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DEPLOYMENT READINESS IS TRULY COMMANDERS' BUSINESS

BY

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United States Army

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By

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR:    James C. Dwyer (LTC.), USA
TITLE:     Deployment Readiness is Truly Commanders Business
FORMAT:    Strategy Research Project
DATE:      13 April 1997    PAGES: 33  CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The end of the Cold War has fundamentally changed the way the US Army must deploy. Power projection now requires Army units to be able to move from post to port to theater in rapid succession. The deployments of the last six years have proven that the Army is not trained and ready to quickly deploy in support of the nation's interests. Army leadership at every level must reassess their deployment training and readiness and make the necessary systemic corrections now. This paper researches the problems and mistakes experienced during past deployments and recommends solutions that can be implemented at company through Department of the Army staff levels.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REVIEW OF RECENT MAJOR DEPLOYMENTS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMALIA</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRINSIC ACTION 2-95</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHAT ARE THE COMMON PROBLEMS?</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE COMPANY</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE BATTALION</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE BIRGADE</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE DIVISION</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE CORPS</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY STAFF</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINAL WORDS</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

This paper discusses a systemic approach to deployment readiness. It will use some of the major deployments that occurred during the last six years in an effort to discover recurring problems and mistakes made by Army units. Based on the research and combat zone experience of the author, conclusions and recommendations will be offered that apply to every level of Army command, from company through Corps. Commanders at every level must understand deployment readiness from a logistical perspective, and include it as a priority in their training and mission planning. Unless the Army improves its deployment readiness even the best of units may arrive at the next battle with too little, too late.

In the "good old days" the Cold War made deployments a rather simple exercise. The 40% of the Army that was stationed in Europe just had to drive a couple of hours from their posts to reach their wartime defensive positions. Deployments were simply convoys; easily planned and executed. Deployment readiness consisted of convoy maps and load plans for vehicles. Even REFORGER exercises where CONUS units displayed their capability to deploy and reinforce NATO forces in Europe were planned years ahead of
time. Those exercises did not test the Army's capability to quickly reinforce Europe on a no-notice basis. The Cold War allowed the Army to confuse convoys and scripted exercises with real deployment readiness. We were lulled into a false sense of security about our ability to deploy units.

The end of the Cold War caused fundamental changes in the roles and missions of the Army. Downsizing and CONUS-basing were terms that described many of the changes. European forces were downsized by over 50%, with most of the units returning to bases within the United States. To reach the "hot" spots in the world the Army would no longer be able to just drive out the front gates of their posts in Germany and convoy for a couple of hours. The ability to project combat power anywhere in the world became a critical mission for all Army units. Deployment readiness took on a whole new meaning. Deployments now involved the ability to move from post to sea and air ports, load strategic lift assets and finally transport troops to meet the equipment as it arrived in the theater of war. Deployments became and still are big business! Getting to the next battle may be tougher than the actual fight itself!
A Review of Recent Major Deployments

Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Desert Shield/Desert Storm were great successes for America's armed forces. The United States proved that it could deploy forces anywhere in the world in support of our allies. When considering the maturity of the theater, the logisticians of the Army worked miracles to get the forces in country, and keep them sustained. Even though the amount of tonnage and troops deployed during the first 30 days of the conflict (7 Aug -- 7 Sept 1990) set records; it still took over 45 days to deploy the first heavy division, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), from the United States. Nearly 7 months passed before a sustainable and offensively capable force was positioned for combat operations. In other words, the deployment was not quick!

