Near East & South Asia
ALGERIA

JPRS-NEA-93-064  CONTENTS  12 May 1993

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International Affairs

Japanese Ambassador on Financial Cooperation
93AF0505A Algerie EL WATAN in French 22 Feb 93 p 5

[Interview with Hayakawa Teruo, the Japanese ambassador to Algeria, by A. Merad and K. Mahrez of EL WATAN; place and date not given: "An Interview With His Excellency the Japanese Ambassador to Algeria: 'Algeria Has the Means to Make It'"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Mr. Hayakawa Teruo, the Japanese ambassador to Algeria, understands Algeria’s position, based on principle, with regard to the issue of its foreign debt and her refusal to reschedule. That already means that the Land of the Rising Sun is ready to step up its financial cooperation with Algeria, especially if her leaders manage to solve the major financial problems facing the country in the next two or three years. Mr. Teruo is “almost certain” that this is possible.

[EL WATAN] A large part of Algeria’s foreign debt is owed to Japan. How do you view the management of this debt by the Algerian authorities? Can we hope there will be “extensions” granted by the Japanese banks?

[Teruo] The largest share of Algeria’s private debt is owed to France. Japan is in second place. With regard to the Algerian position on the issue of the debt, it is understood by our financial authorities. The Algerian Government does not anticipate rescheduling and [its] authorities have reiterated this firm position on several occasions. This is a position that is entirely understood by our country.

[EL WATAN] Right, Japanese bankers do not like it at all when debtor countries reschedule.

[Teruo] I cannot tell you that because there are a lot of countries that resort to rescheduling, but our position is that the country that contracts a debt should respect its obligations. This is a position that is recognized internationally. Algeria is a country that guarantees and respects its obligations; this position is well understood. We cannot bring such an understanding to countries that agree to reschedule.

As to eventual “extensions,” you know that last March Japan took part in the reprofiling operation initiated by the Credit Lyonnais worth a total of $1.5 billion.

Private Japanese banks had a 60 percent share in the overall amount of the operation. Our private banks are following Algeria’s financial situation closely and working with the private banks in other countries that are also interested in Algeria’s financial situation. Our private banks are waiting and following the situation.


[Teruo] Our oil companies are interested in taking part in increasing Algeria’s gas production capacity because gas is a major source of energy for the future, it may be much more important than petroleum owing to environmental problems. Today, on the issue of purchasing Algerian gas, the geographic distance between the two countries poses a problem owing to the high cost of transport. For these reasons, Japan is not in a position to purchase Algerian gas but can help to increase production capacities.

[EL WATAN] What view do you have of the situation in Algeria?

[Teruo] I shall give a very personal answer, not an ambassador’s answer. You know, stability is a fairly relative concept. Compared with Japan, Algeria is not a stable country but compared with certain African countries, Algeria is a stable country. It is still difficult to say absolutely whether a country is stable or not.

[EL WATAN] What interpretation do you have of this notion of a “high-risk country” in economic terms?

[Teruo] Here too, opinions can differ according to surveys of risk calculation statistics. According to certain sources, Algeria is a risky country but according to other sources, the opinion is different. I cannot tell you absolutely that Algeria is a high-risk country.

But unfortunately, because of this accumulation of foreign debt, Algeria can be categorized as a country with few risks. But, since your leaders say that the economic crisis will only last two to three years, and since the whole world knows you have vast natural wealth and major economic potential, the Mediterranean countries of Europe are becoming intensely interested in Algeria.

Japanese traders and businessmen are also interested by Algeria.

So in the short term, the next two to three years, there are many financial problems, but if your country succeeds in overcoming these difficulties, there will be a very promising future and many prospects for economic development.

[EL WATAN] Commercial relations between Algeria and Japan seem to be operating at low speed. What is the reason for that?

[Teruo] Right, but you know there’s the problem of geographic distance, which makes transport costs very high. If your country manages to reform her economic structures, in the future there may be Algerian products that could be sold on the Japanese market. Beyond strictly commercial relations, there are close financial relations and a great interest on the part of Japanese businesses in developing your hydrocarbons industry. Commercial relations are a bit limited, but economic relations are important.

[EL WATAN] How does Japan analyze the development of Islamic fundamentalism in the Maghreb?
I'm not an expert on religious issues, but I believe at the heart of this Islamist movement there is an uneasiness over the Gulf between Western civilization and Muslim civilization; perhaps the Islamic fundamentalists want to make up for this delay in development using Islamism. I'm not certain, but that might be their notion. I think that to make up for technological and economic delay, religion is not the best means. The solution is to be found in expanding technology and economic and financial structures.

Correct, but fundamentalism aims at combating and destroying those Western values...

I think that today's world needs to exchange cultural, economic, etc., values. All countries are interdependent. Then too, you need harmonious relations. The clash of different civilizations does not solve international problems.

So when religion is too mixed in with economic or political problems, there will be more confusion and more difficulties finding solutions to international problems; that's a personal opinion.

Japan has been making known its intention to have more of a presence on the international stage. How does she anticipate doing so?

The international community currently faces two big challenges: keeping the peace using the United Nations, and problems of poverty, the environment, refugees, health, and demographic growth. These are new problems and Japan wants to help solve them.

Does Japan want to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council?

Our foreign minister once said that the UN Security Council might need reforms.

In the future Japan might become a permanent member of the UN Security Council and she is getting ready to take part in this structural reform of the United Nations.

Regional Affairs

Country Said Iran's Primary Target
93AF0503B Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French 15 Mar 93 p 1

[Article by Mounir Zeroual: "The Iranian Fifth Column; Algeria, the First Target"—first paragraph is ALGER REPUBLICAIN introduction]

According to a Khalq mohajedine leader, "for the Iranian mullahs, the only remaining way to cover up for their failures at home is to export the Khomeynist revolution."

In the eyes of the mullahs, creating a diversion by making people believe that the Khomeynist revolution can be exported appears to be the best way to counter the dissent that has been welling up in the country for some time already. The goal is merely to make the Iranians believe that they have a universal mission to accomplish, so that they will overlook the increasingly worrying deterioration of the domestic situation. The Islamic republics of the former USSR, Egypt, Tunisia, and especially Algeria, are the Iranians' targets.

In an interview with APS, Dr. Sanabargh Zahedi, the Khalq Mojahedin Organization's international relations secretary, stated that Algeria is targeted more than any other country. Besides, Iranian officials are not troubled by shame or even diplomacy when they talk about Algeria. In this respect, the mullahs' rejoicing after Boudiaf's assassination, and their frank statements that they will assist the Islamists in their attempts to destroy the State speak for themselves.

The Algerian Government merely answered in kind when it decided, after much thought and deliberation, to reduce to "the strict minimum" Iran's diplomatic representation in Algiers.

To carry out its destructive projects, Iran relies on "strays" of all kinds whom it generously finances, and it has acquired an adequate structure. According to the mohajedins' official, it has created a fifth column, better known as the "El Qods Force," within the Iranian Revolution Guard.

This force is organized into "special sections" in charge of operations in various countries where commandos are sent on terrorist missions, Mr. Zahedi explained to the APS, adding that when it becomes dangerous to travel the organization relies on "local terrorists."

"Wherever the El Qods Force cannot move in as a team, it proceeds by infiltration through individuals, either directly (in the former Soviet republics) or indirectly through local elements trained, equipped, and armed by the mullahs (in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan)," he stated.

That this force may have been involved in the Algiers airport bombing can also not be ruled out. The weekly JEUNE AFRIQUE, quoting "reliable sources," disclosed in this respect that two Iranians bearing false Algerian passports were arrested in France 48 hours after the bombing.

A coordination system involving the Iranian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Islamic Propaganda as well as the intelligence departments, was set up to ensure that the operations carried out by the El Qods Force would have every chance of succeeding.

When it comes to sowing death and terror, the mullahs, who sent 13-year-old children to the front, do so with forethought and scrupulous care.

Belkhadem Explains Position Toward Iran
93AF0535B Algiers LIBERTE in French 7 Apr 93 p 1

[Article by Lotfi Khiari: "Accused of Collusion With Iran, Mr. Belkhadem Explains Himself"]

Challenged by the press, which also accused him of having been in the pay of the Iranian regime, the former APN [People's National Assembly] chairman takes exception to all the allegations that may have been
made against him, stating that he loves Algeria too much to yield to the temptation of “any maneuver against my country.”

