THE PEACE UMBRELLA, A VAGUE POLICY AND CHECKERED PAST

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ABSTRACT

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In the post-Cold War environment the United States is faced with a complex set of challenges, diplomatic, economic and military, for which there is no blueprint to follow.

With the break-up of the former Soviet Union, the United Nations Security Council enjoyed a greater consensus among its members in confronting aggression and participation in humanitarian and peace operations. Deploying significant military forces under the peace umbrella at the beginning of this decade was highly unlikely. However, since 1990, 25 deployments have been conducted with the majority falling under the peace umbrella. This paper will analyze current national and military strategy in regards to the peace umbrella, specifically peace enforcement, military doctrine and the case of Somalia. In addition, this paper will look at doctrine and directives that currently guide deployment of forces and the potential for future peace operations.
INTRODUCTION

"We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world. And peace can only be maintained by the strong."¹ George C. Marshall  
1 September 1945

The words of General Marshall are as true today as they were over 51 years ago. In the post-Cold War environment the United States is faced with a complex set of challenges, diplomatic, economic and military for which there is no blueprint to follow.

With the break-up of the former Soviet Union the United Nations Security Council enjoyed a greater consensus among its members in confronting aggression. As well as participation in humanitarian and peace operations.

Deploying significant military forces under the peace umbrella at the beginning of this decade was highly unlikely. However, a quick review shows from 1950 to 1989, 10 deployments from the spectrum of peace to war were conducted. Since 1990, 25 deployments have been conducted with the majority falling under the peace umbrella.²

Our senior government and military leadership continue to focus on the two Major Regional Conflicts (MRC) strategy. In reality since the Gulf War our armed forces have found themselves...
engaged in numerous peace operations including Provide Comfort, Restore Hope, and current Operations in Bosnia.

As the only clear superpower; politically, militarily and economically, the world looks to the United States for leadership. If our interests as a nation, as outlined in the National Security Strategy of the United States, remain global, then some form of peace operations are inevitable. The peace umbrella is causing consternation among our government, military leaders and people.

This paper will analyze current national and military strategy in regards to the peace umbrella, specifically, peace enforcement, military doctrine and the case of Somalia which this author in retrospect feels was doomed from the start. In addition this paper will look at doctrine and directives that currently guide deployment of forces and the potential for future peace operations.

**STRATEGY**

As stated in the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, the primary mission of the U.S. Armed Forces is to fight and win the nation's wars. This includes the capability to fight and win in two nearly simultaneous MRCs. In addition, our national security strategy employs a range of economic,
political and military instruments which focus on the primary objectives of enhancing our security, promoting prosperity at home and promoting democracy. To ensure these objectives are met, our national military objectives (ends) are sub-categorized in three areas; peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fight and win. Peace enforcement is listed under deterrence and conflict prevention.

Peace enforcement as described in the national military strategy employing the strategic thought process based on the use of ends, ways and means. However, the potential for ambiguity is created in the opening sentence. "On occasion, U.S. forces may be directed to participate in peace enforcement operations or other operations which stand in the gray zone between peace and war." This gray zone causes uncertainty in mission, force structure and definition of goals. It could also cause confusion in the application of diplomatic and economic instruments and Non-Government Organizations (NGO) coordination. (To be discussed later.)

The term peace enforcement lacks a clear definition among military and civilian leadership. Currently listed under deterrence and conflict prevention, peace enforcement is the only one of the eight sub-components of this category which includes
the threat or use of force. One might note that in Joint Pub 1-02 (23 March 1994) Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms there is no definition for peace operations. In Joint Pub 3-0 (1 February 1995) Doctrine for Joint Operations peace operations is defined as “the umbrella term encompassing peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and any other military, paramilitary or non-military action taken in support of a diplomatic peacemaking process. Joint Pub 3-07, (16 June 1995) Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War lists peace building, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace operations. These definitions are approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 (23 March 1994) Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. The definition for peace operations in Joint Pub 3-07 is “encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.”

