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Military Affairs

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Grachev on Current Military Issues
934K0183A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 5, Feb 93 pp 1-2

[Interview with General of the Army P. Grachev, minister of defense of the Russian Federation, Hero of the Soviet Union, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY editor in chief V. Starkov: “General Grachev on the Army and on the Soldier”]

[Text]

Starkov] Pavel Sergeyevich, I would like to begin our conversation with the soldier. Have you not lost your spiritual connection with him? Or has life pushed his concerns into the background for you?

[Grachev] No, I am sometimes reproached for the fact that I spend too much time traveling with the troops. And I do not meet with the leaders only. I go to see the soldiers in their barracks. I look into how they are working on tactics. If I show up on the firing range I must admit that I love to fire all kinds of weapons, including from combat vehicles.

I value the soldier. I recall when a soldier’s mother came to me. I flew with her to the Transcaucasus and looked for her son who was missing in Armenia.

Recently I flew to the Western Group of Forces in Germany and was surprised when Georgians and Uzbeks were serving in the same unit. There were more than 4,000 of the latter, incidentally. So young soldiers have no conception of the idea that Russia is one country, Ukraine—another, and Belarus—a third.

[Starkov] I worked among the missile forces for 10 years and each time before the leaders arrived the fences and buildings were repainted...

[Grachev] When I was a VDV (Airborne Troops) commander I got them out of the habit of painting anything for my arrival. When I would smell fresh paint I would give the unit commander hell...

[Starkov] I remember that they would even paint the grass green if it had started to turn yellow...

[Grachev] They used to paint the grass during Grechko’s time. There were cases where they pruned the trees as well...

[Starkov] ARGUMENTY I FAKTY receives many letters about the idea that there is chaos in the Army nowadays, that many officers have become bitter.

[Grachev] When I became Minister of Defense I decided that my main task would be social security for military servicemen. In the first place, monetary allowances. Of course, we are not satisfied with them, although I can list many measures we have taken. Therefore, now both in the government and in the Supreme Soviet they are constantly being reminded of the military: Give us money. We ourselves will conclude contracts for constructing housing with both local and foreign firms. But so far we are receiving at most 60 percent of what is required.

[Starkov] Who are being cheated the most—the generals, the officers, or the soldiers?

[Grachev] They are all being cheated. But above all the junior officers. Although their monetary allowance has been increased six times since May. Free travel on the railroads to go on leave and return has been introduced for military servicemen and their families from regions of the Far North and those on an equal footing with them. Payment for military rank has been increased 12-fold. A food allotment has been introduced for officers, and for those who do not want it a monetary compensation is given.

[Starkov] What kind of ration is included in the food allotment?

[Grachev] Adequate. It depends on the unit commander and the deputy for rear operations. In military units which have kitchen services they receive meat and butter. Like my son, for example. He is a paratrooper lieutenant and serves in the Transbaykal region. He is a bachelor. People like him receive their food allotment and turn it over to the dining room and they live more or less normally for a month. And if they get cash as well, things are not bad at all. In Moscow, of course, things are not so good.

Further. A one-time monetary remuneration. Previously there was one extra payment per year, the so-called 13th wage. Beginning this year, there will be two extra payments. Plus a payment in the form of material aid. Therefore the officer and the general will receive three paychecks a year in addition to the 12 payments.

[Starkov] And what about housing?

[Grachev] Things are very difficult with housing. As of today there are about 150,000 families of officers and warrant officers without apartments. Because of the mass withdrawal of troops from abroad it is predicted that by 1995 about 400,000 families will be without apartments. This is a tragedy. I am constantly “bombarding” the government—aid must be given. Because the lack of apartments is causing a great deal of dissatisfaction among the officer personnel. There have been many complaints against me and the executive and legislative branches. But I must say that help from above is still inadequate.

[Starkov] It is understandable that the defense minister should have a dacha with special communications. But what about the rest of the generals?

[Grachev] We have been assigned 269 dachas. About 50 of these are occupied by generals. The more than 200
remaining are assigned to senior officers. And it is not just the minister who gives commands with special communications.

[Starkov] They write mainly about the generals' dachas near Krasnogorsk. I would like to know your position.

[Grachev] Indeed these dachas are nicer and they are given to worthy people—veterans of war, labor, and the Armed Forces. We also have Heroes of Socialist Labor and generals of the current generation, mainly participants in the events in Afghanistan to whom the country owes a great deal.

I do not think these people receive regular dachas until near the end of their life so they can live their days out there. I am making every effort to make sure that these dachas are not taken away from them. A general was also once a lieutenant, who gave his health to his country and many of them have seen combat.

[Starkov] What is a “military secret” nowadays? At what level of confidentiality are, say, negotiations with the Americans being conducted?

[Grachev] The equipment at the disposal of all armies is practically no secret anymore. But future models and developments, of course, are state secrets. And the mobilization readiness and the country's preparation as a whole—these are also a state secret.

[Starkov] You travel abroad fairly frequently. Previously defense ministers did that rarely.

[Grachev] In our day the role of the Defense Minister and the role of the General Staff are more or less separated. The General Staff manages the troops and maintains combat readiness at the proper level. The role of the Minister of Defense and the Ministry of Defense is more to fulfill military-political functions.

But once a week I definitely confer with my deputies and head commanders. Orders are also signed by the minister of defense. Perhaps after 1995, when the situation in the Army stabilizes, we will reach a point where the Ministry of Defense will be a civilian department. It should solve military-political problems plus prepare orders for arms, equipment, and the sale of weapons. And the role of the general staff is to manage the troops.

[Starkov] How do you as Minister of Defense feel during the negotiations on arms reduction?

[Grachev] I feel comfortable when I sit down with intelligent calculations and talk to the other side and feel our superiority on the theoretical plane.

[Starkov] But, after all, the people on the other side are no fools.

[Grachev] I like it when the other side is serious as well. And our proposals quickly converge. It has already been proven that the minimum with which one can begin to talk with England, France, and China about nuclear missile reduction is 2,500 units. That is the first thing.

The second thing. We understand quite well that if a war begins it will be with an air-space offensive operation by both sides. Strikes on the main facilities and troops will be made from space, from the air.

The first facilities to be hit will be nuclear electric power stations, chemical plants, dams, and hydroelectric centers. Even if we do not use nuclear weapons, a nuclear-chemical war will still begin because there will be zones of flooding and zones of radiation and chemical contamination. Like Chernobyl. We will have to have medics, doctors, deactivation, decontamination, and disinfection teams. True, that is if there is anyone left to do this work. There will be no front as such. Because of this I am in favor of eliminating the immense quantity of conventional arms that have accumulated, including in our country. Therefore I support the president in the sense that in our day we must completely put an end to nuclear weapons.

[Starkov] Are developments being conducted in the area of laser weapons?

[Grachev] That is in the area of military secrets.

[Starkov] ARGUMENTY I FAKTY has repeatedly published figures on the Army. It has always been hard to get hold of them. How many enlisted men, officers, and generals are there now in Russia.

[Grachev] At the present time the official number of generals in the Armed Forces is 2,218. Of these 1,547 are occupying generals' positions. The ratio between generals and personnel is one general for every 1,262 enlisted. For officer personnel it is one general for 312 officers. Compare: In the USSR Armed Forces in 1987 the ratio was one general for 530 soldiers and one general for 169 officers. Because of the reduction of the number of personnel in the Army and Navy, there has also been a reduction of the number of generals. Thus during the past six years, from 1987 through 1992, it has decreased by 3,815. The official number of generals in the central apparatus has decreased by more than half during this time. The process of further reduction of the number of general's positions is continuing now as well.

[Starkov] How many suicides are there now in the Army and how many people dying altogether.

[Grachev] Approximately six to eight people die in the Armed Forces each month. Most of the tragedies are from traffic accidents and failure to observe safety regulations. Suicides make up six to eight percent of the overall number of deaths. And here is what is surprising. The soldiers' mothers demanded that their children not be sent far away. I made a decision that they should serve within a radius of 1,000 km. from their home. And the statistics from January and February show that the ones who commit suicide, unfortunately, are the boys from
Ryazan Oblast who have been called up in Ryazan Oblast, that is 100-150 km. from home.

[Starkov] Do we and the Americans now have aircraft flying with nuclear weapons on board?

[Grachev] They have been removed from combat duty. Both we and the Americans have strategic bombers and nuclear bombs, but they have been dismantled and are in storage under constant supervision. There is not a single aircraft on combat duty in state of readiness No. 1 with mounted nuclear munitions even parked anywhere, not to mention flying.

[Starkov] Pavel Sergeyevich, in your office you have excellent communications with the whole world and, naturally, with the Commonwealth of Independent States. You know at any moment where anything is going on. What are the most important extraordinary events that have been reported to you during the past few days or week?

[Grachev] The theft of arms and ammunition, especially in those states that have now separated. Unfortunately, this evil has invaded military units on the territory of Russia as well. The reduction of arms thefts has been affected by my order to shoot to kill individuals who try to get hold of weapons or attack the sentry or person on duty in the unit, the more so if it is a facility for storing weapons and ammunition.

As a result of this order in many regions the sentries and guards have actually been shooting to kill.

[Starkov] Where was that?

[Grachev] In Transcaucasia, on the territories of Georgia and Azerbaijan, in the Moscow district, twice in the Transbaikal area, once in the Pacific Ocean fleet, twice in the Leningrad district, and two or three times in the Air Force. They shot to kill and they killed. The last time it was reported to me that in the North Caucasus district there was an attack on a munitions warehouse. The sentry aimed his weapon, killed two people and injured six, he fired at the attackers' vehicle and arrested the wounded. He has now received his thanks and gone on leave.

[Starkov] You speak about all this fairly openly. Can the people rest assured that if some nuclear submarine sinks, God forbid, that it will not be kept secret from them?

[Grachev] No, we will not hide anything. But there is a problem. Tell me, who should work on the most complicated technical equipment? We have on our rosters 1,814,000 recruits, and 1,397,000 cannot be called up. That is 77 percent of all the recruits. Only 416,000, or 23 percent, can be called up.

[Starkov] A meeting of the heads of the states of the CIS has ended in Minsk. From a military standpoint, did it end up with a plus or a minus?


[Starkov] Will the Council of Ministers of Defense go to work?

[Grachev] Apparently it will for now. Although there was an interesting suggestion regarding a new structure of the Main Command of the United Armed Forces made mainly by representatives of the Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan. I do not want to disclose it now. This is a matter for the near future. On the basis of an agreement between L. Kravchuk and B. Yeltsin we arrived at the opinion that monitoring of nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine, all regulatory work, and authors' supervision should be conducted by specialists of the Armed Forces of Russia.

The Kazakhs want to resolve the question of nuclear arms on the territory of Kazakhstan only on a bilateral basis: Russia-Kazakhstan. And it has been resolved positively.

As for Belarus, the agreement with it was concluded long ago, and Belarus has confirmed once again that all the nuclear weapons on its territory are Russian. The question of satellite communications on military matters was considered. Since there are military space forces only in Russia, the satellites are also Russian, and if any state wants to have space communications along military lines, it must conclude a bilateral agreement for payment.

[Starkov] Do you meet frequently with the president?

[Grachev] As a rule, on Mondays at 1100 hours. Additionally, every day at 1000 hours I must give him a five-minute telephone report on the situation.

[Starkov] You, of course, are very loaded down with work. Is there any time left for reading?

[Grachev] To be honest, I read only military literature and mountains of work papers. Although, no... On Sunday a volume of Tolstoy's War and Peace caught my eye. I read 200 pages all at once. I visited Napoleon's grave in Paris recently.

[Starkov] There are many scars on your face. Where did they come from?

[Grachev] I was on active duty for a fairly long time. A total of five and a half years.

Deputy Minister of Defense on Social Guarantees for Officers Discharged Into Reserve
934405584 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 25 Dec 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General Valeriy Ivanovich Mironov by Nikolay Panyukov: "Stepchildren of the Fatherland"]

[Text] Thousands of Officers are Going Into the Reserve, Without Having Either a Peacetime Profession or a Roof Over Their Heads. Servicemen Need State Social Guarantees, Asserts Russian Deputy Minister of Defense...
Colonel-General Valeri Mironov. Today, He Answers RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Readers' Questions

Russian Federation Minister of Defense General of the Army Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev shared his thoughts on reform of the army with our newspaper's readers in a RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA issue. The newspaper invited our readers into the conversation about the army's problems and about the progress of reform in it. We did not have to wait long for responses. And this is also understandable. The processes that are occurring today in the troops affect the interests of all Russians. Someone is either serving right now, has already served, or is just planning to serve in practically every family.

[Panyukov] Valeriy Ivanovich, as if in unison with the currently popular song with the words "Changes, the people are waiting for changes...", our readers are requesting with one voice just a little something to convince them that reform is progressing and that very plan with which they became acquainted through our newspaper in July is being carried out. Many readers assert that the "promised changes are not still visible there". Is this a chance to convince them?

[Mironov] Of course there is. But to do that, right now I would have to retell nearly all of the Minister of Defense's speech at the 7th Congress of Russian People's Deputies. Therefore, I will say just one thing: everything that we planned for this year has already been carried out, point by point.

However, that is all just the very first steps and even, one could say, small steps on the path of the most enormous work that is calculated for years. And the people who, as you say, "are waiting for changes", already today they would like to see a totally new, totally reformed army. And that won't happen. We are faced with a great deal of difficult, even excruciating work.

One of the reasons consists of the fact that the most combat capable and best equipped, first class, modern military hardware and armed troop formations have remained outside Russia's borders, on the territories of our brothers from now already "nearby foreign countries". Forty seven military educational institutions have also remained there. Some of them trained the most unique specialists and they existed, alas, if I can express it this way, in a single copy... Now we need to create all of that all over again. And we need both time, money and labor to do that...

And the most important thing that I would like to say to all those people who are "waiting for changes" is that reform in the Russian Army—is not entirely a departmental matter and not a matter for the Ministry of Defense alone, but a matter for all of Russia. For legislative and executive power. Yes and in general... for each person. Along with reforms directly in the structures of the Armed Forces, along with the profound restructuring of the entire defense complex, we, maybe to an even greater degree, need the reform of our consciousness, the reform of our attitude toward military service, and the mobilized preparation of the national economy. We have assessed the fact that the Congress of People's Deputies placed the issue of the army on the agenda as an important step in that direction. Although on the whole, the trend in society is as before: the expectation that the army itself will conduct reforms. In that sense, this will come to naught.

Nevertheless, there already are real signs of the new. This is also the creation of new Armed Forces formations on Russian territory while considering the conditions that have developed, especially in the region of the North Caucasus Military District, the creation of mobile forces, the transition to manning of some subunits with soldiers and sergeants who will serve on contract...

[Panyukov] Are they those same professionals about whom everyone has dreamed and spoken about so much?

[Mironov] No. They are still not yet professionals. For now, they are ordinary soldiers and sergeants whom we must still yet make into professionals during the course of contract service. Right now we are hiring 100,000 of these people who desire to serve. The Russian Government has given us six billion rubles to do that.

[Panyukov] Reserve Sergeants Sergey Chernykh and Vladimir Malov from Voronezh Oblast ask: can they conclude such a contract? How do they do that?

[Mironov] They are always welcome. Let them turn to the military commissariat at their place of residence or directly to their military unit. And the issue will be reviewed. All the more so since right now we have few reservists who desire to serve. Most of those servicemen who desire to serve are soldiers and sergeants who have served six months or more...

[Panyukov] Maybe civilian youth simply don't know about this yet. There hasn't been much, as they say, advertising?

[Mironov] Maybe... But I think that the main reason is that the process of comprehension has not yet occurred in society: just what is service on contract? That it is not simply an ordinary technique to earn money but an interesting and needed job, a profession: defender of the Fatherland. And I will frankly state that I am irked when some people equate a professional soldier with a mercenary. They are different concepts. And we will never go so far so that Russian soldiers feel that they are mercenaries.

[Panyukov] And yet, Valeriy Ivanovich, judging by the letters to the editor, social issues are the most burning issues for the army. Especially those caused by the relocation of troops onto Russian territory and by the reduction of the Armed Forces...

[Mironov] Yes, unquestionably. We will need to provide job placement for 220,000 servicemen and for more than
200,000 of their family members and provide housing for more than 400,000 families in the next two-three years alone in connection with, as we now say, organizational measures. So in this context the main fever pitch of passions is still ahead. And the Ministry of Defense is entirely incapable of dealing with these problems on its own. We are of course acting. But all of our efforts are in vain without large-scale state programs. That is why we are continually asking our people's deputies to adopt the entire package of laws on defense and security issues as soon as possible.

[Panyukov] And what? Do you have something fundamentally new on social protection?

[Mironov] You know... I will frankly state that I would not use the word combination “social protection” with regard to that situation. And in the documents for which we are awaiting, it should not be a question about that. Really protection—this is already the consequences of something that has already been completed. This should be a question of social guarantees to a person.

Isn't that really logical? I am a state person. While performing state, in this case military, service, I should receive from the state certain guarantees that could protect me from the whims and devices of any sort of bureaucrats. Because I will have the guarantees of the state which I serve.

Otherwise—this will be the continuation of the old story of good intentions with which we suffered for many long years. You certainly recall that we had the so-called CPSU Central Committee, Supreme Soviet, and Government joint decree that stated that an officer who had been released into the reserve would be offered housing within a three-month period. Well, what happened to that? Locally it was viewed as nothing more than a “good intention”. And to this day the decree has not at all helped thousands of unlucky souls-officers. Because a decree is just a decree... You won't be able to use it to file a suit to nail someone, as they say, in any court. You need a law.

[Panyukov] Incidentally, there are already quite a few letters to the editor on the “newborn good intention”. This is a question that recently in the mass media and in the public speeches of various types of leaders there is a lot being said that not one officer without an apartment will be released into the reserve until his housing issue has been resolved. But they are being released. We can cite dozens of examples. They are releasing him while convincing an officer that this same unforgettable “joint decree” will help him at his place of residence. But it, as you have already stated, did not help already in former times. Right now the local authorities are turning people away, saying that since the USSR already no longer exists, all the documents of that time are no longer in force... Russia is the USSR's legal successor. And all of the old documents are in force until new ones appear.

As for cases of the release of officers without apartments into the reserve—we have already done quite a bit so that this doesn’t happen. Right now, for example, a released officer can be “on the books” for an entire year. That is, he is already not in a position but he is still receiving his salary and allowances. You will agree that you can manage to do a lot in a year. And you can get an apartment. And you can even build a farm with a favorable loan. If you had the desire... And right now we are working on the idea of creating a reserve officer corps. Then people will have even broader opportunities.

[Panyukov] You said that you will have to provide job placement services for 220,000 servicemen already in the near future, in the next two-three years. How are they being prepared for that? Our readers, including the leaders of enterprises, are interested in which specialties the retraining of officers is being conducted? Will all officers and warrant officers be able to undergo retraining? This is an enormous army...

[Mironov] An entire retraining network has been created. From classes and schools to academies and distinctive training centers. For example, more than 70 retraining classes are operating in the Western Group of Forces alone. The specialties: from programmers and managers—to leaders of joint ventures...

But something else puts us on guard: the opinion is taking root among the population that not a single officer will get by without retraining. Why? There are a few specialties in the army that are, so to speak, difficult to adapt to the national economy. The majority have, as was said recently, all-union education diplomas. They are already trained engineers, scientific associates, and technicians...

We are releasing 45-year-old regimental commanders, people who know how to lead enormous collectives, people who have wonderful organizational capabilities. Should we really retrain them for the role of “errand boys”?

Is that rational? I don't think so. These specialties are valued in industry and in major management elements. And therefore I am certain that we should conduct not simply the retraining of released servicemen but we should also operate structures that are involved with studying Armed Forces “cadre proposals”. I think that the founders of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA—industrialists and entrepreneurs—have something to ponder here.

[Panyukov] But Valeriy Ivanovich, rumors are circulating that totally unforeseen obstacles in the utilization of reserve officers may arise... They say that some sort of instruction may be developed as a result of increasing unemployment so that pensioners will not be hired. And those same 45-50-year-old reserve officers, who are full
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of strength and energy, are concerned, won't they really be forced to make a choice: either, or? Either a pension or no work whatsoever. Either work, but no pension whatsoever for you...

[Mironov] No, I don't think that the country's leadership will decide on such an unpopular step. All the more so with regard to military pensioners who have earned their pensions through rigorous and deprivations that have frequently entailed risking their lives... An earned pension is a sacred matter. And no one has the right to encroach upon it. It is another matter that maybe no one will have the right to compel some leader or other to hire a pensioner under any conditions. But what can prevent a competitive enterprise from hiring skilled, energetic pensioners? So, I still don't see any problems here...

[Panyukov] Valeriy Ivanovich, there are also such letters in RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA's mail that you can't read without becoming agitated. From fathers and from mothers. On the continuing deaths of their children in the so-called "hot spots". People are perplexed. Why, they say, has the Ministry of Defense promised to not send our children there without their voluntary consent and without the written consent of their parents, but it is still sending them?

