The U.S. Marine Corps and Domestic Operations: Insights on Requirements

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In this briefing we examine issues for the U.S. Marine Corps to consider in organizing and conducting Military Support for Civil Authorities (MSCA) Operations—or, more simply, domestic operations. This briefing is part of the documentation from a CNA study that examined USMC issues in conducting Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HAOs). The Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and the Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force, requested that CNA conduct the study. We focused on how HAOs differ from traditional warfighting operations and on the implications of these differences for requirements in Marine Corps doctrine, organization, training, and equipment. The briefing does not cover all aspects of domestic operations, nor does it cover every role of Marine Forces in these operations. With this background in mind, it focuses on some of the ways in which domestic operations differ from operations conducted outside the United States, and the implications of these differences for the Marine Corps.
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The briefing does not cover all aspects of domestic operations, nor does it cover every role of Marine forces in these operations. Instead, it provides an overview of the Marine Corps’ role in domestic operations. With this background in mind, it focuses on some of the ways in which domestic operations differ from operations conducted outside the United States, and the implications of these differences for the Marine Corps.
The briefing has six basic sections. In the first section we provide a short historical review of the Marine Corps' role in domestic operations, based on an already published CNA study.1 We then examine planning considerations in domestic operations and command-and-control (C2) issues. The section on C2 builds on a quick-look study the team conducted for Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC) in 1994.2 In that report we analyzed the relationship of Marine forces with other services and agencies in recent domestic operations.

We then discuss legal requirements after which we examine the potential training requirements for the USMC to conduct domestic operations. We conclude with suggestions for improving the Marine Corps' responsiveness in future domestic operations.


2. Adam B. Siegel et al. An Examination of USMC Coordination Structures for Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA) Operations, Jul 1994 (Quick Response Report 94-7). In this briefing, we use the terms Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA) and domestic operations interchangeably.
Despite similarities with overseas activities, DOMESTIC OPERATIONS ARE DIFFERENT!

Before we begin discussing the Marine Corps' role in operations on U.S. territory, we must emphasize one point: Whatever the similarities between operations overseas and domestic operations, U.S. military operations conducted on U.S. territory are different. What does this mean? First, command relationships and the legal parameters for military forces are different for domestic operations. Because most Marines (as well as soldiers, sailors, and airmen) focus, as they should, on the command relationship structure for overseas operations, they find themselves confused when they are suddenly involved in a domestic operation with a completely different command structure. Also, different laws apply. Second, in a related area, the military is rarely the lead agency in domestic operations; it usually supports the efforts of other organizations. Third, financing and reimbursement are different for domestic and overseas operations. Fourth, many of the non-military organizations involved in domestic operations are different. Marines are unlikely to find UN officials directly involved in relief operations in Florida, as they are in northern Iraq or Somalia. Finally, and perhaps more difficult to analyze, the psychological factors for the force when it conducts operations are far different. Disaster relief in Southeast Asia does not involve American servicemen in the same way that relief operations in California might. These factors lie beyond the analysis reviewed here, but should not be forgotten.

The briefing has two central themes. First, domestic operations are different from overseas operations. Second, we believe that the Marine Corps can prepare for these differences at a relatively low cost—whether we calculate cost in dollars or in training and planning time.
Historical Overview
The Marines ordered to help restore order in Los Angeles with the outbreak of violence following the Rodney King verdict in 1992 were not the first Marines to respond to riots in the United States. Nor were Marines involved for the first time in disaster relief following Hurricane Andrew. A Marine Corps role in domestic disaster relief and police support dates back at least to 1811. Since then, Marines have been more or less consistently involved in operations throughout the United States. Within the context of U.S. military operations in the domestic United States, U.S. Army and National Guard units have participated in far more operations over the years than the Marines.

Three parameters seem to determine when or whether Marines will be involved. First, if something is local—such as a flood inundating a town next to a Marine Corps base—the Marines will probably help in relief activities. Second, if it is a major disaster or domestic disturbance leading to major federal intervention, Marines may well be part of that federal response. Third, the Marine Corps sometimes has the unique capabilities that fit requirements for the operation. In some cases, all three parameters are lead to Marine involvement; in others, just one.

Four general situations seem to cover the types of operations in the domestic United States the involve the Marine Corps: aiding police and otherwise maintaining domestic order; acting to minimize or ameliorate the damage from a natural or man-made disaster; dealing with some form of refugee flow or aiding displaced Americans; and, finally, the ubiquitous "other" category. In terms of Marine Corps domestic operations, the fourth category includes various types of operations related to enforcing environmental laws or cleaning up an environmental disaster, and conducting search and rescue operations. These four categories should not be viewed as totally distinct. The same situation might require Marines to act across all four categories. For example, in the 1992 relief activities in Florida following Hurricane Andrew, Marines helped clear debris (disaster relief and reconstruction), built camps to house people displaced by the disaster (aid to displaced persons); and maintained order in the camps (aid to police and civil order). Despite this blurring of categories, these do seem to be the four main drivers of Marine involvement in domestic operations. We provide past examples of each of these types of operations in the following pages..
## Aiding Police/
Maintaining Civil Order

- Raids on distilleries, 1860s–1870s
- Guarding the mail, 1894, 1921, 1926
- Alcatraz riot, 1946
- University of Mississippi, 1962
- Riots in D.C., 1968
- Los Angeles Riots, 1992

Using the military to help maintain civil order in the United States dates back to the eighteenth century. Marines have been called on to aid police or otherwise help maintain civil order since the early nineteenth century. These operations have been wide-ranging in scope. In the late nineteenth century, Marines from the Brooklyn Navy Yard aided New York police in a series of raids to shut down illegal distilleries. On at least three occasions, the President has ordered Marines to help guard the federal mail during strikes or amid a string of U.S. mail robberies. Marines have helped prison authorities quell prison riots or move prisoners a number of times, such as when Marine volunteers helped put down a riot at the federal prison on Alcatraz Island in 1946. Federal military forces—including Marines—played a number of roles in the United States during the tumultuous period of the burgeoning civil rights movement and the discord over the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In 1962, for example, Marine helicopters supported the movement of soldiers to ensure that James Meredith could enroll in and attend the University of Mississippi. During the riots that struck many U.S. cities later in the decade, Marines helped to maintain civil order on the streets of Washington, D.C. This included placing Marine snipers on the dome of the Capitol. From the end of the Vietnam War through the 1980s, federal military forces did not play a major role on U.S. streets. In spring 1992, following a major outbreak of violence after the acquittal of officers accused of beating Rodney King, Marine units participated in a Joint Task Force (JTF) to help restore order in Los Angeles.

