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PEACEKEEPING: IS IT FEASIBLE TO EXPAND THE ROLE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS?

BY

COLONEL ARLEY J. BALL, JR.
Army National Guard

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Peacekeeping: Is It Feasible to Expand the Role of The Reserve Components?

FORMAT: Strategic Research Project


The purpose of the paper is to examine the recent history of the Reserve Components participation in peacekeeping missions and determine the feasibility of expanding their role in the future. Numerous research projects, position papers and After Action Reviews have been rendered on the performance, successes, shortcomings and lessons learned on Reserve Component soldiers and units during peace operations. These documents form the basis of my analysis. In addition, leaders from both the Active and Reserve Components have provided me their assessments of past performance and future requirements of the citizen soldiers. The paper's empirical base includes survey and informal interviews of Reserve Component soldiers and their leaders who recently served in Bosnia.

The overall conclusion that it is feasible to increase the Reserve Component role in peacekeeping missions is somewhat hedged by the requirement to “fix” the problems associated with accessing, processing, equipping, and supporting the families of the citizen-soldiers.
INTRODUCTION:

Over the past several years much has been written about the increasing number of deployments of the U.S. Armed Forces. These deployments range from routine training and operational exercises to power projection demonstrations in support of political or national interests, to humanitarian aid, peace operations and even full scale armed combat as in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Given the volatility and instability of the post cold-war, the U.S. can expect the number of deployments to increase in the foreseeable future. Unresolved disputes between developing nations, ethnic unrest and violence, wide spread violence, discrimination, political corruption, poverty and natural or man made disasters all will contribute to the increased demand for outside assistance in relieving human suffering.

Aspiring regional hegemons will continue to foster and support terrorists activity throughout the world. The likelihood of a terrorist event occurring within the U.S. borders is greater today than it has ever been. Advanced weaponry and high tech information systems are available to all, not just to U.S. allies. The increased sophistication and lethality of weapons available to terrorists, coupled with the means to deliver and the determination of those who consider themselves compelled to use them suggest plausible scenarios of almost unimaginable horror.

The world has numerous unstable situations that will require the resources of nations which have the capabilities to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies. Like it or not, the U.S. will be compelled to increase levels of participation and accept leadership responsibility for many of the existing and future operations in this arena. The Army’s Chief of Staff provides the
rationale and importance of deploying forces throughout the world. He envisions land forces as the predominant player in what he terms “preventive defense activities” that range from nation building to bilateral military contacts. The frequency of demands for land forces will increase as the Army is called upon to support peacetime engagement activities, i.e., multilateral military exercises, training, military to military exchanges, as well as crises requiring humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and peacemaking.¹

While the demand for peace operations increases, the U.S. Military has been steadily downsizing since the end of the Cold War. In the eyes of Congress and the American People, the lack of a major threat justifies the reductions of our forces. As the process of downsizing has occurred, the role of Reserve Components in meeting deployment demands has steadily increased. More and more National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers have been deployed in support of Peace Operations. Specific Combat Support and Combat Service Support skills that are no longer assigned to the smaller, more combat oriented Active Component are now available only in the Reserve Component.

Given the satisfactory performance of Reserve Component (RC) units conducting Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)² and the increasing comfort level of Active Duty senior leaders with the RC³, it is reasonable to assume that reliance on the RC will continue to grow. This begs the question: Is it feasible to increase the role of the RC in MOOTW? The question has several components and this paper will examine and amplify the four following subsidiary questions. First, is there a need to reduce the operational tempo of AC units in Peace Operations? Second, has the RC demonstrated success in such operations?
Third, does MOOTW experience contribute to improved readiness of the RC unit? And fourth, are the RC soldiers willing to support Peace Operations in the future?

In a highly competitive environment, leaders of all military services are struggling to attenuate the negative effects of reductions in force structure, delayed modernization and decreased readiness, all of which result from decreasing budgets. As an example, to prove the continued relevance of a “peacetime” force the Army leadership is now willing to embrace the missions of nation assistance, disaster relief, civil emergencies, community projects and other non-combat roles.\textsuperscript{4}

Reserve Component leaders are no less active in their efforts to prevent changes in force structure and curtail the downsizing. Following the successful participation in peace operations missions by RC elements in the Sinai, Haiti, and Bosnia, as well as the Gulf War, the RC leaders are proclamationing the virtues of maintaining the strength of the RC to conduct these missions and help reduce the demand and stress on the AC units.

