[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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Data on South African Nuclear Arms Program
93WP0122A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 26 Mar 93 p 10

[Article by Anastasiya Romashkevich: “The Republic of South Africa Has Announced the Development of an Atomic Bomb. Pretoria Has Quit the ‘Nuclear Club’ Because It Never Really Joined It.”]

[Text] A news conference was held yesterday at the Republic of South Africa [RSA] Embassy in Moscow, devoted to a sensational announcement by that country’s president, Frederik de Klerk. Speaking in parliament, he admitted that the RSA has had a nuclear program and that it culminated in the development of nuclear weapons. De Klerk stated that the RSA does not have nuclear weapons at this time—they have been destroyed, and all work has been frozen, but “no one is ever destined to learn the technical details.”

According to de Klerk, he reached the decision to halt nuclear weapons research after becoming president in 1989. According to information obtained from the RSA Embassy in Moscow, implementation of “a limited program of nuclear deterrence” was initiated in 1974, and by the late eighties, Pretoria already had six nuclear weapons. “The weapons produced were not thermonuclear and the RSA had no intention of using them,” it was stated at the news conference. “The Air Force would have been used to deliver them: The South African Air Force has British Canberra bombers and the American Boeing-707.”

Talking about the reasons for halting the nuclear program, the president of the RSA noted that it “had become a hindrance in the development of relations between South Africa and other countries.” It was decided not only to rid themselves of nuclear weapons but also to convert the capacities of the ARMKOR state military corporation, where they were developed.

Pretoria’s nuclear program was always a “Pulcinella’s secret” for the world community: In 1979, for example, an American satellite registered a secret flash of light in the South Atlantic that had apparently been an RSA test of an atomic bomb, which de Klerk denies. The African National Congress (ANC) welcomed the president’s announcement but demanded additional information. It is the opinion of a number of observers that the president’s initiative might also be connected with the prospects for the ANC probably coming to power in the future as the result of general elections, on which negotiations are now under way between the ANC and the government. The reaction of the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry to the RSA statement will be covered in tomorrow’s edition of KOMMERSANT.

[Begin box] Stages in the Development of the RSA’s Nuclear Weapons (from material from Russian Federation foreign intelligence)

Early Seventies—Development of the industrial base to enrich uranium. Processing of highly enriched uranium starts at a test site in Walindaba.

Mid-Seventies—Development of a test site in the Kalahari Desert, with a 300-meter-deep mine shaft (after development the site was closed).

Late Seventies—Work to develop a uranium-based gun-type explosive device.

Early Eighties—Work on weapons of more advanced design, including thermonuclear.

August 1988—The RSA officially acknowledges that it has a military nuclear program. The Kalahari test site is demothballed. According to expert evaluations in the USSR’s military intelligence, activity started up again at the site, connected with preparations for a test of an advanced nuclear weapon.

Late 1988—A program to develop a gas centrifuge to enrich uranium was completed.

1991—The RSA signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state. After signing the treaty the RSA admitted that it had a considerable quantity of nuclear materials, including stocks of weapons-grade uranium.

1992—Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency conducted inspections at nuclear sites in the RSA, but were not permitted to inspect mine shafts in the Kalahari.

March 1993—An official statement by RSA President Frederik de Klerk on the successful completion of the nuclear program. Nuclear weapons that had been developed were destroyed. [end box]

Arms Industry Space Project Reportedly Halted
MB0404092793 Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 4 Apr 93 pp 1,2

[By Charmain Naidoo]

[Text] The SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation] has scuppered a bid by the South African arms industry to develop its own multimillion-rand missile and satellite programme.

After a bitter behind-the-scenes dispute which has waged for months, the corporation rejected government pressure to sign a satellite deal with a French company, Eutelsat.

Instead, the SABC went for a cheaper but more limited American system. Both services would use satellites in orbit over South Africa to bounce signals back to the country for broadcasting radio and TV programmes.

But the French company had in addition promised to provide Denel, the commercialised wing of Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa], with satellite
facilities which would enable them to use satellite links for a proposed lucrative mobile cellular-telephone network in South Africa. And it had promised to help Denel develop its own satellite.

Without the French company's service, Denel's plans for entering the cellular-phone market in South Africa have been dashed. And with it goes all hopes of getting the money needed to develop eventually its own missile and satellite programme.

The remarkable details of the high-stakes row were disclosed this week by top officials involved in the negotiations.

On one side stood the SABC, anxious to strike the cheapest deal. One the other an armaments industry desperate to find avenues into non-military hi-tech manufacturing and a government concerned about the economic future of the country's armaments industry.

Now, in the wake of the signing of the deal, senior government sources have spoken bitterly of the SABC board acting in its own rather than "national" interest.

"They are behaving selfishly, and have acted without consulting the broader body of public opinion to establish what is best for South Africa," said one source.

"The American choice might be cheaper but it is extremely limiting in its applications, which are restricted to broadcasting and nothing else."

SABC board chairman Christo Viljoen was unrepentant.

"We are not willing to subsidise a government department. Ours was a business not a political decision," he said.

Denel spokesman Paul Holtzhausen, meanwhile, denied that the missile programme had been shelved, and said that a commercial study into the viability of a space programme was still under way.

Yet on Friday 340 employees at Denel's Cape subsidiary, Somchem, and its missile test range at Overberg, near Bredasdorp, were retrenched.

The SABC deal with the American company, PanAmSat—made in conjunction with pay station M-Net [Media Network]—will extend viewing of existing channels to all parts of South Africa by the end of 1994. It will also provide a service for cellular phones.

The SABC does not intend applying for a cellular-phone license—"our business ins broadcasting and we will stick to that," said Professor Viljoen—but M-Net has already done so.

The implication of the SABC deal is that additional satellite time would have to be acquired for the cellular-phone system—but this service alone would not make it economically viable for South Africa to launch its own satellite.

The PanAmSat deal will cost the SABC and M-Net a set rate of US$2-million a year. The European option would have cost twice as much.

According to a Home Affairs source, the Eutelesat deal was preferred because it could provide a wider range of applications.

"More importantly, the Cabinet believed that the increased cost would have been worth it, since one of the clauses in the contract included helping South Africa launch its satellite. Every government wants the total control that having your own satellite gives a country," he said.

Professor Viljoen said the decision to go with the American deal was made after three stringent conditions were put to the test. "I insisted that he price be right, reliability comparable and the technology acceptable."

"On all three questions PanAmSat was best. We have not had a narrow, selfish interest. We were just not willing to pay double the price for a service that we could get more cheaply elsewhere," he said.

Last month Foreign Minister Pik Botha told American officials in Washington that the government had stopped funding SA's ballistic-missile programme but hoped it could be turned into a purely commercial satellite launch venture.

Mr Botha asked the US to help Denel launch its commercial project, but the Americans continued to apply pressure to get South Africa to scrap the missile project because they feared its military application.

Shortly before this Somchem managing director Jacob van Wyk said a partnership with "a European partner" would generate enormous revenue and create as many as 12,000 jobs by the year 2000.

Secret Nuclear Deals With Israel Reported

MB3103140093 Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English 28 Mar 93 pp 1, 2

[Report by Des Blow, investigations editor: "Nuke Bombshell"]

[Text] CITY PRESS can today reveal that SA [South Africa] and Israel assisted one another in the development of nuclear warheads in the late 1970s when John Vorster was still in power.

There were at least four highly secretive deals between the two countries connected with the development of nuclear weapons.

Yet on June 28 1991, Foreign Minister Pik Botha stated that SA had never tested nuclear weapons nor had it ever co-operated with any other country in making them.

The sale of "yellow cake" (uranium oxide), a by-product of SA's gold mines which could be enriched for nuclear
energy, was strictly controlled internationally and Israel was unable to obtain the many tons needed to produce nuclear weapons.

SA, on the other hand, was unable to obtain tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, necessary to explode a nuclear device and which was only obtainable from the United States and Russia.

A deal was struck between John Vorster and the Israeli Prime Minister's Council for Scientific Liaison which was involved in the clandestine purchasing for Israel of nuclear materials. However, SA's Minister of Mines at the time, Piet Koornhof, was against the deal.

Vorster replaced Koornhof as Minister of Mines with Fanie Botha, who was in favour of the arrangement.

Fifty [metric] tons was shipped to Israel and in return Israel supplied SA with 30 grams of tritium—enough to make 12 atom bombs.

The code name used for tritium was “Teeblare” (tea leaves).

It was delivered to SA in small quantities over a year between 1977 and 1978.

Vorster and Gen “Lang” Hendrik van der Bergh, former head of the Bureau for State Security (Boss), worked on the “need-to-know” principle, only informing people like Fanie Botha and Dr Ampie le Roux who was the then chairman of the Uranium Enrichment Corporation (Ucor).

In a third secretive deal, SA sent a further 50 [metric] tons of “yellow cake” to Israel, but this was later released for Israel’s own use.

When Vorster was compelled to resign in 1978 after the information scandal, some of the deals had not yet been completed and were done so under the new State President P.W. Botha.

However, until State President F.W. de Klerk’s admission this week that SA had manufactured six nuclear bombs, the government—from state presidents down—had always denied that SA had the bomb.

It is only now, after the six bombs have been dismantled and it seems inevitable that the Nationalist government will be out of power shortly, that De Klerk has “come clean” and admitted that SA had nuclear bombs for years.

In 1977, during the height of the nuclear weapon connivance between SA and Israel, Prime Minister John Vorster assured President Jimmy Carter of the U.S. in a personal message that SA did not have, nor did it intend to develop, nuclear explosive devices for any purpose.

The last denial came only three weeks ago on March 6, when the head of the state-owned Atomic Energy Corporation, Dr Waldo Strumpf, said SA had provided the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with an inventory of “every single gram of nuclear material” it possessed and that SA had only developed its nuclear programme to produce electricity and had nothing to hide.

This is the same Dr Strumpf who explained on TV on Thursday [25 March] night that SA had dismantled six nuclear bombs.

In June 1978 Dr Ampie Roux, who was in on the secret of the bomb from the start, echoed Vorster’s denial, and in April 1979, State President P.W. Botha who followed Vorster into office, said although SA had the know-how to manufacture the bomb, it planned rather to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

During the next few years the denials continued, although, according to President de Klerk’s statement this week, SA only started dismantling the bombs in 1990.

The 30 grams of tritium supplied to SA by Israel was enough to manufacture explosive devices for 12 atomic bombs but De Klerk claims there were only plans for seven and that only six were manufactured.

In 1979, after SA had been in possession of the tritium for more than a year there was a “double flash” over the south Atlantic—which overseas scientists suspected was a nuclear explosion—and accusations were levelled that SA had exploded an experimental nuclear device: the government denied emphatically they were responsible and once again denied that the country had any nuclear weapons.

There were also accusations that it was a joint Israel-South African experiment, but this too was denied.

This week Dr Strumpf repeated that SA had never ever tested any of the bombs manufactured in SA, yet he said he saw no reason why the six bombs would not have worked.

In October 1991 SA signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with the IAEA, which has already since carried out 115 inspections in SA—and found nothing.

Atomic Energy Officer on Pelindaba Uranium Enrichment Plant

MB2603203193


Penny Smythe introduces her report on the visit to Pelindaba. A video shot shows an outside view of the plant with the entrance in the foreground and buildings with tall chimney-like stacks further back behind trees. Penny Smythe stands with her back to the plant.
Video changes to an office shot with close-up of Dr. Waldo Stumpf, chief executive officer of the Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa, speaking to Penny Smythe:

[Stumpf] “Pelindaba was primarily involved in supplying the material for these devices. We did assist Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] in certain peripheral activities.”

[Smythe] “Now we know that the nuclear devices were stored at Armscor. How were they stored and where?”

[Stumpf] “The devices were never stored in a single form in the first place. They were individually, the components individually stored, so there was never a device that was ready to be used at any point in time, and then there would have to be a long process of assembling such a device. Penny, certainly, there was no single person who had access to any of those devices. There were basically many people who had to give agreement to have access, and there was very good control and cross-control built into the system. But they were stored in vaults—which had certain procedures to open up the vaults.”

[Smythe] “If Armscor did the actual building of these weapons, who did the actual dismantling of them?”

[Stumpf] “The dismantling was done under my leadership. I did manage the dismantling program upon instruction from the state president.”

Penny Smythe is seen in garden outside building, facing camera, holding “uranium ore-containing rock” in one hand, and an “enriched pellet of uranium” in the other. Return to shot inside office with Dr. Stumpf.

[Smythe] “What has happened to that uranium now that ....”

[Stumpf, interrupting] “That uranium was recast into a suitable form and is still at Pelindaba. That will now be used for running our research reactor for a larger scale isotope production, and the material is absolutely suitable, and ideally suitable for running this reactor as the reactor is designed for this type of material; the material is therefore not lost. It (has) a commercial value for this.”

Penny Smythe continues her report at the site of the plant, concluding with a question to Dr. Stumpf.

[Smythe] “We obviously have that capability to create these nuclear devices, and it isn’t going to go away just because the devices have been dismantled. Isn’t it possible that this is something that can be recreated in the future?”

[Stumpf] “In theory possibly, but I think in practice certainly not. First of all, all the documentation and design information has been destroyed. Secondly, however, the material in question is under very high strict international safeguards.”

AEC, Armscor Deny Artillery-Size Nuclear Arms

MB2603194793 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1819 GMT 26 Mar 93

[Text] Pretoria March 26 SAPA—The Atomic Energy Corporation [AEC] and Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] on Friday [26 March] dismissed speculation that atomic bombs produced by South Africa could have been fired by G5 cannons in battlefield situations.

In a joint statement, AEC and Armscor said the six “cannon-type” nuclear devices completed between 1980 and 1989 each weighed about one ton, measuring nearly 650mm in diameter and about 1.8m in length. “Therefore, it could never have been used in an artillery system like the G5 as is speculated.”

A newspaper report on Friday claimed South Africa had possessed smaller nuclear devices which could have been lobbed with the G5 and G6 cannons up to 42km into enemy territory.

It was also reported the country manufactured nuclear “smart bombs” able to fly themselves to pinpoint targets.

The AEC and Armscor statement did not react to this.

It said the calculated yield of each of the six manufactured nuclear bombs was meant to have been about 10 to 18 kilotons TNT equivalent, but was never verified as no atmospheric or underground nuclear tests were ever conducted.

High enriched uranium was used for the bombs and produced by the AEC at its uranium enrichment pilot plant at Pelindaba, in the western Transvaal.

The AEC declined to divulge the quantity and enrichment level of the nuclear material used, claiming it would not be in the interest of security and of non-proliferation.

The statement said the nuclear bombs were developed without help “of any kind” from other countries.

“The first device was completed by Armscor in 1980 and the two parts of the device each containing a sub-critical mass of nuclear material were stored in separate high security vaults under strict control measures entailing three independent access authorisations.

“During 1981-89 a further five devices were produced. The AEC’s pilot enrichment plant was shut down in February 1990 at which time sufficient high enriched uranium was produced and supplied to Armscor for the production of the seventh and final device.”

The statement said State President F W de Klerk in November 1989 instructed the dismantling of the nuclear capabilities in preparation for South Africa’s accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). “The seventh bomb was therefore never completed.”
The devices were dismantled in order to remove the nuclear material, which was melted and recast "in a form which renders it unsuitable for use in a nuclear device".

The recast enriched uranium was returned to the AEC before the safeguards agreement was entered into on September 16, 1991.

It was presently stored at Pelindaba in vaults complying with applicable international standards, the AEC and Armscor said.

All the nuclear material stored was included in an inventory submitted to the international nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and was being inspected by IAEA staff each month and subject to IAEA safeguards, the statement added.

"The facilities in which the nuclear material was processed were slightly contaminated with uranium and had to be decontaminated. All nuclear specific apparatus was sent to the AEC for further decontamination and safe disposal. The areas where the nuclear material was processed were dismantled and contaminated non-nuclear materials disposed of by the AEC.

"All general and non-nuclear equipment are at present being used for the manufacture of peaceful and commercial products."

All documents, drawings, computer software and other data used in the manufacture of the atomic bombs were destroyed. The whole dismantling process was monitored by an independent auditor, Prof W L Mouton, who was appointed by the state president.

The statement said an underground nuclear test site on the SA Defence Force's Vastrap target range near Upington in the northern Cape was never used and abandoned in 1989.

The site consisted of two 200m deep, one metre wide test shafts.

Though no mention is made in the statement of when the shafts were drilled, it is stated that they were initially sealed with concrete slabs and abandoned in 1977 due to international pressure.

Ten years later, at the time of heavy battles in Angola, South Africa reopened one of the shafts and erected a hangar over it "for easy maintenance in case of an underground test".

AEC and Armscor said it was decided after 1989 not to fill-in the shafts due to the costs involved.

"However, if recommended by the IAEA, South Africa would destroy the shafts completely. The site was visited by IAEA staff during 1992."
He said each bomb was comparable to the one that destroyed Hiroshima—small by super-power H-bomb standards, but big enough to destroy the likes of Johannesburg.

Without disclosing secrets, Mouton described the unbelievably difficult internationally prescribed process of melting down the highly enriched uranium which is as heavy as gold. The uranium oxidises quickly and therefore must not come into contact with air. It is coated with nickel for much of the process.

The uranium is smelted into small blocks weighing a "couple of kilograms" each. This must be done with tremendous care to ensure it does not set off any chain reaction.

The small blocks of uranium were then stored in extremely secure conditions as Pelindaba. The rest of the hardware and blueprints were destroyed.

Mouton said that all the documents he saw indicated that the devices were never intended for actual use, but rather to enable South Africa to "flex its muscles" if threatened.

This confirms De Klerk's statement that the strategy was that if South Africa was under threat by the Soviet Union for example, it would carry out an underground test, inform a power such as the United States and ask them to intervene in the conflict.

Cost of Developing Nuclear Bomb Disputed

MB2803122493 Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English Business Times Supplement 28 Mar 3 p 1

[By Ciaran Ryan]

[Text] Scientists have disputed the R[rand]700-million to R800-million cost of developing a nuclear bomb given by President de Klerk this week.

One estimate puts the cost of developing the bomb at 10 times this figure.

Friedel Sellschop, a noted nuclear scientist and former head of the Schonland Nuclear Research Facility at the University of the Witwatersrand, says the given figure appears low: "I wouldn't have been surprised if the figure was much higher."

Johan Kruger, an energy specialist at the Bernard Price Institute, says a figure of R800-million a year for the development of a nuclear bomb is more plausible.

Professor Sellschop says production of weapons grade material requires enriching uranium to more than 90 percent, compared with 4 percent enrichment for nuclear fuel.

"This is a very expensive process," he says.

But Atomic Energy Corporation [AEC] head Waldo Stumpf insists that the project cost no more than R70-million to R80-million a year over a 10-year period.

"This is less than about 0.5 percent of the annual defence budget and it enabled Armscor [Arms Corporation of South Africa] to avoid development of a fighter aircraft which would have cost around R22-billion."

President de Klerk disclosed that SA had developed six nuclear fission devices since 1974. These have since been dismantled, along with the plant where they were manufactured.

Dr Stumpf says the highly enriched uranium used in the bombs has a resale value of between R15-million and R20-million. World prices are depressed because of a glut of highly enriched uranium coming onto the market from Russia.

"The material is worth five to six times this amount if we use it as fuel in our Safari nuclear reactor for the manufacture or medical isotopes."

Dr Stumpf confirmed that AEC had the technical capability of downgrading the highly enriched uranium for commercial use.

AEC operates a semi-commercial uranium enrichment plant to supply Eskom's Koeberg power station with about 100,000 separative work units (SWUs) a year at a cost of $200 per SWU. Russia could supply the same material at $68 per SWU.

Eskom has scaled down its generating capacity at Koeberg, which now accounts for less than 5 percent of its total electricity output.

In view of Eskom's surplus generating capacity it was speculated that Koeberg could be mothballed, allowing the government to close down AEC's enrichment plant, resulting in saving of hundreds of millions of rands a year. The AEC enrichment plant has a production capacity of 250,000 SWUs and currently exports enriched uranium.

AEC supplies one of Koeberg's two reactors; the second is supplied by a third country after being treated in France.

Sales of nuclear fuel to Eskom will be worth about R103-million this year. AEC will receive R469-million from government this year. It has been funded by taxpayers to the tune of R3.6-billion since 1987 to produce sales of just over R600-million, most of this to Eskom.

Dr Stumpf says AEC plans to increase self-funding from the current 30 percent to 75 percent by the year 2,000. Ten companies have been established and several world patents have been registered.
Former Atomic Energy Expert ‘Avowed Rightwinger’
MB2603170193 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 26 Mar-1 Apr 93 p 5

[By Jan Taljaard: “A-bomb expert joins the right”]

[Text] The man who probably knows more than any other person about South Africa’s programme to develop a nuclear bomb is now an avowed rightwinger and confirmed opponent of the present government.

Wally Grant, aged 69, retired as chief executive of the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) in 1987 and was in at the start when PW Botha decided to build himself an atom bomb.

Those in the know give Grant most of the credit for developing the uranium enrichment process unique to South Africa.

But, says Grant, he has been sworn to secrecy by the government of his day, and he will keep those secrets. He had, however, documented the complete history of the programme and it is being preserved for what he terms “our descendants”.

Speaking from his farm in the Senekal district, where he moved after retiring, he recalled the time when the directive was given to develop a bomb as “very exciting.

“Oh, you can just imagine how exciting it was,” he said. “Unfortunately I can’t tell you anything more as I was sworn to absolute secrecy.”

He is not even willing to divulge the size, destructive power, or even the tiniest technical detail of the devices.

Since leaving the AEC Grant has served on several rightwing think-tanks. He is currently chairman of the Volk seenheitskomitee [Peoples Unity Committee] (Vekom), a group of influential rightwingers who are actively propagating the idea of a separate homeland for Afrikaners.

Initially serving on the steering committee of the “Eenheidskomitee 25” [EK25], he was appointed as chairman of Vekom when that organisation grew from EK25.

With him in Vekom are people such as Tienie Groenew a former military intelligence boss as well as well-known rightwingers Koos Reynecke and Blokkie de Beer.

Grant is also among the people representing Vekom inside the Concerned South Africans Group.

Kalahari Nuclear Test Site Explored
MB2803104193 Johannesburg SUNDAY STAR in English 28 Mar 93 p 27

[By Mark Stansfield]

[Text] There’s miles ‘n’ miles of sand and scrub bush in the Kalahari. We were told it would be almost impossible to find in the hundreds of square kilometres of monotonous red dunes.

But, hidden in a remote area, we did find one of South Africa’s best-kept secrets: a nuclear test facility.

We visited it this week with permission to stomp and pry as much as we liked. We couldn’t get inside the building erected over the test shafts, however, because the SADF [South African Defense Force] personnel escorting us had “forgotten the keys at home.”

The quest to find South Africa’s nuclear test facility started 12 years ago after a drunken conversation. There were few clues given at the time. “It” was hidden somewhere in the Kalahari, somewhere near Upington, and had a lime-decked road leading to it. It was a damn good bar-side yarn, little else.

This week the Atomic Energy Corporation’s [AEC] Nicholaas Ligthelm gave a few more hints, and some valuable information, after the Government came clean about its nuclear programme.

Ligthelm was the one who finally admitted “it” did exist. In Government and military parlance, “it” is referred to as just “The Terrain.”

Ligthelm said the site was under the control of the SADF. It had been developed should there ever be reason to conduct a nuclear test. It did indeed lie north of Upington, he said, but had never been used.

“Three shafts were drilled... one has since been back-filled. The other two have had concrete "stoppers" placed in them and slabs of cement laid over them... A building has also since been erected over the shafts,” he said helpfully.

“But I’ve never been there,” he added.

Ligthelm did admit that Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency officials had visited the site themselves in 1991 in the company of AEC officials.

SADF personnel were amazed when told the news that they had under their control a secret the Government has been hiding successfully for about 20 years.
Well, South Africa's nuclear test site lies about 80 km north, and slightly west, of Upington at a place called Vastrap, and it was disguised as an SA Air Force-controlled test-range for aircraft-mounted munitions.

The base looks forlorn and abandoned now. Only two SAAF [South African Air Force] personnel stay permanently there, with a few Nama helpers.

The SAAF personnel and an SA Army commandant said they knew nothing about what had been going on at Vastrap—but an elderly Nama woman refreshed their memories.

"I have worked here 14 years in the kitchens," the old lady informed us.

"And I remember those Godless people who used to come here... so picky, they were: 'wouldn't eat this, wouldn't eat that, because of their religion, you know.'"

She said she was talking about the Israelis "who don't believe in Jesus."

"They used to fly in here for the tests," she added.

The commandant "hurrumped" a lot, so she stopped telling her tale about the Israelis and the "tests."

The site itself is nothing spectacular. One would expect something better for something so terrifying as the testing of nuclear power.

Huddled inside the cockpit of a Piper Arrow at 9,000 feet we could not even see the building that has since been erected over the site—probably to disguise it.

The airspace above Vastrap is a "no-fly" zone, from ground level right into the strato-sphere.

Our pilot, Yannis, assured us he was on the edge of the no-fly zone at 9,000 feet. All we could identify were the abandoned rows of barracks which lie about 15 km from the nuclear "shafts."

Then we drove out there.

The "Airforce Base Waterkloof: Vastrap Testing Range" sign looks innocent enough. So does the metal "Sculpture" of a skeleton holding a sickle at the entrance to the "restricted" zone. A sign above the skeleton says "Welcome to the Fleshpots of Egypt."

One drives for about 20 km through the Kalahari dunes, and there stands a huge, newly built hangar with a concrete apron. Not a runway in sight, which makes the silver hangar look out of place, somehow. It is out of place: beneath it still exist two shafts where South Africa could have exploded the first nuclear device ever set off on African soil, a mere 80 km from Upington and the people who lived there under the shadow of one of man's darker threats.