Another major form of military support (including USMC) in domestic police operations is involvement in drug interdiction operations. However, CNA did not examine counternarcotics operations as part of this study.
A spate of natural disasters in recent years has created an impression that military assistance to minimize damage or aid recovery from a natural disaster is a new role for the military, but this is simply not true. In the nineteenth century, Marines provided aid during disasters, such as firefighting in New York City in 1835. Fighting fires often causes military responses; when wildfires rage beyond the capacity of civilian resources, the military can be called on. In 1994, more than 1,000 Marines from Camp Pendleton participated in fighting forest fires in the Pacific Northwest. California has frequently required military assistance after earthquakes. Marines have played a role in this assistance, from helping provide security after San Francisco’s devastating 1906 earthquake, to helping provide a water supply and providing Korean linguists following the 1994 Northridge earthquake in the Los Angeles area. Major storms can also lead to military aid, such as the all-service efforts in Texas and Louisiana following Hurricane Carla in 1961, and in Florida following Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Domestic operations are, by no means, limited to the continental United States—Marines also participated in a JTF to respond to Hurricane Iniki’s damage to Kauai, Hawaii.
Refugees and/or Displaced Persons

- Refugees
  - Sandy Hook, New York, and cholera, 1892
  - Mariel boatlift, 1980
- Displaced people
  - World Series earthquake, 1989
  - Hurricane Andrew, 1992

A large refugee movement can create a requirement for the military to house, feed, and clothe large numbers of civilians. It can also lead to an assignment for the military to guard these refugees. On a number of occasions, Marines have helped guard, and even helped to sustain refugees. In 1892, Marines helped protect a refugee camp from attack by scared townspeople during a quarantine for cholera. In 1980, Marines augmented U.S. Army soldiers in guarding some of the thousands of Cubans who came to the United States during the Mariel boatlift. In recent years, Marines have established and maintained refugee camps for Haitian and Cuban migrants at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. Marines have also embarked on U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships to maintain order among refugees picked up at sea.

"Refugee" is a term that describes someone who is displaced across international borders. Natural disasters and other emergencies can force Americans from their homes. These "displaced" or "homeless" people can require help similar to that which refugees might require. For example, U.S. Navy ships, with Marine assistance, housed people displaced by the World Series earthquake that hit San Francisco in 1989. Following Hurricane Andrew, Marines built and operated two tent cities in southern Florida for people who had lost their homes to the storm.
The Ubiquitous “Other”

- Environmental enforcement or cleanup
  - Bering Sea, 1891
  - Exxon Valdez, 1989
  - Airlifting whooping cranes, 1989
- Search and rescue

Every typology requires an “other” category. The two key elements of this grouping seem to be various types of environmental enforcement and cleanup, and participation in search-and-rescue (SAR) operations. The second is self-explanatory and can often involve Marine Reservists or Marines acting under the imperative of immediate life-saving measures, rather than in a presidentially ordered operation. For example, Marine force reconnaissance Reservists were among the first SAR groups to reach the derailed Amtrak “Sunset Limited” near Mobile, Alabama, in September 1993.

The other part of the “other” category, environmental activity, seems an area of potential growth in operations, although such activity dates back a century to the Marine participation in enforcing international treaties limiting the seal hunt in the northern Pacific. More recently, in 1989, Marines participated in the JTF that supported the clean-up effort from the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Growing concerns worldwide over environmental issues make this a potential area for growth in military activity—especially if a major technological disaster occurs, such as the one in Bhopal, India.

This limited historical background and the typology of operations that derives from it should be kept in mind as we review planning for domestic operations in the next section.
Planning for Domestic Operations
Domestic operations require considerations in planning and preparation that are different from so-called traditional operations. This viewgraph shows some issues that affect planning for domestic emergency and disaster operations. Although not all-inclusive, it shows a few of the issues that have occurred in recent operations.
The military supports rather than leads most Emergency Support Functions.

- The FRP does not address immediate response.
- The military is unfamiliar with the FRP.

The Federal Response Plan (FRP) is a blueprint for responding to all presidentially declared domestic disasters and emergencies. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the coordinator for federal response, developed the FRP to provide an off-the-shelf response in an emergency or disaster. It is an interagency agreement for 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). In the FRP, FEMA has designated a federal agency to lead each ESF and other appropriate agencies to support the lead agency for each ESF. The Department of Defense (DOD) is the lead agency for one of the ESFs, public works and engineering, and supports all other ESFs.

As is the case in overseas HAOs, the military should serve a supporting role, rather than take the lead. The military is accustomed to taking charge of problems that come its way, even though the FRP, laws, and regulations specify otherwise. What makes it even harder for the military to take more of a supporting stance is that at times they are put into a position of the first group outside the local organizations to respond to a domestic emergency. The FRP does not address immediate response.

For many emergencies, the military is the first outside organization on scene, and thus is initially the lead agency for virtually all ESFs. During the Georgia floods in 1994, the Marines from the Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia, rescued more than 1,700 people, protected property, and provided logistical equipment support to local emergency personnel and the Georgia Army National Guard. (Continued on next page.)
The military supports rather than leads most Emergency Support Functions.
The FRP does not address immediate response.
The military is unfamiliar with the FRP

Much of this activity occurred before the presidential disaster declaration. Even when not first on the scene, Marines can end up as the lead agency for many ESFs—even if only in part of the operational area.

The FRP was developed by FEMA to provide an off-the-shelf plan for responding to domestic emergencies and disasters. In many cases, however, it is not implemented as defined. As described above, the FRP is not practical for immediate response—the actions the military (and other federal agencies) can, and often must, take before a presidential disaster declaration. Without such FRP guidance, the military has had to develop ad hoc immediate-response plans. Also, because many in the military are unfamiliar with the FRP and other disaster plans, not all military responses and activities follow the FRP. A key FRP difference with "typical" military operations is the chain of command. The chain of command for domestic operations requires considerable coordination with FEMA, and most military commands the military is not accustomed to dealing with or reporting to FEMA.
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Although the Marines and the military (particularly the Army) have been conducting disaster and emergency relief operations for decades, such operations are viewed as low-priority missions. Being ready for a major regional contingency (MRC) is the highest priority for the Marines, as it should be. However, it is more likely that Marines will be involved in disaster relief than an MRC. MRCs should be the main focus for the Marines, but disaster relief, both international and domestic, is getting some attention. Although military strategy now includes humanitarian operations as a mission, most Marines are unfamiliar with domestic operations.

Established “on-the-shelf” plans for disaster and emergency relief are limited, though considerably more plans exist now than did several years ago, such as the FRP and an earthquake disaster plan. However, the USMC has no specific guidance on planning for domestic operations.

