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MOROCCO

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MOROCCO

CONTENTS
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POLITICAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EC Commissioner Reviews Results of Visit [Rabat Radio] ........................................... 1
Technology Transfer, Closer Ties To Italy [MAROC SOIR 21 Feb] ....................................... 1
Spanish Foreign Minister Holds News Conference [MAP] ................................................... 1
Economic Relations With Japan Assessed [LA VIE ECONOMIQUE 21 Feb] ............................. 1

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Over $25 Million in Contracts Signed With Libya [LA VIE ECONOMIQUE 13 Mar] ............... 2
King Receives Boudiaf’s Personal Emissary [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 27 Feb] .......... 3
Saudi Investments; ASMA Profiled [LA VIE ECONOMIQUE 28 Feb] .................................. 4

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

King Links Coming Elections to Sahara Referendum [London AL-HAYAH 5 Feb] .................. 5
Impasse on Referendum Blamed on Polisario [L’OPINION 7 Mar] ...................................... 6
Former Polisario Report on Tindouf [L’OPINION 9 Mar] .................................................... 7
Parties Debate Constitutional Reforms ............................................................................... 8
  Speech by Istiglal Leader [AL-’ALAM 24 Feb] ................................................................. 8
  Speech by USFP Leader [AL-’ALAM 24 Feb] ................................................................. 9
  Speech by OADP Leader [AL-’ALAM 24 Feb] ............................................................... 10
  Other Presentations [AL-’ALAM 24 Feb] ..................................................................... 11
Development of Opposition Parties Discussed [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 22 Feb] .... 14
Opposition Leader Fears Postelection ‘Chaos’ [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 19 Mar] .... 16
PPS Leader Announces Decision To Quit [MAP] ............................................................. 16
Authorities Seek New Image on Human Rights [Paris TV] ............................................... 17
Fes Court Sentences 2 Students in Oct Riots [Paris International] ...................................... 17
Violent Police Intervention at College Noted [AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI 27 Feb] ......... 17

ECONOMIC

Prime Minister Pressured on Drought, Strikes [London AL-HAYAH 12 Feb] ....................... 18
Minister Discusses Investments, Privatization [MAP] ......................................................... 18
Government Plan To Overcome Unemployment Urged [L’OPINION 11 Mar] .................. 19
Investment Figures for Industry in 1991 Given [AL-’ALAM 6 Feb] ................................. 19
1992 Import, Export Trade Forecast Reported [LA VIE ECONOMIQUE 28 Feb] ............ 20
Breakdown of Remittances of Workers Abroad [AL-’ALAM 6 Feb] ............................... 21
Negligible Growth, Increased Tourism and Exports Forecast [L’OPINION 7 Mar] ......... 22
Tourism Figures Compared From 1990-92 [LA VIE ECONOMIQUE 13 Mar] ................. 22
Nador Port Activity for 1991 Detailed [AL-’ALAM 20 Feb] ............................................. 23
Prospects for Oil Exploration Discussed [L’OPINION 19 Feb] ....................................... 24
Cost of Living Figures for 1991 Released [AL-’ALAM 20 Feb] ....................................... 26
Cost of Living Index Rises Slightly in Jan [LA VIE ECONOMIQUE 28 Feb] ..................... 27
Results of 1991 Survey on Standard of Living [L’OPINION 11 Mar] ............................. 28
Further Analysis on Standard of Living Survey [L’OPINION 12 Mar] ......................... 29

SOCIAL

Royal Academy Holds Seminar on Islamic Culture [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 15 Feb] 30
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EC Commissioner Reviews Results of Visit

LD13032111492 Rabat Moroccan Kingdom Radio
Network in Arabic 1600 GMT 13 Mar 92

[Text] Abel Matutes, the EC commissioner for Mediterrane-ean policy, has affirmed the identity of views between Morocco and the EC over the development of a new economic and political partnership between the two sides.

Speaking at a news conference in Rabat this morning following the conclusion of his visit to Morocco, Matutes said that the negotiations over the renewal of the EC-Morocco fishing agreement will be resumed within the next few days.

With regard to the free trade zone between Morocco and the EC, Matutes said that the creation of such a zone would be a logical move to improve Moroccan contracting conditions with a view to achieving better Moroccan economic integration in the world economy.

He affirmed that this is a very ambitious plan that necessitates discussion of every sector and every product separately. He pointed out that this rapprochement should proceed with caution and should take into consideration the difficulties, which we can overcome.

With regard to the Arab Maghreb Union [UMA], he said that the quicker the merger process is carried out and the greater the progress made, the easier becomes the commercial merger and the greater the UMA's competitive power and integration among them will become.

He recalled that for some time, Morocco has been calling for the revision of its relations with the EC, adding that the time has come for such a revision in order to establish clearer and more ambitious cooperation that should serve as a model for the other Maghreb countries, which wish to review their relations with the EC.

With regard to financial cooperation between Morocco and the EC, Matutes said that this aspect, which occupies a large part of the cooperation between the two sides, will direct the Moroccan economy toward complete modernization, give it greater competitive power, and enhance its integration with the EC economy. He said that he feels that this financial cooperation is essential.

With regard to the nature of the new relations between Morocco and the EC, Matutes said that these relations have been moving from one of assistance to one of equality between the two sides. He said that this cooperation is similar to the agreements between the EC and Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—with central Europe. He said that he has always tried to preserve a balance between Europe's duties and responsibilities toward its eastern neighbors and its responsibilities toward and interest in its southern neighbors.

The EC commissioner stressed the need to develop and promote political dialogue which he described as a very important aspect. He affirmed the importance of increasing meetings between senior Moroccan and EC ministers and parliamentarians and particularly the establishment of joint parliamentary committees.

Technology Transfer, Closer Ties To Italy

92AF0511A Casablanca MAROC SOIR
in French 21 Feb 92 p 3

[Text] The deputy minister of foreign investments, Mr. Mohamed Madghiri, Alaoui and the Italian ambassador, Mr. Giuseppe Panocchia, discussed several points Wednesday in the company of other Italian officials. Chief among the topics covered were partnerships between Morocco and Italy, technology transfer, and collaboration in the fields of energy, transportation, rail equipment, telecommunications, agribusines, and industry.

The two parties also stressed how important joint projects are to collaboration between Morocco and Italy. Partnerships reinforce both Italian projects in Morocco and trade between the two countries.

Moreover, Morocco is expecting other Italian delegations to arrive over the next few months. The delegations are interested in the naval shipyards, hydraulic plants, and telecommunications, and their coming confirms the growing economic relations between Morocco and Italy.

Spanish Foreign Minister Holds News Conference

LD1803002692 Rabat MAP in Arabic
1610 GMT 17 Mar 92

[Text] Rabat, 17 Mar (MAP)—Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez today said that Morocco "constitutes a factor of stability and modernization in the Arab Maghreb, which makes it a favorite interlocutor not only for Spain but also for the EC." In light of this fact, Fernandez Ordonez told a Rabat news conference this morning that Spain suggested that the EC set up institutional mechanisms for establishing relations with Morocco. He indicated that the new relations between the EC and Morocco should be built on a political basis and should encompass economic, commercial, and financial aspects. He referred to the recent visit that Abel Matutes, the European delegate in charge of Mediterranean policy, paid to Morocco and during which he discussed this matter with Moroccan officials. On his meeting with Abdellatif Filali, Moroccan minister of state for foreign affairs and cooperation, Fernandez Ordonez pointed out that the talks dealt with various issues of common interest and with relations between Morocco and the EC. He added that he discussed with his Moroccan counterpart the meeting due to be held in Madrid—probably in June—between Moroccan Prime Minister Azzedine Laraki and Spain's head of government. Finally, the Spanish minister announced that the Moroccan-Spanish joint cooperation committee would convene in Morocco shortly.

Economic Relations With Japan Assessed

92AF0511B Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE
in French 21 Feb 92 p 25

[Article by Mohamed Benfadil: "It Will Take Large-Scale Promotion To Attract Japanese Capital!"; first paragraph is LA VIE ECONOMIQUE introduction]
The Moroccan General Economic Confederation (CGEM) organized a debate on the economic relations between Japan and Morocco on Thursday, 13 February. The occasion was the visit to Morocco of Japan's former ambassador to Rabat, Mr. Moriyuki Motono, who was invited by Mr. Mohamed Karim Lamrani.

Moroccan businessmen met with Mr. Motono at the headquarters of the Moroccan General Economic Confederation on Thursday, 13 February. Mr. Motono is Japan's former ambassador to Morocco and a current economic adviser to the Emperor.

Mr. Karim Lamrani, who is the economic-affairs adviser to His Majesty the King and the president of the Moroccan-Japanese Association, set up the meeting. The debates focused on the economic relations between the two countries and the status of Japanese investments in Morocco. They were conducted by Mr. Motono and his Moroccan counterpart, and by Mr. Benanai Smires, who is the president of the CGEM.

According to Mr. Motono, Japanese reluctance to invest in Morocco can be explained by Morocco's failure to promote itself to Japanese businessmen. The problem could thus be solved by a large-scale informational and promotional campaign directed at potential Japanese investors.

Japan, Morocco's Seventh-Largest Customer

Indeed, it is illogical that a country considered to be Morocco's seventh-largest customer invests practically nothing here. Other factors argue in favor of Japanese investment, namely an equal trade balance. Morocco even enjoys a trade surplus with Japan—an exceptional situation, for it is the only country that finds itself in that situation vis-a-vis our country (sic).

Moreover, Mr. Motono believes the Japanese prefer to invest as near to consumers as possible, which explains their large presence in Southeast Asia and in Europe, for example.

The president of the BMCI [expansion not given] Mr. Benkiane deplored the hesitation of Japanese investors, and stressed the growing willingness of Moroccan businessmen to “diversify their relations with non-European countries.”

Mr. Motono replied that official Japanese Government aid was earmarked first for neighbors, principally the United States, and Europeans. According to him, such assistance totaled 8.2 million dollars in 1991. Moreover, economic austerity measures and well-defined projects that were initiated by Southeast Asian countries also diverted Japan's attention.

In addition, Mr. Motono commented, “emotional factors” surely count heavily in most investment decisions. Those factors include geographical proximity, culture, language, and education. Thus, it is obvious that a Thai businessman who studied in Japan will feel a certain bond with that country, and a Japanese schooled in the United States will keep up a “special relationship” with the Americans.

But in a humorous aside that was appreciated by the audience, Mr. Bennani Smires remarked that the “private reserve” burden of some European countries suits Japan very well, since it reinforces its hesitation to invest.

In a more serious vein, the CGEM president suggested to Mr. Motono that Japan send experts to stay in Moroccan companies and impart their know-how to personnel.

Japanese Cars in Morocco?

Mr. Belmadani, who is the president of the Federation of Industry, raised the problem of Japanese investment in specific sectors. He wondered why [Japan] “did not encourage one or more automakers to establish a partnership with SOMACA [Moroccan Automobile Manufacturing Company] to manufacture components or spare parts.”

There again, Mr. Motono cited the need to undertake informational campaigns directed at small and medium Japanese firms and industries.

What About the Tourists?

Finally, Mr. Motono estimated that 20,000 Japanese tourists were expected to visit Morocco in 1992.

By way of conclusion, Karim Lamrani stated that since the Japanese move “slowly”, investors from that country will slowly but surely come.

If the delay, he explains, strikes us as hesitation, it is because we eager to see them arrive.

He added that Morocco's political stability, which dates back a thousand years, and Japan's need to expand its relations with a country such as Morocco, should speed the investment process.

Particularly as our country has everything it takes to be a platform for Africa.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Over $25 Million in Contracts Signed With Libya

92AF0584B Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 13 Mar 92 p 20

[Article by A. Daoud: “Trade Between Morocco and Libya: Over $25 Million in Contracts”; first paragraph is LA VIE ECONOMIQUE introduction]

[Text] A meeting between an official Libyan delegation representing the seven prefectures of that country and Moroccan industrialists was held at the Hyatt Regency Hotel from 26 February to 2 March. The objective was to stimulate trade between the two countries.

This meeting was held at the initiative of Salima Holding, a mixed Moroccan-Libyan company, and the Majid Yacoubi company group in the framework of the compensation agreement signed in May 1991 between Morocco and Libya, under which the value of trade in both directions will amount to $100 million annually.

The meeting saw Moroccan industrialists participate who produce shoes, textiles for covering furniture, clothing,
and electrical household appliances. On the Libyan side a commission representing the seven purchasing companies of the seven Libyan prefectures took part.

The meeting was concerned with the implementation of the first segment of the compensation agreement, amounting to 25 percent, or $25 million. The meeting was held in the framework of strengthening trade relations between Morocco and Libya but also in the context of building the UMA [Arab Maghreb Union]. The purpose of the meeting was to promote the export of certain Moroccan goods to Libya, a transaction considered by the organizers as leading in a substantial way to the production of articles made in Morocco.

According to the organizers, the results of the meeting went well beyond their hopes. The different contracts negotiated involved a value of more than the $25 million initially anticipated. On both sides it is not expected that it will stop there.

The organizers plan to sponsor a large trade fair, bringing together all companies that wish to participate in trade between the two countries.

King Receives Boudiaf's Personal Emissary
92AF0493B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
27 Feb 92 p 4

[Article: “Sahara, Bilateral Relations Discussed by Hassan II, Algerian Envoy”]

[Text] On 25 February 1992 in Marrakech, Moroccan Monarch King Hassan II received the personal emissary of Algerian State Council President Mohamed Boudiaf, Minister of Interior and Local Groups Gen. Larbi Belkheir.

Informed sources in Rabat indicated that the Moroccan king’s discussions with the Algerian president’s emissary concentrated on bilateral relations, in which the Moroccan [Western] Sahara dispute looms large.

The Algerian envoy’s visit comes as a result of President Boudiaf’s statements on the future of the Western Sahara issue. Boudiaf stressed that “there is agreement within Algerian decision-making circles on the need to settle this issue expeditiously.” This provoked satisfaction in Moroccan political circles, since Minister of State Moulay Ahmed Alaoui described it as an expression of “Boudiaf’s sincere and deep-rooted belief that establishing good, firm relations between Algeria and Morocco can be a basis for establishing Maghreb unity.”

These sources added that the Algerian emissary’s discussions with Moroccan officials included the current situation in the [Arab] Maghreb Union [UMA] and regional relations, particularly with the European states, whose relations with the UMA nations are currently undergoing important developments. Among the indicators of this development is the official visit of French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas to Morocco, which began on 26 February. King Hassan II is scheduled to receive him during this visit.

Dumas’ visit to Morocco was scheduled for the first week of February, but was postponed due to the reactions that followed the reception of Palestinian Popular Liberation Front leader Georges Habash for medical treatment in a French sanatorium. Dumas also visited Syria this month. Observers attach considerable importance to Dumas’ discussions with King Hassan II and with Moroccan officials. It is expected that the discussions will include three basic points: the traditional bilateral relations between the two countries, whose rhythm has been disrupted the last two years; and Morocco’s relations with the EC, which have been affected by the position that the European Parliament in Strasbourg has taken vis-a-vis Morocco.