Backing this with statements, Mr. Abdelaziz Belkhadem even considered that the Algerian Government has a duty to “do more than merely break diplomatic relations with Iran” because, he said, “breaking relations will not prevent them from doing us harm.”

Islam, he added, “allows us to answer and defend ourselves when we are attacked.” Concerning the country’s present situation, Mr. Belkhadem maintained that “only a frank dialogue, in which all of the country’s political forces take part, can defuse it.” The Islamist factor, he said, is “unavoidable,” and he added: “It is a genuine political force which is there, which exists, and cannot be ignored.” At any rate, he considered, “it is for the people to choose which kind of society they want.”

If some political formations keep attacking the prime minister and calling for his resignation, it is, according to Mr. Belkhadem, because of considerations that have nothing to do with the social and economic policy advocated by the present government. “The moment Mr. Abdesselem told what he thought of the proponents of secularism and assimilation, the very people who at first supported him then turned against him.” According to Mr. Belkhadem, the prime minister should have the support of all political formations, especially at the present stage: “the country’s credibility is at stake.”

Speaking about security, the former APN chairman agreed with some political formations, estimating that “the army must keep out of the fray” and “leave law and order to the security departments that are usually responsible for it.” Nevertheless, he qualified this statement by indication that “anyhow, the army must retain a foothold in politics.”

An influential FLN [National Liberation Front] member, Mr. Belkhadem considers that his party “has a great future” and that, as far as criticism aimed at the current FLN leadership is concerned, “the militants and the congress will decide.”

Kebir ‘Using’ Iranian Passport; German Role
93AF0503A Algiers EL WATAN in French
20 Mar 93 pp 1, 3

[Article by Mohamed Lamine: “Kebir: An Iranian Passport”—first two paragraphs are EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Senhadri, Liabes Fliche... The fundamentalists have gone on to the next stage in their determination to take power or burn Algeria.

They now attack the country’s intellectuals. This is not by chance. They thus show that they are Algeria’s enemies and, as such, mere mercenaries in the service of third parties.

First, one observation: the Islamists have become more violent since Ali Ben Hadj, from his prison, ordered his supporters to step up their criminal activities, and since an international terrorist conference was convened on the eve of the month of Ramadan by the mullahs who have become the actual orchestrators of worldwide organized crime with religious connotations. The conference was held in military barracks, far from prying eyes and ears, and the “delegates,” from every part of the world, were not allowed to go anywhere, even in Tehran.

Special attention was given, in particular, to the strategy to be used to destabilize the Arab world. The dirty work is to be done mostly by the Khartoum regime.

According to the Iranian opposition, the Algerian delegation to the meeting consisted, among others, of Rabah Kebir, Oussama Madama (Abassi’s son), Kerbane, and Anouar Haddam, who took this opportunity to place themselves totally at the mullahs’ disposal in order to carry out their policy.

Since this conference, Rabah Kebir has been travelling with an Iranian diplomatic passport, and Anouar Haddam has made many trips throughout the world to propagandize the Iranian regime. Haddam is not afraid of contradictions. He denounces the republican state but has no qualms taking advantage of the benefits it offers.

Last year, while he was touring Europe and the United States, long-duration illness medical certificates signed by members of his family were given to the USTHB [expansion not given] physics institute where he was teaching, to cover up his absences and thus able him to go on drawing his salary. That gives you an idea of these people’s moral standards. What is surprising in all this is the negative attitude of the German Government, although it will—and with good reason—ban neo-Nazi groups who advocate violence. Actually, the Bonn government is getting increasingly tolerant of Islamist fundamentalist activities on its territory.

Taking advantage of the German Government leniency and of the facilities offered by German laws and regulations, an increasing number of Islamist organizations are expanding their activities from that country. Especially in the case of the former FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], most terrorist leaders abroad, such as Rabah Kebir, Kerbane, and lesser known individuals like Chaiti and Benenni, make frequent stays in Germany. Others, such as Abassi Madani’s relatives, have settled there as “refugees” after leaving Algeria through Morocco.

Currently, there are 200 Algerian Islamist fundamentalists in Germany, most of whom claim to be persecuted and, as such, ask for “political asylum,” which offers them many material benefits.

Considering the fluidity of European borders and the ease with which they can be crossed, we must acknowledge that Algerian fundamentalists come and go unchecked and unhindered. Militants of the former FIS seem to prefer settling and travelling in the area extending from Alsace-Lorraine (France) to Belgium and Germany.
In particular, Algerian fundamentalists have settled in the towns of Neunled, Kaiserslautern, Stuttgart, and Mannheim, with the German Government's blessing. In Germany, militants of the former FIS maintain close relations with Iranian and Turkish fundamentalists, and get financial and material support from the Tehran government. The latter deals mostly with Rabah Kebrir, who is currently staying in Soest, a small town near Dortmund, and who has become an acknowledged agent of the Iranian secret services. With all the complicities it finds throughout the world, the former FIS cannot be said to be a purely Algerian product, especially if one considers the questionable past of many of its leaders.

‘Israeli’ Uzis Seized; Possible Ties Discussed 93AF0035D Algiers EL WATAN in French 10 Apr 93 pp 1, 3

[Article by Mohamed Lamine: “They Are Killing With Israeli Weapons”—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] For the second time in 20 days or so, security services seized Israeli Uzi submachine guns that were used in attacks, first at Bouhnezouli and then in the Algiers area. The appearance in our country of this weapon, a favorite of terrorists and gangsters all over the world, cannot fail to arouse much concern.

Who supplied Algerian terrorists with such a weapon, and how was it shipped to them? It was either the manufacturer itself, i.e. Israel, or the terrorists’ backers, i.e. Iran, which has notoriously become the leader of the terrorist international.

Let’s look at the first assumption. Israel is known to have encouraged the expansion of fundamentalism in the Middle East, because it sees it as a regressive force which, if it can establish itself in the Arab world, will act as a brake on the latter’s development. Strange as it may seem, the fundamentalists feel the same way about Israel. During the war in Afghanistan, they considered that “liberating” that country from the pro-Soviet government was more important than liberating Jerusalem.

For them, Kabul was more “holy” than Jerusalem. Besides, no fundamentalist—whether Algerian, Moroccan, Egyptian, Syrian, or Saudi—ever died for the capital of Palestine, whereas thousands of Arabs were killed on behalf of Afghan chiefs. It is true that Algerian terrorists think it is more courageous to murder a 21-year-old girl and other defenseless Algerian citizens or to shoot at an ambulance than to face Israeli soldiers.

At its apogee, the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] did open a roll of volunteers to liberate Palestine, and Ali Benhidj was the first one to enroll, but so far no FIS militant has actually fought the Zionists.

Zionists are not quite as much their enemies as Algerian citizens.

It is impossible to maintain that there is, especially as such relations can exist only through other channels. At the end of the month of Ramadan, wild rumors about a military coup spread throughout the country. They were spread by the propaganda apparatus of the former FIS. However, the news was first broadcast by Israeli radio, which was immediately relayed by the French-Moroccan Medi-I station and by France-Info. If not Israel, who could have supplied the Uzi submachine guns to the MIA?

In time, it was observed that many leaders of the former FIS do not trouble themselves with scruples and are willing to serve foreign powers. Rabah Kebrir, for instance, who currently has found refuge in Germany, is one of them. He now travels with an Iranian passport.

Before the month of Ramadan, together with Abassi Madani’s son Oussama and other militants of the former FIS, he attended a meeting of the terrorist international in a Teheran barracks. At the meeting, a decision was made to intensify the terrorist struggle in the Arab world. The Iranians will take care of financing and logistics.

They put $3 million at Kebrir’s disposal, an amount that many Algerian fundamentalists envy. It was only after this meeting in Tehran that Israeli submachine guns entered Algeria. How? The Iranians bought thousands of Uzis during the war with Iraq, as was disclosed during the IranGate scandal.

In international relations, a weapon producer will forbid its customer to resell its product to a third party without the producer’s prior authorization. Therefore, the Iranians delivered Uzis to their Algerian mercenaries only after obtaining the agreement of Tel Aviv. How? There are two possibilities: the Algerian-Moroccan border or the Algerian-Libyan border. In both cases, infiltration can occur without the neighbor government’s knowledge.