Peace enforcement should not be confused with peacekeeping or peacemaking. Enforcement is defined as an act to force or compel observance. This statement brings to mind Clausewitz’s definition of war. “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”
How might we clarify the notion of a "gray zone"? One way is to examine the lack of military strategic concepts for meeting the objectives, which in turn reflects our resources. As an example, the case of Somalia will be considered and discussed later.

Our national military strategy employs the strategic thought process of ends, ways, and means. Peace enforcement actions may be undertaken to maintain or restore international peace and security, or to respond to acts of aggression (ends). These operations are characterized by the use of force or the threat of use of force, and are interwoven with diplomatic and economic efforts often involving both governmental and nongovernmental organizations (ways). Ordinarily in such instances, a U.S. command will be established or the mission will be conducted through a competent regional organization such as NATO or an ad hoc coalition (means).5

The ambiguity in the national military strategy is that it does not address possible strategic concepts for meeting the objectives nor does it consider the application of resources to what might be considered strategic concepts. The strategic assessment of 1996 is more specific, stating that "the military objectives are limited in nature, such as protecting safe areas,
enforcing no-fly zones and ceasefires, or compelling disarmament."

The strategic assessment of 1996 introduces the new term of expanded peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This term is used to describe the operations in Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia and Bosnia, and goes well beyond that provided in the national military strategy. Expanded peacekeeping and peace enforcement are defined as organizations which are "larger in magnitude (20,000 personnel or more), more costly ($1 billion or more), and confront a potentially more hostile operational environment," involving "more assertive mandates and rules of engagement including use of force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter."6

Among these operations Somalia proved to be both a good and bad operation. Lessons learned have allowed expanded peacekeeping, peace enforcement to become an asset to the national security strategy and national military strategy.

The inherent risk of the Somalia operation was identified by the Secretary-General of the United Nations when he said that "the United Nations did not have the capacity to deploy, direct or command and control peace enforcement operations . . . and it would be a folly to do so at the present time when the organization is resource-starved and hard pressed to handle the
less demanding peacemaking and peacekeeping responsibilities entrusted to it.\textsuperscript{7} The point is reiterated in a recent article in Foreign Affair. The most common charge about the Somalia intervention initiated by President Bush to feed Somalis in December 1992 Unified Task Force was a success. However, the operation began to flounder when the second United Nations operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) took over in May 1993 and expanded the mission to include the rebuilding of basic state institutions.\textsuperscript{8}

It is precisely in this regard that our national security strategy and national military strategy became ambiguous (gray zone) concerning ends, ways and means.

The strategy went from feeding people, nation building (ends), to disarmament and the capture of Aideed, a key leader. It became a combat operation (ways), without the force structure and weapons (means) to accomplish the strategy. Had a risk assessment been done, the concept could have been changed and the resources needed for combat provided, possibly preventing the deaths of 18 U.S. military personnel on October 3 and 4, 1993.

Somalia is an example of the consequences that can ensue from an ambiguous national and military strategy. The endstate did not come close to being desirable.
SOMALIA MISSION CREEP OR A BAD RISK ASSESSMENT FROM THE START?

Numerous sources will state peace operations should be undertaken by neutral or impartial forces. FM 100-23, (December 1994) Peace Operations, under the section Degree of Impartiality reads that, "A peace operation is likewise influenced by the degree to which the force acts in an impartial manner and the degree to which the belligerent parties perceive the force to be impartial. Peace enforcement also involves impartiality, which may change over time and with the nature of operations ..."9 Were we a neutral or impartial force in Somalia? This issue remains questionable.

The Somali people should have been able to live in unity. However, internal clan disputes and limited natural resources have caused turmoil and continuous clan fighting which has resulted in a state of anarchy.10

Britain and Italy colonized Somalia in the late 19th century. With the country divided, many of the nomads found they were citizens of either Kenya or Ethiopia. Italy's defeat in World War II resulted in Somalia falling under British military rule. Part of the Somalia territory was turned over to Ethiopia to atone for pre-war European aggression. In 1950 the United Nations allowed Italy to return to Somalia and serve as caretaker
until Somalia became self-sufficient. A unified Somalia would appear in 1960.\textsuperscript{11}

