbani, and Litani Rivers!

The Coton plan was essentially a tactical, negotiating plan to serve Israel's undeclared political strategy, which was subsequently revealed by events.

In the midst of this negotiating period, the National Litani River Agency was born in Lebanon on 14 August 1954 to implement the Litani project as an integral unit combining irrigation and power generation within a comprehensive Lebanese (not regional) water plan based on studies undertaken by government offices (i.e., by 'Abd-al-'Al and his team) with the help of an American technical mission.

A basic effect of the establishment of this agency was the conclusive removal of the Litani River from the realm of settlements [with Israel], as we shall see.

5. Johnston-Coton Negotiations, Withdrawal of Litani From Circulation

Formal negotiations between the outlooks of Johnston and Coton yielded the following results:

Johnston agreed with Coton on two basic issues: the coupling of the Yarmuk and the Jordan; and water storage in Lake Tiberias.

He differed with him on two basic issues: the amount to be stored behind the Yarmuk dams; and the water of the Lebanese Litani.

Actually, the Coton plan revealed complete ignorance of the amount of Lebanese water flowing in the Litani basin and channel. I do not know whether this ignorance was deliberate or coincidental. In any case, it should be recalled that the recommendations contained in the American Fourth Point, which we presented in our previous discussion (see AL-SHIRA', 28 September 1991) considered the Litani a single, national project affecting all of Lebanon.
6. The Israeli Reaction

After negotiations with Johnston, and after the Arab countries moved toward implementing national projects designed to preserve their rights to water sources, on 9 February 1956 (several months before the war over the nationalization of the Suez Canal), the National Water Planning Council in Israel amended its seven-year plan, which then became known as the ten-year plan.

The amended plan, which increased the amount of water needed by Israel from 920 million m³ to 990 million m³, was estimated in 1956 to cost $220 million. It included the Hula area and the Tiberias-Bet She'an irrigation projects mentioned above, and the almost total diversion of the waters of the Jordan, i.e., more than 500 million m³ instead of the 340 million m³ envisioned in the seven-year plan. The amended plan also determined that the balance of the necessary water would be supplied by Lake Hula, after an increase in the regional waters diverted to it and the expansion of the irrigated area to 300,000 hectares, up from the 180,000 hectares envisioned in the seven-year plan!

Israel began to implement its ten-year plan at the time of the 1956 War. It extended the plan until after the June 1967 War, because of the constraints imposed by the nature of works in the demilitarized zone on its northeastern border, which is covered by the provisions of the 1948 truce, and the need to supplement its water sources with several regional sources.

Arab League meetings on various levels (technical committees, foreign ministers, and summits) continued. However, these meetings only heightened the tension. Lebanon did not implement any of its pending dam projects. Nor did it build a tunnel to divert the water of the al-Hasbani River and the al-Wazzani River, from which an estimated 150 million m³ was flowing south of the southern part of the country [i.e., into Israel] from a source whose total output is 163 million m³. The water of the Banyas spring also continued to arrive in the occupied territories.

As for Jordan, it embarked on supplying itself with water. It built some diversionary dams on the Yarmuk River and completed the Jordan Valley Irrigation Canal Project.

Conclusion

Our ignorance of Israel's phased objectives was decisive in helping it to achieve them. We do not disagree in our perception of Israel's long-range strategic goals. Israel always seeks to exploit one-upmanship, which, at the very least, serves to camouflage its real purposes from us. Thus, we fire in all but the right direction and are ruled by unchecked mistrust crowned by confusion and tension.

Israel's actions regarding water sources to its north and east are similar to its actions regarding land. It refrains from making major efforts until it is certain of the result. Thus, we "fear" for the Litani's water like someone expecting a present-tense verb that is already "in the past tense, without ever having been in the present perfect," as [the Arab poet] Mutanabbi says.

More clearly stated, the ten-year irrigation project in Israel has resulted in Israel's appropriation of the following water:

- 650 million m³ from the central and upper Jordan (the al-Hasbani and al-Wazzani included),
- 120 million m³ from the Hula area (the drainage of ground water from Jabal 'Amil),
- 150 million m³ diverted from the Yarmuk River to Tiberias,
- 80 million m³ from the Banyas spring.
- The total is thus 1 billion m³. Whoever is not speechless is witless.

[11 Nov 91 pp 16-91]

[Text] In the first installment of this series, "The Litani River, Between Facts and Illusions," we explained how the Litani River project started, the political and administrative circumstances that prevented us from having a clear vision of it, and how the project's social, developmental goal was neglected in its implementation, which upset the balance and ran counter to all recommendations!

We attributed these shortcomings to the hegemony exercised in every Lebanese affair by the merchant mentality, which is interested only in profit and advancing its own interests. In the second installment, "Water, the South, and South of the South," we recalled Israeli schemes with designs on Arab water in the first 20 years following the birth of the state of Israel. Our thesis is basically that Israel wants us to forget about the water which it stole from us in the past, so that it can share in exploiting the region's water in the future! We emphasized that Lebanon took the initiative in moving to exploit the Litani's water during that period, which was charged with conflict over water sources. It seemed clear to us that Israel, when it looked toward the Litani, wanted to camouflage its total diversion of the Jordan River's water. Then, we realized that our fear for the Litani's water was but an echo of the residue of the past and not a present-tense verb pregnant with future possibilities.

In this installment, we will detail the shortcoming in the implementation of the Litani project. We will review its roots, causes, and difficulties to arrive at a recommendation for restoring the lost balance.

The Vision, Foundation, and First Preliminary Concept

In the conclusion of his hydrological dissertation on the Litani River, Ibrahim 'Abd-al-'Ali wrote: "In the al-Biq'a, the Litani is calm and orderly, opening into a gently-sloped plain suited to irrigated crops. However, in the central segment of its course, between al-Qir'awn and al-Khardali, it inclines into a torrential stream suited to hydroelectric production. When it declines sharply into a deep gorge, it no longer serves irrigation purposes,

...
because there are no irrigable areas along this segment of its course. In the 40-km stretch of the river between al-Qir'awn and al-Khardali, the elevation drops from 811 m to 240 m, yielding 571 m of waterfalls."

It is worth noting that the al-Qir'awn and al-Khardali reservoirs function synergistically to facilitate the regulation of the Litani's runoff at the al-Khardali site at an annual rate of 23 m$^3$/second [sec], which drops to 22 m$^3$/sec when we subtract the runoff allotted for irrigation in the southern al-Biqa'. In addition to this capacity, the difference in elevation between al-Khardali (240 m [above sea level]) and al-Zarrijah (100 m [above sea level]) could yield 40,000 horsepower of hydroelectricity. We thus see that storing water at al-Qir'awn and al-Khardali opens up serious possibilities for hydroelectric production on the central and lower Litani.

The Litani River drains the water running off the slopes of Lebanon's southern inland mountains. Along its 80-km upper course (from Ba'labakk to al-Qir'awn), the river moves slowly downwards with a grade of no more than 3 m/1,000 m and is thus suited to being exploited for irrigation projects.

Along its 40-km central segment (from al-Qir'awn to al-Khardali), the Litani flows into a gorge, where its declination is 17 m/1,000 m. This part of its course offers all of the conditions needed for hydroelectric generation, but none, or almost none, of the conditions needed for irrigation.

The Litani's central segment is, in turn, divided into two parts. One part, above the village of Yuhmur, is supplied most importantly by al-Zarrijah spring. The other part, below the village of Qilaya, is where the river flows evenly to al-Khardali, below Qal'at al-Shaqiq.

In its lower course, the river passes through the al-Khardali depression, bends 90 degrees to the west, and flows 50 km to the Mediterranean Sea on a decline of no more than 7 m/1,000 m.

Based on the above description of the Litani's channel, an initial concept to exploit the river was established, as follows:

1. The upper Litani is be a tool for agricultural development through the regulation of existing projects in the southern al-Biqa' (almost 11,000 hectares) and through the implementation of new irrigation projects (almost 11,000 hectares).

2. The central Litani is to be a tool for generating power, based on the integrated use of the al-Qir'awn and al-Khardali reservoirs, as follows: Runoff will exit the al-Qir'awn reservoir at a regulated rate of 12 m$^3$/sec. It will then be conveyed through the elevations of 840 m [above sea level] and 280 m [above sea level] before reaching the al-Khardali reservoir, passing the Yuhmur and Qilaya hydroelectric plants. The runoff will then exit the al-Khardali reservoir (240 m above sea level) at a regulated rate of 22 m$^3$/sec and run through turbines again at the al-Zarrijah hydroelectric plant (100 m above sea level). This system, which requires the construction of 30 km of tunnels, generates about 450 million kilowatt-hours [kWh] at an installed capacity of about 70 megawatts [MW]. This system utilizes 80 percent of the falls as follows: 320 m + 200 m + 140 m/840 m = 80 percent.