The site is exactly as Ligthelm described it: a concrete slab with a building on it. Behind the building one can see where the third "backfilled" shaft may have been excavated. The area is a churned mess of red sand, reinforced concrete, thick, twisted steel plates and chunks of granite which obviously came from deep beneath the earth. The concrete foundations of the "barracks", built in the mid-'70s, where the men who built the site stayed, are also still visible. The area has been scattered with fibreglass models of tanks and other army vehicles, presumably to make it look like a conventional "battle school" to prying satellites.

There's little else left at such an historic site today.

In Upington, we told residents about what lay out there in the desert. They did not seem to understand the technology. Even the name Hiroshima meant nothing to them and they were incredulous about what we were telling them.

The three shafts drilled into the Kalahari desert, which would have been used "if the need ever arose", were excavated by RUC [expansion unknown] Mining Pty Ltd.

RUC's company secretary, Pat Morrison, this week said "he had been party to that," but declined to comment about the project until the Government gave him permission.

That permission was not forthcoming at the time of going to press.

David Kyd, director for the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, declined to comment on a 1991 visit IAEA inspectors had made to South Africa's nuclear test site.

"That remains confidential because our investigations are not complete and certain other nations would be annoyed to read of such things in the press," he explained.

The information that IAEA inspectors had visited the site came from South Africa's AEC.

Moscow Said To Endorse De Klerk Statement

[Anastasiya Romashkevich report: "De Klerk Statement Gets Approval"]

[Text] Yesterday the Russian Foreign Ministry prepared a communication [soobshchenie] on its official position with respect to South African President Frederik de Klerk's statement (see KOMMERSANT-DAILY of 27 March) concerning his country's military nuclear program. Although by the time this issue was signed to press the communication had not yet been issued, KOMMERSANT-DAILY's correspondent learned its main content.

The delay over the preparation of the communication, observers point out, was related to both internal political
upheavals in Moscow and the specifics of the precedent itself. According to KOMMERSANT-DAILY analysts, the future of the [Nuclear Nonproliferation] treaty (its term expires in 1995) in increasingly uncertain. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has withdrawn from it, while the "unofficial nuclear states" such as India, Pakistan, and Israel are thus far not going to accede to it. Despite the Foreign Ministry's worry over the fact that nuclear weapons have been created in a country that is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Pretoria's moves have been given a positive evaluation. The statement also contains a call to observe the norms of the treaty, which, experts believe, should be embodied in the form of more effective verification measures being worked out and will require their harmonization with one of the top priorities of Russia's foreign trade—the arms trade.
JAPAN

DPRK on Tokyo's Plan To Import Tritium From Canada
SK2603062893 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0458 GMT 26 Mar 93

["Nuclear Fanaticism Carried Into Extremes"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, March 26 (KCNA)—The Japanese Government's plan to ship tritium, an H-bomb material, from Canada in October reveals its bloated arrogance in pushing ahead with its nuclear program with increased frenzy, says NODONG SINMUN today.

The news analyst notes:

Japan has stockpiled large quantities of plutonium and is planning to purchase 400 more tons of it in 30 years to come. When this plan is carried out, Japan will be one of the biggest possessors of plutonium in the world. It has made full material and technological preparations for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. It can make atomic bombs any time it decides to. Now it wants to become a nuclear power by manufacturing satanic H-bombs.

It is for the purpose of justifying their nuclear armament design that the Japanese ruling quarters are persistently spreading the rumor about “nuclear suspicion” against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, taking issue with its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

The conversion of Japan into a nuclear power will bring nothing good to the country. The Japanese ruling quarters are forgetful of the serious lesson, bewitched by nuclear arms.

Japan must give up its nuclear design and cancel the plan to transport tritium. This will be good for Japan.

NORTH KOREA

Foreign Ministry Statement on IAEA Resolution
SK0604050793 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0449 GMT 6 Apr 93

["Statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, April 6 (KCNA)—The Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued today a statement clarifying the stand of the DPRK Government in connection with the fact that the United States and its followers adopted by force a "resolution" to transfer the so-called "nuclear problem" of the DPRK to the United Nations at the meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency and are trying to take something like "sanctions" against it with the help of the United Nations.

The statement says:

The United States and other forces hostile to us which have been threatening the DPRK and putting pressure on it over the “problem of nuclear inspection” are now trying to openly interfere in its internal affairs and take even “sanctions” against it with the help of the United Nations.

At the meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on April 1 the United States and its followers adopted by force a "resolution" on transferring the so-called "nuclear problem" of the DPRK to the United Nations, defying the strong opposition of delegates of our country and various other countries.

This is an open hostile act of the United States and its followers to isolate and stifle our republic at any cost.

Considering that the “resolution” of the IAEA Board of Governors is a grave encroachment upon the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the dignity of the nation, the government of the DPRK decisively rejects and condemns it.

There is no ground whatsoever for the IAEA to refer our "nuclear problem" to the United Nations.

It is preposterous for the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors to charge us with "noncompliance with the safeguards agreement" as we refused to allow the inspection of military sites.

The "two sites" the inspection of which was demanded by the IAEA secretariat are our military sites which have no relevance to nuclear activities and, accordingly, these are not subject to inspection under the safeguards agreement.

What is more, the secretariat made public the “satellite intelligence information” provided by the United States and, on this basis, demanded an inspection of our military facilities, claiming that they were nuclear related facilities.

The fact itself that they spied on our country by an espionage satellite or by high-altitude reconnaissance plane was a violation of its sovereignty and it is still more shameless for them to try to reconfirm the “intelligence information” through the IAEA.

By attempting to make an inspection on the basis of this false “information” the IAEA secretariat is joining the United States in the latter's sinister purpose of having our military facilities opened and disarming us.

Some officials of the IAEA secretariat and some member nations have brought our issue to the United Nations, deliberately ignoring our reasonable proposal and patient efforts to seek a negotiated settlement of the problem.
Scores of years have passed since the statute of the IAEA and the safeguards agreement were drafted. But never before had they been trampled upon and trifled with as today.

Judging from this, it is not our country but the United States and some officials of the IAEA secretariat that have failed to comply with the safeguards agreement. They have laid artificial obstacles to our implementation of the safeguard agreement.

It is none other than the United States which deserves complaints at the United Nations and sanctions of the international community. It, a depository of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, has violated its obligations under the treaty and ceaselessly increased nuclear threat to a non-nuclear state.

Our so-called “nuclear problem” is, in essence, not a problem between our country and the IAEA but a problem between us and the United States.

The so-called “nuclear problem” of ours, therefore, is not a matter to be discussed in the U.N. arena but a problem that should be resolved through negotiation between the DPRK and the United States.

All these facts show that the attempt to take our “nuclear problem” to the U.N. arena by charging us with “non-compliance” is an illegal act without any validity and legal ground.

The United Nations should not argue about our “nuclear problem” but pay a due attention to the abuse of the statute and safeguards agreement by some officials of the IAEA secretariat and growing nuclear threat of the United States to us and take a practical step to check it.

As far back as in the 1950s, the United Nations became a warring side against us, its name abused by the United States, and committed grave crimes against the Korean people and has not yet settled the abnormal past with our country.

If the United Nations follow in its past footsteps today when the cold war has ended, it will entail unpredictable consequences and leave another stain in its history.

There is no change in the DPRK Government’s anti-nuclear peace policy and its stand for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

Consistent likewise is our stand to fulfill our obligations under the safeguards agreement to the end and solve the problems arising in this by means of negotiation.

If the U.N. Security Council try to put pressure on us and take “collective sanctions” against us by representing the will of a big power, we will be compelled to take corresponding effective self-defensive measures.

We do not say empty words.
The government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Korean people believe that the governments and peoples of all countries that treasure peace and justice will extend support and solidarity to our just cause of removing nuclear threat from the Korean peninsula and safeguarding peace and security.

**IAEA Not Expecting Pyongyang To Reverse Stance**

*SK3003011293 Seoul YONHAP in English 0056 GMT 30 Mar 93*

[Text] Berlin, March 30 (YONHAP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is expected to hold North Korea in violation of the nuclear safeguards accord and refer the matter to the U.N. Security Council at a special Board of Governors meeting on Wednesday.

The IAEA will convene an emergency meeting of the 35 governor nations Tuesday afternoon to coordinate ideas on the agenda for Wednesday's meeting.

IAEA sources said Monday that South Korea, the United States, Japan and other major governor nations had already drafted a resolution on referring North Korea's nuclear problem to the U.N. Security Council in informal meetings, while agreeing that if China opposed it the Board of Governors should take a vote.

Unless North Korea reversed its stance against special IAEA inspections of two sites suspected of being part of its nuclear weapons program by the Wednesday meeting, there was no way for Pyongyang to avoid the IAEA's taking the matter to the United Nations, they added.

As of Monday, North Korea had not shown any response to the IAEA's request for it to grant IAEA nuclear inspectors access to the suspect sites, according to an IAEA spokesman. He said the IAEA did not expect that North Korea to change its mind.

IAEA Director-General Hans Blix would label North Korea a country defaulting on its obligations under the nuclear safeguards pact at Wednesday's board meeting, he said.

**Russian Scientists Said To Aid Missile Program**

*SK0104012193 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 1 Apr 93 p 1*

[By Moscow-based correspondent Chang Haeng-hun]

[Text] Russian weekly MOSCOW NEWS on 31 March reported that a number of Russian scientists are participating in North Korean production of missiles carrying nuclear warheads.

MOSCOW NEWS, in an article on its interview with (Yuriy Besarabov), 52, and (Vladimir Yusachev), 41, missile experts who were among the 20 Russian scientists who were stopped by a Russian security organization from leaving the country for North Korea at a Moscow airport toward the end of last year, said that Russian scientists who are in North Korea could have left Russia with official permission.

The Russian scientists accepted the North Korean invitation because of the high remuneration of $1,200 a month and the feelings of ideological ties. It has also been revealed that the invitation to the scientists was made through official contacts between the North Korean authorities and the Russian institutes they worked for.

The Russian scientists who are working in the field of missile development in North Korea are from the (Isayev Institute) and the (Makayev Institute), both of which specialize in development of missiles, according to MOSCOW NEWS.

**Article Blames U.S. for IAEA Dispute**

*93WP0123A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Mar 93 p 3*

[Article by Boris Zanegin, doctor of historical sciences: “The Korean Peninsula: The Crisis Worsens”]

[Text] The conflict between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with Washington standing behind its back, gets worse every day. The rigid decision, limited by a short deadline, in effect an ultimatum by the IAEA Council of Directors on 23 February to carry out a “special inspection” of Korean military sites, was rejected by Pyongyang.

In response to the action of IAEA, the United States, South Korea, the People's Central Committee, the highest organ of state administration in the DPRK, announced on 12 March its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

This decision called forth a storm in the international community. But one gets the impression that the reaction to this step by the DPRK on the part of the major, and, let us note, above all, nuclear powers, has an exaggerated character, obviously calculated to exacerbate the situation. The essentially insignificant dispute can and should be settled by political means. But, persistently and inflexibly the West, with Russia's cooperation, is turning it into a dangerous international crisis, fraught with international conflict. The DPRK is a fairly small state, surrounded on all sides by nuclear Leviathans. It is being portrayed as virtually the principal nuclear threat and the sole instigator of the aggravated situation. The world press is discussing an array of ways to pressure this “disturber of the peace,” from the ultimatum of the UN Security Council to the complete isolation of the country and a trade embargo. “If necessary,” writes the German newspaper DIE WELT, “these measures could be supplemented by breaking off all transport and communication connections, and even military intervention.”
When it joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985, Pyongyang, quite apart from the its treaty obligations, came from the position that the Korean Peninsula would be turned into a nonnuclear zone. Its status would be respected by the South Korean regime and the United States. In particular, what it had in mind was that all American nuclear weapons would be removed from South Korea, that the “Team Spirit” military exercises would not be held, and the security of North Korea and its protection against nuclear threat would be ensured. As subsequent events showed, not one of these assumptions proved true. Moreover, in the past year and a half the United States and South Korea have raised the “nuclear issue” with regard to the DPRK, and this has become the main obstacle to normalizing the situation on the peninsula. The process of rapprochement between both parts of Korea, which had been developing successfully heretofore, with the prospect of unification on a confederative basis, has now practically collapsed. From the evidence, the events in Russia in August 1991 (the accession to power of Yeltsin’s anticommunist regime) provided grounds for a reassessment by Washington and Seoul of their previous strategy. Under these conditions, the evolutionary process of unification of the Korean nation, which envisioned preservation of the socialist system, ceased to be satisfactory to the South Korean regime and its American patrons, since the possibility of forcible annexation of the DPRK to South Korea had arisen. In Seoul they were even calculating, based on the German experience, what the “digestion” of the DPRK would cost after it was swallowed. In connection with these new tasks, “crisis diplomacy” was put into action, and a whole arsenal of pressure tactics was mobilized against the DPRK.

The conflict between the IAEA and Pyongyang stems from “suspicions,” contrived and spread by Washington and Tokyo, that North Korea is working to develop nuclear weapons. It should be pointed out that the “suspicions” have so far received no confirmations of any weight at all. Japan acknowledges that the “suspicions” are based on calculations proceeding from abstract assumptions with regard to the capacity to produce armament-quality plutonium using North Korea’s experimental nuclear reactor. Washington had no difficulty prompting the IAEA to undertake the search for data to confirm the “suspicions.” The American side turned over to the IAEA some American intelligence data on nuclear sites which, they said, were not shown in the relevant Korean documents. The IAEA, for its part, demanded that verification of these sites be permitted.

In the controversy which arose, Pyongyang took a constructive position. When the problem of the “discrepancies” between the inspection data and Korean reports first arose, Pyongyang proposed that IAEA inspectors investigate the question at the nuclear sites, jointly with North Korean specialists; this could eliminate the necessity of any “special inspections.” The Korean side has more than ample justification for refusing to permit checking of two military sites in the village of Yongbeng (which the IAEA is insisting on, at the prompting of Washington and Tokyo). To this day, the enemy sides of the Korean Peninsula are divided by a military demarcation line. Military forces numbering nearly a million are concentrated on both sides. American naval forces have bases at their disposal in South Korea, including a nuclear submarine base at Chinhae which can accommodate “Los Angeles” and “Sturgeon” class submarines with nuclear weapons on board. A statement by the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported on 9 September 1992 that the ruling powers of Seoul are blocking any inspection of this base under the pretext that it belongs to the United States. It is difficult to reproach the DPRK, as a country still in a state of war with “UN forces,” for trying, under these conditions, to keep its military capabilities secret from its opponent.

In 1991, for the first time in many years, serious political changes were noted in the dialog between the DPRK and South Korea. The two sides concluded an “Agreement on Armistice, Non-Aggression, Cooperation, and Exchange Between North and South,” and they signed a “Joint Declaration Concerning the Non-nuclear Status of the Korean Peninsula.” Then the U.S. announced the withdrawal of its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and the cessation of the “Team Spirit” exercises. In 1992, for the first time in 17 years, the exercises were not carried out. The resumption of the exercises this year in conjunction with plans by the West to impose international sanctions against the DPRK was perceived in Pyongyang as a serious threat to a nonnuclear country by a nuclear superpower.

“Team Spirit-93” was carried out in March. The American side called the exercises “purely defensive.” They were motivated by the necessity to check the military readiness of American and South Korean forces “in the event of military aggression on the part of the DPRK.” The American declaration is refuted by an analysis of the composition of the troops that took part and the nature of the operations. Some 120,000 servicemen participated in the maneuvers. Of these, 50,000 were American. Over the course of 10 days, they went through offensive maneuvers such as breaching reinforced zones, advancing deep behind “enemy” lines, naval and air assaults, and landing force operations. The exercises began with the largest landing of marines in the entire history of the exercises, in the region of the port of Pohang, where the coastal strip and the terrain are similar to the eastern coast of the northern part of the peninsula. There was no secret about it: the ships and aircraft of the U.S. which took part in the exercises either had nuclear weapons on board or acted as potential carriers of them. The most up-to-date military airplanes were transferred to South Korea to participate in “Team Spirit-93”—the B-1B fighter-bomber and the F-15e and F-117a and “Stealth” fighters. For the first time, an observer from Russia also attended “Team Spirit-93.” The presence of observers at military exercises is a customary thing. But in this case, the move could only
promote an increase in the already close-to-the-limit tensions. It is worth recalling that during B. Yeltsin’s visit to Seoul, an agreement was reached concerning military cooperation, which aroused in South Korean military circles the hope of conducting joint exercises with Russia, where they are very familiar with their former ally in the north of the Korean Peninsula.

What we have here is a dangerous situation, caused by the desire of the United States to impose solutions to international problems that are convenient for itself, by resorting to forcible pressure or acting through international organizations, without taking into account the sovereignty or the interests of particular countries. That was how things stood in Panama and the Persian Gulf, that is how things stand in the former Yugoslavia and the Korean Peninsula. The difficulty of the situation consists of the fact that, now that it is rid of the counterbalance of the Soviet Union and has acquired an ally in the form of “democratic” Russia, Washington is losing its sense of moderation.

In this connection, one’s attention is drawn to the calm, confident voice of Beijing, which has called for a political resolution to the problem—through negotiations and consultations. The question is whether anyone in Washington, and also in Moscow and the other capitals which are supporting the U.S. extremist course on the Korean Peninsula, is listening to the warning tone of Beijing’s appeal. The People’s Republic of China has substantial powers of influence at its disposal, including the right of veto in the UN Security Council.

The Korean side has a basis for political solutions. A DPRK Government statement of 12 March 1993 says that “all questions will find an unimpeded resolution,” if the U.S. will renounce threats and the IAEA will proceed on the principle of impartiality in its approach to the DPRK. But two meetings between North Korean and American representatives, held in Beijing immediately after completion of the “Team Spirit-93” exercises (the most recent was on 19 March), yielded no results. The Americans did not come to the negotiations with any desire to reconcile the positions, but with an ultimatum: they demanded that Pyongyang reverse its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and unconditionally carry out IAEA decisions. Washington announced its intention to get a UN Security Council resolution to adopt sanctions against the DPRK. As long as the American policy of diktat is not countered by any effective opposition on the part of the sound-thinking segment of the world community, the threat of new bloodshed on the Korean Peninsula, in the immediate vicinity of the borders of Russia and China, will continue.

German Commentary Views NPT Withdrawal

‘Full of Danger’
93WP0117B Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Mar 93 p 1

[Commentary by Michael Stuermer: Deterrence or Crash**]

Pyongyang did not accede to the treaty until 1985. Since then the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency have been having a hard time. Information about advanced nuclear armament is now available. The Vienna authority wanted an on-site inspection, and North Korea slammed the door shut: The secret nuclear armament becomes open.

If it stays at that, not only is the cartel shattered, a cartel of older nuclear powers—all of them members of the UN Security Council—that was established in the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968 and essentially maintained until today; but a continuous race by smaller powers will also be unleashed, in East Asia perhaps by South Korea and Japan. Then, unlike in the system of bipolarity, nuclear weapons can no longer be caught in the blockade of first strike and second strike capabilities, or be integrated in a complicated system of treaties and controls.

The North Korean regime has no friends. It is almost autistic, financially ruined by its government and its brutal Marxism, overtaxed by armament, driven by paranoid fear, and shielded against the outside world, sclerotic at the top. The country is impenetrable and unpredictable even for the closest neighbors. Does this now involve ending the tentative negotiation process with the South? Does the North, which has nothing but weapons, want to obtain better cards in the unification process? Is it a matter of finding out an external enemy, in order to keep the population at bay? The harsh war cry from the North suggests such conclusions.

Just how close the regime’s technicians are to the bomb is concealed from the outside world. It would not be logical, however, if North Korea were to pay the price of loneliness without having the bomb within range or already having it. Tests have not been recorded, but for a primitive weapon they are also dispensable. Missile trajectories have been observed, however, and the regime also exports medium-range systems to the countries of some gloomy-looking gentlemen.

The Chinese leadership is now being tested. Itself involved in armaments, it cannot regard North Korea’s adventure with pleasure. Beijing needs constancy and control for its economic modernization. The confidence of the Chinese living abroad, who bring in the greater part of the investments, needs to be cultivated. In recent years the relationship with the United States has also improved, and the People’s Republic has played a role in
the Security Council. Playing the protector of the sinister neighbor would bear a high price. And why should China want to tolerate another Asian nuclear power in addition to itself? The entire region would be forced into unrest. China's great power play is of a different kind. It follows Chinese interests, not the North Korean constraints.

Nuclear weapons are absolute weapons, and are not to be confused with other weapons or civilian power. Since defense is hardly possible, they are, combined with missiles, weapons of the ultimate strike, but not of warfare. Where the potential victim does not possess invulnerable second-strike capabilities, however, the nuclear weapon carries the constant temptation of a first strike, once and for all. It is what the world fears if the nonproliferation regime, which is already endangered by a dozen threshold nations from Israel to India, were to become impotent and obsolete. Even without North Korea's withdrawal from the—weak—contractual obligations, it would long since have been time to deal with greater urgency with fencing in the nuclear weapons after the Cold War.

There is danger ahead. The nonabrogation clause does not provide for specific sanctions. But during the three-month withdrawal period the contractual obligations continue to be in force. Above all, however, it is recognized in international law—and this has prevented many countries from crossing the threshold—that breaking the Nonproliferation Treaty involves a violation of peace and international security according to the UN Charter. This challenges the Security Council, and it must take action. NATO as well must see that this is a case of Article Four of the Washington Agreement. It involves the question of whether the nuclear issue will continue to be a factor in global structural formation or whether it is disrupting the world.

If nothing drastic takes place, beyond consternation in the West and anxiety in the Far East, then the most important international structure of order is just so much paper. The effort to universalize the Nonproliferation Treaty and its principles would be broken. The power of the West to convince the Soviet Union's nuclear successor nations would enter a vacuum. If dissuasion does not work and deterrence has no power, then the plunge will follow.

'Speculations Continue'

[Article by Uwe Schmitt: "A Half-Bluff by the Two Kims; North Korea's War Cries Intended Above All To Stun Own People"]

[Text] The suspicion is growing increasingly strong that North Korea's astonishing abrogation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] and its threats of war against "the U.S. imperialists and their South Korean puppets" were primarily intended to intimidate and mobilize the domestic population. After the first secret talks between North Korea and the United States that took place Wednesday in Beijing, Western diplomats in Tokyo and Seoul consider their assumptions confirmed that the action was well-planned and, to a certain extent as a semi-bluff, served a double purpose for Pyongyang: On the one hand the apparently spontaneous withdrawal from the treaty during the "Team Spirit" maneuver in the south was the only certain and legal opportunity to lock out the inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Everything indicates that, using new methods of analysis, they were in the process of finding out about the nuclear weapons production, disavowed as nonmilitary by North Korea, of even small amounts of radioactive material. Second, the regime's war cry was apparently intended to stun the 21 million North Koreans cut off from the outside world, possibly even to silence protesting voices.

It is indisputable that there is an increasingly major shortage of increasingly more goods in economically ruined North Korea. The only speculation concerns the extent of the difficulties. No one knows whether in fact trains are already coming to a halt, whether the population must be satisfied with one and a half modest meals a day, and due to the scarcity of energy the factories use only 40 percent of their production capacity, as was asserted on Wednesday by the ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL. A former adviser to President Kim Il-song who defected to South Korea said in Seoul that the North could survive at most another two years. But the supply situation is judged differently by the unofficial German representation in Pyongyang, which works with half a dozen employees in the Swedish mission. A rapid collapse should not be anticipated: North Korea and the dynastic regime of its two Kims could last for years, it was said, although only at the most modest level. The representation is now sending a cautious warning to the Foreign Ministry. By radio it reported that Pyongyang already lifted the blackout on Tuesday; the war-mongering incitement campaigns of the party organs have been relegated from the first to the back pages. In the opinion of the German observer in Pyongyang, the bombshell of withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was orchestrated by the leadership to gather the people in fear behind their unpopular "dear leader" Kim Chong-il, who does not enjoy a reputation even remotely approaching his father's. The regime had even prepared a reply to possible sanctions by the UN Security Council.

As unpredictable as the North Korean Government may be and may want to be, which effortlessly found the way back to its Stalinist battle cry of "wiping out the aggressors" on holy ground, accused half the world of lying and swore not to make "any empty threats," it is also as obvious that an attack on rich, highly armed South Korea, which furthermore is under the conventional as well as nuclear protection of the United States, would be
suicidal. In the event of an attack the South Korean armed forces would have at least six hours of early warning time, according to information by Defense Minister Kwon Yong-hae. No troop movements that differ from the usual countermaneuvers during “Team Spirit” have been observed so far. On the other hand, the chief of the South Korean intelligence service Kim Tok does not want to exclude “major or minor military provocations.” Even Beijing, North Korea’s last half-hearted ally, is said to have expressed concern and indirect disapproval over the North Korean withdrawal at a meeting of the 35 board members of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. It was hoped that the situation would not develop into a crisis. The whole world is hoping that Beijing will use its influence accordingly.

The speculations continue. Will North Korea, as one news agency surmises, immediately seek to resume talks with Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo as soon as the maneuvers in the South are over, since the improvement of relations and the cancellation of the treaty are “another problem?” Will the United States leave behind weapons, equipment, and a part of the 19,000 additional maneuver troops at the request of South Korea? The Seoul government has always made it clear that it will neither respond to Pyongyang’s action with armed force nor offer the North cancellation of “Team Spirit 94” as a counteroffer for returning to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. One of the most original speculations among diplomats in Tokyo even judges the withdrawal to be a camouflaged measure for relaxing tensions: Assuming that North Korea actually has nuclear production facilities to conceal, inspections would have led to dangerous incidents and possibly to a military intervention by the United Nations. Barring the inspectors would therefore be a form of preservation of international security.

