NATO EXPANSION AND NORWAY

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**NATO EXPANSION AND NORWAY**

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**STUDY OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF NATO EXPANSION ON NORWAY AND NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICY. SUBJECT IS EXAMINED THROUGH IDENTIFICATION OF HISTORICAL CHARACTERISTICS IN NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICY, HISTORICAL AND CURRENT THREAT ASSESSMENT, IDENTIFICATION OF NORWEGIAN CONCERNS OVER NATO EXPANSION, POSSIBLE COLLECTIVE SECURITY ALTERNATIVES, AND THE INTERNAL NORWEGIAN POLITICAL DEBATE CONCERNING SECURITY ISSUES.**

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Introduction

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Norway's security has been strengthened, along with all of the other countries of Western Europe. This has lead to a basic change in the perception and definition of threats throughout Western Europe, and a search for redefined missions within the collective security apparatus, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Complicating this issue, however, is NATO expansion.

The present debate over NATO expansion had its birth in the end of the Cold War. Expansion was raised in conjunction with redefining the role of the alliance, now that the Soviet Union had collapsed. The argument soon arose that NATO must "go out of area or die". As a intermediate step in an eventual expansion process NATO, in 1994, offered military cooperation and consultation to all the states of the former Soviet Empire under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. PfP enabled the countries of central and eastern Europe to make their military structures compatible to NATO, an essential condition for future membership. In the meantime, NATO was going to develop a systemic approach to expansion through its joint decision making apparatus, to ensure that the capabilities and security guarantees of the alliance would be sustained.

Initially, PfP seemed to be the answer in providing NATO with the time to establish a policy for expansion. But only a few months after NATO postponed the question of expansion, the issue resurfaced. The central European nations continued
to openly press for membership and they were joined by prominent American former policy-makers such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Thus, by 1 December 1994, the NATO foreign ministers tasked the North Atlantic Council to begin an examination within the alliance to determine how NATO could be enlarged. The issue increasingly gained momentum and in the 1996 US presidential election campaign it became part of the foreign policy platform of President Bill Clinton. Throughout this process a general NATO support for expansion developed among the member countries, although the concern over an adverse Russian reaction to expansion was feared by some members. Throughout the spring and summer of 1997 western leaders addressed Russian concerns. In the summer of 1997, NATO agreed to renounce the stationing of nuclear weapons on new member state’s soil, initiate a new round of renegotiations of the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty, and establish the provisions for joint NATO-Russian policy consultations. This alleviated many of the Russian objections over expansion and in July 1997, during the Madrid Summit, an invitation to join NATO in 1999 was extended to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

Norway, however, is still struggling to establish a new set of facts and assumptions that accurately describe Europe’s new security environment, especially one that entails an expanded NATO. The constant that remains for Norway is that the main threat from the Cold War has not withdrawn, nor disappeared. Norway is the only NATO country that still shares a border with the former Soviet Union, specifically the Kola Peninsula. The Kola Peninsula is the home to Russia’s strategic submarine force and some of the most capable units remaining in the Russian army.
and air force. Thus, Kola is not only of prime importance to the defense of Russia, but also to its ability to project both strategic nuclear and conventional military forces. This military threat is also compounded by increased Norwegian concern over environmental damage from the dumping of nuclear material in the Barents Sea, and the potential of a Chernobyl type disaster from the Poljarnye Zor nuclear reactor on the peninsula.

Norway’s initial response to this threat was to strengthen the ties to NATO and, unlike most West European nations, maintain Cold War-level defense spending. Norwegian governments have since 1949 based the national defense on the security guarantee provided by NATO membership, and they view with great concern any action or policy that might hamper NATO’s ability to meet that guarantee. The NATO reinforcements to Norwegian military forces are the cornerstone of strategic Norwegian defense planning. Thus, the enlargement of NATO into Central Europe is viewed with great importance by many members of both the Norwegian government and military. Eventual Norwegian conclusions regarding the implications of NATO enlargement will be the main contributing factor in shaping future Norwegian security policy, its relationship to the United States and other the Nordic countries, and it will determine Norway’s place in Europe.

The high level of reliance that Norway has placed in the NATO security guarantee raises the following questions. First, what are the historical and contemporary factors that influence Norwegian security policy? Second, what are the specific Norwegian apprehensions regarding NATO expansion? Answering the second question will inevitably create a third. Does there exist viable alternatives to
NATO membership for Norway, and what might indicate the pursuit of a non-NATO security arrangement? This thesis will attempt to answer these questions, by assessing historical and contemporary Norwegian security policy in relation to the present European security environment.

Chapter one will focus on the historical development and evolution of Norwegian security policy. It will identify three characteristics that are essential in understanding both Norway's relationship to NATO and its relations with the rest of Europe. These characteristics are important, for they permeate all segments of Norwegian society, to include the political and military elite. This chapter will also address the challenges of pursuing a policy of neutrality through the First World War and up until the Second World War. Finally, the chapter will provide an overview of the internal political debate over joining NATO in 1949, and the evolution of Norwegian security policy since joining the alliance.

Chapter two will examine the history of Norwegian-Russian relations, with an emphasis on the military threat to Norway from the former Soviet Union during the Cold War and the threat posed by Russia today. It will also examine non-military threats, such as nuclear contamination, and highlight attempts by the Norwegian government to improve relations with Russia.

Having established the background for the contemporary Norwegian security policy and discussed the threat that still exists in the Arctic, chapter three will first examine the arguments for NATO expansion that are presented in the international community. They will be studied from a Norwegian perspective. The chapter will further expand to explore the possible implications of NATO expansion, which are
most often expressed by both Norwegian military officers and government officials. It will highlight two issues that have risen in the NATO expansion debate, even here in the United States, the cost of expansion and NATO’s future ability to extend the security guarantee to all its members, and a third uniquely Norwegian concern, marginalization.

Chapter four will utilize the information from the first three chapters to explore the possible courses that Norwegian security policy may take in response to expansion of the alliance and the perception that NATO no longer meets the nation’s security needs. The focus will be the presentation of three options for future Norwegian security policy. Finally, the chapter will closely examine the internal political environment to determine the factors that influence both the closed and open debate concerning Norwegian security policy and NATO.

Finally, the conclusion will bring together all the fragments developed in the previous chapter in an attempt to consider the future course of Norwegian security policy. Based on the summary I will argue that only one viable option exists: Continued active membership in NATO.

**Geographical Factors**

Norwegian history is intimately tied to its geography. To understand the evolution of Norwegian foreign and security policy, and the origin of the characteristics that afflict Norwegian policy and politics, one must be familiar with the geographic environment. Norway’s strategic position during the Cold War was directly attributable to its geography. Norway provided the shortest air routes for both
cruise missiles and conventional bombers in attacks on the Soviet heartland, and possession of northern Norway was the key in bottling-up the Soviet Northern Fleet and strategic submarine force. These strategic considerations remain important even today, and it has become increasingly difficult for the Norwegian government to keep them in the NATO spotlight as European security affairs take a central European focus.

Norway, along with Sweden and Denmark, forms what geographers call Scandinavia. The origin of this term is believed to be rooted in the old Norse words *scatin*, meaning darkness, and *aujo* meaning island. Thus the reference to this area as “the island of darkness”, which can be easily understood by the insular and individualistic nature of its native population, and the area’s harsh climate. Geologically, Norway belongs to what W. Ramsey calls *Fennoscandia*. This describes the Caledonian Mountains straddling its border with Sweden and the Baltic Shield created by the north European area of crystalline Pre-Cambrian rocks that cover most of southern Norway. Norway, however, differs geographically and geologically from its Scandinavian neighbors in three major ways, the extensive coastline, the dominance of the Caledonian Mountain system, and the climate.

The coastline of Norway is 21,926 kilometers long, making it one of the longest in the world. This includes the coastline of over 50,000 islands and numerous long *fjords* which literally bisect the country. The islands form what in Norwegian is called the *skjaergård*, which provides protective waterways against the powerful Arctic, Norwegian and North Seas. The ability to travel in these protected waters, sometimes referred to as the “Inner Leads”, has enabled the Norwegians to maintain
lines of communications and supply in a country that is otherwise dominated by the impassable mountains and valleys formed by the ancient Caledonian Mountain system. It has also made Norwegian waters vital to those nations whose merchant and naval fleets travel the North Atlantic.

The Caledonian Mountain system is the major geographical feature of Norway, encompassing over two-thirds of the land-mass. The mountains run generally from the northeast to the southwest, and create a complex array of jagged cliffs and high plateaus filled with Alpine vegetation. Of the 324,220 kilometer land area of continental Norway, less than 3 percent is arable. This arable land is in the narrow fertile valleys on the west coast and in the broad valley north of Oslo that runs almost all the way to Trondheim, Gudbrandsdalen. The extent of the mountain range makes communications in Norway very difficult, and until the advent of commercial air travel and modern road construction technology
much of Norway was only accessible by sea. The mountains divide Norway into five distinctive areas: Nord Norge (North Norway), Trøndelag, Vestlandet (West Country), Sørlandet (South Country) and Østlandet (East Country). Each of these regions are distinct geologically, culturally, and historically.

The climate of Norway is determined by its proximity to the sea. Vestlandet, Østlandet, and Sørlandet are influenced by the warmed waters of the North Atlantic Drift, resulting in temperature variations of less than 14° Celsius from summer to winter along the coast. The Atlantic Drift also results in a high rate of precipitation in Vestlandet. The city of Bergen receives over 197 days of rain a year. Nord Norge is cooled year round by its proximity to the ice-packs of the Bering Sea, although the ports remain ice free, and temperatures rarely rise above 20° Celsius during the summer. The mountainous areas of Norway are typified by less precipitation and mild temperatures.
Chapter 1: Norway and the Search for Security

Introduction

In an attempt to understand Norway’s relationship to the rest of Europe, it is essential to understand Norwegian history. With an appreciation for the geographical character and position of the country, it is easy to understand how from the outset Norway’s position on the far edge of Europe influenced its development. Its long coastline, deep fjords, and the dominant Caledonian mountain system have made the Norwegians a rugged people, the world’s finest seamen, and capable of extracting a livelihood out of the most inhabitable piece of soil. This chapter will focus on the historical development in regards to foreign and security policy, broadly covering the evolution of Norway until full independence in 1905 and examining in more detail the development of security policy thereafter.

The focus of this chapter is security policy and foreign relations, a combination of political, economic, and military capability. Yet, there are three Norwegian characteristics that will emerge from this chapter, and they are essential in understanding both Norway’s relationship to NATO and its relations with the rest of Europe. First, the Norwegians, as a nation, have a deep historical attachment to the concept of neutrality in world affairs. Second, union with both Sweden and Denmark developed a disdain for alliances, especially alliances where Norway could be dominated by larger, more powerful nations. Third, the Norwegians have historically seen active engagement in international organizations as a vehicle for increasing their
influence in security and foreign affairs. As a result, the Norwegian government and leaders have always been strong supporters of international organizations that allowed Norway to be engaged and enjoy the benefits of membership, yet have the freedom to achieve essential national goals without the fear of domination.

This chapter will further examine the challenges of pursuing a policy of neutrality through the First World War and up until the Second World War. Finally, the chapter will provide an overview of the internal debate over joining NATO in 1949, and the development of Norwegian security policy since joining the alliance.

**A Short History**

The unique geography of Norway created a people that Norwegian poet Ivar Aasen said lived “between hills and mountains, out by the sea”. Norway was first inhabited approximately 14,000 years ago by a nomadic hunting people with a Paleolithic culture. They were followed by farming people from Denmark and Sweden who settled along the coast and inland lakes. The mountains made natural borders between these settlements and by the 8th century over 29 small kingdoms existed. In the next century a seafaring culture developed along the coastal areas, and by the year 800 Norwegian Vikings were sailing across the North Sea to raid both England and Ireland. Over the next 200 years Norwegian Vikings raided as far south as the Mediterranean, and population pressures in Norway led to voyages to and settlements in Iceland, Greenland and North America.

In the 9th century the first successful attempt to unify Norway was made by Harald Fair-haired (Harfagre). He managed to unite Norway in 900 only to have it
divided in a quarrel among his sons at his death. Norway remained fragmented until
the rule of Olav I, the Holy (den Hellige). He reunited the kingdom and in the process
converted it to Christianity. For the next three centuries a succession of native kings
ruled Norway, and Norway began to emerge as a united nation, enjoying a relative
prosperity brought by its trading fleets. In the 13th century Sverre and Haakon IV
consolidated the power of the throne by virtually eliminating the landed aristocracy
and severely curtailing the power of the clergy, and Norway became a land of peasants.
Simultaneously the crown battled the power of the Hanseatic League, which had
gradually expanded its power in the west coast city of Bergen and in north Norway.
The Hanseatic League eventually dominated Norwegian trade on the west coast. At
that time there was over 3000 Germans living in Bergen to facilitate their businesses.

Between 1319 and 1397 Norway was ruled by a succession of foreign born
kings, and Norwegian culture and commerce stagnated. In 1397 the Union of Kalmar
united the three kingdoms of Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Norway was made a
province of Denmark, and for the next four centuries Norway remained stagnant
culturally and economically under indifferent Danish rule. Many Norwegians refer to
this period as the “dark times”.

The end of the Napoleonic wars and the Treaty of Kiel ended Danish rule over
Norway. The Danish king was forced to cede Norway to Sweden. The Norwegians,
however, disavowed the treaty, drew up a liberal constitution, and offered the crown to
a Danish prince. Sweden threatened to invade Norway, and a compromise was
reached where Norway was allowed to keep its constitution. The Act of Union of
1815 gave Norway its own armed forces, a legislature, and full autonomy within its
own borders. The next 80 years saw a rise in Norwegian intellectual and cultural nationalism. The result was a growing dissatisfaction with the union with Sweden. In 1898 the Norwegian legislature demanded that Sweden allow it to establish its own consular service. The Swedish rejection of the demand led to a movement to dissolve the union. In 1905 all the Norwegian administrators offered their resignation to King Oscar II of Sweden. When he refused, the Norwegian legislature, the Storting, declared that Oscar was no longer the ruler of Norway and that the country was an independent nation. In August of the same year a national referendum on independence was passed with 368,208 votes for and 184 against. On 23 September 1905, after intense negotiations between representatives of the Swedish and Norwegian governments, an agreement was reached for the peaceful dissolution of the union. Norway thus entered the 20th century as a newly independent constitutional monarchy, seeking both identity and security among the established nations of Europe.

Neutrality

Since the Union of Kalmar in 1397, Norway had been dependent on Denmark and later Sweden for both consular services and the conduct of foreign policy. Geographically and politically on the edge of Europe, Norway managed to stay out of the conflicts that ravaged the continent. It was only the Napoleonic Wars, in which Denmark allied itself with France, that affected Norway. During that war Norway was blockaded by the British navy, resulting in widespread starvation. This entanglement in a “continental issue” has had a lasting effect on the Norwegian psyche and government policy making. Compounded by the indifference shown by Denmark
towards Norway during the "dark times", it has produced a nation wary of entanglements in alliances with large nations.

It was not until the late 1800's that foreign policy, and specifically security issues, become important to the Storting. The renewed interest in foreign affairs was partially fueled by the dramatic growth of the Norwegian merchant fleet toward the end of the 19th century. The Norwegian shipping companies anticipated the advantages of steam shipping and moved quickly to convert their fleets from sail to steam. In 1890 only 203,000 tons of the merchant fleet were motor vessels, and over 1,500,000 tons were sail. By 1913 the fleet was over 1,103,000 tons of motor vessels and only 600,000 of sail. The result was that Norway's merchant marine, with its larger and more efficient vessels, had the greatest carrying capacity in the world. The protection of this fleet by not entangling Norway in alliances or by taking sides in international conflicts became one of the primary goals of a developing foreign policy, a policy based on neutrality.

After independence in 1905, much of the focus of the new government was internal. Prime Minister Christian Michelsen rallied the country with the motto, a "new work day". The motto represented the conservative coalition government's focus of creating a middle-class industrial society devoid of elitism and class differences. With a geographical position on the edge of Europe, and in the Storting the words of Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, "our best foreign policy is no foreign policy", dominating the view of most members. A sense of isolationism entered the character of foreign policy issues. In this atmosphere the new Foreign Minister, Jørgen Løvland,
was tasked to form a diplomatic corps and develop a foreign policy that would preserve Norway’s security through neutrality in any international conflict.

The diplomatic corps and consular service was quickly formed on the Swedish model, the main difference being that great care was taken not to create an aristocratic service. The fear was that an aristocratic diplomatic corps was more prone to involve the nation in conflicts that otherwise could be have been avoided by low-profile diplomacy. Security was to be ensured by the strict adherence to the principles of neutrality. The army and navy were organized to conduct “neutrality guard” missions, ensuring that no nation used Norwegian territory for military operations. Merchant vessels from all nations were assured that they would have free passage through Norwegian territorial waters, and warships of nations in conflict were to have free passage as long as Norwegian authorities did not place a general ban on all belligerent vessels. The most difficult principle to achieve was the government’s pledge to treat all sides in a conflict equally. This did not take in account that trade was unequal before hostilities, and left the government with very little maneuver-room in dealing with conflicting state’s requests for both military and non-military goods. This was later to have serious ramifications during the First World War and the first months of the Second World War. Based on these principles of neutrality, Foreign Minister Løveland was able to conclude a treaty, the Integrity Treaty, with Great Britain, Germany, France, and Russia in 1907 guaranteeing Norway’s territorial integrity and neutrality in the event of a conflict in Europe.

With neutrality providing both the security from involvement in foreign conflict and the preservation of territorial sovereignty, the government renewed its
inward focus. Norway entered a period of rapid industrial expansion, much brought about by the development of technologies to generate hydroelectric power. The number of industrial workers rose over 80 percent within seven years and power utilization of heavy industry rose over 300 percent. The focus of the Liberal (Venstre) government, elected in 1912 and led by Prime Minister Gunnar Knudsen, was to establish free-trade policies to efficiently govern both Norwegian resources and industry. Consequently, both foreign policy and national defense were neglected. When the German High Seas Fleet took refugee in Vestlandsfjordene during the second Moroccan Crisis in 1911, both the Norwegian government and people realized how fragile their reliance on the treaty with the major powers and avowed policy of neutrality was. The Storting responded with the Army Act of 1911, which reorganized the army and conscription along modern European lines. In 1912 the navy budget was bolstered by an additional 20 million kroner.