Established plans and the limited doctrine on domestic disaster and emergency relief are not always followed. In some cases, not following the established plan is necessary to get the mission accomplished. This may suggest that the doctrine is not useful, or that the potential user is unfamiliar with it.
A Field Assessment Team (FAsT) and/or Disaster Assessment Team (DAsT) is sent to the area.

- FRP implementation relies on local assessment.
- Local capabilities must be identified and assessed.

The key to planning is to understand the situation so that the required forces can be identified more accurately to respond to this situation. Otherwise, worst-case planning usually results in committing more forces than necessary, or inappropriate forces, to the operation.

When an incident occurs that may require a federal response, a Field Assessment Team (FAsT), led by FEMA, is sent to the area. The FAsT focuses on initial response actions for potential federal response and requirements. The military may already be involved when the FAsT arrives, particularly if the incident occurs near a base. This goes back to the issue of immediate response.

If the FRP is implemented (based in part on the FAsT’s report), a Disaster Assessment Team (DAsT) is established. The DAsT assesses damage and determines the requirements for ESF 5, Information and Planning, with FEMA as the lead agency. However, the military maybe the first group on the scene (even after the FRP is activated).

The FRP also assumes that local agencies/authorities/communities will assess the disaster and requirements for federal assistance. This support is not always forthcoming, in part because various states and communities have different assessment capabilities. The situation itself can also limit a community’s ability to conduct assessments. Both the San Francisco earthquake in 1989 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992 damaged equipment that normally would be used to conduct assessments and report conditions to FEMA. In such circumstances, situation assessment can become a military responsibility because the military can respond immediately.
A Field Assessment Team (FAsT) and/or Disaster Assessment Team (DAsT) is sent to the area.

FRP implementation relies on local assessment.

Local capabilities must be identified and assessed.

In addition, not all state governments are equally able to assess disaster situations. The Florida government learned from Hurricane Andrew how important situation assessment is. It now has an impressive evaluation structure that led to detailed reporting to the federal government by Florida towns and counties potentially threatened during the 1994 floods in southeastern Georgia. The Georgia government, without the "benefit" of recent major disaster experience, provided only limited assessments to support flood-relief efforts.

In other cases, the local situation allows for assessment before a federal response is initiated or before the military gets involved. Just as limited or no local reporting can create a problem, too much reporting can cause a different problem. For example, during the L.A. riots, the local and state authorities had a strong grasp of the situation and identified the need for federal assistance. The problem for federal forces was excessive reporting, as the military received multiple reports on the situation from police. Joint Task Force (JTF) Los Angeles and other military planning organizations (such as the Director of Military Support (DOMS) discussed later) had to identify the reports that contained the assessment information necessary for planning.

Assessing local capabilities is important for planning purposes to facilitate economy of force, equipment, and supplies. Contractors and surrounding communities may be able to address particular functions. For example, during the L.A. riots, contractors fed military personnel, provided food to civilians, and removed debris by using commercial vehicles.
Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) should be used to help determine end-state.

- MOEs should be:
  - Measurable
  - Meaningful
  - Able to support trend analysis
  - Numerous

The Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) determines when the military should redeploy its forces from a domestic operation. However, there are no measures to determine when redeployment should occur. In general, the mission end-state occurs when the military is no longer needed because the local agencies/communities/authorities can take over the functions of the military.

As a result of Hurricane Andrew, the 10th Mountain Division established “areas of involvement” during assistance operations for which end-states could be established. These areas of involvement were power generation, debris removal, sanitation, food distribution, and supplying potable water, shelter, medical care, schools, security, and command, control, communications, and coordination. A generalized list of potential domestic operational activities should be developed. Such a list could become part of an MSCA standard operating procedure (SOP) that could then be rapidly adapted for a particular operation. Along with such a list is the development of meaningful measures that to track the progress of operation toward the general desired end-state for these and other areas of involvement.

The 10th Mountain Division tried to establish end-states, but many of these end-states are not measurable. For example, clearing debris that threatens public health was stated as part of one end-state. Defining this as endstate could reasonably mean that the military should not have left until there was no trash anywhere on the streets (since such waste could harbor rats and other threats to public health). The military may not need to clear all debris threatening public health to achieve the true end-state for the military operation (i.e., the military is no longer needed). Thus, this is not really an end-state; it is a task. Instead, measures of effectiveness for tasks with the goal of the end-state can be established.
Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) should be used to help determine end-state. MOEs should be:
- Measurable
- Meaningful
- Able to support trend analysis
- Numerous.

In the past (not necessarily during humanitarian relief operations), some less than meaningful measures have been established. For the debris-clearing example, one might think the number of pounds of debris removed would be an MOE. It is a measure, but it gives no indication of how effective the military has been or how close it is to the desired end-state of turning over the functions to the local community. For this example, a meaningful MOE might be the percentage of local crews (rather than military crews) removing life-threatening debris. When the percentage of local crews clearing the debris reaches a certain level, it could indicate that the situation (or task) no longer required military involvement.

Commanders can also use MOEs to track progress toward the desired end-state. For a given MOE, it may not be possible, or even desirable, to identify a specific level for the end-state. As mentioned, the desired end-state for the military occurs when the local and state authorities or other civilian agencies can take over or complete the military’s functions. MOEs should be tracked during an operation so that trends toward a local takeover can be monitored. Trend analysis also can highlight areas that need more effort. A trend that shows no improvement might indicate a task that needs more support.

As the 10th Mountain Division discovered during Hurricane Andrew, numerous areas of potential military involvement exist during domestic operations. As a result, numerous MOEs are needed to address these areas.
Planning Requirements and Alternatives

- Coordinate with the other players.
- Address immediate response.
- Establish an assessment plan.
- Develop general MOEs to address end-state.

This viewgraph shows planning requirements to address the issues raised on previous slides. To plan effectively, the military needs to coordinate with the other players during domestic operations. It will need to establish relationships with local emergency organizations, such as the police force and fire department. Liaison officers have been assigned to these organizations during past operations, but usually in the midst of an operation instead of during the planning phase. It is important to include appropriate local organizations in the planning process to establish a common operational language, to understand each other's capabilities, and to gather information. Including these organizations in the planning process will require changes in the planning cell's organization.

To help coordinate, appropriate liaison officers should be assigned to the appropriate local organizations, specifically to help with planning. In addition, local agencies should provide liaison officers who will be involved in the planning process. These officers will require education and training.

Although some off-the-shelf plans and memorandums of understanding (MOUs) exist for specific types of disasters and emergencies (flood, fire, civil disturbance, earthquake), these MOUs do not all address immediate response. Either the FRP should be modified or the military should develop an off-the-shelf immediate-response plan for disasters and emergencies in which they are the lead agency for all ESFs. A key issue in such plans should be consideration of how to make a rapid transition from military to civilian lead when the military, because of circumstances, has had to assume the major burden in the operation.
Planning Requirements and Alternatives (continued)

♦ Coordinate with the other players.
♦ Address immediate response.
♦ Establish an assessment plan.
♦ Develop general MOEs to address end-state.

