[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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Another reason may also account for Akatsuki Maru’s drawing so much attention: According to International Atomic Energy Agency, Japan’s plutonium will reach 850 tons (550 tons produced by itself, 300 tons from France and Britain), while its civil nuclear power stations will use only 40 tons, meaning Japan will have a high reserve of ingredients for nuclear bombs.

To Bypass Panama Canal
OW1211050192 Tokyo KYODO in English 0348 GMT 12 Nov 92


Bravo told reporters in San Jose that he had received confirmation from the Japanese Government that the 4,800-ton vessel would not use the canal nor pass through Costa Rican territorial waters, Mexico’s state-run NOTIMEX news agency reported.

The Akatsuki Maru left France on Saturday with its cargo of one ton of plutonium but its return route to Japan has been kept a secret to prevent terrorist hijacking attempts, according to the Japanese Government.

The ship and its armed escort vessel are being tracked, however, by two tugs from Greenpeace, the international environmental group, which says it will report their progress around the world.

Cited Off Canary Islands
OW1411065892 Tokyo KYODO in English 0344 GMT 14 Nov 92

[Text] London, Nov. 14 KYODO—A Japanese plutonium transport ship was sailing south off the Canary Islands in the Atlantic Ocean, the environmental group Greenpeace said Friday.

The 4,800-ton Akatsuki Maru left France on October 7 with a ton of highly radioactive plutonium bound for Japan. It is escorted by an armed Japanese Maritime Safety Agency patrol boat.

Greenpeace said its chartered ship was shadowing the Akatsuki Maru, which was cruising on a southern track some 1,060 kilometers northwest of the Spanish islands at 4 P.M. Friday.

The Japanese Government has been tight-lipped about the route of the cargo ship for security reasons since it left the port of Yokohama in late August.

The plutonium shipment, reportedly the largest-ever single shipment, has stirred anxiety in many nations whose territorial waters it might pass through because of...
the risk of an accident that would leak radioactivity or of an attack by terrorists who covet the nuclear-weapons grade material.

The plutonium, which was reprocessed from spent nuclear fuel at Japanese nuclear power plants, is for use in Japan's fast breeder nuclear programs.

**Tries To Evade Greenpeace**

**OW1311051592 Tokyo KYODO in English 0126 GMT 13 Nov 92**

[Text] Washington, Nov. 12 KYODO—Japan's plutonium carrier played cat and mouse on the high seas with an environmental group's ship shadowing it Thursday, the skipper of the pursuer said.

Harm Jongman, skipper of the 1,872-ton oceangoing tug Smit New York, said the plutonium carrier, the Akatsuki Maru, and its armed Japanese escort switched off all their lights as they changed course in mid-Atlantic on Thursday night.

"They tried to slip away from us," Jongman said with a chuckle as he described by radio the high seas cat-and-mouse game.

"There is no danger for us. I could see them on the radar. The only thing is that it's not a nice thing to do to switch your lights off at night on the ocean," he told KYODO NEWS SERVICE.

The Akatsuki Maru, a converted freighter with a gross tonnage of 4,800 tons, left France on Saturday with a ton of highly toxic plutonium bound for Japan. It is escorted by an armed Japanese Maritime Safety Agency patrol boat.

Jongman said the Akatsuki Maru and its escort, the 6,500-ton Shikishima, changed course late Thursday night and sailed for 20 to 30 minutes without any lights.

"They came close to each other, as if to give the impression that was one dot on the radar and then they split up, probably hoping that we were following the wrong one. But we had the right one," he said.

Jongman said the Akatsuki Maru, which had been cruising westerly for the whole day Thursday, headed south after the evasive maneuver. "Now everything is normal. They turned their lights on again," he said.

The two Japanese ships, cruising south at about 14 knots, were located about 800 kilometers west of the Canary Islands Thursday night but there was still no indication which route they would take on their homeward voyage, Jongman said.

The Dutch skipper maintained that he was keeping his ship three to five miles (five to eight kilometers) away from the Japanese vessels to avoid any possible collision.

The plutonium shipment, reportedly the largest ever single shipment, has sparked concern among a large number of countries whose coasts it might pass about possible accident, such as a fire, or a terrorist attack.

Jongman said the Smit New York, owned by a Netherlands-based salvage firm, is now the only ship tailing the Akatsuki Maru.

Another Greenpeace ship which had shadowed the shipment since its departure from the northern French port of Cherbourg broke away from the convoy as it passed off the mid-Atlantic Azores Islands on Wednesday, Jongman said.

He said it would probably take another four days to tell for sure whether the Akatsuki Maru is heading for the southern tip of South America or toward the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa.

Japan has not disclosed the route for security reasons. The plutonium, which had been sent from Japan for reprocessing, is for use in fast-breeder reactors.

**Tokyo Denies Requesting U.S. Guard**

**OW1211043392 Tokyo KYODO in English 0419 GMT 12 Nov 92**

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 12 KYODO—Japan has not requested U.S. assistance in protecting a plutonium shipment, and has not been informed that U.S. nuclear submarines are tracking the freighter carrying it, the top government spokesman said Thursday.

Chief cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato said the government is investigating reports that U.S. nuclear submarines are monitoring the Akatsuki Maru en route to Japan from France out of apparent concern over hijack attempts.

The Akatsuki Maru is under the protection of a single Japanese patrol ship, the Shikishima.

U.S. Government sources told KYODO NEWS SERVICE in Washington on Wednesday that U.S. nuclear submarines are monitoring the journey of the Akatsuki Maru until the freighter reaches Japanese territorial waters.

The U.S. Defense Department has officially said that Japan's security plans are adequate. The U.S. Government sources said the Shikishima, armed with twin 35-millimeter antiaircraft cannon and a 20-mm Gatling-type gun, would be insufficient in case of an attempted hijack, however.

"We have no agreement with the U.S. for protection. We have neither been informed by the U.S. that they plan to provide surveillance, nor have we made any such requests," Kato told a news conference.

Asked if Japan would welcome such assistance, Kato replied, "It depends on the case." He declined to elaborate.
A senior government official, commenting anonymously, said Japan would welcome the surveillance if it were an act of "good will."

The U.S. sources in Washington said the decision to keep the Akatsuki Maru under surveillance is an independent plan whose scope does not infringe upon Japanese sovereignty.

One source added if the Japanese Government had officially made a request of Washington to provide an escort, there would have been criticism within the U.S. that Japan considered the U.S. military its own hired soldiers, thus politicizing the problem.

Kato said Japan would continue to seek U.S. agreement to the plutonium shipments once President-elect Bill Clinton takes office next January.

Japan must obtain permission for the shipments from the U.S. and Canada because the plutonium was extracted from spent fuel provided by those two countries.

Japan plans to ship some 30 tons of plutonium from France and Britain over the next 20 years for use in nuclear power plants.

Kato also told the news conference that Japan is not planning to revise plans to ship some 30 tons of plutonium from France and Britain over the next 20 years.

The plan has stirred protests and official concern in many of the approximately 100 countries along the potential sea routes.

The Japanese Government has declined to make public the shipment route to deter possible attack. The environmentalist group Greenpeace has been shadowing the vessel with its own ship, however, announcing its successive locations.

**Power Companies Plan Future Shipments**

*OW1211112792 Tokyo KYODO in English 1048 GMT 12 Nov 92*

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 12 KYODO—Japanese power companies are planning another shipment of reprocessed plutonium in 1995 and are considering steps that might make the transport of the fuel for their nuclear power plants safer and less likely to arouse anxieties, industry sources said Thursday.

The first shipment of near weapons grade plutonium intended for use in Japanese power plants is currently on its way to Japan from a reprocessing plant in France.

The shipment has raised fears that the cargo ship is an inviting target for would-be terrorists or an environmental disaster waiting to happen, however.

Sources at Japan’s Federation of Electric Power Companies [FEPC] said its plans for the 1995 shipment include mixing the plutonium with uranium into a mixed oxide fuel.

This would make the containers of the mixture too large to carry away and even if the shipment were hijacked, it would be impossible to extract the plutonium from the mix without reprocessing facilities.

The FEPC plan would also allow for the freighter to transport the shipment without an escort. The 4,800-ton Akatsuki Maru is now being escorted home by a Maritime Safety Agency patrol boat, the Shikishima.

Of the nine power companies within the federation, Tokyo Electric Power Co. and Kansai Electric Power Co. plan to use plutonium in their light water reactors in Fukushima and Takahama starting in 1996, the sources said.

The FEPC is considering how all the companies can jointly contribute to the shipment of the fuel, however, they said.

The federation has already completed a design of the mixed oxide fuel. They are currently negotiating with British and Belgian firms over a nuclear fuel processing facility, they said.
It is also jointly developing a design of containers with British and French firms.

To deter attempted terrorist hijacks, the containers to be used will weigh between 80 and 100 tons, compared with the 1.5 ton containers now in transport on the Akatsuki Maru.

Japan plans to transport some 30 tons of plutonium from Britain and France by the year 2010 with 20 tons of it to be used for plutonium thermal use.

In the future, private power companies will surpass the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (FEPC) [as received], in terms of volume and numbers of shipment of plutonium, the sources said.

For this reason, the FEPC is studying methods of shipment that would not require enlistment of an escort ship. Thus, it is leaning toward the mixed oxide fuel method, they said.

Shipment of plutonium is covered in an agreement on nuclear fuel between Japan and the United States, but since mixed oxide fuel is not in the agreement, it is likely future shipments will be the subject of a new article in the agreement, they said.

Foreign Ministry Reconsiders Plans
OW1511121692 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 1000 GMT 15 Nov 92

[Text] The Foreign Ministry has begun to reconsider Japan's method of transporting plutonium from France, as well as its plans to use reprocessed plutonium, because it is becoming increasingly concerned over unexpected and mounting international criticism over the shipping of plutonium aboard the Akatsuki Maru.

The ship, which departed from the French port of Cherbourg on 7 November and is now headed for Japan, is carrying a cargo of one ton of plutonium to be used as fuel in nuclear reactors. Because the government plans to transport 30 tons of plutonium from overseas for use as fuel in domestic reactors, this seaborne transportation process must be repeated 29 more times.

Not only have coastal nations along the Akatsuki Maru's expected route voiced opposition to the ship's passage, but there have also been voices expressing concern that the plutonium shipments could provide Japan with an opportunity to develop nuclear weapons in the future. Moreover, if the new Clinton administration hammers out policies unfavorable to Japan's plutonium transport, there are concerns that the government may be forced to change its existing policy. Therefore, the government has begun to reconsider the project.

According to current plans, the government intends to procure 85 tons of plutonium by the year 2015, but recent recalculations by the Foreign Ministry indicate that such demand is unlikely, and, in turn, the ministry thinks it may be necessary to cut back on orders. Moreover, there have been recommendations to ship the plutonium by air instead of by sea because of the strong reaction against seaborne transport from those coastal countries along the expected route. The Foreign Ministry plans to open concrete discussions on this matter with the Science and Technology Agency when the Akatsuki Maru completes its current mission.

NORTH KOREA

Foreign Ministry Denies Charge of CW Stockpile
SK3010105492 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1036 GMT 30 Oct 92

[Excerpt] Pyongyang October 30 (KCNA)—A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea answered a question put by KCNA today regarding recent reports of some U.S. media quoting false materials of the South Korean authorities saying that the DPRK has "bio-chemical weapons."

On October 23 the Voice of America quoted a report submitted by the South Korean "security planning board" to the "National Assembly" alleging that the DPRK has established a "biochemical war strategy" and stockpiled chemical and germ weapons enough to totally destroy the South Korean population and that toxic materials are being produced at several factories. [passage omitted]

IAEA To Inspect Unreported Nuclear Facilities
SK0811034192 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean 0308 GMT 8 Nov 92

[Text] It has been learned that upon the conclusion of the on-going fourth ad hoc inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], a high-ranking delegation led by (Villaros), IAEA secretary general, would visit North Korea.

A diplomatic source said: As soon as the ad hoc inspections, which have continued since 3 November, are concluded on 21 November, an IAEA delegation will visit North Korea and inspect two of North Korea's unreported facilities, including a nuclear waste processing facility.

It was also learned that even though North Korea hinted that it would reject the IAEA's inspections on the ground of the decision by the ROK and the United States to resume the Team Spirit joint exercise, North Korea had been cooperating with the IAEA team for the ad hoc inspections as it had done in the previous inspections.
SOUTH KOREA

Two Nuclear Power Plants Near Kyongju Planned
SK1211075892 Seoul YONHAP in English 0612 GMT 12 Nov 92

[Text] Kyongju, Nov. 12 (YONHAP)—Ground was broken Thursday for the third and fourth Wolsong nuclear power plants in Yangnam-myon near here.

Construction of the pressurized heavy water reactors will cost 1.6 trillion won in domestic capital and 720 million U.S. dollars in foreign capital. They will each have a capacity of 700,000 kilowatts of electricity, like plant No. 2, a spokesman for the Wolsong nuclear power plant, said.

Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL) supplied the design and the Korea Heavy Industry and Construction Co. will build the turbine generators for the nuclear power stations, which are expected to replace 12 million barrels of imported oil annually, he said.

Daewoo Corp. is charged with construction of plants No. 3 and 4, slated to finish in June 1998 and June 1999, respectively, the spokesman said. Unit No. 2 has been under construction since last year.

IAEA Talks Planned on Inter-Korean Inspections
SK1311123092 Seoul YONHAP in English 1203 GMT 13 Nov 92

[Text] Vienna, Nov. 13 (YONHAP)—A Board of Governors meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), set to open at the IAEA headquarters here in Vienna on Dec. 3, is expected to discuss the issue of mutual inter-Korean nuclear inspections as one of its agenda topics.

A senior official at the South Korean mission here said Friday that the Board of Governors meeting is expected to call for the early implementation of inter-Korean inspections if the hitherto IAEA inspections of North Korea were found to be not satisfactory.

The official said that at the upcoming IAEA meeting, IAEA Director-general Hans Blix is scheduled to deliver a report on the outcome of the four IAEA inspections held of North Korean nuclear facilities since last May.

"If Hans Blix's report turns out not satisfactory, the meeting is likely to discuss the early implementation of inter-Korean nuclear inspections for more effective inspections," he said.

The official noted that at the September Board of Governors meeting, about 20 countries pointed to the lingering suspicion about North Korea's nuclear arms development.

The fourth IAEA inspection team is now in North Korea inspecting nuclear facilities there since Nov. 2. The team will return to Vienna toward this weekend.

PHILIPPINES

Defense Secretary Urges Nuclear Weapons Ban
HK0911031892 Quezon City MALAYA in English 8 Nov 92 pp 1, 2

[Report by Chit Estella]

[Excerpt] Defense Secretary Renato de Villa said the government must declare a nuclear policy consistent with the constitution in light of plans to allow U.S. military forces to enter Philippine ports even after the termination of the bases agreement.

This indicated that the Armed Forces will enforce the charter's ban on nuclear weapons.

"We will simply implement the nuclear prohibition in the constitution. I cannot pronounce that policy. That policy is something (that should be set by someone) very much higher than me," De Villa said.

"My only position is if it is there in the constitution, I think we should have a policy that is consistent with the constitution," he said.

Under Section 8, Article II [Roman two] of the 1987 Charter, "The Philippines... adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory."

The Aquino government tried to include a nuclear weapons ban in a proposal to allow U.S. forces three more years stay after Senate rejection of a new RP [Republic of the Philippines]-U.S. bases treaty.

Then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon, in talks with then U.S. Ambassador Frank Wisner, wanted the U.S. to agree to amending the 1947 Military Bases Agreement "to meet the constitutional requirement and the objections raised by some senators during the debate on the ratification of the rejected 10-year Treaty of Friendship, Security, and Cooperation" which wanted a nuclear weapons ban.

The U.S. refused to agree on the amendment because of its policy of neither confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons in its facilities, ships, and aircraft.

Last Friday, the Philippines announced it had decided to grant access to U.S. military forces in virtually all seaports and air bases. There was no mention of how the constitutional ban on nuclear weapons would be implemented. [passage omitted]

Manila Urged To Protest Japanese Plutonium Shipment
OW1011140892 Tokyo KYODO in English 1346 GMT 10 Nov 92

[Text] Manila, Nov. 10 KYODO—Philippines political leader Miguel Romero said Tuesday he has asked the government to lodge a protest with Japan over its shipment of plutonium from France.
Romero, chairman of the House of Representatives cabinet appointment committee, said he has asked the Foreign and Defense Ministries to stage a strong protest at the Japanese Government over the shipment because the plutonium-carrying ship may pass through the Bashi Channel between The Philippines and Taiwan.

Romero, a member of the House of Representatives, said there is a high possibility that the Japanese vessel Akatsuki Maru will pass through the strait.

He said it will be dangerous for the 4,800-ton ship to pass through the strait as it is one of the world's busiest sea routes.

A Philippines Air Force chief said he ordered Air Force pilots to carry out surveillance flights to track the route of the Japanese ship when it nears Philippine territorial waters.

Major Gen. Leopoldo Acot said airplanes will support coastal patrol boats in monitoring the country's waters to deter pirates from attacking the Japanese vessel and to prevent accidents from taking place in the Bashi Strait and other waters near the country.

The Akatsuki Maru left France's northwestern port of Cherbourg for Japan last Saturday carrying a ton of highly toxic plutonium which will be used for Japan's fast breeder reactor program.

The ship was loaded with 15 containers of plutonium that was reprocessed by France's state-run nuclear fuel company Cogma at its plant in La Hague, about 25 kilometers from Cherbourg.
EAST EUROPE

BULGARIA

No Evidence of Plutonium Smuggling Found
AU061183392 Sofia BTA in English 1744 GMT 6 Nov 92

[Text] Sofia, November 6 (BTA)—There is no confirmed information about plutonium or other nuclear material having been smuggled into Bulgaria, the Committee for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy officially announced today.

The announcement was made in connection with an article in the November 1, 1992, SUNDAY EXPRESS, claiming that large quantities of plutonium earmarked for Iraq have been smuggled in Bulgaria. On November 2, the Interior Ministry announced it had seized 140 radioactive capsules containing plutonium material superficially implanted into ceramics. The capsules are generally used in army analysers of chemical warfare agents. They had been stolen from a Bulgarian company in 1991.

From the point of view of radiological safety, the seized amount of radioactive capsules poses no hazard unless the plutonium content is extracted and swallowed, the Committee for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy reported. The radioactive material was imported temporarily into Bulgaria for use in military equipment in compliance with international procedures. No violations to the Nonproliferation Treaty have been detected, the committee reported today.

POLAND

Smuggling of N-Arms Components From CIS Suspected
LD0511062292 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 4 Nov 92

[No video available]

[Excerpt] Polish special services suspect that a channel for smuggling components for nuclear weapons is going through Poland from former Soviet republics. According to them, this threatens the security of the Polish state and undermines its basic political interests. Assurances that nuclear weapons behind our eastern border have been under full control of the authorities there are not considered credible.

Polish special services has had four reports so far on the sale of post-Soviet nuclear warheads on our country’s territory. [passage omitted]

Germany Warns Against Smuggling of Radioactive Materials
LD081192692 Warsaw PAP in English 1848 GMT 8 Nov 92

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 6—German authorities have stated that the smuggling of radioactive materials into Germany, an activity which has been on the increase recently, does not pay and that it is not possible to trade such substances in the West, reporters learned at a press conference at the Polish Foreign Affairs Ministry.

In a note sent to the Polish Foreign Ministry and other Polish institutions with radioactive materials in their possession, the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany warned that theft and smuggling of these materials renders no profit and that it intends to make customs investigations more stringent, said Władysław Kłaczynski director of the press and information department at the Polish Foreign Affairs Ministry.

The German Embassy also announced that several days before, German police arrested a few Polish citizens after having confiscated several boxes containing radioactive substances.

Stolen Cesium-137 Containers ‘Still Missing’
LD1111121192 Warsaw PAP in English 1341 GMT 10 Nov 92

[Text] Koszalin, Nov. 10—A local prosecutor’s office in Szczecinek, northern Poland, has accused two local farmers of receiving two stolen containers filled with Cesium-137 and storing them in a manner posing a threat to human health and life, spokesman for the prosecutor’s office Adam Rusinowski has said.

The two farmers allegedly made a deal with Russian soldiers stationed at the Borne-Sulinowo garrison last July and took over two containers filled with radioactive Cesium-137 worth 162 million zlotys (about 10 thousand USD).

One of the containers with 88 kilogrammes of the radioactive substance was found by police after a 12-day search, the second, 35-kilogramme container is still missing.

Intelligence Service Warns of N-Arms Black Market
AU0511090492 Paris AFP in English 0141 GMT 5 Nov 92

[Text] Warsaw, Nov 5 (AFP)—Polish intelligence services heard of four offers to sell a nuclear warhead this year and take “very seriously” the threat of a black market in atomic weapons, Polish television said in a report late Wednesday.
Intelligence officers said Poland had become the main transit country for weapons-grade radioactive material smuggled from the former Soviet Union.

The Polish agents "tried four times" in 1992 apparently without success to intercept "nuclear warheads supposedly based in Poland" and which had been offered for sale at one million dollars apiece.

One of the offers came from Legnica, formerly the site of the main Soviet military base in south western Poland. The other three offers came from northern Poland, the television said.

Recently, German police have foiled several attempts to smuggle radioactive substances into Germany via Poland.
CIS' Shaposhnikov Favors Russian-Ukrainian Summit

OW/1211131392 Moscow INTERFAOX in English
1110 GMT 12 Nov 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Marshal Shaposhnikov has spoken for a Russian-Ukrainian summit to discuss nuclear weapons in Ukrainian territory. He said Russia is the only country that should have such weapons, therefore Moscow and Kiev must reach a compromise.

The longer Ukraine has nuclear weapons without appropriate control, the marshal said, the greater the threat of various incidents related to their safety. The current situation is very dangerous, primarily for Ukraine, and it should realize that. According to the marshal, Ukraine does not have the experts who could properly control nuclear weapons. In this matter Moscow and Kiev should not act like they did in the case of the Black Sea fleet.

The marshal is attending a meeting of the foreign ministers of CIS countries in Moscow who are discussing the CIS charter as well as mutual recognition of visas, the formation of an international TV company, the training of officers etc. Mr. Shaposhnikov believes that the adoption of the charter is a cornerstone of the future of the CIS.

The marshal said that there are no nuclear weapons in the conflict zones in Russia. When the Chechen president Dudayev says something to this end, he exaggerates, the commander stressed.

U.S.-Russian Uranium Trade Accord Cited

Sale of Weapons-Grade Uranium
934P0011A Moscow MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI in Russian No 43, 25 Oct 92 p 21

[Article by Vladimir Kiselev: "Whom Is the Enriched Uranium Enriching?"]

[Text] Our atomic century has never known such a thing! Russia is selling the United States highly enriched uranium [HEU] from the warheads of missiles. The recent enemy against whom these very missiles were targeted for decades is to reprocess the nuclear charges into fuel for peaceful nuclear power stations. However, one opinion is that the contract deprives the Russian nuclear industry of prospects for development, and that its demise is inevitable.

Nonsecret Secrets

For almost a third of a century we were engaged with the United States in a senseless buildup of nuclear muscle. With the advent of the age of disarmament the question inevitably arose: What is to be done with the warheads?

And then the idea turned up (in American heads, I am convinced) to sell the hundreds of tonnes of HEU freed up to partners across the ocean. Talks on this were initiated in December of last year. Two American companies were to convert up to 90 percent of the concentrated charges for bombs into low-enriched uranium [LEU] fuel for power engineering. After the initial contracts had been concluded they reckoned to obtain more profit from the resale of Russian uranium. But the government took matters into its own hands. On 28 August General Burns from the U.S. Department of Energy and Deputy Minister Yegorov from the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy initialized the agreement. It was to be approved by the end of the year.

Russian uranium is less expensive than American uranium. And indeed it is much more profitable to convert the imported weapons-grade uranium into uranium for power production: There are no mines, no conversion facilities, no enrichment plants. If you know how, you can dilute highly concentrated uranium with natural uranium.

Mr. Sewell from the U.S. Department of Energy explained that this deal would not even place any additional burden on the federal budget because the Russian raw materials would be purchased with the money saved on enrichment of their own. Moreover, the cost of electric power could be reduced for the 18 percent of American producers and consumers who receive their electricity from nuclear power stations.

In the opinion of the leadership in the Ministry of Atomic Energy the enriched uranium can bring Russia several billion of the dollars that it needs so much. And indeed, the headache of where to store nuclear materials and how to prevent their accidental use or theft is also relieved.

And the main thing: While weapons-grade uranium is held in storage it is always possible to put it back into bombs quite quickly. What a turn—beating swords into plowshares!

But why did the world learn of the unprecedented agreement from the Bush Administration only after lengthy secret (that is how they have it in the American press) negotiations?

State Department representatives to whom the NEW YORK TIMES referred explain this as a reluctance to make the Russian military people nervous because, they say, some of them are saying that they have been betrayed and that Russia's nuclear sword has been blunted.

I contacted the commander-in-chief of Strategic Rocket Forces, Igor Smirnov. He had heard; their specialists had in fact not been invited to the preparations for the negotiations.

"There is no need for this. Better to have fewer weapons but of better quality," the deputy minister of atomic
energy. Nikolay Yegorov, explained. "But no one made a secret of the negotiations. They were initiated at the Kurchatov Institute and continued up in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs skyscraper on Smolenskaya Square. Undoubtedly representatives of the Tekhsnabeksport and Shishkin personally participated.

The mention of Tekhsnabeksport is not fortuitous, for it is this association, now a joint-stock company, that for more than 20 years has been the monopoly representative of our country in the world uranium market.

