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THESIS

IMPACT OF NATIONAL CULTURE IN FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAMS: A CASE STUDY OF THE SWISS AND FINNISH F/A - 18 FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

by

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December 1996

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a case study of the impact of the national cultures of buying nations on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs. The sales of the F/A-18 fighter aircraft to Switzerland and Finland are specifically evaluated. The issues brought forth in this study will demonstrate the necessity for those employees who interact with people from foreign cultures to ensure that they possess adequate training in cross-cultural communications. In an era of declining defense budgets, defense contractors are pursuing foreign buyers vigorously. Increased competition from foreign competitors mandates the need for increased awareness of intercultural differences and improved skills in this area. Cross-cultural communications training opportunities for both Government employees and contractor personnel are discussed, in addition to reviewing the current status of training received by the personnel assigned to two on-going FMS cases. Proper intercultural communications training will help defense contractors and Government agencies by resulting in more efficient programs with fewer misunderstandings and possibly in lower prices for the Government as a result of increased economies of scale due to the foreign sales. Recommendations for further research are provided.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. OBJECTIVE ............................................................................... 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS ......................................................... 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS .......................................................... 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY ................................. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY ........................................................ 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Chapter II. Background ............................................................ 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Chapter III. Methodology ......................................................... 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Chapter IV. F/A-18 Foreign Military Sale to Switzerland ............. 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Chapter V. F/A-18 Foreign Military Sale to Finland .................... 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chapter VI. Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations ........... 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. BACKGROUND ........................................................................... 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ................................. 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Foreign Military Sales Method ............................................ 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Direct Sales Method .......................................................... 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. WHY FOREIGN MILITARY SALES? .............................................. 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. CULTURE AND INTERCULTURAL INTERACTION ......................... 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Foreign Military Sales and National Culture .............................. 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Why Study Culture? ............................................................... 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Culture Defined ........................................................................ 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Successful Intercultural Interaction .......................................... 21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Evaluating Culture ................................................. 23
6. Intercultural Training Programs ................................. 28

III. METHODOLOGY .................................................... 31
    A. INTRODUCTION .................................................... 31
    B. DATA COLLECTION METHODS ..................................... 31
       1. Media Searches .................................................. 31
       2. Interviews ...................................................... 32
    C. ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES ........................................... 33

IV. F/A-18 FOREIGN MILITARY SALE TO SWITZERLAND ...... 35
    A. INTRODUCTION .................................................... 35
    B. F/A-18 SALE TO SWITZERLAND .................................. 35
    C. THE SWISS AND THE FMS CASE ................................ 37
       1. Intercultural Training ............................................. 37
       2. Perceptions of the Swiss ........................................ 40
    D. INTERPRETATION OF THE CULTURAL INDICES ............. 42
       1. Power Distance .................................................. 43
       2. Individualism ................................................... 44
       3. Uncertainty Avoidance ......................................... 45
       4. Masculinity ..................................................... 46
    E. CONCLUSION .......................................................... 47

V. F/A-18 FOREIGN MILITARY SALE TO FINLAND ............... 49
    A. INTRODUCTION .................................................... 49
    B. F/A-18 SALE TO FINLAND ......................................... 49

viii
C. THE FINNISH PEOPLE AND THE FMS CASE .......... 51
   1. Intercultural Training .................................. 52
   2. Perceptions of the Finnish People ................. 55
D. INTERPRETATION OF THE CULTURAL INDICES .... 58
   1. Power Distance ......................................... 59
   2. Individualism ......................................... 60
   3. Uncertainty Avoidance ............................... 60
   4. Masculinity ........................................... 61
E. CONCLUSION ............................................... 62

VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS .... 65
A. SUMMARY .................................................. 65
   1. Primary Research Question ........................... 65
   2. Subsidiary Questions .................................. 66
      a. *What are the key cultural factors that may affect a
         FMS or contractual relationship?* .................. 66
      b. *To what extent are the cultural practices/
         differences of a buying nation evaluated when
         entering into a Foreign Military Sales agreement
         to determine possible effects that culture may
         have on negotiations/administration of the
         program?* ................................................ 67
      c. *What are the impacts of the Finnish and Swiss
         cultures on their respective F/A-18 Foreign
         Military Sales programs?* .......................... 67
B. CONCLUSIONS ............................................. 68
C. RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................... 69
D. TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ....................... 71
I. INTRODUCTION

A. OBJECTIVE

During the last decade, international arms sales by United States (U.S.) defense companies have been increasing at an astounding rate. The downsizing of the U.S. military, in light of budget constraints and the changing world power balance, has led to a decrease in sales of military hardware in the domestic market. In an effort to remain viable businesses, many U.S. defense contractors have aggressively pursued sales in the international market. From 1986 to 1989 the U.S. Government sold $29.1 billion of weaponry to developing nations via the foreign military sales (FMS) program. From 1990 to 1993 that figure more than doubled to $59.8 billion and in 1993 over 70 percent of all sales agreements made with developing nations involved arms sales. [Ref 1:p.1]

As the number of FMS sales grows, U.S. Government personnel and contractors must become increasingly savvy in the undertaking of international negotiations and contract administration. A host of challenges, including the language barrier and cultural differences, await the U.S. contractor embarking on a foreign military sales program. The laws and regulations of the U.S. are observed in the contractual language of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the Letter of Offer and
Acceptance (LOA) signed by the U.S. Government and a foreign buying government. These documents stipulate the terms of the FMS program. However, as "sellers" being responsive to our foreign "buyers," it is imperative to recognize that the business norms, values, ethics, language, and relationships between buyers and sellers may vary wildly with that to which the average American business person is accustomed when dealing with another U.S. buyer. In order to ensure a solid U.S. presence in the arena of international arms sales, and to maintain positive, healthy relationships with foreign buyers who may have more funds to spend at a later date, U.S. Government officials and defense contractors involved in FMS must be more familiar with and sensitive to the cultural differences between the U.S. and its FMS buyers.

The purpose of this study is to analyze how the culture of a buying nation may impact an FMS program. It is important for both U.S. Government officials and defense contractors to recognize that business relationships with foreign customers will be different from those with which they are accustomed. In order to ensure its place as a respected international business partner and continued business, which is becoming more imperative to the domestic defense industry, it is vital for the U.S. to become more sophisticated in developing relationships with customers from other cultures. This study analyzes the effects of the culture of a buying nation on the FMS
program. Specifically it examines the impact of cultural differences in the F/A-18 FMS programs between the U.S. and both Finland and Switzerland.

B. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary research question is the following:

How does the culture of a buying nation affect a Foreign Military Sales program and how might that knowledge assist in the successful execution of an FMS program?

Subsidiary questions to be addressed in assessing the cultural implications associated with an FMS program include:

1) What are the key cultural factors that may affect an FMS or contractual relationship?

2) To what extent are the cultural practices/differences of a buying nation evaluated when entering into a Foreign Military Sales agreement to determine possible effects that culture may have on negotiations/administration of the program?

3) What are the impacts of the Finnish and Swiss cultures on their respective F/A-18 Foreign Military Sales programs?

C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

This study focuses on a case study of two FMS programs currently underway. The governments of Switzerland and Finland have each entered into FMS agreements to procure the F/A-18 and both programs are
sufficiently established to allow for an evaluation of the relationships
developed between the sellers, the U.S. Government and defense contractors,
and the buyers, the Swiss and Finnish government agents and contractors
involved in the procurement. A broad overview of each program is provided,
along with evaluations by U.S. Government and contractor personnel, along
with foreign personnel, regarding the efficiency with which the programs are
unfolding. The efforts on the part of the U.S. personnel to provide training
and preparation for interacting with foreign buyers are also addressed. These
data are compared to an established model pertaining to international
differences in work-related values and cross-cultural communications.
Conclusions are drawn about preparation that did or did not occur by U.S.
personnel to avoid any cultural conflicts which have arisen in the
administration of the FMS agreements and to improve the perceptions of our
foreign buyers about U.S. work methods and mannerisms.

This study examines the FMS program primarily from the point of view
of what U.S. personnel can and should do when interacting with international
customers. Interviews conducted with several Swiss and Finnish persons
involved in the programs provide insight into the perceptions of the buyers.
This study does not provide recommendations to the foreign buyers regarding
interaction with the U.S. Government or defense contractors, but rather
provides insight to the U.S. personnel on steps available to enhance American interaction overseas in the business world.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

The research and collection of data for this thesis is qualitative in nature and is comprised of three basic parts. Data were collected from the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) F/A-18 Foreign Military Sales office, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Northrop Grumman Corporation, and available publications such as Jane's Defence Weekly pertaining to the contractual agreements in the sale of the F/A-18 to Finland and to Switzerland.

The second section of data, international cultural differences and cross-cultural communications including differences in work-related values and national "personality," has been researched through comprehensive literature reviews. Included in this literature, and the cornerstone of the case study evaluation, is Geert Hofstede's, Culture's Consequences, International Differences in Work-Related Values (1984). Also reviewed were Craig Sorti's, The Art of Crossing Cultures (1990), and Michael Kublin's International Negotiating: A Primer for American Business Professionals (1995). Intercultural training programs were also examined. These training programs encompass those available to Federal Government personnel by
Government agencies and to civilian contractors in the commercial marketplace.

The final section of data focuses on interviews conducted with three groups of people. Personal interviews were conducted with NAVAIR program managers responsible for oversight of the Swiss and Finnish programs. Personal interviews were also conducted with Swiss procurement officials, Swiss subcontractors, and McDonnell Douglas and Northrop Grumman personnel assigned to the program in Switzerland. Telephonic interviews were conducted with U.S.-based McDonnell Douglas and Northrop Grumman personnel assigned to both the Swiss and Finnish F/A-18 programs. Interview questions varied with respect to the specific program and the perspective with which each person viewed the program. Questions concentrated on the training provided to personnel interacting with foreign agents, training received if interacting with foreign agents, or the perceptions of the opposite culture.

