US DECISIONMAKING PROCESS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST EUROPEAN STATES

by

Vitaliy Malashchenko

December, 1996

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   The interpretation of these national interests, in turn, have been shaped by two factors: geostrategic perspectives and domestic political concerns. Wide agreement has emerged between Congress and the Executive branch that NATO enlargement serves U.S. geostrategic interests. Moreover, at least until now, partisan political conflict over NATO enlargement has remained muted. Such conflicts could grow as new strategic questions emerge with the prospect of enlargement beyond the Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic).

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U.S. DECISIONMAKING PROCESS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST EUROPEAN STATES

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The enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is central to the fate of European security. The present study treats the evolution of post-Cold War NATO policy as a case study of the way in which domestic and international pressures interact to shape security policy. I argue that the expansion of U.S. commitments to post-Cold War Europe corresponds to the way key U.S. policymaking institutions have framed American national interests. President Clinton, his key advisers and Republican leaders of Congress emphasize that NATO enlargement advances American interests by accelerating the success of democratic and market economy reforms in Eastern European countries and Russia. President Clinton has argued that this success is in America’s own national interests; indeed, he has stated that “...our security in this generation will be shaped by whether reform in these nations succeeds.” But NATO enlargement also serves a more defensive mission -- that of pushing back threats to the West from the East. NATO is still needed, despite the end of the Cold War, because “the dream of an empire is still burns in the minds of some who look longingly toward a brutal past.” The new NATO doctrine is one of “pre-containment:” work for reform but be prepared for aggression.¹

The process that led to this policy reflects the flexibility of the U.S. decisionmaking structure, and the sharing of powers between Congress, the president and other key actors. Each phase of policymaking process (such as the definition of tasks, the adoption and

implementation policies, and the funding of U.S. commitments) depends on the ability of these institutions to hammer out a common interpretation of national interests.

The interpretation of these national interests, in turn, have been shaped by two factors: geostrategic perspectives and domestic political concern. Wide agreement has emerged between Congress and the Executive branch that NATO enlargement serves U.S. geostrategic interests. Yet, NATO issues are also a source of possible partisan conflict. Republicans in Congress have chided President Clinton for proceeding too slowly on NATO enlargement, and pushed for a more rapid pace. This bodes well for the Visegrad nations. Over the longer term, however, important strategic uncertainties persist -- and with them, new opportunities for partisan conflict. Political pressures to cut spending on foreign affairs, and increase funding for domestic programs, may (over the longer term) encourage policymakers to consider maintaining a more modest military presence in Europe. Such a reduction in U.S. force level within NATO might also make strategic sense, if doing so helped ease the political problems that NATO enlargement posed to pro-Democracy politicians in Russia. Even the possibility of such a reduction in the U.S. presence will also force European political circles to pay closer attention to their own security capabilities. No responsible authority in Europe wants a decreased U.S. commitment to NATO. However, if concerns over potential U.S. reductions were to strengthen the Europeans' commitment to provide for their own defense, this would create not only a fall-back position for European security but would also increase NATO's capabilities to act -- hopefully, in accord with U.S. strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION

The picture of the world has changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War. Bitter rivalry between two superpowers once dominated the entire international order. In the new international environment Cold War era fears of nuclear holocaust have evolved into other concerns over the dangers to peace. Waves of local wars and regional conflicts have occurred around the world. Bloodshed is still a tool that states (and non-state actors) use to manage human society. Even in Europe, where the fires of two World Wars during the 20th century originated, violence and death have continued. In particular, conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have highlighted concerns of war and peace, and strengthened the interest of European governments in building reliable structures for post-Cold War security.

The new European order is more complicated, more vulnerable and less cohesive than during the Cold War. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the willingness Europe to accept U.S. leadership on security issues might have been expected to decline. Over the past five years, however, the leaders of many European states have emphasized the necessity of preserving the U.S. political and military presence in Europe, and have argued that there is not yet a viable alternative structure for European security. While the threat of two-block confrontation has diminished, new dangers have emerged in the wake of communism. These threats and uncertainties have led Central and East European states to apply for NATO membership. Yet, the breakdown of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact has raised a number of questions about the future ties between Western Europe and the United States, particularly in light of the development of the European Union after Maastricht. Concerns also exist over the possible consequences of NATO enlargement for relations between Russia and the West. More broadly, the international environment in which European - American
relations evolve will exert enormous influence over how each actor behaves towards the others.

From the U.S. perspective, 47 years of the participation in NATO has left a legacy of close military and political engagement in Europe. Moreover, as NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) General George Joulwan reminded the U.S. Congress, the existence of NATO provides the US European Command (USECOM) with basing, infrastructure and prepositioned equipment that have proven essential in several post-Cold War contingencies, and were indispensable during the 1991 Gulf War.²

From the perspective of Europe, however, the evolution of NATO in the post-Cold War era -- and the broader structure of European security -- have become extraordinarily controversial topics. The Alliance will become undoubtedly remain a decisive component of European security into the next millennium. But membership in a modernized NATO will entail not only security benefits, but political, economic, military and social obligations. The enlargement of the Organization will oblige both sides - old members and new-- to sacrifice some of their own interests to the new system of international security.

The purpose of this work is to examine how the United States has approached these issues concerning NATO enlargement, and how the disparate organizations involved in U.S. security decisionmaking are likely to shape U.S. policy in the future. Each government conducts its politics, internal and external, in accordance with the national interests defined by the leadership of the

country. But the effort to determine this national interest -- especially on an issue as complex as NATO enlargement -- is itself a highly political process. Indeed, the structure of the decisionmaking process (including the distribution of policy roles and functions) is critical to the outcome of U.S. policy. The aim of my research is to describe the mechanism that determines U.S. security policy, particularly as it concerns NATO enlargement. My special interest is to clarify the key points of security decisionmaking within the nation and to illuminate the critical components of this process. Such an analysis will allow me to define the main characteristics and tendencies of the U.S. decisionmaking process and their influence on future U.S. policies toward European security.

This work argues that enlargement of NATO corresponds to the United States' underlying strategic interests in Europe. By taking the leading role in NATO's structural changes, the U.S. government has provided a reliable basis for its continued influence in the international European state system. The end of the Cold War has made this continued role all the more important for U.S. security. Whereas the bipolar international system simplified and necessitated U.S.-European cooperation, multipolarity has tended to complicate and add new security pressures to multilateral relations. These new pressures have made multilateral security organizations especially valuable, and have helped frame the U.S. debate over the relative costs and benefits of NATO enlargement.

My argument differs from those offered by many other scholars who have examined the U.S. decisionmaking process on NATO enlargement. Jeremy Rosner, Richard Pipes and other prominent scholars predict that NATO enlargement will create serious disputes within the U.S. government in the near future. In particular, these analysts predict that significant opposition will emerge in the United States Senate against ratification of treaties for NATO enlargement. They have also expressed concern over the budgetary impact of NATO enlargement, and the effects of this
enlargement on relations with Russia.

My conclusion is very different. NATO enlargement is bound to spur vigorous debate within the U.S. government. Nevertheless, the recent history of U.S. decisionmaking on the Alliance suggests that U.S. security interests (as they are defined through the U.S. decisionmaking process) will continue to encourage support for NATO enlargement.

A. STRUCTURE OF THESIS.

My thesis consists of four main sections. The next chapter outlines the domestic political structures that shape U.S. security policy. This chapter clarifies the power relationships and decisionmaking roles played by the key officials and institutions of the state. This analysis sets the stage for the study of NATO enlargement-related questions of American foreign policymaking that comprise the focus of this thesis.

Chapter III examines the external pressures on U.S. foreign decisionmaking that stem from European politics. This chapter examines U.S. interests in Europe in the post-Cold War era, and the potential threats to these interests. I analyze why the U.S. has retained such an important role in the Old World and examine the implications for NATO enlargement.

Finally, Chapter IV is based on previous studies and examines the main tendencies of the U.S. foreign policies toward NATO enlargement. The method of research is a content-analysis of recent publications and statements by key American politicians who have had a decisive impact on the decisionmaking process. The selection of these officials was done in accordance with the results of Chapter II. From this study of the internal process of policymaking and from the description of external circumstances, it will be possible to focus on a number of trends in the national
policymaking process, which will directly effect the U.S. policy toward East European states in the context of the NATO enlargement process.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES.

This chapter is devoted to a contentious area of American political studies - the United States national security policymaking process. Scholars have offered widely differing explanations for the determinants of U.S. behavior on security policy, reflecting in part their disagreements over the proper level of analysis to be used. These levels range from the characteristics of individual policymakers, to the structure of the state’s policymaking system, to the pressures and constraints exerted on the state by the international system as a whole.

This study focuses on the structure of the U.S. decisionmaking system, and the effect that this structure has on the definition of the national interests in issues such as NATO enlargement. The unit of analysis is the process of interaction between governmental and other state organizational bodies, which have the impact on the United States foreign and domestic policies. There are a lot of different scholars, schemes, structures, patterns, and assumptions involved in the American decisionmaking system on national security. The most popular and traditional models are: “the concentric circle approach”, the “elite and participatory” models, the “system-analysis approach to policymaking”, and “policy power clusters”\(^3\). Each of these approaches explains to some extent the variety of political actors and their interactions, and attempts to predict the relative importance of various actors (including the president and Congress) on security policy. For example, the “concentric circle” model assumes that the president is at the center of security decisionmaking.

