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MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR:
THE CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER
IN OPERATION SUPPORT DEMOCRACY

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the
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The Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) is the liaison between military forces and humanitarian organizations in military operations other than war. Although Operation Uphold Democracy was a successful operation there were some problems experienced with the CMOC and interagency planning. With the military involved in these operations more often, better planning has to be done. Pre-operation coordination between the military, humanitarian organizations, and other government agencies has to be accomplished. The research will be based on documents and interviews generated by the operation.
ABSTRACT

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR:
CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER
IN OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

The Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) is the liaison between military forces and humanitarian organizations in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Although Operation Uphold Democracy was a successful operation there were some problems experienced with the CMOC and interagency planning.

With the military being involved in these operations more often, pre-operation coordination between the military, other government agencies, and humanitarian organizations need to be accomplished. I will analyze the performance of the CMOC in Operation Uphold Democracy. The research will be based on documents and interviews generated by the operation.
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Introduction

The United States has been involved in Haiti's internal affairs on and off for a number of years. In 1915, the United States began an occupation of Haiti that lasted for nineteen years. The occupation began with good intentions but expanded into an operation that the U. S. military was ill-equipped to perform. The way the operation was conducted left a lot to be desired and the U. S. learned a great deal from it. This occupation and others have influenced how we do Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW) today. The occupation will be discussed briefly as part of this research paper.

Operation Uphold Democracy was determined to be a successful operation. This paper will explore whether the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) contributed to that success by looking at the principles of MOOTW.

The operations conducted in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti have continued the development and evolution of the CMOC. The lessons learned, during these operations, will help in further refining the concept of the CMOC.

Research Question

In looking back at Haiti, in particular, this paper will assess whether the CMOC is a useful and viable concept in MOOTW?
Haitian - United States Relations

The histories of the United States and Haiti have been intertwined since the American Revolution. In 1779, Haitian soldiers along with French troops fought alongside Americans against the British in the Battle of Savannah. American merchants sold weapons and ammunition to Haitians during their war for independence some twelve years later. After Haiti's independence, southern whites looked upon Haiti as a possible place to send free slaves.¹ Haiti was also used as a U. S. training ground for black diplomats.² While the U. S. has had a history of a democratic and stable government, Haiti has had a history of coup d'états, dictatorships, and a poor relationship with its people. Establishing a democratic government and society in Haiti is a very ambitious undertaking and cannot be mandated by the U. S. government. The people of Haiti must themselves decide what their destiny will be. All the U. S. can do is provide Haiti the necessary assistance and tools for them to succeed. The U. S. cannot afford nor should it desire to continue to intervene in Haiti's internal affairs.

Today, in military / strategic terms vital U. S. national security interests are not at stake in Haiti. Haiti has been a small time player in the drug trade to the U. S., but that has been curbed because of normal relationships between the Haitian and U. S. governments. The flow of illegal immigrants from Haiti has been a problem for U. S. immigration. There is no significant commercial interest in Haiti. U. S. economic interests in Haiti are based on humanitarian and economic aid provided. The most important factor in U. S. interests in Haiti is its close proximity to the U. S..³
Occupation (1915-1934)

The United States Navy had entered Haitian waters on at least 28 previous occasions to protect U. S. citizens and various foreign nationals prior to occupying Haiti in 1915. Then, as in 1994, Haiti was a chronically troubled nation.4

In 1915, Haiti’s strategic significance came to the forefront. Germany, interested in establishing a naval base to enhance its war efforts, was interested in Haiti. The possibility of a European nation attacking the United States from across the Atlantic was deemed virtually impossible, but to have Germany with a naval base in the United States’ backyard was not an acceptable notion as far as the United States government was concerned. This coupled with an unstable Haitian government, violence running rampant through the countryside, an out-of-control Haitian national debt, and the just completed Panama Canal, made it essential that stability of the Caribbean be maintained.5 As a result, the U. S. marines and sailors landed in Port-au-Prince on 28 July 1915.

The sole purpose of this occupation was to build a nation that was acceptable to the United States. The president was hand-picked and the Haitian constitution was rewritten by the United States. One thing the U. S. failed to realize was that no country can force its way of government on a society which does not have a history of democracy and which views occupation as an imposition. The occupation of Haiti was not only unpopular among the Haitian population; but it was also hotly debated in the United States [media]. These sentiments continued throughout the nineteen years of the occupation.

The scope of the task associated with the Marine occupation was both broad and varied: from battling insurgency, to keeping the peace, training the national police force, and assisting in developing and implementing social and economic reforms of the nation.
Unfortunately, while bringing a temporary peace and effectively stabilizing the country for almost two decades, the occupation did little to effect long-term change in Haiti. The lessons learned from this occupation play an important part in how we do business today in MOOTW.  