Unfortunately, there are facts that look suspicious. The Moroccan Government is deadly afraid of fundamentalists. To prevent its expansion, it decided to come to terms with its orchestrator. In 1991, the Moroccan secret services signed an agreement with their Iranian counterparts, under which Morocco became a transit territory for fundamentalists from African countries. In exchange, Tehran agreed not to promote the emergence of Moroccan terrorism.

Actually, since then, many Algerian “Afghan veterans” have gone back home via Morocco. For its part, the Oran special court just tried “Afghan veterans” who admitted that they had returned to Algeria via Casablanca.

It is hard to believe that they could elude the Moroccans’ perspicacity in one of the world’s foremost police states. It is true also that the Algerian-Moroccan border is like a sieve, allowing all kinds of traffics.

It is because it is so permeable that Algerian black marketeers have become powerful enough to threaten the State’s stability, especially since they have become the fundamentalists’ allies. Perhaps trafficking in Uzi
submachine guns is their new line of business. Like their fundamentalist accomplices, they do not care about the impact of their activities on the country’s stability.

**Uzi Machine Guns, Scorpions Taken During Raid**

93AF0535E Algiers EL WATAN in French
10 Apr 93 p 3

[Unattributed article: “‘Uzi’: An Israeli Weapon in Terrorists’ Hands”]

[Text] A set of nine submachine guns—four Uzis and five Scorpions—recovered during antiterrorist operations was presented to the press on Thursday by the national gendarmerie command.

Two silencers for the Scorpions and 9-mm and 7.65-mm cartridges were also shown. The weapons and ammunition shown were recovered in Meflah, Larbaa, and Bouguzeul, the same source indicated.

The gendarmerie command indicated that these weapons, “easy to handle and formidable,” and used by international terrorist, organized crime, and drug trafficker networks, appeared in Algeria early in February, at a time when terrorist networks had suffered considerable losses as a result of the raids organized by security forces. It was pointed out that the idea of introducing this new type of weapons, designed for urban guerrilla warfare, “did not originate with domestic terrorist networks, but with outside forces” who wish to reactivate these networks following their failed attempt to create an underground movement.

According to the gendarmerie’s explanations, the weapons recovered do not bear serial numbers. This type of weapons, it was indicated, is used in “clandestine operations.”

The Uzi (9-mm caliber) is made in Israel. It can use 20-, 25-, or 32-cartridge clips. The Scorpion (7.65 mm) is manufactured in Yugoslavia under license and can use 20- or 25-cartridge clips.

The Uzi submachine guns and the 9-mm cartridges shown bore the acronym IMI, which means “Israel Military Industries.”

The gendarmerie command indicated that an investigation is in progress to determine how many weapons of this type are in circulation in Algeria and how they were introduced into the country. (APS)

**Internal Affairs**

**National Plan: Priority Activities Listed**

93AF0535A Algiers LIBERTE in French 7 Apr 93 p 4

[Unattributed article: “Something New in the National Plan; List of 45 So-Called ‘Priority’ Activities”; first paragraph is LIBERTE introduction.

[Text] Following circular No. 625 of 18 August 1992 on foreign trade, which identified three types of products:

- **products the importation of which is prohibited;**
- **products the importation of which is authorized, but not financed by bank either through credit lines or in cash;**

here is a new list of 45 activities that have been declared “priority” activities in the 1993 national plan that was published on Tuesday 6 April by the Ministry of Economy.

1. Land development: drainage, cleanup, root and rock removal, enrichment, windbreak planting, hillside ponds, and irrigation systems.

2. Agricultural activities and livestock farming on land, replacement, development.

3. Drilling for water.


5. Industrial crops: oil-producing grains, industrial tomatoes, tobacco, and cotton.

6. Industrial reforestation.

7. Water treatment, purification, and recycling, solid waste recycling (exclusive of reprocessing activities) and liquid and gas effluent recycling.

8. Infrastructures and rural equipment constructions related to agricultural production: land improvement, animal housing, and extension of utility networks to the plots.

9. Hardy plantations and palm tree plantations.

10. Agricultural activities.

11. Grinding of cereals and oil-producing grains, crude food oil production, food oil refining, yeast production, and food sugar refining.

12. Electric power production and public supply.

13. Natural gas public supply.

14. Water production and public supply.

15. Related research and exploration in the branches of mining (mining and geological prospecting) and energy, including oil and gas, and in priority activities.

16. Iron and steel making and basic metallurgy: steelworks, industrial refining and nonferrous metals, rolling mills, foundries, dam pressure pipelines, seamless pipes, welded steel pipes.

17. Production of fertilizers, tires, basic petrochemicals, synthetic fibers, and inks: phosphoric acid, phosphate, nitrate, and organic fertilizers, methyltertiobutylether (MTBE), tires and inner tubes, resins and polymers, synthetic fibers, inks, industrial gases, woven polypropylene bags.

18. Mining and quarrying activities (exclusive of aggregates and marble) and development (extraction and processing) of mineral raw materials (exclusive of pottery, decorative, or metallic objects).
19. Production of cements, red-clay products, and silico-
calcareous bricks.
20. Glass industry: flat glass, cathode-ray tubes, incan-
descent lamps, automotive glass, bottles, laboratory
  glassware, optical glass.
21. Drug industry and heavy medical equipment manu-
  facturing: biological products, serums, vaccines, drugs,
  contraceptive products, veterinary products, heavy med-
  ical equipment.
22. Durable goods manufacturing: engines and engine
  components, transmissions, sealed compressor units,
  construction equipment, agricultural machinery (tract-
  ors and combines), power transformers, production
  equipment for the manufacturing industries, machine-
  tools and production equipment for craftsmen and fis-
  hers, railroad equipment, washing and handling equip-
  ment, fishing boats.
23. Production of industrial vehicles and passenger cars.
24. Production of measurement and control apparatus
  and instruments (metrology).
25. Production of molds and dies.
26. Production of equipment for the handicapped
   (simple wheelchairs for the disabled, brain-actuated
   motors, and motor-powered minicars).
27. Railroad transportation.
28. Infrastructures for the strategic storage of cereals.
29. Infrastructures for the strategic storage and transpor-
  tation of oil and gas products.
30. Cold storage of seed and seedlings.
31. Industrial maintenance and overhaul.
32. Ship repairing.
33. Artisanal production and services, including arts and
   crafts.
34. Construction of public housing projects.
35. Telecommunications: switching, transmission, urban
   networks, including civil engineering (lines, pylons), and
   related buildings.
36. Production of school and educational materials (lab-
   oratory supplies and small school or educational instru-
   ments).
37. Production of a cultural, artistic, scientific, or peda-
   gogical nature, including publishing (publishing of pre-
   school, school, and college-level books), production of
   films and television programs.
38. Tourist industry: hotels and tourism and water-cure
   complexes.
39. Production of musical instruments and sports equip-
   ment.
40. Small and midsize industries in zones to be pro-
   moted.
41. Basic and applied research activities and research-
    and-development activities.
42. Youth cooperatives created under the DIPJ [expansion
    not given].
43. Financial leasing activities.
44. Work to restore or preserve historical or archeolog-
    ical sites and classified cultural property.
45. Distributing service for the written press of a
    national character.