With little experience in running a western style democracy, Somalia quickly fell into chaos. In October 1969 the President was assassinated, Major General Mohammed Siad Barre became the leader, installing a Marxist doctrine called scientific socialism. In need of weapons to unite his country with the Somali areas of Ethiopia and Kenya, Siad Barre sought the assistance of the Soviet Union. In return for allowing Soviet naval and air stations on the Gulf of Aden, Siad Barre received supplies of heavy artillery. This artillery was used to help Somali guerrillas in Ethiopia battle the United States backed government for rights of secession.\textsuperscript{12}

For various reasons the Soviet Union abandoned the Somalia cause. By early 1978 Ethiopian forces had beaten back Somalia’s forces inflicting numerous losses. Eventually Siad Barre turned to the United States for help. Based on the poor economic state of affairs, the United States agreed to take over the old Soviet bases. By 1990 the United States had poured in over 600 million dollars in arming the country. From 1980 to 1990 the United States supported Somalia. However Siad Barre’s rule deteriorated with the killing of rival clans and politicians. The United
States left in 1990 and Siad Barre eventually fled Somalia in January 1991. Civil war erupted and continues today.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{THE PROBLEM OF THE UNITED STATES APPEARING NEUTRAL OR IMPARTIAL}

"Retaining the appearance of neutrality is perhaps the crucial element in peacekeeping."\textsuperscript{14}

UNITAF, the United States led multinational force, gradually lost any degree of neutrality or impartiality after the entry of forces. The following events individually are not totally damaging to the forces show of neutrality or impartiality. However, collectively they compounded the existing problems.

Initially a Marine translator serving on Lieutenant General Johnston's (UNITAF Commander) staff was the son of General Aideed, the leader of the Somali National Alliance and a key figure in the internal Somalia political struggle. The translator was returned within 30 days of his arrival in Somalia, to the United States. One must assume this event did not set well with Ali Mahdi, Aideed's archrival or other faction leaders.

Of the 21 countries that supplied troops to Somalia, Italy supplied the third largest contingent of troops, behind the United States and Pakistan as of 15 January 1993.\textsuperscript{15} Italy, a former colonial power, who had twice previously been involved in Somali politics. Italy should have been discouraged from
participating in UNITAF based on the lack of impartiality and neutrality that would be perceived. An example appeared in Newsweek; "Most people don’t want to see even a single Italian," says Abdikareen Haji Abdi, a 39-year old Somali chemist. "We will kill them with stones if they come."16

From the author’s perspective the food distribution program established in Mogadishu was unique. Most all forces participated in convoy and site security. However, the Italians were adamant about the sector they would distribute in, which coincidentially was in the general area of the Italian embassy. It was also reported in Somalia Operations Lessons Learned, that the Commander of the Italian forces had opened separate negotiations with Mohammed Aideed.17 This was an obvious breech of neutrality or show of impartiality.

"The real peacekeepers" in a peace operation are the Humanitarian Relief Organizations (HROs) that provide both aid for the present and hope for the future.18 FM 100-23 lists several sections of the close working relationship and coordination that needs to be developed with HROs, Non Government Organizations (NGOs), and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs). This is appropriate and for the most part these organizations are
the real peacekeepers. However, let’s look at the role of some of these organizations in Somalia.

The mission for Somalia: “When directed by the National Command Authority (NCA), USCINCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations and assist UN/NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under United Nations auspices…”\(^2^9\)

When UNITAF forces landed in December 1992 to accomplish the above mission and stop the theft of food, they disrupted the economy and stepped deep into Somalia politics.\(^2^0\)

We must look at the role the HROs, NGOs, and PVOs played up to this point. Were they part of the solution or part of the problem?

