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Beijing Paper Views New U.S.-Russian Relations

HK2104095792 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI in Chinese
No 5, 1 Mar 92 pp 7-8

[Article by Chen Jiejun (7115 2638 6511): “From U.S.-
Soviet to U.S.-Russian Relations—Russian-U.S. Camp
David Summit Meeting”]

[Text] Inheriting the Soviet Union’s international legacy,
Russia intends to continuously act as a global political
power, and in view of its self-interest, the United States
has, to a certain extent, acquiesced to Russia’s intention.

As soon as the first summit of the UN Security Council
closed, Russian President Boris Yeltsin conducted a
one-day working visit to the United States on 1 Feb-
uary. At Camp David, the U.S. President’s hillside villa,
he talked with George Bush for more than three hours on
such issues as Russian-U.S. bilateral relations, nuclear
disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and global
security in an atmosphere which was “not antagonistic
but friendly.” They signed a six-point “Camp David
Declaration Concerning New Bilateral Relations” after
the meeting.

The most prominent topic of discussion in this meeting
was how to develop Russian-U.S. relations. Both parties
agreed not to “treat each other as a potential enemy,”
and U.S.-Russian relations “will be established on the
basis of mutual trust and respect with a view to making
joint efforts to develop friendship and partnership in the
interests of democracy and economic freedom.” Both
parties also pledged to make every possible effort to
widely expand contact and “actively promote economic
cooperation between the two countries.”

Before the meeting, Bush and Yeltsin had announced
their own proposals of unilateral nuclear disarmament
schemes on 28 and 29 January, respectively, and urged
each other to take corresponding steps. During the
meeting, both parties reaffirmed their aims. Bush pro-
posed to completely destroy all land-based multi-
warhead ballistic missiles possessed by both parties, and
reduce strategic nuclear warheads to 4,500-5,000 for
each side (member countries of the Commonwealth of
Independent States [CIS] possessing nuclear weapons
must transfer those weapons to Russia for destruction).
Yeltsin even went further and proposed to reduce stra-
tegic nuclear warheads to 2,000-2,500 for each side, and
reaffirmed that Russian nuclear weapons would no
longer be trained on the United States. But the United
States did not confirm any plan to adjust its nuclear
strike targets. On 18 February, James Baker visited
Moscow and met Russian Foreign Minister Andrey
Kozyrev. Both parties consented to discuss the installa-
tion of a warning system to take precautions against
possible firing of ballistic missiles, and agreed that future
talks on armament control would be conducted directly
between foreign ministers of the two countries.

Nuclear non-proliferation is the issue which the United
States has cared most about all along. During the
meeting, Yeltsin declared that he had taken actions to
hugely increase wages of 2,000 Russian nuclear experts
to keep them and to prevent proliferation of nuclear
technology. On the other hand, Bush proposed to set up
a joint center in which U.S. scientists and over 2,000
nuclear scientists from the former Soviet Union, who
were about to be unemployed, would be able to conduct
research together. However, Yeltsin did not clearly
respond to it.

With regard to the issue of global security, both parties
asserted that they would “make every effort to support”
“the worldwide peaceful transformation,” “peacefully
solve regional conflicts,” “fight against terrorist acts,
crack down on drug trafficking activities, and prevent
environmental deterioration.”

The heads of Russia and the United States met hastily,
just a little more than a month after the Soviet Union
had been dissolved. It shows that with the end of
Soviet-U.S. relations, both parties considered a swift
readjustment of U.S.-Russian relations to be an urgent
need.

Russia has three intentions: First is to seek assistance
from the West, especially the United States, to remedy
its messy domestic situation; second is to completely
inherit the former Soviet Union’s international legacy
by establishing new U.S.-Russian relations so as to contin-
uously play the role of a global political power; third is to
wipe out the memory of Mikhail Gorbachev and build
up Yeltsin’s new image to elevate “new” Russia’s inter-
national prestige.

The United States dares not overlook the Russian Fed-
eration since the latter is still a power in every aspect
and, in particular, it still has tremendous potential in
military industries. To establish a new world order with
itself as the center, the United States must keep in touch
with Russia, “a force which cannot be neglected.” In
addition, the most urgent concern is that the CIS’ future
is uncertain, hence the United States is eager to influence
the situation and development track of the CIS with the
aid of Russian strength, preventing any major turmoil
that will jeopardize European or even U.S. interests. The
United States pays special attention to the Russian
inheritance of almost all the nuclear legacy of the late
Soviet Union, including nuclear designs, nuclear manu-
factures, current strategy, and tactical nuclear weapons.
To guard against nuclear proliferation, the United States
should negotiate mainly with Russia.

The Camp David meeting marked the beginning of
state-level relations between Russia and the United
States, and it also laid down a foundation of mutual trust
in certain areas. Although Russia had proclaimed itself
an autonomous republic on 12 June 1990, the U.S.
response was apathetic because it did not want to jeop-
dardize the then U.S.-Soviet “partner relations.” In June
1991, when Yeltsin visited the United States in the
capacity of Russian president, he was treated by the U.S.
Government as a mere local administrator, and an
ASSOCIATED PRESS commentary viewed the White House meeting held between Yeltsin and Bush as "unofficial." Hence, there had never been a U.S.-Russian summit until the Camp David meeting, which marked "the beginning of a new era" (Bush's words) in Russian-U.S. relations.

Meanwhile, the United States starts approaching Russian-U.S. relations from the high plane of global strategy. The Russian-U.S. Joint Declaration is very similar to past U.S.-Soviet joint declarations, both in contents and wording, which implies that the Russian intention to inherit the former Soviet Union's international legacy and continuously act as a global political power has been, to a certain extent, tacitly agreed to by the United States. During the meeting, both parties "agreed to discuss" "the proposal for a joint development of a worldwide missile-defense system," and indicated that they "would actively strive, with joint efforts," to cope with general international issues of major concern, including proliferation of mass destruction weapons, regional conflicts, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Does it possibly herald a certain form of coordination and cooperation between Russia and the United States in the future global security strategy? There are quite a number of signs to give us much food for thought.

The Camp David meeting also laid bare the fact that there are still plenty of divergencies and contradictions in Russian-U.S. relations. Before the Camp David meeting, Kozyrev had already leaked information that in the following meeting, the two heads of state would "practically go into details" about their respective nuclear disarmament schemes announced a few days earlier. However, viewing from the results of the meeting, both parties did not reach any detailed agreement on reciprocal reduction of nuclear weapons and the United States did not pledge to grant new aid to Russia, they merely issued a six-point declaration guiding the bilateral relations and decided through consultation the reciprocal visit schedule of their leaders. A REUTERS news analysis commented on it, saying when Yeltsin returned to his country, he "would have nothing to declare to customs in Moscow."

Reports on Session of UN Disarmament Commission

Hou Zhiting Urges Superpowers To Lead
OW2104235692 Beijing XINHUA in English 2329 GMT 21 Apr 92

[Text] United Nations, April 21 (XINHUA) - In order to completely prohibit and thoroughly destroy nuclear weapons, countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons, a Chinese diplomat said here today.

Speaking on the subject of nuclear disarmament at the annual session of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, Chinese Ambassador Hou Zhiting for disarmament affairs, said that to realize the disarmament target, the nuclear superpowers must also drastically cut all types of nuclear weapons deployed at home and abroad, thus creating conditions for convening a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon states.

As an effective measure for the prevention of nuclear war before the realization of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the Chinese diplomat suggested that all nuclear-weapon states should commit not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances; not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states; and to support the proposals for the establishment of nuclear-free zones.

The commission opened its 1992 plenary session yesterday with four items on its agenda, including nuclear disarmament in the framework of world peace and security; a regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security; objective information on military matters; and the role of science and technology in the context of world security, disarmament and other related fields.

On the impact of scientific and technological developments on international security and peace, Ambassador Hou believed that the cessation of the qualitative arms race and the realization of complete disarmament and prohibition of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction "constitute the fundamental way to prevent science and technology from being used for destructive purposes and enhance international security."

"While imposing necessary, appropriate and reasonable control on the transfer of high technology that can be used for military purposes, efforts should be made to prevent any hindrance of national development of science and technology for civilian purposes and international cooperation in science and technology under the pretext of restricting or controlling the military application of science and technology," he added.

As for the issue of regional disarmament, the ambassador reiterated China's position that progress in regional disarmament depends firstly on the specific circumstances and conditions of the region involved.

"Extraregional states and especially countries with the largest arsenals should also cooperate with and support such endeavour," he continued, "all regional disarmament measures should be based on a fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced principle and should be initiated by the countries in the region concerned on a voluntary basis and in line with the specific regional conditions so that the security of these countries will be undiminished and security of other regions and countries unaffected."

Dwelling on the subject of objective information on military matters, Ambassador Hou maintained that
appropriate exchange of such information between countries will be conducive to the increase of necessary openness and transparency, the deepening of mutual understanding and the relaxation of tension.

However, he pointed out, such exchange should be carried out on the basis of voluntary consultations and undiminished security and in light of each country's specific environment and its political, military and security conditions.

He emphasized that respect for the purposes of the U.N. Charter and universally-accepted norms guiding international relations is the fundamental premise and primary condition on which any exchange of objective military information and increase of openness and transparency must be based and no measure will work if this principle is not observed.

DPRK Envoy on U.S. Base Inspections

OW2104223992 Beijing XINHUA in English
2150 GMT 21 Apr 92

[Text] United Nations, April 21 (XINHUA)—The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has declared that if the U.S. nuclear bases in South Korea are also open to a comprehensive inspection, the peninsula would be converted into a nuclear-free zone.

Pak Kil-yon, DPRK's ambassador to the U.N., today told the U.N. disarmament commission, which opened its 1992 session yesterday, that his government has insisted that for a fair settlement of the nuclear inspection problem, the U.S. must withdraw all the nuclear weapons from South Korea, remove the nuclear threat to the DPRK and commit itself to a legal guarantee of security for the DPRK and simultaneous inspection must be made of the U.S. nuclear weapons and bases in the south.

He pointed out that despite his government's persevering efforts, the U.S. has continued shipping nuclear weapons into South Korea, increased the threat to the DPRK and "put on us the pressure of unilateral nuclear inspection," which is "an insult to our pride which we could not bear."

The U.S. published a plan last year for the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons, admitting indirectly the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea.

The DPRK Supreme People's Assembly ratified on April 9, 1992 the nuclear safeguards accords concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

At the end of last year, the declaration of the denuclearization of the peninsula was adopted and joint nuclear control commission was set up between both sides of Korea.

Hoping that the U.S. and the South Korean authorities would approach with goodwill towards the implementation of the declaration, the DPRK ambassador emphasized that if simultaneous comprehensive inspection could be conducted in both sides and the denuclearization of the peninsula is respected and guaranteed by the nuclear states including the U.S., the Korean peninsula will be converted into a nuclear-free zone.

Pak concluded that the confidence in disarmament can not be created so long as the nuclear threat continued to be posed against the non-nuclear states.

Japan's Envoy on Transparency Guidelines

OW2104223692 Beijing XINHUA in English
2052 GMT 21 Apr 92

[Text] United Nations, April 21 (XINHUA)—Japan has called on the U.N. to draft guidelines for openness and transparency in all military matters, including military holdings and procurement and transfers of high-technology with military applications.

Speaking at the U.N. Disarmament Commission which began its annual session yesterday on disarmament issues, Japanese Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka for disarmament affairs said that the need to strengthen efforts in the fields of international transfers of armaments and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles "has become an issue of greatest urgency."

During the current session, the commission has before it four items to be considered: objective information on military matters including arms transfers; nuclear disarmament; regional disarmament; and the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields.

The commission, which is a subsidiary organ of the U.N. General Assembly to make recommendations on disarmament issues, is in the second year of a reorganization that seeks to streamline its work by limiting the agenda to a maximum of four items for in-depth consideration, with no subject to be maintained on the agenda for more than three consecutive years.

The commission has already concluded the general debate on the transparency issue. Japan, together with some other countries, submitted a draft resolution last year calling for the establishment of a U.N. register system to monitor international arms transfers. The general assembly adopted the resolution and, in accordance with the resolution, established the system on January 1, 1992.

The Japanese ambassador said that his government believes that "if nations voluntarily made available as much information on military matters, it would contribute to reducing tension in the regions concerned."

As for the item of nuclear disarmament, Tanaka said that the treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) is the most important treaty for establishing a non-proliferation regime throughout the world.

"Progress in the process of destroying nuclear arms and preventing nuclear proliferation within the former Soviet Union," he pointed out, "is of vital importance to world peace and security." He called on all the republics of the former Soviet Union to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states, hoping they will do so very soon.

PRC Submits 'Working Paper'

OW2704224292 Beijing XINHUA in English
2215 GMT 27 Apr 92

[Text] United Nations, April 27 (XINHUA)—China has proposed at the U.N. ten measures and six essential conditions for the acceleration of the nuclear disarmament.

Contained in a working paper which was submitted to the U.N. Disarmament Commission today, these measures include the convention of a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon states when the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals have realized the drastic reduction of their nuclear weapons.

Among other measures, the working paper puts forward the principles for countries with the largest nuclear arsenals to reduce and destroy these weapons; the prohibition of nuclear testing; the effective measure for prevention of nuclear war; the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons deployed abroad by nuclear-weapon states; the halting of the arms race in outer space and the development of space weapons; the prevention of nuclear proliferation; the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; conventional disarmament; and naval nuclear disarmament.

The working paper also proposes that all nuclear-weapon states should take the commitments not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

As to the essential conditions for the acceleration of the nuclear disarmament, the working paper emphatically points out that the creation of a peaceful and stable international environment is conducive to the realization of effective nuclear disarmament. Therefore, the working paper calls on all countries to respect each other's sovereignty, treat each other on an equal footing, mutually respect each other's territorial integrity, not to interfere in each other's internal affairs and settle disputes through peaceful means.

Introducing the working paper today at the meeting of the disarmament commission, Hou Zhitong, Chinese ambassador in charge of disarmament affairs, said that the working paper aims at actively promoting the consideration of nuclear disarmament and accelerating the process of nuclear disarmament.

He hoped the working paper would be earnestly considered and said that China, in the spirit of constructive cooperation, will earnestly consider all proposals and suggestions together with other countries.

The working paper was distributed here today as a U.N. document.
POLAND

Foreign Minister Skubiszewski on Russian Troop Withdrawal
LD2204184292 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network
in Polish 1700 GMT 22 Apr 92


[Koziol] The head of our diplomatic service began by saying that this conference concerned the meeting on the Paris-Bonn-Warsaw line, which will take place the day after tomorrow in the south of France and will be about building European cooperation and removing threats from our continent. But I am very willing to answer other questions as well, the minister added.

The majority of questions put by journalists concerned the issue of the withdrawal of troops of the former Soviet Union from our country and the recent articles on the subject in the Polish newspaper NOWY SWIAT and the Russian KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. NOWY SWIAT sharply attacked the draft treaty on troop withdrawal as very unfavorable to Poland; and in the Russian newspaper, General Pavel Grachev, who was recently in Warsaw for the negotiations, cited specific sums—such as $100 million—that we are supposed to receive for ecological damage done to us.

Minister Skubiszewski said that everything in the NOWY SWIAT article was untrue from beginning to end. When I asked him what he thought of the sums mentioned by General Grachev, the minister said:

[Begin Skubiszewski recording] None of this is in the draft; however, during the negotiations, very different sums were mentioned. The sum expressed in zlotys for ecological damage still needs to be determined, hence our strenuous efforts toward getting access for Polish inspectors concerned with environmental protection to the equipment and installations and bases of those troops, [words indistinct], to ascertain the actual state of affairs. [end recording]

[Koziol] The date of President Walesa's visit to Russia will be fixed later, the minister added. During the visit, the Polish-Russian treaty, which is nearly ready now, and a protocol on the withdrawal of troops are scheduled to be signed.

ROMANIA

Commission To Implement 'Open Skies' Accord
AU2204174492 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1601 GMT 22 Apr 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 22/4/1992—The first session of the Romanian-Hungarian Consultative Commission, set up under the bilateral accord on an “open skies” regime, is taking place in Bucharest. The commission is to adopt practical measures on ensuring the application of the accord, and to survey the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the two sides.

During this first session, the commission is to endorse the rules of procedure, exchange information and technical data, and analyze tangible measures concerning the carrying into effect of the accord. The Romanian representative to the commission is Marin Buhora, director in the Foreign Ministry, and the Hungarian representative is Gabor Brodi, director in the Foreign Ministry of Hungary. The two representatives are assisted by deputies and experts of the ministries of foreign affairs and defense of Romania and Hungary.
'Cycles' in U.S. Arms Spending Viewed

924P0118A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Andrey Baklanov; "Disarmament Strategy—
A View of the 1990s: A Spiraling Arms Race Can Be Predicted"]

[Text] There are four objectives to be reached in forming Russia's foreign policy conception:

determining the country's national interests;
realistically evaluating internal, including economic, possibilities for reaching these goals;
analyzing and predicting development of trends in the world surrounding us, and determining the parameters of our interaction with other subjects of international communication, and the nature of the influence of external factors on events developing in the country;
synthesizing the above-mentioned factors, and determining the specific objectives, as well as the tools, tactics and other attributes of the foreign policy course.

The decrease in the level of confrontation between the leading military powers of the world, the treaties signed between our country and the USA in the area of strategic arms, and equally so, the multilateral agreements on conventional disarmament in Europe are coexisting quite well not only with a worsening situation in different regions of the world but also with improvements in arms. The overall decrease in military expenditures is doing nothing to reduce funding of military research and development. Moreover the percent of total funding going to scientific research and development is increasing. This means that the foundation for further spirals in the arms race is being laid. Problems associated with arms exports, and especially with export of technology and with the "brain drain," are getting worse.

What trends will prevail, and in what directions must Russian diplomacy work in order to avoid another acceleration of the arms race?

To answer this question we need to have a sufficiently clear idea of whether the arms race follows its own laws, or whether it is only a derivative of the situation evolving in international relations.

Many years of studying this question led to the conviction that such laws do exist, and that the trends in arms development can be described and predicted.

It should be noted that the dynamics of producing more and more sophisticated models of weapons can be characterized by a clear, general indicator—the level of military expenditures. Thus we can learn a very great deal about the laws of the arms race by analyzing the dynamics of allocations to military needs.

A graph showing the dynamics of allocations to military needs in the world provides an extremely eloquent picture (military expenditures are given in U.S. dollars in 1970 prices, corrected for inflation).

Dynamics of U.S. Outlays on Military Needs

Key:
1. Billions of dollars
2. First World War
3. Second World War

It should be noted that in the postwar era, the trend of alternating rises and falls in military expenditures has not only been stable, but it has also acquired a new quality—the "rhythm" of these periods has in a sense become steady. As a rule, 5-7 year periods of increasing military production and of corresponding growth of expenditures to finance military programs have been superseded by a 5-6 year period of stabilization or decline.

The stable nature of the trend allows us to predict how the arms race will "behave." To illustrate the reliability of the prediction, we can look at the following example.

In the late 1970s the USA began another spiral in the arms race. It should be noted that according to the plans developed in the USA in these years, the period of forced production of new kinds of arms and of adequate financing of these programs would span approximately 15 years. In other words we are looking at a "double" spiral in the arms race, a spiral without a period of stabilization and decline of the level of military expenditures. However, even this time the law noted above "worked." Military expenditures began to stabilize as of 1986. Once again the curve of "American" military allocations was found to be synchronized in many ways with worldwide military expenditures.

By what is such cyclicity elicited?
Of the numerous factors influencing the dynamics of military expenditures and causing the "spiral" in the arms race, we can distinguish two.

First: the military-technical aspect. The arms race is a process of renewal of arms, each time on a more sophisticated basis. Simple reproduction cannot satisfy the sides participating in the race. There must be an "increment" in the level. But it can be achieved only as a result of purposeful, successful scientific research, and of course in more than just a single year.