But Albert Shishkin, the general director of Tekhsnabeksport, has said that his firm did not take part in the negotiations. He personally was not in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, nor anywhere else. According to his information, a joint venture will be set up for the sale of highly enriched uranium. And in general this subject is extremely delicate and the negotiations were confidential.

The minister of atomic energy, Viktor Mikhaylov, assessed a public statement from the White House about the purchase of weapons-grade uranium as somewhat premature. "We did not have an agreement as the Americans have said. But the presidential team probably thought that it was a trump card in the election marathon." But the minister had difficulty in explaining the differences between his closest aides. "You can be convinced for yourself that there is no secret stamp here," and he showed the initiated agreement across the board table. However, he declined a request to provide a copy for MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI experts to study the terms.

Be that as it may, the many months of silence have been broken. Even our president has appeared on television with a positive assessment of the upcoming deal.

An Epistolary Novel

One after another three letters with keen objections to the sale of weapons-grade uranium arrived in the Ministry of Atomic Energy from the Uralk Electrocemical Combine, the country's largest producer of enriched uranium, until recently better known as Sverdlovsk-44. A mutiny aboard ship! In the atomic department, where there is the strictest centralization and subordination is held as sacred as it is in the army, free-thinking is not welcome.

I telephoned the combine. The leadership's attitude was sour; they are expecting some reaction from the offices in the capital.

"The Urals people have misgivings that the fuel obtained from the weapons-grade uranium may supplant their product in a uranium market that is already totally saturated," the chief of the Ministry of Atomic Energy Main Administration for Science and Technology, Yevgeniy Mikerin, explained. "They are afraid of losing the dollars that they earn from exports of LEU. And this even after all the annual deductions of tens of millions."

Paradoxical though it may be, the Ministry of Atomic Energy wins whatever the case. The small flow of hard currency from the enterprise will flow into the ministry's account. Then, however, the combine will simply come to a standstill.

"This is certainly possible," Mikerin agreed. "If the Americans do not yield part of the market, a number of their own enrichment plants will not close."

But those distant colleagues are in no hurry with the promises. An army of unemployed brings them little joy either. In any event, no such scenario is stipulated in the initiated agreement.

The president of Russia's representative for Sverdlovsk Oblast, Vitaliy Mashkov, has also sounded the alarm. He worked for many years in the nuclear industry and he believes that it is capable not only of saving itself but also of pulling the entire country out of the breach. By selling the weapons-grade uranium for immediate profit we deprive the sector of prospects for development.

Mashkov drew the attention of the chief of the Russian Federation presidential Control Department, Yury Boldyrev, to this. After a long face-to-face talk he sent him a package—a protest against the deal that is being prepared, and proposals for the reorganization of the nuclear industry.

I followed the path of the letter. It was passed from Boldyrev's apparatus to Yegor Gaydar's secretariat, and from there to the department that deals with the defense complex and conversion. One more somersault and it arrives in the Ministry of Atomic Energy. Here the letter is now known as an official request from a deputy (Mashkov is a people's deputy of Russia). One-and-a-half months later an aide to the minister prepared a response. Let me remind you that it is precisely officials from the Ministry of Atomic Energy who are now implementing their own idea of selling HEU to America. The situation is painfully familiar. Nothing has changed in this country. Mashkov determined to break the vicious circle of officials. We met.

"The Russian atomic people have a number of technologies that are the best in the world, they are five to 10 years ahead of the Americans, particularly in isotope separation," Mashkov said. "The centrifuge enrichment method is an order of magnitude better than their diffusion method and the energy consumption is 20 times less. After we reequipped our four enrichment combines by changing from diffusion to centrifuge we freed up the equivalent of three Leningrad nuclear power stations.

"While we sat behind the iron curtain we used to malign warheads that no one needed and had nowhere to go, but the Americans controlled 50 percent of the world uranium market and they were untroubled. But suddenly we also started actively to penetrate it. The United States is accusing us of dumping. But are already opening up the shops at our top secret combines to the general view. So
how is it a question of dumping? That was a shock! The Americans were sure that the Russians were just dragging along behind them. It turned out that the reverse was true. The very complicated centrifuge design was not just a single unit; millions have been produced in series production. It became clear that the prime cost of Russian enriched uranium is much lower than the American enriched uranium; we are very competitive and we are no longer satisfied with a paltry five percent of the world market.

"There is yet another nuance. Centrifuge production was developed with spare capacity. However, Chernobyl occurred and disarmament started. Instead of the expected rapid growth in nuclear power engineering, what followed was a recession. And the separation facilities cannot close down, this would destroy them. In this situation it would be like death if the nuclear industry were to be left without a market in which to sell.

"According to the predictions, in 1995 the 100,000 tonnes of uranium in the West will have been exhausted. And many long-term agreements will expire. A wonderful opportunity to squeeze market competitors. But do not put it off, a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush; do it as soon as possible. We already plan to launch the weapons-grade uranium. Quite a miserly quantity—500 tonnes in 20 years. But this is a special product: 30-32 tonnes of reactor uranium can be obtained from it, but the uranium market is very sensitive to any fluctuation.

"The Americans will cover their own needs with our HEU. It is a fine thing to make savings and obtain a breathing space to modernize their own obsolete production facilities. So, we have lost the war for the market before it has even begun."

Is the Devil So Terrible?

The sheet of paper is dotted with figures. Finally the chief of the department of theory of nuclear reactors at the Russian Scientific Center at the Kurchatov Institute, Doctor of Technical Sciences Yasen Shevelev, sets his pen aside: "This is not at all what I expected..."

I had gone to Shevelev to ask him to analyze the way in which events may unfold.

The possible situation was deliberately made as acute as possible: The United States obtains 1,000 tonnes of our weapons-grade uranium.

"That is enough to operate all American industrial reactors for a minimum of 10 years. Or all the reactors in the world for 2.5 years. The scales of its introduction into the existing market are so great that competition between this method and the traditional method of meeting the needs of nuclear power stations is inevitable. Consequently, domestic competition will start even in the Russian nuclear industry, because people will buy either weapons-grade uranium or LEU. There will be agreement to increase quotas only if we lower the price of raw materials. For economic considerations, the military uranium will undoubtedly win because it has already been produced, there is no demand for it, and consequently it has zero price. Then the separation industry will close down. In short, a company that possesses both potential flows of uranium should give some hard thought to the fate of its own peaceful component and act more circumspectly. The more so since the money obtained both for the weapons-grade uranium and for the LEU can be the same."

This opinion was supported by the director of a private economic research center, Doctor of Technical Sciences Anatoliy Klimenko, who also added that creating uranium reserves is one of the most profitable kinds of capital investment. According to the long-term predictions the market price for it will rise. There will be an end to inexpensive resources. And if we ruin the separation industry, then by the middle of the next century they will be selling us at gigantic prices.

The minister of atomic energy, Doctor of Technical Sciences Viktor Mikhaylov, does not see any danger in the emergence of two competing fuel flows. True, he does make the reservation that the quantities of HEU put onto the market should be relatively small and their appearance there should not in any way reduce our quotas. This is his main requirement for signing the agreement. If the Americans cannot reach a compromise on the antidumping campaign, the minister said, "I shall first appeal to Gaydar: They have duped us, it is time to end it. But as to who will dilute the uranium and in what quantities, that is a technical matter."

A Coming Together

I talked with many nuclear experts about the upcoming agreement. Including the director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Nuclear Safety, Doctor of Physicomathematical Sciences Leonid Bolshov; General Leonid Petukhov, who for a long time headed the main administration for nuclear weapons production in the Ministry of Medium Machine Building; Anatoliy Nikihamkin, laboratory chief in the Russian Scientific Center at the Kurchatov Institute; and independent expert Viktor Bobrov. And each one of them illuminated some new, sometimes totally unexpected facet. I am firmly convinced that the advisability of selling weapons-grade uranium should be discussed not only by officials in Ministry of Atomic Energy offices but also the producers, environmentalists, and foreign intelligence analysts—the broadest possible circle. I do not know whether we will gain or lose by signing the agreement. I fear that no one in the country yet knows that...

From a conversation with Gennadiy Kondobayev, people's deputy of Russia and member of the Supreme Soviet Committee for Industry and Power Engineering: "In December Bush plans to come to Russia. And I think that he is more than likely to sign a weapons-grade uranium agreement with Yeltsin."
“I am concerned that they will advise him thus: Everything is fine, we will soon be disarming, and we will be getting hard currency. And they will remain silent about the fact that it is possibly a blow against our own leading technology.”

Returning to What Has Been Printed

In issue No. 23 of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI this year we talked about how the country has lost for a minimum of 10 years the right to handle its own emeralds. All of them, down to the last little stone, are slipping away from us across country to abroad. We have even pledged to deliver more than we recover. The shortfall will be made up from Gokhran. And they are paying us not in hard currency but in rubles, at prices that are indecently low.

The Russian emerald mines belong to the Ministry of Atomic Energy.

Prospecting Without Work

I was immediately telephoned by several people, saying the same thing: A protocol of intent has been signed to construct a turnkey separation facility in China, fitted out with the most up-to-date equipment. Our skills honed over 30 years, we have kept it top secret. And now...

“A normal commercial deal.” The chief of a Ministry of Atomic Energy Main Administration, Yevgeniy Mikherin, assured my emotions. Yes, the equipment is the latest series produced equipment, but we are not transferring the technology for making it. And we stipulate definitely in the contract that it is forbidden to copy it or re-export it.

But I remain convinced that in China, where not even inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency are allowed access to military facilities, it is in the practical sense impossible to track how our technology is being used. Moreover, uranium for nuclear weapons can be obtained on the centrifuge machines. And China is not a signatory to the international non-proliferation treaty.

It is not even a question of us perhaps cutting ourselves off from existing and possible uranium markets....

Antidumping Pact on Reactor-Grade Uranium

934P0011B Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian No 38, 19-25 Oct 92 p 4

[Untitled article by Sergey Lavrov]

[Text] As KOMMERSANT No. 13 reported, agreement has been reached between Russia and the United States to impose strict limits on exports of Russian uranium products to the United States in exchange for an end to the antidumping investigation into the Russian supplier. On 19 October the U.S. Department of Commerce issued an official statement on the signing of this document.

KOMMERSANT experts suggest that the problems in the uranium trade between Russia and the United States are in no way removed by this agreement. Its chief result will apparently be a buildup of uranium exports to the United States through middlemen.

The agreements concluded between the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, and also by corresponding departments in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, provide for import quotas over the next eight years for imports by the United States of all uranium products from these countries (uranium ore, uranium hexafluoride, LEU, and weapons-grade uranium), and the size of the quotas will depend on the price of uranium ore on the spot market (the one-off contracts market). At any given moment this price is lower than the benchmark price, taken as the readout level, and so the quota equals zero.

At the same time the United States has halted the antidumping investigation against the uranium exporters in the republics of the former USSR, while threatening to impose enormous tariffs for exports from these countries that are unacceptable.

The agreement with Russia has still not entered into force legally. The fact is that the sides signed it conditionally. Before 2 December the American side is to formulate a response to additional conditions from Russia, and if this response is negative the agreement will not legally enter into force. It is the opinion of KOMMERSANT experts that the chief condition will be Russia’s refusal to provide the U.S. Department of Commerce with the documents it demanded on uranium exports from Russia to other countries.

Russian LEU for nuclear power stations, deliveries of which were the main cause of the conflict, are significantly less expensive and more competitive than American LEU. Experts note that the agreement does promise Russia certain opportunities for the official export of uranium products to the United States, and in this sense should be regarded as a success: At the time the agreement was signed Russia was threatened with a total blockade against direct deliveries. But overall the Russian uranium trade with America has sustained a severe blow this year. Because of the restrictions associated with the antidumping investigation, since the beginning of the year not a single delivery has been made officially, and renewal of them is being postponed for an indefinite period.

It is the opinion of experts that in Russia it will be very complicated to make up for this loss by increasing deliveries to the European market because realistic opportunities for sending them there have in the main been exhausted. Moreover, the European producers of uranium products have for several years now been bombarding the bodies of the EC with similar complaints about dumping, trying to get restrictions on
imports of Russian uranium, and, as before, this threat must be taken into account.

The experts suggest that the result of the blockade against direct Russian exports of uranium to the United States will be a buildup of its exports through middlemen using various kinds of operations known in the uranium market as "flag swapping." To this end the Russian supplier (the Tekhgnabeksport company) can use a number of companies in Germany and other European countries connected with it by official and confidential cooperation agreements.

It is precisely with this that the American side's demand to provide information on all world exports of Russian uranium is concerned, and the refusal of the Russian side to provide such information is one of the additional conditions on whose attainment the entry of the present agreement into force depends.

So the Russian government faces a choice that is extremely important for exporters—legal control of exports, or uncontrolled but quite legal exports.

Russia Sees START-3 Missiles as 'Time Bombs'

PM211170692 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Nov 92 First Edition p 4

[Article by candidate of Technical Sciences Petr Belov: "'Chernobyl' on Wheels: Do We Know What We Are Doing by Replacing SS-18 Missiles With SS-25's?]"

