OUTLOOK FOR TRENDS IN COMMUNIST CHINA DURING 1961

By Tange Goro

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CRITICISM OF KIM IL-SUNG'S "LABOR PARTY"

By Han Chae-dok
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What with delicate Sino-Soviet relations, highlighted last year by the Moscow Conference and the slump in agricultural production caused by drought, Communist China last year was beset with all manner of difficulties, both at home and abroad. Having been the scene of chaos last year, what are the moves of Communist China this year? Let us then look at this year's Communist China in terms of the Party, the government, the economy, and foreign policy.

Communist China was beset with all manner of difficulties last year, both at home and abroad. In particular, an unprecedented drought at home brought disaster to agricultural production. This severe damage will leave its mark on this year's production.

In foreign affairs, it brought the Sino-Soviet split into the open. Although the split was patched up at the Moscow Conference late last year, the result was not of mutual satisfaction, by any means. This having been the situation last year, what will be the trends in Communist China this year? Roughly speaking, prospects are not favorable at home. This situation seems to have come to a deadly and perilous stage this year. It is considered to be the worst difficulty the country has faced since its founding. Be that as it may, if the country could survive the period of "spring seasonal change-over" and be blessed with a favorable climate and crops, Communist China may be able to realize the expectations for a leap forward in the latter half of this year or next year. The first half and second half of the year seem to differ quite considerably. The focus of attention is on the fate of this year's agricultural production.

In foreign affairs, the situation is much more promising than that of internal affairs. Consequently no change of foreign policy is
anticipated. The anti-American policy will continue as before. And we can expect no significant change in Communist China's attitude toward Japan. Rather, it is Japan who may display vacillation in her attitude toward Communist China. Communist China once again, as the world situation dictates, will attract attention on problems such as the disposition of the Laotian conflicts, the vote on Chinese representation in the United Nations General Assembly and nuclear testing.

In each of the categories below I have attempted to survey the trends for this year and, at the same time, look in retrospect at the past year.

I. The Party

The 40th Anniversary of the Party's Founding

This year the Ninth All-China Party Congress should be convened, according to Chinese Communist Party regulations. In addition to this, the Party's 40th Anniversary is celebrated on the first of July. Following precedent, the convocation of the Ninth National Assembly may be postponed, but they certainly would not ignore the Party's 40th Anniversary celebration. July of 1961, therefore, is the center of attention.

Party affairs for the last year have certainly been bizarre. The Party General Conference, supposedly convened once a year, (Provision 31 of the regulations) and the Plenary Session of the Central Committee, usually convening at least twice a year, (Provision 36 of the regulations) have never been announced. The meetings of the Central Politburo and the Supreme State Council, for that matter, also have not been announced.

The fact that such organizations met not once in a year of turmoil is indeed odd and deserves our attention. The author believes that, in fact, such meetings were held, but without official announcement. This inference has been derived from the following facts. Many dignitaries of the Party left Peking and met in the Shanghai area in the latter part of June, or in the early part of July. At that time P'eng Chen (彭真), delegate to the Bucharest Conference, hurriedly returned home after the conference. Also, after July the editorials of the People's Daily suddenly shifted the emphasis to agriculture.

Even though we accept the supposition that there was not a single important meeting held last year, the current year will be different. First of all, Party regulations clearly specify that the All-China Party Congress term be five years. The term will expire in September. There are numerous precedents where they did not abide by the code. For example, the Communist Party General Conference, to meet once a year, met only once, in 1958. However, it will not be the same for the festive 40th Anniversary celebration of July first.

The current year being normal, they may aspire to a much more elaborate celebration for the first of July and surpass the tenth anniversary festivities held two years ago to celebrate the founding of the State. They may even desire to have a larger celebration than the Moscow
Conference of late last year in which they proclaimed for all the world to hear a Peiping Declaration with the blessing of the Communist delegates of the stronger nations. This commemorative ritual will be celebrated without fail. This is only natural; the members of the Chinese Communist Party should be tense in welcoming such activities. As it will be discussed later, the early half of this year will be a hazardous one in terms of the supply and demand of foodstuffs. Unless Party members, the vanguard for 700 million people, are spurred into action, the situation will be one in which it is almost impossible to overcome difficulties. Significantly, since autumn of last year, there has been a series of propaganda operations spreading to arouse young Party members.