The "research" period prior to the start of production of a new form of armament requires approximately 5-7 years. This is followed by bench tests, and so on. And it is only after this that the "ideas" are transformed into metal. Interestingly, this is precisely the moment that coincides with the beginning of the next spiral in the arms race, and as a rule, with aggravation of the international situation. This of course is not a coincidence. Though outlays on scientific research and on various sorts of tests are quite sizable, all of these allocations are in order of magnitude less than what is necessary to initiate production. And realistically speaking, sharply increasing military budgets can gain approval only when the military-industrial complex can "demonstrate" the need for new military programs.

Thus what we have is a unique kind of "technological programming," and together with it, a "technological limiter" of the arms race. A time of accumulation of the technological prerequisites for a new burst of activity is required. And as long as this is so, there is clearly a "technological" precondition of periods of maturation of a new spiral, of creation and testing of future weapon models. This period of "nonproduction" of large series of new arms is as a rule a period of stabilization or even reduction of the level of military expenditures.

The second limiter—and concurrently a regulator—of the arms race is the financial aspect of the matter. As a rule, the economy of no country can withstand more than 7-8 years of forced increases in weapon production. A breathing spell is subsequently required.

Thus the arms race seems to us to be much more autonomous a process than might have seemed, one which is not fully under the command of the will and desire of politicians.

So what are we to expect in the future?

Extrapolation leads us to the conclusion that in the second half of the decade, stabilization of the level of military expenditures may be superseded by a new spiral in the arms race, unless the mechanism itself of this phenomenon is destroyed. But how is this to be done?

First of all we need to recognize the fact that the struggle against the arms race is only just beginning in the strict meaning of this term. After all, we have been fighting thus far not the disease itself but its consequences.

Given the obvious importance of reducing and eliminating different types of armament from a military-technical point of view, all this simply means is "anticipatory" destruction of certain types of weapons before they grow obsolete. Weapons were scrapped even in former times after they wore out and became obsolete, and this did not require any agreements with a potential adversary.

Questions of preventing the arms race must become a topic of substantial discussion within the framework of the CIS. We need to do everything we can to ensure that mutual relations within the Commonwealth would not become one of those specific things that spur on the arms race. Just smoothing over presently existing conflicts is obviously not enough. We need to think right now about how we are to plan and finance military research, how to place certain restrictions on qualitative improvement of weapons, and how to reconcile the intentions of the sides.

Extending measures of trust to the CIS—naturally, ones of special content—would have important preventative significance. This would reduce suspicion, strengthen the element of predictability in the actions of the sides, and besides all else, play a positive role in improving the situation in Europe and in the entire world.

Measures to prevent the arms race must occupy a more prominent place in negotiations with the USA and European countries.

One thing we can propose here is discussion of measures of trust in the technological area, in their relationship to solving the problems of conversion. Things have already been essentially started in this area by Boris Yeltsin's proposals for including Russia in the effort to create a global security system.

Special consideration should be given to the "brain drain" problem. One way to reconcile the interests of all sides might be to utilize the new International Scientific-Technical Fund to support scientists and specialists of the former USSR in the development and implementation of a system of measures directed at preventing and averting the arms race, accomplishing conversion, and implementing measures of trust.

Shaposhnikov Visits Paris, Discusses Arms Issues

Meets French Defense Minister

PM1604141992 Moscow KRASTAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Apr 92 pp 1, 3

[ITAR-TASS report: "Visit Continues"]

[Text] Paris, 15 Apr—Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, who is here on an official visit, laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Arc de Triomphe yesterday morning. Afterward Ye. Shaposhnikov and French Defense Minister Pierre Joxe
visited a French Air Force base in the Dijon area (in the Burgundy region). The commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces was familiarized with the life and combat training of the French Air Force’s second fighter squadron.

The marshal of aviation was given a chance to acquaint himself in practice with present-day French combat aviation: During his stay in Dijon he had a 50-minute flight in a Mirage-2000B two-seater fighter aircraft.

Problems of European security, the situation within the CIS, and prospects for French-CIS military cooperation were the main subjects of the talks that Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, had with French Defense Minister Pierre Joxe. The initial results of the trip were discussed at a press conference given by the two men yesterday at the French military department.

During our several hours of conversation, P. Joxe said, we spoke about European security, discussing in most detail, moreover, the problem of settling the conflict in Yugoslavia, where French and Russian servicemen are now taking part in the work of the UN peacekeeping forces. As for military cooperation between our states, the French defense minister stressed, we above all noted that the provisions of the relevant document which Marshal Shaposhnikov and I signed during my visit to Moscow last September are being successfully implemented. The now-regular exchange of military academy cadets and students affords a concrete example of this cooperation.

Most of journalists’ questions were directed to Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov and naturally concerned the processes unfolding on the territory of the former USSR, which are a source of worry to the whole world today. The idea of creating collective CIS peacekeeping forces that is now being discussed also aroused great interest. If these forces are set up, the commander in chief replied, they will be sent to a seat of conflict only with the assent of the conflicting parties. Their main task will be to separate the opposing forces and promote the peaceful settlement of the conflict by political means.

Ye. Shaposhnikov devoted plenty of time to explaining the situation that has taken shape today over the Black Sea Fleet. I would like to stress the main point, he said. This is that, whatever the disagreements between Russia and Ukraine, we must not under any circumstances allow ourselves to be poisoned by the venom of nationalism due to this kind of squabbling. It is hard to even imagine the serious consequences that this might have. I do not think that either the Russian or the Ukrainian people or the world community is committed to this. I would like a sober view of things to prevail.

There were also many questions about the future of the former USSR’s nuclear arsenal, which is also a source of concern to the world community now. Recalling that the strategic nuclear weapons in the CIS are under unified control, Ye. Shaposhnikov emphasized that the tactical nuclear missiles still to be found on the territory of other CIS states are to be moved to Russia by the middle of the year. The commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces categorically denied the claims that nuclear weapons [zaryadyj] are allegedly leaving the CIS for other countries. He also denied the claims in a number of mass media that some tactical nuclear munitions are still sited in the Transcaucasus. “There are no nuclear weapons in the Transcaucasus,” he said.

The talk then turned to the prospects for cooperation with France in the transportation and storage of nuclear weapons and also to the possible use of French technology to further utilize weapons-grade fissionable materials for peaceful purposes. According to the French defense minister, a special working group was set up not so long ago to study this problem. It is to be borne in mind that the operation to dismantle nuclear warheads [boyevyye yadernyye zaryady] will be carried out solely by the CIS authorities. Ye. Shaposhnikov also advocated broadening cooperation with France in this field, in which this country has accumulated considerable experience.

Comments on Ukrainian Issues

PM1604142792 Moscow IzVESTIYa in Russian 16 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 4

[Yuri Kovalenko report: “Meeting Between Yeltsin and Kravchuk To Decide Future of Black Sea Fleet Will Go Ahead, Marshal Shaposhnikov Said in Paris”]

[Text] “Russia and Ukraine have resumed their talks on the Black Sea Fleet. They will end with a personal meeting between B. Yeltsin and L. Kravchuk. Some 100 tanks or one ship are not worth the two fraternal peoples spoiling the relations between them.” Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, who is here on an official visit, said during a press conference at the French Defense Ministry.

By and large Russian-Ukrainian relations are, according to the commander in chief, “even, but with some ups and downs.” The problems are partially due to the fact that Kiev adopted many legislative acts on its own armed forces ahead of the others and is in this respect ahead of the other CIS states.

Ye. Shaposhnikov was acquainted with the French Armed Forces, held talks with Defense Minister P. Joxe, and will be received by Prime Minister P. Beregovoy.

The strategic nuclear forces sited in the CIS have been put under unified command and are under unified control, the commander in chief of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces assured the press. We were to have rebased tactical nuclear weapons from other CIS countries to Russian territory by mid-1992. The process is going successfully on the whole, if you do not count the actions that Ukraine has taken. As you know, it suspended the withdrawal of nuclear weapons, but the main
reason for this decision by Kiev, the commander in chief asserted, is down to journalists. They began to spread false rumors about Soviet tactical nuclear weapons turning up in Iran and other countries. This is all untrue—they are under supervision and none have ever slipped away.

Nevertheless Ukraine, Ye. Shaposhnikov pointed out, rightly asked about taking part in supervising the withdrawal and destruction of the tactical nuclear munitions. There is an agreement on this, it has been signed by Ukraine and will be signed by Russia in a few days, the process of withdrawing the tactical nuclear weapons will resume, and, according to the marshal’s calculations will be completed by mid-summer 1992.

Meets French Foreign Minister
AU17044141092 Paris AFP in English 1323 GMT
17 Apr 92

[Text] Paris, April 17 (AFP)—The head of the armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) told French officials here Friday that Russia is "interested" in French civil nuclear technology.

Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov expressed Russia’s interest at a meeting he requested with Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, according to French Foreign Ministry spokesman Maurice Gourdault-Montagne.

Shaposhnikov arrived here on Monday at the invitation of Defense Minister Pierre Joxe. He also met Friday with Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy.

In his talks with Dumas, the marshal expressed appreciation for France’s efforts to create "a climate of confidence in security matters," and discussed problems concerning the transfer of nuclear weapons from CIS republics to Russia, the spokesman said.

Moscow announced Thursday that Russia and Ukraine had signed an accord on the transfer of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to bases in Russia, ending a dispute that arose on March 12 when Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk suspended the transfers to demand guarantees on their destruction once in Russia.

Dumas meanwhile stressed France’s commitment to a June 3, 1991 plan for disarming and controlling the spread of nuclear weapons, and to a moratorium on nuclear tests in 1992.

Dumas said that France would stick to this policy as long as disarmament agreements continued to be observed, the spokesman said.

STARTalks

New Uses for Ukraine’s ICBM Silos
924P01164 Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
1 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov: “Missiles To Be Destroyed, but What About Silos?”]

[Text]

Problems of Military Conversion

Having proclaimed three nuclear-free principles, Ukraine has embarked on a firm course towards the liquidation of the nuclear arms currently on its territory. Today the disarmament process is already acquiring realistic shape. Ahead of us is the difficult and complex task of dismantling 176 strategic objects on the territory of our state.

It should be remembered, however, that these objects do not consist of missiles alone. The notion “strategic object” includes a large number of auxiliary units, equipped with state-of-the-art equipment. Not to speak about thousands of highly skilled specialists, who maintain this equipment. All of this constitutes Ukraine’s defense and scientific potential. It would be highly irrational to destroy, in the process of liquidating nuclear armaments, that which without exaggeration is the national wealth.

That is why many state and public organizations and science collectives develop and propose original concepts of optimally effective use of military property for peaceful purposes. One of the most serious concepts has been presented to the Ukraine Ministry of Defense by the Institute of Physics and Technology of Low Temperatures [FTINT] of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kharkov.

Academician Viktor Yeremenko, Doctor of Physics and Mathematics Vasily Natsik, Candidate of Technical Sciences Viktor Charkin, and Candidate of Science in Physics and Mathematics Konstantin Chishko proposed establishing a national geophysical system on the basis of strategic arms objects subject to conversion.

The purpose of the program is to convert systems of strategic nuclear armaments located on the territory of Ukraine into nonnuclear defense objects, as well as objects of scientific and national economic use. The realization of this program will allow avoidance of the destruction of costly objects and of the infrastructure of military bases, and save considerable money that would have to be spent on the liquidation of these objects.

The main purpose of the system proposed by the Kharkov scientists is to register seismic waves in the earth’s crust and to determine from the data received from these measurements the coordinates of the source
emitting these waves. This will permit forecasting earthquakes, and monitoring the coordinates and parameters of nuclear and conventional explosions taking place outside of Ukraine borders.

In addition, the geophysical system will make it possible to increase the effectiveness of prospecting for commercial minerals, which is rather important for Ukraine in the current circumstances. On the military side of its use, the system may be qualified as the means of intelligence and command and control.

The proposed project is based to a large degree on special instrumentation developed in FTINT by the Ukraine Academy of Sciences—superconductive gravimeters and gravimetric gradiometers capable of measuring variations in the acceleration of gravity with a high degree of precision. The same institute has developed squeezemagnetometers that register with a high degree of precision magnetic fields.

The realization of the program developed by the Kharkov scientists will make it possible to create a system of seismic, gravimetric, and magnetometric stations in strategic missiles' deactivated launch silos on the territory of Ukraine. These stations will be interconnected with each other and with a single information processing center via communications lines that currently already exist in the strategic missile warheads.

The exploitation of such a system will make it possible to provide employment for a considerable number of military specialists, whose jobs will be lost after the liquidation of strategic missiles. No less important is the fact that the project will allow complete preservation of the costly complex of facilities and equipment of the launch system.

It is assumed that in case of approval, the program will be implemented in three stages. During the first stage it will be necessary to determine the points of station placement, the list of scientific-technical tasks in designing the instrumentation, and the material support for the set of programs necessary for information processing.

At the second stage, the system will be constructed and equipped with necessary equipment.

And the third stage is the final activation of the system and its fine-tuning.

To support the contention of the importance of the Kharkov scientists' project, it should be emphasized that until recently all geophysical research in Ukraine was far from a priority problem. It is not accidental that the leading scientific organizations in this field are outside of the borders of our state.

This kind of research for military purposes was being actively conducted by the military in the scientific-research institute of the Ministry of Defense of the former USSR. This research was put on an active basis about 10 years ago when the West started developing geophysical war programs (stimulation of earthquakes on enemy territory via directional seismic effect).

I think that there is currently an urgent need for the Ukraine to create its own geophysical service.

The proposed program also has the advantage of requiring relatively small expenditures for its implementation, while providing a considerable and fast practical return.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the system developed by FTINT scientists is not the only option for solving this problem. The Ukraine Ministry of Defense has a number of no less interesting proposals for the rational use of the launch silos. There is, for instance, a project to use the missile silos for launching satellites into earth orbit. All these options, however, will require considerable development and wide scientific discussion.

We need to make rational use of the rich scientific and technical potential of the military objects designed for launching strategic missiles. In doing that, we are completely prepared to submit to the monitoring deemed necessary on the part of the international community.

Kozyrev on START Ratification Problems

PM1504194492 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Apr 92 p 3

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer Aleksandr Golts on 14 April news conference by Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev: "Russia's Foreign Policy: There Is a Difference Between the Desirable and the Attainable"]

[Excerpts] Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev's conversation with journalists took place the day after the government resigned. That topic was not discussed directly. The discussion centered on other things—the prospects for a settlement in Karabakh and the Dniester region, the talks between four CIS republics on the START Treaty. I had the impression that the minister, who came under critical fire at the Congress, also wanted to reply to his opponents. Charged with excessive tractability, he wanted to expound his principled approach to safeguarding Russia's interests. [passage omitted]

Talks on the Future of START

Expounding on the nature of the contradictions that emerged in the course of the talks on the implementation of the START Treaty held in Moscow with delegations from Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, A. Kozyrev noted that the solution could lie in the three republics' simultaneous ratification of the START Treaty and their accession to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

I asked the minister whether he had the impression that the partners in the talks are none too interested in the speedy resolution of these problems. It looks as if they would like to preserve their "semunuclear" status in order to reinforce their international prestige.
If anyone seriously expects that, A. Kozyrev replied, he is making a big mistake. The only thing you will achieve that way is the status of a violator of strategic stability. And the longer the uncertainty remains on this issue, the more the republics will lose, without gaining anything in exchange. Kozyrev pointed out that the West does not forgive even its closest allies for trying to achieve nuclear status. [passage omitted]

U.S. Said Pressuring Republics on START Implementation

PM2104083692 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 6

[Article by Stanislav Kondrashov: "Washington and the USSR’s Nuclear Heirs"]

[Text] In addition to the ruble stabilization fund, to which the West has allocated $6 billion on a preliminary basis, there should also be a fund for the stabilization of the Soviet Union's nuclear legacy.

Accords between the heirs to that legacy are deprecating before the eyes of an anxious world community, albeit not as quickly as the ruble is deprecating. The common strategic area promised during the creation of the CIS looks in the immediate future less well defined than the common ruble zone. After four months of searching there is still no answer to the Americans' question: Who from our side is going to ratify the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms [START] signed by Bush and Gorbachev in Moscow 31 July 1991 and how? In the absence of an answer the U.S. Congress is not hurrying with ratification either.

Because full attention is now focused on the political (and politicians') struggle over the economic reform, last Saturday's [11 April] Moscow meeting of the foreign ministers of the Soviet superpower's four nuclear heirs—Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelarus—passed almost unnoticed. The ministers failed to reach agreement again. Ratifying it as four states would mean declaring to the world de facto and de jure that one nuclear power had been replaced by four powers, each of which is stronger than Britain and France. The nuclear club frankly will not accept that because it could undermine the whole world system of nuclear stability and there are other states, quite a few of them, too, which are even more persistently demanding membership of that exclusive club. Russia alone should ratify the treaty—thereby inheriting the nuclear status—while the other three would merely approve the treaty.

But Ukraine, which has proclaimed nuclear-free status its goal, wants to gain maximum political and economic advantage from the existence of nuclear weapons on its territory while en route to that goal—or while pushing it back. Byelarus also wants nuclear-free status but is beginning to hesitate as it glances at its neighbor. Kazakhstan definitely proceeds from the view that its weight in the world will be increased by SS-18 heavy ICBMs.

I am not going to guess at what Andrey Kozyrev told James Baker by phone straight after the unsuccessful meeting in Moscow but good news did come from Washington as early as Monday. Arriving for an official visit to the U.S. capital, Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov assured his counterpart Richard Cheney that Ukraine "will fulfill all its commitments" in the nuclear weapons sphere.

Thus, without any formal presentation ceremonies the proposed USSR nuclear legacy stabilization fund is essentially already operating and is based in Washington. In the CIS the forces of disintegration continue to predominate but as they flee one another yesterday's fraternal republics cannot avoid Washington—that distribution center for entry passes into the "civilized world" and controller of the allocation of credits without which the entry pass loses its meaning.

Credits are given out not only for market economies and radical reforms, as the "package" of $24 billion to Russia stipulated, but also for nuclear security. That is implied and sometimes—for those slow on the uptake—explicitly stated. Ten days ago Secretary of State Baker publicly warned Ukraine about the need to fulfill its commitments on the removal of nuclear arms from its territory. At the same time he explained that the United States will give help "primarily to those nations which demonstrate a commitment to freedom, democracy, and free markets, and also nuclear security."

Morozov's Washington assurances, just like the recent statements of Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko about resuming the removal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia, is also presumably a response to Baker's warning. And the Secretary of State himself can be considered more or less the main initiator of the USSR nuclear legacy stabilization fund itself.

I think that the fund's immediate task will be to bring the four nuclear heirs to agree on the procedure for ratification of the START treaty. Given the discord between us, what else can we hope for?

It is difficult to curb the arrogance of yesterday's citizen of a superpower and get used to a state of dependence on America. How difficult it is! But in the first place, it is best to face the facts. And second, it is possible to find some consolation, albeit slight, in the fact that this is to some extent a state of interdependence.

The old nuclear threat no longer exists and if the specter of apocalypse appears it is due purely to domestic factors, but the nuclear arsenals with their monstrous destructive force are still here. They must be securely controlled. Considerations of their own security dictate to the Americans directly opposite approaches to the two most important spheres of relations with Russia and the other CIS members: On the one hand, encouragement for the decentralization of the economy, on the other, the preservation of centralized control over nuclear weapons. Boris Yeltsin, who promised such control, cannot guarantee it in all the unfavorable variations of
the continuing dominance of centrifugal forces. It is in the interests of the United States and its main allies to securely prop up Russia's rather shaky guarantees.

Third, states, like people, follow the full path from birth to death. Stunned by the tragic spectacle of the demise of the common fatherland in which we took part, we are at the same time passing through the infancy of the new states and the self-assertion of adolescents who recognize the authority not of one another but of a big uncle—"Uncle Sam." When will they (and their leaders!) become mature enough to say "I'm a big boy, too" without childish squabbling but on the strength of their intelligence and dignity? Then they can deal on equal terms with Uncle Sam and know precisely where their interests coincide, where they differ, and how to defend them—with all due respect for others.

Renegotiation of START Treaty Rejected
92F0131A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Apr 92 p 4

[Article by Major General (Ret.) Vladimir Belous, Russian-American University-Corporation: "What Will the President of Russia Take with Him to the United States: Is It Possible To Prepare a New START Treaty in the Time Remaining before the Visit"]

[Text]

Russia—United States

A meeting in Washington between the presidents of the United States and Russia is planned for 16-17 June, according to an agreement that has been reached.