En-Nahda Leader on Resolution of Crisis
93AF0502B Algiers LIBERTE in French 21 Mar 93 p 7
[Interview with En-Nahda leader Abdellah Djaballah, by
Z. Aliou-Salah; place and date not given: "The Lack of
A Legitimate Government Is the Cause of the Crisis"—
first paragraph is LIBERTE introduction]
[Text] The leader of the En-Nahda [Awakening] Islamic
movement, Abdellah Djaballah has the knack of
answering without giving an answer. It is no easy task to
extract clear positions from him. Nevertheless, he still
insists that the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] must take
part in the dialogue; violence is to blame on others. The
rest: a vast tautology.
[LIBERTE] What is your position concerning the recent
assassinations and murders?
[Djaballah] Our movement has always rejected assassina-
tion as a way to solve political differences. Today, our
movement reaffirms its refusal to fall into such a dan-
gerous precipice.
This is why we are insistent in our appeals to the
government to change the methods they use to overcome
the current security crisis.
We do so by studying the causes that led to insecurity
while attempting to resolve them with the courage that
will preserve, for society, the rule of law and the political
rights of individuals.
[LIBERTE] Would you comment on the refusal of some
parties to take part in the dialogue?
[Djaballah] Our movement considers that every party or
organization has the right to adopt the position it deems
to be in accordance with its ideological and political
orientations and in the country's best interest.
Nevertheless, En-Nahda wishes that all political and
civil forces and trends would take part in the dialogue,
because the situation of the country calls for the mobi-
lization of all of society's energies in order to find
objective solutions to the present crisis.
[LIBERTE] What means would you advocate to over-
come the crisis?
[Djaballah] After studying the HCE [Higher State
Council] agenda, we consider that the present multifirm
 crisis is the result of the lack of a legitimate government,
the deterioration of social order as a whole, and the
stranglehold of the francophiles on the centers of decision and influence over public opinion.

This is why the dialogue must absolutely look for adequate means to remedy these causes. We estimate that the solutions that we presented during the first round of the dialogue are adequate to solve the various crises that the country is experiencing, and first of all the political, security, and economic crises.

[LIBERTE] You said that the agenda is not acceptable. Do you have something else to propose?

[Djaballah] The agenda proposed by the HCE focuses on only one aspect of the crisis, an important aspect certainly, but that is not enough. It would not be wise to expose our views before taking part in the dialogue.

[LIBERTE] Why is it that Islamic parties cannot manage to unite although they have the same objective?

[Djaballah] Plurality and diversity of opinions are the very essence of Islam. Nevertheless, the diversity of opinions and points of view must be governed by rules that turn it into a blessing rather than a source of conflicts.

The right to one's own opinion and the duty to help others make it possible to agree on common and complementary concepts.

[LIBERTE] Some parties estimate that dialogue cannot succeed without the participation of the former FIS. What is your position?

[Djaballah] This question concerns first of all the government and the FIS.

Our movement has always been, and will remain, convinced of the need to dialogue with all the partners and political forces present on the national scene.

En-Nahda was the first movement to ask that problems be settled through dialogue.

In our opinion, that is the best way.

[LIBERTE] According to your movement, which parties want to sabotage the dialogue, and which are the neo-assimilationists?

[Djaballah] The parties that oppose the dialogue and want to keep Algeria under a well-established government are those that call for Westernization and secularization, those that advocate a break with national constants and with the proponents of authenticity and modernity.

These parties have spoken openly, and there is no need to name them; they are known. In our opinion, this trend threatens to shatter national unit, to westernize what is authentic and return to a state of dependence, and to replace freedom with despotism.

[LIBERTE] What do you think of the government's attitude toward the opposition and of Sassi Lamouri's statements?

[Djaballah] The government's attitude does not take into account the nature of the political, social, and psychological changes that have occurred in Algerian society and throughout the world.

This ignorance is one of the factors of the government's inability to overcome the crisis. We would like them to give up this approach, which goes counter to the changes that are taking place, and to get rid of hangups and ideological waste.

[LIBERTE] The CCN [National Consultative Council] constitutes a point of dissension between the HCE and the parties. What is En-Nahda's opinion?

[Djaballah] You should know that since President Chadli resigned, and since the constitution of the HCE and the CCN was announced, we have expressed reservations in this respect, in a letter dated 30 September 1992.

However, our movement considers that it is useful to review the composition of the present CCN.

Government Management of Crisis Criticized

93AF0522A Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French 4 Apr 93 p 1

[Commentary by Faycal b. Medjahed]

[Text] We are inventing new concepts, new enemies, and new (but old) anticommunist diversions the better to obscure the essential: the commitment to a republic, elimination of the financial-political "mafia" that hides itself behind a pseudoreligious veil.

We are even coming around reluctantly to the conviction that this government is incapable of meeting the needs of the nation and the state. Unless, perhaps, it has simply and completely been overtaken by the popular demands of the modern era; if that is the case, the people should give consider the mitigating circumstances and afford it an honorable exit.

One must not think that the general public, which shares this point of view, is opposed in principle to its rulers; it is merely opposed to the way they are managing the crisis that is racking the country.

On the one hand, citizens can see that the patriots in uniform are discharging their duty to the nation honorably and clear-sightedly, their security responsibilities with increasing skill and determination—unlike the civilian authorities (the executive, in other words), who seem unable to read the music. What law or mandate gives officials named without their consent the right to impose their personal views by taking over and monopolizing the machinery of state and the government communications media?

All over the country this disturbs and offends the conscience of Algerians from every walk of life, who are much more concerned about the crimes of fundamentalists, the economic morass, soaring inflation, the trafficking in contraband, the problems of state-owned and private enterprises, endemic unemployment, the future
of their children, social injustices, persistent political immorality, the resurgence of banditry...

A government's first duty is to take action on problems of this sort, not to legislate morality, television "bendir" in hand. The people need men of action, not orators. That was also one lesson that came out of the 1954 revolution.

Significance of Liabes Assassination Discussed
93AF0502C Algiers EL WATAN in French
17 Mar 93 pp 1, 2

[Unattributed commentary: "Escalation"]

[Text] A major shock for Algeria: Djilali Liabes, one of the most prominent personalities of the Algerian scientific world was assassinated yesterday as he left his home. That same day, the minister of labor and social affairs, Tahar Hamdi, survived an attempt against his life; two days before, a veritable trap was set for Habib Chawkii; fortunately, it was dismantled in time by the security services.

This escalation in crime, which translated in particular into the murderous attack against Hafid Senhadri, on Sunday, clearly shows that terrorists are stepping up their criminal operations by targeting their victims more selectively. They have decided from now on to attack the patriotic Algerian elite, the carriers and guarantees of a society project resolutely geared to progress, modernism, and universalism—which, by the way, was precisely personified by the late Liabes. Actually, this terrorism, which is far from blind in these circumstances, is targeting this useful, upright, and competent Algeria, which is deeply nationalistic and proud of its values, which opposes the fundamentalist scheme that the criminal residues of the former FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] want to impose at all costs, and especially through violence, murder, and generalized disorder.

By eliminating Djilali Liabes, one of the most brilliant scientific figures, the terrorists wanted to destroy a man who was a symbol, on whom rested so many hopes to give Algeria a new life, and especially a guarantee of success, if the Algerians would only recover their sense of organization and solidarity.

The Algeria that Liabes represented was Algeria itself, hard working, intelligent, in other words a country and a people possessing a huge potential to overcome a multi-form crisis...without remaining excessively dependent on foreign countries. But this is where the main stakes lie, the reason that the fundamentalists of the former FIS, acting as instruments of their Iranian, Sudanese, and other masters, desperately try to return in their favor, leaving ashes behind them, nothing but ashes. After the plot against Mohamed Boudiaf, who understood the facts of Algerian life, they have now eliminated a renowned researcher who, for his part, was also working at a prospective plan likely to provide all the conditions required for Algeria's development.

Algerians must now face the sad reality. The country is in danger because foreign forces want to maintain it in a perpetual state of destabilization, the better to control it. Or rather to control its mineral resources, including gas reserves that are among the largest in the world. In this strategy, the dissolved FIS's part is to do the dirty work by trying to create permanent unrest punctuated by assassinations. The fundamentalists thus pursue well-defined objectives, one of the most important being to weaken the regenerating potential of Algerian creativity and genius. Will the country's patriotic forces allow themselves to be overcome so easily? If the government truly wants to establish democracy, which is the only way to save Algeria, it must imperatively rely, without any mental reservations on these forces that have not yet said their last word—in particular by renouncing its selective struggle against terrorism.

Political Parties React to Liabes Assassination
93AF0504C Algiers EL WATAN in French 17 Mar 93 p 3

[Unattributed article: "(Political) Parties Indignant"]

[Text] The assassination yesterday of Mr. Djilali Liabes has provoked the total indignation, anger, and condemnation of this act, which has been called hateful and horrible.