3. The lower Litani is to be a tool for agricultural development on the coast of southern Lebanon, as follows:

   The regulation of irrigation in the al-Qasimiyah project: 5,000 + 4,000 = 9,000 hectares. The irrigation of the lands of upper and lower al-Nabatiyah utilizing water from the al-Khardali reservoir: 7,000 hectares. The irrigation of plains located higher than 300 m [above sea level] from the al-Zahrani River to Tyre: 6,000 hectares (See Diagram 1).

This concept was clearly inspired by the late Abd-al'-Al. It regards the river as an organic, integral unit that functionally complements other Lebanese areas. Thus, under this concept, the flat, fertile plain of the al-Biqa' could be provided with the permanent water system it needs, and the agricultural society of southern Lebanon could realize its aspiration to replace tobacco with irrigated crops and to expand the fertile, coastal plain between the al-Zahrani River and Tyre and inland to al-Nabatiyah. Finally, the three electricity plants envisioned in the concept would directly increase the project's economic yield.

Preferred Concept and Opposing Concept

All hydrologists who have taken an interest in Lebanon's water system have noted that the Litani is the only domestic river that empties into the Mediterranean. The Litani assumed this course in the early tertiary geologic period, 65 million years ago, after having flowed southward to Tiberias and the Dead Sea. By contrast, the al-Hashani River continues to flow southward in creeks [depressions] to connect with the Jordan river, while the Orontes River flows inland in a northerly direction toward Syria and Turkey before emptying into the Mediterranean at the city of Antakya.

Therefore, it is no wonder that people have long looked toward the coast as their eyes attentively followed the course of this unique river, which is each of its own accord, how to maintain its complete national identity, linking southern Lebanon to the interior of the country with arms older than recorded history.

Despite the profound nature of these givens, some men have been of the opinion that the lower Litani should be shorter and flow more directly down a steeper incline to the sea.

This view determines that water stored at al-Qir'awn should be channelled from the Litani basin to the al-Awwali basin, stored initially at Basri and then run through turbines on the high falls of the al-Awwali basin after being regulated again. This view gave rise to a
second concept to rival the first. This second concept was based on the coupling of the Litani basin at al-Qir'awn and the al-Awwali basin at Basri.

Comparing the Two Concepts

1. The dam constructed at the Basri site was to be very similar to the al-Khardali dam, both being aggregate. The Basri reservoir would provide 80 million m³ of water, and the runoff would be regulated at the same rate of 22 m³/sec.

2. The al-Khardali dam required 170,000 m³ of concrete blocks, while the Basri dam requires only 150,000 m³.

3. The preparation of the new basin requires only 20 km of tunnels, compared to the 30 km needed in the first basin.

4. The second concept calls for the generation of 600 million kWh per year and an installed capacity of 95 MW, whereas the first concept calls for 450 million kWh per annum and an installed capacity of 70 MW.

5. The second concept utilizes 90 percent of the available falls (380 m + 200 m + 190 m/840 m = 90 percent), compared to 80 percent in the first concept.

6. The formulysts of the second concept remembered to stress that irrigation projects would not be neglected.

The idea of coupling two river basins is not new. It is both essential and preferable when one basin, which has water but lacks falls, can complement another basin that has falls but lacks water. However, the Litani and Basri/al-Awwali basins both feature water and waterfalls, which justifies setting up the latter as an independent system!

Falls alone should not suddenly become the deciding factor here. We are not concerned with the amount of installed capacity, but with total productivity, including saving on fuel, which costs us hard-to-find currency. Productivity is determined by the total height of the falls exploited relative to the total height of the available falls. In the first concept, 80 percent of the falls are exploited, and in the second, the figure is 90 percent. This 10-percent difference in productivity amounts to 60 million kWh (out of total production of 600 million kWh).

To focus our thinking, this difference represents only 1 percent of Lebanon's total power generation, which is 6,000 million kWh.

It would be futile to continue our critical examination of the elements of this comparison, because neither the first nor second concept was implemented, nor was the al-Khardali or Basri reservoir. A different concept was adopted. This concept, because of its exclusive emphasis on power generation and 30 km of tunnels, was a sham as far as being a national program was concerned!

Actually, the comparison between the two concepts was not a comparison in the scientific sense. Rather, it was [motivated by] a decision in search of justifications. Moreover, the emphasis on not neglecting irrigation projects remained nebulous. Ignored in the data, it was swept away by time.

A comprehensive outlook means maintaining and increasing the yield. If holding onto the al-Awwali basin means letting go of the Litani basin, where is the comprehensiveness?
I do not understand the meaning of shortening the distance to the sea through a steeper, less lengthy basin! Is the intent to increase capacity by 25 MW, or is it to increase production by 150 million kWh? If the former is intended, the increase in installed capacity in Lebanon would total [only] 25/1300 = 2 percent.

If the latter is intended, respectively!

In addition to this, there is a need for permanent water sources in southern Lebanon, where the only permanent river is the Litani. We will go into this aspect further when we present the general water balance of the Lebanese coasta, the increase in power generated in Lebanon would be 150/2000 = 2.5 percent. When we apply the increase in the percentage of falls that are utilized (90 - 80 = 10 percent), installed capacity and power generation increase by 2.2 percent and 2.7 percent slopes.

Hence, after working with the Lebanese administration, the American technical mission recommended coupling the basins, with the understanding that:

- Six hydroelectric plants would be built in the two basins.
- A storage dam would be built at both al-Khardali and Basri.
- The water diverted from the Litani to the al-Awwali would not exceed 170 million m³. Otherwise, the coupling of the two rivers would simply turn into a diversion.
- A specified irrigation program would be implemented in the al-Biqā'a in the south, and on the coast (see the first installment of this series, 30 September 1991).

In other words, the recommendations formed a composite of the two concepts. The first concept is the Litani without coupling, and the second is, in effect, coupling without the Litani. The project thus continued to have both a developmental, agricultural aspect, and a hydroelectric aspect, i.e. it remained balanced overall.

The issue here—which penetrates deeply into a delicate situation far from the equations of eminent mathematicians—remains one of making the river more Lebanese by adopting for it an outlet on the border between the province of South Lebanon and the province of Jabal Lubnan! Or, let us say that it was a time for river diversion. They [the Israelis] diverted a river there, and we diverted a river here.

Lebanon's Water Balance According to Section of Coastal Slopes

By coastal slopes, we mean all of the western slopes extending from the al-Kabir River in the north to the southern, international border; and from the Mediterranean Sea eastward to the peaks of the western mountain chain running parallel to the coast.

From a hydrological standpoint, these slopes can be divided into three areas based on moisture coming from the sea, topography, elevation, rainfall, and snow. These areas are: the northern area, extending from the northern border to Dahr al-Baydar; the central area, extending from Dahr al-Baydar to the al-Zahrani River; and the southern area, extending from the al-Zahrani River to the southern border.

Statistics on volume before the construction of the al-Qir'awn Dam and the diversion of the Litani's water through the Markaba-Anan tunnel, indicate the following amounts of water from large springs and rivers flowing in each of these three regions [in millions of cubic meters]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Winter</th>
<th>Summer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the construction of the dam at al-Qir'awn and the diversion of water to the al-Awwali, the situation of the previous table became as follows [in millions of cubic meters]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Winter</th>
<th>Summer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The balance, (3200 - 3100 = 100 million m³), is used at the dam for irrigation and other needs.

Litani River Water Balance [in millions of cubic meters]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Water</th>
<th>Winter</th>
<th>Summer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water reaching al-Qir'awn Dam</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Added water from al-Shita' River and al-Zarqa' Spring</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Litani from al-Qir'awn to al-Kharrubi</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Litani from al-Kharrubi to al-Qasimiya</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remark: The water that could be diverted after the construction of the dam and the tunnel is 400 + 90 = 490 million m³.
Water Needs

I. The latest study on Beirut's drinking water states that the capital's annual drinking water needs in 2010 will be about 200 million m³, half of which is to be supplied by water originating north of the capital, and the other half by southern water.