E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

A brief discussion of the remaining chapters is outlined below.

1. Chapter II. Background

This chapter provides a brief definition and explanation of Foreign Military Sales and why they have become an important factor in the U.S. defense industry. Also included is a detailed discussion of national cultural
differences with a concentration on the aforementioned Geert Hofstede's *Culture's Consequences*. His model for identifying national cultural norms is introduced. The Chapter concludes with a summary of available cross cultural communications training to both Government and contractor personnel.

2. **Chapter III. Methodology**

This chapter discusses the interviews conducted with personnel from NAVAIR, defense contractors, and the host nations. An explanation of the analysis technique used to evaluate the Swiss and Finnish FMS programs from a cultural perspective is provided.

3. **Chapter IV. F/A-18 Foreign Military Sale to Switzerland**

This chapter is a summary and description of collected data from the F/A-18 sale to Switzerland. Included are statistical summaries and histories of the Swiss programs, as well as a representative summary of the perspectives of the individuals involved. An evaluation of the contractual relationships developed between the Swiss and the U.S. is provided, along with U.S. Government and contractor perceptions of the buyer/seller relationship and their impressions of the cultural differences present. These perceptions are analyzed using Hofstede's intercultural model.

4. **Chapter V. F/A-18 Foreign Military Sale to Finland**

This chapter is a summary and description of collected data from the F/A-18 sale to Finland. A summary of the history of the Finnish program is
provided, as well as a review of the perspectives of personnel involved. An evaluation of the contractual relationships developed between the Finns and the U.S. is provided, along with U.S. Government and contractor perceptions of the buyer/seller relationship and their impressions of the cultural differences present. These perceptions are analyzed using Hofstede's intercultural model.

5. Chapter VI. Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations

In this chapter, a brief summary is provided, followed by conclusions and recommendations for the preparation and conduct of future Foreign Military Sale arrangements with respect to the consideration given to international cultural differences.
II. BACKGROUND

A. OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

Arms sales by the United States to foreign nations are increasing at fairly steady rates, although worldwide the trend is for arms transfers to be decreasing. U.S. defense companies are searching for new markets in light of domestic defense drawdowns. [Ref 2:p.1] Although the actual dollar value of foreign military sales (FMS) by U.S. firms to other nations has decreased annually over the past three years, FMS agreements and foreign construction contracts still account for an excess of ten billion constant 1995 dollars annually; therefore, most defense companies are aggressively pursuing international markets. [Ref 3:p.138] The Department of Defense (DoD) today forecasts that "the U.S. share of the world's arms market will increase from about 50 percent in 1993 to 63 percent by the year 2000." [Ref 4:p. C5] Some of the top recipients of U.S. arms in the last ten years include such nations as Saudi Arabia, Japan, Israel, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Taiwan, South Korea, Australia, Spain, Germany, Egypt, the Netherlands, Greece, Thailand, Italy, Finland, and Switzerland. Today, some defense industries are attempting to sell their products in other nations such as Poland, Hungary, and the recently formed Czech Republic. Arms sales are a multi-billion dollar business spanning all nations and cultures on the globe. [Ref 3:p. 141]
Two methods are commonly used by foreign governments in purchasing U.S. defense goods. These methods are the previously mentioned foreign military sale and the direct sales method.

1. The Foreign Military Sales Method

A FMS agreement is the means by which the "U.S. Government sells defense articles and services to foreign governments or international organizations." The FMS contract is a sales agreement between the U.S. Government and the foreign government. The U.S. Government then contracts with a prime U.S. defense contractor for the major end items requested by the buyer. The foreign government pays the U.S. Government, who in turn pays the prime contractor for its services. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) details the procedures to be followed in negotiating and pricing FMS contracts and specifies that these acquisitions are to be conducted under the same acquisition and contract management procedures as any other defense acquisition. In other words, U.S. laws and regulations are applicable regardless of the fact that much of the effort may be conducted overseas. [Ref 5:p. 225.73-1-5]

Of interest, however, is that although the U.S. Government is the entity entering into an agreement with the foreign government, it is often the prime contractor who has done the bulk of the "sales pitch" to the foreign government, investing months of time and large quantities of money in
marketing its products to the foreign buyer. By the time the FMS agreement is signed, the prime contractor has had extensive interaction with the buying nation's agents, including an often heated competition with other major arms-exporting nations, such as Russia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and a major source selection effort on the part of buying nation.

In many FMS arrangements, the prime contractor further contracts with multiple U.S. and foreign subcontractors. Often, the prime has agreed to utilize host nation industry as subcontractors in a co-production agreement where the foreign government acquires the technology and "know-how" to manufacture a defense part or item. That part is then used in the final end-item purchased by the foreign buyer or may be used in end-items for other customers. Other agreements call for the U.S. firm to purchase an agreed upon amount of foreign manufactured goods and services which can include a wide variety of categories including furniture, candy, or even clothing, and market it in the U.S. for the foreign government. Such agreements are called "offsets" because the agreement to purchase foreign items is meant to offset some specific amount or percentage of that country's expenditures for U.S. defense items. In either case, offsets and co-production arrangements result in increased interaction between the prime contractor and members of the host nation. [Ref 6:p.644-646]
2. The Direct Sales Method

The second method used by foreign governments to acquire U.S. defense goods is the direct sales method. This method involves a U.S. defense contractor selling directly to a foreign buyer and is regulated by the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR). The ITAR provides licensing and regulatory guidance for the import and export of all defense articles and technology. [Ref 6:p.656] A direct sale also requires the approval of the Office of Defense Trade Control, an agency of the Department of State, which coordinates requests for permission to export defense goods and issues an export license prior to actual exportation of any defense article. Unlike an FMS arrangement, the U.S. Government only passively monitors a direct sale. Although the same cultural interaction occurs in a direct sale between a U.S. contractor and the buying nation, the case study presented herein applies to FMS arrangements only. [Ref 7:p.23-24]

B. WHY FOREIGN MILITARY SALES?

The decline of the defense budget has propelled U.S. military contractors to FMS alternatives to remain viable businesses. [Ref 2:p.1] During the height of the Reagan defense "buildup," $390 billion (in constant 1995 dollars), comprising 6.2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), was allocated to DoD's budget. In 1995, that figure had diminished to $252 billion and 3.5 percent of the GDP. [Ref 8:p.1]
This reduction in defense spending corresponds to fewer domestic arms purchases and reduced profits for defense contractors. In response to this changing environment, defense contractors have turned to the overseas market. From 1987 to 1992, the value of arms sales from the U.S. to foreign buyers almost quadrupled from $8.7 billion in 1987 to $24.1 billion. Today, foreign sales account for almost 25 percent of American arms production. In excess of 20 percent of Raytheon Corporation's sales in 1992 were from Patriot missile sales to foreign nations. Likewise, more than 20 percent of then Martin-Marietta's total sales in 1994 were due to foreign orders. In some cases, foreign sales alone account for ongoing production of some U.S. weapon systems. For example, McDonnell Douglas now sells the F-15 fighter aircraft only to foreign customers. Saudi Arabia has purchase seven times as many General Dynamic M1-A2 battle tanks as the U.S. Army in the past five years. [Ref 2:p.1-4]

The U.S. Government has encouraged arms sales to our allies, and each Service has large offices devoted to the management of FMS programs. These programs not only serve to protect and maintain the domestic arms industrial base, but are also in line with current U.S. policy to reduce domestic defense spending, while relying more heavily on our allies involvement in regional conflicts. Additionally, some FMS programs have resulted in reduced costs to the U.S. Government. In FMS programs
involving weaponry that is still being procured domestically, a large volume of foreign sales may provide an unexpected bonus in the form of reduced costs due to the larger numbers produced - a makeshift "quantity discount" spread over a number of customers. For example, McDonnell-Douglas has contracts for the sales of over 325 F/A-18 fighter aircraft to foreign customers, which has reduced the cost of the 871 F/A-18s procured by the U.S. Navy by over two million dollars per aircraft. [Ref 2:p.2-3]

C. CULTURE AND Intercultural Interaction

1. Foreign Military Sales and National Culture

In the existing domestic defense environment, it is understandable why the U.S. Government has encouraged foreign military sales and why U.S. contractors have focused increasingly on marketing their goods overseas. Additionally, while the Government's role in administering foreign military sales often is in the interest of maintaining healthy international relations, the contractors recognize the importance of maintaining a good relationship with their foreign customers for future sales. Although successfully lobbying a foreign government to purchase a weapon system is, in itself, a milestone celebrated by a company, many contractors discover that the administration of the program is fraught with difficulties and circumstances unlike those expected in what is considered to be a "normal" buyer-seller relationship, when only the U.S. Government or another U.S. company is involved as a
buyer. Many of these difficulties and stumbling blocks can be attributed to a factor that seems obvious, but which, surprisingly, is often overlooked or minimized in foreign sales. Simply put, foreign buyers are the products of foreign cultures.

Program managers will attest to the multitude of challenges and problems that arise between the program office and a prime contractor. These differences may include differences of opinion regarding the interpretation of contract terms and conditions, methods of cost control and cost accounting, or attempts to resolve the inevitable "slide" in the schedule of a program. The challenge presented to the Government officials and the contractor personnel involved in a program is to forge a solid relationship, which is initiated during contract negotiations and continues throughout the life of a program. The evolution of this relationship is characterized by gaining mutual respect, trust, and confidence in working towards a shared goal of a successful program.