It is also anticipated that Dumas and his Moroccan interlocutors will raise the issue of relations with all Maghreb nations, especially the 5+5 Conference, in which the European countries adjoining the Mediterranean basin—Spain, Italy, France, Portugal, and Malta—will meet with the UMA nations. It is certain that this summit is necessary, in view of the incidents that have occurred in the Maghreb area, particularly in Algeria and Libya.

Observers here believe that it is not unlikely that the discussions will touch on a third point—the issue of the Moroccan Sahara dispute—after the optimistic statements made by Algerian President Mohamed Boudiaf, most recently to the Moroccan AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI [SOCIALIST UNION] newspaper, along with the visit of Gen. Belkheir.

It should be remembered that French President Mitterrand always sends a minister who is close to him to deal with thorny issues. Foreign Minister Dumas fits this description, and this confirms the importance of the current visit. It is the preamble for visits of two other French ministers to Morocco in the course of the next two months.

Also in Rabat, King Hassan II will be presiding over the anniversary celebrations of his ascension to the throne, which falls on 3 March each year. The king will deliver a speech to the nation, including a summary of accomplishments in the political and economic fields achieved during the year. The royal speech also sets forth guidelines for future policies.

It should be mentioned that the Moroccan king has spent more than two months in Marrakech, traveling from there to New York and back.

Shortly before the French foreign minister arrived in Morocco, the [Buraykat] brothers held a press conference in Paris, where they declared that their long detention was not founded on any tangible evidence.

The case of the Buraykat brothers is considered a mysterious political issue, because they were arrested in 1973 for reasons that were not revealed at the time. Rumors circulated later to the effect that the affair involved spying against Morocco.

The Buraykat brothers—Midhat, known as Roni; Ali, known as Auguste; and Bayazid, known as Jacques—are of Tunisian origin, but carry French nationality. They settled in Morocco many years before their arrest, where Bayazid
was head of the Chamber of Commerce in Rabat at the beginning of the sixties. Midhat owned a marble processing company.

In an interview with the magazine LE FIGARO, the Moroccan monarch described the issue of the Buryakat brothers as the same type of issue that the English call "wet" [as published] cases, in that there is espionage, circulation of false reports, trafficking in arms, and intelligence contacts with foreign agencies. The father of those persons, according to the Moroccan king, was a well-known informer for the French Residency Office.

King Hassan II then added that the issue was not dealt with properly, either on the investigatory or penal level, explaining that the way that the administration dealt with it was "excessive and negligent." He indicated that the question should have been settled early on with their release, in view of the nature of the actions.

The Moroccan monarch stressed that the delay in settling the affair was a grave error. He said: "I don't say this feeling sorry for them, but rather, I feel sorry for Morocco."

The Buryakat brothers went to France immediately after their release, where the French media and political circles welcomed the decision to release them. It is well-known that they were presented before the Military Prosecutor's Office in January 1991, which decided not to prosecute them, since they had spent so many years in prison.

Saudi Investments; ASMA Profiled

92AF0530A Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 28 Feb 92 p 27

[Article signed F.S.: "Cooperation: ASMA Invest, Preferred Channel for Saudi Investments in Morocco"; first paragraph is LA VIE ECONOMIQUE introduction]

[Text] Born of Morocco and Saudi Arabia's common will to increase their exchanges and broaden and strengthen their cooperation on development, ASMA Invest now provides both countries with a considerable tool for that purpose.

The first board meeting of the Saudi-Moroccan Investment and Development Company (ASMA Invest), chaired by Mr. Mohamed Berrada, finance minister, was held in Rabat on 12 February 1992. The convention creating ASMA Invest was signed in Riyadh on 2 December 1989 by Mr. Mohamed Berrada, the Moroccan finance minister, and his Saudi counterpart, Mr. Muhammad Aba Al-Khayl, the Saudi minister of finance and national economy.

On 16 February 1991, His Majesty King Hassan II appointed Mr. Abdelatif Guerraoui chief executive officer of the company.

At the end of every fiscal year, 10 percent of the net profits will be retained as required reserves until such reserves amount to 50 percent of the issued capital.

Note here that the Moroccan Government has granted the company considerable tax exemptions for the first five years of operation.

Investment for Development

- To complete development-type projects with partners who would make their know-how and/or marketing networks available to the company.
- To acquire an interest in the capital of existing companies, companies to be created, or investment institutions.
- To grant intermediate- and long-term credits.
- To accept term deposits in foreign currencies, to be invested or used in commercial operations.

Such would be the main activities of ASMA Invest. Note, however, that the company is also authorized to invest outside Morocco and Saudi Arabia whenever such investments are likely to have considerable consequences for its development.

As for its fields of activity, ASMA Invest will focus on the most buoyant sectors of Moroccan economy, e.g., agriculture and textile, which account for nearly 50 percent of Moroccan exports, or on sectors producing consumer goods for the local market, as such sectors continue to interest foreign investors.

Meetings with Moroccan and international companies have already taken place, enabling the company to identify a number of projects in the agrifood, industrial and real-estate sectors. These projects were brought to the attention of the board of directors and are currently under consideration.

Mr. Abdelatif Guerraoui, chief executive officer of ASMA Invest, believes that the creation of the company was particularly timely, as there is on the market companies that could be privatized and offer very favorable business opportunities. Mr. Guerraoui told us that the creation of ASMA Invest had met with interest on the part of several Moroccan companies and certain international groups. "This," he told us, "is due to the stability enjoyed by Morocco and also to the part played by Saudi Arabia at international level. Not to mention the fact that the means and incentives granted to ASMA Invest provide it with considerable assets with which to achieve its goals."

[Box, p 27]

A Profile of ASMA Invest

- Creation: 2 December 1989
- Headquarters: Casablanca
- Capital: 400 million dirhams; 50 percent to Morocco, 50 percent to Saudi Arabia.

Board of Directors

- Dr. Abdelaziz Ben Mohamed Al-Turki, chairman of the board. Present position: assistant to the managing director of the Saudi Development Fund (FSD).]
• Mr. Abdellatif Guerraoui: chief executive officer.
• Mr. Abdelmajid Ben Abdallah Al-Wahib: Present position: manager of the Operations Department of the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (CFDI).
• Mr. Mustapha Sahel: Present position: general secretary of the Moroccan Ministry of Finance.
• Mr. Ibrahim Ben Mohamed Rumah: Present position: economic expert at the Public Investment Funds of the Saudi Ministry of Finance and National Economy.

Trade Between Morocco and Saudi Arabia
Trade between Morocco and Saudi Arabia grew from 974 million dirhams in 1988 to 2.3 billion dirhams in 1990. They were estimated at 2.7 billion dirhams for the first nine months of 1991. In 1980, private Saudi investments in Morocco represented only 4.9 percent of all foreign investments in Morocco. They grew strongly until 1985, when they accounted for 28.5 percent of all foreign investments. This was followed by a relative decline until 1990, down to 9.8 percent of all foreign investments and a total of 233 million dirhams.

Footnotes
1. The Saudi Development Fund finances development projects throughout the world through soft loans spread over 15 to 20 years, with service charges of 2 to 3 percent.
2. The Saudi Industrial Development Fund fulfills the same functions in Saudi Arabia as the National Economic Development Bank (BNDE) in Morocco.

Saudi Petrochemical Firm: Credit From Bank
92AF0454C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 21 Feb 92 p 10

[Article: SAMAREC To Benefit From Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank Credit]

[Text] The Saudi SAMAREC [Saudi Marketing and Refining Company] is to supply Morocco with chemical materials, benefitting from banking credit provided by the Arab Trade Financing Program.

In accordance with the agreement signed in Rabat, the line of credit between the Banque Morcaine du Commerce Extérieur and the Arab Trade Financing Program has been set. The agreement specifies that the program will provide the Moroccan bank, which is one of the two national agencies accredited by the program in Morocco, with a line of credit to finance a chemical materials deal with SAMAREC valued at $1.76 million. This deal was made for the Moroccan Phosphorus Company.

The agreement was signed for the Banque Morcaine du Commerce Extérieur by its director general, Abdellatif Jouahri, and for the Arab Trade Financing Program by Usamah Ja’far Faqih, executive chairman of the program’s board of directors.

Aljouahri said that this agreement would contribute to facilitating the task of financing foreign trade exchange in the Arab world, as well as encouraging commercial exchange among nations of the South. In this regard, Usamah Ja’far stated that the program currently does business through 25 national agencies that have been designated by 16 Arab nations so far.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS
King Links Coming Elections to Sahara Referendum
92AF0454B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 5 Feb 92 p 5

[Article by Muhammad al-Ashhab: “Hassan II’s Linkage of Legislative Elections, Referendum Pushes United Nations To Resolve Saharan Issue”]

[Text] In King Hassan II’s linkage between organizing the referendum in the Moroccan [Western] Sahara in the course of the next few months and holding legislative elections before the end of this year, Moroccan diplomatic circles see “an initiative to push the UN into expediting the arrangements required to hold the referendum,” in view of Morocco’s wish to see the local and legislative elections include all areas of the country, including the disputed Saharan provinces.

This Moroccan initiative is aimed at gaining advantage from the increased international interest in the Arab Maghreb region, especially after the recent Algerian incidents and the repercussions of the presidential elections in Mauritania. Rabat is betting on appearing to be the state where democracy reigns, particularly because issues of respect for human rights and concentration on democratic choice are in the forefront of international preoccupations.

Sources believe that the Moroccan monarch’s call for the expeditious preparation of lists of those participating in the Saharan referendum “reaffirms that Rabat is aiming at expanding the base of voters in the referendum,” in light of the latest report submitted by former UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, to the Security Council before the end of his term. This would force the current secretary general, Dr. Butrus Ghali, to use those viewpoints as his point of departure while preparing a new report to be submitted to the Security Council before the end of this month.

The task of organizing the referendum still faces several obstacles. The most important of these are: determining the identity of the participants in the referendum, who must be of Saharan descent; continuing the validity of the cease fire, especially after the exchange of charges between Morocco and the Polisario [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguita el Hamra and Río de Oro] concerning its violation; reducing the number of forces on both sides; releasing prisoners and allowing refugees to return; and providing the financial resources required to support the organization responsible for implementing the UN referendum.

Sources note that the Moroccan monarch has insisted on stating that the legislative elections will be held immediately after the referendum. He has also expressed the hope that the first meeting of the next parliament be held in
October 1992. In the view of observers, this means keeping to the formula of linking the demands of the referendum and the legislative elections, especially since the opposition Istiqlal and Socialist Union [of Popular Forces, USFP] parties have called on King Hassan II to hold the legislative elections on their scheduled date in the summer of 1992.

Former Foreign Minister Mohammed Boucetta was quoted as saying in a political meeting two days ago: “Regardless of the referendum’s date, the elections must be held at the appropriate time.” The viewpoint of the new USFP leader, Abderrahman Yousfi, is that “there is no alternative to amending the constitution, in order to hold honest local and legislative elections.”

In the first political meeting that he has chaired since the death of Abderrahim Bouabdil, Yousfi stated that “we hope that Morocco will gain a parliament that has real authority in legislative and oversight areas, and that is able to get the government to give it organizational and executive jurisdictions.”

He added: “Everyone is convinced that it would be useless to elect a parliament like the current parliament, even if it were done through honest elections, because it would still be weak vis-a-vis the government.”

Observers believe that the battle to prepare for legislative elections began after the reorganization of the pro-government majority parties into political groupings in several parts of the country in recent weeks. However, conditions being laid down by opposition parties, such as the demand to amend the constitution, reconsider the voter lists, and reapportion election districts, will continue to be in the forefront of the issues that fuel political controversy.

Sources think it likely that, after his return from New York, King Hassan II will meet with political leaders to inform them of developments in the Saharan dispute. The subject of legislative elections will also be discussed, especially since he stated in New York that he hopes that the new parliament meets in accordance with new standards and concepts, which is considered a blunt reference to the likely possibilities for holding honest elections reflecting the components of Moroccan society.

More than one group is raising questions about the presence of Islamic groups that have no sanctioned political validity in the new political scene. References have been made to Islamic organizations whose supporters have been urged to register on election lists and vote in favor of candidates with Islamic leanings, regardless of their political affiliations.

It should be pointed out in this context that the Moroccan authorities have not allowed candidates who have no specific political affiliation to enter previous elections. Perhaps the authorities have taken a stricter position this time, in view of the repercussions that resulted from the situation in Algeria, especially since opposition parties—

with the exception of the Istiqlal Party, which is sympathetic to Islamic tendencies—have expressed distress concerning the clashes that have occurred in certain Moroccan universities between Islamic and leftist students. These parties demand that the authorities intervene to put an end to these incidents.

Impasse on Referendum Blamed on Polisario
92AF0547A Rabat L’OPINION in French 7 Mar 92 p 1

[Editorial by Mohamed Idrissi Kaitouni: “An Impasse for Which Morocco Is Not Responsible”]

[Text] In his report to the Security Council, UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali set a deadline of three months to restart the referendum process begun by the United Nations in the Moroccan Sahara; failing that, the entire operation will be reconsidered.

Morocco is not responsible for the current impasse. Indeed, it has collaborated faithfully with the United Nations and has shown a generous spirit of cooperation and sacrifice just by accepting the principle of a referendum in an integral part of its own territory and asking its own citizens to say whether or not they are Moroccans.

The current impasse is due to the attitude of the mercenaries, who know full well that the overwhelming majority of authentic Saharans will vote for the preservation of Sahara’s Moroccanness, as they know that those sequestered at Tindouf, once their freedom of movement is restored, will opt for the reintegration of their motherland, Morocco.

Moreover, convinced as they are that Algeria is going to end its military and financial aid—as Libya has done—and that their margin for maneuver has been reduced considerably, the Polisario [Popular Front for the Liberation of Sagui el Hamra and Rio de Oro] mercenaries had no alternative but to block the process launched by the United Nations and create obstacles to prevent the referendum from taking place.

With the adoption by the Security Council of outgoing Secretary General [Perez] de Cuellar’s last report, which broadened the identification criteria to be used in certifying Saharans as eligible to vote—Morocco expressed reservations on this subject, because a large portion of the Saharan populations was deprived of this inalienable right—the mercenaries lost their last illusions about the results they could expect from the scheduled referendum in our Saharan provinces.

On the Moroccan side, therefore, all possible and imaginable concessions have been made, and it is out of the question for Morocco to consider preventing authentic Saharans from exercising their right to express their wishes just because they do not appear on lists based on a census taken by colonial occupation authorities.

If the United Nations does not go on to complete the process it got under way and fails to implement the Security Council resolutions, including the one confirming
the identification criteria, Morocco cannot wait indefinitely for a referendum that is overtaken by events and will merely confirm the Moroccanness of our restored Saharan provinces.