In one of these the emphasis is on the "Yenan Spirit". This is an appeal to "reflect on the bitter days of Yenan, while fighting for the hopes of the future." This ideological movement is currently aimed at the young Party members. But there are strong indications that, in the end, the movement will be spread out to encompass the entire Party, and, subsequently, the entire populace and the nation will become a place of high excitement.

A point we are prone to misjudge is propaganda to the effect that "under the iron rule of the Central Committee, among the 13 million plus Party members there is not one out of step." Since there are so many members, and not a few novices with little Party experience, things don't always go as the Central Committee orders. Because of this, Communist propaganda is persistent. Various kinds of rectification movements are constantly repeated. This is especially the case in trying days. It is anticipated that in the first half of this year there will be a new rectification movement similar in scale to the anti-rightist struggle in the latter part of 1957.

II. The Government

The Inclination toward Separation of Party and Government

Since the emergence of the nation-wide people's communes in the summer of 1958, the tendency of the Party to jump to the front line of government administration has become conspicuous. Since then, there had been a considerable increase of "Communist Party Central Committee and State Council joint instructions". In the last year, however, such orders diminished quite considerably. Furthermore, from what can be gleaned from the People's Daily, the orders dealing exclusively with the Party are confined to the Party organization. In other words, they are limiting the independent functions of the Party and once again strengthening the internal leadership within the government administration. This tendency toward separation of Party and government seems to be stronger this year.

At their inception, a characteristic of the people's communes was the unity of government and society. However, in the early days of the communes, there was a growing tendency, in effect, to combine the Party with government and society as a single unit. At that time, the Central
Committee stressed that "the Party is to be disengaged." The government, directly influenced by daily affairs, is apt to be wrapped up in the realities of a situation. The Party, on the other hand, looks at things objectively. Rushing to the fore with its ideals unfurled, it is an implementor of policy. In the light of the difficult situation this year it would seem that this tendency toward separation of Party and government is a natural policy.

Last year was a relatively quiet year, without much administrative reorganization or many personnel changes. The creation of the Third Ministry of Machine Industry was the only organizational change last year. As for personnel changes, of key government personnel, the important changes were as follows: Yao Yi-lin (姚依林) to replace Ch'eng Tzu-hua (程子華) as Minister of Commerce and Ts'eng Shan (曾山) to replace Ch'ien Ying (錢瑛) as Minister of the Interior. The resignation of Madam Ch'ien Ying (錢瑛) from the Cabinet leaves only one female minister, Madam Li Te-ch'ien (李德全) of Cabinet rank. Also the promotion of the Young Trio, Tsu An-pin (徐安民), Liu Chieh (劉杰), and Chang Lien-k'uei (張連奎), to full Ministers from Vice-Ministers of the First, Second and Third Ministries of Machine Industry is a striking personnel change.

The movement of a number of army generals last year to administrative posts was also noteworthy: Fang Ch'iang (方強) to the First Ministry of Machine Industry; Yeh Yeh-she (葉也石) to the Ministry of Fisheries; K'uang Fu-chiao (康伏樵) to the Ministry of Geology; Wang Chin-shan (王子山) to the Ministry of Public Security; Chao Ch'i-min (趙石民) to the Third Ministry of Machine Industry; Liu Ping-yen (劉平恩) to the same Ministry; Hsu Pin-chou (徐斌州) to the Ministry of Agricultural Machinery. All the above military personnel were transferred to vice-ministerial posts concomitant with the modernization of the military. It is expected that competent generals with seniority will follow suit in transferring to governmental administration this year.

Among the many eminent dignitaries who died last year are Lin Po-chu (林伯渠), Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the All-China People's Congress; Wei Li-huang (魏立煌), Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Council; Ho Ping-yen (霍炳炎), Commanding Officer of the Ch'engtu Military District; Tao Meng-chao (陶孟和), Vice-President of Academia Sinica; Ma Hung-pin (馬鴻賓), Deputy Governor of Kansu Province.