Active component leaders are also interested in determining whether the RC can perform these missions. In 1994 former Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Sullivan, initiated a test program which activated and deployed a composite battalion, a mix of RC/AC soldiers, in a major peacekeeping role. A battalion-sized force under control of the 82d ABN Division was mobilized, trained and deployed to the Sinai Peninsula. Throughout the process, a research team conducted numerous evaluations of the unit in an effort to answer the General’s question of whether RC units/soldiers could meet the challenge of peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{5}
Part I. Is there a need to reduce the OPTEMPO of the AC in Peace Operations.

During the Cold War period, the U.S. and the Soviet Union generally did not participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Therefore between 1945 and 1985 only fifteen such operations were conducted. In contrast the UN conducted twenty peacekeeping operations from 1986 to 1994.⁶

The U.S. military establishment has experienced a similar increase in the number of peacekeeping missions. As of March 1997, the U.S. has approximately 24,000 soldiers deployed around the world in support of peace operations. By FY 95, the annual cost for U.S. peacekeeping had increased to approximately $1.5 billion, with an additional cost of $689 million in humanitarian aid⁷. Despite the increasing peacekeeping involvements, since 1988 the U.S. government has reduced the Department of Defense (DOD) budget each year and has continued to decrease manpower authorization within the Armed Forces. As a result, the AC has experienced not only cuts in strength but for those soldiers who remain in the military, the additional deployments have in some cases doubled and tripled their workload.⁸

A March 1995 study conducted by the United States General Accounting Office provides a disturbing picture. Peace operations have affected each of the military services differently, but have severely stressed key capabilities in both the Army and Air Force. A large percentage of certain support capabilities in the active component have been used for peace operations. Although most of the Army's support capabilities are in the reserve component, except for individual volunteers, the Army has been authorized to draw on reserves for peace operations only once. Without a presidential call up for Reserves, the Army has had to draw upon the smaller number of active forces and volunteers to meet the requirements. This situation forces
the Army to “borrow” people for overseas deployments, resulting in multiple and/or consecutive rotations for soldiers with certain skills.\(^9\)

The limited resources of the Active Component in the critical areas of Combat Support and Combat Service Support are reflected in the following table. The table reflects key assets that would be required to support a Major Regional Conflict (MRC) but were almost completely consumed by a presumably smaller-scale peace operation in Somalia. This chart clearly illustrates the Army’s problem of trying to support worldwide contingencies without the support of Reserve Component forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Unit</th>
<th>Number of active units</th>
<th>Number deployed to Somalia</th>
<th>% of active units deployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General supply company(a)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5(b)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air terminal movement control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>detachment (\odot)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum supply company</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium truck company (\text{petroleum}) (\odot)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo transfer company</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light-Medium truck company</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire-fighting truck company</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water purification ROWPU (\odot)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>detachment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perishable Subsistence Team (\odot)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(a\) - A company generally ranges from about 90 to about 200 personnel.

\(b\) - The additional unit comprised volunteer reserves.

\(c\) - Detachments are not limited to a certain number; according to Army officials, they range from 2 to 60 personnel.

\(d\) - While there are other medium truck companies for transporting petroleum, these units have particular tactical capabilities.

\(e\) - ROWPU—Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit. This particular detachment is capable of Source: Army Command and Control Agency, Department of the Army, producing drinkable water from any water source, as opposed to a similar detachment that can only produce drinkable water from fresh water sources.

\(f\) - This team deployed about 65 people.
The increasing demand for U.S. military forces to respond throughout the world creates significant stress within the military organizations. As an example, the U.S. Air Force rotates aircrews, maintenance personnel, and aircraft in order to maintain a continuous "ready presence" in theater and reduce stress on aircraft and personnel. The result is an increase in the number of days airmen are deployed away from their home base. Some Air Force personnel believe the additional stress contributes to increased divorce rates and decisions to leave the service. Repeated extended deployments could affect AC morale and retention and ultimately readiness. A senior Army General said, "while peace operations do not hurt the readiness of forces for conventional combat, they do have an effect on quality of life and ultimately on the retention of skilled service members." Not all senior leaders agree on this issue.