For the "Ettahadi" Movement, "It is a dramatic thing to state that the State cannot protect citizens and leading figures who are in the firing line of Muslim fundamentalism. And rightly so: the government, which is busy talking to intermediaries of the terrorists, in this instance the Hamas and al-Nahdah fundamentalist parties, as well as to apologists for the National Liberation Front [FLN] and other groups, and that does not want to be disturbed in this suicidal process, is dangerously reproducing the increased power of fundamentalist violence and thus bears a heavy responsibility in the face of the deterioration of the security situation, the political situation, and the future."

"Faced with these extremely dangerous developments, patriotic and democratic forces, wherever they may be, have the most pressing duty to weigh in with all their force to force a halt to the suicidal process [now] under way:"

1) An end must be put to the "talking" masquerade, which is nothing but a screen masking the successive pullbacks and unceasing concessions by the Higher State Council [HCE] to the fundamentalist movement and the politico-financial mafia.

2) An end must be put immediately to the Abdesselam government, which is attempting to hide the pitiful failure of its policy these last eight months behind politicians' efforts to patch together odd political alliances that are doomed from the start, whose only aim is to conquer and divide up power.

3) It is absolutely urgent to immediately form a republican fighting government, which is capable of leading
and implementing a determined policy of radical change to reform and preserve the republic, to lay down and establish the foundations of a modern, democratic state, and thus respond to the immediate demands of a history which has been forcefully imposed on today's Algeria.

4) Quickly establish conditions to set up new political, state institutions for a republican, democratic transition, which will condition both the political success of the planned referendum, their credibility, and their efficiency." [quotation mark as published] For its part, the Algerian Renewal Party [PRA] was stunned to learn of Mr. Djilali Liabes's assassination and with emotion remembered the memory of that affable, distinguished, and warm man. With the same sentiments, the PRA condemned the attack on Mr. Senhadri and expressed the wish that he be able to return to the love of his loved ones as soon as possible and to his public duties.

"By once again denouncing terrorism as a means of political action," the PRA cannot help but remind those in power "that no sufteruge will bring peace and stability back to Algeria as long as the people have not given their full consent to those who govern them."

For its part, the Front of Socialist Forces [FFS] strongly condemned this criminal act. It mourned the memory of the victim and expressed its compassion to its family.

"The FFS remains convinced that only a total, democratic, and peaceful solution will be able to halt the shedding of blood."

For the Rally for Culture and Democracy [RCD], "In the wake of killings of agents of law and order and killings of soldiers in the hundreds, fundamentalism is moving toward assassinating Algerian professionals."

"Messrs. Senhadri and Liabes are the victims of this new murderous strategy."

"The international fundamentalist [movement] has decided to attack those who run certain target states in order to conquer their societies."

"Algeria is one of those special targets of the international Islamic [movement]."

"It is up to every person to make up his mind and take a stance based on these facts."

"Islam belongs to all of us and no one can assume any special position on the subject and not be an accomplice of the murders which result when religion is politically manipulated."

For its part, the party of the Alliance for Justice and Liberty (AJL) solidly denounced this hateful criminal act, "which this time was directed at a man of science and learning, a researcher and a high-level professional."

The AJL believes that with this act, violence is attacking the university community which is a symbol of hope, progress, and knowledge.

As for the Algerian Movement for Justice and Development [MAJD], it recorded with sorrow and concern the fact that, despite the holiness of the month of Ramadan and the retention of the state of emergency and the curfew, the cycle of violence has not slackened in intensity.

"Recent attacks on the founding president of the ANCAP and the INESG [expansions not given] director general can only give rise to indignation and the condemnation of all those who have rejected using violence as a means of political expression." The MAJD paid its respects to the victims. "This new development again tells the government of the need to eliminate from its talks all political calculation and any unspoken intention so as to make possible the implementation of a national solution to the multiform crisis affecting the country," the MAJD said.

Perpetrators of Attacks Against Hamdi, Flici

Attack on Tahar Hamdi

93AF0521A Algiers LIBERTE in French 3 Apr 93 p 2

[Transcript of interrogation broadcast on Algerian television news at 2000 on 2 April: "Confessions of 6 Suspects in Attack on Mr. Tahar Hamdi, Minister for Labor and Social Affairs"]

[Text] 1. Malaoui Sid Ali, born on 20 January 1961, merchant, resides in Mahieddine housing project #3:

[Question] You're a member of the group.

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] How long have you been one?


[Question] Your political affiliation?

[Answer] None: I was in the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]. Now that it's dissolved, I don't have any political preference.

[Question] What was your position in the FIS?

[Answer] I was a sympathizer.

[Question] Your role in the association where you were active?

[Answer] It was a charitable association, called "El bir oua el Ihene."

[Question] What did you do in the association?

[Answer] I wasn't deeply involved. All I did was help out. The association was started two or three years ago.

[Question] Did it grow?

[Answer] Yes. Some people dropped out. Others replaced them. Some of them are even in prison now. They were the people who perverted the association to other ends.

[Question] What happened to the association?

[Answer] It used to be a charitable association. It was turned into a terrorist association.
[Question] When?

[Question] Who was its leader in the last part of 1992?
[Answer] It was Haddar Lyes.

[Question] And there were others along with him?
[Answer] Yes, Katout Mouloud and Haddada Rachid.

[Question] How many active members were there?
[Answer] Twenty-five to 30 people.

[Question] Where is the group now?
[Answer] Most of them are in prison.

[Question] You were among the last to be arrested?
[Answer] Yes.

[Question] You yourself belong to this group here, and this is the terrorist group of Mahieddhine?
[Answer] Yes, we all belong to the same group.

[Question] Tell us about the terrorist activities between 1991 and the present.
[Answer] In 1991 I wasn’t with them. There was the first group, now in prison. I was involved since late 1992. It was Haddar Lyes along with Hafdiri and Katout Mouloud who perpetrated the Mozart Street attack.

[Question] What terrorist acts has the group committed, in Algiers and elsewhere?
[Answer] There was the Mozart Street attack, where they fired on the police Golf [vehicle] and on another police vehicle in the environs of Martyr Square.

[Question] Did you participate in these operations?
[Answer] No.

[Question] Did the group commit robberies?
[Answer] I did not participate. I don’t know a lot about it. There were two thefts committed: one at Sidi Moussa, at ECM (Metal Construction Enterprise).

[Question] How much did they take?
[Answer] Considerably more than 60 million.

[Question] Who participated in that theft?
[Answer] They’re in prison: Haddar Lyes, Katout Mouloud, Haddada, Defairi, and another group I don’t know.

[Question] Were you familiar with the operation?
[Answer] The second operation was against a cement company near Hamiz. The amount was large: 60 to 100 million centimes.

[Question] Who participated in that operation?
[Answer] The same people as were in the first one.

[Question] Were you a member of a terrorist cell?

[Question] Who brought you in?
[Answer] The first group brought us in, to increase its numbers. Some of them (in the first group) are now in prison.

[Question] Who was the emir and his deputy?
[Answer] That was Rabache Ferhat, also known as “Abu Bakr.”

2. Rabache Ferhat, age 35, married, no children, teacher at Bab Ezzouar university:

[Question] What’s your salary?
[Answer] Nine thousand Algerian dinars.

[Question] Are you a member of the group?
[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Your rank?
[Answer] Emir.

[Question] You accepted this position?
[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Who is the deputy emir (question addressed to Sid-Ali)?
[Answer] That’s Railia Abdelkader.

[Question] And the others?
[Answer] There’s Said, Rachid, Toumi, Kheireddine (four people).

[Question] Where do you live?
[Answer] In the Mahieddhine project.

[Question] What operations did you plan?
[Answer] We are a new group. We didn’t start up until late 1992, early 1993.

[Question] Have you carried out any operations?
[Answer] Yes, the one against the labor minister.

[Question] When did you do it?
[Answer] During Ramadhan.

[Question] Who mounted, organized, and executed this operation?
[Answer] Dafdiri Mohamed.

[Question] Where is he?
[Answer] He’s on the run.

[Question] What exactly did he do?
[Answer] Dafdiri Med is being sought by the police and others. He met me and told me of an operation to be carried out. He told me to contact Boukache Boubaker. Once the contact was made, we met in a mosque. Dafdiri had the information and told us where to find the minister. He was already familiar with his habits.
[Question] Were you aware of preparations for the attack on the minister?

[Answer] Yes, I was informed shortly before the operation was executed. I was told they were going to kill a notable who was going to pass near the “Laymen’s Groups.” I didn’t know who it was.