[Mironov] Neither the Ministry of Defense itself nor any other military command authorities are making these decisions (incidentally, I have already recently answered a similar question from people's deputies while speaking at the Supreme Soviet). We are disavowing our promises. And we will not disavow them. And during the draft that is the only way we will act. But there is a Presidential Edict on introducing a state of emergency if there is a Supreme Soviet decision on sending some armed contingents or other to some area... What are we to do? We are the armed force of the people. And the President and the Supreme Soviet are the elected representatives of the people. Well, how can it be with these "scissors"? In general, legislative acts are needed here with regard to the utilization of "peacekeeping forces", and they are needed as soon as possible. Then, everything will be clear to everyone. Although the adoption of a law is also not everything. We need the laws to operate.

Right now, take the law that has been adopted on military service and military obligation. This is not a law for the Ministry of Defense. More precisely, not only for it. This is a law for our entire state and for all of our society. You give me a healthy, strong, intelligent, educated lad. And I am certain: the state will obtain a wonderful defender of the Fatherland. And if the state cannot support the draft at 30%? If society offers us sick and not always adequately skilled young men... Then what can I say? Take an assault rifle myself and man a post?

[Mironov] I cannot agree with that. A law is not an instruction. You can't cram everything down to the most minor details into it. That is already a matter for local executive power.

Accelerated Withdrawal of Troops From Germany
93UM0378A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY No 54, in Russian 18 Dec 92 p 11

[Article by KOMMERSANT-DAILY Correspondent Vladimir Makartsey, under the rubric: "Pavel Grachev Has Gone To Germany": "The Withdrawal of Russian Troops Will Be Accelerated"]

[Text] An agreement between Helmut Kohl and Boris Yeltsin to reduce the time periods for the withdrawal of Russian Troops from Germany in exchange for an increase of financial aid to the Russian Armed Forces has created new technical problems for the latter: It is not so easy to rapidly transfer so many people and so much equipment. Yesterday Russian Minister of Defense General of the Army Pavel Grachev arrived in the Western Group of Forces that are located on the territory of East Germany in order to, observers suggest, attempt to find certain practical possibilities to carry out government plans.

While speaking at a press conference on the eve of his departure from Moscow, Pavel Grachev noted that a solution to the issue was found thanks to the fact that during his recently concluded visit Helmut Kohl set forth a proposal on rendering additional financial aid for infrastructure development of the troops being withdrawn. In response to that, the Russian Ministry of Defense, having assessed the actual possibilities, agreed that one could actually reduce the time periods for the troop withdrawals, but not by six months as the German side proposed, but by three months---to September 1994. Thanks to that, Russia will receive DM550 million (approximately $330 million) which exceeds the preceding agreements by DM50 million.

According to Russian Ministry of Defense information, approximately 60% of personnel and 72% of vehicles and weaponry have already been withdrawn from Germany by the present time. A special housing construction program has been developed and is already being carried out for the troops being withdrawn from Germany. It proposes the construction of 36,000 apartments on CIS territory, of which 27,320 will be in Russia.

According to observers' assessments, despite the compromise that has been achieved, solutions of the problems associated with the equipment and real estate being left on the territory of military garrisons still require resolution. Furthermore, they will have to take additional steps to reform troop movements as a result of the reduced time periods for the withdrawal.
The visit will continue until 19 December. KOMMER-
SANT-DAILY will report on its results on Tuesday, 22
December.

Youth Attitudes Toward Contract Service
93UM03404 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Jan 93 p 2

[“Youth and Contract Service”—Russian Federation
Ministry of Defense Press Service headline]

[Text] What attitude does Russian youth hold toward
contract service, which is the new way of filling the
Army’s manpower needs?

Data gathered by military sociologists (Armed Forces
Military-Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research
Center) indicate that the majority of those polled in the
survey as favoring contract service (the survey covered
men in compulsory military service and draft-age youth)
grew up in families of industrial workers (39 percent and
22 percent, respectively), families of transportation
branch workers (15 percent, 16 percent), families of
agricultural workers (10 percent for each group), and
families of servicemen (13 percent).

The vast majority of the respondents wishing to perform
service on a volunteer basis were unmarried. They were
raised in families that are well-off, residing or having
resided in cities (about 75 percent), while a quarter of
them claimed a rural residence. However, there was a
larger weight of potential contract takers in the case of
rural youths as compared with those of cities (38 percent
against 46 percent, respectively).

Indicating an interest in becoming “profs” were young
men possessing a secondary or secondary specialized
education.

In the case of men on active military duty, those favoring
signing a contract for service coinciding with their
normal tour of duty constitute percentages distributed
virtually uniformly (up to 6 months, 29 percent; to one
year, 21 percent; to 18 months, 23 percent; to 2 years, 25
percent). The largest figures fell to enlisted men and
noncommissioned officers of the VDV [Airborne
Troops] (53 percent) and the VMF [Navy] (39 percent).
In the PVO [Air Defense Troops] and RVSN [Strategic
Missile Troops], about a third of men questioned indicated
an intent to perform contract service. The figure was
lower (about 20 percent) for those in the Ground
Forces and the VVS [Air Forces].

Rating highest in prestige in the eyes of youth were the
Airborne Troops. This was the contract service assign-
ment of choice expressed by about half of those surveyed
among conscript servicemen and draft-age youths. A
majority figure showed up again for serving in the VDV
on the part of young men intending to enter contract
service. Taking second place on the prestige scale was the
Navy (25 percent of conscript enlisted and noncommis-
sioned officer personnel and 15 percent of draft-age
youths wishing to become volunteers). Further down the
scale were the VVS (16 percent and 24 percent), the
Ground Forces (7 percent and 20 percent), the RVSN (4
percent and 4 percent), and the PVO (12 percent and 7
percent). There was an appreciable increase in prestige
(approximately two-fold) in serving in the Ground
Troops. This is due to an interest in becoming military
drivers (of combat vehicles and transportation vehicles)
because a considerable number of youths favoring
contract service.

Highly popular with youth is service in specialized
units and subunits. In this connection, specialties such
as reconnaissance scout, airborne trooper, and naval
infantryman are more appealing to conscript servicemen
than to draft-age youths (42 percent and 28
percent, respectively).

CIS: POLICY

Shaposhnikov Urges Greater CIS Military
Integration
934C07934 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 20 Jan 93 p 11

[Report by Vladimir Makartsev: “Integration Will Allow
Everyone To Survive: Shaposhnikov Press Conference”]

[Text] Journalists had a meeting with Air Marshal Yev-
geniy Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of the CIS
Joint Armed Forces, yesterday at the International Press
Center and “Moscow” Journalists’ Club in the Hotel
“Slavyanskaya.”

Marshal Shaposhnikov’s press conference was the third
in a series of meetings which the Journalists’ Club has
held amid relaxed circumstances (at breakfast) with
Russia’s leading political figures. Prior to the com-
mander-in-chief, Russia’s vice-premier, Vladimir Shum-
eyko, and the head of the Federal Information Center,
Mikhail Poltarin, had already appeared and spoken to
the journalists. The guests have their breakfast free of
charge, whereas the journalists pay amounts ranging
from 25 to 35 dollars for theirs.

Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov appeared before his audience
dressed in an elegant civilian suit; he made a brief
analysis of the strategic situation in the world and in the
CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries.
The year in which this Commonwealth has been in
existed—Marshal Shaposhnikov noted—has shown that
the hopes for creating a new democratic and secure
union have not yet come to pass. In his opinion, the
processes now going on within the CIS had led to
destabilization and are capable of “exploding the entire
situation.” And the dividing up of the army is playing by
no means the least role in this process. A year ago the
marshal proposed taking the army out from under the
jurisdiction of a single country and creating armed forces
in common and something like a joint ministry of
defense. However, political games led to a split-up of the
armed forces. And this also explains the subjective nature of many regional conflicts.

According to the marshal, last year’s disintegration of the USSR violated and disrupted the balance of forces; and it shattered the world’s bipolarity. This led to a sharp bias or distortion in international relations—the world lost its strategic stability.” Although the “cold war” has become a thing of the past, the arms race is still going on, all the principal military programs are still being carried out in the United States and NATO, and work is continuing with regard to improve high-accuracy weapons, which—in their combat characteristics—closely resemble tactical nuclear weapons. In this sense, the marshal still fails to understand the “games” of inflicting air strikes on targets in Iraq.

Speaking about the prospects for positive development not only in the CIS countries, but also on a worldwide scale, the commander-in-chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces noted that—under the conditions which have been created—the commander-in-chief’s office could become that coordinating and unifying center which would allow the former republics of the Soviet Union to embody the principle of “from self-determination to integration” and create a genuine Union without reviving the rigid and arrogant structures of the Center. In this connection, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov places great hopes on the upcoming CIS summit meeting to be held in Minsk.

Proposed 2nd All-Army Assembly to Push Conservative Agenda

[Article by Irina Shkarnikova under the “Army” rubric: “Officers’ Union to Take Yeltsin and Grachev to Task, Hopes to Close Ranks of Former Soviet Armed Forces”]

[Text] Russian citizens who are of a more political frame of mind were in a state of tension for some time prior to last year’s All-Army Officers’ Conference, due to uncertainty relative to what actions would be taken by military persons who feel that they have been unfairly treated. However, the Conference came to a successful conclusion, with mutual dissatisfaction mollified. The intention of those who called together the Second All-Army Conference—the Central Social Officers’ Union Council, which is headed by retired Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Terekhov, is to depart from last year’s agenda by putting forward, as a priority issue, political demands, with social demands taking second place. This year, as stated by Stanislav Terekhov, the Officers’ Union “will not permit Ministry of Defense functionaries to manipulate the progress of the Conference.”

According to Terekhov, the All-Army Conference was called together on an urgent basis, since “the Officer Corps has become divided and demoralized,” but “there is a chance that it can be reunited.”

The Officers’ Union’s political demands are as follows: Endow the Army with unity and indivisibility throughout the entire territory of the former USSR; put an end to creating national armies and withdrawing Russian troops from the republics of the former Union; and retain the allegiance as expressed in the present oath, since the new oath—-to Russia—is in the opinion of Union members an oath of allegiance to Yeltsin, that is, to the regime, not to the people. The Conference also plans to hold a detailed discussion of the state of affairs in the RF [Russian Federation] Armed Forces, especially in the Navy; make an appeal to servicemen (calling for unification); and consider the restoration of the structure of the All-Army Officers’ Assembly (VOAS) and the procedure to be followed for selecting its governing elements. There should be participation in the work of the Conference by representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Belarus, and of other CIS member countries. The Officers’ Union intends to convene the Conference in the middle of February.

Stanislav Terekhov and like-minded persons look upon the policies of Yeltsin and Grachev as constituting the sole cause of disintegration of the Union Army and of the USSR as well.

The numerical strength of the Officers’ Union is not known. (What is known is merely that it has branches from Kamchatka to Kazakhstan.) The organization’s leaders maintain that the Union is an adequate reflection of the prevailing opinion in the Army. Although the organization is presently supported by communists, the Officers’ Union hopes that deputies of various public organizations will provide support.

No one knows how Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev will react to the Conference, since, judging by statements he has made on a number of occasions, he does not consider this level of conference to be useful for resolving political issues. Nevertheless, the Conference’s organizing committee intends to invite him as “a person responsible for the disintegrated Union Army.”

Rotation of Troops in Remote Federation Regions

[Article under the “Briefing for Readers” rubric by Vasilii Fatigarov, with information prepared by Dmitriy Litovkin and Aleksandr Zotov: “Regular Rotation Scheduled?”]

[Text] This is the tenth year that our son is serving in the Far East. A persistent rumor circulating among officers has it that there will be no rotation in 1993. Is that true?

M. Labutyanayskaya
Samara
CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Features of Preparing the BTR-80 for Storage

93UM0281A Moscow TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE
in Russian No 1, Jan 90 pp 26-27

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Mosunov]

[Text] Before being placed in storage, APC's must be put in a technically serviceable condition and fully supplied with the spare parts, tools and accessories kit and authorized property. Therefore vehicles are thoroughly inspected and all identified deficiencies are remedied before beginning the technological operations for placing them in storage.

Vehicles to be kept in storage for up to one year undergo mandatory TO-1 [echelon of servicing and maintenance] (regardless of mileage) or the next TO-2. But if the planned storage period is more than a year, TO-2 is performed and work prescribed for preparing a vehicle for winter operation is done additionally. In this case the vehicle body is sealed without fail.

Additional work is dictated by BTR-80 design features. For example, when putting a vehicle in storage for a year or more, using diesel fuel in the engine fuel system requires replacing summer diesel fuel with winter fuel having a solidification temperature not over -45°C. To remove the remainder of summer fuel after it is drained from the system, start the engine and allow it to run at medium crankshaft rotational speed for 1.5-3 minutes.

In the engine lubrication system, replace filter elements of the full-flow oil filter, flush the centrifugal oil filter and change the oil. Drain old oil only after the engine is warmed up and turned off. For this, first unscrew the plug in the bottom of the vehicle beneath the engine crankcase, place a container under it, then open the oil drain opening in the engine oil pan and drain the oil into the container using the special accessory. Discharge the remainder through the small cock of the oil heat exchanger. Further, fill the engine crankcase with fresh oil through the oil filler neck after first closing the oil pan drain opening and the small cock on the heat exchanger. After this start the engine and allow it to run 2-3 minutes. Measure oil level in the crankcase 4-5 minutes after it is turned off and if necessary add oil until it is normal.

Fill the BTR-80 engine cooling system in all seasons with grades 40 or 55 antifreeze according to the climatic zone of operation. If for some reason water was used as a coolant in summer without an anticorrosive additive, add antifreeze only after thoroughly flushing the cooling system. To do this, instead of pure water pour water with a three-component additive into the system, which in this case serves as a flushing solution. Then start the engine and warm it up to a temperature of 80-90°C (with heating system on).

Remember that it is prohibited to open the radiator cap when the engine is hot, since then a reverse flow of fluid displaced into the expansion tank becomes impossible due to a pressure drop in the system. This may subsequently lead to its ejection. Therefore drain the flushing solution no sooner than two hours after shutting off the engine, when it cools.

After performing this operation, close drain cocks in the order indicated in instruction tables. Add antifreeze first through the radiator filler neck using a funnel with screen filter for this. In closing the radiator cap, be sure that it does not touch the steam discharge tube connecting hose.

Add fluid to the expansion tank to a level of 10-20 mm from its bottom. After closing all caps and being sure there is no leak at connections and from cocks, start the engine and let it run for 3-5 minutes. Add coolant up to the normal level if necessary. In performing these operations, do not allow oil products to get into the cooling system, since this leads to foaming and blow-out of fluid.

Remember antifreeze is poisonous; therefore strictly observe safety measures in working with it. It is categorically prohibited to suck out fluid through a hose by mouth; the likelihood of it getting into food and potable water must be precluded; and thoroughly wash hands with soap after work.

In preparing the prestart preheater, blow out its gas vents with compressed air and clean carbon from electrodes and the spark plug insulator. Then check to be sure of the working capacity of the fuel heater (according to the degree of heat of its chamber) and the preheater as a whole. If necessary, flush filters, injector, and electromagnetic valve and perform adjustments.
grid of the flame plugs and rinse them in gasoline. After assembling the electronic flame device, monitor its working capacity. To this end, press the indicator light button on the driver's instrument panel and check to see whether or not it functions and whether or not the flame plugs are serviceable. Here the discharge current must not exceed 30 amps. Simultaneously register the time from the moment the electronic flame device is turned on until the indicator light goes on: it should be 50-70 seconds for the first turn-on with positive air temperature, and 70-110 seconds with negative temperature. Judge whether or not there is a flame in the intake manifolds from their degree of heat (by feel at a distance of 70-100 mm from the plugs toward the blower).

After appropriate servicing and maintenance, seal the vehicle body with ZZK-3u lubricant (it is used to seal the covers of all hatches, inspection covers and body plugs) and with fabric (Fig. 1). Load 40 kg of silica gel into the vehicle through the commander's hatch and suspend an indicator bag using a wire 1-1.5 mm in diameter, which is passed through one of the openings under the bolt attaching the hatch cover for dismantling the transfer case. After this close the commander's hatch cover and daub ZZK-3u lubricant around the perimeter.

When the BTR-80 is placed in storage for over six months, remove the load from its suspension assemblies without fail. For this suspend the vehicle body (Fig. 1) using two sturdy, stable horses (Fig. 3), which, by the way, can be made in the repair shop. Strictly observe safety measures. Thus, situate jacks and their supports strictly vertically, ensure their stability, and raise and lower the body smoothly and without skews.

To perform this operation, use two jacks with pads, two horses and two support blocks. The area beneath the vehicle must be level and have a hard surface. First place support blocks under the front wheels and two jacks with pads under the rear part of the body (Fig. 2). Then raise the body evenly until the rear wheels are fully off the surface of the floor, place a horse beneath projections of the attachment of rear brackets of the lower suspension arms and lower the body onto it. Shift the jacks beneath the front part of the vehicle body, raise it until the front wheels separate from the surface of the floor and set the second horse beneath projections of the attachment of front brackets of the lower suspension arms. Air pressure in tires of a suspended vehicle is lowered to 100 kPa (1 kgf/cm²) and wheel valves are closed.

If the vehicle storage period does not exceed six months, then it is permissible not to suspend it, but vehicle support points must be changed every 45 days by rotating wheels 90° or moving it in one direction for approximately 90 cm.

Interview with Chief of New Ground Troops Air Defense Academy
93UM0226A Moscow VOYENNYY VESTNIK
in Russian No 10, Oct 92 pp 2-5

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Viktor Kuzmich Chertkov, chief of the Ground Troops Military Academy, by Colonel V.I. Timokhin; place and date not given: "Four Questions for the Military Academy Chief"]

[Text] Even in the favorable times for the army, the Ground Troops Military Air Defense Academy imeni A.M. Vasilyevskiy was born, as they say, in the throes. Having emerged in 1974 in Kiev under the signboard of a branch of the Leningrad Military Artillery Academy, it acquired its legal independence together with its true name only two years later.

In 17 years the Ground Troops Military Air Defense Academy rightfully came to be ranked on a par with the oldest military higher educational institutions and became a scientific center for elaborating questions of development of the combat arm. But the fall of 1991 came, and the academy went under the jurisdiction of Ukraine, thereby breaking an important link in the system of training officer personnel for the Armed Forces of Russia.

This situation did not last long. And the question itself—"Should there be a new academy or not?"—was decided in only a month and a half. In late April 1992, by order of the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, issued to execute the directive of the President of the Russian Federation, the Ground Troops Military Air Defense Academy of the Russian Federation was created. It began operating as an educational institution already on 1 September.

First some information. Lieutenant-General Viktor Kuzmich Chertkov is 50 years old. He is married and has two sons. He graduated from the Leningrad Antiaircraft Artillery Technical School, the Kiev Higher Artillery Engineering School (command and staff specialty), and the General Staff Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces. The last position held was first deputy commander of Air Defense Troops of the Ground Troops.

[Timokhin] You would agree that this is simply a paradox: Today, when the army is being reduced, when there is a threat that some educational institutions will be merged or even closed, the decision is being made to open an academy. How did you manage not only to defend the very idea that there should be such an academy but to make it a reality in such a short period of time?

[Chertkov] Only at first glance does this seem to be a question of the fate of one higher educational institution. If you look into the matter, the problem is actually much broader.
By the spring of 1992, a critical situation had emerged for the entire system of training specialists for the combat arms. Judge for yourself. A large part of our scientific and pedagogical potential was beyond the borders of Russia, namely: an academy, two (out of five) schools, and five training centers. Our scientific research institute also remained in Kiev. It should be noted that each school had a strictly defined personnel training profile, and the academy also accomplished advanced training for supervisory personnel of the air defense troops of the districts, armies, and formations.

In essence, we lost 100 percent of the capability to train officers with a higher military education, 100 percent of the capability to train officers of the command profile for air defense assets of a motorized rifle regiment (tank regiment), and 75 percent of the capability to train officers with a higher specialized military education. Impressive, isn't it?

We had to start thinking in general about the survival of the Air Defense Troops of the Ground Troops of the Russian Federation and their science. A delay of even 1-2 years in solving these pressing issues could have led to irreversible processes.

And there was something to lose. Here is a fairly graphic example. Our combat arm is one of many that during the past 5-7 years was able to be reequipped with the most modern equipment. Individual models of the equipment are simply unique, and it can be said without exaggeration that there is nothing similar to the equipment in the armies of other states. A real confirmation of this is the offers coming in from many countries of the world, including highly developed countries, to acquire mobile surface-to-air missile systems and command and control and reconnaissance equipment.

In such circumstances, formation of an academy was merely one of the stages of high-priced creative work. In mid-March, a memorandum was prepared addressed to the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, Marshal of Aviation Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, under the signature of the chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General V.N. Samsonov, the deputy commander in chief for personnel, Colonel-General Yu.N. Rodionov, and the commander of the Ground Troops, Colonel-General V.M. Semenov. It contained an analysis of the situation that had taken shape and proposed specific measures making it possible, (without detriment to the cause) with the lease expenditures and in the shortest possible time, to correct the difficult situation for the combat arm. Already on 31 March, Russian President B.N. Yeltsin directed that the Ground Troops Military Air Defense Academy be organized. An order of the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS was also signed concerning this on 27 April 1992.