The decision to deploy the 7th Corps from Germany to the theater stressed the US strategic transportation system. 7th Corps units were accustomed to convoy and rail deployments and they were not familiar with the requirements to move by strategic sea and air lift. In fact, the units did not have unit movement officers (UMOs) nor were they
familiar with the Transportation Coordinator Automated Command and Control Information System (TC ACCIS); a system used by CONUS units to produce automated lists of unit equipment (AUELS) containing their dimensions and weights. That data in turn is used to estimate strategic lift requirements. 7th Corps' units were forced to implement the TC ACCIS requirements even though they were not trained on the system. Secondly, the units had to travel to Stuttgart, often a four hour trip, to input the data for each company within each battalion that was alerted for deployment. The data input by the units was extremely inaccurate, and the resulting strategic lift estimate produced from the data was also inaccurate. The original estimate for moving the 7th Corps was approximately 8 million square feet of cargo and equipment. That amount of materiel was moved to Saudi Arabia by mid January 1991, the required delivery date for the Corps. However, the Corps' equipment did not completely arrive in theater until mid March 1991, after the completion of the ground war. The total amount of materiel moved exceeded 15.5 million square feet, almost twice the original estimate provided by the TC ACCIS system. The units simply did not know how much equipment that they had,
nor did they realize what was truly critical for combat operations.

Inaccurate unit data also caused the piecemeal delivery of one 7th Corps division’s equipment into theater. The unit list was so inaccurate that the strategic transportation system had to put its equipment onto 16 different ships to get it to the theater. The unit kept sending more and more equipment not reflected on their lists to port. Another unit’s inaccurate data list caused a delay in the sailing of a ship carrying the majority of its equipment. The boat settled to the silt in its loading berth due to the unanticipated weight of the equipment loaded in combat configuration. The weights of the equipment were inaccurately input into the system using peacetime parameters, not combat loaded weights. The mistake caused a three day delay in sailing and created the requirement for another ship.³ Limited numbers of strategic lift assets create a zero-sum game when estimates are inaccurate. The diversion of more assets will have a domino effect on other units waiting to move.

One final problem that plagued all units deploying to the theater was the availability of serviceable containers
capable of holding the tons of supplies sent with each unit. Most units did not have serviceable containers that would meet strategic lift standards. The Army had to contract for Sealand 20ft. and 40ft. containers. The delay in delivery of the containers often resulted in divisions deploying without the majority of their supply stocks. In many cases the stocks of supplies were shipped 30-60 days after the division’s equipment arrived in country. The lack of materiel handling equipment that could handle those containers decreased their usefulness. Many of the 40,000 containers shipped to the war were never opened before the end of the war due to MHE and documentation problems.

The Army and the coalition were lucky because Iraq did not take the offensive while 7th Corps was still deploying into the theater. The US basically had six months to deploy the additional units required to assume the offensive. Future potential adversaries probably will not give us that amount of time in the future.

Somalia

The deployment of units to Somalia in 1992, a humanitarian relief and peacekeeping mission, encountered many of the same problems that plagued the deployments to
Desert Shield/Storm. The lack of unit movement officers or poorly trained movement officers again resulted in inaccurate AUELS that in turn frustrated the strategic lift community. More strategic lift assets were required to move the forces than were originally estimated, causing delays that frustrated early planning. UMOs also did not know their unit’s requirements for ammunition or "cold weather" equipment. That lack of knowledge forced some units to deploy into theater without the proper ammunition for force protection and without necessary protective clothing. In addition to the inaccurate estimates, units also failed to properly document hazardous cargo requirements that also require diplomatic clearances for overflight and country clearances. This problem also delayed the movement of materiel via commercial charters due to the administrative burden to move hazardous cargo.4

**Operation Support Hope**

The deployment to Operation Support Hope in Rwanda and Zaire during July-October 1994 was plagued by exactly the same problems that occurred during the Desert Shield/Storm and Somalia deployments. Lack of accuracy in AUELS frustrated the strategic lift community and caused
unnecessary delays. In addition, the hazardous materiel documentation problems also caused critical delays due to the time required to request and receive diplomatic clearances. Again a lack of knowledge of basic loads of ammunition and clothing caused soldiers to deploy without the necessary protection. A main point highlighted in the operation’s after action review was that most of the unit’s movement officers/NCOs and hazardous materiel certification officer (HAZMAT officers) did not understand their functions. Some were appointed just days prior to the deployment. Finally the lack of serviceable shipping containers delayed the transportation of critical supplies until a contract was awarded for Sealand containers.