U.S. military forces would encounter numerous challenges if they were obliged to redeploy on short notice from one or more sizable peace operations to a MRC. Prioritization of limited strategic lift capability would be one of the primary challenges encountered in redeploying forces from peace operations to an MRC. Overburdened contingency support forces, needed in the early days of a MRC, would still be required within the theater of the peace operation to facilitate the disengagement and redeployment.

Dedication, patriotism, loyalty, devotion to duty cannot entirely compensate for the frustration of some soldiers exposed to an unreasonable personnel tempo or PERSTEMPO. PERSTEMO refers to the proportion of time military personnel are engaged in operational or
training missions. Without relief in several key areas, the Active Component force may not be able to sustain the current pace of deployments. The future only promises more of the same.

Part II. Has the RC performance been satisfactory during previous peace operations?

Deployments of Reserve Component Forces in support of Peace Operations have increased significantly during the early 1990s, and the trend is likely to continue. Although the number of deployments has increased, RC unit and soldier performance remains a sensitive issue within the U. S. military establishment. Recent research has proven that RC individual and unit level performance was satisfactory and on par with the AC during the 1994-1995 Multi-National Force Operation (MFO) Sinai mission.13 (Although the stated purpose of this test was to determine availability of volunteers to meet Americas commitment to the MFO mission, performance of the RC personnel was also a part of the evaluation.) The research clearly documents the overall success of the RC contingent and demonstrates the feasibility of using RC forces to alleviate AC OPTEMPO. The study found that the stability and well defined mission of the MFO force were significant factors that contributed to the success of the MFO unit. This test indicates that with sufficient lead time, a well thought out plan and effective leadership, Reserve Component soldiers can be provided for successful peacekeeping missions.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Deborah Lee, conducted a tour of the MFO Battalion, in March of 1995. The battalion, commanded by an active duty Lieutenant Colonel, is a composite unit of 20% Active Duty Soldiers, 8% Army Reserve Soldiers and 72% Army National Guard Soldiers. (The battalion had been serving in the Sinai for approximately three months at the time of Ms. Lee’s visit.) The U. S. Ambassador to Egypt, told Ms. Lee, “The battalion is doing an outstanding job. The only difference that I can see from active duty
battalions is that the soldiers are a little older, more mature and more resourceful.” The MFO unit commander told Ms. Lee that he had been somewhat skeptical of the quality of RC personnel at first, but had changed his mind, now describing RC soldiers as being highly motivated, effective and loyal team members. The Battalion Commander paid his troops the highest compliment when he said, “Here in the Sinai we’re all soldiers. You can’t tell who’s active who’s guard and who’s reserve.” Upon her departure from the region, Ms. Lee surmised, “I left the Sinai feeling extremely proud of the soldiers, active, reserve and guard, who make up the 4-505th PIR Battalion. They are serving America well at a remote location in the Middle East.”

The success of the composite Battalion during its deployment in the Sinai demonstrates the feasibility of using a mixture of RC/AC forces to perform similar missions in the future. Phelps stated, “The results of our research described in this book, Reserve Component Soldiers as Peacekeepers, leaves little doubt that the concept of deploying a composite AC/RC battalion for peacekeeping in the Sinai is a good idea.” Phelps’ cautions readers about generalizing her findings to all peace operation deployments. For example, soldier performance in stable, low-threat conditions, (such as those experienced in the Sinai,) may be quite different under unpredictable, high-threat conditions, such as Bosnia. This concern has been somewhat mitigated by the performance of RC units in Bosnia. Major and minor deployments of RC soldiers for the full spectrum of missions during the 1990s have demonstrated over and over again that when called, trained, and equipped, the RC soldier can perform assigned missions as satisfactorily as AC soldiers in a wide range of challenging environments.

Air assets in the Reserve Components have also made significant contributions to U.S. peace operations around the world. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve perform “real
world” missions on a daily basis as integral components of the “Total Air Force”. These part-time RC airmen enable the active Air Force to conduct missions and meet world-wide requirements that would not be possible without their support.