III. The Economy

As for this year's growth, last year's poor crop will affect it in every field. According to voluminous Chinese Communist source materials, agriculture is a large market for heavy industry. It is responsible for about 80 percent of the raw material needed for light industry. 75 percent of the collateral export for import goods needed
for industrialization is from agriculture and agricultural subsidiary industry. It is also estimated that agriculture affects approximately 50 percent of the national revenue, directly or indirectly. Looking over the economic statistics covering the years since the founding of the nation, one will find that the economic growth rate was greatly influenced by the agricultural situation of the previous year. (Consult table at end of article.)

Premier Chou En-lai stated in his interview with visiting American journalist Edgar Snow that "last year's food staple production was less that that of the years 1958 and 1959 but a little better than that of 1957." The poor crop was mainly attributed to the worst drought (affecting over half the cultivated land) since the founding of the nation.

The year before last also brought severe drought which resulted in lowering the food production target to 275 million tons. The actual production figure, however, was only 207.5 million tons. The goal established for crop production last year was 297 million tons, a ten percent increase over that of the year before. If we take Premier Chou at his word, the actual figure was around 185 million tons -- the 1957 figure -- and a tremendous decrease.

After singing the praises of the Great Leap Forward in 1958-1959, the production of food last year -- having backslid to the level of three years ago -- amounts to only a part of the Standard Food Year (from July of last year to June of this year). One can predict even now that the foodstuff supply and demand situation during this year's "spring seasonal change-over" will be quite harsh.

There are two alternatives in implementing general economic policy at this time. The first is to enforce the "Agriculture First" policy as was done last year, and the other is to resume the radical "Industry First" policy. Since there was a tendency from the latter part of last year to emphasize the parallel approach to industry and agriculture once again, one senses something of the return to an industrial emphasis. But common sense demands that the first path to follow is that of the "Agriculture First" policy. In November of last year, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi (周恩来) told a group of Japanese journalists attending a conference that, "The year of 1961 will be a readjustment period. In 1962 the Great Leap Forward will begin again." Although Communist China would like to continue the drive now, the fact is that this cannot be permitted.

The manner in which the results of the economic construction of last year are to be published is a matter of interest this year. This is because of the precedent set when the results of two years ago were published as "primary statistics" in last year's 23 January edition of the People's Daily and yet were not published at all during the year by the National Statistical Bureau.

In the economic field, one should note that there is a shift of emphasis this year in the operation of the people's communes toward the small production brigade units. As you know, the people's commune consists of three levels; commune, production brigade, and small produc-
tion brigade. The small production brigade is the lowest level and the basic unit. In the year 1958, when the communes were first established, the focal point of operational guidance was in the commune administrative committee. However, since the organizational readjustment of 1959, leadership emphasis had been transferred to the production brigades. Since autumn of last year, guidance emphasis is in the process of being transferred to the small production brigade, at the lowest level. There is the tendency among some Japanese to severely criticize, saying that it means an "all-out retreat by the people's communes."

IV. Foreign Policy

No Change in the Hard Line

In contrast to a difficult internal situation, the world scene this year seems to give favorable advantages to Communist China. As for Communist China's foreign policy last year, she will -- as we saw at the time of the ratification of the new United States-Japan Security Treaty -- show surprising support to those ensnared in anti-Americanism. In the anti-American and anti-French struggles in Cuba and Algeria, Communist China ventured not only moral support but material support as well. It does not appear that there will be any change this year in their intensive hate America hard line policy.