MALAYSIA

Investigation of Libyan Chemical Weapons Aid
BK0304161693 Hong Kong AFP in English 0903 GMT 3 Apr 93

[Text] KUALA LUMPUR, April 3 (AFP)—Malaysia Saturday [3 April] ordered a probe into a report that a Kuala Lumpur firm had manufactured and was exporting eight stainless steel vessels to Libya via Singapore for making chemical weapons.

Defence Minister Najib Tun Razak said he had no knowledge of the report but would order an investigation.

“I believe the sale may be on a company-to-company basis and has nothing to do with the government,” Najib said after Singapore reportedly agreed to block transhipment of the vessels.

News reports said Singapore had told its local shipping agent not to tranship the vessels to Libya in accordance with sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council.

Najib said he did not believe local firms had the technology to build such vessels, a day after his deputy minister, Abdullah Fadzil Che Wan, expressed a similar sentiment.

“This is the first time I am hearing of this. We have to verify the truth of this report,” Fadzil was Saturday quoted by the local BUSINESS TIMES daily as saying.

A U.N. report said American and British experts had claimed that the vessels, called reactors, could be used to prepare chemicals for use in chemical weapons. Libya had said the vessels were for its oil industry.

The sale emerged at a recent meeting of a U.N. Security Council committee monitoring the year-old sanctions against Libya, imposed after Tripoli refused to surrender for trial in Britain or the United States two men suspected of involvement in the 1988 bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland.

Fadzil was reported as saying that Malaysia was continuing its trade relations with Libya as the sanctions against the country were only imposed by Washington and its allies.

Meanwhile, an official of the Malaysian Iron and Steel Industries Federation was quoted by BUSINESS TIMES as saying its members have the capability to produce the high-technology stainless steel vessels.

“We have been producing such vessels for a variety of purposes, both for the domestic and export markets, but we do not know their end-use,” Soong Siew Hoong, the federation’s president said.

Soong said the federation would not know whether its members were producing reactors for Libya.

SOUTH KOREA

Seoul, U.S. Agree to ‘Tougher Action’ on DPRK
SK3003022993 Seoul YONHAP in English 0202 GMT 30 Mar 93

[Text] Washington, March 29 [date as received] (YONHAP)—Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu said Monday that South Korea and the United States had agreed that it was desirable to take tough measures progressively and in stages against North Korea over the nuclear issue.
"Tougher action (against North Korea) can be taken if all efforts to dissuade it from leaving the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty fail," Han told Korean correspondents, winding up his talks with U.S. Government leaders.

The efforts would include letters or visits with North Korean leaders by the United Nations secretary-general or chairman of the Security Council, adoption of a Security Council resolution and dialogue between South and North Korea or between North Korea and the United States, Han said.

Han thus indicated that South Korea and the United States intend to try and persuade North Korea first and then impose sanctions if Pyongyang persists in refusing to accept special inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its nuclear facilities.

In their efforts to persuade North Korea, South Korea and the United States would take a two-pronged approach, Han said.

Declaring that referring the North Korean nuclear issue to the U.N. Security Council was no longer avoidable, Han said that South Korea and the United States would try to convince North Korea of the adverse consequences of its refusal to accept IAEA special inspections through international organizations.

At the same time, in their separate contacts with North Korea, South Korea and the United States would try to explain the "positive side" if Pyongyang retracts its decision to withdraw from the NPT and accepts special IAEA inspections, Han said.

Han stressed, however, that it wasn't the right time for South Korea, the United States and North Korea to hold a conference or high-level U.S.-North Korean talks.

The current councilor-level contact between North Korea and the United States in Beijing was good enough, Han said.

But other levels of contact should not be ruled out, Han added, hinting that high-level talks between Washington and Pyongyang could be a possibility.

Han acknowledged that the question of military action against North Korea was being raised by certain quarters in the United States, but said it was never brought up in his talks with officials of President Bill Clinton's administration.

"Stopping North Korea from possessing nuclear arms without resorting to a military clash is our paramount goal," Han said.

Han said he had asked the Clinton administration to urge China to persuade North Korea.

Though China wanted to take time in persuading North Korea, Beijing, too, would come to believe that it was inevitable for the United Nations Security Council to take up the North Korean nuclear issue, Han said.

China also realized that North Korea should not be allowed to possess nuclear weapons, Han said.

THAILAND

Thais Working on Libyan Chemical Weapons

Plants ‘High Risk Factor’

BK2803084193 Bangkok SIAM POST in Thai 28 Mar 93 pp 1, 2

[Text] A high-level intelligence source has informed SIAM POST on 27 March that the Thai Government is facing acute pressure from countries opposing the production of chemical weapons. The move is spearheaded by the United States which has reliable information that Thai nationals are participating in the chemical weapons project in Libya.

According to the source, the Libyan Government contacted a Thai company to work on the construction of the chemical weapons plant, which was delayed after the withdrawal of German and Japanese firms and their technical expertise at the request of the United States. Construction of the plant first began in early 1985.

The source said the participation of Thai nationals in the Libyan project was based on their self interest and that the Thai Government had no knowledge of it. The Thai firm disguised its business as a worker exporting establishment, but it did not even have a Labor Department permit.

According to the source, there is evidence attesting to Thai nationals working in the Libyan chemical plant. In interviews with the media, returning Thai workers told of the plant's high risk factor and about being issued with only one gas mask each.

The source said a campaign against chemical weapons began in 1925, with the United States and 28 other countries including Thailand signing a convention in Switzerland banning the use of chemical and biological weapons. However, the convention did not ban its production, development, or storage.

The source said: "Based on its humanitarian concern, the United States became the pioneer in opposing countries producing chemical weapons and brought that to the attention of the United Nations. Favorable response from the UK, France, Germany, and Japan resulted in a temporary halt to the Libyan chemical plant project, until its revival as the result of the assistance of the selfish Thai group."

The source said that after getting concrete information about participation of Thai nationals, the United States persuaded the international community to sign a treaty against chemical weapons. Libya refused to join the
treaty and tried to carry on with its project. Therefore, the United States turned pressure on Thailand to identify the group participating in the Libyan project.

The source concluded: "In case Thailand fails to respond, the United States will appeal to Western countries to impose sanctions against countries supporting the project. Thailand will not be able to avoid the repercussions. Thai agencies are now cooperating fully in checking the information to block Thai nationals from participating in the Libyan project."

Three Companies Linked
BK2903133993 Bangkok SIAM POST in Thai 29 Mar 93 pp 1, 2

[Text] According to additional information provided for SIAM POST by a high-level source in the Prime Minister's Office about heavy pressure levied on Thailand by the United States in response to the participation of Thai workers in the Libyan chemical weapons project, at least three Thai private companies were involved in sending Thai workers to Libya for the project. Two of them have their head offices in Bangkok and the other in Chiang Mai Province. All three companies are owned by Thai nationals who formerly worked in Libya.

The companies disguised their businesses as worker-exporting establishments and operated without permits from the Labor Department. The owner of one of the three companies was once arrested on a charge of illegal possession of firearm ammunition and explosives. The evidence gathered by authorities also indicates that he was involved in producing large quantities of explosives to ship to Libya.

In addition to their worker-exporting business, the three companies were reportedly supplying materials, equipment, and tools to Libya because the latter is unable to maintain direct contact with foreign producers following the imposition of UN sanctions.

Acting as procurers for Libya, the three companies make a large profit and commission from the goods they send to Libya. Libya is forced to pay as high as 500 percent over normal prices for the goods. Through very subtle methods, the companies send the goods to Libya with workers if they are not too big to carry. If the goods are too big, they will be taken apart and reassembled in Libya. They have earned hundreds of millions of baht from doing business there. The owner of the company whose head office is in Chiang Mai has not less than one billion baht in savings with the Arab Bank Corporation in Singapore in the form of LC accounts.

The Thai Government, in particular the National Security Council and Foreign Ministry, is reportedly well aware of the problem and knows that such business can adversely affect Thailand's image in the world community. Hence, the Foreign Ministry summoned the owners of the three companies for questioning and asked them to stop meddling with the chemical weapons project; but they refused to comply with the request. One of the companies claimed that Thai workers were working in a tap water production plant and a military medical supply factory.

A source in the National Security Council revealed that the tap water plant is a part of the project because clean water is needed for production of chemical weapons. The construction of the plant has been completed. The plant is now producing clean water for the production of chemical weapons and is closely controlled by Thai engineers and a number of Libyan workers. The chemical weapons project, under the supervision of the Libyan Technology Institute, is scheduled to be completed in 1994.

After completion of the project, Libya will use its chemical weapons as tools for political bargaining which is against the convention which banned the use of chemical weapons—also signed by Thailand. Libya refused to sign the convention. Since Thailand is a signatory of that convention, involvement in the project by three private Thai companies lead Thailand to have problems with the world community and the major powers.

A source from the Labor Skill Development Department told SIAM POST that there is a large number of Thai workers in Libya, but less than one percent are involved in the project. One of the three companies disclosed that these workers replaced German and Japanese laborers who withdrew from the project in 1986. There are 900 workers who have replaced the Japanese and German workers in 73 positions.

A number of Thai workers filed complaints with the department that they have not received pay for their service in Libya. After inquiries, the companies said Libya had not transferred the money to them. Some workers complained that the companies have embezzled their money.

A Thai worker who used to work for the project disclosed that the plant's safety system was very poor. Thai workers were at a high risk of exposure to chemicals. Only one gas mask was issued to each worker. At least two Thai workers had to be hospitalized for exposure to chemicals and their fates are still unknown.

The same worker confirmed that the report on Thais working in the chemical weapons plant in Libya is true. But the majority are not directly involved in weapons production and only a few are aware of the facts. Workers were told that they were constructing a tunnel system to fetch water to new communities in Libya.

Besides the three companies, professors from the faculty of engineering of a renowned educational institute in a province are involved in the construction of the tunnel known as Project 300. The tunnel is, in fact, an underground chemical weapons plant that cannot be detected by satellite or attacked by air.
More on Participation

BK3003104193 Bangkok SIAM POST in Thai
30 Mar 93 p 3

[Article: “Thai Companies Join the Production of Deadly Weapons For Libya”]

[Text] Russian politics has become the talk of the town in comparison with the latest world developments reported by renowned foreign news agencies including CNN, VISNEWS, and Reuter. However, people are now beginning to turn their attention to Libya’s chemical weapons projects again. This issue lost its publicity during the Gulf war.

Libya has been labelled by the West, in particular the United States, as “the culprit” responsible for the operation of various terrorist movements. Despite several measures designed to put pressure on Libya, nobody seems to be able to put an end to the absurdity of the Libyan leader.

The first attempt of Libya to produce chemical weapons to threaten the world community was in 1984. The Libyan Government set aside a huge amount of money to hire private companies with the required technical skills and purchased materials and equipment from Germany, Italy, Switzerland and other Asian countries including Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and even Thailand.

The project advanced rapidly because production of chemical weapons is uncomplicated and requires the same technology used for production of powerful explosives. Chemical experts confirm that any country with medium-sized petrochemical industries, especially OPEC members, is capable of producing chemical weapons.

Moreover, the chemicals used for production of the weapons can be destroyed within a few hours without leaving any traces for later detection.

For these reasons, ill-intentioned countries wish to have their own chemical weapons plants so that they can use the lethal ordnance, as good as nuclear weapons but cheaper, to increase their bargaining power. Libya apparently has no respect for the convention which bans chemical weapons use.

The chemical weapons project is under the supervision of the Technology Center Libya [name published in English], which incorporates a chemical research center, known as Pharma 150 [name published in English], mainly relying on supplies of chemicals and equipment from private companies in Japan and Germany. After the withdrawal of the Japanese and German companies from the project due to U.S. pressure in 1985, private Thai companies were given the opportunity to take over the tasks of the Japanese and German firms.

Three former Thai workers in Libya formed three companies to do profitable business there. The three companies are Company S., owned by A. Th.; Company W., owned by Mr. Ch. in Chiang Mai Province; and Company H., owned by Mr. A.N. [abbreviated names of companies and owners as published].

In particular, the company owned by Mr. A. Th. was responsible for sending 900 Thai nationals to replace the German and Japanese workers while taking over the procurement of supplies and construction work from the German and Japanese firms. Company W. is hired as a subcontractor responsible for operating public facilities and construction work under the project. Company H. supplies chemists and researchers for Plant Pharma 150. Since the head office of Company H. is situated in Chiang Mai Province, professors and engineers from the local renowned institute of higher education have been recruited to serve as advisors for the project.

In 1989 the United States exposed Libya’s chemical weapons project based on photos taken by its spy satellites and applied measures to put pressure on Libya. The plant was closed temporarily. Libya falsely announced that the plant was destroyed by a fire.

Following a short period of inactivity, Libya revived the project with the participation of the three Thai companies.

New equipment and tools were clandestinely brought to Libya with Thai workers. Some were taken apart and reassembled after their arrival in Libya. Libya is unable to purchase the equipment and tools directly from European countries due to the UN air embargo. Although the prices are as much as 500 percent higher, Libya is willing to pay for them.

With full supplies and equipment, the project was revived. However, the plant was moved to a new site in Tarhunan township, 65 km from Tripoli. The new plant, renamed Project 300, referred to among the Thai workers as Site 3, was built exactly the same as Plant Pharma 150.

The new plant is situated in two connected giant underground tunnels constructed in the desert by Company W. and scheduled to be completed in 1995. According to U.S. intelligence, the plant will concentrate on producing nerve gas.

With its bitter Plant Pharma 150 experiences, Libya decided to build the new plant underground to prevent satellite detection and air attacks.

Thai workers not involved in the project were told that the two giant tunnels are used to fetch water from the huge underground water source in the Sahara Desert to communities along the coast.

In any event, the tap water plant allegedly built by the Thai companies does provide clean water for the chemical weapons plant because clean water is one of the major parts of producing the deadly arms.

The revival of the Libyan chemical weapons project has been closely watched by the United States. The participation of the Thai private companies in Libyan lethal weapons projects is a breach of the convention on
banning chemical weapons as Thailand is also a signatory to the agreement. More importantly, Thailand is acting blatantly against the resolution of the world community. If the government allows the interests of a few people to impair the country's image and prestige, Thailand will be viewed as notoriously as Libya.

Report of Up to 25,000 Workers

A press report has said that three Thai job placement firms have sent Thai, workers to the Rabta plant, which the United States previously threatened to bomb.

He said there are about 25,000 Thai workers in Libya, but only 12,000 were sent by the Skilled Labour Development Department.

The rest went there by way of Egypt. No one of the workers sent by the department are at Rabta, he said. Most Thai workers in Libya are laying pipelines and building tunnels. Others are carpenters, masons, equipment operators and cooks, he added.

Thailand has no embassy in Libya, he said, so the Interior Ministry has instructed Thai labour attaches in Cairo to investigate the reports about Rabta which is believed to be the site of a chemical weapons factory.

Mr Suthas said seven job placement companies supply workers to Libya, of which three reportedly sent Thai workers to Rabta during 1989-1990.

They were warned by the Foreign and Interior ministries to stop doing this, he added.

Two of the three companies are W & M and S.P.C. Supachoke.

Thailand is obliged to oppose chemical weapons, he said, and the Foreign and Interior ministries had informed the United States that no Thai workers would be sent to Rabta, which is about 90 kilometres south of the Libyan capital Tripoli.

In January 1989 the United States threatened to launch an air strike against the suspected chemical weapons plant, where about 700 Thais were reported to be working.

Security Council Head Responds

Granting an interview on the same day, Deputy Interior Minister Suthat Ngoenmun said that there are presently seven Thai private companies exporting workers to Libya. They are: the B.P.B. Company, P.P.C. Construction (Thailand) Company, Kuta Company, Udon E.P.A. Company, Criston Company, Bisco Company, and Travel Master Company. Those companies send workers for jobs regularly. Meanwhile, three other companies, the W. and M. Company, N.S. Group, and S.C.P. Suphachok Company, sent Thai workers to Libya during 1989-1990. The S.C.P. Suphachok Company sent about 1,000 Thai workers who have fulfilled their contracts and returned home. There are no more Thai workers who were exported by the S.C.P. Suphachok Company in Libya now. The Labor Skill Development Department
also terminated permission for the company to send Thai workers to Libya in 1991.

Suthat said there are about 25,000 Thai workers in Libya, and 12,000 of them are working with permits while another 13,000 went without permits from the Labor Skill Development Department. The workers who have gone through the process set up by the Labor Skill Development Department have their travel contracts with the department, which can be checked. Most of them are in Libya on contract to build water tunnels, lay oil pipelines, and work as carpenters, masons, chauffeurs, cooks, or officials in charge of community development.

The deputy interior minister said that because we have no labor office in Libya, it cannot be verified what the other 13,000 Thai workers are doing there. The Foreign and Interior Ministries temporarily suspended permission to allow Thais to work in (Lotta), where the chemical project is located. Anyway, the suspension has been lifted after the situation returned to normal. Workers are now allowed to go there. But from checking, there are no Thai workers in (Lotta).

Regarding three companies mentioned in reports who sent Thai workers to assignments on the chemical project in Libya, Deputy Interior Minister Suthat said that, from checking, it was determined that none of them sent workers to Libya. Furthermore, none of the eight private companies which exported workers through the Labor Skill Development Department ever sent workers to the chemical plant. If it is determined that they sent workers there, they will face arrest or have their licenses withdrawn. The Labor Skill Development Department also checked at the office of the S.C.P. Suphachok Company, 34/131 Wiphawadi 60, Bangkhen, Bangkok, and found that the company closed down operations two years ago. The minister said he is checking with the Commerce Ministry for the names of the board members and owners of the three companies cited in the reports. This should be known by 31 March.

Chatchai Hongthong, manager of the Handle Group, said he did not know that the name of his company was reported as being involved in construction of the Libyan chemical plant. He said his company is a small construction contractor company, founded about a year ago, and it deals with small projects in Thailand only. Now it is bidding for tap water work on a housing project, and has nothing to do with Libya.

"I am a construction engineer. I worked as a foreman once in Libya, between 1984 and 1987. I have no knowledge about weapons manufacturing. I only read from magazines on tap water work once and learned that some Korean firms are involved in the chemical weapons project in Libya," Chatchai said.
SLOVAKIA

Prominent Businessman Accused of Uranium Trafficking

LD3003221693 Prague CTK in English 1950 GMT 30 Mar 93

[Text] Banska Bystrica, Central Slovakia March 30 (CTK)—On Monday Slovak police found about three kilogrammes of uranium with isotopes 235 and 238 in a car in Zvolen, Central Slovakia, police investigator Jan Dedko told CTK.

The land office investigator in Banska Bystrica, Central Slovakia, is prosecuting three people for violating the rulings on handling controlled goods and technologies. All the accused, still at liberty, are punishable with three years in prison.

Banska Bystrica police confirmed that one of the accused was the successful Romany businessman Jan Farkas from Rimavska Sobota, South Slovakia.

According to police information, the seized material comes from Russia. The hygienists confirmed that the uranium contained the mentioned isotopes but in view of the amount the population was not exposed to radiation risk.

The investigator rejected the suspicion that the relocation of the uranium could be connected with the Czech Republic or Germany but he did not mention the destination of the seized uranium.

Uranium with isotope 235 is used after enrichment in nuclear power engineering. Its commercial price is bolstered by the fact that plutonium and neptunium, applied in the armament industry for the production of nuclear weapons, are manufactured from it.

Police Arrest, Interrogate Uranium Smugglers

AU0704100093 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 3 Apr 93 p 9

[By Aneta Hofmannova: “Clouds Over the King’s Crown”]

[Excerpts] In recent days, the case of Jan Farkas of Rimavska Sobota has been frequently discussed in the papers. His name has appeared in connection with the car belonging to the Fizik brothers, in which uranium was found. Jan Farkas was apprehended and interrogated. [passage omitted]

By the decision of the investigator at the Police Corps District Office in Zvolen, criminal proceedings were launched against Jan Fizik, Juraj Fizik, and—by a separate decision—against Jan Farkas, for the crime according to Article 124a, paragraph I, of the penal code, that is, for having in his possession radioisotopes of uranium 235 and 238, to an amount of about 2.86 kg. In January 1992, Jan Farkas sold it in exchange for a Mitsubishi car, worth some 1 million korunas. It was treated, of course, without the necessary precautions.

According to the testimony, brothers Jan and Juraj acquired it from Jan Farkas, on his offering them compensation for their financial support in the election campaign of the Party of Security and Labor in 1992. According to the two accused men, they provided more than 1 million korunas to the leader of this party to boost his election success. Jan Farkas promised them, if he is successful in the elections, that their money would multiply several times over, and would be returned to them.

Well, what does it have to do with uranium? Jan Farkas offered them the aforementioned uranium 235 and 238 as compensation for their funds [provided in the election campaign]. Moreover, he promised that he would help sell it and acquire $200,000.

The material was tested in a laboratory in the Special Department of the Hygiene and Epidemiology in Banska Bystrica, and it was confirmed that the material actually consists of radio-nuclides [radionuklidy] to which special rules of distribution and regime apply.

It was also found that this radioactive material was acquired in and transported from the VLK [expansion unknown] Company in Rimavská Sobota, whose owner is Farkas. It was supposed to be distributed to certain entities in the Topolcany district. Jan Farkas is denying everything and says that these are fabrications. [passage omitted] [Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 5 April on page 1, in a 200-word TA SR article entitled “J. Farkas in Custody,” states the following: “According to information provided by Jozef Simko, Commander of the District Command of the Police Corps of the Slovak Republic in Rimavská Sobota, Jan Farkas was arrested on the basis of a warrant delivered to the District Command from the Regional Court in Banska Bystrica on Saturday [3 April].”]
INDIA

Advanced Heavy Water Reactor Under Development

Referring to a recent statement made by Dr Michael Reiss, who had worked with a former U.S. National Security Adviser, Mr Brent Scowcroft, that India could think of subscribing to fullscope safeguards, Dr Chidambaram felt if this was done it would hinder technology development.

Dr Chidambaram said that India could review its stand on the NPT during the world conference in 1995.

IRAQ

Nuclear Weapons Program Discussed

In 1969 Iraq signed the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty. The reactor fell under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the organization which was, in particular, to supervise the peaceful use of atomic energy. After the Treaty was signed, Saddam Husayn lost all interest for his five megawatt-strong “present.”

Around Osirak, or enemies all around

Searches for new partners brought the Iraqi leader to Paris. In September 1975 Saddam Husayn conducted negotiations with French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac on supplies to Iraq of three reactors (more powerful than the Soviet one), Tammouz 1, Tammouz 2 and Osirak. The sides agreed to cooperate, and soon a secret nuclear complex able to produce dozens of kilos of enriched uranium appeared 17 km southwest from Baghdad. The Iraqi nuclear programme became a reality.

This course of events in no way suited Israel. Tel Aviv had no illusions as to where and against whom the Iraqi A-bomb would be used. Saddam Husayn didn’t even try to conceal his intentions. Long before Desert Storm Operation the Baghdad dictator threatened to “burn half the Israeli territory with Iraqi fire.”

In response to such demarches, the Israeli secret services initiated preventive “retaliatory actions.”
On April 5, 1979, the main components of the atomic reactor due to be shipped to Iraq were seriously damaged by an explosion at a depot in the French Mediterranean sea port La Seyne.

On June 14, 1980, the Egyptian physicist Yahya al-Mashhad who was in charge of the Iraqi nuclear programme was killed in Paris.

Finally, on early Sunday morning on June 7, 1981, the Israeli Air Force dealt a powerful blow to the nuclear reactor Osirak, inflicting it serious damage.

Israel also started a “diplomatic offensive” against France which was eventually crowned with success: in 1983 France officially terminated cooperation with Iraq in the nuclear energy sphere.

But this wasn’t to put an end to Baghdad’s nuclear ambitions. The country had accumulated tremendous reserves of unenriched uranium which it received in the 1970s from Brazil, Portugal, China and Nigeria in exchange for the Iraqi oil. Unenriched uranium was also mined by Iraqi political prisoners in the north of the country. Nothing much remained to be accomplished—to buy the technology and centrifuges for enriching the uranium.

To this end, Husayn poured thousands of millions of dollars. Hundreds of nuclear physicists and engineers were recruited from other Arab countries, Germany, Brazil and Italy and paid exorbitant salaries. All research work was conducted in absolute secrecy. “Enemies are all around,” taught “the leader of the Arab nation.” “If not the Iranians, then the Israelis; if not the Israelis, then the Americans...”

“So, what does it matter if Saddam is a bandit and a murderer...”

Most hearty relations were established between the United States and Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq war. On March 15, 1982, the Iraqi regime was struck off the “terrorist list” by the US State Department. The CIA handed Baghdad top-secret information about Iran’s military potential and Tehran’s war preparations and plans, mainly through third countries. The CIA men were proud that from American spy satellite photographs it was clear whether “warriors of Allah” had shaven themselves before battle...

Apart from covert assistance, from 1985 till 1990 the US Trade Ministry issued licences to 750 American companies to provide goods for Iraqi military needs. The deals totalled one and a half thousand million dollars. Among other items, Baghdad received equipment for nuclear energy enterprises. An IBM supercomputer alone played an extremely important role in efforts to produce an A-bomb.

US ex-President George Bush was especially active in aiding Iraq. As early as during his vice-presidency in 1987, he met with Nizar Hamdun, the Iraqi Ambassador to Washington, and assured him that Baghdad could rely on the US selling double-purpose technology used for both civil and military needs. Only nine months before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, President Bush issued a secret memo named Resolution in the Area of National Security. This letter assigned the US state structures the task of establishing closer contacts with Baghdad and allowing new aid amounting to one thousand million dollars. George Bush not only signed this letter, he also personally called banker Draper, his close friend since Yale days, requesting him to “agree to finance American projects in Iraq.” The Export-Import Bank which previously rejected this dubious deal, gave in. As a result, Iraq managed to spend these thousand million dollars on buying agricultural products in the USA, using the saved currency for manufacturing an A-bomb.