Relief agencies forced to hire gunmen to guard themselves and supplies were faced with demands for food and money. When the Mogadishu port was open humanitarian relief organizations paid $5,000 a day in protection payments. The money goes to “thugs” who patrol the area in “technicals”.\(^2^1\) What is a technical? A vehicle mounted with a 106mm recoiless rifle or heavy caliber machine gun. How did “technical” receive its name?
As relayed to this author by an NGO representative the NGOs listed under "Technical Expense" money that was paid for protection to the different gangs or factions. This was Mogadishu's main business. As stated by Rhodri Wynn-Pope, team leader for the relief agency CARE, "the only thing we haven't done is pay them to eat the food."²²

"The paying of protection money was widespread. The CARE team in Baidoa Somalia spent $20,000 a day on security, paying local thugs and their own guards not to attack them."²³ Is this a good example of close working relationships? A statement by Irishman Michael O'Reilly, a field director for Concern in Baidoa. "The American's never could get it right. They certainly didn't in Vietnam, and in the Gulf they left the job half done. They should have come here first, the longer they take, the worse it's going to become."²⁴ Who is the real peacekeepers? Lockton Morrissey, a tough talking former Australian soldier who runs the CARE team in Baidoa, placed machine guns around his compound and dug in for a fight. "I've been kicked out of better countries than this."²⁵

When allied troops arrived at Baidoa airport they were met by Hassan Gwelle, a former lieutenant colonel in the Somali Army and his guards who had guarded the airport. Gwelle and his men
had been paid $20,000 a week to keep the airport open. Gwelle said he wanted to work with the allies but he added, “I still expect the NGOs to keep paying us naturally.”

Is it any wonder that Donald M. Snow’s booklet, *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order* (February 1993) states, “The Americans in Somalia soon learned, for instance, that the "technicals" came to view them as the enemy.”

The above is not intended to portray all humanitarian agencies as a problem or as corrupt. The intention is to show that, unlike many of our references, HROs, NGOs, and PVOs can unknowingly create underlying problems that erode the perception of neutrality or impartiality. These consequences can automatically change a humanitarian operation into a peace enforcement operation.

In lessons learned concerning the peace umbrella we must continually emphasize the impartiality and neutrality aspect of the operation. The perception of impartiality and neutrality was not achieved in Beirut, Lebanon when the Muslim communities concluded the multinational forces had come to help the Christian forces, who were being trained by Americans. Neutrality was violated when United States naval forces fired naval gun fire in
support of the Christian Lebanese defending the high ground over the United States Marines position. The end result for the breach of neutrality and impartiality was the bombing of both the Marine and French headquarters and over 230 Marine casualties.²⁸

Neutrality and impartiality was not in effect in Somalia when the rangers went on the manhunt for Aideed which ultimately resulted in 18 ranger casualties.

The perception of impartiality and neutrality in peace operations must be established from the onset and continually evaluated with each tactical, operational and strategic decision.

FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that worldwide 27 million people are considered refugees outside their own countries, with nearly as many internally displaced. Within the last 10 years the numbers have increased rapidly because of civil war, economic decline and political disorder.²⁹

In addition, whenever refugees retain cohesion as a community they are likely to create problems for the host nation or their own country. This is evidenced in the former Soviet Union, Israel, Lebanon, numerous African nations, the southern
United States and central Europe. 30 Ironically, peace operations appear to be similar to the post-Cold War domino effect.

Stopping the "domino effect" will require timely diplomatic intervention, prudent peace operations and a revised national military strategy. Peacekeeping operations must be defined better than operations in the "Gray Zone."

One such policy that helps define peace operations is Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. PDD 25 has many tenets and presents eight factors for review when making decisions for a possible peace operation at three levels.

The first level is whether or not to support the establishment of a United Nations or regionally sponsored operation. The following eight criteria form the foundation which the next two levels build upon.

- United Nations involvement advances U.S. interests and there is an international community of interests for dealing with the problem on a multinational basis.

- There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security ... defined as one or a combination of the following: international aggression, or, urgent humanitarian disaster
coupled with violence, or sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence or threat of violence.

- There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits . . . between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

- For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping . . . a ceasefire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed.

- For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) . . . the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.

- The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and mandate appropriate to the mission.

- The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction . . . are considered unacceptable.