In the Moscow Conference communiqué made public at the end of last year, Communist China reiterates past demands. At the time of Kennedy's election last autumn, the Peiping papers pronounced him to be "cut from the same mold". This view is quite in contrast with the soft stand of the Moscow papers. Although what Kennedy's approach to Communist China will be is a matter of concern, it is unlikely that Communist China will ever soften its anti-American attitude. The same may be said of Sino-Japanese relations. Immediately following the appearance of Ikeda's cabinet, Communist China watched in silence. However, since the editorial in the People's Daily on 11 October of last year titled, "A Criticism of Trends in Foreign Policy under the Ikeda Cabinet", they are becoming critical and reproachful. With each day they are more persistent in demanding the application of the three political principles in Japan. However, the separate trade negotiations between the two countries have become active recently, and there has been an increase in exchange visits. It is very likely that Japan-Communist China problems may be highlighted in the Japanese Diet. However, this is strictly a matter of Japan's manner of reception. The more confusion created in Japanese politics by the Communist China problem, the more they will gloat and manipulate Japan. They have only one objective -- the unconditional implementation of the Three Principles.

The Sino-Soviet relationship was the topic of the world last year. However it appears that they have reached a compromise of sorts. Things will not be as spectacular this year. The next object of our concern is the disposition of Chinese representation in the United Nations General Assembly this fall.
Another question is whether or not Communist China will conduct nuclear tests this year. On the Laos question, it would seem that Communist China is angling for another Geneva Conference like the 1954 conference on the Vietnamese conflict. With regard to Taiwan, Matsu and Quemoy, the next move of Communist China requires our attention. The United States and Nationalist China's next step, on the other hand, is also of interest in relation to drift of sentiment in the United Nations General Assembly.

[Table follows.]
AGRICULTURAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

(Percentage Increase in relation to Previous Years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agricultural Yields as Compared to the Previous Year</th>
<th>National Income</th>
<th>Financial Revenue</th>
<th>Basic Construction Investment</th>
<th>Total Industrial Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953 abundant</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954 normal</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955 poor</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 abundant</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 poor</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>(-)7.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958 abundant</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 abundant</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 normal</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>21.0</td>
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CRITICISM OF KIM II-SUNG’S "LABOR PARTY"


The boycotting of the north-south general elections was a grave error on the part of the North Korean Communists. The general elections proposed by the United Nations offered the fastest and most feasible opportunity for the unification of Korea.

The Nature of the Labor Party

Those who hope for the unified independence and development of Korea must first have a proper understanding of the situation in North Korea. Without the full knowledge of what the communists are actually doing and scheming in North Korea, we will be unable to defeat communism in North Korea. We are already far removed from the era in which one satisfied himself by emotional denouncements and conceptual criticisms of communism and the communist leaders. In a sense, the April student revolt in South Korea may signify the opening of a new era in which we can conquer the Communist Party in both ideology and practice.

The points that we must acquaint ourselves with relative to North Korea are considerable and varied. However, in order for anyone to achieve a basic and proper understanding of the realities of North Korea, it is imperative that he correctly grasp the state of the Communist Party, i.e., the Korean Labor Party. This is because the Korean Labor Party literally monopolizes national affairs as an essentially dictatorial party.

Although there is, at first glance, an array of plausible organizations such as the People's Republic Government, the Supreme People's
Council -- an organization which imitates the parliamentary form of other democratic nations -- and the Fatherland Unification Democratic People's Front which combines all the political parties and social organizations, these are no more than names. In practice, it is the Labor Party's Standing Committee (equivalent to the politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) that is the supreme leader's organ; it plans, makes decisions, and administers them.

The Kim II-sung clique recognizes this and has stated publicly that "we must reinforce the dictatorship of the proletariat...we must guard the socialist system and its previous attainments with utmost precaution." (Kim Il-sung) Furthermore, whenever the cabinet issues administrative policies, there is always the cliche, "...with the warm consideration of the Party and Government...", and so on. The fact that the Party is mentioned before the government makes it self-evident that the supreme decision maker, that is, the actual ruler, is the Labor Party, not the government.

At the 15th Anniversary Meeting of the founding of the Korean Labor Party opened in P'yongyang's Great Theater on 10 October last year, the vice-chairman of the Korean Labor Party, Pak Kim-ch'ol, delivered a lengthy report. The text, representative of Party literature in North Korea today, is suitable material for study. This report is a summary of Party activity. It praises the achievements of the 15 years since the Liberation and specifies future goals. This comprehensive document, written by the North Koreans themselves, is an excellent source for those of us who intend to comprehensively examine and criticize what they have done up to now and what they intend to do in the future. Before going into this, however, there are several things that should be pointed out.