Evidently the Americans came to see Husayn as an important barrier to Islamic fundamentalism. Only this “fervent Arab nationalist” is in a position to thwart Tehran’s plans to establish domination in the Middle East. The Americans hoped that US aid would force Husayn to act in a more restrained way and even play a positive role in a peace process in the region. It’s not for nothing that US State Secretary James Baker chose namely his Iraqi counterpart, Tariq Aziz, as a person with whom he would fulfill this delicate assignment of persuading the PLO to enter negotiations with Israel, having promised Iraq several hundred million dollars’ worth military aid for the commission.

Peter Rodman, the senior figure in the National Security Council of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, stated cynically: Iraq was a natural ally of moderate Arab countries; it was Egypt’s ally; it played a constructive role in the Middle East peace process. What does it matter if Saddam is a bandit and a murderer, this doesn’t change the essence of the situation... Under pressure from the pro-Iraqi lobby in the US echelons of power, the idea of imposing economic sanctions against Baghdad’s regime was rejected three times during 1990 (the third time a month before the aggression against Kuwait occurred).

The economic result of it all is as follows: because of delayed payments, American taxpayers won’t have back two thousand million dollars out of the five thousand million dollars in aid extended to Iraq over eight years.

A couple of bottles of vodka for a kilo of uranium

The Baghdad leaders’ “anti-imperialist political course” has always found support in Moscow. On April 9, 1972, the Soviet Union signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Iraq. Since that time the USSR has been the major supplier of the Iraqi armed forces. According to Western intelligence, Iraq received over nine kilos of uranium by the summer of 1990. By the way, this quantity of uranium, after being enriched, is quite enough to make one A-bomb as powerful as that exploded by Americans over Nagasaki. Soviet experts worked at Iraqi nuclear installations. In a way, the West and the Soviet Union sort of devided spheres of influence in Iraq: the USSR sent unenriched uranium and
nuclear experts there and the Western countries, high
technology and related materials.

Official contacts with Baghdad were terminated at the
start of the Desert Storm. Soviet experts, including those
who were directly or indirectly connected with making
the A-bomb, returned back home. But the old ties
remained...

According to the Western mass media, last autumn an
international underworld group smuggled a large quantity
of uranium from one of the Russian plants with the
help of corrupt state officials in Moscow. This uranium
was to be brought to the Iraqi Embassy in Sofia and
forwarded to Baghdad by diplomatic mail. Should this
deal had taken place, Saddam Husayn would have
availed himself of the possibility to make about 20
nuclear bombs several times more powerful than those
which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

This criminal group included a British arms trader, a
Swedish businessman and two Polish entrepreneurs.

They were a mere cover for a heterogeneous company of
Russian and Bulgarian military and Party apparatchiks
eager to make millions of dollars on this deadly com-
modity. "The deal of the century" failed only because of
the vigilance of a British diplomat who accidentally
learned that 200 kilos of uranium could be bought in
Bulgaria for cash.

A consignment of uranium was earlier confiscated in
Germany, destined to be used by Iraq for military
purposes, having been smuggled in from Eastern Europe.

A Swiss businessman, a Dane and Yugoslav were
arrested in 1991 in Italy in connection with the discovery
of illegal supplies of uranium leaving Russia.

Two former Soviet citizens were arrested in Germany in
March 1992 for trying to sell 1.2 kilos of enriched
uranium for DM [Deutsche marks] 1.9 million.

Late in 1992 a consignment of uranium weighing "only"
250 kilograms was confiscated in Poland. The traces led
to a small Udmurt town of Glazov. The workers of a
defence enterprise kept the smuggled strategic raw mate-
rials in... their own apartments' bathrooms amidst soap
and detergents. They sold uranium for the fantastic price
of a couple of bottles of vodka per kilo!

In a word, the impression is that nothing is easier than
stealing radioactive materials from 151 Russian instal-
lations connected with extracting, enriching and manu-
facturing uranium.

The Russian firms extracting and processing radioactive
materials refuse point blank to admit to the fact of their
disappearance from their factories. Nevertheless, these
deadly substances travel around Europe in search of
Baghdad merchants. As a rule, these searches are suc-
cessful. And as concerns Russian experts in nuclear
physics, one of them, Sergey Mironov, has said: "There
will be no problem to organize production of A-bombs
with the help of these materials. I'm shocked."

In the meantime, Russia upgrades protection over her
nuclear raw materials. A relevant draft law is now under
consideration in the Parliament: new articles have been
introduced into the Penal Code of the Russian Federation.

The monster on the shores of Tigris and Euphrates

However, other countries have also contributed to the
building of the military monster on the shores of Tigris
and Euphrates. Germany supplied components for
installations producing "super-centrifuges" which allow
a more effective process of enriching uranium, to the
degrees necessary for making nuclear weapons. The
know-how for centrifuges of the new generation was
developed by German, British and Dutch scientists. On
the whole, over a hundred German enterprises took part
in strengthening Iraqi military potential. The biggest
German chemicals concerns vehemently fought for the
right to supply equipment for manufacturing poisonous
gases: those same gases which were used to destroy
Iranian "warriors of Allah," peaceful Kurds in the north
of Iraq and defectors from the Iraqi Army in the moors
of southern Iraq...

Italians equipped radiochemical laboratories and sup-
plied other equipment for Saddam's nuclear programme.
Italy's biggest bank granted Iraq an unprecedentedly
large loan of $4,000 million for the development of its
military industrial complex.

Belgians helped assemble the uranium-enriching instal-
lation in al-Qayn.

Brazilians taught the Iraqi military aerodynamics, car-
rrying out test flights and controlling rocket trajectories.
Brazil also exported electronic equipment and rocket
fuel to Iraq. These two countries signed a secret agree-
ment on building an installation for enriching natural
uranium supplied, incidentally, also by Brazil.

The project of making Condor missiles was carried out
in cooperation with Argentina and Egypt.

A Canadian engineer Gerald Bull, subsequently elimi-
nated by the Israeli intelligence Mossad in Brussels,
provided assistance to Iraq in making the jet super-
cannon Babylone...

In a word, thanks to the efforts by the world community,
in August 1990 Iraq was, in the opinion of Hans Blix,
Director-General of IAEA, "12 to 18 months from
making atomic weapons."

The mysteries of the Baghdad Court

In the course of the Desert Storm Operation, Husayn's
regime was heavily wounded, but not completely
destroyed, making it doubly dangerous today.
Iraq’s military potential wasn’t destroyed by the allies’ bombings. Carefully disguised installations, capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons, remained intact in the north mountains of the country. So, George Bush was obviously mistaken when he said that surgically precise attacks put an end to Saddam’s nuclear activities for a long time. The underground factories and laboratories are still active. According to estimates by American secret services, Husayn has concealed at least 20 installations capable of producing enriched uranium. Despite Iraq’s official statistics (claiming that there are only 500 grams of insufficiently enriched uranium in the country), Western secret services believe that actually Saddam has accumulated about 40 kilograms of this radioactive material.

As before top-class specialists from the world over work now for Iraqi war machine. They are payed generously for their services but are always in danger of being eliminated by Mossad.

After the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687 demanding the liquidation of all Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and the discontinuation of its nuclear programmes, several nuclear scientists as well as uranium were smuggled to Algeria. Iraq managed to overcome the military blockade of its coasts and borders and deliver over 10 tons of unenriched uranium to Jordan. From there it was transferred to Algeria by sea. They fear in “Western intelligence communities” that these two Arab countries, Iraq and Algeria, have formed “a nuclear axis” with the purpose of creating the Islamic world’s first A-bomb. The Algerian reactor which is situated 100 miles south of the capital in Ain-Oussera was built by the Chinese and is of a yield adequate to produce two A-bombs every three years. Last year this information was divulged by the world’s leading news agencies and, naturally, immediately disavowed by the Algerian authorities who claim that the reactor operates under strict control by IAEA.

However, according to the data by IAEA, there have remained secret mobile installations for enriching uranium in Iraq itself. They can’t be traced by either international inspectors or spy satellites, because these mobile mini-reactors daily change their positions throughout the country. Saddam Husayn’s behaviour resembles what is called “minor faults” in sports, i.e., the attempts to impede the contender’s activity by unlawful means, but not such as will entail a serious reprimand.

To buy the required equipment, Saddam Husayn uses secret dummy accounts in various banks around the world. Part of the money is withdrawn from the dictator’s personal accounts—his assets are estimated at $30 thousand million. Only recently the Iraqi authorities have put on the world market several kilos of gold from Husayn’s personal reserves kept outside Iraq. This money is used by at least 44 entrepreneurs active in dozens of countries. This broad secret commercial network is headed by Saddam’s most trusted man, his brother Barzan Ibrahim who, in his time, headed the Iraqi intelligence. Commercial travellers from Baghdad, acting also through intermediaries and dummy companies, rush around the world in search of weapons of the late Warsaw Pact sold at dumping prices.

It’s practically impossible to drop out of this risky game—“defectors” are eliminated. In December 1992 an Iraqi nuclear physicist who decided to “share” with journalists information about “the secret programme for creating an A-bomb” and who named those international companies which were helping Husayn’s efforts, bypassing the UN resolutions, was killed at Husayn’s order in Amman. When seven of the executed scientist’s colleagues condemned this terrorist action, they were also court-marshalled and executed.

An American senator George Mitchell one said: “The dictator we help today may turn his arms against us tomorrow.” This is precisely what has happened. Unfortunately, as is well known, the lessons of history, even recent, teach us that they teach us nothing.

Our Reference

Enriching uranium is the process of artificially increasing the percentage of fissionable uranium 235 which makes only 0.7% of ordinary uranium. The difference between the specific weights of two isotopes of uranium is used. Uranium is turned into a gaseous state under the effect of the centrifugal forces, the concentration of the heavier isotope, uranium 238, increases. This isotope serves as the source of plutonium, secondary nuclear fuel.

Our Reference

Chief of the National Central Bureau of Interpol in Russia Lieutenant General Vasily Ignatov claims that “the journalists who wrote TV or newspaper pieces about buying enriched uranium in Russia were either victims of the scoundrels they wanted to unmask or at times made far-fetched interpretations.”

Swiss Firms Accused of Supplying Nuclear Program

LD2403115193 Bern Swiss Radio International in English 1100 GMT 24 Mar 93

[Text] Swiss firms have been accused of supplying key parts for Iraq’s nuclear program during the 1980s.

German-language Swiss television says a secret report by United Nations weapons inspectors shows that nearly one fifth of 600 key parts came from Switzerland. They included components which could be used to produce enriched uranium and make nuclear arms parts.
However, a Swiss Government official said the material had been exported to Iraq before the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and there was therefore no legal reason for Swiss authorities to ban exports to Iraq.

The International Atomic Energy Agency said it was in contact with the Swiss authorities over the issue, but a government spokesman said there had been no official discussions.

**Russian Scientist Said To Help Arms Program**

93WP0130A Moscow SOBESEDKIN in Russian No 7, Feb 93 [signed to press 15 Feb 93] p 12

[Article by Aleksey Shumilin (special to SOBESEDKIN), Cairo: “Viktor”—Father of the Iraqi Atomic Bomb?”]

[Text] While the Russian foreign intelligence service was gathering material for the sensational report about possessors of nuclear weapons (see SOBESEDKIN, No 5), the Egyptian journal ROSE AL-YUSUF made an independent investigation of a secret inter-Arab network recruiting and using nuclear scientists to create Saddam Husayn's atomic bomb. Persons from the CIS countries are also involved.

The journal's published material indicates that the main countries doing research and development in these fields and actively amassing “intellectual potential” are Iraq, Libya, and Algeria.

Husayn Kamal, Iraq's military industry minister and President Saddam Husayn’s brother/son-in-law, is forming special groups of scientists and sending them to Algeria and Libya via Jordan. Officially, they are going to do contract work in the Ayn-Asir Nuclear Energy Center in a suburb of Algeria's capital and in the nuclear chemistry center at a university in Tripoli.

Iraqi nuclear scientists, the journal reports, have advanced much closer to the creation of a bomb than their colleagues in Libya or Algeria. What their task in these centers amounts to, therefore, is to observe local cadres, with the object of using them later in Iraq.

Another important mission is to accost Soviet and Chinese nuclear scientists who are not averse to cooperating with Iraq but cannot get to Baghdad. The salaries of these people are set at 2,000 dollars a month. Strictly speaking, nuclear scientists from the CIS are not going to Algeria and Libya directly but through third countries.

This was reported to Arab journalists, in particular, by someone named “Viktor.” He used to work in a secret research institute in Moscow. He signed a contract in Moscow with some Libyan organization to do “peaceful atomic” research. He moved to Tripoli and was followed soon after by his family. He is getting the salary he was promised, fully confident that he is working for the Libyan outfit, but in reality he is under constant surveillance. Asked whether he is precisely aware, in the framework of his research, where the boundary between the “peaceful” and the “military” atom lies, he chose to answer with a thoughtful silence.

According to the Egyptian journalists' estimates, there are around two dozen such “Viktors” from Russia and the other CIS countries in Libya alone. About 10 Russian nuclear physicists have made their way to Algeria by various routes.

Late last year, one group of Iraqi scientists opposed to Saddam's regime told representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency about many secret nuclear facilities in Iraq and about the research effort that is soon to provide Saddam Husayn with the “red button” he craves. Scientists are convinced that if this happens, the world—literally—could find itself on the verge of nuclear catastrophe.
Commonwealth of Independent States

Correspondent Reports Nuclear Smuggling from CIS

LD2903193093 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Mar 93

[Video report by correspondent Vladimir Kondratyev; from the “Novosti” newscast]

[Text] Despite the soothing statements by those responsible in the CIS that a leak of nuclear material overseas is practically impossible, the Federal Republic of Germany is already speaking openly about the appearance of a new so-called nuclear mafia from the East. [video shows staged reconstruction of material handover]

One of the latest arrests of people trading in uranium and plutonium, useful for making nuclear weapons, took place in a car park. The authorities are so far not making the exact location and the full names of those arrested when a Polish citizen handed over highly dangerous contraband to a known female German citizen. The dosimeter went right off the clock when the contraband was confiscated.

According to federal criminal department information, more than 100 attempts to buy radioactive material in the FRG were uncovered in the past year alone. It is assumed that this is just the tip of the iceberg, because the police are not omnipotent. [video shows radioactive symbols, train, signs in German saying Bundeskriminalamt and Security Zone]

Specialists have been shocked by the carelessness with which this cargo is being transported and stored. They can contaminate the water table, and cause fear and panic for whole towns, says Zachert, president of the department. [video now shows two persons in protective clothing and respirators approaching a luggage locker; unidentified man in suit interviewed in German, fading into Russian report]

Fifteen kilos of caesium, which explodes on contact with air, have just been found on former Eastern bloc smugglers on the Swiss-German border. It was being kept in two milk churns. [video shows Swiss customs post, resumes interview with unidentified man in German, fading into Russian report]

It will probably not be possible to fight against the new business. As the chief of the department said in Wiesbaden, up to $3,000 has been asked for a few grams of fissile material, so the risk is worth it. [video shows briefcase opened to reveal large quantity of German marks, metal container with radioactivity symbol and the word Caution! in Russian] The criminal agency now needs at least 500 extra employees to resist the nuclear mafia. But thus far, there have not been that many volunteers for this sort of work.

Russia Issues Statement

LD0504164093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1030 GMT 5 Apr 93

["The Government of the Russian Federation Has Issued a Statement With Regard to Nuclear Weapons Stationed on the Territory of Ukraine"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Apr (ITAR-TASS)—The government of the Russian Federation has issued a statement here. It says:

Recently the situation around nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine has sharply deteriorated. Ukrainian representatives plainly declare that these nuclear weapons belong to Ukraine. Such statements can only be interpreted as a claim by Ukraine to the possession of nuclear weapons.

This stance adopted by the Ukrainian leadership indicates direct violation of the decision adopted by the CIS heads of state on 6 July 1992 about the participation of CIS member states in the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. According to this decision, which had also been signed by Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk, the Russian Federation is the only state out of all the legal successors of the USSR to possess nuclear weapons. Other CIS member states have decided to join the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the capacity of states not possessing nuclear weapons.

Kiev’s claims to the possession of nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine also violate the Lisbon protocol to the START I treaty according to which Ukraine undertook an obligation to join in the very near future the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the capacity of a nuclear-free state. The written statement of the Ukrainian side with regard to the signing of that protocol clearly indicates that "the right and responsibility of possessing nuclear weapons of the former USSR has been given solely to the Russian Federation with the express agreement of Ukraine and all the other legal successors of the former USSR."

Kiev’s policy is also at variance with Ukraine’s commitments with regard to the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from its territory with the aim of dismantling and destroying them by the end of 1994. On the contrary, Ukraine is taking practical steps aimed at taking nuclear weapons on the territory of this country into its own hands. Thus, already in April 1992, the rocket and air army, together with combat units and subunits stationed in Ukraine, were included in the composition of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Later, a new staff structure was formed in its armed forces—the center for the administrative control of troops of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s strategic nuclear forces. By a decision
of the ministry's main headquarters, all nuclear-equipment units stationed in Ukraine were placed under the center's command. The personnel of two such units in charge of over 600 nuclear munitions swore allegiance to Ukraine. The list of actions of this kind grows longer by the day. In connection with the above-mentioned, the government of the Russian Federation considers it necessary to state the following:

Russia, understanding its great responsibility to the world community, is firmly advocating that the nuclear weapons that are temporarily sited on Ukraine territory should be under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. The position of Ukraine, which opposes this in violation of commitments taken upon itself, is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences. The effectiveness of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons regime is under threat.

A question mark is put over whether the START I and START II treaties will come into effect; i.e., over the process of real nuclear disarmament.

The government of the Russian Federation would like to draw attention to the undisputed fact that nuclear weapons cannot belong to a nuclear-free state. Only a nuclear state can possess such weapons. It has to be emphasized that the safety of nuclear weapons is indivisible. It can only be ensured through a system of links connected in series under a single command and control. This matter is too serious and it calls for a responsible attitude. All legal and political prerequisites are already in place. It is now just a question of implementing them. Nuclear weapons cannot and must not be an object of political games.

For its part, Russia as a nuclear state is prepared to go its part of the way, in response to Ukraine's appeals, in order to make it easier for Ukraine to meet its international commitments. As a depository of the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, Russia is prepared to provide, along with other depositories, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, guarantees of Ukraine's security, in accordance with the wishes of the Ukrainian side. These guarantees are to come into effect after Ukraine joins the treaty as a nonnuclear state.

In addition to solving the issue of ensuring the safety of nuclear arms in Ukraine and striving to fully remove all anxiety regarding these arms, the Russian side proposes to detach as quickly as possible the front sections from the missiles stationed in Ukrainian territory and to take all nuclear armaments to Russia where they will be subsequently destroyed under Ukraine's control as stipulated by the Russian-Ukrainian agreement signed in April 1992. In order to completely exclude the possible use of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory, in addition to political guarantees (which are quite sufficient as they are) all the weapon-delivery vehicles could be relieved of flight assignments within the next few months.

Russia is also ready to solve constructively the issue of the utilization of nuclear weapons, which is of interest to the Ukrainian side, in such a way that the nuclear substances that are retrieved could be used as fuel for Ukrainian atomic power stations. The Russian side has already put forward its proposals on this account. Now it is Kiev's turn.

Taking into account the special importance of ensuring the safety of nuclear weapons, the Russian Federation is ready to fulfill all the tasks aimed at maintaining these weapons in Ukrainian territory in a safe state given the understanding that the Ukrainian side will provide all the necessary conditions.

A responsible moment has arrived when a balanced decision should be taken immediately, a decision that is not aimed at obtaining political or other dividends. The peoples of both Ukraine and Russia and the whole international community will gain from it.

For its part, Russia is ready to solve immediately all the above-mentioned problems within the framework of the Russian-Ukrainian talks currently under way.

Ukraine in 'Flagrant Violation'

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian Government takes note of the increased tension resulting from the controversy over the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine. "Ukrainian spokesmen insist that this weaponry is Ukraine's property. Such declarations are tantamount to Ukraine claiming ownership of a nuclear capability," says a Russian government statement made public in Moscow Monday [5 April].

This course of the Ukrainian leadership is in flagrant violation of the July 6, 1992 decision adopted by the heads of CIS states on the CIS member states adhering to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. By that decision, of all the USSR's successors, Russia alone would remain a nuclear power.

Kiev's claims to ownership of nuclear weapons also signal a violation of the Lisbon protocol appended to the START-1 treaty whereby Ukraine undertook to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. The course taken by the Kiev government is also incompatible with the commitments to remove nuclear weaponry from Ukrainian territory for dismantling and destruction by the end of 1994.

The Russian government statement insists that the Ukrainian authorities take practical steps to take over the nuclear weaponry stationed in the country. In particular, back in April 1992 the units of a rocket and an air force army stationed in Ukraine were incorporated into the Ukrainian armed forces. Later, a new structure, the Center for Administrative Command of Strategic
Nuclear Forces, was set up in the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. That Center took over all nuclear technical units stationed on Ukrainian soil. Russia insists that the nuclear weapons temporarily deployed in Ukraine remain under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. The statement goes on to say that Kiev's opposition to this, in contravention of its earlier commitments, may result in extremely dangerous consequences. "The nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is endangered and doubt is cast on the ratification of START-1 and START-2 treaties, or on the process of real nuclear disarmament." The government of Russia says that nuclear weaponry cannot be owned by a non-nuclear state; the safety of nuclear weapons is indivisible. It can be assured only by an integrated system of elements under united management and supervision. Nuclear weaponry cannot be turned into a political football.

Moscow declared that, as a depositary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Russia is prepared to grant, together with other depositaries, the U.S. and Great Britain, the security guarantees that Kiev wants as soon as Ukraine joins that treaty as a nonnuclear state. Russia suggests that as soon as possible the warheads be separated from the missiles stationed in Ukraine and removed to Russia for destruction under Ukraine's supervision. To eliminate the possibility of delivering nuclear weapons from Ukrainian soil, the political guarantees can be supplemented by removing mission profile programs from all delivery capabilities, the statement goes on.

Russia is also prepared to resolve constructively the issue that Kiev raised, utilization of the nuclear warheads as fuel in Ukrainian power stations. Because it is very important to see to it that nuclear weapons do not go out of control, Russia is prepared to perform all activities required to maintain safety of such weapons on Ukrainian soil "on the understanding that the Ukrainian side creates a favorable climate for that."

The Russian government states that Moscow is prepared to resolve all these problems in the course of Russo-Ukrainian negotiations now underway.

Nuclear-Free Status Urged
LD0504164793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1550 GMT 5 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Boris Krivoshey and Aleksandr Krylovich]

[Text] Moscow April 5 TASS—The situation that has formed around nuclear weapons which are temporarily deployed on Ukraine's territory has generated increasing concern lately because Ukrainian leaders, contrary to their statement on Ukraine's nuclear-free status, are carrying out practical measures testifying to its desire to possess nuclear weapons, Russian Deputy Defence Minister Boris Gromov said.

He spoke at a press conference today which was held in connection with the Russian Government's statement concerning nuclear weapons deployed on Ukraine's territory.

Mindful of the fact that Ukraine officially stated that it will join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as a nuclear-free state shortly, the Russian side came up with the proposal to take under its jurisdiction the nuclear weaponry temporarily deployed on Ukraine's territory. However, Ukraine did not accept this proposal.

"Being aware of the crisis situation regarding nuclear safety that has formed in Ukraine and the unpredictability of possible consequences in the event of accidents involving nuclear weapons, we believe it is necessary that the next round of talks with Ukraine shall return once again to solving this problem in the hope that the Ukrainian side will continue these talks in the more constructive vein," Gromov said.

Russia attaches immense importance to Ukraine's move to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as a nuclear-free state, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Berdennikov said. This is very important as a conference to review the nuclear non-proliferation treaty should take place in 1995. It will decide the issue of extending this treaty and Russia advocates that it be extended for unlimited duration.

In case a new nuclear state emerges, this may put in peril the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime and serve as a very dangerous precedent for other countries that are on the verge of acquiring the nuclear capability. "In this regard, we are interested in the commitments voluntarily assumed by Ukraine to be fulfilled as soon as possible," Berdennikov emphasised.

Differences Over START Viewed
MK0604111493 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 6 Apr 93 p 9

[Viktor Zamyatin report: "Russian-Ukrainian Differences Over START. Moscow Does Not Agree With Kiev's Arguments"]

[Text] In its statement yesterday, the Russian Government expressed concern over Ukraine's actions testifying to its desire to acquire the status of a nuclear power. The statement was delivered after the Russian and U.S. Presidents had expressed the hope in Vancouver that all the former USSR's countries would join the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Yuriy Dubinin, head of the Russian delegation to the talks with Ukraine, set out the essence of the statement at a briefing yesterday. He noted that Kiev, despite its statements about wanting nonnuclear status, is carrying out measures testifying to the reverse. In particular, in 1992 Ukraine included the 43d Missile Army and the
46th Air Army in the composition of its armed forces, and the Center for Administrative Control of Strategic Nuclear Forces Troops was recently created within the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. Russia, which the U.S. President supported in Vancouver, believes that nuclear weapons cannot have “two masters.” According to Dubinin, Moscow intends to return to the discussion of this question in the near future. He also said that Russia’s proposals had already been conveyed to Ukraine, and now it remains to wait for its reaction. In justifying the dragging out of nuclear disarmament, Kiev is advancing both political reasons (nuclear weapons are a factor deterring “Moscow’s imperial ambitions”) and financial reasons (Ukraine’s experts believe that implementing the START-1 Treaty will cost the republic $2.8 billion, while the United States is promising it only $175 million of aid). Moscow rejects these arguments and considers the guarantee of Ukraine’s security on the part of Russia and the United States to be entirely adequate. Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, head of the Russian parliamentary committee for international affairs, noted that Ukraine is obviously “testing the water as to retaining its nuclear status,” which will make Russia’s ratification of the START-2 Treaty much harder. Tomorrow KOMMER-SANT-DAILY will acquaint readers with Ukraine’s reaction to the Russian Government’s statement.