**Intrinsic Action 2-95**

Intrinsic Action 2-95 initially started as a no-notice deployment of the 1st Cavalry Division to Kuwait in response to detected Iraqi troop movements toward Kuwait. The alert was downgraded to an Intrinsic Action deployment for a task force consisting of approximately 1500 soldiers. The task force’s mission was to draw the set of prepositioned equipment maintained in Kuwait called Army War
Reserve 5 (AWR5), and deploy to the desert for maneuver training with the Kuwaiti Army.

Drawing prepositioned equipment was a new mission for the division and therefore little information was available on the equipment in AWR5. Obtaining a current and accurate listing of the equipment was critical to planning because not only does the list tell a unit what is in the set, but it also tells a unit what it must bring from home station to augment the set. Without an accurate listing, little transportation planning could occur. In addition, the division received two orders; one from Forces Command (FORSCOM), and the other from 3rd Army. Both orders gave conflicting guidance on what to take; FORSCOM’s telling the division to bring more supplies than did 3rd Army’s. The lack of an accurate listing of AWR5 equipment and the conflicting guidance given in the orders forced the division to pack twice as many air-cargo pallets as required. Receiving the accurate information forced the repackaging of all of the pallets previously prepared.6

A compounding problem was that less than half of the division’s UMOs and HAZMAT officers were school-trained. The lack of training again caused inaccurate data entry into
the TC ACCIS system that in turn effected the strategic transportation estimate. Secondly, the improper HAZMAT documentation forced the division to repack every one of the 20 containers the division was using to move sensitive equipment.

The lack of serviceable shipping containers forced the division to convert containers used for permanent storage into shipping containers, causing a 20 hour delay in the packing of sensitive equipment until the division could switch the containers around within units.7

Finally, the division noted in its after action report that the Division Transportation Office (DTO) which consists of one major, one captain and one sergeant first class was too small to handle the amount of work required to deploy a brigade, let alone a division. The section needed at least four more leaders to accomplish all of the tasks required, which included coordinating with all units and services outside the division and ensuring that units were ready when called forward to the airfield.8

Operation Joint Endeavor

The December 1995 deployment of US Army Europe’s (USAREUR) 1st Armored Division into Bosnia as part of the
NATO peacekeeping mission truly reinforced the mission that all units in the Army must be ready to deploy anywhere in the world. Even though most of the units deployed by rail, the same mission tasks were required of the 1st Armored Division as would be required of any deploying CONUS-based unit.

Again, the same problems that troubled all of the deployments discussed above plagued this deployment to Bosnia. 5th Corps decided that TC ACCIS would not be used during the deployment even though the division had done a credible job inputting their equipment lists into the system.9 The management of the entire deployment was done manually, to include the tracking of units and their equipment moving through the deployment corridors. The failure to use the TC ACCIS system caused the estimate for transportation assets to be grossly incorrect. Most units were delayed at the railheads because sufficient rail assets were not on-hand at each loading site. In addition, when the decision was made to fly units into theater because the rail lines could not handle the throughput, a credible estimate of required air assets was not available. In many cases, units would be diverted to air fields for deployment
but would wait for days for the correct number of aircraft to arrive. The deployment was not managed well!

Again, the UMO training problem hampered the division's efficient deployment into Bosnia. Approximately half of the division's UMOs and HAZMAT officers were not school trained, which caused the inevitable delays associated with the lack of proper training noted in the previous deployments.  

The division noted in its after action report, that the Division Transportation Office was too small to handle the amount of work required to move a division. Even though augmented with three more officers, the office still could not perform efficiently.

What are the Common Problems?

The deployments noted above were all plagued by similar problems. The ironic fact is that the Army, as an institution, did not learn from the mistakes of previous deployments. The type of unit, or location of the unit, did not make any difference.