Congress, the general population, and the mass media have significant roles in this process, but are less significant. Yet, they are not the "key points" of policy making. Still wider circles involve other governmental structures and agencies, constituencies and interest groups. The further from the center, the less their importance as "players" in national security policymaking.

My argument is different. While the structure of the U.S. decisionmaking system is fairly constant, the distribution of power and influence on a given issue will vary with the nature of that issue and the sorts of interests that it engages. Issues also have differing levels of different level of immediacy and political significance. The level of seriousness could place an issue into either "routine" or "priority" categories. Routine questions usually take more time and involve a couple of power rings. "Priority" questions are usually resolved in a comparatively short period of time and only by the President and his closest advisers.

NATO-related issues involve both immediate and long-term concerns. In the case of NATO enlargement, the crucial point of policymaking is the balance between domestic political and external interests in shaping security policy. This balance has shifted since President Clinton came into office four years ago. While domestic frustration and some foreign policy success have reminded President Clinton's administration that world leadership can be politically useful, the country's long-term policy priorities have also changed. In this chapter, I will explain how the nature of the issues raised by NATO enlargement help determine the influence exercised by Clinton Administration officials, legislators and other actors, given the larger political context in which U.S. decisionmaking takes place.

It is impossible to analyze in detail the entire system of U.S. national security decisionmaking of a highly developed democracy within such a comparatively brief thesis. Yet, on
the issue of NATO enlargement, the basic allocation of policymaking roles in the U.S. Constitution will play a key role in shaping U.S. behavior. I will also assess the political and institutional interests of specific U.S. actors that may affect their attitudes toward NATO enlargement. In particular, the difference of interests between the U.S. State Department and the Department of Defense are critical to understanding the future American role in Europe.

A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY POLICYMAKING.

In terms of foreign policymaking, the U.S. political system can not be presented as a monolithic entity. The entire structure consists of components with different powers, authorities, interests, and perceptions of the nation’s priorities. Indeed, a key feature of the constitutional frameworks for decisionmaking on issues such as NATO enlargement is the decentralization of power⁴. The framers of the Constitution structured the state to diffuse political power throughout its political system. The principle of separated powers modifies basic characteristics of interactions between the legislative and executive branches of the government. Each of these branches shares security policymaking responsibilities with the other. This principle triggers each side to check the other and to be checked by it. As one of the nation’s founders James Madison argued, this system of interlocking powers distributed among separated branches of the government was essential to the preservation of liberty. Inside the branches of state power “Ambitions must be made to counteract ambition so as to prevent arbitrary acts of the government.”⁵

⁴ This definition have been taken from G. Edvards and W. Walker “National Security and the U.S. Constitution”, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.

⁵ James Madison, Federalist, no. 51
The Constitution gives the President a few specific security policy powers that relate directly to NATO enlargement and the use of forces in a NATO context. These powers include his role as Commander in Chief, his authority to negotiate treaties (such as for NATO enlargement), and to nominate Ambassadors and other executive branch officials. Article 2, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution of the United States of America reads:

"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject, relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Officers against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur...."  

"...he (the President) shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Law be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States."

At the same time, few of the President’s powers can be exercised effectively without Congress’ affirmation. With regards to warmaking, Congress has the power “to declare war,” “to raise and support armies,” and to “provide for the common defense”. The president can negotiate treaties such as those that will provide for NATO enlargement, but those treaties are can only be ratified Provided that “two thirds of the Senator present concur.” The president can appoint ambassadors only “by and with advice and consent of the Senate”. The precept of separation of powers requires the President to act only with the acquiescence of the Congress. Moreover, any decision which causes financial spending must be authorized and appropriated by Congress. NATO

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6 The Constitution of the United States of America

7 The Constitution of the United States of America, Article 2, Section 2.
enlargement is bound to involve new spending requirements; hence, on this issue as well, the Constitution ensures that decisionmaking will be shared by Congress and the president.

The separation of powers has its impact also on the political influence of institutions outside of government, such as political parties, public organizations, and other interest groups. The access among multiple influential elites or interested groups to influencing policymaking is one of the peculiarities of American political system. The multipolar and competitive nature of political interests in the political process is caused by restricted authority in the structure of the national government. In the case of NATO enlargement, I will argue in the final chapter that interests groups such as (Polish Americans) have played a significant role in shaping U.S. policy. A related feature of the American constitutional system is the “vertical decentralization of power,” which is created by federalism as a fundamental base of national security decisionmaking. The result of federalism is the tendency of legislators to be especially concerned for the interests of their constituencies.

Given this wide distribution and sharing of powers, then, issues such as NATO enlargement are bound to be the focus of competition for influence between the president and Congress. As noted by Edward S. Corwin, the Constitution has really provided “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”8 This will be true of the issues surrounding NATO enlargement as well. By giving both branches the power to share responsibilities, the Constitution requires the two branches two work together to define U.S. security priorities.

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B. POWERS OF THE CONGRESS

In the realm of implementing security policy, Congress plays a decisive role. The core power of the Congress in security decisionmaking is to make laws and appropriate funds. Treaty-making power rests in the Senate, whose advice and consent (by two-thirds vote) is necessary before the President can enter into a treaty with another country. In controlling the budget, the Congress has a prime opportunity to subordinate the president’s initiatives to congressional priorities (and to the interests of its constituents). Despite the fact that the Congress has the power to declare war, raise and support armies, maintain and supply a Navy, make regulations for land and naval military forces, make sets of rules for the government, ratify treaties, confirm ambassadors and regulate foreign commerce, legislators ordinarily use these powers to determine whether and how to implement presidential initiatives (rather than launching such initiatives themselves). Because of its multiplicity and size, it is difficult for Congress to formulate strategies for national security. Each member of Congress represents his (or her) constituents and his (or her) goal is to satisfy them. Many members of Congress represent and protect interests of economic and financial elites. These politicians can also be sensitive to the pressures from interest groups or lobbyists. Contradictions between these narrow interests can become especially sharp in cases when the interests of the nation are different than the interests of particular congressional constituencies.

The distribution of power inside the Congress on issues such as NATO enlargement depends on a mixture of numerous variables: the responsibilities of particular committees over relevant legislation, the power and interests of particular members, and the position of the leadership in the House and Senate. Members of Congress depend on their constituencies to get elected, but they also depend on their colleagues to shape the final outcome of any activity. In the ideal scheme the
interaction of these interests should drive adversarial groups to compromise their positions and eventually to reach a consensus. In this scheme the separation of power internal to Congress is important to the whole legislative process. Moreover, the "sword of Damocles" for each member of Congress is a risk of losing reelection⁹. Therefore, in examining questions such as NATO enlargement, the effect of individual electoral concerns on congressional behavior can be of critical importance.

Yet, much of the work of Congress is done by committees, which have their own decisionmaking dynamics. At the start of the legislative process, bills dealing with such NATO enlargement-related issues must go through the appropriate committees and subcommittees, which are led by chairmen appointed by the majority party in each house. Both the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs committees occupy a pivotal place within congressional foreign policy decisionmaking. The main legislative task of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is to draft foreign aid authorization bills for the Senate and to deal with treaties negotiated by the president. Despite the formal responsibility these committees on defense-related, in real life their political influence has declined in recent years relative to other key committees (especially the Senate Armed Services Committee). But no matter which committee takes the lead on treaty ratification issues, the Senate as a whole can play a decisive role in security policymaking through this mechanism. The Senate has the power to block the ratification of a treaty. In the past 200 years 90.1% of all treaties were approved by the Senate and 9.9% were blocked. The Senate refused to consider 118 treaties, and 88 of them were subsequently withdrawn. The Senate can modify a treaty through amendments,

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⁹ Being alone or within the group of congressmen.
reservations and understandings. The Senate can also kill treaties by adding unacceptable stipulations, which it has done in more than 40 cases.\textsuperscript{10} This raises broader issues critical to NATO enlargement: that is, the balance of power between Congress and the president over security policy, and the structure of the Executive Branch in dealing with such issues.

C. CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

In order to understand the balance of power between the President and the Congress, it is principal to note two key differences between them. First, the entire institution of the presidency is incarnate in one person, while in Congress it is difficult to assign responsibility to any one particular member. Consequently, individuals in Congress have much more flexibility and room to maneuver. The President, on the other hand, as leader of the state, must predict the foreseeable future in his activities. A second difference lies in their respective constituencies. The President’s constituency is the whole nation, he is elected to be a nation’s governor. Members of Congress (even senators) represent just fractions of the total population, including restricted communities or interest groups. These differences create implications for the balance of power in real political life.