A great example of this type service was provided in 1994 by the 175th Rainbow Detachment from the Maryland Air National Guard. Consisting of twelve A-10 aircraft and the required personnel, half from the Air National Guard and half from the Air Force Reserve, the detachment was a composite unit of RC airmen. The 175th Rainbow Detachment was part of Operation Deny Flight conducted by NATO to monitor compliance with the UN imposed no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Acting on NATO orders on 5 Aug 1994, two Air Guard A-10 pilots conducted an attack on Bosnian Serb positions near Sarajevo in retaliation for Serbian provocation, including the seizure of four armored vehicles from a UN compound. Using their 30mm cannon, they fired on and destroyed a Serbian tank. This first use of NATO air power was conducted by RC airmen. The success of that initial combat mission and the entire Rainbow Detachment concept illustrates how Reserve volunteerism can help the active component in periods of scarce resources and increasing demands. In addition to the A-10s, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve also operated KC-130 aircraft out of bases in Italy and southern France to refuel the fighters going to and from the Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their performance has been equally successful.

Of this mission, Brinkerhoff captures the essence of RC performance when he writes, “Responsibility was delegated to the 175th Fighter Group to plan, coordinate, organize, and carry out this mission. Colonel Thilly, the 175th commander, and his staff did not have a horde of
active Air Force people hovering over them, trying to be helpful, giving orders and generally
getting in the way. The most striking feature of this operation is that it was so routine. The
total project was handled from conception to redeployment as a military operation handled in a
military manner by military people. The fact that the personnel involved were guardsmen or
reservists serving voluntarily on active duty seemed not to be important or relevant.”

The other services, Navy, Marines, and Air Force have demonstrated a greater degree of
willingness to use their RC forces than the Army. An example of their willingness to use the RC
during a critical combat situation occurred during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The Marines
activated a Reserve Tank Battalion and deployed it as a part of their lead element during the
breech of the Iraqi defenses on the southern border of Kuwait. The Battalion, deployed intact,
completed all required tasks during each phase of the combat operation and one of its companies
was credited with the largest number of “kills” in the Marine Corps area of operation. Recently,
the Marine Corps Commandant stated in response to a question concerning Reserve Component
readiness that, “the reserves are given the mission of being prepared for deployment at any time
and they can expect to be deployed accordingly.” Because of this willingness to integrate the
force, the other services are well ahead of the Army in fostering the mutual trust that must be
present for the Total Army concept to move beyond the concept stage. The argument that the
Army RC leadership is weak and therefore not capable of planning or executing complex
missions in a challenging environment is not supported by empirical evidence. RC soldiers
clearly have demonstrated they are capable of doing the job in war or peace.
Part III. Does peace operation deployment have a positive effect on readiness?

Unit readiness is almost by definition affected by deployment. A deployment exercise, NTC rotation, or contingency deployment provides vital experience to members and units. Although each deployment is a unique event, the cumulative effect on readiness is positive.\textsuperscript{19} Family member briefings, family support activities, employer interactions and public affairs issues all improve as a result of the activation, whether it is for training, natural disasters, civilian emergencies or active duty in support of war or peace.\textsuperscript{20}

As units became more aware of the expectations and the likelihood of their activation, additional effort/attention is directed to maintaining equipment at higher levels of readiness. Unit status reports became an item of interest to the chain of command and response to issues that decrease unit readiness are addressed with renewed vigor. In addition, realizing how critical specific units are to mission success whenever an event occurs, the Active Component, especially the Army, begins to play a larger, more positive role in improving the overall readiness of the Reserve Components.\textsuperscript{21}

In the broadest sense, all of this activity leads to improved readiness status of the Reserve Component. As the Reserve Component absorbs a larger percentage of the Army’s “go to war” capability, especially in Combat Support and Combat Service Support, the additional emphasis on readiness has paid dividends at both the individual and unit levels.

A 1996 study provided substantial empirical support to this assertion. It found that the MFO mission in the Middle East resulted in clear perception among Reserve Component soldiers and leaders that readiness is improved as a result of such deployment. Prior to the deployment,
senior RC leaders were skeptical about the effect peace operations would have on individual training. However, by the time the mission was over and the peacekeeping volunteers had returned to their units, 72.7% of senior RC leaders reported that the volunteers returned better trained. Additionally, senior leaders also reflected a shift in their perception of the impact on combat readiness, with well over a third reporting a positive impact on the combat readiness of their units after deployment.

