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THE RESERVE COMPONENTS AND PEACEKEEPING

BY

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THE RESERVE COMPONENTS AND PEACEKEEPING

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ABSTRACT

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Since the end of the Cold War era United States military forces have experienced an increased role in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). During this same period U.S. military forces have faced the problems of reduced budgets and down-sizing of forces. The effects of reduced defense expenditures, down-sizing, and instability in the world has seriously challenged the U.S. military's ability to maintain warfighting readiness and respond to future MOOTW. This paper examines the effects of MOOTW on military readiness, and the feasibility of an increased role of the Reserve Components in MOOTW.
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INTRODUCTION:

The end of the Cold War has changed the global environment and threatens the future of international peace. At the forefront of these threats to global peace are ethnic and border conflicts, the spread of famine and disease, and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states. With the end of the Cold War the United States (U.S.) military has experienced an expanded role in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW's are a form of military intervention short of full-scale war, in support of diplomatic actions or with an endorsement of a collective security organization in order to restore stability to the region.¹

During the past ten years the U.S. military has conducted in excess of over thirty overseas military operations that fall under the category of MOOTW. Ten of those missions were defined as peace operations.² U.S. military forces have conducted peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Iraq Macedonia, and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai mission. The current commitment of U.S. forces to peace operations is over 25,000 troops worldwide. There is no doubt that the global demand for U.S. participation at some level in peace operations will continue. Furthermore it is safe to assume
that requirements for future U.S. commitment in peace operations will increase due to the regional instability in the world.

During this post cold war era the American public's interests have turned to domestic issues. The demand for a balanced budget and a reduction in the national debt is a common theme to many American voters. Political leaders have reassessed government expenditures and have identified the Department of Defense's budget as the bill payer that could provide the moneys needed in other federal budget areas. The reduction of DOD budget has caused a significant restructuring of U.S. military forces. As an example, today's Army is 25% smaller than that of 1990, with the combined strength of the Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Component (RC) decreasing from 1,520,108 soldiers in 1990 to 1,140,912 soldiers in 1996.3

The effects of down-sizing and the increased regional instability around the world has compounded the challenges of the U.S. military to maintain warfighting readiness and respond to MOOTW. The U.S. military's increased participation in MOOTW specifically peace operations are affecting the operational tempo and personnel tempo of U.S. forces, especially in the United States Army.
This paper will examine Peace operations, the effects of peace operations on military readiness, and the feasibility of increased use of the Reserve Components in peace operations. At the conclusion, a recommendation will be made as to the future missioning of the Reserve Components in peace operations.

Background:

The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the international security environment and redefined the roles of the United States military. During the Cold War era, the world was bipolar dividing the world support behind the two superpowers. The U.S. military might was focused on deterring, fighting, and winning a war against the Soviet Union and its allies. Today the world is multidimensional going far beyond the scope of conventional warfare. The U.S. remains the sole world superpower and is looked upon by other nations to provide leadership for future world stability.

Current National Military Strategy (NMS) requires our military forces to respond to two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) and conduct operations short of declared or intense war, including peace operations. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), titled "Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," reinforces the requirements for
our forces to conduct selected peace operations vital to U.S. national interests and to continue preparations to fight two nearly simultaneously MRC.

Most senior U.S. military leaders believe it is far more likely that U.S. military forces will be committed to peace operations rather than MRC's over the next ten years. Policy statements by both political parties have emphasized the importance of peace operations in reducing instability and limiting conflicts in this world of uncertainty.

Discussion:

The future requirements for global peace operations will continue to grow with the need to bring about and guarantee world peace. Decision makers must realize that future situations will arise through domestic and world political pressures requiring the U.S. to participate in peace operations when U.S. security interests are not at stake. Examples of past MOOTW operations that were conducted when U.S. interests were not at stake are Somalia and Haiti. Successful participation in future peacekeeping operations may well preclude the need to deploy larger forces in a conflict termination role at substantial costs in both blood and dollars later.\(^5\)
Although U.S. participation in peace operations has increased, force structure has decreased. Restructuring has compounded the challenges for future peace operations and the requirement to maintain warfighting readiness. The question of the effect of restructuring the force and the increased participation in peace operations on unit readiness is now at the forefront of military planning. The current belief among military planners is that peace operations detracts from true military readiness.