The First World War: The First Test of Neutrality

The start of the First World War in 1914 took many Norwegians by surprise, and the weeks following the August outbreak of hostilities were marked by runs on the banks and hoarding of imported goods. The government, however, was very proactive and decisive in its declaration of neutrality. Much of this is attributed to Foreign Minister Nils C. Ihlsen. Already on July 29, after the declaration of war between Serbia and the Austria-Hungary, Ihlsen had accepted a proposal by the Swedish representative in Oslo, Baron Fredrik Ramel, for the two countries to seek an agreement so they would “not shoot at each other”. Ihlsen immediately initiated
negotiations and simultaneously the Storting approved limited mobilization. On 30 July the coastal fortresses protecting Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, and Kristiansand were fully manned and the army was given authorization to prepare for the mobilization of 197,000 troops. Ihlsen was convinced by the High Seas Fleet incident of 1911 that only by decisive and concrete action could he protect Norwegian neutrality. On 1 August the government issued the following royal declaration: "War having broken out between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, it has been decided on the behalf of Norway to observe complete neutrality during the war."8 This was followed three days later by a second proclamation asserting the neutrality of Norway: "It is decided on the behalf of Norway that complete neutrality shall be observed during the existing war between foreign powers".9 On 8 August Norway and Sweden signed a non-aggression agreement and issued the following communiqué:

War having broken out among several foreign powers, the Norwegian and Swedish Governments have mutually declared their firm intention to maintain, during the state of war thus occurring, each for itself and to final extremity, their neutrality in reference to all the belligerent powers. The two Governments have besides exchanged formal assurances with a view to rendering impossible that the state of war existing in Europe should result in one of the kingdoms taking hostile measures in reference to each other.10

The monarchs of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway also agreed to meet in December in Malmö, Sweden, to further cement Scandinavian solidarity in their declaration of neutrality in the ever expanding European conflict.

For the first two years of the war the quick, and decisive actions of Ihlsen, and his ability to maintain cordial relations with both the British and German governments, enabled Norwegian firms and shipping lines to profit immensely from the war. One
Labor Party leader noted that "the upper class is enjoying a golden age without parallel in the nation's history." Prices on exported goods rose many-fold, and fortunes were made in both export and shipping. Problems began, however, as early as 1915, when Great Britain demanded that Norway reduce its trade with Germany. The British Admiralty wanted to tighten the naval blockade of the Central Powers and was concerned with the robust trade being conducted between the Scandinavian nations and Germany. The items that concerned the British the most were fish products and copper pyrites, used in the production of artillery shells. The export of these two items had risen dramatically since the start of the war and were instrumental in the increase from 3,000 tons of goods a month shipped before the war from Norway to Germany, to over 28,000 tons a month in April 1915.\textsuperscript{12} Ihlsen was able solve this crisis by negotiating a British purchase of the fish products destined for Germany. The copper pyrite issue was more difficult to resolve. There was the problem of German ownership of one of the mines and a very real government fear that the Germans could involve Norway in the war based on this issue, negotiations on which dragged on into the next year. It was becoming apparent to the Knudsen government that the principle of equal trade and treatment to both belligerents was going to be a difficult one to follow.

The area where the commitment to neutrality and the principles espoused by Løveland in 1905 was tested next was with the merchant fleet. At the outbreak of the war it was one the largest and the most efficient in the world. Many of the members of the cabinet and the Storting, to include Prime Minister Knudsen, had backgrounds in shipping or financial ties to the merchant fleet, which had proclaimed that neutral
ships can carry any cargo, without restrictions from any of the belligerent powers.\textsuperscript{13} The first eighteen months of the war saw Norwegian merchant vessels contribute heavily to the transportation of goods to both Great Britain and Germany. The trade to Germany was generally conducted by older and smaller ships, while the larger, newer ships were used on the transatlantic routes between the United States and Britain. The profits were enormous and the risks, mainly from German submarines, were manageable with the use of the convoy system and armed merchants. This all changed in the fall of 1915, when German submarines intensified their attacks in the North Sea and Northern Atlantic. That fall 143 ships were lost on the Arctic route, forcing the shipping lines to withdraw their vessels from that area.\textsuperscript{14}

On 1 February 1917 the Germans declared unrestricted submarine warfare, and extended it to the North American coast upon the United States entry into the war. Norwegian shipping losses immediately began to rise to over 100,000 tons a month. With no ability to protect the vessels, the Norwegian government entered into several agreements with Great Britain, the most significant was an agreement by which armed British vessels brought essential items, oil and coal, to Norway in exchange for a like number of Norwegian vessels being chartered to Great Britain and flying the British flag. Since these were newer and more efficient vessels, the obvious advantage of this agreement was clear.

After the entry of the United States into the war, the US government increased pressure on Norway to cease its trade with Germany. In 1917 Knudsen sent Fridtjof Nansen, the renowned polar explorer and humanist, to the US to negotiate a solution to this issue and ask for aid for Norway.\textsuperscript{15} Nansen agreed to American demands for
reduced trade in return for aid, and by 1918 Norwegian trade with Germany was a fraction of that of 1916. Ihlsen recognized this as having the appearance of siding with the Allies, and made a pledge to Germany that Norway would remain neutral and would “prevent the use of Norwegian territory as a base for any foreign power”.

With the end of the war in 1918, the Norwegian government began to assess its policy of neutrality, specifically how to maintain it in the face of international pressure. The loss of 49 percent of the merchant fleet, 889 vessels, and the concessions it was forced to make to both sides during the conflict, left many members of the Storting with doubts whether Norway could afford to stay out of a future conflict. The debate was ended prematurely when domestic issues became pressing as a crushing recession hit Norway at the end of the war. Knudsen and Ihlsen were alone left to reassess the neutrality policy. Both were realistic in their assessment that Norway’s solitary and punctilious adherence to the principles of neutrality had done nothing to benefit it, and they came to the conclusion that the key to Norway’s security and neutrality would be in a world organization that could guarantee it. That organization was the League of Nations.

**Between The Wars**

Three events dominated Norway security policy in the years between the First and Second World War. First is the membership in the League of Nations, which gave new hope to the long standing policy of neutrality. The second was the neglect and disarmament of the armed forces, much a result of the optimism and hope placed in
the League. The final event was the growth and rise to power of the Labor Party (*Arbeiderpartiet*), which would eventually dominate Norwegian politics.

During the last meeting of the Scandinavian monarchs in March 1917, it was decided that each country would establish a commission to examine the roles of neutrals once the war was over. The Norwegian commission consisted of former prime minister Francis Hagerup, C.L. Lange, and Johan L. Mowinckel. The commission came out in favor of a system of courts and conferences to resolve international conflicts, very similar to the proposals made by President Woodrow Wilson for a League of Nations. Both Knudsen and Ihlsen also saw the benefit of such an organization and began to discuss membership with the other Scandinavian countries. Enthusiasm was also high among Norwegian intellectuals who formed the Association for the League of Nations (*den norske Forening for Nationernes Liga*) and voted Fridtjof Nansen its chairman. The association presented in 1919 the principles which they thought the league should be founded upon: right of membership to all civilized people, protection for minorities, disarmament, and international economic regulations.\(^\text{17}\)

The neutral nations, however, were given very little influence on the writing of the League Covenant by the victorious European powers. The Norwegian representative, Wedel Jarslberg, did manage to add two provisions. One provision was for the possible increase in the number of non-permanent members of the League Council and the other, and most important for the neutrals, an understanding that instructions from the Council to take part in military sanctions would not be mandatory. Playing on the fear that Norway would be politically isolated by Sweden
and Denmark’s decision to entered the League, Knudsen won approval for membership by a vote of 100 to 20 in the Storting on 4 March 1920.

C. J. Hambro, a conservative who initially opposed membership in the League, was the most prominent member of the Norwegian delegation, and along with Christian Lange, he led an effort in the League that closely paralleled both Norwegian foreign and security policy. Norway had secured her borders in 1925 through the signing of six Arbitration Agreements with Sweden, ending the minor border disputes that plagued their relationship since independence in 1905. Further inter-ministerial conferences also led to agreements among the Nordic countries on range of economic and cultural issues, serving to strengthen the bond between the nations. Hambro was thus able to present Scandinavia as a region where the problem of mutual security had been solved through negotiations and compromise. Hambro described himself as “the delegate of a nation which is in the happy position of living in friendship with every neighboring nation, and never having any claim upon the League”.18

The most influential spokesman for Norway in international affairs, however, was not in government, he was Fridtjof Nansen. Nansen had early embraced the ideals of the League and became its greatest champion, especially the use of the League as an arbitrator in international conflicts. Both Knudsen and subsequent prime minister, Johan L. Mowinckel, showed great enthusiasm for this, as they both saw the League of Nations as the guarantor of Norway’s neutrality. Nansen served as the High Commissioner for the Leagues’ most successful operations: the exchange of prisoners after the Russian Civil war in 1922, the relocation of Greeks and Turks after the Greek-Turkish war of 1922, and the resettlement of Armenians in 1925. His crowning
achievement was the passage of the General Act for the Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts in 1927. This act was strongly supported by all the Nordic countries, who saw it as the cornerstone in their neutral security policies. The act, however, was never accepted by the major powers and proved to have little value. Nansen died in 1930, and with him some of the idealism that had been associated with Norwegian membership in the League.

Partially in response to this, in 1930 Mowinckel convened the Convention of Oslo, whose initial purpose was to counter economic protectionism, but eventually assumed a more political role of reasserting the rights of neutral states. The Convention, often called the “Oslo Group”, consisted of the Scandinavian countries plus Finland, Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Work with and through this group was the focus of Norwegian foreign policy after 1934.

The other area where the Norwegian delegation was very active was disarmament. Lange was recognized as an international expert on disarmament and he helped organize the 1932 League of Nations Disarmament Conference. The resulting optimism from the conferences leading up to the Disarmament Conference, coupled with Nansen’s idealism, led the government to drastically cut military expenditures as early as 1920. Over the next thirteen years the officer and non-commissioned officer corps was reduced by 50%, and the number of recruits trained reduced by 30%. The result was an army and navy, that in 1932, was hopelessly outclassed in both training and equipment, and not capable of resisting an attack or enforcing neutrality.

In 1933 the Conservative government of Mowinckel enacted the Defense Law of 1933. It further reduced the cadre of officers and established a “neutrality guard”
that could be rapidly mobilized. The coastal artillery was transferred to the navy and defense expenditures were capped at 35 million kroner, the same that it had been for the last thirteen years. No regimental training exercises were planned or budgeted for, and the call up of reservists was limited to those situations in which the government feared serious infringements on neutrality. It was in this atmosphere that the Labor Party, under Johan Nygaardsvold, assumed the reigns of government in 1935.

The Labor Party’s rise to power, from relative obscurity, was the result of two events. The first was the split of the party from the Soviet Communist Party, and Third International, when it refused to sign the “Moscow Theses” in 1920. The split led to the formation of the Norwegian Communist Party and the “new” Labor Party. Labor thus began to appear as a less “radical” alternative to the Conservatives (Høyre) and Liberals (Venstre). The second event was the deep economic recession that Norway entered into after World War I. This depression, caused by hyper-inflation and lack of government intervention in the economy, enabled Labor to organize among both blue and white collar unions. In the election of 1929 they achieved a majority in the Storting, but they were unable to form a government until 1935.

The Labor Party had opposed Norway’s entry into the League of Nations, it provided 6 of 20 opposition votes, and had historically been wary of the armed forces, fearing the strike-breaking capabilities of the army, so national security issues were initially very low on its agenda. Still, by 1937 it became apparent that war was a real possibility in Europe and the failures of the League in Ethiopia and Manchuria meant that the international organization could not guarantee Norway’s neutrality.
In 1937, with increased pressure from the conservative opposition, the Nygaardsvold government began to increase the appropriations to the military and approved the General Staff’s request for eighty days of training as prescribed by the Defense Law of 1933. Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht continued to work through the “Oslo Group” to safeguard the neutrality of the member states in case of a European conflict, but the government soon realized that it had put itself in a situation much similar to 1914. The difference in 1939 was that it was less of advantageous to the belligerents for Norway to remain neutral, and both sides possessed the military capability to enforce their will by force.

**World War II: The Failure of Neutrality**

The deeply embedded belief in the policy of neutrality was followed up until the German invasion in 1940. Koht rejected Swedish proposals for a Scandinavian defense agreement the same year, maintaining that Norway could keep itself out of the European conflict by adherence to the neutrality principles established forty years earlier. Just as in 1914 the “neutrality guard” was mobilized, although the armed forces were now in much worse condition to enforce neutrality than they had been at the start of World War I. The merchant fleet, now the world’s second largest, was again placed in the position of being between two belligerents, one conducting a surface war, the other an unrestricted submarine war.

Despite both Allied and German violations of Norway’s neutrality in 1940, the “Altmark” incident and British mine laying, and evidence of preparations for an invasion by both Allied and German forces, there remained a bipartisan opposition to
general mobilization in the *Storting*. The general belief in the government, and among the population, was that they were going to be able to stay out of the war. To exemplify the prevailing mood, on 2 April Conservative former prime minister Mowinckel warned against defense budgets that "would sink our social, cultural and material standard"\(^{19}\) and Defense Minister Birger Ljungberg advocated the demobilization of the "neutrality guard" by 15 April so they could go home to do the "spring-work"\(^{20}\).

Neutral as a viable security and foreign policy for Norway disappeared on 9 April 1940. The German invasion of Norway, Operation *Weserübung*, was the world’s first air, sea, land joint military operation. The plan was both audacious and bold, and due to Norwegian lack of preparation and training, within a week almost all the objectives were met. The operation utilized less than 9,000 men to achieve its objectives, and with the exception of the sinking of the German cruiser *Blucher* at Oscarsborg\(^{21}\) and the successful Allied land operations led by Norwegian General Carl Fleischer in the Narvik area, much of Norway was occupied with little resistance. Allied operations in Norway were hampered by the lack of training in mountainous terrain and snow, and the few Allied successes during the campaign were at sea.

On 9 April King Haakon, the *Storting*, and the Nygaardsvold cabinet had left Oslo for Hamar, in central Norway. The same day the king rejected an ultimatum from Germany to surrender and Norway was officially at war. Later that day at Elverum, C.J. Hambro led and passed a proposal in the *Storting* that gave the government "full powers to take whatever decisions that might be necessary to ensure the best interest of the country"\(^{22}\). The Elverum Mandate (*Elverumsfullmakt*) also
provided the Nygaardsvold government the legal authority to leave the country and establish a government-in-exile. On 7 June the king and the government left Norway for England with the intent of continuing the fight there.

The main Norwegian contribution to the Allied war effort was the merchant fleet. In 1940 the fleet stood at 4.8 million tons, to include 2/5 of all the modern oil tankers in use, and the British magazine The Motorship estimated its value to the Allied cause at over a million men. Already on 10 April the British government requested the transfer of the merchant fleet to British flag to insure “that the fleet be used to its fullest possible extent for the common benefit”. The Norwegian government rejected the offer and throughout the war the fleet was managed by an organization established in London, Nortraship. In 1943 the government entered into the Hogmanay Agreement which allowed the United States to manage the movement and disposition of Norwegian ships arriving and leaving US ports. Losses for the merchant fleet during the war were over 2 million tons, 551 ships. Norwegian military units played parts in the Allied war effort, including the invasion of Europe and the protection of convoys on the North Atlantic route to Murmansk, and on 8 May 1945 Norwegian forces received the surrender of all German forces in Norway. The Nygaardsvold government returned to Oslo on 30 May and the king arrived on 7 June.

From Neutrality to NATO

The German occupation of Norway confirmed that neutrality was no longer a viable policy. Foreign Minister Koht was given much of the blame for the failures of
1940 and in 1941 he was replaced by Trygve Lie. In his first radio speech Lie laid the foundation for a new Norwegian foreign policy:

"...a near and binding cooperation that had to reach west and tie us to those nations that historically we have natural economic bonds to...And the nations that we have had the most ties with in economic areas, are people with same traditions of freedom as us, a fight for the same ideals. This is primarily the British empire...and secondly the powerful and rich united States of America."\(^{24}\)

The change in Norwegian policy was received with enthusiasm in Britain. Sir Cecil Dorner wrote to Prime Minister Anthony Eden that "they (Norway) intend henceforth to align themselves with the great democracies of the west...Lie says that he is convinced that the policy of neutrality is wrong."\(^{25}\) Lie followed the radio speech by publishing an article in The Times on 14 November 1941 entitled *A Community of Nations: Plans for a lasting peace after victory and the bankruptcy of neutrality*. In the article Lie spoke of a need for "amicable relationships" between the powers after the war, the need for military cooperation in the North Atlantic that included the United States, and the formation of "a new League of Nations". The government expanded on this in 1942 by publishing an outline of Norwegian foreign policy, the main points of which included a cooperation with the "Atlantic powers" in the defense of the North Atlantic and the full Norwegian support for the establishment of a "league of nations". But the publication also made two points very clear: that one of the most important factors in Norway's future would be a friendly and candid relationship between the west and the Soviet Union, and that if a "league of nations" was not formed Norway would seek security in a regional defense pact. The importance of
these two points became clear as the relations between western Allies and the Soviet Union deteriorated in the last year of the war.

By the end of the war the Norwegian government had shown increased confidence in the proposed United Nations, and saw the organization as a guarantor of world peace and forum for bridging the increasing east-west differences. Norwegian policy began to focus on the east-west relationship and both Lie and his successor, Halvard Lange, saw Norway's role in the post-war as a "bridge-builder" between the two emerging superpowers.

Immediately upon their return to Norway, the Nygaardsvold government resigned, as specified by the Elverum Mandate of 1940. Labor Party leader Einar Gerhardsen was appointed head of a caretaker government and Lie was selected as the first secretary general of the new United Nations. In elections in October of the same year Labor won a clear majority and Gerhardsen was appointed prime minister, with Lange as foreign minister, positions they would both hold, with brief interruptions, for the next 20 years.

One of the most immediate concerns of the Gerhardsen government was to build up the national defense. All the armed services ended the war in much better condition than they had entered it. Norway had at the end of the war over 70 naval vessels, a modern air force with 2 fighter squadrons, and a fully equipped divisional size army. Efforts to improve the armed services, however, were hampered by lack of funds and the need for an organizational plan for an armed force expected to defend Norway, not just enforce neutrality. A program, titled the Three Year Plan, was enacted by the Storting to address the shortcomings in the armed forces.
Simultaneously, the rift between the east and west increased and Lange admitted in 1946 that “the change in the international situation in the first years after the war tore away the foundations laid for the defense and foreign policy Norwegian authorities had built up prior to liberation”.26

The increased Soviet pressure on Norway for border adjustments and renegotiating of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty,27 and their blockage of disarmament and peace initiatives in the United Nations, made it apparent to both Gerhardsen and Lange that the UN was not going to be the organization to guarantee Norway’s security.28 Discussions in the government centered whether to pursue Lie’s World War II proposal of an “Atlantic Pact”, or to enter into a regional defense agreement. The only unanimity was that Norway was incapable of defending itself and that conditions had to be established in peacetime for the successful deployment of foreign military forces in Norway in the case of war.

In 1948 two events occurred that proved to be the catalyst for Norwegian movement toward a collective security arrangement. The first was the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, an event that caused such an emotional backlash among the Norwegian public that the Communist Party lost all 11 seats in the Storting in the next election. The Czech coup would provide the emotional foundation for policy change, but the Soviet pressure on Finland to sign a treaty of mutual assistance was more alarming to the government.29 The very real fear was that Stalin would present Norway with the same type of ultimatum that he had presented to Hungary, Romania, and now Finland. The Storting reacted by increasing the defense budget by 100 million kroner to 306 million kroner and establishing the groundwork for a
reorganization of the national defense. Concurrently, Lange opened confidential discussions with British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin on the possibility of Norwegian participation in an Atlantic defense agreement. In May, though, the Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Udén arrived in Oslo with proposal for a Scandinavian defense union.