The impact on individual and unit morale also was very positive. Most senior RC leaders reported the peacekeeping volunteers returned with enhanced morale. About one third of the leaders reported an increase in morale within their units while the peacekeeping mission was in progress. Virtually all of the senior RC leaders, (and over 90% of junior leaders/soldiers) thought that participation in the peacekeeping mission was a good idea and endorsed future participation in similar missions. One officer’s comments were illustrative:

“I do not feel the temporary loss of the peacekeeping mission soldiers had any impact on the type or quality of the unit’s training during the past year. The positive impact on our combat readiness that I indicated in this survey, I feel, results from the psychological effect the peacekeeping mission has had on all of our soldiers. This was the first time that these Guardsmen have been given this opportunity to serve. Even for those that did not volunteer to go to the Sinai, there is a sense of pride that members of this unit and this division were called upon to perform a real world mission. This makes them feel more a part of the total Army, and there is an increased chance that they could be called to active service in defense of our national interests. Overall, I feel that this is a good mission for the Guard, and should be “fine tuned” with lessons learned, and continued in the future.”

The results of the study indicate that RC soldiers and units participating in real world deployments gain valuable experience and first hand knowledge of what it takes to be successful in a demanding environment. Such deployments seem to improve morale and unit and individual proficiency.
The foregoing observations must be balanced with less positive findings. Additional useful insights into the ramification of employing RC assets in peace operations came from interviews in 1997 of RC soldiers in West Virginia Army National Guard units which had recently returned from a deployment to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor. These interviews demonstrated that unwise choices in the deployment of RC elements can negatively impact parent unit readiness.

Significantly, both soldiers and leaders strongly believed that readiness and morale of their unit decreased as a direct result of activating a small detachment rather than the whole unit. The Commander was adamant in his view that deploying only part of a company sized unit eliminates any possibility of attaining and/or maintaining the required level of unit readiness. Soldiers were confused as to why some personnel were activated and others were not, they questioned the validity of the unit’s mission if only a portion of the unit were required to deploy. With the deployment of the senior leadership, the non-deployed soldiers were not capable of continuing an effective training program. For all practical purposes, the unit was ineffective during the deployment.

When questioned about the readiness of those who deployed, the leaders strongly believed that individual skills improved during the deployment. Eight out of twelve deployed soldiers who answered the survey agreed that individual readiness was enhanced. However, apparently due to the partial unit deployment, nine out of twelve informants thought that nondeployed parent unit readiness was degraded, this view was shared by the commander and his executive officer.
Soldiers and their leaders strongly believe that individual readiness is improved substantially regardless of whether the soldier deploys with his/her unit, with another unit or as part of a small detachment from the parent unit. However, soldiers and leaders perceive that if detachments are deployed out of parent units, readiness of those parent units is significantly degraded during the deployment and for a substantial period of time after redeployment.

Based on my analysis of the survey data, and my own discussions with soldiers who have deployed on peace operation missions, it is apparent that many common soldier skills are enhanced and soldiers and their leaders feel that individual readiness is improved. However, certain individual and collective combat tasks are seldom exercised and consequently degraded.26

Part IV: The soldiers perspective. Are they willing to support Peace Operations?

During the author’s informal interviews with the soldiers from the 152d MP Det, several key areas were addressed in an effort to determine attitudes toward peace operations and individuals’ willingness to support future deployments. Soldiers were asked to evaluate their pre-deployment training, both unit drill periods and post mobilization, and the transition process from the reserve status to active duty. Additionally, they were asked if the deployment affected the decision to reenlist, if respondents would volunteer for similar missions in the future, if their employer were supportive, and if they considered peacekeeping a viable mission for the Reserve Component forces.

- A bare majority responded that pre-mobilization training did not prepare them for their peacekeeping role.
- A larger majority indicated that employers were supportive of the previous deployment but additional future missions could have a negative effect on their job.
• A substantial majority indicated that the deployment did not have a negative effect on their decision to reenlist. (Six are reenlisting, three are not, one is retiring and three were not sure)

• A strong majority of those soldiers who deployed, (and those who did not) felt that peace operations were viable missions for the Reserve Component forces.