**Intervention-1994**

Jean-Bertrand Aristide became Haiti’s first democratically elected president in January 1991. His presidency got off to a good start. He eliminated excess spending and perks from the government. He developed plans to improve the judicial system, provide universal health care and improve education. He also wanted to rid the country of corruption and smuggling. Under his leadership Haiti became more productive. Because of that productivity, the international community was gaining confidence in Haiti and that confidence led to financial assistance from several countries.

Aristide’s reforms, however, caused discontent among some Haitians. The army and police were some of his principal adversaries because of his efforts to eliminate drug trafficking and corruption, from which they were profiting. Some in the government bureaucracy were unhappy with his civil service reforms. The Haitian elite were uncomfortable with his policies in general. The military did not like his efforts to reform the army. As a result of this discontent, on 30 September 1991 Major Michel Francois of the Haitian Police led a successful coup against President Aristide and placed General Raoul Cedras as head of the government. President Aristide fled the country and went into exile.

The United Nations and the Organization of American States quickly imposed economic sanctions. The effects of these sanctions caused Haitians to take to the sea to escape the repression and terror of life in Haiti. The mounting number of refugees led to the U. S.
opening refugee camps at the U. S. Naval Base Guantánomo Bay, Cuba and a call for the
possible use of military forces to restore President Aristide to power. The refugee camps
were closed in June 1993 because of the mounting cost and the dwindling number of Haitian
taking to the sea, the majority of the refugees were returned to Haiti.9

Economic sanctions and extensive diplomatic initiatives failed to restore President
Aristide to power. The United Nations fearing widespread starvation, authorized the
formation of a multinational force to oust the military leadership of Haiti and to establish a
secure environment. The Clinton administration and congress were at first reluctant to send
the U. S. troops into Haiti fearing a protracted involvement in the country. On 25 August
1994, however, President Clinton authorized the military to prepare plans for the invasion of
Haiti. On 15 September, President Clinton addressed the nation stating that all diplomatic
efforts had been exhausted and the invasion of Haiti was imminent. He told Haiti’s military
leadership “Their time was up”.10 The reasons given for the U. S.-led international
intervention as stated by President Clinton were:

“To stop the horrible atrocities; to affirm our determination that we keep our
commitments and we expect others to keep their commitments to us; to avert the flow of
thousands of refugees and to secure our border; To preserve the stability of democracy in
our hemisphere.”11

If it were not for the efforts of former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell, a bloody invasion would have
taken place. Because of the last minute agreement they forged, the U. S. military entered
Haiti peacefully to assist in the transfer of power between the military leadership and the
democratically elected government.
Operation Uphold Democracy and the Civil Military Operations Center

Operation Uphold Democracy was a U.S.-led multinational effort sanctioned by the United Nations to restore the democratically elected government to Haiti. Twenty-thousand U.S. military personnel from all services, including the Coast Guard, along with five thousand non-U.S. military personnel from twenty-four nations participated as part of the Multinational Force (MNF). Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic (CINCUSACOM) was in command of the operation. The mission statement for the operation read as follows:

"When directed, combined Joint Task Force Haiti, conducts combined military operation in Haiti under the operational control of U.S. Atlantic Command to protect and, if required, evacuate U.S. citizens, designated Haitians, and third world nationals; to establish and maintain a stable and secure environment; to facilitate the return and proper function of the Government of Haiti; to provide logistical support to coalition forces; and, on order, to turn over responsibility for ongoing operations to the government of Haiti or designated international organization."

The initial days of the intervention were used to have the U.S. military establish itself in the country. According to the plan, aggressive civil-military operations would be conducted ensuring all relief work would be conducted by non-governmental (NGO) and private voluntary organizations (PVO). The Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) was established to ensure that this plan was implemented. The opening of the CMOC quickly enhanced the PVO assistance program effectiveness. The CMOC is a coordination center established and tailored to assist the civil military operations officer in anticipating, facilitating, coordinating, and orchestrating those civil military functions and activities pertaining to the civil population, government, and economy, government organization (GO), international organization (IO), non-government organization (NGO), and private voluntary organizations (PVO). The original concept for the CMOC was to keep civil matters from interrupting or interfering with military operations. But due to the complexities of military
operations other than war and large scale civil military operations the duties of the CMOC were expanded.\textsuperscript{15}

The plan was to provide enough assistance to Haitian civil authorities that they would be capable of accomplishing what they needed to accomplish. The object was to make the Haitian government look like the heroes. U. S. military personnel were to keep a low profile and not take any credit for assisting the people of Haiti.