In the executive branch, power is concentrated in one person, who must be able to define the priorities of national interests at a highest executive level. The president is the Chief of State, Chief Executive, Commander-in-Chief, Chief Diplomat, Chief Legislator, and Party Chief. As the officially elected leader of the state, the president is responsible for setting the long-range goals of

\textsuperscript{10} See more in James McCormick, \textit{“American Foreign Policy and Process”} Ch.7, pp.275-278

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the nation and simultaneously selecting the appropriate methods to achieve them. In this structure, the President’s role is to select appropriate ideas and programs, adopt and develop them and try to meet the nation’s priorities through budget provisions. Another peculiarity of the presidency is the capacity the President has to select his staff and name them to the top positions of executive bodies. He must trust them enough to work out ideas and programs and later implement them. In fact, these people compose a close ring of power around the President, which creates and conducts national security policy. This is the President’s team. In the framework of the present study it should be emphasized that the President’s power is based in the main executive institutions - his Administration, the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

In addition to the top appointees who lead the key state departments, the President needs to have his special staff who will create, process and implement security policies. This function used to be carried out by the Cabinet of secretaries. Now this function is fulfilled by the President’s Administration (the second ring of power) and the National Security Council (NSC). But he must penetrate his administration by the view of the world. If the president is to be successful, his own style must dominate security policymaking. If he can not do this, security policies will affected by the contradictions between internal political actors.

One remark important to understanding the process should be made at this point. Each of the executive departments and other state agencies has its own specific interests because of budget financing, formulation and spending for its own programs, the level of their influence in the decisionmaking, the amount of real power in these institutions. Actually, this narrow interests supply a balance of power within the team by the heads and principals of these institutions and agencies.
They support the President by ideas and initiatives and their improvement and implementation. At the same time the principal authorities represent the interests of their own departments. Sooner or later, each of these appointees realizes that he has to defend and advocate his department’s preferences. After all, implementation of any kind of policy by a particular branch can not be universal and unchanged. Each department seeks autonomy and wishes to be as independent as possible. The importance of this tendency will be illustrated in the example of the NATO-related questions in the last chapter.

While balancing domestic priorities and his foreign politics, the President may be able to realize his foreign strategy through relationships with world leaders, the treaties his administration negotiates, and representatives selected and appointed by him all over the world. In times of trouble outside the U.S., the President must be able to deal with a crisis quickly and effectively. Former President G. Ford , for instance, endorsed the view that the Congress is too large and too diverse to handle foreign policy crises\(^\text{11}\). But the national security establishment of the executive branch itself is enormously diverse and complex.

\section*{D. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT}

The present structure of the national security system was established under the National Security Act of 1947 and adopted by Congress in 1949 and 1958. In accordance with this law, the

\footnote{\textsuperscript{11} On the another hand, G. FORD summarized his views on Congress after leaving office: "Congress has gone too far [in recent years] in many areas in trying to assume powers that belong to the president and the executive brunch." Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, "\textit{American Foreign Policy, Pattern and Process}," Second edition, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1882, p.399}
National Security Council (NSC), a position of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the U.S. Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency were created. The purpose of the NSC is to “advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security.” The National Security Council consists of the President, Vice-President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. The Director of the CIA and the Chairman of the JCS are advisors. Other NSC advisers and assistants include the Secretary of Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), heads of governmental organizations such as the International Communication Agency (ICA), the Agency for International Development (AID), and other leaders of state organizations.

Regarding the Department of Defense, the 1947 Act established the position of the Secretary of Defense with the main responsibility of overseeing the national military establishment, formally headed by three cabinet-level officers of three separate departments: the Army, Navy, and Air Force (the Service Departments). The 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act abolished the Service Departments as separate entities and merged them into an enlarged Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense was given full control over the whole Department, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was established to assist him. In addition, a new position, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), was created to precede over JCS meetings. Congress set two important limits on the extent of unification. The Services were to be administrated separately, and the Chairman of the JCS was not required to give independent advice to the Secretary of Defense, but had to act essentially as the spokesman of the JCS. In 1953 President Eisenhower increased the powers of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS. But in 1958 he found it necessary to invite Congress to agree to additional steps toward a completely unified Department. He stated:
"...the tendency toward service rivalry and controversy which has so deeply troubled the American people will be sharply reduced."\textsuperscript{12} Congress accepted the President’s proposals, which gave the Secretary of Defense greater flexibility in the management of defense funds and enhanced control over research and development. The last step in the development of the internal structure of the Department of Defense was taken by the Goldwater-Nicols Bill in 1986 which was aimed at strengthening the position of the Commander of the JCS and which established the position of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low - Intensity Conflicts.

Each of the members of the NSC is responsible for fulfilling his functions of the national security decision-making process: collecting and providing information, identifying issues, formulating, analyzing, and evaluating alternatives; making decisions (within certain parameters), and implementing policy. Each who at the center of decisionmaking is in the inner circle, while organizations still provide necessary information (including the results of their own processing) and must be relied upon to implement the policy.

The President can use the NSC as much as he considers it necessary. It is important to note that by law the NSC has only an advisory capacity. Any assumptions, conclusions or decisions made by the members of the NSC will be presented to the President as advice. Being the highest formal mechanism of security consultations, it is useful for all presidents in taking on it such problems as: collecting of information, identifying problems, dealing with crises, making preliminary decisions, and proof their reasonability, coordinating efforts and actions, and structure of agencies.

The role and function of the National Security Assistant to the President have become much more weighty than just policy advising and coordinating. A lot of political analysts have taken the position that people such as Kissinger and Brzezinski, when they held their positions, overran the powers and the role of the Secretary of State. One of the main responsibilities of the National Security Adviser’s position is to supply the President with objective and unbiased information. To a large extent the personality of the Adviser, his access to the President and the level of trust, provide him room for flexibility in national security decisionmaking. The Assistant is also completely the President’s man, appointed without the approval of Congress. The NSC also has a comparatively small but highly coordinated staff. The structure of three- or four-person divisions, formed on a geographic (or special issue) basis provides a high level of mobility and immunity, and interagency cooperation. It includes mid- and upper-level authorities and experts, and summarizes all available information for PCCs.

The NSC is the most unpublicized but most influential institution in the U.S. decisionmaking process. This body is at the top of the American security decisionmaking pyramid. In fact, the NSC is a state within a state (or government within the government). The example of the “Iran-Contras” case evidently pursued that the NSC’s staff de-facto had become a significant part of decisionmaking and the policy-implementing establishment.

E. CONCLUSION

Given that the Constitution creates an “invitation to struggle” over the control of security policy, the question of which institutions will control NATO enlargement decisions is far from clear-cut. Both Congress and the president have important powers in this regard. Moreover, within the
executive branch itself, large numbers of organizations have at least some authority over security policy. But the office of the President remains a central point of the decisionmaking process. The formulation and implementation of policy on the scale of NATO enlargement would seem to require the coordinated effort that the executive branch is best suited to provide. How have executive branch officials actually shaped policies concerning post-Cold War Europe since the collapse of the cold War, and dealt with the security interests and concerns of European nations?
III. THE INTERSECTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND EASTERN EUROPEAN
NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCESS.

A state's behavior is driven not only by the structure of its decisionmaking process, but by
the pressures of the outside world. The United States as well as the European powers are both
interested in a strong and stable security system, economic interdependence and the preservation of
adequate military capabilities. This chapter will argue that continued U.S. presence in Europe is an
important prerequisite for European security. In the present balance of power in the Old World, each
one of the key political actors - the Western European, East and Central European states, and the
United States itself—has its own national interests in the strengthening of transatlantic cooperation.
The intersection of these interests is a crucial factor for the future of post-Cold
War security structures. Simultaneously, this situation is advantageous for the U.S. in terms of its
own broader objectives in the region, especially for preserving its influence among European powers
on security and economic issues.

A. EUROPEAN POLITICS

1. European Democracies' Goals of NATO Membership

The new Eastern European states are facing the vital question of how to rebuild their national
economic systems, and integrate into the world market economy system. In this context, questions
of national security have become vitally important for the development of democracy, and for the
economic, political, social reconstruction of the new states. The fear of a revitalized superpower
"from the East" has forced newly independent states to give priority to finding effective and
constructive guarantees of their sovereignty and independence. Furthermore, the geostrategic
position of European states gives them special concerns for their security. Former members of the Warsaw Pact find themselves squeezed between Russia (with its potential political instabilities) and effective and highly organized political-military Alliance from the West. The task of avoiding "being in the buffer zone"\(^{13}\) between two still antagonistic blocs has become the main strategic priority of the Eastern and Central European states.

2. The Framework for a New Alliance

In accordance with basic agreements, the changed agenda for Europe will include: 1- stabilization of European security based on the construction and development of democratic institutions and the peaceful resolution of all problems; 2- maintaining sufficient transatlantic links for negotiations on national interests of both sides; 3- efficient interdependence for containment and prevention of all kinds of aggression; 4- the maintaining of the strategic balance within Europe. All four items are related to the United States’ nuclear umbrella over NATO partners.

At this point it should be stated that the possible use of nuclear weapons still poses one of the most serious threats to international security. The character of this threat is somewhat different than it was during the period of the U.S.-Soviet stand-off. Any careful analysis of current bilateral or multilateral international relations will suggest the continuing presence of the nuclear shadow.