The Swedish proposal appealed to those members of the government and Storting that felt that neutrality was still a viable post-war policy. The public sentiment for a joint Scandinavian solution to their common security problems also ran high, over 60% favored a Nordic defense agreement.\textsuperscript{30} Sweden, Denmark, and Norway agreed to each establish a commission to examine the requirements of a defense union. The commission met in January 1949, along the with the foreign ministers and defense ministers of each country. Almost immediately disagreement arose between Norway and Sweden, the main point being Sweden’s insistence that the defense union be a “pact for the maintenance of strict neutrality without any outside entanglements.”\textsuperscript{31} Both Lange and Norwegian Defense Minister Jens Hauge had already expressed in a New Year’s interview in the Norwegian daily Aftenposten that Norway’s security issues could only be solved by cooperation with the large western democracies.\textsuperscript{32} A further issue was Sweden’s insistence on the observance of their version of strict neutrality, which would allow any member of the defense union to opt out of military obligations to assist another state arising out of that state’s involvement in operations outside the union. Both Norway and Denmark saw this as an attack on their participation in the occupation of Germany. Another issue arose when the Norwegian government was informed by the United States government that it could
not guarantee the supply of weapons and other material to a country outside an eventual western defense pact.\textsuperscript{33} With the proposed Scandinavian defense union in serious trouble, Lange traveled to Washington to explore the possibility of Norwegian participation in an Atlantic defense pact.

Lange returned to Norway in early February to attend the Labor Party national conference. At the conference he disclosed that Norway had been invited to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Prime Minister and party leader Gerhardsen and Lange proposed a rejection of Scandinavian defense union and an immediate move towards NATO membership, partly to assure Norway of receiving military assistance and weapons from the United States. Despite a small and well organized opposition, led by Olav Ostvik, and a movement among some of the government ministers to delay a decision, made famous by Finance Minister Gundersen’s outburst “.can’t we just shut up for a while?,” Gerhardsen brought the issue to a vote.\textsuperscript{34} Believing that a rejection of the proposal would appear as a vote of no confidence to the government much of the opposition ceased and the proposal passed with 329 in favor, and 35 for delaying a decision. Gerhardsen informed the Danish and Swedish prime ministers of the position that his government was going to take, and on 29 March the Storting approved Norwegian membership in NATO by a vote of 130 to 13, with 7 members abstaining. On 4 April 1949 Norway signed the Treaty of Washington as a founding member, ending a 150 year policy of neutrality and invoking a security policy anchored firmly in the democracies of western Europe and the United States.
Norway in NATO

NATO membership left the Gerhardsen government with two immediate problems: the precarious state of the Norwegian military and relations with the Soviet Union. The military was reorganized through the five Defense of the Realm Acts (Beredskapslover) of 1950. These laws gave the government extraordinary powers in the event of an international conflict involving Norway, and enabled the military to reorganize and plan for meeting its NATO commitments. The navy moved its headquarters to Bergen, the air force moved the majority of its tactical assets to Northern Norway, and the army organized its training so that each military district (distrikskommando) had a large body of men in readiness. A Home Guard (Heimevernet) was organized, independent of the individual services but mutually supporting, incorporating all able bodied men up to the age of fifty-five. The mission of the Home Guard was territorial defense in their own districts, while the armed services where responsible for national defense and meeting Norway’s NATO treaty obligations. The build-up of the armed forces resulted in the defense budget accounting for up to one-fifth of the total budget, but is not indicative of the amount or value of the military assistance received. One Norwegian military expert concluded: “Our participation in NATO and the American program of assistance have permitted us to build up defense after the war at a much faster tempo and on a much larger scale than we could have managed ourselves”.

Over the next 40 years each arm of the armed forces would develop specific tasks to function within a national and NATO defined plan for the defense of Norway, all of which depended on NATO support and reinforcements. The navy concentrated
on anti-submarine warfare as part of its primary mission of keeping the sea lanes around Norway open, specifically to aid the movement of NATO reinforcements. The air force assumed an air superiority mission, again to protect NATO reinforcements. The army established a brigade structure, with one fully manned brigade in northern Norway, supported by prepositioned equipment for cadre-manned brigades and an extensive network of static defensive positions. NATO units were given the specific mission of reinforcing Norway and they consisted mainly of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Forces-Land (AMF-L) and an American Marine Corps air-ground task force. Norway and NATO trained these units during biannual winter training exercises held north of the Arctic Circle.

Norwegian military policy in the NATO has been closely tied to these reinforcements, both in assurances that the forces will be committed and that they are prepared to conduct their missions. This a direct legacy from the experiences from World War II when Allied reinforcements, including French Alpine troops, were totally unprepared for the challenges of the mountainous terrain and winter weather in Norway.

**Summary**

This chapter has illustrated the historical origins of Norwegian security and foreign policy, leading up to the debate over NATO membership and examining the combined effects of domination by its more powerful neighbors, Denmark and Sweden, until the beginning of the 20th century have provided the basis for the three characteristics that have had an important influence on the conduct of both security
and foreign policy. The first is the deep historical attachment to neutrality. A thousand years on the periphery of Europe have enabled the Norwegian people and its leaders to develop a disdain for the conflicts and devastation that wracked continental Europe. The subsequent involvement in one of the continental conflicts, throughout its union with Denmark, not only reinforced the contempt for international conflict, but also developed the second characteristic, a disdain for alliances. This had been growing as Norwegians increasingly saw their union with Denmark as being one-sided. The term the “dark times” was coined for this period to describe the subjugation of both Norwegian culture and ambition. This was further strengthened during the subsequent union with Sweden, leading to Norwegian independence in 1905.

With independence, however, came the realization that Norway was relatively impotent on the world arena. Norway lacked both the military and political power to insure its territorial sovereignty. The solution was to pursue international guarantees and treaties that would safeguard both the nations sovereignty and neutrality. Following the First World war this policy was actively pursued in both the League of Nations and through the Oslo Group. This is the origin of the third characteristic, and it further manifested itself in the Norwegian support for and leadership in the founding of the United Nations.

The lessons of the Second World War and the start of the Cold War made an adjustment of Norwegian security and foreign policy imperative. Neutrality as a national policy was effectively discarded in 1941 with Foreign Minister Lie’s declaration of “...an orientation towards the west.” The subsequent rejection of a
Nordic defense initiative and heightened threat from the Soviet Union, led the Norwegian government to seek membership in the emerging Atlantic Alliance.

This did not mean that the characteristics that has permeated Norwegian history were suddenly disregarded. In the next three chapters they will reappear. The adoption of both the basing policy and nuclear weapons that will be discussed in chapter two are the result of internal compromises within the governing Labor Party, opposition based on principles that the three characteristics exemplify. The discussions in chapter three and four will also be sown with references to these traits.

The final point that this chapter highlights is that NATO membership is closely identified with the Norwegian Labor Party and two extremely strong leaders within the party, Einar Gerhardsen and Halvard Lange. Without the leadership of Gerhardsen and the skillful diplomacy of Lange, Norway’s membership in the Atlantic Alliance might never have been realized. The ability of these two men to adapt Norwegian NATO membership to reflect the historical legacy of neutrality, disdain for alliances, and active engagement in international organizations while prioritizing national goals, has been the key to continued Norwegian support for the alliance among both the political leadership and population.

The next chapter will examine the historical evolution of Russian-Norwegian relations. This is important in understanding the Norwegian concern over the apparent NATO focus on central Europe and the alliance’s ability to meet the security guarantees of the Atlantic Charter in an expanded NATO. The chapter will also contain a detailed analysis of the threats posed by Russia to Norway today, a threat that is remarkably similar to the threat during the Cold War.
Notes

5. Jensen 15.
7. Jensen 28. “...ikke skyte på hverandre.”
13. The shipping companies utilized the rally cry, “...free (neutral) ships mean free (neutral) cargo!” (“...fritt skip gir fri ladning!”).
15. The issue facing Norway was that Allied shipments took priority on all ships, even Norwegian, that were traveling the transatlantic route. The result was periodic shortages of basic items in Norway.
17. Derry 296.
18. Derry 346.
19. Jensen 113. “...ville senke våre sosiale, kulturelle, og materielle standard.”
20. “våronna.”
21. A great irony is the cannon that sank the Blucher was a 1890 model made by the famous German armament consortium Krupp.
24. Riste, Norge i Krig 65. “...ha bånd vestover og knytte oss fast til de nasjoner som vi fra gammelt av har naturlige økonomiske forbindelser med...Og de nasjoner vi mest av alt har vært knyttet sammen på det økonomiske omrader, er folk med det samme frihetstradisjoner som vi, og som kjemper for den samme idealer. Det er først av alle det britiske verdensrike, verdens største statsdannelse, og dernest det mektige og rike Amerikas forente stater...”
25. Riste, Norge i Krig 67.
27. The Svalbard Treaty of 9 February 1920 was signed by Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom, United States, France, Italy, Netherlands, and
Japan. It gave complete sovereignty to Norway over the Svalbard Archipelago, to include Bjørnøya. The Soviet Union declared its adherence to the treaty in 1922, and it utilized the provisions that guaranteed nation’s that adhered to the treaty equal rights to mineral exploitation in the archipelago to establish coal mines at Barentsburg and Pyramiden. As the archipelago increased in strategic value during the Cold War, due to its proximity to the Kola peninsula and the GIUP gap, Norwegian and Soviet official clashed over perceived violations of the demilitarization clause in the treaty.

29. Lange 19.
31. Derry 416.
32. Lange 33.
35. Derry 418.
36. Hveem 225.
Chapter 2: The Threat

Introduction

Until 1905, Norway’s unions with Denmark and Sweden had predicated the assessment of threats to national sovereignty. Norwegian defense initiatives prior to 1905 were responses to general threats, with the exception of a series of small forts built specifically to ward of British commerce raiders during the Napoleonic Wars. The dissolution of the union with Sweden in 1905 was marked by the building of a string of defense lines and forts along the Norwegian-Swedish border, the first specific response to a threat in Norwegian history. The threat posed by Sweden, however, was solved by a procession of diplomatic agreements that eventually removed the possibility of conflict between the two countries altogether. Armed with an avowed policy of neutrality and buoyed by the perception that Norway still benefited from its position on the fringe of Europe, the Norwegian government’s position was that the greatest threat to sovereignty did not come from a single nation but from the involvement of Norway in a greater international conflict.

The end of the Second World War and Norway’s decision to join the NATO alliance changed this, the threat was now well defined by Norway’s active participation in a North Atlantic defense pact. The Soviet Union would be the main focus of Norwegian threat analysis throughout the Cold War, and remains so today. The challenge the Norwegian government faces is to define these threats within the realities of the post-Cold War world. Increasingly, domestic and international groups
question whether Norwegian defense expenditures and continued NATO exercises in northern Norway are a reflection of the threat that the former Soviet Union poses in the region.

This chapter will examine the history of Norwegian-Russian relations, with an emphasis on the military threat to Norway from the former Soviet Union during the Cold War and the threat posed by Russia today. It will also examine non-military threats, such as nuclear contamination, and highlight attempts by the Norwegian government to improve relations with Russia.

**Norway and Russia: Northern Neighbors**

Norway and Russia share a 196 kilometer border, the only west European nation and NATO member to do so. The border is a modern phenomena, the product of an 1826 agreement. Prior to the agreement the general area around the border, stretching approximately 150 kilometers east and west, was governed as a joint Norwegian-Russian territory.

Relations between Norway and Russia date back to the start of what is referred to as the *Pomor (pomorje)* \(^1\) trade in the early 18th century. The origin of this trade was in the fishing industry developing off the coast of Finnmark. The Russian fishing industry was underdeveloped and not capable of meeting the demands of the Russian internal market. The Norwegians were forbidden by law, because of the exclusive licenses for trade that were owned by merchants in Bergen, to trade with Russia. The inability of the Bergen merchants to provide basic items to northern Norway, however, resulted in a flourishing trade between the population of northern Norway and Russia
in Russian rye flour and timber. In 1787 restrictions on trading in Finnmark were abolished.

Over the next hundred years Norwegians would play an extensive part in the development of the area, on both sides of the border. Norwegian fishermen began to operate off the Murmansk coast, and seal hunters traveled as far as Novaya Zemlya. The Russians, increasingly not competitive as fishermen and hunters, began to find it more profitable to engage in Pomor trade, bringing northern Norwegians both grain and lumber in exchange for fish. The result was that by 1871 over 80 Norwegian boats fished off Novaya Zemlya, with less than 10 Russian boats. Simultaneously, Norwegians were given permission to settle on the Murmansk coast, and after 1859 the number of settlers in the region increased dramatically.

The range of the Norwegian fishing fleet and the number of settlers along the Murmansk coast began to cause concern among the Russian government. The increasing perception among the Russian government was that Norway posed a threat to the country’s northern territories. The renewed interest in the northern territories by the Russian government based itself on two factors that permeate Norwegian-Russian relations to this day. The first is the importance of ice-free, “warm-water”, ports. Despite its immense size Russia lacked year-round ice-free ports. This was further coupled by the realization of the Russian government after the Crimean War that their ports in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea were vulnerable to the closing of the “chokepoints” at the Dardanelles and Kattegat. The response was the founding of an administrative city, Alexandrovsk (today Polyevney), on the Kola Fjord, the stationing of naval vessels off the coast of Murmansk, and renewed efforts to increase the
Russian population on the Murmansk Oblast and the region surrounding the White Sea.

The second factor was caused by the increasing international interest in the Arctic area. Increasingly, German, Swedish, and English vessels entered the Arctic to exploit the fishing grounds and conduct scientific expeditions. It became apparent to the Russian government that if it did not conduct a vigorous and aggressive policy in the Arctic, the possibility of the legal status of Novaya Zemlya, Franz Josef Land, and the Svalbard Archipelago might come into question. Despite the fear of Norwegian ambitions in the region it was obvious to the Russian government that the Norwegians were much preferred over the continental imperial powers, England and Germany. The result was a Russian policy to support Norwegian interests in the region and this evolved to another hallmark of Norwegian-Russian relations, the Russian desire for direct and exclusive bilateral agreements with Norway.

The Norwegian assessment of a Russian threat was influenced after the union of 1815 by Sweden's historical ties to the Baltic. The fear of an expansionist Russia in the Baltic permeated Swedish foreign and security policy, and concerns over the little populated areas in the arctic were minor. The Norwegians, however, independently developed a good relationship with the Russian government, primarily over issues concerning the Arctic region. The reward for this cooperation was apparent in 1905 when Russia became one of the major international supporters of the Norwegian dissolution of the union with Sweden. In 1907 the Russian government also took an active role in the negotiations that resulted in the Integrity Agreement. The obvious advantage of this treaty to Russia was highlighted by a Russian newspaper's
commentary on the treaty: "...the fact that Norway was now a neutral state whose independence was guaranteed by the great powers eliminated the possibility of a third party occupying one of the North Norwegian ports on the Arctic Ocean."³

The Russian Revolution of 1917 effectively ended the Pomor trade. Norway now bordered the new republic of Finland in the north, and Norwegian-Soviet relations began to center around the legal status of the Svalbard and Bjørnøya. Both Svalbard and Bjørnøya were placed under Norwegian sovereignty by the Svalbard Treaty of 1920. The treaty stipulated that Svalbard would remain demilitarized and that all the treaty powers would have equal rights to exploit mineral deposits. Initially a number of companies from Europe mined for coal at Svalbard, but by the middle 1930s only the Norwegian Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani A/S and the Soviet Artikugol remained. The focus of Soviet policy continued to be to deny access to northern Norwegian ice-free ports, and now Svalbard and Bjørnøya, to the continental powers.

Both Soviet foreign policy and military disposition changed with the start of World War II. The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact stimulated Soviet ambitions in Scandinavia and cumulated with the Soviet invasion of Finland on 30 November 1939. The invasion caused a flood of sympathy for the Finns in Norway. The government was faced with the dilemma of an overwhelming open public support for Finland while it was pushing its strict policy of neutrality in the greater European conflict. The subsequent Soviet victory over the Finns, although it raised serious doubts about the ability of the Soviet armed forces, raised Norwegian suspicions about Soviet intentions in the Arctic. This was highlighted by renewed Soviet efforts to

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redefine the legal status of Svalbard and the peace settlement with Finland, which restored the old Norwegian-Russian border. The German invasion of Norway and, subsequently, the Soviet Union made the countries war-time allies and relations remained relatively positive until 1944.

In November 1944 Soviet Prime Minister Vyacheslav Molotov placed a demand on the Norwegian government-in-exile for complete annulment of the Svalbard Treaty and the secession of Bjørnøya to the Soviet Union. The demand came after the Soviet troops had finished the Potsamo-Kirkenes Operation, pushing German troops out of Finnmark. The Soviets occupied Norway as far south as Tromsø. The importance of Svalbard and Bjørnøya had grown as the ice-free port Murmansk became one of the main ports for allied war material and the headquarters for the Northern Fleet of an expanding Soviet navy. Foreign Minister Lie entered into negotiations with Molotov, but little progress was made and negotiations were eventually terminated. Despite the Soviet ambitions on Norwegian territory and the impasse over Svalbard, Soviet troops that had occupied Norway at the end of the war “generally conducted themselves properly” and withdrew to the international border in the fall of 1945.

**NATO and the Defense of Norway**

The Second World War had demonstrated the strategic importance of Norway, both in the defense of western Europe and in the successful conduct of naval operations in the Atlantic. The rugged Norwegian coastline dominates the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) from the United States that would be vital in the event of a
conflict in Europe. Northern Norway also commanded the approaches from the ice-free ports of the Murmansk coast, enabling whomever controlled Northern Norway to effectively interdict all operations from the Kola Peninsula. Consequently, the geostrategic importance of Norway increased as the conflict between the east and the west grew into the cold war. Norway was viewed as one of the "stepping-stones" for a possible Soviet military operation against western Europe. The concern over this is reflected in a report by the National security Council to President Harry Truman in September 1948:

The Scandinavian nations are strategically important to the United States and the USSR. They lie astride the great circle air route between North America and the strategic heart of western Russia, are midway on the air route between London and Moscow, and are in a position to control the exist from the Baltic and Barents Seas. Domination of Scandinavia would provide the Soviets with advanced air, guided-missile and submarine bases, thus enabling them to advance their bomb line to the west, to threaten allied operations in the North Atlantic, and to form a protective shield against allied sea or air attacks from Northwest...6

The Norwegians were aware of their increasingly important strategic position and there developed a real fear within the post-war Gerhardsen government that the Soviets would occupy northern Norway before a solution to the country's security problems could be found. That the Soviets and communism now represented the greatest threats to Norway was highlighted by Prime Minister Gerhardsen's speech at Kråkerøy in 1948:

"...That which can threaten the Norwegian peoples freedom and democracy - that is the threat that the Norwegian communist party represents. The most important task in the fight for Norwegian independence, for democracy and the protection of rights is to reduce the communist party and the communists influence as much as possible... Those that stand at the head of the Communist party in
Norway are Komintern- and Kominform communists. Like their comrade-in-arms in other countries they are in their hearts followers of terror and dictatorship..."7

The speech made it clear to the Norwegian people what the threat was in the post-war world and accelerated the process towards an inclusion in a western defense alliance.

