STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AS A COMPONENT OF NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA

BY

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ABSTRACT

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To date the US-ROK strategy for deterring conflict on the peninsula has been successful. However this strategy needs to be expanded in order to continue deterrence in the future. The time is right to augment current deterrent measures to include Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) for the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s participation in the Agreed Framework signals a willingness on their part to be involved in CBMs. The dire straits that the country is experiencing in its economy, foreign trade, and food situation could be the catalyst to engage the DPRK in military CBMs. Three phases of CBMs are recommended for Korea with the foremost objective to reduce tensions on the Peninsula. Phase I will focus on tension reduction. Phase II CBMs will emphasis reducing the risk of misunderstanding military intentions. CBMs for Phase III will center on increasing transparency in military affairs. Movement between phases should be event based vice time based. The US must employ all of its instruments of power to deter conflict on the Korean
Peninsula. CBMs can complement other instruments of power initiatives by lessening tensions on the Peninsula.
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“WAR BULLETIN! INVASION--SOUTH KOREA!”

“The peaceful silence of Christmas morning in Seoul has been brutally shattered by a massive North Korean invasion launched without warning or apparent provocation. Following deadly predawn air raids and commando attacks on most of South Korea’s major cities, tens of thousands of invading North Korean troops have surged across the demilitarized zone separating the two countries.”

In 1989 Larry Bond wrote the above excerpt in his best selling book entitled “Red Phoenix.”

His book about a future North Korea invasion of South Korea is fiction, the reality of an invasion by North Korea is not fiction.

Today the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) has an army of almost one million ground soldiers of which two-thirds are deployed within 100Km of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In 1996 North Korea denounced the Armistice, intruded into Joint Security Area with armed soldiers, and deployed special operations forces into South Korea via a submarine which ended up running aground. None of these actions by the DPRK were designed to increase stability on the Peninsula.

In light of the continued tensions on the Peninsula, the time is right to expand deterrent measures to include military Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) for the Korean Peninsula. These CBMs should focus on tension reduction, risk reduction, and increasing transparency.

In order to recommend CBMs for Korea, the foundation for US engagement in Korea and the regional environment the CBMs will be employed must be examined.
US Commitment to the Republic of Korea and the East-Asia Region

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain the principal threat to peace and stability in the East-Asia region. North Korea’s continued emphasis on military development at the expense of basic human needs poses a threat to all in the region.  

Because of the continued North Korean threat, a central theme of commitment to the Republic of Korea and the East-Asia Region rings through both the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy of the United States. This commitment to the ROK has been reinforced by President Clinton and by former Secretary of State Warren Christopher. On July 10, 1993 President Clinton in an address to the National Assembly of the ROK declared "So let me say clearly, our commitment to Korea’s security remains undiminished. The Korean Peninsula remains a vital American interest. Our troops will stay here as long as the Korean people need us here." Secretary Christopher echoed the President’s theme at a luncheon honoring the ROK Foreign Minister when he insisted “America’s commitment to the security of the Korean Peninsula remains unshakable.”

Why is the US engaged on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast-Asia?

There are two main reasons for the United States “unshakable” commitment to Korea and to Northeast-Asia. First, is the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROK signed on October 1, 1953. This treaty provides the framework for combined defense against armed aggression by North Korea. Second, is the importance of the Northeast-Asia region to the economic vitality of the United States.
North Korean threat to the ROK

Today North Korea has the most militarized society in the world. Its military strategy is focused primarily on an offensive attack against South Korea and defense against a counterattack. Presently the DPRK has one of the five largest armies in the world—approximately 1 million ground soldiers—of which two-thirds are deployed within 100KM of the DMZ. In 1995 the DPRK completed a 5-year campaign which significantly improved its ground offensive capabilities. The most critical improvement was the continued deployment of long-range artillery systems close to the DMZ.8

The Navy is mainly a coastal naval force. The majority of naval craft are made up of small combatants and amphibious craft. Since 1980 the DPRK has expanded the Navy’s ability to support special operations particularly by submarine.9