II. The drinking water of the villages in the districts of Marj 'Uyyun, Hasbayya, Bint Jubayl, and the upper district of Tyre was estimated in 1966 at about 15 million m³ per year supplied to the Markaba Plant on Lake al-Qir'awn from Bir al-Tawazun via water pipes. The project was frozen at that time for reasons that have become well known.

Now, 25 years later, these needs are estimated at about 40 million m³ per year.

Given that the "Wadi [Jilu] project" aspires to provide less than 3 million m³ per year to a part of this area (i.e., less than 10 percent of needs) by means of entirely uneconomic pumping, and given that the plan to pump water from the Litani below Qal'at al-Shaqif and the plan to pump from Ras al-'Ayn to Tyre appear unfeasible technically and administratively, the projected need for 40 million m³ per year remains unchanged.

III. Studies by the French [Jarsar] Institute on the irrigation of the southern al-Biq'a indicate the possibility of regulating and irrigating close to 25,000 hectares using ground water and local summer springs. The balance of the water needed, estimated at about 50 million m³, could be supplied from Lake al-Qir'awn by means of a 900-m tunnel.

IV. Studies conducted by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization demonstrate the possibility of irrigating and regulating 40,000 hectares in southern Lebanon on the coast, in the mountains, and at various elevations. This would require close to 250 million m³ of water.

V. Industrial needs in 2000 will amount to about 120 million m³, mostly supplied by groundwater.

Thus, total water needs are as follows: 100 million m³ of drinking water for Beirut; 40 million m³ of drinking water for Mt. 'Ammi; 50 million m³ of irrigation water for the southern al-Biq'a; 250 million m³ of irrigation water for southern Lebanon.

Of the total, 160 million m³ are available from Lake al-Qir'awn, given that 60 million m³ must remain behind the dam as an annual reserve.

Conclusion

The hydrological fracture that has struck the unity of the Litani River has produced an imbalance that involves a more damaging and dangerous scheme to break morale. In our previous presentation, we indicated its political, economic, technical, and psychological causes. We also showed how its implementation was prevented from moving forward. The important thing now is for us to restore the balance before it is too late. We believe this can be done through a comprehensive water solution for the south, whose main features are summarized as follows:

- construction of the al-Khardali reservoir, with a capacity of more than 100 million m³;
- construction of the Basari reservoir, with a capacity of more than 90 million m³;
- coordination of these two reservoirs' functions with those of the al-Qir'awn reservoir, within the framework of a complete re-examination of the diversion and distribution of water, including a re-examination of Decree No. 14522;
- allocation of upper [river] water to upper areas, central water to central areas, and lower water to the lower areas;
- employment of a long-range irrigation program (10-15 years), taking into account water consumption by existing facilities and installations. This might require a reversal of some considerations that have prevailed among some, so that irrigation starts from the coast and rises up to an elevation of 850 m, not vice versa!
- repeated proposal of the construction of hydroelectric plants on the Litani's central and lower course, this time from a decided scientific and economic standpoint;
- repeated tendering of an open contract to supply drinking water to the villages of the districts of Marj 'Uyyun, Hasbayya, Bint Jubayl, and the upper district of Tyre, after the tender is amended to provide for current needs. The water for this project would be drawn from Bir al-Tawazun [well] at Lake al-Qir'awn (800 m above sea level) through pressurized water pipes.

MOROCCO

Hassan on Mideast Peace, Algerian Elections

PM1001153892 Paris LE FIGARO in French 9 Jan 92 p 5

[Interview with Moroccan King Hassan II by Philippe Villin, Thierry Desjardins, and Yves Messarowitz; date and place not given]

[Text] [LE FIGARO] Years ago, you were the first to open dialogue with Israel. In secret, of course. Now, many things have changed and the Israel-Arab negotiations are resuming in Washington. How far can the Arabs go with Israel?

[Hassan] As far as Israel is willing to go with them. When it comes to peace, and especially peace among neighbors, there are no limits.

[LE FIGARO] Is a revival of the "Judeo-Arab friendship" which existed, particularly here in Morocco, conceivable?

[Hassan] But that friendship still exists. Many Palestinians have met here with Israelis who hold important positions. When those Jews and Arabs took leave of each other, they always did so with brotherly embraces. No, believe me, there would be no problems in relations between our two peoples if it was up to the Judeo-Arab community alone. For instance, the Jewish community which has lived and still lives in Morocco, knows and
understands the Arab world. In fact, the problem stems from the fact that the Jews from Europe or North America do not accept the idea that by settling in Israel they have also opted for a cultural, geographical, and human environment which is that of the Arab world.

[LE FIGARO] You are chairman of the Council for Jerusalem. What status do you want for the city of Jerusalem itself?

[Hassan] What we need above all is to rid the Jerusalem question of any fundamentalist overtones. The three religions have roots there. Historical fairness is necessary. Each has rights over Jerusalem. All of us—Christians, Jews, and Muslims—are God’s children, the children of the Book.

[LE FIGARO] You said that you were prepared to meet with Mr. Shamir, but you also said that Shamir would never agree to make peace in order “not to betray his generation.” So what would you say to Shamir if he came?

[Hassan] As chairman of the Jerusalem committee, I said that if Mr. Shamir had new and positive proposals to make to me with regard to the solution of the Jerusalem problem, I would examine the possibility of such a meeting. Jerusalem’s status is not a security problem for Israel. Nor is it a political or strategic problem which calls into question the existence or recognition of Israel. Whether Muslim, Jew, or Christian we all have rights over this holy city. It is in this context that we must show imagination and make proposals. If Mr. Shamir moves in that direction, I will publicly apologize for everything I have said about him.

[LE FIGARO] But is it not necessary to negotiate with the “hardliners”?

[Hassan] Yes. In Madagascar, my father always said to those around us: “Do not go and see our friends, they are already convinced, go and see our enemies.” That is time well spent.

[LE FIGARO] Immediately after the Gulf war, you said that the Arab world had just experienced an “earthquake.” What state do you think the Arab world is in?

[Hassan] There was undoubtedly an earthquake. But an earthquake always dies down. We must hope that the cracks which it opened up will be closed again. They have not yet been fully closed, but we must work on it.

[LE FIGARO] What is the state of your relations with Saddam Husayn?

[Hassan] They are normal relations. I received his foreign minister who came to tell me that Iraq was counting on Morocco to try to persuade the Islamic community to help Iraq to partially lift the blockade.

[LE FIGARO] Will you help Saddam Husayn to return to the international community?

[Hassan] It is not just a question of Saddam Husayn but of the Iraqi people and, from this viewpoint, the blockade is largely anachronistic. One Iraqi said to me: “They want to hit President Saddam Husayn by depriving us of food and medicines.” And he asked me: “Sire, have you ever seen a head of state anywhere in the world who has ever lacked food or medicines when his people were starving?” I was forced to reply that no head of state has ever been known to go hungry even when his people were hungry.

[LE FIGARO] You called for a “moratorium on terrorism.” What does that mean? Does it mean that there are no longer any terrorist states in the Arab world?

[Hassan] I think that after the release of the hostages and everything which has happened, we must allow time to do its work. We must not revive a kind of tit-for-tat war. Moreover, saying that Libyan terrorists blew up a plane does not mean that it was Libyans who did everything from start to finish. Who harbored the terrorists? Who organized the logistics? Who guaranteed their escape? Nobody knows. That is why there must be a moratorium. And, moreover, a crisis with Libya would have considerable repercussions for everybody. We and Libya are part of the Maghreb, the Arab world, the Islamic Conference, and the Nonaligned Movement. The escalation with Libya must therefore be halted. Either you carry things through, with serious consequences, or you back down and find a compromise in which case it is better to find it immediately. You can do anything with bayonets except sit on them.

[LE FIGARO] You are Commander of the Faithful. Is Islamic fundamentalism a danger?

[Hassan] Fundamentalism of any sort is a danger because it is the expression of obscurantism and leads to a certain form of dictatorship. Fundamentalism comes about when we allow the contradictions which exist in us to be exacerated. There are fundamentalists in all religions. As regards Muslim fundamentalism, one of the answers consists of promoting the study of Arabic, because it is the language of the Koran. The Muslim who does not fully master that language is dependent on a translator, a mullah who can put any words he likes into the Koran or the mouth of the Prophet. I am convinced that if every Muslim could read the Koran himself, there would be less fundamentalism.

[LE FIGARO] What progress has been made in building a united Arab Maghreb? And is not the presence in the Maghreb of a country which is very different politically and socially a curb on the constitution of a real united Maghreb?