Also, the intention expressed by Algeria's leaders to dispose of this matter as quickly as possible and to resolve this artificial conflict definitively, and their pledge not to undertake any military or other action that would increase tensions, lead us to believe that the natural and logical solution is to recognize the undeniable and indisputable Moroccanness of our Sahara, so that together we can devote ourselves to the building of the Great Arab Maghreb and realization of the deepest aspirations of its peoples.

As for the populations of the Sahara, they have already exercised their self-determination and solemnly proclaimed themselves to be Moroccan.

Former Polisario Report on Tindouf
92AF0573A Rabat L'OPINION in French 9 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Jamal Hajjam: “Polisario Disoriented and Disintegrating”; first paragraph is L'OPINION introduction]

[Text] Seven former Polisario [Popular Front for the Liberation of Sagouia el Hamra and Rio de Oro] members have just come back to the motherland. Their testimony, which they gave us in an exclusive interview, shows that the Polisario is disintegrating. It also shows that it keeps hemorrhaging and that the end of this hoax of a movement is approaching fast.

Now that the Saharan question has reached a decisive stage, promising an imminent and final settlement in favor of our national cause, a general exodus, disorder, and uncertainty prevail on the Polisario side. In short, it is breathing its last.

The hemorrhage that this movement has been experiencing for years continues at such a rate that the leading clique may soon find itself with only women, children, and old people.

Seven new renegades have just returned to the motherland, bringing another testimony on the slow but sure disintegration of a movement that has survived so far only through lies and dictatorship.

Ibrahim Baba Amr, Mohamed Barak Allah Omar, Salama Abdullah Achin, Abdessamad Abdallah Zaghm, Sidi Mohamed Lahbib, Ahmed Yacoub, and Mohamed Khatri Omar, all from Oued Eddahab, had military positions within the Polisario or were political officials at the Lahmada camps.

The situation in Tindouf, they said, is extremely tense, first because the people realize that they were deceived from the start, and second because the Polisario leaders—at least those who still remain—behave like dictators, being unfair, exploitative, and using thousands of innocent people as a bait to attract international humanitarian aid and divert it for their own ends.

Since the eighth Polisario congress, in June 1991, which was “nothing but a plot against the people's interests,” those who have just returned insisted, the split between the rank and file and the leadership has been complete.

The Polisario leadership, consisting solely of pro-Algerian elements—to begin with Mohamed Abdelaziz and the so-called “defense minister,” Mohamed Lamine Ould Boughali, also an Algerian—is practicing a policy of tribalism and regionalism so that the people are subjected to a totalitarian and dictatorial regime that utterly disregards all liberties, except for the leaders' entourage.

This situation, plus the people's conviction that they are Moroccans, is the reason that everybody in Tindouf is only waiting for a chance to leave the camps and go back home, to Morocco.

This also explains the massive return of former Polisario members whenever an opportunity arises.

According to the testimony of the seven who just came back, even the natives of Mali, Mauritania, and other regions, who were used as cannon fodder, have started going back home, leaving the movement because they know that its end is drawing nearer every day and that all its promises were just a deception. Faced with a series of desertions, the leading clique declared a state of permanent alert in order to stop the hemorrhage, and they do not hesitate to torture and imprison anyone who attempts to go over to the other side. They have also divided the people among the military zones so as to isolate and separate them, and every military zone now has its own jail.

This shows the extent of the opposition that prevails in Tindouf. However, in spite of these measures, the determination to come back keeps increasing, especially as everybody in Tindouf, whether civilian or military, is now convinced that the Polisario is finished, as a result of regional and international developments.

The creation of the Arab Maghreb Union [UMA], the fall of the Eastern bloc, the change of heart of several European and African countries, have caused the Polisario to become increasingly isolated. “All that remains is Algerian aid, but it has its ups and downs, depending on conditions and circumstances.”

Another element mentioned by the seven recent renegades shows that the Polisario is really falling apart. Spare parts and weapons are sold to the first buyer who comes along. If, they said, the leaders are selling the humanitarian aid intended for the people, why shouldn't the rank and file do the same? “Especially considering that, as the referendum—which everybody knows will be in favor of Morocco—is drawing near, those who are not from our southern provinces want to get some money for after the referendum....”

At military level, these testimonies indicate that the Polisario is seriously getting ready for war rather than for the referendum.
The humanitarian aid is diverted to purchase military equipment, and youths aged 15 and over are systematically enlisted; similarly, attending military schools has become compulsory. Whoever refuses to join the army is simply jailed. Even in speeches, they keep preparing the people for a possible resumption of the hostilities.

The new renegades also reported that infiltrations and construction continue in the zone located between the international borders of the Sahara and the Defense Wall built by the Royal Armed Forces [FAR], more precisely in Tifariti, Bir Lahlou, Zoug, M'hariz, and Migeek.

The seven who came back, leaving behind their children, their families, and their parents, stated that everybody is ready to come back to the motherland, but the only problem is that of women, children, and older people. They thus appeal to international Human Rights organizations to put an end to this farce and liberate the people detained in Lahmada.

Humanitarian organizations, therefore, are called upon to act in defense of human rights and human values to liberate innocents from an ordeal that has lasted too long already.

**Parties Debate Constitutional Reforms**

**Speech by Istiqlal Leader**

92AF0489A Rabat AL-ALAM in Arabic 24 Feb 92 p 2

[Text of speech delivered by Istiqlal Party General Secretary Mohamed Boucetta at conference on constitutional reforms; date not given]

[Text] In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Blessing and peace be upon Our Master Muhammad and his family.

My sisters and brothers: To speak very briefly, I am glad to take part in opening the activities of this conference on constitutional reforms. Your brothers in our political parties—Istiqlal, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces [USFP], and the Organization of Popular Democratic Action [OADP]—thought it would be useful to organize a conference to provide an opportunity for activists, interested people in all areas, and those who follow constitutional and political life—jurists, professors, lawyers, and other professionals—to present their ideas and views at an open forum on a critical issue for our country and its future.

Although the conference is for engaged party cadres and some specialists who are jurists, it will allow all participants from various organizations and leading activists to express their point of view on a subject that should by no means remain “taboo” and closed to discussion. I would like to praise this timely initiative; for we all believe that public participation in analysis and examination—especially participation by those groups of the public familiar with the subject and by young men and women in particular—such participation has become a pressing need, whether to build structures and institutions or to formulate political, economic, social, or cultural plans; for all these things will control the present and future of young people.

I am not about to give a detailed presentation on the history of our constitutional life since the 1908 attempt at the beginning of the now waning 20th century, nor am I about to describe or compare the constitutions with which we have coexisted since the beginning of the sixties. Our able scholarly colleagues will discuss these matters as part of the first focus—the overall historical context of the constitutional reforms. Neither am I now about to define a final position in the name of the Istiqlal Party about what tomorrow’s constitution ought to be; for we hope that the ideas and views that people will express here to enrich this conference will help us crystallize and define this position more precisely.

We therefore believe that this conference has great importance in this field. It falls within the framework of real exercise of democracy as we understand it and desire it—by expressing opposing opinions and by presenting opposing points of view.

Nevertheless, we must ponder, albeit very briefly, the lessons of our experience in the last two or three decades. The first lesson is that we must build our society earnestly on firm foundations. We must not confine ourselves to glittering appearances and (if one may say so) showy facades. We must not display local or provincial institutions such as municipal or rural councils and professional chambers or, at the national level, such as parliament in order to export their images abroad or convince ourselves of their power, while they lack usefulness and credibility.

First and foremost, we must avoid and utterly erase from our behavior and ethics every administrative and governmental intervention or abuse of power, all cheating, deceit, threatening, or bribery for the purpose of falsifying the popular will, lest we again establish councils and institutions without credibility that cause more harm than benefit.

The second lesson, very briefly, is something that practice, even within these spurious institutions, has demonstrated. It manifests itself in the imbalance between constitutional institutions and between the powers that each them—legislative, executive, and judicial—exercises. There is an imbalance between parliament and the government on the one hand, and between each of them and the constitutional chamber.

This became clearly evident during the debate on the petition for oversight that our parties presented several months ago.

I do not want to speak at length about the need to define the responsibilities of all the constitutional bodies and institutions inscribed in the texts but having no existence in reality, nor do I want to speak about the institutions that must be created in response to the requirements of managing the affairs of the country—a modern country in step with developments in the world, a country of law that guarantees human rights in the full sense of the word.
The constitution, which is the highest expression in the law, establishes the unchanging principles—Islamic belief, territorial unity, and the system of governance. It also establishes the fundamental institutions, whether local or at the national level—councils, chambers, parliament, the Council on Economy and Society, the Council of Information, the Council on Culture, Education, and Scientific Research, and the Council on Security, Defense, and Foreign Policy. It defines their powers and how each institution should perform its role—parliament, for example, in approving the government's program, monitoring the government, or, if necessary, withdrawing confidence from the government.

These, very briefly, are some of the arrangements.

Finally, while the constitution is the highest law to organize the government and define the responsibilities of institutions, it is above all the necessary tool for guaranteeing a decent life to all members of the community: guaranteeing a seat in school, guaranteeing treatment for every patient, guaranteeing work for every unemployed person, and guaranteeing freedom, which cannot exist unless these conditions are met.

Speech by USFP Leader
92AP048GB Rabat AL-ALAM in Arabic 24 Feb 92 p 2

[Text of speech delivered by USFP First Secretary Abderrahman Yousfi at conference on constitutional reforms; date not given]

[Text] My sisters and brothers, ladies and gentlemen: In the name of the political bureau of the USFP, I thank you for responding to our invitation to participate with the Istiqlal Party in attending this national conference. The conference constitutes an important departure for a campaign to educate national public opinion on the subject of the anticipated political system and to clarify the fundamental elements that the desired constitutional revision must include.

In this brief speech I will not discuss the attempts and struggles by the Moroccan elite or the national movement before and during the period of the protectorate to obtain a democratic system based on constitutional institutions. Instead, I will move immediately to the heart of the matter.

The USFP went into opposition only four years after Morocco obtained independence and the exercise of full sovereignty. This was for two reasons: First, we did not agree with the basic political choices desired to be followed in the economic, social, and cultural field. Second, no agreement had been reached on the terms of the problem of organizing the country's authorities within the framework of a constitutional monarchy guaranteeing popular participation through genuine representative institutions enabling subjects to oversee rulers, express their legitimate desires, and realize them through a responsible government.

Obviously, there is a dialectical connection between the two reasons: for when genuine constitutional institutions are present, the choices cannot be otherwise than in the interest of the broadest public.

For the past 32 years we have been in the opposition. Our demand remains the same as our late brother Abderrahim Bouabid expressed in the political report he presented in the name of the executive committee at the Istiqlal Party's emergency conference in Rabat on 7 December 1955. He said: "Merely to free Moroccan sovereignty from its fetters, it is necessary to create an elected national assembly with full sovereignty and a responsible government."

Brothers and gentlemen:

We have invited you to this conference so that you may devote yourselves to studying Morocco's constitutional experience since independence. You will undoubtedly conclude that this experience has not embodied the nationalist movement's hopes and desires on the eve of the end of the Moroccan people's heroic battle for the return of the late Mohamed V and for the restoration of our stolen sovereignty. The three successive constitutions (for 17 years they were not in force, meaning that Morocco went 19 years without a constitution) reflected a negative trend in regard to the role played by parliaments and the governments emanating from them. The USFP was right to oppose the content of the three constitutions, and practical experience now confirms the correctness of our positions. Indeed, the historic debate that took place on the floor of parliament in spring 1990 when a petition to censure the current government was presented (a "petition for oversight," to use the official terminology contained in the Moroccan constitution, terminology that also needs to be changed) has convinced all parties that parliament is powerless and the government absent and nonexistent. Revising the 1972 constitution therefore has become a political necessity—indeed, a national issue on par with fundamental and basic national issues.

The Istiqlal Party and the USFP have diagnosed the weak points in this constitution—weak points that are largely responsible for the country's difficulties—and have presented suggestions they deem necessary. These suggestions form a minimum for any relevant noncosmetic revision that will enable parliament and the government institutions to confront the major challenges facing our country beginning this year.

This does not mean that we are not open to other ideas and opinions that move in the same direction. The goal of this day of study is to broaden and deepen the debate and benefit from all contributions. Whatever model the formulators of the 1972 constitution took into account, we do not wish to imitate the constitutions of France, Spain, or one of the Scandinavian countries. Our point of reference is general constitutional law, our national experience, and our feeling that we are still a country on the road to growth. We have at our disposal considerable accumulations of struggle, education, and culture that qualify us to be a model in our region, to help light the way for our neighbors and brothers, and to prove that true democracy is the way to guarantee development and stability. If there is a constitutional model we should draw upon to test the
reasonableness of our demands and proposed amendments, in my view it is the constitution of Namibia, the most recent African country to gain independence. This constitution was drafted by a Namibian constituent assembly composed of deputies from the liberation movement and deputies loyal to the racist regime that was ruling the country. It expresses the level of democratic thinking that one of the peoples of Africa has attained.

Our country has ratified the two international treaties on economic, social, and cultural rights and on political and civil rights. Our revised constitution should reflect this international commitment. It should take account of the relevant observations that the UN Committee on Human Rights addressed to our government when it studied the two reports that Morocco submitted in 1981 and 1990 respectively.

A basic feature of any democratic system is not only that there should be a government emanating from and monitored by a representative assembly but also that this assembly should include a majority and a minority, each of them enjoying rights and guarantees that, along with an independent judiciary, create a political balance that safeguards both laws and citizens. A way to insure these rights and preserve this balance is for the country to have a balanced pluralistic information system specifically including the radio and television systems, which belong to all the people.

Gentlemen and brothers:

You know well the connection that any constitution has with the way its institutions are formed and particularly with the manner in which its parliament is elected. Periodic, honest elections are an organic factor in constitutional life. Furthermore, parliament’s internal system has an effect on the life and productiveness of parliament. We hope time allows you to consider this important aspect of the constitutional problem. In any case, your studies and analyses will lead you to an essential conclusion: that revising the constitution is a process that must precede the process of electing the institutions provided in the constitution.

We all know that the term of the current parliament, elected in September 1984 under circumstances still fixed in every citizen’s memory, was extended two years by constitutional referendum in hope that the United Nations would hold a referendum in our Saharan provinces within the two years. Whether the United Nations is able to hold the referendum within the period set by its majesty the king or is unable to do so for reasons for which it alone is responsible, legislative elections are expected to be held before October, as the new parliament is supposed to take office on Friday, 9 October 1992, according to provisions of the constitution—i.e., in 32 weeks from today.

Thank you for listening.
First, we see no hard or insuperable contradiction between our desire to implant the elements of a modern democratic system at the constitutional and practical level and our history, culture, national characteristics, and religious values.

Second, the crisis in which our society is faltering on more than one level cannot be separated from our constitutional experiences, even though these constitutions, for all their flaws, remain in some of their principles superior to the reality of everyday life.