[Chertkov] Of course, there were variants. For example, there was also a proposal to select the city of Tver as the site, or more precisely the well-established, related higher educational institution located there—the Air Defense Military Academy.

But the costs would have sharply increased immediately in such a case: the training base would have to be created anew (except for the mathematics, physics, and other departments). You see, we have a different ideology, if I can put it that way. Hence the different approach to questions of combat employment of units and subunits and construction of weapon systems. To underestimate this means to ignore the already existing experience of merging the Air Defense Troops of the Ground Troops with the National Air Defense Troops.

Before dwelling on the advantages of the approved variant, I want to remind you once again that the question of creating the academy was part of the overall problem of restoring the system of training specialists of the combat arm. Therefore, it was resolved together with other similar issues.

The following arguments were made in favor of Smolensk.

First, the time periods and the financial and material expenditures in setting up the academy on the base of the Smolensk Higher Engineering School of Electronics would be minimal, and the qualifications of the bulk of its instructors would make it possible to train command and engineering personnel in accordance with the needs of the troops, even in the process of their reduction. What is meant by this?

The school has 11 departments staffed with sufficiently qualified instructors and capable of functioning as academic departments. Thus, one out of every four of them is a candidate of sciences, and one out of every six has a "docent" academic degree. It is necessary to create an additional six departments, basically operational-tactical and military-special departments.

The existing training facilities comprises 80 percent of the academy's needs. With the introduction of a new classroom building (which needs only to be completed), we will be able to house completely the equipment of various command posts. The school has at its disposal training fields and storage facilities for armament and equipment. There is a good sports base and a park and depot area.

The barracks and dining facility meet the norms for all practical purposes. It is possible to convert part of the facilities as an officer dormitory at a relatively small expense.

Second, a scientific research center of the Ground Troops Air Defense Troops is already in operation under the school. This fact will make it possible in the future to
solve comprehensively and purposefully problems of development of the combat arm and also of professional training of its specialists.

Third, Smolensk is one of the oldest cultural and historical centers of Russia, particularly famous for its heroic past. And this is quite important for expanding the outlook of officers.

[Timokhin] An appointment to such a position, as we know, is preceded by coordination, conversations, and the like at various levels. In agreeing to take such a responsible and unquestionably honored post that involves carrying out generally new and largely unfamiliar tasks, you undoubtedly were guided by some kind of considerations. Could you share them with the readers?

[Chertkov] I do not presume to comment on the motives that prompted the leadership, above all of the combat arm, to pick me for the job. As far as my own decision is concerned, I based it on the following considerations.

I began serving in the army as a soldier, and later as an officer candidate. After completion of the latter, I held various officer positions, including being chief of the Air Defense Troops of our largest grouping—the Western. As you know, there in our units the training and educational processes did not stop for a minute. Moreover, we also should not forget about alert duty.

I will say more. We, as a group, were the ones to receive the newest armament and equipment. And each time we had to master it and analyze and summarize the experience of its operation. This means that we had to organize and monitor scheduled activities when training all categories of servicemen in the new equipment, conduct exercises and conferences (including research), prepare reports, and so forth. Therefore, I know firsthand what the "make-up" of the specialist at various levels and the "end product" of the activities of the entire collective of the academy should be. I think I am also able to select competent like-minded instructors and create for them the conditions for truly creative work.

Of course, the ideal for running such a higher educational institution is to have a person who possesses a high scientific potential and has a wealth of experience in managing creative collectives, specific collectives. But I also understand very well that (as in any other of my positions) I will be forced to engage in basically purely administrative activities for a long time yet, its most routine and administrative part. Unfortunately, each of us has already given considerable time and effort to this in the troops.

Although I also see certain prospects here: the time has come to establish ties based on economic partnership with enterprises and institutions of the city, or maybe simply with business people. Incidentally, the head of the local administration has already contacted me with such a proposal at our first meeting.

Without a detailed study I do not dare to say what form such cooperation will take. But it is an indisputable fact that it is possible and, what is more, is needed. Already now we are seeing spheres of activity which are of mutual interest both for us military and for civilians. Let us take just one example. Quite a few top-rated specialists in electronics serve at the academy. Of course, their knowledge and practical experience should and can serve not only the army, but also the city and oblast.

There are also some thoughts regarding the training process itself. I would like for more attention to be given to the practical orientation of training students, above all, in working out questions of coordination, for example, with troops being covered, air defense and electronic combat troops, and aviation. New command and control equipment is providing great opportunities for this purpose.

[Timokhin] As they say, the starting uneasiness is behind: the training year has begun. The academy is operating. This is evidence that the priority tasks have been accomplished: the academy is staffed and the physical plant has been created. Could you tell us about this in a little more detail?

[Chertkov] The academy is to train officers of the command and engineering specialty with a three-year term of instruction, and also engineers with a higher specialized military education (five-year term of instruction).

This year we recruited the number of students for the first-year class that we were supposed to. The rest of the classes are staffed with students of the engineering school on whose base the academy has been created. They all began classes on 1 September. For the time being we do not foresee any special problems. We plan to train officers beginning in 1993. In the time remaining we have to accomplish several tasks of an organizational nature: finish staffing the departments with instructors, finish equipping the classrooms with training facilities components, develop a number of training and methods aids, and eliminate the most acute social problems.

There is another so-called variable category of servicemen—officer graduate students. This is the way things stand with them. Every year we are authorized to accept 10 people. And we have fulfilled this plan. I want to believe that they will live up to our hopes.

I believe the academy is pretty well staffed with command and instructor personnel. Judge for yourself: all 17 department heads are either doctors or candidates of sciences. The operational-tactical disciplines will be taught by officers who have considerable troop service experience in fairly large positions and have completed post graduate school. There are also graduates of the General Staff Military Academy.

We are devoting a sufficiently great deal of attention to construction, above all, housing, for which specific funds have been allocated. A 70-apartment building has been
started. We are building another on shares with a factory. Of course, we will not be able to solve the painful housing problem completely with just these measures. But we are hoping to at least partially ease the problem in this way.

There is no reason to doubt the reality of our plans. Work is already under way in many directions, and with a fair amount of success.

[Timokhin] Thank you for the interview. On behalf of the journal's editorial staff and its readers I want to wish the collective of the new educational institution success in training officer-professionals who meet the dictates of the times.

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NAVAL FORCES

Rear Adm Aleksin on Future of Fleet
93UM0191A Moscow SOVETSKY VOIN in Russian
No 8, Aug 92 pp 2-3

[Article by Rear Adm Valeriy Ivanovich Aleksin, chief navigator of the Navy, under the rubric “Subjective Comments”: “What Kind of Fleet Do We Need?”]

[Text] This article was prepared by Rear Adm V. Aleksin, chief navigator of the Navy, as a response to critical assessments of our navy which have recently appeared in many publications. One could form the impression from these assessments that the Commonwealth Navy is not only not providing strategic parity with the navies of other states, including the U.S. Navy, but actually constitutes a source of increased danger to sea due to technical imperfections of the ships and inferior training of the crews.

In addition to his immediate duties, Valeriy Ivanovich Aleksin is in charge of the Navy’s press center. He graduated with distinction from the John Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in the USA. Adm Colin Powell, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, awarded him his certificate. We hope that the opinions and the reasoning of Rear Adm Aleksin will be of interest to the reader.

I shall begin with the position taken by opponents. This is what Capt 1st Rank (retired) I. Kolton, former member of the Permanent Commission for State Acceptance of Navy Ships, had to say at a recent round-table meeting arranged by the editorial board of the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI: “I do not believe anyone can tell us what kind of navy we need, since no one knows what it is like right now. The extremely poor quality of shipbuilding, an enormous lag in the area of noise level, failures in the combat training and the disastrous accident situation tell us that we must ascertain the quality of our navy right away. We must have an inventorying of the navy, that is, an objective assessment of the number of ships, their condition, the actual level of the combat training... by a group of independent experts.”

I agree that the navy has many problems. But where do such absolute assessments come from? What are they based on? On what information? On what facts? And who specifically is the object of the criticism implicit in these assessments?

For example, who should be blamed for the fact that American submarines are less noisy than ours, the state of which, according to Ilya Borisovich, is “particularly poor”? The noise problem cannot be resolved with good intentions alone, you see. This is because it is related to the overall national problem of our industry, which is at a lower technological level and caliber than American industry. This is precisely why the attitude of Capt 1st Rank A. Khrapovich, former submarine commander, is without basis. He brags to journalists that he once
"bluntly stated to Yazov" that we should build not 50 inferior submarines but three submarines, noiseless and with excellent armaments. We cannot build just one, let alone three, of the submarines imagined by Khrapovich. We need to learn to service and if necessary to fight with the ships we have. They are not as bad as they are depicted. It is true that our submarines are noisier, but the only person who could criticize them for this is one who is not familiar with the tactics for employing our RPLs [missile submarines] or with the different types of combat, technical and special support for their combat operations. For example, our RPLs do not need to cross the ocean and subject themselves to enemy attack, as was the case 25 years ago. They can employ their weapons from our shores, from where they are stationed, and this is not true of the U.S. Navy's RPLs.

Now, about the accident rate, which I. Kolton calls "disastrous," and since we have brought up the subject of submarines, we shall talk about them.

The data show that collisions involving submarines of the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy occurred almost every year during the 20-year period between 1966 and 1986. The last collision occurred in 1986, and we are therefore considering precisely this period. None of the collisions can be considered to have been deliberate, since any collision can result in the destruction of both submarines. No commander, either American or ours, would take that chance. The following conclusions can be drawn from this:

—shortcomings in the surveillance facilities of American submarines in actual navigation are comparable to ours; furthermore, some of the advantages of American PLs [submarines] with respect to noise level are frequently neutralized. Otherwise, the American submariners could have avoided the collisions with ours, even had the latter sought them;

—the organization of the service and the caliber of navigation on those American submarines involved in collisions are not a bit better than on corresponding submarines of our Navy;

—the training of the personnel on these PLs of the American Navy is comparable to the training of our PL crews.

Incidentally, the Americans have analyzed the collisions and arrived at the same conclusions. Talk of our "failures" in the combat training are therefore, to put it mildly, evidence of incompetence on the part of those involved in this kind of talk. I do not intend to deny the existence of shortcomings, however, and am even prepared to accept the word "failure," but only if the discussion is followed by realistic proposals for rectifying a "failure."

Incidentally, it is my impression from discussions with the Americans that they do not like to be criticized. When I offered them our services for lowering their rate of navigational accidents, they first pretended they did not hear it. They have a sense of national pride. What about us?

There was a three-fold decrease in the average annual number of accidents involving our ships and vessels during the past four years (1988-1991). There was a four-fold decrease in the number of navigational accidents and a six-fold drop in the number of ship collisions with serious effects.

People might reject this, saying that the accident level has dropped because our ships have begun sailing less frequently. This is true, to be sure, but the sailing frequency has decreased by only 40 percent (not considering recent months, of course), while the number of accidents, collisions and all such things has dropped several-fold.

I do not know about our opponents, but I myself am prepared to answer for every figure I have cited. Returning to the study of accidents involving nuclear-powered submarines, we have lost two of them in 20 years and not five, as A. Khrapovich maintains. One in the Atlantic in October of 1986 due to a fire in a missile silo and another in the Norwegian Sea in April of 1989—also due to a fire. The accidents involving a Charlie-class submarine (the NATO designation) cannot be considered losses in an absolute sense. This submarine sank in 40 meters of water in a trimming zone off the coast of Kamchatka. Trimming is done in shallow water so that the submarine does not sink to a great depth during its very first submersion. Fourteen people died. This was a tragedy. The submarine itself was raised, however. It sank a second time right at the dock of the shipyard two years later. Some officials involved with the submarine had wanted very much to report to Moscow on its completion in time for the anniversary and literally shoved the submarine off from the dock, despite the objections of its commander. He was subsequently punished more severely than anyone else.

The submarine was raised this time as well and converted into a trainer for submariners.

Incidentally, a year later the Americans "lost" a nuclear-powered missile submarine, the Nathaniel Green, which was removed from the combat fleet following a serious navigational accident and could not be repaired.

I would add to this the fact that U.S. submarines have gone aground around 10 times since 1987, while we have not had a single such incident.

These comparisons are perhaps not valid, but I want to respond to the attacks by those who would presume to criticize the fleet by underscoring the fact that they should study the facts thoroughly and specifically. Nor should they consider incidents in the navy, whether it be American or ours, with such fastidious exactitude.

I served on submarines almost 20 years before ending up at the Main Naval Staff. I was on vessels which caught on fire and some which sank. I have analyzed the causes of all sorts of incidents and accidents thousands of times. The causes differ in each specific case, of course, and are sometimes deplorable. The famous American ocean rescuer Dzh. Gorz [transliteration] put it best of all the writers on the subject.
with whom I am familiar, however, in his book "Raising Sunken Ships." In the chapter pertaining to the accident rate for submarines he wrote: "The Navy could outfit its nuclear-powered submarines with all the devices essential to give them complete safety, of course, but then they would be unsuitable for anything. However, no one could deny the fact that submarines are a means of warfare and submarine duty constitutes one of the most dangerous occupations."

One can therefore advise all those who have a fear of naval service and the elements of the sea, those possessed by doubts about the navigational safety of submarines or surface ships, not to serve in ships and not even to go near the water. Otherwise, it would not appear possible completely to resolve the problem of safety and to avoid accidents today.

Now a few words about the strategic capacity of our Navy and its combat capabilities.

E. Razin, former specialist in artillery systems of surface ships with the military acceptance agency, has told reporters that our ships "are worthless at a time of danger."

In that case, why does the U.S. Navy continue to keep at sea, in combat patrol zones, those 20-23 nuclear-powered submarines with Trident-I and Trident-2 ballistic missiles and 18-20 nuclear-powered attack submarines with Tomahawk cruise missiles capable of striking land targets at ranges of 2,500 kilometers and carrying 20 torpedos each? Why, with a planned 25-percent reduction in its armed forces during the period 1990-1995, including a 29-percent cut in ground forces and a 28-percent cut in the Air Force, is the U.S. Navy being reduced by only 17 percent? Furthermore, it continues to build 20 modern ships and submarines a year, some of them nuclear-powered missile submarines. The plan is to build them, given the planned reduction, so as to increase the combat capability of the U.S. Navy 1.5- to 2-fold by the year 2000. Why is this being done? I shall let the readers arrive at the answers.

I do not deny the fact that there are many serious problems with respect to maintaining the combat capabilities of our ships and the fleet's strategic capacity. The collapse of the state has exacerbated them.

It is doubtful, however, that these problems will be resolved more successfully if people to whom the basics of military and naval affairs have to be explained, who feel that they know an awesome secret the revelation of which can turn the world around, become involved in the matter.

From the editors: After this article had been readied for publication, a report came in about a collision between an American submarine and one of ours in the Barents Sea. Skipping all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, which was covered extensively and in detail in the mass media, we would mention the fact that the American submariners and their submarine did not perform a bit better than ours in this situation, which confirms what Rear Adm V. Aleksin has said. We still feel, however, that the subject brought up in the article has to be discussed. And it is perfectly possible that Valeriy Ivanovich's opponents will have equally weighty arguments showing that the fleet and specifically its submarines cannot be above criticism.

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Force Development of the Russian Navy
93UM0200A Moscow MORSKOV SBORNIK
in Russian No 10, Oct 92 (signed to press
5 Oct 92) pp 3-7

[Article by Navy Main Staff Department Chief Captain 1st Rank Valeriy Yulyevich Moiseyenko: "The Russian Armed Forces Military Structural Development Concept: A View on the Problem of the Navy"]

[Text] The Russian Ministry of Defense is completing work on the Armed Forces Military Structural Development Concept. Considering the great deal of interest our readers have expressed in the navy's fate in the near future, the editorial staff asked Navy Main Staff Section Chief Captain 1st Rank Valeriy Yulyevich Moiseyenko to comment on the provisions of this document that affect the Navy.

Based on analysis of the series of problems for armed defense of the state, the Concept defines the primary directions of the structural development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and is the basis for further specific elaborations in the theory and practice of military affairs. The structural development of the qualitatively new Russian Armed Forces that meet the demands of the contemporary military-political and strategic situation in the world and the situation that has developed in the Commonwealth of Independent States and in the Russian Federation and that are adequate according to their composition and combat capabilities for the real degree of the military threat for our state and correspond to its economic, demographic and other capabilities is the end goal that has been placed at the foundation of the creation of this document.

In so doing, we have in mind that, first of all, positive changes in the world are not yet irreversible in nature. The instability of the development of the situation, the unpredictability of its changes, the maintenance of political, economic, ethnic, territorial, religious and other contradictions between the individual states unfortunately do not exclude the sources of the military threat for Russia. Today, we do not have any clear enemies but that does not mean that they cannot appear.

Second, the decline of industry and agriculture and the imbalance of the financial mechanism that have caused profound transformations in the national economy have resulted in the reduction of the state's economic potential and have had a negative impact on the capability to build and improve the Russian Armed Forces.

While proceeding from this, the primary tasks of the Russian Federation Armed Forces may be:
—participation in the attainment of the primary goal of Russia's policy—preventing any wars and armed conflicts; ensuring its security and preserving its territorial integrity; and, defending state interests and the constitutional system;

—repelling aggression against Russia or its allies if it is still unleashed; defeating the enemy using all available men and equipment if necessary and creating conditions for the most rapid termination of combat operations and the restoration of a just and lasting peace;

—participation in the fulfillment of obligations to the world community for maintaining peace and stability; and,

—participation in rendering assistance to the population while eliminating the aftereffects of technological and ecological catastrophes, natural disasters and other required cases based on a governmental decision.

We envision carrying out the structural development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in three stages.

During the first stage (during 1992), we propose to conduct a painstaking and objective inventory of existing Armed Forces weaponry, military vehicles and other equipment; determine at the interstate level the status of Russian troops that are outside Russia and continue their gradual withdrawal and infrastructure development on Russian territory; begin to form groups of ground (naval) forces on Russian Federation territory; continue the planned reduction of personnel, weaponry and military equipment; begin the transition to the mixed Armed Forces personnel manning principles based on universal military obligation and recruitment for military service on contract; develop the provisions of the legal basis for the structural development and functioning of the Armed forces; and, complete the formation of the Russian Armed Forces command and control organs.

During the second stage (1993-1994), we are planning to continue to create groups of ground (naval) forces and the military infrastructure on Russian territory; continue the transition to a mixed Armed Forces personnel manning system; continue the reduction and reform of ground (naval) forces and to primarily complete their withdrawal to Russian territory; and, create and legally consolidate a system of social guarantees for servicemen and their family members.

During the third stage (after 1995), we propose to conduct radical transformations of the Armed Forces structure, its combat arms and branches and the navy; largely complete the formation of groups and military infrastructure on Russian territory, reduce Armed Forces strength to the level of approximately 1.5 million men; complete the withdrawal of troops and their infrastructure development on Russian territory; and complete the transition to the mixed Armed Forces personnel manning system.

By 1995, we envision the further reduction of duty categories of servicemen, including admirals, generals and officers. And in 1993 we propose introducing a contract system of service for officer personnel. Specifically, a new category of short-term service officers will appear.

The prospects for military cooperation with foreign countries have been very seriously elaborated in the Concept. It is directed at strengthening the country's national security and increasing our influence in the world while considering Russia's political, military and economic interests and also while preserving and supporting international peace and security.

Right now the role of science is increasing in the structural development of the Armed Forces. The preservation of the existing military scientific potential and its effective utilization is set forth in the Concept. Although, in my opinion, this is quite problematical under the planned reduction of the number of NIU's [Scientific Research Institutions] by 30-35%.

There is a section in the Concept titled "The Socio-Political Aspects of Armed Forces Structural Development". I will not comment upon it here because these issues merit a separate conversation, all the more so since MORSKOY SBORNIK has had substantial reason to devote adequate attention to that.

I think that the readers will be interested in becoming more deeply familiar with the primary directions of development of the Navy as the most important and specific branch of the Russian Armed Forces.

Among them are:

—qualitative improvements of the naval strategic nuclear forces (under conditions of a more than 50% reduction of their composition in accordance with the START Treaty) and their command and control systems;

—bringing the organization of fleet (flotilla) men and equipment into compliance with the reduction of their numbers and the qualitative changes that are occurring;

—reduction of the number of types of submarines, surface ships, and carrier-based and shore-based aircraft systems;

—ensuring the balanced composition of the navy based on combat and support systems;

—expansion of the strike and mobile capabilities of coastal defense troops, including naval infantry, to impart to them the qualities that are needed for operations as part of mobile forces; and,

—improvement of all types of support systems.

We envision reducing Navy strength by approximately 22% by 1995 and by another 16% by the year 2000 which is somewhat less when compared with the other branches of the Armed Forces.

More detailed measures for construction and support of the functioning of the Navy have been developed in today's complex economic and political conditions.
Obviously, military seamen and friends of the Navy also want to primarily learn about them.