Research conducted by Phelps and Farr suggested that a parent unit’s performance may be related to the extent of the troop loss due to a peace operations deployment. Senior leaders who reported a negative impact on readiness seemed to reflect units with a relatively large percentage of troop loss, whereas those reporting positive impact on readiness experienced a relatively small percentage of troop loss. This finding was supported by interview with the leaders of the 152d MP Detachment and the author’s observations of that unit.

In the unit interviewed by the author, unit cohesion still was a problem even though the detachment had returned from Bosnia some six months prior to the interviews. During my visit, I observed a clear distinction between those who had deployed and those who had not. This was not only an apparent emotional separation, but also a physical separation of the two groups. Unit members separated themselves (whether consciously or not) during informal periods such as breaks and lunch as well as during the introductory briefings and group discussions. The soldiers did not feel the unit had regained the team spirit or level of readiness it experienced prior to the deployment.

Based on the findings of the interviews, the soldiers of the 152d MP Detachment strongly believed that they had completed a successful mission and were rightfully proud of their
accomplishment. However, several issues caused them considerable problems during the deployment. These are addressed here in turn.

The doctrinal mission of the detachment is to operate a theater level Prisoner of War Information Center, responsible for receipt, processing, maintenance, dissemination and transmittal of required information and data relating to enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees. Because the NATO forces in Bosnia have not taken prisoners or detained civilians, the unit did not have a mission when it arrived in Bosnia. After a period of debate, discussion and confusion, the unit was assigned the responsibility of supporting the U.S. contingent with force protection, base security and civilian access control at the thirty military bases maintained by the U.S. force (Task Force Eagle).

Unit members strongly believed that the assignment of a non-doctrinal mission was inappropriate. The mission could have been performed by other active duty MP units already in the Theater and the RC mobilization was unnecessary. The After Action Review conducted by the detachment addresses this issue in detail. It offers the following recommendation: “Do not activate reserve units unless they are needed to perform missions that active units cannot perform. The Army could have saved money and resources by not activating an unneeded reserve unit.”

Interoperability of equipment was a key problem that caused considerable stress for the unit in trying to interact effectively with Active Component units. A lack of compatible signal equipment eliminated the detachment’s ability to communicate during critical convoy operations and other high risk situations. Incompatibility of computer hardware and software was another major concern. The unit received training on one computer system and, upon deployment, was
issued a different system. Although the new equipment was an improvement, it delayed the unit's ability to perform effectively upon arrival in the theater. Soldiers expressed concerns that given the unanticipated mission to move throughout region assigned to the U.S. contingent, their organic vehicles and weapons were inadequate given the level of threat. Nothing was done to improve the unit's self-defense capability. Fortunately, the unit was not tested in a violent confrontation.

The deployment process was another "hot topic" for the soldiers of the 152d MP Det. Unnecessary processing and poor movement management created significant delays for the unit. Redundancy in training and certification tasks required the soldiers to perform the same tasks/events numerous times. Communication between agencies, and unwillingness by AC authorities to accept previous test/certification results were major contributors to confusion and delays.  

In many cases, the Active Component personnel responsible for in-processing and sustaining Reserve Component units were not adequately trained, they were ill-prepared to provide proper support in logistics and personnel matters. Deployed RC soldiers found it difficult to obtain basic office supplies and equipment, replacement parts and other essential items. Important personnel actions related to promotion and awards did not occur. The concept of "One Army" was lost in the bureaucracy and soldier morale and enthusiasm suffered. Given these issues I was somewhat surprised by the high number of soldiers (75% of those interviewed) who said they would volunteer for future missions.

Similar responses to those of the 152d MP Det were given by RC soldiers of the composite MFO Sinai Battalion when asked about their willingness to volunteer for future peace
operations. Although responses of the Reserve Component Soldiers in the MFO Sinai mission generally were more positive that the Active Component Soldiers, soldiers of all components expressed some unhappiness with these missions. Phelps and Farr, who studied the MFO Sinai mission midway through it’s deployment, found particularly large declines in job satisfaction, career intentions and willingness to volunteer for future similar missions. They stated, “Although there were a few positive comments written on the surveys, most of them were negative. Among these negative comments, we found a great many complaints about inadequate or misleading communication from the Army as well as accusations of outright lying. At least from the standpoint of many of the deployees, they had been misled or misinformed before and during the deployment.” These perceptions led to the precipitous declines found on some of the survey variables.\textsuperscript{31}