[Text] If the documents on strategic offensive arms reduction are implemented, the levels of confrontation between the CIS (Russia) and the United States will fall from a correlation of 10,271:10,371 at the end of last year, to one of 5,000:5,978 (under the 1992 treaty on a 50-percent reduction—START-2). Or to a ratio of 3,000:3,492 under the framework agreement of June this year (START-3).

The fundamental difference in the present framework agreement is that we are obliged to renounce heavy MIRV'ed ICBM's. These missiles are based on highly hardened launch silos and are designated by the code names SS-18 and SS-24. Instead, it is laid down that light silo ICBM's and any other mobile ground-based missiles are to be kept. That means SS-25's on motor chassis, and these same SS-25's. But only on railroad cars.

Although the threefold reduction in nuclear missiles is certainly necessary and appears to be just, I venture to assert that the ratification of START-3 will lay further mines for an already fragile peace. In the opinion of L. Volkov, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the RIA [expansion unknown; possibly Russian Engineering Academy], and chief of one of the Russian Defense Ministry's key scientific research institutes, "...the elimination of all heavy ICBM's is tantamount to destroying the structure of the strategic nuclear forces and establishing an undivided U.S. monopoly in the sphere of strategic offensive arms." The fact that these ICBM's, with 10 warheads each, ensured an "asymmetrical response" even in conditions of a retaliatory counterstrike [otvetno- vstrechnogo udara] is recognized even by the Americans, who at the same time deem one SS-18 to be the delivery vehicle for 1,000 decoy targets. In this situation the multibillion-dollar SDI was virtually useless. But given the implementation of START-3 the Americans could apparently make do with a considerably cheaper version, designed to deal with only 200 nuclear warheads.

The mobile SS-24's and SS-25's which are proposed instead of the silo heavy missiles are indeed more dangerous... to Russia itself than to anyone else. Here is why. Unlike the American Midgetman, which is more sophisticated in every respect—and which, incidentally, has not been put into operation—our mobile missiles are virtually unprotected against sabotage and are predisposed toward accidents with consequences that would be disastrous to everyone. This is due first and foremost to the unsuccessful design execution of the SS-24 and SS-25, the fact that their bases and redeployment routes are known, and the impossibility in principle, for technical reasons, of preventing and reducing damage from sabotage or accidents. The Americans came to this conclusion on the real potential of our mobile ground-based strategic missile forces back in the mid-eighties. But we have not grasped to this day that these missiles are designed for the role of "time bombs" against ourselves.

That is why there should be no illusions about the combat potential of the Strategic Missile Forces with the ground-based ICBM's "permitted" to them under START-3. They will be annihilated even in the nonnuclear period of a war. Either by high-precision weapons or by saboteurs.

The creation of new silos for large single-warhead ICBM's is not presently in our power. Those that now exist and are to be preserved can be ignored: If one is ever launched, it will be filtered out by the system of "global protection against limited nuclear strikes." The aforementioned 200 warheads, divided by that system's large safety margin, constitute the actual combat might of the strategic offensive nuclear forces that we will have under the latest framework agreement.

The time scale for disarmament that is being imposed on us is also unacceptable. In total, more than 15,000 nuclear warheads must be dismantled [razobrat] within only 10 years, and some 100 tonnes of plutonium thus liberated must be destroyed. We do not yet have either an appropriate national program for this, or the means to ensure the safety of these operations. Bear in mind that dismantling one warhead takes a week, and a mere grain of plutonium is enough to kill any of us.

In my view we should also not rely on "manna from heaven" in the shape of COCOM technologies in the event of the abandonment of the 1972 ABM Treaty and our involvement in operations to create a joint "nuclear
The term of the treaty will soon expire anyway—virtually simultaneously with the second stage of START-3. There is no guarantee as yet that the "umbrella" is an umbrella for two. After all, two-thirds of its cost has already been paid for by the United States. Without us.

As a result the following far from reassuring conclusion seems logical. With the ratification of START-3, we will be adding "priority" SS-24 and SS-25 missiles to the Chernobyl-type nuclear reactors and the ill-considered burial sites for waste from the nuclear industry, and taken together this could lead to a second Chernobyl, but on a countrywide scale. To prevent this, it is necessary more thoroughly to analyze all the possible consequences of the proposed agreements, listening to the arguments of not only professional politicians, but also military-technical experts. The one thing that must not be tolerated is naive and lightweight views on the absence of problems in connection with the implementation of agreements to reduce weapons of mass destruction.

I would like to warn against despair, panic, and the hunt for enemies within. The agreements achieved in June of this year are a notable step toward rapprochement between the Russian and American peoples. But the peoples' wisdom should not permit the "hawks" alone to achieve absolute supremacy over the others. That is always a danger to peace.

This is no time for Russia to seek equality on questions of strategic offensive arms. We have no time for the parities insisted on by the country's military-industrial complex, which often does not know what it is doing. Common sense suggests that we should abandon the practice of bilateral agreements and think about our own self-preservation, as the "little" nuclear states do. Get rid as quickly as possible of the mobile SS-24 and SS-25, which are supposedly designed for a retaliatory strike. These "Chernobyls" on wheels could be the death of us even in peacetime.

Russia's Yeltsin Stresses Safeguarding N-Arms
LD1011161492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1343 GMT 10 Nov 92

He expressed hope that nuclear tests will be ceased by all states and promised that Russian moratorium on them may be prolonged "if there are corresponding conditions for that". Russia prolonged its moratorium on nuclear tests until July 1, 1993.

The leading world powers are showing unprecedented cooperation in promoting peace, security and stability in the world, the president said, but added that the level of interaction has not yet reached its top level.

"Today it is time to raise the issue of transferring Russian relations with the West from partnership to allied ties", Yeltsin said, but explained that this does not mean the creation of any closed union or military bloc. The proposal concerns, first and foremost, trust and mutual understanding the level of which can be significantly raised. Allied ties envisage a complete elimination of military confrontation, according to the Russian president.

Russian, Chinese Nuclear Ties 'Purely Peaceful'
PM0911103192 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 Nov 92 p 3

[Report by correspondent A. Kabannikov: "Our Nuclear Industry Keen To Head East"]

[Text] Beijing—Our country's nuclear industry, which is not enjoying the best of times, has sought to find foreign markets. Russia is developing an extensive cooperation program with China in the sphere of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As part of this program a Russian-designed nuclear electric power station comprising two 1,000-megawatt power units will be constructed on the territory of this country with the participation of our specialists. It will become the PRC's third nuclear electric power station. The two previous ones are being commissioned with the participation of Western firms. China sees the development of the nuclear energy industry as the sole means to satisfy the growing thirst for energy in a number of regions which are developing rapidly but are deficient in hydroenergy resources and coal.

Russia also intends to construct for China a plant to enrich uranium—the fuel of nuclear power stations. V.N. Mikhaylov, Russian Federation minister of atomic energy who is visiting the PRC, stressed that its output is intended to be used only at nuclear power stations and solely on PRC territory. Moreover, Russian and Chinese nuclear industry workers intend to work together in the area of enhancing nuclear power station safety, creating equipment for radiation medicine, and developing technologies for the power industry of the future and other promising spheres. Conversion developments, where China has had greater success than us, are of key importance here, according to the minister.

There is no doubt that these plans will arouse fears in the West and among China's immediate neighbors, however, who suspect it of seeking to consolidate its nuclear
strike potential—now with Russia's assistance. What does the minister think about this? "We do foresee such a reaction," Viktor Nikitovich said, "and we do not have any complexes about it, because the Germans and the French, for example, have long and successfully cooperated with China in this sphere.

"To avoid any speculation we are proposing to the International Atomic Energy Agency that verification methods be stepped up. We will agree to the strictest monitoring in order to convince those around us that our work here pursues purely peaceful ends."

Russian Paper on Foiled Plutonium Sale to Iraq
LDI111141592 Moskow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 11 November 92 p 1


[Text] It was revealed a few days ago that the former Soviet Union still has a certain surplus of nuclear potential. A consignment of weapons-grade plutonium-239 weighing 44 kg was seized at the Sofia "Sheraton" Hotel on the night of 28 October; attached to the consignment by way of covering documents were two assay certificates issued by Russia's "Izotop" Science and Production Association. According to the special services information, the plutonium was due to be shipped to Iraq.

Actually, the wooden box discovered in the Bulgarian capital contained only one-half of the consignment meant to be forwarded to the Near East. At the beginning of September German [as published] businessman Norman Derbyshire telephoned Robert Turp, former British military attache in Paris and Seoul and currently a successful arms dealer, and offered him 80 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. The value of the "commodity" at world prices was perfectly acceptable—$80 million.

"I was offered a commission running into hundreds of thousands of pounds sterling," Turp stated in an interview with the British SUNDAY EXPRESS. "But I had no clue what plutonium-239 was."

The former military attache's ignorance was the cause of the deal's falling through. Turp appealed to specialists, who passed the plutonium disk on to the National Radiological Protection Board.

Interpol officials, who are now conducting an investigation, are convinced that the "Bulgarian deal" is one more confirmation of massive leaks of nuclear weapons components from the CIS republics.

"All this looks more like bluff," Valeri Nesterov, chief engineer of the "Izotop" Science and Production Association, believes. "Two years ago we did indeed deliver to Bulgaria 2,000 calibrating plutonium sources, designed to check gas analysis instruments produced within the CEMA framework. Production of the instruments was later wound up, and the Bulgarians have repeatedly asked us to buy the sources back. But this is simply economically disadvantageous—their value, even allowing for today's inflation, does not exceed 500 rubles per item."

Moreover, Nesterov claims, the sources can be used only for their directly intended purpose.

Russia, France Agree on Use of Nuclear Materials
LD1211225392 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1700 GMT 12 Nov 92

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Sergey Batyrev and Georgiy Shmelyov]

[Text] Paris November 12 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and his French counterpart, Roland Dumas, signed eight new Russian-French agreements on Thursday in the French capital. Among the documents signed are a framework agreement on cooperation in the sphere of safe destruction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons in Russia and the use of the released nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, as well as other agreements on the establishment of cultural centers and terms of their activities, on the search for archives documents and their giving back, and on cooperation in making use of state archives.

The Russian foreign minister came to France on a three-day official visit on Thursday.

Russia, France To Discuss Nuclear Arms Destruction
LD1211065692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0617 GMT 12 Nov 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Batyrev]

[Text] Paris November 12 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev is arriving on a three-day official visit to France on Thursday to discuss French technical help in providing safety for the elimination of Russian nuclear weapons.

The visit on the invitation of French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas will focus on all aspects of Russian-French relations, including such major issue as mutual interaction in eliminating nuclear arms, according to a spokesman of the French Foreign Ministry.

Kozyrev, who is expected to sign several agreements in Paris, will also address the foreign affairs commission of the French parliament and is expected to be received by President Francois Mitterrand.

Economic and financial issues will be also discussed during the visit which is taking place in the framework of
regular consultations of foreign ministers of both countries envisaged by the Russian-French treaty signed during the visit of the Russian president to Paris last February.

The situation in Russia will be also discussed, according to the spokesman.

Russia Issues Decree on Use of Missile Complexes

PM0511153192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Nov 92 First Edition p 4

[Decree No. 820 of the Russian Federation Government “On the Rational Utilization for the National Economy of Missile Complexes To Be Eliminated in Connection with the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” dated Moscow, 22 October 1992 and signed by Ye. Gaydar]

[Text] For the purposes of effecting savings of state funds used to eliminate arms and of constructing housing for officers of the Russian Federation Armed Forces out of the revenue received from the rational utilization for the needs of the national economy of the missile complexes to be eliminated in accordance with the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, the Russian Federation Government decrees:

1. The proposal by interested ministries and departments of the Russian Federation for the rational utilization for the national economy of the missile complexes (excluding nuclear warheads) to be eliminated in connection with the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, which provides for the missiles' modification and use for commercial launches of spacecraft in accordance with orders from Russian and foreign firms, the dismantling of launch complexes and of missiles not to be used for launches with a view to obtaining systems, assemblies, and materials to be used in the national economy and for export, the conversion of the territory of launch complexes into private farms, and the construction of housing for officers of the Russian Federation Armed Forces by means of the funds obtained (the “Housing for Missiles” project, hereinafter the project) is to be approved.

It is to be taken into consideration that the project is funded mainly with the funds attracted from Russian and foreign investors.

2. The proposal by interested ministries and departments of the Russian Federation for the participation in work on implementing the project of the “Scientific and Technical Progress” Association for business cooperation with foreign countries, the “SLBM Conversion” Association, and the “Joint-Stock Union for Conversion Activity,” “Reusable Resources,” and “Space Industry” Joint-Stock Companies is to be adopted.

3. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense is to be confirmed as the project’s general client.

4. The Russian Space Agency is to ensure the coordination of work on the creation of commercial space rocket systems on the basis of utilizing the missiles to be eliminated.