Peace experience has demonstrated contemporary peace operations are different from traditional combat operations in terms of political-military environment, operational objectives and tasks assigned to forces in the field. Peace operations are performed in a less defined environment than war. The identity of the belligerents may be uncertain. Military forces may not encounter professional armies but instead may encounter organized irregulars, terrorists, and conflicting segments of the population as the predominant forces. In most cases, military force are required to remain impartial and restrain from the use of force. The use of force may mean the difference between mission success and failure. The endstate in peace operations may be settlement and not victory. The ultimate objective is to
establish a settlement that will set the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed to establish peace and regional stability.

Peace operations necessitate military forces to engage in a more passive or defensive role than in aggressive or offensive role. Peace operations require military forces to have a totally different mindset than combat operations. Military forces must maintain restraint, remain impartial, and have a thorough understanding of the rules of engagement. Above all restraint must override the automatic response to obtain fire superiority that is instilled in soldiers trained for combat operations.

Peace operations may require forces to conduct static defenses, observation of cease-fires, separation of forces, guarding facilities, and escorting convoys. The size of the force required to perform the task may require only a company or smaller element. Military forces preparing to conduct peace operations must plan and conduct training prior to deployment to the theater of operations. The following tasks are example of the training U.S. forces may be required to trainup to before deployment to peace operations:

- Guarding facilities
- Self-protection in static positions
• Escorting and guarding convoys
• Negotiations, mediation, arbitration, diffusion of tension
• Civic action
• Providing humanitarian assistance
• Psychological and informational operations
• Civic police duties
• Logistic support to non governmental organizations (NGO)
• Civil affairs interaction in local political processes
• Intelligence gathering
• Area and route reconnaissance

Clearly, a unit that trains and performs peacekeeping duties such as high profile patrolling, occupying observation points, using negotiating skills, and knowing restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) that emphasize restraint, cannot be as well prepared for combat. Military forces participating in peace operations may degrade vital combat skills due to the difference of peacekeeping tasks versus warfighting tasks. Peacekeeping forces are not required to conduct battalion and larger sized combat maneuver operations. Most peace operations are defensive in nature and may degrade vital offensive warfighting skills. Combat forces requiring gunnery such as Armor, Mechanized
Infantry (Bradley), and Artillery will be lost due to the difference of the missions.

A study conducted by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that many of the peacekeeping forces would need to be retrained and equipped prior to deploying to a major regional conflict (MRC). The GAO report also highlighted the effects of peace operations on unit capabilities. Overall, the report estimated that it could take up to six months for a ground combat unit to recover from a peace operation and become ready for an MRC.

Peace operations do not just affect unit warfighting readiness it also affects unit personnel tempo or PERSTEMPO. PERSTEMPO relates to the measurement of time military personnel are engaged in operational or training missions away from home.

During the past ten years units of the 10th Mountain, 82nd Airborne and the 101st Air Assault Divisions have been used repeatedly for peace operations. The reason for this excessive use of these units is that light infantry units are more suited for most peacekeeping operations. The 10th, 82nd, and 101st divisions share the responsibility of performing the six month Sinai MFO mission on a rotational basis. A study conducted by the Institute for National Strategic Studies found that excessive
use of these units has eroded unit readiness through the deterioration of quality of life, morale, and retention of personnel. Continued use of the above mentioned units, can have a deleterious long-term effect on readiness by undermining training, morale, and the retention of qualified soldiers.

Peace operations not only affect the readiness of personnel and training, its largest effect on readiness is the diversion of funds to pay for the cost of peace operations. Advanced funding has not been provided to units involved in peace operations. Therefore, in order to offset contingency costs, the services must draw upon Operations and Maintenance Accounts (OMA) of units that are not deployed. This affects unit readiness by depleting the funds required for training, maintenance and the replenishment of supplies and repair parts.

The (DOD) generally agrees that recent peace operations have stressed key military capabilities. DOD is already examining various means to reduce lengthy deployments in support of peace operations and MOOTW. DOD stated that a possible solution to relieve the stress on military capabilities is increased use of the reserve components.