The fact that the military and other agencies involved in domestic operations do not know each other’s capabilities adds to the immediate-response problem even after FRP activation. In particular, FEMA doesn’t understand the military’s capabilities or what of the military needs to know from FEMA to respond. Military coordination with FEMA before a disaster or emergency to educate FEMA personnel on the problems of involving the military (and vice versa) would help responsiveness.

The military must develop generic assessment plans to support immediate-response situations. Such plans could involve developing survey teams that would include engineers; military police; and civil affairs, medical, legal, aviation, and logistics personnel, as well as local organizations, if feasible. This assessment should include a survey of the situation and the local capabilities.

These assessment efforts should tie into FEMA’s Emergency Information System (EIS). The EIS is a computerized database, accessible through remotes, that provides a means to distribute detailed information in domestic emergencies. This powerful system, which includes detailed maps for every part of the United States and a means to provide rapid updates on emergencies and responses to them, is not available throughout the military. Although the U.S. Army’s Continental Armies (CONUSAs) have these systems (because CONUSAs are most likely to have some form of involvement in MSCAs), other military organizations do not.
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The general end-state for virtually all domestic operations occurs when the local community can take over the functions conducted by the military and federal agencies involved in the operation. For military force, the end-state is defined as when civilian organizations (public or private, local, state, or federal) assume the military's functions. Transition ideally occurs as soon as these organizations can assume these functions, but this ideal rarely happens in domestic operations. The turnover of functions can occur in phases, depending on the area of involvement, the damage, and so forth. To help determine when the end-state is achieved, MOEs need to be developed to address potential areas of involvement. During the planning process, local authorities should help choose the appropriate MOEs for monitoring progress throughout the operation. Developing appropriate MOEs that all parties can agree on could hasten achievement of the end-state. MOE tracking will indicate when other organizations should assume the military's responsibilities.
Command Relationships

- The military’s role is one of support.
- Civil authorities have the primary responsibility.

Domestic operations share an important characteristic with overseas humanitarian operations: in both environments, the military is typically not in overall command; rather, its role is one of support. Within the United States, civil authorities—federal, state, and local governments—have the primary authority and responsibility.
The military command structure for domestic operations is fundamentally different from that of overseas operations. In the only major operational role assigned to a service secretary rather than the joint community, the Secretary of the Army has the primary responsibility for military operations on U.S. soil.

Marines may be involved in providing MSCA in three major ways: (1) They may provide immediate response directly to local authorities in a life-threatening emergency. (2) They may be tasked to provide support to an Army commander. (3) For the biggest operations, they may participate in or lead a JTF. In all of these cases, the Marines support civil authorities.

What do these characteristics mean for the way the Marine Corps does business? What are the requirements for command and control (C2) peculiar to these operations, and what is the best way to meet them? We begin with a look at the current national and Marine command relationships.

4. In another difference from overseas operations, as of mid-1995, U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) guidance directed that, for domestic operations, a JTF should be named either a disaster relief task force (DRTF) or a civil defense task force (CDTF). This has not, however, occurred during an actual operation whereas JTFs were formed, for example, following Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki in fall 1992.
This chart shows the decision chain for MSCA operations conducted under Atlantic Command (USACOM). The order changes, but not significantly, for an operation under Pacific Command (PACOM). The governor of a state asks the president for federal assistance. After the President declares a disaster, FEMA takes the lead in coordinating federal assistance. The Secretary of the Army coordinates with the JCS and issues an order through the Director of Military Support (DOMS) on the Army staff to the appropriate commander-in-chief (CINCs), services, and agencies. USACOM is the principal MSCA planning and operating agent for CONUS; PACOM fills this role for Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam. USACOM maintains liaison with FEMA through the Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). FORSCOM has further delegated planning responsibility to Continental U.S. Army (CONUSA) commanders within their geographic boundaries. In an emergency, the supported CINC appoints a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) from the affected region. The DCO provides liaison with the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) appointed by FEMA and local officials. In large disasters, a commander, civil defense/disaster relief task force (CDRTF/CCDTF) may be appointed, with the DCO reporting to him.

In most cases, including such recent relief operations as the San Francisco and Los Angeles earthquakes and Hurricane Andrew, the Army has been in command. Other services may provide JTF commanders, however. An Air Force general commanded the Alaskan Oil Spill JTF, and a Navy admiral commanded the relief effort in Guam in fall 1992.

Note that this formal command and control structure is instituted only after a presidential disaster declaration.
This slide shows the current Marine Corps command structure for domestic disaster relief, as outlined in Marine Corps Order 3440.7. Marine base commanders are designated as regional and local planning agents. A key point of this viewgraph is that this structure differs from that used in overseas contingency operations, in which Marine Corps bases do not play a prominent role. (They are supporting rather than lead organizations.) This difference can create confusion over responsibilities among certain outside organizations—such as the other services—who are more prepared to deal with the operating forces than with a base commander. In addition, the base commander doesn’t control many of the assets that would be used in an operation. However, the structure makes sense in that local authorities—the focal point of a disaster relief operation—routinely interact with the base commander, not the operating forces.

The acronyms in the viewgraph are Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), who is usually a civilian, from FEMA or assigned by the president; State Coordinating Officer (SCO); Disaster Relief Task Force or Civil Defense Task Force (DRTF/CDTF); Principal Planning Agent (PPA), as defined by MCO 3440.7; Regional Planning Agent (RPA); and Local Planning Agent (LPA).

5. This order is currently under review and substantial changes are being considered. These changes are discussed later in the briefing.
Command Relationships:
Conclusions

- Before declaration of emergency and in smaller disasters, coordination with local authorities is key.

- As part of JTF, or upon tasking by DOMS, coordination needs continue with
  - CJTF or DCO
  - Local authorities as mission demands
  - Relief agencies.

- With downsizing, Marine Corps may have to assume DCO/CJTF responsibilities.

As in foreign HAOS, coordination with other agencies and organizations is key. The military effort supports those other groups. Direct coordination with local officials is particularly vital in two environments: big disasters before a presidential declaration of emergency (immediate response); and smaller disasters, when national levels are not involved.

The need to coordinate continues upon activation of a DCO or a JTF. This coordination requires assigning of liaison personnel to other involved organizations, whether federal, state, or local; military or civilian; public or private.