There is certainly no special need to prove that the Navy is one of the important components of our state that is called upon to ensure Russia's security and national, political, and economic interests at sea under contemporary conditions. The Navy makes a weighty contribution to the maintenance of global stability, first of all due to the continuous readiness of the naval strategic nuclear forces. In the event of aggression or armed conflict, the navy must be capable of repelling attacks from the sea and ocean axes, defeating any possible naval enemy and depriving him of the capability to conduct offensive operations, ensuring the protection of our ground-based facilities from attack from the sea, supporting ground forces in their conduct of combat operations on coastal axes when necessary (we must not forget that Russia is an enormous continental power with enormous maritime flanks).

In the future, obviously we must also consider that the proposed integration of Russia into the world economic system with its pragmatic market economy is impossible without the development of maritime trade, fishing, and transportation ties, that is, without the use of the sea lines of communication [SLOC] and the development and protection of the resources of the World Ocean.

If Russia does not want to forgo its basic interests in the future, and she has quite significant interests at sea, she must have a Navy to do this which, based on its composition, structure, and power could reliably carry out primarily deterrent functions with regard to possible manifestations of the unfriendly intentions of other naval powers.

To achieve the goals I have indicated, while considering the specific geographic features of Russia's position (five relatively disconnected maritime theaters that vary in size), we need to have groups of naval forces in the North, Baltic, in the Black Sea, in the Pacific Ocean, and in the Caspian Sea. An orientation toward building up the naval forces of each of the groups to the level of the strongest navy of the world, the American Navy, is not at all mandatory. It is sufficient for the naval forces in each of the specific theaters to be capable of opposing a quite real and defined threat. Assessments indicate that expenditures for the creation, maintenance and training of that navy on the whole could be 2-3 times less than, for example, in the United States. Undoubtedly, the assessment that has been conducted can be made more precise, however, that approach appears to be rational for the Russian Navy.

In so doing, we must consider that the modern navy is a very complex and expensive system which is being created gradually, relatively slow and only in peacetime. It cannot endure quantum leaps or breaks in its development and it requires constant attention, creation and maintenance of the appropriate favorable, primarily economic and production, conditions. The objectivity of these specific features of the navy are confirmed by Russia's historical experience. Under conditions of the steady growth of the role and significance of the navy, ignoring that experience would be an unforgivable error. It is the navy that is the most universal, powerful, and highly mobile branch of the armed forces, that has all of the combat arms and troops, types of weapons and equipment, that is, practically all of the substantial weapons of armed combat that permit it to operate effectively in any environments, areas, and conditions. Naturally, this build up of the appropriate components of naval forces can compensate for the definite reductions of the other branches of the armed forces and weapons. That is one of the reasons for our Western disarmament negotiating partners' careful and considerate attitude toward our Navy.

Let's be frank: only a strong state in the economic sense, that has a developed scientific-technical base, adequate production capabilities, highly professional specialists in all branches of knowledge and activity at its disposal, is capable of building and maintaining an effective navy in our time, and all the more so in the future. Even far from all coastal states are capable of building small surface craft, without even talking about submarines or cruisers, in the creation of which thousands of enterprises, design bureaus and scientific organizations participate, and the preparation of production and the development of technologies can take decades. Today, only Russia has all of this in the CIS—up to 90-95% of the scientific and production potential of military ship building and the sectors related to it (of the former USSR) that have been traditionally oriented toward the navy. And this is quite understandable, more than 95% of the length of all the maritime borders of the former USSR and practically 100%

of the continental shelf belong to it and it bears the primary workload in supporting maritime trade, fishing and other activities at sea.

Russia has no way to avoid supporting its own interests at sea. And although Russia is undergoing a difficult time and is experiencing numerous difficulties today, it will not reject the Navy. There is no doubt of that. We need to think that the Commonwealth of Independent States also understands that and therefore sooner or later the aspiration of the independent republics (on what basis—is already another question) will manifest the desire to come under the protection of the Russian maritime shield, having thus provided for their own interests with the least amount of expenditures. Therefore, today we should not be involved in dividing the navy but in preserving it with its subsequent transformation and bringing it to the level that is adequate for the times.

As we know, on 1 July 1992, there were a little over 200 submarines (approximately 70% nuclear) in the Navy, including 56 strategic missile submarines, nearly 470 combat surface ships of all classes and 320 small surface vessels of various types, an auxiliary fleet, and also nearly 2,000 aircraft and helicopters. We can assert that no more than half of the cited men and equipment meet contemporary demands (there are reasons for that the examination of which go beyond the framework of this subject). All of them are organizationally reduced to four fleets (Northern, Pacific Ocean, Baltic and Black Sea with its current
special status), the Caspian Flotilla and Leningrad VMB [Naval Base] with a total strength of nearly 450,000 men.

The probable prediction of the development of the military-political and military-strategic situation which due to the well-known specific features of the Navy is exclusively important for the Navy and also the assessment of Russia's needs for a naval component of the defense potential and its capabilities for maintenance and future structural development of the navy attest to the fact that today there is already no need to strive to maintain that numerical composition that it now has. The content of the navy under current crisis conditions in an economic sense is becoming sufficiently tense and even burdensome for the state.

Such directions of the future development of the navy as qualitative improvement of ships, weaponry and equipment, of all the forms of naval training, and optimal expenditure of the appropriations and materiel resources allocated to the navy are becoming the priority.

The energetic write off of ships that are obsolete and ineffective in the combat sense (ship "ballast") that had already begun in the second half of the 1980's and also the elimination of those ships and vessels that require excessively large expenditures of finances and time to conduct their repairs seems to be acceptable and economically justified under these conditions. So, we propose attaining one of the goals of the transformation of the navy—to have a fewer in number but "younger" and relatively more effective navy.

Moreover, I want to stress once again that the total reduction of the navy as a result of the realization of this approach must be carried out while proceeding from the need to ensure the adequate reduction of naval strategic forces and general purpose forces and ensuring their cover, defense and protection and also while considering the time periods set forth in the START Treaty.

Furthermore, two more programs are being set forth in the category of priorities. First of all, these are measures to ensure the social protection and infrastructure development of naval seamen and their families that is associated with the need to increase the prestige of naval service and with a concern for the seamen who have been released from service or transferred to new duty locations as a result of the reduction and withdrawal of Naval forces from the Baltic states, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and, possibly, in the future from the south oblasts of Ukraine. Second, this program for scrapping written off ships and surface craft, including nuclear powered ships, must be a comprehensive, statewide and nationwide, while considering its scale.

The future existence, functioning, and development of the Navy will certainly occur within the strict framework of the appropriations allocated however with the calculation to concentrate efforts on the development of the most universal combat arms of the navy and also of various systems and weaponry that support and service the activities of Naval forces. The priority in structural development certainly must be assigned to submarines as the Navy's primary combat arm. In the process, we assume that the number of their types and construction rates will be quite substantially reduced.

I am convinced that, with all of its difficulties, Russia must find the men and equipment to complete the construction of the Varag aircraft-carrying cruiser in Ukraine as well as other ships and vessels that are on the boat slips at Nikolayev and Kherson and the construction of aircraft-carrying ships at Russian enterprises in the future, certainly at a reduced scale while considering their great cost.

From other classes of surface ships, preference must be assigned to ships of the destroyer and escort ship classes that are close in their parameters to the Sovremenny, Neustrashimy and Bidennyy classes while imparting more universal multi-mission qualities to them.

As we all know, the series production of missile cruisers (Kirov and Slava classes), large antisubmarine warfare ships (Udaloy), and amphibious assault ships (Ivan Rogov Class and Polish construction) is being terminated.

A largely similar situation (like the one that is occurring with ships) will develop in naval aviation (right now it is primarily shore-based and not carrier-based); its numerical strength is being significantly reduced primarily by reducing the number of types of attack aircraft which was caused by international agreements.

As a result of the changes that are occurring in the navy, Naval coastal defense forces are attracting significantly greater attention than in past years and naval infantry which is part of the coastal defense forces is acquiring qualitatively new significance. With the preservation of its small numbers (approximately 3% of Navy strength), there are real conditions to increase its combat capabilities, primarily fire power and maneuverability.

As for the basing system and naval infrastructure, under current conditions we can limit them to evolutionary improvements without erecting new major and expensive facilities, although that is required to create new basing facilities in Leningrad and Astrakhan oblasts and possibly in Krasnodar Kray.

So, after realizing the primary provisions of the Navy Concept, there will be 30-50% fewer naval forces than there are at the present time. And its organizational structure, with the preservation—there is no other way!—of all four fleets (based on theaters) and the combat ship formations in the Caspian is being simplified by a factor of 1.5-2.

While completing the conversation about the contours of the Navy in the near future (until the year 2000), we would like to turn to the wisdom of our ancestors who, while following the precepts of Peter the Great, founder of the Russian Navy, understood very well the role and significance of naval power for the state. So, on 12 June 1913, during debates in the State Duma on the content of the navy department's budget, the famous at that time Political Figure N. Savich noted in his speech: "Just having a well-equipped navy, a navy consisting of first class and
new ships, a navy which is entirely manned by well-trained officers and especially commanders, a navy that has a sufficient quantity of well-trained lower ranks, it is only worthwhile for Russia to have such a navy because only such a navy will carry out that task which may be assigned to the navy to carry out in the near future—to protect and defend our national interests and to carry out those large national tasks that fate is placing in the line.”

These words retain their urgency for Russia even today.


Commander of Navy’s Shore Troops Interviewed
93UM0359A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 11, Nov 92 pp 8-10

[Interview with Lt-Gen I. S. Skuratov, commander, Naval Shore Troops, by MORSKOY SBORNIK correspondent Capt 2nd Rank Ye. Privalov: “They Are Naval Infantrymen”; date and place not given; first paragraph is MORSKOY SBORNIK introduction]

[Excerpts] About to arrive are the 287th anniversary of the founding of Naval Infantry units in Russia and the professional Missile Troops and Artillery Holiday. Our country was recently paid a visit by General C. Mandy, commander of the U.S. Marine Corps. Our correspondent, Capt 2nd Rank Ye. Privalov, put several questions to Lt Gen I. S. Skuratov, commander of the VMF [Navy] Shore Troops.

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] Ivan Sidorovich, what was the purpose of General C. Mandy's visit, and what kinds of Shore Troops weapons was he shown?

[Skuratov] We started out by acquainting the general with the organization, armament, and training system of the Naval Infantry. He was shown in a unit of the Baltic Sea Fleet, then in the Northern Fleet, how we take a beachhead and the ensuing widening action, the weapons, and the vehicles employed by Naval Infantrymen. He observed demonstration firings and hand-to-hand combat, with some seamen exhibiting individual training. The purpose of the visit was to establish mutually useful contacts between representatives of Russia’s Naval Infantry and the Marine Corps of the United States of America. This will make it possible to consolidate the relations established by 1989 and 1991 military missions, which were headed by U.S. Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Crowe and General Powell.

[Passages omitted]

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] The developmental history of the Naval Infantry has seen its ups and downs. Tell us something about this aspect and about the creation of the Shore Troops.

[Skuratov] In the postwar period, a time of prevalence of subjective opinions on the dominating role of missiles and underestimation of the other service branches and combat arms, the Naval Infantry was dissolved in its entirety and shore defense virtually eliminated. At the end of the 1950s, however, with the onset of the new military and political world situation, there arose a need to restore shore defense and create the Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops and the Naval Infantry.

The experience gained during the Great Patriotic War indicated that one of the causes of our losing fleets major bases in the first months of the war was the absence, as part of the fleets, of naval forces possessing combined-arms capabilities that could defend shore facilities, acting from land and sea. At the same time, many Western countries, the USA in particular, undertook priority development of so-called rapid deployment forces: naval infantry, airborne units, and landing and transport craft.

To enhance fleets capabilities for defending with naval forces proper the more important land facilities and defend beaches against sea landings, the decision was made in 1989 to create a new component service: the VMF [Navy] Shore Troops.

Thus, instead of the two previous component services—the BRAV [Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops] and the MP [Navy Infantry]—what was formed was a new component service: the Shore Defense Troops (VBO).

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] What was set as the mission of the large units and units of the Shore Troops?

[Skuratov] The mission set for the large units and units of the three different combat arms comprising them varies substantially: the Naval Infantry is involved with amphibious landings; the Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops, with destroying surface ships; the Shore Defense Troops, with protecting fleets land facilities and shore defense against assaults.

Large units and units of the MP and the VBO, with their modern weapons and vehicles and high level of professional skills, can be assigned other missions, including acting as part of mobile forces for the neutralization of possible local military conflicts.

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] Tell us something in conclusion about today’s Troops.

[Skuratov] Shore Troops personnel are worthy successors to Russian Navy Infantry. The Naval Infantry in many training sessions and maneuvers has demonstrated a high level of skill and mastery of the landing art. Also conducting mission routines in peacetime are the BRAV units, as they play their role in protecting our Motherland’s sea boundaries. Rating “best” in last year’s activities was an SF [Northern Fleet] missile unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Litvin, having won the GK VMF [Naval Commander in Chief’s] Award in missile firing competition. Recipients of good ratings were a TOF [Pacific Fleet] Shore Defense Troops large unit commanded by Major General A. Serov, Colonel Polyakov’s Chf [Black Sea Fleet] missile unit, and Major Ye. Levakhin’s MP SF [Northern Fleet Naval Infantry] battalion.
Nonetheless, we are experiencing difficulties common to the entire VMF. They are associated with problems of supply, manpower, and resolution of social problems. There are additional difficulties. They are due to the disintegration of the USSR. The Navy’s new structure has not yet met with final approval, which affects resolution of the problem of forces stationing and garrisoning. We still do not know where a number of our large units will be based. This concerns largely Ukraine. There is also a problem with relocating our troops from the Baltic republics.

I would like to take advantage of this situation by utilizing the MORSKOY SBORNIK to congratulate all personnel of the Shore Troops and veterans of the Naval Infantry and Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops on the 287th anniversary of the Russian Naval Infantry and on the Missle Troops and Artillery Holiday.

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Discussion of Potential Location of Russia’s Main Port

93UMO203B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences Boris Gale
nin, Baltiysk City Soviet Chairman Captain 2nd Rank Vladimir Dovydenko and economist Stanislav Pankratov under the rubric “Point of View”: “Where Will the Maritime Gateway of the New Russia Be?”]

[Text] Against the background of the now flaring and now fading disputes about the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, one cannot fail to think as well about the future of the Russian fleet, the Russian ports and the coastal regions of Russia in general. It is not a simple issue. And it is not a question of military might. The fact is that navies, despite widespread opinion, have fulfilled a peaceful role rather than a role of conquest at the most varied times and in the most varied countries (the Roman Empire, Great Britain, the Russian Empire, the United States of America). They have, first and foremost, protected maritime trade routes and the merchants using them.

The confrontation between East and West transformed the navies into an instrument for military confrontation for many long decades.

Today, when the foundations that caused the ideological division of the world and the Cold War have collapsed, navies are returning to their traditional roles. One of the largest states in the world, however—Russia—has suddenly proven to be without naval bases on the Black Sea and the Baltic, as well as without trading ports, in the new climate.

Aside from the port of Saint Petersburg, Russia is left with only Kaliningrad—a shallow port separated from the ocean by a canal with low throughput capacity—in the Baltic. The decision by the government of the Russian Federation on 12 Aug 92 to construct a cargo port in the city of Baltiysk—the outer harbor of Kaliningrad—to handle large-capacity ships transporting import and export cargo seems extremely important and timely under these conditions. The decree proposes considering the issue of using some of the free berths from the naval base at Baltiysk to serve foreign merchant and passenger vessels as early as the present.

Baltiysk is seemingly specially intended for the creation of a major trade port. Located on a narrow spit covering the entrance to the Wisla Gulf, the eastern part of the city looks out on the enormous Primorsk Bay, joined by a narrow strait with the open sea. The bay is well protected against the ocean waves, and its dimensions make it possible to receive the merchant fleets of all maritime powers trading in the Baltic. One can only be surprised that these unique opportunities were not properly utilized both when the city bore the name of Pillau and in the last half-century.

The development of a major port in Baltiysk is able to give a second wind to the economy and infrastructure of the westernmost oblast of the Russian Federation itself, and at the same time to cool those foreign figures who have declared the inexpediency of preserving the oblast as part of Russia.

The government decision was preceded by a great deal of work by the local authorities. The Baltiysk City Soviet had already created and registered the “Moscow Port” closed-type joint-stock company at the end of last year to build and operate the new port, and the decision had been made to take the body of water and the land. It is currently being transformed into an open-type joint-stock company, which will serve to unify Russian capital in the construction of the new port so needed by Russia and consolidate the link of the westernmost of Russian lands with the rest of our Motherland.

Several alternative variations for the new port were developed under an assignment from the authorities of Baltiysk and Kaliningrad Oblast, and the plan for locating it on the western part of the Primorsk Bay was deemed to be the best.

This plan, in our opinion, also has the advantage that the new port, being located alongside the naval base, provides an opportunity for expanding the capabilities for basing the Russian Navy in the Baltic in a very short time, if the military and political situation should become more complex.

The idea of an organic connection of commercial ports and naval bases could thus start from the city of Baltiysk, while nearby nations will cease to regard the navy of Russia as a threat to their existence.
INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Russian Servicemen Missing in Azerbaijan
93UM0243A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 10 Dec 92 p 3

[Article by S. Turchenko: “Save Them and Your Souls”]

[Text] Let us recall briefly the substance of the preceding article. The 23rd Motorized Rifle Division of the Russian Armed Forces was hurriedly disbanded in July and August of this year on the soil of Azerbaijan. Soon afterward, the command authorities abandoned their subordinates, flying away to Moscow. Many servicemen were left behind, by force of circumstances, in warring Azerbaijan.

Where are they? What happened to them? It appeared that, other than relatives, no one in the Ministry of Defense or in the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of Russia has any serious concern about the problem.

Letters we received have provided a list of servicemen known to be missing at the time. We requested our readers to inform us if any of them had knowledge of their whereabouts.

Soon afterward we took a call from Svetlana Borisovna Gladilin, the mother of Senior Lieutenant Gladilin. Let the reader recall that it was not long before that event that Colonel Matveyev, the former commander of the 131st Tank Regiment, 23rd Division, and the father of Lieutenant Eduard Tonkikh had set out for Gyandzh in their search for five missing officers, after which they themselves adopted an atmosphere of silence. Svetlana Borisovna related the following in an agitated voice:

“They returned, bringing with them only two officers: Sergey and Eduard. They are saying nothing about the location of the others. Or about where they had visited. They do not wish to speak with journalists. It is quite obvious that they have been frightened by someone and will not speak with anyone.”

I appealed to the Ground Forces Personnel Directorate with a request that it set up a meeting with the incoming officers. That is when strange things started to happen. General Pshenchikov, Directorate chief, said that I could meet only with the young officers, since Matveyev had departed for a new duty station immediately after his arrival, and Lieutenant Tonkikh’s father, for Orel, his home. The general cited the time we were to meet in the Moscow Military District Personnel Directorate. General Kurnyshov, the chief of that Directorate, and I sat waiting for half a day, but the young officers never did show up.

Once again I rang the Ground Troops Personnel Directorate. Colonel Akulinsev, speaking for Pshenchikov, conveyed the latter’s apologies and assured me that Gladilin and Tonkikh would be in the Directorate at 10 am on the following day and that I would have an opportunity to participate in an official discussion with them in the presence of the Directorate chief. However, as I was to learn later, I was deceived. Pshenchikov held the discussion with the officers at 9 am. It was only after that that Akulinsev had me meet the officers. However, they told me that they were not about to answer any questions. I had to turn to Akulinsev for an explanation. He likewise had little to say:

“Gladilin and Tonkikh claim that they stayed with the Azerbaijanis of their own volition. They were repairing tanks for their Army. We are reassigning these officers to duty in the Moscow Military District.”

“But what about the other missing men? What has happened to them?”

“I do not know. The Directorate chief sent off a telegram to the commander of the Transcaucasus Military District requesting that he organize a search.”

That is simply unbelievable! Servicemen are missing in the district, no one knows anything about their whereabouts for several months, but the commander needs additional instructions to organize a search. It is highly doubtful that this kind of approach will produce positive results. But what are the boys’ parents to do? Go themselves to make a search, the same as Lieutenant Tonkikh’s father?

“I think that the problem should be worked on at the parliamentary level,” commented Major General Valentin Kurnyshov. “The situation could be clarified by a special commission that could be sent to the area where the servicemen disappeared.”

That seemed to me to be a fruitful idea. I turned to the Russian Federation Procuracy Office with the suggestion that it present the Parliament with this problem. Justice Colonel Anatoliy Permyakov, section chief in a directorate of the Russian Federation Procuracy Office, stated that this kind of commission of the Russian Supreme Soviet had already been created. It had recently returned from Nakhichevan, where it had conducted a search for the missing Colonel Aleksandr Pavlenko, Captain Alfred Idrisov, and Private Vyacheslav Gaynas. The following is what it learned.

Early last year, Colonel Pavlenko was transferred from Nakhichevan to a new duty station on the territory of Armenia. His family remained where they were. Pavlenko visited his family on days free of duty. Early on Monday mornings, the colonel’s service vehicle would pull up to the border control post and await him. On 17 February, Idrisov and Gaynas arrived to pick up Pavlenko. They were detained and taken to the headquarters of the Nakhichevan National Defense. Pavlenko upon learning of this set out by service bus to visit the Nakhichevan border troops for the purpose of rescuing his subordinates. It was at that time that he became the third person to disappear.