[Article contains the following boxed text]

Currently there are 1,600 nuclear warheads in Ukraine on:
- 130 SS-19 (15A25) intercontinental missiles;
- 46 SS-24 (RS-22) intercontinental missiles;
- 24 Tu-95MS heavy bombers;
- 19 Tu-160 heavy bombers.

Russia’s proposals conveyed to Ukraine:
- to transfer all nuclear weapons located in Ukraine exclusively to Russian jurisdiction;
- to remove warheads and to transport to Russia and destroy under Ukrainian control all nuclear ammunition to discontinue training sorties by delivery vehicles in Ukraine;
- to use salvageable nuclear ammunition for fuel for Ukrainian nuclear electric power stations;
- to create a system to supervise nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory.

However, the real technical condition of the nuclear munitions on Ukrainian territory is indeed causing specialists entirely justified concern. Scheduled maintenance of nuclear charges is more than 10 months overdue here. These charges are being kept in dumps alongside warheads from strategic ballistic missiles. The concentration of assemblies [bloki] and warheads in one building is more than seven times the norm.

All this not only drastically increases the background radiation in the arsenals, but can also, specialists claim, cause nuclear munitions to end up in an uncontrollable state and may result in emergencies and an unauthorized explosion. They claim that such an explosion may not necessarily be a nuclear explosion, but, in terms of its consequences in the form of the dispersal of fissionable material—weapons-grade plutonium, uranium—and the radioactive contamination of soil and water, it may indeed be comparable to the results of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

This must not be used to scare people, it is simply necessary to be aware of it. There are roughly 1,200 nuclear warhead assemblies [yadernye bloki] for strategic missiles on Ukrainian territory and more than 600 air-launched cruise missile warhead assemblies. According to the information at our disposal, 446 strategic missile warhead assemblies and 162 cruise missiles did not have the necessary chemical components guaranteeing their total nuclear safety changed during 1992 or the first three months of 1993.

Nuclear specialists describe these components as absorbers, which act as filters to neutralize the gases given off by the nuclear charges during protracted storage, impede the formation of combustible compounds in them, and thus prevent emergencies from arising.

Ukraine does not produce these components. What is more, its specialists do not have the legal right to dismantle or assemble these munitions or change particular components in them since the republic is not a nuclear power and cannot authorize its citizens to carry out this work.

At the same time, Russia too, which does possess these components, effectively does not have the legal right to change them. Ukraine has declared the nuclear warheads to be its property. For Russian specialists to carry out any work on these warheads means acknowledging Ukraine to be a nuclear power and backing its decision, and this constitutes a most flagrant breach of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, of which Russia is a depositary.

So we have a juridical deadlock and a legal moot point which the leaders of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry brought upon themselves and others by announcing the creation of the Center for the Control of Strategic Nuclear Forces and virtually placing all nuclear-technical bases under their own command.

“The nuclear munitions sited in Ukraine do not in fact have a real owner today,” I was told at a Russian Defense
Ministry main directorate, “there is no one to call anyone to account for their safety and good technical condition and no one to be called to account.”

Two rounds of talks between government delegations from the two countries held on Russia’s initiative in order to ensure proper care of nuclear weapons and their technical security have ended in failure. The Ukrainian side is insisting that these weapons belong to Ukraine and is refusing to allow the Russian side the necessary opportunities to carry out guaranteed maintenance on the nuclear warheads.

The Ukrainian officials’ statement regarding Russia’s desire to deprive Ukraine of its right to compensation for the components of these weapons is totally unfounded, I was told by Colonel General Yevgeniy Maslin, one of the participants in the intergovernmental talks and head of a Russian Defense Ministry main directorate. They are well aware that the communiqué signed by Presidents Kravchuk and Yeltsin says that these components are to be processed for use as fuel for Ukrainian nuclear power stations. And Russia is ready to agree on that.

But while talks are under way, how can the nuclear safety of the warhead assemblies on Ukrainian territory be ensured?

Col. Gen. Yevgeniy Maslin said that there may be various options here.

“First,” the general said, “the nuclear munitions of long-range cruise missiles for heavy strategic bombers should be placed in a state of reduced combat readiness and taken to central factory gate bases for subsequent disassembly, as envisaged by the agreement between the two countries. Under Ukrainian supervision, moreover.”

Second, he said, ballistic missile nose cones and their warhead assemblies should be taken to central factory gate bases for the same purpose—disassembly. That can be done within 18 months. And third—and perhaps most important—the targeting information [poletnyye zadaniya] should be removed from all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in Ukraine and the world community secured against an unauthorized nuclear missile launch.

Other specialists think that if Ukraine does not want to remove these munitions before the question of reprocessing them as nuclear fuel for its nuclear power stations is resolved it could have the option of transferring all the nuclear technical and missile technical support bases and arsenals to Russian jurisdiction. Russia could then take full responsibility for preserving the security of the dread weapons and make pledges regarding their material-technical, ecological, and financial maintenance throughout the duration of their temporary sojourn on Ukrainian territory.

Otherwise, they say, Ukraine must openly state that it is becoming a nuclear power and take full legal and technical responsibility for the nuclear safety of these weapons and for the other international legal consequences.

One thing alone must not be allowed: uncertainty as to which state the nuclear munitions belong to. Experts joke bleakly that it is impossible to be “slightly pregnant.” It is a question of either-or. One thing or the other.

News Conference on Arms

PM0604181193 Moscow KRA�NAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Apr 93 pp 1, 3

[Oleg Vladykin report: “Do Not Set a Dangerous Precedent; Question of Siting Nuclear Weapons on Ukrainian Territory”]

[Text] A news conference for Russian and foreign journalists was held in Moscow on Monday 5 April in connection with the Russian Government statement on the question of the siting of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory. Opening this conference, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov said that the talks with Ukraine on the problems of the latter’s subscribing to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a nuclear-free state and its ratifying the START I Treaty have not hitherto borne any fruit. This is accordingly giving rise to concern, as reflected in the published statement, since it may set a dangerous precedent. If another nuclear state emerges, the whole nuclear non-proliferation regime may be placed in jeopardy.

Ambassador at Large Yuriy Dubinin, head of the Russian state delegation at the talks with Ukraine, drew journalists’ attention to the Russian Federation’s readiness to perform all the tasks of keeping the nuclear weapons safe in their current locations on the territory of the former union republics. According to him, the Ukrainian side was handed the draft of the relevant agreement. This speaks in particular of ensuring warranty and manufacturer’s inspection of missile system maintenance [garantiyi i avtorskiy kontrol za eksplutatsiyey raketykh kompleksov]. What is more, in order to remove all concern over nuclear weapons, the Russian delegation has proposed detaching [ostykyvat] the nose sections of the missiles sited on Ukrainian territory within a very short period and bringing all nuclear munitions to Russia for subsequent destruction.

Colonel General Boris Gromov, Russian Federation deputy defense minister, who spoke at the press conference, stressed that despite statements regarding its non-nuclear status the Ukrainian leadership is taking practical steps that attest to Ukraine’s desire to possess nuclear weapons. In particular, he pointed out, the Ukrainian president’s edict No. 209 of 5 April 1992, followed by an order issued by the Ukrainian defense minister, incorporated the 43d Missile and 46th Air Armies (176 missile launchers and 43 strategic bombers)
in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In May 1992 the personnel of two nuclear-technical troop units of the 46th Air Army, where roughly 670 strategic nuclear munitions are stationed, swore the Ukrainian military oath. All this indicates that control has effectively been established over these munitions and the Ukrainian side has begun handling them [nachata ikh eksploatatsiya]. What is more, the subunits guarding the missile systems are being manned solely by citizens of the republic. Ukraine has thus acquired an opportunity in principle to use nuclear weapons.

It is obvious, Boris Gromov said, that the Ukrainian side has no intention either of totally eliminating the strategic arms on its territory within seven years as envisaged by the START I Treaty. The second round of talks saw the first outright reference to Ukrainian ownership of the nuclear weapons temporarily stationed on Ukrainian territory. It is thus no coincidence that this January a new staff structure emerged within the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a structure whose name speaks for itself—the Center for Administrative Command of the Strategic Nuclear Forces [Tsentr administrativnogo upravleniya voyisky strategicheskikh yadernykh sil].

Meanwhile, in response to journalists' questions, Col. Gen. Gromov cited as guarantees against the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons the centralized command of these weapons—not by two or more, but one "master"—and the ordinary common sense displayed by the people directly effecting this command. These guarantees are still in existence today. In Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Although the situation is very tricky.

Ukrainian Ministries' Statement

AU0704102493 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 2 Apr 93 p 10

["Statement by Ukraine's Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs" issued in Kiev on 31 March]

[Text] Regarding reports carried by information agencies to the effect that on 31 March Russian Federation Minister of Defense Grachev called upon the world community to exert pressure upon Ukraine, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense and Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs are authorized to make the following statement:

The attempts to frighten the world community with a possible recurrence of the Chernobyl tragedy in Ukraine sound like mockery, considering that they come from that same country from which that tragedy came to our land. It appears that Russia's own economic and political pressure upon Ukraine are no longer sufficient, and its officials are now appealing to the world community for assistance. The questions of nuclear weapons in Ukraine are now being discussed by the Ukrainian parliament that will adopt decisions in the best interests of the Ukrainian people and Ukrainian state.

The artificially created excitement around the nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine is aimed at achieving Russia's jurisdiction over these weapons, so that Ukraine may be deprived of its right to compensation for the components of the weapons.

Therefore, we are dealing with yet another attempt to blackmail and intimidate us.

Ukraine has repeatedly stated and states now that it is ready to discuss and resolve, at any level, problems of nuclear and ecological safety of strategic nuclear forces in Ukraine. Regarding the speculations on this theme, we are ready to consider the question on the possibility of inviting an authoritative international commission of experts.

We are sure that the world community will draw a correct conclusion from such a dangerous call, as it did in the case of Russia's attempt to play the role of a self-styled "guarantor" of peace on the territory of the former USSR. We also appeal to the world community with a request to promote the creation of preconditions for nuclear disarmament not only in Ukraine, but also worldwide.

Kiev, 31 March 1993

Ukraine Cabinet's Stance

LD0604192093 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 6 Apr 93

[Text] In connection with the Russian Federation Government statement disseminated 5 April regarding nuclear weapons located on Ukraine's territory, the press service of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is authorized to state the following:

Unfortunately, the Russian side has again resorted to distortions of Ukraine's position and made unfounded accusations against Ukraine. This requires additional explanation of Ukraine's approaches to this issue. Contrary to the Russian Government's assertions, the Ukrainian leadership has up to now not made statements which deviate from the intention declared by the Supreme Council of Ukraine to acquire nonnuclear status in the future. As is well known, this issue is currently under examination by the Ukrainian parliament, which is carrying out an all-round analysis of it.

Ukraine is opposed to having this entirely serious problem as the subject of political games. It is worth recalling that with the aim of removing speculation on the subject of the safety of nuclear weapons on Ukraine's territory, the Ukrainian side proposed on 31 March to examine the possibility of inviting an authoritative international commission. As one of the successors to the former Soviet Union, and in accordance with the law of Ukraine of 10 September 1991 on enterprises, establishments, and organizations under Union jurisdiction located on Ukraine's territory, Ukraine confirms its right of ownership to nuclear components of weapons, and not
to nuclear weapons located on its territory, including tactical weapons previously removed.

As is well known, in accordance with the Minsk agreement of 30 December 1991, nuclear weapons located on Ukraine's territory are operationally subordinate to the unified command of the CIS strategic forces, and so there are no grounds for changing this status. This position does not mean that Ukraine intends to acquire control over nuclear warheads. In owning only components of strategic nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine does not have the possibility of unilaterally using these weapons, since elements of the control system are located beyond the boundaries of its territory. Neither does Ukraine intend to acquire such possibilities.

The realistic timetable for removing nuclear weapons from Ukraine's territory with the aim of dismantling and destroying them will be determined by a whole series of factors, not least of which will be the completion of the relevant Ukrainian-Russian talks and the conclusion of agreements which will make possible the elimination of nuclear weapons located in Ukraine.

Although the implementation of functions of operational control of strategic forces on Ukraine's territory is reserved for the unified command of the CIS strategic forces, the administrative control of them was handed over to the Ministry of Defense. Nothing in the concept of administrative control of the troops of strategic nuclear forces located in Ukraine gives grounds to see in it the intention to acquire direct control over nuclear weapons.

Out of considerations of principle, Ukraine cannot agree to foreign troops being located on its territory, to which the declaration of Russian Federation jurisdiction over nuclear weapons located in Ukraine will lead.

The disconnection of the main components of the missiles located on Ukraine's territory alone, without the parallel dismantling of the missiles themselves, would not ensure adherence to the demands of physical and ecological safety of missile complexes. All procedures of elimination of nuclear weapons are to be implemented in a clearly defined sequence, proceeding from legal, technical, financial, organizational, and other possibilities. In this manner Ukraine has a serious and responsible attitude to the resolution of complicated problems connected with the existence of nuclear weapons on its territory, and is guided by agreements valid for it on relevant issues; it is not violating any of them.

Ukraine welcomes Russia's readiness to give it additional security guarantees. The main thing now is to ensure the necessary form, time, level and volume of giving these guarantees. We perceive with satisfaction Russia's readiness also to resolve the issue of compensation for nuclear materials, which are Ukraine's property. We understand that this readiness is also extended to components of tactical nuclear weapons which were previously removed. Ukraine gives special significance to ensuring the safety of nuclear weapons, has always endeavored to create all the necessary conditions for this, and is ready to go on fully cooperating with the Russian side on the issues mentioned.

Ukraine calls on the Russian side to occupy a more constructive and realistic position in resolving these problems at bilateral talks. We are interested in all the complex issues of Ukrainian-Russian cooperation in the matter of destroying nuclear arms located in Ukraine being resolved without superfluous polemics and mutual accusations. The language of ultimata and pressure is not an acceptable form of contact between states, says the statement of the press service of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

Kravchuk: Talks Reach 'Impasse'

LD0604155093 Kiev UKRINFORM in Ukrainian 1251 GMT 6 Apr 93

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Anatoliy Grigoryev]

[Excerpt] Kiev, 6 April—Ukrainian-Russian talks on the fate of strategic nuclear weapons located on the territory of Ukraine have reached an impasse. Therefore, I have proposed to Boris Yeltsin that the solution to this problem should be at the level of premiers of both countries, Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk stated during a meeting with members of the U.S. Congress today. The representative delegation of American congressmen was in Kiev on a visit.

Russia is presenting the problem as if Ukraine does not want its solution, continued Leonid Kravchuk. I suppose that some politicians in the West do not know the details either. Strategic nuclear forces which are located on the territory of Ukraine are subordinate to the CIS, that is, including also Ukraine. Russia is now raising the question of the subordination of these forces to itself. Thus, what is at issue is a change in the status of the strategic nuclear forces on the territory of Ukraine. First, however, a legal document on the basis of which this could be accomplished does not exist. Second, a change in the status would mean that foreign troops would be situated in our land, Leonid Kravchuk stressed. In Ukraine there is no law which permits foreign troops to stay on its territory.

Everything which is on the territories of both Ukraine and Russia is the property of the state on which it is situated. This means that in order to transfer nuclear warheads or components to Russia—incidentally, they could be used at nuclear power plants—it is necessary to change the law. Therefore, in the opinion of the head of the Ukrainian state, all questions about the fate of nuclear weapons in Ukraine should be resolved not by means of pressure but proceeding from the realities which have arisen. Prime ministers of both states could unite the efforts of the sides to achieve a mutually acceptable goal, Leonid Kravchuk considers. [passage omitted; Kravchuk talks to delegation about economy, delegation expressed U.S. willingness to assist Ukraine in achieving nonnuclear status]
Early START Ratification Urged

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Deputy Parliamentary Chairman Vladimir Grinyev says Ukrainian deputies must ratify all international agreements on nuclear-weapon cuts as early as possible. Speaking at a news conference in Kiev on Tuesday, Grinyev said he wanted Ukraine to become a nuclear-free state at the earliest time, adding that he would defend his position in the Supreme Soviet.

At the same time, he warned against Russia's attempts to try to juggle the issue and talk in an ultimatum-like tone with Ukraine, describing this as a hopeless policy. Grinyev said that nothing short of a sustained movement towards a nuclear-free status and realization that this was a common problem could lead to a success.

In Sevastopol, the Ukrainian official reaffirmed his commitment to the idea of transferring it for long-term lease to Russia, an option that he believes would make both sides happy. However, he said this would imply Russia's legal recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty over the Crimean territory and help resolve the issue of the Black Sea Fleet.

On the prospects of relations with Moscow, Grinyev said the economies of the two countries would remain interlinked for the next twenty years. He said Ukraine would remain Russia's main trading partner in the West for a long while yet. Grinyev believes that the huge economic potential that Ukraine inherited from the former Soviet Union can only be exploited together with other republics.

Security Guarantee Sought

[Text] The parliament will ratify START I and the Nuclear Arms Nonproliferation Treaty on the condition that Ukraine will be given guarantees of its security. This was stated by Ivan Plyushch at a meeting with the delegation of U.S. Congress representatives which took place on 5 April in Kiev.

No Comment on Russian Statement

[Text] Kiev—By noon 6 April, there had still been no official reaction to the Russian Government's statement on the nuclear weapons stationed on Ukrainian territory.

Neither the press service of the Cabinet of Ministers nor the Ukrainian Foreign and Defense Ministries could satisfy the curiosity of the journalists who wanted to learn at least the Ukrainian Government's initial reaction. When this request was put to Prime Minister L. Kuchma, he said that he still had not read the official document and thus because of his official position simply has no right to comment on any extracts from it.

But the shaping of public opinion surrounding the Russian Government statement has nevertheless already begun. Ukrainian television was first to react. Its political observer produced a commentary in which he called the latest Russian document an "imperial outburst addressed to a former 'younger brother.'"

However, I would stress, that is not an official viewpoint. At the level of experts and working groups a view has effectively emerged on how to implement the idea of the republic's nuclear disarmament. There are two fundamental principles. Ukraine will be ready to say farewell to nuclear weapons if there are effective guarantees from the nuclear powers regarding its subsequent security and territorial integrity. In addition, the destruction of the nuclear warheads must take place in both the time and the proportions which the United States and Russia have accepted for their own countries. The second fundamental condition is that Ukraine for the moment not sign the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which would effectively ban it from having its own nuclear industry. Without uranium enrichment and the production of nuclear fuel for its own nuclear power stations Ukraine could in the future be left completely dependent on energy sources from Russia.

This logic dictates Ukraine's unusual method of realizing the republic's nonnuclear status proclaimed in the declaration.

Ukraine Hails Russian Intent

[Text] Ukraine hails Russia's intention to compensate it for nuclear components of strategic missiles and hopes that space rockets withdrawn earlier from its territory will also be part of this intention. This was pointed out in a statement of the Ukrainian cabinet. However, the document goes on to say, the Ukrainian leadership is not going to allow Russia's jurisdiction over strategic armaments stationed on Ukrainian territory. Operationally, they come under the control of the CIS Allied Command; administratively—of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Government is against this extremely serious problem becoming an object of political games. There is no one single document or statement where the Ukrainian side would cast a doubt over its wish to become a nonnuclear state in the future. However, the speed of this process is geared to only one thing: the volume of Ukraine's security guarantees and negotiations with Russia, says the statement of the Ukrainian cabinet press service.
RUSSIA

Article Questions Progress Under START II

PM3003130193 Moscow NOVOYE VREMIA in Russian No 12, Mar 93 (signed to press 16 Mar 93) pp 28-29

[Igor Sutyagin article: “How Many Nuclear Weapons Does Russia Need. START II Treaty: Step Forward or Step Into Abyss?”]

[Text] After Presidents Boris Yeltsin and George Bush signed the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty), fierce controversy began in our country over how to assess this event—as an historic breakthrough to a glorious future or as an act of supreme betrayal of national interests? The dispute involves generals, scientists, democrats, the opposition, patriots, and Westernists.

This dispute became particularly trenchant after the parliamentary hearings on the treaty began in the Russian Supreme Soviet. It is thought that it will take parliamentarians about two months to come to a final decision either to ratify the treaty, despite its enemies' views, or to reject it.

The Stores Will Not Be Empty

Russia and the United States agreed to cut back their strategic nuclear forces by 1 January 2003 so that the total number of nuclear warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's], submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBM's], and heavy bombers would not exceed 3,500 units.

That notwithstanding MIRV'ed ICBM's must be destroyed, with the exception of no more than 105 such missiles of a single type, transformed into single-warhead missiles. These missiles must be sited in the launchers they were in at the time that the previous START I Treaty was signed.

In practice this means that the treaty authorizes 105 RS-18 (known in the West as SS-19) missile systems to be retained in the arsenal of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces. These systems currently carry six warheads each. Each system will be left with one warhead. The treaty especially stipulates that there is no need to destroy the removed warheads' standard [shtatnyy] platforms. That is the remaining RS-18's retain room to accommodate another five warheads. The same applies to submarines, the number of whose warheads is also to be cut back.

The treaty especially stipulates a commitment to eliminate all so-called “heavy” missiles, these being our RS-20's, widely known by the Western designation of SS-18. Some 90 launchers can be kept provided they are converted into single-warhead missile launchers.

As of 1 January 2003, in accordance with the treaty, the total number of warheads sited on SLBM's must not exceed 1,700-1,750 units.

The fact that the total number of warheads includes all nuclear charges mounted on heavy bombers without exception—be they the latest long-range cruise missile or an obsolete gravity bomb—is an important element in the treaty.

Thus, as a result of the implementation of the START II Treaty, a structure for the sides' strategic nuclear forces could take shape, one possible version of which is depicted below.

Naturally, the table below does not necessarily depict the optimum or the only version possible. For instance, Russia might deploy a larger number of RS-12M missiles—either mobile or silo-launched—and make fuller use of the permitted quota of 3,500 warheads. The United States might in the future stop keeping ground-launched ICBM's in its arsenal, then 96 nuclear-equipped B-1B heavy bombers and up to 67 B-52H's could be kept in the arsenal.

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<th>Russia</th>
<th>United States</th>
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<td>ICBM's</td>
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<td>105 RS-18's</td>
<td>500 Minutemen-3</td>
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<td>350 mobile RS-12M's</td>
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<td>300 silo-launched RS-12M's</td>
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<td>SLBM's</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Typhoon submarines</td>
<td>18 Ohio submarines</td>
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<td>(1,200 warheads on 120 SLBM's)</td>
<td>(1,728 warheads</td>
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<td>7 Kalmar submarines</td>
<td>on 432 SLBM's</td>
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<td>(336 warheads on 112 SLBM's)</td>
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<td>4 Delfin submarines</td>
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<td>Heavy Bombers</td>
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<td>80 TU-95MS's (480 warheads)</td>
<td>20 B-2's (80 warheads)</td>
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<td>20 Tu-160's (240 warheads)</td>
<td>75 B-1B's (900 warheads)</td>
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<td>36 B-52H's (288 warheads)</td>
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<td>3,203 warheads</td>
<td>3,496 warheads</td>
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How Can America Be Turned Into Africa?

Opponents of the START II Treaty claim that it undermines the might of our national strategic deterrence forces, leaving Russia defenseless in the face of overwhelming U.S. superiority.

I would not want to repeat facts that are well-known, but back in 1990-1991 the General Staff, in conjunction with the relevant branches of the armed forces, conducted a detailed study of the question of the maximum permissible level of cuts in the then Soviet strategic nuclear forces, a level that would not increase the danger for the USSR or increase uncertainty when planning to deter potential aggressors. The magic number is perfectly well-known—2,500 warheads.
Undoubtedly, people obsessed with a certain political stance will reject from the outset the justice of this assessment. However, you can only argue with people who are willing to accept their opponent's arguments—otherwise it is no argument, but a crude squabble. It therefore seems productive to try to evaluate the possible consequences arising from Russia's using the number of warheads to be retained following the implementation of the START II Treaty.

The point is that the most vehement enemies of the treaty seriously underestimate the vulnerability of a modern industrially developed state in the event of nuclear weapons being employed and overestimate the counterforce potential of nuclear arms. The calculations carried out by certain specialists do, however, show that the destruction of just 57-65 installations from the military infrastructure on U.S. territory would deprive the United States for at least 5-10 years of the chance of resuming production of certain key categories of modern weapons, heavy transport aircraft, and so on.

Destroying or merely inflicting serious damage on the reactors at 68 nuclear power stations operating in the United States would render about 193,000-430,000 square km totally unfit for habitation for several decades.

This result, terrible per se, would have catastrophic consequences for the U.S. economy: Some 49 nuclear power stations are located on the eastern seaboard and in the Mid-West, and the industrial regions of the Atlantic seaboard and the Great Lakes would end up in an area dangerous for habitation. Florida would cease to be a resort area—it would begin to be reminiscent of the dead area around Chernobyl. For the same reason New York would lose its reputation as the financial capital of the world. The destruction of just one terminal in the Alaskan port of Valdez would deprive the United States for several years of 30 percent of the oil used in the continental United States. And there are after all also chemical enterprises and major reservoirs on U.S. territory.

In order for this apocalyptic picture to take shape, 200-270 warheads have to be delivered to U.S. territory. Given the level of the strategic nuclear forces prescribed by the START II Treaty that quantity of nuclear warheads—or even more—could certainly be delivered to targets in North America even in the worst case scenario for the Russian Army.

What If the Americans Strike First?