A General Accounting Office (GAO) report stated that making greater use of the reserve components for peace operations would
ease the burden on active U.S. military forces. There are no structural barriers to mobilizing the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve (USAR) units to assist directly in peace operations or "backfill" active component units involved in peace operations. The Department of Defense has been able to obtain reserve components soldiers it needs through a combination of involuntary call-up authority and volunteerism. The demonstrated willingness of DOD to seek and the President to approve call-up authority has minimized the need to rely solely on volunteers to respond to peace operations. Recent changes to the federal law provide the president great flexibility in activating the Guard on either a voluntary or involuntarily basis for as much as 270 days without declaring a national emergency, as long as he gives 24 hour notice of his intentions to the Congress.

The GAO estimates that over 18,000 reserve component personnel volunteered and participated in U.S. peace operations during fiscal years 1992 through 1996. The reserve components' soldiers have participated in peace operations in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. Recent studies conducted for Department of Defense have shown that the volunteer reservists participating in peace operations have been qualified for their assignments and performed well. The general consensus of DOD officials was
that the RC volunteers have proven to be accessible for peace operations to the extent they have been needed. DOD officials, major commands, and active component commands have stated they were satisfied with the quality of reserve component support. The Institute for Defense Analyses recently conducted several case studies of RC units that deployed for peace operations and gave high marks to their performance.\textsuperscript{19}

The Reserve Components provide a robust untapped resource that can be an asset to the U.S. military in MOOTW. The Reserve Components possess a broad base of units and personnel Military Occupational Skills (MOS) that could assist in peace operations and MOOTW missions. A successful example of this was the six month deployment of a predominantly National Guard and Reserve battalion task force to the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission in 1995.

In 1993, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Sullivan tasked the Army and the National Guard Bureau to provide a composite task force for the Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) Sinai mission. Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division and the 29th Infantry Division Virginia National Guard were chosen. The composite task force was 20% Active Component and 80% National Guard and Reserve. Leadership positions were
equally divided between the two components. The task force was designated as the 4/505th Infantry Battalion and would serve as the 28th rotation of the MFO Sinai.

General Sullivan selected the Sinai mission because it offered the opportunity to experiment in a predictable, low-conflict environment, with minimal risk to both U.S. soldiers and the diplomatic relationships of the United States, Egypt, and Israel. The purpose of this composite task force was to test the use of Reserve Component units and soldiers to replace or augment Army units assigned to peacekeeping missions. The U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) for Behavioral and Social Sciences was assigned to assess the feasibility of Reserve Component soldiers as Peacekeepers. General Sullivan was not questioning the capability of the Reserve Component soldiers to perform the mission, rather he wanted to identify the logistics, recruiting, training and family support requirements of the concept.

The ARI research proved that General Sullivan's concept of deploying a composite battalion for peacekeeping was a worthy concept. The National Guard provided qualified volunteers, who were successfully trained to Multinational Force and Observers peacekeeping mission standards. The home units, from which the soldiers were drawn from, were successfully compensated for the
temporary loss of the soldiers and benefited from the increased morale.  

After Action Reviews (AAR) conducted by the 4-505th leadership and 82nd Airborne observers stated, "the AC/RC composite force program works." The AAR advocated future MFO task force organization and training could be reduced from eleven months to seven. The 4-505th leadership recommended that the Multinational Force and Observers task force needed four months to organize and three months to train.  

A study conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) found that forming and training Reserve Component units in this manner is feasible when there is a specific mission whose start date and duration is known months in advance. The ARI study conducted by Phelps and Farr stated, despite the overall success in acquiring qualified volunteers, there were problems 3 weeks prior to report-for-duty date, 39% of the RC soldiers who had volunteered initially were subsequently unable to report, primarily because they were not informed of their mission acceptance early on in the recruitment process. The shortages were made up from other state National Guard units. The problems related to recruitment and volunteers reporting for duty could be alleviated by identifying the mission date early on and
keeping the volunteers informed of the mission. It would also be advisable to form the unit, begin training during inactive duty training (IDT) status which would build unit cohesion and maintain contact with volunteers.