[Hassan] Algeria constituted the gulf in the middle which prevented any union. But the new Constitution and the measures taken by Algeria which was moving toward a pluralist society opened up possibilities. However, it took you 30 years to build Europe. Our plan for a united Maghreb has only existed for two years. Although we have one language, culture, and religion, it will take us time.
[LE FIGARO] What do you think of the first round of the elections in Algeria? Are you worried?

[Hassan] Algeria is engaged in a democratic process which I welcome as a victory for freedom. It is currently involved in its first pluralist election since independence. The Algerian people are a mature and responsible people and I am sure that whatever the election results are, the Algerian government will honor the pledges made by Algeria to its allies and partners.

[LE FIGARO] In the long term, do you hope for a confederation of Maghreb countries?

[Hassan] Why not? That is the advice I am giving to the Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians because only a confederation among those three countries can bring a balanced and secure peace. So why not practice at home what you preach to others?

[LE FIGARO] You have been very critical of pluralism.

[Hassan] In La Baule [at the summit of French-speaking countries] I said that the cure suggested confused the medicine and the dose be taken. I am in favor of the medicine. I am in favor of a multiparty system. Do I need to remind you, in this connection, that Morocco is one of the few countries whose Constitution prohibits a one-party system and this is not a recent provision. But there is a difference between tolerance for a multiparty system and the huge dose which was administered to those countries in an attempt to force-feed them with it. Look at what is happening, there is chaos and disorder. Look at Congo, 4.5 million inhabitants, and 42 political parties! Do you call that a multiparty system? The same is true in Gabon, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, and Zaire. Where are we going? Indeed, I have the impression that behind all that is a political desire to regain control of Africa. People say: They reject a multiparty system, and hence they reject democracy, therefore we have the right to interfere, and so on and so forth. And thus, organized chaos is established.

[LE FIGARO] You have reigned for more than 30 years. What is your assessment of your reign?

[Hassan] I will leave it to History to make that assessment. The heads of state God wished to punish were only given 5 or 10 years. When God gives you an "extension" after 10 years, it means that he is giving you the chance to build something lasting.

[LE FIGARO] What is your greatest source of pride—the education system or the Green March?

[Hassan] Both are educational. My main concern is to maintain the kind of patriotism in the Moroccan people which I knew them to have when I was a child. On the eve of the Green March, I wondered whether the Moroccans in 1975 would be as determined as they were in 1944 when they faced tanks. Well, they went. You see a country's flag is its soul, its symbol.

[LE FIGARO] With regard to the Sahara, what is the position on this famous referendum which seems to be delayed?

[Hassan] The United Nations realized that a referendum like this one had never been held because it is a referendum to ratify the decolonization of a territory by Spain. It is therefore seeking trouble unnecessarily. But I asked for it because I wanted to put an end to this issue in the international sphere. And the United Nations realized that it was necessary to identify who was eligible to vote. It is therefore a longer and more delicate process than expected. There has been a delay. The problem of identifying Saharan eligible to vote in the referendum is very important. Outgoing UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar understood it so well that he drew up a report exclusively devoted to that question. That report gave rise to fierce discussions in the Security Council and was finally unanimously adopted. It has the advantage of broadening the electorate, giving justice to some of the Saharan people who did not appear on the Spanish lists. We are clearly only partly satisfied by it because it does not correspond fully to the reservations we expressed on this very question of identifying eligible voters. Our wish is that no Saharan should be unjustly deprived of the right to express his choice.

[LE FIGARO] You are often criticized for your authoritarianism.

[Hassan] You have to be authoritarian when you are flying a plane which has no automatic pilot mechanism. You have to be at the controls. But there is a big difference between authority and trying to govern alone. I am in favor of authority. But my real power, my real responsibility as Moroccan king is to determine the orientation of my country's policy and then to involve as many people as possible in the broadest possible consensus on the decisions which result from that orientation.

[LE FIGARO] In short, are you a monarchist?

[Hassan] For 1,200 years, this country has been a family comprising the king and the Moroccan people. You can oppose Hassan II, that is no problem. But I will wager that this country will always be a monarchy. The Moroccans want the monarchy. That is an indisputable fact. Choosing to ignore it, as some people have done, leads them to go astray or even to cut themselves off from the real Morocco.

[LE FIGARO] What is the state of your relations with Francois Mitterrand?

[Hassan] I have never had any personal problems with President Mitterrand.

[LE FIGARO] What are your personal feelings toward France now?

[Hassan] I cannot have any grievances toward France. For me France means Ronsard and Chateaubriand. You cannot quarrel with such people. You cannot wipe out 40 years of personal culture. Having said that, I am hurt—yes, I am human like everybody else. It is true that I think that the Paris police chief could stop people
burning pictures of the Moroccan king in Place du Trocadero. That is a public demonstration. It is not part of public freedom. But let us say no more about that.

[LE FIGARO] However, some people have noticed that for some time France has not been awarded major contracts in Morocco.

[Hassan] No, that is not the case. Morocco does not practice discrimination in the choice of its partners. My country makes its decision primarily on the basis of its best interests. Some contracts have recently been awarded to Italian, Spanish, or American companies. But some have also gone to French companies. For instance, there was a great deal of talk about the Larache-Rabat highway, which the Italians constructed. Why the Italians? Quite simply, because they provided the best and most extensive finance for that major project. The fact remains that I am still convinced of the need to safeguard a strong and preferential link with France, and I still think that what is good for Morocco is good for France, and vice versa. Moreover, our two countries have a special and joint responsibility for making Mediterranean Europe, which backs onto the Maghreb, a zone of influence throughout the world and an area of cooperation which will take our countries from a rather frosty confrontation to the broadest and—why not?—the most ambitious partnership.

‘Mercenaries’ Reported Occupying ‘No-Man’s-Land’
92AF0261A Rabat L’OPINION in French 4 Jan 92 p 2


[Text] In ordering a cease-fire as the first stage in the implementation of a peace process that should lead to the establishment of a confirming referendum in our Saharan provinces, the United Nations, acting within the framework of MINURSO [UN Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara], has sent observers to a dozen posts on both sides of the defense wall.

When the UN observers took up their positions at sites located within the “no-man’s-land” such as Tifariti and Bir Lahlou, for example, there was no trace of the Polisario [Popular Front for the Liberation of Sagau el Hamra and Rio de Oro] and the territory was therefore turned over to the United Nations empty. Indeed, Morocco, which had continuously exercised close surveillance over this portion of the national soil, would scarcely have allowed mercenaries, who had been infiltrating the internationally recognized borders of our recovered Sahara, to take up positions there.

However, taking advantage of the deployment of UN observers, mercenaries have infiltrated this no-man’s-land and begun to take up positions there in an attempt to make international public opinion believe that “liberated territories” exist. Consequently, under the cover of the United Nations, the Polisario is trying to induce the international community into error and seeking to confront it with a fait accompli, which is inadmissible and a violation of the UN Charter and the very provisions of the UN peace plan.

Through such irresponsible, provocative actions, Polisario is trying to torpedo the peace process and cast doubt on the credibility and fame of the United Nations, which it seeks to turn into an accomplice and umbrella.

The Polisario aims to implicate the United Nations and distort the facts of the case in anticipation of the referendum, from which it knows it is bound to emerge the loser.

It is therefore up to the United Nations to assume full and complete responsibility for restoring the truth and putting an end to the fraudulent maneuvers undertaken by the mercenaries, long accustomed to resorting to deceit and lies and the most grotesque machinations.

The United Nations must guarantee that there is no abusive exploitation of its presence by the mercenaries in their attempt to distort the process under way through the creation of a new situation prejudicial to full knowledge of the truth and defying respect for international law.

It is the responsibility of the United Nations to demand the immediate withdrawal of these mercenaries who have illegally infiltrated the no-man’s-land in an attempt to effect a return to the situation prevailing before implementation of the ceasefire and the establishment of the MINURSO arrangement.

Whatever the case, Morocco, which is sole master of the territory and exercises all the powers of sovereignty there, cannot accept any fait accompli or allow the mercenaries to use the presence of the United Nations as a cover for achieving its evil designs. It has the right to use all means to provide for its legitimate defense and drive the aggressors from its territories. The presence of mercenaries in the no-man’s-land is a manifest violation of the ceasefire, an intolerable, serious act of provocation fraught with consequences. It is a challenge to the United Nations and the peace.