This problem includes other aspects: nuclear weapons of European states, nuclear armaments’ size and balance, the nuclear shadow of the U.S. membership in NATO, the nuclear

\(^{13}\) This title defines a part of Eastern and Central Europe in the context of the post Cold War security. In political discussions and statements there were some other names given to this region - "the zone of security vacuum", "the buffer zone between former rivalries" and recently - "the grey zone of insecurity".
umbrella over the new (or potential) members of the enlarged Alliance, and finally, the problem of potential nuclearization of Germany.

Since the end of World War II the American presence in Europe was essential to the provision of superpower protection of Western European countries against the "spread of communism". The vital structural element of this counterbalance of superpowers was "the American nuclear umbrella over Europe". In strategic terms this umbrella was more a political than military argument. It allowed Britain and France to produce conventional and other non-nuclear kinds of forces. Germany also shared in this guarantee, but was not allowed to develop its own nuclear capabilities, as will shown below.

3. The "German Problem" in the New Europe

It would be useful at this point to concentrate on the role of the "German factor" in a changed Europe. The whole history of NATO is strongly linked to the resolution of the "German problem" without threatening the security of other European nations. Germany, which is structurally and industrially more powerful than any another country (except Russia), has long had to be accommodated by other regional powers. After the Second World War the main strategy toward Germany was its full integration through mutual cooperation and multilateral agreements without restriction of any European’s state sovereignty. Without this strategy Germany would never have been unified in 1990, nor unified as a full member of NATO. Consequently, it has became clear that Germany’s integration into NATO and Western Europe would reinforce the status quo in Europe and that the NATO structure would provide constructive and cooperative integration of armed forces and reasonable denationalization of its defense policies. The unification of Germany without this
framework would have corrupted the status quo. That is the reason why the Soviet Union agreed to
the proposition that the reunited Germany would remain a full NATO member.

Nevertheless, the “German question” remains one of the top considerations in the framework
of future strategies developed by the Alliance. Some key approaches should be emphasized here.
The first one is the duality of the geopolitical role of Germany in present circumstances. On the one
hand, West Germany is integration into the West European community has been credited with
undermining or preventing revitalized imperial ambitions toward Eastern and Central Europe. On
the another hand, Western Germany is no longer considered a border zone between the East and
the West in stand-off meaning. In the new environment it tends to be a link between Eastern and
Western Europe.

Other important precondition is that the Post - Second World War period created a strong
political Alliance between main European states - Britain, France and Germany, which historically
have not always been friendly. The U.S. participation in NATO and the U.S. presence in the
European theater should be emphasized in this context as significant factors. These preconditions
eventually led to the recognition of West Germany’s international role in the course of the 1989-
1990 reunification.

4. New Europe vs. Old Problems

The purpose of a reconstructed (or enlarged) NATO should be to conduct consultations,
leading to the achievement of a consensus, and to intervene selectively in conflicts that threaten its
security interests. Eventually, the whole scenario of transformation aimed the development from
collective defense to collective security.
Today’s NATO, with the United States at its center, may be well positioned to fill this role. Other states will be attracted by the security of strong relations with the U.S. and its NATO partners. This analysis offers grounds deeper than domestic-level particulars and institutional inertia for anticipating a continued appeal of NATO enlargement amongst former Warsaw Pact states.

Yet, it is also is obvious that the new NATO will need a new type of decisionmaking format. Most analysts predict that the new decisionmaking structure will mainly consist of representation of the most powerful states. Other scenarios are also possible, but further decisionmaking will stick firmly to NATO’s proven way of governing. Any attempt to change the core will cause trouble for the old members of the Alliance and will create significant obstacles for the adaptation of new members. It is more efficient to improve and revitalize the old system than to construct a new one, especially taking into consideration the clarity of the fact that Visegrad Group members will not be the only applicants for NATO membership.

Another aspect of the problem is that the Western countries initially underestimated the fragility of the transformations achieved in the former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet Union. Only some politicians understood that what was true in Western Europe after the Second World War would be even more true in Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War: that interdependence would have to be rebuilt, not merely respected and security provided, rather than simply assumed.

Finally, most people in the West overestimated the profundity of the change that took place in Russia after 1991. Many acted as if Russia had experienced a revolution of a classical kind. In fact, what she had experienced was a collapse: a collapse that left many of her old power structures sullen and demoralized, but intact. To some degree it was a “guided” collapse, instigated not by the Soviet’s most radical opponents, but by its most radical members. It has taken time for the West to
understand that post-Communist Russia is in a murky state and that it has not been entirely transformed.

Then, there is a huge division between the economically integrated countries of the European Union (EU), now including Finland and Sweden, and the “others” who would like to become members of the EU as soon as possible. The “highway” concept can be applied to the future Europe, where some countries move in the very slow right line, while others can drive in the middle one, and “luxuries” prefer the left one. The first two can be divided into the economically relatively well-developed countries of the Visegrad group and a great number of countries struggling but failing to satisfy the basic needs of their populations. They have to change their tactics of becoming members of the EU within the foreseeable time frame.

The economically developed West is unprepared and unwilling to deal with all of these new needs in the former Warsaw Pact. Plans for a Marshall plan-type of economic assistance for Eastern Europe and Russia by the U.S. (first of all, taking into consideration their world dominance), EU, and Germany fueled by a financial transfer from the OECD countries of 0.5% of their GDP per year, have little chance to be realized. As a result, economic frustration adds to the unstable situation in some of the Eastern European countries such as my native Ukraine, Romania, Moldova, Byelorussia, and Russia.

Nevertheless, the weight of political initiative has basically been on the side of the Western European countries. The development of European security structures (and defense identity of single states as a precondition of its stable structure) does not only require an institutional framework with clear and effective rules of decision-making and similar division of roles, but also on understanding and perceiving common social-economic aims. The construction of an economic and monetary
union in the European Union needs the complex interdependence.

The policy makers among the Alliance members ought to respond to the internal problems of the candidates for enlargement. Extending NATO to the East raises complex cleavages: minority problems among Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania, the difficult geostrategic position of the Baltic states with their Russian minorities, and finally the creation of a new direct border with Russia and CIS. Clearly, "NATO going East" is not the only component of the overall question of how to reshape European security and how NATO perceives its future mission.

5. Review of the NATO-Oriented Politics

The Eastern Foreign Minister’s meeting on March 17, 1990 could be considered a turning point in the history of Modern Europe. At that meeting former Foreign Minister of the USSR Shevardnadze claimed that reunified Germany should not be a member of NATO, but should have some kind of special status as a border zone between former hemispheres. Unexpectedly for the Soviet delegation, the foreign ministers of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia did not support this view and were considering Germany’s membership in NATO as a sure guarantee against a resurgence of German nationalism and keeping this country under reliable international control.

It would be a mistake to imply that the positions of the above-mentioned governments countries were completely identical. The foreign minister of Poland Krzysztof Skybuszewski tended to consider the North-Atlantic Alliance as sufficient background for further European security. Hungarian officials occupied almost the same position. Prague, however, had a propensity for a strict pan-European collective security system after the demolition of two-blocks withstanding. The main deviation between the concept of European independent collective security and NATO
efficiency with its American presence was overcome only in the next 18 months.\textsuperscript{14}

The consensus on the question of the importance of the US role in the structure of European security was achieved barely despite Prague’s position. The necessity of orienting toward the Western Alliance had became an unquestioned feature of the position of these countries. Yet, differences in their approaches to the US presence and the “German factor” still remained in that period. At the same time the fear that a united Germany might revert to being a regional aggressor have been reweighed by obvious profitability of its material and political support.

In this situation the best possible scenario for European security from the point of view of the Eastern European states was their participation in the same political-military Alliance with Germany, having the permanent oversight and presence of a state as strong as the U.S.

European alliances were not eager to support the aspirations of the new European neighbors. The main argument of their discretion was stated as a danger of poisoned relations with Russia. They adhere to the position to postpone the adoption of new states until full arrangement of this question with Russia so as to avoid alienation of this state.

The next period in the Post-Cold War interdependence settlement started in 1993 when the official Russian position toward NATO enlargement and European security appeared. Russian military doctrine of November 13, 1993\textsuperscript{15} and Mr. Primakov’s statement on Russian policy toward NATO\textsuperscript{16} were considered as putting into doubt previous rapprochement toward Europe. Simultaneously Moscow had begun a variety of activities to rearrange Russian domination in the


\textsuperscript{15} The newspaper “Krasnaya Zvezda”, November 19, 1993 pp.1-2.

\textsuperscript{16} The newspaper “Izvestia”, November 26, 1993 p.1

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regions of the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, the tensions in the Baltic states caused by the continuing military presence of Russian forces tended to remind the bitter experience of the Soviet foreign policy in the Eastern European states in 1956 and 1968. The last fear was a concern about the possibility of internal military conflict within the former USSR. The pattern of Russian-Ukrainian relations of that period could explain the nature of the latter concerns. First, Russia was over-reacting in the field of former Soviet nuclear weapon on Ukrainian territory. Second, the problem of the Black Sea Fleet was a preeminent issue, since it actually reflected Russian territorial claims to the Crimean Peninsula (which are still exist!).