[Question] Weren’t you afraid of shooting and killing civilians?

[Answer] I’m not a weapons expert. I only told them what had to be done.

[Question] Were you already at the scene of the attack (question addressed to Malaouli Sid Ali)?

[Answer] Yes, it was Dafdiri, Ghobab, and myself who knew what time the minister would be coming along.

[Question] How was the operation carried out?

[Answer] Those who participated were Ghraimia, Ghorab, Malaouli, Dafdiri, and Mana.

[Question] There were five of you?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Who stood guard?

[Answer] Ghraimia was below, watching the roads. His job was to watch for the minister’s vehicle and give us a hand signal as soon as it arrived.

[Question] Who was up above keeping lookout?

[Answer] That was Mana Youcef.

[Question] Where is he?

[Answer] Right here, beside me.

[Question] What was his role?

[Answer] To watch for the police and give us a hand signal.

[Question] Who fired at the minister’s vehicle when it passed by?

[Answer] Dekhdiri and then Ghorab.

[Question] And you?

[Answer] I fired directly at the target.

[Question] And afterward?

[Answer] It happened quickly. The police drew their guns on us. The two marksmen took flight around by the Laymen’s Groups through the forest.

[Question] How long did the operation take?

[Answer] At most, five minutes. We regrouped afterward at the Mahieddine project.

[Question] Who is we?

[Answer] Ghraimia, Mana, and Ghoras.

[Question] What was your assessment of the operation?

[Answer] We believed it was successful, since we were safe and sound and the minister was hit.

[Question] How many shots did you yourself fire?

[Answer] Three or four shots.

3. Youcef, age 35, married, Mahieddine project, painter at the American Embassy:

[Question] Did you participate in the operation?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Where were you positioned?

[Answer] At the upper end of the market.

[Question] Your job?

[Answer] To keep an eye on the police. It was Ghraimia who gave me the “khash” [Kalashnikov] and Dafdiri who procured the guns.

[Question] And after the attack?

[Answer] I gave my gun back to Ghraimia in the forest, in the same brown “caba” [box].

4. Ghraimia Abdelkader, 35, married, Mahieddine project.

5. Oussaid Rachid, born 22 February 1961 in Algiers, Mahieddine project Building 2, No. 15.

[Question] Did you know about the operation?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Were you a participant?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Why not?

[Answer] I never did my military service. I don’t know how to use a gun.

[Question] What was the political objective of the operation (question addressed to Ferhat Rebahe)?

[Answer] As far as I am concerned, the objective of the attack was to abort the political dialogue the government had started with the opposition.

**Attack on Laadi Flici**

93AF0521B Algiers LIBERTE in French 3 Apr 93 p 2

[Transcript of interrogation broadcast on Algerian television news at 2000 on 2 April. "Confessions of Members of Group That Perpetrated Attack on Dr. Laadi Flici"]

[Text] The judicial police have just laid hands on three terrorists implicated in the assassination of Dr. Laadi Flici on 24 March at his medical office at 24 Amara Ali Street, in the Casbah (Algiers); all are members of the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA), the armed wing of the ex-FIS. During an interrogation televised on the news at 2000 on 2 April, the three individuals confessed. Here’s exactly what was said:
1. Talara Hakim, born 7 January 1968 in Algiers, a tailor by trade.

[Question] What is your political affiliation?
[Answer] None, but I'm a member of the MIA.

[Question] What do you do in the MIA?
[Answer] I was in charge of delivering clothing and money [text missing] Kamel, the olive seller at Djamaa Lihoud (Editor's note: the Ketchaoua mosque).

[Question] Who was the clothing and money meant for?
[Answer] For "el-ikhoua" [brothers].

[Question] Which el-ikhoua?
[Answer] For the "el-moussallahine" [armed ones] el-ikhoua.

[Question] Your only role was to deliver clothing and money?
[Answer] Yes, but once they introduced me to two individuals: Ahmed and Hacene.

[Question] Where are they from?
[Answer] I don't know. Kamel knows.

[Question] How old are they?
[Answer] Not past 30.

[Question] Can you tell us what they looked like?
[Answer] Yes, one of them thin but tall, the other one short.

[Question] Bearded?
[Answer] No.

[Question] Why were you introduced to them?
[Answer] He told me to take care of them if they showed up some day.

[Question] Did they ever show up?
[Answer] Yes, three or four days later. They wanted a place to spend the night. So I went to Mohamed Slimani and asked him if he would put them up for the night. He agreed. After that, they went to him directly, without going through me.

[Question] What sort of relationship was there between Ahmed, Hacene, and Mohamed Slimani?
[Answer] They were very close; one day, I heard Ahmed tell Mohamed Slimani he had a "silencer."

[Question] What else did he have?
[Answer] He also used to walk around with a walkie-talkie.

[Question] How long have they been in the Casbah?
[Answer] Almost three months, since I met them.

[Question] Tell us how Ahmed, Hacene, and Slimani are connected to the assassination of Dr. Flici.

[Answer] The evening before the attack on Dr. Flici, I left as usual after eating and having my coffee. I went over to Slimani's place. I heard Hacene tell Slimani they were going to kill Dr. Flici.

[Question] Where did they spend that night?
[Answer] They didn't retire at all. They took a taxi and left.

2. Second individual interrogated.

[Question] Political affiliation?
[Answer] Islamic Salvation Front.

[Question] And today?
[Answer] I belong to the MIA group in the Casbah.

[Question] Your role in the MIA?
[Answer] I participated in two operations: the fire at the TNA [expansion not given], and the ambush on Bouzina Street.

[Question] Tell us the whole story.
[Answer] The arson at the TNA was planned by the group headed by Med Kheir and Toufik, who ordered setting fire to the TNA to draw the police.

[Question] What part did you play in that operation?
[Answer] I had two Molotov cocktails with me inside the TNA.

[Question] What did you do with the two bottles?
[Answer] I threw them into the rear part of the TNA.

[Question] Didn't you have anything else?
[Answer] Yes, a pistol.

[Question] What did you do with it?
[Answer] I never used it that day.

Figures on 'Terrorist' Attacks, Arrests

93AF0502A Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French 22 Mar 93 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Significant Figures"]

[Text] During the 40 days from 20 October to 31 December 1992, 907 people (including four women) were arrested as part of the fight against terrorism. They tend to be middle aged and to come from blackmarket circles. As far as sabotage is concerned, the sector most affected was that of telecommunications. Such are the conclusions of a study based on figures and published yesterday by the evening daily HORIZONS, here are some excerpts from this study:

...An analysis of the statistics of arrests made during the period from 20 October to 31 December 1992 (when the antiterrorist law was promulgated) shows that, in the 241 cases processed, 903 men and four women were arrested. This shows women's lack of participation in acts of terrorism.
As far as age is concerned, those arrested included nine individuals under 18, 143 aged 18 to 25, 483 aged 26 to 43, and 272 over 40.

These figures already draw a profile of the average terrorist, who is recruited mostly in the 26 to 43 age group. This is the age group that was most affected by the policy of exclusion of the eighties. This is the age group that suffered most from the lack of schools, housing, training, etc.

As far as occupations are concerned, we find 24 students, 163 civil servants, 170 clerical workers, 367 self-employed, and 183 unemployed.

Terrorists are recruited among the working population and far more frequently among the self-employed (black market). This is the category that evades the law. It is also the category that is out to make quick profits.

In this respect, the head of the gendarmerie reached the following conclusion: The phenomenon we are facing is not just political terrorism; it is also political subversion, when people try to take advantage of the situation. They are trying to destabilize the current State to institute a parasitical state.

Theft and extortion statistics indicate that there were 453 holdups, the victims being 85 public enterprises and organizations, 365 citizens, and 163 private and public vehicles.

An analysis of these figures shows that acts of terrorism threaten and affect mostly the citizens. This means that citizens do not support the movement. As for sabotage, it affects mostly the Post and Telecommunications. Of the 472 cases reported, 253 involved the Post and Telecommunications, 40 Sonelgaz [National Electricity and Gas Company], and 144 miscellaneous others. As is logical, the same official explained, acts of sabotage affect the most exposed infrastructures; the easiest act is the one that is preferred. As a rule, those who commit such acts belong to the circle of sympathizers in favor of supporting the movement. It is a way to implicate them... and to gain a hold on them.