Deployments are complex operations, requiring all of the resources that the deploying unit can muster. Resources and time must be invested now to truly solve the problems
encountered in the deployments discussed above. The major problems with these deployments were:

1. The entire chain of command failed to pay attention to their units ability to rapidly deploy.

2. The lack of trained UMOs and HAZMAT officers within units.

3. The lack of familiarity with the TC ACCIS system.

4. The lack of common containerization in units required to move equipment.

5. Commanders and other leaders did not know the basic load requirements of their units, to include ammo and military clothing.

6. The inability of the DTO section to manage the workload required for deployments.

7. The currency of data on the Army’s prepositioned equipment sets.

The solutions for these problems will not be easy because they involve every level of command from the company commander to the corps commander; and in reality also involve the Department of the Army staff. The next section of the paper, will present recommendations to help correct the noted deployment readiness problems.
Discussion and Recommended Solutions

The Company

The company/battery is the foundation of deployment readiness within the Army. This is the level where attention to detail must occur if deployments are to be successful. The leadership of the Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and junior officers found at this level is critical to an effective deployment.

The foundation of the company deployment system is the UMO. FORSCOM Regulation 55-1 mandates that each company appoints, in writing, an officer or senior NCO (E-6 or above), with an alternate (E-5 or above) to serve as the UMO. In most cases the UMO is a lieutenant that has that mission as an additional duty. According to FORSCOM Reg. 55-1 the UMO will:

1. Maintain unit movement and vehicle load plans. The Active Component will prepare a deployment movement plan.

2. Review unit movement plans to insure they conform to the regulation.

3. Prepare and maintain documentation needed for unit movements to include Army Unit Equipment Lists (AUEL) reports.
4. Supervise the preparation and execution of unit load plans.

5. Coordinate with higher headquarters and support activities on unit movements.

6. Coordinate operational and logistical requirements for the deployment.

7. Submit and change Unit Movement Data (UMD) as required by the regulation.

8. Maintain on file approved copies of all unit movement plans.

9. Insure the unit has personnel available who are authorized to certify hazardous material and sign required documentation.  

The unit movement plan is an extensive plan that requires a great deal of information about the unit and its soldiers, such as, maps to ports, vehicle load plans and its basic loads of supplies. The unit’s AUEL is a listing of all rolling stock and containers within the unit. The list contains each vehicle with its dimensions and weight and secondary loads. The installation’s Transportation Coordinator Automated Command and Control Information System (TC ACCIS) produces the AUEL. The UMO must go to that
office to input their unit's equipment data list. This data is in turn used by the US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) to produce strategic lift estimates to move that unit, either by sea or by air. The unit equipment list is sent to TRANSCOM indirectly through the JOPES system.

UMOs are trained by attending the three week Joint Deployment Officer Course (JDOC) usually taught at most installations in CONUS or at the 7th Army Training Command in USAREUR. The crucial problem with this course is the time it takes to get a quota for the course and the turnover rate of lieutenants with units. It may take months to get a quota in the installation school teaching the course due to the limited number of times the course is taught and the limited number of seats available. In addition, Army assignment priorities for majors and captains do not permit those officers to remain in units after command or branch qualifying jobs. The result is that most units are short captains and majors and those positions are often filled by lieutenants; causing a high turnover rate for lieutenants within units. In other words, after waiting months for a quota, the lieutenant is finally JDOC trained, but will usually leave the job within a year. The result is that a
high percentage of UMOs are not school trained because the installations simply do not have the resources to increase the throughput of the JDOC courses. In fact, over 50% of III Corps' UMOs at Ft. Hood Texas, in 1996, were not school trained.\textsuperscript{12}

The discussion of the different deployments in the first part of this paper highlights the problems that can occur with untrained UMOs. Unit equipment lists were so inaccurate that estimates for strategic lift assets were incorrect. The 1\textsuperscript{st} Cavalry Division had to repack every container due to HAZMAT documentation problems that the UMO should have corrected. A lack of knowledge of unit basic loads also caused problems in two of the deployments, causing soldiers to deploy without proper equipment and ammo. Information on basic loads is a requirement for unit movement plans; plans created by the UMO. A fully trained UMO is critical to real deployment readiness.