The first is the question of the establishment of the Party as related to the conventions of Party history. During the last 15 years the Kim II-sung clique not only liquidated its opponents but all other factions as well, including such anti-Kim II-sung factions as the Domestic School led by Hyon Chun-hyok, the South Korean Labor Party led by Pak Hon-yong, the Yanen School under Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik and the Russian Nisei School led by Pak Ch'ang-ok. At present the Party nucleus is being strengthened only with Kim II-sung disciples -- the so-called "backbone of the Anti-Japan Partisan Fighters." This follows upon the obliteration of the opposing factional elements. It is for this reason that we call the present Labor Party leaders the Kim II-sung clique. These followers proclaim themselves as being the "reliable communists" and in their own conceit say they are "the only orthodox communists who inherited the revolutionary traditions of the Korean communist movement." If we are to take this statement at face value -- that they are the successors of the orthodox communists who won official recognition from the Comintern -- they should commemorate 17 April 1925 as the Party founding day and not 1945. The disregard of this is an expression of their true intention to deny and obliterate completely the pre-Kim II-sung communist movement. This most certainly repudiates the state-
ment that "only we are the orthodox successors of the Korean Communist Party."

On this point, they would undoubtedly put it this way: We are celebrating the Labor Party founding day, not the Communist Party founding day.

As we all know, however, the North Korean Labor Party came into being after the merging of the North Korean Communist Party led by Kim Il-sung and the North Korean New People's Party of the Yenan group. The overt antipathy of the general populace to a Communist Party label at that time compelled the adoption of the present title for the Party. This joint Party conference was held on 28 August 1946. At this time a new start was made as the Labor Party. The founding day of the North Korean Labor Party should have been this day. Yet even at this meeting the term "North" preceded the title. The time when such prefixes as North and South were absent -- as they are today -- from the Korean Labor Party title was in June of 1949, the date of the amalgamation of the North Korean Labor Party and the South Korean Labor Party. If a founding day for the Korean Labor Party is to be set, should not this be the proper date?

As a matter of fact, however, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik's New People's Party and Pak Hon-yong's South Korean Labor Party were added to / the Labor Party/ not as a friendly merger based on equality, but rather as a tactic to suppress and absorb their powers. To this the realities of the future would bear witness. Kim Il-sung, in his speech titled, On the Education of Communism, stated as follows:

"To all comrades I now speak frankly. In the past, our Party enlisted many sectarian elements into the Central Committee with the purpose of educating them. There was the faction headed by Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik and the Pak Hon-yong faction. The Party brought them in to rebuild and reform them but not to make any ideological compromise with them. In spite of the sincere efforts of our Party, not only did the sectarians refuse to right their wrongs, to the end, but they also intrigued by all means to wreck Party policies. The Party, therefore, commenced a thoroughgoing struggle to remove such elements, and consequently succeeded in liquidating the sectarian powers which for a considerable time had been massively poisoning our revolution."

Kim Il-sung calls Ch'oe and Pak the "sectarian elements", but in their eyes Kim is the sectarian element and their betrayer. In the end, Ch'oe, Pak, and many other Communist Party leaders of the anti-Kim Il-sung factions were liquidated, not because of their sectarianism, but because of the ambition, power and intrigues of the Kim Il-sung clique. Kim pointed out that the amalgamation with the Ch'oe and Pak parties was not for compromise reasons, but for the purpose of giving them ideological training. The young and green Communist Kim Il-sung educating the elderly founders of the Korean Communist movement fits the analogy of a junior high school boy teaching a college professor! We can infer that because they stubbornly refused to rectify their attitudes in spite of Kim Il-sung's attempt to force their unconditional surrender, they were liquidated.
On the other hand, what kind of day is the so-called Labor Party Foundation Day as determined by the Kim Il-sung clique? It is the day that Kim became the actual leader with the backing of the Soviet military command. Immediately following the Liberation, Kim Il-sung threw off his Soviet uniform. He took back his [original] name and dropped the alias of Kim Yong-hwan before becoming a North Korean Communist official. Then he established the Kim Il-sung line. At the time of the Liberation numerous known and unknown communists emerged in various places, including P'yongyang and Hamhung in North Korea, and initiated Communist Party activity, all the while in touch with Seoul. During August, following the Liberation, P'yongyang held daily meetings of the Communist Party to expand its power. Kim Il-sung came on the scene much later.