To date, the Marines have not commanded a major domestic relief effort; the Army, by virtue of its ubiquity and the established command structure, has typically been in charge. With downsizing and base closures, however, this may change. Large areas of the United States will be without the traditional Army presence. In these cases, a Marine base may be closest to a disaster and may be the logical candidate to command the relief effort. (Something like this happened in 1994 when Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Albany conducted a major relief operation in southeastern Georgia during flooding. After the Presidential declaration, 5 days after MCLB Albany began relief efforts, the DCO came from the U.S. Army.)
Command Relationships: 
Requirements and Alternatives

Coordination is important.
- Liaison officers are key.
- No special C2 training is required for units.
- Doctrine and SOPs are needed instead.
» Revise FMFM 7-10

Beyond the bounds of military command is the overriding requirement for coordination—with local, state, and federal officials, and with such organizations as the Red Cross. To meet this need, two approaches are suggested. First, a cadre of liaison officers should be identified and trained in the procedures and organizations that are involved in providing domestic relief—Reservists may be appropriate for this task. Second, given that such training will not be required of all, doctrine and standing operating procedures (SOPs) should be developed to guide the others who are called on in these operations.

In particular, FMFM 7-10, Domestic Support Operations, should be targeted for revision. The Marine Corps is scheduled to review this multiservice Army–USMC publication in 1997. The current version was written by the Army. Although it provides a good starting point for domestic operations, it does not discuss certain critical elements of MSCA (such as the EIS), nor does it reflect military downsizing (which is post publication for the most part), and essentially it does not mention the Marine Corps except on the cover.

6. Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Marine Corps, FM 100-19/FMFM 7-10, Domestic Support Operations, July 1993
Command Relationships: Rqmts. and Alternatives (continued)

With downsizing, will USMC command?
- MARFORLANT/MARFORPAC could devote training and personnel to this mission.
- The Army could be designated as commander, regardless of location.
- HQMC could create a cadre of “deployable EPOs.”

Beyond learning to improve performance of its current role in immediate response and as a supporting force, the Marine Corps should consider other implications of downsizing. The closing of the Presidio and the deactivation of the Sixth CONUSA leaves a vacuum in disaster-prone California. This vacuum creates an opportunity for the Marine Corps leadership to make a decision on the Marine Corps’ future domestic role. Marine Force, Pacific (MARFORPAC) could seek out and embrace a lead MSCA role in southern California. This option has a number of cost implications, fiscally and otherwise. To assume a MSCA leadership role would require dedicating a staff to the mission, as well as commitments of time (for training and pre-crisis liaison/education) and direct fiscal outlays (for basic unit equipment and MSCA-specific material, such as computers with EIS-capabilities).

Alternatively, the Marine Corps could support designation of the U.S. Army as the lead DOD agency for domestic emergencies—no matter what region is affected. The Army already has organizations (CONUSAs) that focus primarily on MSCA. This approach would trade local knowledge for functional expertise.

A third alternative would be an analog to the various CINC’s Joint Task Force augmentation teams. This approach would create a cell of deployable emergency preparedness officers (EPOs) at HQMC or at the MARFORs. Whether a Marine commander is tasked as CJTF or DCO, or functions simply as a component, this team would add its expertise in relief procedures and requirements to the Marine commander’s local knowledge. At other times, they could provide training, write doctrine and SOPs, and establish working relationships with other agencies involved in domestic disaster relief. Most of these billets could be individual mobilization augmentees in the Naval Reserve, with proper authority to use them in of a domestic emergency.
Legal Issues for Domestic Operations
Different Laws and Regulations

- Funding
- Coordination
- Force protection

In addition to command-and-control differences, one critical difference between domestic and overseas operations is the legal environment.

U.S. laws and regulations apply differently to domestic and foreign operations. When operating inside the United States, a series of laws will constrain Marine forces in ways not seen overseas. The Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) must understand these differences to adequately advise the commander. Three legal issues that are affected by these laws and regulations are funding, coordination, and force protection.
The Military gets many requests for assistance.

Domestic disaster relief has some restrictions
- Pre-FRP implementation
- Post-FRP implementation.

In domestic operations, as in overseas HAOs, other organizations will seek military assistance in a variety of areas. This occurs because the military has valuable skills and equipment, and because it is organized to respond quickly even in the midst of a disruptive situation (such as a battlefield). However, a number of legal and fiscal restrictions affect what the military can do in domestic operations. In some cases, the implication of ignoring these restrictions is fiscal—the military unit (or service) might not be reimbursed for expenditures. Other situation have legal implications that could lead (at least in theory) to prosecution. Many activities that might seem reasonable to someone caught up a disaster situation, and who is simply trying to do the right thing, fall into these categories. Commanders must pay close attention to domestic laws and regulations. This can be difficult during domestic operations—in part because of the military’s lack of familiarity with many of the restrictions, and also because of the above-noted desire “to do the right thing.”

In some domestic emergencies, the FRP is not implemented quickly. In such cases, the only tasks authorized involve life saving, the prevention of human suffering, and/or mitigation of great property damage. This is called immediate response. However, a commander may deem it important and want to respond to some tasks that are not considered immediate response. But, by responding to these tasks, the military runs the risk of not being reimbursed.
Funding (continued)

- The Military gets many requests for assistance.
- Domestic disaster relief has some restrictions
  - Pre-FRP implementation
  - Post-FRP implementation.

During the Georgia floods, for example, the FRP was not fully implemented until 7 days after Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Albany had begun relief efforts. Much of this was clearly life saving immediate response—such as pulling more than 1700 people out of the water. Other activities, however, fall into the category of “doing the right thing.” This included, for example, providing food and sleeping cots for the local police. Such activity seemed appropriate, though it fell outside the definition of immediate response. The Marine Corps was eventually reimbursed for such expenditures, but such reimbursement was not guaranteed. MCLB Albany Marines did not get involved in other requested activities (such as helping to provide security) because this would have involved a violation of law. (The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the military from performing police functions.) A key element in such periods is for the SJA to provide advice to the Commander so that he is aware of the potential funding or legal implications of his decisions for action.

Following implementation of the FRP, the military must be careful to perform only tasks assigned by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and passed through the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to the Disaster Relief Task Force (DRTF). Otherwise, the military may not be reimbursed for its expenses. Funding procedures for Civil Disturbance operations are discussed in the Garden Plot operations plan (OPLAN).
During domestic operations, the Marines must coordinate with a variety of federal, state, and local organizations as well as with citizens. This involves laws and regulations that are very different from those that apply in foreign operations. The next four pages discuss some legal issues relevant to coordination with the various groups involved in domestic operations.
Coordination with local communities and governments is important for any domestic operation; however, this coordination involves a variety of laws, regulations, and legal issues. It is important for commanders to understand and work within these constraints and limitations.