The decision to join NATO did not immediately solve Norway’s security dilemma, despite the implicit guarantees of Article 5 of the NATO charter.8 Many of the military leaders in the alliance supported the opinion of Air Marshal Sir William Elliot who stated that, “I do not think that it would be wise to assume a successful defense of either Scandinavia or Italy...”9 The Norwegians did find support from Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and General Dwight Eisenhower, who both viewed Norway and Scandinavia as vital to the successful conduct of military operations on continental Europe by the alliance. Both believed that the perimeter of NATO was vital in guaranteeing that reinforcement could be sent from North America and understood that operations in Norway were not viewed as being “on the perimeter” of Europe from the Soviet Union’s perspective. Their influence in the development of the first NATO plan for the defense of Europe
was evident when the Medium Term Plan was announced, which was also referred to as the “perimeter defense”. The plan called for the Norwegian’s to hold the “Skibotn Line”, plus Tromsø, Narvik and Bodø. 10 The size and composition of the reinforcements to northern Norway from NATO would be based on the situation in central Europe.

The Norwegians had partially achieved both their security and political goals with the Medium Term Plan. First, a commitment was made by the alliance to send troops to Norway as part of an overall defense strategy for Europe. This was vital in view of the overall Norwegian military strategy which outlined the mission of the armed forces as “holding force” until allied reinforcements arrived. Secondly, and most significant politically, it made it clear to the Soviets that northern Norway, to include Svalbard and Bjørnøya, was strategically important to the defense of Europe and would be part of an overall NATO defense plan. It would be two decades, however, before NATO would earmark specific units for Norway. This was a serious flaw in the defense plan, according to many Norwegian military officers citing the experiences with allied troops untrained in winter warfare during World War Two.

The significance of the selection of the Medium Term Plan was that the military requirements of the plan would influence Norwegian military training and equipment acquisitions until the 1980’s. The emphasis on heavy forces and static defenses in the preparation for a Soviet assault in northern Norway left the armed forces with little flexibility in responding to a threat in the rest of the country. The military build-up and extensions of the Three Year Plan following the implementation of the Medium Term Plan did not prepare Norway for an attack similar to Operation
Weserübung. Subsequent evolution's of NATO defense plans would adopt the Maritime Strategy for the defense of northern Europe. The maritime strategy is described by the 1987 White House document *National Security Strategy of the United States*:

Maritime superiority enables to capitalize on Soviet geographic vulnerabilities and pose a global treat to the Soviet's interests. It plays a key role in plans for the defense of NATO allies on the European flanks. It also permits the United States (NATO) to tie down Soviet naval forces in a defensive posture protecting Soviet missile submarines and the seaward approaches to the Soviet homeland, and thereby minimize the wartime threat to the reinforcement and resupply of Europe by sea.\(^{11}\)

The maritime strategy was championed by Norway because it earmarked specific reinforcement to Norway and provided allied assistance in defense of southern Norway, an area neglected by the defense build-up in the 50s. Simultaneously to the adaptation of a maritime strategy for the defense of northern Europe, the United States committed a marine amphibious brigade to the defense of northern Norway and NATO earmarked specific forces from AMF-L (Allied Mobile Force-Land). The American marine force evolved into NALMAGTF (Norwegian Air Landed Marine Air-Ground Task Force) which, by agreement in 1981, had most of its equipment pre-positioned within a mountain complex in central Norway. The AMF(L) also pre-positioned some equipment in Norway, as did the NATO Composite Force (NCF), which replaced the Canadian brigade of AMF(L) in 1990.\(^{12}\) All of these forces were incorporated into the NATO Rapid Reinforcement Plan in 1982.

The adoption of the maritime strategy and earmarking of specific NATO units for the defense of Norway accomplished all of the national security goals that former
Prime Minister Lange had established after the Second World War. The military guarantees accomplished the “insurance” portion of what many Norwegians have come to refer to as the “insurance and reassurance” policy towards the Soviet Union. The “reassurance” was the portion of the policy establishing that Norway refrain from provocative actions, and making it clear to the Soviets that Norway would not be an aggressor, exemplified by the basing policy and nuclear weapons policy.\textsuperscript{13}

**Soviet Cold War Relations with Norway**

Soviet policy toward Norway during the cold war is described by Robert K. German as “applying alternative waves of threat, cajolery, and blandishment; supplementing diplomatic pressures with propaganda efforts to stimulate domestic pressures on governments; and using unilateral concessions of its neighbors as levers for obtaining still more concession from them”\textsuperscript{14}. This was part of a patient and persistent policy of attempting to weaken Norwegian ties to the west and creating, at the minimum, an extension of the eastern European buffer zone in Scandinavia. Despite its failure to keep Norway out of NATO, the limitation imposed by the basing policy and nuclear weapons policy were a product of Soviet pressures.\textsuperscript{15} The base policy and nuclear weapons policy that resulted from these self-imposed limitations would also form the basis for the Soviet’s campaign against Norwegian participation in the Atlantic defense alliance.

On 1 February 1949 in response to Soviets concerns with Norwegian NATO membership, especially the possible basing of American naval and air force units in northern Norway, Lange sent the following declaration to the Soviet Union:
Norway will never contribute to policies which have aggressive aims. Norway will not permit that Norwegian territory be used to serve policies of that nature...The Norwegian government will never accede to a pact with other nations stipulating a duty to open bases for foreign military forces on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is not attacked or threatened with attack.¹⁶

The base declaration was further modified in 1951 to accommodate for the training of NATO forces in Norway and the construction of military facilities that could serve NATO reinforcements. The Norwegian government appeased Soviet concerns about the revisions by declaring that no NATO training is to take place in Finnmark and no NATO air or naval activity operating from or to Norwegian bases was permitted east of 24° East longitude. This created a “buffer zone” that was manned only by a 500-man border guard battalion. A few years later the base policy was also modified to allow for the establishment of Headquarters of Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) at Kolsås near Oslo. Norway resisted NATO pressure for additional troops and remained the only NATO member without foreign soldiers stationed on its soil.¹⁷

The atomic weapon policy came about as a result of the decision by the United States to base atomic weapons in West Germany in 1958. The decision was met with public outcry in Norway resulting in the “Easter revolution” (Påskepprøret) by socialist student organizations. The Gerhardsen government responded by declaring that the Norwegian government “had no plans to store atomic weapons in Norway or install bases for middle-distance missiles”.¹⁸ That position has been maintained by the Norwegian government to this day, despite evidence that Norwegian pilots trained to
deliver nuclear weapons and nuclear capable Nike-Hercules air defense missiles ringed the capital, and remains one of the foundations of the security policy.

Since 1951 it has been a constant Soviet theme to exploit the limitations of these policies. The establishment of AFNORTH, allied military exercises in Norway and the Norwegian Sea, and the pre-positioning of Allied equipment were all examples, according to the Soviets, of the Norwegian’s violations of their base policy. The Soviets further exploited public opinion through propaganda by highlighting that the enlargement of air bases in northern Norway enabled them to accommodate American heavy nuclear bombers and the fact US naval vessels visiting Norwegian ports could be carrying nuclear weapons. The propaganda was aided by incidents such as the shooting down of an American reconnaissance RB-47 off the Kola coast in 1960 and the Gary Powers U-2 affair, the aircraft being scheduled to refuel at Bodø. In both instances the Soviets charged that Norwegian territory was being used by NATO and the United States for aggressive actions against the Soviet Union, in direct violation of Norway’s policy. Simultaneously, the Soviets continued to pressure the Norwegian government to renegotiate the Svalbard Treaty and make land concessions in the Arctic.

The cause of Soviet concern over Norway’s participation in NATO was twofold and grew as the exploitation of technologies made submarines and missiles strategic weapons. First, control of northern Norway and the Norwegian Sea would be vital in the Soviet goal of preventing the movement of reinforcements from the United States to Europe in the case of war. Concurrently, control of northern Norway was necessary for Soviet surface vessels and submarines to pass through the GIUP gap.
Secondly, the strategic importance of the Kola Peninsula increased as the Soviet Northern Fleet, with the strategic submarine missile force, grew. The proximity of the naval bases to Norwegian territory made the facilities and forces on the Kola vulnerable to forward deployed NATO conventional and strategic forces. A third factor also arose with the development of the intercontinental strategic bomber and cruise missiles, as the Kola Peninsula lay on the shortest route between the United States and the Soviet industrial heartland.

**Fortress Kola During the Cold War**

The northern European area, including Norway, was included in the Western Strategic Theater (*Glavny Teatr Voyennikh Deystviy*) of the Soviet armed forces, but operationally it belonged to the North-West Theater (*Teatr Voyennikh Deystviy -TVD*) of military operations. The emergence of the Murmansk Oblast as a major Soviet military area during the Cold War was mirrored the growth of the Soviet Northern
Fleet, which by 1988 was the largest and most powerful of the four Soviet fleets. Since 1945, five naval bases were established on the Kola Peninsula: Severomorsk, Motovskii, Gremikha, Polyarny and Archangalsk. With the exception of Archangalsk, all of them were ice-free year round. By 1988 the Northern Fleet had expanded to 39 strategic ballistic missile submarines, constituting two-thirds of the Soviet Union's strategic ballistic submarine fleet, and 71 principal surface combat vessels: one Kiev-class aircraft carrier, 11 cruisers, 18 destroyers and 41 frigates. The fleet was supported by 210 other vessels for logistics and patrol missions, to include 14 large amphibious assault vessels. There was also a 3000 man naval infantry brigade stationed at Peschenga to support offensive amphibious operations. The fleet constituted the main Soviet offensive naval threat against western Europe and Norway.

From 1945 to 1955 the Soviet Army had 5 infantry divisions on the Kola Peninsula. The number was reduced to two in the early 1960s, the 131st Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) at Pechenga and the 54th MRD at Maalkurtii. Both of these divisions are specially trained and equipped for arctic warfare. The infrastructure of the peninsula also was expanded throughout the 50s and 60s, so by 1988 there existed 40 major military airfields. Most of these airfields were capable of accepting large transports, and the movement of the 76th Guards Airborne Division from its headquarters at Pskov, near Leningrad, was trained on a regular basis. The 76th Guards was capable of moving to the Kola on 24 hours notice and constituted the theater reserve for the northwest. The 6th Army, the overall army command on the peninsula, also had nine motorized rifle divisions that could be mobilized in 24 to 48
hours. Both naval and ground operations had the support of over 600 combat aircraft and 200 helicopters in the Naval air arm and Air Force.

The Soviet attack on Norway would be a two stage operation: initially special operations units (Spetsnaz) would attack and eliminate Norwegian surveillance installation along the border and coast. This would be followed by Spetsnaz operations against military installations, airfields, and harbors. Simultaneous to the special operations, full mobilization of the 6th army would occur and the 131st MRD and 54th MRD would cross the border and seize Finnmark. The naval infantry would support this operation similarly as they had done in the Potsemo-Kirkenes operations of 1944, landing behind and isolating NATO units. The 6th Army, supported by seven division from the Leningrad military district, would then cross Northern Finland through the “Finnish Wedge” to attack NATO forces in the Skibotn area. The operational goal of
the Soviet would be to occupy northern Norway as far south as Bodø. Concurrent to the land operation would be the movement of Northern Fleet surface vessels and attack submarines into the GIUK gap to interdict NATO reinforcement from North America, and the movement of the strategic submarine fleet to their wartime patrol stations in the Arctic and North Atlantic.\textsuperscript{21}

To counter this, the Norwegians had one 550 man border battalion in Finnmark and a mechanized brigade in Troms. The Norwegians admitted frankly that “...We would be unable to hold back an aggressor with our small forces...”\textsuperscript{22} Despite heavy investments in static defenses, coastal forts and the advantage of terrain, the Norwegian armed forces had no illusion that they could not withstand a Soviet attack by themselves. The consequence, was the importance placed on dedicated Allied reinforcements, and in countering the Soviet efforts to drive a wedge between Norway and NATO.

**The Post-Cold War**

The end of the cold war and collapse of the Soviet Union provided Norway with an opportunity to seek bilateral economic and cultural ties with Russia in order to improve relations between the two nations. This was welcomed by the Russians who still pursued their historical policies of seeking exclusive bilateral agreement with their countries on their “near borders”. The Norwegians entered into a series of minor agreements to promote trade between the two countries, concentrating on eight major areas: fishing, shipbuilding and repair, mineral and oil exploitation, mining, forestry, general construction, tourism, and environmental technology. All of these areas were
specifically targeted because they impacted two of the major areas where Norway and Russia historically were in dispute, Svalbard and the Barents Sea dividing line, and the greatest non-military threat to Norway from Russia, radioactive contamination.

Svalbard has been an area of contention between the two countries since the 1920 Svalbard Treaty gave sovereignty to Norway. The former Soviet government made demands throughout the cold war for increased authority to mine the islands and repeatedly contended that the 1920 treaty's requirement that the archipelago remain demilitarized was being violated by Norwegian and NATO troops. Although the archipelago remains strategic geographically as a base for blocking the GIUP gap, over the last five years it has become less economically feasible to exploit the minerals on the islands. Norway has gradually closed the mines on Svalbard, but still maintains a large administrative staff there. Simultaneously the Norwegian
companies have been encouraged to establish commercial ties and assist the Russians in their mining operations.

The establishment of a dividing line between the countries in the Barents Sea has also been an area of contention. The Norwegians have proposed a median line based on the classical principle of equidistance between land reference points, the method utilized to establish the median lines in the North Sea. The Russians have proposed a line drawn from the North Pole to the mainland frontier. The difference is enormous and has become more important since the preliminary discovery of oil and gas deposits on the continental shelf off the coast of northern Norway. The Norwegian approach has been to continue negotiations, while assuring the Russian government that it is in both nation’s interests to solve this issue bilaterally. Joint mineral exploration of the continental shelf and an agreement for Norwegian-Russian management of the fish resources in Barents Sea are two of the encouraging results of these negotiations.

The issue of nuclear contamination is more difficult. The problems with the disposal of nuclear fuel and the aging nuclear power plant on the Peninsula have increased dramatically since 1991, and poses a serious environmental and health threat to Norway. In testimony to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, it was reported that Russia had over the last decade dumped 15 submarine and surface vessel nuclear reactors in the Barents Sea off Novaya Zemalya, along with over 17,000 containers of liquid and solid radioactive wastes. The environmental impact of this dumping will take years to gauge. It was also reported that the estimates of Russian disposal of radioactive material and reactors in the Barents Sea is most
likely much higher than reported. The greatest threat, however, is in the 125 nuclear submarines and 200 reactors that will have to be disposed of by 2010. The Russians lack the funds to properly support those operations and presently many of the submarines are stored afloat in the Kola Fjord. The floating storage of these vessels subjects them to environmental conditions that deteriorate their hulls and piping, resulting in numerous spills and leakage of radioactive material. Norway is in continued negotiation with the Russian government to provide assistance in the proper storage and decommissioning of the nuclear submarines. In 1995 a joint report was commissioned through the Norwegian company Kvaerner Moss Technology and the Russian company Energai that outlined the requirements for the safe decommissioning of the submarines. To date none of the recommendations have been acted upon, and the Russians have seemed to be more receptive to the concept of American assistance in the disposal of the submarines than a Norwegian initiative.

The Norwegian government has been much more successful in attempts to improve the safety and operations of the Poliarne Zor nuclear power plant on the peninsula. The reactors do not fill important safety norms, though not as potentially dangerous as the Chernobyl type RBMK reactors, and they do pose a significant threat to Norway and the Scandinavian peninsula in case of an accident. The Norwegian government has from 1992 to 1997 spent NOK 69 million to upgrade safety at the plant and is actively working with the other Nordic nations through the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation to provide alternative energy sources to the region.

The results of Norwegian efforts in improving relations with Russia and solving the long standing issues that confront the two nations are mixed.
Economically the results have been impressive with large increases in exports and imports. In 1995 trade between the countries constituted 1.2% of all Norwegian external trade, a growth of over 40% since 1990. The largest growth has been in the fishing industry, which constitutes 40% of all Norwegian exports to Russia. The value of the 1994 fish exports rose from 6 million dollars in 1993 to over 30 million dollars. The political results are also mixed, the most positive note being that Russia has been very receptive to Norwegian overtures for talks and negotiations on a wide variety of issues that during the cold war were potential “points of conflict”. Relations today between the two countries are the best since 1917. Resolving security issues has been more difficult, although as the northern area has become a less likely area for superpower confrontation the military threat to Norway has also diminished. The importance of Murmansk Oblast and the Kola Peninsula to Russia’s ability to protect and project its strategic forces still makes this a very sensitive area of the world. The loss of the “buffer zone” enjoyed by Russia since World War II and the close proximity of potentially threatening forces from NATO, is a concern to Russian military commanders. The importance of this region is evident in the fact that it the only region in which there has been no relocation of military forces since 1991.

The end of the cold war and the relocation of Soviet troops from central Europe ended what was the greatest threat to NATO, but not to Norway. Despite the force reduction imposed by the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement of 1990 and the reduction in size of the post-Soviet Russian armed forces, less of this has effected the Kola Peninsula. Although qualitatively the forces in the Kola are questionable, quantitatively they have actually remained fairly close to the levels from
the cold war. They will also continue to rise as a result of the CFE revision of 1996 in which part of the Kola was eliminated as a “flank zone”, a designation which according to the agreement would place quantitative limitations on military equipment stationed there. The treaty was also revised to allow “temporary deployments” of conventional forces to the rest of the peninsula.

The Kola Peninsula remained within the Leningrad Military District after the reorganization of the Russian command structure in 1992, and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from central Europe have made this command a forward area for the defense of Russia. Accordingly all the forces within this district were prioritized within the Russian armed forces. The two MRDs, the 131st and 54th, remain at
Pechenga and Alakurtii respectively and a second amphibious brigade has been recently established at Tumanny. The exercise level of these units have been low, mainly because of personnel shortages and lack of funds, but recent visits by Norwegian army officers to their bases have noted that the equipment appears fully operational and well maintained.\textsuperscript{27} This contradicts the official Norwegian view as presented in the annual report to the \textit{Storting} from the defense department which states that "...Russia's armed forces are today characterized by poor level of training and badly maintained equipment..."\textsuperscript{28} This view is shared by most western analysts, but Norwegian army officers point out that the readiness and high priority of the units in the Kola Peninsula was demonstrated when elements of the 131\textsuperscript{st} MRD were the first troops deployed for the Russian operations in Chechnya. The subsequent poor performance of the Russian units during the Chechnyan conflict has overshadowed the fact that the division was able to deploy over 3000 kilometers in a relatively short period and conduct operations in terrain much different from the Arctic tundra and mountains in which they train.

The Russian navy and air force has been struck the hardest by the economic difficulties faced by the Russian government. Construction of both surface vessels and submarines has been reduced drastically since 1990, while funding for training and maintenance has similarly been reduced. A vivid illustration of the difficulties of the navy was revealed in September 1995 when the electricity was cut off to the Northern Fleet naval bases because of unpaid bills. The strategic submarine fleet has also suffered since 1991, the number of submarines being reduced from 186 to 120. Operational rates are around 50\% and Russian naval officers have warned that
“without extra funding the fleet could collapse”. The air force has suffered a similar fate as the navy, with more dire consequences because of lack of training. The number of aircraft in the inventory has shrunk from over 5000 aircraft to less than half of that today. In the Kola Peninsula the number of air defense aircraft has been reduced from 370 to approximately 180 today. At the same time, the lack of funds for fuel has resulted in only a small portion of line pilots remaining on operational flight status. An illustration of this was the fact that most of the aircrews participating in the opening phases of the Chechnyian campaign had flown less than 30 hours in the previous year.