Many of the difficulties prevalent in a program arise due to the divergent perspectives of the Government "buyer" side, and of the contractor "seller" side. These differences in perspective and attitude are a direct result of the disparate motivations and cultures of the buyer and of the seller. Current management training emphasizes how corporate cultures can vary among many companies. [Ref 9:p.258] With domestic management
philosophy concentrating on culture as a significant factor in the development of synergy between contractual partners, it should be no surprise that when a foreign nation culture, in addition to the foreign corporate culture within that national culture, is added to the mix, significant consideration must be given to the impact that a new and unfamiliar culture will have on program management. When interpretation of contract terms and conditions is a challenge to program managers and contractors in a purely domestic program where most players are essentially familiar with the Government regulations and are intimately knowledgeable of the nuances of the language of the contract-English; how must that challenge multiply when applying and explaining U.S. regulations and business norms to foreign buyers?

2. Why Study Culture?

Gaining an understanding of the culture of a foreign buyer is a logical first step in participating in international business. Unfortunately, U.S. businesses have not earned a good reputation around the world when it comes to interacting with foreign businesses and as tourists. It is due to this deficiency that,

The same bull-in-a-china-shop attitude toward foreign cultures and languages that has always cost American travelers respect overseas is now costing American business billions of dollars a year, according to experts. [Ref 10:p. 245]
For example, General Motors lost a large sales opportunity when it made a "classic cultural blunder" by failing to change the name of its Nova model when introducing the car into the company's South American market; "Nova" means "it doesn't go" in Spanish. [Ref 11:p.xv]

It is believed that due to geographic considerations, executives from European or Japanese companies have more opportunity to develop their intercultural skills; however, in an era of international business, U.S. business people must become more sensitive and aware of cultural interaction. With a domestic market of over 225 million people, Americans have been able to continue to be highly parochial. In other words, they tend to view the world from their own perspectives and disallow other perspectives as wrong, unworthy, or inferior. [Ref 12:p.11-13] Until recently, American corporations have been successful regardless of the fact that while two-thirds of U.S. executives today believe that an emphasis on the international outlook is very important, only one-third believe that experience overseas is important. Only 20 percent regard foreign language training as important. On the other hand, 82 percent of non-U.S. companies' executives believe that an international perspective is important, 70 percent believe foreign experience is vital, and fully 64 percent feel foreign language training is important. Unfortunately, most management training and management schools are located in the U.S.
This tends to reinforce parochial American views, with little emphasis on the cultures of other customers or competitors. [Ref 12:p.12-13]

Regardless of the fact that cultural interaction has become more common during the twentieth century, there are always difficulties whenever extensive cross-cultural interaction occurs. This is due to the fact that people from one culture have become accustomed to their "norms." They define what is "correct" by what is correct in their culture. Actions taken by foreigners that are totally "right and proper" in their minds due to their socialization and culture, may be in great conflict or seem inappropriate to a person from another culture. The result may be prejudice and stereotype development, even in the minds of those who believed they were prepared to meet, interact, or live with, a new or unfamiliar culture. [Ref 13:p.16] An example of this phenomenon follows:

A Swiss executive waits more than an hour past the appointed time for his Latin colleague to arrive and sign a supply contract. In his impatience, he concludes that Latins must be lazy and totally unconcerned about business. He has misevaluated his colleague by negatively comparing him to his own cultural standards. Implicitly, he has labeled his own group's behavior as "good" (Swiss arrive on time and that is good) and the other group's behavior as "bad" (Latins do not arrive on time and that is bad). [Ref 12:p.83]

A common myth has permeated not only international corporate America, but the Federal Government as well, that cultural differences are
certainly important and merit great amounts of attention when the international buyer's culture is "really" different from that of the U.S., such as the cultures of Japan, Saudi Arabia, or Malaysia. But, when the international buyer is from Western Europe, culture is not a big factor, because American culture is rooted in Western European culture and history, so "they are just like us." While there are presumably more similarities in culture, due to the still significant differences, this assumption often leads to numerous misunderstandings and poor interpretations of the actions of Western European customers.

More than one-third of all Americans sent overseas to administer contracts return earlier than their personal tours' original schedule. This is somewhat understandable for "exotic" countries such as Saudi Arabia where the cultural differences are so wide as to impact every aspect of life for the employees and their families. According to one study, an average of 68 percent of Americans sent to Saudi Arabia failed to complete their tours. However, the numbers are high for Western European countries as well. Thirty-seven percent of the Americans working on the F-16 General Dynamics sale in Western Europe returned to the U.S. prematurely and fully 18 percent of Americans sent to England returned early. None of the U.S. personnel sent to England received any cultural training, due to the assumption that England would pose no cultural difficulties for Americans. It should be noted that the
reasons for early return range from difficulties with professional business interaction to simple inability to adapt to living in a foreign country with no prior cultural adaptation training. [Ref 11:p.xiv] Often, "...failures in overseas assignments are not due to technical incompetence, but rather lack of adjustment to a new and different culture." [Ref 14]

The costs of these early returns are high. The U.S. company has lost an employee who may have extensive knowledge and experience in a program. The possibility exists that the employee may have committed a "cultural blunder," putting the company in a position of having to rebuild trust with its foreign counterparts. Finally, the financial expenses incurred by the company may be large due to high rotation of personnel in a foreign program.

The premature return of an overseas employee, a spouse, and two children can cost a company more than $210,000. Every time one of its volunteers comes home early, the Peace Corps loses 50-75 percent of the estimated $7000 it costs the agency to recruit and train one worker. [Ref 11:p.xiv]

It would seem that control of such high turnover rates to reduce costs and to preserve the knowledge base on a program would be a high priority for U.S. defense contractors.
3. **Culture Defined**

Current literature includes multitudes of definitions for "culture."

Robert Winthrop's *Dictionary of Concepts in Cultural Anthropology (1991)* defines culture as,

(1) That set of capacities which distinguishes *Homo sapiens* as a species and which is fundamental to its mode of adaptation.
(2) The learned, cumulative product of all social life. (3) The distinctive pattern of thought, action, and value that characterize the members of a society or group. [Ref 15:p.50]

Culture is an abstract idea, characterized by the actions, habits, and behaviors of the people from a particular region or nation. Confucius stated, "All people are the same, it's only their habits that are different." The cultural backgrounds of individuals will determine not only national habits and personalities, but also those of corporations and governments. A leading Japanese industrial statesman observed that "U.S. and Japanese companies are 95 percent alike in their approaches and operations, but the five percent difference is what really matters." [Ref 16:p.x]

4. **Successful Intercultural Interaction**

Michael Kublin's *International Negotiating: A Primer for American Business Professionals (1995)* offers a variety of characteristics necessary for successful interaction with a new or different culture. Among these attributes are a high tolerance for ambiguity, creativity, and flexibility, a bilingual
ability if possible, humor, stamina, empathy, and curiosity. Applying these characteristics consistently when dealing with people from foreign cultures helps a businessperson to keep an open mind and positive attitude. They also reduce the frustration felt when not fully understanding the actions or motivations of their foreign counterparts. A close examination of these characteristics reveals that they are actually necessary in any business interaction, whether it be with a foreign culture or not. [Ref 17:p.23-28]

A very simple model is suggested in Craig Sorti’s, The Art of Crossing Cultures (1990), for people who are interacting with a foreign culture either in a temporary manner such as negotiations or on a more permanent basis, such as for expatriates living and working in a new country. The model is based on an understanding that people view the world from the culture in which they are raised. When an incident occurs that is in conflict with or differs from the norm that is expected from our own culture, people have an involuntary reaction which is normally some level of discomfort. The important aspect to this occurrence is what we do following that discomfort. Withdrawing from the situation and developing negative stereotypes is common. A better response is to become aware of our internal conflict and determine what is causing the adverse response. In this manner, people become more aware of the cultural differences that characterize the situation, and that knowledge may lead to a more logical response rather than a purely
emotional one. In effect, training oneself to develop opinions and perceptions logically rather than allowing emotions and discomfort to dictate a response will not only lead to greater insight into a new culture, but will also make the experience of interacting with that culture a more beneficial one. The graphic model of this process of adjustment to a new culture is depicted at Figure 2-1.

[Ref 11:p47-62]

5. Evaluating Culture

An understanding of the elements of national culture and the leadership styles that emerge from various cultures is of enormous value to the Government officials and contractors involved in FMS programs. In Culture’s Consequences, International Differences in Work-Related Values (1984), Geert Hofstede sought to determine the effect that culture has on the behavior and attitudes of employees and managers in different countries. Surveying over 160,000 managers and employees of IBM in over 60 nations, Hofstede developed a model comprised of four primary dimensions across which national cultures consistently vary, regardless of the passage of time, the ages of those surveyed, or the level of employment of those surveyed. The four dimensions are Power Distance, Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Masculinity. Each nation was assigned a composite rating in each category, providing a scale or index with which to compare one nation’s culture to another. A brief discussion of each dimension follows.
Figure 2.1. The Process of Adjustment (From Ref [11])
Power Distance is the extent to which a society accepts that power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally. Hofstede's definition of Power Distance is,

...the extent to which a boss can determine the behavior of a subordinate, and the extent to which a subordinate can determine the behavior of the boss. [Ref 18:p72]

In other words, how likely are employees to accept large variances in the treatment of themselves versus the status of their employers?