For example, some activities require legal agreements. Although many have similarities with overseas operations—contracting and legal agreements are required overseas just as in the United States—these agreements are more restricted and have tighter provisions on U.S. soil. Such agreements might include hold-harmless agreements for borrowing public and private property. Also, in cases where there is a relief camp, an agreement is needed to facilitate the transition of the relief camp to local government control. During Hurricane Andrew, the lack of such a transition agreement, combined with hesitation by local officials, made it difficult for the Marines to turn the camps over to civilian control.

In addition to understanding the requirement for agreements, commanders must also be aware of potential constraints on activities, such as providing religious services to victims (the First Amendment, i.e., the Establishment Clause on religion); accepting gifts (e.g., supplies); noninvolvement in election activity (which limits military presence around polling places and will lead to close supervision of support to elections that might be required in a disaster relief situation); and restrictions on psychological operations activity. (This means that the military cannot, for example, create a radio station in the United States as they might in an overseas HAO.)
Another important area of coordination regards the local police. Coordination with the police occurs not only during civil disturbances, such as the Los Angeles riots, but also during relief efforts following disasters, such as Hurricane Andrew. Three important legal issues associated with this coordination are compliance with the Posse Comitatus Act; regulations concerning the leasing of equipment; and observing local jurisdictions.

Often during domestic operations, the military will be asked to help with various law-enforcement activities, such as patrolling or directing traffic. These activities are legal if the primary purpose is to support a legitimate military mission, such as maintaining the flow of relief supplies, equipment, and services. On the other hand, with very limited exceptions, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits military forces from conducting police functions, e.g., detaining and arresting people, or conducting surveillance operations of individuals or groups. In domestic operations, all personnel (and not just the commanders) need to understand the limits on such actions. Written rules of engagement (ROE) cards could be an appropriate way to reinforce predeployment briefings on the limits of the range of military action.

Besides asking the military to help perform certain law-enforcement activities, the police may also seek to borrow military equipment, such as night-vision goggles (NVGs). The requirements for such arrangements are discussed in the Garden Plot OPLAN and 10 USC 2667.

Finally, complying with police lines of jurisdiction will facilitate coordination with local police.
Coordination with the National Guard (NG) varies according to whether the Guard is under Title 10 or Title 32 jurisdiction. When under Title 10 jurisdiction, the NG is under federal jurisdiction and is part of the federal chain of command; however, when under Title 32 jurisdiction, NGs are under state jurisdiction and are part of the state chain of command. The difference in legal status also affects the types of activities the Guard may perform (e.g., law enforcement) and whether individual members are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Commanders need to be aware of the implications of Title 10 and Title 32.

During Hurricane Andrew relief, for example, NG troops remained under state control, thus exempting them from the Posse Comitatus ACT and permitting them to perform law-enforcement activities. Following the LA riots, however, the majority of NG forces were federalized, which limited their freedom of action to support police operations. To confuse the situation, as in the Los Angeles riots, sometimes not all NG forces are federalized and sometimes NG forces will shift in the midst of operations from state to federal and back to state control. These shifts create different levels of freedom of action that everyone involved, from the FCO/DCO to the military commander down to the individual serviceman, needs to understand.
Coordination With Voluntary Organizations and Volunteers

- Providing medical care to relief workers
- Transporting relief workers
- Volunteering assistance

Several legal issues need to be considered regarding coordination with volunteers and volunteer organizations (such as the American Red Cross, the United Way, or the Salvation Army) because, during domestic operations, the military may provide services (e.g., such as medical care and transportation) to these organizations.

Certain laws and regulations, particularly the Stafford Act, affect these activities and the use of volunteers during these types of operations. For example, the Stafford Act allows routine medical services to be provided to civilian relief workers, as long as FEMA or the Public Health Service tasks DOD to provide these services. The Red Cross is not a government organization, but it has a formal role in the FRP and has the lead responsibility for the mass care ESF. Therefore, Red Cross workers may also fly in military helicopters, along with relief supplies, as long as the appropriate commander approves and it is part of the mission. Finally, statutory exceptions exist to the prohibitions against volunteers in 31 USC 1342. Despite these exceptions, during Hurricane Andrew, the military channeled volunteers through private relief organizations, such as the United Way. The JTF-Andrew commander chose this path because of liability and control considerations.
Domestic operations can provide a number of types of force-protection issues. A key challenge for the military commander and the personnel involved is that force protection is different for domestic operations, both in terms of the threat faced and how the military responds to the threat. As in the case of foreign HAOs, the military may not have "enemies," but it will face threats. Threats for domestic operations include gangs, looters, and hostile elements.

A variety of laws restrict the military's ability to prepare for, monitor, or respond to these potential threats. Intelligence gathering, for example, is affected by Executive Order 12333, which prohibits using the military for gathering intelligence on civilians in the United States. During domestic operations, the police will probably provide information on gangs or other potential threats for use in civil-disturbance and force-security planning. A commander might find this restriction on intelligence gathering an unnerving difference between domestic and overseas operations—especially in a situation where some form of serious threat exists against the deployed force.

In terms of ROE, many of the differences between domestic and foreign operations center on the fact that the Marines are coordinating with other active-duty forces or other military units, such as National Guard units and federal, state, or local police. Unless federalized, the NG can act in a policing role with potentially different ROE. The differences in ROE and the range of action can cause confusion in the local population and with other involved organizations because the non-military may assume that anyone wearing a uniform is "military" without understanding the differences between the forces.
Force Protection (continued)

- Intelligence gathering
- Terminology and coordinating with other organizations
- Rules of engagement (ROE)

Although ensuring clear and consistent terminology is required for both foreign and domestic operations, in domestic operations the emphasis is on the difference in terminology used by the police and that used by Marines. For example, the meaning of the term *cover me* is different for police and Marines. When integrating various organizations into joint operations (such as military support to police patrols), such differences must be taken into account. Exchanging glossaries with law-enforcement agencies (LEAs) might reduce the chance of this type of difference causing a problem.

Other differences concern the nature of ROE training for domestic urban environments and the use of key-facilities lists. For any operation, the SJA must help the G-3/J-3 provide guidance and training on the commander's intent and application of the ROE for small-unit commanders. The sensitive nature of ROE definition and distribution becomes even more critical when operations occur on U.S. soil—especially because ROE for domestic operations are not a part of regular training and usually will be needed for short-notice operations. Key-facilities lists also are important in domestic operations and should highlight priorities for the operations. A list might include police stations, schools, or even shopping centers, as was the case following the Los Angeles riots.
Legal Conclusions and Recommendations

- SJAs and commanders need to know and understand domestic legal constraints.
- Attorneys with expertise and/or experience in domestic operations are needed.
- The military must coordinate with civilian authorities, such as police.