On the other hand, the Russians, ambitious of governing the northern half of Korea separately, demanded the communists in North Korea to sever their alliance with the Communist Party of Seoul and reorganize as an independent North Korean Communist Party with Kim Il-sung as the supreme leader. A few days later on 14 October, a mass meeting was held at a stadium in P'yongyang under the order of the Russian military command to welcome General Kim Il-sung. We still recall the scene vividly. Kim Il-sung was introduced as the "hero of the people" by the Russian military administrator, Major General Romanenko [phonetic] and was imposed on us as the "leader of the people."

The establishment of the Korean Labor Party's founding day as the same day Kim Il-sung took over the actual leadership of the North Korean Communist Party is regarded as an attempt to idealize Kim Il-sung by starting the Party history from this date.

The fact that a report as important as the 15th Anniversary Party Report was not given by Kim Il-sung himself, but was made by the Party's vice-chairman, Pak Kun-ch'ol (朴淳哲), a comrade of Kim Il-sung since the days of the partisan guerrilla forces, follows this kind of reasoning. In the Party's official report, there was frequent use of such phrases as "Comrade Kim Il-sung's practical models and accurate instructions..." and "the righteous guidance of the Party's Central Committee led by Comrade Kim Il-sung..." Even Kim Il-sung himself could not say in a speech "my practical models and instructions" or "under my leadership".

We should be aware of the fact that the Korean Labor Party of today is the "Labor Party of the Kim Il-sung Clique." It is the "Labor Party of Kim Il-sung." To make it even more explicit, we might say "Kim Il-sung's Labor Party."

The Main Objective of the Labor Party

"The past 15 years of Party history are full of glorious triumphs and proud accomplishments." This claim pervades the Party report by Pak Kun-ch'ol. The communists, whose very existence is one of fraud and imposture, repeated this at every opportunity. Relating to the alleged "Party's victorious leadership", the report states as follows:

We can not conceive of the unprecedented progress of our present
social life without the Party's sagacious leadership. Our Party has kept firm alignment with Marxism-Leninism principles and has continued its struggle in leading the people in their revolutionary tasks. Our Party, basing its actions on Marxism-Leninism principles which provide the scientific grounds for the true salvation of our country, shall, though faced with difficult and perplexing circumstances, carry out these established policies without hesitation."

Kim II-sung followers assert themselves in these words, but what have they done in actuality? Leaving individual examinations aside, we will look into the basic problem. In order to do this, we must know what has been defined as the basic goal.

The ultimate aim of the Korean Labor Party -- as they are always saying -- is the achievement of a proletarian revolution in Korea, namely, the communization of Korea in its entirety. The bylaws, revised in 1956 and serving also as the Party platform, define it as follows:

"The present aim of the Korean Labor Party is the accomplishment of an anti-imperialistic, anti-feudalistic democratic revolution on a nation-wide scale. The ultimate goal is the building of a Communist society."

On the one hand, the Kim II-sung clique boasts that it has already "accomplished the task of anti-imperialistic and anti-feudalistic revolution" in North Korea and that at the present time "monolithic control of the socialist production relationship between rural areas and cities has been established." (Pak Kun-ch'ol) The excerpt "building of a Communist society on a nation-wide scale" includes South Korea. It is apparent that the Party platform is aimed at South Korea. Kim Il-sung himself stated this point in the following manner:

"The fact that we have completed the socialist construction in the northern half doesn't necessarily mean that our task is over. To us there still remains the mission of the unification of our fatherland and after that there is the mission of land reform, nationalization of industries and other democratic reforms in the southern half. When we accomplish the democratic reforms in the south, we should continue further socialist construction. And after we have completed socialist construction, we must, as in the north, gradually move on to Communism. When we succeed with these tasks we may be able to claim that we have accomplished our duty to the international revolution." (Kim Il-sung, in On the Education of Communism)