Uppermost in the minds of the leaders of both countries, along with economic problems, will be questions associated with the continuation of the nuclear disarmament process. At the future meeting there will be a definite keen interest in the fact that the START Treaty, signed on 31 July 1991 and intended for seven years, has not been ratified as yet.

The meeting proposals which the parties exchanged recently regarding the future of SOA's [strategic offensive arms] indicate both a community of interests and a definite divergence of views on this problem.

First of all, it should be recognized that the American side seized the initiative in the nuclear dialogue with Russia. This was shown most clearly in the statement by President Bush concerning the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, in which the United States disclosed a radical change in its traditional policy with respect to this category of arms. In addition, the statement proclaimed for the first time the aspiration of the United States, and contained a challenge to the USSR to join in the destruction of nuclear warheads, and not only their delivery vehicles, as was contemplated in all previously concluded agreements. Of course, such a transformation of views can by no means be explained by altruism, but by purely pragmatic considerations that are conditioned by the changing situation in the world.

This, first and foremost, is the collapse of the Soviet Union, on whose territory about 30,000 nuclear warheads are deployed, according to the estimates of foreign experts (two-thirds of them constitute tactical munitions). They are the most miniaturized, which were spread out over the territory of many republics, and they are part of the equipment of dual-purpose combat systems. All this creates a heightened threat of their unsanctioned use. The course and outcome of the war in the Persian Gulf zone had a not unimportant influence on Bush's decision. The war rather convincingly confirmed that combat tasks previously planned for tactical nuclear weapons can be successfully accomplished by modern systems, especially by highly accurate weapons in the conventional equipment. This created a definite "anti-nuclear breakthrough" in the thinking of American military specialists.

However, for the United States it is the strategic rather than the tactical arms of Russia that constitute the most immediate danger, and the United States is making significant diplomatic efforts to reduce this threat.

Thus, Washington's latest proposals envision the elimination of all Russia's ICBM's deployed in silos (taking into account that by 1995 Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelarus will either eliminate or withdraw their SOA's) and the retention of 504 mobile single-warhead SS-25 ICBM's, which at the present time number 288 units. In this event the United States agrees to eliminate 50 MX ICBM's (500 warheads) and leave one warhead each on their "Minuteman-3" missiles (500 warheads). The United States also intends to reduce by one-third the number of warheads on its SLBM's [submarine-launched ballistic missiles], as a result of which about 2,200-2,300 warheads will be left on 18 submarines. It is proposed that Russia retain approximately the same number of submarines. The American side also proposed a reduction in the number of heavy bombers on each side, leaving 2,000 warheads on them.

At first glance these proposals are quite logical, inasmuch as they stipulate an approximate equality in all three components of the strategic "triad." However, this equality is deceptive, since it does not take into account differences in the qualitative parameters of the arms and in the historically developed SOA structure of both countries. A more straightforward analysis of the contents of the messages of representatives of the U.S. Administration leaves no doubt that the main purpose of the proposed reductions to a common level, approximately 4,700 warheads for each side, is a sharp reduction in the combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Troops. This long fixed idea of Washington is akin to the well-known obsession of the Roman senators at the time of the Punic Wars, when any one of their speeches invariably ended with the summons: "Carthage must be destroyed."
A characteristic feature of the present stage of negotiations on the further reduction of SOA's is to shift their center of gravity from the level of experts to a higher level. The foreign ministers have now assumed a key role in the negotiating process. On the one hand, this could reduce the negotiating time needed to achieve specific results.

On the other hand, definite advantages are known to be on the side of the U.S. secretary of state in the ministerial dialogue. Baker has the experience of negotiations on disarmament problems, he is more experienced in the subtleties of military-technical policy, he is well-versed in military terminology, and he knows what is concealed behind one or another weapon characteristic. Korzhev does not yet have similar experience. Of course, we would not want to blame our minister for this, especially since youth is a deficiency that passes quickly, and experience will be acquired gradually. However, under these conditions there is an extraordinary growth in the role of the system of adopting very important military-political decisions, when the collective wisdom of the experts and personal responsibility of the authors of some or other proposals should show themselves in the best way. Without putting the kind of a system into effect in Russian diplomacy that guarantees a comprehensive and well-considered approach, it is hardly likely that success in negotiations can be counted on.

In connection with the negotiations being conducted, quite a few articles have appeared whose authors make attempts not only to outline the directions of future SOA reductions but also to determine the quantitative parameters with a preciseness almost down to one warhead. In our opinion, a basic methodological “sin” lies behind this: Details are put first, instead of the resolution of major conceptual problems. We are trying to concentrate our attention precisely on the basic concepts of future SOA reductions.

First, there is no doubt that as a result of the negotiations it is first of all necessary to ensure the maintenance of strategic stability in the world, which will be determined for a long time yet by relations between Russia and the United States in the military sphere.

From a military-technical aspect, an increase in the level of strategic stability can be achieved by means of lowering the effectiveness of the first “counterforce” strike. This is attainable owing to a lowering of the counterforce capabilities of SOA’s and also owing to an increase in their survivability (survival rate) in the event that a first strike is delivered against them. At the same time, the counterforce potential (CFP) of an ICBM or an SLBM is determined by three basic parameters: warhead yield, number of warheads on a delivery vehicle, and targeting accuracy. However, the fine point is that the contribution of these components to the index value of the CFP is by no means equivalent. Thus, an increase in the firing accuracy by a factor of two is equivalent to an increase in the number of warheads by a factor of four (squared), or in warhead yield by a factor of eight (cubed). Therefore, in recent years missile weapons designers concentrated their attention on increasing targeting accuracy.

Second, an increase in strategic stability is inseparably tied to a decrease in the number of warheads on a delivery vehicle. At the present time, this amounts to 4.7 units on U.S. delivery vehicles and 4.1 units on CIS delivery vehicles. After delivering a surprise first strike, an aggressor could, by using about 20-25 percent of his SOA’s, destroy practically all reconnoitered enemy combat SOA systems.

The paradox in the situation that has developed at the present time is that the United States was the initiator of the creation of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV’s) in the sixties and seventies. The large-scale deployment of ICBM's and SLBM's with MIRV warheads was called upon to ensure a decisive U.S. military-force superiority. That is the way it was at first. However, retaliatory measures on the part of the USSR made it possible before long to restore parity in SOA’s, but now at a higher level. At present, the United States is coming out as an active advocate of “demirving” missiles, though mainly with respect to ICBM’s, which are the Commonwealth’s principal SOA component. The sides agree in principle that the highest stability will be achieved when both sides have only single-warhead missiles. In this case, the attempt to deliver a first strike becomes absurd, since, taking into account the technical reliability of missiles and the less than absolute probability of hitting a target, the attacking side will deliberately expend a greater number of missiles than the number of enemy missiles it will be able to destroy.

Third, in conducting negotiations it is necessary to employ a comprehensive approach to an evaluation of combat capabilities and, consequently, to the level of reductions of all components of the strategic “triad.” This is especially urgent in connection with the substantial asymmetries in the structure and qualitative parameters of the SOA’s of both sides.

Approximately 65 percent of all strategic warheads are concentrated in Russia’s Strategic Missile Troops. In their operational characteristics these ICBM's not only are not inferior to similar U.S. systems, but some of them are superior. The Strategic Missile Troops are on permanent combat alert, they are provided with a reliable system of operational command, control, and communications, and they have the entire necessary infrastructure and military-technical support system. At the same time, the United States traditionally has laid stress on the development of its own SOA's on ballistic missile submarines. As a result, only 20 percent of the warheads in the United States are on ICBM's, while almost 55 percent are concentrated on SLBM's. This kind of an asymmetry in the SOA structure complicates the negotiating process significantly.

Fourth, economic factors should become one more basic idea in future agreements. It is generally known that SOA
combat systems are rather expensive; however, according to the "cost-effectiveness" criterion, they have no equal. In order that the disarmament process not be a heavy burden for the country, it is necessary to take two decisive factors into account: First—the eventual SOA structure and composition after reductions at a level of minimal nuclear deterrence, and, second—the period of time allotted for this process. It should be kept in mind that compressed periods for the elimination of weapons frequently sharply increase the cost. Moreover, the ecological danger increases. Therefore, mottoes of the type "the five-year plan in four years" or "the end justifies the means" are absolutely unsuitable in this case.

Fifth, one of the principal provisions of future negotiations should be to place appreciably greater attention on stopping the qualitative arms race. Looking back, it must be stated that purely quantitative parameters formed the basis of previous treaties on SOA limitations and reductions. This led to a channeling of the arms race in the direction of improving the qualitative indices of combat systems, which made it even more ominous and dangerous. Of course, the START Treaty already stipulates certain specific measures for preventing qualitative improvements. However, all of this is a bygone day.

During these examinations, research is continuing on the development of directed action nuclear weapons (superemp [electromagnetic pulse], X-ray laser, nuclear shrapnel, penetrating warheads, etc). Work is continuing on missile and warhead control systems that will provide even greater guidance accuracy. To the extent of further SOA quantitative reductions, the significance of their qualitative characteristics will increase more and more.

Sixth, Russia's nuclear policy in negotiations should be coordinated beforehand with all members of the CIS. The former republics of the USSR participated in the creation of strategic nuclear arms, and therefore they have a right to ensure their security with a nuclear shield. In addition, the conduct of a coordinated nuclear policy of the CIS gives it greater weight, and will serve as one of the means of strengthening the Commonwealth. At the same time, it is necessary to proceed from an agreement signed by the four nuclear states of the CIS concerning the redeployment by 1 July 1992 of all tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Russia for their subsequent dismantling, and also the elimination of SOA's by the year 1995.

The experience of the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space arms shows that they require extremely serious and profound analysis of the proposed decisions on the basis of mutual sensible compromises. In the time that remains before the meeting in Washington it is practically impossible to draw up a new START Treaty that would not only satisfy both sides but would also serve the cause of the future strengthening of peace and international security. In our opinion, it is necessary in the time that is left to concentrate efforts on ratification of the START Treaty in the parliament of Russia and begin its implementation, but also to ensure the fulfillment of mutual obligations envisioned in the statements of G. Bush and M. Gorbachev on tactical nuclear weapons.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Implications of Joint SDI Idea Discussed
PM1604091992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Sergey Leskov: "American SDI for Russian Technologies: Trap or Springboard?"]

[Text] In his speech at the UN General Assembly, which prompted streams of commentaries, Russian President B. Yeltsin not only said that Russian missiles are no longer targeted on American facilities, he also proposed setting up a joint system to protect the United States and the CIS from a nuclear missile strike by a potential aggressor. Previously the USSR had unconditionally rejected any kind of involvement in the SDI problem.

There was no official reaction to these statements, but some time later Western news agencies reported that senior U.S. officials connected with realizing the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) program had submitted a proposal on acquiring Russian technology and cooperating with the former Soviet Union's specialists in the sphere of antimissile defenses. The project envisages acquiring technology in over 50 areas where, so American experts believe, the former Soviet Union achieved the greatest successes, and also making use of more than 1,000 specialists on ABM defenses from the CIS. It is estimated that it will cost the United States some $50 million to implement this proposal.

Your IZVESTIYA correspondent sought commentaries on these sensational reports from a Defense Ministry research institute previously out of bounds to journalists. I came to the research institute convinced that we are hopelessly behind the Americans on the SDI problem.

I had to abandon this conviction quite soon. Such was the impact merely of programs making it possible to bring up onto a display screen a detailed representation of SDI actions. All the nuances are taken into account: the launch site, the type of missile, the launch direction, and engine performance. In the various projections you can observe how SDI destroys enemy projectiles or, as sometimes happens, misses them. I noted that more often than not missiles are destroyed 170 seconds after launch at a height of 140 km.

According to the account given by Major General E. Aleskeyev, director of the research institute and doctor of technical sciences, Soviet military doctrine and also our material resources ruled out our own development work on the SDI problem. However, scientific research work was carried out to model the enemy's actions, and the authenticity of his achievements was technologically verified. Our missiles were improved on the basis of the
models that were drawn up and the prototypes [obrazy] that were constructed, and means of breaking through the American system were elaborated. Hence the pessimism of some of our military specialists regarding the headlong cuts in missile complexes at the present stage—this is prompted not by political conservatism but by the strategic danger of going beyond the minimum reductions in talks with those who possess a system that is beyond our reach. Incidentally, the Americans are mindful of the strategic level that is to their advantage, and their unwillingness to go below the 4,700-warhead mark is explained by SDI's defense capabilities at the first stage of deployment.

So we do have reason to be proud. But today the architects of these unique developments cannot even purchase a pair of decent shoes on their wages. And in the light of the blanket cuts in finance, they hold out no hope for the future. Only additional work on old topics was financed in 1992, and even then far from completely, and there was insufficient money for new, more advanced ideas. Major General V. Gudilin, current deputy director for sciences but familiar from Baykonur as the chief of the "Buran" launch complex, recently received an offer from a well-meaning friend in the new economic structures: twice his present salary for undertaking work—in civil defense...

In such a situation our specialists could go abroad not so much out of mercenary considerations as from a desire to continue working in their chosen field. Their knowledge is of enormous interest to any industrially powerful country. American experts estimate that the former USSR occupies a leading position in roughly 50 percent of space technologies. Of particular note are our advances in propulsion systems based on various fuel components, in electric power systems, in orbital stations, in assimilating new materials, above all composite materials, in launch systems, in hydrogen technology, and in nitrogen injectors.

But it is easy to see that these technologies do not relate directly to the SDI problem. Research Institute Director E. Alekseyev believes that in this area it is probably our power systems, the "Topaz" nuclear space unit, and developments [narabotki] in laser and beam weapons which interest the Americans most. But, calculate it how you will, you will not muster 50 advanced technologies for the SDI program in the former USSR. Obviously, it is a question of globally enlisting our space achievements in every area. And the figure of 1,000 specialists, E. Alekseyev suggests, was not plucked out of thin air. That is roughly the number of skilled specialists who, by American standards, can be appropriately paid with the amount allocated—it works out at $50,000 a year per person.

Clearly, we should not kid ourselves that the relaxation of Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] restrictions will automatically lead to a rapid increase in Russian-American commercial agreements in the space sphere. The administration's permission does not constitute law for powerful private companies, which see no sense in inadvertently strengthening a potentially strong rival's position. After all, several times already major American companies have blocked the conclusion of agreements on using Soviet delivery vehicles to put various payloads into orbit.

It is the experts' view that, in the event of deployment of SDI, we will abet with our own hands the country's demotion to second-class level: We will have to voluntarily inform America in advance of every harmless launch. For this reason the prospects of a Russian-American SDI are not beyond question for the world community. The proposed version gives some of our specialists cause for doubt purely in terms of costs: It cost 650 million [currency unspecified] to develop the unique "Topaz" nuclear space motor, yet it is proposed to sell a sample to the Americans for 10 million. But of course there is also another kind of logic, and it is only with this that we can enter the market. Yesterday's expenditure cannot determine the situation on today's market. The customer is always right, and the set price, no matter how low it may seem to us, merely confirms the simple truth that modern science cannot flourish in conditions of economic decline and is forced to live according to commercial laws.

The imminent entry into the world market confronts our aerospace complex with a previously unfamiliar task. It is necessary to learn how to conclude advantageous deals without losing its advanced, leading-edge positions in many areas. Obviously, given its rich scientific and technical potential, our defense sector's most desperate need right now is for gifted traders.

Velikhov Heads Commission To Prepare Summit Issues
OW1504124892 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1147 GMT 15 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Dr. Yevgeniy Velikhov has been appointed chairman of a special commission of experts to deal with nuclear security and disarmament issues in the framework of preparations for President B. Yeltsin's visit to the U.S. scheduled for June. The corresponding order was signed by Gennadiy Burbulis, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

The commission is designed to work out the concept of a global defence system for the world community, set up a joint Russo-American center of early warning against missile attacks, organize exchanges of defence technologies, and the like.

This involves a range of issues already discussed with the Americans, said a highranking Russian diplomat interviewed by DP's [Diplomatic Panorama] correspondent. Now there is a need to work out proposals or reach
concrete agreements to be included in the agenda of the upcoming summit. The idea of building a global defense system for the world community was put forward by Boris Yeltsin. Since the commission will involve experts from different departments, including scientists and military specialists, we hope that this idea will be concretized, the diplomat said.

According to him, Dr. Veliklov will also be in charge of the efforts to set up in Russia an international science and technology center designed to employ Russian nuclear physicists.

Defense Cooperation With West Advised
MK1804123092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Apr 92 p 2

[Vladimir Basistov commentary under “Position” rubric: “It Is Not Worth Littering Space With Weaponry. It Is More Advisable To Study Opportunities for Cooperation With West”]

[Text] In an address to the nation last year U.S. President George Bush urged the leadership of the USSR to immediately undertake specific steps in conjunction with the United States toward the deployment of non-nuclear defense systems for protection against limited missile strikes.

Mikhail Gorbachev expressed readiness to discuss these proposals. Boris Yeltsin’s statement “On Russia’s Policy in the Sphere of Limiting and Reducing Armaments” confirms this readiness.

The press has already discussed the versions of the creation of a global ABM system with our participation. However, as yet the U.S. Administration has not made one specific proposal on involving our country in work on the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] program. One can trace in the speeches of the U.S. leadership the desire to intensify this work by reducing budget appropriations for other areas and to maintain leadership in military and dual-purpose technologies.

Addressing a Soviet military delegation at the end of last year the director of the SDI program declared: “The U.S. calculates that the new spirit of cooperation will enable us to modify the 1972 ABM Treaty and by mutual agreement deploy a limited antimissile system with space-based elements.” In this connection it is important to stress the particular relevance of the above-mentioned statement by Boris Yeltsin, who confirmed Russia’s adherence to this treaty as the successor to the USSR.

The United States is already prepared to begin the phased deployment of a global ABM system within the next five years. The SDI program budget for fiscal 1992 exceeds by more than one-third the 1991 appropriations, although even Pentagon strategists acknowledge that a nuclear missile strike against the United States no longer seems likely. It is clear that the United States will not stop at the deployment at Grand Forks AFB, where the Minuteman-3M missile silos are located, of the 100 land-based antimissiles sanctioned by the ABM Treaty inasmuch as only a madman could venture a disarming strike against the United States (even if possessing the nuclear might of the entire former USSR). And balanced reductions in strategic offensive armaments will change nothing here.

The developers of the SDI program are currently reorienting it toward the creation of a global system of ABM defense against limited ballistic missile strikes, but even a superficial analysis of its composition allows the conclusion to be drawn that the basic function of the system is not defense against chance launches. And although this system is insufficiently effective against the strategic missile arsenal existing in Russia, it can successfully parry a threat from China, for example.

Rejection of the ABM Treaty and the realization of the Pentagon’s plans to deploy space-based weapons will create obstacles in the path of further substantial cuts in offensive weaponry and may provoke a new cycle of the arms race. The emergence of the new technology designated Brilliant Pebbles was triggered primarily by the fact that the previous variant of the construction of a U.S. space-based ABM system did not give the desired effect given fairly simple countermeasures. This was also envisaged by the “asymmetrical” variant of our response to the American strategic initiative. We have also worked on a “symmetrical” variant, and it has been demonstrated moreover that our own version of Brilliant Pebbles will not differ greatly from the American.

In the opinion of a commission of authoritative U.S. military experts which in 1991 prepared a report on future nuclear strategy, in light of the liquidation of the socialist camp in East Europe and the collapse of the USSR the United States is fully able to reduce the number of nuclear warheads to 4,000-6,000. Moreover, former Defense Secretary Brown maintained that in certain circumstances no more than 1,000 warheads are required to ensure reliable deterrence. The military and the politicians have been brought to an awareness of the inadmissibility of employing nuclear weapons on a large scale by an analysis of the results of mathematical modeling of the consequences of numerous nuclear explosions, and also an analysis of the consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station accident. So that the proposed level of 2,500 nuclear warheads must be only an intermediate stage in the process of the mutual reduction of strategic offensive armaments.