How should the Army solve the problem at the company level? Part of the answer lies with higher headquarters in terms of command emphasis and resources. However, the company commander must pay as much attention to his/her deployment readiness as they do to their training and
logistical readiness. Movement plans must be complete, accurate and current. AUELs must be updated to keep pace with force modernization. Being the best trained unit in the organization is meaningless unless that force can be deployed and used by a CINC when needed. Each leader, E-5 and above, in the company must know how to deploy and the requisite skills that need training. Deployment should be added to every level of command's mission essential task list (METL) and the requisite soldier tasks developed and trained.

The training issue is harder to solve at the company level. Budget cuts will probably preclude throughput increases in JDOC courses. At Ft. Hood the throughput would almost have to double to keep pace with turnover. A possible solution to the training problem would be to add the JDOC training to the professional development courses taught by TRADOC. All lieutenants should receive movement training as part of their officer basic course, and basically become movement certified upon graduation.

The normal JDOC course taught at installations is 136 hours (17 days) long and consists of five phases. They are Army surface deployments (40 hours), USAF equipment
preparation (16 hours), USAF air load planners course (40 hours), USAF CALM air loading system training (16 hours), and TC ACCIS (24 hours).¹⁴ The course can be tailored, and each section can be taught independently of the others. I would submit that the two most critical phases, Army surface deployment and TC ACCIS could be taught during professional development courses. For example the program of instruction for the Ordnance Officer Basic Course (OOBC) lasts 18 weeks and 3 days. Over 165 hours (20.5 days) are allocated to teaching the officers how to perform maintenance on Army equipment¹⁵. I believe that maintenance training could be taught to the officer once he/she arrived at their first unit. However, the deployment training is not easily taught in the field due to its specialized nature and special computer requirements. Substituting the 64 hours of deployment training for 64 hours of maintenance training would be a valid strategy to correct the current deployment training problem that exists in units today. The other three phases, which are not critical to strategic lift estimates, of the JDOC course could also be taught once the officers arrived at their first unit assignment.
I also recommend that these same two JDOC phases be taught at all NCO Advanced Courses. Those students could fill the alternate UMO position and provide needed continuity to deployment readiness given the high turnover of lieutenants.

The company truly is the cornerstone of deployment readiness. If deployment personnel are not trained future deployments will remain inefficient and costly. The company commander must pay attention to detail and check his company's deployment readiness, to include AUELS, movement plans and load plans. His soldiers' lives could depend on their accuracy.

The Battalion

The main problem at the battalion is one of command emphasis. The battalion commander must believe that deployment readiness is a combat multiplier, not just an administrative requirement that detracts from combat training. Army regulations also require battalions to appoint primary and alternate UMOs. The battalion must also have a movement plan that encompasses the company's data and battalion level specific requirements. It is critical that the battalion commander check the deployment
readiness of his companies. Including deployment readiness in the battalion commander’s command inspection program would be a valid method for checking accuracy and concurrently giving the mission the priority it needs for success.

A telling example of battalions’ lack of emphasis is the accuracy of AUELs and HAZMAT documentation prepared for deployments to the National Training Center (NTC) from Ft. Hood. After Action Reports for III Corps units all identify inaccurate AUELs as a major problem in coordinating required rail cars for the deployment to the NTC. HAZMAT documentation errors delay most trains from leaving Ft. Hood on time. The irony of that information is that units know of NTC deployments at least one year before the rotation starts.