An important aspect of any deployment is the family support system. Soldiers and their families must be assured, regardless of the mission, that essential support is available to the family during the soldier’s absence. A deployment has a powerful effect on the family unit. Reserve Component families are more susceptible to the negative effects of deployment than their Active Duty counterparts. Some RC families never fully appreciated or acknowledged the fact the family member could experience a mobilization. RC families are not clustered in a contiguous community like the Active Components, nor do most of them live near a military facility where support is readily available. In addition, they have not had the experience of dealing with military systems, and are therefore somewhat reluctant to access and use the support available. Given these circumstances, it becomes even more critical to the Reserve Component families for the military to establish a user friendly pro-active system of family support.\textsuperscript{32}
Provided with a positive pro-active family support system, families can endure the additional stress created by deployment in most cases. Given the assurance that their families are well supported, the soldiers can concentrate on the mission and not be over burdened by fears of their families' inability to handle the day to day issues or occasional crisis that may occur in their absence. Knowing that lines of communication are open, and that support is available in case of an emergency, reduces the stress on both the soldier and the family members.33

Good support can help soldier morale and family adaptation to deployments. It cannot "fix" marriages or change the fact that deployments are hard on couples and their children.34 However, effective family support can make a difference in the families' ability to cope with the deployment and thus impact favorably on the soldiers' willingness to accept future deployments.

In the MFO Sinai Mission case, the family support system was rated as overall satisfactory, although not all components of the system were satisfactory. The Family Support Handbook, developed by the Family Assistance Officer, was acceptable for the AC families, but did not address issues related to the widely dispersed RC families. The establishment and use of a toll-free telephone was not accomplished until late in the deployment, which limited its effectiveness. The most positive aspect of this family support group was the Family Assistance Officer who worked tirelessly to ensure families were supported and their needs met on a timely basis.35

Most Reserve Component units have a functioning Family Support Group backed up by a State Family Support Coordinator who is responsible for coordinating and assisting them with issues and problems that have not been addressed in the Family Support Guide/Handbook. The 152d MP Det has a strong family support group, which had operated during Desert Shield/Desert
Storm and was well equipped to handle any situation that occurred during the Bosnia deployments. The unit’s experience in this important area had a significant impact on the soldiers’ belief that their families would be supported. This had a significantly positive effect on soldiers’ willingness to accept future deployments.36

**Part V: Conclusions and Recommendations.**

**Conclusions.** What follows is an assessment drawn from current research and feedback from soldiers who have experienced the rigors of peace operations. Despite some problems, expanding the role of the Reserve Component is indeed feasible and possibly critical to the future success of the Active Component forces. Recent deployments provide significant evidence that RC soldiers and units perform competently in crisis situations. Individual RC soldiers indicate a willingness to continue participating in future peace operations. Senior leaders of the RC forces appear ready to prepare soldiers and units for deployments in support of (or in lieu) of AC forces.

Concerted efforts on the parts of the AC and RC leadership to resolve the issues related to mobilization, training, equipping, deployment and family support are required to alleviate some of the problems identified during the previous deployments. For instance, if deployments continue to feature the use of RC volunteers, the conditions, opportunities and benefits of volunteering need to be spelled out in advance, standardized and presented in writing to all volunteers, regardless of their component, unit or location.37 Lip service alone will not work. Soldiers and their families must be assured that they are important and that their leaders care about the problems they face.

**Recommendations.** The employment of RC units and individuals in peace operations is no longer a novel development. The experience to date provides sufficient basis for several changes
which could significantly enhance the value of the RC contribution. First, a comprehensive plan should be developed for identifying, training, mobilizing, deploying and supporting RC soldiers conducting peace operations. The system must be multifaceted to take advantage of the large pool of volunteers readily available in the RC. It should utilize the appropriate TOE units on a systematic scheduled basis. There are at least two significant recurring peace operations missions (the MFO and Macedonia) that could be placed on RC long range planning calendars. Actual units could be provided on a rotating state by state basis. This would provide not only the long lead time required for train-up but also focus the training prior to deployment.