Rights Organization, Press Welcome Royal Releases
LD1801164392 Rabat MAP in English 1224 GMT 18 Jan 92

[Text] Rabat, Jan 18—The Moroccan Organization for Human Rights (OMDH) voiced satisfaction at “the recent release of the three Moroccan political prisoners” and expressed “sincere congratulations to the citizens who recovered their freedom.” The OMDH expressed hope that the case of Ahmed Khiar, another detainee whose death penalty was commuted to a term sentence, will be also definitively settled. The OMDH also said the recent promulgation of the law related to custody arrest constitutes, despite the reservations expressed by the organization, an undeniable progress and called for the respect of the law during political trials.
"The recent release of the three detainees tried in 1977 ends a painful dossier that all Moroccans want to shelve once and for all," wrote the Moroccan daily AL-MAGHRIB in an editorial entitled "New Acquisition for Freedom and Human Rights." The daily of the National Rally for Independents [RNI] hailed Morocco's numerous achievements in human rights matters, saying that clemency measures enabled groups of detainees, involved in political or other affairs, to recover their freedom. It recalls that a Human Rights Consultative Council [CCDH] was set up at the initiative of King Hassan II and that, despite its recent creation, the results it recorded are very encouraging. The debate on human rights has never been so fruitful on the domestic scene, either through the parliament, the CCDH, or Moroccan non-governmental human rights organizations.

BAYANE AL-YAWM, the Arabic-language daily of the Party for Progress and Socialism [PPS], also hail the royal free pardon, saying that the amnesty is likely to stop the ill-intended disparagers who use the human rights issue to harm Morocco. More than ever before, Morocco needs to consolidate democratic acquisitions and oppose anything likely to distort public and individual freedom or a legitimate, responsible political action.

The royal free pardon was granted to Razik Ahmed, Ait Bennacer, and Harif Abdallah, who were tried and sentenced to a 20-year imprisonment in 1977 for an attempt on the state's internal security. The death penalty of another detainee, Ahmed Khiar, was commuted to a term sentence.

Visit of Opposition Parties to Mauritania Reported
92AF0267D Rabat L'OPINION in French 28 Dec 91 p 1
[Text] A delegation including representatives of the Istiqlal Party (PI), the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), and the Organization of Democratic and Popular Action (OADP) arrived in Nouakchott Thursday evening.

According to a statement reported by the Mauritanian Information Agency (AMI), the delegation, which included Mohamed Larbi Messari (PI), Mohamed Lakhassissi (USFP), and Abdelghani Abou Al Azm (OADP), indicated upon its arrival in Nouakchott that "its mission consists in consolidating and strengthening cooperation between Moroccan opposition parties and Mauritanian parties."

The news agency reports that during its visit, the delegation will forward a memorandum to Mauritanian parties dealing with "the situation in the Arab Maghreb and the evolution of the Sahara question." (MAP)

New USFP First Secretary Appointed
LD2001112192 Rabat Moroccan Kingdom Radio Network in Arabic 1300 GMT 17 Jan 92
[Text] During an ordinary meeting held yesterday, the Political Bureau of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces [USFP] entrusted the post of party first secretary to Mr. Abderrahman Youssi, replacing the late Abderrahim Bouabid. In a statement published today by AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI, the party's Political Bureau indicated that Mr. Mohamed Yazghi has been appointed as acting first secretary of the party. [item as heard]

Oil Pipeline Said Operating Despite Leaks
92AF0267C Rabat L'OPINION in French 31 Dec 91 pp 1, 8
[Article by E. Amro: "Casa-Sidi Kacem Pipeline To Remain in Operation"]

[Text] The Casa-Sidi Kacem pipeline will remain in operation despite the risks and dangers it might pose to the people and the environment.

This oil pipeline has constantly been in the news since 1987 due to the countless leaks it has sprung and because it has exceeded its age limit and become dangerously thin.

The risks that the pipeline connecting the oil port to the Sidi Kacem refinery poses to Casablanca and the environment are increasingly evident because of repeated leaks. This at a time when officials admit that the pipeline, which has far exceeded its age limit, has lost a substantial portion of its thickness.

This is what officials are publicly admitting as a result of the most recent leaks that led to disturbances at Roches Noires. One of them occurred in the telephone cable tunnels at Blvd Amro Bnou Al Ass, but was plugged. Since the pressure test turned out negative (see our edition of 29 December 1991), inspections are continuing in order to detect any other leak(s) in the pipeline in question, leaks that reportedly allowed a certain amount of oil to escape into the subsoil while being pumped into the last tanker to dock at the Port of Casablanca (November 1991).

During the pumping, a major leak caused flooding of the roadway between the central Shell Morocco storage depot and the abandoned Lafarge cement works now undergoing demolition by explosives (see our edition of 21 November). The leak was plugged and the pumping, temporarily halted, resumed after assurance was given that all was in order.

However, such was obviously not the case. What other source could there be of the oil that flooded the Blvd Amro Bnou Al Ass tunnels? Whatever the case, officials admit that the pipeline in question has in fact become a veritable sieve, having exceeded the age limit and fallen victim to the corrosive action of sea water when not in use.

It was laid some 50 years ago, although the average lifespan of such a pipeline is 30 years.

Maintenance under salt water in the absence of fresh water has been the responsibility of the technical departments of the Ain Sebaa-Hay Mohammadi prefecture since the appearance of the earliest problems in 1987.
This year, oil has been found in sewer pipes and even the sanitation systems of a number of companies in Roches Noires.

The seriousness of the problem is based on a previous incident. In 1982, a disaster was barely avoided following an oil leak that traveled through sewer pipes to the Sea of Oukacha. A cigarette butt thrown into the water near a collector set off a series of underground explosions that sent cracks the length of Blvd Moulay Slimane and nearly set fire to hydrocarbon deposits and nearby facilities. Since that time, four pipelines have been successively condemned.

The only one remaining in operation carrying crude oil to the Sidi Kacem refinery has demonstrated once again that it is no longer reliable, in spite of systematic inspections.

But can we do without it? From the standpoint of safety, the pipeline exhibits definite risks. The crude oil gives off explosive vapors which, in the presence of a heat source or spark, would result in combustion. It could pollute the shore and underground water table and lead to the deterioration of pipelines and underground facilities (as in the case of the telephone cable tunnels).

From the economic standpoint, condemning this pipeline would result in a halt in activity at the Sidi Kacem refinery, which has not yet been connected to the Mohammedia oil port, a port that also has problems because it cannot accommodate tankers in rough weather.

We therefore realize that the outdated oil port of Casablanca will always be in demand, not only because of the latter problem, but also in order to diversify oil receiving points and thus guarantee a safe supply. All of which brings us back to the matter of planning and looking ahead. One wonders why such serious problems were never handled in time, why the port of Casablanca has not been rebuilt, why the Mohammedia-Sidi Kacem pipeline is not yet operational, and why we are still no further ahead than looking at an overhaul of the Casa-Sidi Kacem pipeline around 1992.

Figures on Increased Cost of Living Reported
92AF0267B Rabat L'OPINION in French
31 Dec 91 pp 1, 8

[Text] The cost-of-living index is following its "natural" course, increasing steadily and gradually eating away at the purchasing power of the people.

In the absence of any real overall policy aimed at protecting household savings, the poorest groups still pay most heavily by virtue of the wage freeze.

The 0.75-percent drop in the cost-of-living index compared with October does absolutely nothing to boost purchasing power.

Situated at 464.9 at the end of November 1991, the general cost-of-living index showed a 0.75-percent drop compared with the preceding month. This drop essentially results from the downward trend in food prices.

Brought back to where it was at the end of December 1990, the progression of this index for the first 11 months of this year comes out to 7.3 percent.

In terms of the average for the first 11 months of 1991, the general cost-of-living index showed an increase of 8.3 percent compared with 6.6 for the same period of the year in 1990.

Such an acceleration is due to across-the-board price increases for the different groups of products.

For example, the price index for food products rose 8.6 percent compared with 7.2 for the same months of 1990.

Clothing and housing rose from 5.9 and 5.1 percent respectively in 1990 to 7.2 and 8.5 percent for the same period of this year.

Such increases also hit other categories of products. Price increases for maintenance, hygiene and care and for transportation, entertainment and miscellaneous rose by 6.8 and 7.9 percent in 1991, compared with 6.1 and 6.4 percent for the same period of 1990.