The biggest legal requirement for domestic operations is for both SJAs and commanders to understand domestic laws and regulations and to ensure compliance. Domestic operations require the military to interact and coordinate with unfamiliar organizations and people, and military personnel are often unfamiliar with the applicable domestic laws and regulations. Attorneys sent to support a domestic operation need to have understood the legal constraints on domestic activities. Attorneys also need to coordinate with civilian authorities, such as the police, rather than foreign NGOs or governments. The SJA's key role is similar in both domestic and foreign operations—to advise the commander on legal issues. However, this role is at the core of domestic operations. The SJA must be familiar with domestic laws and regulations to help the commander navigate the maze of issues involved in applying military capabilities to helping people on American soil.
Legal Conclusions and Recommendations (continued)

- General knowledge of domestic constraints needs to be improved.
  - Use domestic operations SOPs and checklists for disaster relief and civil disturbances.
  - Use lessons learned from past operations in manuals and handbooks.

- Crisis legal awareness is important.
  - Briefings should be given by SJAs to commanders and staff at the beginning of an operation.

Writing standard operating procedures (SOPs) and checklists for domestic operations is one way to improve general knowledge and prepare for military support for civilian authorities (MSCA) operations. In addition, lessons learned should be included as examples in manuals and handbooks, such as FMFM 7-10 Domestic Support Operations.

In case of imminent operations, the SJA should be prepared (and should ask) to brief the commander and other officers on domestic legal constraints. Such briefings should begin as soon as a unit or command perceives that it might be involved in a domestic operation (whether formally through an alert order or simply generalized “intelligence” derived from media reporting on a potential or actual disaster situation). These briefings should be based on lessons learned and should highlight, for example, the Posse Comitatus Act restrictions and funding requirements.
Legal Conclusions and Recommendations (continued)

- Expertise in domestic operations for SJAs should be promoted by
  - Briefings or PME lectures to SJAs on common legal problems during domestic operations.
- Coordination with other organizations needs to be improved.
  - Hold meetings between Marines and other organizations.
  - Exchange glossaries with other organizations, such as the police.

To improve the expertise of SJAs in domestic operations, experienced SJAs should give briefings or professional military education (PME) lectures to other SJAs on lessons learned from past operations.

Finally, to improve coordination with other organizations and to avoid some of the legal pitfalls before the next domestic operation, senior Marine officers and SJAs should hold meetings with attorneys and senior officials from other organizations (e.g., the NG, CONUSAs, FEMA regional offices, state and local emergency preparedness offices) to discuss legal issues, such as how to coordinate with NG units when they are under state rather than federal jurisdiction. Where a particular organization uses different terminology, for example, the police, glossaries can be exchanged to help promote better understanding.
The Marines already have the necessary skills.

Other basic capabilities can be adapted to the situation.

Education in domestic operations is needed.

In general, Marines already have the skills they need to conduct domestic operations. For example, Marines can put up a tent for civilians as easily as they can for Marines. Of course, civilians might have a more elaborate tent, perhaps with cushioned tent spikes so that children won’t fall on the spikes and hurt themselves. But such differences are almost impossible to resolve across the board and, in any event, are relatively minor.

In other circumstances, Marines have basic capabilities that can be adapted to the particular circumstances. During Operation Wildfire in 1994, the Marine Corps provided a disciplined, mobile source of manpower that was called in only after 1,500 firefighters were already engaged. Marines received some basic firefighting training as they deployed for the mission and learned other firefighting techniques on the job, working under professional firefighters. Because the National Interagency Firefighting Center (NIFC) has a well-prepared training plan for such firefighting augmentees (e.g., healthy, well-disiplined, organized personnel), the Marine Corps does not have to fully train each Marine in firefighting for Marines to play an important reinforcing role in firefighting emergencies.

Some situations and requirements, however, are more at odds with basic Marine training. One such area may be security operations in a domestic environment. We discuss security in more detail later.

Marine Corps education needs more improvement than troop skills in the area of domestic operations. In particular, Marines at the level of platoon leader and above should learn how domestic laws and regulations affect the tasks they can perform.
What Must the Military Be Prepared To Do?

The military must
- Operate within the constraints of domestic regulations and laws.
- Conduct planning and coordinate with civilian agencies.
- Conduct security operations in a domestic environment.

During domestic operations, the military must be prepared to operate within the constraints of domestic regulations and laws. Unit leaders—squad leaders, platoon leaders, company commanders—are the Marines actively in the field, dealing with the public. Unit leaders should understand how laws and regulations, such as Title 10, Posse Comitatus, and DoD Directive 3025.1, affect their role in disaster relief and civil disturbances. For example, although the military has the manpower to clear roads and provide transportation services, unit commanders should know that if these activities can be done by civil resources or if the situation does not meet immediate response criteria (life threatening, mitigation of property damage, or prevention of human suffering), the military should not undertake these activities (unless the FCO has assigned this task to federal forces).

Staffs, in particular, conduct planning for their local area of responsibility (AOR) and direct the Marine contribution during larger missions. (This includes helping to determine the proper point for the Marines to withdraw.) Staffs also have the complex task of interacting with many, typically unfamiliar, organizations, including FEMA, the Red Cross, local governments, and police.

Historically, Marines have performed many tasks in domestic operations not related to security; however, security may be an area to target for improving preparation. For example, during the Los Angeles riots units were dispatched with police riot-control gear before they had a chance to train with the equipment.
Implied Training and Education Requirements

What is needed:
- Appropriate level of understanding of mission requirements and restrictions
- Awareness of the role of civilian agencies
- Understanding of ROE, MOEs, and end-state
- Functioning with a restricted ROE
- Control methods, urban patrolling.

For their part, the military sufficient understanding of domestic operations to recognize when a particular task or mission maybe inappropriate. Commanders (whether of a squad or a JTF) must then know where to go for clarification.

To plan the military's role in a domestic operation, staffs and unit leaders must be familiar with certain nonmilitary agencies and the Federal Response Plan. Some on the staff, such as the SJA, require more in-depth knowledge of domestic operations and participants than do others. Staffs also require enough understanding of domestic operations to write proper ROE, determine measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and determine possible mission end-states (conditions that, once met, allow Marine forces to leave).

The security situation during domestic operations is very different from combat, although not so different from certain operations other than war (OOTW) that take place overseas. In general, military presence alone is enough to discourage looters or gangs in a disaster area. Should the need arise, however, Marines must be prepared to respond with force. Improper preparation for security functions could have serious consequences. The skills that small units need include functioning with restricted ROE, crowd-control methods, patrolling in an urban environment, and situational shoot/no-shoot training.
Alternatives to Meet Training and Education Requirements

♦ General awareness and preparedness required.
  - Stage emergency preparedness exercises and drills
  - Use case studies during PME sessions and school-house education

♦ Staffs need to improve and maintain expertise.
  - Advance planning for likely emergencies and planning with civil authorities is needed.
  - Reservists specializing in domestic operations could be assigned.
  - Liaison officer exchanges could be valuable.