It appears that the Russian forces on the Kola Peninsula represent little threat to Norway and are, as one western military observer remarked, “more of a threat to themselves”. But if the Russian military objectives remain the same as they were during the cold war, and the target of a Russian operation would be the occupation of northern Norway, there is every indication that those objectives could be met with the Russian forces in their present condition. The reason for this is that Russian forces can reach their operational goals in northern Norway within a very short period, based on attack with little or no warning. The army units still maintain overwhelmingly favorable force ratios over the Norwegians and the readiness level of the both the MRDs on the Kola, especially the 131st, are underestimated by western observers. The navy has also the capability of supporting operations against Norway, especially limited objective amphibious operations. The Northern Fleet has one Ivan Rogov class landing craft and 13 smaller landing craft of the Aligator and Ropucha class. This is enough capacity to move the entire 61st Naval Infantry Brigade for a limited objective
amphibious operation in northern Norway. The submarine fleet, although suffering from maintenance and training problems, still would be able to screen the GIUK gap and interdict any attempt to reinforce Norwegian forces through the Norwegian Sea. The air force is probably the force where there remain the most question marks. The poor performance of aircrews during the Chechynian campaign was a direct reflection of the lack of air-to-ground and air-to-air training over the last three years. The lack of training, however, is somewhat offset by the replacement of older aircraft with the newer generation of aircraft such as the Su-27 and Mig-29, along with the fielding of advanced weapon systems for both aircraft. These aircraft are superior to any in the Norwegian inventory and are on par with the best in the NATO arsenal.

The conclusion is that the Russians are still able to carry out an attack with limited aims against northern Norway with the forces available on the Kola Peninsula, supported by forces from the Leningrad Military District. The maps showing ground troop dispositions in the Leningrad Military district in 1986 and 1996 show that there has been no change in the forces that are facing Norway. The only question remains whether the operation can be conducted without extensive preparations associated with the mobilization and deployment of forces. Most western observers believe that extensive preparations and force build-up is necessary for the Russians to be successful, thus giving the Norwegians time to man their units in northern Norway and for Allied reinforcements to arrive.\textsuperscript{33} Yet there remains some analysts who believe that the risk associated with a surprise attack, using only Spetznaz and the units stationed on the Kola, could be worth the risk. The Russian forces would then face very little opposition until they reached Troms, where the defenses would be
dependent on what reinforcements were able to reach the area from southern Norway and Europe. An operations such as this would have the great advantage of not facing the two most serious threats to a Russian operation, NALMAGTF and an American carrier group. As one Norwegian officer stated to the author, "...it is quite possible that the Russians would be in Narvik before we could react with any significant force.”

This situation remains somewhat theoretical and is in the minority, but it illustrates the difficult position Norway is placed in by its geography, deployment of military forces, and dependence on allied reinforcements.

**Summary**

This chapter examined the historical relationship between Russia, including the former Soviet Union, and Norway. Initially one based entirely on the mutual *Pomor* trade, it developed by the late 19th century into one of cooperation in the exploitation of the Barents region. During the late 19th century the two main issues dominating Russian policy towards Norway, had their origin. One is the vital need for and the importance of ice-free ports to Russia. Thus, the great strategic importance of the Kola Fjord and the ice-free ports located there. The other is the Russian policy of dealing directly and bilaterally with Norway. Originally intended to counterman the influence of the continental powers in the Barents region in late 1800s, it has remained the hallmark of Russian policy towards Norway to this day.

Economic and scientific cooperation between Norway and Russia has reduced the tension in the Arctic since the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the Kola Peninsula remains one of the most heavily militarized areas in the world. The area
remains of prime strategic importance to the defense of Russia, its ability to project its strategic submarine fleet, and defend the Russian heartland from intercontinental bombers and air launched cruise missiles. There are at present no indications of offensive intentions from the Russians in the north, yet the threat to Norwegian sovereignty from these forces is very real.

The conventional force reductions that were outlined in the CFE treaty did not markedly reduce the forces in Kola Peninsula facing northern Norway. A overview of the order of battle for the Leningrad Military District shows forces strikingly similar in strength and capability to those that were present during the Cold War. It is thus correct to assume that the Russians are still able to carry out an attack of limited aims against northern Norway. The ability of NATO to react rapidly to such a threat is paramount to the Norwegian ability to defend its territory and, again, the importance of dedicated NATO reinforcements cannot be understated. Thus, the emphasis the Norwegian government has placed on reducing tensions with its Arctic neighbor and keeping the Arctic flank as an area of vital importance to NATO.

The military threat is further compounded by the non-military threats to Norway, especially radioactive contamination, the solutions to which are very complex. Recent hearings before the U.S. Senate, however, highlighted the fact that this issue will be one that will soon possibly affect not only Norway, but all countries in the northern hemisphere.

The next chapter will examine the possible effects of NATO enlargement on Norway. This examination will be conducted in context of the historical evolution of
Norwegian security policy, the security needs of Norway, and a contemporary assessment of the threat posed by Russia.
Notes

1. Russian for coastline.
4. Excellent account of Soviet military operations in Murmansk Oblast, northern Finland, and Norway is Major James F. Gebhart, The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Papers, no. 17).
8. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of 1948 states: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...”
10. This is the same defense line established by the German army at the end of the Second World War and the influence of German staff officers in the formulation of the NATO defense plan for Norway is very evident.
12. This force includes an artillery battalion from the Georgia National Guard.
14. German 55.
17. Denmark also does not have NATO forces on its soil, although there are numerous US Air Forces bases in Greenland.
18. Eriksen, Norsk Utenriks Politikk 166.

22. Grove 54.

23. United States, United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Radioactive and other Environmental Threats to the United States and the Arctic Resulting From Past Soviet Activities, Hearing 15 August 1992 (Washington: GPO, 1992) appendix I.


27. Discussion with Norwegian intelligence officer. Norwegian Armed Forces Staff College, Oslo, March 1996.


29. Handler 43.


32. In conversation with Norwegian officer whom has visited the units, seen the equipment, and witnessed training, of 131st in 1994. His observations were that despite the problems of shortages of personnel and funds for training the unit was very capable. He also commented that western analysts had a tendency to generalize their views of the readiness of Russian units. Norwegian Armed Forces Staff College, Oslo, March 1996.

33. Discussed in both NATO’s Defense of the North and Miltær-balansen: 1996/97.
Chapter 3: The Implications of NATO Enlargement

Introduction

The decision by the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the summer of 1997 to offer membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999 will have an effect on all of the members of the alliance. The smaller members and the flank members, however, will face the greatest challenge in insuring the alliance still meets the basic premise of the alliance, their security needs. This is since they are the ones that benefit the most from membership in the alliance, and also have the least number of options in the pursuit of security.

This chapter will first examine the most commonly presented arguments for NATO expansion, with an analysis from a Norwegian perspective of those arguments. It is important here to note that Norway has publicly been very supportive of the expansion process since President Bill Clinton’s declaration that “…The question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how”1. Prior to that time the Norwegian government, led by Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal, had expressed its concerns about a rapid expansion of the alliance. Of particular concern to the Norwegians was the Russian reaction to NATO spreading eastwards. Those concerns have somewhat been laid to rest by the active engagement of Russia by NATO in the expansion process. Still, as chapter 2 highlighted, Norway’s geostrategic placement, the military importance of the Murmansk Oblast to Russia, and the Norwegian dependence on NATO reinforcements in order to meet any military threat
to its sovereignty, places relations with Russia and the potential threat from Russia as one of the important elements of Norwegian security policy.

This chapter will further examine the possible implications of NATO expansion, which are most often expressed by both Norwegian military officers and government officials. These concerns are expressed by many members of the Norwegian military and academic community in informal and unofficial discussions and debates, but center around Norway's position in an enlarged NATO. The main issues are: the marginalization of Norway in an expanded NATO, the cost of expansion, and the ability of an enlarged NATO to respond to crisis.

**Addressing the Arguments for NATO Expansion**

The Norwegian contribution to the initial debate about NATO enlargement was centered around three basic issues: the purpose of NATO expansion and the reasoning behind it, the mission of NATO after expansion in the east, and the role of the European Union in eastern Europe.

The Russian response to enlargement was also very important in the early debate. The significance that Norway places on a Russian role in Europe security policy is illustrated by Foreign Minister Godal's speech to the EUROPEFORUM Conference in 1995:

This (NATO enlargement) implies a role and a place for Russia. As a major power on the European continent, Russia must have central position in the security policy architecture which is currently being designed. Broad Russian participation and Russian input are essential to any new European security structure... enlargement would be a mistake if it were to result in the development of new dividing lines or the resurrection of old ones.²
In the same speech Prime Minister Godal also called for a wider EU role in the integration of eastern Europe stating that: “It is in Norway’s interest that the new democracies in Europe be gradually drawn into EU cooperation and ultimately become members.”\(^3\) It is with this background that three of the main arguments for NATO expansion will be assessed.

The first argument is that NATO enlargement is needed to deter Russian aggression in Eastern and Central Europe. This is one of the main arguments for NATO expansion and is fueled by people such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, who warns that Russia’s “imperial impulse remains strong and even appears to be strengthening”.\(^4\) The problem with this argument lies in interpreting the difference between Russia’s ability and capability in eastern Europe.

The 1997 Strategic Assessment published by the Institute for National Strategic studies defines Russian military capabilities as follows:

Since the late 1980s, the Russian (and formerly Soviet Union) conventional armed forces have been steadily deteriorating. Numerous troop deployments, constant changes in command structure, promotion of incompetent senior officers, large-scale and force wide corruption, infrequent training, excessive equipment downtime, draft evasion, ghost employees, and non-payment of wages have caused a large number of Russian conventional units to be unprepared for combat, incapable of functioning as units even at the tactical level.\(^5\)

This assessment would forestall any concept of Russian armed forces being an immediate military threat to any nation. When asked by the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence how capable and threatening Russian conventional
forces are, Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, answered:

They (the Russians) lack the capability to conduct a Soviet-style conventional offensive against NATO Europe and are not likely to regain that capability within the next decade... (Russia) is not likely during the next decade to regain the Soviet Union's capability to quickly mount a planned strategic offensive deep into Europe.6

The threat that is referred to by advocates of this reasoning for NATO expansion is Russia's ability to threaten the countries of Eastern Europe. That ability certainly exists, but to mount a major military operation in Eastern Europe would require months, if not years, of relatively extensive preparation and mobilization of forces.7 It is certain that the force buildup and preparations on the Russian side would be discovered and western Europe would have plenty of time to extend security guarantees to the east.

The possibility of a surprise military operation against Eastern Europe is extremely remote for two reasons. First, is the lack of objectives that can be achieved by limited and short duration conventional military operations. A quick examination of a map of eastern Europe would confirm this. Secondly, military support from western Europe to the east in the form of reinforcements and materiel would travel over fairly secure and short air/land lines of communication. This would result in a rapid response in any crisis scenario.

This is in sharp contrast to the dilemma faced by NATO's northern flank member, Norway, who faces Russian forces that can achieve their objectives with limited military operations and whose dependence on NATO reinforcements is hampered by long and vulnerable lines of communications. The argument is that
Russia does not present a military threat to Eastern Europe at this time, and what NATO really needs to address is those areas where Russian threat is the greatest, its own northern flank.

A second argument is that membership should be offered to Central Europe because it would project stability in the region. This is also one of the main arguments for NATO expansion. The problem with this argument, however, is that the countries that were offered membership are very stable, and in a sense, were chosen for NATO membership because of their stability. The regions where challenges to democratic institutions, free-market economies, and individual rights exist are not being considered for membership, nor will they in the near future. So where is NATO projecting stability? Certainly not to the three invited members. The underlying problem in this argument is that NATO does not have the means to address the most severe and challenging issues facing many of the nations of eastern Europe. This is especially true of economic and ethnic issues. An example of NATO's impotence in these issues is the failure to prevent the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the subsequent Greek-Turkish clashes.

An argument has also been forwarded that NATO expansion might actually project instability in the region. Geir Henning Eikeland of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs offers the argument that in selective expansion of NATO the non-invites will see this as an affirmation of the Russian view that Europe will still clearly be divided in two, where the areas in the earlier Soviet sphere of influence will still be looked at as "Russian". This will create an atmosphere of "have and have-nots" in Eastern Europe, and have a negative effect on both economic and political reform.
A third argument is that because it will take many years for former Warsaw Pact states to meet the economic and political standards of the European Union, Western Europe must do something to reassure these states about their prospects to be integrated into the west. This is possibly the most compelling argument for NATO membership and can also be referred to as the “emotional” argument. When United States Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited the Czech Republic she said that the extension of NATO membership was a way of “righting the wrong that was done almost 60 years ago when its European allies let Hitler leave the Munich conference smugly confident they would not fight when he sent his troops into Prague”\(^9\) and later stated that “…echoes of Munich…”\(^10\) will come from opponents of expansion. She hence raised expansion to a kind of moral crusade and a way to right the wrongs of the last sixty years, and bring the east in the fold. The reality is that much of Eastern Europe has always considered themselves part of the west, as Czech President Vaclad Havel said “…we have always belonged to the Western sphere of European civilisation…”\(^11\) and always will do so.

What this argument hides is the European, specifically the European Union’s (EU), inability to formulate any policy on the expansion of the EU eastwards. Some even question weather it is not an inability to formulate a policy but a lack of will to do so. West Europe is burdened with severe economic issues such as unemployment and the cost of agricultural subsidies, the Common Agricultural Policy is over 40% of the EU budget alone. The EU is consequently in no hurry to add the inefficient agricultural based economies of eastern Europe to its growing problems. Unemployment alone costs the EU over $240 billion in subsidies annually and has
reached over 11% percent, over eighteen million people out of work, with the prospects that it may reach 20 million before the next century.\textsuperscript{12} Since 1970 there has only been 8 million new jobs created in the European Union, compared to 41 million in the United States,\textsuperscript{13} and since 1991 four million jobs have been lost equaling twice the fall in any comparable period since the great depression of the 1930s.\textsuperscript{14} The dilemma of the EU was thus, in a sense, solved by President Clinton’s pledge to expand NATO. Western Europe could now offer something to eastern Europe without damaging their economies and heavily subsidized common market. The price for “integrating” Europe could now be borne by NATO, with the United States as the main contributor. It is interesting to note that the nations that pressed for additional countries to be invited into NATO, are the same that refuse to establish a timeline for EU expansion east. The unfortunate result is that the organization that is the best vehicle for the integration of the east and the west, the EU, refuses to do so and its member countries instead advocate expansion of an organization neither tailored to or possessing the resources to solve the challenges facing the eastern states.

Other arguments have also raised the points of dampening aggressive nationalism, promoting democracy and economic reforms in eastern Europe. The three afore mentioned arguments, however, are those most commonly raised in the debate about expansion. A debate that by the summer of 1997 seemed mute, with the invitation for membership being granted to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
Norway in an Expanded NATO

The decision by NATO to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic has major implications for Norway, and the concerns are being voiced by both government and military officials. This does not mean that the Norwegian government opposes the expansion. They are an ardent supporter of NATO consensus and thus will follow the course that the alliance chooses to takes. Nevertheless there exists deep concerns, especially concerning the future role of Norway in the alliance, the cost of the expansion, and NATO ability to meet its missions in an expanded security environment.

Marginalization

"Marginalized" is the word that a Norwegian army officer used to describe Norway in an expanded NATO. He depicted a future where Norway's role in the Atlantic alliance would be reduced by the focus on the larger new members, the military integration of the new members, and a broadening debate on who and when to invite the next candidates. That thought was further expressed by Norwegian Cabinet Minister Martin Kolberg: "We have to look in the eye the fact that allied focus will be moved exceedingly away from the north with a central European expansion of NATO. It will surely be evident in the battle for infrastructure."\textsuperscript{15}

The sheer size of the nations that are entering NATO can have impact on Norway's perceptions. The size of Poland's armed forces are 248,500 men, Hungary's 64,300 and the Czech Republic 70,000 men, all which dwarf the Norwegian armed forces of less than 30,000.\textsuperscript{16} There are two issues that are of concern that come from
the "size problem". One is a Norwegian fear that it will loose staff and command positions within the NATO system. This will most likely happen as the new members ask for NATO staff and command positions in relation to their troop and material contribution to the alliance. What makes this more of an issue is that NATO is expanding its membership while it is attempting to reduce its operating costs and reorganize its command structure. Some members will "loose out" in this process and it is likely to be the smaller contributors.

The second issue revolves around NATO’s joint decision making process. In making their joint decision making process dependent on consensus and common consent, the members of the alliance safeguard the role of each member country’s individual experience and outlook. The decision making is accomplished while committing the members to a process which allows them to act rapidly and decisively if the circumstances call for it. This is the same system that has tended to encumber the EU but not NATO, principally because the process has been dominated by the United States. Despite this the NATO decision making processes is burdened by numerous and lengthy negotiations before a compromise solution that is acceptable to all members is reached. This problem is exacerbated by the special position of France in NATO, and the continued strained relations between Greece and Turkey. The thought is that the expansion to 19 members will lead to an increased focus on national and regional issues, especially by the new members who face unique internal economic and social challenges. The "loser" in this will be the small and economically strong member, Norway, a nation which will be perceived as requiring less "assistance" from NATO.

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Cited as evidence of Norway’s marginalization are the loss of standing NATO headquarters on Norwegian soil. In July 1994 the principal features of NATO’s new command structure came into effect. These changes were predicated by the end of the cold war, and the reduction of the military forces and standing defensive commitments of the alliance members. The major elements of this change was the reduction of Major NATO Commands (MNC) from three to two: Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic. Within Allied Command Europe three Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) were created and established as Allied Forces Northwest Europe (AFNORTHWEST) at High Wycombe, United Kingdom, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) at Brunssum, Belgium, and Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples, Italy. This reorganization caused Allied Forces North Europe (AFNORTH) at Kolsås in Norway to be eliminated, along with the Principle Subordinate Command’s (PSC) at Forsvarksommando Sør-Norge (FKS) at Stavanger and Forsvarksommando Nord-Norge (FKN) at Bodø.

This was a major blow to Norwegian prestige and induced a feeling of marginalization among the Norwegian military even before the issue of enlargement became the focus of the alliance. The establishment of a PSC at Stavanger in 1994, AFNORTH, and a wartime-PSC, HQ Joint Task Force North Norway, at Bodø eliminated some of the concern, but not the reality that the defense of Norway was now entrusted to a headquarters in central England. To understand the Norwegian concerns, it is important to realize that AFNORTHWEST is 2250 kilometers way from the most likely region of land conflict in its area of responsibility, Finnmark. A
comparison is the distance from the northern tip of Denmark to the southern tip of Sicily, approximately 2300 kilometers.