- The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the mission.31

The second and third levels which apply to the actual participation of United States personnel (second level) and the (third level) in which combat is likely to occur use these basic eight factors along with more stringent standards.
For the second level the following apply:

- Participation advances United States interests;
- The risk of participation is considered acceptable;
- Personnel, funds and resources are available.
- It is necessary for the United States to participate in order to ensure success;
- Clear objectives and an endpoint are identified for United States participation.
- Congress and public support the operation;
- Command and control arrangements are acceptable.\(^\text{32}\)

And, for the third level, involving the possibility of combat the following apply:

- A clear determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve the objective;
- There is a plan to achieve the objectives decisively;
- There is a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of forces.\(^\text{33}\)

PDD 25 is not all encompassing, however, it does provide a solid foundation for planning. Where does PDD 25 surface in our strategy and doctrine? PDD 25, though not specifically mentioned as such, appears in part in the National Security Strategy of
Engagement and Enlargement on pages 18-19 under the sub title "Deciding When and How to Employ U.S. Forces." PDD 25 is again referred to in the National Military Strategy of the United States of America page 9 under the sub title "Peacekeeping" and lists several of the eight factors for peace operations. PDD 25 also receives a one sentence mention in the strategic assessment 1996 in chapter eleven, page 127. In FM 100-23, Peace Operations, the only reference to PDD 25 is on page iv under "Introduction" in a quote and on page 118 under "Sources Used." PDD 25 provides sound guidance which needs to be emphasized in our national military strategy, joint publications and our field manuals for planning purposes.

LEADERSHIP CONSTERNATION

Providing a sound national military strategy policy for engaging in the peace umbrella is the critical issue. Identifying policy objectives will allow for better policy concepts which will in turn identify the appropriate resources.

Our current national military strategy is vague. This has been realized by our Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Shalikashvili) and the service chiefs. As reported in "Inside the Pentagon" 9 January 1997, the Chairman was prepared to sign off on the Joint Strategy Review (JSR). Concerns by
Deputy Defense Secretary John White over description of a need for the Pentagon to plan better for humanitarian and peace operations has caused some fear with the Deputy Defense Secretary.\textsuperscript{34}

"According to one defense official the wording for the peace umbrella operations should be more illustrative in tone than predictive."\textsuperscript{35}

General Ronald R. Fogleman, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, said the use of military forces for peacekeeping and other non-warfighting operations is a reality that should be addressed as part of congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review of force structure and strategy."\textsuperscript{36}

CONCLUSION

The reality is that FM 100-23, \textit{Peace Operations} identifies some thirty-eight mission essential tasks for engaging in peace operations. Of those, less than half are war time tasks. Certified to perform in war time does not always ensure that units can perform in the demanding peace umbrella.\textsuperscript{37}

We also must look at FM 34-130 \textit{Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield}. A further look at Chapter 6, of "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Operations Other Than War," is needed as well as the quote which opens the Chapter:
The problem is to grasp, in innumerable special cases, the actual situation which is covered by the mist of uncertainty, to appraise the facts correctly and to guess the unknown elements, to reach a decision quickly and then to carry it out forcefully and relentlessly.\textsuperscript{38}

-- Helmuth von Moltke, 1800-1891

Compare the quote against the preface to Somalia Operations Lessons Learned “Common sense suggests that the lessons offered here should be balanced against changing mission requirements and conditions.”\textsuperscript{39} I can only say common sense isn’t common and guessing in today’s environment will result in casualties.

When we look at Chapter 6, “Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,” pages 6-15, under the sub title, “Peace Enforcement,” not a word is mentioned about NGOs or PVOS. To find any mention one must refer to the section of “Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.” However, humanitarian operations is listed in the national military strategy under peacetime engagement not under deterrence and conflict prevention with peace enforcement.

**RECOMMENDATION**

To correct this amorphousness within the peace umbrella we need a “predictive” strategy. Our doctrine is well established for war operations. We know how to fight and win our nation’s
conflicts. For peace operations we need established doctrine from the strategic to tactical level. This should include tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for intervention to endstate.
ENDNOTES


2 Department of the Army, Army Vision 2010 (no date), 5.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.


18 Ibid., 66.

19 Ibid., 16.


22 Ibid.


24 Ibid.


30 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 95.

33 Ibid., 95.


35 Ibid.


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