Most Dangerous ‘Terrorists’ Said at Large
93AF0522B Algiers LIBERTE in French 1 Apr 93 p 3
[Article by Mounir Zeroual: “1,100 Terrorists Still at Large”]
[Text] Despite successive waves of arrests (3,800), despite the severe casualties they have suffered at the hands of the security forces (more than 230 killed since 5 December), 1,100 of them are still running loose.

“They” are the people trying to assassinate Algeria, selling their services to the heirs of the OAS [Secret Army Organization]. They are the ignoble individuals who with axes and daggers took the lives of the young “djounoud” [Arabic] in Boughezoul to confiscate their weapons.

They are also the sinister cowards who travel in packs to shoot lone gendarmes and policemen in the back or even attack members of their family. So long as they are at large, the odious beast of terrorism will continue to work its ravages, even though the public has let them know they cannot count on its complicity. Although the great majority have turned their backs on the Islamists, more active measures must be taken to isolate and defeat the sowers of death. The gendarmerie recently disclosed that some 1,100 of them are still on the loose. That is certainly a large and sobering number, one that should inspire the populace to renewed vigilance. The number of real or potential terrorists may be even larger, but the gendarmerie’s figure is at any rate less misleading than the figure given out by the minister of interior several months ago. When the antiterrorist law was promulgated, Mr. Hardi asserted that the terrorists’ lairs had been “identified” and “targeted.” And what can one say about his predecessor, Larbi Belkheir, who opined, in an interview with the weekly ALGERIE-ACTUALITE, that no more than 20 terrorists were still on the streets?

Months after those boastful statements, and despite the numerous successes credited to the security forces, more than a thousand terrorists are still at large. And that includes the most dangerous of them, the ones that pose the greatest threat to social order: men such as Abdelkader Cheboui, who bears the inglorious title of chief of the MIA [Armed Islamic Movement]; Said Mekhloufi, author of a tract on civil disobedience; Omar Elmi, a founding member of SIT [Islamic Labor Syndicate], freed from a “security center,” who authored a “fetwa” [Arabic] calling for indiscriminate killing; Azzedine Baa, a cohort of Cheboui who recently committed a hold-up at Khemis El-Khechna and is implicated in several assassinations; and Abdelhak Layada, the Baraki ex-convict who replaced Allal Mohamed alias “Moh Leveilley” when the latter was killed in the Blida region last fall.

The biographic data the gendarmerie has furnished on those arrested should incite further vigilance. We must not confine our search for terrorists to society’s dregs. Some may be white-collar workers or even wealthy merchants. The killing at Boughezoul also proves they have infiltrated the army. According to reliable sources, the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], when it was riding high, apparently ordered many militants to enlist in the army, promising them promotions to command levels if ever it should come to power. The result is pathetic, because the ANP [People’s National Army], trained in the “November school,” can only flush out these infiltrators the way many years ago the ALN [National Liberation Army] did the harkis [Algerian who fought with the French in the Algerian war].

Support Group for Families of ‘Terrorist’ Victims
93AF0504A Algiers EL WATAN in French 2-3 Apr 93 p 4
[Statement issued by the Association for Solidarity and Support for Families of Victims of Terrorism: “Victims of Terrorism: the Association for Solidarity”]

[Text] The Association for Solidarity and Support for Families of Victims of Terrorism was founded in early March 1993 at the exclusive initiative of completely independent women and men.
It is true that some people will have the right to think that this association ought to have been born well before this date. Doubtless [this is true].

However you first had to know and meet the men and women who were convinced that civil society can do a great deal when it decides to; you next had to be able to express yourself within an organized framework.

And it happened, inasmuch as in early March 1993, with the election of an executive board and our getting authorization, the members of this association officially have the right to be active and to implement their action program, which is based essentially on this main idea:

- to provide moral and material support to so many grieving families who have been ravaged in their flesh by the loss of a father, a son, or a brother who had been killed in a cowardly way in the name of a blind, murderous hatred by terrorists who only know how to use their weapon in their victim's back or by using a "silencer."

It is to tell all those traumatized, inconsolable families that are marked for life: "You are no longer alone; your sons, your husbands, and your fathers did not die in vain," that our association was born.

Indeed, beyond the unspeakable crime committed by the terrorists, there exists [yet] another one, which is even more odious: it is the crime, first of all, of banality, then of indifference.

The Necessary Awareness

The fight against terrorism is not just a security problem [best] left to the security forces alone. It is also and especially a problem of awareness of civil society in the broadest sense of the term.

If there is a lesson to be drawn from the 22 March 1993 march, it would indeed be to say that precisely for this march to bear its fruits very high and very far, it must in particular not remain an end in itself and be short lived.

Those who took part in this march have come out clearly and courageously against terrorism. Their voices must continue to be heard each day and at every moment to show solidarity with the families of victims and to establish a modern, republican state.

Consciousness Raising and Mobilization

Civil society is an unequalled pressure force, it must be heard, it must organize, and it must no longer wait to be sought out or be galvanized.

It is true that this march ought to have taken place well before 22 March, but "given the state of emergency," the main thing, when all is said and done, is that throughout the entire country women and men rose up in the way of those who thought they could sow terror with impunity.

Is this enough? Certainly not, because you can no longer double lock your door when you know that children and wives helplessly watch their father or husband get murdered.

The day will come when the armored door will be useless and the terrorist, encouraged by our indifference, will force it open and dictate his law.

The members of the Association are aware that measures to raise [people's] consciousness and mobilize them—which is one of the goals of the association—will be the most arduous task. On the occasion of the Aid [as published], and with a view to demonstrating their solidarity, members of the association on two consecutive days paid calls on families of victims (policemen, soldiers, and civilians).

Whether it be a question of widows or mothers and fathers of victims, all [of them] basically complain of the selfishness and the indifference of others.

All of them told us: "I am proud because he died for his country, but it's comforting to think of us."

We think of these two stories: the story of the wife in tears who told of having vainly begged her neighbors to help her take her police-officer husband, who was murdered in front of his house, to the hospital.

This is happening in Algeria! The other indescribable sorrow is the sorrow of the mother lamenting, at this ever so sad time of Aid, [the loss of] her soldier son who was murdered a year ago, and who hears her neighbor tell her: "It happened a year ago and you're still crying over him?"

This is without doubt a thoughtless way of consoling a mother but that once again denotes indifference while you are not involved. We can no longer be content to mourn our friends for just a moment, just enough time to bury them and go back and sleep with a tranquil conscience.

To be by the side of these families, by helping them to bear their misfortune, that is the sole motivation of the members of the association, which is far from any political calculation and any attempt to get back what was lost.

[signed] The President of the Association for Solidarity and Support for Families of Victims of Terrorism,

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Banking Institutions Review Security Measures

93AF0504B Algiers EL WATAN in French 4 Apr 93 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Banks: Security To Be Organized"]

[Text] For some time, banking institutions have been the targets of numerous hold-ups.

One gets the impression that armed robberies are carried out with [such] an ease of operation that questions get asked with regard to the security system in place, if, that is, one exists....

In the case of the Bank for Local Development [BDL] in Barika, for example, the robbery of 226 million centimes was carried out at 1500, when its director was going to deposit the money at the post office located a few meters from the bank. Oddly, the robbers did not mask their faces.
Another more important case is the hold-up of the Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development [BADR] in Annaba. The robbers were reportedly have spent more than an hour to take the 800,000 dinars, which the security services were able to recover by late morning the next day. So current economic conditions require banking institutions to take care of security. Every day crimes are committed because of the lack of modern security equipment or a service within the agencies which look after this issue, lacking the traditional "runner" or the pathetic night watchman, whose presence seems not to discourage thieves. Isn't it necessary to make an effort to improve security by acquiring the right equipment, viz. an alarm system, a camera, an electronic search in the entryway, the automatic closure of doors, etc.?

Let us observe that it was thanks to an alarm system set off in time by an employee that the El-Affrourn hold-up was thwarted. As they wait for other security measures such as very efficient armed patrols, our institutions continue to be the target of armed robberies.