We badly need to reconsider the central rigor that has characterized our constitutions, leaving only a marginal and secondary role for representatives of the will of the nation. We need to reconsider the balance of powers so as to endow them with greater flexibility and give parliament a central role.

Third, our discussions with our brothers in the USFP and Istiqal parties, as well as the writings and positions of all major nationalist, democratic figures, allow us to say that major common denominators exist and can be expanded. We can also say that the demand for constitutional reforms is a national demand with a very broad base that we all must work to strengthen and crystallize.

Fourth, providing the necessary political climate of public and other freedoms and creating appropriate forms for participation by the masses and all national figures in an open national dialogue on constitutional reforms is no less important than the reforms themselves.

Brothers: [one or more words illegible] finally for me to wish success to [one or more words illegible]. We hope this good harbinger will be a cornerstone in an honest national dialogue.

Greetings to you and the brothers who organized the conference. Thank you all.

Peace be upon you and the mercy of God.

Other Presentations

92AF0489D Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 24 Feb 92 p 4

[Article: “Constitution Must Be Changed To Express Society Yearning for Democracy, Development”]

[Text]

Presentation by Professor Abdelkerim Ghallab

In his presentation, “The General Historical Framework of Constitutional Reforms,” Brother Ghallab stated that the subject of reforming or changing the constitution should be placed in the context of the pressing need to develop democratic conditions in Morocco. Morocco has become one of the countries in which the development of the democratic process has become inevitable, necessitated first by the governmental situation, then by the economic and social situation, and finally by Morocco’s situation in its international context.

He mentioned how Morocco’s constitutional experience, now 30 years old, had proved to be a failure in accomplishing all these goals. Thus, any reform or change drawing its formative elements from the 1962 constitution would bear the seeds of failure within itself, for the latter constitution had not met Morocco’s needs even under the first conditions of independence.

Brother Ghallab threw light on the purpose behind the promulgation of that constitution and the unfavorable political circumstances that accompanied it. These included the fact that the nationalist political movement had been divided against itself. This robbed it of its positive strength to influence the course of events either in the government or in the institutions, especially the constitution and elected bodies. The division of the nationalist movement also had the result of aborting the constituent assembly’s attempt in the wake of popular pressure to lay a foundation for the constitution. He also noted that the constitution had been promulgated under unfavorable economic and social conditions. Thus, it had been traditional, had entrenched the central authority, and had emptied of its content the principle of separation of powers.

Brother Ghallab also talked about the undemocratic situation produced by the state of emergency, which had robbed the constitution of the credibility it should have enjoyed. These historical circumstances, he affirmed, prove that the current constitution needs to be changed, not merely amended.

Brother Ghallab next examined the foreign, domestic, and future-related considerations that necessitate constitutional change. On the foreign level, the great powers have begun to prepare for a new world order. What will be affected by this order is the Third World. Furthermore, the world has experienced a great transformation with the liquidation of communism as an ideology and practice. As in the Third World, it has seen noteworthy development since the fifties and sixties, with most of the dictatorships having been shaken by popular awakening. Democracy is a concomitant of economic development. The development toward unity in the world is linked to democratic regimes. Finally, there is the spread of mass culture, which finds its point of reference abroad, based on acquaintance with the democracies of the First World.

Speaking of the domestic conditions that necessitate constitutional change, Brother Ghallab said that experiments with political systems know no stasis. If a constitution born in a developing country in a stage of renewal becomes frozen, its credibility vanishes. The Moroccan constitution in its three forms has not contributed to the development of economic and social life. It has not inaugurated a truly democratic system because of the confusion of all values in the separation of powers and in the two functions of parliament. It has not protected general freedoms and human rights. By certain provisions it has made it easy to return to the life of the constitution under the First World. It has had major responsibility for the irregularities that have occurred in every election without exception and has also caused many disturbances.
In light of these observations, Brother Ghallab concluded by saying that the current constitution has lost its credibility at home and abroad. Had it been a well-made constitution responding to Morocco's political, economic, and social developments, it would have been an impregnable bulwark against all these repercussions the country had witnessed for 30 years.

Speaking about future conditions, Brother Ghallab said that Morocco was not living by itself in a vacuum. Developments in the world prove that Morocco must be enabled to have a constitution that is adequate for the future.

Presentation by Professor Abdelkader [Bayna]

In his remarks, Professor Abdelkader [Bayna] stated that the democratic concept is still a basic guideline for the program and choices of the USFP. The demand for a constitution occupied a privileged position in the party's democratic choice. This concept involved a continuing struggle to establish a constitution that would cement the foundations of a democratic system and strengthen a modern democratic constitutional parliamentary monarchy that would end various negative aspects of the old pre-independence system of government.

He summarized the USFP's various positions on the constitutional question under two headings: 1) the constant and the evolving in drafting and revising the constitution, and 2) the purposes and goals of having and applying a constitution.

Under the first heading he discussed the roots of the demand before and after the 1962 constitution and the evolution of the demand since October 1968.

The second heading, involving purposes and goals, calls for establishing a constitutional parliamentary democratic monarchy, affirming the role of the balanced monarchical institution, giving priority to the role of a present, responsible government, strengthening the role of an effective parliament exercising oversight, and building the foundations of a developed modern state. It also stresses guaranteeing general rights, respecting human rights, an independent judiciary granted the necessary status, putting the administration at the service of citizens, and strengthening and establishing the foundations of civil society.

Presentation of Professor Abdallah [Saeif]

At the beginning of his presentation, Professor Abdallah [Saeif] stated that the importance of the constitutional question is increasing with the developments Morocco is experiencing, taking into account the accumulated experiences and suffering of the components of the national movement.

Very briefly, he said, one can distinguish in general between four stages as regards the constitutional question.

The first stage was before colonization, when constitutional concern and interest in the institutional and legal aspect remained largely marginal in our country and enjoyed no great weight in political attitudes in the country.

The second stage was a foundational stage, the stage of national struggle. The relation of the nationalist movement to the constitutional question was raised in many debates. During this period there were fundamental works that showed the existence of a basic central concern about the constitution.

We can lump within the third stage the three constitutions of 1962, 1970, and 1972 and the struggles that accompanied these three documents. They are the core of independent Morocco's experience in the constitutional field, but they have continued to constitute first steps in the area. Radical criticisms have been aimed at them. Professor Saef said that these three constitutions had never been given a chance to produce constitutional practice.

Professor Saef added that despite all these facts, the nationalist movement with its various components had adhered to a pyramidal classification of problems, distinguishing between the root problem and the basic social, cultural, and political problems.

Nevertheless, we find ourselves facing the failure of this experiment also.

The fourth stage is the current stage. Essential changes have taken place in it in relation to the past. What was secondary has become central.

The debate now is raising issues that were not raised before. This is giving new breath to the present constitutional system.

Professor Saef said that the development of legal awareness and learning from the accumulated experience of the past—all these things are intensifying the struggle.

There is now an awareness that the situation does not constitute political a prioris and that there are possibilities for adjustment and change.

As regards the political subject, the state, it has not advanced in achieving its goals by virtue of these constitutions.

He added that the nationalist parties for the first time have taken a central stand on the constitutional question in their struggle, as shown by their agreement on changing the constitution.

Presentation of Professor Moulay [Amhamed] Khalifa

At the beginning of his presentation on the defects in our democratic and constitutional progress, Brother Moulay Amhamed Khalifa asked whether this derives from the constitution itself (which he calls for amending) or whether application and interpretation of its provisions have not kept pace with democratic thinking; the changes that various societies have experienced in the area of democracy and human rights; and the development of Moroccan society politically, intellectually, and economically; and in all other fields over a period of 30 full years.

"It would be useful for us," he said, "to turn our thoughts to formulating sound, basic observations that we believe necessary if the country's supreme law is to become a constitutional framework faithfully expressing a society
yearning for true democracy in the last decade of this century, and if the provisions of the constitution are to become more precise; less ambiguous; and easier to understand in regulating relations between rulers and ruled, and between the three branches of government in how they use or complement each other."

According to Professor Khalifa, questions about constitutional reforms or amendments have been raised in one form or another since the first constitution was drafted in 1962.

As for the constitutional framework into which the country was placed 30 years ago, whatever the state of that framework may have been at the time—polished and shining or worn and threadbare, ample or narrow—given the development of things and the growth of Moroccan society since the 1972 constitution was put into effect, a review of the constitution has become necessary, so that its content, spirit, and provisions will correspond to the real progress of our society and the legitimate aspirations of our people.

"Morocco's constitutional experience since 1977," he added, "has produced a fact that everyone accepts—the need for rapid constitutional reforms."

In his presentation, Professor Khalifa discussed the purpose of the changes that are being demanded. These include strengthening the state of law and the sovereignty of the law, buttressing the authority of institutions, and democratizing and modernizing the organs of state. He listed the following nine elements as basic components of democracy and distinguishing criteria of a democratic regime:

- safeguarding general freedoms, respecting human rights, and maintaining the dignity of citizens;
- political participation by citizens;
- pluralism;
- peaceful and democratic rotation of power among the country’s political parties and organizations;
- honest elections;
- freedom of information and of opinion;
- separation and balance of powers;
- supremacy of the law, equality before the law, and a truly independent judiciary; and
- guaranteeing justice and equality.

Professor Khalifa explained that if we are to succeed in democratizing society, constitutional changes must be made. These changes can be briefly presented as follows:

First, changes in the legislative authority can be summarized under three basic headings: 1) changes involving parliament itself; 2) broadening the scope of the law; and 3) giving parliament the necessary legal means to exercise its constitutional right for the government to be responsible before it.

Second, the formation of the government should emanate from the majority in parliament. The prime minister should participate in forming it by proposing its members. The required harmony will thus exist among its members, as well as interdependence in the exercise of governmental responsibility. Professor Khalifa deemed this principle to be a true expression of the meaning of a multi-party system, of the role of political parties in political administration, and of their taking turns in guiding the affairs of the country.

He called for defining the government’s duties constitutionally and stipulating its responsibility for solidarity.

He linked presenting the government program to parliament with voting on it.

Third, Professor Khalifa called for real, effective independence of the judiciary in the context of sovereignty of the law. He deemed this a true guarantee of the separation of powers, the building of a state of law, and the building of the advanced civil society that is everyone’s goal.

Fourth, Prof. Khalifa demanded establishing a constitutional provision to democratize the public information media. These must serve national public opinion and be open to all political, cultural, and intellectual views and currents.

**Presentation of Professor Abderrahman Kadri**

Professor Abderrahman Kadri stated that the memorandum submitted about four and a half months ago, containing a series of proposed reforms to the kingdom’s constitution of 10 March 1972, called for a number of observations and for discussion of other aspects, as well.

He added, "If the change demanded by the Istiqlal Party and the USFP proves to be persuasive and is put to a referendum for approval, it would strengthen the parliamentary character of the country’s political system and somewhat moderate its patently presidential character. It would give the government’s responsibility the importance of the governmental institution and its head, both of which had become marginalized through the constitution and especially through practice."

Professor Abderrahman Kadri stated that the change was marked by two basic demands:

First, the government’s role would be defined. The government would be installed by parliament and would thus come to emanate from parliament, just as its counterpart in the Kingdom of Spain under the constitution of 28 December 1978, and in the other European countries, with the exception of France, since the introduction of its current constitution of 4 October 1958.

The second demand involved parliamentary questioning of the government, not the prime minister, contrary to what was contained in the text of the memorandum. This would mean establishing a salutory means of monitoring the government. This is a recognized weapon of parliament in all parliamentary systems in Europe and elsewhere, again with the exception of France since the approval of the 4 October 1958 constitution as revised in 1962 and 1974.

Professor Kadri stated that "These two reforms are considered essential reforms that will strengthen the role of parliament, which will accordingly become a center of
decisionmaking, as is the case both in parliamentary systems and in presidential systems.

"This approach involves generally broadening parliament's powers in the area of legislation, so as to enrich the section on law (Section 45) and other articles. Some of these things have never been specified, such as full immunity and broadening parliament's diplomatic authority, as in other democratic countries and such developing countries as Senegal and Ivory Coast, or as in Algeria before 11 January 1992.

"There is a clear sense that balance must be restored to the central authorities of the state by making the other changes proposed for the constitution, whether this involves the period of each of the two normal or extraordinary sessions, or involves strengthening the means of oversight (investigatory and oversight committees) and the legal quorum for lodging a petition for oversight against the government.

"Finally, a special session of parliament should be called whenever a state of emergency is proclaimed, and a measure dissolving parliament should not be issued when the emergency powers specified in Section 34 are exercised."

Presentation of Professor Benyounes Marzouki
At the beginning of his presentation, "Preliminary Outlines for the General Content of Constitutional Reforms," Professor Benyounes Marzouki stated that the general aim of the proposals was to give a new dynamic to political action in the country. This would be done by: strengthening popular participation; opening developed political relations (i.e., of a parliamentary character) between the legislative and executive branches; and opening broad legal relations on all levels—between citizens and the government and between the constitutional institutions themselves.

Professor Marzouki divided his presentation into four areas: parliament, the government, parliament's relations with the executive, and other topics.

Regarding the first area, he called for employing a system of direct general voting by a system of proportional voting by slate (by vote total). The remaining seats would be distributed by the system of greatest remainders. He stressed shortening the term of parliament, of prefecture and province councils, and of the councils of urban and rural communes, broadening the scope of the law (Section 45 of the constitution), and changing the constitutional rules on passing the budget (especially Section 50 of the constitution).

He called for giving parliament explicit opportunity to schedule debate on its own proposals; widening or loosening the yardstick contained in Section 56, so that members not represented in a work group might propose their amendments in general sessions.

Regarding formation of the government, he called for establishing the principle of parliamentary government. The prime minister would be appointed from the political body that represented the majority in parliament or the majority political coalition. He called for establishing the principle of the government's responsibility for the general state policy, along with the principle of collective governmental solidarity for implementing this policy.

Professor Marzouki called for doing away with the government council and relying only on the cabinet, which would work within a fixed term.

Regarding the executive's relations with the legislature, he stressed strengthening the legislature's means of monitoring government action and speeding up guidelines for dealing with parliamentary laws. He called for converting the constitutional chamber into a constitutional council with broadened powers. An economic and social council should be created, along with other high-level councils to deal with national revival, planning, education, human rights, women's rights, information, defense, and security.

He stressed that the state's respect for human rights, in accordance with all treaties and international resolutions approved by Morocco, should be explicitly stated in the constitution. The voting age should be lowered to 18, and the official information media should be democratized.

Development of Opposition Parties Discussed
92AF0493A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 22 Feb 92 p 14

[Commentary by Hatim Btoui: "Expectations Nominate Ousman as Prime Minister, Trend Toward Postponing Saharan Referendum"]

[Text] The Moroccan opposition parties' train—Isitigil Party, Socialist Union of Popular Forces [USFP], and the Popular Democratic Action Organization [OADP]—has gotten underway again, but this time the Party of Progress and Socialism [PPS], led by Ali Yata, is on board. If coordination among the four opposition parties began when the proposed draft bill pertaining to measures to counter the drought and its negative repercussions on farmers was submitted to the Moroccan parliament; and if the joint communiqué issued last week calling for a national committee to oversee the integrity of the elections and confirming the need to hold them as legally scheduled on the basis of undertaking prior constitutional and political reforms, is—in the view of observers—a progressive step toward forming a unified front of opposition parties, then is the estrangement with the PPS ending?