Almost two-thirds of the 1,100 combat aircraft of the Air Force are older generation Soviet or Chinese made designs. The Air Force does have some newer MiG-23 FLOGGERs and MiG-29 FULCRUMs. Of special note are the approximately 300 1948 vintage An-2/COLT aircraft which are single engine biplanes designed to carry special operation forces behind enemy lines.10

One of the most significant threats to South Korea are the North Korean Special Operations Forces which total about 100,000 troops. One of their primary missions is to establish a second front in the enemy’s rear area. Almost one-fifth of the Navy’s assets are dedicated to support special operations using submarines and hovercraft.11
North Korean Threat to East-Asia

North Korea in the last 10 years has significantly advanced its NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) programs. Additionally it has continued to expand ballistic missile program. Both of these actions pose a significant threat to the stability of the region.

Nuclear Weapons Program

In the context of its nuclear weapons program the DPRK has developed a reprocessing facility at Yongbyon that has the capability to extract weapons-grade plutonium from irradiated fuel. To date the United States’ most pressing objective has been to eliminate the possibility of a North Korean nuclear weapons capability. All operations at the Yongbyon reprocessing facility have been stopped as a result of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework is addressed in more detail during the discussion of Confidence-Building Measures.

Ballistic Missiles

Since the late 1980s North Korea has conducted an aggressive ballistic missile development program. The program has progressed from short range SCUD missiles to the early stage development of a longer range two-stage missile. The Short Range SCUD B and SCUD C can range 300Km and 500Km respectively. The medium range missile, the No Dong, can range approximately 1,000Km with a 1,000Kg warhead and can threaten Japan. There are presently two long range missiles under development, the Taepo Dong I (TD-I) and the Taepo Dong II (TD-II). Estimated ranges for these two-stage missiles are 1,500Km for the TD-I and 4,000Km for the TD-II. Both missiles are currently in design stage but once built pose serious threats to the security of the greater East-Asia region. Security motives are not the only reason for US
involvement in Northeast-Asia. Access to markets in the East-Asia Pacific Rim region is vital to the economic health and future of the United States.

US Economic Future

Asia-Pacific is the most economically dynamic region in the world. The Pacific rim holds the world's fastest growing economies and collectively is the United State's largest trading partner. US trade with the Asia-Pacific region in 1993 was over $374 billion and accounted for 2.8 million US jobs. The economist Jacques Attali predicts that half the world trade in the next millennium will occur in the Pacific Rim. The US must be engaged in this region with all its instruments of power; to protect interests, to shape events, to maintain access, and to ensure peace and stability in the region. The US must consider the regional environment when formulating its engagement strategy.

Regional Environment

As the new world order develops, the Korean Peninsula is "...the only locale in the world where the security interest of four major powers-the United States, Russia, China, and Japan-intersect." It is in this context of an intersection of interests by major powers that the US Military Strategy will be employed.

Rand- KIDA Study

Rand and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) recently completed a joint study that provides a lens from which to view the intersection of the regional powers. In 1995 Rand published the results of their study in a report entitled "A New Alliance For the Next Century-The Future of US-Korean Security Cooperation." In this report RAND and KIDA collaborated on the study to "...assess whether and how the United States and the ROK can maintain and
invigorate their security relationship should North Korea no longer pose a major threat to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.”18 Although this study foresees the security relationship beyond the scope of this paper, its value lies in its interim analysis of the regional players; Russia, China, and Japan.

Russia

Russia has expanded its political and economic ties with the ROK while at the same time reducing those ties with North Korea. Russia’s reduced military power and preoccupation with its own domestic problems have greatly reduced its ability to shape events on both the Korean Peninsula and in the region. Russia no longer presents a military destabilizing role on the peninsula and the region. But it does not present a stabilizing role on the peninsula and the region either. Russia still aspires to be a superpower; however, its internal problems coupled with its rapidly degrading political power are preventing it from achieving its former status. The current adversity in Russian affairs could easily translate into potential instability for East-Asia.19