Finally, it became obvious that Russia wanted to prevent the Central and East European countries from becoming Alliance members, precisely because they could no longer be seen as a Russian security zone or "a zone of special Russian interest." At present, Russia does not accept the possible stationing of foreign (NATO) troops in these countries. Such a deployment would deepen the Russian sense of isolation and hinder the difficult way to extremely important reforms in security policy and the armed forces. The result could be a further militarization of Russian foreign and security policy.

It seems doubtful that these security problems will be resolved in the near future. Different security concepts and approaches are required. At the present time both are lacking. In addition to the Russian-factor, the "go-slow approach" of NATO reflects the understandable reluctance of the U.S. and European allies to take on new security commitments. This is certainly true for Germany. But if NATO should be extended, the Visegrad countries will probably be included, together with security agreements with Russia and closer political cooperation within NATO, leaving out the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldova and the Baltic States. Furthermore, Europe remains divided into a
region of "assured security" and a region outside these security structures.

Another important external consideration in shaping policy on NATO enlargement stems from the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Central European nations grew concerned that they would be victimized by Serbian aggression if Russia kept control over Belgrade's political direction. The officials in Budapest and in other neighboring states felt the danger of Serbian aggression (either in direct form or through nonmilitary confrontation). In particular, it was feared that "ethnic cleansing" which had taken place in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, might extend to the Hungarians of the Serbian territory of Vojvodina. Weak and "unprotected" Central Europeans tended to interpret the situation as the Western ability and willingness to protect only Alliance members. As a result, the new players of the European policy started to consider NATO membership as essential for their national security and political independence. It was impossible to revitalize pre-Second World War Europe. A new security structure had to be built.

B. TRANS ATLANTIC LINKS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

After World War II the United States adopted the strategy of containment against the USSR. The cornerstone of U.S. security strategy persisted throughout the Cold War, including the first years of the Bush Administration. As the Cold War began to disappear, however, the Bush Administration adopted a political concept to serve as a bridge between the Cold War period and the Post Cold War era. The official title of this concept is "the New World Order" (NWO). While there is no precise official definition of this term, the NWO did have a number of broad characteristics.

The most important feature of the NWO's concept for security planning was the persistence of U.S. dominance in the world, politically and economically. Secondly, the American military
capability was to be the decisive means for peacemaking, peacekeeping and the prevention of any sort of aggression in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The NWO concept emphasized that all questions and problems between nations should be resolved by non-violent means. Simultaneously, the United Nations would increase its role as a mediator and peacekeeper. The next feature of that concept was the enhancement of economic cooperation and the interdependence of market-oriented economic systems. The fifth characteristic was the expectation that Eurasian non-democratic or semi-democratic states would orient their security policies toward NATO. The NWO also postulated a high level of cooperation between "great" powers on most important international issues.

The NWO reflected the realities of Post-Communist Europe, including an interdependent Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany. It also kept a cautious eye on the changes in the former Soviet Union. For the future of NATO, however, the most important factor in reshaping U.S. strategy was the raise of ethnonationalist tensions and conflicts across Europe. The unexpected consequence of the breakdown of the bipolar system was the "fragmentation" of Europe instead of desirable "integration".¹⁷ From 1990 to 1993 the United States was interested in leading the debate on using NATO military forces in a Yugoslavia settlement. Furthermore, the CSCE was unable to take any enforcement action because of the absence of institutional structure and efficient procedure. The WEU at that time did not have enough experience in dealing with "sensitive" issues of the European security. All this raised the obvious appeal of NATO involvement. Why NATO? It was the only organization which remained with well equipped, well structured, and well trained military forces. Indeed, NATO has became the only major security institution that survived the years of the

Cold War and continues to create European stability.

The CSCE and WEU’s inability to resolve the Yugoslavian conflict increased the role of NATO’s military power as well as the fact of American leadership within the Alliance and in Europe in the foreseeable future. President Bush argued that:

The New World Order is not a fact; it is an inspiration, an opportunity. We have within our grasp an extraordinary possibility that few generations have enjoyed - to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals, as old patterns and certainties crumble around us.\(^\text{18}\)

This approach became the conceptual background for the President’s Clinton’s European policies. The security strategy of President Clinton’s Administration in Europe focused on U.S. interests in two dimensions: 1) rethinking NATO’s missions in Europe; and 2) increasing NATO’s role in collective security in the region. The revitalization of the North Atlantic Alliance after the end of the Cold War has become strategically vital in terms of security, economic and defense settlements within the Western Alliances. In 1993, Germany, France and Belgium have, with the creation of Eurocorps, begun the process of what could evolve to be the core defense projection capability of the European Union (EU). France and Germany are, meanwhile, cooperating on a wider range of defense industrial projects. The Clinton Administration itself, unsure about the future role of NATO, has hinted at a new cooperative arrangement with non-NATO European states plus former Soviet states which would serve as a second-tier (or qualifying organization) for possible future entry into Alliance. The gesture addresses U.S. diplomacy needed to accommodate the non-NATO states, but failed to develop a strategic rationale for the wider organization, other than the

normal diplomatic need to sustain peaceful communication. Now, the challenge confronting the Clinton Administration is how to proceed on the questions of NATO enlargement — both for the countries hoping to gain entry in the near term, and those that are concerned about being “left behind” as part of a buffer region. In this regard, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) remaining a considerable political and secure base for Eastern and Central European states because:

1- it provides trans-Atlantic links which are the cornerstone of the security guarantees to the East European states (more psychological than actual).

2- it has already enhanced security cooperation in Eastern Europe. In the another words, it has uniting rather then dividing influence in Europe.

3- the recent policies have become more Pan-European by traditionally neutral states such as Austria, Finland and Sweden.

Furthermore, NACC is closely tied operationally to WEU and has actively moved into peacekeeping activity.

From the point of view of its strategic interests in Europe and NATO, and bearing in mind the traditional practice of strategic access to particular areas through the military and security agreements with weaker states, U.S. policy will likely be shaped by the following concerns and objectives:

1- the U.S. military presence and security/political commitments will provide for the psychological and actual security of the Visegrad Group’s members, making NATO/NACC the security institutions of choice.

2- preserving a structure of interdependent European institutions, rather competitive

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19 See more in editorial article, *Defense and Foreign Affairs*, Oct/Nov. 1993
relationships between security blocks, will best preserve U.S. and European security interests. For this purpose the United States should be sure that relationships between the U.S. and the EU as well as between WEU and NATO will remain cooperative. In this context the US will probably recognize the necessity of the WEU’s observer status in the NACC.

3- the U.S. is interested in the improvement of cooperation within the Visegrad Group to ameliorate the considerable differences between individual states in political, economic and military spheres. Otherwise, these differences will create hurdles to NATO enlargement.
IV. THE U.S. APPROACH TO NATO ENLARGEMENT

A. FORMATION AND ADOPTION OF THE US POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE

Participation in European international relations has been a principal focus of American foreign policy in this century. The United States has sent military forces to Europe three times to prevent a single European power from dominating the region: imperial Germany in World War I, Nazi Germany in World War II, and the containment of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. More recently, US forces have been committed to help resolve the military conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

The doctrine of the Clinton Administration governing future of U.S. participation in European security is still evolving. The main dimensions of this doctrine were laid out in the President’s speech in Brussels in January, 1994. He stated

“I come to Europe to help strengthen European integration, to create a new security for the United States and its Atlantic partners, based on the idea that we have a real chance to integrate rather than divide Europe, both East and West, an integration based on shared democracies, market economies and defense cooperation.”

At that summit the “Partnership for Peace” program (PFP) was proposed and adopted. The implementation of this program has become a decisive driving force in the formation of the new security order in the European region. The “PFP” program, which was originally created by Pentagon analysts and proposed for the consideration of the President by the Secretary of Defense

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W. Perry, has provided a solid foundation background for military as well as political cooperation in previously divided Europe.

The essence of the present U.S. national security concept toward NATO and "PFP" was stated by the Secretary of Defense in his message to the President and the Congress:

"In Europe NATO is the foundation of our security strategy, and we continue to play a leadership role within NATO. ... NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) program is already extending a zone of stability eastward across Europe and Central Asia by promoting military cooperation among NATO countries, former members of the Warsaw Pact, and other countries of the region. ...In fact, the positive effects of PFP resonate far beyond the security sphere. Since political and economic issues are a prerequisite to participation in PFP or membership in NATO, many Partner nations have accelerated such changes. In addition, many Partner nations are starting to see value in actual PFP activities, irrespective of whether they lead to NATO membership. The lessons learned and values fostered through the program are intrinsically useful." 22

1. Republicans vs. Democrats

The problem of bipartisan agreement of NATO-related strategy is another decisive constraint on U.S. policies in Europe. In this context the most important problem is the difference in Republican and Democratic positions which have resulted in wide criticism of the President's policies. Rapid movement toward NATO expansion was a key foreign policy tenet of the "Contract with America" which helped allow the Republican Party to gain control Congress in 1994.

Republicans leaders of Congress have repeatedly emphasized the need to accelerate the process of Eastward NATO expansion. Otherwise, they state, the United States and European balance of

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21 This information have been received during meetings in the State Department and the Department of Defense 09/30/1996.