Increasing Trade Deficit With EEC Discussed
92AF0267A Rabat L'OPINION in French 28 Dec 91 p 2

[Text] There has been a net increase in trade between Morocco and the European Community this decade, which amounted to 53.5 billion DH [dirhams] in 1990, 58.3 percent of our total foreign trade, according to a Ministry of Finance memorandum quoted by MAP.

However, this increase in the volume of trade has been accompanied by a chronic deficit in Morocco's trade balance with the EEC, a deficit that has steadily increased over the years until, at the close of 1990, it totaled 8.2 billion dirhams, 40.3 percent of the overall trade deficit.

This negative trade imbalance is largely due to Morocco's great need for imported products and the difficulties Moroccan products encounter in gaining access to the EEC market.

Among other factors, such difficulties are linked to the EEC's imposition of: an import calendar based on certain agricultural products; reference prices and compensatory taxes placed on exports of agricultural products; and self-limitation agreements made for the textile sector.

Nevertheless, although the trade balance with the EEC constantly reflects a deficit for Morocco, the regular account does show a surplus in favor of Morocco due to tourist receipts and wage transfers amounting respectively to 7.087 billion and 15.403 billion dirhams in 1990.
EEC investments in Morocco are low compared with the EEC's total investments abroad, which amount to some $60 million yearly.

Such investments rose between 1985 (179 million dirhams) and 1990 (1.103 billion dirhams), but this increase is essentially due to the efforts of France, whose investments make up half of the total amount.

Financial aid continued to rise. The package granted under the Second Protocol (effective 10 June 1982) was up 53 percent over the First (27 April 1976). The Third (26 May 1988) showed a 63-percent increase over the Second, and the Fourth (June 1991) was up 35 percent over the Third.

Aid granted by the Fourth Protocol amounted to 438 million ECU's [European currency units] (1 ECU = about 11 dirhams), which puts us in second place after Egypt (568 million ECU's). It should be noted that the EEC proposes to set aside 25 million ECU's from this package as "risk capital."

Effects of 1990-91 Harvest on Economy Detailed 92AF0261B Casablanca LE MATIN DU SAHARA in French 26 Dec 91 pp 15-16

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] According to the "circumstantial studies by the Statistics Directorate" based on initial estimates for 1991, there seems to be a trend toward sustained growth. The information available does not completely reflect this situation, but a tangible recovery can be discerned starting in the second half of the year. The results of the agricultural harvest have been confirmed and the 1990-91 season is indeed exceptional. Over 80 million quintals of grain have reportedly been harvested, a record figure. Other crops are also said to have marked up highly satisfactory results, results made possible thanks to plentiful rainfall and even distribution in time and space. The agricultural sector's fine performance has also made it possible to supply both the domestic and foreign markets.

Immediate Repercussions

Domestically speaking, it was the industrial sector that benefited the most. Food industries had a good year, registering the highest rate of growth compared with other branches of the economy. Foreign demand for food products was very intense. Other industrial goods, particularly chemical and parachemical products, experienced difficulties at the beginning of the year. Shrinkage of the market for phosphoric acid is a major problem faced by these products and its effect on the mining sector has been immediate and brutal.

Actually, at the beginning of the year, mining and particularly phosphate activity seemed to be inching back upward, but the situation was very quickly reversed and became generally quite depressed. Phosphate production slowed. Its growth rate even became negative and continued so throughout the first half of the year.

This situation is reminiscent of one observed in 1989, when India broke its contract with the OCP [Moroccan Phosphate Office]. The very uncertain economic environment that prevailed throughout 1990 with the war in the Gulf and extended into 1991 with the abortive coup in the Soviet Union was at the root of the slump in certain markets. Prices for raw materials occasionally hit the floor.

New Thrust

In contrast, runaway oil prices continued throughout the period. The oil bill was heavy and the hardening of the dollar, the main billing currency, made it even heavier. These two phenomena seem to explain the evolution of the energy sector, whose main components began the year in sound health. However, their behavior soon changed. The slump was very marked for oil, but the economic electricity could be the basis for a new thrust during the second half of 1991.

Direct Impact

The evolution of the mining and energy sectors has a direct impact on foreign trade. Our foreign trade situation was not very satisfactory during the first six months of the year. The trade deficit widened alarmingly and the rate of cover of imports by exports dropped, going from 61.6 percent in 1990 to 57.6 percent in 1991. Exports suffered greatly from the shrinking demand for phosphoric acid and fertilizer, which made up 19 percent of total exports in 1990. The growth rate of exports was not very dynamic during the first half of the year (2.9 percent).

It was slower than growth in imports, which exceeded 10 percent. Oil purchases made up 12 percent of all our purchases abroad. Such divergent behavior of purchases and sales abroad had a heavy impact on our balance of payments, which has suffered since the summer of 1990, when the tourist sector was hit by a crisis.

Indeed, tourist activity was greatly affected by international circumstances. Tourist receipts have dropped considerably, as has the number of tourists. The sources of tourism have changed radically. Europeans who once made up the majority of all visitors are now in the minority. The number of Arabs has grown and Algerians are now the predominant group. The Union of the Arab Maghreb seems to have revitalized the tourist sector, one of the main sources of foreign exchange for our country, which for the past several years has made a continuing effort to restructure and restore the basic balance of its economy.

Noteworthy Progress

Noteworthy progress has been made in the field of public finance. Spending has been held to tolerable levels. Investment has not been touched and continues to grow at an encouraging pace, despite limitations affecting our economy. Revenue reflects the results of new reforms undertaken in the field of public finance, reforms that made steady progress during the first half of the year and
resulted in an increase of 7.1 percent, easily exceeding that of regular spending (6 percent). The government's goal, which is to reduce the overall treasury deficit to 3 percent of the GDP [gross domestic product], is apparently gradually being achieved. By the end of July, it was 2,509 billion dirhams, 430 million less than during the same period of last year.

It is in the fields of prices that disturbing signs have been observed. The price rise of 1990 has not slowed; instead, it has speeded up. Inflation, manifested in the cost-of-living index, has revived. At the end of September, the price increase was 8.4 percent, the upsurge affecting all prices with the same intensity. The increase in the agricultural and industrial price indexes was 10.8 and 5.1 percent, respectively. The industrial production price index escaped this strong surge and rose by only 3 percent during the first six months of the year.

Recovery

On the whole, considering all the data and an international environment that was calmer at the end of the year, productive activity seemed to enjoy a recovery in 1991, in contrast with 1990. The gross national product reportedly experienced an increase of some 4 percent in volume. The resumption of activity is for the most part attributable to the soundness of investments and also a more favorable evolution of exports during the second half of the year.

It is the agricultural sector that was reportedly the driving force behind this new growth. Its added value is expected to be 11 percent higher than during the previous year. Other sectors are not growing as rapidly as agriculture, but are nevertheless experiencing satisfactory growth rates given the circumstances.

Disturbances

Elsewhere over the past two years, the world has experienced highly dangerous situations manifested in economic disturbances difficult to control. Financial market places have sometimes been frantic, prices for raw materials have generally reflected a downward trend, and prices for energy products have experienced a very sharp recovery. This scenario has been observed twice: the first time immediately after the initiation of hostilities in the Middle East; the second after the abortive coup in the USSR. The impact of these two shocks was relatively widespread. All the world's economies felt their impact, particularly since they both occurred within a short period of time (August 1990, Gulf war; August 1991, coup d'etat in the USSR). The business world was profoundly shaken and numerous decisions were postponed, causing a slump in the main economies.

A climate of uncertainty was created in the business world, resulting in a drop in production and rising unemployment in countries such as Canada and the United States, then Great Britain and the rest of the European countries with the exception of Germany.

New Order

These events brought the idea of a new international economic order to the forefront. Recent events bear witness to a determination to move toward world detente. The possible ratification of disarmament treaties announced by President Bush and Gorbachev offers a real possibility of the coming of a new world. It is into this framework that the great macroeconomic trends of the world economy fit. World production, which rose by 1.8 and 0.7 percent in 1990 and 1991, should gradually begin to recover early in 1992, achieving a growth rate of 2.8 percent by the end of the year.

World trade could also experience a far better fate in 1992. The world trade growth rate, which was 4.5 percent in 1990 and should reach 3 percent in 1991, will reportedly reach 6 percent in 1992. All countries, developed or underdeveloped, will profit from the expected expansion in international trade. The basic assumption on which prospects are based is essentially the deceleration of certain limitations such as the drop in oil prices, a resumption in demand engendered by the need to rebuild Gulf countries destroyed by the war, and reorganization of the economies of East European countries.