The most reliable way to secure radical reductions in offensive nuclear forces to a level at which other countries too could join in the reduction process is that of lowering the probability that any of them could inflict a disarming strike. For a start it would be possible to agree with the United States on removing from the arsenals multiple warheads on ballistic missiles, which were the basic cause of the development of work on ABM systems incorporating space-based intercept elements. If each side were arbitrarily to position even a small number
(limited by treaty) of single nuclear-armed nose sections on some of its delivery systems (equipping the remaining missiles, for instance, with nonnuclear warheads), then given the parity of nuclear warheads a disarming strike will become impossible. In this event the START Treaty (which in the future must become multilateral) should envisage the possibility of the simultaneous monitoring [kontrol] of all the ICBM's of any participating country, which, following this, would be entitled to change the siting of the nuclear and nonnuclear nose sections at its own discretion.

As far as cooperation with the United States to create defensive systems is concerned, it should be noted that such cooperation will in itself bring about the reduced probability of a military conflict, partly as a result of the elimination of such a destabilizing factor as the collapse of the defense sectors of the industry of the former USSR.

At the present time the United States has proclaimed defense against limited ballistic missile strikes to be the basic task of a global ABM system. Other tasks, including the increased effectiveness of retaliatory measures in the event of a disarming strike, have for the time being been relegated to second place. However, given a deep reduction in strategic offensive armaments, a sufficiently developed U.S. ABM system will be able, if not to play the role of a shield against the nuclear missile potential of any other country, then at least to retain a retaliatory potential in the event of a missile attack on the United States. This system, in the event of a disarming strike on the part of the United States, can ward off a retaliatory strike by the other side's surviving ballistic missiles.

Therefore, one of the most important tasks in designing future strategic systems is that of determining the correlation between levels of defensive and offensive armaments.

It is precisely in this sphere that it is essential above all to reach mutual understanding with U.S. researchers and developers, and where possible also agree on identical approaches to the solution of problems that arise. It would be ideal to utilize the very same or at least mutually calibrated models in order to obtain the appropriate evaluations. This must be the first step in cooperation with the West. Incidentally, the transfer of technologies is not necessary for this purpose.

Improved mutual understanding with the United States places on the agenda the pooling of efforts to resolve the tasks of the global monitoring [kontrol] of near-earth space and the atmosphere by national information means, primarily systems for detecting ballistic missile launches, and the information support means of ABM land-based complexes. The detection of chance ICBM launches and ballistic missile launches by third countries will be more reliable under the dual information regime (at the initial stage, according to pooled data of the national detection systems based on geostationary satellites belonging to us and the United States).

The pooling of information to achieve the requisite operational effectiveness of a warning must be carried out by each side at its own command and computer center. For example, NORAD [North American Air Defense Command] for the United States, and for us the space-missile defense command post. Here, the exchange of information must be carried out via special communications channels guaranteeing maximum operational efficiency. The prototype of such cooperation is the Emergency Situations Warning Center (hot line). In order to increase the operational efficiency of the release of information on ballistic missile launches in comparison with what was provided by U.S. space systems during the Gulf war, it is necessary to accomplish the automatic receipt of information from any satellite (via relay facilities where necessary) both at NORAD and at the space-missile defense command post.

One can also envisage the exchange of information on space and aerodynamic objects, and also the exchange of data of an ecological nature, the recording of which will lower the level of false alarms in detecting the launches of ballistic missiles, jet aircraft, and so on.

It is advisable to study the possibilities of cooperating with Western firms in creating tactical ABM systems (not restricted by the 1972 treaty), including for sale on the external market. In particular, one version could be an air-based ABM complex with an optical-electronic detection system, a target-tracking radar, and two to four antimissiles on board.

Further steps in this direction will depend on the international situation. Clearly, when examining the basic ways of enhancing stability in the world, we must also resolve the problems arising in connection with the further improvement of strategic systems of armaments, including defensive, as well as their monitoring [kontrol]. The elaboration and conclusion of new military-political agreements is a painstaking and protracted process. If in the course of negotiations it becomes really inevitable to reexamine the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems—which is undesirable for us (both on the political and on the military-technical plane)—in the process of achieving new agreements we must seek to retain the ban on placing weapons in space or (worst case) rigidly regulate the orbital parameters of the combat space apparatuses and their total number. Any country which signs the new version of the treaty—which must be open—should provide the opportunity to verify [kontrol] compliance with it and the application of sanctions in the event of its violation.

In conclusion, it only remains to be regretted that in the preparation of new accords in the strategic defense sphere the results of the activity of the working groups of experts from the defense sectors of industry created in the past to analyze the status of work on SDI and to evaluate the capabilities of our own science and technology in preserving a strategic balance of forces have remained unutilized. Their inclusion in the formulation
of proposals on limiting the ABM system would allow us to avoid ill-conceived decisions.

Demolition of Krasnoyarsk Radar Station Delayed
LD1704030792 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0000 GMT 17 Apr 92

[Report by correspondent Gennadiy Nikolayev from Krasnoyarsk]

[Text] Arkady Vetrev, the head of the Krasnoyarsk Krai administration, has ordered that the demolition of the former Krasnoyarsk radar station be halted. Here is our correspondent Gennadiy Nikolaev.

[Nikolayev] To start with, a little history: The Krasnoyarsk radar station was built in the taiga as a link in the early-warning system against a missile attack. In 1989 the decision was made to destroy it, the aim being to retain the ABM treaty signed between the USSR and the United States. At present, the equipment there has been completely dismantled and 70 percent of the building destroyed. However, unforeseen problems have arisen lately. More precisely, the sociopolitical situation concerning the radar station has deteriorated. The fact is that the several thousand blue- and white-collar staff who manned the station could wind up unemployed. Meanwhile, a survey has shown that the remainder of the building, about 60,000 square meters, could be used to manufacture furniture. But if it is all demolished down to the foundations, as is planned, then over 200 million rubles in investment capital will have to be found to ensure work for the people made unemployed.

On 16 April, the Krasnoyarsk Krai administration received a copy of a letter from Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov and Andrey Kozyrev to Yegor Gaidar. It says: Unfortunately, the Americans are insisting that the building be demolished down to its foundations. However, bearing in mind the new nature of U.S.-Russian relations, it is desirable to ask the U.S. President, via top-level U.S.-Russian contacts, about putting the remaining parts of the buildings to civilian use. Also, it could be arranged for representatives of the American administration to visit the radar station site. This, in our opinion, would convince them of the sincerity of our intentions.

This is why the demolition of the Krasnoyarsk radar station has been suspended.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SS-23 Designer Assails Elimination Agreement
924P01122A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Sergey Nepobedimy, Russian Academy of Sciences corresponding member, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lenin and State prize laureate: "Blown Up By Their Own Missiles"]

[Text] Bakatin, when he presented the Americans with secret plans, looked like a little boy next to Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, who have destroyed an entire class of missiles to the USA's advantage and at a cost of billions of rubles.

I would like to tell the story of something that happened a fairly long time ago, but that never got the attention it deserved. Briefly, its essence is the following. In compliance with an agreement between the USA and the USSR, the destruction of Soviet and American intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (INF), with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometers, was completed in May of 1991. However, the operational-tactical missile complex Oka (NATO designation SS-23), with a range of 400 kilometers, was also affected by the reduction. Three hundred sixty Oka missiles were destroyed, as well as 106 self-propelled combat vehicles and the same number of transporter-erector vehicles, all control and servicing equipment, and training center supplies. At the same time, technological equipment and works in progress at defense industry mass production factories, missile ranges and much more have also been "thrown on the scrap heap". The labor of hundreds of thousands of people and more than 4 billion rubles have been scattered to the winds. Add to this the fact that we have essentially given the NATO countries 100 billion dollars by freeing them from the necessity of creating and deploying a European SDC. Western specialists, themselves, will admit this.

What happened? The proposal to eliminate Oka was advanced by M. Gorbachev and E. Shevardnadze during a meeting with the U.S. secretary of state, without preliminary competent preparation. In this manner, the maintenance of parity in disarmament was violated.

When I found out about the cutting out of the Oka operational-tactical missile complex, I wrote official letters of appeal, as the chief designer of the complex, to all the higher departments. During meetings with Army Gen Ye. Ivanovskiy, commander-in-chief of Ground Forces, Ground Forces Army Mar Arty V. Mikhalkin, chief of Ground Forces Missile and Artillery Troops, and Col Gen M. Penkin, chief of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate, it became clear that they had not been consulted on this issue. At a conference with the chief of the General Staff, Marshal S. Akhromeyev, a decision was made to report to Defense Council Chairman M. Gorbachev on the mistake made concerning the Oka complex. But it was already too late—the resolution had been adopted during a meeting with U.S. President R. Reagan.

A curious detail. Evidently, in order to repudiate the objections voiced by specialists, it was ordered that Oka be launched at a range of 500 kilometers on the missile range at Kapustin Yar. The entire brigade of designers and officers, headed by Lt Col Yu. Shumilkin, chief of staff of Missile and Artillery Troops, flew there immediately. Troops had already concentrated themselves in the
launch area. Before our departure, I sent a coded message to Marshal S. Akhromeyev and Lt Gen N. Mazar-kin, missile range chief, explaining that the missile's guidance system would not allow it to launch at a range greater than 400 km, and that if it were switched off, the front end would not separate, and the missile would begin to fly wild, with all the accompanying catastrophic consequences. The launch was canceled.

What kind of conclusions can be drawn from the story of Oka's destruction, which, by virtue of its combat and operational specifications, could have remained the best missile of this class in the world?

This has led not only to a fundamental weakening in Ground Forces combat power. In addition to the development and manufacturing expenditures on Oka that I have already mentioned, several hundred million rubles were also spent on destroying missiles and other elements of the complex. Blowing up a bundle of missiles fully loaded with three tons of solid fuel damaged the environment to a degree that is difficult to estimate.

And, besides this, the developers of the complex had been proposing that it be employed in the interests of domestic and world science to study the mechanisms of large-scale processes that occur in the Earth's atmosphere, ionosphere and magnetosphere, the transfer of manmade pollutants in the upper atmosphere and near-earth space, the impact of pollutants on the flight safety of manmade satellites, the effect of solar and geomagnetic activity on weather and climate. In order to do this, basically, we would merely have had to change the first stage of the missiles and their programming. However, no approval was given for this, either, although the sale of modernized complexes in this way abroad promised solid hard currency earnings.

Is there any hope that a repetition of the Oka complex's fate does not await us with the new large-scale arms reductions?

After all, now even specialists are poorly informed about how the impending cutbacks will affect our security. More than this, with things the way they were when the Soviet Union disintegrated, it is unclear what kind of army we will end up with and to whom it will owe allegiance. What kind of armaments is necessary under these new conditions, how should the doctrine "on the necessity for an adequate defense of the country" be understood? No optimal disposal technique is being developed, and there is no word of proposals for the rational utilization of military technology affected by the reductions. There is no scientifically based program for the conversion of the defense industry. In a word, it could turn out that the disarmament race will be just as destructive for our country as the arms race was.

According to expert estimates, the cost of arms reductions will be, according to the Paris Agreement on Conventional Weapons in Europe, about 80 billion rubles; for the destruction of nuclear arms—10-12 billion dollars; for the destruction of chemical weapons—several billion rubles, at 1991 prices; to cover the expenses of all the necessary inspection groups—tens of millions of dollars.

Would it be possible to reduce these expenses at this time that is critical for our state, when our people are experiencing enormous deprivations?

In my opinion, for this reason it would be appropriate to refuse to destroy our arms according to strictly defined deadlines. It would be expedient to utilize first of all the old prototypes and surplus arms and military equipment, using wasteless, ecologically clean technologies, with the maximum economic effect, not under the pressure of one or another political condition.

I would like to remind you: despite the liquidation of the military-political block of Warsaw Pact countries, the West is maintaining in its entirety the structure of NATO, is making serious attempts to raise the quality of arms, and for all practical purposes enjoys a superiority in nuclear and conventional weapons over our country. The Americans have distinctly determined a short- and long-term arms development program through 1999 inclusively. Two hundred ninety-one billion dollars were allotted for this fiscal year to military spending, and 11.9 billion dollars were allocated for the production of nuclear warheads. There are also proposals to put considerable funds towards future scientific research and experimental design projects.

Our worst fears have been confirmed by the latest newspaper announcements. The newspaper NEW YORK TIMES informs us that "The Bush administration, without undue sensation, has basically blocked purchases in the former USSR of aeronautic and space technology". The newspaper goes on to quote U.S. government officials: "Their opposition to these types of purchases is a part of U.S. administration policy aimed at bringing the Russian space and military industry to such a low level that in the future, it will never again constitute a threat to the USA."

SERGEY NEPOBEDIMYY, Russian Academy of Sciences corresponding member, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lenin and State prize laureate. Request that all honorsaria received for this article be transferred to the PRAVDA Fund.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Further on Latvian-Russian Troop Withdrawal Talks

Deputy Comments
LD0704021292 Riga Radio Riga International in Latvian 1930 GMT 31 Mar 92

[Excerpts] Latvian Defense Minister Talavs Jundzis arrived in Brussels today. [passage omitted] Last week, Latvian Supreme Council deputies, Mihail Stepicevs,
secretary of the Defense and Internal Affairs Commission, and commission member Juris Dobelis were also at NATO headquarters. Commenting on the results of the visit, they especially emphasized that NATO could, of course, influence the political situation in the Baltics. However, NATO cannot control the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics. In the opinion of NATO representatives, Latvia must conclude an agreement with Russia on the withdrawal of troops that specifies a conclusion date and a withdrawal schedule. Only then will it be possible to send international observers to Latvia to follow the fulfillment of those points. Here is an excerpt of what Deputy Juris Dobelis said:

[Begin Dobelis recording] [passage omitted] Of course, we stressed that the most important issue is the withdrawal of the alien troops and the possibility of using the support of other states in resolving this.

During the talks, we also agreed on a certain activity which might promote the resolution of these troops withdrawal problems and might assist in ensuring stability in Latvia. [passage omitted]

We saw an expressly favorable attitude by NATO representatives and their special interest in moving the process into a channel desirable to us. But, at the same time, it must be said that we shall have to learn to travel this road, understanding that it consists of greatly varied sections. Therefore, I can mention that a joint seminar will be organized by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia and the North Atlantic Assembly at the end of April. Several NATO representatives showed a very great interest in the meeting, which will be devoted to the issue of Baltic security.

So then, in such a way we intend to continue our international activity. [end recording]

Deputy Comments Further
LD1904193292 Riga Radio Riga International Service in Latvian 1930 GMT 13 Apr 92

[Text] Russian State Counselor Sergey Shakhray, who leads the talks with the Baltic states, has emphasized that Russia is sticking to a gradual withdrawal of troops from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia; otherwise a conflict would be created. Now here for your attention is what Supreme Council Deputy Juris Dobelis said. As is known, his efforts have played a great part in the question of the withdrawal of the former USSR Army from the territory of Latvia.

[Begin Dobelis recording] As can be seen, about the force that once entered Latvia illegally it is today difficult for the government to change its attitude of earlier years to Latvia as an independent state in fulfilling its promises. The course of the removal of this foreign force is hard. However, we will strive to go on doing our bit.

Our experts have worked out a draft agreement which we will assess together with the Latvian delegation next week. After that there must be an agreement on a meeting with the Russian delegation. We have been hoping for an agreement immediately after the congress taking place in Russia. At the moment it is necessary to continue the work also on the consciousness of the soldiers and officers of various nationalities in the force deployed in Latvia.

We will pay particular attention to representatives of Ukrainian nationality. We have finally agreed with some Ukrainian politicians and Ukrainian representatives living in Latvia on common action to assist in the mutual communication with Ukrainian soldiers and officers, promoting their return to Ukraine. Several representatives of the foreign army, intentionally or unintentionally, are delaying the handing over of buildings, about which we intend to inform the leadership of the Northwestern Military Group and reach agreement about the practical transfer of these buildings.

This will not be easy, of course. The talks will be complicated. However, we cannot back down here. In the future we must plan everything possible to direct our action to achieving the results we need. Latvia must recover everything: foot by foot, building by building. Sooner or later it must have them too. [end recording]

Ukrainian Troops To Leave Riga
LD1904135892 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 0430 GMT 15 Apr 92

[Text] According to information at the disposal of the Latvian Ministry of Defense, at the end of April this year all soldiers of Ukrainian nationality are to be withdrawn from the Army unit stationed at Zakumuiza in Riga rayon. A BNS correspondent was told this by an official of the Latvian Defense Ministry. The Army unit located at Zakumuiza is due to be fully withdrawn to Russia in 1993.

Foreign Minister Hits Russian Stance
AU1604131492 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 16 Apr 92 p 3

[Interview with Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans by Peter Martos in Vienna; date not given; "Latvia's Problems With the Soviet Heritage"]

[Text] [Martos] National tensions in the three Baltic states are growing. What do you think are the reasons?

[Jurkans] We are facing the absolutely absurd situation that Russia, which recognized us under international law, continues to deploy its troops in our countries without a legal basis. Moscow refuses to hold talks on the withdrawal and on the consequences of nearly 50 years of occupation. Nobody can deny that Russia occupied Latvia. After all, it claims to be the legal successor to the USSR. Thus, it is also responsible for the consequences.

[Martos] To what extent does this radicalize the situation in Latvia?
It prevents us from solving our serious economic problems. We must carry out our reforms without foreign support because investors stay away so long as the Russians are here. This is the main problem in modernizing our country. We are caught in a vicious circle. We have seen in Austria and in Eastern Europe, where the occupation forces withdrew in 1955 and 1990 respectively, what changes are possible once the troops have left. However, our sovereignty exists only on paper.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin claims that the Army must protect the Russians in the Baltic republics.

This behavior reminds me of the Stalin and Brezhnev era. Yeltsin also claims that Latvia joined the USSR voluntarily in 1940. Just ask the Russians whether they want to leave Latvia. Are they fleeing in great numbers to Russia? Our legislation corresponds to all European standards.

I admit that the draft of the law on citizenship contains tough stipulations. Thus, a person must have lived for 16 years in Latvia to be entitled to Latvian citizenship. However, this has nothing to do with human rights. We must grant the privilege of citizenship on a selective basis to prevent a split of our society. The measure is necessary to strengthen national identity. In Riga, for example, only 27 percent of the population are Latvians, and the Russians refuse to learn Latvian.

Russia must declare its willingness to hold negotiations on the withdrawal of its troops and on territorial issues. As a matter of fact, Latvia lost some territory in 1944. If we cannot find a solution, I fear that national radicalization might lead to real discrimination against the Russians. "Russians go home" can so far only be heard in the streets. It is not yet part of official policy.

To what extent does Latvia want to cooperate with the other Baltic states?

Cooperation was extremely successful in the struggle for independence. We must now solve all our internal problems. Above all, a new parliament free of KGB officials and Russian officers must be elected. Once this is accomplished, a Baltic confederation is conceivable. The common desire to join the EC might be conducive to cooperation.

Was the “Roundtable Europe” forum here in Vienna useful in this respect?

We met in Vienna and Bratislava to formulate our visions of a future Europe. However, discussions are no longer sufficient at this point. A new system to safeguard peace must be developed. The CSCE plays a certain role, but it is too weak. All the existing structures did not prevent the conflicts in Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh. I am afraid that the same applies to the Baltic republics.

Estonian-Russian Talks on Troop Withdrawal Start

Differences Noted

OW1404222492 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1752 GMT 14 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

The first meeting between official government delegations of Russia and Estonia led by Russian special envoy Vasily Svirin and Estonian State Minister Uno Veering respectively took place in Parnu April 14.

The meeting focused on issues related to the beginning of the talks, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Estonia, observance of ethnic Russians' rights in Estonia.

Sources close to the Estonian delegation told BF [BALTFAX] that the Russian delegation had not displayed particular interest in rapid negotiations.

The two sides have differences over the withdrawal issue. Estonia, as the other Baltics, demands that Soviet troops withdraw within a year. Russia is interested in gradual withdrawal, given its socioeconomic problems.

Earlier, Russian presidential adviser Sergey Shakhray said that the withdrawal of troops from the Baltics will cost Russia 6 billion rubles.

The talks will end April 15.