China

As Russia’s influence in the region wanes China’s influence increases. China’s status as a signatory to the Armistice makes her a key player in any security discussion on Korea. Although its economic assistance for North Korea has been declining, China is North Korea’s principal economic supporter. China also remains North Korea’s most important political and security ally in the world. This support for North Korea is in line with China’s vital interest to be engaged in its northeastern borders.20
China’s growing economic power and increasing political influence make it a major player in regional affairs. China has ambitions to emerge as a true major power and is currently modernizing its military forces to complement its economic and political growth. China’s readiness to achieve this position via peaceful means remains to be seen.²¹

**Japan**

Currently the economic leader of the region and the linchpin of US engagement in the Northeast Asia, Japan plays a key role in the stability of the region. Japanese support for sustaining the US alliance remains strong however there is a move toward a shift in foreign policy that is more “Asia-based.” Any shift to a more focused regional policy by Japan will cause concern among countries in the region. When viewed by its regional neighbors Japan’s expansionist history into China and Korea has not been forgotten nor has it been forgiven.²²

**Regional Security Organization**

Prior to the end of the cold war the regional environment did not promote the development of regional security organizations.²³ However, in 1994 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) established the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF is a multilateral forum for government level discussions on Asia-Pacific security issues. ARF members include the US, China, Japan, and South Korea.²⁴ The ARF has the potential to play a major role in security issues in Northeast-Asia. The foregoing addressed the regional environment, the paper will now focus on the US security relationship with the ROK.
Foundation of US Security Relationship with the ROK

The foundation for the United State’s security engagement with the ROK is based on the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty. This treaty forms one of three pillars of the combined defense structure for the Korean Peninsula. The second pillar is the Combined Forces of the US and the ROK. The Security Consultative Process between the US and the ROK forms the third pillar. The US and the ROK created the Security Consultative Process to provide a forum for the discussion of major security issues. This Security Consultative Process represents the mechanism for change to the military strategy.25

US-ROK Security Consultative Process

Since 1968 the US and the ROK have held Security Consultative Meetings (SCMs) between their respective defense ministers.26 The SCM is normally held annually and is the existing structure for the development and implementation of policy to support the US bilateral security relationship with the ROK. An integral component of the SCM process is the ROK-US Military Committee. The Military Committee is co-headed by each country’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Military Committee receives guidance via the SCM from the National Command Authorities of the US and the ROK.27 The Military Committee is responsible translating the strategic guidance it receives from the SCM into a combined military strategy. With the demise of the Soviet Union the US cold war strategy of containment ceased to exist. This influenced the US to revise its National Security Strategy resulting in a change in the US security relationship with the ROK.
Leading to Supporting

In response to the changing world order, President Bush announced a new NSS focused on selective engagement in critical regions of the world. The underpinning of this new strategy was the US alliance structure with its allies. A further by-product of the new world order was the concept of a peace dividend—the US could begin to spend less of its resources on national defense. A reflection of this thinking was the 1992 report to Congress entitled “A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim.” This report stated:

Our engagement in regional security must take into account changes in the international environment, domestic political realities, and the ability of our allies friends to share responsibility in shaping a new era. Our objective is to adjust our presence to reflect all these elements.

Accordingly the US adopted a phased approach in determining its security engagement in East-Asia and Korea. This phased approach was first outlined in the 1990 East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI) Report. The strategy was one of “leading to supporting.” For the ROK this meant it would transition to a leading role in its own defense. The transition consisted of the following actions:

1991
- A ROK Army Major General assigned as senior member of UNCMAC (United Nations Command Military Armistice Command).
- US began withdrawal of troops from DMZ.

1992
- Combined Field Army Deactivated.
- ROK Army four-star general assigned as the Combined Ground Component Commander.
- 6,987 military personnel reduced (Army-5,000, AF 1,987). Endstrength after reduction approximately 37,000.

1994
- Peacetime, or “Armistice” operational control of ROK forces returned to the ROK.

The EASI required an assessment of the strategic environment prior to making additional troop cuts projected for 1993-1995. This assessment—made in light of North Korea’s continued
intransigence on stopping its nuclear weapons program—motivated Secretary Cheney to put future US troop reductions on hold. This announcement was made by Secretary Cheney at the 23d SCM in November 1991. The original target was to cut an additional 6,500 personnel bringing the total US personnel to approximately 31,000.31 To date the US has not made any additional troop reductions.