Aftereffects

Developing countries have faced numerous difficulties linked to deteriorating terms of trade, problems with the debt, and the effects of protectionist policies adopted by most industrialized countries. Morocco has not escaped the aftereffects of this depressive situation, but its economy has withstood the shock and not suffered disturbing slippage.

After lying low for years, inflation is once again rearing its head. It is very strong and marks all economies, developed or not.

This situation has resulted from the higher price of oil and rising interest rates on financial markets.

Nevertheless, the current drop in interest rates and oil prices should enable the economy to recover in 1992, but despite accelerated growth, the IMF does not foresee a resurgence in inflation next year.

Actually, IMF experts say, inflation will reportedly be held to 3.8 percent in 1992 in industrialized countries, compared with 4.6 in 1991. It is expected to be moderate in Germany, with an increase of 3.5 percent, while in France it should not surpass 3 percent next year, compared with 3.3 in 1991.

Exceptional Season

The 1990-1991 season has turned out to be exceptional. Rainfall has been very abundant and well-distributed. The monthly average was about 480 mm [millimeters]. The level of rainfall between September 1990 and April 1991 exceeded that of the 1989-90 season by 10 percent. Climatic conditions were therefore favorable and pointed to very good results for all agricultural activity.
Grain Production in 1,000 Quintals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>1989-1990</th>
<th>1990-1991</th>
<th>% Variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soft wheat</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>+36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard wheat</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>+37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>+52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>+38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Early estimates made by Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform departments backed this hope. The four main types of grain could produce over 80 million quintals, 29 percent more than during the previous season. Except for corn, growth rates varied between 36 and 52 percent for the different types of grain.

Based on such figures, national production would cover 75 percent of our needs for soft wheat, compared with 60 percent for the previous year. It will also result in major foreign exchange gains, gains bolstered by the drop in prices on the world market.

Concerning exports, agricultural products are enjoying good results. The volume of citrus fruits exported by the end of June was 475,000 tons, up 80 percent over 1990. Their countervalue was 1.2 billion dirhams, an increase of 52.1 percent. Early vegetables shipped (tomatoes and potatoes) totaled 191,000 tons worth 560 million dirhams.

SUDAN

RCC Official Defends Country's Human Rights Record
EA1801202092 Khartoum SUNA in English 1614 GMT 18 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Khartoum, 18 Jan—[Revolutionary Command Council [RCC] member and head of the Peace and External Relations Department, Colonel Muhammad al-Amin Khalifah, has said the unjust campaign currently being waged against Sudan in the name of human rights is basically malicious political diatribe from circles who oppose the directions of the National Salvation Revolution.

Col. Khalifah, speaking at a symposium on human rights in Sudan held at the Friendship Hall here Saturday [18 January], explained that these circles are afraid of the revolution's capability of unleashing the energies of the Sudanese people to attain development. The RCC member voiced Sudan's rejection of using the issue of human rights as a weapon for the realization of special interests and the adoption of dual standards in this connection.

Col. Khalifah further called on the international and regional non-governmental organizations to be more accurate in their information about Sudan, saying that most of what has been said by them is sheer fabrications and lies based on incomplete and misleading information. "This has led the Sudanese people to question the credibility of these organizations," Col. Khalifah asserted.

Col. Khalifah said that Sudan welcomes at any time any fact-finding committee, saying that Sudan has nothing to hide. Col. Khalifah pointed out that a number of international commissions, topped by a European Community (EC) fact-finding committee, had visited the Sudan in the past for the same purpose.

The RCC member said that the [National] Salvation Revolution had always respected the right of the people of the south [passage indistinct] the human rights record of the Sudan is clean and an object of pride." Khalifah stressed. [passage omitted]

Official Says Sudan 'Strongman of Africa'
EA0601110992 Khartoum SUNA in English 1616 GMT 2 Jan 92

[Text] Khartoum, 2 Jan—The secretary-general of the International People's Friendship Council, Dr. Mustafa 'Uthman Isma'il, has indicated that the celebrations of Sudan's independence this year have come when Sudan is standing up to the enemies of peace and freedom. In press statements on the occasion of the 36th anniversary of Sudan's independence, Dr. Isma'il said that Sudan has become the strong man of Africa, and is a helping hand to its neighbors and friends. He added that "on this occasion, an assessment of what we have gained from independence should be made, laying down a base for the future."

Dr. Isma'il called on this occasion for abandoning rifts and differences from which Sudan has gained nothing but destruction and havoc.

He said that the International People's Friendship Council had effectively contributed to the rehabilitation of Sudan's relations with the world in full coordination with the role undertaken by the Foreign Ministry. Dr. Isma'il referred to the convocation of a number of popular, international and Arab conferences, peace forums; and symposia.

He concluded that the council is celebrating this year's independence of Sudan with the participation of a number of Arab and Islamic delegations, particularly from Iran, Jordan, and other countries.

Islamic Front Leader Departs Eritrea
EA1301202592 Asmara Voice of the Broad Masses of Eritrea in Arabic 0530 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Dr. Hasan al-Turabi, friend of the [Eritrean] revolution and the people of Eritrea, left Asmara International Airport at 1230 on 12 January afternoon after a three-day friendly visit to Eritrea. Dr. al-Turabi had arrived in Asmara on the morning of 10 January. He was received by Brother Ramadan Muhammad Nur, secretary to the general secretariat of the Eritrean interim government.
Dr. al-Turabi met at the guest house with Asmera Islamic affairs representatives and Father Mekarios, the deputy to the head of the Ethiopian Church, and attended Friday prayers in Khulafa al-Rashidin Mosque in Asmera. After the prayers, he addressed those praying, congratulating the Eritrean people for achieving victory and the liberation of all the Eritrean soil. He called for devotion and integration of the peoples in the region—Muslims and Christians alike—to maintain peace and stability as an example for peace and stability to all the peoples of all the African continent.

Dr. al-Turabi visited Mits’iwa and saw the ruins of the destructive raids carried out by the Dergue colonial system.

**Shantytown Residents Clash With Police**

92P40090A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 23 Dec 91 p 1

[Text] Sixteen persons died, and an unknown number of others were wounded in a clash yesterday between Sudanese police and residents of the shantytown Dar-al-Salam, located 30 km southeast of Khartoum.

Following the clash, residents carrying the bodies of two of the victims headed toward the prime ministry, surrounded it, and repeatedly shouted anti-government slogans and demanded a meeting with Lt. Gen. ‘Umar al-Bashir.

The council of ministers was meeting in regular session at the time, and continued even as police used tear gas bombs to disperse the crowd, most of whom were women and children armed with sticks.

The Dar-al-Salam community, which sprang up almost 10 years ago and expanded without planning, is populated by a mixture of immigrants from the south and the west of Sudan, most of whom work at occasional jobs or as unskilled workers in private and public enterprises.

The violence erupted as the deadline was reached on a government ultimatum for the residents of the community to vacate their houses by 22 December, thus enabling the land authorities to apportion the lands on which the houses stood within the established housing plan.

Khartoum state authorities warned shantytown residents of the vacating and relocating. Since 1985, the government has tried three different times to relocate the residents of Dar-al-Salam, but each attempt ended in failure because of residents’ opposition to moving to another area.

**Al-Bashir stresses Police Role**

EA2721220509J Khartoum SUNA in English 1616 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] Khartoum, 26 Dec—Gen. ‘Umar al-Bashir, chairman of the Revolution Command Council (RCC), has underlined the important role of the police in the implementation of the overall national strategy. Al-Bashir, addressing a gathering [of] the different police units in Sudan held at the friendship hall here in the context of the National Strategy Conference [on] Thursday [26 December], noted that all the strategy’s programs are based on security. Noting that the prevalence of security is the mainstay for any development in the country, he hailed the efforts exerted by the various police units, along with the Armed Forces, for combating armed robbery in Darfur state, adding that reports arriving from the state indicated that security is maintained in the state in a manner unprecedented in the last 10 years.

The RCC chairman urged the police force to work to create an integrated society in the Sudan, protect virtue and combat vice, pledging that the state would provide the necessary backing for the police force. The RCC chairman announced a donation of one million Sudanese pounds in support of the families of police martyrs.

The gathering was also addressed by RCC Deputy Chairman and Interior Minister Maj. Gen. al-Zubayr Muhammad Salih. Re-emphasising the importance of the prevalence of security for development in the country, Maj. Gen. Salih noted that the police strategy for the next 10 years is aimed at “the realization of development and boosting the shari’ah [laws] of Allah.”