That would, for instance, be the case were, first, the U.S. forces to be the first to attack Russian nuclear weapons from alert duty operations mode, that is without raising the strategic forces' level of readiness, something that could be detected in advance.

Second, if all the targets on Russian territory were attacked by the Americans simultaneously, and the surviving Russian missiles only began to be launched once the U.S. attack was completely over. But in practice that scenario has no chance of being carried out since some of the attacking missiles would be detected in advance due to the different flight times to targets located at different distances. Clearly, Russian missiles would start to be launched in retaliation from the more remote regions immediately after the attack on the "closest" Russian targets.

In every case the number of nuclear warheads that would reach U.S. territory would be considerably higher than 200-270. As a result the United States would for at least 10-15 years be put in a position that is not even comparable to the position of today's developing African countries.

All that does, I think, give grounds to say that, even if the START II Treaty still bears the mark of the "cold war," it is a step in the right direction, since it removes an unjustifiably plentiful supply of the "megadeath" that both the USSR (now Russia) and the United States took years to stockpile for "use" on the territory of the "most likely adversary" should the need arise. If the treaty is ratified, there will be more common sense in international relations. Saying that the START II Treaty destroys Russia's ability to check possible aggressive actions against it, is somewhat awkward...

Offers of Help With CW Dismantling Welcomed

In the two months since the signing of the Convention on Chemical Weapons in Paris, 10 more states have acceded to this agreement. So the number of countries that have embarked on the path of renouncing the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons has reached 140. But only two states have yet ratified the convention—Fiji and Mauritius. The document stipulates that it will come into force 180 days after its ratification by at least 65 participants, but not later than two years after it was signed.

So after 13 January 1995 one more problem will be added to all our others—the need to destroy chemical weapon stockpiles. For Russia, this will be a particularly difficult task. Fulfilling our commitments under the convention will require not only the formal consideration of a new factor in international politics, but also very substantial financial expenditure.

In Russia, as President Yeltsin expressively put it the other day, several times more chemical weapons have been stockpiled than could possibly be needed by all the countries in the world. And unlike the United States we have no ready-made infrastructure for the destruction of the lethal stockpiles. Creating one would take, according to various estimates, several billion (!) dollars. Obviously that is a burden beyond Russia's powers. And we cannot cope with it single-handed. Therefore what is now particularly interesting and relevant is the experience of France, the FRG, Italy, and other countries, which have
decided, on their own initiative, to help us in the cause of eliminating weapons of mass destruction. International assistance would help, on the one hand, to make not only Russia but the entire world safer, and on the other, to lift part of the financial and economic burden from the shoulders of our state and ultimately the Russian people.

Statute on Military Product Export Control
93WP0097A Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian No 5, 1-7 Feb 93 p 24


[Text] The Russian Government has confirmed the listing of military-designated production, export and import of which are effected by license. The Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations will issue licenses only in cases where the appropriate government decision has been made. A license is issued for one production variety.

Statute on Licensing Procedure for the Export and Import of Military-Designated Production (Work, Services) in the Territory of the Russian Federation

1. This statute determines licensing procedure for the export and import of military-designated production (work, services) on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Licensing in the Russian Federation of shipments of special components for the production of arms and military equipment within the framework of CIS member states is effected in accordance with procedure as determined by Decree of the Russian Federation Government No. 517 dated 24 July 1992.

2. The export and import of military-designated production (work, services) is effected on the basis of licenses issued by the Russian Federation Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations.

A license is issued to entities of economic activity which have received the authorization of the Russian Federation government to export and import military-designated production (work, services).

A license which has been issued is not transferable to other juridical or physical persons.

The procedure for registering a license is determined by the Russian Federation Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations. In this regard, applications for the export of military-designated production (work, services) are coordinated with the Russian Federation Committee on Defense Sectors of Industry and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense.

Applications for the export of released assets of military designation are issued upon additional coordination with the Russian Federation State Committee on the Management of State Assets.

The Russian Federation Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, jointly with the Russian Federation State Customs Committee upon coordination with the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, has the right to introduce necessary changes to the Product Nomenclature of Foreign Economic Activity (henceforth termed TN VED).

3. The following comprise grounds for the registration of an export license for military-designated production (work, services):

—decision of the Russian Federation government;

—application drawn up according to established procedure;

—original of a certificate of the end user of military-designated production (work, services) issued by an authorized organ of the receiving country;

—signed or initialed contract for the export of military-designated production (work, services);

—original of authorization, or its certified true copy, for the accomplishment of export-import operations by a foreign firm in military-designated production (work, services), issued by an authorized organ of the country in which this firm is registered.

4. The following comprise grounds for issue of an import license for military-designated production (work, services):

—decision of the Russian Federation government;

—application drawn up according to established procedure;

—signed or initialed contract for the import of military-designated production (work, services).

5. A license for export (import) of military-designated production (work, services) is issued for one production variety on the TN VED, regardless of the number of production entries included in a contract.

In certain situations, issue of a general license for several production varieties is permitted to entities of economic activity authorized to export (import) military-designated production (work, services) by decision of the Russian Federation government on the basis of agreements of the Russian Federation with foreign countries, if these production varieties belong to the same product subheading of the TN VED.
6. A general license is issued to an applicant for a period of one calendar year. Export (import) operations under a general license may be carried out through one or several transactions.

A one-time license is issued to an applicant for a period of up to 12 months for the conduct of export (import) operations for each separate transaction.

The period of validity of a license may be extended at the justified request of an applicant by the Russian Federation Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations. Extension of the period of validity of a license is confirmed in writing.


7. A license or justified refusal to issue one is sent to the applicant not later than 25 days after the date the application arrives at the Russian Federation Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations.

In the event an applicant is asked to provide additional information, the time frame for issue of a license is computed from the date such information arrives at the Russian Federation Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, and comprises not more than 15 days.

Issued licenses are registered with the Russian Federation Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations.

8. The Russian Federation Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations has the right to cancel the validity of a license based on decisions of the Russian Federation government or Interdepartmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and Foreign Countries, as well as to suspend its validity in the event a license holder violates the procedure established by this statute.

Suspension of the validity of a license by the Russian Federation Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations may be appealed to the Interdepartmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and Foreign Countries, whose decision is final.

9. The Russian Federation Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations determines procedure according to which exporters and importers of military-designated production (work, services) submit information for statistical accounting and reporting, and for verifying that payments are made as established by legislation of the Russian Federation.

10. The Russian Federation State Customs Committee exercises control over export from the territory of the Russian Federation and import into the territory of the Russian Federation of military-designated production (work, services).

11. Entities of economic activity bear responsibility for violations of this statute in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation.

Approved by Decree of the Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation No. 80 dated 28 January 1993

### Listing of Military-Designated Production (Work, Services) on the Territory of the Russian Federation Whose Export or Import Is Effect by License

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production Designation</th>
<th>TN VED Code*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks and other self-propelled armored vehicles with and without armament, parts and accessories to these—</td>
<td>00000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military aircraft:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters with empty weight not greater than 2,000 kg—</td>
<td>11900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters with empty weight greater than 2,000 kg—</td>
<td>12900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes and other aircraft with empty weight not greater than 2,000 kg—</td>
<td>20900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes and other aircraft with empty weight greater than 2,000 kg, but not greater than 15,000 kg—</td>
<td>30900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes and other aircraft with empty weight greater than 15,000 kg—</td>
<td>40900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts for aircraft classified within product headings 8802-8803</td>
<td>10900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8803</td>
<td>20900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8803</td>
<td>30900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8803</td>
<td>20900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apparatus for aircraft take-off and flight; carrier deck braking apparatus or similar mechanisms for aircraft landings; ground-based simulators; parts for such apparatus—</td>
<td>90100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apparatus for aircraft take-off and flight; carrier deck braking apparatus or similar mechanisms for aircraft landings; ground-based simulators; parts for such apparatus—</td>
<td>90990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolvers and pistols (except those classified under product headings 9303 and 9304)—</td>
<td>00100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolvers and pistols (except those classified under product headings 9307)—</td>
<td>00000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9302</td>
<td>00900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Production Designation | TN VED Code*  
--- | ---  
Parts and accessories to military weapons, revolvers, and pistols classified under product headings 9301 and 9302--9305 | 10000  
9305 | 90100  
Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles, and similar weapons for conducting combat operations and their parts; cartridges, other ammunition, projectiles and their parts—9306 | 90100  
Military-use powders—3601 | 00000  
Military-use explosives—3602 | 00000  
Military-use detonation devices—3603 | 00900  
Telescopic and laser sights for mounting on weapons periapces, military-use optical and laser scopes, mechanisms, devices, parts, and accessories to them—9013 | 10000  
Military-use navigational devices and accessories to them—9014 | 00000  
Military-use radar apparatus, radio navigation devices, and remote-control radio equipment, parts and accessories to them—8526 | 00000  
Military-use parachutes (including airship parachutes) and rotating parachutes, their parts and accessories—8804 | 00000  
Transmitting apparatus for radiotelephone and radio-telegraph communications, radio or television broadcasting, with or without receiving equipment, sound-recording, or reproduction apparatus, military-use television cameras, parts and accessories to these—8525 | 00000  
Means of protection from toxic substances used in combat, parts and accessories to these*—9308 | 00000*  
Military uniforms and accessories*—6508 | 00000 *  
Military-designated work and services* | At the end of the appropriate TN VED code insert "1" instead of "Q"  
Normative-technical documentation for military-designated production (design and operation documentation)* | At the end of the appropriate TN VED code insert "2" instead of "Q"  

*TN VED—Product Nomenclature of Foreign Economic Activity

Article Views Arms Export Control Regulations

93WP0082A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 3 Feb 93 p 2

[Article by Vadim Bardin: "Government To Control Export of Special Equipment"]

[Text] Viktor Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Council of Ministers, has signed a government decree "On Licensing Procedures for the Export and Import of Military Products (Works, Services) on the Territory of the Russian Federation." Thus "B" experts believe, a new basis has been created for state control of the most effective type of national export. Yesterday the decree was officially distributed.

The competitiveness of nationally produced weapons and accompanying goods is generally recognized. It is quite natural, therefore, that the uncontrolled export of military products has been one of the consequences of the process of arms reduction in Russia occurring in parallel with the withdrawal of the former Soviet Army from the Soviet Republics and the creation of various autonomous military formations in these now independent states. But attempts to concentrate all Russian military exports in special associations of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties are actively opposed by the changing defense industry.

The procedures approved by the government differ fundamentally from usual export licensing: in order to obtain a license for military products, government consent for the corresponding export is required. Further processing of the license is transferred to the discretion of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties. There the requests for export are coordinated with the Committee on the Defense Sectors of Industry and with the Defense Ministry of Russia. Consent for the export of freed-up military property is also coordinated with the Goskommuisheshestvo [State Property Committee]. Licenses for the export (import) of military products are issued for each product type, and general licenses are issued for several types of products only in those cases when the government has allowed its recipient the export (import) of military products on the basis of Russian intergovernmental agreements. There is also another condition: a general license is issued for goods which belong to a single product group.

A one-time license is issued for one deal and is in force for up to 12 months. A general license is for one year, without restriction in the number of deals. A time limit for consideration of a license request is also defined: 25 days from the moment that the documents reach the ministry. The ministry also has the right to annul licenses already granted, on the basis of a decision of the government or of the Interdepartmental Commission for Military-Technical Cooperation, which has the final say when disputes arise.
Overall, the “B” experts believe that the government decree, which officially does not limit the number of exporters of military goods, introduces clarity in the licensing of exports and provides a very effective mechanism for state control of this type of export activity.

Some types of licensed military products:

- Telescopic and laser sights for mounting on weapons, periscopes, military optical and laser tubes, devices, instruments, parts and accessories for them. Code TN VED 901310000.
- Military navigational instruments and accessories to them. Code TN VED 901400000.
- Military parachutes (including dirigible parachutes) and rotating parachutes, their parts, and accessories. Code TN VED 880400000.
- Transmitting apparatus for radiotelephone and radiotelegraph apparatus, radio broadcasting and television, including or not including receiver, apparatus; sound recording or reproduction apparatus, military television cameras, parts, and accessories to them. Code TN VED 852500000.
- Protective equipment against military toxic materials, parts, and accessories to them. Code TN VED 930800000.
- Military uniforms and accessories to them. Code TN VED 650800000.

Grounds for processing a license for the export (import) of military goods:

- Decision of the government
- A duly processed request (coordinated with the Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry, the Ministry of Defense, and, if necessary, with Goskomimushchestvo)
- A signed or initialed contract
- An original of the certificate of the user of the goods, issued by the authorized organ of the receiving country (only for the export of military goods)
- An original or official copy of the consent for execution of export/import deals involving special equipment by a foreign company, issued by the authorized organ of the base country of the company (only for the export of military goods)

The Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties has the right to elicit from the applicant any information necessary for issuance of the license (only for the export of military goods).

Paper, Minister Review Uranium Trade Outlook
PM2903150193 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 20 Mar 93 p 4

[Mikhail Rebrov article, incorporating interview with Russian Atomic Energy Minister V.N. Mikhaylov, carried under the “Defense Complex” rubric; date and place not given: “Whom Will Unenriched Uranium Enrich? Russia Seeks a Place in the World Market, but Without Impairing Its Own Security”]

[Text] It is unwise for the uninitiated to get involved in the discordant disputes over the sale of uranium. Some shout: “They have betrayed Russia”; others that “Russia has betrayed us.” But all of them have the same argument: “Highly enriched uranium from the warheads of our missiles is disappearing across the ocean with the knowledge and active participation of the authorities.” In other words, we are selling for a song the guarantees of our own security to the former enemy on whom those missiles were targeted for many years.

Is that actually so? What is the truth here, do we have deliberate rumormongering or naive delusion? I began my conversation with Professor Viktor Nikitovich Mikhaylov, Russian Federation atomic energy minister, with those questions. His answer was categorical: “The rumors are the product of false ideas: It is not highly enriched but low-enriched uranium, not nuclear explosive material but fuel for peaceful atomic power stations. That’s how it all started.”

But now everything is in order. The “Uranium Project” (as it is called) was set up in the former USSR on the basis of the accelerated development of atomic energy and for purely military purposes. Both those tasks were resolved. The world’s first AES [nuclear electric power station] was commissioned, power reactors were created for submarines and surface ships, as were atomic and hydrogen bombs, warheads for missiles... Moreover, we built up vast stockpiles of uranium, which will be enough for 10-15 years of continuous operation of all the AES’s of Russia and Commonwealth countries.

Such is the result of the decades of the cold war, of the unrestrained buildup of nuclear muscle and rivalry with the United States. But then the “era of disarmament,” as it is known, dawned, and the inevitable question arose: What is to be done with the weapons-grade uranium from the warheads? It has a high—90 percent—concentration. The idea of “reprocessing” or “diluting” the highly concentrated uranium with natural uranium in order to obtain low-enriched power-grade fuel also arose at the time. As did the idea, given that we have enough of both, of selling some of it abroad.

And again the question arises: Whom will the unenriched uranium enrich? The answer is clear cut: Russia. The Americans will naturally not come out losers either. The laws of the market are such that everyone seeks to get his own share. What share is another matter.

Russian uranium (and plutonium too) are cheaper than their American counterparts. The content of uranium-235 in its natural state is extremely small—only 0.7 percent. Such a concentration rules out its use in atomic warheads and in most kinds of nuclear reactors. Enrichment is essential, which demands special production techniques, highly sophisticated modern equipment, and considerable energy costs. And although many people in the West consider Russian technology “old-fashioned...
and trapped in the grip of a wrecked economy," the Americans are 15 or even 20 years behind us.

As far as converting weapons-grade uranium into power-grade uranium is concerned, that too is very advantageous, as it is not necessary to carry out mining operations, start up subplate production and enrichment plants etc. The cost of converting the highly enriched uranium contained in nuclear weapons into unenriched uranium (or, more precisely, into the necessary concentration) is substantially lower than by conventional means of production.

"The fissile material contained in our nuclear arsenals represents a large unutilized asset which can be converted into hard currency—primarily for the purposes of converting the nuclear weapons complex, implementing Russia's environmental revamp program, and creating our own national Russian science support fund. Leaving aside this immediate advantages, I would say that the sale of uranium will benefit Russia rather than the Western countries through the repayment of our debts..."

An "Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States on the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons" was signed at the end of February. It is anticipated that the value of the uranium sold will be to $8-9 billion; Russia's earnings will be worth $150-200 million per annum in the first five years and will then increase. The American side has also agreed additionally to buy Russian unenriched uranium (4-5 percent in terms of the isotope uranium-235) for a sum of $115 million.

Thus the fact of Russia's access to the world market with a high level of competition and high added value on uranium products is already noteworthy in itself. What will we gain from this agreement? And here Mikhailov added weighty arguments:

"It will make it possible to set up production to process highly enriched uranium into power-grade uranium, to ensure its long-term operation, to increase the workload of existing separator plant capacities, to reduce state expenditure on storing nuclear material released as a result of disarmament and will also promote further building of confidence between Russia and the United States..."

All that is so. But, I repeat, the market is the market. The arrival of our uranium on it has caused dissatisfaction among certain U.S. circles, people have started talking about sanctions against Russia, and a so-called dumping investigation has been organized. And the price of reprocessed uranium ore has fallen on the U.S. market, which has caused extraction to be cut back, and, given that the U.S. Department of Energy holds the interests of its own nuclear industry dearer than the Russian, it has wished to become a go-between on more favorable terms. The Atomic Energy Ministry thinks otherwise, however; according to the minister's statement, he does not intend to "nursemaid" foreign civil servants and will continue seeking to secure his own rights and interests; in short, Russia will not accept discriminatory terms.

Another important point. The signed agreement sets out strict limits to the use of the uranium bought from us: It can only be directed toward peaceful purposes. And that will strengthen the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime, facilitate the recording of all nuclear materials, and enhance their "physical protection" and, consequently, the protection of the environment too.

"If we do not reach agreement with the Americans on all points in our plan," the minister concluded, "the contract could be canceled. But it is not we but the Americans who will lose. They need time to retool their enterprises and create new technology. And there are many people in the world who want nuclear fuel...."

Interpol Russia Chief on 'Radioactive Exporting'

Militia Lieutenant General V.P. Ignatov, chief of Interpol's Russia bureau, answers questions by FEDERATSIYA editorial office, reported by Veniamin Polubinskii "Only for FEDERATSIYA": "Radioactive Business: Myths and Reality"

"[Militia Lieutenant General V.P. Ignatov, chief of Interpol's Russia bureau, answers questions by FEDERATSIYA editorial office, reported by Veniamin Polubinskii "Only for FEDERATSIYA": "Radioactive Business: Myths and Reality"]"

[Text] Lately, the mass media has been frequently reporting on attempts to take various radioactive materials out of Russia and on criminal groups' cashing in on the sale of Russian strategic raw materials abroad.

To what extent does this information correspond to reality? How extensive is the "radioactive exporting business" and does the underground trade in these materials not pose the real threat that homemade nuclear weapons will eventually crop up somewhere? These were the questions the editors put to Militia Lieutenant General V.P. Ignatov, chief of Interpol's Russian national central bureau.

In Pursuit of Sensation

I need to say frankly that many news media reports about attempts to take radioactive materials out of the country contain inaccuracies, and the facts published are not always verified and checked by editorial offices. Some reports are obviously designed to "tickle" the readers' nerves.

Not so long ago "Ostankino," in a bid for sensation-ali, revealed to TV viewers that in Omsk the law-enforcement agencies had thwarted an attempt to steal so-called "red mercury" allegedly used in nuclear technologies. It even showed test tubes and vessels with this substance confiscated from the criminals, and it was shouted from the rooftops that we should soon learn the secret of the radioactive "specter" that foreign special
services have for so many years been hunting so unsuc-
cessfully, and which is now being hunted too by under-
ground nuclear business operators. However, the prom-
ised continuation of that TV feature never came.

Almost at the same time NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
reported on the courageous adventures of a reporter
from a Prague newspaper, M. Mrnk [as transliterated],
who managed to get hold of a whole test tube full of "red
mercury." According to the successful journalist, it "is
produced in the famous Krasnoyarsk-25, which manu-
factures classical-type nuclear bombs."

This story is fiction, pure and simple, from beginning to
end. Moreover there is no such city on Krasnoyarsk soil,
and no nuclear bombs are produced there. The main
thing, however, is that it has been incontestably proved
that "red mercury" does not exist in nature. And if from
time to time people come forward claiming that they
possess a substance of this name, invariably it transpires
that they have fallen victim to smart confidence trick-
sters. The latter simply foist on the unsuspecting buyers
ordinary mercury slightly colored by additives or its
simple compounds.

It could be argued that where there is smoke there is fire
and if the concept "red mercury" has existed for nearly
half a century, there must be something real behind it.
Everything will fall into place once we turn to history. As
is known, the nuclear industry in the USSR was created
in the midforties. Naturally, from the start, not only
information about production, but also all nuclear mate-
rals were strictly classified. It was precisely for that
reason that an idea was born to designate them by the
code name of "red mercury," especially since that term
was already being used by foreign nuclear scientists. That
is the entire explanation of the fact that neither special
services nor journalists have thus far been able to find
this mysterious substance.

And Yet Journalists Are Right

They are right in that the criminals are not abandoning
attempts to steal radioactive materials and take them out
of Russia to foreign countries. They are correct in their
concern over the possible serious consequences of such
criminal acts.

The fact remains: People seeking easy gain are hunting
not only for the radioactive "scepter," but also the quite
corporeal caesium, plutonium, and uranium. Not so long
ago the prosecutor's office of the Udmurta republic
started criminal proceedings and opened an investiga-
tion into a case of the stealing, illegal storage, and
transfer of uranium. Over several months 100 kg of
uranium was stolen from the Chepetsk mechanical works
located in the city of Glazov. Having established requi-
site ties with their nearby foreign parts and with more
distant foreign countries, the criminals tried to forward
the stolen strategic raw materials there. Luckily, their
transactions were thwarted in good time by law enforce-
ment agencies. One of the traders was detained in Brest
when attempting to sell several kilograms of the metal to
a Polish citizen. Another "entrepreneur" was arrested at
the Beloruskiy railway terminal in Moscow in the
middle of a deal with a Lithuanian citizen. Eight factory
workers and several city residents were implicated in the
illegal operations with the stolen uranium. During the
search of the detainees over 60 kg of uranium was
discovered, and also thousands of dollars and large sums
of money.

Apart from this incident, in 1992, another two attempts
to steal radioactive materials were stopped. Criminals
attempted to steal 1.5 kg of uranium from a Moscow
Oblast enterprise, and eight kg at a plant in Nizhniy
Novgorod Oblast.

I can state with full responsibility that not a single
criminal attempt to steal weapons-grade nuclear mate-
rials has been registered at any Russian military indus-
trial installation. All instances of the illegal use of radio-
active substances uncovered by our law enforcement
agencies were related to those that cannot be used to
fabricate weapons without special technologies and
equipment. In an overwhelming majority of cases the
subject of the illegal use were ionizing radiation mate-
rials (strontium, caesium, and cobalt).

It should be stressed that one of the driving motives for
such criminal operations is the impression, artificially
created by some mass media outlets, that there is alleg-
edly a huge demand for the above materials in foreign
countries, that their prices are high, and that it is easy to
export them from Russia. Our bureau, at its own initia-
tive, repeatedly asked corresponding foreign countries
whether such statements tally with reality. Virtually
none of them has confirmed that these rumors are
correct.

For our part, we are seeking to thoroughly consolidate
contacts with our foreign colleagues on questions of
preventing and solving crimes related to radioactive
materials. In the past year alone we have received from
abroad 21 reports on such cases. On each of them
requisite checks were made and their results were duly
reported to the initiators of the inquiries.

The West Is Also Concerned

Problems of illegal circulation of radioactive substances
have recently been causing growing concern in the inter-
national community. It is no accident that Interpol is
giving such serious attention to questions of preventing
and fighting these crimes. In January 1993, the first
European working meeting on the illegal circulation of
such materials was held in its General Secretariat
(Lyons, France). Taking part in it were delegations from
23 European countries, including one from the Russian
Internal Affairs Ministry, and also representatives of the
United States and Canada as observers.

It was stressed at the forum that the above offenses
should be looked at in the overall context of ecological
crimes. The situation in this field in some European
countries was analyzed. It was noted that along with
normal trade exchanges and use of radioactive substances in science and various technologies, in a number of Western countries there is a "black market" in them, while illegal circulation is increasing. Thus, whereas in 1991 in Germany only one illegal transaction involving such materials was registered, in 1992 there were 15 such deals. Along with this, several hundred cases of fraudulent operations were registered involving enriched nuclear materials. What is usually offered for sale is metallic uranium or sources of ionizing radiation. In Belgium in the past three years, 21 instances of unauthorized circulation of allegedly radioactive substances were registered. However, subsequent investigation revealed that all these transactions were of a purely fraudulent nature.

Participants in the meeting also familiarized themselves with Austrian legislation providing for liability for negligent (careless) handling of radioactive materials and also for polluting the environment with them. Crimes related to them are now in the charge of a special Internal Affairs Ministry task force created as part of the Anti-terrorism Directorate.

Our delegation reported on measures undertaken at the state level to ensure nuclear and radiation security in Russia and also on concrete examples of international cooperation in this field. We raised the question of the need to work out an international legal act (possibly a Convention) to combat nuclear terrorism that would provide a legal foundation for closer collaboration of the states interested in preventing it.

The European meeting in Lyons once again confirmed the general concern over this increasingly prominent phenomenon that poses a serious threat to public security.

**On a Firm Regulatory Basis**

Along with the strengthening of practical measures taken by law enforcement agencies, Russia is revising its normative basis defining not only nuclear, radiation, and technological security standards, but also requirements for ensuring dependable protection of nuclear materials and installations. In particular the Supreme Soviet is currently considering a draft law of the Russian Federation "On the Use of Nuclear Energy."