U.S. Cited Seeking ‘Rapid’ Pullout

OW1604135792 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1345 GMT 16 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

The press service of the Estonian Foreign Ministry reports that, in his speech at a meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the permanent US representative in NATO, Ambassador Alexander Taft, said the US Administration insisted that the current negotiations between Estonia and Russia result in the rapid withdrawal of the troops of the former USSR from Estonia.

He called upon Russia to do its best to finish the negotiations and take-decisions acceptable to the Baltic states.

Estonian representative Clyde Kull proposed that the NACC Political Council put the issue on the agenda for one of its future meetings and that a working group be formed to work out recommendations for the Estonian and Russian delegations carrying on the negotiations. The proposal was supported by all participants in the meeting and was recorded in its final document.
CFE Plenary Session Held in Vienna
LD1504222892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1420 GMT 15 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna April 15 TASS—Control problems and exchanges of information were discussed at a plenary meeting of parties to the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) here today. They will be important elements of the future agreement to limit the armed forces of nations taking part in these talks.

The meeting has shown that the stand of most delegations on the creation of an information bank on the armed personnel and provisions for their verification are identical not only conceptionally, but as regards practical approaches, too.

Tabled so far are three documents, pertaining to the control problem. One of them was submitted by delegations of Canada, France, Germany and Great Britain. The second—by delegations of Byelarus and Russia, and the third—by delegations of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

"The elaboration of principles, related to the exchange of information and control is largely facilitated by the fact that the parties to the negotiations can and must draw to the maximum on corresponding provisions of the treaty on conventional armaments in Europe," head of the Russian delegation Vladimir Shustov told ITAR-TASS. According to Shustov, herein lies the first and main principle by which everybody should be guided when drawing up the future agreement.

"The second main principle," the Russian diplomat continued, "lies in the need to stick to a differentiated approach to the furnishing of information on the armed personnel, which depends on its military importance, role and place in the overall structure of the armed forces and, of course, on the scope of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe. And, finally, the third principle, to which the Russian delegation attaches much significance too, is the correlation of the volume and comprehensiveness of figures concerning the number of armed personnel, on the one hand, and tasks of control—on the other.

Troop Withdrawal Issue Settled With Poland
LD1604223692 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 16 Apr 92

[Video report by correspondent Yu. Ulyanov; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Polish President Lech Walesa received Colonel General Pavel Grachev, Russia's first deputy defense minister, in Warsaw. All the problems relating to the withdrawal of our troops from Poland were effectively settled during the meeting. The installations remaining after their departure—airfields, test ranges, and buildings—will be used for the establishment of joint enterprises, the revenue from which will go towards financing the withdrawal itself and building homes for our officers in Russia. It is possible that Walesa will visit Moscow as early as April to meet Yeltsin and sign a treaty on relations between Poland and Russia.

Russian Envoy Criticizes Western Stance at Helsinki Session
LD2004150992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1211 GMT 20 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Surikov]

[Text] Helsinki April 20 TASS—The attempts of some delegations to spread the debate to matters unrelated to it may have a negative effect on the atmosphere and the course of the Helsinki meeting. This was said by Ambassador Konstantin Mikhailov, deputy head of the Russian delegation to the meeting. In an interview to ITAR-TASS he commented on the statements of Baltic countries on matters related to Russian troops withdrawal from the Baltic countries.

"I would like to note that the entire set of problems related to the withdrawal from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania of forces of the former USSR, now under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, is now discussed at bilateral negotiations. We believe that to discuss such problems at an international forum is counterproductive", Mikhailov said.

Regarding the discussion of military-political themes in general at the European forum, Mikhailov stressed that the main task in this area is preparing the mandate for new negotiations about problems of arms control and disarmament, and also confidence- and security-building measures. In other words, an attempt is being made to fuse two independent tendencies, to combine their themes and to bring together their participants. Twenty-two countries now participate in the treaty on conventional forces. The range of participants in the negotiations on confidence-building measures will be much larger. The future negotiations are expected to involve virtually all participants in the European process.

The question connected with the attempts of NATO countries to expand the zone of future measures of disarmament and confidence-building to the part of Russia beyond the Urals will apparently arise, Mikhailov said. There is, specifically, an idea to spread this zone to the meridian of Krasnoyarsk.

"We believe such an attitude is unjustifiable. The widening of the zone can only be decided on a basis of reciprocity. All participating countries, including the United States and Canada, should open their territories to such measures. It should be taken into consideration that confidence-building measures with regard to new
territories, say the Asian part of Russia, or U.S. territory could be milder, different from measures applied to Europe”, Mikhailov said.

There is a need for understanding and consent of all participating countries. So far some NATO countries fail to consider this. It is yet difficult to predict what developments will follow but the Russian delegation has all ground to adhere to this stand which has been proven in the legal, moral and ethical respects.

The military confrontation in Europe is over, Mikhailov said. We no longer view each other as enemies. We strive to interact as partners. At the same time, it should be admitted that the confrontation is replaced by a set of factors giving rise to serious concern. These are instability in some districts of Europe and beyond it, flareup of regional conflicts, the threat of the spread of dangerous armaments and military technologies. All this suggests that close attention be given to the military-political aspect of the Helsinki process, Mikhailov said.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Russian Calls for Test Moratorium Criticized

[From “Diplomatic Panorama”; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A leading Russian expert in the area of disarmament, Aleksandr Savelyev, believes that Russia’s statements concerning a moratorium on nuclear tests were prompted largely by propagandistic considerations. At Tuesday’s [14 April] briefing in the press center of the Foreign Ministry in Moscow it was announced that Russia supports France’s decision to refrain from nuclear tests till the end of this year, and urges other nuclear powers to follow suit.

A. Savelyev is vice-president of Russia’s National Security and Strategic Research Institute. In an interview for DP’s [Diplomatic Panorama] correspondent he said that Russia was forced to take this step. Being unable to continue testing at the nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk because it is located in Kazakhstan, Russia came to face difficulties at its Novaya Zemlya test site too. The public in Russia’s northern areas and in Scandinavian countries resolutely objects to the use of that test site.

According to A. Savelyev, France was also forced to impose a moratorium on nuclear testing under strong pressure exerted by the “Greens”.

As for the appeals to the U.S. to support the nuclear moratorium, according to the Russian expert they are futile, since “pragmatic Americans proceed from the assumption that as long as there is nuclear weaponry it has to be tested”.

U.S. Attitude on Test Moratorium Scored

924P01117A Moscow TRUD in Russian 15 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Erik Alekseyev, international reviewer: “Wouldn’t It Be Better to Put the Genie Back in the Bottle?: The USA Refuses to Support the Moratorium on Nuclear Explosions”]

[Text] France’s decision to halt nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean this year (a new series was planned for May) was clearly a surprise. And perhaps for this reason, especially gratifying. The governments of many states responded at this time with approval and support. And naturally, the overwhelming majority of people on the Earth breathed a sigh of relief, inasmuch as all any of them ever get from nuclear tests is anxiety over their fate.

The moratorium announced by the French is especially significant, I think, because it may be considered to be either a response to the Russian moratorium (effective until October of this year), or an action parallel with it. But in either case it is an encouraging step on France’s part.

Encouraging chiefly in the sense that it was perceived as yet another direct signal (following ours) that other nuclear powers have joined the moratorium. And the Russian leadership, which welcomed this step by France, also supported its appeal to other nuclear countries not to conduct nuclear tests at least until the end of this year. Margaretha af Ugglas, the foreign affairs minister of Sweden—a country that has been very consistent in its call for cessation of nuclear explosions—clearly stated on her part: “We express the hope that all countries possessing nuclear weapons will halt their testing.”

It is quite obvious that the hopes voiced were directed primarily at the United States. However, the U.S. State Department’s official spokesperson M. Tutwilier stated clearly and categorically that the USA will continue nuclear testing “as necessary.” Such tests, she emphasized, are critically important to ensuring “reliability, security and survival of the policy of deterrence,” which “continues to play an important role in the strategy of the national security of the United States.”

It is important to note here that many specialists and politicians emphasize that halting and then prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons mean not only stopping improvements but also laying a most dependable basis for subsequent total and universal prohibition of such weapons. In the CIS countries they have already been completely “neutralized.” It was officially announced that they have now been retargeted for “nowhere.” And even if someone wished to “activate” them suddenly in the event of “catastrophic necessity,” wouldn’t that be practically possible today?

However, the USA is making conclusions completely different from what would be desired on the basis of these and many other conditions undeniably evolving
for quick, joint deliverance of the planet from the Damoclean sword. It has clearly seen this as a new possibility for reinforcing its position as a superpower, disdainful of peace and holding a nuclear stone behind its back just in case.

Are we judging too harshly? But we need to look at things with open eyes, after all. This is precisely what Ms. Tutwiler said about all of this, though in somewhat different words. She quite definitely distinguished two principal factors making it necessary for the USA to continue testing and improving nuclear weapons. First of all there are the interests of the strategy of the "national security" of the USA itself. Second, this is extremely important to "survival of the policy of deterrence"—that is, deterring others, exerting influence (or pressure) upon them. What surfaces in the memory involuntarily in this regard is a secret Pentagon report that was recently made public: In particular, it sees nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of the USA's position as the sole superpower, called upon to play a leading role in the world.

And so, Washington unfortunately rejects the possibility of joining the moratorium on nuclear testing. It may be that its position was influenced to some degree by the fact that another 150 kiloton nuclear explosion in Nevada on 26 March did not elicit much of a commotion in the world (a group of scientists from Russia were located 32 kilometers from the epicenter with their instruments).

But there is something to think about here: The USA's stubborn desire to possess increasingly more menacing weapons encourages those who do not have such weapons yet to work harder to obtain a nuclear club for themselves, even a quite "small one." And there are more than enough seekers of such weapons in the world already.

But how dangerous would just a temporary moratorium on nuclear tests be to the USA's security and to its position in the world? On becoming universal, there can be no doubt that such a moratorium would create a more favorable climate for stage-by-stage solution of the fundamental problems associated with nuclear weapons: from an agreement to completely halt their improvement, to recognition of their senselessness, and of the need for halting their production anywhere, and achieving their unconditional and complete prohibition.

Yeltsin 'Circles' Deny Testing To Resume
LD1604080692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0737 GMT 16 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow April 16 TASS—Russian supreme leaders are considering addressing all members of the "nuclear club" with a proposal to announce a moratorium on all nuclear explosions by the end of the year, ITAR-TASS learned from the circles close to Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

The same source noted that, while supporting the French decision to suspend nuclear tests, Moscow continues to advocate complete prohibition of tests.

The Russian president's circles also dismissed as groundless the report in London's "THE INDEPENDENT" newspaper that Yeltsin had allegedly ordered a resumption of nuclear tests in October.

Russian Congress Welcomes French Nuclear Test Halt
LD1704181692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1639 GMT 17 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]


Deputies called on parliaments of other nuclear states—Great Britain, China and the United States—to joint the moratorium on nuclear tests, declared by the Russian Federation and the French republic, says a congress statement circulated here today.

Continued U.S. Testing in Nevada Criticized
LD2004143592 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 19 Apr 92

[Commentary by Valentin Zorin]

[Text] On the 26th of last month [March] the United States used its formal right to carry out an underground nuclear test in the Nevada Desert. Commentary is by Valentin Zorin.

Washington seems reluctant to update its mentality—otherwise, what can explain the build-up of U.S. nuclear arsenals and the squandering of taxpayers' money in Nevada? Incidentally, next week marks an anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, which may be regarded as an object lesson in the abject effects of nuclear explosions. A few years ago people around the world were too appalled to imagine what could happen if more Chernobyls were to follow. Today the news about more nuclear tests in the United States moves them to voice this question. Reality refuses to leave room for both theories and doctrines of past decades and policies based on such theories. The testing ground in the Nevada Desert is a symbol of the "cold war" and outdated mentality. It belongs to a museum collection. The sooner it joins other mumified rarities the better for every nation on this planet, including the Americans.
CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Journalist Tours BW Installation in Sverdlovsk
92P0602004 Moscow POISK in Russian 7-13 Mar 92 p 5

[Article by correspondent Lidiya Usacheva, Yekaterinburg: “Nine Hours Behind the Barbed Wire: Reporting From the 19th Military Installation From Which, Many Allege, Anthrax Broke Out in 1979”]

[Text] I had not intended to touch on this history, but I could not avoid it. I very much wanted to look into the eyes of those who lived and worked here in the fatal year of 1979, to hear their direct response to an equally point blank question. This is why, while greedily devouring information on the present day of the Center of Military Technical Problems of Biological Defense of the Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology of the Ministry of Defense—the present name of this facility—I unintentionally returned my interlocutors to those events of 12 years past.

In response to this, many frowned and the colonel escorting me, the deputy director of the center, Anatoliy Mikhailovich Lobur, quickly changed the topic. On the whole, he proved to be an uncommonly severe stage director: not a step to the side, every meeting, every word—strictly by prearranged script. True, it was proposed that I select my interlocutors myself, but that is like looking for a fellow tribesman on a little-studied planet. Any attempt at free discussion was immediately interrupted.

To sum up, from 0900 to 1800 I visited five laboratories. Before me passed—not counting the escort who also interjected his commentaries from time to time—11 interviewees, mainly military chemists, physicians, biologists and one civilian—an engineer.

At times it seemed that I was drowning in a sea of highly specialized information. The outward appearance of openness was created, although I could not believe in it because a man with a tape recorder constantly followed my main escort like a silent shadow. “Are you checking up on me?” I burst out near the end. “No, on ourselves,” was the equally awkward reply.

Thorns and Roses

The first impression when, passing by the central guardpost, you leave the bustle of the city and enter the confines of the center is that you have found yourself in a comfortable resort town, where sun sparkles on white snow, there is silence, peace... And the rare passerby moves towards you and the low stone buildings fit prettily into the green woods. And in harmony with your mood, your escort in shoulder boards and general's papakha [hat] carries on a conversation about the delightful life here: no crime, no social disturbances. The children are growing up—there is everything they need here: no problems with either schools or daycare.

But here the path ends and again a barbed wire fence comes into view—the checkpoint leading to the battalion's territory and consequently more vigilantly guarded. We take a few more steps and again push our way through a revolving gate: Ahead lie the production buildings with the same secret laboratories that still strike terror into the hearts of the townspeople. “All the same, why are you needed?” I wonder. “Isn’t there a convention prohibiting biological weapons?”

“And has Hussein signed it?”

The argument, it cannot be denied, is convincing. There is a danger—antidotes are needed. We need to know without fail how man, nature and equipment will behave if, God forbid, a disaster happens. And for this reason in numerous experiments with simulators of toxic and pathogenic substances which are manufactured right here in Candidate of Medical Sciences I. Poberiye's laboratory, a search is being conducted for more effective measures of defense and disinfection.

The pride of the military scientists is the climatron being built on the territory of the installation: large chambers where the “susceptibility” of tanks, armored transporters, BMP [armored infantry vehicles] and similar military equipment to different microbes will be tested.

It turns out that the microbe is an omnivorous creature. It may "eat" even metal. And as the result failures occur in the systems of aircraft, guns and tanks. And often! The loss is up to R40 billion per year. The problem is extremely serious. During the last five years alone, more than 100 scientific books in military and academic science were devoted to it. At the installation it is being studied in the department of Candidate of Medical Science Valeriy Nepokryt. It is a serious study: in a comparatively small department there are eight candidates of science, the most luxurious instrument base. By the way, one can’t get into the installation even as a junior research assistant without a scientific degree.

So if it happens tomorrow that the need for missiles and tanks drops off, the knowledge will be useful. Let’s say that our hospitals, maternity homes and pharmacies are infected with staphylococci, our poultry farms, with salmonella. Cleansing the harmful microorganisms from their environment is a mere trifle for the scientists in shoulder boards. And lately they have been actively helping the townspeople control this misfortune.

It is noteworthy that everywhere you go there is perfect cleanliness and order. Fish frisk in aquariums, flowers twine along the walls. And the main thing—it's been a long time since I've seen the like—everything in its own place. Here work people, mainly women, in snow-white caps bristling with starch.

A letter by one worker of the Center was published once by the local "Vecherka" [newspaper]: "I am a native of the 19th Installation, I have lived here for 26 years. No, I am not an ardent patriot, there are no military among my relatives, but what other enterprise can boast of such..."
a production area, such as exists in no sanatorium? When I arrive at my installation—only here do I breathe deeply, safe from the asphixiating gases of my native Sverdlovsk-Yekaterinburg."

I, too, am ready to subscribe to these words.

**Why It Is Not Liked**

However the name of the 19th Installation has changed (first it was the Scientific Research Institute for Vaccine Preparations, then, after certain events, the Military Epidemiology Sector of the Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and now the above named center), its main task has always been the same: to maintain biological defense of buildings, military material and the population in the event of a biological warfare attack. But here is the paradox—this task is not even asking but demanding: "Rid us of this 'defense'. Remove the facility from the town immediately!"

A wave of dissatisfaction with the military in white [lab coats] swept over the town in 1990-1991, when a series of publications containing accusations against the microbiologists rolled through the central newspapers like an angry breaker: Death had come to the Sverdlov residents not from infected cows but from the laboratories of the military installation. It remained only to be demonstrated. But that was exactly the hardest thing to do—at that time the KGB tried its hardest. The deputies, however, were inclined to tell the people the truth and force the guilty institution to pay compensation to the relatives of the deceased. Inquiries were made to all the highest authorities. And responses were obtained including even one from Yazov, who is now awaiting his hour in the "Matrosskaya Tishina" jail. The head of the defense department echoed that the outbreak of the disease was caused by infected meat. Committees were created at all levels... And everything died down.

True, a commission of the Russian parliament is threatening to study the anthrax incident, but it hasn't convened yet. And around the 19th Installation new rumors are spreading, inspired by the impending construction of a plant there to manufacture promising antibiotics. And although the command swears that ecologically clean production is planned, the people don't believe it. After all, how many times have they been deceived? "Is it possible," remains Mikhailovitch tries to make his point, "that in all this time not one of the residents of the settlement over which the 'orange cloud' allegedly dispersed has been injured in his kitchen garden? After all, everything was supposed to have settled on the soil. But there aren't any complaints, are there?"

Anatoliy Mikhailovitch doesn't live in America and knows very well that our doctors write diagnoses as directed: What does it matter to them—acute respiratory disease or anthrax? Am I being insulting? Not at all—in the beginning that was the diagnosis: death from pneumonia. But when the pneumonia struck tens and hundreds of people..." "No, there was no discharge," asserts the author of an anthrax vaccine unique in Siberia, candidate of medical science Nikolay Vasilevich Sadovo, looking me straight in the eye with his honest gaze. "If there had been, the outbreak would have lasted not a month and a half, but a week at most. But I favor specialists studying the question and removing what are doubtlessly futile emotional gestures by the press against us."

Do you sense it? They started on a positive note and towards the end the righteous anger died out.

**And All the Same There Is a Reason to Like Them**

"Conversion?" Lobur thinks for a minute. "This word somehow doesn't apply very well to us. After all, we never were a VPK (military industrial complex) that worked on war. We always worked on defense."

Nonetheless the process that has seized all of "defense" is going on in the 19th Installation visibly or invisibly. The sharp drop in budgetary financing is forcing the military scientists to search for means for existence. And that means—coming out from underground, opening up to the surrounding world and working with it. Today the Center of Military Technical Problems of Biological Defense is ready to offer—I carefully studied their catalog—more than 70 services to the civilian population starting with disinfection of hospitals, pharmacies, and food industry enterprises and ending with participation in solution of ecological problems of the town and oblast.

Much of what the specialists of the 19th Military Installation are doing strikes the imagination. For example, a method of eliminating contamination of water and soil, and spills of fuel oil and other oil products, developed jointly with scientists from the Tyumen Petroleum and Gas Institute. Microorganisms are placed in a vessel containing a fairly thick layer of fuel oil, certain conditions are created—and in three weeks (depending on the thickness of the layer) the fuel oil has disappeared. In "eating" it, the microorganisms give off proteins that fish are glad to feast on.