Even as AFNORTH strove to become fully operational, deliberations began at NATO headquarters regarding the future command structure of the alliance. A proposal was tabled to reduce the number of MSC from three to two. This would be achieved by eliminating the newest MSC, AFNORTHWEST. The reasoning behind this reorganization according to a NATO spokesman is to make operations “easier to handle, require less staff, and save money.” AFCENT at Brunssum would then assume the responsibilities for the defense of Norway. The future of the PSC at Stavanger is thus put in doubt. The concern expressed by Norwegian military officers is that AFCENT lacks the maritime capability required for general war operations. Successful NATO naval operations in the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea have always been the cornerstone of the reinforcement and defense plans for Norway. On top of the task of expanding its area of responsibility with the new NATO members, AFCENT would also have to assimilate the process of connecting and working with the Atlantic and Eastern Atlantic naval commands. This process could take years and can have drastic effects on the alliance’s ability to respond to a crisis in Norway. Again, it is important to remember the lesson learned by the Norwegians in World War Two, that only trained and dedicated Allied reinforcements can prevent a repeat of April 1940. NATO’s ability to meet that commitment will be severely hampered by reorganization and the perception that AFCENT will not put as high priority on training and operations in Norway.
The Cost of Expansion

The eventual cost of expansion and Norway's contribution to that cost has taken an increasingly large role in the discussion of an enlarged alliance. In the recent Storting election in Norway, the Conservative Party (Høyre) leader made a special point of attacking the ruling Labor Party (Arbeiderpartiet) on the issue of financing the expansion. Conservative leader Jan Petersen made it clear that NATO expansion should not come at the expense of Norwegian defense. The present Norwegian defense budget does not have provisions that would increase funding in case of increased burden sharing costs in NATO. This point is also shared by many military officers, who see the government's commitment to a modernization program initiated in 1993 as the key to future Norwegian security policy.

The actual cost of expansion and the contributions of each member remains a issue of debate. In a recent issue of Army Times the ranking Democratic member of the House International Relations Committee, Representative Lee Hamilton of Indiana, estimated the cost between $5 billion and $125 billion. To illustrate how difficult it is to get an accurate estimation on the cost, one only needs to look at the differences between the Clinton Administration report to Congress and the one issued by the Congressional Budget Office. The reports are broken down into two funding categories, military restructuring and direct enlargement costs:

- Military Restructuring: This includes ground forces modernization, such as standardized artillery, armor upgrades, and refurbished ammunition storage. Air force modernization upgrades include the procurement of one squadron of refurbished western combat aircraft per
new member, as well as additional surface-to-air missile upgrades. It also includes expanding the capabilities of current NATO members to meet contingencies in the new member states. Accounted for are costs to correct shortfalls in deployability, logistics, and deployment. The Clinton administration puts the estimate of this at $18 billion to $33 billion over a twelve year period.\footnote{21} The Congressional Budget Office estimates this will cost $60 billion over an eleven year period.\footnote{22}

- Direct Enlargement Costs: These are the costs required to attain initial capability such as enhancements in command, control, communications and intelligence equipment. Also included is staff and language training in order to integrate new members into NATO’s command structure. The Clinton administration estimates $9 billion to $12 billion over twelve years while the Congressional Budget Office estimates $25 billion over eleven years.\footnote{23}

The total costs thus range from $45 billion to $95 billion. The question remains how much each new member will contribute to the costs. A US Defense Department estimate that each new member will and can contribute 40% percent of the cost appears to be optimistic.\footnote{24} Based on the Clinton administration figures of $45 billion, that would require a $1.5 billion dollar contribution per new member annually over a twelve year period, roughly equal to the entire combined Hungarian and Czech Republic defense budgets for 1996.\footnote{25} If the Congressional Budget Office figures are utilized, with the Defense Department estimate, it would equal a contribution of $3.5 billion each year for an eleven year period. This is roughly equivalent to the entire
Polish defense budget for 1997. This places an enormous financial burden on the new members and one that appears very difficult for them to meet without significantly increasing their defense budgets.

The contributions of the remaining NATO members could vary from $27 billion to $57 billion, depending on which study most closely reflects the actual costs. The ability of the rest of the NATO members to bear these costs are also questionable, as is the US Congress is willingness to shoulder what appears to be a very disproportionate share by the US. Most of the NATO members have had drastic declines in their defense budgets, led by Germany’s average annual decline of 7.5% per year for the period 1990-95. This, coupled with record unemployment and the difficulties that the European Union members have in meeting the fiscal requirements of the monetary union under the Maastricht Treaty, raises the question of how the expansion will be financed. The fear is that Norway, with a robust economy and low unemployment, could be encumbered with a incommensurate amount of contributions to the expansion.

The area where the costs of expansion can be most dramatic to Norway is the military modernization plan instituted in 1993. The plan is a result of a report by the Defense Commission of 1990, which examined the security requirements of Norway in the post-cold war world. The result of the report was Stortingsmelding Nummer 16, the White Paper for the Armed Forces. The goal of the restructuring plan and reorganization was to enable the armed forces to have the capability to conduct a time-limited invasion defense in one part of the country at a time, be able to secure land communications between Trøndelag and North Norway, and defend against sabotage.
and raids in the rest of the country. To accomplish this task, the army was reorganized and re-equipped from a brigade structure to a single maneuver division supported by three independent brigades. The navy was programmed for the replacement of the four 1950s era OSLO-class frigates with six new ships and the introduction of eight new missile torpedo boats (MTB). The air force began the process of evaluation replacements for the aging F-5 Freedom Fighter and the fielding of a new ground based air defense system, Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS). The cost of this program is estimated at approximately $5 billion, increasing the yearly investments in materiel acquisitions from 25% of the budget to approximately 30%.28 To meet this goal the armed forces instituted a dramatic program to reduce infrastructure and operational costs. The reductions were necessary as the defense budget changed from a 3.25% annual real increase before 1990 to a 1% real annual decline in the years 1990-95.29 Recently the Norwegian Chief of Defense, General Arne Solli, stated that defense expenditures must be increased by 1.5% in real terms annually if the armed forces are to be maintained with only minimum reductions and the modernization program sustained.30 General Solli’s concern is to avoid large investments in weapon systems and force structure that would have to be abandoned because of the lack of funds. With the budgetary margin so small for the modernization plan to be continued successfully, it is imperative that additional loads are not placed on the defense budget.

The question that remains is how much will expansion actually cost Norway and how big a burden can the defense budget carry? These questions are not easily answered, for it is nearly impossible to determine how much a nation actually
contributes to NATO overall operations and maintenance. Based on the Clinton administration and the Congressional Budget Office estimates, coupled with the Defense Departments estimate that 40% of the cost will be borne by the new members, either $27 billion or $57 billion of the cost will have to be paid by the current NATO members. If this cost was divided evenly among the members it would amount to $150 million annually for twelve years in the Clinton administration estimate, and $310 million in the Congressional Budget Office estimate. The problem is that not all the NATO members can pay. Greece and Turkey will have difficulty to find funds in their deficit budgets, while Spain and Portugal most likely will not be able to pay due to domestic austerity programs and reduced defense budgets, and both Italy and Belgium will find it difficult because of their attempts to meet the Maastricht Treaty requirements for the monetary union. It is thus not unrealistic to expect that Norway will be asked to contribute anywhere from two times to three times the figures presented above. That would represent 8% of the 1996 Norwegian defense budget of $3.7 billion in the best case, and 24% in the worst.\textsuperscript{31} It is improbable that Norway can afford to pay such cost and still maintain the modernization program instituted in 1993.

This could leaves the Norwegian government with the difficult decision of choosing what is more important, NATO enlargement or the defense modernization program. This decision is further complicated by the internal politics of defense acquisitions, the four frigates for example are very important in maintaining a Norwegian naval shipbuilding capability and also represent a major contract for Norwegian defense corporations.
The Security Guarantee

The last concern expressed is whether the present NATO members have the capacity to extend a security guarantee to the new members, and most importantly what impact the extension of the guarantee will have on NATO’s present commitments to reinforce Norway. These points were raised by the Norwegian permanent member of NATO Military Committee, Lieutenant General Dagfinn Danielsen, as an argument against NATO expansion. He quickly affirmed that the comments were his personal opinions and not the official Norwegian government position, but it clearly illustrates the skepticism within the Norwegian military that NATO can continue to meet their military obligations in an expanded alliance. Since that time the debate over the military dimension of expansion has increased with prominent retired US military officers, such as General Frederick J. Kroesen and Major General Edward B. Atkenson, raising critical questions about NATO’s ability to meet the military obligations of the alliance in the future.32

At the root of this concern are the questions of what military forces are required to make the security guarantee to the east. Estimates of the requirements to defend one the new members is the movement eastward of six German divisions, one French division, one United Kingdom division, one Belgian brigade, one Dutch brigade, and four American brigades.33 In addition, command and control, and logistics units would have to accompany the combat units. What airpower and, in the case of Poland, naval assets would be necessary has not been determined. This would put a tremendous strain on NATO’s ability to meet their commitments elsewhere,
especially in light of the reductions made in all of the members armed forces since 1992.

In 1991 NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept, one that was to reflect the new political and security environment in Europe. The concept called for a force structure which would enable the alliance to respond effectively to a wide spectrum of risks and contingencies. This new structure would place an emphasis on flexible, mobile and highly deployable units. Simultaneously a reduction in the overall peacetime strength of the NATO forces was instituted. These included:

- Ground Forces: a 25% reduction in the total number of alliance ground combat units and reduction of over 45% in the peacetime strength of NATO’s land forces in the central region, with a large proportion of the total land force requirement being met by mobilizable units.

- Naval Forces: A reduction of over 10% in the number of naval combat units, including aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and submarines assigned to NATO and normally deployed within the NATO area.

- Air Forces: a decrease of over 25% in the total number of combat aircraft assigned to NATO and stationed in Europe, with a 45% reduction of air forces in the central and northern region, and a 25% reduction in air force reinforcements from the United States.\(^{34}\)

It is important to note that the largest reduction in NATO forces came in the central region, it is exactly these forces that will be required to respond to a crisis in the east. With the reduction in forces came an assurance to the flank members that the
commitments for reinforcements would be kept. There is increasing Norwegian skepticism to this, however, not because of the lack of will but because the of the lack of capacity and capability.

The reduction in capability is reinforced by the increased "dual hatting" of military units. This is the practice of assigning a military unit to several organizations, for example an infantry division assigned to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps-Land (ARRC) might also be assigned to the French-German EUROCORPS and additionally for national contingency missions. The difficulty with this practice becomes immediately apparent when multiple contingencies arise simultaneously.

A second problem associated with "dual hatting" units that is unique to the NATO reinforcement scenario in northern Norway is the special training and acclimation required for units to be combat effective in the Arctic environment. This was a painful lesson learned by the allied units in 1940. Yearly winter training exercises in the Arctic of NATO units earmarked for Norway has thus become a cornerstone of Norwegian security policy and has its origins in the experiences of World War Two. Norwegian Chief of Defense General Solli confirmed this in his long term report to the Storting where he declared that "...it is essential that possible reinforcement forces have the opportunity to exercise in Norway." If the units have not had adequate winter training there is a real possibility that they will become combat ineffective due to the environmental challenges. The reinforcements are thus more of a burden to Norway than as an asset.

So what are the implications for Norway? At the present time, allied reinforcements having Norway as their deployable option comprise 24,000 men and 14
air squadron of about 250 aircraft. According to LtGen Danielsen’s argument, NATO could not make this commitment if faced with a similar contingency in eastern Europe, since the forces do not exist. The obvious answer then is to either modify the commitment to the defense of Norway, or to build-up force capabilities in NATO to a level that more accurately reflect the contingency requirements of the alliance. The fear, obviously, is that the former option will be taken, an opinion supported by the continued cuts in continental European defense budgets.

Summary

Despite open public support for the NATO expansion process, both Norwegian military officers and political figures remain concerned about the implications of the expansion on Norway. Prior to the conference in Madrid, the debate centered around the common arguments for expansion. Now that expansion has become a reality and the invitations extended, the debate has shifted towards the future role of Norway in the alliance. The concerns expressed have an underlying theme. Can the alliances continue to provide the same security guarantees to Norway as it has for the last 50 years?

The concern over marginalization within the alliance is often an emotional one for Norwegians. The “dark times” of Danish rule and the union with Sweden have left Norwegians with a fear of being dominated by larger, more powerful partners. They want the security needs of Norway to be viewed by NATO as of prime importance to the alliance, in an essence that their needs are as important to the alliance as the needs of the rest of the members. But recent reorganization in the NATO command structure
has challenged this notion. Not only has the headquarters responsible for operations in Norway been moved over 2000 kilometers away, but there is also a second proposal to shut-down this headquarters and give the responsibilities to AFCENT. The move to AFCENT would further reinforce the opinion that NATO will have a central European focus in the future, and that Norwegian security needs would be secondary. This is further compounded by the sheer size of the new members, imposing to a nation that only has a professional military numbering 12,000.\textsuperscript{37} Also there is concern over whether the issue of adding more members will upset the alliance’s joint decision making process.

The cost of expansion has been the issue that has been the most difficult to clarify, with estimates from $45 billion to $95 billion. The Norwegian government is faced with a 1% real annual decline in the defense budget and the continued costs of a modernization program deemed vital to Norwegian security needs. A requirement to contribute to expansion costs, possibly a disproportionate amount, could put the government in the position of having to choose between the continued force modernization or contributions to the NATO enlargement process.

The issue that is the most challenging, however, is whether an enlarged NATO can still meet the security guarantees to Norway. When Lieutenant General Danielsen originally raised this issue there had been little open debate about the military dimensions of enlargement. Since the Madrid conference the debate has increased with prominent retired US military officers, such as General Kroesen and Major General Atkenson, raising the question about NATO ability to meet the military obligations of the alliance. This issue is of prime importance to the Norwegian
government, since Norway cannot defend itself alone, and is totally reliant on the military guarantees of the alliance.

The difficulty faced by the Norwegian government is that there appears to be no present alternative to its membership in NATO, and it has publicly committed itself to NATO expansion. The next chapter will explore some of the options that the Norwegian government has, should it decide that NATO no longer meets the security needs. The question is whether those options are viable within the present European security environment, and also whether the internal political debate in Norway will support the search for alternative means of meeting the nations security needs.
Notes

7. An assessment of Russian ability to mount major military operations is made in both Militærbalansen 1996/97 and Strategic Assessment 1997.
23. “USA counts the cost,” and “US worry,” Jane’s Defense Weekly. A RAND Corporation report puts the estimate for expansion at $70-110 billion for improving forces of new members, improving power projection of allied forces and stationing a limited number of NATO troops in the new member states:
RAND Corporation, *What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?* April 1996. There are also numerous other estimates, but since a US decision will be most likely be made based on the one of the two estimates presented, the decision was made to utilize them for the comparison.


34. *NATO Handbook* 164-165.


Chapter 4: Alternatives to NATO and the Internal Political Debate

Introduction

The decision by NATO to offer membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic has increased the debate over the implications of NATO enlargement on Norwegian security policy. This debate has raised the question of whether NATO can continue to be the cornerstone of Norwegian security policy. Complicating this debate is Norway's position as somewhat of an "outsider" in Europe, because of its rejection of European Union membership in national referendums. The rejection of the EU exemplifies the Norwegian population's rebuff of what they perceive as continental European attempts to infringe on their sovereignty and exploit their natural resources. Despite the rejection of the EU, however, the Norwegian population overwhelmingly supports continued Norwegian membership in NATO. The dilemma for the government is to balance the desires of the populace with the realities of a changing European security environment, an environment where Norway increasingly struggles to stay involved.

The previous chapters of this thesis have explored Norway's move from a policy of neutrality to collective security, the historical and contemporary issues surrounding Norway's security relationship with Russia, and the concerns over the implications of NATO enlargement. This chapter will examine the possible courses that Norwegian security policy may take in response to expansion of the alliance and the perception that it no longer meets the nation's security needs.
The initial focus of the chapter will be the presentation of three options for future Norwegian security policy. The first is closer ties to the Western European Union (WEU), in conjunction with the union's implementation of a European defense initiative. The second is an extension of defense cooperation with the United States, through a bilateral defense agreement. The last option is the reemergence of a Nordic defense initiative similar to the one that was rejected in 1948, one that is encouraged by the broad Nordic cooperation in many other areas. All of the options will be examined for their feasibility, especially in the context of the three characteristics described in chapter one and Norway's current position in Europe as a non-member of the European Union.

Finally, this chapter will further examine the internal Norwegian political debate concerning security issues. The parties that have dominated the debate over security issues and NATO will be identified, as well as the unique internal political conditions that make an open national discussion over the implications of NATO enlargement so very unlikely.

The Western European Union

Recent years have seen the WEU increasingly referred to as "NATO's European pillar and the EU defense arm". Though never envisioned as a replacement for NATO, the WEU is increasingly viewed by many of the members of the alliance as an instrument for managing crisis in which the Europeans can undertake their full share of the political and military burden. The obvious interest that the Norwegian government has is whether the WEU will, through a gradual evolution, become the
foundation for a common European defense. Key to this, according to Foreign Minster Godal, is the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept and the development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. Both of these are moving closer to being a reality. The question thus arises: Can an evolved WEU be viewed as a viable alternative for the security requirements for Norway in the future?

There are obvious European internal challenges to a WEU led European defense initiative, but the issues that face Norwegian participation and dependence on such an initiative are very unique. The first is historical. The perception among Norwegian military and government officials is that WEU maintains a strictly “continental” focus. Norway’s historical position of being on the fringe of Europe, both geographically and politically, thus places it outside of the WEU’s area of prime interest. To fully appreciate this point it is necessary to understand the origins, membership, and reemergence of the WEU.

The WEU is a defense organization founded by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom with basis in the Brussels Treaty of 1948, which in its part evolved from the French-British Dunkirk Treaty of 1947. The original intent of the treaty was to insure military cooperation in the event of German aggression, but it evolved to address the issues of Soviet supported communist expansion and military threat to western Europe. The Brussels Treaty was revised in 1954 with West Germany and Italy added to the organization. The role of the organization, however, was overshadowed by the emergence of NATO as the foundation for all European defense initiatives. Between 1957 and 1973, the main role
of the organization was to serve as a bilateral forum between the "EEC six" and non-EEC member United Kingdom. With the UK entry into the EEC in 1973, the organization went into a "hibernation", although the organizational framework was maintained. The WEU "reawakened" in 1984 with the Rome Declaration, a mainly French initiative. The WEU, since that point, has aimed to reorganize its structure and redefine its role to the EU, NATO, and eastern Europe. Instrumental in the reemergence of the WEU over the next several years was a general continental European dissatisfaction with US policy towards the Soviet Union, lead by France.

On 27 October 1987, the WEU foreign and defense ministers approved the "Platform on European Security". The platform lays down the principles to guide the security and defense political cooperation between WEU member countries. Part V of the agreement states that the member countries in WEU are committed to give all possible "military, other help and assistance" in case of attack against one of its members. The Norwegian government sees this as actually a stronger mutual commitment than is the case of in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Thus, there was a renewed Norwegian interest in the evolution of the organization.