Shortly before the joint communiqué was issued, Ali Yata denied in a press statement that his party may have reached the end of the rift with the three opposition parties, inasmuch as there was coolness and tension in relations among them. However, he did not hide the rift with those parties concerning joint action with the PPS, revealing that the dispute among the opposition parties is tactical and not strategic.

The dispute between the PPS and the other opposition parties peaked when the PPS opposed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and criticized Saddam Husayn's regime. The rift was also caused by the PPS position on the 14 December
1990 strike called for by the Democratic Labor Confederation and the Moroccan Workers' General Union [UGTM], both supporters of the USFP and the Istiqlal Party. The PPS viewed the strike as a political success, since the government of Dr. Azzedine Laraki expressed willingness to hold a dialogue and offered concessions. Therefore, interests required that it not enter the general strike.

The PPS' understanding of the government's position caused the other opposition parties to regard it with doubt and suspicion, particularly since this understanding comes in critical circumstances that are only a few months away from the elections.

The dispute also emerged when the PPS opposed isolating the Moroccan labor union (the oldest union organization in Morocco) [UGTM]. The PPS expressed its belief in the unity of unionized labor, while the opposition parties responded that they had no part in this affair, and that the union had isolated itself when it adopted negative positions concerning social problems, in the parliament and on the labor scene. This was in addition to the PPS' call to the Moroccan Government and political and economic powers to ratify the "national charter," aimed at ending political and social tension, concentrating on the issue of the unity of Moroccan territory, and working to keep Moroccan public opinion focused on the basic issue until the referendum is held. The PPS also called for the formation of a national coalition government to oversee the referendum process in the [Western] Sahara and to organize collective, legislative, and vocational elections.

Ali Yata's demands were rejected by the other opposition parties, and they continue the linkage between mobilizing on behalf of union and social demands, and mobilizing on behalf of the unity of Moroccan territory and constitutional reforms. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that Mohammed Boucetta, the Istiqlal Party's secretary general, recently stated that his party would not join the PPS in forming a national coalition government at the present time. In this context, informed sources told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the process of organizing the referendum in the Western Sahara might be postponed until after next October. This is the month that Hassan II set for the new parliament's work to begin. These sources suggested that the reason for this was to weaken the material resources of the UN Minurso [Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara], which is charged with overseeing the holding of the referendum, and thus lengthen the time required for reviewing the [voting] lists of Saharans that Morocco has submitted.

These same sources believe that it is likely that Morocco will experience an empty legislative year and will resort to the chapter of special provisions in the Moroccan constitution issued in 1972, especially Article 102, which states: "Until the Chamber of Deputies is installed as stipulated in this constitution, the king shall adopt the legislative measures required to establish constitutional institutions, conduct public authority, and arrange state affairs."

In all the increasing talk about this scenario, the opposition parties think that the question of linkage between the referendum in the Sahara and the elections is clearly evident on the formal level. Substance is not evident, because the constitutional and legal authority of existing representative institutions ended two years ago.

If the Istiqlal Party wants the referendum held at the earliest possible time, despite the fact it considers the referendum a pointless encroachment, it puts responsibility for any postponement on other quarters, i.e., the UN or the Polisario [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saquia-el-Hamra and Rio de Oro], and not on Morocco. Accordingly, the four opposition parties' joint communiqué stresses the need to hold elections on their legally scheduled dates.

There is talk in Moroccan political circles that, because of this empty legislative year, Morocco will experience the formation of a new government that might be headed by Ahmed Osman, head of the National Liberal Grouping party (majority), and in which the USFP would participate. Reinforcing this prediction are two events that have given pause to long-time observers of Moroccan political life. They consider them to be indications of thinking about a formula for a national coalition government. The first incident was the meeting organized by the National Liberal Grouping in Rabat, at the end of the week before last, where Ahmed Osman called for a dialogue among all Moroccan political powers, in order to form a national consensus on "the requirements to attain a Morocco of unified territory, democracy, human rights, and comprehensive development." This caused observers to believe that this call expresses the grouping's desire to participate in the political and constitutional reforms that the opposition is demanding. On the same occasion, Osman criticized the Moroccan administration, describing it as stagnant and bureaucratic. He said he wanted the coming elections to be free and honest, something that made his political speech approximate the tone of opposition political speeches.

The second incident was the speech delivered by Ahmed Osman at the 40th-day [after the death] ceremony of the late leader of the USFP, Abderrahim Bouahid, when he praised Bouahid's fight to build a state of laws and progress in Morocco and to develop its democratic experience on various political and economic levels. He pointed out that Bouahid had left a legacy of a model intellectual school, represented by the USFP, and that he had left clear imprints on Moroccan political life, both in the national liberation phase and the phase of constructing a modern state.

Accordingly, a leftist intellectual can conclude that if Ahmed Osman is a lofty statesman, he is also a judicious oppositionist. Therefore, while Prime Minister Azzedine Laraki makes it clear that he cannot offer a useful prescription to end to many of Morocco's problems, Ahmed Osman makes it clear that he is the savior who will bring the country to a state of confidence and psychological balance, particularly since he enjoys the confidence of King Hassan II, as well as the respect of the opposition.
parties. Moreover, we should not forget that the continuous democratic experience began when he was prime minister. The Green March was also during his regime.

Political circles think that if Osman is appointed prime minister, it will mean that the Moroccan monarch has abandoned the custom that he has followed since he came to power in Morocco: that the prime minister not be affiliated with any political party, i.e., that he be an arbitrator, not an adversary. The same circles add that Osman will not accept limited powers. This proves that the authority of the administrative apparatus will be forced to dwindle whenever a prime minister is appointed. In addition, the number of partisan ministers will outweigh the technocrats, no matter how much of the previous scenario is achieved. Surely the current government's days are numbered, as a consequence of the winds being whipped up openly by the opposition and tacitly by certain majority parties. It is expected that the fog that envelops Moroccan political life will lift, in light of the previously mentioned data. This might reshuffle the cards, perhaps radically. Many questions continue to occupy observers, including: To what extent will the opposition parties adjust to new circumstances that might result from delaying the Sahara referendum? Will they resort to escalating the call for more strikes to pressure the government? To what extent will opposition coordination continue among the four parties, particularly since these parties—excluding the PPS—will be holding a forum on political and constitutional reforms on 29 February 1992.

Opposition Leader Fears Postelection ‘Chaos’

PM2303151192 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 19 Mar 92 p 6

[Interview with Ali Yata, secretary general of the Moroccan Party of Progress and Socialism, by Hatim al-Butaywi in Casablanca; date not given]

[Excerpts] [al-Butaywi] Have you not thought about changing the party's name in the light of the changes in the socialist camp? Or does socialism still mean something to you?

[Yata] The name “Progress and Socialism” sums up our party's program both at present and in the future. At present we are working for progress in all domains. In the economic domain we are working for the sake of developing the country's economic power and guaranteeing citizens adequate living standards. In the social domain we believe that present achievements are insufficient, which is why we are working to expand them with regard to wages and family compensation. As for the political domain, we acknowledge that our country has made achievements about which no one can argue. But even they are insufficient. This is why we are demanding the introduction of amendments to the Constitution in order to enhance the legislative authority's powers and grant a kind of independence to the executive authority under the surveillance of the people's representatives. We also demand that the judiciary be independent and that it guarantee citizens' freedoms and rights. And we believe that conditions are favorable for such progress.

With regard to the stage ahead, we hope that it will be characterized by socialism, in the sense that society will be based on total freedom, social justice, and equality among citizens and not on the exploitation of one another. Thus I believe that in these circumstances we of the Party of Progress and Socialism see no benefit in changing the party's name. The name is completely suitable for the present stage and the stage ahead. So we believe that there is no need to change it. [passage omitted]

[al-Butaywi] What is left of your ties to yesterday's comrades in the socialist camp and the states that revolved in its orbit?

[Yata] With regard to the socialist countries that were linked to the Soviet Union, we have no link with them except some correspondence between our party and two old communist parties, one in Hungary and the other in what used to be called Democratic Germany. As for the other countries in which communist parties have vanished, we have no link with them or with their parties. But there are other socialist states which still exist, like the PRC, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. And there other states that are still socialist and with which we have normal relations like in the past. [passage omitted]

[al-Butaywi] There is talk about the next election being held with impartiality. Do you not fear that the election could bring surprises, as happened in Algeria, and that the parties could find themselves excluded from the democratic game?

[Yata] Impartiality and freedom are two fundamental conditions for ensuring the usefulness of elections. And I cannot imagine that after what we have suffered in the past there will be any interference from the authorities, locally or nationally, in these elections. What does inspire fear is the danger that this freedom could lead to a kind of chaos and turn the election into a "jungle election," as happened in Algeria.

I think that Moroccan nationalist forces, especially the opposition, can take the necessary measures to prevent that chaotic aspect from outbalancing the fairness of the elections.

PPS Leader Announces Decision To Quit

LD2103105392 Rabat MAP in English 1240 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] Rabat, March 20 (MAP)—Secretary General of the Party for Progress and Socialism [PPS] Ali Yata announced he would quit the party's leadership that he had been assuming since 1945.

In an interview with Saudi daily AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT published Thursday [19 March], the PPS leader who would announce his decision during the party's fifth congress said a change at the leadership will give a new impetus to the party and secure it more success.
Most leaders of Moroccan political parties are rather old and the leadership of all these parties need an injection of young blood, Ali Yata said.

Referring to the meeting King Hassan II had held recently with leaders of political parties, Ali Yata said the explanations given by the sovereign prompted optimism, as the proposed changes would be the prelude to a new era of progress, freedom and democracy.

As to the possibility to form a national union government and conclude a national pact between the various political and economic forces, Ali Yata underlined his party's readiness to participate in such a government, under some conditions, such as being granted some guarantees and being able to participate in the elaboration of the governmental program.

Authorities Seek New Image on Human Rights
LD1203190792 Paris Antenne-2 Television Network in French 1900 GMT 9 Mar 92

[Report by correspondents Gerard Beaufils, Gilles Dobbelaere, and Elie Cohen on human rights in Morocco; first graf announcer-read introduction]

[Text] A new report today on human rights in Morocco: A television camera has been allowed into a Moroccan prison officially for the first time. The pictures you will see were filmed in Rabat, where the authorities seem to be quite determined to display openness (pictures not reproduced). Here is a report from Gerard Beaufils, Gilles Dobbelaere and Elie Cohen:

[Beaufils] The Rabat-Sale model prison opens its door for the first time. The prisoners here are common law prisoners who have received sentences or are still awaiting sentence. This has nothing in common with the stories of detention in the sinister Tazmamart jail, which has now been officially destroyed. Human rights are respected here even if the prisoners live ten to a room. The visiting rooms are open and visits authorized. Whatever the polemics of the past, the authorities affirm that there are no longer any political prisoners in Morocco.

[Begin recording] [Driss Basri, Moroccan interior and information minister] There are no people in Morocco who have been arrested for their opinions.

[Cohen] The Moroccan sovereign speaks of the future, speaks of democracy. Is there any similarity between your notion of democracy today and what is called democracy in the Western countries, for example?

[Biasi] Yes, as His Majesty has said, democracy is a notion and a moral code for living which is very evolutionary, and that notion of living must, of course, be adapted to the state of development of each country. [end recording]
Prime Minister Pressured on Drought, Strikes
92AF0454D London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
12 Feb 92 p 5

[Article by Muhammad al-Ashtab: "Laraki Government Faces Pressure From Opposition"]

[Text] The government of Moroccan Prime Minister Dr. Azzedine Laraki faces intense pressure from principal opposition parties, which are criticizing him for the increasing social problems. Workers' unions were scheduled to hold multiple strikes in the health, education, and other sectors. Two health workers' unions announced that they were organizing six future protest parades in Rabat, after a protest strike to be held on 13 February. Central education unions announced a similar strike beginning on 23 February.

A heated controversy is increasing over the government's responsibility for the deaths of several young men on the Mediterranean Sea last week, in what is being called the case of "the death boats," referring to these young people's attempt to enter Spain across the Mediterranean without obtaining a visa. Recently, the business of "smuggling" youth who wish to work in Spain, and certain other European countries, has become active, through the use of small fishing boats that frequently sink.

Furthermore, it is expected that the confrontation between the government and opposition parties will increase if the drought and dearth of rain—which have been having disastrous effects on the country's economy—continue. Last night, King Hassan II was scheduled to receive members of the Farmers and Agricultural Reform Committee of the Moroccan Parliament to discuss ways of countering the drought's effects. The government is scheduled, in the course of the next few hours, to study practical measures to lessen the drought's repercussions. Most likely, the matter will turn into a red hot controversy between the government and the opposition parties, especially since Mohammed Boucetta, the head of the opposition Istiqlal Party, has made clear the unlikelihood of his party's participation in an expected government. In a recent press conference, he said: "Our dispute with the opposition Party for Progress and Socialism stems from its being invited to form a coalition government while, for our part, it is unthinkable in the present circumstances to accept this proposal."

It should be remembered that the Istiqlal Party and the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, USFP, Party had previously formed a unified front for political coordination, which is closed to the rest of the opposition parties. Some observers interpret the Istiqlal Party's hard-line position as resulting from its desire to enter the coming legislative elections in full coordination with the USFP. This might even reach the point of submitting joint candidate lists. However, others believe that the Istiqlal Party wants to break up an existing initiative aimed at having the USFP and the National Liberal Grouping participate together in a transitional government. However, the certainty is that the confrontation between the government and the Istiqlal Party will continue, especially since the Istiqlal Party is considered sympathetic to Islamic trends. Quoting its leader, Mohammed Boucetta: "My party believes there should be no obstacles in the way of expressing the people's will under the law and Islam."

He was commenting on the position of the fundamentalist group, "Justice and Benevolence," which is led by Shakh Abdelsalam Yassine. However, Boucetta stressed that "before all else, Islam is the religion of the state. We have no organizational link with these groups, except that we have humanitarian connections when the matter calls for defending freedom of expression."

Minister Discusses Investments, Privatization
LD1103150492 Rabat MAP in English
1326 GMT 11 Mar 92

[Text] Rabat, Mar. 11 (MAP/POOL/UMA)—Arab investments in Morocco in 1991 financed 14 percent of industrial projects and accounted for 63 percent of the overall amount of foreign investments, Rachidi Rzezouani, Moroccan minister in charge of planning told Saudi daily "AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT".

The minister said the creation of an off-shore financial market and a free zone in Tangier (northern Morocco) will drain more capital from mideast countries. In addition to private initiative companies operating in tourism and industry, he added, Morocco has set up a number of joint ventures with some Arab countries (Libya, the UAE [United Arab Emirates], Kuwait, Saudi Arabia).