Or here is a big problem in the CIS—destruction of chemical weapons. Attempts to build special plants have stumbled over protests of the "Greens": One way out is, again, microorganisms. On the eve of my arrival in the installation a conference took place on this issue with participation by tens of military and civilian departments. It seems that a way has been found. And the same principle will be used—a microorganism placed in a medium of a chemical substance will eat it and as a result itself die. One-hundred percent purity and much lower expenses.

I admit that I left the installation with a different attitude than when I arrived. I regret one thing: The innuendos and the long concealment of the truth have resulted in mutually unacceptable relations between those who, to the contrary, should have the greatest trust in each other—the residents of the surrounding area and the workers of the military scientific center. After all, such
centers exist throughout the world. And they are not hated and feared, solely because of a constant stream of reliable information on such centers. It rids people of conjectures and leaves no grounds for fear. It's time for us to live by these principles.

“Green” Activists Suspect Removal of BW Equipment From Aral Sea Site

92P60201A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian No 61, 28 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Irina Nevinnaya: “Island of Degeneration”]

[Text] Were biological weapons tested in the Aral Sea? The “greens” categorically assert, “Yes.” A frank dialogue with the military is apparently yet to come.

In the middle of the last century, during one of the expeditions around the Aral Sea a Russian naval officer A. Butakov discovered an unknown, uninhabited island. The discoverers named it Konstantin Romankov in honor of Prince Konstantin Romankov, president of the Russian Geographical Society. Soon the sailors saw yet another island, a scrap of dry land, and named it in honor of the Russian Emperor Nicholas. The third to be drawn on the map was Naslednik [Heir] Island.

When did Nikolay Island become Vozrozhdeniya? It is hard to say. But what is known for sure is that after the war a special, secret life began. Lost in the sea far from populated shores, scoured by the sun, devoid of freshwater, the island was uninhabited and attracted neither fishers nor sailing enthusiasts. But on the other hand, it would be harder to find a better place for organizing a regular military proving ground. Flat terrain, remoteness from curious eyes. What the military was doing on the island remained a secret behind seven seals.

Only occasionally did the Aral region inhabitants and shepherds, and geologists, geographers, biologists working on expeditions, become witnesses of unpleasant and hard-to-explain events. At times in clear, dry weather, clouds, now yellow, now black, approached from the direction of the sea. It became hard to breathe. People took shelter in their houses and yurts. Some became ill.

The secret island was studied by the international public committee “Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan”. And while previously all the fragmentary stories about the small scrap of land had sounded more like a gloomy legend, the committee members—scientists and public figures, not only collected witnesses' testimony but also tried to document it.

Thus, in 1976, a massive die-off of fish occurred in the Aral Sea. By that time the ecological conditions in the region were undergoing severe deterioration. The sea was becoming shallow, the composition of the water was changing. But the fish rotted not only at unsafe sites—where the water was polluted with runoff from chemicalized rice fields. They also died where the sea remained essentially healthy. The true cause was not determined at that time. And perhaps it was decided not to make it public?

In June 1989, a heavy smog hung over the Aral region. The same summer outbreaks of plague were noted in the region. A mysterious disaster also befell sheep—entire flocks lost their wool. The bald sheep died.

A year earlier, in May 1988, still another tragedy occurred. On the Turgay steppe (to the north-east of the Aral Sea) in one hour approximately one half million saiga [antelopes] dropped dead. A disease overcame the animals suddenly, when spring was in full swing, when food and water are plentiful and the undemanding steppe dwellers feel very healthy. The ground was covered with saiga carcasses. The fact of the mass death was concealed from the public. The dead saiga were buried by bulldozers and ploughed under by tractors. And it was the military who did this. A commission that arrived from the center—it also included men in shoulder boards—did an on-the-spot “investigation” and made a diagnosis—the saiga had died from an intestinal infection.

The reassuring explanation was hard to believe. For many years the military had answered all questions and inquiries regarding the proving ground on Vozrozhdeniya Island in the negative: They said that biological weapons had never been tested on the territory of the republic. And, by the way, they weren't lying. The fact of the matter is that the command of military unit 25484, based on the island, is located in Aralsk on the territory of Kazakhstan, and the proving ground itself is on the part of the island that belongs territorially to Karakalpakstan.

Finally publications appeared abroad. It became impossible to remain silent. In response to an inquiry by the president of the public committee “Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan”, poet and public figure M. Shakhnov, came a letter signed by then Defense Minister D. Yazov and former Atomic Industry Minister V. Konovnlov. The letter said, “With respect to information on the tests of biological weapons allegedly conducted on Vozrozhdeniya Island in the Aral Sea, we inform you that the Soviet Union has signed and strictly observes the Convention of 1972 on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons. A field scientific research laboratory of the USSR Ministry of Defense's Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology, which engages in testing of defensive means against biological weapons, is located on Vozrozhdeniya Island”.

How should this be understood? Using elementary logic, if defensive means against biological weapons had really been tested on the island, is it possible to conduct such studies without the agent itself? And if field tests of biological or chemical weapons were conducted here up to 1972, then terminated under the international agreement, why not say so honestly?
In 1990, an international commission from UNESCO visited the Aral area in order to analyze conditions in the region. The authorities prepared for the meeting in advance. Food and extremely attractive consumer goods appeared in the stores. And on the shore of the sea, which had receded into the distance, and on its salt-saturated, dried out bottom, for a few brief days green parks appeared. Saplings were hurriedly stuck into the sick earth. Who cared that in a couple of weeks they turned into dessicated skeletons?...

People's Deputy M. Shakanov gave a speech at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the republic of Kazakhstan and called on the government to terminate the existence of the proving ground on Vozrozhdenyi Island, calling it "Vozrozhdenyi [Degeneration] Island". The session supported him, making the appropriate appeal to the military. Three months passed, but the "masters" of the island have remained silent.

What is more, literally several days ago the international public committee received a telegram from Aralsk sent by the head of the administration of Aral Rayon in Kyzyl-Ordinsk Oblast, B. Kayupov. It said that on 7 March a "convoy" heading from military unit 25484 had been detained. An attempt had been made to "evacuate" heavy-freight trucks, tractors, tank trucks and other equipment. The "green" fear that the specific, secret equipment may have already been dismantled and shipped out.

In my opinion, we should strive for publication of the documents showing the scientific activities of the laboratory on the island and of the parent organization—the Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology of the USSR Ministry of Defense. And not only that: the laboratory was not the only one to have engaged in development of biological weapons and, of course, the proving ground on Vozrozhdenyi Island is also far from being the only one in the former Soviet Union.

Chemical Weapons Storage, Destruction Assessed

PM1404133192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Apr 92 Single Edition p 7

[Interview with Major General Igor Yevstafyev, deputy chief of Chemical Troops, by Andrey Abrosimov and Mikhail Gusev, under the "Military Policy" rubric; place and date not given: "Poor Man's Nuclear Bomb Could Make Us Slightly Richer"—first four paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Five years ago we admitted to the world that we have chemical weapons. But even after that, the closely guarded secret facilities still remained out of bounds to the press. But who in Saratov Oblast did know about Shikhany and Gorny, or in Udmurtia about Kambarka, or in Kaliningrad about the ammunition graveyard at the bottom of the sea? The principle was simple: It does not matter what kind of conjectures citizens indulge in, provided the press keeps quiet.

But times are changing. We are the first people that the military-chemical leadership has allowed to visit secret facilities with a tape recorder and camera.

...The depots are like depots. It is just that the tanks and drums contain millions of potentially agonizing deaths. But the people working here are not suicidal. It is their children who live closest to the dangerous place, while their wives work beyond the checkpoint, behind rows of barbed wire. The roads here are crumbling, the stores are empty, there is not enough housing—these are the "privileges" of the chemical warfare complex. The wages are yesterday's, the prices are today's. Business happily welcomes them—they are educated, efficient, and know how to give and take orders. Many are leaving. Some are joining the ranks of the unemployed.

Truly, measuring the thickness of drums of chemical agents day in and day out and "probing" the air, water, and ground next to depots is not the most entertaining of occupations...

The questions we brought from the military facilities were answered for us by Major General Igor Yevstafyev, deputy chief of Chemical Troops for scientific work, who is a doctor of technical sciences, a professor, and a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Igor Borisovich, if we did not bring chemical weapons into service and, as is being said, did not even intend to do this, why did we obtain and accumulate them and, in short, spend a fair amount of money on them? Incidentally, how much of this commodity have we got? Who, apart from us, possesses them?

[Yevstafyev] It was precisely the presence of chemical weapons in our country that prevented Germany from using them against us. It is the so-called deterrent factor. The 1925 Geneva Convention bans the use of chemical weapons. Yes, it was signed by almost all countries, but with provisos—those possessing such weapons reserve the right to a retaliatory strike.

Russia, the United States, and Iraq possess them indisputably. But, according to informational data, something like 20 countries have or could have chemical weapons. After all, they do not represent anything complex from the production viewpoint. Not for nothing were they previously called the poor man's nuclear bomb.

You ask what quantity of chemical agents is possessed by countries armed with a chemical warfare capability? Iraq has little compared with others, but even UN experts cannot ascertain exactly how much. The Americans have 32,000 tonnes. We have 40,000.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Is that a lot or a little—40,000 tonnes?

[Yevstafyev] Quite sufficient to conduct a large-scale chemical war.
[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] If so, are we really continuing to produce them today?

[Yevstafiev] The Soviet Union officially announced the ending of their production in 1987, and I say with utmost responsibility: Since that time not a single piece of ammunition has been produced.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Tell me, was this veto on production imposed by us unilaterally?

[Yevstafiev] The Americans also did not produce chemical weapons over a number of years—from 1967 through 1987. But then they resumed. The production of binary weapons, moreover.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] What about them, do they have their own “advantages”?

[Yevstafiev] They are safer to handle because they consist of two inert components which become a weapon only at the moment of firing or bomb release.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] And do we not have these “safe” weapons?

[Yevstafiev] We do not have stockpiles, but any country with chemical production capability could have the production potential. Even Iraq has it.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] What types of chemical agents is our Army armed with?

[Yevstafiev] Mainly organophosphorous agents; they constitute approximately two-thirds of our stockpiles. They are sarin, zaman [as transliterated], and V-x. They are loaded into missiles, cannon and rocket artillery shells, and aviation bombs, and there are airborne spray instruments. One-third of our stockpiles is made up of lewisite, a chemical agent of prewar times containing arsenic. That was precisely when it was mainly produced. We also have a small quantity of mustard gas and its lewisite compounds.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] What do the Americans, with whom we have usually maintained parity, have?

[Yevstafiev] They have a relatively large amount of mustard gas but no lewisite.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Do they envy us?

[Yevstafiev] No, they do not, the substances are on par with each other.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Talks have been going on in Geneva, for almost 20 years now, on the elaboration of a multilateral convention banning chemical weapons as such. Including their development [razrabotka]....

[Yevstafiev] As of today not a single document bans this. Strange as it may seem, even the multilateral convention which does indeed provide for a ban on the development of chemical weapons does not give a definition of the term “development” itself. Let me remind you of 1945, when the atomic bomb was dropped on Japan. Neither the population nor even the Japanese physicists could not understand what had happened. It is terrible when science in a state lags so far behind that it ceases to understand the processes going on in other countries. That is why the multilateral convention contains a section on “Permitted Activity.” Under it, a state is entitled to monitor the development of chemical, biological, and other sciences in the world in order to devise protection measures.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] That is, it is entitled to engage in espionage?

[Yevstafiev] You will not achieve anything by spying here. It is much more advantageous to have your own laboratories and your own scientists who are capable of forecasting and evaluating. Chemical weapons are easily made, and God knows who will have them tomorrow. There is not, and there cannot be a guarantee that all countries would sign a multilateral convention. Even if all chemical weapon stockpiles were destroyed the world will not rid itself of the danger of their reappearance. Including new types of them.

Monitoring the absence of stockpiles of them is quite easy. Monitoring the presence of production of binary weapons is by an order of magnitude harder, although possible in principle. But how can nondevelopment be monitored? There will ultimately be a convention, therefore we too must reorganize ourselves accordingly, which includes activity permitted by the convention.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] The agreement the year before last with the Americans, signed by the two presidents, can be considered the first step toward it. Why, in your view, has it not been ratified yet?

[Yevstafiev] Previously chemical weapons were associated with a number of secrets subject to special protection. As regards nuclear weapons, materials were published and possible doctrines were talked about, but everything regarding chemical weapons was kept well under wraps. The bilateral Soviet-U.S. agreement set the aim of making it easier to find out about each other’s potentials. I cannot say that the series of “barter” visits to each other’s military facilities yielded much, but it is believed that the sides, by exchanging information on the overall volume of weapons stockpiles, started to understand each other more clearly.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] But did the treaty with the Americans not envisage the destruction of stockpiled chemical agents rather than familiarization with them?

[Yevstafiev] Yes, the sides were due to begin chemical weapons destruction no later than 1992. And by 1995 they were to have a destruction capacity in the order of 1,000 tonnes per year. They agreed to destroy all their stockpiles by 2002, leaving 3,000 tonnes each as a sort of safety margin.
It seems to me that one of the reasons why this agreement was not submitted for ratification in our country is our technical unpreparedness. Political decisions clearly outstripped reality.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] You cannot say that about the Americans...

[Yevstafyev] The bulk of their chemical weapons was produced some 20 years ago. Here they utilized light alloys for the manufacture of ammunition and their weapon casings were thinner, which we, it must be said, envied. But now they have come up against the fact that their stockpiles have lost their operating efficiency and the question of storage became critical. They must be destroyed. We will be in the same situation in about 30 years—because we finished production five years ago, our weapons are the latest. But the Americans are fine fellows—they very skillfully turned their technical problem into an international political problem. They forced us to spend money on destroying chemical weapons at such an economically hard time.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] And a lot of money which we do not have will be needed?

[Yevstafyev] Under the state program, 5.4 billion rubles [R] plus $146 million.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Is storage cheaper?

[Yevstafyev] In order to ensure that our stockpiles are maintained in a safe condition we need around R50 million per year. True, at last year's prices.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] So if we wait 30 years this money will have gone to waste—either way money will have to be spent on destruction.

[Yevstafyev] I am not urging that we wait 30 years. But let us get to grips with the technologies by which we will do this. Unlike the United States, we do not even have the legislation which would determine all questions on destruction: How, in what time spans, what benefits will the population derive, what will be gained by the regions where destruction will be carried. Nobody is going to agree voluntarily to having a test site located in his own backyard. It is always a potentially dangerous facility, always a definite risk. Moreover, the country's economy must get on its feet if only in a very small way.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] But was a chemical weapons destruction program not actually devised by the Ministry of Defense two years ago? Surely it clearly outlined all these problems?

[Yevstafyev] It was. It was submitted to the former USSR Supreme Soviet. It envisaged the construction of plants. It also mentioned the costs—around R4 billion. The construction site was chosen without ceremony at the time. Chapayevsk was chosen (assigned). I think it was a mistake. Even without us, there is an uncomfortable ecological situation there, there is simply nothing to breathe. But the plant was constructed. When the situation in the country changed abruptly, a government commission on the spot decided: That's it, we are closing it! The very modern plant did not work for even a day!

The program suffered the same fate. It fell through later, before the end of the year, no decisions were adopted on it. At the end of 1990 Gorbachev issued a resolution in accordance with which the task of amending the program and submitting it to the Cabinet of Ministers was set. We did this by 9 May. Since then no decisions on it have been adopted. Nobody wants to make them.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] You military personnel are being accused of being solidly in favor of absolute destruction instead of processing the lewisite to obtain arsenic, and consequently profit.

[Yevstafyev] That is just an insult. We always struggled against the "favorite" Ministry of the Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry to ensure that raw materials were not destroyed thoughtlessly. Because they believed that it is easier to melt them with sulfur and bury the waste. From the ecological viewpoint this is simply terrible. Every tonne of lewisite yields nine tonnes of waste containing arsenic, which additionally have to be buried somewhere forever. We have said time and again in the press that the technology making it possible to isolate scarce pure arsenic is available. In Gorny, incidentally, they handed over their test site for experiments. Scientists simply did not see this work through to the end. However, the Americans do not have the advanced technology in this instance, either. But they are very interested in it.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Igor Borisovich, we visited Gorny and we were taken around the storage facilities which have been there since postwar times, and we saw for ourselves that the 10-mm tank casings are getting thinner by only 0.1 mm per decade, an ideal standard. But all the same, there is no absolute guarantee of safety?

[Yevstafyev] The probability of even a localized accident is 10 to the power of minus four. For comparison: The probability of a Moscow Oblast inhabitant dying from unnatural causes is greater by a whole order of magnitude. Our facility can even improve on this, but not with the current financing.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Life is now such that there would be no harm in insuring such a tank against a machine-gun burst...

[Yevstafyev] Our people do take out insurance. By our estimates, incidentally, the probability of such a situation is 10 to the power of minus eight. If you are interested, the probability of a meteorite falling on our facility is 10 to the power of minus 15. Yes, a 50-tonne capacity tank is not the best method of storage. For two years we have been trying to get money allocated for the
construction of a deactivation terminal [terminal rass-naryazheniya]—because our liquids cannot be poured by hand into modern tanks. There is no money. There are plans.

[ROSSIIYSKAYA GAZETA] Since you have agreed to be frank, can you name all the chemical weapons storage centers on Russian territory?

[Yevstafyev] We have named them for the Americans, but I cannot name them for you. It is not a question of not being frank but simply of ensuring that probability does not drop to 10 to the power of minus two instead of 10 to the power of minus eight. The world is not without stupid people, and there are plenty of people seeking weapons.

[ROSSIIYSKAYA GAZETA] But there has been information that major chemical weapons depots are located in Azerbaijan, in the combat operations area...

[Yevstafyev] A false alarm. All chemical weapons are located on Russian territory alone. All stockpiles of chemical agents likewise. But there are two provisos. I do not rule it out that somebody may possibly have chemical weapons in the so-called hot spots. And second: Chemical weapons do not include so-called irritants—temporarily disabling agents widely used nowadays for self-defense: gas canisters, revolvers, and pistols.

[ROSSIIYSKAYA GAZETA] Were chemical weapons used in Afghanistan?

[Yevstafyev] Ours were not. But others’ were.

[ROSSIIYSKAYA GAZETA] Who is currently in control of chemical weapons?

[Yevstafyev] The CIS Joint Armed Forces. Recently President Yeltsin signed a decree setting up a special Russian Government committee which was made responsible for all convention questions on chemical weapons.

[ROSSIIYSKAYA GAZETA] Have the chemical weapons of the military units which were on duty outside Russia and the USSR been returned to Russia?

[Yevstafyev] They were never issued to troops at all. Chemical troops and chemical weapons are being identified completely erroneously. These troops are engaged in anything you like except chemical weapons. Only scientific research structures deal with chemical weapons.

[ROSSIIYSKAYA GAZETA] Does the chemical warfare complex face a problem similar to the “nuclear” complex problem—the “brain drain,” advantageous contracts for scientists from countries desperate to have modern chemical weapons?

[Yevstafyev] They have not been encountered so far. Although in order to make nuclear weapons, evidently hundreds and thousands of people have to leave, but in order to make chemical weapons just a dozen is sufficient.

[ROSSIIYSKAYA GAZETA] Igor Borisovich, your forecast: When will our country nevertheless begin chemical weapons destruction and when will we be able to record this fact in writing and visually?

[Yevstafyev] Approximately 10 years from the moment the decision is made and the finances for the construction of destruction facilities are allocated. By our estimates, we will be able to destroy all our organophosphorus in one powerful plant or two regional ones. Plus, a separate plant is needed to process lewisite. Roughly speaking, the figures are 3,000 tonnes of arsenic at $5,000 per kilogram. A total of $15 billion. Thus the poor man’s nuclear bomb could make us slightly richer.

Yeltsin Signs Decree on Biological Weapons

OW/1504183692 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1553 GMT 15 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree guaranteeing enforcement of international responsibilities in the area of biological weapons which the Russian Federation claims, in collaboration with the convention on the ban on development and accumulation of stocks of bacteriological and toxic weapons, and on their destruction. Yeltsin put control on enforcement of the convention on the committee on conventional problems of chemical and biological weapons.