The Power Distance Index (PDI) rating can be used to predict various attitudes and beliefs within the nation. PDIs ranged from 11 to 94, with the higher number signifying greater discomfort or formality between employer and employee. In countries with a high Power Distance Index, such as the Philippines and Mexico, powerholders are entitled to greater privilege and employees fear disagreement with their boss. In contrast, in a low Power Distance nation such as Israel or Denmark, employees are less afraid to disagree with their supervisors and everyone should have equal rights. [Ref 18:p.65-92]

Individualism refers to a loose social framework in which most people expect to take care of themselves, whereas collectivism occurs when there is a tight social framework in which people relate strongly to a group of people, possibly relatives or a clan, who are expected to care for each other. The
Individualism Index (IDV) spans from 12 for more collective societies, to 91 for the most individualistic society surveyed. Not surprisingly, the United States and Australia, which are highly individualistic in relation to the other surveyed nations, are characterized by an "I" mentality with an emphasis on self-preservation. Countries that are highly collective, such as Columbia and Venezuela are very "we" conscious and people expect their organizations to help defend them. [Ref 18:p.148-173]

The third dimension, Uncertainty Avoidance, is the extent to which a society feels threatened by undefined or rapidly changing situations and to what lengths ambiguity is avoided. Hofstede believes that "...extreme uncertainty creates intolerable anxiety and human society has developed ways to cope with the inherent uncertainty of our living on the brink of an uncertain future." [Ref 18:p.111] The Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) ranges from rating of 8 for Singapore, to 112 for Greece, with the lower rating signifying more difficulty coping with uncertainty. Characteristics common in nations with a high capacity for handling uncertainty include a more positive attitude towards young adults and a belief that fewer rules are better. In cultures with lower uncertainty tolerance, younger people are more suspect and rules are absolutely needed. [Ref 18:p110-140]

Finally, the Masculinity Index (MAS) expresses the extent to which respondents endorsed more traditionally masculine attitudes and preferences.
such as being more assertive versus a culture that tended to convey traditionally feminine characteristics of a more nurturing vein. The MAS ranges from a rating of 5 for Sweden to 95 for Japan. The higher score indicates a society that tends to display traditionally masculine attributes. A higher MAS such as those of Japan, Austria, and Venezuela indicates a greater belief in gender inequality and occupations that are considered to be for "men only" or for "women only." Lower MAS countries such as Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden typically display attitudes demonstrating greater equality of the sexes and less stereotyping of employment opportunities. [Ref 18:p.176-207]

Hofstede's model is a useful tool, which does not stereotype a culture but seeks to define the culture comparatively based on other cultures' tendencies. The model can be a tremendous source of information on what generally to expect when interacting with people from another culture. Hofstede includes numerous lists of information including the consequences of the various index differences for the societies at large and for organizations within the culture, the origins of the various index differences, and characteristics that typify lower or higher index ratings. The Appendix contains a more detailed list of the societal norms of the four dimensions of the model.
6. Intercultural Training Programs

A wide variety of intercultural training programs now exist for employees of the civilian contractors and of the Federal Government. This section reviews some of the options available to personnel assigned to FMS cases to educate them in the area of cross-cultural communication.

Several agencies of the Federal Government offer courses that include information on intercultural interaction. The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is responsible for conducting courses of study to prepare military and civilian personnel for assignments in security assistance management positions, which include personnel working on FMS programs. [Ref 6:p.89] According to the Director, Management Studies at DISAM, ten courses are offered including an Overseas Course for personnel assigned to overseas posts. This course includes six to eight hours of cross-cultural training, which is regionally based. Most personnel assigned to FMS cases who are based in the U.S. do not attend the Overseas Course, but rather attend the Case Manager's Course or the Program Manager's course, both of which include a brief overview of cultural factors. The textbooks for these courses do offer a list of recommended readings on international communications. [Ref 19]

Another alternative for Government employees is the Special Operations' Cross Cultural Communications Course, Eglin Air Force Base,
Florida. This is a five-day course open to all Government employees that includes information about U.S. culture and attitudes, traits of other cultures, and teaches "mindfulness" of other cultures to students. The training can provide regionally based cultural information, if requested. The instructors of this course will also travel to distant locations to present the training to large groups. [Ref 20]

As more U.S. companies turn to international business, more consultant companies are offering seminars on cross-cultural topics. For defense contractors, many options now exist to expose their employees to cultural factors prior to involvement with foreign buyers.

One example is Professional Training Associates, a company that specializes in cross-cultural training for corporations. This company will travel to the corporation to provide a presentation to a large audience and will either tailor the seminar to a particular region or will present a broad overview of how to be aware of cultural factors. The owner of Professional Training Associates, Sheila Hodge, stresses that rather than learning by trial and error in the international arena, executives can gain the knowledge and skills to improve cross-cultural communications from the beginning. She believes that, with training, an employee can experience greater peace of mind when confronted by a different culture and that employee can
concentrate on accomplishing missions and goals rather than experiencing frustration and anxiety. [Ref 21]

The Intercultural Training Institute (ITI) of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, offers similar services. ITI's programs include assistance in screening and selecting expatriate candidates and cross-cultural training for domestic support staff who communicate with foreign affiliates. Both of these are circumstances that occur for defense contractors in FMS cases. [Ref 14:p.3] ITI asserts that cross-cultural training will "facilitate adjustment to new cultural and work environments, increase expatriate performance, reduce culture shock, and minimize premature returns." [Ref 14:p.1]
III. METHODOLOGY

A. INTRODUCTION

Research for this study is primarily qualitative in nature and consisted of three basic parts: media searches, interviews, and a literature review. The literature review discussed in the previous chapter provided the background on intercultural interaction and the framework for the case study analysis.

B. DATA COLLECTION METHODS

Data collection was accomplished through the use of media searches and interviews. A brief overview of each method is discussed in this section.

1. Media Searches

Data base searches and media reviews are the sources for detailed facts and figures regarding the FMS arrangements for both Finland and Switzerland. Searches on the LEXIS/NEXIS system yielded a large number of articles with information about the sales of the F/A-18 aircraft to Switzerland and Finland, to include the numbers, sales price, and political climates in the respective countries at the time of the agreement. Many articles were located that address the previously discussed issues surrounding the growth of Foreign Military Sales and arms transfers. Articles, editorials, and press minutes were located in such periodicals as The New York Times,
2. Interviews

Interviews with personnel involved in the Swiss and Finnish F/A-18 FMS programs provided specific information for the case study. These interviews were both telephonic and personal, completed during travel to the Swiss F/A-18 assembly site in Emmen, Switzerland and to the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Arlington, Virginia. Telephonic interviews were conducted with the program manager of the Swiss F/A-18 program for McDonnell Douglas and the vice-president of Marketing for Finavitec, a Finnish subcontractor to McDonnell Douglas. Personal interviews were conducted in Switzerland with two Swiss program managers, the Northrop Grumman project director for Switzerland and the McDonnell Douglas program director. NAVAIR program managers for both Finland and Switzerland and the F/A-18 Deputy Program Manager for International Programs were also interviewed in person at the Naval Air Systems Command.

Interview questions varied depending on the nationality of the subject and the agency employing the subject. Some questions were very specific, such as whether or not the subject spoke the language of the buyer or seller, depending on the nationality. All U.S. subjects were questioned about any
training they had received or provided to other employees interacting with foreign buyers. The interviews with the Finnish and Swiss gentlemen were not expected to yield specific information about the programs, but to provide a general perspective of the buyers' impressions of the U.S. participants, attitudes, and business approaches.

C. ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES

The previous chapter introduced the cultural analysis performed by Geert Hofstede in *Culture's Consequences*, which suggested four dimensions of national culture. The indices derived from Hofstede's analysis provide the basis for the analysis to be performed herein.

The case to be analyzed in this study involves the sale of the F/A-18 aircraft to Switzerland and Finland, and the resultant contacts between people from Switzerland/Finland and people from the United States. This contact is necessary not only in the negotiation of the sale, but in the successful administration of the contracts. Both of these FMS arrangements were initiated in the early 1990s and the working relationships between the Swiss/Finns and the U.S. personnel are long-term in nature.

More than 60 countries were included in Hofstede's analysis of international differences and cultural dimensions. Switzerland, Finland, and the United States were among the nations surveyed and indexed. This study will utilize Hofstede's indices as benchmarks from which to analyze the data.
collected through the interview process. The analysis discusses the characteristics that could have been anticipated from people who are native to the countries in question, based on the societal norms and consequences of differentiation on an index. The case study also examines if the impressions and information provided by the U.S. personnel involved in the F/A-18 FMS cases about their Finnish and Swiss counterparts are supported by Hofstede's indices. More importantly, the question of whether or not the anticipation of these characteristics, and appropriate adjustments to U.S. expectations and approaches, were accomplished through "on-the-job-training" after years of interaction and cultural missteps, and whether these realizations could have been brought about earlier through intercultural training.
IV. F/A-18 FOREIGN MILITARY SALE TO SWITZERLAND

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents and analyzes the cultural implications of the Foreign Military Sale to Switzerland of the F/A-18. Included is a discussion introducing the facts of the F/A-18 sale to Switzerland. This is followed by a sample of the perspectives of some U.S. and Swiss personnel involved in the administration of the FMS case, to include an examination of the cultural training attended or received by the U.S. personnel. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the Swiss culture using Hofstede's model and indices, comparing the information available from Hofstede's indices with the observations of the FMS personnel.