Since 1990 the organization has attempted to redefine its role in the changing security environment of Europe. The WEU was initially envisioned as becoming responsible for the coordination of European efforts in certain types of crisis situations in Europe. Although originally focusing only on Europe, the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 established that the WEU can also be utilized for the following operations outside of Europe:
- Operations in connection with crisis management.
- Peacekeeping tasks, including embargo and enforcement of sanctions.
- Humanitarian and rescue operations.
- Evacuation of WEU member civilians from crisis areas.

This was later enhanced by the adoption of the CJTF concept. This is a concept under which the WEU can draw on the resources of NATO to conduct military operations that the non-WEU members of NATO either do not want to participate or cannot participate in.

Despite this, the Norwegian government’s reaction to the reemergence of the WEU has otherwise been largely positive as exemplified by Foreign Minister Godal’s Speech to the EUROPAFORUM in 1995:

Norway considers it essential to participate actively in the development of European security and defense cooperation and the WEU. European security and defense cooperation should be further developed in a way that facilitates the participation of a wider circle of European countries. It would be unwise not to take advantage of the contributions towards solving common European tasks that broad participation could offer.²

Increasingly, however, the WEU and the EU were referred to as being linked. The same speech that cited the WEU so positively also highlighted that the Norwegian government does share the view that the WEU can not act as the “defense arm” of the EU and somehow replace the existing defense structure in Europe without a broad based attempt to meet the security needs of non-EU members:

The WEU should be maintained as an independent organization. If the WEU is integrated with the EU, Norway should be given an opportunity to associate with this part of the EU cooperation.³
That WEU should be maintained as an independent organization emphasizes the Norwegian view that the WEU cannot replace NATO, that it must assume a role as complimentary European pillar to the Atlantic pact. The reason for this is twofold. The first is that Norway is not a member of the EU, and only an associate member of the WEU. Of the 18 full members, associate members, and nations with observer status only Norway, Iceland, and Turkey are not EU members. Thus, the Norwegian government has little ability to influence either organization, and especially important is that they do not have vote in the critical discussions being conducted among EU members as part of expanding the Maastricht Treaty to include a common European defense. This is critical, for it is becoming apparent there does not exist a broad enough support within the Norwegian political parties or population to reopen the issue of EU membership, which has been rejected twice in national referendums.

Norwegian populace has twice rejected membership in the EU, in 1972 and 1994. In both instances the questions of a loss of national sovereignty by the transfer to the EU of certain executive responsibilities and the potential threat to the nation's maritime industries were the overriding factors in the rejection of membership. There is no indication that those issues would not also dominate the debate should a renewed attempt to join the EU be launched by the government, especially as the Norwegian populace observes the continued debate in Denmark over the loss of sovereignty associated with the Maastricht Treaty and the continued economic difficulties of the agricultural sector in Sweden since membership. Consequently, a renewed effort to join the EU over the issue of security would most likely be overshadowed by the issues
that dominated the previous referendums. The key to increased role of the WEU in Norwegian security policy is thus linked to future EU membership.

The second reason is based on the skepticism expressed by many Norwegian military officers to the WEU's ability to assume the role of coordinating and orchestrating military operations, and eventually lead a European defense initiative. The complexity of NATO's operation in Bosnia exemplified just how involved combined operations are. Despite the fact that over 80% of NATO's staff and troops are European, there still was a heavy dependence on US expertise and leadership to coordinate the operation. There was also concern over the indecisiveness of European policy before the Dayton negotiations, which reinforced the belief that many of the decision-making challenges that are experienced by the EU would also be faced by the WEU.

Another, and more subtle, concern is in line with the Norwegian fear of marginalization within a European defense initiative and the perception of a continental focus. If the WEU became the "European pillar" of NATO, it would mean that the WEU would fill certain military posts within the NATO command structure. The most likely positions would be as Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH). Although none of these positions are viewed as vital to preserving Norwegian interests in NATO, the occupation of these positions by French or Spanish officers, who are outside the normal NATO command structure, could certainly reduce the importance placed on the north flank. Should the
WEU be organized as the “defense arm” of the EU outside of NATO, this would obviously preclude Norwegian participation in any of the command or staff positions.

Foreign Ministry cabinet minister Kolberg summarizes Norway and the WEU as follows:

For Norway, as a non-member of the EU, the integration of the WEU into the EU is problematic. If it is the intention that the EU can unitize NATO resources, as the WEU can today, we can (Norway) be left without any influence. Our associate membership in the WEU is problem enough, since we can only attach ourselves to resolutions passed.4

The issues raised over Norwegian involvement in a European defensive initiative in the WEU are really the same as many of the ones raised in chapter 3. Marginalization, a continental (central European) focus, and an inability to meet the security guarantees are the same raised in arguments against an enlarged alliance. The issue with the WEU is, nevertheless, dominated by Norway’s position outside the European Community. As long as the WEU is viewed as the “defense arm” of the EU and Norway remains outside of the union, there is no reason to assume that the WEU will play a larger role in Norwegian security issues. The Berlin conference in 1995 enhanced the position of the associate members of the WEU within the organization. But their formal status has not changed. Therefore, membership in a European defense initiative outside of NATO is unrealistic. Should a European defense initiative emerge within NATO it is imperative that full members of NATO must also have corresponding rights within the WEU, as far as planning and conducting operations where NATO resources are concerned.
Closer Ties to the United States

The relationship with the United States has been an important part of Norwegian defense policy since 1948. Some would argue that it has been the dominant factor in Norwegian security policy since Trygve Lie’s 1941 speech in which he stated:

...a near and binding cooperation that had to reach west and tie us to those nations that historically we have natural economic bonds to...And the nations that we have had the most ties with in economic areas, are people with same traditions of freedom as us, fight for the same ideals. This is primarily the British empire...and secondly the powerful and rich United States of America.

The fading of the British Empire after the Second World War and the emergence of the United States as the dominant world power made the US the target of the “binding and near cooperation” that was necessary to ensure Norwegian security. Since Norway’s entry into NATO in 1949, it has been the role of every government to balance its relationship with the United States, in and outside of NATO, while projecting the desire to remain a member of the European family of nations.

The importance of the commitment of the United States to Norwegian defense is exemplified by Christian Borch’s article on Norway’s foreign policy for the Official Documentation and Information Service from Norway, which declares that, “Norway is completely dependent upon a military guarantee from the USA.” This does somewhat conflict with the foreign department declaration to the Storting in Storting Report Number 11 that, “...for Norway it will still be important to maintain NATO as the central western forum for defense(issues)...” The issue is whether Norway should
seek closer cooperation with the United States to offset the possible negative implications of NATO enlargement.

The United States has played a major role in the development of the Norwegian armed forces since 1945. Although both the Army and the Air Force were initially re-equipped after the war with surplus British equipment and captured German war-stocks, by the middle 1950s there was a significant shift towards American military equipment. This was followed by increased Norwegian participation in NATO and US training programs that enabled Norwegian military officer to receive advanced schooling and training in the United States. Over the next decade developed what Major Victor M. Bird in America’s Post-Cold War Commitment to Norway terms “the Norwegian security triangle”.

...Norway has maintained a balanced relationship with partners, America and Europe, who have provided the strategic balance to deter the Soviets. Norway’s intention has been to optimize security while maximizing freedom of maneuver. The triangle provides Norway with credible defense on Norwegian terms and secured the essential American commitment. Yet, the institutional framework shielded Norway from (perceived) susceptibility to domineering US influence. Norway believes that perpetuating this triangular relationship is a desirable and suitable means for dealing with the new European security environment...Norwegian membership in the EC would maintain the integrity of the triangular security relationship by strengthening European tie – now threatened by the decline of NATO’s primacy...Without a strong European tie, Norway could become more dependent on a bilateral relationship with the US.

Bird’s study was completed in 1992 and does not reflect the 1994 rejection of EU membership, a rejection that has placed the triangular relationship in jeopardy. His study also does not reflect the emergence of a possible European defense initiative.
outside of NATO. Both of these are events that make a scenario of a closer bilateral defense relationship between the US and Norway possible.

Reinforcing this possibility is the increased American commitment to Norwegian defense since 1980. This commitment consists of five programs:

1. Norway Air Landed Marine Air Ground task Force (NALMAGTF): In accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the governments of Norway and the United States signed 16 January 1981, the US has prepositioned the equipment for a US Marine Corps Task Force from the Second Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) in central Norway. Using nearby airfields that support heavy air transports, NALMAGTF can begin reinforcing Norway within hours of a decision to commit troops. The cost of prepositioning was originally carried by the US, but a recent revision of the 1981 MOU has placed most of the cost burden on Norway.

2. The Collocated Operating Bases (COB): An agreement between the US and Norway to provide for the prepositioned support of US Air Force planes at nine Norwegian airfields: Andøya, Bardufoss, Bodø, Flesland, Gardermoen, Øland, Rygge, Sola, and Værnes. The agreement calls for the construction of NATO second and third generation hardened aircraft shelters, compatibility of armament and ground support equipment, and maintenance of runways to insure compatibility with US aircraft operations.
3. The Invictus Program: Originally a 1980 bilateral agreement between the US and Norway that allowed for the storage of two fleet hospitals (500 bed), spare parts, fuel and ammunition for the US Navy. Since 1992 one of the fleet hospitals has been removed, while the other is now prepositioned in the same complex that stores NALMAGTF.

4. NATO Composite Force (NCF): Consist of one US artillery battalion, one German artillery battalion and a Norwegian helicopter unit. The equipment for the artillery units is prepositioned in Troms in northern Norway. Until 1997 a battalion from the Georgia National Guard fulfilled the American NCF commitment. That mission is now being reassigned to another artillery unit.

With the exception of the NCF, all of the other security programs stand outside of the NATO commitments to Norway. Also of significance is the increased US participation in NATO and Norwegian training exercises since 1990. During the Persian Gulf war in 1991 the United States participated fully in the NATO winter exercise, demonstrating both a commitment to the joint defense of Norway, but also the capability to simultaneously respond to crisis situations in two vastly different parts of the world. This was not lost on the Norwegians who have had increasing difficulty in getting the other NATO nations to participate in training exercises in northern Norway and perceive a continental focus in discussions of European defense initiatives.

The appearance is that Norway can meet all of its security needs through expanded and continued bilateral military cooperation with the United States. There
are still two problems with such a solution, which would entail a bilateral defense agreement with the United States. The first is that it would further put Norway "outside" of Europe, especially in regards to defense issues. Despite the reservations expressed by the Norwegian government and military over the course of European defense initiatives, especially outside of NATO, and the implications of NATO enlargement, there still remains a desire by the Norwegian government to stay engaged in the discussion and decisions regarding a possible European defense initiative. Consequently, a decision to seek a bilateral military alliance would further place Norway outside of Europe. The implications of this are made clear in the previous discussion of Norwegian views of the WEU. As an associate member of the EU and non-member of the EU, Norway would be left without any influence over the European defense process. This is one of the reasons that the Norwegian government presently has made it clear that any initiative in the WEU, or separately in the EU, cannot come at the cost of NATO.\textsuperscript{10} Norway cannot afford to disengage itself from Europe.

Placing itself outside of Europe can also have severe effects on the economy in Norway. With all of its traditional trading partners, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark, in the EU Norway increasingly finds it more challenging to maintain the competitive edge of its economy. The economy has a high dependence on international trade, with over 80% of Norway's export of goods and services going to the EU’s 15 countries.\textsuperscript{11} The enhanced EU restrictions on imports and many finished goods make it increasingly difficult for small to medium sized Norwegian firms to compete in the European market place.\textsuperscript{12} Despite its position as Europe’s largest
producer of oil and gas, there is increasing pressure from producers in eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Russia, who have favorable trade agreements with the EU. The fear is that increased marginalization in the political and security environment of Europe, due to closer ties to the US, can lead to economic marginalization in an increasingly competitive and restricted European market.

The second issue with a bilateral defense alliance with the US lies in the one of two of the characteristics discussed in chapter one. Geir Lundestad, member of the Nobel Institute and history professor at the University of Oslo, identifies these characteristics as a historical belief in neutrality and detachment from “great-power politics”, or fear of alliances.\textsuperscript{13} He claims that despite 50 years of NATO membership, these traits still pervade both Norwegian society and government. This is what makes Norway at once both wary of European involvement and fearful of European exclusion. This also leads to fear of domination by a larger more powerful partner, in this case the United States. Norway, in many ways, would like to maintain its historical policy of active engagement with all nations and organizations, but only to the degree that it achieves essential national objectives and only if the terms are likely to minimize the risk of domination.\textsuperscript{14} Bird claims in his study that this risk was minimized by Norway’s pursuit of the triangular relationship with America and Europe. It is more likely, however, that this risk was reduced by the active Norwegian membership in NATO and the strategic importance placed on Norway in the event of an east-west conflict. The relative importance of Norway was thus raised disproportionately to its political and military strength. In that position Norway was able to pursue policies that it would otherwise have been unable to, such as the base
policy and the nuclear weapons policy. Today, with the reduced possibility of an east-west conflict, Norway’s role in NATO is in perceived decline, the options would be severely reduced should the Norwegian government enter into a bilateral defense agreement with the US.

The Reemergence of a Nordic Defense Initiative

There are other possibilities that have been debated in regards to meeting Norwegian security needs, should NATO be unable to meet its guarantees. The expansion of the security role of the United Nations and Norwegian participation in such an organization is discussed in detail in the political platform of the Norwegian Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti), but it is an unrealistic option based on the current world political and security climate. Several parties on the left of Norwegian politics, the Norwegian Communist Party (Den Norske Kommunistparti) and Red Election Alliance (Rød Valg Allianse) suggest solving Norway’s most pressing security issues through direct bilateral treaties with Russia. The Norwegian government has refused to address security issues bilaterally with the former Soviet Union, now Russia, since NATO membership in 1949, although it has pursued economic, environmental, and cultural agreements. Norway’s present position within NATO and the radical left parties position on the fringe of both Norwegian politics and society suggest that this is an option for discussion among the leftist academics only. The one option that can be seen as viable, by all political parties and the Norwegian populace, is the reemergence of a Nordic defense initiative.
Since the rejection of a Nordic defense union in 1948, there has been a rapid development of cooperation among the Nordic countries in many areas. The establishment of the Nordic Council and later the Nordic Council of Ministers has led to close cooperation in most areas of society. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a similarly rapid rise in the areas of foreign and security policy. Much of this was attributed to the expectations that Norway would join Sweden and Finland in joining the EU. The rejection of EU membership by Norway was expected to dampen the drive for further cooperation among the Nordic countries, since Norway sat outside the European Union. The opposite has actually happened; the Norwegian government has attempted to stimulate more comprehensive Nordic cooperation. Norwegian Foreign Minister Godal declared that:

The changes over the last few years have made it possible to build a new foundation for Nordic cooperation. A more dynamic relationship is now developing, based on a joint security agenda. Finland and Sweden are active PFP (Partnership for Peace) partners...The possibility of increased cooperation peace support missions is being explored. There are many new possibilities to be exploited.
This gives hope to those who see a Nordic defense initiative as the solution, should NATO fail to meet Norway's security needs. The present cooperation has focused on foreign policy, particularly within the framework of the UN, the multilateral development banks, and other global organizations.

There has also been a greater focus on regional security issues resulting in triennial meetings of the Nordic Defense Ministers. The result of this has been the founding of the Barents Cooperation in 1993, which includes Russia and observers from other European nations. The Barents Cooperation meets on two levels: the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Regional Council. The Barents cooperation has been very successful in addressing the concerns over radioactive contamination from the North Fleet bases in Murmansk and the safety of the Poljarnye Zor nuclear power plant. Agreement on broader security concerns has been more difficult to reach and is blamed on two factors: the historically neutral tradition of both Finland and Sweden, and the historical Russian opposition to any defense agreements between Finland and the rest of Scandinavia. Only the issue of Russian opposition to Finnish membership in a Nordic defense initiative seems presently surmountable.

Another area where Nordic defense cooperation has been very successful is the combined training of peacekeeping troops for UN operations. The origin of the combined training is the Skagen Document issued by the Nordic Council in 1991. This document outlined a proposal from the Nordic countries for strengthening UN peacekeeping operations. This was very favorably received in both the UN and Europe, and the result was that the Scandinavian countries were asked to form a
combined battalion for peacekeeping duties in Macedonia. The unit, NORDBAT, was deployed in 1993 and consists of a Danish headquarters company and an infantry company each from Norway, Sweden, and Finland. The success of this unit led it to be transferred to Bosnia in 1994 and it served attached to the American division in the Bosnia implementation force. Today it continues to serve as part of the stabilization force in Bosnia.

Despite the apparent success of Scandinavian security cooperation in the Barents Sea region and in the UN peacekeeping operations there appears little desire to move beyond the current framework of cooperation. The Norwegian government has admitted that “...here is no indication of a ...willingness to establish any form of isolated Nordic defense cooperation.”17 There is also the problem of both the Finnish and Swedish traditions of neutrality. Both have chose observer status in WEU after joining the EU in order to “avoid entanglements in any military alliances”, and have been active supporters of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. There thus appears to be little present momentum in the Nordic countries to seek security in any collective security organizations, although if a European security initiative is developed within the EU and outside of NATO it might place the two countries in the situation of having to choose between a broader European security initiative or revitalizing the initiative that was rejected in 1948.

The Internal Norwegian Political Debate

Despite the debate within the Norwegian military and among defense
experts, there is very little internal political debate about Norwegian security policy and NATO expansion. This follows a historical trend. A study by Ottar Hellevik revealed that relatively few questions were asked about foreign policy during the parliamentary question hour, about 3.5% of the total. More interesting was the fact that, since joining NATO in 1949, during periods of international crisis the number of questions actually dropped. What this reveals is not an apathy towards international security issues and Norwegian defense, but a national consensus towards the course taken by Norway in 1949 among all the political parties and the general population. This consensus has been consistent over the last 40 years as the two following polls conducted among active political party members and leaders in the parties with the largest Storting representation demonstrate:

Poll conducted 13 April 1957.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should Norway be a member of NATO or not?</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>KrF</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>K</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway should be a member</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway should not be a member</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not know</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Poll conducted 1994.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does Norwegian NATO membership provide security for the country?</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>KrF</th>
<th>SV</th>
<th>SP</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>FrP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does provide security</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increases danger</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makes no difference</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not know</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The polls confirm Richard Bitzinger’s study on the politics of defense in Norway after NATO membership which concluded that:

Basically, nearly all major traditional actors in the country’s policy- and decision-making process- politicians (from conservative right to social democratic left), bureaucrats, the military, various civilian advisors and analysts, the trade unions, business organizations, and the local media-have been for the most part in agreement over the fundamental elements of national security policy.\textsuperscript{21}

The agreement on national security policy is also present in the general population, where polls conducted over the last 10 years show an average 75% favorable approval rating for NATO membership.\textsuperscript{22} This consensus has overridden the traditional characteristics of neutrality and disdain for alliances, while reinforcing the notion that Norway can be actively engaged in an organization on its own terms. The 75% favorable rating among the population has also resulted in public internal political debate concerning NATO and the implications of expansion on Norwegian security needs being very limited.