5. It is to be laid down that:

work on the project connected with modifying missiles for commercial launches of spacecraft during 1993-1994 is funded in accordance with contracts with the client out of appropriations from the Russian Federation republic budget provided for under the subhead “Realization of International Treaties on the Elimination, Reduction, and Limitation of Arms”; the profit made from realizing the project is used to construct housing for officers of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and to fund research and development on converting missiles of the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Navy into carrier rockets for launches of spacecraft and [to fund] the development of basic progressive technologies for the production of national economic output on the basis of utilizing these missiles.

6. The Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense are to transfer without payment to the organizations involved in carrying out work on the project the missiles to be eliminated, the launch and ship complexes, and their equipment as they are taken off combat duty, as well as missiles and equipment with expired guarantee periods.

7. For the realization of the project, organizations involved in work on the project are to be permitted to engage in foreign economic activity in accordance with the procedure laid down in existing legislation with regard to concluding treaties and contracts for carrying out commercial launches of spacecraft and selling the technical output, materials, and equipment obtained following industrial processing of missiles and the equipment of launch and ship complexes.

8. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, the Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, jointly with the other departments and organizations involved in realizing the project, are to draw up and approve within two months a statute defining the organization of the fulfillment of work on the project, the timing and the procedure for the handover of missiles and combat launch and ship complexes, the procedure for settling up for this work, the utilization of the revenue received, and the participation in the said work of elimination bases, troop units, and test sites of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense.

9. The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, jointly with other interested departments and entrepreneurial structures, are to ensure the
preparation and holding of talks with the U.S. side and
other foreign partners with a view to improving the
possibilities of realizing the project.

Signed) Ye. Goydar.

Russia's Kokoshin Interviewed on Missile Forces

PM1211163692 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Nov 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by Viktor Litovkin incorporating an interview
with Russian First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey
Kokoshin during visit to Rezhits Missile Division; date
not given: "Russian Army Begins Modernization of Its
Strategic Nuclear Forces"]

[Text] "We are on the brink of the adoption of very
important decisions on the strategic nuclear forces,"
Russian First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokos-
shin stated in an interview for IZVESTIYA during his
visit to the Guards Rezhits Red Banner Missile Division
of the Strategic Missile Forces, stationed in the European
part of Russia, in Valday.

"The START Treaty has been ratified. Further reduc-
tions in the strategic forces lie ahead, and the entire
system of the country's defense capability is being
reviewed," he said. "We are trying to formulate a new
strategy for the development of the Strategic Missile
Forces as the basis of our security and to define projects
and avenues of research and experimental and design
work."

The Moscow guests, who also included Aleksandr
Piskunov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation
Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security,
visited the missile division's new mobile command
center; went down 40 meters deep into the concrete
dungeon of a regimental command center to call on the duty
crews; familiarized themselves with the system with
which the formation is equipped; and met and talked
with residents of the Bologoye garrison and officers of
the unit.

The Defense Ministry leadership also had other reasons
to visit the division. "Sotka," the MR-UR-100 missile
system which the unit has had in place since 1979 (in an
appendix to the START Treaty it is designated by the
U.S. terminology as SS-17, and by Russian terminology
as RS-16), is to be removed from the armory in the next
two years.

The last few hundreds of these missiles, especially those
with multiple warheads, exist only in the European part
of Russia. They come under the START Treaty and will
be eliminated. They are to be replaced by the "Topol"
(or SS-25) mobile missile system, a division of which is
being withdrawn from Belarus. Orders for this system
have also been placed with the Russian defense industry
for 1993. But, in future the strategic nuclear forces are to
have a fundamentally new, standardized missile of the
next generation.

The composition of the Strategic Missile Forces, our
experts claim, will be drastically reduced. But structur-
ally it is proposed that they will combine mobile and
stationary systems of high nuclear safety and reliability,
efficient in use and cheap to manufacture, which comply
fully with the various international agreements and
treaties.

In strengthening its security Russia will continue to rely
on the strength and might of the Strategic Missile Forces.
Andrey Kokoshin told me. Incidentally, experts say that
the missile forces are the cheapest branch of the Armed
forces. They are capable of tackling 60-100 percent of
strategic combat tasks, yet require only 5-6 percent of the
total defense budget. Seven percent of that goes on the
personnel's pay, 9 percent on capital construction, and 4
percent on research, design, and experimental work.

In connection with the redeployment of the missile
division from Belarus to Valday, Colonel General Igor
Sergeyev, commander in chief of the Strategic Missile
Forces, said, it is planned to launch housing construction
in the Bologoye garrison in 1993. Funds have already
been allocated for this and surveys have been carried out.
The missile regiments will be withdrawn and changed
over not all at once, but gradually, two units a year, and
will be provided with apartments and the necessary
infrastructure.

The construction of emplacements for the Topols, the
commander in chief noted, will be fairly cheap—they do
not have to be dug into the ground, and the infrastruc-
ture of the MR-UR-100 is almost entirely suitable for
them.

Russia To Restore Nuclear Weapons System

PM1311165392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Nov 92 p 2

[Report by Major Aleksandr Dolinin: "Those Who
Ensure Missile Safety"]

[Text] More than 2,000 strategic missiles are operated by
the Strategic Missile Troops and the Navy, while 36
complexes and systems are operated by the space forces.
Moreover, nuclear weapons are sited on the territory of
four Commonwealth states. Is there a single body which
looks after the safety of missiles during their operation
and during their removal from alert duty and storage?

Such a question did not exist in the conditions of the
USSR. Today Russia also has enough manpower and
resources to exercise supervision over strategic missiles
and space complexes and systems. In the Strategic Mis-
side Forces, for example, a system of organizational and
technical measures has been created which guarantees
the technical readiness and nuclear safety of missile
complexes. What, then, is the problem?

The whole point is that major changes have recently
occurred in the system of guaranteed technical and
personnel supervision of missile complexes and sophisticated space systems on the part of industry: First and foremost, the structure of the central organs of management of defense production has changed. The specialists involved in guaranteed supervision have not found a place in it. The economic autonomy of enterprises has led to ties being ruptured not just in the Commonwealth, but in Russia itself. There has been an exodus of the specialists engaged in direct supervision. It has become unprofitable for enterprises to keep them on. Finance for this work has been cut back. The responsibility which enterprises involved in design and manufacture used to bear for the technical state of missile and space complexes, from their installation to their removal from operation, has begun to diminish.

How, then, are the troops to maintain equipment and armaments in working condition today? After all, even when they have been removed from duty, you cannot leave them ownerless: They require supervision both by the troops and the actual enterprises which produce them from the very beginning of the production cycle to their installation.

Given that the system of supervision which existed for decades has been destroyed and the responsibility of enterprises has diminished, the fact that missile complexes have not become more dangerous is basically thanks to the troops’ efforts. But their activity has become difficult in the extreme.

What can be done? From conversations with the leadership of the troops and with specialists it emerges that guaranteed technical and personnel supervision should be immediately restored, and design bureaus and enterprises should be obliged by decree to accept responsibility for defense output, regardless of the form of ownership. It is seen as advisable that a Supervision Center be set up as an autonomous subunit of the Russian Federation Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry.

Experience shows that it makes no sense whatsoever to destroy what has performed perfectly well. During the years of guaranteed supervision a normative and technical base was created and concomitant documentation prepared. Cadres of experts were formed.

The center is not seen not as a “roving” entity which—where need be—“puts out fires” in operating units, but as a coordinator of the action of the creators of missile and space complexes and their operators.

Enterprises, establishments, and organizations, regardless of their departmental subordination or forms of ownership, are required by the law on defense to meet their contractual obligations. The law is a good one, but even in earlier, stable times acts of legislation were skillfully sidestepped. For that reason the adoption by the Russian Federation Government of the decision on supervision prepared by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry is objectively essential.

A new system of guaranteed nuclear and environmental safety may emerge in the future, but today it is essential to restore the previous one—and not just in the Russian Federation, but in the other Commonwealth states too. An agreement among them on watertight guaranteed supervision will soon become an acute item on the agenda.

Russia Denies Rumors of Nuclear Leaks
OW1311200492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1918 GMT 13 Nov 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service [FIS] press bureau Yuri Kobaladze has rejected western press reports that various radioactive substances and even nuclear armaments left the territory of the former USSR for other countries. He dismissed information that two warheads had been discovered in Iran after allegedly finding their way there via a Central Asian republic which today was a CIS member state as pure fabrication.

Kobaladze pointed out that measures to supervise and guarantee the safety of nuclear reactors and radioactive substances were being implemented by the relevant departments and western specialists recognised that those methods were among the most reliable in the world.

Russian Officials on Leak of CW ‘Secrets’
OW1111123092 Moscow Central Television First Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1945 GMT
5 Nov 92

[Interview with Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Gorbovskiy, director of the Chemical Weapons Issues Administration under the Russian Presidency’s Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, and Aleksy Petrovich Kondaurov, deputy chief of the Ministry of Security’s Public Relations Center, by Mikhail Solntsev; from the “Utro” program—live]

[Text] [Solntsev] The scandal that erupted recently when state secrets involving chemical weapons were divulged caused a certain stir both in Russia and abroad. We have with us people who are directly involved in putting an end to this scandal, am I not correct?

[Kondaurov] It is hard to say....

[Solntsev, interrupting] In any case, I am happy to introduce our guests. This is Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Gorbovskiy, a doctor of engineering sciences and director of the Chemical Weapons Issues Administration under the Russian Presidency’s Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons—a very long title. Good morning.

[Solntsev] This is Aleksey Petrovich Kondaurov, deputy chief of the Russian Ministry of Security's Public Relations Center. Good morning.

[Kondaurov] Good morning.

[Solntsev] Let us begin with the article published by Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov, in which they accuse Russia of breaking international agreements banning chemical weapons. Mirzayanov was arrested, Fedorov was not.

[Kondaurov] Mirzayanov was detained. The nature of the action taken against him was changed, and he was released from custody on his own recognizance. But, criminal charges against him have not been dropped.

[Solntsev] How do you feel about the recent criticism that has been leveled at your department—criticism that says you have again started persecuting dissidents and those who disagree with current policy?

[Kondaurov] As to dissidents, in terms of this accusation against us, I would say that we do not persecute those who disagree with policy, but, rather, we pursue those who break the law. When criticism is not constructive and shows no desire for absolute truth, we treat it in a very relaxed way. The Ministry of Security, in accordance with the Law on Federal Security Organs, is charged with and is responsible for protecting state secrets. Our workers do not have the right—I repeat, do not have the right—to look the other way and not act when a law is being broken. The Mirzayanov case, in both our opinion and that of the Procurator's Office, which sanctioned criminal proceedings, and the detaining of Mirzayanov... [changes thought] We think that an offense has taken place, and criminal charges have been brought against the suspect, as defined by Article 75 of the Russian Federation decree. Nevertheless, I must repeat that the filing of criminal charges does not amount to saying unanimously that a person is guilty or not. A thorough inquiry is called for, and this is why we have the police and the court.

[Solntsev] Aleksandr Dmitriyevich, what are your comments on these accusations against the Russian Government—accusations that claim the government is breaking its international commitments in the sphere of chemical weapons? What is your opinion as a chief of the Chemical Weapons Issues Administration?

[Gorbovskiy] Indeed, after reading these articles, many people may form such an opinion, but let me note that a whole series of international agreements are in place today. The first is the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, and other gases in wartime. This protocol does not, however, ban the development, manufacture, and production of chemical weapons. As to the second document, a memorandum on the exchange of information and control in observing the ban on chemical weapons was signed in 1989. The first stage of this information exchange has been carried out, as was a mutual visit of U.S. and Russian inspectors.

The subsequent release of data on military chemical potential is planned for 1993, as are inspections aimed at working out international control procedures. There are mutual agreements on destroying chemical weapons which have yet to be put into effect because Russia's industrial base is not prepared for large-scale destruction of chemical weapons. Finally, there is a convention currently under development—it is practically ready—which, if it is signed, will completely ban the development, manufacture, and all other activities related to chemical weapons.

[Solntsev] As a chief of an administration overseeing chemical weapons, how do you feel about these publications by Mirzayanov and Fedorov on the problem of banning chemical weapons?

[Gorbovskiy] The signing of the convention banning chemical weapons is far from being just the wish of politicians. Nevertheless, a material base, the allocation of funds, solutions to an entire complex of economic and technological problems, the construction of unique destruction sites, and the furnishing of laboratories with modern, world-level equipment is essential. The activity of scientists, and these groundless statements... [changes thought] They were not included in resolving these important problems. A whole team of scientists is working on this, and there are planned steps designed to hasten the solution of these problems. Yet, such statements do not really contribute anything to this process. On the contrary, they generate distrust in our negotiating partners, as well as prolong this period we would like to put behind us as soon as possible.

[Solntsev] So, this is directly damaging to the talks. I have a question for Aleksey Petrovich. Why were criminal charges only brought against Mirzayanov while Fedorov was left alone?

[Kondaurov] For the same reason the Ministry of Security works strictly within the limits of law. Despite some mass media bodies presenting the case as a persecution of journalists, Mirzayanov is not a journalist but a party to state secrets. As to Fedorov, he has no connection to any secrets; he is just the coauthor of the article. Therefore, no criminal charges were brought against Fedorov. We act in accordance with the law and strictly within the limits of the law.