Nonetheless, even now there are sufficient legal means to fight the above crimes. I would like to remind you that in line with Russia's commitments arising from the international Convention "On Physical Protection of Nuclear Material," back in 1988, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium passed an edict whereby the following new statutory crime provisions were included in our Penal Code:

- illegal acquisition, storage, use, transfer or destruction of radioactive materials (Articles 223/2, under part I—imprisonment for a term of up to five years, under part II—up to 10 years);
- theft of radioactive materials (Article 223/3—imprisonment for terms between three and 10 years with or without confiscation of property);
- threatening to commit the theft of radioactive materials or to use them (Article 223/4, under part I—imprisonment for a term of up to three years, under part II—up to five years);
- violation of the rules of storage, use, accounting, and conveyance of radioactive materials and of other rules of their handling (Article 223/5, under part I—imprisonment for a term of up to three years, under part II—up to 10 years).

Without in the least belittling the danger inherent in the illegal radioactive business, at the same time the situation should not be over dramatized. The talk about the so-called threat originating from Russia's territory has no foundation in reality. Its law enforcement agencies have sufficient possibilities to more or less safely close off the channels for the uncontrolled disappearance of radioactive materials abroad.

City's Plan To Export Osmium-187 Examined

934K0739A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 11, 17 Mar 93 p 13

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondent Kirill Belyaninov: "Theater of the Absurd Surrounding Osmium-187: A Few Words About the Mayor of St. Petersburg's Contribution to the Development of National Physics"]

[Text] On 13 October 1992 D.V. Sergeyev, deputy mayor of St. Petersburg for economic matters, moved onto the world market. The move had been occasioned, strictly speaking, by exclusively domestic factors: winter was advancing on the city, and there was no chance of coping with it without the attraction of foreign capital.

D.V. Sergeyev set forth his thoughts on the results of a study of the overseas market in the form of a letter to the government, requesting for "a solution of the problems of maintenance of the viability of the municipal economy" the granting of an export license for 20 kg of osmium-187. The government responded favorably to the request, and S.Yu. Glazyev, deputy minister of foreign economic relations at that time, replied: "In the event of the allocation of export quotas, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of Russia will accept for consideration an application for the granting of licenses for exports of osmium-187." The letter then made its way to the Committee of the Russian Federation for Precious Metals and Gemstones and, subsequently, to a number of very serious organizations. And it seemed that the dazzling foreign economic prospects opening up to the St. Petersburg City Hall would finally make it possible not only to supply hot water in good time but also to touch up if only a little the facade of the "cradle of the revolution," had the scientists not interfered.
V.N. Prusakov, director of the Molecular Physics Institute of the "Kurchatov Institute" Russian research center, for example, requested of the Ministry of Finances additional funds for testing and announced, incidentally: "There was speculative demand for osmium-187 isotopes in 1992. Price was to the purchasers 'no object.' The situation is such that the product could have great commercial value. Together with this we, as physicists, wonder: Which of osmium-187's properties evoked such great interest in it? There is as of this time a number of versions concerning its application, but none of them can be taken as reliable." In conclusion the director requested of the Ministry of Finances 7 million rubles and 2-2.5 kg of natural osmium, promising within six to eight months of research to have obtained 5-10 grams of the notorious osmium-187.

S.K. Kalinin, corresponding member of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, and V.I. Lavetskiy, chief of the Engineering Division of the Dzhezkazganstvetmet Research-Production Association, were even more specific in their exegesis of the situation. According to their data, in samples of the ore of the Dzhezkazgan deposit—the biggest source of osmium—the osmium-187 content constitutes three ten-millionths, that is, "for 1 billion atoms of other elements the ore contains only 1 atom of the isotope osmium-187." And "the quantity of the specimen in... the consignments sold to various research organizations constitutes grams, tens of grams at the most." Obtaining an osmium-187 sample of approximately 99 percent purity is altogether impossible for "it would be necessary to obtain several hundred grams of such a specimen to process almost the entire volume of world production of regular osmium."

In short, neither the Kurchatov Institute nor, even less, the Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan had as yet suspected the staggering successes scored by St. Petersburg's city hall in the study of physics. Although, I repeat, several versions emerged in this connection.

"There is no question at all of any purchase in the West of the osmium isotope, of exports, even less." V.V. Skripchenko, chairman of the Commission of the Supreme Soviet of Russia for Deputies' Control of the Use of Currency Resources and Foreign Credit, believes. "Considering the cost of 1 gram of this specimen, it may easily be estimated that a kilo would cost $1.5-2 million. No businessman would offer the city hall $40 million for Red Mercury Theft Scare Debunked"

Some experts, come to that, assume that it is a question of an elementary game of world market prices. Regular osmium is so specific a commodity that even negligible offers for purchase could lead to a significant rise in prices. Simply put, it was the producers of this metal who were involved in the osmium game. It is, as before, merely the St. Petersburg City Hall situation which is not all that clear. Even if it is allowed that 20 kilos of a superpure isotope were obtained in the secret laboratories of the Smolny and it was planned to use the cruiser Aurora for its conveyance overseas.

I have to upset those awaiting specific conclusions from this story. If only because a logical explanation of the actions of the authorities is impossible. Neither in previous Russian governments nor in the present one have any quantities of any commodity. And as confirmation he spreads out those same official papers, observing: "If I can bring out for you such a rare product as osmium-187, well, for some conventional metals it goes without saying...." Having obtained the credit, the entrepreneur usually goes into hiding. And that, most likely, is that.

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In short, neither the Kurchatov Institute nor, even less, the Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan had as yet suspected the staggering successes scored by St. Petersburg's city hall in the study of physics. Although, I repeat, several versions emerged in this connection.

"There is no question at all of any purchase in the West of the osmium isotope, of exports, even less." V.V. Skripchenko, chairman of the Commission of the Supreme Soviet of Russia for Deputies' Control of the Use of Currency Resources and Foreign Credit, believes. "Considering the cost of 1 gram of this specimen, it may easily be estimated that a kilo would cost $1.5-2 million. No businessman would offer the city hall $40 million for a commodity for which it is hard to find an application."

Skripchenko is sure, for that matter, that the techniques of the conclusion of the deal are in this case far simpler: a foreign entrepreneur is interested not in the commodity but merely the documents for it. Having as a result of negotiations obtained two or three official papers with the signatures of members of the government and the stamps of serious ministries, he may with an easy conscience return home and go to any corporation interested in trade with Russia. Once there, introducing himself, he offers to deliver from the former USSR any quantities of any commodity. And as confirmation he spreads out those same official papers, observing: "If I can bring out for you such a rare product as osmium-187, well, for some conventional metals it goes without saying...." Having obtained the credit, the entrepreneur usually goes into hiding. And that, most likely, is that.

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Plutonium Theft Trial Opens in Moscow

PM0604110593 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA

PRAVDA in Russian 6 Apr 93 p 1

[N. Yefimovich report: "Plutonium Can Damage Your Health"]

[Text] Orel—Several staffers at the Orel branch of the Moscow Instrument Making Institute attempted to sell 75 grams of plutonium for $100,000. They had stolen this rare nuclear material from a laboratory at their institute. This deal, unusual for the local market, did not go ahead—the militia intervened. Criminal proceedings have been instituted against its participants.

Red Mercury Theft Scare Debunked

93P50134A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY

in Russian 27 Mar 93 p 20

[Andrey Sasko article: "Investigation of the Theft of Red Mercury: The Mercury in Fact Turned Out Not To Be Strategic"]

[Text] Yesterday it was finally established that the red mercury stolen from an Omsk factory by two Kazakh brothers is not that strategic substance about which there has been so much talk in recent years. The brothers were detained while trying to sell 4 kilograms of mercury.
KOMMERSANT as early as 20 March expressed doubts as to whether the stolen mercury was the so-called "red." Experts also confirmed this conclusion after analyzing the stolen substance in the possession of the thieves.

Yevgeniy Ovchinikov, senior investigator in a department of the Internal Affairs Administration, reported yesterday to KOMMERSANT that there is now no question of smuggling "red mercury." In fact the substance is called "red mercuric oxide" [rtut okis krasnaya]. The Omsk office of the Institute of Catalysis of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences carried out its analysis. It was carried out in glass half-liter containers, labelled "pure red mercuric oxide" TU6-09-3927-75, net weight 1 kilogram, batch 18, Slavyorod Factory imeni Vereshchagin. The experts' conclusions: "The substance in each of the four containers is red oxide of mercury [krasnii oksid rtuti]. It is used in laboratory work and to derive chemical flow sources" [poluchenyi khimicheskikh istochnikov toka]. As the investigator explained, there were also mistakes as to who was buying and who was selling. This substance has no strategic value; one can find it in any school laboratory.

Nuclear Facility Said Disguised as Seismological Lab
AU2403134493 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 23 Mar 93 p 1

[Besik Barateli commentary from Tbilisi: "A Bang in Semipalatinsk Resounds in Chukotka, or Why the Seismological Laboratory in Nizhniy Eshery Is So Dear to Russia"]

[Text] As a high-ranking military official—a retired Russian Army colonel presently residing in Tbilisi—stated in a confidential conversation, the military facility in the village of Nizhniy Eshery has the status of separate battalion and is a seismological laboratory. It belongs to the 12th Main Administration of Russia's Ministry of Defense Headquarters, which deals with questions associated with nuclear weapons. All together, there are ten such facilities on the territory of the former Soviet Union and they constitute a special brigade with the headquarters in the town of Zagorsk-7 near Moscow. Beside Eshery, such military units are located in Plesetsk, Novaya Zemlya, Siberia, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere.

The laboratory in Eshery conducts observations on the seismological state of the earth's crust on the southern flank of NATO, in North Africa, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. However, according to the source, who used to work at the Eshery laboratory in the 1970's and 1980's, its activity is not limited to observations of the seismological state of the earth's crust. The laboratory is located underground at a depth approximately equal to the height of a 30-story building and is literally stuffed with expensive uranium-containing equipment. This equipment is used to conduct experiments with directional nuclear explosions. As a rule, nuclear charges of small or medium power are placed in shafts and detonated in such a way that the resulting waves cause narrowly directed wavelike tremors of the earth's crust in a specific area. According to the informant, as early as at the beginning of the 1970's, such a directional explosion detonated in Semipalatinsk was recorded in Chukotka.

Tectonic weapons were quite successfully developed in the former Soviet Union, and this area of development was a priority one. That is why the Eshery laboratory as well as other laboratories of the 12th Administration were classified as even more top secret than the activities of military intelligence. It is claimed that the dismantling of the laboratory will cost several hundred million dollars, and it is virtually impossible to dismantle such precision equipment complete with biological sensors of seismological activity.

If one is to believe the statements by the Russian military leadership, no personnel remain today at the Eshery laboratory, which is located in the immediate vicinity of the frontline in the confrontation between Georgia and Abkhazia. About 800 Russian assault troops are guarding the territory of the laboratory.

Eduard Shevardnadze, as one of the high-ranking communist leaders back in the 1970's and 1980's, perhaps knew about the actual state of affairs in the laboratory and, for that reason, offered the Russian side the chance either to use it jointly or to invite international observers to monitor the facility. The Russian side responded by categorically refusing the offer.

In the opinion of competent military experts in Tbilisi, the very presence of this laboratory in the path of advancing Georgian troops last August caused a halt to their offensive at the beginning of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. As experts maintain, this particular laboratory as well as the strategically extremely important air base in Gudauta—the main center of Abkhazian separatists—are within the sphere of Russia's military-strategic interests in the Georgian Black Sea shore area.

Military Spokesmen on Eshery Lab
934K0767B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 13, Apr 93 p 6

[Report by D. Makarov: "It Is Impossible To Create a Tectonic Weapon"]

[Text] "The lab in Eshery is as capable of influencing the seismological situation as the thermometer outside your window is capable of influencing the weather," said Colonel Yu. Cherepanov, deputy chief of the Russian Ministry of Defense's seismological service. Our conversation with officers of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense [GU MO] took place after ARGUMENTY I FAKTY published in issue No. 9 Radio Liberty's information on the development of the so-called tectonic weapon.
"Labs such as the one in Nizhniy Eshery are indeed located all over the former USSR. Their task is to broadcast such "strange" information? If underground nuclear explosions were to take place in Eshery or somewhere else in the former USSR, it would have been instantly detected. However, we have not conducted any nuclear explosions for three years.

From the standpoint of physics, in principle, it is impossible to create tectonic weapons for several reasons:

First, it is impossible to generate a directional seismic wave by an underground nuclear explosion.

Second, even if we collect all nuclear weapons accumulated on earth and explode them underground, the seismic energy generated will be barely equivalent to the energy produced by an earthquake measuring 8.9 on the Richter scale, which happens approximately once every three years.

Third, some may object that an underground nuclear explosion, which indeed is not capable of creating an earthquake on its own, may serve as a sort of a trigger for a quake already 'readied' by nature. For this, however, we would have to know how to predict earthquakes so that they could be influenced. Unfortunately, we have not learned to do it yet.

And something else. There are about 1,000 earthquakes taking place on earth every year, but so far nobody has been able to establish any connection between them and underground nuclear testing.

"All of the above," continued General Zelentsov, "is very well known to Western physicists and the military. Therefore, such accusations have never been put forward in serious scientific literature or in communications of U.S. or NATO officials."

There was a question, however, that the officers of the 12th GU MO could not answer with certainty and could only offer some guesses. The question goes more or less like this: "Why do earthquakes on the territory of the former USSR happen, of all places, in the zones of ethnic conflict?"

One can only offer hypotheses in this respect, believes Colonel M. Sazonov, a department chief in the seismic service. In principle, any natural changes affect human psyche to some extent; this includes the change of seasons and magnetic storms. It is possible that changes in physical fields that take place during earthquakes have a widespread impact on people living in seismologically unstable regions. But this is only a hypothesis which must be proven by special scientific research.

One can ask a logical question: Why did Radio Liberty broadcast such "strange" information?

This is what General Zelentsov thinks on this subject: "A tectonic weapon, had it been created, would be a weapon of mass destruction. It does not work selectively. Therefore, we are being accused of developing a barbaric weapon for use against peaceful inhabitants, thus driving a wedge between the civilian population and the military."

Scientist Claims Binary Bomb at Secret Base

[Text] He arrived a half hour before the appointed time. He said he felt nervous and he hadn't slept all night, getting ready for the first interview in his life. Vladimir Uglev, 46, only recently one of the leading Soviet scientists in the chemical weapons development sphere, by Oleg Vishnyakov; date, place not given: "An Interview With a Noose Around the Neck. One of the Makers of the Soviet Binary Bomb Claims That It Is Being Kept at a Secret Base in the Bryansk Region"—first four paragraphs are introduction]

The Mirzayanov case" became widely known thanks to the Russian and world press. NEW TIMES was the only magazine which managed to interview the scientist just the day before his arrest. In his interview, Mirzayanov spoke about the new class of poison gases, not only one of the leading Soviet scientists in the chemical weapons development sphere who had worked for 15 years in a super-secret town Volsk-17 (about 100 kilometres off Saratov) had the courage to speak. He admitted that he does so after seeing no other way to openly support his colleague Vil Mirzayanov who is prosecuted for allegedly divulging a state secret.

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At that time NEW TIMES undertook an independent investigation of "the binary bomb case." We managed to interview an engineer of the National Organic Chemistry and Technology Institute (GSNIOKIT) Andrey Zheleznyakov who took part in laboratory experiments with the binary weapon created on the basis of the chemical agent code-named Novichok (Fresher). As a result of an accident he was exposed to Novichok and remained an invalid for the rest of his life.

Now the maker of this deadly weapon was sitting in editorial office in person.

[Vishnyakov] To begin with, how was it that you started working in military chemistry?

[Uglev] In 1975 I graduated from the Moscow Institute of Chemical Technology and was assigned a job in the
Volsk branch of GSNIIOKhT. I immediately started working as a member of a group headed by a well-known scientist who developed new types of poisonous agents. I won't call him by name, because he still works in the Institute. It's he who managed to synthesize a principally new phosphorous nerve agent which was later called Novichok.

When I started my job in this laboratory, the work on synthesizing the new chemical was already in full swing—primary investigations were completed and the first results obtained. Over a hundred chemicals of that class were synthesized during the 15 years that I worked there. Only five of them, those which were of “combat use,” were thoroughly investigated. The dubious honour of discovering three of them belongs to me.

[Vishnyakov] What does “thorough investigation” mean?

[Uglev] It means that the substance has passed all the three stages of examination: the gauging of its main parameters, perfection of the technology of its production and, finally, field tests.

[Vishnyakov] Which means that the testing of this new agent did take place at the test-site in Shikhany?

[Uglev] I personally have more than once taken part in it. A few kilos of such substances are manufactured with the help of experimental plants for each such test. In principle, one kilo would be enough to kill thousands of people.

[Vishnyakov] Vil Mirzayanov stated in his interview to our magazine and in his other publications that the destructive power of the agent surpasses the currently most powerful of them all, gas VX, by 5 to 8 times. An expert in the West has already expressed his opinion in the American press that this is impossible.

[Uglev] This is possible. Laboratory experiments demonstrated that the destructive power of the new agent and of VX must be approximately the same. Yet our field tests made it clear that our “product” was much more effective. The military, who directed the tests, wouldn't even dare report the results to the high authorities for a long time, because they looked incredible.

[Vishnyakov] Couldn't you tell us, how many times more potent your “discovery” is than VX?

[Uglev] Of course, I don't have the exact data, but the military told me in a whisper that it was at least 5 to 10 times stronger.

[Vishnyakov] Do you see your discovery as being of the same dimensions as the one made by the Swedish chemist Tammlin who was the first to synthesize VX in 1956?

[Uglev] It’s not for me to judge. I will only note that as early as in the mid-1950’s our scientists were very close to the discovery of this chemical agent. It was later, when I worked in secret archives, that I found their calculations. All their plans were frustrated by the intelligence reports about the success of the Swedish scientist. As a result, their work was discontinued and all efforts were focussed on making our own VX.

[Vishnyakov] Your discovery must have created a sensation in scientific circles...

[Uglev] It did, though at first we did our best to keep the results of our work secret from our colleagues. This would have afforded us to quietly continue investigations. But Victor Petrunin who was Deputy Director of the Volsk branch of GSNIIOKhT made haste to report the success to Moscow. Ivan Martynov, Director of GSNIIOKhT, immediately rushed to Volsk-17.

We were supplied with first-rate equipment—the only thing expected from us was work. We continued our experiments, but we no longer felt at ease. All experiments conducted in our laboratory were classified “work of prime importance,” the highest degree of secrecy in those years. All our reports, in hand writing as was required those days, were sent directly to GSNIIOKhT in Moscow.

Also in 1976 we filed an official application for a certificate of authorship. No answer from Moscow. Only 8 years afterwards I happened to accidentally learn that absolute outsiders had defended their candidate and doctoral dissertations based on the reports we submitted to Moscow. Boris Martynov, son of the then GSNIIOKhT Director, was among them.

[Text] When we realized that our discovery had simply been stolen, I wrote a letter to the Director. My boss and I were called to Moscow, they showed us our documents. Our applications from 1976, as well as our signatures, were falsified. They offered us a deal—a considerable promotion in exchange for our silence, but we refused. After prolonged debates we managed to have the “outsiders” names erased from our application for authorship of the invention but none of them was ever deprived of their scientific degrees. Boris Martynov, D.Sc.(Chemistry), is still heading a laboratory in GSNIIOKhT.

I'm positive that this plagiarism would have been impossible without Victor Petrunin's active participation, a person totally devoid of any moral principles. Very soon he made a swift climb up in rank—now he occupies the Director's chair at GSNIIOKhT.

[Vishnyakov] Is it true that neither the chemical agent you synthesized nor its components (precursors) were included in any of the three lists of semifinished chemical agents whose reserves are subject to obligatory declaration and inspection under the Geneva Convention?

[Uglev] Quite right. Besides, even having eliminated or “reconverted,” under the Convention, all production facilities for the manufacturing of these poisonous agents, we'll easily be able to arrange production of the
new agent from ordinary chemical products, if need be. One only has to know the technology. This is one more “advantage” of this agent over other phosphorous poisonous gases; sarin, soman and VX.

[Vishnyakov] The leaders of your military chemical complex claim that Russia has never had binary chemical weapons. Is that true?

[Uglev] This is a lie. Out of the three new poison agents I have synthesized, one of them is the main component in binary gas which, to the best of my knowledge, has successfully passed field tests.

I also have other information about Russia having at least one more type of binary gas made on the basis of the so-called “Novocheboksarsk product,” a chemical agent which we declared as VX in international agreements. I guess the work over both binary weapons was carried out simultaneously.

[Vishnyakov] But in this case you are speaking about developing and testing, and not about manufacturing, these weapons. In the opinion of the military, developing doesn’t count.

[Uglev] I’m also informed about an undetermined quantity of components for binary weapons having been manufactured and currently being stored at a secret depot somewhere in the Bryansk Region. If, of course, they haven’t destroyed it to “cover their tracks.”

There is also indirect evidence for the existence of binary weapons—the Lenin Prize A. Kuntsevich, V. Petrunin and other “strategians” were awarded in spring of 1991. This could occur only after [printed in boldface] an experimental consignment of a product launched into production was obtained.

[Vishnyakov] Can the components of the Russian binary agent be used separately for the benefit of the national economy?

[Uglev] Such a weapon, if it existed, would be ideal to the military in all respects—any country, even having assumed the obligations not to produce chemical weapons, could nevertheless produce components of binary gas with an easy conscience and use them as insect-killers or dies; at the same time, it would be ready for chemical warfare if the necessity arose. As far as I know, such perfect weapons don’t exist yet. Nevertheless, the agent I have synthesized can be rather easily disguised as a chemical product for civilian use in case of an international inspection.

As concerns the other, not principally important component, it has a rather respectable use in the national economy.

[Vishnyakov] In which domain?

[Uglev] I’d rather not answer this question.

[Vishnyakov] Last September the press published a list of double-purpose chemical agents and technologies. Henceforward their export requires special licences. The resolution was signed personally by Boris Yeltsin. V. Mirzayanov insists that this list fails to include the components both of the new agent and of the “Novocheboksarsk VX.” Consequently, they can be easily exported...

[Uglev] It really does fail to include either. The list mentions the components of the binary weapon based on the “classical” VX and not that which has been produced in Novocheboksarsk for 15 years. The latter, although it has the same basic formula C11,H26,OsPSN as VX, is substantially different from it on the level of radicals. Essentially, this agent is only akin to V-gas, which, however, doesn’t diminish its destructive power.

[Vishnyakov] But the President’s advisors who had prepared the list (perhaps this concerns A. Kuntsevich again) couldn’t have been unaware that it was incomplete. Could they really have consciously drawn up such an incomplete document?

[Uglev] I can’t offer a different answer to your question. As far as I see it, they could have been guided by two motives: the opportunity to sell unhindered strategic chemical agents and technologies to countries like Iraq, Libya or North Korea (none of which has joined the Geneva Convention) and thus enrich themselves or, which is even more likely, the desire to “undermine” the President on the eve of the signing of the Convention and thus impede the process of chemical disarmament. Nor do I rule out the possibility of a collusion between the Russian and American military with the purpose to disrupt detente.

[Vishnyakov] Are you serious?

[Uglev] You should understand that neither Kuntsevich and Petrunin nor their American colleagues can applaud chemical disarmament. When as a young specialist I started working in Volsk-17, I believed that chemical weapons were vitally important to our country to prevent Americans from waging a chemical war against us. Yet I couldn’t obtain from our military an answer to the simple question as to if we had a concept for using these weapons. Even today I’m confident that they’ve never had such a concept for their use—chemical weapons were a nice source of subsistence for our generals, a “trough” from which to get state awards, prizes and subsidies for investigations.

Now they try to forget about it, but in the the days of the August putsch the generals of chemical troops were among the first who saluted the “restoration of order” and who announced their support for the putschists.

[Vishnyakov] Are you aware that after this publication you are likely to share Vil Mirzayanov’s fate?

[Uglev] I made this decision absolutely consciously and I’m prepared to take the consequences.
Tomsk Authorities Deny Biological Weapon Production

LD2903093893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0911 GMT 29 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Yakushev]

[Text] Tomsk March 29 TASS—Experts working in Tomsk biological industry have categorically denied that bacteriological weapons were ever produced in Tomsk.

The statement was made following publications in the American NEWSWEEK magazine, lately published by the MOSCOW NEWS, which greatly alarmed residents of the city full of defence enterprises.

The publications contained a chart mapping out former Soviet cities—centers of bacteriological weapons production, testing and storage. Tomsk was among those cities indicated on the chart.

“We do not know anything about this in Tomsk,” Professor Gennadiy Plekhanov, director of Biology and Biophysics Research Institute, said on Monday.

“This is misinformation. We have never had anything to do with bacteriological weapons,” said Nikolay Cherny, director of “Virion” Scientific and Research Association.

Many other polled experts in biology also categorically denied the development and production of biological weapons in Tomsk.

Privatization of ‘Biomash’ NPO Plant Contested

93P60150A Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Lidiya Ivchenko: “The Building ‘D’ Affair. A Private Firm Has Privatized a Major Medical Factory for a Song”]

[Text] One morning in January a group of men wearing paratrooper uniforms and armed with police truncheons took the fence of the guarded territory of the Moscow Scientific Production Association “Biomash” by storm and ensconced themselves in a building under construction. The leader of the detachment explained to the NPO [scientific production association] management that the men of this private sub-unit were acting under contract with the “Apromed” joint-stock company, which has been asserting a claim to the seized building, and that they would remain there as long as their employer required. At the same time, “Apromed” was planning to demolish the fence and make a gate in order to have its own entrance to the building, which it considers its own.