The commission of deputies met with Geydar Aliyev, chairman of the Nakhichevan Supreme Majlis. He directed that the Nakhichevan side create a similar
commission. However, the committee’s work amounted to attempting to convince the representatives of the Russian Parliament that in Nakhichevan there were no missing Russian servicemen and there could be none there. It was determined that G. Aliyev as early as 13 March responded to R. Khasbulatov’s letter requesting that a search be initiated, dispatching the instruction: “To Gafar Mamedov, Supreme Mejlis deputy chairman: Request that you investigate and brief me.” However, the Russian commission was not provided with any documentary or other evidence indicating that the Nakhichevan side was engaged in any activity of that kind.

However, it was at that time that the Russian Parliamentary representatives managed to find persons who had seen Colonel Pavlenko riding in the service bus as it was on its way to the headquarters of the Nakhichevan National Defense. They had been told by border troops that the colonel and his subordinates had been arrested on suspicion of spying for Armenia.

“However, that was as far as the search went,” said Justice Colonel Permyakov. “I then petitioned Aliyev for his help in placing notices in the local news media announcing our search, with a listing of Moscow telephone numbers. There was a possibility that someone would act anonymously to put us on the right track. I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to make an appeal to government persons and businessmen via SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. When there arose a suspicion that missing Americans fighting in Vietnam showed up on Russian soil, Borovoy, our self-made millionaire, set up a fund for rewarding persons for providing information. Why is it, then, with Russian servicemen missing, that no one has thought of doing something like that? In any event, the state has an obligation to provide the necessary funding for serious organization of a search for the missing men.”

Even more outspoken is Moscow Soviet Deputy Olga Suprenenko in her response to our correspondent: “If even the Parliamentary commission could get nowhere regarding our missing boys, then the Supreme Soviet should take even more serious measures, up to and including the economic and diplomatic kind. No self-respecting state would permit itself to act in this manner when it comes to its citizens.”

Nonetheless, the numerous responses to the correspondence associated with the topic “Missing” indicates that our “democratic” state does permit itself as well as others to make a mockery of the matter of its protectors and the latter’s relatives involved in the search. Let me cite some excerpts from the “vociferous” letters.

“Our son, Private Mikhail Makeyev,” write Lidiya Mikhailovna and Nikolay Matveyevich Makeyev of Millerovo, was serving in the town of Kutaisi, Military Unit 39419 A. The 20th of March of this year was the last time we heard from him. Since that time, we have no knowledge of where our son is or what has happened to him. We send telegrams to the unit commander only to receive no response. We appealed to the rayon military commissar, but he could provide no information whatsoever. We wrote to the Ministry of Defense, but no one there has taken the time to answer us. So where are we to search for our dear son now? Who can tell us where he is and what has happened to him?”

“My son, Private Gennadiy Novikov,” writes Antonina Yakovlevna Novikova of Bashkiria, “was serving in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait, Military Unit 61683. I have not heard from him for seven months. All the military commissariat could do is spread their hands and say: Wait! From the Ministry of Defense I have received no response at all. After sending many letters to Military Unit 61683, one of them was returned with the stamp ADDRESSEE NO LONGER AT THIS LOCATION.”

Anna Mikhailovna Kusheruk of Yakutia in her letter of many pages tells of her trips to Moscow and Tula, then to Vladikavkaz, the last duty station of her son, Private Oleg Kusheruk, from whom she has not heard since 28 March of this year. She also tells of the humiliations she has had to endure in bureaucratic offices of the new governmental system. She believes that in Vladikavkaz, Military Unit 5474, something was being hidden from her, what with unfinished statements and hurried attempts to get rid of her, with promises of organizing a search and informing her of results. However, three months have passed without her receiving any information.

The above letter and many other letters, and my meetings in person with spokesmen for the Ministry of Defense indicate that the search for the missing men is being impeded not only by objective causes, but also by obstacles specially created by someone. It is obvious that some officials not only in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Nakhichevan, and North Ossetia, but also in the Russian Ministry of Defense, do not wish to make public the true causes of why so many persons are missing on the war-torn boundaries of the recently mighty peaceful state. One can only assume that these causes are more varied and terrible than mere disintegration of the Army entity and loss of control of the Army.

As told to me in confidence by several representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the disappearance of the servicemen is associated with removal of witnesses to illegal trade in weapons; with personal involvement of the servicemen as specialists in trade dealings for the benefit of incipient armies; and with voluntary or involuntary enlistment of some of them by local nationalistic bands. In any event, in my view, it is necessary to set up a parliamentary commission to investigate the servicemen’s disappearance and ascertain the causes of the latter. For this phenomenon is not local, but one of massive proportions.
The following names of missing men, as compiled in the last few days, are to be added to the list:

Ivanov, Vitaliy Borisovich; born in 1972; disappeared on 3 June of this year in Azerbaijan, town of Shamkhor; Military Unit 93717 “B.”

Demyanov, Artur; born in 1973; disappeared on 2 June of this year in town of Shamkhor; Military Unit 93717 “B.”

Dekin, Pavel Vladimirovich; born in 1973; disappeared on 3 June of this year in town of Shamkhor; Military Unit 93701 “P.”

Prikhodko, Andrey Vasilyevich; born in 1973; disappeared on 30 September of this year during transfer from Military Unit 30647 (West Siberian Military District) in Tajikistan.

Semenov, Yevgeniy Valeriyevich; born in 1973; disappeared on 28 September of this year in town of Nalchik; Military Unit 5504.

Epov, Sergey Nikolayevich; born in 1972; disappeared on 25 July of this year in Azerbaijan, town of Gyandzha; Military Unit 21185 “R.”

Limarenko, Aleksandr Vladimirovich; born in 1972; disappeared on 17 August of this year in town of Gyandzha; Military Unit 93625.

Novoselov, Yuriy Borisovich; born in 1971; disappeared on 17 August of this year in town of Gyandzha; 23rd Division.

Yagubkin, Andrey Vladimirovich; born in 1973; disappeared on 27 February of this year in city of Sochi; Military Unit 55677.

Krechlov, Yuriy Alekseyevich; born in 1961; disappeared on 15 March of this year in town of Batumi; Military Unit 73947.

Agafonov, Sergey Vladimirovich; born in 1961; disappeared on 23 May of this year in town of Gyandzha; Military Unit 93826 “Kh.”

Golyatin, Aleksey Nikolayevich; born in 1972; disappeared in August of this year in Lenkoran; Military Unit 2038 “Kh.”

It is requested that anyone possessing knowledge of the above persons or their whereabouts provide such information to the editorial office.

S. Turchenko

Latvia's Dinevics' View on Russian Troop Talks
934K0144D Riga DIYENA in Russian
16 Jan 93 pp 1, 8

[Report by Janis Silis: “Dinevics: ‘Russia Is Applying Pressure Before the Start of the Talks’”]

[Text] Riga, 15 January—No special shift is foreseen at the round of interstate negotiations expected next week between Latvia and Russia, the leader of the Latvian delegation Janis Dinevics said at a news conference today. J. Dinevics assesses the statement issued yesterday by Boris Yeltsin's press secretary on mass violations of human rights in Latvia as crude pressure from Russia on the eve of the talks, because even UN experts have been unable to establish such violations.

The Plan for the Upcoming Negotiations

At the talks that are to be held in Jurmala 19 through 21 January, it is planned to continue work on the text of a basic interstate agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia. The Latvian side has agreed to review additional agreements offered by Russia (on the use of Latvian ports and transport during the Army's withdrawal and procedure for crossing the border) that could be put into effect before conclusion of the main agreement since in practice the process of withdrawal has already started, although the rate of the withdrawal does not satisfy Latvia.

J. Dinevics noted that in the additional agreements a certain guile can be traced concerning the period that they will be in force. In the version offered by Russia, these agreements may be altered only after agreement by the two sides, and so in general it will not be possible to alter the texts, but Russian warships will be using Latvian ports. The Latvian side believes that it is better to conclude all the agreements as a package, indicating the final period for the withdrawal of Russia's Army.

The Latvian side is preparing to present Russia with a list of its own claims with respect to the systematic violations by the Air Force of Latvia's air space and the clandestine arrival of recruits, and also about the condition in which military facilities are being handed over. J. Dinevics reported that Latvian experts are making preparations to present Russia with a bill (for 10 billion Latvian rubles) for maintaining its Army on the territory of Latvia (this point has already been agreed in the text of the main agreement). During the course of talks held earlier, the leader of the Russian delegation, Sergey Zotov, made constant reference to Latvia's debt for gas, which is 30 billion rubles [R]. Thus, giving due consideration to the exchange rate for the two countries' currencies (R1 Latvian to R3 Russian), the reciprocal debts are almost the same.

Russia's Statement is Crude Pressure

Yesterday Boris Yeltsin’s press secretary circulated a statement to the effect that in Latvia there are gross and
massive violations of human rights, and he expressed his assessment of the policy of the government and parliament of Latvia in an insulting tone.

J. Dinevics assessed this as crude pressure on Latvia on the eve of the interstate talks, and also as pressure on the CSCE's General Commission on National Minorities, which arrives in Riga today. "In the fighting with the parliament the president of Russia, wishing to extract political dividends for himself, has assumed an extreme position. In this situation the Russians living in Latvia will be the losers, since they will be perceived as the conductors of the imperialist thinking of the president and parliament of Russia. Such statements do not promote mutual understanding between Latvians and Russians," J. Dinevics said.

This statement, and also a letter received recently from the organization that defends the interests of veterans, are consonant with a recent interview given by S. Zotov to the Baltafax agency, and the call from the former Latvian Republic Supreme Council faction Ravnopraviye to express their mistrust in the state minister, and are in the opinion of J. Dinevics bound together as one and timed for the start of the talks.

S. Zotov reproaches Latvia for its reluctance to build civilized relations with Russia according to international law, and he notes that this year the focus of the talks will be questions concerning human rights in Latvia. "I hope that Mr. Zotov has not forgotten that this, in his opinion, important question is not connected with the withdrawal of the Army," J. Dinevics noted. He also added that in accordance with international law, Russian troops should have been withdrawn on the day that the state demand this. Latvia has been demanding the withdrawal of troops since September of this year. As far as right of ownership of military plants is concerned, Russia has been proclaiming its principle everywhere: "The property is ours and the social problems of those working in these enterprises are your concern."

Following Russia's statement, the Latvian side plans to discuss the possibility of meeting in a third country and of looking for mediators for the negotiations.

The Latvian Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs assesses the statement issued by B. Yeltsin's press secretary as an unfriendly act against Latvia. The Latvian Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs press service informed DIYENA that, while expressing its own political assessment, it emphasizes that this statement violates one of the basic principles of international law, namely, the principle of noninterference.

The Russian ambassador in Riga, Aleksandr Rannikh, believes that the statement by B. Yeltsin's press secretary expresses the alarm of the Russian leadership concerning the situation that has taken shape. "It is probable that through this the Russian leadership is trying to focus the attention of the Latvian leadership on a problem that does exist and of which we are aware," A. Rannikh said. In answer to DIYENA's question about whether the ambassador himself agrees with this, A. Rannikh said that he could not but agree with what his president said.

UKRAINE

Deputy Defense Minister on Priority Military Tasks
93UM0165A Kiev NARODNA ARMYA in Russian
4 Nov 92 pp 1.3

[Interview with Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General Ivan Vasilyevich Bizhan by NARODNA ARMYA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Shvyrev: "Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan: 'While Making Any Decision, You Need To Consider the Realities of Life and Our Capabilities'"

[Text] Recently Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General I. Bizhan met with the NARODNA ARMYA editorial collective. Our newspaper has already introduced Ivan Vasilyevich to our readers and there is certainly no need to discuss his biography once again. And yet we would like to note that he has more than 30 years service in the army behind him and he attended two military academies, one of which he graduated from with a gold medal. Having returned to the Homeland and having become first deputy minister of defense in May 1992, he is devoting much effort to the matter of building the Ukrainian Armed Forces and increasing its combat readiness.

Having thanked us for the invitation to meet with the editorial staff's and publishing house's journalists, workers and employees, Ivan Bizhan said:

[Bizhan] I always begin my workday with a review of the newspapers. And as it has already become my custom, I pick up NARODNA ARMYA first. And not only because it is the central organ of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. It impresses me, as you reflect the questions of the building our army, the national and cultural revival of the Ukrainian people, the social and legal protection of servicemen and their family members, combat training and the service of the troops, strengthening discipline and others on the pages of the newspaper. Of course, timeliness and urgency are still not present in all of the articles, there are still problems in our lives that you are skirting for now. However, on the whole, the newspaper enjoys popularity not only among military but also among civilian readers.

But this, so to speak, serves as the introduction. Further, I would like to touch upon issues that are worrisome today and that are at the center of attention of the Ministry of Defense. I will immediately point out that the press, including NARODNA ARMYA has already repeatedly written about what I am going to say. However, I think that you and all of the readers will be interested in learning the position of the Armed Forces..."
leadership, on some issues or other and its views on the processes that are flowing both in the army and in society.

If we talk about our priorities, then the first and main issue is certainly building the Armed Forces. Today it may be beginning to appear to some people that the work on creating the Ukrainian Army has entered some sort of dead end situation. By no means is everything proceeding according to plan and, more precisely, in strict compliance with the concept that was approved by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. Incidentally, Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov said that in parliament during the review of the military doctrine.

It is another matter that here not everything is turning out as we would like. Take if only the building of the Ukrainian Navy. Where it should be based, what its composition should be, what missions it should perform—we have not made and do not intend to make a secret of this matter. But nevertheless our intentions to have our own navy in the Black Sea are encountering active opposition from Russia and its military department. They, in contrast to us, think that the Black Sea Fleet should remain as it is today until the end of 1995. And they not only think, they are also doing everything so that it does indeed occur, and they sometimes are simply violating individual provisions of the Yalta Agreements that were signed by Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin.

By way of illustration, in accordance with that agreement, all appointments to leading posts in the Black Sea Fleet must be made after an appropriate discussion of the candidacies between the leaders of our states. They must be but in reality the Russian side is not listening to our opinion and is acting the way it wants to. The appointment, say, of the fleet chief of staff is graphic confirmation of that. There are also other cases that in some way or other attest to the fact that there is no proper understanding of the problems that we face or a desire to somehow resolve them in Moscow and Sevastopol (I have in mind Admiral I. Kasatonov who is still there after receiving a service promotion). Delays, deceiving society, inciting political passions around the fleet, and finally fear, a game on the nerves and feelings of our fellow countrymen who are ready to loyally and truthfully serve their own people have far-reaching goals behind them: to prevent Ukraine from creating its own Navy or to ultimately find that solution that would force Ukraine to follow in the wake of its eastern neighbor. However, neither the one nor the other will be. The position of our state is clear and unambiguous: Ukraine will have its own strong and modern navy. But for now not everything is as simple here as it might appear at first glance. Therefore, I ask you, the journalists, to be very thoughtful and tactful when you prepare both special issues of the newspaper on the problems of Crimea or the Black Sea Fleet and also individual articles. Remember, any of your careless, thoughtless words could complicate an already tense situation in that region. We must proceed through the process of creating our own Navy painlessly and in a civilized manner.

Another problem. Despite Ukraine's well-known position on the issue of nuclear weapons, the opinion is being expressed in the press and in the speeches of certain politicians and parliamentarians that we say, should not part with the ballistic missiles that are on our territory. Since through their presence they guarantee, first of all, the respect of Ukrainian citizens by international society and, second, oblige other states to help us and to take us into account. And that point of view is finding the understanding and support of a certain portion of the population in our difficult times.

What do we, military people, think in this connection?

Yes, there are nuclear weapons in Ukraine and, I will point out, a large number of them. There are units and subunits that maintain and operate missile complexes and perform combat alert duty.

We must and are obliged to utilize every means available to increase our state's defense capability and to strengthen its security. But, in the process, we must once again proceed from the realities of life, our capabilities, and a profound substantiation of all ways to achieve that goal. Otherwise, we cannot avoid errors and sharp turns in our development, which, you yourself understand, is extremely undesirable right now. We think that the editorial staff must more deeply investigate the processes that are occurring in this sphere and orient the readers in the needed direction through appropriate articles.

The third problem is associated with the return of officers and warrant officers to the Homeland. To begin, I will cite some figures. As of today, 12,000 officers and warrant officers have already been transferred to Ukraine from Russia, the Transcaucasia, and the Central Asian Republics. The fate of 31,000 of our fellow countrymen who have written requests is at the stage of resolution. And, according to predictions, the arrival of a total of 120,000-130,000 servicemen is anticipated. The difficulty and vital nature of this problem consists of the fact that, despite the interstate agreement that we have on the procedures for the transfer of individuals who desire to serve in the Homeland, every possible obstruction is being made for them in countries near and far, and their documents are moving through the bureaucracy for an unjustifiably long period of time. Moreover, as of December 1st, Russia intends to administer the oath to everyone. This step will certainly complicate the situation on this issue. But be that as it may, we must do everything to assist our citizens to overcome these difficulties as quickly as possible and to rapidly become part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and to create for them the required conditions for normal life and service.

So, we have arrived at another and, perhaps, the most urgent problem—housing. Today tens of thousands of servicemen are being compelled to rent apartments, to settle down in dormitories that are reequipped barracks, and private homes that are frequently similar to barns. It
is understandable that the bitter realities of a homeless military person is forcing the Ministry of Defense to persistently seek solutions to this difficult situation. And I need to point out that some progress has already been noted here.

For example, this year they plan to turn over more than 12,000 apartments. Is that a little or a lot? For comparison, I will say that this is 1,500 more apartments than were built last year by the three military districts—Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian. And that is when construction materials just recently have increased in price several times over. Furthermore, the Armed Forces will receive 4,500 apartments from shared participation. As for the capitol garrison, nearly 4,000 servicemen are on its housing lists. New homes will accommodate only approximately 40% of the officers and warrant officers.

As you can see, housing construction rates are not high. However, despite the increasingly deteriorating situation in the economy and the reduction of conscripts to whom we can hand a trowel instead of an assault rifle, they will increase, both due to military construction and also due to reallocation of resources to the budgets of the local authorities. You can judge the Ministry of Defense’s serious attitude toward the problem of infrastructure development for servicemen if only by this fact. All of the money received from the sale of military vehicles and equipment through our commercial center is going exclusively toward the resolution of the housing problem, regardless of whether it is in rubles, coupons, or hard currency.

And the last thing. Today, we sometimes have the opportunity to hear about the alleged trends that have been noted toward the isolation of our Armed Forces from the armies of other states. What is being said here? Having proclaimed our nonparticipation in any alliances or blocs whatsoever, Ukraine is nevertheless continuously seeking military cooperation with other countries. Specifically, we have already prepared a package of documents on military issues with Belarus and Uzbekistan. The only thing left is to sign them. There are agreements with Russia, in accordance with which the transfer of servicemen to the Homeland is currently being conducted and the training of specialists is occurring. The leadership of Azerbaijan has requested that we establish close contacts in the military sphere. However, we have been compelled to refuse them in this due to the instability of the situation in the Transcaucasus region.

Furthermore, we have permanent contacts with NATO and with the military departments of many Western countries. The Ukrainian Minister of Defense has conducted official visits to the United States and France. In a word, we have not withdrawn and do not intend to withdraw into the circle of our own domestic tasks and problems.

Then the Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Defense answered journalists’ questions. In particular, he was asked to explain what caused the reduction of the number of deputy ministers.

[Bizhan] This was primarily done in the interests of strengthening one-man command. Initially, the minister of defense had several deputies. Among them were: the chief of the Main Staff, the first deputy, and the deputy for weaponry... Later others were added to them. When the activities of some of them were analyzed, we came to the conclusion that the appointment of some directorate chief or other by a deputy minister to an area of work that had been assigned to him did not at all improve matters. Moreover, increasing deputies increases the number of people who can make decisions. And that is not always justified. The case of the sale of firearms at a Carpathian Military District garrison is also confirmation of what has been said.

Currently, the minister of defense has several deputies who are delegated broad duties and powers. However, we need to point that this will not always be. New deputies may be added to the currently existing ones as the Armed Forces are built. But once again, that will be done while proceeding from the interests of the matter.

[Shvyrev] Ivan Vasilyevich, there are quite a few letters to the editor whose authors are disturbed by the unjustified delay in awarding them the next higher rank. They ask: “How long will that continue?”

[Bizhan] Actually, a sort of paradox has developed. In the former Soviet Army, the path to attain promotions was much longer but few delays in promotions occurred. Now everything is the reverse. At times officers wait weeks for copies of orders. And that is all because there are quite a few callous and indifferent people among personnel officers who do their work any old way. Of course, there is no room in our army for such people. And we will decisively rid ourselves of them.

In order to introduce total clarity into this question, I want to remind the workers of personnel organs that, in accordance with the Ukrainian Minister of Defense's order, awarding military rank must be conducted immediately upon expiration of the period, that is, day for day. That is possible but only under the condition if each official will invest the spirit into his labor and precisely carry out the duties assigned to him. Try to do that, dear personnel workers, and newly promoted captains, majors, lieutenant colonels will just say thank you.