There is no doubt that the Reserve Component units can become an effective peacekeeping force multiplier. But first military planners must identify early on Reserve Component peacekeeping roles and missions in advance to take advantage of this force multiplier. A study conducted by DOD's Task Force on Quality of Life advocated better planning and a minimum advance notice of 6 months to 1 year would be required to enhance the use of Reserve Component units.\textsuperscript{25} A valuable lesson learned by the American forces during the United Nations (UN) Mission in Haiti was the early identification of peacekeeping units who would participate in the operation. Timely notification allowed identified forces to conduct the necessary planning and pre-deployment (mission specific) training prior to arrival in the area of operations. The conduct of pre-deployment training ensured forces were ready to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of peace operations.\textsuperscript{26}

The ARI study conducted by Phelps and Farr found that although the 4-505th was successful during MFO Rotation #28,
their success may or may not apply to other peace operation missions. For example, soldier performance demonstrated under stable, low-threat conditions, such as those experienced in the Sinai, may be quite different under unpredictable, high-threat conditions, such as Bosnia. The ARI study recommended the continued use of the Reserve Components in the Sinai MFO and possible use in Macedonia. It is therefore important for military planners to identify peacekeeping missions having the same characteristics of the Multinational Force and Observers Sinai mission.

Peace operations cover a broad range of tasks and missions from peace making to peace building. A gray area develops between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. FM 100-23 Peace Operations defines peacekeeping as: "Military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents: designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlements." FM 100-23 states, it is important to note that units conducting peacekeeping missions lack size and composition to move to peace enforcement missions. Military planners must identify the variables of consent, the use of
force, and impartiality in determining mission criteria for the required forces in peace operations.

Sir Brian Urquhart recognized as the "father of peacekeeping" established a criteria that may assist military planners in further defining peacekeeping missions. Urquhart used the established UN mandate guidelines for the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF) mission. UNEF forces established a buffer zone, performed observation, investigation and reported violations in accordance with the Sinai Disengagement Agreements of 1974 and 1975. The UNEF II peacekeeping mission was conducted successfully from 1973 to 1979. This successful UN peacekeeping mission led to the establishment of the Camp David Accord and the current MFO Sinai peace mission. Urquhart's criteria is as follows:

- The level of consent of the parties involved in the conflict to the establishment of the operation.
- Continuing and strong support of the operations by the mandating authority.
- The establishment of a clear and practicable mandate.
- The Peacekeepers must be seen as impartial by all parties involved.
- The non use of force except as a last resort of self defense.
- The willingness and support of troop contributing countries to provide adequate forces and to accept the degree of risk which the mandate and situation demands.  

Using the definition from FM 100-23 and Urquhart's criteria, traditional peacekeeping missions can be identified by the
following characteristics: The peacekeeping mission requires the consent of all parties through a recognized truce or mandate. The peacekeeping force conducts only noncombatant tasks such as observation and separation of forces with the consent of all parties. The Peacekeepers are lightly armed and the use of force is authorized only in cases of self-defense. The Peacekeepers are recognized as impartial by all parties involved.

By identifying traditional peacekeeping operations that meet the criteria established above, peacekeeping tasks similar to the Sinai Multinational Force and Observer tasks can now be established. All traditional peacekeeping missions requiring forces to conduct observation and separation of forces with the consent of all parties involved would meet within the capabilities of Reserve Component forces. Current missions meeting this peacekeeping typology are: Sinai and Macedonia missions. Thus by using the Reserve Component units in performing these type of missions could substantially reduce the PERSTEMPO stress now occurring in many Army units today.

The current trend to notify Reserve Component units of peacekeeping missions on short notice should be reversed. Possible peacekeeping missions should be identified months in
advance. Reserve Component units could be selected early and begin to perform the requirements of organization, planning, and training during Inactive Duty Training (IDT) status. During the post-mobilization stage RC units could conduct unit exercises and training related to the peace operations. Upon completion of peacekeeping related training, validation by an Active Component command could take place. Once the unit is validated the unit could deploy to the theater of operations. This method could substantially reduce the time and cost of activating Reserve Component units for peacekeeping missions. The training requirements could be further reduced if the Army leadership would evaluate the current level of training and experience of the Reserve Component soldiers and use it as a baseline for training.