B. F/A-18 SALE TO SWITZERLAND

In 1993 the government of Switzerland completed negotiations to purchase 34 F/A-18 fighter aircraft (24 single-seat F/A-18Cs and 8 two-seat F/A-18Ds) from the U.S. Government as a Foreign Military Sale. McDonnell Douglas is the prime contractor, with Northrop Grumman, General Electric, General Motors, and Hughes as the major U.S. subcontractors. NAVAIR provides administrative oversight, management, and support, with a staff of approximately 25 people assigned specifically to the Swiss program. The sale
price for the aircraft was approximately $3.1 billion, with $1.3 billion of that allocated for extended service and training. [Ref 22:p.2-3]

The first two aircraft were assembled in St. Louis, with the remaining 32 produced and assembled in Switzerland with parts both imported from the U.S. and parts produced by five major Swiss subcontractors. The Swiss companies are subcontracted directly to both McDonnell Douglas and to Northrop Grumman, necessitating a close working relationship between the American contractors and their Swiss counterparts. The Swiss Defense Technology and Procurement Agency (GRD) functions as the Swiss program management office. The first two F/A-18s, assembled in St. Louis, were delivered to the Swiss in early 1996 after a successful first flight on 20 January 1996. [Ref 23P.1-2] The first aircraft assembled in Emmen, Switzerland, underwent a successful first test flight on 3 October 1996. [Ref 24:p.16]

McDonnell Douglas and Northrop Grumman have had personnel assigned in Switzerland since 1993 and expect to maintain some minimal presence for at least five more years. More than 115 employees of the two companies have worked in Switzerland providing U.S. support to the program since mid-1993. At least 20 of these employees have lived in Switzerland for at least six months at a time, some with tours lasting in excess of two years. Many of these "permanent" residents also have family members accompanying
them, including school age children. The remainder of the employees have had working trips or shortened tours lasting anywhere from five days to three months. [Ref 25]

Each corporation has a stateside F/A-18 program office as well. The program offices of McDonnell Douglas are located in St. Louis, where the overall program manager is assigned. The stateside program manager of Northrop Grumman is located in El Segundo, California. Each corporation's program office consists of some personnel who work exclusively in the U.S. and some who commute to Switzerland on a regular basis for meetings, quality inspections, repair assistance, or program assessments.

C. THE SWISS AND THE FMS CASE

Personnel from McDonnell Douglas, Northrop Grumman, and NAVAIR were interviewed regarding their roles in this FMS case and their opinions about the Swiss culture, based on the interaction each had had with Swiss nationals in the course of their business. Due to the candid nature of many of the answers received and in the interest of protecting the privacy of those interviewed who provided many purely opinion-based perspectives of their international customers, the names of these personnel will not be used.

1. Intercultural Training

All FMS case personnel interviewed were asked about the intercultural training they had received prior to embarking on a business relationship with
the Swiss or any other international business partner. Each person had at least two years of experience working on the Swiss program. NAVAIR employees assigned to the Swiss program had attended courses provided by the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and a Cross Cultural Communications Course offered by the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. The DISAM course on the "Management of Security Assistance" deals primarily with familiarizing the student on the principles and procedures of a FMS case, but includes a chapter on living and working in a foreign country. The course textbook includes recommended readings on cross-cultural communications. [Ref 6:p.117] The Cross Cultural Communications course offered by the U.S. Special Operations School is an intensive, five-day course that examines U.S. culture and attitudes. It also teaches the student to be mindful of cultural differences and what to expect from the cultures of various regions of the world. [Ref 20] The primary lesson one NAVAIR Swiss program employee took from this course is to remember that "...the American way is not always the best way." [Ref 26]

No U.S. contractor personnel had attended any formal cultural training. In addition to "screening" employees to ensure they are prepared to work in an international environment, the most prevalent method of familiarizing an
employee with the Swiss culture is through books, briefings, and discussions with program managers or employees already involved with the program.

There are no formal classes in Swiss culture and environment. Books, articles and some briefings are provided and the individuals can use them to their purpose. We could do better in this area, but it is always a compromise between time available and need. [Ref 27]

Another opinion is that the only challenge is the language barrier because "...coming to Europe we are looking at the same culture." [Ref 28] Most of the literature provided to people en route to Switzerland for a permanent assignment consists mainly of "do's and don'ts" in order not to offend anyone and generalities such as to expect the Swiss to be stubborn, detail oriented, zealots for cleanliness, and dedicated to the search for perfection. One manager in industry who had been involved in a program in the Middle East in the 1980s stated that extensive briefings and training sessions were provided to all personnel prior to going to the region. [Ref 29] This fact exemplifies a prevalent attitude that solid training on intercultural issues is necessary for some regions, but not for others.

No data are available indicating the number of tours of duty in Switzerland that were cut short due to professional or personal difficulties in adapting to the Swiss and the Swiss culture. However, informal accounts of one employee removed from the program due to differences with the Swiss
were revealed. Another anecdote was of one family, including children, that moved to Switzerland and returned to the U.S. within a few months due to pre-existing medical problems with one child that could not be effectively handled in Switzerland due to the nature of the health care system and unfamiliarity with the region. The family did not reveal the problem to the company prior to moving, nor did they consider the ramifications of the problem in Switzerland, because it was so easily handled in the United States. [Ref 29]

2. **Perceptions of the Swiss**

When asked to provide a description of the Swiss "personality" based on their personal experiences with them, answers varied little regardless of the organizational background of the respondent. Descriptions typically included a range of adjectives including "focused," "conservative," "nationalistic," "isolationist," "narrow-minded," "prideful," and "reasonably stern." One manager from industry noted that the Swiss are very hard working and intense in their work.

They tend to be more narrowly focused in their roles, preferring to defer questions and judgments about areas outside their specific role to others. They are more oriented to committee or consensus decisions than we tend to be. [Ref 27]

An interesting point to note is that when asked this same question of himself, a Swiss manager responded that the Swiss are more quality oriented than
Americans and that he believes the Swiss have a greater sense of personal responsibility to a job than most Americans he has encountered. [Ref 30]

Surprisingly, the language barrier was not perceived to be a big problem. English is widely spoken and understood by the Swiss, and although they acknowledged a pleasure in knowing that the Americans were attempting to learn German, the fact that all contracts are in English did not concern the Swiss managers. However, a U.S. manager based in Switzerland noted that sometimes the language barrier can be used by the Swiss as an "excuse" when disagreements arise over specifications or requirements in the contracts. [Ref 29]

The Swiss drive for high quality products provided the largest disagreements with their American counterparts. "The Americans require higher quality (from Swiss parts) than they provide." [Ref 30] Although many of the U.S. personnel indicated a belief that the Swiss did not like to accept blame or responsibility for quality problems experienced, both NAVAIR and contractor managers admitted that the Swiss drive for high quality had, in fact, resulted in reexamining and refining many of the processes used in building parts for the aircraft. "Their concern for very high quality and value has made all of us more aware, to our benefit, of our products, processes, and customer orientation." [Ref 27]
D. INTERPRETATION OF THE CULTURAL INDICES

The purpose of this section is to evaluate the Swiss culture by using the cultural dimensions discussed by Geert Hofstede. A comparison of the U.S. and Swiss ratings on the four cultural indices will provide an insight into the differences between the American culture of the FMS caseworkers and their Swiss counterparts. This analysis reveals a correlation between what has been discovered by the U.S. personnel in the course of their work and the information that could have been available to them through cultural specific research. Table 4.1 lists the four cultural indices, along with the index values for both the U.S. and Switzerland. The four cultural dimensions included are the Power Distance Index (PDI), the Individualism Index (IDV), the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), and the Masculinity Index (MAS).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power Distance</strong></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individualism</strong></td>
<td>91</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uncertainty Avoidance</strong></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Masculinity</strong></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 4.1. U.S. and Swiss Indices Value [After Ref 18]

Using the information in Table 4.1, a manager anticipating doing business with the Swiss can become educated about what to expect in broad terms. An analysis of the variability between the U.S. values and the Swiss
values will enlighten an employee about the tendencies of the Swiss, using the U.S. culture, which is well known to that employee. A list of social norms from each dimension comparing a low-value country with a high-value country is set out in the Appendix.

A cursory examination of the data above reveals that the U.S. and Switzerland are ranked very closely in several categories, with the exception of individualism. Therefore, the value of further analysis lies primarily in a comparative sense. For example, both Switzerland and the U.S. exhibit a low Power Distance Index, with Switzerland's being slightly lower than that of the U.S. The conclusion may then be drawn that the average Swiss person, and hence organization, tends to display the characteristics listed in the Appendix for a low-PDI country to a slightly higher degree than the average U.S. person or organization.

1. **Power Distance**

Switzerland's lower PDI value reveals a number of characteristics about the nation and its people. Low PDI countries indicate a nation with a strong sense of independence and federalism, with a great need for technology. Development of a strong middle class with general questioning of authority is typical. There is a belief that inequality should be minimized and that interdependency is crucial. Another connotation of a low PDI is a mixed feeling about employees' participating in management, which is demonstrated
by the absence of unions in the Swiss organizations involved in the FMS case. [Ref 18:p.77-107]

2. Individualism

The United States is the highest rated country of all of those surveyed on the Individualism Index with a value assigned of 91. Switzerland's IDV of 68 suggests a society more geared to the individual than to the group, but less so than that of the U.S. From this difference, an American working with the Swiss can expect to encounter a greater belief in the decisions of a group, an observation that was made by one U.S. manager interviewed. Because Switzerland's IDV does reflect a fairly high level of individualism, it should be anticipated that the characteristics described for a high IDV country in the Appendix are accurate for Switzerland. If it does not seem so to an American in Switzerland, this is probably due to the fact that they are "less individualistic" than the U.S. Other characteristics of high IDV countries are a strong tradition of individualist thinking and action and balanced political systems, both of which accurately describe Switzerland and its tradition of neutrality and a long lasting federalism. [Ref 18:p.158-173] Switzerland's strong sense of individualism as a nation manifested itself in a referendum in 1986 voted on by the people that rejected membership in the United Nations. [Ref 31:p.328]
3. **Uncertainty Avoidance**

The Uncertainty Avoidance Index value for Switzerland also demonstrates a noted difference between the U.S. culture and that of the Swiss. Switzerland received a higher UAI than the U.S., which, according to Hofstede, means a greater preference for clear requirements and instructions and a desire for managers to be expert in their fields. [Ref 18:p.132] Both of these characteristics were mentioned by U.S. managers working in Switzerland. "They tend to be more narrowly focused in their roles, preferring to defer questions and judgments about areas outside their specific role to others," one manager said. [Ref 27] Another described the need on the part of the Swiss for absolute clarity to a much higher degree than normally provided in a technical package they received. A high UAI also reveals a suspicion toward foreigners as managers. Knowledge of this tendency could be valuable to a "foreigner" en route to Switzerland as it would provide that expatriate with an alert to how necessary it is to be sensitive to the image and demeanor portrayed while new foreign counterparts are assessing the newcomer. This distrust of foreigners does not stop with management and business; for instance, foreigners have no voting rights in Switzerland. Foreknowledge of this tendency is important for both the employee and family members when preparing to live in Switzerland. [Ref 18:p.122-143]
4. Masculinity