Human Rights Report Said Exaggerated
93AF0504E Algiers LIBERTE in French 3 Mar 93 p 3

[Article by Idir Benyounes: "Human Rights in Algeria: a Media Overdose"]

[Text] Amnesty International's report on the "deterioration of human rights under the state of emergency" in Algeria, but in particular the way the media have treated them, raises quite a few questions.

Monday evening on foreign television stations, stunned Algerians learned that a devastating Amnesty International report on the status of human rights in Algeria had just been compiled. However, the report in question, which has reached [this newspaper's] editorial board, is stamped "Emargo date, 2 March 1993." Now, following the example of French Channel 2, the foreign stations made it public on Monday, 1 March. Here is a troubling question: why didn't the Western media abide by the embargo and why did they rush to carry the information? Is a report about Algeria a worldwide scoop that deserves to make a mockery of an embargo? If it is true that a report by an international organization such as Amnesty International attracts the limelight, it is less true that there is something not very clean about this frenzied media attention to this report about Algeria. Algeria is experiencing hard times and it is true that in such a situation violations can occur at any moment. It is also true that a violation, even a single one, will be one violation too many if you want to build a modern republic in which the preservation of human rights is a cardinal virtue. Excesses should be criticized and certainly exist, but it seems a priori that Amnesty International's report contains a wee bit of exaggeration. By attempting to dissect the Algerian situation, Amnesty International may be enlightening Western opinion, but it is throwing oil on the fire in domestic terms and helping to maintain confusion.

Thus Amnesty International has put the government and terrorists back to back on the issue of human rights.

This Manichaean vision on the part of Amnesty International reminds us oddly of the position of certain nationals who reject "violence where it comes from." If cases of torture are known to persons or organizations, it is their duty to report them to public opinion. In this way, Abdennour Ali Yahia's LADDH [Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights], in a communiqué dated 1 March, has announced the imminent publication of a white paper on torture.

Readers will remember that Mr. Ali Yahia denounced the practice of torture that persists in "concentration camps." Readers will also remember that he was called in by officials to cite cases and evidence of the practice of torture. Nothing came of it. Notwithstanding the missions of one and all, the simultaneous issuance of Amnesty International's report and Ali Yahia Abdennour's communiqué seem to be related to one another by a watchmaker's chance.

HCE Dialogue, 'Concessions' Criticized
93AF0502D Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French 18 Mar 93 p 4

[Statement dated 16 March 1993, from Ettahadi executive committee: "HCE's (Higher State Council) Concessions to the Fundamentalist Movement"]

[Text] Forty-eight hours after the attack in which Hafidh Benhadri was killed, Djilali Liabes, sociologist, director of the INESG [expansion not given], former minister of higher education, renowned intellectual, a patriot and a democrat, was killed in cold blood by the barbaric forces of fundamentalism and obscurantist regression.

It is tragic to realize that the State cannot protect the citizens and personalities targeted by the fundamentalist movement. And for a good reason: the government is busy negotiating with terrorist relays, in this case the fundamentalist parties Hamas and al-Nahdah, and with reconcilers from the FLN [National Liberation Front] and other formations; as it does not want this suicidal process to be disturbed, it dangerously reproduces the rise of fundamentalist violence and thus bears a heavy responsibility for the deterioration of the security and political situations and for the future.

Through this escalation of terrorism, fundamentalism is quite consistent with its supporting logic: to reject any compromise, to impose the most total surrender on the forces of reconciliation, and to take on the entire government.

Faced with such extremely dangerous developments, the patriotic and democratic forces, wherever they may be, have the imperative duty to apply as much pressure as they can to impose an interruption of the current suicidal process:

1) To put an end to the "dialoguing" masquerade, which is nothing but a lamentable screen concealing the successive retreats of the HCE [Higher State Council] and its constant concessions to the fundamentalist movement and the political and financial mafia. This dialogue, as conceived and practiced, is merely the expression and packaging of a strategy of compromise that is knowingly and treacherously
implemented with respect to fundamentalism and the political and financial mafia. This dialogue represents a marked retreat with respect to the real political determination to eradicate fundamentalist terrorism, and to the determination to save Algeria as a State, nation, and society, a project for which the late Boudiaf had taken responsibility clearly, confidently, and with determination.

2) To put an immediate end to the Abdesselem government, which tries to conceal the pitiful failure of its policy of the past eight months behind politicking attempts at building up dubious political alliances, doomed in advance, whose only purpose is to gain and share power.

3) As an absolute emergency, to form immediately a republican struggle government that can direct and implement a determined policy of radical change to reform and safeguard the republic, set up and establish bases for a modern and democratic State, and thus meet the immediate demands that History forcefully assigns to today's Algeria.

The mandatory tasks of this republican struggle government must hinge around two basic points:

a) Resolute, determined, and uncompromising struggle against fundamentalism and terrorism in all its manifestations; restoration and consolidation of the republican State's authority; ensuring the normal operation of its institutions, as well as law and order and civil peace;

b) Immediate start of all major reforms required for Algeria's safeguard and recovery as a State and a nation, and for the transformation of Algerian society; recasting the legal system and the administration, especially local administrations, radically overhauling the school and academic system, continuing economic and social reforms, etc.

**Entry of Foreign Nationals; Vigilance Urged**

93AF0503C Algiers EL WATAN in French 3 Feb 93 p 3

[Article by Omar Berbiche: “Clandestine Immigration: Complicity or Negligence?”—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Algeria has recently become an asylum for citizens of sub-Saharan African countries that poverty, or quite simply the search for more elemenents, drive to our country.

We are not talking about Malian or Nigerian refugees who crossed the border with their wives and children, fleeing the poverty and death that threatened them, and whose organized return under conditions agreed on by their respective governments has already begun with the assistance of international organizations. No day goes by but security services arrest African citizens who have crossed the border illegally to come and try their luck in large urban centers, especially Algiers, where you can see them in Port Said Square, which has been aptly dubbed Africa Square. The security problem resulting from illegal immigration cannot be stated in the same terms as in the south of the country, in Tamanrasset where insecurity is becoming rampant, causing the local population to live in a climate of fear and anxiety, especially with the appearance of armed bands who impose their law on the region’s inhabitants.

**A Place of Transit**

What is new and is a cause of concern is that many of these illegal immigrants hold fake passports and visas from various countries, including Algerian documents. We should recall the “find” made a few days ago by the Tamanrasset governorate police, which revealed the existence of a considerable traffic of passports and other administrative documents from all countries! Taking people back to the border has become a routine operation.

Some offenders are referred to the courts. But these retaliation measures do not seem to have discouraged would-be illegal immigrants, who probably benefit from local complicity in drawing up the fake papers that will enable them to apply for a job in the sector that traditionally provides much African labor, especially in the south, namely the construction sector.

For many, our country is just a place of transit toward other skies. Because it is located at Europe’s gates, Algeria attracts many Africans for whom it is the only possible stopping place, the one presenting the fewer risks (at worst, the illegal immigrant is sent back to his own country), and also the least expensive to reach the other shore.

Quite likely, land borders have become dangerous for illegal aliens, because security measures have been reinforced as a result of the country’s security crisis. Illegal aliens are turning to maritime ways. The adventure of some 15 citizens of African countries who were about to board a ship for Marseille at the port of Bejaia stopped right there, the APS reported, quoting the governorate security services. From the same source, we learned that these illegal aliens were in possession of “questionable” passports and visas, and that “a network based in countries across the border has turned the port of Bejaia into a preferred transit point for illegal immigrants.”

How did these alien citizens enter Algeria? If they came through regular border posts or through ports and airports, how could they elude the vigilance of the relevant authorities, especially considering that the documents found in their possession when they were arrested in Bejaia proved to be fake. Are we talking about complicity or mere negligence?

A few days ago, we learned, as a result of a recent investigation on passport traffic, that the country's major ports and airports are equipped with equipment specially designed to detect fake passports. The ideal solution would be to extend the use of such equipment to all ports and airports in the country. But that is not enough: we also need repressive laws within the limits of the right to defense, as exist in all countries.

It has been established that being taken back to the border has never discouraged illegal immigrants, as they have no trouble coming back to Algeria after being expelled. We must act according to Algeria’s best interest while abiding with international laws. Algeria’s difficult situation calls for greater vigilance. Respect for the country’s sovereignty and the laws of the Republic must be placed above any other consideration.
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