22 Message of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, March 1996.
powers will loose all benefits of the Cold War victory. They consider President Clinton’s “hypersensitivity to Moscow” as the key impediment to NATO enlargement. During the Presidential campaign, Republican nominee Bob Dole emphasized that Republican NATO policies would accelerate the Alliance’s expansion. In a written statement, submitted in response to President Clinton’s speech in Detroit on October 22 (when he discusses the possibility of inviting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join NATO in 1999), Mr. Dole emphasized the president’s unwillingness to move faster on the NATO enlargement issue. Dole claimed that:

“...he is still waffling and still unwilling to assert American leadership in NATO. Under Bill Clinton NATO enlargement will never happen”\(^{23}\)

After 1996 elections and the victory of President Clinton, it seems likely that Republicans will strongly support measures aimed at increasing the American role in new Alliance’s strategy. This assumption is confirmed by the opinion of Dole adviser and Armed Services member Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) who stated:

”...the United States leads NATO, and it should be expanded. And as for why we should send American boys to die in Eastern Europe, the answer is the same as it is to the question why we were willing to send them to die in Luxemburg during the Cold War. Because that’s better than having them fight and die in Baltimore.”\(^{24}\)

This remark is the essence of the American concept of national security concept that is likely to endure into the next decade.

The comparison of European-related programs presented by two dominant parties is most clearly evident in the debate of the last presidential campaign. On most of these issues the


\(^{24}\) See James Kitfield, “America’s Not Listening”, \emph{National Journal} 7/13/96., p.1527.
Republican nominee Bob Dole and Democratic favorite Bill Clinton did not significantly differ on NATO enlargement - which is the essence of the central problem of whether to extend U.S. and Western military guarantees to Eastern and Central Europe. Mr. Dole just argued that Mr. Clinton was not moving not fast enough.

2. Congress vs. the President

Another problem is whether the U.S. Congress will approve the initiative of NATO enlargement. Future treaties to provide for the inclusion of new members in the Alliance will require two thirds of the votes in the Senate. The same situation took place in 1952, when the Senate barely approved membership of Greece and Turkey, in 1955 with the membership of Germany, and Spain in 1985. But these decisions were motivated by the conditions of the Cold War. A lot of analysts agree with the assumption that the domestic and partisan political pressures will now come to the fore. The Republican party included pro-enlargement provisions in the “Contract With America” to force the Clinton Administration to speed up the process. The White House resisted this initiative as an attempt to restrict the President’s authority to conduct foreign policy.25

In the context of NATO-oriented politics, a number of experts emphasize that fact that President Clinton was the first among all 16 alliance members to take the lead on enlargement, arguing in January 1994 that there is no question “whether or not” NATO will enlarge, “but when and how”. At the same time, Steve Kull notes that Republicans “... keep trying to make headway on foreign policy by emphasizing a more unilateralist posture, increased defense spending and a

25 See more in the article by Jeremy D. Rosner “NATO Enlargement’s American Hurdle”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996.
rejection of multilateralism, but polling data indicate that on most of these issues Clinton is much closer to the mainstream.” Fully 77% of those polled by the program, for instance, opposed Congress’s addition of $7 billion to the FY 1996 defense budget, and 66% disagreed with the statement that it’s better for the United States to act on its own when military force is required than to work through the United Nations.26

The cost of enlargement seems to be the main unresolved problem. The involvement of new members would force NATO to reshape its military capabilities and infrastructure, and improve current armed forces, including defense industries. The preliminary estimated price of expansion and subsequent change has recently been estimated by RAND corporation analysts Ronald Asmus and Richard Cugler. They predict the amount of spending from $10 billion to $50 billion in the next 10-15 years. The most possible amount at present situation is $42 billion, where the annual U.S. share will be $1 billion. To understand the value of this figure we must compare it with the present 1996 defense budget. This is only 0.5% of the present annual defense expenses, and just a tiny part of this year’s $7 billion Congress’ addition to the Department of Defense’ budget.27

Another estimation was recently done by the Congressional Budget Office. The results of this study predict that the cost of expanding the Alliance will range from $61 billion to $125 billion over a 15-year period, with about 10% of that borne by the United States.28 Moreover, Clinton’s plans do not include the financial guarantees of radical changes in the new Eastern European alliances.


28 “Eastern European Countries Lobby for Seat at the NATO Table”, The Washington Post, October 22, 1996, Pg. A 08
Speaking about operational control in Bosnia, Anthony Lake, the National security adviser stated:

Sometimes it makes practical sense to share the burden, in both manpower and money, with our allies. That same view animated the formation of NATO. I think it should continue to animate us. The President has said all along that we will work together when we can, and alone when we must.29

As most analysts predict, the cost factor seems most likely to effect the implementation stage of the U.S. commitments on enlargement, rather than at the treaty ratification stage. In terms of the present political balance of power between the President and Congress, increasing of NATO-related spending will provide a strong background for a broader coalition between them in favor of ratification.

3. Public Support of Foreign Policy

One of the arguments in the discussion of NATO-expansion discussion is the question of public support, in particular the efficiency of its influence on the decisionmaking process. Critics note that American commitments to the process will cause huge budget expenditures which will directly affect the interests of taxpayers. Such questions do not usually gain wide public support.

The role and strategy of the United States in the new Europe will be determined by domestic considerations, especially those pertaining to its economic and financial interests and capabilities, but the model and size of American interference in European politics will be determined considerably by the American people. Why? Any kind of further American engagement in European politics will depend on two crucial factors: on the announced intentions of the U.S. government, and on the American military forces deployed in Europe. Both of these factors will be largely


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determined by the public's wishes.

Being worried about their annual incomes and everyday problems, average citizens are less interested in foreign issues which affect them indirectly. Nevertheless, the balance between taxpaying interests and the necessity of foreign program expenditure is a matter of confidence in the efficiency of the government's strategy. The real instrument for measuring public opinion is the presidential elections. In developed democracies like the United States, public support is sovereign. Voting to the particular candidate constituencies are voting for his program

The ability of President Clinton's Administration to exercise national security strategy can be seen in the message of Clinton's national security adviser Antony Lake states:

Go back to January 1993, and I think you'll understand why the public believes that the President has been successful in foreign policy. At that time there was war in Bosnia, a refugee tide from Haiti, an aggressive nuclear program in North Korea and thousands of Russian missiles pointed at U.S. cities. Today there's peace in Bosnia; we've seen the first transition from one elected government to another in Haiti's 2000-years history. North Korea's nuclear program is frozen under international supervision and no Russian missiles are targeted at our cities. ... and if you define national security as what makes a difference to American citizens in their everyday lives, look at the progress we've made towards creating an undivided and democratic Europe, in maintaining security presence in Asia, in taking the offensive against the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, and in creating a global trading system that has opened markets to the most competitive economy in the world, which is ours. All of those things have a direct impact on the lives of everyday Americans.30

The results of the last roll firmly confirmed that the Clinton Administration in foreign policy can count on the support of the majority of the nation.

30 IBID
4. The Diaspora

Many recent publications and discussions over NATO expansion focus on the policymaking influence of Central and Eastern European ethnic groups and organizations within the United States. In fact, the amount of influence of ethnic minorities to the decisionmaking and level of the President team’s attention remains unclear.

Speaking only about Poland as a candidate to the Alliance, analysts say there are nearly 10 million Polish-Americans and 20 million have ethnic origins in the region of Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{31} This argument in debates on NATO expansion and its impact on internal political prices within the nation is both strong and weak. On the one hand these people, who comprise about six percent of all constituents, will strongly support the engagement of their historical homelands in a security alliance with the United States. On the other hand, (critics state) this question does not have impact in their everyday life. Many ethnic organizations, such as the Polish American Congress, have paid a lot of effort and attention to the NATO-enlargement issues. As a result, both parties were interested in playing their “NATO enlargement - card” in the electoral race.

Two moments are interesting in this context. First, in the recent “Message on the Observance of Polish American Heritage Month” on October 8, 1996, President Clinton stated:

... the deep cultural and familial ties between the peoples of the United States and Poland have been strengthened by our shared values and aspirations. For generations, Poles have demonstrated the same reverence for individual rights and dignity that infuses our own system of government. The United States supports Poland’s democratic transition and her people’s efforts to establish a pluralistic society and a free market economy. Poland and the United States are building a new security for the twenty-first

\textsuperscript{31} Data have been taken from “NATO Enlargement’s American Hurdle” by Jeremy D. Rosner, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, July/August 1996, p.13
century, working together to prepare for NATO's enlargement in an undivided Europe.\textsuperscript{32}

The second point was made by writers for the Washington Post. Talking about the first foreign policy speech during the presidential campaign in Detroit on October 22, journalists made the point that "Detroit was regarded as a good choice for such a speech because of its population of Central and Eastern European ethnics, according to White House aides."\textsuperscript{33} The influence of interested ethnic Americans in the NATO decisionmaking process could itself be the subject of an entire thesis. What is evident, however, is that the White House team pays careful attention to ethnic factors dealing with such issues.