Military Expert on Chemical Weapons Elimination

LD/1704231392 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 17 Apr 92

[Text] President Yeltsin has issued a decree on establishing a special committee on chemical and biological weapons. The committee is supposed to coordinate preparations for the elimination of chemical weapons. A leading military expert on the problem, chief of the Department of Chemical Arms within the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces, Col. Viktor Kholstov told our reporter [in Russian, fading into English translation]:

The Russian Government is now getting ready to scrap chemical weapons. On instructions from Vice Premier Yegor Gaydar, several Russia’s [as heard] ministries and departments, together with officials from the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, have prepared a joint decision on priorities in preparation for scrapping chemical weapons and have worked out a draft decree of Russia’s Government. The preparations for scrapping chemical weapons include first of all setting up a special commission to determine in three months where to locate the scrapping facilities. Russia is likely to bear the
brunt of the program since all the stores of chemical weapons are located on its territory.

According to the 1990 Soviet-American agreement, Russia must begin scrapping its chemical arms on 31 December this year at the latest and the international convention on banning chemical weapons, currently being prepared, provides for their elimination in 10 years. But this is hardly feasible because of Russia's current social, political and economic difficulties. It would be wise to extend the 10-year term. The term provided for by the Soviet-American agreement also needs to be reconsidered. According to Col. Kholstov, there has been no serious incident with chemical weapons over the past 40 years of their storage in stationary containers. This suggests they can be safely stored for about 20 or 30 years more.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Sixth Round of Sino-Russian Border Troop Reduction Talks
LD/504151392 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1335 GMT 15 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Beijing, April 15 TASS—The sixth round of Sino-Russian talks was held in Beijing from March 23 to April 16, 1992, in compliance with the intergovernmental agreement on basic principles to govern the mutual reduction of Armed Forces and confidence-building measures in the military sphere along the Soviet-Chinese border, signed on April 24, 1990.

The sides continued to discuss the key problem on the agenda—components and categories of armaments and hardware subject to reduction, as well as territorial aspects of the future agreement.

The delegations were received by Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei and Deputy Chief of the Chinese general staff Colonel-General Xu Xin. A tour was organised for the guests to the Nanjing military area.

The next round of the talks will be held in Moscow.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Kazakh Need for Nuclear Weapons Pondered
92AP0111A Alma-Ata ZHAS ALASH in Kazakh
19 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Nurmakhan Orazbekov, journalist, distinguished Kazakhstan cultural worker: "What Need Do We Have for a Weapon We Will Never Use?"]

[Text] Some foreign press media have spread an idle report to the effect that: "Oh Woe! Kazakhstan is selling components of nuclear weapons to outsiders." President Nazarbayev's press service has denied the report. The president himself has announced that nuclear weapons are positioned in the territories of the Republic of Kazakhstan, but that the republic will participate in all agreements and processes to reduce them.

Views have been published in several republican newspapers in connection with these events, and the preponderance comes to the conclusion that "Kazakhstan needs nuclear weapons." I cannot but make my views known on this question, on the one hand as a journalist who has been somewhat involved with the political aspects of nuclear weapons, and on the other as a citizen concerned about the fate of my country, of my people. It should be borne in mind that these views are not the views of the editors of the paper, but are my own ideas alone.

...It was at the very last General Congress of the Communist Party (today there are citizens attempting to rebuild the Communist Party, but I think that the party they form will be altogether new, a parliamentary party which will propagandize the Communist heritage). After a long, heroically pompous speech stirring up the masses and saying nothing, the majority of the delegates discussed a proposal to restructure the Communist Party as the Socialist Party, and began to discuss the platform report. Only one thing was lacking in the useless document, precision. As a result, various suggestions were advanced. I offered, as one of the many suggestions offered, the suggestion that the new party announce that it would struggle to make Kazakhstan a nuclear-free region. However, this suggestion was not accepted, under the pretext of "present circumstances."

At that time one of my old friends suddenly said: "the Semey polygon has in fact been closed."

This is not a question of the Semey polygon. I recalled to mind something I noticed in 1970 in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Washington, and other cities in the United States. There was a map of the Soviet Union hanging in front of many movie theaters, and the only thing shown on the map was our country's rocket bases. Two points were shown in Kazakhstan, Bayorgy, and Saryshaghan. In the twenty years since then I have heard nothing else about the intercontinental ballistic missiles based in Kazakhstan. However, I cannot say that there were no intercontinental ballistic missiles based in Kazakhstan during the twenty years since 1970. I was thinking of this when I made my proposal to declare Kazakhstan a nuclear-free region.

According to the estimates of specialists, there are 27,000 nuclear warheads located in the territories of the former Soviet Union. Leaving aside the question of the nuclear weapons of other countries, these warheads alone are altogether capable of destroying the planet several times over in a cataclysm. The popular proverb says: "A thousand die, a thousand are born." However, the face of the earth would be destroyed not a thousand times, but only once. It would not be able to come back to life.
I remember 21 December in this connection. The heads of 11 countries had just signed a treaty on the establishment of a Commonwealth of Independent States, and now hordes of journalists were waiting upon the words of the heads of state in the great hall of the White House. Nursultan Nazarbayev said, in answer to a question about the fate of nuclear weapons: "In order not to increase the confusion, I ask that my assistants present the treaty we have signed."

We in turn devoted our attention to that treaty signed by the heads of the four countries: Nuclear weapons making up part of the unified strategic forces will guarantee the common security of the members of the Commonwealth. Countries participating in the treaty each obligate themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In agreement with the president of Russia, it was decided that until nuclear weapons stationed in the territories of Belarus and Ukraine are destroyed, there is a need to maintain the weapons. Nuclear weapons are to be given to none. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine are not opposed to transferring nuclear weapons to the territory of the Russian Republic so that they can be destroyed. They will guarantee delivery of tactical nuclear weapons to the appropriate bases for dismantling by 1 July, 1992. These alone are the essential practical measures of the treaty.

If you look at the agreement, there is nothing about nuclear weapons (not including tactical nuclear weapons) located in Kazakhstan. However, it means nothing at all that we will not use tactical nuclear weapons against ourselves, or against our kinsmen in China. That is what the range of the weapons is. We might get nuclear weapons used at average ranges as far as Saryozek. Thus what is left are strategic weapons, that is to say, intercontinental ballistic missiles with their warheads. That is why there is a statement about unified strategic forces included in the treaty under discussion.

There's the rub. What, after all, are the targets of the forest of strategic nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan? Here one does not need to be an expert. The targets are the countries once considered enemies of the Soviet Union, that is, the United States and the countries of Europe and Asia. This is what we mean when we say in the above-mentioned treaty that we will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. And who is going to be the first to use such fearful weapons? This was something the Soviet Union long ago obligated itself not to do. Is the United States going to? And what about France and Britain? No, they also have obligated themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

While on his trip, and before going to the United States and France, Russian President Boris Yeltsin reported that our rockets can no longer aim at the cities of the mentioned countries as before, and that the rockets are aimed only at the silos hiding American and French rockets, and at military objectives. There is great mystery in this statement. We will touch on it again somewhat later.

In this connection, why have we armed ourselves to fight to the death, to compete? Why have we squandered our funds in competition with the American government, exhausting our economy, unable to raise the weight of the club that is attached to our belt? In particular, why have we armed ourselves with nuclear weapons? Here, in order not to take things out of the blue, or to appear too knowledgeable about the armaments sector, it is appropriate to rely on the views of foreign experts. Stalin is supposed once to have said to a minister who was rejoicing at the news of the successful testing of a Soviet atomic bomb: "Stupid man, you don't understand anything. Now there will be no war." And when U.S. President Truman heard about the testing of the hydrogen bomb: "Now we have begun to enter an era which has the capacity to destroy humanity....War in the future will mean that we will have the capacity to destroy millions of lives in a twinkling by the action of a single person, to wipe great cities from the face of the earth....It will mean that we will have the capacity to destroy civilization itself. Such wars are not possible in the view of intelligent, moral human beings." During the middle of the 1950s, the English became split into two groups, of "pessimists" and "optimists." Whereas the "pessimists" lamented that it would take only three bombs to destroy England, the "optimists," we are sad to say, offered the advice that as many as six bombs would be needed to destroy it. Judging from this, it was clear and obvious to all sides that nuclear weapons cannot be used. In spite of this, the armaments race continued until quite recently. Why? Was it, as some commentators have said, solely the fault of the Soviet Union? Distinguished American politicians and specialists Robert MacNamara (one-time secretary of defense), Karl Kauzen, and George Radjens have said: "Both with us (the United States) and them (the Soviet Union), the very factors which have multiplied the numbers of nuclear weapons are powerful ideological influences upon social concepts, the view that the enemy is the den of iniquity, the secrecy of the Soviet Union and the size of its own nuclear arsenal and its complete overestimation of its potential, along with America's own feelings of technological superiority." There is no need to add anything at all to this.

After the above-mentioned agreement was made public, I exchanged views on the theme with various friends and colleagues. Most approved of the republic having nuclear weapons, "under present circumstances."

But, my friends, I said to them: First of all, we cannot use nuclear weapons. Second, keeping nuclear weapons means that those weapons become a target. Third, one characteristic of nuclear weapons is that they are not aimed against the military, but against cities where people are concentrated. (In this connection we should recall to mind the words of Yeltsin above. There are experts who think that intercontinental ballistic missiles, all in all, justify themselves only for striking cities of a
million people. American missiles are designed in this way and are made with ranges of 10,000 kilometers.) That is to say, the ballistic missile is primarily a weapon directed against the common people. However, who are more numerous in our cities, Kazakhs or others? If such is the case, whom are we trying to impress, whom to awe?

Let us now look at something else. Those saying that Kazakhstan must retain nuclear weapons first and foremost seem to be those who see danger from Russia. "Should not small countries such as our own, which have just achieved their independence, be a little careful about such giants as Russia?" they ask. And if I myself do not believe that Russia is a nuclear threat to Kazakhstan (I have, to be sure, already given one reason for this above), let us consider for a moment whether or not there is any basis to my colleagues' fears. Also, if this is so, can strategic nuclear weapons defend Kazakhstan? They cannot. One reason, already mentioned above, is the range of ballistic missiles and the ethnic composition of our cities. A second primary reason is that on the day that the president of the republic gave permission (God forbid) for these missiles to be used either to awe enemies or for defense, he could not use them. There is only one reason, the key needed to launch the missiles is in the hands of Yeltsin and Shaposhnikov.

Thus, does Kazakhstan need nuclear weapons? No! What use is there in wearing clubs we cannot raise? This is a question which emerges from even a rough consideration of the losses which keeping them in the republic will entail.

The view of my colleagues that "Kazakhstan has suffered imponderable loss due to the building of nuclear weapons; therefore Kazakhstan has the right to keep such weapons," has taken hold widely. At first glance, the view seems justified. This is because there have been 467 nuclear explosions in Kazakhstan, according to official reports. Of them, some 124 were air explosions during the years 1949-1963, and 343 were underground blasts. The destructive power of the explosions of the first 14 years alone exceeded that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima by 2,500 times. During a ten-year period (1975-1985) in Semey Oblast alone, the incidents of deaths from cancer due to increased numbers of white blood cells grew seven times. Incidence of respiratory illnesses doubled. Ignoring the effects of other illnesses arising due to nuclear explosions, it suffices to mention that one-sixth of the three million persons living in areas near the nuclear testing area, that is to say, 500,000 persons, have been harmed by radiation from the blasts. However, the most frightening thing is that radioactivity has an influence, above all, on the reproductive organs, that is, on DNA. Damaged DNA repeats the damage in the bodies of coming generations. This is particularly noticeable in the third or fourth generations, that is, among grandchildren and great-grandchildren. What kind of influence there will be on subsequent generations, no scientist can say with certainty. These are the official facts.

However, are the conclusions drawn from these facts correct? Are they in accordance with the expectations of the Kazakh people, with the expectations of its future generations, that is to say, with the expectations of Kazakh national preservation? I doubt it. All of those who have explored the above-mentioned facts, so awful that they make our hair stand on end, must avoid nuclear weapons entirely. This is because strategic nuclear weapons are not just weapons of defense, or weapons to awe enemies; they are, above all, targets for nuclear counterstrikes. Such strikes, however, will not be directed at cities, and even if they are directed against nuclear targets, we must bear in mind what the effects will be. To make myself clear, let me give an example, even if it overshades the case. Even if we ignore the numbers of human beings who will be harmed, what about the cattle which will be herded, the crops grown, and the water drunk in a stepppe poisoned for thousands of years? Will the cattle, crops, and water become a death trap? The issue is so obvious, why do you not heed it, my friends? In short, the conclusion that Kazakhstan has "a moral right to have nuclear weapons" is not in terms of the concerns, the future, and the independence of the Kazakh people. My colleagues, whether you choose or not, this is about the complete destruction of the Kazakh people, of turning its future to night. A people which has been destroyed needs no independence. Only a free, liberated people needs it.

What then should we do? Our president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, should declare publicly that Kazakhstan does not need nuclear weapons, and that it will become a nuclear-free zone. Even if we cannot go as far as making such a decision, when we sign disarmament treaties, we should declare that such weapons will be destroyed in Kazakhstan first.

Kazakh Official on Plans for Nuclear Arsenal
NC2104094292 Istanbul TURKIYE in Turkish
10 Apr 92 p 11

[Interview with Erik Maksymovic Asanbayev, chief assistant to the Kazakhstan president, by Servet Kabakli in Alma-Ata; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Kabakli] As Turks of Turacy, we gladly welcomed the Turkic republics' independence. Turkey had the honor "of being the first country to recognize these states." What are you doing to bolster Kazakhstan's independence? [passage omitted] Now Kazakhstan has a very powerful nuclear force, how would you use it?

[Asanbayev] We want to sign the 1968 international disarmament agreement. We favor the small rockets from Kazakhstan being taken to Russia to be destroyed and dismantled, but we oppose sending large rockets to Russia. We want to join that disarmament agreement as a country with a nuclear and atomic force. We have not signed because the United States is saying: "Sign this agreement as a country without a nuclear force."
[Kabakli] It pleases us all that fraternal Kazakhstan has a nuclear force to ensure world peace. What strategy will you follow?

[Asanbayev] If everyone else destroys their atomic bombs, we will follow suit. If international conferences are organized for the destruction of atomic bombs, we will take part as a country possessing such bombs. We know their value in our possession. We never want to enter the ranks of countries which have none. We are maintaining our original position. We know the value of the power we possess. Kazakhstan is the only country with atomic bombs in a 1.3 billion people-strong Islamic world. We will destroy these bombs only when Russia destroys its own nuclear and atomic weapons. As a deterrent and a guarantee of peace, our nuclear force is a guarantee for the Turkic world. That force is at its disposal. America, Britain, and France are helping us because we possess atomic bombs. [Passage omitted]

[In its 11 April issue, under a banner headline, TURKIYE says the Turkish people are proud of Kazakhstan having nuclear weapons. A subhead says: "Our report on fraternal Kazakhstan possessing an 'atomic bomb' pleased our citizens enormously."

[On 12 April, TURKIYE again reports on public reaction to Kazakhstan possessing nuclear weapons, on its front page quoting Professor Dr. Yalcin Sanalan, head of the Turkey's Atomic Energy Organization, saying: "We are ready to cooperate with Kazakhstan" and "We could cooperate technically and scientifically with Kazakhstan—of that we are proud." The paper refers readers to a detailed report on page 13, but the newspaper fails to carry any such article.]

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Nuclear-Free Resolution
LD1504185392 Kiev UKRIFORM Diplomatic Information Service in Russian 1325 GMT 15 Apr 92

["Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on Additional Measures for Providing Ukraine's Acquiring of Nuclear-Free Status"—UKRIFORM headline]

[Text] The Ukraine Supreme Soviet, guided by the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine of 16 July 1990 and the Statement of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on the Nuclear-Free Status of Ukraine of 24 October 1991, which announced Ukraine's intention to adhere in the future to non-nuclear principles and Ukraine's right to control the nonuse of nuclear weapons stationed on its territory;

confirming Ukraine's intention to join the 1968 treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons;

bearing in mind that the Government of the Russian Federation and the command of the Strategic Forces have not created the system to implement, by Ukraine as well, effective technical control over the nonuse of nuclear weapons stationed on its territory envisaged by the 21 December 1991 agreement on joint measures regarding nuclear weapons;

taking into account Ukraine’s great responsibility for the destruction of nuclear warheads transferred from its territory to the territory of the Russian Federation under reliable international control, which must secure the nonuse of nuclear components of these warheads for the repeated production of weapons and a ban on their export to other states;

stressing that the destruction of nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine must be carried out under conditions guaranteeing Ukraine's national security;

considering it necessary to carry out a comprehensive study of the political, economic, financial, ecological and other consequences of the liquidation of nuclear weapons under conditions of Ukraine's independence, resolves:

1. To confirm the course taken by Ukraine for peaceful cooperation with the world community, nonparticipation in blocs, neutrality and adhering in the future to the three nonnuclear principles.

2. To consider it expedient not to transfer tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine until the mechanism of the international control of their destruction has been worked out and implemented with Ukraine's participation.

3. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is to immediately take corresponding measures for providing effective technical control by Ukraine over the nonuse of nuclear weapons stationed on its territory.

4. To recommend that the Ukraine president enter into negotiations with leaders of the nuclear states of the world regarding the complex resolution of issues connected with liquidation of nuclear weapons, taking into account the necessity of putting into effect as soon as possible the 1991 treaty on reduction of strategic offensive arms.

5. That the commissions of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet for issues of defense and state security, foreign affairs, for issues of planning, budget, finances and prices, for issues of developing the main branches of the economy, for issues of ecology and rational treating of nature, with the involvement of specialists from ministries, departments and the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and, if necessary, independent experts, consider in April of this year the entire complex of issues of nuclear disarmament, in particular the economic, financial, ecological, organizational and other aspects of the destruction of nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine, including utilizing their components for peaceful purposes, from the point of view of guaranteeing the security and external political interests of Ukraine.
6. The Government of Ukraine is to submit for ratification by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine the agreement on joint measures regarding nuclear weapons of 21 December 1991 and the agreement between the member-states of the CIS of 30 December 1991 and the agreement between the member-states of the CIS on the status of the Strategic Forces of 14 February 1992.

7. The Ukraine Defense Ministry is to take measures for manning the Strategic Forces, stationed on the territory of Ukraine, with servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

8. The Presidium of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet is charged with control over the implementation of this resolution.


Ukrainian Confirms Nuclear-Free Policy to Baker
LD1504195292 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1700 GMT 15 Apr 92

[From the “Novosti” newscast]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State James Baker met today with Ukrainian Minister of Defense Konstantin Morozov. A broad range of issues was discussed, specifically, policy in the sphere of tactical nuclear arms. Konstantin Morozov confirmed that Ukraine would be a nuclear-free state and that all strategic and tactical nuclear arms stationed on its territory would be destroyed.

Byelarus, Ukraine Nuclear Commitments Outlined
PM1504095992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by Sergey Mushkaterov: “Ukraine and Byelarus Confirm Commitments To Get Rid of Nuclear Weapons. West Is Concerned About Timetable for Fulfilling These Promises”]

[Text] When will the territories of Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan be free of nuclear weapons? This question, which has been temporarily pushed into the background by the Congress of People’s Deputies and the disputes between Ukraine and Russia over the Black Sea Fleet, continues to interest the leaders of foreign states, and not just them. Vyacheslav Kebich, chairman of the Byelarus Council of Ministers, who is in Rome, and Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov, who has held talks in Washington with Pentagon leader Richard Cheney, tried to answer it at least partially.

Byelarus will be a nuclear-free, neutral state, Kebich stated to ITAR-TASS. Our stance on this question is principled and immutable. This means that sooner or later all nuclear weapons situated on Byelarusian territory will be destroyed. The only issue is that the republic does not possess its own means to eliminate them. In the minister’s words, the only such enterprise is in Russia, and Byelarus will wait its turn to withdraw its weapons beyond its borders to be destroyed. Kebich also named an approximate time frame for this operation—two-three years. But as early as this year Byelarus will no longer possess tactical nuclear weapons. Only strategic weapons will remain on its territory, and how fast these are destroyed will in the final analysis depend on Russia, according to Kebich.