Of privatization he said this option is meant to adapt public institutions to market reality, production costs and prices and promote the private sector. The minister also said the current development plan gives to local councils and private sector a major role in working out economic policy. Local councils were granted human and material means needed to improve their financial resources which went up from md [Moroccan dinar] 3.3 billion in 1977 to about md 9 billion in 1991. This enabled the local councils invest md 14.5 [word indistinct] in the [word indistinct] first years of the plan in addition to programs of rural electrification and drinking water supply, reforestation and development of industrial zones.

Concerning the private sector, Rzezouani said the sector has undergone structural reforms meant to streamline production, promote external exchanges, improve the tax system and encourage investments.

Morocco, added the minister, has mainly taken into account in its structural adjustment the need to maintain internal and external budget balance while the country's development policy has always taken into account the social factor. Morocco grants priority to Moroccan citizens education, the number of university students went up from 5,117 in 1960 to 125,000 now and there are currently 7,000 university teachers, most of whom are Moroccans. In 1960, there were only 172 university professors including only 32 Moroccans, Rzezouani told the Saudi paper.
Government Plan To Overcome Unemployment Urged
92AF0584A Rabat L'OPINION in French
11 Mar 92 p 1


[Text] The problem of unemployment, particularly among young people who have received their degrees, is now one of the most difficult obstacles in the path of our social and economic development and one of the major concerns of our citizens.

In effect the poor and middle classes among our people, from whom the overwhelming majority of unemployed young graduates come, are feeling deep bitterness and great disillusionment. They see that after so many years of sacrifice and endurance to ensure the education and training of their children the latter are condemned to unemployment and idleness. Their children have been added to the ranks of the hundreds of thousands of young people without jobs who have been expelled from different educational programs for reasons that have nothing to do with their intellectual aptitude. Rather, these expulsions are the result of action taken by the government—in accordance with the instructions of international financial organizations—to reduce budgetary expenditures for the creation of jobs. They also relate to the implementation of a selective policy of setting up multiple barriers in the path of students and pupils to eliminate the largest number of them.

The establishment of the National Council of Youth and of the Future [CNJA] made it possible to carry out a review of the jobs market by preparing a list of young people without employment. Through the proposals that it makes it should contribute to the adaptation of classes offered in educational and vocational training centers to meet the qualifications required in the job market as well as including young people in the active life of the nation.

Therefore, this action undertaken by the CNJA has made it possible to find jobs for more than 40,000 young graduates, particularly in local governments, the public and semipublic sector, and, to a lesser degree, in the private sector, with the exception of the banks.

This result clearly shows that when it is desired to do something, it can be done. By barricading itself behind budgetary restrictions and the lack of financial resources the government has shown a clear lack of imagination and political will to resolve this social problem before it assumes alarming proportions.

The government could have adopted, a long time ago, a broad program for the creation of jobs instead of resorting to the policy of anticipating events and showing indifference which has only accentuated the crisis and made it more complicated.

Furthermore, if the government does not change its policy and does not undertake large scale action to create more jobs, the number of unemployed people—and particularly young graduates—will continue to increase. And the efforts made by the CNJA will have been in vain.

Certainly, this is the kind of action to whose success the state, local governments, the semipublic sector, and also the private sector must contribute. However, the government must provide an example by introducing radical reforms in the civil service to open up more administrative positions and particularly by renouncing the policy of waste and disorder.

Investment Figures for Industry in 1991 Given
92AF0490B Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 6 Feb 92 p 4

[Text] Industrial investments in 1991 were marked by a pronounced slowdown. Investments that enjoy certification by the investment plan were not flourishing: at 11 billion dirhams, they increased 2 percent over 1990, vis-a-vis an increase of 35 percent in 1990 compared with 1989, and 40 percent in 1989.

There was also a 9-percent decline in the expected volume of jobs as a result of the performance of those investments: an estimated 81,692 jobs against 89,506 linked to certified investment in 1990.

This is at a time when the number of investment portfolios rose 11 percent (from 2,950 in 1990 to 3,268 in 1991). The decrease in investment encompasses many sectors: the food industry, 33 percent; the textile and leather industry, 15 percent; the mining and machinery industry, 34 percent, the contracting industry and related services, 4 percent. The 2 percent investment increase was in two sectors: the chemical and quasi-chemical, at more than 58 percent; and the electric and electronic industries, 31 percent.

This drop in investments is attributed to a number of factors, related first and most importantly, to the government's economic policies, after the tax measures ordered by the revision of the Finance Law of 1990 (the former tax progression and tax prepayment). It is also attributed to contract financing and measures to liberalize loans and interest rates, which led to a steep rise in interest rates and competition for treasury contributions for investment, and consequently their swallowing of a portion of personal savings, because the contributions are derived from offset interest; also, and basically, exemption from all tax, and adjusting some of them for privatization and preserving them with its financial means, too. All this is in addition to the atmosphere of apprehension stemming from the Gulf war.

At the sector level, certified investments in 1991 were distributed as follows:

- The chemical and quasi-chemical industries held 39 percent of total investment, expected to bring about 16 percent of expected job positions.
- The textile and leather industry held 27 percent, which is expected to provide 58 percent of anticipated jobs.
- The industrial-type activities sector occupies third place, with 13 percent of certified investment, expected to provide 9 percent of employment.
- In fourth place are the food industries, with 12 percent of total certified investments and 8 percent of expected jobs.
- Next is mining and machinery, with 5 percent of total certified investments and 6 percent of expected jobs.
- The electric and electronic industries have 1.3 percent of total certified investments.

The shareholders in these investments are distributed as follows:

- Only 9 percent of the total investments were public. This is related to the expansions achieved by Sioca, Royal Air Maroc, the tobacco company, and ACOZ.
- 22 percent were foreign investments, amounting to 2.246 billion dirhams, down 6 percent from the previous year.
- The remainder were, as usual, private Moroccan investors.

Of certified investments, 56 percent were partially or entirely for export. These investments require disbursement in hard currency amounting to 7 billion dirhams, or 60 percent of the total, an increase of 0.6 percent over last year.

55 percent of investment portfolios are in small and medium-size industrial contracting. The average investment in these contracts was just 1.1 million dirhams, led by textile contracts: 46 percent of investments of this type were in contracting, followed by chemicals and quasichemicals, with 19 percent.

Turning to regions, Casablanca came in first, with 38 percent of total certified investments, and 49 percent in small and medium contracting projects; followed by Safi, at the level of total investment, with 13 percent; Settat with 11 percent; and Tangier with 6 percent; followed by Rabat at the small and medium contracting level, with 10 percent; Tangiers with 7 percent; and Fes with 5 percent.

Turning to foreign investors, they are led by the French, with 1.206 billion dirhams, or 50 percent of all certified foreign investment, and 10 percent of total certified industrial investment. Then comes Switzerland with 2 and 9 percent, respectively; Spain with 7 and 1.4 percent, respectively; and finally Italy, with 3 and 0.7 percent, respectively.

1992 Import, Export Trade Forecast Reported
92AF0530B Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 28 Feb 92 pp 10-11

[Article signed M.H.: “Foreign Trade; 1992 Forecasts: Imports: +14 Percent; Exports: +15 Percent”; first paragraph is LA VIE ECONOMIQUE introduction]

[Text] At the meeting of the Financial Market Credit committee, Mr. Ali Amor, head of the Foreign Exchange Bureau, presented his estimates concerning the foreign trade balance in 1992, for both imports and exports. The projections for 1992, reflecting current world-market trends for leading products (imports and exports) show a trade balance deficit hovering around 26 billion dirhams, a 13-percent increase over last year, Mr. Amor pointed out, adding:

"Imports should increase by more than 14 percent, up to about 68 billion dirhams, compared with 59.61 billion in 1991. As for exports, they should reach 42.15 billion dirhams, i.e., an increase of about 15 percent."

Cereals: A Weighty Factor
The increase in imports, which might affect all product groups, would however be larger for food products (+16.9 percent), capital goods (+16.5 percent), and semifinished goods (+14.1 percent).

The last two items alone would represent nearly 54 percent of all imports.

Energy: +12 Percent
The increase expected for the food-beverages-tobacco group would be due essentially to increased cereal imports. The increase would be due both to the amounts that would have to be purchased and to higher wheat prices on the international market.

As for the cost of energy, it would rise by about 12 percent due to increased crude oil requirements.

Expected percent changes for the leading imports are shown in Table A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A - Import Projections (billion dirhams)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I. Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incl. wheat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
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<tr>
<td>II. Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>incl. crude oil</td>
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<tr>
<td>III. Raw materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incl. sulfur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A - Import Projections
(billion dirhams)
(Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unprocessed wood</td>
<td>1.919</td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td>+42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable oils</td>
<td>.740</td>
<td>.755</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Semifinished goods</td>
<td>17.360</td>
<td>15.209</td>
<td>+14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Equipment</td>
<td>18.880</td>
<td>16.206</td>
<td>+16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Consumer goods</td>
<td>8.300</td>
<td>7.431</td>
<td>+11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>68.000</td>
<td>59.610</td>
<td>+14.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for exports, the projections show an overall increase of 14.5 percent, bringing the value of our sales abroad to 42.150 billion dirhams compared with 36.800 billion in 1991.

This increase would be due in particular to exports of semi-finished goods, which would increase by more than 16 percent, including +17 percent for natural and chemical fertilizers, and close to 12 percent for phosphoric acid.

Phosphate Exports Expected To Rise
Raw material exports might rise by over 22 percent as a result of the expected increase in raw phosphate sales (over 23 percent).

Exports of finished goods would increase by nearly 15 percent, and food exports by over 8 percent, due in particular to an increase in fish product exports (over 7 percent). Expected percent changes for the main export product groups should be as shown in Table B.

Table B - Export Projections
(billion dirhams)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>10.900</td>
<td>10.069</td>
<td>+8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incl. fisheries</td>
<td>5.505</td>
<td>5.115</td>
<td>+7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrus fruit</td>
<td>1.940</td>
<td>1.810</td>
<td>+7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>1.080</td>
<td>.956</td>
<td>+13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw materials</td>
<td>6.260</td>
<td>5.112</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incl. phosphates</td>
<td>3.710</td>
<td>3.015</td>
<td>+23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semifinished goods</td>
<td>11.010</td>
<td>9.445</td>
<td>+16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incl. fertilizers</td>
<td>3.880</td>
<td>3.316</td>
<td>+17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phosphoric acid</td>
<td>4.150</td>
<td>3.716</td>
<td>+11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finished goods</td>
<td>12.900</td>
<td>11.218</td>
<td>+15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>42.150</td>
<td>36.800</td>
<td>+14.5</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Foreign Current Account Projections
As for the other main items in the foreign current account, in view of the return of tourist flows that occurred during the second half of last year, 1992 tourism revenues are expected to increase by over 25 percent, to 10.9 billion dirhams, i.e., more than was achieved in 1990 (10.548 billion dirhams).

Funds repatriated by Moroccans living abroad are expected to increase and to reach nearly 18 billion dirhams by the end of 1992, compared with 17.2 billion in 1991, i.e., a 4.7 percent increase.

The negative balance of investment income should decrease by nearly 5 percent in 1992, to 11.7 billion dirhams, not taking any rescheduling operation into account.

Thus, assuming a trade deficit of 26 billion dirhams and no rescheduling, the current account would show a deficit of 5.3 billion dirhams, instead of 6.72 billion, i.e., a 21.2-percent decrease.

This deficit would amount to 2.1 percent of the gross domestic product, compared with 2.9 percent the year before.

Breakdown of Remittances of Workers Abroad
92AF0454A Rabat AL-ALAM in Arabic 6 Feb 92 p 4

[Article: “A New Slide Toward Stagnation”]
[Text] Moroccan remittances from workers abroad during the first 10 months of 1991, according to disbursement office statistics, amounted to 14.3841 billion Moroccan dirhams, compared to 13.9008 billion dirhams for the
same period last year, an increase of 3.5 percent. These statistics include the summer period, when remittances are very important.

Concerning methods of remittances, the largest percentage was made through banks, 64.4 percent (9.2653 billion dirhams), 22.5 percent through the mail (3.2321 billion dirhams), and 13.1 percent through banknotes (1.8867 billion dirhams).

These remittances came basically from: France, 9,8764 billion dirhams, 68.6 percent; Netherlands, 1,2347 billion dirhams, 8.6 percent; Benelux (Belgium and Luxembourg) 1,0255 billion dirhams, 6.1 percent; Italy, 741.6 million dirhams, 5.1 percent; and Germany, 677.7 million dirhams, 4.7 percent.

One should note that bank remittances declined 6.5 percent in favor of other direct ways of sending remittances, i.e., banknotes (up 49.1 percent) and by mail (up 18.7 percent).

It should also be noted that, on the other hand, the 3.5 percent increase indicates—once again—a stagnating trend in remittances from Moroccans working abroad, since two years of increase came after two years of decline.

Negligible Growth, Increased Tourism and Exports Forecast
92AF0547B Rabat L'OPINION in French Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Ignace Dalle: “No Growth in 1992”]

[Text] Intensified inflationary pressures, a growth rate close to zero, increased export and tourism earnings: This is the outlook for Morocco in 1992, the country's leading financial authorities said at the recent meeting in Rabat of the Financial Market Credit Committee (CCMF). Fuller accounts of the meeting will appear in the economic press this weekend.

Finance Minister Berrada noted with satisfaction that in 1991 real growth in GDP [gross domestic product] was 5 percent, foreign investment was up 58 percent from 1991 [as published], and exchange reserves grew from 2.1 billion (1990) to 2.8 billion [units not specified]—in other words, 4 and one-half months' worth of imports—but he was much less sanguine about the money supply situation.

Berrada said that “excessive distribution of credit following the lifting of restrictions led to sharp growth estimated at 17 percent in the money supply, compared to the 7-percent target.” “This growth in monetary supply affected overall price levels, and as a result the cost of living index rose by 8.2 percent, compared to 6.7 percent in 1990,” he continued, before noting: “This revival of inflationary pressures is a major concern for us, because if it persists it could compromise the attainment of our balance of payment objectives and affect the stability of our currency.”

Mr. Omar El Bahraoui, director of planning, opined that in 1992 it would be difficult to repeat the satisfying growth rates seen in 1991, because the outlook for the agricultural season is poor owing to the lateness of the rains. The weekly VIE ECONOMIQUE goes so far as to speak of “zero growth in 1992.”

Mr. El Bahraoui also provided some information on unemployment, which currently extends to 12.1 percent of the labor force—the jobless rate is 20.3 percent in the cities, though only 5.7 percent in rural areas.

Also, nearly 40 percent of the country's young people are believed to be unemployed, the director of planning added.

The director of the Exchange Office, Mr. Ali Amor, forecast a trade deficit in the neighborhood of 26 billion dirhams (about 17 billion French francs [Fr]), which is 13 percent greater than the 1991 deficit. He said imports are expected to increase by 14 percent to more than 68 billion dirhams, versus 59.6 billion in 1991.