B. THE U.S. POLICY TOWARD EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

1. The U.S. Support of NATO Enlargement

As was explained before, NATO expansion will continue the leading role of the United States in European security. The Western European states count on the US to share the expenses of the Alliance enlargement the East, and Central Europeans want the U.S. to share security guarantees. To a large extent the main value of NATO membership is that it provides for the American security commitment that comes with this membership. Providing nuclear and conventional guarantees to the states of Central and Eastern Europe states carries risks to the United States if a conflict occurs, but (at least in theory) should make the outbreak of conflicts less likely.

\textsuperscript{32} Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, October 8, 1996

\textsuperscript{33} John F. HURRIS, "Clinton Vows Wider NATO in 3 Years", The Washington Post, October 23, 1996, Pg. A 01
The governments of the new democracies do not trust in Western Europe's ability to provide such guarantees, and wish to protect themselves from revitalized Russia. They also feel themselves much more comfortable with an American counterbalance to a reunified Germany. The U.S. presence in Europe is also desired by the Europeans because of the size and power of the United States and the distance between North America and Europe, as long as the U.S. lacks any goals of hegemony in the region.

The abilities of the Alliance to deal with post-Cold War Europe have been tested one more time in the Bosnian settlement. NATO has accomplished the mission assigned to it in last year's Dayton peace accord. The civilian part of the settlement - the reconstruction, the creation of joint government institutions, the return of refugees - is stuck in the mud of bureaucracy and the inability of Western diplomats to finish the job. In the eyes of many civilian officials and military officers, this problem also resulted because NATO officers and their troops seem to think more creatively and push harder to reach solutions than their civilian counterparts. U.S. officers repeatedly tried to engage Western diplomats and civilian officials from the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for refugees to deal with the impending confrontation.

A decisive force of U.S. involvement in the European politics, from my point of view, is the strategy of "enlargement and engagement" proclaimed by President Clinton and his political team. The NATO enlargement question has been on the top-priority list of politics for the last four years of Mr. Clinton's presidency. The question is sharp, controversial and still under negotiation. Yet, the implementation of the course is gradual and successive. The process started with the U.S.

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34 See John Pomfret, "U.S. Army Leads Rebuilding of Bosnia", San Francisco Chronicle, November 1, 1996
leadership when President Clinton made the proposal (which was adopted) that NATO should be expanded during the summit in Brussels in January, 1994. Then he reaffirmed the U.S. position during his visit to Europe in June, 1994, when he stated that the enlargement of the Alliance is not “whether or not”, but “when and how”. During the ministerial meeting in December, 1994 (under the U.S. role again) NATO members adopted for the Organization a two-phase program for 1995. The first phase was devoted to internal discussions and agreements of circumstances and sequences of enlargement. Then, the issues “what” and “how” were presented individually to the “Partnership for Peace”-program members.35

For domestic reasons the United States will have to have a more modest military presence in Europe, but for strategic reasons it can afford to have a more modest presence. Indeed, as long as Russia abides by the norms of common security, the United States should maintain a more modest presence. In the case of the American role in Europe at the outset of the post-Cold War era, for once all good things do go together. Secretary of State W. Christopher stated on the meeting with foreign ministers from the Baltic and Central European counties in Brussels on December 6, 1995, that:

“The process of enlargement will stay on course. Our approach will be steady and deliberate. For the United States, this process offers the prospect of peaceful integration on a continent, where our own security is deeply engaged. Step by step, it gives us the opportunity to build a partnership with Europe as a whole. These are the goals we will pursue today and in the days ahead.”36

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35 Focus on when and how had also been detailed in the President’s speech in Warsaw, July, 1994: “As have said, [NATO expansion] is no longer a question of whether, but when and how. And that expansion will not depend on the appearance of a new threat in Europe. It will be an instrument to advance security and stability for the entire region...And now what we have to do is to get the NATO partners together and to discuss what the next steps should be.”

36 U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol.6, No.50.
In Central Europe, in Russia, Ukraine, the other New Independent States, the forces of reform have earned all our respect and will continue to have the support of the United States. Now we must begin to welcome Europe’s new democracies into NATO, strengthen NATO’s partnership with Russia, and build a secure and undivided Europe.  

Speaking in Detroit on October 22nd, 1996 the President showed the perspectives of NATO and European perspectives:

also pledge for my part and I believe for NATO’s part as well, that NATO’s doors will not close behind its first new members. NATO should remain open to all of Europe’s emerging democracies who are ready to shoulder the responsibilities of membership. No nation will be automatically excluded. No country outside NATO will have a veto.”

2. The Growing Political Mission of the US Military

In the course of the present study of the decisionmaking process, I found that the United States is placing an increased reliance on U.S. military institutions and organizations in the face of continued budget cuts for the State Department and other non-military international affairs programs. In FY 1996 the U.S. government spent on its international affairs programs $18.6 billion, down from the previous year level of $20.1 billion. Even the budget of the U.S. foreign service has been cut tremendously:

... the US foreign affairs budget has been cut so sharply (51 percent in real terms since 1984) and the US is now so deeply in arrears to the U.N., the World Bank and the World Health Organization (which are owed more than $2 billion ) and the foreign aid budget has been reduced so far (Egypt and Israel now get almost the whole thing) that the ability of

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37 Remarks to the 51st Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City. September 24, 1996


the next President to maintain U.S. leadership and conduct real preventive diplomacy will be severely handicapped unless he can cut a new "Grand bargain" with Congress.\textsuperscript{40}

Secretary of State Warren Christopher accused Congress yesterday of endangering US security by cutting so deeply into spending on diplomacy that future administrations will be unable to respond to international crisis without early use of military force. "If we rely on our military strength alone, we will end up using our military all the time," Christopher said in a speech to the West Point corps of cadets.\textsuperscript{41}

In the real world, the failure to maintain diplomatic readiness will inevitably shift the burden to America's military. Diplomacy that is not backed by the credible threat or use of force can be hollow - and ultimately dangerous, ...but if we do not use diplomacy to promote our vital interests, we will surely find ourselves defending them on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{42}

State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said the foreign affairs budget, which was just under $20 billion a year when the Clinton administration took office, now is $2.5 billion a year lower.

The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) at Georgetown University released a report, "U.S. Foreign Affairs Resources: Budget cuts and Consequences," last July which states that the State Department is currently funded at the same level as it was in 1991 despite the necessity to open 19 new embassies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The U.S. Information Agency, the organization that informs foreign citizens about the achievements of U.S. democracy abroad, has

\textsuperscript{40} Thomas L. Friedman, "Your Mission, Should You Accept It", \textit{The New York Times}, October 27, 1996.

\textsuperscript{41} Editorial, "Embassy Funds Called Vital to Peace", \textit{Los Angeles Times}, October 26, 1996.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{IBID}
had its operating budget cut by 20% since 1991, and one-quarter of its work force has been downsized since 1994. The ISD report paints a gloomy picture of the future. Anticipating the balanced budget of FY 2002, it predicts reduction of another $4 billion in current dollars from current $18.6 billion in FY 1996 for international affairs programs. That budget figure includes military assistance as well as funding for nonmilitary programs, but the specific areas of the cuts have not been delineated. “Our international programs and activities buy us influence worldwide. They are part of leadership, but they also assist us in promoting our global interests and values. It borders on the irresponsible to believe that the United States’ global position can be secured through defense expenditures alone.”

Congressional cuts of the State Department’s budget will result in the closing of more than 30 U.S. overseas missions. At the same time Mr. Dole in his article in “Foreign Policy” noted, that “Reform and reductions in the U.S. aid program are the overseas equivalent of welfare reform at home”. This seems strange, especially bearing in mind the fact that the amount spent for foreign affairs programs and personnel presents a small part of the amount the American nation earns from or of the amount it is forced to spend in the cases when foreign crisis turns into any possible war or conflict.

In his Address at the Foreign Service Institute on September 10, 1996 the Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott stated that:

Our environmental assistance to the new independent states of the former Soviet Union has fallen from nearly $75 million in FY 1995 to less then $10 million in FY 1997. That’s a

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dramatic retreat on a crucial front.\textsuperscript{44}

The U.S. Department of State "...spends just a little more than 1\% of the total federal budget on foreign affairs, in contrast to the approximately 18\% still spent on defense.

Foreign assistance programs have ultimately put more dollars into the pockets of American taxpayers than they have ever taken out. Most foreign assistance dollars stay right here at home. Nearly 80\% of USAID contracts and grants go to U.S. firms. Ninety-five per cent of all food assistance purchases are made in the U.S., and virtually all military assistance is spent on U.S. goods and services.\textsuperscript{45}

The Republican Congress has pushed a firmer policy toward Russia and a reduction in foreign aid programs in general. One of these programs is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program which insists on the reduction and monitoring of former Soviet nuclear weapons. The cuts of this program mean slowing down the implementation of the START treaty.

At the same time the non-military funding for international security has been slashed, the U.S. Army put into practice its skills in the course of implementing the "Partnership for Peace" program and the settlement in Bosnia (which is most important in terms of the Congressional debates) and has had very positive results.