The CMOC for Operation Uphold Democracy was established at Fort Drum and deployed as part of the MNF. Once in Haiti, two CMOCs were established, one in Port-au-Prince and the other in Cap-Haitian. A number of humanitarian organizations were reluctant to work with the U. S. Military, so a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) had to be opened. The opening of the HACC caused confusion among the NGOs and PVOs because their experience had been working with the CMOC and they continued to call on the CMOC. The confusion, however, caused delays in providing valuable assistance.\textsuperscript{16} The HACC operated out of the USAID building in Port-au-Prince at a neutral site that had been used for some time by NGOs and PVOs. The manning of the CMOC/HACC was rather rank-heavy, with very few NCOs involved; but with a good mix of active duty and reserve civil military personnel.\textsuperscript{17} The combined manning of the two CMOC and HACC were three colonels, five lieutenant colonels, eight majors, four captains, one sergeant major, two master sergeants, two sergeant first class, eight staff sergeants and nine sergeants.\textsuperscript{18}

Because there were no Title 10 funds available for this operation there was a limit on what civil military projects could be conducted. The guidance that was given by JCS is as follows:
The following qualify for DOD funding as mission essential:
- Street cleanup and basic sanitary measures.
- Landfill operations.
- Repair of critical roads and bridges.
- Public safety improvements.
- Emergency humanitarian assistance.
- Limited civic action projects.\textsuperscript{19}

Four hundred NGOs and PVOs operated in Haiti. Most were already in Haiti before the arrival of the MNF. These organizations frequently requested transportation. Because of lack of funding, transportation was provided on an "opportunistic lift" basis. The HACC held a coordination meeting once or twice a week, which all organizations requesting transportation or security escort had to attend. If they did not attend, no transportation or security was provided. This coordination was important to make sure available "opportunistic lifts" did not go unused or that security patrols were forced to escort one or two vehicles.\textsuperscript{20} The humanitarian organizations had distribution problems that were caused by the imposed embargo and sanctions. Shortages of fuel and vehicle repair parts were part of the problem; another part was that the vehicles (non-military) that were available were operated with poor quality fuel, coolant, and motor oil. It became important to reestablish trade to Haiti to solve this distribution problem.\textsuperscript{21}

A system was set up to answer all civil affairs requests within 48 hours. Because of this program:

- Safe water was restored in 17 cities and villages.
- 50 critical pieces of Bio-Tech equipment were repaired.
- 12 major hospitals had assessments and assist programs conducted.
- Public health, public safety, and public facilities were assessed.

Of 675 civil affairs requests made, 600 were completed.\textsuperscript{22}

Other civil military operations accomplishments were:
- Restored electricity in 16 cities and villages.
- Transported over 21,000 tons of humanitarian supplies.
- Established nationwide "cold chain" (a refrigeration system available to keep vaccines cold).
- Provided firefighting instruction and repaired or obtained equipment.
- Constructed roads and cleanup following tropical storm Gordon.
- Opened and repaired ports.
- Opened new and rebuilt police stations.

Humanitarian projects brought small improvements in the lives of the Haitian people.

Medical training was provided to Haitian health care providers and schools were renovated. It was extremely important to open schools and restore the normal economic and commercial activities in Haiti.

Opening the port and restoring electricity in Haiti were important projects. Returning the port to operation was a major challenge. Corruption was widespread in the port but a close working relationship was established with port management and the Haitian government to solve this problem. Operation Lighthouse was a successful program for getting lights turned on in Haiti. The lights on at night gave the population a sense of security and stability.

Army reserve civil affairs officers, thirty-four total, were assigned to assist the new democratic government in building a foundation for a strong and prosperous future. These officers were experts in fields such as health care, law, community planning, forestry, traffic management, and environmental matters. Their mission was to be advisors to the 12 Haitian government ministries. The director of this team was Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham, Commander of the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade and the senior civil affairs officer in Haiti. "We are not there to run the government", Bingham stated. "We were there to advise, support, and provide information and assist as necessary." The advisory team reported to William L. Swing, Ambassador to Haiti, who thought the advisers made a valuable
contribution to the operation. The advisers also left very positive impression with the
individual ministers and their staffs.\textsuperscript{26} As a result of the advisory team the following gains
were made:

\begin{itemize}
\item The agriculture department started a restoration program, which will diminish erosion
and enhance agriculture production;
\item The commerce department is actively involved in cultivating tourism and attracting
foreign investors;
\item Civil affairs soldiers with expertise in banking and finance helped develop a viable
budget for Haiti.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{itemize}