The Secretary of the Army and the National Guard Bureau are studying the roles and missioning of the eight National Guard divisions. Currently the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not assigned the eight National Guard combat divisions a role in any major regional conflict envisioned in DOD planning scenarios. The eight National Guard Divisions possess the ability to assemble battalion-sized units and deploy them over sustained periods without degrading the readiness of the Army’s initial reaction
elements—the designated Contingency Forces.\textsuperscript{29} The utilization of entire Guard divisions intact in MOOTW roles is not likely, however, there are a wealth of opportunities for the involvement of company or battalion sized forces in traditional peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{30}

A possible solution to the Army’s PERSTEMPO problems is to assign the MFO Sinai missions to the eight National Guard divisions. This would ease the PERSTEMPO problems of the 10th, 82nd, and 101st divisions who have been used excessively in these types of missions. It would also allow these units to concentrate on critical warfighting tasks training in preparation for future MRC’s. A study conducted by IDA found that the formation of the 4-505th Battalion allowed the Army to avoid using an existing active component battalion for the rotation and saved the readiness of an entire light infantry brigade.\textsuperscript{31}

Repeated activation of RC units could affect unit readiness and PERSTEMPO. However, through detailed planning, the assignment of peacekeeping missions could be spread across the broad base of the eight National Guard divisions thereby reducing PERSTEMPO of the RC or AC units.

The use of Reserve Component units in peace operations is a win-win-win situation: it is a good deal for the nation, a good
deal for the Reserve Components, and a good deal for the active forces. The Reserve Components become a well trained and effective force to assist in maintaining peace and stability in the world. The active component reduces PERSTEMPO stress through a reduction in peace mission rotations. The active component can concentrate on MRC mission related training and increase unit readiness.

Conclusion:

Given the continued likelihood of an unstable multidimensional world situation the requirement for U. S. participation in peace operations will increase. The current trend to reduce the U.S. budget deficit by reducing DOD expenditures may require further downsizing of an already stressed Active Component Force. As a result, those who remain in the Active Component will experience an ever increasing PERSTEMPO. The additional stress on the Active Component will ultimately have a negative effect on unit readiness, morale, quality of life and retention.

Balancing the requirements of training for combat and peace operations may be a bridge too far for an undersized Active Component force. The requirement to train for a two MRC contingency while constantly deploying for peace operations
creates a significant conflict in the Active Components planning process. The prevalent assumption that if a unit is prepared for combat it is also prepared for peace operations is irresponsible.\textsuperscript{33} Readiness indicators must explicitly measure the ability of the force to carry out each type of operation it may conduct, otherwise units may be deployed into operations for which they are unprepared.\textsuperscript{34}

Reserve Component units have clearly demonstrated during recent peace operation missions in the Iraq, Sinai, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia that they can be successful when given the opportunity and adequate time to prepare. The research study conducted by Phelps and Farr indicates that Reserve Component soldiers will continue to volunteer for peace operation missions.

Reserve Component soldiers and leaders agree that individual readiness is enhanced by participating in peace operation deployments. The mobilization process, trainup and interface with the Active Component forces provides the Reserve Component soldier with the opportunity to improve their skills in a wide range of areas.

The most effective way to provide U.S. participation in peace operations without unduly burdening active forces would be to adopt a plan to increase the use of the reserve component in
peace operations. This plan could reduce the consequences for the active component of numerous or long-duration peace operation deployments, while still allowing the U.S. both to participate in them in a worthwhile fashion and to be prepared to conduct peace operations unilaterally should that need arise.

Recommendation:

The success of future U.S. military strategy demands the use of the Total Force concept to meet the requirements of PDD 25 and world stability. Planners of national military strategy must plan to integrate the use of reserve forces in future peacekeeping operations. The Reserve Components provide a robust, untapped resource that will reduce active component personnel tempo and increase the U.S. military's capabilities to meet the requirements of fighting two nearly simultaneously major regional conflicts.
ENDNOTES

5 Ibid. 6.
7 Ibid. 35.
11 Ibid. 15.
12 Ibid. 13.
14 Ibid. 40.
Ibid. 6.  
Ibid. 4.  
Ibid. 439.  
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