Mr. Amor said exports are expected to total 42.15 billion dirhams, or 15 percent over the 1991 level.

Tourism revenues, he noted in conclusion, are expected to increase by more than 25 percent to 10.9 billion dirhams (Fr7.2 billion). The first half of 1991 was very bad for Moroccan tourism, owing to the Gulf crisis, but a very substantial recovery occurred late in the year.

Finally, remittances from Moroccans living overseas are expected to increase by nearly 5 percent to 18 billion dirhams, which should hold the external deficit on current account down to 5.3 billion dirhams.

Tourism Figures Compared From 1990-92
92AF0583C Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 13 Mar 92 p 10

[Text] A net increase in tourism in Morocco has taken place since November 1991. Is this the end of the impact of the Gulf war?

During January 1991 the total number of tourists who entered Morocco was larger than that in January 1990:

• January 1990, 166,899
• January 1991, 211,020
• January 1992, 242,911.

We cannot comment on these figures without taking into account Algerian tourists. The increase in their total radically changed the overall tourist figures for 1991. Algerian tourist statistics were as follows:

• January 1990, 84,039
• January 1991, 153,282
• January 1992, 156,261.

For other tourist points of origin we obtained the following figures:

• January 1990, 82,860
• January 1991, 57,738
• January 1992, 86,650.

Unquestionably, there was an improvement in January 1992, compared to January 1991, which is normal, taking into account the fact that one year ago the crisis in the Gulf was reaching its most serious point. However, what is encouraging is that tourist figures are above those for 1990.
We thought that it would be interesting to compare the figures for the different points of origin in January 1992 and January 1990. (See Tables I and II below).

We also note that "Latin" tourists have been the quickest in Europe to resume visiting Morocco. France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal had a total of 38,027 tourists visiting Morocco in January 1990 and 41,810 in January 1992. Special mention should be made of tourists from Italy.

Finally, we note a net increase in Soviet and Japanese tourists.

Table I

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<th>Jan 1992</th>
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Table II

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Nador Port Activity for 1991 Detailed

92AF0490A Rabat AL-ALAM in Arabic 20 Feb 92 p 9

[Article: "1,326,556 Tons 1991 Volume of Commercial Sales at Nador/Beni Ensar Port"]

[Text] Commercial sales through the Port of Nador/Beni Ensar last year amounted to 1,326,556 tons, versus 1,317,821 tons in 1990, a slight increase of about 1 percent.

Total imports amounted to 978,592 tons, up from 968,353 tons, a 1 percent increase. There was a falling off in grain, lead, mine supports, and fuel imports, while there was a rise in the import of coal and steel ducts used in the National Company for Iron and Steel (Sonasid’s) production units. Turning to exports, their volume was stable (347,964 tons versus 349,468 tons), and changed in terms of the exported goods, represented in the increase recorded in acids, barytine [barite], and various types of minerals, with a decrease in exports of lead, iron, and bytownite.
The movement of transiting travelers saw a marked increase of 24 percent from 1990; both departing and arriving, they totaled 12,369, versus 9,984 in 1990. Automobile traffic, too, increased 32 percent, or 2,912 cars, up from 3,867 [percentage as published].

Tonnage of fish unloaded in the port was down 10 percent, from 11,190 in 1990 to 10,003 tons, though there was an 11 percent increase in value—110,345,066 Moroccan dirhams, up from 93,776,176 dirhams in 1990.

In the second half of 1990, the Nador/Beni Ensar Port saw the establishment of the Maritime Workshop Company to build fishing boats, which has built 15 boats to date.

On another front, the port administration has worked on improving profitability for all goods and products passing through Nador Port. One of their most important initiatives was the manufacture of a four-footed crane for loading acids, considered the first of its kind in a Moroccan port. This crane has made it possible to reduce unloading time 50 percent.

To develop equipment and improve profitability in the port's present facilities, the Bureau of Ports Usage has allocated a financial portfolio worth 54 million dirhams for the Nador/Beni Ensar Port, during the 1992-1996 five-year plan.

Prospects for Oil Exploration Discussed
92AF0436A Rabat L'OPINION in French 19 Feb 92 p 4

[Interview with Mohamed Douieb, general manager of Onarep, by Naima Ennazi; place and date not given: “Looking for Treasure”; first paragraph is L'OPINION introduction]

[Text] Mohamed Douieb, general manager of Onarep [National Agency for Petroleum Research and Production], explains to us the state of petroleum prospecting in Morocco and the estimate of the nation's potential as far as black gold is concerned.

[Ennazi] Mr. Douieb, what is the situation with petroleum exploration in Morocco?

[Douieb] Petroleum exploration in Morocco, which dates back several decades, has made tremendous progress in recent years, partly because the human potential has been strengthened through the training of petroleum geologists and geophysicists in Moroccan and foreign institutions. But also because of the increased interest that international oil companies have been showing in exploration in our country. We also need to emphasize the technological progress that has been made in prospecting activities in connection with geology, geophysics, and drilling.

Over the past 10 years, Onarep and the international oil companies have made great efforts in the field of exploration. The results of that activity were reported during the seminar on exploration that was held from 10 to 12 February.

There have been some positive results in the form of discoveries—admittedly modest—of gas and petroleum in the regions of Essaouira and Rharb. But it must be said that those results are not as great as we had hoped.

[Ennazi] It is often said that Morocco's sedimentary basins are underexplored. Can you explain the reasons for that underexploration to us?

[Douieb] I believe that the two basic reasons we can mention are the following:

The budgets allocated to petroleum exploration are unavoidably limited because of the state's limited resources.

We cannot say that there is a lack of prospective areas to be explored. They do exist, but they require drilling work that the nation cannot afford. In addition, and despite the interest shown in Morocco by certain international petroleum companies (there is a very considerable international competition because many countries are trying to attract capital for petroleum exploration, and this is true even of the big producers of gas and petroleum), those petroleum companies have limited budgets, and it is therefore completely natural that priority should go to areas that are already producing petroleum. It is commonly said in petroleum circles that one must look for petroleum around petroleum.

We feel that this is a temporary situation. Petroleum prices have dropped considerably since 1986—resulting in smaller investments in exploration—and they cannot remain depressed forever.

The worldwide demand for petroleum is increasing, and this should eventually lead to higher prices and, consequently, make the exploration for petroleum in new areas more economical and more attractive.

[Ennazi] Do you feel that the new Hydrocarbon Code and the various agreements that have been signed will give exploration efforts new impetus?

[Douieb] It is certain, as was explained at the seminar, that the new code will give a big boost to exploration in our country in 1992.

The three companies—Texaco, AGIP, and Shell—are going to begin drilling operations in their respective areas, all of which are located on the Atlantic coast, and it can be estimated that the investment in those operations will total $40 million. In addition, the SCP [expansion not given], which is associated with Onarep, will drill from four to six shallow wells in the Rharb region to identify new gas reserves.

[Ennazi] Despite the growing number of permits being granted, we have noticed that the area covered by those permits is shrinking from year to year. Won't that have a negative impact on the general level of exploration?

[Douieb] I don't think one can establish a correlation between the areas covered by permits and the general level of exploration, the reason being that exploration can be extensive or intensive.

Let me explain: in seismic surveys, for example, you can have campaigns with widely spaced grids that give you a
general idea of the petroleum potential in the region being explored, but there can also be an intensive seismic survey covering smaller areas and involving more finely tuned seismic tests with tighter grids. That kind of survey can provide a more accurate idea of petroleum potentialities.

It is true that the new Hydrocarbon Code stipulates a maximum area of 2,000 square km for each permit (the previous limit was 5,000 square km per permit). Why the reduction? Because we would like to have more companies exploring in the same region so as to benefit from larger investments and wider experience, but also because we would like to stimulate competition among companies.

[Ennazi] So you are choosing intensive exploration?

[Douieb] Both are necessary, but I feel that at the current stage of development with respect to knowledge of Morocco’s petroleum geology, we need to concentrate on more finely tuned exploration in specific and well-known areas.

[Ennazi] Is it possible, at this stage of petroleum prospecting, to make a rough estimate of Morocco’s petroleum potential?

[Douieb] That is a very difficult question to answer because there are several schools of thought, several ideas, and several approaches, and it is not possible to quantify the petroleum potential in advance—before we have identified the deposits by drilling wildcat wells and appraisal wells.

[Ennazi] Do the various discoveries of petroleum and gas in Morocco have any commercial value?

[Douieb] They have scientific and technical value. The wells that have been producers, both in Essaouira and in Rharb, have had commercial value, since the reserves identified through those wells have made it possible to supply the OCP [Moroccan Phosphates Office] in Essaouira with gas and the Moroccan Board and Paper Company and the SCP in Rharb with gas as well.

[Ennazi] How much does it cost to produce a barrel of Moroccan petroleum, considering that the cost of drilling a well ranges from $5 million to $10 million dollars?

[Douieb] Based on certain studies we have conducted, we feel that the cost price of a barrel of petroleum in Morocco may range from $4 to $8, depending on the size of the deposit, the size of the consuming centers or the ports through which it is exported, and also the rate of petroleum flow from the well in question.

I feel that that spread—from $4 to $8—is a reasonable one, and this shows that it is very competitive and very worthwhile from the economic standpoint to engage in the exploration and production of petroleum in our country.

[Ennazi] Don’t you think that that is still expensive and that it would be better to continue to import petroleum?

[Douieb] No, it is not expensive. Naturally, there are the traditional producing areas in the Middle East, where the cost is from $1 to $2, but when you consider that petroleum sells for roughly $20 and that it can be produced at a cost of from $4 to $8, producing it is always more worthwhile than importing it because of the savings in foreign exchange and the very sizable tax benefits for the Treasury.

[Ennazi] If petroleum prices are deregulated, how do you think the distributing firms will react?

[Douieb] A decision on deregulation has not yet been made, and domestic prices are currently calculated on the basis of international prices. Obviously, excise taxes are collected in every country, and that is completely natural.

I don’t think there will be any major difficulties in deregulating prices, either from the standpoint of the refineries or from that of the companies distributing petroleum products.

The profit margins at the refineries and distributing firms are rather limited, and in every case, when we talk about deregulation, it will be necessary to continue to remunerate invested capital, both in the field of refining and in that of distribution.

[Ennazi] Considering that Moroccans do not consume a lot of natural gas (0.7 percent of our total energy consumption), do you feel that the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline project will contribute to the favorable development of Morocco’s future gas network?

[Douieb] It is true that natural gas consumption is very low in Morocco. The gas in question comes from the deposits in Rharb and Essaouira.

It is a fact that importing natural gas into Morocco will contribute to the diversification of usable energy sources and certainly lead to development of the gas network, both for energy use (the production of electricity) and for industrial use (the sugar and cement industries).

[Ennazi] Do we import natural gas?

[Douieb] No, Morocco does not currently import natural gas. We do import butane gas.

[Ennazi] When it comes to energy sources, what are the alternatives to petroleum?

[Douieb] The alternatives to petroleum when it comes to energy sources are natural gas, of course, and coal (of which we import sizable quantities). In the future, alternative sources may to some extent be renewable energy sources and, once the technology is perfected, bituminous shale.

[Ennazi] What is the future of bituminous shale in Morocco?

[Douieb] It is a potential resource in Morocco, and we are currently keeping a close watch on technological developments in connection with the upgrading of bituminous shale, notably in Brazil, for the purpose of trying to apply them in our country.

[Ennazi] Within the framework of the Greater Maghreb, does Onarep have cooperation and coordination relations with neighboring countries?
[Douieb] In the area of Moroccan-Algerian relations, there is a Sonatrach-Onarep Technical Committee that specializes in hydrocarbon exploration and production.

That committee makes it possible to exchange information and scientific and technical experiences.

We have also sponsored visits and geological studies in the two countries, and in the future we anticipate prospecting operations in an attempt to identify new hydrocarbon resources in the border areas and more especially along the route of the future gas pipeline.

[Ennazi] Have the Canadian and Japanese experiences increased your know-how in any way?

[Douieb] As a matter of fact, there is both Canadian and Japanese assistance, and those two forms of cooperation have helped us a lot because they have helped improve the training of our geophysicists and geologists and made it possible to define the new exploration plans that were presented to new petroleum companies, and we were able to attract those companies thanks to those studies, which were conducted in cooperation with Petrocanada in the case of international assistance and with the JNOC, which is the Japanese petroleum company.

[Ennazi] In your estimation, what percentage of our country's need for energy products do we supply?

[Douieb] Energy sources in the form of petroleum and gas cover about 3 percent of Morocco's requirements.

A lot remains to be done.

Cost of Living Figures for 1991 Released
92AF0490D Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 20 Feb 92 p 4

[Text] The average cost-of-living indicator figure (for 210 goods) in 1991 recorded an 8.2 percent rise over 1990. This is seen as the steepest rise in the indicator in the past five years. This growth is attributed to the upward price variations experienced by all groups. It should be noted that the indicator for food, which made up the largest segment of the limited-income population’s consumption, played a major part in moving prices up 8.6 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Variation</th>
<th>Foodstuffs</th>
<th>Clothing</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Maintenance, Cleaning, Medical Treatment</th>
<th>Transportation, Recreation, Misc.</th>
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</table>

A. Growth of Cost of Living Indicator by Commodity

As mentioned above, the indicator for foodstuffs helped to make a major variation, a rise of 8.6 percent, which was specifically an effect of price growth: coriander and spices up 32.0 percent; meat up 18.3 percent; other crops up 13.9 percent; fish up 12.5 percent; other sweet goods up 9.3 percent; carbonated drinks up 7.9 percent; milk and cheese up 7.7 percent; and grains up 5.9 percent.

In second place we find the housing category, whose average indicator saw an increase of 8.2 percent over the previous year. This was, specifically, the result of the growth of maintenance and repair costs (up 17.6 percent); heat, light, and water (up 10.3 percent); furniture and home textiles (up 6.1 percent); rent (up 5.6 percent); and household appliances (up 5.5 percent).

Clothing also played a part in the growth of the indicator. Its average rose 7.1 percent from last year's figure. That came about as a result of the change in tailoring rates (up 7.9 percent), garment cloth (up 7.2 percent), shoes (up 7.0 percent), clothing textiles (up 5.4 percent), and miscellaneous goods (up 5.1 percent).
The average indicator for the transportation, recreation, and miscellaneous category saw growth of 7.7 percent stemming from the variation in public transport costs (up 9.7 percent), private transport (9.4 percent), entertainment and culture (7.0 percent), other expenditures (up 6.3 percent), and tobacco and cigarettes (up 4.6 percent).

Finally, the average indicator for the maintenance, cleaning, and medical treatment category saw an increase of 6.7 percent, attributable to the rise in cleaning costs (7.2 percent), medical treatment (up 6.7 percent), and maintenance (up 6.2 percent).