The EASI was instrumental in beginning the transformation of our relationship with Korea to one of supporting vice leading. The election of President Clinton in 1992 did not change this process. The foundation for change in the security relationship that the EASI began complemented President Clinton’s new NSS of Engagement and Enlargement.

National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement

A central thrust of the present NSS is to sustain and adapt the security relationships we have with key nations around the world. The ROK is one of those key nations. In 1993 President Clinton introduced his integrated strategy for the region entitled “A New Pacific Community.” The first pillar in this strategy is security which serves as the foundation for stability in the region. To support this strategic pillar the US will continue to maintain a military presence in East Asia to deter aggression.32

National Military Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement

The present strategy of “flexible and selective engagement” outlines three components: peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fight to win.33 The component
of “deterrence and conflict prevention” supports the security pillar of President Clinton’s strategy of “A New Pacific Community.”

**Component of Deterrence and Conflict Prevention**

Deterrence and conflict prevention is designed to deter threats to US security and interests and is the overriding strategy for US engagement on the Korean Peninsula. The US and the ROK are focused not just on winning a war, but more importantly, preventing a war. The US and the ROK are confident they can defeat an invasion by North Korea; however, the tremendous destruction that would ensue would have a severe impact on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Seoul, the economic, political and cultural hub of South Korea is only 26 miles from the DMZ. A renewed war on the peninsula would have grave second order effects on the economy and future of South Korea. The third order effects on the region could be just as grave and adversely impact the economic vitality of the United States.\(^3^4\)

The major element of the United State’s “unshakable” commitment to deterring aggression on the peninsula is its forward deployed forces. These forces coupled with the United State’s treaty commitment send a clear signal to the DPRK that any aggression on their part will not be tolerated and will automatically involve the United States. Presently there are approximately 37,000 military personnel stationed in the Republic of Korea. Their mission is to contribute to deterrence, to enhance readiness by participating in combined training, and—if deterrence fails—to defend the ROK.\(^3^5\)

Another deterrence factor has been the ROK Force Improvement Program (FIP) which complemented the “leading to supporting strategy” of the EASI. The ROK continues to improve and modernize its forces. Major areas of the FIP have been the addition of: self-propelled
artillery, counter battery radar, armored personnel carriers, advanced aircraft, and coastal defense ships. In addition to improving weapon systems, the ROK has improved its ground forces warfighting capability through the creation of more armored and mechanized units. Deterrence and conflict prevention provides the framework for other elements that build stability and security. An integral element of this strategy is Confidence-Building Measures.

**Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)**

US military forces will continue to be directly involved in CBMs to foster openness and transparency in military affairs and to prevent conflict. Confidence-Building Measures are designed to bring about an assurance of mind and trustworthiness of intentions between nation states in respect to their military activities. CBMs help reduce the threat of conflict by employing mutually accepted protocols. Properly designed CBM protocols foster mutual trust and lessen the chance of miscalculation between countries.

CBMs also employ the concept of transparency. Transparency is widely viewed as a valuable method of building trust and preventing security dilemmas among states. The premise of transparency is that when a state-A voluntarily makes itself more vulnerable to a neighboring state-B by informing state-B about its defenses, state-A does not view the neighboring state-B as a threat and is therefore is not a threat to the neighboring state-B.

CBMs are emerging as an essential means of reducing military tensions and preventing accidental wars. CBMs are not a means unto themselves, but can provide the framework for two nations whom distrust each other to coexist and even improve relations. There is an existing CBM program in Europe that has been successful and can serve as a model for the Korean
Peninsula. This program of CBMs is sponsored by the States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of which the US is a member.\textsuperscript{40}

**Confidence-Building Measures and the Vienna Document of 1994**

The CSCE administers a program of CBMs under the umbrella of the Vienna Document of 1994. Specific CBMs addressed in the Vienna Document of 1994 include:

- Annual Exchange of Military Information
- Risk Reduction
- Contacts
- Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities
- Observation of Certain Military Activities
- Annual Calendars
- Constraining Provisions
- Compliance and Verification Highlights

The foundations of the Vienna Document are CBMs with protocols designed to increase openness and predictability about military activities.\textsuperscript{41} Highlights of principal CBMs of the Vienna Document are listed below.