It is obvious that the Korean Labor Party of the Kim II-sung clique has set its goal as the communization of South Korea. This is a direct admission that the peaceful unification that they continually clamor for is neither negotiated unification nor democratic unification, only unification under Communism. Toward this end, they have used all means and intrigues. In the last extremity they venture to the stratagem of military aggression. On this subject they state their program as follows:

"The Korean Labor Party will fight to the end to achieve the complete unification of the fatherland under democratic principles, with
the vast mass of the people united behind them. The patriotic potential will strengthen the unified front and will work in every field, under the banner of the labor league(s), to liberate the southern half of our nation from the American imperialistic aggressive forces and South Korean reactionary rule." (Provision 1, The Korean Labor Party Bylaws)

Although our criticism is needed on this excerpt, let us look at the implementation of their revolutionary program over the past 15 years.

Has the Korean Labor Party really been able to rally the North and South Korean masses around their flag? Have they been able to strengthen the unified front with the patriotic and democratic potential in every field which serve as their base, labor and agricultural leagues? The facts prove that the result has been the exact opposite, a succession of failures and defeats.

What the Labor Party Accomplished

With the backing of the Russian occupation forces, the Communists succeeded in establishing their political regime north of the 38th parallel. However, from the Communists' so-called revolutionary standpoint, this was not a successful achievement. First of all, they jumped the usual revolutionary steps; thus, they were too far removed from the will of the people. For example, we can cite the land reforms. In Korea, land reform could have been reasonably accomplished without such harshness as they employed. The inhumane acts inflicted upon the landlords and related persons who were liquidated at the time of the land reforms in March 1946 provoked antipathy not only among those who were directly affected, but in the general populace. This is a rare occurrence even among Communist nations. The nationalization statutes controlling heavy industry produced similar results.

Under the cliche of national capital protection, the act of confiscation of medium and small private assets aroused much dissatisfaction and uneasiness among the majority of the people, not merely among the medium and small entrepreneurs and merchants. In addition to this, the persecution and purging of nationalists and theologians added further to the alienation of the general populace. Also, the liquidation of liberal ideas among the intellectuals and the forced subscription to Communist ideology drove the society further into chaos. The people of Korea, liberated from the fascist rule of Japanese imperialism, instead of the democratic freedoms for which they thirsted, found their society smothered by a Communist dictatorship imposed upon them. This further aggravated the feelings of the people. The successful maintenance of the Communist regime in spite of the prevailing circumstances must be attributed to Russian-backed dictatorial power.

The daily exodus of long lines of people into South Korea and away from Communist control, and the enthusiastic welcome given by the North Koreans to the ROK army and the UN forces when they marched into North Korea, stem from these reasons. This is what we mean when we
speak of the Kim Il-sung clique's actually failing in its goal of communizing North Korea.

In spite of the prevailing situation, the Communists could not satisfy themselves with North Korea alone, but devoted themselves to the communization of South Korea as well. The Kim Il-sung clique attempted to place South Korea under Communist rule by cooperating with and exploiting Communists in South Korea. Taking their cue from the February Czechoslovakian change of government in which the Communists took over the political hegemony, they saw a similar opportunity if a coalition government could be established to their advantage.

Their aim was the establishment of "the Provisional Korean Democratic Government", anticipated by the "Moscow Conference" (the three foreign ministers of the US, Great Britain, and the USSR met in Moscow to deal with the problems of postwar Korea). For this purpose, Kim Il-sung and his followers extended their full support to the Moscow Conference resolution and used all means to gain the leftists' absolute advantages on the US-USSR Joint Commission (the organization created to work on the unification of Korea in 1946). However, such one-sided demands could not prevail. Consequently, the US-USSR Joint Commission failed and the problem was transferred to the United Nations. However the Communists, who eyed the opportunity to snatch the political hegemony of a coalition governing body, boycotted the proposal for North-South general elections to be supervised by the United Nations. The proposal passed with an absolute majority.