[Solntsev] Does the phrase party to a secret mean that the person signed a document pledging not to divulge it?

[Kondaurov] Yes, he signed such a document, and he had access to state secrets during the course of his work. There are voices claiming that because there is no law on state secrets, there can be no case against Mirzayanov. Nevertheless, there is a list of the most important secret data, which was confirmed by the USSR Council of Ministers, and this list was made legal by a decree from the Russian president in January, and it remains in effect today. Also, there is Article 75 of the Russian Federation decree on the divulging of state secrets.
[Soltsev] Can you tell me what is new on the Russian Ministry of Security's front lines?

[Kondaurov] The Russian Ministry of Security is working fairly intensively and under a rigid schedule, and the Mironyaynov case is not the only case. We have have acted on many cases recently. One of the most serious was when we, in cooperation with the St. Petersburg organs, arrested a group of combatants engaged in banditry and robbery. About 500 people were involved in this criminal group's activities. Several dozen are already under arrest, and firearms, ammunitions, edged weapons, and material possessions worth more than a half-billion rubles were confiscated from them during the investigation.

[Soltsev] A half-billion?

[Kondaurov] Yes. Recently, the Russian Federation's Ministry of Security arrested a member of the Russian Foreign Ministry, who was suspected of accepting a bribe for issuing overseas travel passports—on 23 October.

[Soltsev] Is the amount of the bribe known?

[Kondaurov] Let us say that this is still a secret of the investigation.

The chairman of a cooperative enterprise was arrested on suspicion of grand theft through the use of false documents. On 26 October, acting on information received during an investigation, and with the procurator's sanction, a search was conducted in a building occupied by one of Moscow's commercial banks, and a great deal of unregistered material wealth was confiscated. The list for even the last few days is fairly long, and it all involves breaches of trust and the acceptance of bribes—in short, activities of corrupt officials, including those within law enforcement organs.

[Soltsev] I would like to thank you for coming here so early. We have discussed a subject which is of interest to everyone.

Aleksandr Dmitrievich Gorbovskiy, director of the Chemical Weapons Issues Administration under the Russian Presidency's Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, and Aleksey Petrovich Kondaurov, deputy chief of the Russian Ministry of Security's Public Relations Center, thank you both, and good luck at work.

Russian Intelligence Chief on Arms Control

PM031103192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Oct 92 Morning Edition p 2—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Report by Gennadiy Charodeyev: "Russian Supergents Continue to Trickle Out"]

[Text] According to Gennadiy Yevstafyev, chief of the new Russian External Intelligence Service Administration for Arms Control and Nonplication of Weapons of Mass Destruction, regional conflicts and wars are conducive to the use of weapons of mass destruction. It was for that reason that a new approach was devised to the problem of arms control.

This approach, he stressed, is geared primarily to the interests of the Russian Federation, to Moscow's precise and full implementation of its international commitments, and also to the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction to third countries. This approach opens up a wide area where the interests of a large number of states coincide. So "certain opportunities could be found for cooperation in intelligence activity, the purpose of which would be to create a safer world. By preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction to third countries we can create an incentive for nuclear states to follow the path of nuclear disarmament, the external intelligence representative said.

As G. Yevstafyev said, being a nuclear state, Russia is responsible for its own security and other countries' security. The appearance of new states in possession of weapons of mass destruction, particularly on its periphery, is not in its interests. The External Intelligence Service representative said that research related to the development of nuclear weapons is continuing in Pakistan, North Korea, and a number of other countries and "this is worrying."

G. Yevstafyev reported that the threat of terrorism in relation to nuclear facilities remains a world problem. This also applies to CIS countries. The number of incidents that has occurred near nuclear facilities in the world as a whole is very high.

The External Intelligence Service representative stressed that the former Soviet Union had nothing to do with the leaking of nuclear technologies and materials for military nuclear research to Iraq. Until recently the Iraqis did have at their disposal materials on some versions of techniques for enriching uranium and plutonium. But it is now known for certain that the Iraqis obtained all these materials from Western Europe.

In the past 18 months seven members of the Russian Federation External Intelligence Service have gone to the West. "We are all of us, including intelligence agents, living in the same country and facing the same problems," the External Intelligence Service representative said.

Ukraine's Kravchuk Reaffirms Nuclear Stance

LD1211064892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0615 GMT 12 Nov 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Kolesnichenko]

[Text] New York November 12 TASS—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk reiterated that his country is ready to eliminate or withdraw from its territory all nuclear arms if it receives preliminary compensation from Russia.
In a telephone conversation with U.S. President-elect Bill Clinton on Wednesday Kravchuk said that "Ukraine wants to play a stabilising role in the region", according to Clinton's spokesman George Stephanopoulos.

Clinton supported Ukrainian intention to become a nuclear-free state, according to the spokesman.

Ukraine Noncommittal on Sale of Nuclear Material

PM1211133992 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda
in Russian 12 Nov 92 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Kaushanskiy under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Will Ukraine Trade Nuclear Charges?"]

[Text] Kiev, 11 Nov—The hopes that Western credits alone will help Ukraine rise to a new economic level are unrealistic. A nation can survive only by work and responsibility. It was in those categorical terms that President Leonid Kravchuk assessed the present situation in Ukraine at his usual meeting with the press 10 November.

On the eve of the press conference, Vice Premier Igor Yukhnovskiy met with journalists and, when talking about the most urgent problem, namely the fate of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, stated that the republic has no reason to disarm itself free of charge, as it were. The nuclear charges left after dismantling the missiles could reasonably be sold to those countries which will pay most for them. Some figures have been published in the press here: 176 SS-19 and SS-24 missiles with 1,280 warheads could net Ukraine $9 billion if the nuclear fuel is sold [v sluchaye prodazhi yadernogo topliva]. But if the missiles are given to Russia to dismantle "just like that," this will give the northern neighbor a chance to make a fat profit and will mean a loss of resources forever.

Will the republic sell its nuclear wares? The Ukrainian president answered diplomatically: We will have to think about it... But in so saying he noted that Ukraine has already given Russia all its tactical nuclear weapons without receiving any material equivalent in exchange.

Ukrainian Parliament's Nuclear Stance Viewed

MK1211091792 Moscow Moskovskiiye Novosti
in Russian Nos. 45-46 (Signed to press 10 Nov 92) p 11

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Lartsev, Candidate of philosophical sciences, and Vladimir Ruban, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI Ukraine correspondent: "Ukrainian Parliament Dreams of Atom Bomb"]

[Text] The National Security Council, headed by President Kravchuk, approved Ukraine's draft military doctrine back in May this year. At last, after repeated debate in parliamentary commissions, the people's deputies examined the draft in plenary session at the end of October. They sent it back for further work.

Many deputies believe that Ukraine will not benefit from being a nonnuclear, nonaligned [vneblokovyy] state. But these were the principles that were enshrined in the Declaration of Ukrainian State Sovereignty (July 1990) and later reaffirmed in a special Supreme Soviet statement in October last year. Moreover, according to the defense minister, Colonel General Konstantin Morozov, declaring Ukraine to be a nuclear state would be out of step with its economic potential and strategic interests. As regards Ukraine's nonaligned status, the draft military doctrine proposes a compromise—in the event of aggression being prepared against Ukraine, it could act with other states to thwart any attack. But by no means was everyone satisfied with this.

Just why have the people's deputies changed their position so markedly in just a year?

Parliamentary Revenge

As the economic crisis deepens, authoritarian trends are objectively getting stronger. The authorities are trying to hang on, primarily by strengthening the Army, the state security service, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Moreover, a relatively influential military lobby has emerged of late. It is made up, on the one hand, of people's deputies who are military men (Major General Vladimir Tolubko and Lieutenant General Boris Sharikov, who, prior to 24 August 1991, opposed Ukraine's secession from the USSR and the development of national armed forces, before abruptly adopting this position), and, on the other hand, by their colleagues from the patriotic officers' union.

The failure of the draft military doctrine in the Supreme Soviet was also brought about by the fact that it was debated the day after the new government was confirmed. Premier Leonid Kuchma set deputies a tough condition—either they voted for the entire Cabinet of Ministers, or he would not be responsible for its future activities. The parliamentarians gave way, but they were to have their revenge. The examination of the draft military doctrine came (from the standpoint of the people's representatives) right on cue. At the same time, the deputies taught the president a lesson, too. The majority in parliament showed Leonid Kravchuk—who is leaning toward the idea of calling early elections to the Supreme Soviet—that it is too early to write off the old parliament. Nor did the democratic opposition, which the president has played a part in fragmenting—miss the chance to make its presence felt.

Other deputies (former communists) withheld support from the draft military doctrine in order to protest the influence wielded over the Defense Ministry leadership by Vladimir Mulyava, head of the ministry's social psychology [sotsialno-psихологическое] service and placeman of the national radicals, who in less than a year has been promoted from reserve-list sergeant to major general. He has not yet managed to set up an effective social psychology service designed to replace political organs, but attempts are being made to inculcate officers...
and warrant officers—most of whom are Russians—in the traditions of the Ukrainian insurgent army and Ukrainian nationalism. Many people do not like this.

**Ukrainian Defense**

The foreign policy reasons are no less important. The deputies are following with alarm the exacerbation of the political struggle in Russia and the statements made by the National Salvation Front leaders, and they believe that if the latter were to come to power, a nonnuclear and nonaligned Ukraine could find itself defenseless.

Nor is everything smooth in relations with the current Russian Federation leadership. The Yalta accords—specifically on the Black Sea Fleet—are not being implemented (and Ukrainian politicians blame the Russian side). Kiev also well remembers that recently Russia has essentially twice made territorial claims against Ukraine (last year immediately after the declaration of Ukrainian state independence, and this year at the height of the Crimea confrontation). Similar schemes are being hatched by various political forces in Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland.... "In order to guarantee its territorial integrity, Ukraine needs to control at least a small nuclear potential which would act as a deterrent," the well-known radical Stepan Khmara stated from the Supreme Soviet rostrum. He was not alone in that opinion.

**Possible Maneuvers**

So just how will events pan out? The Army, the military-industrial complex, and the state as a whole cannot function normally for long without a military doctrine. Without it, it will be impossible even to downsize the armed forces. The president, the head of the government, and the defense minister will either have to wait for new elections to the Supreme Soviet (which will not be for at least a year) or try to persuade the present parliamentarians to accept a compromise. Clearly, it would be effective for the Defense Ministry leadership to issue a statement which would present the Supreme Soviet with a choice of either approving the draft military doctrine or rejecting the declaration of Ukraine as a nonnuclear, nonaligned state. The people's deputies would hardly be likely to assume that responsibility. But it is unlikely that Konstantin Morozov will go for broke. This means that Ukraine will clearly have to survive for a time without a military doctrine.

**Belarusian Authorities Discover Uranium Smuggling Ring**

**LDI111191192 Warsaw PAP in English 0114 GMT 11 Nov 92**

[Text] Kiev, Nov. 10—Belarusian authorities on Tuesday reported they had discovered a ring of smugglers trafficking Russian Uranium to Poland.

According to newsmen from Minsk, Acting Prosecutor General Vladimir Kondratev said in the parliament that a Russian citizen carrying 2.5 kilograms of Uranium had been apprehended at a border crossing in Brest.

Kondratev added that the man admitted that he had smuggled to Poland three more kilograms of Uranium this year.

The prosecutor refused to disclose what was the destination of the Uranium and what would its price on the Black Market be.

**Belarus Plans Arms Reduction, Missile Withdrawal**

PM1111094992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA

*In Russian 7 Nov 92 p 2*

[Report by Valeriy Kovalev: “Belarus Will Not Be an Arms Exporter, Although Even After Fulfillment of CFE Treaty It Will Be Left with 1,600 Tanks, 200 Infantry Fighting Vehicles and Armored Personnel Carriers, and 130 Aircraft”]

[Text] It is known that on 21 October the Belarusian parliament ratified the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe. Belarus—hitherto one of the countries on the European continent most saturated with troops (not of its own will, of course)—is about to reduce the arms it inherited from the former Belorussian Military District.

The republic has been allocated 40 months for this. Not so little time, you might think! But judge for yourselves how much has to be done. Here are the data which Major General Viktor Vakar, chief of the Belarusian Control and Inspections Agency under the Republic of Belarus Ministry of Defense, cited for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: More than 1,600 tanks, 130 combat aircraft, and more than 1,200 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers are subject to reduction. According to specialists' estimates, the cost of this "operation" will total approximately 500 million rubles.

The tank repair plant in Borisov is already practically ready to "disarm" and convert some of the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for use in the national economy. The aircraft repair plant in Baranovichi will dismantle aircraft, and the special base at Stankovo—armored personnel carriers. The bodies of armored hardware subject to destruction will be melted down at Zhlobin Metallurgical Plant.