**Principal CBMs of the Vienna Document of 1994**

1. **Annual Exchange of Military Information**—participating states will exchange military information to include military organizations, manpower, and major weapon and equipment systems.\textsuperscript{42}

2. **Risk Reduction**—participating states will consult and cooperate with each other concerning any unusual or unscheduled military activities.\textsuperscript{43}

3. **Contacts**—Participating States will develop programs to exchange visits between members of the armed forces at all levels, especially between junior officers and commanders.\textsuperscript{44}
4. **Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities**-States will give notification in writing 42 days or more in advance of the start of a notifiable military activity whenever it involves: at least 9,000 troops, at least 250 main battle tanks, at least 250 artillery pieces, 200 or more fixed wing sorties etc.\(^{45}\)

5. **Observation of Certain Military Activities**-Participating States will invite observers from all other participating States to observe military activities when the number of troops equal or exceed 13,000, battle tanks equal or exceed 300, armored combat vehicle equal or exceed 500, artillery equal or exceed 250 etc.\(^{46}\)

6. **Annual Calendars**-Each participating State will provide all other participating States with annual calendars of its military activities.\(^{47}\)

7. **Constraining Provisions**-No State will carry out within two calendar years more than one military activity involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks or within one calendar year more than six military activities each one involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks, but no more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks.\(^{48}\)

8. **Compliance and Verification**-CBMs will have adequate forms of verification. National technical means can play a role in monitoring compliance. With in the zone of application for CBMs, each State has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating State.\(^{49}\)

The Vienna Document of 1994 provides a point of departure for the development of military CBMs for Korea. Today the United State’s primary engagement in CBMs on the Korean Peninsula is non-military and focused on the US-DPRK Agreed Framework.

**US-DPRK Agreed Framework**

The US-DPRK Agreed Framework is specifically designed to meet concerns over North Korea’s nuclear program and calls for a halt to all elements of their graphite-moderated nuclear reactor program. The Agreement also provides the framework to monitor North Korea’s nuclear freeze and sets conditions to bring the DPRK into full compliance with nuclear safeguards.\(^{50}\)

Under the Agreed Framework the DPRK has resolved to dismantle its three nuclear reactors, to dismantle its reprocessing plant and related facilities, and to halt all reprocessing of spent fuel.
The terms of the Agreed Framework call for North Korea to be provided with heavy oil for heating and generating electricity. Additionally, the DPRK’s plutonium reactors will be replaced with two light-water reactors to generate electricity. The endstate is a electricity generating capability for the DPRK with less risk of plutonium diversion.\textsuperscript{51}

North Korea’s participation in the Agreed Framework may signal a willingness on their part to consider other types of CBMs. Another factor that may influence the DPRK to consider CBMs are the dire straits that the country is experiencing. North Korea is coping with increasing internal pressure in its economy, foreign trade, and food situation. These internal pressures could spark an implosion in North Korea resulting serious consequences for all.

DPRK in Dire Straits

Economy

North Korea has experienced an increase in fuel and electric shortages between 1991 and 1995 resulting in idle factories. In 1995 the DPRK’s factories operated at less than 50 percent capacity. Economically the county is a basket case. Heavy industry, to include robust weapons production, is favored over the production of consumer goods. The second order effect of this has been a decrease in exportable items which has resulted in less hard currency to procure food, fuel, and other critical items.\textsuperscript{52}

Foreign Trade

The reduced output of the DPRK’s factories has had a direct negative impact on its foreign trade. In 1994 North Korea’s trade was at its lowest level since 1978. The DPRK relies heavily on imports for such critical needs as crude oil, coking coal, and food. North Korea has recently
placed a higher emphasis on earning foreign currency to buy much needed imports. The DPRK is now trying to increase its engagement in world markets to fix its critical economic needs. However it will require the DPRK to revamp its industries and to increase quality of goods if its exports are to attract foreign exchange.\textsuperscript{53}