This is a story for the prosecutor rather than for the newspaper. It contains a host of complicated legal issues, and all possible investigations amount to clearing them up amidst an avalanche of contradictory documents. But the essence of the matter is that a laboratory building built at government expense and intended for the medical industry has been appropriated by the private “Apromed” company. And “Apromed,” of course, will not relinquish it voluntarily.

For a long time the collective of the VNIIbiokhimash-proekt, created to develop technologies based on fine microbiological analysis, had not even had normal working conditions. They had randomly rented premises scattered around Moscow and had taken shelter in attics and cellars. But they gradually built a place for themselves and finally created the complex of buildings in which the laboratory building under construction, building “D,” as it was called, was assigned not the least significant role. Important things were being done within the walls of the institute, including things for military purposes, for which the institute is now being reproached by its former chiefs, who have become the managers of the “Apromed” AO [joint-stock company]. After all, it’s stylish now to curse the military-industrial complex, forgetting that it was not just a consumer but also a creator, who created not the worst products in the world and who brought the country hard currency.

With the start of conversion, the NPO “Biomash,” of which the institute is now part, focused totally on the problems of the national economy, developing technologies for obtaining biologically active substances for medicine, the food industry, and agriculture. Here they created processes for obtaining beta-carotene (prevents many disorders, including oncological ones), amino acids, pectins, microbiological polysaccharides (they increase the yield of oil from wells). They found stimulating additives for animals, ecologically pure plant protectants, biological fertilizers, the technology for obtaining extracts from medicinal herbs with a high output of useful substances, and much else.

Naturally, the workers became interested in having their developments pass beyond the boundaries of the laboratories and yield as valuable products as possible. And here the collective placed their greatest hopes on building “D,” which, as it were, completed the experimental-production cycle.

In June 1990, when the USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 590 “On Approving the Regulation on Joint-Stock Companies and Companies With Limited Liability” came out, on the wave of new trends the former managers of the NPO decided to create a joint-stock company in order, in their words, to attract money from commercial structures and finish construction of the building. In a few short days “Biomash” became one of the founders of the “Apromed” AO, which was headed by M. Kuzmich and V. Makarevich, who simultaneously remained the deputies of the “Biomash” general director. Working in the interests of the private structure created by them, they contributed the unfinished building “D”—state property which did not belong to “Biomash”—to the joint-stock company’s capital fund.
"Perhaps at the time we didn't know, didn't understand what we were doing, that actually privatization was occurring," says "Apromed" AO President M. Kuzmich, "but this uncompleted building, then valued at 1.1 million rubles, was contributed to the capital fund. Yes, it was state property, but after official registration of the documents, everything transferred to the capital fund, in accordance with the 'Law on Property in the RSFSR,' becomes the common property of the stockholders..."

And that is how it all began. In the beginning the collective protested: Why hadn't people been asked? After all, the decision to create a joint-stock company was made individually by General Director V. Popov, in violation of the fifth paragraph of the aforementioned Council of Ministers decree. The director "reassured" the gathering that the NPO was not part of any joint-stock companies. When this was said, "Biomash" had already been listed as a founder of "Apromed" for a half year. As it turns out, were there reasons to conceal the truth? At the same time documents were being officially registered. Literally one month later the uncompleted building "D" was transferred to the "Apromed" AO balance sheet. And what is more, quietly, secretly, one "un-invest"—the stockholder has no right to demand his shares back.

"It is now the property of the joint-stock company," explains M. Kuzmich. "Now, if everyone begins to demand his investment back, we will have to disband ourselves! We are ready to reimburse 'Biomash' the monetary value of its investment..."

There is probably no point in explaining what a thousand-square-meter facility is, compared with 1.1 million inflated rubles. That's right, an enterprise which operates 70 percent for public health needs (the concern supplies 8 billion rubles worth of medicines, blood transfusion systems, etc.) has lost its production area. A private company engaged in the manufacture of cosmetic cream and hair gel has become the proprietor of a building built at government expense. What is more, without compensation, having for this a "Certificate of Ownership for a Privatized Enterprise," issued by the Russian State Property Committee.

I personally had a lot of questions about this. Is it lawful to consider irreversible a conversion to joint-stock company status carried out by the unconstrained decision of people who were simultaneously wearing two official hats? Is uncompensated transfer of a building under construction—state property—into private hands contrary to the RSFSR Law "On Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the RSFSR," lawful? Was it from state positions that former Deputy Chairman of the Russian Property Committee A. Yutkin—who began this "privatization" with his decision—spoke? And is a "Certificate of Ownership for a Privatized Enterprise" issued for a building that no one had privatized, legal?

Everyone interprets these answers in his own way: this is not at all easy amidst the masses of mutually exclusive laws, regulations, decrees and addenda. To crown it all off, by decree of the Russian Federation Government dated 30 December 1991, building "D" is included in a list of the most important construction projects for 1992 being financed from the state budget! It's enough to make your head spin...

I feel for the collective of the scientific production association but I can offer them only one suggestion—apply for arbitration, for the knot of legal ignorance, shortsightedness, scheming and deception can only be untied (or cut) by a court. And I have related this for others' edification: in a complex time of conflict, when innumerable abuses exist, it is still best to learn from others' experience.

Commentary Urges Pyongyang To Clarify Nuclear Intent

SK2903114993 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean 1000 GMT 24 Mar 93

[Talk by station commentator Yuriy Solton from the "Focus on Asia" Program; "Will Pyongyang Make Public the Secret of Its Nuclear Project?"]

[Text] Tension is relaxing on the Korean peninsula. It has been reported that Pyongyang has lifted the complete combat-ready posture of its army. However, Pyongyang's official statements so far have not answered the question of whether it would accept the International Atomic Energy Agency's [IAEA] inspections of its military sites. The deadline given by the IAEA is 31 March.

Since its declaration on the withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT], Pyongyang has kept silent on this matter. This has led people to suspect that its nuclear project has military purposes.

Regarding this, several recent newspaper articles have attracted our attention. In a report by its Moscow correspondent, Japan's SANKEI SHIMBUN said that at the end of the Brezhnev rule, Pyongyang had planned to test its nuclear bombs at one of the Soviet nuclear test sites. There is also a report that Pyongyang has had secret dealings with Tehran. The report also says that the DPRK promised to hand over its technology for nuclear weapons manufacturing to Iran for $500 million. Moreover, Korea is known to have completed its project to manufacture Soviet-designed Scud missiles. Iraq used a similar model during the Persian Gulf war. According to
several other newspaper reports, Pyongyang has developed the Nodong 1 ballistic missile capable of loading a small nuclear warhead with a shooting range of up to 1,000 km.

This report is based on [word indistinct] experts' opinion and intelligence information. Therefore, its accuracy is (beyond doubt).

Still, this report can hardly repel our doubts. In this regard, the United States, Japan, and the ROK are going so far as to prepare countermeasures: In the event that Pyongyang does not accept the IAEA's inspections, this issue will be discussed at the UN Security Council. Then, it will end up with sanctions against the DPRK.

China opposes the sanctions which would aggravate the situation. No one can exercise its influence on Pyongyang to ensure that it accepts the IAEA's inspection or rejoins the NPT. However, unless the DPRK clarifies its nuclear project, it may be faced with stern measures by its neighboring countries. Stability in the region will then be aggravated to the extreme.

**ARMENIA**

**Armenia Considers Export Controls of Material**

NC0304103693 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 2 Apr 93

[Text] An expanded session of the Armenian Council of Ministers Presidium was held under Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan.

It adopted a decision on organizing border trade according to the Armenian-Iranian trade and economic agreement. The decision is to be published.

The meeting also examined a draft decree by the Armenian president on measures to control the export of material, equipment, and technology from Armenia that might be used to produce weapons of mass destruction.

The meeting opened the way for an agreement that allows the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to allocate $57.4 million in credits to Armenia for the construction of the fifth unit of the Razdan Power Plant. The credit will be repaid in 15 years.

The meeting also decided on a system of control over the distribution, use, and committed expenditure of the credits that will be issued for investment purposes.

**BELARUS**

**UK, U.S., Russia Give Security Guarantees to Belarus**

OW0504133993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1106 GMT 5 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Great Britain, the United States, and Russia have given Belarus additional security guarantees, of which the republic's Foreign Affairs Ministry received an official confirmation on Monday [5 April]. The guarantees were given to Belarus in connection with the country's compliance with the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear arms and the Belarusian parliament's ratification of START I.

A memo from London states that "the United Kingdom, in accordance with the UN Charter, will aid any non-nuclear state which is a member of the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear arms, including Belarus, if it becomes a victim of aggression or is subject to the threat of aggression with the use of nuclear arms."
ESTONIA

Cesium-137 Isotope Stolen Again in Estonia

[Shkolnik] Last year Kazakhstan declared its adherence to that organization. 147 states are members of it. To join the IAEA one must sign several agreements about safeguards. Placing peaceful nuclear facilities under safeguards includes a large complex of technical and organizational measures, connected with establishing the appropriate monitoring of nuclear technologies and materials, in order to prevent their use for non-peaceful purposes.

This is already the second visit by IAEA specialists to the Republic of Kazakhstan. The first time they came they acquainted themselves with the work of the nuclear facilities in Aktau and the Nuclear Physics Institute near Alma-Ata. This time they visited Ust-Kamenogorsk and Kurchatov. Among the members of the group were three employees of Division S of the Safeguards Department, headed by a section chief, Mr Murakami.

The purpose of the visit was to acquaint them with our nuclear facilities and to work out further plans for cooperation in placing them under safeguards, training personnel, and defining specific aid to the Republic of Kazakhstan in performing this work.

At the IAEA's expense, an international seminar for workers in the nuclear industry complex and the corresponding state structures will be held in Alma-Ata in June.

[Kazakhstan Nuclear Chief on IAEA Inspections]

[Borisov] Will inspections by IAEA inspectors be announced or will their schedule be agreed on in advance?

[Shkolnik] It is not so large and it is greatly exceeded by the benefits which membership in that international organization will give us. Joining the IAEA will increase the prestige of our state and will make our nuclear policy open. Secondly, it will give us access to new nuclear technologies and will expand the possibilities of our market.

[Kazakhstan Nuclear Chief on IAEA Inspections]

[Borisov] What assessment have the IAEA specialists made of the nuclear facilities which they have visited?

[Shkolnik] According to the specialists' conclusions, the level of technical equipment in our establishments, from the point of view of establishing reliable monitoring, is high enough and makes it possible, in very short order, to prepare them for a safeguards regime. Such an assessment was also given to the Swedish nuclear energy inspectors, with whom we closely cooperate. In that country there is a very high level of work in connection with nuclear safety. My upcoming visit to Sweden envisages discussing what has already been done, as well as training programs for Kazakhstan specialists in that...
country. Such training will take place in March, and a group of 80 persons has already been chosen.

The work connected with joining the IAEA is going forward according to a strict schedule. If there are no problems—and there is practically no reason to expect them—then in September—precisely when an IAEA general conference will be held—our republic will become a full-fledged member of that organization.

Of course, joining that organization is not an end in itself. It is one of the most important phases in creating the republic's nuclear policy. The most important thing is that we must form in society such high concepts of culture and security that they will become superior to any motivations for human activities.

LITHUANIA

Lithuanian Nuclear Fuel Container Missing

LD3003132493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1212 GMT 30 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladas Burbulis]

[Text] Vilnius March 30 TASS—A careful search throughout March has failed to find an unused container of nuclear fuel which has gone missing from Ignalina nuclear power station, according to today’s edition of the newspaper RESPUBLIKA.

The cassette which weighs 270 kilogrammes, together with registration certificate has disappeared without leaving a trace. According to Yuriy Naumov, deputy manager of the nuclear reactors, it costs around 60 thousand U.S. dollars on the world market.

He said that 15-20 new nuclear fuel cassettes are stacked each week in every reactor and this is 60 per cent of the cost of one kilowatt of generated electricity.

"The question of the missing cassette is not only financial, it is also one of prestige for the whole Ignalina nuclear power plant. Bookkeeping of nuclear fuel is extremely poor at the station and this is unsafe for the environment and people", writes RESPUBLIKA.

A nuclear power plant which cannot keep reliable books and store nuclear fuel should be deprived of the right to furthering its acquisition, and is justifiably alarming neighbouring countries and international organizations, it added.

Further Reporting

OW0204210893 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1616 GMT 2 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Director of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in Lithuania Viktor Shevaldin stated that, according to initial information from the yearly nuclear fuel inventory, a lost container of nuclear fuel was not found by the end of March.

The Ignalina commission investigating the incident has established that the container was delivered with nine other containers to the plant's reactor building on August 8, 1992.

The commission decided to conduct a repeat inventory of all nuclear fuel at the Ignalina plant by April 20 of this year. If the container does not turn up, they will run a check on all containers that were delivered to the first reactor in the second half of 1992. They will be able to do this only in July, when the reactor is to shut down for planned repairs. The commission has not lost hope that the missing container may be found in the first reactor.

As is known, specialists from the power plant discovered the loss of the container in the beginning of the year, when conducting an inventory of nuclear fuel. Later it was established that the container's technical documentation - "passport" - is also missing.

The State Inspectorate on Atomic Energy Safety and the International Agency for Atomic Energy have already been notified of the missing container.

UKRAINE

Ukraine's Kravchuk Interviewed on Nuclear Issues

LD0304183393 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 3 Apr 93

[Report by station observer Valentyn Vasylko on "main points" of 2 April live interview with Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk, answering questions posed by readership of MOLOD UKRAYINY newspaper; portions within quotation marks recorded]

[Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, in a live Ukrainian television and radio broadcast on 2 April, answered a variety of questions posed by the readership of the newspaper MOLOD UKRAYINY. Radio Ukraine observer Valentyn Vasylko introduces the audience of Radio Ukraine External Service to the main points of Leonid Kravchuk's answers.

[Vasylko] Here is what Leonid Kravchuk said answering the question on nuclear weapons in Ukraine, the first in a number of topics raised:

[Kravchuk] "It is not for the first time that this question is being asked. It is even being posed by deputies. Today, I received a statement by the Lvov Viche [People's Assembly]. The statement openly demands that the president declare Ukraine a nuclear state.

"Well, to begin with, these issues today are no longer settled by the president, because there is a Supreme
Council declaration, or rather a Supreme Council resolution, to the effect that Ukrainian policy in this sphere is gradually—I would like to stress this—gradually to attain a nuclear-free status and be a state which will accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. All of this is our policy.

"However, policy is one thing. We also must take exactly the road that we have determined and not be a state whose policy changes, because in that case we would not be respected. I have already said this on several occasions and want to stress this once again for you.

"But there also are military, technological, economic, and other aspects of this matter. After all, a nuclear state can only be nuclear by having a nuclear industry. That is to say, the warheads that are today on the nuclear missiles cannot be used by Ukraine as weapons because they were not manufactured by us. This is the main point. We never want to use the warheads as weapons. We stand for the elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world. Thus Ukraine wants to (set an example), but to do so prudently.

"We have certain issues that must be settled, those in respect of Ukraine's security, compensation, aid, finance, organization, and others. These issues must be settled and we will settle them in accordance with our state policy."

[Vasyylko] Answering a question on the former CPSU functionaries, or partocrats, stepping up their activity generally in Ukraine, and particularly in parliament, President Kravchuk said:

[Kravchuk] "I would not like to generalize all the deputies. The term partocrat has already become widely used. But no generalization can be made. As far as using this terminology is concerned, partocrats differ, (it seems to me). Not all of the former Communists in the Supreme Council assess the current situation in the same way and act in the same way.

"However, we must not forget that there are both the right- and left-wings. I want this to be known and analyzed correspondingly. Everything today cannot be blamed on one side. No lesser harm is being caused to us by both the right- and left-wings. However, I understand that a significant distance will have to be traversed so that people may understand the situation and (its contribution to) the protection of the state.

"But someone might not understand this, and a constitution really needs to be adopted now. [Words indistinct] will execute its will and its command. But it is unrealistic to believe that today someone can be forcefully prohibited or someone can be forcefully ousted from the Supreme Council or a local council. This would not be democracy. This would not be a law-abiding state."

[Vasyylko] The third topic raised concerned the president's awareness of opposition to Ukrainian independence. Here is Leonid Kravchuk's answer:

[Kravchuk] "There are forces today which would not like to see Ukraine independent. There are forces which understand independence in a particular way. They say it has got to be an independent republic within the framework of either the CIS or the Union, or something else. That is to say, these forces understand independence partially and not completely, not as sovereignty and full independence.

"What partial independence are they talking about? There are those who are against independence, and we know this. It is hard to say how large these forces are, but they exist. I think here our fear of it should not be exaggerated, but it is there.

"As for combating these forces, it should only be based on law. If we transgress the law, everybody must realize that that is the road to totalitarianism and lawlessness. We have already experienced all of this, and those who are older know about the grave consequences this had for us."

[Vasyylko] Following the question on opposition to Ukrainian independence, Leonid Kravchuk was asked about his support for such a notorious figure as Metropolitan Filaret. In reply, the Ukrainian president said:

[Kravchuk] "First, I support nobody. My attitude is the same toward everybody, both toward Volodymyr and Filaret, as well as toward Lyubachivsky (Cardinal Myroslav Ivan Lyubachivsky of Ukrainian Catholic Church), and all the heads of church that function in Ukraine today. [passage indistinct] In all the documents adopted by me, I raise the same issue of principle in all of [word indistinct], and that is that the state should form conditions for religious rights to be exercised, for equal rights and opportunities for all the churches and all the beliefs to function. Here I do not provide any advantage for anyone.

"The only thing is that I would like to appeal to believers and representatives and heads of church to find strength in themselves, and for the possibility not to exacerbate the interdenominational quarrel, and to take the road of unity. [passage indistinct] The internal struggle has got to stop and the road to concord has to be found.

"As for the structures of power and others, they must not directly interfere in interdenominational and (traditional) matters. This should only be done on the basis of law. [passage indistinct]."

[Vasyylko] Next followed a question on Russian-Ukrainian relations. In particular, Leonid Kravchuk was asked about his meeting with Ruslan Khasbulatov and his attitude toward territorial claims made by Russia against Ukraine. Here is Leonid Kravchuk's reply:

[Kravchuk] "First, I needed a meeting with Khasbulatov in Kiev at the residence of the president to speak to him once again and to propose that everything possible should be done by the Supreme Soviet chairman to
prevent the further examination of issues connected with the territorial integrity of Ukraine. As for me, this was the main point.

"I can openly say that, of course, Khasbulatov understands the complexity of all of this. But not everything depends on him in this instance. I do not make excuses for Khasbulatov, because he has got his own point of view and he has the right to hold this point of view. However, whether or not to raise this at the Supreme Soviet and its commissions does not entirely depend on Khasbulatov. The composition of deputies and, unfortunately, the manner of thinking of many Russian deputies is such that they cannot come to terms with the fact that Ukraine is an independent state, and they cannot accept the fact that the Crimea and Sevastopol at a certain time in the past [words indistinct] were transferred to Ukraine in accordance with the laws adopted by resolutions and decisions without any violations.

"I cannot agree with those rhetorical questions that raise the reconsideration of the borders. I insist and maintain that the only correct way for this question to be posed today is not to raise the issue of territorial integrity, the issue of the borders.

"Everybody has to realize straight away that, if we take that road it is going to be the road of (danger and) confrontation. "We have got to live with Russia as friendly neighbors and equal partners. This is what was determined for us by fate and history. That is why steps which would exacerbate our (?neighborliness) should not be taken today."

[Vasylyko] Kravchuk was asked a question about certain forecasts in the West that Ukraine will be swallowed up by Russia in a year or so.

[Kravchuk] First, [words indistinct] I do not know what Western politicians make such analysis and give such recommendations that Russia will swallow up Ukraine in a year and a half. It is possible that they write this in newspapers—I simply do not read papers that are published abroad. However, Ukraine is building its independent state, Ukraine is building its independent economy—we are managing this with difficulties, Ukraine is pursuing its independent foreign policy and we are managing with difficulties as well and we will be doing everything to uphold the independence of our state, in the first place, with the help of our own people and also by means of (?close) cooperation and mutual understanding with other peoples including Russia.

I want everyone to understand that we have no grounds and no right before ourselves, before history and before our grandchildren to quarrel with Russia at present. We can and must live with Russia only in peace, accord, partnership and friendship. There simply is no any other way. If someone understands this in a way that one can pursue the line of confrontation—this means being doomed to complete confrontation. We cannot allow this—there are millions of people. Russia is great and Ukraine is great; can they afford such an unconsidered and careless policy as that which is sometimes suggested to us? I repeat, only cooperation, mutual help as well as accord, friendship and partnership must determine our today's and long-term goals."

[Vasylyko] Leonid Kravchuk was also asked the following question: In his opinion, how will Ukraine live in a year or in two or three years?

[Kravchuk] "It depends on two factors how Ukraine will live in a year or in two or three years: on our ability and wisdom to govern the state and not to allow confrontation. I apply this, in the first place, to the president, the government and the Supreme Council. And, second, on the ability of people to work and not argue. If these two factors work, we will govern and will quickly get rid of those mistakes, and these mistakes do exist, and people will stop going against each other—one party against another, one movement against another—and will unite, will achieve accord and will start working for Ukraine. So if these two factors start working, I am convinced that in a year or two Ukraine will be both independent and richer and a legal state. We will preserve the state of Ukraine (?for ourselves) and (?for) our children and grandchildren (?and will) be building it."
GERMANY

Company Official on Controls of Dual-Use Materials

93WS0261C Duesseldorf VDI NACHRICHTEN in German 29 Jan 93 p 5

[Article by Juergen Salz: "Regaining Trust"]

[Text] VDI-N, Hanau, 29 Jan 93—Because of its controversial exports to countries like Iraq, Libya, and Pakistan, Leybold AG, vacuum technology specialist in Hanau, has been constantly making the headlines. The company is promising to improve its record, however. Suspect contracts are now being refused, and in the process, Leybold is losing millions in income.

VDI Nachrichten: Dr. Heidsieck, for some months now Leybold has had strict internal guidelines in place with respect to exports. Do you have a bad conscience today because of your earlier exports to Iraq, Libya, and Pakistan of dual-use goods, i.e., goods that can be used for both military and civil purposes?

Heidsieck: It is not a question of having a bad conscience. It is simply that we have reacted to the changed political, societal, and legal conditions in place since the end of the Gulf war by changing our internal guidelines, the company is promising to improve its record, however. Suspect contracts are now being refused, and in the process, Leybold is losing millions in income.

VDI Nachrichten: Just how do you describe your new company policy in practical terms?

Heidsieck: According to our new guidelines, we absolutely do not export when we know, or have grounds for knowing, that our products will be misused by the customer or end user for the development and production of nuclear weapons or their delivery systems.

Last year, for example, we refused to put an arc smelting furnace into operation in India, even though the project had been approved by the responsible German authorities. After receiving our government's approval, we were informed by certain U.S. sources that the products to be produced in our furnace could possibly be used for military purposes. We then made further inquiries in U.S. offices and the Atomic Energy Agency [AEA]. But no one could give us any additional information, nor was any official agency prepared to provide us with specific information.

VDI Nachrichten: How many million German marks [DM] in trade turnover has Leybold lost in this way?

Heidsieck: Calculated for the year, we easily reach a figure of tens of millions.

VDI Nachrichten: How do you explain to your employees the fact that you are refusing contracts, while at the same time you are eliminating many jobs and entering red figures in the books?

Heidsieck: It is a bitter thing to do, but necessary if we are to win back lost trust. The entire work force here is united in this.

VDI Nachrichten: Why do you accept such trade losses when the pertinent laws and export regulations would permit such trade?

Heidsieck: To protect ourselves. It was not so very long ago that Iraq was viewed very favorably by the West because a good many politicians saw Iraq as a bulwark against the spread of fundamentalism. Then the Gulf war broke out and many companies suddenly found themselves being pilloried. The situation with Iran was just the opposite. Initialy, Iran was isolated for many years, then German industrialists were being encouraged to invest there and help in reconstruction. Obviously, the approval ratings of some countries change rapidly. In order not to be left out in the cold, we consider it prudent to assume some responsibility by a policy of self-restraint.

VDI Nachrichten: And if you were to receive a request from Iran today...?

Heidsieck: ...We would refer it immediately to the Government Export Control Office. The same policy would hold for India, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, and Syria. With some customers we have put agreements in place that would give us permission to conduct inspections on the spot to determine with certainty that our products are not being used for purposes other than those stipulated.

VDI Nachrichten: Customers from these sensitive countries would not always approach Leybold directly.

Heidsieck: That is correct, but experience to date shows that attempts to circumvent our control system are detected. We have established a staff office for export controls. Its four-member staff thoroughly checks out deliveries within Germany. We inspect each packing crate before it leaves the premises to ascertain with finality that everything therein contained is as described.

Kohl Calls for Bilateral Nuclear Dialogue

93WP0113A Madras THE HINDU in English 20 Feb 93 p 9

[Article: "Germany Willing To Have N-Talks"]

[Text] New Delhi, Feb. 19. Germany has expressed its desire to enter into bilateral nuclear dialogue with India even as it feels that New Delhi should ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

"We know that you share our aim of drastically reducing nuclear weapons as well as preventing their proliferation. We therefore hope that soon, India too, will be able to ratify the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Mr. Kohl said, "We are prepared to conduct a comprehensive dialogue with you on aspects of non-proliferation."

The comment assumes importance in the context of the possibility of the expansion of India's nuclear diplomacy at a bilateral level. Notwithstanding pressures from several powerful quarters to sign the NPT, India has so far stuck to its guns, rejecting the NPT as discriminatory.

Significantly, the German Chancellor's address in the context of disarmament and non-proliferation, links India's ratification of NPT to Indo-German economic and technical co-operation. Ratification of the NPT by India would be "beneficial to Indo-German economic and technical co-operation," Mr. Kohl, said.

Referring to the Indo-Pak bilateral dialogue, Mr. Kohl urged both countries to consistently continue the confidence building process.
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