A weapons buy back program was initiated and temporary buy back sites were established
in several areas throughout the country. A person turning in a weapon would receive a chit
that they could redeem at one of four chit redemption centers. The buy back program was
conducted in four phases. Prices were varied which helped sustain the public interest in the
program. The program was successful in removing 4124 weapons and 9176 explosives and
CS grenades, thus making the country safer for the MNF to operate.\textsuperscript{28}

The CMOC was in charge of coordinating support to the elections, insuring that the
Haitian government safely warehoused, prepared, transported and received voter registration
material. It was important that the government conduct its own election process. To achieve
this a government representative always accompanied voter material. The MNF assisted in
election preparations but the government was always responsible for the election. This
mission was not planned for by the U. S. forces, but nevertheless was done exceptionally
well.\textsuperscript{29}
There were some problems with civil military operations. Free fuel that was provided to electric plants to keep lights on in Haitian towns and villages was cut off in some areas. This caused a number of areas to fall back into darkness, reversing the progress made during the initial stages of the operation.30

The humanitarian organizations that were in Haiti were ones that were interested in long term assistance and were much more deliberate in providing assistance. The relief organizations that provide disaster relief assistance did not rush to Haiti because they thought there was no urgent need for their services.31

U. S. military cooperation and coordination with other U. S. government agencies was poor. There was no information provided on where relief warehouses were located nor what was in them, so proper security could be provided to prevent looting. A planning conference was held in August 1994 between the military and other U. S. government agency to make sure problems like this did not occur. After the operation began, it was soon realized that these agencies could not or would not be able to move at the speed of the military forces.32

**ANALYSIS**

The purpose of MOOTW is to deter war, promote peace, and support civil authorities. Joint Doctrine 3-07 states that these operations are used to achieve national policy objectives without entanglement in an unplanned, undesired, or unnecessary war. Generally, they occur in peacetime and in the gray area of political - military conflict. These operations are driven by political considerations which make them more sensitive to the overriding objective of limiting potential hostilities. Whether the military is in a lead or supporting role, two important factors about political primacy standout. First, all military personnel, from the JTF Commander to the junior leaders, must understand the political objectives and the potential
impact of inappropriate military actions on them. Secondly to avoid adverse political effects, commanders must adopt courses of action that support the political objective. The CMOC helps assist in this process.33

One of the reasons Operation Uphold Democracy was a success was due the performance of the CMOC and HACC. The coordination provided by the two organizations was exceptional.

The presidential selected reserve call up was activated early in the planning process for the operation and provided much needed civil affairs personnel into the planning process, enabling the JTF to put a large civil affairs presence on the ground during the early stages of the operation.

Some "mission creep" was unavoidable in some cases, but constituted only a minor problem. It was important for the CMOC to arrange and use military assets to provide transportation and security for the humanitarian relief organizations. This kind of response paid off in the long run.

Although the lack of funds curtailed the amount of assistance the CMOC could provide, it did an outstanding job of managing its resources and sought innovative ways to provide the assistance necessary. The assistance provided by the ministerial advisors was invaluable, but more could have been done if the funding had been available. Only time will tell if the assistance provided by the advisors will lead to an enduring and better Haitian government and infrastructure. The success of this program will have to depend on the ministers, their staffs and President Aristide.

The CMOC reflected in its performance a sensitivity to the principles of a MOOTW in the case of Operation Uphold Democracy.
**Objective.** The basic tenet of all military operations is that they must be directed towards a well-defined objective. In attaining that objective commanders must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate operational and tactical objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives not only complement each other but, most importantly, contribute to accomplishing the mission. The objective for Operation Uphold Democracy was to provide a stable and secure environment for the return of the legitimate government of Haiti. The CMOC contributed to the objective by coordinating projects discussed earlier.

**Unity of Effort.** Unity of effort is essential for every military operation. But during MOOTW operations achieving unity of effort is complicated by the number of non-military agencies participating, lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective. This area is where the presence of a CMOC pays off. The CMOC and HACC coordinated all the humanitarian and interagency efforts for Joint Force Commander so he could concentrate on other matters. By coordinating "opportune lifts" for humanitarian organizations, the CMOC and HACC ensured so uninterrupted humanitarian assistance could be provided to towns and villages outside of Port-au-Prince.

**Restraint.** Restraint involves the prudent application of appropriate force or military capability. The use of force should be limited to the minimum necessary to accomplish the specific mission in support of the political actions. Restraint requires the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective.