The Kim Il-sung clique acclaims the North-South Roundtable Conference in the latter part of April at P'ongyang, prior to the Republic of Korea's general election of 10 May 1948, as one of their big achievements. However, it was, in the end, a serious error on the part of the Communist camp. The Korean independence movement leader Kim Koo (金九) (later assassinated) who, with other patriotic idealists, crossed the 38th parallel in the belief that they could find a resolution in a conference with Kim Il-sung, were made cognizant of the ambitions of the Kim Il-sung clique. In his instructions, Kim Il-sung said: "The unique strategy of the unified front is always to obtain hegemony and to strengthen it." The fact is that they not only demand the hegemony but also attempt to obtain absolute rule and demand the puppetization of all other parties. The Fatherland Unification Democratic Front People's Front is a good example of this. However, patriots in every field and many other democratic potentials are estranged from the Kim Il-sung clique because they despise being in company with them. Does this fact leave any room for them to claim they have strengthened the united front?

The gravest error of the Communists, however, was their boycotting of the North-South general elections. Not to mention North Korea under Communist dictatorial rule, it is a fact that even in South Korea there were considerable numbers of people who were interested in Communism during the early days immediately following the Liberation. The North Korean Puppet Regime's Tactics Manual, published by the Asian Anti-Communist League in South Korea, recorded that "in 1947, 370,000
laborers and farmers joined the Communist Party. At the time free elections were held under the observation of the United Nations Commission, there were numerous Communists who denounced the attitudes of the Kim Il-sung clique and the USSR. And, of course, the South Korean labor Party members who had gone north were disappointed. The regret may be analogous to the old adage, "the fish that got away was the biggest," but this is the voice of people who do not comprehend the real intentions of Kim Il-sung and his followers who, as long as there is no prospect for unification under Communism, intend to persevere with a Communist regime in North Korea. In any case, the fact is that they cannot escape the responsibility for the resultant worsening of the division of Korea following their boycott. The general elections proposed by the United Nations offered the best and most feasible opportunity for the unification of Korea.

Recently, the Kim Il-sung group has been advocating North-South general elections under the observation of neutral countries in an appeal for peaceful unification, but they cannot expect as advantageous an opportunity to again present itself. It is apparent now what the outcome will be if fair general elections are held under United Nations or neutral nations' observation, now that the Korean War has ended. It is no mere accident that the Kim Il-sung clique proposed the implausible North-South federation plan when South Korea began to emphasize peaceful unification by general election.

Immediately following the establishment of the Republic of Korea in August 1948 and the international recognition as the sole lawful government, the Communists followed suit and set up the Korean Democratic People's Republic in September. Then the Kim Il-sung clique started an armed invasion against South Korea on 25 June 1950. This was their decisive act to achieve the ultimate goal of the communization of all Korea. This internal disturbance resulted, however, only in a widening of the schism between our people. It produced several million casualties and transformed the country into ashes.

On the eve of the Korean War, the Communists miscalculated. They thought that certain circles in the United States advocated the abandonment of the defense of Korea. They thought that United States forces actually had withdrawn, leaving only the Military Advisory Group. They thought that the people of South Korea, because of political chaos, would welcome them. The invasion, carried out with this miscalculation, brought about the above-mentioned results. Thus their responsibility as Communists became much more grave and serious.

Disgraced, Kim Il-sung put the blame on South Korean Labor Party leaders Pak Hon-yong and Yi Sung-hwa (李承燁), saying the failure was derived from errors in the evaluating and reporting of the situation in South Korea. Ostensibly the two leaders were executed as traitors under the conventional charge of espionage, but the truth is that they became scapegoats for the failure of the war. The Soviet Union, also, recalled its ambassador to North Korea, Levetchev, and, according to reports, placed against him severe Party sanctions. However, it goes without saying that the responsibility lies squarely with
Kim Il-sung and his clique.

Despite these grave facts they persist in saying: "the Labor Party's last 15 years of history are filled with proud achievements and brilliant victories."

About the Author

Han Chae-dok (韩载德) was the editor of Democratic Korea, the official organ of the Korean Labor Party, and the Secretary-General of the League of Writers and Artists. He took refuge in South Korea in September 1959.