Finally, the Swiss reflect a higher Masculinity Index than do the Americans. Both countries were in the top half of all countries surveyed, indicating strong masculinity characteristics among both populations. The higher index rating on the part of Switzerland correctly reflects a higher differentiation in that country of the roles of the sexes and a stronger belief that "men should dominate in all settings." [Ref 18:p.205] In fact, Swiss women only obtained the right to vote in 1971. [Ref 31:p.342] Other characteristics typical of a higher MAS value are the delineation of occupations based on sex, a greater affinity to Catholicism, and fewer women in more qualified and higher-paid jobs. More than 50 percent of Swiss are Roman Catholic and the Emmen region where the F/A-18 is assembled is in a primarily Catholic area. [Ref 31:p.350] Additionally, when asked about the absence of women during a walk-through of the manufacturing floor and assembly area of the F/A-18, both Swiss managers replied that there was one woman employed in a technical job. Any other women in the area were in secretarial roles. [Ref 32] While not hostile towards women in the workplace, the reality of Switzerland is that most women do not work outside of the home. This is an important factor to consider and to expect for employees and their families when living in Switzerland.
E. CONCLUSION

This analysis of the Swiss cultural dimensions in comparison to the cultural tendencies of the United States has revealed a high degree of concurrence between the perceptions of the U.S. personnel who have been involved in the Swiss F/A-18 FMS case. While no concrete data can be provided to indicate a higher degree of awareness on the part of those U.S. persons who have received intercultural training, it can be anticipated that those people who had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the principles of intercultural interaction may have been more open to the Swiss and more accepting of the differences in behavior and attitudes they encountered. This Chapter demonstrated one resource available to gain an understanding of a foreign culture in advance of actual contact.
V. F/A-18 FOREIGN MILITARY SALE TO FINLAND

A. INTRODUCTION

This Chapter presents and analyzes the cultural implications of the Foreign Military Sale to Finland of the F/A-18 fighter aircraft. A discussion introducing the facts of the sale to Finland is included, followed by a sample of the perspectives of some U.S. and Finnish personnel involved in the day-to-day administration and management of the FMS case. The cultural training of the U.S. personnel interviewed is also addressed. The Chapter concludes with an analysis of the Finnish culture, again using Hofstede's cultural model and four indices.

B. F/A-18 SALE TO FINLAND

In May of 1992, the Finnish government chose the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 as its replacement for their current inventory of Russian Mig-21s and Swedish Drakens. The F/A-18 was selected following a competition that included the American General Dynamics F-16, the French Dassault Mirage 2000, the Swedish JAS-39, and the Russian Mig-29. [Ref 33:p.9] There were 64 aircraft ordered, including 57 F/A-18C single-seat aircraft and seven F/A-18D two-seat aircraft. [Ref 34] As with the Swiss deal, McDonnell Douglas is the prime contractor, with subcontractors including Northrop Grumman, General Electric, Hughes, and ITT Westinghouse. [Ref 35]
NAVAIR provides similar administrative management, review, and oversight as with the Swiss program. The sale price for the aircraft was approximately $3 billion, with the U.S. contractors agreeing to an additional $3 billion offset deal that is viewed by the Finns as a means to guarantee business for a recessive economy. [Ref 33:p.7]

All F/A-18Ds are to be built by McDonnell Douglas in St. Louis, Missouri, while the 57 F/A-18Cs are to be assembled in Finland by a Finnish company named Finavitec. The goal for Finavitec is to become independent for all future engine overhaul repair work through the knowledge it will gain assembling both the aircraft and the General Electric engines that the F/A-18 use, "... independence being the backbone of Finnish defence policy." [Ref 34] Finavitec is a subcontractor to McDonnell Douglas.

McDonnell Douglas and its subcontractors have had personnel assigned in Finland since 1993. A strong presence will be maintained until the in-country assembly of the aircraft is complete in 1999, with a smaller contingent remaining in Finland after the year 2000 for maintenance and repair assistance. More than 28 employees have worked in Finland since the beginning of 1995, with 16 of these employees having a tour in Finland of at least six months. Presently there are 11 personnel in Finland on a full-time basis, most of whom also have a spouse accompanying them. [Ref 36] At least a dozen employees of McDonnell Douglas and Northrop Grumman have
traveled to Finland for short-duration visits, with some of these employees traveling from Switzerland to assist in the Finnish program on a short-term basis. As with the Swiss program, a U.S.-based McDonnell Douglas program team consists of approximately 30 employees fully dedicated to the Finnish program. [Ref 37] The stateside program manager splits time between the St. Louis office and Finland, with about 30 percent of the work time spent in Finland. [Ref 29]

NAVAIR support of the Finnish program closely mirrors that of the Swiss program. The NAVAIR Finnish Program Manager travels to Finland at least three times a year with a small team for administrative and assistance reviews. Other interactions between the Finns and the NAVAIR team occur on a regular basis with Finnish personnel who are assigned in the U.S. to oversee administrative matters of this FMS case. [Ref 38]

C. THE FINNISH PEOPLE AND THE FMS CASE

Personnel from McDonnell Douglas, Northrop Grumman, and NAVAIR were interviewed about their roles in the Finnish FMS case and their experiences with the Finnish culture. A vice-president of Finavitec was also interviewed about his experiences with Americans involved in the F/A-18 program and his perceptions of differences between his own culture and that of the United States.
1. **Intercultural Training**

All FMS case personnel interviewed were questioned about the intercultural training they had received prior to involvement with anyone from Finland. The NAVAIR program manager had attended several DISAM courses at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, most of which concentrated on FMS procedures. Although he had not attended any courses specifically designed for intercultural training, he had extensive experience with other FMS cases, including one involving South Korea. Also, the Navy International Programs Office (Navy IPO), which is responsible for the management of international program policy for the Secretary of the Navy, provided the personnel on both the South Korean case and the Finnish case with general guidance about those respective nations. [Ref 6:p. 481] This guidance essentially took the form of "do's and don'ts" and basic cultural information considered important to avoid offending anyone from the foreign nation. [Ref 38]

One effective measure that NAVAIR took in the Finnish program was to "pair up" some of the personnel assigned to the case with a Finnish counterpart. For example, one manager was paired with a Finnish manager of approximately the same age, gender, education level, and with similar hobbies. According to the manager, it was very easy to develop a relationship
with his Finnish counterpart, to gain mutual trust, and to learn more about each other's cultures. [Ref 38]

Similar to the Swiss case, U.S. contractor personnel generally had not attended any formalized intercultural training. When asked about the level of training provided to people moving to Finland, one stateside manager commented, "...the answer to that question is 'none'. My recommendation is that it become much more than 'none'." [Ref 39] However, a director living in Finland for over a year now commented that,

We received a large notebook full of interesting facts and articles regarding Finland. It also had a list of recommended reading regarding the Finnish culture that was readily available at the local library. In addition, we had several conferences with an employee from the travel division of McDonnell Douglas, who had been to Finland several times. All in all, we knew what to expect before we got here. [Ref 40]

Another employee based in the U.S. had attended a four-hour course offered through the McDonnell Douglas Voluntary Improvement Program (VIP) that he said was available to all personnel working on the Finnish program. This course included information on Finnish history, government, laws and regulations, and the Finnish people. [Ref 37] He also stressed screening as an integral part of the process for selecting people on the Finnish program team. Many of the people assigned to the program have had experience with other
international programs and are accustomed to interacting with other cultures. [Ref 37] However, this screening does not include the employee's family. [Ref 29]

Whether from an employee working in Finland or an employee based in the U.S., the common explanation for the absence of formalized intercultural training was lack of time. The most prevalent opinion is that once someone is chosen to go overseas on a program, the most important priority is to prepare that person for the business aspects of the role to be filled, rather than on general or specific intercultural training. No consideration seems to be given to the generic issue of how to integrate effectively with people from other cultures by any personnel in the international programs office of the contractors. When asked about their cultural training, every manager interviewed thought only of country specific training.

The F/A-18 Deputy Program Manager of International Programs at NAVAIR also agrees that NAVAIR international personnel could be better prepared to interact with foreign personnel. However, he stressed the fact that a team does not have very much time to respond once a request from a new country is submitted, let alone trying to get additional cultural training about that country. [Ref 41] Again, the belief seems to be that cultural training means "country specific" training, vice general intercultural
communication exposure that would benefit an employee interacting with any new country.