The elimination of combat hardware is expected to give Belarus approximately 50,000 tonnes of high-grade metal. Mindful of this fact, as well as the fact that it is planned to use some of the components, units, and mechanisms for civilian purposes, many specialists with whom I have spoken arrive at the conclusion that the republic is capable of not only covering its own expenditure on arms reduction but also making some profit.

It is interesting that during the discussion of the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe a number of deputies proposed replenishing the treasury more "solidly." For
this, in the opinion of some parliamentarians, part of the combat hardware ought not to be destroyed but... sold abroad. The proposal did not meet with support in the Supreme Soviet, however. Of course, it would be nice to sell it, but the treaty does not permit the sale to other countries of arms being reduced. They are liable to mandatory elimination or conversion for use for civilian purposes.

Maj. Gen. Viktor Vakar confirmed the readiness of Belarus to fulfill its commitments to the other parties to the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe in full and within the times strictly allocated for this. The remaining arms are another matter. The republic has the right to dispose of them at its own discretion. It will have on a legal basis 1,600 modern tanks, 200 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 130 aircraft, and a considerable number of artillery systems and helicopters. But, according to forecasts by the Republic of Belarus Ministry of Defense, the republic will refrain from selling surplus weapons.

First, I was told, prestige, the respect of other states, and the desire for neutrality and peaceableness—a desire declared at the highest level—are dearer to it than money. Second, this combat hardware, even if mothballed on bases and in storehouses, will remain for a further five, six, or even more years at the level of the highest demands and will meet the needs of the republic's young army. So Belarus will hardly become a major arms exporter.

Incidentally. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has learned that a schedule for the withdrawal of strategic nuclear missiles to Russia from the republic's territory has been drawn up and approved in accordance with a directive by Belarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich. By agreement with the Russian Federation leadership it is planned to withdraw combat hardware and 81 ICBM's from Belarus over two years. Eight nuclear missile brigades will leave Belarus in 1993 and the same number in 1994. It is intended that Belarus will be nuclear-free by 30 December 1994.

Lithuanian Nuclear Expert Views Ignalina Plant
AU1011130092 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 9 Nov 92 pp 195-196

[Interview with Rimvydas Jasiulionis, chief of the Physical Institute of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences and government adviser for the Ignalina nuclear power plant, by DER SPIEGEL; place and date not given: "Otherwise a Chernobyl Will Be Imminent"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] When do you think the Ignalina nuclear power plant will be out of control?

[Jasiulionis] I hope never. After the maximum credible accident of Chernobyl, the capacity in Ignalina was reduced. However, this it not sufficient. There are not enough emergency cooling systems and there is no safety jacket.

[DER SPIEGEL] Therefore, it is demanded in the West that the plant be immediately switched off.

[Jasiulionis] Independently of the construction, there is another danger: The staff of a state that no longer exists is working in Ignalina. If extremists come into power in Moscow, they can use the reactors as a means of blackmail to solve the Lithuanian question in accordance with their wishes.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why doesn't the Lithuanian Government simply turn the switch off?

[Jasiulionis] We are in a dilemma. Our young government needs electricity from this plant. We cannot afford large-scale oil, gas, and electricity imports. Moreover, we do not have the money to preserve the reactors after they have been closed down.

Therefore, I propose to use the first reactor, which has been in operation since 1983, for another two to three years and use the second, modern reactor for about 10 years. In this period, we will have to build a modern reactor of a Western type or find other sources of energy.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is it possible to reequip Ignalina with safety technology?

[Jasiulionis] Only to a limited extent. The Swedes help us there.

[DER SPIEGEL] What about the qualifications of the staff?

[Jasiulionis] The staff is highly qualified. This is a requirement because there are no fully automatic operating systems. The shift manager must always have the reactor under control. Unfortunately, computerized training facilities, with which emergency situations could be rehearsed, have not been established so far. One cannot help training new people in practice. After Chernobyl, the technicians have become more safety-minded.

[DER SPIEGEL] Nevertheless, the people who live near Ignalina are very much afraid.

[Jasiulionis] Right. They are taking the risk and do not even get electricity from their plant cheaper. We have now started to set up measuring stations that are to ascertain the radioactivity within a radius of 3 to 5 km. There are evacuation plans. But where are the people supposed to go in such a small country?

[DER SPIEGEL] Not only Lithuania would be affected by a maximum credible accident. If you had it in your hands, would you shut Ignalina down?

[Jasiulionis] Yes, of course. I already said before its construction: We do not need such a thing in Lithuania. I visited Chernobyl after the catastrophe. I know the consequences of a damage not only from books.

In principle, it is irresponsible to continue to operate such a dangerous object. However, we must not detach ourselves from reality. We are all freezing now because
there is not enough electricity. We have to use the first reactor for two more winters, we will manage this. The International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna is supporting us.

[DER SPIEGEL] You are taking an enormous risk. In the past few months there were several breakdowns, also in the cooling system. An accident might have even led to a catastrophe.

[Jasiulionis] Right, that was in July. If one is cynical, one can say: All European environmental institutions can adjust their measuring instruments in our country. I disapprove of the management of the plant because it tried to conceal facts. Only if one is open can safety be increased, otherwise a Chernobyl will be imminent.

[DER SPIEGEL] In 1989, the Lithuanians protested against the plant.

[Jasiulionis] There were demonstrations against the development of the third block, which was stopped afterward. Originally, six blocks were planned in Ignalina. In my opinion, however, it would have been a better solution to complete the third reactor and immediately switch off the critical first one.

[DER SPIEGEL] What will be done with the used fuel rods?

[Jasiulionis] This is also a dangerous thing. In former times, they were taken to the Soviet Union. Now a deposit is being built near the plant. There are plans of a St. Petersburg institute that are completely insufficient concerning safety regulations. If we close down the first reactor, we will not need such a plant; then we can store the used fuel material in this building.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is it true that even the site of Ignalina is dangerous because there are earth movements?

[Jasiulionis] Yes. Geologists ascertained tectonic dislocations there. At that time, in their search for an appropriate place, the Moscow generals only saw the lake that is required for the cooling system and the railroad near by. But we are not alone with this geological problem. The nuclear power plants in the Crimea and Armenia were also built on unsafe ground. Ignalina will, therefore, continue to frighten the people for a long time even after it has been switched off.

Azerbaijan Calls Atomic Bomb Claims ‘Groundless’

LD1011165692 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1500 GMT 10 Nov 92

[Text] Today's sitting of the national assembly in Baku debated a very curious issue: Does Azerbaijan really have an atomic bomb? The issue was raised by deputies following a recent speech by the republic's Interior Minister Khamidov to the effect that it has two atomic bombs. After a lively debate, Supreme Soviet Chairman Gamberov officially declared that Azerbaijan does not have an atomic bomb and that such claims are absolutely groundless.

FRANCE

Dumas Suggests Talks Between 5 Nuclear Powers

OW0411031892 Beijing XINHUA in English 0214 GMT 4 Nov 92

[Text] Paris, November 3 (XINHUA)—French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas said today he hoped that the United States, Britain, China, Russia and France would hold talks on nuclear testing.

Dumas, speaking in the national assembly, said representatives of the five nuclear powers participating in the conference on disarmament in Geneva should collectively consider the issue of nuclear tests.

He suggested the setting up of a supervisory system for the launching of ballistic missiles to prevent the proliferation of massive antipersonnel weapons.

France announced the suspension of its nuclear tests at the beginning of this year.

On European defense, Dumas said Europe had two forces now—the joint army corps of France and Germany and the Atlantic alliance. He regarded the Atlantic alliance as the cornerstone of European defense, but France did not hope to return to the military integration of the alliance.

Dumas Considers Extending Nuclear Moratorium

PM1311100992 Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Nov 92 p13


[Text] The National Assembly adopted the Foreign Ministry budget, which includes the budgets for European affairs and the French-speaking world, presented by Roland Dumas, Elisabeth Guigou, and Catherine Tasca, by 275 votes to 210 on 4 November. The Socialists voted in favor, the Union for French Democracy and the Rally for the Republic voted by a large majority against, and the Union of the Center and the Communist Party abstained. This decision by the communists, who had not announced their intention in advance, followed Mr Dumas' announcement that France is "studying" the possibility of extending the suspension of its nuclear tests until July 1993.

Mr. Dumas did not have to indulge in rash promises to secure the adoption of his ministry's credits, which amount to 14.87 billion French Francs [Fr], an increase of 5.53 percent at current prices.

During the debate communist spokesman Robert Montdargent devoted a considerable proportion of his speech
to disarmament, as usual. "France has imposed a one-year moratorium on nuclear tests, a decision I support," the Val d'Oise deputy pointed out. "But unlike the two great nuclear powers (the United States and the CIS—LE MONDE editor's note), it has not yet decided to extend it until July 1993. Paris has just ratified the nonproliferation treaty and regards the antiproliferation campaign as a priority, however."

"We have suspended our nuclear test program for this year: The Americans, then the Russians, followed us, imposing moratoriums on their tests until July 1993, which is good, and we are studying this option," the minister replied before pointing out that France "also proposes finalizing a regime to monitor ICBM launches." That was all it took for the communists, who had taken care not to state their position before the minister's speech, to decide to abstain.

Whereas Mr. Montdargent's comment was somewhat measured, Jean-Claude Lefort (Communist Party, Val-de-Marne), on the other hand, mounted a vigorous attack on the government's action over the debate on the meager credits for the Ministry of European Affairs (Fr14.27 million) given that the French contribution to the EC budget (Fr83.5 billion) is examined during part one of the finance law (LE MONDE, 25-26 October). "The main function of your budget is to organize international meetings, finance a touring exhibition, and promote your one-sided propaganda campaigns aimed at primary schools. No further comment is needed," the communist deputy exclaimed.

In truth, the situation was not very critical for the foreign affairs budget. The centrists, loyal and habitual supporters of the government on European matters, had given the government the benefit of the doubt, as they did last year, by announcing in advance their intention to abstain.

Firmly supported by the Socialists, Mr. Dumas, following Mme Guigou who was opposed by Mrs. Nicole Catala (Rally for the Republic, Paris), who briefly revived the Maastricht debate, was thus able to withstand unscathed the criticisms of the Union for French Democracy and the Rally for the Republic. "The Union for French Democracy has decided to vote no, not because of any particular action that has been carried out but because of something your policy lacks which is not expressed by credits: Namely, the moral duty of France to take the stand that is expected of it," Jean-Francois Deniau (Cher) affirmed. "For France's voice to be heard, it needs money and the will. You have a little of the former: I fear that you seriously lack the latter," Michele Alliot-Marie, (Rally for the Republic, Pyrenees-Atlantique), declared.

More on Extending Moratorium
PM1011170492 Paris LE MONDE in French 6 Nov 92 P14


[Text] "We are studying the possibility" of a new moratorium on France's nuclear tests, until July 1993. Confirming rumors reported by LE MONDE in its 14 October issue, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas caused ripples on the evening of Tuesday 3 November by improvising, in front of deputies, this announcement, which was not present in the speech he had distributed.

"The Americans and then the Russians followed us," Mr. Dumas stated, "by adopting moratoriums on their own tests until July 1993. This is a good thing." The foreign minister then invited the five nuclear powers (apart from France, they are the United States, Russia, Britain, and communist China) to embark on "joint consideration of the question of nuclear tests" at the time of the Geneva disarmament conference.

It was last April, at the time of Pierre Beregovoy's general policy statement, that the prime minister announced the head of state's decision to suspend for a year, 1992, France's campaign of nuclear explosions at the Polynesian sites of Mururoa and Fangataufa.

Defense Minister Pierre Joxe, the general staffs, and the Atomic Energy Commission, in their different ways, all registered surprise at this initiative, which the prime minister justified by stating that France intends to set an example and compel the other powers to imitate it.

Admiral Jacques Lanxade, Armed Forces chief of staff, aware of the trouble created by this moratorium in the defense community, dissociated himself, pointing out, in an unusual message to the Armed Forces, that it is a question of a political decision—which amounts to not accepting military responsibility—and that it is clear, in his view, that this step should not be prolonged beyond 1992. At the Atomic Energy Commission, the fear of a fatal delay in the modernization of the French deterrent was put forward earnestly.

In subsequent months the camp of supporters of a resumption of nuclear tests grew stronger in France. China has in effect continued its tests, admittedly at a very slow pace. With the result that the defense minister, in preparing his draft budget for 1993, opted to reserve credits for a new campaign of tests, despite the planned reduction (at the level of 11.5 percent on average) in investments allocated for national nuclear equipment.

Attempt at Evaluation
Everything has changed since October. One after another, the Americans and then the Russians announced that they are suspending their nuclear tests until July 1993. The Chinese, for their part, have promised nothing. Only the British, who carry out their
experiments at U.S. sites, grumbled, because they believe an international moratorium is prejudicial to their interests. In spite of everything, France had ceased to be isolated, and its stance was no longer unilateral.