The rally was also addressed by police Maj. Gen. ‘Awad Khawjali, who reiterated the police’s determination to boost shari’ah laws and their siding with the people. Police Brig. Gen. ‘Abd-al-Muni’m Sayyid Sulayman, chairman of the Overall [words indistinct] Police Committee, also spoke at the gathering, explaining the strategy formulated by the committee on the police force. The strategy, which will be implemented in four stages over eight years, covers all aspects of police work.

[Paris AFP in French at 1433 GMT on 27 December, in a Khartoum-dateline report adds, “The leader of the Sudanese junta also decided to allocate 16 million Sudanese pounds ($10.6 million at current rate) to the Police Cooperative Union; the Police Families and Martyrs Fund; and the Collective Marriage Program, under which bridal outfits, furniture, and houses are offered to young couples. According to [Sudanese Arabic-language daily] AL-INQAZ AL-WATANI, Gen. al-Bashir announced the upcoming integration of regular forces such as firemen, prison wardens, and forest guards into the police.”]

**University Officials Resign in Protest**

92P40094A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 2 Jan 92 pp 1,4

[Report by ‘Uthman Mirghani]

[Excerpt] London—Informed Sudanese sources disclosed to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the director of Khartoum University, Professor Mudathir al-Tanqari, submitted his resignation after a conflict with the minister of higher
education, Professor Ibrahim Ahmad 'Umar, over government policy concerning the university. These sources indicated that 14 deans of colleges in the university also decided upon resignation in a show of solidarity with Professor al-Tanqari.

According to these sources, the crisis erupted when the director of Khartoum University received an urgent telephone call from the minister of higher education while he was discussing the reopening of the closed university at a meeting of the council of deans in an effort to save the current academic year from being wasted. However, the minister of higher education informed the university director that neither he nor the council of deans had the right to act independently in matters concerning the resumption of studies at the university at the present time, as that would conflict with a decision made by the government requiring all university students to complete a period of military training at People's Defense Forces [PDF] camps. This period would not end until next March.

The sources said that Professor al-Tanqari objected on the grounds that the government decision meant practical postponement of the academic year for the Khartoum University students. The director then made his position known to the deans, indicating that he had decided to tender his resignation in protest against the government's policy toward the school and because he had no desire to profit from a political battle against the students. The deans, in turn, decided upon collective resignation in solidarity with their director.

The minister of higher education, Professor Ibrahim Ahmad 'Umar, a former deputy in the founding group of the National Islamic Front [NIF], had recently issued a declaration warning all university students of the consequences of evading their performance of compulsory military service in the PDF camps. The first official acknowledgment of the [student] mutiny at the al-Qutaynah PDF camp, reported by AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Tuesday before last, came with the minister's declaration, wherein he indicated that the authorities would track down all students who had fled from the al-Qutaynah camp south of Khartoum, calling upon whomever had not yet returned to the camp to do so immediately.

WESTERN SAHARA

Intervention Urged To Liberate Moroccans 'Held'
92AF0268A Rabat ALMAGHRIB in French 4 Jan 92 p 3

[First paragraph is ALMAGHRIB introduction; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Rafael Esparza Machin, president of the Moroccan-Canary Islands Friendship and Cooperation Association and member of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE, which constitutes the present Spanish Government), issued an appeal on 1 January to international humanitarian organizations to act urgently in seeking the release of Moroccan detainees in the camps at Lahmada operated by the Polisario Front.

In an interview with MAP, Esparza, who is making a visit to Morocco, emphasized that the humanitarian organizations concerned should inquire into the inhuman conditions under which Moroccan citizens are held against their will in these shameful camps and denounced the daily violations of human rights committed by the mercenaries of the "Polisario" [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro].

He added: "It is the duty of these organizations to act to ensure the return of the detainees to Morocco, the country in which they were born, where they can rejoin their families."

He continued: "This is the logical attitude that these organizations should take as a first step" in putting an end to the sufferings of the detainees.

Esparza said: "It is time for those organizations to provide evidence of their seriousness and objectivity." On the same occasion he criticized the inconsistent policy followed by certain, so-called humanitarian organizations which only act to serve certain, unadmitted political interests.

He stated: "Such organizations will be condemned by history for the silence that they have maintained," whenever violations of human rights are involved in the camps at Lahmada.

Replying to a question about the future of the "Polisario" after the return of several leaders of this movement to Morocco, the Spanish leader thought that the end of the "Polisario" is imminent. He recalled the political and ideological problems it faces, as well as the internal struggle going on within the front.

He said that the "Polisario" is nearing the end of its activities. He emphasized that the serious incidents that took place in the camps near Tindouf in 1988 proved to the entire world the desire of the Saharan people to return to Morocco, their fatherland.

He also mentioned the differences that have emerged within the leadership of the "Polisario." Esparza explained that these had accelerated the disintegration of the Front.

Regarding the referendum in Western Sahara following the adoption by the UN Security Council of the final report of UN secretary general Javier Perez de Cuellar, the Spanish leader stated that this referendum, which, moreover, relates to the situation in the past, will confirm, once and for all, the Moroccan identity of the Saharan provinces. He said that he was convinced that if the possibility of voting were immediately offered to the detainees in the Lahmada camps, they would vote to support Moroccan retention of the Saharan region.
He emphasized that the new criteria for the identification of persons called on to vote in the referendum contained in the report of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar are more just and more logical, since they assure all persons born in the Sahara of the right to vote.

Regarding this subject, Esparza indicated elsewhere that the census carried out by Spain in the Sahara in 1974, which had many gaps in it, cannot constitute the only basis for the determination of who is to vote.

He emphasized: "It is not up to the 74,000 persons listed by Spain and to them alone to determine the future of this territory."

In answer to a question on the recent visit to Las Palmas by a delegation of former founding members of the "Polisario" who have returned to Morocco, he emphasized the great impact of this trip in exposing the allegations and the propaganda of the mercenaries of the "Polisario" and in informing public opinion in the Canary Islands on the situation prevailing in the camps at Lahmada and the development program carried out by Morocco in the Saharan provinces.

The president of the Morocco-Canary Islands Association for Friendship and Cooperation also stated that the number of Canary Islands sympathizers with the "Polisario," which is based on disinformation and lies, is steadily declining. He emphasized that he himself had been led into error by the views expressed by these mercenaries. However, after mature reflection and an objective and historical analysis of the Saharan question, he said that he had realized that the realities were totally different from those that the mercenaries alleged.

Risk of Uprising in Camps Suggested
924P0268B Rabat L'OPINION in French 27 Dec 91 p 4

[First paragraph is L'OPINION introduction; quotation marks as published]

[Text] MAP—Labbat Ould Mnainou was born in one of the Saharan provinces. He recently returned to Morocco in response to a royal appeal that stated, "The country is compassionate and merciful." He stated on 25 December that the mercenaries in the "Polisario" [Popular Front for the Liberation of Sagua el Hamra and Rio de Oro] are trying by all possible means to interfere with the holding of the referendum to be able to continue their domination of the camps at Tindouf and Lahmada, where all of the people detained there wish to return to Morocco.

During a press conference held in Rabat Ould Mnainou said that he was convinced that the result of the referendum will in no way favor the mercenaries. He indicated that the detainees in the camps are more devoted than ever to their status as Moroccans, whatever the sacrifices to be made.

He continued that because of the anarchy and factional splits that currently exist in the ranks of the "Polisario," the mercenaries are currently going through a state of total disarray, as shown by the defection of several persons who had previously supported the position of the separatists.

Ould Mnainou was born in 1966 in Dakhla. He and members of several other families were kidnapped in 1975 at a place near where he was born. He stated that the detainees in the camps are subjected to systematic controls and that they are living under inhuman conditions.

He said that even Polisario soldiers are subject to this kind of control. In this regard he emphasized that members of the unit which specializes in torture are currently refusing to obey the orders given to them by the mercenaries.

Ould Mnainou's first attempt to escape took place in 1988, in the course of which he was arrested and thrown into "Al-Jazira" prison. He stated that the detainees can no longer stand the conditions under which they live in these camps of shame, where human rights are systematically flouted.

He considered that the disastrous economic and human conditions, characterised by the shortage of basic needs, as well as the savage repression and methods of torture carried out against all of those who assert that the Sahara belongs to Morocco, are likely to provoke a general uprising in the camps.

Furthermore, Ould Mnainou stated that six other Moroccans from the Sahara who fled with him were arrested by the mercenaries of the "Polisario."
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