The level of violence was reduced as a result of the weapons buy back program which was orchestrated by the CMOC. Support of the Haitian people for the operation was enhanced by the accomplishments of the CMOC, such as restoring electricity and cleaning
up the cities. Rendering the environment less hostile and encouraging an atmosphere of cooperation between MNF personnel and the Haitian people.

**Perseverance.** Perseverance entails preparing for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.\(^{37}\) Perseverance requires an information strategy that clearly explains the goals, objective and desired end state and links them with U. S. interest.\(^{38}\) The CMOC contributed to perseverance by coordinating “opportune lifts” for humanitarian organizations and ensured that all civil affairs personnel knew what the goals and objectives were for the operation in Haiti. Also, the CMOC showed the flexibility in providing support to mission that were not planned such as election support.

**Legitimacy.** Legitimacy is the condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality or rightness of a set of actions. This audience may be the U. S. public, foreign nations, the population in the area of operations, or the participating forces. If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action; if perceived as not legitimate, the action will not be supported and may be actively resisted.\(^{39}\) In operations such as Uphold Democracy legitimacy is frequently the decisive element. The CMOC/HACC contributed to the legitimacy of the operation by all the coordinated projects it participated in from restoring electricity to the weapons buy back program. From the outset the U. S. military sought to make the humanitarian assistance organization and the Government of Haiti look like the heroes by keeping them in the forefront, while MNF personnel maintained a low profile giving the Haitians and the international community a sense that the MNF was not in Haiti to force its will on the people and the government. It was important for U. S. forces to stay away from nation building. The value of having a well
planned and organized CMOC is important in establishing legitimacy and, therefore, is critical to the success of an operation such as Operation Uphold Democracy.

**Recommendation**

One of the more significant lessons learned in Operation Uphold Democracy was that effective communications and a sound working relationship must be established among the U. S. military, U. S. government agencies and humanitarian relief organizations. In Haiti better communications might have made the U. S. military aware of the distribution problems that the humanitarian organizations were experiencing and that other U. S. government agencies would not be in country at the designated time. A conference should be conducted, with these organizations in attendance, to help resolve long standing problems and alleviate problems in future operations.

More funding would have been desirable but the CMOC was very creative and resourceful in using the funds that were provided.

Early establishment of the CMOC during the planning process should continue for future operations. It seemed to have paid dividends for this operation.

If programs, such as, providing free fuel to restore electric power to towns and villages are started in the early stages of an operation it should continue until the government is able to take over that responsibility. The progress that was gained when fuel was provided was lost when the fuel was cut off.

**Conclusion**

The United States is one of the only remaining world powers that possesses the resources to intervene and the influence required to resolve the emerging conflicts threatening global security. Whether the mission will be one of peace operations, support of insurgency,
counterinsurgency, or nation assistance, success will require military forces to apply the fundamental principles of MOOTW.40

The CMOC is essential to the success of an operation such as Operation Uphold Democracy. The effort of the CMOC and civil affairs personnel paid dividends because they showed the people of Haiti that someone cared. They also showed that the MNF was dedicated to the restoration of the democratic government in Haiti and that stability was maintained in the country. They helped to enhance the confidence the populace had in the MNF and helped foster better relationships. The primary goal of the CMOC was to provide the necessary tools for the Haitian people to help themselves.

The U. S. military continues to make progress every time one of these operations take place. The lessons learned from these operations and war gaming various MOOTW scenarios have continued to allow refinement in planning and execution. But more work needs to be done. Conferring with humanitarian organizations and other U. S. government agencies, will help refine doctrine and avoid or alleviate future problems.

Army reserve personnel played an important role in the CMOC. Without their expertise the CMOC/HACC could not have provided the services they did. There is one problem with the civil affairs community, it is heavily dependent on the reserve component. There is no short term solution to this problem because the skills of those personnel cannot be found in the active component. Reserve personnel will have to be identified early in the planning stages of an operation to take advantage of their expertise during the planning process.

Some assumptions were made, during the planning for Operation Uphold Democracy, based on what was experienced in Somalia. One was that nation building was not a viable objective in Haiti. This was the correct avenue to take because to force the will of the MNF
on the government and the people of Haiti would have been an elusive goal. It would have alienated the Haitian people and may have caused the loss of U. S. lives. The other assumption was that disaster relief organizations would come to Haiti just because the military was there. There should have been contact made with these relief and humanitarian organizations to find out who was planning to participate in the operation. That is why constant contact with these organizations is so important.

The ultimate success of Operation Uphold Democracy will depend on whether a long lasting democracy is established in Haiti.

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