[Shvyrev] Comrade colonel-general, a report has been leaked to the press that alleges that graduates of the military district training center that is located at Desna pgt [urban settlement] are fighting in the Transcaucasus. Is that really true?

[Bizhan] Of course not. Not one of the training center's graduates has been sent outside the borders of our state, all the more so to so-called “hot” spots, since the time that the training center was transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As for those soldiers who studied at it, say, in 1990, they are possibly fighting on someone’s side. However, incidentally, we have no ties to them.
whatsoever, just as we don't have any ties to the Ukrainian pilot who was shot down in the sky over Nagorny Karabakh.

[Shvyrev] Chaplains' institutes exist in many of the world's armies. What do you think, could there be clergymen in our Armed Forces?

[Bizhan] I understand this as follows: everything that engenders good in man has a right to exist. Therefore, we too will also possibly live to see the day when clergymen will be on staff in our divisions and regiments. However, I will point out that the resolution of this issue is only within the competence of the state.

[Shvyrev] Military commissariat workers and employees are perhaps the lowest paid people in our Armed Forces. Tell me, is a salary increase planned for them?

[Bizhan] I want to immediately assure them: a letter has been sent to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers proposing a salary increase for that category of specialists. We hope that an appropriate decision will be made on it in the very near future.

[Shvyrev] During the discussion of the military doctrine in the Ukrainian parliament, criticism was heard in the speeches of some people's deputies directed at the Ministry of Defense Socio-Psychological Services Directorate. Please tell me if you yourself feel any pressure from that side?

[Bizhan] No. Moreover, I will attempt to clarify the situation on that issue. Such a biased attitude toward the socio-psychological service is associated first of all with the fact that among many people it is currently associated with the former Party political apparatus structures. But this is actually not so. In contrast, say, to the former glavpur [main political directorate], the SPS [socio-psychological service] Directorate is one of the Main Staff directorates. And nothing more. As for the structures of this service, they are tied in to the commanders on everything and they are subordinate only to them. By way of illustration, the signature of the chief of the socio-psychological service is not required during the resolution of cadre issues. In this regard, I cite our Ministry of Defense. As you know, the highest certification board has been created under it and, incidentally, I am the chairman of that board. After each session, we compose a protocol which is later laid on the minister of defense's desk. And later he and only he makes the decision about the assignment of a general or officer to some post of other. And in so doing, there is no coordination, and all the more so the signature of the chief of the socio-psychological service directorate is not required.

There certainly may be excesses or pressures on commanders by SPS chiefs in some places. But those are only miscalculations and costs in work but there is no politics whatsoever. And we need to understand it in just that way.

Having responded to other questions, Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan wished the NARODNA ARMIYA editorial collective and Publishing House creative success in work and called on the journalists to not spare their strength or energy in the matter of building our Armed Forces and Ukraine's attainment of true independence and statehood.

Armaments Modernization Chief on Black Sea Facilities Dispute
93UMO283C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian 8 Dec 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Armaments and Equipment Repair and Modernization Directorate Chief Colonel German Nikitovich Bulbinov by NARODNA ARMIYA Correspondent Major Sergey Chernous: "For Whom Is It More Painful: For Ukraine or For Russia, 'Whose Fingers Have Been Squeezed in the Doors?...""

[Text] In the frantic flow of news, reports have flashed by about the conflict between Russia and Ukraine because of the ship repair facility on the Black Sea. Telegraphs from Europe and the world have disseminated that news throughout the world. The problem of dividing the Black Sea Fleet is once again the focus of attention. It is bursting into the homes of citizens with the major headlines and biting commentaries of television journalists and is rousing the minds of the people. Our correspondent asked Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Armaments and Equipment Repair and Modernization Directorate Chief Colonel German Bulbinov to comment on the events of recent days and to clarify the situation that has developed at the ship repair plants.

[Chernous] Articles have appeared in the mass media, and in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, in particular, on Ukrainian Minister of Defense Order No. 160. The information is varied and at times contradictory. What can you say in this regard?

[Babinetov] The Minister of Defense order has been issued, in accordance with which we should have placed under our jurisdiction part of the centrally subordinated Navy, of which the ship repair plants are a part, by 1 December 1992. A team of officers drove to Sevastopol expressly for that purpose. My deputy, Colonel Aleksandr Sharapov, headed the team and he was working there locally with the leaders of the enterprises and assigned them the specific task to prepare internal inspection commission work acts. They were to have assessed the state of the financial and management activities of the plants and to come to our directorate with those materials for approval of those documents. After that, we intended to include these plants in the list of Ukrainian Ministry of Defense enterprises. Colonel Sharapov disseminated tasks to the chiefs of the plants that must be carried out within the prescribed period of time.
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But, unfortunately, the influence of the pro-Russian ship repair directorate headed by Rear Admiral Yurii Petrov was continuously felt during the course of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense commission’s work at the enterprises. He and his subordinates attempted to do everything possible to interfere with our commission’s work and they partially managed to do that. Urgent tasks were not carried out by the heads of the plants. That is, we noted an obvious negative turn in the resolution of the problem that had emerged through civilized means—through negotiations, reciprocal compromises and, the main thing—on a solid legal basis.

That is how it should have occurred in principle. I recall (and not that long ago) that the Black Sea Fleet leadership promised to arrive for negotiations with the Ukrainian Armed Forces Armaments Directorate Chief in order to coordinate issues of cooperation and resolve the fate of these plants.

[Chernow] German Nikitovich, your name has also been mentioned in the press in that regard.

[Bublinov] Yes, I was also directly involved with this problem. In August, I specially drove to those enterprises and quite thoroughly studied that issue. I am convinced that these plants will soon close, highly skilled cadres will leave, and the decline of production is inevitable if we don’t find ways to cooperate. These processes could become irreversible without the appropriate supply and technological documentation. All the ship repair plants of the former Union are very closely interrelated. That is a specific feature in this sphere. There are definite specific features even in planning ship repair. The plan must be approved 2-3 years prior to the major overhaul of a ship. The appropriate documentation must be completed and spare parts and assemblies must be ordered under this plan. That is, preparatory work goes on for 2-3 years. The chain turns out to be quite long in time and with quite a large number of geographically spread out subcontractors. Therefore, you can’t immediately cut off relations no matter what kind of efforts you activate for this goal. Yes and today it is inadvisable for us, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Armaments and Equipment Repair and Modernization Directorate, to take on the functions of planning, management, and support of ship repair work at all of the plants that are located in Ukraine. But we seek to and will conduct our policy to preserve existing ties in the future, just as we have done with other types of repair (I have in mind the repair and servicing of armored, motor vehicle, aircraft, and missile-artillery equipment). In a word, where it is possible, we are striving for broad cooperation between the enterprises of various states. And we are not concealing our goals. We do not want to destroy the established mechanisms or disrupt production cycles. But rather the contrary: we are striving to protect our repair structures, and to strengthen and develop them. As we establish the production of spare parts and components, in the future we plan to shift to a closed cycle of ship repair work in Ukraine.

But the lack of understanding and the ambition of the leadership of the Russian Navy is preventing us from coming to an agreement on ship repair for the time being. And there are many examples of mutually advantageous cooperation. We have signed agreements with the Russian Armed Forces Main Tank Directorate and with the leadership of the Russian Air Force. And this is advantageous for everyone. We are repairing Russian equipment and thereby providing a workload for our repair enterprises and providing work for tens of thousands of specialists, preserving ties, and receiving spare parts and components from Russian enterprises. Of course, we are also repairing our equipment at these plants. Our desire to also structure our mutual relations with Russia in the sphere of ship repair in this same manner is quite natural.

[Chernow] So, what is the stumbling block? What is preventing the establishment of businesslike relations with Russian manufacturers and customers?

[Bublinov] If you judge by the statement in the press of Russian Navy Ship Repair Plant Directorate Chief Rear Admiral Yurii Petrov and of Black Sea Fleet Deputy Commander for Operations, Repair and Armaments Rear Admiral Aleksandr Aladkin, the Russian side is protesting against the drawing up of the legal act of subordination of the ship repair plants to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. I will frankly state that the position is incomprehensible. These enterprises are located on Ukrainian territory and Ukrainian citizens work at them. In short, all of this property, to the last nut, belongs to our independent state. After all, we are not claiming the repair and ship building plants of St. Petersburg, Severomorsk, or part of the Northern, Pacific Ocean, or Baltic fleets, although many of the ships of these fleets were built at Ukrainian wharves...

The paradox is that the Russian side formally agrees at the negotiations that these plants belong to Ukraine. And how could it be otherwise? There can be no doubt of that! According to all laws, that property is ours.

[Chernow] So, what kind of problems can there be? It seems that everything is clear.

[Bublinov] That’s just the point, when the matter is reduced to signing specific agreements, common sense fails our negotiating partners. They begin to conduct some sort of incomprehensible game according to rules that have been dictated from Moscow. Some sort of vicious circle has formed. We advocate honest, open discussion and cooperation without pressure. The essence of the matter is that these enterprises must be registered in Ukraine, after which they must adopt their own charter and consequently accept the status of a legal person in our state. Formalities, you say? Maybe that’s what they are but they’re very important ones. And the enterprise acquires the right of foreign economic activity only after that. That is, it can cooperate and organize joint production with the enterprises of Russia and Belarusia... Yes and even of China and the islands of the
Emerald Isle, in short, of any country. And only then can it sign the appropriate agreements on cooperation, mutually advantageous deliveries, in short, it is free to operate for the benefit of the people. We advocate a solution on a just basis and businesslike grounds for any issues but we are categorically opposed to all sorts of dishonest games.

There is no such opposition in other areas and spheres of our activities. Approximately 40 enterprises are subordinate to us and we are finding a common language and mutual understanding everywhere, including with the Russians. All of these plants have obtained the capability to operate normally. This year, our directorate did not permit a single bankruptcy. We are helping to organize the supply of these enterprises.

[Chernous] By the way, about supply. In his statement, Rear Admiral Aleksandr Aladkin cites what are at first glance persuasive figures of support of the ship repair plants in particular, with material resources from the Black Sea Fleet. How much do these data correspond to reality? What is this: weighty arguments in a dispute, distinctive trump cards, or juggling figures?

[Bublinov] So, about the figures. They cause a great deal of doubt not only from me but from any person with common sense. We have other data on this score. There are 113 enterprises—monopolists in the Russian Federation that manufacture electronic equipment and armaments for the navy. As of today, there are 23 such plants in Ukraine that operate in the interests of all the fleets of the CIS countries. I once again stress: this is a question of enterprises—monopolists. And that means that they manufacture products that no one makes anymore. So, on the correlation. Yes, in Russia there is a preponderance, and a significant one at that, but it is far from the absolute superiority that some journalists and Russian admirals are attempting to prove. That simply doesn’t exist.

[Chernous] German Nikitovich, permit me to quote Rear Admiral Aladkin: “…The navy will be obliged to remove these enterprises from all types of subsistence. Fuel, spare parts, painting materials, metal, and cable products are being shipped to the plants from naval depots…” How can you respond to that ultimatum?

[Bublinov] Russia has already not been supplying the ship repair plants since the beginning of this year. Our northern neighbor has practically ceased all deliveries. As a result, the enterprises have found themselves in a severe economic situation. But, as you see, all of them have survived and are operating. We, without waiting for a solution to the problem, are helping these enterprises who have found themselves deep in debt as a result of the political demarche and stubbornness of the Russian side. We are financing them and we are carrying out deliveries of repair resources. Ukraine is repairing its coast guard ships at these plants. That is, we are using our own capabilities to replenish the repair resources of these plants and we are delivering armaments. The heads of the plants themselves are already appealing to us for assistance. So, we have allocated several million rubles to the plant managed by Captain 1st Rank Sergey Yudin in order to cover expenditures for repair work for Russia’s needs which Russia has not paid.

I would like to remind our Russian opponents that the ship repair capabilities that are located in Ukraine are intended for the repair of all the ships of the Black Sea basin. And so it is clear that, if common sense does not prevail and the situation deteriorates, Russian ships from Black Sea bases will have to sail to the other end of the world for repairs. Let them consider how much that will end up costing them. Life suggests that we need to find forms of cooperation and work together. That is advantageous. We need to foresee that all of this will be reflected in the welfare of the peoples of both Ukraine and Russia. Additional resources for maintenance and repair of ships (and these will inevitably appear if we don’t arrive at a common denominator at the negotiations) will be taken from the pockets of the citizens of our states.

[Chernous] What kind of solution to this situation do you see?

[Bublinov] I think that we will nevertheless reach an agreement with Russia and we will cooperate. I hope that a sober approach will prevail from the Russian side. So, literally several days ago, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Armaments Directorate Chief Lieutenant-General Ivan Oleynik conducted negotiations with Rear Admiral Yuriy Petrov. Our delegation proposed a real solution to the situation. We assert that first of all we need to register these enterprises, adopt their charter, in short, legitimize their existence and activity. But the Russians are demanding to make them joint ventures, without registering them in Ukraine where they are located. The question immediately comes to mind: in that case, whose plants will they be? And that simply cannot be and will not be in a single civilized or even semi-civilized country. This is legal nihilism. Yes, foreign firms may have plants in many countries. But they live and structure their activities according to the laws of the country on whose soil these enterprises have been organized.

But I still hope that we will arrive at a mutual understanding and partnership. And that will be beneficial for both Russian and Ukraine. I think that in the near future we will yet sign the necessary agreements. Right now it is difficult for Ukraine alone to organize and support ship repair work at the plants and to provide work for all of the production capacity. But it will be no easier for Russia to do this. Then the comparison instinctively comes to mind: why break each others fingers by squeezing them in the doors and by yelling to the entire world about whose fingers hurt more. Wouldn’t it be better to sit at the negotiating table and to resolve all of the issues peacefully. Both Russia and Ukraine will gain from that.
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[Chernous] German Nikitovich, what else can you add on this subject? Obviously, many problems have remained outside the framework of our conversation?

[Bubinov] I think that, at the negotiations during the resolution of the problems of the division of the fleet, it first of all must be a question not of figures but of production plans and repair schedules and about the fate of people: the workers, engineers, and employees. And there are tens of thousands of them at these plants... They have not only jobs but they also have families, wives and children. We must not forget under any circumstances that unique specialists work at these plants whom we need to train for 5-7 years. Therefore, haste, rashness and voluntarism are intolerable in decision making, especially today. We need to find ways and opportunities to make weighty and well thought-out decisions while resolving the problems that have emerged in the difficult economic and political situation.

[Chernous] Thank you for the informative conversation.

Naval Commander on Nature of Planned Fleet
93UM0283B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian 8 Dec 92 p 1

[Interview with Ukrainian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Boris Borisovich Kozhin by Ukrainian Navy Press Center Senior Officer Captain 3rd Rank Nikolay Savchenko: "Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin: 'Ukraine Will Have a Modern Fleet'"

[Text] Ukraine is an independent maritime power and as a subject of international law is creating its own Navy. What will it be like? What is Ukraine's naval concept? Ukrainian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin answers these and other questions.

[Savchenko] Boris Borisovich, development of Ukraine's naval concept is occurring right now. What is the primary mission of the Navy that is being created?

[Kozhin] The naval concept that is being developed will precisely define that Ukraine is not striving for superiority at sea and will never, not under any circumstances, be the first to use its Navy for an attack if Ukraine itself is not the object of aggression. Among the primary goals is the defense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our independent state.

[Savchenko] What will be the composition of the Navy?

[Kozhin] First of all, it will have surface and submarine forces, naval aviation, coastal defense troops, and also special troop units: rear services, educational institutions and scientific institutions...

Sevastopol will become the Ukrainian Navy's main base and base facilities will be at those ports—from Izmail to Mariupol—where the appropriate structure has already been developed.

[Savchenko] Does it propose the presence of Ukrainian Navy ships outside the Black Sea?

[Kozhin] Yes, but just like any other coastal state, in the form of a temporary presence for the defense of our own interests.

[Savchenko] Will the Navy have nuclear weapons in its inventory?

[Kozhin] Ukraine's naval concept assumes that there will not be nuclear weapons on ships.

[Savchenko] A series of international agreements on naval ship movements were signed by the former Soviet Union. Will they remain in force for the Navy that is being created?

[Kozhin] Yes, Ukraine intends to reaffirm its adherence to the provisions of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and the 1982 Convention in the sphere of military ship movements, and will also accede to the 1936 Convention that regulates the legal regime of military ship movements in the Black Sea and in the Straits Zone.

[Savchenko] On what principles does Ukraine intend to carry out construction of its Navy and along what directions?

[Kozhin] One of the main principles is one-man command and centralized leadership. The Ukrainian Navy will consist of dozens of new ships and no more than 40,000 servicemen.

[Savchenko] How will the Navy be manned?

[Kozhin] We propose manning the Navy based upon a combination of universal military obligation, voluntary entry into the service and on contract. In percentages, it will look like this: 10 percent—officers, the same number of compulsory service seamen, and the remainder—on a contract basis as naval warrant officers of extended service seamen.

[Savchenko] What ships will compose the Navy?

[Kozhin] We envision the development of modern surface ships such as missile cruisers, multi-mission escort ships, coast guard ships, missile boats, and ocean-going and coastal minesweepers. A program has also been set forth for renewal of diesel-electric submarines and the auxiliary fleet, and also for improvement of the aircraft fleet.

[Savchenko] A solid scientific base is needed to carry out the enormous series of tasks...

[Kozhin] That base is already being created. This is the scientific-research center which will organically merge with the Navy and will be called upon to develop the theoretical aspects of operational art, tactics, weaponry, and shipbuilding and will work toward the future.

[Savchenko] Recently many rumors have arisen on the fate of the Varyag Heavy Aircraft-Carrying Ship, including that during your visit to France you discussed
the issue of acquiring submarines in exchange for Varyag. Is there a decision on that ship?

[Kozhin] The technical readiness of the TAKR [aircraft-carrying ship] for turnover is nearly 70%. Three variations of the resolution of its fate are possible: its completion for the Ukrainian Navy or for the Russian Federation Navy or its sale to one of the states. The decision must be made in the next 2-3 months because irreversible processes are occurring on the unfinished ship. In a year, its completion will be practically impossible. One thing is clear, a final decision will be made at the appropriate level. As for the so-called barter with France that KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA wrote about, no negotiations whatsoever have taken place. It seems to me that many states would like to acquire it.

[Savchenko] Boris Borisovich, you examined modern weaponry at the naval equipment exhibition in France. Does Ukraine intend to acquire something that you saw there?

[Kozhin] We were interested in some models by such firms as “Thompson”, “Aerospaziale”, “SAT”, and others. We also reached an agreement with their representatives on future contacts.

[Savchenko] Along what directions are you conducting these contacts with France?

[Kozhin] Already right now I can say that our delegation was interested in the technological developments of individual firms, for example, a unified European air transport control system and a computerized warning, surveillance and landing system that will ensure flight safety.

[Savchenko] Boris Borisovich, some observers think that Ukraine does not need large antisubmarine warfare ships.

[Kozhin] Combating submarines is one of the Navy’s primary missions, therefore the Ukrainian Navy structural development concept envisions the Navy being composed of surface antisubmarine warfare ships of various classes, submarines and aircraft and the task of the scientific-research institutes will be the search for new and improvement of existing nontraditional submarine detection techniques.

[Savchenko] What ships are already augmenting the Navy today?

[Kozhin] The Slavutich command and control ship is already successfully undergoing state testing. The crew has already been formed and sent to the escort ship Getman Sagaydachnyy, the flag will soon be raised on it and it will head out to sea for testing. Construction has been completed on a Zubr Class hydrofoil amphibious assault ship in Feodosiya and the crew has been formed and sent to the ship. In the near future, the Ukrainian Navy will be augmented by a missile cruiser, several escort ships, small antisubmarine warfare ships, support ships, and other new ships.

[Savchenko] The Ukrainian Navy and the Russian Navy will be created on the Black Sea in accordance with the Yalta Agreement. What kind of relations do you see between them?

[Kozhin] It seems to me that our cooperation will be based on the appropriate contracts for ship repair, reciprocal deliveries of equipment, and training of naval specialists. However, the main thing is mutual respect for each other and equality.

Count of Officers Returning from CIS Units to Date
93UM0283A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian 8 Dec 92 p 1

[Article by Captain O. Mizyakivskyy, Air Force Press Center: “They Are Returning Home”]

[Text] The transporting home of servicemen and their families—citizens of Ukraine—from the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Moldova, and the Baltic states, is continuing. Almost every day, Ukrainian Air Force planes have taken off and headed for the various regions of the former Soviet Union. Thus, since 13 April of this year, 2,622 family members, 2,379 officers, 388 warrant officers [paporshi-schyky], and 2,125 term servicemen have returned to our country. Military aircraft also transported 3,689 metric tons of freight, most of which consisted of the personal belongings of Ukrainian citizens.

The courage and high professional skill of our military pilots enabled them to transport their countrymen to Ukraine according to the plan of our country’s Ministry of Defense. In spite of difficult weather conditions, great physical and psychological demands, and in some cases even danger to their lives, crews under the command of such officers as V. Derevyanko, A. Kuznetsov, and V. Chernysh made repeated flights from the countries of the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, the Baltic states, and Moldova. The duty groups [cherhovi brupy] of air traffic controllers of the Ukrainian Air Force also performed their job well.