**Food**

Due to a disintegrating food situation in 1995, the DPRK was forced to publicly request rice aid and loans from other countries. Before the government’s request for assistance there were widespread reports of malnutrition and increased absenteeism from jobs. This public appeal on behalf of North Korea emphasizes the severity of the food crisis and the future for improvement looks bleak. The DPRK’s arable land is only about 16 percent. This lack of usable land coupled with poor farming techniques and unpredictable weather will continue to produce poor harvests resulting in severe food shortages. To compound the problem, North Korea experienced its third consecutive year of floods which did major damage to agricultural land. The DPRK’s lack of hard currency only adds to the problem. Because of North Korea’s lack of foreign exchange it will continue to need external assistance for food. This food aid must be on very favorable terms to the DPRK or be free food aid.\textsuperscript{54} All the factor discussed thus far concerning the dire straits that the DPRK is in could contribute to pushing a fragile regime over the edge. However, the food crisis is the most dangerous to stability on the Peninsula.

Accordingly, the US must employ all of its instruments of power to ensure that the DPRK does not perceive it is being backed into a corner and therefore must resort to desperate military action. The time is right to expand deterrence measures to include the development of military
CBMs for the Korean peninsula. CBMs can complement other initiatives by lessening tensions on the Peninsula.

**Confidence-Building Measures and the Korean Peninsula**

The CBMs found in The Vienna Document have evolved over a twenty year period and provide a point of departure when developing Confidence-Building Measures for Korea. One cannot assume that CBMs which work in Europe can be templated for Korea; however, those found in the Vienna Document have stood the test of time.

**CBMs and a Pagoda Built on Sand**

Sometimes in the West if something is unstable it is referred to as a “house of cards.” In the orient a pagoda built on sand, similar to a house of cards, will not last. The pagoda must be built on a solid foundation. The framework for CBMs, similar to the solid foundation of a pagoda, must be solid and mutually supporting. The CBM framework for the Korean Peninsula consists of the forums for developing CBMs and the mutually agreed CBMs.

**Forums for developing Korean CBMs**

Three possible forums for developing, implementing, and monitoring CBMs are US-ROK, DPRK-ROK-US-PRC, and the ARF.

**US-ROK**

The US and the ROK have an existing forum, the Security Consultative System, for discussing major security issues. This Security Consultative System represents the mechanism for changes in the military strategy and is the forum for developing CBMs. The US-ROK Security Consultative System comprised of the SCM and the MCM form the foundation to develop Confidence-Building Measures.
DPRK-ROK-US-PRC

The Four Party Meeting, recently proposed by both President Clinton and President Kim Young Sam, could form the foundation to negotiate and adopt a set of mutually agreed CBMs. This forum could be the precursor to an organization similar to CSCE to oversee the development and implementation of CBMs. At first the DPRK indicated that they were not interested in the proposal. However, the DPRK may have recently changed their position by hinting to visiting US Senators that additional food aid might be a precondition to participating in the Four Party talks.

ASEAN Regional Forum

The ARF represents another avenue for the development of CBMs for Korea. "...the United States has encouraged an active ARF work program, focusing on confidence-building measures, defense transparency, and peacekeeping cooperation." In light of the US position, the ARF could be a useful mechanism in shaping the regional security environment. The foremost objective of a CBM program for Korea is to reduce tensions on the Peninsula, a phased approach is the best way to start.

Phased Approach

Three phases of CBMs are recommended for Korea. Phase I should focus on tension reduction. It should have a modest start and be designed to ensure all parties comfortable with the process. Emphasis of Phase II CBMs would be on reducing the risk misunderstanding military intentions. CBMs for Phase III would center on increasing transparency in military affairs.
CBMs listed for each Phase can be linked to other elements of power. The scope of this paper does not permit an examination of the other elements of power and their relationship to recommended CBMs. However, two examples are proposed. First, DPRK compliance in Phase I could be linked to favorable economic initiatives. Foreign Aid in the form of Economic Development Aid could be increased to the DPRK as an incentive to move forces away from the DMZ. Second, the Recognition Policy as a diplomatic instrument could be used with the DPRK. In recognition of the DPRK’s compliance with CBMs the US could reward the DPRK by officially recognizing their government by establishing an embassy and full diplomatic relations. Movement between phases should be event based vice time based. All parties should agree that the procedures used in implementing Phase I CBM have been successful prior to moving to Phase II.