Lastly, battalion commanders must be sensitive to the turnover rate and training problems of UMOs within their battalions. Each company must have a cadre of trained deployment officers if the battalion expects to effectively deploy. Failure to recognize the criticality of school trained company personnel could delay or disrupt battalion deployments and could potentially cause mission failure.
The Brigade

Again, the problem at this level of command is one of command emphasis. All of the recommendations that apply to the battalion command also apply to the brigade commander. Checking and emphasizing deployment readiness is crucial to the success of the brigade’s ability to deploy. In addition, the brigade commander should also ensure that his entire brigade combat team is also ready to deploy. All members of the BCT are vital to mission accomplishment, and the failure of one unit to be ready to deploy along with the other members of the BCT could jeopardize the mission.

The Division

Deployment readiness is just not the job of the division G-4, the logistics officer on the commanding general’s staff. The division deployment plan must be managed in the same way that a combat operation is managed. The commander must emphasize the importance of deployment planning and readiness. Adding deployment readiness to his command inspection program would help provide incentive for his subordinates. In addition, adding the requirement to update unit’s AUELS concurrently with the Preparation for
Overseas Movements (POM) process would ensure accurate and current AUELS.

A full-up orders process, to include rehearsals, must be initiated to write the deployment plan. The intricacies of unit tasks are just as complicated in deploying off post as in any battle. Rehearsals will pay off! 16

Divisional plans should be written for contingencies including a total deployment, where all equipment is taken; to a deployment where a brigade is ordered to draw prepositioned equipment. The 1st Cavalry Division discovered that the differences between the two were substantial and trying to branch off a total deployment plan will not work for a prepositioned equipment deployment.17 A plan must also be written that covers both contingencies. A division could be ordered to deploy a brigade to draw prepositioned equipment and the rest of the division ordered to totally deploy. That type of deployment would be extremely complicated and would require extensive help from outside the division. The timelines of that type of deployment might find one of the brigades moving all of its equipment to port before the “prepositioned” brigade would fly away.18 The Army War Reserve battlebooks must be on hand
within the division and in each brigade. Those books are critical to the planning for "prepositioned" or AWR deployments. Their availability could mean the difference between success and failure of the deployment.

The division must ensure that units that have the mission to draw AWR equipment study the battlebooks and know what equipment must be taken from home station to augment the AWR sets. The units must also know the number of containers and pallets required to take that augmentation equipment. That knowledge must be included in their deployment plans and in their AUELs. Units with both types of deployment missions, AWR and total deployments, should have two sets of AUELs that in turn could be used to estimate strategic lift requirements. The failure to create a separate AUEL for AWR deployments could cause a critical delay in the arrival of strategic lift.

The availability of serviceable containers for deployment purposes is also critical to meet deployment timelines. As described above, the 1st Cavalry Division had to use containers used for permanent storage to deploy equipment to Intrinsic Action 2-95. The movement of those containers within the division took 20 hours to occur, much
too long! In addition, container requirements will differ depending upon the type of deployment ordered for the unit. A 20ft. container used for sea deployments will not fit on a C-141 aircraft. Divisions must obtain the proper type and numbers of requisite containers needed for deployments. Those containers must be inspected occasionally to meet required standards imposed by the transportation industry. The division must plan for its container needs because of cost and availability. Failure to obtain containers now, will certainly hinder the ability to deploy in the future.

Finally, as noted in two of the scenarios described above, the Division Transportation Office (DTO) is too small to handle the amount of work required to deploy divisional units. The G-4 office, in which the DTO is located, is also over tasked during deployments and can not augment the section with any of its staff. The division commander must realize the situation and must augment the DTO with additional staff. The author recommends that the Movement Control Office (MCO), located within the Division Support Command, be attached to the DTO during deployments. The MCO consists of four transportation management personnel and would be a logical augmentation for the DTO.
The Corps

The corps can also increase the level of command emphasis given to deployment readiness. Adding deployment readiness to its command inspection program would help provide that emphasis. If possible deployments should be added to the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) conducted for divisional commanders. The author understands the complexity of that recommendation, but deployments are just as complex as fighting the actual battle and simulating the deployment during BCTP would serve to enhance the total training opportunity of the program. If the actual simulation can not be enhanced with a deployment scenario, the corps should check the deployment readiness of the division with an emergency deployment readiness inspection (EDRE). The only Corps currently conducting EDREs is the 18th Airborne Corps. However, the inspection must check the validity and currency of AUEIs within the division, a check that is not made by the 18th Airborne Corps currently in its EDRE program. 19

Finally, Corps must track the training level of its subordinate units' UMOs. The deployment readiness of its units should be tracked just like their materiel readiness.
Increasing the throughput of the JDOC schools to increase the training level of UMOs and trying to reduce the turnover of lieutenants would greatly enhance deployment readiness.