BALTIC STATES

Estonia: Arms Purchases To Be Made From The West
93UN0674D Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian, 15 Dec 92 p 3

[Article by Alo Kullamaa: “Estonia Buying Arms From Western States”]

[Text] The Ministry of Defense has been negotiating with Western states for the purchase of arms to be used by Estonia’s defense forces, Defense Minister HAIN REBAS announced Sunday at Parnau.

“The government has proposed making a transition to NATO arms,” Defense Minister Rebas said, explaining that: “Negotiations with one Western state are approaching a commitment to supply three Estonian
infantry battalions with military technology of Western origin." Specific offers, the defense minister said, have been received from Germany and France. “Estonia's arms purchases will be made legally,” Rebas added.

Two thousand complete sets of Swedish winter uniforms arrived in Estonia last Friday, Rebas said. Before that, 2,000 rifles and three machine guns had arrived from Finland. The defense minister also said that 50 of the rifles will be given to Estonian farmers for additional security.

Rebas thought that automatic weapons could be produced in Estonia-based armament factories of the former Soviet Union, but such a step should be coordinated with legislation beforehand. "So far, four licenses have been issued in Estonia for producing weapons," the defense minister said.

Speaking of state defense, Rebas deemed it necessary to create a total defense system for Estonia that would consist of military, civil and psychological defense. This would be modeled on Finland, and on Sweden, in particular, where civil and military authorities work hand-in-hand. "In Sweden, a lot of weapons are in the hands of the population and, in case war breaks out, an entire third of the population will become part of the total defense system," said Rebas, who has served as a captain in the Swedish army.

The defense minister said that an inquiry was sent to all the factions yesterday, asking each of them to submit their concept of a defense system, together with a plan for financing it.

Hain Rebas thought that it takes a proper administrative structure to reorganize the Defense Ministry. So far, in Rebas' opinion nothing sensible has been produced by the Defense Ministry. Plans also call for merging the Defense Ministry and the Staff Headquarters of Defense Forces. Rebas said that, beginning January 1, the new Chief of Kaitse [Defense League] will be Johannes Kert. Also employed by the Defense Ministry will be Jüri Estam, whose job it will be to gather addresses of Estonian officers working in the West.

Defense Minister Rebas said that he favors territorial waters extending to 12 nautical miles. "As defense minister, there is no reason for me to give anything away, but rather to protect what we have," Rebas said. Areas beyond a four-mile stretch are said to be suitable for carrying out submarine operations. There is reason to believe, the defense minister thought, that our neighboring state has installed something there. "With the help of a submarine belonging to a foreign country friendly to Estonia, we intend to check out what is there," Rebas said.

The defense minister said that the current government carries authority among the governmental circles of Europe. "For solving its defense problems, Estonia has been offered help on a much larger scale than ever before," Rebas said.
ARMS TRADE

Aven Press Conference on Arms Sales to Asia
93UM0377A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian No 45, 5 Dec 92 p 17

[Article by KOMMERSANT-DAILY Correspondent
Natayla Kosneleva, under the rubric: "Russia Expands
Arms Trade"; "Petr Aven Thinks That It Is Profitable to
Sell Arms To Asia"]

[Text] After the conclusion of the Russian People's
Deputies Congress session, on Thursday evening Rus-

sian Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Petr Aven
told journalists that Russia will attempt to expand the
arms trade market.

The minister noted that intense negotiations are being
conducted with Malaysia right now during the course of
which commercial terms for the delivery of MIG combat
aircraft to it are being discussed. In the minister's words,
"the fundamental decision" on the acquisition of this
aircraft has already been made. Petr Aven thinks that the
success of this deal will signify "not only our access to
Malaysia but to that entire region".

Petr Aven also noted that the first contracts have already
been signed for the purchase of Russian weapons by the
Republic of Korea but at the same time refused to name
the specific list of products being delivered there. He
reported that the experts of the two countries are dis-
cussing the possibility of joint arms production.

Russia arms have also begun to be supplied to Iran
(which purchased three submarines from Russia) and to
the United Arab Emirates.

In Aven's opinion, the Chinese market appears to be
"very interesting, profitable and promising" for Russia
and there is every basis to suggest that military coopera-
tion with that country in 1993 will be "even more
productive" than in this past year. Russia plans to
deliver Russian SU combat aircraft to China. According
to the minister's statement, "bilateral relations in this
sphere will certainly not be limited to just that contract".

As for Taiwan, in Petr Aven's words, "there are no
contacts on arms sales whatsoever" with that country.
Furthermore, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information
and Press Department Director Sergey Yastrzhembskiy
stated at a briefing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
Thursday that Russia's sale of SU-27 aircraft to China is
"in no way associated" with the deal that has caused
such a sensation on the sale of a large shipment of
American F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan.

Moscow Plant to Develop Commercial Ballistic
Launchers
93UM0377B Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian No 19 Dec 92 p 7

[Article by KOMMERSANT-DAILY Correspondent
Mikhail Sergeyev, under the rubric: "Retooling the Plant
imeni Khrunichev": "Ballistic Missiles Will Carry a
Commercial Payload"]

[Text] Yesterday Moscow Machinebuilding Plant imeni
Khrunichev that produces ballistic missiles and launch

vehicles, received the Russian Government Chairman's
order to develop commercial launch vehicles to launch
space vehicles based on military missiles. This order
authorizes the plant to use the Proton launch vehicle for
participation in commercial projects. The contract with
Motorola to place communications satellites into orbit
should become one of the first projects.

According to Viktor Chernomyrdin's order (No 2349-r
dated 16 December), the Plant imeni Khrunichev can
begin to launch commercial launch vehicles based on
military ballistic missiles. The plant has been authorized
to conclude a contract with the American Firm Motorola
for three launches of commercial space communications
satellites using the Proton launch vehicle.

The American Firm Motorola is creating the Iridium
general use global low-orbit communications system.
Placed in low orbits, the Iridium satellites will be able to
receive a signal from an ordinary radiotelephone and to
provide communications with a subscriber at any point
of the Earth's surface (suggested tariff—$3 per minute).
One of the project's variations proposes the launch of 77
satellites weighing approximately 800 kg each into cir-
cular orbits at an altitude of nearly 1,600 km. Motorola
is interested in the utilization of Russian launch systems
to deploy its satellite network.

Several Russian missile firms (Samarskii Central Spe-
cialized Design Bureau, Raduga Design Bureau at
Dubna, and Moscow Institute of Thermal Equipment)
conducted negotiations with Motorola on placing com-

muncations satellites into orbit for Project Iridium.
However, the firm selected the Plant imeni Khrunichev.

Plant imeni Khrunichev's telephone number: (095) 145-
98-29.
MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Commentary on November Bonn Conference on European Security
93UM0270A Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian
11 Dec 92 p 3

[Article by Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Chupakhin: "What Kind of Chain Does the 'Anchor of Stability' Have?"]

[Text] A seminar on the problems of European security took place during the course of four days of November at Bonn's "Dreizen" Hotel which is right on the bank of the Rhine. Twenty-nine politicians, political scientists, diplomats, and journalists from 18 countries, who were invited by the recently created Academy on Security Issues under the German Federal Government, had the opportunity to listen to the speeches of such famous figures on the European landscape as NATO General Secretary Manfred Winer and EEC Secretary-General Wilhelm von Eken, and also representatives of the Bundeswehr, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other federal departments and to participate in the discussions.

The president of the newly founded Academy is Retired Admiral Dieter Wellershof. That name is well known to Krasnaya Zvezda readers. The former Bundeswehr Inspector General was quite frequently quoted in our press, including in Krasnaya Zvezda, during the Cold War. Those were other times and other ways of life. Today, it is all the more noteworthy, when the shroud of ideology and political blunders have fallen from both sides, to find among our former opponents people who are concerned about the same thing that concerns all of us—stability in the world and in our own country.

Dieter Wellershof makes an impression of a gregarious and animated interlocutor, a pragmatist and a realist. Certainly a man who thinks primarily about Germany's interests but who at the same strives for a sufficiently broad view and who recognizes the integrity and interdependence of the modern world. The very idea of creating the Academy says enough about a lot of things, the main engine of which as it is unanimously recognized became Wellershof and the fact, by way of illustration, that not only representatives of Western countries, and not only from all of the forces that attract Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to the West, but also representatives from Russia and other CIS countries were invited to this seminar for the first time.

Of course, today the Western Europeans have a mass of their own problems. And at this seminar, an adequate length of time was devoted, say, to the problems of implementing the well-known Maastricht agreements, in accordance with which the EEC countries are moving toward the closest political, economic and monetary union. However, for the time being there really isn't any unity on the path to Western European unity. The Danes voted against Maastricht in a referendum and the English have their own special position... Some of the seminar's participants called attention to the following contradiction in this connection: on the one hand, the processes of European integration are certainly natural. On the other hand, their end goal is utterly unclear. What are the Western Europeans ultimately intending to achieve? The so-called United States of Europe? Some kind of more or less definite forms of confederation? Or something else?

But take the interrelations of NATO and the EEC. Although von Eken, while speaking at the seminar, several times called the EEC "NATO's European support", still his interpretation of the nuances of the "subordination" of these two organizations was quite substantially set apart from those that M. Winer had just presented.

This sort of incontrovertible thought was heard several times at the seminar: a strong, united Western Europe is necessary because it will then be able to play the role of a kind of "anchor of stability" on the continent. But then and there, the natural question arises: if a united EEC is the "anchor of stability", what then is this anchor's chain and to what is the chain itself secured?

The model proposed by Polish Professor Artur Hanish caused animation: the fate of an anchor without a chain that is rusting alone somewhere in the depths of the future ocean is extremely sad. In other words, the transformation of the EEC into a close, but purely closed, isolation union is hardly capable of ensuring the reliable security of Western Europe itself and, all the more doubtful that it will serve as still some sort of guarantor of the security of other states outside of that bloc. It is perfectly obvious that this is possible only in that case if the common European process and the development of cooperation within the framework of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] deepens in every possible way along with Western European integration. Only then will the needed "chain" appear on the "anchor"...

An extremely urgent and unambiguous problem in this connection is that military-political vacuum that is currently gaping in Eastern Europe. How and with what will it be filled? There are politicians in the West who reason in the categories of "sanitary corridors" and "expansion of spheres of influence" and who would like to reduce the matter to the isolation of Russia and its further weakening. But other voices dominated here, in Bonn. Indeed, some Eastern European and Baltic Region representatives were continually stressing a vested interest in accelerated integration, including military-political. But the Western European participants were somewhat more cautious. Specifically, they spoke about the inadmissibility of including new members in NATO in the foreseeable future. At the same time, they stressed the soundness and potential of such an institution as the North Atlantic Council for Cooperation which, as we all know, both Russia, other CIS countries, the Baltic states, and Georgia have joined...
When they began talking about what kind of structures could promote the creation of a new European security structure, the thought was even heard that, they said, the ideal thing would be to have some sort of “second NATO” in Eastern Europe or, in other words, that system of collective security that, in contrast to the Warsaw Treaty, would not confront the North Atlantic Alliance but, on the contrary, would cooperate with it and supplement it, while serving as a “second support” of European Security. They also talked about Russia’s possible role as a “bridge” between Europe and Asia and about the fact that Asia very much needs a process like the CSCE...

Listening to all of this, we instinctively began to think: why are these ideas, which are understood by the Western Europeans, having such a difficult time making headway in the CIS? Say, Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov talked about the possibility of creating a collective security system and an Allied Armed Forces based on the NATO type even before the thoughtless process of dividing the army according to national apartments began. Today, it would be somewhat more difficult to carry out that task.

Unfortunately, to some people it sometimes appears that there is nothing more important than momentary interests and that the main thing in the current situation is to act a bit more assertively in order to gain some share of security for ourselves at the expense of another. But the unwillingness to consider the interests of others will boomerang and hurt our own interests...

In this connection, it’s worth citing an individual but instructive episode. Ukrainian Representative A. Goncharenko took the floor during the course of the discussion on nuclear weapons on the territory of the CIS countries. He suddenly announced that, although Ukraine considers itself to be a nuclear-free state in the future, certain conditions are needed to do that: if they (as we can guess—the West) guarantee Ukraine’s security after the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and if the West pays not Russia but Ukraine for this withdrawal and destruction of the nuclear weapons. It was curious to hear what... the German side in the person of Doctor Joseph Holik gave as a response to that. He patiently explained to the Ukrainian professor that to set forth conditions with regard to issues that are considered resolved in an international context is, putting it mildly, incorrect and that the West is rendering aid to Russia for the destruction of nuclear weapons, including for those being withdrawn from Ukraine because only Russia can be involved with that. The plants where that can be done are precisely on Russian territory. “Of course,” Doctor Holik shrugged his shoulders, “Ukraine can begin to build such plants on its territory but no Western aid whatsoever will defray the costs of such an expensive undertaking...”

Frankly speaking, a strange aftertaste remained: how will we build a security system if we come to international forums with such perceptions of things of global significance? Isn’t that the cause of that definite caution with which our Western partners look at the CIS countries.

That also affects Russia. Maybe Russia to an even greater degree. This question was heard in one way or another in a whole series of speeches: but won’t something unpredictable happen in your country? Won’t you return to the past?

We sensed that it was quite difficult to assess our Russian vicissitudes from there, from the West. The “Collapse of the Empire”—that stereotype was still habitually slipping through when they began to talk about what is happening on the territory of the former USSR. But those people who said it, judging by everything, themselves understand that it is impossible to explain anything seriously using the commentator’s wording “the collapse of the empire”. The USSR has disintegrated but there is now the Russian Federation—also an enormous, multiethnic state which you also can, in general, declare to be an empire and begin to somehow or other undermine, while encouraging separatism and nationalism. But does the West need that new “headache”. Is it really insufficient that the collapse of the USSR has turned into a series of small and not so small wars, the appearance of a multitude of seats of instability, and the disruption of the geopolitical balance in general?

“A stable Russia is a good Russia,” M. Winer considered it necessary to stress that twice in his speech. “An unstable Russia is a bad Russia.” He also spoke about the West’s vested interest in the success of Russian reforms and in Russia not turning away from the path of democratic development...

You can only welcome all of that but one supplement is also necessary. Russia’s stability is inseparably linked with the need to strengthen its statehood. Its current amorphous state can’t last forever. But the more Russia recognizes itself as a state, and a quite strong and great state as before, the more precisely its vital interests will be drawn in great detail and the more often it will have to announce them and, maybe, not always in total agreement with the West. Is the West ready for that? Is it ready to relate to this new situation with understanding and cool-headedness? Or will the first attempts of a Russia that is trying to assert itself cause a new wave of accusations of “great power attitude” or “imperial approaches”...

If the words about a “stable Russia” are sincere, then a second step is also needed—the understanding that only a strong independent Russia can be stable. Support is also needed so that it can become strong and independent...

Today security is an extremely complex and difficult concept. No blocs, no most powerful allies, no “security umbrellas” will shelter anyone from the awesome challenges of modern times or from the multitude of global risks that mankind faces. German Ministry for Economic Cooperation State Secretary Viccard Hêrdtl painted a graphic picture of that in his speech. He also spoke about the danger of demographic explosions, about the worsening economic problems, about the uncontrolled growth of industrial production and energy consumption, about the threat of the revival of aggressive nationalism, about the possibility of uncontrolled
migratory torrents, and about the global scale of international crime. His conclusions about the enormous conflict potential between the developed and developing countries was extremely impressive. Herdtl stressed that the industrially developed countries are rather an exception in today's world. Two-thirds of the world population, in the professor's words, "is despair, poverty and a readiness for conflicts".

In general, it seems that today the problems of security have entered some sort of circle of paradoxes. Phrases are changing to minuses. What appeared to be the greatest evil yesterday fades before new threats today. Only the kind of pillars of the "new thinking" have consoled us with the victorious reports that the "threat of a worldwide catastrophe has been postponed" and the "end of the superpowers' global confrontation has laid the foundation for a new era"... And today other conclusions are heard from the mouths of the European intelligentsia: "After the collapse of the USSR, the world has not at all become more secure", "The bipolar world was more stable than the current multi-polar world", and "It is much more difficult to carry out crisis management right now"...

And the conclusion that Geneva University Professor Kurt Gastayer made to his lecture sounded quite pessimistic: "The 21st Century, alas, will hardly be the peaceful century"...

In a word, the enticing horizon has been reached but a new, just as remote horizon has opened up... The threat to mankind has only changed its appearance with the change of the geopolitical paradigms but it hasn't totally disappeared...

But what can we do? What is the solution? It is certainly in the fact that we should once and for all recognize: no philosophies, no messiahs, no "isms" or "new thinkings" will in and of themselves provide security to the world. Only painstaking work and the painstaking formation of a new security architecture can provide it through a synthesis, consideration of the largest number of inter-relations and interests, and the increase of the diversity of the structures and institutions that ensure the harmony and equality of geopolitical configurations and normal cooperation...

The emblem of the new Academy which Wellschow demonstrated to the participants of the first international seminar consists of six hexahedrons. It is a quite complex symbol and it conveys, as it was explained to us, many different meanings. But one of them is simple. "It is similar to the honeycombs of a bee," the retired admiral explained while smiling. "And that, on the one hand, symbolizes a certain rationality and, on the other hand, harmonious work, like ours was at the seminar..."

There's something to that. But the matter is not only the Academy and not only the seminar. Although this beginning, of course, also deserves a kind word.

But today we need reason and harmonious work, if we are talking about security and in the larger sense. No one can currently provide security for himself by himself. Security can be provided only jointly and only on a coordinated basis. The truth is just as simple as those six hexahedrons... But it still hasn't actually been grasped by mankind.

SECURITY SERVICES

Retired KGB Foreign Intelligence Official Buried
93P50037A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 28 Jan 93 p 14
[German Zaychenko report: "A Former Soviet Intelligence Officer Has Died: Yuriy Popov Has Died"]

[Text] Yesterday, Maj Gen (Ret) Yuriy Popov was buried in the Novo-Kuntsevskiy Cemetery in Moscow. Until 1990 he was deputy chief for foreign intelligence in the former First Chief Directorate of the USSR KGB. Yevgeny Primakov, director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, gave a eulogy.

Based on circumstantial data, the KOMMERSANT correspondent was able to elucidate some aspects of the illustrious intelligence officer's biography. Yuriy Popov spent about 30 years abroad. He started out as a simple intelligence officer in the United States. Then he worked in Southeast Asia and in European countries; he was Soviet intelligence resident in Japan. In the words of his colleagues, he "passionately loved that country and knew it thoroughly."

Yuriy Popov was an enthusiastic stamp collector. His collection of Soviet, Asian and African stamps would be the pride of any European-rank stamp collector.

In recent years Yuriy Popov was a consultant on strategic problems to Leonid Shebarshin, the chief of the First Chief Directorate. Popov was awarded the Order of Lenin (In the USSR such honors were given only to an intelligence officer "in the field," whose name was not made public.).

Ukrainian Southern Border Guard Chief on Challenges
93UM0165C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian 29 Oct 92 p 2

[Interview with Ukrainian Border Troops Southern Directorate Chief Major-General Vladimir Mikhaylovich Bondar by Ukrainian Border Troops Press Service Officer Senior Lieutenant Sergey Astakhov, under the rubric: "Timely Interview": "Major-General V. Bondar: 'We Are Reliably Guarding the Southern Border'"

[Text] It turned out that it was difficult to meet with the Ukrainian Border Troops Southern Directorate Chief. And not because Major-General V. Bondar is avoiding contacts with journalists. He would willingly grant an interview if he had at least a little bit of free time to do that. But right now perhaps time is the thing which
Vladimir Mihaylovich has left: nearly 2,000 kilometers of guarded border of which half—is the Moldovan sector which has been specially taken under guard—requires not the headquarters style of work but the personal presence of the directorate chief at the recently erected border posts and entry control points. And yet our meeting took place on the eve of the first anniversary of the Ukrainian Border Troops.

[Astakhov] Vladimir Mihaylovich, our Southern Directorate began its history just this year. What facilitated its creation?

[Bondar] After an intergovernmental agreement on visa-less border crossings for citizens of Romania and Moldova was concluded by those two countries, Ukraine's southern border turned out to be open. The armed conflict in the Dniester Republic began shortly after that. Therefore, on March 17, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk signed the Edict "On Measures for Guarding the Ukrainian State Border with the Republic of Moldova". The State Committee for Matters Concerning Guarding the Ukrainian State Border began to create the Southern Directorate essentially since that time. In the process, they have pursued the goal of bringing the leadership closer to the units and thereby more efficiently resolve duty issues and provide southern directorate subunits with everything necessary to survive.

[Astakhov] How would you characterize the situation that has developed on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border?

[Bondar] The situation on the border has stabilized, social tension has markedly subsided, and the flow of refugees has ebbed with the cessation of the armed conflict in the Dniester Republic. Mutual respect is being maintained between Ukraine and Moldova and the most favorable conditions are being created for interethnic ties and this is being reflected on the border as if in a mirror.