To promote general awareness and preparedness in domestic relief operations, Marine bases should stage disaster preparedness drills at the discretion of individual commanders. These drills might simulate the effects of an earthquake in southern California or a hurricane in the eastern United States. Such exercises are fairly expensive, but they reach many Marines. Another way to increase general awareness of domestic operations would be to include case studies of past missions during PME sessions and school-house education. This can be done to a limited extent at little cost.

Maintaining a staff's expertise in domestic operations is an ongoing process. Advance planning with civil authorities for likely emergencies can help both civil and military organizations to better understand each other's capabilities, which will lead to more realistic expectations during actual crises. To provide in-depth knowledge in domestic operations without overburdening the regular staff, the Marine Corps could assign reservists to specialize in domestic operations. To fulfill their reserve hours, these Marines could attend disaster-relief conferences, study the Federal Response Plan (FRP), and act as liaison officers. These reserve specialists could also give PME lectures to teach units, unit commanders, and staffs about domestic operations. Regular staff officers can also serve as liaison officers but at greater cost to the staff.
Unit leaders should be educated in domestic operations.
- Prepare a domestic operations handbook.
- Give predeployment briefings.

Small units need to have training.
- Situational ROE training required.
- Training in crowd-control methods and weaponry.

Unit-leader education in domestic operations can be achieved in part by promoting general awareness and preparedness of domestic operations in the Marine Corps (see previous slide). Other ways to improve awareness of domestic operations include preparing a domestic-operations handbook or predeployment briefings that stress such issues as appropriate missions, working with nonmilitary organizations, and ROE.

Some security skills that small units need, such as functioning with riot-control gear, can be learned just before going out on a mission. Other skills that are sometimes required in overseas OOTW, as well as in domestic operations, are important enough to include as part of a unit's regular training program.

Already the USMC Basic School has an Urban Patrolling course based on lessons learned from Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. The course is conducted at the FBI Academy and stresses shoot/no-shoot scenarios. Although it does not address domestic operations, the lessons of this course are still relevant to them.

At present, Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)s) train for a variety of urban security functions, including crowd-control and riot-control operations, military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), and urban patrolling. Because they may be forward deployed, however, MEU (SOC)s may not be available to respond in most domestic operations. To improve security training for domestic operations, the Marines Corps could include noncombat security operations as a small part of the task list for certain U.S.-based units.
We recommend that the Marine Corps develop expertise in MSCA operations, but within reasonable cost constraints. Consideration should be given to developing a cadre of active and reserve Emergency Preparedness Officers (EPOs) at HQMC who could deploy to a disaster or civil-defense emergency as required and augment the staff of the local Marine commander. This group could otherwise be responsible for writing doctrine and SOPs, providing training, and coordinating with the other federal agencies involved in MSCA. Local reservists could also serve as EPOs. In addition, some Reservists who already have experience and contacts with local governments, such as police officers or government employees, should be used as Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs). Anecdotal evidence indicates that there are underemployed Reservists at the O-5/O-6 level who could represent the Marine Corps as liaison officers with local and state governments, the relevant CONUSAs, and other agencies involved in domestic emergency responses.

Besides these EPO/EPLO experts, who should receive education and training in MSCA, the USMC may want to add a short session designed to raise awareness of these operations to the Marine Corps University (MCU) curricula. In addition, MSCA could be raised in PME sessions at commands most likely to be involved in domestic emergencies. Finally, those staffs with MSCA responsibilities should periodically exercise these operations, as I MEF has recently done with the Fifth Army at Fort Bliss. Exercises should be low-cost in dollars and training time. They should include EPO/EPLO augmentees and representatives of key outside organizations.
Marine Corps Order 3440.7, which outlines the Marine structure for MSCA, is under review. We believe that this review is appropriate and that MCO 3440.7 should be changed. The changes under consideration include eliminating local planning agents and making all bases Regional Planning Agents. Base commanders would determine the boundaries of their planning AORs because they know best their own resources and localities. These proposals make sense; they eliminate one level of bureaucracy and use base commanders' local expertise and proximity to potential emergencies.

In addition, the Marine Corps should take advantage of the opportunity to revise FM 100-19/FMFM 7-10. The Marine Corps should submit proposed revisions to the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in the coming year to ensure that the revision prepared for the 1997 review will more fully reflect Marine Corps issues. The revision should incorporate the USMC MSCA coordination structure, cite Marine Corps Order 3440.7, *Marine Corps Assistance to Civil Authorities*, and should highlight unique Marine Corps perspectives and capabilities. On a more mundane level, at least some of the numerous historical examples should come from Marine Corps history.
Consider implications of downsizing for USMC role in MSCA: Options include:
- Seeking expanded USMC role or
- Supporting the USA as lead DOD actor
- Creating USMC EPO/EPLOs

Finally, the Marine Corps leadership should consider the implications of Army downsizing for the Marine role in MSCA. As outlined earlier, options include:

- Seeking a greater Marine Corps role in MSCA operations, including the designation of Marine Corps officers as defense coordinating officers (DCOs). Such a decision should be made at the highest level of the Marine Corps; it could involve a significant resource commitment in personnel, training time, equipment expenditures, and other direct fiscal outlays. Designating DCOs implies creating a staff to support the DCO, which will need to be equipped and trained. These personnel will then have restricted availability for overseas deployment.
- Seeking to have the Army (through the CONUSAs) maintain the lead from MSCA, even in areas where the Army no longer has a major presence (as in southern California). This would sacrifice familiarity with the region and with responding forces (most likely to be Marines in this area, for example) for the functional expertise CONUSAs have developed in MSCA.
- Creating an Emergency Preparedness Officer (EPO) and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) program in the Marine Corps. These officers—perhaps O-5/O-6 Reservists—would be responsible for acting as experts in advising Marine Corps commanders, and acting as liaison officers with other actors in domestic operations. The creation of a cadre of EPOs at HQMC that could deploy to a disaster and augment the Marine staff would be even more valuable should the Marine Corps assume DCO or CJTF responsibilities for MSCA operations.
Related CNA studies


Smith, Karen D. *Command and Coordination in Humanitarian Assistance Operations*, Apr 1996 (CNA Research Memorandum 95-165)

LaMon, Kenneth P. *Training Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance Operations*, Apr 1996 (CNA Annotated Briefing 95-83)


Keefer, Linda S. *Legal Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance Operations*, Apr 1996 (CNA Annotated Briefing 95-84)

Siegel, Adam B. *Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance Operations*, Apr 1996 (CNA Annotated Briefing 95-85)