**Phase I Tension Reduction**

Phase I should focus on tension reduction along the DMZ. The DPRK has the majority of its elite maneuver and fire support assets positioned close to the DMZ. This employment provides the US-ROK Combined Forces little or no warning of a pending attack.

**Tension Reduction** - DPRK and ROK-US will cooperate by moving X number of troops, X number of Tanks, X number of APCs, and X number of Artillery pieces X Kilometers from the DMZ. (Note-No specific numbers of equipment and troops are recommended instead “X” will be used to denote those instances where a specific number is recommended. These numbers will be derived through negotiation between the interested Parties.)

**Phase II Risk Reduction**

Phase II CBMs should build upon the tension reduction of Phase I but also begin to focus on decreasing the risk of misunderstanding military intentions.

**Risk Reduction** - DPRK and ROK-US cooperate by notifying each other concerning any unusual or unscheduled military activities. (Note- many terms will have to be defined and agreed upon by all parties such as
"unusual or unscheduled military activities." Establishing solid terms of reference will be vital to preclude any misunderstandings.)

**Phase III Transparency**

CBMs for Phase III would continue to build on Phase I and II but center on increasing transparency in military affairs. The following CBMs form a menu of options from which to choose for Phase III.

**Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities**- DPRK and ROK-US cooperate by notifying each other in writing X days or more in advance of the start of any military activity whenever it involves: at least X # troops, at least X #s of major combat systems.

**Constraining Provisions**- DPRK and ROK-US will not conduct within X calendar years more than one military activity involving more than X # troops or X #s of major combat systems, or within one calendar year more than X military activities each one involving more than X # of troops or X #s of major combat systems.

**Compliance and Verification**- CBMs will have adequate forms of verification. National technical means can play a role in monitoring compliance. Each State has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating State.

**Observation of Certain Military Activities**- Participating States invite observers from all other participating States to observe military activities when the number of troops equal or exceed X # and major combat systems exceed X #.

**Annual Calendars**- Each participating State provides all other participating States with annual calendars of its military activities.
Conclusion

The Korean peninsula has long been know as the “Land of the Morning Calm.” This adage expression belies a turbulent past, a price the Korean people have paid for their geostrategic location. The last war ended in an Armistice and led to a continued US presence on the Korean Peninsula as a deterrent to further conflict.

To date the US-ROK strategy for deterring conflict on the peninsula has been successful. The elements of US forward presence, combined training, and ROK force improvement have all contributed significantly deterring aggression from the DPRK. However this strategy needs to be expanded in order to continue deterrence in the future.

The time is right to augment current deterrent measures to include Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) for the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s participation in the Agreed Framework signals a willingness on their part to be involved in CBMs. The dire straits that the country is experiencing in its economy, foreign trade, and food situation could be the catalyst to engage the DPRK in military CBMs.

Three phases of CBMs are recommended for Korea with the foremost objective to reduce tensions on the Peninsula. Phase I will focus on tension reduction by decreasing military presence along the DMZ. Phase II CBMs will emphasis reducing the risk of misunderstanding military intentions by mutual notification of military activities. CBMs for Phase III will center on increasing transparency in military affairs by expanding the notification of military activities, by exchanging military calendars and by inviting military observers to participate in exercises. Movement between phases should be event based vice time based.
The US must employ all of its instruments of power to deter conflict on the Korean Peninsula. CBMs can complement other instruments of power by lessening tensions on the Peninsula. The risk in implementing CBMs is minimal when compared to the current state of military impasse; any progress in tension reduction is progress in the right direction.
Endnotes


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26 Ministry of National Defense, 111.

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30 Ibid., 19-20.

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32 Ibid., 40.


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53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 9.
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