Finally, as in the Swiss case, no statistics are available documenting the numbers of employees who returned early from Finland due to difficulties working in the host nation. However, according to one NAVAIR manager, at least one Government employee was invited to depart Finland early from a business trip by his supervisor after "unacceptable" behavior towards the Finns. [Ref 38]

2. Perceptions of the Finnish People

When asked to describe Finnish "personality," answers again varied little across organizational backgrounds. A director living in Finland described his counterparts as

...extremely shy quiet people. If they don't know you, they don't smile often, but after getting to know them, they are warm and kind and in many cases, you have made lifetime friends. They love Americans and anything you can tell them about America. They are an extremely literate society and possess an incredible amount of knowledge regarding the USA. [Ref 40]

The NAVAIR manager noticed an apparent "paranoia" of Russia, based on Finnish history with that bordering nation. He cited the fact that the Finns were adamant about not procuring any air-to-ground weapons for their F/A-18s, in an effort to assert the fact that their aircraft were for defensive purposes only. [Ref 38]
When asked about gender differences in Finland, personnel based in the U.S. and in Finland have noticed that the Finns are very nondiscriminatory in assigning work roles to women. The Director of Procurement Management of the F/A-18 program is a Finnish woman, an occurrence that would not be found in Switzerland. A Government employee commented on the fact that in Finland, there is no distinction between genders when it comes to business or social activities. The only distinction commented upon was in regard to the social activity the Finns use on a regular basis for "relationship building" in the work area: the sauna. Two U.S.-based managers commented that it is very hard to get used to the idea of being so open and exposed with several men they hardly know, in addition to the fact that any women on their team are excluded from these activities, which do, in fact, aid in building trust and a sense of teamwork. [Ref 37][Ref 38]

Two other managers, one based in the U.S. and one based in Switzerland who has traveled occasionally to Finland on a consultant basis, both noticed that the Finns tend to stand back and observe in a more receptive manner than the Swiss; they do not micromanage, but rather state what they desire and expect that it will occur. They are receptive to instruction, with a goal of eventual independence in the maintenance of their newly acquired aircraft. [Ref 29][Ref 42]
In contrast with the Swiss case, the language barrier was cited by U.S. personnel as a difficulty, but a minor one. Much of this is due to the fact that although many of the Americans in Finland attempt to learn the language, it is ranked as the second most difficult language to learn. [Ref 40] Therefore, unlike German in Switzerland, which many U.S. personnel can at least learn several useful phrases, there is a heavy reliance on the Finn knowledge of English. A Finnish vice-president with Finavitec believes that although there are minor difficulties with some people whose fluency in English is not very strong, it is a relatively minor problem. He commented that he has spoken English for 40 years as a fourth language, as do many of his countrymen. [Ref 35]

When asked to describe his own people's culture and personality, this same manager described it as,

...honest, straight-forward, thinking before answering, inert, not very talkative, means what he says, keeps his promises, not good at small talk. The Finns are proud of their quality both at the organizational and individual level. At all managerial levels people are accustomed to trust that the given tasks will be done. Individualism is the key word. It is almost a rule that whenever a task is given, the individual starts thinking how could I do it easier, better, faster, cheaper. Giving tight orders without explaining why only leads to bad cooperation. I understand that in the U.S. workers are generally doing as ordered. [Ref 35]
D. INTERPRETATION OF THE CULTURAL INDICES

The purpose of this section is to evaluate the Finnish culture by using Hofstede's cultural dimension model. As with the Swiss evaluation, the value of this analysis lies in the comparison between the U.S. indices values and those of Finland. Regardless of one's unfamiliarity with the Finnish culture, a typical American can use knowledge of the U.S. culture and Hofstede's index ratings to be prepared for the tendencies likely to be displayed when interacting with the Finnish people. This knowledge could help to alleviate discomfort and misunderstandings when dealing with the Finnish people on a regular basis. Table 5.1 lists the four cultural indices, along with the index values for both the U.S. and Finland. The four dimensions represented are the Power Distance Index (PDI), the Individualism Index (IDV), the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), and the Masculinity Index (MAS).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Finland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power Distance</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty Avoidance</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masculinity</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1. U.S. and Finnish Indices Values [After Ref 18]
Using the information in Table 5.1, a manager anticipating interacting with Finnish people can develop some broad guidelines about what to expect from his Finnish counterparts. Expected societal norms for lower or higher index ratings, which will assist in interpreting the Finnish indices as opposed to the ratings of the United States is set out in the Appendix.

1. **Power Distance**

Finland’s PDI value of 33 and the U.S. value of 40 are fairly low, with more than half of the countries surveyed receiving higher PDIs. The highest PDI awarded in the survey was a 94. [Ref 18:p.77] The closeness of the U.S. and Finnish scores indicate a great deal of similarity in the two cultures with regard to the Power Distance characteristics, with the Finnish people generally embodying the characteristics of a "low PDI" society to a slightly greater extent than Americans. Some of these characteristics, which are included in the Appendix, are a belief that the powerful should attempt to appear less powerful than they are and that equal rights are imperative. Some consequences for organizations of lower PDIs are less centralization and a smaller proportion of supervisory personnel, an indicator which supports earlier comments from Finnish personnel about the independent nature of their workers. [Ref 18:p.106]
2. Individualism

The IDV ranges from 12 to 91, with the United States receiving the highest score. Finland's index rating of 63 places it in the top half of all countries surveyed, but with tendencies of high IDV countries to a lesser extent than the U.S. Finland's relatively high IDV, as compared with other nations, is in concert with the Finnish manager's assertion that individual autonomy for workers is displayed routinely in the Finnish workplace. [Ref 35] Some other connotations for higher IDV countries are that more importance is attached to freedom and challenge in jobs and that individual decisions are better than group decisions. Other consequences of higher IDV countries are more press freedom and balanced political systems. [Ref 18: p.173] Finland has undergone a "revolution" in these areas with the recent fall of the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and is continually striving to maintain its "individualism" from Russia. [Ref 33] It is important to note again that although the Finnish IDV does indicate a relatively high level of the individualism characteristics, Americans should, on average, display these high IDV characteristics to a greater degree that the Finns. The value of this information is in comparative judgments.

3. Uncertainty Avoidance

With a range from 8 to 112, the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) provides a guideline for a population's ability to cope with stress, change, and
the unknown. Finland's UAI of 59 and the U.S.' value of 36 put them in the lower half of all nations surveyed. Of all countries surveyed, one consistency was that all of the younger democracies, such as Finland, indicated higher UAIIs than older democracies such as the United States. [Ref 18: p.122-135] However, with Finland having only a slightly higher UAI, an American interacting with the Finnish people should anticipate that the characteristics for a low UAI country are present in Finland, but to a lesser extent than amongst a U.S. population. Some of these characteristics and their consequences include confidence in younger people and in delegating authority, lower job stress, and preference for broader guidelines. [Ref 18: p. 140-143] This description supports a comment by a U.S. manager that the Finns "stand back, watch, or say 'this is what I want' and trust it will be done" [Ref 42]

4. Masculinity

It is in the area of Masculinity that the U.S. and Finnish dimension diverge significantly. With a range from five to 95, the U.S. MAS of 62 is in the top half of all countries surveyed, while Finland's 26 is in the bottom half. Americans interacting with Finns will discover more of a service ideal, with a belief in developing strong relationships with managers and co-workers. Low MAS countries typically have far less differentiation between jobs that are designed "for men" and "for women," as indicated by a female Minister of
Defense in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Finland. Social roles are very important in Finnish organizations, as witnessed by the U.S. employees initially uncomfortable with the role of the sauna in Finnish business life. On the other hand, the high MAS of the U.S. represents a tendency of traditional male and female roles where men are the "breadwinners" in families. Certain occupations are expected to be filled by men, and certain occupations are expected to be filled by women. The wide disparity between the two index values indicates a large difference in cultural norms of which an American working in Finland or with Finns should be aware. [Ref 18: p.190-207]

E. CONCLUSION

As with the analysis comparing the indices of Switzerland and the U.S., this comparison of Finnish indices with U.S. scores reveals a high level of similarity between the observations of Americans working with the Finnish people and the expectations of the Finnish culture that could be developed using Hofstede's dimensions. Since most of the personnel interviewed have worked on the Finnish program for three to four years, it is probable that many of their observations and comments have the benefit of prolonged interaction and intimate knowledge of the Finnish people. Additionally, many of the people interviewed had either some amount of cultural training and briefings or have had in excess of five years experience with international programs and interaction. However, every U.S. employee interviewed,
regardless of employment background, stressed the need for extensive screening prior to involving someone in an intercultural situation or for more cultural training.
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY

This research was conducted to address the primary and subsidiary questions outlined in Chapter I. It is appropriate to re-address these questions to ensure that adequate answers have been provided for each of them.

1. Primary Research Question

How does the culture of a buying nation affect a Foreign Military Sales program and how might that knowledge assist in the successful execution of a FMS program?

As addressed throughout Chapters II, IV, and V, the different culture of a buying nation may have a profound impact on a FMS program. Specifically, the different culture requires a readjustment of the typical manner in which our contractors and the Federal Government do business. Dealing with a foreign nation as a buyer requires a great deal more sensitivity to the varying norms of that country with regard to how to build trust in business relationships or the degree of involvement and demand a country will have with administering a program. Determining exactly what the customer wants is more difficult when that customer looks at the world through different eyes.

If the personnel interacting with people from other nations on FMS cases have a solid background in intercultural communication, the benefit will
be programs that have fewer personality conflicts, and employees, from both countries who have a higher level of comfort in dealing with "foreigners."

Whether it be generic "how to get along comfortably" intercultural training or country-specific training, ensuring that our employees possess a global mindset rather than a parochial vision of business and the way people "ought to act" will only benefit our defense industry as it strives for more international business in an increasing competitive environment.

2. Subsidiary Questions

a. **What are the key cultural factors that may affect a FMS or contractual relationship?**

This question is answered in broad terms using Geert Hofstede's cultural dimensions. The key cultural factors that will impact a FMS case are those factors with which the United States and its people most differ from its customer country. The broad dimensions that can be used to evaluate a culture and its variability with that of the United States are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. Within these four dimensions a wide variety of specific characteristics can be predicted of the population of the country evaluated. This is not a "cook book" formula, but rather provides tendencies for the population at large. Individuals will always vary around the specific value assigned to a country as a result of its survey.
b. To what extent are the cultural practices/differences of a buying nation evaluated when entering into a Foreign Military Sales agreement to determine possible effects that culture may have on negotiations/administration of the program?