It is this new context which explains why Mr. Dumas is able to make it known today, in the National Assembly, in an atmosphere of comparative indifference and in the context of a public opinion mobilized by the U.S. elections, that France is considering continuing to suspend its nuclear tests until next summer. In different circumstances this announcement, which points to the fact that the French nuclear arsenal no longer has the same priority, would have prompted a large-scale public debate. Nonetheless, in the general staffs and the Atomic Energy Commission it will prompt serious anxiety concerning France's capacity henceforth to implement its plan of perfecting what remains of its strategic system, namely the warheads for the new M5 missile, which are to arm the four Le Triomphant-class nuclear submarines, and the warheads for the air-to-surface missile mounted on the Rafale aircraft.

Technicians claim that there is no substitute for a full-scale test, given that laboratory simulations cannot test—in order to improve—the "stealth" of a weapon (its capacity to mislead enemy defenses), the definition of the "geometry" of the warhead (the composition of its "ingredients," in order to create a system that combines cost and efficacy), or the quality of the keys guaranteeing the system's security (with a view to an explosion on command).

At the French general staffs people are already preparing to win the government round in favor of a provisional solution, which, after July 1993, would be to make provision for at least one experiment in order to keep the Polynesia sites in a suitable condition—putting them to the test in order to "calibrate" the measuring instruments. In fact, the Americans have made it clear that in the three years following the 1993 moratorium, that is, between 1994 and 1996, they will resume their tests at a reduced level. They have British support.

For their part, the Russian military are not keen to be outdone, and to this day they have not broken off work on the islands of Novaya Zemlya, in the Barents Sea, in the Arctic Ocean, which will be operational for tests next summer.

Reports Continue on Japanese Plutonium Ship

**Navy Tightens Security**

*OW0211145692 Tokyo KYODO in English 1028 GMT 2 Nov 92*

[Text] Cherbourg, France, Nov. 2 KYODO—The French Navy tightened security at Cherbourg harbor early Monday in anticipation of antinuclear protests against the arrival of a Japanese vessel that will transport one ton of plutonium from France to Japan.

Small Navy patrol boats cruised the harbor as Greenpeace activists and scores of journalists camped out Sunday night at the harbor's entrance for the arrival of the 38,000-deadweight-ton Akatsuki Maru.

The ship reportedly left Brest on France's Atlantic coast Saturday evening after it was loaded with provisions, and was expected to reach Cherbourg on the English Channel as early as Sunday evening to load 133 casks of highly toxic radioactive substance. The Sunday arrival never materialized, however.

Heavy rains and strong winds built up to 100 kilometers per hour by Monday, according to a domestic weather station. Navy officers said it was unlikely the bad weather would have any effect in delaying the Akatsuki Maru, however, saying it was not unusual to take more than a day to sail the distance from Brest to Cherbourg.

They also pointed out that ferry service linking both sides of the channel was being operated as usual.

The ship's route has triggered concern in many countries and among international environmental groups which point out the dangers of a possible accident at sea involving the extremely toxic substance.

As the French Industry and Foreign Trade Ministry maintain a policy of silence on the whereabouts and arrival schedule of the ship, rumors have started circulating among protesters that the vessel has been hidden in a Cherbourg Navy magazine under cover over night.

Other unconfirmed reports say the ship has not left Brest, as the state-run nuclear fuel company Cogema is still waiting to load 25 casks of plutonium.

French Minister of Industry and Foreign Trade Dominique Strauss-Kahn said earlier loading would be complete within 24 hours.

Japan intends to ship some 30 tons of plutonium from Europe over the next 20 years after reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from plants in Britain and France. The plutonium shipments are designated for Japan's fast-breeder nuclear energy program.

**Demonstrators Amass**

*AU0611123792 Paris AFP in English 1211 GMT 6 Nov 92*

[Excerpt] Cherbourg, France, Nov 6 (AFP)—Battle lines were being drawn Friday [6 November] in this Channel port as more security forces were expected for the now-imminent start of loading operations in the biggest intercontinental shipment yet of radioactive material—1.5 tonnes (3,300 pounds) of plutonium from Cherbourg to Japan by sea.

A first convoy of more than 100 gendarmerie trucks were seen approaching Cherbourg Thursday evening, and a dozen of them later entered the Arsenal military shipyard here, where the highly toxic plutonium will be loaded aboard a Japanese freighter, the Akatsuki Maru.
Various witness accounts had scores of gendarmerie units bivouacked in or converging on the area to ensure the strictest of security for the delicate operation.

They are expected to turn the 26-kilometer (16-mile) road between Cherbourg and La Hague, site of the COGEMA recycling plant, into a veritable no-man's land.

The exact number of security forces involved is not known, but the last time a plutonium shipment left Cherbourg—a much more modest 240 kilograms (528 lbs) in 1984—there were 1,100 mobile gendarmerie troops and an armored vehicle.

The 1984 shipment too was made by the Akatsuki Maru, but it was then called the Pacific Crane.

Opposed to the shipment on safety grounds are a handful of environmentalists who have been camped here for the past six weeks, under the informal leadership of the Greenpeace group. [passage omitted]

**Ship Leaves for Japan**

*OW0811020092 Tokyo KYODO in English 0109 GMT 8 Nov 92*

[Text] Cherbourg, France, Nov. 7 KYODO—The Japanese ship Akatsuki Maru left France's northwestern port of Cherbourg on Saturday night for Japan carrying a ton of highly toxic plutonium which will be used for Japan's fast breeder reactor program.

Japan's Maritime Safety Agency patrol boat Shikishima will escort the plutonium carrier throughout its voyage home.

The Akatsuki Maru was loaded with 15 containers of plutonium that was reprocessed by France's state-run nuclear fuel company Cogema at its plant in La Hague, about 25 kilometers from Cherbourg.

Television monitors set up by Cogema showed the loading of the cargo to journalists in a temporary press center inside a freight railroad station near Cherbourg port.

The 3,800-ton Akatsuki Maru, which left Japan on August 24 and sailed into the French port of Brest on October 29, arrived in Cherbourg at around 5 a.m. Saturday.

It is not known what course the Akatsuki Maru will take on its voyage home. Citing security concerns, the Japanese and French Governments have been tight-lipped about the vessel's route.

Japan plans to ship about 30 tons of radioactive plutonium from Europe and Britain in the coming three decades.

A number of countries and environmental groups have raised concerns that the shipments could be involved in an accident at sea. Plutonium is also a key ingredient for making nuclear weapons.

**Escort, Greenpeace Ships Collide**

*LD0811142792 Paris France-Inter Radio Network in French 1300 GMT 8 Nov 92*

[Text] The military ship Shikishima, which is escorting Akatsuki Maru, rammed the Greenpeace ship Solo this morning. A Greenpeace spokesman said: We think this act is deliberate. According to the spokesman, Shikishima moved closer to the Solo, which it harrassed all night. The most suprising thing about this incident is that it was the bigger ship, the Shikishima, that seems to have been damaged worse than the Solo, the smaller one. The two ships are continuing their route normally at the moment.

**Nation To Help Dismantle Russian Nuclear Arms**

*AU1111125392 Paris AFP in English 1236 GMT 11 Nov 92*

[Report by Philippe Rater]

[Text] Paris, Nov 11 (AFP)—France is to join the United States and Britain in helping dismantle 90 percent of Russia's nuclear weaponry, the defence ministry said here Wednesday.

The sources said a bilateral framework agreement would be signed here Thursday during a visit by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. Under a separate bilateral agreement, the two countries will study the possibility of destroying the fissile material left after vectors are separated from their nuclear charges.

Two methods are currently used for dealing with the fissile matter. The United States stocks it, but experts warn that is not a long-term solution.

France on the other hand has experience in burning the fissile substance in a nuclear reactor, which is an ideal way of stemming nuclear proliferation.

The joint studies with the Russians will determine whether their reactors are capable of burning off the fissile matter, ministry sources said.

Kozyrev will be signing ancillary agreements covering protection against radiation and procedures in case of accident. Two more bilateral agreements to be finalised by the end of the year deal with the supply of machine-tools for cutting up weapons and delivery of containers.

The three to four year deal worth hundreds of millions of francs was put together by teams of French experts visiting Russia over the past year.

According to Western estimates, Russia has 35,000 operational nuclear weapons. Under disarmament agreements, 22,000 are to be eliminated. The process involves
separating a launcher from its nuclear warhead. Subsequent destruction of the fissile matter, if carried out, means transforming uranium or plutonium into a sort of ingot.

The weapons are both tactical and strategic, and include missiles, shells, mines and underwater grenades.

The production, and now the dismantling, of the weapons is done in 10 “forbidden” cities, where 1 million of their 2 million inhabitants are directly employed in the military and civilian nuclear industries, informed sources said.

The comparable workforce in the United States is 100,000, and the military applications sector of France’s atomic energy agency has 6,000 employees.

The Russians have calculated they could dismantle 2,000 nuclear warheads a year without outside help, which would mean a gigantic task stretching over 10 to 15 years to get rid of all the arms earmarked for elimination, experts said.

GERMANY

Suspected British Plutonium Dealer in Custody
LD0311212192 Hamburg DPA in German 2018 GMT 3 Nov 92

[Text] Flensburg (DPA)—A 51 year-old alleged plutonium dealer from Britain was taken into investigative custody this evening in Flensburg on strong suspicion of violating the war weapons control law. This was announced by the spokesman for the state prosecutor’s office in Flensburg, in reply to a question.

The Englishman, who describes himself as a “commodity dealer” and has been running a business for “diving work of all types” from a backyard in Flensburg since 1985, is said to have been involved in dealing in nuclear weapons-grade plutonium. The man is accused of receiving the plutonium, which came from former Soviet stocks, from a Swedish supplier and passing it on to a British intermediary.

It is not yet known exactly how much plutonium is involved. According to previous reports the man is said to have initially supplied three grams of the highly dangerous material, on a trial basis. A total of 280 kg are said to be at stake, however, which is assumed to have been earmarked for Iraq. The illegal trade was broken up in England and Bulgaria.

CIS ‘Wave of Secrecy’ on Nuclear Material Cited
AU0411105392 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 4 Nov 92 p 3


[Text] Berlin—The illegal uranium merchants from the ex-Soviet Union have not yet found their market, Andras Heinemann-Gruender of the Berlin Berghof-Institute for Peace and Conflict Research believes.

The coauthor of the study “Satan’s Fist—The Nuclear Legacy of the Soviet Union,” which was presented yesterday, observed the black market with the nuclear asset for a long time. The small amounts of fissionable material that have turned up in Germany demonstrate the attempt “to check the market first.” According to research done by Siegfried Fischer and Offfried Nassauer, the publishers of the study, the Soviet nuclear factories produced more than 27,000 nuclear warheads. Nothing is left of glasnost in the CIS military circles. Much rather, “a new wave of secrecy” is spreading. It applies, above all, to the problems of nuclear material.

UNITED KINGDOM

Rifkind To Rebuff Yeltsin on New N-Arms Talks
PM0911130392 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 7 Nov 92 p 4

[Report by Peter Almond: “Rifkind To Stand Firm on Nuclear Arms Talks”]

[Text] Mr Rifkind, Defence Secretary, is expected to rebuff sharply any Russian attempts to include Britain in new nuclear arms talks when Mr Yeltsin, the Russian President, arrives in London today.

Indications that the subject is high on the Russian agenda are seen in the arrival with Mr Yeltsin of Gen Pavel Grachev, his youthful defence minister; in increasing Russian objections to the new Start 2 nuclear arms cuts; and by Russian officials who pointed to a hiatus of several months as President-elect Clinton establishes his administration in Washington.

Mr Boris Ivanov, of the disarmament Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said: “This is a good chance to fill in the vacuum, to fill in issues on arms policy and bring in other countries, such as the United Kingdom.

Mr Major and Rifkind, however, are expected to tell the Russians that Britain’s Trident nuclear force is non-negotiable, although British officials concede that the Start 2 talks, which envisage cuts to 2,500 or 3,000 strategic nuclear warheads in both Russia and America, make the 400 or more British warheads statistically more relevant.

More important to Britain is the opportunity to question the Russian leaders about the growing strength of Russian military opposition to Mr Yeltsin’s economic plans.

Western officials are also concerned by Mr Yeltsin’s decision to stop the movement of Russian troops out of the Baltic states because of a shortage of housing for
them; and by his failure to reveal one of Russia's biological warfare programme until the West told him.

American officials said there is growing military resistance to the Start 2 cuts, to the point that the Ukraine is reconsidering giving up the ballistic nuclear missiles on its territory. There is also concern that the reorganization of Russia's forces has left confusion and a lack of direction.

"We still do not have a definition of exactly what are our strategic forces," admitted Mr Ivanov at a symposium on UK-Russian defence cooperation in London last week. "Yes, there is a certain confusion on some of the issues. There are some grounds for you to be worried."

Mr Ian Bond, head of NATO section at the security policy department at the Foreign Office, said there was concern about the reliability of military officers at the centre of the Russian government, and about "leakages" of weapons to other groups and other countries.

But Britain believes it is essential to help Mr Yeltsin's reforms because the alternatives—disintegration or an expansionist or chauvinist regime—would be worse.
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