But that does not signify that the functions of the border guards are being reduced to just examining documents and accounting for those who are arriving in Ukraine and for those who are leaving it. After the termination of the engagements in the Dniester Republic, thousands of weapons were not returned to Moldova's army depots. We find people who are willing to bring something into Ukraine. Border guards have seized hundreds of rifles weapons, including assault rifles, machineguns, grenade launchers, pistols, hunting rifles, thousands of cartridges, hundreds of knives and gas weapons, and a large quantity of grenades at entry control points. Furthermore, we are maintaining order in the border areas and we serve as the guarantor of public calm. Border guards have detained a dozen armed groups and have disarmed several criminals who were terrorizing the local inhabitants.

[Astakhov] Without the assistance of border area residents, it would have been difficult to set up new border posts in such a short period of time and to take this complicated sector of the border under reliable guard.

[Bondar] Of course. The majority of people relate to us with understanding and help us in every way possible. So, there is honey, milk, grapes, and fresh vegetables at the border posts, thanks to the residents of Kodymskiy, Krasnooknyapskiy, Razdelianskiy, and other rayons. Ukrainian Presidential Representative for Renisyk Rayon Aleksandr Andreyevich Prokopenya maintains under his continuous personal control construction of the "Nagornaya" Border Post and promises to exert every effort so that it will be ready for settlement by 4 November, Ukrainian Border Troops Day. He has also promised us that he will build an apartment building in the city of Reni on a shared participation basis with the subsequent allocation of 10 apartments to border troops. There is a similar situation in Belgorod-Dnestrovsk. They are prepared to allocate several apartments to us in one of the apartment buildings that is ready to be turned over if we contribute our share. Right now the question is, where do we get the needed resources—it is very difficult for us to obtain money.

Unfortunately, we have encountered the fact that some leaders are placing the interests of their businesses and departments above the state's interests. I will cite the following example. Shershenets Village residents have offered us a former school building that was built several decades ago. But they asked 28 million for it! But it is understandable that the troops are on a state subsidy and those people who are demanding that kind of money from us are essentially beating it out of the people.

As you can see, there are enough problems. Nevertheless, the last few months have demonstrated that the creation of the Ukrainian Border Troops Southern Directorate— is a step that, although forced, is entirely justified. With time and when the process of establishing and managing is over, it will give us a great deal of independence and many difficulties will be resolved much more rapidly and easily—it is really much easier to see what needs to be done at the local level.

**Ukrainian Border Guard Chief Views First Year**

**93UM0165B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian 4 Nov 92 pp 1-3**

[Interview with Colonel-General Valeriy Aleksandrovich Gubenko by NARODNA ARMIYA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Nagoryanskyy, under the rubric: "Today is Border Guards Day": "Colonel-General Valeriy Gubenko: 'It's Still Too Early to Plant Flowers on Neutral Ground""]

[Text] "There is no Ukraine on earth, There is no other Dniepro."

God Himself is following after us, the descendants of the Great Kobzar, protecting this miracle-land which he so passionately extolled, the love for which he sends us even today.
But what does—protecting Ukraine—mean?

For some people these comments are quite pathetic. But it is difficult soldier’s labor for those men who bear arms at the border. And our people should be grateful to the lads in the green service caps and, naturally, they should also be concerned about them.

Today is their holiday. Yes and ours also. Therefore, we invited State Committee for Matters Concerning Guarding the State Border Chairman—Ukrainian Border Troops Commander Colonel-General Valeriy Gubenko to visit us.

[Nagoryanskiy] This year we have been left without the traditional 23rd of February. A New Army and Navy Day has still not been approved. So, we can be kindly jealous of the border troops: you have your own holiday. Valeriy Aleksandrovich, accept warm congratulations on behalf of NARODNA ARMYA’s readers.

[Gubenko] Thank you... We also did not mark the 28th of May—our old holiday—in 1992. For information, I will remind you: The Supreme Soviet adopted the Law “On the Ukrainian Border Troops” on 4 November 1991. This essentially became the date of birth of the Border Troops of the young sovereign state. We submitted a proposal to the President and Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk issued the Edict on Border Guards Day on 25 May 1992.

While looking back today, on its first anniversary, you are amazed: how many events has history pressed into this small segment of time? I have in mind the statewide events and those people who overfilled the life of the Border Troops. I am a man who is an old hand in the service. I have worn shoulder boards for nearly 30 years. The Transcaucasus, Transbaykal, Far East, Northwest— I have seen a lot. But it was probably never as difficult as this year. We have had to start a lot of things from zero. Thanks to the legislators: they adopted a series of important acts on the basis of which our activities are structured. (In parentheses, I will point out that this legal basis for the Border Troops has not been created in a single CIS state.) Specifically, this the Law “On the Ukrainian State Border”. The State Committee for Matters Concerning Guarding the Ukrainian State Border has been created. This is a fundamental factor. Previously, as you know, the Border Troops were structurally part of the KGB and that system had existed for decades. Today we are an independent committee. There are more missions and the responsibility is greater.

[Nagoryanskiy] Obviously the Supreme Soviet proceeded from that when it resolved the issue on increasing the strength of the Border Troops?

[Gubenko] Quite right. Besides, the geographic position of our state in Europe is special. Its borders extended more than 7,500 kilometers. Moreover, a maritime economic zone exists, the water area of which reaches more than 10,000 kilometers. And we need to protect, reliably protect, all of that. Nine border guards detachments, two independent maritime brigades, an aviation unit, and six entry control points that have seven highway, 13 railroad, 15 maritime and five air entry points carry out that mission.

[Nagoryanskiy] And all of that is directly tied to the State Committee?

[Gubenko] No. We have created a more flexible system and have formed three directorates—Southwestern with its center at Lvov, Southern—at Odessa, and Southeastern—at Kharkov.

[Nagoryanskiy] Perhaps it’s most difficult of all for those who are now standing guard on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border.

[Gubenko] Generally, duty is difficult in other areas but there the workload on people is definitely higher. The very fact that the issue on the border with Moldova was raised to the level of a Presidential Edict speaks for itself.

[Nagoryanskiy] I had the opportunity to drive out to those areas. I spoke with many people. Of all the forces that have been activated there, opinions are highest about the border troops. They are reliable lads.

[Gubenko] And there is no place for any others in our troops. It is no secret that they end up in the border troops after a special selection. But, as they say in Ukraine, “There is more to being a Cossack than throwing a spear.” We teach people during their entire service time. Yes, add to all of that—the ancient traditions of the Border Troops. Indeed, what they say about that right now is that it is not in the main stream. Because some politicians are demanding that we reject everything that made up our lives in the former Union. They hate the traditions even more. I will limit myself to one sentence: we already at one time attempted to “destroy everything to the foundation and then...”. Didn’t these countless experiments teach us anything?

[Nagoryanskiy] I would like to return to the conversation about the Ukrainian-Moldovan border...

[Gubenko] Everything that is associated with it, that is, our activities in that region, has become the first serious test for the state’s young Border Troops. We had covered the main directions of the border in the shortest possible period of time after publication of the Ukrainian Presidential Edict that I mentioned above. And it extended nearly 800 kilometers from the most difficult side—with Odessa Oblast. People were gathered there from the less important sectors. They ended up, putting it mildly, in conditions that were less than sanitary. I remember that I encountered that fact during one of my trips to that region. Lieutenant Colonel Shumeiko, by the way my former fellow serviceman, had prepared for a silver wedding. He was already at work at the table arrangement. But an order came in and he found himself in the field, scattered to the winds, on the holiday.

But we were not the only ones who found ourselves in such difficult conditions. Ministry of Internal Affairs,
Ukrainian Security Service, and National Guard workers have performed and are performing duty alongside us. I will cite just one fact in confirmation of the effectiveness of the joint work: hundreds of firearms have been seized.

[Nagoryanskiy] It is understandable what caused the steps to strengthen the border with Moldova. But today many people are perplexed, why erect border posts with Russia and Belarus! People have also not permitted in their thoughts that, by way of illustration, they would have to go through a border post while traveling from Chernigov to Gomel. The report that the Ukrainian President has signed a directive “On Border-Customs Control on the Ukrainian State Border With the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation” has served as a cause for concern. Far from everyone understood the above mentioned steps in the background of the elimination of borders between the countries in Western Europe. Is the situation really that complicated?

[Gubenko] First of all, there is no need to dramatize events. Do you know that here the following stereotype is set into motion in some people: if you make a border, then you must erect barbed wire fences. No, this is a question of something altogether different—about the standards that have been adopted in the civilized countries.

If there is a state—therefore, there must be a border post. What kind of border post is something for the state to decide for itself. Incidentally, I don’t understand the thesis of the transparency of borders that was advocated by the Russian side at one time. Either there is a border or there isn’t. Here there can’t be some sort of third “transparent variation”, as they have attempted to propose to us. As for the comparison with the West, it is not entirely successful. There are different military-political and economic conditions over there. By way of illustration, they are not engaged with smuggling sugar or gasoline as is being done in our country. They have an established market and all of that is done on a legal basis.

Second, the situation is not as innocuous as it may appear at first glance.

[Nagoryanskiy] Please clarify it.

[Gubenko] We have to take several factors into account here.

The situation has drastically deteriorated in the regions that border that same Northern Caucasus. Until recently, there wasn’t proper control of the movement of individuals and cargoes across the state border. It is sufficient to recall how many volunteers were detained this spring when they, with or without weapons, attempted to cross over to the Dnieper Republic from Rostov Oblast.

Mafioso structures were living it up and smuggling increased in the border oblasts of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. I will not make unsubstantiated statements: MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] organs detained nearly 4,000 people who were attempting to transport narcotics on the Ukrainian-Russian border during August and September alone. Several kilograms of narcotics substances have been seized this year just on the border with Russia. Yes and our fellow countrymen are good. In comparison with last year, crime in the Ukraine’s border areas has increased by 37%.

There is one other important circumstance that has compelled us to toughen measures on the borders with our neighbors—that is the use of our territory by citizens of third countries for illegal migration to the West. Here’s some statistics for you. Since January, border guards have detained nearly 900 people—from Vietnam, Pakistan, India, China, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Korea on the western axis alone.

And now about another scourge—the increase of the illegal export of various cargoes and unlicensed goods to Russia and Belarus. And here are the facts once again. Cargoes worth a total sum of nearly 1.5 billion rubles have been seized on the border with these two states just during the first 10 months of the year. And we hardly have a surplus of these goods—that same sugar—in our country.

[Nagoryanskiy] Valeriy Aleksandrovich, but doesn’t it appear to people from that same Russia that the “independent Ukrainians” are attempting to isolate themselves and are hatching some sort of schemes.

[Gubenko] Well, first of all, whether or not we isolate ourselves—that is our affair, and if yes, then how. Second, we are not original in our decisions. Perhaps not everyone knows that the Russian President has published an Edict “On Urgent Measures to Organize Customs Control in the Russian Federation”. Since they have done it, they must consider it necessary. That is the Russian’s personal affair. So, customs posts and militia posts are already functioning on seven major highways and at three major rail hubs that link Rostov Oblast with Ukraine. They plan to create a total of 14 such posts.

Now to sum up: The steps taken on the border with Russia and Belarus are advantageous for all three states. And I will also add that the Ukrainian President’s Directive, besides to us, extends to the Cabinet of Ministers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the State Customs Committee. Tasks will also be assigned to other structures.

[Nagoryanskiy] Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin signed an agreement at Dagomys which, specifically, records their adherence to the principle of the openness [otkrytost] of state borders. Don’t the steps that were recently adopted by both powers violate them?

[Gubenko] Not hardly. In a word, both Presidents at the meeting stressed that the principle of the openness of borders does not mean they remain uncontrolled. As for the personal trips of citizens, there should not be any obstacles whatsoever.
[Nagoryanskiy] Yes, there are many tasks facing the border troops. And there are certainly no fewer problems.

[Gubenko] But who doesn’t have problems? Previously, as I already stated, the Committee for State Security ran us. Many documents and directives arrived from Moscow already in prepared form. Just take them and carry them out. But today all of the organizational functions lie exclusively on us alone. But that is not the most difficult thing. The work with people is somewhat more difficult, all the more so, when we have to resolve personnel issues.

A Committee collegium session occurred not too long ago. They talked about many things but talked about officer cadres with special emphasis. Service is difficult and they are not providing the appropriate benefits. Salary? It is laughable to even say it... We need to give our people their due: under these conditions—both financial and purely living—the overwhelming majority serve conscientiously. Incidentally, about housing. Until recently, there were more than 2,000 officers and warrant officers without apartments in the Border Troops. Besides, nearly 500 families have huddled in buildings that have been adapted any which way directly at the border posts and entry control points. Right now, six military from other CIS countries are being transferred to Ukraine; the housing problem is worsening. And that is despite the small amount of aid that the government is attempting to render to us. And we calm ourselves since we know that others are not living any easier. It is the same in the army and in the navy.

The situation in those collectives that have been augmented by those people who are arriving from the republics of the former Union worries us. First of all, I have in mind compulsory service soldiers. Alas, their discipline is low. They have certainly gotten out of hand in anticipation of a transfer to Ukraine. By the way, NARODNA ARMIYA wrote on that topic and quite justifiably. There is also reason to criticize certain officers who were transferred from nearby countries. But I don’t want to talk about that today. It is still a holiday. Yes and it also the first holiday for us.

[Nagoryanskiy] Valeryi Aleksandrovich, I had to wait an entire month in order to get an interview with you, although I know that you have a favorable attitude towards our newspaper. Perhaps it has been more difficult for you in time in the Border Troops...

[Gubenko] You can say that again. I’ll put it this way: The more you work the less time you have. It happens that there aren’t even a few minutes left for personal matters in a day. I am a photo buff, I take pictures with a camera. But, frankly speaking, I can’t recall the last time that I went out to take pictures. And I want to spend some time with my children and grandchildren—I have a son and a daughter and three grandchildren...

[Nagoryanskiy] Remember the lines of one of Vladimir Vysotskiy’s songs: “And the flowers are extraordinarily pretty on neutral ground”. What do you think, Valeryi Aleksandrovich, will the time come when the borders will be erased and we will plant flowers on all of the “neutral ground”?

[Gubenko] As they say, God willing that this should happen. But they are dreams for now. So, we will have to wait with the flowers. For the beginning, all of us need to erase the borders in our own consciousness and expand the borders of the human intellect. Perhaps this is somewhat more complicated than removing the border posts. That is what I think about most today...

**Border Troops Try to Cope with Refugees from Afghanistan**

93UM0335B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Anatoly Ladin and Aleksandr Pelts under the “Events and Commentaty” rubric: “Tajikistan: Government Troop Offensive Successful”]

[Text]

Islamic Detachments Still Recruiting New Fighters at Home and in Neighboring State

The 11 January offensive launched by government troops against the Pamir towns of Obigram and Rogun, where a large number of detachments of Islamic fighters has gathered, is meeting with success. We were informed in the headquarters of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division that on 12 January the advancing troops captured the town of Obrigarm without suffering any losses and are presently deploying their forces to proceed in their movement in the easterly direction. The government troops are pursuing a single goal: rapid disarmament of Islamic detachments. Failure to do so would result in the likelihood of armed resistance breaking out anew in the near future. There is another reason for taking action without delay. Many areas of the Pamir are approaching the point of hunger as a result of the continuing blockade of the Dushanbe-Khorog Highway. Also suffering abject hardship is Rogun’s Russian-speaking population, whom the Islamic fighters have decided to take hostage.

Incidentally, there are reports indicating that Islamic fighters are penetrating into the territory of neighboring Kyrgyzstan. They are agitating there to rally the local populace under the flag of Islam. Three local residents who offered the armed “agitators” resistance were killed and 18 persons were taken hostage. The fighters raised the flag of Islam over the Dzergetai rayispolkom building.

The situation in the Tajik-Afghan border area also remains extremely tense. The major problem is refugees, who in the Pyandzh border detachment area alone number in the tens of thousands. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has a number of times reported on their distressful condition.
What is the situation there today? This was a subject we discussed with Colonel Valeriy Kochinov, first deputy commander of the Russian Federation Border Troops in Tajikistan. He informed us that the greatest concentration of refugees—about 70,000 adults and children—is situated in the direction of Kumsangirskiy. They are located on both the Tajik and the Afghan sides. Valeriy Kochinov went on to say emphatically that the people are completely exhausted. Islamic fighters are active in their midst. They are spreading a rumor to the effect that those who return can expect certain reprisal.

Recently created at the National Security Committee of Tajikistan was the Border Protection Directorate. Subordinated to it is a specially formed brigade assigned the mission of covering the rear approaches to the border. Three detachments equipped with armored vehicles have already assumed their duties, thus improving considerably the situation for the Russian Border Troops. Nonetheless, conditions there remain extremely tense.

Possible Spill-Over of Tajik, Afghan Disorders Probed
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[Article by Aleksey Viktorov: “Two Civil Wars Meet: The Tajik-Afghan Border Situation”]

[Text] Alarming reports continue to arrive from the Afghan-Tajik border area, a region which in both the geographic and the political sense has become identified as a juncture of two civil wars raging in these neighboring countries, ones close culturally and ethnically. Causing concern is the increasingly evident future occurrence of mutual interference and intertwining of these bloody conflicts.

Immediately following the above events, tens of thousands of peaceful residents in Tajikistan poured over the Pyandzh River on the border. The number of refugees located on Afghan territory has risen to 30,000. They consist not only of Tajiks, but of Kirghiz living in the border areas.

According to some reports, some of the persons entering the neighboring state’s territory are Islamic fighters, who used peaceful residents as a “living shield” for crossing the border. However, as far as one is able to judge, the factors prompting the refugees to flee are not connected with politics; the people simply wish to leave the area of fighting. This can be seen particularly clearly in appeals made by refugees’ representatives to the consulate-general in Mazar-i-Sharif for assistance to depart from Afghan soil and, with the current difficult situation in their homeland, they further request sending the refugees to Kyrgyzstan or Russia.

The appearance of Tajik refugees in Afghanistan is a highly paradoxical event. These are people saving themselves from the fires of civil war by fleeing to a ravaged country—one drained of blood—which itself for 14 years has been suffering a vicious circle of enmity and violence. The mujahedeen, who in April of 1992 overthrew the Najibullah regime, started fighting among themselves immediately afterward for a “just” division of newly-won power. The situation is complicated by the fact that pushing virtually every Afghan group are various kinds of external forces: Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, all struggling to gain influence in the new Afghanistan. The intrapoltitical struggle is proceeding with a background of sharp antagonisms peculiar to Afghan society, of which the most painful are ethnic differences between the Pushtruns, who traditionally dominate the Afghan nation, and non-Pushtrun nationalists (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Khazars), who are seeking to become well-entrenched in the socio-political life of society.

Exacerbating the situation is the “Lebanonization” of the country. The prerogatives and actual possibilities of a central power in Afghanistan have always been limited. The country in the present situation is not governed by a single center. Even the leaders of the major military and political mujahedeen groups as a rule exert a merely formal local control over the armed detachments of their parties. The field commanders in reality are independent, constituting the sole real power in their areas. Control at the provincial level is exercised on a coalition basis via “jihad councils.”

What forces are shaping the situation in the north of Afghanistan, in the area adjacent to the borders of CIS republics?

There are at least five border provinces with Mazar-i-Sharif as their center under the control of a large military and political organization that supports the interests of non-Pushtrun peoples of the north: the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIDA), which is headed by General A. Dustum (an ethnic Uzbek). There are also areas under the prevailing influence of the Field Commanders Supervisory Council (largely Tajik in composition), and this is headed by A. Sh. Masud. Significant enclaves are controlled by local commanders of the Pushtrun Islamic Party (IPA) of G. Khekmatiar.

As far as one is able to judge, only the NIDA of all the abovementioned forces is in a position to exert sufficiently effective control over its “own” sector of CIS republic borders, but its influence does not cover the entire extent of the Tajikistan border. The difficulty of resolving problems associated with the border zone situation, and the trouble with the refugee question in particular lies squarely in the absence of a single spokesman the other side could present to conduct negotiations. In addition, reports indicate that some
local mujahedeen commanders, guided by considerations of material advantage or ideas of the jihad, are acting on their own initiative in making ceaseless attempts to exercise direct interference in Tajikistan's internal affairs.

However, the above problems must be resolved. History, including the Afghan conflict experience, teaches that refugees can be easily politicized to the advantage of various political forces to further the latters' sometimes unseemly purpose. In the event the refugee stay on the Afghan shore of the Pyandzh is dragged out, this can serve as a source constantly feeding the civil war in Tajikistan, as a channel for interference by various kinds of external forces (not only of the Afghans) in the affairs of that state and of the remaining Central Asian republics. On the other hand, one cannot rule out the possibility of involvement of Tajik refugees in some manner or other in the infra-Afghan political struggle, including the latter's ethnic aspect.

The protracted nature of the Afghan conflict and absence of a stable and responsible government in that country will continue to render a negative influence on the situation north of the Pyandzh and Amu Darya. Russia, the same as the Central Asian republics, has an objective interest in a rapid settlement of Afghanistan's internal conflict and in doing away with this breeding ground of tension existing at the CIS borders.
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