Pre and Post Mobilization training must be carefully restructured to eliminate redundancy and reduce the amount of “dead time” in the process and provide realistic mission oriented training. Training plans should be relevant to the mission, focus on soldier and leader tasks, and enhance the security and survivability of the unit. This must be a coordinated effort on the part of both the RC and AC planners/trainers in order to ensure comprehensibility and elimination of unnecessary or redundant training. Early involvement of the personnel who are responsible for the mission, i.e. Task Force Commander, the appropriate staff proponent, the Commanders representative, and/or the receiving unit, must be play an integral role in the mobilization and deployment of a RC unit. They must identify the type unit or soldier skills required, the mission to be performed and the equipment required. Without a significant level of involvement of these “agencies” in the process, confusion abounds, units/soldiers are not properly trained or equipped and general disappointment prevails. Some standardization of the required training can be accomplished due to the common skills and levels of training required for any soldier or unit. However, a “cookie cutter approach” should be avoided due to the uniqueness of each mission.
Upon identification of the mission and the soldiers/unit, the planners must develop a plan specifically tailored for those soldiers/units.

With regards to equipment, force protection and interoperability are unquestionably the most critical issues to be resolved. Electronic and signal equipment must be upgraded where required, and time provided in the training plan to develop proficiency on new equipment.

It would be extremely beneficial to assemble a “focus group” of soldiers, leaders (both AC and RC) and researchers who have experience from previous deployments. Augmenting this group with family members and representatives of the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve at specific junctures would be beneficial to the process and could significantly reduce friction in these critical areas. This team should be charged with synthesizing the lessons learned from the previous deployments and developing the framework for a planning process which could be used by future planners and trainers responsible for the deployment of a RC force. This approach would incorporate all members of the “team” responsible for the successful deployment of Reserve Component forces conducting peace operations. It should charge them with the responsibility for a comprehensive plan that would reduce or eliminate the barriers to using these forces.

Army Vision 2010 provides support for these recommendations by noting that we have not had the exact Army we needed when we needed it. Yet, we built an Army with a core set of capabilities and infused it with the agility and flexibility to adapt to domestic or international demands as they arose. The future will demand more…the modality of agility will be even more essential to our ability to adapt to a dynamic strategic environment.
It is apparent that the Active Component cannot achieve this goal alone. The Reserve Component forces must be leveraged to provide mission support on a daily basis as members of the Total Army structure. The availability, accessibility and willingness of the Reserve Component forces to serve in times of peace and war must be used to enhance the Army's ability to respond as the decisive military instrument of the world's only super power. It is time for an increased role for the citizen soldiers.\textsuperscript{39}
ENDNOTES

1 Army Vision 2010, Department of the Army, Wash, D.C., 1996, 3.
4 Conflict Containment, Reassurance, Core Security and Humanitarian are outlined as 'redefined missions in a changing world' under the heading of Full Spectrum Capabilities, Army Vision 2010, Department of the Army, Wash, D.C., 1996, 8.
7 Ibid., 129.
8 United States General Accounting Office, PEACE OPERATIONS: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts, Report to Congressional Requesters, March 1995, 22, 23.
9 Ibid., 17, 20, 22.
10 Ibid., 27.
12 Some senior Army officials have expressed concern that participating in peace operations may degrade combat unit readiness for combat operations because of the inability to practice certain individual and collective wartime skills.
17 Ibid., 14.
18 GEN Krulak, in a speech at the Army War College, 1997.
19 Personal experience of the author as member of the RC who has been mobilized and deployed numerous times during my career.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 431.
25 A detachment of seventeen soldiers of the 152d MP (PWIC) Company was activated and deployed to Bosnia as part of IFOR. Among those deployed was the Commander, Operations Officer and the senior NCOs. The remainder of the 53 person unit was not deployed. The detachment was activated on 17 Dec 95, deployed on 5 Jan 96 and was released from active duty in July 1996.
28 Department of the Army, After Action Review, 152d MP DET (PWIC), Task Force Eagle, Tuzla, Bosnia, 1996, 7.
29 Ibid., 9, 10.
30 Author's interviews of 152d MP DET (PWIC) soldiers who deployed to Bosnia for Operation Joint Endeavor, (Feb 8, 1997)
32 Authors personal experience as a member of the RC.
33 Ibid.
36 Interviews of 152d MP DET (PWIC) soldiers who deployed to Bosnia for Operation Joint Endeavor, (Feb 8, 1997)
38 Ibid., 9.
39 Ibid., 443.
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