NATO's influence here is massive," a western ambassador said. "Their organizational and management skills make us look like kids selling lemonade on a Sunday afternoon."\textsuperscript{46}

Speaking on the topic of lessons resulting from Yugoslavian conflict, Madeleine K. Albright,


\textsuperscript{45} IBID.

\textsuperscript{46} Quoted from "U.S. ARMY Leads Rebuilding of Bosnia", John Pomfret's article in San Francisco Chronicle, November 1,1996.
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations said:

...if a team is to function successful, as each player must acknowledge the validity of the other’s perspectives. The diplomats must think a little like generals. The military commanders must be at their most diplomatic. All must focus on the goal of a durable peace. And together, we must meet and surmount a series of tests.⁴⁷

3. The Participation of Congress in Implementing Foreign Policy

To provide effective implementation of his foreign policy programs in terms of Congressional approval, President Clinton should include some of the leading Republicans on his decisionmaking team. It is commonly thought that this step would provide considerable support of foreign policy propositions in both bodies of the Republican-dominated Congress. Such a scenario, on the one hand, would make treaty ratifications and budgetary spending easier for the President and, on the other hand, will provide additional points of Congressional influence on the executive branch.

The President should also enlist the Joint Chief of Staff in his lobbying. Let the generals explain to Congress the importance of having sufficient diplomatic resources so troops aren’t the only option. Moreover, President Clinton, if he does win, should appoint several well-known Republican foreign policy figures to his team. Without a real bipartisan approach, no progress on the foreign affairs budget will be possible.... The President needs to help nurture a whole new foreign policy generation, and he could start by giving them political cover for traveling. Lawmakers, fearful of being accused of junketing, don’t travel anymore. Those who don’t travel don’t know. Those who don’t know don’t care.⁴⁸

The realization of this tactic in terms of decisionmaking would have a number of results:

1) the team of the Democrat President would become partly Republican;

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2) consequently, the foreign policy actions would become more bipartisan. In terms of NATO enlargement it means stronger support of the process;

3) the participation of key Republican congressmen would facilitate the ratification and implementation of presidential initiatives;

4) the process of the creation of national security concepts and priorities would be concentrated (more or less) in the hands of the closest to the President think-tanks;

4. The Impact of the "Russian Factor"

Why should the Russian position be taken into consideration in terms of U.S. policies toward NATO and Europe? Regardless of different opinions among political analysts, it will be necessary for the American government to deal with such questions as whether to include Russia as a participant of all-European process, while not giving it a veto over NATO or EU’s future, in order to minimize the negative impact on Russian internal politics of NATO expansion, and to guard against any possible counter-moves against Ukraine, Baltic States and other neighbors.

The new Alliance’s strategy includes an effort to convince Russia that NATO should no longer be considered an anti-Russian bloc. As former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote,

Neither the alliance nor its prospective new members are facing any imminent threat. Talk of a “new Yalta” or of a Russian military threat is not justified, either by actual circumstances or even by worst-case scenarios for the near future. The expansion of NATO should, therefore, not be driven by whipping up anti-Russian hysteria that could eventually become a self-fulfilling prophecy.”

Actually there is no final decision about NATO enlargement within the political elites of the

49 Foreign Affairs, January/February, 1995.

51
Russian Federation. Some of the key officials favored Russian joining NATO.\textsuperscript{50} Others like the Russian Foreign minister Primakov have rejected the idea of the Alliance’s expansion, which makes “the axis of a new European system”.\textsuperscript{51} At the same time Russia is becoming more and more involved in the process of cooperation with the Alliance. Its Defense Minister in the beginning of last September even proposed opening Russian liaison offices in NATO headquarters in Belgium and at the U.S. Atlantic Command in Norfolk, with NATO to open an office in Moscow.\textsuperscript{52} Unfortunately, the majority of the Russian political elites, including both Democrats and Nationalists, oppose NATO expansion.

U.S. policymakers may need to provide some kind of “compensation” for Russia and management of its politics toward its Eastern European neighbors. Russia’s political reaction can also affect the implementation of already existing agreements, such as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty or Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START II) Treaty. In the present situation the most real variant of further settlement of this problem is an agreement to a strategic NATO - Russian Security Treaty with special U.S. guarantees.

Talking about the present level of U.S.- Russian bilateral relations, “for all its troubles and waning power, Russia still occupies a special place in the council of America’s President and his national security advisers.” This opinion was underscored by Senators Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn after a closed-door meeting in Moscow in early October of members of the Russian parliament

\textsuperscript{50} See “Security Chief Suggests Russia Could Join NATO”, “Russia today” 13/11/96., www


\textsuperscript{52} “Should we Be in Europe?” The Washington Post, September 16, 1996, Pg. A18
and a U.S. delegation consisting of Defense Minister William J. Perry and Sens. Lugar and Sam Nunn.  

It is possible that the United States, for domestic reasons and in spite of European opposition, were to decide to cut its involvement in NATO-related activities. The growing pressure of domestic problems and the growing difficulties of the political elites in developing support for America’s engagement in the world could lead to such an outcome -- despite the long-range costs to American interests. For better or for worse, the possibility of such a scenario will force European political circles to pay careful attention to their own security capabilities. Currently, if a threat arises, Europeans hope that the United States will still join them. Moreover, no responsible authority in Europe wants a decrease of U.S. commitment to NATO. However, the creation of a European security system would not only create a fall back position, but would also increase NATO’s ability to act, hopefully, in accord with a United States that leads the strategy of NATO’s transition.

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V. CONCLUSION

The expansion of the U.S. commitments to New Europe corresponds to the way key U.S. policy making institutions have framed American national interests. NATO enlargement advances American interests by accelerating the success of democratic and market economy reforms in Eastern European countries and Russia. President Clinton has argued that this success is in America's own national interests; indeed, he has stated that "...our security in this generation will be shaped by whether reform in these nations succeeds." But NATO enlargement also serves a more defensive mission -- that of pushing back rising nationalism in the East. NATO is still needed, despite the end of the Cold War, because "the dream of an empire is still burns in the minds of some who look longingly toward a brutal past." The new NATO doctrine is one of "pre-containment:" work for reform but be prepared for aggression. \(^54\)

The process that led to this policy reflects the flexibility of the U.S. decisionmaking structure, and the sharing of powers between Congress, the president and other key actors. Each phase of policymaking process (such as the definition of tasks, the adoption and implementation policies, and the funding of U.S. commitments) depends completely on the ability of these institutions to hammer out a common interpretation of national interests.

The interpretation of these national interests, in turn, have been shaped by two factors: geostrategic perspectives and domestic political concerns and interests. Wide agreement has emerged between Congress and the Executive branch that NATO enlargement serves U.S.

geostrategic interests. Yet, NATO issues are also a source of possible partisan conflict. Republicans in Congress have chided President Clinton for proceeding too slowly on NATO enlargement, and pushed for a more rapid pace. This bodes well for the Visegrad nations. Over the longer term, however, important strategic uncertainties persist -- and with them, new opportunities for partisan conflict. Political pressures to cut spending on foreign affairs, and increase funding for domestic programs, may encourage policymakers in the future to consider maintaining a more modest military presence in Europe. Such a reduction in U.S. force levels might also make strategic sense, if doing so helped ease the political problems that NATO enlargement poses to pro-Democracy politicians in Russia. The possibility of a reduction in the U.S. presence will also force European political circles to pay closer attention to their own security capabilities. No responsible authority in Europe wants a decreased U.S. commitment to NATO. However, if concerns over potential U.S. reductions were to strengthen the Europeans' commitment to provide for their own defense, this would create not only a fall-back position for European security but would also increase NATO's ability to act -- hopefully, in accord with U.S. strategy.

The initial responsibility for resolving these issues will be concentrated within the restricted group of the President's cabinet-level nominees, and possibly the under-secretary level in the cases of the Department of Defense and the Department of State. But more near-term issues (such as the possible inclusion of the Visegrad countries in NATO) will involve Congress, particularly the Senate in its treaty ratification role. Moreover, beyond the Visegrad countries, special problems may emerge in congressional attitudes toward enlargement. Congressional support will depend on the ability of particular states to manage their own democratic changes and make the transition to a market economy. The success and results of this management will affect significantly Congress'
willingness to approve the U.S. security commitments (including sending American military and financial resources overseas). Such issues could already loom large by 1998, the year of midterm elections and of final decisions on NATO enlargement.

A broader tendency within the U.S. government -- and on of potentially great importance to Europe -- lies in the area of traditional and non-traditional measures of policymaking. There is a strong shift of policymaking instruments from the foreign service (and other traditional instruments of diplomacy) to military institutions and non-military employees of the Department of Defense. Especially in the framework of NATO enlargement, "military-to-military" contacts and related programs are gaining increased prominence. The character of these new military missions will accelerate the shift of DoD's responsibilities from "military" to "political-military" roles. The Department of Defense is likely to increase the number of civilian expert personnel to fulfill these functions. At the same time, the United States is attempting to improve the quality of its even as force reductions continue. For future U.S. policymaking on NATO enlargement, this analysis suggests that the voice of the Department of Defense will continue to grow, and that the nations of Europe will need to give that voice special attention.
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