**Department of the Army**

Adopting and executing the recommendation to incorporate the movement training into the officer and NCO professional development courses would greatly increase the Army's deployment readiness. The author realizes the cost of those schools and the zero-sum game that is played with new training, but much of the materiel taught could be easily taught in units of assignment. The scenarios highlight that deployment readiness needs improvement, and should receive priority for training.

Another recommendation for the Army staff would be to automate the AWR battlebooks. Placing the data on CD ROMs and then distributing them to all units with the AWR mission, or placing the AWR data base on an interactive server allowing units to access the data when needed. Given the importance of the data and the domino effect it can have when incorrect, a live interactive data base would be most beneficial.
In addition, a method must be found that notifies units when additions are made to the AWR fleets so that units’ plans and AUELs can be changed to reflect those changes and strategic lift estimates remain current.

Common containerization is also a problem. The deployment scenarios stress the problems with containerization that plagued the deploying units. A common system of containers should be procured for all deploying units. This container system should consist of large 20ft. containers that can carry the stocks of parts and supplies required, but also smaller containers that can be used to carry equipment and supplies as secondary loads on vehicles. A common system of containers would be more cost effective (mass quantities) and would allow the existing fleet of materiel handling equipment to be used to move the containers. If each unit buys its own unique container, the shipping and handling of those containers might be difficult due to differences in size and MHE requirements.

Lastly, the Army staff should revamp its Sea Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (SEDRE) by making it a more "no-notice" exercise. Currently, the SEDRE program is
scheduled about one year out and is extremely scripted. Considering the long lead time, units have time to "stack-the-deck" and ensure that everything is perfect. Yes, there is some value in the exercise, but the value added of making it more real time oriented would greatly increase the daily deployment readiness of units. The units would have to go as they are, a requirement dictated by the Army’s mission.

**Some Final Words**

The end of the Cold War created fundamental changes in the US armed forces. Downsizing and CONUS-basing made power projection a very critical task for all services. It will take great team work and cooperation of all the services for any deployment to work and be effective. Given current budgets and future budget forecasts, strategic lift assets will be critically managed assets in the near term due to their limited numbers. A dual Major Regional Contingency (MRC) situation will certainly stress the nation’s strategic lift resources, especially if the MRCs are occurring simultaneously or nearly simultaneously. In that scenario, strategic lift will certainly be a zero-sum game. A delay in the movement of one unit will force a delay in the movement
of follow-on forces for both contingencies. Deployment readiness could and would influence that scenario.

The Army must be ready to deploy at a moments notice. The Army must be ready to deploy as rapidly as the other services if it is to remain a viable and vital tool to the CINC. Future adversaries will probably not give us the same amount of time that Sadam did during Desert Shield to deploy all the required forces into theater. The Army must simply become an expert in deploying forces from anywhere to anywhere in the world. Our National Security Strategy relies greatly on the nation's armed forces to be ready to protect its interests anywhere in the world. Our citizens also rely on the Army to be ready, but also to protect the lives of their spouses and children that they entrust to our care as soldiers. Deployment readiness will enhance our ability to fight our nation's wars and will ensure that we can get the right forces to the right place on the battlefield at the right time, that in turn will save the lives of our soldiers.
Endnotes

2 Ibid., 43.
7 Ibid., 37.
8 Ibid., 38.
10 Ibid., E-2.
12 Roger Jones, Col., G-3 1st Cavalry Division, telephone interview by author, 22 October 1996.
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