All the major parties in Norway support NATO membership. Consequently, NATO is named as the cornerstone of Norwegian scrutiny policy and defense in the party platform of every major political party. The Labor Party and the Conservatives have dominated the security issue in Norwegian politics over the last fifty years and continue to do so, while the two parties in the center, the Center Party and Christian Peoples Party, have traditionally not shown much interest in security matters.\textsuperscript{23} It is only the minor parties on the radical left, such as the Socialist Left Party, that question the direction of Norwegian security policy and its membership in NATO.
The poll also reflects a fifty year shift away from neutrality and non-alliance. NATO membership was initially a Labor Party initiative. Sold to the party through the leadership of Gerhardsen and Lange. The consensus among the Labor Party to seek membership in the Atlantic Alliance, rejecting a Nordic defense initiative and presenting no other option for security, left the other Norwegian political parties with little choice but to support the Labor proposal in the Storting. The subsequent decision in favor was thus never really in doubt.24

This exemplifies one of three features of Norwegian politics that make it difficult to originate a national political and public debate over Norwegian security policy and NATO expansion. The first is that ruling party is especially prone to important foreign policy decision making within the party apparatus. The major historical precedent for this is Norway’s decision to join NATO. As discussed in detail in chapter one, the major debate over the course of Norwegian security policy and the decision to join NATO was made at the Labor Party conference in 1949, public debate was very limited and reactive to the Labor proposal. This is one reason why almost all key security policy decisions made in Norway since 1949 have been taken when the Labor Party enjoyed a solid majority.25 This has inevitably led to many programs and policies being directly tied to a particular party. In Norway the Labor Party is identified with NATO and the transatlantic cooperation between Norway and the United States. Thus, major policy revisions or statements on security issues is expected to come from the Labor Party. This is especially significant because the Labor Party has dominated Norwegian politics since the end of the Second World War. The major discussion concerning membership in NATO and the future of
Norwegian security policy after 1949 was conducted within the Labor Party, not in the Storting.

An example of this is the decision to forbid the stationing of foreign troops and nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil. In 1949 the majority of Labor Party newspapers, Storting members and possibly a majority of the party members still had strong doubts about NATO membership. The party leadership was able to placate the concerns of these opponents of membership by establishing the base policy, which prevents the stationing of foreign troops on Norwegian soil in peacetime, and the no nuclear weapons policy. This raised the approval for NATO membership within the party to the levels indicated by the poll taken in 1957. Consequently, an internal agreement to create consensus within the Labor Party became national policy.

The second issue that affects Norwegian politics is the party leaderships fear of splitting the party. There exists a fear in all the Norwegian political parties of splitting the party on a major issue. The mere anticipation of split within the party could have major influence on a national policy decision within the government. This is a phenomenon especially prevalent among the “social democratic” parties in all of Scandinavia. The result is great efforts by the party leadership in order to avoid open disagreement on an issue within the parties. The outcome is consensus politics initiated well within the party organizations and leadership. Consequently there has been very little discussion on either NATO expansion or alternatives to NATO because a consensus to do so cannot be reached in any of the major parties. Therefore, any discussion or declarations beyond the statements such as, “NATO is the cornerstone in Norwegian defense and security policy”, is difficult to find in any of the
major party policy declarations. It is only the smaller parties on the radical left, such as the previously mentioned Socialist Left, that openly challenge the idea of NATO membership and offer alternative security proposals.

The last feature of Norwegian politics is that the political system is a consensual system. This means that policy decisions tend to be reached by some broader based decision rule than that of a mere majority. Historically this approach has attempted to create a solid and enduring basis for policy, which can survive shifts in government. Thus, there is a strong tendency to seek support “across the middle”, across the strongest cleavage. In Norway this means consensus between the Labor Party and the Conservatives on security issues. This tendency to seek support across the middle is also visible within the political parties, especially the Labor Party. Since the Labor Party traditionally has been the leader in security issues, the consensus negotiated on a policy within the party is the one that is presented to the traditional partners on defense, the Conservatives. Since Labor has the most margin for maneuver, due to their traditional majority in post-war politics, and thus can set the terms for the debate, there is little room for in the consensus building to raise the question of the implications of NATO expansion. To this date the Labor Party has gone along with all the NATO proposals concerning expansion, citing often the importance of NATO’s consensual decision-making process. The result has been little official government concern or comments over the possible implications of expansion. Challenges to public debate over NATO enlargement by the parties on the radical left has only produced generic statements such as, “How can we deny the countries of the
former east-bloc the same security that we (Norway) have enjoyed, therefore NATO must be expanded," in response from the Labor Party.\textsuperscript{31}

The implications of this is that the debate over security policy and NATO that does occur has been conducted within the political parties in Norway, with very little external debate among the major parties on security issues and NATO. Since there is little consensus within the parties, especially the Labor Party, to open a debate concerning the implications of NATO expansion, it appears that this issue will not be discussed in open debate the near future.

**Summary**

This chapter has examined the viability of three alternative options for Norwegian security in the wake of NATO enlargement and the internal political debate over security issues. The examination of alternative options centered on increased Norwegian engagement in the WEU, bilateral defense ties to the United States, and the possibility of restarting the Nordic defense initiative that was abandoned in 1948. All three of these options have been found wanting in meeting Norwegian security needs, not so much in the guarantees that they provide, but in the feasibility of the option being accepted both politically and by the Norwegian public.

A Norwegian interest in the WEU has its grounds in the organization is possible evolution into the foundation for a common European defense. The key factors being the implementation of the CJTF concept and the development of a European defense initiative within the current NATO framework. If the organization is formed outside of NATO, serving as the “defense arm” of the EU, there would be
obvious problems with Norwegian participation. The primary problem is Norway's position as a non-member of the EU, coupled with associate membership in the WEU. This leaves Norway without a vote and little or no influence over the process in either of the organizations. The possibility of a Norwegian entry into the EU in the near future is also doubtful, due to lack of popular support for such an initiative. Norwegians also express doubts about an enhanced WEU being able to meet the security guarantees of an expanded defense union, and an eventual marginalization of Norwegian security interests in an organization with a traditional continental focus.

The relationship between the United States and Norway has been one of the cornerstones of Norwegian security policy since 1948. Hence, the possibility of Norway seeking a bilateral defense agreement with the US, should NATO fail to meet its security needs, seems quite viable. Norway and the US have entered into a series of defense agreements since 1980 that present the appearance that this is a likely course of action. The problem with this solution is that Norway wants to stay engaged in Europe. Presently NATO is the only major European organization where Norway sits on equal footing with the other European nations. A rejection of NATO and the acceptance of a bilateral defense pact with the US would place Norway on the outside of Europe, with the negative economic and political implications that implies. A second reason is the historical Norwegian disdain for alliances and fear of domination by a larger power, this surfaces immediately in the political debate when closer ties to the US is mentioned.

The third option discussed is the reemergence of a Nordic defense initiative. This is fueled by the increased Nordic cooperation in cultural, economic, and security
matters since the end of the Cold War. Norwegian optimism about further developments in this area is dampened by the historical Russian opposition to Finnish membership in a Nordic defense union, and the tradition of neutrality present within the Swedish and Finnish political leadership and population. Presently neither of these issues appear to be solvable in the near future.

The final discussion in the chapter resolves around the internal political debate over security issues in Norway. The ruling Labor Party is identified as the leader in security issues, with support from the Conservative Party. The rest of the political parties remain outside of the security debate, while the radical left provides the opposition to both NATO membership and ties to the US. The debate over security issues is further hampered by three unique features of Norwegian politics:

- The ruling political party is especially prone to important foreign policy decision making within the party apparatus.

- Fear among the leadership in all the Norwegian political parties of splitting the party on a major issue.

- The existence of a consensual political system.

These three factors conspire to limit the debate over security issues. The concerns over the implications of NATO enlargement and future Norwegian security policy has thus been limited to informal discussion among military officers and government officials.

The conclusion will consider the Norwegian governments current policy and its significance in determining the course of Norwegian security policy. It will also attempt to synergize the characteristics identified as influencing Norwegian policy, the current military threat to Norway, and the perceived negative implications of NATO
expansion with the current internal political environment to present a possible further course of action.
Notes

2. Godal, "Enlargement eastwards of the EU and NATO: Speech to EUROPAFORUM".
3. Godal, "Enlargement eastwards".
4. Kolberg 32. "For Norges vedkommende, som ikke-medlem av EU, framstår en integrasjon av VEU i EU som problematisk. Hvis det er meningen at EU skal kunne trekke på NATO's ressurser, som VEU kan det i dag, vil vi kunne bli stående helt uten innflytelse. Vårt assosierede medlemskap i VEU pr i dag er problematisk nok, idet vi bare kan slutte oss til vedtak som treffes."
5. Riste, *Norge i Krig* 65. "...ha bånd vestover og knytte oss fast til de nasjoner som vi fra gammelt av har naturlige økonomiske forbindelser med... Og de nasjoner vi mest av alt har vært knyttet sammen på det økonomiske område, er folk med det samme frihetstradisjonen som vi, og som kjemper for de samme idealer. Det er først av alle det britiske verdensrike, verdens største statsdannelse, og dernest det mektige og rike Amerikas forente stater..."
10. Addressed by Godal at both the Leangkollen Conference and EUROPAFORUM.
20. *Fakta om Forsvaret* 45.
22. Fakta om Forsvaret 45.
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Conclusion

This thesis has presented a broad analysis of Norwegian history, politics and security policy in an attempt to provide insight into the challenges that Norway faces with NATO expansion. The thesis has attempted to provide answers to the three questions posed in the introduction. First, what are the historical and contemporary factors that influence the formulation of Norwegian security policy? Second, what are the specific Norwegian apprehensions regarding NATO expansion? Third, does there exist a viable alternative to NATO membership for Norway, and what may indicate the pursuit of a non-NATO security arrangement? The first section of this conclusion will summarize the information presented in the thesis by answering the first two questions. In the second section, I will present my answer to the third question, based upon the information provided in the thesis, and attempt to establish the likely future direction of Norwegian security policy.

Summary

This thesis has identified three characteristics, three internal political factors, and an external threat that influence the formulation of Norwegian security policy. It discussed the Norwegian concerns over the affects of NATO expansion, and has explored the possibility of viable security options other than NATO. Also, it presented the importance of appreciating Norway's position at the periphery of Europe and its emerging geostrategic position in the later part of the twentieth century.
The three historical characteristics identified are: neutralism, a disdain for alliances, and active engagement in international organizations as a vehicle for increasing Norwegian influence in security and foreign affairs. Neutralism, or neutrality, evolved as much from Norway’s position on edge of Europe as it did from the insular nature of its population. It was the suffering of the Norwegian population caused by the British blockade during the Napoleonic Wars, however, that endured the Norwegian people and political elite to a policy of neutrality. The disdain for alliances is a product of successive unions with Denmark and Sweden, and is further manifested in a fear of domination by larger more powerful nations. The prominence of these two characteristics in Norwegian public and political life led to the pursuit of a policy of neutrality when Norway became independent in 1905. The challenges of maintaining neutrality during the First World War led the Norwegian government to seek guarantees for Norwegian neutrality through active engagement in international organizations. The ability of the Norwegian government to achieve essential national goals without the fear of domination, through organizations such as the League of Nations and the Oslo Group, led to the third characteristic that influences Norwegian security policy making formulation: the active participation of Norway international organizations as a means of achieving policy goals.

The internal political factors are identified as being important in understanding the scope and the lack of debate concerning security issues in Norway. The factors identified in the thesis are: the ruling political party is especially prone to important foreign policy decision making within the party apparatus, fear among the leadership
in all the Norwegian political parties of splitting the party on a major issue, and the existence of a consensual political system.

All of the characteristic and internal political factors have manifested themselves in the major Norwegian security policy decisions since the end of the Second World War. The best example of this is the debate over Norwegian security policy immediately after the war, where Einar Gerhardsen and Halvard Lange had to convince those who wished to maintain Norwegian neutrality and appease those who feared domination by a larger nation in a defense alliance. Consequently, the desire to be engaged, on an equal footing with the other member nations, won over the two historical characteristics. The internal political factors also displayed themselves prominently during the NATO debate in 1948. Not only was the important foreign policy decision made within the ruling party apparatus, but it was also only made after Einar Gerhardsen was fully convinced that issue would not split the party. The overwhelming vote in favor of membership, 130 to 13, clearly illustrated the consensual political system.

The final influencing factor on Norwegian policy formulation is the threat. The conventional force reductions that were initiated at the end of the Cold War and by the CFE Treaty did not markedly reduce the forces in the Kola Peninsula facing northern Norway. An overview of the Russian ground forces in the Leningrad Military District shows forces strikingly similar in strength and capability to those that were present during the Cold War, forces capable of achieving any objective in an attack on northern Norway. Economic, scientific, and environmental cooperation between Norway and Russia has attempted to reduce the tensions in the Arctic and
address concerns in those three areas, but the main issue is that the Kola Peninsula remains one of the most heavily militarized areas in the world.

The specific Norwegian apprehensions to NATO regarding NATO expansion were presented in the thesis in two parts, the issues before the 1997 Madrid Summit and those that have risen since. The issues that were raised before the Madrid Summit were concerned with the reasoning behind NATO expansion. They were: that NATO enlargement was needed to deter Russian aggression in eastern and central Europe, that enlargement would promote stability in the region, and that expansion would dampen nationalism and promote democracy. All of these arguments were addressed and challenged from a Norwegian perspective. After the Madrid Summit, Norwegian military officers and government officials began to address their concern about the effects of enlargement on Norway. Their specific concerns were marginalization, the cost of expansion and its possible effect on Norway’s defense programs, and the ability of NATO to respond to crisis in an expanded alliance.

Marginalization is the Norwegian concern over its diminished importance and role in NATO, should the alliance expand. Already faced with the loss of NATO headquarters, the Norwegian military view NATO expansion as a furthering the European security focus away from Norway. The actual cost of NATO expansion has been one of the issues that has been the most difficult to ascertain. The fact remains, however, that the Norwegian defense budget and long range defense plan does not have room for large contributions to the expansion process. If contributions are necessary, it will most likely mean the cancellation of several Norwegian military modernization programs.
The ability of the alliance to meet its military obligations in expanded alliance has received increasing attention among military professionals. Recently, two prominent retired US general officers questioned the ability of NATO to guarantee the security of all its members. This was the same point that Norwegian Lieutenant General Danielsen had raised, adding credibility to the Norwegian concern over military capability and expansion.

Thus, there remains only the question of whether there exists viable alternatives to NATO for Norway and what might indicate a pursuit of such a course. In the second section of the conclusion I will answer that question and address the likely future direction of Norway in an expanded NATO.

**NATO Enlargement and Norway**

In the introduction, I presented a scenario for the future course of Norwegian security policy: to stay the course of the last 50 years and adapt in an evolving NATO. In answering the last thesis question I will highlight the reasons why this is the most likely course that future Norway will take.

The option to increase Norwegian engagement in the Western European Union as part of a European defense initiative was the initial alternative scenario presented. The main problem with this scenario is the fact that Norway is not a member of the EU. The WEU is increasingly referred to as EU’s “defense arm”. There is every indication that an expansion of the role of the WEU in European security affairs, and an eventual evolution of the WEU into a European defense union, will be accomplished within the framework of the EU. With no voting rights in either
organization, Norway is only an associate member of the WEU, there appears to be little that the Norwegian government can do to influence the process. Norway has attempted to stay engaged in the debate, stressing that a European initiative must either include NATO or give the same membership rights to non-EU members. Yet, given that one of the major proponents of a European defense initiative is France, who is outside the NATO command structure, it is more likely that the EU will press for a defense identity separate from NATO. This would leave the Norwegians “out in the cold”. There is, obviously, one solution to this dilemma, join the EU.

The second alternative discussed was closer ties to the United States. Norway and the United States have increased their military cooperation since 1980, both inside and outside of NATO. This inevitably leads to the question of whether the United States can meet Norwegian security needs through a bilateral defense agreement between the two countries. This is not outwardly rejected on the thesis, basically because close cooperation with the US will always be an integral part of Norwegian security policy. The problem with this alternative again relates to Norway’s position in Europe. Already forced to compete economically with the EU, and subject to increasingly restrictive EU regulations, Norway cannot further abandon Europe by rejection of a European security initiative and seeking a trans-Atlantic security solution.

The third alternative discussed was the reemergence of a Nordic security initiative. This initial process over a Nordic defense initiative was abandoned in 1948 when Norway and Denmark decided to join NATO. Since that time Nordic, including Finland, cooperation has been expanded in numerous areas. Since the end of the Cold
War, this increasingly meant cooperation in the areas of security and military affairs. The success of this cooperation, especially NORDBAT in both Macedonia and Bosnia, has increased the debate over the feasibility of a Nordic defense initiative. The obstacles in such an initiative are large, however, and do not appear to be solvable in the near future. The first is Sweden and Finland’s historical neutrality. Sweden’s insistence of a neutral defense union was one of the reasons that lead to failure of the Nordic initiative in 1948. Even as an EU member, Sweden remains committed to a policy of neutrality, as does Finland, and demonstrated that by only accepting observer status in the WEU. There appears to be little desire by the Swedish and Finnish governments to expand on the level of security cooperation already achieved in Scandinavia, despite the Norwegian enthusiasm for doing so. Russia’s historical opposition to Finnish participation in a Nordic defense union is the only issue that appears to be solvable, this though the continuation of the successful cooperation between the Nordic states and Russia initiated in the Barents Cooperation.

Having exhausted the viable options it is almost by default that the future of Norwegian security is determined. There remains one question: what would indicate a Norwegian pursuit of a non-NATO security arrangement? The one event that would indicate a shift in Norwegian policy is application for EU membership. EU membership has twice been rejected by the Norwegian population in national referendums, in the early 80s by a large majority, and in 1994 by only a 3% margin. This indicates a slight shift towards European integration and its economic benefits among the general population, but there remains a well organized opposition that fear
both loss of Norwegian sovereignty and a negative impact on the Norwegian domestic economy.

The movement towards integration with Europe through EU membership is further complicated by the ideological split among the parties in the center over the issue of the EU. This has created within Norwegian political parties and the government bureaucracy what is referred to as *Ja* (yes) and *Nei* (no) men. The reference is to those who support (*Ja*) or do not support (*Nei*) EU membership. The result of this split is that it is very difficult for the parties in the center, who are the only real opposition, to form a coalition alternative to a Labor government. A shift in government as a result of the upcoming *Storting* elections to a centrist coalition would, thus, most likely produce a government and cabinet evenly split over the issue of the EU. Internal compromises and agreements among the *Ja* and *Nei* men to maintain the viability of the coalition would prevent any further meaningful movement towards EU membership. Europe and security issues would take a “back-seat” to domestic issues, the traditional focus of the centrist parties. Thus only the continuance of a Labor government, in majority, will see any dramatic changes in Norwegian policy towards Europe or security policy.

The European Union is, in reality, the key to Norway’s future role in Europe, and thus is a vital factor in determining the future of Norwegian security policy. As long as Norway remains outside the EU, the government will have little influence over either the political or security process in Europe, outside of NATO. Consequently, there is a need to stay in NATO in order to remain significant in the Europe. EU membership would, by placing Norway firmly among the European community of
nations, give the Norwegian government room to balance its security requirements against the historic characteristics and the internal political factors that influence security policy, the threat, and the realities of a new European security environment that will include an expanded NATO. Until EU membership is realized, continued active Norwegian participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will remain the cornerstone of Norwegian defense policy.
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