The differing cultures of buying nations are not specifically evaluated by any agency when a FMS arrangement is formed in order to determine how that culture may impact the program at large. There is an effort on the part of the Federal Government and the defense contractors involved to provide their people with some level of information about the country prior to interacting with their international buyers. Some agencies do make an effort to educate their employees in intercultural interaction, but often the resources available in this area are underutilized due to a sense of urgency in negotiating or administering a program.

c. What are the impacts of the Finnish and Swiss cultures on their respective F/A-18 Foreign Military Sales programs?

Chapters IV and V fully discuss the Swiss and Finnish F/A-18 FMS cases and review the impact of those respective cultures on the programs. Little information exists to support an assertion that personnel have been relieved from either program due to intercultural problems. However, people on both programs cited numerous examples of differences in the way the Swiss or the Finns do business, socialize, or interact with the
FMS personnel. Most of these comments can be correlated to the differences in broad cultural dimensions between the U.S. and Switzerland or Finland.

B. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis identified the effects that cultural differences can have on Foreign Military Sales programs. Much of the impact is subjective and interpersonal. In an era of declining domestic defense budgets, defense contractors will become more involved in the international trade arena. Additionally, faced with an increasingly competitive international arms market, U.S. defense companies are being forced to become more savvy in marketing their products abroad. As this trend continues, so must U.S. Government and contractor personnel become more savvy in interacting with people from other cultures in negotiating and administering the programs they do sell. The price of failure in this area is a poor reputation for the United States in international business, and perhaps eventually losing badly needed contracts to foreign competitors who know how to interact with different cultures. Although many options exist for all personnel, both Government and contractor, to become educated about intercultural interaction, the prevailing attitude is that the training takes too much time. In fact, cross-cultural communication courses may be received in a matter of hours or days and the benefits of this education versus "trial and error" interaction with our
foreign customers will be readily noticed and appreciated by our foreign customers.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Most of the intercultural training or experiences of the personnel interviewed for this study took the form of books, instructions of the "do's and don'ts" of the foreign culture, or on-the-job training. While on-the-job experience can result in an employee well-suited for intercultural interaction, many missteps may occur before any significant experience is attained. Many resources are available for training prior to interacting with a foreign culture. Advance training is preferable to the on-the-job, by-default approach. Prior training can prevent many conflicts with foreign buyers. It can prepare employees for interacting with new cultures, and can save companies and the Government time by reducing the number of cultural blunders that must be handled. Training can also save money by ensuring that employees are prepared for and suited to intercultural interaction prior to traveling abroad and then discovering that they are not.

Numerous sources for intercultural training have been cited throughout this study. For Government personnel, the Air Force Special Operations' Cross Cultural Communications Course offers a broad indoctrination for developing a mindset conducive to doing business with foreigners. This course is five days and the course trainers travel to distant locations to
provide the course to any Department of Defense agency that requests it. With the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) courses tailored to the administrative specifics of a FMS case, the Special Operations Course offers a thorough indoctrination for employees specifically tailored to intercultural communications.

For civilian personnel involved in international programs, many other training resources exist other than the books and pamphlets most typically provided. The consultant services discussed in Chapter II such as seminars offered by Professional Training Associates and the Intercultural Training Institute at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, can be geared to general cross-cultural training or region specific, as requested.

The benefits of the generic intercultural training are that the company acquires an employee who has been offered the resources to develop a mindfulness of other cultures and can more readily adapt to interacting with other foreign customers in the future. The Federal Government and its defense contractors should lead the way for American international businesses in ensuring that its people are among the best at being sensitive to cross-cultural communication.
D. TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Some recommendations for future research include an examination of the use of the Integrated Product Team (IPT) philosophy on FMS cases. IPTs and the associated team-building activities in conjunction with them may be effectively used by Government agencies, contractors, and host nation personnel to help bridge cultural gaps.

A second recommendation is to expand the scope of this study by examining programs with other countries. Hofstede's model may be applied to determine further correlation between his cultural dimensions and the cultural experiences of the FMS case personnel. If this model provides an accurate prediction of the cultural differences between the U.S. and other FMS buyers, it may be a good foundation to develop a cross-cultural training program.
APPENDIX. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF CULTURE

THE POWER DISTANCE SOCIETAL NORM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low PDI</th>
<th>High PDI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inequality in society should be minimized.</td>
<td>There should be an order of inequality in this world in which everyone has his rightful place; high and low are protected by this order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All should be independent.</td>
<td>A few should be independent, most should be dependent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy means an inequality of roles, established for convenience.</td>
<td>Hierarchy means existential inequality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinates are people like me.</td>
<td>Superiors consider subordinates as being of a different kind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superiors are people like me.</td>
<td>Subordinates consider superiors as being of a different kind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of power should be legitimate and is subject to the judgment between good and evil.</td>
<td>Power is a basic fact of society which antedates good or evil. Its legitimacy is irrelevant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All should have equal rights.</td>
<td>Powerholders are entitled to privileges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerful people should try to look less powerful than they are.</td>
<td>Powerful people should try to look as powerful as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stress on reward, legitimate and expert power.</td>
<td>Stress on coercive and referent power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The system is to blame.</td>
<td>The underdog is to blame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The way to change a social system is by redistributing power.</td>
<td>The way to change a social system is by dethroning those in power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People at various power levels feel less threatened and more prepared to trust people.</td>
<td>Other people are a potential threat to one's power and rarely can be trusted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latent harmony between the powerful and powerless.</td>
<td>Latent conflict between powerful and the powerless.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation among the powerless can be based on solidarity.</td>
<td>Cooperation among the powerless is difficult to bring about because of the faith in people norm.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Ref 18:p.94]
## THE INDIVIDUALISM SOCIETAL NORM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low IDV</th>
<th>High IDV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In society, people are born into extended families or clans which protect them in exchange for loyalty.</td>
<td>In society, everyone is supposed to take care of him or herself and his or her immediate family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;We&quot; consciousness.</td>
<td>&quot;I&quot; consciousness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivity-orientation</td>
<td>Self-orientation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity is based in the social system.</td>
<td>Identity is based in the individual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional dependence of individual on organizations and institutions.</td>
<td>Emotional independence of individual from organizations or institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on belonging to organization; membership ideal.</td>
<td>Emphasis on individual initiative and achievement; leadership ideal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private life is invaded by organizations and clans to which one belongs; opinions are predetermined.</td>
<td>Everyone has a right to a private life and opinion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise, order, duty, security provided by organization or clan.</td>
<td>Autonomy, variety, pleasure, individual financial security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendships predetermined by stable social relationships; but need for prestige within these relationships.</td>
<td>Need for specific friendships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in group decisions.</td>
<td>Belief in individual decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value standards differ for ingroups and outgroups; particularism.</td>
<td>Value standards should apply to all; universalism.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Ref 18:p.171]
# THE UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE SOCIETAL NORM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low UAI</th>
<th>High UAI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The uncertainty inherent in life is more easily accepted and each day</td>
<td>The uncertainty inherent in life is felt as a continuous threat that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is taken as it comes.</td>
<td>must be fought.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time is free.</td>
<td>Time is money.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard work is not a virtue, per se.</td>
<td>Inner urge to work hard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weaker super-egos.</td>
<td>Strong super-egos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive behavior is frowned upon.</td>
<td>Aggressive behavior of self and others is accepted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less showing of emotions.</td>
<td>More showing of emotions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict and competition can be contained on the level of fair play</td>
<td>Conflict and competition can unleash aggression and should therefore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and used constructively.</td>
<td>be avoided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More acceptance of dissent.</td>
<td>Strong need for consensus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance is not felt as threatening; greater tolerance.</td>
<td>Deviant persons and ideas are dangerous; intolerance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less nationalism.</td>
<td>Nationalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More positive towards young people.</td>
<td>Younger people are suspect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less conservatism.</td>
<td>Conservatism, law and order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More willingness to take risks in life.</td>
<td>Concern with security in life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement determined in terms of recognition.</td>
<td>Achievement defined in terms of security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relativism, empiricism.</td>
<td>Search for ultimate, absolute truths and values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be as few rules as possible.</td>
<td>Need for written rules and regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If rules cannot be kept, we should change them.</td>
<td>If rules cannot be kept, we are sinners and should repent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in generalists and common sense.</td>
<td>Belief in experts and their knowledge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The authorities are there to serve the citizens.</td>
<td>Ordinary citizens are incompetent versus the authorities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Ref 18:p.140]
### THE MASCULINITY SOCIETAL NORM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low MAS</th>
<th>High MAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People orientation.</td>
<td>Money and things orientation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of life and environment are important.</td>
<td>Performance and growth are important.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work to live.</td>
<td>Live to work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service ideal.</td>
<td>Achievement ideal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdependence ideal.</td>
<td>Independence ideal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intuition.</td>
<td>Decisiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathy for the unfortunate.</td>
<td>Sympathy for the successful achiever.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leveling: do not try to be better than others.</td>
<td>Excelling: try to be the best.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small and slow are beautiful.</td>
<td>Bug and fast are beautiful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men need not be assertive but can also take caring roles.</td>
<td>Men should behave assertively and women should care.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex roles in society should be fluid.</td>
<td>Sex roles in society should be clearly differentiated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences in sex roles should not mean differences in power.</td>
<td>Men should dominate in all settings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unisex and androgyne ideal.</td>
<td>Machismo (ostentative manliness) ideal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Ref 18:p.205]
LIST OF REFERENCES


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29. Interview with Manager C, Swiss F/A-18 Program Office, Northrop Grumman, Emmen, Switzerland, on 28 August 1996.

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32. Interview with Mr. Armin Portmann, Sales Manager, Swiss Aircraft and Systems Company, Emmen, Switzerland, on 26 June 1996.


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40. Interview with Manager G, Finnish F/A-18 Program Office, Helsinki, Finland, on 7 November 1996.

41. Interview with Mr. Frank Amarosi, F/A-18 Deputy Program Manager, International Programs, NAVAIR, Arlington, Virginia, on 24 September 1996.

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