Defense Minister Morozov, it would appear, was unceasing in his promises in Washington that Ukraine “will fulfill all its commitments in this sphere.” He described the suspension of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine as temporary; discussions are under way right now, in his words, on “how to carry out the further withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons.” At the same time he stressed that weapons should not simply be passed from one state to another. In his opinion, an international system should be set up to monitor the dismantling and destruction of these weapons. As for the Black Sea Fleet, it should be free of nuclear weapons, Morozov stressed.

Let us give the high-ranking representatives of Byelarus and Ukraine their due for the clarity of their positions as expressed above. The only pity is that it follows from these positions, especially from the Ukrainian minister’s statement, that the process of nuclear disarmament will be dragged out over quite a long period. In view of this, it will not be easy to implement the accords between the CIS “nuclear republics” whereby all tactical nuclear weapons should be transferred to Russia by 1 July this year.

Undoubtedly, possession of nuclear weapons brings a number of benefits to the independent states which emerged after the disintegration of the USSR. Nuclear arsenals apparently raise the status of these countries and give them greater political weight. For example, if Ukraine and Kazakhstan were to take control of the nuclear weapons stationed on their territories, they would at once become the third and fourth most powerful nuclear states in the world. Nuclear weapons could become a trump card which could be used extremely successfully in disputes and conflicts with neighbors.

However, the possible enrollment of the new independent states into the “nuclear club” will endanger all the international efforts aimed at ensuring the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The West, desiring to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, will not in these circumstances embark on large-scale economic aid, without which none of the CIS countries will manage to solve their problems.
U.S. Pressure on Ukraine on Tactical Arms Viewed
PM1604143592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 4

[Sergey Mushkaterov report: “Ukraine Will Shortly Resume Withdrawal of Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Foreign Minister A. Zlenko Asserts”]

[Excerpts] Everything indicates that Ukraine has decided to relax its tough stance on the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from its territory to Russia.

According to a REUTERS report, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko said in Kiev that the withdrawal of these arms, suspended last month, will be resumed over the next few days. There has been no mention of a precise date. [passage omitted]

You get the impression that the change in Ukraine's stance did not come without pressure from the United States, which has directly linked the possibility of granting substantial economic aid to Kiev with the latter's observance of its nuclear disarmament pledges. Typically, Zlenko made his statement while a group of representatives of the U.S. Administration is visiting Kiev.

The West thinks that Ukraine's unyielding position could have seriously complicated the implementation of USSR-U.S. agreements on nuclear arms reduction. REUTERS reports that Ukraine has already said that it would like to take part in future strategic nuclear arms talks as an independent state. There is every indication that Washington would prefer to deal with just one representative of the CIS—Russia.

Yeltsin, Kravchuk Sign Weapons Transfer Accord

Russian Foreign Ministry Announcement
LD1604155892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1545 GMT 16 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Moscow April 16 TASS—Presidents of Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement outlining the order of transportation of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to the Russian industrial warehouses where they will be dismantled and destroyed. ITAR-TASS was told in the Russian Foreign Ministry that the agreement is accompanied by a protocol and an addendum which regulate the process of control over the destruction. The agreement envisages that the weapons will be taken from the territory of the Ukraine by July 1st 1992.

An earlier decision, reached in Alma-Ata in December 1991 stipulated that nuclear weapons from Ukraine as well as from Belarus and Kazakhstan be destroyed by July 1st, but Ukraine suspended the implementation of the treaty in February this year.

The new agreement revitalised hopes that the earlier accords will be fulfilled.

Baker Welcomes Agreement
LD1604181192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1731 GMT 16 Apr 92

[Text] Moscow, April 16 TASS—Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker had a telephone talk on Thursday [16 April]. The Russian side reaffirmed President Boris Yeltsin's course towards support for the government of reforms and expressed gratitude to President George Bush for the understanding of this policy course.

Baker welcomed information that President Yeltsin and President Leonid Kravchuk had signed a package of documents making it possible to resume the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine's territory and the weapons' elimination.

Kozyrev and Baker discussed specific possibilities to overcome the difficulties that have arisen in the path to bringing the strategic arms reduction treaty into force.

The Russian foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state touched upon matters connected with the regime of non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies, raised by a deal between Russia's space agency Glavkosmos and its counterpart in India. The Russian side declared for an immediate holding of a meeting of experts to discuss the problem.

Kozyrev and Baker discussed the complex situation in Afghanistan and reached an understanding on the need to prevent hostile actions against foreign missions in Kabul, against Russia's embassy in Afghanistan, in particular.

Ukraine Reported To Deny Agreement
LD1704194192 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 17 Apr 92

[Text] An agreement on withdrawing nuclear ammunition from Ukraine to the territory of Russia was sent to Kiev some time ago. Following its signing by President Leonid Kravchuk it was returned to us, said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Fedor Shefov-Kovedayev today. According to him, President Boris Yeltsin signed this document on 16 April and thus it has come into force.

Today the press center of the Ukrainian president told a CSTK correspondent that it is not aware of the signing of the agreement. Presidential advisor Nikolay Mikhailchenko then announced that today his country re-embarked on withdrawing tactical rockets from Ukrainian territory.

[Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1900 GMT on 17 April, broadcasts the following brief, related item as part of its “Vesti” newscast: “In our evening edition of ‘Vesti’ we reported that an agreement
on resuming the withdrawal of nuclear missiles from Ukraine was signed. Kiev is denying that report."

**Cranston Praises Byelarusan Nuclear Policy**

*LD1704181692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1938 GMT 16 Apr 92*

[By BELTA correspondent Tatyana Khryapina for ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Minsk April 16 TASS—"I value the stand taken on nuclear weapons by the Byelarusan Republic," American Senator Alan Cranston told BELTA in an interview. He arrived today on a working visit to Minsk, the capital of Byelarus. "The desire of Byelarus to be a non-nuclear zone is a very strong and reliable stand. Byelarussia's stand on human rights also commands respect in our country," he said. Alan Cranston is on a tour of member countries of the CIS.

Chairman of the Byelarusan Supreme Soviet, Stanislav Shushkevich received the American senator today. Among the subjects discussed were questions concerning problems of disarmament and control of the destruction of nuclear weapons.

"The aim of my current visit is not only to hold discussions on nuclear safety. I want to have first hand information on economic problems so that the USA can provide affective aid to republics to overcome their difficulties," the senator said.

**Byelarus Monitoring of Arms Destruction Urged**

*LD1704161192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1525 GMT 17 Apr 92*

[By BELTA-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Minsk, 17 Apr—Acting Byelarusan Defense Minister Petr Chaus thinks that experts from this republic should take part in monitoring [kontrol] the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons being withdrawn from the territory of Byelarus. The acting minister's press secretary told a BELTA correspondent about the military leader's view. According to the press secretary, Petr Chaus thinks that such monitoring will guarantee that few surprises will occur, including the chance of tactical missiles with Byelarusan markings appearing in one of the world's hotspots.

**Nuclear Transfer Controversy Not 'Critical'**

*LD1904130192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 18 Apr 92*

[Commentary by Vadim Solovyev—read by announcer]

[Excerpts] This week, the commander in chief of the Commonwealth allied forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov, went to France on an official visit. Our commentary is by Vadim Solovyev:

The visit of the Commonwealth representative to France appears to be very important for consolidating and adjusting Russia's relations with West European countries. [passage omitted]

The works [the transfer of CIS nuclear weapons to Russian territory] were fully under way when Ukraine announced they should be halted. It took the sides almost two months to handle the situation. The president of Russia and his Ukrainian counterpart have signed a set of documents on tactical nuclear weapons that stipulate the withdrawal of tactical weapons will be completed in terms agreed upon earlier. The situation around strategic nuclear weapons appears to be more complicated. The Ukrainian authorities lately voiced the wish to bear their share of responsibility for carrying out the Soviet-American treaty on reducing strategic weapons. Such approach not only contradicts the course towards nuclear neutrality recently voiced by Ukraine but also runs counter to the documents signed by the heads of the Commonwealth states several months ago.

It looks like Ukraine tries, in such a way, to raise its international prestige, and the example encourages other nuclear Republics of the former Soviet Union—Byelarus and Kazakhstan—to adhere to wait-and-see policy.

The situation, however, must not be seen as critical. A way out will certainly be found since all the sides believe it is necessary to strictly abide by the international treaties on reducing strategic weapons concluded by the former Soviet Union.

**Bessmertnykh on Resisting Nuclear ‘Temptations’**

*LD2004095192 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 19 Apr 92*

[Studio interview with Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh, former USSR foreign minister and president of the Foreign Policy Association, by unidentified correspondent in Moscow; date not given; from the “Itogi” program—live or recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] We asked Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh, former USSR foreign minister and currently president of the Foreign Policy Association, whom we invited to our studio as an expert, to comment on the divide of the Black Sea Fleet by Russia and Ukraine.

[Bessmertnykh] I think that the task which faces all leaders who have these weapons [nuclear weapons] on their territories is to resist a number of temptations, so that this problem would not turn into an insoluble problem of our region, and consequently of Europe and the world. These weapons have one very bad aspect, a quite dangerous aspect. One can develop an addiction to them, like to drugs, which is difficult to cure. That is why
it is not just leaders but also entire nations who get involved in the process of dividing nuclear weapons. It is important to avoid this.

[Correspondent] ...because the super power syndrome may develop here.

[Bessmertnykh] Absolutely right. Some may think that the status of a state which joins a new community of powers could be strengthened by the fact that this state also has nuclear weapons. The error in such calculation is that such an unnatural entry to the nuclear states' club may evoke not so much respect as concern. An instinct of self-preservation may develop at the time when, unfortunately, the relations between the CIS countries are marked with instabilities and complexities. One may think along the following lines: I had better hang on to these weapons so that no one will dare touch me. I think this syndrome is also very dangerous since the presence of the nuclear factor means that elements of force could emerge in relations between the former members of the Soviet Union. This is completely inadmissible.

[Correspondent] Is what you are saying just now the result of the work of your Foreign Policy Association, or, like many call it, a shadow foreign ministry?

[Bessmertnykh] The Foreign Policy Association is not a shadow foreign ministry. We do not lay claims to this role, though we have reached certain heights which the Russian Foreign Ministry, or foreign ministries of other republics are unable to reach for a number of reasons. Intellectual centers, like our association, concentrate their efforts on elaborating concepts and views, which have prospects and offer them up to the political fabric, and then it is up to governments, foreign ministries, parties, or whoever, to accept our work or not.

[Correspondent] In this case, may I ask you a very personal question? Eduard Shevardnadze, who was the president of the Foreign Policy Association before you, and who, incidentally, is also a former foreign minister, has returned to big politics. Will you follow the same path?

[Bessmertnykh] No, I have no such desire at present. I am going through a happy stage in my life. I can think freely and speak freely without being tied up by instructions from above. I am not quite used to this role, but I fully enjoy it and I am quite satisfied with it.

[Correspondent] Thank you, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich.
FINLAND

Russia Urged To Withdraw Troops From Baltics
LD1604221392 Stockholm Radio Sweden in English
2100 GMT 16 Apr 92

[Excerpt] Finland has called on Russia to withdraw its
troops from the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia if Russia wants stability in the region. The
statement was released in Helsinki Thursday at a
meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe. Finland says it is opposed to the presence of
foreign troops in any nation without its agreement.
[passage omitted]

FRANCE

Army To Cut Back on Pluton Missile Deployment
92ES0663B Paris LE MONDE in French 1 Apr 92 p 14

[Article by Jacques Isnard: “French Army Losing Half
Its Pluton Nuclear Missiles”]

[Text] Beginning this summer, the French Army will lose
half of its nuclear artillery regiments, equipped with
Pluton ground-to-ground missiles. This decision, which
reduces that portion of France’s panoply of nuclear
weaponry that is devoted to the so-called final warning
phase of France’s nuclear deterrent policy, does not
affect the Air Force and the Navy. These two branches
have planes armed with air-to-ground nuclear missiles
and capable of carrying out a short-range mission.

Between 1974 and 1977, France gradually formed five
nuclear artillery regiments, each of which, with a
strength of around 1,000 men, can put into action six
launchers erected around the chassis of an AMX-30
tank. These ramps have received a missile, baptized the
Pluton, capable of delivering a 25-kiloton nuclear pay-
load (a power exceeding that of the bomb launched over
Hiroshima) over a range of 150 kilometers. In all, this
force represented 32 launch ramps—these are reload-
able—if to the 30 missiles in the regiments the two other
so-called general reserve batteries are added.

The Pluton has always been presented as a single-shot
weapon of mass-destruction for use against military
targets, to warn a potential aggressor that France is
prepared to use its strategic nuclear weapons (its Mirage
IV bombers, Albion plateau missiles, and missile-
launching nuclear submarines), should the aggressor
continue the action in question.

Unilateral Disarmament Steps

This weapons system has frequently been criticized by
France’s allies, especially Germany, which, forgetting
that the Pluton is mobile, assumed that, should it ever be
called into action, its targets could only be situated on
their territory.

This is why the Army launched the Hades program,
consisting of a ground-to-ground missile mounted in
pairs on a commonplace truck—hence more mobile than
a tank—and having a range of 350 to 500 kilometers.
This missile was to carry a nuclear charge of variable
power but not exceeding 80 kilotons. As originally
planned, the program called for three Hades regiments
(30 launchers for 60 missiles) to replace the five Pluton
units.

Last fall, the president of the Republic decided to
“freeze” the Hades program—for which between 10 and
11 billion francs[Fr] had already been spent—at the level
of 15 launchers. One Pluton regiment—the 15th Artillery
Regiment—was designated to store, at the Suippes
(Marne) camp, the Hades missiles that would be pro-
duced, so that they could not be deployed for operational
use.

According to information published very recently by the
Defense Ministry, it now appears that two additional
Pluton regiments—of the four remaining—will be losing
their nuclear artillery specificity. Beginning this summer,
the 74th Artillery Regiment, based at Belfort (Territoire
de Belfort), is to be converted into a unit equipped with
multiple rocket launchers, which the Army is currently
procuring. And before the end of the year, the 32d
Artillery Regiment, garrisoned at Oberhoffen (Bas-
Rhin), will lose its Plutons and will receive conventional
AUF-1 rapid-fire, 155-mm cannons.

Only two nuclear units will be equipped with the Pluton:
The 3d Artillery Regiment, based at Mailly-le-Camp
(Aube), and the 4th Artillery Regiment, based at Laon
(Aisne).

This reduction of France’s pre-strategic strike arsenal to
half its size is unquestionably part of a policy inspired by
Mr Francois Mitterrand, which consists, from France’s
standpoint, of “accompanying” the nuclear disarm-
ament measures that were decreed during bilateral discus-
sions between the United States and the former USSR
(now the CEI), with unilateral initiatives.

For the moment, only the Pluton, aged 20, is concerned.
In effect, the potential retained within this class of
weapons, so-called final-warning weapons by the French
Air Force and Navy, is not to be touched in 1992. The
Air Force, for its part will continue to have three Mirage
2000-N squadrons (45 planes), which are capable of
firing the ASMP (air-ground medium-range) missile, and
a fourth squadron of Mirage 2000-N’s (15 planes under
the command of the 3d Fighter Wing), capable of firing
the ASMP missile as well as precision-guided air-ground
missiles armed with conventional warheads. As for the
Navy, its ambition remains that of being able to align 50
carrier-borne fighter planes of the Super-Etendard type
modified to use the ASMP missile carrying a 150-kiloton
nuclear charge over distances of from 100 to 300 kilo-
metros, depending on the launch altitude.
Defense Minister on Planned Conventional Forces Cutbacks

PM2204094492 Paris LE MONDE in French
18 Apr 92 p 12

["J.-P. D." report: "Army Restructuring Affects 8,000 Professional Soldiers and 4,750 Civilians"]

[Text] The armed forces restructuring measures announced by Defense Minister Pierre Joxe on Thursday 16 April have prompted numerous reactions from elected representatives and officials in the regions concerned, and from the trade unions representing the Armed Forces’ civilian personnel. In all, 24,000 military (including 16,000 conscripts) and 4,750 civilians are affected by these decisions to disband or regroup units involving 93 districts in France and four in Germany.

It is a “policy of fait accompli” according to the Rally for the Republic speaking through Francois Fillon, its defense representative who, without “casting doubt on the justification for these reforms,” is demanding “the organization of an emergency debate” and calling “emphatically for a detailed and bold plan for the future of our Armed Forces.”

Officials from the regions most affected were less subtle in their judgment, like Jean-Jacques Weber, Union of the Center deputy for le Haut-Rhin: “It is a neutron bomb...to put it in naval warfare terms, Alsace has been hit and sunk.” For Gilles de Robien, (Union for French Democracy) mayor of Amiens, the elimination of the 8th Infantry Division based in Picardie confirms that his city which has not benefited from any decentralization of public services, is being “systematically forgotten and neglected.” Finally, the French Democratic Confederation of Labor’s federation for state establishments and arsenals called a strike for 23 April while the General Labor Confederation “condemns the whole content and form of the Joxe plan which takes the whole defense policy back to the drawing board because of Europe.”

Addressing the National Assembly Defense and Armed Forces Commission on Thursday, the minister said, however, that his ministry was “prepared to shoulder its responsibilities in regional development together with all the relevant state bodies.” “I am not ignoring the local effects which this restructuring will have,” he added.

A delegation for restructuring has been given the task of “studying and implementing all the redevelopment actions appropriate for each installation together with all local partners concerned—local councils, trade unions, social and professional bodies, and the military authorities.” A fund of 80 million francs [Fr] has been allocated to finance these measures. The ministry’s departments expect to have to devote an additional Fr200-500 million to the social management of the restructuring. The implementation of this restructuring will not take place before July 1993, which, Mr. Joxe estimated, is “adequate forewarning.”

The figures provided (8,000 professional soldiers, and 4,750 civilian personnel) include transfers and lost positions. In the latter case, those affected should be able to benefit from training and redeployment measures, the ministry said. There will be cooperation with the trade unions which will have a meeting with Mr. Joxe’s departments on 23 April.

The minister stressed that the changes in our geopolitical environment and especially “the disintegration of the former Soviet empire,” make this restructuring plan vital—the first measures were announced at the end of 1991 and it will be continued until 1996.

In total, he said, the Army should “be reduced by between one fourth and one fifth” of its manpower. The reductions will be smaller for the Air Force whose fleet of planes will eventually be reduced from 450 to 400, and for the Navy which “is specializing its maritime fronts,” with Brest grouping antisubmarine vessels and Toulon the surface fleet. Finally, the General Delegation for Armaments will undergo restructuring to take account of the changed situation in the arms market.

Chief of Staff Views Suspension of Nuclear Tests

PM2204104092 Paris LE MONDE in French
22 Apr 92 p 32

[Unattributed report: “Admiral Lanxade Refers to the Military’s ‘Many Questions’ on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests”]

[Text] In a message to the Armed Forces, Admiral Jacques Lanxade tried to reassure “all those working on the constitution of the nuclear forces or those who man them” about the temporary nature of Mr. Mitterrand’s decision to suspend nuclear tests in 1992. This is the first time that Admiral Lanxade has echoed “the many questions” raised by this presidential initiative, with regard to which the Armed Forces chief of staff took care to explain that it is “a political decision.” In his message, the Armed Forces chief of staff took care not to say that there is any military reason for this decision. “We must,” he said, not without a degree of caution in the wording of his official message, “ensure that the necessary capabilities for the resumption of tests at the end of the suspension decided by the government are maintained at all levels.” “This temporary halt in our tests,” Admiral Lanxade explained, “comes in addition to other unilateral measures already taken by France and bears witness to our policy of restraint in the nuclear arms sphere. If this signal was not understood, if this example was not followed, it is clear that this suspension could not be continued,” beyond 1992. It is known that this suspension of the four planned tests in Polynesia was announced by the prime minister, but was not preceded by detailed consultations with the various general staffs. Since then, the United States and China have announced the continuation of their tests. Only Russia is pursuing the moratorium it has had since 1990.

But sources close to the British intelligence services recently suggested that Mr. Yeltsin had signed a secret decree on 23 February for a possible resumption of tests on an Arctic island next October.
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