B. Growth of Cost of Living Indicator by City

The variations for indicators in various cities fluctuated from a 9.3 percent increase in Tetouan to a 7.2 percent increase in Fes. It is notable that this is the second straight year in which the cost of living indicator for Tetouan has had the highest growth.

The rest of the cities had also almost identical variations, which might be classified in two categories: The first category comprised Casablanca, Marrakech, Agadir, and Rabat. These cities grew, respectively, by 8.4 percent, 8.2 percent, 8.2 percent, and 8.1 percent. The second category comprised Oujda, Kenitra, and Fes, which recorded, respectively, growth of 7.7 percent, 7.3 percent, and 7.2 percent.

<p>| Variation of the Cost of Living Index From December 1991 to January 1992 (General Index and Index by Product Group) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dec 91</th>
<th>Jan 92</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>478.3</td>
<td>478.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>377.5</td>
<td>379.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>387.9</td>
<td>388.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal care, hygiene, health</td>
<td>361.9</td>
<td>363.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, leisure activities, miscellaneous</td>
<td>552.3</td>
<td>559.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General index</td>
<td>464.8</td>
<td>466.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Variation of the Cost of Living Index by Town |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dec 91</th>
<th>Jan 92</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casablanca</td>
<td>474.0</td>
<td>476.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td>478.2</td>
<td>479.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fes</td>
<td>460.4</td>
<td>461.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetouan</td>
<td>440.2</td>
<td>442.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenitra</td>
<td>423.7</td>
<td>427.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marrakech</td>
<td>480.6</td>
<td>483.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oujda</td>
<td>453.6</td>
<td>451.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agadir</td>
<td>489.5</td>
<td>491.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cost of Living Index Rises Slightly in Jan 92AF0530C Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 28 Feb 92 p 20

[Article signed K.A.; “Retail Prices: Slight Rise in January, 0.4 Percent”; first paragraph is LA VIE ECONOMIQUE introduction]


The retail price index rose by 0.40 percent, to 466.7. All product groups contributed to this increase; food prices, however, were the least affected and their index hardly changed (478.6 compared with 478.3 the previous month).

Increase in Transportation-Leisure Activities

Note that during last December this group of products had shown a decrease of 0.2 percent and that, during the entire year 1991, it had been the leading factor in variations of the general index, both upward and downward. In January, the largest price increase (+1.28 percent) was for transportation, leisure activities, and miscellaneous, an item that had remained unchanged the previous month. The breakdown by town also shows little change, around 0.50 percent, except in Rabat where the index rose by 0.18 percent, and Oujda where it declined slightly: -0.37 percent. This, however, is in contrast with the situation in December, when the price index of all towns had declined.
Results of 1991 Survey on Standard of Living
92AF0583A Rabat L'OPINION in French
11 Mar 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Mostafa Nassiri: “Has the Standard of Living of Moroccans Improved?”]

[Text] In March 1992 the Directorate of Statistics introduced a feature of macroeconomic studies, which has been much commented on. More precisely, this concerns in part the relative gap between national account aggregates, which up to now it has been charged with preparing, and the new, social and economic variables, which is attempting to understand in an effort to provide other, additional elements for explaining social and economic change.

This is a very praiseworthy effort that it has made in the context of a study with multiple objectives whose detailed results will be available by the end of March.

The best trained, statistical sleuths throughout the Moroccan statistical profession have been mobilized in this exhaustive and detailed work. Using portable recorders in their interviews, they are attempting to identify the faults or distortions in the answers made by the households surveyed. However, the small size of the sample (3,400 households) makes it possible to ask somewhat insistently how representative it is. Only those who prepared the sample, on the basis of a master program, are convinced that it is representative.

The size of the sample of households surveyed is paradoxical and terrible contrast with the questionnaire, whose length was probably only equalled by the power of the microphones set up for this purpose. A beginning survey taker would probably have ended up out of breath before completing the list of households assigned to him or her.

In short, as far as we are concerned, we wish to avoid becoming involved in the answers to our own questions. Under these eminently scientific circumstances we also wish to prevent Rachidi Rezouani, minister of planning, from referring once again and spontaneously, in his subjective way, and for the nth time minus one, to the “partisan press.” Moreover, this is a term that cannot make the press less objective, any more than the subjective concepts of “nonpartisan” observers can make them objective. We realize the consequences of the objectives and ideas of Minister Rezouani and Mostafa Tadili, director of statistics.

This study with multiple objectives covered the year 1991. It was intended to cover several social and economic variables, as well as to measure in particular the essential needs of the people. These included: living conditions, the level of literacy and education, jobs and unemployment, household expenditures, etc. The interpretation, the identification of common elements, and the comparison and even highlighting of certain other information on the basis of the basic data gave rise to several functions, including one related to the living level of the people, which seems to have interested those who initiated this major study in the first place. This is an important study. Because of the multiple aspects upon which it touches, it reflects the true concepts and purposes of statistics used as a tool, including those that are sought and are useful. We say that because in Morocco the process of planning or decisionmaking has always been hampered by the absence of variables and indicators that are quantitatively and qualitatively available and effective. Furthermore, at a time when we are reaching the end of the structural adjustment process, which must be the prelude to the implementation of an economic and social development strategy, the actual preparation of such a program is an attribute of socially and economically developed economies. This strategy, which requires the adoption of several models, is based, among other considerations, on work like that which the Directorate of Statistics is currently completing.

However, it is necessary for such work to be carried on in a framework of scientific orthodoxy, at the same time that it is undertaken in close relationship with other variables, which are pertinent and specific to the setting under study.

The limited results of the World Health Organization study of 1991 note a decline in housing built with discarded materials(??)—14 percent, compared with 26.4 percent in 1971—and an improvement in the people’s access to safe drinking water (51.1 percent of all households in 1991, compared to 44.8 percent in 1984-85) and electricity (51.1 percent, compared to 39.3 percent in 1984-85).

In Morocco 45.3 percent of the people above age 10 know how to read and write, compared to 35 percent in 1982. The rate of attendance at elementary schools of children living in cities (ages 7 to 13) is 80.55 percent. In rural areas this same rate is 40.9 percent. According to the study, financial resources are the primary reason for the failure of children to attend school.

During every month 15.2 percent of the Moroccan people run the risk of falling sick or being injured (?!). Only 53.4 percent of the households surveyed have access to medical and health services.

The work force was calculated at 9,933,000 people in 1991 (an increase of 3.4 percent per year since 1987).

The work force without jobs amounted to 1,940,000 persons. In 1991 the urban rate of unemployment was calculated at 20.6 percent. In the rural areas it was 3.6 percent.

Average per capita expenditures in 1991 were 6,780 dirhams. This level of expenditure almost doubled, compared to 1985, for an average annual rate of growth of 5.1 percent in constant dirhams and 10 percent in current dirhams.

In our view the combination of these variables makes it possible to state that, although there has been an improvement in the standard of living, it has only occurred to the extent that the variables in question concern the idea of living levels. Above all and in parallel fashion it can only be said that there has been an improvement in the standard of living to the extent that the sampling is credible and/or through the extrapolation of results. This latter conclusion can only limit the conclusions of the inquiry concerning the standard of living.
Although there has been an improvement, it furthermore provides evidence that the social and economic fabric of Morocco is distinguished by great resistance to the pressures and restrictions of all kinds, which were applied to it during the lean years of structural adjustment and drought. Against this background unemployment acquired an alarming rate of increase that is now recognized by everyone.

**Further Analysis on Standard of Living Survey**  
92AF0583B Rabat L’OPINION in French  
12 Mar 92 p 1

[Editorial by Mohamed Idrissi Kaitouni: “The Other Side of the Coin”]

[Text] According to the final results of a national study on the standard of living of the Moroccan people, made public by the Ministry of Planning, there has been progress made from every point of view. The Moroccan people are better housed, they have more medical treatment, there are fewer illiterates among them, they have safe drinking water and electricity, and their purchasing power has increased. In short, everything is going well in this best of all possible worlds. However, a few shadowy points remain, which those responsible for the study could not pass over in silence. There is an appreciable difference between those living in the cities and in the countryside. There are about 4 million poor people, and urban unemployment has reached 20.6 percent.

We do not wish to question the reliability of the results of this study, which is said to be “scientifically not open to attack.” However, there is a basis for making some general comments while raising the question whether those conducting the study took into account certain, fundamental facts related to the reality that the people face on a daily basis. There is also a basis for asking whether the study contains only statistical data prepared without referring to this reality, based on theoretical studies and the general extrapolation of the facts obtained. This is all the more pertinent since the choice of the sample and the methods used during the study that was undertaken are decisive factors that influence the results obtained.

For example, regarding the improvement in the purchasing power of ordinary Moroccans, in reality this is fictitious. This is because prices increased sharply while the study was being conducted, so that, although the growth in purchasing power was arithmetic, the growth in prices was geometric. All increases in the SMIG [Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage]—salary increases are the exception—were absorbed by the rise in prices for basic needs, rents, and different services. Moreover, and this is a fundamental consideration, we cannot speak of a general improvement in purchasing power when there are considerable differences between incomes, while distinguishing between living standards and styles of living in the same group.

Thus, regarding housing, electricity, and safe drinking water, we do not know whether those conducting this multipurpose study asked themselves at what price the progress made was achieved. This is particularly true of rents, which at times absorb more than half of incomes, and charges for water and electricity, which have undergone substantial and unexpected increases seriously affecting the family budget.

Regarding illiteracy, the study showed that 54.7 percent of the people over 10 years of age do not know how to read or write.

Moroccan women are the most affected by this scourge, with its varying rates of illiteracy, depending on whether we are speaking of the urban or rural area.

In other words the results are hardly satisfactory, and the considerable gaps between the living standards of the rural people and those in the cities and between the various social classes require the adoption of a policy based on the achievement of social justice. Such a policy requires the elimination of flagrant disparities between incomes and living standards. Priority must be given to the struggle against social disasters, against deterioration in the purchasing power of the people as a result of price increases and low salaries, against unemployment and the marginalization of the rural population.
Royal Academy Holds Seminar on Islamic Culture
92AF0454E London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
15 Feb 92 p 16

[Article by [Mansuf] al-Salimi: "Challenge of Western Culture Defined; Answer Lies in Applying Islamic Mind"]

[Excerpts] The issue of Islamicizing education monopolized the discussions of intellectuals and Islamic experts in the Royal Moroccan Academy's seminar on "Islamic Culture and Western Culture: Give and Take." The participants were unanimous that the answer to the challenge of Western culture is to apply the Islamic mind.

The participants in the academy's seminar, who included Taha Abderrahman, Mohamed Belchehir, Mohamed Kettani, and Dr. Abdelhamid Aouad, analyzed the changes that have marked the relationship between the Islamic and Western cultures, highlighting the trends of hegemony in the roots of Western culture.

Abdelaziz Ben Abdallah, a member of the Royal Academy, believes that dealing with the problem of "Islamicizing education and the educational system," which preoccupies the educated and intellectual elite in the Islamic world, should begin by unifying the curricula, emphasizing that the ideal Islamic objective is that every educational movement aimed at serving humanity is considered Islamic. He added that the "late Ismail al-Raji al-Farouqi, director of the World Institute of Islamic Thought, drew a true picture of the Islamic world, which is wandering aimlessly on a wave of anxiety. He proposed that the attention of Islamic thought be focused on searching for an effective means of ensuring that Islamic thought be molded into a duality, in which unshakable Islamic culture is accompanied by the laudable gifts of humanistic culture."

However, Moroccan Islamic thought believes that the "liberation of Islamic countries politically has been followed by a broad, cultural invasion under the influence of a psychological complex vis-a-vis the progress of purification in Morocco." Dual educational systems were selected: contemporary and traditional. Ben Abdallah called for getting rid of programs of foreign educational reform, emphasizing that true reform lies in putting the Islamic stamp on contemporary education. He proposes the renewal of humanitarian perspectives, social sciences, and natural sciences on a new Islamic foundation, in harmony with the realities and values of Islam.

Ben Abdallah said that applying a fundamentalist and comprehensive program to modern curricula and sciences would be an alternative to those educational curricula and subject matters that the West possesses, and which proselytize millions of minds.

Dr. Jarari thinks that, despite the fact that the world situation is in the midst of changes that the Muslim perceives with frustration and hopelessness, Islamic culture will continue to be vibrant and viable, providing it be rich in self-belief and self-confidence, and be optimistic about the future and life, in the spirit of the message. There must also be a path of reciprocal action based on the growth that has occurred in the past, meaning that benefit should be gained from the Islamic legacy, the heir of others, and from the culture of modern education, but avoiding the pitfalls and errors into which the tyrannical, materialistic civilization fell. [passage omitted]

While Dr. Mohamed Kettani stresses that development of modern Islamic thought was marked by turning away from theological and traditional issues, it was rarely preoccupied by current political, social, and cultural problems, so as to counter the challenges that have threatened Islam since the Western invasion of the Islamic world. He considers that this change is a strong manifestation of the effect of the new reality imposed by Western civilization.

One can distinguish the state of modern Islamic thought by isolating two dissimilar movements:

The first is preoccupied with the challenges that the Islamic world faces from Western civilization and its culture, in order to react to them and to formulate appropriate positions on them, on the basis of rejection, acceptance, or adaptation. This movement represents the Islamic world's confrontation of the latter. Rifa'ah al-Tahtawi and Khayyredinne al-Tunisi, who are concerned with issues of state and political progress, are considered the most prominent leaders of this movement. They start from the historic question: "How can Muslims become part of the Western world without abandoning their Islamic law [shari'ah]?"

As for the second movement, under the influence of changing reality, it stresses that the Islamic world should be concerned with self-modernization, reviewing its legacy, and returning to its roots, in order to restore their structure. This movement began with Shaykh Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. [passage omitted]

Contemporary Islamic Jurisprudence

Dr. Mohamed Farouk [Ennebian] explained the points of disparity between Islamic and Western methodologies. The former starts from faith and the sanctity of Islamic sources, while the Western scholar starts from criticism, rejection, and condemnation. In addition, Western scholars are ignorant of the texts and terms used by the ulama of Islam in their learned books, which results in many errors and distortions of Islamic thought.

More important than that was the prejudice against Islamic culture: that it was indolent, stagnant, and intransigent. This prejudice resulted from historic factors buried deep in the differences between Islam and Christian cultures. The studies of orientalists fall into this context. [passage omitted]

In his commentary, Abdallah Kamel Kettani, the reporter of the Royal Moroccan Academy, emphasized the quality of universality in the concept of culture. He believes that culture is like science in its broadness, like civilization in its universality, like religion in its internationalism, and like faith in its omissions and additions. It has ebb and flow, expansion and recession. Consequently, it is a state among all mankind, in which nations and peoples circulate, giving and taking. This leaves the door open to all people for cultural sharing, or rather, imposes the need for give and take, fertilization and integration, and creativity. It can be deduced from that that mastering culture is a historic affair achieved by energetic, creative people, no matter what their nationality or religion. Cultural growth cannot be achieved by those who neither strive nor create!
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